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1833-1841

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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST WARS,
1833-1841

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the 1830's Iberia was the scene of succession crises in both Spain and Portugal. Civil wars resulted and for a brief period of time the two conflicts almost became one. Spain also became the stage upon which the advocates of opposing principles fought throughout the decade. Liberal constitutionalists battled with absolutists and in so doing found support among the great powers. The Eastern Powers provided moral and financial aid to the absolutists. Britain and France joined the liberals of Spain and Portugal to create a Quadruple Treaty.

This alignment is commonly understood as the recognition of an Anglo-French entente that began with the Belgian revolt and lasted until the 2nd Middle East Crisis. R. W. Seton-Watson speaks of an entente cordiale and says Palmerston viewed good

relations with France as essential. H. C. F. Bell, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, and Sir Charles Webster all endorse this view with only minor differences among them. Webster, for example, argues the entente cordiale lasted only until 1835. William Langer points to Iberia to show how Britain and France, being partners in an entente cordiale, worked to establish a constitutional government in Spain during the Carlist Wars.¹

The Quadruple Treaty was not an entente cordiale but rather it reflected the mutual suspicion and tension that existed between Britain and France. At no time during the 1830's did Anglo-French relations approach a rapprochement. After the signing of the Quadruple Treaty the French government failed to implement the terms of the agreement and rather

¹R. W. Seton-Watson speaks of an entente cordiale and says Palmerston viewed good relations with France as essential. What Palmerston regarded as essential was the continued French separation from the Eastern Courts and a curtailment of Louis Philippe's expansionist activities. See below page 12. R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge: The University Press, 1937), p. 183. H. C. F. Bell supports the entente idea as also do Woodward and Webster; H. C. F. Bell, Lord Palmerston, 2 vols., (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966), I, 192; Sir Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 231; Sir Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841; Britain the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question, 2 vols., (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1951), I, 55; and William L. Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852 (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), Chap. III.

than cooperating with Britain to defeat the Carlists undermined the allied cause. Despite the suspicion and distrust both governments repeatedly and publicly stated their support for the Anglo-French understanding. The public statements belied the real struggle for control of Spain and predominance in other parts of the world. Britain and France agreed to the treaty because of their isolated positions in European international relations.

Spanish affairs also attracted the attention of the Eastern Powers which wanted to preserve the area for absolutism and to prevent an Anglo-French accord. Money and supplies were sent by these powers and their agents to help Don Carlos, the absolutist pretender, to the Spanish crown. The Eastern Powers planned to surround France with conservative governments to help control that revolutionary state. At no time did these powers seem to realize that the most effective way of defeating liberalism in the West was an appeal to the conservative side of Louis Philippe, the French king, which could have resulted in the complete isolation of Britain and the defeat of liberalism in Europe.

The Spanish policies of Viscount Palmerston, British foreign secretary for most of the 1830's, differed noticeably from those of the Eastern Courts. Following the death of the

reactionary king of Spain, Ferdinand VII, which left a disputed succession, Palmerston tried to implement the three basic objectives of his Spanish policies. He wanted to establish British influence within the Madrid government and to exercise some control over French foreign policies while lending encouragement to liberalism and constitutionalism. Motivation for these policies came from Palmerston's acceptance of liberal concepts and his belief that Iberia was vital to Britain's defense. Furthermore, he anticipated expanded British trade through a liberal Spanish commercial treaty he hoped to obtain. Palmerston also distrusted the French government which he thought was expansionist and might try to reaffirm the Franco-Spanish family compact.

The French government was an interested party in the affairs of the Iberian Peninsula and had been for a long time. On two previous occasions in the 19th century French troops had occupied Spain. In the 1830's the government of Louis Philippe wanted to protect its interests in Spain. Trade and dynastic relations which included the old idea of the family compact were two reasons why Louis Philippe expressed a lively interest in the country. He also feared domination of the Spanish government by a hostile power and the threat of a two-front war that suggested. Because of the fear of domination

he was extremely sensitive about the problem of Spanish marriages. The French government also worried about a liberal or democratic government gaining power in Madrid. Consequently, Louis Philippe's government pursued policies in Spain that protected France from Spanish liberalism, combatted foreign domination of the Madrid government and maintained French commercial interests.

All of the great powers of Europe had expressed some interest in Spanish affairs since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, but Britain had been particularly concerned. Although initially in general concert with the other great powers by 1820 Lord Castlereagh, British foreign secretary, began forging an international role for England as the defender of liberalism. In a memorandum he issued in 1820 Castlereagh publicized his policies on the occasion of the Colonel Riego revolt in Spain and the Congress of Troppau. He opposed foreign intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and he recognized the importance of public sentiment in Britain that ran strongly against the reactionary policies of Ferdinand VII of Spain. Castlereagh pointed out that the alliances of 1814-15 were aimed at preventing a military threat to European peace and not against the spread of "Democratic Principles." This statement suggests that the foreign secretary was

neutral toward the liberalism in Spain reintroduced by the Colonel Riego revolt of 1820.²

George Canning, foreign secretary following Castlereagh's death in 1822, supported the May 5, 1820 memorandum.³ Actually, it had been Canning who first formulated the concepts set forth by Castlereagh in 1820.⁴ Like Castlereagh he had begun to object to the system of meetings (congresses) that Austrian Prince Clement von Metternich favored in the years after the Congress of Vienna. Canning in 1823 insisted upon strict neutrality towards Spain and berated France for its hostile posture toward the rebels of that country, the liberals and constitutionalists. His Spanish policies in 1822-24 alienated the government of Spain and failed to prevent the entry of French troops into the country to restore Ferdinand VII. France and Spain became reunited, a situation Canning had hoped to prevent.

The Eastern Courts joined with these two governments in loudly protesting Britain's New World policies that recognized

²Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) or Documents Old and New (Cambridge: University Press, 1938), pp. 47-63.

³Ibid., pp. 64-66.

⁴H.M.V. Temperley, Life of Canning (London: James Finch and Co., Ltd., 1905), p. 141.

the independence of several Latin American nations. Canning did get the Polignac Memorandum from France which stated that the French had no intention of restoring the American colonies to Spain. But no mention was made of France's occupation of Spain. Herein Canning's policies of neutrality and nonintervention failed him as the family compact was reinstated.⁵ Canning recognized the revolutionary states of America in order to thwart French and United States designs there and to retain the area for British commerce, but in so doing he forfeited any influence the London government had previously established at Madrid.

Canning modified his policies of neutrality in the Portuguese situation when Don Miguel defied King Pedro's settlement of the Portuguese crown on his daughter Donna Maria. Don Miguel had been named regent to Maria but later moved against the constitutional state created by Pedro. This constitutional opposition aroused Canning and prompted the British intervention of 1827 which ended when Miguel in early 1828 promised to respect the constitution. Once relieved of the British presence Miguel led a coup d' etat in 1828 and proclaimed himself the king.

⁵Ibid.

Whatever the relations had been among the five great powers of Europe since 1815 the revolutions of 1830 split the group into two sections, one autocratic and the other liberal. The autocratic powers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria fought liberalism, nationalism, and constitutionalism wherever they encountered it. These states enjoyed some success in Poland, Italy, and the Germanies. At Münchengratz in 1833 they reaffirmed the Holy Alliance. In contrast Britain and France appeared as the liberal powers after the July Revolution in France and the Belgian declaration of independence.

While there was considerable agreement in policy among the Eastern Powers the Western Powers experienced discord in their objectives. Palmerston, directing foreign affairs in England, genuinely supported the liberal movement in Europe although he did not always aid the liberals in their struggles against absolutist governments. Louis Philippe did not really sympathize with liberalism and in his own country presided over a change in government more symbolic than meaningful.⁶

⁶David H. Pinkey, "The Myth of the French Revolution of 1830" from David H. Pinkey and Theodore Rapp, eds., A Festschrift For Frederick B. Artz (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964), pp. 52-71.

The French government became more anti-liberal as the years progressed. This trend was visible not only in internal affairs but could also be seen in French relations with both Spain and Britain. So long as conservative forces controlled Madrid, the French government reluctantly provided some aid, but when a truly liberal government established itself in Madrid the French worked against it. The Western Powers, consequently, though appearing united were often at odds with each other.

When Palmerston became foreign secretary in 1830 he faced the continuing problem of Portugal to which was added the Carlist War in 1833. Palmerston during this time, 1830 to 1833, came to be looked upon as the defender of the liberal cause in Europe. His jubilant response to the July Revolution, his objections to the Six Resolutions passed by the German Diet in 1832, his support of Belgian independence, and his break with the Eastern Courts over these points gave him some claim to be called the defender of liberalism. This international role of defender of liberalism became a cornerstone of Palmerston's foreign policy which he pursued with more vigor than had Canning.⁷ When the volatile situation developed in

⁷Jasper Ridley, Lord Palmerston (London: Constable, 1970), p. 173.

Iberia, Palmerston was anxious to preserve the area for liberalism.

Palmerston's adherence to liberal principles came late as did his interest in foreign affairs. He had not dabbled in foreign affairs until the late 1820's but then in a parliamentary speech he "introduced to the Commons an altogether new Palmerston."⁸ Palmerston addressed Commons on the Portuguese issue which saw Don Miguel trying to usurp the throne of his niece Donna Maria, the legitimate ruler. He thoroughly opposed Don Miguel and his actions in Portugal. Although Palmerston repeatedly professed his adherence to liberal principles in 1829, it took time before he could implement foreign policies based upon these ideals. In 1829 he said, "I consider the constitutional states to be the natural allies of this country."⁹

A year later he enthusiastically celebrated the July Revolution as he informed Lady Cowper, "we shall drink the cause of Liberalism all over the world."¹⁰ Continuing this

⁸W. Baring Pemberton, Lord Palmerston (London: The Butchworth Press, 1954), p. 62.

⁹Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁰Philip Guedalla, Palmerston, 1784-1865 (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927), p. 150.

happy outburst he wrote, "This event is decisive in the ascendancy of Liberal Principles throughout Europe; the evil spirit has been put down and will be trodden underfoot. The reign of Metternich is over."¹¹ Webster writes that Palmerston's, "aristocratic outlook and environment did not prevent him from holding a deep and obviously sincere belief in Liberalism cherishing an ardent desire to see it spread throughout the world."¹²

Palmerston from 1830 on gave repeated assertions of his adherence to the liberal cause. In Parliament he stressed his convictions when he praised liberalism and supported the principles of constitutionalism.¹³ John Hobhouse noted that Palmerston, "talked liberal just as well and as freely as if he had played the part all his life."¹⁴ Despite the rather remarkable and sudden transformation Webster is strongly convinced that Palmerston's, "acceptance of the new Liberalism

¹¹Letter, Lord Palmerston to his brother-in-law Sullivan, 1 August 1830, Bell, Lord Palmerston, I, 192; and Guedalla, Palmerston, p. 150.

¹²Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 55.

¹³Ridley, Lord Palmerston, p. 101.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 102.

is obviously sincere," and, "was to determine much of his policy during the next ten years."¹⁵

Palmerston could not immediately implement a liberal foreign policy in 1830 because of the dangerous and isolated position he encountered in international relations. The Belgian revolution brought Britain and France to the brink of war as Palmerston worked to protect England from the French occupation of strategically important Belgium and Luxembourg. This revolution strained relations between the three Eastern Powers and the Western Powers of Britain and France also. Thus, Palmerston experienced isolation from all the great powers.

War with France over Belgium had been a very real possibility and it aroused Palmerston's suspicions of Louis Philippe's plans. The foreign secretary said of the French plans to obtain compensation,

I do not like all this [a French suggestion that they receive Luxembourg or parts of the Germanies]; it looks as if France was unchanged in her system of encroachments, and it diminishes the confidence in her sincerity and good faith which her conduct up to this time had inspired.¹⁶

¹⁵Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 81.

¹⁶Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 7 January 1831, Private, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston: With Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence, 2 vols., (London: Richard Bentley, 1870), II, 27-29.

Furthermore, Palmerston noted, "it is only on the supposition that she [France] content herself with the finest territory in Europe, and does not mean to open a new chapter in encroachments and conquest," that good relations can exist.¹⁷ French threats of aggrandizement annoyed Palmerston more than any other factor. Over the Belgian question he wrote, "[General] Sabastiani and [Marshal] Soult [of France] apparently want to pick a quarrel with all their neighbors, or to compel everybody to submit to their insolence and aggression."¹⁸

No quick and easy solution to the Belgian question was found, but the Western Powers finally achieved Belgian independence and neutrality over the opposition of the Eastern Powers. Palmerston used threats and coercion in an effort to defend British interests in Belgium from the Eastern Powers and from France. The French government, endeavoring to gain advantages for its citizens and possible territorial extension, played a lone hand until the threat of war became too great to be hazarded.¹⁹

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 17 August 1831, Ibid., II, 108-110.

¹⁹Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, p. 91.

The situation in Portugal in the early 1830's presented an obstacle to Palmerston's implementation of a liberal foreign policy there. Don Miguel ruled Portugal as an absolutist and as a usurper. Britain's foreign secretary could not support Miguel, but he became alarmed when the French government sent a fleet to the Tagus to protect its citizens in 1831 at the time when a French army occupied parts of Belgium. War seemed possible and Anglo-Portuguese treaties would have required Britain to protect Don Miguel against French aggression.

In 1832 Don Pedro landed in Portugal to support his daughter's claim to the throne, and he received the unofficial support of Palmerston. Palmerston had refused to help overthrow Miguel because he opposed military intervention. However, he supported, "intermeddling in every way, and to every extent, short of military force," which permitted the foreign secretary indirectly to help Pedro defeat Miguel.²⁰ Opposing Miguel fitted into Palmerston's scheme of thwarting absolutism in Iberia, but he also was interested in preserving British trade, especially trade in port wine, and was interested in preventing an extension of French influence into Portugal.

²⁰ Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 2nd Series, XXI, 1643-60, subsequently cited as Hansard's.

Problems in Spain in 1833 exacerbated the situation in Iberia and affected the Portuguese. A disputed succession in Spain caused the uncle, Don Carlos, to challenge the right of his niece, Donna Isabella, to the Spanish throne after her father, Ferdinand VII died. Don Carlos, already in Portugal at the camp of Don Miguel, refused to acknowledge Isabella and upon Ferdinand's death civil war broke out. The Biscayan-Basque provinces further complicated the civil war for the succession by beginning an insurrection aimed at preserving their fueros. The fueros were special privileges granted the Biscayan-Basque provinces which made them virtually independent of the Madrid government. The government of Isabella also became anxiously concerned about the Miguelite Wars still continuing in Portugal.

The situation remained obscured as the two pretenders fought the female heirs to the thrones of their respective countries. The contending parties fought not only for the succession but for political principles. Both pretenders favored absolutism and therefore found support from the Eastern Powers. Palmerston sympathized with the young liberal constitutional queens because he wanted to support liberalism and to defeat absolutism.²¹ Old treaties and commerce also

²¹Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, II, 186.
 "Great Britain, naturally, favouring the constitutional side."

motivated the foreign secretary as did his intention of thwarting French influence in both states. France faced a serious problem because Louis Philippe wanted to end French isolation.

To implement his policies Palmerston in early 1834 negotiated a treaty with Spain and Portugal which he subsequently permitted France to join as a contracting party. The Quadruple Treaty was a defense between two antagonists rather than a rapprochement. Palmerston planned to provide limited aid to the liberal governments of Iberia while controlling French activity in the area. His treaty also presented the facade of a united block of liberal constitutional states to the Eastern Powers. The treaty did momentarily mask the tensions and rivalries existing between the British and French governments. Both governments stated repeatedly their support for the Anglo-French understanding that they insisted was real. But the treaty failed to resolve the Anglo-French difficulties that had developed.

Throughout the remainder of 1834 and 1835 a rapprochement eluded the allies. Efforts by Palmerston to obtain an Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty in late 1834 provoked French suspicions of British policies. The French government refused to implement the terms of the Quadruple Treaty and preferred

to undermine the allied cause. Under Louis Philippe's guidance French policy veered toward the East as he continued his efforts in favor of an understanding with the absolutist courts.

The vigorous and decisive Spanish struggle between Britain and France in 1836 became a conflict of principles between Palmerston and Count Molé, the chief minister of France. Molé helped to establish temporarily a pro-French ministry in Madrid and followed policies designed to secure the Spanish government to his own. By miscalculating the situation he and Cristina, the queen regent of Spain, precipitated a military revolt that subsequently saw French influence decline. Sir George Villiers, British minister in Madrid, then reconstructed his influence in the Spanish government while Palmerston defended himself and his policies in Parliament.

Early in 1837 the discord between the British and French governments emerged publicly and Palmerston became more pragmatic about his interests in Spain. Public opinion in England helped to determine Palmerston's reaction at this point. Issues such as free trade, aid to the Madrid government, French fear of a two-front war, imperial defense, and other differences kept the Western Powers at cross purposes. Palmerston pursued

British interests with increased vigor since Isabella's cause, though not victorious, appeared more secure.

The closing years of the Carlist War was a time of increasing hostility between Britain, France, and Spain. Palmerston berated both the French and Spanish governments because of developments in Spain and the Levant. The focal point of the struggle was the Mediterranean where France was active in the east, in Egypt, and in the west, at King's Islet, Port Mahon, Minorca. Cristina granted the King's Islet to France which alarmed the British foreign office because of the deteriorated condition of the royal navy and the Mohammed Ali controversy. Other difficulties with the Spanish government such as debts, marriage rumors, and the refusal of a commercial treaty annoyed Palmerston also.

The termination of the Carlist Wars in 1839 did not resolve all the problems existing among the treaty powers. Relations between Britain and France deteriorated even more although Anglo-Spanish conditions slowly improved. Palmerston witnessed the diminution of French influence in Spain which was replaced by a corresponding increase in pro-British sentiment in the Spanish government. By the time Palmerston left the foreign office in 1841 Anglo-Spanish relations were cordial and cooperative. On the other hand, Anglo-French relations

remained at a low point due not only to the recent Spanish civil wars but also because of the Mohammed Ali settlement.

CHAPTER II

GENESIS OF THE QUADRUPLÉ TREATY

In 1833 and 1834 various European powers became increasingly involved in the Carlist War in Spain. This war occurred because of a disputed succession in 1833. Not only was it a war of succession, but it quickly became a conflict of principles too. The forces of absolutism under Don Carlos battled against the more moderate principles that the young queen, Isabella, represented. The division in Spain coincided with the growing split among the major European states who lined up behind their respective Spanish champions.

Palmerston followed a policy from the outset that opposed absolutism as a form of government in Spain. At the time of Ferdinand VII's death in September 1833 he could not support either of the claimants to the throne because there was little difference in their policies. Neither Don Carlos nor Cristina advocated liberalism or free trade which Palmerston favored. Therefore, he refused to acknowledge the rights of either to

the Spanish throne. One thing he did do was express his opposition to French and Eastern interference in the affairs of Spain.

The French government immediately recognized Isabella and offered support to her chief minister, Dr. Francisco Zea Bermudez. Zea Bermudez's conservative policies appealed to Louis Philippe who feared a liberal ascendancy in Spain. Nevertheless, French support for Zea Bermudez was qualified because Louis Philippe really preferred Don Carlos above all others.¹ France was caught between the absolutism of the Eastern Powers and the liberalism of England which made it impossible for the French government to commit itself wholly to one faction or the other.

Unlike France the Eastern Courts had no qualms and they openly aided the absolutists whom Palmerston opposed. While these powers never recognized Don Carlos diplomatically, they gave him their unqualified moral support and some financial aid. Because of their geographic location they could not provide any military aid. The Eastern Powers also aided Don Carlos by trying to prevent a union between the two major liberal states

¹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 242.

of the west, Britain and France, through intimidating Louis Philippe.²

The Spanish succession crisis that led to the Carlist War revolved initially about the confused status of the Salic Law and the existence of two claimants to the throne. King Ferdinand VII of Spain in actions that obscured the issue restored and then revoked the Salic Law in the early 1830's after the birth of his daughter Isabella. In April 1833 he required, by decree, that the Spanish nation acknowledge his daughter's rights of inheritance in an oath to her. Don Carlos, already with Miguel in Portugal, refused. The National Cortes meeting on 20 June 1833 at Madrid complied with the weakening king's order. Three months later Ferdinand VII died and Isabella became queen with Cristina, her mother, queen regent.

To assuage fears and to cultivate friends for her daughter's cause Cristina produced a manifesto. The proclamation was conservative and conciliatory in tone. It revealed that the regency would adhere to established practices and laws. Furthermore, the queen dowager said political innovation

²Philip E. Mosely, "Intervention and Nonintervention in Spain, 1838-39," Journal of Modern History, XIII (March 1941,) 195-217.

would be avoided. Despite these assurances Don Carlos countered with a statement of his own insisting that Ferdinand had died without a male heir so that the throne devolved upon himself. Several more rival proclamations followed as the contestants declared their positions.

Little difference on policy existed between Cristina and Carlos initially, but the country divided in its loyalties. The single most important issue was the succession and neither contender denied his rights. The Biscayan-Basque area favored Don Carlos. This part of the country opposed Cristina because their fueros were endangered. Their cause became united with that of Don Carlos. Most of the country remained apathetic or supported the queen.³

Foreign powers also divided on the issue of supporting Isabella or Don Carlos. The Eastern Powers refused to recognize the queen. They withheld diplomatic recognition of Carlos, too, but they gave him moral and financial support. The French government immediately recognized Isabella as the queen of Spain. Palmerston chose to wait a short while to see which way the situation developed, but he spoke favorably of Isabella's

³Great Britain, Foreign Office, "Memorandum on the Political Events in Spain, From August 1836, to January, 1837," F.O. 146/180.

succession saying it was important to the liberal cause and before 1833 closed he recognized her.

Palmerston chose to support Isabella in the Carlist War as he had chosen to support Donna Maria in the Miguelite War because he preferred liberalism and constitutionalism to absolutism. By supporting these two young queens he in no way guaranteed that British interests such as trade, defense, and influence would be maintained. He did know that these queens represented the liberal party in their respective countries. That being the case he not only aided them because of their association with liberalism, but also because he hoped to protect British interests. For the most part liberals and liberal governments more nearly agreed with Palmerston's policies than did absolutists.

The primary reason for Palmerston's reluctance to recognize the young Spanish queen immediately was her chief minister Dr. Francisco Zea Bermudez. Zea Bermudez was a reactionary who aided Don Miguel against Donna Maria in Portugal. Palmerston had attempted to prevent Spanish aid going to Miguel by sending Sir Stratford Canning on a special mission in 1832 to the court of Ferdinand VII to persuade him and his minister to cease helping the Portuguese pretender.

Both had refused.⁴ Zea Bermudez, as chief minister to Isabella, wanted to continue aiding Miguel. He also followed other conservative policies such as the cultivation of the Eastern Courts and opposition to Carlos.⁵ Zea Bermudez further annoyed Palmerston when he suggested that the French representative to Spain, the Conde de Rayneval, be given the power to summon French troops into the country to crush Don Carlos if he returned from Portugal.⁶

Throughout 1833 Palmerston's dislike for Zea Bermudez had been growing and he worked to bring about his dismissal. "The English minister . . . from the first moment wanted the triumph of the liberals, understanding that he had to support them to defeat Don Carlos, and in this sense he worked openly against [Zea Bermudez] the President of the Council."⁷ Henry

⁴Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 371.

⁵R. Carr, Spain, 1808-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 156; and Sir Spencer Walpole, A History of England From the Conclusion of the Great War of 1815, 6 vols., (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1905), IV, 298.

⁶Francois Pierre Guilleme Guizot, Memoires Pour Servir a L'Histoire de Mon Temps, 8 vols., (Paris: Michel Levy Freres, 1861), IV, 70; Bell, Palmerston, I, 145; and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 381.

⁷Gines Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior de España Durante La Menor Edad de Isabel II (Madrid: Editorial Rues, Academia, 1929), p. 38.

V. Addington, British minister to Madrid, was recalled by Palmerston because he sympathized too much with Zea Bermudez. George Villiers replaced Addington in August 1833. Palmerston continued his efforts to get Zea Bermudez dismissed and in Villiers he had a cooperative agent. Zea Bermudez unintentionally helped Palmerston and Villiers bring about his replacement by alienating both liberals and conservatives with his policies. He attacked Carlos, which angered the conservatives, and he refused to grant the political reforms that the liberals wanted. Palmerston insisted that Zea Bermudez, whom he thought was a French tool, should shift for himself and he withdrew all British support from the man.⁸

Palmerston tried to change the policies of Zea Bermudez even while working to obtain his dismissal. He hoped the influence of the Eastern Courts could be replaced by that of England and France with the former predominating. The foreign secretary also wanted Zea Bermudez's policies toward Don Miguel and with respect to Anglo-Spanish trade modified. In view of the worsening position facing Don Miguel and under the relentless urging of Villiers the President agreed with the growing inexpediency of supporting the Portuguese pretender. Finally,

⁸Carr, Spain, p. 155.

in late October Zea Bermudez, in a major shift of policy, admitted the desirability of joint Anglo-Spanish mediation in Portugal.⁹ Villiers also suggested that the unaccredited representatives from the Eastern Courts should be expelled from Spain for refusing to recognize the queen.¹⁰ The Zea Bermudez government made a request for British aid but failed to obtain it. The Spanish government hinted at some type of joint action involving Britain, Spain, and Portugal in the conflict between Don Pedro and Don Miguel. Palmerston would not agree to the proposal because Zea Bermudez had made it. He did offer British mediation to the protagonists but his offer was declined.¹¹ Zea Bermudez then turned to the French and requested military aid but they declined fearing repercussions from the East.¹²

The Eastern States exerted their influence in both of the Iberian Courts as Palmerston knew only too well. They

⁹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 October 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/412, No. 16.

¹⁰Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 30 November 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/413, No. 31.

¹¹Major John Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1912), p. 177; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 October 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/412, No. 16.

¹²Guizot, Memoires, IV, 70; and Bell, Palmerston, I, 145.

were trying to secure absolutism in Spain.¹³ Palmerston told Villiers the Eastern Courts were trying to maintain their grasp on Zea Bermudez. Furthermore, the Eastern Powers hinted that should France attack Spain they would attack France. No binding commitment, in the form of a treaty, existed covering this possibility.¹⁴ All of the Eastern Powers refused to recognize Isabella's rights to the throne and thereby indicated openly their hostility to her regime.

Meanwhile, in the late fall of 1833 Cristina reluctantly had begun courting the liberals to gain a broader base of support. She was an opportunist who saw the only hope for her daughter lay with the liberals. She introduced some liberals into the government and Palmerston extended recognition to the young queen. Cristina also began talking of liberal political reform in the government and even the granting of a constitution was discussed. In January 1834 she removed Zea Bermudez from office since he was estranged from everyone except the governments of Russia and France.

¹³ Despatch, Addington to Lord Palmerston, 3 June 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/409, No. 79.

¹⁴ Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 11 October 1833, France, F.O. 146/145, No. 123, Secret; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 26 October 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/406, No. 79.

The replacement of Zea Bermudez by Martinez de la Rosa pleased Palmerston. Rosa had served in the constitutional regime of 1822 and he supported liberal ideas similar to those of the British foreign secretary. The new President of the Council opposed Don Miguel and directed the use of Spanish forces against his followers. He also worked against Don Carlos. Moreover, Rosa began drafting a new constitution, the Royal Statute, similar to the French Charter of 1814.¹⁵ Palmerston welcomed these changes in Spanish policies and thought Rosa was pro-British.¹⁶

While Palmerston approved of the liberal Rosa regime the French government did not. Rayneval thought Rosa was inefficient and along with other French officials he believed the president "patronne par l'Angleterre."¹⁷ Because of French actions and attitudes Rosa felt compelled to ask Louis Philippe to cease supporting Don Carlos. The Spanish army

¹⁵Carr, Spain, p. 157.

¹⁶Duc de Broglie, ed., Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, 5 vols., (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892), V, 210; Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 55; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13 August 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/425, No. 112.

¹⁷Marquis de Noailles, Le Comte Molé 1781-1855; Sa Vie-Ses Memoires, 6 vols., (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Edourd Champion, 1930), V, 195.

had reported that the Sous-Prefect of Bayonne permitted Carlists to enter Spain and reinforce the rebels. Rosa explained that continued aid to Don Carlos could only prove harmful to France and might precipitate a major European war.¹⁸

To settle the Carlist issue and prevent a major war Rosa formally requested British aid but not French. "M. de la Rosa understood the necessity of counting on the help of England and on the acquiescence of France."¹⁹ Palmerston reacted with encouragement to the Spanish overtures. He wanted to remove the two pretenders and settle Iberia peacefully while insuring the area for the liberal cause. Palmerston suggested a formal treaty involving Britain, Spain, and Portugal. The French government would ultimately be asked to adhere to the convention, although not as a contracting party. Rosa, reassured by Palmerston's response, empowered the Comte de Florida Blanca to negotiate a convention. M. de Sarmiento, the Portuguese minister to London, also urged the formulating of a treaty covering Iberian affairs.²⁰

¹⁸Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 8 March 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/421, Nos. 28 and 31.

