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SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY: LINKAGES AND THE
NEW ZEALAND CASE.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973
Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY:
LINKAGES AND THE NEW ZEALAND CASE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

LOREN PAUL GRESHAM

Norman, Oklahoma

1973

SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY:
LINKAGES AND THE NEW ZEALAND CASE

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks is due many individuals who have contributed to the educational experience which has reached an important plateau in this dissertation. Dr. Rufus G. Hall has maintained a close interest in the planning and writing stages and deserves much credit for the completion of the study. Dr. Larry B. Hill was instrumental in helping to secure the Fulbright Research Grant which afforded me the opportunity for the field research. Of the dissertation committee, all of whom were most helpful, these two deserve a special thanks.

A different type of assistance has been provided for many years by my father, Dr. L. Paul Gresham. Without his prodding and encouragement, the likelihood of my completing this and other smaller projects would have been lessened.

My wife, Linda, and daughter, Lynette, have shared with me the joys and pressures of higher education. Their cheerfulness and support, even when denied diversions and ease for the demands of graduate school, have helped turn what might have been drudgery into enjoyable learning.

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CHAPTER I

SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY:

THE NEGLECTED FIELD

I. Introduction

Nation-states characterized by limited population, small geographic size, and military inferiority are a vital part of the contemporary political scene. With the decline of feudalism, such political units developed possessing all the attributes of larger counterparts except magnitude. Since 1648, any reasonable dichotomy of nations by size shows the smaller ones to outnumber the larger by a wide margin. This numerical superiority of small over large states has never been greater than presently. Indeed, the proliferation of new sovereign states since the Second World War may be the most distinctive characteristic of this era.

Another development which has emerged over the last few centuries is the interest in political studies as distinct from jurisprudence, economics, and history. Study of foreign policies grew out of this interest and now claims to be an important sub-field of political science. Accelerated activity in the contemporary international system has produced a corresponding response from academic and government researchers in an attempt to make sense of the oft-times

puzzling world scene. Scholars still are striving to close the gap between observation and explanation, between experience and understanding.

Traditionally, students of world politics have chosen their objects of study according to the importance and potential impact of the issue. This reasonable method helps explain why interest in foreign policy analysis has centered since Machiavelli's time on the large and powerful states. It was, after all, the mighty who played the dominant roles on the international stage, while the weak acted in a supporting capacity or even in bit parts. Thus, attention to small nations' external affairs was cursory and scant. Customarily, they were considered in the footnotes and conclusions of books on the great powers.

This apparent weakness or oversight in analyses of national foreign policies should not be too harshly criticized, for the realities of international life also have traditionally relegated small states to decidedly inferior positions. A summary review of recent history amply illustrates this fact.

II. Small Power Influence Since 1815

Napoleon's demise and the construction of the balance of power system at Vienna provides a natural starting point for a look at contemporary small nation influence. Waterloo marked the end of more than two decades of intermittent

strife. During this fight for survival the small states had fought alongside the larger allies to help secure victory. Yet, even before the Congress of Vienna convened, it was deemed expedient by the large powers to institutionalize the power differential between large and small states.¹

As a result, the lesser powers were denied equality of representation and had no voice in major decisions at Vienna, this at a time when political equality was widely hailed. They had no choice "but to accept a settlement which the concert had agreed upon and which it was ready to enforce."² With slight variation, this was the prevalent pattern of relations during the balance of the nineteenth century.

As the Concert system eroded it became possible for the small states to assume more independence from great power domination. The last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth witnessed an increase in maneuverability and influence of lesser nations as the large power blocs fell into disarray. Thus it was that a small nation could have attained the importance to receive blame for igniting World War One. In retrospect this seems flattering to Serbia; history shows the breakdown of the alliance

¹Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 11-13.

²Genevieve Peterson, "Political Inequality at the Congress of Vienna," Political Science Quarterly, LX (December, 1945), p. 552.

system should more correctly bear the onus. Be that as it may, the discrediting of the balance of power system, which was a direct result of the war, gave new hope to the small states.

Negotiations to conclude a treaty at Versailles presented the lesser powers with enhanced political opportunity which stands in contrast to the Vienna experience. While the Big Three certainly made their presence and wills felt, views from men like Smuts of South Africa and Koo of China were frequently heard, if not always accepted and enacted as policy. Development of the League of Nations provided numerous previously unsuspected chances for voicing small nation perspectives and exerting the force of morality, in which weaker states have traditionally prided themselves.

Interwar experience proved disheartening for those who placed great faith in collective security. To be sure, small powers played an increasingly important role in League affairs. However, when pressure was greatest on the organization, the small powers felt impelled to hedge on their original commitment, as evidenced by the Declaration of Copenhagen in July, 1938. This amounted to a collective denunciation of the League, but stopped short of a complete pull-out. For the seven signatories, all small states, this signalled the end of hope for the ill-fated League, and a retreat into neutrality.³

³See Nils Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-1941 (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1953), p. 188ff.

World War II provided another important opportunity for extending small nation influence. Active in war, many lesser states emerged intact and hopeful of playing a meaningful role in the restructuring of the war-ravaged globe. In some measure their expectations were fulfilled by the prominent position accorded them at the San Francisco Conference which laid the groundwork for the League's successor. Though still dominated by the large victorious states, the conference heard opinions and suggestions from numerous small state representatives, acting favorably on some. One prominent observer noted that "the voice of the middle and small Powers [was] louder, more insistent, and . . . more productive" than theretofore.⁴

Under the auspices of the United Nations a host of sovereign states have come into being since 1945 (a listing of these may be found in Appendix B). Several characteristics distinguish the majority of these, i.e., a colonial heritage, underdeveloped economic and political systems, and military impotence. Not insignificant is the small geographic size of almost all new states.⁵ By virtue of this dramatic numerical increase in small nations, the composition of the United Nations has changed, the bi-polar world has undergone

⁴Philip C. Jessup, "The Equality of States as Dogma and Reality," Political Science Quarterly, LX (December, 1945), p. 528.

⁵George C. Abbott, "Size, Viability, Nationalism, and Politico-Economic Development," International Journal, XXV (Winter, 1969-70), p. 58.

great stress while competing for their allegiance, and the "power of the weak" has continued to grow.⁶

With the obvious extension in numbers and influence of small states, there has developed a corresponding burgeoning of academic interest in their external relations, among other topics. This interest has resulted in an increasing number of works devoted to the unique problems and potentialities of small states in world affairs. It is to the literature of small nation foreign policy that we now turn.

III. Review of Literature on Small Nation Foreign Policy

In-depth research on small state external relations has been undertaken only recently. To be sure, some attention has always been paid small country roles, but the treatments were neither comprehensive nor very useful. Most references to lesser powers were simply to fill in gaps in a larger study, and lacked incisiveness and depth. In order to find early works on the subject one must look into materials from other fields, most notably history and economics. A few scattered efforts appeared in the first half of the twentieth century and will be noted below. However, it was not until after World War II that significant studies were presented. Since 1945 there has been a steady increase in research and writing, until at present there is available a small but

⁶Arnold Wolfers' phrase quoted in: Erling Bjøl, "The Power of the Weak," Cooperation and Conflict, III (1968), p. 157.

respectable list of books and articles devoted to small nation foreign policy.

Due to the relative newness of small state studies, most suffer from weaknesses typical of newer foci for research. Not unlike the study of foreign policy in general, small nation research has been conducted without benefit of adequate theory. Most works do attempt to test a few assumptions, but there has been virtually no uniformity in hypotheses. The result is a "shotgun approach" which, while often suitable for isolated study, fails to provide much basis for comparison with related works. Any assumption that small state foreign policies are too diverse for comparison would be premature, as approaches used thus far have not attempted general comparative models.

Another weakness of existent works lies in their characteristically unimaginative methodology. Description characterizes most accounts of single nation foreign affairs. Analysis is generally lacking, as most case studies concentrate on relating chronological development of policies or treat only one overriding issue. In short, scholarly inquiries into the nature, characteristics, and specifics of small nation foreign policy lack the imagination and creativity of research in related fields. A review of the available material reveals a positive trend toward overcoming some of these shortcomings. The following chronological listing evaluates those works which represent the most direct attempts at small nation foreign policy analysis.

The earliest works focusing exclusively on small state external affairs seem to have been stimulated by the creation of the League of Nations in particular and the post-World War I political climate in general. Several studies emerged chronicling a budding interest in lesser states' roles in the new system. H. A. L. Fisher's "The Value of Small States" (1920) and Arnold Wolfers' "The Role of Small States in the Enforcement of International Peace" (1923) attest to a slowly awakening concern for small state matters.⁷ These works were followed by some shorter glimpses into small nation viewpoints in the 1930's. Sean Lester recounted the Manchurian Incident as lesser countries saw it,⁸ and William E. Rappard evaluated the influence and positions of small states in the League of Nations.⁹

Before proceeding into the 1940's, another vein of study should be noted. During early decades of the twentieth century, geopoliticians presented their interpretations of

⁷H. A. L. Fisher, "The Value of Small States," Studies in History and Politics, London, 1920; Arnold Wolfers, "The Role of Small States in the Enforcement of International Peace," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 21, pp. 24ff. Cited in David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 193; and Rothstein, Alliances . . ., p. 37n.

⁸Sean Lester, "The Far Eastern Dispute from the Point of View of the Small States," Problems of Peace, 8th Series (1934), pp. 120-135.

⁹William E. Rappard, "Small States in the League of Nations," Political Science Quarterly, IL (December, 1934), pp. 544-575.

world developments. Some treatments from this school of thought bore relevant hypotheses for small countries during the interwar period. Strict geographic determinist ideas presently are in scientific disrepute, but the small political entity cannot afford to ignore its geographic assets and limitations when assessing foreign policy alternatives. Such factors as size, location, and accessibility to natural resources are treated below in Chapter II. It suffices the present discussion to mention several of the more astute students of environmental influences and to point out in broad terms their major contributions to external affairs analysis.

Nicholas Spykman of Yale University emerged as foremost among the American interpreters of MacKinder, Bowman, and the Haushofer school.¹⁰ None of his works devotes exclusive attention to small states, but no discussion of foreign policy as influenced by geography is complete without inclusion of Spykman's views.¹¹ Since Spykman, the leading interpreters of environmental phenomena to political science have been Harold and Margaret Sprout of Princeton University.

¹⁰For examples of their works see: Halford J. MacKinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, XXIII (1904); Isiah Bowman, The New World (Yonkers, New York: World Book, 1922); and Derwent Whittlesey, German Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1922).

¹¹None of Spykman's many works more succinctly states his views on foreign policy than: "Geography and Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, XXXII (1938), pp. 28-50.

After a disciplinary lapse in interest following the Second World War, this husband and wife team insistently brought the view of political scientists back to geographic considerations. They have made modest claims for their approach, but have persuasively demonstrated the relevance which ecological influences still have for foreign policy analysis.¹² Others have trumpeted the message of geography, e.g., Bernard Cohen, Richard Hartshorne and Charles Fisher,¹³ but none has touched so directly the foreign policy question as have the Sprouts and Spykman.

World War II forced a curtailment of scholarship generally, and only one contribution emerged which assumed the focus of earlier works, i.e., a second article by Arnold Wolfers, "In Defense of the Small Countries."¹⁴ Wolfers defended the viability of small states against critics who advocated reducing the number of small sovereign states. He pointed out the durability of lesser nations and made suggestions as to how they might play even more effective roles in international affairs.

¹²See: Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965). This is their most complete work on the topic.

¹³For examples of their works see: Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963); Richard Hartshorne, Perspective on the Nature of Geography (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally, 1959); and Charles Fisher, ed., Essays in Political Geography (London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1968).

¹⁴The Yale Review, XXXIII (Winter, 1944), pp. 201-220.

The bare trickle of studies on small state foreign policy received a substantial infusion by the publication of four major books during the 1950's. Although these works did not gain immediate acclaim, they are now looked upon as meaningful landmarks in this basically uncharted expanse. First to appear was Nils Orvik's The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-1941 in 1953.¹⁵ This thoughtful descriptive volume added to the understanding of small state activity during the important years between the onset of World War I and World War II. Appearing in 1957, George Liska's International Equilibrium focused on the balance of power concept, and gave much more consideration to small state roles than any previous volume on the same topic.¹⁶ Liska also provided more theoretical substance than any previous writer, even though his concern was not for small nations per se, but for their ability to influence international balance.

Sir Hilary Blood added The Smaller Territories: Problems and Future in 1958.¹⁷ This brief treatment looked at those British dependencies which were then clamoring for statehood and the majority of which attained it shortly thereafter. Blood's analysis focused on less developed areas which inherently shared the consequences of small size with older

¹⁵ Full citation in footnote #2 above.

¹⁶ (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957.)

¹⁷ (London, England: The Conservative Political Centre, 1958).

small nations. Narrower in scope and intent, this work is somewhat overshadowed by each of the others in the decade.

Last to appear was Annette Baker Fox's The Power of Small States, in 1959.¹⁸ Restricted to analyzing the diplomacy of six small nations in the Second World War, this nevertheless was the first book-length analysis which consciously focused attention on small entities and their behavior as the major unit of study. In each previous tome, the small were at best additional variables in a power equation; with Fox they occupied the central position. Although this work was theoretically limited, it was a stimulus to the writers of the 1960's, a time when small state foreign policy research experienced its most profound growth.

A number of books and articles appeared during the last decade which demonstrated the continued interest of academicians in small nation relations. In 1960, E. A. G. Robinson chaired a symposium which he later substantially reproduced in the volume Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations.¹⁹ Recognized experts from economics and related fields delivered papers on selected topics concerned with the size of domestic markets, level of development, and other highly pertinent factors for small states. Conclusions drawn at the conference remain applicable today, and the Robinson

¹⁸ (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

¹⁹ (London, England: MacMillan & Company, Ltd., 1960).

study has no peer in the area of economic influence on foreign policy of lesser nations.

In the mid-sixties the rate of publication increased markedly for writings on small nation foreign affairs. Pursuing his earlier interest, Nils Orvik examined the role of lesser members in the NATO alliance;²⁰ and a fellow Nordic scholar, Johan Galtung, performed a comparative study of small nations within the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances.²¹ Both of these articles provided perceptive insights into the role of lesser countries in alliances; the latter offered the most innovative application of methodology utilized in small state studies thus far. Robert Rothstein added a fine article analyzing the comparative advantages of alignment and nonalignment policies for small nations in the postwar world.²²

One scholar dubbed 1967 the "annus mirabilis" of the small state in international politics.²³ Several reasons were given for such a christening, one of which was the rapid-fire appearance of five books on small nation foreign policy. Of these, two are in English: Burton Benedict's The Problems

²⁰"NATO: The Role of the Small Members," International Journal, XXI (Spring, 1966), pp. 173-185.

²¹"East-West Interaction Patterns," Journal of Peace Research, III (1966), pp. 146-177.

²²"Alignment, Nonalignment, and Small Powers: 1945-1965," International Organization, XX (1966), pp. 397-418.

²³William E. Paterson, "Small States in International Politics," Cooperation and Conflict, IV (1969), p. 119.

of Smaller Territories and David Vital's The Inequality of States.²⁴ The former provided a compilation of articles treating various aspects of smallness, e.g., sociological aspects. This volume rendered reasonably adequate syntheses of previously held views on the topic. However, it failed to break new ground in the area of foreign policy.

Vital's book, conversely, provided the field of small state studies with its most theoretical work yet. Using historical examples to verify his assumptions, the author drew a bleak picture of what the future seems to hold for small nations in world affairs. One cannot help surmising that Vital's personal experience as an Israeli may have colored his outlook. He is open to criticism on several points, e.g., a failure to establish a class of small states which is obviously distinct. Also, his analysis is restricted to the nonaligned state, which leaves much ground unturned. In spite of these and other weaknesses, Vital has done a service in setting forth the beginnings of a theory of small nation international behavior.

²⁴ Complete citations: Burton Benedict, ed., The Problems of Smaller Territories (London: Athlone Press, 1967); and David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). The other three volumes mentioned are: Daniel Frei, Neutralitat-Ideal Oder Kalkul? (Verlag Huber, 1967); Hans R. Kurz, Bewaffnete Neutralitat (Verlag Huber, 1967); and Gustav Daniker, Strategie des Kleinstaats (Verlag Huber, 1967).

Robert Rothstein's book Alliances and Small Powers completes the list of existing full-length treatments on the subject at hand.²⁵ Focusing on small states in alliances, he complements Vital's work nicely, providing in the two books a well-balanced treatment of all lesser units. Rothstein uses history to an even greater extent than Vital, and examines the Little Entente, the Classical Period of the nineteenth century, and other typical examples of small state behavior in alliance systems. He concludes, as does Vital, with an analysis of strategic implications for non-nuclear small nations.

After the works of Vital and Rothstein, later analyses seem to lack depth and scope. However, several articles have added to the growing bibliography in the field. One of the best of these is Donald Neuchterlein's essay "Small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand, and Australia," which appeared in 1969.²⁶ He effectively compares the diverse interests, power, and milieu of the three and makes some cautious prognoses.

It seems clear from the foregoing analysis that definite progress has been made in overcoming the lack of theoretical foundations for small nation foreign policy study. However, each of the major attempts has clear limitations, and

²⁵ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.)

²⁶ Orbis, XIII (Summer, 1969), pp. 600-623.

therefore applies only to certain small states. If small nations are to constitute a unique subject matter field, theory must continue to fill in gaps. Hopefully, some standard hypotheses could be developed for universal application, even given the vast diversity found among lesser entities. Such a goal presents obvious difficulties, if it is attainable at all. However, no such attempt has failed yet, since none has been undertaken.

Methodology remains conservative, largely descriptive, and lacking in imagination. With the many new tools and techniques now available, it is necessary that some of them be applied to small state studies if current interest is to be maintained. Johan Galtung's article mentioned above provides the only deviation from a standard narrative treatment, and more attempts of this type are sorely needed.

As might be expected, Table 1 indicates that scholars from Scandinavia have been among the leaders in the number of small nation foreign policy studies produced. However, their contributions have been less theoretical, less macro in character, and more case-study oriented. Great Britain has kept up a vital interest in small states, and her scholars have provided a number of valuable studies. The works of Rothstein, Neuchterlein, Fox, and others have enabled the United States to share in the advance of the field. It has, therefore, been a joint effort, and the results,

while not spectacular, indicate possible future advances along the lines suggested above.

TABLE 1
WORKS ON SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY
BY HOMELAND OF AUTHOR

Country or Region	Books	Articles	Total
Nordic Region	2	8	10
United States	3	4	7
Great Britain	3	1	4
Others	1	2	3
Total	9	15	24

Source: Appendix A

IV. Small Nations--A Separate Class?

Despite the growing literature which treats small states as unique entities in world affairs, there remain serious doubts as to the justification for such a segregation. At worst the relegation of small nations to a separate category has brought frank and open denial of difference from big nations. William E. Rappard expressed the following view concerning small states in the League of Nations.

In fact the so-called Small States within the League of Nations have nothing in common which distinguishes them from others, except that they enjoy no permanent representation on the Council. . . . Nothing more decisively proves the fragility of

the concepts of Small States and Great Powers than the lack of any doctrine or creed uniting either of the two groups and opposing it to the other.²⁷

This near-total rejection of a large-small dichotomy represents a viewpoint still held strongly by a few scholars.

At best, the advocates of the uniqueness of small state problems and policy rest their case on somewhat suspect underpinnings. This results in part from some thorny methodological difficulties, e.g., the problem of definition of smallness. However, plausible differences do exist which warrant treating small states as distinct from large ones.

A very obvious difference pertains to dimensions of size, both geographic and demographic. Natural and human resources bear an uncertain but real relationship here. While it is certainly true that technology and national ingenuity can go far in overcoming smallness, important limitations to economic and military development cannot go disregarded.

Directly dependent on the foregoing factors is the power potential of a given nation. Clearly, differences in power exist among states, resulting in role differentiation which separates large from small. It seems obvious that analysis of such diverse entities as Switzerland and the Soviet Union requires the application of different theories and methods due to the immense gulf which exists in their respective power potentials.

²⁷Rappard, "Small States . . . ," pp. 544, 571-2.

More subtle but no less real are psychological and emotional differences held by citizens and decision makers of strong and weak states. Both Vital and Rothstein devote considerable attention to this issue. The former spends an entire chapter discussing the mental and administrative consequences of being small and weak.²⁸ Included in his discussion are such factors as the second-hand information which must be received from larger nations' intelligence files, smaller diplomatic corps, and knowledge that in a serious security threat outside assistance would be needed to avoid disaster. Rothstein speaks of the "psychology of fear" which tends to complicate decision making for small state leaders.²⁹ As a result of these and other factors, the lesser nation has a much different world view and operates with less margin for error.

When Rappard assessed possible differences between large and small in the League, he commented thusly: "Except as regards a general conception of the League, . . . we do not believe differences exist."³⁰ While denying policy differences, he touched on the fundamentally different outlooks, the separate concepts held by large and small in the League of Nations. His refutation of differences thus became an explanation that unique feelings and emotions did exist, and

²⁸Vital, Inequality . . . , pp. 10-38.

²⁹Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 28.

³⁰Rappard, "Small States . . . ," p. 570. My emphasis.

that in and of themselves they constituted concrete evidence supporting a large state-small state dichotomy.

These various "differences" are all subject to question. Wide diversity among the many small powers means that for some the range of difference between larger states and smaller "micro-states" will be difficult to explain. Thus, for example, Sweden possesses one of the most capable military establishments in Europe, more powerful than some of the large states. To compare it to Fiji and other fledgling entities would seem more ridiculous than comparison to, say, Italy. This type of exception could be pointed out in regard to economic strength, psychological and emotional outlook, or any other measure of difference applied to the categories of states.

Therefore, the most meaningful distinction between large and small states is the one in analysts' minds. However weak and seemingly untenable the alleged differences at times appear to be, the assertion that important factors distinguish small from large states has gained acceptance. Common usage of such labels as "Great Powers" or "Superpowers" connotes a classification of abundant size and strength. By the same token, diminutiveness provides us with the opposite type of nation-state. For observers of world politics these two categories have provided a useful, if not always clearly portrayed, distinction.

Some novel labels have been adapted to illustrate more clearly the relationship of the strong to the weak. Johan Galtung dubbed them as "topdog" and "underdog," respectively.³¹ Andrew Boyd of the Economist referred to the big powers as "lions" and to their small counterparts as "mice."³² Perhaps most political scientists now accept some distinction between large and small states as reflecting the realities of international politics. However, much less agreement is found on the problem of definition of "small nation" and on appropriate methods of studying them.

V. What is a "Small Nation"?

In spite of the concept's attraction, the problem of definition has prevented the analysis of small nation foreign policy from gaining more unqualified acceptance. Size is a relative dimension. Among the 130 plus nation-states in existence today, nearly every conceivable geographic and population variance may be witnessed. Drawing the line between various divisions has proved an unsatisfying task. Regardless of whether a two-fold, three-fold, or multi-fold classification is designed, there will be some who recognize the categories for what they are, i.e., arbitrary and man-made. It may seem fruitless to attempt overcoming this

³¹Galtung, "East-West . . . ," p. 146.

³²Andrew Boyd, "The Role of the Great Powers in the United Nations," International Journal, XXV (Spring, 1970), p. 359.

problem, but a review of previous definitions and usages does shed light on the nature of the problem.

Most analysts have refused to join the ranks of those who attempt definition. Some prominent works on small nation foreign policy ignore the question entirely.³³ There seems to be the assumption that everyone understands the difference between small and large. This is obviously not the case. Paul Doty has studied the problems related to small nations attaining nuclear capabilities.³⁴ In his treatment he recounts the experiences of France and Great Britain as examples of what small states aspiring to membership in the nuclear club may expect. Doty used the best available examples from among the nuclear powers, perhaps, but if the claim that small powers are distinct is plausible, his observations as related to France and England lack relevance for lesser states, such as Finland, Belgium, and New Zealand.

For those who have seriously attempted definition, a common result has been admitted failure at precision. Sir Hilary Blood stated that he "clearly could not set out these

³³For example, see: Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Economic Theories of International Politics (Chicago, Illinois: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 25-45. In this article, the authors postulate that small nations do not bear their fair share of alliance debts. No definition of smallness is given.

³⁴Paul M. Doty, "The Role of Smaller Powers," in Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961), pp. 305-6.

criteria of size in any kind of formula."³⁵ Obviously countries can be small in one sense and not in another. Since smallness is only one variable, the issue of definition remains cloudy.

Authors have devised definitions to suit the needs of particular analyses. Some of the best of these have lacked precision, but have conveyed the essential meaning of what smallness means in a state's foreign policy. A case in point is Robert Rothstein's attempt.

. . . a Small Power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in its international politics.³⁶

Although vague, this definition conveys the intended meaning well, i.e., that small states are not self-sufficient in security matters and need explicit or tacit promises of assistance in case of threat.

Another type of definition has been the attempt to draw definite limits on population which reflect smallness. This has been adapted by some to show differences in level of development, and the major criteria of size have gained general acceptance. Robinson's study Economic Consequences of

³⁵Blood, The Smaller . . . , p. 7.

³⁶Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 29.

the Size of Nations based its research on populations which did not exceed fifteen million.³⁷ Michael Michaely added the dimension of development and judged \$300 per capita per annum to be the dividing line between developed and underdeveloped economies.³⁸ Vital adopted Michaely's standards but included an additional category of from 20 to 30 million population for underdeveloped countries.³⁹ None of these attempts at definition is completely satisfactory. Arbitrariness is the standard, and thus continual criticism will be the lot of those who attempt hard and fast statements of definition.⁴⁰

For the current study, a definition is needed. It would be folly to assume that the arbitrariness and restrictiveness which has characterized past definitions could be eliminated. Therefore, the following definition is offered with attending explanations: a small nation is one which (1) cannot be completely self-sufficient in any sense; (2) has no more than 15 million citizens of \$300 per capita per annum nor more than 30 million citizens of less than \$300 per capita per

³⁷ Particularly see: Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth of Small Nations," in Robinson, Economic Consequences . . . , p. 14.

³⁸ Michael Michaely, Concentration in International Trade (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1962), p. 16 n.

³⁹ Vital, Inequality . . . , p. 8.

⁴⁰ For example, see William Paterson's critique of Vital's definition in: Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 119.

annum; and (3) whether aligned or nonaligned must rely on outside powers for aid in times of dire security threats.⁴¹

The first characteristic is noncontroversial in nature. No state in our day can indefinitely maintain itself without external trade and other relations. When superpowers find it expedient to engage in international intercourse, small states, with presumably lesser natural resources, find it even more necessary to import the goods and services of other nations.

Admittedly arbitrary, part two of the definition provides us with definite guidelines concerning population size and level of development. The reader will readily note exceptions to certain hypotheses stated below in Chapter II. Exceptions must be labelled as such, for general statements can scarcely hope to be universally applicable. The wisdom of lumping developed and underdeveloped states into one mass is subject to serious question. In defense it may simply be said that the problems of security, economic growth, and international identity apply to all these states, and that they are felt more acutely as the population size and level of development are reduced.

As to the third part of the definition, it is felt that neither the protection of an alliance nor the moral appeal of

⁴¹For a list of states which fit the writer's definition, see Appendix B. Because of lack of source material from behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, communist countries are not included. States which are not members of the United Nations are also excluded.

nonalignment give completely acceptable protection to the threatened small state. The comparative advantages of each basic policy have been outlined in depth elsewhere.⁴² Much of Chapter II treats the justification of this facet of all small nation foreign policies which may be termed "inherent vulnerability."

VI. Object of This Study

Faced with the nearly limitless possibilities for studying small nation foreign policy, it is necessary to determine the most worthwhile areas of study. It would be presumptuous to suppose that one additional work on the subject could fill all the gaps which exist. However, if one or two could be adequately filled and some thoughtful suggestions offered on fruitful areas for further research, this project could be deemed successful.

In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways of approaching the phenomena. The number of approaches has multiplied rapidly in recent years. For some time the so-called "great debate" raged between the champions of various methodologies, each maintaining that his pet method held the best prospect of successful explanation and prediction. In the opinion of many, among whom James N. Rosenau stands out, the "contentiousness of the 1960's has been replaced by an acceptance of diversity and a readiness

⁴²See Chapter 5 of Vital, Inequality . . . , pp. 87-115.

to get on with the job" of conducting research and perfecting theory.⁴³ The existence of numerous routes to knowledge is now readily accepted.

Still, the question of choosing a method which will fit the object of study presents a problem. Differing approaches offer special types of advantages and disadvantages which must be considered in light of available resources. In adapting a method of study for this project, the following diverse methods and tools were considered, many of which could be adapted successfully to small nation research.

Two efforts at analyzing international behavior illustrate the type of studies which can be done using computer aids. Rudolph Rummel of the University of Hawaii has worked intensively on the subject of international conflict.⁴⁴ Also the husband and wife team of Rosalind and Ivo Feierabend from San Diego State University have performed similar research.⁴⁵ The use of quantitative methods to analyze aggregate data enables the scholar to scan a wide range of activities and

⁴³James N. Rosenau, "Introductory Note," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: Revised Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴Among other works, see: R. J. Rummel, "Some Dimensions in the Foreign Behavior of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, III (1966), pp. 197-224.

⁴⁵Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Level of Development and International Behavior," in Richard Butwell, ed., Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), pp. 137-188.

to proffer some generalizations based on the processing of magnitudinous data.

Examination of ideological strains has been profitably used in analyzing some small states. Among the newly independent, less developed countries, an affinity for ideology is well-known. Nationalism and neutralism, among other concepts, have a tendency to assume strong ideological significance for entire countries, providing the setting for analysis of the meaning of such doctrines to foreign policy execution. There has been a reaction against this type of approach in recent years since it tends to overlook broad strategic interests in favor of such factors as religious outlook, social philosophy, or other parochialism.⁴⁶

Systems theory has developed into a prominent and useful tool for political scientists. The structure and order which it provides has enabled it to find uses beyond the early macro level of analysis employed by Morton Kaplan, Charles McClelland, and others. Development of sub-system foci promise to make possible even greater use of the systems approach. Michael Brecher and Leonard Binder provided successful early applications of the sub-system approach to

⁴⁶For an example of one type of underdeveloped nation ideology see: Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963); for a criticism of the ideological approach see: Kenneth Thompson and Roy C. Macridis, "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 1-3.

