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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE STRUCTURING OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: NORM PATTERNS IN A STATE LEGISLATURE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

LELAN E. McLEMORE

Norman, Oklahoma

1973

THE STRUCTURING OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR:

NORM PATTERNS IN A STATE LEGISLATURE

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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CHAPTER I

THE STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE NORMS

> ...it would be a very naive sort of dogmatism to assume that there exists an absolute reality of things which is the same for all living beings. Reality is not a unique and homogeneous thing; it is immensely diversified, having as many different schemes and patterns as there are different organisms. Every organism is, so to speak, a monadic being. It has a world of its own because it has an experience of its own. The phenomena that we find in the life of certain biological species are not transferable to any other species. The experience--and therefore the realities--of two different organisms are incommensurable with one another. In the world of a fly . . . we find only "fly things"; in the world of a sea urchin we find only "sea urchin things." Ernst Cassirer[1]

> The first and most fundamental rule is: <u>Consider social facts as things</u>. Emile Durkheim[2]

This is a study of legislative "things." A fundamental premise guiding the research reported in this study is that legislators' shared experiences in the day to day process of lawmaking creates a reality for them that shapes their conduct by giving meanings to those experiences and that process. Through the use of interview data an attempt will be made to understand one aspect of legislative "things": the meanings attributed by legislators to a variety of possible courses of action in a legislature.

The particular subject matter for the study is the second session of the thirty-third Oklahoma legislature (1972).

I have sought to describe aspects of the normative environment that to a greater or lesser extent enveloped the men and women who were members of that legislature. The principal concept utilized is that of norm. Using this concept an attempt is made to systematically describe the character and strength of normative regulations operative in eleven behavioral areas believed essential to legislative life.

Having said what this study is, it is important to alert the reader to what it is not. It is not a study of legislative behavior: No attempt will be made to describe or explain particular behaviors in the legislative arena. Nevertheless--and this a second premise giving shape to this study--it will be argued that a systematic understanding of legislative "things" is indispensible if legislative behavior is to be described or explained.

Social Facts and the Structure of Behavior

That social behavior is structured is obvious even to the most casual observer. Both daily living and social science are founded upon the premise that some order or structure is inherent in the social world. Neither actions nor beliefs are randomly distributed; certain types (or "groups") of persons perform certain kinds of actions, other types (or "groups") perform other kinds of actions, and so on. Similarly, certain types of situations evoke particular types of responses: "In every society people tend to develop more or less standard expectations about how they and others

will behave in various situations."[3] As Dahrendorf has noted, "Human society always means that people's behavior is being removed from the randomness of chance and regulated by established and inescapable expectations."[4] Social science is possible precisely because events involving human actors are structured in relatively stable and recurring patterns.

Social scientists, however, have seldom been satisfied with simply describing patterns of behavior manifested in the social world. The problem common to the social sciences has been that of developing concepts and theories capable of explaining particular empirically identified patterns of behavior. Aware of the plethora of ways of looking at the social world and cognizant that what we "see" is related to the way in which we orient ourselves, social scientists have developed enumerable concepts, frameworks, and quasi-theories in search of more fruitful modes of access to the subject matter of social science. But, as Robert Merton noted well over a decade ago, "We have many concepts, but few confirmed theories; many points of view, but few theorems; many 'approaches,' but few arrivals."[5]

The importance of adequate conceptualization cannot be over emphasized. As Alfred Kuhn has observed, concepts are " . . . the things we think with, perceive with, communicate with, and build a society with."[6] In speaking of the need for orienting concepts, David Easton has argued,

> The expectation and hope that it will be possible to develop a common underlying social theory impels

> research in certain inescapable directions. The most significant of these for our purposes is that it has led to the search for a common unit of analysis that could easily feed into the special subject matters of each of the disciplines. . . . In this way they would constitute the particles out of which all social behavior is formed and which manifest themselves through different institutions, structures, and processes.[7]

The problems confronting the student of human behavior are not limited to the determination of a set of formal criteria by which the adequacy of concepts might be evaluated (a problem shared with natural scientists); the more fundamental task is that of determining precisely what aspects of human experience can most profitably be brought together in concepts. From the vast amount of "data" potentially available to the student of the social world only a limited amount may be drawn together in concepts whose function is to simplify experience and make parsimonious explanation possible. In short, social scientists must ask "what needs conceptualizing?" The manner in which this question is answered not only gives focus to our science, but largely prefigures the knowledge empirical research will yield and the shape our theories will take.

If there has been a dominant focus to concept formation in the social sciences that focus has been on social reality. That social relationships and practices may be objectified and given symbolic support such that the socially produced "objects" control their creators is one of the most pervasive themes of modern social thought. Social scientists

have sought to conceptualize these objects and describe their impact upon human behavior. In general, these concepts refer to "social facts," to use Durkheim's famous terminology, which motivate and structure human behavior. Few social scientists today would question Durkheim's contention that "social facts" have "the power of external coercion."[8]

"To investigate the lawfulness of social facts," Solomon Asch argues, "is the task of the social disciplines."[9] Even more firmly, Alfred Schutz concludes his brilliant phenomenological analysis of the social world with the comment that, "Every social science . . . sets as its primary goal the greatest possible clarification of what is thought about the social world by those living in it."[10] These views are predicated upon the belief that human actors determine their courses of action upon the basis of the "reality" confronting them, and that this reality is itself the product of social processes. In part, this is explicable by noting that what is real is a conceptual rather than an empirical question; conceptual criteria and not empirical testing are at the heart of any attempt to determine the reality of any particular phenomenon.[11] Nevertheless, for the actors living in the commonsense world of daily experience, what is real largely depends upon what others believe to be real. In daily experience the thought objects of a social character (i.e. those having reference to intangible entities) having their source in the social world (i.e. having intersubjective

support) are regarded as real in a sense not unlike the reality attributed to physical objects. These objects are believed to exist "outside" and independent of individual consciousness. "Social facts," Asch suggests, "have the same reality as other facts of nature."[12]

Like many other concepts used by social scientists, the norm concept is a product of an interest in conceptualizing fragments of social reality. During the past forty years the utility of the norm concept has been established beyond any shadow of a doubt. From attempts to develop a general theory of society to efforts to explain dyadic relations, the norm concept has become an important tool in the conceptual apparatus of modern social science.[13] Students of legislative behavior have long recognized that an understanding of organizational norms is crucial to the systematic examination of legislative bodies. Legislative norms describe expectations which more or less effectively define the boundaries of appropriate conduct for the members of the legislature. That these socially prescribed modes of conduct often shape actual behavior constitutes the explanatory value of the norm concept.

Legislatures, like other social institutions, may be said to develop a culture consisting of interrelated values, norms, and symbols which collectively function to regulate behavior, define the meaning of membership, and assure a framework for social interaction. As Katz and Kahn have observed,

> Every organization develops its own culture or climate, with its own taboos, folkways, and mores. The climate or culture of the system reflects both the norms and values of the formal system and their interpretation in the informal system. Organizational climate reflects also the history of internal and external struggles, and types of people the organization attracts, its work processes and physical layout, the modes of communication, and the exercise of authority within the system. Just as society has a cultural heritage, so social organizations possess distinctive patterns of collective feeling and beliefs passed along to new members. . . . Even a casual visitor can detect differences between the atmosphere of Antioch, Swarthmore, City College of New York, The University of Oklahoma, and Princeton University.[14]

The member of the legislature attributes certain meanings to his and other members' behaviors, selects his own courses of action on the basis of certain standards, and sees the legislative environment from a particular perspective. These meanings, standards, and perspectives are not random: individual perspectives are inextricably interwoven with common perspectives, meanings are shared, and standards often emerge through the reciprocal influence of legislative interactions. The beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of the members of the legislature not only define the boundaries of that system, but largely determine the circumstances within which that system functions, and processes by which it operates, and, in short, the social reality in which the legislature is enveloped.

To study legislative norms is to focus on one aspect of the culture of the legislature as an on-going social system. The norm concept emphasizes the integrative symbols and

beliefs as well as the coordinating mechanisms which emerge from the complex connections, interchanges, and relationships that characterize legislative life. Legislative norms are the carriers of tradition, the constitutive elements of social roles in the legislature, and, for the participants, a part of the daily environment of legislative life.

The Study of Legislative Norms

During the past two decades the norm concept has gained widespread currency in discussions of legislative behavior. That legislative behavior could not be adequately explained without recourse to legislators' beliefs regarding the appropriateness of various kinds of acts (and hence, the meaning of various acts for the legislators themselves) became apparent in the wake of the behavioral movement. The theoretical lacunae created by juxtapositioning analyses of roll-call voting and other studies of legislative "behavior" besides earlier "institutional" studies revealed the need for concepts capable of integrating structural, attitudinal, and behavioral data. Hence, students of legislative behavior were led to the correlative concepts of "role" and norm" which were developed by sociologists and social psychologists during the first half of this century. That the promised benefits of these concepts have not yet been fully realized perhaps reflects the difficulties of legislative research rather than inherent shortcomings of the concepts.

Despite interest in the concept, few empirical studies of norms in the legislative setting exist. Rather impressionistic descriptions of norms operative in the Congress can be found in the works of Young, Truman, White, and others.[15] Other studies have focused upon the operation of informal Congressional practices strongly supported by tradition, such as senatorial courtesy and the seniority rule.[16] Still other studies have focused upon the effects of what might be termed the formalized norms of the Congress, the official rules applicable to individual behavior in that body.[17] Beyond these studies, few systematic analyses of legislative norms operative in the Congress or state legislatures have been produced during the past two decades.

Early Attempts to Identify Legislative Norms

Among the earliest studies of legislative norms was Ralph K. Huitt's case study of Senate reaction to a party "bolter."[18] In 1952, Senator Wayne Morse, then a Republican, openly supported Adlai Stevenson's candidacy for the Presidency. After the election Morse declared himself an Independent and asked that his committee appointments in the Senate be made by the entire membership of that body rather than by the Republican caucus. Despite his repeated efforts, Senator Morse was unable to regain his previous committee assignments during the 83rd Congress. Relying primarily upon the written record of events surrounding Senator Morse's attempts to regain his committee seats, Huitt sought to

identify particular Senate norms through an analysis of this conflict situation. Huitt found that despite friendship and ideological ties with Morse, liberal Democrats refused to support Morse's claims to his previous committee assignments. The failure of liberal Democrats to support Morse was explained by reference to a Senate norm: members of one party should never interfere with the committee selections of the other party. For Huitt, "this was the rule which prevented the majority party from making all the committee selections, as it had the power to do; and this rule proved stronger than the ties of friendship and interest group ideology which bound liberal Democrats to Morse in 1953."[19] Although Huitt's analysis suffers from the shortcomings of all case studies, it was the first study in which the norm concept was utilized to explain behavior in the legislative setting; it is deservedly a classic of legislative research.

The first study attempting to systematically identify a broader range of norms operative in a legislative body was Donald Matthews' U. S. Senators and Their World.[20] Through the use of what he termed "focused interviews" with 109 informants, twenty-five of whom were U. S. Senators, Professor Matthews identified six norms or "folkways" operative in the Senate. These were apprenticeship, legislative work, specialization, courtesy, reciprocity, and institutional patriotism. For Matthews, these norms significantly shape behavior in the Senate (that is, most behavior is in conformity with these

norms) along functional lines by contributing to "the survival of the system without change."[21] In other words, "without these folkways the Senate could hardly operate with its present organization and rules."[22]

Not only were these norms found to be functional in Matthews' analysis, they were also found to be supported by sanctions. The most important sanction encountered by those not conforming to Senate norms was the loss of effectiveness. With a rather crude index of legislative effectiveness based upon the passage of bills sponsored by individuals in the Senate, Matthews found that those who violate Senate norms tend to be less effective than those who conform. Matthews then attempted to delineate characteristics shared by those who tend not to conform to the folkways. A Senator's previous political experience, political ideology, political ambition, and the character of his constituency were shown to affect the propensity of the Senator to conform to Senate norms regarding floor speaking. Matthews suggested that the costs of conformity were high for those sharing one or more of the following characteristics: previous gubernatorial office, liberal political ideology, presidential ambitions, and competitive two-party constituency. The costs of conformity were found primarily in the lack of publicity and the inability to produce quick results that accompany norm conformity. Matthews did not suggest that these are the only factors affecting the degree of norm conformity exhibited by members of the Senate, but he did not examine the relation-

ship between psychological variables and norm conformity or the affect of structural characteristics of the Senate upon norm conformity.

The Outsider and the Deviant "Roles"

In a case study of Senator William Proxmire's refusal to accept Senate norms Ralph K. Huitt directly challenged Matthews' assumptions regarding the norm violator in the Senate.[23] Senator Proxmire, first elected in 1957, recognized Senate norms and guided his conduct by these unwritten rules for a period, but before the end of his first session in the Senate consciously chose to be an "outsider" in the Senate. For Huitt, an outsider is not the person who simply fails somehow to become a member of the inner club of the Senate; rather, the outsider is the member who does not want to be a member of the inner club. Huitt suggested that the "outsider" is not a deviant, but is a role seen as legitimate and accepted by the majority of the Senate. This conclusion rested upon two pieces of evidence. First, among the most venerated members of the Senate have been those men who did not choose to be members of the inner club--Senators LaFollette, Borah, and Norris, for example. Second, and more important for Huitt, sanctions utilized to protect and enforce Senate norms were not applied to Senator Proxmire: "The Senate has proved that it can and will take telling measures against what it considers deviant behavior, but the kind of behavior associated without Outsider role is remarkably

free of institutional inhibitions."[24] Huitt concluded then, that

> the behavior associated with Outsider role seems to fall well within the bounds of what most members of the Senate regard as tolerable . . . . The Outsider is . . . not a deviant but an alternative role.[25]

Even further, Huitt suggested that the outsider role is not only acceptable to the Senate, but is in fact functional to the achievement of Senate tasks.

One aspect of Huitt's study of Proxmire deserves special mention. In accounting for Proxmire's choice of the outsider role, Huitt did not refer to any of the factors identified by Matthews as contributing to nonconformity to Senate norms. Rather, Huitt explains Proxmire's behavior on the basis of two personality traits--Proxmire's ambition and "compulsive independence"--which were reinforced by his recognition of the role played by earlier outsiders. Although Huitt's evidence here was at best impressionistic, few references to the relationship between psychological variables and norm conformity in the legislative setting exist outside this study.

The presence of deviants in the Senate was not denied by Huitt; rather, he made a subtle distinction between the outsider and the deviant and focused his study upon the former. In a study of the Wisconsin Assembly Samuel Patterson focused directly upon the deviant in the legislature.[26] Using open-ended questions Patterson discovered three types

of norms: (1) norms limiting floor speaking ("don't be a talker"); (2) norms regulating legislators' relationships with lobbyists ("don't be a moocher"); and (3) norms promoting party loyalty ("don't be a maverick"). Defining the deviant as "an actor who persistently violates, and who is expected to violate the established and widely shared norms of the system,"[27] Patterson identified "deviant roles" corresponding to each of the above mentioned norms: the talker, the moocher, and the maverick. In short, individuals who were expected to violate each norm were said to play the deviant role corresponding to that norm. The talker and moocher roles were identified "on an impressionistic basis during the course of interviews" while mavericks were identified by asking members to name those expected to play that role.

Like Matthews had found of norm violators in the Senate, Patterson found that mavericks tend to represent competitive constituencies and perceive conflicts of interests between party and constituency more often than others, i.e. constituency factors were found to strongly affect the likelihood that a legislator would be known as a party maverick. Unlike Matthews' findings, however, Patterson found that "mavericks will tend to cluster at the moderate point in the ideological continuum."[28] Patterson's analysis of "talkers" and "moochers" was less adequate: he suggested that these roles could be

accounted for by reference to psychological variables but he provided no such analysis.

Although Huitt and Patterson presented the case for the "outsider" and "deviant" roles in the legislature, the use of the role concept in these contexts is inappropriate. The role concept implies both that expectations are positionally anchored and that these expectations have a normative or "ought" aspect. The positional character of social roles has been emphasized by Theodore Newcomb: "the ways of behaving which are expected of any individual who occupies a certain position constitutes the role . . . associated with that position."[29] Further, expectations which can be said to found a role have both an anticipatory and a normative quality: "the other person is not only <u>expected</u> to behave in a certain way; he <u>should</u> behave in that way."[30] Patterson's analysis emphasized the anticipatory character of expectations but neglected the normative quality of expectations linked to roles. Operationally, occupants of deviant roles were identified by asking legislators to name those members expected to play deviant roles. That most legislators anticipate only occasional party voting from a member, however, does not imply that that member is playing a role. What was needed in Patterson's analysis was evidence that members expected certain types of deviant behavior from members sharing some characteristic (those from competitive constituencies, for example) or occupying some position and that

they believed that these members should and will perform in a particular way in a given situation (i.e. roll-call voting, floor debate, etc.).

Similarly, Huitt neither linked the outsider role to any particular position within the legislature nor demonstrated that members of the Senate "expected" Proxmire's behavior in anything more than an anticipatory manner. Rather, Huitt demonstrated that Proxmire's behavior was, on the whole, acceptable to the Senate; or in terms of norm theory, Proxmire's behavior fell within the range of tolerable behavior. Clearly, however, tolerable behavior alone does not imply the existence of an outsider role.

The shortcomings of the case for the deviant and outsider roles within the legislature are demonstrated, I believe, by the means by which both Patterson and Huitt sought to account for these roles. Both researchers refer to psychological variables to account for behavior which they have called role behavior. Psychological variables are often used, of course, to account for deviant behavior, but to use psychological factors to account for social roles is to betray a profound misunderstanding of the role concept. The explanatory power of the role concept is derived precisely from the fact that it enables the researcher to describe and account for social behavior without reference to the individual personalities occupying positions within the social system undergoing analysis. The individual whose behavior conforms to

the dictates of a role cannot be said to be a deviant: role behavior and deviant behavior are analytically distinct and the notion of a deviant role is a contradiction in terms.

The Normative Structure of State Legislatures: The Four-State Study

Legislative norm studies were given a new focus by the work of John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy Ferguson.[31] Applying a conceptual scheme developed in social psychology and sociology to data from rather lengthy structured interviews with 94% of the legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee, Wahlke and his colleagues were able to deal with a number of traditional questions concerning legislative behavior from a perspective quite unlike that of prior legislative studies. This unique perspective, the authors' explicit concern with theory building, and their substantive findings revolutionized the study of legislative behavior.

The conceptual apparatus utilized by Wahlke, et al., revolved around the notion of organizational roles. Although others had applied the role concept to the study of legislatures, the level of sophistication achieved in the four-state study was far superior to prior applications. Wahlke and his associates suggested the possibility of viewing a legislative system as a network of interrelated roles, arguing that it is precisely the legislators' roles which make the legislature an institution. Hence, the authors suggested that the term role

> . . . refers to precisely those behavioral uniformities or regularities which constitute the institution. No legislature or other institution could be seen by the analyst if the human actors did not exhibit behavior in conformity, to at least some minimal extent, with the norms of behavior constituting their roles.[32]

The basic unit upon which a role analysis can be developed, according to the authors, is that of organizational norms: "To study the role of legislators...is to study particular sets of norms which underlie relevant legislative behavior."[33] Thus the theoretical significance of legislative norms was much broader for Wahlke, et al., than for earlier students who had viewed legislative norms simply as one factor among many useful in accounting for legislative behavior.

Wahlke and his colleagues distinguished between role sectors by demarcating between the "alters" correlative to roles found in the legislature. Four role sectors were identified: core-roles, clientele-roles, specialized-(sub)roles, and incidental roles. The most important sector for purposes of describing and explaining behavior inside the legislature is the core-roles sector. This sector was defined as "all the norms guiding the legislator's behavior with reference to other legislators perceived simply in their character (or role) as one of all coequal legislators, or with reference to the legislature perceived as a social situation or a sort of 'generalized other.'"[34] In brief, the core-roles refer to the legislator's beliefs about appropriate conduct which are predicated upon his perception of how other legislators expect

him to behave. For Wahlke, et al., "elements of the core-roles sector go far toward fixing the character of the legislative institution, since they govern a large part of the legislators' behavior in encounters with other legislators 'inside' the legislature."[35]

The core-roles sector was subdivided according to the functional significance attributed to particular norms into purposive roles (those relating to the legislator's conception of the purpose or goal of his activities), representational roles (those relating to the process of decision-making believed appropriate by the legislator), and consensual roles (those relating to the shared agreements about how the legislative game is to be played). Norms constituting consensual roles were subdivided into two types: those which are formalized in the written rules of procedure of the legislature and those which remain unwritten but are informally understood to be operative in the legislature. This latter subdivision is, of course, synonymous with Matthews' folkways and represents those informal norms applicable to all legislators regardless of their position within the legislature.

In order to identify the unwritten rules of the legislature Wahlke et al., asked respondents in the four states the following questions:

> We've been told that every legislature has its unofficial rules of the game--certain things members must do and things they must not do if they want the respect and cooperation of fellow members.

> a. What are some of these things--these "rules of the game"--that a member must observe, to hold the respect and cooperation of his fellow members?
>
> . . . . . .
>
> c. Some members don't seem to have the respect and cooperation of their fellow members because they don't follow the "rules of the game." What are some of the things that may cause a member to lose the respect and cooperation of his fellow members?[36]

On the basis of answers to these open-ended questions forty-two "rules of the game" were identified. The most often mentioned were performance of obligations, respect for other members' legislative rights, impersonality, self-restraint in debate, courtesy, openness of aims, modesty, integrity, independence of judgment, and personal virtue.[37]

Wahlke, et al., reasoned that the norms identified serve several functions important in the legislative process. More specifically they suggested that the norms identified promote group cohesion and solidarity, increase predictability of behavior within the system, limit conflict, and expedite performance of legislative business. Other norms identified were seen to give tactical advantages to the individual member who adheres to them while still others referred to personal qualities believed desirable. The assignment of functions to groups of norms was, of course, at best conjecture on the part of the authors.

The authors argued that their findings "give strong evidence that legislative rules of the game constitute a body of specific rules of behavior generally accepted and understood

by all members."[38] This conclusion was buttressed by the fact that 93% of those interviewed recognized sanctions supportive of the unwritten rules.[39] The most commonly mentioned sanctions were obstruction of legislation, ostracism, and mistrust. No effort was made, however, to identify positive sanctions (rewards) nor to link specific sanctions with particular norms.

The Legislative System is deservedly regarded as a landmark study of legislatures. However, it is perhaps inappropriate to praise this study as an analysis of legislative behavior; unfortunately no data concerning the actual behavior of legislators was collected and the relationship between the normative structure that was described and actual behavior in the legislatures was not analyzed. Nevertheless, the accomplishments of the four-state study were tremendous. Wahlke and his colleagues managed to emphasize the importance of legislative norms by placing them in a larger theoretical framework, provided a wealth of empirical evidence describing legislative norms, and completed the first truly comparative study of state legislatures. No student of legislative norms can fail to acknowledge his indebtedness to The Legislative System; but, simultaneously, no student of legislative norms can be satisfied with a simple replication of the four-state study.

The shortcomings of the four-state study are best illustrated by focusing upon a single, but representative,

example of the means by which legislative roles are explicated and then operationalized. No aspect of The Legislative System has such widespread currency as the typology of representational role orientations (delegate, trustee, politico); for this reason the representational role as developed by Wahlke, et al., is selected as our example.

Representational roles we are told refer to norms that "concern the method or process of individual decision making deemed appropriate to pursuit of the substantive goals."[40] Further, the reader is assured that "all legislators seem to recognize norms making up what we have called their representational role."[41] This assurance is lost with the next sentence which suggests that legislators conceive of their representational roles in different ways. Hence, representational role orientations are said to refer not to the role itself, but, rather, to

> a general type of attitude in a particular role, or an inclination to play a particular role in a certain way. This usage focuses attention upon patterns of consensus (or dissensus) about what the role is.[42]

This theorizing may be fairly summarized in the following manner: (1) legislators recognize beliefs postulating an appropriate process of decision making; (2) these beliefs (norms) define the representational role of the legislator; (3) nevertheless, legislators may play this role in different ways (i.e. they may have different role orientations); hence, differing role orientations reflect dissensus about what the

role is. Obviously this conclusion does not follow from the premises and would in fact seem to contradict statement (1).

However murky these waters may seem, they become more so when we are told that

> The term role orientation refers to a pattern of norms making up a particular role which may be contrasted with other patterns for the same role. In other words, it refers to systematic differences in legislators' conception of a particular component of the role of legislator.[43]

Put differently, but again not unfairly, this statement means that each role orientation rests upon a particular set of norms, i.e. that the "style" by which a legislator plays his role is itself supported by norms. Hence, the role is defined by norms, the various role orientations are defined by norms, and the legislator's choice of a particular style or role orientation simply reflects the choice of one set of norms rather than another. At best this means that we have conflicting definitions of a particular role, that more than one set of norms are appropriate for a particular type of behavior (decisional behavior in the case of representational roles). At worst, this means that there is simply no role guiding decisional behavior, that legislators disagree about the criteria applicable to making decisions. The second possibility becomes plausible if we ask what "role" remains if the three orientations toward that role are removed. Clearly, the answer is none--the discussion of the representational role makes no reference to any "role" except the role orientations themselves.

This unfortunate conception of representational roles is the result, I believe, of trying to merge role theory with a methodology that was incompatible with the requirements of a role analysis. In general, the role types developed by Wahlke and his colleagues reflect the legislators' self-selected orientations towards some alter, but by no means do these orientations reflect positionally anchored norms. Roles were developed without regard to the expectations of the alters associated with those roles. More specifically, legislators were asked the following questions:

> Now, a couple of questions about the job of being a legislator:
> a. First of all, how would you describe the job of being a legislator--what are the most important things you should do here?
> b. Are there any important differences between what you think this job is and the way your constituents see it? (What are they?)[44]

Answers to these questions were analyzed and those statements elicited which pertained to "criteria of decision" were utilized to develop the representational role orientations. The inadequacies of this procedure are revealed by the fact that 38% of the legislators interviewed could not be classified as delegates, trustees or politicos--the percentage of respondents to which the researchers were able to assign representational role orientations varied from 44% in California to 70% in Ohio.[45]

The shortcomings of the four-state study are both conceptual and methodological in nature. Unfortunately, the shadow of these shortcomings has been cast over numerous

studies attempting to employ the conceptual framework presented in The Legislative System. Hence, the four-state study has both stimulated and retarded studies of the normative structure of legislative bodies.[46]

The Normative Structure of Congressional Committees

The norm concept became an indispensible tool in Richard Fenno's brilliant analysis of the appropriations process in the Congress.[47] Focusing primarily upon the House Committee on Appropriations, Fenno suggested that behavior relevant to the appropriations process might be described through a systems model utilizing legislative norms as a major descriptive variable. For Fenno, "the basic materials of description [in this study] are the normative expectations of the various participants; the perceptions and attitudes, or images, of the participants; and the behavior of the participants."[48] An analytic distinction was made between external and internal relations of the House Committee on Appropriations, the former category referring to relations between the Committee and the House as a whole, the latter designating relations inside the Committee. In describing external relations of the Committee a distinction was made between "goal expectations" (what House members expect the Committee to do) and "maintenance expectations" (how House members expect the Committee to do it). Together goal and maintenance expectations not only establish a normative guide for the Committee as a subsystem, but also have a significant impact in defining the norms and roles

guiding individual behavior for members of the Committee in their relationships with one another (internal relations).

Through the use of the norm concept Fenno was able to describe Committee roles which guide interaction among members and hence shape structural characteristics of the Committee. A single example--albeit, a lengthy one--of Fenno's method of dealing with norms and the roles which they define should suffice to demonstrate the insightful use made of the norm concept in this work. Fenno found the Appropriations Committee to be a highly integrated unit with a well structured decision-making process despite the existence of numerous relatively autonomous subcommittees. The decision-making structure of the Committee was described through an analysis of the norms defining major roles in the Committee. Seven roles were described: Committee Chairman, ranking minority member, subcommittee member, newcomer, subcommittee chairman, ranking minority subcommittee member, and clerk.

The roles of the Appropriations Committee chairman and ranking minority member were shaped by the formal perogatives of these positions, House norms, and Committee norms. House members as a whole were found to expect the Appropriations Committee Chairman to

> call meetings of the Committee, fix its agenda, and preside over its meetings. He is expected to create subcommittees he thinks necessary and to appoint the majority party members to each subcommittee. . . . He is expected to suggest (subject to formal appointment by the speaker) the House conferees on appropriations bills. . . . He is expected to exercise surveillance over the

> flow of Committee work. . . . He is expected to hire the Committee's staff members and supervise their work. And he is expected to be the major spokesman for the Committee to the House or to other groups in the environment. All of these expectations are fixed by the traditions of the House.[49]

Expectations of Committee members were also found to shape the role of the Committee Chairman:

> He may choose subcommittee members, but he is expected to observe seniority in the advancement of members on the subcommittee and in his choice of the subcommittee chairman. He is not expected to be arbitrary or vindicative or attempt to aggrandize his personal position at the expense of others. His surveillance over and participation in subcommittee work is expected to be minimal. He is expected to support subcommittee autonomy and display confidence in their decisions. He is expected, in all his actions, to be the exemplar of the Committee's style--a model for the imitation of others.[50]

The role of the ranking minority member was defined by the same norms, although the formal perogatives of his position are considerably less than those of the chairman. Further, the ranking minority member was expected to work closely with the chairman and "speak for the Committee's minority members when such a voice is required."[51]

House norms were less important--and Committee norms more important--in defining the other five committee roles. The role of the subcommittee member, a role played by all members of the Committee, was characterized by norms of specialization, hard work, reciprocity (subcommittee), subcommittee unity, and most importantly, minimal partisanship. The role of the newcomer was essentially that of an apprentice:

> The newcomer is expected to work hard, to amass information, to learn the business of his subcommittee, to listen to the senior men, and to follow them . . . to devote himself wholeheartedly to the routine proceedings of the subcommittee. And, except in the cases of pressing constituency needs, he is not expected to wield influence.[52]

The roles of the subcommittee chairman and the ranking minority member were shaped by norms dictating fair play, active leadership, skill and technical competence in relevant subject matter areas, cooperation with other subcommittee chairmen, and exemplary adherence to subcommittee norms in general. Subcommittee clerks, finally, were guided by the norms of hard work, minimal fanfare, and nonpartisanship.

This rather lengthy example of Fenno's method of dealing with legislative norms illustrates the means by which norms were utilized to develop legislative roles in his analysis. Each role is viewed as a set of norms applicable to the occupant of a particular position in the social structure of the Committee. Although both Wahlke, et al., and Fenno analyzed role patterns in the legislative setting, similarities between these two studies are more apparent than real. Whereas the roles uncovered by Fenno represent shared expectations of how the occupants of various positions should behave, hence demarcating interrelationships between positions, as was pointed out earlier, role types developed by Wahlke and his colleagues reflect nothing more than legislators' self-selected "orientation" towards some alter.

Using the conceptual framework developed by Fenno, Charles O. Jones examined the role of the subcommittee in a study of the House Committee on Agriculture.[53] Jones found that the Agriculture Committee, unlike the Appropriations Committee, was not a well integrated unit. Seeking reasons for this failure to achieve a high degree of integration, Jones analyzed the operation of norms identified by Fenno as contributing to committee integration--specialization, reciprocity (between subcommittees), subcommittee unity, and minimal partisanship. He found that norms of specialization and reciprocity were operative, being virtually formalized through the subcommittee system and the "omnibus procedure" of developing bills. Less evidence was found, however, indicating a viable norm of subcommittee unity operative in the Committee.

The effectiveness of the norms of specialization and reciprocity in achieving Committee integration were shown to be deeply affected by the fact that the norm of minimal partisanship was not achieved in actual behavior. The failure of the Committee to achieve behavior in accordance with this norm was explained by reference to the coincidence of party and commodity interests in the Committee. More precisely, minimal partisanship was not achieved because of the alignment of cotton, rice, and tobacco interests with the Democratic Party and wheat, corn, and small grain interests with the Republican Party. Hence, Jones concludes that "the

norms developed by Fenno . . . were applicable to the Committee on Agriculture, but there was a gap between these norms and actual committee behavior."[54] Despite this conclusion, it is unclear from Jones' analysis whether there is simply a "gap" between the norms of minimal partisanship and subcommittee unity and actual behavior, or whether these norms simply do not exist within the House Committee on Agriculture.

The framework developed by Fenno was also utilized by John F. Manley in a study of the House Committee on Ways and Means.[55] Manley found the Committee to be a relatively well integrated unit operating in a bipartisan manner much of the time. Despite the fact that party votes in the Committee were not uncommon, Manley discovered widespread consensus among Committee members regarding the manner in which decisions were to be made: decisions were to be made only after a thorough and detailed analysis of each bill. Although the norm of minimal partisanship did not eradicate all party differences in the Committee, major bills brought before the Committee received serious bipartisan consideration. Further, the norm of minimal partisanship was shown to be deeply affected by both the nature of the subject matter dealt with by the Committee and expectations of the House as a whole. The subject matter dealt with by the Committee is usually sensitive and is almost always technical and complex. Because major bills reported to the House by the Committee are virtually always given "closed rules" (thereby prohibiting

amendments from the floor) House members expect the Committee to make satisfactory adjustments of conflicting demands before reporting bills. These two factors encouraged the norm of "working in a responsible way," a norm compatible with and highly supportive of minimal partisanship norms in the Committee. Manley found Committee integration to be further promoted by the careful recruitment of members to the Committee, a strong apprenticeship norm, and the astute leadership role played by Chairman Wilbur Mills.

