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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HERMAN H. HORNE'S INTERPRETATION OF JOHN DEWEY'S DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HERMAN H. HORNE'S INTERPRETATION OF JOHN DEWEY'S DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

A culture which permits science to destroy traditional values but which distrusts its powers to create new ones is a culture which is destroying itself.

--John Dewey

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Subject of the Study

Herman H. Horne has written a friendly interpretation of Democracy and Education by John Dewey. This companion volume to Dewey's famous work is significant, both from the Idealist's as well as from the Pragmatist's points of view. Horne's volume entitled The Democratic Philosophy of Education attempted to philosophically elucidate and elaborate upon the pragmatic and idealistic positions. His intent was not necessarily to criticize Dewey nor the pragmatic points of view, but rather to (a) offer an expository analysis of the main points in the argument and to (b) provide a contrasting point of view which he concluded was necessary if a fundamental philosophy of life was to be effected. Such an endeavor was needed, believed Horne, and would serve as a stimulus in the study of philosophies of education.[1] Horne obviously holds certain philosophical views notably different from those

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[1]Herman H. Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. vii.

presented by Dewey in Democracy and Education. According to Horne, ". . . a two-fold need has arisen for this work; the first is to understand Dr. Dewey more readily, and the second is to estimate his views more discriminatingly."[2] The validity of such an exploration as revealed in The Democratic Philosophy of Education is the subject of this study.

Statement of the Problem

Although many well-informed writers have expressed a keen interest in Dewey's Democracy and Education, few have demonstrated the insight of Herman H. Horne and few have so skillfully undertaken the systematic and logical approach toward such an interpretation as has Horne.

The purpose of this dissertation is to make a comparative study of John Dewey's Democracy and Education and Herman H. Horne's The Democratic Philosophy of Education. Further, this dissertation will undertake to determine which of the two interpretations of the principal themes developed in both of these books is more valid. The criterion for making this determination is: which of these two philosophies constitutes the most adequate basis for developing a philosophy of education for a democratic society.

Nature of the Study

A careful study of Herman H. Horne as philosopher would represent a worthwhile endeavor. However, due to the scope of

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[2] Ibid., p. ix.

his philosophical discussions, certain delimitations are necessary. The first delimitation is that no attempt will be made to evaluate and analyze Horne as an Idealist. His philosophic posture will, to some extent, be reflected in his analysis of pragmatism and subsequent implications inherent in his study of a philosophy of education.

A second delimitation is that the analysis for this study will be concerned chiefly with Horne's volume, The Democratic Philosophy of Education in which he carefully interprets John Dewey as he views him and his philosophy of education.

In conclusion, other writings of Horne will be examined for the purpose of obtaining a better understanding of his philosophy of education. These may be identified as other books written by Horne and include the following: The Philosophy of Education; The Psychological Principles of Education; Idealism in Education; Free Will and Human Responsibility.

Significance of the Study

One of the main reasons Herman H. Horne has been successful in effectively contrasting the philosophies of idealism and pragmatism is due to the clarity with which he presents his points of views in his "Comments." Such clarity in his writing is indicative of the familiarity and understanding which Horne had achieved. His work is aimed at a clarification of positions, rather than to enforce a stronghold of philosophical posture. As a result, the reader clearly identifies two alternative views, each left to stand on its own merit. The

value of each must ultimately be determined by the scholar. In this way, the opportunity for examination and discrimination has been provided by Horne. Although the philosophies of pragmatism and idealism have often been viewed as antithetical, there appears to be a neglect in the area of an intensive study which logically compares, analyzes, interprets, and then projects into education the subsequent contributions and consequences of each. It may be asserted that Horne, as philosopher, has had little direct influence on contemporary education and educational practices. Yet, the influence of idealism, the system of philosophy which he represents should not be ignored nor depreciated. One of the most significant influences has been the manner in which he has attracted and interested other writers who represent the idealist's position in education, or those who have undertaken to portray the various philosophies of education.

John S. Brubacher[3] refers to Horne as the most prolific writer on the idealistic philosophy of education in the twentieth century. Brubacher believed this to be true due to the fact that "at a time when idealism was beginning to fade as the dominant American theory of education, Horne managed to draw together the strains of idealism into a systematic educational elaboration."[4] Brubacher[5] further identifies at least

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[3]John S. Brubacher, A History of the Problems of Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 128.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

two points of views attributable to Horne. One was his emphasis on volition and effort in learning. In this connection, Horne is seen to agree with Froebel in that the child, like the plant, can withhold his response. Therefore, all education may be viewed as self-education; it is the result of voluntary effort put forth by a self-active mind. According to Horne, if effort is aided by interest, well and good. If not, then, like Kant, Horne would urge that the pupil put forth the greater effort in obedience to what he "ought to do." A second notable point in Horne's exposition, as identified by Brubacher, is that Horne did not make any significant alteration in the developmental theory of education in the light of the Darwinian theory of evolution. Obviously, Horne realized that evolution had made the developmental process irreversible in contrast to the Aristotelian pattern of matter. Nevertheless, the Absolute had no difficulty in assimilating this new theory of development. Horne could still say that the Absolute is; only the finite becomes.[6] Philosophically, this position would appear to describe education as the process by which the child still becomes what he was always meant to be.

In addition, Theodore Brameld[7] describes Horne as one of the most outstanding idealists. Brameld goes further in identifying Horne as one of the early and most influential essentialist

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[6]Ibid.

[7]Theodore Brameld, Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955), p. 239.

leaders. Thus, it is noteworthy that such an influential idealist should address himself to Dewey's pragmatic philosophy of education as presented in Democracy and Education. This investigation is designed to analyze Horne's interpretation of John Dewey's classic statement of the democratic ideal and its connection with education.

Related Studies

The chief classification of related studies may be found as incidental references to Horne's educational views. These generally are found as brief statements and are referred to by writers in discussions of idealism or the idealist's philosophy of education. Typical of this classification are statements made by John Brubacher and Theodore Brameld. Brubacher[8] has identified Horne as representing a strong reaction against pragmatism and especially the aims of progressive education. As a critic of the philosophy of pragmatism, Horne has been cited as emphatically denouncing growth as the aim of education. A further rejection by Horne was that growth for the sake of growth simply did not go far enough. Brameld[9] alludes to Horne as a staunch representative of essentialism. An interesting and significant observation was made by Brameld with respect to the idealist's view of school and society. In this discussion,

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[8]Brubacher, A History of the Problems of Education, p. 20.

[9]Brameld, Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective, p. 241.

he finds an inconsistency which points to a swinging back and forth from the pole of education as cultural reinforcement to the pole of education as a guide to social change. Brameld's conclusion was that such a position constituted an attempt to accommodate both aims within the idealist's theory of education, thereby conveying a degree of eclecticism, if not ambiguity.[10]

Organization of the Study

Chapter One of this study introduces the purpose, nature, and significance of this study. Related literature and the basic organization of the remainder of the study are also included in this chapter. The study is then divided into chapters as designated by specific philosophic considerations made by Horne. Special emphasis will be given to contrasts and their respective contributions to philosophy, especially as these are viewed as significant contributions to a philosophy of education. Although the study is divided into chapters, it is not implied that each section is considered distinct and self-contained. Each chapter overlaps to some extent with all other chapters. The specific chapters under investigation are determined by the logical divisions as presented by Horne in The Democratic Philosophy of Education.

In Chapter Two, "Education as a Need and Function of Society," the specific considerations which are presented for

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[10] Ibid.

analysis include the following: (1) Education as a Necsssity of Life; (2) Education as a Social Function; (3) Education as Direction; (4) Education as Growth; (5) Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline; (6) Education as Conservative and Progressive. These topics as interpreted by Horne will be carefully analyzed and criticized in an attempt to establish a better perspective relative to these selected philosophical considerations.

Chapter Three, "Democracy in Education," reviews those philosophic considerations as they relate to education in a democracy. The major themes in this chapter include the following: (1) The Democratic Conception in Education; (2) Aims in Education; (3) Natural Development, Social Efficiency and Culture as Aims; (4) Interest and Discipline; (5) Experience and Thinking; (6) Thinking in Education; (7) The Nature of Methods; (8) The Nature of Subject Matter; (9) Play and Work in the Curriculum; (10) The Significance of Geography and History; (11) Science in the Course of Study. In this chapter are to be found the most significant philosophical themes as presented by Dewey and interpreted by Horne.

Chapter Four is entitled, "Our Educational Limitations." The subject for this chapter concerns an explicit discussion of educational values as these relate to the total curriculum. Prior attention to the subject of values has been made, especially in relation to aims and interests. This aspect of values has been critiqued in Chapter Three, "Democracy and

Education." Included in this chapter are the following topics: (1) Educational Values; (2) Labor and Leisure; (3) Intellectual and Practical Studies; (4) Physical and Social Studies; (5) The Individual and the World; (6) Vocational Aspects of Education.

Chapter Five, which is entitled, "The Philosophy of Education," presents a summary account of all previous chapter discussions. In this chapter, an explicit consideration of a philosophy of education is found. The three topics in which Dewey's key philosophical themes have been interpreted are: (1) Philosophy of Education; (2) Theories of Knowledge; (3) Theories of Morals. Due to the nature of this chapter, it is anticipated that it will serve to effect a synthesis and a consolidation of earlier topics under consideration in this study.

The concluding chapter contains a summary of findings made in this study. Appropriate findings will be presented according to the aforementioned chapter divisions. Conclusions, where applicable, will also be identified in this chapter.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATION AS A NEED AND FUNCTION OF SOCIETY

Education as a Necessity to Life

1. Renewal of Life by Transmission

The considerations in this discussion were basically the definition of education in its broadest sense. Initially, attention was focused upon the origin of life and subsequent implications for philosophy. The Idealist (Creationist) and the Pragmatic positions were contrasted for the purpose of establishing that such a consideration was valid in order to present a sound philosophy of education which was whole and complete.

Horne expressed considerable concern with the "phenomenon of life,"[1] especially in view of his contention that Dewey had failed to raise the basic question concerning "the nature of life and its origin."[2] There was, however, no agreement concerning the origin of life. The strength of Horne's position was diminished by the finding that neither the speculative scientists nor the philosophers had found satisfying answers to this problem. Nevertheless, Horne continued to assert that

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[1]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 7.

[2]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

the philosophical view one holds relative to this question makes a considerable difference. "To believe in chance or necessity as the origin of life is to diminish its value. The category of chance is haphazard and the category of necessity is blind."[3] Rejecting both these categories, Horne identified the category he believed as best suited to give life its greatest value:

> The category of creation and the category of purposeful development alike mean life was intended. If this is the case, then life conscious of itself, as in man, may sense its unity with, and cooperate with, the ultimate Source of things.[4]

Since a concern with this question necessarily called for speculation and a transcendental projection, Dewey found little need for concentrating on the origin of life as a basis for a philosophy of education. Furthermore, he found no purpose for such an endeavor for a sound philosophy could not be predicated upon a metaphysical orientation. At the same time, Dewey was concerned with the nature of life and the transmission of an ever increasingly enriched life. Essentially, Dewey's view on this point was that life and society were significantly interwoven. The imperative need for the effective transmission of life was analogous to the biological life.

> Society exists through a process of transmission . . . a transmission which occurs by means of communication of habits of doing, thinking, feeling from

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[3] Ibid., p. 8.

[4] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

> the older to the younger. Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectation, standards and opinions, social life could not survive.[5]

Since this renewal obviously was not automatic, nor destined to be, it was up to man to effect a genuine and complete transmission for the perpetuation of life and society. Thus, the task for education was identified for Dewey.

Since the activities of this domain were so great and pressing, Dewey found no necessity for pursuing the speculative, uncertain, vague, and a priori considerations where education and its task was concerned. Concentrating on the formative stage of the process of transmission, Dewey held the opinion that societal transmission was analogous with that of biological life:

> I believe that all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness of the race. This process begins unconsciously almost at birth, and is continually shaping the individual's powers, saturating his consciousness, forming his habits, training his ideas, and arousing feeling and emotions.[6]

Dewey's early views, as expressed in his writings, consistently identified the nature of life with the growth of the individual. The educative process thus was seen as beginning at birth and continuing by way of the social process which man had shaped. Thus, the responsibility for the perpetuation of life as well as sustaining quality of life, was

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[5]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 5-6.

[6]Ibid., p. 360.

in the hands of man void of any pre-determined direction or impetus to the life of man.

Contrasted to this position, Horne viewed life and growth in terms of the a priori considerations. The effects of this concept meant that the school and education in general were necessarily guided by fixed and determined external influences.

Speculation regarding the origin of life was an imperative for Horne. He believed that only in this way could an adequate philosophy of education be found. In Dewey's philosophy of education, such a position was essentially irrelevant to the consideration of a thorough and adequate philosophy since speculation could yield nothing in a positive sense. Education, for Dewey, began at birth, and the quality of process and the extent to which the individual developed, was determined by man in his natural social setting.

2. Education and Communication

The chief criticism made by Horne was aimed at the writing style effected by Dewey. Specifically, Horne called attention to Dewey's use of the term "communication."

> . . . Dr. Dewey's style is to give a familiar word an unfamiliar meaning. We ordinarily think of 'communication' in connection with a note, letter, telegram, . . . whereby some news is communicated by one individual to another individual. Communication is thus a product, a communication, and individual. To Dr. Dewey it is a process of sharing common interests, holding things in common, or transmitting things held in common.[7]

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[7]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 10.

Horne's use of the term did not hold the scope nor breadth in comparison with Dewey's usage of the term. The added dimension to the term, as used frequently by Dewey, was the social connotation. Basically, the term was used by Horne in a singular, personal sense. For Dewey, communication involved a group and was therefore social. Dewey suggested that like-mindedness was a prerequisite to the formation of a community. But there was more than a verbal relationship between the terms, "common," "community," and "communications." He believed an interdependence existed between these terms and that each served as a complement with the other. Such a relationship was expressed when Dewey stated:

> Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common, and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge. The communication which insures participation is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions.[8]

Dewey recognized that not all aspects of social life produced genuine educational products. Routine and haphazard communication between individuals ceased to be educative. Effective communication was viewed as a process and must have been effected as the result of a formulated experience. The extent to which communication became educative was dependent upon the quality and genuineness of a given unit

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[8] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 5.

of experience found in the social life. It was from this viewpoint that Dewey held a concern in this discussion. Mere acknowledgment of a common goal did not constitute a social group even though maximum cooperation had been attained. Rather, it was the sharing of a common end with a common interest so that all activity became regulated and directed toward the achievement of a specific goal. Thus, the process of communication becomes a necessity. "Consensus demands communication."[9]

In its most meaningful sense, the term "communication" for Dewey was something more than the simplistic connotation of sending a letter, a telegram, or a note. It was more than the exchange of news between individuals. Viewed from Dewey's point of view, communication denoted the sharing of experiences and interests in such a way as to modify or change the behavior of both parties. To the extent that this was accomplished, communication could properly be considered educative.

3. The Place of Formal Education

Horne interpreted Dewey's position as one which was far too informal. It seemed to Horne that Dewey's informal method was similar to that of "social participation of primitive man."[10] In other words, Horne saw in Dewey's scheme formal

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[9] Ibid., p. 6.

[10] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 11.

education acquired informally, if not unintentionally. Horne rejected this procedure unless it was supplemented by a more formal method.

Dewey recognized the role of formal education in modern society. However, Horne believed the term "formal" in the context of Dewey's writing meant that it was formal only in the sense that the school was an institution intentionally designed to transmit the resources and achievements of society.

Dewey did recognize the role of formal education as an imperative because of the increased complexity of society. He pointed out that education must not be viewed as incidental, nor left to accident and chance. The school was purposely organized in order to serve as a deliberate directive force. Dewey believed that only when the school was so viewed and perpetuated could the educative process hope to effect a change in the attitudes and behavior of the young. Dewey's posture on this consideration was as follows:

> Without such formal education it is not possible to transmit all the resources and achievements of a complex society. Such [formal education] also opens a way to a kind of experience which would not be accessible to the young, if they were left to pick up their training in informal associations with others, since books and symbols of knowledge are mastered.[11]

Dewey's justification for distinguishing between the broad, informal aspect of education and the formal, direct, and intentional institution was apparent upon examination of

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[11]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 9.

his text. He was opposed to the narrow, prescriptive aspect of traditional formal education which he believed to be void of vitality and meaning. Furthermore, Dewey wished to avoid the pitfall of allowing formal education to become an end in itself; that is, assuming the position of isolation from life and experience. Dewey recognized an inherent danger when the transition was made from the indirect to the direct or formal type of education:

> Formal instruction easily becomes remote and dead--abstract and bookish. There is the standing danger that the material of formal instruction will be merely the subject matter of the schools, isolated from the subject matter of life-experience.[12]

It was not difficult to ascertain Dewey's concern as expressed above. Far too often the notion of education had depreciated social necessity and as a consequence social interests had been lost. As a consequence, the emphasis is easily transferred to verbal signs or form, rather than upon meaningful content identified with, and projected into, human association. Dewey warned that when such concern for the conscious life of the individual was omitted, learning in the formal sense became mere acquisition of information.

Although opposition to formal education was not found in Dewey's exposition, he remained conscious of the undesirable effects which resulted when a division was allowed between the informal and the formal experience. He exhorted the educator to strive for a balance between the formal, intentional

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[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

operations and the informal, incidental operations. Because of the rapid growth of technology and attendant implications, Dewey believed there was an even greater danger of merely acquiring knowledge without meaning in the social sense. When this condition was permitted to exist, Dewey saw the permanent and practical aspects of education seriously impaired.

Horne's criticism of Dewey's discussion was not in terms of his opposition to formal education in the school. However, Horne did find objectionable Dewey's method of implementation and his close identification to the informal with the formal.

Education as a Social Function

1. The Nature and Meaning of Environment

Again, Horne has focused his attention upon terminology. "The novelty is the twist given the dictionary meaning of the term "environment."[13] Like the term "communication," "environment" had been used by Dewey in a manner which suggested an unfamiliar meaning. Horne preferred the use of this term with a more limited meaning and significance for the individual. He stated: ". . . the things to which a man responds, though remote in space and time, are his environment, while the things to which he does not respond, though at hand, are not a part of his environment."[14] Dewey viewed man and his environment

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[13]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 14.

[14]Ibid.

differently. Though simply stated, Dewey's usage of the word possessed greater depth and was dependent upon man for its characterization. "The things with which a man varies are his genuine environment."[15] In other words, the genuine environment for the individual were not necessarily his surroundings, but rather, those things, near or remote which really concerned him, with which his activities are continuous. Viewed from this perspective, only those things or conditions which directly affected or influenced man represented his genuine environment. This Dewey believed to be the case since these were the conditions which produced change in the active, living being. Dewey continued to stress the active element of experience in his formulation of man's environment. ". . . the environment consists of those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living being."[16]

2. The Social Environment

Horne's primary concern in this discussion was the nature of the learner's environment as presented by Dewey. In particular, he attacked Dewey's concept of activity as a basis for learning. Horne pointed out "that while children can learn as animals learn, animals can not learn as children can."[17] An

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[15]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 13.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 18.

additional concern for Horne was also identified. He stated:

> Children can and do learn by the 'law of effect,' viz., that satisfaction in an act leads to its repetition, and annoyance in an act leads to its avoidance. But if children learned only in this way, . . .they could become at best only sublimated pleasure-seekers and pain avoiders . . . .[18]

Horne believed it was dangerous to assume that learning was restricted to this method. Dewey, too, was cognizant of this fact. For him, setting up stimulant conditions which brought about different or modified ways of behaving was but the first step. This condition was the initiating agent and served as the element best suited for making an activity a learning experience. The second and final step was then attained when the individual became a sharer or partner in the activity so that he acquired the associated successes and failures as his own.

Horne disclosed that the essential difference was found in the fact that animals can not share in the uses of the activities in which they engage; Dewey maintained that the significant difference was that animals do not share in the uses of the activities in which they were engaged. Both Horne and Dewey agreed that the essential element in this connection was that the absence of the animal's ability to share experiences suggested a superior brain capacity and that a higher order of learning was possible in addition to that achieved by the "law of effect." Horne acknowledged the fact that Dewey's theory

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[18] *Ibid*.

goes far beyond the supposition that all learning must be kept on the basis of physical activity. Dewey recognized that in one instance we were dealing with training--modification of behavior eventually producing habituation. This level constituted a low order of learning as compared with teaching which could properly be called educative. In other words, not all shared experiences resulted in increased meaning. The quality of experience was the element which would determine the degree to which a shared experience or activity was educative. Insofar as words were concerned, Dewey's principle remained constant. Indeed, the use of language as a tool used to convey or acquire ideas was but an extension of the principle that "things gain meaning by being used in a shared experience or joint action."[19] Dewey further emphasized this point when he stated: "When words do not enter as factors into a shared situation, either overtly or imaginatively, they operate as pure physical stimuli, not as having a meaning or intellectual value."[20]

To grasp fully the implications of Horne's position, attention had to be given to his view of the mind and man's superior brain capacity. For him, this meant that thinking was an intellectual pursuit which enabled man to transcend human intelligence. This view was antithetical to Dewey's physiological

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[19]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 19.

[20]Ibid.

organic response concept of the mind. Where meaning and perception were concerned, Horne's posture appeared somewhat hypothetical and highly speculative. Dewey believed that social activity and the mutual sharing in the social environment remained the best activity for effecting the desired stimulus to a higher kind of thought process. It was this kind of process which could properly be viewed as educative rather than the isolated process which resulted in a trained individual. For Dewey, the superior intellect of man was not the deciding factor. It was what man did with his intelligence that made the difference between man and lower forms of animals. By contrast, Horne asserted: "Only low-grade intelligences require only an activity basis of learning."[21] From his discussion, it appeared that Horne equated activity with physical activity and failed to perceive the mind as an active agent rather than a passive one. If he had viewed mind as active, his appreciation for activity would have increased. For Dewey, language remained the chief instrument of learning, but meaning was found in shared activities which, in effect, suggested social activity. From this point of view, shared experiences became the basis for shared meaning for the individual and among individuals. Dewey stressed the utilitarian aspect of language. Language was socially meaningful because it was based on social experience as found in associated activity.

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[21]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 19.

Although Horne was obviously aware of the fact that Dewey was not a behaviorist, his interpretation in this study was bent in that direction. Horne believed he saw in Dewey's writing the suggestion that the young learn in much the same way as do animals. Nothing could be found in his discussion which alluded to this narrow, mechanistic approach found in behaviorism.

3. The Social Medium as Educative

Horne was not particularly antagonistic with Dewey in discussing the unconscious influence of environment, but Horne would have given more credit to example, imitation, and suggestion as these were related to the discussion. Horne did object to Dewey's principle of situation-response whereby the situation provided the objects which stimulated certain capacities to respond and develop, while others, if lacking in proper stimuli, lie dormant.

Basically, Horne objected to Dewey's naturalistic approach to learning and his failure to give consideration to self-consciousness and the habits of religious life. He believed these were traits or characteristics which all individuals possessed. "No individual is without self-consciousness and no society is without religion."[22] Nevertheless, the significance of Dewey's "unconscious influence of the environment" was applicable even should these two dimensions be added to

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[22] Ibid., p. 21.

learning through experience. The following statement was pertinent and deserved consideration in this discussion:

> Just as the senses require sensible objects to stimulate them, so our powers of observation, recollection, and imagination do not work spontaneously, but are set in motion by the demands set up by current social occupations.[23]

Although Dewey did not give special emphasis to the knowledge of self nor to religious feelings, the task of the educator was to recognize the necessity for development of these. Dewey believed that these traits only accumulated as the result of small-unit family relationships and other common influences which had been exerted upon the young. He readily recognized that the primary characteristics found in the disposition of the young were basically formed independent of formal schooling. Dewey clarified this position when he stated:

> What conscious, deliberate teaching can do is at most to free the capacities thus formed for fuller exercise, to purge them of some of their grossness, and to furnish objects which make their activity more productive of meaning.[24]

Therefore, we basically see two lines of approach. One line represented by Horne, illustrated concern for the influence exerted by example, imitation, and emulation. These, he believed were the most relevant factors found in the environment. The other was Dewey's situation-response. The latter view presented a situation whereby objects would be provided

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[23]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 20.

[24]Ibid.

which in turn would stimulate certain capacities to respond, while others would lie dormant.[25] A study of the writing of both Horne and Dewey revealed that the broader context of each implied that the two approaches eventually resulted in the same thing. Neither position totally ignored the other. It was in the area that was emphasized that a departure was noted.

Finally, Dewey believed that while there might be other methods of inculcating attitudes and forming dispositions necessary for growth, the significant criteria where true development of the individual was concerned could only be measured by the extent to which he was capable of sharing and participating in the activities deemed most worthwhile by society.

4. The School as a Special Environment

Horne recognized the school as a formal, planned agency and did not disagree with Dewey that as such this agency was probably the best equipped to accomplish the task with which it had been charged. As expressed in other discussions, Horne's chief concern in this matter was the omission of some yardstick or standard by which the school environment could be evaluated.[26] Specifically, Horne concentrated on the chosen environment of the school and its three specific functions as

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[25]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 21.

[26]Ibid., p. 24.

outlined by Dewey. These were: (1) to provide a simplified environment to which the individual could respond; (2) to eliminate undesirable features of the environment--purified medium of action; (3) to provide a balanced and representative social environment thereby assuring each individual the opportunity to go beyond limitations characteristic of his social group.[27]

Expressing concern for Dewey's first function, Horne raised the question as to which features of our complex society were to be selected.[28]

A fundamental postulate for Dewey was that no fixed standard existed. The point stressed by Dewey was that there must be a beginning in this endeavor. Dewey adopted a kind of spiraling process. In order to avoid confusion in this selective process, Dewey began by selecting those features "which are fairly fundamental and capable of being responded to by the young."[29]

From this point, a progressive order was called into play proceeding from the simple to the complex. The process was essentially one which proceeded from the simple to

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[27]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 24.

[28]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 24.

[29]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 24.

the more complex as responses of the young changed due to growth, maturation, and other changing environmental factors. Since no set standard could be ascertained by Dewey, he continued to strive for the best and most efficient features where selection of a simplified environment was concerned.

Horne's second concern was with the task of eliminating undesirable features of the environment. The question raised by Horne concerned determining the best features found in the environment and then deciding which should be eliminated due to undesirability.[30] Dewey recognized that a total elimination of undesirable features from the environment would be impossible, but he believed such an attempt was necessary if the best was to be accrued from the environment for educative purposes. The central element at this point, as Dewey viewed it, was the pluralistic characteristic of a democratic society. Unlike a monistic society, a democratic society demanded diversified representation of different groups. An attempt to identify those features in society which more nearly served the needs of its youth was imperative. When members of any group were isolated, their horizons are narrowed thereby placing an undue restriction of vision upon them. Dewey addressed himself to the factor of plurality found in a democracy and the subsequent focus for education when he stated:

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[30]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 24.

> It is this situation which has, perhaps more than any other one cause, forced the demand for an educational institution which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced environment for the young.[31]

Further recognition descriptive of society was given when Dewey stated: ". . . a modern society is many societies more or less loosely connected."[32]

Although Horne did not express complete disagreement with Dewey's concern for societal simplification, purification, and the need for social balance, he did reject these attempts as unsound until some yardstick or standard had been identified. Until such a formula was presented, Horne rejected Dewey's approach as an unsound one where significant school improvements could be made.[33] Essentially, Horne's thought in this matter was dominated by a plea for absolutes. Only from such a definite frame of reference could we point to the school environment as one conducive to harmonious learning conditions.

Education As Direction

1. The Environment as Directive

While conceding that education might well be viewed as directive, Horne was reluctant to accept the concept of education as direction as presented by Dewey. Horne viewed such

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[31] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 25.

[32] Ibid., p. 24.

[33] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 24.

an approach as "vague unless we know the direction in which the educative process should go."[34] Again, Horne's strategy called for a design or plan before education as a directive force could be considered. He believed this task to be that of the teacher since he was the one who was in a position to know the direction toward which the student should be directed. Without such a design, any direction afforded by education would be aimless and haphazard. In this sense, Horne envisioned a kind of fixed, ideal society. Only when viewed in this context, could appropriate attempts at direction be realized to the fullest extent.

Although the exact nature of such a society was not readily characterized nor identified by Horne, he did present a possible prerequisite for such a consideration. "Democratic relations in society and an unselfish character might represent the needed social and personal goals of education as directing."[35] If these would be viewed as acceptable guides, then it becomes possible to consider education as an educative force which provided direction for the young.

Both Horne and Dewey discussed control in terms of the individual and his development. The distinction between the two when using the term "control" may be found in both the emphasis and meaning associated with its usage. Horne's

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[34] Ibid., p. 26.

[35] Ibid., pp. 26-27.

arbitrary setting for control pointed toward an external, coercive condition of control. Where control and direction were concerned, Horne would assign a leading role to the teacher who at all times was the inspirer of the learner. Dewey did not overlook the significant value of the personal relationship between teacher and student. However, he cautioned against the traditional role of the teacher where the teacher believed himself to be the director and originator of all activities and learning. For Dewey, greater educational value in the activity was produced by the interpersonal relationship between the student and his problem situation. His profound disagreement with the position presented by Horne may be seen from the following: ". . . purely external direction is impossible. The environment can at most only supply stimuli to call out responses. These responses proceed from tendencies already possessed by the individual."[36]

Dewey recognized that such a system of external direction might result in efficiency yet efficiency under these conditions tended to be temporary at best. Furthermore, operating within this framework presented the possibility of promoting negative behavior in the future.

The negative aspect of this point of view was expressed by Dewey. He stated:

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[36] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 30.

> . . . the control afforded by the customs and regulations of others may be short-sighted. It may accomplish its immediate effect, but at the expense of throwing the subsequent action of the person out of balance. Those engaged in directing the actions of others are always in danger of overlooking the importance of the sequential development of those they direct.[37]

Dewey intentionally gave consideration to the aspect of individuality and individual interests. Nevertheless, the individual, as viewed by Dewey, was by far more interested in cooperative activities which resulted in benefits for the whole society. If this were not the case, then how can a community of interests and a subsequent community of living be realized? For Dewey, any system of government which projected compulsion or coercion also jeopardized its educational ideas and practices; furthermore, such a system would stifle effective direction of the individual. The desirable control to which Dewey ascribed was both intrinsic and internal. This became evident when he stated: "Control, in truth, means only an emphatic form of direction of powers, and covers the regulation gained by an individual through his own efforts quite as much as that brought about when others take the lead."[38]

Dewey's objective where education and direction of the individual was concerned was the gradual development of self-control and self-direction. These, he believed, effected long-term results. Ultimately, this was the condition

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

which the mature individual must possess if his growth was to be effective and if it was to continue uninterrupted. Thus, the concept described by Dewey took into consideration the present as well as a projection into subsequent consequences. Dewey further identified the task of the school when he stated that "to achieve this internal control through identity of interest and understanding is the business of education."[39]

2. Modes of Social Direction

Horne's interpretation revealed an obvious objection to the modes of sound direction, as presented by Dewey. In terms of direction, the question raised by Horne was which kind of direction was the most effective--the direct and personal or the indirect and impersonal. For Horne, it appeared that it was the direct, personal control which held the dominant, although not exclusive, place in the educative process.[40] Furthermore, he viewed Dewey's preference for the indirect and impersonal as a situation which resulted in an inappropriate evaluation of the direct, personal mode of social direction. Horne further identified his position when he stated: ". . . let the reader recall the greater influences that have shaped his life; are they not persons rather than things controlled by persons?"[41]

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[39] Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[40] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 31.

[41] Ibid.

The second criticism cited by Horne was that Dewey had placed a secondary importance on sensation as a source of knowledge. As a result, Horne contended that an unnecessary obstacle regarding knowing had been created:

> Those born blind can know nothing of light and color by acquaintance, though they may learn much about them by description. Those born deaf know nothing of tones and noise. . . . it is the sensation and not the use that gives the knowledge, and without sensation there could be no intelligent use.[42]

Thus, for Horne, mere sensation may constitute knowledge. The discrimination presented by Horne would seem to be a subtle one. Admittedly, the sensations may provide the materials of knowledge, and, in effect, result in a kind of knowing. "Through sensation we may know what we do not use. . . ."[43] In his analysis, Horne admitted that a thing can be best known only when it can be interacted with or used. Thus, the knowing projected by Horne was indeed a kind of knowing, but at best it was rudimentary. It could hardly be placed on the highest plane as an intellectual approach to knowledge. Overemphasis upon the sensations as a source of knowledge further suggested a dependence factor best suited for the immature. Learning about a thing by description is at best a poor substitute for knowledge which has been acquired as the result of participation with and use of things in such a way as to permit us to know what we can do with them. It is true that

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

one may gain a certain knowledge about the stars by way of sensations. Yet, such knowledge, as presently existing, would be void of meaning in terms of use in the present or in the future.

Psychologically speaking, Horne was correct in recognizing that the sensations played a primary role in acquiring knowledge. The significance of this condition would be dependent upon the degree of action which accompanied such knowledge. Unless knowledge of this variety leads to further knowledge or to some future usage, then the individual has only been afforded the materials or furnishings of knowledge insofar as any decisive perceptions and insights are concerned.

Horne's general conclusion was that direct control deserved the greater emphasis in the guidance and molding of the immature. By contrast, Dewey would have us form a complementary disposition for responding or behaving while Horne forms a direct guiding hand in directing and controlling the habits of the young. The key consideration in Dewey's theory was that the mind was an instrument actively engaged in the process of control and direction. Dewey identified his position when he stated:

> The philosophy of learning has been unduly dominated by a false psychology. It is frequently stated that a person learns by merely having the qualities of things impressed upon his mind through the gateway of the senses. Having received a store of sensory impressions, association or some power of mental synthesis is supposed to combine them into ideas--into things with a meaning. The difference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a mental act is that the latter involves response to a thing in its meaning; the former does not.[44]

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[44]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 34-35.

In other words, Dewey viewed direct influence of one person on another as impossible except as use was made of the physical environment as an intermediary.[45] Dewey called attention to a need for examining in greater detail the social medium if social direction of the young and its implications were to be fully realized. He issued a caution concerning the separation of the physical from the social environment. Such a condition represented both a psychological as well as a philosophical fallacy.[46] That which resulted from the above arrangement tended to be a vague, if not blind, response to a physical stimulus. Admittedly, such activity might produce a kind of training for the individual, but little would be accomplished in the sense of an educational gain.

Concerned with the intellectual aspect and its relationship to social control, Dewey stated:

> . . . the fundamental means of control is not personal but intellectual. It is not 'moral' in the sense that a person is moved by direct personal appeal from others. . . . It consists in the habits of <u>understanding</u> which are set up in using objects in correspondence with others. . . . <u>Mind</u> as a concrete thing is precisely the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them; a socialized mind is the power to understand them in terms of the use to which they are turned in joint or shared situations. <u>And mind in this sense is the method of social control</u>.[47]

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[45] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 33.

[46] <u>Ibid</u>.

[47] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 39-40.

Dewey saw social habituation achieved through the intellect. The individual has been educated to act intelligently only when he acts with a certain end in view which carries with it a certain meaning. Performing the act for the sake of that meaning constituted intelligent action from the standpoint of Dewey.

4. Imitation and Social Psychology

Horne concluded that the views presented by Dewey on imitation were understated and were ". . . a way of depersonalizing the educative process."[48] At the same time, Horne did not doubt that among certain people, especially the intelligent, ". . . there is much similarity of action that is not due to imitation. They see the reason for doing as others."[49] Imitation probably plays a far greater role than admitted by Dewey especially during the formative years of the child. A failure to recognize this facet of the educational process, or to dismiss it as insignificant, could result in a defect at some point in the development of the child. The emphasis and importance of imitation as an influence in learning was stressed by Horne. He stated: "But it remains true that direct personal control of the right sort and the imitation of worthy models taken as examples are among

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[48]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 34.

[49]Ibid., p. 33.

the best, most common, and most influential ways of forming mental and moral dispositions."[50]

By sharp contrast, Horne favored this method and saw in it no danger for the child. "We can control children directly without being arbitrary and we can imitate our superiors without being slavish. We must continue to be what we want our children to become."[51]

A study of Dewey's text revealed that he had not avoided a consideration of imitation and its role. For Dewey, this method of learning received a different emphasis. He also believed that imitation and emulation needed to be viewed in proper perspective. According to Dewey's theory, that which has been referred to as imitation was a misleading name for the act of partaking with others in a use of things which leads to consequences of common interest.[52]

Dewey was fully cognizant that some "learning" had taken place as a result of imitation. Such a condition was not, however, the case of an individual choosing by way of his own initiative. Recognizing and viewing a prescribed model is one thing. Accomplishing what another person has accomplished is quite another where the individual is concerned. If one continues to imitate another as a pattern for learning,

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[50] Ibid., pp. 34-35.

[51] Ibid., p. 35.

[52] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 41.

participation on the part of the individual and by the individual likely will be neglected. Dewey recognized that in observing individuals collectively, they may appear to be imitating one another on the surface or at first glance. In this case, what appears to be the condition and what really is happening are two different activities. Aware of some of the hazards associated with imitation, Dewey believed there was no need to consciously appeal to this method as though it were a valid activity in learning. He stated:

> The basic error in the current notion of imitation is that it puts the cart before the horse. It takes an effect for the cause of the effect. There can be no doubt that individuals in forming a social group are like-minded. They tend to act with the same controlling ideas, beliefs, and intentions, given similar circumstances . . . they might be said to be engaged in 'imitating' one another. [But] 'imitation' throws no light upon why they so act; it repeats the fact as an explanation of itself.[53]

The educational concern expressed by Dewey was that the eventual outcome was conformity requiring little imagination or originality. Such a position only served to depreciate the true educative function and learning in the broadest sense of the term.

Further elaboration on this point was made by Dewey when he recognized the role of interest and self-initiative:

> Imitation may come in but its role is subordinate. The child has an interest on his own account; he wants to keep it going. He imitates the means of

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[53] *Ibid*.

> doing, not the end or the thing to be done. . . he imitates the means because he wishes, on his own behalf, as part of his own initiative, to take an effective part. . . .[54]

Dewey noted a defect in the scheme of imitation when it became apparent it was the ends which the individual was imitating. Such an emphasis at best produced an artificial and therefore temporary result. While it may appear to be effective, its ineffectiveness must be evaluated in terms of the long-range effect upon the disposition of the young.

In summary, Dewey believed the individual might well observe the means of doing a particular thing in order to improve his own actions but the observation of the model or pattern must remain a secondary function where learning and the learning process are concerned.

5. Some Applications to Education

The major pedagogical criticism made by Horne relative to imitation in its social context was that he believed Dewey placed far too great an emphasis upon the manipulation of things rather than a concern for persons and personal relationships.[55] There is little doubt that learning is accomplished from association of persons and from personal relationships. From Dewey's point of view such learning was extrinsic and likely to be imposed from without. Too great a reliance upon

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[54]Ibid., p. 42.

[55]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 37.

this method was dangerous since it might well be an impairment to learning. Dewey viewed this form of experience as beneficial, but it was only a beginning and represented an initial, if not a lower form of learning, in the process of education. By comparison, Dewey contended that learning stems from a personal involvement in the meaningful manipulation of things or ideas. He believed that only in this way could the learner truly find understanding and meaning for himself. Actually, Dewey did not aim at an emphasis upon things <u>or</u> persons where the intellectual endeavor of learning was concerned. He stated:

> Only by engaging in a joint activity, where one person's use of material and tools is consciously referred to the use other persons are making of their capacities and appliances, is a social direction of disposition attained.[56]

Therefore, Horne's appeal to learning by way of passive absorption was not consistent with Dewey's theory of social interaction as a basis for learning. Any isolation of learning from the social use of materials was not only pseudo-intellectual, but also self-defeating. The essence of social control for Dewey was to be found in a common understanding of the means and ends of action. The thrust was not to be found in the situation, but rather in the control and direction of the situation made by the learner as he attempted to gain an understanding common to all in the social context. Dewey

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[56]Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 47.

further warned against extreme control over others in an attempt to directly influence their actions:

> . . . we are likely to exaggerate the importance of this sort of control at the expense of a more permanent and effective method. The basic control resides in the nature of the situation in which the young take part. In social situations the young have to refer their way of acting to what others are doing and make it fit in. This common understanding of the means and ends of action is the essence of social control. It is indirect, or emotional and intellectual, not direct or personal.[57]

In contrast with Horne's extrinsic appeal to the disposition of the person, Dewey's appeal was to the intrinsic, internal force, not the external, coercive. Dewey ascribed to the school a major social task in order to achieve the internal control which he described. "Schools require for their full efficiency more opportunity for conjoint activities in which those instructed take part, so that they may acquire a social sense of their own powers and of the materials and appliances used."[58]

Education as Growth

1. The Conditions of Growth

The key factors for Horne as conditions of growth are direction and guidance. The failure of some in the process of proper growth was viewed by Horne as an outgrowth of poor direction and guidance. While recognizing that the young were

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., p. 48.

possessed with a bent toward activity, he maintained that only through adequate guidance imposed by society could we ultimately effect growth in the right direction. An avoidance of selfishness might be achieved through proper guidance and direction of the young. "A proper social guidance of their 'eager and impassioned activities' might well have led to that social sharing which is the antithesis of selfishness."[59] Therefore, Horne's scheme called for a kind of social responsiveness which in turn determined the quality and quantity of growth. He stressed that growth became an induced activity purposefully planned and designed by the shadow of the adult. Horne's position in this connection was clearly identified when he stated: "Our children are what they are made to be until they get old enough to help make themselves."[60] If this be the case, then the individual himself has little opportunity for participation and little or no influence upon his own growth. Nor do potential and capacity serve as key factors when so viewed.

The antithesis of this position was presented by Dewey. He emphatically stated:

> . . . immaturity designates a positive force or ability,--the <u>power</u> to grow. We do not have to draw out or educe positive activities from a child, as some educational doctrines would have it. Where there is life, there are already eager and impassioned

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[59] Horne, <u>The Democratic Philosophy of Education</u>, p. 43.

[60] <u>Ibid</u>.

activities. Growth is not something done to them; it is something they do.[61]

A far greater sensitivity for personal action on behalf of the young was designated by Dewey. Intense social direction need not be subjected upon the young. They naturally possess a far greater capacity for individual direction than was recognized by Horne. They are not as immature at social intercourse as the adult might imagine. On the contrary, Dewey's position recognized a greater facility and capacity for growth through social interaction than was to be found in the adult. Recognizing the facility for independent growth, Dewey turned his attention to the social concern. The difference between Horne and Dewey was not found to be in the recognition of certain dangers inherent in increased personal independence. Rather, it was found in the solution. Both Horne and Dewey recognized the potential conditions which could eventually lead to indifference to others and their needs. However, for Horne, the solution was found by establishing the power of dependence--adult domination over the young. Conversely, Dewey suggested that ultimately the key was to be found in setting up the conditions conducive to a state of interdependence so that the need for others parallels growth at a time when the possibility for both were at a peak. Central to this theme, Dewey asserted:

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[61] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 50.

> It is essentially the ability to learn from experience; the power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation. This means power to modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions. Without it, the acquisition of habits is impossible.[62]

2. Habits as Expression of Growth

In Horne's interpretation, his chief criticism relative to the treatment of growth stemmed from the significance which Dewey attached to habits and habituation in the growth process. Indicative of this concern, Horne emphasized:

> Note that the whole process of growth is subsumed under the conception of habit-formation. Even the moral, emotional, and intellectual phases of life are treated as effects of the environment on the responsive organism, as cases of habit.[63]

Dewey's appeal to the naturalistic emphasis in the whole process of growth was inadequate for Horne. He believed that a naturalistic emphasis as related to growth failed to take into account the higher powers of mind held by all men.[64] Addressing himself to this criticism, Horne stated:

> Particularly is this evident if we raise the question whether judgment and decision can change a bad habit into a good one. Apparently not, since the choices and decisions are presented as themselves a part of the emotional disposition which is itself in turn made by habit.[65]

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[62] Ibid., p. 53.

[63] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 48.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

Horne's conclusion to this question was negative. He also objected to the significant role assigned to man's environment as an agent for promoting the active use of intelligence. The implicit criticism in this consideration was that Dewey had relieved man of responsibility by focusing attention upon his surroundings--his environment. According to Horne, ". . . this whole treatment of habit makes the response and not the respondent responsible."[66] Horne called for a different treatment of man's inner life, one which would not be evaluated from the viewpoint of habit alone. Thus, a consideration of some metaphysical or spiritual attribute guiding or giving direction would represent a more stable and a more nearly complete base upon which to evaluate growth.

At this point, Dewey projected an attempt to evoke an opposite point of view. It was obvious to him that such a frame of reference necessitated a total rejection of dualism as was suggested in the Idealist's theory. Choices and decisions were a part of the individual's emotional dispositions and the formation of habits as a function of growth was not dependent exclusively upon either internal nor external influences. Man's decisions and choices were concluded as an outgrowth of the active agent of intelligence. Like conformity, habits were neither good nor bad in and of themselves. The criterion of either condition was the direction in which

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[66]*Ibid.*, p. 49.

these led the individual and subsequent responses which resulted. A basic pedagogical concept for Dewey was sequential development. Therefore, how development was conceived becomes a major consideration for him in assessing the educative process. While Horne would identify fixed goals and ends for education, Dewey viewed the educative process as its own end.

False ideas relative to growth are, for Dewey, dangerous when these become associated with growth, i.e., education in a democratic society. Dewey believed that fixation of goals constituted one of the major drains in the process of education. This philosophical posture, he believed, constituted an important element since other considerations of educational theory were built around this position. Furthermore, any metaphysical orientation, when viewed as serving as a stimulus to growth, also gave rise for concern when viewed from Dewey's concept of growth.

Essential to Dewey's position was an understanding that neither habits, organic changes in the individual, nor an isolated environment provided an adequate focal point. The ability of the individual to effect habits which later enabled him to adjust to his environment was the essential point.

