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SURROGATE DIPLOMACY: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S
PERSONAL ENVOYS, 1941-1945.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973
History, modern

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

SURROGATE DIPLOMACY: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S

PERSONAL ENVOYS, 1941-1945

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAMES HERBERT LAZALIER

Norman, Oklahoma

1973

SURROGATE DIPLOMACY: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S
PERSONAL ENVOYS, 1941-1945

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When I arrived at the University of Oklahoma, I carried a fair amount of Eastern Oklahoma parochialism. For their sincere encouragement and advice in broadening my perspective of history, I would like to thank Dr. Donald J. Berthrong and Dr. Arrell M. Gibson. I owe special debts to Dr. Sidney D. Brown and Dr. Rufus G. Hall for their constructive criticism of the dissertation. For his selflessness and friendship throughout these years-- I thank you Dr. Phillip H. Vaughan, and because his humanizing qualities have influenced me more than he can realize, I remain indebted to Dr. David W. Levy. Since his patience with my stylistic lapses has endured beyond that of Job, I can only express my deep and sincere appreciation to my chairman, Dr. Russell D. Buhite. To my parents, Mr. and Mrs. H. C. Lazalier, I can only hope that this work will in part compensate for a debt that can never be fully settled. Finally, to my wife Louise, for her patience, understanding, and forbearance, my deepest gratitude.

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INTRODUCTION

In one of Upton Sinclair's Lanny Budd stories, a fictional President Roosevelt exclaimed to Budd, his Personal Representative to China: "Hi Marco Polo.... By golly, I can't tell you how I have missed you." Sinclair's Presidential Mission is of course fiction and his characters somewhat overdrawn, but his description of the affable and politically artistic Roosevelt is accurate; moreover, the characterization of Lanny Budd as a Presidential agent emphasizes one of the most consistent features of Roosevelt's administration: the use of the "Personal Representative" to implement foreign policies.

Traditionally, ambassadors and ministers have served as presidents' representatives, but their responsibilities have centered on the day-to-day relations with a particular country and are generally guided by the State Department. The Personal Representatives were unique, however, as they remained free from the official encumbrances and operated under instructions received directly from the White House. Further, the agents were not recommended to the United States Senate, nor did they receive confirmation from it.

The urgent nature of the war, the distrust of the bureaucracy, and Roosevelt's belief that his methods for success on the domestic political level--the direct personal approach--would easily transfer to the international stage prompted Roosevelt to select several individuals to serve as his Personal Representatives. Most of these agents were New Deal politicians who lacked the diplomat's training and experience, but Roosevelt believed that the deficiency could be easily remedied by receiving instructions from the White House and reporting directly to the President. The agents included his personal adviser Harry Hopkins; New Deal economist Lauchlin Currie; politicians Joseph Davies, Louis Johnson, Patrick Hurley, Wendell Willkie and Henry Wallace; businessmen Myron Taylor, W. Averell Harriman, and Donald Nelson; and public servants William Phillips and Robert Murphy.

This study seeks primarily to determine the value of Roosevelt's wartime diplomacy as implemented by his personal representatives. Since Roosevelt's preference for such extreme personal control of foreign policy was, in part, an overt demonstration of his lack of faith in the State Department, this study considers the impact of such an approach on that agency. Roosevelt's willingness to risk the alienation of his own foreign office is not surprising when one considers that the wartime imperatives created special circumstances in which the end often justified the means.

To Roosevelt, the larger objective of his diplomacy was twofold: to maintain the alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia at all costs and to enhance his own image in the eyes of the American public. He felt that the personal approach was the only effective manner in which both of these objectives could be met simultaneously.

Aware of the high esteem in which the President of the United States is held by foreign officials as well as by the American people, Roosevelt saw the dramatic value that could be gained from dispatching the surrogate diplomats directly from the White House. If Roosevelt had any doubts about the practicality of implementing his program of Personal Representative diplomacy, they were completely assuaged by two additional important considerations. He could use the missions to pay political debts, and he could also remove from contention certain political aspirants and other "undesirables." Of course, much of the following discussion is devoted to the missions themselves, the roles of the individual agents, and their success or failures.

Since the emphasis of this study is on Roosevelt's Personal Representative diplomacy rather than his overall wartime foreign policies, I have excluded from consideration the Allied summit conferences. That aspect of World War II international relations was the ultimate in Roosevelt's personal approach to American foreign policy; and he reserved that activity for himself.

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DECISION MAKING: ROOSEVELT, HULL,
AND THE "STRIPED-PANT SET"

CHAPTER I

While the main thrust in Franklin Roosevelt's control of foreign policy emerged during the war years, the habit of close personal supervision appeared throughout the twelve years he served as President. A major characteristic of New Deal decision-making in foreign policy was Roosevelt's disdain for the State Department and his unwillingness to view the Department as anything more than a clerical agency. Although the President often sought out the advice of experts for solving domestic problems, he virtually ignored the expertise available in his own State Department--an approach which became commonplace in Roosevelt's conduct of American foreign policy.

Some observers of the Roosevelt administration noted the "inherently disorderly nature" of the New Deal and the "constant readiness for internecine strife" among Roosevelt's subordinates, but explained them as the President's ways of testing and developing the abilities of his underlings. One must conclude, however, that his approach in the area of foreign policy was designed not so much as a

means of evaluating his apprentices as a method of controlling foreign policy. By spreading responsibility for one area between two or more men, Franklin Roosevelt assured himself of a position at the center of the decision-making process. This resulted in his receiving diverse views about American foreign policy--views ranging from politicians' recommendations, which were often influenced by the voter's shadow, to the detached reports of professional Foreign Service Officers who often described conditions and proposed policies regardless of their impact on the public. Finally, the President's method of conducting diplomatic affairs became a means by which he could control and at the same time avoid using the State Department. The President's unwillingness to use the State Department and his consistent criticism of it reflect a deeply traditional and provincial American attitude toward foreign policy and the professional career diplomats. First, the nation's isolationist background prompted Americans to eye suspiciously a group that spent its time developing policies for carrying on social, economic, and political intercourse with the very outsiders that the American people sought to avoid. Second, from the early days of the republic, Americans viewed diplomatic negotiations as a waste of time--filled with too much talk, and not enough of the shirt-sleeved action that best illustrated America's national virility. Thus, Roosevelt believed

that a professional staff not accountable to the public, especially the dilettantes and striped-pant career men in the State Department, who would not be as reliable as advisers personally selected by the President. Once the United States became a belligerent in the Second World War, Roosevelt's designs for consolidating his grip on foreign policy would be supplemented by the exigencies of the war--unavoidable circumstances which necessitated tighter personal control of foreign policy. Regardless of whether the motive was personal power or wartime pressures, Roosevelt's method often produced an unsettling effect that resulted in a lack of interdepartmental coordination and the development of personal jealousies that hampered Roosevelt's effectiveness as an international leader.¹

When Franklin Roosevelt selected his Secretary of State in 1933, the decision was not based on whether Cordell Hull had prior experience or personal ability as a diplomat but on his influence among Democratic politicians. The sixty-one year old Democrat served in the United States Congress from 1906 to 1933, as a Representative and

¹Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, vol. 2 of The Age of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1959), 535-536; Henry L. Stimson, and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, c. 1948), 333; Julius Pratt, "The Ordeal of Cordell Hull," Review of Politics, 28 (January, 1966), 76-77; James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (Harcourt, Brace and World, c. 1956), 373.

Senator from Tennessee except for a four year period from 1920 to 1924. During his legislative career, Hull helped draw up the Federal Income Tax Law of 1913, became a leading advocate of tariff reform, and attained prominence in the Democratic Party in the 1920's by serving as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Because of his advocacy of states-rights, his long-time opposition to economic privilege, and his support for Roosevelt over the urban liberal and Roman Catholic Alfred E. Smith, Hull had considerable influence among Southern Democrats and was expected to hold that voter bloc in line for Roosevelt. Further, Hull held the respect of his former colleagues in the Congress and would be a valuable negotiator for Roosevelt in the efforts to secure New Deal legislation.

While Cordell Hull had some voice in the attempt to develop policy for lowering tariff barriers and improving relations with Latin American nations, his over-all influence was limited by Roosevelt's methods of controlling American foreign policy. The technique against which Hull had no means of defense was Roosevelt's use of the Personal Representative. The President found this method to be an expedient way around the supposedly cumbersome and slow State Department, and he often told his agents to report directly to the White House in order to avoid the necessity of including the Secretary of State in the discussions. Even though Hull could request information from the envoys,

he was never sure that he would receive it; if the agent did respond, Hull remained unsure that he had received the most important information from the envoy, or the White House.²

²Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1964), 70. Since 1789, when Gouvenour Morris went to Great Britain for President George Washington, special emissaries, personal representatives, ceremonial agents, and other titular designees have gone to foreign states as personal envoys for many presidents. Even though the "executive agent" is not mentioned in the United States Constitution, the practice is generally accepted and has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Henry M. Wriston's Executive Agents In American Foreign Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), for the most comprehensive study of the personal agent's role in American foreign policy to 1920. For examples of President Roosevelt's practice of by-passing the Secretary of State and the State Department see Charles Romanus, and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, and Stilwell's Command Problems, vol. 9, parts 1 and 2 of United States Army in World War II (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953 and 1956); William H. Standley, and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955); Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie, Fighter for Freedom (Marquette: Northern Michigan University Press, c. 1966); Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, c. 1966); Theodore White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., c. 1948); James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, c. 1970); Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: The Macmillan Company, c. 1970). Throughout the Foreign Relations of the United States volumes for the years 1941-1945, dispatches are often cited as "copied from file at Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York," and "copy received by the Department of State on (date)," a date long after the original transmission of the communique. One can conclude that such messages, when not directed to other departments, went directly to the White House, and were then routed to the State Department--sometimes. Foreign Relations volumes hereafter cited as FRUS.

The former Senator from Tennessee, a proud man humiliated at being bypassed in the formulation of foreign policy, often complained that Roosevelt's personal envoys "tended in many instances to create havoc with our Ambassadors in the capitals they visited" and "that no person outside the State Department and White House could break into these affairs without serious risk of running amuck so to speak, and causing hurtful complications." Regardless of his pleas, Hull learned early that Roosevelt not only relied on his own judgement via his surrogates, but cared little about the need to coordinate with or inform others of his decisions.³

Within three months after taking office, Roosevelt named Hull as head of the American delegation to the World Economic Conference at London, a meeting called to fight world-wide depression by obtaining international agreement on currency stabilization. Before the American delegation had gathered in London, the President's statements generally reflected agreement with the conference's basic goals, but after listening to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Roosevelt changed his mind and decided the best monetary policy for the United States would be independent management of the dollar.

³Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2 vols (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), I: 191, 200; II: 1585-1586.

Instead of calling upon Hull to explain his new position, the President sent Assistant Secretary of State Raymond Moley to London. When Moley arrived at the conference as Roosevelt's personal envoy, he immediately became the central figure--much to the chagrin and embarrassment of Cordell Hull. As Roosevelt's spokesman, Moley explained the President's position and agreed to a conference statement which recognized eventual stabilization and reserved the right of each nation to manage its currency. When Roosevelt learned of Moley's action, he rejected the agreement and announced that domestic economic recovery came before international financial cooperation. Although Hull attempted to keep the meeting from disintegrating, the President's action doomed the conference to failure and nullified the efforts of both Hull and the personal agent Moley.

Knowing that Hull was upset at the outcome of the talks and his unannounced change of position, Roosevelt took steps to soothe the Secretary of State. Before Hull returned to the United States, Roosevelt cabled him to express his great regard, affection, and confidence in the Secretary of State and noted Hull's display of personal courage and sincerity in the attempt at preventing a collapse of the conference. In a further effort to mollify Hull and to use his personal persuasiveness to convince the Secretary that others were responsible for the

London debacle, Roosevelt asked him to be a guest at Hyde Park on his return to the United States. Once the two men met, Roosevelt insisted that he had not given Moley any special powers but had meant for him to "drop over to London as a liaison man" between the delegation and the President, and that Moley had likely promoted the public fanfare which greeted him in London. To placate the Secretary of State, Roosevelt, within a few weeks, transferred Moley away from the State Department. Hull never got over Moley's intervention, and when Postmaster General James Farley later tried to convince Hull that Moley was not so bad, he replied, "I admire loyalty and you certainly have put up a good case for Moley. But he is a Son of A Bitch after all, isn't he?"⁴

At the same time he decided to send Moley to London, Roosevelt also decided to recognize the government of the Soviet Union. Instead of confronting State Department policy which adhered to lines set by earlier Presidents, and Cordell Hull's moralistic objections to the atheistic nature of the Russian regime, Roosevelt called on his New York neighbor Henry Morgenthau, Jr., to begin talks with Russian economic representatives as preliminary steps to

⁴Hull, Memoirs, I: 267-268; Harold Ickes, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939, vol. 2 of The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, c. 1954), II: 686.

recognition. While his long-time friend met with agents of Amtorg, the official Russian corporation, Roosevelt also contacted Assistant Secretary of State William C. Bullitt and ordered him to negotiate with the Russians and report directly to the President. Not only did Roosevelt use personal friends to conduct private talks, but now ordered professional Foreign Service Officers to bypass their superior officer--the Secretary of State--and report the outcome of the talks straight to him. Once assured that formal recognition of the Soviet Union was imminent Morgenthau withdrew from the talks in favor of State Department representatives.⁵

While the President often used Personal Representative diplomacy to avoid discussing policy decisions with Hull, he also entertained ideas of reconstructing the State Department in order to make it more responsive to his leadership, but he never initiated the action because of his reluctance to fire people or personally face the task of rebuilding an old organization and being responsible for the results. Instead, Roosevelt decided to rely on Sumner Welles, a close personal friend in the State Department,

⁵John M. Blum, Years of Crisis, 1928-1939, vol. 1 of From The Morgenthau Diaries, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), I: 54-57; Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and The Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, c. 1967), 87-119; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries: How F. D. R. Fought The Axis," Colliers, 120 (October 11, 1947), 20-21, 72-79.

to advise him on international issues. After making that decision, Roosevelt dispatched Under-Secretary of State William Phillips to Rome as Ambassador and then named his long-time friend as Under-Secretary. To satisfy Hull, who wanted Assistant Secretary R. Walton Moore as Under-Secretary, Roosevelt activated the post of "counselor of State Department" by naming Moore to that position.⁶

Although Welles' selection as Under-Secretary was largely the result of his personal and political ties with the President, he did not lack for experience in foreign relations. Welles first joined the Department during World War I and served at the American embassies in Tokyo and Buenos Aires. In the 1920's, he served on a commission dealing with American-Honduran affairs and then in the Department's Division of Latin American Affairs. In 1933, he served briefly as American Ambassador to Cuba, and then became an Assistant Secretary of State. Four years later, with twenty-two years experience, Welles was named Under-Secretary. Welles had a precise mind, was a hard worker, and got to the point of a policy discussion quickly, while Hull "was given to building up his case fact by fact and reason by reason."⁷

⁶Memorandum of conversation between Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and President Roosevelt, July 10, 1935, Morgenthau Diary, Book 8: 51, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. The Roosevelt Library is hereafter cited as FDRL.

⁷Louis Wehle, Hidden Threads of History (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), 115.

Throughout the six years Welles served as Under-Secretary, he and Cordell Hull clashed over many issues, but the basic conflict went beyond policy formulation. Welles' personal relationship with the President and his grating practice of going over the Secretary's head caused Hull to develop a long-lasting personal bitterness for Welles and a tendency to be more in "agreement with [his] other associates more often than with Welles on important questions of policy."⁸

In October 1937, Welles proposed that Roosevelt invite all Washington diplomatic representatives to the White House on Armistice Day to sit down and work out a plan for peace along lines to be proposed by Roosevelt. Hull rejected the plan because Welles suggested it, and because he opposed any conference that would fail to produce any real results. After several conversations with the President, Hull finally convinced him that he should abandon the project.

Hull found that he could not discourage all of Welles' proposals when he learned from President Roosevelt that he was sending Welles to the major capitals of Europe in 1940 to determine if there were any prospects for peace. Hull saw this as another attempt by Welles to "step out more toward the center of the stage" and cautioned the

⁸Hull, Memoirs, I: 313.

President that "five hundred different rumors would inevitably arise" and "would create confusion in Europe and here at home." Roosevelt decided to send Welles anyway and ultimately saw the trip end in failure. While Roosevelt believed that his informing Hull would placate the Secretary, Hull's personal resentment toward Welles continued to smolder.

In July 1941, the Secretary of State again became irate when Welles, not Roosevelt, informed him of the date for the beginning of the Roosevelt-Churchill talks in Newfoundland and then grew livid when he learned that the President asked Welles, not Hull, to accompany him to the summit meeting. Hull told Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long that had he been consulted, he would have suggested Welles as the State Department representative to the conference, yet he deeply resented being totally uninformed of the events.⁹

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Welles traveled to Rio de Janeiro in early 1942 to try to create a band of wartime solidarity between the Americas by getting the Latin nations to declare war on the Axis powers. Prior to Welles' departure, Hull and the delegation agreed that a strong resolution must be signed and that the Latinos

⁹Hull, Memoirs, I: 546-549; Theodore Wilson, The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 240.

must cooperate with the United States to insure the safety of the Western Hemisphere. Because internal political problems and connections with Germans caused the Argentine delegates to refuse to declare war on Germany, Welles agreed to a compromise statement that recommended but did not openly announce the breaking of relations with the Axis nations. Cordell Hull first learned of the modified declaration from a radio news broadcast and went immediately to the White House. Through White House facilities, and with the President listening in, Hull spoke more sharply to Welles than he "had ever spoken to anyone" in an effort to get the Under-Secretary to rescind the agreement. Welles declared that he had the President's direct and personal authority to act and would not repudiate the statement unless Roosevelt decided otherwise. After listening to both men, Roosevelt rejected Hull's objections. The President's decision did pave the way for Welles' resolution, but at the same time it also intensified Hull's frustration and animosity toward Welles.¹⁰

The Under-Secretary of State had Roosevelt's ear, but the President's constant indifference toward Hull meant that the Secretary of State would eventually demand Welles' removal. In mid-1942, Hull, learning of rumors that Welles

¹⁰Hull, Memoirs, II; 1148-1149; Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 94-122.

engaged in homosexual activities, discussed the problem with Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. Over the next twelve months, Hull often mentioned his fear of the possible damage to the President and the State Department if such rumors became public. If those rumors were known, Welles could have been subject to blackmail by foreign governments. By August 1943, Long noted that Hull's conversations dwelled at length on the subject, and within a month, Hull presented the President with an ultimatum on Welles--likely including the sordid rumors as one of the reasons why Welles had to resign. Fearing a serious rupture in his Democratic coalition if Cordell Hull quit and finally seeing that his efforts to use Welles to circumvent the State Department had caused the Hull-Welles differences to grow beyond reconciliation, Roosevelt accepted Welles' resignation in September 1943. Although Roosevelt had the power and authority to use Welles in whatever manner he chose, the resulting Hull-Welles conflict caused the two men, the White House, and the Department much needless suffering.¹¹

¹¹Cordell Hull was not the progenitor of the gossip about Welles' purported indiscretion. Former Ambassador to France William C. Bullitt received information about the Under-Secretary from R. Walton Moore. As the result of his promise to the dying Moore, but more likely because he believed he might succeed to Welles' post, Bullitt went to the White House in April 1941 and gave Roosevelt a document that supposedly confirmed the rumors about Welles. Probably incensed over Bullitt's charges and the revelation of the

Besides Roosevelt's personal friends and Presidential envoys, the Secretary of State had to compete with fellow cabinet members in trying to develop foreign policy. After the Spanish Civil War erupted in 1936, Hull refused to issue passports to American ambulance units that volunteered to serve with the Loyalists. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes was incensed at Hull's strict application of neutrality in that case. He felt that Hull was too intimidated by totalitarian governments and that the Secretary of State was like "a bladder...filled with air. You push at one point and it bulges at the opposite." Ickes wanted tougher policies which would hinder the aggressive Germany and Japan, and accordingly in 1938 he refused to sell helium to Germany for the Zeppelin airships. Secretary of State Hull held that the United States agreed to sell the gas to Germany and could not back out of a binding contract.

document, the President sent Bullitt on a "mission of information" to the Middle East. Once he realized that Roosevelt had probably used the mission as a pretext to get him out of Washington, and later seeing that the President did not plan to use him in any meaningful way, Bullitt resigned as the President's Personal Representative; see Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For The President, Personal and Secret, Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 512-517; Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, c. 1966), 323-335; "Welles Showdown Spotlights Feuds in the State Department," Newsweek, 22 (September 6, 1943), 48; Welles to Roosevelt and Hull, September 21, 1943, President's Secretary's File: State Department, Welles, Sumner, Box 79, FDRL.

Ickes, however, got around that agreement by arguing that it was nullified by the fact that the Zeppelins could be converted to military use. It was Roosevelt's decision to overrule Hull by returning the German money and canceling the contract.¹²

As the international situation grew tense, Ickes became impatient with Hull's cautious policies and called for an embargo on oil, gasoline, and scrap iron to both Spain and Japan on the grounds that the Iberian neutral would send it to Germany and Japan who would use it for expanded military activities in the Far East. The State Department opposed cutting off the oil to Spain out of fear that the neutral nation would be driven into Hitler's camp, while Hull's reluctance to confront the Japanese was based on the belief that the European situation required the bulk of the United States' support at that time, and to invoke the embargo against Japan could precipitate an all-out war before the American military would be ready. Ickes was beside himself, wondering "how the President can put up with the State Department," and accusing "that damn State Department at work again continuing its appeasement policy,"

¹²Harold Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943), 338; Ickes, The Inside Struggle, 1938-1939, and The Lowering Cloud, 1939-1941, vols. 2 and 3 of The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 3 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, c. 1954), II: 93, 396-399, 414; III: 228; Hull, Memoirs, I: 597-598; Pratt, "The Ordeal of Cordell Hull," 80.

and when finally and totally exasperated, Ickes cried "Once again I say 'Goddamn the Department of State.'"¹³

Another interdepartmental conflict over policy formulation concerned Hull's wartime efforts to improve the United States' position in Anglo-American trade relations. He tried to persuade Roosevelt to allow him to use wartime aid to pressure the British to revise their imperial preferential status for British colonies, but the President remained reluctant to do so until 1944, when he granted Hull permission to initiate talks with the British. At the same time, and in a seemingly unrelated action, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau's plan to convert Germany into a country primarily agricultural in character.

Recognizing that other departments and agencies would be involved in postwar planning, Hull was not particularly concerned over the leaders acceptance of Morgenthau's plan, although he did hold out for State Department coordination and implementation of those policies. What incensed Hull was Morgenthau's agreement with Churchill that the United States would provide over six billion dollars in supplies to Great Britain--with no strings attached. Hull declared that the action angered him "as much as anything that had happened during [his] career as

¹³Ickes, *The Lowering Cloud, 1939-1941*, III: 273-274, 298-299, 339, 473, 640; Pratt, *ibid.*, 87-88.

Secretary of State." Morgenthau's precipitous action undercut Hull's plan to use the loan proposal as an instrument to force the British to agree to revise their trade system. He told Morgenthau that he was "shocked at the way such vital matters had been settled without any consultations with the appropriate experts of our Government and without any regard for the policy we had been trying to pursue in the past." Following that meeting, Hull went to the White House to try to convince President Roosevelt to reject Morgenthau's plan and to allow the State Department to conduct all negotiations with the British for additional aid. When confronted by the irate Secretary of State, Roosevelt explained that he had not actually committed himself to Morgenthau's plan, and he evaded the touchy issue by telling Hull that postwar planning did not need their attention at that time.¹⁴

During World War II, Franklin Roosevelt's personal control of foreign policy became greater as he established the "Map Room" at the White House as the headquarters for all communications with the Allied leaders. An introductory note to the Map Room File at the Franklin Roosevelt Library states that the President wished to have in the Map Room, established in January 1942, the only complete file of the personal messages he exchanged with Churchill, Stalin, and

¹⁴Hull, Memoirs, I: 509-510.

Chiang Kai-shek. For that reason messages from the Map Room went through Navy Department communications facilities and replies were received through the War Department. While the President was on trips, all messages were encoded in the Map Room and sent to him through Army or Navy circuits. The President's replies, returning through the same military channels, were decoded in the Map Room.

In addition to the Map Room arrangement, a profusion of new wartime agencies chipped away at the State Department's jurisdiction and its role in foreign policy. As Cordell Hull complained:

The State Department was...bedeviled by the multiplicity of Departments and agencies, speaking for the government in foreign relations, such as the Treasury, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the Coordinator of Information, the Petroleum Coordinator, and the Office of Lend Lease Administration. Foreign diplomats were repeatedly coming to us to express their confusion at the number of agencies that approached them as the authorized representatives of the United States Government.

The Secretary of State did not acquiesce completely as his Department's power gradually eroded. In 1942, Vice-President Henry Wallace, as chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare, persuaded Roosevelt to grant his agency enough authority to deal directly with foreign governments and to send its agents abroad for that purpose. Hull saw the order as "virtually creating a second State Department," and as giving Wallace's agency the power to negotiate

postwar economic settlements. Beside the power conflict, Hull likely saw the Board of Economic Warfare as being organized "to throw a sop to left wingers by letting them use buying or purchases abroad for social and economic ideas they wanted to spread." Motivated then by personal and ideological differences, Hull convinced the President to reduce the powers of the Board of Economic Warfare.¹⁵

In addition to the impact of the Map Room and the new bureaus, the wartime estrangement of Hull and the State Department from Roosevelt widened when the White House, in 1942, decided that Roosevelt would work with Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Premier Stalin and the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, while Secretary Hull and the State Department would take care of the routine foreign relations and would develop plans for the postwar settlement. The President may have talked about delineating between wartime and postwar policies and problems, but his actions revealed that he allowed very little vital information about "Big Three" political agreements to be passed to the Secretary of State. Hull tried to improve his position by sending Sumner Welles to the White House to request copies of Map Room cables;

¹⁵Hull, Memoirs, II: 1155-1156; Frederick J. Dobney, ed., Selected Papers of Will Clayton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, c. 1971), 66-67.

however, three hours after the President seemingly agreed to provide the messages, Hull "got a message that the President had decided he would not do it." Hull told Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau that "The President runs foreign affairs. I don't know what's going on." He added that "since Pearl Harbor he does not let me help in connection with foreign affairs, I just don't know what's going on and the President won't let me help him," and further lamented that, "I asked to see the political part of the cables between the President and Churchill, because I have to find out from Halifax [British Ambassador in Washington] what's going on between the President and Churchill."¹⁶

The President also excluded Secretary of State Hull from the summit meetings at Casablanca, Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta, preferring instead to have Harry Hopkins at his side. Hull did attend the Quebec Conference of August 1943, but he spent most of his time in discussions with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. The meeting Cordell Hull attended, where he could be considered a primary figure, was the Foreign Minister's Conference at Moscow in October 1943; even then he was second choice to Sumner Welles.

¹⁶Memorandum of conversation between Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Cordell Hull, July 9, 1943, Morgenthau Diary, Book 647: 170, FDRL; George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, c. 1967), 172-173.

Roosevelt's decision to withhold information relating to summit conference agreements from Secretary of State Hull and the State Department had a predictable effect on the Department's efforts to formulate plans for postwar policy. Three months after the Teheran Conference, career diplomat Robert Murphy told Hull that "many Foreign Service Officers like myself would be strengthened in our operations if we could be informed of the secret conversations which Roosevelt had had with Stalin." With the knowledge that his own persistent pleas for information about Teheran were ignored, Hull told Murphy that "the operations of the Secretary of State would also be strengthened if he knew what happened at Teheran." In July 1944, almost a year after the Teheran Conference, Hull attempted to remind Roosevelt that the State Department had little information about the Cairo and Teheran meetings when he wrote to the President that "the Department of State is accordingly endeavoring to obtain true copies of any documents agreed upon for the United States at the Conferences," and in January 1945, Hull again informed Roosevelt that "it would be helpful to me and to the senior members of the Department who are handling Soviet-Polish matters if the pertinent sections of the report on the Teheran Conference might be made available to the Department." When Henry Morgenthau told Hull that he had learned that Roosevelt had agreed that Germany should be "dismembered in either

three or fifteen parts," Hull declared that "this is the first time I have heard this." He also added that he had "never been permitted to see the minutes of the Teheran Conference." Even though a State Department man, Charles Bohlen, had served as recording secretary for the American delegation at Teheran, his transcription of the meetings' minutes had gone directly to the White House, leaving the State Department only fragmented reports on the decisions about Poland, Germany, and the projected second front in Europe.¹⁷

The information requested by Robert Murphy, when he referred to the Roosevelt-Stalin conversations, also affected an area of diplomacy specifically connected with postwar planning and policy. As a result of the information received about the Teheran meeting, State Department officials concluded that the Allied leaders had agreed on a plan for postwar occupation zones for Germany. Earlier, in the spring of 1943, Secretary Hull and British Foreign

¹⁷Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 447; Louis Fischer, The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1941-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, c. 1972), 196; Hull to Roosevelt, July 20, 1944, President's Secretary's File: State Department, 1944; Hull to Roosevelt, January 11, 1945, President's Secretary's File: Russia, 1944-1945, FDRL; From the Morgenthau Diary at FDRL; Memorandum of conversation between Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Cordell Hull, July 9, 1943, Book 647: 169; Memorandum of conversation between Morgenthau, Daniel Bell, and Harry D. White, August 18, 1944, Book 763: 202; Memorandum by Morgenthau, September 8, 1944, Book 770: 120.

Secretary Eden had started talks on surrender terms and occupation zones for Germany. Hull opposed permanent political-economic dismemberment for Germany, and with Eden's support, developed a zoning plan on that basis. In a fashion not surprising when a lack of coordination persists, Hull set up a commission of representatives from the State, War, and Navy Departments, while Roosevelt, Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff held private talks on the same topic. In addition to Hull's handicap of not knowing about the high level talks and agreements, the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department decided the zoning problem was of a military nature, and it refused to take part in the discussions. When they finally did join the talks, the Civil Affairs representatives remained uncooperative. Again, Roosevelt's secretive style of diplomacy caused disjointed and uncoordinated responses from several groups working on the same problem.

In January 1944, the situation grew worse when the European Advisory Commission started planning for the zonal boundaries. The results of the lack of coordination and continuity in policy planning surfaced when the political adviser to the American delegation, George Kennan, received instructions which limited that group to an advisory role only and made it clear that its advice was welcomed only upon request. Further confusion arose when shortly after the Teheran Conference, the British and Russian delegations

presented their zoning proposals. The American delegation, unaware of the prior discussions and agreements which affected their position, could do nothing but press for clarification of instructions. In March, a short dispatch arrived which contained the President's zoning proposal: a plan that if presented would disrupt the meetings. Roosevelt's proposal included, for the American zone, over half of the Germany population, almost fifty percent of the Germany territory, with an additional area not relegated to any one zone. George Kennan returned to the United States, and after unsuccessful efforts to gain information from State Department officials unwilling to admit their own confusion, went to the White House and explained the situation to Roosevelt. The President "laughed gaily and said 'Why that's just something I once drew on the back of an envelope.'" Roosevelt, having earlier learned of the British zonal proposals, decided while enroute to the Cairo meeting, that the time for a policy position had arrived. He had drawn the zonal boundary proposal on the envelope. Then, in a manner typical of Roosevelt, he filed the "memo" and considered the basic job completed. With the American zoning policy proposals based on the envelope notations and the American delegation suffering diplomatic dyspepsia, the President finally sent instructions approving the British and Russian zoning

proposals.¹⁸

As the President's wartime controls expanded and the new agencies reduced the State Department's influence further, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the State Department faced an additional problem--a constant sniping by some journalists. While some of the criticism accurately described an organization in need of administrative repair, much of the attack was likely instigated by the White House in an effort to justify Roosevelt's singular control of policy and to transfer the blame to the State Department for any policies which might prove unpopular with the American public.

In articles for New Republic and The Nation, George Soule, I. F. Stone, and Malcolm Cowley described the "reactionary" State Department as an agency which selected permanent personnel according to wealth and social background and promoted them on the basis of seniority and favoritism rather than according to merit. The "collaborationist" policies toward the Vichy French, the failure to expand quotas to admit more refugees from anti-Nazi countries, and the "dismal" Darlan deal were all laid on the doorstep of the Department, and George Soule, in a

¹⁸Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, 167-171; William M. Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin," World Politics, 16 (October, 1963), 15; Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany," Foreign Affairs, 28 (July, 1950), 580-604.

statement typical of the critics, called for a greater division of responsibility in order that the "reactionary-type policies would not be followed in the future conduct of American diplomacy." What the writers often overlooked was the fact that the Department's policies reflected the views of President Franklin Roosevelt.¹⁹

One book which reflects the composite reaction against the State Department is The Riddle of the State Department by Robert Bendiner. The author, also editor of The Nation, used most of the book to describe how a few men--conservative in their ideology and elitist in their educational and social backgrounds--guided American foreign policy. He blamed Cordell Hull and the State Department for the appeasement policies of the late 1930's: allowing Japan to purchase raw materials after the 1937 invasion of China, denying the cessation of shipping oil to Italy after that nation's aggression against Ethiopia, and executing commercial arrangements with the Vichy French Government. Bendiner charged Hull with procrastination, wishful thinking, and the tendency to spout moral homilies when faced with Axis aggression, yet at the same time he described Sumner Welles as the "guiding spirit of the Department"--a hard

¹⁹"State Department Appeasers," New Republic, 105 (July 28, 1941), 105-106; George Soule, "Liberals and the State Department," ibid., 107 (December 14, 1942), 788-789; Malcolm Cowley, "What's Wrong With State," ibid., 109 (August 16, 1943), 185; I.F. Stone, "Millionaires Club," The Nation, 159 (December 9, 1944), 703-704.

working, humane and considerate statesman who had the most "realistic attitude" toward the Axis. Bendiner wrote that the ultimate responsibility was the President's but that Roosevelt accepted the Department's policy recommendations because he recognized the Secretary of State's and the Department's domestic "political force." To rectify the situation and to give the chief executive more control, Bendiner proposed that the President announce policy decisions and leave the Department no choice but to develop policy along those lines. He further suggested that Roosevelt make use of special emissaries for highly important or delicate missions instead of regular Foreign Service personnel, and he also called for the establishment of some new agencies to syphon off some of the State Department's power. He was right about Hull's conservatism and the Secretary's political influence in the South; still, like many of the journalists enthralled by Roosevelt's domestic programs, Bendiner ignored the President's personal preference for isolationism in the decade prior to the war, and the fact that Roosevelt alone had directed wartime policies. Either Bendiner knew nothing about Roosevelt's techniques for controlling the policy making process, or else he wrote The Riddle of the State Department as a means of directing criticisms away from the President by attacking the State Department, and to give public support for Roosevelt's means

of directing foreign policy.²⁰

As a result of the public criticism and the President's feeble, reluctant defense of department policies, the State Department attempted to improve its own image. The Division of Special Research began analyzing newspaper editorials, journalists columns, organizations' statements, and Congressional reactions to policies, and in 1943, the State Department contracted with the Office of Public Opinion Research in Princeton, New Jersey, to study and evaluate public attitudes toward foreign affairs. Hoping to lessen criticism and draw more supporters, the Department published a book entitled Peace and War. The "White Paper" reviewed American foreign policy for the years 1931-1941 in an effort to remind critics that the American public's isolationist attitude for that earlier decade did not allow the Department to choose a policy which might have deterred Axis aggression.²¹

While State Department officials wanted to learn about the American public's views on foreign policy and to improve the Department's image, more conservative supporters

²⁰Robert Bendiner, The Riddle of The State Department (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, c. 1942).