South Asia and the Middle East.⁴⁷ A more recent article by Peter Berton suggests that sub-system, or submacro, analysis could be used to study national groupings other than those which share geographic regions.⁴⁸ This is partially what is attempted below in Chapter II.

"Geopolitics" still has value for analysts of small nation foreign policy. Harold Sprout properly has rejected geography as the "master variable," but geographic factors play a major, if not decisive, role in lesser states' external affairs.⁴⁹ Raymond Aron singles out "geographical situation" and "resources" as the two most important factors which influence small state foreign relations.⁵⁰ Other scholars, including John Herz,⁵¹ have reconsidered earlier predictions

⁴⁷Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, XV (January, 1963), pp. 213-235; and Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, X (April, 1958), pp. 408-429.

⁴⁸Peter Berton, "International Subsystems: A Submacro Approach to International Studies," International Studies Quarterly, XIII (December, 1969), pp. 329-334.

⁴⁹Harold Sprout, "Geopolitical Hypotheses in Technological Perspective," World Politics, XV (January, 1963), p. 187.

⁵⁰Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966), p. 138.

⁵¹In 1959 Herz said, " . . . the nation-state is giving way to a permeability which tends to obliterate the very meaning of unit and unity, power and power relations, sovereignty and independence." International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959),

of the decline of territoriality. Factors like Cohen's space, time, and national vantage points,⁵² Wood's "remoteness,"⁵³ and Gottman's "accessibility" and "movement" are regaining some of their relevance and import.⁵⁴ It remains to be seen whether the renewed interest in geopolitics will extend to the study of small state foreign affairs. It would seem logical that such a focus would attract environmental studies by the very importance of ecology to the lesser entities.

From other possible additions to the foregoing survey of appropriate methodological approaches, the current study has undertaken the application of two methods. The first of these deploys a macro-analytic strategem and focuses on systemic behavior patterns, while the second is micro in

p. 41. A decade later he said, "Developments have rendered me doubtful of the correctness of my previous anticipations. . . . There are indicators pointing in another direction: not to 'universalism' but to retrenchment; not to interdependence but to a new self-sufficiency; toward area not losing its impact but regaining it; in short, a 'new territoriality.'" Quoted from: "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: Revised Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 77.

⁵²Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), p. xxxi.

⁵³D. P. J. Wood, "The Smaller Territories: Some Political Considerations," in Burton Benedict, ed., Problems of Smaller Territories (London: Athlone Press, 1967), p. 29ff.

⁵⁴Jean Gottman, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at Analysis," World Politics, IV (July, 1952), pp. 513-515.

scope and attempts to apply a newer methodological schema. Since the two form distinct though related efforts, discussion of each in its own right is necessary.

a. A Pre-Theory of Small State Foreign Policy

Political theory predates precise scientific study of political phenomena. The early theoretical writings of Socrates and Plato, not to mention the Oriental thinkers, set the stage for the empirical studies of Aristotle. Down through the intervening millenia the inductive method has characterized numerous political studies. Its use is still prevalent.

Centuries of theorizing yielded diverse ideas about the nature of the state, sovereignty, relationship of church to state, and countless other topics. These treatises were usually one man's notions concerning the current political scene in a given country or region. Although frequently alleged to be universal verities, the postulates set forth rarely possessed lasting applicability, since most of them were responses to local situations and circumstances. Indeed, objective hypothesizing was not seriously attempted by most. Normative prescriptions about what "ought to be" preoccupied the thoughts of men intent on bringing reality into line with their ideals.

Attempts to find theory which could be universally applied for the purpose of comparative analysis have intensified in recent centuries and even decades. The respective

prescriptions of Marx in economics, Darwin in the biological sciences, and Einstein in physics provide rigorous explanations for an assortment of phenomena, each purporting to give universal insight into a particular subject matter field. The merit of these and other lesser known efforts have been subjected to continuing scrutiny.

In the comparatively new study of politics, more modest claims generally have been made for recent theories. Treatises similar in scope to Plato's Republic and Augustine's City of God rarely are undertaken by serious students of politics today. With the astronomical number of variables and the specialization in professional training, theorizing has become more narrow in scope, fitting Stanley Hoffman's category of "partial" theories.⁵⁵ This seems a wise trend since many of the sub-fields of political science are still in their adolescence.

International relations, which has been established as an academic field for only about forty years, fits this youthful description.⁵⁶ To be sure, there was theory on international interaction, but it had not reached a very

⁵⁵ Stanley Hoffman, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 6.

⁵⁶ Charles A. McClelland, "International Relations: Wisdom of Science," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: Revised Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 3.

sophisticated level. Theorizing on foreign policy developed out of more general works on war, trade relations, and colonial policies. It lacked wide applicability and was thus not very useful for comparative research.

This weakness has been attributed by James Rosenau to a lack of "pre-theory" in foreign policy research. A perceptive scholar, Rosenau believes that data must be given a "preliminary processing" which would determine whether the raw materials were truly comparable and ready for serious theorizing.⁵⁷ He further assumes that the widespread use of pre-theories, as in economics, sociology, and other areas, would result in the accumulation of data which would be comparable, even though diverse views might result in a variety of pre-theories.⁵⁸ Patterns of thought would emerge and similar ideas would be easily sorted out.

In illustrating the utility of the pre-theory concept, Rosenau outlined a five-dimensional scheme into which he contended all foreign policy data could be categorized. Listed in order of their increasing time and place distance from the decision making source, the five sets of variables are as follows: idiosyncratic, or decision making traits; role, i.e., external behavior of officials generated because

⁵⁷James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 40.

⁵⁸Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ," p. 51.

of the role occupied and likely to occur regardless of who holds office; governmental, or those aspects of a government's structure which help or hinder foreign policy formulation and execution; societal, i.e., the nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence external relations; and systemic, or any influences from the external environment which condition the choices of decision makers.⁵⁹

For further illustration, Rosenau suggests applying the sets of variables to various types of states. He employs three diads, large versus small states, developed versus underdeveloped, and open versus closed political systems.⁶⁰ In each of these three dichotomies, he ranks the five sets of variables according to importance in the foreign policy machinery. The resultant grid provides an excellent basis for comparing nations, checking to see if the order of variables remains the same for certain open, large, developed countries, or whether variation may be seen.

Such an elaborate model would be nearly impossible for the single researcher to test on large numbers of states. However, Rosenau only attempted to present the scheme and illustrate its usefulness. On a similar scale, this is what the writer attempts in Chapter II. The paucity of theory on small nation foreign policy lacks universal applicability

⁵⁹Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ," p. 42.

⁶⁰Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ," p. 47.

among states of our general definition. Each attempt thus far has so pared the total number of smaller countries, for purposes of narrow analysis, that a truly "macro" type of theory cannot be said to exist for small entities. Comparisons have been limited to a few states, opening up authors to the aforementioned criticism of inadequate definition by virtue of omission. While admittedly general, the proposed pre-theory in the second chapter opens the case for general comparison, and suggests refinements to clarify and qualify the many exceptions. Cast in terms of "pre-theory," it is understandably tentative and general, but it attempts to test the validity of comparative small nation foreign policy analysis with due regard for previously restrictive definitions.

Both the method of obtaining the generalizations and the presentation of them in Chapter II bear explanation. The explicit and implicit literature on the subject has been perused, and an inventory of statements, propositions, and hypotheses has been compiled. These have been reduced to a manageable number which have a maximum scope of applicability and overlap minimally. Inconsistencies in interpretation, conflicting views of various authors, as well as general agreement and strength of argument are noted and receive comment. This chapter consists, therefore, of syntheses of scholarly opinion and judgment as to what of the existent

material is valid and applicable to the group of small states which fall within the domain of the above definition.

In order to set forth the pre-theory clearly and coherently, an outline system of analysis is utilized. Hypotheses are made in the form of linked propositions to give continuity and order to the development of ideas.⁶¹ Many of the propositions appear, and indeed are, self evident; but they provide the opportunity of re-exploring some of the "givens" of small nation foreign policy study and allow for easy mental movement from one theoretical statement to the next.

Summarily, what is attempted is a macro-level of analysis of small nation external behavior. By assessing past common and diverse policies, hypotheses are stated providing for comparison of states on the basis of the crude pre-theory. Methods by which aspects of the pre-theory could be tested are also suggested.

b. "Linkage Politics" in New Zealand

The second major portion of this project involves the application of one newer methodological technique to the study of a small nation. Such an application performs several useful tasks. In the first place, recently developed methods have not been widely adapted to small state foreign

⁶¹This method has been used to good advantage by Andrew M. Scott in his volume The Functioning of the International System (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967).

policy inquiries. The present attempt hopes to demonstrate the value of one newly developed analytical tool, i.e., the concept of "linkage politics." A further contribution involves partially fulfilling a need which William Paterson notes, namely "more intensive" study on the policy process of individual small states.⁶² The linkage politics concept, therefore, is applied to New Zealand with the intention of understanding more clearly the underlying influences affecting one small country's external ties. Thorough knowledge of the linkage idea and of the characteristics which render New Zealand a suitable situation for study are needed for interpreting Chapter III.

The profession's intellectual debt to James Rosenau is obvious in the preceding pages. In view of his perceptive and creative contributions over many years, it is not surprising that he has been instrumental in developing the linkage concept into an accepted tool for foreign policy research. His efforts were the key in producing the major work to date on this subject, Linkage Politics, in 1969.⁶³ Chapters I and III of this volume are Rosenau's explanation of what a "link" consists of and how the phenomenon may be studied.

⁶²Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 123.

⁶³Full citation: James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

Linkage theory is based on the assumption that science and technology have reduced the effectiveness of such previously formidable dividers as space and time. As this process has become pronounced in recent decades, dependence of one state upon another for trade or protection or both has resulted in a "heightened interdependence" among states.⁶⁴ As nations have come closer together for purposes of mutual benefit, incursions into each other's policy machinery and even execution have become commonplace. The "linkage" is that contact of national and international systems that makes possible the penetration of the nation by the environment and vice versa.

Linkages are found everywhere and so would seem readily available for research. No society can isolate itself from the influences of outside political forces. However, past study of links between domestic and international milieux treated this phenomenon as a dependent variable until Rosenau's efforts at highlighting it. Nevertheless, there has been widespread recognition of the blurring of national policy boundaries for some years.

Examples of scholarly adherence to the linkage concept are easy to uncover. As early as 1949 one author noted that "the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy have for

⁶⁴Rosenau, Linkage . . . , p. 2.

all practical purposes disappeared."⁶⁵ Joseph Frankel noted more recently that "the distinction between domestic and foreign is much less clear [than the distinction between separate sovereign nation-states] and the divorce between the two has never been complete."⁶⁶ Carl Friedrich reached the same conclusion and further noted that " . . . the inter-meshing of domestic and foreign policy is so intricate that it has become difficult to define foreign policy satisfactorily."⁶⁷ Perplexed by this seamless web he queried "what is genuinely foreign policy in a world shaped by a variety of international organizations?"⁶⁸

These examples scarcely reveal the top of the iceberg. It is no longer realistic to separate domestic from foreign policy for analytic purposes.⁶⁹ However, in spite of general

⁶⁵Rowland Egger, International Commitments and National Administration (Charlottesville, Virginia: Jarman Printing Company, 1949), p. iii.

⁶⁶Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 84.

⁶⁷Carl J. Friedrich, "Intra-national Politics and Foreign Policy in Developed (Western) Systems," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 98.

⁶⁸Friedrich, "Intranational . . . ," p. 98.

⁶⁹A few references to separation may be found. One such is Fred Sondermann's article, "The Linkage Between Foreign Policy and International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 8-17. He makes a clear distinction between domestic and foreign policy on page 9, asserting that such concerns as education and labor policies need not be influenced by foreign policy.

acceptance of linkages, the work on isolating and studying the relationship wherein domestic and foreign sectors combine has proceeded slowly. This may be attributed to several factors.

In the first place, linkages are not easy to isolate, observe, count, or measure. Being the stated object of international relations research, i.e., focusing on the interaction of nations, has not made systematic study any less difficult. Until Rosenau's study, no one had proposed any pattern for researching links, and so they remained obvious in everyone's mind, but almost untouched by rigorous study. A second reason why the linkage concept has not been widely applied is that inadequate theory existed which would provide testable hypotheses and propositions. Rosenau noted this lack and through the articles in Linkage Politics went far in providing some beginning theory to challenge case study application. Thus the difficulty in finding methods of study and the lack of adequate theory have been largely overcome, although continued refinements will no doubt be made.

The articles in Rosenau's work are very general, and there is need for widespread application of the linkage concept. Although they do suggest a variety of ways in which links can be approached, it is left for many deeper and narrower projects to develop the intricacies of linkages as they exist in different types of real world states. The

current work constitutes one such attempt at applying an adaptation of Rosenau's linkage politics concept to a small nation, i.e., New Zealand. Detailed explanation of the research design is found in the introduction to Chapter III.

Many characteristics render New Zealand a suitable country in which to undertake small nation foreign policy research. For one thing, it fits the definition of small states given above. Population figures suggest that in early 1971 there were 2,856,000 inhabitants.⁷⁰ An independent, parliamentary government, composed of a stable two-party system, rules the populace, while retaining close ties to the British Commonwealth. Memberships in the United Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization allow for active international political involvement. In addition, the ANZUS Pact provides military guarantees from two larger allies, the United States and Australia. Thus, New Zealand may be considered a typical, economically developed small state.

Another fact which makes New Zealand desirable for this type of study is the concentrated venue of the major governmental and non-governmental linkage groups. Wellington serves as the government's seat and also as headquarters for the bureaucracy, which comprises a high percentage of this welfare state's total work force. In addition, pressure groups representing the major interests maintain offices in

⁷⁰New Zealand Official Yearbook (Department of Statistics, Wellington, 1970), p. 65.

the capital. Thus it is possible to study thoroughly all linkage groups of consequence without excessive movement about the country.

The most attractive characteristic which New Zealand offers to researchers of linkages is its smallness. It would be practically impossible for a lone student to attempt an exhaustive study of major linkages in the United States, Great Britain, or France. Their size, complexity, and diversity would complicate such a task immeasurably. However, New Zealand constitutes an ideal laboratory for linkage research. Developed politically, yet manageable in size, links between external and internal environments can be identified and analyzed profitably.

CHAPTER II

A PRE-THEORY OF SMALL-STATE FOREIGN POLICY

I. Introduction

Works on small state foreign affairs which have appeared thus far have focused on various sub-types of the general category. Thus Fox treated six European developed states in wartime; Vital dealt with unaligned nations, regardless of development, but excluded Central and South American countries; and Rothstein devoted his attention exclusively to aligned polities, which had faced up realistically to their weakness (he also excluded Latin America). All other works have made similar qualifications and distinctions resulting in the paring away at the general class of smaller states.

The reason for such specialization is obvious; simply stated, the staggering diversity and range of capabilities and interests renders small states en masse too wide a field for analysis. Thus students of these countries have spared themselves by not attempting theoretical generalizations which would attempt to cover the entire group of such entities. As a result, there is no general theory of small state foreign relations, even though considerable thought has been given to specific groups of small states.

One might assume, therefore, that a comprehensive theory of small nation external affairs is impractical and impossible. However, several reasons exist to throw doubt on such an assumption. First and most basic is that no one has yet attempted a general theory. Various types of partial theories have been set forth, but no one has ventured out in the uncharted sea of general theory. A second reason for doubting the aforementioned assumption is the evident lack of "pre-theorizing" on the part of authors to date.

In the two most ambitious studies, i.e., those of Vital and Rothstein, neither devoted more than cursory attention to the possibility of including all small states in his analysis. Vital analyzed nations acting alone because this independent posture allegedly enabled him to compare the small state with the large, which he assumed act independently.¹ Rothstein dismissed a study of all small states as "clearly impossible" because of the extreme range of polities.² While both chose to focus on less expansive topics, each included some treatment of states outside the realm of his stated limits. Rothstein utilized an entire chapter to discuss comparative advantages and disadvantages of alignment, and Vital noted that aligned small states had to face similar situations as nonaligned.³

¹Vital, Inequality . . . , p. 5.

²Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 1.

³Rothstein, Alliances . . . , Chapter 8, pp. 237-264; Vital, Inequality . . . , p. 185, for example.

There is thus insufficient evidence to conclude that a general theory is either impossible or nonessential. While interested scholars do not deny the utility of such general theorizing, none has as yet launched into the task. Indeed, before such a feat could be accomplished, the subject would require extensive "pre-processing" in order to discern whether small states are in fact comparable. This involves what Rosenau calls construction of "pre-theories."⁴ It is the purpose of this chapter to construct such a pre-theory, and in the process to try to demonstrate that small states do form a distinguishable analytic category.

II. Analytical Problems

Before the proposed pre-theory can be accepted seriously, three issues must be treated which heretofore have been stumbling-blocks to general theory. First is the issue of alignment versus nonalignment. This will be followed by consideration of differing levels of political and economic development. Finally the problems of analyzing territories and populations of widely different dimensions are reviewed.

a. Alignment Versus Nonalignment

The first issue involves a difference of opinion over whether the most viable strategic posture for a small state is to be under the wings of larger allies, or to act alone and be dependent on its own resources and other states' good

⁴Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ," p. 40.

will. Few have held firmly to one position or the other. Vital and Rothstein stand at the two poles in their respective books on the subject, but both concede that the immediate international mood determines which policy holds promise for greater advantage. Briefly, the alleged comparative advantages are as follows.

Nonalignment offers the best possibility of small nation influence when the power positions of the large states are fairly evenly balanced. It is in this situation that a lesser state can demand more in aid from the opposing blocs and can make its voice heard out of all proportion to its weight militarily or otherwise. As Liska says, "The smaller the margin of power that favors either of two contending parties, the more relevant is the total power of the intrinsically weak third party."⁵ It follows that a nonaligned state's prestige and influence is highest during a big-power stalemate. On the other hand, neutral minor states are expendable and vulnerable when the balance of power shifts drastically to one side or the other.

Small states enter alliances for several reasons. Liska mentions three: security, stability, and status.⁶ Whether these goals are attainable depends again on the international

⁵George Liska, "The Third-Party: The Rationale of Non-alignment," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., Neutralism and Non-alignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 80.

⁶George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 27.

political environment. As with a nonaligned policy, alignment tends to bring attention and advantage when the balance is stable. When a clear advantage is maintained by either large bloc, the lesser allies' interests may be overlooked and their requests ignored. Thus the position of the minor states seems characterized by dependence on what directions their larger counterparts take.

It is thus possible to see advantages in either adopting an alignment or nonalignment policy. Nonaligned states have been fairly secure since World War II. Likewise, aligned small states have benefitted by their posture. In a status quo alliance system such as the present one, all small states possess considerable freedom of action and maneuverability.

Should uneasy peace fade into general war, the whole picture would undergo instant transformation. A situation resembling that before 1939 could re-emerge. Herbert Dinerstein characterized this era as one in which genuine security for small powers was not to be found in or out of alliance folds.⁷ He discounts the possibility of a return of the international system to such a setting; such a prognosis may be rational, but is unrealistic. Contingency planning should never exclude war as a possibility.

Thus, small states either aligned or neutral have profitted in recent years by their respective positions.

⁷Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," American Political Science Review, LIX (September, 1965), p. 593.

However, should a serious threat to lesser powers' security arise, grave doubts exist for the advantages of either type of policy. In the arms race, nonalignment has resulted in procurement from several camps. The wartime situation would place the neutral in a precarious position. Raj Krishna admits that India, while not small in all regards, takes for granted that forces of some other power will assist her if serious threats endanger her security. Explaining this he says, "In other words, non-alignment has always been, in reality, an informal, unstated, unilateral alignment with unnamed Powers."⁸

In view of the relative military weakness of virtually all small states, the distinction between aligned and non-aligned seems to break down. The advantages of each in stable times gives way to the uncertainties which both experience in wartime or in a state of political imbalance. Just as larger allies serve their own interests before attending to small friends, the neutral must hope for a protective big nation to prevent disaster. For the purposes of this study, therefore, there is no distinction drawn between partisan and neutral, aligned and nonaligned.

b. Differing Levels of Development

Of the three analytical problems mentioned above, the difficulty in evaluating states at widely differing levels

⁸Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," India Quarterly, XXI (April-June, 1965), p. 122.

of development is the most troublesome. Taking two nations, one highly developed and the other underdeveloped, and attempting to compare their effectiveness in executing foreign policy presents the scholar with serious complications. Military, political, and economic potentials all relate to the level of development which a given nation has attained. These in turn largely determine the policy options open to the government. Thus comparison of a state such as Sweden with, say, Mali, becomes of dubious value, especially if the researcher's only interests are two lone states rather than seeing them as members of a class of small states.

Numerous studies have been done of developed and underdeveloped states, but the utility of this simple dichotomy has been neither universally granted nor rejected. Scholars studying the new nations of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands have found the distinction very useful. Thus far, the international relations field in general has not treated level of development as a major variable.⁹ Developmental hypotheses are beginning to appear in international relations study, and Rosenau has included the developed-underdeveloped dichotomy in a sample pre-theory.¹⁰

On the other hand, there are good reasons for not dividing all small states according to this basically

⁹Richard Butwell, Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 6.

¹⁰Rosenau, "Pre-Theories . . . ," p. 48.

economic formula. For one thing, foreign policy does not depend solely on productivity. Leadership, geography, and numerous other factors also play a role. Furthermore, the concept of the developed-underdeveloped division is of western origin, and, according to Wilson C. McWilliams, it "conceals more than it reveals." McWilliams interprets the doctrine as suggesting that "to learn the universal and general, men should study those states that are developed, whereas to learn the exotic and particular, men should study those states that are developing."¹¹ McWilliams therefore rejects the developed-underdeveloped dyad and treats small states as a class with common problems that are intensified, but not necessarily made different, because of economic backwardness.

This attitude toward the level of development typifies other accounts. B. K. Blount, for example, theorizes that in the future power will move away from states with small populations and to states with a large populace. His thinking is that all countries are experiencing scientific revolutions, and that in the long run, the states with the most manpower will produce more and therefore have great physical power. China and India, he projects, will become "leading nations, eclipsing, perhaps, even Russia and the United States,

¹¹Wilson Carey McWilliams, "Political Development and Foreign Policy," in Richard Butwell, ed., Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p. 14.

and the little countries of Europe--Britain and Germany, France and Holland--will sink into obscurity."¹² Blount's assumptions are suspect, and the larger view of international relations taken in his article definitely relegates the small states to a similar, lowly position without regard for level of development.

For the purposes of this study, a global perspective is assumed. Our broad pre-theory views economic development as only one contributing factor--albeit an extremely important one--to foreign policy formulation and execution. Exceptions exist to many hypotheses stated below. In such cases, the essential variable being considered is the common quality of smallness as defined in Chapter I, rather than the particular level of development enjoyed or endured by one state.

c. Size Differences

A brief glance at Appendix B suffices to demonstrate the differences of national populations which are included in the definition of "small state" adopted for this study. From the Maldives Islands to Ethiopia, a broad spectrum of nations is presented. Some of these are making major contributions to international affairs; others scarcely deserve to be called sovereign states. Certainly their dimensional diversity raises reasonable doubt as to the comparability of such nations.

¹²B. K. Blount, "Science Will Change the Balance of Power," The New Scientist, 2 (June 27, 1957), p. 9.

Admittedly, this broad category leaves the writer's definition open to question. Vital received criticism for not having established a class of small states that was obviously distinct in their external relations.¹³ If viewed from a narrow perspective, the present study would be even more vulnerable to similar disapproval.

However, the nature of a pre-theory demands a comprehensive look at the phenomena, even though subsequent refinements certainly will be required. Also, it is maintained that similar types of problems face Sweden and Somalia, Western Samoa and Ceylon. These involve the problem of small size in a world dominated by giants. Certainly size is relative, but the mental, economic, political, and metaphysical outlooks of small states bear marked resemblance whether they be in Asia or Latin America, Africa or Scandinavia.

Therefore, as the subsequent pre-theory unfolds, the reader is asked to remember the limitations and aims of the study. Whenever generalizations are applied to ninety-seven nations, exceptions will be numerous. On the other hand, the set of hypotheses provides a basis for further research on and refinement of more specialized categories.

III. The Pre-Theory

The organization of the pre-theory follows three broad areas which set small states apart from larger ones. First

¹³Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 119.

and most important are questions of survival. Security troubles all states to some degree; however, several factors highlighted below show how tenuous self-preservation can be for the small nation. Secondly, the pressures and problems of international economic existence are treated. Finally, some propositions relating to the psychological and emotional characteristics are set forth. In each of these areas the small nations find themselves in contrasting situations to the large. The sets of linked propositions provide the theoretical base which posits the similar character of small states. Where exceptions to the pre-theory exist, they are noted.

A. Security Policy

Any country's security policy comprises several facets. Among other things, geographic position and potential, diplomatic and military capabilities, and possible policies toward global and regional political entities stand out. In order to fully grasp the status of small state security policy, a thorough appreciation of these three factors is necessary.

Before turning to a separate analysis of each variable, several propositions concerning the totality of small state foreign policy should be put forward.

- 1:1 For the small state, matters of security dominate foreign policy considerations; and
- 1:2 therefore, foreign policy often gets more attention than domestic policy; and

1:3 therefore, questions related to military posture, alignment or non-alignment, and appropriate external responses assume proportionately greater significance than in large states.

These statements require some comment since there exists scant scientific proof of their validity. The primacy of security frequently has been noted among scholarly works on small states. One Nordic student has noted, "The foreign policy of a small nation can have but one purpose: the safeguarding of its independence and security."¹⁴ This generalization expresses the life-or-death importance of defense to the lesser countries, particularly in time of crisis. In wartime, large defeated states often have forced upon them total disarmament, steep reparation schedules, and territorial partitions, but they usually remain intact as nations. The small state rarely fares as well. More often the fate of the Baltic states awaits minor powers found attached to the losing side in a major war. With such an ignominious demise ever a possibility, the questions of maintaining identity and independence become all-important for the small state.

The overriding importance of foreign policy derives from several conditions which exist among substantial numbers of small states. First, of course, is the demand for security already mentioned. Secondly, the need for international

¹⁴Ralf Torngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX (July, 1961), p. 601.

trade causes an intense awareness of external affairs among such states as Ceylon, Switzerland and New Zealand. Thirdly, for certain underdeveloped countries, an ebullient foreign policy is thought to save face for a faltering domestic policy. Peter Lyon further notes an ideological uncertainty among some neutrals as to whether domestic matters for them should take precedence over foreign policy or whether Ranke's primacy of foreign policy includes the nonaligned.¹⁵ For these reasons, external problems consistently capture more attention than domestic affairs in many small states. Systematic studies should be undertaken to scientifically test this hypothesis, but indications based on existent literature tentatively validate the assumption.

In regard to the third proposition several qualifying factors must be taken into account. For many lesser states the answers to questions of military strength, alignment policy, and external affairs in general already have been decided. Older small states, e.g., Switzerland and Sweden, hold to long-standing policies; however, the facing of these problems by newly independent nations has become a recurrent source of frustration and perplexity. The majority have settled such issues as size and composition of military, position in relation to competing political alignments, and other important fundamental policy imperatives. Especially

¹⁵ Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 74.

for the new states, the development of an army as a symbol of sovereignty has assumed a high priority. Even among older neutral states, such as the two just mentioned, the maintenance of an appropriate defense force occupies much of the time of their planners. Thus, these related concerns become major issue areas among small states because of the survive-or-perish stakes which confront small states in the event of war.

- 1:4 The overriding importance of security causes the inherently weak small state to seek outside assistance in order to ensure maintenance of sovereignty;
- 1:5 therefore, the prevalent policies adopted by lesser entities have been the result of leaders' assessments of national interest; and
- 1:6 therefore, the posture of older, developed states has tended toward alignment with the Western democracies, while the newer, underdeveloped states have pursued nonalignment policies.

The essential truth of these statements should not conceal several important exceptions. Weakness has forced small states to turn beyond their borders for assurances of assistance. The nature of this external help has differed from country to country.

Some nations have taken refuge in alliances and allowed other states to take the major responsibility for their defense. An example of this type of state is Panama who in one survey ranked 88th of 88 nations in percentage of population

in the military.¹⁶ Despite being situated in the heart of volatile Latin America, Panama has entrusted her defense entirely to her American ally.

An opposite sort of outside request has been proffered by Switzerland, i.e., that her neutrality be respected. Along with Sweden, Geneva asks no military intervention or financial assistance, only that her status as neutral not be violated.

In between these extremes are a host of different situations. By and large they fit hypothesis 1:6, although special circumstances exist for many. Careful analysis demonstrates the supreme importance which national interest assessments have for policy formation. For some, adherence to nonalignment seems to best serve interests in procuring aid from all sides. For others, historic and cultural ties preclude nonalignment and encourage close cooperation with a major power. In either case, external assistance is solicited and necessary for viability in the realm of security.

1. Geographic Considerations

In assessing national interests, geographic factors play an important part. Despite technological advances which have overcome many natural boundaries to travel and communications, there remain significant geographic considerations which neither small nor large nations can ignore. In light of this

¹⁶Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 75.

truism the following proposition related to small states is offered.

- 1:7 Geographic factors such as position, accessibility, insularity, and natural boundaries may largely determine the security and economic fate of a small nation.

Even to suggest geographic determinism necessitates a rather complete explanation of this hypothesis. In recent years there has been a fairly systematic rejection of geography as having more than peripheral bearing on a state's development. Due to the development of intercontinental bombers, atom bombs, and jet planes, even geographers were ready to admit to a lessening influence of natural factors on political strategy. Harold and Margaret Sprout noted in 1952, "Broadly speaking, the geographical layout of lands and seas and the configuration of the lands have lost much of the military-political value once attached to these factors."¹⁷

If one turned to the most recent, reputable books on small state foreign policy, i.e., those of Vital and Rothstein, it could be assumed that geographic factors had lost even the devalued importance which they retained in the Sprouts' views of two decades past. Neither The Inequality of States nor Alliances and Small States devotes more than an occasional passing mention to geography.¹⁸ The paucity of attention

¹⁷Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Geography and International Politics in Revolutionary Change," Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV (March, 1952), p. 160.