¹⁹Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 55.

²⁰Ibid.

While Palmerston encouraged the liberalization of the Spanish government after Ferdinand's death he wanted to check French designs in Spain. Throughout the eighteen months preceding the conclusion of the Quadruple Treaty Palmerston repeatedly expressed distrust for the French government and its Spanish policies. Palmerston always considered the French a potential threat to England.

As early as 1829, Palmerston insisted that France posed a more serious threat to European peace than either Russia or Prussia which many of his contemporaries feared. As a matter of fact, he linked France with Russia, and he feared the potential consequences of an alliance between these two powers. This combination of land and naval forces he feared above all other diplomatic or military combinations because of the threat it posed to Turkey, to India, and to European peace. His concern about France grew in the early 1830's as Anglo-French relations deteriorated over the Belgian and Portuguese problems.²¹

Palmerston's policies toward Spain in 1833 made it evident that French influence over the Madrid government was

²¹Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, p. 91; and Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 221.

not acceptable. He wanted to keep France isolated and contained within her present boundaries. It was for these reasons and for Britain's defense that England and France had come to the brink of war over the Belgian problem. The foreign secretary warned the French not to intervene militarily in Spain. He also refused to cooperate with the French government when it first recognized Isabella.

Internal disorders in neighboring countries had provoked French intervention on several occasions and Palmerston knew full well a similar development might occur again. In 1808 Napoleon had attempted to occupy the country. More recently the French had sent troops into Spain in 1823 with the full support of the Eastern Powers to crush the liberal constitutional government forced on Ferdinand VII. Palmerston while in office had witnessed French intervention in both Belgium and Portugal so he knew the potential for action in Spain existed. Palmerston's fear of military intervention by France gained reinforcement from the Portuguese, especially Don Pedro, the abdicated ruler of Portugal, who trembled at the thought of his "natural enemy, France," invading his daughter's state to restore peace.²²

²²Lytton Strachey and Roger Fulford, The Greville Memoirs: 1814-1860, 6 vols., (London: The Macmillan Co., 1938), II, 411.

Palmerston's fear of military intervention by France grew in 1833 with the death of Ferdinand VII. France once again had established an Army of Observation along the Pyrenees to contain the Spanish disturbances. Because of family ties, old alliances, and trade the French government believed it had special rights in Spain, and this concept disturbed the government of Lord Grey, British prime minister. On 18 September 1833 Palmerston intimated to Grey that France intended trying to extend its influence over Spain and he proposed keeping an observant eye on Paris.²³

Other considerations contributed to Palmerston's suspicions about the policies of France in Iberia. Louis Philippe confessed to Lord Granville, British Ambassador to France, that he passionately favored the success of absolutism in Spain where he preferred the Salic Law and Don Carlos to a liberal monarchy.²⁴ The Duke de Broglie, the French foreign minister,

²³Letter, Palmerston to Grey, 18 September 1833, Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, II, 833.

²⁴Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 13 September 1833, France, F.O. 27/467; Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 242; Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 182; Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, II, 168; Edgar Holt, The Carlist Wars in Spain (London: Putnam and Co., 1967), p. 52; and Guizot, Memoires, IV, 57-74.

refused to support the exclusion of Don Carlos from the throne even though he had recognized Isabella.²⁵ In late August and early September 1833, Donna Maria, Queen of Portugal, visited Louis Philippe and received a very uncivil welcome which indicated the true sentiment of the French monarch toward the liberal constitutionalists.²⁶

More bad news came to Palmerston's attention as time passed. He found that there was a real desire on the part of some members of Louis Philippe's government and among high ranking civilians to intervene in Spain on some pretext or other.²⁷ But perhaps the most disturbing news of all for Palmerston came in December after the initial sporadic uprisings of northeastern Spain had subsided. The Carlist chiefs who escaped the first round of action fled to France. Once there and safe from pursuit they remained unmolested by the French and were permitted to return to Spain to renew hostilities in 1834.²⁸ Palmerston's warning to Grey that

²⁵Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 253.

²⁶Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, II, 417.

²⁷Walpole, History of England, IV, 306. Thiers was one of those who sought French intervention in Spain.

²⁸The Times (London), 9 December 1833.

France needed to be carefully watched obviously revealed his awareness of the French position toward Spain. The foreign secretary went so far as to warn the French not to intervene militarily in Spain.

Louis Philippe, diplomatically isolated, could ill-afford to antagonize any of the major powers over Spain. He found himself sharply divided from the Eastern Powers because of the nature of his government and his apparent alliance with Britain over Belgium.²⁹ Because of this estrangement Prince Talleyrand, French Ambassador to Britain, tried to obtain an Anglo-French defensive alliance in October.³⁰ A cool rebuff greeted his advances. Later Louis Philippe and de Broglie expressed their desire for such a treaty. Through such an alliance the French expected to close their vulnerable back door, the Pyrenees. The treaty would also have given France an ally against the Eastern Powers. The French had a fear of a major two-front war such as Napoleon had fought.³¹ Thus, while national interests and Louis Philippe's personal wishes

²⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 11 October 1833, France, F.O. 146/145, No. 123, Secret; and Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 182.

³⁰Broglie, Talleyrand, V, 187; and Woodward, Age of Reform, p. 231.

³¹Louis Blanc, The History of Ten Years, 1830-1840, 2 vols., (London: Chapman and Hall, 1844-45), II, 216.

indicated a French solution, practical considerations dictated by isolation and fear of a two-front war drove the government of Paris reluctantly toward Palmerston who could solve both problems.

Considerable alarm over the Iberian situation existed within the government of Louis Philippe. The king said Britain and France should act together in Iberia and de Broglie went so far as to assure Palmerston that France would not act without, "previously concerting the measure with England."³² And yet while such statements were issued and while France did recognize Isabella after Ferdinand's death, the real feelings of the French government differed markedly. Louis Philippe recoiled from the thought of a liberal ascendancy in Spain.³³ Even while Zea Bermudez, an ultra conservative kept power, de Broglie observed that France had no commitment to aid Spain and reserved the right to act in their own best interests.³⁴ But the French also said they

³²Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 16 September 1833, France, F.O. 27/467, No. 178; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 18 October 1833, France, F.O. 27/467, No. 225.

³³Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 242.

³⁴Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 15 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 261.

did not want to interfere militarily in Spain since that would prove embarrassing.³⁵ Granville agreed with these comments adding that an armed response to the situation would not be popular in either France or Britain.³⁶ The French government had already turned down a request for aid from Zea Bermudez because it feared Eastern responses.

Besides being interested in preserving liberalism in Spain and thwarting French activities there Palmerston wanted to encourage Anglo-Spanish commercial exchanges. The foreign secretary had opposed Zea Bermudez and had cautioned the French not to intervene in Spain. When Villiers took up his post in Madrid he received instructions to negotiate a commercial agreement with the Spanish government. Palmerston had expressed an interest in trade for some years.

As a close friend of William Huskisson, President of the Board of Trade, 1823-30, Palmerston had shared his liberal views on trade. In 1832 he attacked protective tariffs during a debate on silk duties while advocating their repeal. He insisted that liberal principles guide Britain's trade measures

³⁵Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 18 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 262.

³⁶Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 November 1833, France, F.O. 27/468, No. 242.

and provide an example to other countries.³⁷ According to Webster Palmerston was and always remained "an advocate of freeing trade from restraint."³⁸ The instructions Palmerston sent with Villiers in September 1833 reflected his concern for commerce. He ordered the British representative to seek a liberal reciprocal commercial treaty which he described as being mutually beneficial. Palmerston also urged that the independent states of Latin America be recognized by the Spanish government. He thought recognition of these states would be advantageous to the world and for British trade. At this point Palmerston offered a word of caution. He repeated Canning's earlier warning that Britain would consider attempts to reconquer the New World as an act of aggression not to be tolerated. But he did not abandon Spain to the reactionary states as Canning had.³⁹

Much of the concern revealed in these instructions revolved about essentially commercial problems. Commerce, however, was not Palmerston's primary concern in these early

³⁷Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, II, 411; and Guedalla, Palmerston, p. 177.

³⁸Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 11.

³⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 9 September 1833, Spain, F.O. 72/406, No. 1; and Spain, F.O. 185/137, No. 2.

months of Isabella's reign. This fact was obvious since the foreign secretary failed to stress its importance until after the Quadruple Treaty was signed. Apart from his original instructions on the matter there was little reference to commerce until over a year later.

Palmerston's efforts to support liberalism, to check French designs, and to encourage free trade in Spain were opposed every step of the way. None of this opposition deterred him from his Spanish policies. From the beginning of his tenure as foreign secretary in 1830 Palmerston was accused of wanting to use the principle of intervention to involve England in constant war.⁴⁰ The Tories suspected him and the Radicals distrusted him since he had only recently adopted the Whig party and the philosophy of liberalism as his own.

There was opposition to Palmerston even in the cabinet. Several of the traditional Whigs disagreed with him and later in the 1835 cabinet he was almost excluded. Only the fact of his ability and the unavailability of an alternate kept him from being refused the position of foreign secretary. Both of the Whig prime ministers of the thirties, Lords Grey and Melbourne, got along well with Palmerston. Indeed, they

⁴⁰Hansard's, 2nd Series, XXII, 139-141 and 559-664.

generally supported his policies. Usually the cabinet ministers in the 1830's, like Commons, concerned themselves more with domestic problems rather than foreign affairs, but both could be difficult on occasion.⁴¹

As expected, the Tory party opposed Palmerston's policies throughout his tenure of office. Of the Belgian incident Lord Aberdeen said, "I look upon this quasi-war of our Government against Holland, and our union with France for this purpose, as the most stupidly impolitic, as well as one of the most wicked acts of which any state was ever guilty."⁴² The Tories could only conceive of the French as enemies and the irony is that while Palmerston used them, he was extremely suspicious also. In 1833 Aberdeen feared the Iberian situation would result in the Peninsula becoming revolutionized by England and France. To him the only encouraging event of the year was the meeting at Münchengratz between the members of the Neo-Holy Alliance. In Spain he believed Zea Bermudez meant safety

⁴¹Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 26.

⁴²Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, November 1832, Parrey E. Jones, ed., The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832-54, 2 vols., Camden Third Series, LX, (London: Butler and Tanner, Ltd., 1938), I, 8.

from revolution and French dominance.⁴³

Complaints on Palmerston's Spanish policies from the Tory opposition were evident in 1833 even before the succession question developed as a reality. The Tories expressed their inclination to support the cause of absolutism by saying they wanted to back Don Miguel in Portugal. The Whigs were blamed when Don Pedro enlisted British subjects to combat Don Miguel.⁴⁴ The Tories generally opposed the idea of repealing the Foreign Enlistment Act when it was debated. Earl Grey in the debate over the Foreign Enlistment Act supported the principle of repeal which would have aided Don Pedro. Similarly, John Murray, M.P., asked for repeal of the act in Commons on the grounds that it was unjust, unnecessary, and inexpedient. In the next session of parliament Murray again advocated repeal and obtained a second reading of the bill at which time there was a majority in favor of the measure. One specific objection to repeal at this point involved the question of British subjects fighting in foreign civil wars.⁴⁵

⁴³The term Neo-Holy Alliance is used to designate the three powers of Münchengratz, Russia, Prussia, and Austria rather than the Holy Alliance of 1815 which was much broader in representation.

⁴⁴Walpole, History of England, IV, 293.

⁴⁵Hansard's, 3rd Series, XX, 865 and 381; and XXII, 1368 ff.

The opposition recalled that the Miguelite War witnessed such involvement and feared the potential use of Britons in Spain.

Opposition members of Parliament did not confine their distrust to Palmerston or the use of mercenaries in Iberia. Lord Aberdeen became gravely concerned over Cristina's role as queen regent after Ferdinand's death. He believed the queen mother entirely untrustworthy and much preferred Zea Bermudez whom he candidly admitted was a bigot. Tory alarms sounded, however, as fear of French ascendancy appeared likely.

George Moir, a Tory writer, cautioned the government about French designs in Spain. He said Spain appeared to be another Portugal in the making where France had tried to establish control over the government. Potential marriage alliances alarmed him as much as the immediate effect of French action in Spain. Rather naively Moir suggested that Europe leave Spain alone so that the tranquility of the Continent might be assured when Don Carlos took his rightful place as king. France, in particular, he said, should be kept out but, as with most Tories, while he wanted the French kept out of Spain he offered no method of achieving this goal.⁴⁶

⁴⁶George Moir, "The Spanish Succession," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XXXIV (November 1833), 804-813.

The Times, much more sanguine than Moir, late in 1833 reported the Spanish insurrectionists as leaderless and lacking direction. The newspaper warned against British involvement though it recognized the possibility of foreign intervention either by France or the Neo-Holy Alliance. A leading article declared Britain had no right to intervene but ought to prevent any other foreign action there. Again, there was no mention of how this policy could be implemented. The Times adopted these attitudes because it felt French policy had changed since 1823 and that while that government continued to believe it had special privileges in Spain it no longer thought in terms of occupying the country or dictating a government for Madrid.⁴⁷

The Radicals were as upset with Palmerston as were the Tories. The foreign secretary had not gone far enough in implementing a liberal foreign policy to suit them. They had wanted more aid for Don Pedro and Maria than England had provided. Palmerston's reluctance to issue a note of protest over the Six Resolutions in Germany did not gain him any Radical support. This group wanted an end to the Foreign

⁴⁷The Times (London), 9 October 1833.

Enlistment Act so Britons could legally aid the liberal struggles in Europe without fear of punishment.⁴⁸

Almost the entire diplomatic corp, foreign and domestic, opposed Palmerston too. Lord Greville, a man intimate with statesmen of both parties, reported strong feelings against Palmerston personally and against his policies. Many people characterized the minister, however unjustly, as being indolent, negligent, and insolent. Talleyrand was particularly upset at times for having to wait two hours or more to see Palmerston. Other foreign ambassadors had similar grievances and by 1834 several of them had taken leaves to escape from Britain's foreign secretary. Personal antipathy to Palmerston played a significant role in determining foreign policy. Talleyrand, for instance, feeling slighted and abused, in the fall of 1833 preferred an understanding with the Eastern Powers. Louis Philippe entertained the same notion.

Palmerston's own diplomatic corps frequently complained about his policies and his lack of communication with overseas posts. The foreign secretary displayed partiality in the case of Belgium which annoyed some, particularly Lord Lamb, his

⁴⁸Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 42-3; and Ridley, Lord Palmerston, pp. 154-5. Palmerston did eventually send a note of protest to the Diet in Germany.

ambassador in Vienna. Greville said Lamb was "be-Metterniched" but in no fear of being removed from his post since Palmerston was in love with his sister, Lady Cowper.⁴⁹ Villiers criticized his superior on several occasions from Madrid after receiving his post there from Palmerston. He felt British influence could be foremost in Spain but of his government's policy said sarcastically, "if all the rest of our foreign policy is managed like the Spanish branch, it must be a great satisfaction to our enemies."⁵⁰ On an earlier occasion Villiers wrote bitterly saying, "it is very amusing to read the French newspapers, which, having no debates . . . to fill their columns, have for the past three weeks been commenting upon the policy of the English government in Spain -- as if it had any."⁵¹

Although there were many areas of disagreement between Palmerston and his domestic opponents there were one or two

⁴⁹Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, I, 399 and 425. Palmerston later married Lady Cowper.

⁵⁰Letter, George Villiers to Edward Villiers, 13 February 1836, Sir Herbert Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George Villiers, Fourth Earl of Clarendon, 2 vols., (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), I, 106; and Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, III, 9 and 11.

⁵¹Letter, George Villiers to Edward Villiers, 14 October 1835, Ibid., p. 101.

points of accord. The foreign secretary agreed with the idea of nonintervention and had spoken in favor of this policy for some time. The Tories objected to an alliance with France which they saw as the traditional Continental foe. In 1833 the foreign secretary likewise disavowed an agreement with France when he turned down a defensive alliance proposed by Talleyrand. The Radicals, on the other hand, wanted to support liberalism in Spain and Palmerston agreed with them. Generally those points over which the Tories and Palmerston agreed the Radicals opposed. The support for liberalism that Palmerston and the Radicals accepted the Tories rejected. This situation made it difficult for Palmerston but he, nevertheless, pursued his own goals.

Like his domestic foes the Eastern Courts attacked Palmerston's personality and his policies but with them there were no areas of accord. The Eastern Courts tried to block action in Iberia, and they also worked to prevent an Anglo-French rapprochement at the same time. The Eastern Powers objected to Palmerston because of the doctrine of nonintervention he espoused. Another reason for opposition to England was the, "offensive arrogance of the English cabinet," which was, "no doubt due to the personal character of Lord Palmerston,"

but there were other reasons too.⁵² Metternich and his allies seriously believed the Whig government would be forced from office any day and therefore they refused to moderate their views and accept Palmerston.⁵³ Furthermore, the Austrian Prince loathed revolution and liberalism which the western constitutional states represented.⁵⁴ The opposition to constitutional forces in Iberia by the Eastern Courts was such that by February 1834 they still had not recognized Isabella even though England and France both had acknowledged her some months before.⁵⁵

Palmerston began negotiations for the Quadruple Treaty despite the domestic and foreign opposition. To triumph over the absolute powers, Palmerston thought, would greatly strengthen the liberal spirit throughout Europe and might encourage Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, and Greece to act as a powerful block to the Eastern Courts. Rosa's request for British

⁵²Letter, Talleyrand to Duc de Broglie, 11 February 1833, Broglie, Talleyrand, V, 87 and 187.

⁵³Letter, Palmerston to Temple, 15 July 1834, Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 205; and Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, II, 416.

⁵⁴Walpole, History of England, IV, 299.

⁵⁵Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXI, 101-102; Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 168; and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, II, 168, III, 381.

aid encouraged Palmerston who wanted to see the two pretenders removed from Iberia. The foreign secretary suggested a formal treaty involving Britain, Spain, and Portugal to which France would ultimately be asked to adhere, though not as a contracting party.⁵⁶

By March the suggestion for the treaty had been made, Spain and Portugal had both empowered their minister in London to conclude a convention, and the remainder of Europe knew nothing about the negotiations. Talleyrand, France, and all Europe did not discover the agreement until it had been written. The Eastern Courts had tried for the previous year to block British action in Iberia just as they had worked to prevent an Anglo-French rapprochement.⁵⁷ Talleyrand first became aware of the treaty on April 10, 1834, at which time he still maintained high hopes for an Anglo-French treaty. Not until April 14 did he drop this idea in favor of France becoming a contracting party in the recently negotiated triple alliance.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Letter, Palmerston to Villiers, 11 January 1834, Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 390.

⁵⁷Pemberton, Lord Palmerston, p. 65.

⁵⁸Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 22 November 1833, Spain, F.O. 185/137, No. 23.

Talleyrand had several reasons for insisting that France be admitted as a contracting party in the treaty. He wanted French inclusion in the treaty as a contracting party rather than as a consenting party only so as not to leave the impression of French subservience to England with the Eastern Courts. Talleyrand feared that, as a consenting party only, the isolation of France would be apparent to all.⁵⁹ The French also argued they had been contacted first to provide aid to Spain, and, therefore, they had a right to be part of the agreement.⁶⁰ But Talleyrand's real concern for French involvement appeared in a letter he wrote to the Comte de Rigny, newly appointed French foreign minister, which said, "we must not allow England to take action alone with Spain."⁶¹

Palmerston surprised not only Talleyrand but his own cabinet. Most of his dealings with Miraflores and Sarmiento must have been secretive and since the cabinet was more concerned with domestic matters anyway, they had no real knowledge

⁵⁹ Blanc, Ten Years, II, 286; and Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, II, 188.

⁶⁰ Guizot, Memoires, IV, 88.

⁶¹ Letter, Rigny to Talleyrand, 17 April 1834, Broglie Talleyrand, V, 247.

of the negotiations. Palmerston wrote that he carried the cabinet, "by a coup de main, taking them by surprise, and not leaving them time to make objections."⁶² He wrote enthusiastically saying, "This treaty was a capitol hit, and all my own doing."⁶³

The Quadruple Treaty that Palmerston signed on 22 April 1834 and which he was so proud of did many things. Article I required the governments of Maria and Isabella to use all the resources at their disposal to defeat the pretenders. The second article called upon Spanish forces to enter Portugal to aid in defeating Miguel and Carlos who were together in that country. Isabella agreed to withdraw these forces as soon as Miguel left Portugal. Britain, in Article III, agreed to provide naval forces to aid in Miguel's defeat. Article IV said,

"If the co-operation of France should be deemed necessary by the High Contracting Parties, for the complete attainment of the objectives of the treaty, His Majesty the King of the French engages to do, in this respect, whatever might be settled by common consent between himself and his three August Allies."

⁶²Guedalla, Palmerston, p. 192.

⁶³Letter, Palmerston to William Temple, 12 May 1834, Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 186.

Articles V, VI, and VII provided for a general amnesty to the rebels, a suitable pension for Miguel and Carlos upon their retirement and for ratification of the treaty.⁶⁴

The Quadruple Treaty of April was designed to remove the pretenders from Portugal and their removal was expected to pacify all of Iberia. Perfunctory roles in this process were assigned to Britain and France. Naval aid that England was required to provide could hardly effect the outcome of the contest since Miguel's forces were all well inland. France had only the most passive role to play which was precisely what Palmerston intended. Portugal required only minimal aid from her neighbor Spain. The treaty, rather than being an effective military alliance, was a moral and diplomatic tool emphasizing the isolation of Miguel.

Reactions to the news of the Quadruple Treaty were mixed but Palmerston was jubilant. In recounting the details of the agreement and French participation in the final treaty to William IV, Palmerston enunciated three basic ideas. In the first instance he argued that French acquiescence along

⁶⁴Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, 1833-1834, XXII, "Treaty Between Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal for the Pacification of the Peninsula, Signed at London, 22nd April, 1834," (London: James Ridgeway and Sons, 1847), 132.

with the other three powers had a greater moral effect. Secondly, the West presented a visible demonstration of unity to the Eastern Courts after their serious efforts to prevent such a treaty. Finally, and here he demonstrated his mistrust of France, he said it was advantageous to get a binding treaty with Louis Philippe to afford some measure of control over his insecure government.⁶⁵ "Nothing ever did so well as the Quadruple Treaty," he concluded.⁶⁶

Some of the Whigs did not share Palmerston's enthusiasm for the treaty. Lord Brougham wrote Grey somewhat despondently, "I suppose we must now, in concert with Spain and with the concurrence of France, if not with her help, put down the anarchy in Iberia." Brougham hoped the treaty would not antagonize the Eastern Powers. Grey replied and concurred in his friend's sentiments.⁶⁷

The Tories disagreed strongly with the treaty. They had objected to Palmerston's recognition of Isabella II, his

⁶⁵Letter, Lord Palmerston to William IV, 12 April 1834, Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, II, 806-807.

⁶⁶Letter, Lord Palmerston to William Temple, 27 June 1834, Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 197.

⁶⁷Letters, Brougham to Grey, 31 December 1833 and Grey to Brougham, 4 January 1834, Brougham, Henry Lord Brougham, III, 216-217.

opposition to Zea Bermudez, and his desire to aid Portugal. He was charged with deliberately fostering war in Spain and Sir Robert Peel insisted the Portuguese problem stemmed from ministerial actions. Palmerston denied these allegations. Peel expressed his desire for tranquility in Iberia and stated the necessity of having good relations between England and France.⁶⁸ This last point conflicted with the opinions of several other Tories such as Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington. Both of them reflected a deep antagonism toward an intimate policy of friendship with Louis Philippe's government which they thought the treaty indicated. They represented the old Tory views which Palmerston did not deviate far from because he and the cabinet also maintained serious suspicions about the French. William Russell, minister to Portugal wrote, "I wish your cabinet were not so dreadfully suspicious and distrustful of the French."⁶⁹

Metternich, like most people, querulously complained about the treaty to everybody, but especially to the French.

⁶⁸Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXI, 101-102.

⁶⁹Letter, William Russell to Lord John Russell, 23 August 1833, Rollo Russell, ed., Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1805-1840, 2 vols., (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), II, 40.

The Prince scornfully informed Louis Philippe's government that had it pursued French interests the Franco-Spanish family compact would have been renewed. Playing upon French doubts he further stated that Britain and France had no justification for interfering in Spain. Metternich vaguely suggested a five-power agreement might have been the best solution to the problem.⁷⁰ He had envisioned a settlement entirely in favor of Don Miguel and Don Carlos. Such an accommodation Louis Philippe could easily have supported except that the Eastern Powers had shown little willingness to cultivate French friendship.

Despite the disapproval expressed by most people the dividends expected by Palmerston from signing the treaty were forthcoming. Rosa within days recalled the Spanish ministers to Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, thereby acknowledging the ascendancy of Britain and France. He justified his stand by saying some of the Eastern Powers had not yet extended recognition to Isabella.⁷¹ Later the Rothschilds, the international bankers, offered his government 15

⁷⁰Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 26 May 1834, France, F.O. 27/484, No. 220.

⁷¹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 29 April 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/422, No. 52.

million francs for Spain's immediate needs.⁷² Still more importantly the signing of the treaty effectively ended the resistance of Don Miguel. He and Don Carlos gave up the struggle in a matter of weeks and both agreed to leave the Peninsula. Miguel went to Italy while Carlos boarded an English naval vessel and travelled to England. Neither of the pretenders were satisfied with this turn of events nor were their backers.

Several members of Parliament were not satisfied with Palmerston's Spanish policies even though Iberia was temporarily pacified. The Marquis of Londonderry sarcastically suggested the policy of nonintervention, so successful in driving Don Miguel and Don Carlos from their respective countries, would be resorted to in order to insure that neither of them returned.⁷³ The Earl of Winchelsea inquired about allegations he had heard that the royal navy stopped vessels with arms bound for Don Carlos. He deprecated the compact which he described as forwarding French designs in Spain and Portugal.⁷⁴ Melbourne in the Lords, who favored Palmerston's

⁷²Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 12 May 1834, France, F.O. 27/484, No. 220. It was the London branch of the international Rothschilds that offered the loan.

⁷³Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXIV, 595.

⁷⁴Ibid., XXV, 465-466.

policies, failed to respond to these charges except in vague terms and the attacks continued.

Londonderry repeatedly flayed the government over its foreign policies. Critically he examined their actions which he insisted had cost England the friendship of the Eastern Courts. Substituted in its place the Whigs erected an alliance with their, "powerful allie Louis Philippe." Warning the government, he told Melbourne to keep a watchful eye on the July Monarch since Britain traditionally had tried to prevent a close Franco-Spanish alliance not encourage it. Wellington assailed the agreement saying he thought it thoroughly inconsistent with British interests and with a policy of nonintervention. Melbourne replied by reiterating Palmerston's argument that the treaty limited and controlled intervention which the Whigs believed justified the understanding.⁷⁵

In Parliament Palmerston, limited by his office, could not indicate his true sentiments concerning France. To have done so publicly would have revealed the complete isolation of the Whig government. Palmerston had found himself forced to reach some understanding with France because of Britain's isolation in foreign affairs. Louis Philippe's government

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 942 ff.

appeared to be the only one with which he could arrive at a modus operandi. Belgium had isolated both states from the Eastern Courts but also had created serious differences between them. Münchengratz further emphasized the East-West split though Tories like Aberdeen thought that conference encouraging. Iberia, under the guise of liberal-constitutionalism which both France and Britain professed to support, Palmerston thought could provide the common ground for an understanding. However, he retained grave suspicions about French designs and never formulated a defensive or military alliance with France. Palmerston knew that if the Eastern Powers attacked France, England would have to aid Louis Philippe for the sake of the balance of power. The Tories, ever mindful of their allies of the Napoleonic period, could not divorce themselves from the belief that only France distorted the balance of power.

Palmerston had grasped this point but failed to drop his old Tory views completely. The isolation of Britain and France, however, permitted these nations to move closer together. But differences in their respective policies on Greece, Belgium, and their struggle to control Iberia meant no entente cordiale could exist. Only one or two symbols of

a supposed understanding can be found. There were some verbal expressions of the "alliance," even from the crowned heads, and there was the Quadruple Treaty. Since Palmerston's view of the Quadruple Treaty was that it restricted French activity in Iberia and supported liberalism, it obviously cannot be maintained this understanding represented a cooperative alliance. Nor can the verbal communications issued by Britain or France since their actions reveal contrary ideas.

Louis Philippe joined the Quadruple Treaty, indeed demanded to be a part of it, because of his fear of isolation and his suspicions about England. Münchengratz in 1833 reaffirmed the Neo-Holy Alliance and the prospective triple alliance including Spain, Portugal, and Britain, left only one major power without allies, France. In this isolated role he feared the possibility of a two-front war.⁷⁶

Talleyrand's government detested the thought of unilateral British action in Iberia, which could end French influence and predominance there. At the same time France needed Britain, as the earlier desire for an Anglo-French defensive treaty makes plain, as an ally. Louis Philippe had to accept

⁷⁶Blanc, Ten Years, II, 216, 286.

some kind of treaty with England under these circumstances and since Palmerston offered only the Quadruple Treaty France accepted it.