²¹William O. Chittick, State Department, Press, and Pressure Groups (New York: Wiley-Interscience, c. 1970), 24-25; U.S., Department of State, Peace and War, 1931-1941 (Washington: Department of State, 1943); Life, 14 (January 18, 1943), 28.

attempted to defend the Department by attacking the critics. State Department files reveal two extensive reports which reviewed the "Campaign Against the State Department" and the "Groups Attacking the Department of State."

The theme of these studies, most interesting in light of Senator Joseph McCarthy's attacks on the Department in the 1950's, was that the anti-State Department campaign originated with "communist and radical groups in the United States." The first report viewed the criticisms as most threatening to the "integrity of American institutions." It maintained that the body of "so-called American liberals and intellectuals" who attacked the Department was in fact composed of Marxist revolutionaries. The report named Robert Bendiner, Freda Kirchwey, I. F. Stone, and Michael Straight as having connections with or being on the fringe of the communist element within the United States. After further highly circumstantial accusations against those individuals, the report attempted to show how an "infamous, meretricious, and diabolical" campaign by several organizations tried to influence the formation of American foreign policy. The report listed "Groups Attacking the State Department" as The Union for Democratic Action, The International Rescue and Relief Committee, Citizens For Victory, and the International Free World Association, and it accused those groups of not only

seeking to destroy the State Department but desiring the "abolition of the capitalist system and [replacing] in its stead a modified form of Bolshevism." The "study" unleashed most of its attack on the Union for Democratic Action, charging its leaders--Dr. Reinhold Neibuhr, Robert Bendiner, Freda Kirchwey, Kenneth Crawford, and Dr. Frank Kingdon--with concerted attempts to get rid of high State Department officials and of being members of or collaborating with the American Communist Party. The Union for Democratic Action, forerunner of the Americans for Democratic Action, concerned itself with developing and advocating improved national social programs for the United States, and promoting a policy of cooperation with the non-fascist governments of the world.²²

While most professional State Department officials refused to give any attention to those contrived and reactionary polemics, the mere existence of the reports shows how Roosevelt's singular control of foreign policy and the sometimes contrived attacks on the Department eventually produced harsh reaction to the criticisms. The legitimate defense of the State Department and the

²²"Attacks on the United States State Department, 1942," unsigned manuscripts in Box 90, File 403, Cordell Hull Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; Freda Kirchwey, "McCormick's Gas Attack,"; and I.F. Stone, "Washington Notes," The Nation, 154 (May 23, 1942), 590-591.

professional efforts to improve its image were the direct results of the President's unwillingness to accept responsibility for his own foreign policies when they produced unfavorable responses and of his willingness to allow the State Department to bear the brunt of the press's criticisms of those policies.

After Franklin Roosevelt won re-election in November 1944, Cordell Hull resigned as Secretary of State. The seventy-three year old Hull felt some satisfaction in his accomplishments in that office: reciprocal trade agreements, improved relations with Latin American nations, smoother executive-legislative relations regarding long-range postwar foreign policy planning, and the laying of a foundation for a new international organization. Yet Hull's conservative style and his lack of administrative experience, when combined with Roosevelt's neglect, left a State Department poorly equipped to deal with the rapidly changing world.

The President recognized this, and prior to Hull's resignation, he named Edward R. Stettinius to replace the departed Sumner Welles. According to the President, the new Under-Secretary was "going to raise Hell in the State Department" because the "'personal prestige of the Secretary of State, the organization that he heads, has only to be mentioned in almost any circle, American or foreign, to arouse either doubt, despair, or derision.'" Stettinius'

first job was to reorganize the State Department into groups with similar functions within the same divisions, and to streamline and improve the processes for long-range policy planning. More important, at least to Franklin Roosevelt, was the creation of the Office of Public Information which concentrated on developing a better image for the State Department by explaining the Department's, and Roosevelt's, policy positions to the American public.²³

When Hull left office, Roosevelt replaced him with Stettinius, who immediately recommended the elevation and appointment of several advisers; Joseph L. Grew became Under-Secretary; Dean Acheson was retained, and William Clayton, Nelson Rockefeller, and Archibald MacLeish were named as Assistant Secretaries. Within the new organization, Stettinius established a Planning Committee to advise the Secretary on long-range policy matters and to re-distribute Departmental activities so that the geographic offices reported to Assistant Secretaries rather than to the Under-Secretary. Although the new Secretary of State tried to construct a new, more efficient system for disseminating information within the Department, the primary control of American foreign policy remained as before--

²³Walter Johnson, "Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.," in An Uncertain Tradition, American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, Norman A. Graebner, ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), 210.

with Roosevelt.²⁴

While Stettinius appeared to be developing a smooth running foreign office, the lack of communications between the White House and the State Department was so great that it bothered, at least momentarily, the President's top Personal Representative, Harry Hopkins. At the Cairo Conference, he met and was impressed by a young Foreign Service Officer, Charles E. Bohlen. Hopkins spent much time talking with Bohlen, and quickly became aware of the career diplomat's outstanding knowledge of policy issues and objectivity toward Russo-American relations. When Hopkins evaluated the Foreign Service as full of "cookie pushers, pansies--and usually isolationists to boot," Bohlen defended the Department with such a forceful and intelligent argument that Hopkins persuaded President Roosevelt to have Bohlen assigned to the White House as a State Department liaison man. Bohlen's role was to keep the President, Hopkins, and Admiral William Leahy, Roosevelt's military adviser informed on current world problems and to get quick Departmental recommendations on any subject when Roosevelt needed it. Bohlen held the job from December 1944 to April 1945, but his effectiveness as a White House-State Department liaison officer was limited as he was in London from January to March 1945, and when he

²⁴ibid., 213-214.

returned to the United States, he went to San Francisco for the United Nations organizational conferences. Once James Byrnes became Secretary of State, Bohlen returned to field duty. Even President Roosevelt seemed to be paying more attention to the State Department. At Yalta, he declared that the Department's assistance was so important that he would not attend another meeting without its representatives. His rhetorical recognition of the Department's value came only two months before his death.²⁵

Even though United States-Japanese negotiations between 1939 and 1941 were conducted almost exclusively by Cordell Hull and the State Department, Franklin Roosevelt acted as his own Secretary of State. It was not that he deceived the American public when he picked Hull as Secretary of State; it was a matter of priorities, and in that position, the former did what Roosevelt wanted: deal with the Congress. In using Hull in that manner and in conducting foreign policy from the White House, Roosevelt did not exceed his constitutional authority--he merely broadened it. While this manner of handling Japanese relations was an apparent contradiction in Roosevelt's policy, there are possible explanations. Knowing that Roosevelt would never have delegated much authority to the

²⁵Smith Simpson, Anatomy of the State Department (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 260.

Secretary of State unless the situation demanded it, one can conjecture that Roosevelt's preoccupation with the war in Europe took precedence over his concern with Asian affairs. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Roosevelt was firmly convinced he could better handle foreign policy issues than could the Foreign Service and the State Department. Moreover, as the head of the Democratic Party and one who appeared to have achieved considerable success on the domestic front, Roosevelt no doubt believed that through greater personal control he could also succeed on the international level, thus building in the voter's mind an image of security through Democratic competence in foreign affairs. While President Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to broaden his personal control of foreign policy was by personal calculation, at the same time, the war caused a burgeoning of agencies concerned with the war and postwar foreign policies which cut into the State Department's position and provided the President with even greater control of American foreign policy.

UPHOLDING THE ATLANTIC CHARTER.....ALMOST

CHAPTER II

Prior to America's entrance into World War II, Franklin Roosevelt's thinking on foreign policy remained ambivalent. When a crisis developed, he seemed to push the United States to extend further aid to the European allies, but he would then back off and await the public's approval before he took a firm stand. Yet the President's ambiguity is understandable; he was reluctant to take steps that would involve the United States in war, and while he received growing public support for his policies, he hesitated in taking a firm stand because he did not want to risk Congressional defeat of his plans for aiding those nations already at war with Germany.

As the Axis machine rolled into high gear, Roosevelt saw the potential menace to the United States and sought indirect methods of stopping it. He saw that the neutrality legislation of the 1930's hindered the European nations' efforts to get American supplies but he did not publicly advocate the revision of that restrictive legislation until early efforts to repeal the arms embargo failed. When the President finally did act on September 21, 1939, he

informed a special session of Congress that replacing the arms embargo with cash and carry was necessary to keep the United States out of war.

Although Roosevelt talked about the madness of Hitler's world and the need to bolster Great Britain and France, he remained unwilling to commit the United States to physical involvement in the war. As Norway, Denmark and the Low Countries fell and France struggled against the German onslaught, Roosevelt told the American people that the nation needed to provide all-out aid to the Allies, but when the French Premier requested military support, Roosevelt responded with a tribute to French fighting stamina and also allocated additional material support, but no troops. Roosevelt's hesitant response to Churchill's plea for American warships created a four month delay in delivery. Not until popular approval swelled and White House lawyers found a legal way of avoiding a fight with Congress did Roosevelt agree to trade fifty old destroyers for eight naval bases. Even with the negotiations concluded, Roosevelt spoke of the agreement not as a means of aiding Britain, but of expanding the American line of defense.¹

¹Robert A. Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, c. 1969), 24-43; Willard Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (Athens: University of Georgia Press, c. 1959); Foster Rhea Dulles, and Gerald Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," Political Science Quarterly, 70 (March, 1955), 1-18; Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign

Prior to December of 1940, Great Britain had followed the Congressional prescription, and paid cash for their goods and British vessels to carry the supplies to the home islands. In that same month, Prime Minister Winston Churchill informed President Roosevelt that Britain could no longer pay cash for shipping and American munitions. To make sure that Britain received the needed supplies, Roosevelt sought a way of removing the dollar sign from the aid. He finally settled on lending goods instead of money--lend lease. Roosevelt sent the bill to Congress, where it faced intense opposition from an isolationist bloc which viewed the proposal as another step closer to American involvement in the war.

After he had taken his stand, Roosevelt's first thoughts turned to how he could get more public support for the bill. He told Harry Hopkins that he believed a lot of the opposition toward lend lease could be quieted "if Churchill and I could just sit down together for awhile," but he added that arrangements could not be made at that time. Hopkins immediately proposed that he go to London to confer with the Prime Minister. At first, Roosevelt refused, declaring that Hopkins' place was in Washington to

Policy: A Democratic View," Foreign Affairs, 6 (July, 1928), 573-586; Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, c. 1945), 36-39; Morton J. Frisch, "Roosevelt on Peace and Freedom," Journal of Politics, 29 (August, 1967), 585-596.

help prepare the State of the Union address, a budget message, the third Inaugural, and to develop strategy for the battle with Congress over lend lease. Pleading that his position on lend lease might be more of a hindrance than a help in the fight with Congress, Hopkins received support for his cause from Marguerite LeHand, Roosevelt's personal secretary, and Justice Felix Frankfurter who induced the President to change his mind and send Hopkins to England.²

The frail, sickly Hopkins had begun to secure his position in the Roosevelt political family when Jesse Strauss resigned as head of the New York State Temporary Emergency Relief Administration. William Hodson, chairman of the Russell Sage Foundation, suggested Hopkins as a successor for Strauss, and Governor Franklin Roosevelt put him to work. In this role, Hopkins, as he had done in his earlier New York state social work, used imagination and ability to circumvent the bureaucracy, and he quickly impressed Roosevelt. Shortly after becoming President, Roosevelt called Hopkins to Washington to become director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Hopkins then became head of the Works Progress Administration, and later moved up to serve briefly as Secretary of Commerce. After Louis Howe's death in 1936, Hopkins became Franklin

²Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, c. 1948), 32, 230.

Roosevelt's most trusted adviser, dispatched the President's final decisions, served as Roosevelt's critic for speeches and legislative ideas, and to attest to his importance, soon became the main target for Roosevelt's naysayers. By 1940, Roosevelt so valued this relationship that he moved Hopkins into the White House to live. Later, Roosevelt told Wendell Willkie:

some day you may well be sitting here where I am now as President of the United States. And when you are, you'll be looking at that door over there and knowing that practically everybody who walks through it wants something out of you. You'll learn what a lonely job this is, and you'll discover the need for somebody like Harry Hopkins who asks for nothing except to serve you.

He also recognized in Hopkins a trait which made him even more valuable for Roosevelt's style of diplomacy: "Harry is the perfect ambassador for my purposes. He doesn't even know the meaning of the word 'protocol.' When he sees a piece of red tape, he just pulls out those old garden shears of his and snips it."³

When Roosevelt decided to send Hopkins to England, he told reporters that Hopkins was going merely to say hello to a few people. Roosevelt spoke the truth. He could get the needed information for the aid program through the American Embassy, but he really wanted publicity for

³Ibid., 2-17.

the lend lease proposal, and he believed Hopkins' mission would accomplish that, plus boosting the British public's morale.

On the day before Congress began debate on lend lease, and in the midst of an air raid, Harry Hopkins arrived in London to confer with British leaders. As Roosevelt made clear in his instructions to Hopkins, the mission was not to decide the extent to which Great Britain should be aided but to determine if British leaders were "asking for enough to see them through."⁴

The next morning, January 10, 1941, Hopkins went to No. 10 Downing Street for an appointment with Prime Minister Winston Churchill. They talked of the desire of Roosevelt and Churchill for a personal meeting, the state of British defenses, and the need for closer and better communications between the two leaders. After spending a weekend with the Prime Minister and paying his respects to the royal family, Hopkins cabled his first impressions to Roosevelt. In one of many notes delivered directly to the President, Hopkins wrote that the British "need our help desperately and I am sure you will permit nothing to stand in the way." In Hopkins' estimation, "Churchill is the gov't in every sense of the word---he controls the grand strategy and often the details---labor trusts him---

⁴Ibid., 236.

the army, navy, air force are behind him to a man. ---I cannot emphasize too strongly that he is the one and only person over here with whom you need to have a full meeting of the minds." Hopkins indeed believed that Churchill personified the British tenacity in holding their own against German pressures at home and in the Mediterranean, and he reiterated his approval of Roosevelt's desire for a summit conference by adding that "I am convinced this meeting between you and Churchill is essential."⁵

While Hopkins conferred with the Prime Minister, Roosevelt sought other ways to publicize the need for lend lease. Governor Herbert Lehman of New York suggested that he invite Wendell Willkie to the White House to discuss the best means of gaining total support for the national defense program, and the President agreed. Although Willkie opposed Roosevelt's domestic programs, the 1940 Republican Presidential candidate supported the Chief Executive's proposal to extend aid to Great Britain. With Willkie's approval, Roosevelt could dramatically declare bipartisan support for the measure, and hopefully reduce Congressional opposition.

The White House expanded on Governor Lehman's suggestion and decided that Willkie should make a trip to England. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Harold Guinzburg broached the

⁵Ibid., 242-244.

idea to a Willkie friend, Irita Van Doren, who in turn suggested the trip to Willkie. Shortly after the aid legislation went to Congress, Willkie publicly declared his support for the proposal and announced his plan to go to England to learn more about the situation.⁶

Four days later, at the urging of Secretary of State Cordell Hull---with prompting from the President---Willkie appeared at the White House to discuss his trip with Roosevelt. The President suggested that in addition to the Prime Minister, Willkie should confer with leading members of the Labor Party, people responsible for production, representatives of labor, and the English intellectual community. Following the conference, Willkie again called for Congressional approval of lend lease, warning opponents within the Republican Party that it would remain a minority party if they ignored the international crisis. Now, Roosevelt had the popular Republican on his side, and although Willkie paid for his trip from personal funds, he became the President's unofficial, personal Representative to Churchill and the English people.⁷

⁶Herbert Lehman to Roosevelt, November 7, 1940, President's Personal File: Lehman Folder, Box 93, FDRL; Typewritten manuscript detailing account of dinner meeting with Wendell Willkie, January 16, 1941, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Willkie, Wendell File, Box 112, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.

⁷Frankfurter file, *ibid.*; U.S. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 87, pt. 10, January 14, 1941, A106; New York Times, January 15, 1941, 12; January 20, 1941, 6; Donald B. Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell

On January 26, Willkie held a news conference in London. Speaking to a gathering of over two hundred newsmen, Willkie contributed what Roosevelt desired---the voice of the opposition party in behalf of aid to Britain. When questioned about the practical value of his trip, Willkie declared, "I don't know what you mean by practical use but I do make speeches and write sometimes," and to the delight of the British, added that "I want to do all I can to get the United States to give England the utmost aid possible in her struggle for free men all over the world."⁸

Between January 27 and February 5, Willkie met British officials, toured coastal defense installations, saw the House of Commons in session, and inspected the results of German air raids. Further, by the frequent visits with the man on the street and his publicized jaunts around the country, Willkie helped dramatize the significance of the President's lend lease proposal.

At that time, with an abundance of newspaper reports describing Willkie's activities, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Walter George, sought Willkie's appearance before that committee. On February 9, he returned to the United States and presented his support for lend lease before the Senate committee.

Willkie (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), 173.

⁸The Times, January 28, 1941, 4; New York Times, January 27, 1941, 1,4; February 9, 1941, part 4, 8.

With Willkie's testimony before that body, Roosevelt had the most recent Republican Presidential candidate's concurrence--backed by a personal inspection for his proposed lend lease legislation.⁹

While the Republican leader did his job, Harry Hopkins continued his activities. With Prime Minister Churchill, Hopkins traveled to Scotland to give a send-off to Lord Halifax, the new British Ambassador to the United States. They visited air raid warning stations, toured coastal defenses at Dover, Southampton, and Portsmouth, met with representatives of some governments-in-exile, and appeared together on the platform when Churchill spoke to local officials in Glasgow.

After extending his stay to six weeks, Hopkins cabled his full report to President Roosevelt. That Hopkins' thirty page report was probably compiled by a logistics expert did not matter; the important point is that the British trusted Hopkins with secret data that revealed the dire situation in England. Further, the British Prime Minister knew that this Personal Representative

⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on S.275, part 3, 77 Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, 873, 900-906; Roosevelt seriously considered using Willkie as his Personal Representative to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia but the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended that idea. Welles to Roosevelt, December 5, 1941; Roosevelt to Willkie, December 5, 1941 (never sent); Memo by Grace Tully to Roosevelt, December 8, 1941, President's Personal File: 7023 (Willkie, Wendell), FDRL.

was the President's closest adviser, and treated him with utmost confidence and respect. Churchill developed the kind of relationship with Hopkins whereby he presented proposals to Hopkins for the President's consideration, but if Hopkins felt the time was not right for the idea, Churchill knew he should not approach Roosevelt.¹⁰

In conjunction with the aid program, Roosevelt wanted a summit meeting with the British leader. He believed a personal conference with Churchill would lend emphasis to the American commitment to the Allies and at the same time promote a consensus in the American public's mind for a more active role in the conflict. The Prime Minister concurred with the President's idea, but the protracted debates over lend lease, British intervention in Greece, and German successes in the Balkans caused first Roosevelt and then Churchill to ask a postponement of the conference.

By the summer of 1941, however, Roosevelt concluded the summit must be held soon. He decided to include a discussion of the coverage of Iceland by American naval patrols, and he wanted personally to reassure Churchill

¹⁰Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 28, 1941, 855.001 Leopold/78; Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 28, 1941, 740.0011 EW1939/8061; Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 30, 1941, Harry Hopkins Papers, Box 121, Folder A; Harry Hopkins Diary, January 30, 1941; Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 31, 1941; Hopkins to Roosevelt, February 3, 1941, 121.841 Hopkins, Harry/10 3/7, Harry Hopkins Papers, Box 121, Folder A, FDRL; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 257-258.

about continued American support. Again, he sent Hopkins to London, this time to get Churchill's agreement on a firm date for the meeting.

Once in London, Hopkins informed Churchill of Roosevelt's decision about the shipping; moreover, he secured agreement on a date for the conference. Later, as he discussed other problems with British officials, Hopkins concluded that his lack of knowledge about the Russian front and its relations to Anglo-American military strategy necessitated a trip to Russia. On July 25, Hopkins cabled Roosevelt that he should travel from London to Moscow because "everything possible should be done to make certain that the Russians maintain a permanent front even though they be defeated in this immediate battle." Roosevelt could send a personal note so that "Stalin would then know in an unmistakable way that we mean business on a long term supply job." On the following day, Roosevelt cabled his approval.¹¹

Shortly after arriving in Moscow on July 28, Hopkins met Premier Stalin and informed him that President Roosevelt desired a discussion of the ways in which the United States could most effectively extend aid to Russia. Stalin

¹¹Roosevelt to Hopkins, July 26, 1941, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee On The Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, part 20, 79 Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, 4373.

at once requested anti-aircraft guns, two thousand pursuit planes, and added that Murmansk would be the best ice-free port for receiving supplies. After a brief meeting with British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps and Foreign Affairs Minister V.M. Molotov, Hopkins and Stalin met for a second time. Stalin opened with an in-depth analysis of German military positions on the Eastern front, their capabilities, and the successes and failures of the Russian forces. He reiterated the primary need for tanks, aluminum for aircraft construction, machine guns, and large anti-aircraft guns. Hopkins noted the requests but added that the logistics problem could not be adequately resolved until a joint conference was held to explore the strategic interests and needs of the three nations. Stalin agreed to give the proposal his personal attention, an action which, to Hopkins, meant that the conference was almost assured of taking place. Hopkins had earlier met with Molotov and learned so little from that conference that he knew Stalin alone gave out any important information and made all vital decisions. Roosevelt valued and later used Hopkins' personal observations in his attempts to win over the Russian leader.¹²

¹²Memorandum by Harry Hopkins, July 30, 1941, FRUS, 1941, I: 802-815; Harry Hopkins, "The Inside Story of My Meeting With Stalin," American Magazine, 132 (December, 1941), 14-15, 114-117.

Departing Moscow on August 1, Hopkins hoped to return to England in time to accompany Churchill to Newfoundland for the historic meeting with Roosevelt. His physical condition, however, did not lend itself to the arduous task of riding a military bomber on a trip from Great Britain to Russia and back within three days. He had been seriously ill in 1937 when a cancerous malignancy required the removal of part of his stomach. Now, in his haste to return, he forgot his supply of medicine and spent the journey in misery. The next day, August 2, one week after he cabled for permission to go to Russia, Hopkins rested on the British warship Prince of Wales as it awaited the Prime Minister.¹³

On August 9, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met at Argentia Bay, Newfoundland. In addition to discussions on military strategy and the extension of the American naval patrols, Churchill tried unsuccessfully to gain a positive understanding about America's position if war should break out in Asia. Realizing that they had to make a public declaration and hopeful of dramatizing the growing relationship between the two nations, the two leaders discussed the possibility of issuing a joint statement of purpose. The British delegation proposed five articles, the third of which read "they respect the right

¹³Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 347-348.

of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live." Roosevelt, unable to pass up an opportunity to express his convictions about self-determination, proposed that they add "and they hope that self-government may be restored to those from whom it has been forcibly removed." With some revisions, the two leaders issued a press release which became known as the Atlantic Charter. The statement declared that both nations sought no territory or territorial changes without the consent of the people involved, recognized the rights of all people to choose their own form of government, favored access by all nations to trade and raw materials of the world, sought world cooperation to improve labor, economic, and social standards, desired a world free from fear and want; and believed that all nations should have freedom of the seas and a peace based on disarmament pending establishment of a permanent system of international security.¹⁴

The Atlantic Charter received praise throughout the parts of the world which struggled against Axis aggression and inspired many inhabitants of the British Empire. Most Americans accepted the statements as drawing the two nations closer together and in particular viewed Article Three as symbolic of the United States' position in the

¹⁴Memorandum by Sumner Welles, August 10, 1941, FRUS, 1941, I: 354-356; Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading (New York: Harper and Brothers, c. 1946), 6-18.

world of 1941.

While President Franklin D. Roosevelt strongly believed in the right of self-determination, his attempts to uphold Article Three of the Atlantic Charter would be influenced by the American war effort, domestic politics, and the article's possible effect on the Grand Alliance. This became clear shortly after the summit meeting when British and Russian forces invaded and occupied Iran. The Iranian Minister in Washington called on the United States to take steps to uphold Iranian independence. Recognizing the strategic importance of the territory and not wanting to block the Allies' efforts against Germany, Roosevelt replied that the invasion was justified.¹⁵

Although the President wisely refrained from intervening in the Iranian situation, British policy toward India caught his attention. He reacted to the problem with imprudent and meddling policies which showed once again his tendency toward impulsive, dramatic responses which not only confused many American citizens, State Department officials, and Indian nationals hopeful for independence, but also strained Anglo-American relations.

Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,

¹⁵Memorandum of conversation by Cordell Hull, August 22, 1941, FRUS, 1941, III: 406-407; Memorandum by Wallace Murray, August 26, 1941, ibid., 419-421; Memorandum of conversation by Cordell Hull, August 27, 1941, ibid., 431.

Roosevelt and Churchill met in Washington to plan wartime strategy. Anxious over the military losses in the Far East, Roosevelt opened discussion on British policy in India. As the Prime Minister himself later wrote, "I reacted so strongly and at such length" that Roosevelt never spoke of the problem again.¹⁶

In spite of Churchill's adverse reactions, events caused Roosevelt to continue pressing for a change in British policy. The Japanese move into Singapore on February 14, 1942, caused him much anxiety, and at the same time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took up the matter of British policy and India. On February 25, the Committee reviewed the status of American manpower in the Far East, specifically in China and India. Senators Thomas Connally, Arthur Vandenberg, Robert LaFollette, and Theodore Green were particularly outspoken in their belief that the United States should demand autonomy for India. The State Department representative at that meeting, Breckinridge Long, concluded that the unanimity of the members present and the length of their arguments should be taken seriously, because their strength could lead to attacks against the administration for its failure to push for political changes and large scale military

¹⁶Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, vol. 4 of The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 209.

activities to support the American manpower in the Far East. The White House took note of the Senators' collective view, for on that same evening Roosevelt wired John Winant that either the Ambassador or W. Averell Harriman, Roosevelt's Personal Representative in charge of lend lease in Britain, should determine Churchill's attitude toward a new policy in India.¹⁷

On the next morning, February 26, Churchill told Harriman that the Moslems made up seventy-five per cent of the Indian fighting force, and since that group's population exceeded one-hundred million and remained antagonistic to the All India Congress movement, he would do nothing to alienate them. While Churchill remained adamant in his position, he did inform Roosevelt that the British had thought of dominion status for India, but to grant it at that time would throw the state into chaos. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister saw the need for softening the criticism of Britain's position and ordered a special mission under Sir Stafford Cripps to conduct direct discussions with Indian political leaders and the heads of Indian cities and towns. Knowing that many politicians and members of the All India Congress sought immediate independence, Churchill also agreed to propose full

¹⁷Memorandum by Breckinridge Long to Welles, February 25, 1942, FRUS, 1942, I. 606-607.

independence to India after the war if demanded by an elected assembly.¹⁸

In order to hush his Senatorial critics and to refute Churchill's arguments about the instability of Indian political diversity, Roosevelt suggested a specific policy to the British leader. He pointed to the individuality of the original thirteen American states and how they eventually formed a strong unified nation. Citing this example, Roosevelt called for a temporary government in India to be headed by a group representing the different castes, religions, geographic areas, and the existing British government. Such a body, he believed, could set the ground work for a permanent government which could take over following the war. Unsure that his suggestions would not upset the British and thinking of the likely political and religious turmoil in India if his plan should be accepted, Roosevelt covered his tracks by declaring, "For the love of heaven don't bring me into this, though I do want to be of help. It is strictly speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making."¹⁹

¹⁸Harriman to Roosevelt, February 26, 1942, ibid., 608; Churchill to Roosevelt, March 4, 1942, ibid., 612.

¹⁹Roosevelt to Churchill, March 10, 1942, FRUS, 1942, I: 615-616; Gary Hess, America Encounters India, 1941-1947 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, c. 1971), 39.

While the President was attempting to give Churchill a lesson in political science, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle proposed the dispatching of an economic mission to India to evaluate the productive capacity and efficiency of India's war effort. Because of the devastating and rapid military successes by the Japanese, Roosevelt decided the mission must go and announced that Louis Johnson would head the task force.

The President's decision to send an envoy to India came primarily from his concern for the effect of the political quarrel on the Allies' military effort. Further, the selection of Louis Johnson, a novice in diplomacy, perhaps reveals Roosevelt's belief that the presence of any Personal Representative in India would influence the disputants to turn their energies against the Japanese.

Although Roosevelt was primarily concerned with strategy, he also used the mission as a means of employing the loyal and influential Johnson. The West Virginia Democrat served as organizer of the veterans' vote in the 1932 campaign, and was rewarded with an appointment as Assistant Secretary of War. In that post, Johnson advocated all-out preparedness for the United States but ultimately resigned in 1940 because of a policy clash with the isolationist Secretary of War, Harry Woodring. The President did not know or care that his man had no known views on colonialism or the specific subject of India, but

instead remembered him as an organizer and former national commander of the politically potent American Legion, who felt hurt when not appointed to succeed Woodring as Secretary of War, and betrayed when Roosevelt selected Henry Wallace as his running mate. By naming Johnson to the India mission post, Roosevelt could use him to perform a vital task for the nation, while at the same time, soothe the politician's feelings.²⁰

At the outset of the discussions on his mission to India, Johnson objected to the title of "Commissioner" because he felt that many Southerners viewed it as a label for "a conspicuously unsuccessful lawyer." He did, however, agree with the suggestion that he be the "Personal Representative of the President." When Assistant Secretary of State G. Howland Shaw then informed him that his duties as Special Representative at New Delhi would take precedence over his work as Chairman of the mission, Johnson said that was the first he had heard of that and complained that he had not received any information about his mission.

The State Department continued to brief Johnson for his mission, but he received no specific instructions from the President. While the earlier suggestions to Churchill

²⁰Memorandum by Adolf Berle, January 28, 1942, Berle to Roosevelt, January 29, 1942; Roosevelt to Berle, February 2, 1942, Official File 48-H, FDRL; Department of State Release, March 9, 1942, FRUS, 1942, I: 613; Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom, 220.

for a possible confederacy in India revealed Roosevelt's imprecise and poorly-conceived approach to the Indian question, the lack of instructions to Johnson perhaps indicated calculation on Roosevelt's part. He likely refrained from spelling out those objectives because he knew that Johnson tended to be blunt in tackling political problems and that he would probably charge into the conflict with the self-imposed goal of settling the issues so that the war could be fought without facing serious political obstacles. Ambiguity also provided Roosevelt an opportunity to later alter Johnson's status without appearing to bend to British demands that the United States stop meddling in its colonial policies. At the same time he modified Johnson's status, Roosevelt recalled the American Commissioner from New Delhi. Thomas Wilson had served in that post since July 1941, and could have provided valuable assistance to Johnson; but the President wanted "one who had a close recent contact with military affairs and who is well known to the leaders of our armed forces." In fact, Roosevelt wanted someone in India whom he could trust and rely upon to report directly to him. Moreover, the announcement that the "President's Personal Representative" was being dispatched to India would be more likely to capture the American public's attention than merely upgrading a Foreign Service Officer.²¹

²¹Welles to Wilson, March 11, 1942, FRUS, 1942, I: 617-618.

During this time, Sir Stafford Cripps met with Indian leaders and explained the British plan to broaden the Viceroy's executive council to include Indian national representatives. While the Viceroy continued to be the Imperial administrator in India and the Council remained responsible to the Crown, the British promised that instructions to the Council would be kept at a minimum. The plan further called for all military operations to be under British officers, but once the war ended, a representative group of Indians and delegates from the princely states would prepare a constitution establishing India as an independent dominion; but each province would retain the right to join or remain outside the federation and form its own government. The Cripps Plan met opposition from Indian nationals who rejected the proposal because of continued British control of defenses and Britain's intention of granting recognition to Pakistan.²²

With the belief that his Commander-in-Chief stood firmly behind him, Louis Johnson arrived in New Delhi on April 3, 1942. After holding two long sessions with Cripps, Johnson cabled Roosevelt that Cripps favored some

²²Haselton to Hull, March 26, 1942, Department of State File 845.01/133 National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Hereafter any reference to Department of State Files will be D.S. File...NA; Haselton to Hull, March 28, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/134 NA; Merrel to Hull, April 2, 1942, FRUS, 1942, I: 624; Haselton to Hull, March 31, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/140, NA.

compromises which included giving India a place in the War Cabinet and the naming of an Indian as defense minister. Cripps had also proposed an alternative which would convert the defense ministry into a war ministry under the Imperial Commander and, at the same time, create a new office of Minister of Coordination of Defense. This post would be filled by an Indian who could be in charge of "relatively innocuous matters." While Cripps worked diligently to develop an acceptable compromise, Viceroy Lord Linlithgow and General Archbald Wavell informed Churchill of their opposition to the plan. Agreeing with Cripps' proposals, Johnson called for the President to intercede with Churchill or risk failure of the entire British effort. Roosevelt rejected Johnson's plea for intercession on the grounds that if he "interposed his own views, the results would complicate further an already complicated situation."²³

Even though the President decided to stay out of the affair, Johnson pushed hard for Cripps' compromises. On April 8, Johnson met with General Wavell and convinced him that nothing would be lost in changing the form of the military administration in India. With Wavell's recommendation and Viceroy Lord Linlithgow's apparent approval,

²³Johnson to Roosevelt, April 4, 1942; Welles to Johnson, April 5, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/149, NA; Hess, America Encounters India, 47.