¹⁸Very brief mention is made in Vital, pp. 59, 65, 89 and 147; in Rothstein there is also very little, e.g., see p. 61.

paid by these two scholars scarcely matches that of numerous other works, and the avoidance of geography constitutes one point upon which both men's works have been criticized.

In contrast to the Vital and Rothstein attitudes, stand several other works which place geography among the most important factors in the analysis of small state foreign affairs. For example, Raymond Aron singles out geographic position and resources as the two "decisive" factors in determining lesser nations' fates.¹⁹ However, the strongest defense of geographic relevance to small states comes from Professor Erling Bjøl of the University of Aarhus. He begins a recent article with a discussion of the troubled relationship between Albania and the U.S.S.R. since World War II. According to Bjøl, the Soviet Union did not possess the kind of power which could be used successfully against her smaller foe because of the geographic location of the latter. Furthermore, he coined the phrase "security geography," the importance of which he maintained as follows:

I would suggest that security geography would be one of the first categories to take into consideration if one wants to elaborate a conceptual framework for the

¹⁹ Raymond Aron, Peace . . ., p. 138. Others sharing a similar view on the place of geography are Charles A. Fisher, Essays in Political Geography (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1968), pp. 4-5; Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics . . ., entire first chapter; also, numerous case studies, some of which will be mentioned below, highlight geographic considerations.

analysis of the role of small states in international politics.²⁰

Bjøl proceeds to list three factors which assume great import for the small state. First is natural boundaries, most notably mountains and water; second is the climatic dimension; and finally is position. Although Bjøl in his article fails to develop the security significance of these, they are treated hereafter in the order listed.

Few would dispute the historic importance of natural boundaries to worldwide development. For example, geographic limitations enabled parts of the Far East to remain isolated for centuries, even when western technological advances were facilitating travel and communication elsewhere; and a narrow strip of water has successfully kept England from invasion by ground or sea forces for over nine centuries. The two most significant barriers are mountains and water. Mountains have played a major role in insuring neutrality for Switzerland, ideological independence for Albania, and military protection to a number of states in varying degrees. Naturally, mountains do not provide protection from air attack by planes or missiles, but they do deter conventional ground and artillery attacks. It is questionable whether the interests of a large power would be saved by launching a sophisticated nuclear attack on a nation fitting our definition of "small." More is said on this point below.

²⁰Bjøl, "The Power . . . ," p. 158.

Water, likewise, provides an inhospitable barrier. As previously noted, even a small body of water can present tactical and strategic problems to the would-be aggressor. The English Channel, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Gibraltar provide examples wherein water has become a barrier to aggression. Having mentioned these it scarcely seems necessary to note the barriers which oceans present.

Particular advantage lies with insular states. Iceland and the Caribbean and the Pacific Island nations all share certain definite advantages which Finland, Austria, and Rhodesia do not share. There seems to be greater freedom of action for the former states. From a different perspective, no threat is presented large states by small island nations. However, Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle note that island states suffer with some burdens which tend to balance the advantages. Their usefulness as bases for military and economic ventures of large states often makes them subject to pressures for concessions. Also, resources not available locally must be imported. Quite often foodstuffs must be brought from outside.²¹ Thus with greater political freedom goes possible economic dependence.

Climatic characteristics can play an important role in the small state's security considerations. Growing season,

²¹Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduction to the History of International Relations (London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 15.

rainfall, and temperature variation determine the food supply and vegetation. These factors influence the type of foreign policy by affecting the degree of dependence on outside sources of food. Also, the direct security factor can be seen here. Climate may determine whether a nation is susceptible to or immune from guerrilla warfare. There are numerous other implications of climatological factors, but they need not receive further attention here.

Geographical position or location also weighs heavily in security considerations of small states. It is obvious that Switzerland and Sweden enjoy advantages of position over Czechoslovakia and Finland, respectively. Likewise, the location of Laos puts it in a more difficult strategic and security position than, say, Iceland.

Two of the myriad problems which frequently face small nations are (1) bordering a major power and (2) not having direct access to the ocean lanes. In the first instance Finland provides a classic example. Experience over the past centuries has demonstrated the need of Finland's maintaining amicable relations with Moscow. When the smaller state refused to give in to the larger state's will in 1939-40, the great power pushed her aside.²² The possibility of such action constitutes a permanent feature of contingency planning

²²Max Jakobson tells this story very thoroughly in his The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961).

among small states in a similar position. Austria, the former Baltic States, and the Himalayan countries are among those who must ponder this truism.

The landlocked state has other problems. Military assistance against aggression, economic trade, and other types of international exchange become subject to the possible restrictions of neighboring states. While not itself a nation-state, Berlin in 1948-49 provides an extreme example of the potential for disruption which a land bound state must face. A number of central African nations find themselves in this position. Quite often this type of country finds itself cast in the role of a buffer. For the lesser powers this can spell doom.²³

Having briefly enumerated some of the major consequences which geographic factors may impose, one is brought back to the question of why the works of Vital and Rothstein apparently do not deem physical attributes important to understanding small state external affairs, particularly security policy. Several possible explanations exist. William Paterson asks if examination of geographic characteristics might too strongly highlight the differences of each small state, and thereby score the idea of a class of lesser entities.²⁴

²³See, for example, Hugh Toye, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

²⁴Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 121.

Another explanation might be derived from the fact that both Vital and Rothstein deal at length with the plight of small nations in the nuclear environment. Their analyses seem to indicate a belief that small states are considered fair game by the five holders of the nuclear monopoly. Admittedly several small states have examined the possibility of acquiring their own nuclear forces, an act which would leave them susceptible to large power pressure and planning. However, the political likelihood of any small power attaining independent nuclear weapons still seems remote, even though a number possess the necessary knowledge and materials to do so.

The most plausible explanation for the omission of geography in the analyses of Vital and Rothstein seems to be the assumption held by many that technology has forever changed man and his world. There is, in fact, ample evidence to support such an opinion without considering the topic here. However, in face of such evidence, counter opinion exists which demonstrates the need for examining carefully such factors as geography, even in the face of gigantic technological strides. Eugene Skolnikoff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology supports this position:

Technology, instead of minimizing consciousness of national sovereignty, has exaggerated it; instead of discouraging the emergence of weak, small states, has made proliferation of states possible; instead of bringing about sharp changes in attitudes and assumptions of governments toward foreign affairs, has

allowed continuation of "traditional" approaches to the workings of the international system.²⁵

In view of the foregoing analysis it is unnecessary to defend further the relevancy of geography to security affairs of small states. Traditional geographic factors continue to have meaning for the minor state. Very few are seriously threatened directly by the presence of nuclear weapons in the world. They must still look first to their physical assets and liabilities in formulating security policy.

2. Diplomatic and Military Capabilities

Whereas no state can choose the climate, physical location, and natural barriers with which it must face the world, diplomatic and military factors are less static. In fact, of the components of security, these facets offer the small state the greatest opportunity of changing its status, for better or worse. However, small size inherently places certain limitations upon a country's diplomatic and military sectors which again render it different from the large state:

- 1:8 Because of size differences, small states suffer weaknesses diplomatically and militarily which severely limit their activities vis-a-vis large powers; and
- 1:9 therefore, diplomacy of lesser states is narrower in scope, more limited in manpower, dependent on others for

²⁵ Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "The International Functional Implications of Future Technology" (unpublished paper presented to annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September, 1970), p. 1.

intelligence, and more conscious of efficiency than that of larger counterparts;

- 1:10 however, size disparity can bring advantages which somewhat balance disadvantages in the diplomatic field.

Diplomacy offers the small state a chance of overcoming some of the limitations it suffers in other areas. Unlike economic and military affairs, size of a diplomatic corps does not determine quality and effectiveness of policy. However, despite the real opportunity which diplomacy offers, the small state still labors under handicaps.

Being largely intangible, diplomatic activity deals in such products as influence, intelligence, and prestige. Representation abroad provides a key avenue of influence and negotiation; small states cannot be as completely represented around the world as large states. Their financial and manpower resources prohibit placing numerous, large missions on a global scale.²⁶ Likewise in the field of information gathering, the minor states cannot maintain hired agents on a scale which would provide masses of first-rate intelligence. Therefore, there is the necessity of cooperating with other small states, such as the New Zealand-Australian collaboration example, or seeking information from major nations' espionage networks.

²⁶Vital, Inequality . . ., pp. 16-23. This is the most thorough evaluation available which compares large and small state diplomatic machinery.

At first glance these weaknesses would seem to render ineffective the external representation of a small country. Indeed for some, e.g., the land-locked central African nations, their foreign relations are conducted without benefit of many trained experts, adequate intelligence, or numerous overseas legations. Countries such as Uganda and Mali frequently rely on larger countries, usually former colonial mentors, to care for some diplomatic duties in areas where they have no representation. In view of these facts it is obvious that the small country cannot compete successfully against the large state.

Before writing off the small state in diplomatic affairs, several points should be raised which qualify the rather somber picture just presented. In the first place, small states do not plan globally, but locally. There is no need to have representation in every country or even in every main region. The relevant environment for the small state is narrow, and thus the lack of worldwide representation presents few problems. Secondly, intelligence gathering may be given exaggerated importance by large government officials. It is most comforting to have information readily available, but the degree to which secret intelligence would alter a small nation's policy options is subject to question.

Thirdly, small diplomatic corps and limited information should not drastically affect the formulation of small state foreign policy. Foreign policy for any nation involves what

Aron calls "a share of adaptation to circumstances."²⁷ For small states this involves an even greater necessity to adapt than in the large ones, since the materials from which a strong, positive policy may be constructed are denied the former. Minor states live in what Cohen calls the "world of indirect power capability," one in which the weak act when the situation allows, not necessarily when they choose.²⁸ Thus, a smaller number of interests and a narrower relevant geographic area mean that greater attention may be given to structuring a viable policy. Paterson feels that the lesser state has a better possibility of formulating a coherent policy than major states.²⁹

Several factors, if present, can help to fulfill this high expectation for the small state diplomatic machinery. Liska mentions organization, social cohesion, morale, and statesmanship as key traits needed to overcome diplomatic weakness.³⁰ Small state diplomats need to be aware of the unique tools available to them, e.g., the emotional impact which can be elicited if threatened by a major power. Max Jakobson maintained that if the military and world opinion were used as criteria, Finland defeated the Soviet Union in

²⁷Aron, Peace . . . , p. 284.

²⁸Cohen, Geography and Politics . . . , p. 28.

²⁹Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 122.

³⁰Liska, International Equilibrium, p. 25-26.

the Winter War. In his words, "A pawn had beaten a castle."³¹ Probably overstated, this nevertheless demonstrates the effect emotional appeals may have for the underdog state. If all the available resources can be mustered, small diplomatic efforts can exert an influence far beyond their expected potential.

1:11 Disparity of size prevents the small state from being truly competitive militarily with the large state at the present time and for the foreseeable future; and

1:12 therein lies the basis of the tenuous character of small states, since economic, psychological, and political well-being ultimately depend on security as provided by the military.

Taking these general statements in order, a number of qualifying remarks are appropriate. However, their essential truth to most small states has been accepted for centuries. As noted in the introduction in Chapter I, lesser countries always have been ignored and maneuvered by large states against their wishes. Arnold Wolfers noted during World War II that the military weakness characteristic of smaller entities provided a temptation to expand for strong, aggressive states.³² More recently, another student of international relations has noted the parallels between the situations in the Balkans before World War I and in Southeast Asia since World War II and has concluded that the presence of numerous

³¹Jakobson, The Diplomacy . . . , p. 5.

³²Wolfers, "In Defense . . . ," p. 210.

small states in one geographic area constitutes "a classic case of a power vacuum."³³ One is tempted to view this condition as axiomatic.

However, before leaving this point it should be understood that while small states cannot fight a successful war against a great power, neither can some states which claim large power status. As Rothstein says, "Italy could not defeat France; France could not defeat Germany, and Germany could not defeat the United States."³⁴ Furthermore, some small states might be able to wage successful wars against a larger neighbor. Sweden, for example, contains a strong air force produced domestically, a very unusual thing for small states. Also, the civilian defense system is highly trained and has highly developed conventional power capabilities. Also, Switzerland, possesses the ability to forestall any invasion except a nuclear missile strike. Its geography and defense system make it secure from all but the most sophisticated aggression.³⁵ Also, as Paterson suggests, Sweden may be a stronger power militarily than France.³⁶

³³Donald Neuchterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, VIII (September, 1968), p. 807.

³⁴Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 21.

³⁵For a good assessment of Switzerland's capability see: George A. Coddington, Jr., "The New Swiss Military Capability," Foreign Affairs, XL (April, 1962), pp. 488-494.

³⁶Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 120.

Israel's military prowess has been amply demonstrated during its harried, brief history. Though small numerically and exposed geographically, the Israelis have defended themselves well against their foes. This remarkable example owes much to preparedness, high morale, and extensive overseas funds.

These three states are quite exceptional. However, even in view of their past successes in the military field, the thought of attempting an offensive war against a major, industrial state would be suicide in the long run. They are simply too small in too many ways to seriously consider a major war. Much additional proof could be mustered to demonstrate this assertion, but it would be expounding on the obvious.

In the second statement above the term "tenuous character" is applied to small states. This clearly requires explanation. As was noted in the introduction to this study, small states are today more numerous, more influential, and more productive than at any time in past history. It would seem a contradiction of fact to suggest that their continued existence is tentative or in danger. It should be stressed in explanation that the hypothesis applied specifically to the military weakness which small nations share. This makes them subject to unusual stress in times when relationships between great powers are out of balance. If war is a possibility, the small state's security is threatened, depending, of course, on its strategic importance and geographic position relative

to the disputing factions. Thus, the statement was made with the possibility of military action in mind. Militarily, small states are weak and must seek to derive the most possible benefit from the non-military facets of its foreign policy. This brings us to the consideration of various policy alternatives available to the small state.

3. Policy Alternatives

Having enumerated the assets and liabilities which characterize a small state's diplomatic, military, and geographic circumstances, the importance of policy matters seems obvious. A knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses which smallness bestows on a state is the first necessity for the statesman dealing in foreign policy.

It is in the realm of policy that the individual differences of small states become most apparent. To set forth specific, viable policy guidelines applicable to all small entities would demand listing pages of footnotes explaining the various exceptions to presumably universal rules. In view of this diversity, only basic statements are made and only the most noteworthy exceptions mentioned.

- 1:13 Because of their diminutive size, small states necessarily view the international system with a much narrower perspective than large states;
- 1:14 therefore, policy actions tend to hold local rather than world-wide significance; and
- 1:15 these policies tend to be more strongly dependent on the external world than

policies pursued by large states; and

- 1:16 this results in a negative foreign policy which is largely a reaction to stimuli from without, rather than a policy which is positively planned and executed from domestic origin.

In discussing these hypotheses, several natural subjects emerge. The first two statements highlight the small state's limited security interests; secondly, the two broad security policies entered into by lesser powers are alignment and non-alignment; and finally, the importance of international organization policy to small countries is widely recognized. Each of these topics is treated below, and appropriate conclusions drawn at the end of this section.

Global versus regional interests.--In the field of security, small states are severely handicapped by their size. As already mentioned, smallness tends to have its effect on every segment of society. This effect is particularly noticeable in the field of national security. Not only are manpower resources slight, but natural resources also are generally limited. Thus the range of security policies open to small states is restricted.

This being true, a global policy is not usually feasible for the smaller powers. On this point the scholarly community expresses unanimous accord. For example, William E. Paterson observes, "It is, in any case, usually more important for a small state to provide for its defence against possible

enemies in its own sub-system (e.g., Israel) than to defend itself against a Super-Power."³⁷

Not only is the small state able to concentrate on her own region, ordinarily she can concern herself only with those states which share a common border. For the lesser power bordering a major power this is certainly enough with which to be preoccupied. Afghanistan, Finland, Israel, Laos, and Nepal, among others, all face peculiar problems because of their proximity to major military powers. The significance of close physical contact with a major power intensifies the security problems shared by all lesser powers.

This regional interest results both from necessity and choice. Small powers cannot realistically consider pursuing a global strategy. Their policy must focus on the local environment by which they are most affected. Although certainly aware of multiple warhead missiles and hardened silos, the lesser states are much more concerned with restive political groups in a nearby state, or how to best use the limited resources available to them. In summing up deposed Cambodian Head of State Norodom Sihanouk's policy of a few years back, John Armstrong used the phrases "politics of weakness" and "how to get more bang without any bucks."³⁸ For small powers

³⁷ Paterson, "Small States . . . ," p. 120. Other references to the essentially regional character of small state foreign affairs includes: Bjol, "The Power . . . ," p. 159; Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 62.

³⁸ John P. Armstrong, Sihanouk Speaks (New York: Walker and Company, 1964), p. 148.

operating in a large power dominated world, these words have deep meaning.

In view of these realities, the choice of a general strategem becomes very important. During peacetime the type of overall policy frequently dictates considerations beyond the field of security, e.g., it might help determine trading partners. During wartime, the choice of policy might ultimately decide the fate of the nation. Unfortunately, the small state that minds its own affairs and operates a non-aggressive foreign policy is not guaranteed continued existence. The historic case of Poland testifies to the sometimes precarious condition of any small state caught in the aftermath of war. This possibility of a modern day Poland may seem remote, but the uncertainty experienced by small states in their policy choices is very current. Foreign policy concerns are very crucial to their general welfare.

In deciding what policy to pursue, many options are open to the small state. George Liska states that "the range of policies of small countries runs from biased neutralism through strict nonalignment to outright alliance membership."³⁹ Such a range of policy should not be surprising for anyone aware of the ninety-eight states listed in Appendix B.

³⁹George Liska, "The 'Third Party': The Rationale of Nonalignment," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., Neutrality and Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1962), p. 92.

However, despite many variations and individual circumstances, most of these states can be classified simply as aligned or nonaligned. It is to the implications of these policies that we now turn.

Alignment versus nonalignment.--A definition of terms is scarcely necessary in regard to these key small state policies. It is, however, advisable to discuss at some length the types of factors which induce adoption of one or the other policy. Naturally, the perceived national interest of a given state would largely dictate which stance to assume. In addition, there are historic, domestic, political, and other like factors which play strong roles in influencing which strategy would best serve the individual state. In the following pages a review is provided of what factors motivate a state's leaders in their decision to pursue either an alignment or neutralist stance and of some of the comparative advantages of each.

Alignment involves entering into an agreement with other nation-states whereby joint efforts are taken to ensure the security of all signatories. This implies several things for the small state in alliance. First, a tacit admission of dependence and reliance on another or several other powers is formally made. Second, a record before the world is made signifying in which camp the sympathies of the nation lie. Finally, the aligned power becomes automatically a party to the good and bad actions of any contesting alliances. Thus,

in a very real way the small state rejects the opportunities which isolation and independent action may offer, and becomes a cog in a much larger machine. In this role its voice may be infrequently adhered to or heard. It may become temporarily important, but if a large power is also a member, long range influence is almost certain to be elusive.

Benefits may accrue from membership in an alliance. Loans, gifts, and shared use of military equipment may be forthcoming. Access to large state training and intelligence services may be gained. Promises of assistance in case of external aggression are somewhat nebulous at times, but they are among the most desirable benefits.

Generally, small states prefer aligning themselves with nations who share similar security problems. For this reason, alliance systems seem to be formed in the face of some geographic threat, real or perceived. The free world alliances since World War II have all had a regional character, even though membership tended to stretch beyond certain natural geographic boundaries. In these cases, either dominant interests of a major power or strong cultural and historical ties expanded the membership to include far-flung nations. Albert Wohlstetter explained this phenomenon in these words: "Distance bears no simple relationship either to interests or military strength." He noted that "cultural interests have never fallen off with distance," and that Englishmen

have found Australians and New Zealanders quite congenial culturally even when they could not understand the French.⁴⁰

Small state costs for alliance membership are difficult to calculate. In terms of monetary outlay, the small country probably gets a good return for its investment. A recent scholarly study shows a tendency toward disproportionate assumption of alliance financial responsibilities by the large states. Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhouser have produced evidence which shows that small states tend to fall short of their assigned quotas in alliances and international organizations. They attribute this finding to the fact that "each ally gets only a fraction of the benefits of any collective good . . . but each pays the full cost of any additional amounts of the collective good."⁴¹ Thus, say the authors, when a small state has paid its share for whatever level of defense it deems personally sufficient, it discontinues payment and the large nations take the rest of the bill upon themselves.

Intangible costs may not leave the small state in as advantageous position. Whatever independence of policy they possess resulting from geographic situation, possession of a valued natural resource, or other advantage, may be sacrificed to the interests of the group. If a major power

⁴⁰Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," Foreign Affairs, XLVI (January, 1968), pp. 244, 247.

⁴¹Olson and Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory . . . ," p. 43.

is also a member of the alliance, the chance for enhancing one's position by playing one large state against another would be lost. Also, the assumed stance of moral superiority taken by neutrals could not be utilized. Thus, the positive and negative factors seem to be fairly evenly balanced. What reasons then cause small states to seek alliance membership?

Several factors influence choice of alignment rather than nonalignment. Donald Neuchterlein has mentioned several possible reasons in his comparative study of Iceland, Thailand, and Australia.⁴² In the first place, decision to align frequently follows the failure of a neutralist policy. Rothstein notes that nonalignment is a viable policy only in certain circumstances and that these conditions usually do not exist. Therefore, many neutralist policies become "a euphemism for a policy of indecision and fear."⁴³ Neuchterlein's examples, Iceland and Thailand, demonstrate the frustration and fear which sometimes causes states to align.

A second condition which causes some states to opt for alignment is the absence of a recent colonial experience. The old adage "familiarity breeds contempt" may apply to many former colonies who prefer enduring some of the disadvantages

⁴² Donald Neuchterlein, "Small States in Alliances," Orbis, XIII (Summer, 1969), p. 622.

⁴³ Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 34. He lists the conditions which are suitable for a neutralist policy on p. 32.

of neutrality rather than once again find themselves taking orders from a new master in the field of security. At any rate, no such fears inhibit states like Thailand, never an official colony, and Iceland, independent since 1918.

Other conditions which render alignment advantageous include agreement between the major and minor power on the "nature and source of the principal security threat," and the small state's confidence in the great power's intention to defend the small in face of a security threat.⁴⁴ Another factor which helps maintain alliances is the alternative which faces the state who pulls out for whatever reason. Although there are few examples of this, the presence of apprehension as to what route the small state just detached from an alliance can take has been expressed. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew voiced his concern over the possible breakup of the Commonwealth system. After noting the troubled world situation and pointing to the value of the former colonial ties he remarked that despite quarrels and disputes, "the former dependencies may find the British and their technological and industrial power the most valuable and the most comfortable to make use of. . . ."⁴⁵ The allied small state can extricate itself from its ties only at the

⁴⁴Neuchterlein, "Small . . . ," p. 622.

⁴⁵Lee Kuan Yew, "Hitching on to Some Other Wagon May Be Exacting and Stifling," Commonwealth Journal, XII (February, 1969), p. 5.

risk of losing what security it possesses even though alliance arrangements are unsatisfactory. Distrust is sure to persist among potential allies of a state which changes alliance policies.

Nonalignment presents for some a viable alternative to binding security ties. If Rothstein's previously noted allegation that neutralism succeeds only under certain circumstances is true, there are certainly numerous small states which feel that such conditions exist now. However, the conditions described by Professor Rothstein differ markedly from a similar list provided by Herbert Dinerstein, a scholar with a more sympathetic view of nonalignment.

Whereas Rothstein posits that the small power must be "strategically irrelevant and politically nonprovocative" to be neutrally viable,⁴⁶ Dinerstein sees in the post-World War II international system three major changes from pre-war alliances which make it plausible for a state to remain unaligned. These alterations are: (1) the supersession of military by political goals; (2) the significant alteration in the relative power and number of participating states; and (3) the emergence of ideology as a major factor in alignment choice.⁴⁷ Dinerstein feels that the raison de etre for seeking alignments is deterrence against war rather than

⁴⁶Rothstein, Alliances . . . , p. 32.

⁴⁷Dinerstein, "The Transformation . . . ," p. 593.

preparation for war. He notes that greater independence in foreign affairs characterizes small state policy and observes the broadened sphere of choice taken by Eastern European client states. His analysis preceded the Czechoslovakian experience in 1968. So different from Rothstein, Dinerstein concludes that "whatever the origin of the present security of the smaller powers, the present reality is that both diplomatic and ideologic non-alignment are realistic policies for the weaker nations in the international system."⁴⁸

Turning from professional difference of opinion, we can note a number of conditions for or motivations to non-alignment. This type of stance presumes that competing factions exist. Ernest Lefever simply notes, "It takes three to make a neutral."⁴⁹ Since 1945 the competition for emerging states has certainly been keen between the two Superpowers. Furthermore, non-alignment fills several deep-seated needs of small states. Particularly among newly independent nations, non-alignment fills the need of having a national policy which is recognized as worthy by outside states. This tends to focus the attention of the people on common goals and to diminish their feelings of separateness. Thus, as Liska maintains, neutralism is "inspired largely by domestic

⁴⁸Dinerstein, "The Transformation . . . ," p. 594.

⁴⁹Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., Neutralism . . . , p. 116.

concerns."⁵⁰ Liska believes that both political and economic needs are served by a nonalignment policy. Bolstering these various domestic areas serves to build nationalism, which Lefever sees as "the primary concern of all neutralist states."⁵¹

Internationally a nonalignment policy is presumed to convey an aura of moral superiority. This positive facet of neutralism receives frequent mention, especially by adherents. Marshal Tito captured the feeling which these states hold for themselves when he referred to them as the "conscience of mankind."⁵² This self-righteousness causes the nonaligned to see themselves as uncorrupted by power, and possessing a detachment and innocence which qualifies them to speak reasonably and humanely.

In the view of others, this scene hardly approximates reality. Nils Orvik, himself a Norwegian, admits the selfishness of small states in the interwar period. He says:

They [small states] were not saints in international relations more than anyone else. . . . They declined the honor of becoming martyrs. The small states were primarily concerned with themselves and

⁵⁰George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 217.

⁵¹Lefever, "Nehru . . . ," p. 116.

⁵²Marshal Tito, "Excerpts From Addresses at the Opening of Neutral Leaders' Talks in Belgrade," New York Times, September 2, 1961, p. 2.

their own eternal, insolvable problem of sovereignty and security.⁵³

In the same vein Rothstein remarks, "If power corrupts, so does the lack of it."⁵⁴ Thus it is questionable as to just how untarnished the badge of respectability of nonaligned states in fact is.

Neutralist states possess a certain freedom of choice which may be thought advantageous. Sweden and Switzerland enjoy this privilege and are able to have their opinions widely respected. Perhaps as important as their stated policies are their highly capable military machines located in advantageous geographic locations. Other neutrals certainly do not fare as well. With more exposed physical situations, less adept security provisions, and poorer trade advantages, many small states are "taken for granted," thus rendering their decisional independence of questionable value. Still, they do enjoy the pursuit of an "independent foreign policy."

It is obvious that domestic needs and external prestige play important roles in the decisions of states that opt for nonalignment. There are numerous types and variations of nonaligned policies. The efficacy of such policies depends on several factors over which the small state may or may not have influence. Geographic and resource potential remain

⁵³Orvik, The Decline . . . , p. 194.

⁵⁴Rothstein, Alliance . . . , p. 11.

fairly constant. Government policy can be altered, and has a major responsibility in ensuring the success of nonalignment. For example, small state neutralist leaders must make it abundantly clear that they intend to "avoid any disputes with other states" which might adversely affect their ability to maintain independence.⁵⁵ The ability to withhold a needed export item from foreign buyers may buy time and goodwill, although such a policy could become a temptation to aggression.

Finally, Herbert Tingsten notes a factor which is intangible, impossible to quantify, and hardly academic, but which surely must come into play, "pure luck."⁵⁶ In explaining his country's foreign policy, i.e., Sweden, Tingsten refused to credit his government and people with any particular moral fortitude. He pointed out the ambivalence of debates on alliance policy, and generally conveyed the impression that Sweden has succeeded in her neutralism by chance and by the possession of a strong military establishment.

In summing up the pros and cons of alignment we may conclude that at times small states' interests may be best served by adhering to an independent course in their external affairs. Certainly the Cold War has presented the combination

⁵⁵William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 248.

⁵⁶Herbert Tingsten, "Issues in Swedish Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (April, 1959), p. 475.

of circumstances allowing for profitable pursuance of nonalignment, as has been pointed out frequently.⁵⁷ However, if the Cold War should escalate into general war, neutrality would probably not provide any more security for the lesser states than it has for most neutrals in past wars. This general situation underlines a basic fact inherent in small size: success or failure of any foreign policy depends in large measure on the international political milieu. This, in turn, depends on the actions and policies of the major powers.

In such a situation, small states could take a fatalistic view of the future. Some indeed have. For example, John Galtung of the Peace Research Institute refers to the essential dependence of small on large states as the "feudal system."⁵⁸ Dubbing small and large entities as "underdog" and "topdog," he systematically demonstrates that the bigger powers ignore the lesser powers and control international relations for their benefit. He concludes pessimistically:

What, then, does all this add up to? In one sentence: that international politics (not non-governmental interaction) is big power politics, for good and for bad, between friends and (particularly) between enemies, in the past, at present and in the

⁵⁷For an excellent analysis of this theme, see: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., "The Testing of Non-Alignment," The Western Political Quarterly, XVII (September, 1964), pp. 517-542.

⁵⁸Galtung, "East-West . . . ," p. 146ff.

foreseeable future, probably to some extent as long as nations exist.⁵⁹

The result of this situation for small nation foreign policy is ambivalent. Some scholars, leaders, and citizens in lesser states see little reason in spending money, time, and effort to construct and implement a policy which probably won't be listened to or heeded. This type of attitude results in the feeling that external relations are beyond the scope of the small country's influence and that they are pawns in a chess game dominated by queens. This helpless feeling has been expressed to the writer on numerous occasions during the course of his research activity in New Zealand. Claude Phillips received similar responses in a project undertaken in Nigeria, although certainly not by our definition a small nation. Citizens there told Phillips that, "Nigeria does not have a foreign policy."⁶⁰ He interpreted this to mean that there was no predictable reaction, no consistent policy to external stimulus. When decisions were required, Britain's lead usually was followed. For many small states this is a typical non-policy.

