

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

REALIGNMENT THEORY IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

A Dissertation

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

DONNA R. HOFFMAN

Norman, Oklahoma

2001

UMI Number: 3018336

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 3018336

Copyright 2001 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.


Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346


©Copyright by Donna R. Hoffman 2001
All Rights Reserved.

REALIGNMENT THEORY IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE


A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE


BY











ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Allen Hertzke for his guidance on this project. This dissertation is a much better finished product because of his direction. In addition, Professor Keith Gaddie deserves thanks for his many constructive comments. I would also like to acknowledge my mother Glenda Riddle for acquainting me with the political system early in my life and instilling the idea that one individual can make a difference. Thanks goes to my family who provided much support during the final stages of this work when we were 'homeless.' They also went above and beyond the call of duty in helping Nathan-sit. A special thanks goes to my husband, Mike, to whom this work is dedicated. This work would never have been completed with his encouragement, love, and support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
-----------------------	----

Chapter

1. REALIGNMENTS AND A CHANGING ELECTORATE	1
Overview	

2. THE “SCHOLARLY MORASS” AND VALUE CHANGE	11
--	----

Realignments of Electorates

Realignment Characteristics

Critical Realignments

Secular Realignments

The Importance of Cleavages

Further Articulation of the Theory

How to Identify a Realignment?

Realignments: Running Behind

Dealignment

Rethinking Realignment

The Poverty of Critical Realignment Theory

Social Change

Inglehart & Value Change

Implications for the U.S.

Critical Realignment Theory in a Societal Context

3. CHANGING ELECTORAL CIRCUMSTANCES	45
---	----

Changes in the Political Environment

Evidence for Dealignment, Apartisanship or both?

Have Cleavages Changed Over Time?

Cleavages, Critical Realignment, and Value Change

The Importance of Cleavages

The Cleavages

Gender

Age Cohorts

Race/Ethnicity

Education

Place of Residence

Region of Residence

	Income	
	Union Membership	
	Ideology	
	Religion	
	Postmaterialist/Materialist Values	
	Cleavage Summary	
	Active Cleavages	
	Latent Cleavages	
	Where do the Cleavages Leave Us?	
Changes in the Social Environment	Who are the Postmaterialists?	
	Age	
	Education	
	Religion	
	Ideology	
	Partisanship	
	The Results	
Summary		

4. IS THERE A 'DIME'S WORTH OF DIFFERENCE'? THE EBB AND FLOW OF PARTY PLATFORMS 133

The State of Cleavages
Investigating Cleavage Patterns
Why Platforms?
Method
Platform Analysis
1952: The Specter of Communism
1960: Gap Politics
1968: Vietnam and the Triumph of Domestic Policy
1976: The Rise of Civil Liberties
1984: A Clear Choice
1992: Breaking the Mold
1996: A new Paradigm?
Platform change over time
Priority
Polarization and Differentiation
Conclusions

5. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE	216
Party Platforms and Social Change	
The Culture War as a Limited War	
Implications of the absence of critical realignments	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	226
APPENDICES	238

CHAPTER 1

REALIGNMENTS AND A CHANGING ELECTORATE

Virtually every election since the mid 1960s has been hailed as some kind of realignment, somewhere in the United States by someone. This proliferation of realignment variations has given us regional, rolling, hollow, major, minor, across-the-board, compensating, creeping, step, non-critical, top-down, incomplete, no majority, postindustrial, evangelical, southern, and policy realignments. Dealignment has also been used to explain electoral circumstances. There seem to be more disagreements among scholars about realignment than agreements. The confusion and lack of agreement over sometimes even the most fundamental foundations of realignment could indicate a theory that has outlived its usefulness in explaining the behavior of the electorate. Critical realignment theory, and its failure to appear in the contemporary electorate, is the focus of this work.

While there are many disagreements over what constitutes a 'realignment' and when and where they have occurred, there is broad agreement that there has not been an earthshattering, sudden movement of a large part of the electorate since the New Deal. Why has no 'critical realignment' occurred? Why have we been in a prolonged period of dealignment? One of the possible reasons why there has been no critical election, and thus a realignment, in the United States since the 1930s is that the electorate has changed

so substantially that critical realignment theory does not fit contemporary electoral circumstances.

When scholars have sought to solve the puzzle of the absent critical realignment, they have primarily looked to political change, exploring such factors as election returns, partisan identification, divided government, and voter turnout. For example, many have documented the political changes that contribute to dealignment, such as increasing numbers of independent voters, less partisan attachment and loyalty, split-ticket voting, and media-centered and image driven elections (Beck 1977; Ladd 1981; Norpoth and Rusk 1982; Carmines, McIver, and Stimson 1987; Wattenberg 1996). Observed political changes are what has driven much of the realignment literature since the 1970s.¹ But, politics does not exist in a vacuum and critical realignments have always hinged on broad societal factors. The critical realignment preceding the Civil War involved the issues of slavery, secession, and recession (Sundquist 1983, 74-82). The critical realignment of the 1890s was largely about the dislocation of the agrarian sector during industrialization (134-169). The Great Depression and the tearing of the social fabric it caused sparked the critical realignment of the 1930s (198-229). When scholars have looked back on electoral history and identified critical realignments, they have noted the importance of not only the political, but also the social environment (Key 1955, Sundquist 1983, Burnham 1970). However, when scholars of electoral behavior assess the contemporary

¹To a large extent, this may be due to the increasing reliance of the subfield of electoral behavior on survey data. By the 1970s, there was sufficient data to establish a time series and document changes over time. Unfortunately, this reliance on survey data has led scholars in this area to focus more on the microanalysis of electoral behavior rather than the macroanalysis.

electorate, they often lose sight of the social forces that accompany political change. The impact that broad societal change may have on electoral politics needs to be explored further. If the electorate, or even a part of the electorate, has undergone a large scale social change, then what does this mean for theories of electoral behavior? The paradigm for explaining electoral circumstances in the United States has been realignment theory. Does this paradigm still fit the circumstances of the contemporary electorate?

Political scholars working outside the framework of realignment have increasingly noticed profound changes in contemporary society and the effect these social changes have on politics (Putnam 1993a, 1995a, 2000; Skocpol 1999; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1997). Since critical realignments of the past have been accompanied by changing social forces, it is certainly the case that societal factors should be considered when seeking an explanation for the lack of a critical realignment. What has been missing from the studies that attempt to explain the lack of a critical realignment in the contemporary electorate is a discussion of broad societal forces that may be at play and the impact these forces may have on this particular theory of electoral change. What has been missing, in short, is a theoretical framework that addresses large-scale social change. This study seeks to examine critical realignment theory in a broad social perspective by using one such theory.

Broad social change has been examined both globally and within the United States (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1997; Bell 1973; Hunter 1991, 1994; Putnam 1995b, 2000). However, few have brought together the political AND social changes that have been occurring within the American electorate and assessed the impact these changes might

have on the state of critical realignment theory, which is what this investigation seeks to do. Changes in social interactions, fundamental values, or even the way society views religion could profoundly alter not only the way segments of the electorate behave, but also who makes up the active electorate. But, there are several competing, though not wholly unconnected, broad theories concerning the state of postmodern society.

Perhaps the best known theorist in this area is Robert Putnam. Working initially in Italy, Putnam documented that the more civic-minded and socially connected citizens of northern Italy had better government than their fellow citizens in southern Italy. The reason, Putnam discovered, is because northern Italy is imbued with social capital - trust, social networks and norms of reciprocity - which make democracy 'work' (1993a). Most recently, Putnam has documented the decline of social capital in the United States and its implications for democracy (1995a, 1995b, 2000). "It is commonly assumed that cynicism toward government has caused our disengagement from politics, but the converse is just as likely: that we are disaffected because as we and our neighbors have dropped out [and become civically disengaged], the real performance of government has suffered" (2000, 347). Social disengagement, he feels, has led to poor government and political disengagement. As society's store of social capital declines, democracy may be imperiled. As government begins to malfunction, there are fewer and fewer people who participate and perform the important function of overseeing government to insure that it does not overstep its bounds.

Despite the appeal of Putnam's theory, his is not the theoretical framework of social change utilized. This is not to say that Putnam's insights might not be useful in

helping to explain the lack of critical realignments. Part of V.O. Key's criteria for a critical election is an electorate that is intensely involved (1955). The declining rates of both political and social engagement that Putnam documents have certainly affected this aspect of critical elections. However, Putnam has little to say regarding the active electorate's partisanship and how increasing disengagement might affect it. Since this work is concerned with the *partisan* changes in the electorate, Putnam's theory is less useful for the task at hand. There is, however, another theory of broad social change which has direct implications for critical realignment theory because it does address how the changing social environment affects the partisanship of the electorate. This framework is Ronald Inglehart's theory of value change in postindustrial society.

Inglehart sees changing features in western industrial societies evidenced by increasing postmaterialist values (1971, 1977, 1997). The value change he identifies has political implications because he sees a new cleavage forming that is taking the place of traditional partisan cleavages. Inglehart argues that society's values are changing from being materialist (values that emphasize economic and physical security) to postmaterialist (values that emphasize quality of life and self-expression) in substantial portions of the industrialized West's electorates. If, over the last several decades, society's values became more postmaterialist and this value orientation affected the nature of partisanship as Inglehart asserts, then the status of traditional theories of voter behavior, in particular critical realignment theory, may be jeopardized in an electorate whose patterns of partisanship have fundamentally changed since V.O. Key formulated his theories of critical elections (1955) and secular realignment (1959).

There are several reasons why Inglehart's theory of value change serves as the theoretical framework for this examination of critical realignment theory in social perspective. First, critical realignment theory is based upon the partisanship of the active electorate. It is crucial for critical realignment theory to be able to identify the partisan nature of cleavages within society. Putnam, and others working in the same theoretical vein, have much to say about disengagement, but less to say about the partisanship of those who are engaged. Secondly, Inglehart's theory is arguably the best articulated and quantifiable theory of social change. The survey instrument that Inglehart formulated for identifying one's value orientation has been included in the American National Election Studies and Inglehart has been quite detailed in describing the expected characteristics and behavior of materialists and postmaterialists. Further, Inglehart believes the importance of economic issues are being eclipsed by quality of life issues for postmaterial voters. When critical elections and the realignments that cause them have occurred, they have always had an economic element.² Therefore, it is plausible that if economic issues are less important, critical elections might be less likely to occur. Another reason why Inglehart is the chosen framework is the link the two theories have to societal cleavages and their partisan nature. Both Inglehart's conception of value change and critical realignment theory are based upon cleavage behavior and have certain expectations regarding the partisanship of groups. Finally, the onset of dealignment in the mid 1960s and 1970s corresponds to the time period when Inglehart believes postmaterialist values began to make an impact in the electorate. Inglehart, with a co-author, is the originator of

²I am indebted to Keith Gaddie for the illumination of this fact.

the term “dealignment” and he obviously sees a connection between the rise of postmaterialist values and the impact they have upon partisan identities (Inglehart and Hochstein 1972). For these reasons, the social change framework for this examination of critical realignment theory’s status will be Inglehart’s concept of value change.

Overview

The following chapters will undertake a step-by-step examination of critical realignment theory’s status in the contemporary electorate in light of the changes that Ronald Inglehart sees occurring in postindustrial society. Chapter Two reviews the two theories, critical realignment theory and Inglehart’s theory of value change, and the expectations they have for cleavage behavior in the electorate and its partisanship. In Chapter Three, partisan voting trends are examined with an eye toward Inglehart’s value change theory and the implications it holds for critical realignment theory. Substantial changes are found in cleavage behavior that indicate the concept of critical realignment in the United States, a theory formulated in the 1950s, should not be applied to current electoral circumstances. It may be beneficial to speak of realignments occurring within cohesive groups, such as white Southern voters, or white evangelical Christians; it is not beneficial to seek to apply the framework of realignment to the entire United States like a blanket without attention to the individual groups that are partisanly aligned, which is what many seek to do when they declare a ‘realignment.’ In addition, Chapter Three finds that the changes evident in group electoral behavior do not seem to be caused by Inglehart’s theory of value change as he measures the phenomenon and theorizes about it. Since Inglehart’s measure of social change was not fruitful, party platform analysis over

time is utilized as an alternative indicator of social change. Chapter Four investigates the party platforms of the two major parties for possible reasons why many cleavages dissipated in the 1990s yet others remained strong. It is found that beginning in 1992, the two parties' approach to political issues, such as the economy, social welfare policy, and government administration become less distinct, but their stances on cultural issues in the area of civil rights and liberties were quite polarized. Based on this evidence, there may be a kernel of truth in Inglehart's basic theory that quality of life issues are beginning to take precedence over economic ones, at least when viewed solely from the content of party platforms. Cultural issues on which the two parties now polarize are seen as quality of life issues for many voters.³

Chapter Five draws conclusions from the analysis of cleavage behavior and political party platforms. The electorate has changed; substantial portions of it have become increasingly less partisan over time. These changes suggest that we need to adjust our thinking about critical realignment theory. The 1990s witnessed a disintegration of many partisanly aligned cleavages that would preclude a critical realignment from occurring in the present partisanly splintered electorate. In addition, the parties in the 1990s began to polarize on issues that many segments of the electorate did

³This characterization, however, is problematic if Inglehart's theory is taken in finer detail because he narrowly conceptualizes quality of life issues. For example, abortion is certainly not an economic issue. Inglehart does see it as a quality of life issue but he characterizes those who oppose abortion as materialists and those who support abortion rights as postmaterialists rather than characterizing all those who feel abortion is a defining issue as postmaterialists. Regardless of the side of the debate one chooses in the abortion battle, one should be characterized as a postmaterialist because one is choosing a quality of life issue over economic issues, but this is not Inglehart's view when his theory is closely scrutinized. See Inglehart 1997, 271, 276-279.

not deem to be of primary importance (cultural issues) and became less distinct on the issues they did consider to be of primary importance (political issues). Groups that remained partisanly cohesive in the 1990s were the very groups to which cultural appeals have the most allure and these were the issues upon which the parties polarized. Thus, many voters could be partisanly ambivalent because the political issues they seemingly care most about are the issues on which the parties' stances are similar. The evolution of party platforms has loosely followed the broad outline of Inglehart's basic theory that quality of life issues are eclipsing economic ones.⁴ Given, however, that Inglehart's own measure of values is not congruent with his theoretical expectations, the theory must be revisited before applying it to the American electorate. Perhaps more instructive to the American case is Hunter's culture wars thesis (1991, 1994). The two parties have begun to polarize on the issues over which Hunter believes the culture wars are being fought. In addition, Hunter may be more applicable because he believes the culture wars are elite driven. Since party platforms are elite-written documents, it could be that the changes in the way issues are addressed in the party platforms are largely elite-led and do not have broad mass appeal. This is substantiated by the fact that substantial portions of the electorate in the 1990s did not believe cultural issues were of primary importance.

Because of the changes observed in the electorate, critical realignment would seem to be a theory that can safely be put on the shelf, not to be taken down again until greater numbers of identifiable groups become more partisanly attached. The two parties

⁴This is true if one takes the broad outlines of the theory and not some of the more specific aspects of it, as noted above.

are polarized on certain issues, but these issues do not currently appeal to enough groups of voters that a critical-election-prompting coalition could form. Enough groups within the contemporary electorate have become sufficiently apartisan that it makes little sense to speak of an identifiable Democratic or Republican coalition large enough to form the basis for a critical realignment. While there are still groups that maintain strong partisan identities, the electorate as a whole is too partisanly splintered to satisfy the requirements for a critical realignment. If there were to be a critical election that clearly produced a majority government, one would still need to identify the groups that contributed to that majority. One has to be able to identify the characteristics of who is aligned with which party for one to cognitively make sense of a realignment. Presently, the electorate does not meet this requirement.

CHAPTER 2

THE “SCHOLARLY MORASS” AND VALUE CHANGE

As research on realignments has accumulated and spawned a thousand types, Carmines and Stimson were prompted to label the situation a “scholarly morass” (1989, 25). The label rings true as scholars disagree over when, where, how, and why realignments have occurred. Why has realignment theory become so disorderly and confused? Has realignment become a “scholarly morass” because it no longer fits with electoral circumstances due to some large-scale change in American society? That the character of American politics has changed in the last thirty years is not in doubt. The nature of the transformation, however, is intensely debated. One change posited by political scientists is a cultural shift brought on by postindustrial society, where values are increasingly bifurcated along materialist and postmaterialist dimensions (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1997). Could this societal change be responsible for the difficulty realignment theory has had in explaining electoral circumstances? This chapter provides the context needed to answer this question.

Realignment of Electorates

Realignment theory is concerned with the behavior of the electorate. It is often caricatured as the result of a large number of voters switching political party allegiance. Any time the partisan control of Congress or the presidency changes hands, journalists

often declare a realignment; it makes a nice headline. A central aspect of much voting behavior literature (performed by scholars, not journalists) concerns realignments. The concept is constantly being reformulated to fit the latest election or the latest twitch, however slight, of the electorate. This is largely due to a lack of definitional clarity, the lack of a consistent measure of evidence that would point to a realignment, and the failure of a critical realignment to appear “on schedule.”

Realignment Characteristics

Any discussion of realignment, no matter what type, must begin with V.O. Key. In two successive articles in the *Journal of Politics*, he identified two types of realignments, one that causes a critical election (often termed a critical realignment¹)(1955) and the other identified as a secular realignment (1959). The key to distinguishing between critical realignment and secular realignment is time. A critical realignment happens abruptly over the course of a few elections but the change will persist across many subsequent elections. With a secular realignment the change is made evident over the period of many elections. No one election stands out as critical in the gradual realignment. The result of both types is the same, a profound and lasting change in partisan attachments. If one is plunging into the quagmire that realignment theory has become, it helps to keep in mind the definition of the two types of realignments that Key posited.

¹Key himself does not use the term ‘critical realignment’; he states that critical elections occur when there is a realignment. The ‘critical realignment’ terminology is Burnham’s (1970).

Critical realignments

Key's article, "A Theory of Critical Elections" (1955) began the debate about realignments within the electorate. The underlying question addressed by Key is whether or not all elections are the same. Maybe, he suggested, some elections are more important, or at least different, than other elections. Key posits that a critical election occurs when there is a realignment of voters. Examining these "critical elections" could tell one something useful about the behavior of voters. A realignment, and thus a critical election, will include three elements, according to Key:

1. The electorate's involvement in the election is deep, intense, and high
2. Election results indicate that there has been a marked change in the electorate's cleavages
3. These changes persist over time (1955, 4)

One must keep in mind what Key repeats, "Central to our concept of critical elections is a realignment within the electorate both sharp and durable" (1955, 11). In today's realignment literature on the United States, many (both scholars and journalists) proclaim realignment at the slightest ripple in election returns. There is usually not an ensuing discussion of depth of concern, issue, or turnout. Realignments are often proclaimed after the results are in from a single election, but one election does not make a realignment. It is crucial for definitional clarity that time is allowed to pass to see if the new alignment persists in subsequent elections and thus signals that a critical election occurred because voters' new alignments have endured. As Sundquist points out in his masterly work on realignments, "... a voter who crosses the line to vote against the party he normally supports is not realigning unless he makes a lasting shift of party loyalty and attachment.

If the shift is temporary, he is merely *deviating*" (1983, 4).

Secular Realignments

Key termed the other type of realignment secular realignment. Secular realignments occur when there are "long-term . . . shifts in party attachment among the voters" (Key 1959, 198). A prime example of a secular realignment is the shift of Southern white voters from the Democratic party to the Republican party that began in the 1960s and was not fully complete until well into the 1990s (Petrocik 1987; Bullock 1988; Miller and Shanks 1996; Gaddie and Hoffman 2001).

The Importance of Cleavages

Central to Key's discussion of realignment, whether critical or secular, is the concept of cleavages. Cleavages, according to Lipset and Rokkan, are divisions in society that stem from characteristics within the electorate (1967). Lipset and Rokkan identify four sets of cleavages that are present in western electorates: center and periphery, church and state, rural and urban, and class (13-26). Thus, when Key speaks of urban, immigrant Catholics voting preponderantly for the Democratic party in the 1920-28 elections in New England while their rural, American-born counterparts voted for the Republicans, he is speaking of cleavages and their effects on voting preferences. This is a crucial, and not often emphasized part of Key's conception of realignment, both for critical and secular types. Key refers to electoral cleavages and in his criteria for a critical election, he states that "the voting reveals a sharp alteration of the *pre-existing cleavage*

within the electorate” (italics mine 1955, 4).² In his article on secular realignment, his definition states, “a secular shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement of the members of a *population category*” (italics mine 1959, 199). Population categories form the bases for potential cleavages. Key delineates the categories on which a realignment might be based: “occupational group, income class, religious faith, or even the residents of a geographical area” (199).³ Key also recognizes that cleavages may disintegrate over time (203, 205). The rural-urban dimension is essential to Key’s

²One should note that the election of 1896 is identified by Key as a critical election, and thus, a realignment took place (1955). Key does not believe that cleavages played a role in this election, but he can only examine the cleavages of religion, national origin, and industrialization and even these are based on the only reliable figures he has - population of the town (14). “Perhaps the significant feature of the 1896 contest was that, at least in New England, it did not form a new division in which partisan lines became more nearly congruent with lines separating classes, religions, or other such social groups”(12). Key concluded this because the Republicans benefitted fairly consistently across populations and even though this election is often presented as a contest between the haves and have-nots, Key does not find evidence of such in his data (13). He concludes, however, “Instead of a sharpening of class cleavages within New England the voting apparently reflected more a sectional antagonism and anxiety, shared by all classes, expressed in opposition to the dangers supposed to be threatening from the West” (16). It is important to note that Key is only examining election returns from New England states and his data is limited. Therefore, it would seem that the relevant cleavage for this election, to which Key alludes, would be a sectional one that would not be evident from the data Key examined.

³It should be recognized that Key (1966) would later emphasize the importance of analyzing voter behavior in relationship to issues, not group characteristics. Key states, “Not every election generates group-related issues which drive a wedge through the electorate along lines easily identifiable by gross characteristics of the electorate” (1966, 70). However, examining the contemporary status of realignment theory, which I seek to do, necessitates looking at broad groups within the American electorate, their partisan attachments, and how these have changed over time. If the postmaterialist-materialist value distinction does, in fact, cleave the electorate, one still needs to know ‘who’ the postmaterialists and materialists are. There is no other way to do this than to look at broad group characteristics.

identification of cleavages. The rural-urban cleavage, however, ceases to be very useful once the vast majority of the population lives in cities.

What is it that is realigning? Voters, but specifically voters with certain characteristics. Who is realigning is only interesting if one can identify the meaningful characteristics of the 'who.' Essentially, a realignment is a realignment of the cleavage structure of the electorate. It is a realignment of the partisan vote choices of certain groups within society.

Further Articulation of the Theory

Key does not attempt to explain why realigning elections occur. He simply shows that they do occur and provides a simple way to identify when they have occurred. The fact that realignments have become a part of normal, every day political discourse indicates the impact of Key's theory. Certainly the theory, as set forth by Key, is only the beginning point for the study of realignments, something he recognizes. Many scholars have taken up Key's challenge to do further study in this area. Unfortunately, the theory has not progressed in a coherent manner.

Within the massive realignment literature, there are many disparate threads. Disagreements occur as to what constitutes a realignment and when they have occurred historically, though there is general agreement on three periods of realignment. Most agree that a realignment of voters occurred before and during the Civil War, when a third party, the Republicans, came to power. A second realignment is generally considered to have occurred in the 1890s in favor of the Republicans. During this period the Republicans were predominantly in control of the major organs of government and

strengthened their position with this realignment. So, a change of dominant parties did not take place.⁴ Finally, there is general agreement on a realignment occurring in the Great Depression of the 1930s, when the Democrats became the majority party. Dates are generalized because there is no broad agreement as to what specific election of the period signaled the realignment. In fact, it is generally agreed upon that dates will vary with regions of the country and their different circumstances (Key 1955; Campbell, et al., 1960; Brady 1985). Beyond these three periods, there is little agreement on when realignments have occurred. Burnham identifies five realignments (1970, 1). Sundquist distinguishes between major (1850s, 1890s, 1930s) and minor (1910, 1920) realignments (1983, 37). Brady (1985) and Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (1990) make persuasive cases for only the three generally agreed upon realignments.

In the landmark *The American Voter*, the authors contended that there is usually a catastrophic issue involved in electoral realignments (Campbell, et al. 1960, 534). The Michigan scholars also believed that an electoral realignment would actually occur over several elections, constituting an “electoral era.” For example, the New Deal realignment began in 1928 and did not reach its peak until 1936 (535). This is also consistent with Key’s findings in New England, where he determined that “the Roosevelt revolution of 1932 was in large measure an Al Smith revolution of 1928” (1955, 4). Campbell, et al., find that it is not so much that already socialized voters switch party allegiances, though this does occur, but that those socialized during the elections of the realignment form a

⁴For this reason, Gerald Pomper does not agree on this realignment period because his definition of a realignment is based on a change in majority party (1968).

lasting allegiance to the dominant party (1960, 535-536). Both Anderson (1979) and Erikson and Tedin (1981) conclude that critical elections are not caused by people already in the electorate changing their party identification; critical realignments are caused by the mobilization of new voters, either first time voters or newly re-active voters. Carmines, McIver and Stimson also believe that the initial socialization is the key and that most voters do not switch horses in midstream, so to speak (1987). However, Key's final work published after his death found, at least at the presidential level, " . . . that the shifting voter is far more numerous than is commonly supposed" (1966, 52). Sundquist also maintained that conversion is a process that is common. He concludes, "The weight of evidence supports a conclusion that both conversion and mobilization play substantial parts in the realignment, in proportions still indeterminate" (1983, 230). More recently, Miller and Shanks have concluded that there was significant conversion of older voters in the 1980s (1996, 151-84).

Walter Dean Burnham examined what he termed critical realignments, echoing Key's assertion that critical elections involve realignments. Building upon Key's initial theory, he adds ideological polarization and periodicity (1970, 7-8). Polarization will occur first within the party or parties and then between them. Burnham, unlike the Michigan scholars, saw one characteristic of a realignment as an event where "large blocks of the active electorate . . . shift their partisan allegiance" (1970, 3). Burnham formulated the "party system" nomenclature where the five party systems are delineated with realignments. Consequently, he identifies realignments occurring with regularity in 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932 (1970, 1).

Sundquist (1983) has examined realignment periods, of which he sees only three major ones - the Civil War era, the 1890s, and the New Deal - and determined that there are five key elements that cause a realignment. These elements are the following:

1. An all encompassing critical, cataclysmic issue
2. The issue polarizes the public
3. Party leaders are polarized by the issue
4. Parties are also polarized by the issue
5. Voters' ties to the party they choose, according to their stance on the issue, are strengthened and endure (41-46)

Both Sundquist and Burnham contribute to the discussion of realignments by delineating some common characteristics. For example, both see realignments occurring when there is some cataclysmic issue and the major parties polarize, thus giving voters a clear choice of sides. Nevertheless, beyond the three generally agreed upon realignments, Sundquist and Burnham do not agree on occurrence.

Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1990) reformulated a portion of Key's critical election theory. These authors see realignments as following critical elections, not occurring simultaneously with them. The ensuing realignment will come as a response to whether those elected in the critical election were successful in correcting the crisis or problem that was responsible for their election (30). If they are successful, then voters align with that party. If they are unsuccessful, the realignment does not materialize, but a critical election still occurred. According to this conception 1994 would classify as a critical election but one that failed to produce a critical realignment.

How to Identify a Realignment?

Not only do scholars disagree on when realignments have occurred, but they also

disagree on how to measure and identify them. A debate surrounds what unit of analysis should be used. Largely this depends on whether one thinks of realignments as local, state, regional, or national phenomena. There is not a consensus on whether individual or aggregate level data should be used. When Key wrote, he had only limited data available to him, aggregate election and population statistics. Since the advent of reliable survey data in the 1950s, most have come to use it as the basis of their studies (Erikson and Tedin 1981; Petrocik 1987; Norpoth 1987; Wattenberg 1987; Carmines, McIver, and Stimson 1987; Miller 1991). Burnham (1970) used congressional election returns. Nardulli used presidential election returns (1995). Bullock used office holding data at the presidential and both state and federal legislative level (1988). The most comprehensive examinations are to be found in Brady (1985) and Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1990). Brady not only used congressional election returns, but also incorporated institutional measures such as partisan polarization, committee turnover and policy change in the House of Representatives. Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1990) argued that one must look at more than just election returns to identify realignments. They also considered political leadership and government control in their analysis.

When Key examined critical elections, he used a regional perspective focusing on New England. There is much to suggest that this should be the preferred unit of analysis, especially given the diverse nature of states' political culture (Elazar 1984). Brady (1985) incorporated regional analysis in his historical assessment of realignments and found that only in the 1930s was there an across-the-board shift to the Democrats. The realignments of the 1860s and the 1890s were both compensating realignments where the movement,

both for and against the would-be majority party, was concentrated in specific regions. A regional perspective was also taken up by John Petrocik (1987) in his analysis of the South and its contemporary shift to the Republican party. He adds something important to the realignment debate by concluding that realignments do not just have to be about who is the majority party (372-373). The South has been secularly realigning to the Republican party but the national dominance of the Democrats remained at the time of his article. Kawato argues that “to focus on the national partisan vote deflects our attention from the diverse nature of U.S. politics” (1987, 1236). Scholars, therefore, should not focus on national realignments, but regional shifts, and at different electoral levels. Subsequently, Bullock looked at regional realignments by focusing on different election levels (1988). He found that Republican (secular) realignments seemed to be occurring at the regional level both for the South and the Mountain West (570). Most recently, Nardulli has argued for regional realignments, not just recently but throughout history (1995). He concluded that most realignments have been regional in nature.

Realignments: Running Behind

Some see realignments as cyclical. Burnham was the first to expound this in relation to party systems. “. . . [R]ealignments do recur with rather remarkable regularity approximately once a generation, or every thirty to thirty-eight years” (1970, 26). Accordingly, an election that would have realigned the electorate in the manner of a critical realignment should have occurred in the mid-1960s. The failure of this period, or even subsequent decades, to produce a critical election threw realignment theory into its present state of disarray, where every election is scrutinized as some new variant of

realignment.

Dealignment

The expected critical realignment did not occur in the 1960s, nor did it happen in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. Many began to argue that the 1960s began a period of dealignment (Inglehart and Hochstein 1972; Beck 1977; Ladd 1981; Norpoth and Rusk 1982; Carmines, McIver, and Stimson 1987; Wattenberg 1987, 1996). Those who propose we are in a period of dealignment build upon the notion that voters have become less attached to the parties. However, dealignment also suffers from a lack of conceptual precision, much like realignment itself. As Shafer notes, in its common usage “[dealignment] is effectively a name, not a concept” (1991, 63).⁵ This is because there are two ways of viewing dealignment, one within the realignment framework and the other outside the realignment framework.

Within the framework, one conceives of dealignment as the period preceding a new realignment, where there is a gradual move from the old alignment but no new alignment has yet replaced it. It is expected the dealignment will, over a short period, give way to a new alignment. The first usage of the term “dealignment” can be attributed to Inglehart and Hochstein, which they define as “declining rates of identification with *any* party” (1972, 345). Beck’s notion of realignment as a socialization process employs

⁵Shafer believes dealignment can come to be meaningful. “Either it must imply a gradual *but general* shift away from the beneficiary of the last realignment, with partisan outcomes becoming gradually less favorable to the old majority party as the old realignment ebbs. Or it must imply that partisan attachments, as registered in partisan electoral *outcomes*, will become increasingly random” (1991, 64). Unfortunately, dealignment has come to mean both.

the same concept, although he does not use the term dealignment initially (1974). He employs it subsequently when analyzing the southern electorate (1977). Inglehart, who along with Hochstein first coined the term dealignment, still conceptualizes electoral behavior in the realignment/dealignment framework (1984, 68; 1997, 311).

Outside the realignment framework, one can conceive of “dealignment” as simply being a prolonged period of partisan detachment. There are many indicators that one can use to establish this detachment: rise of independent voters, image driven campaigns, split-ticket voting, party defectors, increasing incidences of divided government, and declining turnout. Carmines, McIver, and Stimson (1987) see the 1960s beginning a period where strong party identifiers declined, and those who still did identify with a party were more likely to split their tickets. This led to an electorate that became more volatile and less predictable. Wattenberg attributes dealignment to the media and candidate centered elections (1996). Politicians do not have to rely on their party to get out their message and thus, parties have become less relevant to both the politicians during the campaign, and the voters. Manza, Hout, and Brooks (1995) have begun the process of applying modifiers to dealignment. They investigate evidence for a class dealignment.

The term ‘apartisans’ is used by Dalton and Wattenberg (1993, 206) to describe the new type of voter that inhabits the durable dealignment in which we currently find ourselves. Thus, apartisanship would be a better way to conceptualize this period and could also alleviate the double role the term “dealignment” has been filling. Both dealignment and what I am terming apartisanship involve weakening of party attachment

but the temporal component is different, much like the difference between critical realignment and secular realignment. Apartisanship can serve as a steady state, although it is a constant state of volatility in the electorate, and exists outside the popular realignment/dealignment framework. This would seem to indicate a different type of system than previous party systems in American history conceived of as bracketed by critical realignments. As Niemi and Weisberg observe, “While most political scientists agree that party dealignment has been occurring since the mid-1960s, there is a lively controversy as to how to interpret this in the realignment framework” (1993, 325). Perhaps it is time to step outside the framework that critical realignment has so long provided. Maybe the electorate is so substantially changed, not only politically, but socially as well, that critical realignment theory is useful only as an historical construct. Political scientists need to “think outside the box” - the realignment box - into which every election since the mid-1960s has been forced.⁶

Rethinking Realignment

There are those who argue that the realignment framework should be tossed onto the trash heap. Most who advocate an end to realignment theory are only talking about critical realignments and not secular ones, although they often do not make this clear. For example, Everett Carl Ladd discussed in a 1991 article how political scientists anticipating a critical realignment reminded him of Estragon and Vladimir who were

⁶This is not to say that the concept of realignment is no longer useful. In examining specific groups and their changing partisan identities, using the term realignment to describe changing partisan attachments is meaningful. Critical realignment, where the concept of realignment is applied to the entire, or substantial sections, of the electorate is the theory debated and focused upon here.