Norm Socialization

Although several studies have dealt with legislative norms, norm violators, and the "inner club" within legislatures, little is known of the processes and agents which socialize new members to the norms of legislative bodies. Implicit in most studies is the assumption that socializing new members is the task of the more tenured members, party leaders, or even the "inner club" itself. In a study of interpersonal relations in the Michigan House, Stephen Monsma suggested that the primary agents of norm socialization are informal groups within the legislature.[56] Monsma reasoned that "informal groups aid in the integration of the legislative system by socializing their members into norms which function to limit conflict and promote cooperation."[57] Using the two open-ended questions developed by Wahlke and his associates in the four-state study, Monsma asked members of the Michigan House to identify the "unwritten rules" of that body.

Using an "Index of Agreement on the Rules of the Game" Monsma measured norm agreement for all pairs of legislators, hypothesizing that norm agreement would be higher among members of informal groups than among non-group members. Unfortunately, the data did not support Monsma's hypothesis: norm agreement was not appreciably higher among members of informal groups than among others. Hence, Monsma was led to conclude that

> informal groups played a role in socializing their members into the norms of the House. . . . However, to say that informal groups were the principle or even a major device of socialization is not warranted by the data. The data indicate a measurable and consistent influence on the part of the groups, but not a dominant one.[58]

Legislative Norm Research: An Overview

This review reveals that the norm concept has been utilized in three different but nevertheless interdependent ways in legislative research. First, and basic to all uses of the norm concept, it has been used to explain why certain behaviors occur in legislative bodies. Huitt's explanation of the failure of liberal Senators to support Senator Morse in his attempt to regain his committee seats is a paradigmatic case of this usage: the problematic behavior is shown to be the result of a widespread belief about the appropriateness of certain conduct. Similarly, Matthews' explanation of what goes on in the Senate is, in part, accomplished through reference to Senate norms. In Matthews' account, no specific item of behavior is explained; rather the on-going

processes of the Senate are shown to be significantly shaped by the "folkways." That the norm concept is capable of explaining various aspects of legislative behavior is a well accepted notion; that it is capable of explaining a particular behavior or pattern of behavior is, of course, an empirical question.

Second, the norm concept has proven to be a useful tool in describing aspects of the social structure of legislative bodies. That some members stand "outside" the social system of legislatures has usually been explained by reference to the normative structure of these organizations. No study of legislative behavior has pointed to categorical characteristics (race, religion, etc.) to explain why certain legislators are disliked and hence ineffective; rather, explanations of this phenomenon are founded upon the notion that those individuals who are "outside" are so because their conduct violates certain normative expectations held by the membership. The notion of a "maverick" or "deviant," for example, makes no sense apart from the norm concept: norms form a baseline which enables both the researcher and the legislator to evaluate conduct (albeit, for different purposes) within legislative bodies.

Finally, the norm concept has often been incorporated into a larger theoretical framework for purposes of description and explanation. The affinities between the norm concept and a systems framework are made apparent in the work

of Wahlke, et al., Fenno, Jones, and Manley. There is no a priori reason, however, why the norm concept could not be utilized within other theoretical frameworks, not excluding conflict models.

Despite the obvious utility and applicability of the norm concept to legislative research, studies of legislative norms have been neither theoretically satisfying nor empirically well-grounded. In 1966, Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson suggested that "contemporary legislative research does not permit us to deal systematically with the development of legislative norms, nor can we synthesize data (because we know of none) which takes us very far in the explanation of policy affects."[59] This appraisal remains accurate despite the passage of seven years of legislative research: little systematic knowledge of the character, structure, and functions of legislative norms exists. What we do know about legislative norms is the result of only a handful of studies, many of which have only tangentially dealt with the subject.

Footnotes

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38. Ibid., p. 143.

39. Ibid., p. 152.

40. Ibid., p. 12.

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CHAPTER II

DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING THE NORM CONCEPT

An analysis of research more or less systematically dealing with legislative norms reveals conceptual and methodological weaknesses as well as strengths, trivial as well as significant substantive findings. Despite the uneven quality of prior research in this area, collectively the various studies focusing on legislative norms have significantly contributed to our understanding of not only what goes on inside legislatures, but also why. An important research area has been identified and superficially explored by prior research, but no thorough-going analysis of legislative norms is yet available. The research reported in this work aspires to the task of closing this gap.

This chapter will examine several properties of legislative norms. Phenomena conjoined by the norm concept will be explored with specific attention to their presence in legislative bodies. The means of operationalizing concepts crucial to the study of legislative norms will be examined, and the site of the research reported in this study will be briefly discussed.

Defining the Norm Concept

An examination of literature from the various disciplines utilizing the norm concept reveals that no single well-accepted definition of the concept has emerged despite widespread usages for both descriptive and analytic purposes. The following sampling of definitions should incicate the lack of definitional consensus surrounding the use of the norm concept.

Bierstedt: "A norm . . . is a rule or a standard that governs our conduct in the social situations in which we participate. It is a societal expectation. It is a standard to which we are expected to conform whether we actually do so or not."[1]

Thibaut and Kelly: " . . . a norm exists when there are (1) agreements, or consensuses, about the behaviors group members should or should not enact and (2) social processes to produce adherence to these agreements."[2]

Morris: "Norms are generally accepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, or prohibitions against, others' behavior, belief or feeling . . . , i.e. what others <u>ought</u> to do, believe, feel--<u>or else</u>. Norms must be shared prescriptions . . . Norms always include sanctions."[3]

J. Litterer: " . . . a norm is an agreement or consensus of group members concerning how individuals should or should not behave."[4]

Newcomb: "The term 'norm,' unfortunately, has several meanings. We shall use it . . . only in the sense of 'more

or less fixed frame of reference,' whether of quantitative or qualitative nature."[5]

Secord and Backman: "A norm is a standard or behavioral expectation shared by group members against which the validity of perceptions is judged and the appropriateness of feelings and behavior is evaluated."[6]

Homans: "A norm . . . is an idea in the minds of the members of a group, an idea that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances . . . . any departure of real behavior from the norm is followed by some punishment."[7]

A central problem in defining the norm concept is that by any account the term refers to a set of multifaceted phenomena rather than a single item of human experience. Norms involve attitudes, attitude change, expectations, interactions, standards, socialization, and sanctions (and hence power). Definitional problems arise because of the difficulty in stating how these phenomena (and perhaps others) are intertwined to produce norms. Not all attitudes are constitutive of norms, nor do all cases of attitude change involve norms, and so on. Further complicating the definitional problem is the difficulty of distinguishing between definitional criteria and phenomena contingently related (perhaps invariably) to norms. Jack Gibbs, for example, argues that behavioral conformity to expectations are only contingently related to the

notion of norms; others, however, have insisted that behavioral conformity is an intrinsic part of the norm concept itself.[8]

Abraham Kaplan has suggested that,

> It is easy to sharpen concepts as much as we like; what is hard is to determine whether this sharpness is worth achieving in a particular way . . . . The process of specifying meaning is a part of the process of inquiry itself.[9]

Kaplan's point seems particularly cogent for the student of social norms; the relationship between definitions and research is dynamic rather than static. Nevertheless, the subject matter of this study is legislative norms and this subject matter may be tentatively specified through definition.

Katz and Kahn provide the basis for the definition of norms employed in this study. They identify three criteria which define system norms:

> (1) there must be beliefs about appropriate and required behavior for group members as group members, (2) there must be objective or statistical commonality of such beliefs; not every member of the group must hold the same idea, but a majority of active members should be in agreement, (3) there must be awareness by individuals that there is group support for a given belief.[10]

Relying upon the definition given by Thibaut and Kelly, a fourth criterion can be made explicit: sanctions must be available for the enforcement of system norms. Thus legislative norms have reference to <u>widely shared sets of beliefs regarding appropriate or right behavior for legislators as legislators where these beliefs are not only shared but</u>

<u>believed to be shared by group members and where conformity is encouraged through group mechanisms</u>.

This definition has the advantage of making explicit the fact that the norm concept does not denote a single datum but has reference to a number of closely interwoven phenomena. More specifically, this definition emphasizes four properties of a norm. First, norms must differentiate between appropriate and inappropriate conduct. Second, norms reflect attitudinal consensus on the part of the members of an organization. Third, norms reflect beliefs given intersubjective support through member awareness that these beliefs are shared by others. Fourth, norms are supported by social mechanisms which function to assure that at least minimal conformity is likely. The significance of each of these properties for legislative research will be discussed separately in the following pages.

Appropriate and Inappropriate Behavior

In order to systematically describe the functional property of norms--the differentiation between appropriate and inappropriate conduct--three interrelated aspects of this differentiation must be described: the focus, content, and ranges of acceptable behavior associated with legislative norms. To identify those areas of behavior regulated by norms is to identify the foci of legislative norms. Further, norms specifically forbid some behaviors and encourage others. To identify particular behaviors affected by the normative

environment is to specify the content of legislative norms. Finally, within a single behavioral area norms may forbid some modes of conduct while leaving others to the discretion of the individual. To identify modes of conduct available to the legislator within the confines of norm conformity is to specify ranges of acceptable behavior associated with legislative norms.

The focus of legislative norms. A question fundamental to the normative structure of any social system involves the foci of norms operative within that system: which areas of conduct are regulated by social norms and, conversely, which are left to individual discretion? As Sherif has suggested, "All social behavior cannot be classified as deviating."[11] In American society at large, for example, social norms have traditionally regulated sexual behavior; lawn mowing behavior, on the other hand, appears relatively free of normative regulation. Anthropologists have often noted the cultural variability with regard to areas of behavior regulated by system norms. Similarly, within a single society the areas of conduct subject to normative regulation often vary from region to region and from organization to organization.

Legislative norms, then, would not be expected to govern all aspects of legislative life. Within a given legislature a significant portion of the behavior exhibited by legislators can be explained by reference to formal rules (formalized norms). Areas of behavior not regulated in this manner are

either governed by informal norms or left to the discretion of individual members. The procedures for voting, for example, are specified in the rules of legislatures and behavior seldom, if ever, deviates from these procedures. How a legislator votes (yea or nay), on the other hand, is not regulated by formal rules. Nevertheless, it seems likely that in many legislatures informal norms strongly encourage members to support their party with their votes on party issues.[12] On bills toward which the parties are indifferent, however, the legislator appears to be relatively free of normative regulation in deciding how to vote. Hence, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that the behavioral area "voting on party issues" is one focus of legislative norms whereas "voting on nonpartisan issues" is a behavioral area outside the normative focus of the legislature.

Despite an emphasis in legislative norm research on the functions of legislative norms, the question of focus is not identical with that of identifying the functions served by legislative norms. Functions, in this context, refer to what the norms "do" to preserve the legislature as a system. Focus, on the other hand, has simply to do with the areas in which behavior is regulated regardless of whether the results of this regulation serve any function for the system. Nevertheless, it seems likely that norms are most likely to emerge in areas critical to the life of an organization. As Secord and Backman have suggested,

> Behaviors that contribute to accomplishment of a group task are likely to be subjected to normative control, for they lead to achievement of the group goals and satisfaction, as well as to the avoidance of failure. Thus norms develop to ensure cooperative action and to establish consensus on attitudes relevant to group goals.[13]

Prior legislative research has suggested what some of the areas of conduct regulated by norms might be. Considerable evidence, for example, suggests that in the U.S. Congress there are norms which govern the selection of leadership personnel, especially within the committee structure.[14] Similarly, studies of both the Congress and state legislatures suggest that there are norms operative in the category of behavior that can be described broadly as "floor behavior."[15]

Content. Norms regulate behavioral areas with specific prescriptions and/or proscriptions. These prescriptions and proscriptions make up the content of the norms of a system. Normative foci and content are, of course, closely interrelated. Nevertheless, the identification of behavioral areas regulated by legislative norms is independent of the problem of specifying behaviors prescribed and/or proscribed by those norms. All legislative bodies, for example, may have norms regulating floor behavior; the content of these norms, however, may vary from one legislature to another.

Prior legislative norm research has focused almost exclusively upon the content of legislative norms. Although students of legislative process as well as legislators themselves are agreed that certain unwritten rules of conduct

enforced by sanctions are operative within legislative bodies, little precision has been achieved in identifying specific norm content.

The primary shortcoming of prior efforts to identify norm content is that many of the types of expected behavior identified, such as "integrity," "courtesy," "personal virtue," and "don't be a moocher," reflect expectations of behavior operative throughout American society; these items, hence, do not differentiate legislatures from other social systems. Obviously there is no reason why norms operative in one social system, a legislature for example, might not be operative in numerous other social systems as well. Nevertheless, the value of studying legislative norms is severely limited if the only norms found operative within legislatures are those widely accepted by individuals outside legislatures. As George Blair has noted,

> The so-called 'informal rules' or 'rules of the game' are not peculiar to the legislative system. Most persons would recognize these axioms for 'going along to get along' as the generalized rules of the game of life. Thus it might be questioned whether such rules and sanctions can be identified specifically to the legislative arena or whether they are merely transferred to the legislature by men and women who operate by them in their daily lives.[16]

That many of the norms identified by prior legislative studies are congruent with expectations of behavior operative outside the legislature is in itself a significant finding, but the failure to deal adequately with legislative norms which differentiate the legislature from other social groupings is indicative

of the limited conceptual and methodological development of the study of legislative norms.

Specifying ranges of acceptable behavior. As Muzafer Sherif has shown, norms vary in the amount of discretion that is left to the conforming individual in his choice of behaviors.[17] Given a behavioral area regulated by norms, specified behaviors are forbidden but a number of others are perhaps available to the conforming legislator. In Sherif's terms, "Norm-regulated behavior cannot be represented as a single point. The expected or ideal behavior within the bounds of a given norm is represented by a range of behaviors. . . ."[18] Some norms permit the legislator no choice (the formalized parliamentary norm of voting procedure, for example) while others permit a wide range of behavior ("don't talk too much," for example). The number of alternatives available within the bounds of norm conformity determines in rough fashion the breadth of the range of acceptable behavior.

In dealing with the content of legislative norms, students of legislative process have focused their attention only on clearly prescribed or proscribed behaviors without considering the range of behaviors permitted by each norm. Hence, only a part of each norm has been uncovered. What is needed is a clear demarcation between behaviors prohibited by legislative norms and those alternatives remaining within the range of acceptable behavior. What courses of action are available within the confines of norm conformity?

Directing attention to this question will yield important information regarding the degree to which behavior is standardized through normative regulation in legislative bodies. In short, analysis of behavioral alternatives available to the conforming legislator as well as those not available is required of a systematic examination of legislative norms.

Consensus

Norms are the product of attitudinal consensus on the part of the members of a social system. The appellation "social norm" cannot be attributed to an individual's attitudes whatever their character. Personal standards and social norms, though often intertwined in given empirical situations, remain analytically separate. As Sherif has noted, "A norm is a group property and, as such, is a sociological designation."[19] The norm concept refers to a possible attribute of the attitudes of a set of individuals who in some sense may be said to "belong" to a particular social group. To constitute a norm those attitudes must be widely shared. If members are divided in the opinion of a particular behavior--if no consensus is found--then that behavior cannot be said to be subject to normative regulation. Factors other than normative regulation such a formal rules, leadership influence, or external pressures may, of course, lead to a standardized behavior. Norms, however, are not inherent in all cases of standardized behavior and other factors capable of producing behavioral uniformity in the legislature should

not be confused with legislative norms.

Although students of legislative behavior have recognized the fact that norms reflect consensus opinion, legislative norm studies have not been able to uncover an empirical consensus supportive of claims that specific expectations are in fact widely shared. In the most systematic attempt to date to identify legislative norms, Wahlke and his associates identified forty-two particular types of expected behavior which they called norms.[20] They found that the most salient (as measured by number of mentions) "rule of the game" in any of the four legislatures examined was "performance of obligations" which was mentioned by 64% of the California legislators; the second most salient norm was "self restraint in debate" named by 59% of the Tennessee legislature. No other rule was mentioned by a majority of the legislators in any of the states studied. Rather than establishing the existence of legislative norms, their study would suggest the absence of norms in the four states studies if "statistical commonality" is a criterion which should be applied.

The failure to find consensus or even near consensus on specific norms in the Wahlke, et al., study perhaps reflects the weakness of an open-ended question rather than the absence of consensus. Certainly the structured interview situation would preclude the possibility of each legislator listing all of the "unofficial rules" that he could think of given unlimited time and adequate incentive. Each respondent is

likely to list but a few of these types of behavior. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to know how to treat items which are not frequently mentioned. One possibility is to say (as do Wahlke and his colleagues) that virtually any type of behavior mentioned is a "rule of the game" or norm. Another possibility is to establish some cut-off point, arguing that a particular type of behavior must be mentioned by a certain percentage of respondents before it can be considered a norm. However, there may be norms which would not be frequently mentioned. Legislators would not be expected to view all norms as external rules; rather, many norms are probably internalized and, hence, are not viewed as "rules of the game" as much as standards of personal conduct stemming from internal motivations. In other words, to the extent that the socialization process is successful in a legislature, legislators would be expected to internalize legislative norms.

This is not to say that the employment of open-ended questions has been a wasted effort. It was, however, only a limited first step toward the identification of norms. In fact, the effort to identify norms of any organization with which the investigator is unfamiliar should probably begin with semi-structured conversations with members, seeking to discover the types of behavior members are willing and able to describe as informal rules. Such conversation, however, should be only the basis for further investigation which

would seek to determine if, on any of the items, there is an adequate level of consensus to justify considering the prescription a norm.

Member Awareness of Shared Beliefs

Members of the system must not only share beliefs about the appropriateness of certain modes of conduct, they must also perceive others in the system as sharing these beliefs. The fact that legislators personally evaluate behaviors in a certain way--and that their evaluations are often quite similar--says a great deal about the normative environment of a legislature. A legislator's evaluation of the appropriateness of certain actions serves not only as a bssis for judging others' behavior, but also as a guideline for choosing between alternative courses of action available to him. To the extent that these evaluations are widely shared the researcher has reason to suspect that these evaluations are the product of group processes and that behavior will normally be in conformity with these evaluations.

The legislator's own evaluations of behavioral possibilities, however, are not the only consideration in determining a course of action or in judging others' performances in the legislature. Norms have both a subjective and objective component. Subjectively, the legislator has preferences which reflect his own sense of appropriateness, i.e. he is affectively oriented to various possible behaviors in different ways. Objectively, he perceives--perhaps correctly, perhaps

not--the preferences of others in the legislature, i.e. he is cognitively oriented to others' attitudes toward various possible behaviors. His actions--and his judgments of others' actions--may be predicated upon this latter dimension, the belief that "others" in the legislature evaluate behavior in a certain manner.

Norms reflect an intermeshing of these two dimensions: The individual not only evaluates behavior in a certain fashion, but also believes that others in the legislature similarly evaluate behavior. Hence, beliefs constitutive of norms draw support from correlative perceptions of similar beliefs held by others. Perceptions of others' attitudes, thereby, serve to validate the individual's attitudes and make these opinions a perceived characteristic of the legislature. As Festinger has noted, "An opinion, a belief, an attitude is 'correct,' 'valid,' and 'proper' to the extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar beliefs, opinions and attitudes."[21]

Sanctions

As an organization develops norms, it must also develop means of enforcing these norms. As Clyde Kluckhohn, et al., have suggested, "If conduct is to conform even approximately, to standards, there must--for most of the behavior of most people--be sanctions, organized or diffuse."[22] Positive and negative sanctions and the processes by which they are applied form a sanction system. This system is critical to the life of a social organization. Richard Jessor and his associates

have noted that "the effective operation of a sanction system is functionally so important to the maintenance of organized social relationships that social disorganization is frequently indexed by the absence or attenuation of this source of control. . . . "[23] In short, if the normative system of an organization is to be effective in regulating member behavior it must be supported by a sanction system.

Four conditions must be met if a sanction system is to be effective in preserving the normative structure of a legislative body: the norms must be transmitted to incoming members, positive and/or negative sanctions must be available to encourage conformity, members must believe that their behavior is monitored, and finally, some agent or agents must apply whatever sanctions are available. Each of these conditions will be briefly discussed here.

First, the norms of the legislature must be communicated to new members. Information regarding expected behavior can come through direct statements from more experienced members or may be communicated through subtle and less direct means. Norm transmission is, of course, a part of the broader socialization process undergone by new members of the legislature. Whether or not the new member internalizes the "rules of the game" is not important in this context; what is critical for the sanction system is that all members be aware of the norms operative in the legislature. There is no evidence suggesting that norm communication is not achieved in American legislatures.

Only two respondents interviewed in the four-state study, for example, could name no "unwritten rules of the game."[24] Significantly, no explanation of deviant behavior in legislative bodies has claimed ignorance of the norms as the reason for norm violation.

Second, members must believe that deviant behavior will be identified as such. Most members must believe that their behavior relevant to the normative structure of the legislature is monitored. Whether or not member behavior is actually monitored is perhaps less important in the short run. Nevertheless, continual unpunished norm violation should indicate for most members that sanctions are not available or that member behavior is not being monitored by those capable of applying sanctions. In other words, over a long period of time the amount of surveillance believed operative is probably a function of the amount of actual surveillance. Surveillance may be a function of a specialized group within the legislature or may be performed more or less regularly by virtually all members.

Third, there must be positive or negative sanctions, or both, applicable to norm relevant behavior. Norm violation must "cost" the violator something if the normative structure of the legislature is to be effective in the regulation of behavior. Sanctions may vary in severity, probability of application, and legitimacy. Emphasis in prior legislative research has tended to focus primarily upon negative

sanctions or punishments. In the four-state study, for example, Wahlke and his associates identified seven negative sanctions ranging from obstruction of legislation to reprimands.[25] Similarly, Matthews found deviants to be less "effective" in the Senate.[26] Positive sanctions, or rewards, on the other hand, have received little attention in legislative research. Nevertheless, students of legislative process have tended to assume that the person who conforms to the norms of the legislature is more esteemed, more influential, and more likely to be a part of the "inner club."

Fourth, appropriate sanctions must be applied by some individual, some group, or the membership as a whole. The sanctioning agents can, of course, vary according to the nature of the norm violation, the position of the violator, and so on. The power to apply some sanctions rests in the hands of a single individual (committee appointments in most state Houses are a perogative of the Speaker, for example) while other sanctions require application by virtually the entire membership (ostracism, for example). The sanctioning agents may be synonymous with those responsible for monitoring member behavior or the personnel performing these two functions may be different.

Research Design

This research is directed toward the systematic examination of aspects of the normative structure of a state legislature. The research reported here was generated by the

belief that earlier studies of legislative norms have tended to oversimplify the norm concept, that systematic research infused with a broader theoretical understanding of norms can provide insights into the structuring of legislative behavior previously overlooked. This study, therefore, represents an attempt to broaden our understanding of the normative environment in which legislative behavior is enveloped by thematically focusing on the individual properties making up norms operative in a legislative body. Rather than limiting analysis to the identification of behaviors condemned by the informal rules of the legislature, an attempt is made to describe the strength and character of normative regulations in several behavioral areas believed fundamental to the structure and functioning of a modern legislative body.

No standard, well-accepted operationalization of the norm concept has been developed despite widespread usage of the concept in empirical research. The means for operationalizing the norm concept in this research are adapted from the work of Professor Jay Jackson.[27] This operationalization is based on the premise that norms represent collective evaluations of behavior and that what is fundamental to locating norms in an organization is the identification of shared tendencies to approve or disapprove various modes of behavior.

Respondents were asked to evaluate fifty-five modes of conduct that could (in principle) occur in the legislature.

These modes of conduct are referred to as possible behaviors. The fifty-five possible behaviors were divided into eleven behavioral areas: (1) following party on substantive bills, (2) following party on procedural votes, (3) following party in committee actions, (4) publicity seeking, (5) floor speaking, (6) floor speaking for freshmen, (7) dealing in personalities, (8) development of subject-matter expertise, (9) bill introduction, (10) relations with special interest groups, and (11) support of the governor's programs.[28] Respondents' evaluations of possible behaviors were made using a nine-point Likert-type attitude measurement scale that provided for responses ranging from "strong disapproval" to "strong approval" with a midpoint labeled "indifferent." Mean evaluations were calculated for each behavioral possibility and then plotted on a graph in which the evaluative dimension is along the Y-axis and the possible behaviors within a single behavioral area are located on the X-axis. An example of this procedure can be seen in Figure 2.1. This operationalization yields the following information.

Norm focus. A behavioral area in which the mean scores for all possible behaviors approximate five (indifference) may be regarded as a behavioral area unregulated by legislative norms.

Norm content. Specific prescribed and proscribed behaviors can be identified by observing the location of the mean for the possible behaviors within a behavioral area.

FIGURE 2.1

GRAPHIC PATTERN FOR DISPLAY OF BEHAVIOR EVALUATIONS BY RESPONDENTS



B_1: A House member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_3: A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_4: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_5: A House member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

Range of acceptable behavior. Those behaviors toward which member attitudes are favorable or at least indifferent (behavioral possibilities with a mean score of five or above) reflect behaviors available within the confines of norm conformity, i.e. these behaviors form the range of acceptable behavior for a particular norm regulated area of behavior. In the example, the range of acceptable behavior includes two possible behaviors, B_2 and B_3.

Optimal behavior. The behavioral possibility which is maximally approved by members may be identified by comparing the means for those items making up a behavioral area. The behavioral possibility with the largest mean may be designated as the optimal behavior for that particular behavioral area. In the example, B_2 (the member who usually but not always supports party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill) is easily recognizable as the optimal behavior.

Norm crystallization. The amount of consensus on each behavioral possibility is measured by the standard deviation of the responses to that item. When the standard deviation is high, indicating that legislators' evaluations do not coincide, the degree of crystallization is low. For the fifty-five behavioral possibilities included in this study the standard deviations ranged from 0.84 to 2.71, about one-third of the items having standard deviations above 2.00. As a convention, where the standard deviations were above 2.00 (low crystallization items) the response distributions have been examined to determine the cause for low crystallization.

Low crystallization may indicate that members are divided in their evaluations, that a sizable number of the respondents approved of a behavior that is disapproved of by an equally sizable number. Low crystallization, however, may indicate that responses were spread over varying degrees of either approval or disapproval, that disagreement is centered on the degree of approval or disapproval and not approval or disapproval as such. Only by examining the response distributions on low crystallization items can the causes of low crystallization be determined.[29]

This operationalization, thus, provides a quantitative means of identifying the focus, content, range of acceptable behavior, and consensual support for the norms of a legislative body. It does not, however, enable the researcher to say anything of the sanction system or of legislators' awareness that their beliefs are shared by others in the legislature. Open-ended questions were used to elicit information regarding the presence, character, and agents of the sanction system. In order to explore Oklahoma legislators' perceptions of others' attitudes toward possible behaviors in each behavioral area respondents were asked to select the possible behavior in each behavioral area which they believe most members of their chamber would most approve. More specifically, respondents were asked the following question:

> Now we would like to ask you about the kinds of behavior that you think most members of the House (Senate) approve of. Using these cards would you tell me which of the items on each card most members of this chamber would most approve of.

On each card were the five possible behaviors making a particular behavioral area.

Distinguishing between subjective evaluations of possible behaviors and perceptions of others' evaluations of these behaviors opens a new dimension of the normative structure of the legislature to investigation. Exploration of this dimension is possible through comparisons between each respondent's choice of behaviors most preferred by most members of the chamber and, on the basis of his own evaluations of behaviors within each behavioral area, the behavior most preferred by the respondent. This comparison results in a rough measure of the congruence-incongruence between behavior personally preferred by the legislator and the behavior--within the same behavioral area--he believes most preferred by most of his colleagues.

The data utilized in this study were obtained through structured interviews with 134 of the 147 members of the 33rd Oklahoma Legislature. A team of seven interviewers completed the necessary interviewing in a period of five weeks during the early weeks of the second session of the legislature. Approximately one-fourth of the interviews were completed by the author. Of the 134 interviews, 126 were completed during the first two weeks of interviewing. Interviews usually took about 35 minutes each, although a few were completed in as few as twenty-five minutes and one lasted two-and-one-half hours.

An effort was made to interview the complete membership of both Houses, but for a variety of reasons thirteen legislators could not be interviewed: one legislator was ill, eight refused to be interviewed, two could not be contacted, and two agreed to interviews but never found time for the interview. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suspect systematic biases in the data collected. The completion rate for the two Houses was almost identical: interviews were completed with ninety (91%) members of the House and forty-four (92%) members of the Senate.

Generally, interviewing was done in the respondents' offices during working days of the legislature. Despite the press of a heavy workload and a fast-moving session, most legislators were amiable, fully cooperative, and thoughtful in their answers. House members tended to be more accessible than members of the Senate, but members of both chambers were equally cooperative once the interviewing had begun. Many of the respondents wanted to comment upon the information elicited through fixed-choice items; these comments were recorded in the margins of the interview schedule. Particularly helpful was the willingness of party and house leaders to discuss in detail many of the items included in the interview.

Professor Dick Cherry, himself a former state legislator, has written "there is really no way of knowing what it is like to be a legislator, except to be one."[30] Nevertheless, the researcher can and must attempt to grasp the

essential atmosphere in which legislative business is conducted. Such information often escapes even the most skillfully designed interview schedule. Hence, prior to, during, and after the actual interviewing, the author observed the two chambers at work from the galleries. Informal discussions with enumerable secretaries (who are often more candid than their bosses) and two television newsmen assigned to the capitol were also very helpful. Although at best impressionistic, information acquired through these means serves to give the researcher a "feel" for what goes on in the legislature and supplements data gathered in more systematic fashion.

Research Site

Since 1967 the Oklahoma legislature has met in annual sessions. By constitutional provision sessions of the legislature are limited to ninety legislative days. House members serve two-year terms while members of the Senate are elected for four-year terms. The terms of Senate members are staggered such that approximately one-half of the membership is elected every two years.

Wide political experience is not characteristic of Oklahoma legislators. Like most state legislatures, rapid turnover is common. The elections immediately following the court-ordered reapportionment of 1964 left only slightly more than one-half the House incumbents and slightly less than one-half the Senate incumbents in office. Membership in the thirty-third legislature included nineteen freshman House

members and three freshman Senators. Further, 70% of those interviewed in the House and 41.8% of those interviewed in the Senate held no political offices (elective or appointive) prior to their election to their respective chambers.

Only once since statehood has the Republican Party controlled a chamber of the state legislature (House in 1920). In partisan makeup the 33rd Oklahoma legislature was hence typical: The Democratic Party was the majority party in both chambers. In the House Democrats held a wide 78 to 21 partisan edge. The Senate was even more dominated by Democrats, the margin being 39 to 9. Despite Democratic dominance in the state legislature the Republican Party has made significant inroads in statewide elections. Although the Democrat David Hall was in the Governor's mansion at the time of the present study, two of the past three gubernatorial elections (1962, 1966) were won by Republicans. Further, a majority of Oklahoma voters have cast their ballots for the Republican candidate in five of the past six Presidential elections. The Democrats won Oklahoma's eight electoral votes only in the Goldwater debacle of 1964.

Leadership in the Oklahoma legislature is formally in the hands of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate President Pro Tempore. These positions are filled at the beginning of each new legislative session. As Professor John Wood has observed, "legislative leaders are <u>in fact</u> chosen in [Democratic] party caucus which meets prior to the opening

of the session."[31] Not the least of the powers of the leaders of the two chambers is their control over committee appointments. All committees as well as committee chairmanships in the House are appointed by the Speaker. In the Senate committee appointments are made by the Committee on Committees appointed by the Senate President Pro Tempore. At the time of the present study, Rex Privett of Pawnee was completing his second term as Speaker of the House. In the Senate, Finis Smith, an attorney from Tulsa, was serving his second term as Senate President Pro Tempore.

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29. For a discussion of problems involved in developing a measure of crystallization see Appendix B.

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CHAPTER III

NORMS AND THE STRUCTURING OF PARTISAN BEHAVIOR

Among the most important reciprocal expectations affecting legislative performance are those which focus more or less directly upon the partisan identification of the members of the legislature. Whatever party labels mean in terms of enacted behavior in the legislature, the stability of that meaning derives in part from norms differentiating between appropriate and inappropriate behavioral orientations to the party system. The party system in legislative bodies endures and functions with stability through norms which assign a degree of legitimacy to party claims for loyalty and allegiance. In this sense we may think of norms supportive of a particular party system as substitutes for informal influence, i.e. such norms reduce the need for informal influence by structuring behavior in terms amenable to the existent party system.

Partisanship in Legislatures

In examining partisanship, students of legislative behavior have tended to focus on three interrelated problems: description of partisanship in legislative bodies, examination of the impact of "outside" factors upon partisanship, and analysis of party leadership in the legislature.

