

PROTECT WESTERN FRONTIER.

[To accompany bill H. R. No. 406.]

MARCH 3, 1836.

Mr. JOHNSON, of Kentucky, from the Committee on Military Affairs, made the following

REPORT:

The Committee on Military Affairs, having taken into consideration the exposed condition of our inland frontier, beg leave to present the following report:

The objects of military establishments with despotic nations are twofold: the suppression or preservation of domestic insurrections, and the repulsion of foreign enemies.

The first of these constitutes no part of the object of our establishments. In this happy republic, the people are the sovereign; all power emanates from them and returns to them. American citizens are identified with the Government, and they need no armies and bulwarks to fortify against themselves. Our Government rests upon the broad basis of public sentiment, and no intestine commotions can mar the fabric or endanger its safety. A great military establishment is, therefore, unnecessary in time of peace. But the history of the world shows that nations, subject to the ambition and caprice of despotic and irresponsible rulers, are inclined to hostility; and that the nation whose interest and disposition could preserve the olive, must present a frontier as impregnable as circumstances will permit.

This sentiment so far prevails, that our whole maritime border is in a progressive state of defence, which, it is believed, will be continued with increased energy, till the whole shall be perfected. But our greatest exposure to sudden incursions, the committee believe, has been too little regarded; it is our inland frontier.

The savage tribes which border upon our settlements, from the Canada line to Louisiana, are more dangerous to the lives and property of our citizens than the whole civilized world. Their numbers at any one point are not so great as to give the most distant prospect of eventual success to any of their incursions; and if they were well informed of what must inevitably be the end of every hostile movement on their part, no danger would be apprehended from their depredations. But they are savages, uncivilized and unenlightened; creatures of passion and momentary impulse; and the late sufferings from the Black Hawk war in the north, and the more recent barbarities of the Florida Indians in the south, admonish us of the necessity of furnishing more effectual protection to our inland borders.

In both of these cases, it is believed, that, besides the great loss of lives and of individual property, the expense to the Government in subduing the savages, will have been ten times as great as would have been requisite to have prevented the catastrophe.

In the Florida war, the force of the enemy was so perfectly insignificant in point of numbers, that any thing like a system of defence, with such military force as might, at a very inconsiderable expense, be placed along the line, would have effectually prevented it. But for want of these preparatory measures, numbers of valuable lives have been lost which cannot be estimated by any amount of money; great destruction of individual property has been sustained, which is as much a national loss as if it had flown from the treasury; and no less than five thousand militia have been called into the field, which, besides individual sacrifices, will take from the public coffers, at a moderate estimate, not less than a million of dollars.

The Black Hawk war presented a scene equally appalling. The savages were indeed subdued, but the lives which were lost could not be restored, and the expense to the treasury was not less than a million of dollars. These two wars alone, if they may properly be called wars, cost the nation twenty times as much as is now called for in the arrangement of a regular system of defence.

The policy of the Government to remove the Indians from the interior of the States, beyond our western boundary, renders a regular system of defence still more necessary.

The number that will eventually have emigrated in conformity with that policy, is estimated at nearly two hundred and fifty thousand. The honor of the nation is pledged to provide for their safety, and to extend to them all possible benefits.

To prevent the miseries which would result from feuds among themselves, as well as the depredations which they might be tempted to commit against our own citizens, there must be a military force within their observation; and the committee do not see any plan so economical, and at the same time so effectual, as that which may be anticipated from that which is suggested by the War Department, viz: by a military road and strong posts and deposits upon it, embracing the whole frontier of Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana. The letter of the Secretary of War, marked A, the letter of the Commissary General, marked B, and the statement marked C, are appended as a part of this report.

Bordering as we do upon an Indian frontier so extensively, and having so often felt the effects of their sudden impulses in bursts of the most cruel passions, the committee regard it alike the dictate of humanity and of sound policy, to present to their view such an aspect of strength as will tend at once to restrain their savage ferocity and to supersede the painful necessity of retaliation.