Other states realize their disadvantaged plight, but look upon the positive side of things. Every small state possesses some advantage which, if exploited fully, can help

⁵⁹Galtung, "East-West . . . ," p. 168.

⁶⁰Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. viii.

overcome its inherent weakness. Such advantage might be geographic, or presence of a highly desirable resource, or even utter and complete helplessness which elicits support for its continued existence. The resourceful small state has been known to parlay its assets into considerably more influence than ordinarily would be expected. For some this influence may be short-lived, as was the case with Cambodia under Sihanouk. For others the influence is still being maintained, as with Sweden. Essential to small state foreign policy success is the capitalization on any available strengths, and in the process offsetting the material and size disparities which will always exist.

In essence, the small state is constantly adapting to forces in its environment. James Rosenau quite adequately conceives of all foreign policy as "adaptive behavior." He maintains the importance of the "salient environment" and constructs a pre-theory for the purpose of analyzing the adaptations.⁶¹ It is reasonable that small states are required to make greater adaptations than large states. Their dependence, in many areas, on their large counterparts puts the onus on the lesser for making necessary changes that will preserve the system.

In trying to adapt to their inferior power and diplomatic status, small states have found a forum for their

⁶¹James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior," Comparative Politics, II (April, 1970), pp. 371-2.

diverse views in international organizations. It is to this facet of policy that we now turn.

International organization policy.--

- 1:17 Small nations support the principles, activities and institutions which have tended to further the causes of collective security, dissemination of technical knowledge, and spreading of economic advantage; and
- 1:18 their activities in such organizations are aimed at substituting small state wishes for policies regarding colonialism, military development, and economic imperialism, and thus represents a major facet in the essentially negative nature of small state policies;
- 1:19 positive contributions as mediators and peace enforcers neither assure the success of the respective organization nor conceal the basic self-interest motivation which results in enthusiastic small nation support for international organizations.

From the Hague Conferences til the present, the small powers have been in the vanguard of efforts to strengthen and extend the purview of international organizations. There are several reasons for this beyond the obvious use of collective security measures to ensure peace. Not the least of these motivations is the diplomatic scope which an organization like the United Nations provides. Certainly the much talked of "forum" provided does make it possible for small states to express their views in the presence of worldwide representatives.

There is also the chance for leadership which is afforded small power statesmen. Trade advantages and aid grants may

also accrue from membership in multinational groups. These obvious advantages touch only the easily observable benefits, and the analysis of the scope of action of small powers in international organizations still has not been explored in depth.

In spite of continual efforts and support, it is questionable as to just how great an influence small states exert on international organizations. Their need of this type of forum has frequently been mentioned. Andrew Boyd has paraphrased both Dag Hammarskjold and U Thant as dubbing the United Nations as a "smaller members' organization, because they need it more than major powers do."⁶² Despite their need of such associations, small states participation does not show a perfect record by any means. In fact, the criticisms of lesser powers outweigh in some minds the positive contributions made. A look at both viewpoints reveals not only the record of small power activities, but also the potential for service which current organizations provide. In this analysis, only the two most significant collective security organizations are treated; economic groups are discussed below and regional defense organizations generally follow the pattern of the world wide ones.

When forming the League of Nations there were contrasting opinions concerning the proper place and influence of the

⁶²Boyd, "The Role . . . ," p. 367-8.

small nation. Woodrow Wilson defended small nation rights as part of his strong adherence to equality. On the other hand, Lord Robert Cecil was critical of what he felt were "excessive demands" presented to the Versailles Conference by some small states.⁶³ In the final agreement, the inequality of states was institutionalized with the recognition of three distinct classes of states: Great Powers, Intermediate Powers, and Small Powers. This arrangement did not suit all parties, as might be expected. Representation on the Council was denied lesser states but the number of individual leadership positions held by small power statesmen and the general advantages of the League caused the small states to accept their inferior status.

As the high hopes for the League faded in the face of repeated aggression during the 1930's, lesser powers found themselves facing possible military attack without internal strength or external guarantees of assistance. Most of this pressure was brought to bear in northwestern Europe, as most other areas receiving pressure were still held as colonies. The Italo-Ethiopian war opened the eyes of those who had trusted their security to the League. Large states reacted by firming up alliance commitments, while the small and weak "started digging up the decaying remnants of traditional neutrality."⁶⁴

⁶³Rappard, "Small States . . . ," pp. 553-555.

⁶⁴Orvik, The Decline . . . , p. 172.

This retreat to neutrality did not succeed in immunizing the Scandinavians and others from the conflict after 1939. However, the unsuccessful attempts of the League to prevent general war during the late 1930's did not inhibit small state interest in a successor organization. Due to the perceived advantages which such an association provides, lesser states were eager participants in San Francisco in April, 1945, at the conference to formulate a Charter for the United Nations. As in the League, smaller members tried to exercise as much influence as possible over all matters of importance. Great power dominance did not allow for much lesser state influence in the seemingly important security field. Nevertheless, the small nations capitalized on any advantages which breaches in large state solidarity allowed. More significantly, the small states "sank their teeth into the . . . question of the secretariat."⁶⁵ From this position of Secretary General to the clerical and stenographic tasks, small nations have played a central if not dominant role in the day to day operation of the United Nations.

Several characteristics of small state participation in the United Nations demonstrate something of the thinking which motivates the lesser power generally. For one thing, there has been a tendency toward bloc voting in an effort to exert influence over the large states. This has been specifically

⁶⁵Boyd, "The Role . . . ," p. 359.

noted with reference to non-aligned states.⁶⁶ However, in a quantitative analysis of General Assembly roll call votes there was a "fairly high correlation between supranationalist voting and a country's smallness."⁶⁷ The same study noted that in the four Assembly sessions studied (1947, 1952, 1957, and 1961), there were attempts made by the smaller members to impose their will on the larger and wealthier nations.⁶⁸

This desire to express their will over the large states springs from another trait of small nations and their role in international organizations, i.e., their emphasis on principle. Small states are very concerned with such concepts as sovereignty, equality, self-determination, and freedom of choice. As George Liska points out, this emphasis on principle is in their best interests, as states which are light on the scales of power find a show of idealism to be a realistic and viable policy.⁶⁹ Their idealism often leads small states to criticize military expansion, neo-colonialism via economic means, and other alleged large state incursions into their spheres of interest. Such a self-righteous stance is particularly well-suited to the non-aligned.

⁶⁶Lefever, "Nehru . . . ," p. 119.

⁶⁷Hayward R. Alker and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 130n.

⁶⁸Alker and Russett, World Politics . . . , p.129.

⁶⁹Liska, International . . . , p. 67-8.

Another characteristic of lesser power activity in the United Nations has been the participation of their military contingents in Emergency Force efforts. In the 1956 Suez War, in the Lebanon and Congo crises, small power forces were committed under the auspices of the organization to preserve peace and help stabilize volatile situations. This type of action provides an outlet for small states and serves the entire United Nations well. Although this type of contribution has been well-received, future efforts of this type will need to deal with a number of problems relating to the organic relationship of the small state and the United Nations force, among others.⁷⁰

In a related area, small nations could aid United Nations sponsored efforts at disarmament by moral influence and by offering help as mediators. This could lead to a major role for individuals from small states as inspectors, liaisons, or even prime movers in establishing and carrying out discussions involving the major states. This type of activity has already been partially realized as small, neutral states have provided facilities for U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions on limitation of nuclear arms.

These characteristics of small state activity demonstrate to what degree small powers attempt to use international

⁷⁰For a review of these problems see: Hidejiro Kotani, "Peace-keeping: Problems for Smaller Countries," International Journal, XIX (Summer, 1964), pp. 308-325.

organizations to benefit themselves and the global community as a whole. Prognoses for the future vary. Some observers, among them Francis O. Wilcox, believe that if smaller members support the organization vigorously and enthusiastically, "they will have a magnificent opportunity to give vitality and direction to the United Nations."⁷¹ This view seems over-optimistic in view of the monopoly which the large powers have been able to maintain over substantive issues. At the very most, international organizations provide no panacea for the small power either economically or militarily. The consequences of smallness remain, even though membership in an association such as the United Nations can help alleviate some of the problems. It is probably in the area of technological support that many underdeveloped small states can profit from participation in international organizations. The time has not yet arrived when an international group can provide for any state's security, least of all the safety of a small nation.

B. International Economic Policy

For numerous small states, foreign policy considerations revolve more around economic than diplomatic or security interests. Even though continued survival politically is deemed of primary importance, most lesser entities are not faced with imminent threats to their continued existence. Thus other

⁷¹Francis O. Wilcox, "The Nonaligned States and the United Nations," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., Neutralism . . . , p. 136.

problems weigh more heavily on them than such issues as military preparedness and protection of sovereignty. Therefore, in the last third of the twentieth century, economic prosperity and development is uppermost in the minds of citizens and statesmen in most small nations.

- 2:1 Small nations suffer economic problems which make them more vulnerable to international pressure than large states;
- 2:2 while not insurmountable, problems such as size of domestic market, difficulty of marketing goods overseas, and lack of natural resources force the small nation to always function near the limits of economic viability;
- 2:3 dependency on overseas trade for natural resources and as an outlet for manufactured goods places the small state in a precarious position when global economic trends change;
- 2:4 the result of these factors is to cause small states to seek special privileges in trading communities or common market arrangements which tend to reduce trade barriers.

The total implications of these statements may be seen when a close look at the intricacies of small-state economic life is undertaken. To facilitate the task, four topics are subsequently treated which demonstrate the handicaps imposed by small size and the various methods by which lesser powers have attempted to overcome their limitations. The topics are: accessibility to natural resources, trade policies, views on international economic integration, and policies of giving and receiving aid. Knowledge of smaller nations' policies in

these areas helps the student understand why so much foreign policy activity is devoted to economic matters.

Access to Natural Resources

No nation can hope to have all the natural resources which might be desired in developing a diverse economy. This is true even for the large, developed country. The small state, particularly if it has a modern, diversified economy, feels even more acutely the need of finding sources for those raw materials which are crucial to maintaining its productivity. This search for resources inevitably results in the extension of foreign trade, a factor discussed below.

While accessibility to needed resources is important, the inherent or actual resources of a small state are even more important. Unfortunately, most small countries lack in their own territories the diversity and volume of resources necessary to support a balanced economy. Still, the possession of even one abundant resource can ensure the interest of foreign individuals and governments in the product of the respective small state. Naturally, if the commodity is of strategic value or is in short supply the interest is heightened. Contrast the current comparative positions of the Persian Gulf States and New Zealand: the Middle Eastern small states find no problem in securing buyers for their petroleum, while the government in Wellington faces serious economic woes when Britain's entry into the European Economic Community slices its overseas dairy produce outlet.

Fortunately, most states have some natural resource which provides potential access to overseas trading partners. Possession of such a resource frequently results in foreign policy alterations which may or may not be beneficial for the smaller power. For example, Libya was found to possess vast quantities of oil. This discovery, according to Charles Cecil, "changed the nature of the 'givens' of Libyan foreign policy."⁷² Even the possession of rich soil and rainfall, as in the case of the Southeast Asian "rice bowl," may have foreign policy implications if combined with other geographic and demographic factors.

In times of political stress, the ability to withhold a much needed resource from a foreign power can result in heightened prestige and influence for the small power. However, the mere possession of a needed resource by a small nation could constitute a sufficient temptation for a larger power to take control. Thus, the diplomacy of the lesser power must be very aware of the interdependence of geographic, natural resource, and political factors.

It is not difficult to see that exportable natural resources are important. However, some small states seem almost totally lacking in this area. Luxembourg and Switzerland are examples, yet their economic stability has been remarkable. Obviously the reasons for this phenomenon must be found in

⁷²Charles O. Cecil, "The Determinants of Libyan Foreign Policy," The Middle East Journal, XIX (Winter, 1965), p. 23.

explanations other than abundance of natural resources.

Simon Kuznets believes that "every small nation has some advantage in natural resources. . . . But some show a capacity to build on it."⁷³ For explanations as to why one small nation deals successfully with its problems and another does not, we must look further into the economic and social systems.

Trade Patterns

Because of their size, small states necessarily are dependent on trade for supplying the products which cannot be manufactured domestically. Small home markets make it impossible to produce certain types of goods in sufficient quantity to compete with prices of overseas and international imports. For example, only Sweden, among the states fitting the definition of smallness in this study, has both aircraft and automobile industries. Most of the lesser nations have neither. There are other examples which could be given, but the basic limitations which small size impose are well known.⁷⁴ Having to rely on outside producers for a high proportion of their consumers goods, presents the small state with the necessity to trade, resulting in some problems which larger nations do not have.

⁷³Kuznets, "Economic Growth . . . ," p. 28.

⁷⁴A. D. Knox gives an excellent analysis of the trade problems of small nations in "Some Economic Problems of Small Countries," in Burton Benedict, ed., Problems of Smaller Territories (London: Ahtlone Press, 1967), pp. 35-44.

For example, because they must trade, small nations cannot greatly influence the prices of its imports and exports. Thus they seek out and cultivate trading partners who will be generous in handling their export goods. Furthermore, the limited domestic market and restricted resources force specialization in the number of articles manufactured by the lesser state; consequently most small states produce a narrow range of commodities for sale or trade. Since the quantity of goods produced is usually small, the number of nations buying from the small state is also small. And, since imports tend to come from those countries who buy exports, the number of trading partners for the small state is fewer than for a large state. This circumstance is unfortunate for several reasons.

In the first place, the small country needs to reduce its economic dependence by any means. Hirschman pointed out some years ago that dependence can be lessened by distributing trade among many countries.⁷⁵ This lesson has not been put into practice by small states. He further noted that the lesser nation should not direct too large a share of its trade to any single great trading country, lest integration into the larger economic system rob the small power of its independence. This lesson also has not been completely translated into small state trade policy. Thus we frequently see the small nation faced with severe strains because of what cutting off trade

⁷⁵Hirschman, National Power . . . , p. 31.

with its major partner would mean for the economic life of the country. A case in point is the New Zealand scramble for new markets to replace the United Kingdom which is entering the European Economic Community.

This combination of factors places the small state in a vulnerable position vis-a-vis its trading partners. In some cases, small states may be excluded from some of their foreign markets. More commonly they have to accept terms of trade which favor larger countries. The result of size, therefore, is one of placing the small state at a disadvantage in several key areas. The significance of these handicaps is more severely felt by the smaller states. Simon Kuznets found that the ratio of foreign trade to national income usually rises as the average size of population declines.⁷⁶ Thus the stake of trade in the economy increases the possibility of financial pressure increases. Theoretically, then, the smaller the nation and the more specialized its exports, the more vulnerable that state is to international economic pressure.

This analysis of trade weaknesses could be extended further, but would not greatly expand on the ideas already presented. The fact remains that many small states live with the very conditions described above and do quite well. Reasons for the success of Switzerland, the Scandinavian

⁷⁶Kuznets, "Economic . . . ," p. 20.

countries, and other small states are found primarily in the nature of the society. One might credit economic success to a fortunate possession of some natural resource. It is the opinion of most authors, however, that the abilities and motivation to develop what natural assets exist is more important than the simple possession of such. This factor relates to the national character, particularly the educational and the technological skills which a small country has. These are influenced in turn by the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the society, and the ability of the government to maximize the efforts of the populace. Such contingencies are discussed in fuller perspective a little later in this chapter, but are of great importance to trade.

In summary, small states operate their trade with some distinct disadvantages which invariably affect the foreign policy of the country. In fact, for most small nations, the foreign and domestic spheres cannot be separated because of the vital part played in both by trade.

Economic Integration

Problems of small economies have been enumerated and discussed above, and thus need not be recounted. In seeking solutions for such economic problems, there have been a variety of policies suggested which analysts thought would assist lesser states. Interest in economic integration, possible institution of free trade areas, and collective bargaining by groups of small nations vis-a-vis larger states

are some of the theoretical alternatives which have seemed to offer relief to the beleaguered economies of lesser states. However, there is little hard evidence which tends to vindicate the early optimism of the few attempts by small states at economic integration, and collective bargaining and free trade areas seem to offer less hope.

In spite of the basically non-productive efforts to date, there continues to be some interest in economic integration schemes along the lines of those pursued in East Africa and Latin America.⁷⁷ One very basic problem which has plagued efforts at economic integration has been the tendency for it to spill over into the area of political integration. It was this factor which partially caused the crisis in the East African Common Services Organization in 1963.⁷⁸ Such spill-over has been particularly prevalent in less developed countries, precisely the types of polities which are least prepared emotionally for relinquishing some of their sovereignty to a federated union.

Because of political spillover, and other lesser problems, the successes of economic integration have been few among small nations. Supra-national economic associations have

⁷⁷For articles describing these experiences see J. S. Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration," International Organization, XIX (Autumn, 1965), pp. 870-884; and Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," Journal of Common Market Studies, V (June, 1967), pp. 315-343.

⁷⁸Nye, "Patterns . . . ," pp. 874-876.

been either avoided, or have been tried and found less satisfactory than had been hoped.⁷⁹ With a very few exceptions, one of which could be the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Association, small states have not found integration a satisfactory economic solution. Although they will probably continue to attempt integration schemes, the value of which cannot be now judged, past experience would not bring cause for future hope.

Foreign Aid

In no other area of this study is there a clearer differentiation between developed and underdeveloped small nations than in their practices concerning aid. Quite clearly, no small country will have the surplus goods, services, or hard cash to grant aid on the scale of the large developed and politically competitive nation. However, most small countries participate in aid programs in some way: developing nations as recipients, and developed nations as donors.

The rationale for foreign aid in general may be reduced to four main objectives: (1) defense, (2) economic, (3) humanitarian, and (4) political.⁸⁰ Which of these may be the motive of the small country depends on whether the

⁷⁹See R. J. Harrison, "European Integration and the International System," Political Science (New Zealand), XVIII (September, 1966), p. 3.

⁸⁰Lloyd D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Company, 1968), p. 13ff.

lesser power is on the giving or receiving end of a transaction.

Small country donors generally give because of humanitarian and/or political reasons. In this there is a very real difference seen in the strategies of large and small states. Large states seem to use foreign aid more as a lever for securing defense and economic advantages, while smaller donor nations give with fewer strings attached. This conclusion is reached by looking at the comparative methods of dispensing aid. The large country gives most of its aid through bilateral agreements. Whereas the smaller countries provide most of their aid in "the form of contributions to international agencies."⁸¹ This reveals the less politicized motivation of small nation aid as well as the desire to cut the cost of administering aid. Nevertheless, the more humanitarian and cooperative spirit of small country aid is obvious. One only need read Burdick's Ugly American and Lasky's Ugly Russian to see the large country motivation in some of its crasser detail.⁸²

Developing nations receive aid basically for economic, and in some cases, defense reasons. There is very little discrimination used in selection of donor countries, as may

⁸¹Edward S. Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 3.

⁸²Eugene Burdick and William Lederer, The Ugly American (New York: Norton, 1958); and Victor Lasky, The Ugly Russian (New York: Trident Press, 1965).

be observed in the frequently used "highest bidder" formula. Also, small backward economies constitute neither a political threat nor much of a political prize, and must therefore take what they can secure from whatever sources. Generally, the most beneficial aid seems to derive from international and regional organizations.

In conclusion, the small state donor appears to be more altruistic than his bigger counterpart. This may not always be true, as is pointed out in an article on Nordic aid by Per Olav Reinton, but it serves as a rule of thumb.⁸³ Small nation recipients think less of political consequences and implications than their larger counterparts. In this area generalization may be hazardous, and the constant reminder of individual differentiation among states must be considered.

To sum up, economic disadvantages which small states labor under are more pronounced among developing states than developed ones. Even among highly developed lesser states there exists a different set of problems than those faced by the large state. However, such a factor as level of development seems more important than size, as there are numerous examples available of small states which have overcome their diminutiveness and successfully compete with larger neighbors in economic affairs. Smallness does play an important role

⁸³Per Olav Reinton, "Nordic Aid and the Politics of Inequality," Cooperation and Conflict, V (1970), pp. 112-124.

in economics. However, the full impact of small size is felt only when other variables are equally unhospitable.

C. Psychological and Emotional Characteristics

Because of the more concrete and tangible differences between large and small states, the following propositions are offered concerning the distinctness with which the lesser power views the world.

- 3:1 Small nation publics view the world from a different perspective than large nations;
- 3:2 this difference is more pronounced in the newer, less-developed states than in older, established states;
- 3:3 differences seem to derive from the level of perceived ability to alter the respective state's political position and economic condition;
- 3:4 small nations appear to either accept their lot knowingly or through the imitation of large states try to act a part they cannot fulfill.

States have increasingly been referred to and analyzed in recent years in much the same way as individuals. Once looked upon as institutions of stone and steel, the modern nation-state is recognized as possessing the attributes of an organism. Although the concept of an organic state is not new, the careful attention to such items as "national character" and "psychological makeup" is novel. A few years ago Philip C. Jessup noted, " . . . states are not factually equal, for their powers differ; states have 'feelings' and

the psychological factor cannot be ignored any more than the power factor."⁸⁴

Despite Jessup's admonition, most analysts have ignored the "feelings" of states. This has particularly been the case with small nations. With few exceptions, among these is Biafra, the lesser territories, states, or racial units have had their psychological makeup largely ignored.

David Vital has done more by way of analyzing small country mental perspectives than any other writer to date. He points out some factors which demonstrate the obvious handicaps which the small state must endure. These factors have been listed and discussed above, but a brief recounting serves to illustrate Vital's main points.⁸⁵ Among the characteristics mentioned are the small number of people from which to draw public servants, the reliance for intelligence information on the generosity of larger states, the problem of the "brain drain" which prevails in many lesser nations, and the military impotence which is all too common. These factors, while not all present in all small states, certainly are not unfamiliar to the decision maker in the lesser power.

Nor do these difficult circumstances escape the man-on-the-street. The reactions to these problems are widely divergent, depending on the particular state involved.

⁸⁴Jessup, "The Equality . . . ," p. 528.

⁸⁵See: Vital, The Inequality . . ., Chapter 2, "Mental and Administrative Perspectives," pp. 10-38.

Participation in the international system by the small power depends on its individual ability, or lack of ability, to cope with the problems with which it is concerned.⁸⁶ Since a country's present ability to cope successfully depends in large part on its past ability, there is a natural sort of division between the older established states and the newer ones.⁸⁷ The older small states such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria tend to behave in a different way from such newer states as Ghana, Senegal, and Western Samoa. A strong tendency exists among new small states to emphasize symbols, pageantry and nationalism. Older states are less emotional and more concerned about mundane matters related to quality of life.

Because of the psychological differences between large and small countries, behavioral differences naturally exist. Vital notes several stances which particularly characterize the underdeveloped state.⁸⁸ Invariably this is compensatory behavior, much of which appears pathetic to the large-state onlooker. Moral superiority is one oft-assumed attitude of the small state. Another popular stance involves falling

⁸⁶ Rudolph J. Rummel makes this point in "Some Dimensions in the Foreign Behavior of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, III (1966), p. 212.

⁸⁷ Klaus Knorr notes this distinction in On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 129-131.

⁸⁸ Vital, The Inequality . . ., pp. 33-35.

back on stubbornness and dignity. Or, the inferior state may hold to a philosophical idea with which it hopes to rationalize itself out of its predicament. In making these points, Vital notes that both large and small power statesmen approach relations with each other holding the opinion that a small power is of a particular "species to which certain attitudes and considerations are appropriate, while others are not. . . ." ⁸⁹

Thus, not only resources, size, population, and economies differ, but also the mental and psychological outlooks of small states vary from those of large states. While this study cannot delve deeply into this issue, the next chapter does reveal some of the particular attitudes of New Zealanders which would belie their small state origin even if otherwise unknown.

D. Linkages and the Small State

Because of the characteristics discussed above, the following propositions concerning links between small states and their international milieu are offered.

- 4:1 Small nations are more dependent on linkages to the outside world than larger states because they cannot be as nearly self sufficient in factors related to politics and economics;
- 4:2 linkages tend to be more numerous among developed lesser powers and their environments than among underdeveloped lesser powers and their respective environments;

⁸⁹Vital, The Inequality . . . , p. 32.

- 4:3 small nation links tend to be stronger and more numerous to large states than to others of approximately their same size;
- 4:4 for small states there tend to be more inputs from the environment than outputs to the environment, i.e., the small state is more affected by what goes on around it than its environment is affected by the actions of the lesser power;
- 4:5 a small state's linkages provide an indicator of its ability to function as a sovereign entity.

Some explanation of these propositions is necessary here, even though further clarification may be seen in the subsequent chapter. For the first statement there need not be lengthy justification. Limitations of size result in certain handicaps in politico-military and economic style. These factors were discussed in some depth above, and deserve only passing comment here.

"Dependency" has been identified as perhaps the most apt expression which describes the plight of the small. It is of significance to know who the small state depends upon and in what ways the dependency is manifested. Answers to these types of questions can come from a knowledge of the lesser states links to the outside world. Such factors as to whom the lesser country is allied militarily (or if it is non-aligned), who is its source of raw materials, which country buys the major portion of products exported by the smaller state, and who would side with them in matters of regional and/or international debate, may all be answered by examining the links maintained across borders.

Concerning the second proposition (4:2), it stands to reason that highly developed small countries, such as those of Scandinavia, would have a broader range of consumer needs to be filled than a developing Latin American or Central African country. With these wider needs comes the necessity of more links to facilitate importation of goods, services, and expertise. International corporations now are being recognized as an important linkage and an avenue of penetration by one state into the internal affairs of others.⁹⁰

While linkages of this type are more numerous in developed states, links to international organizations and/or specialized agencies are more significant to the underdeveloped state. In fact, the future development of such states is largely dependent on the linkages to international and regional groupings which disseminate aid of all types. Thus the loci of the linkages tends to differ depending on the level of development of small states. Links with private companies and with other nation-states are more prevalent among developed states, whereas the less developed states tend to be more closely linked to international organizations.

Concerning the third statement (4:3), there is evidence that lesser states do not show affinity for the goods or services of each other. The prevailing feeling seems to be

⁹⁰ For an example of this type of linkage see: Jonathan F. Galloway, "Worldwide Corporations and International Integration: The Case of INTELSAT," International Organization, XXIV (Summer, 1970), pp. 503-519.

that another small country would not possess anything which could significantly aid one's own position, whether by shared knowledge, trade, or otherwise. It is thought to be wiser to consult a large nation where the techniques used have produced successful results. Another factor frequently considered is the attending prestige and influence accruing to the small state which deals successfully with a large state. Only on rare occasion have small nations banded together in the hope of bringing mutual benefit.⁹¹ Naturally, this attitude seems absurd to observers. Far preferable to a big brother helping a little brother would be a small country whose knowledge and expertise in dealing with similar problems could assist a small sister-state. Thus far, the logic of this has been for the most part lost on the small state.

In regard to proposition 4:4, there is overwhelming consensus on the fact that national politics become blurred and are oftentimes international, and vice versa. This so-called "seamless web" is recognized by virtually every contemporary writer; examples are offered above in Chapter I.⁹² However, in this picture where the boundary lines

⁹¹One such occasion, which produced nothing of lasting significance, was a conference held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961. It was more for propaganda purposes than anything else. A brief note in the New York Times, September 2, 1961, p. 2, quotes Tito on aims of the conference.

⁹²The only dissenter to this view is Stanley Hoffman of Harvard University. In a representative excerpt he says, "The starting point of any valid theory of international relations is the recognition of the radical difference between

between domestic and international are vague, the influence tends to flow more heavily from the outside environment into the small state than vice versa. This point is made in each previous section of this chapter. The small state reacts to the external stimuli rather than exerting pressures which force some larger entity to act. According to Deutsch this situation is not prevalent in stable polities to the degree it is in unstable ones.⁹³ Still, he believes the linkage between internal and external affairs creates this situation, and that nothing short of severing the links can alter it.

As to the last statement, it is the feeling of the writer that Rosenau has hit upon a key to analyzing small state foreign policy by developing the linkage concept. He did not personally, nor did the contributors to his book Linkage Politics, attempt to apply the linkage concept to small states. However, the relevancy of it seems even more significant to the small than to the large state. Also, the implementation of the concept is more feasible in a

the domestic and the international milieu. There are circumstances where this difference tends to vanish. . . . Also, at certain points in history, the two milieus are interlocked: at the present time, international politics borrows various institutions from domestic politics; domestic politics is often subordinated to and, in some cases, even determined by international competition. . . . The model from which a theory of international relations must start is that of a decentralized milieu divided into separate units." Quoted from: The State of War, pp. 13-14. My underlinings.

⁹³Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches . . ., pp. 8, 10.

smaller society than in a large. Thus for both relevancy and applicability the lesser power is an ideal arena in which to test Rosenau's theory.

CHAPTER III

LINKAGES AND NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. Historical Background

New Zealand constitutes an ideal setting in which to test research methods of all types. The reasons have been noted previously in the last part of Chapter I, but may be summed up in the two factors of "smallness" and "accessibility." Not only is the population small, but the government is open and there are few restraints on ordinary scholarly research. Also, there is not the isolation of public servants that is sometimes encountered by researchers in larger countries. Thus one may simply write or telephone most officials and easily be scheduled for interviews and/or may have records made available. It is important to note that government records are not held sacrosanct as they are by British officials.

In earlier times most study of New Zealand focused on the several phases of social experimentation which swept the country first around the turn of the century and then again in the interwar period. Americans, particularly, have been interested in the government sponsored medical plans, various social security and unemployment insurance schemes, and the generally harmonious biracial situation. In spite of such

interest, not much effort has been expended to examine the motivating factors behind New Zealand's foreign policy. In order to understand the paucity of published material on external affairs one need only look briefly at the background to contemporary foreign policy making and attitudes.