Mere habituation, similar to that suggested by Horne, does not lead to growth since this suggests a passive accommodation of the individual to his environment which may or may not prove beneficial. Less attention to the use of intelligence

was called for in Horne's scheme. Therefore, one might expect the results to amount to a mere adaptation of the individual to his environment.

Dewey believed the significance of habits was dependent upon the extent to which intelligence was associated with them. Relevant to this connection Dewey stated:

> Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or degenerate into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree in which intelligence is disconnected from them. Routine habits are unthinking habits; 'bad' habits are habits so severed from reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious deliberation and decision.[67]

For Dewey, the characteristic of habit which determined its significance was the quality of action or activity and the direction it in turn leads the individual. The efficiency of action when viewed with habit was to be found in the quality of habit. If these be low-grade in quality, then intellectual forces will be at a minimum. As a result of this condition, a fixed habit may also lead to ". . . routine ways, with loss of freshness, open-mindedness, and originality. Fixity of habit may mean that something has a fixed hold upon us, instead of our having a free hold upon things."[68]

The significance of habit was further identified by Dewey when he stated:

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[67]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 58.

[68]Ibid., p. 57.

> It means formation of intellectual and emotional disposition as well as an increase in ease, economy, and efficiency of action. Any habit marks an inclination--an active preference and choice for the conditions involved in its exercise. A habit also marks an intellectual disposition.[69]

The text of both Horne and Dewey revealed that habits in the form of habituation provided the individual the necessary background for growth. Dewey's projection held that when habits provided the capacity to adjust or readjust activities in order to meet new conditions, then growth had occurred. For Dewey, all human growth naturally and necessarily took place within the social context. For Horne, the activity and productivity of habit were minimized and the possibility of spiritual and metaphysical initiative was maximized.

3. The Educational Bearings of the Conception of Development

Since growth was a key concept in the educational philosophy of Dewey, Horne, like other critics, has directed much attention toward his interpretation of the term. The difficulty with Dewey's growth process which suggested that growth produced more growth was made clear when Horne stated: "It is not enough to say 'education is growth'; we must add education in growth in the right way."[70] The factor omitted in Dewey's theory was that a standard or some form of a criterion

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 52.

needed to be identified if right growth, rather than wrong growth, was to be the result. Repeatedly, Horne has called for some directing force as a guide in the process of education. Yet, who or what should constitute such a force was not revealed by Horne in his discussion. From his general views on education, Horne assigned a leading role to the teacher. Again, an external influence dominated growth of the individual without sufficient attention given to involvement of the learner. The inspirer and director of what Dewey termed the "cumulative movement of action" must, then, be the teacher. The traditional point of view held by Horne was fully taken into account by Dewey. He believed that such a view had placed great emphasis upon the immaturity of the young. Furthermore, it focused constant attention upon his state and subsequently set out to elevate the young to an adult environment. The adult environment, therefore, was seen as the model and pattern toward which the young should be directed. This was the condition as presented by Horne. For him, a premium was placed upon the personal relationship between student and teacher.

Dewey did not discount the value of such a relationship; however, the greater educational value for him was to be found in the activity produced by the impersonal relationship between the student and his problem situation.

The fear of faulty or destructive growth leading to malignant growth was but a failure on the part of the critic

to recognize and understand the essential meaning of the growth concept as conceived by Dewey. Justifiably, Dewey consistently advocated the true meaning of the growth concept which implied a dynamic process of continuous, positive, and healthy development.

A major concern for Horne in this connection was that Dewey had abandoned imposed goals. The theory of growth for more growth, and education subordinated only to more education was a vague concept for Horne. His real objection remained in his conclusion that Dewey's growth was void of a goal. "Its weakness is, growth needs a goal."[71] Consequently, without a goal the concept of growth was minimized and must be subjected to criticism. A definite reaction to this position was evident when Horne stated:

> Children must be directed in their growth toward something worthwhile in person and social relations. They must grow up to be something admirable by constantly having admirable models and patterns and associations. Growth must be toward an ideal of human character.[72]

Thus, for Horne, emulation and admiration of adults by the young produced the best results in terms of growth. In this way, satisfactory induction into the adult community could be brought about. Viewed within this framework, growth was viewed as having an end, rather than being an end. The consequences of such a philosophy suggested an abortion of

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[72] *Ibid.*

growth by restricting, if not disregarding, the instinctive, creative powers of the young. Originality, when operating within this setting, has been reduced to a minimum. The character of individuality which must be viewed as an asset in terms of personal efficiency and in making a contribution to society has been stifled. Dewey, aware of these circumstances pointed out the dangers inherent in this process of external control. The nature of Horne's philosophy and Dewey's attendant concern were expressed when he stated:

> Natural instincts are either disregarded or treated as nuisances--as obnoxious traits to be suppressed, or at all events to be brought into conformity with external standards. Since conformity is the aim, what is distinctively individual in a young person is brushed aside, or regarded as a source of mischief or anarchy.[73]

Thus, the result of Horne's educative process of growth was a promotion of singularity as opposed to the open, pluralistic approach which welcomed and supported progress. The use of external agents in education represented a semblance of maintenance, if not regression. The possibilities of new frontiers in education have been aborted. The external method promoted by Horne encouraged a mechanical method predicated upon the attainment of an external end.

That which was most descriptive of growth for Dewey may best be understood when viewed in terms of the close association with life and the life process. In terms of education,

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[73]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 60.

immaturity must not be viewed with impatience nor as something which must be abandoned as soon as possible. For Dewey, life meant growth and the significance of this condition was that growth was as positive at one stage as it was at another. Supporting this position, Dewey stated:

> . . . education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age. Life is not to be identified with every superficial act and interest.[74]

Much criticism of this key concept in Dewey's philosophy stems from a misunderstanding or a misinterpretation of the concept. Growth was not the uninhibited fostering of the child's inherent nature with the child's interest forming the center of all activity. On the contrary, growth was predicated on the involvement and satisfactory solution of problems assisted by the teacher when the student recognizes an experienced difficulty in his personal fulfillment. Such a construct of growth makes a special kind of educational experience imperative. It demands an experience in which the student is permitted to see the difficulty for himself, formulate it into a problem, propose possible solutions, then validate his idea. Growth was never a stagnant, sometimes dormant, condition. It was that process which provided a foundation for more growth or fulfillment of purposeful

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[74] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

activity. It is important that recognition be given to the fact that not all activity is purposeful and conducive to growth. Likewise, not all conduct of experience assures advancement toward learning. The emphasis and focus was upon the kind of activity in which the learner became involved. As for experience, the determinant relative to its educative value was to be found in the quality of each unit of experience.

A criterion of growth was established by Dewey. Developing out of a problem situation, it was the capacity of the solution to provide satisfactory consequences which would be immediately applicable as well as provide adequate means to deal successfully with future frustrations, problems, and difficulties.

The task of the school was also identified by Dewey:

> The criterion of the value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.[75]

Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline

1. Education as Preparation

Although differing opinions were presented by Horne and Dewey in this consideration, the differences were primarily found in the area of emphasis. Horne believed that preparation for the future was not wholly an unconscious issue. He

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[75] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

contended that preparation for the future may enter into the conscious, even to the extent of serving as a part of unconscious motivation.[76] This was an important consideration in the formulation of an educational program. Even so, Horne did not believe that such a consideration would lead to confusion and a loss of motive power. His concern for the future, while living in the present, was not only possible but was viewed as an imperative if complete living in the present was to be achieved. In Horne's theory, getting ready for tomorrow was determined by being ready today.

A study of the text of both Horne and Dewey revealed that Horne placed great emphasis upon the term "preparation" while Dewey preferred the term "planning" and its connotation.

Obviously, the future may well not be all that the individual had envisioned unless he has in advance employed a degree of serious thought and management of present affairs. Both writers on this subject were not in disagreement on this point. However, Dewey believed Horne had set up another dualism in the time continuum. For Horne, it was a consideration of present and future; for Dewey, it was a consideration of present-future.

Horne clearly stated his position by declaring: "It would seem to be a highly abstract and impractical point of view to separate the present entirely from conscious thought

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[76]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 61.

of the future."[77] It might be concluded that from the position taken by Horne a separation had already taken place. The aspect of "getting ready" for the future was further emphasized by Horne when he insisted that such a posture was the only safe thing for society.[78] The importance of timing and preparation was also an important feature of Horne's theory. "The license to practice precedes the practice and the license is based on preparation, and conscious preparation."[79]

If Horne's interpretation which held that Dewey had totally disregarded the future by way of avoiding or neglecting it were true, then criticism was justified. Experientially, the question becomes how can the young be preparing for, while at the same time be involved in his growth and development? Perhaps the most important aspect in a consideration of preparation or planning ought to be the nature of the individual's present activities. Does his focus and orientation demand a preoccupation with the future or does his orientation permit him to focus upon the quality and richness of present activity? If the latter case be true, do these serve in such a way as to promote growth toward the desired direction? When these questions are answered, then a more nearly adequate appraisal of this consideration would be possible.

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[77] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[78] *Ibid.*

[79] *Ibid.*

Prolonged lingering and conjecture about the future was a condition which held damaging results, according to Dewey's philosophy. The fact that a child lives in the present logically provided an attendant asset which in turn ought to be seized upon and the most made of it. For Dewey, conscious preparation for the future and for future needs only served as a deterrent to present efforts and energies. Viewed from Dewey's point of view, the fallacy of the position assumed by Horne was in the fact that present efforts were likely to be misdirected, especially when consideration was given to the uncertainty of the future. However, for Horne, the future was not vague nor uncertain. The nature and character of adult living as it ought to be had long ago been identified, according to traditional thought.

Horne's position was not only futuristic; it also had a transcendent quality. Not only should educational practices focus on education as preparation in this life, but they should also serve as preparation for another life. The condition of the young was one of probation. The assignment for the young was a kind of preparation geared to equip him for an ultimate future in which he could fully participate and share.

Dewey emphasized the gross loss in energy, time, and accomplishment when the individual's attention was focused upon something other than present conditions. He stated:

> It is impossible to overestimate the loss which results from the deflection of attention from the strategic point to a comparatively unproductive point. It fails most just where it thinks it is succeeding--in getting a preparation for the future.[80]

Similar to the question of growth, Horne's position concerning the future tended to be prescriptive. For education, this meant a normative function must be adopted for it was the method best suited to direct the educational enterprise.

Relative to education, Dewey did not believe the future should be ignored. Certainly, he recognized that in the distance a future was to come and that intervening time would cause that future to become the present--a reality. Again, emphasis probably accounted for the divergent opinions noted. Growth, being a key concept, offered an explanation of Dewey's views. From his point of view, it was not a question of whether education should or should not prepare for the future. He stated:

> If education is growth, it must progressively realize present possibilities, and thus make individuals better fitted to cope with later requirements. Growing is not something which is completed in odd moments; it is a continuous leading into the future. The mistake is not in attaching importance to preparation for future need, but in making it the mainspring of present effort. Because the need of preparation for a continually developing life is great, it is imperative that every energy should be bent to making the present experience as rich and significant as possible. Then as the present merges insensibly into the future, the future is taken care of.[81]

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[80]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 64.

[81]Ibid., p. 65.

2. Education as Unfolding

Differences as to basic concepts of education and the idea of development constituted the main portion of Horne's criticism in this discussion. True to the idealistic philosophy, Horne reflected upon Dewey's rejection of transcendentalism, the a priori, and modern idealistic philosophy in general.[82]

Horne could not view human life in all its fullness and goodness without ascribing to an infinite goal. Like the doctrine of preparation, the goal inherent in Horne's developmental doctrine was directed toward and away from the present and transcended the experienced. While the individual was in preparation for duties of the future, the developmental doctrine was at work directing toward the ideal and spiritual qualities of the principle which was unfolding. In its philosophical context, such a system represented a transitional operation as opposed to a transactional operation, the latter representing the posture held by Dewey.

A system of non-perceptual reality was for Horne logically necessary if any consideration was to be given to the ideal and spiritual attributes of man. Horne made no attempt to prove or disprove his claim to a supernatural order. Nevertheless, Dewey's rejection of such a position was viewed by Horne as an injustice to man and all that he is

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[82]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 69.

or aspires to become. The following statement represented Horne's affirmation in this connection:

> The rejection of an infinite goal of human life, of a supersensible world whose reality is not directly 'perceived,' does violence to the experience of the mystics, subordinates the conceptual order to the perceptual, and it would revolutionize the practices of the religions of the world in so far as they involve the recognition of a supersensible or spiritual order in prayer and praise.[83]

Two sources were likely responsible for Horne's adherence to a non-temporal order of reality. First, the influence of Plato and his doctrine of ideas; by the traditional doctrine of a priori forms; and by Kant's non-experienced thing-in-itself.[84] Second, Horne affirmed his position by declaring it need not be proved since it could not be disproved. Acceptance became the rationale. This was clearly borne out when he asserted: "Our philosophy. . . involves an intellectual venture akin to faith."[85] The nature of goals as presented by Horne was rejected by Dewey. This Dewey did primarily because such goals were advanced toward complete, finished unfoldedness.

The rejection by Dewey of these goals basically stemmed from the dualism which he saw as inherent in Horne's interpretation. Furthermore, the nature of these goals must be

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[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid., pp. 69-70.

[85] Ibid., p. 70.

viewed as apart from and removed from the present context of the individual's growth and development. Dewey further elaborated when he stated:

> The perfect or complete ideal is not a mere ideal; it is operative here and now. But it is present only implicitly, 'potentially,' or in an enfolded condition. What is termed development is the gradual making explicit and outward of what is thus wrapped up.[86]

This being the case, substitutes must then be advanced in order to complete the principle, and substitutes for Dewey are just that: they remain inadequate in terms of real meaning. It is as though we must deal with a phantom or, at best, an abstraction void of meaning--a contradiction of perceptual reality.

In terms of education, Dewey's objection to such a scheme possessed validity. Strong opposition to the Idealist's position was noted when he stated:

> An abstract and indefinite future is in control with all which that connotes in depreciation of present power and opportunity. Since the goal of perfection, the standard of development, is very far away, it is so beyond us that, strictly speaking, it is unattainable. Consequently, in order to be available for present guidance it must be translated into something which stands for it.[87]

Both the historical institutions relied upon by Hegel as well as the symbolic presentation of Froebel was rejected in Dewey's philosophy. Horne, as well as Dewey, did recognize

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[86] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 67.

[87] Ibid., p. 66.

and applaud Froebel for his acknowledgment and influence in more properly viewing the child and his potential. The importance attached to Froebel's contribution was noted by Dewey:

> Froebel's recognition of the significance of the native capacities of children, his loving attention to them, and his influence in inducing others to study them, represent perhaps the most effective single force in modern educational theory. In effecting widespread acknowledgment of the idea of growth . . . [however] Froebel's love of abstract symbolism often got the better of his sympathetic insight; and there was substituted for development as arbitrary and externally imposed a scheme of dictation as the history of instruction has ever seen.[88]

As a consequence of the condition described in the above analysis of Froebel, education, too, must focus attention upon the whole or complete "unfoldedness"--the finished product. In method, product, not process, became the focal point of attention and concern. Again, the _a priori_ formula was rejected by Dewey.

Conversely, almost complete acceptance of the idealistic philosophy of both Hegel and Froebel was made by Horne. He believed that both the symbolism of Froebel and the themes found in Hegel's series of historical institutions were necessary forms for consideration if an adequate concept of education was to be achieved. Acceptance of these concepts by Horne and their rejection by Dewey could be traced essentially to the same source. Both institutional and symbolic forms represented or embodied those traits of the Absolute. Horne

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[88] _Ibid._, pp. 67-68.

properly identified Dewey's reason for rejection of these traits when he stated:

> Having rejected any infinite goal of life, it is logical to reject the symbols of Froebel, and the institutions of Hegel as representing that goal, or manifesting its nature in time.[89]

The basic tension between Horne and Dewey was in the area of the concept of growth and goals. It was a matter of knowing by way of perception--the pragmatic position--or believing that man ". . . is a potential image of the divine, and that this image should unfold in accordance with the model of perfect manhood. This view may be rejected; it has not been disproven."[90]

Horne, true to the idealistic philosophy accepted the premise that growth and social progress were a matter of organic change. Being organic in nature, Horne concluded that Dewey's criticism which denounced this philosophy as static was mistaken. Horne further emphasized the organic concept of the idealistic philosophy when he asserted, "The whole system of reality is organic. Human society is becoming so. Progress toward the infinite goal is without limit and no 'arrest of growth' is implied."[91] In other words, Horne saw this philosophy as one which was neither static nor exclusively

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[89] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 70.

[90] Ibid., p. 71.

[91] Ibid., p. 72.

dynamic, it was dynamic.[92] On the contrary, Horne believed the absolute and the individual could be viewed as harmonious counterparts, not antithetical one to the other. Theoretically, this would be a desirable arrangement if in the results there could be found a degree of concreteness.

A significant limitation of the idealistic theory was recognized by Dewey. Inherent in the organistic philosophy was the attendant analogy between society and the body. It was in this area that Dewey projected an objection since such a system had the tendency to restrict the individual, stifle his growth, and limit him by place and function in society. Projecting this theory further, Dewey identified a philosophical strain which ultimately produced an arrangement which permitted class distinction. Aware of this theoretical framework, Dewey concluded that ultimately such a system became a contradiction to the conditions of a democratic society. When this occurred, educational theory and practice was subsequently steered away from the democratic concept of education. Dewey issued a caution concerning the organistic of human society. Since the traits of a dynamic, democratic process were restricted and class distinctions were promoted, his final conclusion and warning was:

> As one portion of the bodily tissue is differentiated so that it can be the hand and the hand only, another, the eye, and so on, all taken together making

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[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

> the organism, so one individual is supposed to be differentiated for the exercise of the mechanical operations of society, another for those of a statesman, another for those of a scholar, and so on. The notion of 'organism' is thus used to give a philosophic sanction to class distinctions in social organization--a notion which in its educational application again means external dictation instead of growth.[93]

The social progress which Dewey spoke about must be based upon experimental selection and choice. He insisted that choices in decision and application must not be allowed to be mandated by arbitrary and prescriptive methods. External dictation which ultimately led to a static condition was rejected.

3. Education as Training of Faculties

The doctrine of formal discipline as expressed by Locke was identified by Horne as one which continued to attract the attention of students of educational theory.[94] In practice, the theory held that by training certain inherent mental faculties the learner may in the end be a trained person, one whose powers had been refined through exercise. The acquisition of certain habits thus became the product of education, without giving consideration to the view of education as a process. Indeed, the focus was upon the result of identifiable aims in education rather than upon a plurality of outcomes when growth was viewed as a continuous process.

Horne's interpretation of the traditional training of faculties was not consistent with that of either Locke or

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[93]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 70.

[94]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 80.

Dewey. A shift in psychological emphasis was noted. Like Dewey, Horne identified inconsistencies when he analyzed Locke's theoretical base. Horne believed that Bacon, rather than Locke, better illustrated the theory of mental discipline and faculty psychology. Horne's reference to Locke and formal discipline appeared to be an attempt to further divide, if not shift, his attention to any attributes associated with this theory. This was indicated from the following statement:

> There are theories held by Locke which are inconsistent with formal discipline. Locke himself rejected the 'discipline' he received. . . . He rejected the faculty psychology upon which the theory rests, along with innate ideas.[95]

To summarize his assessment, Horne concluded:

> . . . that as to aim he [Locke] is a social realist, and as to means he is now a sense realist, now a naturalist, and now to a degree a disciplinarian. He is more disciplinary in his theories of physical and moral than of intellectual education.[96]

Although Horne rejected the historical interpretation of Locke, he did maintain that the value of transfer of training could not be ignored. Training as associated with method remained an essential element in Horne's psychological and philosophical posture. Deviating somewhat from the traditional view he wrote: "We are still permitted to speak of education as training, only it must be training of the responses, not of the faculties."[97]

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[95] Ibid., p. 81.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid., p. 82.

It was in method and outcome that a dispute between Horne and Dewey became evident. Exercise of essential powers, biologically or intellectually, remained the key to Horne's method in learning. He would train the responses, but not the faculties. Thus, he returned to the deductive method of learning.

Horne's primary analysis was aimed at Dewey's fundamental philosophical objection to all forms of dualism. The specific dualism favored by Horne and rejected by Dewey was that of training of impulses by exercises. Unity as to mind and matter as well as to individual and the world represented a key factor in Dewey's philosophical base. He consistently rejected all forms of dualism. Horne found the position maintained by Dewey unacceptable on the ground that such a view could not readily be understood. Furthermore, Horne concluded that Dewey's posture was vague and had not been proved, at least not by an acceptable criterion. If, indeed, such unity could be achieved for Horne, ". . . it would have to be a unity of experience, a known unity, a conscious unity, an all-embracing unity, and hence some form of idealism."[98]

Dewey believed a psychological fallacy existed in the theory referred to as training of faculties. His critical analysis of such a concept was definite. He summarily dismissed such a theory when he stated:

> Perhaps the most direct mode of attack consists in pointing out that the supposed original faculties

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[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

> of observation, recollection, willing, thinking, etc., are purely mythological. There are no such ready-made powers waiting to be exercised and thereby trained.[99]

Dewey did acknowledge certain native tendencies or instinctive reactions. He believed that these were associated with original connections of neurons in the central nervous system.[100] These tendencies, however, must not be viewed as isolated, each to be dealt with separately and trained individually. The recognition of and adherence to the biological impetus connected with changes in behavior was also important in Dewey's thought. Another important dimension in Dewey's theory was an organic accommodation whereby man was able to modify or change his environment. The operation of these tendencies and the importance attached to them collectively were evident from the following statement:

> But these tendencies (a) instead of being a small number sharply marked off from one another, are of an indefinite variety, interweaving with one another in all kinds of subtle ways. (b) Instead of being latent intellectual powers, requiring only exercise for their perfecting, they are tendencies to respond in certain ways to changes in the environment so as to bring about other changes. It is by such specific changes of organic activities in response to specific changes in the medium that that control of the environment of which we have spoken is effected.[101]

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[99]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 73.

[100]Ibid.

[101]Ibid.

Horne made the following statement relative to Dewey's philosophy:

> He is a monist, not of the idealistic, or agnostic, but of the naturalistic type. In this view awareness is not distinct from the stimulus or situation of which we are aware. The knower and the known are both inseparable constituents of the same naturalistic process.[102]

Although viewed as vague and uncertain by Horne, Dewey's criterion for development in general and the role of education in specific were repeated when he declared: ". . . the criterion here must be social. We want the person to note and recall and judge those things which make him an effective member of the group in which he is associated with others."[103]

Idealistic thought dominated Horne's stance. The origin of mind and his central theme of reality attest to this fact: "Man is not simply an organism with flexible responses; he is a self originating in a Self."[104]

When the full scope of Horne's interpretation of Dewey was analyzed, there was the recognition that each began by assuming a different premise. In assessing the arguments projected by each, it should be recalled that Horne and Dewey reasoned from a vastly different philosophical orientation.

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[102]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 82.

[103]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 78.

[104]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 83.

At times, an agreement with Dewey's thought was advanced by Horne. He stated:

> We may bring this lengthy discussion to a close by remarking that on the individual side the important thing in Dr. Dewey's thought is the interaction of present organic activities with the present environment, and on the social side is the sharing of group activities. This is the height and the depth of his educational thinking.[105]

Education as Conservative and Progressive

1. Education as Formation

In this chapter Dewey reviewed and assessed traditional philosophical views. Horne's interpretation concluded that Dewey had rejected or at least minimized emphasis upon the past. The fact that such an interpretation was made by comparing the idealistic and pragmatic philosophies accounted for Horne's conclusion. In the area of consideration of subject matter this was especially true. Dewey had rejected education as conservative. By comparison, he presented education in a progressive framework for this posture was fundamental to the pragmatic philosophy of education.

Horne also noted a striking contrast between Herbart's position and that held by Dewey. While Herbart's powers of the mind received impetus by the soul's reaction to realities that acted upon it, Dewey viewed these same powers of mind as arising through the selection and coordination of the organic responses to stimuli.[106]

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[105] *Ibid*.

[106] *Ibid*., p. 87.

Horne's overview of the variations between the two points of view relative to mind were seen from the following statement:

> The two differences are that Herbart is more psychological and intellectualistic and Dewey more physiological and voluntaristic. According to Herbart the soul is passive until acted upon and then it is reactive; according to Dewey the organism in its environment is active as well as passive.[107]

Such an analogy was not found objectionable. But to analyze and attribute to Herbart's method meaning and educational significance similar to that of Dewey's represented a far-reaching search for Horne. Nevertheless, Horne saw this endeavor as the best method for interpreting Dewey since the similarities in method remained.

Although not in total agreement with Herbart, Horne believed that some of Herbart's fundamentals were psychologically sound. Horne contended that:

> . . . it is still true that knowledge of certain subject matter is important, that Herbart's method is one efficient way of securing such knowledge, that knowledge is one of the sources of interest. . . whatever his method, the teacher's influence is great.[108]

Both Horne and Dewey recognized Herbart's contribution to educational Theory. Dewey, however, found it necessary to modify Herbart's theory of interest. Interest, viewed singularly, did not necessarily signify intelligent action. When isolated from interaction with the present environment, interest becomes a distracting element and possibly a barrier to

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[107] *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

learning. In an attempt to overcome this inadequacy, Dewey proposed the additional components of need and purpose. As a result, he believed the individual was more likely to see a given task through to its successful conclusion. His service to sound pedagogy lay basically in his identifying specific tasks for education thereby rejecting former tasks which were random, routine, and often vague. As a result of Herbart, Dewey believed teaching was brought into the realm of conscious method with a definite aim and procedure.[109] Dewey acknowledged the great contribution made by Herbart and recognized him as a forerunner to progressive educational philosophy:

> Herbart undoubtedly has had a greater influence in bringing to the front questions connected with the material of study than any other educational philosopher.[110]

While Horne saw Herbart's method as one efficient method of securing knowledge, Dewey's elaboration was more relevant:

> He stated problems of method from the standpoint of their connection with the subject matter: method of having to do with the manner and sequence of presenting new subject matter to insure its proper interaction with old.[111]

Dewey's appreciation for Herbart's method as well as his keen insight into Herbart's theory possessed greater depth than that implied by Horne. The long-range implications of Herbart's theory were recognized and applied by Dewey. Yet,

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[109] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 83.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid.

For Horne, evidence of such recognition in terms of application into educational practice was not found.

Horne rejected Herbart's pluralistic realism, his intellectualism, and his determinism; yet, he failed to assess any theoretical weakness.[112] The fact that Herbart's theory of formation was dependent upon external operations for direction was not evaluated by Horne.

Dewey identified another fundamental weakness in that Herbart overemphasized the influence of intellectual environment upon the mind at the expense of learning associated with personal sharing of common experiences--the learner's privilege of learning which was free from external coercion. According to Dewey, reconstruction and reorganization resulted in formation. Differentiating his position, Dewey stated:

> All education forms character, mental and moral, but formation consists in the selection and coordination of native capacities so that they may utilize the subject matter of the social environment.[113]

2. Education as Recapitulation and Retrospection

Both Horne and Dewey recognized heredity and environment as factors to be taken into account when analyzing growth and development in the young. For Horne, heredity was the greater contributing factor. Although he agreed with Dewey that the two were cooperative elements, Horne maintained, ". . . that

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[112] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 88.

[113] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 84.

our heredity contributes more to our making than does our environment."[114] The precise meaning of the phrase "to our making" was not clear. Since strong emphasis had been placed upon the relationship between heredity and the intelligence quotient, the assumption could be made that Horne portrayed a fixed, predetermined organism. It was obvious from Horne's theory that there existed a depreciation and neglect for the efficacy of the present environment and the role of environment concerning the individual. Relying heavily upon the fixed determinant of the intelligence quotient, Horne's position promoted intellectual selectivity which allowed little regard for other significant factors in the growth process of all individuals.

A more consistent theory was advanced by Dewey. Both heredity and environmental factors were taken into account, yet a broader perspective was maintained by Dewey. Dewey's view was significant because it projected far-reaching possibilities for the development of individual capacities when the individual was furnished an environment conducive to the fullest development of his potential.

Dewey believed a serious implication was inherent in the theory of recapitulation and retrospection in that education was thus conceived to be a process of ". . . accommodating the future to the past. . . [it] finds its standards and

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[114]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 93.

patterns in what has gone before."[115] Furthermore, Dewey recognized a distortion in the regressive approach which resulted in a serious misconception of heredity and subsequent implications for education. In the first place, Dewey identified a biological fallacy. Concerning this misconception, he stated:

> Embryonic growth of the human infant preserves, without doubt, some of the traits of lower forms of life. But in no respect is it a strict traversing of past stages. If there were any strict 'law' of repetition, evolutionary development would clearly not have taken place. Each new generation would simply have repeated its predecessors' existence. To ignore the directive influence upon the young is simply to abdicate the educational function.[116]

Clearly, Dewey believed that far too great an influence had been credited to heredity at the expense of a sound recognition of the present environment. Educationally, a distinction was crucial. The extreme emphasis upon heredity had the effect of fixing and stifling development of the individual. The other position recognized original endowment but did not allow this basic fact to determine or limit the development of the individual's unique capacities. The latter position suggested that what the young might become was not wholly dependent on the limiting factor of heredity. The significance of this condition was readily recognized by Dewey:

> Education must take the being as he is; that a particular individual has just such and such equipment of native activities is a basic fact. That they were produced in such and such a way, or that they are

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[115]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 92-93.

[116]Ibid., p. 85.

> derived from one's ancestry, is not especially important for the educator. . . .[117]

Dewey recognized that heredity served as a limiting factor in education, but it did not predetermine future use of present capacities. Disregarding the trait of heredity as a limiting factor would, indeed, be an error. Recognition of this fact was necessary in order to conserve time and energy by providing profitable experiences for the young instead of hampered attempts toward guiding the individual in a non-productive direction.

Going beyond emphasis each theorist held closely to his view as the result of a different orientation given to life and the life processes.

In this connection, a striking contrast between personal idealism and pragmatism was noted. In speaking of cultural study, especially the literary products of man's history as the main material of education, Dewey wrote:

> Isolated from their connection with the present environment in which individuals have to act, they become a kind of rival and distracting environment. Their value lies in their use to increase the meaning of the things with which we have actively to do at the present time.[118]

Relative to specific subject matter, the present, for Dewey, had been reduced to a more or less futile imitation of the past especially when the literary products of man's history were

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[117] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

overemphasized. Dewey's justification for the study of man's history was clearly for its practical utility. The purpose of such study was pragmatic. Since the individual lives in the present and is constantly influenced by his present environment, the study of history, from Dewey's point of view, may possess value. When subject matter, such as history, provides connections between the past and present conditions of life, a worthy dimension has been added to the educative process. From the pragmatist's point of view, knowledge of the past becomes significant only as it further assists in producing a better understanding and enrichment of the present. To the extent such a contribution is not attained, then the study is of little value.

In opposition to the pragmatist, Horne stated:

> Knowledge of any kind may be a good on its own account. The fact that some individuals are interested in acquiring impractical knowledge and enjoy the possession of it may be an adequate justification for it.[119]

Horne also found equal justification for such study when the purpose was for intellectual satisfaction or as a means of furthering the cause of complete or whole living. Ascribing to the idealist's position, Horne alluded to the Hegelian doctrine of Selbst-Entfremdung. Such a doctrine afforded the self of man further development toward one's larger self.[120] Embracing this doctrine, Horne declared:

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[119]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 94.

[120]Ibid., p. 95.

> By going far afield, the self leaves its limited quarters behind, becomes at home in the big foreign world, finds itself there too, and then returns a larger self to its native place. Only by estranging oneself from one's little self can one find one's larger self. By compassing the past one may better realize oneself.[121]

While Horne believed such an adventure constituted proper philosophic reflection, Dewey saw such an endeavor as a simple idealization for the sake of emotional satisfaction. If and when emotional satisfaction can be achieved as the result of such reflection, then to that extent a worthwhile accrual has been achieved. Throughout the text of Dewey, there appeared to be a neglect in this realm of acquiring knowledge which might prove to be relevant. Viewed from the democratic perspective and the ideas to which such a society is committed, Dewey might have furthered his theme by admitting a more thorough approach to a more genuine democratic philosophy of history; one which would lend assistance in clarifying ideas to which our society is committed as well as one which would serve to guide us to fruitful and productive alternatives for the future. The psychological benefits alone might well justify this dimension of thought.

However, since no practical influence upon human action was likely to be presented from ideas attained from this endeavor, Dewey concluded that such thinking constituted a kind of philosophic wandering. The irrelevancy of any trancendent orientation was clearly seen when he stated:

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[121] *Ibid.*

> Men escape from the crudities of the present to live in its imagined refinements, instead of using what the past offers as an agency for ripening these crudities.[122]

Dewey further dismissed this notion by asserting that ". . . an individual can live only in the present."[123] In the literal sense, there is truth to the statement that man could live only in the present. But, at the same time, is it not possible that he can enjoy and appreciate products of the past? It was probably true that Dewey had projected an over reaction to the subject of literature since this had so long dominated and been made the mainstay of the curriculum.

The value of history as a "discipline" was depreciated by Dewey. In part, this was due to his rejection of the idea that cultural history, especially the literary aspects of man's history, had been held by many to possess some unique power which could liberate man.[124] Dewey was especially cognizant of this influence in higher education. A careful assessment of Dewey's pragmatic view of history revealed he believed there had been a degree of neglect to the intrinsic value which such study might hold for the serious historical inquirer.

Nevertheless, Dewey's final word on this subject warrants further consideration in light of the two areas of neglect

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[122]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 88.

[123]Ibid.

[124]Ibid.

mentioned above. "A knowledge of the past and its heritage is of great significance when it enters into the present, but not otherwise."[125]

Dewey believed that to focus attention upon materials of the past represented a neglect to the demands of the present. Such an orientation, he believed, tended to sever that vital connection between the past and its products from the present and its unique problems and frustrations:

> The present, in short, generates the problems which lead us to search the past for suggestion, and which supplies meaning to what we find when we search. The past is the past precisely because it does not include what is characteristic in the present. The moving present includes the past on condition that it uses the past to direct its own movement.[126]

3. Education as Reconstruction

Horne recognized the depth and scope of Dewey's educational philosophy as well as the valuable contributions found in his theory of reconstruction or reorganization of experience. He also believed the subject of growth as well as Dewey's more general theses concerning a philosophy of education could be best understood in terms of this discussion. Horne pointed out little in the way of objection to Dewey's projected theory at this point. The weakness, for Horne, was found in certain qualities omitted by Dewey. His comments, therefore, were directed toward observations he found in Dewey's text rather than a criticism of Dewey's discussion.

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[125] *Ibid*.

[126] *Ibid*., p. 89.

Dewey had pointed out that reconstruction of experience was both social and personal. The limiting factor observed by Horne was that Dewey had overemphasized the objective experience and had neglected the subjective self. While Dewey spoke of the participants as the "young," the "immature," or the "individual," Horne visualized a more identifiable self as the personal being involved in the experience and sharing in the meaning produced as the result of such an experience. For Horne, it was the self having the experience. Again, emphasis accounted for the differing opinions in this discussion. Each recognized in his own way the existence of both experience and the imperative factor of the individual experiencing. Dewey concentrated on the quality of experience, while Horne preferred to concentrate on the "self" who was involved in the experience. The concept of structure also provided the basis upon which Horne proposed a different concept from that explained by Dewey. As a result of this posture, Horne focused on the outcome; that is, the reconstructed self. Like Horne, Dewey was aware of the growing and developing individual but he preferred to place the greater emphasis and significance upon the experience and its personal counterpart in the social matrix. Upon examination more similarities were found than significant differences.

Horne's attitude relative to the social and personal aspects of experience revealed a shift in emphasis from the external environmental factors to the personal side of the

subjective self. Indicative of this position in Horne's philosophy was the following statement regarding the person and experience:

> The self has the experience. In the reconstruction of experience it is really the self that is being reconstructed, the self in relation to other selves and the intervening world.[127]

Although Horne's point was a salient one, he believed a closer view of self in the process of reconstruction would yield a far greater dimension to a more comprehensive philosophy of education.

The pragmatist has placed far greater importance to the term "reconstruction of experience." The idealist insists that what is reconstructed was not experience at all but rather an ideal pattern of social and individual development antecedent to it. As such, man possesses a free personality and the function of education remains to cultivate that personality.

Horne objected to Dewey's belief in maximum utilization of active adaptation to a dynamic environment at the expense of passive adaptation to a static environment. The implication in Horne's interpretation was that lack of attention to the latter might well result in a decrease of active adaptation since the one was viewed by Horne as complementing the other. Essentially, Horne called for increased reflection upon the constant, unchanging elements of society.[128] His

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[127]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 99.

[128]Ibid.

appeal to these constant static elements represented far more than an appeal for mere assistance to the process of active adaptation:

> . . . certain principles are changeless even in a changing world. Toward these education may very well take a passive, an absorptive attitude, which . . . will modify the active conduct and character.[129]

It was apparent that Horne looked to these static elements as controls even to those elements characteristic of a dynamic society.

Certainly, experiences such as would be projected upon the self do contain both static and dynamic qualities or characteristics. However, Horne viewed these as separate accounts each making its contribution to the process of environmental adaptation. By contrast, Dewey viewed both the active and passive elements as ones where adaptation was concerned. Mere adherence to the static elements constituted a passive adventure for Dewey. Furthermore, such an endeavor whether connected with historical products of present involvement tends to disengage the individual from personal meaning. Only as active adaptation to a dynamic environment is effected in society would there be the likelihood of meaningful reconstruction and reorganization of experience. Thus, Dewey's technical definition of education: "It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of

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[129] *Ibid.*

experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."[130]

Horne concluded that passive adaptation to a static environment had been rejected.[131] However, a study of Dewey's text reveals the fact that Horne has not modified Dewey but has supplanted his theory with tenets of the idealistic philosophy. Neither implication nor neglect served as sufficient grounds for the conclusion that Dewey had rejected Horne's thesis. Such was not the subject of Dewey's discussion.

A third weakness was identified by Horne relative to Dewey's discussion of education as reconstruction. He stated:

> The result and the process of the educative experience are held to be identical. Horne further assessed this theory as a probable contradiction and contended this arrangement was both 'vague and incomplete.'[132]

Viewing his own theory of education as continuous reconstruction, Dewey admitted to a verbal contradiction. Yet, he insisted the contradiction existed only at the verbal level:

> It means that experience as an active process occupies time and that its later period completes its earlier portion; it brings to light connections involved but hitherto unperceived.[133]

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[130]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 89-90.

[131]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 99.

[132]Ibid., p. 100.

[133]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 92.

Horne's adherence to words and word meaning was evident from the following statement:

> It is vague because the configuration of fact and the corresponding pattern of our language distinguish between process and product, purpose and result, means and end.[134]

From Horne's philosophical stance, he detected a serious limitation, if not a defect, in Dewey's theory. The central element missing, according to Horne, was due to the fact Dewey's "process" lacked direction and control. Horne believed the question he raised represented a serious one. How can the means leading to a result be efficient and good if the outcome or end has not been clearly identified? Horne rejected Dewey's concept which held the result and the process of the educative experience to be identical. "Without some such conceived end, the conception of result-process remains vague, and its guidance difficult."[135] Horne believed Dewey's concept of a process as identical with the product was further incomplete because of a second deficiency. Specifically, it lacked absolutes and eternal values. Horne believed that when all reality was viewed as temporal in character the wholeness of reality could not be realized. His primary objection dealt with the incomplete nature of Dewey's means-ends theory. Expressing his concern on this point, Horne declared: "It assumes that the process is all the reality there is, and that all reality is temporal in character."[136] Therefore, in order to come to a realization

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[134]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 100.

[135]Ibid., p. 101.

[136]Ibid.

of the sum of reality recognition must be given to the non-temporal and the eternal aspect of experience.

For education, recognition of this dualistic character of experience bears with it a different connotation and task from that suggested by Dewey. Nevertheless, Horne believed a new dimension would be added as a consequence and man's completeness would be the outcome of this educational theory. Directing the implications of his theory to education Horne summarized:

> And our education, to be complete, must consequently adjust us to the whole of reality of which we are a part. Our education would then be viewed as progress in the consciousness of our relation to the whole of reality of which the process is indisputably a part. Our definition might run: Education is the increasing realization of the temporal and eternal values of life.[137]

The task of accommodating the temporal with the non-temporal aspects of experience was but one facet of the transcendental-metaphysical posture to which Horne alluded. For education it meant the further awakening of self to the changeless, sublime realities. Much like Plato, Horne placed great stress and emphasis upon unchanging concepts for only in these was man afforded a reliable frame of reference from which he could engage in change. Substantiating this claim and its importance, Horne stated: "We ourselves have an unchanging centre of reference in ourselves; in a sense, though changing, we remain the same."[138] From the idealist's point of view

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[137] Ibid.

[138] Ibid.

the task of education is quite different from that in contrast with the technical definition provided earlier by Dewey. The concept that education is a constant, sequential process of reorganizing and reconstructing experience was central to Dewey's theme in connection with his philosophy of growth and knowledge.

Dewey's ideal of growth was consistent with the concept that education was a constant reorganization and reconstruction of experience. The nature of this attitude was clearly identified by Dewey. "It has all the time an immediate end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end--the direct transformation of the quality of experience."[139] Based upon this premise, if the activity of experience is to be truly educative, it is its own end. The value of a given experience rests wholly upon what is actually learned at any and every stage. From this point of view ". . . it is the chief business of life at every point to make living thus contribute to an enrichment of its own perceptible meaning."[140]

Horne identified a source of power which provided direction to the educative experience. Dewey believed that when education was viewed as a plan providing for reconstruction of experience, the added power of direction had been achieved.

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[139] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 89.

[140] Ibid.

Such a scheme provided that needed direction to the whole educative process. This direction further enabled the individual to anticipate consequences of actions with a much higher degree of accuracy than was the case in random, aimless kinds of activity or activity resulting from external dictation. Thus, the course of direction in the educative process accounts for the major difference in emphasis between the two philosophies of Horne and Dewey.

The role of perception in learning also assumed a major role in Dewey's theory. When attributed to the learner, the role of perception elevated the individual's role in the process of his learning. "The increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged."[141]

Dewey further elaborated upon the pragmatic condition when he stated:

> The essential contrast of the idea of education as continuous reconstruction with the other one-sided conceptions. . . is that it identifies the end (the result) and the process. It means that experience as an active process occupies time and that its later period completes its earlier portion; it brings to light connections involved, but hitherto unperceived.[142]

Further:

> The latter outcome thus reveals the meaning of the earlier, while the experience as a whole establishes a bent or disposition toward the things

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[141] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[142] *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

> possessing this meaning. Every such continuous experience or activity is educative, and all education resides in having such experiences.[143]

In contrast with Horne's philosophical posture, Dewey rejected external stimuli to action. All prearranged, designated outcomes-ends which serve to control or direct the means pursuant to such ends have been rejected. For Dewey, this must be the case since such ends are remote and isolated and lacking in a disposition formed as the result of intelligent action. The missing factor for Dewey was a recognition of the connection between the act and the result. The outcome of the traditionalist's view was that learning had been lessened since perception and personal understanding did not accompany the action. This is not to suggest that no learning could take place as the result of routine activity. It does suggest, however, that learning leading to further learning and understanding has been minimized.

The educational significance of perceiving connections between actions and subsequent results was further emphasized by Dewey. He stated: "But we learn only because after the act is performed we note results which we had not noted before."[144]

In spite of Dewey's appeal to the aforementioned condition, much school work is often made up of prescriptive rules which

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[143] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[144] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

designate the manner in which pupils are to act; but, after having so acted, they are not led to see the connection between the result and the method pursued in performing the particular act. Such routine action may increase skill to do a particular thing, but it is prone to lead to habits of action resulting in little, if any, significant educative quality.[145] ". . . it does not lead to new perceptions of bearings and connections; it limits rather than widens the meaning-horizon."[146] The condition described by Dewey probably accounts for (1) minimal effectiveness in learning; and (2) disruptive behavior of students in the classroom or school environment.

As presented by Horne, a dichotomy between means and ends has been effected. For Dewey, this represents one of the most obnoxious dualisms because of the artificial separation characteristic of such a posture. Dewey viewed means-ends as representative of a continuum with emphasis upon the dynamic nature of the end-in-view. Such a view not only affects the character of means but also brings out selectivity as to the method chosen. Ends for Dewey were in fact not ends at all, but rather means leading to additional means. They were never fixed and final. Instead, they stood as tentative solutions to problems which serve best when viewed in retrospect.

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[145] *Ibid*.

[146] *Ibid*.

Ideal, fixed, immutable ends such as those purported by Horne must be rejected by Dewey. As such, they stand in opposition to the dynamic process of learning--the concept of learning as adjustment for continuous growth. In the philosophy of Dewey, an admission of ideal ends as postulated by the idealist would tend to subordinate the importance of experience itself. Instead, emphasis would be allotted to the mysterious and supernatural, thereby negating free inquiry into causes, consequences, and other natural relationships.

From Horne's interpretation of Dewey's means-ends relationship, it was made to appear Dewey had produced a view of education which was both vague and incomplete. Horne concluded that Dewey's theory had failed to produce objective criteria upon which to base validity to the process of the educative process.

Upon careful examination of Dewey's text, it was found that actions and activity must be evaluated in terms of their consequences rather than with reference to other external criteria. Dewey's philosophy demanded careful and complete observation of all factors involved with an activity. In addition, attention must be given to discernible consequences of that activity so that the proper method for an objective evaluation could then be made. Education in a democratic society demands and deserves no less.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRACY IN EDUCATION

The Democratic Conception in Education

1. The Implications of Human Association

Horne has identified in Dewey's philosophy three kinds of democracy. These he has described as political, industrial and social. It is true that Dewey has, by implication, viewed these as segments of society in order to clarify the ideal of democracy. For Dewey, both the negative and positive attributes of these must be examined in order to fully understand his concept of democracy and a society which possesses qualities worthy of a democratic description.