The expense will be of small consideration compared with the utility of the object. A line of posts, marking that frontier, and facilities of communication between them by a continuous military road, may be accomplished at an inconsiderable expense less than a tithe of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands in the very domains which most require this protection.

The committee in conformity with these views, beg leave to report the following bill.

A.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
February 19, 1835.

SIR: In answer to so much of your letter of the 11th inst. as relates to the defence of the western frontier, I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, of the Senate, which conveys the views of the Department on this subject. The residue of your letter, concerning the increase of the army, shall be answered as soon as the necessary information can be procured.

Very respectfully,

Your most ob't servant,

LEWIS CASS.

Hon. R. M. JOHNSON,
Chair'n Com. Mil. Affairs, Ho. Reps.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
February 19, 1836.

SIR: In conformity with your letter of the 10th inst. I have the honor to submit for your consideration the following views upon the best method which can be adopted for the protection of the frontiers exposed to the hostile incursions of the Indians.

As I presume, that in this question you refer to such measures as the nature of the country and the habits of the Indians render necessary, independently of any increase of the numerical strength of the army, and as the subject of that increase is specially referred to me by a resolution of the Senate, I shall, in this communication, confine my suggestions to the proper distribution and employment of a military force, and to the means which can be provided for its operation, so as to interpose the most effectual barrier against the incursions of the Indians.

The period has arrived when a systematic plan for the protection of our frontiers ought to be devised and adopted. Heretofore, posts have been established upon our extensive inland boundary, as circumstances, from time to time, required, without regard to any general arrangement. And, indeed, from the position of the Indians, any other course was, probably, impracticable. No line could be drawn, upon one side of which the Indians could be kept, and our citizens the other. Positions were therefore selected, with relation to their geographical advantages, and to the moral effect they were calculated to have upon the Indians. Among other inconveniences, however, which attended this plan was one that has occasionally produced considerable difficulty in our Indian intercourse. Changes of policy are the necessary result, more or less, of a change in the persons upon whom the administration of a general course of measures depends. As different views have been entertained, posts have been advanced into the Indian country and then withdrawn. Wherever this withdrawal has taken place, excitement among the Indians, and sometimes more serious difficulties, have occurred. They cannot comprehend the motives which dictate these operations, and they attribute such measures to a sense of our weakness or to a fear of them. It is only, therefore, in extraordinary cases that posts,

once established in the Indian country, should be withdrawn. If moved at all, the movement should be in advance.

Annexed to this report, are tables showing the number of Indians who now are, or probably soon will be, placed in contact with our settlements west of the Mississippi river. It will be seen, by reference to them, that there have already been removed to that region from the country east of the Mississippi 31,348 Indians, and that the indigenous tribes, between them and the Rocky Mountains amount to 150,341, making already an Indian force of 181,689, requiring precautionary measures to restrain them. There are yet 62,181 to emigrate, and when their removal is effected, the whole Indian force west of the Mississippi, and east of the Rocky Mountains will probably be about 244,870.

Although many of these reside far from the settled frontier, yet all of them are roaming in their habits; and the nature of the country, as well as the general possession of horses, enables them to extend their war excursions to great distances. And, besides, we must adopt the policy of preventing the various tribes from committing hostilities upon one another. If this cannot be effected by remonstrance, it should be done by force. We owe such a decisive procedure not less to ourselves than to them. Our remote settlements will never be safe, so long as the petty tribes in contact with them are permitted to engage in hostilities at pleasure, nor will our citizens residing in, or passing through the Indian country. A war party, when once it has commenced its march, cannot return without scalps, unless at the sacrifice of its honor. And if an enemy cannot be found, or cannot safely be attacked, the necessary trophies must be furnished by a friend. Many feuds upon our borders have been occasioned by outrages of this character. We have also promised protection to the emigrated tribes, and this guarantee, deemed so highly important by them, cannot be preserved without the adoption of vigorous measures, and the establishment of a system of defence adequate to any exigency that may occur.

The above estimates, although conjectural, are yet made from the best data that can be obtained, and may be considered as sufficiently approximating to the truth for all the purposes of this communication.