Description of Partisanship

Basic to discussions of partisanship is the assumption that parties organize and structure behavior in the legislature. As Wahlke and his associates have noted, "political party must be perceived as a differentiating factor in the legislative struggle before partisanship can have much meaning at all."[1] If party makes a difference in legislatures then party identification must be linked to identifiable patterns of behavior. Generally, research describing differences between the two parties has been limited to analyses of voting behavior. By examining party cohesion scores and those votes on which a large percentage of one party opposed a large percentage of the other party, students of legislative behavior have made considerable headway in the effort to describe the degree of partisanship on roll-call votes in state legislatures and the Congress.[2] Summarizing a plethora of research focusing upon the effect of party upon roll-call voting, Jewell and Patterson note,

> Studies of roll call voting in Congress and in some of the two-party state legislatures have shown that on nonunanimous roll calls, the voting follows party lines more often than it is related to sectional, urban-rural, or other factors that have been tested. Occasionally the voting pattern on a particular roll call can be better explained by some factor other than party, but voting follows party lines (more or less perfectly) on the largest proportion of roll calls.[3]

Outside Factors and Partisanship

Partisanship, however, is the product of numerous factors and is not simply the result of party membership as such. Establishing the fact that voting and party membership are often closely related leads, therefore, to the search for factors that can account for this relationship. The task becomes that of explaining why certain identifiable patterns of behavior are related to party membership in the legislature. Factors most commonly mentioned as modifying and shaping partisan differences involve constituency demographic characteristics: they have been shown to significantly effect party behavior in the Congress and several state legislatures.[4] Other factors such as ideology, constituency party system, and constituents' opinions have also attracted attention.[5] At the committee stage of the legislative process, Fenno found that partisan differences within the House Committee on Education and Labor are largely the result of ideological differences between Democratic and Republican representation on the committee.[6] Jones, on the other hand, found the differing agricultural interests traditionally associated with the two parties to be the basis of partisan divisions within the House Committee on Agriculture.[7]

Party Leadership

The party membership of a legislator makes him a part of his party's legislative organization, an organization guided by leaders. Despite recognition of the importance of party leadership in legislative bodies, few systematic analyses of legislative leadership have emerged. Early studies of legislative party leadership were primarily historical and/or impressionistic in character and tended to be almost anecdotal in substance. Although still lacking in methodological rigor, more recent studies have tended to focus more directly upon the mechanisms, goals, and effects of party leadership. An often overlooked aspect of the four-state study of Wahlke and his associates was their rather sophisticated attempt to identify leadership roles in state legislatures.[8] Matthews provided an insightful examination of party leadership in the U.S. Senate based upon the assumption that party unity is the primary goal of leadership in that body, an assumption later questioned by James D. Barber.[9] More recently Froman and Ripley described "conditions" in which leadership can be expected to exert a greater influence over party members,[10] and in separate volumes Ripley and Jones have described leadership styles in the Congress through an analysis of majority and minority parties.[11]

Partisanship and Legislative Norms

The effects of party leadership, however, like the effects of partisan identification and constituency demographic characteristics, are not automatic or undifferentiated. Partisanship occurs in the midst of a complex set of interactions and not in a vacuum. Nevertheless, attempts to explain legislators' behavior with respect to political parties have tended to neglect the normative environment in which that behavior is embedded. From what we know about the nature of institutional cultures, it seems likely that the processes through which demographically (or other "independent" variables) produced cleavages develop--and the processes through which these factors affect the party system inside legislatures--are shaped by norms regulating the legislator's relationship to his party's leadership. Norms affecting the legitimacy of party leadership, the duties of the party member, and the role of parties inside the legislature should have a direct bearing upon the manifestations and effects of constituency characteristics, leadership styles, or other factors often utilized to explain partisanship inside legislatures.

Conflict, compromise and accommodation are more easily channelled by the parties if norms supportive of the party system are operative. This is not to suggest that norms concerning behavioral orientations to party are necessarily supportive of party unity; rather, it is to suggest that

parties may be an important focus of legislative norms in most American legislative bodies. It would be a mistake to assume without empirical evidence that norms regulating the legislator's relationship with his political party are present only in legislative bodies having cohesive and competitive party organizations. In some legislatures norms may encourage and reinforce partisan loyalties, thus contributing to unified or cohesive political parties. In other legislatures, however, norms may impede partisan loyalties and frustrate the development of cohesive political parties.

The important point is this: party organizations inside legislatures are a part of the environment confronting legislators and it is likely that the particular party system manifested in a legislature is supported by norms of conduct, whether the party system is dominated by one party or is more competitive. Hence the degree of partisanship exhibited by a legislator should not be viewed solely as a personal attribute or as the product of overt power relationships. The degree of partisanship manifested in a legislature may often be the product of group norms emerging from the ongoing interactional process found in the legislature. Partisan behaviors, for example, may be tempered or perhaps even eradicated in a legislative body with strong norms encouraging non-partisanship. Conversely, even the weakest psychological identification with political party may be translated into highly partisan behaviors in a legislative body in which

such behaviors are supported by the normative environment.

Viewing legislative parties as organizations directs attention to norms affecting the member's willingness to follow his party's leadership. An examination of legislative norms regarding the willingness of party members to follow party leaders should give some indication of the importance of party as a reference group, the potential influence of party leadership, and the role of parties in structuring the legislative process. Where legislators highly value the "party man"--the legislator who always goes along with party leadership--legislators can be expected to choose behavioral alternatives supporting party leadership more often than not. Party leadership would be a significant reference group for the members of the legislature and the high evaluations of those who follow party leadership would serve as a substitute for the open use of power and manipulation by party leadership. Conversely, where legislators highly esteem those who seldom or never follow party leadership, party leadership would be regarded as illegitimate; even attempts to sanction the party maverick would be unlikely to have member approval. Such normative environments are probably rare in legislative bodies for they would make party organization itself virtually impossible.

Legislators may, of course, reject both the party man and the frequent party maverick but accept the legislator

who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership. In other words, legislators may hold the independent legislator in high esteem while simultaneously rejecting the person who frequently acts against the desires of party leadership and the legislator who appears to be simply the servant of party leadership. The legitimacy of party claims of allegiance would be recognized, but legislators would balance those claims with those emanating from other sources and the desire for independence in the legislature. Leadership would hence be regarded as legitimate, but limited. Bargaining and manipulative skills would be prerequisites of successful party leadership; party unity would be achieved by party leadership only if leaders were capable of manipulating negative and positive sanctions effectively.

Two distributions of attitudes might suggest the absence of norms regarding the relationship between the party member and party leadership in the legislature. First, legislators may simply be indifferent towards this relationship. They may hold the party man, the independent, and the frequent party maverick in neither high nor low esteem, i.e. members may not care how willing others are to follow party leadership. Second, there may be no consensus among legislators with regard to the appropriate relationship between the member and his party's leadership. Some members, for example, may highly respect the party man while others find

such behavior inappropriate and still others remain indifferent. As was noted earlier, without consensus, norms cannot be said to exist. Such dissensus is nevertheless revealing, for it identifies a potential area of conflict among legislators. Whenever disagreements arise involving appropriate behavior for the party member in the context of controversial legislation the resulting conflicts might indeed be acrimonious. Further, dissensus regarding a particular stance toward party leadership would make that stance precarious for any member.

The impact of party leadership on legislative behavior may, of course, occur at several stages of the legislative process. Similarly, norms governing the legislator's willingness to follow party leadership may apply differentially to the various stages of the legislative process. In this study legislative norms affecting partisan behavior in three behavioral areas were examined, all having to do with the legislators' willingness to follow party leadership. The behavioral areas examined were behavior on procedural votes, behavior on substantive votes, and behavior in committees.

Party Leadership and Procedural Voting

As noted earlier, the most commonly observed relationship between behavior and party membership involves roll-call voting. Despite the proliferation of research delving

into the relationship between party membership and roll-call voting, little is known of legislative norms concerning party voting. Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting that norms promotive of party cohesion on roll-calls are operative in at least some state legislatures. Samuel Patterson, for example, found that members of the Wisconsin Assembly are generally expected to follow their party in voting, especially on procedural matters and party platform legislation.[12] Wahlke and his associates found that "behavior supportive of party or administration is emphasized more" in competitive two-party states than in less competitive states.[13] In his famous description of the folkways of the U.S. Senate Matthews made no mention of norms encouraging party support. He did find, however, that whereas "party 'discipline' is weak,. . . party 'identification' is strong"; hence party leadership might utilize party identification when dealing with recalcitrant party members.[14]

Although often inextricably intertwined in the legislative process, the distinction between procedural and substantive roll-calls is important for leadership. The relatively low visibility and facade of unimportance often characteristic of procedural matters may serve to give leadership greater influence on procedural votes than on substantive votes. As Lewis Froman, Jr., and Randall Ripley have suggested, "...the less visible the action, the better the leadership's chances of holding the line against

defectors."[15] The legislator who would have difficulty in explaining to his constituents why he voted against a particular bill, for example, would probably not be asked to justify a vote to recommit that same bill. Conversely, future constituency problems as a rationale for voting against one's party would seem more likely acceptable to party leadership on substantive than on procedural votes. Party irregularity on procedural matters would be particularly hazardous for the majority party member: conflicts with party leadership over procedural matters could mean a direct confrontation between the member and the presiding officer of the chamber.

Not only is the effectiveness of leadership dependent upon the type of issue at hand, norms affecting roll-call voting likely differ depending on whether the issue is substantive or procedural in content. Norms regulating the members' relationship with party leadership would be expected to encourage party regularity to a greater extent on procedural matters than on substantive issues. Such norms would function to reduce the range of conflict within the parties while permitting disagreement over substantive issues. Norms encouraging party support on procedural issues would also give leadership of the two parties greater control in structuring conflict within the legislature.

In order to examine the normative environment surrounding voting on procedural matters respondents were

asked to evaluate each of the following behaviors using the nine-item Likert-type scale mentioned earlier:

1. A House (Senate) member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

2. A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

3. A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

4. A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

5. A House (Senate) member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

Means for these items for House members are shown in Figure 3.1. Two of the five possible behaviors are within the range of acceptable behavior: on the whole, House members approved of the legislator who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on procedural matters and the legislator who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in such matters. Approval of both these items, however, bordered on indifference. Although the means indicate approval or indifference towards these types of behavior, there was little consensus among Oklahoma House members regarding such behaviors; the standard deviations for both items were well above 2.0. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of the respondents indicated indifference or approval towards both behaviors.

FIGURE 3.1

PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_3: A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_4: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_5: A House member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

Three behaviors in this behavioral area lie outside the range of acceptable behavior. The legislator who always supports his party's leadership was rejected with more than half of the respondents indicating varying degrees of disapproval. Nevertheless, this item elicited a remarkable range of responses among House members. The standard deviation for responses was 2.71, the largest of any item among the fifty-five norm items included in the interview schedule. While one-fourth of the respondents strongly disapproved of the party man on procedural matters, an almost equal number approved of this behavior. Such dissensus would provide conflicting cues to the incoming legislator and suggests that strong party loyalty is ambiguously received by the members of the Oklahoma House. In short, the ground is treacherous for the party man.

More clearly rejected by members of the House was the legislator who more frequently disregards party leadership in deciding how to vote on procedural matters. The largest number of extreme answers was elicited in response to the legislator who never follows his party's leadership on procedural matters. Somewhat less extreme disapproval was shown towards the legislator who seldom follows his party's leadership on procedural matters. Although the diversity of responses to this item resulted in a standard deviation of 1.98, two-thirds of the respondents indicated disapproval of the legislator who seldom follows party leadership on procedural roll-calls.

Senate evaluations of possible behaviors within this behavioral area resembled those in the House. Means from members of the Senate to these items, shown in Figure 3.2, were quite similar to those from House members; acceptable behaviors and optimal behaviors were identical in the two chambers. Although well crystallized in both houses, crystallization was slightly greater in the House than in the Senate with regard to the legislator who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership on procedural matters. Crystallization was greater, however, in the Senate on all other items in this behavioral area. Again, however, the range of evaluations of the party man on procedural votes was unusually large: Although slightly more than one-half the respondents disapproved of the legislator who always follows his party's leadership on procedural votes, one-third approved of such behavior.

Substantive Roll-Calls and Party Leadership

Similar items were used to examine the normative environment surrounding voting on substantive bills. Legislators were asked to evaluate the following five types of behavior:

1. A House (Senate) member who <u>always</u> follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

2. A House (Senate) member who <u>usually, but not always</u>, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

FIGURE 3.2

PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_2: A Senate member who usually, but not always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_3: A Senate member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_4: A Senate member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_5: A Senate member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

3. A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

4. A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

5. A House (Senate) member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

Means for House members are shown in Figure 3.3 and those for members of the Senate are shown in Figure 3.4.

In both chambers "usual" and "sometimes" support of party leadership on substantive roll-calls were the only behaviors found to be within the range of acceptable behavior. These possible behaviors, however, were more positively evaluated than the corresponding behaviors in the procedural voting behavioral area. Put differently, although the range of acceptable behavior is identical on procedural and substantive voting, legislators were less indifferent regarding items making up the range of acceptable behavior in the substantive voting area. Unlike evaluations in the procedural voting area, sometimes following and sometimes not following party leadership was the optimal behavior in the substantive voting behavioral area. In the House only 3.3% of the respondents indicated disapproval of such behavior; similarly, only 7.2% of the Senators interviewed disapproved. These findings would seem to indicate that party regularity on procedural votes is held in higher esteem than party regularity on substantive

FIGURE 3.3

SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_3: A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_4: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_5: A House member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

FIGURE 3.4

SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_2: A Senate member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_3: A Senate member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_4: A Senate member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_5: A Senate member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

votes. Additionally, crystallization was much greater on items found within the range of acceptable behavior in the substantive voting behavioral area than in the procedural area.

Negative evaluations were again given to the "party man" and the frequent party maverick. As was the case with the procedural area, greatest disapproval was generated by the legislator who never follows party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill. Evaluations of all behaviors found to be outside the range of acceptable behavior were well crystallized among House members. In the Senate only evaluations of the "party man" failed to be well crystallized.

Committee Behavior and Party Leadership

The ease with which roll-call votes may be analyzed often tempts the student of legislative behavior to limit analysis of partisanship to voting behavior alone. But as Wahlke and his associates have suggested, "A legislator's conduct in the final voting provides little basis for inferences about his behavior at other stages of the legislative process."[16] Identification of partisan behaviors--and norms affecting those behaviors--at stages prior to the final vote on legislation is important for an understanding of the impact of party on the legislative process. Partisanship has several dimensions and the analysis of this phenomenon should not be limited to any one stage of the legislative process.

The most important hurdle for a bill is often the committee stage. As has been noted by numerous observers, the veto power of committees is often formidable: through a variety of means proposed legislation may be effectively halted in committee. Since Woodrow Wilson's famous analysis of the Congress, committees have been a major focus of legislative studies. The normative environment in which committee behavior is enveloped, however, has only recently attracted attention.[17] Not surprisingly, one of the more important aspects of the normative environment of committees identified in this research involves the degree of partisanship manifested in committee meetings.

In Oklahoma, as in most state legislatures, majority party leadership is usually able to exert considerable influence in committees through control of committee personnel. The Speaker of the House appoints all committees and committee chairmen without benefit of a committee on committees. Complaining of the Speaker's influence over standing committees, one House member remarked that "Things are so bad around here that a seniority system would be a progressive reform." Committees in the upper chamber are similarly influenced by the President Pro Tempore, but control is somewhat less direct: The President Pro Tempore selects a committee on committees which in turn makes committee appointments. Party balance or quotas for the partisan distribution of committee seats as practiced in

the Congress is not used in either chamber.

In order to examine partisan norms affecting committee behavior respondents were asked to evaluate the following types of legislators:

1. A House (Senate) member who always follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

2. A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

3. A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

4. A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

5. A House (Senate) member who never follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

Means from the House are shown in Figure 3.5. Means from the Senate are shown in Figure 3.6.

As was the case with the previously examined areas involving partisanship, the range of acceptable behavior in this behavioral area included two items, "usual" and "sometimes" support of party leadership. Attitudes towards both of these behaviors were well crystallized in the two chambers. In both chambers legislators tended to be rather indifferent towards the legislator who usually but not always follows party leadership in deciding upon a course of action in committees: the mean for this item was 5.67 in the House and 5.19 in the Senate. More clearly approved

FIGURE 3.5

COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who always follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_3: A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_4: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_5: A House member who never follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committee.

FIGURE 3.6

COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who always follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_2: A Senate member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_3: A Senate member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committee.

B_4: A Senate member who seldom follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_5: A Senate member who never follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

was the legislator who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership.

Again, as they had with regard to voting on both procedural and substantive issues, Oklahoma legislators of both chambers rejected the party man and the frequent party maverick. Greatest disapproval was registered for the legislator who never follows party leadership in committees: only 3.4% of the House members and none of the Senate members approved of this behavior. Though with somewhat less intensity, both chambers similarly rejected the legislator who seldom follows party leadership in committees: only about 10% of the respondents in each chamber indicated approval of this behavior.

The diversity of opinion that had characterized evaluations of the party man on procedural and substantive voting was also characteristic of evaluations of the legislator who always supports party leadership in deciding upon a course of action in committees. Although only about one-fifth of the members in each house approve of the party man in committees evaluations were nevertheless dispersed such that the standard deviations of the responses in each chamber were well above 2.00.

Party Membership and Party-Related Norms

Attitudes toward partisan related behaviors do not appear to be related to party identification. Although the

small number of Republicans in the Senate precludes analysis of member evaluations by party in that chamber, analysis by party is possible in the House. Means to the items involving procedural voting are shown by party in Figure 3.7 for House members. Democrats were more prone than Republicans to give higher evaluations of legislators who more frequently support party leadership and lower evaluations to those who only sometimes, seldom, or never follow party leadership. Even greater similarity between the two parties is apparent in behavioral areas involving party support on substantive bills (Figure 3.8) and in committees (Figure 3.9). Although differences are too small for anything but tentative conclusions, it is interesting to note that in all three behavioral areas the means for Democrats were lower than that for Republicans with regard to the legislator who seldom follows party leadership and the legislator who never follows party leadership. These differences are perhaps explicable by reference to the fact that the Speaker's office was occupied by a Democrat, thus perhaps increasing the likelihood and/or severity of sanctions applied to party mavericks in the Democratic Party. Also, party loyalty may mean more to members of a majority party that controls the governorship as well as both chambers of the legislature.

Consensus and Party-Related Norms

The amount of consensus elicited by items within these behavioral areas varied considerably from item to

FIGURE 3.7

PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS BY PARTY, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_3: A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_4: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

B_5: A House member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

FIGURE 3.8

SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS BY PARTY, HOUSE



Democrats
Republicans

B_1: A House member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_3: A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_4: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

B_5: A House member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

FIGURE 3.9

COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS BY PARTY, HOUSE



Democrats - - -
Republican ———

B_1: A House member who always follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_3: A House member who sometimes follows and sometime does not follow his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_4: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

B_5: A House member who never follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

item. Nevertheless, a rather consistent pattern in the dispersion of the distribution associated with each item did emerge. The standard deviations for the five possible behaviors in each behavioral area are shown for House members in Figure 3.10 and for members of the Senate in Figure 3.11. An examination of these graphs suggests that degree of interpersonal agreement among Oklahoma legislators tends to increase as the behavior in question becomes more anti-party. That is, as the suggested behavior became more anti-party the standard deviation of responses decreased. Somewhat surprisingly, attitudes toward items suggesting somewhat ambiguous, but nevertheless not anti-party, behaviors tended to be widely shared; hence, attitudes toward "usual" and "sometimes" support of political party leadership were relatively well crystallized. Likewise, respondents agreed in their evaluations of the legislator who frequently fails to support party leadership: crystallization was greatest on these items. Little agreement was apparent, however, in attitudes toward the legislator who always supports party leadership. Despite the fact that in all three behavioral areas a majority of the respondents indicated disapproval of the party man, crystallization was low.

Intersubjective Support

In order to explore Oklahoma legislators' perceptions of others' attitudes toward possible behaviors in the three

FIGURE 3.10

STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PROCEDURAL VOTING, SUBSTANTIVE VOTING, AND COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREAS, HOUSE



Procedural Voting Behavioral Area · · · · ·

Substantive Voting Behavioral Area – – –

Committee Behavior Behavioral Area ———

FIGURE 3.11

STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PROCEDURAL VOTING, SUBSTANTIVE VOTING, AND COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREAS, SENATE

Procedural Voting Behavioral Area · · · · · ·

Substantive Voting Behavioral Area - - - -

Committee Behavior Behavioral Area ———

party-related behavioral areas respondents were asked to select the possible behavior in each of these behavioral areas which they believe most members of their chamber would most approve. The results for party-related behavioral areas are shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.

An examination of these tables permits several generalizations. First, in all cases there is relatively widespread consensus among chamber members that a particular type of legislator is preferred by "others" of their chamber. Of those responding to these items, substantially more than half were in agreement as to the most preferred in all cases. Such widespread agreement should provide relatively unambiguous cues to the neophyte legislator as to expectations of "party behavior." Few respondents expressed the belief that anti-party behavior was preferred by their peers: No respondent believed the legislator who never follows party leadership to be preferred in any of the partisan-related behavioral areas. Similarly only a negligible percentage believed that the legislator who seldom follows party leadership is preferred by the other members of their chamber. Second, there is little difference between responses from the two chambers. Similarly, only minor differences are evident in the responses of Democrats and Republicans in the two chambers.

These findings suggest that these perceptions of "preferred behavior" are indigenous to the legislature as

TABLE 3.1

PERCEPTIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PARTY

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who Follows Party Leadership on Procedural Votes				
	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
House	14.5%	63.9%	20.5%	1.2%	0.0%
Democrats (N=63)	14.3	61.9	22.2	1.6	0.0
Republicans (N=20)	15.0	70.0	15.0	0.0	0.0
Senate	7.5	65.0	25.0	2.5	0.0
Democrats (N=32)	3.1	62.5	31.3	3.1	0.0
Republicans (N=8)	25.0	75.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 3.2

PERCEPTIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PARTY

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who Follows Party Leadership in Deciding How to Vote on a Bill				
	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
House	6.0%	71.1%	22.9%	0.0%	0.0%
Democrats (N=63)	6.3	69.8	23.8	0.0	0.0
Republicans (N=20)	5.0	75.0	20.0	0.0	0.0
Senate	2.5	67.5	27.5	2.5	0.0
Democrats (N=32)	0.0	62.5	34.4	3.1	0.0
Republicans (N=8)	12.5	87.5	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 3.3

PERCEPTIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PARTY

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who Follows Party Leadership in Determining a Course of Action in Committee				
	Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
House	12.0%	55.4%	32.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Democrats (N=63)	12.7	58.7	28.6	0.0	0.0
Republicans (N=20)	10.0	45.0	45.0	0.0	0.0
Senate	2.6	56.4	41.0	0.0	0.0
Democrats (N=32)	6.2	50.0	43.8	0.0	0.0
Republicans (N=7)	0.0	83.7	14.3	0.0	0.0

such and not to a particular party or chamber of the Oklahoma legislature. These findings suggest, in George Herbert Mead's terminology, that the referent for the legislators' perceptions with regard to a preferred behavioral orientation to party leadership in the legislature is a "generalized other." Validation of this hypothesis would require further investigation using questions specifically designed to probe for referents of beliefs about appropriate party conduct.

Third, with respect to all three areas of behavior--party support in committee, on procedural votes, and on substantive votes--the legislator seen as most preferred is one who "usually but not always" supports party leadership. Oklahoma legislators do not believe that their peers prefer automatic acquiescence to party leadership. Nevertheless, frequent violations of party regularity are not perceived as preferred. In short, the Oklahoma legislator probably feels "expected" to usually go along with his party.

Congruence-Incongruence

To what extent is there agreement or congruence between a legislator's own evaluation of possible behaviors and his perception of others' evaluations? Despite the fact that the optimal behavior in two of the three behavioral areas was sometime support of party leadership, the behavior seen as most preferred by others was usual support of party

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Congruence-Incongruence

To what extent is there agreement or congruence between a legislator's own evaluation of possible behaviors and his perception of others' evaluations? Despite the fact that the optimal behavior in two of the three behavioral areas was sometime support of party leadership, the behavior seen as most preferred by others was usual support of party

leadership in all three behavioral areas. That is, legislators' perceptions of others' preferences appear to be at variance with their own preferences. The first question, then, involves the extent of congruence between personal evaluations and perceptions of others' preferences. High congruence between personal preferences and perceived preferences of others would be expected. There is no evidence in either legislative behavior research or in norm theory itself that would suggest the existence of widespread discrepancies between the legislator's evaluations of possible behaviors and his perceptions of others' evaluations of the same behaviors. Congruence should itself be a product of the on-going interactional process.

Contrary to expectations, however, the findings suggest widespread discrepancies in all three party-related behavioral areas. Comparisons between respondents' choice of behaviors most preferred by most chamber members and their own preferences suggest rather widespread incongruence in these behavioral areas. As is shown in Table 3.4, the percentage of respondents giving congruent responses is low in both chambers. Most surprising was the low congruence between perceptions and personal evaluations in the procedural voting behavioral area: less than fifty percent of the respondents in each chamber gave congruent responses. As might be expected congruence between personal preferences and perceptions of others' preferences was consistently higher in the smaller

TABLE 3.4

CONGRUENCE: PARTY-RELATED
BEHAVIORAL AREAS, BY CHAMBER

	House	Senate
Procedural Voting		
Behavioral Area	45% (N=80)	46.2% (N=39)
Substantive Voting		
Behavioral Area	53.7% (N=82)	66.7% (N=39)
Committee Behavior		
Behavioral Area	51.2% (N=82)	67.5% (N=42)

and more closely knit Senate than in the larger, more impersonal House. Nevertheless, the major result overshadows all else: there is very little agreement between the legislators' perceptions of what others most prefer and their own preferences in either chamber of the Oklahoma legislature.

If congruence is the result of continued interaction with other members of the legislature, then congruence should increase as seniority increases. As is shown in Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, however, the relationship between tenure and congruence is inconsistent within and across behavioral areas. In the House, the percentage of congruent responses tends to increase as the number of previous legislatures served increases in two behavioral areas, committee behavior and substantive voting. With respect to the procedural voting behavioral area, however, the reverse is true: congruence is greatest among freshmen House members and least among those with the greatest seniority. In the Senate the N's are too small for anything but tentative hypotheses, but no pattern whatsoever emerges among Senators' responses when examined by seniority.

Somewhat easier to interpret is the relationship between position in the leadership structure of the legislature and congruence between personal beliefs regarding behavior and perceptions of others' preferences regarding the same behavior. Leaders, it was thought, would be more

TABLE 3.5

CONGRUENCE: PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PREVIOUS LEGISLATURES SERVED

	House		Senate	
	Percentage Congruent	Total N:	Percentage Congruent	Total N:
Previous Legislatures Served				
None	62.5%	16	0.0%	2
1-2	45.0	25	36.4	11
3-5	34.5	29	55.0	20
6+	30.0	10	50.0	6

TABLE 3.6

CONGRUENCE: SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PREVIOUS LEGISLATURES SERVED

	House		Senate	
	Percentage Congruent	Total N:	Percentage Congruent	Total N:
Previous Legislatures Served				
None	56.3%	16	100.0%	2
1-2	53.8	26	55.5	11
3-5	53.3	30	71.4	21
6+	70.0	10	66.7	6

TABLE 3.7

CONGRUENCE: COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PREVIOUS LEGISLATURES SERVED

	House		Senate	
	Percentage Congruent	Total N:	Percentage Congruent	Total N:
Previous Legislatures Served				
None	50.0%	16	0.0%	2
1-2	61.5	26	63.7	11
3-5	60.0	30	75.0	20
6+	10.0	12	66.7	6

likely to evaluate possible behaviors in a manner similar to their perceptions of how others in the legislature evaluate the same behaviors. Congruence, in other words, would be expected to be greatest among leadership in the legislature. Operationally defining leadership as formal majority leadership, formal minority leadership, and committee chairmen, examination of this hypothesis is possible. Again, however, no empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis can be found in the results. As is shown in Tables 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, no clear pattern emerges between leadership position and congruence. Leaders are no more likely than non-leaders to prefer behaviors seen as most preferred by most of their colleagues.

Given the high percentage of respondents giving incongruent responses, the structure of these responses becomes important. The expectation that personal preferences toward party-related behaviors would be congruent with perceptions of most others' preferences--especially for those with greater seniority and those with leadership positions--was founded upon the assumption that the legislator's own attitudes would be shaped by his perceptions of others' attitudes. This assumption, as has been shown, is empirically false in the case of the Oklahoma legislature. Personal preferences are only loosely related to perceptions of others' preferences.

TABLE 3.8

CONGRUENCE: PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND POSITION

	House		Senate	
	Percentage Congruent	Total N:	Percentage Congruent	Total N:
Position				
Leaders	46.7%	30	46.2%	26
Non-leaders	44.0	50	46.7%	13

TABLE 3.9

CONGRUENCE: SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND POSITION

	House		Senate	
	Percentage Congruent	Total N:	Percentage Congruent	Total N:
Position				
Leaders	54.8%	31	74.1%	27
Non-leaders	52.9	51	53.3	13

TABLE 3.10

CONGRUENCE: COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND POSITION

	House		Senate	
Position	Percentage Congruent	Total N:	Percentage Congruent	Total N:
Leaders	67.7%	31	66.7%	27
Non-leaders	60.8	51	66.7	12

This becomes clearer when the relationship between perceptions of others' preferences and personally preferred behaviors is examined more systematically. This relationship is shown in Tables 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 for House members and Tables 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 for members of the Senate.

In both chambers--and for all three behavioral areas--the greatest proportion of those believing that their peers prefer usual or sometimes support of party leaders also personally prefer usual or sometimes support of party leadership. In all three party-related behavioral areas congruence was highest for those perceiving others as preferring the legislator who sometimes follows party leadership and sometimes does not. Congruence was second highest for those believing that others most prefer the legislator who usually follows party leadership; although a significant proportion of those holding this belief personally prefer the legislator who only sometimes supports party leadership. The N's for those who perceive others as preferring the legislator who always follows party leadership are too small for anything but cautious inferences. It appears, however, that congruence is lowest for this group.

Most commonly incongruence was the product of respondents who preferred less frequent support of party leadership than they perceived others as preferring. In each of these behavioral areas approximately one-third of

TABLE 3.11

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who Follows Party Leadership on Procedural Votes				
		Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Perceived Preferred Behavior: Follow Party Leadership on Procedural Votes	Always	5.0%	3.8%	5.0%	1.3%	0.0%
	Usually	11.3	28.8	22.5	2.5	1.3
	Sometimes	2.5	1.3	11.3	1.3	1.3
	Seldom	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Never	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=100.5%*
						N=80

*Total greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 3.12

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who Follows Party Leadership on Substantive Votes				
		Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Perceived Preferred Behavior: Follow Party Leadership on Substantive Votes	Always	1.2%	2.4%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%
	Usually	6.1	35.4	30.5	0.0	0.0
	Sometimes	1.2	3.7	17.1	0.0	0.0
	Seldom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Never	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Total=100.0%

N=80

TABLE 3.13

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who Follows Party Leadership in Committee				
		Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Perceived Preferred Behavior: Follow Party Leadership in Committee	Always	3.7%	2.4%	4.9%	1.2%	0.0%
	Usually	2.4	34.1	17.1	2.4	0.0
	Sometimes	2.4	2.4	25.6	0.0	1.2
	Seldom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Never	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.8%*
						N=82

*Total less than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 3.14

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who Follows Party Leadership on Procedural Votes				
		Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Perceived Preferred Behavior: Follow Party Leadership on Procedural Votes	Always	2.6%	5.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Usually	15.4	28.2	20.5	0.0	2.6
	Sometimes	0.0	10.3	15.4	0.0	0.0
	Seldom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Never	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=100.1%*
						N=39

*Total greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 3.15

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who Follows Party Leadership on Substantive Votes				
		Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Perceived Preferred Behavior: Follow Party Leadership on Substantive Votes	Always	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Usually	2.6	43.6	23.1	0.0	0.0
	Sometimes	0.0	0.0	25.6	2.6	0.0
	Seldom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Never	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=100.1%*
						N=39

*Total greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 3.16

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who Follows Party Leadership in Committee				
		Always	Usually	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
Perceived Preferred Behavior: Follow Party Leadership in Committee	Always	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Usually	5.3	26.3	26.3	0.0	0.0
	Sometimes	0.0	2.6	36.8	0.0	0.0
	Seldom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Never	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.9%*
						N=38

*Total less than 100.0 because of rounding.

the House members and about one-fourth of those in the Senate gave responses indicating that most others prefer more frequent support of party leadership than they themselves prefer. For House members, these responses accounted for 70.5% of the incongruent responses in the procedural voting behavioral area, 76.3% of those in the substantive voting behavioral area, and 80.0% of those in the committee behavior behavioral area. In the Senate, 52.4% of the incongruent responses in the procedural voting behavioral area, 91.7% of those in the substantive voting behavioral area, and 76.9% of those in the committee behavior behavioral area are accounted for by those who preferred less frequent support of party leadership than they believed to be preferred by most others.