Having been settled by Britons only since 1840, New Zealand is a comparatively young state. It entrusted virtually all of its external relations to England until well into this century. England's lead was followed in both the world wars, and there appears to have been little serious questioning of such direction. An early Commonwealth observer and scholar, Viscount James Bryce, noted just after World War I, "There are no questions of foreign policy, because that is left to the Motherland. . . ." ¹

Because of New Zealand's enthusiastic acceptance of London's leadership in international affairs, she was the first Dominion to join the war effort in 1914, and the first Dominion to capture enemy territory. Out of a population of just over one million at that time, one hundred thousand men--most of whom were volunteers--served overseas, and there were nearly sixty thousand men either killed or wounded. ²

A similar intensity in effort was shown in World War II. In

¹James Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. II (New York: MacMillan, 1921), p. 313. My underlinings.

²Kenneth Melvin quotes these figures in: New Zealand: The Small Utopia (Auckland, New Zealand: Collins Publishing Company, 1962), p. 31.

that effort, one-sixth of the entire population was under arms, a higher proportion than any other country except Soviet Russia.³

Participation in overseas war efforts has not been restricted to the two world wars. New Zealand troops have been in Korea and in South Africa (during the Boer War), to name only the most important efforts. This worldwide involvement has not derived from a war-mongering culture or people. Neither has it resulted from a careful assessing of the country's national interests in strictest security terms. Rather it has derived from a composite of factors which relate to the numerous links and ties which bind New Zealand to England but which are now pulling in other directions. These newer linkages are illustrated by her recent participation in Viet Nam.

However, the foreign policies have not been restricted to military and security matters. More important for the livelihood, prosperity and growth of the small country have been the business and trade ties. Historically, these also have been to Britain, especially since refrigeration came to shipping in 1882. Thereafter, New Zealanders relied on England for overseas trade; England replaced Australia which had been the largest early trade partner. During the years 1880-1940, New Zealand sold no less than 74 percent of its exports in

³Melvin, New Zealand . . . , p. 32.

any year to Great Britain, and bought no less than 47 percent of its imports from her.⁴ From these figures it is no wonder that F. L. W. Wood described his own country as "a very junior partner--the smallest, most distant, least self-sufficient member of the British household."⁵

Not only was the Wellington government reliant on England in security and commercial dealings but also in diplomatic representation. New Zealand allowed Britain to take care of her diplomatic needs, which were few. This practice continues today in several countries where New Zealand is not represented.

The pattern of allowing England to speak for Wellington underwent a change in the mid-1930's. Most students of foreign policy agree with R. M. Burdon that the first major break with London occurred over the Ethiopian crisis of 1935. Endorsed by the British government, the Hoare-Laval proposals met with immediate protest in New Zealand. For months the New Zealand position was one favoring maintenance of sanctions against Italy and respect for the self-determination principal of the League of Nations. Burdon quotes an editorial which shows how clear-cut the difference of opinion was between Britain and New Zealand.

⁴New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1970 (Wellington, New Zealand: Department of Statistics, 1970), p. 610. At times the figures reached higher, e.g., 88 percent exports (1940) and 67 percent imports (1890).

⁵F. L. W. Wood, This New Zealand (London: Hammond, Hammond, & Company, 1958), p. 208.

New Zealand has had the courage to criticise severely the British attitude to the League and to the Spanish War. New Zealand, once Britain's white-headed boy, has now, under a Labour Government, taken Australia's place as the most intractable member of the family.⁶

World War II represents a watershed which further and more drastically altered the relationship of London and Wellington. As early as June, 1940, the British government indicated to New Zealand that if Japan entered the war, the United Kingdom would have to rely on the United States to protect her interests in the Pacific.⁷ This was followed by the difficult war years when a pulling back of Britain's sphere of influence was made mandatory by the results of the conflict. Thus, by 1945 it was clear that New Zealand was being forced to stand on her own strength and with such other assistance as she might be able to gain. In accordance with the new demands Britain had thrust upon New Zealand by virtue of the former's default, Wellington's representatives acted alone in helping to set up the United Nations. Having had a Department of External Affairs only since 1943, there was, somewhat surprisingly, no hesitation in assuming the role of a full-fledged member of the international system. However,

⁶R. M. Burdon, The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand Between the Wars (Wellington, New Zealand: A. H. and A. W. Reed, 1965), pp. 267-268.

⁷Noted in a speech by Angus Ross, "New Zealand in the Pacific World," Fifth Lecture in the Sir Sidney Holland Memorial Lectures, 1965, sponsored by the New Zealand National Party.

New Zealand's independence still was ambivalent. Not until 1947 was the Statute of Westminster, which granted the dominions full equality with the mother country, adopted by the New Zealand Parliament. This was sixteen years after the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Statute and five years after Australia, the next-to-last holdout, had done so. By accepting the terms of this statute, New Zealand gave "legal fulfillment to the fact of sovereignty" for which she had never really lobbied.⁸

Since that time there has been a steady movement away from the womb of Britain. This may be seen in the declining import-export links, and also in the attitudes of the people. Between 1940 and 1969 the percentage of New Zealand's exports to England declined from 88 percent to 39 percent and imports from England fell from 47 percent to 31 percent.⁹ During these same years exports to Australia rose from 3 percent to 8 percent, to the United States from 4 percent to 17 percent, and to "other states" from 5 percent to 36 percent. This is a picture of diversification attesting to the awareness of independence which has increasingly characterized commercial dealings.

This awareness has been evident in security affairs in at least as marked a pattern. In 1951 Wellington entered into

⁸ Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (Ringwood, Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books Australia, Ltd., 1969), p. 307.

⁹ New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1970, p. 610.

a tripartite defense pact with Canberra and Washington (ANZUS) signalling her recognition that "the countries bordering her own ocean will make or mar her future."¹⁰ In 1954 New Zealand joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, a further sign of her new regional orientation. On the economic and cultural levels, she participates in the Colombo Plan, and she is actively looking for markets around the Pacific basin from Peru in the east to South Korea and Japan in the west.

None of these activities has impaired seriously the historic ties of the peoples of New Zealand and England. Although some in both countries decry the British entry into the European Economic Community as harmful to relations, the cultural and traditional links have continued to be strong. New Zealanders will continue to look first to Europe and Great Britain, but they are taking an increasingly open-eyed view of their immediate environment. Such nations as Japan, China, Indonesia, India, the United States, and, perhaps most importantly, Australia, are assuming greater importance for contemporary New Zealand. Economic and political links to Britain probably will loosen further, but simultaneously, close cultural and personal connections are likely to be maintained.

¹⁰W. H. Oliver, The Story of New Zealand (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 228.

At the same time, ties with Australia are becoming stronger. Being the closest real neighbor of New Zealand, and sharing a similar culture and heritage, it seems strange that modern, truly intimate trans-Tasman ties have been so long in developing. Now, however, the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement is helping to foster closer economic and official links. There even has been some suggestion that federation of the two states could be accomplished with mutual benefits. This idea has not gained much currency, especially in New Zealand where their inferior status in such an arrangement is clearly predictable.

At present one can see the great distance which New Zealand has traversed in foreign policy in just the past three decades. From the position of a willing supernumerary she has emerged as a full-fledged international participant, and has exercised without much question an increasing amount of influence in this brief time. Long-held ties with Britain gradually have been loosened and new relationships have formed to take their place. The long term success of such a policy is still in doubt. With no real choice in the matter, New Zealand is attempting to make the most of the situation.

Even with the foregoing brief review of recent international developments, one can see that New Zealand fits well the category of a small, developed nation trying to exercise its sovereignty in a world of superpowers. With less than three million people demanding a high level of consumer goods

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but with an economy largely dependent on agriculture, she must export. But the area of the world which she has developed as a market has a surplus of agricultural produce. Thus she faces very real problems which have caused some to examine seriously her future prospects.¹¹

And yet, New Zealand finds herself in no worse condition than many other small states. As a typical developed lesser country, she offers a suitable example for a summary verbal juxtaposition of her characteristics against the pre-theory suggested in the preceding chapter. The chronological order of the hypothetical statements presented above is followed, beginning with security considerations.

In examining New Zealand's security policy it is apparent that it fits some of the propositions but not others. The notion that New Zealand's security is dependent on Britain's security, and therefore that New Zealand must be ready to go where needed to assist the United Kingdom, has declined sharply since World War II. Thus, the concept of defense has been greatly narrowed, her allies have been substantially altered, and the net result is a regional outlook

¹¹An excellent study of New Zealand's current situation and a look into the crystal ball is offered by W. Rosenberg, an economics lecturer at Canterbury University, Christchurch. Entitled A Guidebook to New Zealand's Future (Christchurch, New Zealand: Caxton Press, 1968), it presents very provocative data which would bring apprehension to every Kiwi.

which replaces the old global perspective inherent in British dependency.¹²

The propositions cited in Chapter II, page 56, must be examined critically in New Zealand's case. The assertions allege that small states are preoccupied with security affairs, and that matters important to defense assume a larger significance than in large states. New Zealand is concerned about such affairs, but certainly not to the degree other small states are. Her geographic location is the reason for a generally less intense interest in security considerations than, say, Switzerland, Finland, or Cambodia. New Zealand illustrates well the essential verity of proposition 1:7 on page 58, Chapter II, i.e., that geographic factors have great importance for the security of small states.

New Zealand's experience in alliances lends credence to propositions 1:4-1:6, which posit small nation reliance on larger states for protection. Wellington consistently has been aided in its defense arrangements, first by England and more recently by the United States and Australia. Furthermore, New Zealand has depended upon the diplomatic and intelligence machinery of other states, as is suggested in

¹²This narrow view of defense may be seen in the defense expenditures of the 1960's. From 1960-1969 the spending for defense varied from 1.8 percent to 2.3 percent of the Gross National Product annually. This represented in no year more than 7.1 percent of total government expenditure. New Zealand Yearbook, 1970, p. 274. While these percentages are not rock bottom, they are low when compared with small mid-east countries who are in geographically strategic areas and are poor.

proposition 1:9. On the other hand, her smallness has been used to good advantage by focusing upon moral issues and rallying other small states to seek common cause against the larger states. Militarily, however, New Zealand is not now and never will be able to compete with large states, nor is she desirous of doing so.

Policy direction is narrow, as is hypothesized in 1:13-1:16, and principally looks to the Pacific basin. More particularly, Wellington seeks to protect herself from the possibility of armed aggression from Southeast Asia and ultimately China. She is definitely in a position to react to external stimuli rather than to cause other states to react to her policies. Having committed herself to a policy of alignment, she plans to rely heavily on others in case of imminent threats to her security.

New Zealand also relies on international organizations to prevent war and to provide a variety of humanitarian services. She has been a willing participant in the League of Nations and the United Nations as well as in the regional groups which function in the Pacific. Her influence in these organizations has not been great, and the basic, though not the sole, reason for participation is enlightened self-interest.¹³

¹³For example of this tactic see: J. K. Cunningham, "New Zealand as a Small Power in the United Nations," Political Science, IX (September, 1957), pp. 33-46.

This small South Pacific nation provides verification for several of the economic propositions forwarded. As previously noted, New Zealand depends heavily on its exports and imports for economic prosperity. The small domestic market makes it impossible to manufacture certain types of durable goods, e.g., heavy machinery and commercial aircraft. Such major items must be brought from Western Europe, America, or Australia. In practice, many types of consumer durables also are imported.

In order not to fall into a severe deficit trade balance, the agricultural produce of New Zealand has been sold to England and other areas. The vulnerability of Wellington to overseas pressure may be seen nowhere more clearly than in its attempts first to avert and then to adjust to the entry of Britain into the Common Market. As her number one agricultural market, England could have demanded some harsh concessions from New Zealand if she had so desired.

There is a lack of certain natural resources which places New Zealand at a further disadvantage. Petroleum, for example, thus far has not been discovered in sufficiently large quantities to sustain the domestic needs. Therefore, the oil must be imported from the Middle East in foreign-owned tankers to supply the local demands.

Because of these economic handicaps New Zealand has sought relief by joining trade communities. She is a member of the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT),

originally a United Nations sponsored group. This consortium of some sixty nations has come under fire from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but Wellington has felt that her interests were being served by adherence to the GATT.¹⁴ In addition to participating in the GATT, Wellington also has worked to create several bilateral trade agreements. These have been contracted with the United Kingdom and with Australia, and they have contributed much to the total trade situation existing between New Zealand and these countries.¹⁵

New Zealand has other bilateral arrangements, but they have been neither as structured nor as important to her trade policy. For example, there is a "voluntary agreement" with the United States concerning beef and veal exports from New Zealand. This is a one-sided arrangement which involves the United States dictating the amount of beef it will accept and New Zealand agreeing voluntarily to ship no more rather than having a quota system imposed on her by Washington. There is also a trade agreement with Japan which has been revised periodically since first being contracted in 1958. New Zealand has tried in each of these cases, with varying degrees

¹⁴For a discussion of New Zealand's policies in GATT and UNCTAD, respectively, see: W. Rosenberg, A Guidebook to New Zealand's Future, pp. 120-124.

¹⁵The agreements spoken of here are the New Zealand-United Kingdom Trade Agreement and the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

of success, to keep as much control over her trade as possible. Her dealings with Australia have been more successful than those with the larger powers.

It is obvious that New Zealand is not an exception to the statements listed above in propositions 2:1-2:4 which concern trade policies. She is heavily dependent on both import and export trade. She lacks certain resources which force her to look beyond her borders for overseas help, taking her to GATT and other arrangements to fulfill her economic needs.

New Zealanders have used admirably the intangible factors of education, ingenuity, and culture to overcome many of the handicaps inherent in their situation. As was suggested earlier, human factors may either alleviate or complicate the physical qualities of the small country. In the case of New Zealand, the effect has been positive. Her national character, to use an imprecise term, has helped New Zealand to overcome strategic and economic problems, and to produce a developed society which looks inward more than outward. New Zealanders are concerned about their problems and do a lot of thinking, researching, and reading about themselves. Some overseas observers have mentioned this trait and have been pointed in their evaluations. One American in particular failed to endear himself to Kiwis by expressing the following opinion which is typical of other statements by David Ausabel.

New Zealanders also tend to have quite unrealistic notions about the extent to which people in other parts of the world are concerned with events in their country. Although they frequently admit to being tiny, insular and unimportant, they really don't believe that this is the case and confidently expect such protestations to be contradicted by overseas visitors. . . . Another manifestation of this exaggerated sense of national importance is the peculiar expectation that, for reasons apparently assumed to be self-evident, New Zealand is entitled to specially favoured treatment in her relations with other nations.¹⁶

Despite the impression they give of thinking and acting like the British, New Zealanders have a very distinctly different Anshauung, and add support to the first statement made in the pre-theory relating to psychological and emotional characteristics (3:1). They also seem to derive their attitudes from their perceived ability, or inability, to alter the world in which they operate, a trait supportive of proposition 3:3. As noted below in the treatment on linkages, New Zealanders readily admit to their smallness, but they try to act as if they were larger. There is, thus, a distinctiveness about their psychological and emotional characteristics which defies easy explanation or description.

¹⁶David P. Ausabel, The Fern and the Tiki (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 57. This type of statement has not been popular with New Zealanders, but more than one admitted to me that Ausabel's observations were accurate.

Propositions 4:1-4:5 concern the effect which linkages have on New Zealand, particularly on her foreign relations. It is to this topic that we now turn for in-depth study.

II. Research Procedures

Through funds provided in a Fulbright Research Grant, it was possible for the writer to reside in New Zealand from October 1, 1970, until July 1, 1971. During these months research was conducted on the types, intensity, and impact of overseas linkages on New Zealand society and government.

The research design was twofold. Early months were spent in perusing the library materials available at the Rankin-Brown Library of Victoria University in Wellington, the House of Representatives Library in the Parliament complex, and the smaller number of holdings in the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. In this preliminary study, careful attention was given to theories of small state foreign policy and to recent New Zealand politics and foreign affairs. Rosenau's Linkage Politics was carefully studied, and the questions which were later researched began to emerge.

Secondly, the personal interview technique was decided upon as the best method of securing responses to the questions. Because of the lack of precedent in constructing a questionnaire on linkages, it was deemed advisable to present a short, open-ended format which could possibly be refined in successive

projects. After two pre-test interviews, the original questionnaire was slightly altered to its final form as shown in Appendix C.¹⁷

The questions which prompted the form and substance of the questionnaire were general. It was first necessary to discover which types of groups maintained overseas linkages and which did not. Further, the nature of these links was important in understanding what if any effect they might have on an organization or department. Given New Zealand's historic ties to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, it was also necessary to test whether or not such links were still strong or if they were loosening. If the latter, it was essential to determine what other poles might be exerting an attraction. Finally, it was hoped that by gaining knowledge about travel trends and policies of New Zealand respondents, some further dimension could be gained concerning external influence on New Zealand, and vice versa.

Subjects for the interviews were selected with an eye to getting as complete a sampling of total societal links as possible without contacting every business, government agency, and, indeed, each citizen. As the interview task came to its final stages, the similarity of responses from within the

¹⁷ Dr. Alan Robinson of Victoria University was most helpful in the early stages of the project. He assisted in the choice of interview subjects, the refinement of the questionnaire, and gave a number of suggestions which made the launching of the project decidedly easier.

groups confirmed in the writer's mind the conviction that the sample had uncovered the major linkages even though the total number of interviews was but sixty-seven. The distribution of these is shown in the following chart.

TABLE 2
BREAKDOWN OF INTERVIEWS BY SUBJECT-RESPONDENT
N=67

Agency	N	%
Government departments and ministries	42	63
Political parties	3	4
Private groups, lobbies, interest groups, etc.	12	18
Quasi-governmental agencies, boards, etc.	7	10
Businesses	3	4
Totals	67	99*

*Total percentage does not reach 100 because of rounding.

There was no formula used in the selection of groups or individuals to be interviewed. Government pervades every area of New Zealand life, so the majority of the study focused there. Major political party officials were interviewed, including a representative of the Social Credit Party. The Communist party was contacted in Wellington but the leadership admitted to a very decentralized organization nationwide, with some groups maintaining links to Moscow and

others to Peking. It was decided that their performance collectively at the polls (less than 1 percent in the 1972 elections) did not warrant tracing the numerous branches of the party and for this reason no interview was accomplished.¹⁸

Private groups interviewed under the third category above included a wide sampling of organizations. Heading the group in importance would probably be the Federation of Labour, with the Manufacturers Federation, the National Council of Women, and the New Zealand University Students Association being other leading organizations. Also included in this category were groups representing religious life, sports, and promotion of alcoholic beverage sales.¹⁹ From group four, the major produce boards were examined as well as other similar organizations. Finally, three large companies were queried representing the business field.

In each individual case, care was taken to interview someone knowledgeable on the international ties of the organization. As far as government was concerned, someone from the senior level of career public servants seemed best qualified in most departments or ministries. Several were the top executive officers of their respective departments. Among non-governmental interviewees, most were top officials of

¹⁸Actually, several appointments were made for interviews with the Wellington branch of the party, but the party representative failed to keep any of these.

¹⁹The complete list of interviewees may be found in Appendix D.

their board or council. The prime concern in every instance was to get authoritative responses to the questions.

Administration of the questionnaire was by personal interview in all but one case.²⁰ The duration of each interview was approximately forty-five minutes, but these were frequently longer. Respondents were encouraged to give full explanation of their answers, and the data was recorded as given. The writer was the sole interviewer for the project.

At this juncture a reminder on the nature of the data is in order. The whole purpose of the project was to gather impressions which were based on personal experience as well as fact. As recorded, the interview data was the opinion, feeling, surmise, or intuition of the subject, and no attempts were made to prove or disprove the respondent by research in records, interviews of other officials who might have different views, or intensive questioning of the responses received. Care in selection of the subjects was the key factor in trying to insure the integrity of the data, and the responses were accepted at face value.

Coding and interpretation of the data was carried out in pursuance of suggestions for open-end questionnaire analysis given by Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursh in

²⁰Exception: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. Mr. H. E. Gilbert, Security Chief, sent some materials from which part of the information on the questionnaire could be derived.

their book Survey Research.²¹ Coding sheets were used on which all non-identical responses were recorded; then these were reduced in number so as to give a fair distribution of opinion, but also to place into a manageable number of categories the overlapping and duplicative responses. Analysis of the coded data represents the writer's attempts at drawing defensible and logical conclusions from the material gathered. In addition, some inferences which were substantively supportable were noted. Cross-category and intra-category analyses were utilized in an attempt to show relationships which helped to answer the queries posed to the interviewees. These techniques also helped draw out additional information indicative of the importance of linkages in New Zealand.

III. The Findings

Extent of Linkages

It was somewhat surprising to find that the sixty-six interviewees believed unanimously that their sectors had some links to the external environment. Although not revealing in regards to the nature or intensity of links, the overwhelming presence of ties to the environment enables one to see clearly to what levels penetration from the environment goes. It touches every government department and ministry, every political party, every private interest, and every business

²¹ (Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 153-170.

from which information was received.²² Considering the divergence of subjects this fact was noteworthy.

Understandably, not all sectors experienced the same degree of external contact. Some, in fact, noted only a few unimportant points of overseas linkage. However, this type was in the minority, as may be seen in Table 3.

TABLE 3
COMPARATIVE NUMBER OF LINKS
N=66

How many links does your sector maintain?	N	%
Numerous links	31	47
Considerable number	12	18
Some	15	23
A few	8	12
None	0	0
Total	66	100.00

Nearly one-half of all respondents stated that their sector maintained "numerous ties" to the overseas environment. The thirty-one who thus responded represented more than twice as many as the next largest group. When the first two categories were combined, representing those sectors who had "considerable" and "numerous" ties, the figure was 65 percent of the total

²²No information was available from the New Zealand Intelligence Service, but the existence of overseas contacts to this department are unquestioned.

number. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the interviewees said that their sectors were in close contact with the external world by virtue of the links which they maintained.

A further breakdown of the responses in Table 4 reveals the following pattern. Among the five categories, the lowest intensity of linkage was that maintained by the political party organizations. This was to be expected since the focus of such a group is clearly domestic and only secondarily international. Of the three parties polled, the two major ones were more active than the Social Credit Party. Both the National Center Party and the Labor Party are affiliates of international associations which share ideological viewpoints. Contacts mainly involved interchange of literature in what Mr. Ralph Wilson, General Director of the National Center Party, characterized as an "exchange of paper."²³ Social Credit reported no hard core contacts, but some irregular correspondence and sharing of ideas with the Australian Social Credit League and the Alberta government.

Each of the remaining four categories reported a high frequency of overseas links. In terms of percentages, the businesses unanimously ranked in the highest category. These represented a variety of products and ownership schemes and are representative of other large companies. The Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) is government-owned, but disclaims any special favors. New Zealand Forest Products, Limited, is a

²³Interview #2-1, answer to question #1.

TABLE 4

LINKAGE FREQUENCY BY SUBJECT CATEGORY
N=66

Subjects By Category	Gov't. Depts.		Political Parties		Private Groups, Lobbies, Int. Groups		Quasi-Gov't. Boards, Agencies		Busi-nesses	
Frequency of Linkages	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Numerous	19	46	0	0	3	25	6	86	3	100
Considerable	9	22	0	0	2	17	1	14	0	0
Some	7	17	2	67	6	50	0	0	0	0
A few	6	14	1	33	1	8	0	0	0	0
None	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	41	100	3	100	12	100	7	100	3	100

shareholding company partially owned by locals, but the majority of shares are held by individuals or interests overseas. Europa is the only wholly New Zealand owned petroleum company of the five firms which have permission to operate in the country.

BNZ reported many ties abroad through its branches in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Pacific Islands. Also, it maintained arrangements with banks around the world, attended conferences on international banking, and sponsored liaisons for overseas companies which trade in New Zealand. New Zealand Forest Products, being controlled from outside, was very much influenced by linkages. Perhaps more important than the ownership was the overseas markets which took a high percentage of the annual produce. Also, pricing on the world market affected all three of the businesses polled. Europa, while locally owned, was dependent for its crude oil on its supplier, the Gulf Oil Company of the United States. Also, there is a joint refinery for all five petroleum firms operating in New Zealand, the others being either wholly or mostly owned by outside interests.²⁴ These three subjects are big businesses with a multiplicity of worldwide interests. While representative of larger commercial ventures they are not typical of many New Zealand enterprises which are smaller and certainly less global in their scope of operation.

²⁴The other four are Mobil, British Petroleum, Caltex, and Shell.

The quasi-governmental boards, agencies and bureaus showed the next most frequent and intense linkage contacts. Of the seven polled, six reported regular and numerous overseas relations, and the seventh reported a considerable amount of contact abroad. The only agency polled which fell below the others was the Vice-Chancellor's Committee of the University system, and Mr. Peter Hampton, the Secretary, still acknowledged a high degree of international interchange of ideas and staff.²⁵

Government provided a wider number of services and touched more diverse areas than any of the other single categories. Despite this divergence of interests there was still a high intensity of international contact. As previously noted, some 65 percent of the respondents reported that their sectors had at least a considerable number of linkages, and 47 percent had "numerous" contacts. Among the latter were some which are predictable, including the Treasury Department, Defense Department, Department of Agriculture, Customs Department, Industries and Commerce Department, Maori and Island Affairs Department, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there were several interviewees reporting "numerous" ties which were not anticipated, including the Electricity Department, Ministry of Works, State Insurance Office, and Railways Department. Of those who reported "considerable"

²⁵Interview #4-6.

frequency in overseas links, unanticipated agencies were also present, e.g., Forest Service, Department of Labor, Police Department (not Intelligence Security), and Lands and Surveys Department. It was clear that world standards greatly concerned most of these agencies, and kept them receptive to outside advances in technology and methods.

Even the subjects who reported "some" or "few" overseas contacts seemed in many cases to value such links. Several, including Mr. K. Gillies, the Auditor-General, valued the infrequent overseas trips for attendance at conferences and the like. Others reported less usefulness and seemed to feel that external ties were next to valueless. The Public Trust Office, for example, derived little from its overseas ties. This was exceptional among governmental respondents and for the entire study.

While less involved with the overseas environment than the previous three categories, "private groups" still maintained regular linkages. Considering the intention of this group of organizations, i.e., to influence the domestic polity and society, the degree to which they maintained at least some overseas ties was significant. Forty-two percent reported "considerable" or "numerous" international ties with the Chamber of Commerce, the National Council of Churches and the University Students Association in the latter category. The only group of this type which maintained only "a few" linkages was the Table Tennis Association, an impoverished group

that would become more interested in international contacts if financial resources allowed.²⁶

Looking at the total number of interviews one can see how numerous the ties of New Zealand organizations are to outside nations and international organizations. As to the details of the relationships between New Zealand and the outside world, a look at the nature of the linkages provided some insights.

Nature of Linkages

Of equal importance to knowing how extensive the linkages were which tied New Zealand to her environment was the knowledge of the type of links which existed. In trying to analyze the nature of New Zealand's links, several questions arose. First, whether the links were established and maintained on an official basis or by unofficial and personal contacts was deemed important. Second, the issue of extent of linkage influence, while difficult to determine precisely, was probed. The number of ties could be at the same time numerous and unimportant if no substantial influence crossed the international boundary line. Also, the direction of the influence flow presented a factor difficult to measure but which holds significance for small state studies. Third, the actual physical contacts made by the various sectors were charted. This helped to validate what turned out

²⁶Interview #3-7, answer to question 7c.

frequently to be none too definite impressions by interviewees.

In trying to learn what sorts of contacts were most common, the interviewees were asked whether their contacts were official or unofficial, impersonal or personal, or a combination. Table 5 shows respondents' replies in brief form.

On the basis of figures in Table 5, most of the respondents maintained both official and unofficial contacts with overseas individuals and agencies. In fact, only 8 per cent stated their contacts to be unofficial only, and none maintained strictly official ties. What happened in many cases, as described by the interviewees, was that an official meeting or conference would establish the initial contact which would then be pursued on a personal friendship basis. This trend emphasized the interest which New Zealanders have in other nations as evidenced in their high rate of international travel. Once established, personal links are diligently maintained.

The five respondents who maintained only "unofficial" links were distributed among three of the five groups and represent a very small percentage of the total. Two were from government, i.e., the Crown Law Department and the Government Life Insurance Department. Both of these reported only a few outside links, and their work does not require them to look elsewhere for ideas, techniques, or advice.

TABLE 5

UNOFFICIAL V. OFFICIAL LINKS AMONG SUBJECT CATEGORIES
N=66

Subjects By Categories Types of Contact	Gov't.		Political Parties		Private Groups		Quasi-Gov't. Boards, Agencies		Busi- nesses		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Both-equal proportion	15	36	2	67	8	67	2	28.6	1	33	28	42
Both-official outweighs	11	27	0	0	3	25	2	28.6	2	67	18	27
Both-unofficial outweighs	13	32	0	0	1	8	1	14.2	0	0	15	23
Official only	--	--	-	--	-	--	-	----	-	--	0	0
Unofficial only	2	5	1	33	0	0	2	28.6	0	0	5	8
Totals	41	100	3	100	12	100	7	100	3	100	66	100

Among the political party organizations, the Social Credit League reported only a few unofficial ties to their counterparts in Australia and Canada. Both the two major parties reported links of both types, leaving the impression that the reason for Social Credit's lack of overseas contacts may be its more inward-looking platform and interests.

Two quasi-governmental agencies reported only "unofficial" links, i.e., the Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, and the Secretary of the Vice Chancellor's Committee of the University System, Mr. Peter Hampton. Significantly, and unlike the other three above, both of these agencies maintained "considerable" or "numerous" overseas links. The explanation for this phenomenon lies in the nature of the work of the Ombudsman and the University system. Sir Guy Powles maintained numerous personal ties with other Ombudsmen, academics, and occasional governmental contacts on legal matters. However, these did not bear directly on the discharge of his responsibilities. Being a highly individualized office, the overseas contacts depend on the person holding the position and potentially change when each one in turn retires. There were not as of 1971 any formal international associations for ombudsmen.