Independently of the obligations upon the Government of the United States to afford protection to the whole country, there are peculiar reasons why occurrences upon the western border should excite peculiar solicitude. After a full consideration of the best means fitted to improve the condition of the Indians, and to place them in circumstances where they can do least injury to the people of the United States, it has been determined to transfer them to the country beyond the limits of our settlements west of the Mississippi. The system has already been pursued to such an extent as to insure its final success. When consummated, an immense body of Indians, whose estimated amount I have already stated, will be placed upon the borders of our settlements. We must expect that they will return in some measure to many of their former habits. They will, in a great degree, be strangers to one another, and to the primitive tribes occupying that region. They will form little quasi independent communities, and will, of course, be liable to all those accidents and excitements which, even in more advanced societies, are calculated to lead to collisions. These will be increased by the peculiar views and feelings of the Indians. Their institutions have a tendency to war. No warrior arriving at manhood can enjoy any estimation until he has been present

where the blood of an enemy has been shed. From that period he dates his distinction, and his fame is after that proportioned to his success in war. Their civil polity is feeble, seldom providing punishments for offences, unless through the medium of the injured party. This, of course, leads to all those acts of revenge and retaliation, which disturb barbarous communities.

It is obvious, from these remarks, as well as from our own experience, that we must anticipate, after the removal of the Indians, that causes of difficulties, both among themselves, and between them and our citizens, will arise, and be in continual operation. These must be counteracted by the proper distribution along the frontier of a sufficient military force, and by such arrangements for its employment as circumstances may call for. We must not make any calculations upon the mere comparison of our strength with the weakness of the Indians, and upon the consequent forbearance of the latter. The Indians have no conception of our actual power. They judge by what they see about them; and experience has shown that they are prepared to commence hostilities under circumstances which, as we well know, leave them no chance of success. They are, in fact, a people of impulse, and are brought into difficulties by the passions of the young men who act in opposition to the opinions and advice of those who are better disposed and more experienced.

Assuming, therefore, that the system of Indian emigration will soon concentrate upon our western frontier the powerful force already described, and that common prudence requires the adoption of a plan of defence adequate to any exigency which will probably arise, I proceed to submit to your consideration such views as have occurred to me upon this subject.

The country upon the border of which these transplanted tribes have been and will be stationed, extends from Red river, passing the frontiers of Arkansas and Missouri, and the cession made by the Sacs and Foxes in 1832, to the tract west of Prairie du Chien, assigned by the treaty with the Winnebagoes in 1832 for their residence.

The great object is to make such arrangements as will distribute along this line a sufficient force to overawe the Indians, and to intercept any parties who might be disposed to make irruptions upon our settlements. And also to facilitate the necessary communication, and to allow a speedy concentration of troops upon those points where it may be required.

It is my opinion, that by opening a proper communication from some place upon the Red river, not far from Fort Towson, passing west of the ceded country in Arkansas, Missouri, and Michigan, to the right bank of the Mississippi, above the mouth of the Des Moines, and below the St. Peters, and by the establishment of proper posts along this communication, better protection will be afforded to the frontiers than in any other manner; and with a view to effect this measure, I have the honor to submit for the consideration of the committee, the accompanying bill.

The length of the route will probably be upwards of eight hundred miles, but this conjectural estimate will be varied by changes of direction necessary to accommodate the road to the nature of country, and the situation of the frontier inhabitants and Indians, and by any variations that may take place in the points of commencement and termination upon the Red river and the Mississippi. An examination of the country can alone furnish the necessary information upon these subjects.

After the road is surveyed, and its route determined, it should be opened

for military purposes, that is to facilitate the movement of the troops along it. For this purpose, the trees should be cut down, so as to give a proper width in the timbered country, and the marshy and wet places should be causewayed or otherwise rendered passable, and occasionally, perhaps, the earth should be thrown up in the centre of the road. The smaller streams, where there are not good fords, should be bridged. But it is believed there is a great deal of the country over which this road will pass, so favorable that scarcely any work need be done upon it. It will be seen, from this description, that such a mode of construction is contemplated as will be economical, and, at the same time, sufficient for the object.