Summary

Attitudes concerning following party leadership in three behavioral areas have been examined in this chapter. In all three partisan-related behavioral areas the range of acceptable behavior included only the legislator who usually supports party leadership and the legislator who sometimes does so. On matters having direct relevance to the substance of legislative outputs--voting on bills and committee behavior--the member who remains relatively independent of party leadership was the ideal of Oklahoma legislators. Preference for the independent member who only sometimes supports his party's leadership in these two behavioral areas, however,

tended to have low visibility; less than one-half of the respondents in each chamber recognized the fact that most others in their chamber most prefer this type of behavior. Nevertheless, for about one-half of the House respondents and two-thirds of those in the upper chamber congruence between their own preferences and their perceptions of most others' preferences was found in these two behavioral areas.

The fact that members of both houses disapproved of both the party man and the party maverick but tended to be relatively indifferent towards the legislator who usually supports party leadership perhaps reflects the ambiguous character of party politics in the Oklahoma legislature. The vastly outnumbered Republicans have no power as a party, lacking even the ability to enforce party regularity. This was apparent in the comments of a Republican House member: "So I don't go along with the party--what can Republican leadership do to me? They simply don't control anything around here." Conversely, the wide majority enjoyed by the Democrats suggests that numerous party defections would probably not affect partisan outcomes in the legislature.

Normative support for more frequently following party leadership was found in the procedural voting behavioral area where respondents in both chambers tended to most approve of the legislator who usually follows party leadership. Further, most respondents believed that others in their chamber also most approved of this behavioral possi-

bility; slightly more than three-fifths of the respondents in each chamber indicated that most members most prefer the legislator who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership on procedural votes. Contrary to what these findings suggest, however, congruence between personal preferences and perceptions of others' preferences was low in this behavioral area: less than one-half of the respondents gave congruent responses.

In all three partisan-related behavioral areas congruence between personal preferences and perceptions of most others' preferences was low. Congruence was somewhat lower in the House than in the Senate and was shown to be related to seniority. In the substantive voting and committee behavior behavioral areas congruence increased as seniority increased. In the Senate a less clear relationship between seniority and incongruence was uncovered: those who had served in three to five previous legislatures gave a higher percentage of congruent responses than those with less or more seniority. No relationship was found between leadership-nonleadership position and congruence in either chamber.

Footnotes

1. John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy D. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 351.

2. See, for example, Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," American Political Science Review, XLIX (September, 1955), 773-791; Charles W. Wiggins, "Party Politics in the Iowa Legislature," Midwest Journal of Political Science, II (February, 1967), 86-97; Hugh L. LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates: Party and Constituency Influences," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII (February, 1969), 33-57; David Mayhew, Party Loyalty Among Congressmen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

3. Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 416-417.

4. See, for example, Thomas A. Flinn and Harold L. Wolman, "Constituency and Roll Call Voting: The Case of Southern Democratic Congressmen," Midwest Journal of Political Science, X (May, 1966), 192-199; Leroy Rieselbach, "The Demography of Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," American Political Science Review, LVIII (September, 1964), 577-588; Duncan MacRae, "The Relation Between Roll-Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, XLVI (December, 1952), 1046-1055; Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," Western Political Quarterly, XIV (June, 1961), 473-480; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963).

5. Loren K. Waldman, "Liberalism of Congressmen and the Presidential Vote in Their Districts," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XI (February, 1967), 73-85; Malcolm Parsons, "Quasi-Partisan Conflict in a One Party Legislative System: The Florida Senate," American Political Science Review, LVI (September, 1962), 605-614; Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), 45-56.

6. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House of Representatives and Federal Aid to Education," in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, ed. by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (2nd ed.; Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 283-323.

7. Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Congressional Subcommittee," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (November, 1962), 327-344.

8. John Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, pp. 170-192.

9. Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1960); James D. Barber, "Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion," Journal of Politics, XXVIII (May, 1966), 347-367.

10. Lewis Froman, Jr. and Randall Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case for the House Democrats," American Political Science Review, LIX (March, 1965), 52-63.

11. Randall B. Ripley, Majority Party Leadership in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968); Charles O. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970).

12. Samuel Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," Western Political Quarterly, XIV (June, 1961), 460-472.

13. John Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, p. 150.

14. Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, p. 123.

15. Lewis Froman, Jr. and Randall Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership," p. 61.

16. John Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, p. 239.

17. See, for example, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966); Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Congressional Subcommittee."

CHAPTER IV

TASK-RELATED NORMS

The legislature brings together an assortment of individuals with differing backgrounds, personalities, and goals. The tasks of the legislature require behavior structured in relatively stable patterns, a structuredness unlikely to occur without normative regulation. Formal rules offer a framework for behavior, giving legislative life a skeletal structure that provides a loose outline of appropriate procedures. This framework is augmented by norms that serve as a working consensus enabling legislators to work together despite the variety of their biographies. Working together in an environment that demands cooperative and collective action while making intense demands of their time, abilities, and political skills, these individuals become a social group. As David Truman has observed,

> Such a body is not properly conceived of as a collection of individual men, unorganized and without internal cohesion. Nor is it any better accounted for exclusively in terms of the formal, legal structure of the legislature. A legislative body has its own group life, sometimes as a unit, perhaps more often as a collection of subgroups or cliques. It has its own operating structure, which may approximate or differ sharply from the formal organization of the chamber. When a man first joins such a body, he enters a new group. Like others, it has its standards and conventions, its largely unwritten system of obliga-

> tions and privileges. To these the neophite must conform, at least in some measure, if he hopes to make effective use of his position.[1]

In this environment legislators take part in a number of interrelated activities which collectively serve to perform the functions of the legislature as a governmental unit. Daily activities in the legislature--committee meetings, lengthy floor sessions, drafting legislation, etc.--take place in this social context. Since these activities often involve relatively standardized situations, reciprocal expectations differentiating between appropriate and inappropriate ways of conducting legislative business are likely to emerge. These reciprocal expectations or norms collectively define the "right way of doing things" and give the legislative process a structuredness that goes well beyond that enforced by formal rules. Successfully taking part in the daily activities that make up the legislative process requires that the legislators be able to predict with some degree of reliability responses their own actions are likely to evoke from other members, that the informal structure of the legislature as well as its formal rules be understood.

Students of legislative norms have tended to emphasize task-related norms, suggesting that the most important feature of the normative environment surrounding legislative life are those norms which facilitate the work of the legislature. As Wahlke, et al., have suggested, "one . . . would

expect legislative rules of the game . . .to be couched in terms directly relevant to specific legislative functions and purposes."[2] Hence, Matthews found that U. S. Senators are expected to be "work horses and not show horses," serve an apprenticeship, specialize in some narrow substantive area, be courteous to other members, reciprocate with other members, and be loyal to the chamber.[3] All of these norms, it was argued, serve to promote the performance of legislative tasks and facilitate interactions in the Senate. Similarly, norms promoting the expeditious handling of legislative business, impersonality, and "proper" relations with lobbyists have been identified in state legislatures.[4]

In this chapter task-related norms operative in the Oklahoma legislature will be investigated. These norms are divided into three general areas. First, norms affecting floor behavior through their influence on behavioral areas involving publicity seeking, the frequency of floor speaking, and dealing in personalities in floor debate will be probed. Second, norms affecting the likelihood of subject matter specialization occurring in the legislature will be examined by an analysis of attitudes toward the development of expertise and restrained bill introduction. Finally, attitudes toward legislators' relationships with interest groups and the governor will be dealt with in search of normative regulations governing these relationships.

Floor Behavior

Norms focusing on floor conduct have been uncovered in state legislatures as well as the U. S. Congress. Reciprocal expectations delineating between appropriate and inappropriate floor behavior would be expected to govern the frequency and content of remarks made in debate, the uses of floor actions, and general demeanor on the floor of the legislature. In this study four areas of behavior linked to floor conduct are examined with respect to members' attitudes toward behavioral possibilities in these areas. The four areas to be examined are (1) publicity, (2) floor speaking, (3) freshman floor speaking, and (4) dealing in personalities in floor debate.

Publicity

The legislator stands in an ambiguous relationship with regard to publicity in general and the media in particular. The legislator who actively seeks publicity runs the risk of alienating his colleagues, of gaining the reputation of being a "show horse and not a work horse." Nevertheless, publicity--or at least good publicity--increases the legislator's chances of reelection and often provides an opportunity for seeking higher office. On the other hand, the legislator may actively seek to avoid publicity at times; public notice of actions likely to be unpopular among constituents is rare.

Among members of the Oklahoma legislature this ambiguity is further complicated by legislators' apparent distrust of the Oklahoma City dailies, two of which are owned by Mr. E. K. Gaylord. No questions were used to gather specific information concerning legislators' attitudes toward the press, but several legislators volunteered comments concerning the press during interviews. One legislator even suggested that "you can't understand the legislature without understanding the way we're treated by E. K. Gaylord." Objections to press treatment focused not on the ideological stance of the Oklahoma dailies, but on alleged frequent misquotations by Gaylord's newspapers. This attitude is typified by the case of a long time Democratic floor leader who claimed that he had not granted an interview to anything but his hometown newspaper in the past ten years. When asked why, he answered by telling of the many times he was misquoted by the Oklahoma dailies with adverse effects in his constituency.

Norms focusing on publicity-seeking involve judgments of the motives of others in the legislative arena. The speech or press conference may be sincerely intended by the actor as a means of achieving a particular legislative goal; others, however, may view these actions as an attempt to gain favorable publicity, as "showboating." In short, publicity seeking is not inherent in particular actions, but rather, involves member estimations of the motivations

for those actions. To castigate a member for seeking publicity--or conversely, to sanction him for avoiding publicity--requires a judgment that particular actions are motivated by considerations of press or media coverage.

These considerations suggest that evaluations of others' intentions vis a vis the press are an important dimension of legislators' attitudes toward specific behaviors. Excessive floor speaking, for example, may be frowned upon by some members of the legislature because of the suspicion that floor debate is being used as a vehicle for publicity. Other members, however, may condemn excessive floor speaking solely on the grounds that such behavior is dilatory to the work of the legislature. The student of legislative norms must keep in mind that the "reasons" for approval or disapproval of various behavioral possibilities are not always self-evident and that a particular behavior may be condemned for a variety of reasons.

To explore legislators' attitudes toward publicity seeking respondents were asked to evaluate each of the following using a 9-point Likert-type scale:

1. A Senate (House) member who always consciously attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions in the Senate (House).

2. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not always, attempts to avoid publicity for his actions in the Senate (House).

3. A Senate (House) member who neither seeks nor attempts to avoid publicity for actions in the Senate (House).

4. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not always, seeks publicity for his actions in the Senate (House).

5. A Senate (House) member who consciously seeks as much publicity as possible for his actions in the Senate (House).

Means for these behavioral possibilities from the House are shown in Figure 4.1. Those from the Senate are shown in Figure 4.2.

Perhaps what is most striking about these graphs is their similarity. Members of both chambers tended to be rather indifferent towards the legislator who always (item 1) or usually (item 2) tries to avoid publicity. Similarly, members of both chambers disapproved of the member who usually (item 4) or always (item 5) tries to seek publicity, with greatest disapproval falling on the latter. Optimal behavior in both chambers was neither seeking nor avoiding publicity; this was the only behavioral possibility with a mean score high enough to suggest chamber approval significantly beyond indifference. Responses to this behavioral possibility, however, were not well crystallized, having a standard deviation of 2.20 in the House and 2.10 in the Senate. Low crystallization on these items, however, reflects varying degrees of approval as only a small number in each chamber disapproved of this behavioral possibility. More than 90% of the members of each chamber gave evaluations ranging between strong approval ("9") and indifference ("5").

FIGURE 4.1

PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who always consciously attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions in the House.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions in the House.

B_3: A House member who neither seeks nor attempts to avoid publicity for his actions in the House.

B_4: A House member who usually, but not always, seeks publicity for his actions in the House.

B_5: A House member who consciously seeks as much publicity as possible for his actions in the House.

FIGURE 4.2

PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who always consciously attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions in the Senate.

B_2: A Senate member who usually, but not always, attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions in the Senate.

B_3: A Senate member who neither seeks nor attempts to avoid publicity for his actions in the Senate.

B_4: A Senate member who usually, but not always, seeks publicity for his actions in the Senate.

B_5: A Senate member who consciously seeks as much publicity as possible for his actions in the Senate.

Put differently, Oklahoma legislators appeared to be indifferent toward publicity-seeking and most approved of the legislator who is also indifferent. They disapproved of the legislator who usually seeks publicity, but disapproval was not (as reflected in the means) intense. Only the legislator who always tries to seek publicity was clearly condemned in the two chambers.

As indicated in Table 4.1 Oklahoma legislators not only preferred the colleague indifferent to publicity, they believed that their fellow chamber members also prefer such a legislator. When asked to select the single behavior within this behavioral area most preferred by most of their colleagues well over half of those in each chamber selected behavioral possibility #3. Roughly about one-sixth in each chamber believed that others in their chamber prefer a legislator who tries to seek publicity (usually or always) while 20.5% of the House members and 10% of the Senators viewed the member who tries to avoid publicity (always or usually) as preferred by their colleagues.

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show in greater detail the relationship between legislators' own beliefs regarding publicity and their perceptions of the behavioral possibility in this behavioral area most preferred by most other members. For almost two-thirds (64.2%) of the House members and three-fourths (76.9%) of the Senators there is congruence between personal preferences and perceptions of the preferences of

TABLE 4.1

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR:
PUBLICITY SEEKING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who					
	Always Avoids Publicity	Usually Avoids Publicity	Neither Seeks Nor Avoids Publicity	Usually Seeks Publicity	Always Seeks Publicity	Total %
House (N=83)	7.2%	13.3%	63.9%	10.8%	4.8%	100.0%
Senate (N=40)	5.0	5.0	72.5	17.5	0.0	100.0

TABLE 4.2

HOUSE MEMBERS: PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who				
		Always Avoids Publicity	Usually Avoids Publicity	Neither Seeks Nor Avoids Publicity	Usually Seeks Publicity	Always Seeks Publicity
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Always Avoids Publicity	3.7%	1.2%	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%
	Usually Avoids Publicity	1.2	7.4	3.7	0.0	0.0
	Neither Seeks Nor Avoids Publicity	3.7	4.9	46.9	8.6	0.0
	Usually Seeks Publicity	1.2	0.0	2.5	6.2	1.2
	Always Seeks Publicity	1.2	1.2	2.5	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.8%*
						N=81

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 4.3

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who				
		Always Avoids Publicity	Usually Avoids Publicity	Neither Seeks Nor Avoids Publicity	Usually Seeks Publicity	Always Seeks Publicity
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Always Avoids Publicity	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%
	Usually Avoids Publicity	2.6	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0
	Neither Seeks Nor Avoids Publicity	7.7	0.0	64.1	2.6	0.0
	Usually Seeks Publicity	0.0	0.0	5.1	10.3	0.0
	Always Seeks Publicity	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=100.2%* N=39

*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

others. Almost one-half of the House respondents and two-thirds of those in the upper chamber personally indicated a preference for the member who neither seeks nor avoids publicity and also perceived most others as most preferring this type of behavior.

Frequency of Floor Speaking

To casual observers floor discussion of pending legislation is perhaps the most visible work of legislators. Those not familiar with the legislative process in general and the work of committees in particular are likely to mistakenly identify floor debate with the "real" work of the legislature. To deflate this popular view of the legislative process is not to suggest that floor debate is totally meaningless. Articulate and well prepared remarks on the floor can mean the difference between victory and defeat for the legislator's favorite piece of legislation, especially if that legislation is local in its effects.

Norms regulating the frequency of floor speaking have been noted by several students of American legislatures. Patterson, for example, found that in the Wisconsin Assembly non-leaders "who talked on the floor with considerable regularity were regarded as having violated the norm."[5] Similarly, Wahlke and his associates found that self restraint in debate was the fourth most commonly mentioned norm in the four-state study.[6] The authors of this study

noted that, "The patience of most legislators is very short, particularly with respect to members who monopolize the floor or who engage in sheer obstructionism."[7] For Matthews, limited floor speaking in the Senate is a part of the general norm "be a work horse and not a show horse."[8]

Earlier students of legislative norms, however, have only dealt with a segment of this behavioral area. The implication of these studies is that anyone who does not speak too frequently on the floor is abiding by the norms of the legislature. Ignored is the possibility that norms focusing on floor speaking may also function to encourage members to speak with at least minimal frequency. In other words, attitudes toward the member who never or only rarely speaks may indicate disapproval similar to that evoked by the member who speaks too often.

The items used in this study take into account the possibility that legislators may disapprove of the silent member as well as the talker. The five items used to measure legislators' attitudes toward floor speaking by others are as follows.

1. A Senate (House) member who never speaks on the floor.

2. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

3. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor about as often as other members.

4. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

5. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor much more often than most members.

These items deal with floor speaking in quantitative terms without mentioning specific numerical quantities. This format was chosen on the assumption that legislators themselves do not view the frequency of others' floor speaking with mathematical precision, but in broad but quantifiable (and normative) terms such as "too much," "not enough," etc. Although these questions do not deal specifically with the contents of a legislator's remarks on the floor, it is likely that consideration of content is a part of evaluating the propriety of a particular frequency of floor debate on the part of a member.

Means for these items for House members are shown in Figure 4.3. Means for Senators are found in Figure 4.4. In general, members of both chambers tended to be indifferent toward the frequency of others' floor speaking except in the case of the legislator who speaks much more often than most other members. In both chambers the means indicate slight disapproval of the legislator who never speaks and virtual indifference toward the member who speaks slightly more often than other members. Approval was given to both the legislator who speaks less often than other members as well as to the member who speaks about as often as other members; on neither of these items, however, are the means higher than 6.00 in either chamber. Whereas members of the lower chamber showed about equal approval of

FIGURE 4.3

FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who never speaks on the floor.

B_2: A House member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

B_3: A House member who speaks on the floor about as often as other members.

B_4: A House member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

B_5: A House member who speaks on the floor much more often than most members.

FIGURE 4.4

FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who never speaks on the floor.

B_2: A Senate member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

B_3: A Senate member who speaks on the floor about as often as other members.

B_4: A Senate member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

B_5: A Senate member who speaks on the floor much more often than most members.

the legislator who speaks less often than other members and the member who speaks about as often as others, Senators clearly preferred the latter behavior over the former.

The only behavior in this behavioral area clearly condemned was that of speaking much more often than other members. As a party leader in the Senate commented of those who speak much more frequently than others, "Just because you know how to dance, doesn't mean you have to dance every dance." More pointed comments were heard from a House leader: "The talkers don't accomplish much around here. Nobody likes them." Although attitudes toward the legislator who talks much more frequently than others were not well crystallized in either house, low crystallization was the result of varying degrees of disapproval: Only 15.5% of the House respondents and 12% of those in the Senate indicated approval of the legislator who speaks much more often than most others.

Perceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral area are shown in Table 4.4. More than half the respondents in each chamber perceived others as preferring the legislator who speaks out about as often as other members. Nevertheless, examination of this table suggests that a significant portion of the membership in both chambers perceived others as preferring less frequent floor speaking than is actually exhibited. Of the House respondents, 42.7% believed that most others prefer less floor speaking than is

TABLE 4.4

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR:
FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who With Respect to Others Speaks					
	Never	Less Often	About the Same	Slightly More Often	Much More Often	Total
House (N=82)	1.2%	41.5%	53.5%	3.7%	0.0%	99.9%*
Senate (N=39)	0.0	30.8	64.1	5.1	0.0	100.9

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

typical in the chamber.

The implications of these findings are of considerable interest given the wording of the five items making up this behavioral area. These items are such that the respondent is required to make an estimate of the normal or typical frequency of floor speaking (i.e. "often as others") and then normatively evaluate that "average" and behavior deviating from it. What is indeed surprising is that a significant percentage of the respondents--46.4% of the House members and 35.9% of the Senators--believed that most other chamber members most prefer a behavior seen as differing from "normal" behavior. In other words, more than a third of the Senators and almost half of the House members believed that the "normal" frequency of floor speaking in their chamber violates the preferences of most members.

The relationship between legislators' preferences and their perceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral area are shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. For 67.1% of the House respondents and 55.3% of those in the upper chamber there was congruence between their own preferences and their beliefs about most others' preferences. Greatest congruence is found for those lawmakers who believed that most others in their chamber most prefer the member who speaks about as often as others. Examination of those legislators whose personal preference differs from the behavioral possibility seen as preferred by most others is revealing. Among House

TABLE 4.5

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Others Speaks				
		Never	Less Often	About the Same	Slightly More Often	Much More Often
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Never	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Less Often	0.0	27.8	8.9	2.5	2.5
	About the Same	1.3	8.9	36.7	3.8	3.8
	Slightly More Often	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	1.3
	Much More Often	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Total=100.0%

N=79

TABLE 4.6

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Others Speaks				
		Never	Less Often	About The Same	Slightly More Often	Much More Often
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Never	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Less Often	0.0	13.2	13.2	5.3	0.0
	About the Same	0.0	13.2	42.1	5.3	2.6
	Slightly More Often	0.0	2.6	2.6	0.0	0.0
	Much More Often	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=100.1%*
						N=38

*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

respondents, 10.1% preferred less floor speaking than they believed others prefer but 22.8% preferred more floor speaking than they perceived others as preferring. Similar results are found in the Senate: 18.4% preferred less and 26.4% preferred more frequent floor speaking than they believed others prefer.

For this behavioral area one can conclude that behavior is likely affected by members' disdain for the lawmaker who speaks much more frequently than others and the member who never speaks. Otherwise, Oklahoma legislators tended to prefer the normal frequency of floor speaking, to view others as preferring the same, and to hold views congruent with their perception of others' preferences. A significant number in both chambers, however, believed that the normal frequency of floor speaking exceeds that preferred by most of the membership.

The Frequency of Freshman Floor Speaking

The belief that freshmen legislators are expected to serve an apprenticeship in the legislature is a part of the conventional wisdom concerning the norms of legislative bodies. This conventional wisdom rests heavily on Matthews' rather impressionistic study of the U. S. Senate and the findings of the four-state study completed by John Wahlke, et al.[9] The authors of the latter study, however, were able to muster little empirical support for the contention that

an apprenticeship norm is operative in the four legislatures studied. Using an open ended question they found that apprenticeship was mentioned as an "unwritten rule of the game" by only five percent of the California legislature, ten percent of the New Jersey legislature, eight percent of the Ohio legislature and one percent of the Tennessee legislature.[10] Nevertheless, the practice of treating any mention of an "unwritten rule" as evidence of such a rule led the authors to conclude that an apprenticeship norm was operative in the four states studied.

An apprenticeship norm would be expected to cover several types of behavior for freshmen. Freshmen legislators, for example, might be expected to work a little harder than the veteran member, to speak out less often, to introduce few items of legislation, and--in general--show deference to members with seniority. No attempt is made in this study to identify a general apprenticeship norm; rather, expectations of freshmen lawmakers in a single behavioral area often believed to be an integral part of apprenticeship is examined. More specifically, attitudes regarding freshmen floor speaking are examined using items almost identical to those used earlier for the floor speaking behavioral areas. These items are:

1. A freshman Senate (House) member who never speaks on the floor.

2. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

3. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor about as often as most other members.

4. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

5. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor much more often than most other members.

The means for these items are shown in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. These findings indicate that only speaking more often than most members (items 4 and 5) are outside the range of acceptable behavior for freshmen. House members tended to be indifferent towards the freshman who never speaks, to slightly approve of the freshman who speaks about as often as other members, and to most approve of the freshman who speaks less often than others. Findings in the Senate differ slightly from those in the House. Members of the Senate indicated mild disapproval of the freshman who never speaks and somewhat greater disapproval of the freshman who speaks out more often than most members (items 4 and 5). Members of the upper chamber were practically indifferent towards the freshman who speaks about as often as others and, like House members, most approved of the member who speaks less often than others.

The relationship between personal preferences and perceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral area is quite strong. Congruence between these two variables is found for 72.8% of the House respondents and 83.8% of the Senate respondents. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show this relationship

FIGURE 4.5

FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREAS:
MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A freshman House member who never speaks on the floor.

B_2: A freshman House member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

B_3: A freshman House member who speaks on the floor about as often as most other members.

B_4: A freshman House member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

B_5: A freshman House member who speaks on the floor much more often than most other members.

FIGURE 4.6

FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A freshman Senate member who never speaks on the floor.

B_2: A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

B_3: A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor about as often as most other members.

B_4: A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

B_5: A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor much more often than most other members.

TABLE 4.7

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Freshman Member Who With Respect to Others Speaks				
		Never	Less Often	About the Same	Slightly More Often	Much More Often
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Never	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%
	Less Often	7.4	55.6	9.9	3.7	1.2
	About the Same	1.2	1.2	14.8	1.2	0.0
	Slightly More Often	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Much More Often	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.9%*
						N=81

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 4.8

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Freshman Member Who With Respect to Others Speaks				
		Never	Less Often	About the Same	Slightly More Often	Much More Often
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Never	0.0%	2.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Less Often	2.7	56.8	5.4	2.7	0.0
	About the Same	0.0	0.0	27.0	0.0	0.0
	Slightly More Often	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0
	Much More Often	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Total=100.0%

N=37

in detail. In each chamber slightly more than one-half of the respondents indicated a preference for--and believed that others in the chamber most prefer--the freshman who speaks less often than others. Of those respondents in the House believing that others most prefer the freshman who speaks in floor debate, but not as often as others, 71.4% personally preferred this behavior from freshmen. Of those believing that most others prefer that freshmen speak about as often as others in the chamber, 80.0% also most preferred this behavior. Senate results shown even greater congruence: 84.0% of those believing others most prefer the freshman Senator who speaks less often than others also most preferred that behavior and 100% of those believing that others most prefer that freshmen speak about as often as others shared that preference.

In order to examine the possibility that these evaluations of freshman floor speaking reflect notions of an apprenticeship for freshmen comparison with the more generalized floor speaking area is required. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the means for both behavioral areas for the House and Senate.

An examination of these graphs suggests that freshmen were evaluated differently than the generalized membership with regard to floor speaking. In both chambers members were more tolerant of the freshman who never speaks: members of both chambers tended to be indifferent towards the freshman

FIGURE 4.7

FLOOR SPEAKING AND FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING
BEHAVIORAL AREAS: MEANS, HOUSE



For Member ———
For Freshman Member — — —

B_1: A (freshman) House member who never speaks on the floor.

B_2: A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

B_3: A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor about as often as other members.

B_4: A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

B_5: A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor much more often than most members.

FIGURE 4.8

FLOOR SPEAKING AND FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING
BEHAVIORAL AREAS: MEANS, SENATE



For Member ———
For Freshman Member — — —

B_1: A (freshman) Senate member who never speaks on the floor.

B_2: A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

B_3: A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor about as often as other members.

B_4: A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

B_5: A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor much more often than most members.

who never speaks whereas they disapproved of the member who never speaks. Freshmen who speak less often than others were given greater approval than the generalized member who speaks less often than others, and the freshman who speaks about as often as others was given a lower evaluation than others who do so. Whereas members in both chambers tended to be indifferent towards the member who speaks slightly more often than others, freshmen who do so were condemned. Freshmen as well as others who speak much more often than others were condemned; in both chambers freshmen who do so, however, received lower evaluations than others.

An examination of Oklahoma legislators' perceptions of others' preferences further substantiates these conclusions. These are shown in Table 4.9. Whereas a majority of the members of both chambers believed others most prefer the member who speaks about as often as others in debate, more than three-fourths of the House respondents and two-thirds of those in the Senate believed that others most prefer the freshman legislator who speaks less than most others.

These findings suggest that members of the Oklahoma legislature judge the frequency of floor speaking by freshmen only slightly differently than for other members. In short, freshmen are expected to speak less or with about the same frequency as most other members. Member attitudes, supported by beliefs about others' attitudes, are most

TABLE 4.9

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED FREQUENCY OF FLOOR SPEAKING FOR FRESHMEN AND THE GENERALIZED MEMBER, BY CHAMBER

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who With Respect to Others Speaks					
	Never	Less Often	About the Same	Slightly More Often	Much More Often	Total
House						
For Freshmen (N=82)	3.7%	78.0%	18.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
For "Members" (N=82)	1.2	41.5	53.7	3.7	0.0	100.1*
Senate						
For Freshmen (N=39)	0.0	70.3	27.0	2.7	0.0	100.0
For "Members" (N=39)	0.0	30.8	64.1	5.1	0.0	100.0

*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

favorable towards the freshman who speaks less often than others. For House members, the range of acceptable behavior in floor speaking frequency was wider for freshmen than for others: indifference rather than disapproval was indicated toward the freshman who never speaks. Among Senators, the range of acceptable behavior for freshmen was identical to that for others. Members of both chambers disapproved of the freshman who speaks more frequently than others (slightly more or much more) more than of others who do so. The sole benefit of freshman status in the legislature in terms of floor speaking seems to lie in the fact that members of both chambers show more tolerance toward the member who never speaks if he is a freshman. In general, then, these findings indicate that the normative environment in the Oklahoma legislature permits freshmen the same latitude of behavioral alternatives as others, but encourages less floor speaking than is expected of veteran members.

Dealing in Personalities

Floor speaking norms dealt with thus far have involved the frequency of floor speaking without regard to the content of floor speech. In this section attention will be focused on legislators' attitudes towards the substance of floor debate with respect to the kind of remarks permitted on the floor. More specifically, legislators' attitudes toward dealing in personalities in floor debate will be probed.

In their study of legislatures in Ohio, New Jersey, California, and Tennessee, Wahlke and his colleagues found that the third most commonly mentioned norm was that of impersonality: "Don't deal in personalities."[11] Although there is little systematic data from other state legislatures, it seems likely that the norm would be widespread in American legislatures. The need for such a norm as well as the difficulties involved in achieving conformity have been cogently described by James David Barber:

> . . . there is a marked contrast between the legislative situation and normal behavior in the general culture, so that special rules are needed to make the legislature work. The average citizen very rarely finds himself involved in any sort of formalized controversy in a situation where antagonists confront one another, debate, and decide. And when he does get into an argument, the personal dimension is likely to be closely intertwined with the issue under discussion. Entering into a rational debate requires an artificial wrenching apart of the substance of what is being said from who is saying it, a pretending, a denial of one aspect of the real situation. . . . Perhaps the highest ability in debate is to be able to deal consciously with the substance of an issue while at the same time keeping in mind the parallel personal relationships. But this is a subtle skill; most members will find it too difficult, especially when the audience is a large one. Debate thus always verges on fighting, always risks hurt feelings and blind anger. Legislators need standards of impersonality to counteract these tendencies if they are to decide by reasoning.[12]

The following items were used to examine Oklahoma legislators' attitudes toward dealing in personalities.

1. A Senate (House) member who always avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

2. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

3. A Senate (House) member who sometimes deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

4. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not always, deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

5. A Senate (House) member who always deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

The means of responses to these items are shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10.

Means in both chambers result in graphs quite unlike those found in other behavioral areas. Both House members and Senators strongly approved of the member who never deals in personalities, gave somewhat weaker approval to the member who seldom deals in personalities, and strongly disapproved of all other possible behaviors in this behavioral area. Legislators of both chambers were more likely to give extreme responses to items making up this behavioral area than to items in other behavioral areas. Hence, 69% of the House respondents and 63.2% of those in the Senate strongly approved ("9") of the member who never deals in personalities. Conversely, 83% of the House members and 92% of the Senators strongly disapproved ("1") of the member who always deals in personalities. The attitudinal intensity reflected in these findings suggests that the prohibition against dealing in personalities is the strongest norm in the Oklahoma legislature uncovered by this study.

FIGURE 4.9

DEALING IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who always avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_3: A House member who sometimes deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_4: A House member who usually, but not always, deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_5: A House member who always deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

FIGURE 4.10

DEALING IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who always avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_2: A Senate member who usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_3: A Senate member who sometimes deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_4: A Senate member who usually, but not always, deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

B_5: A Senate member who always deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

Responses, however, were not always well crystallized. Standard deviations are highest in both chambers on behavioral items 2 and 3, i.e. those concerning the legislator who does not usually deal in personalities and the legislator who "sometimes" deals in personalities. The mean for the former, as was noted in the above, was well above the indifference line. Nevertheless, 21.7% of the House members and 16.7% of the chamber members disapproved of the member who usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personalities. The reason for their disapproval seems to lie in their rejection of the member who deals in personalities at any time. Similarly, despite the fact that the mean for item 3 is well below the indifference line, 13.7% of the House respondents and 14.3% of those in the upper chamber approved of this behavioral possibility.

The higher standard deviations on these items suggests that opinion is--for whatever reason--mixed concerning the legislator who deals in personalities without getting the reputation of doing so "usually" or "always." Because of the high intensity of disapproval toward the member who usually or always deals in personalities, the safest possible behavior is to always avoid dealing in personalities. As a House member noted, "You can get away with it [dealing in personalities] once in a while. But you'd better be damn careful." These remarks were supported by those of a member of the Senate: "Getting involved in personalities is

sometimes necessary to clear the air. But I wouldn't want to get the reputation of doing it regularly."

The ban on dealing in personalities was clearly perceived by most members of the legislature. Perceptions of others' preferences are shown in Table 4.10. More than three-fourths of the respondents in each chamber believed that most others most prefer the member who never deals in personalities. Another one-sixth of the respondents in each of the two chambers believed that most others prefer the member who usually (but not always) avoids dealing in personalities. Only 4.8% of the House respondents and 5.0% of those in the Senate perceived others as preferring other behavioral possibilities in this behavioral area.