‘Waiting for Godot’ to appear. He went on to say that ‘realignments’ (by which he meant critical realignments) were no longer useful anymore. Four years later, Ladd would subtitle an article “The Post-industrial Realignment Continues.” Simply to peruse the titles of these articles may cause one confusion. Ladd, in the second article is referring to a type of secular realignment he has formulated and the two articles are not as inconsistent as the titles might indicate.

In *Issue Evolution*, Carmines and Stimson also argue for getting rid of realignment and replacing it with their concept of issue evolution (1989). However, issue evolution turns out to be just a variation on secular realignment. Consider their lengthy definition of what issue evolution is:

We define issue evolutions as those issues capable of altering the political environment within which they originated and evolved. These issues have a long life cycle; they develop, evolve, and sometimes are resolved over a number of years. The crucial importance of this issue type stems from the fact that its members can lead to fundamental and permanent change in the party system (1989, 11)

This sounds like a secular realignment. However, they believe their issue evolution captures more of the nuances of the electoral situation than does a realignment (194).

Geer also argues that realignment is no longer a relevant theory (1991). Using a rational choice model, he postulates that parties want to win, and will move to the center on most issues to capture the maximum number of voters. If parties no longer polarize, realignments should no longer occur, and consequently the theory is no longer useful to explain voter behavior. Of course, parties have always wanted to win, and Geer does believe that there have been realignments in the past. The key to his theory is his notion

of public opinion polls. When realignments have occurred, public opinion polls either did not exist or were not accurate. Therefore, parties lacked evidence on where the public stood on issues and tended to polarize, rather than moderate their views.

Another perspective comes from those who argue that partisanship has been replaced as the defining feature of the American electorate. Ideology is increasingly more important than partisanship in the American electorate. Rabinowitz, Gurian, and MacDonald argue for dealignment, but at the same time see evidence of a secular realignment (1984). Nevertheless, the secular realignment is different because party is no longer the cue to which voters look. The cue is now ideology. McCloskey and Zaller (1984) also argue that ideology, not partisanship, is key to understanding the American electorate. Ladd would agree because his postindustrial realignment is also based on the idea that the electorate is less partisan and more ideological (1995). More recently, Levine, Carmines, and Huckfeldt (1997) found that “ideology exerts an increasing and distinct impact on partisanship over the past two decades” (28).

The Poverty of Critical Realignment Theory

Dynamics of the Party System is a substantial contribution to realignment literature. Still, it seems that James Sundquist unwittingly contributed to the confused state of realignment theory in two ways (1983). First, he recommends jettisoning the distinction that Key made between secular and critical realignments. He believes, “it confuses more than it clarifies to treat the critical and the secular as separate types of realignment rather than as phases of a single process” (12). Second, Sundquist encourages the use of modifiers with realignment (10). “Without a modifier, indeed, the

word realignment defined broadly is of little analytical value” (14). Unfortunately, with so many apparently taking this advice to heart, the word realignment, defined in such varied ways is also of little analytical value. The discipline has arrived at a place where each election is a different type of ‘realignment’ with a different modifier. The outcome of elections is diverse and no two are alike, but if we are going to call each election a realignment of some sort, realignment broadly defined, becomes synonymous with ‘election’.

To their detriment, most political scientists have limited their scope when studying realignment by focusing mainly on political factors that affect the electorate such as aggregate changes in independent voters, self-professed party identification, party defectors, election returns, voter turnout, divided government, and split-ticket voting. There are those who advocate a ‘holistic’ view of realignment and talk about including social change and social variables (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1990; Ladd 1991). Still, few studies of realignment have analyzed anything beyond the explicitly political environment.⁷ Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale advocate a more complex conceptualization

⁷ Notable exceptions that go beyond the explicitly political are Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Wattenberg (1996). Carmines and Stimson focus on the effect race has had on American politics. Wattenberg focuses on a social change (the rise of the mass media) and its effects on political parties and campaigns. He concludes that party decline is due to the mass media’s influence on campaigns. Politicians no longer depend on the party to get out their message. Rather than having a partisan contest between candidates, the contest focuses on the candidates themselves and the image that is projected by the candidate’s organization, not the party organization. It should be emphasized that there are studies of realignment that look at social variables (class, religion) and the changes these variables have undergone in partisan attachment. There is a difference, however, in simply examining social variables and addressing changes in the broader social environment.

of realignment (1990). “Partisan realignments were initiated by shifts in the distribution of the popular vote in response to crisis conditions and widespread *societal* tension and dissatisfaction” (italics mine, 30). Indeed, their model is much more complex than most (Brady 1985 would be the exception) because they add considerations of political leadership and government control. But, they do not include a measure of “societal tension and dissatisfaction.” They give lip-service to accounting for broad societal factors but their model still incorporates only political factors. Ladd, in his critique of critical realignment, suggested examining a combination of societal and political factors when seeking to delineate party systems (1991). He states, “Each succeeding *partisan era* has differed significantly from each of its predecessors because in important regards each succeeding *societal era* is unique” (emphasis original, 30). While political factors are important in assessing whether the electorate has undergone a partisan change, the root cause of the change is likely societal. Therefore, one must go beyond just the political. Societal changes could be documented by examining changes in class structure, religious structure, values, social capital, patterns of belonging to social organizations, or any number of other societal factors.

It should be emphasized that at the root of broad political change, one can usually find social change. Historically, critical realignments have always been anchored in the social landscape of the day and turned on a critical issue, whether it is slavery, monetary policy, or depression. Thus, it is vitally important to ask why critical realignments, which have played such a role in our history, have become historical artifacts. Are there no important issues? Is the electorate asleep or just ambivalent? Are political parties failing

to polarize in their attempts to reach the median voter?

From the above review it should be evident that we are clearly left with more questions than answers regarding realignment. Returning to the basics of realignment theory might be useful, therefore, which would necessitate going back to Key. Important to Key, but left out of today's studies, is the notion of intense involvement by the electorate. Also important to Key was the notion of cleavages. In fact, a realignment is meaningful because cleavages exist and one can readily distinguish which groups are aligned with a particular party. Electoral cleavages need to be re-evaluated. If there are changes occurring in values as Inglehart posits (1971, 1977, 1997), then we may be experiencing a new era of political behavior on the part of the electorate where the importance of traditional cleavages like race, religion, social class, are being replaced by a new value cleavage within western societies. If there is a new era of political behavior brought on by broad social changes, then the political theories of the previous era may have been rendered irrelevant in their application to the contemporary electorate.

Social Change

A separate stream of scholarship has examined social and cultural characteristics within the electorate. The initial, path breaking work in this area is Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963). This was the first of the political culture research genre, which flourished in the 1960s, that would examine the connection between democracy and certain cultural variables and try empirically to link them. In a review assessing "The Civic Culture at 30," David Laitin argues that contemporary political culture studies should take advantage of new techniques and advances in the field and bring "this

research tradition into the ‘progressive’ mode” (1995, 168).

Over the last several decades, scholars working in political culture began to do just that. The result was that several began to advance the notion that American society was undergoing some type of large scale change that while not explicitly political, had political implications. Robert Putnam has documented the decline of social capital (1995a, 1995b, 2000). Theda Skocpol has detailed changes in the social organizations to which people belong (1999). Ronald Inglehart has theorized about value change (1971, 1977, 1997).

It is Inglehart’s theory that will be utilized as the theoretical framework for examining social change. In part, this is both because Inglehart was the first to articulate a theory of social change in postindustrial society and because his theory is readily quantifiable. More importantly, however, Inglehart’s theory has direct implications for critical realignment theory because both theories have certain expectations regarding cleavage behavior. In addition, Inglehart feels there is a connection between dealignment and the advent and growth of postmaterialist values.

Ronald Inglehart conducts research in the tradition of *The Civic Culture*, doing exactly what Laitin would later counsel in his review article. Inglehart takes advantage of statistical methods not utilized in the past and survey data not previously available to those originally working in the political culture field. Inglehart, a pioneer of looking at value change within societies, is truly a scholar in the Almond and Verba tradition. Not only has he reexamined and retested the civic culture hypothesis, which argues that democracy requires a supportive political culture of which interpersonal trust is an

important part, and found it valid (1988), but he also pioneered study in the area of value changes in societies (1971, 1977). He has continued studying value change throughout his career (1981; 1983; 1985; 1987; 1990; 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Abramson and Inglehart 1995). Inglehart, formulating his theory of value change in western industrialized democracies almost thirty years ago, characterized it as a “silent revolution” (1971, 1977). The theory revolves around the concept of generational value change in postindustrial societies. Value change can be defined as changes in “preferred goal states” (Namenwirth and Lasswell 1970, 6). That is, priorities change regarding which values are most fundamental, a phenomenon of considerable consequence for political scientists because values serve as the source of opinions and behaviors.

On the face of things, Inglehart’s theory may not appear to be connected to realignment theory. Yet, if postindustrial society is going through some kind of large scale change then there are certainly political changes that are related, as Inglehart duly notes. He feels a cleavage over values has formed that supercedes and is eroding traditional cleavages such as class and religion. This is where the connection lies between Inglehart’s theory and critical realignments. The political change that he explores, however, is a broad, global change in postindustrial society. He does not entail what this change might mean in a more specific application. If there is a value change occurring in the United States, what might this entail for critical realignment theory?

Inglehart and Value Change

In the literature on postmaterialism, Ronald Inglehart has largely defined the debate. He sees postindustrial societies realigning around a materialist-postmaterialist

cleavage, eventually replacing the class cleavage around which industrial societies revolved. The value change is conceptualized by Inglehart as a social phenomenon where people in postindustrial societies in the aggregate are shifting their primary values from being materialist (values that emphasize economic and physical security) to postmaterialist (values that emphasize quality of life and self-expression). Supporting postmaterialist issues will help them satisfy intellectual, aesthetic and belongingness needs (Inglehart 1971, 991-992). This concept, as formulated initially by Inglehart, owes much to Maslow's determination that needs are satisfied from bottom to top of a needs hierarchy. This hierarchy, beginning at the bottom, starts with physiological, safety, social, and esteem needs, and finally ends with self-actualization or self-fulfillment (Maslow 1954). Inglehart hypothesizes that there is a change in value priorities taking place in postindustrial societies that has made those who were socialized in a more affluent atmosphere since World War II (the atmosphere of both the country and of the family) less likely to see economic security as their main goal, because their basic material needs have been satisfied.⁸ Since these basic needs have already been obtained,

⁸Inglehart and others who collaborated on the first Eurobarometer survey in 1970 formulated a question to capture the components of postmaterial versus material values (Inglehart 1971, 993). The initial survey question used for capturing the postmaterialist-materialist distinction was: "If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you?"

1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving people more say in important political decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech"

Respondents choosing 1 and 3 were deemed to have materialist values (called at the time "acquisitive values") while those choosing 2 and 4 were deemed to have postmaterialist values (called at the time "post-bourgeois values"). All other combinations were classified as mixed (Inglehart 1971, 994-995).

younger cohorts can then focus on other areas of concern, such as equality, the environment, and other nonmaterial desires - what Inglehart will eventually term postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1988). In the 1977 book that further develops the original thesis, Inglehart expands his value measure in the survey data to include the original four choices, plus eight additional ones.⁹ In addition, he no longer refers to his theoretical basis in Maslow's hierarchy, but now articulates two distinct hypotheses.

1. A Scarcity Hypothesis. An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment; one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.

2. A Socialization Hypothesis. The relationship between the socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved, for, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years (1981, 881)

The scarcity hypothesis says that one will value most that which is scarce. According to the socialization hypothesis, values are formed in childhood and will reflect the conditions prevalent in childhood. Thus, the shift has a generational aspect and grows as older cohorts are replaced by younger ones. It is important to note that Inglehart sees the scarcity hypothesis and the socialization hypothesis as taking into account period effects and cohort effects. "Taken together, the two basic hypotheses imply that the process of

⁹The additional measures are:

1. For measuring materialist orientations respondents must indicate preferring the following: 1) Maintain a high rate of economic growth; 2) Make sure that this country has strong defense forces; 3) Maintain a stable economy; 4) Fight against crime.

2. For measuring postmaterialist orientations respondents must indicate preferring the following: 1) Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their country; 2) Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful; 3) Move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society; 4) Move toward a society where ideas are more important than money (Inglehart 1977, 44)

value change is characterized by period effects (reflecting short-term fluctuations in the socioeconomic environment) superimposed on long-term cohort effects (reflecting the conditions prevailing during a given age group's formative years)" (1985, 103). In other words, the hypotheses imply that times of scarcity will lead to more materialist values, and times of prosperity will lead to more postmaterialist values, but in the end, postmaterialism will grow because it is generational. Inglehart acknowledges the fact that postmaterialism has a tendency to rise and fall in the short term, depending upon economic circumstances (1981, 883; 1983, 81-82; 1990, 64). Long term, however, postmaterialism remains stable, rising as new, more postmaterialist generations replace materialist generations (1985).

Originally formulated with western European data (Inglehart 1971, 1977), the theory has subsequently been applied globally (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1997). Postmaterialism is often taken as a given phenomenon, both generally in western industrialized democracies, and more narrowly when the focus is the United States (Crepaz 1990; Opp 1990; Rohrschneider 1990, 1993; Lipset 2000; Schier 2000). One scholar considers that "the concept of postmaterialist or materialist value orientation has become a central variable in social science research" (Opp 1990, 212). However, it is not without considerable controversy. There is disagreement over whether there is truly a value change occurring and whether Inglehart has adequately captured and measured this phenomenon in his prolific research on postmaterialism (Van Deth 1983; Flanagan 1987; Trump 1991; Duch and Taylor 1993; Warwick 1998; Davis, Dowley, and Silver 1999; Davis and Davenport 1999). In addition, there is evidence that the theory's application to

the United States is problematic (Brown and Carmines 1995; Layman and Carmines 1997).

Inglehart's most recent work, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, updates and expands his earlier works (1997). Postmaterialism is set into the larger framework of postmodernism, which encompasses change in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Anytime society moves to another era (traditional society to modern society to postmodern society) there are accompanying political, economic, and cultural changes. Table 2.1, reproduced from Inglehart, provides the key changes he sees occurring from era to era.

TABLE 2.1
TRADITIONAL, MODERN, AND POSTMODERN SOCIETY:
SOCIETAL GOALS AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES

	<i>Traditional</i>	<i>Modern</i>	<i>Postmodern</i>
<i>Core Societal Project</i>	Survival in steady-state economy	Maximize Economic growth	Maximize subjective well-being
<i>Individual Value</i>	Trad. Religious and communal norms	Achievement motivation	Postmaterialist and postmodern values
<i>Authority System</i>	Traditional authority	Rational-legal authority	De-emphasis of both legal and religious authority

Source: Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) 76, table 3.1.

Postmaterialism is just one aspect of postmodern society. Where postmaterialism is the shift from emphasizing economic and physical security to self-expression and quality of life, postmodernism includes postmaterialism plus the decline of traditional authority. Inglehart identifies two areas where the shift to the postmodern era is evident. The first is the shift in value systems that has been the focus of his previous research, what he has identified as postmaterialism. Second, institutional structures are changing.

Hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations are on the way out (1997, 28).

Implications for the U.S.

Since people's preference of values is changing, different issues are important in the postmodern era than issues that were prevalent in the modern era and the pre-modern era before it. Inglehart exemplifies, "there are profound differences in the behavior and worldviews of people who feel insecure about their personal survival and people who worry about global warming" (1997, 37). Some new issues that Inglehart believes have emerged in response to postmaterialism are environmental issues, women's issues, and gay and lesbian issues. In the modern era, economic issues were of primary importance. "The politics of advanced industrial societies no longer polarize primarily on the basis of working class versus middle class; and the old issues, centering on ownership of the means of production and government control of the economy, no longer lie at the heart of political polarization" (1997, 265). The formation of green parties and their increasing viability in Western Europe, for Inglehart, is a sign of changing values manifesting itself in the political system. In addition, and consistent with the second shift Inglehart identifies, "mass loyalties to long-established hierarchical political parties are eroding" (43).

The value shift that Inglehart finds does, he thinks, affect political party preference, at least in multiparty systems. Those forming postmaterialist values, young cohorts with more affluent family backgrounds, who would traditionally favor the more conservative parties, are instead favoring parties that are change oriented - the more leftist parties such as greens and socialist-progressive parties. At the same time, those with

materialist values, who traditionally have favored parties of the left (social democrats), are becoming more conservative and beginning to favor parties of the right (1971, 992).¹⁰

Both of the shifts that Inglehart identifies, postmaterialism and decline of hierarchical, bureaucratic organizations, may have ramifications for realignment theory in the United States. Both could affect the party system and the way it is viewed by an electorate with values that have changed. It should be noted that Inglehart's initial research focused on Western Europe and some of his discussions, especially about political parties, apply more to multiparty systems than the United States' two-party system. The United States' experience did not explicitly enter Inglehart's discussion until *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (1990), although he had long projected his postmaterialist theory to other western, industrialized nations based on his findings in western Europe. Data on the U.S. was also included in *Modernization and Postmodernization* (1997). Public opinion surveys are vital to Inglehart's method of establishing a postmaterialist shift and he must have a time series to establish change over time. His time series on Western Europe goes back to 1970 but his data on the U.S. is limited to two surveys, one in 1981 and the other in 1990.¹¹ Two potential problems

¹⁰Inglehart does not emphasize the formation of the "new right" in later works as he does in earlier works. However, he does indicate in later works that there is a reactionary function where those with materialist values are fighting for their disappearing values. The seeming increase in fundamentalism is one of the manifestations of this. "The rise of militant religious fundamentalism in the United States, and of xenophobic movements in Western Europe, represents a reaction against rapid cultural changes that seem to be eroding some of the most basic values and customs of the more traditional and less secure groups in these countries" (1997, 251).

¹¹The United States was surveyed in the 1981 and 1990-91 World Values Survey. See Inglehart 1997, appendix 1 and 5. The U.S. was also surveyed in the presidential

emerge: the very limited time series that Inglehart uses, and the wholesale application of a European-rooted theory to the United States. This may make Inglehart's theory of value change suspect when applied to the United States.

Caveats aside for the moment, it seems that Inglehart has captured a trend with his measure of materialist and postmaterialist values. Figure 2.1 shows the growth in postmaterialist values and the decrease in materialist values for the United States from 1972 to 1992 using NES data.¹² Those who picked one postmaterialist value and one materialist value, the majority of those surveyed, are labeled as mixed. Based on Inglehart's theory, we should find postmaterialist values rising since 1972 as younger cohorts enter the electorate. Similarly, we should find materialist values decreasing as older cohorts exit the electorate. Those with mixed orientations should also be steadily declining as postmaterialists expand within the electorate. Those with mixed orientations should also be steadily declining as postmaterialists expand within the electorate. It should not be the case that those with mixed orientations are simply in transition on their

election years of 1972-1992 by the NES. However, Inglehart seldom utilizes this data, preferring the World Values Survey so he can make multinational comparisons.

¹²The NES asked a variation of Inglehart's original question in presidential election years from 1972-1992, at which time it discontinued the question. The NES asked: "For a nation, it is not always possible to obtain everything one might wish. On this page, several different goals are listed. If you had to choose among them, which would seem the most desirable to you? Which one would be your second choice?" Respondents were then given the same four choices as listed in footnote 8. Inglehart expanded the values question in 1977 to include a total of twelve options as indicated above. NES did not expand the original four-choice question to include the eight additional choices. However, NES data will be used because it provides a substantial time series, being asked every four years from 1972-1992. In addition, Inglehart has defended the validity of the four-item question when compared with the 12-item question (Inglehart and Abramson 1999).

way to postmaterialist values. According to Inglehart, values are formed in one's formative years and the change in value orientation is generational. Therefore, an individual's values should not be subject to conversion.

FIGURE 2.1
VALUE PREFERENCES: 1972-1992




Table 2.2 shows the bivariate regression results of each value with time, which indicate that there is a statistically significant secular trend for all three value orientations.¹³ However, the trend for mixed orientations moves in the wrong direction; it has significantly increased over the time series rather than decreased, as expected. Nevertheless, the trends for both materialists and postmaterialists behave according to Inglehart's theory. As the R^2 for these two models indicate, time accounts for a substantial amount of the variation in the independent variable. Thus, at least cursorily, there is evidence that Inglehart has captured some kind of trend in the United States. One task for the next chapter will be to see if Inglehart's broad, all-encompassing theory holds up when it is applied specifically to the United States given the above caveats and the fact that the mixed category does not behave as Inglehart expects.

TABLE 2.2
BIVARIATE REGRESSION OF TIME ON VALUES, 1972-1992

	VALUE ORIENTATION		
	Materialist	Mixed	Postmaterialist
Intercept	40.5	53.3	6.2
Temporal Counter	-4.2** (.9)	2.1* (.5)	2.1** (.4)
Adj. R^2	.81	.76	.84
Durbin-Watson	2.8	3.2	2.3
N	6	6	6

* $p \leq .05$

** $p \leq .01$

Standard error in parentheses

¹³The effect of time is captured by a temporal counter, set to 0 in 1972 and increasing +1 for each presidential election year.

In the United States' two-party system, there is not the choice of parties that those who live in a multiparty system have and the formation of viable third parties is very difficult. If values are shifting in the U.S., it would therefore be imperative that the two American political parties adjust their beliefs to accommodate the shifting of values if they are to be relevant to the electorate. But, the rational political party in a two party system will position itself so it can capture the most voters (Downs 1957). In other words, it will move to the center. Is there really much difference between the platforms of the two major parties today? To determine this, looking to the actual party platforms will be imperative. Their content will be analyzed by looking for the way issues are prioritized by the parties and how this has changed over time. In addition, the degree of polarization on issues will also be important. One possible reason why the decline of political parties may have occurred is that they have failed to reflect issues important to the electorate and have become less consequential to significant portions of the electorate. If there has been a change in values taking place but political parties are not reflecting this change, select groups may become much less partisan or remove themselves from the electorate. Alternatively, the electorate may be sufficiently fragmented and disengaged that it is impossible for the party to know where to position themselves to attract the most voters.

Inglehart remarks that the cultural changes he has unmasked have "... left Western political systems in a schizophrenic situation" (252). The old issues axis was based on social class; the new issues axis, still in transition, will be based on "Postmodern and fundamentalist worldviews" (265). It seems that even where there is a

multipart system in place, the major political parties are still largely focused on the old axis. Minor parties have grown up around the new issues and are growing in power.

Inglehart does not believe the spread of postmaterialist values began until about two decades after World War II (210). Children born and socialized in the much more stable and affluent atmosphere of the postwar world, essential for the formation of postmaterialist values, would be of legal age by that time. Roughly, these values would have become evident in the mid-1960s, about the time many believed the U.S. should be experiencing a partisan realignment that never materialized, even in decades after.

Inglehart views the 1972 election in the U.S. as pivotal because “for the first time in history, white working class voters were about as likely to vote for the Republican as for the Democratic candidate” (1997, 244). In fact, it is Inglehart, in a separate vein of work with a coauthor, who first applies the term “dealignment” to the situation of the United States in the late 1960s (Inglehart and Hochstein 1972). Since Inglehart’s value change is perceived as cutting across both parties’ traditional bases of support, dealignment could be the result of the onset of a postmaterialist-materialist value distinction. The beginning of dealignment is commonly placed in the mid-1960s, about the same time that Inglehart believed postmaterialist voters would begin entering the electorate. This brings us back around to a discussion of cleavages that play such an important role in society and in realignment theory.

Critical Realignment Theory in a Societal Context

Two streams of scholarship have been reviewed, realignment theory and value change. On the surface, they seemingly do not have much in common. However, a

further look may show that value change in society may affect the state of realignment theory in the United States. Politics does not exist in a vacuum. It exists within society. Society affects politics but politics also affects society. By combining the insights from a theory of political change (realignment theory) with a theory of societal change (value change), we can hopefully add something constructive to our knowledge. Considering social *and* political change may help explain the poverty of critical realignment theory since the New Deal. Thus, examining social change in conjunction with critical realignment theory is of paramount importance when seeking to establish the contemporary status of that theory.

First, it will be necessary to reexamine critical realignment theory from the basis of cleavages since they serve as the foundation of the theory. If groups are less partisan, then *partisan* realignment is in jeopardy of being an historical artifact. One alternative might be an ideologically based realignment that some believe might be taking place (Rabinowitz, Gurian, and MacDonald 1984; Ladd 1995; Levine, Carmines, and Huckfeldt 1997). An ideological realignment may not correspond exactly with the major political party identification and thus would be difficult to see using the traditional methods of identifying partisan realignments. Second, Inglehart's research suggests that there is a new cleavage, one based on a change in values that crosscuts the old partisan cleavages. If this is the case, it could serve as a basis for future partisan realignments, but only if the political parties begin to respond and polarize on the issues important to the new cleavage. One requirement for a critical realignment is that there must be polarization on a critical issue (Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983). Eventually, the polarization manifests

itself in the major political parties and the public has a clear choice on the critical issue.

Examining the behavior of the two major political parties, therefore, is essential in assessing the state of realignment theory. It is possible that the materialist-postmaterialist dimension gives us the critical issue, but there has not been any polarization among the political parties. By analyzing the platforms of the two major political parties, one can determine if polarization is present and on which particular issues.

CHAPTER 3

CHANGING ELECTORAL CIRCUMSTANCES

This chapter will examine two areas of interest to those who study the behavior of the American electorate; aggregate electoral behavior and cleavage behavior. This will be accomplished using data from the biennial American National Elections Studies (Sapiro, et al., 1998; Sapiro, Rosenstone, and NES, 1999). With this data, one can study elections from the period 1952-1998.

First, the aggregate behavior of the electorate is examined. Chapter Two briefly presented the foundations from which this discussion will proceed. On the one hand, we have the realignment/dealignment framework that conceives of electoral change as a cyclical process. Partisan alignments decay over time into a state of dealignment where partisan attachments of the electorate are weakened. After a period of time, a new alignment will form and the cycle begins again. The other framework presented was apartisanship, a new terminology and new distinction for something that is usually lumped under the rubric of dealignment. But there is a distinction between dealignment (within the realignment framework) and apartisanship (outside the realignment framework). Dealignment will progress into a realignment. Apartisanship involves a prolonged period of fluid and volatile voter behavior; there is no expectation of a forthcoming realignment. Thus, much as time is the key in distinguishing between

secular and critical realignments, time also helps distinguish between periods of dealignment and periods of apartisanship. The evidence in this first section, however, leaves a confused picture as to whether either of these frameworks fit recent electoral behavior.

Secondly, I will examine the behavior of cleavages within the electorate.¹ If cleavages are both the bedrock of realignment theory and the foundation of Inglehart's theory of value change, it makes sense to examine the two in conjunction. We may find that the two theories are linked in an important way to what has been occurring in the American electorate in the last 35 years. Additional questions arise, however, when cleavage behavior is examined in light of Inglehart's theory of value change. Finally, Inglehart's theoretical foundations will be examined because of questions presented by the analysis of cleavages and their voting behavior.

Overall, the evidence suggests that it is time to think anew about sandwiching electoral periods between critical realignments. Cleavage behavior has changed over the

¹A cleavage necessarily involves a division within a broad classification such as gender, educational attainment, or class to name just a few. Recall the definition of cleavages given by Lipset and Rokkan and discussed in Chapter Two. Cleavages are divisions in society that stem from characteristics within the electorate (1967). Also recall that Key speaks of realignments being based in population categories (1959). Take gender as an example. Gender is divided into male and female; these two groups make up the cleavage of gender. One can call gender a cleavage whether the groups that make up that cleavage are partisanly distinct or not because it encompasses a division within society. Realignment theory (whether critical or secular) is concerned with the partisan attachment of the groups that make up cleavages. Determining which groups within the electorate are aligned with a political party and which groups are not is crucial. Groups within the cleavage can be termed active or latent in terms of their partisanship, the criteria for which is set forth below. Critical realignment theory is concerned with the partisan attachment of these groups in society that make up cleavages.

course of the time series and the changes suggest that critical realignment theory is no longer a theory that fits with the contemporary electorate which has profoundly changed in recent decades. Critical realignment should no longer serve as the lens through which we view the behavior of the electorate because the contemporary electorate cannot satisfy the requirements of the theory. Yet, these changes in the electorate do not seem to stem from Inglehart's conception of the way the electorate has been changing.


Changes in the Political Environment

There are many indicators that suggest we must revise the way in which we think about electoral behavior. Political variables that have witnessed change over time include voter turnout, incidence of divided government, and the many indicators of "dealignment" to which observers point, such as rising numbers of independents, more voters splitting tickets, and partisan defectors.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Key believed that a critical election would involve a substantial portion of the electorate (1955). Many initially hailed the 1994 congressional elections as an historic, critical realignment, but the "realignment" was not sustained in subsequent elections. The fact that the Republicans captured both chambers of Congress was certainly historic, but it was not a realignment. First of all, the emphasis that Key put on the electorate's involvement in the election is seldom discussed as a factor in critical realignments. Only 36.6% of the voting age population turned out to vote for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994 (U.S. Census Bureau 1999, 301). Key did not set exact guidelines for determining if the electorate's involvement in an election was deep, intense, and high, but it would seem that a little more than one-third of

the electorate participating does not come close to that mark. Of those voting, 52.4% voted for the Republican House candidate in their district (U.S. Census Bureau 1998, 283). Translate this into the percentage of the voting age population that voted for a Republican candidate and it is 19.2%. That does not give the Republican party a credible basis for proclaiming a mandate, let alone signal a critical realignment. Voter turnout in the United States has declined to the extent that on this criterion alone, no recent election qualifies as any type of realignment (Figure 3.1).

FIGURE 3.1
TURNOUT FOR PRESIDENT AND HOUSE, 1952-1998



Source: Statistical Abstract 1999, 301.

The much cited divided government also reared its head after the New Deal realignment (Table 3.1). Divided government has increasingly become the norm since 1952. Sundquist (1988) has argued for a new theory of government because divided government does not fit the traditional conception of government, i.e. single party control. Divided government has the same effect on realignment theory. It makes our traditional conception less useful in explaining today's behavior. This view is supported by Epstein

(1986), who states, "Realignment theory rests on that expectation [of unified party government] - explicitly on a restoration of a close tie between presidential and congressional elections that would be both a cause and effect of greater policymaking cohesion of congressional parties" (69). For Brady, divided government alone would indicate we can no longer expect realignments because one of his criteria for a realignment is the existence of unified government for a minimum five elections (1985, 30). Divided government, as Mayhew (1991) documented and Jones (1994) substantiated, may not make much difference in terms of the policy that is being made, but it does make a profound difference when dealing with a theory that seeks to explain partisan change in the electorate and the elected officials the system produces.

TABLE 3.1
INCIDENCE OF DIVIDED PARTY GOVERNMENT

Period	House	Senate	White House	Divided
1951-52	○	○	○	
1953-54	●	●	●	
1955-56	○	○	●	✓
1957-58	○	○	●	✓
1959-60	○	○	●	✓
1961-62	○	○	○	
1963-64	○	○	○	
1965-66	○	○	○	
1967-68	○	○	○	
1969-70	○	○	●	✓
1971-72	○	○	●	✓
1973-74	○	○	●	✓
1975-76	○	○	●	✓
1977-78	○	○	○	
1979-80	○	○	○	
1981-82	○	●	●	✓
1983-84	○	●	●	✓
1985-86	○	●	●	✓
1987-88	○	○	●	✓
1989-90	○	○	●	✓
1991-92	○	○	●	✓
1993-94	○	○	○	
1995-96	●	●	○	✓
1997-98	●	●	○	✓
1999-2000	●	●	○	✓
2001-2002	●	○ ²	●	✓

○ Democrats control
● Republicans control

Source: Stanley and Niemi 1998, 35. Updates by author.

²A 50-50 split in the Senate occurred from the 2000 elections. From January 4 to 20, 2001 the Senate was controlled by Democrats due to the fact the Vice President was Democrat Al Gore. Republican Vice President Dick Cheney took office on January 20 and control reverted to the Republicans. However, control of the Senate again changed hands on June 6, 2001 after Senator James Jeffords left the Republican party to become an independent. Democrats held a plurality of seats and again controlled the Senate.

Evidence for Dealignment, Apartisanship, or Both?

Factors that have spurred talk of dealignment are indicators that show a decline in partisan attachment in the electorate. These indicators include the rising numbers of independent voters, rising numbers of split-ticket voters, and increasing party defectors. However, one must be careful when making blanket statements about the declining partisanship of the electorate because there are myriad ways to define these measures and there is a long-standing debate over whether self-professed partisanship is stable or unstable.³ Dealignment, as viewed from within the realignment framework, would suggest that a period of steadily declining partisanship would precede a realignment. The partisan attachments of the electorate would be in transition during a dealignment. The following realignment would see partisanship increase and become stable once again. Apartisanship, a view that steps outside the realignment framework, is consistent with dealignment in that there is an absence of partisanship, but the lack of partisanship would continue unabated because no realignment would follow. In addition, a period of apartisanship would exhibit volatility as partisanship is not in transition, but is merely in a

³*The American Voter* (Campbell, et al., 1960) found that individual partisan identification was stable. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989) seemingly challenged this view with their concept of macropartisanship which found that partisanship in the aggregate was unstable, fluctuating with presidential performance and economic situation. This view has been challenged, most recently by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (1998), to which MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1998) persuasively responded. It should be noted that MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson do not see their view of partisanship in the aggregate as inconsistent with the view that one's individual partisan identity is stable (1998). Regardless, caution should be exercised when interpreting aggregate measures of partisan identification. Presumably, using only partisanship (regardless of which party) as a measure can alleviate some, but not all of this concern. In later analysis, self-professed partisan identification will not be used precisely because of its murky nature.


permanent state of flux.