I propose that a sufficient number of positions be selected along this line for the establishment of military posts, and that the necessary works, similar in their character to those at our stockaded forts, be constructed. At or near each end of the route, and at an intermediate point, the dragoons should be stationed, while the other posts will be occupied by infantry. As fast as circumstances will permit, the garrisons in the Indian country, east of this line, ought to be transferred to it. This will occasion the removal of Fort Towson, should the road commence at any considerable distance from that place; of Fort Gibson, if not upon the line; and of Fort Coffee. The position of Fort Leavenworth is probably sufficiently favorable to anticipate its continuance. It has already been determined to abandon Fort Armstrong on Rock island, as the ceded country has extended considerably west of it, and to remove the garrison to St. Peters.

This latter post will, under any circumstances, continue, and the temporary position occupied by the dragoons at the Desmoines will be the only remaining one in the Indian country west of the Mississippi. The detachment of dragoons occupying it will, of course, be transferred as soon as proper arrangements can be made, to some point near the northern termination of the proposed road.

The following are the places north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi, where garrisons are now maintained on account of the vicinity of the Indians, namely: Fort Gratiot, at the outlet of Lake Huron; Michilimackinack, on the straits connecting Lakes Huron and Michigan; Sault Ste. Marie, at the foot of Lake Superior; Chicago, at the head of Lake Michigan; Green Bay, at the mouth of the Fox river; Winnebago, at the portage between the Fox and Ouisconsin rivers; and Prairie du Chien, upon the Mississippi.

It will probably be many years before all these military positions can, with safety, be abandoned, and the garrisons occupying them stationed upon the communication proposed to be opened. This however may be done, from time to time, as the Indians in their vicinity retire west of the Mississippi. Fort Gratiot will not probably be long retained, and Chicago may be evacuated in the course of this season or the next, if the Pottawatomie Indians emigrate peaceably in conformity with their treaty. The positions at Michilimackinack and the Sault Ste. Marie, must be held as long as those places are depots of Indian trade, and places of resort for the Indians during the open season of the year. The country about Green Bay is settling with much rapidity, and its advantages of soil and climate hold out the prospect of a dense population. The Indians have already left the immediate vicinity of the fort; and although it is proper it should be occupied for the present, with a view to its moral effect upon them, still it cannot be necessary long to retain possession of it.

The nature of the country on the upper branches of the Ouisconsin, and the indisposition of the Indians to leave it, will probably postpone, for some time, the cession of their title. Until this takes place, Fort Winnebago, or some position in its neighborhood, must be maintained. Prairie du Chien, under this arrangement, may be considered a temporary post, to be transferred to the line of communication at some future period, which cannot be distant, when the Indians shall have left the country in its vicinity, and withdrawn to that at a distance from the Mississippi.

A barrier thus interposed, and resting upon the right bank of the Mississippi, would cut off all communication between our settlements and the Indians west of that river, but would still leave open the frontier from Lake Huron to the Mississippi, passing north of the settlements at Green bay and of the portage.

But the great difficulty to be anticipated is, from the Indians west of the Mississippi, and not from those occupying this region. Little is to be apprehended from the Chippewas of Lake Superior; from the Menomonees, or from the Indians upon the peninsula of Michigan. In a few years, both of the latter will probably have been removed, and the progress of our settlements will have indicated whether any farther cessions of Indian titles are necessary east of the Mississippi. We shall then be enabled to determine upon the permanent arrangements to be made for the security of that part of the country. It is to be observed, however, that propositions are already before Congress for purchasing a part or the whole of the Indian possessions in the neighborhood of Green bay, and of the country upon the Mississippi above Prairie du Chien.