Legislators' perceptions of others' attitudes toward dealing in personalities, shown in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, are highly congruent with their own attitudes. Agreement between personal preferences and perceptions of others' preferences is found for 84.1% of the House and 87.2% of the Senate. Of the small number of respondents for which disagreement between preferences and perceptions of others' preferences is found, 84.6% of those in the House and 80% of those in the Senate personally preferred less frequent dealing in personalities than they believed others prefer. These findings support the hypothesis that dealing in personalities is clearly forbidden by the norms of the Oklahoma legislature. Both legislators' own attitudes and their beliefs

TABLE 4.10

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: DEALING IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who Deals in Personalities					
	Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Usually	Always	Total
House (N=83)	78.3%	16.9%	3.6%	1.2%	0.0%	100%
Senate (N=40)	77.5	17.5	2.5	2.5	0.0	100

TABLE 4.11

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: DEALING IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who Deals in Personalities				
		Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Usually	Always
	Never	75.6%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Perceived	Seldom	8.5	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Preferred	Sometimes	2.4	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Behavior:	Usually	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Always	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.8%
						N=82

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 4.12

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: DEALING IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who Deals in Personalities				
		Never	Seldom	Sometimes	Usually	Always
	Never	74.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Perceived	Seldom	10.3	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Preferred	Sometimes	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0
Behavior:	Usually	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0
	Always	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=100.2%
						N=39

*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

about others' preferences lend strong normative support to impersonality in floor debate.

Specialization

The need for subject matter specialization is explicitly recognized in legislative bodies through the committee system. Committees give some structure to the pursuit for subject matter competence and serve to guarantee that a set of individuals have dealt thematically with most legislation brought before the chamber for consideration. Committees, however, provide only a framework for the use of specialists and subject matter experts; per se, the committee system gives no assurance that such specialization will develop. Further, as Wahlke, et al., have noted, "committees are denied the formal authority that might accompany specialized responsibility. They remain, in theory, representative of the whole house...."[13] And yet, as Jewell and Patterson have noted, "Specialization of tasks is probably essential in a modern legislative body which has a limited amount of time and a complexity of tasks to perform."[14] Similarly, Wahlke and his colleagues cogently argue that

> Specialization--the process by which an individual legislator brings to the group's deliberation the product of this personal competence in a subject-matter field--appears to be a characteristic of the functioning of state legislatures.[15]

Nevertheless, Jewell and Patterson claim that although specialization occurs in state legislatures, "it does not have

a powerful normative status."[16] Examining this contention, the general hypothesis of this section is that specialization is encouraged by legislative norms, that the framework provided by the committee system is augmented by member expectations prompting members to develop subject matter expertise. Two behavioral areas affecting specialization in the legislature are examined. First, attitudes toward the development of expertise in subject matter areas dealt with by the legislature are probed. The important question for consideration here is whether or not the norms of the legislature encourage the development of specialized subject matter competence on the part of the members of that body. Second, lawmakers' beliefs concerning the number of bills appropriate for introduction by members of the legislature are examined. The question is whether or not the legislator is encouraged to focus his attention on a limited number of legislative activities by norms which limit the number of bills that he may introduce.

Subject Matter Expertise

The generalist--the legislator who does not specialize in a few substantive areas, but instead tries to develop expertise in all substantive areas dealt with by the legislature--is likely to become frustrated in the legislature. The diversity of substantive areas, the brevity of legislative sessions, and the absence of a legislative staff conspire to limit the range of matters which the lawmaker may

competently attend. In short, the work of the legislature and the conditions under which that work must be done are likely to hinder the ambitions of the generalist. Nevertheless, there are forces at work which may serve to force this role upon the legislator. The absence of a seniority system which would give some guarantee of continuous service on particular committees, diverse constituency interests, and the absence of expertise in others may encourage the legislator to expend himself in the effort to develop expertise in a broad number of substantive areas.

The opposite of the generalist is the legislator who makes no effort to specialize in any substantive area. For lack of interest in the work of the legislature, for lack of time, or for whatever reason, he makes no effort to develop expertise in any of the substantive areas dealt with by the legislature. Barber, for example, found that a significant number of freshmen in the Connecticut Assembly had little interest in actively participating in legislative process.[17]

Standing between these two extremes is the legislator who attempts to develop expertise in a limited number of substantive areas. The number of areas may vary, but this type of legislator is set apart from the extremes discussed in the above by his recognition of the need for specialization. The decision to specialize may depend purely upon personal background factors, or upon the recognition of the futility and ineffectiveness of the legislator who specializes

in everything or nothing. The selection of an immediary position between these two opposites may, however, be prompted by the expectations of others in the legislature.

In order to probe attitudes toward subject matter expertise the following items were used:

1. A Senate (House) member who does not try to be an expert on any of the subject matters dealt with by the Senate (House).

2. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert on a single subject matter area dealt with by the Senate (House).

3. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert on only a few of the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate (House).

4. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert on most of the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate (House).

5. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert on all the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate (House).

The means for these items are shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12.

Among House members the range of acceptable behavior includes two possible behaviors: the member may try to specialize in one (item 2) or a few (item 3) subject matter areas dealt with by the chamber. The means for these items indicate strong approval of the legislator who chooses either of these behavioral possibilities, with the latter being the optimal behavior. Attitudes toward the legislator who chooses to specialize in a single subject matter area were not well crystallized: nevertheless, 83.9% of the responses range from indifference ("5") to strong approval ("9"). Oklahoma

FIGURE 4.11

EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who does not try to be an expert on any of the subject matters dealt with by the House.

B_2: A House member who tries to be an expert on a single subject matter area dealt with by the House.

B_3: A House member who tries to be an expert on only a few of the subject matter areas dealt with by the House.

B_4: A House member who tries to be an expert on most of the subject matter areas dealt with by the House.

B_5: A House member who tries to be an expert on all of the subject matter areas dealt with by the House.

FIGURE 4.12

EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who does not try to be an expert on any of the subject matters dealt with by the Senate.

B_2: A Senate member who tries to be an expert on a single subject matter area dealt with by the Senate.

B_3: A Senate member who tries to be an expert on only a few of the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate.

B_4: A Senate member who tries to be an expert on most of the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate.

B_5: A Senate member who tries to be an expert on all of the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate.

House members approved of those who try to develop expertise in one substantive area, but approval was greater and agreement regarding the degree of approval was more common toward those who try to develop expertise in a few subject matter fields.

House members rejected with varying degrees of disapproval the three remaining behavioral possibilities. Disapproval of the member who tries to develop expertise in most substantive areas dealt with by the chamber (item 4) was only slight, bordering on indifference. Somewhat surprisingly, greater disapproval was indicated toward the legislator who tries to develop competence in all matters brought before the House than was directed toward the member who simply makes no effort to develop subject matter expertise. Crystallization is low on all three items outside the range of acceptable behavior, the standard deviations being 2.31, 2.50, and 2.65 for items 1, 4 and 5 respectively. On both extreme behavioral possibilities (items 1 and 5), however, a majority of the respondents indicated some degree of disapproval with approximately 20% indicating approval. Toward the member who tries to be an expert on most subject matter areas, House members were more divided in their opinions: 52.8% indicated disapproval, 27.5% indicated approval, and 19.5% were indifferent.

Responses from the Senate indicate a somewhat different picture of attitudes toward expertise in that chamber. Three

items elicited responses resulting in means of 5.00 or higher; this range of acceptable behavior included legislators who try to be experts in one, a few, or most of the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate. Approval was highest for the legislator who tries to be an expert in a few subject matter areas, while trying to be an expert on most subject matter areas was given a mean score only slightly above indifference. Although Senators disapproved of both the legislator who does not try to be an expert on any of the subject matters dealt with by the Senate and the member who tries to be an expert in all areas, as in the House, disapproval was greater toward the former than the latter.

In the Senate attitudes toward only two of the five possible behaviors were well crystallized. Standard deviations are above 2.00 on items 2, 4, and 5. Closer examination of the responses elicited by these items suggests that genuine disagreement exists over the matter of expertise in the upper chamber. A majority of the respondents approved of the legislator who tries to be an expert in only one substantive area, but approximately one-fifth of the respondents disapproved and another one-fifth of the respondents remained indifferent. Similarly, there was majority agreement disapproving of the legislator who tries to develop expertise in all subject matter areas, but <u>all</u> those who approved of this behavior (11.9%) indicated strong approval

("9"). Unlike responses to these items, no majority opinion was found with regard to the legislator who tries to develop competence in "most" subject matter areas: 42.9% approved, 33.3% disapproved, and 23.8% were indifferent.

Perceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral area, shown in Table 4.13, further substantiate the conclusion that specialization in a few subject matter areas is the optimal behavior in both chambers. More than half of the respondents in each chamber believed that others most prefer this behavior. The proportion believing that others most prefer the legislator who tries to develop expertise in "most" areas was twice as large in the Senate as in the House. This behavioral possibility, as was noted in the above, met with slight approval in the Senate and slight disapproval in the lower chamber.

Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show the relationship between the legislator's own preferences and his perception of the behavioral possibility most preferred by most other members. Congruence between perceptions of others' preferences and personal beliefs is evident for 68.4% of the House respondents and 71.0% of those in the Senate. Although most respondents' preferences in this behavioral area are in agreement with their perceptions of others' preferences, 13.4% of those in the House and 7.9% of those in the Senate preferred specialization in fewer subject matter areas than

TABLE 4.13

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR:
EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who Tries to Be an Expert in					
	No Areas	One Area	Few Areas	Most Areas	All Areas	Total
House (N=83)	8.4%	14.5%	67.5%	8.4%	1.2%	100%
Senate (N=39)	5.1	15.4	59.0	17.9	2.6	100

TABLE 4.14

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who Tries to Be an Expert in				
		No Area	One Area	Few Areas	Most Areas	All Areas
	No Area	3.7%	3.7%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%
Perceived	One Area	0.0	12.2	1.2	1.2	0.0
Preferred	Few Areas	1.2	11.0	47.6	6.1	1.2
Behavior:	Most Areas	0.0	1.2	0.0	3.7	3.7
	All Areas	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
						Total=100.1%*
						N=82

*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 4.15

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who Tries to Be an Expert in				
		No Area	One Area	Few Areas	Most Areas	All Areas
	No Area	2.6%	0.0%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Perceived	One Area	2.6	7.9	5.3	0.0	0.0
Preferred	Few Areas	0.0	5.3	44.7	10.5	0.0
Behavior:	Most Areas	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.8	2.6
	All Areas	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.9%*
						N=38

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

they believe others prefer. Conversely, 18.3% of the House respondents and 21.1% of those in the upper chamber preferred those who try to develop expertise in more subject matter areas than is congruent with their perceptions of others' preferences.

Bill Introduction

Closely intertwined with the need for expertise is the notion that each legislator should introduce only a limited number of bills each session. Given the brevity of legislative sessions and the many demands on their time, most legislators cannot "work" but a limited number of bills. Passage of non-consensual legislation is a time consuming enterprise often requiring considerable research and numerous one-to-one discussions with fellow lawmakers. Speaking of getting bills through the House, one member remarked that "you've got to do your homework and then educate the membership, talking to them one at a time." Nevertheless, for some legislators the need to comply with constituency demands, gain favorable publicity, or simply to do the work of the legislature as they see that task, may necessitate introducing a sizable number of bills each session. Some legislators, on the other hand, introduce no legislation, feeling little confidence in their abilities to get bills passed. Others may view additional legislation as unnecessary. This view was typified in the remarks of a long time Democratic

member of the House: "All of these new bills introduced each session are a waste of time. Hell, we need to repeal the laws we've got!"

Items similar to those dealing with floor speaking were used to measure attitudes regarding the introduction of legislation. These items are:

1. A Senate (House) member who never introduces any bills.
2. A Senate (House) member who introduces fewer bills than most other members.
3. A Senate (House) member who introduces about as many bills as most other members.
4. A Senate (House) member who introduces slightly more bills than most other members.
5. A Senate (House) member who introduces a great many more bills than most other members.

Results from both chambers, shown in Figures 4.13 and 4.14, indicate that only introducing many more bills than normal (item 5) or never introducing legislation (item 1) are outside the range of acceptable behavior. The legislator who introduces many more bills than others was viewed with mild disapproval, disapproval being greater in the Senate than in the House. Members of both chambers, however, disapproved of the member who never introduces legislation more than the member who introduces many more bills than others. In both chambers crystallization is lowest on items outside the range of acceptable behavior. Examination of the responses indicates that while no House member strongly

FIGURE 4.13

BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who never introduces any bills.

B_2: A House member who introduces fewer bills than most other members.

B_3: A House member who introduces about as many bills as most other members.

B_4: A House member who introduces slightly more bills than most other members.

B_5: A House member who introduces a great many more bills than most other members.

FIGURE 4.14

BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who never introduces any bills.

B_2: A Senate member who introduces fewer bills than most other members.

B_3: A Senate member who introduces about as many bills as most other members.

B_4: A Senate member who introduces slightly more bills than most other members.

B_5: A Senate member who introduces a great many more bills than most other members.

approved (responses "8" or "9") of the member who never introduces legislation, 34.9% indicated indifference and an equal percentage indicated strong disapproval (responses "1" or "2"). Results in the Senate were strikingly similar on this item: no Senator strongly approved (responses "8" or "9"), but 35.7% indicated indifference and an equal percentage indicated strong disapproval (responses "1" or "2"). The range of disagreement on this item, hence, lies between strong disapproval and indifference. Reactions to the member who introduces many more bills than others did not fall within the same range. About one-half of the responses in each chamber indicated disapproval of this behavioral possibility, but approximately one-fifth indicated some degree of approval.

For both chambers means for the three remaining items in this behavioral area indicate approval bordering on indifference: No item elicited a mean of more than 6.00. Even the legislator who introduces about the same number of bills as others--the optimal behavior in both chambers--was viewed with only slight approval. Oklahoma legislators are indifferent toward the number of bills their colleagues introduce except for extreme behaviors. On items 2, 3, and 4, more than 60% of the respondents in each house chose responses "4"-"6".

Respondents' perceptions of most others' preferences in this behavioral area, shown in Table 4.16, follow a pattern not unlike that found in the floor speaking behavioral

TABLE 4.16

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR:
BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who, With Respect to Others, Introduces					
	No Bills	Fewer Bills	About the Same No. of Bills	Slightly More Bills	Many More Bills	Total
House (N=82)	1.2%	37.8%	56.1%	3.7%	1.2%	100.0%
Senate (N=39)	0.0	33.3	61.5	0.0	5.1	99.9*

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

area. Among House respondents 39% believed that others prefer less bill introduction from members than is "normal," and 4.9% believed that more bill introduction is desired by others. Responses from the Senate were similar: 33.3% believed that less bill introduction than is "normal" is preferred by others while 5.1% believed that more is preferred. What is again most striking is the fact that only 56.1% of the House members and 61.5% of those in the upper chamber believed that others prefer the frequency of bill introduction that they view as normal!

Tables 4.17 and 4.18 show the relationship between individual preferences and perceptions of the behavioral possibility most preferred by most others in the chamber. Congruence was characteristic of this relationship for 70% of the House respondents and 65.8% of those in the upper chamber. Among House respondents 20% personally prefer more frequent bill introduction than they perceive others as preferring while only 10% prefer less than they perceive others as preferring. Senate results reverse this relationship: 7.9% preferred less frequent bill introduction than they perceive others as preferring but 26.3% preferred more.

On the basis of the results for these two behavioral areas it may be concluded that Jewell and Patterson's claim that specialization is not given strong normative support in state legislatures must be qualified. Attitudes toward the development of specialized expertise are not well

TABLE 4.17

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Others Introduces				
		No Bills	Fewer Bills	About the Same No. of Bills	Slightly More Bills	Many More Bills
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	No Bills	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Fewer Bills	0.0	26.3	8.8	2.5	0.0
	About the Same No. of Bills	1.3	8.8	40.0	5.0	2.5
	Slightly More Bills	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	1.3
	Many More Bills	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
						Total=100.3%*
						N=80

*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 4.18

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCE: BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Others Introduces				
		No Bills	Fewer Bills	About the Same No. of Bills	Slightly More Bills	Many More Bills
	No Bills	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Perceived	Fewer Bills	2.6	18.4	10.5	0.0	2.6
Preferred Behavior:	About the Same No. of Bills	0.0	5.3	44.7	10.5	2.6
	Slightly More Bills	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Many More Bills	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6

Total=99.8%*

N=38

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

crystallized in the Oklahoma legislature, but these attitudes--supported by beliefs about the attitudes of others in the legislature--should serve to encourage members to develop expertise in one or a few subject matter areas dealt with by the legislature. Conversely, these attitudes should discourage legislators from trying to develop expertise in all substantive areas or from simply refusing to develop any expertise whatsoever. These findings, however, do not support the hypothesis that the number of bills introduced by each legislator is subject to strong normative control. On four of the five behavioral possibilities in this behavioral area means were between 4.16 and 5.88, thus indicating near indifference toward the number of bills introduced by members of the legislature. Only the member who never introduces legislation is strongly condemned by members of the Oklahoma legislature.

Relations with Interest Groups and the Governor

The relationship between state legislators and influential outsiders is central to the legislative process and policy formulation at the state level. Demands from a variety of external sources converge on the legislative process. Powerful pressure groups, the governor, and high ranking state officials are often adversaries capable of wielding both the carrot and the stick, of rewarding their friends as well as punishing their enemies. These "outsiders" are often vitally interested in the work of the

legislature, build alliances with lawmakers, and become a crucial element in legislative decision-making. From the perspective of the legislator, the problem is that of cooperating with these groups and individuals while maintaining a degree of distance between himself and those who would coopt his legislative options. As Leroy N. Rieselbach has noted, lawmakers "must decide how to relate to requests from the executive or from the public."

> Is the primary job to speak and act for their interests or should he resist their demands? The lawmaker must face conflicting appeals from the various external sources and decide where his primary loyalty lies, and he will in all probability have to face and reface such appeals as legislative attention shifts from issue to issue.[18]

The decision of how to relate to these demands from external sources is not made in a vacuum. Relationships between legislators and outsiders are not solely determined by random factors, but are instead subject to group control through norms regulating these relationships. As David Truman noted over twenty years ago, the access of groups and individuals to the legislative process depends in large measure on the norms of the legislature.[19] These norms, he reasoned, will provide easier access to the legislature for some groups than others, facilitating some interests while impeding others. Pressure groups depending upon the work of professional lobbyists, for example, would find access difficult in a legislature with strong normative prohibitions

against working with professional lobbyists. Similarly, where legislators expect the governor to be a legislative leader as well as chief executive, the governor would be likely to have a significant impact upon legislative decision-making. In short, relationships between legislators and outsiders are likely subject to normative controls which serve to provide access to some groups and deny it to others.

In this section attitudes toward legislators' relationships with interest groups and the governor are probed. Two hypotheses are involved. First, it was hypothesized that the distance between legislators and lobbyists is subject to normative regulation in the legislature, that some relationships would clearly be preferred by members of the legislature and that other relationships would be condemned. Second, it was hypothesized that legislators' responsiveness to the governor's programs--regardless of his political party affiliation--is governed by group norms.

Relations with Interest Groups

The following items were used to identify legislators' attitudes toward various possible relationships between the lawmaker and interest groups.

1. A Senate (House) member who is known as a spokesman for special interest groups and their lobbyists.

2. A Senate (House) member who is closely affiliated with special interest groups and their lobbyists.

3. A Senate (House) member who is friendly with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but

is not committed to such groups.

4. A Senate (House) member who has nothing to do with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but does not oppose such groups.

5. A Senate (House) member who always opposes special interest groups and their lobbyists.

Means from these items are shown in Figures 4.15 and 4.16.

Only items 3 and 4 are within the range of acceptable behavior in the House. Only 7.9% of the House respondents indicated disapproval of the member who is friendly with special interest groups without committing himself to them. Receiving almost minimal approval was the legislator who has nothing to do with special interest groups and their lobbyist, but does not oppose such groups. Responses to this item, however, were not well crystallized, the standard deviation being 2.00. Slightly more than two-fifths of the House respondents indicated indifference, but 36.7% indicated some degree of approval and 20.5% some degree of disapproval. Of those behavioral possibilities outside the range of acceptable behavior, House members most disapproved of the member who is known as a spokesman for special interest groups or lobbyists. Somewhat less disapproval was shown for the legislator who is closely affiliated with interest groups, and even less disapproval was indicated toward the member who always opposes special interests. Crystallization was low on the latter behavioral possibility, but 88.4% of the responses ranged from strong disapproval ("1") to indifference ("5").

FIGURE 4.15

RELATIONSHIP WITH INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who is known as a spokesman for special interest groups and their lobbyists.

B_2: A House member who is closely affiliated with special interest groups and their lobbyists.

B_3: A House member who is friendly with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but is not committed to such groups.

B_4: A House member who has nothing to do with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but does not oppose such groups.

B_5: A House member who always opposes special interest groups and their lobbyists.

FIGURE 4.16

RELATIONSHIP WITH INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who is known as a spokesman for special interest groups and their lobbyists.

B_2: A Senate member who is closely affiliated with special interest groups and their lobbyists.

B_3: A Senate member who is friendly with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but is not committed to such groups.

B_4: A Senate member who has nothing to do with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but does not oppose such groups.

B_5: A Senate member who always opposes special interest groups and their lobbyists.

On the basis of members' attitudes, interest groups and lobbyists would appear to have more difficulty affecting the passage of legislation in the House than in the Senate. On those items suggesting a close relationship between the legislator and interest groups (items 1 and 2), means were lower in the House than the Senate. Whereas 80.4% of the House respondents disapproved of the member who is known as a spokesman for interest groups, only 56.1% of those in the Senate disapproved of this behavior. Similarly, 78.9% of those in the House disapproved of the lawmaker who is closely affiliated with special interest groups, but only 46.4% of those in the Senate did so. Conversely, on those items suggesting minimal contact with lobbyists (item 4) or outright opposition to their activities (item 5) means were higher in the House than in the Senate. Of the House respondents, 36.7% approved of the legislator who has nothing to do with special interest groups and 11.4% approved of the member who opposes such groups. In the upper chamber only 26.8% approved of the former behavioral possibility and 4.8% of the latter. These findings suggest that Senators are likely to maintain less distance between themselves and lobbyists than are House members.

Given these results it is surprising to find that the percentage of House members believing that others most prefer the member who is a spokesman for special interest groups or closely affiliated with such groups is almost

three times as high as that found in the Senate. An examination of Table 4.19, showing legislators' perceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral area, indicates that 14.6% of the House respondents but only 5.1% of those in the Senate believed that others most prefer the member who is closely associated with interest groups. Nevertheless, a majority of those in both chambers believe that others most prefer the member who is friendly but not closely associated with interest groups and their lobbyists. This behavioral possibility was believed to be preferred by most others by 92.3% of the Senate respondents and 80.5% of those in the lower chamber.

The greater antipathy of House members to interest groups and their representatives is clearly seen in examining the relationship between legislators' personal preferences in this behavioral area. This relationship is shown in Tables 4.20 and 4.21. Agreement between personal beliefs and perceptions of others' preferences is common in both chambers, but more prevalent in the Senate (78.9%) than in the lower chamber (69.1%). Significantly, of those House respondents whose personal preferences differed from what they believe others most prefer, all personally preferred a behavioral possibility implying a greater distance between the lawmaker and interest groups than they perceived others as preferring. Of those in the Senate whose personal preferences differed from their perception of others' preferences,

TABLE 4.19

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: RELATIONSHIP WITH INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL AREA BY CHAMBER

	Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who, With Respect to Special Interest Groups					
	Is A Spokesman For	Is Closely Affiliated With	Is Friendly With	Has Nothing To Do With	Opposes	Total
House (N=82)	1.2%	13.4%	80.5%	4.9%	0.0%	100%
Senate (N=39)	0.0	5.1	92.3	2.6	0.0	100

TABLE 4.20

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Special Interest Groups				
		Is A Spokesman For	Is Closely Affiliated With	Is Friendly With	Has Nothing To Do With	Opposes
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Is A Spokesman For	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%
	Is Closely Affiliated With	0.0	2.5	6.2	3.7	1.2
	Is Friendly With	0.0	0.0	63.0	14.8	3.7
	Has Nothing To Do With	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0
	Opposes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Total=100.0%

N=81

TABLE 4.21

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Special Interest Groups				
		Is A Spokesman For	Is Closely Affiliated With	Is Friendly With	Has Nothing To Do With	Opposes
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Is A Spokesman For	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Is Closely Affiliated With	2.6	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Is Friendly With	2.6	5.3	73.7	7.9	2.6
	Has Nothing To Do With	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0
	Opposes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.9%*
						N=38

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

50% preferred behavioral possibilities implying greater distance and 50% preferred possibilities implying less distance from interest groups.

Support of Governor

Items used to identify attitudes toward support of the governor's programs are as follows:

1. A Senate (House) member who always supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

2. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not always, supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

3. A Senate (House) member who sometimes supports and sometimes opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

4. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not always, opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

5. A Senate (House) member who always opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

Means for these items are shown in Figures 4.17 and 4.18.

Comparison of these graphs indicates that House members gave lower evaluations to all five possible behaviors than did members of the upper chamber. That is, House members indicated less approval of items within the range of possible behavior and greater disapproval of those behaviors outside that range than did Senators. In both chambers the range of acceptable behavior included only item 2 and item 3. Approval of the legislator who usually, but not always,

FIGURE 4.17

SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, HOUSE



B_1: A House member who always supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_2: A House member who usually, but not always, supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_3: A House member who sometimes supports and sometimes opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_4: A House member who usually, but not always, opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_5: A House member who always opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

FIGURE 4.18

SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, SENATE



B_1: A Senate member who always supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_2: A Senate member who usually, but not always, supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_3: A Senate member who sometimes supports and sometimes opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_4: A Senate member who usually, but not always, opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

B_5: A Senate member who always opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

supports the governor's programs bordered on indifference: in both chambers exactly one-half of the respondents gave evaluations ranging from "4" to "6" to this behavioral possibility. The optimal behavior in both chambers was sometimes support and sometimes opposition to the governor's programs. Only 8.2% of the House respondents and 2.4% of those in the Senate indicated disapproval of this behavioral possibility. Crystallization on both these items is high, the standard deviations falling well below 2.00.

Among those items outside the range of acceptable behavior, greatest disapproval was indicated toward the legislator who always opposes the governor's programs. Significantly less disapproval was indicated toward the member who always supports the governor's programs. Senators indicated less disapproval of the member who always supports the governor's programs than did members of the lower chamber. Only item 4 failed to elicit well crystallized responses among House members; nevertheless, 83.8% of the responses from House members range between strong disapproval ("1") and indifference ("5"). Similarly, responses from Senators to item 1 were not well crystallized, but 85.7% of these responses range between strong disapproval ("1") and indifference ("5").

These findings suggest that members of both chambers believe that the legislator should be relatively independent of gubernatorial influence. In short, Oklahoma legislators

believe that the governor's programs should be judged on their own merits. This view was made explicit by several respondents:

> If the governor's programs are good, we support them. If they're bad, we beat hell out of them.
>
> I support good legislation--whether it comes from the governor or not!
>
> We try to cooperate with the governor when we can. His [the governor's] bills usually get serious consideration, but then his bills usually affect the state more than most of those introduced around here.

Nevertheless, indifference toward the member who usually supports the governor's programs--and disapproval of the member who usually opposes these programs--suggests that Oklahoma lawmakers accept the legitimacy of gubernatorial influence in the legislature. What is clearly rejected by members of both chambers are behaviors implying an automatic reaction to gubernatorial programs: Senate and House members condemned both those who always support and those who always oppose the governor's programs.

Examination of respondents' perceptions of others' preferences, shown in Table 4.22, supports the conclusion that the governor's influence in the legislature is accepted and considered legitimate. A significant number in both chambers are likely to feel expected to usually support the governor's programs. Despite the fact that the optimal behavior in both chambers was "sometimes" support of the governor's programs, more than half of those in the House

TABLE 4.22

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR:
SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER

		Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who With Respect to Governor's Programs					
		Always Supports	Usually Supports	Sometimes Supports	Usually Opposes	Always Opposes	Total
House	(N=83)	2.4%	53.0%	43.4%	1.2%	0.0%	100%
Senate	(N=39)	2.6	38.5	56.4	0.0	2.6	100.1*

*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.

and one-third in the upper chamber believed that most other members most prefer the legislator who usually supports the governor's programs. Virtually all of the other respondents believed that others would most prefer the lawmaker who maintained greater independence, sometimes supporting and sometimes opposing the governor's programs.

The relationship between legislators' own preferences and their perceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral area are shown in Tables 4.23 and 4.24. Congruence between personal preferences and beliefs about others' preferences is found for 71.1% of the Senate respondents and 63% of those in the House. In the lower chamber 54.5% of those believing that most others most prefer the member who usually supports the governor's programs did not personally prefer that behavioral possibility; these members probably account for the lower overall percentage of congruent responses in the House. Conversely, 88.2% of the House respondents and 90.9% of those in the upper chamber perceiving others as preferring the member who only "sometimes" supports the governor's programs shared that preference. That legislators in both chambers perceive others as preferring more frequent support of the governor than they themselves prefer is apparent in the incongruent responses. Of those House members whose personal preferences differed from their perceptions of others' preferences, 80.6% preferred less frequent support of the governor's programs than they believed

TABLE 4.23

HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Governor's Programs				
		Always Supports	Usually Supports	Sometimes Supports	Usually Opposes	Always Opposes
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Always Supports	1.2%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%
	Usually Supports	0.0	24.7	28.2	0.0	1.2
	Sometimes Supports	0.0	4.9	37.0	0.0	0.0
	Usually Opposes	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0
	Always Opposes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
						Total=99.6%*
						N=81

*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.

TABLE 4.24

SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA

		Percentage Preferring the Member Who With Respect to Governor's Programs				
		Always Supports	Usually Supports	Sometimes Supports	Usually Opposes	Always Opposes
Perceived Preferred Behavior:	Always Supports	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Usually Supports	2.6	15.8	21.1	0.0	0.0
	Sometimes Supports	0.0	5.3	52.6	0.0	0.0
	Usually Opposes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Always Opposes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Total=100.0%

N=38

others preferred. Similarly, 72.8% of those in the upper chamber giving incongruent responses indicated a preference for less frequent support of the governor's programs than they believed was preferred by others in the chamber.

The findings for these two behavioral areas support the contention that legislators' relations with interest groups and the governor are foci of normative controls in the Oklahoma legislature. The attitudes of Oklahoma legislators lend normative support for the independent legislator and probably serve to protect and preserve the integrity of the legislature as a viable political institution. Lawmakers tended to prefer the legislator who is independent of interest groups, a preference supported by their perceptions of others' preferences. House members appear to be slightly less amenable to close relations between members and pressure groups than are members of the upper chamber. Similarly, Oklahoma lawmakers prefer the legislator who approaches the governor's programs independently, judging each program on its own merits. Attitudes toward the member who sometimes opposes and sometimes supports the governor's programs, however, received only qualified support in legislators' beliefs about others' preferences.

Summary

Oklahoma legislators' attitudes toward forty possible behaviors in eight task-related behavioral areas have been

examined in this chapter. Each of these behavioral areas involves behavioral alternatives related to the substantive tasks of the legislature and each has been mentioned in prior legislative research as areas possibly regulated by norms.

Four behavioral areas examined involve floor behavior: publicity seeking, floor speaking, freshman floor speaking, and dealing in personalities. Members of both chambers tended to be rather indifferent toward the member who always tries to avoid publicity, to condemn the member who always tries to gain publicity, and to most prefer the member who is indifferent toward publicity. In the floor speaking behavioral area solons in both chambers most approved the member who speaks about the same as others and rejected those who never speak as well as those who speak much more often than others. Legislators viewed the frequency of freshman floor speaking only slightly differently: They preferred the freshman who speaks less often than others and condemned those who speak on the floor more frequently than others, but were tolerant of the freshman who never speaks. Clearly the strongest norm uncovered was found in the dealing in personalities behavioral area where members of both chambers indicated strong approval of the member who never deals in personalities, somewhat less approval of the member who usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personalities and strong disapproval of behavioral possibilities involving

more frequent dealings in personalities.

Two behavioral areas investigated involve specialization. It was found that if specialization is identical with the development of expertise in a limited number of subject matter areas, then there is normative support for specialiation in the Oklahoma legislature. Lawmakers in both chambers rejected the member who does not try to develop expertise in any area as well as the member who tries to develop expertise in all subject matter areas dealt with by the legislature. Most approved was the member who develops expertise in a few subject matter areas. Normative support for specialization, however, did not extend to limitations on the number of bills that the legislator may appropriately introduce. Although members of both chambers most approved of the legislator who introduces about the same number of bills as others, behavioral possibilities deviating from this preference evoked clear disapproval only in the case of the legislator who introduces many more bills than others.

Two behavioral areas involving relationships with outsiders were examined. In the first of these, the relationship with interest groups behavioral area, it was found that extremely close ties as well as hostile relations with pressure groups are discouraged in both chambers. Most preferred in both chambers was the lawmaker who is friendly with interest groups and their lobbyists, but who remains uncommitted to such groups. Nevertheless, House members were more

likely to condemn close relations with pressure groups than were members of the upper chamber. With respect to relations with the governor it was found that members of both chambers disapproved of the solon who automatically reacts to the governor's programs, condemning both the legislator who always supports the governor's programs and the member who remains relatively independent of the governor, preferring the member who responds to programs on the basis of their merits.