Mr. Hampton described his contacts as being initiated via correspondence and later established at conferences. Most of these personal links led to exchange of ideas, information, and staff, but were always on an "unofficial" basis. In summary, where the type of interviewee concern was almost

exclusively domestic, only a limited number of unofficial contacts were maintained. On the other hand, where frequent personal contacts were reported, the specific individual and/or sector represented had some particular characteristic which rendered official ties unnecessary.

Ninety-two percent of the respondents reported both "official" and "unofficial" links to the overseas environment. Sixty-five percent of the total sample reported maintaining either "considerable" or "numerous" ties. A combining of these two factors yields the following results showing the types of contacts maintained by the most active agencies or sectors.

TABLE 6
RESPONDENTS REPORTING
CONSIDERABLE/NUMEROUS CONTACTS
N=43

Types of Contacts	N	%
Both-equal proportions	17	39
Both-more official	13	30
Both-more unofficial	11	26
Unofficial only	2	5
Total	43	100

A comparison with Table 5 shows that these figures do not differ greatly from the entire sample. Thus it may be assumed that whether or not a department, agency, ministry,

or other sector had a low or high frequency of overseas links, the general distribution of linkages would be as presented in Table 5.

The significant fact is that 92 percent of all respondents maintained "official" and "unofficial" links to the international environment. To determine the incidence and distribution of the linkages is one thing, to determine their effect on the respective New Zealand sectors interviewed is another. We now turn to the individual representatives and their evaluations of outside influence.

Policy Influence of Linkage Contacts

Influence measurement is one of the most difficult tasks with which political scientists grapple. The reason for this is the inability of the researcher to get inside another person's mind where, after all is said and done, actual influence is felt. Karl Deutsch has distinguished between influence and power in these terms. "Influence then tries to get inside the personality of a person, whereas power operates upon him mainly from without."²⁷ Thus far, only neurologists are directly probing the minds of men, and their work does not primarily concern itself with cultural background and traits.

In studying a particular society and asking questions which relate it to the external world there are several

²⁷Karl Deutsch, Politics and Government (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 24.

possible types which may be expected. Among small nations the psychological perspective colors every response. There may be the tendency to sell short the abilities, power, influence, and importance of one's homeland in comparison with more powerful neighbor states. On the contrary, some individuals will not see realistically their nation's weaknesses; instead they will pick out some area in which they as a society excel and simply disregard other important factors. Both of these tendencies were observed by the writer in the course of this project. Influence proved difficult to weigh, and the subjects' objectivity was very questionable.

Sixty-five of the interviewees responded to the question of how great an influence the overseas contacts they maintained had on the policy decisions of their respective sectors. Results of the responses are in Table 7. This chart shows that all who responded believed that the external world influenced their sector through the contacts maintained. At the extremes, there were three times as many who believed the international influence "marginal" as those who felt it was "decisive." By far the greatest cluster of responses was equally distributed in the three middle categories. Probably the most striking result is that 59 percent of the respondents felt at least a "fairly strong" policy influence from without the country. Such a level of penetration is indicative of the small nation's plight. A much lower level of perceived policy influence is predictable in larger, developed states.

TABLE 7

PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF OVERSEAS
CONTACTS ON POLICY FORMATION
N=65

Level of Influence	N	%
Decisive	6	9
Very strong	16	25
Fairly strong	16	25
Some	17	26
Marginal	10	15
Totals	65	100

Government, comprising the largest number of respondents, closely followed the total pattern of influence perception as shown in Table 7. There was only a slight change evident, this showing up in the two categories of strongest influence. Although feeling less "decisive" influence, government respondents had a higher percentage who felt "very strong" influence on policy formation than the total sample. Still, these changes were minor, and the government sample seemed to parallel closely the total societal perception of outside influence.

According to Table 8 government departments which felt most keenly the outside influence were the Foreign Aid Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Post Office Department. In the dispensing of New Zealand's

TABLE 8

PERCEIVED POLICY INFLUENCE BY INTENSITY AMONG
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS (N=41)

Decisive N=2 %=5	Very Strong N=13 %=32	Fairly Strong N=10 %=24
Foreign Aid Div. (Min. of Foreign Affairs) Post Office Department	Treasury Dept. Defense Dept. Dept. of Agriculture Elec. Dept. Ind. & Commerce Dept. Dept. of Educ. Labor Dept. Lands & Survey Dept. Min. of Works Economic Section, Min. of For. Aff. State Ins. Office Dept. Min. of For. Affairs Dept. of Scientific & Ind. Research	Customs Dept. Forest Service Justice Dept. Marine Dept. Maori & Island Aff. Dept. Prime Minister's Dept. Statistics Dept. Min. of Transportation Soc. Security Dept. Tourist & Publicity Dept.

TABLE 8-Continued

Some N=10 %=24	Marginal N=6 %=15
Health Dept. Inland Revenue Dept. Audit Dept. Law Drafting Office Police Dept. Mines Dept. Legislative Dept. State Services Comm. State Advance Corp. Dept. Railways Dept.	Crown Law Dept. Gov't Life Ins. Gov't Printing Office Public Trust Office Valuation Dept. Gov't Research Unit, Legis. Dept.

overseas aid the requests received were considered the most important factor in formulating policy. Likewise, the New Zealand Post Office was subject to the decisions of several international organizations whose policy directives could only be overridden by act of Parliament.²⁸

Ministries or departments which reported a "very strong" influence from abroad included the Treasury, Agriculture, Defense, Electricity, Industries and Commerce, Education, Labor, Lands and Survey, State Insurance and Scientific and Industrial Research Departments, as well as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Works. Most of these were predictable, but several were somewhat surprising. For example, the Electricity Department representative pointed to both technological and sociological influences which affected his department. In Mr. Nicholson's words, "What's proved itself overseas will soon be adopted here."²⁹ Mr. Ian Stirling, the Assistant Surveyor-General, spoke of a continual reliance on techniques pioneered overseas.³⁰ Perhaps the least expected affirmation of strong external influence came from Mr. R. W. Prestney, Manager of the State Insurance Department. Ties to the International Union of Credit Insurers, otherwise known as

²⁸Interviews 1-22 and 1-35 with Mr. Ian Clark and Mr. J. Struthers.

²⁹Interview 1-7 with Mr. William Nicholson, Office Solicitor for the Electricity Department.

³⁰Interview 1-26.

the Berne Union, bound New Zealand in such a way that policy could in some cases be determined from abroad.³¹

Government agencies which were influenced least from overseas included the Crown Law Department, Government Life Insurance, Government Printing Office, Public Trust Office, and Valuation Departments. These were engaged nearly entirely in domestic concerns and the marginal influence exercised from other nations or organizations is understandable and predictable. There are no particular surprises in those departments included in the "fairly strong" and "some" categories.

Non-governmental influence followed roughly the same pattern of intensity as that of the governmental as Table 9 indicates. A comparison with Table 8 shows that there are some differences. Most notable was the smaller percentage of non-governmental subjects who reported at least "very strong" influence from the external world, i.e., 27 percent as opposed to 37 percent among government respondents. This is important because more than 17 percent of the non-governmental responses perceived external influence to be "decisive" as compared with only 5 percent of the government responses. At the other extreme, a slightly higher percentage of non-governmental opinion perceived there to be but "marginal" outside influence than was expressed by government response, 17 percent and 15 percent, respectively.

³¹Interview 1-34.

TABLE 9

PERCEIVED INTENSITY OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL POLICY
INFLUENCE FROM OVERSEAS CONTACTS (N=24)

Decisive N=4 %=17	Very Strong N=3 %=12	Fairly Strong N=6 %=25	Some N=7 %=29	Marginal N=4 %=17
NZ Rugby Football Union NZ Table Tennis Assoc. NZ Council of Educ. Research NZ Dairy Board	NZ Manufact. Fed. Meat Board Wool Board	Chamber of Commerce Nat. Council of Churches Nat. Council of Women Bank of NZ NZ Forest Products, Ltd. Europa Oil Co.	NZ Retailers Fed. NZ Employees Fed. Fed. of Labor Nat. Council NZ Univ. Students Assoc. Ombudsman NZ Broadcast- ing Company	Nat. Center Party NZ Labor Party Medical Assoc. of NZ Vice- Chancellor's Comm.

It is interesting that both major political parties felt very little overseas influence. The Social Credit League reported to be "not at all influenced" from the external environment and was not included on the chart. It may be concluded that except for maintaining general ideological accord with affiliated groups abroad, political parties operated exclusively on the domestic scene.

A further fact was that three of the seven sectors which reported at least "very strong" external policy influence were marketing boards, i.e., the Meat, Wool, and Dairy Boards. Typical of the strong influence felt by these groups which promote New Zealand products abroad was the statement by Mr. R. Jones of the Meat Board when he noted, "When Britain spits, we put up an umbrella."³² A small country which depends a great deal on overseas trade feels keenly this type of influence from its largest trading partner.

Other organizations which felt the influence from abroad were the two sports associations interviewed, the New Zealand Rugby Football Union and the New Zealand Table Tennis Association. Mr. R. E. Morgan, Secretary, noted the "absolute effect" which the International Rugby Board has on New Zealand's rugby.³³

In the category which felt "some" outside influence, the Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, gave a fairly typical response.

³²Interview 4-2.

³³Interview 3-6.

He reported gaining some "very helpful ideas" from his personal contacts, though not being greatly influenced by any official organizations or bodies. Of those groups reporting "fairly strong" influence, Mr. H. P. Brown of New Zealand Forest Products, Ltd, gave a representative reply. He believed his business was affected "to quite a great extent," particularly in the area of pricing on the world market.³⁴

Summarily, the extensive contacts which New Zealanders maintained with international entities resulted in significant direct and indirect policy influence internally. This influence was felt most strongly and directly by the government agencies which dealt in foreign affairs, including aid, and trade, and by the non-governmental agencies which had to be in more or less continual contact abroad. Generally speaking, the greater the number of contacts, the greater was the policy influence emanating from the contacts. Table 10 contains a complete breakdown of all the categories and their comparative influence distribution.

Countries and Regions of Strongest Linkage

Because of the geographic isolation of New Zealand and her former colonial status, the tracing of overseas links to particular countries and regions was designed to chart any changes which may be taking place. Despite the loosening of ties with the United Kingdom, there was still evidence of a strong attachment between the two countries. However, the

³⁴Interview 5-2.

TABLE 10

PERCEIVED POLICY INFLUENCE OF OVERSEAS CONTACTS BY CATEGORY
N=65

Degree of Influence \ Category	Gov't		Political Parties		Private Groups		Quasi- Gov't		Business		Totals	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Decisive	2	5	0	0	2	17	2	28.6	0	0	6	9
Very Strong	13	32	0	0	1	8	2	28.6	0	0	16	25
Fairly Strong	10	24	0	0	3	25	0	0	3	100	16	25
Some	10	24	0	0	5	42	2	28.6	0	0	17	26
Marginal	6	15	2	100	1	8	1	14.2	0	0	10	15
Totals	41	100	2	100	12	100	7	100	3	100	65	100

diversification of links is becoming more obvious. A heightened awareness of the Pacific basin region and Australia were among the trends in linkage association that emerged in this study. One fact which reconfirmed itself was the necessity of trade for a developed small state. If the doors to the English market are closed, the New Zealander must look elsewhere to ensure economic survival.

In trying to discover which countries and/or organizations were the strongest influencing agents, respondents were asked to identify in rank order the three overseas entities which most strongly affected their sector. Some of the interviewees were indefinite or could not discern more than one or two influencing agents. Thus the number of respondents declines in the second and third areas of choice. Also, some sectors believed outside influences were about equal from two entities. In such cases, the response was recorded for both regions or countries.

Table 11 shows the distribution by nation or region of the New Zealand agencies interviewed.

With a clear margin over all other states or organizations, nearly a majority of the respondents listed England as New Zealand's most influential overseas link. Most interviewees noted that their ties to Great Britain and Australia were for two reasons: (1) trade and (2) geographic proximity. These two factors are key in explaining any linkages between New Zealand and her overseas environment. With most sectors

TABLE 11

PRIMARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY SECTOR

United Kingdom & Western Europe N=31 %=49		Australia N=8 %=13
Treasury Dept.	Gov't Printing Office	Gov't Life Ins. Dept.
Agriculture Dept.	Justice Dept.	Inland Revenue Dept.
Crown Law Dept.	Law Drafting Office	Lands & Survey Dept.
Customs Dept.	Marine Dept.	Tourist & Publicity Dept.
Forest Service Dept.	Police Dept.	State Advances Dept.
Electricity Dept.	Mines Dept.	NZ Manufac. Fed.
Industries & Commerce Dept.	Min. of Foreign Affairs	NZ Retailers Fed.
Education Dept.	Legislative Dept.	Vice-Chancellor's Comm.
Health Dept.	Prime Minister's Dept.	
Audit Dept.	Gov't Research Unit (Parl.)	
Public Trust Office	Dept. of Scientific & Ind. Research	
Post Office Dept.	Chamber of Commerce	
Railways Dept.	Vice-Chancellor's Comm.	
Medical Assoc. of NZ	NZ Dairy Board	
Meat Board		
NZ Broadcasting Company		
Bank of NZ		

TABLE 11-Continued

United States & N. Amer. N=6 %=9	Japan & Asia N=1 %=2	Pacific Islands Int'l. Organ. N=17 %=24	
Defense Dept. Min. of Works Railways Dept. Council of Ed. Research Europa	Railways Dept.	Maori & Isl. Affairs Dept. External Aid Div. (Min. of For. Aff.) Statistics Dept. Social Security Dept. Economic Sec. (Min. of For. Affairs) NZ Fed. of Labor Nat. Council of Churches NZ Forest Prod., Ltd.	State Ins. Dept. Valuation Dept. NZ Employees Fed. NZ Rugby Football Union NZ Table Tennis Assoc. Nat. Council of Women NZ Univ. Students Assoc. Wool Board

there was little question as to which linkage was most influential, especially among those whose choice was England. Those who felt stronger influences from elsewhere are particularly noteworthy.

Certain New Zealand sectors were much more closely tied to one or another of the environmental entities. For example, as indicated in Table 12, government sectors are closely linked to United Kingdom counterparts as twenty-four of the forty-two respondents (57 percent) identified England or another Western European country as the most influential overseas agency. This percentage was higher, by a factor of more than two, than for any other country. The other three categories of groups chose England as primary influencing link in only seven of twenty-one cases, or 33 percent. On the other hand, nine of the twenty-one private, quasi-, and non-governmental sectors (43 percent) felt the greatest influence was from international organizations. Primary linkage influence by international organizations was felt by only six governmental agencies, just 14 percent of the total for government.³⁵ Political parties denied that any country or organization influenced them more than another, and there is thus no listing for them.

³⁵ Those government departments which listed international organization as their main overseas influence were the Department of Labor, Statistics Department, Economic Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Insurance Office, and the Valuation Department.

TABLE 12

PERCEIVED PRIMARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=63

Region, Country or Int'l. Org.	Category of Respondent	Gov't		Private Groups		Quasi- Gov't.		Business		Total
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
United Kingdom & W. Europe		24	57	2	18	4	57	1	33	31
Australia		5	12	2	18	1	14	0	0	8
United States & N. America		4	10	0	0	1	14	1	33	6
Japan & Asia		1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific Islands & Int'l Org.		8	19	7	64	1	14	1	33	17
Totals		42	100	11	100	7	99*	3	99*	63

*Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.

The foregoing gives a portion of the New Zealand linkage scene, but not all of it. Even though the United Kingdom continued to hold a significant influence over many segments of the public and private sectors in New Zealand there were persistent signs that this trend is weakening. A number of interview subjects frankly pointed to a diminution of English influence. For example, Chief Inspector L. F. Jones of the Mines Department mentioned the originally decisive influence of Britain, but noted that there had been a marked decrease.³⁶ While it was not the objective of this project to chart the comparative ebb and flow of influence among the prominent states in Wellington's environment, it was possible from the data gathered in the questionnaire to chart the countries and/or international organizations which were making encroachments on what had been in the past a British monopoly of influence. Subsequent tables show the estimate of which nations or international entities exercised influence that was somewhat less than the most influential, but still major.

Some changes are evident in Table 13 as we focus upon the respondents' second most significant overseas influence. Australia emerged as the nation thought to be most influential next to the United Kingdom. Geography and culture would appear to be the two decisive factors in this trend. It is noteworthy that the government perceived that North American

³⁶Interview 1-21.

TABLE 13

PERCEIVED SECONDARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=49

Region, Country or Int'l Org.	Category of Respondents	Gov't		Private Groups		Quasi- Gov't		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
United Kingdom & W. Europe		8	24	3	33	1	14	12	24.5
Australia		9	27	3	33	3	43	15	30.6
U.S.A. & N. America		11	33	0	0	2	29	13	26.5
Japan, Asia		1	3	2	22	1	14	4	8.2
Pacific Islands & Int'l Org.		4	12	1	11	0	0	5	10.2
Totals		33	99*	9	99*	7	100	49	100

*Total is less than 100% because of rounding.

influence was stronger than Australian. Also, Japan showed an increase in the secondary influence totals. From 1.5 percent who believed the Japanese were a primary influence, the percent who perceived them as a secondary force rose to over 8 percent. Conversely, international organizations and South Pacific regional influence declined somewhat, from 27 percent to 10 percent. The overall picture is one of Australia and the United States very close to Britain as secondary influences. Many who did not perceive England as the most significant overseas power still felt their presence to a considerable extent, as evidenced by the 24 percent who judged them second.³⁷

As displayed in Table 14, tertiary influence emanated from the following main sources. The United States and North America emerged as the strongest influencing agent at this third level with 37 percent of the respondent opinion. Japan and Asia remained a fairly definite contender for influence in the future, while Australia was runner-up to the United States. International organizations and regional states were listed by 13 percent of the respondents.

Taken in their entirety the results of the three figures show a rough distribution of perceived influence as follows. While not taking into account the value of the respondents' rankings, Table 16 shows the distribution of total numerical occurrence on the questionnaires, i.e., the

³⁷All three businesses listed only a first choice, thus there are no figures for their secondary and tertiary influence.

TABLE 14

PERCEIVED TERTIARY LINKAGE INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=38

Region, Country or Int'l Org.	Category of Respondent	Gov't		Private Groups		Quasi- Gov't.		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
United Kingdom & W. Europe		4	14	0	0	0	0	4	11
Australia		7	24	0	0	1	25	8	21
U.S.A. & N. America		11	38	3	60	0	0	14	37
Japan & Asia		5	17	1	20	1	25	7	18
Pacific Islands & Int'l. Organization		2	7	1	20	2	50	5	13
Totals		29	100	5	100	4	100	38	100

TABLE 15
TOTAL PERCEIVED LINKAGE INFLUENCE
BY COUNTRIES/ORGANIZATIONS

Country/Region/Organization	N	%
United Kingdom & W. Europe	47	31
Australia	31	21
United States & N. America	33	22
Japan and Asia	12	8
Pacific Islands & International Organization	27	18
Totals	150	100

frequency with which each country/region/organization was ranked as most, second most, and third most influential. The data in Table 16 were created by giving a value of 3 to a most influential ranking, 2 to a second most influential, and 1 to a third most influential ranking. From the data in Tables 14-16, we can draw the following conclusions about New Zealand's linkage characteristics. First, Great Britain still was the most influential external influence, even though situated half way around the globe. Most basic governmental service agencies looked first to England, as did the majority of the trading boards which marketed New Zealand products abroad. However, by consulting Table 16 it was possible to note a counter-trend which focused on North America.

TABLE 16

RANKED VALUE OF LINKAGE INFLUENCE
N=326

Country/Region/Organization	By Place						Totals	
	1st	x3	2nd	x2	3rd	x1	N	%
United Kingdom & W. Europe	31	93	12	24	4	4	121	37
Australia	8	24	15	30	8	8	62	19
United States - N. America	6	18	13	26	14	14	58	18
Japan & Asia	1	3	4	8	8	8	19	6
Pacific Islands, Int'l Organization	17	51	5	10	5	5	66	20
Totals	63	189	49	98	39	39	326	100

Australia, to be sure, emerged as the second most influential national linkage. However, the types of links maintained there were not as likely to affect the country's long-range development, whereas the types of links increasingly being forged with North America were. For example, agencies which listed Australia as the number one influencing state included the Government Life Insurance Department, the Inland Revenue Department, and the Tourist and Publicity Department, among others which were characterized by their similarity to Australian counterparts. It may be stated that these types of agencies do not determine the broad developmental policies of a country. On the other hand, North America was listed as the primary influencing area by the Defense Department, the Railways Department, and the Ministries of Transport and Works. These powerful government agencies were and are vitally involved in the planning of New Zealand's future. In addition, the Council of Educational Research listed the United States and North America as its primary influence. Thus in several key areas American influence was being felt.

A second somewhat predictable result was the manner in which the linkage pattern closely paralleled the external trade pattern. Great Britain accounted for approximately 35 percent of New Zealand's total trade, a percentage very close to the 37 percent figure listed for United Kingdom

linkages in Table 16.³⁸ While the comparative amounts of overseas trade to Australia, North America and the other categories used in this study did not correspond as closely, they were nevertheless similar and in the same basic order. This seems to reemphasize the proposition in the previous chapter which underlines most small states' characteristic dependence upon trade.³⁹

Another feature of New Zealand's linkages was the major role played by international organizations. According to Table 12, 17 percent of the respondents listed international groupings as their principal overseas link and influencing agent. Among "private groups" the percentage was particularly high; seven of eleven respondents singled out organizations abroad rather than nation states. Such a trend clearly supports proposition 2:4 above which noted the tendency of smaller nations to seek some relief from their smallness by aligning themselves with other like-minded states.

Despite the admission of Britain into the Common Market and all the other signs of loosening ties, London remained the strongest voice heard by New Zealanders. Another decade may drastically alter this fact, but for the early 1970's the cultural and economic ties to England will continue to be the most important single external linkage.

³⁸See New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1970, p. 611ff.

³⁹See Proposition 2:3, p. 96.

Influence Flow Via Linkages

Influence is not a one-way process; it moves both into and out of all countries, and the difficulties in charting such a fluid and comprehensive force are great. Recent studies have attempted a number of analytic methods for measuring power and influence, but thus far results have not been entirely satisfying. Probably the most satisfactory have been studies emerging from the communications theorists. Karl Deutsch's early attempt to chart cross-national mail flow remains one of the more rigorous efforts of this school.⁴⁰

For this aspect of the study we continue to rely on respondent attitude and opinion. The following questions were asked: What percentage of interviewees believed their sectors were trying to exert an influence abroad? What outside entities would be influenced most by such attempts? Does more influence flow into or out of New Zealand?

Not all New Zealand sectors attempt to exert external influence, but, as Table 17 indicates, a considerable number do. Some 65 percent of the sectors polled (forty-three of sixty-six) did make some attempt to exert influence beyond the boundary of the nation. Some made very feeble efforts and expected little for them. For example, the Social Credit League reported making a trip abroad to acquaint others of its party's stand without expecting to see much results.⁴¹ Others

⁴⁰Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1953).

⁴¹Interview 2-3.

TABLE 17

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE INTENTION
AMONG RESPONDENTS (N=66)

Yes--Try to influence Overseas Entities N=23 %=35	Some Weak Attempts N=20 %=30	No Attempt N=23 %=35
Treasury Dept.	Forest Service Dept.	Crown Law Dept.
Defense Dept.	Electricity Dept.	Inland Revenue
Agriculture Dept.	Gov't Life Ins. Dept.	Gov't Printing Office
Customs Dept.	Education Dept.	Law Drafting Office
Industries & Commerce Dept.	Health Dept.	Marine Dept.
Labor Dept.	Audit Dept.	Maori & Isl. Aff. Dept.
Prime Min. Dept.	Justice Dept.	Police Dept.
Min. of Transport	External Aid Div.	Mines Dept.
Econ. Section, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Min. of Foreign Affairs	Legislative Dept.
Dept. of Scientific & Ind. Research	Lands & Survey Dept.	Public Trans. Off.
NZ Labour Party	Statistics Dept.	State Services Comm.
NZ Manu. Fed.	Tourist & Pub. Dept.	Min. of Works
NZ Employees Fed.	Social Credit League	Social Security Dept.
NZ Table Tennis Assoc.	Chamber of Commerce	Post Office Dept.
NZ Univ. Students Assoc.	NZ Rugby Football Union	State Advances Corp. Dept.

TABLE 17-Continued

Yes--Try to influence Overseas Entities	Some Weak Attempts	No Attempt
NZ Meat Board NZ Wool Board NZ Dairy Board Bank of NZ NZ Forest Prod., Ltd. Europa State Ins. Office Min. of Foreign Affairs	Federation of Labor Nat. Council of Churches Nat. Council of Women National Council Coun. of Ed. Res. NZ Broadcasting Company	Railways Dept. Valuation Dept. Gov't Research Unit Nat. Centre Party NZ Retailers Fed. Medical Assoc. of NZ Ombudsman Vice-Chancellor's Committee

were involved primarily in overseas influence, e.g., the Meat and Wool Boards and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The subject matter of each individual sector determined its involvement and interest in overseas contacts.

Eighteen of the twenty-three sectors (78 percent) which claimed to exert no intentional influence abroad were government departments or sub-departments. In addition, the Ombudsman and the Vice-Chancellor's Committee of the University system were tied closely to government. This heavy predominance of government agencies among the sectors which did not attempt to exert an international influence reflected the more purely domestic aspect of government services.

All three of the businesses polled were among those respondents who reported definite influence attempts. Europa, New Zealand Forest Products and Bank of New Zealand were all explicit in their desires for procuring better markets, trying to finance overseas projects, or trying to get the best arrangements in the refining consortium.⁴² Also prominent in this list were the trading boards (Wool, Meat and Dairy) and several of the more influential government departments and ministries, e.g., Treasury, and Industries and Commerce. Thus, a clear majority admittedly were trying to exert an international influence.

The next question was "Do you feel that your attempts are having the desired results?" Put differently, the

⁴²Interviews 5-2, 5-1, and 5-3.

respondents were asked to assess whether or not their efforts were being taken seriously by the objects of the influence. A comparison of the totals in Table 17 with those in Table 18 reveals several interesting trends. Sixty-five percent of the respondents admitted intentionally exerting at least a minimal amount of influence on external entities. A considerably higher proportion of respondents, 73 percent, believed that their sector had at least a minimal influence on the overseas environment. This means that some respondents believed that they had an influence which they did not consciously seek to exert. Further, although we have no comparative data, the fact that over half of the respondents felt that they had more than slight influence over their international contacts seems to contradict the propositions on the psychological effects of small size. The group-by-group distribution of perceived overseas influence reveals several things. First, the private groups, quasi-governmental agencies, and businesses felt that they had fairly good success in influencing overseas entities; fifteen of twenty-two respondents (68 percent) believed their efforts were successful beyond the minimal level. This was a much higher perceived average influence than was expressed by government sectors. Perhaps this reflected the greater specialization of government departments, some of whom deal wholly with domestic concerns.

TABLE 18

CATEGORICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEIVED SECTORAL OVERSEAS INFLUENCE
N=66

Response	Gov't		Political Parties		Private Groups		Quasi-Gov't		Business		Totals	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	18	44	1	33	8	66	5	71	2	67	34	52
Slight	10	24	1	33	2	17	1	14	0	0	14	21
None	13	32	1	33	2	17	1	14	1	33	18	27
Totals	41	100	3	99*	12	100	7	99*	3	100	66	100

*Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.

The overall picture was still one in which New Zealand interviewees perceived themselves as exerting influence even beyond their own admitted attempts. However, this does not appear to the writer as either unduly idealistic or chauvinistic. Most respondents conceded the overall smallness of their country and their relative paucity of international influence. For example, the Agriculture Department's interviewee, Mr. John B. Quigg, noted that "no state is overly influenced because of New Zealand's smallness." Speaking personally he felt that some states sounded as if they were affected, but that New Zealand did not feel they were.⁴³ One respondent questioned just how much net influence could be brought to bear by New Zealand.⁴⁴ These types of responses were common even from sectors like Agriculture and Industries and Commerce where successful trade arrangements were of vital importance. Thus, even when the opinion was expressed that a sector's influence was being felt abroad, the amount of that influence did not seem to be overestimated.

Table 19 indicates the respondents' opinions as to which external entities were affected by New Zealanders. A preliminary word may clarify some seeming discrepancy between the data in Table 19 and those in the preceding ones. Whereas only forty-three respondents believed they were influencing

⁴³Interview 1-3.

⁴⁴Interview 1-9, Mr. W. E. B. Tucker, Director of Trade Policy, Department of Industries and Commerce.

overseas entities, sixty external entities were named as being receptive to New Zealand efforts. The reason for this discrepancy is that some sectors believed they had about an equal influence on several international bodies, and these opinions were recorded in any and all categories mentioned.

TABLE 19

PERCEIVED OVERSEAS INFLUENCE BY NEW ZEALANDERS
N=60

Nation, Organization, or Region Influenced	N	%
International Organization	15	25
Australia	13	21
United Kingdom & W. Europe	8	13
Pacific Islands	18	30
Others--Including U.S. Japan, SEA	6	10
Totals	60	99*

*Totals do not reach 100% because of rounding.

The respondents thought that outgoing influence was widely dispersed. No single state, region or international organization was thought to be the focus of influence to the extent New Zealanders believed they were influenced by the United Kingdom. Comparison with Table 16 above showed that 37 percent of the respondents felt England's influence keenly, if not most intensely, while 30 percent believed the Pacific Islands were the most influenced by New Zealand.

Besides being more dispersed, the outgoing influence was thought to be more successful in a different range of powers than those which brought the most influence to bear in New Zealand. The interviewees felt that the Pacific Islands, Australia, and international organizations were the most likely to respond favorably to influence emanating from New Zealand. On the other hand, the United Kingdom and Western Europe and the category "others" were thought to be the least influenced by New Zealanders. This was significant because it clearly pointed to the perceived inability of a small state to have very much influence on its larger counterparts, even though long cultural, linguistic, racial, and national interest ties existed.