There is not before the Department the necessary information for determining the number of posts which ought to be occupied between the Mississippi and Red rivers. This can only be ascertained by a careful examination of the country. Presuming that Fort Snelling, at St. Peters, Fort Leavenworth and Fort Towson will continue to be occupied, it is not probable that more than four or five others will be found necessary. The object will be to establish them at proper geographical points where the supplies may be most easily furnished, and sufficiently near to the Indian settlements to produce a proper effect upon them; and also at such distances from one another, that the necessary communications may be preserved with facility. The dragoons, during the open season of the year, when Indian aggressions are to be feared, should be employed in ranging along the road, and, if necessary, in making lateral excursions to the Indian towns and settlements. Proper supplies of forage and subsistence should be deposited at each of the posts, and the dragoons would thus be enabled to move promptly and rapidly, without any danger of destroying their horses, which is the necessary result of severe marches in the woods, where grain cannot be procured. It may be found advisable to erect block houses for temporary occupation, at intermediate points, as places of deposit, and to facilitate the passage of streams too large to be bridged. These, however, can be constructed by the troops.

If any unusual occurrence should render necessary the concentration of the infantry force stationed upon the line, they could be promptly moved, and for that purpose should always be prepared with the means of transportation. These, however, might be very limited, as the several posts would be provided with all the *materiel* necessary to efficient action. But it would probably be found that the employment of the dragoons in this

service, would be sufficient for all the purposes contemplated. This is a species of force peculiarly dreaded by the Indians, and its movement along the road would operate to restrain them, and to prevent their war parties from passing this barrier. Although constitutionally brave, yet in their war excursions they are very cautious, and are unwilling to expose themselves to a force in their rear.

I consider these remarks as practicably applicable, although in fact the road will pass beyond our frontier, and thus leave a small portion of the Indians within it. These however will belong to the emigrant tribes, from whom the least danger is to be apprehended, and there is little fear, with our settlement on one side, and this road thus secured and traversed on the other, that these Indians will engage in any hostile aggressions.

A portion of the work contemplated may be done by the troops. But to what extent, must depend upon their health, and upon the other duties they may be required to perform; and also upon the time, within which it may be deemed proper to complete the whole plan.

I submit, herewith, a report from the Quartermaster General, containing some valuable suggestions made by that experienced officer, which I cannot but recommend to your consideration. He estimates that the whole work, including the construction of the road, and the establishment of the posts, may be completed for the sum of \$100,000. Fort Gibson ought not to be included in this computation, because it must be re-constructed, either upon its present site, or upon some other to be hereafter selected, and an estimate for that purpose is already before Congress. For the same reason a new station upon the Desmoines should be excluded from the calculation. There is, in the military appropriation bill, a proposition for the establishment of a post in that quarter.

It is proper however to remark, that these estimates, made by the Quartermaster General, are necessarily very uncertain, because there is little precise information upon the subject in the possession of the Department. Col. Dodge, whose opinion is entitled to great weight, considers the whole country as affording great facilities for the construction of a road, and he thinks that one may be made at a very little expense. But, even if the expenditure should ultimately exceed the estimate of the Quartermaster General, viz: the sum of \$100,000, still, the measure is sufficiently important to justify its adoption. And I am satisfied, that no other plan can be devised which will afford adequate protection to the frontiers, and not involve far greater expenditures than this.

It will be observed, that I have not proposed any defensive measures for the western frontier of Louisiana adjoining the Mexican boundary. I have supposed that your call relates to protection against Indian incursions, and have therefore confined myself to that subject.

Very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

LEW. CASS.

HON. THOS. H. BENTON;

Chairman Com. Military Affairs, Senate.

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, February 15, 1836.

SIR: In obedience to your order requiring my opinions and views as to the general route of a road from St. Peters to Red river, and as to the number and the proper positions of the military posts required for the defence of that flank of our country, with an estimate of the cost of making the road, and establishing the posts: I have to remark, that our whole western frontier, extending from Lake Superior to the Gulf of Mexico, through seventeen degrees of latitude, is, as you are well aware, either bounded by a foreign territory in a state of civil war, or in direct contact with powerful and warlike Indian tribes. Should those who are in arms against their Government on our borders be beaten, they will naturally fly to our country for protection; and if the bands of Indians under the control of their Government be employed against them, the whole of our frontier south of Fort Towson will be exposed to their incursions, and to the indiscriminate slaughter, characteristic of Indian warfare.