Legislators' preferences in these behavioral areas were clearly supported by their perceptions of others' attitudes. A sizable number of the House respondents failed to recognize that most members in their chamber most prefer the member who only sometimes supports the governor's programs, a majority believing that others prefer "usual" support of the governor's programs. For all other behavioral areas examined in this chapter, however, it was found that the optimal behavior--the behavior most preferred--was perceived as being most preferred by a majority of the members in each chamber. The percentage of respondents recognizing the optimal behavior as such varied in the House from 80.5% in the relationship with interest groups behavioral area to 43.4% in the support of the governor behavioral area. Similar results were obtained in the Senate where 92.3% recognized the optimal behavior as being most preferred in the relationship with interest groups behavioral area but only 56.4% correctly perceived

the most preferred behavior in the support of governor behavioral area.

In these task-related behavioral areas members of both chambers tended to personally prefer the behavioral possibility they believed most preferred by others. Table 4.25 shows the percentage of congruent responses in each chamber for these behavioral areas. Congruence tended to be more common on these task-related behavioral areas than on the party-related behavioral areas examined in the previous chapter. With the exception of the floor speaking and bill introduction behavioral areas, the percentage of congruent responses was consistently higher in the Senate than in the lower chamber.

These findings support the conclusion that behaviors associated with performance of the substantive tasks of the legislature are regulated by norms in the Oklahoma legislature. In general, legislators' attitudes in these behavioral areas differentiated between appropriate and inappropriate modes of conduct, there was widespread agreement on most behavioral alternatives, and awareness of the preferences of others was common.

TABLE 4.25

CONGRUENCE: TASK-RELATED BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER

Behavioral Area	House		Senate	
Publicity Seeking	64.2%	(N=83)	76.9%	(N=40)
Floor Speaking	67.1	(N=82)	55.3	(N=38)
Freshman Floor Speaking	72.8	(N=82)	83.8	(N=39)
Dealing in Personalities	84.1	(N=83)	87.2	(N=40)
Expertise	68.4	(N=83)	71.0	(N=39)
Bill Introduction	70.0	(N=82)	65.8	(N=39)
Relationship with Interest Groups	69.1	(N=82)	78.9	(N=39)
Support of Governor	63.0	(N=83)	71.1	(N=39)

Footnotes

1. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 343-344.

2. John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 157.

3. Donald R. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960).

4. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, pp. 141-169; Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," Western Political Quarterly, XIV (June, 1961), 460-472.

5. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System," p. 464.

6. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, pp. 146-147.

7. Ibid., p. 163.

8. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, p. 95.

9. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World; Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System.

10. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, p. 146-147.

11. Ibid.

12. James D. Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 161.

13. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, p. 194.

14. Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (2nd ed.; New York: Random House, 1973), p. 392.

15. Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, p. 214.

16. Jewell and Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, p. 399.

17. Barber, The Lawmakers.

18. Leroy N. Rieselbach, ed., The Congressional System: Notes and Readings (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), p. 233.

19. Truman, The Governmental Process, pp. 343-346.

CHAPTER V

THE SANCTIONING SYSTEM

Before a half filled gallery an elderly Senator rises, announces the first reading of his bill to increase the salaries of election judges, and proceeds to enumerate the benefits of such legislation. After five minutes of rhetoric in the best tradition of rural politicians in the Southwest an equally aged Senator rises and calls for a "point of order." A third Senator reminds the first speaker that debate on the first reading of a bill is highly unusual and in this circumstance uncalled for. Still another member rises to suggest that the first speaker has "perhaps forgotten" the procedures of this "somber chamber." At this point the enraged and frustrated speaker opens a brief but bitter exchange with his critics. The presiding officer, a first term Senator substituting for the President Pro Tempore, is unable to settle the dispute arising over the point of order and a page is sent to the Senate Majority leader asking for assistance. Quickly surmising the situation, the young and ambitious majority leader asks that the entire exchange be stricken from the records. He then asks the first speaker to withdraw his comments and await a later reading of his legislation for debate. Red with anger, the Senator agrees

and is seated. Surprisingly, a younger member asks for "special privilege" and speaks for a few minutes praising the chastised member for his "lengthy service to this chamber and to the state." Business then proceeds as usual.

What happened? When asked about these events a Senator who had remained silent during the exchange commented, "That son-of-a-bitch was showboating, wanting to look good for his folks. A few of the members wanted to embarrass him. He got what he deserved." Most of those in the gallery that afternoon were election judges from the main speaker's district. His bill, which later died in committee, had no chance whatsoever of passage; budgetary limitations precluded even a token salary increase for election judges (and there was strong sentiment that salaries were already high enough). What happened? A member violated a norm of the "somber chamber," was chastised, and the entire event smoothed over with the kind words of the last speaker.

The effectiveness of the norms of a legislature in regulating member conduct ultimately depends upon a sanction system that assures at least minimal conformity from most members most of the time. As Thibaut and Kelly have emphasized, "...if conformity is <u>totally</u> governed by internalized values and norm sending processes are not activated in the absence of conformity, it is questionable whether a norm should be said to exist."[1] The wayward member may be

dealt with in a number of ways--embarrassment is but a mild rebuke--that encourage conformity. Whatever relationship the norms of the legislature have to actual behavior is largely a function of the effectiveness of the sanction system in manipulating rewards and punishments.

As was noted earlier, the sanction system depends upon four elements: members must be made aware of the norms, member behavior must be monitored, sanctions must be available to encourage norm conformity, and some individual or group must apply sanctions when necessary. Each of these components of the sanction system of the Oklahoma legislature will be examined in this chapter.

Awareness of Norms

In coming to the legislature freshmen enter an environment that is for most neither fully anticipated nor familiar. Despite the rather large number of freshmen present in state legislatures, freshmen usually have little impact upon the social structure of legislative bodies. As is documented in Barber's study of freshmen in the Connecticut Assembly, freshmen must adapt and adjust to legislative life; the reciprocal impact of the institution and its new members is heavily weighted in favor of the former.[2] Freshmen must learn how to be legislators; put differently, they must be molded by the institution in which they serve. As Gerth and Mills have observed:

> Institutions not only select persons and eject them; they also form them....Impulse and sensitivity are channeled and transformed into standard motives joined to standard goals and gratifications. Thus, institutions imprint their stamps upon the individual, modifying his external conduct as well as his inner life. For one aspect of learning a role consists of acquiring motives which guarantee performance.[3]

The tasks of legislative life involve not only the acquisition of a set of parliamentary and substantive skills, but also adjustment to the normative environment of the legislature. Aspects of that environment are incarnated in the written rules regulating behavior; other aspects are less visible and are discernible only through acquaintance with the traditions and folklore surrounding the legislature; still other aspects can only be surmised by careful observation.

Recognition of the importance of member awareness of the norms was apparent in the comments of a party leader in the Senate. When asked how things are made difficult for the norm violator, he responded in the following fashion:

> I'm not a religious nut, but I believe that Bible gives good counsel on these matters--my church applies them and I try to apply here in the Senate. First, I personally go by his [the norm violator] office and discuss the matter with him on a one to one basis--he may not know that what he is doing is wrong. If they continue in their ways a group of Senators, including myself, will visit with the member and try to persuade him. If this fails, we are forced to bring the matter before the full membership [of the Senate]. And if this fails...[hesitation] we wipe him out.

How do legislators come to know the norms of the legislature? Not all legislators are as unfortunate as the House member who reported that his first acquaintance with the norms came when "they lowered the boom on me." The employment of sanctions for norm violation, no doubt, familiarized the member with what is expected of him by others, but such severe measures do not appear common. Most members of the Oklahoma legislature believed that other members made at least "a little" effort to inform them of the "unwritten rules" of the chamber in which they are serving. Only 15.1% of the House members and 11.6% of the Senate members claimed that other legislators made no effort to tell them of the unwritten rules when they were first elected to their chamber.

However they might acquire their information there is no evidence to suggest that members of the Oklahoma legislature were unaware of operative norms. When asked to identify the "unwritten rules" of their chamber only two House members claimed that there are no norms in the House. Of those House members interviewed, 56.6% were able to name three or more norms. Similarly, only one Senator claimed to know of no norms in the Senate and 61.4% of the Senators interviewed named three or more "unwritten rules." These figures are shown in Table 5.1. Further evidence emerges from reactions to the statement "There is a recognized right and wrong way of getting things done here in the

TABLE 5.1

NORM AWARENESS, BY CHAMBER

Norm Identification	House N=89	Senate N=44
Percentage claiming chamber has no norms	2.3%	2.3%
Percentage naming only one norm	17.9	4.5
Percentage naming only two norms	22.5	31.8
Percentage naming three or more norms	57.3	61.4
Total	100.0	100.0

House (Senate)." In the House, 92.2% of those interviewed agreed with this statement; agreement was only slightly lower in the upper chamber where 81.8% agreed.

Several implications may be drawn from this widespread awareness of operative norms. First, awareness of the presence of unwritten rules governing behavior implies that members recognize the legislature as more than an assemblage of individuals regulated by formal rules. Oklahoma legislators see the legislature as an on-going social group with regulatory devices emerging from that "groupness." Second, recognition of the existence of unwritten rules further implies that efforts to apply sanctions would likely be seen as legitimate by members of the legislature. Attitudes supportive of norm enforcement are a likely corollary of widespread awareness of the existence of unwritten rules. Third, awareness that there is a right and wrong way of getting things done should caution the member without knowledge of specific norms regulating behavioral areas in which he is involved to gain such knowledge before acting. Simply put, awareness of the presence of norms in the chamber should lead legislators to gain knowledge of the specific foci and contents of those norms.

Perceived Surveillance

Crucial to the sanction system is the surveillance of member behavior. Members must believe that their behavior relevant to the norms is being monitored. This is not to

suggest that an atmosphere of "big brother" is characteristic of legislatures with effective norms. As was noted earlier, a large portion of institutional behavior is not regulated by institutional norms: most behaviors are either outside the foci of organizational norms or within ranges of acceptable behavior. Nevertheless, for norms to be effective regulators of behavior the potential norm violator must believe that his violation of system norms will be observed by those capable of bringing sanction to bear upon him.

Obviously, the amount of surveillance believed operative will vary from organization to organization and within a single organization surveillance will be greater with regard to some norms than others. Surveillance is probably greater with regard to norms believed crucial to the life of an organization than with regard to those believed less important.[4] The amount of actual surveillance probably also varies with certain structural characteristics of the organization such as cohesion, role structure, size, etc.

Just as the amount of surveillance may vary, the monitoring agents may vary. Those observing norm relevant behavior might include only particular individuals (formal leadership, for example), specifically constituted subsystems (a committee on ethics, for example), or they might include virtually all members of the legislature. The monitoring agents probably vary from norm to norm, with some norm relevant behavior monitored by leadership, other by various

subgroups, and still other by the entire membership. Personal attacks upon a fellow member in violation of system norms, for example, are probably noted (as violations) by virtually the entire membership of a legislature; deserting the party on crucial votes in violation of "party norms," on the other hand, is probably more apparent to party leadership than to the rank and file membership.

According to the traditional description of American politics, the final monitoring (and sanctioning) agent is the voter. Considerable evidence belies this description; most voters are unaware of most of the activities of their elected officials.[5] The visibility of most legislative behavior is relatively low for outsiders, and most outsiders are simply not interested in what goes on in the legislature. In deciding upon a course of action most American legislators are therefore probably more aware of expectations arising in the legislature than those of their constituents.

Three fixed-choice items were employed to elicit information regarding the amount of perceived surveillance and roughly identify monitoring agents. Respondents were asked to register their response on a four-point scale (strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree) to the following statements:

> My constituents are usually aware of my behavior here in the House (Senate).
>
> Other members of the House (Senate) are usually aware of my behavior here in the House (Senate).

House (Senate) leaders are usually aware of my behavior here in the House (Senate).

The distribution of responses elicited by these questions is shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. A vast majority of the respondents agreed (either strongly or somewhat) with all three statements. Although differences are small, the percentage of members in both chambers agreeing that chamber leaders are aware of their behavior was slightly larger than the percentage agreeing that other members are aware of their behavior. Despite the fact that the House has more than twice as many members as the Senate, perceived awareness by leaders and peers was remarkably similar in the two chambers. Perceived constituency awareness of behavior was, as expected, lower than either other member or leadership awareness. Approximately one-third of those interviewed in the House apparently believe that their behavior is not usually monitored by constituents, a sentiment shared by almost one-half of the Senators interviewed. Belief that others are aware of their behavior, of course, does not imply that others are actually monitoring behavior. Nevertheless, such widespread agreement that other legislators are aware of behavior suggests that actual surveillance is likely.

These data support the conclusion that the second requisite of a sanction system is fulfilled in both chambers of the Oklahoma legislature. Members of both houses believe that leaders and other members are usually aware of their

TABLE 5.2

PERCEPTIONS OF OTHER' AWARENESS OF BEHAVIOR: HOUSE

Perceived Awareness	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	
Other members usually aware of behavior	50.6%	48.3%	1.1%	0.0%	100.0%	N=89
Chamber leaders usually aware of behavior	51.1	46.7	2.2	0.0	100.0	N=90
Constituents usually aware of behavior	32.2	33.3	26.7	7.8	100.0	N=90

TABLE 5.3

PERCEPTION OF OTHER' AWARENESS OF BEHAVIOR: SENATE

Perceived Awareness	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total	
Other members usually aware of behavior	54.5%	40.9%	2.3%	2.3%	100.0%	N=44
Chamber leaders usually aware of behavior	56.8	40.9	2.3	0.0	100.0	N=44
Constituents usually aware of behavior	29.5	22.7	25.0	22.7	99.9*	N=44

*Less than 100% because of rounding.

behavior in the legislature.

Sanctions

Knowledge of the norms and awareness that norm relevant behavior is subject to surveillance does not assure norm conformity. The crucial element in any sanction system is the availability of rewards and punishments that encourage behavior congruent with the norms of the system. As Daniel Webster noted, "A law without penalty is mere advice." Members must not only believe that their behavior is monitored, they must also believe that norm violation will "cost" them something.

Central to any discussion of sanctions is the differentiation between negative and positive sanctions. The notion of sanctions as well as the distinction between positive and negative sanctions has been clarified by Secord and Backman:

> Norms are enforced by means of sanctions. This term refers to the actions of others or of an actor himself that have the effect of rewarding conformity and punishing non-conformity to norms by facilitating or interfering with the need gratification of the individual. Where need gratification is facilitated, we speak of positive sanctions. Where need deprivation is the result, we speak of negative sanctions.[6]

An important characteristic of any social organization is the type of sanctions employed to encourage norm conformity. The functioning of a sanction system relying solely upon negative sanctions, one embodying Machiavelli's famous

advice that "it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be wanting," would differ markedly from one depending solely upon positive sanctions. These polar opposites, however, are rarely encountered in reality. A mixture of positive and negative sanctions, as Machiavelli himself understood, is not only more commonly found in social organizations but is also probably more effective in eliciting conformity.

Negative sanctions discourage nonconformity whereas positive sanctions encourage conformity. There is a certain amount of simple verbalism in this statement, but it does highlight the main emphases of these two types of sanctions. It seems unlikely, for example, that the norm violator is offered any rewards for ceasing to violate the norms; punishment is a far more likely consequence of norm violation. Nevertheless, the average member sees that certain rewards accrue for behavior in accordance with system norms and that particular punishments are the result of norm violation. The cost of nonconformity is not simply the resulting punishment; the costs also include the loss of rewards that might result from conformity. Hence, although theoretically significant, the distinction between positive and negative sanctions is probably less important for the member of a social system. To be deprived of a reward is likely to be seen in the same light as a penalty; both negative sanctions and the absence of positive sanctions cost the norm

violator something.

Although the effectiveness of positive and negative sanctions in eliciting conformity probably differs somewhat from individual to individual, it seems likely that negative sanctions are generally more effective in achieving compliance. In part, the greater success of negative sanctions rests upon the fact that the ability of a legislature to severely punish is greater than its ability to greatly reward. Positive sanctions probably accrue over a longer period of time; firm institutional rewards likely come more slowly than punishment and are probably less clearly linked to particular acts. Also, it is important to note that the impact of the employment of negative sanctions extends far beyond the member or members to which these sanctions are applied. Most negative sanctions are visible even to those not being sanctioned. The member is able to see what is likely to happen to him if he should violate particular norms by observing what has happened to those who did violate these norms. In other words, the application of negative sanctions not only punishes the misbehaving member but acts as a deterrent against future norm violation by <u>others</u> as well as the punished member.

Two questions were employed in the present study to obtain information regarding the sanctions utilized in the Oklahoma legislature. After asking legislators to identify the "unwritten rules" of their chamber, they were asked:

How is it made difficult for those members who do not follow these "unwritten rules"?

How is the member who carefully obeys these "unwritten rules" rewarded?

Negative Sanctions

The belief that negative sanctions are available was widespread in both chambers of the Oklahoma legislature. Members rarely had difficulty in identifying specific sanctions. Only six House members claimed that things are not made difficult for the individual who does not follow the "unwritten rules" of the chamber. No Senator made a similar claim. Approximately one-half of the members in each chamber were able to identify two or more negative sanctions.

The members of the two chambers identified quite similar sanctions. The negative sanctions uncovered in the House are found in Table 5.4. Those identified in the Senate are shown in Table 5.5. Most commonly mentioned in the two houses were sanctions involving (1) the effectiveness of the member, particularly the member's ability to get his own legislation passed, (2) personal relations, and (3) committee appointments.

The most frequently mentioned negative sanctions were those affecting the legislator's effectiveness in the legislature. Loss of effectiveness or influence (general) was mentioned by 30.8% of the Senators identifying negative

TABLE 5.4

NEGATIVE SANCTIONS: HOUSE

First Response N=79	Second Response N=39	Negative Sanctions
8	0	1. Poor personal relations (general)
11	1	2. Personal ostracism
1	1	3. Loss of respect
11	7	4. Loss of effectiveness or influence (general)
19	15	5. Obstruction of legislation
12	6	6. Committee appointments
2	2	7. Penalties from leadership
2	2	8. Discrimination with regard to office space, secretarial assistance, pages, etc.
3	0	9. Reprimands from leadership
0	1	10. Ignored by leadership
2	0	11. Problems on the floor
1	1	12. Problems in committee meetings
7	3	13. Other

TABLE 5.5

NEGATIVE SANCTIONS: SENATE

First Response N=39	Second Response N=21	Negative Sanctions
6	3	1. Poor personal relations (general)
3	2	2. Personal ostracism
4	1	3. Loss of respect
8	4	4. Loss of effectiveness or influence (general)
13	7	5. Obstruction of legislation
3	3	6. Committee appointments
0	1	7. Penalties from leadership (general)
0	0	8. Discriminate against with regard to office space, secretarial assistance, pages, etc.
1	0	9. Reprimands from leadership
1	0	10. Ignored by leadership
0	0	11. Problems on the floor
0	0	12. Problems in committee meetings
0	0	13. Other

sanctions and 22.8% of the House members. Loss of effectiveness can, of course, have several meanings. It seems likely, however, that Oklahoma legislators measure effectiveness in terms of the ability to get legislation passed. Difficulty in getting legislation passed was mentioned as a negative sanction by 51.5% of the Senators and 40.5% of the House members. These findings suggest that Senators are slightly more aware of a relationship between legislative effectiveness and norm conformity. This might result from greater concern for effectiveness and "getting things done" in the upper chamber.

In addition, a sizeable number of the members of both chambers believe that violation of the "unwritten rules" may result in the deterioration of personal relationships. Of those members identifying negative sanctions, 23.1% in the Senate and 10.1% in the House mentioned poor personal relationships in general as a consequence of norm violation. Quite often respondents were more specific: 15.2% of the House members and 12.8% of the Senators mentioned personal ostracism as a negative sanction. Also, two (2.5%) House members and five (12.8%) Senators mentioned loss of respect as a negative sanction.

Poor personal relationships with peers and ineffectiveness are, of course, interrelated in legislative bodies. Accomplishments in the legislative setting depend upon the ability to persuade others. Friendships, mutual respect,

and warm personal relations are important prerequisites for achievement. Leadership position, success in getting bills through the maze of committee procedures, and the ability to persuade a majority on critical floor votes often depend upon successful one-to-one relations with other legislators. The merits of a bill are sometimes less important to members than personal relations with the sponsor of that bill. More than two-thirds of those interviewed in the two chambers agreed with the statement that "the likelihood of a bill's passage largely depends on who is sponsoring that bill." The relationship between effectiveness and personal relations is well illustrated by the fate of a bill before the Senate during the period in which interviews were conducted. After it was apparent that the measure was to be defeated, a supporter of the proposed legislation told his colleagues "A vote for this bill is a vote for Senator_____ [the bill's sponsor]. A vote against it is a vote against him." The measure was immediately passed.

Members of both houses also mentioned poor committee assignments as a negative sanction. Failure to gain a seat on desirable committees can often have damaging consequences. Getting legislation passed, personal prestige and influence, bargaining position, and even re-election might sometimes depend upon favorable committee assignments. Members of the House, however, were appreciably more aware of committee appointments as a punishment for norm violation than were

members of the Senate. In discussing negative sanctions, 22.8% of the House members and 15.4% of the Senate members identified committee appointments.

Other negative sanctions were also mentioned. Perhaps the most important of these dealt with penalties directly stemming from chamber leadership. Responses specifically mentioning relations with leadership were more common in the House than in the Senate. Leadership may simply ignore the deviant or norm violation may be directly reprimanded. In the House, leadership may also sanction by the assignment of office space, secretarial assistance, and pages. These services are controlled by chamber leadership in both Houses, but only in the lower chamber do members share offices and secretarial assistance. According to some of those interviewed in the House, the assignment of these services reflects not only the position of the member but also his conformity to chamber norms. The practice of each Senator having his own office and secretary usually precludes such sanctions in the upper chamber. Nevertheless, a Black Senator, the first in Oklahoma's history, complained that his office, located in a hidden nook of the Senate office wing of the capitol building, was assigned in an effort to "hide a Black man."

Positive Sanctions

Members of both houses were less able to articulate positive sanctions. Four Senators and ten House members

claimed that there are no rewards for norm conformity. Positive sanctions mentioned in the House are shown in Table 5.6 and those identified in the Senate are found in Table 5.7. In general, positive sanctions mentioned in the two chambers tend to mirror the negative sanctions identified earlier.

Like negative sanctions, rewards were most commonly believed to involve effectiveness and influence, personal relations in the chamber, and committee assignments. In the House 17.8% of those identifying positive sanctions mentioned gain in effectiveness or influence and 38.4% expressed the belief that norm conformity is rewarded by increasing the likelihood that one's own legislation will be passed. Of those identifying positive sanctions in the Senate, only 11.1% identified a gain in effectiveness or influence but 41.7% mentioned the increased likelihood of legislation passing. In both houses members named personal relations as a positive sanction, but this item was more frequently mentioned in the Senate than in the House. Improved personal relations in general was mentioned by 25% of those Senators identifying rewards, but by only 8.2% of those in the House. Similarly, winning the respect of others in the chamber was mentioned by 27.8% of the Senate and only 13.7% of the House. Committee assignments and favors from leadership, on the other hand, were more commonly identified as positive sanctions in the House than in the Senate. Three House members mentioned committee chairmanships as a reward, but

TABLE 5.6

POSITIVE SANCTIONS: HOUSE

First Response N=73	Second Response N=34		Positive Sanctions
6	0	1.	Improved personal relations (general)
2	0	2.	Become a member of the "team"
10	0	3.	Win the respect of other members
10	3	4.	Gain effectiveness or influence (general)
21	7	5.	Legislation more likely to pass
11	13	6.	Committee assignments
3	0	7.	Committee chairmanships
6	2	8.	Favors from leadership (general)
0	2	9.	Office space, secretarial assistance, pages, etc.
1	2	10.	Travel ("junkets")
0	4	11.	Leadership position
3	1	12.	Other

TABLE 5.7

POSITIVE SANCTIONS: SENATE

First Response N=36	Second Response N=17		Positive Sanctions
6	3	1.	Improved personal relations (general)
3	1	2.	Become a member of the "team"
7	3	3.	Win the respect of other members
2	2	4.	Gain effectiveness or influence (general)
12	3	5.	Legislation more likely to pass
3	0	6.	Committee assignments
0	0	7.	Committee chairmanships
1	0	8.	Favors from leadership (general)
0	2	9.	Office space, secretarial assistance, pages, etc.
0	0	10.	Travel ("junkets")
0	1	11.	Leadership position
2	2	12.	Other

no Senator made a similar claim. House members were also more likely to mention favors from leadership (general) as a positive sanction: 9.6% of the House members but only one Senator made mention of this item in discussing the rewards of norm conformity.

Sanction Patterns

The data regarding sanctions are presented in a different format in Table 5.8. Responses have been grouped into four substantive categories and the percentages of legislators mentioning items in these categories as a first or second response is shown by chamber. Also, the percentage naming other sanctions as well as those claiming that their chamber has no sanctions is shown.

Several comparisons can be made on the basis of this table. First, comparisons of the positive and negative sanctions within chambers is possible. In the Senate, effectiveness and personal relations were most commonly affected by sanctions mentioned by the membership of that chamber. A large number (64.4%) of the Senators interviewed believed that norm violation leads to decreased effectiveness; a smaller number (42.5%) suggested that norm conformity increases effectiveness in the chamber. Sanctions involving personal relations, on the other hand, were more frequently mentioned as rewards for norm conformity than as punishments for norm violation. Committee assignments were

TABLE 5.8

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SANCTIONS, BY CHAMBER*

Area Affected	Senate		House	
	Positive Sanction	Negative Sanction	Positive Sanction	Negative Sanction
	N=40	N=39	N=83	N=79
None	10.0% (4)	0.0%	12.0% (10)	7.1% (6)
Effectiveness	42.5 (17)	64.4 (25)	49.4 (6)	55.3 (47)
Committee Assignment	7.5 (3)	15.4 (6)	33.7 (27)	22.4 (19)
Personal Relations	50.0 (20)	43.6 (17)	21.7 (18)	25.9 (22)
Favors from Leadership	7.5 (3)	2.6 (1)	14.5 (12)	9.5 (8)

*Percentages total more than 100% since most respondents named more than one sanction.

mentioned about twice as often as a negative sanction than as a positive sanction. Also, rewards from leadership were mentioned more often than penalties.

In the House, sanctions involving effectiveness and committee assignments were mentioned most frequently. A larger number of House members mentioned changes in effectiveness as a negative sanction than as a positive sanction. Conversely, committee assignments were more often viewed as positive sanction. About one-fourth of the House members believed that personal relations can be adversely affected by norm violation; a slightly smaller proportion (21.7%) mentioned improved personal relations as a consequence of norm conformity. In identifying sanctions House members also mentioned relations with leadership, with a larger proportion mentioning rewards than penalties from leadership.

Comparisons between the two chambers are also possible. Most apparent is the remarkable similarity of sanctions in the two chambers: the categorization scheme used in Table 5.8 is both brief and fully applicable to both chambers. In general, however, sanctions (both positive and negative) affecting effectiveness and personal relationships were more frequently mentioned by members of the Senate than by House members. Members of both houses mentioned sanctions affecting the individual's effectiveness more often than other sanctions. Nevertheless, sanctions involving effectiveness were more commonly mentioned

in the Senate than in the House. Almost two-thirds of those interviewed in the Senate believed that norm violation decreases effectiveness in that chamber. Sanctions involving interpersonal relationships were also mentioned in both chambers. Like effectiveness, however, mention of personal relations was more frequent in the upper chamber: The percentage of Senators identifying improved personal relationships as a consequence of norm conformity was more than twice that of the House members making similar mention. While personal relations were mentioned more frequently in discussing positive sanctions in the Senate, the reverse was true in the House.

Those sanctions indirectly or directly involving chamber leadership, however, were more frequently mentioned in the House than in the Senate. Most significantly, committee assignments were named as a positive sanction by 33.7% of the House members but by only 7.5% of those in the Senate. Not surprisingly, in answer to another question included in the interview schedule, 8.8% of the House members interviewed claimed indifference or dissatisfaction with their committee appointments; only one Senator expressed similar dissatisfaction. Rewards and penalties coming even more directly from leadership were also more commonly mentioned by House members: favors from leadership as a consequence of norm conformity was mentioned by 9.6% of the House members but by only one Senator.

Sanctioning Agents

The final component of the sanction system operative in the Oklahoma legislature to be dealt with here is the identification of sanctioning agents. Sanctions must not only be available, but some individual, group, or the membership as a whole must apply those sanctions if the sanction system is to function.

Two precautionary statements are necessary. First, the application of sanctions does not always (or perhaps even usually) indicate a conscious decision upon the part of the sanctioning agent to reward or punish a fellow member. Failure to cooperate, ostracism, and even obstruction of goal achievement is a common response to norm violation in most social environments. The sanctioning agent in any particular case may be responding in a pattern that is almost universal: we are simply less likely to be friendly and helpful towards those whom we dislike. Second, no motive should be imputed to the sanctioning agent. Obviously, sanctioning is often motivated by a desire to achieve norm conformity. Nevertheless, sanctions are probably often employed for reasons that have nothing to do with increasing conformity to norms. Sanctions, for example, may be applied for revenge or any number of similar motives. Hence, in dealing with sanctioning agents no assumptions are made regarding the intentions or motives of those reputed to reward conformity and punish nonconformity.

A single question was used to identify sanctioning agents in the Oklahoma legislature. After respondents identified negative sanctions employed in their chamber, they were asked,

> Without naming names, who is most likely to make things difficult for these members.

In other words, respondents were asked to identify the sanctioning agents for negative sanctions. The similarity of negative and positive sanctions identified earlier, nevertheless, suggests that the sanctioning agents for both types of sanctions are quite similar also. Additionally, it should be noted that the question employed deals with reputation, i.e. legislators' beliefs regarding the identity of sanctioning agents.

Sanctioning agents identified by House members are shown in Table 5.9. Those identified by members of the Senate are shown in Table 5.10. Sanctioning agents most commonly mentioned were leadership and membership of the chamber as a whole.

Comparison of sanctions employed in the two chambers indicated that sanctions stemming from leadership were more common in the House than in the Senate. Nevertheless, respondents in the two chambers mentioned leadership as a sanctioning agent with similar frequency. Leadership in general was mentioned by 30.9% of the Senate and 27.6% of the House. Likewise, the percentage of legislators mentioning items

TABLE 5.9

SANCTIONING AGENTS: HOUSE

First Response N=80	Second Response N=22	Sanctioning Agents
19	4	1. Leadership (general)
15	2	2. Speaker of the House
1	2	3. Party leaders
2	0	4. Opinion leaders
7	1	5. Members with seniority
3	8	6. Committee chairmen
7	2	7. Older members
21	2	8. Membership as a whole
5	1	9. Other

TABLE 5.10

SANCTIONING AGENTS: SENATE

First Response N=42	Second Response N=6	Sanctioning Agents
13	1	1. Leadership (general)
2	1	2. Senate President Pro Tempore
1	0	3. Party leaders
0	1	4. Opinion leaders
0	1	5. Members with seniority
0	0	6. Committee chairmen
1	1	7. Older members
21	0	8. Membership as a whole
4	1	9. Other

that can be construed as referring to leadership is similar in the two chambers: leadership items were mentioned by 50% of the House members and 42.9% of the Senate members.

An important difference should be noted, however, between responses naming leadership in the two chambers. A surprisingly large number of House members specifically identified the Speaker of the House when asked about sanctioning agents. The Speaker was named by 21.3% of the House members interviewed. Mention of the highest position in the formal leadership of the Senate (the Senate President or Pro Tempore), on the other hand, was made by only 7.1% of that chamber. In other words, the Speaker was viewed as actively enforcing the norms of the House much more frequently than his equivalent in the upper chamber.

Belief that the membership as a whole sanctions norm violators was widespread in both chambers. That the membership as a whole should be regarded as a sanctioning agent more often in the Senate than in the House was implied by the greater proportion of Senators mentioning sanctions involving personal relations. Not surprisingly, then, 50% of the Senators interviewed claimed that "everybody in the chamber" makes it difficult for those who violate Senate norms. In the House, where personal relations appear to be less affected by sanctions, only 28.8% mentioned the membership as a whole as a sanctioning agent.

In the House several "types" of legislators were identified as sanctioning agents. Committee chairmen were named by 13.8% and 10% identified those with seniority as sanctioning agents. A "generation gap" in the House is suggested by the fact that 11.8% of those interviewed specified "older members" as sanctioning agents. Although no data are available permitting linkages between sanctioning agents and specific sanctions employed, it seems likely that committee chairmen, members with seniority, and older members would have greater effect in applying sanctions affecting legislative effectiveness.

In the Senate, however, only two members mentioned members with seniority or older solons--and no Senator mentioned committee chairmen as sanctioning agents. What is most striking about responses from the Senate is their convergence in naming leadership and the membership as a whole as sanctioning agents. Only six Senators were able to name more than one sanctioning agent and only seven named sanctioning agents other than leadership or membership as a whole. Of other sanctioning agents identified none was mentioned by more than one Senator.