Johnson and Cripps seemed ready to achieve a settlement.²⁴

While Johnson pursued the compromise, Roosevelt's chief agent, Harry Hopkins, met with Churchill to discuss forthcoming military operations. The Prime Minister called Hopkins to his office and read a dispatch from the Viceroy. According to Lord Linlithgow's account, Cripps, with Johnson's active cooperation, presented the alternative plan without consulting the resident administrator in India. In an attempt to assuage Churchill's "unfortunate impression" that Johnson had instructions to intervene, Hopkins told the Prime Minister that Johnson's original mission had nothing to do with the political crisis and that he was not acting in an official capacity. Hopkins then informed Churchill that Roosevelt wanted his name kept out of the situation unless the Prime Minister requested his assistance and that he would mediate only if both parties would accept any plan he worked out. Churchill had all he needed to stop Johnson's meddling and informed the Viceroy that the American was not acting on Roosevelt's behalf.²⁵

²⁴Johnson to Hull, April 9, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/153, NA.

²⁵Hopkins to Roosevelt, April 9, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/158, NA; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 524-525.

Unaware of the activities in London, Johnson proposed the substitute defense amendment and received endorsement by Cripps, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Indian Congress President. Cripps then announced that he could not change the original proposals unless Churchill approved, an announcement which meant the end to the negotiations. Johnson held no bitterness toward Cripps, for the American knew that London--meaning Churchill--had not been enthusiastic about the talks. It appeared to Johnson that as the negotiations reached a settlement, the Prime Minister could not accept the prospects of seeing the government lose any control of its valued possession. On April 19, the Indian Congress rejected Cripps' plan.²⁶

If the Louis Johnson mission to India had a specific goal of settling the political conflict, it failed. Responsibility for the lack of success rests not with Johnson but in the White House. Roosevelt knew well that Johnson would not stand still during the Cripps negotiations, yet he refused to back his envoy with any serious efforts to dissuade Churchill from recalling Cripps. His clumsy, whimsical proposal for an Indian confederation exposed his shallow understanding of the conflict and gave Churchill an opportunity to blame the Indian politicians for not

²⁶Johnson to Roosevelt, April 11, 1942, President's Secretary's File: India, 1942, Box 43, FDRL.

accepting the Prime Minister's plan--which had some similarities to Roosevelt's proposal. Moreover, Hopkins' discussions with Churchill in London, whether directed by Roosevelt or not, demonstrated the President's unwillingness to support his envoy. Hopkins knew of Johnson's modified title to "Personal Representative Near The Government at New Delhi," but had no choice in his story to Churchill as he knew well that Roosevelt had no desire to confront the Prime Minister on the Indian issue.²⁷

Although the negotiations had ended, Johnson continued to try to fulfill what he thought was his mission. He informed Washington of a forthcoming All India Congress meeting and believed the pro-Allied Nehru would be strengthened in his attempt to gain more power in the Congress if the United States, Great Britain, and China would issue a joint statement of Pacific war aims which included freedom and self-determination for India. In an attempt to improve America's image in India, Johnson held a press conference and later spoke to the Indian people over the All-India Radio Station at Delhi. In both instances, he vaguely implied that the United States supported the

²⁷Johnson to Murray, June 10, 1942, D.S. File 123 Johnson, Louis A./38, NA; Johnson to Leonard Parker, June 29, 1942, D.S. File 845.24/245, NA; Leo Crowley to Roosevelt, July 6, 1942, OF 4069; Crowley to Stephen Early, July 10, 1942; OF 77, FDRL; Hess, America Encounters India, 52.

Indian goal of independence, but did not denounce colonial administrators or advocate specific changes in British policies. His efforts proved unsuccessful as angry British administrators saw Johnson's words as inflammatory, and Indian politicians criticized him for failing to condemn the British policies in India.²⁸

While Johnson persisted in his efforts to salvage something from the mission, mutterings were heard in Washington about the further usefulness of the President's Personal Representative. The Near Eastern Division of the State Department became concerned over Johnson's direct appeal to the Indian people and the effect of a declaration of war aims in the Pacific. Wallace Murray told Sumner Welles that Johnson's suggestion was impracticable and unadvisable because such a policy must include other Pacific areas or it would arouse antagonism among those groups. In a dispatch to Johnson, Welles set down Murray's ideas and further informed Johnson that he should not get too involved with any particular Indian political group. Fearful that he would completely antagonize the colonial government, the State Department hoped this message would quash any further public utterances by

²⁸Johnson to Roosevelt, April 13, 1942, FRUS, I: 635-637; Johnson to Roosevelt, April 17, 1942, ibid., 638-639; Memorandum of conversation by Wallace Murray, April 24, 1942, ibid., 639-642; The Statesman, April 22, 1942 (British newspaper in New Delhi); transcription of Louis Johnson Broadcast, April 23, 1942, OF 48-H, FDRL.

Johnson.²⁹

On May 4, Johnson made one final plea to Washington. He wrote Roosevelt that the All-India Congress had passed resolutions which reflected Gandhi's call for non-resistance to the Japanese. Johnson again proposed a national government for India, with the primary military defense of India to be left in the hands of the Viceroy. Welles told Roosevelt that the military situation would likely see little change and that the proposals should be rejected since they had no assurances that a second effort would be successful. The President wired his appreciation to Johnson for his efforts, but rejected the plan.³⁰

One day later, realizing the President's support had disintegrated, Johnson decided to end his mission. He had struggled for over a month and had nothing but rebuffs for those efforts. In addition, a bothersome sinus condition required minor surgery, and caused Johnson even more aggravation. With his physical condition as an excuse, Johnson announced his decision to return to the United

²⁹Johnson to Roosevelt, April 21, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/170; Johnson to Roosevelt, April 25, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/171; Wallace Murray to Berle, Welles, and Hull, April 24, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/175; Memorandum on Louis Johnson Press Conference, April 23, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/170, NA.

³⁰Johnson to Roosevelt, May 4, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/176; Wallace Murray to Welles, May 6, 1942, ibid.; Welles to Roosevelt, May 7, 1942, ibid.; Roosevelt to Johnson, May 6, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/186A, NA.

States. In spite of pleas from Washington that his sudden return would be misinterpreted, Johnson left India on May 14.³¹

In a conversation with Wallace Murray after his return to Washington, Johnson aired his ideas as to why the mission failed. Loyal Democrat to the end, Johnson made no comments on the President's vacillation and rejection of his policy proposals. Instead, he said the British Government had sabotaged the Cripps Mission, never wanting it to succeed. He also declared that while Cripps had not received specific power to make alternative proposals, the situation could have improved if Churchill had consented to further talks. Johnson never realized that the Prime Minister remained uncompromising in his position partly because Churchill knew Roosevelt was not committed to a definite change of policy by the British.³²

Following his meeting with State Department officials, Johnson recuperated from his illness at Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, and then returned to the law firm of Steptoe and Johnson in Clarksburg, West Virginia. President Roosevelt decided he should find a job for the

³¹Johnson to Roosevelt, May 9, 1942, FRUS, I: 651; Hull to Johnson, May 13, 1942, ibid., 653; Doctor Orrin E. Swenson to Johnson, May 14, 1942, D.S. File 123 Johnson, Louis A./38, NA.; Johnson to Roosevelt, May 14, 1942, FRUS, I: 654.

³²Memorandum by Wallace Murray, May 26, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/206, NA.

politically valuable Johnson but not as his Personal Representative. After the United States seized the German-owned General Aniline Corporation, Roosevelt, in July 1942, named Johnson as President of the General Dyestuff Corporation, a sales organization for the parent company. Johnson remained in that post until 1949, when he resigned to become Secretary of Defense for President Harry S. Truman. Johnson served in that post until September 1950, when illness and policy conflict caused his retirement.³³

During the summer months of 1942 conditions in India continued to worsen. From New Delhi the ranking State Department officer, George Merrell, sent messages revealing Gandhi's plan for massive civil disobedience in order to force immediate withdrawal by the British. Merrell also pointed out that Nehru and the All-India Congress would follow Gandhi's lead and passively demonstrate in a demand for immediate independence. When the British offered no changes in their policies, the Indian Congress passed resolutions calling for mass non-violent disobedience. As the passive resistance began, the British rounded up leading Indian political figures, and the promised revolt began. Throughout the remainder of August 1942, over four thousand Indians were killed or wounded, and about 100,000 were arrested and jailed. In a reply to the rebellion, Churchill

³³New York Times, December 8, 1951, 5.

blasted the Indian Congress' actions and held the original Cripps proposal as the only possible solution.³⁴

As the Indian issue flared, Roosevelt learned that some Indian political leaders believed that he could find a solution to the problem. The President again changed his mind and decided that he would again try to resolve the conflict.

Unable to resist the call of the Indian politicians, and understanding that the extremely tense situation "warranted the appointment of a trained diplomat of great distinction and prestige," Roosevelt named his old friend William Phillips as the new Personal Representative to India. Roosevelt selected Phillips partially because of their solid friendship but more so because he knew Phillips to be a conservative, tight-lipped diplomat who would not act in India without first securing the White House's approval. Also, the choice of Phillips became even easier because, in the summer of 1942, he did not have any outspoken views on the crisis and had the reputation of being an Anglophile.

A New England native, Phillips entered the diplomatic service in 1903 as personal secretary to Rufus Choate,

³⁴Merrell to Roosevelt, May 21, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/191; Merrell to Roosevelt, May 25, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/192; Merrell to Hull, June 17, 1942, D.S. File 845.01/207, NA.; Hess, America Encounters India, 81-88.

American Ambassador to the Court of St. James, and within nine years became first secretary of the Embassy in London. He then resigned his post and returned to the United States to serve as Secretary of The Corporation at Harvard University. At the urging of President Woodrow Wilson, he returned to the State Department in 1914 as Third Assistant Secretary of State, and while in this post became acquainted with Assistant Secretary of Navy Franklin Roosevelt. Particularly well-suited for the conservative nature of American diplomacy of the 1920's, the quiet, obedient Phillips served as Minister to The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium. The singular instance of personal reaction to American foreign policy came when Phillips resigned his Ambassadorship in Ottawa, Canada because of President Herbert Hoover's tariff policies. When Roosevelt became President, Phillips agreed to serve as Under Secretary of State. In 1936, he became Ambassador to Italy and remained in that post until 1940. By the summer of 1942, Phillips was Director of the Office of Strategic Services headquarters in London.³⁵

³⁵Phillips to Roosevelt, February 10, 1933, President's Personal File 552, FDRL; William J. Donovan to G. Howland Shaw, July 16, 1942, D.S. File 123P54/515, NA.; William Phillips' personal impressions of his government career, and the mission to India are found in his Ventures In Diplomacy (Boston: The Beacon Press, c. 1952); Raymond Moley After Seven Years (New York: Harper and Brothers, c. 1939), 131.

In the State Department, Sumner Welles and Wallace Murray recommended to Hull that Phillips be called home so he could be acquainted with the facts and latest developments about India. Even though Phillips had no diplomatic experience in that part of the world and had not been briefed about Johnson's mission, Roosevelt decided that Phillips would go directly to New Delhi. In addition to the State Department's problem of trying to inform Phillips of the situation in India, there was the nettlesome matter of his official title. Murray pointed out that because rank held great import in India, and since Phillips had rendered long and distinguished service to the government, he should be entitled to "Personal Representative of the President With the Rank of Ambassador." Murray further reasoned that if Phillips were named "Commissioner," the appointment would have to go to the Senate where some embarrassing questions might be asked about the last mission. While Roosevelt could settle the titular problem, the British did not agree so quickly. Lord Halifax preferred the latter title, believing that Personal Representative Johnson had committed serious blunders and had caused hard feelings between the two allies by actively exceeding his instructions. If Phillips had the lesser sounding title, Halifax believed his chances of mediating the problem would be nullified. After the British finally agreed, Roosevelt announced the appointment of William Phillips as his "Personal

Representative to serve near the Government of India."³⁶

With the announcement of Phillips' appointment, many people assumed that his goal was to actively seek a solution to the Indian problem, and in drafting his instructions, the State Department proved to be no exception. The proposed message mentioned that Phillips should discuss the Indian situation with British officials in London, and once abroad, he should keep "close contacts with the representatives of British, Hindu, and Moslem thought in India, as well as with representatives of any other influential groups." These suggestions gave Phillips more latitude than Roosevelt intended, as indicated by the cable of November 20 which made clear that Phillips' job did not include "such informal discussion to the point where it might be charged by the opposite side that you and this Government were attempting to intervene on our own initiative to put up proposals and plans for them to accept." Phillips then read that "the terrific complexities of the Indian situation are difficult to analyze and understand. With your great experience and fine common sense you will well understand how to preserve thoroughly agreeable

³⁶Welles to Murray, November 5, 1942; Murray to Welles, November 6, 1942; Welles to Hull, November 7, 1942; Murray to Welles, November 7, 1942; Murray to Welles, November 19, 1942, D.S. File 123P54/525 1/2; Murray to Shaw, November 10, 1942, D.S. File 123P54/557, NA.; M. J. McDermott to Stephen Early, December 10, 1942, OF 2314, FDRL.

relations with both countries and how to say or do anything, in a tactful way, that might encourage both sides or either side, in the way of a practical settlement." Phillips was struck by the naivete' of the statement that suggested that he might be able to produce an agreement when the conflict had been so intense for years. But then Phillips, like Louis Johnson, concluded that he must do everything possible to help solve the issue because he assumed the President had finally decided to make a firm stand on the Indian question; otherwise why send him?³⁷

After he arrived in New Delhi on January 8, 1943, Phillips spent the first few weeks acquainting himself with the situation. Presenting Roosevelt's personal letter, he met the Viceroy and received his assurances that he could travel about the country as he wished. He met Generals Archbald Wavell and Claude Auchinlech, both of whom Phillips counted on as supporters of his mission. Wavell remained a believer in the empire but favored softer measures, while Auchinlech looked at the possibilities of improved military activities by the Indians if the political situation improved. Phillips found that while people in England wanted to grant dominion status to India, the Government of India remained totally opposed to a free

³⁷Draft of message to Phillips, November 7, 1942; Hull to Phillips, November 19, 1942, D.S. File 123P54/531, NA.; Phillips Ventures In Diplomacy, 343-345.

India, and that "it was the British themselves who were permitting the impasse to continue rather than using their good offices to bring the opposing parties together."

Phillips' personal conclusions, reached early in his stay in India, caused him much frustration and bitterness toward the British for their unyielding attitude.³⁸

Anxious to get away from the ever growing line of Indian nationalists at his office, and seeking to strengthen his position toward the Viceroy, Phillips visited several Indian provinces. He traveled to Lahore, Punjab, met several local officials, visited Punjab University and some holy shrines, and talked with local politicians. After two days Phillips returned to New Delhi enroute to Bombay.

Believing he could not carry out his mission unless he met Gandhi and the Congress leaders, all of whom were in custody, Phillips saw the Viceroy and asked permission to visit Gandhi in Bombay. The Viceroy denied Phillips' request on the ground that no government officials would be permitted to visit him, and indicated that Gandhi planned to start a fast the next day. Realizing the serious nature of Gandhi's action, Phillips agreed and postponed the rest of his tour.

On February 11, two days after Gandhi started his

³⁸Phillips to Roosevelt, January 22, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 180-183; Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, 349-355.

fast, Phillips wired Roosevelt that since the situation might reach serious proportions, more and more pressure centered on him to do something. Phillips described how every Indian visitor referred to the American power and influence to solve the problem, which left him in a position of not knowing what to say in return. Having requested clarification of his position and latitude of action, Phillips awaited word from Roosevelt.

Over the next three days, shops and markets closed in Calcutta, Bombay, New Delhi and smaller cities; explosions occurred in the Delhi railroad station; many Indian students stayed away from classes and demonstrated in sympathy for Gandhi. In describing those incidents, Phillips again pointed out that the Indian press continually criticized his silence and wondered when the American would see the jailed Congress leaders. Phillips' frustrations became clear as he wrote that "such comment is not pleasant to read" and "without instructions, I must not do anything to jeopardize my position with the Viceroy and therefore must stay and do nothing which might be interpreted as critical of the Government's actions or inaction." The President--with Phillips on the scene--had to make a decision.³⁹

³⁹Phillips to Hull, February 8, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 185-187; Phillips to Roosevelt, February 11, 1943, ibid., 189; Phillips to Hull, February 13, 1943, ibid., 192; Phillips to Hull, February 15, 1943, ibid., 193.

Roosevelt felt he had to take some action to answer the charges of American indifference toward India, but more importantly he feared that Phillips, like Johnson, might start making proposals to Indian politicians and British administrators. Roosevelt simply would not risk a confrontation with Churchill's policies because the prospects of a serious division could set back or destroy the Allied priority of defeating Germany. To have that strategy realigned because of India would mean less pressure on Germany from the West, a probable loss of one or more years operations in Europe, and the possibility that one of the Allies would find a separate peace to be in its national interests. In his work, America Encounters India, 1941-1947, Gary Hess claims that Roosevelt lost his "coercive potential" due to the Allies victories in North Africa, Stalingrad, and the Pacific in late 1942 and 1943; but if Roosevelt was really serious about independence for India, he would have been in a stronger position with the physical threat to India diminished and the concern about the impact of India's internal struggle on Allied military strategy eliminated. Roosevelt did not pressure Churchill, but told Secretary of State Hull that "in view of the fact that William Phillips is getting pretty well oriented in regard to the general situation in India, will you please wire him that I would like to see him in Washington the end of April or the beginning of May, and that he can get

a chance to be in this country about a month." Roosevelt wanted Phillips out of India but likely held out the possibility that he would soon return to India in order to keep him from making a Johnson-style exit.⁴⁰

Even though he knew Roosevelt's thoughts, Phillips represented the President and could not remain in India as a disinterested observer. After receiving approval to approach the Viceroy and informally inquire about Gandhi's fast, Phillips told the Viceroy that the President "hoped some means could be found to avert the worsening of the situation which would almost certainly follow Gandhi's death." The Viceroy told Phillips that the present British policy remained correct and that although there would be some trouble in India, it would pass within six months. He told Phillips not to mention his visit but tell reporters that the Viceroy was keeping him informed. From that, Phillips assumed the Viceroy desired no further personal contact with the American, and from that time, few of Phillips' messages mention meetings with the Viceroy. One day later, February, 19, Phillips met with Chakravarty Rajagopalachari, another Indian Congress leader. Known as a moderate in Indian politics, Rajagopalachari told Phillips that the United States needed to clarify its position or

⁴⁰Roosevelt to Hull, February 15, 1943, OF 48-II, 1943, FDRL; Hull to Phillips, February 16, 1943, D.S. File 123P54/581, NA.; Hess, America Encounters India, 102-103.

or Asians would conclude that America was collaborating with Great Britain in India. Voicing his fear of an anti-white reaction should Gandhi die, he called on Phillips to do something to prevent the catastrophe.⁴¹

Without instructions, Phillips could do nothing. Indian nationalists saw his inaction and silence as America's support for British policies. Following the unsuccessful meeting with the Viceroy, Phillips suggested that Roosevelt pressure Ambassador Halifax and that the Crown release Gandhi. Phillips really wanted a statement from Washington which would reassure the Indian nationalists and give him positive instructions to intervene to help solve the immediate crisis. Phillips got his instructions on February 20 when Hull wired him to tell politicians and reporters "that any phases of the Indian situation which requires discussion will be dealt with by the ranking officials of the American and British Governments." Phillips still had no way of pressuring the Viceroy or answering the Indian nationalists.⁴²

By March 3, with the fast ended and Gandhi still alive, Phillips wrote President Roosevelt that the fast

⁴¹Phillips to Hull, February, 16, 1943, D.S. File 845.00/1798, NA.; Hull to Phillips, February 17, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 195; Phillips to Hull, February 19, 1943, ibid., 196-197.

⁴²Hull to Phillips, February 20, 1943, ibid., 199.

resulted in greater anti-British feelings throughout India; and to reduce the hostility, Phillips proposed that the President invite all Indian political leaders to gather and discuss future plans for India. The conference would be chaired by an American who could harmonize the divergent views of the participants, show America's interest in India's future, and serve as a guarantee of India's independence. To pressure the Indian politicians, the conference would be held under the auspices of the King, President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Phillips felt certain that the Indian leaders could not refuse the offer, for to do so would show the world that India was not ready for self-government. In closing, Phillips appealed to Roosevelt's political side by declaring that while the conference might not be successful, it would nevertheless show that the United States had taken dramatic steps to further the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. Phillips never received a reply to his March 3 suggestions, but Roosevelt read them, thought them "amazingly radical for a man like Bill," and asked Hopkins to show the report to the visiting Anthony Eden. The British Foreign Minister saw the dispatch but ignored it because he knew Roosevelt would not reply favorably to Phillips' plan. Unaware of the President's action, the State Department also reviewed Phillips' formula for a settlement and in a long note to Welles and Hull, Wallace Murray added

his support to Phillips' proposal to enable the United States to at least be on record as having made the effort. While the State Department seriously pondered the import of the note, Hopkins showed the dispatch to Eden and then had it filed away.⁴³

After writing down his ideas, Phillips left on his delayed tour of southern India. In Bombay, he met with many local politicians and found the same anti-British hostility there as in Delhi. He then traveled to Madras where he again met Rajagopalachari and learned that the Indian again planned to call for Gandhi's release--convinced that a "duration of the war" settlement could be reached. Phillips also toured the states of Hyderabad, Travancore, and Mysore and learned more about the immense problems which awaited the Indians in attempting to reconcile sectional, political, and economic differences.

Upon his return to New Delhi, Phillips learned that the conference between the Viceroy and the Indian political leaders had fallen through. The Indians sought to gain permission to see Gandhi, but the Viceroy refused to go beyond statements to be delivered and answered in writing. Concluding that the British authorities had no desire to

⁴³Phillips to Roosevelt, March 3, 1943, D.S. File 845.00/1906; Roosevelt to Hopkins, March 19, 1943, President's Secretary File: India, 1943, Box 43, FDRL; Murray to Welles and Hull, March 31, 1943, D.S. File 845.00/1916, NA.; Hess, America Encounters India, 106.

end the deadlock, Phillips knew his request to see Gandhi and Nehru would also be refused. As Phillips planned to return to Washington, he felt the mission would end in failure unless he saw the leading Indian politicians. Knowing the meaning of Washington's silence on his March 3 proposals, Phillips nevertheless told Hull that his request to the Viceroy would be strengthened if he were "in a position to say that my Government hopes that my request for permission to visit Gandhi and Nehru will be granted." Welles opposed the idea and told Hull that as Phillips was returning to the United States shortly, nothing should be done to deviate from past policy until the Department and Phillips reviewed his conclusions. Hull accepted Welles' recommendations and informed Phillips on April 14 that his request would have to be on a "purely personal basis."⁴⁴

Under Secretary of State Welles not only opposed Phillips proposal for intervention, but inadvertently made Phillips' stay in India more uncomfortable with a letter to the New York Times. Replying to Harvard University Professor Ralph Barton Perry's criticism of the Department's

⁴⁴Donovan to Hull, March 11, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 208; Bowers to Hull, March 19, 1943, ibid., 209; Phillips to Hull, March 19, 1943, D.S. File 123P547591; Phillips to Hull, April 1, 1943, FRUS, 1943 IV: 210; Phillips to Hull, April 4, 1943, ibid.; Phillips to Hull, April 2, 1943, ibid., 211; Murray to Welles, April 6, 1943; and Welles to Hull, April 6, 1943, D.S. File 845.00/1933, NA.; Hull to Phillips, April 14, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 215.

India policy, Welles repudiated a role of active intervention by the United States in India. When news of Welles' letter reached India, the story omitted a passage referring to America's willingness to assist in the situation, leading the Indian press to conclude that Welles' letter reflected an American underwriting of British policy. In a tense meeting with Hindu newspapermen, Phillips tried vainly to explain policy limitations but saw that the only action to offset the bitter feelings would be a successful attempt to meet with Gandhi and Nehru. As a result of the conference, Phillips wrote Roosevelt that:

India is suffering from paralysis, the people are discouraged and there is a feeling of growing hopelessness. The political leaders remain hostile to one another, although they maintain that if the British would open the door to negotiation they could manage to pull together on a provisional basis for the duration of the war and to prepare for postwar responsibilities. Meanwhile, there is very little thought given to the war among Indians. India is in a state of inertia, prostration, divided counsels and helplessness, with growing distrust and dislike for the British, and disappointment and disillusion with regard to Americans. Indians say that while they are in sympathy with the aims of the United Nations, they are not to be allowed to share the benefits of such aims, and they feel, therefore, that they have nothing to fight for. Churchill's exclusion of India from the principles of the Atlantic Charter is always referred to in this connection.

As I see it, unless the present atmosphere is changed for the better, we Americans will have to bear the burden of the coming campaign in this part of the world and cannot count on more than token assistance from the British in British India.

It was for this reason that I have laid so much stress on asking the Viceroy for permission to see Gandhi. If the record shows that I have never made a serious effort to obtain the views of the Congress Party from Gandhi, then indeed my future usefulness here is at an end. For it would be assumed that I have not been interested in the picture as a whole and have been satisfied to give my Government a one-sided and incomplete report of the situation. My stock would fall very low indeed, unless it were known that I had, at least, made the effort.⁴⁵

When he received an invitation to join the Viceroy for a tiger hunt, Phillips knew the time to make his request had arrived. During a three hour elephant ride, Phillips explained that if the Viceroy refused to let him see Gandhi, he would let it be known publicly that he had tried. The Viceroy refused to allow Phillips to see Gandhi and with little choice agreed to Phillips' statement about the rejection. Phillips' visit to Dhera Dun was an unsuccessful "hunt for Gandhi," but he left satisfied after finally making the effort.

⁴⁵New York Times, April 11, 1943, 1, 28; Phillips to Hull, April 16, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 216; Phillips to Roosevelt, April 19, 1943, President's Secretary's File: India, 1943, Box 43, FDRL; Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy, 378-381.

Prior to his departure from New Delhi, Phillips hosted a cocktail party for the press. There he announced that "I should like to have met and talked with Mr. Gandhi; that I have requested the appropriate authorities for permission to do so and have been informed that they were unable to grant the necessary facilities." Phillips finally placed the burden directly on the British, and thereby gave Indians the impression that he tried but was denied a chance to mediate the conflict. Newspapers throughout India criticized the British for refusing the request, with the Indian Social Reformer alone pointing out Washington's lack of support for Phillips. American newspapers and periodicals reported his announcement, but it created little excitement among the public.⁴⁶

Once back in Washington, Phillips met with the President to discuss the Indian situation. In his manner of personally avoiding unpleasanties, Roosevelt started to joke, rambled on other topics, and so monopolized the conversation that Phillips could only listen. Far from satisfied that the President understood his feelings about India, Phillips went to the State Department and wrote a report to Roosevelt. Airing his pent-up frustrations, Phillips informed the President that:

⁴⁶Phillips to Hull, April 25, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 220; Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy, 382-383; Hess, America Encounters India, 109-110.

There is no evidence that the British intend to do much more than give token assistance. If that is so, then the conditions surrounding our base in India become of vital importance. The present Indian army is purely mercenary and only that part of it which is drawn from the martial races has been tried in actual warfare and these martial soldiers represent only thirty-three percent of that army.

It is not right for the British to say "this is none of your business" when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the future struggle with Japan. If we do nothing and merely accept the British point of view that conditions in India are none of our business then we must be prepared for various serious consequences in the internal situation in India which may develop as a result of despair and misery and anti-white sentiments of hundreds of millions of subject people.⁴⁷

One week later, Roosevelt asked Phillips to talk with Churchill while the latter visited in Washington. Phillips assumed that the President had had enough of Churchill on India and that he preferred that Phillips himself be across from the Prime Minister at this meeting. Perhaps Roosevelt believed that if Churchill was rough enough on the diplomat, Phillips would be reluctant to return to India, thereby giving Roosevelt a way out of the situation. At the British Embassy on May 23, Phillips learned firsthand of the obstinance encountered by Roosevelt when he raised the

⁴⁷Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy, 386-387; Phillips to Roosevelt, May 14, 1943, President's Secretary's File: India, 1943, Box 43, FDRL.

topic of India with the Prime Minister. In his memoirs, Phillips writes that he presented his views on the military, political, and educational aspects of Indian society and added that Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of Muslims in India, should be given the opportunity to meet and try to reach an agreement. Highly annoyed, Churchill exclaimed "My answer to you is: Take India if that is what you want! Take it by all means! But I warn you that if I open the door a crack there will be the greatest bloodbath in all history; yes, bloodbath in all history. Mark my words, I prophesied the present war, and I prophesy the bloodbath." Phillips reported the Prime Minister's reaction to Roosevelt who seemed amused at the meeting, "but glad I had spoken out so frankly."⁴⁸

At a later meeting with the President, Phillips mentioned that unless some British policy changes took place, he felt a return to India would be useless. Roosevelt agreed and said he would ask Churchill to send Eden to India for exploratory talks with all political leaders, and if the Prime Minister agreed he would then say that he wanted Phillips to go along. At the same time, Roosevelt astonished Phillips by suggesting that until the Eden proposal had been accepted, he would take the Minister's post in Ottawa, Canada. Roosevelt may have been amused at

⁴⁸Phillips, Ventures In Diplomacy, 389-390.

Phillips' meeting with Churchill, but he decided the diplomat's usefulness in India had ended. Phillips knew that such an appointment would be seen in India as a decision by the President to ignore Indian aspirations for independence. Roosevelt agreed, and not wanting to discuss the issue further, he told Phillips to take a leave and await further developments.

The State Department and the American Mission in New Delhi explained Phillips' extended stay in the United States as due to the Indian "hot season," but as that period drew to a close, the President had to decide about a public statement on Phillips' future. By ordering Phillips back to his post, Roosevelt would raise false hopes among the Indians and irritate Churchill. If he did not send him back, Roosevelt would disappoint Indian politicians and be criticized for acquiescing to British policy. To solve his dilemma, and probably at the President's own suggestion, the War Department requested that Phillips assist with political and civilian planning related to the forthcoming Allied operations against the European continent. Roosevelt quickly agreed to the request and declared that if conditions warrant, he would order his Personal Representative back to New Delhi. Phillips retained his official title, but Roosevelt never intended to send him back to India.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Phillips, ibid., 391-392; Phillips to Roosevelt,

Before he left the United States for London, Phillips learned of a serious famine in Bengal and attempted to persuade Roosevelt that the United States should make all possible efforts to help relieve the suffering of those people. Not only did the humanitarian element prompt Phillips to make the suggestion, but he believed the American image in India could be improved by that action. The President finally decided to make no further gestures toward the British regarding India and "carried this policy to tragic lengths." Phillips' note and appeals from the Indian League of America were sent to the State Department where Cordell Hull declared that "shipping between the United States and India is now under British control and it therefore rests with the British to determine to what extent available space may be utilized for the transportation of any foodstuffs which might be sent from this country."⁵⁰

May 31, 1943, President's Secretary's File: India, 1943, Box 43, FDRL; Merrell to Hull, July 2, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 225; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., and Joe A. Morris, eds., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 52-53; Merrell to Hull, September 8, 1943, D.S. File 123P54/616; Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, August 30, 1943, D.S. File 123P54/616 1/2, NA.; Hull to Merrell, September 8, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 226-227.

⁵⁰Phillips to Roosevelt, September 9, 1943, President's Secretary's File: India, 1943, Box 43, FDRL; Hull to Merrell, October 13, 1943, FRUS, 1943, IV: 307; Burns, Roosevelt, Soldier of Freedom, 381.

Even with Phillips safely entombed in Allied Military Headquarters in London, Roosevelt's gesture of dispatching a personal agent to India proved to be even more troublesome. On July 25, 1944, Drew Pearson's column in the Washington Post quoted from Phillips' May 14, 1943 letter to Roosevelt in which the diplomat roundly criticized British policy in India. In Washington, British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell learned from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle that the publication had not been authorized and that the Government regretted its appearance. Later, Campbell told Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius that the British Government wished that either Roosevelt or Hull would make a public statement of dissociation because of the letter's effect on the Indian army's morale and the unkind reference to Britain's secondary role in the war against Japan. Hull pointed out to the President that while the Department had expressed its regret over the publication, it was not felt that a statement of that sort could be issued as the Department shared Phillips' views. Roosevelt agreed and said nothing. Realizing that his continued presence in London complicated the matter even further, Phillips left his post and returned to the United States.⁵¹

⁵¹Copy of Drew Pearson article in President's Secretary's File: State Department, Phillips, William C., Box 77, FDRL; Memorandum of conversation by Adolf Berle,

Although Phillips knew the hazards of expressing one's views in letters to public officials, his wife Caroline demanded that the White House explain the leakage of the letter. She wrote that although her husband was deeply injured by the publication of the letter, his paramount concern was the availability of presidential files to Drew Pearson. Roosevelt answered her letter and pointed out that Phillips sent three copies of the letter--to the President, the State Department, and to Sumner Welles. Roosevelt denied the leak came from his office and said that while the State Department's denial proved nothing, the leak likely occurred "because of the friendship between Sumner Welles and Drew Pearson, the suspicion points to him." Throughout the Louis Johnson and William Phillips missions to India, Franklin Roosevelt with Sumner Welles' support, controlled the American reaction to British policy in India. Welles opposed both envoy's suggestion that the President pressure the British to change their policies, and for that reason would have little desire to embarrass the British. However, Welles' long-time personal conflict with Cordell Hull culminated in Welles' resignation as Under Secretary of State in September 1943, and the rancor

July 27, 1944, FRUS, 1944, V: 239; Memorandum of conversation by Edward Steettinius, August 8, 1944, *ibid.*, 241. Although Phillips left his post in London, Roosevelt did not formally accept his resignation as Personal Representative until March, 1945.

which Welles felt toward Hull could have prompted him to use the letter as a means of embarrassing Hull and the State Department. Further, Drew Pearson's later statement that a State Department official passed the letter to him lends some circumstantial credence to Roosevelt's accusation.