Horne concluded that a disparity existed as the result of Dewey's text which traces the origin of democracy to industry while at the same time finding no democracy in the industrial complex.

Dewey conceived democracy in terms of the intelligent social intercourse of men. Any social action which is limited to the special interests of any section of society is injurious to his basic conception of democracy. The essential content of democracy consisted of the sharing of interests within groups and between groups, thus leading to progressive change. Dewey

recognized that democracy was not produced by deliberate effort but that it was sustained and extended by it.

Dewey recognized two elements as essential criteria to democracy:

> The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups. . . but change in social habit--its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situation produced by varied intercourse. . . . These two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted society.[1]

It is true that Dewey viewed industry as an association which gave impetus to the development of democracy. In industry, however, democracy may flourish or it may serve in the end as a debilitating force where democratic advancements are made. Since the two elements which characterized democracy were not the product of deliberation and effort, a more definitive course had to be identified. Science and industry came into play at this point. A clearer perspective concerning the role of industry and its relationship to democratic ideal may be seen from the following. Dewey stated:

> . . . they were caused by the development of modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, migration and intercommunication which flowed from the command of science over natural energy.[2]

Having achieved a broader community of interest and greater

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[1]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 100.

[2]Ibid., p. 101.

individualization, then it becomes a matter of deliberate effort to sustain and extend them. The extent to which we are successful at this deliberate attempt will determine the success or failure of a democracy.

The task of education is to provide situations in which the student has opportunities to encounter the experience of the ages in the shortest possible time with a view toward being an effective, intelligent citizen--one who is capable of meeting his own personal problems and also be effective in the larger problems of social life. Such a life would require that the individual be free to make intelligent choices between alternatives without external directives.

Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. Further:

> A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability.[3]

Dewey recognized the danger of class stratification in a democracy. Communication of interest and a free exchange of varying modes of life experiences between members of society are imperatives and serve as prerequisites to the maintenance

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

of a society free from a privileged class. To prevent this and to insure the continuance of the democratic results applied to industry, intellectual opportunities must be kept accessible to all on equable terms. A major concern of Dewey was a condition which prohibited the sharing of interests between members of a group. In order for intellectual stimulation to remain in balance, a variety of shared interests which challenged thought must be maintained and promoted. His concern with the division of labor often necessitated by efficiency in production was closely associated with his concept of democracy. For Dewey, diversity, rather than restriction of stimulation, was the best means of providing challenge to thought. Consequently:

> The more activity is restricted to a few definite lines--as it is when there are rigid class lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences--the more action tends to become routine on the part of the class at a disadvantage, and capricious, aimless, and explosive on the part of the class having the materially fortunate position.[4]

A sincere and intense social consciousness characterized Dewey. The condition as described above might, if permitted, result in a slave-master relationship "even where there is no slavery in the legal sense."[5] Understanding, interest and a personal interest in the work men perform were the conditions necessary if slavery was

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[4] Ibid., p. 98.

[5] Ibid.

not to be the outcome. The significance of science which promotes greater efficiency in work may also be the factor serving to reduce ". . . efficiency of operation to movement of the muscles."[6] A more positive assignment for science must be found, according to Dewey:

> The chief opportunity for science is the discovery of the relations of a man to his work--including his relation to others who take part--which will enlist his intelligent interest in what he is doing. Efficiency in production often demands division of labor. But it is reduced to a mechanical routine unless workers see the technical, intellectual, and social relationships involved in what they do, and engage in their work because of the motivations furnished by such perceptions. [The result is that] intelligence is narrowed to the factors concerned with technical production and marketing of goods.[7]

For education, Dewey's philosophy called attention to the need for the existence of a form of education which would be deliberate and systematic. In order for the traits of democracy to be most effective, a deliberate effort must be made in order to sustain and extend them operationally. It is, in effect, a community mobilized for learning.

Horne challenged the term "democracy" as perceived by Dewey. He further questioned the possibility of accomplishment under the terms of a political government called a democracy. Horne preferred the term "spirit" in describing

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., pp. 98-99.

democracy while Dewey preferred the term "ideal." Horne overlooked Dewey's concept that democracy was something more than a form of government. For Dewey, Democracy represented a way of life or ". . . a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. . . ."[8] Dewey conceived of democracy in terms of the intelligent social intercourse of men. A further separation in the two philosophies may be found in the contest between naturalism and supernatural authority. Dewey proposed the philosophy of naturalism because it promised to liberate man from all external or supernatural authorities. On the other hand, Horne viewed the democratic society as analogous to the religious concept of the "Kingdom of Heaven" on earth.[9] Horne emphasized his position when he stated:

> In content the two are similar; in inspiration and motive they are different. The inspiration to the one is human, to the other is divine. The motive to the one is humanitarian, to the other is theistic. The central conception of the one is man, of the other is God.[10]

For Horne, man alone, as social man, could never completely realize the benefits of the democratic ideal in the fullest

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[8] Ibid., p. 101.

[9] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 113.

[10] Ibid.

sense. The completion of such fulfillment could only be realized by way of ". . . the dynamic belief in God who works with man."[11]

Dewey's philosophy having freed man of external influence places the control of all social institutions and practices into the hands of man. Man's responsibility is but to direct his energies and interests to the solution of his social problems. Dewey's identification of democracy with naturalism resulted in a depreciation of the social value found in the idealistic philosophy of Horne. The transition made in Dewey's philosophy naturally became the target of criticism for Horne.

Basic to Dewey's theory of a democratic society was the demand for a pluralistic orientation, one uniquely equipped to sustain and perpetuate the ideals of democracy. Unlike a class-structured society, a society which is mobile, and a society in which change is taking place must provide deliberate attention to the education of its members. Such a position must be taken if those members are to acquire the capability to adapt and understand changes which are taking place. The element of change is vital because it is this characteristic which provides the possibility of improvement. When such an awareness is not effected, the result will be confusion with benefits realized by a select few at the expense of the ill-informed.

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[11] *Ibid.*

2. The Platonic Educational Philosophy

An examination of the Platonic philosophy by both Horne and Dewey shows each asserting Plato's concept of democracy lacked adequate criteria.

Horne, however, contended that Plato's lack of consideration of progress was due not to philosophical reasons, but rather for social reasons. The adequacy of Plato's social history was sufficient, as viewed by Horne. Plato's frame of reference in this context depended upon ". . . the stability of states which he admired, or their decline, which he deplored."[12] Horne's interpretation was not inconsistent with the Platonic idea, since he believed social progress might be realized even though lacking an adequate criterion for progress and growth. Indicative of this belief was the following statement: ". . . social progress may be made gradually, even in zigzag fashion, toward a goal that is fixed, 'eternal in the heavens'."[13] The emphasis here becomes one focused upon progress toward a fixed goal. Democracy in this context thus becomes the permanent ideal or goal toward which a society aspires, yet realizing the attainment of such a goal could never be fully achieved.

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[12] Ibid., p. 117.

[13] Ibid.

Such an arrangement was unacceptable in Dewey's philosophical scheme. This was true primarily because Plato's organization of society was ultimately dependent upon the character and knowledge concerning the end of existence. In reality, Horne, like Plato, recognized that the certainty of such knowledge was doubtful. Without knowledge, the individual and his unique capabilities were likely to be overshadowed and in bondage to ideals which remain static. Philosophically, the structure of social arrangements and progress which might be effected through change was left to chance or left in the hands of a supreme being with little encouragement for man's active participation as an instrument of social progress through change.

Dewey questioned these conditions and doubted that any consistency of mind was possible in this philosophy. He stated:

> A society which rests upon the supremacy of some factor over another irrespective of its rational or proportionate claims, inevitably leads thought astray . . . [we are therefore left] . . . at the mercy of accident and caprice.[14]

Summarily, Dewey identified the breakdown of Plato's idealistic philosophy by the fact that he could not trust progressive improvements in education to bring about a better society. An ideal state, fixed and unchanging necessarily became characteristic of Plato's philosophy. From such a posture, the aims and purposes of education became minimal.

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[14]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 102-103.

Dewey stated:

> Correct education could not come into existence until an ideal state existed, and then education would be devoted simply to its conservation.[15]

Consequently, the class, rather than the individual, became the primary social unit.

Horne found a synthesis in his idealistic conception by combining ". . . the static and the dynamic in what we have called the organic."[16] He referred to the term "organic" as a synthetic view similar to that held by Hegel which suggested a dual concept of society. Hence, Horne furthered adherence to another dualism that is consistently found in the idealistic philosophy.

3. The "Individualistic" Ideal of the Eighteenth Century

Horne recognized that the theory purported by Rousseau lacked the conditions for an education centered in life sharing. This was true because there was no group by which either intra- or inter-group relations could function. The paradox of this situation was reflected when Horne stated:

> The early years of life were necessarily spent in preparation for a society that did not exist. His freedom was a freedom <u>from</u> not <u>in</u>, society, and his individual was apart <u>from</u>, not <u>a</u> part of, society.[17]

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[15] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 106.

[16] Horne, <u>The Democratic Philosophy of Education</u>, p. 117.

[17] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 120-121.

For Dewey, the eighteenth century philosophy represented a set of ideas unique to the period. Nature remained unreconciled and separate from systems of social organization. Plato held a distrust for gradual change in education as an avenue for effecting a better society. Rousseau distrusted existing social institutions and viewed them as factors impeding education. The more stable society as described in Rousseau's theory held that nature was the key and only an education in perfect harmony with nature was worthy of existence in a liberated society. His concept held that society encompassed the entire spectrum of humanity--a humanity whose progress was dependent upon the individual. Thus, a basic agreement existed between Horne and Dewey when each considered the philosophy of Rousseau and others who supported claims of the "individualistic" ideal. Dewey concluded this when he stated: ". . . it lacked any agency for securing the development of its ideal as was evidenced in its falling back upon Nature."[18]

As a result of this philosophy, a new role of education emerged; yet, the concept of learning remained ambiguous, left to drift aimlessly and void of direction and deliberate intent. Both Dewey and Horne recognized in Rousseau's philosophy a neglect of the individual, making him subservient to the citizen. Even though both recognized attempts made by Rousseau in favor of man, evidence in his Émile pointed to the formation of the citizen as the aim of education.

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[18]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 116.

Supportive of agreement in this area, Horne stated:

> The suggestion of Dr. Dewey that there is a neglected strain in Rousseau favoring the citizen rather than the man is valuable and worthy of special investigation.[19]

4. Education as National and Social

Horne raised the question of the application of Dewey's criteria to the social, while not making the same application to education in regard to national motives. It was clear that the proper stance for Dewey was to view education as a social process. It therefore followed that the application of Dewey's two criteria of democracy were concerned with the societal, not the national aim. In earlier discussion, Dewey demonstrated his theory relative to nationalism, especially in its extreme forms. He cited the example of the nationalistic style demonstrated by the German states during the nineteenth century. An adequate interpretation of social efficiency was practically impossible. With clarity and conciseness, Dewey elaborated the state of affairs under such an arrangement. The implications for the individual, and subsequently for education, were clearly stated by Dewey:

> Since the maintenance of a particular sovereignty required subordination of individuals to the superior interests of the state. . . social efficiency was understood to imply like subordination. The educational process was taken to be one of disciplinary training rather than of personal development.[20]

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[19]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 121.

[20]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 109-110.

Dewey's criteria for educational criticism were found in the following two points: ". . . the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups."[21] Similarly, Horne stated: "A nationalistic state in as far as it fails to share interests within and beyond the group is not democratic."[22] A second criterion made by Horne was found in the form of a question: Can a national state conduct a system of education which embodies and furthers the concept of increased realization of social aims?[23] Horne suggested that Dewey gave serious consideration to this question, yet failed to prescribe adequately a course of action which guaranteed the attainment of a course which would ultimately assure human progress in this direction. In connection with this assessment of Dewey's position, Horne concluded that Dewey's course merely produced a dilemma and a predicament. Seeking absolutes, Horne saw no way out as he viewed the theory presented by Dewey. At least three concerns were projected by Horne in this connection: (1) failure to follow this course is not democratic; (2) doubt as to whether such a course would be followed; and (3) failure to affix predetermination upon man in order to assure the following of such

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[21]Ibid., p. 115.

[22]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 127.

[23]Ibid., p. 128.

a course. In summary, Horne believed that Dewey simply had ". . . no faith in the universe or its ground. . . ."[24] This, he believed to be the case especially since predetermination for man had been eliminated in the course of human events.

Dewey gave much attention to the seriousness of question and the attendant implications implicit in alternative patterns chosen by man. He gave no guarantees for the realization of an educational system equipped to meet social aims to the fullest. Evidence, however, of Dewey's consideration of this problem was found in the following statement:

> One of the fundamental problems of education in and for a democratic society is set by the conflict of a nationalistic and wider social aim.[25]

The solution to this problem must not be left to chance. Neither must the philosophy of determinism be relied upon. From Dewey's frame of reference, man must provide for and continue to make allowance for the conditions whereby a state can conduct an educational process which conveys the full social meaning of democracy. Democratic education is not narrowly nationalistic. According to Dewey, the idea of national sovereignty as a basis to political practice historically has impeded progress toward an accommodation and a mutual sharing between the nation and its interest with the realization of social efficiency.

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 113.

The interdependence of man necessarily must be recognized. In a broader sense, the interdependence of nations must be more fully realized. Although a prerequisite for the realization of a democratic system of education, such an arrangement had not yet been fully understood nor achieved. Dewey stated:

> Each [nation] is supposed to be the supreme judge of its own interests, and it is assumed as a matter of course that each has interests which are exclusively its own.[26]

In addition to a division of society into races, Dewey recognized a second dimension overlooked by most in a democratic society, namely, that of economic equality. It was not sufficient to eliminate class exploitation. Schools in a democratic education must further permit:

> Modification of traditional ideas of culture, traditional subjects of study and traditional methods of teaching and discipline as will retain all the youth under educational influence until they are equipped to be masters of their own economic and social careers.[27]

The question raised by Horne as to whether a national state could or could not conduct an educational process consistent with the full social meaning of democracy was not necessarily the question. Dewey showed that such an arrangement was possible if deliberate attention and effort were exerted toward effecting such an educational process.

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., p. 114.

Not only must schools strive to promote economic and social understanding, but also nations must do the same. Dewey, commenting on this need, stated:

> The emphasis must be put upon whatever binds people together in cooperative human pursuits and results, apart from geographical limitations.[28]

Democratic education, according to Dewey, must be as broad in the area of opportunity as in the pluralistic society in which it thrives. Democratic education should use the resources of the past but add to these the resources of the present. On the basis of a dynamic interaction between individuals in society new problems and their solutions may be discovered. Without this dynamic interaction between individuals in society we have less than a democracy. Prescriptive and arbitrary methods of disseminating information is not proper communications, nor educative; it is propaganda.

Dewey believed that democratic education could not be viewed as narrowly nationalistic. To be vital in the sense that it is a process, it must be based on meaning shared and communicated between relatively small groups. Dewey consistently called for a return to smaller units of social life. For a better understanding of this point, one should study the character of the community as the smaller organization about which Dewey speaks. This posture is basic not only to

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[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

his understanding of democracy but also to his concept of education and life in general. As a deterrent to further conflict, these shared or common understandings must be projected into the larger sphere of international concern through a "world community." Earlier, Dewey identified as a major problem confronting education the conflict existing between nationalistic aims and social aims affecting the individual:

> The secondary and provisional character of national sovereignty in respect to the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as a working disposition of mind.[29]

In other words, the close association and intercourse which characterize the family unit must also come to play a significant role both nationally and internationally. The above seems to reenforce the statement with which Dewey began this discussion. In summary, Dewey stated:

> The conception of education as a social process and function has no definite meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind.[30]

Aims in Education

1. The Nature of an Aim

In this appraisal, Horne again appealed to some form of an absolute in solving the problem of aims, especially as these relate to and regulate educational practices. His

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[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

primary objection to Dewey's concept of education aims was that the aim was within the educative process. Further criticism was found in Dewey's association of aims with growth since growth was identified with democracy. "How," asked Horne, "can this framework hold validity if democracy has not yet been fully attained?"[31] Relative to Horne's concern was the spatial or time factor as it relates to aims and their fulfillment, or the end. His emphasis on the end or completion of an aim may be clearly seen in the following statement:

> Being without in part, and yet being the aim, it is clear the aim is not wholly within the process except in an ideal sense or with reference to some future fact. This is important as it lengthens the time enormously between the beginning and the completion of proper fulfillment of the activity. . . . Thus the end, though foreseen, may be remote, and does not have to be immediate or near at hand.[32]

Horne failed to suggest that the result effected by the aim was of utmost importance. For Dewey, the quality or the effectiveness of the result should also receive prime consideration. In effect, a result may be profitable and worthy of being designated an end. In another instance, depending on the quality of the outcome, it may not be an end at all. For Dewey, there must be something in the outcome which completes or fulfills what went before. Dewey recognized that democracy stood as an ideal. He further recognized that the

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[31]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 132.

[32]Ibid., pp. 132-133.

richness to be realized as the result of the experiential conduct of individuals involved in the ever-evolving process made possible the democratic framework. For Dewey, the condition of an aim was not finality. Aims, the educative process, growth, and even democracy could best be understood in Dewey's theory when viewed as products of a process involving human interests and desires. There cannot be the finality of aims which Horne attempted to project in his philosophy while, at the same time, maintaining the democratic framework.

Horne's doctrine of aims negated the value of the present since it failed to incorporate into it what Dewey designated as intrinsic continuity. Without serious consideration of this factor, random activity would likely be pursued or the activity would follow a course dictated by some external influence. In either case, less than desirable results would be the outcome in terms of fulfilling desires or of attaining satisfactory solutions to human problems.

Aims, when related to results, widen the perspective of aims and enhance the possibility of their providing a base for future successful solutions to problems. For this reason, Dewey was explicit. He said, "The first thing to look to when it is a question of aims, is whether the work assigned possesses intrinsic continuity."[33] The element of present

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[33]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 118.

activity is thus connected with aims when the criterion suggested above is applied. For Dewey, not all activity fulfilled an assignment as designated by an aim. Furthermore, the validity of the activity would be determined by the contribution it made to continued growth. Applying Dewey's principle of continuity, it was suggested that only those activities which promote future successful solutions to problems and which lead the individual to continued growth were desirable. Continuing his description of the nature of activity, Dewey stated: "An aim implies an orderly and ordered activity, one in which the order consists in the progressive completing of a process."[34]

Satisfactory aims for Dewey, then, can be identified only as they are viewed in terms of satisfactory results, not by the fact that an aim has merely accomplished an end.

For Dewey, aims-goals were valuable and continued to be valuable, not because they were prearranged or dictated by the supernatural or from "feeling," but because they continued to satisfactorily fulfill a particular interest or desire. Aims must always take into account the intervening process between the original condition and the final result. That is, the achievement of an aim must be viewed as directly connected to the means by which it is to be achieved. The nature of the activity, i.e., orderly and ordered, provides

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

the added dimension of foresight, the ingredient which serves as a facilitator toward the completion of an aim within the process.

2. The Criteria of Good Aims

Beginning his criticism of Dewey's analysis of good aims, Horne asserted: One thing we miss in this account of the criteria of good aims is the setting up of a worthy standard."[35] Horne's interpretation suggested a need for the establishment of another absolute or at least some standard of perfection. In Dewey's philosophy neither was available nor desirable since to exact such a condition could be to establish an aim set up outside of existing conditions, thus giving rise to external priorities. External standards, for Dewey, led to conformity. Conformity, subsequently becomes an aim in and of itself void of attachment to present activities; consequently, an absence of flexibility would be noted. Activity so directed and imposed necessarily becomes static in character. Dewey emphasized this point when he stated: "It is always conceived of as fixed; it is <u>something</u> to be attained and possessed."[36]

While Horne called for some "worthy standard" by which we might identify an aim as good or bad, Dewey spoke of these in terms of desired or desirable. In other words, Dewey

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[35]Horne, <u>The Democratic Philosophy of Education</u>, p. 137.

[36]Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 123.

believed the process of selection or choice played an important role relative to those aims which are to receive contingent approval. A fixed standard as described by Horne must be viewed as antithetical to the democratic ideal to which both Horne and Dewey supposedly subscribed. Horne recognized Dewey's three criteria regarding the nature of an aim. The aim must be (1) " outgrowth of existing conditions, (2) flexible, and (3) it must lead to a freeing of activities."[37] He then raised the question regarding the thief who gets a thrill out of each new accomplishment. His aim was a bad one, according to Horne, because "it shows no respect to human rights."[38] Yet, such an aim met the criteria set forth by Dewey, according to Horne's interpretation.

Dewey's position in this consideration was that such an activity was undesirable because it did not take into account adequate sharing of interests and it projected a restriction of freedom for interaction with others within the society.

In the case of the thief's action, Dewey further rejected the thief's aim on the ground that it led to action which would not be conducive to growth in a general way. The benefits accrued from such action were designed to meet the selfish interests of the one individual.

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[37]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 134.

[38]Ibid., p. 137.

Dewey conceived democracy in terms of the intelligent social interaction of men. When social action is limited to the special interests of any group or individual, an injustice has been done to his basic concept of democracy.

The criterion of an aim--educational value or end-in-view--was that it provided the capacity or ability for further growth. Growth, for Dewey, could not be defined as a specific content which was universally the same for every person. To be sure, there are general aims which education must provide as challenges, but growth is a personal quality set in the framework of individual series of fulfillments each of which leads to a broader understanding and development.

Horne suggested another criterion for correctly establishing an aim. He stated: ". . . a good aim is democratizing. It may even be conceived as being in harmony with absolute good."[39] The intelligent consensus of men was inadequate for Horne. Without an absolute or a concept of something harmonious with the absolute, the philosophy was inadequate for man and for the education of men.

Dewey made a distinction between the democratic community and society. This distinction was very important in its bearings on the pragmatic philosophy of life. For him, the smaller unit of social life provided a unity often found lacking in society. Only by identifying the characteristics

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[39] *Ibid.*

of the latter, can the fruits of democracy be fully realized. It was here that sharing within the group could best be realized. In a pluralistic society there exist special interest groups which do not meet the criteria of democratic social life, i.e., sharing within the group and the freedom to share and interact with other groups. Thus, the aims and purposes of the thief illustrated by Horne must be rejected since the thief represented a segment of society which fell short of the democratic ideal as projected by Dewey.

A strain was noted concerning means and ends. For Horne, a separation between an end and the means for achieving that distinctive end must not be left to mere convenience or be considered a matter of temporal reference. Essentially, he rejected the theory that means are ends and ends are means. Again, the distinction made by Horne in this connection was a significant one because it had a direct bearing on the conflict between the idealistic and pragmatic philosophy. He further contended that:

> Unwelcome and uninteresting means may be used to attain welcome and interesting ends. It is necessary . . . to separate wanted ends from unwanted means.[40]

A merger of ends and means taken from Dewey's arrangement of means-ends "would logically give us only means and no ends, or means as the only ends."[41]

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[40] Ibid., p. 138.

[41] Ibid.

Horne's concern with the philosophy of Dewey in this context was primarily the fact that his posture suggested change and flux. In the philosophy of Horne, the ends may well justify the means; the ends may well determine the means; the ends may well demand that the individual tolerate the means all for the sake of the end. From this account, interest and the richness found in the means was sacrificed.

Dewey's dismissal of the dualism existing between means and ends was important in this respect. While Horne would allow an external nature of the aim to lead to a separation of means from ends, Dewey preferred:

> . . . an end which grows up within an activity as plan for its direction. . . . Every means is a temporary end until we have attained it. Every end becomes a means of carrying activity further as soon as it is achieved.[42]

To the extent that an end is divorced from means, the significance of activity has been reduced, according to Dewey. As a result of this condition, the activity has been reduced to the dull, the routine, to that which easily becomes "drudgery from which one would escape if he could."[43] In contrast with the position assumed by Horne, Dewey believed that while the democratic ideals are being pursued, the end becomes a means and serves as an impetus toward the achievement. The

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[42] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 124.

[43] Ibid.

aim of democracy, from Dewey's point of view, was to serve as a means of action. If attainments in democracy are to be realized by means other than externally imposed forms of activity, then the means-ends relationship must be subscribed to. Democracy was not viewed by Dewey as an absolute in itself.

Contrary to the position taken by Dewey, Horne stated: . . . "until it [democracy] is realized, the end is different from the means."[44] Until and unless man's efforts culminate in a complete realization of democracy, ". . . it remains an end different from the means, and itself becomes one of the absolutes."[45] Democracy as an end was Horne's final consideration. He contended that Dewey's theory placed democracy as its highest category. Since democracy was never fully achieved or realized, how, then, could the aim be a part of the means existing as it does with a remote end? It becomes apparent that Horne's philosophy gives lesser attention to the concept of value or values than did that of Dewey. When Dewey moved from a consideration of what was or had been "good," into a consideration of what might be "good" his emphasis shifted to the term "value." One major significance of Dewey's democratic concept was that through means we achieve value. According to Dewey, one criterion of good aims was to be found in the

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[44] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 139.

[45] Ibid.

phrase "freeing of activities."[46] It is our activity in conjunction with the object, or, as Dewey phrased it, it is the "doing with the thing, not the thing in isolation, which is his end."[47] The end, democracy, and its attainment can only be realized fully as it has developed as a concomitant with the activity. Failure to recognize the ends-means relationship as purported by Dewey leaves the alternative of establishing means in order to achieve an external, prescribed end. If the value of such a process is to be achieved through the means, then Horne's theory reduces the accrual of values to a minimum since the end remains an end which is imposed outside activity. Attacking this traditional posture, Dewey stated:

> It is always conceived of as fixed; it is <u>something</u> to be attained and possessed. When one has such a notion, activity is a mere unavoidable means to something else; it is not significant or important on its own account.[48]

Thus, activity, as viewed from the idealistic philosophical framework, was reduced to a necessary evil, something which must be tolerated before one could reach the end. It was this attained object which alone stood as worthwhile and valuable. Man's involvement and intelligent disposition in striving for an ideal such as democracy is of lesser consequence when we ally our theory of aims with that of Horne.

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[46]Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 123.

[47]<u>Ibid</u>.

[48]<u>Ibid</u>.

Horne concluded that the attainment and full realization of democracy was unlikely. At best, it is but an ideal only partially realized. As such, democracy "remains an end different from the means."[49]

It is at this point that Dewey's philosophy stands in opposition with the traditional views as projected by Horne. Ideal, fixed ends were not admissible in Dewey's analysis because these were directly opposed to his interpretation of learning as adjustment for continuous growth. Dewey believed static ends to be both naive and dangerous. When ideal ends which are incapable of human attainment become the focal point of our industry and energies, at least two undesirable consequences are likely to be the result: (1) the individual in his search for a real solution to practical problems, will become constantly frustrated, if not maladjusted, because of the ineffectiveness of such a goal as a directing force; or (2) the unreal end will continue as a representative symbol to which lip-service is given, but no real commitment is actually given. Operating within such a philosophical scheme, the artificial ends tend to arrest the process of growth by appealing to a previous concept of truth and value, or result in misdirected growth by failing to set a true course for the adjustment process.

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[49]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 139.

Furthermore, ideal ends, as purported by Horne, depreciated the significance of experience itself while at the same time it emphasized the mysterious and the supernatural. When the importance of experience was so neglected, little appeal would be made to reflective thinking, free and open inquiry into causes and consequences, and the pursuit of other natural relationships.

The logical intent of Dewey's philosophy was an attempt to merge ends and means. Critical of this condition, Horne concluded that such a philosophy yielded "only means and no ends, or means as the only ends."[50] The concern in this connection for Horne was that we are left with no "final values, [and] no absolute. Man himself is not an end, only a means, an agent of change."[51] Again, the strain presented in this context may be traced to Dewey's philosophy of naturalism and Horne's philosophy of supernatural authority. Horne's interpretation of Dewey's position relative to means and ends was quite accurate, e.g., means but not ends. A thorough analysis of Dewey's theory reveals means are means to other means, which in turn are means, and so on.

An essential implication in Dewey's theory must be recognized as this point. Dewey's philosophy of naturalism represented a break with traditional thought which established man

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[50] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

[51] *Ibid.*

as the dominant agent with the freedom to control social institutions and practices. By directing his energies and interests to the solution of his social problems, external agents held a significantly lesser role in directing the affairs of man. This identification of democracy with naturalism led to a depreciation of the social value which had before been associated with the philosophy of idealism and other traditional philosophical thought.

Aims for Dewey must be an outgrowth of existing conditions and should be built around problems and difficulties arising out of problematic situations. Rather than directing attention toward ends lying outside experience, aims ought to receive impetus from problematic conditions which are close at hand. It was Dewey's belief that such a posture was more likely to produce aims which would be flexible, more consistent with present needs, and certainly more meaningful in terms of making use of intelligence. Dewey believed that ready-made aims which served as the directing force from without tended to impede progress in growth as well as the total process of learning.

Although Dewey spoke of formulating aims, it should be noted that aims, as such, were worthy only as man attempted to realize them. From this point of view, the emerging aim was always a tentative one serving as an agent of transaction in the progress toward growth. The possibility of revising an original aim should always be realized and utilized when such is deemed appropriate, based upon its success, or the

degree of success which has been realized in directing one's activity. Only when aims were so developed could we hope to utilize an aim as a means of altering or changing undesirable conditions. Flexibility, rather than rigidity, was the significant trait in regard to legitimate aims for Dewey. Dewey's aims were experimental, tentative, and constantly growing.

Natural Development, Social Efficiency and Culture as Aims

1. Nature as Supplying the Aim

Horne first pointed to an inconsistency in Dewey's educational aims when he commented: "It is said that education has aims but no aim."[52] Horne's primary concern was with growth and democracy as these related to aims. He believed aims could not be separated from an aim. The attainment of suitable means could be achieved in the educative process only as general aims are identified within the context of an intended aim. His view was that growth pointed toward the accomplishment of democracy rather than growth in a general direction of democracy. Horne saw the ideal of democracy as that which merely served as the impetus for direction in the growth process.

For Dewey, the establishment of aims in education suggested one final aim subsequently subordinating all others to the primary aim. Furthermore, there existed an inherent danger in

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[52] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

effecting a hierarchial arrangement of aims. Ultimately, Dewey saw the individual subordinated to a fixed aim, if not subservient to external models or patterns of living.

That there are and should be general aims each supporting the other was a conclusion made by Dewey in this consideration as well as in other discussions. However, in order for there to be meaning and understanding on the part of the participant, these general aims must stem from a plurality of views, the value of each dependent upon its possible value in terms of making a contribution to a particular endeavor. Dewey called for a survey of existing conditions in an attempt to estimate relative value. Concluding this summary, Dewey declared:

> As a matter of fact a large number [of aims] have been stated at different times, all having great local value. For the statement of aim is a matter of emphasis at a given time.[53]

In a democratic society the position taken by Dewey relative to aims versus aim, presented a theory far more compatible with democracy and the educative process within such a society.

Horne's second criticism was aimed at Dewey's consideration of Rousseau. From Rousseau's theory, both Horne and Dewey analyzed education as a process of development in accordance with nature. The central theme projected by both theorists was that of nature and its function relative to growth, development, and aims. The role of nature as presented by Dewey was

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[53]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 130.

one which must be recognized, but the limitations of the function of nature was also important to Dewey. Where learning was concerned, nature both initiated as well as limited. Evidence of Dewey's position may be seen in the following statement:

> The natural, or native powers furnish the initiating and limiting forces in all education; they do not furnish its ends or aims. There is no learning except from a beginning in unlearned powers, but learning is not a matter of the spontaneous overflow of the unlearned powers.[54]

Dewey recognized that native powers played a significant role in learning, especially in the attitude of interest, physical mobility, as well as the recognition and regard for individual difference among the young. According to Dewey, the fallacy of Rousseau's view was his concept that nature was totally good. Ultimately nature subordinated social activities and dictated a negative restraint upon the positive uses of an individual's native capacities. Rousseau's emphasis upon the intrinsic goodness of all the furnishings of nature was attributable to the fact that for him nature was identified with God, and, therefore, wholly good.[55] Social efficiency was not a matter of concern nor a topic of discussion for Rousseau, except as he recognized that social arrangements could only interfere with the divine plan. Thus, it could only corrupt. Dewey's objection in regard to nature

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[54] Ibid., pp. 133-134.

[55] Ibid., p. 134.

and natural impulses was the excessive value man ascribes to them. When such forces are left alone to serve as the exclusive stimulus, an improper employment has been made. Translated into aims, such original endowments are neither viewed as good or bad, nor can they provide an absolute standard where their utilization is concerned. To do this would subordinate man's activity and a necessary restraint would be placed upon man's selections, especially in activities bearing a social context. Recognition of original impulses was necessary, Dewey believed, but the use to which they were put was the important consideration. In addition, such recognition, for Dewey, while not wholly supplying the aims does point toward the means of accomplishing desirable, educational practices. Dewey's pragmatic posture in this consideration was evident when he stated:

> But it is hardly necessary to say that primitive impulses are of themselves good nor evil, but become one or the other according to the objects for which they are employed. That neglect, suppression, and premature forcing of some instincts at the expense of others, are responsible for many avoidable ills, there can be no doubt. But the moral is not to leave them alone to follow their own 'spontaneous development,' but to provide an environment which shall organize them.[56]

For Rousseau, nature not only supplied the initial and limiting forces in all education but also furnished the ends and aims; thus social intervention could only interfere with

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[56] Ibid.

the divine plan. Stemming from a wise creator, original powers ought to be left alone, according to Rousseau. That Dewey should note Rousseau's association of God and nature was perplexing to Horne. The objection raised by Horne in this connection appeared irrelevant to the discussion of Dewey concerning nature as supplying aims.

Dewey's text was an attempt to assess properly the character of nature and subsequently project man's involvement relative to these native powers.

Horne would have preferred that Dewey had taken a different approach to such a discussion on nature, but he did not do so. Therefore, Horne's interpretation of Dewey's exposition may properly be termed incongruent and inconsistent when viewed in light of Dewey's text. In a sense, Horne did not address himself to Dewey's discussion, but instead attempted to interpret Rousseau. The result was that Horne's analysis became largely a theological question. Horne stated:

> Though expressing an opinion on the other views of Rousseau, Dr. Dewey does not comment on the view that Rousseau 'identified God with nature.'"[57]

Since Dewey did not elaborate on this view, it is strongly suggested that he believed such an elaboration was irrelevant to the salient points selected for his philosophical consideration. Furthermore, the fact that Dewey has not made the kind

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[57] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 152.

of theological assessments preferred by Horne, raises the question as to Dewey's interpreting Rousseau at all. It would appear that Dewey adequately summarized Rousseau's theory of nature and that he gave proper attention to Rousseau when he attempted to identify that which was right and that which was wrong in Rousseau's principles. Dewey's consideration of Rousseau and of natural development may be summarized in the following statement:

> . . . Rousseau was right, introducing a much-needed reform into education, in holding that the structure and activities of the organs furnish the conditions of all teaching of the use of the organs; but profoundly wrong in intimating that they supply not only the conditions but also the ends of their development. As matter of fact, the native activities develop, in contrast with random and capricious exercise, through the uses to which they are put. And the office of the social medium is, as we have seen, to direct growth through putting powers to the best possible use.[58]

While Horne preferred theological speculations, Dewey preferred to address his inquiry into nature and man and the significant relationship which existed between the two.

2. Social Efficiency as Aims

Social efficiency as a concept in Dewey's philosophy may be translated into two specific aims. One of these Dewey has identified as economic power or "industrial competency."[59]

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[58]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 133.

[59]Ibid., p. 139.

Life is dependent upon some means of subsistence. The significance of this statement is to be found in the means employed in achieving such subsistence. Dewey noted that these "have a profound influence upon all the relationships of persons to one another."[60] Implicit in Dewey's theory was the economic as well as the sociological significance. Injury to others may be the outgrowth of both extremes. The economic parasite who must be dependent upon the activities of others for survival ". . . misses for himself one of the most educative experiences of life."[61] Dewey further addressed himself to the seriousness of this condition:

> If he is not trained in the right use of the products of industry, there is grave danger that he may deprave himself and injure others in his possession of wealth. No scheme of education can afford to neglect such basic considerations.[62]

The economic component in Dewey's theory was a significant one. That such should be a concern for education becomes apparent when the focus of attention moves away from a form of government by the few to a democratic society. Dewey believed there was also a danger in an arrangement whereby the end becomes formulated as the result of an education which overemphasizes existing economic conditions. Specifically, the

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[60] *Ibid*.

[61] *Ibid*.

[62] *Ibid*.

danger was the concept of social efficiency as an end in and of itself. The result of such a view, if not democratically maintained, could be that the individual and his personal identity might be sacrificed. Dewey elaborated by making the following statement:

> There is. . . grave danger that in insisting upon this end, existing economic conditions and standards will be accepted as final. A democratic criterion requires us to develop capacity to the point of competency to choose and make its own career. This principle is violated when the attempt is made to fit individuals in advance for definite industrial callings, selected not on the basis of trained original capacities, but on that of wealth or social status of parents.[63]

Dewey concluded that efficiency meant simply that provision should be made for the individual to share in a give and take experience. "In the broadest sense, social efficiency is nothing less than that socialization of mind which is actively concerned in making experiences more communicable."[64] Dewey suggested a social doctrine based on a commonality of experience for both individual and society. From Dewey's point of view, this concept was most in harmony with breaking down the social barriers of social stratification which he believed made individuals unconcerned with the interests of others.

Horne's interpretation regarding the assumptions presented by Dewey suggested a basic agreement and consensus. In addition

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[63] Ibid., pp. 139-140.

[64] Ibid., p. 141.

to identifying efficiency with the development of power, Horne added another dimension to the term "efficiency." To Dewey's concept Horne added the element of "economy in the application of power. The term refers to machines as well as to persons."[65] Thus, efficiency was given increased meaning when viewed with its counterpart, economy. To some extent the degree of efficiency may be determined by the ease which accompanies how one does things or gets things done. Although the element of economy was implicit in Dewey's theory, Horne's further consideration enhanced rather than diminished Dewey's interpretation of social efficiency as aims. The human quality in efficiency was also recognized and promoted by Horne. Alluding to Dewey's suggestions, Horne stated: ". . . there must be much of humanity in efficiency to save it from being mechanical."[66] In applauding Dewey for his interpreation of social efficiency as an education aim, Horne concluded: ". . . here is indeed social efficiency, humanism at its best."[67]

3. Culture as Aim

The chief criticism made by Horne in this discussion was of Dewey's analysis which concluded that culture and social efficiency could best be understood when viewed as synonymous.

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[65]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 156.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Ibid., p. 157.

Again, tension between Horne and Dewey was the result of Dewey's insistence that a dualism must be overthrown. The dualism which Dewey rejected was the dualism of life in which two ideals have been projected as antagonists, one against the other. The question raised by Horne related to the extent to which the individual self is capable of sharing in an experience within the context of society. Dewey's position strongly suggested that a person should give all he can to society since he will necessarily receive from society. Horne contended that such a condition of give and take was impossible because of the unique and unsharable traits characteristic of the individual. His disagreement with Dewey may be seen from the following interpretation:

> . . . [the individual] can not give all he is to society; and. . . he can not get all he is from society. He can not give all he is to society, for that centre of consciousness known as the ego, the self, is an unshareable experience. . . . Another can not feel your feeling, think your thinking, see your seeing.[68]

For Horne, the close relationship between the individual and experience had not been as clearly realized as it had for Dewey. The relationship between the individual and society was adequately understood by Horne in terms of Dewey's perception. For Horne, the individual may well have contact with things about him, but this is not to suggest a necessary or possible interaction with those things.

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[68] Ibid., p. 160.

It is at this point that the dualism to which Dewey addressed himself may be identified. If the self is an unshareable self, as described by Horne, then the missing link between the two is mainly that of communications; that full and free intercourse which is an indispensable element in Dewey's philosophy. A personal inner holding conceived as something exclusive and known only by one man was rejected by Dewey since such a condition limited communications between individuals:

> A free give and take of intercourse. . . transcends both the efficiency which consists in supplying products to others and the culture which is an exclusive refinement and polish.[69]

Furthermore, the conflicting theory, as presented by Horne, presumed that reciprocity between the individual and society was unnecessary. For Dewey, however, a democratic society was impossible when culture and efficiency were viewed separately, neither relying on the other for its justification. Horne's concept of activity as related to efficiency presented culture in opposition to efficiency and the individual was left less an individual because of a depreciation of his uniqueness. Until a condition has been exacted whereby culture and efficiency have attained a harmonious relationship, each productive in terms of the other, the true elements of democracy were yet to be achieved when viewed from the philosophy of Dewey.

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[69] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 143.

Dewey warned against placing a premium upon social efficiency without due regard for the worth of personality. A division of values was viewed by Dewey as a "product of feudally organized society with its rigid division of inferior and superior."[70] The opportunity for full development in broad human interests was thus limited for the inferior class while the favored segment of society was left to develop fully as human beings. The inferior were further limited to providing external products which inevitably became fixed by-products in a culture where the individual had been subordinated.

The essential criteria for a democratic society, as viewed by Dewey, were eliminated in Horne's interpretation since free and full communication of shared interests were violated in favor of an external aim associated with "the false conception of culture which identifies it with something purely 'inner.'"[71] Horne's discussion of the inner personality which questioned sharing with society was descriptive of the condition which Dewey argued against. To Horne's theory, there appeared to exist a projection of a social division which eventually led to class stratification. Dewey rejected that exclusive aspect of Horne's theory which led to a dualism of aims in education. He stated:

> The separation of the two aims in education is fatal to democracy; the adoption of the narrower meaning

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[70] Ibid., p. 142.

[71] Ibid., p. 143.

> of efficiency deprives it of its essential justification. When social efficiency as measured by product or output is urged as an ideal in a would-be democratic society, it means that the depreciatory estimate of the masses characteristic of an aristocratic community is accepted and carried over. The aim of efficiency (like an educational aim) must be included within the process of experience.[72]

Further analysis of Horne's comments revealed that he was not, in fact, rejecting the concept of culture and efficiency as being synonymous. From his point of view they were closely related terms. A relevant consideration of each generally was to be made at different times, each associated with a separate set of conditions.

Activity which included a broad range of acts was the major criterion for Dewey in establishing aims as an outgrowth of culture. Culture and efficiency were harmonious counterparts when conceived with the spirit and meaning of activity. Although Dewey was criticized by Horne for his neglect of the individual and his unique, distinct qualities, it was evident that a genuine concern had been expressed in this context as well as in other considerations pertinent to Dewey's general philosophy. Especially was this true when viewed in terms of essential elements consistent with the development of democratic ideals.

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[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

Interest and Discipline

1. The Meaning of the Terms

In this discussion Horne turned his attention to the contrast drawn by Dewey concerning the role of spectator and participant. Horne's primary concern was that Dewey had needlessly over-emphasized the role of each when he viewed the spectator as passive leaving only the participant as the active, involved individual.

According to Horne, the spectator was properly seen as active to the extent that he was interested in what he was observing. In this context Horne suggested the possibility of something more than a passive spectator. Man may be a spectator, but he may well be an active spectator, especially if interest and attention are strong. The element of interest and its attachment to the individual became a focal point for Horne. His analysis of Dewey's discussion regarding the matter led Horne to conclude that only the participant could truly be viewed as an interested agent. Logically, Horne concluded "that being a spectator means feeling no interest."[73] His rejection of Dewey's theory, as stated above, was unmistakable and was worthy of close examination. He stated: "One may be a participant without immediate interest, and one may be a spectator without immediate interest."[74]

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[73]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 166.

[74]Ibid.

The immediacy of interest associated with an act was not so important for Horne as the possibility of interest as an ideal. For Horne such a distinction was necessary since it held significant educational value.

Surely, as a spectator one may possess interest in what one observes to be going on about him. By comparison, when Dewey asserted that the spectator was indifferent to what is going on about him, he did not suggest that some degree of interest would not be present. The fact is that as a spectator one is not involved in a course of action or activity intent upon altering or influencing the probable outcome of the event. He remains indifferent only to the extent that, as spectator, the interest associated with his observing does not create an involvement so that probable consequences will be seriously affected. Even if thinking was a part of the element of interest, as suggested by Horne, it was not that variety of interest which concerned itself with the intent of changing courses of action by projecting into consequences. From Dewey's point of view, the defect of Horne's interpretation was found in the variety of interest and the intent associated with that interest. At best, the spectator can only be viewed as a "restrained participant"[75] with heavy emphasis upon the restraining characteristic.

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[75] Ibid.

In Dewey's theory, the concept of active process must be recalled in order to understand the significance of his contrast between spectator and participant. While Horne's discussion was best described as a general analysis of the two terms, Dewey designated a more specific differentiation. For Dewey, the involvement of the emotions alone does not sufficiently suffice as an effective criterion for causing things to be different. Dewey viewed the mere spectator as he stood in the distance, and possibly in time, too far removed from the action. The essential difference between spectator and participant was that of attitude. The attitude, according to Dewey, must be connected in some way with personal interest and concern. His concern relative to the outcome of events was especially significant to him. He took note, therefore, not only of the immediate outcome or results, but also projected a consideration of long-range consequences and how these might affect the individual. The individual engages himself in the activity in an attempt to direct conditions. Interest combined with concern consequently serves to motivate the participant.

The significance of Dewey's analysis of this subject was clearly stated:

> Such words as interest, affection, concern, motivation, emphasize the bearing of what is foreseen upon the individual's fortunes, and his active desire to act to secure a possible result. But for an active being, a being who partakes of the consequences instead

> of standing aloof from them, there is at the same time a personal response.[76]

The second observation noted by Horne was Dewey's close identification of interest with effort. Although interest and effort may accompany the other, this was not necessarily the case in Horne's interpretation. Horne stated that "effort is an effect of an ultimate as well as an immediate interest."[77] As in earlier considerations, Horne divorced the two elements and thereby provided a kind of dualism characteristic of his theory and practice in education. He readily admitted into his theory two kinds of interest; namely, the immediate and the remote. For Horne, effort attained and sustained by remote interest may be equally as effective as that effected by immediate interest or interest associated with and found within the activity itself. Where immediate interest has produced effort, well and good. Where it has not or when effort lags, the remote interest must be relied upon even though externally imposed. If necessary, even forced interest must be solicited in order to accomplish a given task or fulfill an assumed obligation. While Horne perferred that interest result from effort, the absence of such interest did not negate the obligation even though effort must be forced.