Figure 3.2 shows strength of partisanship in the electorate regardless of party preference.⁴ Respondents are asked, “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” and then prompted to classify their partisanship as strong or not very strong if they identify with Republicans or Democrats. Those who answer strong, regardless of party are represented as strong partisans; those who answer not so strong, regardless of party are classified as weak partisans. If the respondent claims to be independent, the respondent is then asked if he/she is closer to one party or the other. Leaners are those who indicate they lean toward one party or the other *and* also those who respond to the initial question with “no preference” but then go on to indicate they feel closer to one major party when probed. Therefore, it must be recognized that leaners are both those who initially respond “independent” and upon probing indicate a partisan preference *and* those who respond “no preference” but go on to indicate they “lean” toward one party or the other. As Wattenberg (1996) points out, this is an important distinction because there is a qualitative difference between the two responses but they are categorized as the same in the summary question used in Figure 3.2.⁵

⁴The summary question on partisan identification is used. 1952-96 NES VCF0305; 1998 recode of NES V980339.

⁵Wattenberg (1996) established that the no preference category has steadily increased since 1968.

FIGURE 3.2
STRENGTH OF PARTISANSHIP, 1952-1998



Source: National Election Studies


As Figure 3.2 shows, the vast majority of the electorate has remained either strongly or weakly partisan, but partisan nonetheless. Strong partisans have rebounded from the trough their numbers hit in the late 1970s and have actually begun to expand in the electorate. Weak partisans still make up a plurality of the electorate although their numbers have declined slightly. The major category of interest is the group classified as leaners because here is where the steady growth has taken place, ending the series at

approximately 25%. Independents are pure independents who maintain their independence when probed. The much touted independent, however, makes up a relatively small portion of the electorate. The number of pure independents has actually declined since peaking in the mid-1970s, and has since remained fairly constant at around 10%.

Figure 3.2 can be divided into 3 distinct time periods. From 1952-1962, the partisanship of the electorate was remarkably stable. Weak and strong partisans stayed constant and together made up the vast majority of the electorate, never dipping below 70% during this period. Leaners and independents were also quite stable and together made up about a quarter of the electorate. Beginning in 1964, however, the picture begins to change. Trend lines for 1964-1978 are consistent with the expectations of dealignment. Strong partisans precipitously decline until 1978. Weak partisans become more volatile, showing both marked increases and marked decreases during the fourteen year period. Leaners and independents both steadily increase their share of the electorate. The final period can be delineated beginning after the 1978 election and continuing until the present. During this period, the expectations of dealignment are not consistently met and the picture becomes one of partisan volatility. The movement of both strong partisans and independents has been relatively smooth *and* both move in contrary directions to what the dealignment framework would predict. Strong partisans began to increase from their low point of 1978. Independents began to steadily decrease. At the same time, the movement of both weak partisans and leaners became more volatile from year to year.

Figure 3.3 presents an alternative way of looking at the movements of partisanship. It simply classifies as partisan those who initially indicate they are a Republican or a Democrat, regardless of strength of that association. Apartisans represent those who initially signify a lack of identification with either party. As noted above, these include those who identify as independents and those who profess no preference. While there are qualitative differences in these responses, both do represent partisan detachment. This lack of partisanship is of major concern in assessing the status of partisan realignment theory. Notice that partisanship drops remarkably beginning in 1964, but begins to make a slight comeback in 1980. It is not, however, on the same scale as the partisanship of the electorate in the earliest time period. Since 1984, partisanship and apartisanship in the electorate has showed volatility from year to year. During the final period of the time series, apartisans make up about one-third of the electorate.

FIGURE 3.3
PARTISANSHIP AND APARTISANSHIP, 1952-1998




Another indicator of declining partisanship, partisan defection, combines self-identification and self-professed voting behavior. This measure is one indicator of the strength of one's partisan attachment. Dealignment and apartisanship, both, would predict increases in partisan defectors as party comes to mean less to all voters, even partisans. Dealignment would be indicated by steady increases and a leveling off as partisan preferences realign. Apartisanship would be indicated by increasing numbers but

also volatility as the electorate is not in transition to new alignments but entering a period of fluidity in partisan attachment. For both frameworks, party loyalty decreases and in the case of apartisanship, becomes more volatile. Figure 3.4 shows trends in defection. Only self-identified partisans who vote for the opposing major party in the particular race are included. There is only a very slight increase in defections over time evident in votes for Congress. The mean percentage of defections in a given House election is 11.7% and 12.1% for Senate elections, not a substantial proportion of partisans. Partisans voting for the opposing party's presidential candidate have actually decreased over time.⁶ If one uses the three time periods delineated above to examine trends in partisan defections, one again finds stability from 1952-62. 1964, however, begins a somewhat volatile period. From 1978 to the end of the time period, the volatility of the earlier period ceases. Defections in presidential contests decline to their lowest numbers during the latter time period, while house and senate defections stay rather constant. Defections in house and senate races in the final time period are slightly higher overall than the previous two periods. Yet, defectors do not make up a substantial proportion of partisans.

⁶One possible explanation for the decline is that people are simply self-identifying with the party whose presidential candidate they supported, providing cursory evidence for the macropartisanship thesis of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1998). However, their view of macropartisanship might be something that developed over time since defection was most likely in presidential races at the beginning of the time series, but at the end of the series was the least likely contest in which one would find defections.


FIGURE 3.4
PARTISAN DEFECTORS



One final indicator of declining partisanship that is often used is evidence of split-ticket voting. Again, both dealignment and apartisanship would predict that as partisanship becomes less important, ticket-splitting would become more common. Split-ticket voting does not take into account one's partisan identification but merely measures the percentage of voters casting ballots where there is a split partisan vote for two particular races. Figure 3.5 shows levels of split-ticket voting. Again, the middle time

period is consistent with the expectations of dealignment and apartisanship; in the early 1960s, split ticket voting began to notably increase. It reaches its peak from 1972 to 1980. However, since the peak, it has declined for all combinations of races. In addition, split-ticket voting is not as widespread as may be commonly assumed; there is only one incidence, the 1978 Senate-House contests, where more than 30% of the electorate split their ticket. Similar to what was found above, from the late 1970s until the present split ticket voting has declined, a trend that is contrary to the expectations of dealignment and apartisanship.

FIGURE 3.5
SPLIT-TICKET VOTING



Source: Stanley and Niemi (1998), 1952-1996; NES (1998), 1998.

On the face of this data, we are left with an inconsistent picture that does not easily fit into either framework: dealignment/realignment or apartisanship. The dealignment framework would predict steady decreases in partisanship and increases in both rates of defection and split-ticket voting since the mid-1960s in the build-up to a realignment. The apartisanship framework would predict decline and increasing volatility in partisanship and increases in defection (with accompanying volatility) and split-ticket

voting since the mid-1960s as the electorate becomes unmoored from partisan linkages indefinitely. What seems to have happened is that the common indicators of dealignment did behave as expected until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since this time there has been volatility in some indicators, as would be expected by apartisanship, but there is the lack of volatility in some indicators as well. For example, we see erratic movement in weak partisans and leaners but rather constant trends for both strong partisans and independents. People who say they are partisans still comprise the vast majority of the electorate and partisan defectors in presidential elections have actually declined over time, perhaps hinting at the tendency of voters to simply identify with the party of their presidential vote. Partisan defectors from the parties remain fairly constant during the later time period. In addition, incidence of ticket splitting has actually declined from its peak in the late 1970s. The above data, however, are simplistic and might be masking important movements within the electorate in certain groups. Therefore, it is necessary to delve deeper into the behavior of voters to see what has happened over the last half-century.

Have Cleavages Changed over Time?

As discussed in Chapter Two, cleavages are the foundation upon which realignments are based. At issue will be whether the cleavage structure in the United States has changed over the time period being examined, 1952-1998. The traditional way of making sense of the behavior of the American electorate has been sandwiching party systems between partisan realignments. With the advent of a prolonged period of so-called dealignment in the mid-1960s, however, political scientists were left contemplating

whether or not the fifth party system had come to an end and we had entered into a sixth (Aldrich and Niemi 1996). This is when the disarray in realignment theory began for dealignment did not progress into a new alignment of voters, which according to Burnham's classification scheme would begin a new party system (1970). At this point, political scientists began speculating that realignment or some variant thereof was either here or just around the corner after virtually every election. Unfortunately for those seeking tidiness in realignment theory, the transitional dealignment period has persisted for 35 years, about the same period of time that Burnham posited was in an entire realignment cycle (1970, 26). However, from the data presented above, it would seem that dealignment alone does not adequately explain the events of the last 35 years. It does seem to fit from the mid-Sixties to the late Seventies, but then its expectations are not met in the behavior of the electorate. In addition, apartisanship does not seem to adequately describe electoral behavior either, at least based upon the cursory evidence presented above. Accordingly, it is necessary to delve deeper into the behavior of the electorate by examining the way various groups have voted over time

Therefore, my task in the remainder of this chapter is to shed some light on not only how the electorate has changed and its implications for realignment theory, but also to explore one possible explanation for why the electorate has been in such a state of flux. Realignment theory will be discussed in the context of a specifically posited social change, a change in values as conceptualized by Ronald Inglehart. Realignment theory and Inglehart's conception of value change both have expectations regarding cleavages within the electorate. The lack of a critical realignment, which has caused many

consternation, could be related to the societal change Inglehart sees taking place globally. I will first examine the voting behavior of certain cleavages in the United States. The evidence suggests marked changes in the way various groups in the contemporary electorate voted that would make a cleavage-based *critical* realignment all but impossible under current circumstances. However, some of these changes are inconsistent with Inglehart's expectations of cleavage behavior in postindustrial society. Thus, I then turn to examining the theoretical basis of Inglehart's theory of value change. The results call into question the applicability of Inglehart's theory to the United States for it seems that Inglehart's measure of postmaterialism is perhaps capturing the increasingly ideological nature of the American electorate.

Cleavages, Critical Realignment, and Value Change

Inglehart's identified value change has ramifications for the traditional cleavage structure in the United States which would necessarily affect realignment theory. He sees a new cleavage forming, a value cleavage, that crosscuts traditional cleavages and partisan identity (1997, 330). This value change he believes is occurring does not correspond to existing partisan labels because postmaterialist issues do not correspond to the traditional issue stances that parties represent (Inglehart 1984, 54-55). “. . . [Postmaterialists] have less incentive to identify with any specific political party among the available choices. The established political parties were established in an era dominated by social class conflict and economic issues and tend to remain polarized along these lines” (Inglehart 1997, 311). In addition, Inglehart believes most existing demographic cleavages also do not correspond to postmaterialist values. Age and

education would be the exceptions because postmaterialist values should correspond to age (those socialized since WWII) and education (those with higher education levels, as this is an indicator of formative security). Accordingly, this should render traditional cleavages such as religion and social class less relevant to vote choice over time as postmaterialists grow in the electorate. He remarks that the changes he has unmasked have “. . . left Western political systems in a schizophrenic situation” (1997, 252). Schizophrenic might be an apt description of the state of realignment theory in recent decades and since the onset of dealignment and the emergence of postmaterialist values coincide, there might be a relationship. Inglehart views the 1972 election in the U.S. as pivotal because “for the first time in history, white working class voters were about as likely to vote for the Republican as for the Democratic candidate” (1997, 244). This would indicate a once active group aligned with a certain party had become latent, evenly splitting its vote.

If cleavages are the bedrock upon which realignments are based, examining their voting behavior during the time when critical realignment theory has become so inadequate should be useful, especially since Inglehart believes traditional cleavages are being rendered irrelevant due to the value change he has unmasked. An examination of cleavages is the only way to determine who supports the Democratic Party and who supports the Republican party. To answer the question of ‘who supports party x?’, one must talk in the languages of cleavages. If one cannot say how the cleavages divide and which party a group supports, then the answer is of no interest for there is no way to distinguish one supporter from another. As new circumstances arise within society,

cleavages may change. It could be that cleavages in society are reforming on a non-traditional axis. Inglehart believes the axis is the postmaterialist-materialist value distinction, but this axis does not correspond with partisan identity because of a failure of parties to adequately address and polarize on postmaterialist issues. If there is no correspondence of this new axis to partisan identity, however, it would be impossible to have a partisan realignment.

If Inglehart is correct, we would expect the importance of traditional cleavages to be dissipating over time, beginning slowly in the mid 1960s and picking up steam as those socialized in the postwar era age. Since Inglehart's value change is perceived as cutting across both parties' traditional bases of support, the seeming inapplicability of realignment theory, whether resulting in dealignment or apartisanship, could be the result of the onset of a postmaterialist-materialist value distinction. The beginning of dealignment is commonly placed in the mid-1960s, about the same time that Inglehart believed postmaterialists voters would have been entering the electorate. The first task will be to track the vote choice of various groups that are potential cleavages in relation to party support for House of Representative candidates since 1952. Using data from the biennial National Election Studies (Sapiro, et al., 1998; Sapiro, Rosenstone, and NES, 1999) for the period 1952-1998, it can be determined if the cleavage structure in the United States has changed over time.

The Importance of Cleavages

Cleavages make realignment meaningful. Saying that most African-Americans support the Democratic party is both meaningful and easy to understand. If one

encounters evidence that particular groups within a cleavage are not overwhelmingly supporting one party or the other, then the cleavage would seem to no longer be relevant to vote choice. The group's political view and corresponding vote would not be cohesive. Inglehart has argued that traditional demographic cleavages such as class and religion are being replaced by a new, all encompassing value cleavage where the electorate is divided between those with materialist values that stress economic and physical security, and those with postmaterialist values that stress self-expression and quality of life (1977, 1997). As Inglehart conceptualizes this change, it cuts across most of the old social/demographic cleavages and their traditional connection to party identity. If this is true, we would expect the importance of traditional cleavages to be dissipating over time, beginning slowly in the mid 1960s and picking up steam as those socialized in the postwar era age. The first task will be to track the vote choice of various groups that make up potential cleavages in relation to party support for candidates for the House of Representatives since 1952.

Examining cleavages and their voting behavior can aid in establishing whether or not certain group characteristics are important to partisan vote choice. If group identity has become less important to vote choice, this would lend support for Inglehart's value change theory which says the new value cleavage will cut across traditional partisan cleavages. If traditional cleavages are dissipating without new ones taking their place then critical realignment theory, based on the concept of active cleavages within the electorate, cannot be applied to current electoral circumstances. While there are still groups that are partisanly aligned, the number of these groups have declined over time.

These partisanly aligned groups are not a sufficient base for either party to win an election. To win elections, the parties must appeal to groups of swing voters who no longer maintain firm and stable partisan allegiance. Large segments of the electorate have become increasingly apartisan.

While many researchers of electoral behavior focus on self professed party identification, this study will use the respondent's self-reported vote for the U.S. House of Representatives. Wattenberg has argued voters are largely indifferent toward the two parties (1996). Similarly, Bullock notes, "since many voters either profess no party affiliation or regularly defect, party identification may not provide the perspective necessary to recognize a realignment" (1988, 554). I am interested in the electoral behavior of the respondents, not what they say is their party preference. After all, one might still be a registered Democrat and think of himself accordingly, even though he has voted predominantly for the Republican party for the last 10 years. Or, one might think of herself as independent but always cast her ballot for a Democrat, especially given the dearth of independent candidates. In addition, I am focusing on House elections because they occur with the most frequency and in all districts simultaneously.⁷ Every voter does not have the opportunity to cast a ballot for senator or president every two years as they do with House elections. The presidential vote is increasingly image driven and not suitable for examining long-term partisan preferences in the aggregate. While image is certainly going to play a role in House elections, it will conceivably play the least role in

⁷There is precedent for using house vote with survey data as the basis of examining the alignment of cleavages (Kellstadt, et al., 1996b).

all federal elections because House members attract less media attention on average (Jacobson 1997, 101).

A word must be said about the role of incumbency. House incumbents are considerably more “safe” than their senate counterparts (Mann and Wolfinger 1980, Fiorina 1977, Mayhew 1974). However, Mann and Wolfinger (1980) have noted that voters base their votes for house candidates on the one they “like” the best, not automatically on incumbency or party identification. James Campbell (1993) has also pointed out that factors such as incumbency and the partisanship of the district are constant factors and therefore cannot account for change from election to election. The incumbency advantage will obviously have an effect on this analysis but it should balance out in the aggregate view. As Jacobson notes, “the electoral politics of Congress may center largely on individual candidates and campaigns, but the collective results of congressional elections are what shape the course of national politics” (1997, 124). We are, after all, concerned with electoral realignments because of their impact on national politics.

Cleavages that will be considered include gender, age cohorts, race/ethnicity, education, place of residence, region of residence, income, union membership, ideology, religion, and Inglehart’s value measure.⁸ Figures 3.6 - 3.24 map the way various groups are dividing their partisan votes for the House of Representatives since 1952. The lines represent the percentage voting for the Democratic house candidate minus the percentage voting for the Republican house candidate, giving what will be called a partisan

⁸See Appendix 1 for breakdown of categories.

attachment score. Thus, a positive number indicates a majority of the group is voting Democratic while a negative number indicates a majority of the group is voting Republican.⁹ A group will be considered either active or latent, depending upon the way it is distributing votes. Those groups whose percentages indicate an ample majority of its members (60% or more) are voting for one party or the other will be considered partisanly active. The group characteristic would seem to be important to partisan vote choice. Conversely, if a group is not overwhelmingly giving support to one party, then the group as a whole is dividing its votes fairly evenly between the two parties and will be considered latent.¹⁰ Index scores above 20 and below -20 will signal that a group is active whereas points between 20 and -20 will indicate latency. For example, if women gave 60% of their votes to Democratic House candidates and 40% to Republican candidates, their score would be 20 and they would be considered actively aligned. If men gave 55% of their support to Republican candidates and 45% to Democrats, their score would be -10 and they would be considered a latent group. Trend lines converging around zero would indicate a dissipation of that particular cleavage as groups are dividing their vote fairly evenly between the two parties, indicating they do not significantly support one party over the other. Finally, volatility, or lack of partisan consistency, on the part of a group would lend support both for apartisanship and Inglehart's theory.

Following Inglehart's theoretical expectations, one should see fewer and fewer

⁹Percentages are calculated in terms of the two-party vote.

¹⁰This threshold is established because a supermajority rather than a bare majority would seem to be required to establish a group's firm partisan allegiance. If one is seeking to describe a group's partisan allegiance, a supermajority is required.


active partisan cleavages as postmaterialists begin to multiply in the electorate beginning in the mid 1970s and wreak havoc on the traditional cleavage structure. There are two cleavages, however, that Inglehart believes will be of importance for postmaterialists: age and education. Those cohorts socialized in the post-World War II era should be the most likely to be postmaterialists because their basic needs and necessities would readily have been met. In addition, higher education levels should also correspond with postmaterialist values because Inglehart relies on education as an indicator of one's formative security, vital in establishing postmaterialist values. Therefore, these two groups should exhibit some cohesiveness in voting behavior, though not necessarily any partisan consistency since party ties are thought to be few for postmaterialists because of the inadequate way in which the traditional parties address postmaterialist values. Beyond these two cleavages, age and education, it can be inferred from Inglehart that he believes group identity will steadily become less and less relevant to one's partisan vote choice.

The Cleavages

Gender. In recent U.S. history, gender has become important in terms of vote choice. Gender had traditionally not been seen as a cleavage until the emergence in the 1980s of the so-called gender gap. Before the 1982 election there was no discernable difference between the way men and women cast their votes (Figure 3.6). Men voted slightly more Democratic than women but both trend lines followed the same pattern of movement. In the 1982 election, however, women began to move decisively toward Democratic house candidates; at the same time men began to move away from them.

And, the trends no longer followed the same pattern. In the 1994 election, men gave a majority of their vote to Republican house candidates for the first time since the 1952 election. Women qualify as an active group for the 1982-1992 period, giving an average of 61.3% of their vote to Democratic house candidates. Since 1992, the gender gap between men and women has remained; women still vote more Democratic than men. Since 1994, however, women's cohesiveness has declined; they are no longer an actively aligned group, and they have begun to fairly evenly split their vote between Republicans and Democrats in the 1990s.

FIGURE 3.6
GENDER AND HOUSE VOTE



Age cohorts. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the voting patterns of different age cohorts. Those born in 1926 and later are represented in Figure 3.7 and those born prior to 1926 in Figure 3.8.

Those in cohorts one (born 1959-80) and two (born from 1943-58) should be, according to Inglehart, the generations most likely to be postmaterialists because they

were socialized in the post-World War II era. These two groups, along with the highly educated, are the only cleavages that Inglehart believes will endure in a postindustrial electorate. Thus, they should be a cohesive voting block but not necessarily a consistent one in terms of partisan preference. Since postmaterialists are to be less partisan, we would expect the partisan preferences of these two cohorts to fluctuate. In fact, cohort one does exhibit cohesiveness and is very volatile in terms of partisan preference. It enters the electorate giving a large majority to Republican House candidates (67% in 1978), but in the next election cycle almost evenly splits its vote between Democrats and Republicans. In the 1982 election, however, the youngest cohort gave its most overwhelming support to Republican house candidates in the time series (73%). Just two elections later, the youngest cohort gave overwhelming support to Democratic house candidates. By 1992, this group had become latent, splitting its two-party vote rather evenly but generally favoring Republican candidates. The overall volatility in cohort one is exemplified by the standard deviation from the mean partisan attachment score; with a mean partisan attachment score for the time series of .78, the standard deviation is 26.44.

The second cohort, those born from 1943-1958, does not exhibit the erratic voting behavior of the youngest cohort but does exhibit some cohesiveness. For most of the period under study, cohort two gave a majority of their votes to Democratic house candidates. From 1970-76, they make up an active group for Democrats. Again briefly, in the elections of 1988-92, they obtain partisan attachment scores above 20, making them actively aligned with the Democrats. With the pivotal 1994 election, however, cohort two voters bestowed majority allegiance to Republican house candidates, but they

fall short of being an active group. By the end of the time series, cohort two is evenly divided in its vote preference.

In terms of Inglehart's expectations regarding those voters most likely to be postmaterialist (cohorts one and two), the results are mixed. Cohort one is often cohesive and inconsistent as Inglehart's theory would lead one to predict. However, cohort two, while sometimes cohesive does not show a pattern of inconsistency in partisan choice as cohort one does and as we would expect.

The third cohort in Figure 3.7 consists of those born from 1927 to 1942. Cohort three briefly attains active status for the Democrats once in every decade but the 1980s. This lack of overwhelming Democratic support is surprising since a good portion of cohort three consists of voters who would have been socialized during the Great Depression and FDR's New Deal. A similar pattern of behavior emerges with this cohort as the previous one; the early 1990s begin a period where these voters are evenly splitting their votes between Democrats and Republicans.

FIGURE 3.7
AGE COHORTS (1927-1980) AND HOUSE VOTE





Figure 3.8 depicts the oldest cohorts within the electorate. Cohort four is made up of those born from 1911 to 1926. From 1958-1966, this cohort makes up an active partisan group for the Democrats giving their candidates an average of 61% of their vote during this period. Also, during the elections from 1978 to 1992, cohort four becomes on average an active group for Democrats. Again beginning in the 1990s, this group as previous cohorts, lessens their support of Democratic candidates.

The remaining two cohorts by the end of the time series do not make up sufficient numbers to be reliably included in what appears to be the pivotal decade of the 1990s. Cohort 5 briefly attains active status for the Democrats in a few elections (1962-1964, 1974, and 1986) but is primarily a latent group during the time series. Cohort six is very erratic, going from active Democratic status in one election to active Republican status a few elections later. Much of this can be attributed to small sample size of this cohort, especially beginning in the 1970s as this cohort begins to fade from the electorate.

FIGURE 3.8
AGE COHORTS (BEFORE 1927) AND HOUSE VOTE




Race/Ethnicity. It is not surprising that the data show African-Americans and Hispanics as two of the Democratic party's solid supporters (Figure 3.9). For the entire time series, African Americans give a vast majority of their vote to Democratic house candidates and obtain partisan attachment scores well above 20. Their support peaks in 1976 when they give 97.2% of their vote to Democrats. Most notably, however, they follow the pattern seen in previous groups; their partisan support has declined in the

1990s. They end the time series giving their lowest, though still overwhelming, level of support to Democrats (73.1%).

Hispanics are not identifiably sampled by NES until 1978. They, like African-Americans, overwhelmingly support Democratic house candidates and their partisan attachment scores are well above 20 for the time series, making them an actively aligned group. The average partisan attachment score for Hispanics during the time series is 58.2, well above the established threshold of 20. Unlike previous group behavior, however, the 1990s do not see a decline in partisan support, but an increase in support for Democrats.

White voters attain active status in only two elections, 1964 and 1990 and both supporting Democrats. By 1994 they are giving majority support to Republican candidates (57.2%). But in subsequent elections in the 1990s, partisan support, while still favoring Republicans, becomes more evenly divided.


FIGURE 3.9
RACE/ETHNICITY AND HOUSE VOTE



Education. Education levels are categorized according to one's highest level of educational attainment. At the beginning of the time series in 1952, those with the lowest education levels do not attain active status, but do give a majority of their vote to Democrats (Figure 3.10). In fact, those with the lowest levels of education do not give majority support to Republican candidates at any point in the time series. By the 1958 election, both those with a grade school education or less and those without a high school

diploma became actively aligned groups for the Democrats. In the case of those with the least education, from 1958 to the end of the time series, they maintain this status. High school drop outs, however, are a little less supportive of Democratic house candidates than those with the lowest education levels. From 1970 to 1996, those without diplomas do maintain partisan attachment scores well above 20. Both groups in the lowest levels of education, despite a spike for the 1996 election, show declining support for Democrats in the 1990s when compared to the two previous decades. The lowest education group maintains its active status, but high school drop outs not only fall into latency status with the 1998 election but split their vote evenly between Democratic house candidates and Republican house candidates.


FIGURE 3.10
LOWEST LEVELS OF EDUCATION AND HOUSE VOTE



Trends for those with higher levels of education are depicted in Figure 3.11. All three categories in 1952 give majority support to Republican candidates; high school graduates even obtain a partisan attachment score of -21.4 making them an active Republican group. By 1956, however, a majority of graduates support Democrats. For the remainder of the time series, high school graduates sporadically make up active groups for the Democrats, but rarely for more than one election at a time. The one

exception is their voting behavior from 1986 to 1992 where they do sustain active status. With the 1994 election, however, they plummet not just into latency, but to an even division of their two-party vote. In subsequent elections, they again begin to favor Democratic candidates on the whole but only by slim margins.

FIGURE 3.11
HIGHER LEVELS OF EDUCATION AND HOUSE VOTE



Voters who are high school graduates with some post secondary education are only an active group for one election, 1990, when they attain a partisan attachment score

of 22.8. This is their peak of support for any party in the entire time series. In 1994, this category gives majority support to Republican candidates. They continue to do so in subsequent elections and strengthen their support for Republicans.

Finally, voters with the highest educational attainment give less support to Democrats on the whole than the other educational categories. In the 1958 election, they briefly achieve active Republican status. In the 1974 election, they momentarily achieve active Democratic status. By the election of 1990, those holding college degrees were within .4 of a point of being an actively aligned Democratic group. But, by 1994, they had switched majority partisan preference *and* become an active Republican group, which they would maintain in 1996. In 1998, however, they substantially pulled back their support for Republican candidates.

Inglehart believes that those with the highest educational attainment should be one of the groups still relevant in a postmaterialist electorate. Thus, they should be an increasingly cohesive voting block. The data presented here, however, do not meet these expectations. Those with college and professional degrees are an active Democratic group in 1974 and then become an active Republican group in 1994 and 1996 but do not sustain this cohesiveness in the 1998 election. In addition, since Inglehart believes political parties are doing an inadequate job representing the issues of primary importance to postmaterialist voters, they should not necessarily be consistently voting for one party or the other. There is some support in the data for partisan inconsistency. In 1970, those of highest educational attainment had a partisan attachment score of precisely 0. The next two elections would find them giving majority support to Democrats, but in 1976 they


give majority support to Republicans. For the remainder of the 1970s and all of the 1980s, they support Democrats, but never overwhelmingly. By 1994, they have switched majority support to Republicans and this support was strong enough for them to be an actively aligned Republican group in both 1994 and 1996. Thus, Inglehart's expectations are not wholly met in this data.

To summarize, one finds both similarities and differences in the educational category with other groups. Across the board, the election of 1990 proved to be a peak in Democratic support for all education categories. Subsequent elections, however, show marked declines overall in Democratic fortunes. Both high school graduates and graduates with some post secondary education behave differently after the 1994 election than other previously examined groups; they strengthen their partisan support (one Democratic, the other Republican) whereas most groups after 1994 retreat from partisan support. In addition, the two categories of lowest education attainment increase their Democratic support in 1996 but there is a subsequent decrease of this support in the 1998 election, a substantial one in the case of those without high school diplomas.

Place of residence. Residents of central cities make up a solid Democratic constituency for a vast majority of the time series (Figure 3.12). They never give majority support to Republican candidates and are actively aligned with the Democrats from 1956 to 1992 (after which they drop to a partisan attachment score of 19.4) and then return to active status in both 1996 and 1998. Rural voters have peak Democratic support in 1964, giving 68.2% of their support to Democratic house candidates, but Democratic fortunes with rural voters will not see this level of support for the remainder of the time series. In

the 1992 election, rural voters are still giving a majority of their two-party vote to Democrats but the 1994 election changes that when rural voters briefly become an active Republican group. In the two subsequent elections, rural voters still favor Republicans. But, by 1998 they are only giving Republican house candidates a 1.2 percentage point edge over Democrats. Suburban voters in 1990 favor Democrats, giving them 58.4% of their two-party vote, a seven election high. Once again the 1994 election proves to be monumental; suburban voters switch majority support to Republicans and strengthen that support for the remainder of the time series. Unlike many of the other categories, suburbanites are becoming more partisan at the end of the time series, not less.

FIGURE 3.12
PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND HOUSE VOTE



Region of residence. Figures 3.13 through 3.15 show voting behavior from a regional perspective. Figure 3.13 contains voting trends for those in border states and the South. The history of house voting in border states is sporadic but favors the Democratic candidate. Only three times in the time series did border states give majority support to Republican candidates (1956, 1962, 1984). From 1972 to 1992, border states qualify as an active Democratic group almost without interruption (interruptions being the elections

of 1976 and 1984). Declining Democratic fortunes begin with the 1992 election and hit bottom with the 1996 election when only 53.8% of voters in border states give support to Democratic candidates. However, in 1998, Democratic candidates see a resurgence of support and again cross the threshold of being an actively aligned Democratic group, thus making the border states one of the few categories where partisanship increased in the final election of the 1990s after the initial downturn of that decade.

The South's movement away from its "solid" status is evident in Figure 3.13. This region begins the time series giving overwhelming support to the Democrats. It is not until the 1994 election that the region's majority begins to favor the Republican candidate in House level elections, and after a lessening of that support in 1996, strengthens it remarkably in 1998 to attain a partisan attachment score of -35.6. As with the border states, the southern states are becoming more partisan in the final election of the 1990s, but support different parties.

FIGURE 3.13
REGION 1 AND HOUSE VOTE





Figure 3.14 portrays trends from both the northcentral and northeastern United States. The northcentral United States only attains active status twice (1986 and 1990) and that status only endures for one election. Volatility is common; majority support switches party nine times from 1952-1998. Similarly, the northeast is quite volatile. The elections of 1962 and 1964 see northeasterners maintaining active Democratic status, but this is the only incidence of active partisanship that endures for more than one election.

In the 1990s, Democratic fortunes decline from their 1980s level of support and the time series ends with a partisan attachment score of 3.8, indicating that northeastern votes are almost evenly divided between the two parties.

FIGURE 3.14
REGION 2 AND HOUSE VOTE




Finally, Figure 3.15 presents the data from the mountain West and the Pacific West. Early in the time series, the mountain West gives huge support to Democratic

candidates; they are an active Democratic group from 1952 to 1960. However, in 1962, the mountain West supports Republican candidates at a very high level, only to return to the Democratic fold by similar margins. But, from 1968 to 1986, majority support in the mountain west is given to Republicans and active status is maintained from 1968-70 and from 1980-86. The elections of 1990 and 1992 sees the return of the mountain West to a Democratic group, as with all the other regions, the 1994 election witnesses the shift to majority support for Republicans that is strengthened in the 1996 election. While majority support returns to the Democrats in 1998, the two party vote is almost evenly split. Thus, the mountain West ranks as the most volatile section of the country (with a standard deviation of 30.3 from the mean partisan attachment score), the trend line looking much like the peaks and valleys of this region's natural landscape.

Despite beginning the time series voting substantially Republican, the Pacific West gives a majority of their two-party vote to the Democratic party in all elections but three (1952, 1968, and 1986). Even in 1994, a decidedly Republican year, the electorate for this region votes a 50-50 split. By 1998, partisanship in favor of Democratic candidates was increasing.

FIGURE 3.15
REGION 3 AND HOUSE VOTE




Thus, regional trend depictions give us three patterns. For the six regions examined, two would seem to be becoming more partisan by the 1998 election, the border states and the South. Each end the time series as active groups; the border region for the Democrats and the South for the Republicans. One region, the Pacific West does not attain active status but with a partisan attachment score of 12.8, ends the time series

giving moderate majority support to Democrats. The remaining three regions end the series with small partisan attachment scores indicating the two party vote is closely divided. The mountain West, northcentral and northeastern United States have partisan attachment scores of 5.8, 6.4, and 3.8 respectively at the end of the time series.