Also evident was the tendency of smaller powers to be restricted in influence to their own geographic region. Whereas the respondents believed that some 61 percent of the linkage influence came into New Zealand from outside her immediate area, some 76 percent of the perceived outgoing influence was restricted to the South Pacific region or to international organizations. This emphasized the relevancy which geography--as it affects perception--has even in the 1970's for the lesser state. This may be contrasted to the global influence of the superpowers and even some secondary states. Small states like New Zealand can have only a limited range of influence and power.

As was noted in Chapter II, small nations tend to rely on collective action as a means of overcoming their individual smallness. This type of reliance may be seen in the fact that nearly one-fourth of the respondents mentioned international organizations as an influence receiver. Such an attitude is understandable, especially in New Zealand's case. She has had one of her own, Sir Leslie Munro, serve as President of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as numerous other officers serving in influential posts for other organizations. Whether these types of honors have resulted in more real influence is subject to question. The fact remains that New Zealanders think it has.

Tables 20 and 21 provide the breakdown by category of the various interviewees' perceived outgoing influence. A fact which emerged was that certain types of New Zealand sectors gravitated toward certain overseas entities. This was not surprising since the type of service provided, the commodity dealt in, or the subject matter involved would naturally determine the linkages maintained.

It is clear from Table 21, for example, that those sectors which tended to feel that their influence was greatest upon the Pacific Islands were for the most part "service" sectors. The Department of Education, Council of Education, Maori and Island Affairs Department, Statistics Department, Lands and Survey Department, and Council of Women are "service" in orientation and felt in the interviews that the

TABLE 20

PERCEIVED OVERSEAS INFLUENCE BY CATEGORY
N=60

Nation, Organization or Region Influenced	Gov't		Political Parties		Private Groups		Quasi- Gov't		Business	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
International Org.	8	24	0	0	4	33	2	20	0	0
Australia	8	24	0	0	3	25	1	10	2	67
United Kingdom & W. Europe	5	15	1	50	0	0	2	20	0	0
Pacific Islands	11	33	1	50	4	33	1	10	1	33
Others--Including U.S.A., Japan, SEA	1	3	0	0	1	9	4	40	0	0
Totals	33	99*	2	100	12	100	10	100	3	100

*Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.

TABLE 21

PERCEIVED OVERSEAS INFLUENCE BY
NEW ZEALAND AGENCY
N=60

International Organization N=14 %=23	Australia N=14 %=23	United Kingdom & W. Europe N=8 %=12
Treasury Dept.	Defense Dept.	Health Dept.
Indus. & Comm.	Customs Dept.	Agriculture Dept.
External Aid Div., Min. of For. Affairs	Lands & Survey Dept.	Audit Dept.
Prime Min. Dept.	Min. of Trans.	Prime Min. Dept.
State Serv. Comm.	Tourist & Publicity Dept.	Valuation Dept.
Min. of Trans.	Min. of For. Affairs	NZ Labor Party
State Ins. Off. Dept.	State Advances Corp.	NZ Meat Board
Dept. of Scientific & Ind. Research	Railways Dept.	Ombudsman
NZ Empl. Fed.	NZ Manu. Fed.	
NZ Table Tennis Assoc.	NZ Retailers Fed.	
	NZ Fed. of Labor	
Nat. Council of Churches	NZ Council of Education	
NZ Univ. Students Assoc.	NZ Forest Prod., Ltd.	
NZ Wool Board	Bank of NZ	
NZ Dairy Board		

TABLE 21-Continued

Pacific Islands N=18 %=30	Others N=5 %=9
<p>Dept. of Educ.</p> <p>Dept. of Labor</p> <p>Maori & Isl. Aff. Dept.</p> <p>Legislative Dept.</p> <p>Lands & Survey Dept.</p> <p>Statistics Dept.</p> <p>Min. of Works</p> <p>Min. of Transportation</p> <p>Tourist & Publicity Dept.</p> <p>State Advances Corp.</p> <p>Min. of For. Affairs</p> <p>NZ Labor Party</p> <p>NZ Manu. Fed.</p> <p>NZ Rugby Football Union</p> <p>NZ Fed. of Labor</p> <p>Nat. Council of Women</p> <p>NZ Council of Educ.</p> <p>Bank of NZ</p>	<p>Inland Revenue</p> <p>NZ Manu. Fed.</p> <p>NZ Meat Board</p> <p>Ombudsman</p> <p>NZ Wool Board</p> <p>NZ Broadcasting Co.</p>

developing areas near them were most receptive. None of the independent boards (Meat, Wool, or Dairy) fell into this category; in fact none of the sectors felt they had much to gain by sharing with this region. Benevolence and generosity seemed to be key reasons for association at all.

Composition of the other lists was based more on self-interest. For example, the list whose members thought themselves successful in influencing Australia had definite interest-oriented commodities, e.g., the Departments of Defense, Customs, Tourist and Publicity and Ministry of Foreign Affairs from government, and the Manufacturers' Federation, Federation of Labor, Forest Products, Ltd., and Bank of New Zealand from the private or quasi-governmental sector.

Having treated several other facets of international influence among New Zealand and her external environment, let us now examine New Zealanders' attitudes about the direction of influence flow. As has been clear from the data presented thus far, there was both inward and outward influence flow. The influence was dispersed, coming from several geographic areas and directed chiefly toward several geographic areas. Interviewees were asked to express their opinions as to whether more influence was brought to bear on their sectors from abroad, or whether they provided more influence to their overseas environment. This was an attempt to evaluate the perceived directional influence flow. Results from respondents are presented in Table 22. Clearly, the most

TABLE 22

SECTORAL RESPONSE OF PERCEIVED INFLUENCE FLOW
N=66

Equal Influence Flow N=8 %=12	More Comes Than Goes N=38 %=58	
Forest Serv. Dept. Inland Revenue Service Audit Dept. External Aid Div., Min. of For. Affairs Chamber of Commerce Nat. Council of Churches Nat. Council NZ Council of Ed. Research	NZ Treasury Dept. Defense Dept. Dept of Agric. Electricity Dept. Dept. of Ind. & Commerce Dept. of Educ. Gov't Printing Office Labor Dept. Mines Dept. Prime Min. Dept. Lands & Survey Dept. State Serv. Dept. Statistics Dept. Min. of Works Min. of Trans. Tourist & Pub. Dept. Min. of For. Aff. State Ins. Off. Vice-Chancellor's Comm. Bank of NZ	Post Off. Dept. State Advances Corp. Railways Dept. Min. of For. Aff. Dept. of Scientific & Ind. Research Nat. Center Party NZ Manu. Fed. NZ Retailers Fed. Medical Assoc. of NZ NZ Rugby Football Union NZ Table Tennis Assoc. Nat. Council of Women NZ Univ. Stud. Assoc. NZ Meat Board NZ Wool Board NZ Broadcasting Co. NZ Dairy Board NZ Forest Prod., Ltd.

TABLE 22-Continued

More Goes Than Comes N=10 %=15	Not Certain N=6 %=9	Negligible Influence N=4 %=6
Customs Dept. Gov't Life Ins. Dept. Health Dept. Marine Dept. Maori & Isl. Aff. Legis. Dept. Valuation Dept. NZ Employees Fed. Ombudsman Europa	Justice Dept. Police Dept. Soc. Security Dept. NZ Labor Party Soc. Credit League Fed. of Labor	Crown Law Dept. Law Drafting Office Public Trust Office Gov't Res. Unit

prevalent attitude which emerged from the table was that of a dominance of influence flow into New Zealand. The 58 percent becomes 68 percent if the last two categories, which represent vague answers, are removed. When this is compared with the 15 percent, or 18 percent if categories four and five are left out, who believed that New Zealand affected the environment more than it affected her, the picture is definitely one of strongly perceived external influence and of weakness in the projection of New Zealand influence. What this may mean in terms of psychological and emotional response is difficult to calculate, but it is clear that they did not feel capable of influencing their environment very strongly.

A minority of the respondents felt differently. Approximately one-fourth of the interviewees thought the influence flow to be either balanced or to flow outward more than inward. Such a minority was to be expected in a developed small country in a region with underdeveloped small countries.

From Table 23 several additional observations may be proffered. In all categories except that of political parties, where the totals were too small to be of real significance, the influence flow was perceived to be inward rather than outward. Having already noted the extreme importance of agricultural overseas trade to New Zealand, it is significant to note that the Departments of Agriculture and Industries and Commerce, and the Meat, Dairy, and Wool Boards, all felt that more influence "comes than goes." In

TABLE 23

PERCEIVED DIRECTIONAL INFLUENCE FLOW BY CATEGORY
N=66

Response	Gov't		Pol. Parties		Private Groups		Quasi- Gov't		Business		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Equal Influence Flow	4	10	0	0	3	24	1	14.3	0	0	8	12
More Comes Than Goes	23	56	1	33	7	58.3	5	71.4	2	67	38	58
More Goes Than Comes	7	17	0	0	1	8.3	1	14.3	1	33	10	15
Not Certain	3	7	2	67	1	8.3	0	0	0	0	6	9
Negligible	4	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6
Totals	41	100	3	100	12	99.9	7	100	3	100	66	100

this particularly important area of the national economy representatives from several of these agencies gave revealing comments. An example would be that of Mr. John B. Quigg of Agriculture when he stated in response to queries on influence flow, "We follow rather than lead."⁴⁵

Overall, the picture is one of New Zealand as an object of perceived influence. This supports propositions 1:15, 2:3, 3:3, and 4:1, all of which posit that small states are to a great extent "dependent" on external nations, organizations and agencies.

Overseas Travel, Training, and Immigration

Other indicators of external linkage were the direct contacts gained by virtue of overseas travel and training. It was not expected that the overseas travel would in any sense be equal to the total linkages, but it did represent one additional type of link. As such, the following data were gathered which show the level of travel which was found, and also demonstrate the degree to which a large percentage of New Zealand sectors do send trainees abroad.

About one-fourth of the sectors queried reported no overseas training. Nearly one-half sent only an occasional trainee abroad. The other one-quarter showed a regular and frequent use of training facilities in other countries. Perhaps the significant fact to recall is that nearly

⁴⁵Interview 1-3.

TABLE 24

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL RECEIVING
OVERSEAS TRAINING (N=66)

Response	N	%
None	17	26
Very few	32	48
Quite a few	9	14
High Percentage	4	6
Most of Sector	4	6
Totals	66	100

three-fourths of the sectors did send personnel overseas for training. The sectors which fell at the two extremes, that of no overseas training and that of "most of sector," were predictable. Examples of sectors utilizing no training facilities abroad included the Government Printing Office, Statistics Department, the National Center Party, and the New Zealand Manufacturers Federation. Those reporting that most of their sector received training abroad were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which made overseas training almost a prerequisite for hiring, the Medical Association of New Zealand, an estimated 95 percent of whose members go abroad for at least some of their training.⁴⁶ The National

⁴⁶Interview 3-4.

Council, and the Council of Educational Research.

When asked if officials make overseas visits, sixty of the sixty-five respondents replied affirmatively. Of course, most sectoral visits were by the top officials, but the 92 percent figure was impressive nonetheless. Some of the sectors reported only infrequent trips, while others had continual traffic abroad. The breakdown of travel by frequency is given in Table 25.

TABLE 25
FREQUENCY OF OVERSEAS TRAVEL
N=59

Reported Overseas Visits	N	%
Rare	12	20.3
Occasionally	20	33.9
Often	22	37.3
Continuously	5	8.5
Totals	59	100

Government respondents followed pretty closely the aggregate percentages. Business and quasi-governmental sectors exhibited the greatest tendency toward travel, and the political parties made the fewest trips. All five sectors

which reported continuous overseas travel were from the government, i.e., Department of Agriculture, Department of Industries and Commerce, Maori and Island Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.

This means that there was nearly universal overseas travel on sectoral business among respondents. Also, a significant number of New Zealand agencies and departments relied on overseas training, whether by other countries or through international organizations. Influence most certainly was transmitted through these media, though measurement of such was not attempted.

IV. Conclusions

More extensive conclusory remarks are offered in Chapter IV, but a few brief comments are in order here. New Zealand maintained a multiplicity of linkages to her regional and worldwide environment. These links included all types of official and unofficial ties, from international organization memberships to close personal friendships. Examples of two extremes in linkages would be the official relations maintained by the Department of Labor with the International Labor Organization in Geneva, and, in contrast, the friendly but private links maintained by the much respected New Zealand Ombudsman, Sir Guy Powles, who reported no official ties. In between were a variety of combinations of official

and unofficial links. These bound New Zealand very closely to her external world.

New Zealand's professed need for overseas participation in trade and security matters rendered these links a very important, if frequently intangible, part of her economic, social, and military welfare. Due to this fact of life there was a healthy awareness among key sectors of the need to guard, extend, and nurture these links. The verity of the foregoing was not lessened by those New Zealanders who failed to see the need for extensive international involvement, and who would, presumably, seek an isolation akin to that of Imperial China during the Manchu Dynasty.

Such a need will continue to exist as long as smallness of a society, economy, and military establishment continue to be of importance in national development. Small size dictates a borrower's life style, and New Zealand will never be a relatively larger nation than she is now. Thus, one may reasonably expect to see increasing attention paid to linkages, rather than the reverse. A policy of establishing a greater variety of ties has been adopted by the government and will probably be followed by private groups.

New Zealand's past heavy reliance on linkages will not change in intensity, only in direction. There is a noticeable shift in interest from Western Europe toward the Pacific Basin. Countries in the latter region seem to hold the best chance of replacing the European trade links, and

perhaps even the strong emotional links to British culture and tradition. This will require time to assess accurately. What seems most certain is that New Zealand will continue to have its life and development conditioned by the links it maintains to overseas entities.

CHAPTER IV

EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

I. Introduction

Small nation foreign policy and the concept of "linkages" have been brought together for the first time in the foregoing pages. Hopefully, this effort will prove to be preliminary to further similar works, as the combination of subject and method appears to yield pertinent information. As conclusions have been drawn throughout the paper on a topic-by-topic basis, it is the intention here to minimize redundancy and evaluate the overall project as succinctly as possible. In so doing, two basic aims are pursued.

First, pertinent evaluation of both the research methods employed and the resultant data is undertaken. Included is an assessment of the entire topic of small nation foreign policy theory. Also, the "linkage" concept receives some final comment as a tool for research. Reflection on the writer's method of information gathering and processing leads to some suggestions for future possibilities of linkage research. These evaluative remarks attempt to assay the "macro-analytic" portions of the total project.

Additional remarks are also directed toward the con-
clusions which can be drawn relative to the New Zealand case

study. Extended comments beyond those found in Chapter III, are offered to juxtapose more thoroughly the historical posture of the Wellington government over the thirty-two propositions presented in Chapter II as a "pre-theory." This portion of the final chapter treats the "micro-analytic" side of the project in as specific a way as possible, given the nature of the study.

II. Research Evaluation

The current project has involved implementing several research techniques not previously tried conjunctively. Basically two assumptions have been taken and tested with varying degrees of success. The two premises are: small nations and their foreign policies constitute a unique field of study as distinguished from larger counterparts, and by understanding the links which are maintained by the lesser powers one may explain to a great extent the motivations for their external policies. Each of these statements deserves separate treatment before some critical comments are offered relative to the writer's methodology in testing them.

Small Nation Theory

While small nations still are not universally accepted as a distinct class of states among the entire academic community, its reception by some has proceeded apace since the first chapter of this paper was written some months ago. The best evidence of this is to be found in the scholarly

works which have appeared recently, each accepting the uniqueness of the lesser power. Included in a growing bibliography is another book by David Vital, The Survival of Small States, which examines three case studies, each of which analyzes a situation of weak power-great power conflict.¹ The author in this volume, as his first on the subject, was still preoccupied with security threats, a problem which is not major for many small nations.

Another recent book, Small States in International Relations, edited by August Schou and Arne Olaf Brundtland, brings together papers presented at the Seventeenth Nobel Symposium in 1970.² It contains selections from a representative group of large and small state scholars and statesmen. Treated are such topics as the role of small nations in alliances, their potential for conflict resolution, and their actions in international organizations.

In addition to the foregoing there have been a number of related books which treat various world regions in which weak states are prominent. An example is Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean, edited by Emanuel de Kadt.³ This collection was based on the assumption that size and limited

¹(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). Case studies include Israel, Finland, and Czechoslovakia in recent power confrontations.

²(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971).

³(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

resources were the common denominators of the countries of the West Indies and that their dependency upon larger, more powerful nations gave each a similar foreign policy outlook.

Articles also have been appearing in increasing numbers. Two of the more pertinent recent ones are Jorge I. Dominguez' "Mice That Do Not Roar," and Wu Yuan-li's "Planning Security for a Small Nation."⁴ These are only a few of a considerable number of scholarly analyses which take as their central theme the "weak" state.

Graduate schools and research institutes are also producing material which treats the present subject. A dissertation was completed by Vaughan A. Lewis entitled "The Structure of Small State Behavior in Contemporary International Politics" at Jamaica, West Indies, in 1971.⁵ Jean K. Laux presented a paper at the International Studies Association meeting (March, 1971) in San Juan, Puerto Rico, entitled "Small States and Inter-European Relations."⁶ Other works

⁴Jorge I. Dominguez, "Mice That Do Not Roar," International Organization, XXV (Spring, 1971), pp. 175-208; Wu Yuan-li, "Planning Security for a Small Nation," Pacific Community, III (July, 1972), pp. 661-674.

⁵Vaughan A. Lewis, "The Structure of Small State Behavior in Contemporary International Politics," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Jamaica, W. I., 1971).

⁶Jean Kirk Laux, "Small States and Inter-European Relations: An Analysis of the Nine," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (San Juan, Puerto Rico: mimeo, 1971).

have appeared on related topics such as micro-states and small territories.⁷

While the foregoing list is neither exhaustive nor long, it does show that the concept of the small nation as a distinct entity is being increasingly accepted in the profession. Country studies have appeared on a number of individual states which would further lengthen the listing, but that is not necessary. That the identity of the lesser powers is being respected and widely studied as something different than the large power demonstrates the acceptability and utility of one of the writer's premises.

Linkage Concept

The other basic premise of this project, i.e., that linkages provide a clue, if not a key, to understanding the external relations of the smaller states, has also been receiving some attention and testing in recent months. James N. Rosenau, the formulator and articulator of the general theory, has personally undertaken to analyze the usefulness of the linkage concept. He found a mixed picture. In a paper presented to the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association he noted the early criticisms which had been levelled at the concept after its initial christening in 1966. After recalling some valid and some

⁷For example, George L. Reid, "Linkage Theory in Application to Micro-States," a dissertation prospectus (Southampton: mimeo, 1970); also, Jacques Rapaport, Ernest Muteba, and Joseph Therattil, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems (New York: Arno Press, 1971).

excessive beratings, he mentioned that the concept had not died.⁸ He then proceeded to list a number of articles, graduate theses, and books which had utilized the linkage concept in some way. The list is diverse and quite lengthy, and while acceptance and use should not alone accredit such an approach, the linkage idea must be acknowledged as an interest stimulator.

In rethinking this project, the linkage concept brought the national-international contact points into focus for the writer, a main object of international relations study for several years. However, identifying phenomena and finding ways to successfully study them are quite different procedures. Rosenau's book Linkage Politics provided some usable ideas as to how interactions could be isolated and studied; still, to suggest that the value of linkage theory could be judged on one project is unreasonable. More time and studies are needed before assessment of the linkage idea can be fairly undertaken.

A strong advantage of the approach has been the variety of methods which may and have been used in researching linkages. Methods of some early works, e.g., those in the volume Linkage Politics, have been expanded and extended. Rosenau notes that one characteristic of linkage studies has been the "readiness

⁸James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago: mimeo, 1971), p. 17.

of their authors to tailor the original framework to the specific foci of their research."⁹

Another characteristic of linkage studies, according to Rosenau, has been the tendency of authors to use it to explain "hierarchical phenomena."¹⁰ This observation vindicates in some ways the joint use of small nation theory and linkage theory in this paper. Most of the studies have involved linkages between large powers and neighboring inferior powers. Rosenau feels that this trend is normal, but hopes a shift in interest will occur to bring about analyses which treat equally ranked states. Nevertheless, the relating of unequal national entities has laid the groundwork for further work in the field.

Review of Methodology

In assessing the methods used for gathering and processing the data used in Chapters II and III several impressions linger. Generally, these relate to some ideas concerning the value of joining the small state concept with the linkage concept, the pros and cons of the questionnaire used, the analysis of New Zealand responses, and the future prospects for this type of research. Briefly and sequentially, these impressions follow.

As previously noted, most linkage studies have focused upon unequal states. This is not surprising because the ties

⁹Rosenau, "Theorizing Across . . . ," p. 19.

¹⁰Rosenau, "Theorizing Across . . . ," p. 18.

ties between a large and a smaller nation are more easily recognizable. Linkages between two large entities inherently leave more latitude for mutual maneuverability because of the greater independence of each power.

Assuming that the pre-theory outlined above has validity, it points to the fewer policy alternatives which small states possess. Large states generally have more policy options by virtue of their wider linkage contacts, at least a partial result of their greater magnitude. When two large nations engage in negotiation on trade, security, or other matters, the larger number of alternatives open leaves the researcher with problems of tracking down such options and verifying them. More importantly, many contacts made by larger states with each other may remain unknown because of the still prevalent use of secret diplomacy. Such a situation is less likely between unequal nations where the stakes are not as great for the large power. Thus, part of the reason for combining the study of linkage politics and small state foreign policy lies in the ease with which they complement one another.

Secondly, the greater dependency of the small nation makes the study of its connections to outside entities reasonable. An understanding of the lifeline which helps to sustain a lesser power provides many answers to the behavior patterns and policies pursued by the state. It thus seems

that the linkage politics concept fits the small state case study approach better than the large state.

New Zealand was particularly well suited for linkage research of the type conducted. Survey methods were well received and produced quite satisfactory results. Being a dependent state, the study of ties to overseas entities was revealing and in most cases followed the pre-theory propositions. Some contrary examples are noted later in this chapter. All things considered, the use of the linkage concept with the small state provided a productive project.

As for the research instrument, several impressions remain. There were advantages and disadvantages in the questionnaire utilized. One advantage was its ability to evoke a wide range of response. With open-ended questions, the respondents often gave very lengthy and rambling opinions, some of the most valuable data resulting from remarks which might have been by-passed in a tool eliciting more specific answers. A further plus was the personal contact afforded the interviewer with a variety of sectors in the host country. This would have been lost to a great extent in a mail survey or a more structured questionnaire which offered less editorializing on the part of respondents.

However, with the advantages were some drawbacks. For example, some of the opinions lacked the clarity one would desire, despite efforts of the interviewer to seek qualification and clarification. Whereas the open-end questions

encouraged candor and freedom, they often resulted in answers which left a considerable burden on the interviewer in evaluating responses. This added a higher degree of subjectivity than might have been attained with a more specific questionnaire. In partial justification for the subjective character of the data, to the writer's knowledge this was the first survey research attempted on linkages. If future similar attempts probe a common source, the open-end question could be combined with more specific response options to employ the best aspects of both questionnaire types.

National character and culture inevitably have some effect on this type of research. The degree to which such factors might alter the results of a questionnaire are difficult to establish. Also, the possible effect which cultural uniqueness might have on respondents' data is not a topic encompassed within the purview of this project. Nevertheless several considerations which relate to New Zealand's special outlook bear review.

New Zealanders tend to be either overly apologetic or excessively boastful for their country and the ways of its people. David Ausubel noted this and felt that the underselling was usually with the idea that the visitor would object to some self-inflicted slights.¹¹ Another characteristic of respondents in the study was their stati as high

¹¹David P. Ausubel, The Fern . . . , p. 25.

government bureaucrats or successful private citizens. While their positions rendered them the logical authorities to speak for their departments, it nevertheless colored the outlook they had for the questionnaire. A further factor was that a small number of the interviewees were actually immigrants from other countries. There were several from other Commonwealth countries and even one from eastern Europe. These represented a scant minority and should not be over-emphasized. What significance these factors had for the data results is not clear. In the context of western democratic research, New Zealand opinion is probably very little different, as far as analysis goes, from opinion in France, the United Kingdom, or Canada.

Future prospects for this type of study appear bright. The cautionings of Rosenau do not seem to represent insurmountable problems as several possible directions could be profitably pursued in trying to diminish the objectionable and disappointing aspects. Group research would open the possibility of gathering much more data. There were times during the data gathering stages of this project when additional manpower would have been helpful. Also, the chance for continual interchange and sharing of ideas during the planning and research stages would have been beneficial. Ability to gather and process a greater amount of data would enhance the linkage concept as it has been applied thus far.

More sophisticated quantitative tools also could benefit this type of research. No claim was made in this project for a high level of data processing expertise or sophistication. It was intended to probe the possibility for further similar efforts, and it is conceivable that statistical and cybernetical methods could be applied to small nation linkage research to bring out variables with greater clarity and meaning.

To fill one of the lacunae in linkage research, indicated by Rosenau, some future studies should focus on states of fairly equal status and power. Developing countries offer a good opportunity for this type of research, and the comparative dimension could be added. To date none of the linkage studies have seriously attempted to integrate the approach with other newer methods of comparative politics. This could provide some of the older, tested tools with new data options, and would provide linkage theory a chance for maturation.

Summarily, there are several ways in which the small nation and linkage concepts could be extended profitably. Results of research thus far has been mixed. The future direction will depend on two factors: first, how fruitful the joining of small state studies with linkage research proves to be, and second, how well these methods can dovetail with older, more established tools.

III. New Zealand and the Pre-Theory

The essential uniqueness of each nation-state hardly needs to be argued. Despite the rapid increase of independent states since World War II to a total of around 150, there are still vast differences which distinguish each country from all the rest. This is certainly true with reference to New Zealand. What this means, among other things, is that each state must be individually analyzed if the pre-theory of Chapter II is to be tested.

General historical statements were related in the early sections of the previous chapter. However, no systematic attempt was made to treat New Zealand as a prototypal small state and to juxtapose it against the propositions stated. An assessment of New Zealand foreign policy in light of the thirty-two statements of the pre-theory may show how the pre-theory can be applied to such states. Examination of the propositions will be in the order presented in Chapter II and reproduced in Appendix E. As widely differing opinions exist among the citizenry of this small country on various aspects of its culture and politics, the writer has used his perspective in presenting the major differences. Wherever possible, judgments are made as to which body of opinion most nearly represents government and/or popular opinion.

Four basic areas of propositions are treated in the pre-theory: general security and diplomacy, economic, psychological, and linkage. Before summarizing the total

picture, a brief discussion of each area separately is in order.

General Security and Diplomatic

By far the largest number of hypotheses are posited on various aspects of this topic. For purposes of organization, the total number of propositions can be grouped into four sub-groups: (a) general, (b) geographic, (c) diplomatic and military, and (d) international organization participation.

(a) General security is said to dominate foreign policy considerations for small states. This point would be questioned by many citizens in New Zealand. There tends to be a feeling that there is safety in isolation among many citizens, a feeling that the world is largely by-passing their insular and remote land. However, this feeling is not shared by those in government whose responsibility is to maintain New Zealand's position in the world community. Mr. Dennis McClain of the Defense Department noted in private conversation that there is no apathy among his colleagues on the topic of security.¹² Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed the same interest in preserving the external position of New Zealand. In general hypotheses 1:1 was supported by the attitudes of the government officials interviewed.

¹²Interview 1-2.

Hypothesis 1:2 is more difficult to assess in reference to New Zealand. The thesis is that due to the importance of security affairs, the foreign policy of the nation receives at times more attention and is thought to be more important than domestic policy. Foreign policy does get a great deal of notice from the populace. Being small, a vast majority of what takes place in the world happens outside her borders. However, there is a strong tendency toward introversion, certainly not an unusual circumstance among nations. The outside perspective is strongly colored by Commonwealth events which are a tie to tradition. Basically, though, the New Zealand citizenry seem more preoccupied with internal concerns than with foreign policy, thus constituting a situation that would seem to contradict the second proposition. However, the hypothesis referred to, and the interview data, reflected opinions of decision makers, not of "public opinion." As applied to the former, the statement has more validity.

The third statement in the pre-theory cannot be definitely assessed for New Zealand. It posits that certain questions relating to security assume greater importance for small than large states. Since security is of utmost import to most nations, since the ability to judge such a factor is lacking, and since no data was available from a contrasting large state, the question is impossible to decide. It is interesting to note the plans announced by officials of the

United Arab Republic and Libya to unite, resulting in the swallowing up of the smaller power. This would seem to indicate that some small states do not hold sovereignty to be as valuable as others. Contrariwise, New Zealand has resisted proposals to federate with Australia. Of course neither the UAR case nor the New Zealand-Australia case involve threats to security, only to continuation of sovereignty in a historical sense.

Proposition 1:4 alleges that the small state will seek outside assistance to help maintain her sovereignty. This has been true of New Zealand. Founded as a colonial offshoot of Great Britain, there was no rush to independence; then after independence there was the tendency to remain close to London for cues in foreign and military policies. Although the New Zealand government has realigned itself since World War II with Pacific basin powers (Australia and the United States), Wellington's security policies have always been alignment oriented.

The fifth statement summarizes the policy goals of all states, large or small. National leaders tend to pursue postures that will befit their abilities, whether that means alignment or nonalignment. Proposition 1:6 is supported by New Zealand and relates to the previous one. It notes the tendency of developed small states to align and the opposite trend of underdeveloped small states to remain neutral. The

national interest perspective dictates this, and the respective positions of the older and newer states is understandable.

Other hypotheses of a general security character are those numbered 1:13-1:16. The first of these notes the narrower perspective with which small state governments, as contrasted with large, view their environment, a point which is undeniably true. New Zealand policies are definitely in line with proposition 1:14 as Wellington's foreign policy actions tend to be focused more in a single region than a major power's actions. This has been shown in security matters since the Second World War as the United States and Australia have assumed the role of the most important allies replacing the United Kingdom. Likewise in trade, Pacific basin partners are being developed rapidly, even though Western Europe still is a major patron.