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[76]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 147.

[77]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 166.

Obviously, Dewey finds a much greater validity in immediate interest. Dewey believed forced interest had a tendency to negate relatedness and connections between present conditions and that which the learner perceived. The element of perception was an element of learning which must be present at all times, according to Dewey.

The difficulty with forced interest, Dewey contended, was that there was no such thing:

> Interest, concern, mean that self and world are engaged with each other in a developing situation. To be interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. To take an interest is to be on the alert, to care about, to be attentive.[78]

Etymologically, interest denotes "what is between."[79] Educationally, what is between covers the difference between the student's present powers and the teacher's aims. When emphasis is placed upon the aims of the teacher, the focus becomes that which represents the remote limits, a condition destined to reduce the benefits to be realized from the intrinsic interest of the learner. The fact that such interest is remote naturally decreases perception. Between the present powers of the learner and the remote limits of the teacher was to be found the means, e.g., the conditions by which the "initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation."[80]

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[78]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 148.

[79]Ibid., p. 149.

[80]Ibid.

When interest is forced, these intermediate conditions fail to connect with that which the learner perceives. Dewey stated:

> To make it interesting by leading one to realize the connection that exists is simply good sense; to make it interesting by extraneous and artificial inducements deserves all the bad names which have been applied to the doctrine of interest in education.[81]

Not only in learning was the concept of interest worthy of serious consideration for Dewey, but also in the total school situation the student must be viewed as a living, growing, active participating person. A school which takes this living growing person out of his natural environment and forces him into another's mold without showing any necessary connections runs the risk of establishing the basis for one of the school's major problems, the disciplinary problem. To the participant the results of any activity do make a difference to him. He is never content to remain indifferent to that which is going on about him. He must be an involved organism if learning and perception are to be the outgrowth of instruction.

2. The Importance of the Idea of Interest in Education

Horne acknowledged with Dewey that interest and discipline were connected. However, Horne was not so concerned with how these were connected. If discipline must attach

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[81] Ibid., p. 150.

itself to a negative characteristic in order to effect a particular result, then well and good. Horne believed that even then, "effort 'through the acknowledgment of duty' may be worthwhile in itself and even lead eventually to interest."[82] It was with alarm that Horne viewed modern educational theory which purported to make learning a pleasant experience for the student. His position suggested a certain preference for the negative aspect of discipline and learning. The doing of something not of particular interest to the individual somehow presupposed the establishment of good habits of learning. Horne stated: "Fowls thrive best when they have to scratch for their food, and the law applies to human beings in search of mental refreshment."[83]

Horne noted that wise men of all ages have found habits of learning, regardless of their source, invaluable. Habituation of this variety, Horne believed, could only be achieved as the result of often doing that which you would rather not be doing. It should be noted that Dewey acknowledged the desirability, if not the necessity, for the development of a bent or disposition towards good habits. The essential difference between Horne and Dewey in this connection was the method employed in the attainment of habits. For Horne,

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[82] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 174.

[83] Ibid.

discipline with or without accompanying interest was permissible. Central to Dewey's theory was a close relationship of the two.

Contrasted with Horne's position, Dewey viewed discipline as something positive. He stated:

> To cow the spirit, to subdue inclination, to compel obedience. . . to make a subordinate perform an uncongenial task--these things are or are not disciplinary according as they do or do not tend to the development of power to recognize what one is about and to persistence in accomplishment.[84]

Thus, interest and discipline were seen as connected for Dewey; they were not opposed one to the other. In addition, the element of intelligence had meaning in Dewey's theory of discipline:

> A person who is trained to consider his actions to undertake them deliberately, is in so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the essence of discipline.[85]

In other words, Dewey viewed discipline as but a directive force whereby the individual pursued a particular course of action with full realization of his undertaking.

In the traditional views held by Horne there was a disagreement with Dewey concerning discipline. Historically, a certain safeguard had protected educators from intelligent criticism or inquiry pertaining to traditional methods and

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[84] Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 151-152.

[85] Ibid., p. 151.

practice in learning. If a body of knowledge had the approved classification of "discipline," it efficiently resisted questions and "removed the subject from the realm of rational discussion."[86]

Such a theory placed a serious impediment to views which encouraged serious inquiry into any realm of subject matter. Cultivation and growth of the self received little attention and neither did subject matter which had little or no value to life itself. The process of experience from which all educational aims should stem continued to be viewed as extraneous and thus separated from the learner. Dewey expressed disdain for this condition since he saw the damage produced by such a theory:

> Even when discipline did not accrue as a matter of fact, when the pupil grew in laxity of application and lost power of intelligent self-direction, the fault lay with him, not with the study or the methods of teaching. His failure was but proof that he needed more discipline, and thus afforded a reason for retaining the old methods. It was designed to discipline in general, and if it failed, it was because the individual was unwilling to be disciplined.[87]

Thus, responsibility was transferred from the teacher to the student in the traditionalist's philosophy. If failure or indifference to the task at hand resulted, the fault evidently lay with the student.

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[86] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

[87] *Ibid.*

Further evidence of the negative concept of discipline in Horne's discussion was found in his repeated demand for greater "conscious mental effort"[88] whether or not such effort was designed to promote growth as a constructive power of achievement. He implied that this factor perhaps surpassed all others in accounting for past progress. The consequences of Dewey's more modern view was not a subject of Horne's discussion.

Again, Dewey believed that an unnecessary diffusion of effort was the likely outcome of the theory represented by Horne. Separation of subject matter from the concerns of the individual, Dewey believed, served only to divert personal attention and interest and thereby diminished the educational returns from effort:

> The more indifferent the subject matter, the less concern it has for the habits and preferences of the individual. . . and hence the more discipline of will. To attend to material because there is something to be done in which the person is concerned is <u>not</u> disciplinary in this view. Application just for the sake of application, for the sake of training, is alone disciplinary.[89]

No significant criticism was made by Horne concerning the attitude held by Dewey relative to subject matter. Horne did not share the same concern in his analysis as did Dewey. In fact, it would appear that Horne doubted the significance of

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[88]Horne, <u>The Democratic Philosophy of Education</u>, p. 174.

[89]Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 157.

Dewey's deep concern in this matter. The fact that subjects exist as separate branches of study was not a major topic of discussion for Horne. The fact that these separations were often formulated as the result of classical divisions, likewise, was not particularly appraised by him. In fact, such a classification appears to be the logical formula for Horne in view of increased specialization. While admitting to a general view of wholeness to knowledge, an elimination of separate branches of knowledge would not be wise, nor practical, according to Horne. He stated:

> It is, of course, true that ideally speaking all knowledge is part of a single system, that all parts of knowledge are interrelated, . . . but none of this means that the unity of knowledge excludes various classes of knowledge.[90]

Both better and newer classifications of knowledge were foreseen in Horne's analysis of subject-matter. Nevertheless, an elimination of prior, traditional classifications did not need to be eliminated.

Dewey's analysis projected a theory of subject-matter which held far more serious implications than that described by Horne. This disagreement was far more than a matter of semantics for Dewey. In Dewey's analysis such divisions and sharply marked-off disciplines provided yet another dualism similar to that of isolation of mind from activities. Isolation of subject matter represented an educational scheme

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[90] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 173.

whereby the accomplishment of ends became the major focus and emphasis in that direction provided the warranted means to such an achievement. Regarding this, Dewey stated: "In the traditional schemes of education, subject matter means so much material to be studied."[91] The situation thus became one whereby the teacher was charged with the responsibility of covering so much ground, much like the activity of the farmer whose goal is to make ready the necessary conditions for planting his crop. Such a ready-made curriculum and arrangement of subject matter were totally rejected by Dewey since it presupposed that the subject matter arrangement possessed completeness and independence in and of itself. Essentially, Dewey's rejection was based on the notion that adherence to external arrangements was not only possible but that such was desirable. Sound educational purposes were seriously hampered by such a theory. According to Dewey:

> Having a ready-made existence on their own account, their relation to mind is exhausted in what they furnish it to acquire. This idea corresponds to the conventional practice in which the program of school work. . . consists of 'studies' all marked off from one another, and each supposed to be complete by itself.[92]

Such a completion of a series of events merely in order to complete a course of study seriously affected the outcome of learning and subsequently provided a depreciatory effect. In

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[91] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 157.

[92] Ibid., pp. 157-158.

addition, the possibility of increased intrinsic motivation was vastly diminished. Dewey concluded by stating:

> . . . it means that the act of learning or studying is artificial and ineffective in the degree in which pupils are merely presented with a lesson to be learned.[93]

Although varying degrees of criticism were aimed at Dewey's theory of interest by Horne, one in particular may be identified. The nature of activity as related to interest marks a particular variable in the philosophy of the idealist as compared with that of the pragmatist. Indicative of the idealist's position is the following assertion:

> The basic difficulty with Dr. Dewey's theory of interest is that the activity is by implication always physical. . . activity is conceived of either as play or as useful occupation. Perhaps interests are not something the self _is_, but something the self _has_. Our author's views on interest fit children better than adolescents and adults.[94]

Such a concept of mind as suggested in this philosophy represented a serious detriment to effective educational theory and practice, Dewey maintained. For Dewey, isolation again made this condition an impairment to implementation in instruction. Mind, thus conceived, becomes preeminent over things and facts to be known. Such traditional notions of interest were termed as "mythical" by Dewey when he stated:

> Mind appears in experience as ability to respond to present stimuli on the basis of anticipation of

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[93] _Ibid._, p. 158.

[94] Horne, _The Democratic Philosophy of Education_, pp. 174-175.

> future possible consequences, and with a view to controlling the kind of consequences that are to take place. Action that does not involve such a forecast of results and such an examination of means and hindrances is either a matter of habit or else is blind. In neither case is it intelligent.[95]

Horne's perception of Dewey's theory of interest implied that by activity Dewey meant physical activity in the literal sense. Such was not the case.

Dewey never accepted the notion that physical activity was a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of educational aims and objectives. He rejected the dualistic attribute of self as portrayed by Horne. Interests represented neither something the self is nor something the self has. Dewey's theory of interest demanded unity. Purely mental exercises pursuant to an accumulation of knowledge was also rejected since such activity did not engage the individual and his thinking and personal judgments in the selection of directed activities. While Horne's theory of interest ultimately resulted in an interest-effort dilemma, Dewey consistently denied that educational aims and ends were external to the self. The key to Dewey's proposal was unity. He believed that interest was initiated and sustained only when the self and the proposed course of action became united; the two, the self and the activity must merge into one. For the self, all ready-made aims and ends were rejected by Dewey.

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[95] Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 153-154.

The two were, therefore, in the process of becoming. He found no ready-made, fixed self existing behind activities. Dewey did not suggest that there existed no sense of unity where the self was concerned. However, unity had been achieved only when a consistency or balance was effected as an outgrowth of movement or experience. Until the individual was confronted with a problem there was a relatively stable balance. Confronted by a disturbance, interest would then be aroused and effort became the vehicle by which interest was sustained until the disturbing element had been successfully removed. Horne's traditional view on this subject tended to make interest a mere product of effort for it was effort which called it into being. The end, therefore, became the final step of the activity, thereby subordinating interest to that position which merely denoted the process by which the end was achieved.

The task of education, when viewed from Dewey's perspective, necessitated a greater personal responsibility than that stemming from Horne's frame of reference. The role played by educators becomes a unique one since subject matter and its attendant activities are now closely associated with the individual learner and his perceptions rather than a body of knowledge to be learned from an imposed, external force. Subject matter had to be organized in such a manner as would cause the learner to recognize the connections between the content of subject matter and the subsequent end or object.

Isolation of means from ends, Dewey believed, had a diminishing effect upon interest and its intrinsic value for the learner. Increased interest in the means could be expected only as the learner was enabled to see a close relationship between means and ends in the subject. Furthermore, Dewey felt that interest in the means would be more meaninfgul when a balance was maintained between the simple or emotional qualities, and the intellectual qualities of interest. Emotional qualities as depicted by Dewey were merely immediate reactions to a problematic condition, while intellectual qualities developed out of the problem itself.

In his discussion, Horne was especially critical of Dewey's theory of interest as it related to learning. In viewing the educational task, Horne found the intrinsic interests on the part of the learner generally unreliable, if not invalid. When placed in this context, Horne and other traditional thinkers subscribed to extrinsic means to motivation and learning. The result of such a philosophy was a projection of a pseudo-type of interest having a depreciatory effect upon personal meaning and perception.

Dewey readily rejected transitory interests as valid educational criteria. Present interests of the learner serve well as initiators, he believed, but they were to be viewed as starting points and not ends in themselves. As long as the learner came to view the problem as his own, Dewey found little objection to exerting strong means in an attempt to get the

individual learner in consecutively directed activity of an intellectual nature.

Divergent views were presented by Horne and Dewey relative to interest and discipline. The implications of each should be studied seriously when formulating a philosophy of education in a democratic society. In Dewey's doctrine a theory of education was devised whereby prime consideration was given to the individual. The task of education assumed a unique function. The teacher necessarily must strive to provide a variety of experiences and must provide an environment conducive to the diversity represented in the classroom. Dewey summarized his theory and at least two relevant implications:

> Interest and discipline are correlative aspects of activity having an aim. On the one hand [this doctrine] protects us from the notions that mind and mental states are something complete in themselves, which then have to be applied to some ready-made objects and topics so that knowledge results. It shows that mind and intelligent or purposeful engagement in a course of action into which things enter are identical. . . . It shows that subject matter of learning is identical with all the objects, ideas, and principles which enter as resources or obstacles into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course of action.[96]

The task of education was clearly identified by Dewey. Provisions must be made for an environment which allowed for a course of action to be developed whereby:

> . . . ends and conditions are perceived. [This is] . . . the unity which holds together what are

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[96]*Ibid.*, pp. 161-162.

> often divided into an independent mind on one side and an independent world of objects and facts on the other.[97]

Horne's theory concluded with a strong emphasis upon discipline, externally imposed when necessary. Little attention was given to self-discipline nor to increased effort resulting from sustained interest. If a particular occupation or duty called for work accompanied by drudgery, then the social implications might well dictate the nature of the action and activity. He stated:

> There will remain in life an element of discipline without interest. Our conclusion is that life, and education as a phase of life, may be interesting if they can, but disciplinary if they must.[98]

Experience and Thinking

1. The Nature of Experience

From Dewey's analysis of experience, Horne by way of interpretation, cited at least three weaknesses. He contended that in placing so great an emphsis upon the "interactive relation of the individual to his environment,"[99] the concept of experience was one-sided. This was due to Dewey's neglect of the interaction between the individual and other individuals. Horne's primary objection to such a theory was

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[97] Ibid., p. 162.

[98] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 178.

[99] Ibid., p. 184.

that Dewey failed to acknowledge the social aspect of learning by experience. While Horne generally slighted the social condition of learning, at this point he called for a return to such as a prerequisite to learning. In evidence of his belief that the social consideration had been omitted, Horne stated:

> And no educative process is adequate that does not profit by this distinction [between experience and intercourse] and recognize that the pupil learns from the teacher as well as from his own bodily activities and manipulations. In other connections Dr. Dewey emphasizes the social environment and virtues; it should not be omitted from this analysis of experience.[100]

Horne attempted to ascribe a keen interest in the benefits derived from societal involvements or from the interaction of individuals with other individuals. It is evident from his discussion that he had not in actuality called into play a plurality of experiences one with the other. His position was somewhat restricted and narrow. His discussion in this context does not directly concern the individual's learning through experience. Rather, Horne strongly suggested that the social matrix might afford opportunity for learning from one another. In the traditional sense, he viewed the learner as gaining much by way of imitation and emulation of the teacher. This theory as projected by Horne demanded little intelligent thought, interest, or concern on the part of the learner. As cited before, Horne continued to project a dualism

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[100] *Ibid.*

between social conditions and physical activities. Negating the notion that a unity between the two existed, Horne summarily dismissed further observation:

> From his teacher he may learn kindness, gentleness, sympathy, love, honesty, self-respect, and reliability, which are characteristic of social situations in distinction from physical activities.[101]

Dewey repeatedly demonstrated that the entire social matrix was a significant element in the environment. He consistently generated the importance of the environment to the life and growth of the individual, indeed of all individuals. The two could not be separated. When viewed in isolation, the benefits possible from the physical-social activities were vastly diminished.

In experience, as in other theoretical considerations, Dewey rejected all forms of dualism. He repeatedly singled out the evils resulting from the dualism of mind and body. When bodily activity has been subordinated to mental activity, the "obvious result is a mechanical use of the bodily activities which have to be employed more or less."[102] Dewey believed that experience was primarily an active-passive affair and not primarily nor necessarily cognitive. The relationship of the two constituents were combined in order to form a unique combination. He stated:

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[101] Ibid.

[102] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 166.

> On the active hand, experience is trying--a meaning which is made explicit in the connected term experiment. On the passive, it is undergoing. When we experience something we act upon it, we do something with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something to the thing and then it does something to us in return: such is the peculiar combination.[103]

In order to understand Dewey's concept of experience adequately, the term "consequences" needs to be considered. Horne criticized Dewey's analysis of experience as being one-sided. He cautioned that too great a stress was placed upon the physical at the expense of the social and mental set. As viewed by Horne, physical activity constituted experience, according to Dewey. Upon examination of Dewey's discussion, ample evidence is available to question the interpretation made by Horne. Indicative of his posture, Dewey declared:

> Mere activity does not constitute experience. Experience as trying involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from it.[104]

From Dewey's point of view, not all activity was productive, nor did all experiences constitute perpetual growth. Only when one reflected from the activity into subsequent consequences was there potential significance for learning. Only when changes made in the individual were noted as a result of such action could one accurately estimate learning.

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[103] Ibid., p. 163.

[104] Ibid.

While noting Horne's interpretation, understanding of Dewey's theory could best be achieved by a return to his fundamental principle, namely, "continuity of experience." As previously noted, the basis for discriminating among experiences could be ascertained only when attention was given to the different forms in which continuity of experience operates. It is in this setting that Dewey saw the close relationship between experience and growth. On the basis of his "principle of continuity," Dewey suggested that only those activities which condition future successful solutions to problems would lead the individual to continued growth.

Horne's discussion contained a division between physical and intellectual pursuits, thereby subordinating the natural impulses of physical action to the higher order of mental activity. In its application such a theory eventually subordinated the pupil to the teacher. The attendant condition was that learning would be prescribed and dictated by the teacher. An adherence to external, super-imposed aims and objectives must necessarily be dealt with by the learner for these directed him and his activities.

Responsibility and the opportunity for responsible decisions relative to learning was of little significance in Horne's scheme. Another negative aspect of his position was that the likelihood of continued growth in the educative sense would be diminished. Education so construed was therefore relegated to something which took place inside school. At a given stage in his

intellectual pursuit, education somehow came to an abrupt end. Thus, the concept of education as a life-long experience for the individual was further decreased in terms of meaning. The consequences of this abbreviated educational theory is that application to life and life experience is held to a minimum. The ability for individual thinking will probably not be initiated. Although the "what" and the "how much" of Horne's philosophy was recognizable, the "why" and "what for" was neglected.

Throughout Horne's analysis of Dewey's theory relative to experience and thinking, considerable attention was given to that which Horne believed was a serious neglect of the intellectual function. A careful study of Dewey's discussions revealed his sincere concern for the type of intellectual inquiry which brought about an educational bearing upon the occupation of the individual. Dewey believed and taught that bodily activities must not be allowed to become mechanistic or mechanical in their use. He believed that the senses were to be viewed as avenues to knowledge, not because external facts were somehow transmitted to the brain, but because they were to be used in connection with doing something with a purpose. According to Dewey, it was precisely when an act was permitted to become isolated from a purpose that it became mechanical and consequently non-productive in terms of learning.

Horne further suggested that Dewey's concept of thinking was entirely a function of experience, void of ideas and

"intellectual perception."[105] Again, Horne did not present a comprehensive statement of Dewey's philosophy. Certainly, Dewey objected to any view which separated mind from experience with things. Such a condition tended to place emphasis on things rather than upon relationships and connections. The matter of emphasis at this point was most significant for Dewey.

In order to assure that perception accounted for more than mere sensory excitation, Dewey believed and taught that perception must not be separated from judgmental activity on the part of the learner. Judgments necessitating thought must be employed if the function of perception was to be fully realized. To illustrate the importance of the kind of mental activity he believed would produce maximum meaning, Dewey stated:

> Words. . . are easily taken for ideas. And in just the degree in which mental activity is separated from active concern with the world, from doing something and connecting the doing with what is undergone, words, symbols, come to take the place of ideas. The substitution is the more subtle because <u>some</u> meaning is recognized. But we are very easily trained to be content with a minimum of meaning, and to fail to note how restricted is our perception of the relations which confer our significance.[106]

It was apparent that Horne was basically in agreement with Dewey in that a discernment of relationships was the genuine

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[105] Horne, <u>The Democratic Philosophy of Education</u>, p. 186.

[106] Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 168.

intellectual endeavor and consequently a major educative task. However, Dewey recognized that to stop at this point was to stop short of acquiring maximum learning benefits. Dewey clearly distinguished his position from that described by Horne:

> The failure arises in supposing that relationships can become perceptible without experience--without that conjoint trying and undergoing. . . .[107]

Stressing the important role of experience as associated with perception and subsequent learning, Dewey stated a reenforcement of his position:

> An ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any theory has vital and verifiable significance. . . a theory apart from an experience cannot be definitely grasped even as theory. It tends to become a mere verbal formula. . . used to render thinking. . . unnecessary and impossible.[108]

Similar to earlier interpretations, Horne believed an additional imperative was necessary which he had not found in Dewey's critique of experience and thinking. Even Dewey's concept of reflective thinking was inadequate for Horne since such an activity of thought must be appraised as resting in the realm of the physical. Therefore, it was viewed as lacking a sufficient degree of intellectual exercise. For Horne, certain problematic conditions, due to their nature, cannot be experienced and therefore cannot be tested. Even so, we

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[107] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[108] *Ibid.*

still continue to think the problem and fully realize that no solution is available--it remains beyond experience.

The central feature in Horne's interpretation of thinking may be best understood by a recognition of his attitude relative to projected thought or hypotheses. He emphasized that many of these were incapable of testing. Therefore, as such, the solution of these could not be placed within the realm of actual experience. Viewed from his standpoint, mind was engaged in a passive occupation. Horne's concept of thought, when contrasted with that of Dewey's, assumed a greater character of transcendentalism, intellectualism, and eventually found its posture anchored in a more philosophical adventure.

The passive characteristic of mind as identified in Horne's point of view, was evident in his discussion of this aspect of thinking:

> And so the last step of testing can not be taken. But we can and do think this problem, though the solution is beyond our actual experience. Here then thinking transcends experience, though growing out of it. Without such thinking the speculative element would be eliminated. . . .[109]

Although aware of a certain inherent weakness associated with this type of thinking, Horne continued to maintain its value. Apart from experience and remaining speculative and philosophical, Horne maintained that such thinking was "regulative of much human conduct and action."[110]

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[109]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 192.

[110]Ibid., p. 193.

Horne accepted Dewey's concept of reflection in experience. However, in order to achieve a more comprehensive philosophy, another step must be taken beyond the experiential. Only by advancing to this stage of thought can we hope to promote an adequate philosophy of education. Convinced of the value of forming intellectual constructs accompanied by transcendental reflection, Horne stated:

> For education this conclusion opens for use in addition to experience the realms of the unexperienced and the, as yet at least, unexperiencable.[111]

Incomplete though it was, thinking of the variety described by Horne found its justification as a warranted activity purely on the grounds of what might be its outcome. The accuracy of the outcome or conduct of behavior imperative in Dewey's tested hypotheses was not found to be a necessary prerequisite for the value of Horne's speculative-philosophical thinking. Apart from experience, it still remained a viable endeavor so long as we are led to some form of action as the result of belief, disbelief, or even indifference in any given situation.[112]

Further rejecting Dewey's concept of experience and thinking, Horne concluded: "We do not. . . need with Dewey to destroy faith in the transcendent world to make room for knowledge."[113]

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[111] *Ibid*.

[112] *Ibid*.

[113] *Ibid*.

Operating within such a framework as was purported by Horne, the elements of quality and validity in thinking assumed a lesser degree of significance than that formulated by Dewey.

It was suggested by Horne that Dewey had, in fact, reduced, narrowed and minimized thought by insisting that it be a part of the model problem-solving method--a method which adhered to reflective thinking.[114] Dewey rejected thinking which produced metaphysical constructs for two reasons: (1) metaphysics often leads us into transcendentalism; and (2) because such thinking was not prompted by problematic conditions. However, Dewey recognized that in some instances such thought might indeed lead to further inquiry and eventually revert to the problem-solving, scientific method for eventual solutions.

Even when this impromptu occasion presented itself as a possibility in Horne's scheme, it was inadequate because it reduced the problem-solving approach to triviality. At best, in Horne's philosophy, the problem-solving method was not viewed as intentional; rather, it came about as haphazard thought not necessarily arising out of a genuine intellectual problem.

In terms of Dewey's philosophy thinking or thought could never be viewed as passive. Reflective thinking placed in the context of Dewey's philosophy was an active process. Thinking, for Dewey, "is thus equivalent to an explicit rendering of the intelligent element in our experience. It makes it possible

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[114] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

to act with an end in view. It is the condition of our having aims."[115]

Essentially, Dewey believed it was necessary that reflective thinking be bound up with intelligence and on the basis of intelligent action the individual would then see new connections between that which he had done and its subsequent consequence:

> A separation of the active doing phase from the passive undergoing phase destroys the vital meaning of an experience. Thinking is the accurate and deliberate instituting of connections between what is done and its consequences.[116]

For Dewey, the situation as it presently presented itself was either a fact or it was a theory yet to be tested before a valid acceptance could be made. For Horne, an acceptance of an image construct without a prior percept might be justifiable. This he believed to be true and warranted on the grounds of intellectual necessity. The process of speculative thought necessarily became significant when the solution to any existing problem was beyond actual experience.[117] Horne believed such an intellectual concern must be maintained even though an assured conclusion appeared to be impossible at present or at any time in the future. In the meantime, it was sufficient that the individual acted as though

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[115] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 171.

[116] Ibid., p. 177.

[117] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 192.

his thinking were true or false, or even a matter of indifference.

Dewey found little satisfaction in the speculative thought because as such it rendered little in the way of new knowledge which would be dependable; therefore, the educative value of Horne's posture was doubtful in light of Dewey's theory of thought and its role in the educative scheme.

Problematic conditions of which solutions were possible existed in abundance in Dewey's outlook. Thinking, therefore, ought to be directed toward these situations. Only when so conceived could thought be projected as an active process whereby connections could be noted between that which is done and its resulting consequences. Without the possibility of reaching a conclusion or solution to a problem, of what benefit was thought except for its intellectual quality and content which was the view held by Horne.

Dewey insisted that a reason for thinking must exist if thought was to produce a projection of possible conclusion or termination of the original problematic condition. He stated:

> Only what is finished, completed, is wholly assured. The object of thinking is to help reach a conclusion, to project a possible termination on the basis of what is already given.[118]

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[118] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 173.

Horne maintained an identity with the traditionalists' point of view. This was especially true relative to thinking associated with speculative, transcendent "natural" science. Dewey rejected the a priori knowledge supposedly disclosed from this realm of thought. Such knowledge prior to and independent of knowing held little validity. Thinking, therefore, associated with such a condition held little educative value. Dewey insisted that productive thinking must originate within the context of a problem and that consequences of reflection must be observed in the process. Finally, Dewey sought knowledge which served to function in life situations. The quest for certainty in a problematic situation remained a central theme in Dewey's philosophy of active thought.

Dewey did not argue that valid thought was primarily intellectual or primarily physical. Such a differentiation was, however, made by Horne in his interpretation. In summary, Dewey placed his concept of thinking in proper perspective:

> While all thinking results in knowledge, ultimately the value of knowledge is subordinate to its use in thinking. . . and all knowledge as distinct from thought is retrospect.[119]

Properly interpreted, reflective thinking for Dewey amounted to thought with a purpose. Such thought must not be random or haphazard thinking. This latter may produce some knowledge, but at best these were the products of the

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[119] Ibid., pp. 177-178.

trial and error method. Knowledge, while associated with thinking, must not be equated with thinking or inquiry. The process of inquiry, for Dewey, was but the instrument used to create objects of knowledge. Knowledge, on the other hand, was the end product of the process of reflective thinking which has been critically tested and verified by experimental procedures. Therefore, that which leads to knowledge validated experimentally was characteristic of the process of reflective thinking or inquiry, but the process must not be confused with the conclusion. Dewey believed that those conditions which presently could not be verified must realistically be held in suspension until such time as the experimental method could be applied. Only then could problems requiring critical inquiry be solved or concluded. Apart from this framework, knowledge having instrumental value was not likely to be achieved.

Inquiry and thinking viewed from Dewey's perspective must have a more significant role to play than simply to function in the context of a philosophy which disconnects, rather than connects thought from verification.

Thinking in Education

1. The Essentials of Method

Horne recognized in Dewey's discussion of thinking as related to educational method, a parallel between his essentials of method and those formulated by Herbart. Rather

than concentrate on the educational significance and that which Dewey suggested for the improvement of learning and the school environment, Horne chose to concentrate upon a narrow theme. This he did by contrasting the methodology of Herbart and Dewey. He failed to analyze adequately the essentials in the method of projected thinking as proposed by Dewey. Horne wrote an interpretation of Herbart rather than of Dewey. Far too much attention was given to the Herbartian "method" at the expense of Dewey's concept of thinking in education and its attendant conclusions for present and future learning. Horne's rationale for providing such a comparison was his belief that "the contrast between Herbart and Dewey is fundamental."[120]

The emphasis of Horne's interpretation may be seen when he stated:

> Herbart is an intellectualist and Dewey is a pragmatist. Herbart believes the idea is primary and Dewey believes the act is primary. . . . Finally Herbart seeks an application of a truth already found, Dewey seeks the testing of the validity of the hypothesis by a trial application.[121]

Dewey did not see the necessity for making a choice between the idea as primary and the act as application. His theory did not call for a strong emphasis upon one at the expense of the other. Certainly he believed ideas served as

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[120]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 206.

[121]Ibid., pp. 206-207.

adjuncts in thinking, but ideas alone could not supply valid answers to questions:

> They define, clarify, and locate the question: they cannot supply its answer. Projection, invention, ingenuity, devising come in for that purpose.[122]

In this sense, ideas in Dewey's scheme provided that element which was the prerequisite for the leap from the unknown to the possibility of a known. Ideas continued to serve as the vehicle to projection, inventiveness and on into the creative realm. Ideas formulated between acts were viewed by Dewey to be important intermediaries in the learning process; yet, they were never final. The traditional concept which held certain ideas to be fixed, final, and fact was the concept Dewey believed responsible for the passive view of mind and learning. As a result of this condition, the mind was considered static, a kind of receptacle waiting to be filled from without:

> Activity, even self-activity, is too easily thought of as something merely mental, cooped up within the head, or finding expression only through the vocal organs.[123]

Dewey did not object to the essential of application of ideas. He did find objectionable the misuse of application when it led to finality. Dewey's views may be seen from the following:

> While need of application of ideas gained in study is acknowledged. . . the exercises in application are sometimes treated as devices for <u>fixing</u>

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[122]Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 186.

[123]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 189.

> what has already been learned and for getting greater practical skill in its manipulation. But practice in applying what has been gained in study ought primarily to have an intellectual quality.[124]

Dewey believed that ideas were tentative and incomplete. Their best function was to serve as intermediaries in order to secure "methods for dealing with situations of experience."[125] In other words, until an idea has secured an identity in an experienced condition the thought diminishes in reality and meaning. It is the application of the idea which serves to test it and only by way of testing can full meaning be attained. "Short of use made of them, they tend to segregate into a peculiar world of their own."[126]

Dewey again suggested that such a condition tended to isolate mind, the consequences being that a select group consisting primarily of the theoretical-minded class had developed. This class often found itself formulating ideas which social conditions did not allow the group to test. As a result, thoughts as ends-in-themselves emerged and formed a philosophy which resulted in a drastic reduction of learning.[127]

Dewey expressed concern regarding this position because of its inherent limitations:

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[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid., p. 185.

[127] Ibid., p. 190.

> Excessive reliance upon others for data (whether from reading or listening) is to be depreciated. Most objectionable of all is the probability that others, the book or the teacher, will supply solutions ready-made, instead of giving material that the student has to adapt and apply to the question in hand for himself.[128]

The essence of Dewey's concern in this matter, as reflected from the above, was that of further exposing the passive nature of traditional education. In addition, this observation was made by Dewey to exemplify a central theme in his educational philosophy.

At best, ideas remained tentative; they served well the function of providing a suggestion. Possibly they indicated a specific course of action which eventually would lead to full meaning as found only in an experential situation.

The terms experimentalism and scientific method, as interpreted by Horne, suggested a limited educational method. Indicative of Horne's view is the following statement:

> It is just the scientific method used by all experimentalists alike from the days of Galileo to Darwin. His real novelty and originality is in limiting the essentials of educational method to the essentials of scientific method. It is strong where education is scientific and weak where education is literary, historical, aesthetic, and spiritual.[129]

Horne emphasized specific disciplines and focused upon these in his attempt to analyze and interpret the scientific

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[128] Ibid., p. 185.

[129] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 209.

method. As a result, the significance of "method" as Dewey described it lost the broad implications intended by him in his theory of thinking as related to a sound educational method. Dewey believed that thinking as a process represented a method of educative experience. Relating this concept to instruction, Dewey believed thinking was productive to the extent that good habits were employed in the process. "The essentials of method are therefore identical with the essentials of reflection."[130]

Although Horne attempted to interpret Dewey's analysis of thinking and its relationship to education, he has, for the most part failed to come to grips with the subject. No discernible conclusions were reached, nor were any significant educational implications projected. He failed to assess adequately scientific method and reflective thinking. He concluded that scientific thinking was valuable only in the realm of scientific investigation and failed to recognize the significance of the scientific method as "method" which constituted an approach to verifiable knowledge.

The Nature of Method

1. The Unity of Subject matter and method

Dewey's emphasis on unity took into account (1) subject matter; (2) methods; and (3) administration.[131] Central to

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[130] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 192.

[131] Ibid., p. 193.

his theme in a consideration of these topics was relatedness. This was especially true relative to the close connection between subject matter and the attendant method.

Horne took into account these same topics. He recognized them as related, yet considered them in a vastly different light from that formulated by Dewey. Horne suggested an addition to the above list which included "the pupils and the teachers."[132] Failure to include the latter in the study amounted to "the impersonality of this system."[133]

Dewey was concerned for the individual as well as for all people in the environment in which learning was to take place. Basic to Dewey's theory was:

> . . . the connection of subject matter and method with each other. The [traditional] idea that mind and the world of things and persons are two separate and independent realms--a theory which philosophically is known as dualism--carried with it the conclusion that method and subject matter of instruction are separate affairs.[134]

Again, Dewey declared that any such division was false. His concern was not only that of promoting pedagogical soundness. Equally imperative was his firm belief that neither the student nor the teacher should be subjugated or subordinated to a higher, predetermined order. Yet, when subject matter was set in the framework of the traditionalist's view,

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[132]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 215.

[133]Ibid.

[134]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 193.

such was likely to be the outcome. Dewey believed that when mind and the world of things and persons were two separate realms then method and subject matter were separate entities. As such, subject matter assumed the characteristics of a rigid, systematized set of facts and principles. Viewed in this context, method necessarily assumed the role of how best to impress upon the mind a set of facts. Little or no concern was allowed for the involvement of the person who was to learn. Thus, an external approach to learning had been demonstrated, the effects of which have continued to present a persistent problem in education.

Horne's charge of impersonality in this discussion seemed unjustifiable. If method and subject matter were to be viewed as synonymous and subsequently implemented efficiently, the missing link necessarily became the individual learner.

The role of the individual may best be seen by Dewey's definition of method:

> Method means that arrangement of subject matter which makes it most effective in use. Never is method something outside of the material.[135]

From the above statement as well as further elaboration on the subject, Dewey seemed fully cognizant of the individual. From the standpoint of method, the individual himself manipulates the material of subject matter. Again, it is not something foreign being imposed upon the learner. Rather:

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[135] Ibid., p. 194.

> It is simply an effective treatment of material . . . with a minimum of waste of time and energy. Method is not antithetical to subject matter; it is the effective direction of subject matter to desired results. It is antithetical to random and ill-considered action,--ill-considered signifying ill-adapted.[136]

Any treatment of subject matter which applied an external impetus to learning was rejected by Dewey. The student's role where material is concerned was simply to utilize the material in such a way as to effect a purpose. To be efficient the student must accomplish this by eliminating wasted motion and energy. Thus, perception could not be accomplished apart from the perceived; likewise, the act must not be divided from the acting. As for method, this was viewed as that element arising out of the individual's experience. Furthermore: it gave meaning and purpose to present and future actions so that the product of such deliberate action would be most productive in terms of desirable results.

Dewey expressed equal concern for both student and teacher in connection with methods and materials as these were related to the conditions of learning. He abandoned the notion of sameness and uniformity in his pedagogical theory. When inadequate opportunities are afforded the learner to experiment and observe outcomes, both the teacher and student are denied the full measure of benefit possible from direct experience.

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[136] *Ibid.*

Teachers as the result of this condition are then thrown back upon other sources in search of adequate methods. Referring to this problem, Dewey stated:

> Experiences are had under conditions of such constraint that they throw little or no light upon the normal course of an experience to its fruition. 'Methods' have then to be authoritatively recommended to teachers, instead of being an expression of their own intelligent observations. Under such circumstances, they have a mechanical uniformity, assumed to be alike for all minds.[137]

The serious nature of Dewey's previous discussion regarding method, as well as the false assumption often made by others relative to learning was evident when he stated:

> Instead of being encouraged to attack their topics directly, experimenting by the consequences that accrue, it is assumed that there is one fixed method to be followed. . . . Nothing has brought pedagogical theory into greater disrepute than the belief that it is identified with handing out to teachers recipes and models to be followed in teaching.[138]

While Horne agreed that such a theory is sometimes valid, there are instances when separation of method and activity must logically be made. Horne seemingly recognized the evils of a mechanistic approach void of creativity and flexibility. Nevertheless, he contended that "much good teaching has been done on the basis of the five Herbartian steps. They are the classic illustration of method separated from subject matter."[139]

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[137] Ibid., p. 198.

[138] Ibid., p. 199.

[139] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 216.

From the above discussion, it was evident that the prescriptive approach possessed value for Horne. As illustrated earlier in this analysis, Horne believed learning was intrinsically good in and of itself. He often focused attention upon learning as a direct end in itself irrespective of other social factors and meaning for the one learning.

That "good teaching" resulted from following the five Herbartian steps raised many questions. At best, the implication was that emphasis was to be upon quantity, not quality of instruction. To assert that good teaching had taken place necessarily carried the implication of effective learning. To hold to the former without due consideration of the latter posed a contradiction of terms. Obviously, learning for its own sake was a familiar expression and was frequently used by Horne.

Dewey understood the traditional approach to learning as outlined by Horne. Admittedly, some learning might well be the outgrowth of an adherence to the formal, systematized method such as formulated by the Herbartians. Horne's favorable recognition of this method, however, overlooked many of the dangers inherent in such a system. Such a theory neglected individuality and focused emphasis on the ways children are alike. As a result, an acknowledgment of variety in methods as determined by the personal experiences of the learner was likely to be overlooked. Subsequently, the value to be gained from intelligent observation by both teacher and learner was

likely to be lost. Perhaps even more damage would result from the inevitable decrease of meaning for the learner when subject matter became just something to be learned. In making an assessment of these two views pertaining to the nature of method and subsequent implications, it would appear that the starting point and the point of consummation in learning had become confused. Indeed, they may well become reversed if careful thought is not attributed to the process. When such becomes the case, strict adherence to a single method or the following of specific steps identified in a method, may lead to a condition whereby the method actually becomes a deterrent and stands in the way of effective teaching and learning. Diversity, rather than singleness, ought to be the guide if, indeed, meaning for the individual is to be achieved. Diversity, uniqueness, and variation were identified as terms best suited to Dewey's philosophy.

Conscious of the concept which isolates methods from subject matter, Dewey recalled another false notion implicit in such an idea. Specifically, the two elements of dicipline and interest now assumed a new meaning and their combined function became less effective. Dewey believed that isolation of subject matter from method generally tended to minimize the element of interest in learning. Under such a condition, the alternative was to subscribe to other means in an attempt to motivate the learner. Whatever form these means assumed, the long-term educative value was vastly diminished. Dewey

determined that there were basically three ways in which to establish a relationship between the participant and that activity in which he was engaged in the process of learning:

> One is to utilize excitement, shock of pleasure, tickling the palate. Another is to make the consequences of not attending painful; we may use the menace of harm to motivate concern with alien subject matter. Or a direct appeal may be made to the person to put forth effort without any reason.[140]

It should be noted that each of these alternative measures assumed a negative, rather than a positive posture. Each suggested displeasure, rather than pleasure where learning was concerned. Each favored a preoccupation with the subject to be learned at the expense of meaningful participation and involvement on the part of the learner. Ultimately, Dewey saw that subscribing to these measures resulted in fixed attention upon the mere fact that something has to be learned, a condition leading to a self-conscious attitude resulting in a constrained, mechanistic approach to learning. Both the elements of meaning and personality likely would be neglected, a condition which tended to decrease the engagement of the word "process" in educational practice.[141]

A firm conclusion was drawn by Dewey from his comments on this subject:

> But when the subject matter is not used in carrying forward impulses and habits to significant results, it is just something to be learned. The

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[140]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 198.

[141]Ibid.

> pupil's attitude to it is just that of having to learn it. Conditions more unfavorable to an alert and concentrated response would be hard to devise.[142]

Throughout Dewey's elaborations, cause and effect played an important role in determining the best method to be employed in learning. From his point of view, when one has selected and arranged causes into an order best suited to productive outcomes, he then has a method of procedures or a tentative procedure. Method, for Dewey, must be viewed as a relative procedure as well as something which recognized and welcomed the ingredient of variety. Only in this way could methods best be defined and then implemented by individuals. Only in this way would the personal involvement and experiencing of the individual provide the kind of method characteristic of intellectual observation and "activity motivated by a purpose."[143]

2. Method as General and as Individual

The interpretation of Dewey in this discussion again led Horne to the conclusion that Dewey's views had upset traditional Herbartianism. In this connection, Horne projected an objection to Dewey's concept of method which held method to be both general and individual at the same time. Also objectionable to Horne was the view which held "that method

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[142] *Ibid.*, p. 199.

[143] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

is the art of uniting the mind and the subject matter, which presupposes a dualistic position."[144]

Horne believed Dewey neglected a warranted consideration of "special method" as applied "to a single field, like history, English or science."[145] Referring to the concept of method as both general and individual at the same time, ". . . Dr. Dewey would have the individual teacher or pupil work out his individual modifications of general method for himself."[146]

Another criticism was identified by Horne concerning Dewey's concept of general principles and their application to individual subjects:

> . . . to Dr. Dewey there is no such set of general principles; no method is general without being individual, and no set of principles is applicable equally to all subjects. . . 'special method' is the application of 'general method' to a single field, like history, English, or science. . . .[147]

From Horne's point of view, Dewey's views were disturbing because they violated those commonly held concepts pertaining to method. Methods which were held to be general and individual at the same time form the basis for the chief criticism found in Horne's interpretation of Dewey's discussion.

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[144]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 220.

[145]Ibid.

[146]Ibid.

[147]Ibid.

The tension existing between Horne's analysis and that of Dewey again stemmed from the respective points of view taken and the emphasis allotted to specific principles. Horne held to a universality of general principles designed to promote general methods. Dewey abandoned universal principles in favor of general methods from which the application of individual method was accomplished.

Dewey recognized the existence and significance of general methods. He did not, however, believe in the existence of a comprehensive set of principles, the accumulation of which provided the basis for reliable methods applicable equally to all subjects. The general methods recognized by Dewey stemmed from the fact that "there exists a cumulative body of fairly stable methods for reaching results, a body authorized by past experience and by intellectual analysis, which an individual ignores at his peril."[148]

But there was a vast difference between strict adherence to fixed principles as described by Horne and the intelligent application of general methods for use in teaching specific subject matter. The intelligent use of method was paramount to Dewey. Method must be viewed as intellectual by Dewey if it was to be an effective means of regulating learning procedures. In order for an intelligence to function, the teacher should always adapt, not adopt, particular procedures.

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[148]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 200.

For Dewey, unity in the concept of method as related to the general and the specific was imperative. Without such unity, Dewey quickly pointed out that "there is always a danger that these methods will become mechanized and rigid, mastering an agent instead of being powers at command for his own ends."[149]

Dewey not only recognized the existence of classic forms of method, but he also viewed these as complementary to individual or specific methods. His intent was not to denounce these, but rather to place them in proper perspective for effective utilization in the classroom. Simply put, "he [the innovator] devotes them to new uses, and in so far transforms them."[150]

Rather than opposing general methods, Dewey believed individual initiative and originality to be enhanced as a result of their existence. In summary, he declared:

> On the contrary they are reinforcements of them. For there is radical difference between even the most general method and a prescribed rule. The latter is a direct guide to action; the former operates indirectly through the enlightenment it supplies as to ends and means. It operates. . . through intelligence, and not through conformity to orders externally imposed.[151]

Since situations were not all alike, Dewey believed that the one best method should be considered a variable and dependent

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[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid., p. 201.