The mixed reaction to the Quadruple Treaty became unimportant when Don Carlos suddenly returned to Spain. Though under surveillance by the British government he fled London using a feigned illness as a ruse to gain time. Quickly passing through France he arrived in Navarre, a seedbed of Carlist opposition forces and anti-liberals.⁷⁷ Orders for arms and supplies came from the Carlists to be paid for with money allegedly provided by the Eastern Courts.⁷⁸ A loan subscription, authorized by Don Carlos, and managed by M. Jauge, a French banker, appeared in Paris.⁷⁹ By the middle of July Don Carlos had caused a sensation and thoroughly alarmed the French government.

Did the Quadruple Treaty of April 22, 1834, cover the recent developments in Spain? Rigny was not sure since both of the pretenders had been expelled from Iberia which was the

⁷⁷Holt, The Carlist Wars, p. 58.

⁷⁸Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 11 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 293.

⁷⁹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 16 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 299.

stated purpose of the agreement. He declared that if the treaty did not cover Don Carlos's return to Spain, France would work toward this end, "in a way and to the degree which might be settled between the Spanish and French governments."⁸⁰ Palmerston hoped to avoid this possibility, but Rigny tempered this statement by revealing his desire for a continuation of the Quadruple Treaty based in part upon French domestic considerations. Many Frenchmen wanted a French army sent into Spain but Rigny did not; he feared the potential repercussions.⁸¹ If the treaty remained in force, Rigny could say that he could only act in concert with the other powers. This reasoning had the added advantage of protecting the king who did not want to invade Spain.

Both Rosa and Palmerston understood the treaty still to be in effect. The Spanish minister appealed to the governments of London and Paris for aid as members of the treaty. He pointed out the war was one of ideologies, the liberals versus the absolutists. For the moment the foreign minister insisted he had no need for foreign troops but did ask that

⁸⁰Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 21 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 304.

⁸¹Ibid.

the flow of arms to the enemy be stopped.⁸² Palmerston thought the treaty continued in effect though initially only intended to cover the Portuguese problem. French attitudes compelled Palmerston to adopt this outlook and led him to suggest the four powers consider the new developments in the Peninsula.⁸³

The allied response to the new dilemma included an agreement on additional treaty articles. In August the articles ratified by the states, defined more precisely the aid Spain might expect in resisting Don Carlos. Britain agreed to provide naval forces in a limited capacity and arms. France, refusing to offer troops, met Rosa's request to secure their common frontier and prevent supplies and material going to the Carlists.⁸⁴ By these terms French activities in Iberia remained limited and peripheral while Britain's role, a traditional one that relied upon sea power, involved a somewhat larger and more direct involvement. France, however, made use of her navy to hinder the flow of arms by

⁸²Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 30 July 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/424, No. 100.

⁸³Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 27 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/499, No. 129.

⁸⁴British and Foreign State Papers, "Additional Articles to the Treaty of 22nd April, 1834," XXII, 138.

sea into Carlist held Spanish ports.⁸⁵

The Quadruple Treaty produced a variety of responses among Europeans. Metternich and the Eastern Courts became annoyed, and they continued to provide support to Don Carlos. Britain and France appeared to be cooperating on behalf of liberal-constitutional ideals. They were not, however, because they were jealous of each other and competed for the control of Spain. Talleyrand adequately summed up the French point of view saying, "it is well known that ever since the Peace of Utrecht, England has always sought to oppose our [French] influence in Spain."⁸⁶

⁸⁵Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 25 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 307.

⁸⁶Broglie, Talleyrand, V, 209.

CHAPTER III

THE ILLUSION OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE SHATTERED

Several developments in British foreign policy in Spain occurred between the signing of the Quadruple Treaty and the end of 1835. At first the spirit of April 22nd seemed to continue, but this was illusory. Friction among the allies never disappeared though momentarily it declined. Palmerston and de Broglie expressed desires for cooperation at least verbally in the autumn of 1834. After the Duke of Wellington replaced Palmerston in the foreign office a changed attitude emanated from London. The Iron Duke felt the Spanish should muddle through on their own. Such a policy permitted the French to interfere in the Carlist War in a way detrimental to British interests. When Palmerston returned to office his task had been made much more difficult by Wellington's action. Britain's desire for a commercial treaty with Spain provoked and alarmed the French, too, adding yet another dimension to the struggle for dominance in Madrid.

This struggle for dominance in the Iberian Peninsula remained the real issue no matter how clouded the picture became. Constitutionalism and liberalism were part of the serious conflict engaged in by Palmerston and the Continental Powers. France, ostensibly the ally of Britain opposed that power as Louis Philippe sought better relations with the Eastern Courts.¹ He received encouragement in this endeavor from Talleyrand and later Count Mole, French foreign minister in 1836. De Broglie mouthed platitudes to Palmerston, but French action exposed the true sentiment of Louis Philippe's government.² Despite repeated failures to obtain complete French cooperation, Palmerston continually pressured their government to comply with the treaty.

These efforts had some effect since France and Britain, motivated by mistrust and fear, briefly cooperated in the last months of Palmerston's tenure as foreign minister; and, furthermore, Rigny and Palmerston exchanged assurances that the Quadruple Treaty continued in effect.³ And from Spain came word

¹Bell, Palmerston, I, 210-211.

²Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 398.

³Despatch, Arthur Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 4 August 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 2.

that Rosa sincerely believed Don Carlos could be defeated by Spanish forces. This optimism was conditional. Rosa required Britain and France to insure that supplies destined for the opposition never reached them; this was the rub.⁴

Only in this one area could the French act to effect the outcome of the Spanish civil war with impunity. The Pyrenees border area adjacent to the territories held by Don Carlos and criss-crossed with tracks, quickly became a depot for the insurgents. Little that the British or Spanish governments did materially affected any clandestine operation encouraged by the French. The allies issued remonstrances but Louis Philippe easily rejected any suggestion that he failed to honor the treaty. Nevertheless, Rosa repeatedly asked the allies to prevent aid reaching his enemies' camp.

In vain Rosa asked the British government to halt the shipments of arms from London merchants to the Carlists. Furthermore, the Spanish minister hinted at the desirability of intercepting at sea war material destined for the insurgents, but again met with disappointment. Palmerston, only too eager to render whatever service he could to Spain, found himself in

⁴Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 30 July 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/424, No. 100.

a dilemma. On the one hand the Quadruple Treaty bound him to provide naval and other aid to Spain, but on the other hand, international law prohibited Britain from stopping vessels bound for Iberia. Arthur Aston at Paris, substituting temporarily for Granville, pointed out the non-belligerents, both France and Britain, could create serious problems if they attempted to intercept vessels trading with Spain.⁵

Palmerston asked the appropriate authorities in London to define Britain's options in the arms trade and found himself severely limited. The Board of Trade, after due reflection, described an Order in Council prohibiting arms exports as "inconvenient and embarrassing" and declined to agree to one.⁶ Approximate figures of arms exports were also provided by the Board at this point and revealed that 850,000 guns had been exported between 1831 and July 1834. The bulk of these weapons had gone to France, Britain's avowed ally.⁷

⁵Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 4 August 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 2. Opposed to military intervention Palmerston at first used this international law, which Britain traditionally had ignored, as reason enough not to get deeply involved in the military aspects of the Carlist Wars.

⁶Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 27 October 1834, Spain, F.O. 185/141, Part 1, No. 60.

⁷Ibid. This meant there was a considerable legal arms trade in England that might object to embargo or trade restrictions.

News from other sources was equally discouraging and Palmerston reported to Villiers that H. M. cruisers could not interfere with neutrals since England was not a belligerent.⁸ And, of course, the foreign minister had no intention of becoming a belligerent since that idea ran counter to his nonintervention concepts. Besides, as Palmerston pointed out, to acquiesce in Spain's request meant the necessity of getting a Parliamentary act to that effect which he was loath to do.⁹

Some cooperation in 1834 among the allies can be observed despite the mutual suspicions. The British consul at Bayonne, J. V. Harvey, in July reported on measures taken by France to seal the Pyrenees border area to the flow of arms and men into Spain.¹⁰ These measures taken by the French were not designed to aid the allied cause so much as they were obviously meant to protect France. Rigny spoke of the danger to French tranquility in the southern departments if Don Carlos, in northeastern Spain, received aid. He cited French legitimists who might be inflamed by the Apostolic or Don Carlos

⁸Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 26 August 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/419, No. 48.

⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 28 October 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/416, No. 69.

¹⁰Copy of Letter, J. V. Harvey, Consul at Bayonne to Lord Granville, Paris, 26 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 321.

faction to the detriment of Louis Philippe.¹¹ For this same reason French forces, naval and land, provided some arms to the Spanish royalist cause. The navy received orders to intercept some neutral vessels carrying arms at sea.¹² Britain cooperated with France at this point at least to the extent of providing warnings of arms shipments bound for Spain by sea.¹³ Palmerston still keenly observed France, however, since Louis Philippe had an army collected along the Spanish border.

Rosa, requesting aid in July, reassured Palmerston that he needed no foreign troops, that he only contemplated the aid suggested by the Quadruple Treaty. Villiers pressed the point about foreign intervention as he tried to get Rosa to clarify his position on this issue. The Spaniard assured the minister that he utterly opposed the use of any foreign troops in Spain. Suspicions lingered and even when the Cortes received a state of the nation report from Rosa, pro-British in sentiment, it abated but little. On several occasions Rosa took time to

¹¹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 23 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/486, No. 310.

¹²Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 29 August 1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 45.

¹³Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 28 July 1834, France, F.O. 27/484, No. 315.

reassure Palmerston that foreign troops would not be utilized and especially French troops would not be sought. This attitude Villiers reported as being fairly consistent throughout the queen regent's cabinet.¹⁴

Laboring under apprehensions with regard to French designs in Spain, Palmerston also received disturbing news of the activities of the Eastern Powers. For months he had been aware of the hostility of these Powers toward Isabella and western cooperation. Now fresh reports of their efforts on behalf of Don Carlos surfaced. Agents in Holland shipped arms to Biscay. Other agents in Amsterdam tried to raise loans similar to those M. Jauge had tried to get in Paris and Metternich made efforts to borrow money for the same cause.¹⁵ In conjunction with these movements ambassadorial activity increased. Count Pozzo di Borgo of Russia, Ambassador to France, hoped that there would be no foreign interference in Spain.¹⁶

¹⁴Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 7 and 13 August 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/425, Nos. 106 and 112; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 30 July 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/424, No. 100.

¹⁵Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 25 August 1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 42; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 31 October 1834, Spain, F.O. 72/419, No. 71; and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 413.

¹⁶Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 22 August 1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 35.

Britain maneuvered to obtain the same objective, non-interference in Spain. But the French government caused anxiety because of pressure on Rigny from the holders of "rentes perpetuelles." These French bondholders asked for intervention in Spain on their behalf, a request that the British bondholders later repeated to Palmerston.¹⁷ In November the British foreign minister discussed Spain with M. Barcourt, French Charge d' Affaires, at which time he stressed the harmful effect British or French action in Iberia could have. Specifically, he thought a loss of freedom might result from interference and Barcourt concurred in this sentiment. Barcourt further said that his government viewed the alliance as a moral force rather than a reference to financial aid or intervention.¹⁸

To the extent that neither of the western allies wanted to see the Eastern Powers involved in Spain, they cooperated. The western allies had no other basis for an agreement because their goals were mutually exclusive. Palmerston, who refused a defensive Anglo-French treaty, acknowledged this joint

¹⁷Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 12 September 1834, France, F.O. 27/487, No. 72.

¹⁸Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 27 November 1834, France, F.O. 27/479, No. 4.

opposition to the Eastern Courts in the early 1830's. No solidarity existed between the two governments; and as soon as national interest developed, the two powers parted.¹⁹

At home the British government found itself under fire from those disagreeing with the Spanish policies although The Times granted a temporary reprieve to await the results of the measures taken by Palmerston. Completely at odds with intervention, the paper exuded optimism that the alliance would work and the Spanish war would end quickly. When General Mina replaced General Rodil, the London paper gleefully told its readers any thought of French intervention had ended. Mina, a guerrilla leader against Napoleon, reportedly would become Carlist rather than admit the French into Spain again. Franco-Spanish relations had already cooled because Rayneval still favored Zea Bermudez despite his removal in January 1834. Britain temporarily gained favor with the Madrid government because of the alliance but also because Palmerston made military supplies and services available to Isabella.²⁰ While The Times conditionally tendered its support

¹⁹"The normal rivalry between Britain and France began again to be prominent all over Europe and overseas." Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 413.

²⁰The Times (London), 9, 18 September and 4 November, 1834.

to Palmerston other organs attacked him.

Tory spokesmen slashed away at the foreign secretary and the policies he implemented after 1830. Fundamentally one basic difference in foreign policy existed between the Whigs and Tories though both parties agreed France remained the most suspect Continental Power. The point in question revolved around the issue of controlling French designs, real and imagined, in Europe. The Tories could not agree to an alliance with France for this purpose. They really preferred John Carteret's old approach of alliances with the Germanies to resist both French and Russian threats.²¹ In fact, some Tories saw only France as a potential threat to European peace and, therefore, supported a British understanding with the Eastern Courts. Palmerston long before indicated he thought France a major concern in foreign affairs.²² The treaty he concluded in 1834 reduced French freedom of action and recognized publicly that a difference existed between East and West. This difference Palmerston exploited in trying to prevent France from moving toward an agreement with

²¹John Carteret, Earl Granville, during George II's reign followed a foreign policy that placed great emphasis upon the Germanies and in particular upon Hanover.

²²Bell, Palmerston, I, 77.

one or more of the Eastern Courts. Balance of power had a place in Palmerston's scheme of things.²³

The opposition press accused the government of being deceived by France and of destroying the old alliance system. Britain and France overturned every second rate government within reach, they said, including Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland. Germany, the indictment continued, had been thrown to Russia. This vitrolic statement pointed out how despotic France, led by Louis Philippe and desirous of an empire, had, with Britain's aid, secured the back door against attack with the alliance and, the article conjectured, probably would gain Spain and Portugal by marriages with the House of Orleans.²⁴

Of course, Palmerston did not see the situation this way. A year earlier he expressed concern over the possibility of war with Russia.²⁵ Since Britain and France had only just

²³Palmerston spoke of the Quadruple Treaty as "a powerful counterpoise [balance] to the Holy Alliance." Letter, Palmerston to William Temple, 21 April 1834, Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 780; also Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 397.

²⁴Archibald Alison, "Foreign Affairs," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XXXVI (October 1834), 507-525.

²⁵It must be remembered that in 1833 the Münchengratz meeting took place and the Russo-Turkish treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was signed.

avoided an armed clash over Belgium it behooved him to keep these powers separated. The Quadruple Treaty did just that and by late 1834 he felt secure enough on this point of leaving the foreign office in November to say, "Spain is safe." Presumably he meant safe from the Tories, but France was another question.

When Palmerston left office in December 1834, to be replaced by the Duke of Wellington, France had a golden opportunity. Almost a year earlier Wellington had been described as being disinclined to continue an intimate French alliance. He disapproved of Palmerston's foreign policy generally, but particularly with regard to Spain. Once in office though, the Iron Duke found himself as closely controlled by the Quadruple Treaty as the French. The foreign minister could not, in his brief tenure in office, reverse the policies of his predecessor. He took Britain's treaty obligations seriously and though objecting to the agreement he, nevertheless, fulfilled its stipulations as best he could without committing England too deeply.

Wellington expressed his belief that the treaty referred to moral influence rather more than to assistance.²⁶ Rigny

²⁶Draft, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office, 16 January 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 2.

took this stand months earlier, but with the French government now inclined more toward the Eastern Courts Wellington's relative inaction opened the door for French aid to Carlos. Rosa continued cool toward France and told Wellington of his refusal to ask Louis Philippe for help.²⁷

In February Wellington asked France to protest over the murdering of war prisoners in Spain and still later asked Louis Philippe's government to cooperate on finding a lasting solution to this problem.²⁸ In this seemingly innocent and humanitarian gesture Wellington had a secret plan to inform Don Carlos of the hopelessness of his cause. The foreign secretary, to end the war, intended to offer the pretender asylum in either Britain or France.²⁹ In due time Lord Eliot, named by William IV as a special envoy, left England for the headquarters of Don Carlos. In late March, the French began a series of objections and delaying tactics. Louis Philippe first insisted that he would be unable to cooperate because the Madrid government had not specifically requested French

²⁷Despatch, Villiers to the Duke of Wellington, Madrid, 11 February 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/440, No. 21.

²⁸Draft, Duke of Wellington to Aston, Foreign Office, 20 February 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 10.

²⁹Draft, Duke of Wellington to Lord Cowley, Foreign Office, March 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 4, Secret and Confidential.

mediation. Nothing daunted Wellington who sent Eliot to Bayonne hoping that the French would send a counterpart for the intended discussions with Carlos.³⁰

The Eliot Mission, under Wellington's guidance, with its twofold objective aimed at a peaceful solution to the contest. However, the Radicals disapproved of Eliot's venture to Don Carlos' headquarters. Thomas Duncombe, M.P., suspicious of the Eliot Mission, asked Lord Mahon of the Tory government if Britain now supported the pretensions of Don Carlos. Mahon replied in the negative. Ever since the Wellington government obtained office liberals had been worried about their Spanish policies. The Carlists reportedly expressed gratification that Wellington had become the foreign secretary. Spanish liberals on the other hand, thought of the Duke as a generalissimo of the Neo-Holy Alliance.³¹

The French continued obstinate in refusing to make the Eliot Mission a joint venture. Spain had not requested French participation in the anticipated talks between Carlos and an English representative. Even as late as 13 April 1835, Louis

³⁰Draft, Duke of Wellington to Lord Cowley, Foreign Office, 2 April 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 9.

³¹Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVII, 837; and The Times (London) 22 December 1834.

Philippe's government still had not been contacted by the Spanish ambassador on the Eliot Mission.³² In fact, when finally approached by the Spanish, the government in Paris felt quite slighted since they received merely a copy of the original draft submitted to the foreign office requesting British aid.³³ Louis Philippe failed to receive an original request for this type of aid because Rosa remained pro-British and obviously did not want the French involved. Wellington suggested a Frenchman accompany Eliot not because he desired Parisian involvement, but the Iron Duke meant to live up to the Quadruple Treaty and this required French participation. Though the British foreign secretary disapproved of the treaty, he could neither reverse policy nor could he disregard the agreement.

Wellington did everything he could to comply with a strict interpretation of the treaty. At times he became callous or perhaps derisive, observing that the rebels controlled only thirty square leagues and were cut off from

³²Despatch, Lord Cowley to the Duke of Wellington, Paris, 13 April 1835, France, F.O. 27/501, No. 19. Webster suggests that the French did not want to intervene in Spain at this point but clearly Rosa refused to give Louis Philippe any excuse for intervention in Spain in early 1835. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 427.

³³Draft, Duke of Wellington to Lord Cowley, Foreign Office, April 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 9.

supplies by sea and land. On the other hand, he pointed out that Isabella had all the resources of Spain at her disposal. Requests for foreign intervention annoyed Wellington most under these circumstances. But neither his opposition to the treaty, nor his hostility toward those desiring intervention prevented him from providing military supplies. General Alava of the queen's army, on asking for war materials, received prompt assurances he would get them. Indeed, Wellington took immediate steps toward this end. His only question being how and when would the supplies be paid for by the Spanish government. By the end of the first week in April material valued at eighty thousand pounds had been supplied, but an end to the war appeared nowhere in sight.³⁴

Knowledgeable people in the early days of April had a growing conviction that the Carlist Wars were going to be long. Eliot's mission had been attempted to reduce the horrors of the conflict but no negotiations directed toward terminating the war had occurred. Palmerston and Louis Philippe agreed on the bleak prospects for a quick termination of the war.³⁵

³⁴Drafts, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office, 6, 10 March and 7 April 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, Nos. 15, 17 and 28.

³⁵Despatches, Lord Cowley to the Duke of Wellington, Paris, 10 and 13 April 1835, France, F.O. 27/501, Nos. 16 and 19.

Wellington felt this way, too, while in office but believed Cristina was capable of muddling through.³⁶

Rosa told Villiers of his conviction that foreign troops would not be asked to intervene yet by May 1835 the situation looked surprisingly different. Dramatic shifts in Spanish affairs, though startling, were not uncommon. In May and June there unfolded a serious reappraisal of the Spanish situation which ultimately led to the use of foreign soldiers and marines in the queen's cause. Rosa had a complete change of heart on intervention and began soliciting additional allied help. His appeal to England, France, and Portugal, based upon the spirit, though not the letter of the Quadruple Treaty, he revealed to Villiers on 20 May 1835.³⁷

Don Carlos in the twelve months following the allied signing of the treaty had improved his position with arms, supplies, money, and operations against the queen. To meet this growing threat Rosa pressed for and received arms from

³⁶Draft, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office, 6 March 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/439, No. 15. Rosa shared this view in February 1835, The Times (London), 4 February 1835, also 14 February 1835.

³⁷Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 May 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, No. 83. The Times reported that as late as 23 April 1835, Rosa still remained firm against intervention.

Britain. The largest army ever under a single command in Spain operated against Don Carlos for the queen. This army, created since the death of Ferdinand, became demoralized in the spring of 1835 because of reverses in the field. In defense of his government Rosa cited the French intervention under Napoleon when 6,000 guerillas tied down 30,000 seasoned troops.³⁸

The change which affected Rosa reflected a corresponding change of opinion among the general public in Spain. The young queen's cause looked hopeless as Don Carlos received aid of all types from outside Spain. Even Spain's ally, France, failed the Rosa government by permitting Carlist agents to operate out of Bayonne. A steady stream of provisions and supplies reached the rebels from France despite the alleged watch kept by the Army of Observation for such activity.³⁹ The Spanish government knew of these activities as did the

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Despatch, J. V. Harvey to Lord Palmerston, Bayonne, 29 May 1835, France, F.O. 146/161, No. 6. "England accused France of favoring and tolerating the arms shipments ordered by the army of Don Carlos." Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 139. The Times reported large quantities of supplies going to Carlos saying, "in the search of Carlist combustibles . . . every species of absurdity, under the cloak of a strict surveillance is constantly occurring." 7 January 1835, 9 March 1835, 6 April 1835.

public. Rosa, his government, and his generals, had, according to Villiers, made every effort to contain and defeat the insurrection and having failed now believed that intervention from outside would be their only savior. Isabella's government became quite alarmed in May as it realized the position it found itself in.⁴⁰

The alarm and concern of the Spanish minister infected Villiers who relayed numerous dispatches to Wellington and Palmerston. So alarmed did the British minister become that he urged repeatedly that Britain intervene. He insisted on support for Rosa because he feared the effects a change in ministers would have upon the war effort. What he did not say, but what he really objected to, was the replacement of Rosa by a pro-French ministry. Villiers doubted that anyone in Spain would object under the circumstances, if French troops entered the country as they had in 1823.⁴¹ Such an event would virtually end any British influence in Spain. The best guarantee that French influence would not emerge dominant in the councils of the Madrid government was timely assistance from Britain.

⁴⁰Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 May 1835 and Aranjuez, 7 June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, Nos. 83 and 90; and The Times (London) 26 May 1835.

⁴¹Spain, F.O. 72/442, No. 90.

Wellington and Palmerston on receiving these communications from Villiers took an astonishingly similar line. Formal requests for aid had not been made by Spain and would have been turned down had the request arrived in May. Wellington, on the point of leaving office, refused to give his countenance to any projected use of foreign troops in Spain; and Palmerston concurred with these sentiments as he returned to the foreign office. Both men, to bolster their stand, cited the stipulations of the treaty which made no mention of Britain being required to supply troops.⁴² The drafts to Villiers, and hence to the Spanish government, must have been written after Wellington and Palmerston consulted together. While not identically worded, the communications were alike in sentiment and reflected the policy and wishes of Wellington far more than the desires of Palmerston. There was one new point raised in these drafts which concerned the feasibility of recruiting the Biscayan followers from Don Carlos. The foreign office argued that it might be arranged for the Madrid government to

⁴²Draft, Duke of Wellington to Villiers, Foreign Office, 22 May 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/439, No. 1; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 22 May 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 1. Palmerston was on shaky ground in his party and had almost been refused a cabinet seat. This fact perhaps helps to explain why Palmerston's response to Villiers was at first so cautious.

entice the Biscayans away from Don Carlos by resolving the difficulties surrounding their fueros. Nobody, however, could separate the problem of the fueros from the Carlist cause at this juncture. Palmerston, soon after returning to office, recognized this stumbling block.⁴³

Other issues clouded the problem in late May and June. Villiers continued his stream of notes to the foreign office convinced that intervention had become vital. Aside from the purely military considerations motivating the minister two other related problems alarmed him. He anticipated an increasing boldness by Carlists and Democrats as the queen's government weakened. He concluded that the queen might be deposed, or what was worse, the French might intervene fearing the spread of revolutionary sentiments into their southern departments. In either contingency Villiers saw Britain ousted from the councils of Madrid. Citing Rosa's desires for aid and Count Toreno's concurrence along with the wishes of the army and the public, the energetic minister emphasized the need for action. Furthermore, he said that Spain experienced some agitation because a few Spaniards thought France unlikely

⁴³Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 14 August 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 21; and The Times (London), 26 June 1835.

to honor the Quadruple Treaty.⁴⁴

Indeed, the French, who had been permitting supplies to cross their border into Spain, expressed deep anxiety about the Spanish request for military assistance. De Broglie, who had returned to the foreign office, concocted several reasons to explain his reluctance to become seriously involved. Initially, he delayed his reply to the request for aid until he learned of Palmerston's response. In the meantime Louis Philippe's government explained that it feared a large scale Napoleonic involvement because of relations with the East. De Broglie predicted that Holland would create difficulties if French troops crossed the Pyrenees. The French minister saw pitfalls everywhere when someone suggested intervention, and he said that even to acknowledge the Spanish request would publicize the weakness of the queen's government and make matters worse. Not even a formal request in early June induced him to provide more aid for Spain than the treaty stipulated.⁴⁵

Rosa, though not yet formally requesting military assistance in May, had indicated he intended to do so. The slightest

⁴⁴Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Aranjuez, 2 June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, No. 88.

⁴⁵Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 5.

suggestion of this request set diplomatic wheels turning. Britain reiterated its nonintervention policy and recommended France do the same. Palmerston also advised Louis Philippe's government, in strong terms, to execute the provisions of the treaty. Rosa intended asking for troops from Britain, France, and Portugal if there appeared to be a good chance of the aid being granted.⁴⁶ In view of the initial responses to the hinted need for aid the formal solicitation did not materialize immediately. Rosa resigned June 8 still not having requested aid to be replaced by Count Toreno.⁴⁷

Rapid changes occurred in the early days of June, 1835, not only in Spain but in London and Paris. Suddenly foreigners were available for military service in Spain in spite of all the recent assurances and warnings about the use of such troops. But the type of action envisioned by Palmerston left him able to say Britain was not intervening militarily in Spain. Britons, mostly Irishmen, received permission to enlist in the queen of Spain's army as part of the British Auxiliary Legion, B.A.L. Only the name and the personnel

⁴⁶Letter, Lord Palmerston to Count Sabastiani, Foreign Office, 5 June 1835, France, F.O. 146/161, copy.

⁴⁷Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Aranjuez, 8 June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, No. 91.

were British. The unit had never been part of the British army and having a legion form up and train in Spain differed significantly from sending the Coldstream Guards or the Black Watch to aid Isabella. The latter definitely would have been British military intervention while the former begged the question. Successive Spanish governments were to pay the legion and the Spanish army controlled its activities. This control gave rise to bitter recriminations as the Spaniards treated the legion as one of their own and failed to supply it with the necessities, including pay. Palmerston later repeatedly assailed the government of Madrid in vain attempts to get proper supplies and treatment for the legionnaires.⁴⁸

Palmerston resorted to this method of aiding Isabella because de Broglie, though convinced France should not interfere,

⁴⁸Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 11 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 8. Some Britons felt the law against foreign enlistments ran counter to the rights of Englishmen. They argued that manufacturers, entrepreneurs, and skilled workers could all sell their skills or wares wherever they chose without fear of legal loss of citizenship. These people viewed soldiers as professionals who ought to enjoy the same rights and, therefore, they had tried on a couple of previous occasions to get the Foreign Enlistment Act repealed. Their parliamentary efforts at repeal had been first made prior to the signing of the Quadruple Treaty. In June 1835 an Order in Council suspended the act for a period of two years. The suspension of the act was a subterfuge used to militarily aid Isabella. Half-pay officers received encouragement to enlist and obtained reassurance that their half-pay would be continued while serving the queen.

had nevertheless considered using the French Foreign Legion in Spain.⁴⁹ Louis Philippe, presiding over his Council, decided against sending a regular army as requested by Spain and countered by offering the legion de Broglie had spoken about.⁵⁰

Count Toreno exhibited much bitterness toward Louis Philippe and the French Ambassador to Madrid, the Conde de Rayneval, whom Toreno accused of duplicity. Spain's foreign minister told Villiers the French ambassador led him to believe one thing while the queen regent received information to the contrary. Toreno, quite peeved, offered explanations of the French government's alleged insincerity. He believed Louis Philippe, refusing to send an army into Spain as he requested, would blame his nonintervention upon England. The treaty bound France to act with Britain, but that power had just told Louis Philippe not to intervene. De Broglie used a similar line of reasoning in the summer of 1834.⁵¹ Moreover, Toreno thought the French refused aid at this juncture so the

⁴⁹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 5 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 7.