Proposition 1:15 defies easy verification for New Zealand. It is difficult to determine whether a given small state is more dependent than a given large state; however, the context of the proposition found in Chapter II provides explanation for such a statement. In New Zealand's situation the dependence on others for security and trade are such that there is little reason to call into question the hypothesis.¹³

The final general hypothesis, i.e., 1:16, alleges that small states must pursue negative foreign policies because of

¹³See page 68.

their inability to take the offensive. Although New Zealand has positive programs in aid and certain nonpolitical areas, with reference to general defense and security matters this proposition is supported by her experience. To date there has not arisen an instance where positive unilateral actions were necessary, and it is hard to imagine what circumstances would present such an opportunity. If such an occasion presented itself, New Zealand would hardly be effective against any but her small island neighbors. From hardware and logistical standpoints she would be very limited.

(b) Fortunately, geography provides a very comfortable surrounding environment for the Wellington government and her people. The nearest neighbor of any size is Australia, a friendly Commonwealth state some 1200 miles to the west. When this type of isolation is compared with the position of Switzerland, Finland, or Libya, the advantages of New Zealand's position are obvious. Thus, as well as any other small power, New Zealand supports the proposition (1:7) that geographical factors such as insularity, position, and accessibility are still vital for the lesser powers.

Of course, what is advantageous in security terms becomes disadvantageous in commercial terms. Being small and relying on trade, New Zealand must pay shipping costs on goods coming into and going out of the country, and competition with states located closer to trade routes is therefore more difficult.

(c) In diplomatic and military affairs a small power is at an obvious disadvantage to large states. Disparities of manpower, industrial capability, and intelligence all are present to some degree in big power-small power relationships. New Zealand being a developed nation could certainly compete against a large power better than most underdeveloped states of similar size. Still, there would be little chance of victory for Wellington against a larger state.

Diplomatically, New Zealand does not attempt to maintain high commissions and/or consulates in all nations of the world or even in all of the most important ones. Much of the routine diplomacy with smaller powers is handled by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the efficiency of New Zealand's diplomatic corps, it will always be limited in manpower; general experience supports propositions 1:8 and 1:9.

Lack of size and an innocuous nature have provided at times good opportunity for overseas political leadership, thus adding weight to hypothesis 1:10. New Zealand's lead in various international organizations has been widely recognized. As a small member of the world community, New Zealand has been able to lead in assisting development of other small but underdeveloped countries, a role which might be denied a larger power because of unallayed suspicions.

Hypothesis 1:11 posits an inferior position militarily and diplomatically for the foreseeable future. With the

resources available to it, it is difficult to imagine the Wellington government opting for a high priority military development program. The only proven shortcut that could drastically alter New Zealand's weakness would be an effort to acquire a nuclear capability. Given the smallness and remoteness of the country, her alignment with the United States, and the feeling of the government and people, such a possibility is remote. If asked to reply to the question of perpetual military weakness for the foreseeable future, the average New Zealander would probably respond, "Who cares?" New Zealand's prospects, as well as past experience, support the proposition (1:11).

The last of the diplomatic and military hypotheses (1:12) alleges that small states possess a tenuous character resulting from their inability to defend themselves against security incursions. For New Zealand, there is not enough evidence to fully support or refute this statement. Presently, there appear no contingencies which would threaten the continued existence of the small insular nation. However, Japanese submarines prowled her coasts early in the Second World War, and alert conditions similar to those implemented along the west coast of North America were affected. It would be unwise to discount totally the possibility of any future wars which might threaten to disrupt New Zealand's quietude, but from our 1973 vantage point the future does not appear to hold imminent military peril.

(d) New Zealand has been an active participant and supporter of a variety of international organizations, a position very much in line with the first proposition on this topic (1:17). Particularly since World War II there has existed a firm commitment to the principles espoused by the major world and regional organizations. Proposition 1:18 reports small nation attitudes in these groupings as being opposed to some large state practices such as colonialism, military development, and economic imperialism. New Zealand's stand in this type of organization has been very consistent with these stands. Wellington's key platform has been in promoting the relaxation of trade barriers, a policy which would obviously suit New Zealand's national interest and which adds support to hypothesis 1:19. Thus far, small nations have not been very effective as go-betweens and mediators. Individuals from lesser powers, such as Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant, have experienced some success in negotiating disputes, but as a bloc, weak states possess neither the cohesiveness nor the mutuality of interest to be effective as a counter to major powers. New Zealand has been very typical in this regard. Interestingly, small states tend to cooperate with and support large states, rather than acting together.

Economic Policies

New Zealand benefitted from the years of tutelage as a British colony. It, therefore, avoided many of the growing

pains of developing nations in economic matters. Nevertheless, the future offers possibly the greatest challenge of New Zealand's national life. As the United Kingdom has entered the European Economic Community, Wellington has had to search for supplemental outlets for its products to replace the diminishing British market. This has placed considerable strain on an economy which has typically lived with a fairly fragile balance of trade.

In regards to proposition 2:1, New Zealand experience supports the assertion that economic vulnerability is part and parcel of being small. The international trade system has not been particularly congenial, with quotas often limiting the amount of imports a given country will accept. During the years the British entry into the Common Market was being negotiated, New Zealand worriedly, and even frantically, tried to protect its single most important trade outlet. Yet, there was not a great deal that could be done to alter the final outcome. There is a very real economic vulnerability which is not always tangibly evident.

Hypothesis 2:2, positing the marginal character of small state economies, cannot be supported by the New Zealand experience. Pressures are persistent, but one could not say objectively that their economy was functioning near the limits of viability. Indeed, if all nations used their economic potential to the degree Wellington does, the average standard of living would rise quickly. Smallness will always be

present, but the New Zealanders have learned how to cope with its economic problems.

Geographical location and lack of key resources make dependence on trade a fact of economic life. With numerous overseas trade contacts, the New Zealand government and business community must be apprized of economic trends in other areas of the globe, a condition which supports proposition 2:3. The writer recalls an interview with two Bank of New Zealand executives the afternoon after the Deutsch-mark was floated on the international monetary market in early May, 1971. There was concern, caution, and a protectiveness of New Zealand's position--a posture which typifies the attitude necessary among all states, but which is more intensely felt by the small country.

As noted above, New Zealand is active in international organizations, particularly in regard to economic unions such as the General Agreements on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Beyond these multilateral associations, New Zealand works toward effecting more relaxed trade barriers. Her experience strongly supports proposition 2:4.

Generally, New Zealand possesses similar economic characteristics to other smaller developed states. She has made the most of her assets, but because of the size and character of her economy she will continue to feel pressure to a greater extent than the average large power.

Psychological and Emotional Characteristics

From the data gathered in the research project and from numerous conversations informally, hypothesis 3:1 seems to be supported by New Zealand culture. This project was not designed to elicit responses which would measure psychological and/or emotional characteristics of New Zealanders. Yet in responding to the prepared questionnaire, many respondents volunteered comments on their country's smallness and ineptitude. Though unsolicited, these comments revealed a great deal about the national self-perception of the citizenry.

Most of the respondents noted the smallness of their country. Mr. John B. Quigg, in the Department of Agriculture, described his land as a "small fish in a big sea."¹⁴ Several interviewees noted the "brain drain" problem which affects many small states; others mentioned "remoteness" as being a factor in New Zealand's overseas dealings.¹⁵ Although the author has no other experience living in a small state, the outlook of New Zealanders stands in contrast to the American view which generally seems to be one of greater control of its circumstances.

Proposition 3:2 was unverifiable on the basis of this study as it pertained to the comparatively different views

¹⁴Interview 1-3.

¹⁵See, for example, interview 1-22 with Mr. Ian Clark of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and interview 1-24 with Mr. Nelson, then the Secretary to the Prime Minister.

held by underdeveloped and developed lesser nations. However, the next statement, hypothesis 3:3, relates to material in the preceding paragraph, i.e., the perceived ability of smaller powers to determine their own destiny. Politically, the New Zealanders are confident that their sovereignty is not now, nor is likely to be, threatened. Economically there is uncertainty. The persistent necessity to export large quantities of agricultural goods causes New Zealand to be in constant search for markets. Also, some interviewees noted their own dependence on overseas technology. For example, Mr. L. G. Crawford of the Railways Department indicated that there was no fundamental research being done by his sector.¹⁶ In view of such reports it is not surprising that doubts persist as to how much could be done to alter the condition of the country if faced by challenges to their well-being.

On the subject of proposition 3:4, i.e., the attitude assumed by small nations toward their plight, New Zealand opinions add support. There is seen some ambivalence of the type noted in the hypothesis, but a fairly large number of respondents recognized their national smallness and accepted the implications thereof. There was scarcely an attempt to magnify the admittedly slight role played by New Zealand on the world stage. In fact, many New Zealanders expressed derision toward the Australians for their alleged attempts to act like a larger power. However, tendencies to moralize

¹⁶Interview 1-37.

exist. Some assumed a status of superiority even while conceding that a powerful role is denied them. The fact remains that their metaphysical outlook differs from that of large states' citizens.

Linkages and New Zealand

Chapter III dealt extensively with the linkages of New Zealand, and little need be added here. Several observations bear repeating and expanding. In line with hypothesis 4:1, New Zealand relies more strongly on its external ties than most larger states do. There is less ability to produce needed goods, less chance of standing alone than for a nation such as the Soviet Union, France, or Italy. New Zealand depends on links for her livelihood economically and, to a lesser extent, politically.

Hypothesis 4:2, which posits that more links exist in developed than underdeveloped countries, cannot be verified or disproved by the current study. There was no research in the latter type nation with which to compare New Zealand data.

As to the linkage partners, New Zealand's case study supports the third statement which posits that small states tend to trade and ally with large states rather than with their own kind. Most of those perceived as leading influencers of New Zealand policy were large states, as was brought out in the previous Chapter III. Australia was the only nation from the category of small nations which figured

prominently in New Zealand linkages. Proposition 4:3 is strongly supported by New Zealand experience.

The fourth hypothesis concerning links (4:4) posits that more inputs from the environment tend to affect small states than outputs from small states affect the environment. By practically any standard of measurement, including the opinions of her own citizenry, New Zealand absorbs a greater amount of influence than it exudes. This is the normal status for the small nation.

Finally, the current study supports the supposition that linkages provide an indication of the lesser power's ability to survive (4:5). The New Zealand picture is one of dependence, one in which she must seek friendly assistance from larger neighbors in order to maintain development at the desired level. New Zealand is a borrower in most fields, even though her original accomplishments should not be minimized or discounted. Again, size considerations severely limit her ability to stand alone and plan a course independent of large states.

In summary, New Zealand's foreign policy lends firm support to the pre-theory in all major areas. Table 26 shows the results of the research as it related to the thirty-two hypotheses. The most striking feature is the lone proposition of the pre-theory which was not supported by New Zealand's experience. Hypothesis 2:2 which posits a perpetually precarious economic position for the lesser state, is not

TABLE 26

NEW ZEALAND AND THE PRE-THEORY
N=32

New Zealand Experience	N	%
Agrees with pre-theory	27	84
Disagrees with pre-theory	1	3
Insufficient data	4	13
Total	32	100

applicable to New Zealand. Though small, the economy has learned to cope with the problems of remoteness and with its essentially lopsided character. There are no verifiable signs that imminent collapse is a serious possibility. Four of the propositions related to the comparative positions of small developed and underdeveloped states. Since there were no data available from less developed countries, comparison was impossible.

By far the most significant point is the degree to which the data agree with the pre-theory of Chapter II. What is now needed is similar studies which would provide comparable data to that gathered in this venture. It would be particularly profitable to assess the differences which supposedly would exist between developed and underdeveloped states. There is much work which still needs to be done before the preliminary

statements of this project can be accepted or rejected. It is hoped that such efforts will be forthcoming.

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APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX B

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As of September, 1969, With Supplementary
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Countries of under 10 million: Alphabetically and Non-Communist (UN Members)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>GNP (1967)</u>	<u>GNP Per Capita</u>
1. Austria	7,349,000 (1968E)	\$ 8.86 bill.	\$1,210.00
2. Barbados	235,000 (1968E)	\$105 mill.	\$ 420.00
3. Belgium	9,619,000 (1968E)	\$ 16.67 bill.	\$1,740.00
4. Bolivia	4,680,000 (1968E)	\$645 mill.	\$ 170.00
5. Botswana	611,000 (1968E)	\$534 mill.	\$ 90.00
6. Burundi	3,500,000 (1968E)	\$165 mill.	\$ 50.00
7. Cambodia	6,557,000 (1968E)	\$835 mill.	\$ 130.00
8. Cameroon	5,562,000 (1968E)	\$710 mill.	\$ 130.00
9. Central African Republic	1,488,000 (1968E)	\$175 mill.	\$ 120.00
10. Chad	3,460,000 (1968E)	\$240 mill.	\$ 70.00
11. Chile	9,351,000 (1968E)	\$ 4.3 bill.	\$ 470.00
12. Congo	870,000 (1968E)	\$165 mill.	\$ 190.00
13. Costa Rica	1,640,000 (1968E)	\$655 mill.	\$ 410.00
14. Cyprus	619,000 (1968E)	\$480 mill.	\$ 780.00
15. Dahomey	2,571,000 (1968E)	\$200 mill.	\$ 80.00
16. Denmark	4,870,000 (1968E)	\$ 9.44 bill.	\$1,950.00
17. Dominican Republic	4,200,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.01 bill.	\$ 260.00
18. Ecuador	5,695,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.16 bill.	\$ 210.00
19. El Salvador	3,266,000 (1968E)	\$850 mill.	\$ 270.00
20. Equatorial Guinea	281,000 (1968E)	\$ 66 mill.	\$ 240.00
21. Finland	4,688,000 (1968E)	\$ 7.74 bill.	\$1,660.00
22. Gabon	480,000 (1968E)	\$195 mill.	\$ 410.00

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>GNP (1967)</u>	<u>GNP Per Capita</u>
23. Gambia	350,000 (1968E)	\$ 30 mill.	\$ 90.00
24. Ghana	8,376,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.63 bill.	\$ 200.00
25. Greece	8,803,000 (1968E)	\$ 6.1 bill.	\$ 700.00
26. Guatemala	4,864,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.46 bill.	\$ 310.00
27. Guinea	3,795,000 (1968E)	\$335 mill.	\$ 90.00
28. Guyana	710,000 (1968)	\$225 mill.	\$ 330.00
29. Haiti	4,674,000 (1968E)	\$320 mill.	\$ 70.00
30. Honduras	2,413,000 (1968E)	\$585 mill.	\$ 240.00
31. Iceland	200,000 (1968E)	\$335 mill.	\$1,690.00
32. Iraq	8,634,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.94 bill.	\$ 230.00
33. Ireland	2,910,000 (1968E)	\$ 2.64 bill.	\$ 910.00
34. Israel	2,745,000 (1968E)	\$ 3.2 bill.	\$1,200.00
35. Ivory Coast	4,100,000 (1968E)	\$255 mill.	\$ 50.00
36. Jamaica	1,913,000 (1968E)	\$865 mill.	\$ 460.00
37. Jordan	2,102,000 (1968E)	\$510 mill.	\$ 250.00
38. Kuwait	540,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.81 bill.	\$3,490.00
39. Laos	2,825,000 (1968E)	\$250 mill.	\$ 90.00
40. Lebanon	2,580,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.3 bill.	\$ 520.00
41. Lesotho	910,000 (1968E)	\$ 53 mill.	\$ 60.00
42. Liberia	1,130,000 (1968E)	\$210 mill.	\$ 190.00
43. Libya	1,803,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.24 bill.	\$ 720.00
44. Luxembourg	336,000 (1968E)	\$670 mill.	\$2,000.00
45. Madagascar	6,500,000 (1968E)	\$635 mill.	\$ 100.00
46. Malawi	4,285,000 (1968E)	\$250 mill.	\$ 60.00
47. Maldives	106,000 (1968E)	\$ 8 mill.	\$ 80.00
48. Mali	4,787,000 (1968E)	\$375 mill.	\$ 80.00
49. Malta	319,000 (1968E)	\$180 mill.	\$ 570.00
50. Mauritania	1,120,000 (1968E)	\$145 mill.	\$ 130.00
51. Mauritius	787,000 (1968E)	\$170 mill.	\$ 220.00
52. New Zealand	2,751,000 (1968E)	\$ 5.2 bill.	\$1,890.00
53. Nicaragua	1,842,000 (1968E)	\$640 mill.	\$ 360.00
54. Niger	3,806,000 (1968E)	\$250 mill.	\$ 70.00
55. Norway	3,819,000 (1968E)	\$ 7.04 bill.	\$1,860.00
56. Panama	1,372,000 (1968E)	\$730 mill.	\$ 550.00
57. Paraguay	2,231,000 (1968E)	\$475 mill.	\$ 220.00
58. Portugal	9,505,000 (1968E)	\$ 3.97 bill.	\$ 420.00
59. Rhodesia	4,670,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.04 bill.	\$ 230.00
60. Rwanda	3,405,000 (1968E)	\$198 mill.	\$ 60.00
61. Saudi Arabia	7,100,000 (1968E)	\$ 2.45 bill.	\$ 350.00
62. Senegal	3,685,000 (1968E)	\$700 mill.	\$ 190.00
63. Sierra Leone	2,475,000 (1968E)	\$340 mill.	\$ 140.00
64. Singapore	1,988,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.18 bill.	\$ 600.00
65. Somalia	2,745,000 (1968E)	\$135 mill.	\$ 50.00
66. Southern Yemen	1,195,000 (1968E)	\$150 mill.	\$ 130.00
67. Swaziland	395,000 (1968E)	\$110 mill.	\$ 280.00
68. Sweden	7,912,000 (1968E)	\$ 19.67 bill.	\$2,500.00

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>GNP (1967)</u>	<u>GNP Per Capita</u>
69. Switzerland	6,147,000 (1968E)	\$ 14.03 bill.	\$2,310.00
70. Syria	5,738,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.0 bill.	\$ 180.00
71. Togo	1,772,000 (1968E)	\$172 mill.	\$ 100.00
72. Trinidad & Tobago	1,021,000 (1968E)	\$800 mill.	\$ 790.00
73. Tunisia	4,660,000 (1968E)	\$960 mill.	\$ 210.00
74. Uganda	8,133,000 (1968E)	\$795 mill.	\$ 100.00
75. Upper Volta	5,175,000 (1968E)	\$255 mill.	\$ 50.00
76. Uruguay	2,818,000 (1968E)	\$ 1.53 bill.	\$ 550.00
77. Venezuela	9,686,000 (1968E)	\$ 8.23 bill.	\$ 880.00
78. Western Samoa	13,,000 (1968E)	\$ 17.4 mill.	\$ 130.00
79. Yemen	5,000,000 (1968E)	\$375 mill.	\$ 70.00
80. Zambia	4,080,000 (1968E)	\$710 mill.	\$ 180.00
81. Fiji	505,000	No Data Available	

Addenda to Previous List

Nations with less than \$300 Per Capita GNP and under 35 million (UN Members)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population (1968E)</u>	<u>GNP (1967)</u>	<u>GNP Per Capita (1967)</u>
1. Afghanistan	16,113,000	\$ 1.1 bill.	\$ 70.00
2. Algeria	12,943,000	\$ 3.14 bill.	\$250.00
3. Burma	26,389,000	\$ 1.81 bill.	\$ 70.00
4. Ceylon	11,964,000	\$ 1.87 bill.	\$160.00
5. Republic of China	13,466,000	\$ 3.29 bill.	\$250.00
6. Congo (Kinshasa)	16,730,000	\$ 1.47 bill.	\$ 90.00
7. Ethiopia	23,900,000	\$ 1.42 bill.	\$ 60.00
8. Iran	26,985,000	\$ 7.36 bill.	\$280.00
9. Malaysia	10,384,000	\$ 2.92 bill.	\$290.00
10. Morocco	14,580,000	\$ 2.685 bill.	\$190.00
11. Nepal	10,700,000	\$735 mill.	\$ 70.00
12. Sudan	14,770,000	\$ 1.29 bill.	\$ 90.00
13. Tanzania	12,590,000	\$975 mill.	\$ 80.00
14. Kenya	10,209,000	\$ 1.19 bill.	\$120.00

Addenda to Previous Lists

Nations with over \$300 GNP Per Capita and Population From
10-15 million

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population (1968E)</u>	<u>GNP (1967)</u>	<u>GNP Per Capita (1967)</u>
1. Argentina	23,617,000	\$18.6 bill.	\$ 800.00
2. Australia	12,031,000	\$23.15 bill.	\$1,970.00
3. Canada	20,772,000	\$48.65 bill.	\$2,380.00
4. Colombia	19,825,000	\$ 5.76 bill.	\$ 300.00
5. Netherlands	12,743,000	\$19.15 bill.	\$1,520.00
6. Peru	12,772,000	\$ 4.34 bill.	\$ 350.00
7. South Africa	19,167,000	\$11.41 bill.	\$ 590.00

APPENDIX C

Code: _____

LINKAGE QUESTIONNAIRE

Interviewee _____

Official Title _____

Date of Interview _____

1. What if any overseas ties link your sector to the external environment?

2. Are such links official or unofficial, explicit or tacit?
In other words, what is the nature of these links?

3. What if any effect do these links to overseas nations or international organizations have on policy formation in your sector?

4. What influence does your sector's recommendations have on New Zealand's external relations with nation-states and/or international organizations?
5. From which geographical direction do the greatest influences to your sector's affairs derive?
6. What sort of influences does your sector attempt to exert on other international entities? What states and international organizations are most affected by actions taken in your sector? Would you estimate that more inputs flow from your sector to outside entities, or vice versa?
7. How many of your personnel receive overseas training? Are there citizens from other countries serving in your sector? If so, how many, and in what capacities (e.g., clerical, administrative, etc.)? Do officials of your sector make regular or frequent overseas visits on business related to your work?

Evaluation: _____

APPENDIX D

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES BY CATEGORY

I. Government Departments and Ministries

Mr. J. J. Bryant	Treasury Department	Head of External Economics, Political Section
Mr. D. McClain	Department of Defense	Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mr. John B. Quigg	Department of Agriculture	Senior Investigating Officer
Mr. B. Rockel	Crown Law Department	Crown Counsel
Mr. L. L. Meek	Customs Department	Administrative Officer
Mr. J. Lee	New Zealand Forest Service	Supervisor of Information
Mr. William Nicholson	New Zealand Electricity Department	Office Solicitor
Mr. J. Gellatly	Government Life Insurance Department	Supervisor of New Business
Mr. W. E. B. Tucker	Department of Industries and Commerce	Director of Trade Policy
Mrs. L. Downey	Department of Education	Head of External Relations Section
Mr. R. J. Gray	Health Department	Executive Officer
Mr. Robert Phillips	Inland Revenue Department	Senior Investigating Officer
Mr. K. Gillis	Audit Department	Auditor-General

Mrs. R. Simons	Government Printing Office	Publications Officer
Miss G. Webb	Justice Department	Senior Legal Advisor
Mr. B. Murray	Department of Labour	International Labor Organization Officer
Mr. L. McVeagh	Law Drafting Department	Senior Draftsman
Mr. W. Atkinson	Marine Department	Public Affairs Officer
Mr. W. Connal	Maori and Island Affairs Department	Public Affairs Officer
Mr. J. Harris	Police Department	Senior Sergeant--Correspondence Section
Mr. L. F. Jones	Mines Department	Chief Inspector
Mr. Ian Clark	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (External Aid Division)	Head of Experts in Projects
Mr. C. P. Littlejohn	Legislative Department	Clerk-Assistant--House of Representatives
Mr. C. Nelson	Prime Minister's Department	Secretary to the Prime Minister
Mr. J. C. Kerslake	Public Trust Department	District Solicitor--Wellington
Mr. I. F. Stirling	Lands and Survey Department	Assistant Surveyor-General
Mr. D. N. Ryan	State Services Commission	Secretary
Mr. J. B. McKinney	Statistics Department	Divisional Director
Mr. L. J. Key	Ministry of Works	Director of Personnel
Mr. J. Kennedy-Good	Ministry of Transport	Senior International Relations Officer

Mr. G. J. Brocklehurst	Social Security Department	Director
Mr. A. Morris	Tourist and Publicity Depart- ment	Senior Research Officer
Mr. R. Young	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Economic Section)	Research Officer
Mr. R. W. Prestney	State Insurance Department	Manager
Mr. J. Struthers	Post Office Department	Public Relations Officer
Mr. I. J. Babe	State Advances Corporation	Deputy General Manager
Mr. L. G. Crawford	Railways Department	Assistant General Manager
Mr. D. R. B. Dodson	Valuation Depart- ment	Registrar
Mr. T. C. Larkin	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Deputy Minister
Mr. K. Richards	Legislative Depart- ment (Government Research Unit)	Research Officer
Mr. H. E. Gilbert	Security Intelli- gence Service	Security Chief
Dr. R. W. Willett	Department of Scientific and Ind. Research	Assistant Director- General

II. Political Parties

Mr. Ralph Wilson	National Centre Party	General Director
Mr. William Nairn	Labour Party	Assistant Secretary
Mr. M. J. Glubb	Social Credit League	Dominion Secretary

III. Private Groups, Lobbies, Interest Groups, etc.

Mr. S. G. A. Frost	Manufacturers' Federation	Information Officer
Mr. T. A. Currie	Retailers' Federation	Secretary
Mr. M. R. Richards	Employers' Federation	Executive Officer
Mr. G. R. Lee	Medical Association of New Zealand	Executive Secretary
Mr. G. W. Annand	Chamber of Commerce	Director
Mr. R. E. Morgan	New Zealand Rugby Football Union	Secretary
Mr. K. C. Wilkinson	New Zealand Table Tennis Association	Secretary
Mr. W. J. Knox	Federation of Labour	General Secretary-Treasurer
Rev. David Taylor	National Council of Churches	Executive Secretary
Mrs. R. K. Dell	National Council of Women	National President
Mr. James Thompson	National Council	Director
Mr. Lindsay Wright	New Zealand University Students Association	Educational Research Officer

IV. Quasi-Governmental Agencies, Boards, etc.

Mr. J. Watson	Council of Educational Research	Director
Mr. R. Jones	Meat Board	Chief Executive Promotional Officer
Sir Guy Powles	Office of Parliamentary Commissioner for Complaints	Ombudsman

Mr. W. D. Grace	Wool Board	Director of Information
Mr. I. H. McClean	New Zealand Broad- casting Company	Administrative Officer
Mr. Peter Hampton	Vice-Chancellor's Committee	Secretary
Mr. A. J. Goldfinch	Dairy Board	Director of Information
V. <u>Businesses</u>		
Mr. Gerald Scott	Bank of New Zealand	Deputy-Manager (International Division)
Mr. H. Pierce Brown	New Zealand Forest Products, Ltd.	Deputy Export Sales Manager
Mr. A. Notley	Europa Oil Company	Company Secretary

APPENDIX E

HYPOTHESES OF SMALL NATION FOREIGN POLICY

1. For the small state, matters of security dominate foreign policy considerations.
2. Therefore, foreign policy often gets more attention than domestic policy.
3. Therefore, questions related to military posture, alignment or non-alignment, and appropriate external responses assume proportionately greater significance than in large states.
4. The overriding importance of security forces the inherently weak small state to seek outside assistance in order to ensure maintenance of sovereignty.
5. Therefore, the prevalent policies adopted by lesser entities have been the result of leaders' assessments of national interest.
6. Therefore, the posture of older, developed states has tended toward alignment with the Western democracies, while the newer, underdeveloped states have pursued non-alignment policies.
7. Geographic factors such as position, accessibility, insularity, and natural boundaries largely determine the security and economic fate of a small nation.
8. Because of size differences, small states suffer weaknesses diplomatically and militarily which severely limit their activities vis-a-vis large powers.
9. Therefore, diplomacy of lesser states is narrower in scope, more limited in manpower, dependent on others for intelligence, and more conscious of efficiency than that of larger counterparts.
10. However, size disparity can bring advantages which somewhat balance disadvantages in the diplomatic field.

11. Disparity of size prevents the small state from being truly competitive militarily with the large state at the present time and for the foreseeable future.
12. Therein lies the basis of the tenuous character of small states, since economic, psychological, and political well-being ultimately depend on security as provided by the military.
13. Because of their diminutive size, small states necessarily view the international system with a much narrower perspective than large states.
14. Therefore, policy actions tend to hold local rather than world-wide significance.
15. These policies tend to be more strongly dependent on the external world than policies pursued by large states.
16. This results in a negative foreign policy which is largely a reaction to stimuli from without, rather than a policy which is positively planned and executed from domestic origin.
17. Small nations support the principles, activities and institutions which have tended to further the causes of collective security, dissemination of technical knowledge, and spreading of economic advantage.
18. Their activities in such organizations are aimed at substituting small state wishes for policies regarding colonialism, military development, and economic imperialism, and thus represents a major facet in the essentially negative nature of small state policies.
19. Positive contributions as mediators and peace enforcers neither assure the success of the respective organization nor conceal the basic self-interest motivation which results in enthusiastic small nation support for international organizations.
20. Small nations suffer economic problems which make them more vulnerable to international pressure than large states.
21. While not insurmountable, problems such as size of domestic market, difficulty of marketing goods overseas, and lack of natural resources force the small nation to always function near the limits of economic viability.

22. Dependency on overseas trade for natural resources and as an outlet for manufactured goods places the small state in a precarious position when global economic trends change.
23. The result of these factors is to cause small states to seek special privileges in trading communities or common market arrangements which tend to reduce trade barriers.
24. Small nation publics' view the world from a different perspective than large nations.
25. This difference is more pronounced in the newer, less-developed states than in older, established states.
26. Differences seem to derive from the level of perceived ability to alter the respective state's political position and economic condition.
27. Small nations appear to either accept their lot knowingly or through the imitation of large states try to act a part they cannot fulfill.
28. Small nations are more dependent on linkages to the outside world than larger states because they cannot be as nearly self sufficient in factors related to politics and economics.
29. Linkages tend to be more numerous among developed lesser powers and their environments than among under-developed lesser powers and their respective environments.
30. Small nation links tend to be stronger and more numerous to large states than to others of approximately their same size.
31. For small states there tend to be more inputs from the environment than outputs to the environment, i.e., the small state is more affected by what goes on around it than its environment is affected by the actions of the lesser power.
32. A small state's linkages provide an indicator of its ability to function as a sovereign entity.