Shortly after Phillips resigned, the incident took on new controversy. In another column, Pearson quoted Anthony Eden's dispatch, in which the Foreign Secretary told Ambassador Campbell that India was worth more than Phillips. To complicate matters further, Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky, at the time of Phillips resignation, denounced British interference in American diplomatic affairs and revealed that Phillips had been declared "persona non grata" to the British Government. Lord Halifax denied the charges, indicating that Chandler was misinformed and had made erroneous charges. Chandler then happily publicized a telegram which supported his charges and showed the British answers to be evasive and wrong. Signed by Sir Olaf Caroe, of the New Delhi External Affairs Office, and directed to the Secretary of State for India in London, the message described the British use of censorship to stop publication of Pearson's article in India, and how "we understand designation of Phillips is still President's Personal Representative in India. Whether or not he was connected in any way with leakage, views he has stated would make it impossible for us to do other than regard

him as persona non grata and we could not again receive him. His views are not what we are entitled to expect from a professedly friendly envoy. Viceroy has seen this telegram." With the Indian administrator's views exposed to the American public, the British requests for a statement from Roosevelt or Hull ceased, and the issue evaporated with the front page news of the Allied efforts on the continent.⁵²

Realizing that any further American involvement in British-Indian affairs would accomplish only greater alienation of both the British and the Indians, Roosevelt chose to postpone his attempts to promote the principle of self-determination. In reacting to the Indian crisis, Roosevelt believed the situation could be indirectly mediated by his personal envoys. But once he saw Winston Churchill's adamant opposition to any revision in India's status, Roosevelt directed policy in such a way as to mask his loss of interest in Indian self-determination and to try to overcome some of the irritation in Anglo-American relations caused by his clumsy approach to the problem. He purposely remained vague and noncommittal about his

⁵²Caroline Phillips to the Secretary of the President, August 26, 1944, President's Secretary's File: State Department, Phillips, William C., Box 77; Roosevelt to Caroline Phillips, August 28, 1944, ibid., FDRL; Hess, America Encounters India, 142-147; Memorandum of conversation by Breckinridge Long, September 2, 1944, FRUS, 1944, V: 243-246.

Personal Representatives' objectives, and when Louis Johnson and William Phillips made requests for greater freedom to press the British to take a more conciliatory position, Roosevelt did little to support them. Roosevelt's primary concern at this time was the immediacy of the war in Europe and the overriding priority of cooperation with the British and Russians. This situation overshadowed any inclination that Roosevelt had for insisting on immediate and universal application of the Atlantic Charter.

CATHOLICS, COMMUNISTS, COLLABORATORS, AND FASCISTS:
ROOSEVELT'S UNHOLY ALLIANCES

CHAPTER III

At the same time that Franklin Roosevelt was involved in Indian politics, he was considering approaches that might be used to improve the Allies' position in Europe. Concerned by the possible defeat of Russia and the general growth of German military success on the continent, Roosevelt concentrated his efforts toward reducing the pressures on the Allies' position not only by offering material aid to Russia, but also by refraining from pressing for Russian acceptance of political principles that might hinder Allied military cooperation. He saw that the issue of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, which he had broached in order to gain more domestic support for lend lease to the Soviet Union, was becoming a source of irritation to the Russian Premier; consequently he chose not to press the issue further. While Roosevelt refrained from pursuing further involvement in Russian domestic affairs, he recognized the benefits to be derived by raising political issues to court the favor of the neutrals. To accomplish these ends, he used Personal Representative

diplomacy in an attempt to gain a better relationship with Generalissimo Franco of Spain and Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal. Further, in an attempt to insure overwhelming success of the 1942 invasion of Africa, the President directed his personal agent to deal with the collaborationist French at Vichy. Thus not unlike his direction of American policy toward India, Roosevelt decided that rather than demand adherence to the principles expressed in the Atlantic Charter, American policy would follow lines of expediency--negotiate and deal with fascist and communist governments alike.

Before the United States started aid to the Soviet Union, however, the problem of the coordinating of requests and delivery of supplies to Great Britain confronted Roosevelt. At the time of his first visit to London, Hopkins recommended that Roosevelt send a man who could maintain good relations with Britain's industrial community and at the same time have enough status to be influential in the diplomatic circles, but one who would not be burdened with the responsibilities of an embassy. Roosevelt selected W. Averell Harriman as his Personal Representative in charge of lend lease in Great Britain. Averell Harriman, the son of railroad magnate Edward H. Harriman, acquired considerable experience in the business world as a financier and as chairman of the Board of Directors of Union Pacific Railroad. He had demonstrated his ability by

successfully directing construction of the first prefabricated ship for use in World War I and later operating the Union Pacific without capital loss during the depression. Impressed by Harriman's capabilities as a business administrator, Harry Hopkins brought him to President Roosevelt's attention. Called to duty in the New Deal, Harriman served in the National Recovery Administration, Commerce Department, and briefly as chief of the raw materials branch of the Office of Production Management.

In his attitude toward the administration of lend lease and foreign policy in general, Harriman followed President Roosevelt's example. He viewed the military establishment as central to his wartime function and tended to turn to that side for advice. In London, Harriman saw his position as that of "delivering the goods" and seeing that no delays impeded the military's actions. He understood lend lease to be the crucial feature of Anglo-American relations at that time and that the White House directed the entire program--to the general exclusion of the American Embassy. Believing that his association with the top British leaders produced the needed information, Harriman made little use of the State Department or Foreign Service personnel other than as general clerical laborers for the lend lease program. Accurate in his reporting, understanding the locus of power in

Great Britain, and disinterested in personal gains, Averell Harriman was a good choice for the London job.

While much of Harriman's activities involved the tedium of economic and technical details, the President also expected him to fill other duties in England. The United States had a regularly appointed Ambassador, John Winant, but Roosevelt was not sure if Winant could do the job, so in addition to his regular lend lease duties, Harriman went to London to oversee Winant. Roosevelt not only bypassed his Ambassador, but with the lend lease mission independent of Embassy control, Harriman used private couriers and Naval communication facilities to report directly to Roosevelt and Hopkins. When Ambassador Winant found that Harriman had greater access to Roosevelt, he also used the military channels to communicate directly to the White House. It again became clear that the State Department was being bypassed, and the air no doubt grew thick as Hull received month-old dispatches with a note attached informing the Secretary that "this is for your information."¹

¹Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 27, 1941, D.S. File 121.841 Hopkins, Harry/9, NA; Felix Frankfurter-Henry Morgenthau, Jr., conversation, January 23, 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, Book 350, 186, FDRL; FRUS, 1941, III; 309n; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 269-270; Harriman to Roosevelt, April 19, 1941, President's Personal File 6207 (Harriman, W. Averell); Harriman to Roosevelt, May 7, 1941, PSF: Great Britain, Harriman Folder, Box 41, FDRL; Wilson, The First Summit, 275; George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, c. 1967), 231-234.

Once settled in England, Harriman served as "general handholder" for Britishers with aid-related problems, toured British defense bases at Churchill's request, and traveled to the Middle East to look into supply problems. As Roosevelt expected, Harriman not only served as an administrator but became a popular symbol of American aid to Great Britain.

As Harriman settled into his role, Hopkins cabled Churchill that Roosevelt had instructed Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox to recommend supply allocations for Great Britain and Russia for a period extending to June 29, 1942. With that information gathered, Roosevelt proposed that a joint conference be held in London to be followed by a similar meeting in Moscow; both meetings would have as their major objective a reconciliation of the differences between the Allies' needs and the American ability to provide the goods. To head the American mission, Roosevelt selected Harriman and Churchill named Lord Beaverbrook to represent Great Britain. Following the London meeting, the Anglo-American mission traveled to Moscow.²

²Harriman to Roosevelt, May 7, 1941, PSF: Great Britain, Harriman Folder, Box 41, FDRL; Harriman to Roosevelt, June 3, 1941, FRUS, 1941, III: 276; Harriman to Hopkins, June 25, 1941, ibid., 280; Hopkins to Churchill, September 9, 1941, ibid., 1941, I: 829-830.

After arriving in Moscow on September 28, and over the next three days, Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook held meetings with Stalin. Other emissaries met with their Russian military counterparts, but as Hopkins had earlier noted, little came from the subcommittee meetings because all Russian information and decisions came from the Russian Premier. Harriman and Beaverbrook found Stalin to be genial at the first meeting, and listened as Stalin estimated that German tanks outnumbered the Russians by three to one; German air superiority by four to one; and in army divisions by 380 to 320. To stem the German offensive, Stalin called for four thousand tons of barbed wire per month, small caliber anti-aircraft guns, and armor plating. At the next meeting, Harriman found Stalin to be in a rather restless mood, seemingly disinterested, and as Harriman noted, Stalin "rode us pretty hard" in an attempt to get all he requested. At the final conference, Stalin resumed his earlier, more affable stance and "accepted with undisguised enthusiasm" the list of items put forth by Harriman and Beaverbrook. No doubt Stalin was pleased with the agreement that included four hundred planes and five hundred tanks per month, over twelve hundred anti-tank guns and five thousand Jeeps to be shipped to Russia by the end of June, 1942.³

³Harriman to Roosevelt, September 29, 1941; Harriman to Hopkins, September 30, 1941; Harriman to Roosevelt,

Before Harriman left Russia, he came into direct conflict with the State Department and Cordell Hull. Knowing the Department had no control over lend lease, Harriman, at Roosevelt's urging, suggested that Stalin bypass the Department and communicate directly with the President on any matter of importance, especially lend lease. Harriman clashed with Hull when the Secretary of State informed the Russian Government that the United States would help build petroleum refineries in Russia if American petroleum engineers and technicians could inspect the sites. Through his secretary Edward Meiklejohn, Harriman told State Department officials that they had adopted an unrealistic position that would create harmful suspicion among the Russians, and since all aid to Russia came under lend lease, any matter relative to supplies and equipment should go to Harry Hopkins at the White House. The basic conflict between Harriman and Hull's Department went beyond that of control of lend lease to the type of policy the United States would maintain toward Russia. State Department officials sought a "quid pro quo" policy that would force Russia to make concessions of

September 30, 1941; Harriman to Roosevelt, October 1, 1941; Harriman to Roosevelt, October 3, 1941; Steinhardt to Hull, October 3, 1941, FRUS, 1941, I: 836-842; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 387-388; William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador To Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), 66.

postwar political security in Europe and Asia in return for American aid. But Harriman, like the President, opposed any qualifications on the aid to be given in order to insure continued Russian resistance against the Germans and to put off troublesome negotiations over major non-military issues.⁴

In one of his conversations with the Russian Premier, Harriman learned that Stalin lacked confidence in Laurence Steinhardt, the American Ambassador to Russia. Stalin told Harriman that the Ambassador, believing rumors that Moscow would soon fall, had sent most of the Embassy staff to safer locations, and had on separate occasions become panicky about the situation. Resentful over the Ambassador's lack of confidence in the Russian army, Stalin indicated that Steinhardt's attitude "made him of little value in the relationship between the two countries." Harriman informed the White House, and Roosevelt soon cabled Steinhardt that since future Soviet-American relations would be dealing with supplies and equipment, he believed it would be advantageous to have an ambassador who was acquainted with American production and supply. Steinhardt left Russia one week later and became Ambassador to Turkey in

⁴Memorandum by Edward Page, November 15, 1941, FRUS, 1941, I: 860-861; Hull to Steinhardt, November 5, 1941, ibid., 853-855; Raymond H. Dawson, The Decision To Aid Russia, 1941 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, c. 1959), 267.

early 1942. In addition to his role as lend lease negotiator, Harriman effectively removed barriers to the expeditious shipment of lend lease supplies to Russia.

To replace the departed Steinhardt, the President suggested General James Burns of the Lend Lease Administration, but strenuous objections from the State Department prompted Roosevelt to offer instead, Admiral William H. Standley. Former Chief of Naval Operations and long-time friend of the President, Standley was a modest proponent of the Department's policy recommendations. While Standley's appointment buoyed State Department hopes about a possible change in policy, the White House knew such a shift unlikely. In order to rush delivery of goods and to insure control of lend lease by the White House, Roosevelt's lend lease agents channeled requests from Moscow directly to Hopkins, who then expedited the shipment of orders. The growing prospects of a German victory demanded quick action, and the Roosevelt-State Department policy differences negated any chance that the President would use the Department to implement his aid program.⁵

Although Roosevelt felt no hesitation in extending immediate aid to Russia, he did not include the Soviet

⁵Harriman to Roosevelt, October 1, 1941, Harry Hopkins Papers: Harriman File, Box 123, FDRL; Roosevelt to Steinhardt, November 5, 1941, FRUS, 1941, I: 852-853; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 395.

Union in his initial lend lease proposal to Congress because many Americans had not dropped their antagonism toward the communist regime. Among hostile groups, the Catholic bloc loomed large in the President's thinking. Because of the Russian Government's suppression of Catholics, Vatican leaders and many American Catholics opposed aid to the Soviet Union.

To offset the expected protests, Roosevelt directed Harriman to raise the issue of religious freedom in Russia during his talks with Stalin. In response to Harriman's inquiries, Stalin told him that a response to the President's statements on religious freedom would be forthcoming "in a manner to obtain maximum publicity in the United States." The Russian leader's response would satisfy Roosevelt but many Americans still had to be further convinced that Russia had dropped its barriers against religious freedom.⁶

In addition to prompting a gesture from Stalin, Roosevelt sought the support of the Catholic hierarchy and turned again to the Vatican. Two years earlier, in 1939, in an attempt to gain more information about internal conditions in Italy, and to try indirectly to pressure Mussolini into a less belligerent position, Roosevelt had

⁶Memorandum by Harriman on Religion In The USSR, October 4, 1941, Hopkins Papers: Harriman File, Box 123, FDRL.

decided to establish informal relations with the Holy See. Now, in an attempt to lessen Catholic opposition to his aid plan, Roosevelt called on his unofficial Ambassador to the Vatican.

The President's Personal Representative to the Vatican, Myron Taylor, had spent considerable time in the 1920's negotiating the reorganization of several faltering textile mills. In 1927, at J. P. Morgan's insistence, Taylor joined United States Steel, and as the firm's finance committee chairman, he directed a major reorganization of the company's financial structure, enabling it to pay off \$340,000,000 in debts. He sharpened his negotiating skills in the 1930's when labor disputes enveloped the steel industry. As chairman of the Board of Directors of United States Steel, Taylor junked the company's traditional anti-labor policies and in 1937 became the first major steel executive to recognize and sign a collective bargaining agreement with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Following Taylor's retirement a year later, Roosevelt selected him to head the American delegation to a 1938 international conference on war refugees. Taylor's qualifications for the Vatican post improved as he became acquainted with several Vatican representatives at those meetings; also the Pope, before his rise to the pontificate, had been Taylor's guest while visiting in the United States. Taylor's soft-spoken approach remained an asset throughout

the period in which he served Roosevelt. His ability to project a sense of confidence in the American cause and his very deliberate style of negotiating helped prevent any resentment or fear of intimidation among the leaders of the neutral nations he visited.

The President appointed Taylor as his "Personal Representative To The Pope" in December, 1939. In the face of considerable domestic opposition, Taylor traveled to Rome in February 1940, and presented his letter of introduction to the Pope. However, he remained in Rome only a month before illness forced his return to the United States.⁷

Although Roosevelt sought the Pope's assistance in reducing criticism of the aid program, he also knew that the supply of needed information about Italy's political affairs had dwindled since Taylor's first trip. Furthermore, Roosevelt feared that Germany might occupy the Azore Islands, so he instructed Taylor to learn Prime Minister Antonio Salazar's feelings about Portugal's strategic possessions.⁸

⁷Martin J. Hastings, "United States-Vatican Relations," Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia, 69 (June, 1958), 46; New York Times, May 7, 1959, 33; Taylor to Roosevelt, February 38, 1940, D.S. File 121.866A/31; Hull to Taylor, March 18, 1941, D. S. File 121.866A/39B, NA.

⁸Welles to Roosevelt, January 24, 1941, D.S. File 121.866A/105A; Johnson to Hull, January 26, 1941, D.S. File

Before he left the United States, Taylor met with Roosevelt to discuss the strategy he would employ at the Vatican conferences. The envoy pointed out that the opponents of aid to Russia supported their argument with a passage from the 1922 "Encyclical on Atheistic Communism" by Pope Pius XI. The statement that "communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever" appeared in many Catholic newspapers and left Roosevelt's Catholic supporters little choice but to either disregard the Papal encyclical or not support the President. Taylor believed a statement from Pope Pius XII would resolve the dilemma of the Catholic supporters, and he received Presidential instructions to pursue that objective. In his letter to the Pope, Roosevelt wrote that he believed Russian churches would remain open, that wartime exigencies would force the Russian Government to recognize freedom of religion, and that ultimately religion in Russia would be accorded more respect than in Germany. Roosevelt then tried to convince the Pope that Russia's totalitarianism remained less dangerous than that of Germany, and suggested that the Pope enlighten Church leaders in the United States

121.841, Hopkins, Harry/8; Welles to Taylor, February 3, 1941, D.S. File 121.866A/105 1/2, NA.; Welles to Roosevelt, June 4, 1941, PSF: Portugal, Box 51, FDRL; Memorandum by Welles, August 9, 1941, FRUS, 1941, I: 345.

so that they would give no further aid to Germany by their parochial attitudes. Fortunately, the Pope realized that Roosevelt faced domestic opposition and overlooked the President's clumsy efforts to down play the atheistic nature of the Russian Government.

When Taylor reached the Vatican, he told the Pope that the American people would not stand for a German victory, but that the 1922 encyclical caused much divisiveness among American Catholics. Taylor reiterated Roosevelt's belief that the encyclical did not condemn the entire Russian population, but objected to official abuses of civil liberties. To confirm this interpretation, Taylor requested a Papal clarification of the message. The Pope replied that neither the United States nor the Vatican could influence the Russian Government's policy toward religion and prophesized that communism would spread throughout Europe and Latin America if Germany should be defeated. Following three extensive meetings in which Taylor elaborated on Roosevelt's determination to see Germany defeated, the Pope declared that he understood the reasons for supporting the Soviet Union and agreed to make public his interpretation of the 1922 encyclical.⁹

⁹Transcript of Taylor telephone message to the White House, August 30, 1941, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor File, Box 55, FDRL; Myron Taylor, ed., Wartime Correspondence Between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 57-62; Roosevelt to Pope

After the Pope clarified the difference between giving aid to the Russian people and supporting the communist ideology, the American Catholics' response was generally favorable. The editor of the Michigan Catholic chided its readers for over-simplification and taking out of context passages of the 1922 message to support their anti-Russian position. And as if on cue, Russian Ambassador Ivan M. Maisky told a luncheon meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce that the Soviet Union considered religion a private matter for each citizen, that the Russian Constitution provided for freedom of religious worship, and that the new Polish Army being created in Russia would include Roman Catholic chaplains. With the Pope's message and the Russian gestures to use as levers, Roosevelt encountered less outward opposition from American Catholics to his aid plan.¹⁰

On September 22, Taylor left Rome to complete the remainder of his mission. He flew to Lisbon, Portugal and called on Prime Minister Salazar. Portugal had a

Pius XII, September 3, 1941, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor File, Box 55, FDRL; Memorandum by H. E. Monsignor Tardini, September, 1941, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor File, Box 56, FDRL; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, 746.

¹⁰U.S., Cong. Rec., vol. 87, pt. 8, 77 Cong., 1st Sess., 1941, 8700-8701; Maisky speech, September 23, 1941, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor File, Box 55, FDRL; Dawson, The Decision To Aid Russia, 1941, 267.

predominantly Catholic population, and even though Salazar was a dictator, he sought to remain on good terms with the Vatican. When he learned of the American's relationship to the Pope, he may have been influenced to be more cooperative in allowing the United States to compete with Germany in buying war materials from Portugal. Further, Taylor got the impression that the Portuguese leader did not adhere to the Nazi system, and would make every effort to keep Portugal and the Azores neutral.

After meeting with Salazar, Taylor traveled to England and conferred with Ambassador Winant about the relationship between Great Britain and Ireland. This trip itself produced little success, for the Irish Government remained married to a policy of neutrality, and the British refused to change their policies regarding the six counties of North Ireland where there was a Catholic majority. Taylor's earlier visit to Rome, however, appears to have influenced the Pope to be friendlier toward the British, and even though it had little impact on British policies, the Vatican's new attitude likely helped offset German attempts to propagandize Irish Catholics.

When Taylor returned to the United States, Sumner Welles informed him that the Government would not continue to raise the subject of official Soviet attitudes toward religion. After learning from Harriman that Stalin opposed

any liberalization of policy beyond that described in Maisky's speech, and fearful that the Soviet Government might become even more resentful with added prodding, Roosevelt wisely drew back from a policy designed to promote the Atlantic Charter.¹¹

After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor and the United States entered the war, Roosevelt's main goal was to first win the war in Europe, and with that came the necessity of keeping Russia in the struggle. One way of achieving both objectives was a counterattack by the United States and Great Britain against Germany. At Argentia, Roosevelt showed interest in Churchill's proposal of an African invasion designed to begin pinching in on the Axis. Because the American public might grow restless and demand immediate action against the Japanese, Roosevelt wanted quick deployment of American troops into the war, but of greater import, he wanted to show the Russians that the United States and Great Britain intended to cooperate fully to reduce German pressure on the Soviet front.

In Washington, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff General George Marshall worked to get the President to accept their plan. Instead of Africa, they

¹¹Memorandum by Myron Taylor, no date (September, 1941), Hopkins Papers, Box 51; Memorandum by John Winant, September 37, 1941, PSF: The Vatican, Taylor File, 1941, FDRL; Welles to Taylor, November 19, 1941, D.S. File 861.404/459, NA.

concluded that an invasion of the European continent would draw off sizable German forces and keep Russia in the war. Roosevelt agreed, and he responded by directing Harry Hopkins and General Marshall to go to London to explain the plan to Churchill.

On April 8 Hopkins and Marshall arrived in London to lay the plan before Churchill. Even though the Prime Minister recalled the prolonged trench warfare and high casualty rates of World War I, his sympathetic reaction to the proposal convinced Hopkins that they would soon reach an agreement. However Churchill soon called Hopkins to his office and began to talk about the political situation in India, the serious nature of the British naval defeats in the Indian Ocean, and the fact that more American military aid was needed in that sector. Hopkins saw the Prime Minister's attempt to reorder the military priorities and stated that a European invasion remained foremost in the President's mind; and further that the attack must be carried out without serious delay. In the final meeting, Hopkins got Churchill's agreement on the principle of the proposal, and despite the fact that Churchill remained skeptical of an early strike against the continent, Hopkins informed Roosevelt that planning for the operation should go ahead.

When Hopkins' message reached Washington, Roosevelt cabled Stalin to request that Foreign Minister Vyacheslav

Molotov be sent to Washington to discuss the second front. When Molotov reached the White House in late May 1942, Roosevelt had his plan ready. He told the Russian that a second front could be expected before the end of the year. At Molotov's insistence, the President agreed to a public declaration which, while ambiguous in wording, in effect stated that the Allies had reached an accord for a second front in 1942.

In his haste to propose the cross-channel operation, and without awaiting over-all military analysis of the plan, the President acted out of both political and military considerations. He knew that the Russians were pressing Great Britain to recognize Soviet territorial claims in the Baltic, and as Hopkins told Churchill, the President made the proposal to ease the pressure of Russian diplomatic demands on England. A more important concern, however, was the immediate strategic situation in Eastern Europe; Roosevelt feared that the Germans might deliver a decisive blow to the Russians in the next offensive or at least become entrenched with control of the Caucasus and Ukraine; thus, an Anglo-American second front would reduce the pressure on the Russian front by drawing some German forces away from that area.

In June, Churchill, with his reservations about the plan, flew to Hyde Park to discuss the military operation and to try to persuade the President to reconsider. When

he learned of the fall of Tobruk, Churchill concluded that the move against the continent must be postponed and offered his original plan; an operation against Africa.¹²

Neither Roosevelt or Personal Representative Hopkins had any choice in the strategy decision since a cross-channel invasion could not be undertaken without the British, who were now adamant in their opposition. Furthermore, Roosevelt should have realized that the planning, transportation, and accumulation of supplies made the continental invasion impossible before mid-1943 at the earliest. Indeed, the American industrial sector had not been totally converted to wartime production by that time and would not be able to meet the additional demands for supplies required by the operation. Finally, as the Dieppe raid of August 1942 showed, German military might was strong enough to turn back an Allied operation.

After the Prime Minister and his military advisers set their opposition to the European invasion, Roosevelt directed his attention to the African proposal and sent Hopkins on his fourth trip to confer with Churchill. This time Roosevelt would have no delay, and he instructed Hopkins to tell the British leader that if an acceptable

¹²Memorandum of Conference at the White House, May 29, 30, and June 1, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 566-587; Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, vol. 4 of The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, c. 1950), 377-383; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 518-519; 526.

plan for the invasion of Africa could not be developed, American troops would be used in another region--implying a possible shift in emphasis to the Pacific. When the British appeared reluctant to get down to business, Hopkins cabled Roosevelt to set a date for the project. Confronted by Roosevelt's statement that the North African campaign should start no later than October 30, the joint conference soon agreed to map out the strategy.¹³

As the new plans meant postponement of the continental invasion, Churchill went to Moscow to explain the revised strategy to Stalin. Averell Harriman cabled Roosevelt and suggested that he attend the conference to indicate American agreement with the decisions and to allow him to make personal reports directly to the President. At first, Roosevelt opposed the idea because he preferred that Churchill face Stalin alone and because he did not want to leave the impression that he had sent Harriman to

¹³Hopkins made his last trip as a Roosevelt Personal Representative in January 1945, when he spent several days in London trying to soothe the Prime Minister, who was smoldering over a State Department press release that criticized British policy in Italy. After the cool reception in London, Hopkins flew to Paris and conferred with Charles DeGaulle, then to Rome where he had an audience with the Pope, and to Naples where after a brief visit, Hopkins flew to Malta to await President Roosevelt's arrival for the Yalta Conference; Roosevelt to Hopkins, July 16, 1942, Hopkins Papers, Box 125, Book 5, FDRL; John Gaddis, United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 72; Arthur Bryant, Turn of the Tide (London: Collins, 1957), 425-429.

spy on Stalin and Churchill. After Anthony Eden informed Churchill of Harriman's suggestion, the Prime Minister wired Roosevelt that Harriman would be helpful. The President ordered Harriman to Moscow and instructed him to inform Stalin of the President's desire to meet with him in the near future.¹⁴

The meeting began with Churchill's explanation of the reasons for the postponement. In reply, Stalin described the German pressures on Stalingrad, sarcastically adding that the war could not be won unless the Allies were willing to take risks. After chiding the British leader, Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with the decision but stated that he could not force a decision about the second front. Harriman thought that Churchill's elaboration on the African plans and the possible movement of British and American air forces into southern Russia was effective enough to put Stalin in a cordial mood for the next meeting, but his evaluation of the Premier's mood quickly changed when Stalin gave both men a formal statement that reflected his bitterness over the Allies' decision and pointed out how the change adversely affected Russian military plans. In reply, Harriman supported the Prime Minister's position and added that no promise had been

¹⁴Harriman to Roosevelt, August 4, 1942; Roosevelt to Harriman, August 4, 1942, and August 5, 1942, Map Room File, Miscellaneous Presidential Messages, Box 14, Folder 1 (A), FDRL.

broken regarding the second front.

Before the conference ended, Harriman informed Stalin of Roosevelt's desire for a personal meeting of the two leaders. Stalin agreed rather than cause prolonged negotiations with Roosevelt but when the President later proposed a meeting in 1943, the Russian leader declined. Roosevelt, with his personal approach to diplomacy, found a tougher figure in Stalin than any he encountered in dealing with American politicians.¹⁵

While Harriman and Churchill met with Stalin, the President heard from Wendell Willkie. The Republican leader told Roosevelt that he wanted to visit the fighting fronts of Russia, the Middle East, and possibly China. Roosevelt agreed, seeing a chance possibly to soften Stalin's bitterness over the postponement of the invasion; such a move would demonstrate to world leaders the unified stand of American politicians. Always the shrewd politician, Roosevelt also saw an opportunity to lessen the Republican Party's appeal in the 1942 Congressional elections by featuring their leading personality as the "President's Personal Representative" and having him out of the country

¹⁵Harriman to Roosevelt, August 14, 1942, and August 15, 1942, *ibid.*; Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, 483-486; After that trip to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman returned to London and served as the direct contact for Americans traveling to London on official business. After serving at London, and as a part of the Roosevelt diplomatic team at Teheran, Harriman was named Ambassador to Russia.

during the campaign.¹⁶

As Willkie embarked on his trip on August 26, Roosevelt cabled Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek that Willkie would soon visit the two nations, but he mentioned no specific reason for the mission. Franklin Roosevelt should have realized his envoy's independent manner and have limited him to a mission of discussing general aid plans in addition to inspecting industrial facilities of the countries he visited, but Roosevelt's estimation of Willkie's ability to draw support for his wartime policies negated any fears he had about the trip. Consequently, he ignored Acting Chief of Staff Joseph McNarney's warning that Willkie should be given specific instructions because "when we send a representative to a foreign country he immediately embraces all of their problems as his own and urges the United States to undertake the solution of them."¹⁷

When Willkie landed in Russia, he met Ambassador Standley at the temporary capital of Kuibyshev and set off on an inspection tour of collective farms, airplane

¹⁶Willkie to Roosevelt, July 27, 1942; Roosevelt to Willkie, August 2, 1942, PSF: Willkie, Wendell, Box 132, FDRL; Donald Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), 215; Burns, Soldier of Freedom, 274-276.

¹⁷Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, August 21, 1942; Roosevelt to Stalin, August 22, 1942, Elliott Roosevelt, ed., FDR, His Personal Letters, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, c. 1950), II; 1341; Joseph McNarney to Roosevelt, July 31, 1942, PSF: Willkie, Box 132, FDRL.

factories, and facilities along the Volga River. Wherever he traveled, Willkie--as a good politician--talked with the working class Russian and found that the conversation invariably turned to the second front. Willkie knew nothing about the forthcoming African operation but offered his view that the American people hoped a second front would open very soon.

Following his three-day stay in Kuibyshev, Willkie traveled to Moscow and again played the role of important American dignitary by visiting factories, farms and appearing at public gatherings. When he stopped to talk with "the Russian on the street" in Moscow, Willkie found the question the same as before: When will the second front begin? Willkie likely began to wonder if the President had agreed to his visit knowing that he would be confronted at every turn by that embarrassing question.

During the remainder of Willkie's stay, he was guest of honor at several dinners. At more than one of those affairs, he declared that the United States favored a second front but that Great Britain opposed it, later adding that the only way to help Russia was through the second front and to get the project moving, the American public might have to prod the military leaders. At a time when Roosevelt and Churchill tried to gain Stalin's understanding about the need to postpone the operation, Personal Representative Willkie was in Moscow making

statements which could only prompt the Russians to remain adamant in their demands for the invasion. The situation was indeed confusing for the Russians as they could hardly believe that Roosevelt's envoy would make such statements without the President's approval or that he would be directly opposed to administration policies. Willkie's remarks also infuriated many American officials who believed they had enough problems without Willkie calling on the civilian population to "prod" the military.¹⁸

While Willkie's remarks caused elation and bewilderment among some Russians, his activities led to agonizing moments for Ambassador William Standley. From the beginning, Standley opposed the envoy's presence in Russia--it made him appear and feel as if he were nothing more than a nominal office-holder. He resented the politician's casual style of diplomacy and became incensed at Willkie's lack of regard for the Embassy in making his own arrangements for conferring with Soviet officials, foreign diplomats, and news correspondents. Standley's irritation grew almost beyond control when he learned the date and time for the Willkie-Stalin conference from the English-speaking Russian doorman at the Willkie guest house. When Standley

¹⁸Memorandum by Ambassador Standley, attached to cover letter of October 24, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 637-648; Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie...Fighter For Freedom (Marquette: Northern Michigan Press, c. 1966), 360.

asked about the meeting, Willkie declared it to be between Stalin and himself, adding that he would let Standley know of the results later. Willkie did give the Ambassador a brief review of the meeting but added, "There are other matters so secret that I can't trust them to coded messages or even to the Ambassador." Enraged, Standley requested that he be recalled to Washington for consultation. He returned to the United States and gained what he thought would be a definite understanding that visiting Personal Representatives, when they had to appear in Russia, would operate through the Embassy.¹⁹

Although Willkie's second front remarks irritated Roosevelt and Churchill and his presence in Russia strained Standley's patience, it appears that his meeting with Stalin produced a favorable response from the Russian leader. At the meeting, Willkie followed Roosevelt's one suggestion and raised the question of Polish-Soviet relations. Roosevelt's suggestion was a part of his effort to gain better treatment for Polish citizens in Russia and to get the Russians to release from jail the members of a Polish relief delegation. Willkie pointed out that the causes of friction between the two European nations should be removed so as not to detract from the Allied war effort. Stalin informed Willkie that he did not wish to argue the

¹⁹Standley, Admiral Ambassador, 295.

case but would meet with Polish officials. Although Stalin seemed curt in his exchange with Willkie, it appears that the meeting prompted a positive decision. Within two months, Russian officials informed the Polish Charge that espionage charges against fifteen Polish officials would be dropped, and seventy-eight others would be expelled from Russia instead of being tried.²⁰

Once Willkie reached Chungking, he followed much the same pattern toward American officials that he exhibited in Russia. He refused Ambassador Clarence Gauss' offer of housing and instead used the sumptuous quarters provided by the Chinese Government, believing those quarters would give him more freedom to meet Chinese officials without Gauss being around. Embassy officials also suffered considerable anguish over his abruptness and indifference toward the President of China who had hosted a dinner for Willkie. They were also concerned that when Willkie inspected factories, he drew the accompanying reporters around him and blithely toured the plants without as much as a question or kind word for his host, the Chinese Minister of Economics.²¹

²⁰Memorandum by Polish Ambassador Clechanowski, October 26, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 196.

²¹Barnard, Willkie, 367; Mary Dillon, Wendell Willkie (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1952), 280-281.

While Willkie toured the Chinese wartime capital, the Generalissimo saw the American as another pawn in his efforts to influence Roosevelt's policy toward China. Chiang Kai-shek wanted more military supplies and an American field commander who would follow his orders without question. Without Willkie fully understanding the situation, the Chinese leader planned his itinerary to put Willkie in enough schools, factories, and other sites to keep him completely isolated from Americans in China who disagreed with Chiang's policies. As the American field commander for operations in China, Joseph Stilwell wrote, "the idea is to get him so exhausted and keep him so torpid with food and drink that his faculties will be dulled and he'll be stuffed with the right doctrines." Chiang did not want Willkie reporting to Roosevelt that Stilwell's command was necessary for victory in Asia; therefore, he skillfully maneuvered Willkie into ignoring Stilwell except to request an interview with Claire Chennault, a favorite of Chiang.²²

The shortcoming of Roosevelt's practice of sending uninformed envoys abroad became evident when Willkie met the air force leader. Chennault startled Willkie when he told him that the air force defended China with less than one hundred fighters and that Stilwell held back his plan

²²Gauss to Hull, October 8, 1942, D.S. File 032 Willkie, Wendell/124, NA.; Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, c.1948), 156.

for defeating the Japanese in China with air power. Stilwell rightly believed that Chennault's airplanes could not operate without adequate ground forces to hold the air bases, but Chennault's simplistic plan appealed to Willkie. Overlooking the implications of Chennault's proposal that he be given full authority in China for the plan to be successful, and ignoring the fact that he was going around Stilwell, Willkie ordered Chennault to prepare a report that he would personally carry to the President. In addition to his public policy suggestions in Russia, Willkie now promoted more dissension among American military men in China.²³

While Willkie continued the series of tours and luncheons, he received word that his call for a second front had incensed officials in Washington and that Roosevelt had tried to downplay his words by telling reporters that he did not think Willkie's stories were important enough to read. The Army and Navy Journal believed Willkie's status as a Personal Representative had ended and said that it was just as well, before he called for another second front--in the Pacific. The remarks about the second front infuriated Roosevelt, but he could only wait until his Personal Representative returned to the United States to try

²³Claire Chennault, Way of A Fighter (New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, c. 1949), 212; Romanus, and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission To China, 252.

to squash any further policy suggestions from Willkie.