These findings suggest important differences between the House and Senate. In the Senate perceptions of sanctioning agents tended to be considerably more diffuse than in the lower chamber. In the Senate leadership as a sanctioning agent was commonly seen as a collective term specifying a

set of leaders rather than particular positions in the Senate hierarchy. House members, on the other hand, tended to specify with more precision the formal positions or attributes of sanctioning agents. Hence, a much larger number of House members than Senators specifically identified as sanctioning agents the Speaker, committee chairmen, older members, and members with seniority. Similarly, House members were able to mention more sanctioning agents than were members of the upper chamber: the percentage of House respondents naming more than one sanctioning agent was almost twice as large as the percentage of Senate respondents naming more than one. Conversely, the percentage of respondents claiming that the membership as a whole is a sanctioning agent was much larger in the Senate than in the House.

Differences between the House and Senate regarding the identity of sanctioning agents correspond with differences in the sanctions mentioned by members of the two chambers. As was noted earlier, Senators more frequently than House members viewed positive and negative sanctions as affecting legislative effectiveness and personal relationships. Both of these sanctions--in positive or negative form--may be employed without any particular legislator being held responsible. Obstruction or promotion of legislation can come in a variety of discrete ways, from committee decisions to the final vote, and may involve particular leaders, leadership in general, or the whole membership. Similarly,

personal relations in a legislative body involve almost the entire membership.

House members, it was noted, more often than members of the upper chamber mentioned committee assignments and leadership actions (favors and punishments) as sanctions. In the House the power to employ these sanctions rests, for the most part, with the Speaker of the House and are not diffused throughout the chamber. In the Senate, however, committee appointments are made through the mechanism of a committee on committees. Unlike the Senate President Pro Tempore, the Speaker of the House has a number of small favors or punishments at his disposal in the assignment of office space, secretarial assistance, and phone service, all of which are shared by two or more members.

The reasons for these differences may also lie in structural differences between the two chambers. The House has more than twice the membership of the Senate, its members serve shorter terms of office, and its turnover rate is higher. Hence, the frequency of personal contacts between members is probably lower and the sense of fraternity or comraderie less well developed in the House than in the Senate. Relying on the membership as a whole to sanction norm violators probably requires more frequent personal contacts between members and more unity than are common in the lower chamber. Hence, a greater share of the sanctioning in the House likely comes from leadership, committee chair-

men, and those with lengthy tenure than in the Senate.

Summary

In this chapter the four components of the sanctioning system upon which the normative structure of the Oklahoma legislature rests have been examined. These four components are awareness of norms, belief that behavior is monitored, sanctions, and sanctioning agents. Widespread awareness of unwritten rules of conduct was found in both chambers. Likewise, a large percentage of the members of both chambers believe that their behavior is monitored by leadership and other members. Member awareness of positive and negative sanctions was also widespread. Among the most often mentioned positive and negative sanctions in the two chambers were those affecting legislative effectiveness, committee assignments, and personal relations with other members. Similarly, members had little difficulty in identifying sanctioning agents. The most commonly identified sanctioning agents were the chamber membership as a whole and leadership.

Despite the general similarity of the sanctioning systems in the two chambers of the Oklahoma legislature, several differences were noted. The most important differences involved the character of positive and negative sanctions and the identity of the sanctioning agents. Actions affecting legislative effectiveness and personal relations were mentioned more often and committee assignments and

favors from leadership were mentioned less often as sanctions in the Senate than in the House. Similarly, perceptions of the sanctioning agents tended to be more diffuse and less specific in the Senate than in the lower chamber.

Footnotes

1. John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelly, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 242.

2. James D. Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1965.

3. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1953), p. 173.

4. Thibaut and Kelly, The Social Psychology of Groups, p. 248.

5. See Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, LVII (March, 1963), 45-56; Donald E. Stokes and Warren Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI (Winter, 1962), 531-546.

6. Paul F. Secord and Carl W. Backman, Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 464.

CHAPTER VI

NORMATIVE RESPONSE PATTERNS

That norms give structure to the legislative process by augmenting the formal rules of the legislature with a complex network of interrelated decisional cues applicable in more or less standardized situations is the premise of this research. The legislature is an on-going social system anchored in psychological and attitudinal interrelationships that give coherence and meaning to legislative life. Collectively legislators' attitudes toward possible behaviors intermesh, creating a normative environment in which choices are made in the legislative arena. Norms, hence, are parts of the fabric of legislators' social reality--"fragments" of social reality, in Roger Brown's terms[1]--that structure behavior along socially predetermined channels. To deviate from a norm in choosing a course of action is not simply to ignore others' opinions, but is to test a part of the social reality in which group behavior is embedded. There is nothing magical in this. Alternative courses of action confronting the individual legislator are not devoid of all but instrumental meanings; the response believed likely to be evoked among others is a part of the meaning (for the legislator) of each alternative.

In this concluding chapter a partial framework for the study of legislative norms is developed. Such a framework attempts to provide a composite picture of the normative structure of a legislature by identifying patterns of normative responses to alternative modes of conduct across behavioral areas. This framework is developed inductively; rather than attempting to construct a broad-gauge theory of social norms or even a general typology of norm types, an effort is made to develop categories founded in norm theory and meaningful in terms of the research findings. The ultimate goal of such a framework is, nevertheless, the development of a theory of legislative norms capable of explaining the impact of normative structure upon legislative behavior and, hence, upon legislative policy outputs. The framework developed here is only a step along the long, but necessary, road to such a theory.

Norm Elements and Normative Structure: The Need for a Framework

The need for such a framework is made apparent by an examination of the findings reported in previous chapters. In Chapter II we argued that four criteria may be used in the effort to identify legislative norms. First, norms distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate modes of conduct, i.e. norms have specific prescriptive and proscriptive contents. Second, norms represent consensual attitudes. Third, norms have recognized intersubjective support. Finally, norms

are supported by a sanctioning system. In Chapters III and IV legislators' attitudes in eleven behavioral areas were examined and, through an analysis of these attitudes, a range of acceptable behavior was identified for each behavioral area. Additionally, varying degrees of consensual support and intersubjective recognition of others' preferences regarding optimal behaviors were identified for the behavioral possibilities making up these behavioral areas. In Chapter V it was shown that an operative sanctioning system exists in both chambers of the Oklahoma legislature. On the basis of this analysis it may be concluded that norms regulating behavior are operative in each of the behavioral areas examined.

The reader who has closely followed this analysis, however, has undoubtedly noticed considerable variation in legislators' attitudes from one behavioral area to another. Simply saying that behavior in each of these areas is subject to normative regulation conceals differences between behavioral areas as well as variations in responses to behavioral alternatives within each area. Put differently, despite the fact that each of these behavioral areas is regulated by norms, these norms vary in significant respects.

These variations point to what is conceptually and methodologically the most problematic aspect of studying legislative norms: the phenomena conjoined by the norm concept are variable in content. Hence, we have found that the

optimal behavior in some behavioral areas is much less approved (as measured by the means) than behaviors approved, but not optimal, in other areas. To say that a particular alternative is an optimal behavior means only that it is the most preferred behavior within a specified behavioral area. Likewise, the degree of crystallization and the amount of member awareness of group support may vary from one behavioral area to another and from behavioral possibility to behavioral possibility within a behavioral area. Sanctions, too, may vary in severity and applicability for norm conformity (positive sanctions) and norm violation (negative sanctions). In short, each of the elements comprising a norm is best visualized along a continuum.

These considerations give rise to two further problems. First, what particular findings with respect to each of the elements constitutive of a norm can be regarded as "adequate" evidence for the existence of a norm? What degree of crystallization, for example, is necessary to support a norm? Or, with respect to another element, how many members must recognize a particular set of prescriptions and proscriptions in order for the researcher to conclude that there is "widespread" awareness of a norm within the system? The second problem involves the fact that relationships between variables tied together by the norm concept are contingent and not necessary. Widespread consensus regarding appropriate and inappropriate conduct may exist, for example, without

equally widespread awareness that such consensus exists. Conversely, there may be widespread beliefs that a particular behavior is prescribed by the membership when in fact members do not prefer that behavioral possibility as much as another within the same behavioral area.

These problems make difficult the application of the term "norms" to empirically generated data. The term "norm," however, is not an honorific appellation; nothing is gained in the effort to describe the normative structure of legislative bodies by a preoccupation with applying labels. The value of the norm concept as an explanatory and descriptive device is immeasurably diminished by an insistence upon a rigid dichotomy between norms and "non-norms." The normative structure of a legislature is infinitely complex and any attempt to describe that structure must respect this complexity by admitting of a variety of attitudinal patterns. Some attitudinal configurations can be identified which clearly indicate the presence of norms. Other attitudinal configurations may clearly indicate the absence of normative regulation. Between these two extremes, however, are a large number of attitudinal configurations which cannot be labeled "norm" or "non-norm" without qualifications. The important point is that configurations lying between these extremes may have a significant impact upon the choice of behavioral alternatives within the legislature; simply stated, these attitudinal configurations are also a part of the normative environment

in which legislative behavior is embedded. Ignoring these on the grounds that definitional criteria are not met would be myopic.

Normative Response Patterns: A Framework

The framework developed here makes use of two elements common to all norms, but does not attempt to label chamber responses to behavioral alternatives as "norm" or "non-norm."[2] Focusing upon the evaluative character of legislators' attitudes toward behavioral alternatives and the degree to which these attitudes are crystallized, nine types of response patterns to behavioral possibilities are identified. The resulting typology permits the development of hypotheses relating response patterns to behavioral alternatives to the structuring of behavior within legislative bodies.

This framework delineates patterns of responses within a chamber to the fifty-five possible behaviors included in this study. The first aspect of these responses is their evaluative character; collectively chamber members approved, disapproved, or were indifferent toward these possible behaviors. Unfortunately, there is no completely satisfying operational procedure of classifying possible behaviors as prescribed, proscribed, or indifferent. It is possible, of course, to create a dichotomy by using 5.00 as a demarcation between approved and disapproved behaviors. Those behavioral possibilities with a mean evaluation above 5.00 could then be regarded as prescribed while those with a mean evaluation

below 5.00 could be viewed as proscribed behaviors. Since on many of the items, however, a sizable number of the respondents indicated indifference, this category must be preserved in any classification scheme seeking to group together possible behaviors evoking similar evaluations. A further consideration in determining a criterion for the classification of behavioral possibilities is the need to identify clearly prescribed and proscribed behaviors; hence, only behavioral alternatives with mean evaluations indicating strong approval or disapproval should be (operationally, at least) regarded as prescribed or proscribed behaviors.

On the basis of these considerations behavioral possibilities classified as prescribed behaviors include only those items with a mean evaluation greater than 6.00 and those classified as proscribed behaviors include only those items with a mean evaluation of less than 4.00. Items with mean evaluations falling between 4.00 and 6.00, therefore, are tentatively classified as indifferent behaviors.

Classification of mean responses--labeling each behavioral possibility as prescribed, proscribed, or indifferent--is not in itself a completely satisfactory descriptive device for it ignores differences in the degree to which these attitudes are crystallized. The second element incorporated into this framework, therefore, is the degree to which evaluations are in fact collective, i.e., the crystallization of attitudes serving to prescribe, proscribe, or leave indifferent the various behavioral alternatives.

Demarcating between levels of crystallization is a matter that, given the nature of the data, must necessarily be determined in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. In order to group similar crystallization scores, the crystallization scores for the fifty-five possible behaviors have been trichotomized on the basis of their size. For each chamber the eighteen behavioral alternatives having the highest standard deviations are classified as low crystallization items. Similarly, the eighteen behavioral alternatives having the lowest standard deviations are classified as high crystallization items. The nineteen behavioral possibilities having standard deviations between the high and low crystallization categories are classified as medium crystallization items.[3] Inferences drawn on the basis of crystallization scores categorized in this manner are possible, but require care because of the somewhat arbitrary means by which scores were categorized. It must be kept in mind that high, medium, and low crystallization refer only to the size of a set of crystallization scores relative to the size of the crystallization scores for all behavioral areas.

Based upon these classificatory schemes for mean evaluative responses and crystallization scores, nine types of normative response patterns toward behavioral alternatives may be identified. These are shown in schematic fashion in Figure 6.1. Unfortunately, there is no developed terminology that is of assistance in labeling normative response patterns. Hence, it is important to forewarn the reader that these response

FIGURE 6.1

NORMATIVE RESPONSE PATTERNS:
A FRAMEWORK

Mean Evaluative Response	Crystallization: High	Crystallization: Medium	Crystallization: Low
More than 6.00	Consensual Prescription	Nonconsensual Prescription	Controversial Prescription
4.00 - 6.00	Consensual Indifference	Dissension	Conflict
Less than 4.00	Consensual Proscription	Nonconsensual Proscription	Controversial Proscription

patterns are meaningful--operationally, at least--only in relation to one another. By labeling a particular response pattern "conflict," for example, we wish only to designate a response pattern with disagreements wider in scope than others, signifiying that disagreement is greater on some items than on others included in this study.

Where crystallization is high, indicating the likelihood of consensus, response patterns are designated consensual prescription, consensual proscription, and consensual indifference depending upon the location of the mean response. Disagreement as well as agreement can, of course, characterize legislators' evaluations of alternative modes of behavior. Medium crystallization indicates that consensus is missing but suggests that the range of disagreement is limited. Medium crystallization, in other words, indicates that dissensus is nonpolarized. Where the mean of the responses is above 6.00 or below 4.00 medium crystallization, hence, implies that legislators generally agree in their evaluations of behavioral alternatives but disagree with respect to the intensity of their approval or disapproval. That is, legislators collectively approve or disapprove behavioral alternatives despite disagreements over the degree of approval or disapproval. A sizable number of legislators may, for example, strongly approve of a behavioral possibility which numerous others only minimally approve. These two patterns of nonpolarized dissensus are termed nonconsensual proscription and nonconsensual prescription.

Medium crystallization indicates that evaluative responses are not clustered around a single point on the evaluative scale but are arrayed over a limited distance along the scale. Hence, whenever medium crystallization is accompanied by a mean falling between 4.00 and 6.00 mild disagreement over approval or disapproval as such is indicated; medium crystallization in these circumstances indicates that most responses fall in a range from slightly disapprove to slightly approve. This third pattern of nonpolarized dissensus, therefore, is termed dissension.

Likewise, low crystallization indicates that the scope of disagreement is not limited to differences of opinion over degrees of approval or disapproval, but is expanded to include disagreements over approval or disapproval as such. In these circumstances we may speak of polarized dissensus. Three patterns of polarized dissensus may be distinguished. Where the mean response indicates that a behavior is prescribed, respondents disapproving of the behavioral possibility in question are either intense in their disapproval or reasonably sizable in number; otherwise, the crystallization score would be higher and/or the mean would be lower. Hence, either through the intensity or number of those disagreeing with the majority opinion, greater controversy is likely over items prescribed despite polarized dissensus than over items evoking consensual or nonconsensual prescription. This response pattern, then, is designated controversial

prescription. Similarly, a response pattern proscribing behavioral possibilities despite polarized dissensus is termed controversial proscription.

Maximal dissensus is approached in polarized responses having a mean falling between 4.00 and 6.00. Where legislators disagree in their evaluation of a behavioral possibility with about equal numbers approving and disapproving, the mean of the responses would, of course, fall close to the middle of the evaluative scale. Low crystallization indicates that respondents are spread far from the mean; hence, when the mean falls in the middle of the scale and crystallization is low respondents have necessarily evaluated the behavior in question dissimilarly with approximately an equal number at each end of the scale. This response pattern, then, is designated conflict.

Response Patterns and Legislative Behavior

The value of this framework ultimately depends upon the discovery of empirical linkages between response patterns and the ways in which behavior is structured in legislative bodies. Several interrelated linkages are suggested by this framework. The most important of these involve the enactment of behavioral alternatives, the sanctioning system, and changes in the normative structure of legislative bodies.

First, it seems likely that the frequency with which behavioral alternatives are enacted is related to normative response patterns to these alternatives. The probable

enactment of behavioral alternatives can be visualized along a continuum. At one end of this continuum are those behavioral alternatives with a high probability of occurrence and at the other end are those with a low probability of occurrence. The question, unanswerable without data on legislators' actual behavior, is whether or not behaviors with an empirically determined equal likelihood of occurrence are related to similar patterns of normative response. In other words, can normative response patterns be linked to points along this continuum?

Figure 6.2 shows a hypothetical arrangement of normative response patterns along such a continuum. At one extreme are behavioral alternatives prescribed by well crystallized attitudes and at the other extreme are alternatives proscribed by equally well crystallized attitudes. Behavioral alternatives evoking responses close to either of these extremes are those most likely affected by the normative environment of the legislature. The legislature would likely avoid the enactment of proscribed behaviors whenever possible and, conversely, to enact prescribed modes of conduct whenever possible; hence, proscribed behaviors would be expected to occur with less than random frequency and prescribed behaviors would be expected to occur with more than random frequency. Consensual prescription and proscription, thus, represent response patterns most likely to structure behavior along socially determined routes.

FIGURE 6.2

NORMATIVE RESPONSE PATTERNS AND THE PROBABILITY OF ENACTMENT:
A HYPOTHETICAL ORDERING



Between these extremes are arrayed the remaining normative response patterns. The choice of behavioral alternatives is not determined solely by the normative environment; otherwise consensually prescribed behaviors would always be enacted. Where pressures originating outside the normative environment make the enactment of consensually prescribed behaviors impossible, the next best choice within a behavioral area would be expected. In other words, legislators would be expected to choose the situationally permitted alternative toward which normative response patterns are most favorable. In the hypothetical ordering shown in Figure 6.2, legislators would be expected to choose the available alternative furtherest from consensual proscription and closest to consensual prescription; an alternative evoking controversial prescription, for example, would likely be chosen over one eliciting controversial proscription. Put differently, the likelihood of a behavioral alternative being enacted depends not only on the pattern of normative responses to that alternative, but also depends on the situation and patterns of normative response to other alternatives within the same behavioral area.

Normative response patterns may also be related to the application of sanctions within the legislature. It might be hypothesized that the severity of sanctions and their likelihood of application decreases as the chamber response pattern shifts from consensual prescription and consensual proscription toward the center of the continuum. Hence,

sanctions would be least likely to enforce behaviors evoking the conflict, dissension, or consensual indifference response patterns. Perhaps more importantly, the legitimacy of the application of sanctions is probably linked to normative response patterns. Nonconsensual and controversial proscription, for example, would likely lead to disagreements in the appraisal of sanctions. Those strongly preferring a controversially prescribed alternative would likely approve the use of extreme positive sanctions more readily than those whose approval is less intense. Similarly, sanctioning agents are likely linked to response patterns toward behavioral alternatives. The application of sanctions for the enactment of behavioral alternatives not consensually prescribed or consensually proscribed is likely to require a specialized sub-group; the membership as a whole could not be relied upon to enforce regulations for which there is less than consensual agreement.

The response patterns identified by this framework might also be useful in examining changes in the normative structure of legislative bodies. Although this framework does not directly focus upon processes, it does suggest a likely order to changing patterns of chamber response to behavioral alternatives. Hence, this framework might be profitably employed to trace stages of attitudinal configurations through which the members of a legislature become indifferent to a behavioral alternative formerly consensually proscribed.

Conservely, the framework suggests response patterns that are likely stages in the development of consensual prescription; the change in response to a behavioral alternative from consensual indifference to consensual proscription or consensual prescription likely evolves through intervening normative response patterns.

Normative Response Patterns in the Oklahoma Legislature

Consensual and Nonconsensual Prescription

Prescriptions direct attention to modes of conduct believed most appropriate by most if not all members of the legislature. Prescribed behaviors are those behavioral alternatives that the legislator "ought" to enact. Response patterns indicating widespread approval would be expected to focus upon those actions believed most valuable to the functioning of the legislature. The enactment of prescribed behavioral alternatives is, therefore, likely to be related to the distribution of positive sanctions; doing what others believe is most appropriate would, as was shown in the previous chapter, likely gain respect, effectiveness, and position for the legislator.

Behavioral alternatives consensually prescribed in the Oklahoma legislature are shown in Table 6.1. Those nonconsensually prescribed are shown in Table 6.2. The primary differences between the two chambers with respect to prescribed behaviors were related to differences in the relative

TABLE 6.1

CONSENSUALLY PRESCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Sometimes following and sometimes not following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill	1. Trying to be an expert on only a few subject matter areas
2. Trying to be an expert on only a few subject matter areas	2. Speaking on the floor about as often as other members
3. Freshman speaking less often than most other members	3. Being friendly with, but not committed to, special interest groups
4. Always avoiding dealing in personalities	4. Always avoiding dealing in personalities
5. Sometimes supporting and sometimes not supporting the programs of the governor	

TABLE 6.2

NONCONSENSUALLY PRESCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Sometimes following and sometimes not following party leadership in committee	1. Sometimes following and sometimes not following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill
2. Being friendly with, but not committed to, special interest groups	2. Sometimes following and sometimes not following party leadership in committee
	3. Freshman speaking less often than most other members
	4. Sometimes supporting and sometimes not supporting the programs of the governor

size of the crystallization scores for prescribed behaviors and not prescription as such; only one item eliciting either consensual or nonconsensual prescription in the Senate failed to be prescribed (either consensually or nonconsensually) in the lower chamber. Although the range of acceptable behavior included two or more behavioral possibilities in ten behavioral areas in the Senate and nine in the House, not more than one alternative was either consensually or nonconsensually prescribed in the two chambers. This suggests that despite the presence of a range of acceptable behavior, Oklahoma lawmakers tend to have widely shared preferences for only a single behavioral possibility within behavioral areas.

Three behavioral areas in the Senate and four in the House included no behavioral possibility that is classifiable as either consensually or nonconsensually prescribed. Hence, in neither chamber was there consensual or nonconsensual prescription for any behavioral possibility in the procedural voting, introduction of bills, and publicity seeking behavioral areas. In the Senate consensual prescription was elicited by one item from the floor speaking behavioral area, but no behavioral possibility from this behavioral area was prescribed in the House. The absence of prescribed behavioral alternatives in these behavioral areas--all involving floor behavior--suggests that Oklahoma legislators tend to regard members' conduct on the floor as less important than other dimensions of legislative life.

Never dealing in personalities and trying to be an expert in a few subject matter areas were the only behavioral alternatives consensually prescribed in both chambers. In addition, sometimes supporting the governor and sometimes following party leadership in substantive voting were consensually prescribed in the House but nonconsensually prescribed in the Senate. Speaking about as often as others on the floor and maintaining a friendly but uncommitted stance with respect to interest groups were consensually prescribed in the upper chamber, but not in the House. In the Senate no item involving relations with party leadership or the governor is consensually prescribed. Nevertheless sometimes following party leadership in voting on bills, sometimes following party leadership in determining a course of action in committee meetings, and sometimes support of the governor's programs were nonconsensually prescribed.

It is interesting to note that legislators' responses to alternative relationships with party leaders were substantially the same as their responses to parallel relationships with interest groups and the governor. The importance of these relationships is apparent in the fact that Oklahoma legislators are neither indifferent to these relationships nor widely divided in their estimation of "correct" relationships. The prescribed behavior in all of these relationships is to remain independent of others' influence in decision-making by following no wielder of influence too closely.

These prescriptions are not unexpected in a legislature traditionally dominated by one party. The cause of party loyalty is neither substantially protected nor promoted by proscribed or prescribed behaviors; rather, normative evaluations serve to preserve the status of party leadership as one group among many competing for the legislators' support.

Controversial Prescription and Proscription

Response patterns prescribing or proscribing behavioral alternatives despite polarization were found in both chambers. These behavioral alternatives are shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. Controversially prescribed and proscribed behaviors involved eight behavioral areas in the House and nine in the Senate. In neither chamber were behavioral alternatives in the introduction of bills or procedural voting behavioral areas controversially prescribed or proscribed.

Controversially prescribed alternatives were identical in the two chambers: trying to be an expert in only one subject matter area, seldom dealing in personalities, and neither seeking nor avoiding publicity. Surprisingly, one of these alternatives--neither seeking nor avoiding publicity was an optimal behavior. One can only speculate as to the reasons why these behaviors evoked polarized responses. It seems likely, however, that while a majority approve of these behavioral alternatives a significant portion of the respondents believed that dealing in personalities at any time should be condemned and that those who specialize in a

TABLE 6.3

CONTROVERSIALLY PRESCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES: HOUSE AND SENATE

1. Trying to be an expert on a single subject matter area
2. Usually, but not always, avoiding dealing in personalities
3. Neither seeking nor avoiding publicity

TABLE 6.4

CONTROVERSIALLY PROSCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Always following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill	1. Always following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill
2. Always following party leadership in committee	2. Always following party leadership in committee
3. Not trying to be an expert on any subject matter	3. Not trying to be an expert on any subject matter
4. Trying to be an expert on all subject matter areas	4. Trying to be an expert on all subject matter areas
5. Speaking on the floor much more often than most members	5. Speaking on the floor much more often than most members
6. Always opposing special interest groups	6. Being a spokesman for special interest groups
7. Uusually, but not always, opposing the programs of the governor	7. Always supporting the programs of the governor
	8. Sometimes dealing in personalities

single subject matter area are not doing their share of the work of the legislature.

In both chambers one-half of the controversially proscribed behaviors involved relationships between legislators and those likely to intervene in legislative decision-making: party leadership, the governor, and interest groups. In the Senate polarized dissensus with respect to these relationships centered around legislators who maintain little distance between themselves and those potential wielders of influence. Hence, Senators collectively condemned--despite dissidents--those who are spokesmen for special interest groups, who always support the governor's program, who always follow party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill or upon a course of action in committees. Controversial proscription was also the pattern of chamber response in the lower chamber toward those who always follow the party leadership on bills or in determining a course of action in committees. Being a spokesman for special interest groups and always supporting the governor's programs, however, were consensually proscribed behaviors in the House. In the lower chamber usually opposing the governor's programs and always opposing interest groups, both of which were dissensually proscribed in the Senate, were controversially proscribed.

Consensual and Nonconsensual Proscription

Proscribed behaviors are those most disapproved by members of the legislature and, hence, those least likely to

occur. A number of negative sanctions ranging from ostracism to poor committee assignments can be used to discourage the enactment of proscribed behavioral alternatives. Like prescriptions, proscriptions would be expected to arise in areas of legislative life believed critical to the functioning of the legislature as an on-going social system. In areas where there is a consensually prescribed "correct" way of acting, actions deviating from that way are likely to be condemned; proscriptions, then, would be expected to mirror prescriptions.

Consensually proscribed behavioral alternatives are shown in Table 6.5 and those nonconsensually proscribed are shown in Table 6.6. Seventeen behavioral possibilities in the House and fifteen in the Senate were either consensually or nonconsensually proscribed. There are clearly "wrong" ways of acting in the Oklahoma legislature. Only one behavioral area in the House and two in the Senate contained no consensually or nonconsensually proscribed behavioral possibilities. Again, the similarity of the normative structure of the two chambers is striking: Only one of the behavioral alternatives consensually proscribed in the House was not also consensually proscribed in the Senate.

In the House, three of the four behavioral areas having consensually proscribed behavioral alternatives involved legislators' relations with party leadership and the governor. These proscriptions serve to prevent legislators' "independence" from party leadership and the governor from degenerating

TABLE 6.5

CONSENSUALLY PROSCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Seldom following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill	1. Never following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter
2. Never following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill	2. Seldom following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill
3. Seldom following party leadership in committee	3. Never following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill
4. Never following party leadership in committee	4. Seldom following party leadership in committee
5. Usually, but not always, dealing in personalities	5. Never following party leadership in committee
6. Always dealing in personalities	6. Usually, but not always, dealing in personalities
7. Always opposing the programs of the governor	7. Always dealing in personalities
	8. Consciously seeking as much publicity as possible

TABLE 6.6

NONCONSENSUALLY PROSCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Seldom following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter	1. Seldom following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter
2. Never following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter	2. Freshman speaking on the floor much more often than most other members
3. Never speaking on the floor	3. Never introducing bills
4. Freshman speaking on the floor much more often than most other members	4. Always opposing special interest groups
5. Sometimes dealing in personalities	5. Usually, but not always, opposing the programs of the governor
6. Never introducing bills	6. Always opposing the programs of the governor
7. Being a spokesman for special interest groups	7. Usually, but not always, seeking publicity
8. Being closely affiliated with special interest groups	
9. Always supporting the programs of the governor	
10. Consciously seeking as much publicity as possible	

into anti-party and anti-governor actions. Hence consensually proscribed behaviors include seldom and never following party leadership in deciding how to vote on bills and in determining a course of action in committees, and always opposing the governor's programs. Similar constraints on anti-party behaviors were found in the Senate where consensually proscribed behaviors included never following party leadership on procedural votes as well as those party-related items consensually proscribed in the House. Never supporting the governor's programs, however, was nonconsensually proscribed in the upper chamber.

The only consensually proscribed behaviors in the House not related to party leadership involved dealing in personalities. The proscription was clear: don't deal in personalities. Usually and always dealing in personalities were also condemned in the Senate and, in addition, always seeking publicity, a nonconsensually proscribed alternative in the House, was consensually proscribed.

Whereas consensually proscribed behaviors primarily involved legislators' relations with party leadership, nonconsensually proscribed items covered a wide range of activities. In the House but not in the Senate actions associated with not doing the work of the legislature were nonconsensually proscribed: never speaking on the floor (freshmen and others), never introducing legislation, and always seeking publicity. The latter item was consensually proscribed in the upper chamber, and Senators were consensually indifferent toward

those who never speak. Usually seeking publicity, a behavioral alternative evoking dissension in the House, was nonconsensually proscribed in the Senate.

There were other differences between the two chambers. Sometimes dealing in personalities and freshmen speaking much more often than others were nonconsensually proscribed in the House but not in the Senate. Also, behavioral alternatives suggesting close relations with interest groups and the governor were nonconsensually proscribed in the House but not in the Senate. Conservely, always opposing interest groups and usually, but not always, opposing the governor's programs were nonconsensually proscribed in the Senate but not the lower chamber.

Although it may be a function of items used in the interview schedule, it is interesting to note that almost one-third of the behavioral possibilities included in this study were consensually or nonconsensually proscribed in the two chambers; only about one-seventh were consensually or nonconsensually prescribed. Although we have no data concerning legislators' motives for rejecting these behaviors, condemnation of these behavioral alternatives should serve to encourage independence on the part of Oklahoma legislators, assure that members contribute at least minimally to the work of the legislature, and, finally, to limit the number of and character of disruptions to the legislative process.

Conflict and Dissension

The identification of behaviors likely to evoke conflicting evaluations from chamber members is an often neglected element in the study of the normative structure of legislative bodies. Courses of action which provoke dissimilar evaluations--i.e. some members approve, but others disapprove--demonstrate the limitations of the normative structure of a legislature and give the researcher some indication of the degree to which the normative structure of a legislature is developed. Although qualitative considerations are important, i.e. the types of behavior over which there is conflict, in general it might be assumed that the greater the number of behavioral alternatives generating dissimilar evaluations, the less developed the normative structure of the legislature.

Items in ten behavioral areas evoked either dissension or conflict response patterns in the two chambers. Dissension characterized chamber responses to seven behavioral possibilities in the House and eight in the Senate (Table 6.7). Conflict as a response pattern is seen on eight behavioral alternatives in the House and seven in the upper chamber (Table 6.8). Slight differences in the two chambers are indicated by the fact that only four of the seven items evoking dissension in the House evoked dissension in the Senate. Nevertheless, the primary contrasts between the two chambers were the result of differences in the scope of disagreements; hence, items evoking dissension or conflict in one chamber tended to evoke either

TABLE 6.7

BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES EVOKING DISSENSION: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Usually, but not always, following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill	1. Usually, but not always, following party leadership in committee
2. Speaking slightly more often than most other members on the floor	2. Speaking on the floor less often than most other members
3. Freshman speaking about as often as most other members	3. Speaking on the floor slightly more often than most other members
4. Usually, but not always, supporting the programs of the governor	4. Freshman never speaking
5. Having nothing to do with, but not opposing, special interest groups	5. Freshman speaking about as often as most other members
6. Usually, but not always, attempting to avoid publicity	6. Being closely affiliated with special interest groups
7. Usually, but not always, seeking publicity	7. Having nothing to do but not opposing, special interest groups
	8. Usually, but not always, supporting the programs of the governor

TABLE 6.8

BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES EVOKING CONFLICT: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Always following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter	1. Always following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter
2. Usually, but not always, following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter	2. Usually, but not always, following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter
3. Sometimes following and sometimes not following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter	3. Sometimes following and sometimes not following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter
4. Usually, but not always, following party leadership in committee	4. Usually, but not always, following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill
5. Trying to be an expert on most subject matter areas	5. Trying to be an expert on most subject matter areas
6. Freshman never speaking	
7. Introducing a great many more bills than most other members	6. Introducing a great many more bills than most other members
8. Consciously attempting to avoid publicity	7. Consciously attempting to avoid publicity

dissension or conflict in the other. Only two items with a chamber response of either dissension or conflict in the House did not evoke either dissension or conflict in the upper chamber.