⁵⁰Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 8 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 12. This legion also formed up and trained in Spain.

⁵¹See above page 60.

confusion in Spain would spread. Once the anarchy spread, so the Spanish minister mused, Louis Philippe intended to intervene singlehandedly to defend France upon terms he dictated. Villiers discounted this explanation and told Palmerston he doubted that Rayneval had been optimistic about French aid for the queen.⁵²

France offered the use of the Foreign Legion to Spain, but at no time did that government exhibit a real desire to cooperate beyond this low-keyed offer.⁵³ When Palmerston asked de Broglie to station the Army of Observation closer to the Pyrenees border to improve surveillance, the French refused to cooperate. They rejected a similar request from Toreno.⁵⁴ At this time the Carlists had expanded the area they controlled to include the entire Pyrenees border which doubtlessly facilitated the acquisition of supplies from France by the rebels. Isabella's government, though it had by now formally requested both British and French aid, remained

⁵²Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 22 June 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/442, Separate and Secret.

⁵³Despatches, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 8 and 17 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, Nos. 12 and 22.

⁵⁴Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 11 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/497, No. 9; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 25 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 33.

suspicious of de Broglie's ministry and not until 25 June 1835, did Toreno accept the offer of the Foreign Legion.⁵⁵ Except for the decision to permit the legions to operate in Spain and the fulfilling of the provisions of the treaty, neither Britain nor France provided additional military aid as requested.⁵⁶

The state of affairs in Spain, rumors of French activities and the Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act prompted a bitter June debate on Spanish affairs in Parliament. Lord Londonderry opened the attack against the ministry by inquiring whether or not royal navy ships had gone to Spain and who paid for them. Lord Melbourne responded vaguely with the articles of the Quadruple Treaty while assuring the House of Lords he would inquire into the subject. The following day Melbourne told the Lords the Spanish government intended to defray the cost though the British government would not for the time being press for payment. Anticipating hostile remonstrances upon divulging this information to the Tories Melbourne revealed that this repayment policy originated with Wellington.

⁵⁵Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 25 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 33.

⁵⁶Annual Register, 1835, LXXVII, 444.

Royal navy vessels first patrolled the Spanish coast in August 1834, but the question had remained dormant in Parliament until deeper involvement appeared likely.⁵⁷

Developments in Spain with the French responses as chronicled and editorialized in The Times reflected a growing British concern for Iberia. At first, in late May, the London paper examined the Additional Articles to the treaty and wrote that the French could not send auxiliary forces into Spain. A week later the same paper suggested a marriage to resolve the problems, but doubted that this solution would be acceptable because Don Carlos was a bigot. Reversing itself on 10 June, The Times thought French abstention from intervention unlikely. Maintaining its often stated position the paper reiterated its disapproval of English intervention, but like several contemporaries it could provide no viable alternate.

Surprisingly enough The Times did not oppose the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act. In fact, the tone of the paper in reporting the composition of the B.A.L. and its officers was quite laudatory. Once the men saw action a regular feature of the paper involved reporting the exploits of the legion. The London paper on several occasions in the

⁵⁷Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 338.

ensuing year became almost jingoist in describing British engagements.

Meanwhile, the government continued under sharp attack in Parliament. The House of Lords, largely Tory in composition, strenuously attacked Melbourne. Wellington, Aberdeen and Londonderry all voiced suspicion and resentment of the government. Aberdeen sarcastically declared, "This is a new kind of intervention, . . . which is not to be called war." Furthermore, he thought this latest episode a disgrace, all the more so, because he believed in a closer understanding with the Eastern Powers.⁵⁸ Lord Mahon echoed these sentiments in the Commons insisting the government's policies were ruinous and its B.A.L. poorly commanded and constructed. Though mounting a frontal attack upon the latest development in policy Mahon did not attack the Quadruple Treaty or the principals upon which it rested. Primarily he objected to the halfway measures used by Palmerston that meant neither war nor peace, a sentiment shared by several associates.⁵⁹ In August Londonderry renewed the attack again saying, "there was scarcely one

⁵⁸Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, 16 June 1835, Jones, Early Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen, I, 31.

⁵⁹Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 1133 ff.; and The Times (London), 25 June 1835.

branch of their [the government's] foreign policy which was not liable to the heaviest censure." Melbourne replied, "it was in the interests of England that Spain should be strong--that Spain should be united--that Spain should be prosperous--and, above all, that Spain should be independent of all foreign nations."⁶⁰

While the debate raged in the House of Lords nobody there intended to try to topple the government because of its Spanish policies. The Tory's attempted to embarrass Melbourne and to otherwise persuade, cajole or modify those policies, but nobody wanted a constitutional crisis. For this reason the Lords, while submitting their questions, generally remained quiet. A government censure they overruled as being a tactic likely to provoke Commons. The Tories knew they could pass any measure in the Lords, but they felt quite certain the government would not alter its course one bit. It is interesting to observe the unlimited power the Tories had in the Lords and compare it to the extremely limited power the Lords had in influencing the government in this instance.⁶¹

⁶⁰Ibid., XXX, 980-986.

⁶¹Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, 30 July 1835, Jones, Early Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen, I, 35.

Cressett Pekham and Sir Robert Peel both argued against the government's Spanish policies in general and against interference in particular. Pekham insisted interfering in civil wars established a dangerous precedent that might be turned against England in the future if such a war occurred in Britain.⁶² Pekham's recollection of British history must have been non-existent. Peel's objections aimed at something higher since he postulated that all weak powers would be at the mercy of any strong power if interference as a principle was upheld.⁶³

Palmerston defended his actions in Commons. He denied that any similarity between French activities in 1823 and his own with regard to the B.A.L. existed. The Quadruple Treaty, he argued, should be maintained to insure Isabella's success. British interests, largely unspecified, were used to bolster his position. Precedents for a legion, which some foes said did not exist, Palmerston dismissed out of hand saying twenty precedents could not insure victory if his assessments were wrong. Later the foreign minister referred to Elizabethans fighting in Holland as precedent enough for his own policies. Finally, in a direct response to Peel's charges Palmerston

⁶²Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 914.

⁶³Ibid., p. 1158.

candidly replied:

"In the first place, the present interference (for he took it to be generally allowed that it was in principle an interference) was founded on a treaty arising out of an acknowledgement of the right of a sovereign, decided by the legitimate authorities of the country over which she ruled."⁶⁴

Donald Southgate in The Most English Minister, The Politics of Palmerston, gleefully seized upon this statement to prove that "There was no pretense of neutrality or non-intervention on Palmerston's part in this war."⁶⁵ Such a statement is quite rash. Palmerston never thought of neutrality as a viable policy for England and certainly not in the 1830's. He opposed the Eastern Powers much of the time, his Belgian policies were not those of a neutral and the Quadruple Treaty obviously was not. As for intervention, Palmerston unalterably opposed it. Southgate uses the word intervention, not Palmerston, who uses the term interference. This difference is not merely semantics for as Palmerston said of intervention,

"one Nation has no right to control, by force of arms the will of another Nation in the choice of

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 1162.

⁶⁵Donald Southgate, The Most English Minister, The Policies and Politics of Palmerston (London: Macmillan and Co., 1966), p. 101.

its government or ruler."⁶⁶ "But if by interference is meant intermeddling, and intermeddling in every way, and to every extent, short of actual military force; then I must affirm, that there is nothing in such interference, which the laws of nations may not in certain cases permit."⁶⁷

Palmerston received some support in these debates following the creation of the B.A.L. Daniel O'Connell said England's interests demanded support for liberal institutions since the Holy Alliance was not dead. Henry Bulwer accosted Peel verbally pointing out that when all France welcomed Napoleon from Elba Peel had supported British intervention to remove him. Bulwer first alluded to Elizabethan interferences which Palmerston usually got credit for.⁶⁸ Debate in Parliament and in the press continued and few people expressed satisfaction with the measures taken by the government.

On the international scene considerable dissatisfaction continued. France and Britain remained suspicious of each other's Iberian involvement. De Broglie demanded to know if the British Auxiliary Legion received payment from London. Palmerston reassured him such was not the case although the

⁶⁶William Cargill, The Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Administered by the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston (London: John Reid and Co., 1841), p. 101.

⁶⁷Bell, Palmerston, I, 82.

⁶⁸Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXVIII, 1168.

half-pay officers continued to get their regular allotment while serving in Spain. Once assured on this point de Broglie placed the French Foreign Legion under Spanish command.⁶⁹

Responses to the news of the foreign legions and their use in Spain varied. Metternich, representing the Eastern Courts, objected strenuously to this new development. The Prussians appeared equally annoyed. Neither power would have objected more vociferously even if France had sent an army into Spain. The Eastern Powers did not object to intervention, but resented interference for the wrong cause, Isabella's.⁷⁰ Don Carlos also protested loudly as could be expected. He issued a royal decree stating that any foreigner captured while in the service of the queen would be shot immediately.⁷¹ This decree negated the Eliot convention concluded a year earlier though that agreement had never been honored in practice.

Palmerston insisted on protesting against this latest decree issued by Don Carlos and asked the French government

⁶⁹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 29 June 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 42.

⁷⁰Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 3 July 1835, France, F.O. 27/502, No. 50.

⁷¹Despatch, J. V. Harvey to Lord Granville, Bayonne, 11 July 1835, France, F.O. 27/503, No. 49; and Annual Register, 1835, LXXVII, 446.

to join him. At first Louis Philippe was inclined to agree but after reconsidering the matter decided not to. Except for de Broglie, the entire French cabinet opposed making any threat against Don Carlos they could not back up with action. Not for the first time was de Broglie out of step with Louis Philippe and his associates. A month after this refusal, and probably knowing full well that Palmerston would refuse, de Broglie suggested the joint mediation of the two countries to settle the problem of Spain.⁷² At least once before he had inquired about Britain's disposition toward the Spanish question in such a way as to illicit a negative response from Palmerston.⁷³ Louis Philippe had no intention now or at any time of cooperating in establishing a liberal regime in Spain. "England and France became rivals rather than allies in the complicated struggle that arose in Spain."⁷⁴

Palmerston, as anticipated, refused to consider joint Anglo-French mediation. The foreign minister saw insurmountable

⁷²Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 17 July 1835, France, F.O. 27/503, No. 69; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 11 August 1835, France, F.O. 27/498, No. 40; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 14 August 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 21.

⁷³Blanc, Ten Years, II, 368.

⁷⁴Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 415. Louis Philippe had admitted in 1833 that he opposed a liberal regime in Spain.

obstacles blocking a settlement though the timing was auspicious. In July Don Carlos's most capable officer, General Zumalacarregui, lost his life at Bilbao. The effect of this loss had several repercussions in Spain. General Moreno, another Carlist general, replaced Zumalacarregui, but his appointment aroused the jealousy of his brother officers. In addition, the defeat at Bilbao meant the loss of certain monies raised for the cause in Holland.⁷⁵ Mediation remained impossible because of the irreconcilable differences between Carlos and Isabella. The Biscayans and others fighting for Carlos could not be detached from their leader even though their real objective in fighting remained the reinstating of their fueros. The two goals had become inseparable making it necessary that Isabella's government defeat both.⁷⁶ Refusal to cooperate, as de Broglie requested, contributed to a further serious deterioration of Anglo-French relations concerning Spain.

From 1833 to the summer of 1835, while there had been considerable mutual suspicion with no entente cordiale, the

⁷⁵Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10 July 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/443, No. 108. See p. 149.

⁷⁶Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 11 August 1835, France, F.O. 146/162, No. 40.

governments at St. James and at the Tuilleries had been able to act together out of necessity to preserve a front of cordiality. By September, 1835, the veneer, at least in Spain, called cooperation, had worn thin. Palmerston, still bent on providing all aid short of military intervention, continued his support of the Spanish government.

Villiers had esconced himself in Madrid as an important adviser to the Toreno ministry. When, in September, Toreno left office he asked Villiers' advice on Spanish affairs as did Juan Mendizabal, who replaced Toreno. Even the queen regent requested Villiers' opinion on the Spanish situation. The minister told Isabella's mother he thought she should sustain the moderates rather than throw herself to the army for support though he really preferred Mendizabal to all other candidates.⁷⁷ Mendizabal, a Jewish financier and radical, meant to conduct the war against Don Carlos with vigor but was unable to because of the dissatisfaction and strife among the queen's generals and government.⁷⁸

⁷⁷Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 September 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/444, No. 145. Indicative of Villiers' influence at Madrid was the signing of a Slave Treaty between Britain and Spain in July 1835. The Times (London), 14 July 1835.

⁷⁸E. Christiansen, The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 53.

Further harm occurred when France failed to adequately maintain the blockade along the Pyrenees border. Britain relayed Spanish requests that supplies for Carlos be stopped and Palmerston originated his own requests based upon consular reports of French laxity in this matter. De Broglie responded by saying the area had large numbers of trails and the chief occupation of the region, smuggling, made it extraordinarily difficult to stop the traffic. Repeated notices of French reluctance to close the border passed across Palmerston's desk. When a report of 600 horses passing over the border in broad daylight came to the foreign minister's attention, he urged Granville to protest in the strongest terms and suggested such an occurrence could only happen with the connivance of French officials.⁷⁹ Reports of this nature increased in the last months of 1835 after Mendizabal assumed power. The Spanish prime minister did not relax his government's efforts to end the war, on the contrary, new troop levies and revenues were sought.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 18 August 1835, France, F.O. 27/498, No. 48. "The English government, always opposed with all its power supposed increases in French influence in the Peninsula." Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 102; and The Times (London), 16 July 1835.

⁸⁰Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 26 October 1835, No. 170, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48539, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.

The French, courting the Eastern Powers and somewhat alarmed by the thought of a liberal ascendancy in Spain, opened their borders even more to the Carlists. De Broglie sent word to Rayneval of the procedure he should follow in case of a radical or violent change in the regency. The French apparently anticipated such a change while Palmerston explicitly stated his belief that there would not be a change at Madrid.⁸¹ Other indications of the fears Louis Philippe felt about the Spanish disorders can be observed. Reinforcements for the Army of Observation arrived in the Pyrenees border areas, but still the French government refused to commit regular forces to Spain.⁸² Estimates of the number of troops required for a successful French military intervention ran as high as 200,000 which meant no action would be taken.⁸³ Despite the uneasiness of the French government and the reinforcing of the Pyrenees area, Mendizabal continued to press for a closing of the border.

⁸¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 4 September 1835, France, F.O. 146/162, No. 55. Louis Philippe at this time engaged in a secret correspondence with the Austrians as part of his personal diplomacy. Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 102.

⁸²Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 8 September 1835, France, F.O. 27/504, No. 150.

⁸³Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 25 September 1835, France, F.O. 27/504, No. 164.

Louis Philippe in September 1835 quite obviously opposed the government of Mendizabal and Palmerston's policies in Spain. Though the French, at least outwardly, had maintained cordial relations and had attempted to affect cooperation with the allies, they were never sincere. Their pretenses dropped late in the summer of 1835 as openly they aided the Carlists by permitting an unchecked flow of material into his camp. Reports reaching Villiers from spies in the Carlist headquarters indicated the French aided and abetted the rebels by assuring Carlos of their neutrality. The same source also described the arrears of pay made good in French coinage.⁸⁴ Acrimonious charges aimed at the French by the Spanish continued to fly. Catalanian officials said French naval officers, ostensibly aiding Spain, encouraged opposition to the Madrid government. The officers agitated against Mendizabal and persuaded some Catalonians to do likewise. Other Catalanian reports emphasized the lack of French vigilance along the border and suggested the first additional article of the

⁸⁴Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 September 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/444, No. 149, Secret and Confidential. The Times suggested that had Palmerston favored French intervention for Isabella it would have been declined by that government. Furthermore, the paper said non-execution of the Quadruple Treaty was a moral shock to the alliance between England and France. The Times (London), 25 August 1835.

treaty had yet to be enforced.⁸⁵ Even more significantly the Spanish described the southern departments of France as a haven for escaping Carlists. Mendizabal's government alleged that Carlist forces pressed by royalist forces on several occasions crossed into France to evade capture or battle. These same forces later returned to Spain to harass the royalists. De Broglie, of course, denied all the charges made by Madrid.⁸⁶

Granville repeatedly relayed the urgent Spanish requests that France increase its vigilance along the border. De Broglie said the reported arms shipments were grossly exaggerated by Madrid since the Carlists manufactured some of their own arms.⁸⁷ De Broglie disclaimed many of the allegations expressed by Mendizabal and in particular denied the Spanish charge that Carlists had crossed the border to escape royalists only to re-cross it once the danger subsided. He insisted insurgents, disarmed and detained in various fortresses, failed to return

⁸⁵Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 2 October 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/444, No. 155.

⁸⁶Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 12 October 1835, France, F.O. 27/505, No. 194; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 31 October 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/150, No. 31; and Annual Register, 1835, LXXVII, 460.

⁸⁷Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 9 October 1835, France, F.O. 27/505, No. 185.

to the scene of fighting.⁸⁸ Consul Harvey at Bayonne made no mention of Carlists or Carlist sympathizers being rounded up and detained anywhere along the Pyrenees border. His reports supported the Spanish views rather than the French. The Spanish reiterated their complaints even going so far, because of their exasperation, as to ask their ally if it had or had not fulfilled the first additional article.⁸⁹ Moreover, Madrid requested a commission of inquiry to determine whether or not the arms crossed the borders and to determine if France honored its treaty commitment.⁹⁰

Throughout the remainder of the year Mendizabal objected strenuously and vociferously about the passage of arms and material. The Duke de Frias, Spanish minister to France, asked for the removal of Carlist sympathizers found in close proximity to the Pyrenees border. Following his orders Frias petitioned de Broglie to have French authorities refuse to honor passports signed by Don Carlos. Palmerston lent his support

⁸⁸Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 3 November 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/151, No. 33.

⁸⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 14 October 1835, France, F.O. 146/163, No. 80.

⁹⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 14 October 1835, France, F.O. 27/498, No. 80. Nothing came of this request for a commission of inquiry.

to the Spanish entreaties.⁹¹ Out of these efforts came not cooperation, but an incident involving Harvey. First of all de Broglie frustrated the Spanish by refusing their requests to remove Carlists and not to recognize Don Carlos' passports. Louis Philippe's government then turned on Harvey and accused him of signing a Carlist passport. The French Prefect of Bayonne had first signed the passport, a fact Harvey quickly pointed out, though no charges faced him. In the Consul's estimation the government had laid a trap for him because over the past several months he had become a nuisance by reporting to Granville and Palmerston the movement of supplies to Spain.⁹² Eventually the situation cleared up but relations that had never been entirely friendly and cooperative continued to deteriorate. Louis Blanc in The History of Ten Years says of the early 1830's, "These views [of Anglo-French cooperation] were deficient in soundness and accuracy in more than one point; . . . the alliance between France and England could not be based upon any community of interests."⁹³

⁹¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 27 November 1835, France, F.O. 146/163, No. 114; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 23 November 1835, France, F.O. 27/498, No. 114.

⁹²Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 1 December 1835, France, F.O. 146/163, No. 118.

⁹³Blanc, Ten Years, II, 365.

Similarly there could not be a community of interest between the government of France and the liberal government of Spain. Under Rosa the Spanish government declined to ask for French mediation with Carlos when they solicited such aid from Palmerston. Their suspicions of Louis Philippe's government lingered and with the passage of time gained reinforcement. Finally in December 1835 Mendizabal's government offered proofs of French infidelity. The Captain General of Catalonia, Mina, presented documented instances of French aid to the Carlists which included a number of letters covering the period May through July 1835.⁹⁴ Despite the proofs of French complicity they remained intransigent at the close of 1835.

While the members of the Quadruple Treaty could not agree on joint action neither could the Eastern Courts. Nicholas, tsar of Russia, wanted to provide moral support and monetary aid to Carlos. He hoped the governments of Vienna and Berlin would join him. All the Eastern Courts realized the impossibility of providing military aid to the rebels.

Austria denounced the Quadruple Treaty and attempted to persuade France that opposition to Don Carlos would be detrimental. Metternich did not offer Louis Philippe an understanding

⁹⁴Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 3 December 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/151, No. 47.

with the Eastern Courts. He struggled to prevent the Anglo-French alliance and failing this afterwards worked to detach Louis Philippe from the new agreement. The Congresses of Münchengratz and Toplitz and the hostility of the Eastern Courts which effectively isolated France, however, had left Louis Philippe little choice.

Metternich several times expressed surprise that Louis Philippe overlooked the extreme danger from Isabella's Spain. France, in Metternich's terms, faced exposure to democratic principles emanating from there.⁹⁵ This type of barrage directed against a receptive French monarch had a telling effect which resulted in declining cooperation with the Quadruple Allies. The lack of French involvement in the Eliot Mission indicated a mood of opposition, but this in itself had no adverse effect. Opening the borders to the Carlists did materially affect the rebellion. Thus, in 1835 Louis Philippe and the Eastern Powers moved closer together in their views on the Spanish situation.

Britain, on the other hand, found itself more isolated from the rest of Europe in its Spanish endeavors yet closer to the Mendizabal government. Palmerston had long desired a

⁹⁵Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 19 November 1835, Spain, F.O. 185/151, No. 40.

commercial agreement with Spain to replace earlier treaties he believed had become obsolete. Indicative of the close relations existing between the governments of London and Madrid was the agreement obtained by Villiers. Palmerston had pressed his minister from the moment of his appointment on this matter. Not until November of 1834, over a year after arriving in Madrid, did Villiers consider the time propitious for commercial negotiations. He said, by way of explanation, that during this earlier period the several ministers of finance had supported Spain's prohibitive tariff system. Late in 1834 Count Toreno entered the ministry of finance and Villiers felt encouraged to broach the subject of a commercial agreement. Specifically, Villiers questioned both Rosa and Toreno about the feasibility and desirability of lowering Spanish tariffs. The English minister lucidly demonstrated that the existing tariff system stimulated contraband trade rather than encouraging legitimate enterprises.⁹⁶ The Spanish stalled for time and Villiers made little headway in his quest though

⁹⁶Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 2 November 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/427, No. 169. Villiers said codfish had a duty of over 100 per cent with the result that one vessel legally entered Cadiz to unload while four ships entered Gibraltar and put their cargoes in the contraband trade. The Times, in October, reported preferential rates given to French commerce engaged in Spanish trade by a royal ordinance issued at Madrid. The Times (London), 13 October 1835.

the Spanish experienced difficulties acquiring funds and resorted to extreme measures. In this regard and with political considerations in mind, the Jesuit order fell victim to a government order to close. The property confiscated from the Society the government applied to the national debt.⁹⁷ Shortly after this event Villiers once again pressed vigorously for an Anglo-Spanish treaty.

Catalonia had broken out in revolt against Isabella's government and Villiers, upset by repeated delays in commercial negotiations, seized upon the opportunity this presented. In the past Cristina, mindful of the serious situation she faced, feared provoking industrial Catalonia into rebellion by concluding a treaty with England potentially harmful to the manufacturers of that province. With the province in revolt, Villiers insisted Catalonia no longer had a claim for special consideration and Toreno agreed. Capitalizing on the situation, Villiers forcefully argued that France could make no special claims either since, "France would be without any just ground for complaint, because the concessions made to England would be in return for assistance which had been solicited

⁹⁷Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10 July 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/443, No. 106.

from France, and refused."⁹⁸ Again, Toreno agreed saying that if the British government gave effective aid in ending the civil war Britain might "dictate the rates of duty at which the manufactures of England should be admitted into the Ports of Spain."⁹⁹ The minister of finance thought public opinion supported these views and, "was daily becoming more eager for [an] alliance with England, and [was] finally [prepared] to shake-off the influence of France."¹⁰⁰

Proceeding from this new position Villiers in the next several weeks pushed hard for a new treaty. Palmerston encouraged the minister to call Mendizabal's attention to correcting the situation.¹⁰¹ Suddenly and dramatically Villiers got a commercial treaty which he negotiated and signed himself with a provision that it could not bind the British government until approved in London. Then, in an action that must have left Villiers thunderstruck, Palmerston turned down the agreement. He cited two reasons for refusing the treaty. In the first place Spain asked for aid, a loan, to fight the civil war and

⁹⁸Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 31 July 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/443, No. 141.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 29 September 1835, F.O. 185/150, No. 26.

Palmerston said this appeared like the Quadruple Treaty and had the same objective. Secondly, he asserted that Britain did not desire special privileges in trade but only reciprocity and moderation. Politically he objected because the treaty involved only two of the four allies, and he felt this fact would not escape the Eastern Powers who would then assume the Quadruple Treaty lacked unity, which it did.¹⁰²

The treaty climaxed a year of political, commercial, and diplomatic activity on the part of the British foreign office and its agents. It had been a year of frustration and suspicion among the three primary allies of the Quadruple Treaty. The problem presented by Don Carlos grew infinitely worse in 1836 and not the least of the unrest developed from the commercial treaty Villiers negotiated and Palmerston rejected. Nevertheless, Jeronimo Becker y Gonzales quotes Javier de Burgos saying, "The intervention of the minister Villiers in the composition of Mendizabal's Ministry had given English politics an exclusive influence in the [Madrid] cabinet."¹⁰³

¹⁰²Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 21 December 1835, Spain, F.O. 72/439, No. 50; F.O. 185/151, No. 49, Secret; and France, F.O. 146/163, Secret.

¹⁰³Jeronimo Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones exteriores de españa durante el siglo XIX, 1800-1839, 3 vols., (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipografico de Jaime Rates, 1924), I, 702.

CHAPTER IV

THE FRENCH BID FOR SPAIN, 1836

Alarmed and annoyed at the apparent ascendancy of British influence in Madrid, the French made a serious bid for Spain in 1836. Louis Philippe's government, cleverly outmaneuvered in 1834 by Palmerston and bested again in 1835 when Villiers managed to extract a commercial treaty from Toreno, intended to retrieve its position in Spain. To this end the French government undermined Mendizabal and the regency with the apparent intention of later stepping in to rescue the situation. Unforeseen events changed the picture though and further damaged French plans. Palmerston continued to oppose Don Carlos and tried to counter the drive for French ascendancy in Spain.

The French, at first unaware of the Anglo-Spanish commercial negotiations, learned of Villiers dealings probably from the queen regent. Angered at the negotiations the French threatened the destruction, insofar as possible of Spanish

industry if the treaty became ratified. Mendizabal, in view of Palmerston's annulment of the treaty negotiated by Villiers, early in January 1836, extended an invitation to France to accept an identical treaty. The failure of Louis Philippe's government to act on the offer resulted in a temporary suspension of further discussions on this volatile topic.¹

The Spanish minister next sought financial aid in another way. An alternate method of obtaining financial aid had been proposed in December 1835 by Palmerston. Then the foreign minister had reflected that perhaps Spain should solicit a loan from Britain and France simultaneously. Such a suggestion is startling coming from a man who repeatedly refused to agree to this approach in the past and would refuse it in the future.² Villiers reported that after considering the alternatives Mendizabal might ask for a guaranteed loan from his allies. Such a loan the Spanish minister thought to repay by pledging customs funds so the entire matter might appear as an advance on expected customs duties.³

¹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 2 January 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/457, No. 1.

²Ridley, Lord Palmerston, pp. 202-203; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 4 April 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 21; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 13 November 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 112.

³Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 2 January 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/457, No. 1.

Throughout the affair Mendizabal tried to salvage the Anglo-Spanish treaty. He explained that the treaty had not envisioned political ends but had been expected to provide immediate financial relief at a critical juncture and a lowering of tariffs to Britain's advantage. In assessing the situation Mendizabal said that on three occasions, in 1808, in 1814, and in 1820, Britain lost the chance to establish British influence in Spain. Obviously he believed London had just missed a fourth opportunity.⁴

In 1835 Palmerston had managed to establish British influence at Madrid but to keep it required constant attention. Two developments between them reversed the scene by May 15, 1836, when the pro-French Francisco de Isturitz replaced the resigned Mendizabal. Palmerston's refusal to accept the commercial treaty and his subsequent refusal of financial aid to Spain in a guaranteed loan was one factor. The British refusal to provide a loan stemmed from the firm conviction held by Palmerston that Parliament would insist on Spanish relaxation of its commercial policies.⁵ The second factor

⁴Ibid.