As Willkie made his way back to the United States, his differences with the President began to appear. At a stop-over in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Willkie told newsmen that "in regard to flippant statements made by certain public officials concerning the expression of my opinion in Russia on the question of a second front, I did not deem it appropriate or in good taste for me to reply to such flippancies while I was in other countries. I felt it my duty while abroad to uphold the President, which I continued to do even after such remarks were made." Knowing that Willkie directed the statements toward him, Roosevelt instructed his secretary, Stephen Early to inform Sam Pryor, a vice-president of Trans-World Airways and Willkie's close friend, that reports of Willkie's anger had upset the President. In his effort to head off anymore publicity over the tiff, Roosevelt wanted to see Willkie before he made any more statements, and by getting Willkie into the White House, the President thought he could charm the irate Indiana itinerant.²⁴

After Willkie's plane landed at Minneapolis and Pryor phoned him of the President's request that he go to Washington to report first to Roosevelt, Willkie made only general remarks about the trip. When asked about the "flippant"

²⁴New York Times, October 13, 1942, 1; ibid., October 14, 1942, 1; Dillon, Wendell Willkie, 280.

statement, Willkie waved it off with the comment that "the element which criticized my trip were the same old diehard Tory groups that still think America can live to itself." Seemingly Willkie's anger had cooled, but by the time he reached Washington, he was boiling over Roosevelt's remarks about "typewriter strategists" and how they were trying to run the war effort. Actually, the President had directed those remarks toward some professional journalists, but Willkie took it as a personal attack.

Once he reached the White House, Willkie and Roosevelt talked for more than an hour. Roosevelt listened to Willkie's report, and then branded as false the reports that he had criticized Willkie's remarks. After the lengthy meeting, Willkie held a press conference and summarized the White House discussion. He said that as he and Roosevelt had agreed that Willkie would speak his mind while on the trip, that his remarks about the second front were entirely proper, and that he closed the conference with the note that he and Roosevelt were not at odds over American policy.²⁵

While the President partially calmed Willkie's rumpled feelings, Roosevelt could not keep him from broadcasting a report to the American people. No doubt Willkie sought to drive home the need for international cooperation

²⁵New York Times, October 15, 1942, 7; Dillon, ibid.

while keeping his name before the American public and strengthening his position within the Republican Party. On October 26, Willkie told a radio audience of over three million listeners about the trip and his impression of the Allied war effort. He launched into a critique of American foreign policy, how it created liabilities and caused severe leakage in the "reservoir of good will." Willkie first cited the failure to make good the promises of military aid to the Allies because of the fact that America was only "40 per cent mobilized." To Willkie, the fact that the United States had not clearly defined its war aims confused many people in Russia, China, and particularly India--who could not "ascertain from our government's wishy-washy attitude toward India what we are likely to feel at the end of the war." Willkie remembered Standley and Gauss, apparently unimpressed by the Ambassadors he neglected, and called on the President to stop treating the people of Eastern Europe as inferior allies and "send to represent us among our Allies really distinguished men who are important enough in their own right to dare to tell our President the truth." To Roosevelt and the others who criticized him, Willkie referred to the "atrophy of intelligence which is produced by stupid, arbitrary or undemocratic censorship," and that the "record of this war to date is not such to inspire in us any sublime faith in the infallibility of our military and naval experts." Willkie then

called for the start of the second front in order to relieve German pressure on the Russians. The speech buoyed internationalist feeling across the nation, and added to Willkie's political popularity. Some political analysts declared it the best speech of the 1942 campaign, in fact, Joseph Barnes, a correspondent and Willkie's companion on the world junket, stated that the speech produced more mail than any speech Willkie ever made.²⁶

Following the speech, Roosevelt told reporters that he approved of Willkie's view, adding that there was "not a controversy in a car load" about differences between the two men. Roosevelt did agree with Willkie's evaluation of how the world should exist, but knew the realities of the wartime situation went beyond Willkie's simplistic prescriptions. Roosevelt resented the public criticisms of the administration's war efforts, but could say or do nothing because he was trapped by his own doings. Roosevelt had sent Willkie as his Personal Representative, and now could not publicly rebuke him lest he be willing to have the American public believe the President made a bad decision in sending Willkie abroad. If he did attempt to chastize Willkie, Republicans would use his criticism to show Roosevelt's refusal to listen to suggestions and also label it as oppression of the freedom of speech. Finally, to

²⁶Joseph Barnes, Willkie (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1952), 311.

dispute Willkie's statements would cause the Allies to raise questions about American strategy as Roosevelt had made similar statements about the need for a second front, more aid to China, and an end to colonialism.²⁷

Besides causing confusion among the American public and the Allies, this instance of Roosevelt's Personal Representative diplomacy proved of little worth as a domestic political instrument. In the 1942 elections, the Republican Party gained forty-four seats in the House, nine in the Senate, and captured the governorships in several states having large electoral votes.

While the President recovered from the Willkie fiasco, Under Secretary of State Welles met with Myron Taylor and discussed the latter's mid-1941 trip to the Vatican. They agreed with the view of many lay Catholics and Vatican representatives who believed the Pope had been greatly encouraged at the appearance of Roosevelt's representative in Rome. Taylor informed the President of this and added that another trip would encourage Catholics in Axis occupied countries.

Although Roosevelt liked this method of propagandizing and agreed it would encourage those people, he wanted Taylor to go abroad for more immediate reasons. As the Axis forces achieved fresh victories, their representatives at Rome

²⁷New York Times, October 27, 1942, 8.

appeared at the Vatican and called for a Papal appeal for peace. Because Roosevelt feared the Pope might eventually make a statement which would hurt the Allied cause, he wanted Taylor to see the Pontiff in an effort to offset the Axis pressures. He also instructed Taylor to visit Spain and Portugal to determine their attitudes toward an Allied operation along the African coast.²⁸

Even though he agreed that Taylor should return to the Vatican, the President wondered how Taylor planned to get into Italy. The answer to Roosevelt's question brings to light the case of Harold A. Tittman, "secretary" to the Vatican envoy. After the United States had entered the war, Heinrich Himmler convinced Benito Mussolini to expel the "nest of diplomatic spies" from the Vatican, meaning the Allied diplomats who moved to the Vatican when the war started. While the Vatican did not plan to yield to this pressure, the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See did point out that Tittman was not a representative of the American Government to the Vatican. The Vatican officials had no answer for that charge and requested Tittman to clarify his position. As this bode no good for Tittman, he wrote Hull that he needed a title--Minister or Charge-- to regularize his diplomatic status with the Vatican. A short time later, Roosevelt provided the rank of Charge for

²⁸Taylor to Roosevelt, August 11, 1942, D.S. File 121.866A/240 1/2, NA.

Tittman.

At the same time that he granted a title to Tittman's station within the Vatican, the President's action raised a legal question concerning Taylor's position. While White House and State Department officials consistently denied any change in Taylor's status, Harold Tittman's new title conferred the responsibility of a legal mission on him while the next higher officer, Minister or Ambassador was absent. Although Tittman's personal safety required Roosevelt's immediate action, the President never attempted to later gain the Senate's approval, nor did the State Department revise its story that Taylor served as "Personal Representative," and that Tittman served as his secretary--not as Charge^e of an embassy.²⁹

Safely ensconced in his official station, Tittman took up the matter of Taylor's journey with Vatican officials, who in turn inquired about safe conduct from Italian authorities. The Italian Foreign Office opposed the trip because the United States refused safe passage for the Italian Ambassador to Argentina, but when Foreign Minister

²⁹Hull to Tittman, February 9, 1942, D.S. File 121.866A/305; memorandum by Adolf Berle, December 13, 1941, D.S. File 121.866A/202 1/2; Welles to Hull, December 13, 1941, D. S. File 121.866A/203 1/2; Tittman to Hull, December 23, 1941, D.S. File 121.866A/206; Welles to Archbishop Cicognani of the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, December 23, 1941, D.S. File 121.866A/205 1/2; Senator Henrik Shipstead to Hull, June 1, 1944; Hull to Shipstead, June 15, 1944, D.S. File 121.866A/403, NA.

Count Ciano stated that treaty rights which granted neutrality to the Vatican and all foreign missions to it must be upheld, the Italian Government presented no objections.

On September 12, 1942, Taylor flew from New York to Lisbon, where he boarded an Italian commercial plane for the remainder of the trip. Once in Rome, Taylor traveled in an official Vatican automobile escorted by Italian police.³⁰

During his three audiences with the Pope, Taylor attempted to offset German pressures on Italy and the Vatican. He declared that if the Italian people decided to abandon Hitler, they would be "given adequate assistance" in postwar reconstruction programs. Aware that his proposals of money for relief and reconstruction would reach Italian officials, Taylor made the gesture hoping it would be another wedge in prompting the Italians to make a separate peace. In an effort to gain the Pope's assurances that he would not make public statements about Axis peace proposals, Taylor read a long, broadly phrased statement of American war aims that just happened to coincide with the Pope's ideas for world peace. He mentioned Roosevelt's

³⁰Tittman to Hull, August 26, 1942, D.S. File 121.866A/242; Tittman to Hull, September 4, 1942, D.S. File 121.866A/246; Welles to Bert Fish, American Minister to Portugal, September 3, 1942, D.S. File 121.866A/248; Tittman to Hull, September 29, 1942, D. S. File 121.866A/272, NA.

goals of no territorial ambitions, self-determination for all people, and the need for an "expanded United Nations" to insure world peace. Gently but firmly, Taylor pressed the Pope to make no remarks about the Axis suggestions for peace. At the next audience the Pope told Taylor to inform the President that the United States did not have to worry about a Papal advocacy or approval of compromise peace proposals and that outside pressures would not force a change in the Vatican's attitude.³¹

At the same time Taylor sought his cooperation, the Pope requested Taylor's assistance in a matter of vital importance to the Vatican. As early as February 1942, the Vatican made inquiries in London and Washington about the possibility of Allied bombers bypassing Rome, and now, the Pope asked Taylor to intercede with the Allied leaders. At a dinner meeting with Churchill in London, Taylor mentioned the Pope's concern for Rome's safety and asked for Churchill's assurances that the eternal city would be spared from Allied bombs. When the Prime Minister refused, Taylor then tried to persuade him to limit bombing to military targets, but Churchill refused on the grounds that

³¹Report by Myron Taylor to Roosevelt on the Trip to the Vatican, September 17-September 28, 1942, PSF: The Vatican, Myron Taylor File, Box 56, FDRL; Taylor to Roosevelt, September 21, 1942, D.S. File 121.866a?256; Tittman to Hull, September 29, 1942, D.S. File 121.866A/272, NA.

night bombing did not lend itself to the accurate bombing of military targets. Taylor thought he would be more successful in Washington because Roosevelt had earlier implied that the United States might follow an independent course on the bombing of Rome, but when he tried to get the President's concurrence, Taylor found that Roosevelt had once again changed his mind and would not object to the bombing of military installations in Rome when necessary.³²

After Taylor finished his talks with Vatican officials, he flew to Spain to conduct talks with the leaders of that neutral nation. His mission remained in line with the American policy of trying to keep Spain from becoming actively aligned with the Axis powers and supplying them with vital materials.

In Madrid, Taylor met with Generalissimo Franco and Foreign Minister Gomez Jordana. Taylor never mentioned an alliance with the United States but instead he tried to convince the two men that only the Allies could offer an

³²Winant to Hull, December 8, 1942, PSF: The Vatican, Myron Taylor File, Box 56, FDRL; Memorandum of Myron Taylor telephone message to Roosevelt, November 30, 1942; Hull to Roosevelt, December 3, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 792-793; Roosevelt to Taylor, December 4, 1942, PSF: The Vatican, Myron Taylor File, Box 56, FDRL. Between February 1942, and June 1944, the bulk of correspondence between Charge Harold Tittman and the Vatican officials dealt with the bombing of Rome, Monte Cassino, and other Papal territories; see FRUS, 1942, III: 791-800; 1943, II: 910-953; 1944, IV: 1274-1314.

assurance of a stable postwar society in Europe. Franco and Jordana understood the meaning of Taylor's offer of postwar food and reconstruction loans but refused to make a commitment to the Allies.

Although the talks produced no immediate results, Ambassador J. H. Carleton Hayes believed Taylor's display of confidence in the Allies ability to continue the fight and his stern conviction that Germany would soon collapse helped soften Franco's attitude toward the Allies. At the same time, the pro-Franco Archbishop of Toledo published a four-page condemnation of a pro-Nazi book in the official Spanish Catholic periodical Official Bulletin. With this sudden shift by the Spanish prelate and Taylor's exposure of Franco's uncertainty about the outcome of the war, Hayes cabled Roosevelt that Taylor's trip to Madrid came "at the right psychological moment for the American cause in Spain."³³

From Spain, Taylor's mission took him to the other neutral but equally important Portugal. Though it did not possess outright military power, Portugal's tungsten holdings were of basic importance to the production of weapons, and the mid-Atlantic Azores could be used as naval stations and supply bases. Following the British approach of mild pressure and trade agreements, the United States reached an

³³J. H. Carleton Hayes to Roosevelt, September 30, 1942, FRUS, 1942, III: 296-298.

agreement with Portugal for the purchase of the vital ore, wolframite. Although the American acquisitions did not cut into that pledged to Germany, they did keep larger amounts from going to the Axis, and the pact also allowed the United States to over-bid the price of wolframite, an action which made it so expensive the Germans could not long afford the vital minerals.

In his conversation with Salazar, Taylor used the same confident but subtle persuasiveness that he used with the Pope and Franco. He described the predicted social upheaval in postwar Europe and elaborated on United States' plans to maintain political and economic stability there. Then Taylor deftly turned the conversation to a discussion of Salazar's bogeyman--communism. He used that phobia and the prospect of American aid as an incentive to Salazar to form an alliance or at least pro-Allied neutrality. The Portuguese leader remained non-committal in 1942 but later granted facilities in the Azores to the United States.

After the conference with Salazar, Taylor met with the Catholic Cardinal of Portugal in an effort to get the Prelate's endorsement for a pro-Allied agreement. He told the Cardinal of his very long and satisfactory conferences with the Pope and the extended talks with Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Maglione and other Vatican officials. To further impress the leading Portuguese Catholic with the Vatican's attitude toward the United States, Taylor showed

him the document in which the Pope rejected Axis attempts to force a change in his attitude and declared his support for the Allied goal of total victory. Even though the Cardinal remained noncommittal, Taylor left Portugal with the impression that the talks had won another spokesman for improved Portuguese-American relations.³⁴

Although Myron Taylor's trip to the Vatican and the Iberian Peninsula produced no outward shift toward the Allies, it did contribute to the Allies' psychological warfare. Taylor's mission became a symbolic one-man invasion force crossing enemy lines and setting up camp in the capital city of one of the Axis countries. The later rumors of his trip's value to the successful invasion of Africa so incensed the Italian and German Governments that President Roosevelt wisely refrained from sending him back to Rome until late 1944. The Pope's agreement not to discuss Axis peace proposals helped the Allied cause in the early days of the war when rumors of separate peace talks needed to be quashed. The psychological impact of his suggestions about postwar security no doubt caused Franco and Salazar to wonder about their relationship with the Axis. Franco's decision not to send troops against the Allies in Africa and Salazar's later agreement on the Azores likely found some impetus from Taylor's visit.

³⁴Hull to Taylor, September 8, 1942, PSF: The Vatican, Myron Taylor File, Box 56, FDRL; Dobney, ed., Selected Papers of Will Clayton, 66.

The nature of the early days of World War II demanded that the President follow a moderate policy toward any government which would help the Allies. At that time, the United States did not have the military wherewithal to defeat the Axis. Thus, Roosevelt used what political means were available to try to offset Axis influence, especially in Vichy France and the French possessions in North Africa.

After Germany's victory in France in 1940, a French government was set up in the unoccupied part of France at Vichy. While Germany held command in most of France, it did not control the French possessions in either Africa or the Western Hemisphere. The American public objected to doing business with the French, but Roosevelt recognized the value of continued diplomatic relations with that government. He felt that with encouragement, the Vichy group might resist German pressures on their colonies and might cooperate when the second front got underway. Although Admiral William Leahy served as Ambassador to Vichy France, the President wanted information about the French colonies in Africa, so he directed Robert Murphy to cultivate sympathizers and report on political conditions in the French possessions.

Murphy first became acquainted with the nature of diplomacy when he worked as a code clerk in Switzerland during World War I. Following the war, he returned to the United States, completed law school, and passed the foreign

service examination. In the 1920's while serving as American Consul in Munich, Murphy observed the growth of Hitler's Nazi Party. Like many other Foreign Service Officers, Murphy reported on the situation but thought Hitler's activities no more reactionary than that of many other German political groups. During the next decade, Murphy served in the American Embassy in Paris; and when Ambassador William Bullitt left France in 1940 after the German occupation, Murphy became Charge of the American delegation at Vichy, until called by the President, and worked to keep French possessions in Africa from falling under German control.

After reading reports on French Africa, Roosevelt wanted to discuss ways of aiding and encouraging French administrators who remained relatively free in operating those holdings, so he called Murphy to Washington in September 1940. Roosevelt instructed Murphy to make a complete inspection of conditions in Africa and report directly to him. The President again showed his disregard for the State Department by telling Murphy that when he learned something of special interest not to bother with Department channels but to send it to the White House. Murphy felt uneasy at the prospects of ignoring his professional superiors but accepted the situation as "one of the occupational hazards of Roosevelt's special assignments." Murphy understood the President's brand of personal diplomacy

as he later remarked that "there always was the consolation that the President, though he might let one down in a public utterance, gave very staunch support in private."³⁵

Throughout the trip, Murphy saw and heard much anti-Nazi sentiment voiced by Frenchmen in Africa, and as a result of his observations, Murphy suggested that the United States sign an economic aid agreement with French North Africa. With Roosevelt's approval, Murphy and the French administrator for Africa, Maxime Weygand, concluded negotiations on that accord. The terms of the agreement allowed frozen French funds in the United States to be used to buy non-strategic goods to be shipped to Africa. And to insure the goods did not fall into German hands, the French agreed to permit American representatives to observe the off-loading of the supplies in African ports. While the compact encountered heavy criticism from the American press, Roosevelt viewed the agreement as practical. He agreed to Murphy's plan, and the Weygand-Murphy Agreement became effective in March 1941.

While the aid never reached the amounts desired by the French, it did bring much friendship for the United States among the needy French and Arabs who had not received promised German aid. Of greater importance, the right to have personnel in vital ports allowed the resident

³⁵Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 70.

Americans to carry on surveillance activities and keep informed of German movements, as well as build personal friendships which were of value in the later military operations.

After Murphy completed the initial mission, he spent the rest of 1941 traveling between Africa and Washington trying to quell opposition to the aid program. The biggest objection came from the Board of Economic Warfare and their British counterparts, which opposed any assistance to the French. The result was a considerable delay in the movement of goods. Following several months of protracted negotiations, the British finally agreed to allow the French ships to cross the British blockade. Murphy encountered another obstacle when the Vichy Government, under German pressure, recalled Weygand in November 1941, an action which resulted in American suspension of the agreement. One month later, as a result of Churchill-Roosevelt talks on the possible invasion of Africa, Cordell Hull cabled Murphy that the accord was being reactivated.³⁶

As Murphy continued his African operations, his increased knowledge of the French colonists led him to call for a conciliatory and cooperative policy for late 1942.

³⁶The jurisdictional conflict between the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare is described in William Langer's Our Vichy Gamble (New York: W. W. Norton, 1947), 264-272.

He saw the melange of Europeans living in French Africa: the rich and poor refugees; Jews and Polish nationals; Spanish loyalists and communists, all comprising a part of a potentially disruptive element that needed to be controlled in the event of hostilities. To Murphy, only the experienced French administrators could keep stability in the European community in Africa at the time of Allied military operations.³⁷

When he returned to Washington in late August 1942, Murphy carried those impressions with him. Shortly after his arrival, Murphy met with Secretary of War Stimson and General George C. Marshall and found both men uninspired by the strategy to invade Africa. Stimson never gave up the idea of a continental strike, and Marshall, if it had to be, wanted an outright attack on French Africa without any collaboration with the French administrators. When Murphy traveled to Hyde Park, he found that the President understood the political problems associated with the landing of American forces in French Africa. To undertake the invasion without some form of cooperation by the Vichy Government would leave the United States facing resistance by loyal French forces in Africa. If French resistance did slow the operation, German forces in Africa could attack the Allied troops before they could establish a salient,

³⁷Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 97-98.

thus prolonging the North African campaign and possibly provoking the Germans into sending troops through Spain to seize Gibraltar and cut off the Allied train of supplies to Africa. This possibility left the alternative of either needing an overwhelming force to offset the French military or as Murphy suggested, convincing the leading civilian authorities to cooperate with the Americans. At the same time, Murphy hoped French naval officers could be persuaded to pull the French warships out of their berths at Toulon, France and join the Allied fleet.

After they reviewed the African situation, Roosevelt informed Murphy of the invasion plans and added: "Don't tell anybody in the State Department about this. That place is a sieve!" Murphy said that such a silence would strain his relationship with Secretary of State Hull, but Roosevelt brushed that aside with "Don't worry about Cordell. I will take care of him; I'll tell him our plans a day or two before the landings." Roosevelt's directive removed Murphy from any responsibility to the State Department, and from the time he returned to Algiers, Murphy transmitted and received messages through a military code not held by the Department. Murphy's deciphered messages finally reached the State Department in September 1960.³⁸

³⁸Morgenthau Diaries, Book 572, September 28, 1942, 181-J to 181-K; *ibid.*, Book 573, September 29, 1942, 32-35, FDRL; Roosevelt to Murphy, September 22, 1942, D. S. File

When Murphy received his instructions from the President and the operations commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, he knew that both men agreed with his view that Charles DeGaulle should not be brought into the operation. Washington's attitude toward DeGaulle's Free French movement was never cordial, but became even more distant following the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident of December 1941. The United States and the Vichy official in charge of the two French islands off the coast of Newfoundland had signed an agreement which stated there would be no change in the political status of French possessions in the Western Hemisphere. Directed toward Germany, the accord also had the additional effect of barring the Free French from the islands. Once German submarines began prowling the waters of the northern coast of the United States, the tiny islands' importance as a communications center was considered by the United States. As Great Britain, Canada, and the United States negotiated over joint control of the islands, DeGaulle's forces seized them. The expedition thrilled battle-hungry Americans and imbedded DeGaulle in their minds as a true French patriot. Angry over DeGaulle's action which gave Germany an excuse to take the same action in

123M956/477 1/2, NA; FRUS, 1942, II: 392n; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 102, 106; Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 301.

the future, Roosevelt, Hull, and the State Department refused to cooperate with the Free French movement and talked of DeGaulle as power hungry, irresponsible, and one who could not be trusted.³⁹

Following the extensive planning conferences, Murphy returned to Algiers on October 11, 1942, three short weeks before the Allied invasion. After considerable investigation, he concluded that General Henri Giraud was the best hope for French cooperation. The General had snubbed German overtures for collaboration, and when imprisoned for his refusal, Giraud had escaped and returned to Vichy France where he lived as a national hero. Murphy believed the heroic Giraud could easily persuade the French military in Africa to join the Allies. While Giraud remained in Lyon, France, Murphy negotiated with General Charles Mast, commander of French forces in Algiers.

While he negotiated with Giraud's agent, Murphy learned that Admiral Jean Francois Darlan might bring the French fleet to Africa if the United States would supply him with large-scale aid. As commander-in-chief of all French military forces, Darlan's control of the French

³⁹Murphy to Hull, October 12, 1942; Murphy to War Department, October 13, 1942; Murphy to War Department, October 15, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 390-394; Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During The Second World War (New York: John Wiley and Sons, c. 1965), 36.

Navy and his cooperation with the United States would almost insure success for the invasion. Murphy suggested that Darlan be encouraged and then attempted to reconcile differences between Darlan and Giraud. General Mast told Murphy that Giraud expected the Americans to deal with him because Darlan could not be trusted. He explained that since the French Army had confidence in Giraud and would obey him, the French Navy would follow the army. Mast then raised the question of command of the forces in Africa, proposing a unified command with Eisenhower heading the American forces and Giraud leading the French. Murphy recognized the problem and tried to label it a technicality, but Mast insisted it was a political point that had to be settled in advance, and he called for a meeting with officers from Eisenhower's staff to discuss the issues and arrangements for the operation.

Three days after the Murphy-Mast talks, General Mark Clark and four staff officers flew from London to Gibraltar and then went by submarine to the African coast. In a style befitting Upton Sinclair's Lanny Budd, the Americans left the submarine, paddled their kayaks to the Algerian coast, and rendezvoused with Murphy and Mast at a farm near Cherchell. Mast wanted more information about the time and location of the invasion and declared that Giraud should be assured of immediate command of all forces. Clark remained silent on the invasion date and told Mast that

Giraud's command of the forces would take place once the initial landings were completed. He then outlined a proposal to include Darlan, but Mast again rejected the plan, holding to the idea that Giraud alone could deliver French forces in Africa. Seeing that the French General was adamant, Clark and Murphy dropped the effort to include Darlan rather than alienate Giraud and risk making the invasion without a major collaborator. Finally, Clark stated that Giraud's desire for a simultaneous landing in France would not be considered until after the North African invasion and that if Giraud accepted the conditions as presented, he should be prepared to leave France by submarine.⁴⁰

Although Mast believed Darlan no longer in contention, unexpected events projected the French Admiral into the situation. Prior to the Clark-Murphy-Mast talks, Alain Darlan, the Admiral's son, contracted polio and entered an Algiers hospital. Two days later, the Admiral arrived in Africa to visit his son and to inspect French military installations. While there, Darlan made contacts to determine if American planners would accept his leadership of French forces in Africa. With Giraud seemingly in tow, the Americans left the French Admiral's overtures unanswered,

⁴⁰Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 328-331; Murphy Diplomat Among Warriors, 119.

and he made plans to return to France.⁴¹

With Clark's secret visit completed, Robert Murphy had two weeks to finish negotiations with General Giraud and local officials. When Giraud learned of the outcome of Mast's talks with Clark, he wrote Murphy that while the American army would carry out the initial landings, the "Inter-Allied Commander-In-Chief" (Giraud) should set the date for the landings and take complete control forty-eight hours after the operations got underway. He also called for a simultaneous landing of fifty thousand men on the southern coast of France. Murphy saw the potential for trouble and requested permission to tell Mast when the expedition would arrive. Once informed, Mast charged lack of faith by the Americans and then cabled the news to Giraud. By return courier, the French General told Murphy that he could not leave France before November 20 and that the imminence of the invasion forced him to see the proposition as nothing more than an ultimatum. Believing his personal negotiations about to collapse, Murphy panicked and cabled the War Department" that it is not unreasonable that Giraud be given 3 weeks interval to perfect his metropolitan organization and arrange his departure with maximum advantage to us." With the convoys already formed and

⁴¹Murphy to Leahy, October 18, 1942; Murphy to Ray Atherton, October 30, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 398-400.

underway, his recommendation was rejected. Giraud objected to the new circumstances, but he left France aboard a submarine and then transferred to a seagoing plane for the rest of the trip to Africa.⁴²

The confusion mounted even further because at the same time Giraud left France, Admiral Darlan returned to Algiers to be with his son, who seemed to be near death. With the invasion only two days away, Darlan likely guessed at the approximate time of the operation and flew to Algiers to once again try his luck with the Allies.

When Giraud failed to arrive at Algiers, Murphy's plans became more muddled. He planned for Giraud to be in Algiers to issue a cease-fire order when the invasion started, but Allied officers feared that Giraud continued to harbor those sentiments expressed in the letter to Murphy so they detoured his plane to Eisenhower's headquarters at Gibraltar. They were right. He refused to issue a public cease-fire order unless installed as Inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief with the authority to make all decisions regarding the dispersal of Allied troops in French Africa, and he stubbornly held to the idea of an invasion of southern France. After a day and night of

⁴²Giraud to Murphy, October 27, 1942, 419-422; George C. Marshall to Murphy, October 27, 1942, 406; Murphy to Leahy, October 31, 1942, 409; Leahy to Murphy, November 2, 1942, 423; Murphy to War Department, November 4, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 424; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 120-121.

grueling talks, Giraud finally accepted the reality of his position and accepted the title of commander-in-chief of all French forces in North Africa.

With the landings starting and Giraud nowhere in sight, Murphy went to the home of the ranking French officer known to be sympathetic, informed him of the invasion, and requested a cease-fire order. General Alphonse Juin pointed out that his proclamation would be useless because Admiral Darlan outranked him and could rescind any statement Juin might issue. At Murphy's insistence, Juin contacted Darlan who soon appeared at the General's home. The Admiral acted surprised and then angry at the American move; he told Murphy that he remained loyal to Marshall Petain. Protecting his own position, and not completely sure of the operation's chances for success, Darlan cabled Petain for permission to stop the fighting.

Without hesitation, Murphy negotiated with the Vichy Admiral. Darlan, not Giraud, clearly commanded the allegiance of French military forces and could end hostilities without question. President Roosevelt helped make Murphy's decision easier by authorizing him to make any arrangements with Darlan which would help insure the operation.⁴³

⁴³Murphy to Leahy, November 25, 1942; Leahy to Murphy, October 17, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 425; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 127-134; Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 338.

While Murphy and Darlan negotiated the Admiral's post-invasion position, Giraud arrived in Algiers supposedly to bring an end to French resistance. The French African military officers refused to deal with Giraud and declared their allegiance to Petain and Darlan. When General Mark Clark arrived and Murphy informed him of Darlan's reluctance to act without Petain's approval, Clark threatened to arrest him. Fortunately for Darlan, the Marshall's authorization arrived, and news reached Algiers of Germany's movement into Vichy France. Realizing Petain was no longer in control and seeing his own position in jeopardy, Darlan quickly contacted all French African military commanders to stop fighting.

With the French resistance ending, Eisenhower still faced the problem of which Frenchman would be administrative officer for French Africa. If the United States supported Giraud, the situation would remain sensitive because of Darlan's many military supporters; on the other hand, to support Darlan would mean the loss of the French General's capabilities as a military tactician. Fortunately, Giraud understood the problem and told Murphy that he wished to be free from any civil duties. Subsequently, Giraud became military commander of French forces and Darlan served as civil administrator for French Africa.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Agreement between General Mark Clark and Admiral

The President's Personal Representative diplomacy proved successful as the Allies suffered less than 1,500 casualties in the initial invasion, and the ease in making the landings bolstered public morale at a most crucial time. The ultimate credit for the operation's success goes not to the Personal Representative but ironically, to the French Admiral. Robert Murphy followed Roosevelt's instructions and contacted the Frenchman he thought could stop the fighting, but Murphy's selection of Henri Giraud proved to be a bad choice. Then, through fortuitous circumstances and Darlan's opportunistic planning, Murphy finally made the right choice.

During the pre-invasion days, the State Department knew nothing of Murphy's negotiations with Darlan or the subsequent agreement putting the Admiral in charge of civil affairs in French Africa. While Hull concurred with Roosevelt's Vichy policies, critics saw that Robert Murphy, a State Department professional diplomat, was implementing a collaborationist-type policy toward the Vichy and they leveled their attacks at the State Department and Secretary of State Hull, not the White House. When news of the African landings reached the State Department, Hull moved quickly to answer the critics. Before he learned of the

Francois Darlan, November 22, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 453-457; U.S., Department of State Bulletin, vol. 7, November 21, 1942, 935.

subsequent arrangements with Darlan, however, Hull told reporters that credit for the successful operation belonged to the State Department. As news of the Darlan negotiations reached the United States, public hostility centered once again on Hull and his Department. Roosevelt tried to lessen public criticism by calling it a "temporary expedient," and he ordered the word "protocol" stricken from the formal Clark-Darlan agreement to avoid using a title which implied formal recognition of the Darlan regime and which would evoke even more public condemnation.

Opponents of Roosevelt's African policies based their objections on the collaboration with the Vichy French and the subsequent damage to the American national character for dealing with fascists. They aimed further criticism at the failure to include Charles DeGaulle's Free French organization in the operation. Ignoring the fact that there was a lack of real alternatives, the liberal press railed at Hull and Roosevelt. Freda Kirchwey of The Nation saw Darlan as "America's First Quisling," and feared that Murphy's deal weakened democracy while The New Republic's Dorothy Thompson believed the policy brought into question America's basic war aims. Walter Lippmann bemoaned the fact that "we have been put to a very severe moral test in North Africa and we are not meeting that test," and he described administration policies as trying to "turn the moral world upside down by insisting that wrong is right

and bad is good." Even Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau quietly complained about the deal, but the Clark-Darlan agreement remained in force.⁴⁵

The critics of the "Darlan Deal" in their all-out support for Charles DeGaulle, ignored the fact that neither Giraud nor DeGaulle had commanded enough backing to deliver the French forces in Africa in November 1942, but the subsequent criticism of Murphy's post-invasion decisions was justified. When Admiral Darlan set up his administration, he sought to replace the Governor-General of Algiers, who continually criticized his earlier concessions to the Nazis. At Darlan's request, Murphy arranged for Marcel Peyrouton to serve in that post. As Vichy Minister of the Interior, Peyrouton had issued the first anti-semitic decrees which led to the imprisonment of many French citizens. In a later Vichy power struggle, Peyrouton helped force the Nazi sympathizer, Pierre Laval, from office. When Laval regained control, Peyrouton was sent to Argentina as French Ambassador. With Murphy's approval, he joined Darlan in Algiers. Murphy's antipathy for DeGaulle influenced his decision to place more Vichyites in power in

⁴⁵Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 122-123; Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom, 295-296; Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, 378; Freda Kirchwey, "America's First Quisling," The Nation, 155 (November 28, 1942), 529-530; The Nation, 156 (January 2, 1943, and January 30, 1943), 3-4, and 151-152; Time, 41 (January 4, 1943), 15-16; New Republic, 108 (February 8, 1943), 165-166; Morgenthau Diaries, Book 584, 170-A to 170-G, FDRL.