The Indians north of Red river, if united, might bring into the field perhaps twenty thousand warriors, and their numbers are daily increasing by the emigrating tribes from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Many of the emigrants occupy their new positions under the influence of hostile feelings, the result of real or imaginary wrongs; and for the purposes of vengeance, would readily unite with the native tribes, who naturally view with jealousy the steady progress of our population westward, in any measures against us which should promise even temporary success; and even were the mass of them inclined to preserve peace with us, danger is to be apprehended from the collisions among themselves, and their misunderstandings with frontier settlers. The better, and indeed the only way, to preserve peace among them, and to protect them and ourselves, is to establish a strong cordon of posts along the whole line, with one or more advanced posts on the Missouri; and if found necessary, on the Arkansas and Red rivers also, with good roads communicating between them, and from them to the interior. The posts should be fortified, and the garrisons should be sufficiently strong and well supplied to resist any sudden attack, and hold out if besieged; and there should be a mounted force constantly patrolling the road, and whenever circumstances should render such a measure advisable, strong detachments of dragoons or mounted riflemen should make excursions even into the remotest Indian country.

Taking Fort Snelling at the junction of the St. Peters with the Mississippi, as the most northern point of the cordon, and Fort Jesup near the Red river, as the most southern, the intermediate posts already established, are Fort Leavenworth on the Missouri, Fort Gibson on a principal branch of the Arkansas, and Fort Towson near the Kiamichi branch of Red river. To complete the line, a post is required about midway between Fort Jesup and Fort Towson, another between Fort Towson and Fort Gibson, a third near the Osage agency on the Neosho, and a fourth on the river Desmoines, between Fort Leavenworth and Fort Snelling. Three positions on Desmoines have been mentioned, either of which, if properly fortified and garrisoned, would exercise a decided influence over the Indian tribes between the Missouri and Mississippi rivers, viz: at the Raccoon fork, the north fork, and the upper fork. I should prefer the latter, because it is on the direct line of defence, and is within the neutral hunting ground of several tribes of Indians.

This office furnishes no data on which an estimate could be made with any tolerable degree of accuracy of the cost either of making the road or establishing the posts. The labor, however, would in both cases be performed by the troops, and but little expense would therefore be incurred, except for the wages of master workmen, the extra pay to the soldiers employed, the means of transportation required, and the tools and materials to be taken from the interior, such as glass, nails, iron, &c.

A road has already been opened between Fort Jesup and Fort Towson, a distance exceeding three hundred miles, which is now undergoing repairs by authority of an act of the last session of Congress. The length of the road from Fort Towson to Fort Snelling will exceed eight hundred and fifty miles; but the greater part of the route lying over a high and open country, where the work to be performed will be limited, in a great measure, to erecting bridges over streams, and causewaying low and marshy places in their vicinity, thirty-five thousand dollars it is believed, will be sufficient for the road; and for the four posts, about sixty-five thousand will suffice; making together a hundred thousand dollars for the road and posts; a small sum when compared with the important objects expected to be obtained.

In addition to the cordon indicated, the Council Bluffs should be reoccupied: that position is in the immediate vicinity of several tribes of Indians; it is within one day's march of the Otoes, one and a half from the Great Pawnees, two from the Mohas, two from the Pawnee Loups, and at a convenient distance from the hunting grounds of the Sioux. During the whole time it was held by our troops, scarcely an instance occurred of difficulty between the Indians enumerated and our traders or other citizens. From the number of tribes it may control, I consider it the most important military position on the Missouri; and whether we establish other posts or not, it should be seized and maintained. Prairie du Chien, though within this line of defence, cannot safely be abandoned; and a garrison of one or two companies will be required for some time at the mouth of the Desmoines.

Five thousand men, of whom fifteen hundred should be mounted, are necessary for the defence of this line, and it cannot safely be trusted to less. It will, therefore, be readily perceived, that in the views I have taken, I have had no reference to the existing military establishments: for experience has shown that it is entirely inadequate to the defence of the country. We have neither artillery sufficient for the forts on the sea board, nor infantry and cavalry sufficient for the interior frontier. If the companies were placed on a war establishment, and provision made to arm one of the regiments of infantry with Hall's rifles, and mount it when the service should require it, complete protection might be afforded to the whole country. The expense may perhaps be objected to, but I have yet to learn that the blood of American citizens is to be estimated by dollars and cents; and if it were, that system which is most efficient will be found the cheapest in the end.

