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MANANDHAR, Mangal Siddhi, 1941-
    THE IDEA OF ONE ARAB NATION-STATE: A
STUDY IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973
Geography

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE IDEA OF ONE ARAB NATION-STATE: A STUDY

IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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Norman, Oklahoma

1973

THE IDEA OF ONE ARAB NATION-STATE: A STUDY

IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer is especially grateful to Dr. Ralph E.
Olson for much-needed guidance throughout the preparation of
this dissertation, and for the tremendous amount of his valu-
able time spent in making this work possible. Gratitude is
also extended to Dr. Gary L. Thompson and Dr. Marvin W. Baker
for their valuable suggestions, and to Dr. Harry E. Hoy and
Dr. John W. Morris for their encouragement.

The writer extends his appreciation to the many Arab
friends on the University of Oklahoma campus for their help
in gathering information. Last but not least, thanks must go
to my friend, Kay Coffey, for helping in every possible way
and for typing the final draft of this dissertation.

This work is dedicated to my father,
Jagat Narayan Manandhar,
who is no more.

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INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

According to Pan-Arab nationalists, there is an Arab

nation numbering more than one hundred million people. It

occupies a contiguous geographical area and has a strong

sense of common identity. Within it, they say, the idea of

a single Arab nation-state is deeply embedded.[1] The spatial

framework of this Arab nation-state is illustrated by the

speech of a Saudi Arabian delegate to the United Nations in

which he said that "Arab nationalism will not give up a span

of territory of the Arab fatherland from the Atlantic to the

Arabian Gulf, and from the northern extremity of the United

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[1]A number of writers have explored the theoretical as
well as the practical aspects of nations and nationalism.
For example, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), and The Historical
Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1949); Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in
Its Origin and Background (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1945); Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955); and Rupert Emerson, From
Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and
African Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1960).

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Arab Republic down to the southern borders of the Sudan in the heart of Africa."[1]

As early as 1945, just at the close of World War II, H. A. R. Gibb, a well-known historian of the Middle East, wrote that it was no longer a question of whether Arabs could unite, that rather the question was: "On what terms and in what relation to the outer world will Arab unity be realized?"[2] Confidence in the inevitability of Arab unity with the termination of Turkish, British, French, and Italian colonialism was strongly expressed by Nejlah Izzeddin: "Unity is a basic underlying norm in the life of the Arab peoples; their division in separate entities is a transient phase of recent intrusion."[3] Fayez A. Sayegh, an Arab political scientist, looking at the region in 1958, concluded: "The idea of Arab unity is a primary fact of political life in the Arab world today."[4]

Such Arab unity sentiments as those just expressed presumed that the Arab people's sense of nationhood and territory would naturally lead to statehood. These assumptions,

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[1]Henry Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," The Middle East Journal, XVI (Winter, 1962), p. 48, quoting Ahmad Shugayri, Saudi Arabian Delegate to the United Nations, an address to the General Assembly, August 15, 1958.

[2]H. A. R. Gibb, "Toward Arab Unity," Foreign Affairs, XXIV (October, 1945), p. 119.

[3]Nejlah Izzeddin, The Arab World (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 314.

[4]Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958), p. 213.

however, overlooked some very important stumbling blocks

along the road from nationhood to statehood. The Arab nation

has not yet impressed the idea of cultural unity into the

political landscape of the earth. The purpose of this disser-

tation is to examine the idea of one Arab nation-state, its

genesis and development, and the factors which have tended to

promote or obstruct the achievement of this ideal. An attempt

will be made to provide an explanation for the delays in the

realization of one Arab nation-state and to draw some meaning-

ful conclusions as to the future prospects for such a state.