[151] Ibid.

upon the specific case or problem with which the teacher and pupil were confronted. In other words, Dewey believed and taught that specific methods emerged out of the general. The two methods in reality were not two, but one.

This distinction made by Dewey was a significant one for it served to clarify his theory of method as well as his view of learning. Dewey repeatedly emphasized that it was folly to suppose that any school, any teacher, or any student could be handed a model or method which could be viewed as profitable for all in all cases.

The value of general methods acquired from the past, likewise, was not overlooked by Dewey. These may prove beneficial to the teacher or they may be damaging:

> When they get in the way of his own common sense, when they come between him and the situation in which he has to act, they are worse than useless.[152]

In other words, when these were acquired intellectually and later used in the profitable solution to problems unique to the individual case, then they had constructive value.

The extent to which methods formulated by experts prove to be harmful or beneficial largely depended upon the personal

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[152] *Ibid.*, p. 202.

use made of them. If they reduced intelligent reaction, to this extent they must be viewed as impeding effectiveness. To the extent that personal judgment had been increased, methods of this type were held to be worthwhile. Such was the position held by Dewey.

Still another matter of concern was raised by Horne. Specifically, it concerned testing on a quantitiative basis. According to Horne, "the text would easily be interpreted to mean that Dr. Dewey is against it."[153]

As a result of analyzing Horne's discourse on this subject, it becomes evident that he has gone far beyond Dewey's treatment of the subject in Democracy and Education. He has left much to conjecture. Horne attempted to compare present findings with those supposedly projected by Dewey. This Horne set forth to do in order that he might identify a discernible contradiction in Dewey's position relative to Intelligence Quotient reports and their implications for schools, teachers, and the student.

It was difficult to determine where in Dewey's text Horne found reason to believe that Dewey was opposed to intelligence testing. This was not the intent of his discussion *per se*. Without doubt, Dewey indicated concern as to the use made of intelligence scores, especially as these

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[153]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 220.

had been utilized both by the classroom teacher and the school. In addition, there was ample evidence which suggested Dewey's disdain for homogeneous grouping as practiced by many schools. In his later writing, Dewey did make reference to this practice.[154] In effect, his opinion was that homogeneous grouping without due inquiry and consideration ran the risk of transforming a theoretical finding into a rule of action. Even this additional projection would hardly seem to be sufficient evidence to constitute a contradiction of his earlier writing. Dewey aimed at disclaiming any practice which placed great emphasis on the quantity of mind. Such a regard for the individual, Dewey believed, served primarily to abort originality and to fix capacities for growth.

Dewey's most vigorous concern in this matter was best seen in terms of his insistence upon the application of democratic principles to the individual. For Dewey, the question of intelligence scores was more than a rhetorical one. Nor was it to be considered in terms of mere academic conjecture.

Dewey held a far different view of intelligence than that held by Horne and tradition. Dewey did not believe the Intelligence Quotient score represented a fixed trait capable of determining the individual's possibilities for growth. Admittedly, the individual's capacity for growth and his potential for increased growth were factors worthy of consideration.

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[154] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

Even these, however, served only to discover limits and limitations attributable to a given individual.

Dewey resisted the concept which portrayed individuals as differing in the quantity of mind:

> Ordinary persons are then expected to be ordinary. Only the exceptional are allowed to have originality. The measure of difference between the average student and the genius is a measure of the absence of originality in the former.[155]

A democratic accommodation and provision for development of the individual's fullest capacity was clearly the aim of Dewey. It was obvious that Dewey had broken with classical, traditional views on this subject. He had denounced any educational scheme whereby the elite would be given prime attention. The task of the school and of the teacher was simply to provide an environment which welcomed all regardless of any fictitious notion of the mind such as that held by some traditionalists. Operating within this framework, the base was a quantitative comparison and represented a false notion. Dewey viewed this concept as doomed to failure. Certainly, it represented the antithesis of his democratic framework:

> How one person's abilities compare in quality with those of another is none of the teacher's business. It is irrelevant to his work. What is required is that every individual shall have opportunities to employ his own powers in activities that have meaning. Mind, individual method, originality signify the <u>quality</u> of purposive or directed action.[156]

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[155]Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 203.

[156]<u>Ibid</u>.

Any procedure differing drastically from the one described above, Dewey believed was an invitation to impose uniform methods for all. The result of such a condition inevitably produced mediocrity in all except the few. Additional adverse outcomes resulting from quantitative arrangements were noted by Dewey. He stated:

> And measuring originality by deviation from the mass breeds eccentricity in them. Thus we stifle the distinctive quality of the many, . . . and infect the rare geniuses with an unwholesome quality.[157]

Horne's interpretation of this portion of Dewey's text and the alleged contradiction relative to intelligence testing, was bent in a direction not intended by Dewey nor detected in the text. While it was evident that Dewey intentionally projected a departure from classical lines of thought, any further interpretation or elaboration would seem unjustifiable. Statistics cited by Horne relative to testing procedures in many cities failed to add clarity to his interpretation of Dewey's discussion. It was quite clear that Horne would not discard testing of this nature, nor would he abandon homogeneous grouping of students. According to Horne, "they are a notable and distinctive contribution to educational science."[158]

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[157] Ibid., p. 203.

[158] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 223.

Horne provided a strong argument for his position; nevertheless, his arguments in the final analysis proved to be incongruous in interpreting Dewey's discussion of this subject.

From Dewey's point of view, it remained that good methodology operated and flowed from, or was an outgrowth of contact with experience and observation.

3. Traits of Individual Method

Specific traits of individual method were selected by Dewey. These have not been cast as separate and distinct from general method, but rather as traits variable with the individual and the conditions in which he finds himself.

General methods continued to constitute the general features of the method of knowing. As outlined by Dewey previously, the features of general method which stood as applicable to all were: (1) problem; (2) collection and analysis of data; (3) projection and elaboration of suggestions or ideas; (4) experimental application and testing; and (5) the resulting conclusion or judgment.[159]

The specific traits of individual method, not designed to oppose general method, were identified by Dewey as the following: "(1) directness; (2) open-mindedness; (3) single-mindedness; and (4) responsibility."[160]

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[159]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 203.

[160]Ibid., p. 204.

While recognizing the adequacy of method, both general and individual, Horne found objectionable any attempt to differentiate between the two. Essentially, he called for a merger of the two since he viewed each as stemming from the same source:

> Really, it would seem that the steps of general method are also individual, and the traits of individual method are also general. Each individual in solving his problem should use the five steps of general method, and every individual in using the five steps of general method should exemplify the four traits of individual method.[161]

But the very strength of individual method as described by Dewey was dependent upon diversity. Individual judgment, individual habit, and individual interests all were viewed as prerequisites for originality. Originality and individuality remained for Dewey the necessary ingredients for effective personal responses leading to greater efficiency in problem solving.

For the sake of uniformity, Horne would combine general method and individual method, thus effecting a merger of the two. "The general method becomes individual, and the individual traits become general."[162]

The recognition of plurality in the application of individual method was significant for Dewey. Within this framework, tendencies unique to the individual personality were allowed maximum utilization:

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[161]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 229.

[162]Ibid.

> The method of one will vary from that of another (and properly vary) as his original instinctive capacities vary, as his past experiences and preferences vary.[163]

Furthering the significance of the traits of individual method, Dewey declared:

> But methods remain the personal concern, approach, and attack of an individual, and no catalogue can ever exhaust their diversity of form and tint.[164]

A sound rationale was expressed by Dewey in that individuality and uniqueness of personality were recognized and encouraged to flourish. A third element relevant to Dewey's rationale was that of individual responsibility and his attack upon a problem. The allowance for, and recognition of, variability in individual method demanded that consideration be given to projected consequences.

The view expressed by Horne which would combine general method with individual method might well be the simpler course where implementation is concerned. The tendency in the classroom would be to foster methods and conditions which were not necessarily conducive to personal engagement of thought. External rewards likely would become a substitute for genuine intrinsic motivation. In general, a negative attitude toward discipline would become the rule, thereby diminishing freedom

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[163]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 203.

[164]Ibid., p. 204.

of thought and creativity of action. Recalling this condition, Dewey warned:

> What is sometimes called 'stern discipline,' i.e., external coercive pressure, has this tendency. Everything that makes schooling merely preparatory works in this direction.[165]

Alluding to the necessity for consideration of traits and attitudes consistent with individual method, Dewey concluded:

> Expressed in terms of the attitude of the individual the traits of good method are straightforwardness, flexible intellectual interest or open-minded will to learn, integrity of purpose, and acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of one's activity including thought.[166]

Throughout this discussion, an implicit concern for a democratic theory relative to this subject was maintained by Dewey.

By comparison, Horne's comments for the purpose of interpretation have suggested a traditional, if not an aristocratic notion when projected into application in the school environment.

The Nature of Subject Matter

1. Subject Matter of Educator and of Learner

Although critical of the synonymous use of the terms educator and teacher, Horne accepted Dewey's usage of these

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[165] *Ibid.*, p. 209.

[166] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

terms. From the point of view of semantics, however, Horne differentiated the two. The slight difference in connotation has neither increased nor decreased the text of Dewey from the standpoint of meaning. The general nature of subject matter remained the primary theme of emphasis.

The second point of concern for Horne was the discussion in which Dewey centered attention upon "school studies as standards of current culture."[167] As a result of such emphasis, Horne believed the school and the curriculum became one-sided when put into practice. The primary criticism made by Horne was concerned with the associated terms "progressive education," and "child-centered schools." Horne noted that such schools had radically departed from the teaching of Dewey and had in so doing, "neglected the racial deposit of relations with society and nature."[168] Horne was essentially accurate in making this observation relative to certain schools which supposedly had adopted practices purported by Dewey. It is interesting to note, however, that this subject of Horne's interpretation did not represent an analysis of the discussion found in the text of Dewey.

In another instance Horne presented a more realistic declaration subject to interpretation and possible criticism.

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[167]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 235.

[168]Ibid.

Horne urged a far greater emphasis on past culture. He maintained a need existed for a set of principles to guide us in order to gain adequately from a study of past racial experience.[169] From Dewey's writing, Horne found a neglect of a proper study of cultural experience. Again, a philosophical strain may be seen in Horne's interpretation. The pragmatic concerns of current, experienced social interactions represented an inadequacy for Horne. Pertaining to this condition, he confirmed his belief:

> We need the recognition of mental assimilation without a necessary practical application. We need too the recognition of the worth of knowledge concerning social conditions that no longer exist.[170]

Even when knowledge was found lacking any present social or practical use, Horne believed:

> . . . we also need the recognition of the worth of knowledge that satisfies individual desire and interest. . . . In this sense, knowledge may justifiably exist for its own sake, and truth be its own excuse for being.[171]

Horne contended that Dewey had stressed the practical, utilitarian aspect of knowledge, without the supplement of personal knowledge, based merely upon individual desire and interest. His view was not that of holding to one at the expense of the other. The intrinsic value of this aspect

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[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid.

[171] Ibid.

of intellectual knowledge held some validity and warranted serious consideration so long as this position was maintained in proper perspective. Horne emphasized the importance of projecting this view into subject matter when he stated:

> It allows culture for its own sake, even hobbies in learning, and the social transmission of intellectual coinage no longer current for those whose fondness lies that way.[172]

The significance of Horne's posture in this consideration pointed toward the enrichment of a person's life and an expanded appreciation in the realm of the aesthetics. Certainly study, whatever the nature, ought to allow for attainments in these categories. From a study of Dewey's text, it appeared that ample consideration had not been given to these facets of knowledge.

Dewey recognized the necessity for combining into the context of human experience both the moral and aesthetic traits which Horne had described. At the same time, Dewey was again confronted with the task of reconciling another dualism, the dualism between culture on the one hand and everyday life on the other. Horne spoke of culture and the successful transmission of culture in a sense incompatible with that which was presented in Dewey's philosophy. Dewey defined culture as "the capacity for constantly expanding

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[172] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

the range and accuracy of one's perception of meanings."[173] and viewed the task of the educator as one whereby ordinary human experience was combined with intellectual, moral, and aesthetic qualities. In his view, cultural studies were not cultural because of their removal from life, but because they represented the systematized and refined wisdom of the race.[174]

Consistent with his theoretical discussions, Dewey placed great emphasis upon the social content and function of any course of study. The subject matter of the school and the ideals of the social group of necessity had to be connected. He insisted:

> The ties are so loosened that it often appears as if there were none; as if subject matter existed simply as knowledge on its own independent behoof, and as if study were the mere act of mastering it for its own sake, irrespective of any social values.[175]

Both Horne and Dewey made significant contributions to this discussion. In addition to emphasis and definition, the more important contrast was noted when the stage of development was taken into account. Horne's posture reflected the condition and state of affairs designated for the mature or the educator; Dewey's position took into account the nature and experience of the young, the learner. Horne focused his theory on results, while Dewey concentrated upon

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[173]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 145.

[174]Ibid., p. 213.

[175]Ibid.

the means by which the young accomplished that whole and harmonious life which Horne described.

The disparity which existed between the teacher and the student was of great concern to Dewey. Likewise, he viewed systematized bodies of knowledge held by the adult as a formidable accumulation, often impeding learning and growth of the young:

> From the standpoint of the educator. . . the various studies represent working resources, available capital. Their remoteness from the experience of the young is not, however, seeming; it is real. The subject matter of the learner is not, therefore, . . . identical with the formulated and crystalized subject matter of the adult; the material as found in books and in works of art, etc. The latter represents the possibilities of the former; not its existing state.[176]

Dewey recognized, further, that the attitude of the teacher to subject matter was vastly different from that of the student:

> Failure to bear in mind the difference in subject matter from the respective standpoints of teacher and student is responsible for most of the mistakes made in the use of texts and other expressions of preexistent knowledge.[177]

The significance of the difference in attitude between the teacher and the student made knowledge in the concrete a prerequisite for sound teaching. The importance of such a recognition was reaffirmed when Dewey stated:

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[176] Ibid., pp. 214-215.

[177] Ibid., p. 215.

> The teacher presents in actuality what the pupil represents only in posse. That is, the teacher already knows the things which the student is only learning.[178]

For Dewey, the material of school studies ought to perpetuate those meanings of current social life which were desirable to transmit. Further, it provided the teacher an organized form of the essential ingredients of the culture worthy of perpetuation. Dewey recognized the merits of scholarship yet insisted mastery of subject matter was not enough. The possibility of the adverse effects of this condition were evident, when Dewey noted some features of scholarship might actually:

> . . . get in the way of effective teaching unless the instructor's habitual attitude is one of concern with its interplay in the pupil's own experience. In the first place, his knowledge extends indefinitely beyond the range of the pupil's acquaintance. In the second place, the method of organization of the material of achieved scholarship differs from that of the beginner.[179]

The conclusion from the above discussion was that when mastered subject matter and the teacher became the focal points in the teacher-pupil relationship, at this point scholarship might indeed impede effective teaching. Herein was found the likelihood of allowing the two worlds of teacher versus pupil to exist whereby a false or assumed attitude relating to learning would be the outcome.

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[178] Ibid., p. 215.

[179] Ibid., pp. 215-216.

Another concern for Horne was identified when he quoted Dewey: "'in the last analysis, all that the educator [teacher] can do is to modify stimuli. . . .'"[180]

Horne viewed the role of the teacher as depicted by Dewey as too impersonal, shallow, and incomplete.[181] From the philosophy of the idealist as distinct from that of the pragmatic philosophy, Horne portrayed the role of the teacher as one responsible for far more than manipulating the environment. He stated:

> . . . the teacher not only supplies environment but is environment, not only modifies stimuli but is a stimulus. His contacts with his pupils are not only indirect through a situation he is handling but direct with a person in whom he is interested.[182]

Horne suggested that the pragmatic philosophy was both indirect and impersonal where the subject and the pupil were concerned. Greater insight would have been provided had Horne completed his original quotation of Dewey. In terms of the results of the educative enterprise, the concluding portions were both significant and enlightening:

> In the last analysis, all that the educator can do is modify stimuli so that response will as surely as is possible result in the formation of desirable intellectual and emotional dispositions.[183]

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[180]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 236.

[181]Ibid.

[182]Ibid.

[183]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 212.

The social environment for Dewey represented a significant element if meaning was to be provided in the sense of effecting an identifiable linkage between the individual and his knowledge.

From Horne's discussion it was obvious that he made a distinction between informal and formal education. But for Dewey, it was informal education which provided the basis for understanding of the subject matter contained in formal instruction. "In what we have termed informal education, subject matter is carried directly in the matrix of social intercourse."[184]

So long as knowledge remained justifiable for its own sake, Horne could accurately ascertain which knowledge should be in the forefront of the student's experience. The role of the teacher could then be viewed as director, rather than facilitator. The teacher could then be viewed as constituting both environment and stimulus. In this context, the teacher was in a position to manipulate the student, and in return the student's response to the teacher could be expected. The result of Horne's position amounted to a teacher-dominated environment, while for Dewey, the learning environment was one supplied and structured by the teacher.

Personal concern for the one learning was expressed by Dewey when he made the following comment on subject matter:

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[184] *Ibid*.

> The problem of teaching is to keep the experience of the student moving in the direction of what the expert already knows. Hence the need that the teacher know both subject matter and the characteristic needs and capacities of the student.[185]

2. The Development of Subject Matter in the Learner

Dewey identified three stages in the growth of subject matter in the experience of the learner when he commented:

> In the first estate, knowledge exists as the content of intelligent ability-power to do. This kind of subject matter. . . is expressed in familiarity or acquaintance with things. [Second] this material gradually is surcharged and deepened through communicated knowledge or information. [Third] it is enlarged and worked over into rationally or logically organized material--that of the one who, relatively speaking, is expert in the subject.[186]

Horne was quick to note ". . . the pragmatic emphasis upon knowledge as control of a situation. This is the only thing in the first stage, and the main thing in the other two stages."[187]

All three stages of learning as presented by Dewey were analyzed by Horne. He injected into this interpretation a recognition of the usefulness of the pragmatic theory of knowledge, especially since it connected knowledge with action. As in earlier analyses, the pragmatic view was not necessarily rejected. Horne simply believed such a view did not go far enough where knowledge was concerned.

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[185] Ibid., p. 216.

[186] Ibid., pp. 216-217.

[187] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 245.

For the most part, Horne believed the individual was restricted by the terms practical and experienced. He believed:

> We know and enjoy much that we can not use. We understand and appreciate much that we have not experienced, though something similar has been experienced. The point that pragmatism misses here is that we can know by reason the unexperienced and unexperienceable. And life is much richer because of our ability to transcend experience in some forms of knowledge.[188]

Dewey's thought was basically intellectual and social; Horne, injecting a contrasting view, added a third dimension, namely, the appreciative. Transcending experience as a mode of increasing the appreciative capacity represented a valid and necessary exercise for Horne. Dewey rejected this form of information because it consisted of knowing about something without knowing it in a personal, meaningful way. Informational knowledge of the type described by Horne was viewed differently by Dewey. While both theorists recognized the potential for the appreciative, the value found in this form of knowledge was secondary for Dewey except when taken into account for its instrumental value. A similarity between the idealistic and pragmatic philosophies was again noted at this point:

> Informational knowledge is the material which can be fallen back upon as given, settled, established, assured in a doubtful situation. It is a

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[188] *Ibid*.

> kind of bridge for mind in its passage from doubt to discovery. It has the office of an intellectual middleman.[189]

Dewey's initial stage embodied the power to do or attainment of knowledge of "how to do."[190] The instrumental emphasis placed upon knowledge by Dewey was further confirmed when he stated:

> When education. . . fails to recognize that primary or initial subject matter always exists as matter of an active doing. . . the subject matter of instruction is isolated from the needs and purposes of the learner, and so becomes just a something to be memorized and reproduced upon demand. . . the natural course of development, on the contrary, always sets out with situations which involve learning by doing. Arts and occupations form the initial stage of the curriculum, corresponding as they do to knowing how to go about the accomplishment of ends.[191]

The application of the scientific method to learning caused Horne to conclude that learning-knowledge was void of the emotional quality. In addition, the role of science in the development of subject matter made Dewey's theory essentially an intellectual endeavor. This was especially true when Horne considered the third or technical phase of study as outlined by Dewey. Viewing this situation Horne called for another element as a supplement to Dewey's treatment:

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[189] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 221.

[190] Ibid., p. 217.

[191] Ibid.

> Still, something essential is lacking. It is the appreciative aspect of experience. Subject matter is more than knowledge, even if all three stages of knowledge are present. It is the emotional aspect of experience, always present, always giving a characteristic tone. . . .[192]

It may be concluded that an intentional, designed consideration for the emotional and appreciative aspects of learning were not identified in Dewey's writing. If these were not provided for nor acknowledged by implication, Horne's criticism was justified. Yet, meaning and personal experience were stressed throughout Dewey's analysis. Evidence of the emotional and appreciative elements was found in Dewey's theory although these possessed a different connotation and were presented from a different frame of reference than that found in Horne:

> Wisdom has never lost its association with the proper direction of life. Only in education. . . does knowledge mean primarily a store of information aloof from doing.[193]

Further stressing the personable and emotional attributes of the pragmatic posture, Dewey stated:

> Knowledge of things in that intimate and emotional sense suggested by the word acquaintance is a precipitate from our employing them with a purpose. This attitude carries with it a sense of congeniality or friendliness, of ease and illumination.[194]

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[192]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 246.

[193]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 218.

[194]Ibid.

In addition, Dewey's treatment of the social aspect of subject matter provided that needed supplement to the intellectual experience. The place of communications continued to play a significant role in Dewey's theory. Within this context it was likely that both the appreciation aspects as well as the emotional ones came into existence for Dewey:

> In so far as we are partners in common undertakings, the things which others communicate to us as the consequences of their particular share in the enterprise blend at once into the experience resulting from our own special doing.[195]

Furthermore, Dewey provided a criterion for estimating the value of informational material found in school:

> The place of communication in personal doing supplies us with a criterion for estimating the value of informational material in school. Does it grow naturally out of some question with which the student is concerned? Does it fit into his more direct acquaintance so as to increase its efficacy and deepen its meaning? If it meets these two requirements, it is educative. The amount heard or read is of no importance--the more the better, provided the student has a need for it and can apply it in some situation of his own.[196]

Horne pointed out that all individuals know some things which he could never use in controlling a practical situation. This was well and good. That such a condition existed, Dewey did not disagree. The quality of knowledge and personal meaning were significant signals when Dewey discussed the acquisition of knowledge. The variety and framework of

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[195] Ibid., p. 219.

[196] Ibid.

knowledge about which Horne spoke was of lesser consequence for Dewey and therefore warranted the lesser consideration. Merely identifying with knowledge as the result of another's distributing it to the individual was a dangerous practice, Dewey warned. The legacy of knowledge could not be assumed immediately by the individual when merely acquired by verbal transmission from one person to another.

Dewey warned against what he considered a faulty view relative to quantitative knowledge.[197] He recognized that such material existed in tremendous volume, but cautioned that such must not be confused with the true nature of knowledge itself. Dewey recognized there was a record of knowledge existing outside of inquiry, yet such knowledge was weak in furnishing us with resources for further inquiry. He seriously doubted that information of this type should be construed as knowledge. Dewey further suggested that as a result of this condition educators and learners alike have merely identified with knowledge void of understanding and meaning on the part of the individual to whom such knowledge has been communicated. Dewey believed that a very real danger existed when information of this variety came to dominate the process of institutions of learning at all levels and stages. Skepticism was evident in Dewey when he made the following charge:

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[197] *Ibid*.

> Probably the most conspicuous connotation of the word knowledge for most persons today is just the body of facts and truths ascertained by others; the material found in the rows and rows of atlases, cyclopedias, histories, biographies, books of travel, scientific treatises, on the shelves of libraries.[198]

Horne displayed little concern for this argument. In fact, he believed these features might indeed provide the avenues to the possession of genuine knowledge:

> We do not have to do anything else about it to make it knowledge for us. We can know what others tell us without testing it for ourselves. Most of our knowledge is of this type.[199]

For Horne, no response to the raw material of informational knowledge was necessary. Because knowledge of this variety might or might not possess meaning for the receiver, Dewey viewed it as faulty. Also missing from this point of view was the power to promote added significance to future situations and to solutions of future problems.

Knowledge, for Dewey, presupposed a motive power to do, to perceive, to apprehend, and to move the recipient in a direction. Outside this framework, the quest for certainty would make little progress. Concerning the above discussion, it should be noted that Dewey differentiated between intellectual certainty and our own certainty:

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[198] Ibid., p. 220.

[199] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 246.

> In its honorable sense, knowledge is distinguished from opinion, guesswork, speculation, and mere tradition. In knowledge, things are ascertained; they are so and not dubiously otherwise. The undisciplined mind is averse to. . . intellectual hesitation; it is prone to assertion. It likes things undisturbed, settled, and treats them as such without due warrant. Ignorance gives way to opinionated and current error,--a greater foe to learning than ignorance itself.[200]

Still a further contrast was identified by Dewey and that was the personal, intrinsic nature of knowledge which was the outgrowth of an internalized process of learning:

> . . . one receives what is indeed knowledge for others, but for him it is a stimulus to knowing. His acquisition of knowledge depends upon his response to what is communicated.[201]

As a safeguard against the accumulation of dubious knowledge, Dewey projected the method of science as the most valid approach to knowledge and learning. He stated:

> Science is a name for knowledge in its most characteristic form. It represents in its degree, the perfected outcome of learning,--its consummation. What is known. . . is what is sure, certain, settled, disposed of; that which we think with rather than that which we think about.[202]

Such a characterization served further to point out fundamental traits which differentiate the pragmatic philosophy from the idealistic.

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[200] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 222.

[201] Ibid., p. 221.

[202] Ibid., pp. 221-222.

Dewey believed that the cultural heritage was but raw material which served to connect the child with the past, but this was not the end of the process. Out of the interaction of the child with the raw materials--the child, on the basis of intelligence--saw new connections and as a consequence new experiences resulted:

> Science represents the safeguard of the race against these natural propensities and the evils which flow from them. Without initiation into the scientific spirit one is not in possession of the best tools which humanity has so far devised for effectively directed reflection. For he does not become acquainted with the traits that mark off opinion and assent from authorized conviction.[203]

Dewey emphasized the importance of a thorough study of subject matter materials. His view of subject matter, however, was different from that held by Horne. The chief difference was that Dewey believed subject matter was simply raw material which had to undergo certain transformations as it was internalized by the individual. Then and only then could it be described as having been a part of cognitive experience. Dewey also emphasized the instrumental character of objects of knowledge. Knowledge was never immediate. It always stood at the conclusion of a successful process of reflective inquiry.

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[203] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

The assignment of science was not, as intimated by Horne, an intellectual exercise in the pursuit of knowledge:

> Not organization but the kind of organization effected by adequate methods of tested discovery marks off science. It is organized on the basis of relation of means to ends--practically organized. Its organization as knowledge. . . is incidental to its organization. But scientific subject matter is organized with specific reference to the successful conduct of the enterprise of discovery, to knowing as a specialized undertaking.[204]

Summarizing, Dewey called for a carefully developed subject matter leading to sequential activities on the part of the learner. Content was determined by experience which took place interactively between: (1) the learner as he experiences; and (2) the object or thing in the environment. "But experience makes us aware that there is a difference between intellectual certainty of subject matter and our certainty."[205]

In addition to the three phases of structure outlined by Dewey previously in this discussion, Horne identified another stage which he designated as the speculative or metaphysical.[206]

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[204] Ibid., pp. 223-224.

[205] Ibid., p. 222.

[206] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 246.

Beyond the intellectual standpoint,

> Man can think about what he does not know, may never know. Yet such thinking may be disciplined by the canons of self-consistency and consistency with the known. Such thinking, not being verifiable, is non-scientific.[207]

The "larger realities" interjected by Horne were to be disciplined by self-consistency and consistency with the known. As the result of examination, it appeared that a resemblance existed similar to the theory of Dewey relative to growth and continuity of experience. However, in the context of Horne's framework the intent of such thinking was quite different from that presented by Dewey as reflective thinking. Horne's thinking remained a passive condition of mind lacking in intelligent direction. Only in the philosophy of the idealist would this fourth stage in the development of subject matter be admissible. It remained speculative and metaphysical. Further indicative of Horne's attempt to combine idealistic elements into the pragmatic position was his final summary of this discussion:

> When the appreciative aspect of experience is joined with the speculative, one result may be a spiritual interpretation of the universe, leading to a religious attitude on the part of the learner. . . it too should form one phase of subject matter.[208]

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[207] *Ibid*.

[208] *Ibid*., p. 247.

In reality, Horne's interpretation of this segment of Dewey's text must be viewed as an enlargement of the philosophical tenets found in pragmatism. The views presented by Dewey adequately recognized the intellectual, emotional, scientific as well as the social aspects. He omitted the speculative or metaphysical thought; the religious attitude was not discussed in his text because its treatment would have represented an inconsistency in his philosophy. The end result would have been to include Horne's fourth stage, the metaphysical.

Dewey's resolution posed a serious problem. One was the difficulty of establishing curricular priorities; the other was the necessity of obtaining and maintaining teachers who were truly artists--well informed and imaginative. The effective implementation of Dewey's theory was more or less dependent upon the latter.

Dewey concluded that teaching must be viewed in terms of art. It remained that science refined this process and served to effect successful conduct to the enterprise of discovery and subsequently to intellectually ascertained knowledge:

> The positive principle is maintained when the young begin with active occupations having a social origin and use, and proceed to a scientific insight in the materials and laws involved, through assimilating into their more direct experience the ideas and facts communicated by others who have had a larger experience.[209]

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[209]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 227.

The implications of this theory were significant ones. They meant the teacher must possess sufficient ideas, meanings, and concepts so that he could aid students in the pursuit of understanding. Furthermore, Dewey's theory provided the teacher with a sense of direction, yet this did not place him in the role of supreme director. Providing an environment which encouraged the student to gain greater insights on his own was a major objective of Dewey's scheme. The creative teacher would necessarily have to develop his own sense of the appropriate. At times he would endeavor to place the student in situations that would cause him to arrive at conclusions considered significant by the teacher; at other times, the student would be confronted with less structured conditions designed to lead him to original or novel considerations and outcomes not necessarily anticipated by either the student or the teacher. In spite of traditional pedagogy, Dewey refused to present a systematized methodological formula which would serve as the deciding factor for the teacher in determining when and how to employ a particular emphasis.

3. Subject Matter as Social

Horne believed the rights of individuals were merely social rights as these were analyzed by Dewey. Horne's interpretation was limited in terms of Dewey's theory of subject matter and social rights. Horne presented the view that Dewey projected only the rights of individuals as social rights, thereby casting individual rights in the shadow of

the social element, "but they are the rights of common men and women."[210] Horne believed disharmony could be found in Dewey's discussion of this subject and found himself unable to identify the elements which would have unified Dewey's theory:

> . . . the activity element in his doctrine and the social element in his doctrine are not well unified. The activity element ties knowledge down to occupation with, and manipulation of, material things; the social element drops the material and stresses social problems, responsibility, insight, and interest.[211]

In Horne's judgment, such disharmony "would disappear in case the theory of knowledge as exclusively intelligent control of a material situation were surrendered."[212]

Horne did not discuss a curriculum and a subject matter best suited for a democracy. Nevertheless, this subject was a major concern for Dewey. Set statements concerning appropriate subject matter for all individuals were rejected. He warned of the temptation for the educator "to conceive of his task in terms of the pupil's ability to appropriate and reproduce the subject matter. . . irrespective of its organization into his activities as a developing social member."[213]

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[210]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 249.

[211]Ibid.

[212]Ibid.

[213]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 227.

Horne concluded that the disharmony in Dewey's writing was traceable to a theory of knowledge dependent upon intellectual control of the material situation.

Contrary to the above interpretation, Dewey differentiated and expressed concern for both the intellectual and the social aspects as each related to subject matter. Relative to social control and subject matter Dewey confirmed his position:

> . . . our prior remarks have been mainly concerned with its intellectual aspect. A difference in breadth and depth exists even in vital knowledge; even in the data and ideas which are relevant to real problems. . . motivated by purposes. For there is a difference in the social scope of purposes and the social importance of problems. . . education should use a criterion of social worth.[214]

Dewey's social dimension of learning was best understood in terms of the biological emphasis of instrumentalism. It was the biological-social concept which Dewey promoted. Viewed from this standpoint, man's capacity to think reflectively in dealing with problems in his environment was largely dependent upon the use of language, meanings discovered, and other instruments of thought which were the product of human experience. Growth of individuals or of societies was dependent upon an appropriation of knowledge and subsequently bringing thought processes to bear on life situations. Such an adaptation of learning and thinking was consistent with Dewey's theory of evolutionary development. Dewey believed the social

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[214] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

experience remained as the medium which transformed physical nature. Although physical stimuli were furnished by nature, the interpretation given to these by society determined their significance:

> All information and systematized scientific subject matter have been worked out under the conditions of social life and have been transmitted by social means. The scheme of a curriculum must take account of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the existing community life; it must select with the intention of improving the life we live in common so that the future shall be better than the past.[215]

Dewey expressed the belief that it was necessary to establish a priority in the formulation of an effective curriculum. The curriculum must be planned making special reference to:

> . . . placing essentials first, and refinements second. The things which are socially most fundamental, that is, which have to do with the experiences in which the widest groups share, are the essentials. The things which represent the needs of specialized groups and technical pursuits are secondary.[216]

Horne failed to note the two important attributes relating to subject matter and the real task of education. Implicit in Dewey's philosophical efforts were the elements of humanism and democracy. It was difficult to determine Horne's reason for this omission. Dewey viewed these two traits as uniquely related, one dependent upon the other. And learning itself he viewed as a human, social, and moral problem.

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[215] *Ibid*.

[216] *Ibid*.

"There is truth in the saying that education must first be human and only after that professional."[217] It was clear from Dewey's discussion that he had not alluded to "humanism" in terms of a specialized class.[218] Nor did he have in mind classical humanism in which men of leisure become preoccupied with the preservation of classic traditions. Aware of this traditional tendency frequently adhered to by many, Dewey warned: "They forget that material is humanized in the degree in which it connects with the common interests of men as men."[219]

Furthermore, he urged:

> Democratic society is peculiarly dependent for its maintenance upon the use in forming a course of study of criteria which are broadly human. Democracy cannot flourish where the chief influences in selecting subject matter of instruction are utilitarian ends narrowly conceived for the masses, and, for the higher education of the few, the traditions of a specialized cultivated class.[220]

Dewey viewed the school as a planned agency which provided the opportunity for all to profit from education. The school and the curriculum were to be designed in such a way as to promote the concept of universal schooling whereby every individual could continue his education throughout his lifetime.

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[217] Ibid.

[218] Ibid.

[219] Ibid.

[220] Ibid., pp. 225-226.

Growth in terms of education was to be effected as the result of his pursuing a deeper meaning and refinement in every realm of experience.

Dewey believed that those subjects designated as liberal or illiberal should not form the basis of the essentials in the curriculum. These conditions, Dewey believed, infected education and were "based upon ignorance of the essentials needed for realization of democratic ideals."[221]

Concern for the establishment of a curriculum which was consistent with the problems of common humanity was also expressed by Dewey:

> A curriculum which acknowledges the social responsibilities of education must present situations where problems are relevant to the problems of living together, and where observation and information are calculated to develop social insight and interest.[222]

There is confusion in Horne's interpretation. This was especially evident when he attempted to identify the real task of the educator.

Concerning Dewey's theory of the social aspect of subject matter, Horne declared: ". . . the activity element in his doctrine and the social element in his doctrine are not well unified."[223] Horne's interpretation strongly suggested neither the activity element nor the social had been fully

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[221] Ibid., p. 226.

[222] Ibid.

[223] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 249.

expanded. The specific criticism made by Horne was found in that aspect of Dewey's theory which emphasized the activities of the individual when cast as a "developing member of a social group."[224] Horne stated that the individual's rights were merely social rights as portrayed by Dewey; inviolate rights common to every individual had not been given sufficient attention.

Dewey's concept of subject matter maintained strong psychological implications. In order to resolve the traditional dualism which had existed between subject matter and the student, psychology had to be applied to subject matter if it was to be effectively introduced into the student's experience. Dewey argued that mind and subject matter must not be viewed separately. Expressing this concern, he stated:

> Especially is the educator exposed to the temptation to conceive his task in terms of the pupil's ability to appropriate and reproduce the subject matter in set statements, irrespective of its organization into his activities as a developing social member.[225]

Foreign subject matter regardless of its origin was not best suited for the accomplishment of meaningful learning. For Dewey, this attitude remained one of the most significant evils which often accompanied traditional educational theory and practice.

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[224] Ibid.

[225] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 227.

Play and Work in the Curriculum

1. The Place of Active Occupations in the Curriculum

Horne believed that Dewey's analysis of Plato and his account of knowledge was presented in such a way as would favor the pragmatic theory. This Horne believed Dewey had accomplished when he called attention to the emphasis placed on practical knowledge by Plato. Such a reference, therefore, necessitated a supplement to Plato's theory, according to Horne. The additional interpretation was noted when Horne stated:

> . . . he [Plato] recognized also an absolute knowledge of the real nature of things, their essences, of 'ideas.' The world of practical activities he preferred to regard as the region of 'opinion,' whereas the world of ideas yielded absolute knowledge. Plato's theory of knowledge was not pragmatic.[226]

Horne's interpretation of Plato's theory was accurate. The "two-world" concept was a part of Plato's theory.

Since Dewey held little validity for the concept of ideas which yielded absolute knowledge, his text disregarded this aspect of Plato's philosophy. Instead, Dewey alluded to that side of Plato's thought only in order to demonstrate relatedness which existed between play and work:

> Plato gave his account of knowledge on the basis of an analysis of the knowledge of cobblers, carpenters, players of musical instruments, etc., pointing out that their art. . . involved an end, mastery of material or stuff worked upon. . . and a

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[226]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 252-253.

> definite order of procedure--all of which had to be known in order that there be intelligent skill or art.[227]

Dewey emphasized the fact that the young were engaged in work and play out of school. As a result, he failed to see why activities conducted in the school must necessarily be concerned with a radical departure from this exercise.[228] When these circumstances prevailed, Dewey believed that growth as the result of education was likely to be more or less accidental.[229] Introduction of artifically designed activities in the school often represented an unnecessary arrangement whereby conditions outside of school were likely to be disregarded.

Further stressing the seriousness of this condition, Dewey declared: "But it must not be forgotten that an educational result is a by-product of play and work in most out-of-school conditions."[230] In summary, Dewey called attention to one of the essential tasks of the school when he affirmed:

> It is the business of the school to set up an environment in which play and work shall be conducted with reference to facilitating desirable mental and moral growth. It is not enough just to introduce plays and games, hand work and manual exercises. Everything depends upon the way in which they are employed.[231]

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[227]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 229.

[228]Ibid., p. 231.

[229]Ibid., p. 230.

[230]Ibid.

[231]Ibid.

2. Available Occupations

Horne identified this section as an illustration of the "project method."[232] Furthermore, he recognized that the essence of this method was found in purposeful activity:

> The method is bound up with the pragmatic theory of knowledge as a phase of action. That we learn much by doing is indisputable; that we learn much more without doing, without manipulating materials, is also probably true; . . . the project method is only one of many worthwhile methods. . . .[233]

Dewey insisted upon active occupations with the raw materials of knowledge. From such a posture it may be asserted that emphasis was upon things to do, not upon studies *per se*. The educational significance of things done in connection with the raw material of inquiry was dependent upon the extent to which those activities typify social situations.[234]

The term "project method" may have been implicit in Dewey's discussion, but it was not found in his text.

Dewey wrote about laboratory work, manual training and the object lesson. Concerning the employment of these, Dewey was quick to point out the inadequacies of each often found in educational practice. In both the laboratory and the manual training shop, he cautioned against the limitations inherent in the use of raw materials when isolated from association with the finished product. He warned:

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[232]Horne, *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, p. 261.

[233]*Ibid*.

[234]Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 234.

> The notion that a pupil operating with such material will somehow absorb the intelligence that went originally to its shaping is fallacious. In practice, overemphasis upon formed material leads to an exaggeration of mathematical qualities, since intellect finds its profit in physical things from matters of size, form, and proportion and the relations that flow from them.[235]

Likewise, in the case of the object lesson Dewey noted a fallacy in the belief that pupils must know how to use tools before they can begin the process of making. The error identified by Dewey with respect to the object lesson was in the assumption that pupils cannot learn how in the process of making.[236]

Horne interpreted Dewey's theory of active occupation as meaning an exaggerated preoccupation with physical activity at the expense of intellectual pursuits. However, this position warranted further analysis. Dewey suggested that the student learned to do by doing and that active participation on the student's part was essential to learning if it was to possess personal meaning.

The element of wholeness characteristic of Dewey's philosophy was clearly discernible when he stated:

> Intellectually the existence of a whole depends upon a concern or interest; it is qualitative, the completeness of appeal made by a situation. Exaggerated devotion to formation of efficient skill irrespective of present purpose always shows itself in devising exercises isolated from a purpose.[237]

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[235] Ibid., p. 232.

[236] Ibid., p. 233.

[237] Ibid., pp. 232-233.

Humanism and purpose were the traits which served best to qualify the variety of activities and the knowledge attendant to active occupations with things. "The more human the purpose, or the more it approximates the ends which appeal in daily experience, the more real the knowledge."[238]

Horne appealed to the historic connotation of the term "liberal." His interpretation served well to contrast the pragmatic theory of knowledge with that of the idealistic theory:

> Historically a liberal education was intellectual, not manual, and was associated with leisure; here it is intellectual through being manual and is associated with physical production of some sort. The historic view eliminated the commercial motive; the new view only subordinates it.[239]

Horne believed manual pursuits profited little in way of a "liberal" education. In this respect Dewey's philosophy was viewed by Horne as anti-intellectual, illiberal, and untrue in historical perspective.

From Dewey's point of view, no one subject in isolation was better equipped to furnish a liberal education than any other subject.

Disdainful of traditional views which purported intellectualism and liberating qualities, Dewey cautioned:

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[238] Ibid., p. 232.

[239] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 261.

> The false notion referred to takes the standpoint of the expert, the one for whom elements exist; isolates them from purposeful action, and presents them to beginners as the 'simple' things.[240]

Horne failed to consider economic factors. He also neglected the significance of scientific content and social value. Increasingly, a consideration of these factors becomes imperative in a comprehensive philosophy of education. It is unlikely that the immature student will pursue problems merely for the sake of discovery, independent of original, direct interest.[241] Furthermore:

> The continually increasing importance of economic factors in contemporary life makes it the more needed that education should reveal their scientific content and their social value. For in schools, occupations are not carried on for pecuinary gain but for their own content. Freed from extraneous associations and from the pressure of wage-earning, they supply modes of experience which are intrinsically valuable; they are truly liberalizing in quality.[242]

Horne conceived manual occupations as that activity tied down to physical occupations without regard for mental activity. "There are thinkers as well as doers. And if we learn by doing, we also learn by thinking."[243] Again a dualism was found in Horne's thinking. Physical activity was viewed as part from mental activity. Doing was separated from

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[240]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 234.

[241]Ibid., p. 235.

[242]Ibid.

[243]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 263.

thinking. In either case, Dewey believed there existed the possibility that adequate conditions and disposition of mind could promote both simultaneously.

Active occupations for Dewey were framed within the context of social life. He recalled that science grew gradually out of useful social occupations. Physics developed from the use of tools and machines, and the science of mathematics had its origin in the practical use of numbers in counting and measuring.[244] A review of the historical development of subjects was not intended as an argument for a recapitulation of the history of the race. Nevertheless, an awareness of these conditions strongly suggested the possibilities for the present--of using active occupations as opportunities for scientific study.[245]

Horne made an inadequate interpretation of Dewey on scientific method and the implications of such a method for other types of knowledge. His interpretation failed, however, to give ample consideration to the whole range of possibilities in establishing new realms of knowledge. Evidence of his limited interpretation is evident when Horne declared: "But it would be a mistake to limit all scientific investigations to solving practical problems."[246] Horne's rationale stemmed

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[244]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 235-236.

[245]Ibid., p. 236.

[246]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 262.

from his belief that not all problems contained practical applications and consequently did not necessarily warrant practical solutions. Even so, logical reasoning and systematic thought were justified for "they still furnish intellectual stimulation and satisfaction to the pure scientist."[247]

By contrast, Dewey criticized the traditional concept and further emphasized the importance of the experimental method:

> Connection of occupations with the method of science is at least as close as with its subject matter. The ages when scientific progress was slow were the ages when learned men had contempt for the material and processes of everyday life, especially for those concerned with manual pursuits. Consequently, they strove to develop knowledge out of general principles--almost out of their heads--by logical reasonings.[248]

Dewey further concluded:

> . . . the rise of experimental methods proved that, given control of conditions, the latter operation is more typical of the right way of knowledge than isolated logical reasonings.[249]

Certain practices found in Dewey's theory Horne criticized because he believed they lacked sufficient intellectual qualities. The elements of practical involvement as well as emphasis upon social life were also targets of criticism by Horne.

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[247] Ibid.

[248] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 237.

[249] Ibid.

The accumulation of knowledge experienced and transmitted by others was held in high esteem by Horne. Certainly recognition of this body of knowledge ought to be taken into account. That such a body of information existed was not denied by Dewey. The difference between the two theorists was found in the method selected by which the learner could be introduced to knowledge in such a way as would promote maximum learning. Horne suggested that Dewey's method encouraged trial and error. From Dewey's point of view, one of the inadequacies of traditional pedagogy has been its failure to recognize the significance of trial and error especially during initial stages of learning. Dewey placed this phase of learning in its proper perspective when he stated:

> . . . opportunity for making mistakes is an incidental requirement. Not because mistakes are ever desirable, but because overzeal to select material and appliances which forbid a chance for mistakes to occur, restricts initiative, reduces judgment to a minimum, and compels the use of methods which are so remote from the complex situations of life that the power gained is of little availability.[250]

And he suggested further:

> The problem of the educator is to engage pupils in these activities in such ways that while manual skill and technical efficiency are gained and immediate satisfaction found in the work, together with preparation for later usefulness, these things shall be subordinated to <u>education</u>--that is, to intellectual results and the forming of a socialized disposition.[251]

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[250] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 231.