Income. Income level voting trends are depicted in Figure 3.16. Those occupying the lowest 1/3 of the income scale make up the low income category. Throughout the time series, they never give a majority of their two-party vote to Republican candidates. In 1952, low income voters are at their lowest level of Democratic support. Throughout the time series, the overall level of support for Democrats rises until it reaches its peak in the 1990 election when 76.6% of low income voters favor the Democratic house candidate. Even with this solidly Democratic constituency, the Democrats' level of support drops precipitously after the 1990 election and low income voters end the time series dropping from being actively aligned with the Democrats for the first time since 1968.

FIGURE 3.16
INCOME AND HOUSE VOTE




Middle income voters, like their low income counterparts, have their peak Democratic support in the election of 1990 when 71% of them cast ballots for the Democratic house candidate. However, in the 1994 election, they switch majority party support to Republicans, the first time in the time series when a majority of the middle income voters cast ballots for the GOP. In the subsequent elections, partisan attachment scores are very small, all with absolute values less than 5, indicating an increased

propensity for evenly splitting the two-party vote.

Finally, the high income voters comprise the upper 1/3 of the income scale. These voters do not attain active status for the entire time series until the 1994 and 1996 elections when they overwhelmingly support Republican candidates. However, by 1998, while still giving a majority of their support to the GOP, high income voters were not giving this support sufficiently to maintain their active status. Thus, at the end of the time series, all income categories had become much less partisan than they were just two elections earlier.

Union membership. Union households are an active Democratic group from 1952 to 1994, with the exception of the 1968 election when their partisan attachment score drops to 15.8 (Figure 3.17). With the 1996 and 1998 elections, a majority of union households still support the Democrats but they fall into latent status with scores of 19.2 and 14.2 respectively. As with many of the previous trend lines, beginning in the 1990s, the partisan support of union households declines. Nonunion households are only a partisanly active group in one election, 1990, when they obtain a partisan attachment score of 24.2. The very next election, however, nonunion households give a majority of their vote to Republican house candidates but they do not become an actively aligned partisan group. Their support of Republican house candidates after 1994 is not as strong.

FIGURE 3.17
UNION HOUSEHOLD AND HOUSE VOTE




Ideology. While liberals throughout the time series are always actively aligned with the Democrats, the same cannot be said of conservatives and their support for the Republican party (Figure 3.18). Mean liberal support for Democratic candidates for the

time series is 77.1% with a standard deviation of 3.8. Conservative voters during the time series gave an average of 62.2% support for Republican candidates and the standard deviation of 7.4 indicates comparatively more volatility. Conservatives qualify as an active Republican group in 1976, 1980-84, 1988, and 1992-1998, only 9 of the 14 elections, whereas liberals are an active Democratic group in all of the 14 elections. Conservatives are at their most partisan during the late 1990s than at any other time period and their partisan support peaks in 1996. Liberals are less partisan from 1992 to the end of the time series; their partisan support peaks in 1988. Still, liberals are more partisan by the end of the time series because their partisan attachment score in 1998 is 49 whereas the partisan attachment score for conservatives is -41.

The vast majority of the electorate inhabits the moderate and “don’t know” categories. The moderates were a consistently active Democratic group from 1982 to 1990. However, after the 1990 election their support in every subsequent election drops off and they end the time series with a partisan attachment score of 4.2, indicating they have become not only a latent group but one that is almost evenly dividing its vote between the two parties. Voters who respond to queries about their ideology with a “don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about it” strongly favor Democratic house candidates. While they miss the threshold for active status in 1972, 1984, and 1998, they are not far from scores of 20 in those years. The overall mean partisan attachment score for 1972 to 1998, the only years the ideology question was asked by NES, is 31. Those with ambivalent attitudes toward party ideology supported the Democratic house candidate with an average two-party vote of 65.7%.

While liberals, moderates, and those ambivalent about ideology saw their support for Democratic candidates decline after the early 1990s, conservatives strengthened their support for Republican candidates. In 1990, conservatives only gave 56.5% of their vote to Republicans but by 1996 were giving an all-time high of 76.9% to them. The ideological bent of all categories decreased from 1996 to 1998. It is important, however, to recognize that liberals and conservatives retained their active status and the “don’t knows” only missed the partisan attachment score necessary to sustain their active status by .6 of a point. Therefore, even though the connection between ideology and vote choice was loosened, it remained strong.

FIGURE 3.18
IDEOLOGY AND HOUSE VOTE



Religion. Religion has always played a unique role in American society and this role is an evolving one. This evolution makes the analysis of religion challenging. This difficulty is compounded when using NES data because of the lack of continuity in both religious questions and coding of religious denominations. Initially, the NES only asked respondents their preference of religion by prompting them to choose from being

Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. Only in 1970 was the question altered to include “something else” as one of the responses in the actual question itself. In 1960, the NES began asking Protestants to distinguish their denomination and allowed for approximately 50 different codes.¹¹ In 1990, when it became apparent to scholars who study religion and politics that the breakdown of various denominations as being used by NES since 1960 was incapable of capturing the changing religious picture in the United States, the NES updated and expanded its denominational codes. This lack of continuity in both question format and in religious coding is extremely problematic when trying to get a picture of voting trends by religious groups. Consequently, religion in this study is examined in three ways in an attempt to get the most comprehensive picture of the voting behavior of different religious traditions.

First, religion is presented in its simplest form using the basic categorization of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish because this is the one question for which the NES provides continuous data for the entire 1952-98 time series (Figures 3.19). Because we know there are substantial voting behavioral differences that follow racial lines (Kellstedt, et al., 1996a), trends for only white Protestants are shown in Figure 3.19. This distinction, however, still does not alleviate the problem of putting all Protestants within one classification. As evangelicalism and fundamentalism within Protestantism grew and mainline denominations declined during the mid to late twentieth century, the conflating of two often very different religious views under one categorization has masked important


¹¹However, the question was not asked in 1962 but was resumed the following election year.

differences in political behavior. Nevertheless, Figures 3.19 gives us a broad religious overview of the American electorate since 1952. While this overview is not perfect, it is still useful.

As can be seen, Jews are by far the most faithful supporters of Democratic house candidates. In every election, they register as an active Democratic group. Democratic fortunes with Catholics have steadily fallen off since their peak support in 1960 when John F. Kennedy had remarkable coattails within the Catholic community. In 1994, Catholics gave majority support to Republican house candidates for the first (and only) time. The remainder of the 1990s do see them return to giving majority support to Democratic house candidates but by slim margins. White Protestants rarely give majority support to Democratic house candidates during the time series. The 1998 election finds white Protestants giving their strongest support ever to Republican house candidates; they register a partisan attachment score of -31.8.

It is notable that what we do not see in the religion category is the across-the-board falling off of cleavage strength in the 1990s as has been evident in many of the other categories examined, indicating that at least for some, religious affiliation remains firmly linked to partisan vote choice. Jews are maintaining their active status as a Democratic group. White Protestants have strengthened their Republican support. Finally, Catholics do behave in the same manner as previous groups; their partisan attachment scores since 1994 hover around 0.

FIGURE 3.19
RELIGION 1 AND HOUSE VOTE



A more nuanced view of religion can be gleaned from NES data. However, this approach is not without its difficulties as well. The comparability of the 1960-1988 coding and the 1990-98 coding of denominations is problematic. While possible to roughly translate denominational codes to make them comparable, the codebook warns of this comparability as being “extremely dubious” (Sapiro, et. al, 1998). Kellstedt, et al., (1996a) provide guidance in categorizing the now more than 100 denominational codings that NES has used since 1990. They recommend 5 denominational distinctions within Protestantism: Evangelical, Mainline, Black, conservative nontraditional, and liberal nontraditional (188-189). These denominational assignments, the translation of religious codes provided by NES, and the limitations of the NES data itself has led to Figures 3.20 and 3.21, which offer a more nuanced categorization than the original religion question provides, but the data still must be viewed with the noted caveats.

From Figures 3.20 and 3.21, it is possible to more accurately gauge the partisan leanings of religious groups.¹² Figure 3.20 portrays voting trends for Catholic and Eastern Orthodox, Jewish, and secular respondents. Catholics and Eastern Orthodox are an active Democratic group in all but five elections, 1970, 1980, and 1994-1998. Most notably, Catholics and Eastern Orthodox began giving majority support to Republican candidates

¹²Ideally, we would have ten categorizations: secular, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Black Protestants, conservative nontraditional Protestants, liberal nontraditional Protestants, Catholics, Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, and other nonchristian (Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt 1996). However, there are not sufficient respondents in several of these categories for the analysis to be reliable. Therefore, five categories will be utilized here: Secular, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Catholic and Eastern Orthodox, and Jewish. See Appendix Two for the breakdown of religious coding. The reference line at 1990 marks the change in NES denominational coding where comparability is in doubt.

in both 1994 and 1996. Even though this majority support is slight, it is a remarkable change in a very short amount of time; the partisan attachment score for Catholics was 24.4 in 1992 and plummeted to -2.2 in 1994. The 1998 election saw Catholics and Eastern Orthodox again giving majority support to Democrats, but the partisan attachment score is under 10 so the support is not overwhelming. The cohesiveness of the Jewish vote and its loyalty to Democratic house candidates is reflected in the fact that partisan attachment scores never fall below 20, the threshold for active status. Secular voters begin the time series in 1960 heavily favoring Republican candidates.¹³ By the next election for which data is available (1964), the secular are heavily favoring Democratic candidates and do not return to Republican majority support.

¹³Data for the 1996 and 1998 election is treated as missing for seculars because there were fewer than five respondents.

FIGURE 3.20
RELIGION 2 AND HOUSE VOTE




Figure 3.21 breaks the Protestant faith into two different categories, mainline Protestants and white evangelicals.¹⁴ Mainline Protestants are those who belong to

¹⁴It should be reiterated that the trends for Protestants before 1990 should be treated with caution due to the inadequacies of the NES categories within Protestantism. Beginning in 1990, the codes were adapted to better fit changing religious circumstances and, thus, are more reliable. In addition, there is a difference in political views between black evangelicals and white evangelicals as Kellstedt, et al., (1996a) point out. Black evangelicals are not sampled in large enough numbers by the NES to be included here.


Methodist, Episcopalian, Congregationalists, Presbyterian and similar old-line denominations. Historically, mainline Protestants have always been perceived as a very Republican constituency, at least at the presidential level. The data for congressional elections show a group that gives majority support to Republican candidates in 75% of the elections captured in the time series but often not at active status levels. This is surprising because the strength of that Republican support is not as strong as might have been assumed given presidential data and conventional wisdom. Mainline Protestants are sporadically an active Republican group, in 1960, 1968, and 1994-98. However, in 1990, mainline Protestants give a majority of their vote to Democratic house candidates but are certainly not an actively aligned group. From that peak of Democratic support in one election, mainline Protestants immediately return to the fold of the Republican party and the rest of the 1990s see them strengthen that support so that they end the time series as an active Republican group and, if the current trend continues, one that is deepening.

White evangelical Protestants are a much more Democratic constituency at the congressional election level during the bulk of the time series than are mainline Protestants. From 1960 until 1980, white evangelicals are a solidly Democratic group, reflecting the fact that evangelicals were disproportionately from the South and of lower income (Fowler and Hertzke 1995, 97-98). During the early part of the time series, these two characteristics were likely to predispose them to the Democratic party even though they tended to be conservative in social outlook. Although much has been written about the move of white evangelicals to the GOP, the trend is not as pronounced when examining data on congressional elections. Often the local Democratic party was at odds

with the national party's outlook, especially in the South. In this region, there was also a dearth of Republican candidates during much of the time period under examination. Thus, there is a significant time lag involved in the move of white evangelicals to the GOP from presidential election data to congressional election data.¹⁵ The conservative, white evangelicals began moving to Republican presidential candidates in the mid-1960s. However, the retreat from Democrats happens after the 1978 election when one examines data for congressional elections. In 1980, white evangelicals give a majority of their congressional vote to Republican house candidates for the first time. From 1984-1992, they evenly split on congressional candidates. In 1994, however, they support Republican House candidates by a whopping margin; their partisan attachment score in 1994 is -39.8.


¹⁵For more on the differences between presidential and other elections in the South, see Glaser 1996.

FIGURE 3.21
RELIGION 3 AND HOUSE VOTE



Attendance at religious services is also a characteristic that should be tracked as there is considerable evidence of increasing bifurcation within religious traditions (Green et al., 1996, Layman and Carmines 1997, Layman 1999). Accordingly, Figure 3.22 presents a final way to look at religion in the United States. It tracks House vote by whether one attends religious services frequently (weekly or more) and those who attend infrequently (few times a year, never). After 1984, frequent attendees begin voting for Democrats less and less. By 1992, they are giving solid majorities to Republicans. Those who never or infrequently attend services are much more predisposed to Democratic House candidates. Although their support drops after 1992 it rebounds at the end of the time series.

FIGURE 3.22
ATTENDANCE AND HOUSE VOTE



Thus, the picture presented here is a mixed bag. By the last decade of the time series some religious traditions, Jews and mainline Protestants, maintain their historic support of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. On the other hand, Catholics and Eastern Orthodox, as well as evangelical Protestants but especially white evangelicals have retreated from their historic overwhelming support of one party, the Democrats. By the 1990s, white evangelicals are decidedly favoring Republican candidates. Catholics and Eastern Orthodox indicate some ambivalence towards the two parties by the end of the time series as they are almost evenly splitting their vote between the two. If the overall trend that is evident in the time series for Catholics and Eastern Orthodox since 1960 continues, then this partisan ambivalence will fade as Catholics strengthen their Republican support. Only time, however, will reveal whether or not this trend will continue.

Overall, the voting trends of religious groups in the United States do not conform to Inglehart's expectations of declining importance; religion is still a salient characteristic for many voters. First, Jews traditional strong support of the Democratic party has continued. In the 1980s, Democratic support was at its lowest level but Jews still remained a very active group. Democratic support among Jews has since rebounded; the average partisan attachment score for the decade of the Nineties was 49.5 making Jews one of the strongest Democratic constituencies. In addition, mainline Protestants are strengthening their support for the Republican party in the latter part of the time series, being an actively aligned Republican group in the last half of the 1990s. House candidates can also count on solid white evangelical support in the 1990s.


More in accordance with Inglehart's expectations, are the trend lines for Catholics and Eastern Orthodox. At the end of the time series, they are rather evenly divided on their support of the two parties. Catholics and Eastern Orthodox are no longer in the active Democratic camp. It could be that they will continue to move decisively toward Republican support but future elections are necessary to see if this trend continues.

Postmaterialist-materialist values. Finally, the last category examined is value orientation, those whom Inglehart identifies as having materialist, postmaterialist, or mixed values, and the relationship to vote choice.¹⁶ Inglehart is adamant that postmaterialist values will not correspond to partisan vote choice because parties have done an inadequate job of addressing issues important to postmaterialists. Since postmaterialist values are supposed to crosscut partisan lines, Figure 3.23 is surprising. In fact, postmaterialists are a consistently active and strong group for the Democrats; the partisan attachment score for the time series is 27. This does not fit with Inglehart's theoretical expectations as postmaterialists overwhelmingly favor Democrats. If postmaterialism were truly crosscutting partisan ties, one would expect latency and volatility, but not active partisan status.

Given Inglehart's theory, one might expect materialists to be an active partisan group since it is their values that Inglehart believes the two parties have been addressing. However, materialists fail to attain active partisan status. Those with mixed value orientations also can be classified as a latent group.

¹⁶See Chapter 2 for the explanation of how value orientation is determined with NES data. NES discontinued the Inglehart question after the 1992 survey.

FIGURE 3.23
VALUE ORIENTATION AND HOUSE VOTE



Cleavage Summary

If Inglehart is correct in his theoretical assumptions, cleavages should have begun to dissipate in the mid 1970s as postmaterialists voters make their presence felt in the electorate. However, an overview of the cleavage trends shows that the 1970s was not the pivotal decade. The 1990s were the decade where the dissipation of cleavages materialized, several decades after Inglehart believed the change would become evident.

If one compares partisan attachment scores across the 1990s, there are many once active groups that fade into latency during this decade. Many have partisan attachment scores that hover around 0 indicating an even division of the partisan vote. For these groups, the group characteristic is not important as a whole to partisan vote choice. In addition, most of the groups, whether latent or active, show declining strength during the 1990s as well. Thus, there is a dissipation of many cleavages found, as Inglehart would predict, but the time frame is different than what Inglehart predicted. There are, however, some notable instances where cleavages are not behaving as Inglehart thought, as in the cases of ideology, religion, region of residence, race, age cohorts, and Inglehart's own value orientation. There is evidence that some groups within these cleavages are attaining higher and higher partisan attachment scores as time progresses becoming more partisan, contrary to how Inglehart believed a postmaterialist electorate would behave.

Active groups. Table 3.2 shows the active groups in the 1990-1998 period. There are still a number of active partisan groups within the electorate, but a majority are showing signs of waning. Nine of the 18 active groups in this period are decreasing, sometimes to the point of latency by 1998. Of the active groups, there are notable ones that remain strong and are not showing signs of decreasing strength. These groups are Hispanics, conservatives, white Protestants, Jews, mainline Protestants, white evangelicals, frequent attendees at religious services, and postmaterialists. These groups behave contrary to Inglehart's expectations of the postmaterialist electorate because they are active and because they are not becoming less cohesive in their vote.

TABLE 3.2
ACTIVE GROUPS 1990-1998

<u>CLEAVAGE</u> group	<u>DECREASING COHESIVENESS</u>
Race/Ethnicity	
African-Americans	✓
Hispanics	
Education	
Grade School or less	✓
High School, no diploma	✓
Place of Residence	
Central City	✓
Region of Residence	
Border	✓
South	
Income	
Low Income	✓
Union Household	
Union	✓
Ideology	
Liberals	✓
Conservatives	
Don't know	✓
Religion	
White Protestants	
Jewish	
Mainline Protestants	
White Evangelicals	
Frequent attendees	
Value Orientation	
Postmaterialists	

Inglehart is silent on expectations for racial and ethnic cleavages. Since issues of equality are identified by Inglehart as of concern to postmaterialist, it should not be surprising that African-Americans and Hispanics remain two of the most cohesive voting blocks in the American electorate. Given Inglehart's expectations of the postindustrial electorate, however, it is surprising that these two cohesive groups are also highly partisan. African-Americans have seen their strength as a voting block decrease in the 1990s and register the lowest percentage of Democratic support in 1998, but race remains the most enduring active cleavage within the American electorate. Hispanics, on the other hand are one of the few groups that seems to be strengthening their cohesiveness in the 1990s.

Inglehart believes that with the growth of postmaterialist values ideology will decrease in importance because of its link with the old cleavage structure and its lack of a link with value change, but this does not seem to be the case in the United States. Ideology is a strong cleavage in the 1990s. Conservatives in the 1990s have strengthened their cohesiveness while liberals show declining strength in the Nineties, but it is slight and they remain a highly partisan group. The non-ideological, the "don't knows", also qualify as an active Democratic group but they have voted less cohesively as the 1990s progressed.

According to Inglehart, postmaterialist society will be a secularized society. As postmaterialist values grow, religion as a cleavage should decline in importance. However, religion has always played a unique role in American society. Rather than fading from the political scene, religion shows interesting movements that indicate more

cohesiveness. The active religious groups do not show signs of weakening as many of the other cleavages. White Protestants in the broad view became an actively aligned Republican group with the election of 1994 and its support of Republican house candidates remains strong. Jews remain a very active Democratic group, and one that has not abated in the Nineties. Mainline Protestants in the 1990s go from being an active Democratic group to an active Republican group and show signs of growing strength. Also, white evangelicals and those who attend religious services frequently have also become solidly Republican constituencies.

The last of the groups that are not showing decreasing strength in the 1990s, the postmaterialist group, is the most surprising given Inglehart's theory. Postmaterialist values are supposed to crosscut partisan lines. In fact, however, postmaterialists are an active Democratic group, and one that was becoming a stronger group in 1992 when the time series ended.

Latent groups. Latent groups are identified in Table 3.3. There are 25 latent groups in the 1990s. Even though these groups are latent rather than active, a similar pattern is evident; 19 of the latent groups are exhibiting decreasing strength as they move closer toward evenly splitting their vote between the two parties. There are six groups whose strength has been increasing in the Nineties; the youngest age cohort, suburbanites, high income earners, the secular, those with mixed value orientation, and those who infrequently or never attend religious services.

TABLE 3.3
LATENT GROUPS 1990-1998

<u>CLEAVAGE</u> group	<u>DECREASING COHESIVENESS</u>
Gender	
Female	✓
Male	✓
Age Cohorts	
Born 1959-80	
Born 1943-58	✓
Born 1927-42	✓
Born 1911-26	✓
Education	
HS grads	✓
Some post HS ed	✓
College degree and +	✓
Race/Ethnicity	
Whites	✓
Place of Residence	
Rural	✓
Suburbs	
Region of Residence	
Mountain West	✓
Pacific West	✓
North Central	✓
Northeastern	✓
Income	
Middle	✓
High	
Union household	
nonunion	✓
Ideology	
Moderates	✓
Religion	
Catholic & Eastern Orthodox	✓
Secular	
Infrequent attendees	
Value Orientation	
Mixed	
Materialist	✓

The youngest cohort, born from 1959-1980, goes from being an active Democratic group in the late 1980s to exhibiting signs of moving toward becoming an active Republican group by the 1998 election. This is especially contrary to Inglehart's theory because those socialized since World War II are the most likely to be postmaterialists and to have lessened partisan allegiances.

Suburbanites also show signs of strengthening cohesiveness and if their Nineties trend continues will soon become an active Republican constituency. Of the three place-of-residence categories examined, one would expect suburbanites to be the most likely postmaterialists because of the security in which they are likely to have grown up.¹⁷ Yet, they are increasingly partisan just as the youngest cohorts are.

High income earners also are becoming increasingly partisan in the Nineties as are the secular and those with values that are neither materialist or postmaterialist. Like suburbanites, one might expect high income earners to tend toward postmaterialist values as they are likely to have material needs satisfied.¹⁸ Yet, those with the highest levels of income are becoming more partisan, not less as one might think. Of those in the religious

¹⁷It should be noted that Inglehart measures the security of one's formative years by educational attainment only, not place of residence, but it would seem to intuitively make sense that suburbanites are more likely to be postmaterialists than those in the central city and rural areas.

¹⁸Again, it should be noted that Inglehart does not use one's current income level as an indicator of security because he is concerned with security of one's formative years which he believes is best captured by educational attainment. As is the case with suburbanites, it makes intuitive sense that high income earners would be more likely to be postmaterialists than those with lower incomes.

grouping, the secular would be the most likely to be postmaterialist given that Inglehart believes postindustrial society is increasingly secularized and religion means less and less. However, his expectations are again confounded as the secular are close to moving into active status, becoming more, not less partisan. Similarly, those who are infrequently at religious services and those who never attend are also becoming more partisan, not less, as would be expected if Inglehart's theory was true.

Where do the Cleavages Leave Us?

Thus, an examination of group voting behavior within the American electorate shows marked changes occurring in the 1990s. While there are still actively aligned partisan groups within the electorate, many of these are showing signs of decreasing cohesiveness in terms of partisan house vote. Of the active groups, nine have increased their voting strength in the 1990s; five of these are within the religious cleavage (white Protestants, mainline Protestants, white evangelical Protestants, Jews, and frequent religious service attendees), one is racial (Hispanics), one is ideological (Conservatives), one is regional (the South), and one is value based (postmaterialists). Latent groups are more numerous than active groups; of the 43 groups, 25 are latent. A vast majority (76%) of the latent groups are also showing signs of decreasing cohesiveness. All but six are dissipating in the last decade of the time series. As cleavages dissipate, the possibility for critical realignment becomes remote. However, this dissipation did not occur until the 1990s. Combining the thinking of both Inglehart and conceptions of dealignment, increasing dissolution should have begun in the Sixties and Seventies, but this is not the case. It could be that the value change Inglehart has identified simply does not begin to

show up in the cleavage data until the vast majority of the electorate consists of those most likely to have postmaterialist values (those socialized after WWII).

Much of the above data would seem to confirm Inglehart's expectations that cleavages in postindustrial society are of decreasing importance. Is this due to value change? The great majority of groups, whether active or latent, have shown declining partisan strength in the 1990s. There are, however, some groups that do not seem to fit Inglehart's expectations regarding the declining importance of cleavages: Hispanics, conservatives, Jews, white Protestants, mainline Protestants, white Evangelicals, the youngest cohorts, suburbanites, those with the highest incomes, the secular and infrequent religious service goers, those with mixed values, and most importantly Inglehart's own postmaterialists. In addition, the youngest cohort should be the most likely postmaterialists according to Inglehart's theory. As shown above, postmaterialists are an active Democratic constituency. Yet, the youngest cohort shows signs of moving into the Republican camp if the current trend continues. This is true for suburbanites and high income earners also.

The cleavage data indicate the existence of few active cleavages of growing strength within the electorate, thus calling into question the applicability of critical realignment theory to current electoral circumstances. In addition, the cleavage data leave questions about Inglehart's theory. Many cleavages have dissipated, but the time frame does not meet Inglehart's expectations. Those with postmaterialist values are an active partisan group which would call into question the crosscutting nature of the value cleavage on which Inglehart insists. Ideology, religion, and race/ethnicity also seem to

play large roles in partisan vote choice but Inglehart believes as postmaterial values gain ascendancy, these characteristics will play a lesser role due to its lack of correspondence with the value distinctions he delineates. Clearly, the electorate has change over the course of the time series, but is that change due to a value change? A detailed look into Inglehart's theoretical assumptions is in order given the questions that the cleavage data have presented.

Changes in the Social Environment

The previous section established that the political environment has indeed changed. Recent decades have seen the political environment become increasingly fluid and less predictable in terms of partisanship. Many cleavages in society have dissipated, leaving few that are still active and on which a realignment could be based. The question to be addressed now is whether or not the observed changes in cleavages can be attributed to a change in values, specifically Inglehart's conception of materialist and postmaterialist values. Already, some of Inglehart's expectations in regards to cleavage behavior have not been met, leaving important questions about his theory.

Who are Postmaterialists?

Inglehart outlines certain characteristics that will distinguish postmaterialists from materialists and those with mixed orientations. These expectations can be tested using logit analysis and data from the 1972-1992 NES surveys.¹⁹ The dependent variable is the measure of one's values, coded 1 for those with postmaterial values and 0 for all others (materialists and mixed). The independent variables are age, education, attendance at

¹⁹See Appendix Three for coding.

religious services, ideology and partisanship. These variables were chosen because they are theoretically important to one's value orientation according to Inglehart.

Age

As noted previously, Inglehart does not believe that postmaterialist values began to have a political impact until about two decades after World War II when children born and socialized in the much more stable and affluent atmosphere of the postwar world begin to come of age.

During the period since World War II, advanced industrial societies have attained much higher real income levels than ever before in history. Coupled with the emergence of the welfare state, this has brought about a historically unprecedented situation: most of their population does *not* live under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity (Inglehart 1997, 132).

The aggregate affluence of postindustrial society should thus foster the formation of postmaterialist values because according to the scarcity hypothesis, one does not pursue needs that have already been satisfied. Materialist values, which emphasize economic and physical security, can be forsaken by this younger generation to pursue the higher level needs of equality, self-expression and quality of life, or postmaterialist values. The socialization hypothesis accords that values formed in childhood will endure.

Postmaterialists should, according to Inglehart's theory, be concentrated in the ranks of those born after World War II. As the electorate grows, we can expect postmaterialist values steadily to increase over time as generational replacement occurs. For this analysis, two categories will be used: those socialized after World War II (born 1943 and later) and those socialized before World War II (born before 1943).

Education

The formative years are crucial to Inglehart because of the importance he places on the socialization hypothesis. The more security in one's formative years, the more likely one is to form postmaterialist values. Because security in one's formative years does not have a direct measure, Inglehart uses a proxy - education. "... [O]ne's educational level is a considerably better indicator of security during one's formative years than is one's *current* income or occupation. Education gets closer to the key causal factor, which is *formative* security" (1997, 152). Thus, the better educated are more likely to have postmaterialist values than those with lower levels of education. The education variable contains four categories: those with no high school diploma or equivalent, high school graduates, those with some post high school training and/or some college, and finally, those with a bachelor's degree and higher. Those with the lowest level of education are compared with each of the other three categories of successively higher education.

Religion

The secularization of society is also associated with the move to postmaterialist values. As people become more secure physically and economically, organized religion and the reassurance it provides are less important (1997, 281). The religious, therefore, are more likely to be materialists than postmaterialists. "The publics of most advanced industrial societies show both declining confidence in churches and falling rates of church attendance and are placing less emphasis on organized religion" (1997, 45). Religiosity, in the context of Inglehart's theory, can be measured by one's church attendance. Those

who attend services once or twice a month, almost every week and every week are contrasted with those who have no religious preference, never attend services or attend only a few times a year.

Ideology

One key way in which value change is said to be reshaping the political landscape is by crosscutting the traditional left-right distinction. Because Inglehart conceptualizes the materialist-postmaterialist dimension as replacing the class cleavage, the traditional left-right dimension should become less significant as postmaterialism grows.

Postmaterialists do *not* automatically adopt whatever happens to be the conventional Left position. On many issues, they do gravitate toward the Left. But the rise of Postmaterialism has brought a new perspective into play, one that sometimes runs against established political orthodoxy; it is reshaping the meaning of Left and Right. (1997, 319)

Thus, liberalism and postmaterialism should not necessarily go hand in hand. As postmaterial values grow, the traditional labels of conservative and liberal should become less significant to values. In fact, we might expect those who respond to the ideology question with a “don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about it” as likely candidates for postmaterialist values as neither of the traditional dimensions perfectly fit their values.²⁰ Ideology contains four categories: conservatives, moderates, liberals, and those who indicate no preference. Conservatives are utilized as the reference category.

Partisanship

Finally, postmaterialists should be more nonpartisan than those who are not

²⁰This category of respondents is the largest from 1972-84 and is second only to conservatives in 1988-92. The percentages in this category are: 1972 - 22.4%; 1976 - 32.5%; 1980 - 34.8%; 1984 - 29.9%; 1992, 26.6%.

postmaterialists.

Although their higher levels of education and politicization predispose them to identify with *some* political party, the younger relatively Postmaterialist cohorts have less incentive to identify with any specific political party among the available choices. The established political parties were established in an era dominated by social class conflict and economic issues and tend to remain polarized along these lines (1997, 311).

Partisanship is categorized by strength of partisanship, not nominal affiliation.

The three categories are made up of strong partisans, weak partisans, and nonpartisans (all others). Strong partisans are used as the reference category. Nonpartisans should be much more likely to be postmaterialists than partisans, weak or strong.

The Results

The results of the logit analyses for each year, 1972-1992 are contained in Table 3.4. Overall, the characteristics of those holding postmaterialist values do not conform to Inglehart's theoretical expectations.

TABLE 3.4
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR POSTMATERIALIST VALUES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992
socialized after WWII	.2 (.25)	-.02 (.16)	.42* (.21)	-.4* (.2)	.39* (.14)	.19 (.13)
Education (reference = less than hs diploma)						
hs graduates	.14 (.42)	.42 (.24)	-.73* (.35)	-.13 (.31)	-.1 (.2)	-.41* (.17)
Post hs training/some college	1.07* (.34)	.4 (.22)	-.33 (.27)	.02 (.26)	-.26 (.22)	-.24 (.19)
College degree and above	1.62* (.38)	.95* (.24)	-.32 (.31)	.23 (.31)	.21 (.21)	.19 (.19)
regular church attendance	.77* (.24)	.35* (.15)	-.19 (.2)	.5* (.19)	-.09 (.13)	.34* (.12)
ideology (reference = conservative)						
Moderate	-.36 (.36)	.14 (.2)	-.24 (.3)	.02 (.26)	.17 (.18)	.57* (.17)

Liberal	.83*	.55*	.63*	.49*	.7*	1.03*
	(.31)	(.2)	(.26)	(.25)	(.18)	(.16)
Don't know	.21	-.14	-.45	-.2	-.17	.36*
	(.37)	(.23)	(.28)	(.26)	(.19)	(.18)
strength of partisanship (reference = strong partisan weak partisanship)	-.11	-.09	.45	-.05	-.1	-.001
	(.3)	(.2)	(.27)	(.23)	(.17)	(.15)
Apol, ind, lean indep	.06	.22	.45	.18	-.06	-.04
	(.29)	(.2)	(.27)	(.23)	(.16)	(.14)
Constant	-2.83	-2.39	-2.47	-1.72	-1.73	-1.76
	(.21)	(.12)	(.18)	(.17)	(.13)	(.12)
Log-likelihood	561.2	1398.8	774.3	787.01	1498.1	1946.8
Null prediction	90.4	90.11	90.85	83.95	82.85	81.45
Pseudo R ²	.18	.07	.05	.04	.05	.08
N	1011	1793	1311	916	1679	2120
*p ≤ .05	standard errors in parentheses				No VIFs above 1.5	

The two defining characteristics of postmaterialists should be age and education level. However, these two theoretically important variables do not behave as expected. Those socialized since World War II should be significantly more likely to hold postmaterialist values than others. This variable is significant in the years 1980-1988. But, in 1984 the coefficient is of the wrong sign, indicating those socialized pre-World War II are significantly more likely to have postmaterialist values in that year. Later years produce insignificant coefficients. Education, a proxy for security in one's formative years, does behave as expected in 1972 and to a lesser extent 1976, with the higher levels of education attaining significance compared with the lowest level of education. In subsequent years, however, education does not meet expectations. First, in 1980 and 1992, those with high school diplomas are significantly less likely than those without high school diplomas to be postmaterialists, contrary to the theoretical assumptions that those with the lowest levels of education should be the least likely to be postmaterialists. In addition, those with the highest levels of education are not more likely after 1976 to have postmaterialist values than those with the lowest level of education, a significant departure from Inglehart's assumptions. Thus, the two most theoretically important variables do not meet Inglehart's expectations.