Africa, but his policy of cooperation extended beyond its usefulness when Germany's invasion of Vichy France shut off American contacts in that part of France, and since the French Forces in Africa had joined the Allies, the need for Vichy politicians no longer existed.⁴⁶

At first, Roosevelt supported Murphy's unpopular arrangements, but the assassination of Admiral Darlan spared the President prolonged agony in defending that stand. With the French leader no longer a liability, Roosevelt gradually succumbed to public demands for policy changes. At Casablanca in January 1943, Roosevelt arranged for Giraud and DeGaulle to work together in the African political set-up. Demanding that he be in charge, DeGaulle refused to negotiate with Giraud. The sticky problem remained until Roosevelt grew weary of the African situation and left DeGaulle free to pressure Giraud into accepting his leadership in French Africa.

By January 1943, control of civilian programs in Africa reverted to the State Department, and Murphy's role as Presidential Representative ended. He became civilian political adviser on General Eisenhower's staff, helped arrange negotiations which led to Italy's surrender, met with Josip Tito to discuss American aid to Yugoslav partisans,

⁴⁶Hull to Murphy, December 11, 1942, FRUS, 1942, II: 481; "Recall Robert Murphy," The New Republic, 108 (February 1, 1943), 131-132.

and in August 1944, became Eisenhower's adviser on German affairs.

As the African campaign got underway, Roosevelt hoped Premier Stalin would be mollified by the operation. Postponement of the cross-channel invasion and reduced convoys of lend lease supplies to Murmansk strained Stalin's patience and caused Roosevelt to wonder if the alliance could survive. In March 1943, Ambassador Standley added to the tension when he accused the Russians of abusing American aid and not making an all-out effort on the military front. To reassure Stalin, the President saw one approach--a face-to-face meeting. After all, Churchill had met with Stalin, and Roosevelt no doubt believed he could get better negotiations with Stalin than did Churchill.

Instead of calling on Ambassador Standley to carry his proposal to Stalin, Roosevelt dispatched another Personal Representative to Moscow. He had to find a way to remove Standley without appearing to have succumbed to Russian demands that the Admiral be recalled. Roosevelt remembered Standley's outburst in 1943 as personal envoys began appearing in Moscow and likely assumed that the arrival of another Personal Representative might provoke Standley to resign. Indignant at the appearance of another agent who ignored the Ambassador, who had a letter the Ambassador was not allowed to read, and who conferred with

Stalin without the Ambassador being present, Standley resigned within three months. Roosevelt promptly replaced him with W. Averell Harriman.

To make the Moscow trip, the President called on Joseph Davies. The Roosevelt-Davies relationship dated back to the Wilson years when the Wisconsin lawyer-politician had served as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission while Roosevelt was in the Navy Department. Davies and Roosevelt, like other Progressives, belonged to the "Common Counsel Club," a political discussion group in which they developed and shared a lasting friendship. When Roosevelt first ran for President, Davies worked for the ticket and, in 1936, he served as Roosevelt's campaign chairman. As a result of his efforts for the ticket, but more so because of his \$10,000 donation to the campaign, Davies was named Ambassador to Russia.⁴⁷

During Davies' pre-war stay in Russia, he had thoroughly alienated most of the Foreign Service Officers in Moscow. George Kennan "saw every evidence that his

⁴⁷Once he became American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman complained that he was often forced to make inquiries of the Russian Foreign Office because Washington failed to keep him informed on vital issues; Davies to Roosevelt, March 22, 1943, PSF: 104, Davies Folder, FDRL; Richard, Ullman, "The Davies Mission and United States-Soviet Relations," World Politics, 9 (January 1957), 224; Quentin Reynolds, "Diplomat On The Spot," Colliers, 112 (July 24, 1943), 13; Standley, Admiral Ambassador, 364-382; 475.

motives in accepting the post were personal and political" and accused Davies of a "readiness to bend both the mission and its function to the purposes of personal publicity at home." Kennan's early judgment proved correct as Davies ignored his staff and constantly laid his views before American correspondents stationed in Moscow. Davies adopted the position that the Communists were no longer bent on world revolution or conquest, but acted as they did in order to secure Russia against future German aggression.

In spite of his lack of popularity with the professionals, Davies gained considerable publicity for his predictions of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and the later successful Russian stand against the Germans. Even though grossly erroneous, Davies' book entitled Mission to Moscow helped boost his popularity even further. In the book, Davies described Stalin as no heavy-handed killer, but a lover of children and dogs who had ordered the trials of the late 1930's to purge Russia of German spies. He also concluded that Russian communism was actually growing close to American capitalism and presented less a threat than fascism because communism was based "on the same principle of the brotherhood of man which Jesus preached." After he left the Ambassador's post, and returned to the United States, Davies continued to describe the Soviet Union in the glowing terms he likely believed would most

help Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to improve relations with Russia.

The former Ambassador's ideas and style did not change during the intervening five years. After he arrived in Moscow, Davies ignored Standley and the American Embassy staff and arranged his own meeting with Stalin. He also held a press conference in which he caused an uproar among newspaper correspondents when he accused them of disservice, treasonable activities, and aid to Hitler for their criticisms of the Soviet Government. He attempted to impress Stalin with his friendliness by showing a film adaptation of Mission To Moscow, but he received only "glum curiosity" from Soviet officials and an occasional grunt from Stalin.⁴⁸

When the two men talked in private, Davies informed Stalin that the President wanted to get away from the "red tape of diplomatic conferences" for an "informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me." Roosevelt suggested either side of the Bering Strait for a meeting, and to keep it simple, only Harry Hopkins, one

⁴⁸Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, 82-83; Joseph Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, c. 1941), 34, 511, 551-552; "How Russia Blasted Germany's Spy Machine," American Magazine, 32 (December, 1941), 81, 110-112; "What We Didn't Know About Russia," Reader's Digest, 40 (March, 1942), 49-55; Standley to Hull, May 22, 1943, D.S. File 121.861/159; Standley to Hull, May 25, 1943, D.S. File 121.861/162, NA.

interpreter, and one stenographer would accompany him. Stalin questioned the value of a conference but told Davies that although he could not meet in the early summer, possibly a conference in Fairbanks, Alaska, could be arranged for July or August.⁴⁹

Although Davies successfully completed his mission and returned to Washington in early June 1943, Roosevelt's flair for impulsive and uncoordinated personal diplomacy momentarily wiped out the prospects for a personal meeting with Stalin and resulted in more of the agitation that he had hoped to forestall. When Churchill learned of Roosevelt's designs, he protested that enemy propagandists would use the conference to show a split in the Allied camp and that it would produce resentment and alarm among the British people. Caught in the act, Roosevelt simply lied to Churchill and told him that Stalin initially proposed that the two leaders meet alone. Though his anger was real, Churchill quickly cooled since he had just returned from a Washington conference where he got Roosevelt's approval for continued operations in the Mediterranean in exchange for a firm British pledge to undertake the cross-channel invasion in May 1944. Once Stalin learned of the decision to direct operations against Italy, which meant

⁴⁹Roosevelt to Stalin, May 5, 1943; Stalin to Roosevelt, May 26, 1943, FRUS, "The Conference at Cairo and Teheran," 1943; 3-7.

the continental front was second again, he cabled Roosevelt that the decision represented an act of bad faith on the two leaders' part. In addition to the maneuvering by Roosevelt and Churchill, the Russian leader likely saw Davies' appearance in Moscow and Roosevelt's gesture for a personal meeting as nothing more than the President's effort to soften him for the unpleasant news.⁵⁰

The agents dutifully carried out the instructions they were given and accomplished the sought-after goals, but Roosevelt's Personal Representative diplomacy suffered most from his own doings and taught him an important lesson about the imprudence of mixing domestic politics and foreign policy. Prompted by Democratic politics and convinced that his personal charm could overcome any difficulties, Roosevelt foolishly sent Wendell Willkie abroad without any guidelines. He subsequently found himself making apologies for an uncontrollable envoy and fighting Willkie-created demands for a second front. From that experience, Franklin Roosevelt learned never again to use a popular opposition politician as a Personal Representative.

Aside from the Willkie fiasco, the President's policies did show imagination and a practical approach to

⁵⁰ Churchill to Roosevelt, June 25, 1943; Roosevelt to Churchill, June 28, 1943; Stalin to Roosevelt, August 8, 1943, ibid., 10-11; Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom, 371.

the desperate political-military situation in Europe. During the first two years of the war, Roosevelt saw that the extremely critical period of the war was at hand, thus the heavy flow of Personal Representatives in 1942 and 1943. As reflected in his envoys' missions, Roosevelt refused to guide his actions by fixed political principles that would have narrowed his policy options and have created suspicion and conflict within the Allied camp. The no-strings-attached aid helped keep Russia in the war at a crucial time and allowed the Russians time to re-equip their military forces and re-group their industrial forces. The President knew the Communists were not serious about extending religious freedom to the Russian people but he felt the gesture would be another bullet in the war of words. Nothing mirrored Roosevelt's belief in the special agent's practical value more than the dispatching of the Personal Representative to negotiate with Franco and Salazar. The agent's wartime visits to Spain and Portugal helped move those neutral leaders away from a cooperative policy with Nazi Germany. Further, Roosevelt heard, suffered from, and tried to play down the domestic reaction to his Vichy policies; but when no other possibility could assure the quick and relatively safe landing of Allied troops in Africa, the President willingly embraced the Vichy Admiral.

ROOSEVELT AND THE CHINESE PUZZLE

CHAPTER IV

Although Franklin Roosevelt's first concern was winning the war in Europe, he was simultaneously attempting to create military conditions in the Far East which would help to insure the success of a later intensified military campaign against the Japanese. To accomplish that goal, a major American effort was directed toward keeping China in the war. The United States supplied Chinese forces with the weapons that would keep Japanese troops tied down on the Asian mainland, while the Chinese agreed to provide locations from which American planes could strike against Japan. Later, as American forces gathered, Chinese ports would also serve as debarkation points for the invasion against the Japanese home islands.

While President Roosevelt actively pursued the military objectives, he also sought political goals for China. Since Roosevelt thought in the traditional terms of the Open Door, he believed that strengthening China would secure that nation's postwar territorial integrity and provide some stability in the Orient. It followed that

if China was recognized as the major power in the Far East and did preserve order in Asia, the United States would not be actively involved in maintaining a Far Eastern balance of power. Yet Roosevelt relegated China to a secondary position in the wartime scheme of things, and when coupled with the Chinese internal problems, such a policy invited defeat for his goals in the Far East.

The efforts to make that Far Eastern nation militarily and politically sound met with serious problems from within China. For over four years before the United States entered the war, China fought against Japan with one very evident result--a badly deteriorating society. The indiscriminate conscription of large numbers of young men from villages and the ruthless confiscation of food caused many peasants to see the Nationalist army as being no different from the Japanese; and as the lower ranks swelled with the sullen draftees, the army's effectiveness dropped. At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek did not provide adequate leadership for his troops; instead, the Generalissimo remained reluctant to deal with the problems of military control and organization and constantly maneuvered his armies in order to avoid any major engagements with Japanese forces. Another major obstacle to China's wartime effectiveness was the malignant effect of the Nationalist-Communist conflict. When Chiang Kai-shek began his attempted purge of Chinese Communists in 1927, a civil war broke out and continued

through the 1930's. With the Japanese invasion, the two Chinese groups agreed to cease fighting in order to defeat the Japanese, but by 1940 the shaky coalition had collapsed. To prevent the Chinese Communists from expanding their control into Nationalist territory, Chiang used army units to watch the Communists instead of fighting the Japanese. Fearing the prospects of Communist territorial gains and the loss of support by the Kuomintang conservatives if he agreed to initiate liberal reforms, Chiang Kai-shek refused to yield to any terms that would lessen the Nationalist Government's dominant position.

The basic problem which prompted much pre-Pearl Harbor American aid was the rapidly disintegrating Chinese economy. The Japanese offensives and subsequent occupation of the coastal centers forced the relocation of China's meager industries into undeveloped regions, a shift which cut China's industrial capacity and productivity to less than ten percent of prewar levels. A corollary to the production problem was that China also suffered at the hands of businessmen and government officials whose speculation and hoarding of badly needed commodities added to the inflationary economy.¹

¹Tang Tsou, America's Failure In China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, c. 1963), 55-56; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 3-13.

During the four years prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American material aid to China amounted to less than one hundred million dollars. Insignificant in comparison to the aid extended to Great Britain, and later to the Soviet Union, the American assistance to China did help keep that nation from falling under the complete dominance of the Japanese.

In an attempt to stabilize the Chinese economy in 1937, the United States agreed to buy Chinese yuan equivalent to fifty million American dollars. The yuan purchases amounted to over forty-eight million dollars by mid-1938 but proved to be of little efficacy in braking the soaring Chinese inflation. Of equal importance to the Chinese was the American arsenal of weapons which amounted to only nine million dollars in aid through the first three years of the Sino-Japanese war. In response to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal in late 1940, President Roosevelt decided to send Lauchlin Currie, his White House economic adviser, to reassure the Generalissimo that more economic and military aid would be forthcoming.²

Born in Scotland and educated at the London School of Economics, Currie earned his graduate degree at Harvard University. His work on monetary policy, The Supply and Control of Money in the United States, prompted Secretary of

²U.S., Department of State, United States Relations With China, 1944-1949 (Washington: GPO., 1949), 31.

the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., to persuade Currie to go to work for the New Deal in 1934. For the next five years, he remained a part of Morgenthau's work force in the Treasury Department, producing several articles and proposals for stimulating the economy. By July 1937, he had won such recognition for his economic proposals that the President called him to serve as a White House economic adviser.

Although he had no previous contact with China and did not understand the perplexing internal problems of that nation, the brilliant and self-assured economist agreed with Roosevelt's decision to send him to China. Currie believed that he alone could gain a quick understanding of China's problems and develop the best possible solution to China's economic and political difficulties.

On February 7, 1941, Currie and his party landed at the Chungking airport. During the next three weeks, Currie interviewed Chinese bankers and officials of the Ministries of Finance and Economics; took the inevitable tour of airfields, training schools, and farming projects; and spent twenty-seven hours in conference with Chiang Kai-shek. As Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson pointed out, Currie's visit was "an audit since it brought to the attention of the Chinese Government more clearly many of the weaknesses and problems facing the nation."³

³U.S., Department of State Bulletin, 4 (January 25,

Within five days of Currie's return to Washington on March 12, Roosevelt received his assessment of the situation. Currie's report became doubly important because it contained the first detailed statistical information on China's wartime financial conditions and because it provided the President with some first hand impressions about the Nationalist-Communist problems. Currie told Roosevelt that he had attempted to impress Chiang with the need for a unified front against the Japanese, but the Generalissimo had such hatred for the Communists that the two groups could not reach an agreement. To gain more information about the Nationalist-Communist conflict, Currie exchanged notes with Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist liaison officer in Chungking. He noted that Chou did not seem particularly radical and considered him sympathetic toward the struggle against Japan. Currie concluded that the Chinese Communists were growing stronger because of their progressive taxation of landlords, introduction of local village democracy, anti-Japanese propaganda, and basic appeals to the Chinese peasants.

With Chiang using fifty army divisions to watch the Communists and seeing a growing disaffection among the liberal element within free China, Currie proposed a

1941), 110; Johnson to Hull, February 28, 1941, FRUS, 1941, V: 602-603; Johnson to Hull, March 3, 1941, D. S. File 033.1193 Currie, Lauchlin 23, NA.

conciliatory rather than a suppressive policy toward the Communists. After failing to convince the Chinese leader, Currie turned to Roosevelt and suggested a quid pro quo policy. The installation of an American adviser in China to manipulate American aid could "exert enormous influence in instituting thorough-going political and economic reforms and so prevent the clash that now appears inevitable between the left and the right."⁴

The issue of pressure over unconditional support for China found the same response as Roosevelt had given to demands for prior political agreements with the Soviet Union. He believed that he could personally influence Chiang to change the undesirable policies without the threats of withholding or withdrawing aid. Yet Roosevelt failed to recognize the Generalissimo's diplomatic skill in turning the situation on its head and making the dependence on American aid a major lever in gaining more aid from the United States. When the decision had to be reached, however, Roosevelt would not stand up to Chiang Kai-shek any more than he had to Churchill or Stalin, and for much the same reason. China was needed to keep two million Japanese troops engaged on the Asian mainland, and Roosevelt would do nothing to jeopardize that situation.⁵

⁴Currie to Roosevelt, March 15, 1941, FRUS, 1941, IV: 81-86; John Paton Davies, Dragon By The Tail (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, c. 1972), 251-252.

⁵Tsou, America's Failure in China, 105-106.

When he reviewed the military situation, Currie told Roosevelt that Chiang had strongly intimated that the Chinese would not go on the offensive until they received more guns, ammunition, and planes from the United States. Concerned about Chiang Kai-shek's stubbornness and Chinese military capabilities, Currie recommended an American military officer be sent to China to inspect facilities and determine if the Chinese forces could in fact carry the fight to the Japanese.

From his observations about the Chinese leader, but moreso because of his knowledge of Roosevelt's style of diplomacy, Currie concluded that Chiang could be held in line with a little "care and attention." By speaking of China in the same terms used toward England and by mentioning the possible postwar surrender of American interests in Shanghai, Roosevelt could improve Sino-American relations. Currie further suggested that as Chiang "reads every word of your speeches and considers you the greatest man in the world" a more personal evidence of friendship "would allow the United States to help China in the military struggle and guide China in her development as a great power in the postwar period."⁶

The economist's proposal gave Roosevelt an idea for fulfilling the goal of making China into an international

⁶Currie to Roosevelt, ibid., 92.

power--without a substantive commitment by the United States. During the war, the President used the "care and attention" gesture in an attempt to placate Chiang and build up China. In 1943, he supported repealing American extraterritoriality rights in China, favored Congressional repeal of Chinese exclusion, and insisted that China be a signatory nation to the Declaration of the Four Nations in Moscow, thereby recognizing China as an equal partner in the war; finally, Roosevelt invited Chiang to attend the Cairo Conference with Roosevelt and Churchill.

To insure an adequate hearing of Chinese requests, Currie suggested some changes in Roosevelt's organizational method of determining priorities for aid allocations. As the breadth of the President's Aid Committee should be extended to include China, Currie proposed that he be attached to the body to make sure Chinese requests received the same consideration as other Allied needs.⁷

After listening to Currie's recommendations, President Roosevelt initiated a flurry of activity in Washington. On April 1, 1941, the United States agreed to purchase Chinese yuan equivalent to fifty million American dollars. Ten days later, the President put Currie in charge of organizing the supply program for China and authorized him to deal with the War Department for aircraft "or any other

⁷Ibid.

thing that the Chinese request." But at the same time, Roosevelt that "I don't want to imply that I am at this time in favor of any of the proposals. Obviously that can only be finally worked out in relationship to our whole military problem and the needs of ourselves and the British." Roosevelt would make some gestures toward China, but he had not become so upset that he lost sight of the primary American goal of aiding the European allies.⁸

As a further symbol of America's desire to aid China, Roosevelt named Owen Lattimore as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. In the early years of the twentieth century, Lattimore had lived in and traveled across Mongolia and Manchuria, and by the time of the Sino-Japanese War he was recognized as a leading scholar on China. From 1938 to 1941, Lattimore served as Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University and edited Pacific Affairs, a journal published by the Institute of Pacific Relations. He went to China in July 1941, but returned to the United States less than a year later, since the Generalissimo

⁸U.S., Congress, Joint Committee On The Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearing Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, part 20, 79 Cong., 2d Sess., 1946, Roosevelt to Currie, May 15, 1941, 4539; United States Relations With China, 31.

sought an expert on American politics, not Chinese affairs.⁹

Although Secretary of State Cordell Hull agreed with the President's appointment, he pointed out that "it is assumed that Mr. Lattimore would of course in any such position function as a private American citizen and not as an official of this government." Hull, in June 1941, sought to keep the United States from being charged with unneutral acts which would add to the already growing tension with Japan. Moreover, the Secretary of State recognized the implications for the State Department of Lattimore's being stationed next to Chiang Kai-shek when Currie informed him that the President would use commercial channels to communicate with Chiang rather than the normal diplomatic routes. Currie added that he planned to continue using the naval radio channels on matters pertaining to lend lease for China.¹⁰

The Secretary's apprehension proved real as some messages transmitted to the American Embassy in Chungking were in a code held only by Lattimore, the Chinese Government, and the White House. As a result, Ambassador Clarence

⁹Currie to Roosevelt, May 6, 1941, FRUS, 1941, V: 644; Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: Macmillan Company, c. 1970), 226.

¹⁰Hull to Roosevelt, May 21, 1941, 648; Hull to Gauss, May 29, 1941; 651; Currie to Hull, May 3, 1941, 642; all cited in FRUS, 1941, V.

Gauss delivered cables to the Chinese without knowing the substantive contents. Predictably, Gauss complained to the Secretary of State:

no Ambassador to China can function intelligently and efficiently under present conditions without some background on what is transpiring through other than the usual diplomatic channels. For what is being done by way of aid to China under the Lend Lease Act and we have no information regarding the provisions of the currency stabilization loan agreement.

Gauss concluded, as did numerous other professional diplomats, "that coordinated and effective American representation in China calls for the use, to the fullest extent practicable, of normal diplomatic channels of communication." Even Sumner Welles, who jumped State Department channels with regularity, objected to the practice and recommended that he explain the situation to Currie. After hearing from his friend in the State Department, Roosevelt endorsed the suggestion and directed him to send for Currie and work out the problem. Currie compromised slightly by agreeing to provide the Department with copies of messages transmitted between the President and Chiang Kai-shek. Currie did send copies of messages to the Department--several days after sending or receiving the transmission at the White House. At the same time however, Currie instructed Owen Lattimore that normal cables would be sent through the Embassy but "special messages may continue to be

routed through me."¹¹

Although Welles succeeded in altering the practice somewhat, the fact remained that Roosevelt once again built a bridge around the State Department. Much as Harry Hopkins became the link between Roosevelt and Churchill, Lauchlin Currie via Owen Lattimore became the direct contact between the Generalissimo and the President. Once the United States entered the war, Roosevelt decided to send General Joseph Stilwell to China to coordinate the American-Chinese war effort. Hopefully, Chiang would grant Stilwell authority to develop plans and use whatever means necessary, including Chinese troops, to carry out the task of fighting the Japanese, saving Burma, and keeping China in the war.

The American general's task was made difficult from the outset by the complicated system under which he operated. Stilwell was the Chief of the Allied Staff under

¹¹Gauss to Hull, July 24, 1941, FRUS, 1941, V: 684. The practice of ignoring the Ambassador also bothered Gauss' predecessor. Nelson T. Johnson wrote that "He [Currie] reaches the scene [the Embassy Office] simultaneously with me, I after thirty years of travel, talk and observation; he after an elapsed period of twelve days during which he has had contact with no minds or facts that might have prepared him for what he is to hear or see;" Russell D. Buhite, Nelson T. Johnson and American Foreign Policy Toward China, 1925-1941 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), 11; Welles to Roosevelt, July 25, 1941, 684-685; Memorandum by Stanley Hornbeck, July 30, 1941, 679; Owen Lattimore to Currie, July 28, 1941, 687; Currie to Lattimore, July 30, 1941, ibid., all cited in FRUS, 1941, V.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; he was commander of all American forces in the China-Burma-India theater; and later he served as deputy commander of the Southeast Asia Command. In a position that should have been divided into three area commands, Stilwell's attempts to initiate military operations against the Japanese in Burma encountered obstacles: the United States could not send the requested supplies or men because of the higher priority on the European sector of war; Great Britain's decisions on logistic support were based on the same military considerations, and even placed the defense of India before Burma; and not the least of Stilwell's problems was Chiang Kai-shek's unwillingness to commit Chinese troops to battle in Burma because of his desire to protect his government. Finally, Stilwell's efforts were hampered by his disdain, often openly expressed, for the Chinese leader.¹²

During the early months of 1942, Stilwell attempted to halt the Japanese push into Burma. The overwhelming number of Japanese forces made shambles of the general's efforts to keep Rangoon from falling, but Chiang Kai-shek's interference also contributed to Stilwell's defeat. Independent of Stilwell, Chiang ordered changes in the strategy which left the Chinese army commanders no choice

¹²Charles F. Romanus, and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, vol. 9, part 2 of United States Army in World War II (Washington: Department of the Army, 1956), 1.

but to obey him. Though the defeat in Burma did not come as a result of Stilwell's poor planning, many Chinese officials believed the American officer knew the plan could not succeed and accused him of needlessly throwing Chinese troops into an unnecessary battle.

In addition to charging that Stilwell's planning for Burma's defense was woefully inadequate and poorly conceived, Chiang erroneously concluded that Stilwell remained indifferent to the effectiveness of air power in China. Chiang received support from Major General Claire Channault, who believed the war in China could be won in the air. With the subsequent military defeats, domestic economic crises, and disappointingly small spurts of American aid, Chiang became more and more disenchanted with Stilwell. The American General, in turn, found the Chinese leader ignorant, arrogant, stubborn and unwilling to allow him to execute plans which called for the use of more Chinese in the fight against Japan.

In June 1942, Stilwell informed Chiang Kai-shek that heavy bombers originally scheduled for China were being re-routed to the Middle East and that some lend lease supplies stockpiled in the United States for shipment to China were allocated elsewhere. The Generalissimo accused Washington officials of operating behind Roosevelt's back and wondered if the United States and Great Britain considered China as one of the Allied theaters. He charged

Stilwell with the responsibility for seeing that the promised supplies were delivered; he then charged him with not submitting his aid recommendations to Washington. Finally, Chiang told Stilwell to radio Washington "and ask for yes or no on the question, 'Is the U.S. interested in maintaining the China Theatre'" Madame Chiang underlined the ultimatum by declaring that the Generalissimo would make a speech on July 7 and had to "tell the Chinese people the truth at that time"--whether the Allies considered the area necessary and would support it.¹³

At the same time, Roosevelt was considering a Chinese request that Harry Hopkins be sent to Chungking to review Sino-American relations. The President had already decided that Hopkins' health would not permit him to make the long and hazardous trip, but he had not decided whether or not he would send a representative. Lauchlin Currie suggested that he make the trip "to encourage the garrison until supplies arrive" and to let the "impression be created that important developments are pending." When the President learned of Chiang's reaction to the transfer of the bombers; his "three minimum demands" of three United States divisions in India, 500 combat planes, and 5,000 tons of supplies per month; and the not so subtle threats about

¹³Charles F. Romanus, and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, vol. 9, part 1 of United States Army in World War II (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953), 167-171.

the forthcoming radio speech, Roosevelt quickly decided that Currie should once again go to China.¹⁴

In his instructions to Currie, the President reiterated his views on Stilwell, China's role in the war, and the future Sino-American relationship. He directed Currie to leave the impression that important actions would be undertaken shortly; explain that present circumstances made the European battle front most crucial; emphasize the importance of Stilwell's mission and that he could best represent Washington with the China-Burma-India military requirements; indicate the disappointment over the failure to establish a coalition with the Chinese Communists; and finally, imply to the Chinese leader that economic aid would be influenced by internal developments. Currie was also instructed to assure the Generalissimo that he would be consulted on all postwar matters. Roosevelt appeared to change his mind on the use of aid to press Chiang to bring some reforms in the Chinese Government, but the nature of Currie's instructions was general and implicit rather than set in specific demands.

Once Currie reached Chungking, he found Chiang still adamant in his desire to have Stilwell removed from the China scene or at least no longer in control of lend lease

¹⁴Currie to Roosevelt, June 3, 1942, 62; Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, July 4, 1942, FRUS, 1942, China: 95; Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, c. 1948), 121.

supplies for that theater. In talking with the Chinese leader, Currie learned that much of the confusion and hostility came from Chiang's objections to Stilwell's efforts to reform and modernize the Chinese army, the proposal to use Chinese Communist forces in the fighting, and his failure to acquire the promised aid.

Currie agreed with Stilwell's plan for re-taking Burma and restoring the air transportation route into China, but at the same time he created a bothersome problem when he described the General's role on Chiang's staff as being confined to those parts of the China Theater which lay outside Chinese territory. Since the geo-political boundary of China and the wartime China Theater coincided, Stilwell's position within China seemed non-existent. The Chinese quickly recognized the gap between Stilwell's authority and Currie's description and believed the American's role in China had ended but the War Department soon explained that Stilwell was the Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo's Joint Staff for Allied forces anywhere in the China Theater and had the duties of planning, organizing, training, and setting field operations as directed by the Generalissimo.¹⁵

¹⁵Instructions to Currie, no date June, 1942, President's Secretary's File: Executive Office, Currie Folder, Box 107, FDRL; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, 181; Tuchman, Stilwell and China, 318-319.

While in Chungking, Currie followed Roosevelt's instructions by holding a press conference and later delivering a speech at the Chinese-American Institute of Cultural Relations. He told both groups of greater war production in America and of expected increases in aid, and he implied that the United States was making plans for a counter-offensive. The remarks on the first points were general and expected rhetoric, but the broadly phrased description of the second front led many Chinese to believe the American attack would first come in the Pacific. As time passed without the expected counter-offensive, more Chinese joined Chiang in expressing their doubts about American sincerity in helping the Chinese fight the Japanese. Roosevelt wanted Currie to lead the Chinese to believe more attention would be paid to that area, but Currie's remarks did little to help Stilwell in his efforts to cooperate with the Generalissimo.¹⁶

After Currie returned to Washington, he continued to support Stilwell's proposals for training Chinese troops and going into Burma but did not support the plan for aiding China on a quid pro quo basis. Since his earlier trip, Currie had learned of Roosevelt's attitude against requiring pre-aid agreements from the wartime allies and

¹⁶Gauss to Hull, August 10, 1942, D. S. File 033.1193 Currie, Lauchlin/29, NA.

concluded that the United States did not "need to lay down any conditions or tie any strings to our support" of the Chinese military under General Stilwell. Even though Currie supported Stilwell, he failed to recognize the tactical plan's relationship to the Chiang-Stilwell differences. If Stilwell reformed the army and used the Chinese Communists, Chiang's position would be threatened. But Currie swallowed Chaign's argument that the personality differences with Stilwell hampered an all-out war effort and recommended to Roosevelt that the American General be recalled from China.

Believing his personally selected agent to be right, Roosevelt wrote General George Marshall that Stilwell "would be more effective in some other field," but the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War Henry Stimson remained staunch in their position that Stilwell should be retained in his post because no other commander would be as experienced or as competent. Roosevelt again reversed his position and accepted Marshall's arguments, but Currie continued in his efforts to soothe the Generalissimo. In addition to suggesting Stilwell's recall, Currie also recommended the recall of Ambassador Gauss and suggested that he, Currie, be appointed to that post. Roosevelt appeared to favor the idea at one time but dropped the proposal once he learned that Chiang Kai-shek preferred

that Currie stay in Washington.¹⁷

As Lauchlin Currie pointed out in both the 1941 and 1942 reports, parts of Chiang Kai-shek's army spent their time keeping Chinese Communist forces under surveillance and blockading Communist areas in order to prevent their infiltration into Nationalist territory. In 1942, at least sixteen Nationalist divisions were engaged in trying to prevent Communist expansion into Sian, and by 1943, an estimated 400,000 Nationalists were engaged in patrol duty along the border.¹⁸

During the war, Washington officials familiar with the problem called for a policy of reconciliation between the two sides. John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, Raymond Ludden, Joseph L. Grew, and the "boys" in China--Charge George Acheson and John Paton Davies--viewed the marriage of Communists and Nationalists through glasses of expediency. First, the internal struggle meant that over one million men were not being employed in the major war effort; second, the Chinese Communists held vitally important areas in Northern and Eastern China which would

¹⁷Currie to Roosevelt, October 1, 1942; Roosevelt to Marshall, October 3, 1942, President's Secretary's File: China, 1942, Box 28; Currie to Roosevelt, November 13, 1942, President's Secretary's File: Executive Office, Currie Folder, Box 107, FDRL; Marshall to Roosevelt, October 6, 1942, FRUS, 1942, China: 159; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, 186n.

¹⁸United States Relations With China, 53; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, 184; Tsou, America's Failure In China, 150-151.

be of considerable value in the eventuality of a China-based American offensive against Japan. President Roosevelt looked beyond the wartime necessities and visualized a major conflict resulting from a Chinese civil war which might draw the United States and the Soviet Union into the struggle. He told Sumner Welles that the greatest post-war threat to peace was a civil war in China as: "The danger there was that the Soviet Union would intervene in behalf of the Communists, and the Western powers would be tempted or forced in their own interests to back the anti-Communist side." The experts in the State Department and the decision-makers at the White House were in agreement about the impact of a Chinese civil war--on the war and postwar Far East, but it ended at that point. Franklin Roosevelt relied on his Personal Representative's estimation of the situation and continued the cautious approach to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to change his policies toward the Chinese Communists.¹⁹

In 1943, Chiang Kai-shek declared that the Chinese Communists could fight only if they served under his command, took orders from his generals, and received American aid only through his administration. In addition to the Chinese internal friction, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated after Chiang charged that the Russian

¹⁹Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 152.

Government secretly supplied the Communist forces with arms and munitions and that Russian troops had fired on and killed Chinese Nationalist forces along the border at Sinkiang.

In a manner typical of Roosevelt, the President viewed Chiang's Russophobia as not well founded and believed that no real grounds for conflict existed between the Soviet Union and China. Roosevelt believed that through another personal agent he might be able to draw the Chinese and Russians together and, at the same time, persuade the Generalissimo to negotiate with the Chinese Communists.

As the President sought answers to those problems, he encountered an issue pertaining to his forthcoming campaign for re-election. Throughout the third term, Roosevelt's Vice-President, Henry A. Wallace, received growing criticism for his liberal political views and, by 1944, the reaction against Wallace reached such intensity that Roosevelt feared a major split in the Democratic Party if Wallace ran again. To avoid facing the difficult problem of personally rejecting Wallace and likely hoping that a long trip at this time would cause serious erosion among Wallace supporters; to allow Wallace's rivals for the Vice-Presidential spot to build their support; and to make a gesture of concern toward the Chinese problem, Roosevelt decided that Wallace needed

to make an extended trip.