⁵Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 12 March 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 59.

detrimental to British interests in Spain involved the replacement of de Broglie by Adolph Thiers as the President of the Council and foreign minister.⁶ De Broglie's downfall, according to Hall, led to reduced harmony between London and Paris.⁷ Thiers turned toward the Eastern Courts and gradually began to detach France from England.⁸ Louis Philippe, ever since the autumn of 1833, had been inclined the same way, but circumstances had prevented him from fulfilling his desires.⁹

Villiers, unaware of the effects of the refusal of financial aid and of the impending change in the French government, continued quite optimistically in Madrid. To Mendizabal he gave innumerable suggestions for restoring Spain's finances, reforming the clergy, and on many other facets of government. The British minister believed himself well ensconced in the confidences of Mendizabal. He even felt hopeful that he could

⁶Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, 18 February 1836, France, F.O. 27/520, No. 71.

⁷Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 225.

⁸Blanc, Ten Years, II, 407. Probably by this time he had already decided, along with Louis Philippe, that an Orleanist should marry a German princess. The Times (London), 2 May 1836.

⁹Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 182; and The Times (London), 25 August 1835.

reconcile the Spanish minister with Isturitz, who, however, in late March would not join the government as Villiers urged.¹⁰ He indicted Mendizabal saying the government found itself in a serious predicament.¹¹

Mendizabal acknowledged some difficulties concerning finances and prosecution of the war. But he, too, generally remained optimistic and thought a royal victory concluding the war could be achieved by the end of the summer. This design he hoped to achieve without the intervention of foreign troops provided money could be obtained.¹²

Cristina, the queen regent, eventually foiled Mendizabal's plans. As the Anglo-Spanish commercial negotiations proceeded in November and December 1835, she leaked the information to the French.¹³ She had no deep affection for Mendizabal who conducted the negotiations. Early in 1836 the queen's displeasure with Mendizabal surfaced again and even more alarming Cristina, in passing, referred to French intervention in Spain.

¹⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 2 June 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 44.

¹¹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 22 March 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 67.

¹²Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 12 March 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 59.

¹³Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 92.

Mendizabal, pro-British, stood in sharp contrast to the queen regent. Cristina, a capricious, self-willed woman with an active private life that scandalized many, appeared increasingly to favor the French in the spring of 1836.¹⁴

The French, whether clandestinely directing affairs behind the scenes or not, took advantage of the queen regent's frame of mind at this point. They had definitely come to oppose Mendizabal who owed his position to the British. The French government wanted him removed since he conceded the commercial treaty to Palmerston and accepted British suggestions. Thiers reportedly suspected Villiers of using his influence to exclude the French from any part in the Spanish affairs.¹⁵ Villiers wrote to his brother Edward in February 1836 saying little effort would be required to completely predominate in Spain if the foreign office backed him.¹⁶ William Russell late in 1835 exuberantly described Britain's international role, including the position in Spain, when he said, "don't let us spoil our noble position, for England never stood so high. She has but to dictate her will to the

¹⁴Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, 30 January 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/457, No. 25.

¹⁵Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 110.

¹⁶Ibid., 106.

world."¹⁷ Louis Philippe's government could only respond by attempting to reverse Britain's role in Spain.

When Thiers entered his office in February, he quickly assured Granville there would be no change in French foreign policies. But the British minister felt compelled to state Britain's opposition to a European concert to settle outstanding international problems indicating at least a hint of change in French policy in that regard.¹⁸ Thiers had undergone a change of mind concerning French intervention in Spain which in 1835 he ardently supported, but by the spring of 1836 he opposed.¹⁹

Thiers reversed his policy toward Spain as can be seen in his refusal to cooperate with Palmerston there. In March Palmerston urged that the Army of Observation occupy certain Spanish border territories and extend its operations to cover the border coastline where war materials from England and Holland came ashore for the Carlists. Louis Philippe resisted the appeal, and Thiers refused to introduce the suggestion

¹⁷Russell, Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell, II, 146.

¹⁸Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 26 February 1836, France, F.O. 27/520, No. 81.

¹⁹Blanc, Ten Years, II, 410.

into the council.²⁰ This matter of introducing a French army into Spain remained an important consideration until the end of summer when it became resolved. In Spain the public generally rejected the idea as did Mendizabal.²¹ Cristina had hinted at the possibility in January and Isturitz, assuming the lead in the Moderado party, favored French intervention.²²

France accelerated the implementation of its Spanish policies which angered Mendizabal. Having already permitted large amounts of supplies to reach Don Carlos by the end of 1835, even more material went to him. In April 1836, Mendizabal discussed this problem with Rayneval and Villiers. He raised objections against the French. The minister objected strenuously to the relaxation of trade restrictions between the southern departments of France and territory controlled by the Carlists. By opening up this intercourse in supplies the French nullified the blockade they had agreed to in the Quadruple Treaty. In answer to this charge Rayneval weakly replied that

²⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 14 March 1836, France, F.O. 27/516, No. 38; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 18 March 1836, France, F.O. 27/520, No. 112.

²¹Annual Register, 1836, LXXVIII, 362.

²²Ibid., also, Evelyn Ashley, The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 2 vols., (London: Richard Bentley and Sons, 1879), I, 336; and Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 158.

military supplies still got stopped at the border thereby continuing the blockade. To the Spanish the most effective aid France could provide the Carlists at the moment, and the most damaging to the royal cause, was the supply of food, since the rebels were reported starving.

Rayneval continued his explanation of French policy by stressing the necessity of placating the southern departments which suffered economically because of the blockade and needed relief. Mendizabal offered to buy supplies from the affected area for the Spanish army if the controls were re-established again. He met with no immediate response and charged the French government with not upholding the Quadruple Treaty. Seizing this opportunity Mendizabal gave vent to several other complaints. But in the same breath he stated that Britain had fulfilled its treaty obligations to the letter.²³

Quite obviously the French by this time made little secret of their feelings toward the Spanish government. The queen regent, Villiers reported, also had turned decidedly against her own minister. She would not give public support

²³Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 April 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 91. Actually, the southern departments enjoyed a minor boom because of their trade with Don Carlos.

to him despite Villiers insistence that she should.²⁴ There appears to have been an understanding between the French, the queen regent, and Isturitz to oppose and remove Mendizabal.

"The French king considered Mendizabal as his personal enemy, and did not conceal his belief that Spain was given up [lost] to anarchy and to the demagogues that sustained the interests of England Isturitz was encouraged by the French ambassador who, although not as influential among the moderates as was Villiers among the progressives, had succeeded in persuading many of them and a good number of Spanish Grandes, that the desired French intervention would be a reality as soon as Mendizabal fell²⁵

In May Mendizabal submitted his resignation which the regent did not at first accept. The minister's desire to replace two royalist generals, Cordova and Quesada, angered the queen regent and subsequently she accepted his resignation.²⁶ Villiers, believing it would prove harmful to change ministries, proposed to Rayneval that together they should so inform Cristina. While the French ambassador agreed a change might be harmful he declined to issue a joint statement to the queen regent with Villiers.²⁷ Remaining consistent to

²⁴Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 April 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/458, No. 93; and Ashley, Life and Correspondence, I, 336.

²⁵Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, pp. 154-58.

²⁶Annual Register, 1836, LXXVIII, 362.

²⁷Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 May 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/459, No. 121.

French policy Rayneval would not support Mendizabal. France felt confident Isturitz would be much more amenable and co-operative.

On May 15 the queen regent accepted Mendizabal's resignation and named Isturitz President of the Council of Ministers.²⁸ Officers of the British Legion alleged that the change resulted from French influence which they believed would further increase. Thiers insisted his government had not opposed the previous ministry.²⁹ Isturitz enjoyed only the support provided by the regent. In the Cortes he found only hostility, and he told Villiers that should his proposed government loan fail he intended to resign. Was this a warning to Villiers? Within a week, on May 22, the new president tendered his resignation after the liberals passed a resolution of opposition in the Cortes. A recommendation accompanied Isturitz's resignation letter in which he advised the queen regent to dissolve the Cortes. He believed that the revolutionary party (liberals) was growing stronger each day, and on the following day the

²⁸Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 May 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/459, No. 123; Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 20 May 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 195; and Carr, Spain, p. 177.

²⁹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 30 May 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 211.

Cortes received orders to dissolve.³⁰

No single action could have been more detrimental to the welfare of Spain. Not only had French influence replaced that of Britain, which disappointed Palmerston, but the Spanish government for the next several months, the queen regent said, would be, "ordained provisionally and on the proposals of my responsible advisors."³¹ This decree made control or influence over the "responsible advisors" doubly important. Since Isturitz retained the royal favor and exhibited pro-French tendencies British influence appeared to have ended. Villiers, unlike his customary self, abstained from interfering in the selection of new Spanish ministers. Palmerston approved of this line of action, but May had been a catastrophic month for British policy.³² France appeared supreme in the councils of the Cristina government.

Affairs in Spain during the spring of 1836 fared no better on the battle field than they had in politics. General

³⁰Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17, 22, and 23 May 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/459, Nos. 128, 132, and 133. The liberals generally enjoyed the support of Villiers and Britain.

³¹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 23 May 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/459, No. 134.

³²Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 2 June 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 44.

George de Lacy Evans, commander of the British Auxiliary Legion, in early May won a victory at San Sebastian, his first since Bilbao a year earlier. Lord John Hay, commanding the British naval forces stationed in Spanish waters, had aided the royalists with his ships as ordered by the Admiralty. Marines went ashore to garrison some vital points on the coast, but they fought no real battles before mid-year. Spanish forces had less success than the British forces.³³ If the situation looked unfavorable to British desires in May, it deteriorated as the summer passed both in Spain and at home.

Palmerston experienced little relief from the domestic opposition concerning his Spanish policies. During the last quarter of 1835 he had faced rancorous charges which resumed with the opening of Parliament in 1836. The royal address to Parliament provoked Londonderry to speak against Spanish policies. He insisted that all the information the government possessed on war materials supplied to Isabella be laid before the House. Similarly, in Commons, the foreign minister received warnings about the French alliance when Grove Price, M.P., said, "it was not to be imagined . . . that an alliance between France and England could be reckoned upon as being stable

³³Holt, Carlist Wars, pp. 124 ff.

or permanent." Arthur Trevor, M.P., commented, "that if ever there was an instance of unprovoked and improper interference with a foreign power by Ministers professing neutrality, it was to be found in the conduct of the British towards Spain."³⁴

Later in the same session other Tories challenged Spanish policies. Donald Maclean, M.P., meditated aloud about the drastically altered policy which permitted British intervention in Spain. Peel accused Palmerston of so broadening the idea of intervention that Britain might act on the internal conditions of a country at any time. He said Palmerston predicated his Spanish involvement on defending free institutions and thus acquired a treaty that led to a deeper commitment by the government. Reviewing the situation Peel said involvement began by grants of arms followed by permission to Britons to enlist for Isabella. He concluded by saying that there never was a country in less danger from foreign aggression. The question might be asked whether or not that freedom from foreign aggression was because of or in spite of the Quadruple Treaty.

Palmerston found himself severely restricted in his responses to the accusations. Because of this he confined his

³⁴Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXI, 116 and 1008; and The Times (London), 6 February 1836.

remarks to illustrating how divided the opposition ranks appeared in their choice of solution to the problem. Furthermore, he could not publicly state that he suspected the French of double-dealing in Spain though privately he might have felt that way. The reason was that Britain remained diplomatically isolated, and he still feared a Franco-Russian rapprochement.³⁵

The Times led among those vehemently attacking Palmerston and his foreign policy in general. Calling him the "Lord Fanny of Diplomacy . . . cajoling France with an airy compliment, and menacing Russia with a perfumed cane," the paper mounted a campaign of opposition in February 1836. Sparing no efforts the paper reproached "Lord Fanny" for trying to extricate himself from his blundering Spanish policy by employing the B.A.L. Simultaneously, he was impeached in the press for self-delusion concerning French activities. A letter to the editor, signed "Anti-Metternich", accused him of leading every revolutionary scheme in Europe. Referring to the uncertainty of Spain's future Palmerston said "the fogs were impartial." The Times gleefully seized upon this comment and said, "Fogs have always been partial to his Lordship, and never was he more mist-ified

³⁵Ibid.

than on Friday evening last."³⁶

Critics of Palmerston assailed him in and out of Parliament not only because they opposed interference, but because of missed diplomatic opportunities elsewhere, because of Evan's men, because a quick and lasting solution to the war appeared improbable, and because of a deep-seated distrust of France. Russia they characterized as being ambitious and grasping, bent on seizing India. France, no better than Russia, the Tories believed had already committed herself to the tsar. While the opposition disliked Evans, they deplored his dependence upon the Spanish crown for his supplies, a state of affairs they blamed on Palmerston.³⁷ Aberdeen, thoroughly disgusted with the Spanish problem, wanted supplies stopped and the B.A.L. removed from Spain.³⁸ A letter to Palmerston signed "Diplomaticus" described the situation another way. It pointed out that thanks to Palmerston Britain could not, "go forward with honour nor retreat without disgrace."³⁹

³⁶The Times (London), 22 and 29 February 1836, 12 March 1836; and Bell, Lord Palmerston, I, 209.

³⁷Archibald Alison, "Foreign Results of Democratic Ascendancy in France and England," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XXXIX (May 1836), 655-668; and The Times (London), 15 March 1836.

³⁸Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXII, 387.

³⁹The Times (London), 14 April 1836.

While the opposition maintained and even intensified its attacks upon Palmerston and the government, the foreign secretary seemed to continue in his delusion. He said French policy would not change with the coming of Thiers despite his pro-alliance stand since Louis Philippe really controlled foreign affairs. He predicted Princess Lieven and Talleyrand, both working against the treaty, would fail in their efforts.⁴⁰ Yet, in only a few short months Palmerston resentfully accused France of causing unnecessary trouble in Spain and of following policies unhealthy for Louis Philippe.

But, "Not the least striking feature of the situation was that Palmerston, only too ready to condemn the French for their infidelity to the alliance from the first, persisted in his efforts to hold them to it until the very end."⁴¹ This thinking is erroneous because Palmerston did not try to preserve the alliance; no alliance existed, only a treaty. He used the Quadruple Treaty to overthrow French influence in Spain and substitute that of Britain. For example, the foreign

⁴⁰Letter, Lord Palmerston to William Temple, 5 March 1836, Ashley, Life and Correspondence, I, 323; and Letter, Princess Lieven to Lady Cowper, 22 May 1836, Lord Sudley, The Lieven--Palmerston Correspondence, 1828-1852 (London: John Murray, 1943), p. 128.

⁴¹Bell, Palmerston, I, 217.

secretary asked Thiers to order its cordon sanitaire advanced to the frontier in March.⁴² He knew full well Louis Philippe would do nothing. Palmerston calculated that Louis' inaction would annoy the Spanish government. To emphasize poignantly the degree of difference between British and French policies the English minister then offered additional naval aid along the northern coast of Spain. Such aid aimed to prevent the Carlists from capturing several ports and to help the royalists recapture any coastal place held by the rebels.⁴³ Fernandez de Piñedo Alava expressed confusion as he wrote, "The same England that in June 1835 thought that Spanish means alone were sufficient to defeat the Carlists, began to find them insufficient in March 1836."⁴⁴

An adequate explanation for Palmerston's apparent about face is not difficult to discern and should not have mystified anyone. The minister's policy was consistent; he continued trying to eliminate French influence in Spain. In 1835 when

⁴²Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 14 March 1836, France, F.O. 146/171, No. 38.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Pando Fernandez de Piñedo Alava, Memoria Para Escribir La Historia Contemporanea de los Siete Primeros Años del Reinado de Isabella II, 2 vols., (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1843), I, 200.

the French government found itself pressured by money interests wanting intervention, and Thiers enthusiastically desired the same thing, Palmerston cautioned de Broglie not to send an army to Spain. French policy changed by 1836 so Palmerston encouraged the French to intervene realizing they would not. Both times France lost to Britain's ably directed Spanish policies.

In the spring the French made a surprising comeback not fully anticipated by Palmerston. Mendizabal's ministry attested to the advantage Britain gained on the earlier occasions. Likewise, his removal from office reflected momentary French ascendancy. Palmerston, trying to salvage something from the state of affairs in Spain and to gain time, assured Thiers Britain would lend support to the Isturitz government. Furthermore, he emphasized the need for Anglo-French cooperation. But privately Palmerston told Villiers the dismissal of Mendizabal could only harm the queen's cause.⁴⁵

Deterioration continued. Villiers wrote,

"I am again under the painful necessity of reporting to your Lordship the disastrous state of affairs which prevails in this country. The ministry of M. Isturitz has been an uninterrupted series of

⁴⁵Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 2 June 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 46.

misfortunes, and since the death of Ferdinand the Queen's throne has never been in so much peril as at the present moment."

A junta formed at Malaga and others were anticipated at Zaragoza and Cordoba. Carlists reportedly broke free in Aragon.⁴⁶ On top of this news came word of fresh allied infidelity. A report reached Madrid that a French brig carrying arms to Don Carlos lay stranded on the Portuguese coast. Another report alleged that a French naval Captain interfered with royalist operations against a force of Carlists in the port of Pasajes.⁴⁷

Thiers dismissed the Pasajes incident as a trivial matter not worthy of consideration and displayed his anger toward his allies. A growing lack of cooperation developed between France and Britain. Thiers directed his anger at the Spanish also. He became annoyed with Isturitz and with General Cordova whom he had previously described as, "the only hope of

⁴⁶Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 31 July 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/460, No. 188. The juntas were revolutionary local town governments created spontaneously as conditions in Spain deteriorated which prevented the Madrid government from exercising control over the distressed areas.

⁴⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 31 May 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 42; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 10 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 230.

salvation of the Queen's cause."⁴⁸ Pressure from the Eastern Courts and suspicions about his allies prompted some of Thiers outbursts. The French minister resorted to the suggestion that a European congress or a marriage might best solve the Carlist problem. He made personal attacks on Granville whom he described as being ill-disposed toward himself. Thiers cited examples of Britain's lack of cooperation in Spain including comments made by British citizens.⁴⁹ This last comment might have been in response to French dislike of Villiers. The whole tenor of the conversation appeared as a prelude to a further break with Britain over Spain. This idea was substantiated by another Granville despatch declaring General Harispe, in command of the French Pyrenees border troops, lacked instructions to help Spain more. Such a negative attitude, the ambassador stated, resulted because of Eastern pressures.⁵⁰

Palmerston expressed complete surprise at Thiers' suggestion of a marriage between Isabella and Don Carlos' eldest

⁴⁸Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 6 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 221.

⁴⁹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 13 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 234.

⁵⁰Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 17 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/522, No. 243.

son. He denied emphatically that such a union could resolve the dilemma since the struggle involved not personalities but the principles of liberalism and absolutism. Particularly galling was Palmerston's knowledge that, "from the commencement of the civil war in Spain the three Eastern Courts (and especially that of Vienna) have entertained the notion of putting an end to the contest by a marriage."⁵¹ Obviously Palmerston disliked this French move toward the Eastern Powers, and he pointed out the dangers inherent in supporting a marriage that would result in Spanish absolutism. Switching sides, he told Louis Philippe's government, would not diminish the need for active French intervention in Spain.⁵²

Clearly French policy in May and June moved decidedly against Britain and Spain. As Granville informed Palmerston, Thiers looked East more each day. In Spain Louis Philippe pursued a dual cause as he permitted supplies to go to Don Carlos yet at the same time convinced Isturitz and friends additional French aid appeared imminent. Thiers went so far as to begin forming a second legion at Pau and intended to reinforce the

⁵¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 8 June 1836, France, F.O. 27/517, No. 109.

⁵²Ibid.

legion already in Spain.⁵³ Around this aspect of French policy the isolated Spanish ministry rallied. General Alava, Spanish Ambassador to France, requested additional French aid in keeping with the avowed goals of Madrid.⁵⁴

Another apparent attempt by Louis Philippe to harm Britain's role in Spain occurred in June. Thiers, speaking in Paris, discussed the use of British forces occupying certain strategic points along the Spanish coast. He alleged that ports under British control would be, if requested, turned over to French forces. This revelation caused a sensation in Madrid. Palmerston quickly ordered a denial of Thiers' remarks saying Britain had no agreement to give up the ports in question then added that there were no ports to give up in the first place.⁵⁵ Apparently Thiers needed to silence domestic critics fearful of British forces near the French border and to drive a deeper wedge between the governments in London and Madrid.

⁵³ Fernandez de Piñedo Alava, Siete Primeros Años, I, 248; and The Times (London), 17 March 1836.

⁵⁴ Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 27 August 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/460, No. 205.

⁵⁵ Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 20 June 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 53 and France, F.O. 146/172, No. 53. Thiers' statement must have referred to Palmerston's request of March that the Army of Observation occupy certain strategic points in Spain.

Conditions in Spain worsened in July because of the lack of a strong government, the lack of a Cortes, and the lack of military action by the royalist generals. As the situation deteriorated the government of Louis Philippe considered reinforcing the legion. Thiers represented the force behind this change, but he also proposed the marriage between Isabella and Don Carlos' eldest son again. Other points of this proposal made to Metternich included a regency with Cristina and Don Carlos, an amnesty for all, and finally, a guarantee by the great powers.⁵⁶

The Sergeants' Revolt at San Ildefonso against Cristina interfered with French plans and proved too liberal for Louis Philippe. On August 12 the regiment of Provisional Guards at San Ildefonso mutinied. Encouraged by members of the National Guard and with their pay three months in arrears the leaders of the movement forced adoption of the Constitution of 1812. Villiers and Bois le Comte, special French envoy to Cristina, tried to see the queen regent to give her any aid they could. It is ironic that during this crucial period Rayneval, who had

⁵⁶Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 12 August 1836, France, F.O. 146/173, No. 32, Confidential. These proposals are evidence of Thiers move to cultivate the East, particularly Austria, as France tried to produce a Spanish solution compatible with Louis Philippe's interest and a marriage for the Duke of Orleans.

earlier urged French intervention, remained seriously ill in bed and le Comte offered the aid Isturitz had been seeking since May.⁵⁷ At this point, when French influence could have reached new heights, the revolution broke out which resulted in the adoption of the constitution that scared Louis Philippe away from Spain. Thus, the best efforts of France carefully nurtured over the last several months came to naught.

Villiers advised the queen regent, when finally he obtained an audience with her on the 13th, to accept the fait accompli concerning the constitution. Bois le Comte concurred with this view, but the immediate danger to Isabella and Cristina remained. General Mendez Vigo, minister of war, recently arrived from Madrid, urged Cristina to return to Madrid which Villiers predicted the mutineers would not permit. As anticipated, the resolution of Vigo aroused the anger and suspicions of the San Ildefonso regiment placing the court in a precarious situation. Once again summoned to the queen regent Villiers reiterated his belief that the constitution had to be adopted. Following the interview the queen regent

⁵⁷"Memorandum on the Political Events in Spain; From August, 1836, to January, 1837," F.O. 146/180. The revolt is labeled in various ways such as the Sergeants' Revolt, the La Granja revolt and the revolt of San Ildefonso.

sent word she and her daughters would proceed to Madrid to swear to the constitution. Furthermore, she dismissed her ministers and called upon José Maria Calatrava to form a new government.⁵⁸ The British minister played a significant role in persuading Cristina to accept a change in government such as this. Calatrava, a personal friend of Mendizabal's, belonged to the Progressive party which both Palmerston and Villiers favored. Later he brought Mendizabal into the government as minister of finance.

Madrid, hearing of the revolt at San Ildefonso underwent several disturbances before and after the court returned. The National Guard took an active role in the tumults even going so far as to murder General Quesada whom Mendizabal months before had tried to relieve of his command. By August 21 the queen had returned to Madrid and Villiers had an interview with her and afterward with Calatrava. He urged both of them not to condone a counter-revolution nor listen to advice counseling that line of action. Boise le Comte repeated Villiers sentiments in his audience with the queen regent.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid. Isabella returned to Madrid with her mother on August 17. Mendizabal's efforts to remove Quesada in May, 1836, resulted in his dismissal from office and cleared the way for Isturitz.

The government announced plans for the convoking of a Cortes on October 24 and at the same time acknowledged the constitution. Cristina informed the country that the constitution would be reformed and in concluding her statement referred to Spain's glorious resistance to Napoleon's invasion. One cannot help speculating if this remark was intended as an oblique reference to the recent defeat France suffered during the Sergeants' Revolt when the Spanish ministry had been changed. Palmerston blamed events there on the discontent produced by the lack of a Cortes, money, and an effective government after Mendizabal resigned from office.⁶⁰ For three months the country had existed without a government that vigorously conducted the war. The revolt initiated several changes in Spain and in Spanish relations with other powers. Calatrava replaced Isturitz and called Mendizabal back into office as his finance minister.⁶¹ This change was only one of several that the La Granja experience forced. It is significant because once again the more liberal group supported by Palmerston, the Progressives, returned to power and created a new constitution. Britain

⁶⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Ignasio Jobot, Spanish Chargé d' Affaires, Foreign Office, 22 August 1836, France, F.O. 146/173, No. 40.

⁶¹Carr, Spain, p. 178.

gained since its influence with the new government replaced that of France.

Palmerston's influence had waned during the summer months when Isturitz and Cristina directed affairs. Britain, still enjoying considerable influence in the majority party which was then out of power, did not cooperate as fully with Cristina as previously. Villiers assumed a hands-off policy but at the same time kept in contact with the queen regent and during the August 12 La Granja revolt offered advice to her.

Quite obviously Louis Philippe reversed the estimation he had of a conservative Spanish success in the queen regent's government after receiving word of the revolt. Bois le Comte, just prior to the unexpected turn of events in August, journeyed to Spain on a special mission. His mission, undertaken with Louis Philippe's full knowledge, involved a French offer to reinforce the legion, add a second legion, and develop a base at Pau for allied use. Moreover, the legion would have been commanded by a French general of distinction. One of the peculiarities of this affair revolved about Thiers' use of a special envoy to convey the news rather than the ambassador,

Rayneval.⁶² Following the San Ildefonso revolt Louis Philippe dropped his offer of aid completely and Thiers left office. In the words of Vidal y Saura, "The first effect that the La Granja pronouncement produced in foreign affairs, was the changed criterion of Louis Philippe, that caused the fall of Thiers."⁶³ This French crisis, provoked by Spanish politics, had great repercussions in all the European chancelleries."⁶⁴

Palmerston disagreed with Louis Philippe's assessment of the La Granja revolt and its meaning. The British minister reacted strongly against the French accusing the monarch of favoring Carlism, refusing to intervene and aid the constitutional government, and of deserting Spain in its hour of need.⁶⁵ Villiers relayed information to London describing hostile French actions in Spain which included alleged orders to agents from Paris to cause disruptions in Spain.⁶⁶ Palmerston bitterly remarked,

⁶²Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 21 August 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/460, No. 202. Louis Philippe reluctantly agreed to the le Comte mission.

⁶³Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 176.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 177; and Fernandez Piñedo de Alava, Siete Primeros Años, p. 249.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 178.

⁶⁶Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 14 September 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/461, No. 231.

"I said that we took in good part the assurance from Count Molé, [Thiers replacement], that the alliance between England and France would remain unshaken, but that it was useless to attempt to conceal from ourselves that for months past that alliance, as far as the affairs of Spain are concerned, has been merely nominal"67

Thiers had ordered the legion's advance halted giving added meaning to Palmerston's words.⁶⁸

The Spanish government expressed the hope that Britain and France would not refuse additional aid because of the adoption of the constitution. Again Palmerston blamed the French for the situation in Spain citing the refusal of Louis Philippe's government to provide troops in May and June. He accused the queen regent of contributing to the dilemma because of her dismissal of Mendizabal and the Cortes months earlier. Britain refused to comply with Spain's request for more aid justifying the stand by citing the apathetic ways of the queen regent's government and French prolongation of the war.⁶⁹ Palmerston had become quite annoyed over the turn of

⁶⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 8 September 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 77.

⁶⁸Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 19 August 1836, France, F.O. 27/524, No. 47.

⁶⁹Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 22 August, 8 and 12 September 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, Nos. 75, 77, and 78; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 12 September 1836, No. 78, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.

events in Spain in recent months. From a position of great influence at Madrid in March 1836 Britain lost favor while Isturitz held office. Slowly, after the La Granja revolt, Villiers reconstructed British influence, but neither he nor any other British subject could check the growing hostility of the French court.

Probably the most significant change resulting from the Sergeants' Revolt involved the dismissal of Thiers and his replacement by Molé. Under Molé French policy became decidedly more opposed to the Spanish government. Aston, reporting from Paris, relayed news of hundreds of carts full of supplies observed by an English officer leisurely proceeding to Spain with no attempt made by French authorities to stop them.⁷⁰ Molé indicated he had given strict orders to prevent supplies reaching Don Carlos. Molé said only one point of difference existed between himself and Palmerston and that involved the use of French troops in Spain which he would not permit.⁷¹ While mouthing platitudes and pious expressions of cooperation like this Molé ordered the base at Pau broken up and legion

⁷⁰Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 30 August 1836, France, F.O. 27/517, No. 46.