According to Inglehart, the secularization of society accompanies the rise in postmaterialist values. As people become more secure, they rely less on traditional belief systems such as that which religion provides. Church attendance does prove to behave as Inglehart hypothesized in relation to postmaterialist values. It attains significance, and in the correct direction, in four of the six years. Thus, there would seem to be a religious

component to those who indicate postmaterialist values; they do tend to be more secular in that they seldom attend religious services.

One's ideology, which should not be a defining characteristic of postmaterialism, proves to be the most consistently significant independent variable. Liberals are significantly more likely to be postmaterialists than conservatives in every year. In addition, the suspected relationship between postmaterialists and those who indicate no preference in terms of ideology does not prove to be significant. Those with no ideological preference, when compared with conservatives, are not more likely to be postmaterialists, except in 1992, when every category is significantly more likely to be postmaterialist than conservatives.

Partisanship is the worst performing variable in the model as it does not attain significance in any year. Weak partisans and nonpartisans are not more likely to be postmaterialists than strong partisans.

Thus, Inglehart's theoretical expectations do not hold up very well against his measure of postmaterialism in the United States. What the measure of postmaterialism seems to capture most consistently is liberal ideology, not something Inglehart believes to be a defining characteristic of postmaterial values. The only variable that consistently behaves as Inglehart theorizes is church attendance, attaining significance in four of the six years. Age and education, which should be two of the defining characteristics of postmaterialism, do not live up to expectations. Inglehart's measure of values would seem to be capturing the increasingly ideological nature of American politics as noted by others (Rabinowitz, Gurian, MacDonald 1985; Ladd 1995) rather than his conception of

postmaterialist values. However, we cannot say this definitively because it could be that the left-right dimension, which Inglehart believes should be crosscut by the new value dimension, has simply adjusted to reflect the bifurcation of materialist and postmaterialist values. Still, his two definitive characteristics of postmaterialists, age and education, do not conform to his theoretical expectations. It could also be that the measure of values is flawed or that the U.S. has once again proved to be exceptional as Inglehart's theory has its roots in western Europe. Regardless, before we take the applicability of postmaterialist values to the U.S. as an article of faith, further study is needed regarding the nature of value change in the United States. It is evident that this further study should not rely on Inglehart's simplistic measure of materialist and postmaterialist values but should examine other possible indicators of postmaterial-material values.

Summary

The question of whether the political environment has changed has been answered affirmatively. Turnout is at its lowest level in the last decade of the time series. Divided government is increasingly common. Apatisans have increased and among partisans there has been a slightly increased tendency to defect in congressional elections. Voters who split their ticket, while less than one-third of the electorate, are more common in the 1990s than in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, and more importantly for addressing the relevance of critical realignment theory, many cleavages have disintegrated. This evidence calls into question the applicability of critical realignment theory to a fundamentally changed electorate.

Change in the social environment was addressed by examining the basis of

postmaterialist values. Because several cleavages did not behave as Inglehart predicted, a test of his theoretical assumptions was conducted. This test indicated that Inglehart's conception of postmaterialist values and the characteristics of those who have those values is flawed. The results call into question many of Inglehart's core assumptions about who postmaterialists are and leave political scientists interested in political behavior and social change with many lingering questions about why group voting behavior changed in the 1990s. It could be that Inglehart's core theoretical assumptions are correct but the instrument for capturing values is flawed. Therefore, the next chapter will take a different approach in trying to answer the question of why cleavages began to behave the way they did in the 1990s, rendering critical realignment theory less relevant to the contemporary electorate. Party platforms are analyzed as an indicator of social change. By using party platforms, one can investigate further whether or not large scale social change might be connected to cleavage behavior.

CHAPTER 4

IS THERE A 'DIME'S WORTH OF DIFFERENCE'? THE EBB AND FLOW OF PARTY PLATFORMS

Often, complaints are heard in an election year that 'there's not a dime's worth of difference' between the two parties. If this is indeed true, it could go a long way in explaining why the United States has not seen a national, critical realignment in seventy years. More specifically, the behavior of the two major political parties may aid in the investigation of cleavage dissipation that began in the 1990s, making critical realignment an inappropriate concept for the contemporary electorate. Inglehart's theory of value change was entertained as a possible reason for cleavage dissipation in Chapter Three, but the theoretical expectations were not congruent with the survey instrument. This, however, does not mean that one should begin digging the grave on the concept of value change in society. Therefore, another avenue of gauging social change needs to be explored. In this chapter, the platforms of the two major political parties are investigated over time as an indicator of social change. In addition, by using platform analysis one can explore whether there is a possible connection between party platforms and not only the partisan disaffection found in many cleavages in the 1990s but also the enduring strength of other cleavages during the same time period.

Part of Sundquist's criteria for a realignment is the polarization of political groups (1983). An absence of polarization, therefore, would preclude a realignment. When no

polarization occurs, portions of the electorate may be more likely to remove themselves from politics because they do not feel there are partisan differences. Accordingly, one feels that whether a Democrat or a Republican is chosen on election day, policies will remain essentially the same. Gerald Pomper's model of the meddling voter applies to this situation (1968). He states "[Voters] are prepared to meddle selectively in the political system by granting their vote to the party which seems best able to deal with their personal concerns" (95). If neither party deals with the voter's personal concerns, it is rational to abstain from voting. Those who choose to vote may feel less partisan attachment because of the lack of difference they see between the two parties. In the past when partisan identification was stable, one's party affiliation was enough to compel one to vote with his or her historical affiliation in the absence of what Carmines and Stimson call "easy issues." (1989). This is no longer the case today when it often makes little sense to talk of individual partisan attachment. Thus, less polarization by parties could be a reason why, 1) voter turnout has declined, and 2) why cleavages have dissipated and partisanship within groups has become increasingly fluid. Thus, the beliefs and behavior of the parties themselves could be a contributing factor to the era of apartisanship. The existence and nature of party polarization over time needs to be determined if an investigation of the root causes of apartisanship are to be explored.

The State of Cleavages in the Electorate

The electorate is in a messy state. Dealignment, as defined earlier, does not seem to explain adequately current electoral circumstances. We seem to have entered a period of apartisanship where many cleavages' behavior is ambivalent in terms of partisan

preference. This behavior directly impacts the state of realignment theory which requires partisan stability on the part of a substantial number of groups within the electorate.

While some groups have maintained high partisan allegiance, the cohesiveness of many has disintegrated over time. The culmination of this dissipation seems to have occurred in the 1990s where it was found that many groups are splitting their vote almost evenly between Democrats and Republicans.

Without active cleavages, realignments are moot. Since the 1960s, debate has raged over the lack of a critical realignment and its probable causes. Few, however, have attempted to examine the very behavior of the parties for clues. Shea (1999) did conclude the parties are to blame for lack of realignment, but he focused on the party organization rather than the parties' beliefs and policy ideas. Voters' partisan disaffection is not in doubt but the root causes of it are. While the rise of the service oriented party, which Shea believes is the culprit, is certainly contributory, it is not the whole story. Again, a student of realignment fails to consider more socially rooted explanations. The policy beliefs, what one might call the core values of the party, are contained in party platforms, which Shea's investigation neglects. It is possible to examine party platforms over time for changes not only in the way issues are addressed, but also for changes in which issues are addressed. This examination may also further illuminate the status of value change within the American electorate.

Any one single cause of partisan disaffection in the electorate does not exist. It is certainly a combination of things. However, party platforms have been an overlooked potential piece of the puzzle. An examination of party platforms can add another clue in

solving the riddle of apartisanship among some voters and enduring loyalty in others. This chapter's analysis of party platforms finds that it is very likely that parties have influenced and responded to the partisan disaffection of certain groups because the parties no longer polarize on political issues as they once did.¹ Both parties' platforms underwent a significant change in 1992 that carried over to 1996, the very time frame when the dissipation of many groups was observed in the previous chapter. At the same time, the parties' most significant polarization was on cultural issues that hold special appeal to the very groups in the electorate that do remain partisanly attached.

Investigating Cleavage Patterns

This chapter examines party platforms for evidence of changes that might be linked to cleavage dissipation. Is the dissolution of many partisan cleavages affected by political party behavior as manifested in political party platforms? Further, is the endurance of some partisanly aligned groups linked to what the parties have to say? To shed more light on the increaing apartisanship of large segments of the electorate and the enduring loyalty of others, we should consider the policies and beliefs of the two major political parties.

Why Platforms?

What a party stands for can be judged by using the party's platform. Gerald Pomper in his classic study of political party platforms found that platforms do matter,

¹It should be noted that this analysis does not provide the evidence for establishing whether the parties' treatment of certain issues in the platforms caused cleavage behavior to become less partisan, or whether the parties were merely responding to cleavage behavior and reflecting its ambivalence on certain issues within their platforms, or both.

both for the voter and for policy that will subsequently be made. Three-fourths of the pledges made in a platform are kept by the party that wins the presidency (1968, 187). In addition, platforms are important for the voter, even if they do not read the document. “The statements made in the platform reach the voter less directly, through interest groups, mass media, candidates’ speeches, party controversy, and incomplete popular perceptions” (177-78). This analysis of party platforms will look at how statements of policy ebb and flow over time. It is important to look at party behavior in conjunction with cleavages’ partisanship to see if something occurred in party platforms in the 1990s that might pertain to the behavior of cleavages.

Method

Using content analysis, I examine the two major parties’ platforms for dominant themes from 1952 to 1996.² The ebb and flow of the issues addressed by the two parties will be mapped and degree of polarization will be determined. By looking at platforms over time, it can be determined if there were changes in the way issues were addressed. Changes in these indicators may give a clue as to the peculiar cleavage behavior observed in the 1990s.

This analysis examines the platforms using a two pronged approach. First, the platforms are quantitatively analyzed using a prioritization index. Second, the platforms are qualitatively analyzed for polarization on certain issues. For the quantitative analysis,

²Every other platform beginning with 1952 and ending with 1992 is analyzed. In addition, the platforms for 1996 are also analyzed since the cleavage time series ends in 1998. Every other platform is analyzed because Pomper contends that there is continuity within the parties’ platforms from election to election (1968, 155).

paragraphs are utilized as the unit of analysis. Pomper's analysis of party platforms found that there were three types of statements in platforms (1968, 156-158). The first category consists of statements of rhetoric and fact. For the purposes of this analysis, these statements are not coded. The second category consists of evaluations of parties' records and past performances. These statements include both approvals and criticisms. Statements of future policies, which includes rhetorical pledges, make up the third category. The paragraphs that satisfy both the second and third criteria are coded. Because I am interested in the issues that parties discuss over time, I do not distinguish between statements that address future policies and statements that criticize or approve of past policies and performance. Therefore, any paragraph that addresses a policy area is counted as equal to every other paragraph that addresses a policy area regardless of whether it refers to the past or the future. Preambles and introductions to platforms are not coded for two reasons. First, they are usually full of rhetorical statements, such as "America is the greatest country on earth," that take no stand on policy. Second, preambles and introductions usually lump many policy areas into single paragraphs while paragraphs within the body of the document do not.

Paragraphs are classified as one of nine different policy areas. These policy areas are the ones that Pomper used in his analysis of platforms (1968). The nine broad issue areas are foreign policy, defense policy, economic policy, labor policy, agriculture policy, resource policy, social welfare policy, governmental affairs policy and civil rights/civil

liberties.³ The form used to code the platforms is found in Appendix Four and indicates the specific policy areas that fall into the broader categories. Paragraphs devoted to policy areas are counted and the percentage of the space given to that policy in the total platform is computed to standardize comparisons between platforms. A prioritization index is formed consisting of the percentage of the platform devoted to a policy area divided by the placement (1-9) of the policy area in the platform.⁴ For example, the 1952 GOP platform devoted 9.9% of the total platform to economic policy (fourteen of 142 total paragraphs). Economic policy was discussed after foreign policy, defense policy and governmental affairs, giving it a prioritization of four. The priority index for economic policy is 2.5 ($9.9 / 4$). For each year the Republican and Democratic party prioritization scores are graphed to suggest whether the priority each party is giving to policy areas is similar.

The analysis for polarization is qualitative in nature. Once paragraphs have been coded for the type of policy, the policy areas are then compared between the two parties for degree of polarization. Polarization is defined as the parties taking opposing stances. For example, the Republican party in 1984 pledges to “eliminate the incentive-destroying effects of graduated tax rates.” (Congressional Quarterly 1995, 150). In that same year,

³Some additions and slight changes were made to Pomper’s policy areas. These changes are noted in Appendix Four.

⁴Carmines and Stimson (1989) established that the space devoted to policy within the platform and the position of that policy within the platform are good indicators of the importance of an issue to the party (1989, 56-57). However, it should be noted that their priority index and the one utilized here are different due to the fact that Carmines and Stimson only look at racial policy within platforms.

the Democratic party calls for increasing progressivity in the tax code (145). The parties are polarized on the issue of taxation. Polarization is distinguished from issues on which parties merely differ. For example, in 1992, the Democrats support a National Missile Defense program and the Republicans support a long-range missile defense programs. There are differences between the two programs. The Democrats would work within the bounds of ABM treaty while the Republicans call the treaty outdated and would not be bound by it. There is certainly a difference between the two parties in this area but they are not polarized. Both parties support a missile defense system; there is differentiation but not polarization.

Platform Analysis


The following sections detail the platforms for the years analyzed. The prioritization index is graphed for each year and evidence for polarization is discussed.

1952: The Specter of Communism

Figure 4.1 graphs the priority index scores for the two platforms for 1952. The Republicans give a much higher priority to both foreign policy and governmental affairs than do the Democrats. Both differences can be attributed to the role that communism played in the 1952 election. The foreign policy differences are largely due to the fact that the Republicans are the party out of power and they devote substantial portions of the foreign policy plank to criticisms of previous Democratic administrations and their foreign policy since 1933. The differences between the two parties in the area of governmental affairs stem from the strong stand the Republicans take against communism and rooting communism out of domestic government institutions. The Democrats devote

more attention to the economy and social welfare than the Republicans. In these two areas, the Democrats have had considerable successes while in office and devote more space detailing the good they have done in these areas. Other policy areas are similar in terms of prioritization.

FIGURE 4.1
1952 PRIORITIZATION INDEX



The Republican platform's tone is very polarizing. One of the opening salvos in the Republican preamble states, "We charge that [Democrats] work unceasingly to achieve their goal of national socialism" (Johnson and Porter 1973, 497). The tone of the Democratic platform is more measured as they are not defensively criticizing a current administration but trumpeting the successes they have had. Unlike the Republican preamble, the Democratic preamble is positive.

Under Democratic Party leadership, America has accepted each new challenge of history and has found practical solutions to meet and overcome them. This we have done without departing from the principles of our basic philosophy, that is, the destiny of man to achieve his earthly ends in the spirit of brotherhood (475).

Both parties in 1952 give pride of place in their platforms to foreign policy. With the nomination of Eisenhower at the GOP convention, the internationalist wing of the Republican party beat back the isolationist wing represented by Senator Robert Taft, whom Ike defeated for the nomination. In terms of foreign policy, the platforms are remarkably similar in substance, but not in tone. The Republicans, being the party out of power, stress the Democratic party's failings in the area of foreign policy, especially the abandonment of numerous countries to communism and the war in Korea which they believe was preventable (Johnson and Porter 1973, 497). They are very critical of the Democratic policy of containment, calling it a "negative, futile and immoral policy . . . which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism" (499). Meanwhile, the Democrats "look forward to the day" when Soviet satellite states of central and Eastern Europe are once again free (476). Interestingly enough, both parties propose the use of the Voice of America program to penetrate the Iron Curtain (476, 499).

So, although the rhetoric is sharp, the foreign policy proposals are not vastly different in terms of real substance. The Democrats state “peace with honor is the greatest of our goals” (475) while the Republicans declare “the supreme goal of our foreign policy will be an honorable and just peace” (498).

Domestically, communism was also a large issue. The first domestic issue discussed in the Republican platform is simply labeled “Communism” (500) but does not address the international kind, only the kind they see running rampant at home. The Republicans’ views, therefore, on governmental reform are ranked high on the prioritization index. In 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy began his crusade against communists in government. And, the 1952 election came on the heels of the Rosenberg’s 1951 conviction on charges that they were Soviet spies. Not coincidentally, the Republican platform declares, “There are no communists in the Republican party” (500). It goes on to detail the governmental reforms the Republicans would enact to ensure that government would include only the loyal (i.e., not communists). McCarthy’s methods of ferreting out communists in government are not directly sanctioned in the GOP platform. Nevertheless, it does declare “by the Administration’s appeasement of Communism at home and abroad it has permitted Communists and their fellow travelers to serve in many key agencies and to infiltrate our American life” (500). The Democrats counter by stating, “We deplore and condemn smear attacks upon the character and reputations of our federal workers” (486). Their discussion of governmental affairs is the next to the last platform section thus they give the section much less weight than do the Republicans.

While the Republicans begin their discussion of domestic policy with a discussion

of government reform, the Democrats give more weight to economic policy. Here, the two platforms give perhaps the best glimpse of the overall philosophies of the two parties in 1952. “Here a little, there a little, year by year, [the Democratic party] has sought to curb, regulate, harass, restrain and punish. There is scarcely a phase of our economic and social life today in which Government does not attempt to interfere” (500). This is the Republican refrain. The Democrats, however, champion government involvement in the economy by advocating price controls, rent controls and other means of keeping prices down (478). Thus, in terms of the role of government in the economy, there are significant differences; polarization occurs because the Democrats favor government involvement and the Republicans do not. No polarization is displayed over taxation. Both parties favor qualified tax cuts. The Democrats would first ensure defense needs before cutting taxes while the Republicans would cut spending to enable a cut in taxes.

In other domestic policy issues, the Democrats and Republicans also diverge and are quite polarized even though the prioritization is roughly the same. In the area of agricultural policy, the GOP is against direct subsidies that “make the farmer dependent upon government” (501). Conversely, the Democrats “will continue to protect the producers of basic agricultural commodities under the terms of a mandatory price support program at not less than ninety percent of parity” (479). Labor policy planks also differ as the Republicans pledge to uphold and strengthen Taft-Hartley, the act which limits some labor union practices. The Democrats advocate its repeal.

The platforms of 1952 indicate that there are considerable differences between the two parties in both substance and emphasis. The Republicans focus on the issue of

communism both abroad and at home. While the Democrats are also focused on communism abroad, they focus more attention on the economy domestically.

1960: Gap Politics

The differences in issue prioritization for 1960 are displayed in Figure 4.2. The largest of these differences are found in defense, foreign policy, and civil rights/civil liberties. The Republican platform places heavy emphasis once again on foreign policy. Foreign policy is also what the Democrats emphasize the most, but they discuss defense and civil liberties much more than Republicans. There is also significant polarization that occurs in the planks on defense, economy, labor, agriculture, resources, and civil rights.

In 1960 the Democrats can take the offensive with their platform and challenge the record of the Eisenhower Administration just as the Republicans had attacked the Truman Administration in their 1952 platform. The 1957 launch of the Soviets' *Sputnik* left the Eisenhower Administration open to attack from many segments of society that the Soviets were "winning." Accordingly, the Democrats hit hard on what they claimed was America's lack of preparedness. The Democratic platform charges the Soviets were outpacing the United States, leaving a "missile gap, space gap, limited-war gap" (575).


The charge of a loss of preeminence, the Democratic platform claims

. . . has been persistently made by high officials of the Republican Administration itself. Before Congressional committees they have testified that the Communists will have a dangerous lead in the intercontinental missiles through 1963 – and that the Republican Administration has no plans to catch up (575).

Of course, the Republicans do not acknowledge a missile gap. In the platform, they state, "Under the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration, our military might has been forged into a

power second to none" (608). The Republicans, however, seem sensitive to the missile gap charge, whether real or perceived, for in their platform they pledge "unremitting modernization" and the acceleration and "intensified development" of various defense programs (608). All this is pledged even while their man Eisenhower is still in the White House.

FIGURE 4.2
1960 PRIORITIZATION INDEX



The approach that each party takes on defense is different. The Republican's defense section of the platform concludes by stating, "There is no price ceiling on America's security" (608). The Democrats, however, would close the missile gap partially through disarmament. They devote nine full paragraphs to their disarmament planks as compared with the single paragraph of the Republicans. The Democrats do not specifically call for more defense spending. They believe pursuing arms agreements will enable them to provide for "an orderly shift of our expenditures" thus enabling them to provide for tax reductions and the "backlog of public needs" (576).

Defense ranks higher on the prioritization scale for both Democrats and Republicans than in any other year examined. Even so, the prioritization index on defense indicates a difference in emphasis. This gap in the prioritization index on defense is due to the Democrats' criticisms of the Eisenhower Administration's defense policy, a laundry list of policy proposals to close the defense gap, and plans for pursuing disarmament agreements. Thus, the Democrats place much more emphasis on defense policy than do the Republicans.

Foreign policy is another area where the two parties' prioritization differs. Here, however, the Republicans give higher priority to foreign policy than do Democrats. The Democrats actually devote more overall space to foreign policy but they place it after defense in their platform. This is reflected in the prioritization index.

The Republican platform, when compared with the 1952 platform's statements on foreign policy, is remarkable in its statements on communism. The attacks on and the rhetoric directed against communism are very limited. In regard to the Soviet satellite

states, the Republican platform simply says they do not “condone” their subjugation and that “we are not shaken in our hope and belief that once again they will rule themselves” (607). There is none of the sharp rhetoric present in 1952 and little space devoted to communism. Even though the Democratic platform devotes twenty-four paragraphs to detailing their stances on relations with communist nations, a change in tone is apparent. The acceptance on the part of both parties of a bipolar foreign policy environment is evident as it was not in 1952.

The final area where the prioritization index indicates large differences is in the area of civil rights and liberties. The Democratic platform gives a higher priority of this policy area than does the Republican platform. However, civil rights and liberties rank high on the scale for the Democrats due to the priority they give immigration policy in their platform, not because of attitudes to civil rights, per se. Both parties favor increasing immigration but the degree differs. The Democratic platform states “The national-origins quota system of limiting immigration contradicts the founding principles of this nation” and they pledge a liberalization of immigration laws (577). Republicans, on the other hand, include immigration policy as the very last plank in their platform and would require “the annual number of immigrants that we accept be at least doubled” (620).

Beyond immigration policy, there are other significant differences that pertain specifically to civil rights. In their civil rights planks, the Democratic platform never refers specifically to African-Americans and states that they are “the party of Jefferson” (599). The Republican platform declares they are “the party of Lincoln” (618). While

Democrats dance around the issue of civil rights to keep both northern and southern wings of the party appeased, the Republicans are much more direct and specific in dealing with civil rights than are the Democrats. Yet, the Democrats were able to include a significant civil rights platform despite the call from nine southern delegations at the convention to delete it (Congressional Quarterly 1995, 104). The most direct differences occur over the implementation of desegregation. The Democratic platform states, “We believe that every school district affected by the Supreme Court’s school desegregation decision should submit a plan providing for at least first-step compliance by 1963, the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation” (Johnson and Porter 1973, 599). The Republicans directly counter by stating, “We oppose the pretense of fixing a target date three years from now for the mere submission of plans for school desegregation . . . We believe that each of the pending court actions should proceed as the Supreme Court has directed and that in no district should there be such delay” (619). In addition, the Republicans include a plank that addresses the use of literacy tests on which the Democrats are silent. The Republicans pledge “Legislation to provide that the completion of six primary grades in a state accredited school is conclusive evidence of literacy for voting purposes” (619).

Even though in the other policy areas the prioritization index indicates remarkable similarity between the two parties’ platforms, this does not preclude polarization. In terms of the economy, the Democrats blame the Republicans and their “high-interest, tight-money policy” for the two recessions during Eisenhower’s tenure (582). They recommend full employment and government aid to depressed areas. The Republicans

“reject the concept of artificial growth forced by massive new federal spending and loose money policies” (609).

In terms of labor, the two parties repeat the stances made on Taft-Hartley in the 1952 platforms. The Landrum-Griffin Act, passed in 1959, is similarly opposed by Democrats and favored by Republicans. In addition, their stances on agriculture remain essentially the same as in 1952.

In the area of resources, the Democrats indicate the beginning of environmental consciousness. “America” they say “can no longer take pure water and air for granted . . . Federal action is needed in planning, coordinating and helping to finance pollution control. The states and local communities cannot go it alone” (591). The Republican platform is silent on pollution control.

Social welfare also shows a degree of difference between the two parties. The Democrats advocate a medical program for the elderly that would not be means tested (588). The Republicans also advocate developing a health care plan for the “aged needing it” (616). But, they prefer encouraging private insurance to “develop sound coverage plans for the senior population” (616) rather than a government-instituted plan.


Thus, the differences between the two parties’ platforms are significant for 1960. The tone of the platforms is not as polarizing as it was in 1952 but there are still large differences between what the parties are advocating. The major differences revolve around activist and limited government (especially in the economy) and approaches to defense.

1968: Vietnam and the Triumph of Domestic Policy

Figure 4.3 indicates only three policy areas in which there are prioritization differences for 1968. These differences, however, are large and occur in relation to the economy, social welfare policy, and governmental affairs. The starkest differences in terms of substance occur over economic policy, social welfare policy, crime control, defense and civil rights. In addition the two platforms are notable for the treatment of Vietnam and its priority (or lack of it) in the platforms.

The Democrats' platform leads with the economic plank. In this section they stress the three recessions under past Republican administrations and the success of the economy under Kennedy and Johnson citing "a 90-month period of recession-free prosperity, the longest and strongest period of sustained economic growth in American history" (719). Democrats commit themselves to "full employment and price stability." While their preferred method of obtaining full employment is the private sector, they would commit the federal government to be the "employer of last resort" for those who cannot otherwise find employment (735). In terms of containing inflation, the Democrats point out that they have made the tough decisions in fiscal policy. They raised taxes in 1966 and 1968 and stated this in their platform (728). In addition, they stress the progressivity of the tax code "which [is] based on the democratic principle of ability to pay" (728). They propose a minimum income tax for the wealthy and no income taxes for those below the poverty line (728).

FIGURE 4.3
1968 PRIORITIZATION INDEX



The Republicans, most interestingly, do not capitalize or even mention the Democratic tax increases that the Democrats themselves acknowledge in their own platform. In terms of taxation the Republicans are very brief and offer no specific proposals. They do state “the imperative need for tax reform and simplification will have our priority attention” (756). They pledge funds saved as a result of the end of the war toward “critical domestic needs and to reduce the heavy tax burden” (756). This is the extent of the mention of taxation.

The Republicans repeatedly stress the virtues of the free enterprise system and individualism. “The nation must look to an expanding free enterprise system to provide jobs” (752). In addition, a Republican administration would “avoid such economic dislocations as wage and price controls” (756).

The Democrats biggest priority in the platform is social welfare policy. Much of the platform stresses the success of the war on poverty: Head Start, Job Corps, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Upward Bound, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Higher Education Act of 1965, Medicare, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968. For the future, they pledge a federalization of the amalgam of state welfare programs. “Every American family whose income is not sufficient to enable its members to live in decency should receive assistance free of the indignities and uncertainties that still too often mar our present programs” (736).

Pledging to “create a new mix of private responsibility and public participation in the solution of social problems” is what the Republicans include in their planks on social welfare (749). To aid them in this task they would “favor maximum reliance on

community leaders utilizing the regular channels of government to provide needed public services” (753). They stress the failures of the war on poverty, especially the duplication of services. In addition they advocate federal revenue sharing to buttress state and local efforts to combat poverty.

The Democrats offer several specific health care proposals including uniform standards among states for Medicaid, equalizing Medicare benefits to the disabled, and containing costs “through a partnership of government and private group practice arrangements, increased availability of neighborhood health centers and the greater use of sub-professional aides” (737). The Republican counter to this laundry list of proposals is their “pledge to encourage the broadening of private health insurance plans” (753).

The Republicans’ highest priority is their plank on crime and the administration of justice. Conversely, the Democrats’ section on “justice and law” is the very last section in their platform. Although not the case in their other planks, the Republican platform is much more specific than the Democratic platform. The Republicans stress personal responsibility; “We must re-establish the principle that men are accountable for what they do, that criminals are responsible for their crimes, that while the youth’s environment may help to explain the man’s crime, it does not excuse the crime” (750). In addition, the Republicans call for “decisive action to quell civil disorder” (750). For their part, the Democrats stress combating crime by attacking “the root causes of crime and disorder” and stress their concern for equal justice and safeguards for civil liberties (742).

Finally, there is also a significant difference in the way the two parties discuss civil rights. While the prioritization index indicates there is little difference in the space

and emphasis the two parties give to this area, it should be underscored that civil liberties are also included in this category along with civil rights. The Republicans offer no separate section on civil liberties or civil rights. They only devote seven paragraphs (3.9%) of the platform to both and these paragraphs are scattered throughout. Of the seven paragraphs, three deal with discrimination of racial minorities, one with immigration, and the remainder with civil liberties. The two paragraphs that most directly deal with discrimination occur in the platform's introduction to domestic policy and pledge:

Energetic, positive leadership to enforce statutory and constitutional protection to eliminate discrimination;

Concern for the unique problems of citizens of long disadvantaged in our total society by race, color, national origin, creed, or sex (749)

The third and final paragraph that deals with discrimination states that racial minorities are more likely to be living in poverty and that "this nation must not blink the harsh fact" that this occurs(753).

The Democratic platform, while not giving huge amounts of space over to civil rights and liberties does accord it a relatively high priority in the platform. They accentuate the Johnson Administration's record, especially the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In addition, they include an entire section on their future policy proposals in this field.

Gone are the days when foreign policy and defense planks were placed at the beginning of the parties' platforms. Even though the Vietnam War is raging, the priority given it in the platform is low. Both the Democrats and Republicans have virtually

identical prioritization scores for both defense and foreign policy. Both parties de-emphasize the war and this is especially true for the Democrats as they are the incumbent party. Democrats do not even mention the war in Vietnam until paragraph sixty-one. The section of the platform that discusses Vietnam policy appears one quarter of the way into the platform. The Democrats offer more concrete policy proposals but devote less space within the foreign policy plank to Vietnam. Of the fifty-seven paragraphs devoted to foreign policy, only 23% deal with Vietnam. The Republicans mention Vietnam in their opening paragraphs but do not refer to it again until they are more than one-third of the way into the platform where they are discussing veterans' benefits, not foreign policy. Eighty-three percent of the platform precedes the statements on Vietnam policy. However, the Republicans devote 46% of their foreign policy plank to Vietnam policy with the bulk of this criticism dedicated to the conduct of the war. The Republicans emphasize the mistakes of the Johnson Administration in Vietnam and seem to be running on the "not Johnson and the Democrats" plank in terms of foreign policy even though their policy prescriptions do not differ substantially.

In terms of actual policy proposals, the two parties differ very little. The Democrats advocate Vietnamization. This entails negotiating for the "withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign forces – both United States and allied forces, and forces infiltrated from North Vietnam" (725). The platform goes on to say, "We reject as unacceptable a unilateral withdrawal of our forces [from Vietnam] which would allow . . . aggression and subversion [from North Vietnam] to succeed. We have never demanded, and do not now demand, unconditional surrender by the communists" (725). The

Republican platform advocates “de-Americanization” (762) saying,

We pledge a program for peace in Vietnam – neither peace at any price nor a camouflaged surrender of legitimate United States or allied interests – but a positive program that will open a fair and equitable settlement to all, based on the principle of self-determination, our national interests and the cause of long-range world peace (762).

The Republicans and Democrats do significantly differ in their stances on defense even though they accord roughly the same priority to defense. For the Democrats, arms control is foremost in their defense plank. Their platform pledges, “We support concurrent efforts to freeze the present level of strategic weapons and delivery systems, and to achieve a balanced and verified reduction of all nuclear and conventional arms” (725). The Republicans “encourage international limitations of armaments, provided all major powers are proportionately restrained and trustworthy guarantees are provided against violations” (761). However, they go on to say, “not retention of American superiority but parity with the Soviet Union has been made the controlling doctrine in many critical areas [by the Johnson Administration]” (762).

The Republican platform of 1968 is quite vague and haphazard; its overall theme is one that calls for “new leadership.” The Democratic platform’s policy prescriptions are quite specific in comparison thus making the platform quite lengthy and often verbose. There are several significant differences in terms of prioritization, the starkest of these being in the area of law and order (governmental affairs). Polarization also occurs in many areas of domestic policy such as the economy, social welfare and defense.


1976: The Rise of Civil Liberties

Overall, the two platforms for 1976 are very different even though the

prioritization for most issues does not vary much (Figure 4.4). The Republican platform stresses limited government involvement in the economy, several constitutional amendments in the area of civil liberties, local and state control, and the use of block grants. The Democrats on the other hand, call for more involved, activist federal government in the economy and protection of civil liberties.

Both the Democratic and Republican platforms lead with their economic planks but the priority index shows that the Democrats give a higher priority to the economy. This is because the Democrats devote more space to economic policy. The Democrats and Republicans both urge job creation, but their method of creation differs. The Democratic platform pledges to reduce unemployment to 3% during the next presidential term. In part, this would be possible because the Democrats believe “The federal government has the responsibility to ensure that all Americans able, willing and seeking work are provided opportunities for useful jobs” (Congressional Quarterly 1977, 856). The Republicans, however, state that “sound job creation can only be accomplished in the private sector of the economy. Americans must not be fooled into accepting government as the employer of last resort” (904).

FIGURE 4.4
1976 PRIORITIZATION INDEX



Similarly, the platforms take opposite stances on price controls. The Republican party bluntly states, “Wage and price controls are not the solution to inflation . . . the Republican party strongly opposes any reimposition of such controls, on a standby basis or otherwise” (904). Conversely, the Democrats argue that “A comprehensive anti-inflation policy must be established to assure relative price stability . . . At times, direct government involvement in wage and price decisions may be required to ensure price stability” (857).