[251] <u>Ibid</u>.

3. Work and Play

Horne raised the question whether or not art could remove drudgery from work. He also questioned the proposition that intrinsic motivation would sufficiently sustain the individual through to the completion of certain tasks designated as work:

> It is a little difficult to see how work at a machine in one of our factories can be art, or in the mines, or in a lumber camp. But such work has to be done under any economic order. Extrinsic motivation seems to remain in many lives most of the time and in all lives some of the time.[252]

One of Dewey's major concerns was that work often is taken "as a mere means for avoiding some penalty, or for gaining some reward at its conclusion."[253] Rapidly changing economic patterns caused Dewey to voice alarm at the prospect of man becoming a robot-like individual, his activities being divorced from a sense of personal interest. The contribution made by the individual under this condition remained remote if not unintelligible. In contrast with work as drudgery, Dewey viewed work as a creative activity when accompanied by motivation engaging the emotions and the imagination. The end was intrinsic to the act or a part of the course of the act. With intrinsic motivation serving as a stimulus, the effort required for the completion of a given task was real rather than artificial.

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[252] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 267.

[253] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 240.

Dewey attempted to avoid drudgery as a necessary concomitant to work. "Activity carried on under conditions of external pressure or coercion is not carried on for any significance attached to the doing."[254]

He further elaborated upon man's plight when social conditions make him subservient to the activity or occupation of work:

> Under unfree economic conditions, this state of affairs is bound to exist. Work or industry offers little to engage the emotions and the imagination; it is a more or less mechanical series of strains. Only the hold which the completion of the work has upon a person will keep him going. But the end should be intrinsic to the action; it should be _its_ end--a part of its own course.[255]

Dewey recognized the terms play and work but did not view these as necessarily opposed to one another. His use of the term "active occupation" included both play and work. In their intrinsic meaning any sharp division between the two was due to undesirable social conditons.[256] Upon examination of the two theorists, the difference between work and play was in large part due to the time factor which directly or indirectly influenced the connection between means and ends. The activity of play allows interest to be close at hand instead of having a remote result; ". . . activity is its own end, instead of its having an ulterior result."[257]

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[254] _Ibid_.

[255] _Ibid_.

[256] _Ibid_., p. 237.

[257] _Ibid_., p. 238.

However, Dewey cautioned against blind acceptance of this statement because such a concept suggested that the action of the moment was purely physical and lacking in meaning. When play activity is supposed to be taken as having no end in the sense of directing an idea then the significance of the statement regarding play has been lost. "When an activity is its own end in the sense that the action of the moment is complete in itself, it is purely physical; it has no meaning."[258]

The element of play for Dewey was not the most significant aspect of his theory as related to living and learning. It was not the mere physical movement associated with play. Rather, it was the attitude which held significance. In play there existed an attitude which involved an anticipation of outcome or result. Dewey believed this anticipatory attitude would, in turn, stimulate present responses.[259]

Dewey continued to resist the notion that work necessarily involved subordination of an activity to an ulterior result:

> When the fairly remote results of a definite character are foreseen and enlist persistent effort for their accomplishment, play passes into work. Like play, it signifies purposeful activity and differs not in that activity is subordinated to an external result, but in the fact that a longer course of activity is occasioned by the idea of a result. The demand for continuous attention is greater, and more intelligence must be shown in selecting and shaping means.[260]

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[258] Ibid.

[259] Ibid.

[260] Ibid., p. 239.

In addition to the economic distinction between play and work, Dewey made a further contribution in the following comment:

> Psychologically, the defining characteristic of play is not amusement nor aimlessness. Work is psychologically simply an activity which consciously includes regard for consequences as a part of itself; it becomes constrained labor when the consequences are outside the activity as an end to which activity is merely a means.[261]

Horne believed certain work must be undertaken under external motivation. In some cases, this represented a desirable condition since such an endeavor "may develop [at a later time] a sense of intrinsic value."[262] And Horne was probably correct in saying that ". . . what began as drudgery may end as art."[263]

The Significance of Geography and History

1. Extension of Meaning of Primary Activities

Dewey's emphasis was focused around direct interests of life. The extent to which meaning was acquired from any body of knowledge was dependent upon the degree to which perceived connections were effected.[264] Meaning and the possibility of its increment continued to be the focal point for Dewey.

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[261] *Ibid.*, pp. 241-242.

[262] Horne, *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*, p. 268.

[263] *Ibid.*

[264] Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 243.

In Horne's interpretation little attention was directed toward Dewey's text and discussion. Instead, Horne presented a discussion of the philosophy of idealism. Special consideration, however, was given to the terms "spatial" and "temporal." When he moved to this subject, Horne criticized Dewey's analysis of geography and history as studies in the curriculum:

> The argument takes it for granted that there are only two classes of meanings, the spatial of geography and the temporal of history.[265]

Believing there existed both a nonspatial and a nontemporal order, Horne suggested a third class of meanings, namely the transcendental. Horne believed that since such a realm of meaning could not be refuted, it should not be assumed that space and time contained all meanings.[266]

Although Dewey differentiated between temporal and spatial meanings, his theory maintained unity and continuity. Dewey was interested in presenting both geography and history as rich sources of meanings which were of concern to mankind. Information remote and alien to everyday experience failed to further perception and meaning and was, therefore, merely a mass of unassimilated information.[267]

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[265] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 275.

[266] Ibid.

[267] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 245.

The educational significance of these subjects was immense from Dewey's point of view:

> . . . geography and history supply subject matter which gives background and outlook, intellectual perspective, to what might otherwise be narrow personal actions or mere forms of technical skill. With every increase of ability to place our own doings in their time and space connections, our doings gain in significant content.[268]

When Dewey viewed history and geography as they were typically taught in school, he cautioned that a diminishing effect might be the result. Furthermore, he suggested they might have a deadening effect unless ordinary experience was enlarged in meaning as the result of relating connections:[269]

> If geography and history are taught as ready-made studies which a person studies simply because he is sent to school, it easily happens that a large number of statements about things remote and alien to everyday experience are learned. Activity is divided, and two separate worlds are built up, occupying activity at divided periods.[270]

The following statement made by Horne deserves some attention relative to an interpretation of Dewey's discussion:

> It should be noted that the term geography as used by our author evidently covers all the physical and natural sciences, like physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, physiology, and the like; while the term history likewise covers all the remaining types of learning such as, the social, literary, and linguistic subjects. Here is an unusual, if not unwarranted, extension of the meanings of the terms geography and history.[271]

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[268] Ibid., p. 244.

[269] Ibid., p. 245.

[270] Ibid.

[271] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 276.

When Horne projected the above interpretation as descriptive of Dewey's position, it appeared he made an extension of terminology where the terms geography and history were concerned. These terms were not found in Dewey's discussion relative to these subjects. Dewey's major emphasis was a reinforcement of earlier attempts aimed at presenting what he viewed to be the task of education. He asserted:

> The task of education. . . is to see to it that such activities are performed in such ways and under such conditions as render these connections as perceptible as possible. To 'learn geography' is to gain in power to perceive the spatial, the natural, connections of an ordinary act; to 'learn history' is essentially to gain power to recognize human connections.[272]

2. The Complementary Nature of History and Geography

Horne subscribed to Dewey's complementary view of history and geography. "One can readily see the interdependence of these two studies. . . . But the interdependence. . . is not the same as 'the interdependence of man and nature.'"[273] Horne believed man to be dependent on nature yet he did not conceive nature as dependent upon man.[274] Horne saw no interdependence between nature and man since it was man who was totally dependent on nature. Man must adjust himself to nature in order to survive. While Dewey viewed nature as

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[272]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 246.

[273]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 280.

[274]Ibid.

concerned with this earth, Horne associated nature as tuned to a metaphysical sphere. The generative power for nature was not in the hands of man.

In the study of both geography and history the human emphasis was central to Dewey's discussion. Information available from these studies must provide a unification of experience and social direction. The approach to such information must be in terms of present-lived experience. Otherwise, Dewey believed the outcome would be but an accrual of isolated facts of knowledge possessing little meaning for the learner. In the school, geography and history had often been accepted in the curriculum simply because it was customary that they be taught and learned.

It was interesting to note that Horne failed to define the function of these two subjects. Neither did he attempt to present justification for their existence in the school curriculum. Horne would have rendered a service had he elaborated upon the nature and function of geography and history. Dewey clearly specified the function of historical and geographical subject matter:

> . . . it is to enrich and liberate the more direct and personal contacts of life by furnishing their context, their background and outlook. While geography emphasizes the physical side and history the social, these are only emphases in a common topic, namely the associated life of men. For this associated life. . . does not go on in the sky nor yet in a vacuum. It takes place on the earth. Nature is the medium of social occurrences.[275]

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[275]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 247.

The discovery of this function must be employed as a criterion for trying and sifting the facts taught and the methods used.[276]

Without this view of interdependence as depicted by Dewey there could be little unifying effect. Much teaching and study of history has lost its vigor because the human emphasis associated with history and the natural emphasis associated with geography has not been recognized or has been ignored. Dewey believed when this condition was permitted to exist "history sinks to a listing of dates with an appended inventory of events, labeled 'important'; or else it becomes literary phantasy--for in purely literary history the natural environment _is_ but stage scenery."[277]

Dewey considered geography and history as studies best suited to be called information studies. They "are the information studies _par excellence_ of the school."[278] While the two were viewed separately in order to identify the implications of each, "these subjects are two phases of the same living whole, since the life of men in association goes on in nature, not as an accidental setting."[279]

Horne's interpretation was preoccupied with the terms nature, earth, nature study, and human nature.[280] He would

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[276] _Ibid_.

[277] _Ibid_., pp. 247-248.

[278] _Ibid_., p. 246.

[279] _Ibid_., p. 255.

[280] Horne, _The Democratic Philosophy of Education_, p. 281.

have objected to Dewey less if the latter had originally stated that nature and earth were equivalent only in terms of their physical relationship.

Horne like other theorists dealt specifically with the logical aspect of subject matter in connection with history and geography. His general views on the nature of subject matter disregarded the psychological aspect. From the standpoint of geography and history, Dewey believed a study of these should exemplify human association and living. In this way, the individual was brought into closer harmony with his surroundings, nature, and the world. Individual experience was thus enlarged in meaning by seeing connections between that which was studied and activity in present living.

Science in the Course of Study

1. The Logical and the Psychological

The terms "logical" and "psychological" had a unique meaning in Dewey's use. Speaking of them, Horne noted:

> The 'logical' here refers to a mode of arranging subject matter in scientific form and to a method of teaching subject matter so arranged. Similarly, the term 'psychological' is here used to refer to the mode of teaching science through utilizing the experiences of the learner.[281]

Horne was helpful when he clarified the meaning of each of these terms. Logical refers to the science of correct thinking and psychological carries the general meaning which

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[281] *Ibid.*, p. 295.

refers to the science of human behavior. Horne believed Dewey's usage of these terms "unusual."[282] Certainly, a different meaning was used by Dewey from that generally applied. Attention should be called to the fact that Dewey's discussion was concerned primarily with method. Again, the psychological approach to method was consistent with his earlier discussions of subject matter and the learner. Failure to recognize the psychological side of presenting subject matter resulted in a deposit of information in a vacuum.

Dewey's discussion further revealed that he took into account the logical implications of knowledge. "Logical order is not a form imposed upon what is known; it is the proper form of knowledge as perfected."[283]

Dewey was concerned that subject matter presented in its logical or perfected form would result in an isolation of science from significant experience. When presented in this manner the learner "acquires a technical body of information without ability to trace its connections with the objects and operations with which he is familiar--often he acquires simply a peculiar vocabulary."[284]

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[282] Ibid.

[283] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 256.

[284] Ibid., p. 257.

Dewey's concept of the logical order of scientific knowledge was that it represented the perfected form better suited for the expert than for the immature or non-expert:

> To the non-expert. . . this perfected form is a stumbling block. There is a strong temptation to assume that presenting subject matter in its perfect form provides a royal road to learning. What more natural than to suppose that the immature can be saved time and energy, and be protected from needless error by commencing where competent inquiries left off?[285]

Dewey suggested a method which stressed understanding and interest rather than the traditional method where instruction was largely a matter of presenting large sums of material stated in technically correct scientific form. "When learned in this condition it remains a body of inert information."[286] In distinction from the logical method, Dewey recognized the chronological method. Such a method "begins with the experience of the learner and develops from that the proper modes of scientific treatment."[287] This method Dewey also referred to as the "psychological" method. The logical method properly remained with the expert or specialist, not with the novice learner.

The psychological method had an advantage which surpassed any apparent loss of time. Dewey saw such a method

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[285] *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257.

[286] *Ibid.*, p. 259.

[287] *Ibid.*, pp. 257-258.

as one which de-emphasized mastery of symbolic learning in which the learner gained little in the way of meaning. "What the pupil learns [from the chronological method] he at least understands."[288] Not only would understanding be greater, but Dewey also believed the learner was more likely to gain more in the way of independent power to deal with material within his range thereby avoiding much mental confusion and distaste so often associated with subject matter.

Both Horne and Dewey believed the value of the laboratory method of teaching science had been overemphasized. Both agreed that in spite of the vast amount of equipment required, it had generally failed to obtain the desired results. Horne stated that in adapting this method, "there was a tendency to return to the older method of class demonstration."[289] From his discussion, it was obvious that Horne preferred the psychological method over the scientific laboratory as it was "intended for the research work of the specialist."[290] By contrast, Dewey believed that while laboratory exercises represented a significant improvement over the use of textbooks "arranged upon the deductive plan, [they] do not of themselves suffice to meet the need."[291] Further elaborating

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[288] Ibid., p. 258.

[289] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 295.

[290] Ibid., p. 296.

[291] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 259.

upon the problems associated with the laboratory method, Dewey emphasized:

> Our attention may be devoted to getting skill in technical manipulation without reference to the connection of laboratory exercises with a problem belonging to subject matter. There is sometimes a ritual of laboratory instruction as well as of heathen religion.[292]

Although in disagreement with Dewey's use of the term "psychological," Horne's comments revealed he was in general agreement with Dewey. Horne believed the psychological method needed to be supplemented by the logical, "in the case of the novice as well as the expert."[293]

Further emphasizing the importance of the psychological approach, Horne stated:

> A little psychological learning will carry much logical learning. A little first hand experience of the matter in question will carry much vicarious experience. But it is not necessary that by the use of the experimental method the pupil find out everything for himself and by reflection logically organize for himself all he has learned. The psychological method alone is too slow, the logical method alone is too abstract.[294]

An analysis of Horne's comments reveals that differences may be identified when a consideration is given to emphasis and stress upon scientific learning. Dewey placed strong emphasis upon method of instruction and quality of learning for the pupil. Horne attempted to combine both quality and

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[292] Ibid.

[293] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 296.

[294] Ibid.

quantity by effecting a merger between the psychological approach and the logical method of instruction:

> And pupils do need to know much about our world that, for lack of time, they can not discover for themselves. We could never get such knowledge by the psychological method alone.[295]

The vast scientific knowledge compiled as the product of history remained a vital concern to Horne. He held a greater concern for the quantitative aspect of scientific knowledge, while Dewey continued to stress qualitative factors with emphasis upon connections, meanings, and intellectual content.

2. Naturalism and Humanism in Education

On these topics Horne wrote a defense of the humanities. Dewey is sharply criticized. For example, "This short section seems to have been an afterthought."[296] Further, "The purpose is obviously to enhance regard for the sciences in the course of study."[297] And he concluded that Dewey failed to provide adequate claims for the humanities in the course of study.

Dewey correctly noted our educational tradition has long fostered dissension between science and literature. Dewey did not declare that science held greater humanistic qualities than

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[295] Ibid.

[296] Ibid., p. 310.

[297] Ibid.

did literature for neither of these disciplines rightly possessed a monopoly. He stated:

> But the assumption, from whatever side, that language and literary products are exclusively humanistic in quality, and that science is purely physical in import, is a false notion which tends to cripple the educational use of both studies. Human life does not occur in a vacuum, nor is nature a mere stage setting for the enactment of its drama.[298]

Obviously, the natural sciences were held in high esteem by Dewey since he viewed man's life as inseparable from the processes of nature:

> Man's power of deliberate control of his own affairs depends upon ability to direct natural energies to use: an ability which is in turn dependent upon insight into nature's processes.[299]

Horne thought Dewey held literary studies in low esteem. However, Dewey merely attempted to express a caution about the way these subjects, as well as science, had traditionally been taught. Specifically, Dewey recognized certain kinds of teaching which were damaging for both the humanities and the sciences. He maintained:

> That science may be taught as a set of formal and technical exercises is only too true. This happens whenever information about the world is made an end in itself. The failure of such instruction to procure culture is not, however, evidence of the antitheses of natural knowledge of humanistic concern, but evidence of a wrong educational attitude. . . . humanistic studies when set in opposition to study of

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[298]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 267.

[299]Ibid.

> nature are hampered. They tend to reduce themselves to exclusively literary and linguistic studies, which in turn tend to shrink to 'the classics.'"[300]

In its proper context, Dewey's appeal was to avoid isolating the two disciplines, thus bringing each into close association with the other so that together they would promote an education consistent with the industrial era and healthy for a democratic society.

Furthermore, Dewey did not attempt to de-humanize the humanities. He sought to promote humanistic qualities in all subjects. Consistent with his view of human experience in evolution, Dewey believed new insights were possible in both the scientific and social realms. Effecting increased humanistic attitudes was an imperative, he believed, if a greater segment of mankind was to benefit from an industrial, democratic social order.

Dewey did not intend to subordinate the humanities. He contended, however, that scientific studies possessed neglected potential:

> To be aware of the medium in which social intercourse goes on, and of the means and obstacles to its progressive development is to be in command of a knowledge which is thoroughly humanistic in quality. One who is ignorant of the history of science is ignorant of the struggles by which mankind has passed from routine and caprice, from superstitious subjection to nature, from efforts to use it magically, to intellectual self-possession.[301]

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[300] *Ibid.*, pp. 267-268.

[301] *Ibid.*, p. 267.

Dewey stressed the historical condition which he believed prompted a dichotomy between the sciences and the humanities. Instruction in institutions of higher learning was especially identified as having promoted a breach between these two disciplines. With little regard for social implications, the sciences had been viewed and treated as a body of knowledge best suited for providing factual information about the physical world and physical things. The humanities on the other hand had historically been viewed and treated as that realm of study sufficient to supply only knowledge about man and his existence. Dewey saw here another destructive dualism:

> There exists an educational tradition which opposes science to literature and history in the curriculum. The quarrel between the representatives of the two interests is easily explicable historically. Literature and language and a literary philosophy were entrenched in all higher institutions of learning before experimental science came into being.[302]

Dewey charged that attitudes accrued from the historic role of the humanities had come to represent a leisured class representative of an aristocratic group:

> Dislike to employ scientific knowledge as it functions in men's occupations is itself a survival of an aristocratic culture. The notion that 'applied' knowledge is somehow less worthy than 'pure' knowledge, was natural to a society in which all useful work was performed by slaves and serfs, and in which industry was controlled by the models set by custom rather than by intelligence.[303]

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[302] Ibid.

[303] Ibid., p. 268.

Dewey's discussion of this issue was most significant to any interpretation of Democracy and Education since the points stressed contained essential characteristics of a philosophy of education in a democratic society.

Simply to state, "There may be a science of everything, but anything is more than the science of it,"[304] hardly seemed representative of an adequate assessment of the points stressed by Dewey. Furthermore, Horne failed to submit a definition or characterization of humanities in the curriculum. Neither did he elaborate upon the "liberating" value inherent in such studies.

Dewey stressed the importance of humanistic studies when they were viewed as complements with the study of nature. He also provided a generalization descriptive of his definition of a study of the humanities:

> Knowledge is humanistic in quality not because it is about human products in the past, but because of what it does in liberating human intelligence and human sympathy. Any subject matter which accomplishes this result is humane, and any subject matter which does not accomplish it is not even educational.[305]

It was not Dewey's purpose to demean the humanities as subject matter. However, it was his purpose to criticize the practice of isolating subjects from one another. His search was for a method whereby a greater segment of society might benefit from the fruits of democracy--intellectually, socially, and economically.

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[304]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 311.

[305]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 269.

CHAPTER IV

OUR EDUCATIONAL LIMITATIONS

Educational Values

1. The Nature of Realization or Appreciation

Herein Horne presented a general interpretation of Dewey's theory and questioned the adequacy of the latter's position:

> To Dr. Dewey likings become values only when they are intelligent. When what we like is seen to have desirable connections and consequences, it is a value. It is not likings that are values but intelligent likings. A thing has value when it is both felt as a value and seen to be valuable.[1]

Horne believed values were identified by Dewey only as these were couched in forms of human experience; natural process lacked value apart from man since it lacked intelligence. Horne concluded that values for Dewey were vested only in the human, social, and subjective realms. Beyond man, values did not exist.[2]

Dewey did not include a discussion of nature apart from man. Horne did not in his "comments" consider Dewey's position

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[1]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 324.

[2]Ibid., pp. 324-325.

adequate, and, surprisingly, used an anti-dualistic argument against Dewey. "If man has value, and nature has none, then there is discontinuity between the two."[3] Horne's emphasis was in sharp contrast as compared with Dewey. The standard of value for Dewey was man-centered while the position favored by Horne tended to diminish man. Further, Horne said, "man does not create value as much as discover preexistent value."[4] Viewed from Horne's point of view, man does not create but rather his task is one of discovering values in those elements which naturally possess value "inherent in the universe of reality."[5]

Horne's interpretation of values was one clearly contrasting the idealistic and pragmatic positions. Horne's posture again emphasized the importance of metaphysics. By contrast, Dewey presented a theory in which the individual in the course of human experience and concrete situations determined the measure of value. Dewey warned on this occasion, as in earlier discussion, of the danger of allowing symbols to supersede that of which they are representative:

> . . . there is always a danger that symbols will not be truly representative; . . . . Formal education is peculiarly exposed to this danger, with the result that when literacy supervenes,

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

> mere bookishness, what is popularly termed the academic, too often comes with it.[6]

Greater attention to individuality and personal experience is evident in Dewey's theory when compared to that of Horne.

Horne suggested values ought to be reality-centered.[7] Reality portrayed by Horne was already inherent in the universe and pointed toward the metaphysical.

Dewey was also vitally concerned that appreciation of values be realized through the medium of experience. Without this type of appreciation, values remained purely symbolic and void of translation into reality. He elaborated:

> His 'knowledge' is second-handed; it is only a knowledge that others prize. . . as an excellence, and esteem him in the degree in which he exhibits it. Thus there grows up a split between a person's professed standards and his actual ones. . . the result is a kind of unconscious hypocrisy, an instability of disposition. He may be able to recite, but the recital is a mechanical rehearsal. The formation of habits is a purely mechanical thing unless habits are also tastes--habitual modes of preference and esteem, an effective sense of excellence.[8]

Dewey recognized that much of our experience was indirect. "All language, all symbols, are implements of an indirect experience; in technical language the experience which is procured by their means is 'mediated.'"[9] Symbols in Dewey's theory

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[6]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 272.

[7]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 325.

[8]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 275-276.

[9]Ibid., p. 272.

represented intermediate agents and experience so achieved "stands in contrast with an immediate, direct experience. . . instead of through the intervention of representative media."[10] Dewey noted a tendency to adopt purely representative forms. These, then, were allowed to decrease the sphere of direct appreciation.[11] He cautioned:

> . . . in other words, the tendency to assume that pupils have a foundation of direct realization of situations is sufficient for the superstructure of representative experience erected by formulated school studies. Sufficient direct experience is even more a matter of quality; it must be of a sort to connect readily and fruitfully with the symbolic material of instruction.[12]

While not denying the usefulness of the symbolic, Dewey insisted that connections be effected between the direct experience and symbolic material. In schools, genuine situations must be provided so as to encourage personal participation. Only in this way would the import of the problems and materials submitted be conveyed.

Dewey did not deny the value of imagination; on the contrary, he encouraged an active engagement of the imagination. The depth and scope of Dewey's significant appraisal of the negative and positive aspects of imagination are clear:

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[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 273.

[12] *Ibid.*

> The imagination is the medium of appreciation in every field. The engagement of the imagination is the only thing that makes any activity more than mechanical. Unfortunately, it is too customary to identify the imaginative with the imaginary, rather than with a warm and intimate taking in of the full scope of the situation. This leads to an exaggerated estimate of. . . fanciful symbols, verse, and something labeled 'Fine Arts,' as agencies for developing imagination and appreciation. Meantime mind-wandering and wayward fancy are nothing but the unsuppressible imagination cut loose from concern with what is done.[13]

Placed in its proper frame of reference, Dewey viewed the role of the imagination and subsequent responses as valuable instruments promoting appreciation.

The term "value" as used by Dewey was forward looking and future oriented. Values were not found in some form of universal existence waiting discovery. Dewey suggested values were realized at that point where thought and action, theory and practice, came together. Conclusion of previous inquiry was the source of judgments relative to value but such conclusions were valuable only as they continued to be instrumental in present and future conditions and problems.

Two meanings of the term "value" were suggested by Dewey. These he identified as (1) the appreciative, having intrinsic value, and (2) the instrumental, distinctively characteristic as an intellectual act--to valuate.[14] Yet, Dewey cautioned against the practice of allowing studies in the curriculum to

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[13]*Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

[14]*Ibid.*, pp. 291-292.

be divided thus creating an isolation of the one against the other. "But every subject at some phase of its development should possess, what is for the individual concerned with it, an aesthetic quality."[15]

The criterion for determining the worth of instrumental values in studies was the contribution these made to immediate, intrinsic values.[16] Furthermore, Dewey questioned the practice of assigning separate values to the different subjects while at the same time regarding the curriculum as an aggregate of segregated values. This condition he believed was the result of an isolation of social groups and classes.[17] To avoid this condition democratic education is necessary. "Hence it is the business of education in a democratic social group to struggle against this isolation in order that the various interests may reënforce and play into one another."[18]

Horne was skeptical of Dewey's theory which "held that we can not appreciate what we have not experienced directly . . . that without basic direct experience we lack the organs for appreciating indirect experiences."[19] It was possible,

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[15] Ibid., p. 292.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 325.

Horne believed, to achieve an appreciative experience vicariously, apart from direct experiences.

Dewey was sensitive to appreciative experience. However, he did not wish to focus attention upon "appreciation" as something merely academic--not sufficiently connected with material of instruction. Securing a sense of direct appreciation held greater meaning for Dewey. In addition to increased personal meaning, appreciation gained directly held far greater value in forming present habits and dispositions as well as making a contribution to future enrichment of activity.

> Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it.[20]

2. The Valuation of Studies

Horne identified a dualism and a lack of harmony in Dewey's theory of values. This, Horne believed was true due to an incompatibility between the pragmatic theory of ideas and Dewey's theory of value. From Dewey's point of view, Horne noted:

> An idea has truth only if it is a good instrument in controlling a situation. But an experience has value in itself or because it leads to an experience having value in itself.[21]

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[20]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 278.

[21]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 335.

Furthermore, Horne failed to take into consideration the element of continuity inherent in the process of experience as repeatedly presented by Dewey.

"To value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but secondarily it means to apprize, to estimate."[22] Passing judgment upon the nature and amount of a given value as compared with something else was a vital act when Dewey made an assessment of values.[23] Both the instrumental and appreciative were a part of Dewey's theory. One was often found to complement the other either presently or at some future time. The act of judgment about which Dewey wrote suggested there were times when it became necessary to "valuate or evaluate."[24]

> The distinction coincides with that sometimes made between intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic values are not objects of judgment, they cannot (as intrinsic) be compared, or regarded as greater and less, better or worse. They are invaluable; and if a thing is invaluable, it is neither more nor less than any other invaluable.[25]

In his interpretation of Dewey's writing, Horne accurately identified the element of immediacy implicit in Dewey's theory of values. For Dewey, the nature and worth of values were

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[22]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 279.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid., pp. 279-280.

relative to time and occasion. He recognized the appreciative condition of values. At the same time instrumentalism played a significant role in determining the efficacy of a value. Dewey emphasized:

> If a man has just eaten, or if he is well fed generally and the opportunity to hear music is a rarity, he will probably prefer the music to eating. In the given situation that will render the greater contribution. If he is starving, or if he is satiated with music. . . , he will naturally judge food to have the greater worth.[26]

Horne detected the criterion of experience as a controlling factor when Dewey established the worth of a value. It has "value in itself or because it leads to an experience having value in itself."[27]

Genuine appreciation, for Dewey, was merely an elaborate name for the realizing of a thing as the result of an idea "coming home to one," or "really taking it in."[28] The pragmatic theory of ideas was evident when Dewey stated: ". . . the only way to appreciate what is meant by a direct experience of a thing is by having it."[29]

There was in Dewey's theory evidence of a sincere concern with respect to educational values and the notion held

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[26]Ibid., p. 280.

[27]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 334.

[28]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 272.

[29]Ibid.

by some theorists that there were degrees of value. It was at this point that the basic tenet of his doctrine was noted:

> We cannot establish a hierarchy of values among studies. It is futile to attempt to arrange them in an order, beginning with one having least worth and going on to that of maximum value. Insofar as any study has a unique or irreplaceable function in experience, insofar as it marks a characteristic enrichment of life, its worth is intrinsic or incomparable. . . the only ultimate value which can be set up is just the process of living itself.[30]

Concerning the curriculum, Dewey did not view studies and activities as means subordinated to an end.

> . . . it is the whole of which they are ingredients. . . appreciation means that every study in one of its aspects ought to have just such ultimate significance. It is as true of arithmetic as it is of poetry that in some place and at some time it ought to be a good to be appreciated on its own account--just as an enjoyable experience. . . .[31]

Horne's interpretation relative to Dewey's theory of value represented a contribution in that it provided a keen insight which to the casual observer might otherwise go undetected. Horne noted Dewey's theory of value held to ultimate, intrinsic worth which projected an inconsistency with the basic pragmatic doctrine of ideas.

Although Dewey differentiated between the intrinsic and instrumental value, he favored those instrinsic values which

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[30] Ibid., p. 281.

[31] Ibid.

had the "greater instrumental value."[32] The pragmatic view has found it expedient to weigh values in terms of their relative contribution.

Horne interpreted the views presented by Dewey on the subject of values as ultimately eliminating the distinction between instrumental and the intrinsic value. While this distinction was maintained by Dewey, Horne was correct when he detected an eventual merger of the two kinds of value. Further, he recognized that "while intrinsic values do not merge into instrumental values, instrumental values do merge into intrinsic values."[33]

The justifying trait of an intrinsic value was found in its ability to contribute to future use according to Dewey:

> For we cannot stop asking the question about an instrumental good, one whose value lies in its being good <u>for</u> something, unless there is at some point something intrinsically good, good for itself.[34]

Evidence of a merger of instrumental value into the intrinsic appeared when Dewey stated: "An instrumental value then has the intrinsic value of being a means to an end."[35] If the immediate value was warranted by sufficient motive, Dewey saw no need for further justification.

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[32] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 284.

[33] Horne, <u>The Democratic Philosophy of Education</u>, p. 335.

[34] Dewey, <u>Democracy and Education</u>, p. 283.

[35] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 284.

Consciousness of the end was irrelevant. The response to an act or to the material furnished by a given subject may serve as an adequate function in the individual's life.[36] He viewed value *per se* as unsound "unless teacher or pupil can point out some definite assignable future use to which it is to be put. . . ."[37]

Relative value plus "consciousness of connection"[38] represented for Dewey the wisest course when determining criteria of value:

> In general what is desirable is that a topic be presented in such a way that it either have an immediate value, and require no justification, or else be perceived to be a means of achieving something of intrinsic value.[39]

Horne insisted that the distinction between the two kinds of value as conceived by Dewey ultimately became vague if not inconsistent. From the idealist's point of view, the pragmatic theory, as presented by Dewey, was inadequate in that no sound base was afforded upon which to make sound judgments relative to values and valuing. Viewed from the pragmatic frame of reference the aspect of universality was of little consequence as related to a theory of values

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[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 283-284.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 284.

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *Ibid.*

especially as these related to educational values consistent with sound pedagogical practice.

Dewey summarized his theory of values and the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values:

> Contribution to immediate intrinsic values in all their variety in experience is the only criterion for determining the worth of instrumental and derived values in studies.[40]

3. The Segregation and Organization of Values

Dewey believed a general classification of values served a purpose in that it provided the means to a wide survey of aims in the educational enterprise.[41] However, he did not favor a classification of values which tended to segregate educational values. Isolation of educational values represented a grave mistake. He believed the outcome of such a condition created a "regard [for] these values as ultimate ends to which the concrete satisfactions of experience are subordinate."[42]

Horne suggested Dewey ran the risk of segregating values from each other.[43] The observation made by Horne resulted because Dewey found justification for a general classification of values. A study of Dewey's text concerning this

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[40] Ibid., p. 292.

[41] Ibid., p. 285.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 344.

subject revealed that the nature of his classification was general, not specific and concrete. "They are nothing but generalizations."[44]

Dewey recognized the potential danger inherent in a segregation of educational values. An avoidance of such a pitfall was a major objective in developing his theory of values. He rejected the idea that different subjects possess a unique kind of value. This concept represented a fallacy according to Dewey:

> To regard such things as standards for the valuation of concrete topics and process of education is to subordinate to an abstraction the concrete facts from which the abstraction is derived. They are not in any true sense standards of valuation;. . . .[45]

This practice which Dewey described as prevalent meant the curriculum would represent merely a gathering together of various studies until a sufficient variety of independent values had been assembled.[46]

The construction of such a curriculum, Dewey noted, contained the notion that there existed a number of separate ends to be reached, and that various studies could be evaluated by referring each study to its respective end.[47]

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[44]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 285.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid., p. 286.

[47]Ibid.

This attitude toward subject matter was further opposed by Dewey since the view suggested that educative powers inherently resided in the subject irrespective of any functional power. Thus the subject received its "rigid justification."[48] "If they do not operate, the blame is put not on the subject as taught, but on the indifference and recalcitrancy of pupils."[49]

From the numerous references made by Dewey on this point there appeared to be sufficient evidence to negate the charge of segregating values. The interpretation presented by Horne appeared invalid in view of the extensive discussion by Dewey in support of his theory. For Dewey, continuity of experience remained a major focus in his doctrine of values. Moreover, he believed:

> The point at issue in a theory of educational value is then the unity of integrity of experience. Educationally, the question concerns that organization of schools, materials, and methods which operate to achieve breadth and richness of experience.[50]

A further point which contained significant educational implications in Dewey's philosophy was his distinction between the appreciative and instrumental values as these related to studies in the curriculum:

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[48] Ibid., p. 288.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid., p. 291.

> We must not, however, divide the studies of the curriculum into the appreciative, those concerned with intrinsic value, and the instrumental, concerned with those which are of value or ends beyond themselves.[51]

Dewey's analysis of values revealed that ultimately the intrinsic attribute of a value was the determining factor in establishing the worth of any value. He contended:

> Contribution to immediate intrinsic values in all their variety in experience is the only criterion for determining the worth of instrumental and derived values in studies.[52]

The text of Dewey sufficiently supported his claim that he had not segregated values as was charged by Horne. Dewey did adopt a general classification of values. Yet, a study of his entire discussion revealed that these were to be held as tentative and provisional. His claim that values should be organized was not a violation of his concept regarding values. Values were separated only to the extent that classification enabled Dewey to further analyze and project his theory relative to specific traits of values:

> But every subject at some phase of its development should possess, what is for the individual concerned with it, an aesthetic quality.[53]

From the above statement, it may be concluded that the only true criterion for determining the worth of values is

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[51] *Ibid.*, p. 292.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] *Ibid.*

the extent to which intrinsic values have been enhanced, encouraged, and promoted.

Labor and Leisure

1. The Origin of the Opposition

Horne noted that Dewey discounted the dualistic view of labor and leisure projected by Aristotle. Such a view created a division within social life. Horne questioned Dewey's habit of rejecting psychological and philosophical theories by recourse to their presumed social implications.[54]

Horne also seriously questioned Dewey's argument that Aristotle held the views he did simply because he found it necessary to rationalize the kind of society in which he lived.[55] Horne continued his interpretation by identifying another view which he believed was questionable in Dewey's analysis. He stated:

> It is also suggested that views which were the effect of one kind of society are no longer tenable when the social pattern changes. Both of these positions are open to question.[56]

In another instance, Horne stated, "Modern conditions themselves may and do need changing."[57] At this point, Horne

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[54]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 350.

[55]Ibid., p. 351.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid., p. 352.

appeared to recognize the necessity for considering and comparing characteristic social conditions of the Greek society with that of contemporary social conditions. The point Horne stressed was that man may subscribe to certain views apart from economic and social conditions of which he is a part. Yet, further study revealed Horne did not believe the latter condition was ever completely effected. Additional discussion made clear his recognition that man's thinking was never completely independent of present social life:

> It is only to suggest that a man's thinking is not wholly dependent upon the time in which he lives. Some thinking is rationalizing, conformative; some thinking is creative; reformative.[58]

Horne's remarks relative to thought and social conditions found in a particular period failed to project a significant disagreement between Horne and Dewey. Conditions and circumstances described by Horne did not represent disharmony with the essential discussion presented in Dewey's text. Horne's interpretation did not represent an analysis of the specific concerns as expressed by Dewey. Some of Horne's discussion was not relevant to Dewey's remarks.

Dewey specifically called attention to social conditions promoting isolation of aims and values in education that produced a division within social life. He expressed concern toward the resulting condition which he believed had prompted

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[58] *Ibid.*, p. 351.

one type of education for useful labor and another type for those deemed worthy for the life of leisure. Such a condition, Dewey believed, reflected a serious division within social life.[59] The effect of this philosophical attitude had served to produce a dichotomy and a serious antithesis in educational theory and practice. Dewey expressed opposition to this condition primarily because ultimately society would be further divided. He believed the business of education was not to promote such a conflict, but rather the proper aims of education should and could do much toward promoting values of both labor and leisure.

The impact of Dewey's discussion at this point was noted when he identified the nature and cause for such a distinction as well as the isolation of educational aims and values. The circumstances leading to and promoting what Dewey viewed as a dichotomy would be traced to historical and social attitudes:

> These general considerations are amply borne out by the historical development of educational philosophy. The separation of liberal education from professional and industrial education goes back to the time of the Greeks, and was formulated expressly on the basis of a division of classes into those who had to labor for a living and those who were relieved from this necessity.[60]

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[59] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 293.

[60] Ibid., p. 294.

Dewey continued his assertion that the identification of work with material interests and leisure with ideal interests was a social product and a reflection of the society in which such an attitude was permitted to exist:

> Only when a division of these interests coincides with a division of an inferior and a superior social class will preparation for useful work be looked down upon with contempt as an unworthy thing: a fact which prepares one for the conclusion that the rigid identification of work with material interest, and leisure with ideal interests is itself a social product.[61]

Dewey believed the ideas found in Greek thought had permitted the social conditions described above to have little justification and no attempt was made to rationalize them. By contrast, Horne preferred to provide some justification for the Greek thought which Dewey identified as the historical factor that had laid the basis for isolation of aims and values:

> Now thinking that arises under one set of social conditions may be true as representing ideals and so may carry over to other social conditions unlike themselves.[62]

In the broadest sense, a contribution was made by Horne when he emphasized the necessity of considering existing social conditions. While he recognized changing ideas and new concepts to be a part of historical developments, Horne

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[61] Ibid.

[62] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 351.

placed the greater emphasis upon changing intellectual conditions as accounting for the validity of new patterns of thought. Illustrating this position, Horne stated:

> Ideas arising under conditions of slavery may have truth under conditions of freedom. Aristotle's conception of the soul may have validity under modern democratic conditions;. . . . It is no refutation of his psychology to say we no longer believe in slavery.[63]

Much of the disparity existing on the subject of liberal and technical education was due to the definition of these terms. An examination of the discussion by both Horne and Dewey strongly suggested this was the case. This is not to imply that they agreed on a philosophical definition. For Dewey these terms implied two types of education as well as two modes of occupation. Any discussion or planning relative to education in a democratic society necessarily meant a rejection of this framework from Dewey's point of view. Such a rejection also represented one of the basic elements which served to differentiate between the pragmatic theory of education and that traditionally held by the idealist.

The distinction noted by Dewey held far greater significance and concern than was revealed in Horne's interpretation of this subject. A clear distinction between the two types of studies was a proper and necessary one, according to Horne.[64] Educationally, this condition did not represent

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

servitude nor did it suggest a social division culminating in an inferior and superior class. Indeed, a separate identification in terms of education was desirable even in a modern democratic society. Horne declared:

> The distinction between them is not wiped out by the extinction of Greek slavery. A liberal education is no longer intended for freemen; it is still that which makes men free. A technical education is no longer that intended for slaves; it is still that which enables men to earn a better living.[65]

The educational implications of liberal or technical education were not included in Horne's interpretation. There was in Horne's view, however, sufficient evidence to support two types of education. Horne believed Dewey expressed too great an alarm relative to this subject. Dewey believed this dualism resulted in unfavorable educational practices. He also believed certain negative aspects of social and economic affairs were the product of this arrangement.

Voicing strong objections to the maintenance of a strict distinction between a liberal and a technical education, Dewey emphasized:

> Individually and collectively there is a gulf between merely living and living worthily. Means are menial, the serviceable is servile. To these two modes of occupation, with their distinction of servile and free activities (or 'arts') correspond two types of education: the base or mechanical and the liberal or intellectual.[66]

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 296.

Dewey rejected the notion that certain individuals, because of suitability, ought to be trained for practical endeavors--for doing. A dualistic absurdity was furthered when Dewey noted that some, due to a superior intellectual capacity, should, presumably, be nurtured in a liberal education--to know:

> Liberal education aims to train intelligence for its proper office: to know. The less this knowledge has to do with practical affairs, with making or producing, the more adequately it engages intelligence.[67]

Dewey further noted that no justification was required for the "knowing" or information possessed by the individual deemed worthy of the purely intellectual life. He stated:

> In knowing, in the life of theory, reason finds its own full manifestation; knowing for the sake of knowing irrespective of any application is alone independent, or self-sufficing. . . education that makes for power to know as an end in itself, without reference to the practice of even civic duties, is truly liberal or free.[68]

Horne did not believe a liberal education necessarily represented the antithesis of professional or technical education. Indeed, he affirmed the value of liberal tradition first, with technical education to be built upon these studies. Thus, Horne viewed liberal studies as the base of future technical studies while at the same time serving as a complement to such study.

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[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

> Very likely each man's education should be liberal at the base and technical at the apex, but the conclusion does not follow automatically from the change from Greek aristocratic to modern democratic conditions.[69]

Further discussion by Horne did not consider the existence of traditional divisions of social class. Probably he failed to assess adequately this condition which Dewey recognized as historical fact.

Dewey viewed the habituation and technical skill which accrued as the products of mere training as deplorable since these generally were not accompanied with understanding and were often void of reflective thought and choice of action:

> This training. . . operates through repetition and assiduity in application, not through awakening and nurturing thought. Liberal education aims to train intelligence for its proper office: to know.[70]

In the analysis presented by Horne no description was provided of the conditions whereby men might be free. Furthermore, he did not specify what contribution should be made by a liberal education. That which made men free remained his definition of a liberal education. By contrast, Dewey was more realistic. The elements of choice and active participation were closely bound to his philosophy of liberal and technical education. From Dewey's point of view, the professional or vocational school might be liberal or illiberal.

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[69]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 352.

[70]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 296.

At the same time, the liberal arts curriculum might be illiberal and would be illiberal insofar as it was permeated with a narrow sectarian bias, or employed methods of mere mass appeal. In other words, any study or activity when reduced to the level of drudgery and routine, or which failed to awaken independent thought and imaginative choice had attained the characteristics of the label, "illiberal."

2. The Present Situation

Dewey's social-economic criticism is sharp. For Horne, Dewey was a radical. Horne's personal belief was that Dewey had gone too far and too fast in his recommendations for economic reorganization of society.[71] He observed that:

> . . . Dr. Dewey is revolutionary in his aim but not in his method. He aims at an industrial democracy but his method is that of educational reform. An education that could give us an industrial democracy might mean either a modified capitalism or the overthrow of capitalism.[72]

In another instance, Horne stated: "The objectives of Dr. Dewey are similar to those of Soviet Russia; his 'ideology' and methodology are different."[73] And Horne raised another basic objection:

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[71]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 359.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Ibid., p. 360.

> Historically, he [Dewey] holds that society has made our schools; but he recommends for the future that our schools make our society. The schools work with the young generation; they are supported by adult society; they reflect the adult society that supports them. How can they do other than continue the type of society in which adults believe? The adults live where the economic problems are, where the changes are going on.[74]

This statement represents the conservative philosophy. As he viewed the role of the school, Horne seemed to express a note of resignation. A break from traditional social patterns seemed highly unlikely and possibly undesirable in the scheme projected by him. The school remained a passive agent of society, particularly the society composed of and maintained by adults. The adult world had prevailed and would continue to do so.

Dewey recognized social change as inevitable and consistent with an emerging scientific and technological era. This represents the very core of Dewey's concern. He remained steadfast in his belief that dehumanization and alienation of the individual need not result if intelligent planning and thought accompanied social and economic reform. Scientific thought was but a form of learning which had grown out of the history of man's interaction with the world. This type of learning, Dewey believed enabled men to reconstruct and further their understanding of society and themselves. Clearly a distinctive feature of Dewey's philosophy was his

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[74] Ibid., p. 359.

persuasion that social reform could be achieved by the application of scientific values. These, he insisted, were not antagonistic, but rather were complementary to and consistent with those values included in the democratic tradition. Dewey denied our national problems were the necessary outcome of scientific knowledge and practical achievement. Such a position, Dewey believed, was an error:

> . . . the inferiority and subordination of mere skill in performance and mere accumulation of external products to understanding, sympathy of appreciation, and free play of ideas. If there was an error, it lay in assuming the necessary separation of the two: in supposing that there is a natural divorce between efficiency in producing commodities and rendering service, and self-directive thought. . . .[75]

Present and future projections in Dewey's theory did call for fundamental change in the social arena. The school was assigned the role of social and economic change. Dewey further recognized that far more was required than a mere correction of Aristotle's theoretical assumption. No longer could the social state of affairs which had generated such a concept be tolerated. Neither could the Greek philosophy of life be transcended by a mere shifting of theoretical symbols suggestive of the free, the rational, and the worthy:[76]

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[75] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 299.