While Wallace was to go abroad, Roosevelt did not want him stopping in India, Moscow, or any of the Pacific combat zones where he might make headlines, but someplace secure, like Northern Siberia where the Vice-President could placidly and quietly inspect Russian industrial and agricultural efforts. The President's political motive becomes readily apparent in looking at Wallace's itinerary; he spent three weeks in Siberia, May 20 to June 21; only three days in Chungking, June 23 to June 26; and continued his "inspection tour" until returning to the United States on July 9, only ten days before the Democratic National Convention began.²⁰

With the preparations completed, Wallace left Washington on schedule. He arrived in the Soviet Far East on May 23 and spent three weeks touring numerous farms, industrial plants, and military installations. After completing his inspection tour of Siberia, the Vice-President flew to China and arrived at Chungking on June 20.

In three lengthy conferences, Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek discussed the necessity of improved Sino-Soviet relations, problems between the Nationalists and Communists,

²⁰ Edward Stettinius to Hull, March 8, 1944, FRUS, 1944, China: 216; Samuel Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 438-439; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 740-741.

and the military situation in China. Following the President's instructions, and appearing to use Roosevelt's own words, Wallace pointed out that China's problems with Russia should be settled in order to prevent any interference with the Chinese war effort. He also passed along Roosevelt's observation that the Communists and Nationalists were basically friends and that "nothing should be final between friends," and if their differences could not be settled, they needed to call in a friend. When Chiang grabbed the obvious implications and asked for Roosevelt's personal assistance, Wallace rejected the request. He knew the President would not jeopardize his reputation by attempting to resolve China's internal disputes nor would he risk causing more problems with Russia by proposing solutions for long-time Sino-Soviet problems.

The Vice-President mentioned the poor showing of Chinese troops in recent fighting, citing a report that government forces in Honan fled without offering any resistance to the Japanese. President Chiang turned Wallace's criticisms around, claiming the inflation and scarcity of goods dampened his troop's morale, and pointed to the American decision not to start a Burma campaign as most seriously affecting Chinese fighting spirit. By blaming the American failure to act in Burma and the reduction in aid to China, the Generalissimo sought to cover the Chinese Army's impotence and his own ineptness in

planning and directing the military operations.

The only positive results of the Wallace Mission dealt with the request that an American military group be allowed to enter Communist territory to determine the location of Chinese Communist forces for use when American operations got underway in that region. At first, Chiang said the Americans could go only if the Communists agreed to his requirements for consolidation; but on the last day of the talks, he reversed his position and consented to the mission.

At the same time that Chiang agreed to the American expedition to Yennan, he told Wallace of his loss of confidence in General Stilwell. He mentioned Stilwell's refusal to give enough supplies to the Chinese forces for a campaign and pointed out that the Chinese war effort could not be expected to improve without adequate assistance and cooperation from the American General. Chiang also explained that he wanted closer cooperation and an understanding with the President but felt that the multi-channeled State Department hindered progress in that direction. To serve as a direct liaison between the two leaders and to allow Chiang Kai-shek to forego any further dealings with Stilwell, he requested the appointment of a Personal Representative who would handle military and political matters.²¹

²¹Summary Notes of Conversations Between Vice-

Before he returned to the United States, the Vice-President cabled his impressions of the situation to the White House. He told of Chiang's request for a Presidential envoy and then pointed out the discouraging state of China's economic, political, and military elements, the absence of morale among the Chinese, and the possibility that Eastern China, including American air bases, could fall to Japanese forces within four weeks. Wallace suggested that one means of alleviating the crisis would be to replace Stilwell with General Albert C. Wedemeyer--who had recently visited Chungking and had favorably impressed Chiang Kai-shek.²²

By the time he returned to the United States, Wallace found the President to be playing his favorite election year game of encouraging several popular Democrats to run for the Vice-Presidential nomination. When Wallace inquired about his position, he got the same story as the other potential running mates: Roosevelt supported him but wanted the open convention to decide the ticket. Roosevelt's method worked again, as the Democratic Convention named Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri as the Vice-Presidential nominee to run with

President Henry A. Wallace and President Chiang Kai-shek, June 21-24, 1944, United States Relations With China, 549-559.

²²Wallace to Roosevelt, June 28, 1944, FRUS, 1944, China: 234-237; Tuchman, Stilwell and China, 465.

Roosevelt. The Wallace mission, while doing nothing for Sino-American relations or for Henry Wallace, did pay-off--for Roosevelt.

Although President Roosevelt agreed with Wallace's evaluation of Stilwell's personality, he rejected the suggestion to name Wedemeyer and instead followed the Joint Chiefs of Staff's advice. Fearful of a total disaster for the American war effort in China, the Joint Chiefs wanted Stilwell to have a stronger hand in running the operation. They praised Stilwell's ability and his job performance, and they called for the President to designate him to coordinate all Allied forces including the Chinese Communists and to direct all military operations in China. Accepting those proposals, Roosevelt cabled Chiang that he was raising Stilwell to the rank of General and suggested that he be placed in command of all military forces.

The President's proposal showed his shallow understanding of the Chinese leader. Chiang Kai-shek would never accept the placement of a foreigner, especially Stilwell, in anything but nominal command of his military forces. Accepting Stilwell would be to admit that he was personally to blame for the poor war effort and that the American was right in his military strategy. Finally, Stilwell's new position, if Chiang agreed, would mean the arming and placement of Chinese Communist troops in the

field without Chiang having complete control over their maneuvers.

In his cable of July 8, 1944 to the President, Chiang agreed with the principle that Stilwell should be in command but felt that the complex nature of Chinese domestic politics and the fact that Chinese soldiers did not easily accept direction pointed up the need for considerable review before making a decision. Chiang would agree to the idea but would not consent to the transfer of authority until he worked out certain reservations with Roosevelt's Personal Representative.

As the Chinese leader hoped, Roosevelt's return cable placed primary emphasis on the selection of a political emissary to travel to Chungking to discuss Stilwell's role. Successful in his maneuver, Chiang had only to await the arrival of the President's position and the proposal that he be placed in command of all forces in China.

While the President traveled to Hawaii to confer with General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz on military strategy for the Pacific, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General George Marshall questioned Patrick Hurley about China and were satisfied that Hurley was the man who might smooth over Stilwell's abrasiveness and at the same time work with the Chinese leader. Stimson saw Hurley as "loyal, intelligent and extremely

energetic, pleasant and diplomatic in his manner" and "the only man that either Marshall or I could think of to revolutionize the situation of backbiting and recrimination and stalemate."²³

Patrick Hurley was no newcomer to Washington or the President's style of foreign policy. A successful claims lawyer and investor in oil and real estate, Hurley became acquainted with life in the nation's capital when he served as national attorney for the Choctaw tribe. After six years as the Choctaw's attorney and a brief stint in the United States field Artillery in World War I, Hurley returned to his law practice and private life in Tulsa, Oklahoma.²⁴

By 1928, Hurley was well-known in the Republican Party in Oklahoma and worked hard for Herbert Hoover's nomination and election. For the Oklahoman's efforts, President Hoover named him Assistant Secretary of War; and when his superior, James Good, died in November 1929, Hurley was elevated to Secretary of War. In that post, Hurley's nationalistic views of foreign policy became

²³Feis, The China Tangle, 172-173; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 415-416; Tuchman, Stilwell and China, 479.

²⁴The author has relied heavily on Russell D. Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), for information on Hurley's background, professional activities, and concepts of foreign policy.

evident as he fought against immediate independence for the Philippine Islands. Hurley believed, in 1930, that the Filipinos had not exhibited a maturity or readiness for independence, and that such an abrupt change would cause economic chaos for the islanders, who remained dependent on American markets. Hurley was also concerned that the islands might slip under the influence of the bellicose Japanese, which would subsequently affect American interests in the Far East. Never one to back away from pressure, real or imagined, Hurley often showed a willingness to settle differences and defend his position by the bare knuckle approach--thus his belief that an aggressive nation like Japan could be checked only by the power of the United States.²⁵

After the Democrats gained control in 1933, and Hurley lost his cabinet post, he worked on legal matters for several independent oil companies and served as legal agent for oilman Harry Sinclair. During the next five years, Washington saw little of Hurley; but in 1938, he regained some prominence in the capital as a result of his successful negotiations with the Mexican Government over expropriation of foreign owned lands and the subsequent nationalization of oil company property.

After prolonged discussion and after seeing that

²⁵Buhite, ibid., 68-73.

Harry Sinclair's company would not be paid dollar for dollar invested in Mexico and that the Mexican expropriation policies would not be rescinded, Hurley got an agreement by which the Mexican Government paid eight and one-half million dollars to Sinclair and allowed him to buy twenty million barrels of oil at a discount price. Securing an agreement acceptable to both parties and maintaining good relations with the Mexican officials throughout the discussions point to Hurley's ability as a negotiator and his awareness, at that time anyway, of the most realistic settlement possible.²⁶

Even though a life-long Republican, Hurley supported several of the New Deal domestic programs and called for the American people to stand behind the President as he tried to stem the depression. He also supported Roosevelt's foreign policies: the lend lease proposals, the destroyers-bases deal, and repeal of the Neutrality acts.

With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the reserve artillery officer sought active duty, but George Marshall had younger men to fill such billets and denied Hurley's request. President Roosevelt also refused to grant Hurley's wish but did use him on several occasions as his Personal Representative. To have Patrick Hurley, a cabinet member in Herbert Hoover's administration, would

²⁶Buhite, ibid., 82-99.

lend more respectability to Roosevelt's plea for wartime unity.

Between January 1942 and February 1944, Roosevelt sent Hurley to Australia to try to get supplies to General Douglas MacArthur's beleaguered forces in the Philippines; on a mission to inspect Russia's fighting forces; to the Middle East in 1943 to evaluate conditions in the Arab states; to China in November to confer with Chiang Kai-shek about topics to be discussed at the Cairo Conferences. He also called on Hurley for advice at the Teheran Conference the next month. Hurley's missions were primarily intended to determine the views of national leaders and to give encouragement to those people in nations Franklin Roosevelt could not personally visit. Hurley did his job in a most satisfactory manner, and by the end of the Teheran Conference, he awaited his next assignment.²⁷

By the summer of 1944, with the recommendations from Stimson and Marshall, the President decided on Patrick Hurley as his Personal Representative to China. Roosevelt knew Hurley had very limited knowledge of the Far East, having spent only three days in China in 1943 and having heard only Chiang Kai-shek's views on the trouble with Stilwell and the problem with the Chinese Communists, but

²⁷Buhite, ibid., 103; 106-107; 113-116; 124-132.

the President saw other features which no doubt offset Hurley's lack of experience in Sino-American relations. While Hurley's success as an envoy in the previous three years helped, far more important was his personality, his belief in his own persuasiveness as a negotiator, and his grand ego--all of which had previously caught Roosevelt's attention. Much like the President, Hurley also held little regard for the "stuffed-shirt diplomats in the State Department" and the Foreign Service, believing he could and would successfully complete his mission in China. Finally, Roosevelt likely felt that Hurley's prior status as Secretary of War would lend prestige to the mission.²⁸

In his instructions, the President designated Hurley as Personal Representative to the Generalissimo to "promote harmonious relations between General Chiang and General Stilwell and to facilitate the latter's exercise of command over the Chinese armies placed under his direction."

²⁸Wallace Murray to Hull, July 17, 1944, Box 90, Folder 403, Cordell Hull Collection, Library of Congress. In 1944, Hurley had a stormy session at the State Department with Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Eugene Rostow of the Division of Supply and Resources over one of Hurley's reports. Rostow had prepared a memorandum, and initialed by Acheson, that referred to the Hurley report on the Middle East as "hysterical Messianic globoloney," prompting Hurley to challenge Rostow to "come out in the hall and repeat what you said..." and then Hurley wondered aloud if Rostow was a "real man" or if he was hiding from military service by status of deferred diplomat, a point which Acheson quickly cleared up by informing Hurley that Rostow had already served and been discharged from further military duty. Hurley never forgot the incident or the officials, or the State Department.

Hurley was to maintain close contact with Ambassador Gauss, and finally, any duties relating to lend lease would be specified by the War Department.²⁹

From his orders and conversation with the President, Hurley assumed his primary job was to keep China in the war, maintain Chiang Kai-shek's regime in power, and unify the Chinese military forces in the struggle against the Japanese. Doubts have been raised as to whether Hurley went beyond his original orders and independently attempted to reconcile the Communist-Nationalist differences, but he never received orders from President Roosevelt to stop his line of negotiations.³⁰

When Hurley prepared to leave for China, he told the State Department that he was going to detour to Moscow to solicit advice "on the line he should adopt in his dealing with Chiang Kai-shek" and to inform Stalin of the nature of his mission. Department officials feared the side trip would disturb Chinese officials and "would not be in accord with General Hurley's position." Secretary of State Hull believed the trip was an afterthought, but even though the President had told Hull that he had not given Hurley instructions for the Moscow trip, Roosevelt in fact

²⁹Hull to Gauss, August 22, 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI: 250-251.

³⁰Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 149-150.

directed Hurley to go to Russia, knowing that Stalin's assurances were important to Hurley's chances for success in China.³¹

From his talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Hurley learned that the Russians approved of the efforts to achieve military unification in China and that the Soviet leaders viewed the Chinese Communists as not bonafide communists but as using the name communist to show their dissatisfaction with conditions in China. As a result of Molotov's observations, Hurley approached the Chinese internal problems with the idea that without Soviet support the Yennan group would be more receptive to a plan for unification and that if Chiang Kai-shek knew of the Russian position, he would worry less about Russian aid to the communists. Thus, Hurley partially based his plan for unification on Molotov's statements. Hurley was not duped by the Foreign Minister but took his word out of personal trust for the Russians. In 1942, when Hurley went to the Soviet Union for Roosevelt, Stalin allowed him to be the first American to have a full briefing on Russian strategy and also to visit the Russian front at Stalingrad. With this earlier trust exhibited by the Russians, Hurley could see no reason for believing otherwise in 1944.³²

³¹Matthews to Hull, August 24, 1944; Hull to Harriman, August 26, 1944, and August 29, 1944, FRUS, VI: 252-253; Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 316.

³²Feis, The China Tangle, 179-181.

Once Hurley arrived in Chungking, his first major effort involved trying to clear the Chiang-Stilwell feud. The American General's professional and personal disdain for "The Peanut" and the Generalissimo's total opposition to Stilwell's proposal to use Chinese Communist troops and personal control of lend lease supplies had not diminished since Vice-President Wallace had written of the conflict two months prior. Hurley tried to arrange a settlement, but the two irreconcilable forces and the military situation in China blocked any real compromise.

The conflict moved beyond Hurley's ability to mediate when Stilwell received a message from President Roosevelt to be delivered to the Generalissimo. In reference to Japanese military successes in China, the President declared that a major disaster could not be avoided unless the Salween River troops were reinforced, attempts were made to reopen the Burma Road, and, to provide military leadership, Stilwell were placed in unrestricted command of all forces in China. When Stilwell showed him the message, Hurley knew it would "knock the persimmons off the tree" and tried to persuade Stilwell not to deliver it or at least to allow Hurley to try to prepare Chiang for it, but the crusty, frustrated General would not pass up the chance to see the Chinese leader's face when he read the message. Stilwell unwisely handed the dispatch to Chiang in the presence of other Chinese

officials, thus insuring the Chinese leader's irrefragable opposition and thereby demolishing any hope that Hurley might be able to present a workable solution.³³

When Chiang next demanded Stilwell's removal, Roosevelt agreed to remove Stilwell as the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff and of responsibility for lend lease in China but wanted to place him in command of Chinese troops in Burma and Yunnan Province. Stilwell evidently realized the Chinese leader's anger and revised his prior stand. In an agenda prepared for proposed talks with Chiang, Stilwell agreed to yield control of lend lease to the Generalissimo and propose to the Chinese Communist that they acknowledge Chiang's authority; Stilwell later declared that he would not insist on using the Chinese Communist troops in the war. The President's proposal, along with Hurley and Stilwell's efforts at accommodation failed. The growing tension over whether Roosevelt would recall Stilwell ended when H.H. Kung, Chiang's Personal Representative in Washington, cabled Chungking that he had learned from Harry Hopkins that the President planned to recall Stilwell. With that news, Chiang informed the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang that Stilwell must go.

³³Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, September 16, 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI: 157-158; Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 335.

When Hurley learned of this, he knew that the issue was no longer negotiable; after Chiang made his position known to subordinate Chinese officials, the Generalissimo would not accept any other action.³⁴

In the same dispatch in which he relayed Chiang's statement that Stilwell was unacceptable in any position, Hurley informed Roosevelt that he knew of no other Chinese "who possesses as many of the elements of leadership as Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell are incompatible. Today you are confronted by a choice between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell." While Hurley refrained from calling outright for Stilwell's removal, he observed that "there is no other issue between you and Chiang Kai-shek." In a cable three days later, Hurley reached the inevitable conclusion. He recommended that as Chiang resented Stilwell, Roosevelt should recall the General. On October 19, the President ordered Stilwell back to the United States.³⁵

Although Hurley failed in his efforts to reconcile the Chiang-Stilwell differences, he saw the "incompatible

³⁴Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, October 5, 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI: 165-166; Hurley to Roosevelt, October 6, 1944, Box 88, Folder 8, China File, Patrick Hurley Collection, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma.

³⁵Hurley to Roosevelt, October 13, 1944, Roosevelt to Chiang Kai-shek, October 19, 1944, ibid.

personalities" as the core of the problems between the United States and China; and he assumed that with Stilwell out of the picture, other issues would soon be settled. He had resided in China for only one month and had a limited understanding of the depth of the problem of trying to unify peacefully the Communist forces with Chiang Kai-shek's army while preventing the collapse of the Generalissimo's government.

To Hurley, the best means of gaining an accommodation between the two groups would be personal persuasion and a show of good-will toward both sides. On November 7, 1944, Hurley flew to Yen-an to confer with the Chinese Communist leaders. When the door of the aircraft opened, with Mao Tse-tung and other officials ready to welcome him, the six foot three inch Hurley appeared and introduced himself with a Choctaw war whoop. Following a formal round of introductions and a banquet in Hurley's honor, the negotiations got underway.

During the next two days and nights, Hurley and the Communists "argued, agreed, disagreed" and finally worked out a five point accord. The agreement, signed by Mao Tse-tung for the Communist and Hurley as the "Personal Representative of the President of the United States," called for the Kuomintang and the Communist to work toward unification and for a coalition government representative of all anti-Japanese political parties. The new government

would support and pursue the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment "of a government of the people, for the people, and by the people"; all military forces would carry out the orders of the United National Military Council; and the coalition government would recognize the legality of all anti-Japanese parties. As John Paton Davies writes, "Hurley was in the tradition of the many American political celebrities who lay great store by sonorous pronouncements," and he visualized himself as "the word-smith of Magna Charta for a new China." But in proposing a plan that was apparently beneficial to the Chinese Communists, Hurley was motivated by more practical considerations than the egotistical characteristics described by Davies. He sought to unify the Chinese forces for military expedience--to keep Japanese forces engaged, and because he believed that the Chinese Communists, even with those favorable concessions, could never succeed in their efforts to gain control in China.³⁶

Yet Hurley's suspicious nature caused him to see others, rather than the incompatible Chinese forces, as responsible for his lack of success. While in Yen-an, he met Theodore H. White, a journalist who told him that Mao believed there was little chance for an agreement with Chiang. Hurley, his suspicion swelling, felt that White,

³⁶Theodore H. White, and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, c.1946), 246.

who was simply passing on information, was "definitely against the mission." When Chiang rejected the five-point plan, Hurley continued his efforts, believing that the Generalissimo wanted an understanding; and once the plan was rejected, he blamed "insider" Foreign Minister T. V. Soong and accused British Ambassador Horace Seymour, who had merely observed that Hurley could not succeed, of trying to sabotage his efforts.³⁷

After rejecting the Hurley proposal, the Chungking Government submitted a counterplan. They agreed to incorporate, "after reorganization," the Chinese Communist forces into the Nationalist army and to grant recognition to the Chinese Communist Party as a legal party; wanted the Chinese Communists to give over control of their forces to the National Government and designate officers to sit on the National Military Council; and they agreed upon adherence to the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek's plan offered no coalition, would reorganize and receive the Communist forces under his command alone, and promised reforms--eventually. Chiang would not agree to any coalition because he recognized the growing strength of the communist movement in China and realized that a coalition would mean the eventual control of the government by the Communists.

³⁷United States Relations With China, 74; Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 367.

From Yen-an, the Communists saw the vaporous gesture for what it was and rejected Chiang's three point plan. For many years, Chiang had promised to initiate reforms and democratic processes but had not done so; Chiang made all the decisions for the National Military Council, therefore, representation on that body meant nothing; finally, to turn over the Chinese Communist forces to "reorganization" under Chiang Kai-shek would virtually assure the demise of the Chinese Communist Party.

Although the two groups were obdurate in their positions, Hurley persisted in his efforts to draw them together. He tried to persuade Chou En-Lai to travel to Chungking for further talks, but the Chinese Communist rejected Hurley's suggestion on the grounds that no evidence warranted another conference. Four days later, Hurley received another communique from Chou stating that the talks were discontinued until Chiang's government released all political prisoners, withdrew Kuomintang forces from around Chinese Communist territories, abolished restrictions on the people's freedoms, and ceased secret service activity.³⁸

The Communist shift to a tougher line came as a result of an American military plan that called for United

³⁸Memorandum by Patrick Hurley, November 8, 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI: 673-674.

States and Chinese Communist cooperation in attacking Japanese positions in the communist sectors of China. The Communist leaders believed that they would receive American military assistance through this plan and no longer saw the need to negotiate with the Kuomintang or Patrick Hurley.³⁹

Although Hurley approved of the scheme, he qualified it by pointing out that the Communists should not be informed of the plan while the negotiations were underway. When he learned that the Communists knew of the proposal, Hurley cabled the White House that the American military representatives were the source of the breakdown of the talks and were part of a plot to undermine his activities. Hurley grew more incensed when he learned that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai were attempting to arrange a secret trip to Washington to see President Roosevelt and were using some Foreign Service Officers to circumvent his authority.

The conflict between Hurley and the Foreign Service Officers involved two distinct yet related areas: policy recommendations and the independent status of the State Department group. This problem is yet another example of the extent to which disjointed efforts can disrupt the effectiveness of a foreign mission. The struggle may well have been the outcome of Roosevelt's unwillingness to support

³⁹Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 179-180.

Clarence Gauss and to see that all diplomatic and military missions were coordinated by the American Embassy in Chungking.

During his stay as Ambassador, Clarence Gauss found that the President used his Personal Representatives either to deal directly with Chiang Kai-shek or to go through the Generalissimo's agents in Washington. Gauss could rely on little assistance from Cordell Hull as State Department staff served only as informants and consultants rather than advisers on American policy toward China. Now, in November 1944, Gauss gladly relinquished the post to Hurley.

When Hurley took over, the Embassy's status did not change. He seldom worked in his office, made little, if any, use of the voluminous records and historical data available to the new Ambassador; and spent very little time with dispatches, preferring instead to have clerks bring them to his quarters and read them aloud to him. Hurley continued to rely on his own style of personal contact and negotiation rather than working with the experienced Embassy staff.⁴⁰

At the same time, a group of Foreign Service Officers

⁴⁰Hull to Hurley, December 16, 1944; Chou En-lai to Hurley December 16, 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI: 739-740; Memorandum of conversation (author not cited), December 19, 1944, ibid., 741-743.

continued to operate as they had when Gauss was Ambassador-- independent of Embassy control. Between 1942 and 1944, several of the professional Foreign Service personnel received assignment to General Stilwell's headquarters in China. Hopefully, these men would help Stilwell as a liaison and advisory staff in his efforts to coordinate policy in China, Burma, and India. The General needed the personnel, but their assignment placed them outside the jurisdiction of the American Embassy, allowing them to send separate reports and recommendations to Washington on various problems with China.⁴¹

The first political officer detailed to the American military mission and instructed to serve under Stilwell was John Paton Davies. In the following two years, John Stewart Service, Raymond Ludden, and John K. Emmerson joined Davies in the group detached from the American Embassy. Their hyperactive reports and independent sorties into the field prompted Gauss to hope that with Stilwell's replacement possibly a better understanding about the Foreign Service Officers' "duties, relative position and relation to Embassy would be worked out." In time, Hurley also would be confronted with policy recommendations not in line with his own thinking and would demand the removal of career diplomats who had more

⁴¹White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 247.

experience and more knowledge about China than other professionals in the area.⁴²

The Foreign Service Officers, especially Davies and Service, held views contrary to Patrick Hurley. In general, the former saw the Chinese Communists as having control of North China and having the support of many local Chinese for their reforms; the group was repelled by the avarice, corruption, and ineptness of Chiang's regime and believed that as the war grew longer, the Chungking government committed fewer troops to the struggle against Japan, preferring instead to concentrate their forces for the fight against the communists. Subsequently, the field officers recommended that policy makers give serious consideration to the idea of military and economic assistance to the Yen-an group.

Even with the similarities in view, Service and Davies supported the proposal for aiding the Chinese Communists for different reasons. Service saw the Communists political program as being democratic in nature and as serving the interests of the Chinese people while the Kuomintang headed in the opposite direction--authoritarianism. With considerable admiration for the Chinese Communists, Service concluded that the United States could develop a close relationship with the Communists if

⁴²Feis, The China Tangle, 256-258.

"American good will and economic assistance was forthcoming." Davies, who admitted to mistakenly describing the Yen-an regime as democratic, went beyond a comparison of the democratic gestures of the two regimes and called for aid to the Communists on the basis that the United States "must not indefinitely underwrite a bankrupt regime." He said that if a coalition, however desirable, could not be consummated, "then we shall have to decide which faction we are going to support." If the Kuomintang did not make a serious effort to become a viable part of that new coalition, Davies believed the United States "must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default wholly to the Russians." He concluded that America "can through control of supplies and postwar aid expect to exert considerable influence in the direction of Chinese nationalism and independence from Soviet control."⁴³

From his position in Chungking and aware of President Roosevelt's attitude toward Chiang, Ambassador Hurley believed the Generalissimo's government would, if supported materially, introduce reforms and ultimately improve the lot of the Chinese peasant. Hurley opposed any military aid for the Communists, believing they would eventually agree to coalesce with the Kuomintang if they

⁴³Gauss to Hull, October 31, 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI: 633-664.

could not count on American aid. Hurley based this argument on Russian Foreign Minister Molotov's remarks that the Soviet Government would work with Chiang Kai-shek's regime and did not recognize the Chinese Communist Party. Other areas of disagreement between Hurley and the Foreign Service group ranged over estimates of the durability of the communist movement, the comparative strength of the two Chinese military forces, and the necessity for immediate as opposed to postwar reforms by the Kuomintang.⁴⁴

The judgement as to who had the best perspective of the situation in China is weighted on the side of the Foreign Service Officers. They ranged far and wide, observing conditions in both Yen-an and Chungking, and were attracted to the system which appeared to represent their own image of the best political society. Conversely, Hurley spent most of his time in Chungking and relied on his personal judgment that the Kuomintang regime would become more democratic if given a boost by the United States. Yet the Foreign Service Officers proposals were least acceptable because to supply arms to the Chinese Communists as a legitimate element of China's political

⁴⁴Memorandum by John Paton Davies, November 7, 1944; November 15, 1944, FRUS, 1944, VI: 669-670, and 696; Report by John Stewart Service, August 3, 1944, ibid., 565; U.S., Cong., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employees Loyalty Investigations, Senate Report 2108, 81 Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, 1361-1365; Memorandum by John Stewart Service, June 6, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII: 403-405; Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 183-185; 194-199; Feis, The China Tangle, 263-264; Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 371.

society would mean American intervention in her internal affairs. Moreover, there was always the possibility that with American aid the Chinese Communists would be less likely to cooperate with the government. The prospect for aid to the Chinese Communists, regardless of their cohesiveness and stamina as a fighting force, remained a distant option for American policy makers. Indeed, by 1945 Franklin Roosevelt had Premier Stalin's word that Russia would enter the Asian war once Germany was defeated, and he knew that Soviet penetration of the Chinese frontier would jeopardize Chiang's position; therefore, Roosevelt would not sanction aid to the Chinese Communists. Further, Roosevelt felt that aid to the Communists would be of limited value, militarily, and would cause the Generalissimo more problems in trying to reach a settlement with the dissidents.⁴⁵

As did Louis Johnson and William Phillips in India, Patrick Hurley ultimately proposed a meeting whereby Roosevelt would be able to exert his personal influence. Hurley wanted the President to get British and Russian agreement to immediate unification of military forces in China; after Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung reached an agreement, Roosevelt would meet with the two leaders. Hurley knew of Roosevelt's persuasiveness and propensity

⁴⁵Feis, ibid., 264.

for personal diplomacy, but the President was not willing to risk his reputation on China anymore than on the Indian question.

Although the President rejected his suggestion, Hurley continued his efforts to make some headway in the stalled talks. In January 1945, Hurley informed Mao that Chiang would agree to Communist membership in a war cabinet. On January 24, the talks resumed with the Kuomintang representative proposing that an American officer, under Chiang, command Communist forces; an American-Communist-Kuomintang representative body advise Chiang Kai-shek on Chinese Communist army related matters; and that a seven to nine-man war cabinet representative of all political parties be established. Again, the Communists pointed out that the only satisfactory plan was a coalition--not incorporation into Chiang's regime. Later, the Kuomintang agreed to a consultative conference to determine how one-party rule could be ended and a constitutional government established, and Chou En-lai implied that the Chinese Communists would participate in the conference, but the conference came to naught when Chiang proposed self-seeking changes in the plan.⁴⁶

Until he left China in February to return to Washington for consultation, Hurley never rested in his efforts

⁴⁶Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 187.

to keep the conflict down and the two sides talking. He felt that while a civil war might not erupt at once and possible reconciliation would be secured eventually, the hopes for military unification seemed remote.

With his strong contempt for the State Department, his practice of withholding information about the talks from the Department personnel, and the independent activities of the Foreign Service Officers, what Hurley saw as the reasons for the failure of his efforts pointed directly to the professionals.

The conflict with the group attached to General Wedemeyer's headquarters reached such a pitch that Hurley demanded their recall from that theater. Hurley did not care to be told that his approach might not be successful, and as the evidence seemed to mount in favor of his critics, Hurley grew more outraged and heaped invectives on the professionals. John Paton Davies, who saw the Ambassador's efforts as a "conceited and foolhardy commitment of the United States to a futile and dangerous course," suffered early from Hurley's wrath and left Chungking on January 9, 1945, for his new duty station.⁴⁷

The other officers, Service and Ludden, also incurred Hurley's displeasure. When Service returned to China from Washington in January 1945, Hurley threatened to have him

⁴⁷United States Relations With China, 79-81.

cashiered out of the service if he continued making policy recommendations as before. Ludden had been in the area north and west of Yen-an for over four months and had traveled by pack mule across Communist territory never before explored by an American Foreign Service Officer. After returning to Chungking, he told Hurley that popular support of the Chinese Communists was a reality and that the movement was gaining strength steadily and rapidly. Not at all pleased with the report, Hurley dropped the topic and demanded to know who authorized Ludden's trip. With orders from Wedemeyer's headquarters, Ludden had carried out his mission, but it became another "green persimmon" for Hurley.⁴⁸

Shortly after that, Hurley traveled to Washington for further consultation. At that time, Service and Ludden decided to inform the State Department that Hurley's reporting was "incomplete and non-objective." The memorandum, prepared on February 17, pointed out that American aid and support made the Generalissimo unwilling to compromise; that the Communists were gaining in strength and were thinking of requesting Soviet support; and civil war in China was likely if policy was allowed to drift. To alleviate those problems, the report continued, the United States should continue to aid Chiang Kai-shek's government

⁴⁸Davies, Dragon By The Tail, 382; White and Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, 284.

but also, in definite terms, inform him that military necessity required giving support to the Chinese Communists. Further, the United States should offer its good offices to help unify the Chinese military forces, but aid to any military forces would be undertaken regardless of whether the compromise had been reached. In addition to the authors, George Atcheson, as Charge' while Hurley was in Washington, agreed with the report and prepared an accompanying telegram that noted that his concurring dispatch had the agreement and assistance of the political officers of the Embassy staff and was endorsed by the acting commandant of the American military mission, General Gross.⁴⁹

After receiving the communique, Acting Secretary of State Joseph L. Grew sent it, along with State Department recommendations, to the White House. Grew pointed out signs of Chiang's recent obstinance and suggested that American policy needed to be flexible, apparently meaning that a less exclusive support of the Generalissimo's regime might improve the situation.⁵⁰

On March 5, Hurley met with Department officials to discuss the report. Hurley raged against the Embassy staff, charging that they were acting behind his back, that the

⁴⁹Davies, ibid., 402-403.

⁵⁰United States Relations With China, 87-92; Fies, The China Tangle, 268n.

Foreign Service Officers were in collusion against him, and that his efforts to effect an agreement would have to be worked out once again.⁵¹

As long as he was Ambassador, Patrick Hurley would not stand for reports that offered proposals contrary to his approach. Hurley demanded and got George Atcheson, along with the staff members who approved the telegram, transferred from the Embassy. The groups of Foreign Service Officers attached to General Wedemeyer's office were removed from China. In a move that appears almost vengeful, John Stewart Service was transferred from Wedemeyer's staff to the Embassy personnel roster--under Hurley's jurisdiction. Needless to say, Service soon joined the others for re-assignment.

The validity of the Ambassador's decision to replace Atcheson, for whatever reasons, cannot be denied. The Charge knew that his telegram would be antithetical to Hurley's views and would embarrass the Ambassador while he was in Washington. The objection by Hurley was technically correct, but the Foreign Service Officers' case is another question. Davies, Service, Emmerson, Ludden, and the others had orders attaching them to the Commanding General's staff to do advisory and liaison work in the field. Their independent activities and reports would have

⁵¹Feis, ibid., 271.

helped, but Hurley objected to any activity that did not have his prior approval. As Personal Representative, Hurley worried little about Ambassador Gauss, and his independent maneuvers were upheld by President Roosevelt, but that was the big difference between Hurley and the Foreign Service Officers, a difference that could not be resolved. Hurley had Roosevelt's instructions and the President's support for his policies and position against the State Department.

The Ambassador and the Foreign Service Officers both erred in believing that the United States could persuade Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists to form a coalition. The Generalissimo was not willing to yield to a realistic compromise in which he would relinquish any of his control, and the Communists would not agree to Kuomintang dominance for that very reason. The Americans also wrongly viewed the Yen-an group as being something akin to democrats--an understandable miscalculation because of the rhetoric about "free enterprise," "democracy," and "elections" and possibly because of the belief that America's influence on China was salutary enough to prompt the Chinese Communists to believe in and accept democracy.