In terms of taxation the Democratic platform disparages the “massive tax welfare” going to the wealthiest in society (857). To combat, Democrats pledge “a complete overhaul of the present tax system, which will review all special tax provisions to ensure that they are justified and distributed equitably among our citizens” (857). The Republican proposals are geared toward the wealthy in that they promise

hastening capital recovery through new systems of accelerated depreciation, removing the tax burden on equity financing to encourage more capital investment, ending the unfair double taxation of dividends, and supporting proposals to enhance the ability of our working and other citizens to own a ‘piece of the action’ through stock ownership (904).

The Democrats, as would be expected, put much more emphasis on labor than Republicans do. In direct opposition to each other, the Democrats pledge to support “the full right of construction workers to picket a job site peacefully” (858) while the Republicans “oppose . . . the legalization of common-situs picketing” (909). And the perennial issue of Taft-Hartley arises with the Democrats stating support for a repeal of the section of the act that allows states to pass right-to-work legislation and the Republicans reasserting their support of this section and the right of states to legislate in

this area.

In terms of agricultural policy the two parties' planks do not differ significantly. Both call for estate tax reform, expanding markets, and support for family farms. The difference in the priority index stems from the Republican placement of agriculture toward the platform's beginning.

Stark differences occur in the discussion of resources. Democrats sharply attack the oil industry. They begin by stating, "Republican energy policy has failed because it is based on illusions; the illusion of a free market in energy that does not exist, the illusion that ever-increasing energy prices will not harm the economy, and the illusion of an energy program based on unobtainable independence" (864). The Republicans would eliminate price controls on oil and natural gas to let the free market function. "Fair and realistic market prices" they say "will encourage sensible conservation efforts and establish priorities in the use of our resources, which over the long run will provide a secure supply at reasonable prices for all" (912). They also stand up for the oil industry by adding to their platform the following statement: "The petroleum industry is an important segment of our economy and is entitled to reasonable profits to permit further exploration and development" (912). The Republicans fully support nuclear energy (912) while the Democrats want to keep nuclear power to the absolute minimum necessary to meet needs (865).

Within the social welfare planks there are also many differences between the two parties. The Democrats call for a national health system that would have universal coverage. The Republicans reject this notion and call for better utilization of the private

health insurance system (859, 908).

The Democrats again call for a replacement of the shared welfare system with a federal system (866). Republicans “oppose federalizing the welfare system; local levels of government are most aware of the needs of their communities” (910).

The two parties also square off in the area of civil liberties and civil rights. The Republicans support no less than three constitutional amendments (right to life, anti-busing, and school prayer) plus the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. The Republicans call for a constitutional amendment “to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children” (909). The Democrats are much less dogmatic saying, “We fully recognized the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion” but go on to oppose a constitutional amendment overturning court decisions on abortion (860). The Republicans also call for a constitutional amendment to allow non-sectarian prayer in public schools.

Similarly, on civil rights issues, there is polarization over affirmative action. The Democrats pledge “vigorous federal programs and policies of compensating opportunity to remedy for many Americans the generations of injustice and deprivation; and full funding of programs to secure the implementation and enforcement of civil rights” (860). The Republicans, however, state their pledge to enforce vigorously equal treatment laws but go on to say “The way to end discrimination, however, is not by resurrecting the much discredited quota system and attempting to cloak it in an aura of new respectability” (908).

Busing is another polarizing issue. The Democrats call it “a judicial tool of last

resort” but nonetheless support its use (861). Segregated schools are “morally wrong” say the Republicans but they advocate neighborhood schools and oppose busing (907). They add, “The racial composition of many schools results from decisions by people about where they choose to live” (907). In fact, they call for a constitutional amendment that would forbid “the assignment of children to schools on the basis of race” if Congress continues to fail to protect neighborhood schools (907).

There is no polarization found in several policy planks dealing with the workings of government unlike previous years. For example, both parties advocate revenue sharing. There is disagreement when both parties address campaign financing although each party supports some variation of reform. The Democrats call for partial public financing of congressional campaigns (859) while the Republicans stress improving the disclosure of the funds public officials receive from lobbyists (906).

Even though both parties talk about foreign policy and defense matters in the last section of their platforms, they devote more paragraphs to foreign policy than any other policy area. The Democrats stress openness, candor, and the core American values of freedom and justice. They criticize the secretiveness of the Nixon and Ford Administrations in the area of foreign policy. Strangely enough, the Republican platform also indirectly criticizes the past two Republican administrations due to the fact that a segment of the foreign policy plank was the work of the Reagan camp at the 1976 convention.⁵ The Reagan forces did not subscribe to the realist machinations of Secretary

⁵The Reagan sponsored section was offered as a minority report from the floor. The Ford forces declined to fight the Reaganites on the foreign policy plank even though they opposed it. It was then added to the platform before the whole platform was

of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and successfully inserted a section into the platform entitled “Morality in Foreign Policy” that registered their disapproval of the Nixon and Ford Administrations’ “secret agreements”⁶ and support of the Helsinki Accords.

A portion of the Reagan-sponsored section states, “ours will be a foreign policy which recognizes that in international negotiations we must make no undue concessions” (914) directly countering the cooperation between the US and USSR that had made detente possible. This set the stage for the disagreements the two parties had in relations to arms control. The Democrats stress their objective as deterrence and advocate seeking “those disarmament and arms control agreements which will contribute to mutual reduction in both nuclear and conventional forces” (868). Whereas the Democrats emphasize only enough defense for effective deterrence, the Republicans state “a sound foreign policy must be rooted in a superior defense capability” (914). Therefore, they call for “a period of sustained growth in our defense efforts” (914).

The Republicans and Democrats emphasize the same areas of policy in 1976. Their prescriptions within these policy areas, however, are quite different. Economic policy is given more weight by the Democrats and they stress a high level of government involvement. The Republicans, conversely, favor letting the free market function with little intervention. In addition, the polarization within civil rights and civil liberties

accepted by the convention (Congressional Quarterly 1995, 129).

⁶The secret agreements presumably refer to Kissinger’s secret trip to Peking in 1971, and secret negotiations he undertook to negotiate an end to the Vietnam war.


becomes more developed than in previous platforms.

1984: A Clear Choice

The prioritization index again shows differences of emphasis in only two of the policy areas: economic policy and social welfare policy (Figure 4.5). The Democrats give more weight to these two areas than the Republicans. There are many other areas of policy polarization. The preambles to both platforms give a good indication of the parties' overall philosophy. The Democrats say, "We have a proud legacy to build upon: the Democratic tradition of caring, and the Democratic commitment to an activist government that understands and accepts its responsibilities" (Congressional Quarterly 1985, 73B). In contradistinction, the Republicans state, "... the divine command to help our neighbor is directed to each individual and not to a bureaucratic machine. Not every problem cries out for a federal solution."⁷ The Democratic platform is scathing in its indictment of the Reagan Administration but many of the very things the Democrats criticize, the Republicans gladly accept credit for in their platform. The 1984 platforms offer voters a clearer choice on policy proposals than any of the previous platforms reviewed.

⁷The references to the 1984 Republican platform will not contain page numbers since the document is available on the World Wide Web @ <http://europe.cnn.com/allpolitics/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/past.platforms/gop84/>.

FIGURE 4.5
1984 PRIORITIZATION INDEX



Both Democrats and Republicans begin their platforms with economic issues. With budget deficits drastically increasing after the 1981 tax cut and increases in defense spending, the issue of taxation came to the fore in the election. The priority index shows that both Democrats and Republicans give more weight to the economy than any other policy area. The Democrats also give it more weight than the Republicans. In addition, the content of the two economic planks could not be more distinct.

The Republicans pledged to “oppose any attempts to increase taxes.” They attack the Democrats, whose candidate Walter Mondale had said in his speech accepting the Democratic nomination “Mr. Reagan will raise taxes, and so will I. He won’t tell you. I just did” (Congressional Quarterly 1995, 144). The Republicans inserted into their platform the following: “Democrats claim deficits are caused by Americans’ paying too little in taxes. Nonsense. We categorically reject proposals to increase taxes in a misguided effort to balance the budget.” The Republican platform also pledges further tax reductions on interest income and dividends. They indicate their support for a modified flat tax, not “. . . the incentive-destroying effects of graduated tax rates.” The Democrats counter with indictments of the “Reagan tax cuts for wealthy Americans” and pledge to increase tax progressivity (Congressional Quarterly 1985, 78-B). In addition, the Democrats propose a minimum 15% corporate tax. Everyone paying a fair share is the dominant theme. “Our tax code must produce sufficient revenue to finance our defense and allow for investment in our future, and we will ask every American to pay his or her fair share. . . . Wealthier taxpayers will have to shoulder a greater share of the new tax burdens” (78-B).

The prioritization index also indicates a gap in the attention the two parties give to social welfare issues. The polarization in this area is also quite marked. The Democrats call attention to rising health care costs and the effect these costs have had on the federal budget (78-B). In addition, they repeat their call of years past to move toward comprehensive national health insurance (95-B). To control escalating health care costs, the Democrats advocate more preventive health care and the fostering of innovation in delivery systems (HMOs and PPOs). The Republicans repudiate the Democrats call for nationalized health care by stating, “We reaffirm . . . our opposition to any proposals for compulsory national health insurance.” Again, the Republican platform draws heavily upon laissez-faire doctrines and emphasizes personal responsibility. In their discussion of health care failures, the Republicans blamed a “lack of free-market incentives to respond to consumer wishes. Instead, government’s heavy hand was everywhere.” They also advocate personal responsibility. “A supportive environment linking family, home, neighborhood, and workplace is essential to sound health policy. The other essential step is to encourage the individual responsibility and group assistance that are uniquely American.”

Both parties acknowledge the federal role in education is limited. The Democrats stress educational leadership at the federal level while acknowledging the responsibility of local government. “While education is the responsibility of local government, local governments already strapped for funds by this Administration cannot be expected to bear alone the burden of undertaking the efforts we need for quality education . . . without leadership at the federal level” (80-B). The Democrats decry the cuts in education

funding instituted by the Reagan Administration and pledge to restore them (80-B). The Republicans acknowledge a much more limited federal role. "We believe that education is a local function, a State responsibility, and a federal concern." They go on to define further what "a federal concern" entails. "It includes helping parents and local authorities ensure high standards, protecting civil rights, and ensuring family rights." Later in the document they qualify the federal government's civil rights role. "Discrimination cannot be condoned, nor may public policies encourage its practice. Civil rights enforcement must not be twisted into excessive interference in the education process." In terms of federal funding for education, the Republicans pledge to "complete the block-grant process begun in 1981. We will return revenue sources to State and local governments to make them independent of federal funds and of the control that inevitably follows." The Republicans also advocate school choice through the use of vouchers.

Governmental affairs

The Republican platform places more emphasis on governmental affairs than the Democratic platform and there is also significant disagreement on policies. The budget process is addressed by the Republicans who call for a constitutional convention to amend the constitution with a balanced budget amendment. They blame the problems on the congressional budget process. "The congressional budget process is bankrupt . . . The President is denied proper control over the federal budget." The Democrats specifically repudiate a constitutional convention and say, "We oppose the artificial and rigid Constitutional restraint of a balanced budget amendment" (78-B). They specifically blame Reagan for the budget deficits which they state were caused by tax cuts and

defense spending. "The Democratic Party is pledged to reducing these intolerable deficits. We will reassess defense expenditures; create a tax system that is both adequate and fair . . ." (78-B).

The defense budget is also debated. The Democrats propose "rational defense spending" (78-B). Democrats do not propose a cut in overall defense but do advocate a reduction in "the rate of increase in defense spending" (78-B). Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is never mentioned by name in the Democratic platform but is addressed and labeled a waste. "We will stop throwing away money on unworkable or unnecessary [defense] systems"(78-B). The Republicans are firmly behind SDI. "We enthusiastically support the development of non-nuclear, space-based defensive systems to protect the United States by destroying incoming missiles."

Also included in the area of governmental relations are basic principles of federalism over which the two parties fundamentally disagree. State and local control is something that is not restricted to one area of the Republican platform but is a common thread that runs throughout it.

For more responsible government, nonessential federal functions should be returned to the States and localities wherever prudent. They have the capability, knowledge, and sensitivity to local needs required to better administer and deliver public services. Their diverse problems require local understanding. The transfer of rights, responsibilities, and revenues to the "home front" will recognize the abilities of local government and the limitations of a distant federal government.

Similarly, the common thread running throughout the Democratic platform is the idea of federal government involvement and assistance to states and localities. The Democrats often support local and state control in areas such as education and the administration of

justice but temper this control with statements about federal oversight. For example, the education plank in the Democratic platform states, “We will create a partnership for excellence among federal, state and local governments” (80-B). The platform continues with proposals for federal funding for science, math, computer education, and supplementation for community-based programs.

Finally, in the area of civil liberties and civil rights there remain gulfs in what the two parties believe. The Republicans continue to include a plank on abortion and their opposition to it as they had since the 1976 platform. They call for a constitutional amendment to make the 14th Amendment apply to unborn children. In addition, they oppose public funds going to any organizations who advocate and/or support abortion. The Democratic party takes the opposite position on both matters but they go on to include a statement that acknowledges differences of opinion on this issue within the party. “We fully recognize the religious and ethical concerns which many Americans have about abortion. But we also recognize the belief of many Americans that a woman has a right to choose whether and when to have a child” (93-B).

The Republican platform no longer supports the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment as they did in the 1976 platform. They do stress they support equality and state, “President Reagan believes, as do we, that all members of our party are free to work individually for women's progress. As a party, we demand that there be no detriment to that progress or inhibition of women's rights to full opportunity and advancement within this society.” This falls short of advocating the position of the Equal Rights Amendment. The Democrats indicate “A top priority of a Democratic Administration will be

ratification of the unamended Equal Rights Amendment” (92-B).

The Republicans also no longer call for a constitutional amendment for school prayer as they did in the 1976 platform. They still support the concept but do not indicate they would amend the Constitution to allow it. “Mindful of our religious diversity, we reaffirm our commitment to the freedoms of religion and speech guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and firmly support the rights of students to openly practice the same, including the right to engage in voluntary prayer in schools.” The Democrats do not directly address school prayer, per se, but state “The Democratic Platform affirms its support of the principles of religious liberty, religious tolerance and church/state separation and of the Supreme Court decisions forbidding violation of those principles” (92-B).

Similarly there is a strong differentiation in what the two parties proclaim regarding affirmative action. The Democrat party “reaffirms its longstanding commitment to the eradication of discrimination in all aspects of American life through the use of affirmative action, goals, timetables, and other verifiable measurements to overturn historic burdens of discrimination in hiring, training, promotions, contract procurement, education, and the administration of all Federal programs” (92-B). The Republicans never mention affirmative action by name but do proclaim:

Just as we must guarantee opportunity, we oppose attempts to dictate results. We will resist efforts to replace equal rights with discriminatory quota systems and preferential treatment. Quotas are the most insidious form of discrimination: reverse discrimination against the innocent. We must always remember that, in a free society, different individual goals will yield different results.

In terms of foreign policy, the main debate in the 1984 election is over American involvement in Central America. The Democrats included within their foreign policy plank a checklist of sorts that indicate when unilateral military involvement should not be used by the United States that would apply to the Reagan Administration's activities in Central America. In addition, the platform includes a detailed section on Central American foreign policy that states, among other things, "We must terminate our support for the *contras* and other paramilitary groups fighting in Nicaragua" (104-B). Conversely, the Republican platform states, "We support continued assistance to the democratic freedom fighters in Nicaragua."

The Democratic platform's rhetoric toward the Soviet Union is not as sharp as the Republican platform. The Democrats believe, "We must see the Soviet Union as it is - neither minimizing the threats that Soviet power and policies pose to U.S. interests, nor exaggerating the strength of a Soviet regime beset by economic stagnation and saddled with a bankrupt and sterile ideology" (102-B). The Republicans state,

We hold a sober view of the Soviet Union. Its globalist ideology and its leadership obsessed with military power make it a threat to freedom and peace on every continent. . . . Republicans reaffirm our belief that Soviet behavior at the negotiating table cannot be divorced from Soviet behavior elsewhere.

The approach the two parties take to defense policy is also different as shown in the discussion of defense budgeting above. Their approach to arms control, similarly, also demonstrates the differences between the two parties. The Republicans are proud of their accomplishments in the area of building defense and pledge continued modernization. "Our military strength exists for the high moral purpose of deterring

conflict, not initiating war.” They state President Reagan’s willingness to negotiate with the Soviets even though the Soviets have been unwilling. As the Democratic platform is quick to remind, “Ronald Reagan is the first American president in over twenty years who has not reached any significant arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, and he is the first in over fifty years who has not met face to face with Soviet leaders” (100-B).

The Republican platform points out the Soviets’ refusal to engage in talks stems from the US deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe.

Soviet intransigence is designed to force concessions from the United States even before negotiations begin. The Soviet Union will return to the bargaining table only when it recognizes that the United States will not make unilateral concessions or allow the Soviet Union to achieve nuclear superiority.

The Republicans stress the verification of any future arms control agreement reached with the Soviets due to their “sustained pattern of violations.” Republicans, to deter this behavior stress that

the United States must . . . display a willingness to respond to Soviet violations which have military significance, and adopt a policy whereby the defense of the United States is not constrained by arms control agreements violated by the Soviet Union.

The Democrats state, “True national security requires urgent measures to freeze and reverse the arms race, not the pursuit of the phantom of nuclear superiority or futile Star Wars schemes.” (100-B). Democratic proposals are much more specific in the area of arms control.

. . . [A] Democratic President will initiate temporary, verifiable, and mutual moratoria, to be maintained for a fixed period during negotiations so long as the Soviets do the same, on the testing of underground nuclear weapons and anti-satellite weapons; on the testing and deployment of all

weapons in space; on the testing and deployment of new strategic ballistic missiles now under development; and on the deployment of nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles. (100-B).

Whereas the Republicans confine their section on arms control to seven paragraphs, the Democrats are much more detailed in their proposals. They devote 40% of their discussion of defense policy to arms control proposals. The Republicans devote 13% of their total defense plank to arms control.

Overall, the two platforms of 1984 are quite distinct. They offer voters a clear choice in terms of policy in most areas. Previous platforms analyzed above did not so clearly delineate the differences in policy proposals. The increasing polarization of the two parties, evident in the 1976 platforms, reaches its peak in 1984.

1992: Breaking the Mold

There are many ways in which both parties' platforms in 1992 do not conform to previous years. This is evident not only in the prioritization index but also in terms of the traditional expectations of what both platforms look like and address. Figure 4.5 shows the prioritization index for 1992 and the differences in the scores for social welfare issues is pronounced. In addition, the prioritization scores differ on governmental affairs. Even though the Democratic platform moves to the right in some areas, the Republican platform moves farther right. Therefore, there are still significant differences evident in the Republican and Democratic platforms.

First, the Democratic party platform is the shortest ever for the period examined.


It ran to only eighty-three paragraphs.⁸ This is highly unusual since the challenging party's platform usually has a substantial number of paragraphs denouncing the policy of the incumbent administration. The Democrats do attack the Reagan and Bush Administrations, but the platform devotes relatively little space to these attacks and the overall tone is optimistic. In addition, the influence of "New Democrats" is very evident. The Democratic platform states, "We reject both the do-nothing government of the last twelve years and the big government theory that says we can hamstring business and tax and spend our way to prosperity. Instead we offer a third way."⁹ Indeed the title of the platform is "A New Covenant with the American People." On this new covenant, they state, "To make this revolution, we seek a New Covenant to repair the damaged bond between the American people and their government, that will expand opportunity, insist upon greater individual responsibility in return, restore community, and ensure national security in a profoundly new era." The platform's overall theme is responsibility; it uses the term sixteen times. Three times the phrase is "personal responsibility," a traditionally Republican phrase. References to "values" also appear as they have not previously. Within the relatively short platform, there are ten references to some type of "values."

⁸83 paragraphs refer to the number of coded paragraphs. By comparison, the 1984 Democratic platform was 597 coded paragraphs. Due to the succinct nature of the 1992 Democratic platform, the standard of using four paragraphs to indicate the prioritization placement had to be altered. Several topics were covered in one paragraph. In addition, paragraphs tended to be somewhat longer than in previous years. Therefore, the standard used for 1992 was first substantial mention of a policy area that was not covered subsequently in the platform.

⁹The 1992 Democratic platform is available on the World Wide Web at <http://europe.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/past.platforms/dem92/index.shtml.orig>. Therefore, page references are not indicated.

However, none of these references are to “traditional family values” or “family values,” phrases the Republicans will repeat, but refer instead to basic American values.

FIGURE 4.6
1992 PRIORITIZATION INDEX



The Republican platform is also different from preceding ones. In 1984, there were three references to God, none of which were in a specifically religious context.¹⁰ In the 1992 platform, this changes. While there are only four references to God, three of them are specifically used in a religious context. There are two references to “faith in God,” one to a nation “under God,” and a thanks to God for peace. In addition, the platform takes a quotation from the book of Proverbs and there are two references to the United States’ “Judeo-Christian heritage.” The religious overtones in the Republican platform are exemplified in a statement from the preamble. “We believe in traditional family values and in the Judeo-Christian heritage that informs our culture.” In addition, the language of values is also present in the 1992 Republican platform and is the focus of much of the platform. There are eighteen references to “values.” Seven are references to family values or traditional family values. The remainders are to moral, religious, cultural and general values. By comparison, the 1984 platform contained only eight references to values and two of these were specifically economic, referring to land and asset values.

The Democrats primarily emphasize the economy and deficit reduction. While the platform is much more moderate than in past years, there are still some traditional Democratic stances. In contrast, the Republicans place their primary emphasis on social welfare policy and specifically focus on a discussion of family values. The thread running through past Republican platforms was local control, but the thread running

¹⁰The 1984 Republican platform made use of the phrases “God-given natural resources,” “God-given and inalienable rights,” and “God-given rights.”

through the 1992 Republican platform is an emphasis on the family.

Prescriptions for the economy are the first item of business the Democrats say they will attend to if elected. There is criticism of President Bush's lack of attention to domestic matters and he is blamed for slow economic growth. The Democratic platform states, "We believe in free enterprise and the power of market forces." The platform indicates the Democrats would facilitate economic growth through public investment by channeling money saved from defense into research, education and training. In addition, they would encourage private investment through tax credits for those who invest in new technologies and businesses. The differences between Democrats and Republicans in this particular area are not as stark as in years past but there are still differences.

We reject the Democrats' politics of division, envy and conflict. They believe that America is split into classes and can be healed only through the redistribution of wealth. We believe in the economics of multiplication: free markets expand opportunity and wealth for all.¹¹

And, in traditional Democratic fashion, the Democrats repeat pledges of past years to "make the rich pay their fair share in taxes." They call for middle class tax relief that will be made possible by "forcing the rich to pay their fair share." The Republican platform must put the tax increase that President Bush signed in 1990 into perspective. They do so by saying, "We will oppose any attempt to increase taxes. Furthermore, Republicans believe that the taxes insisted on by the Democrats in the 1990 budget agreement were recessionary. . . . We believe the tax increases of 1990 should ultimately be repealed."

¹¹The 1992 Republican platform is available on the World Wide Web at <http://europe.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/past.platforms/gop92/>. Because the platform is available in electronic format, page references are not used.

The deficit is another area of concern for the Democrats. “In place of the Republican supply-side disaster, the Democratic investment, economic conversion and growth strategy will generate more revenues from a growing economy.” This, in conjunction with a reevaluation of spending, will reduce the deficit over time. The Republicans stress in several areas that the Democratic Congress was responsible for both the tax increase in 1990, the lack of subsequent tax cuts that were proposed by Bush but not passed by Congress, and a failure to control spending. Had President Bush been able to hold spending down (say, with a line item veto and a balanced budget amendment - both of which the platform champions) then the deficit would have been controlled. The Republican platform contains no other prescriptions for controlling the deficit but does state, “As the deficit comes under control, we aspire to further tax rate cuts.” The lack of attention to the deficit is striking, especially when one considers that 1992 is the year Ross Perot challenged both Bush and Clinton with his primary emphasis on deficit reduction and attention to the national debt.

Other policy planks in governmental affairs reveal the rightward shift of the Democratic Party platform. In a statement that in years past could have been in the Republican platform, the Democrats state, “To foster greater responsibility in government at every level, we support giving greater flexibility to our cities, counties and states in achieving Federal mandates and carrying out existing programs.” However, in the 1992 platform, the Republicans favor doing away with the mandates altogether. “We oppose costly federal mandates that stifle innovation and force tax hikes upon states and localities.” So, while the Democratic party moved to the right, the Republican party

moved further in that direction.

The area of social welfare holds the largest differences for the two platforms. Whereas the Democrats lead with planks on the economy, the Republicans lead with planks on the family that encompass social welfare policy.¹² The Republican platform states, “This is the ultimate agenda of contemporary socialism under all its masks: to liberate youth from traditional family values by replacing family functions with bureaucratic social services. That is why today’s liberal Democrats are hostile toward any institution government cannot control, like private child care or religious schools.” The platform goes on to encourage “state legislators to explore ways to promote marital stability,” and states “. . . we put the highest priority upon enforcement of family rights and responsibilities.” The Democratic platform also contains a statement on “strengthening the family” but it is one paragraph unlike the Republican platform which contains references to family in virtually every section. The Democrats opening statement, however, sounds as if it could have come from the Republicans. “Governments don’t raise children, people do. People who bring children into this world have a responsibility to care for them and give them values, motivation and discipline.” But, the Democrats go on to advocate strengthening the family through pay equity and family and medical leave, two things that are not mentioned in the 1992 Republican

¹²The discussion of family values in the Republican platform is often pure rhetoric and/or fact. Paragraphs of rhetoric and fact were not coded for inclusion in the prioritization index. However, when there were specific policy proposals couched in the language of family values, they most often, but not always, dealt with social welfare issues. Thus lumping the entire discussion of family values under the social welfare category is an uneasy fit since the Republican discussion of civil rights, civil liberties, and the economy also included proposals that linked these policy areas to family values.

platform.

The education planks for the two parties are in direct opposition on the subject of vouchers. The Democrats oppose school vouchers that could be used at private schools as an “effort to bankrupt the public school system.” The Republicans support vouchers, although they do not label them as such. “The president has shown unprecedented leadership for the most important education goal of all: helping middle- and low income families enjoy the same choice of schools - public, private or religious - that families with more resources already have. The president's proposed "GI Bill for Children" will provide \$1,000 scholarships to middle- and low-income families, enabling their children to attend the school of their choice.”

The Democrats address the disparities in funding of public schools. We “. . . believe every child deserves an equal chance to a world class education. Reallocating resources toward this goal must be a priority.” The Republicans call for the continuation of the “education revolution” begun by President Bush which has resulted in “a new generation of break-the-mold” schools. The Republicans, however, do not address funding disparities. They do encourage innovation and choice. “We have an uncompromising commitment to improve public education - which means assuring that our schools produce well educated, responsible citizens - not the maintenance of a government monopoly over the means of educating. American families must be given choice in education.” Finally, the Republicans support abstinence education in public schools of which the Democrats make no mention.

Past Democratic platforms called for a national health care system. The 1992

platform modifies this to call for “universal access to quality, affordable health care.” The details of how they would accomplish this are quite sketchy in the platform. The Republicans portray this as a fundamental difference between the two parties, stating “Republicans believe government control of health care is irresponsible and ineffective. We believe health-care choices should remain in the hands of the people, not government bureaucrats.”

One area where the Democratic shift to the right is very evident is in the area of welfare. Rather than calling for the federalization of welfare programs as in previous platforms, the Democrats chart a new course. The Democrats include a substantial section on the restoration of community in their platform and this is where they include their prescriptions for welfare reform.

Democrats will pursue a new course that stresses work, family and individual responsibility, and that empowers Americans to liberate themselves from poverty and dependence. We pledge to bolster the institutions of civil society and place a new emphasis on civic enterprises that seek solutions to our nation’s problems.

The Republicans, however, go further to the right and advocate the surrender of the federal role in welfare. “It cannot be merely tinkered with by Congress; it must be recreated by states and localities.”

There remain significant gulfs between the beliefs of the Democrats and Republicans over civil rights and liberties. While the Democratic platform is short on specifics, they repeat their support for certain items that appeal to traditional Democratic constituencies. They state support for the ratification of the ERA, affirmative action, civil rights protection for homosexuals, prosecution of hate crimes, and stronger protection for

voting rights of racial and ethnic minorities. Even though the Democrats lump all these pledges of support into one sentence, they do include a separate section on reproductive rights and the Democrats' support of choice. The Republicans repeat their opposition to abortion and call for "a human life amendment to the Constitution." In addition, the Republicans do not support the enlistment of homosexuals in the military. In their statement on AIDS, Republicans oppose the discrimination of AIDS victims and pledge to slow the spread of AIDS, but they link prevention to a very controversial statement. "The administration has thus placed great emphasis on a variety of prevention efforts to do so. We must recognize, also, that prevention is linked ultimately to personal responsibility and moral behavior." In their section on promoting cultural values, the Republican platform counters the position of the Democratic platform. "We oppose efforts by the Democratic Party to include sexual preference as a protected minority receiving preferential status under civil rights statutes at the federal, state and local level."

The platforms also take opposite stands on federal support of the arts. The Republicans believe "Government has a responsibility . . . to ensure that it promotes the common moral values that bind us together as a nation. We therefore condemn the use of public funds to subsidize obscenity and blasphemy masquerading as art." The Democrats respond to this controversy by stating "We believe in public support for the Arts, including a National Endowment for the Arts that is free from political manipulation and firmly rooted in the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee."

The Democrats make no mention of either their support for or opposition to school prayer. However, the Republicans include a statement that falls short of calling

for a constitutional amendment, as they have in the past, but do unequivocally state their position. “Mindful of our country's Judeo-Christian heritage and rich religious pluralism, we support the right of students to engage in voluntary prayer in schools and the right of the community to do so at commencements or other occasions.”

In the area of defense policy, the Democrats condemn the Republicans for still thinking in the Cold War mode. They advocate a restructuring of forces that will save expenditures while better meeting the needs of a new international landscape. Specifically this would mean a reduction of forces in Europe and increasing use of technology and intelligence. The Republican platform lauds President Bush’s victory in the Gulf War and emphasizes his leadership ability. They recognize the end of the Cold War means fewer defense expenditures but call for “a controlled defense drawdown, not a free fall.” Republicans also do not give up on Ronald Reagan’s dream of SDI. “We will cooperate with our former adversaries both to curtail proliferation and to move beyond the ABM Treaty toward effective ballistic missile defenses.”

In the area of foreign policy, the Democrats discuss the global environment, something that was not discussed in previous platforms. The Democratic platform states, “The United States must become a leader, not an impediment, in the fight against global warming. We should join our European allies in agreeing to limit carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.” The Republicans do not talk about the environment in terms of foreign policy. They do, however, obliquely refer to global warming in their discussion of domestic resources. “[Liberal Democrats] use junk science to foster hysteria instead of reason, demanding rigid controls, more taxes and less

resource production.”

Both platforms briefly address the Balkans. The differences in the way the two parties approach this area of the world are subtle, but they are differences, nonetheless. The Democrats believe, “. . . we must act decisively with our European allies to support freedom, diminish ethnic tensions, and oppose aggression in the former communist countries, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are struggling to make the transition from communism to democracy.” The Republican platform’s statements on the Balkans do not involve action on the part of the United States, only support. “The violence in what used to be Yugoslavia is an affront to humanity. We condemn those responsible for the carnage there and call for an immediate international investigation of atrocities. We support the United Nations peacekeeping effort and urge an immediate cease-fire by all parties. The United States should continue to demand respect for international law and fundamental human rights in this agonizing conflict.”

The 1992 platforms are fundamentally different from what each party produced in past years. The Democrats, moving to the right, moderate their traditional stances in many areas. By using references to values and personal responsibility, they adopt the language that traditionally has been used by the Republican party. Yet, even as they do this, their solutions for restoring values and responsibility are different from Republican prescriptions. Democrats do, in addition, still include some traditionally liberal stances such as support for abortion rights and progressive taxation. The policy area of civil rights and liberties hold the largest differences between the two parties. The Democratic platform does not include any references to God; it does inclusively speak of religious

faiths on two occasions.

The Republican platform is more conservative than the very conservative Republican statement of 1984. However, the fundamental difference between the 1992 Republican platform and past Republican platforms is the overtly religious nature of the document. In addition, the Republicans increase the references to family and values in their 1992 platform. While the Democrats, by moderating many of their traditional positions, move right, the Republican party moves further right by incorporating religion in the 1992 platform. Voters were offered a clear choice in 1984 between a liberal Democratic statement of beliefs and a very conservative Republican statement. The 1992 platforms offer voters a clear choice between a moderate, secular Democratic platform and a conservative, religious Republican platform.

1996: A new paradigm?

The prioritization index for 1996 (Figure 4.7) looks a lot like the prioritization index for 1992 with one important exception; the Democratic index resembles the Republican index of 1992 and the Republican index of 1996 looks like that of the Democrats in 1992. In 1992, Republicans overwhelmingly emphasized social welfare issues due to the platform's focus on the role of family values. In 1996, Democrats overwhelmingly emphasize social welfare issues and they place a huge emphasis on values. Republicans in 1996 shift their main emphasis to governmental affairs focusing especially on reform, crime and judicial selection. The Democratic platform of 1992 gave a high priority to governmental affairs. There are also important changes in terms of the substance of the two platforms as well.