[76] Ibid., pp. 299-300.

> Important as these theoretical and emotional changes are, their importance consists in their being turned to account in the development of a truly democratic society, a society in which all share in useful service and all enjoy a worthy leisure.[77]

In one instance, Horne suggested that Dewey had given prime consideration to both social and economic factors especially as he viewed these in the light of new patterns yet to be formed as a result of science and technology. In another instance, Horne suggested Dewey had gone too far in defining the role of the school as constituting a leadership position. In short, Horne questioned the validity of both aim and method as he interpreted Dewey's theory. In reality, Dewey had taken into account both cultural changes and educational reform as he viewed emerging conditions which he believed necessitated change. Educational change envisioned by Dewey was one which was harmonious with societal developments. The following statement is indicative of his belief in this concept:

> It is not mere change in the concept of culture--or a liberal mind--and social service which requires an educational reorganization; but the educational transformation is needed to give full and explicit effect to the changes implied in social life.[78]

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[77] Ibid., p. 300.

[78] Ibid.

There was implicit in Dewey a definite rejection of psychological and political distinctions which had traditionally promoted a dualism of thought. Educationally, such a division had effected a distinction between a liberal education devoted to a life of leisure and knowing for its own sake and the useful or practical training void of intellectual content.[79] Dewey recognized these did not exist in pure form, but he was concerned. "It would be hard to find a subject in the curriculum within which there are not found evil results of a compromise between the two opposed ideals."[80]

To the extent that a compromise did exist, Dewey believed educational values and human life had been depreciated. The historic distinction accompanied with compromise tended to "reduce the efficacy of the educational measures."[81]

Intellectual and Practical Studies

1. The Opposition of Experience and True Knowledge

Relative to this segment of Dewey's text, Horne made the following statement:

> Again, let it be noted that Dr. Dewey is utilizing the genetic mode of refutation. The practical and intellectual should not be opposed

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[79] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

> to each other because the social conditions under which the opposition arose have changed.[82]

Horne continued to disagree with Dewey. There was in Horne's comments an obvious skepticism when he assessed Dewey's account of the opposition between intellectual and practical studies. The incongruency noted by Horne in Dewey's theoretical discussion was invalid essentially for the same reason as the dualism Dewey projected in the former chapter pertaining to labor and leisure. Horne insisted that social conditions had changed sufficiently so that no longer was the historic situation relevant as a problem confronting educational theories. Horne believed the condition which earlier presented a problem had now somehow been solved and that no longer should the division be viewed as constituting a dualism in educational practice. For this reason Horne concluded that Dewey's method of refutation was both emotionally and intellectually unsatisfactory.[83]

The basic question for Horne remained a speculative one in spite of an apparent attempt to draw attention away from traditional philosophies:

> What we want to know is whether there really is a world of reality, changeless in character, which is grasped by the intellect, which remains despite man's denial and social change, which is implied even by the process of change itself.[84]

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[82]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 366.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Ibid., p. 367.

On the surface it would appear that the philosophic tension between Horne and Dewey was the result of a divergent posture relative to absolutes. Evidence of this appeared when Horne raised the issue of absolutes especially as these existed in the context of known reality and its close approximation to supreme reality, if not God:

> Now thought does possess such a world, and it can be shown to do so. In general, it is the realm of concepts, essences, universals. The very notion of change implies the changeless, without the permanent there is no impermanent.[85]

Dewey's discussion did not place emphasis upon the negative or positive aspects of absolutes nor did he attempt to prove or disprove their existence. Horne, however, believed an identification of this realm was necessary before consideration could be given to the concept of change. The precise location of this world, according to Horne, was in the mind. The activity of mind or thought process remained the surest grasp of the formal, changeless truths.

Horne was correct when he suggested that change in social conditions had brought about new perceptions and this he believed applied to traditional philosophical thought. Nevertheless, in view of Dewey's discussion, Horne underestimated the profound influence social conditions exerted upon modern educational philosophy. Dewey insisted that social change had only produced modification of the traditional opposition

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[85] *Ibid.*

with varying degrees of reorganization. These modifications often were accompanied by a compromise in the establishment and maintenance of studies in the curriculum. Furthermore, Dewey emphasized the fact that history had not eradicated the opposition existing between theory and practice, intelligence and execution, knowledge and activity.[86] In tracing the historical antecedents to the thought which had produced this condition, Dewey called attention to the concept of experience and reason as formulated by Plato and Aristotle. Although contemporary thought differed in many respects, Dewey argued that a recognizable agreement persisted and that:

> . . . they agreed in identifying experience with purely practical concerns. . . . Knowledge, on the other hand, existed for its own sake free from practical reference, and found its source and organ in a purely immaterial mind. . . . Hence the practical life was in a condition of perpetual flux, while intellectual knowledge concerned eternal truth.[87]

Dewey expressed doubt as to the continued existence of all these distinctions in their full technical meaning. Nevertheless, he held to the firm belief that man's subsequent thought about education continued to be influenced by the original contempt expressed for the practical and the supremacy expressed for the intellectual. Dewey issued the following warning:

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[86]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 306.

[87]Ibid.

> Medieval philosophy continued and reënforced the tradition. When we add to this motive the force derived from the literary character of the Roman education and the Greek philosophic tradition . . . we can readily understand the tremendous power exercised by the persistent preference of the 'intellectual' over the 'practical' not simply in educational philosophies but in the higher schools.[88]

2. Experience as Experimentation

For the purpose of interpreting Dewey on experience and experimentation Horne identified two propositions: one was that all practical pursuits should be intellectualized; the other was that all intellectual pursuits should be practical. In agreement with Dewey, Horne subscribed to the notion that both were involved in the functional unity of the intellectual and the practical methods of knowing and doing.[89] The first of these propositions Horne accepted except for noting that some practical activities possessed a greater degree of intellectual content than others. The second proposition was condemned by Horne. "It keeps the intellect of man in working clothes."[90] While the practical pursuits should be intellectualized, intellectual pursuits assumed a depreciatory quality when lowered to the realm of the practical.

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[88] Ibid., pp. 310-311.

[89] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 381.

[90] Ibid.

Closely allied with this criticism was Horne's rejection of Dewey's concept of experience and experimentation. "Experimentation is indeed one phase of experience, but experience is much more than experimentation."[91] Thus, Horne's appraisal of Dewey's mode of knowing through experience-experimentation, revealed a dissatisfaction both emotionally and intellectually. Experimentation, according to Horne, represented a strictly intellectual and practical activity, while experience contained the additional ingredient of certain emotional factors.[92]

Horne failed to recognize the reciprocal effect of response which was a central feature of Dewey's theory relative to experience as experimentation. This neglect accounted for the condition which permitted Horne to conclude: "The dentist may engage in experimentation, while the patient gets the experience."[93] As viewed from this position, both parties had engaged themselves in uncommon effort and activity. The responses of each of these persons held little significance. The experimentor was involved in an active pursuit, while the other, receiving the experience, remained passive.

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[91] Ibid., p. 382.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

Differences of opinion and attitudes concerning activity accounted for much of the disagreement found in the discussions of both theorists. Dewey never recommended activity for the sake of activity; on the contrary, he stated "mere activity does not constitute experience."[94] His concept of activity must be understood only in the context of the meaning of experience. The controlling influence on activity was always the problematic situation. Out of the interaction which resulted from attempts to relieve an imbalance in the environment there existed of necessity activity:

> The combination of what things do to us (not in impressing qualities on a passive mind) in modifying our actions, furthering some of them and resisting and checking others, and what we can do to them in producing new changes constitutes experience.[95]

In Dewey's philosophy, experience enjoyed a close relationship with knowledge. No longer was experience placed in opposition to rational knowledge and explanation as was suggested by Horne.[96] Experience, for Dewey, assumed "deliberate control of what is done with reference to making what happens to us and what we do to things as fertile as possible of suggestions and a means for trying out the validity of the suggestions."[97] Activity was not to be equated with unguided,

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[94]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 163.

[95]Ibid., p. 317.

[96]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 382.

[97]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 319.

gross, bodily movement. In Dewey's theory, it meant the organism was interacting with the environment toward the solution of a problem:

> When trying, or experimenting, ceases to be blinded by impulse or custon, when it is guided by an aim and conducted by measure and method, it becomes reasonable--rational.[98]

Conditions, particularly those which we can regulate, were the determining factors which suggested change to the prevalent notion of a necessary opposition between the purely practical studies and those held to be purely intellectual. Further:

> Practical activities may be intellectually narrow and trivial; they will be so insofar as they are routine, carried on under the dictates of authority, and having in view merely some external result.[99]

Dewey designated the term experience as the name given to the active-passive relations sustained between the individual and his social surroundings:

> In just the degree in which connections are established between what happens to a person and what he does in response, and between what he does to his environment and what it does in response to him, his acts and things acquire meaning.[100]

Dewey taught that education designed for a purpose should present an environment in which interaction would effect an

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[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., p. 320.

acquisition of meanings so important that they become instruments of further learning. He believed activities out of school were sometimes important but often ineffective. Activity out of school was often carried on under conditions which were not specifically and deliberately designed with the intent of promoting understanding and adapted to the formation of effective intellectual dispositions.[101] Educationally, this suggests the following:

> It is not the business of the school to transport youth from an environment of activity into one of cramped study of the records of other men's learning; but to transport them from an environment of relatively chance activities (accidental in the relation they bear to insight and thought) into one of activities selected with reference to guidance of learning.[102]

Dewey's goal was to make education scientific. He was sensitive to the advances of psychology and industrial methods, and thought that education should use the methods of science. Furthermore, he argued that activity in the school situation ought to exemplify the experimental problem-solving method of science.

Horne was critical of what he termed Dewey's doctrine of learning by doing. For elementary education, Horne found this theory acceptable. Adult education, however, must also involve "learning to think by thinking."[103]

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[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 381-382.

In alluding to Dewey's doctrine of "learning by doing," Horne would have demonstrated a greater degree of accuracy had he been consistent with his phrase, "learning to think by thinking." Dewey's doctrine correctly interpreted would then have read "learning to do by doing."

Dewey recognized that the historical idea of experience as purely practical and void of intellectual qualities would be transformed only by the realization:

> . . . that doing may be directed so as to take up into its own content all which thought suggests, and so as to result in securely tested knowledge. 'Experience' then ceases to be empirical and becomes experimental.[104]

Dewey's theory of activity did not involve taking a "known" and through use in some external activity making it a "know how." Knowledge remained the result of the activity of the whole organism and its environment in a problem situation. "Reason ceases to be a remote and ideal faculty and signifies all the resources by which activity is made fruitful in meaning."[105]

Physical and Social Studies: Naturalism and Humanism

1. The Historic Background of Humanistic Study

Horne's interpretation of Dewey's historical account of naturalism and humanism led Horne to conclude that "Dr. Dewey

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[104] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 323.

[105] Ibid.

has here probably overdrawn the doctrine of unity between man and nature in the Greek thinkers."[106] Horne argued in favor of a dualism which had its roots entrenched in Greek philosophy, and he found no precedent for unifying humanism and naturalism in the thought of either Socrates or Plato. ". . . Plato was a quantitative dualist but a qualitative idealist. . . ."[107]

While Dewey may have gone to the extreme in stressing unity of man in Greek thought, Horne had probably overdrawn the doctrine of dualism when he approached Aristotle. The form-matter hypothesis formulated by Aristotle probably did not represent a dualism to the extent indicated by Horne. Aristotle could not accurately be cited as a humanistic naturalist. Nevertheless, the forms and essences representing the common characteristics of his theory were found in nature as well as in man. To this extent, there did exist an element which tended to serve as a unifying force in the philosophy of Aristotle.

Dewey noted that the conflict existing between the naturalistic and humanistic studies could not be attributed to classic Greek philosophy.[108] In his historical account,

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[106] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 388.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 324.

Dewey saw these characteristics of Greek thought: (1) Socrates did not believe a science of nature was important; (2) Plato furthered the belief that any discussion of the good of man must concern itself with the essential good or end of nature itself; and (3) Aristotle exceeded prior Greek thought and extended it in the direction of naturalism. Knowing in pure form found nature a most suitable subject.[109] The argument presented by both Horne and Dewey relative to the origin of this dualism remained unsettled and open for debate.

While the problem of dualism and its subsequent threat to a unified scheme in education may or may not be traced historically to Greek philosophy, their method was apparently responsible for the origin of the conflict between man and nature.

Horne failed to take into account the great influence exerted by the Roman culture, especially that of the Church. In addition, Dewey identified the method and philosophy of Scholasticism as furthering the entrenchment of this dualism. This period in history represented a time when attention was directed toward the control of man rather than a concern for the control of nature:

> And its dependence upon tradition was increased by the dominant theological interests of the period. For the authorities to which the Church appealed were literatures composed in foreign tongues. Scholasticism

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[109] *Ibid.*, pp. 324-325.

> . . . is nothing but a highly effective systematization of the methods of teaching and learning which are appropriate to transmit an authoritative body of truths.[110]

Dewey presented a sound summary to this historical argument when he stated:

> If we take what the philosophers stood for in Greek life, rather than the details of what they say, we might summarize by saying the Greeks were too much interested in free inquiry into natural fact and in the aesthetic enjoyment of nature. . . to think of bringing man and nature into conflict.[111]

The unfortunate significance of this condition, however, was clear to Dewey. The result of such a scheme "is reflected in the division of studies between the naturalistic and the humanistic, with a tendency to reduce the latter to the literary records of the past."[112]

Horne maintained the Greeks, not the Romans, were responsible for the formative thought giving rise to the physical-social dualism in educational theory:

> The Greek thinkers were dualists with emphasis on the intellectual as the more real, to whom no scientific study of nature was equal in educational value to philosophy.[113]

Horne avoided an analysis of the dialectical method of the Scholastics. This was the age and the method which Dewey

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[110] Ibid., p. 327.

[111] Ibid., pp. 325-326.

[112] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 338.

[113] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 389.

determined had made the greatest contribution to the already existing division between the physical and social studies. Whereas Greek thought probably gave birth to this dualism in theory and practice, the Romans and their method of Scholasticism provided the link between earlier educational practices and those which were found existing in contemporary practice. Dewey concluded:

> So far as schools still teach from textbooks and rely upon the principle of authority and acquisition rather than upon that of discovery and inquiry, their methods are Scholastic. . . . For their practical genius was not directed to the conquest and control of nature but to the conquest and control of men.[114]

2. The Present Educational Pattern

Horne thought the historic division of the practical sciences and the humanities a profitable one. Divisions and sub-divisions among studies afforded a practical approach to the organization of the curriculum. Separation among subjects also represented the best rationale for an analysis of a particular subject in the curriculum.[115] Horne's traditional bias is reflected in the following quote:

> Among the sciences include physics and chemistry. The natural sciences include biology and related studies. The social studies may also be sub-divided into the humanistic and social studies. The humanities include languages and literatures. The social sciences include history, sociology, and economics.[116]

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[114]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 327-328.

[115]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 400-401.

[116]Ibid., p. 401.

Dewey was not interested in classifying and formulating divisions among studies in the curriculum. His attempt was to decrease the influence exerted upon the curriculum by sharp demarcations traditionally maintained in educational practice. On the positive side Dewey sought to harmonize the relationship of man-nature, rather than that of man and nature. Strongly influenced by the doctrine of biological development, Dewey viewed man as one continuous with nature. "Man's home is nature; his purposes and aims are dependent for execution upon natural conditions":[117]

> From the standpoint of human experience, and hence of educational endeavor, any distinction which can be justly made between nature and man is a distinction between the conditions which have to be reckoned with in the formation and execution of our practical aims, and the aims themselves. . . . Knowledge accrues in virtue of an attempt to direct physical energies in accord with ideas suggested in dealing with natural objects in behalf of social uses.[118]

Horne's discussion of humanistic and naturalistic studies presented a strong case from the idealist's point of view. Whether or not he grasped the essential elements of Dewey's discussion remained questionable. Dewey, nevertheless, argued in favor of a close relationship between humanistic and naturalistic studies. Relative to this concern, Dewey contended:

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[117] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 333.

[118] Ibid.

> . . . education should take its departure from this close interdependence. It should aim not at keeping science as a study of nature apart from literature as a record of human interests, but at cross-fertilizing both the natural sciences and the various human disciplines such as history, literature, economics, and politics.[119]

Pedagogically and philosophically, this is one of the most significant contributions found in Dewey's text. A merger of studies was not recommended by Dewey. Horne's interpretation, nevertheless, while proposing a "monism of studies" in order to overcome the dualism of the physical and social had in effect caused a new pluralism to appear on the scene--increased unification and greater diversification in the curriculum.[120]

The position maintained by Dewey was both humanistic and democratic. It was humanistic in that it called into play an intelligent sense of human interests. It was democratic in the sense that pluralism pervaded. Thus, the narrow scope of the Greek humanistic spirit has been avoided as well as the one-sided condition typical of Classical Humanism:[121]

> Any study so pursued that it increases concern for the values of life, any study producing greater sensitiveness to social well-being and greater ability to promote that well-being is humane study.[122]

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[119] Ibid., p. 334.

[120] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 401.

[121] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 337.

[122] Ibid.

Dewey believed a dichotomy existed between the sciences and the humanities only when science provided factual information about the physical world while the humanities remained the sole depository of knowledge about man. To assume this philosophic stance was fallacious, according to Dewey, for both the sciences and the humanities. This state of affairs provided for and encouraged the continuance of the dualism Dewey strived to overcome. Educationally, the abandonment of this theory had to be effected in keeping with the development of a philosophy of education in a democratic society.

Dewey characterized his definition of humane studies as follows: "Knowledge is humanistic in quality not because it is _about_ human products in the past, but because of what it _does_ in liberating human intelligence and human sympathy."[123] Then he issued a warning relative to the philosophical dualism which he believed was reflected in the division of studies between the naturalistic and humanistic:

> But the more immediate applications of science were in the interests of a class rather than of men in common; and the received philosophic formulations of scientific doctrine tended either to mark it off as merely material from man as spiritual and immaterial, or else to reduce mind to a subjective illusion. In education, accordingly, the tendency was to treat the sciences as a separate body of studies, consisting of technical information regarding the physical world, and to reserve the older literary studies as distinctively humanistic.[124]

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[123] _Ibid._, p. 269.

[124] _Ibid._, p. 339.

The Individual and the World

1. Mind as Purely Individual

Horne found this section of DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION one of the most confusing ones. It was true that the discussion was highly concentrated and presupposed the reader possessed a wide range of background especially in the realm of history. Horne was correct when he declared that the student of Dr. Dewey's text, "needs to have a large background in history, in the history of philosophy, and in the history of education."[125] Unlike previous discussions, it was difficult in this chapter to ascertain how the views presented were related to Dewey's own views.[126]

In addition to the dualisms which Dewey believed had been effected by divisions between work and leisure, knowing and doing, man and nature, he identified another dualism. Philosophically, this dualistic theme had occurred as the result of a "sharp demarcation of individual minds from the world, and hence from one another."[127]

Dewey admitted that the educational implications of this dualistic philosophy of mind and the world were not so obvious as previous accounts of influences resulting from dividing the

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[125]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 408.

[126]Ibid.

[127]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 340.

subject matter of education into separate studies.[128] There were, however, specific educational bearings associated with this dualism:

> . . . the dualistic philosophy of mind and the world implies an erroneous conception of the relationship between knowledge and social interests, and between individuality or freedom, and social control and authority.[129]

The underlying assumptions of those philosophies elaborating upon the question of cognitive relationship of the individual to the world seemed to be the point stressed by Dewey. These assumptions "have found expression in the separation frequently made between study and government and between freedom of individuality and control by others."[130]

Horne rejected the historic overview presented by Dewey. In particular, Horne noted a discrepancy in Dewey's discussion when Dewey claimed that private individualism was "comparatively modern" and that its origin was found in the medieval nominalist.[131] Horne believed the identification of this period as the origin of the idea of individualism was far too late in the development of historical thought.[132] It was

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[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid., pp. 356-357.

[131] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 408.

[132] Ibid.

suggested at this point that Dewey's intent was to "dispose the reader in advance to reject it."[133]

For all practical purposes, Dewey believed that individualism, or the struggle for greater freedom of thought, had been translated into philosophic subjectivism and was the product of the early modern period.

Horne's aim in providing certain historic illustrations was meant to establish that the concept of the mind as purely individual was an ancient one. Secondly, his objective was to establish that this concept could not be rejected on the basis that it was formulated in the early modern period:

> If rejected at all, it must be on other than historic grounds. Meantime, there is considerable ground that the universe itself is a Self and selves (Personalism), or even a Self of selves, including the realm of physical nature (Objective Idealism).[134]

2. Educational Equivalent

In this section, Horne agreed with Dewey and admitted that the body was united with the mind.[135] There is insufficient evidence to support the claim that Dewey discounted mind individually or collectively. He voiced strong objections to the theoretical framework which implied mind and the

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[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid., p. 410.

[135] Ibid., p. 427.

world as separate entities. This was because he believed this dualistic view produced an erroneous concept of the relationship between knowledge and social interests, between individuality or freedom, and social control and authority.[136]

Dewey insisted the social factor is present in learning. In its absence, "learning becomes a carrying over of some presented material into a purely individual consciousness . . . ."[137]

From Dewey's point of view, the student may at a given time work alone. At other times he may necessarily be engaged in group activities. Individual activity should not be taken to mean a student has been left to work by himself or alone.

> There is no inherent opposition between working with others and working as an individual. That a child must work alone and not engage in group activities in order to be free, is a notion which measures individuality by spatial distance and makes a physical thing of it.[138]

In terms of learning, Horne correctly identified Dewey's position relative to freedom of thought and personal thinking. When learning has been cast in any other framework, learning and its meaning in an internal sense has been lost.

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[136] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 340.

[137] Ibid., p. 352.

[138] Ibid.

Dewey's analysis of freedom was presented in terms of intellectual freedom. Horne believed such a discussion was insufficient and lacking since there was "no discussion of moral freedom, or the freedom of the individual as a self-determining agent."[139]

> Concerning freedom. The view presented is that freedom resides in the set of physical and social conditions allowing effective thinking to go on. This is intellectual freedom.[140]

It should be noted that Dewey was a foe of any social arrangement whereby the individual was controlled by others. Without intellectual freedom, the individual became the victim of "intellectual servility."[141]

Dewey drew no distinction between freedom and individuality. Like thinking, freedom represented a personal and individual achievement.

Although physical and social conditions were counterparts of the theoretical framework proposed by Dewey, these were not foremost. The existence of these conditions did not necessarily insure the successful attainment of freedom:

> Regarding freedom, the important thing to bear in mind is that it designates a mental attitude rather than external unconstraint of movements, but this quality of mind cannot

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[139] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 427.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 356.

> develop without a fair leeway of movements in exploration, experimentation, application, etc.[142]

In Dewey's discussion there was a double meaning to the term "individuality." In the first place, the individual was seen as one mentally involved in reflective thinking relative to his own purposes and problems. His activity is in large measure self-directed, receiving impetus from his questions, his concerns, and his curiosity. To the extent that these elements are permitted and encouraged to flourish, he is intellectually free. In the second place, "there are variations of points of view, of appeal of objects, and of mode of attack, from person to person."[143] Mental confusion and artificiality resulted when these variations among persons were suppressed in behalf of uniformity.

Horne continued with a persuasive bent toward a consideration of personality rather than a consideration of the individual. This was another instance, according to Horne, where the idealistic philosophy would have presented a broader spectrum in relation to the self, its learning, and approaches to methodology. Essentially, Horne believed Dewey failed to go far enough in his analysis of the individual and his concept of freedom:

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[142] Ibid., p. 357.

[143] Ibid., p. 354.

> Here the omission is consistent with the denial of the private, personal, self. Personality is not here presented as a fundamental category. Freedom is thus lack of constraint on thinking; such freedom might just as well be called determinism.[144]

Horne, at this point, seemed to confuse free thinking with the concept of thinking freely. It was the latter which Dewey accepted and taught. It was democratic social conditions which liberated thinking. He remained optimistic in his belief that men would voluntarily seek to improve conditions when they found themselves functioning in a free society. In Horne's philosophy, however, moral freedom was only achieved as the result of man's free will and a recognition of human responsibility. In this respect Horne contended that this dimension of freedom was more stable. Horne again urged for a return to fundamental categories as a sound basis for thinking and freedom.[145]

Social conditions, as well as physical, were characterized by Dewey as those elements which must be confronted if a democratic society was to be a truly progressive society. In summary, Dewey stated:

> A progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means of its own growth. Hence a democratic society must in consistency with its ideal, allow for intellectual freedom and the

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[144] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 427.

[145] Ibid.

> play of diverse gifts and interests in its educational measures.[146]

Vocational Aspects of Education

1. The Meaning of Vocation

Horne placed great emphasis upon the definition of the term "vocation." He also believed Dewey chose an unfamiliar meaning to the term. Noting this condition, Horne reaffirmed his criticism of Dewey's definition:

> Usually, by vocation we mean the occupation by which one earns his living. The definition given in the text extends the usual meaning of one's vocation to cover all his personally significant and socially useful activities; one's vocation is to be usefully human.[147]

Horne believed that Dewey used vocation and occupation as synonymous terms--those interests the individual shared with others were also a part of his existence. But Horne noted, "It is commonly recognized that one's vocation is not his only interest."[148]

The term "vocation" assumed a much broader meaning and its implications extended into all life's activities. This extension was inappropriate according to Horne:

> . . . the definition is too broad, including too many of the worthy interests of life. It is also too broad in excluding from the definition some worthy interests in life.[149]

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[146]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 357.

[147]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 432.

[148]Ibid.

[149]Ibid., p. 433.

Horne rightfully recognized that there existed certain negative or "useless" vocations bearing little or no social worth. On this point he stated:

> There are socially useless vocations, such as racketeering, burglary, banditry, dope-peddling. These are all vocations in the sense that they are ways of making a living.[150]

Unworthy vocations remain just that. Like bad habits and other negative increments to growth, the positive and worthy concept should not be deemphasized merely because of the existence of their opposites. There was in Dewey's text sufficient evidence to support his recognition of the conditions cited above by Horne, and Dewey's criterion for habits and growth still prevailed in his philosophy. Only when the individual's activities contributed to the well-being and happiness of others in his society were his activities deemed to be worthy ones. From Dewey's point of view, the central question remained: Do the actions and activities of the individual lead in the general direction toward making a positive contribution to those goals and ideals preferred by members of society? Social vices such as those described by Horne did not meet the requirement demanded for social acceptance.

Admittedly, ways of making a living comprise one aspect of a vocation. However, Horne's interpretation of Dewey exceeded the emphasis warranted relative to this aspect of

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[150] *Ibid.*

the concept of a vocation. The real issue intended by Horne's comments was to revive the controversy of liberal versus vocational education. Although this issue was not presented in Dewey's discussion, Horne maintained that Dewey, by subtle means, had raised the question.

2. Present Opportunities and Dangers

Referring to Dewey's definition of the term "vocation," Horne made the following observation:

> In this case the effect of the meaning given the term is so to widen it that vocational education will be equivalent to liberal and vocational education. This is to beg the question at issue by initial definition.[151]

Dewey consistently sought to decrease the element of narrowness as well as any restrictive quality upon man's activities and interests. The role of interest continued to be a vital one. Interest, according to Dewey, must be viewed as inherently involved in the interactive process. An occupation fulfills the requirements laid down previously in connection with aims, interests, and thinking, when pursued under conditions whereby the realization of the activity rather than merely the external product is the aim.

Dewey did express concern over the philosophic dualisms which had been associated with the whole subject of vocational education:

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[151] *Ibid.*, pp. 432-433.

> There seems to be too great a gap between the remote and general terms in which philosophic ideas are formulated and the practical and concrete details of vocational education. . . it is necessary to define the meaning of vocation with some fulness in order to avoid the impression that an education which centers about it is narrowly practical, if not merely pecuniary.[152]

The definition offered by Dewey was simple, yet broad and inclusive:

> A vocation signifies any form of continuous activity which renders service to others and engages personal powers in behalf of the accomplishment of results.[153]

Attention should be called to the fact that Dewey was not concerned with "vocational" education *per se*, but rather with the intellectual quality of all learning. His objective was not to make vocational education an equivalent to a liberal education. Neither did Dewey attempt to elevate vocational education to a position of superior worth. While it might be possible to confuse Dewey's expansion of intellectual pursuits to practical studies by suggesting he advocated vocational education, such an assumption would be false and would only serve to confuse the issue:

> Any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to assume and to perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses. . . . Such a vocational education inevitably discounts the scientific and historic human connections. . . .

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[152] Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 358.

[153] *Ibid.*, p. 373.

> To include such things in narrow trade education would be to waste time. . . .[154]

Dewey noted a tendency for a particular vocation to become too dominant, too exclusive, and absorbed in its narrow specialized aspect. He believed this condition ultimately led to an increased emphasis upon skill and technical method at the expense of meaning.[155] Dewey believed these conditions could possibly exert negative influences upon educational practices. Aware of these restrictive circumstances, he warned:

> Hence it is not the business of education to foster this tendency, but rather to safeguard against it, so that the scientific inquirer shall not be merely the scientist, the teacher merely the pedagogue, the clergyman merely one who wears the cloth. . . .[156]

The term "vocation" represented for Dewey but a name designated to single out that one calling which distinguishes one individual from all others. Words and their definition should not subject an analysis to a denial of the many other callings when consideration is given to the vocational phases of education.[157]

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[154] Ibid., p. 372.

[155] Ibid., p. 360.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Ibid., p. 359.

Horne claimed that Dewey had omitted the greatest of all vocations--that of being oneself. "Most of the service we can render society can be as well or better rendered by some other person.[158] By contrast, Dewey called attention to the individual as well as to the society in which he functioned. "The dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is living--intellectual and moral growth."[159]

Dewey's theory denied the right of any person to enjoy leisure at the expense of another person's labor. This position was admitted by Horne as an ethical right, not to be confused with the historic meaning of the terms "liberal" and "vocational."[160] In addition, Dewey insisted that all workers should understand the cultural backgrounds of their occupations in order to increase the surety of intellectual and emotional satisfaction.

A significant principal was repeated by Dewey:

> . . . training may develop a machine-like skill in routine lines but it will be at the expense of those qualities of alert observation and coherent and ingenious planning which make an occupation rewarding.[161]

Dewey pointed out that this would be the condition when the work pursued by man was devoid of essential social bearings.

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[158]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 439.

[159]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 362.

[160]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 451.

[161]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 363.

Intelligence would then be limited to technical, non-humane, and non-liberal channels.[162]

There was an absence of any discussion by Horne relative to the nature of vocation and work demanded by a democratic society. Dewey, however, predicated his discussion upon this very point. The negative aspects of work in the pursuit of a vocation necessarily had to be eliminated if the individual was to function effectively and participate freely in intellectual and moral growth:

> In an autocratically managed society, it is often a conscious object to prevent the development of freedom and responsibility; a few do the planning and ordering, the others follow directions and are deliberately confined to narrow and prescribed channels of endeavor.[163]

Such a scheme, according to Dewey, might serve to insure prestige and profit of a privileged class but this was accomplished at the expense of limiting the development of the worker.[164] He believed that the great majority of workers had no real insight into the social aims of their work and no direct personal interest in them. Consequently, results achieved were for all practical purposes not the ends of their actions, but of their employers'. In summarizing

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[162] Ibid., p. 365.

[163] Ibid., p. 363.

[164] Ibid.

his concern, Dewey stated:

> They do what they do, not freely and intelligently, but for the sake of the wage earned. It is this fact which makes the action illiberal, and which will make any education designed simply to give skill in such undertakings illiberal and immoral. The activity is not free because not freely participated in.[165]

There was both a challenge and warning raised by Dewey. The extent to which industry and education have been responsive appears to be minimal in terms of contemporary society and the participating individual. Possibly a narrowly conceived scheme of vocation and vocational education has prompted and perpetuated the philosophic division between social aims and interests and the endeavor of work.

The question of vocational education continues to stand in a crucial position. According to Dewey, two fundamental questions remain to be dealt with, each significantly related to social, economic, and educational activities:

> Whether intelligence is best exercised apart from or within activity which puts nature to human use, and whether individual culture is best secured under egoistic or social conditions.[166]

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[165] Ibid., p. 304.

[166] Ibid., p. 374.

CHAPTER V

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Philosophy of Education

1. A Critical Review

Horne identified this chapter of Dewey's text as a significant one; he believed Dewey's review in this section "critical." The extent of Horne's respect for Dewey is well indicated in the following quote:

> One rarely meets such concentrated expressions of thought, such meaning-laden sentences, such brief and weighty observations.[1]

Nevertheless, Horne maintained Dewey had neglected the evaluative aspect of philosophy in his writing. "The review does not do justice to the richness of the content of the preceding twenty-three chapters."[2] The summary provided by Dewey at the conclusion of each chapter did contain concise statements intended to serve as a supplement. In this section of his text, statements were often brief. Yet, these often served to clarify discussion in the preceding portion of the

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[1]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 460.

[2]Ibid., p. 459.

chapter. Clarification, not evaluation, was the primary objective of Dewey's summary.

2. The Nature of Philosophy

In retrospect, Horne reviewed the material presented by Dewey up to this point. He concentrated upon providing a summary of significant philosophical positions which he believed were similar to Dewey's theory. Additional observations contrast Dewey's reconstructed philosophy and that of traditional theorists prior to Dewey. Herbart's philosophy was the first contrasted:

> Dr. Dewey is not an Herbartian in his educational philosophy. . . but he has Herbart's conception of the relation of philosophy to education. Herbart, however, did not limit philosophy to formulating the interests of social life.[3]

Horne's analysis would have been more effective if he had concentrated upon the fact that social conditions present at the time Herbart made his formulations were vastly different from those which confronted Dewey. Dewey was cognizant of the disharmony between pre-scientific and scientific conditions. Consequently, one of the most persistent problems in Dewey's inquiry was that of restoring a balance between man's beliefs about the world and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct conduct. The findings of science demanded a new integration and a spirit of cooperation if man was to live with a sense of purpose and commitment

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[3] Ibid., p. 471.

to human endeavors. Dewey noted that the same problems of life recur from time to time and that changes were due to change of social context, "including the growth of the sciences."[4] Furthermore, he insisted that philosophy and education bore a special responsibility when society is faced with drastic revolutionary change. Scientific investigations give rise to new insights about the nature of thinking. For Dewey, the intellectual task must now be viewed quite differently. The implications of instrumentalism are more than philosophical rhetoric:

> The fact that philosophic problems arise because of widespread and widely felt difficulties in social practice is disguised because philosophers become a specialized class which uses a technical language, unlike the vocabulary in which the direct difficulties are stated.[5]

The relationship between philosophy and education was vividly expounded by Dewey. At no time in the history of philosophy of education had the connection been so closely appraised as that which was portrayed by Dewey. He described this relationship as an intimate one and believed education offered the best vantage point from which "to penetrate to the human, as distinct from the technical, significance of philosophic discussions."[6]

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[4]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 382-383.

[5]Ibid., p. 383.

[6]Ibid.

Dewey felt that previous philosophical inquiry had played only a minor role in the course of human events because philosophers had merely been engaged in a kind of discourse often not attached to problematic conditions encountered in the society of this world. Since he adopted the evolutionary point of view, thought as a process assumed a new role--a role which he hoped would reverse the direction of traditional philosophical history. Philosophy, to be vital and instrumental, must now find its way into the stream of conscious life. The point of entrance into life, Dewey believed, must necessarily be education. To education he assigned the task of bringing philosophy out of the ivory tower and into contact with life. Philosophical theories must be put to the educational test:

> The educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice. . . . Philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education. Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic--or verbal--or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct.[7]

Horne recalled that Hegel's philosophy also held to the theory of reconciliation of opposites and noted this theory resembled that of Dewey's in that each sought to unify and comprehend conflicts of interests:[8]

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 471.

> The method is Hegel's; the difference is that Hegel applies his method to all phases of reality and to reality itself, while Dewey applies his only to social struggles.[9]

By way of analogy, Horne claimed that Dewey had rejected those philosophical and educational systems from which he had inherited so much. There is little reason to doubt that Hegel's theory, as well as those theories held by Herbart, did serve as an influence upon Dewey's philosophy. The influence, however, was ultimately negative, and often resulted in a rejection of earlier theories. There was truth in Horne's analysis which concluded that Dewey had rejected most of Hegel's system.

Horne suggested that Dewey did seek to understand and unify conflicting interests in social life for it was in the social arena that he believed the conflict of interests existed. As a result of the disturbing conditions which Dewey recognized in society, he felt there was a real need to restore equilibrium between man and the world and that this was the task for philosophy and education. In effect, he labored to effect a new integration which would be consistent with the findings of science. Dewey maintained there must always be the endeavor, "to attain as unified, consistent, and complete an outlook upon experience as possible."[10]

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 378.

The interpretation by Horne in this section would have been enlarged had he noted Dewey's rejection of that element in Hegel's philosophy which resulted in determinism. Dewey was not a determinist. It would probably be more nearly accurate to claim that Dewey rejected Hegel's system to a greater extent than he rejected his method.

An examination of Dewey's logic and psychology would also have provided greater insight. Both of these in combination served to explain the natural evolution of effective thought and the conditions which gave rise to it. Dewey's concept of reflective thinking was rooted in the biological scheme of things and the method of scientific inquiry. The unifying theme which gave direction to Dewey's educational proposals stemmed from his intense concern for the civilized experience, the nature of evolution and its role in furthering growth. Although this theme was repeated throughout Dewey's text, Horne failed to assess adequately the assignment of a joint responsibility for philosophy and education. Civilization, according to Dewey, amounted to a process of growth in human experience. The task for philosophy was to work out those conditions which would lead to greater human fulfillment within the conditions emerging in the specific civilization in question. Philosophy should illuminate the course that experience had taken and project possible modes of conduct for the future.[11] Thus, the partnership was an imperative from

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[11] *Ibid.*

Dewey's point of view. Philosophy must maintain an awareness of advances in knowledge arising from research in the natural and social sciences in order to keep in contact with man's real situation. At the same time, work in psychology and education must continue to be pursued in order to assure that knowledge would properly function in the affairs of men's lives. Dewey affirmed that philosophy had a dual task:

> . . . that of criticizing existing aims with respect to the existing state of science. . . and also that of interpreting the results of specialized science in their bearing on future social endeavor. It is impossible that it should have any success in these tasks without educational equivalents as to what to do and what not to do. . . . By the educative arts philosophy may generate methods of utilizing the energies of human beings in accord with serious and thoughtful conceptions of life. Education is the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and tested.[12]

Specific traits of Dewey's philosophy were identified by Horne in an attempt to point out what he viewed as deficient or inconsistent. Horne made the following claim in describing some of the characteristics of Dewey's philosophy:

> His own philosophy is epistemological, and ethical or social. . . . He does not intend his philosophy to be metaphysical. . . and so raise questions about the nature of being, the order of being, and man's relation to the whole of reality. He rejects these problems of ontology and cosmology as non-philosophical, and so omits them from his list. . . . But it takes a metaphysics to reject a metaphysics. Ontology creeps in.[13]

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[12] Ibid., p. 384.

[13] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 471.

Philosophical reform was of utmost importance to Dewey. He directed his greatest effort toward its accomplishment. Science, which Dewey believed held great promise, was also the source of many disruptions. The creation of a technological-urban social order necessitated that attention be given to new alternatives since old community forms were beginning to disappear. Much of Dewey's involvement and concern were focused toward the emerging society--its potential as well as its problems. With this in mind, he applied all facets of human endeavor which he felt his ontology permitted. The inclusion of unnecessary metaphysical concepts would have been of little assistance to Dewey's objective which was to reconstruct philosophy and philosophical thought.

Horne made an unwarranted assumption when he claimed Dewey rejected questions posed by ontology and cosmology on the ground that these were "non-philosophical."[14] Questions raised out of concern for ontology were rejected because such speculative questions yielded little to Dewey's view of philosophy. Democratic social conditions and educational objectives were of far greater concern to Dewey. A rejection of metaphysics and related questions was never a major concern in theory or in practice.

Horne tended to lean in the direction of absolutes, and he argued in favor of placing the new construct in an old

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[14] *Ibid.*

framework. He apparently failed to recognize that it was physics which had dislodged metaphysics just as astronomy had replaced astrology. New developments in psychology had chartered new attitudes regarding metaphysics. From Dewey's point of reference, epistemology and the import of epistemological considerations caused ontology and cosmology to receive less attention. Dewey believed these areas of thought should remain the domain of speculative philosophers.

Further characterizing Dewey's philosophy, Horne stated:

> His bias is on the side of the scientific as against languages and literature; he does not recognize the *a priori*, and the transcendental element in thinking; he does not care for speculative philosophy; he does not acknowledge the experience of the mystic. . . .[15]

Dewey did express a preference for the scientific method yet he did not neglect the possibility of value to be found in language and literature. He merely questioned those studies enjoying traditional sanction only. The pragmatic philosophy with its concern for instrumental values implies a certain bias for the scientific. The criterion of value, however, was not found in the content of any subject matter *per se*. The deciding factor in determining value was the method employed and the extent to which these contributed to subsequent solutions to human problems.

Recognition of the *a priori* and transcendental would have represented a contradiction in Dewey's philosophy. In his

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[15]*Ibid.*, p. 474.

perspective, no knowledge existed prior to or outside experience. Therefore, an acceptance of the a priori would have reduced thinking to submission to some external authority. Speculative philosophy, according to Dewey, ultimately found itself grounded in dogmatic traditions. Therefore, those elements found in traditional philosophy such as Horne's, were incompatible with the pragmatic philosophy.

Horne was correct when he claimed Dewey gave little recognition to the experience of the mystic. It should be pointed out, however, that Dewey never denied the possibility of a subjective experience for the individual. Such an experience should be viewed as private, and as such, could not be assumed to be the condition for verifying true knowledge.

Noting that Dewey had failed to acknowledge the "experience of the mystic," as well as a priori truth and transcendental elements in thinking, Horne was led to conclude that Dewey's philosophy did not exemplify the disposition of "totality."[16] At this point another striking contrast was called to attention by Horne. From his frame of reference, philosophical totality was attainable only as reference was made to the abstract and to a theory which embraced orthodox universals. Totality had been achieved for Horne only when completeness and finality had been exacted. Dewey's concept of totality was associated with the individual's experience

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[16]Ibid.

and did not suggest finality in the sense of terminating or disposing of philosophical questions. His position relative to totality was further clarified when he stated that "completeness and finality are out of the question in any literal or quantitative sense. . . ."[17]

> From this point of view, 'totality' does not mean the hopeless task of a quantitative summation. It means rather consistency of mode of response in reference to the plurality of events which occur. Totality means continuity--the carrying on of a former habit of action with the readaptation necessary to keep it alive and growing.[18]

Experience was represented as an ongoing, changing process. The very nature of experience as conceived by Dewey prohibited the use of the terms "final" and "total" in the sense these had been adopted by Horne. These he included because he believed that philosophy and a philosophy of education were complete and comprehensive only as these attitudes were applied to experience.[19]

Dewey discussed these and similar terms quite differently. Totality and finality were false concepts when viewed as traits pointing toward "ultimateness of philosophy."[20] When taken literally, Dewey discredited such language and declared these

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[17]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 379.

[18]Ibid., pp. 379-80.

[19]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 474.

[20]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 379.

terms to be "absurd pretensions; they indicate insanity."[21]

> Finality does not mean. . . that experience is ended and exhausted, but means the disposition to penetrate to deeper levels of meaning--to go below the surface and find out the connections of any event or object, and to keep at it.[22]

One of the most definitive arguments presented by Dewey in this chapter was his statements concerning the role and function of philosophy and science. A clear distinction was drawn between these when he discussed the relationship between theory and practice, knowledge and intelligence, and facts and values. Dewey was convinced that theory and abstract thought must be brought into a position of harmony in order for man to effectively interact with the world of nature and the problems faced by man in the social context. Philosophy, he maintained, had played only a minor role in the course of human events largely due to the fact that it had been retained in the ivory tower far removed from experience. Although an intimate and direct connection existed between philosophy and science, Dewey believed it was necessary to differentiate between the two in order to effect an adequate outlook upon life.[23]

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[21] Ibid., p. 380.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., p. 379.

> Particular facts and laws of science evidently influence conduct. They suggest things to do and not to do, and provide means of execution. When science denotes not simply a report of the particular facts discovered about the world but a general attitude toward it--as distinct from special things to do--it merges into philosophy.[24]

Further elaboration by Dewey provided additional insights into the respective character and function of science and philosophy:

> . . . obviously it is to mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology, history. . . that we must go, not to philosophy, to find out the facts of the world. It is for the sciences to say what generalizations are tenable about the world and what they specifically are. But when we ask what sort of permanent disposition of action toward the world the scientific disclosures exact of us we are raising a philosophic question.[25]

For Dewey, science provided facts--grounded knowledge--about the world. As distinct from science, philosophy represented a particular disposition of attitude. This general attitude, Dewey emphasized, was the factor which enabled man to decide what to do with those facts about the world as reported by the products of science. At this stage of involvement man became philosophic. An integration consistent with the findings of science must of necessity be effected before the aggregate of known things could reach into men's lives in such a way as to govern their conduct and permit them to live with a sense of purpose. Put another way, science

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

discovers facts while philosophy assumes the responsibility for guiding and determining alternatives which ultimately suggest the best course to follow in utilizing the facts which have resulted from scientific inquiry. Philosophy as projected by Dewey was important in that it provided the linkage between that which has been settled, i.e., knowledge, and the application of those findings. An understanding of these two intellectual enterprises was imperative if educational implications were to be understood in terms of Dewey's philosophy and his general theory of education:

> Since education is the process through which the needed transformation may be accomplished and not remain a mere hypothesis. . . we reach a justification of the statement that philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately conducted practice.[26]

Unlike the orientation of Horne, Dewey's central theme was that educational problems were to serve as a testing ground in which philosophical ideas had to prove themselves before they could be construed as viable educational components containing instrumental value.