⁷¹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 21 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/525, No. 279.

reinforcements sent to Africa.⁷² In Spain alleged French agents undermined the government. Specifically these agents, according to reports, hoped to have the Northern Provinces and Catalonia declare their independence. Following independence France expected to dominate the area. The Spanish, said Villiers, gave great credence to the scheme.⁷³

Palmerston continued receiving information of French duplicity which prompted his angry denunciation of Louis Philippe's policies. In a long draft to Villiers and Granville dated September 29, 1836, Palmerston cataloged his grievances against French policy in Spain. He accused the French of failing to honor the Quadruple Treaty, saying, "But it is notorious to all the world that, from the day when the treaty was signed down to the present hour, this engagement [to stop supplies] taken by France has remained a dead letter." The moral effect of this had been as important as the aid supplied said Palmerston. He then alluded to Mendizabal's resignation and indicated that many people believed the, "unfriendly feelings entertained toward that minister by the Government

⁷²Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 23 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/525, No. 283.

⁷³Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 29 September 1836, France, F.O. 146/174, No. 138.

of France toppled him."⁷⁴

In the same document Palmerston suggested that if Britain and France actively supported the present government of Madrid the disturbances there would be quelled quickly. The foreign secretary then warned of the possible consequences if France failed to provide assistance to Madrid. If Don Carlos succeeded, he said, there would be placed on the Spanish throne a monarch hostile to Louis Philippe. Equally serious for France would be the establishment of a republican government in Spain which led Palmerston to conclude that the best possible solution still remained Isabella and a liberal ministry. A republic, he conjectured, might force the Eastern Powers to intervene or force France into the predicament of 1823. Taking heed of recent reports Palmerston cautioned against creating independent states near the Pyrenees border who, "seek [ing] support from more powerful neighbors, might place themselves under the protection of France."⁷⁵ Opposition to such a plan, he predicted, would come from all the major powers. Finally concluding his exposition and warning the foreign secretary

⁷⁴Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 29 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/518, No. 138 and F.O. 146/174, No. 177.

⁷⁵Ibid.

reiterated his belief that only the cause of Isabella would secure peace in Europe.

Anglo-French-Spanish relations did not improve after this draft from Palmerston. Calatrava bitterly denounced France only two weeks later. He said,

"no means, however unworthy, were spared by France to create disorder here [in Spain], and weaken the Queen's cause . . . it is impossible to quote a single act on the part of the French Government which is not favorable to our enemies."⁷⁶

Palmerston lodged yet another complaint against the unchecked flow of goods into Spain. Accompanying the usual complaints was a new one which charged the French with permitting foreign agents known to be aiding Carlos to communicate with the rebel leader from Bayonne. Palmerston pointed out that this line of action was incompatible with the treaty France had signed.⁷⁷ A few weeks later the agents of Sardinia, Austria, and Prussia received recall notices from their governments.⁷⁸

M. Latour Maubourg, newly appointed French Ambassador to Spain, in October candidly admitted a changed policy toward

⁷⁶Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/462, No. 253.

⁷⁷Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 11 and 28 October 1836, France, F.O. 27/518, Nos. 152 and 167.

⁷⁸Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 28 November 1836, France, F.O. 27/526, No. 376.

Calatrava. He explained that San Ildefonso had changed everything. Louis Philippe feared the possibility of infecting French troops with republican sentiments.⁷⁹ Molé said that since a previous French government had offered troops and not himself, he had no obligation to honor the commitment. Strange reasoning this, because its logical application meant France had no obligations save only those entered into under Molé's direction. The ministers might have changed, but the same monarch reigned and directed French foreign policy. Maubourg's lame explanations make curious reading and made a very poor impression in Madrid.⁸⁰

In contrast to France, Britain, when asked to provide more muskets for the royalists, readily complied. Fifty thousand weapons were dispatched immediately with a like number due for later delivery.⁸¹ Palmerston also aided Calatrava by complaining of French activities. On the other hand, Palmerston insisted on payment for arms already received. He also refused

⁷⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 6 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/157, No. 88; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 17 October 1836, France, F.O. 27/525, No. 309.

⁸⁰Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/462, Nos. 261 and 262.

⁸¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 6 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/157, No. 85.

a loan Mendizabal suggested might be redeemed by the customs returns of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philipines. Furthermore, Palmerston warned the Spanish government not to resort to anarchy which could only result in Britain leaving the Quadruple Treaty and Spain to their foe. Palmerston complained of the mistreatment of the British Auxiliary Legion and insisted that Spain pay its debts to British bondholders.⁸²

While complaining to the Spanish Palmerston encouraged Villiers to begin negotiations for a commercial treaty with Spain. Late in November Villiers renewed talks concerning an Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty. The Spanish ministers appeared receptive and to allay French charges of subversion Maubourg received intelligence of the negotiations from Villiers. Britain's minister invited the French to participate in the discussions. Maubourg replied to the invitation by saying only this topic could produce friction between England and France. Having made the gesture of friendship, and complying strictly with the Quadruple Treaty, Villiers proceeded to negotiate. He assured the Spanish that France, having refused

⁸²Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 23 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/462, No. 263; Ridley, Palmerston, pp. 202-203; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 31 October 1836, No. 93, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.

to join the talks, relinquished all rights to complain.

Palmerston applauded the action taken by Villiers.⁸³

Granville found Molé incensed over the commercial negotiations. Molé said he would do everything to defeat such an agreement, and he openly threatened relations with Britain and with Spain. Should Villiers succeed, Molé said, "the cordiality and intimate political relations now subsisting between the British and French governments might thereby be seriously effected."⁸⁴ Palmerston responded to the surprising utterances of Molé late in December with a statement of his own. Goaded by Molé's attitude he said,

"attempts on the part of the French government, either directly or indirectly, to check the extension of commercial intercourse of Great Britain with other countries, will be considered hostile to the British Government, and to the British Nation."⁸⁵

⁸³Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 26 November 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/463, No. 306; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 15 December 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/456, No. 126. Earlier Molé said the topic of French intervention was the only area of difference between English and French policies. The most sensitive issue, however, remained the idea of an Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty.

⁸⁴Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 5 December 1836, France, F.O. 27/527, No. 386.

⁸⁵Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 27 December 1836, France, F.O. 146/176, No. 247.

Just a year earlier the governments of Britain and France expressed similar sentiments when Villiers successfully negotiated a treaty. At this late date in 1836 no treaty materialized, but Anglo-French relations suffered yet another blow. Anglo-Spanish relations, however, attained new heights by the close of the year with, "Villiers returning to be the arbiter of the [Spanish] Cabinet, as he had been before Isturitz came. This English preponderance was sufficient to disgust Louis Philippe."⁸⁶

The same disgust for Britain appeared in the Eastern Courts who lent their support to Don Carlos. Such support from the East appeared either as loans to Carlos or as individual mercenaries in his employ. Early in the year 40 million florins in a loan from Austria had allegedly been agreed to at Toplitz. Loans and moral support for Don Carlos generally coincided with military successes enjoyed by the rebels. But it proved quite impossible for any of the Eastern Courts to provide systematic military help. Eastern pressure on France had a greater effect upon the fortunes of Carlos than anything else except money.⁸⁷

⁸⁶Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 195.

⁸⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 28 January 1836, Spain, F.O. 185/156, No. 5. This pressure resulted in supplies flowing to Carlos with no interference from French authorities.

Metternich, not overly sympathetic to Carlos, yet a supporter of absolutism, impressed upon Louis Philippe the necessity of following France's own best interests. Louis Philippe, seeking a closer understanding with Vienna since the autumn of 1833, quite naturally gave some consideration to Metternich's words. For this reason Palmerston again found himself divided from his ally, France. Not only did a competition for control of Spain exist among the great powers, but France was the center of a second dual. A manifestation of French desire to cooperate more closely with the Eastern Powers can be observed in Thiers' proposal for Isabella's marriage to Don Carlos' eldest son. This solution, among others, had earlier been suggested by Metternich, but on every occasion it was suggested Palmerston opposed it.

Resorting to alarmist techniques, Metternich revealed to France an agreement between Spain and Austria guaranteeing succession. The document, called the Pragmatic of Philip V, in a reciprocal contract signed by Philip V and Maria Teresa assured both nations of their legitimist succession. Austria, of course, believed Carlos the rightful heir in Spain and the sole person capable of preventing anarchy there. The Austrian hinted that only Carlos's failure to ask for aid had prevented action. Metternich also advised Louis Philippe of the probable

effect on France should a French invasion be permitted and cited the 1808-1813 period for his argument against intervention.⁸⁸

Following the La Granja revolt Eastern opposition to Isabella and the principles she stood for became more obvious. The Chargés d' Affaires of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia all demanded their passports. Calatrava directed his agents at these courts to demand their papers too. All relations with Isabella's government thus ended. But these same Eastern Powers, who had never recognized Isabella, after recalling the Chargés sent agents to Bayonne to carry on correspondence with Don Carlos' camp. Palmerston objected to this use of French territory from which the agents communicated with Carlos. Ultimately these foreign agents left as demanded, but only after repeated British and Spanish requests that they vacate Bayonne.⁸⁹

As the year ended Isabella's position appeared worse than it had for some time. Carlos' general, Gomez, had led

⁸⁸Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 19 August 1836, France, F.O. 146/173, No. 37.

⁸⁹Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 September and 1 October 1836, Spain, F.O. 72/461, Nos. 243 and 249; and Despatches, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 3 October and 4, 7 November 1836, France, F.O. 27/526, Nos. 331, 339, and 342.

a small army the length and breadth of Spain and returned to defensive positions with loot, supplies, and recruits. Diplomatic relations between Madrid and the Eastern Powers ceased to exist and relations with France were shakey. Only Britain appeared friendly and Villiers' council continued quite important. Even so, the English government resorted to threats against the royalist government as Palmerston strove to protect British interests. These threats reflected Palmerston's support of British interests, but they also indicated public pressure against his policies in Spain.

While Palmerston battled against French and Eastern attempts to predominate in the court of Madrid, he also found himself surrounded by domestic opponents. Some political foes even accused him of war-mongering. Political reactions to the Spanish policy had been quite vocal ever since 1833 and foes took particular delight in the failures of Evans and setbacks to Palmerston. Palmerston faced the most severe criticism to date of his Spanish policies late in the Parliamentary session of 1836. Not only did the Tories subject his Spanish designs to close scrutiny they denounced all of his activities. Alarmists predicted Russia and Prussia waited for an opportune moment to take India. France, on the sidelines, waited to join a crusade for freedom of the seas said Alison. To combat

this catastrophic deterioration of British prestige this sage advisor advocated an expanded navy and curtailment of the policy of aiding revolutionary Europe.⁹⁰ Ironically, the government had asked for naval increases months earlier, but they had been castigated for it.⁹¹

Under fire in both houses, Palmerston fought a delaying action as the session drew to a close. Questioned whether or not Lord Hay, in a conflict between Isabella's supporters and constitutionalists, would side with the Queen, Palmerston said the naval commander would be neutral.⁹² Grove Price, M.P., spoke against the newly adopted Constitution of 1812 with its universal suffrage and other liberal measures. The "Secretary for Foreign Accidents," as The Times dubbed Palmerston, was rebuked particularly severely after the La Granja revolt. In a perverted view of the Quadruple Treaty Talleyrand received credit for the treaty. According to the paper in September 1836 that treaty, like the treaty concerning Greece, burst apart as the contracting parties, alienated by Palmerston, left the alliances. England became friendless in a hostile

⁹⁰ Archibald Alison, "What is our External Policy and Condition?" Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, XL, (June 1836), 780-792.

⁹¹ The Times (London), 6 February 1836.

Europe. Furthermore, The Times charged, the treaty, "for the time served the necessities of Louis Philippe's position."⁹³ The Tories and their spokesmen thoroughly resented the policies Palmerston pursued, and they overlooked no expedient, even name calling, in their opposition to Palmerston.

Thomas Attwood, radical M.P., advanced one of the most intelligent, although admittedly biased viewpoints, of the Spanish dilemma. Comparing his parties' position to that of the Spanish liberals he noted how the Whigs and Tories combined, like the forces of Don Carlos and Queen Isabella, to defeat any truly liberal policies being introduced in parliament. In his words, "As the country [Spain] was now situated, it would not do for the Queen's Government to put down the Carlists altogether, they were necessary to keep the liberal party in check." Palmerston lamely commented that Britain had not selected the queen but merely supported the Spanish choice.⁹⁴ The Radicals had only just given their support to the foreign office a few months earlier when Palmerston suspended the Foreign Enlistment Act by Order in Council. Already

⁹³Ibid., 19 September 1836.

⁹⁴Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXV, 947. Attwood made these remarks just prior to the La Granja revolt.

they experienced disillusionment though they did not abandon the government on this issue.

The foreign secretary defended himself as best he could and on occasion spoke eloquently. Rarely speaking in his own defense he did so the 6th of August after being taunted by Maclean and Attwood for a couple of days. He stated his belief that the Quadruple Treaty gave Britain the right to act as it had and that with no declaration of war England was not one of the principles. Contradicting opposition statements that Britain's moral influence in the world was low, he cited the mediatory role his government played between those of Paris and Washington. In this explosive and delicate confrontation over debts Palmerston helped keep negotiations going. The French had at one point feared a Russo-American defensive treaty.⁹⁵

Palmerston could not detail his true sentiments concerning foreign intervention in Spain. At times he appeared to have deluded himself and some of his agents sincerely believed their chief out of touch with the situation. Nothing was further from the truth. Neither France nor England wanted to act in Spain as the agent of the other in ending the war.

⁹⁵The Times (London), 4 December 1835.

At the same time neither power desired the unilateral intervention of the other which might have resulted in the domination of Spain by that power. Palmerston's best excuse for armed assistance by indirect means and for political interference in Spain was suspicion of France.⁹⁶ This reason he could not use publicly since to do so would acknowledge British isolation. So long as the illusion of an Anglo-French alliance existed the Eastern Powers were not entirely free to act. The treaty had the added advantage of keeping Russia and France from concluding an understanding. No matter how viewed the Quadruple Treaty reduced the risk of confrontation even though it was resented in England and elsewhere.

Villiers recognized the situation after La Granja for what it was. Accusing the French of having always acted with bad faith he said, "we shall have broken with France, and of course be left alone."⁹⁷ Palmerston recognized this fact also and had known it for some time. Detailing past events the foreign minister said, "The French last year grew jealous of our influence in Portugal, Spain, and Greece . . . they

⁹⁶Lloyd C. Sanders, Life of Viscount Palmerston (London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1888), p. 62.

⁹⁷Letter, George Villiers to Mrs. Lister (Theresa Villiers), 14 September 1836, Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 129.

turned out Mendizabal, and gave the power to Isturitz and Cordova. But what a little and narrow-minded policy and view of European affairs that must have been."⁹⁸ He ordered Aston at Paris to indicate to the French that he viewed France as having backed out of the Quadruple Treaty. "The French Government no doubt think that when matters have gone to a certain length in Spain France will be called upon to re-enact the drama of 1823."⁹⁹ "Lord Fanny" described Louis Philippe's territorial ambitions as similar to those of Louis XIV especially with regard to the northern Spanish provinces.¹⁰⁰

A great difference of opinion existed over Spanish affairs between the governments of London and Paris. While the split between the two governments increased in 1836 there had always been a gulf separating them. The Quadruple Treaty in 1834 had papered over the cracks, but the activities of 1836 tore the fabric apart. Still no lasting solution to the problem emerged and the contest between Palmerston and Molé for supremacy in Spain continued through 1837-1838.

⁹⁸Letter, Palmerston to Aston, 19 August 1836, Ashley, Life and Correspondence, p. 336.

⁹⁹Letter, Palmerston to Granville, 20 September 1836, Ibid., p. 337.

¹⁰⁰Letter, Palmerston to Temple, 1 November 1836, Ibid., p. 327.

CHAPTER V

MOLÉ VERSUS PALMERSTON

1837-1838

Palmerston's Spanish policies beginning in 1837 became pragmatic as he faced continued attacks from opponents on all sides. The most striking feature of his policies in 1837 and 1838 was his public rebuke of the French which was followed some time later by a threat to Spain that he would renounce the Quadruple Treaty. One of the principal reasons for this change of policy was his continued belief and hope for an Anglo-Spanish commercial accord. This projected accord remained a serious obstacle to good relations among the allies but it was not the only difficulty. A new problem that developed during this period involved the leasing of King's Islet, Minorca, to the French which further poisoned Anglo-French relations. By the end of this period these two allies were poles apart although they had never been close during the 1830's.

Palmerston experienced no respite from his domestic opponents, who, early in the new year of 1837, cautioned him not to be present at the opening of Parliament and denounced his Spanish policies. In contrast, Louis Philippe opened the Chambers in Paris amid loud cheers when he reiterated his policy of nonintervention in Spain.¹ Palmerston excluded any mention of France in the king's speech opening Parliament. Public pressure over the last several months concerning the Spanish policies and French laxity in fulfilling the terms of the treaty undoubtedly influenced Palmerston's silence on the Anglo-French treaty. Other matters had annoyed the foreign minister too.

Villiers once again undertook the task of securing a commercial treaty with Spain. Palmerston encouraged this endeavor, but Molé objected insisting the state of affairs in Spain would not permit tariff revision. Molé intended to protect French interests which the status quo served better than any free-trade instrument Britain might create. In case his protestations against an accord failed, the French minister claimed the right to his inclusion in the treaty on a most

¹The Times (London), January 3, 1837.

avored nation basis.² On the other hand, French agents actively promoted Louis Philippe's program of high tariffs, conservative government, possible marriages, and perhaps aggrandizement.

Here in a microcosm was the struggle between England and France, liberal and conservative. Though the immediate issue was trade the crux of the difficulty remained which foreign power would predominate at Madrid, and which political persuasion would dominate there, liberal or autocratic. France unequivocally opposed British supremacy in Spain, but if the British interfered then the French expected to share the fruits of British involvement. Conversely, if Britain's policies toward Spain created problems France refused to accept responsibility.

Commercial relations with Spain had long been a bone of contention between England, France, and Spain. Nothing Palmerston attempted aroused Molé's opposition quicker than his efforts to reduce tariffs and open the Spanish coastal trade to British vessels. The French minister categorically refused to consider modifications of Franco-Spanish agreements.

²Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 2 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, No. 2; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 4 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/477, No. 2.

France, experiencing considerable economic stress, opposed any agreement that reduced French trade with Spain. Earlier French concern for the difficulties in the southern departments had led to a relaxation of their border patrols. The Spanish ministers had objected and had charged the French with failing to honor the additional articles of the Quadruple Treaty. Now, as then, Molé tried to block the treaty efforts of Villiers by saying the time was not propitious for such transactions.³ The French would never think the time was right for an Anglo-Spanish agreement of this type.

Villiers continued with his negotiations since he had carefully prepared the groundwork by inviting the French to participate in the deliberations. Mendizabal dragged his feet although he supported tariff reductions favorable to Britain. The British minister, expressing Palmerston's point of view, insisted upon the right to most favored nation status. He argued that although England befriended Spain, France enjoyed superior commercial privileges. Mendizabal continued to be recalcitrant and the exasperated Villiers threatened him, pointing out that he owed his position largely to the

³Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 4 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/477, No. 3; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 6 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, No. 7.

efforts of Britain. The English minister had interceded with the queen regent and Calatrava on Mendizabal's behalf. Mendizabal at the time had enjoyed a reputation as a liberal with decidedly pro-British sentiments.⁴

For his activities in trying to obtain an Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty Villiers was branded a commercial agent. The author of this Philippic was William Russell, brother of John Russell, the leader of Commons. William also wrote with invective against the "horde of Blackguards" fighting the Biscayens, the B.A.L., and insisted the British army was dishonored in Spain.⁵ Many Tories such as Aberdeen, Wellington, and Peel agreed with Russell on all three counts and, of course, blamed Palmerston. They condemned every aspect of Palmerston's Spanish policies.

The foreign minister was to blame and if Villiers appeared to contemporaries as a commercial agent this reflected Palmerston's strong desire for the commercial accord. He consistently pursued the liberalization of Spanish tariffs

⁴Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 4 and 14 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/477, Nos. 3 and 19. See page 133. Villiers' threat did help keep the negotiations alive for a time.

⁵Letter, William Russell to John Russell, 4 January 1837, Russell, Early Correspondence, II, 191.

but on a reciprocal basis and without favoritism showed toward England. Palmerston encouraged Spain to broaden and liberalize trade policies with all nations. To this end Villiers received orders to protest against exclusive commercial privileges granted Spain by Mexico.⁶ Later Palmerston urged the Spanish government to conclude a commercial treaty with the Porte as Britain had already done.⁷ He expressed great concern over Spain's commercial relations and Villiers spent much time trying to obtain the agreement.

Differences with France intruded upon these commercial deliberations from time to time. Very early in January 1837 Anglo-French relations became quite strained. Louis Philippe in addressing the Chamber made no mention of Britain either as an ally in Spain or as a recent mediator between France and the United States.⁸ At Molé's insistence the speech also failed to include a declaration of French hostility toward

⁶Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 23 March 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/162, No. 32; Guedalla, Palmerston, p. 186.

⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 13 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/169, No. 136.

⁸Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 2 January 1837, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 242.

Don Carlos despite opposition demands for such a statement.⁹ Palmerston speculated that the French would not aid Spain by sending troops or money. Working from this assumption he advised Madrid to refrain from soliciting French aid. He personally had asked Molé's government for French naval cooperation in Spanish waters but had been refused.¹⁰ France responded negatively to the Spanish question as a result of the aftermath of La Granja.

Reports of marriage proposals between Isabella and the Duc de Bordeaux, Louis Philippe's son, circulated in January also. Villiers received word that the rumors were erroneous. However, as a precaution Villiers told Cristina Britain would not be indifferent to a French Prince on the Spanish throne.¹¹ This rumor continued Spanish marriage difficulties between Britain and France that dragged on for a decade.

Over a year later Cristina proposed to England that a British consort be found for Isabella. Failing this the

⁹Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 6 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, No. 8.

¹⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 6 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/162, No. 2; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 6 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, No. 7.

¹¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 6 January 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/475, No. 14.

queen regent next expressed a desire for a German prince acceptable to English tastes. Villiers pointed out that France would reject both of these proposals and Louis Philippe would not accept an Austrian archduke. Palmerston offered to consult with the French on the marriage although he expected nothing but objections from them, and he was not disappointed.¹² Cristina nevertheless proceeded with her scheme to find her eight-year-old daughter a husband. With this in mind Zea Bermudez, living in exile, was empowered by the government to approach Austria on the subject of a marriage. Palmerston wanted nothing to do with an Austro-Spanish marriage which he viewed as harmful to Spain and detrimental to the liberal institutions he preferred there. Calatrava and the queen regent felt certain the proposed marriage would save Spain.¹³

The marriage rumors of early 1837 added to the uncertainty and suspicion the foreign office had for France. Already

¹²Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, No. 296, Secret; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 30 November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/500, No. 319, Secret.

¹³Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 December 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, No. 301; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 December 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/510, No. 319, Secret. Cristina never was a liberal and in fact a conservative government was always her objective. An Austrian consort might have meant a conservative regime in Spain.

piqued by Louis Philippe's speech in the Chambers, pressed by the Tories at home, and annoyed by other rumors, Palmerston for the first time publicly rebuked his French ally. The medium the foreign minister choose was William IV's address to Parliament. In foreign affairs the speech made no mention of France or an Anglo-French alliance. The French were shocked and alarmed by this disavowel of the alliance. They wanted the facade of an alliance without the substance because of their diplomatic isolation in Europe. Greville, then visiting in Paris, revealed his surprise at the no-mention policy and pointed out that in recent weeks the French had attempted to placate Britain. He cited the speeches made in the Chambers favorable to England and the fact that the members of the Chambers had voted money for additional border officials along the Pyrenees.¹⁴

The French did not feel more agreeable toward Palmerston or his Spanish policies. True, there had been some sentiment

¹⁴Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, III, 343. Palmerston's rebuke of the French appeared indirect although the French did not interpret it that way nor did the British cabinet. The no-mention policy was fully intended as a public chastizement and Paris took it as such. Louis Philippe had made no mention of the so-called Anglo-French alliance when he opened the Chambers either. Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 452.

for the British alliance and the border officials, but not from Molé's government. The border guards, all too ineffective in the past because the government closed its eyes, did not, even with their numbers augmented, represent a change of heart at Paris. Material still flowed to Carlos. Ministerial speeches, reflecting Molé's attitudes, did not soften, and Molé accused the former ministers of bad conduct. Thiers, occasionally favoring cooperation with England, was specifically singled out to be chastized. The Duke of Naouilles declared that previous policies toward Spain had been derogatory to French honor and interests. He further accused England of having taken advantage of the interruption of French trade with Spain. The Duke then intimated that the ports of San Sebastian and Pasajes would become new Gibralters threatening France. The Marquis de Boissy d'Anglas joined this chorus of opposition to England saying the alliance was illusory. Nothing but distrust for Lord Palmerston and his policies emanated from Paris.¹⁵

Distrust and suspicion of Palmerston in Parliament was also rampant although a military victory at Bilbao temporarily

¹⁵The Times (London), 13 January 1837; 17 January 1837; and 23 January 1837.

relieved the Melbourne cabinet of some opposition pressure. Parliamentary debate on Spanish affairs occurred first in March when Viscount Mahon called for Commons to assert itself in controlling foreign affairs. He calculated the cost of the war to Britain as being half a million in sterling and informed the House that serious commercial grievances existed. France and the United States, he insisted, had greater influence and better commercial relations with Spain than England, which he deplored. Mahon attacked the foreign minister at his most vulnerable point by saying Britain received nothing in return for a large expenditure of men, material, and money. Palmerston denied these allegations saying commerce had improved as had British influence at Madrid.¹⁶

Palmerston nevertheless registered a modified attitude toward Spain and France in 1837-1838. Having seen Isabella defended during the critical years 1833-36 the foreign minister made greater efforts to resolve Anglo-Spanish problems. He continued trying to curb French influence while working on the

¹⁶Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXVII, 223 ff.; and Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, III, 332. Palmerston said, "if affairs had gone ill in Spain . . . the Tories would have laid hold of it" Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 3 February 1837, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 244. Lord Mahon also spoke of Parliament's abdication of control of foreign affairs, a trend he insisted on reversing. Annual Register, 1837, LXXIX, 188.

problems of debts, marriages, and commerce. The debt question, finances for the war, and commerce, were all inextricably bound together in Palmerston's mind. Consequently, Spain's empty treasury became a focal point in the continuing struggle at Madrid.

To fill the treasury Palmerston encouraged tariff revision which the French consistently opposed. The foreign minister argued that the payment of a low tariff on an increased volume of trade meant greater returns than non-payment of excessively high tariffs. France opposed revision having experienced a loss of influence at Madrid, and clung tenaciously to the commercial advantages she enjoyed. Molé grasped this last vestige of French preference in Spain to preserve some semblance of superiority at Madrid and to alleviate the economic miseries experienced by his nation.

Successive Spanish governments tried to link relaxation of tariffs with a guaranteed loan which they hoped would fill their treasury. Palmerston refused to agree to this idea as he had in the past because he knew it would be impossible to obtain parliamentary support. The foreign minister also argued that lower Spanish tariffs which improved Spain's commercial posture probably would induce private capital to

provide loans for Madrid.¹⁷ Molé opposed a guaranteed loan and declared that tariff changes could easily lead to a declaration of independence by Catalonia.¹⁸ When M. Aguado attempted to secure a large loan in Paris backed by the revenues of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines he failed.¹⁹

Mendizabal had by this time accepted the majority opinion of the cabinet which favored a treaty with England. The Spanish cabinet and Cortes insisted on a loan guaranteed by England or France. Obviously Madrid really did not want tariff adjustments, but a loan.

Disturbances in Catalonia occurring in early spring again delayed consideration of the commercial treaty as did, "the more than ordinary hostile attitude by France towards Spain." By the end of July the Spanish government realizing it could not get a loan, dropped the commercial negotiations. Catering to British sensibilities Calatrava said even if

¹⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 1 June 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/162, No. 68.

¹⁸Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 2 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, No. 2.

¹⁹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 8 April 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/479, No. 85; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 1 May 1837, France, F.O. 27/541, No. 155. Molé blocked Aguado's efforts to obtain a French guarantee that if Spain defaulted France would intervene.

Britain had received some privileges France would have been denied them.²⁰

These assurances did nothing to placate the growing public hostility to British involvement in the Carlist Wars. Sir Henry Hardinge opened a three-day debate in Commons in April by petitioning that the Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act not be renewed. Sir Stratford Canning seconded the motion and detailed his opposition to the B.A.L. The debate followed news of the decisive defeat Evans suffered in late March at Hernani. Only on the third day of debate did Palmerston reply to his tormentors. In one of his most able speeches of the 1830's the foreign minister repudiated opposition claims point by point.²¹

In his defense Palmerston pointed out that nobody had challenged the legality of the Order in Council in Parliament.