The Democrats' platform in 1996 does not return to normal length; it is still abnormally brief but does manage to be almost twice as long as the 1992 document. Contributing to the document's length is the fact that the Clinton administration has a record it can champion in 1996 as it did not in 1992. There is a sense in which the Democratic platform tries to out-republican the Republicans. Recall that the 1992 Republican platform was heavily religious and referred extensively to values. The 1992 Democratic platform contained no references to God; the 1996 Democratic platform contains five (one more than the Republican platform in both 1992 and 1996). In addition, both the 1992 and 1996 Republican platforms refer to some type of "values" eighteen times. The 1996 Democratic platform uses "values" twenty-nine times while being a much shorter document than the Republican platform. There is also a peculiar paragraph in the Democratic platform of 1996 that lauds the fact that the Democrats are doing all the things the Republicans have promised in the past but never accomplished.

For years, Republicans talked about making government smaller while letting it grow — Democrats are doing it. For years, Republicans talked about cutting the deficit while letting it climb — Democrats are doing it. For years, Republicans talked about shifting power back to states and communities — Democrats are doing it. For years, Republicans talked about making government more businesslike and efficient --Democrats are doing it. Democrats are bringing responsibility back to Washington.¹³

The Democrats are saying they are more successful Republicans than the Republicans!

¹³The 1996 Democratic platform is available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.perkel.com/congress/platform.htm>. Due to its availability electronically, page numbers are not referenced.

FIGURE 4.7
1996 PRIORITIZATION INDEX



The 1996 Republican platform returns to the pattern found before 1992, once again focusing on issues of federalism. The 1996 platform is not overtly religious as the 1992 document was. One might characterize it, however, as covertly religious as there are many planks that appeal to religious conservatives such as support for home schooling, phonics education, school vouchers, abstinence education, appeals to traditional family values, denunciation of homosexuality as a category for civil rights purposes, strong pro-life statements, calls for stopping moral decay, and strong anti-pornography statements.¹⁴ The Republicans also return to the traditional theme in their platform - local control over federal control - instead of the theme of family values that dominated the 1992 platform. There are still plenty of appeals to family values in 1996 but it is not the pivot point around which the rest of the platform revolves; local control is.

The Democrats put a very high emphasis on social welfare issues while the Republicans do not. In education, Democrats stress the cuts the Republican 104th Congress tried to implement. "The Republican budget tried to take Big Bird away from 5-year-olds, school lunches away from 10-year-olds, summer jobs away from 15-year-olds, and college loans away from 20-year-olds." In other areas, however, the Democrats drift toward some Republican stances. For example, the Democrats support expanding public school choice, but do not support vouchers that could be used at private institutions. "We should expand public school choice, but we should not take American

¹⁴The 1996 Republican platform is available on the World Wide Web at <http://cgi.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/san.diego/facts/gop.platform/index.shtml>. Due to its availability electronically, page numbers are not referenced.

tax dollars from public schools and give them to private schools.” The Democrats also voice support for innovative charter schools. The Republicans say, “We support and vigorously work for mechanisms, such as opportunity scholarships, block grants, school rebates, charter schools, and vouchers, to make parental choice in education a reality for all parents.” The Democrats also include a plank entitled “teaching values in schools” that has a decidedly Republican feel. “We applaud the efforts of the Clinton-Gore Administration to promote character education in our schools.” However, a very important gulf still exists between Republican and Democratic education policy. The Republicans want to do away with the federal government’s role in education.

Our formula is as simple as it is sweeping: the federal government has no constitutional authority to be involved in school curricula or to control jobs in the work place. That is why we will abolish the Department of Education, end federal meddling in our schools, and promote family choice at all levels of learning.

Even though the Democrats do support some traditionally Republican ideas (choice, charter schools) they do not advocate abolishing the Education Department or relinquishing the federal role in education.

Today's Democratic Party will stand firmly against the Republican assault on education. Cutting education as we move into the 21st century would be like cutting defense spending at the height of the Cold War. We must do more to expand educational opportunity -- not less.

Even though the Democrats moderate their traditional stance on education, there is still differentiation between the two parties.

The rightward turn of the Democrats is evident in the area of welfare reform more than any other area. In past platforms, Democrats often called for the federalization of

welfare. In the 1996 platform, the Democrats changed their tune. "Today's Democratic Party knows there is no greater gap between mainstream American values and modern American government than our failed welfare system." When the Democratic platform was presented, the reform bill that shifted responsibility for welfare to the states was a recent development. The Democratic platform is careful to point out that Republicans were forced to compromise on key issues. "We are proud the President forced Congressional Republicans to abandon their wrong-headed and mean-spirited efforts to punish the poor." The platform also states that the welfare reform measure is flawed but Democrats will work to fix its problems. The Republicans are proud of their welfare reform package. "The key to welfare reform is restoring personal responsibility and encouraging two-parent households. The path to that goal lies outside of official Washington. In the hands of State and local officials, and under the eye of local taxpayers, welfare can again become a hand up instead of a handout." Thus, 1996 finds the Democratic and Republican platforms closer than ever before in the area of welfare policy. And, it is the Democrats who repositioned themselves.

In the area of health care, the Democrats have to finesse the failure of Clinton's attempt at reform in his first term. They do this by ignoring it and stressing the incremental reforms accomplished in the time since the Clinton plan went up in smoke, such as the Kennedy-Kassebaum Act. They also pledge to "preserve and strengthen Medicare and Medicaid" which they feel are under attack from Republicans. The Republicans disparage "Clintoncare" and are firmly committed to protecting individual choice. They also favor the establishment of medical savings accounts to help make

health care more affordable. The Republicans directly counter the Democrats' position on Medicare. "We reaffirm our determination to protect Medicare. We will ensure a significant annual expansion in Medicare." Medicaid is a different story. "Medicaid" say the Republicans, "should be turned over to State management with leeway for restructuring and reform."

While the Democrats are concerned primarily with social welfare, Republicans emphasize governmental affairs. They especially stress reform of the bureaucracy and Congress. In addition, substantial portions are dedicated to crime control and the administration of justice.

The Republicans continue to champion a balanced budget amendment to the constitution and legislation requiring a supermajority vote in Congress before taxes could be raised. They include a long list of congressional reforms, one of which calls for a constitutional amendment to impose term limits on members of congress. The bureaucracy is similarly held up as grossly in need of reform.

As a first step in reforming government, we support elimination of the Departments of Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Education, and Energy, and the elimination, defunding or privatization of agencies which are obsolete, redundant, of limited value, or too regional in focus. Examples of agencies we seek to defund or to privatize are the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the Legal Services Corporation.

Not only do the Republicans favor the devolution of most federal responsibilities to states and localities, they also call for privatization. "Republicans believe we can streamline government and make it more effective through competition and privatization." The Democrats pledge to continue "reinventing government" but they are not as inventive as

the Republicans. Democrats do acknowledge “the era of big government is over” and that “we need a smaller government.” They even feel the need to state, “We know that government workers are good people trapped in bad systems, and we are committed to reinventing government to reform those systems.” Nevertheless, the reforms they propose are not nearly so far reaching as Republican proposals. The Democrats would reinvent government by cutting waste, improving customer service, and demanding accountability.

In the area of electoral reform, differences are quite apparent. The Democrats hold up the Motor Voter Act as an achievement which “make[s] it easier for people to participate in our democracy and exercise their civic responsibility in the voting booth.” The Republicans are happy to give credit to the Democrats for passing the Motor Voter Act, which they see as an unfunded mandate, call “ill-conceived,” and “the Democrats' costly invitation to ballot fraud.” The Democrats also call for the Republicans to allow McCain-Feingold, the campaign finance reform bill, a vote in Congress. The Republicans do not mention the bill by name but do state, “We will eliminate made-in-Washington schemes to rig the election process under the guise of campaign reform. True reform is indeed needed: ending taxpayer subsidies for campaigns, strengthening party structures to guard against rogue operations, requiring full and immediate disclosure of all contributions, and cracking down on the indirect support, or “soft money,” by which special interest groups underwrite their favored candidates.”

Crime is discussed extensively by both parties. Both parties agree on a constitutional amendment to protect victims' rights. Both agree that crime is a problem.

The Democrats believe they have made substantial headway in combating crime; they especially tout the 1994 Crime Bill. The Republicans do not believe inroads have been made in combating crime. They state "Making America safe again will be a tremendous undertaking, in its own way as heroic as was the liberation of Europe from a different kind of criminal half a century ago." The Republican proposals largely seek to correct inadequacies in the administration of justice. "We will reform the Supreme Court's fanciful exclusionary rule, which has allowed a generation of criminals to get off on technicalities." In addition, they pledge "Bob Dole, the next Republican president will . . . make our courts once again an instrument of justice." The Democrats approach crime in a different manner. "The Democratic party under President Clinton is putting more police on the streets and tougher penalties on the books; we are taking guns off the streets and working to steer young people away from crime and gangs and drugs in the first place."

The Republicans call for judicial reform and their criticisms are sharp. "The federal judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court, has overstepped its authority under the Constitution. It has usurped the right of citizen legislators and popularly elected executives to make law by declaring duly enacted laws to be 'unconstitutional' through the misapplication of judicial review." The reform for these failings, state the Republicans, is the wise application of the president's appointment power. The Democratic platform does not address the judiciary.

Again, the movement of Democrats toward the center is discernable. They call for less government. Republicans, however, demand even less government. Republicans advocate the cutting of whole agencies, advocating the demise of more bureaucracies than

in past platforms. Despite the movement of Democrats toward the center, the parties do not get any closer in the area of governmental reform because the Republicans also become more conservative and strident.

Civil rights and civil liberties have been the areas where the Democrats and Republicans are farthest apart since the 1976 platforms. This tradition remains intact in the 1996 platforms. The Republicans do include a statement of tolerance at the beginning of their civil rights plank, the likes of which has not appeared in previous platforms.

We are the party of the open door. As we approach the start of a new century, the Republican Party is more dedicated than ever to strengthening the social, cultural, and political ties that bind us together as a free people, the greatest force for good the world has ever seen. While our party remains steadfast in its commitment to advancing its historic principles and ideals, we also recognize that members of our party have deeply held and sometimes differing views. We view this diversity of views as a source of strength, not as a sign of weakness, and we welcome into our ranks all Americans who may hold differing positions. We are committed to resolving our differences in a spirit of civility, hope, and mutual respect.

However, the pro-life plank of the platform is taken almost verbatim from the 1992 platform. Similarly there is no support for homosexual rights. "We reject the distortion of [equal opportunity laws] to cover sexual preference, and we endorse the Defense of Marriage Act to prevent states from being forced to recognize same-sex unions." New to the Republican platform is the call for "a constitutional amendment or constitutionally-valid legislation declaring that children born in the United States of parents who are not legally present in the United States or who are not long-term residents are not automatically citizens." There is also a call for English to be designated the official language. Republicans repeat from past platforms their desire to amend the Constitution

to protect against flag burning. Support for voluntary school prayer is reiterated but no constitutional amendment is advocated.

The Democratic platform counters most of these stances. Democrats repeat from previous platforms their support of a woman's right to choose in the area of abortion. In addition, Democrats "believe everyone in America should learn English so they can fully share in our daily life, but we strongly oppose divisive efforts like English-only legislation, designed to erect barriers between us and force people away from the culture and heritage of which they are rightly proud." Democrats do call for the inclusion of sexual orientation to those afforded civil rights protection. Finally, Democrats include a cryptic statement on school prayer which distinguishes between public and private religious expression. "Americans have a right to express their love of God in public, and we applaud the President's work to ensure that children are not denied private religious expression in school."

Defense policy is another area where the Democrats move in the direction of the Republicans, specifically concerning missile defense. The Republicans advocate a long-range missile defense system. "The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the last two Republican administrations has been dismantled by Bill Clinton, who - contrary to the national security interests of the United States - clings to the obsolete Cold War ABM Treaty." The Democrats, in a change from previous years, state that they are "committed to a strong and balanced National Missile Defense (NMD) program." This program is different, however from the old SDI.

The Democratic Party opposes the Republican NMD plan — spending up

to \$60 billion on a revival of the Star Wars program that would force us to choose a costly system today that could be obsolete tomorrow. The Republican plan would waste money, weaken America's defenses and violate existing arms control agreements that make us more secure. It is the wrong way to defend America.

The Democratic plan, according to their platform, is cheaper, more realistic, and would not violate the ABM treaty.

In the area of foreign policy, the Democrats and Republicans disagree over the deployment of troops in Bosnia. Republicans "did not support the ill-conceived and inconsistent policies that led to [troop] deployment." Republicans believe that if the Bosnians had not been placed under an arms embargo, the U.S. would not now be involved. The Democrats see their intervention in Bosnia as a positive. "Four years ago, America stood aloof as war and genocide spread through the former Yugoslavia. Today, thanks to NATO airstrikes, American diplomacy and the deployment of troops from the U.S. and other nations, the war has stopped and Bosnia has its first real chance for a lasting peace."

The parties' core beliefs, as presented in their platforms, still present voters with a choice but in some policy areas the traditionally Democratic stances are forsaken as they were in 1992. Even as the Democrats reposition themselves to the right of previous platforms and try to co-opt many traditionally Republican stances, the Republican party relies more on cultural appeals to the traditionally religious. The Democratic platform is, in part, a reaction to the Republican platform of 1992. The Democrats include more references to God and values than does the Republican platform. Yet, the Democrats' stance, especially in relation to civil rights and liberties does not move right. For those

who care about issues other than civil liberties and civil rights, there is not the polarization between the two parties as in the past. However, when the platforms are taken as a whole, there remain significant differences.

Platform change over time


Changes have occurred in the way issues are addressed over time both in terms of prioritization and substance. In terms of prioritization, three areas have instructive trends: foreign policy, economic policy, and governmental affairs. In terms of polarization, there have been important shifts in the way the parties think about the scope of government. The seven platforms analyzed from 1952-1996 show significant changes in the way certain issues are addressed by the two parties. Economic policy, social welfare policy, and governmental affairs are addressed one way by the Democrats in 1952, another way in 1996 and the change is quite large. While there is still differentiation in social welfare policy and the approach to governmental affairs at the end of the time period, there is no polarization - if polarization is taken to mean direct opposition. More subtle changes are evident over time in the parties stances on civil rights and civil liberties. Polarization in the area of civil liberties, begun in 1976, is especially distinct by 1996.

Priority

Figure 4.8 maps the falling fortunes of foreign policy's priority in the platforms. The two trends are almost identical. When the time series began in 1952, both parties led with their foreign policy planks. Beginning in 1968, foreign policy loses its preeminent position and is relegated to the end of the platforms by both parties. The effect of Vietnam on this re-prioritization cannot be overstated. Both parties de-emphasize


Vietnam in their 1968 platforms even though it is arguably the largest issue in the election. It is also the most divisive. In subsequent years, foreign policy does not regain its opening position, largely because the country is still suffering from a Vietnam hangover and attention is focused on domestic matters. Even though the Cold War is raging for much of this period, domestic issues take precedence over foreign policy. This does not mean that foreign policy is not extensively discussed in platforms; it simply means that domestic issues are deemed to be more important to the public. Foreign policy still continues to have many, often the most, paragraphs dedicated to its discussion but its placement in the platform itself moderates its prioritization.

FIGURE 4.8
FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIZATION OVER TIME




Economic policy is emphasized more by the two parties at the end of the time series than when it began (Figure 4.9). The void left after 1968, when foreign policy was relegated to the end of the platforms, is largely filled by economic policy. Even though the Democratic catchphrase for the 1992 election was “It’s the economy, stupid,” 1992 witnesses a large drop in the priority the Democrats give to economic policy. The Republican emphasis on economic policy steadily rises over the course of the time series. These two trends are explained by a shift that occurs within economic policy around 1976. When the series begins in 1952, there is polarization between Democrats and Republicans over government intervention in the economy. However, the 1976 platforms begin a change in the area of emphasis within economic policy. In 1976, the Democrats continue to advocate a government that is active in the economy but they also begin to emphasize tax progressivity, thus more space is devoted to economic policy. At the same time, the Republicans begin to address taxation more than any other economic plank in addition to praising the virtues of the free market, thus the steady growth in their prioritization trend. The large drop in prioritization for the Democrats in 1992 was due to the Democrats’ de-emphasis on government intervention in the economy while maintaining their emphasis on taxation.

FIGURE 4.9
ECONOMIC POLICY PRIORITIZATION OVER TIME



The prioritization index for governmental affairs also indicates growth over time for both parties (Figure 4.10). The Republican trend makes a huge spike in 1968 and 1996. Both of these spikes are due to the Republican platform's emphasis on law and order. A steady growth in the discussion of governmental affairs is evident for Democrats. Governmental policy encompasses several policy areas that all are of increasing concern as time progresses. Crime and the administration of justice, issues of federalism, and the growth of bureaucracy are all given more space in the platforms as time passes.

FIGURE 4.10
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS PRIORITIZATION OVER TIME



Polarization and Differentiation

There is significant polarization in economic policy between the two parties but the issues on which the parties are polarized has changed over time. From 1952 to 1968, this polarization was over the federal government's role in the economy; from 1976 to 1996 the polarization was over tax policy. The Democrats advocated an active role for government in the early period, championing price controls, aid to depressed areas, the government as the employer of last resort and government involvement in the setting of interest rates and control of the money supply. The Republicans felt government involvement in these areas was ruinous. In 1976, the focus within economic policy shifts. While the Democrats still advocate significant involvement in economic matters and the Republicans disdain it, the two parties turn their focus to taxation. Before 1976, the two parties did not heavily emphasize taxation and when they talked about it, there were not huge disagreements. For example, the Democrats state in their 1968 platform that they raised taxes twice during the last presidential term. The Republicans do not refer to this at all in their 1968 platform. Often tax policy was spoken of in vague generalities before 1976; calls for tax reform and tax simplification. The polarization over taxation becomes prominent in the 1976 election with the Republicans stressing tax relief and the Democrats emphasizing making the tax code more progressive. This would mean tax increases for the wealthy, the group to which the Republican tax relief was most often targeted. After 1976, the Republicans' economic policy was dominated by taxation and their insistence on tax reductions. In 1992, the Democrats drop all calls for an economically activist government and actually trumpet the free market in their platform

quite extensively. They would spur the economy indirectly (rather than directly as they advocated in years past) by public investments in education and training and encouraging private investment by offering tax credits. The debate over taxation, however, is an enduring area of polarization between the two parties from 1976 to 1996. The Democrats stress progressivity and making everyone pay their fair share. The Republicans advocate tax cuts and especially tax cuts that would benefit those with investments and business.

There is a large gulf between the way the two parties address issues of social welfare in 1952 and this polarization continues until 1984. As in economic policy, the debate is over the extent of federal government involvement. The Democrats favor an activist federal government that provides many things for its citizens such as health care, retirement income, unemployment assistance and welfare programs. The Republicans stress that the federal government should not be active in most of these areas and that the private sector and/or state and local levels of government are better able to fill these needs for citizens. In 1992, however, there is an important change in the way the two parties approach social welfare issues. The Democrat move significantly rightward and the Republicans move even further rightward. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of welfare. In past platforms, the Democrats had consistently called for the federalization of welfare rather than the hodgepodge of shared programs that delivered basic needs to the poor. They do not make this call in 1992 and begin to talk about personal responsibility and reforming the welfare system. Republicans favor a total abdication of the federal role in welfare and propose states, localities, and institutions of civil society can take care of the needs of the poor much better. They move farther right in that they

stress the responsibilities of families and private community organizations to care for the poor as the ideal, and propose steps in that direction. Also in 1992, the Democrats do not call for a national health care system. Instead, the platform advocates “universal access to quality, affordable health care” which falls short of their former goal of a federalized system. In education, they also list rightward by favoring educational choice (though not vouchers) and innovation. Unlike economic policy, where there was a change in emphasis but still significant polarization between the two parties over taxation in the 1990s, the polarization on social welfare policy disappears in the 1990s. There was still significant differentiation between the two parties, but they were not polar opposites in these policy areas as in previous decades.

In governmental affairs there is also a shift on the part of the Democrats that moves them closer to the traditional Republican stance. The Republicans step further rightward. This occurs mainly in the area of federalism and bureaucratic reform. Again, the move occurs in the 1992 Democratic platform. The Democrats in 1992 call for “greater flexibility” to lower levels of government. The Republicans, in this area move further rightward in advocating not “greater flexibility” but total devolution. The growth of bureaucracy after the 1960s is something both parties address, albeit not always at the same time. Republicans begin their assault of the bureaucracy in the 1970s; the Democrats do not address its growth until 1992 when they call for smaller government. The Republican platform always emphasizes using local and state governments over the federal government. The Democrats actually begin to moderate their belief in federal centralization in the 1976 platform’s support for revenue sharing. By 1992, the

Democrats are advocating giving more responsibilities to states and localities and they continue this theme in 1996. There is still a significant difference about what to do about the deficit at the end of the time period. The Democrats would spur the economy and “re-evaluate spending.” Tax increases are not specifically ruled out but are not advocated in the platform. The Republicans specifically rule out raising taxes, advocate cutting taxes, and would balance the budget by cutting spending. In addition, there is a difference in the 1990s in the way the two parties approach crime and the administration of justice. The Republicans would focus on what they identify as the mal administration of justice by using the appointment power and legislation to reform the way the courts work. The Democratic platforms focus on prevention of crime and more law enforcement efforts.

Thus, there occurs a sea change in Democratic philosophy in the 1990s that affects the relative polarization between the two parties. The 1984 platforms were the pinnacle of polarization for the examined time period. Democrats advocated extensive government involvement in the economy and social welfare programs that both cost a lot of money and needed a lot of civil servants to administer. Republicans in 1984 advocated a modified flat tax, block grants to public education to make them independent of federal involvement, and devolution of social programs. However, in 1992, the Democratic platform is moderated and this trend continues in 1996. In economic policy, social welfare policy and governmental affairs, there are areas where the Democratic platforms of the 1990s are more like Republican platforms of the past than Democratic platforms of the past. It should be reiterated, however that there is still polarization between the two parties on taxation, a very important issue. In addition, the Republicans move farther

right at the same time the Democrats move right, so even as polarization disappears the degree of separation remains rather constant. The parties are no longer polarized in key policy areas but there is still differentiation.

More significant changes are evident in the area of civil liberties and civil rights. In these two areas, the degree of polarization actually increases between the two parties over time. First, by 1968 the two parties have polarized on issues of civil rights. Secondly, the polarization on civil liberties begins in earnest in 1976 and grows. Finally, the religious appeal of one platform far outstrips the other beginning in 1992.

The 1968 platform indicates the Democrats are fully in support of expanding civil rights, a stance they actually solidified in the 1964 platform that was not used for this analysis. In the 1970s, the two parties take opposite stands on busing. As time progresses, the Democrats expand the groups they believe should be afforded protection from discrimination. In 1996, they include the standard race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, age, and gender, but they would also protect against discrimination on the basis of disability and sexual orientation. In 1996, the Republican platform states, “. . . we oppose discrimination based on sex, race, age, creed, or national origin and will vigorously enforce anti-discrimination statutes.” They do not expand protection based on sexual orientation.¹⁵ In addition, the Democrats continue to support affirmative action. The 1996 platform states, “When it comes to affirmative action, we should mend it, not

¹⁵Although not included in this statement from the Republican platform, there is an earlier pledge that states “We believe in the equality of all people before the law and that individuals should be judged by their ability rather than their race, creed, or disability.”

end it.” The Republicans consider it a form of discrimination and pledge in 1996 to “end discrimination by the federal government.”

Greater differences exist in the area of civil liberties. In 1976 there is a change in the combativeness on civil liberties that grows over time. The Republicans’ abortion statement also debuts in 1976. “The Republican Party favors a continuance of the public dialog on abortion and supports the efforts of those who seek enactment of a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn children” (Congressional Quarterly 1977, 906). The Republicans, in later years, will strengthen this statement of opposition and it will appear in every platform. On abortion, the Democratic platform of 1976 states “We fully recognize the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion. We feel, however, that it is undesirable to attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to overturn the Supreme Court decision in this area” (860). The Democrats will also strengthen their support for a woman’s right to choose in later platforms.

By 1984, the separation of church and state issue has entered the platforms. The Democrats include a strong statement of support for this principle. “The Democratic Platform affirms its support of the principles of religious liberty, religious tolerance and church/state separation and of the Supreme Court decisions forbidding violation of those principles” (Congressional Quarterly 1985, 92-B). The Republican statement of that year supports the right of students to “practice . . . [freedom of speech and religion], including the right to engage in voluntary prayer in schools.” In 1996, the Republicans call for a constitutional amendment for flag protection. “[The flag’s] deliberate desecration is not

‘free speech,’ but an assault against our history and our hopes. We support a constitutional amendment that will restore to the people, through their elected representatives, their right to safeguard Old Glory.”

Judicial reform is also strongly advocated in the 1996 Republican platform. This is partially due to the fact the battle over civil rights and civil liberties is most often played out in the courts. The Republicans begin their section on the courts by stating, “The American people have lost faith in their courts, and for good reason. Some members of the federal judiciary threaten the safety, the values, and the freedom of law-abiding citizens.” The mention of values is instructive in this statement as it indicates the extent to which the Republican platform stresses the courts as being out of the mainstream of American life.

Just as the 1992 Democratic platform was very different from their previous platforms, 1992 also marks a change in the Republican platform.¹⁶ As mentioned previously, the 1992 platform is overtly religious and the 1996 platform is covertly religious. The appeal the Republican platforms hold for religious conservatives is apparent. Both parties in the 1990s increasingly use the term “values” in their platforms as detailed above. The Republican platform in 1992 is focused around the theme of family values and makes many references to religion. In 1996, the Republican platform is not so blatantly religious but still contains appeals to religious conservatives. The 1996

¹⁶Pomper argues that “There is a manifest continuity in each party from one election to the next. Changes of emphasis and of specificity . . . are evident, but there is no important change in direction” (1968, 155). Pomper’s analysis ended with the 1964 platform. This analysis suggests that 1992 is an exception to this rule.

Democratic platform makes appeals to “values” even more than the Republican platform. Even though they co-opt the language of the 1992 Republican platform, the 1996 Democratic platform is not appealing to traditionalists because of the stances taken in the area of civil rights and liberties. It does not include policy positions that warm the hearts of religious conservatives. In addition, the use of language, specifically appeals to values, in the 1996 Democratic platform could have turned many voters from its traditional base off.

Conclusions

The analysis of party platforms has turned up some very interesting findings. Platforms have indeed changed over time both in terms of issues addressed and the positions taken. Party platforms were analyzed to see if there were any linkages to cleavage behavior in the 1990s hidden in the text. A plausible link to cleavage disintegration has been found.

In the decades prior to the 1990s, the two parties offered distinct choices on both political issues (the economy, social welfare policy, and government administration) and social or cultural issues (civil rights and liberties). 1984 was the last platform analyzed where polarization on both political and social issues was present. Beginning in 1976, it is evident from the analysis that there are partisan differences on cultural or social issues between the two platforms and these differences grow over time as the Republican platforms become more and more strident. 1992 marks the beginning of significant changes in both parties’ platforms and the 1990s is when cleavage behavior undergoes a change; many groups’ partisan distinctiveness begins to collapse while some groups

maintain or strengthen their degree of partisanship. In key policy areas such as federalism, social welfare, and bureaucracy the two parties are no longer polarized. The choice for voters to whom these policy areas are primary is smaller. This could account for the disaffection of some voters as the parties do not offer the choice they once did. Some voters could feel they are being offered an echo, not a choice. The parties' stances are not identical in these areas but they are no longer polarized as in previous decades. In civil rights and liberties, however, there are very large choices given by the parties in the 1990s.

CHAPTER 5

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE FOR REALIGNMENT THEORY

Ronald Inglehart (1997) has long postulated that a value change is taking place in society that is profoundly affecting postindustrial politics. Inglehart believes one of the consequences of this value change is the declining partisanship of cleavages in society. His theory, like critical realignment theory, is built upon the behavior of cleavages. Accordingly, this study began with an examination of cleavage voting behavior. Inglehart posits that traditional cleavages in society are becoming less and less important because of a changing value structure that is itself forming the basis for a new cleavage. Individual voting behavior in his view will increasingly be based on value orientation which has fluid partisan attachments, rather than other characteristics that have traditionally been important determinants of one's partisan vote, such as social class and religion. Inglehart believes this new value cleavage crosscuts the old cleavages, rendering them less relevant to partisan vote choice. These two theories were examined in conjunction with one another because of the link they have in their expectations of partisan cleavage behavior.

Upon examination, the partisanship of many groups in society was found to have decreased over time as Inglehart predicted, rendering the likelihood of a critical realignment remote in the present electorate. However, certain aspects of cleavage

behavior did not correspond to Inglehart's expectations. First, the partisan disaffection on the part of certain groups did not culminate in the 1970s as Inglehart postulated it would, but in the 1990s. In addition, while many cleavages dissipated, other cleavages endured. Religion, a cleavage Inglehart believes is fading in importance in postindustrial society, remained an important indicator of partisan vote choice and an enduring cleavage. Similarly, ideology was found to be a cleavage of growing importance to partisanship. This is also contrary to Inglehart's expectations. Two cleavages that he believed would endure because of their link to postmaterialist values, age and education, also did not perform as he theorized.

Because of the inconsistencies in the performance of Inglehart's indicators, a test of his theoretical assumptions was conducted. A lack of congruence between Inglehart's measure of values and his theoretical assumptions was indicated. Accordingly, another indicator of change, party platforms, was utilized. Chapter Four analyzed these documents to determine if the behavior of the parties as manifested in their platforms was in some way connected to the partisan disaffection of certain groups and the enduring nature of the partisan attachments of other groups that was evident in the 1990s. The findings indicate a definite change in both parties' platforms beginning in 1992, the very time period when substantial changes were observed in cleavage behavior. It is now time to draw some conclusions from these findings.

The previous chapter found that, beginning in 1992, the two parties no longer polarized on important *political* issues, such as social welfare policy and governmental affairs. They did, however, continue to polarize on *cultural* issues, specifically civil

rights and civil liberties. Thus, the choice for voters to whom traditional political issues are of primary importance has become limited due to the fact the parties no longer polarize on these issues. Voters may increasingly cast ballots for candidates from either party because of similar stances on these issues. Or, they may choose to abstain from voting. For voters to whom cultural issues are primary, there is significant polarization between the parties. The divide on cultural issues actually became significant in the 1976 platforms. It was not until 1992, however, that polarization on many political issues ceased, leaving the parties polarized not on both political and cultural issues as in the past, but primarily on cultural issues.

Cultural issues hold more appeal for certain segments of society, especially racial minorities, the ideological, and the religious. These are the very cleavages that the previous analysis showed were exceptions to the trend toward apartisanship that many other cleavages exhibited. When given real choices on issues that are conceivably of primary importance to them, these particular cleavages do partisanly divide and remain distinct. Therefore, it is plausible that the other dissolving cleavages of the 1990s may be reacting to the smaller range of choice that the parties offer on political issues. Since they are offered an echo, not a choice, they might respond by echoing back partisan ambivalence.

Party Platforms and Social Change

While a previous chapter cast doubt on Inglehart's version of value change, the further analysis afforded by party platforms indicates that there is a social change occurring that does comport to the very broad outlines of Inglehart's conception of

postmaterialist values. What he identifies as postmaterialist issues - issues of equality, quality of life, and self expression - *are* coming to the fore. These are the issues on which the two parties polarize today. However, Inglehart's theory does not allow for the different ways that one might express postmaterial concerns. He does not allow for supporters of the two sides of the debate over issues such as abortion, affirmative action, or the environment both to be classified as postmaterialists. Rather, the supporters of the ideologically liberal side of the debate are termed postmaterial, but the supporters of the ideologically conservative side are deemed to be holding onto materialist values.¹ This is likely one of the reasons why Inglehart's survey instrument fails to capture his conception of values and actually captures liberal ideology. Regardless of the ideological side chosen in these cultural debates, these are certainly postmaterial issues, something that Inglehart does not accept. In addition, Inglehart fails to consider the unique role that religion plays in American society. This role has not faded as he predicted, but may in fact be strengthening. Because of these deficiencies in Inglehart's theory, there may be other, better-suited explanations of social change in the United States. Inglehart's insights may be useful, but the theory must be refined before being applied to the case of the U.S.

Others have remarked about the increasing bifurcation of and attention to cultural values in the United States (Hunter 1991, 1994; Green, et al., 1996). And, given the faults with Inglehart's theory and the refinement needed in it, it may be fruitful to look to these conceptualizations for a better-tailored theory of social change. Hunter's proposition of a culture war (1991, 1994) would seem to describe the state of

¹See Inglehart 1997, Chapter 9, and Appendix 3.

contemporary American society more adequately than does Inglehart's conception of value change.

The battle lines in Hunter's culture wars are drawn between two groups. One group he terms "orthodox" and is made up of religious conservatives. The other group, made up of those who are religious liberals and the secular, is termed "progressive." It would appear from the findings in Chapter Four that the culture war has manifested itself in the parties' platforms.

This new cultural division identified by Hunter is based upon religious outlook but does not follow religious denominational lines.² Since this potentially new cleavage (orthodox versus progressive) cuts across religious denominations, identifying it is difficult. Frequency of attendance at religious services, rather than denomination, has been used as a means of getting at this variable (Layman 1999).

Layman's study of both parties' national convention delegates from 1972-1992 found that the culture wars were having an impact on the two parties (1999). Using survey data and relying on attendance at religious services, he found that delegates to the Republican national convention were increasingly made up of the religiously committed (as determined by frequent attendance) and Democratic delegates were increasingly made up of the secular and those who infrequently attend religious services. Since convention delegates have a hand in platform construction, it makes sense that if the culture war is bifurcating delegates to the conventions, it will also bifurcate the platforms of the two

²This is another reason why Inglehart's theory is a poor fit with the case of the United States because he believes religion is becoming less important in post-industrial society.

parties. Hunter also observed that the culture war was being played out at the elite rather than mass level (1991, 1994). Platforms are constructed by party elites. From the platform analysis conducted here, it would appear that there is a culture war going on between the two parties' platforms. Others have argued, however, that a minority of voters is concerned with the cultural issues around which the cultural wars are fought (Dionne 1991, Layman 1999). If only a minority is concerned with cultural issues, then the culture war is being fought by generals who have few foot soldiers to whom they can appeal.