While still in Washington, Hurley learned of the Far Eastern provisions of the Yalta accord: Russia would enter the war against Japan; Port Arthur would be leased to the

Soviet Union; Darien would be internationalized; Russia and China would jointly operate the Chinese Eastern Railway; Kurile Island and the southern half of Sakhalin Island go to the Soviet Union; status quo would be maintained in Outer Mongolia. Hurley was not particularly concerned about the protocol's implication for China's sovereignty in Manchuria--what he sought was Russia's support for Chiang's government. President Roosevelt worried little about the apparent violation of the Open Door--he followed the military's advice and agreed to the terms in return for Russia's commitment to fight in the Far East.

To get Churchill's diplomatic support and to insure Russian cooperation in the Far East, Roosevelt sent Hurley back to China by way of London and Moscow. Without contrary instructions from the President, Hurley believed his mission was to continue the efforts to gain military unification and give support to Chiang Kai-shek's regime. In his side trips, Hurley got British agreement to support America's Far Eastern policy and Stalin's commitment to unification of the Chinese government under Chiang.⁵²

While Hurley was enroute to China, President Franklin

⁵²Memorandum by Joseph Ballantine, Director of Office of Far Eastern Affairs, March 6, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII; 260-261; U.S., Cong., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and Committee on Armed Services, Report on Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, 3256.

D. Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Georgia. His successor, Harry S. Truman, continued Roosevelt's policies toward China and supported Hurley in his efforts to arrange a unification of the Chinese forces.

Upon his return to Chungking, Hurley felt an agreement would soon be forthcoming once the Communists learned of the Russian willingness to treat with the Generalissimo, but Hurley once again became perturbed when he learned that a recent State Department memorandum recommended the arming of Chinese Communist forces if they were directly helpful to American plans. These reports buttressed Hurley's personal beliefs that the Far Eastern Office of the State Department was disloyal, was conniving against him, or at the best, did not know the President's policy toward China and the problems of unification. It is possible that the Department officials responsible for American policy toward China did not know about the White House views; evidence throughout this study shows how Roosevelt consistently ignored the State Department and regular diplomatic channels and no doubt decided on Hurley's instructions without prior consultation with the Department. The Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that until he received different instructions from the President, he would pursue the original instructions--to support the Nationalist Government.⁵³

⁵³Buhite, Patrick Hurley, 202-208.

Hurley persisted in his efforts to achieve the desired unification and coalition but he could not and would not accept the fact that the Chinese opposites were just that--irreconcilable. Nevertheless, Hurley placed faith in the Russian influence on the Chinese, believing that once the Communists learned of the Soviet position, they would strike a bargain. In August 1945, the Sino-Soviet accord embodying Russian recognition of the Chiang regime became public, prompting Hurley to make further efforts to get the negotiating teams together again. Once the groups met in Chungking, Mao Tse-Tung called for a partitioning of China at the Yangtze River; for the Communists to be allowed to disarm Japanese troops in parts of China; and for status quo on military positions. With a possible geo-political division of China into three areas controlled by the war lords, Communists, and the Kuomintang; neither Hurley, the President, nor the State Department seriously considered that proposal as a possible way out of the Chinese puzzle. By mid-September, with increasing reports of armed battles between Nationalist and Communist forces, American policy continued to be that of supporting Chiang Kai-shek's government.⁵⁴

While mediating the talks, Hurley learned that two of the Foreign Service Officers who supposedly conspired

⁵⁴Ibid., 211-212.

against him, John Stewart Service and George Atcheson, were being assigned to General Douglas MacArthur's Far Eastern Command headquarters. They would serve in much the same capacity as under Stilwell--political advisers. Hurley also read various reports criticizing his efforts and suggesting that he should resign. Seeing the appointment of Service and Atcheson and the newspaper rumors as part of an effort to build pressure to remove him, Hurley decided to return to Washington to talk with President Truman about his position. Hurley not only sought a conference with Truman about conditions in China but had been giving serious thought to resigning his post. He was tired and needed to get away from the physically debilitating environs of Chungking to see his family. Moreover, Hurley believed he had done a good job, considering all the interfering outsiders, and could now withdraw without appearing to be running away from the situation.⁵⁵

After he arrived in Washington and heard from Secretary of State James F. Brynes that he had the President's support, along with that of the Secretary, Hurley went to his home in New Mexico for rest and to consider Truman's request that he stay in China. Indecisive at first, Hurley made up his mind as he read reports of growing conflicts between the two forces in China. He also learned that

⁵⁵Ibid., 213.

Chinese Communist forces were occupying parts of Manchuria while the Russians, in blatant violation of their earlier agreements, were preventing Nationalist forces from landing at ports in Manchuria. As those activities became public knowledge, some newspapers criticized Hurley for supporting Chiang Kai-shek and accused him of carrying on activities that were contradictory to policy formulated in Washington.

By November 26, Hurley had composed his letter of resignation, returned to Washington, and tried to present it to Brynes. The Secretary of State refused to accept the resignation, saying he would check into Hurley's charges that some of his reports were being leaked to the press by State Department officials. Later that same day, Hurley met with Brynes again and agreed to return to Chungking after the Secretary declared that the Department would back him and that there was no change in American policy toward China.⁵⁶

The following day, however, Hurley read of Congressman Hugh DeLacy's speech criticizing him for supporting Chiang's regime, for dumping Ambassador Clarence Gauss, and for engineering the purge of the Foreign Service group. Overlooking the fact that DeLacy could draw his information from many newspaper and periodical accounts, Hurley again saw the conspirators at work in the State Department. He

⁵⁶Ibid.

decided that in spite of Brynes reassurances, he would not have the Department's support if he returned to Chungking.⁵⁷

Shortly after noon on November 27, Hurley resigned his Ambassadorial post by releasing his letter of resignation to the press. It described his efforts in China, his idea that "the professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communists to keep China divided against itself," and that those officers whom Hurley had relieved were now advisers to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan and "continued to side with the Communist armed party against American policy." Further, and in a prescient fashion, Hurley denounced the policy of being "sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism," a charge that later proved to be disastrously accurate for the United States in Southeast Asia.⁵⁸

Most other politicians would consider that an adequate and just parting shot and would let the issue be done--not Hurley. On November 28, he made a speech before the National Press Club and again charged the Foreign Service Officers with sabotaging his attempts to reach a settlement and also of independently changing American policy in China. In December, he appeared before a Senate

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., 267-268.

Foreign Relations Committee hearing and named Acheson, Davies, Service, and Emmerson as part of a "pro-communist, pro-imperialist" group responsible for destroying American policy in the Far East.⁵⁹

In all the public charges, Hurley revealed that he was not the kind of man who accepted defeat, easily or any other way. He never considered the possibility that he, and Franklin Roosevelt for that matter, had been duped or had under-estimated the Chinese Communists. Hurley could not accept the fact that his personal judgment of the Chinese and Russian leaders needed revising, nor would he acknowledge that the Russians had put one over on him. Instead, he hurled the invectives which eventually but prematurely ended the careers of several Asian experts and left Hurley a bitter and disgruntled old man.

The dreary and sad case of Patrick Hurley's legacy as Franklin Roosevelt's Personal Representative and Ambassador to China never really ended--it became more of a prologue. The Hurley charges against the State Department and the Foreign Service Officers surfaced again at the time of the demonic "witch hunts" of Senator Joseph McCarthy as the reasons for America's "loss of China." McCarthy used Hurley's charges to build a national following and win another six-year term as United States Senator as he sought

⁵⁹United States Relations With China, 581-583.

out the supposed net of communists, communist sympathizers, traitors, or whatever from within the ranks of the Foreign Service. The accused, guilty of nothing more in general than of advocating a different policy, provided McCarthy, who took up where Hurley left off, with the answer for America's failure to keep a friendly government in power in China and the answer, in McCarthy's eyes, for America's power suddenly becoming less than omnipotent--traitors in the State Department. The Foreign Service Officers-- John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies, and John Stewart Service--were all recipients of McCarthy's venomous attacks, and all three were exonerated of the charges of being communists or in league with the Communist Party in the United States. The Officers were besmirched with the red stain, however, and their usefulness as experts in American foreign policy was thereafter certainly limited. John Carter Vincent retired in 1953; John Paton Davies, who underwent eight State Department hearings, all of which found him totally loyal, was fired by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1954 as a "security risk"; in 1969 the Department re-examined Davies' case and granted him security clearance; John Stewart Service was dismissed from the Foreign Service in 1951 for "reasonable doubt" of his loyalty and was then reinstated as a senior foreign officer in 1957.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Buhite, ibid., 272-273; Davies and Service's

When the President decided to send Hurley to patch up the Stilwell-Chiang split, he also decided to send along Donald Nelson--a domestic political liability. The former chairman of Sears, Roebuck Company, Nelson had joined Roosevelt's administration in 1940 as purchasing agent for the National Defense Committee and did a good job in negotiating with consumer goods industries for the government but after he became chairman of the War Production Board, Nelson came under constant criticism for his lack of forcefulness in persuading some industries to speed up conversion to wartime production. Finally, in June 1944, Nelson violated Roosevelt's political aphorism: Do the job with no adverse publicity which might cost the Administration votes and give the Republican Party ammunition for the next campaign. The trouble started when Nelson issued an order permitting production of a few previously prohibited items for civilian consumption. The military services and the War Manpower Commission opposed any cutback in production of military supplies, and Charles Wilson, executive vice-chairman of the War

personal views of Sino-American relations are found in Davies' Dragon By The Tail, and John Stewart Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1971); E.J. Kahn, Jr., "Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight," New Yorker, 48 (April 8, 1972), 43-44 discusses Service's career; and David Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972) provides an account of Davies professional life, the blighting of his career, and his life in professional exile.

Production Board, resigned in protest against Nelson's reconversion plan.

Facing election in November, the President decided to send Nelson where he could do the least harm--to China. His assignment was to investigate the Chinese economy and to evaluate its effect on the war effort. But as is now clear to historians, Roosevelt did not need Nelson's analysis. He received a steady stream of reports from General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss; and Lauchlin Currie, in charge of lend lease for China, kept an up-to-date status report on the Chinese economy. The instructions were, in fact, meant to keep Nelson out of the news in the United States, to keep him from interfering with policy or strategy in China and, as General George Marshall declared, to "'confine himself to selling razor blades."⁶¹

To the political observers, it was evident that President Roosevelt did not select Nelson for his knowledge of China or his ability as a statesman. Nelson's previous experience as a representative of the United States came in October 1943, when he toured some Russian industrial locations. He knew little about China, a limitation which Roosevelt saw as an asset in this particular mission. The businessman's shallow understanding

⁶¹Romanus, and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 376-387; Tuchman, Stilwell and China, 479.

of the Chinese situation appeared in his reports, which made no mention of the large parcels of productive land being controlled by a few landlords or the deleterious effect of the Communist-Nationalist conflict on China's economic and political stability. Nelson's personality assured the President that his agent would not make offensive remarks to the Generalissimo. As chairman of the War Production Board, Nelson preferred to negotiate and come to terms with other agencies but when he faced a demanding official, Nelson tended to be conciliatory and generally backed down in his demands for scarce materials.⁶²

In spite of his reluctance to stand up to competitive administrators, Nelson understood business organization and management and knew how to explain it to Chiang Kai-shek. After spending nearly three weeks surveying Chinese industries around Chungking, Nelson reported his findings to the Generalissimo. Nelson's report reflected the American businessman's desire for order and stability in a national economy, as he denounced the bureaucratic obstacles that caused inefficient work practices and prevented greater productivity by Chinese industry. Nelson proposed dispatching a mission of experts to China--one in steel making, one in management of steelworks, two

⁶²Roosevelt to Nelson, August 18, 1944, President's Secretary's File: China, 1944, Box 28, FDRL; Tuchman, Stilwell and China, 479.

ordinance experts, experts to assist in the repairing of Chinese trucks, and alcohol experts to help improve methods of distillation and increase the percentage of productivity of fuel. For implementation, Nelson produced an organizational flow chart showing the establishment of seven departments, fourteen subcommittees, and one Director; the composite committee to be known as the Chinese War Production Board.

To complete his review of China's economic situation, Nelson conferred with Chiang Kai-shek on China's postwar economic reconstruction. He called for seven more American experts, one each in textiles, steel, power, banking, consumer goods, export trade, and railroads to confer and advise the heads of seven ministries on the procedure to establish and regain various markets for China. Nelson rejected Chiang's idea for automobile factories in China and instead protected Detroit's best interest by suggesting that China should build plants for assembling American-made parts. Nelson also envisioned an eight hundred million dollar dam on the Yangtze River, which at completion would speed China's transition into an efficient made-in-America industrialized nation, allow 3,000-ton ships to sail directly to Chungking, control flooding, allow irrigation of farms in central China, and eventually provide ten million kilowatts of electric power for China. Until the development loan was paid off,

and to carry out the project and manage it, Nelson proposed the establishment of a Tennessee Valley Authority type-agency in China.⁶³

After listening to Nelson, the Generalissimo believed he had found another staunch advocate of increased American aid to China, as well as a politician who had access to the White House. To impress Nelson, finding him another pliant American, Chiang asked him to serve as Chief Adviser to the Chinese War Production Board, adding that if he did not return to China, the situation would become hopeless. Again, Chiang used a Presidential Representative to turn the situation around and made the gesture of following Roosevelt's suggestion for reforming China's economic infrastructure, but in fact he agreed to a plan which would only build more centralized power for Chiang Kai-shek.

After making his own suggestions for improving the Chinese industrial productive sector and finding himself

⁶³Stettinius to Hull, August 9, 1944, D.S. File 740.0011PW/8-944, NA.; Transcript of Henry Morgenthau-Grace Tully conversation, October 27, 1941, Morgenthau Diaries, Book 454; 204, FDRL; I.F. Stone, "Nelson vs. Wilson," The Nation, 159 (September 2, 1944), 259-260; Donald Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, c. 1946), 414; Herman Somers, Presidential Agency: Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 182-202; Richard Polenberg, War and Society, The United States, 1941-1945 (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, c. 1972), 9; Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier of Freedom, 246.

unable to refuse the Generalissimo's flattery, Nelson agreed to recommend that he return to China to set up the Chinese War Production Board. Donald Nelson had to show confidence in his own plan but more likely saw the post as a passport by which he could eventually return to a better position in Washington.⁶⁴

As Nelson developed the economic plans for China, the White House also planned for Nelson's future. Administrative assistants Jonathan Daniels and James Barnes reminded the President that he must decide about Nelson's position on the War Production Board. Roosevelt wanted Nelson's resignation but did not push for it prior to the trip to China, instead naming Julius Krug as Acting Chairman. Now, with the notoriety over the Nelson-Wilson feud abating, Roosevelt decided Nelson could resign his official post without causing undue publicity for the White House. But as James Barnes cautioned, Nelson remained a symbolic leader for American businessmen and had many friends in Congress; therefore, "a slight in this respect might be politically harmful." Roosevelt would handle the matter with his personal, and sometimes overbearing, political style.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Conversations of September 19, 1944 between President Chiang Kai-shek and Donald M. Nelson, D.S. File 893.00/10-1244, NA.; Eliot Janeway, "The Nelson Impact on China," Asia and The Americas, 45 (March, 1945), 123.

⁶⁵Jonathan Daniels to Roosevelt, September 20, 1944;

When Nelson returned to Washington in October 1944, he agreed to resign his job on the War Production Board, but in order to make "a graceful exit from the Government," he wanted a job promoting American foreign trade. Roosevelt grasped the opportunity, suggested that Nelson adhere to Chiang's request, and then proposed that Nelson become "Personal Representative of the President and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Large of the United States of America" to represent and advise Roosevelt on economic relations with other nations. Harry Hopkins agreed that Nelson wanted that type of job but warned that such a fancy title could subject the President to political criticism. Roosevelt agreed and reduced the embellishment to a mere "Personal Representative to the President."

To further insure that Nelson's resignation would not produce adverse political reactions, word "leaked" out that the President might have Nelson in mind to succeed Jesse Jones as Secretary of Commerce. To complete the political charades, Roosevelt empowered Nelson to attend Cabinet meetings and then used the White House budget to set up a fully equipped and staffed office for Nelson in the State Department building.⁶⁶

James M. Barnes to Roosevelt, September 21, 1944, Official File 2626, FDRL.

⁶⁶Harry Hopkins to Roosevelt, September 27, 1944;

Although the President wanted Nelson to appear to be important, Roosevelt preferred that he gain publicity elsewhere. One week after Roosevelt granted him ex-officio status for Cabinet meetings, Nelson left on his second trip to China. He spent three weeks setting up the Chinese War Production Board and then traveled to Australia and New Zealand for talks relating to economic cooperation between those countries and China. Within a month, Nelson returned to Washington, and while Roosevelt could not keep him abroad forever, Nelson's private life saved the President further trouble. Divorced in late January 1945, Nelson then married his secretary a month later and quietly remained in his post until May 1945, when he resigned to become President of the Society of Independent Movie Producers.⁶⁷

The Nelson mission to the Far East met Roosevelt's objectives of considerable surface activity by Nelson, but it had no impact on basic American policy toward China. The War Production Board streamlined the Chinese productive effort on paper only, and Nelson's recommendations

Draft of letter to Donald Nelson from Roosevelt, October 3, 1944; Jonathan Daniels to Roosevelt, October 6, 1944; Hopkins to Roosevelt, October 7, 1944, President's Secretary's File: War Production Board, 1944; Roosevelt to Nelson, November 2, 1944, Official File 5626, FDRL; "Best Mission," Time, 44 (December 4, 1944), 18.

⁶⁷New York Times, January 20, 1945, 13; February 9, 1945, 17; May 13, 1945, 3.

for postwar economic development received little consideration in Washington. The biggest reaction came from the State Department, which claimed that any investigation of Nelson's proposals should be coordinated and carried out by the State Department.

The President's diplomacy toward China mirrored his positioning of the Far East in his over-all war plans, his understanding of the serious nature of attempting to resolve the Nationalist-Communist conflict, and his attitude toward the State Department. His unwillingness to commit large numbers of troops and amounts of supplies to the China theater shows Roosevelt's fundamental priority of channeling the bulk of America's force against the Axis powers in Europe. Throughout the war, Roosevelt supported Chiang Kai-shek primarily to keep China in the war to tie down Japanese forces. Toward the Nationalist-Communist conflict, the President had no real policy options because the Kuomintang was China's ruling body, and Roosevelt clearly recognized the implications of following the recommendations to support and arm the Chinese Communists. American aid to the rebel force against the expressed wishes of the sovereign ruler would be a dangerous policy and might provoke the Generalissimo to consider a separate peace with Japan. While the President did send Henry Wallace and Donald Nelson to China for his own political reasons, Lauchlin Currie and Patrick Hurley's

missions show the President's deep concern for, and his serious efforts to solve, the economic and political problems which hindered China's wartime activities and which tore at Sino-American relations. Moreover, Roosevelt tried to develop American policy toward the Far East in order to build a more compatible relationship with the Soviet Union--a nation which also saw no alternative to working with Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Finally, because of his personal prejudice against the State Department and because their policy proposals were unacceptable, Franklin Roosevelt ignored the professional advice as he developed policy toward China. Because of his unwillingness to trust the State Department experts, Roosevelt caused much of the animosity between his agents and the career officers, which appeared to thwart effective implementation of policy in China. In fact, the jealousies between the two elements had little impact on American policy in the Far East; even if he had used State Department personnel to carry out his decisions, circumstances within China and Franklin Roosevelt's understanding of the situation would have dictated that American policy toward China remain the same.

CONCLUSION

In the development and execution of America's wartime foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt believed that if he could meet with other heads of state, he could settle mutual problems; however, since the war precluded many summit meetings, Roosevelt attempted to exert his personal influence through his surrogates. Further, while the war was at its most crucial stage, 1941-1943, the President used these personal agents in an effort to build morale at home and abroad by publicizing the envoys' trips as examples of cooperation and Allied harmony; thus, the Personal Representative became the on-stage understudy for the President in the diplomatic theater. The resident American Ambassador could have been used in many instances, but Roosevelt preferred the splashy, high-sounding "Personal Representative of the President of the United States." He hoped that by this technique, the foreign leader would be impressed by the personal envoy arriving directly from the White House. The Ambassador would not be acceptable for another reason: Roosevelt's approach to foreign policy was influenced to a large degree by domestic politics, and he attempted to play to the American voter

through his personalized handling of American foreign policy. At the same time, however, as complicated as was the President himself, Roosevelt's motives for using the personal agent cannot be so easily delineated and often fall into both classifications.

As international problems were, of course, foremost in the President's mind, Roosevelt sought to keep the Anglo-American-Russian alliance intact by using Harry Hopkins to impress Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin with his sincerity and desire to cooperate in winning the war. The frail, often ill Hopkins accomplished his main objectives on each mission and had more influence on American wartime policies than any other envoy. He helped set up the lend lease channels between the United States and Great Britain, influenced Roosevelt to develop an aid program for Russia at a time when some Americans were willing to see Germany defeat the Soviet Union, hammered out the plans with Churchill for the 1942 invasion of Africa and, most important, developed a working relationship with the British Prime Minister which helped cement the Anglo-American part of the Grand Alliance.

The President would not think of posting Harry Hopkins in London permanently, so he selected the capable Averell Harriman to become his on-station symbol for American-British cooperation. Roosevelt could have looked far before finding another envoy as selfless and dedicated

as Harriman, whose substantial contribution to maintaining a good Anglo-American relationship cannot be overlooked. The President recognized Harriman's good work and his talent, and in 1943 when he wanted a diplomat to try to improve relations with the Soviet Union, he selected Harriman to serve as Ambassador.

As to Roosevelt's decision not to follow the same practice and send a Personal Representative to Moscow, one can only conclude that first, the President placed greater priority on cooperation with the British, and second, he believed Russian needs could be met by the American military mission stationed in the Russian capital. As the war progressed, however, and Stalin became upset over the Anglo-American failure to initiate a second front, Roosevelt tried to mollify the Premier with an almost steady flow of Personal Representatives to Russia. Hoping the appearance of the personal agents could convey his concern and sincere desire for cooperation, Roosevelt dispatched Patrick Hurley to tour the Russian military front; at other times, he sent Donald Nelson to check on the Soviet industrial sector and then Vice-President Henry Wallace to inspect Russian agriculture. An early invasion of the continent was not possible because of the problem of re-tooling American industry for wartime production and immediate demands that slowed the requisite stockpiling of goods for the invasion. Stalin grew increasingly bitter

because of the President's precipitous promises of a forthcoming invasion which were then broken. To try to offset the damage, Roosevelt sent Joseph Davies to try to arrange a summit meeting of the two leaders so that Roosevelt could attempt personally to charm the Soviet leader. Stalin received and treated the agents with cordiality and sumptuous banquets--but cared more about the arrival of American supplies.

At the same time, Roosevelt did not overlook the Asian theater and also used Personal Representative diplomacy in an attempt to placate the demanding Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek. Lauchlin Currie made two trips to the Far East, ostensibly to work out details for American financial aid to China; yet, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau's department had earlier negotiated loans to the Chinese and could have easily extended the agreement. Thus, Currie's main objective was not economic aid for China, but to present to the Chinese visible proof that the President and the American people had not forgotten the Far Eastern ally, and to give the Generalissimo a sense of participation in the Allied war plans. Roosevelt sent other envoys, Wendell Willkie and later Vice-President Wallace, to show his truthfully serious concern over the Chinese situation. The problems in China did bother Roosevelt, but his primary concern was with the European theater of the war, and as he understood that American

military power could not be equally effective in both areas, his agents to Chungking carried words of encouragement but no promises of substantial increases in material aid for China. Because of the Generalissimo's threats of a possible separate peace with Japan and because the Stilwell-Chiang clash appeared to hamper the war effort, Roosevelt dispatched Patrick Hurley to Chungking in an attempt to settle the problem. Hurley tried and, when faced with failure, blamed others, never realizing that neither he nor the President could succeed in solving the problem. At least Roosevelt's efforts did help keep the Chinese in the war, tying down large numbers of Japanese troops on the Asian mainland.

The coterie of agents gave the American people a picture of Franklin Roosevelt as the non-partisan, wartime helmsman of American foreign policy and at the same time, allowed him to work to improve his political image at home. All of his Personal Representatives' missions had political implications. In 1941, he sent the Republican standard bearer, Wendell Willkie, to England to build support for lend lease; then, in the late summer of 1943, the President dispatched him to Russia and China to impress those nations' leaders with the unified American war effort. The latter mission, however, had a more important goal for Roosevelt: to lessen Willkie's influence as an opposition politician. His decision to send Willkie to those countries

without restraints on the topics of discussion proved disastrous for the President. Roosevelt apparently believed that Willkie accepted the premise that the trip was solely designed to show American wartime unity; Willkie evidently knew better and did more to raise public questions about Roosevelt's foreign policies than would have been raised if the President had not sent him on the second trip. The other well-known Republican Personal Representative, Patrick Hurley, became a regular supporter of the President's policies and did a creditable job of carrying out Roosevelt's instructions. The idea that Herbert Hoover's prestigious Secretary of War would serve as a Personal Representative had considerable appeal, and Roosevelt no doubt felt that by using Hurley, he would gain additional Republican support for his policies. Further, Roosevelt probably believed that if a Republican was involved in carrying out policies, other members of the opposition party would be less likely to attack the administration.

The Personal Representative diplomacy also afforded the President the means of removing political liabilities from the administration without a bitter personal confrontation, and gave him a plausible explanation with which to gloss over the damaging questions and publicity which followed that type of dismissal. When adverse publicity centered on one of his subordinates, Roosevelt called on

the individual to make a "fact finding" trip to a distant country--a euphemistic title which meant for Henry Wallace a trip to Siberian farmlands, the confines of Chungking for Donald Nelson, and the Middle East for William Bullitt. In his attempt to maintain party unity and to keep down public criticism, Roosevelt used the same technique on office holders of lesser importance. Lowell Mellett, former newspaperman and public relations worker in the New Deal, was head of the Washington branch of the Bureau of Motion Pictures, a wartime censoring agency. He came to Roosevelt's attention when Congressional opposition to his office began to surface and he was subsequently sent on a "mission of information" to the Middle East. After the publicity died down, and Mellett returned to the United States, he became a White House administrative assistant, but he operated out of the public's eye.

The dualistic character of Personal Representative diplomacy, that is, improving Allied relations while at the same time building domestic support for his policies, appeared in the missions of Myron Taylor, Louis Johnson, William Phillips, and Robert Murphy. Taylor's appointment as Personal Representative to the Vatican was designed to combine the moral suasion of the White House and the Vatican to influence Mussolini to take a less belligerent position; then, Roosevelt sent him to gain the Pope's support in order to persuade American Catholics to be less vocal in

their opposition to Roosevelt's plans to aid Russia; and finally, in 1942, Taylor traveled abroad in an effort to sway Spain and Portugal to take a friendlier stand toward the Allies. Roosevelt's instructions to Taylor to raise the specter of postwar communism with Franco and Salazar, and the offer of American economic aid to offset that possibility was part of the attempt to gain better accommodations with the neutrals. The offer of reconstruction aid was used primarily as a wartime lever, but Roosevelt also supported it because he saw that policy as a means of developing postwar economic stability which would help reduce future world tension. In using the Personal Representative, the President had the means and opportunities to influence foreign governments in an attempt to secure inroads for American business interests, but evidence does not show that Roosevelt purposely sent agents abroad for that goal. The military situation first influenced the decision to offer rehabilitative economic aid; then, the desire to lay the foundation for an international trade system spurred Roosevelt, who considered economic benefits for the United States to be secondary to the basic goal of winning the war. Indeed, Taylor's representations helped mold a good relationship between the President and the Pope, and his tactful discussion with Franco and Salazar doubtlessly enhanced those neutral leaders' receptivity to further Allied overtures for cooperation.

Seeing the political crisis in India, the President believed that an American gesture for Indian independence might prompt greater Indian support for the Allied cause, so he sent Louis Johnson and William Phillips to try to alleviate the conflict. Further, the presence of a Presidential Personal Representative would show the American people that in addition to the basic military goals, Roosevelt was actively pursuing the democratic ideals of the Atlantic Charter. Louis Johnson, the brusque politician, and William Phillips, the skilled diplomat, believed they failed in their missions; yet, the President never gave them enough power to really pressure the British to move toward independence for India. Roosevelt knew the British Prime Minister would not yield to American intervention in India, and when Churchill showed his personal displeasure at the Presidential envoys' meddling, Roosevelt pulled his agents out of India and made no further gestures toward that region.

At first glance, the President's selection of Robert Murphy for the pre-invasion negotiations in Africa appears to have been a matter of no choice. Except for the fallen-from-grace Bullitt, no New Deal politician had Murphy's experience in dealing with the French, nor had any one of them traveled as extensively in the French African possessions. Murphy did prove to be a good choice; he saw the political value of, and made recommendations for, the

establishment of an economic trade program with the French Africans; he set up an intelligence gathering network and made arrangements with the Vichy representatives in Africa, which saved many Allied and French lives at the time of the 1942 invasion. But Roosevelt's opportunistic use of the surrogate technique for domestic political purposes strongly suggests that he would have selected a Foreign Service Officer for that particular mission anyway. The severe domestic criticism of Roosevelt's policies toward the Vichy French Government would be expected to swell once again when the political arrangements in French Africa were revealed. Although a remote factor, the anticipated reaction likely prompted the President to pick the professional diplomat, thereby allowing Roosevelt to turn much of the ensuing criticism away from the White House, and toward the State Department.

In his calculated attempt to appeal to the American voter, Franklin Roosevelt made a conscious effort to restrict the State Department and Foreign Service's role in foreign policy. As John Franklin Campbell points out in Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, Roosevelt's attitude toward the State Department reflects a traditional view of public service dating back to George Washington's administration. In that first cabinet, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton favored the establishment of a durable, energetic corps of professional office holders to provide an element

of continuity in the government, while Thomas Jefferson called for frequent changes of office holders, fearful that a permanent administrative bureaucracy would develop in the executive branch and evolve into a government unresponsive to the people's wishes. In 1924, Congressional legislation formally established the Foreign Service, but through American history, the Jeffersonian idea has been dominant, and Franklin Roosevelt's thinking proved to be no exception to that belief.

The professional diplomat, dedicated to looking at issues from the position of how policy affects the nation's interests and to implementing a President's policies regardless of his party affiliations, did indeed reflect a Hamiltonian image: a permanent, intellectually elite body, carrying out foreign policy from administration to administration without regard for the impact of policies on the public. The career diplomats' aloofness from partisan loyalties caused Franklin Roosevelt the Democrat to see the Foreign Service as dull, vapid, and manned by reactionary officials incapable of responding to his policies. George F. Kennan writes that in addition to his desire for power, Roosevelt had little or no understanding of a disciplined government organization that was not interested in domestic party politics; thus, the professional diplomatic corps would be of little value to Franklin Roosevelt in his national political campaigns. Therefore, he embraced and

perpetuated the popular view of the career diplomats: distrust and animosity for the small, talented group of non-politicians that did not concern themselves with the democratic process, seemed unresponsive to the people's demands, and had grown into a closed bureaucracy thereby losing touch with the American people. Further, Roosevelt feared that if State Department officials were actively involved in the decision-making, they would ignore the domestic political sector in formulating policies, thus causing him additional problems with the voters. Franklin Roosevelt justified his own rejection of the State Department and the Foreign Service by accusing them of being just what they were--a group of disinterested specialists--and of operating as they were supposed to operate--like dedicated enforcers of American foreign policy. Further, by adhering to his view of the State Department, Roosevelt ignored such highly qualified Foreign Service Officers as Llewellyn Thompson, Foy Kohler, Charles Bohlen, George F. Kennan, John Paton Davies, and John Carter Vincent. By whatever means used to select his personal envoys, Franklin Roosevelt often adhered to the political aphorism that an ounce of loyalty is worth more than a pound of brains.

While he expressed dissatisfaction with the State Department because of its archaic and bureaucratic machinery, Roosevelt made few gestures to correct the supposed ills he so often pointed out. Moreover, while he

criticized the group, he excluded the Foreign Service professionals from any responsible positions for developing wartime policy, thereby denying that group an opportunity to prove its worth.

The President's method of dealing around the State Department meant that all vital information flowed straight to the White House, and often no farther. Each time he used an agent, Roosevelt reduced the prospects for developing any body of Presidential strength within the bureaucracy outside the White House. With the lack of concentrated centers of power at levels beneath the President, State Department officials found themselves unable to respond to those issues being handled within the confines of the White House.

As a result of his exclusive control of foreign policy and his unwillingness to defend the Foreign Service against its many detractors, Roosevelt's method had a demoralizing effect on the group; more important is the fact that his attitude had a lasting impact on the public's understanding of the State Department. If the President, especially Franklin Roosevelt, implied that the State Department was in a bad way, the American people accepted and continued to believe it. When Senator Joseph McCarthy investigated the "causes for the loss of China," he ultimately directed a barrage of accusations of treason not at Roosevelt so much as against the Foreign Service, the group

that had a minor role in formulating America's wartime policies. Roosevelt classed them as reactionary, and McCarthy called them communists, but the contradiction in terms meant little to some Americans; they remembered that the President had complained about the Foreign Service Officers, and they applauded as the Senator ferreted the supposed elitists and traitors out of the government.

Like Roosevelt, the Senator exploited the popular myth of incompetence and immorality within the Department by adding the charge of communist infiltration, thereby contributing to the deterioration of the professional ranks by driving many career officers into early retirement, intimidating policy planners, and no doubt causing many bright young people to disregard the foreign service as a career.

While their means differed, the two politicians' actions had the same deleterious effect of confirming and perpetuating the public distrust for the State Department and the Foreign Service.

Although the President had the constitutional power to conduct foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt's personalized diplomacy broadened even further the Chief Executive's dominant position in the making of foreign policy. Congress authorized and appropriated monies for the war years, confirmed the President's ambassadorial nominees, and passed resolutions supporting American participation in the United Nations, but in fact the legislative branch had

little real influence on wartime diplomacy. Franklin Roosevelt's close control of foreign policy practically eliminated the Congress from maintaining a viable role in policy development, reduced the interchange of ideas from the legislative branch, and emasculated the Senate's power to advise and consent. Finally, the Personal Representative method of executing policy, based partly on unavoidable military requirements and partly on Franklin Roosevelt's personal and political motives, set a pattern of growing executive supremacy in the development and implementation of American foreign policy which has extended to the present.

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