Theories of Knowledge

1. Continuity versus Dualism

Prominent ideas drawn from Dewey's text were analyzed by Horne in this section of his summary. The overview of Dewey's chapter was presented by adopting certain key phrases which

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 387.

Horne believed were descriptive of the language used by Dewey. Some of these terms were valid in terms of Dewey's expressions, while others were only similar. Horne identified the following as deserving of special comment: (1) social origin and nature of philosophy; (2) social and educational equivalents of epistemological dualism; (3) validity of the conclusions of physiological psychology; (4) philosophy of evolution; (5) flexible responses to environmental stimuli.[27]

The adequacy of the experimental method as well as the feasibility of schools devoted to this method was a special target for Horne's criticism. He not only questioned the practicality of the experimental method, but he also questioned whether or not Dewey's theory actually exemplified the experimental approach.[28]

> . . . Dr. Dewey uses the literary and dialectic methods which he decries, not the experimental method which he praises. . . he goes into his study and writes a book advocating the experimental method. . . . If his theory is correct, then he has made for us, not knowledge, but more beliefs. Besides having stated his beliefs, he is transmitting them with whatever authority attaches to his great reputation.[29]

Horne's criticism of Dewey's theory and method at this point is not clear. His basic argument was apparently to call attention to a monistic ontology. His argument was for

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[27]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 484-485.

[28]Ibid., p. 483.

[29]Ibid.

a return to a unified theory of reality wherein both the knower and known could be assessed adequately in terms of knowledge which held validity.[30]

Horne's comments indicated that he never fully recognized the full scope of Dewey's theory of knowledge especially as it was related to the experimental method with its scientific basis.

The philosophical equivalent of this theory could only be understood when Dewey's commitment to the evolutionary view of human experience had been carefully noted. Repeatedly, Dewey stressed that it was not the external procedures of empirical science that needed to be adopted, but rather the dynamic relationship between science and experience. He viewed science instrumentally--free of traditional rigidity and rhetorical dictates. Science, Dewey was convinced, represented an effective instrument for use in present problematic conditions. At the same time, it was recognized as a valuable factor in projecting consequences of behavior in future situations.

Horne further criticized Dewey when he insisted ". . . his method is not in accord with his theory."[31] The theory of continuity advanced by Dewey in previous chapters was a proposition not given sufficient consideration in Horne's

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[30] Ibid., p. 485.

[31] Ibid., p. 483.

comments. For a more comprehensive understanding of the philosophic significance of Dewey's developmental theory, the investigator must take into account biological evolution. Dewey emphasized:

> For the philosophic significance of the doctrine of evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon continuity of simpler and more complex organic forms until we reach man. As activity becomes more complex, coordinating a greater number of factors in space and time, intelligence plays a more and marked role, for it has a larger span of the future to forecast and plan for.[32]

Meaning continued to be a significant factor for Dewey. The greater the increment of perceived meaning in terms of the experimental method, "the more our trying out of a certain way of treating the material resources and obstacles which confront us embodies a prior use of intelligence."[33] The scientific experimental method was not a trial of luck but a trial of ideas. Immediately or in the future, successful or unsuccessful, ". . . it is intellectual, for we learn from our failures when our endeavors are seriously thoughtful."[34] Dewey described the experimental method as a "new scientific resource," yet it was, "as old as life as a practical device."[35] However, he was not surprised that certain

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[32]Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 392-393.

[33]Ibid., p. 394.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid.

philosophers and intellectuals found this method difficult to comprehend as a vital element in the pragmatic tradition:

> It will doubtless take a long time to secure the perception that it holds equally as to the forming and testing of ideas in social and moral matters. Men still want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs fixed by authority, to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of directing their activity by thought.[36]

Horne was not accurate when he expressed the belief that Dewey had employed "literary and dialectic methods."[37] From his discussion, there was reason to believe Horne's criticism stemmed from the fact that he had not found Dewey in the laboratory practicing his experimental method.

It is apparent Horne failed to understand the intimate connection between philosophy and education as maintained by Dewey. Yet, the latter's view is clear: "Education is the laboratory in which philoscphic distinctions become concrete and tested."[38] Education, for Dewey, affords the best vantage point from which to penetrate into the human significance of philosophic discussions. Dewey expressed skepticism, if not contempt, for the literary and dialectic method and cautioned that these methods had promoted undesirable practices in the school:

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 483.

[38] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 384.

> But every advance in the influence of the experimental method is sure to aid in outlawing the literary, dialectic, and authoritative methods of forming beliefs which have governed the schools of the past, and to transfer their prestige to the method which will procure an active concern with things and persons. . . .[39]

Dewey proposed the experimental method as that method best suited for getting knowledge and certifying it as knowledge and not mere opinions, guesses, or hypotheses. It represented the method of both "discovery and proof."[40] He firmly believed this approach was the last great force in bringing about a true transformation in the theory of knowledge.

The theory of continuity expressed a theme characteristic of Dewey. From his point of view, the theory was a logical appendage to the doctrine of evolution--the development of simple organic forms to the more complex. Horne, however, assessed such a concept as inadequate and he believed the scheme was far too impersonal.[41] His interpretation of Dewey's "continuous flow of experience," was greatly simplified. As a result he diminished the value of the concept and minimized its role in acquiring valid knowledge. In fact, Horne thought Dewey psychologically inadequate:

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 484.

"Dewey leaves only the organism making flexible responses to environmental stimuli."[42] In the final analysis, Horne found Dewey's thinking relative to knowledge intellectually wanting.

Horne sought to establish that the knower in the case of man must necessarily be recognized as a conscious being distinct from the object which he comes to know. Thus, with Descartes, he could affirm that language has meaning when it says, "I think."[43] From this criticism, it was evident that Horne was expressing his belief that Dewey eliminated the distinction between the knower and the known, thereby reducing mind to a mere agent of response to external stimuli. According to Horne, Dewey had, in effect, created an epistemological dualism.[44]

Dewey viewed both the knower and the known as a part of the same world. Each existed as a separate entity, yet neither existed in opposition to the other. The two elements were not to be isolated in such a way as to permit one to be independent of the other. Dewey proposed a plan which eliminated the traditional dualistic character of the knower and the known, and their identity and dependence were to be

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

intellectually grasped. His theory of knowing was an attempt to displace the notion that the individual's role was to engage himself as a spectator, not as a participant. Whereas the spectator theory cast the individual in the role of a mere onlooker, Dewey cautioned that this view, "goes with the idea of knowing as something complete in itself."[45]

> . . . the doctrine of organic development means that the living creature is a part of the world, sharing. . . and making itself secure in its precarious dependence only as it intellectually identifies itself with the things about it, and, forecasting the future consequences of what is going on, shapes activities accordingly.[46]

Horne called man a "conscious being. . . as distinct from that which he knows."[47] However, Dewey regarded the knower as an "experiencing being. . . an intimate participant in the activities of the world to which he belongs."[48] In Dewey's theory, knowledge was a mode of participation and was valuable in the degree to which it was effective. "It cannot be the idle view of an unconcerned spectator."[49] Horne's argument appears to be that before a being can identify with things in his environment, he must first be a spectator of that environment.

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[45]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 393.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 485.

[48]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 393.

[49]Ibid.

Horne viewed Dewey's theory of exprience and thinking as void of any awareness of the sensations. Thus, Horne was persuaded Dewey's continuity of experience was but a process whereby the organism made flexible responses to sporadic environmental stimuli.[50] Dewey refuted such a simplistic notion when he recalled the function of the nervous system and the reciprocal arrangement of stimuli received from the environment.

> But in fact the nervous system is only a specialized mechanism for keeping all bodily activities working together. . . it is the organ by which they interact responsively with one another. The brain is essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the environment and responses directed upon it.[51]

In this section Dewey is also concerned with the problem of interest:

> Thus in education we have that systematic depreciation of interest. . . plus the necessity in practice, . . . of recourse to extraneous and irrelevant rewards and penalties in order to induce the person who has a mind. . . to apply that mind to the truths to be known.[52]

Dewey cautioned that reliance upon extrinsic forms of motivation impeded learning. In addition, such an attitude had encouraged disruptive discipline problems in the school.

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[50]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 484.

[51]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 392.

[52]Ibid., p. 391.

Further evidence of his concern in this matter is revealed when Dewey warned:

> Thus we have the spectacle of professional educators decrying appeal to interest while they uphold with great dignity the need of reliance upon examinations, marks, promotions and emotions, prizes, and the time-honored paraphernalia of rewards and punishments.[53]

The effects of this condition which discounts the importance of both intellectual and emotional disposition were serious ones, according to Dewey. It is realistic to assume that much of the disruptive character currently found in the educational setting has its roots directly or indirectly in the supposed opposition between the intellect and the emotions. Because of this condition, Dewey gave much attention to practices in the school resulting from this dualism.

Horne, nevertheless, continued to express doubt as to the validity of Dewey's argument: "In the discussion of this same dualism it is not clear what the school equivalent is for pure intellect as distinct from the emotions."[54] The probability of a dual role for the intellect and the emotions was sustained as Horne summarily dismissed the consideration:

> It might only be that the opposition arose through the fact that the intellect grasps facts and relations coldly through insight and the emotions lay hold on truth warmly through intuition, or sensing the whole of a situation.[55]

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[53] Ibid.

[54] Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 486.

[55] Ibid.

Since the major portion of Horne's interpretation was in the form of questions, it is difficult to determine precisely his position on this issue. He did, however, clearly differentiate the character and function of the emotions and the intellect and maintained that each held a distinctive role in the attainment of knowledge for the individual.

2. Schools of Method

Horne, in this section contrasts Dewey on knowing and habit: "Knowing is flexible, habit is rigid. This account makes all habits 'passive' and so opposes the theory of 'active' habits earlier accepted."[56] An examination of Dewey's discussion in this section revealed no inconsistency as suggested by Horne. The assertion that knowing was flexible while habit was rigid appeared to be the nomenclature adopted by Horne. The focal point of Dewey's analysis was neither flexibility nor rigidity in terms of knowing and habit. Knowledge, according to Dewey, may be flexible and active. Likewise, habits need not be viewed as passive. They may contribute directly to the function of knowledge in a complementary manner.

Dewey often referred to habits as active. His reference to "habit" in this discussion was analogous to knowing. The proper perspective and attitude toward method seemed likely to be the determining factor as to whether or not habit made

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[56] Ibid., p. 498.

a positive contribution to knowledge. When habit enabled the individual to undergo certain modifications through experience, the outcome was the formation of a "predisposition to easier and more effective action in a like direction in the future."[57] On the other hand, habits which did not yield themselves to successful future experiences tended to enslave rather than free the mind for change and readaptation.

One of Dewey's criticisms of the various schools of philosophy was due to the fact these often "regarded knowledge as something complete in itself irrespective of its availability in dealing with what is yet to be."[58] Dewey was persistent in his belief that previous concepts of knowledge and truth had been distorted. As a result, educational practitioners had come to believe that a mere appropriation of subject matter stored in a textbook constituted knowledge. Methods which accompanied this attitude were generally ineffective in terms of effective learning:

> No matter how true what is learned to those who found it out and in whose experience it functioned, there is nothing which makes it knowledge to the pupils. It might as well be something about Mars or about some fanciful country unless it fructifies in the individual's own life.[59]

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[57] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 395.

[58] Ibid., p. 398.

[59] Ibid.

The pragmatic theory of knowing was the method advanced by Dewey. To maintain continuity of knowing with an activity which purposely modifies the environment was the essential feature of this doctrine.[60] The organization of conscious dispositions was an imperative if knowledge was to possess meaning in application:

> Only that which has been organized into our dispositions so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge.[61]

Dewey believed that knowledge as something possessed consisted of all our intellectual resources and all habits which make our action intelligent. Truth and knowledge, according to the pragmatic philosophy, must be: (1) functional; (2) adaptable; (3) practical; (4) capable of change; and (5) friendly to the doctrine of continuity. In short, the pragmatists are: "Those concerned with progress, who are striving to change received beliefs, while emphasizing the individual factor in knowing."[62]

Knowledge, democracy, and education represented prime factors in Dewey's philosophy. Democracy, in theory and in practice, demanded the development of educational equivalents

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[60] Ibid., p. 400.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid., p. 401.

for its sustenance. Dewey gave further credence to this position when he stated:

> In an analogous way, since democracy stands in principle for free interchange, for social continuity, it must develop a theory of knowledge which sees in knowledge the method by which one experience is made available in giving direction and meaning to another. The recent advances in physiology, biology, and the logic of the experimental sciences supply the specific intellectual instrumentalities demanded to work out and formulate such a theory.[63]

Unlike the rationalists, realists, and the idealists, the pragmatic philosophy broke away from those philosophic systems whose primary considerations were set apart from social conditions. The positive and progressive nature of the pragmatic doctrine was noted by the urgent appeal for reconstruction:

> If there is especial need of educational reconstruction at the present time, . . . it is because of the thoroughgoing change in social life accompanying the advance of science, the industrial revolution, and the development of democracy.[64]

Thus, the reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of social ideals and methods must go hand in hand, according to the progressive philosophy of Dewey.

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[63] *Ibid.*

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 386.

Theories of Morals

1. The Inner and the Outer

Dewey criticized the philosophic tendency to divide moral ideas into "inner and outer, or the spiritual and the physical."[65] As a result of this condition he believed a sharp demarcation had been drawn between the motive of action from its consequences, and of character from conduct:

> Motive and character are regarded as something purely 'inner,' existing exclusively in consciousness, while consequences and conduct are regarded as outside of mind, conduct having to do simply with the movements which carry out motives; consequences with what happens as a result.[66]

Dewey appealed for unity and continuity in moral theory. Morality viewed in terms of an "inner" and an "outer" represented another dualism. The continuation of this dualism served only to abort the cultivation of morals in a pragmatic sense. Dewey maintained that moral principles were to act as guides in directing conduct. Morality and conduct were central to his theory. "Results, conduct, are what counts; they afford the sole measure of morality."[67]

Horne insisted there existed the "outer" element to morality without an "inner." He did not produce any valid illustrations in proof of this position. The fact that

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[65] *Ibid.*, p. 402.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 406.

behavior was not always continuous attested to a disunity between mind and activity. He stated:

> In the case of a multiple personality. . . the unity and continuity of behavior is disturbed. The different personalities within the same organism alternate; successive states of the same personality are continuous with each other but are discontinuous with the alternating personality. In the case of a disranged personality there is but little unity and continuity left.[68]

With respect to Dewey's concept of the theory of morals, Horne's analysis at this point provided little insight. His success was in proving that behavior was not always continuous. Dewey believed there was no substitute for realistic thinking in combination with unifying principles. Both tended to increase the probability that a contribution would be made in behalf of development of the whole self. The principles of reflective thinking and growth were indispensable concepts. An understanding of these is a necessary condition for understanding Dewey's theory of morals.

Horne's interpretation of the "inner" and "outer" components of moral ideas vastly differed from the analysis presented by Dewey. Horne made little attempt to establish unification between the two. The dualism of mind and body remained the formula providing the impetus to his theory. For Horne, the inner facet was associated with the psychical phase of experience while the outer realm was associated with overt conduct. Absolutism and transcendental motives continued

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[68]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 508-509.

to serve as the foundation for Horne's judgments concerning the right and wrong in making moral decisions. On the other hand, authentic support for Dewey's argument was vested in life experiences of the human organism--a unity of mind and body. While Horne retained the institutionalized and doctrinaire orientation, Dewey rejected this in favor of an approach grounded in the spirit and methods of evolutionary theory, of science, and of democracy.

Possibly Horne underestimated the character of Dewey's psychological base. In this chapter, as in previous ones, the principle of growth provided the foundation for Dewey's analysis of moral acts. The act was to be guided by an idea. The moral act when committed represented an expression of the conscious self. In the case of moral theory, Dewey maintained that feeling, thinking, and muscular response must be viewed as coordinated functions. Their equilibrium would be perpetuated by conscious effort and disciplined intent. Thinking, in Dewey's philosophy, served as a substitute for overt action:

> Action with a purpose is deliberate; it involves a consciously foreseen end and a mental weighing of considerations pro and con. During this time complete overt action is suspended. . . activities are confined to such redistributions of energy within the organism as will prepare a determinate course of action.[69]

In effect, this means that consciousness has been accented and one's own attitudes seriously evaluated. The aggregate

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[69] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 403.

of the individual's mental and emotional dispositions were taken into consideration as a guide to subsequent behavior. The suspension of overt action allows thinking to play a major role. As related to morals and moral judgments, Dewey's appeal resulted in what might properly be termed reflective morality. He continued to voice strong opposition to traditional or customary methods in making moral choices:

> Morals concern nothing less than the whole character, and the whole character is identical with the man in all his concrete make-up and manifestations. Virtue means to be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming through association with others. . . .[70]

The 'good' from Dewey's point of view was "an empty term unless it includes the satisfactions experienced in concrete situations."[71] Moral and ethical values could not be separated from human experience. He rejected the ready-made formula in making moral selections. Nevertheless, in the framework of his methodology, many traditional values would continue to be valuable and instrumental. Instead of ascribing to them transcendental relationships which had no basis in experience, Dewey hoped that all ethical formulations would one day be viewed from the experiential conditions which brought them into existence. When Horne stated, ". . . there is in man a moral judgment concerning the right and the wrong,"[72] there

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[70]Ibid., p. 415.

[71]Ibid., pp. 412-413.

[72]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 522.

was an obvious inclination to escape to transcendental absolutes. This position can not be reconciled with pragmatic theory.

2. The Opposition of Duty and Interest

Dewey was emphatic when he asserted that in moral discussions there was probably no greater antithesis than that set up between acting from "principle" and from "interest."[73] Neither action stemming from principle nor that which ensued from interest provided the single clue which would alleviate the opposition he believed had been effected: "To act on principle is to act disinterestedly. . . . To act according to interest is. . . to act selfishly, with one's own personal profit in view."[74] These statements made by Dewey on duty and interest do not appear to be "vague and general"[75] as alleged by Horne. Dewey identified a specific condition which he believed had contributed to the controversy. Those who supported the "interest" side consistently used the term "self-interest." Both modes of acting implied that the self was a fixed and isolated entity. As a result, a conflict emerges between acting with interest for the self and without interest.

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[73]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 407.

[74]Ibid.

[75]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 510.

With reference to this section of Dewey's text, Horne stated that effort, not interest, won the battle. The result, according to Horne, was that interest becomes that which sides with agreeable habit, and effort is aligned with "disagreeable readjustment."[76]

Dewey believed that the cause for the underlying opposition between interest and effort was the false idea of interest. False concepts of interest were criticized by Dewey in a previous chapter (See Chapter X). Reference to the nature of habit, self-discipline, and effort would have promoted greater clarification in Horne's interpretation. Several statements presented by Dewey served to refute Horne's argument. The position taken by Dewey was concise. He stated:

> The moment we recognize that the self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action, the whole situation clears up. The mistake lies in making a separation between interest and self, and supposing that the latter is the end to which interest in objects and acts and others is a mere means.[77]

In general, the critique presented by Horne was an examination of Dewey's pedagogy with emphasis upon the conflict of interest and effort. The nature of habit as a readjusting element involving effort as a deliberate function did not receive the attention it deserved. Horne often alluded to the authoritative thus injecting his meanings into Dewey. In doing so,

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[76] Ibid., p. 517.

[77] Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 408.

Horne moved from discussion to disputation. The examples below illustrate this point:

> 1. . . . there is no ought in this ethics, no universal binding principles, no obligatory duties, no rapturous apostrophe. . . to the starry heavens above and the moral law within, no clear universal distinction between right and wrong. Any individual has received more than he has given. What he owes is his ought; what is due is his duty.[78]
>
> 2. Interest is presented as the adequate motivation of work. This overstates the case. Probably most of the world's work is actually done under extrinsic motivation. . . .[79]
>
> 3. The self is presented as identical with interest. This is confusing. The self has interest but is not interest. Interest is the emotional attraction an actual or ideal object has for the self.[80]
>
> 4. But there is in man a moral judgment concerning the right and the wrong. . . its form is the same in all men. Enlightened, it is man's safest guide in conduct; though changing in content, it is permanent in form. . . . A man may know. . . what the right is, and yet after long deliberation decide to do the wrong. The lacking element is that he does not adequately love the right.[81]

But does merely preferring the right over the wrong provide a solution for the man who goes on to commit the wrong act? Neither was this condition an adequate guide to proper conduct according to Dewey. The answer to the problem was not found

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[78]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 516.

[79]Ibid., pp. 516-517.

[80]Ibid., p. 517.

[81]Ibid., pp. 522-523.

in simply knowing the right from the wrong, but the formations of proper habits, practice, and motive were the elements required in making moral judgments concerning right and wrong. Within Dewey's framework, the establishment of character could be achieved only as the result of intelligence.

3. The Social and the Moral

Dewey identified morals as a constituent of the whole character and he viewed the whole character as identical with the individual. The extent to which one became that which he is capable of becoming is dependent upon his social interaction with others.[82]

Horne found Dewey's identification of the moral with the social confusing. Horne was convinced the identity of the person has been lost as a result of Dewey's view. "After all, there are the personal and the social aspects of experience. They may not be separable in fact; they are so in thought."[83] From this point of view, morals might or might not have an accompanying social connotation and connection. The social dimension of morals came into existence only when personal ideas, feelings, and purposes found expression in overt behavior affecting others. By contrast, Dewey's attitude toward the moral-social arrangement suggested that moral life and social relationships were reciprocally related. He stated that moral

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[82]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 415.

[83]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 527.

qualities such as truthfulness, honesty, chastity, and amiability were moral only in the functional sense.[84] Such traits were not held to be moral because of their identification with transcendental verities nor due to the fact they were inherent in the universe. For Dewey, these attributes continued to be instrumental because they represented essential components carrying with them other desirable attitudes. Consistent with this belief, Dewey stated:

> They are moral in an emphatic sense not because they are isolated and exclusive, but because they are intimately connected with thousands of other attitudes which we not explicitly recognize--which perhaps we have not even names for.[85]

Dewey maintained that moral laws received their significance from their effectiveness. The primary aim of philosophy is to effect intelligent guides for moral action. These guides to conduct derive from reflective evaluation of the past, and at the same time require consideration of their instrumental value.

The school, as a miniature society, should provide a program conducive to human growth and moral development. For the achievement of this goal, a democratic social order is a prerequisite. Dewey continued to criticize those social institutions which opposed or failed to support conditions for sound growth of mind and character:

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[84]Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 415.

[85]Ibid.

> And education is not a mere means to such a life. Education is such a life. To maintain capacity for such education is the essence of morals. For conscious life is a continual beginning afresh.[86]

In effect, Dewey held that all those aims and values desirable in education are themselves moral.

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[86] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study is to present a critical analysis and evaluation of Herman H. Horne's interpretation of John Dewey's Democracy and Education. This study attempts to determine which of the two interpretations provides a more nearly adequate philosophy of education in a democratic society. The material for this investigation is The Democratic Philosophy of Education, the text in which Horne's efforts are directed toward providing a discriminating interpretation of Dewey's educational philosophy.

The themes upon which Horne concentrated are developed in accordance with those topics presented by Dewey in Democracy and Education. A summary of the findings of this study and a statement of the conclusions follow.

Summary

Although the chief objective of Horne is to present an interpretation of Dewey's theories, it is evident that he did not intend to confine his study to this endeavor alone. Of equal importance, he directs his efforts toward providing an opposite point of view from that held by Dewey. In general,

this does not detract from the import of Dewey's argument. At times, this approach provides a worthy addition and serves to stimulate reflection. The result of studying those views presented by both Horne and Dewey is that areas of strengths as well as weaknesses are further identified.

For the purpose of establishing a contrast, Horne presents a valid appraisal of the Idealist and Pragmatic philosophical postures. This approach provides the basis for the remainder of his interpretation of Dewey's Democracy and Education. Horne is concerned with the speculative and transcendental dimension relative to the origin of life. By contrast, Dewey rejects the metaphysical orientation since he believes such attempts are non-productive in terms of supplying a sound basis for a philosophy of education. From his point of view, life and society serve as inseparable counterparts each interwoven with the other. An understanding of biological life represents a prerequisite in man's attempts to effect a genuine and effective transmission of life and society. Unlike Horne, Dewey rejects a priori considerations for education and notes these are invalid presuppositions.

Thinking as developed by Horne is best described as an intellectual endeavor--one which enables man to transcend human intelligence. For Dewey, the concept of thinking is viewed as a process and the highest kind of thought process receives its stimulus from social activity and mutual sharing in the social environment of which the individual is an integral part.

Horne claims Dewey has placed too great an emphasis on the social medium as an educative force and as a result his philosophy of education is restricted. Essentially, Horne objects to Dewey's naturalistic approach to learning and his failure to provide necessary considerations to self-consciousness and individual personality. Horne ascribes far greater relevancy to the influence of example, imitation, and emulation. The significant aspect of environment for Dewey is a central theme and is summed up by the term, "situation-response." Within this view, objects are seen as producing the necessary stimulus which in turn enables certain capacities to respond.

Horne partially accepts Dewey's concept of direction in education. However, Horne is reluctant to accept the environment as providing the primary force behind such direction. He assigns to the teacher the primary task of providing direction in the learning process. Horne believes the design afforded by the teacher prohibits direction in education from being aimless and vague. The control set by Horne assumes an arbitrary position ultimately resulting in external direction if not coercion. Dewey believes the results achieved from this system tend to be temporary and eventually promote negative behavioral patterns. Rather than the force of extrinsic and external control, Dewey believes a more effective control is achieved in educational direction when intrinsic and internal motivation is applied.

The key factors for growth in Horne's scheme are direction and guidance. These two facets of growth are supplied and maintained by the mature for the benefit of the young. Only in this way can we hope to effect growth in the right direction. Growth for Horne is purposefully planned and induced by the adult society. In contrast, Dewey insists the young possess far greater social responsiveness than supposed by the adult. He believes that immaturity itself designates a positive force and power to grow. As such, the immature probably possesses a greater facility and capacity for growth through social interaction than does the adult. While Horne believes the ultimate solution may be established by creating a dependence on the part of the young, Dewey envisions conditions which are conducive to a state of interdependence. Satisfactory induction of the young into the adult community represents a major goal for Horne. Growth is viewed as having an end, rather than being an end. Educationally, Dewey views growth as a life process.

Horne observes a certain limiting factor in Dewey's reconstruction of experience theory. From Horne's point of view, Dewey places an undue emphasis on the objective experience at the expense and neglect of the subjective self. Although Dewey alludes to both the social and personal aspects of experience, Horne visualizes a more definite self--the person--as being involved in the experience. Dewey expresses a preference for the quality of experience while Horne focuses his

attention on the outcome or the reconstructed self; Dewey prefers to remain attentive to the growing and developing individual. Emphasis, for Dewey, remains with the experience and its personal counterpart, the social matrix.

The role of perception occupies a far greater role in Dewey's theory than in Horne's. Dewey insists that perception remains a major force in learning. From Dewey's construct, the learner's role in the process of learning is elevated. The increment of meaning achieved as a result of perception not only contributes to present meaning, but also provides necessary connections between activities in which the individual becomes engaged in the future. The strong involvement of external stimuli to action as found in Horne's philosophy negates the value of perception and decreases the likelihood of a recognition between the act and the result.

Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy embraces three kinds of democracy--political, industrial, and social. When Dewey traces the origin of democracy to industry, Horne notices a paradox since he finds little democracy existing in the industrial complex. While Dewey does associate the development of democracy with industry, he points out that industry may cause democracy to flourish or it may serve as a barrier to the promotion of democratic arrangements. Dewey's point is that industry has the potential for democratic advancements, but it is not the model which necessarily guarantees the fulfillment of democratic ideals.

Dewey believes democracy is produced not by deliberate effort, but is sustained and extended by it. His concept of democracy essentially consists of the intelligent social interplay of men. Any social action which is limited to the special interests of a particular segment of society is injurious to his basic concept of democracy. Progressive change from Dewey's point of view is achieved as interests within and between groups are mutually shared.

Horne's interpretation of Dewey is limited since he overlooks Dewey's concept of democracy as an ideal consisting of far more than a mere form of government. For Dewey, democracy represents a way of life. In order for the traits of democracy to be most effective, Dewey calls for deliberate effort in order to sustain them. He believes the proper philosophy of education in a democracy must necessarily be deliberate and systematic--the result of planning, yet not planned. The scope of Dewey's philosophy is viewed as a social process and the application of his democratic aims is concerned with the societal, not the national aim. The conflict between nationalistic aims and the variety of social aims represents, for Dewey, one of the fundamental problems of education in and for a democratic society. Horne goes on to question whether or not a national state can conduct an educational process consistent with the full social meaning of democracy while Dewey maintains that such an arrangement is possible only if deliberate attention and effort continue to be exerted toward effecting such an educational process.

Another objection is raised by Horne relative to Dewey's analysis of good aims. This is because Horne believes Dewey fails to establish a worthy standard or criterion. There is, in Horne's criticism, a call for some absolute or at least some standard of perfection before the criteria of good aims are established. In Dewey's philosophy, neither is available nor desirable since such a condition would result in the establishment of an aim set up outside existing conditions and would, therefore, give rise to external priorities. Dewey finds it necessary to reject external standards since he believes these ultimately lead to conformity, a condition which tends to become an aim in and of itself void of considerations to present activities. He warns that activity so directed necessarily becomes static in character.

A philosophical difference between Horne and Dewey is noted when means and ends are analyzed. For Horne, a separation betwen an end and the means for achieving that distinctive end must not be left to mere convenience. Horne rejects the theory that means are ends and ends are means. Where democracy is concerned, Horne views the end as distinct from the means and, as such, democracy itself becomes one of the absolutes. By contrast, Dewey seeks to effect a merger between ends and means into a means-ends relationship. As a result of this arrangement, Dewey logically gives us means and no ends, or means as the only ends. Dewey's philosophy states that the end becomes a means which in turn serves as an impetus

toward the achievement of the end. The aim continues to serve as a means of action. It appears Horne is less concerned with the concept of value or values than is Dewey. The significance of Dewey's democratic concept is that through means we achieve value. Emphasis is not necessarily placed upon the attainment of the ideal, but rather upon attainment as it develops in conjunction with activity.

Horne believes man may be a spectator and that he may well be an active, not merely a passive one. The latter he believes is true when interest and attention are strong--when the individual's emotions are involved. Furthermore, he rejects Dewey's theory of interest and discipline because he believes Dewey neglects the spectator theory of learning. From Horne's point of view, one may be a participant without an immediate interest, and one may be a spectator without an immediate interest. By comparison, Dewey notes that the individual as mere spectator, even with interest, is not involved in such a way so as to directly influence the probable consequences in a problem situation. For Dewey, the involvement of the emotions alone does not suffice as an effective force for causing things to be different. He believes the essential difference between spectator and participant is that of attitude. According to Dewey, the attitude must be connected in some way with personal interest and concern. In turn, the individual engages himself in the activity in an attempt to direct conditions. Interest combined with concern consequently serves to motivate the participant.

In terms of learning, Horne does not insist upon the close identification of interest with effort which Dewey sees as necessary counterparts. While these may accompany one another, Horne does not believe this arrangement is necessarily the case. His theory readily admits two kinds of interest; namely, the immediate and the remote. Horne contends, however, that effort sustained by remote interest may be equally as effective as that yielded by immediate interest or interest associated with and found within the activity itself. When necessary, he does not object to externally imposed or even forced interest if it appears necessary in order to accomplish a given task or fulfill an obligation. Dewey finds far greater validity in immediate interest and goes on to warn that forced interest results in unsound psychology. Where learning is concerned, interest so induced tends to diminish relatedness and connections between present conditions and that which the learner perceives. As a result, meaning for the learner is minimized.

Horne denies Dewey's concept of thinking primarily because Dewey views constructive thought in terms of problematic conditions which arise out of experience. From Horne's point of view, the accuracy of the outcome as the imperative in Dewey's tested hypotheses is not a necessary prerequisite for productive thought. Horne is convinced that reflective thought is limited when restricted to the experiential realm alone. In addition to this dimension Horne advances thought to the realm of transcendental reflection believing value is achieved from accompanying intellectual constructs. In terms of Dewey's

philosophy, thinking is active. Reflective thinking is necessarily linked with intelligent action. He believes that without the possibility of reaching a conclusion or solution to a problem, little benefit can be realized from speculative thought except for its intellectual quality. Horne not only sees value in the intellectual content of speculative thought, but also views this realm of thought as extremely significant when the solution of an existing problem appears to be beyond actual experience.

Dewey rejects any treatment of subject matter which applies an external impetus to learning. The student's role is simply to utilize the material of subject matter in such a way as to effect a purpose. He views method as that element arising out of the individual's experience and abandons the notion of uniformity in his pedagogical theory. Furthermore, he insists that method and activity must not be separated, one functioning at the expense of the other. Dewey remains convinced that good methodology operates from and is an outgrowth of contact with experience and observation. At this point, Horne agrees such a theory is sometimes valid, but he believes there are instances when separation of method and activity must logically be made. He further suggests that learning is intrinsically good in and of itself.

Horne finds the pragmatic theory of knowledge which is basically intellectual and social useful insofar as it goes. He believes, however, such a theory is limited and may be

strengthened when the appreciative aspect is added. Transcending experience as a mode of increasing the appreciative capacity represents a valid and necessary exercise for Horne. Consistent with the pragmatic philosophy, Dewey rejects information gained as the result of transcendental speculation because he believes it consists merely of knowing about something without knowing it in a personal and meaningful way. The value found in this form of knowledge remains for Dewey secondary except as it is taken into account for its instrumental value.

In a general way, Horne subscribes to Dewey's complementary view of history and geography. At the same time, Horne notes that the interdependence of these two studies is not the same as the interdependence of man and nature. Horne believes man is totally dependent upon nature, yet he does not conceive nature as dependent upon man since man must adjust himself to nature in order to survive. Horne's interpretation of this relationship is preoccupied with the terms nature, earth, nature study, and human nature. Had Dewey originally stated that nature and earth were equivalent only in terms of their physical relationship, Horne's objection would be lessened.

His views relative to these studies have for the most part disregarded the psychological aspect. By contrast, Dewey believes a study of these subjects should exemplify human association and living. Dewey views nature where man

is concerned with this earth. Horne associates nature with a metaphysical sphere and relegates the generative power for nature to the transcendental realm and not in the hands of man.

Horne provides a helpful clarification to the terms "logical" and "psychological." He notes that logical refers to the science of correct thinking while psychological conveys the general meaning which refers to the science of human behavior. An analysis of Horne's comments reveals his belief that the psychological method adopted by Dewey should be supplemented by the logical even in the case of the novice. He insists it is not necessary that by use of the experimental method the learner finds out everything for himself. The psychological method alone is too slow and the logical method alone is too abstract.

Since Dewey's discussion is primarily concerned with method, the psychological aspect of learning receives the greater emphasis. However, his discussion does take into account the logical implications associated with knowledge. His primary concern is that subject matter should not be presented in its logical or perfect form isolated from science and experience. For this reason, he gives greater recognition to the "psychological" method. The logical method, for Dewey, should properly remain with the expert or the specialist, not forced upon the immature learner. Horne holds a far greater concern for the quantitative aspect of scientific

knowledge, while Dewey continues to stress qualitative factors with emphasis upon connections, meanings, and intellectual content.

Horne contends that Dewey identifies values only as these are found in human experience. He further concludes that values for Dewey are only vested in the human, social, and subjective realm; beyond man, values do not exist. Since Dewey fails to include a discussion of nature apart from man, Horne surprisingly uses an anti-dualistic argument against Dewey. If man has value, yet nature, has none, Horne believes there is discontinuity between the two. For him, man does not create value; rather, his task is one of discovering values in those elements which naturally possess value. These, he believes, are inherent in the universe of reality. Again, the importance of metaphysics is evident in Horne's discussion of values. When he insists values ought to be reality-centered, he alludes to a reality already inherent in the universe. Essential values which man must seek and come to know can best be drawn from a metaphysical orientation. Dewey's concept of reality demonstrates a different concern. He insists that an appreciation of values must be realized through the medium of experience. Without this element, appreciation of values remains purely symbolic and void of translation into reality. While Dewey does not deny the usefulness of the symbolic, he insists that connections between the direct experience and the symbolic material be taken into account.

When purely representative forms are adopted, Dewey warns there is an increased tendency toward decreasing the sphere of direct appreciation on the part of the individual.

Dewey differentiates between intrinsic value and instrumental value but is careful to note that intrinsic values which have greater instrumental value are of more worth. The pragmatic view finds it expedient to weigh values in terms of their relative contribution. For Dewey, the justifying trait of an intrinsic value is found in its ability to contribute to future use. Horne presents a convincing argument when he suggests such a distinction between the two kinds of value is vague if not inconsistent. He maintains Dewey's distinction is unnecessary since the two eventually merge into one--the instrumental ultimately merges into the intrinsic. While Horne correctly identifies this condition in his interpretation, his scheme of universal values seems questionable. Viewed from the pragmatic frame of reference, the aspect of universality is of little consequence when related to a theory of values which contributes to sound pedagogical practice. He concludes that the only true criterion for determining the worth of any value is the extent to which intrinsic values have been promoted and enhanced.

In Horne's interpretation, no description is provided regarding conditions whereby men might be free nor does he specify what contribution is made by a liberal education. That which makes men free remains his definition of a liberal

education. By contrast, Dewey presents a more realistic approach. He portrays the elements of choice and active participation as closely bound to his philosophy of liberal and technical education. His position suggests that the professional or vocational school may be liberal or illiberal. At the same time, the liberal arts curriculum may be illiberal and does assume this characteristic when it becomes permeated with a narrow sectarian bias or employs methods of mere mass appeal. His warning is that any study or activity when reduced to the level of drudgery and routine and fails to provoke independent thought has properly attained the label, "illiberal."

Dewey's account of the opposition between intellectual and practical studies results in a skeptical attitude in Horne's evaluation. The philosophic tension between Horne and Dewey is due for the most part to divergent points of view relative to absolutes. Evidence of this appears when Horne raises the issue of absolutes as these exist in the context of known reality and their close approximation to supreme reality. Horne believes such an identification of this realm is imperative before valid consideration can be given to the concept of change. Dewey's discussion does not emphasize either the negative or positive aspects of absolutes nor does he attempt to prove or disprove their existence. In view of Dewey's entire text, it appears Horne underestimates the profound influence social conditions have exerted upon modern educational philosophy.

Horne rejects Dewey's concept of experience and experimentation. His appraisal of Dewey's mode of knowing by way of experience-experimentation reveals a dissatisfaction both emotionally and intellectually. Experimentation, according to Horne, represents strictly an intellectual and practical activity, while experience contains the additional ingredient of certain emotional factors. In this context, Horne fails to recognize the reciprocal effect of response which is a central feature found in Dewey's concept of experience as experimentation. Dewey never recommends activity for the sake of activity; on the contrary, he insists that mere activity does not constitute experience. The arrangement promoted by Dewey pertaining to activity can best be understood when reference is made to the meaning of experience. From Dewey's viewpoint, the controlling influence on activity is always the problematic situation. Out of the interaction which results from attempts to relieve an imbalance in the environment, there exists of necessity activity.

One of Dewey's major goals was to make education scientific. He is, therefore, especially sensitive to advances in psychology and industrial methods. He argues in favor of the kind of activity in the school situation which exemplifies the experimental or problem-solving method of science. Horne finds this theory acceptable in terms of elementary education, but is generally critical of that which he terms the doctrine of "learning by doing." In addition to this concept he

designates an additional dimension to learning; namely learning to think by thinking.

In Horne's discussion of humanistic and naturalistic studies, he presents a strong case from the idealist's point of view. Dewey remains a strong advocate of maintaining a close relationship between the humanistic and the naturalistic studies. While Horne prefers a monistic approach to these two studies, Dewey declines a merger between them. Pedagogically and philosophically, Dewey's position represents one of the most significant contributions found in his writing. His attitude remains both humanistic and democratic. As a result of Dewey's posture, he avoids the narrow scope of the Greek humanistic spirit as well as the one-sided condition typical of Classical Humanism.

The relationship between philosophy and education is vividly expounded by Dewey, but Horne claims Dewey has rejected those philosophical and educational systems from which he has inherited so much. There is little doubt that Herbart's theories influenced Dewey's philosophy.

Horne makes an unwarranted assumption when he states Dewey rejects questions posed by ontology and cosmology on the ground that these were "non-philosophical." Horne is correct when he maintains Dewey gave little recognition to the experiences of the mystic. Unlike Horne, Dewey's central theme is that educational problems serve as a testing ground where philosophical ideas prove themselves.

The experimental method is a special target for Horne's criticism; however, Horne fails to recognize the full scope of Dewey's theory of knowledge. Dewey believes knowledge as something possessed consists of all of man's intellectual resources and all habits which make his action intelligent. Knowledge, democracy, and education represent prime factors in Dewey's philosophy.

Horne insists there exists the "outer" element to morality without an "inner," but fails to produce valid illustrations in proof of his position. He makes little effort in establishing unification between the two and his analysis of Dewey's theory of morals provides little insight. Dewey maintains moral laws receive their significance from their effectiveness. The school, as a miniature society, should provide a program conducive to human growth and moral development. To achieve this, a democratic social order is a prerequisite. Horne underestimates the character of Dewey's philosophical and psychological base.

Dewey takes for granted the democratic criterion and employs his philosophy as a means of application to present social life and its enrichment. Horne assumes the idealistic philosophy and then attempts to apply appropriate philosophical criterion to the conditions of his interpretation of democracy. The pragmatic epistemological view which Horne rejects is in effect a rejection of the concept that freedom in a democracy means that truth in its practical sense has an opportunity to realize its fullest expression in men's lives.

Conclusions

Both Horne and Dewey purport to discuss issues in light of the relationship between democracy and education. Each claims his philosophy provides a theory of education consistent with and in support of democratic ideals. In the process of the argument, democracy and aristocracy are ultimately projected as opposing social programs.

The conclusions of this dissertation are:

(1) Horne discusses democracy as an incidental factor and then proceeds to emphasize a philosophy based on fixed principles, tradition, and a rigid adherence to dogmatism. He presents a less convincing attitude in identifying the characteristics of a democratic community than does Dewey.

(2) Dewey emphasizes the conditions necessary for a democratic society and then applies the pragmatic philosophy to those conditions. His choice of democracy is definite and continues to represent the dominant influence in his development of the pragmatic philosophy of education.

(3) Dewey's theories, unlike those of Horne's, stem out of a pragmatic, naturalistic orientation while Horne's principles assume a passive stance based on the supernatural which calls for emulation, imitation, and hero worship.

(4) Horne approaches philosophy as philosopher; Dewey faces philosophical issues as philosopher and educator.

(5) Horne maintains a greater degree of philosophical consistency than does Dewey. This is probably attributable

to the fact he works from a systematized philosophical frame of reference supported by principles transcending and not subjected to experiential conditions and human involvement.

(6) Horne's interpretation is probably inadequate in terms of Dewey's arguments in Democracy and Education. Dewey conceived the nature of social conditions as scientific and increasingly urban; this receives minimal attention in Horne's interpretation.

(7) Democracy as a form of associated living is not granted the consideration from Horne that is deserved; Horne's interpretation, therefore, is weakened since democratic conditions are at the very heart of Dewey's philosophy.

(8) Economic and political factors receive far greater attention by Dewey than by Horne since Dewey believes these considerations affect man's thoughts, his actions, and the direction of his entire life.

(9) Horne often interprets Dewey from his own philosophical orientation. This presents a major obstacle when he attempts to penetrate the full realm of Dewey's philosophical thought.

(10) There is sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that Dewey was a philosopher of revolt. His emphases appear to be extreme as a result of his break with traditional views and patterns of thought. Dewey's revolt against formality in education should continue to warrant the educator's attention.

(11) The pragmatic philosophy represents in theory and in practice a philosophy more compatible with a democratic society.

(12) A wholesome balance is maintained by Dewey when he stresses the need for aims in education which center about the developing individual as a person while at the same time educating him in such a way as to encourage his productive membership in society.

(13) Horne recognizes in Dewey a preoccupation with dualisms and correctly identifies this as a negative factor rather than a virtue for Dewey.

(14) Horne appropriately notes there is not sufficient attention allocated to the appreciation of the emotions of man in Dewey's text. Most of Dewey's references to the emotions are associated with active responses to man's environment and are generally restricted to the activities of the intellect.

(15) Another relevant conclusion pertaining to contemporary issues is Dewey's inadequate recognition of education for leisure. From his discussions, it is apparent he views leisure as self-contained and a companion to labor. Dewey objects to the traditional dualism prompted by two classes--one of leisure and another of work. For this reason, he does not emphasize to a great extent the importance of educating for leisure time.

(16) Horne concludes Dewey devotes little attention to the subject of physical education. Only in one strong paragraph does he devote recognition to the value of health education.

(17) A final conclusion drawn by Horne which summarizes his interpretation is found in the following statement:

> Dewey does not mean to reject discipline, but only discipline without immediate interest; nor natural development, but only natural development in an unsocial atmosphere; nor culture, but only culture that is inefficient; nor personal refinement, but only personal refinement that is unsocial. All of these values as isolated, he rejects; all as integrated in a social ongoing process, he accepts.[1]

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[1]Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 529.

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