The Culture War as a Limited War

It is possible to test the proposition that a minority of voters is primarily concerned with the issues over which the culture wars are being fought. One can look at the NES question that asks "What do you think are the most important problems facing this country?"³ For the years 1992 and 1996, the most important problem is seen as being in the area of social welfare policy that encompasses population, child care, aid to education, the elderly, health care, housing, poverty, unemployment, 'welfare,' etc. In 1992, 37.2% of the sample said this area encompassed the most important problem; in 1996, 39.3% said this area contained the most important problem. The NES category of "public order" encompasses most of the areas that fall under cultural issues. The public order category includes crime, drugs, civil liberties and non-racial civil rights, women's rights, abortion rights, gun control, family/social/religious/moral 'decay,' and church and state, etc. Only 11.9% said issues within public order were the most important problems

³Sapiro, et al., 1998, v875.

in 1992; by 1996, this had risen to 27.8% but was still surpassed by those believing that social welfare issues were more important. A plurality of the public felt the most important problem in the 1990s was in the area of social welfare issues, one of the areas where the two parties offered more similar positions in the 1990s than ever before.

Therefore, the two parties presented the mass electorate in the 1990s with a culture war in which a substantial number of them were not involved. From these findings and the previous platform analysis it can be surmised that voters were presented with:

1. Less choice on issues of primary importance to most voters; and,
2. More choice on issues of primary importance to select voters

The culture war is a war in which the mass electorate is not yet much engaged. The parties, however, are fully embroiled in the conflict by 1976 and by 1992 cultural issues are those on which the parties exhibit the most differences. Just the polarizing rhetoric on these cultural issues may be sufficient to turn off a portion of the electorate so that they remove themselves from the electoral fray. Add to this, however, the fact that on traditional government issues, the parties are not polarized in the 1990s; these are the issues that matter to a plurality of voters. When not given a choice, many voters may stay home and those choosing to vote may increasingly split their ticket because of the lack of difference they see between the parties on the issues that matter most to them.

What does this mean for realignment theory? If there are fewer partisan cleavages, as was found in Chapter Three, there can be no critical realignment because cleavages make realignment meaningful. The electorate has changed. Many cleavages

have begun to exhibit a partisan ambivalence in terms of their voting behavior. There would seem to be a connection between the dissipation of many cleavages, the endurance of other cleavages, and the way parties addressed issues in the 1990s. It is, however, impossible to establish causation with this analysis. One cannot say, based on the evidence presented here, that the political party platforms caused the peculiar cleavage behavior evident in the 1990s. Nor can we say that the electorate's behavior caused the political parties to alter the way they addressed certain issues. Likely, the effects run both ways. What can be said is that critical realignments will not occur in an electorate that has insufficient enduring cleavages and where political parties do not polarize on many issues that substantial portions of the electorate feel are of primary importance.

It is up to future research to further illuminate the social changes that affect the American electorate and go beyond critical realignment theory. Especially important would be to incorporate the insights of Hunter's culture wars more fully with the broad outlines of Inglehart's theory. There is a connection between the two theories that should be further explored; the broad outlines of Inglehart's theory seems to contain a kernel of truth. Cultural issues do seem to be taking precedence over economic ones, at least to some. However, there are significant refinements that need to be made to Inglehart's theory. The theoretical framework of Maslow (1954) on which Inglehart initially relies but then abandons should be re-established. Part of the failure of Inglehart's religious expectations might be alleviated by returning to Maslow. Inglehart fails to recognize that spiritual well-being is definitely a higher level need that those who have satisfied lower order needs will often pursue. For many, religion *is* a quality of life issue. In addition,

the role of elites needs to be explored further. It could be that instead of postmaterial values manifesting themselves in broad society, the elites (who will be the most likely to have satisfied lower level needs) will lead the way in formulating them and the masses may (or may not) follow.

In addition it would be instructive to combine Putnam's documentation of increasing social and political disconnectedness and investigate its affects on partisanship (2000). The increasing apartisanship of the electorate may be the result of declining social capital. People have become unmoored from traditional forms of participation that may have reinforced certain partisan allegiances. Atrophied social networks and the partisan reinforcements they may have provided could be a reason why partisanship has become increasingly unstable and fluid. In addition, it could be especially profitable to explore the effect declining social capital has had on the status of critical realignment theory because one element of the theory, not explored here, is the criterion that a critical election will spark increased political participation.

Implications of the Absence of Critical Realignments

So why should we care that critical elections and the realignments that cause them seem to have gone by the wayside, at least for the immediate future? Burnham believes that critical realignments are (or at least were) "the chief tension-management device available to [our] peculiar political system" (1970, 181). The years preceding critical elections become increasingly unstable but critical realignments provided a means of dealing with the shocks and once again stabilizing the system. However, given the broad agreement today that the government should at least minimally be involved in the

economy and prevent the large economic swings of previous eras, and given the fact that all previous critical realignments have had an economic element, critical realignments may not need to perform the stabilizing function they once did. It is probably more important that we should mourn the passing of critical elections because they necessarily involved the deep, intense, and high participation of the electorate (Key 1955) actively engaged in the debate over a critical issue (Sundquist 1983). As many have documented, this is not a characteristic of today's electorate, and democracy suffers when the electorate is disengaged.

For political scientists in particular, the passing of the critical realignment framework may especially be missed because it has not only provided the paradigm for explaining electoral behavior and party systems, but it has provided extensive fodder for political scientists' debates. Perhaps now more attention can be devoted to developing another organizing framework that fits the changes in the contemporary electorate. Critical realignment theory can be placed upon a shelf, not to be taken down again until electoral conditions favor it.

If critical realignment theory is again to become relevant in American politics, the parties must be able to capture enough cohesive voting blocks to win an election overwhelmingly - and then be able to sustain their appeal. Currently within the American electorate there are not enough of these groups on which a realignment could be based. There also does not seem to be an issue on which sufficient numbers care about and polarize. The culture wars may yet provide the issues around which politics will one day revolve, but the mass electorate is not yet fully engaged in this war.

Bibliography

- Abramson, Paul R. and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. *Value change and global perspective*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Aldrich, John H. 1999. Political parties in a critical era. *American Politics Quarterly* 27: 9-19.
- Aldrich, John H. and Richard G Niemi. 1996. The sixth American party system: Electoral change, 1952-1992. In *Broken contract: Changing relationships between Americans and their government*, ed S. C. Craig, 87-109. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, Kristi. 1979. *Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Argersinger, Peter H. and John W. Jeffries. 1986. American electoral history: Party systems and voting behavior. In *Research in micropolitics: Voting behavior*, ed. Samuel Long, 1-33. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1972. Where the votes come from: an analysis of electoral coalitions, 1952-1968. *American Political Science Review* 66: 11-20.
- _____. 1986. Presidential election coalitions in 1984. *American Political Science Review* 80: 281-4.
- Beck, Paul Allen. 1974. A socialization theory of partisan realignment. In *the Politics of Future Citizens: New Dimensions in the Political Socialization of Children*, editor Richard G. Niemi, 199-219. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- _____. 1977. Partisan dealignment in the postwar South. *American Political Science Review* 71: 477-96.
- _____. 1988. Incomplete realignment: The Reagan legacy for parties and elections. In *the Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance*, editor Charles O. Jones, 145-71. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Beck, Paul Allen, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen, and Charles E. Smith. 1992. Patterns and sources of ticket splitting in subpresidential voting. *American Political Science Review* 86: 916-28.

- Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The coming of post-industrial society: A venture in social forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brady, David W. 1985. A reevaluation of realignments in American Politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review* 79: 28-49.
- Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza. 1997. Social cleavages and political alignments: U.S. Presidential elections, 1960 to 1992. *American Sociological Review* 62: 937-46.
- Brown, Robert D. 1995. Party Cleavages and Welfare Effort in the American States. *American Political Science Review* 89: 23-33.
- Brown, Robert D. and Edward G. Carmines. 1995. Materialists, Postmaterialists, and the Criteria for Political Choice in U.S. Presidential Elections. *Journal of Politics* 57: 483-94.
- Brunell, Thomas L. and Bernard Grofman. 1998. Explaining Divided U.S. Senate Delegations, 1788-1996: A realignment approach. *American Political Science Review* 92: 391-9.
- Bullock, Charles S. III. 1988. Regional realignment from an office holding perspective. *Journal of Politics* 50: 553-74.
- Burnham, Walter Dean. 1965. The changing shape of the American Political Universe. *American Political Science Review* 59: 7-28.
- _____. 1968. American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election. *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 12: 1-40.
- _____. 1970. *Critical elections and the mainsprings of American politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- _____. 1991. Critical Realignment: Dead or Alive? In *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*, editor Byron E. Shafer, 101-39. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- _____. 1996. Realignment Lives: The 1994 earthquake and its implications. In *The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals*, editors Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, 363-95. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Campbell, James E., Mary Munroe, John R. Alford, and Bruce A. Campbell. 1986. Partisanship and Voting. In *Research in Micropolitics: Voting behavior*, editor Samuel Long, 99-126. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press.
- Campbell, James E. 1993. The presidential pulse of congressional elections. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Carmines, Edward G., John P. McIver, and James A. Stimson. 1987. Unrealized partisanship: A theory of dealignment. *Journal of Politics* 49: 376-400.
- Carmines, Edward G. and Harold W. Stanley. 1992. The transformation of the New Deal party system: social groups, political ideology, and changing partisanship among Northern whites, 1972-1988. *Political Behavior* 14, no. 3: 213-37.
- Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chester, Edward W. 1977. *A Guide to Political Platforms*. Hamden, CT: Archon.
- Chubb, John E. 1978. Systems analysis and partisan realignment. *Social Science History* 2: 144-69.
- Clubb, Jerome M., William H. Flanagan, and Nancy H. Zingale. 1981. *Analyzing Electoral History: A Guide to the Study of American Voter Behavior*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- _____. 1986. Realignment and political generations. In *Research in Micropolitics: Voting Behavior*, editor Samuel Long, 35-63. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press.
- _____. 1990. *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Congressional Quarterly. 1977. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1976*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
- _____. 1985. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1984*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
- _____. 1995. *National Party Conventions, 1831-1992*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.

- Constantini, Edmond and Charles Dannehl. 1993. Party registration and party vote: Democratic fall-off in legislative elections. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 18: 29-50.
- Crepaz, Markus M. L. 1990. The impact of party polarization and postmaterialism on voter turnout: A comparative study of 16 industrial democracies. *European Journal of Political Research* 18: 183-205.
- Dalton, Russell J., and Martin P. Wattenberg. 1993. The new look in public opinion research. In *Political science: The state of the discipline II*, ed. Ada W. Finifter. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
- Davis, Darren W., and Christian Davenport. 1999. Assessing the validity of the Postmaterialism Index. *American Political Science Review* 93: 649-64.
- Davis, Darren W., Kathleen M. Dowley, and Brian D. Silver. 1999. Postmaterialism in World Societies: Is It Really a Value Dimension? *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 935-62.
- Dionne, E. J., Jr. 1991. *Why Americans Hate Politics*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Duch, Raymond M., and Michael A. Taylor. 1993. Postmaterialism and economic conditions. *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 747-79.
- Elazar, Daniel J. 1984. *American federalism: A view from the states*. 3rd ed. New York: Harper & Row.
- Epstein, Leon. 1986. *Political Parties in the American mold*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Erikson, Robert S., Thomas D. Lancaster, and David W. Romero. 1989. Group Components of the Presidential vote, 1952-1984. *Journal of Politics* 51: 337-46.
- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, and James Stimson. 1998. What moves macropartisanship? A response to Green, Palmquist and Schickler. *American Political Science Review* 92: 901-913.
- Erikson, Robert S. and Kent L. Tedin. 1981. The 1928-1936 partisan realignment: The case for the conversion hypothesis. *American Political Science Review* 75: 951-62.

- Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Flanagan, Scott. 1987. Changing values in advanced industrial society revisited: Towards a resolution of the values debate. *American Political Science Review* 81:1303-19.
- Flanigan, William H. and Nancy H. Zingale. 1974. The measurement of electoral change. *Political Methodology* 1: 49-82.
- _____. 1998. *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*. Washington, D.C: CQ Press.
- Fowler, Robert Booth, and Allen D. Hertzke. 1995. *Religion and politics in America*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Gaddie, Ronald Keith and Donna R. Hoffman. 2001. Critical Events in Contemporary Southern Politics: Dynamic Growth and Partisan Percolations. In *Eye of the Storm: The South and Congress in an Era of Change*, Eds. John C. Kuzenski, Lawrence W. Mooreland, and Robert P. Steed, 17-37. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Geer, John G. 1991. Critical realignments and the public opinion poll. *Journal of Politics* 53: 434-53.
- _____. 1998. A call for new perspectives. In *Politicians and Party Politics*, editor John G. Geer. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Glaser, James E. 1996. *Race, campaign politics, & the realignment in the South*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Schickler. 1998. Macropartisanship: A replication and critique. *American Political Science Review* 92: 883-899.
- Green, John C. 1999. Whither the Parties? The Volatile Nineties and the Future of the Party System. *American Politics Quarterly* 27, no. 1: 4-8.
- Green, John C., James L. Guth, Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt. 1996. *Religion and the Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Hunter, James D. 1991. *Culture wars: The struggle to define America*. New York: Basic Books.

- Hunter, James D. 1994. *Before the shooting begins: Searching for democracy in America's culture war*. New York: Free Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1971. The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial societies. *American Political Science Review* 65: 991-1017.
- _____. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1981. Post-Materialism in an environment of insecurity. *American Political Science Review* 75: 880-900.
- _____. 1985. Aggregate stability and individual-level flux in mass belief systems: The level of analysis paradox. *American Political Science Review* 79: 97-116.
- _____. 1990. Values, ideology and cognitive mobilization in new social movements. In *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*, editors Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, 43-66. New York: Oxford University Press.
- _____. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Paul R. Abramson. 1994. Economic security and value change. *American Political Science Review* 88: 336-54.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Avram Hochstein. 1972. Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States. *Comparative Political Studies* 5: 343-72.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1997. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. 4th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Johnson, Donald Bruce and Kirk H. Porter. 1973. *National Party Platforms, 1840-1972*. 5th ed. Urbana, Il: University of Illinois Press.
- Jones, Charles O. 1994. *The presidency in a separated system*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
- Kawato, Sadafumi. 1987. Nationalization and partisan realignment in Congressional elections. *American Political Science Review* 81: 1235-50.

- Kellstedt, Lyman A., John C. Green, James L. Guth, and Corwin E. Smidt. 1996a. Grasping the essentials: The social embodiment of religion and political behavior. In *Religion and the culture wars: Dispatches from the Front*, eds. John C. Green, James L. Guth, Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, 174-192. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- _____. 1996b. Has Godot finally arrived? Religion and Realignment. In *Religion and the culture wars: Dispatches from the Front*, eds. John C. Green, James L. Guth, Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, 174-192. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Key, V. O., Jr. 1955. A theory of critical elections. *Journal of Politics* 17: 3-18.
- _____. 1959. Secular Realignment and the party system. *Journal of Politics* 21: 198-210.
- Key, V. O., Jr., with the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, Jr. 1966. *The responsible electorate: rationality and presidential voting, 1936-1960*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. Short-Term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896-1964. *American Political Science Review* 65: 131-43.
- Ladd, Everett Carll. 1981. The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election. *Political Science Quarterly* 96: 1-25.
- _____. 1991. Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of "Realignment" for Understanding change in contemporary American Politics. In *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*, editor Byron E. Shafer, 24-36. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- _____. 1995. The 1994 congressional elections: The postindustrial realignment continues. *Political Science Quarterly* 110: 1-23.
- _____. 1997. The 1996 vote: The 'no majority' realignment continues. *Political Science Quarterly* 112: 1-28.
- Laitin, David. 1995. The civic culture at 30. *American Political Science Review* 89:168-173.

- Lawrence, David G. and Richard Fleisher. 1987. Puzzles and confusions: Political realignment in the 1980s. *Political Science Quarterly* 102: 79-92.
- Layman, Geoffrey C. 1999. 'Culture Wars' in the American Party System: Religious and Cultural Change Among Partisan Activists Since 1972. *American Politics Quarterly* 27: 89-121.
- Layman, Geoffrey C. and Edward G. Carmines. 1997. Cultural Conflict in American Politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior. *Journal of Politics* 59: 751-77.
- Levine, Jeffrey, Edward G. Carmines, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1997. The rise of ideology in the post-New Deal party system. *American Politics Quarterly* 25: 19-34.
- Lichtman, Allan J. 1982. The end of realignment theory? Toward a new research program for American political history. *Historical Methods* 15: 170-88.
- Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1995. Malaise and resiliency in America. *Journal of Democracy* 6: 4-18.
- _____. 2000. Still the Exceptional Nation? *Wilson Quarterly* 24: 31-45.
- Macdonald, Stuart Elaine and George Rabinowitz. 1987. The dynamics of structural realignment. *American Political Science Review* 81: 775-96.
- MacRae, Duncan, Jr and James A. Meldrum. 1960. Critical Elections in Illinois: 1888-1958. *American Political Science Review* 54: 669-83.
- Mann, Thomas and Raymond Wolfinger. 1980. Candidates and parties in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review* 74: 617-32.
- Markus, Gregory B. 1983. Dynamic modeling of cohort change: The case of political partisanship. *American Journal of Political Science* 27: 717-39.
- Maslow, Abraham H. 1954. *Motivation and personality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Mayer, William G. 1998. Mass Partisanship, 1946-1996. In *Partisan Approaches to Postwar American Politics*, editor Byron E. Shafer, 186-219. New York: Chatham House.

- Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congressional elections: The case of the vanishing marginals. *Polity* 6: 295-317.
- _____. 1991. *Divided we govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946-1990*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- McClosky, Herbert, and John Zaller. 1984. *The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism and democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- McSeveney, Samuel T. 1991. No More 'Waiting for Godot': comments on the putative 'end of realignment'. In *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*, editor Byron E. Shafer, 85-100. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Miller, Arthur and Brad Lockerbie. 1992. The United States of America. In *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*, editors Mark N. Franklin, Thomas T. Mackie, and Henry Valen, 362-80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, Warren E. 1991. Party Identification, Realignment, and party voting: back to the basics. *American Political Science Review* 85: 557-68.
- Miller, Warren E. and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. *The New American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Namenwirth, J. Zvi, and Harold D. Lasswell. 1970. *The changing language of American values*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Namenwirth, J. Zvi and Robert Philip Weber. 1987. *The Dynamics of Culture*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Nardulli, Peter. 1995. The concept of a critical realignment, electoral behavior, and political change. *American Political Science Review* 89: 10-22.
- Nardulli, Peter, Jon K. Dalager, and Donald E. Greco. 1996. Voter turnout in the U.S. presidential elections: an historical view and some speculation. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 29: 480-90.
- Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1993. *Controversies in Voting Behavior*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Norpoth, Helmut. 1987. Under way and here to stay: Party realignment in the 1980s? *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51: 376-91.

- Norpoth, Helmut and Jerrold G. Rusk. 1982. Partisan dealignment in the American electorate: Itemizing the deductions since 1964. *American Political Science Review* 76: 522-37.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1990. Postmaterialism, Collective Action, and Political Protest. *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 212-35.
- Petrocik, John R. 1987. Realignment: New party coalitions and the nationalization of the South. *Journal of Politics* 49: 347-75.
- Pomper, Gerald M. 1968. *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.
- _____. 1998. The alleged decline of American parties. In *Politicians and Party Politics*, editor John G. Geer, 14-39. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993a. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____. Spring 1993b. The Prosperous Community: Social capital and public life. *The American Prospect* 13: 35-42.
- _____. 1995a. Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy* 6: 64-78.
- _____. 1995b. Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in America. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28: 664-83.
- _____. 2000. *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rabinowitz, George, Paul-Henri Gurian, and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. 1984. The structure of presidential elections and the process of realignment, 1944 to 1980. *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 611-35.
- Rohrschneider, Robert. 1990. The roots of public opinion toward new social movements: An empirical test of competing explanations. *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 1-30.
- _____. 1993. Environmental belief systems in Western Europe: A hierarchical model of constraint. *Comparative Political Studies* 26: 3-29.

- Sapiro, Virginia, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies. 1999. National election studies, 1998: post-election study [dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor].
- Sapiro, Virginia, Steven J. Rosenstone, Warren E. Miller, and the National Election Studies. 1998. American national election studies, 1948-1997 [CD-ROM]. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor].
- Schier, Steven E. 2000. *By Invitation Only: The rise of exclusive politics in the United States*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Shafer, Byron E. 1988. *Bifurcated Politics: Evolution and Reform in the National Party Convention*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- _____. 1991. The notion of an electoral order: the structure of electoral politics at the accession of George Bush. In *The End or Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*, editor Byron E. Shafer, 37-84. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- _____. 1998. Partisan elites. In *Partisan approaches to postwar American politics*, editor Byron E. Shafer, 75-141. New York: Chatham House.
- Shea, Daniel M. 1999. The passing of realignment and the advent of the "base-less" party system. *American Politics Quarterly* 27: 33-57.
- Silbey, Joel H. 1991. Beyond realignment and realignment theory: American political eras, 1798-1989. In *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras*, editor Byron E. Shafer, 3-23. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1999. Advocates without members: The recent transformation of American civic life. In *Civic Engagement in American Democracy*, eds. Theda Skocpol and Morris Fiorina. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
- Sprague, John. 1981. One-Party Dominance in Legislatures. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 6: 259-85.
- Stanley, Harold W., William T. Bianco, and Richard G. Niemi. 1986. Partisanship and Group Support Over Time: A Multivariate Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 80: 969-76.
- Stimson, James, Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. Dynamic representation. *American Political Science Review* 89.

- Sullivan, John L., James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1978. Ideological constraint in the mass public: a methodological critique and some new findings. *American Journal of Political Science* 22: 233-49.
- Sundquist, James L. 1983. *Dynamics of the party system: alignment and realignment of political parties in the United States*. revised ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Trump, Thomas M. 1991. Value formation and postmaterialism: Inglehart's theory of value change reconsidered. *Comparative Political Studies* 24:365-90.
- U.S. Census Bureau. 1998. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Van Deth, Jan W. 1983. The persistence of materialist and post-materialist value orientations. *European Journal of Political Research* 11:63-79.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Warwick, Paul V. 1998. Disputed causes, disputed effect: the postmaterialist thesis re-examined. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 62: 538-.
- Wattenberg, Martin P. 1987. The hollow realignment: Partisan change in a candidate-centered era. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 51: 58-74.
- _____. 1996. *The Decline of American Political Parties*. Enlarged ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

APPENDIX 1
BREAKDOWN OF CATEGORIES UTILIZED FOR CLEAVAGE ANALYSIS

Race/Ethnicity (1952-96 v. 106 and 108; 1998 v. 673 and 659)

Education (1952-96 v. 140; 1998 v. 577)

Grade school or less	8 grades or less
HS, no diploma	9-12 grades, no diploma/equivalency
HS graduate	12 grades, diploma/equivalency
some post HS ed	HS diploma plus non-academic training and/or some college, no degree
college degree or +	BA level degrees and advanced degrees

Place of Residency (1952-96 v. 111; 1998 v. 99)

Rural	rural, small towns, outlying and adjacent areas
Central city	central city
Suburban	Suburban

Income (1952-96 v. 114; 1998 v. 652)

Low	0-33 percentile
Middle	34-67 percentile
High	68-100 percentile

Union household (1952-96 v. 127; 1998 v. 649)

Ideology (1952-96 v. 804; 1998 v. 399)

Liberal	extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal
Moderate	moderate
Conservative	extremely conservative, conservative, slightly conservative
Don't know	don't know, haven't thought much about it

Religion

Four category question (1952-96 v. 128; 1998 v. 546)

Multiple denominational distinctions (1960-88 v. 129; 1990-96 v. 152; 1998 v. 569)

Value orientation (1952-96 v. 9019 and v. 9020)

Gender (1952-96 v. 104; 1998 v. 672)

Age Cohorts (1952-96 v. 103; 1998 v. 571)

Cohort 1	born 1959-80
Cohort 2	born 1943-58
Cohort 3	born 1927-1942
Cohort 4	born 1911-26
Cohort 5	born 1895-1910
Cohort 6	born before 1895

Region of Residence (1952-96 v. 901; 1998 v. 86)

Border	DE, KY, MD, OK, WV
South	AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA
North central	IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI
Northeast	CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT
Mountain West	AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, UT, WY
Pacific West	AK, CA, HI, OR, WA

APPENDIX 2 RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONAL CODING

1960-1988

1. Secular

- 100 Protestant, no denomination given
- 800 Agnostic, atheists
- 996 Refused
- 998 no preference

2. Evangelical Protestant

- 101 Non-denominational Protestant church
- 123 Baptist
- 126 Mennonite; Amish
- 127 Church of the Brethren
- 131 Church of God; Holiness
- 132 Nazarene; Free Methodist
- 133 Church of God in Christ
- 134 Plymouth Brethren
- 135 Pentecostal; Assembly of God
- 136 Church of Christ
- 137 Salvation Army
- 138 Primitive, Free Will, Missionary Fundamentalist, and Gospel Baptist
- 139 Seventh Day Adventist
- 140 Southern Baptist
- 141 Missouri Synod Lutheran
- 149 Other fundamentalists

3. Mainline Protestant 102, 110-16, 120, 122, 124, 125, 155

- 102 Community church (no denomination basis)
- 110 Presbyterian
- 111 Lutheran (exc. Missouri Synod or AME)
- 112 Congregational
- 113 Evangelical and Reformed
- 114 Reformed, Dutch Reformed or Christian Reformed
- 115 United Church of Christ (not Church of Christ)
- 116 Episcopalian, Anglican, Church of England
- 120 Methodist
- 122 United Brethren
- 124 Disciples of Christ
- 125 'Christian'
- 155 Quaker

4. Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 200, 710-719

- 200 Roman Catholic
- 710 Greek Orthodox
- 711 Russian Orthodox
- 712 Rumanian Orthodox
- 713 Serbian Orthodox
- 719 Other Eastern Orthodox

5. Jewish

- 300 Jewish

1990-1998

1. Secular

- 010 Protestant, no denomination given
- 800 Agnostics
- 801 Atheists
- 995 none, no preference
- 997 other

2. Evangelical Protestant

- 020. Non-denominational Protestant
- 100. 7th Day Adventist
- 102. Fundamentalist Adventists (Worldwide Church of God) [1990 only]
- 109. Adventist (NFS)
- 120. American Baptist Association
- 121. American Baptist Churches U.S.A. (inaccurately known as "Northern Baptist")
- 122. Baptist Bible Fellowship
- 123. Baptist General Conference
- 124. Baptist Missionary Association of America
- 125. Conservative Baptist Association of America
- 126. General Association of Regular Baptist Churches (G.A.R.B.)
- 127. National Association of Free Will Baptists (United Free Will Baptist Church)
- 128. Primitive Baptists
- 133. United Free-Will Baptist Church [1990 only]
- 134. Reformed Baptist (Calvinist)
- 135. Southern Baptist Convention
- 147. Fundamental Baptist (no denom. ties)

148. Local (independent) Baptist churches with no denominational ties or links to a national fellowship
149. Baptist (NFS)
160. Church of the Brethren
161. Brethren (NFS)
162. Mennonite Church
163. Moravian Church
164. Old Order Amish
166. Evangelical Covenant Church (not Anabaptist in tradition)
167. Evangelical Free Church (not Anabaptist in tradition)
168. Brethren in Christ
170. Mennonite Brethren
180. Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA)
181. Church of God (Anderson, IN)
182. Church of the Nazarene
183. Free Methodist Church
184. Salvation Army
185. Wesleyan Church
186. Church of God of Findlay, OH
199. Holiness (NFS); Church of God (NFS); R not or NA whether R Pentecostal or Charismatic
200. Plymouth Brethren
201. Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America
219. Independent-Fundamentalist (NFS)
221. Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod; LC-MS
222. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod; WELS
223. Other Conservative Lutheran
240. Congregational Methodist (Fundamentalist)
250. Assemblies of God
251. Church of God (Cleveland, TN)
252. Church of God (Huntsville, AL)
253. International Church of the Four Square Gospel
254. Pentecostal Church of God
255. Pentecostal Holiness Church
256. United Pentecostal Church International
260. Church of God of the Apostolic Faith
261. Church of God in Prophecy*
262. Vineyard Fellowship
267. Apostolic Pentecostal
268. Spanish Pentecostal
269. Pentecostal (NFS); Church of God (NFS); R not or NA whether R Pentecostal or Charismatic
271. Cumberland Presbyterian Church

- 272. Presbyterian Church in American (PCA)
- 275. Evangelical Presbyterian
- 276. Reformed Presbyterian (NFS)
- 291. Christian Churches and Churches of Christ
- 292. Churches of Christ; "Church of Christ" (NFS)

3. Mainline Protestant

- 030. Community church
- 040. Inter-denominational Protestant
- 110. Episcopalian; Anglican
- 111. Independent Anglican, Episcopalian
- 150. United Church of Christ (includes Congregational, Evangelical and Reformed)
- 151. Congregational Christian
- 165. Quakers (Friends)
- 220. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (formerly Lutheran Church in America and The American Lutheran Church); ELCA
- 229. Lutheran (NFS)
- 230. United Methodist Church; Evangelical United Brethren
- 234. Primitive Methodist
- 249. Methodist (NFS)
- 270. Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.
- 279. Presbyterian (NFS)
- 280. Christian Reformed Church (inaccurately known as "Dutch Reformed")
- 281. Reformed Church in America
- 282. Free Hungarian Reformed Church
- 289. Reformed (NFS)
- 290. Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)
- 293. Christian Congregation

4. Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 400, 700-08, 719

- 400. Roman Catholic
- 700. Greek Rite Catholic
- 701. Greek Orthodox
- 702. Russian Orthodox
- 703. Rumanian Orthodox
- 704. Serbian Orthodox
- 705. Syrian Orthodox
- 706. Armenian Orthodox
- 707. Georgian Orthodox
- 708. Ukranian Orthodox

719. Eastern Orthodox (NSF)

5. Jewish

500. Jewish, no preference

501. Orthodox

502. Conservative

503. Reformed

APPENDIX 3
CODING OF NES VARIABLES USED IN LOGIT ANALYSES

Dependent Variable

Postmaterialism (coded from v9019 & 9020)

- 1 - postmat
- 0 - other

Independent Variables

Age (recoded from v. 103)

- 1 those socialized after WWII (born 1943 ->
- 0 those socialized before WWII (born before 1943)

Education (recoded from v140)

- 1 no high school diploma or equivalency
- 2 high school graduates
- 3 some post high school training, some college
- 4 college degree and higher

Religious attendance (recoded from v130)

- 1 no religious preference, never, few times a year
- 0 once or twice a month, almost every week, every week

Ideology (recoded from v803)

- 1 conservative (extremely conservative, conservative, slightly conservative)
- 2 moderate, middle of the road
- 3 liberal (extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal)
- 4 don't know, haven't thought much about it

Partisanship (recoded from v. 305)

- 1 strong partisans
- 2 weak partisans
- 3 apolitical, independent, leaning independent

APPENDIX 4
CONTENT ANALYSIS FORM FOR PARTY PLATFORMS

Year _____

Party _____

Ticket _____

total number of paragraphs _____

Policy Areas¹

Foreign policy ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

diplomacy, United Nations, foreign aid, collective security agreements (unless exclusively military in nature), policy toward specific nations, trade

Defense ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

conduct of war and military strategy, draft, living conditions of military personnel, weapons systems, military research, civil defense, United Nations armed forces, disarmament, testing of nuclear weapons, intelligence, int'l terrorism

Economic policy ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

control of business cycles, federal fiscal policy and taxation, regulation of business, distribution of military procurement contracts, science and nonmilitary research, transportation (including mass transit and rivers and harbors), depressed areas, infrastructure, technology

Labor ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

Regulation of labor unions, employment conditions, minimum wage, retraining programs, employment services, farm workers, standards in govt contracts other than nondiscrimination

Agriculture ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

Farm commodity, storage, loan, and income policies, food reserves, foreign distribution of agricultural surpluses, agricultural research, production and marketing controls, rural electrification

Resources ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

policies relating to minerals, fuels, and other raw materials, depletion allowances, water, forest, and game policy, air and water pollution, conservation and recreation, atomic energy for domestic purposes, regional development, electrical and hydroelectric power policy (excluding rural electrification), fisheries

Social Welfare ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

all programs related to health, hospitals, education, and social welfare, social security, unemployment insurance, programs for the aged and handicapped, consumer protection, housing, urban planning and renewal (other than transportation), Dept of Urban affairs, veterans, rent control, food stamp programs, school lunches

Government ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

Administration, loyalty programs, management of the civil service, federalism (including programs of federal-state tax adjustment), federal budgeting and spending levels apart from particular programs, the national debt, statehood, govt of territories and DC, regulation of elections, legislative apportionment, congressional procedures (other than Senate cloture), crime (administration of justice)

Civil Rights/Civil lib ¶ devoted to _____ Placement in platform _____

all provisions related to discrimination against minorities (including segregation in the armed forces, schools, etc), social welfare programs specifically designed to deal with racial discrimination, Senate cloture, immigration policy, American Indians, discrimination against women, sexual minorities, disabled, civil liberties

¹The following modifications were made to Pomper's original categories.
(Pomper 1968, 277-279).

1. Trade included under foreign policy. It was not specifically listed in Pomper's categories
2. Fisheries was moved from Agriculture to Resources
3. Civil liberties - moved from government to civil rights/civil liberties
4. To the area of civil rights, discrimination against sexual minorities, and the disabled were added
5. Crime and the administration of justice was added to governmental affairs
6. Food stamps and school lunches was moved from agriculture to social welfare
7. Equal pay for women was moved from labor to civil rights/civil liberties.
8. Intelligence was added to defense