²⁰Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 May 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/479, No. 118, 3 June 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/480, No. 137, 1 July 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/581, No. 172, and 29 July 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/482, No. 203.

²¹Hansard's, 3rd Series, XXXVII, 83 ff. and XXXVIII, 1 ff. Palmerston concluded saying, "Spain has been connected with various countries, at one time with Austria, and at another with France; the object was, in future, that there should be neither an Austrian Spain nor a French Spain, but a Spain which should be Spanish." Annual Register, 1837, LXXIX, 195. Aberdeen said the government vowed to resign if defeated on its Spanish policy. Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, 19 April 1837, Jones, Correspondence, I, 65; and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 449.

Opponents of the measure had repeated all the old arguments but particularly galling to them was Palmerston's efforts on behalf of Isabella that meant neither war nor peace. Despite the abrasive attacks by the opposition the Order in Council was renewed in June 1837 for one year. The B.A.L., however, broken and poorly supported, ended its days at the close of 1837. The royal marines aiding the Isabella cause stayed at their post until 1840 after the peace ended the war.²²

By the close of 1837 the principal reason for British quasi-military involvement in Spain, French intervention, no longer existed. The French, thanks to the Quadruple Treaty, had failed to gain predominance in the Spanish government. Nevertheless, the Anglo-French struggle continued but on a different level. Militarily the French could not intervene, but they could try to obtain concessions from the Spanish government. Palmerston throughout the remainder of the 1830's fought these efforts by Louis Philippe, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. The French tried to maintain their commercial pre-eminence with Spain which included tariff breaks, lower port charges, and participation in the coastal trade. Molé,

²²Holt, Carlist Wars, pp. 162-163.

fighting a war in Algiers, also negotiated for, and received, a coaling station at Port Mahon, Minorca.

The striking thing about British foreign policy in Spain in 1837 was its comparative failure when compared to that of France in terms of immediate gains. Villiers' much sought after commercial treaty failed to materialize. One advantage gained for Britons in Spain involved their exclusion from a special forced loan, but it should be added that French subjects had long enjoyed that privilege.²³ Cristina defaulted on obligations to pay British bondholders which resulted in more pressure on Palmerston to end his involvement in Spain.²⁴ The foreign office looked askance at the leasing of the Port Mahon base to France. Similarly, Britain viewed with concern the rumors that General Clausel of France intended to intervene in Spain for Isabella with 20,000 troops.²⁵

The year 1837 marked a rapidly widening gulf between Britain and France in Spain and elsewhere. Differences in

²³Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 14 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 158; and Ridley, Lord Palmerston, 203.

²⁴Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 4 May 1837, No. 43, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537, Palmerston Letter-Books, Vol. CXXI.

²⁵Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones, I, 731.

policies in Turkey, Greece, and Egypt became more noticeable. Portugal became another center of the Anglo-French struggle. Palmerston accused Molé of opposing British efforts in the capitals of all of these areas.²⁶ The primary reason for this hostility remained the jealousy France had of the commercial prosperity generally enjoyed by Britain. France feared liberal trade policies which Palmerston and the Board of Trade wanted established.²⁷ French suspicions meant opposition to the Calatrava government in Spain despite the fact that Louis Philippe finally agreed that Don Carlos' cause was hopeless.²⁸

Calatrava became angered by French activities in Spain detrimental to his government. France refused aid, a loan, and additional troops as did Britain, but pursued other

²⁶Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 6 October 1837, France, F.O. 27/543, No. 306. He accused France of making and unmaking Spanish ministers as well as suggesting that Paris desired the prolongation of the war. Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 19 October 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 139.

²⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 10 October 1837, France, F.O. 27/537, No. 261; and Letter, Sir Herbert Taylor to Lord Melbourne, Brighton, 2 January 1837, Lloyd C. Sanders, ed., Lord Melbourne's Papers (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1889), p. 358.

²⁸Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 13 January 1837, France, F.O. 27/538, Confidential.

objectives construed as hostile in Madrid. Enemy agents operated out of Bayonne and supplies still crossed to Don Carlos. Friction between the French consul at Barcelona and the governor of the area had the makings of a serious rift. Latour Maubourg, the French ambassador to Madrid, speculated that the incident might produce a rupture. Maubourg made no effort to resolve the problem and Calatrava acidly commented that, "Maubourg has never had a word of sympathy for our reverses, or of satisfaction at our success."²⁹ Franco-Spanish relations deteriorated. Count Compazano, Spanish Ambassador to France, hoped to obtain a French loan but instead caused a considerable row with Mole. Maubourg, after a brief trip to Paris, returned to Madrid where Villiers and Calatrava alleged he attempted to manufacture a still wider split between France and Spain.³⁰

Despite this threat Villiers became more sanguine about Spanish affairs in general and even revived his hopes for a commercial treaty. However, he cautioned the queen regent that Louis Philippe might well continue to promote confusion

²⁹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 May 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/479, No. 117.

³⁰Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 12 August 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/482, No. 224.

and unrest, particularly in Catalonia. Palmerston assured Cristina that, "the obligation of the Quadruple Treaty will restrain within certain limits the deviation of the French policy."³¹ Even Granville, normally somewhat apologetic for the French, said little cooperation could be expected from France so long as Molé directed the government. He told Palmerston he saw no possibility of a concert between England and France on Spain.³²

Palmerston became more diplomatically isolated and threatened at the end of 1837 than he had been in the last several years. Virtually all of Britain's treaties with the major powers, some dating back to the Congress of Vienna, ceased to exist. Former allies, such as France and Russia, had tacitly withdrawn from their previous commitments leaving Britain befriended only by the likes of Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Moreover, the former allies had all embarked upon naval programs the result of which became apparent in the last days of December. The aggressive nature of the former

³¹Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 29 July 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/482, No. 201; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 12 August 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 104.

³²Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 10 July and 7 August 1837, France, F.O. 27/542, Nos. 244 and 275.

allies manifested itself in their expansion into new lands and interference in Spain.³³

The Eastern Powers and their satellites renewed their activities in Spain in the summer of 1837 as Don Carlos made plans to capture Madrid. Sardinia sent ships of war to the Spanish coast with arms for Carlos. The Sardinian government also advanced financial support to the pretender. Agents representing the Eastern Courts encouraged this operation against Madrid, and they expected a popular revolt to occur in favor of Carlos. The Eastern Powers also favored Carlos with some financial assistance, but they withheld diplomatic recognition pending the outcome of the siege of Madrid.³⁴

While there remained scant military aid the Eastern Courts could give Carlos, he received their diplomatic patronage. Metternich, aiding Don Carlos diplomatically, cautioned Louis Philippe about starting a European war over Spain. "This menace of a European conflagration, truly a sword of Damocles that Metternich always held over the head of Louis Philippe;

³³The Times (London), 23 November, 25, 29 December 1837.

³⁴Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 3 January 1837, France, F.O. 146/180, No. 1; Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 6 May 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/479, No. 108; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, France, F.O. 27/536, No. 248.

was not in our judgment, anything more than a sophistry of the astute chancellor in order to intimidate the French monarch."³⁵ Metternich never went any further in his dealings with Louis Philippe, and he never offered the French king an alliance which would have been eagerly grasped by France. But his efforts on behalf of Carlos did help momentarily.

When Don Carlos failed to capture Madrid, the Eastern Powers lost faith in him. After 1837 they repeatedly refused the requests by Carlos for additional aid. Even the best Carlist agents sent to Vienna could not rebuild the relations that had existed before the failure at Madrid. Metternich and his allies, however, continued to give verbal support to Carlos. The watershed of the Carlist War was this attempted capture of the Spanish capital and with its failure came the failure of the pretender's cause although it took until 1839 to drive him from the battle field.

The most immediate effect of the failure of Carlos was to produce a deeper rift between Britain and France in August 1837. Although Carlos failed to capture the capital his

³⁵Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 178; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 12 May 1837, France, F.O. 146/182, No. 144, Confidential.

activities provided Cristina with an excuse to dismiss Calatrava and Mendizabal.³⁶ The queen regent appointed the more conservative and pro-French Eusebio Bardaji as head of the government. Villiers accused Molé of engineering this ministerial shuffle. Molé's joy on receiving the news of Calatrava's fall knew no bounds. The French minister in July had expressed a fear that France might become contaminated by the radicalism he associated with Calatrava. Nevertheless, Molé denied emphatically any French complicity in the recent change.³⁷

France benefitted most from the recent change in the Madrid government and received the lease on King's Islet, Port Mahon, Minorca, which was yet another blow to Anglo-French relations. The Port Mahon news led Palmerston to protest over the danger to which the Anglo-French alliance was exposed. France gave immediate assurances that King's Islet was a coaling station only. Like the earlier rumors of French

³⁶Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 207. Cristina always felt ideologically closer to Louis Philippe than to Palmerston since she was not a liberal.

³⁷Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 26 August 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/482, No. 241; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 13 July 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 90; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 4 September 1837, France, F.O. 27/543, No. 13.

designs to stir up Catalonia with the intention of later incorporating it into France the Port Mahon affair fell far short of reassuring Palmerston that all was well.

Port Mahon signaled the further deterioration of Anglo-French relations and the significant increases in French naval activity failed to alleviate suspicions. For a considerable time past the agents of Britain and France had found themselves at odds in several diplomatic posts. Nowhere was this more true than in Iberia, particularly in Spain where Villiers long had been suspect in French eyes. Maubourg, the French agent, and Rayneval before him, had both in turn been suspected by Villiers of partisan interference in Spain. Palmerston up to the end of 1836 had nevertheless tried to maintain the illusion of French cooperation because of the solidarity of the Eastern Courts. Since then he had been much less active in that regard after the blatant French rejection of the alliance following La Granja.³⁸

Port Mahon and Spanish ministerial changes coupled with a new drive for money in Spain provoked Palmerston into threatening an end to the Quadruple Treaty. Like his public rebuke

³⁸ Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 16 November 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 158; and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 447.

to France early in 1837 this chastizement of Isabella's government marked a serious departure from previous policies. The specific issue at hand was the forced loan that Spain levied against Spaniards and Englishmen but from which the French were exempt. Palmerston was able finally to obtain exemption from this forced loan for British subjects. But Molé and Maubourg protested about the language Palmerston used and said Villiers was jealous of French preference, meaning, of course, Palmerston was jealous. They were right on that point. Molé also claimed he had no desire for special concessions, nor did he, since France already enjoyed special privileges. To calm ruffled feelings he professed support for the Whig ministry which he did not mean.³⁹

Molé uttered these pious expressions of friendship after it had become obvious to all that the so-called Anglo-French alliance, which had never really existed, had ceased to have any meaning. Palmerston said that although France had signed the treaty in 1834 it had remained a dead letter.⁴⁰ He had remarked before how Molé spoke to Granville on matters of no

³⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 14 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 185/163, No. 181.

⁴⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 29 September 1836, France, F.O. 27/518, No. 138.

consequence, but refused to discuss any question involving serious Anglo-French interests.⁴¹ This situation again reinforced the feeling that there was no effort being made by the French to support an Anglo-French entente. The Times interpreted these attitudes as a deliberate French effort to end the alliance.⁴²

Following the Port Mahon disagreement there came yet another ministerial change. Count Ofalia, a moderado, replaced Bardaji in early 1838 since he had proved to be utterly incapable of running the state. Toreno and Maubourg persuaded Ofalia to enter office. Ofalia felt optimistic about French aid for his government and he enjoyed the temporary, though not enthusiastic, support of Villiers who felt there was no other choice.⁴³ Villiers encouraged Cristina, embittered by

⁴¹The Times (London), 21 November 1837; and Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 3 November 1837, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 245.

⁴²The Times (London), 27 November 1837.

⁴³Ofalia's ministry needed three things to survive according to The Times: a loan, military success, and additional aid from the allies. The first and last items the paper, like many opponents of Palmerston, felt should not be supplied by England. The Times (London), 3 January 1838. The count based his optimism on Louis Philippe's address to the Chambers where he said, "On my part, I will continue to faithfully execute the stipulations of the Quadruple Treaty, and I hope the cause that has all our support triumphs." Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones, I, 738.

recent French policies, to appoint Ofalia to office. Like the rest of his party the new president remained suspicious of Britain. Moderados, sharing French attitudes, believed Britain sought territorial aggrandizement and exclusive commercial privileges in Spain, objectives that the French seemed to want.

Villiers had to dissuade the new Spanish president of these ideas and to combat a resurgent belief that the French intended aiding Spain. He denied the charges against British policy and expressed the cornerstone of Palmerston's policy which had "exercised a useful control over the policy of France."⁴⁴ The minister also recounted the military aid Britain had already provided and informed the Spanish government that the English public increasingly objected to the lack of success in Spain. Somewhat less than candidly the English minister added that Britain never interfered in the parties and personalities of foreign nations while suggesting the French did meddle.⁴⁵

With Ofalia Villiers discussed his belief that Louis Philippe would not aid Madrid and the activities of the French

⁴⁴Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 17 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/485, No. 321.

⁴⁵Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 and 30 December 1837, Spain, F.O. 72/485, Nos. 386 and 396.

Chamber of Deputies eloquently bore him out. In the Chamber the opposition resolution stressing the fear of counter-revolution in Spain demanded French military intervention, but the government defeated it. A British request for French naval assistance along the coast of France failed to elicit a favorable response also. Molé said naval forces could not be spared because they already patrolled Ashmet Bay, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Argentina.⁴⁶ Yet French agents in Spain repeatedly urged that aid be given to prevent both a loss of influence and the revolutionary excesses France feared. Ofalia quickly learned that the expected aid from France would not materialize nor would additional aid be granted by Britain.⁴⁷

Palmerston, in fact, took an increasingly threatening attitude toward Madrid as he tired of the reluctance of the Spanish government to deal effectively with Carlos and specific English problems. Complaining of the creditors who constantly harrassed him to recover their money from Spain, he pushed for the commercial treaty again while threatening the

⁴⁶Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 30 October 1837, France, F.O. 27/544, Secret and Confidential; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 12 January 1838, France, F.O. 27/559, No. 11.

⁴⁷Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13 and 20 January 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/501, Secret, and No. 26.

Spanish with dire consequences if satisfaction was not granted.⁴⁸ A Bilbao duty which discriminated against British merchants, aroused Palmerston. The foreign minister protested and remarked how unfortunate it would be if royal naval vessels assisted British subjects rather than the Spanish government as intended. The Board of Trade took a hard line, too, and openly warned Spain of possible retaliatory trade measures directed against Spanish commerce.⁴⁹

Palmerston applied yet more pressure to Ofalia as he denounced Spanish affairs. He turned down requests for additional muskets and in an unprecedented move told Ofalia to account for the 336,600 weapons already supplied to Spain. The matter of financial assistance arose but Palmerston refused to consider the question until Spain ratified a commercial agreement. Ofalia acknowledged Spain's debts to England and indicated he planned to preside over a general tariff reduction favorable to England. Upon hearing this news Villiers'

⁴⁸Letter, George Villiers to Edward Villiers, 17 February 1838, Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 146.

⁴⁹Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 25 January and 8 March 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/499, Nos. 16 and 46; and Ridley, Lord Palmerston, p. 204.

old optimism returned and he foresaw great events in Spain.⁵⁰

Palmerston in adopting this threatening tone revealed a pragmatic turn of mind previously concealed during the early years of the Carlist Wars. The new pragmatism coincided with his acknowledgement that the Anglo-French alliance lay shattered when he said that, "if he couldn't praise France, he would not mention them." Both attitudes were reflected in the Port Mahon issue first raised late in 1837. Palmerston protested over the French base of King's Islet again and simultaneously demanded an explanation of the affair. Since he had failed to receive satisfaction he pursued the issue in 1838 and insisted upon a full explanation with assurances that the Spanish government had not given France a sovereign piece of territory. Possessing a suspicious mind, especially with regard to Molé and France, the foreign minister believed the worst about the Minorca incident.⁵¹

⁵⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 22 February and 22 March 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/499, Nos. 35 and 57; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10 March 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/502, No. 87.

⁵¹Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, III, 343. The contract between Paris and Madrid stipulated occupation of Kings Islet, Port Mahon, for a period of two years by France as a coaling station between Algiers and the French ports. Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 25 January 1838, Spain, F.O. 185/169, No. 12. See pp. 133 and 135.

Later in the year Palmerston's concern about Minorca grew rather than diminished.⁵² Diplomatic reports indicated the French intended to foment disturbances on the island. The coaling station, allegedly the reason for the base expanded into a hospital and something of an armed depot. France garrisoned more troops at the post than there were Spanish soldiers on Minorca. M. Ladiev, consul for Prussia and Russia on Minorca, said the French encouraged ideas of independence from Spain in the islands. Palmerston readily accepted this information and his misgivings deepened since he believed France had earlier had similar designs in Catalonia.⁵³

The vital concern over Port Mahon reflected the jealousy, rivalry, and mutual suspicion with which Britain and France had always regarded each other in Spanish affairs. Throughout the 1830's their respective policies mirrored these attitudes and prevented the two powers from concluding a meaningful alliance. Palmerston worked to check the extension of

⁵²Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, 19 May 1838, No. 86, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.

⁵³Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 19 May 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/504, No. 191; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 14 June 1838, Spain, F.O. 186/169, No. 101; Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 209; Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 27 January 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/501, No. 34; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 2 June 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/505, No. 207.

French influence in every quarter save only one, in Western North Africa. There the French through military conquest created a colony in Algiers. Aside from this one instance the French were not successful in enlarging their sphere of influence by 1838 and the nation remained as diplomatically isolated as it had been in the early 1830's. France remained sensitive to isolation and paranoid about revolution. For these reasons the Molé government occasionally retreated from its position in Spain to encourage the moderates and even on a few instances to offer to cooperate with Britain. But Molé carefully orchestrated the times and conditions of cooperation for he was not dominated by Palmerston nor was his desire for cooperation sincere.

Meanwhile, Palmerston provoked some sections of British public opinion to new heights of indignation in early 1838. The focal point of the disquiet was the awarding of a Knight Commander, Order of the Bath, to DeLacey Evans of the defunct B.A.L. Greville noted that the United Service Club became particularly annoyed. The Times was furious. That paper cited the many precedents broken by the awarding of the honor.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Palmerston in this public action reaffirmed his Spanish policies of the last few years by supporting the unpopular Evans. Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, IV, 29.

With opinion already aroused because of the condition of ex-legionnaires who had yet to receive their pay, the Evans controversy precipitated a debate in Commons leading to a motion of censure against Palmerston's Spanish policies.⁵⁵ The motion proposed by Lord Eliot, similar to one made a year earlier, contended that the Melbourne government's actions in Spain were not in Britain's best interests. Debate flourished upon the introduction of the motion and was not concluded by the end of the day's session. The following day the division took place immediately after the session opened taking everybody by surprise. Only Russell of the ministry was present. Eliot's motion failed by eight votes giving the ministry a weak victory. Besides being a general censure of Palmerston's policies the motion explicitly requested that the Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act not be renewed.⁵⁶ The failure of the motion did not deter the opposition from continued attacks upon the policies.

⁵⁵The Times (London), 12 and 22 February 9, 19, and 30 March 1838.

⁵⁶Hansard's, 3rd Series, XLI, 1320; and Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, IV, 47. The Order in Council was not renewed because the B.A.L. had ceased to exist in December 1837. Opposition forces in the debate wanted to guarantee the B.A.L. would not be recreated again. On the previous motion of 1837 Palmerston received a 36 vote majority which included support from most of the radicals.

Increasing numbers of people joined the resistance to governmental policies. Palmerston reported angry outbursts in England directed against the incompetent O'Fallon whom he insisted was the only person able to solve the problems.⁵⁷ Merchants, bondholders, ex-legionnaires, and Tories all had lists of complaints. Palmerston handled these objections in a doctrinaire fashion when he explained to Russell the need for an independent Iberia that could assist Britain in maintaining a European balance of power.⁵⁸

Simultaneously the foreign minister clutched at the idea of a negotiated settlement offered by Villiers as a means to end the conflict and reduce British involvement in Spain. The minister received Palmerston's permission to attempt a negotiated settlement. Instead of a fruitless approach to Carlos, Villiers decided to try to detach his guerrilla chieftains from the conflict. His intermediary, Lieutenant Turner, R.N., approached the guerrilla chiefs at the same time Palmerston tried enlisting the aid of Molé in a joint mediation.

⁵⁷ Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 3 May 1838, No. 79, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48537. Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXI.

⁵⁸ Letter, Lord Palmerston to William [Temple?], 14 April 1838, Ashley, Life and Correspondence, p. 344; The Times (London), 9 June 1838; and Hall, Orleans Monarchy, p. 208.

Villiers received word that the Carlist chiefs insisted upon a guarantee by Britain and France of any terms negotiated. Since he acted for the Spanish government and knew in advance Palmerston would not accept the role of guarantor Villiers' negotiations temporarily foundered. Molé, like Palmerston and Villiers, had thought a negotiated settlement an acceptable solution to the conflict. The French minister had similar reservations about a guarantee, but he encouraged Cristina to take advantage of Villier's initial contacts. Louis Philippe terminated French involvement in these peace probes by refusing to permit French officials to contact Don Carlos or his agents. This refusal did not mean the king wanted the war continued but only that he would not unconditionally support Isabella. Villiers sincerely believed that Louis Philippe really did want the war continued indefinitely.⁵⁹

Palmerston preferred a negotiated end to the war and French participation in the process because he believed the resulting peace would last longer. He also wanted to present

⁵⁹Despatches, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 30 April, 11 and 14 May 1838, France, F.O. 27/561, Nos. 138, 156, and 162; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 19 May 1838, France, F.O. 27/556, No. 228; and Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, II, 456.

a united front to the rest of Europe by involving France and expressed great disappointment at the French refusal to cooperate. The foreign minister no longer believed in the Anglo-French alliance, but he hoped to continue exercising some influence over Louis Philippe's foreign affairs.

Palmerston wanted this control over Louis Philippe because he feared a Franco-Russian alliance in 1838. Both Russian and French policies in the Middle East alarmed him. The naval strengths of these powers caused some alarm too. France with a base at Minorca and another in Algiers coupled with a growing influence over Mohammed Ali in Egypt threatened communications with India. In addition France had fleets in Mexican and Argentinian waters. Russia had a Baltic fleet of considerable force while England's navy had declined in both strength and efficiency in the 1830's. Palmerston discussed the problem of Russian advances on India with Lord John Russell and told him a certain leader in Afghanistan acted as the tool of the tsar.⁶⁰ Later in the year Russell confided in Melbourne that he believed the army needed enlarging because of colonial and foreign affairs.⁶¹

⁶⁰Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Russell, 1 October 1838, Russell, Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell, II, 223.

⁶¹Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 8 June 1838, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 268.

Under these adverse conditions French cooperation in Spain took another turn for the worse.⁶² Molé permitted supplies to go to Carlos and made no attempt to restrain the Princess de Bierra, the Portuguese Princess, from traveling to the rebel chief. She crossed French territory to get to Spain and only after the fact could Palmerston protest. Molé said he failed to understand why the princess should have been stopped. Subsequently, she married Don Carlos' son and in so doing joined the causes of the two Iberian pretenders together. Supplies Molé allowed into Spain included a herd of 700 horses which Palmerston complained about. French sources said there had been only 600 horses and that, to make amends, they had provided Isabella's forces with compensating supplies of arms.⁶³

Anglo-French relations followed an ambiguous path in the last months of 1838, but they were essentially hostile. Molé still opposed French action in Spain and encouraged the moderados. Marshall Soult represented Louis Philippe at

⁶²Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 8 June 1838, Bulwer, Viscount Palmerston, II, 268.

⁶³Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 October 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, No. 265; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 30 October 1838, France, F.O. 27/558, No. 363; and Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 2 November 1838, France, F.O. 27/564, No. 310.

Victoria's coronation and received extensive public demonstrations of good will toward himself and France.⁶⁴ No similar feeling emanated from the French and by late fall certain British circles again objected to Louis Philippe's actions. The French fleet blockading Mexico hurt British merchants with that state and aroused some concern.⁶⁵

Cristina confided to Villiers her concern about French policies which she bitterly denounced. She made no mention of France in her speech opening the new Cortes but indicated her real foreign ally was Britain.⁶⁶ Villiers, reflecting his hostility toward France, advised Cristina to appoint a new government that excluded representatives of the moderado party, the majority party. He feared both a repeat of La Granja and the ascendance of French influence. Villiers accused the moderados of being opposed to vigorously pursuing an end to the war. By the middle of December Perez de Castro became President of the Council with the approval and backing of Count Luchana, the queen's most active general who shortly

⁶⁴Strachey and Fulford, Greville Memoirs, IV, 78.

⁶⁵Letter, Lord Aberdeen to Princess Lieven, 4 November 1838; and Jones, Early Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen, I, 117.

⁶⁶Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 8 November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, Nos. 266 and 288.

replaced Cristina as regent.⁶⁷

During these months Villiers repeatedly warned the queen regent of the declining British support for her cause. He and Palmerston urged the regent to curry English favor by negotiating a commercial treaty. Since 1833 Palmerston had pressed for such a treaty which he saw as the solution to Spain's financial problems. He cited the recent example of the Baron de Meer, commander of Catalonia, who, when all else failed, liberalized tariffs in that province with the result that he raised sufficient revenues to pay for military operations there. Cristina, for the first time, agreed to the necessity of a trade treaty and put her ministers on the task while telling Villiers she was indifferent to the hostile reaction she anticipated from France.⁶⁸

The years 1837-38 witnessed a great conflict between Molé and Palmerston over Spain. Neither had been able to

⁶⁷ Despatches, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 October and 10 November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/509, Nos. 266 and 288. Villiers to obtain his ends advised unconstitutional means in suggesting the queen appoint a cabinet. Count Luchana was the title General Espartero had at this point, and he was the most successful Isabella general.

⁶⁸ Draft, Lord Palmerston to Villiers, Foreign Office, 15 November 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/500, No. 128; and Despatch, Villiers to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 December 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/510, No. 320.

establish a clear ascendancy over the Spanish government. France, of the two powers, came out ahead with the concession Molé received in Minorca which was the type of thing Palmerston had hoped to prevent. But it was at the expense of any residual belief Palmerston had in the French government. Palmerston learned by the events in Spain that France could not be expected to honor its treaty obligations.⁶⁹ Repeatedly Palmerston and Villiers witnessed flagrant violations of the Quadruple Treaty by France and this soured their opinions of the French still further. In future crises Britain would not rely upon France but would look to traditional allies on the continent.

⁶⁹Bulwer, Life of Henry John Temple, II, 247.

CHAPTER VI

TO THE BRINK OF WAR AGAIN

The contest in Spain between Britain and France for the control of Spain continued after the Convention of Bergara ended the Carlist Wars in August 1839. A crisis external to the Spanish problem again brought Britain and France to the brink of war in Spain. It was a displacement reaction for the development that occurred in the Near East settling the Mohammed Ali problem which saw France temporarily opposed by all the other great powers. Spain for a while turned against Britain in the face of increased hostility from France until information supplied by Palmerston concerning French intentions in Minorca revealed the real designs of Louis Philippe. Throughout these vacillations Britain insisted upon settling its outstanding differences with the Madrid government.

Palmerston pursued his course trying to obtain payment for various British claims against the Spanish treasury. To the familiar claims of the bondholders, the B.A.L. and merchants

he added his own demands for payment of the arms supplied to Spain during the course of the civil war. Linked inevitably to these claims was the foreign minister's insistence upon a trade treaty which he still believed would solve all of Spain's financial troubles. As in the past, the prospects of an Anglo-Spanish treaty of this nature aroused the French to complain and to undermine the Spanish government. One or two other proposals to solve the British financial demands received some attention but failed to resolve the difficulty. The end of the war ultimately helped Spain meet her foreign obligations but great pressure still had to be applied.

Marriage proposals for Isabella also aroused British suspicions which changes in the French cabinet did not reduce. Molé left office to be replaced by Marshall Soult who was more favorable to Britain but who opposed Palmerston on the marriage question. A special Spanish mission to the Eastern Courts led by Zea Bermudez failed to alleviate the problems associated with the Spanish marriage. When Palmerston finally left office in 1841, this difficulty still had not been settled nor would it be for several years until after Palmerston returned to office. A multitude of vexing problems faced Palmerston as he continued to implement British policy in Spain.

Requests from Madrid for loans continued to be pressed but both the British and French governments refused to cooperate. In early January 1839 Spain negotiated a loan with private contractors, Boyd and Lizardi of London, under the direction of a new finance minister Pita Pizarro. The finance minister counted heavily upon obtaining the London loan to the point that he threatened resignation if he failed. He also decided to dissolve the Cortes if successful in getting the loan and to undertake commercial reform.