The ill judged economy which arrested the measures projected for the defence of the frontier in 1819, and broke down the army in 1821, has caused all the difficulties which have occurred with the Indians since; had those measures been carried out, and the force then in service retained, competent garrisons might have been placed wherever necessary, and at least two regiments have been disposable, and ready to reinforce any point

requiring their aid; and the bloodshed, devastation, and consequent expense, attending three Indian campaigns, might have been avoided.

I have the honor to be,

Sir, your obedient servant,

TH. S. JESUP,
Quartermaster General.

Hon. LEWIS CASS,
Secretary of War, Washington.

C.

Number of Indians emigrated.

Tribes.	No.
Winnebagoes	700
Chippewas, Ottawas and Pottawatamies	1,200
Pottawatamies from Indiana	441
Choctaws	15,000
Anapaws	300
Creeks	3,600
Opalachicolas	265
Cherokees	6,000
Lickapoos	588
Delawares	826
Shawanees	1,250
Ottawas	200
Weas	222
Wankeshaws	162
Peorias and Kaskaskias	132
Menecas	251
Menecas and Shawanees	211
Total	31,348

Number of Indians to remove.

Tribes.	No.
New York Indians	4,176
Ottawas of Ohio	230
Wyandots	575
Pottawatamies of Indiana	3,000
Miamies	1,100
Chippewas, Ottawas and Pottawatamies	6,400
Winnébagoes	4,500
Menomonees	4,200
Cherokees	8,000
Creeks	21,000
Chickasaws	5,500
Seminoles	3,000
Apalachicola's	400
Total	62,181

Number of Indians south of Lake Superior.

	No.
Peninsula of Michigan	5,674
Northwest coast of Lake Michigan	274
Northern curve of Green Bay	210
Sources of the Ouisconsin and Menomonee rivers	342
Northwest coast of Lake Huron	302
St. Maries river	436
Southern shore of Lake Superior	1,000
Total	8,238

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Number of Indians of the indigenous tribes, within striking distance of the frontier.

Tribes.	No.
Sioux - - - - -	27,500
Ioways - - - - -	1,200
Sacs - - - - -	4,800
Foxes - - - - -	1,600
Sacs of the Missouri - - - - -	500
Osages - - - - -	5,120
Kanzas - - - - -	1,471
Arikaras - - - - -	1,400
Otoes and Missourias - - - - -	1,600
Winnebes - - - - -	10,000
Comanches - - - - -	7,000
Kioways - - - - -	1,400
Nebrascans - - - - -	15,000
Quapaws - - - - -	450
Appataches - - - - -	15,000
Missinaboins - - - - -	8,000
Greys - - - - -	3,000
Grös Ventres - - - - -	3,000
Arrows - - - - -	4,500
Madocoes - - - - -	2,000
Loncas - - - - -	800
Trickares - - - - -	3,000
Cheyennes - - - - -	2,000
Blackfeet - - - - -	30,000
Total - - - - -	150,341

The recapitulation shows the number of Indians that will be between the frontier and the Rocky mountains, after the emigration is completed.

Recapitulation.

Number of Indians emigrated - - - - -	31,348
Number of Indians to remove - - - - -	62,181
Number of Indians of the indigenous tribes - - - - -	150,341
Total - - - - -	243,870

Probable distance on the map from Red river, at Fort Towson, to Fort Snelling.

	Miles.
From Fort Towson to Fort Gibson - - - -	200
From Fort Gibson to Fort Leavenworth - - - -	300
From Fort Leavenworth to Fort Snelling - - - -	400
Total - - - - -	900

Probable distance from Fort Towson to Fort Crawford.

	Miles.
From Fort Towson to Fort Leavenworth - - - -	500
From Fort Leavenworth to Fort Desmoines - - - -	200
From Fort Desmoines to Fort Crawford - - - -	130
Total - - - - -	830