In both chambers, the conflict pattern characterized response patterns to four behavioral alternatives involving party leadership. Three of these are from the procedural voting behavioral area; always, never, and sometimes following party leadership on procedural votes evoked widespread disagreement in both chambers. It is surprising to find greater disagreement on these items than on items relating to support of party leadership on substantive votes and committee behavior. Even the optimal behavior from the procedural voting behavioral area (usually support party) evoked conflicting evaluations in the two chambers. Disagreement over these items is apparently due to a division between legislators believing that procedural votes call for more frequent support of party leadership than do substantive votes and those for whom only sometimes following party leadership is preferable on all matters involving party leadership.

Conflict is also seen in responses to those who usually follow party leadership on substantive bills in the Senate, an item evoking dissension but not conflict in the House. Conversely, usually following party leadership in determining a course of action in committees evoked conflict in the House but dissension in the Senate. It is interesting to note that

in neither chamber did conflict response patterns involve legislators' relationships with interest groups or the governor.

The conflict pattern of chamber response, however, was not limited to behavioral alternatives involving party leadership. Widespread evaluative disagreement was also found in both chambers with respect to members who introduce many more bills than others, those who always consciously avoid publicity, and those who try to be experts in most subject matter areas dealt with by the legislature. In addition, conflict was found in the House over freshmen who never speak, an alternative evoking dissension rather than conflict in the upper chamber.

Dissension represents a halfway house between conflict and consensual indifference. Should evaluative differences become more intense over items evoking dissension the corresponding response patterns would shift from dissension to conflict. Should they become less intense, converging over time, consensual indifference would be the outcome. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that dissension is not a relative stable response pattern. Since the intensity of approval and disapproval is relatively low, evaluative differences are probably tolerable.

In the House, dissension as a chamber response was elicited by items suggesting usual support of the governor's programs and party leadership on substantive bills, and

having nothing to do with special interest groups. Other items evoking dissension in the House included speaking slightly more often than others, usually avoiding and usually seeking publicity, and freshmen who speak about as often as others.

Four items eliciting a dissension chamber response in the House evoked a similar response in the Senate. Two of those eliciting dissension in the House but not in the Senate are from the publicity seeking behavioral area: Usually avoiding publicity met with consensual indifference in the upper chamber and usually seeking publicity was nonconsensually proscribed in the upper chamber. Other differences in the two chambers involved floor speaking and relations with interest groups. Whereas speaking less often met with dissension in the Senate, House members were consensually indifferent toward this behavioral alternative. Also, whereas being committed to special interest groups and their lobbyists met with dissension in the Senate, this alternative was nonconsensually proscribed in the House.

Consensual Indifference

Consensual indifference as such would neither encourage or discourage the enactment of particular behavioral alternatives. Nevertheless, consensual indifference may play an important role in structuring legislative behavior. Legislators confronted with situations which prevent the enactment of prescribed behaviors would be expected to choose the safety

afforded by an alternative course of action toward which the general chamber response is that of consensual indifference.

Items eliciting consensual indifference are shown in Table 6.9. In both chambers consensual indifference as a normative response pattern was limited to items involving floor behavior. Members of both chambers were consensually indifferent toward introducing slightly fewer, slightly more, and about the same number of bills than others. In the House four behavioral possibilities evoking consensual indifference involved floor speaking; House members were indifferent with respect to speaking on the floor slightly less often, slightly more often (freshmen and others), and about the same as others. In the Senate speaking slightly less often and speaking slightly more often elicited dissension and speaking about the same was consensually prescribed. Never speaking, on the other hand, evoked consensual indifference in the Senate but was nonconsensually proscribed in the House. In the Senate, but not in the House, usually avoiding publicity also evoked consensual indifference.

Recognition of Response Patterns

The effects of differing normative response patterns are likely mediated by a number of factors. From the point of view of the normative structure of the legislature, one intervening variable deserves special attention--norm recognition. Members' awareness of normative response patterns would be expected to play a significant role in any fully

TABLE 6.9

CONSENSUALLY INDIFFERENT BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES: BY CHAMBER

House	Senate
1. Speaking on the floor less often than most other members	1. Never speaking on the floor
2. Speaking on the floor about as often as other members	2. Freshman speaking slightly more often than most other members
3. Freshman speaking slightly more often than most other members	3. Introducing about as many bills as most other members
4. Introducing about as many bills as most other members	4. Introducing fewer bills tha most other members
5. Introducing fewer bills than most other members	5. Introducing slightly more bills than most other members
6. Introducing slightly more bills than most other members	6. Usually, but not always, attempting to avoid publicity

developed theory of legislative norms. In Chapter II, it was argued that awareness of intersubjective support for evaluative attitudes was an important property of the phenomena designated by the norm concept. In order for legislators' collective response toward behavioral alternatives to have an impact upon the individual member's behavior it seems likely that the individual must correctly perceive others' evaluations of the behavioral alternatives in question. In short, individual's who adjust their behavior on the basis of a false reading of other legislators' attitudes are no closer to norm conformity than those who consciously deviate from others' expectations.

Recognition of others' evaluative attitudes is particularly important since Oklahoma legislators tend to <u>believe</u> that their own preferences are shared by others, that they prefer the behavioral possibility most preferred by others. That is, congruence between legislators' own preferences and their perceptions of others' preferences is quite common. Table 6.10 shows the percentage of congruent responses for each of the eleven behavioral areas by chamber. In nine behavioral areas in the Senate and eight in the House more than 60% of the respondents gave congruent responses. Only with respect to the procedural voting behavioral area did less than a majority of the respondents in either chamber give congruent responses.

TABLE 6.10

CONGRUENCE: ALL BEHAVIORAL AREAS, BY CHAMBER

Behavioral Area	House	Senate
Procedural Voting	45.0% (N=80)	46.2% (N=39)
Substantive Voting	53.7 (N=82)	66.7 (N=39)
Committee Behavior	51.2 (N=82)	67.5 (N=42)
Publicity Seeking	64.2 (N=83)	76.9 (N=40)
Floor Speaking	67.1 (N=82)	55.3 (N=38)
Freshman Floor Speaking	72.8 (N=82)	83.8 (N=39)
Dealing in Personalities	84.1 (N=83)	87.2 (N=40)
Expertise	68.4 (N=83)	71.0 (N=39)
Bill Introduction	70.0 (N=82)	65.8 (N=39)
Relationship with Interest Groups	69.1 (N=82)	78.9 (N=39)
Support of Governor	63.0 (N=83)	71.1 (N=39)

Legislators' awareness of others' attitudes is an empirical question and cannot be inferred from normative response patterns. Hypothetically, at least the range of intersubjective awareness is quite broad. At one extreme are those behavioral possibilities for which all members clearly and correctly recognize others' evaluations. In this circumstance the relationship between normative response patterns and actual behavior would likely be direct; linkages between normative response patterns clearly recognized by members and actual behavior should follow a pattern not unlike that discussed in the preceding pages. At the other extreme are those behavioral possibilities for which all members misperceive others' evaluations. That is, members--possibly the entire membership--may predicate their actions upon a misunderstanding of others' preferences. This pattern of intersubjective awareness of others' preferences has been termed "pluralistic ignorance" by earlier students of social norms.[4] The behavioral consequences of this phenomenon are not certain, but it seems likely that legislators' misperceptions of normative response patterns might lead to a reordering of the behavioral effects of these patterns.

The data do not permit an examination of the respondent's perceptions of others' preferences for all behavioral possibilities included in this study. Limited analysis is permitted, however, through comparison of the optimal behaviors for each behavioral area with the percentage of respondents

believing that most others most prefer these behavioral possibilities.

Table 6.11 shows the percentage of respondents perceiving most others as preferring optimal behaviors. No consistent pattern emerges supportive of the contention that recognition of others' preferences is common in the Oklahoma legislature. Nevertheless, others' preferences for several of these items appear to have been clearly visible to sizable percentages in both chambers. More than 70% in both chambers correctly recognized others' preferences for the legislator who never deals in personalities, who is friendly with interest groups but not committed to them, and the freshman who speaks less often than others. Slightly fewer, but nevertheless a majority, recognized others' preferences for the legislator who tries to be an expert in a few subject matter areas, who speaks about as often as others in the chamber, who usually follows party leadership on procedural votes, who neither seeks nor avoids publicity, and who introduces about as many bills as others.

The percentage of respondents recognizing that most others in their chamber most prefer the optimal behavior is quite high, in other words, if items 2, 3, and 11 are excluded. These items deal with legislators' relationships with party leadership and the governor; "pluralistic ignorance" best describes legislators' perceptions of others' preferences in these behavioral areas. A majority of legislators in both

TABLE 6.11

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS PERCEIVING MOST OTHERS AS MOST PREFERRING OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS, BY CHAMBER

	Optimal Behavior	House		Senate	
1.	Usually following party leadership in deciding how to vote on procedural matters	63.9%	(N=83)	65.0%	(N=40)
2.	Sometimes following party leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill	22.9	(N=83)	27.5	(N=40)
3.	Sometimes following party leadership in determining a course of action in committees	55.4	(N=83)	38.5	(N=39)
4.	Neither seeking nor avoiding publicity	68.9	(N=83)	72.5	(N=40)
5.	Speaking on the floor about as often as others	53.7	(N=82)	64.1	(N=39)
6.	Freshmen speaking less often than others	78.0	(N=82)	68.4	(N=39)
7.	Always avoiding dealing in personalities	78.3	(N=83)	77.5	(N=40)
8.	Trying to be an expert on only a few subject matter areas	67.9	(N=83)	59.0	(N=39)
9.	Introducing about as many bills as others	56.1	(N=82)	61.5	(N=39)
10.	Being friendly, but uncommitted, to special interest groups	80.5	(N=82)	92.3	(N=39)
11.	Sometimes supporting the programs of the governor	43.4	(N=83)	56.4	(N=39)

chambers believed that others most prefer "usually" following party leadership in all three party-related behavioral areas. The fact is, however, that with respect to substantive bills and committee behavior most legislators preferred less frequent support of party leadership, a majority most preferring only "sometimes" following party leadership in these behavioral areas. Similarly, a majority of the members of both chambers personally preferred the member who "sometimes" supports the governor's programs, but mistakenly believed that most others most prefer "usual" support of the governor's programs. It is interesting to reflect on the possibility that a majority of the members in both chambers of the Oklahoma legislature order their behavior on the false belief that others prefer the member who usually "goes along" with party leadership and the governor.

Conclusion

What is seen in the legislative process largely depends upon the breadth and scope of the conceptual apparatus through which the process is viewed. This study, as was stated in Chapter I, represents an effort to broaden our vision of the legislative process by systematically describing fragments of the normative environment in which legislative behavior is embedded. A knowledge of this environment contributes not only to our understanding of "what" goes on in legislatures, but "why" as well.

By limiting our attention to a description of aspects of the normative structure, we do not mean to imply that the goal of legislative norm research is solely descriptive in character. The absence of theoretically satisfying descriptions of legislative norms, however, necessitates this first step toward a more complete understanding of the normative structure of legislative bodies and its effects on legislative behavior. Neither the origins nor the effects of the normative structure of legislative bodies can be properly understood before a theoretically sound descriptive analysis of that structure is available.

The value of the norm concept lies in its focus upon the social determinants of legislative behavior. Both norm theorists and students of legislative behavior have the same goal: to explain relatively persistent kinds of behavior occurring in a social context. Without denying differencss in the individuals making up the legislature, the norm concept directs attention to social forces likely to produce behavioral uniformity despite individual differences. The norm concept emphasizes factors internal to the legislature which mold individual action and regulate the processes through which external factors influence legislative behavior.

Systematic application of the norm concept, as we have seen, requires the use of a number of related concepts such as range of acceptable behavior, optimal behavior, crystallization, etc. It is only through concepts such as these

that legislative norms may be studied. These concepts provide the tools necessary for the description of normative structure.

Theoretically well-grounded definitional criteria for the identification of norms direct attention to the most essential features of the normative structure of legislatures. Rigid application of definitional criteria, however, is likely to lead the researcher to overlook normative response patterns having significant import for the legislative process. Inquiry into the normative structure of the legislature is therefore best served by a theoretically sound definition of the norm concept that serves not as a device to make arbitrary distinctions between "norms" and "non-norms" (although such distinctions are not always arbitrary) but as an orienting concept, directing the researcher's attention to a variety of normative response patterns likely to have differential effects upon legislative behavior.

It is hoped that this research has demonstrated both the complexity and the utility of the norm concept in its application to legislative research. The complexity of the norm concept is neither insurmountable nor regretable; it arises because of the complexity of the phenomena designated by the concept. By conjoining a number of multifaceted phenomena, the norm concept provides a device which enables the researcher to describe mechanisms serving to constrain behavior through informal social processes. Despite their

theoretical richness, norm-related concepts such as range of acceptable behavior, norm crystallization, etc., are often cumbersome to apply and difficult to operationalize in legislative research. This study has sought to make the use of these concepts, and hence the norm concept itself, a more viable alternative for those engaging in legislative research.

Footnotes

1. Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 49.

2. Although in principle possible, limitations in the data prevent the integration of all four elements of norms into a common conceptual framework that describes norm patterns across behavioral areas. These limitations involve the sanctioning system and the degree of perceived group support for specific norm contents. First, no data linking specific sanctions to particular prescribed and proscribed behaviors are available. Hence, we cannot say that a particular prescribed behavior is encouraged by a specific positive sanction nor can we link specific negative sanctions to the enactment of particular proscribed behaviors. Second, only incomplete information is available concerning legislators' awareness of others' preferences. This information is limited to legislators' perceptions of the behavioral possibility within each behavioral area most preferred by most of the members of their chamber.

3. In the Senate this procedure resulted in classifying standard deviations falling below 1.60 as high crystallization, those above 1.92 as low crystallization, and those falling between 1.60 and 1.92 as medium crystallization. In the House standard deviations falling below 1.75 are classified as high crystallization, those above 2.00 as low crystallization, and those falling between 1.75 and 2.00 as medium crystallization.

4. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 53.

APPENDIX A

OKLAHOMA LEGISLATIVE STUDY

Bureau of Government Research

University of Oklahoma

Interviewer:

Date:

Time:

The general purpose of this survey is to study the way Oklahoma legislators feel about their jobs as legislators, the problems they encounter, and their attitudes toward activities here in the legislature.

The information and opinions you give me will be tabulated with material from other legislators and compared with similar information from other state legislatures. No names will be used, and what you say will be completely confidential.

Interview Number: _____

1. How many sessions have you served in the Oklahoma House (Senate)? _____

2. As of today, is it likely that you would be willing to serve (3) or more terms in future legislatures?

   1. _____ Willing
   2. _____ Don't know (depends)
   3. _____ Not willing

   9. _____ No response

3. If you were to choose to run for the re-election to your seat in the legislature, what are the chances that you'll be re-elected? Would you say that you:

   1. _____ Will certainly win
   2. _____ Will probably win
   3. _____ Could go either way
   4. _____ Will probably be defeated
   5. _____ Will certainly be defeated

   8. _____ DK
   9. _____ No response

4. Which of the following phrases best describes you when it comes to political matters?

   1. _____ Very liberal
   2. _____ Somewhat liberal
   3. _____ Middle of the road
   4. _____ Somewhat conservative
   5. _____ Very conservative

   8. _____ DK
   9. _____ No response

5. (FOR NON-LEADERS ONLY) If the opportunity arose, would you be interested in becoming a party leader in the legislature? Would you say:

   1. _____ Definitely
   2. _____ Probably
   3. _____ Undecided (don't know)
   4. _____ Probably not
   5. _____ Definitely not

   8. _____ Does not apply
   9. _____ No response

6. (FOR LEADERS ONLY) If the opportunity arose, would you be interested in remaining as a party leader in the legislature? Would you say:

   1. _____ Definitely
   2. _____ Probably
   3. _____ Undecided (don't know)
   4. _____ Probably not
   5. _____ Definitely not

   8. _____ Does not apply
   9. _____ No response

7. Have you ever considered seeking election or appointment to some other full-time public office in the future? Would you say you have considered this:

   1. _____ A great deal
   2. _____ Some
   3. _____ A little
   4. _____ Not at all

   9. _____ No response

8. Did you hold any public offices prior to your election as a state legislator? If so, were they appointive or elective?

   1. _____ Yes, elective office
   2. _____ Yes, appointive office
   3. _____ Both elective and appointive
   4. _____ None

   9. _____ No response

9. Would you say that the way you vote in the legislature is:

   1. _____ Always a true indication of your <u>personal feelings</u> on an issue.
   2. _____ Almost always a true indication
   3. _____ Seldom a true indication

   8. _____ DK
   9. _____ No response

10. We hear some talk these days about the need for the position of state legislators to become a full-time job. In other words the desirability for the legislator to become a professional person like the doctor, the lawyer or the schoolteacher. Generally speaking, are you in favor of such a trend? Would you say:

    1. _____ Definitely in favor
    2. _____ Tend to favor
    3. _____ Neutral
    4. _____ Tend to disfavor
    5. _____ Definitely disfavor

    8. _____ DK
    9. _____ No response

11. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your committee assignments? Would you say:

    1. _____ Very satisfied
    2. _____ Satisfied
    3. _____ Indifferent
    4. _____ Dissatisfied
    5. _____ Very dissatisfied

    8. _____ DK
    9. _____ No response

12. Generally speaking, how often are you able to predict what other legislators are going to do and how they will react to you. Would you say that you know what they are going to do:

    1. _____ All of the time
    2. _____ Most of the time
    3. _____ Some of the time
    4. _____ None of the time

    8. _____ DK
    9. _____ No response

13. What is the single most important function of the House (Senate) other than lawmaking?

14. Which of the following do you consider to be most important in the legislative process here in the House (Senate)?

    1. _____ Legislative committees
    2. _____ Legislative subcommittees
    3. _____ Individual effort
    4. _____ Legislative leadership
    5. _____ Other _____

    8. _____ DK
    9. _____ No response

15. As you think of a typical legislative day, how much would you say you communicated with or interacted with other legislators? Would you say you communicated with them

    1. _____ A great deal
    2. _____ Often, but not a lot
    3. _____ Not very much
    4. _____ Hardly at all

    8. _____ DK
    9. _____ No response

141. What is highest level of educational attainment?

1. _____ None
2. _____ High school or less
3. _____ Some amount of college
4. _____ College degree
5. _____ Trade or vocational training
6. _____ Graduate or professional training beyond college
7. _____ Law degree

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

16. We've been told by other members of this legislature that there are some informal-unofficial rules governing a member's conduct in this chamber, things that a member is expected to do or not to do in order to get along with the other members. You may call them "unwritten rules" if you wish. What, from your point of view, are some of the more important of these rules?

(TRY TO GET AT LEAST THREE: Probe: "ARE THERE ANY OTHERS?")

(IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS QUESTION 16 BY SAYING THAT THERE ARE NO "UNWRITTEN RULES" THEN GO TO QUESTION 24.)

17. How is it made difficult for those members who do not follow these "unwritten rules"?

(Clarification: made "difficult" = "make it harder for a legislator to do his job.")

18. Without naming names, who is most likely to make things difficult for these members?

    (Probe: What kinds of members are most likely to make things difficult for those who violate these unwritten rules?)

    (Clarification: kinds = characteristics such as age, tenure, position)

19. How is the member who carefully obeys these "unwritten rules" rewarded?

    (Clarification: rewarded = "make it easier for a legislator to do his job.")

20. When you were first elected to the legislature how much effort did other members make in telling you about these unwritten rules? Would you say:

    1. _____ A great deal of effort
    2. _____ Some
    3. _____ Little
    4. _____ None at all

    8. _____ DK
    9. _____ No response

21. On the whole, how committed are you to following these "Unwritten rules" of the House (Senate)? Would you say you are:

1. _____ Strongly committed
2. _____ Somewhat committed
3. _____ Not very committed
4. _____ Not committed at all

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

22. Do you strongly disagree with any of these unwritten rules of the House (Senate)?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

23. If yes, which ones?

Now we would like to ask some more specific questions regarding the kinds of behavior that legislators approve of in this chamber. The following statements describe possible actions by legislators. We have tried to cover a wide range of behavior; you may find yourself strongly approving of some, disapproving just as strongly with other actions, and perhaps indifferent to others. The best answer to each statement is <u>your</u> personal opinion.

Please use this card in answering these questions (card 1). A "1" represents strong disapproval, a "9" represents strong approval, and a "5" represents indifference. Your answer to each statement can be any number from one to nine.

Strong disapproval			Indifferent					Strong approval
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

24. _____ A House (Senate) member who always consciously attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions in the House (Senate).

25. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions in the House (Senate).

26. _____ A House (Senate) member who neither seeks nor attempts to avoid publicity for his actions in the House (Senate).

27. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, seeks publicity for his actions in the House (Senate).

28. _____ A House (Senate) member who consciously seeks as much publicity as possible for his actions in the House (Senate).

29. _____ A House (Senate) member who does not try to be an expert on any of the subject matters dealt with by the House (Senate).

30. _____ A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert on a single subject matter area dealt with by the House (Senate).

31. _____ A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert on only a few of the subject matter areas dealt with by the House (Senate).

32. _____ A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert on most of the subject matter areas dealt with by the House (Senate).

33. _____ A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert on all of the subject matter areas dealt with by the House (Senate).

34. _____ A House (Senate) member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

Strong disapproval			Indifferent					Strong approval
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

35. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

36. _____ A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

37. _____ A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

38. _____ A House (Senate) member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.

39. _____ A House (Senate) member who always supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

40. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, supports the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

41. _____ A House (Senate) member who sometimes supports and sometimes opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

42. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

43. _____ A House (Senate) member who always opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.

44. _____ A House (Senate) member who never speaks on the floor.

45. _____ A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

46. _____ A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor about as often as other members.

Strong disapproval			Indifferent					Strong approval
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

47. _____ A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most members.

48. _____ A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor much more often than most members.

49. _____ A House (Senate) member who never introduces any bills.

50. _____ A House (Senate) member who introduces fewer bills than most other members.

51. _____ A House (Senate) member who introduces about as many bills as most other members.

52. _____ A House (Senate) member who introduces slightly more bills than most other members.

53. _____ A House (Senate) member who introduces a great many more bills than most other members.

54. _____ A House (Senate) member who always follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

55. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

56. _____ A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

57. _____ A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

58. _____ A House (Senate) member who never follows his party's leadership in determining a course of action in committees.

59. _____ A House (Senate) member who is known as a spokesman for special interest groups and their lobbyists.

Strong disapproval			Indifferent					Strong approval
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

60. _____ A House (Senate) member who is closely affiliated with special interest groups and their lobbyists.

61. _____ A House (Senate) member who is friendly with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but is not committed to such groups.

62. _____ A House (Senate) member who has nothing to do with special interest groups and their lobbyists, but does not oppose such groups.

63. _____ A House (Senate) member who always opposes special interest groups and their lobbyists.

64. _____ A House (Senate) member who always follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

65. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

66. _____ A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

67. _____ A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

68. _____ A House (Senate) member who never follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.

69. _____ A House (Senate) member who always avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

70. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

71. _____ A House (Senate) member who sometimes deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

Strong Disapproval			Indifferent					Strong approval
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

72. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always, deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

73. _____ A House (Senate) member who always deals in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.

74. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who never speaks on the floor.

75. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor less often than most other members.

76. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor about as often as other members.

77. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor slightly more often than most other members.

78. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor much more often than most other members.

We have been asking you for your opinion regarding various kinds of behavior here in the House (Senate). Now we would like to ask you about the kinds of behavior that you think most members of the House (Senate) approve of. Using these cards (CARDS 2-12) would you tell me which of the items on each card most members of this chamber would most approve of.

79. _____ CARD 2 (publicity)

80. _____ CARD 3 (expert on subject matter areas)

81. _____ CARD 4 (follow party on procedural matters)

82. _____ CARD 5 (support governor)

83. _____ CARD 6 (speaking on the floor)

84. _____ CARD 7 (introducing bills)

85. _____ CARD 8 (follow party in committees)

86. _____ CARD 9 (relationship to special interest groups)

87. _____ CARD 10 (follow party on bills)

88. _____ CARD 11 (dealing in personalities)

89. _____ CARD 12 (floor speaking for freshmen)

All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things in our work. I am going to read a list of things that sometimes bother legislators and I would like you to tell me how frequently you feel bothered by each of them. Would you say that you are: never, rarely, sometimes, rather often, or nearly all the time bothered by the following.

(CARD #13)

90. Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, too many things to be done.

1. _____ Never
2. _____ Rarely
3. _____ Sometimes
4. _____ Rather often
5. _____ Nearly all the time

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

91. Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting demands placed on you as a legislator.

1. _____ Never
2. _____ Rarely
3. _____ Sometimes
4. _____ Rather often
5. _____ Nearly all the time

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

92. Not knowing just what the people you work with expect of you.

1. _____ Never
2. _____ Rarely
3. _____ Sometimes
4. _____ Rather often
5. _____ Nearly all the time

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

93. The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out your job as a law maker.

1. _____ Never
2. _____ Rarely
3. _____ Sometimes
4. _____ Rather often
5. _____ Nearly all the time

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

94. Feeling that you may not be liked or accepted by the people you work with.

1. _____ Never
2. _____ Rarely
3. _____ Sometimes
4. _____ Rather often
5. _____ Nearly all the time

8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response

Now, here are some statements concerning legislative life. As I read each of the following would you please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. (use Card #14)

1. Strongly Agree
2. Somewhat Agree
3. Somewhat Disagree
4. Strongly Disagree
8. DK
9. No response

95. _____ A legislator cannot be effective if he is constantly concerned with reelection.

96. _____ I am well satisfied with my job as a legislator.

1. Strongly Agree	4. Strongly Disagree
2. Somewhat Agree	8. DK
3. Somewhat Disagree	9. No response

97. _____ If something is good for the state, a legislator should support it even if the people back home don't like it.

98. _____ Many of the bills are so detailed and technical that I have trouble understanding them.

99. _____ I consider myself more influential in the House (Senate) than most other members.

100. _____ My district includes so many kinds of people that I often don't know just what the people there want me to do.

101. _____ There is a recognized right and wrong way of getting things done here in the House (Senate).

102. _____ There is so little time during a session to study all the bills that sometimes I don't know what I'm voting for or against.

103. _____ My constituents are usually aware of my behavior here in the House (Senate).

104. _____ I think that the rules and procedures used in the House (Senate) serve a useful purpose, and ought to be protected against changes.

105. _____ Some members of the House (Senate) are granted special privileges.

106. _____ Generally speaking, I usually feel a great deal of pressure from my constituents to vote a particular way.

107. _____ I am usually not very active in discussion and debate in committee meetings.

108. _____ The likelihood of a bill's passage largely depends on who is sponsoring that bill.

109. _____ It is extremely important that a legislator perform various services for his constituents.

110. _____ The unofficial rules we talked about earlier should be defended and protected from change.

1. Strongly Agree	4. Strongly Disagree
2. Somewhat Agree	8. DK
3. Somewhat Disagree	9. No response

111. _____ Other members of the House (Senate) are usually aware of my behavior here in House (Senate).

112. _____ When I hear someone criticizing the Oklahoma House (Senate) I feel compelled to speak out and defend it.

113. _____ Often legislators get so involved in affairs at the capitol that they lose touch with their constituents.

114. _____ The House (Senate) is controlled by the action of a few members.

115. _____ So many groups want so many different things that it is often difficult to know what stands to take.

116. _____ The House (Senate) is composed of the best group of people that I can imagine working with.

117. _____ All members of the House (Senate) have about equal power to get things done.

118. _____ House (Senate) leaders are usually aware of my behavior here in the House (Senate).

119. _____ I am usually not very active in discussion and debate on the floor of the chamber.

120. _____ I seldom have to sound out my constituents because I think so much like them that I know how to react to almost any proposal.

121. _____ A legislator should always vote according to the dictates of his conscience even if his vote conflicts with the wishes of the people.

122. _____ If an issue came up which might reduce the power of the House (Senate), I'd work as hard as I could to protect this body's powers.

123. _____ I am not really very involved in my job as a legislator; my other interests and activites are more absorbing.

We are interested in comparing the way state legislators think of themselves with what we know about the general public. Each of the following statements is about life in general or about how people may or may not feel about themselves. Each represents a commonly held opinion and there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree with these statements: whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree (use care 14).

1. Strongly Agree
2. Somewhat Agree
4. Strongly Disagree
8. DK
9. No Response

124. _____ An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably doesn't know too much.

125. _____ A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear.

126. _____ I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

127. _____ Before I do something I try to consider how my friends will react to it.

128. _____ The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.

129. _____ It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one.

130. _____ If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.

131. _____ Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who don't mind being different and original.

132. _____ I dislike men who always follow the usual social conventions (manners, customs, etiquette, etc.).

133. _____ Most people cannot be trusted, so you can't be too careful in your dealings with others.

134. _____ People who insist upon a yes or no answer don't know how complicated things really are.

135. _____ I certainly feel useless at times.

136. _____ Most people are more inclined to help others than merely looking out for themselves.

1. Strongly Agree
2. Somewhat Agree
4. Strongly Disagree
8. DK
9. No Response

137. _____ I am able to do things as well as most other people.

138. _____ A person should change his ideas and behavior to the group that happens to be with him at the time.

139. _____ A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things.

140. _____ Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient information.

APPENDIX B

QUANTIFICATION AND THE STUDY OF NORMS

As was noted in Chapter II, fixed-choice items offer several advantages to the student of legislative norms. Primary among these is the fact that fixed-choice items permit the researcher to delineate degrees of approval or disapproval evoked by various behavioral alternatives and to measure the amount of agreement among respondents. Nevertheless, the precise measurement of the chamber response to a behavioral alternative and the crystallization of the individual responses collectively making up the chamber response is problematic. In this study means are used to indicate the chamber response to each behavioral alternative and standard deviations are used as a measure of crystallization. The choice of these measures requires brief explanation.

Operationally, the task of identifying the chamber response to a possible behavior involves a measure of central tendency. Norms, however, are not synonymous with the "average" attitude but, rather, reflect an evaluation that is "typical," i.e., a point along the evaluative scale around which a large number of individuals' evaluations are arrayed. Hence, the most appropriate measure of central tendency for norm research using fixed-choice questions is one that best

locates points along the evaluative scale that lie in the middle of clustered responses. No measure of central tendency, however, guarantees the performance of this function.

Two alternative measures of central tendency were considered: medians and means. The primary shortcoming of the mean is the fact that it often has the effect of moving the "score" closer to the indifference line than may appear to be warranted by a visual inspection of the distributions. Where the distribution of the response is skewed, the mean is always closer to the indifference line than the median. Means, hence, often "underestimate" the degree of chamber approval or disapproval. For example, the item "A Senate member who tries to be an expert on all the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate" elicited the following distribution of responses:

	Response	N
Strong Disapproval	1.	11
	2.	8
	3.	6
	4.	4
Indifference	5.	8
	6.	0
	7.	0
	8.	0
Strong Approval	9.	5

Examining this distribution, it seems evident that there is a norm against trying to be an expert on all matters. The median, unaffected by the five respondents choosing response "9," is 2.83. The mean, on the other hand, is 3.48. This is perhaps a minor difference, but it is a systematic

difference: extreme scores far from a clustering of responses will always move the mean out of the clustering and toward the indifference line unless that clustering is itself around the indifference line.

Nevertheless, the median is a less satisfactory measure than the mean because (1) it is a less stable measure than the mean, and (2) it can be even more misleading than the mean. These shortcomings of the median can be shown by a consideration of the following hypothetical distribution of responses.

	Response	N
Strong Disapproval	1.	50
	2.	1
	3.	0
	4.	0
Indifference	5.	0
	6.	0
	7.	0
	8.	0
Strong Approval	9.	50

In this example, the mean is 5.002 and the median is 2.00. The greater instability of the median is apparent in the fact that if the respondent selecting response "2" had chosen response "8" the median would be 8.00 but the mean would change only slightly to 5.008. Further, if the respondent selecting response "2" had chosen response "1" the median would be 1.4999 <u>regardless of the selections made by the remaining fifty respondents</u>.

The degree to which responses are clustered around the point identified by a measure of central tendency is, of

course, taken into account by a measure of dispersion. As was the case with measures of central tendency, two measures of dispersion were considered: interquartile deviations and standard deviations. The interquartile deviation has the advantage of giving a very descriptive account of crystallization. If the interquartile deviation is 1.00, for example, the researcher knows that the middle 50% of the responses fall within a range of 2.00 along the evaluative scale. Nevertheless, the interquartile deviation does not necessarily identify the greatest clustering of responses. In the following hypothetical example the interquartile deviation is 3.50 despite the fact that 74% of the cases are at response "1." This misleading result is possible because the interquartile deviation ignores extreme responses at <u>both</u> ends of the evaluative scale: it is descriptive of the middle 50% of the responses and nothing more.

	Response	N
Strong Disapproval	1.	74
	2.	0
	3.	0
	4.	0
Indifference	5.	0
	6.	0
	7.	0
	8.	1
Strong Approval	9.	25

The standard deviation is, hence, a more satisfactory measure of crystallization. Interpretation of standard deviations in the absence of normal distributions, however, must be done with care; unlike interquartile deviations, a

particular standard deviation cannot be translated directly into a percentage statement about agreement among respondents. Nevertheless, by comparing standard deviations for all items, the researcher is able to identify items having greater and lesser crystallization. In other words, standard deviations provoke a basis for statements regarding the crystallization evoked by behavioral alternatives relative to that evoked by other alternatives.

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