Urged by Lord Clarendon to modify the tariff Perez de Castro, new President of the Council, said that extreme care must be taken not to offend France. Castro reasoned that France could do a great deal of harm to Spain if offended. Clarendon asked how it was possible to do more harm than had already been done since Louis Philippe never implemented the Quadruple Treaty. The Englishman told Castro that Spain should assert its independence. Clarendon meant Spain should assert its independence from France while cooperating closely with Britain.¹ Britain still objected to the special privileges

¹ Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, Foreign Office, 7 February 1839, No. 17, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48538, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXII. Sir George Villiers became Lord Clarendon upon the death of John Chamless Villiers, Third Earl of Clarendon, in 1838. Despatch, Lord Clarendon to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 2 and 23 February 1838, Spain, F.O. 72/526, Nos. 36 and 53.

France enjoyed in trade particularly in the province of Catalonia where French influence appeared most powerful. In April Castro dismissed Pita and further trade negotiations floundered.

Palmerston repeatedly pressed the various ministries of the period 1839-41 for a favorable revision of the tariff which would have started Spain on the path to free trade. Spanish ministers responded to his efforts with delays but tantalized him with assurances changes would be implemented. J. M. Jerningham, British representative to Madrid beginning in November 1839, reported some concessions which permitted hitherto prohibited items into Spain but at a high tariff rate. Jerningham encouraged the Spanish government to make further changes at every opportunity he had. Palmerston wrote to General Alava on the same subject and to recommend strongly that the debts owed Britons be paid.² Nevertheless, the Spanish continued their deceptions. They also complained about the amount of smuggling British subjects engaged in while ignoring some of the questionable French practices.

²Despatch, Jerningham to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 18 January 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/548, No. 15; and Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Jerningham, Foreign Office, 6 February and 19 March 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, Nos. 11 and 25.

Palmerston's policies of aiding the Isabella faction earned him no special consideration in commercial matters with the Spanish, not even equality with France.

During the course of the next two years Anglo-Spanish trade relations regressed as Spanish tariffs were revised. New fish duties were implemented but still discriminated against British merchants and forced Palmerston to warn of retaliatory measures. Later in 1840 still another newly completed tariff schedule appeared which proved detrimental to British trade and provoked yet another sterner warning that if the measures were adopted Britain intended to impose retaliatory measures against Spanish trade.

The foreign secretary condemned the measures as proof of the hostile feeling Spain had for Britain. He said "the adoption of such a plan [of tariffs] would give a new, and unfriendly character [to] the relations between the two countries." His assertion, diplomatically correct, failed to obscure the fact that in 1840 Anglo-Spanish relations were not as cordial or frank as previously. Nor did they improve in 1841 on topics relating to trade despite the appointment of a commission in Spain to review the question of tariffs.

Palmerston left office in mid-1841 still not having obtained

complete satisfaction on a commercial agreement that he had pursued since 1833.³

Palmerston suspected France of promoting this continued opposition to a liberalized tariff because of past experience with Molé and because of French jealousy of British commercial prosperity. France and Catalonia proved to be the stumbling blocks time after time though it must be admitted there were few ministers at Madrid really committed to reform. Obviously France influenced Spain on the tariff subject as in all other areas of consequence because of her proximity and the Franco-Spanish experiences of 1807 and 1823.

French influence can be observed in the explosive Port Mahon squabble also. Late in 1837 Molé established the French flag at King's Islet, Port Mahon under an agreement with Cristina's government. Palmerston, of course, became upset with this arrangement and asked the Spanish not to renew the lease. As Anglo-French relations deteriorated over the Eastern

³Draft, Lord Palmerston to Jerningham, Foreign Office, 16 April 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, No. 31; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 19 August 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, No. 34; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 20 August 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, No. 34; Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 13 June 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/552, No. 60; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10 July 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/577, No. 155.

Mediterranean question the King's Islet base assumed greater significance. Not only had France acquired a base in the Western Mediterranean but the French fleet had been enlarged. The threat to British influence in the Mediterranean basin and the threat to imperial defense and communications prompted the foreign secretary's request that the lease be permitted to lapse.⁴ His entreaties fell upon deaf ears and Southern explained why in a despatch to the Foreign Office.

Southern told Palmerston the Spanish were thankful for the British aid given to Isabella in the past. However, Spaniards reckoned they could rely on the continued support or at least the goodwill of England. On the other hand, French aid or intervention was not assured although French interference was a foregone conclusion. The result was that a political party, the moderados, rallied around the idea of gaining French support. The party had used precisely this point for several years in attempts to return to office or maintain power.

Throughout all of these intrigues Palmerston remained in an unenviable position. His suspicions about French involvement in Spain forced him into an active British policy

⁴ ~~Source~~ ~~Source~~ Palmerston to Southern, Foreign Office, 11 July 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/176, No. 40; and The Times (London), 25 February 1840.

in Madrid. It also meant that he would obtain few tangible returns on Britain's investment in Spain, a point which his domestic opponents attacked. Under these circumstances Southern ended his despatch saying, "It is for these reasons that the slightest movement of [French policy] produces so deep an impression in Spain." This fact represented the biggest obstacle to Palmerston's policies throughout the Carlist Wars.⁵

Port Mahon reflected just how accurate Southern's assessment of the situation had been. France for a number of years tried to establish greater control over Minorca by bribing local officials and agitating among the islanders. The French also tried, and finally succeeded, in establishing a base on the island. In 1839 the recently changed government of France, now led by Marshall Soult, wanted to renew the lease. Palmerston told Castro that French assurances of friendship were genuine since he wanted to reduce the friction between England and France. He verbally re-affirmed the idea of the Anglo-French alliance. The foreign minister, however, could not reconcile himself to the idea of a French base, no matter

⁵Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 22 June 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/530, No. 93.

what the alleged reason for it, in the Western Mediterranean. When Castro renewed the lease in September, after having previously assured Clarendon he would not, Southern protested. Charged with being unreliable Castro defended himself by repeating earlier statements about the need for a benevolent France. The Spanish government in the new lease, as a concession to Britain stipulated that the agreement could not be renewed.⁶

Shortly after this event Palmerston became concerned over rumors of another Franco-Spanish deal. In November 1839 a French company offered a loan to Spain with the Philippines as security. Seeing this potential agreement as a secession of territory to France, Britain objected though a short while earlier Palmerston had tried to negotiate for the purchase of two small Spanish islands in the South Atlantic. Instead of the French loan, which Palmerston felt was thoroughly unjustified with the return of peace, he insisted again upon the liberalizing of tariffs. Spain denied the loan

⁶Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 27 July 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/531, No. 133; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Southern, Foreign Office, 11 July 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/176, No. 42; Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 7 September, 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/533, No. 170; and Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 334.

rumors Palmerston had acted on.⁷

To help eradicate the slave trade the British foreign secretary had earlier suggested that Spain sell Fernando Po and Annabon Islands for £50,000. The islands were to be used as bases for royal navy vessels patrolling the African coast. Two years later the islands emerged again in a discussion about paying Spain's debts to British bondholders. Several months after this proposal the Spanish changed their ideas on selling the islands and made other arrangements to settle with the bondholders.⁸

The problem of Port Mahon drew England, France, and Spain to the brink of war. H. M. Government requested a copy of the French lease to determine under what conditions King's

⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 11 June 1840, Confidential, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48538, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXVIII, Draft, Lord Palmerston to Southern, Foreign Office, 14 December 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/524, No. 81; Despatch, Jerningham to Lord Palmerston, Foreign Office, 21 December 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/524, No. 81; and Despatch, Jerningham to Lord Palmerston, Foreign Office, 21 December 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/535, No. 37.

⁸Vidal y Saura, La Política Exterior, p. 334; Draft, Lord Palmerston to Southern, Foreign Office, 18 June 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/177, Slave Trade, No. 8; Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 5 April 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/574, No. 76; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 24 August 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/578, No. 199. In effect Palmerston said the British government would assume a portion of Spain's indebtedness to British bondholders in return for the islands.

Islet was occupied.⁹ Late in the summer of 1840 the Balearic Islands became the focal point of the triangular contest. Sir George Bulwer, Britain's representative to Paris, warned his government that France might intervene in Spain or the Balearic Islands to restore its credibility with the French people after the Eastern settlement. More substantial information came to Palmerston describing a French plot to seize the islands in a preventive action. This plot involved the collecting of a French fleet under Admiral Hugous at Toulon to seize the islands. Motivation for this action came from the impending war some French sources anticipated between England and France because of the Mohammed Ali settlement. The idea was to "protect" the islands for Spain and restore them at the conclusion of the war.¹⁰ Supporting this intelligence Aston at Madrid received information about several hundred reinforcements recently despatched to King's Islet. Palmerston suggested that the Spanish garrison at Port Mahon be increased as a precautionary measure since the French

⁹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Jerningham, *Foreign Office*, 6 February 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, No. 12.

¹⁰Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, *Foreign Office*, 15 October 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, Secret.

reinforcements outnumbered Isabella's forces.¹¹

Thiers, recently returned to office, complained of being deserted by England over the Mohammed Ali settlement in favor of the Eastern States. He felt particularly vulnerable since he had in the past occasionally supported the Anglo-French alliance.¹² Trying to prevent precipitate action by the French Bulwer suggested to Thiers that Britain and France offer Cristina joint advice in the deteriorated Spanish situation. Thiers would not coordinate the advice to Cristina, and Bulwer suspected him of encouraging the queen regent in pro-French action.¹³ Again the suspicions of British officials concerning French reliability manifested themselves particularly after July when disturbances occurred in Barcelona, long an area of French intrigue.¹⁴ As the summer of 1840 progressed, Bulwer sent several additional warnings to Palmerston about possible French manufactured disturbances in Spain.

¹¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 15 October 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, No. 55; and Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones, II, 22.

¹²Despatch, Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 27 July 1840, France, F.O. 27/604, No. 34.

¹³Despatch, Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 11 September 1840, France, F.O. 27/605, No. 75.

¹⁴F.O. 27/604, No. 34.

The Spanish government received the reports of French intentions toward Spain's Balearic Islands from Palmerston. The Spanish government responded by attempting to nullify the French lease on the grounds that France had failed to pay the required expenses. France argued that its obligation had been met by improvements to the base. The original coaling station had grown to include a hospital and fortifications which Britain viewed with displeasure.

Relations between Spain and France cooled in view of the hostile intentions of Soult toward the Balearic Islands. Spain substantially increased the size of the garrison on the islands until it numbered over 3,000 men and included several battallions of artillery. The Duke de la Victoria, President of the Council, also insisted France pay the back charges and in future could use Port Mahon only on the same basis as other nations did thus ending any claim to special privileges. Palmerston repeatedly urged this line of action and gave much encouragement to Victoria's stand against France.¹⁵

¹⁵Drafts, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 26 November 1840, Spain, F.O. 185/182, Nos. 75 and 76; Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 6 December 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/556, No. 156; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 4 June 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/576, No. 137.

At the same time Palmerston, in continuing efforts to undermine and to counteract French intrigue in Spain, studiously tried to get recognition from the Eastern Courts for Isabella's government. Diplomatic recognition of the queen by the Eastern Powers had ceased when Isabella assumed the throne in 1833. Since that time no Spanish government, not even that of Don Carlos, had received their diplomatic recognition. With the war over Palmerston undertook at Spain's request, the task of trying to reestablish the severed diplomatic relations. His efforts coincided with a growing detente between England and the Eastern Powers over the Mohammed Ali question. It also underscored the real difference existing between France and England on both these questions.¹⁶

Palmerston late in 1840 viewed possible French intervention in Spain seriously, and Bulwer thought much the same way. He cautioned the French government in strong language not to intervene in Spain. Palmerston approved his agent's actions and added, "Any such armed interference on the part

¹⁶Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 16 November 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/555, Secret and Confidential; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 26 November 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, No. 17.

of France in the affairs of Spain . . . would unquestionably lead to the most serious consequences."¹⁷ This statement reflected the abiding mistrust Palmerston had of any suggestion of French involvement in Spanish affairs. It also indicated the fluidity of relations among the allies of the Quadruple Treaty.

Only a year earlier with the fall of Molé and the coming of Soult Palmerston had encouraged the Spanish to believe Soult meant well. In fact Soult had for a short while cooperated perhaps more sincerely with the allies than any other French minister since the signing of the treaty in April 1834. Naval cooperation improved as Spanish troops for the first time were conveyed by French war ships like Hay had been doing for years. Border vigilance improved and conditions temporarily approached cordiality.

The Mohammed Ali question and Thiers' buildup of French armed forces coupled with the clandestine operations of agents provocateurs from Paris spelled an end to the honeymoon.¹⁸

¹⁷Draft, Lord Palmerston to Bulwer, Foreign Office, 18 September 1840, France, F.O. 27/600A.

¹⁸Draft, Lord Palmerston to Southern, Foreign Office, 11 July 1839, No. 39, British Museum, Add. M.S. 48538, Palmerston Letter-Books, CXXII; and Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 15 June 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/530, No. 90. Palmerston

Espartero had never expected much from Soult by way of aid nor did the Spanish government anticipate either the seizure of the Balearic Islands nor an invasion of Spain by French forces. Nevertheless, impressed by British intelligence and their own reports the Isabella government had reinforced the islands.¹⁹

In this crisis of 1840 Palmerston made no real effort to conciliate France. The issue remained too important to the British empire and besides, Palmerston had learned in the years the Quadruple Treaty existed that Louis Philippe's government could not be trusted. His erstwhile ally had never fulfilled the terms of that treaty.

accused Louis Philippe of wanting, in addition to Spain, Egypt, Syria, and Arabia. In late 1839 French ships-of-the-line in European waters outnumbered British ships. Thiers wanted 150,000 more troops added to the 440,000 already under arms. Accompanying this intelligence were highly inflammatory and provocative editorials in Paris newspapers insisting France should seize the Levant and Gibraltar. Despatch, Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 26 October 1840, France, F.O. 27/578, No. 394, Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones, I, 775. Palmerston asked Thiers for an explanation of French military action in June 1840 as the Mohammed Ali issue reached crisis proportions. Clarendon thought Palmerston's actions would precipitate war. Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 198. Clarendon had earlier complained that the foreign secretary had moved entirely to close to Russia on the Eastern question. Fulford and Strachey, Greville Memoirs, IV, 223.

¹⁹Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 20 March 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/574, No. 55.

In the meantime Don Carlos, estranged from his followers and relentlessly pursued by Espartero, retreated and eventually fled to France. The British-initiated policy of division among the Carlist chiefs aided by the growing dissention in the rebel ranks facilitated the signing of the Convention of Bergara in 1839.²⁰ Although all opposition to Isabella did not cease until the following year the back of the movement lay broken. France had the dubious honor of Don Carlos' presence which Soult did not like. Palmerston insisted the rebel chief be held in custody which proved embarrassing to the French government since Carlos had not committed a crime in France. Soult and Louis Philippe in a short time became extremely reluctant to hold Carlos and not just because of the embarrassment. Carlos, they feared, could become the focal point of reactionary opposition elements in France and could also affect the unstable relations they had with the Eastern Powers.

Another disturbing situation developed later when the queen regent fled the powerful and popular Espartero and

²⁰Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 158; and Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones, I, 776. The author states that English efforts procured the best terms possible for Isabella's government. The Times (London), 16 September 1839.

entered France. Rumors of Spanish marriage alliances, long a topic of speculation, took on an added dimension.²¹

The marriage of Isabella vitally concerned the French from the moment she gained the throne of Spain. Palmerston expressed a continuing interest in Isabella's marriageability also because he objected to the idea of a Franco-Spanish compact. On numerous occasions this marriage possibility had been rumored. Always Palmerston spoke out heatedly against a renewal of the family compact in this fashion.

He remained equally opposed to an Austro-Spanish arrangement and here enjoyed the support of the French government which feared being surrounded by Metternichian forces. Cristina had asked Palmerston to name a British prince suitable for Isabella but had been turned down. In 1839 a special mission named by Cristina travelled East in search of a prince. Zea Bermudez and M. Marliani, the former reactionary and the latter quite liberal, represented the Spanish government on the mission. Both were unfortunate choices, Zea Bermudez because he had never sworn an oath of allegiance to the constitution governing

²¹The French held Don Carlos after his capture at Bouges in September 1839. Despatch, Lord Granville to Lord Palmerston, Paris, 21 October 1839, France, F.O. 27/587, No. 327; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Foreign Office, 13 December 1839, France, F.O. 27/578, No. 398.

Spain since 1837 as the law required, and Marliani because his liberalism annoyed Metternich and other princes in Germany.

Without knowing the full details of the mission Palmerston instructed Lord William Russell, H. M. Ambassador to Berlin, to provide any assistance Zea Bermudez and Marliani needed.²² Zea Bermudez received instructions to negotiate for a marriage and a second notice to refrain from mentioning or supporting a European congress to consider Spanish affairs. Additionally the two-man mission wanted to restore diplomatic relations with any power friendly to Isabella's government. This venture caused alarm in several chanceries. Molé took a strong line of opposition to the point of threatening immediate armed intervention in Spain should an Austrian archduke become the groom. Metternich opposed an Austrian also as did Palmerston. So alarmed was Molé that Palmerston felt constrained to tell him he had nothing to do with the substance of the Zea Bermudez mission.²³

In Berlin Zea Bermudez received a moderate welcome as he presented a marriage proposal. But in Vienna the proposals

²²Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, Foreign Office, 7 February 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/176, No. 18.

²³Despatch, Lord Clarendon to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 27 February 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/526, No. 54; and Draft, Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, Foreign Office, 7 March 1839, Spain, F.O. 185/176, No. 32.

were met coldly by Metternich who charged Zea Bermudez with being an embarrassment to the Austrian government. In both instances the good offices of Britain had been requested and used, and one cannot help speculating if the proximity of British representatives to the Spaniard did more harm than good especially since Palmerston stood as the enfant terrible in Metternich's eyes.²⁴ Perhaps Palmerston, who did not agree with an Austrian prince, aided and abetted the Spanish as a sure means of obtaining an Eastern veto on the whole arrangement. The mission proved ultimately to be a failure in every way since no marriage developed nor did Spain obtain recognition from any of the Eastern Powers.

Isabella's marriageability continued to excite all kinds of speculation and rumor. Another rumor of this type occurred late in 1840 when many people suspected Cristina of going to Paris to arrange an alliance between Isabella and one of Louis Philippe's sons. This accord Palmerston opposed above all others. Still another rumor then current thought the Infante Don Francisco the object of the rumored Paris trip.

²⁴Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 16 March 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/527, No. 7; Despatch, Southern to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 25 April 1839, Spain, F.O. 72/528, No. 43; and Maxwell, Life and Letters, I, 198.

Again objections were found because of his education and natural defects.²⁵ The Spanish government told Palmerston Isabella could not marry anyone unless the Cortes agreed to it. These assurances temporarily placated him.²⁶

In September and October 1840 a more pressing problem faced Palmerston as the queen regent thought seriously of resigning her position. The formation of several juntas and growing liberal opposition to Cristina forced her to consider this move. The juntas reflected annoyance at the regents' efforts to eliminate some of the special municipal privileges the towns enjoyed. Liberals, on the other hand, believed the French exercised undue influence over internal Spanish affairs through the queen mother.

M. de la Redorte, French minister to Spain, urged Cristina to resist the newly formed juntas as he supported her anti-liberal policies. Louis Philippe feared and detested the liberal cause which prompted him to interfere in Spain. Thiers, more liberal than his master, nevertheless had an

²⁵Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 26 November 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/547, No. 73; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Valencia, 19 October 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/555, Confidential.

²⁶Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 6 December 1840, Spain, F.O. 72/556, No. 155.

aversion to Spanish liberals of the progressive party that Palmerston supported, and he encouraged resistance to the juntas.²⁷ Aston believed the reason the French urged opposition to the juntas was to see Cristina fall but this idea makes no sense.²⁸ More likely Cristina's opposition to the liberals supported by France was intended to conciliate the Eastern Courts for the purpose of gaining recognition for Isabella and to reduce Spanish dependence upon Britain.

Redorte thought Spain in imminent danger of disintegrating into several small federal states. Palmerston and Clarendon had long speculated upon this possibility and the efforts of France to detach Catalonia from Spain. The Balearic Island controversy which provided Granville and Bulwer with proof of French hostility reinforced these doubts about France. Palmerston told Granville Louis Philippe lacked integrity, scruples, and honesty.²⁹ At virtually every turn in Spanish affairs the governments of London and Paris disagreed on policy as they had done throughout the 1830's.

²⁷ Despatch, Bulwer to Aston, Paris, 21 August 1840, France, F.O. 27/605, No. 43.

²⁸ Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Valencia, 9 October 1840, Spain, F.O. 27/554, No. 112.

²⁹ Letter, Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, 23 April 1840, Ashley, Life and Correspondence, p. 367; and Becker y Gonzales, Historia de las relaciones, II, 8.

Cristina resigned the regency 12 October 1840 after having failed to establish an ultra-moderado government and having repealed some liberal measures. Her reactionary repeal of municipal privileges led to Espartero's resignation from the government which left the queen regent in an untenable position. Espartero, the hero of the wars, returned to the government as President of the Council after her resignation. In May 1841 the victorious general became sole regent. Cristina had, upon resigning her office, travelled toward Naples by way of Marseilles where she altered her plans and went north to Paris. Outside Paris Louis Philippe greeted her warmly and personally escorted her to the city. During the remaining months of Palmerston's tenure in office considerable speculation about Isabella's marriage centered around Cristina's residence in Paris.³⁰

A new plan to wed Isabella to Louis Philippe's son emerged in 1841 and the Spanish minister to France, M. Olozaga, supported the idea. With this in mind the French government worked to defeat Espartero's drive to deprive Cristina of her guardianship over Isabella. The French felt the removal of

³⁰Annual Register, 1840, LXXXII, 202-207; and The Times (London), 26 November 1840.

Cristina would eliminate their influence in deciding who would be the prince consort. Earlier France had supported the idea of making Espartero sole regent in place of Cristina so it was obvious the marriage scheme of 1841 reflected a change in French attitudes.³¹ By the time Palmerston left office in August 1841 the issue still had not been resolved.

On the question of legal guardian to Isabella Louis Philippe supported the queen mother while Palmerston favored Espartero. Molé, in the French Chambers, argued that to support Cristina meant in effect to give England control of Spain. He predicted that Britain would resolve the Spanish problem as it had done the Egyptian, without the aid of France and entirely to British satisfaction. Guizot said this possibility existed since the party in power in Spain, by his own admission, remained extremely pro-British.³² The Spanish government did exhibit somewhat more friendship for Britain under Espartero. Attempts to conciliate England included efforts to pay the money due to bondholders and a refusal to renew the Port Mahon lease with France.

³¹Draft, Lord Palmerston to Aston, Foreign Office, 11 June 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/570, No. 85; and Despatch, Aston to Lord Palmerston, Madrid, 10 July 1841, Spain, F.O. 72/577, No. 157, Confidential.

³²Annual Register, 1841, LXXXIII, 240.

The Carlist War gradually lost its domestic significance in England in the late thirties. Palmerston experienced a significant reduction in domestic opposition to his Spanish policies in 1839. Not all of his critics felt satisfied with the cost of the war or the outcome, but the issue died with the Convention of Bergara. Other more pressing concerns, notably Chartism, Mohammed Ali, and the Opium War absorbed the attentions of Parliament. Clarendon, recently returned from his post at Madrid, replied to Lord Lyndhurst's last weak parliamentary attempt to make Spain an issue. The ex-minister to Madrid went into a justification of past and present policies which elicited only mild protest from Wellington and the opposition. Spain as a burning issue had clearly been extinguished. The Iron Duke's most serious charge was that contrary to Palmerston's denials England had been a belligerent in the wars.³³

The Whig government experienced many difficulties in 1839 and temporarily forced out of office managed to return to power only because of Victoria's stubbornness on the burning issue of her ladies in waiting. Never a popular person, Palmerston

³³ Colonel Garwood, The Speeches of the Duke of Wellington in Parliament, 2 vols., (London: John Murray, 1854), II, 452.

took his share of the invective hurled at the government. Greville reported him as abhorred, hated, and unpopular but "still reigning in his little kingdom of the Foreign Office."³⁴ The foreign secretary thoroughly alarmed his own cabinet over the Mohammed Ali dilemma which made Clarendon believe Palmerston had got too close to Russia while keeping France in check on that issue.³⁵ So completely did these events occupy the minds of Britons that after the Convention of Bergara, despite serious problems still existing among the allies, little attention was focused on Spain.

In 1841 at the opening of Parliament Wellington directed a few remarks toward past policies in Spain. Rather surprisingly he lent support to the ministers on their foreign policy in general. With reference to Spain and Anglo-French relations he also expressed approval though he denied the concept of an Anglo-French alliance saying,

"I have heard a great deal, on this and on other occasions, of what is called the alliance between England and France. I know that an alliance existed between England and France when those powers cooperated on several occasions for the purpose of obtaining some particular object."

³⁴Fulford and Strachey, Greville Memoirs, IV, 137.

³⁵Ibid., 225.

They cooperated, he said, in the Netherlands and in Spain where they enjoyed the best understanding. "But I know of no other particular alliance existing between the two countries."³⁶

Clearly, if the best understanding England and France enjoyed in the 1830's was in the Netherlands and Spain, no rapprochement existed for these powers. France cooperated in the Netherlands only because of the immediate threat of war with England and refused time and again to cooperate in Iberia. Their nationalist interests in Western Europe and the world prevented any rapprochement with Palmerston in the 1830's.

³⁶Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CARLIST WARS,

1833-1841

British foreign policy in Spain during the Carlist War was remarkably consistent and reflected the personal wishes of Palmerston. With his Spanish policies he wanted to re-establish British influence within the Madrid government and to exercise some control over French policies there while lending encouragement to liberalism and constitutionalism. Palmerston succeeded in implementing his program.

The basis for Palmerston's policies was his sincere and abiding support for liberalism in the 1830's. Although a late convert, he nevertheless embraced liberalism as a cause worth defending in Europe and particularly Spain. There he could not only support liberalism but at the same time he could combat absolutism and the French aggrandizement he feared. Not once during the protracted war did he try to topple a liberal Spanish regime. He lent his support to the most radical liberal

governments that were established by the Spaniards and hoped their policies might be moderated. However, he did support them. Liberalism in Spain was preserved at least as long as Palmerston and the Whigs held office in Britain.

Palmerston enjoyed remarkable success in keeping the French out of Spain. Limiting Louis Philippe's freedom of action in Iberia was one of the fundamental goals of the Quadruple Treaty and although the French occasionally gained a temporary ascendancy in Madrid during the struggle they never retained it. By the end of the war their position was weakened and it declined still more in the last two years of Palmerston's tenure in office. During that time Palmerston made effective use of the French threat to seize the Balearic Islands to undermine their position with Espartero, the liberal general and Cristina's replacement as regent.

There is an obvious and basic disagreement between this study and studies made by several other historians. The most fundamental difference is evident in the terminology used. Webster, Langer, Woodward, Bell, Hall, Holt and indeed almost everyone that has written about the Carlist Wars have referred to the agreement between Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal in 1834 as the Quadruple Alliance. That document was a Quadruple Treaty, not an alliance. A treaty implies something

less than an entente cordiale or alliance which is the contention of this study. No rapprochement or entente cordiale existed between Britain and France in the 1830's nor was one possible because the foreign and imperial policies of these two powers were almost everywhere in conflict.

Palmerston also used the Quadruple Treaty to insure the separation of France and the Eastern Powers. In 1833 Louis Philippe had begun looking to the Eastern Courts for an understanding. Following the signing of the treaty no rapprochement between France and the Eastern Powers was even remotely possible. Louis Philippe gradually lost the benefits of the Quadruple Treaty in the following years as he further alienated Palmerston, but he still failed to reach an accord with the Eastern Courts.

One of the remarkable things about Palmerston's success in Spain was that he accomplished so much without overturning his policy of nonintervention. Palmerston was not interested in militarily intervening in Spain although Southgate charges that he was. He did not even threaten to intervene against Carlos to end the war. He did materially aid the Madrid government with arms and he permitted the formation of the B.A.L., but he never threatened Carlos with the British army. Palmerston repeatedly stated his policy of nonintervention. In fact,

rather than intervene, Palmerston said he would end the aid Britain was giving Isabella when her government refused to settle certain outstanding problems affecting British subjects.

In two areas of concern vital to British interests Palmerston did not do too well. Although he made repeated efforts to obtain a satisfactory liberal commercial treaty, he failed. There were some tariff revisions and he enjoyed partial success, but the Spanish were not prepared to go the way of free trade in the 1830's. Some discriminatory charges still remained to hamper British trade and while some tariff revision occurred the rates remained high generally. The second area of concern involved the marriage of Isabella. The issue was not settled by 1841 when Palmerston left office, but he had been successful to the extent that neither a Bourbon, Orleanist, or Habsburg was betrothed to the young queen. His success was in preventing a decision rather than in obtaining a lasting solution.

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