This study begins with the presumption of the exist-

ence of one Arab nation, in the cultural sense of that term,

and acknowledges the efforts in the direction of political

unification as expressive of Arab nationalism.[1] It is recog-

nized here that the desire for political unification, i.e.,

the drive to create a single Arab nation-state, is a viable

force and that efforts toward this goal will continue in the

future. It is not assumed here that all, or even most, of

the existing Arab countries will be brought into one political

union in the near future. In the midst of the recent turbu-

lence in the Arab World, it does seem that the situation is

becoming more favorable to the one Arab state idea. Political

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[1]Fayez A. Sayegh distinguishes three main objectives
of Arab nationalism: emancipation from foreign domination,
socio-economic development, and political unification. Ibid.,
p. 5. The last-named objective, that of political unification,
in the present context may also be called Pan-Arabism.

scientists and historians have written at length about the divisive forces and the cohesive forces operating within the Arab nation, or Arab World. This study, while recognizing the reality of these forces, is focused primarily on the spatial aspect of the Arab unity problem. Some political geographers have differentiated between the terms "political area" and "political action area" in analyzing the state-idea. According to Cohen and Rosenthal, "political area refers to a part of the earth's surface that has location and content and is legally organized and bounded."[1] For the purpose of this study the definition has been somewhat modified. As used here, the term political area will refer to a part of the earth's surface not necessarily enclosed by political boundaries but where there is a commitment of the people to a certain idea--in this case, the idea of unity. The area under study is an area bounded by the outer limit of a people's consciousness of their being Arab and within which there is a commitment to the idea of one Arab nation-state. The political area thus refers to all the Arab-occupied territories where there is the potential for the unity idea.

The "political action area," again according to Cohen and Rosenthal, "refers to the specific area on which political transactions make their impact."[2] In this study,

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[1]Saul B. Cohen and Lewis D. Rosenthal, "A Geographical Model for Political Systems Analysis," The Geographical Review, LXI (January, 1971), p. 31.

[2]Ibid.

when referring to the political action area of the unity idea,
the writer has reference to an area where until recently the
idea had intense commitment from many of the people but no
successful impact. At present, however, a more real political
action area is evident in the recent establishment of the
Federation of Arab Republics.

The potential for unification has been enhanced
somewhat by new and changing realities in the Arab World,
especially by the emergence of Egypt during the past twenty
years as a strong leader among the Arab states and a potential
primary core area for the Arab nation. The Arabs' improved
understanding of their national ideology, their united stand
against Israel, and the new economic conditions created by
Arab oil wealth have brightened the prospect for unification.
The creation of the Federation of Arab Republics by the
governments of Egypt, Libya, and Syria in September, 1971, is
the latest evidence of the potency of these new conditions.

Background

Since the modern awakening of Arab national con-
scousness in the late nineteenth century, the longing among
Arabs for political unity has increased tremendously. Never-
theless, several attempts toward political unification have
ended in essential failure. The first of these attempts,
that of the Sherif of Mecca in leading a revolt against
Turkey during World War I, was shattered by the secret
Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In 1945 another unity attempt,

this one encouraged by the British Government, produced the Arab League, which so far has fallen far short of its long range objective of political union. The Arab League is still only a voluntary association of sovereign states agreeing to coordinate their policies towards the common good of all.

To fortify their anti-Israeli stance and ward off a potential anti-communist threat from within, Egypt and Syria merged their governments and formed the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958. Within five weeks the Kingdom of Yemen was federated with the U.A.R. under an umbrella designation, the United Arab States. The changes set in motion by the creation of the United Arab Republic were of monumental significance to the aspiration of other Arabs for unity, but their hopes were soon marred by contradictory and self-defeating actions among the Arabs themselves. The Yemen link to the U.A.R. was never very meaningful, and after only three years, in 1961, the Syrian regime also broke away from its Egyptian ally. Egypt, however, retained as its official name the United Arab Republic for whatever usefulness it might have in the future. Somewhat in response to the Egyptian-Syrian merger, the more conservative governments of Jordan and Iraq declared unity under the term Arab Union on February 14, 1958. A violent revolution in Iraq the following summer, overthrowing the dictatorship of the prime minister, General Nuri al-Said,

ended the Union in summary fashion and led to Iraq's with-

drawal from the anti-communist oriented Baghdad Pact.[1]

The Tangier Conference of April 1958 adopted a

Resolution for the Unification of the Arab Maghreb (Tunisia,

Morocco, and Algeria), but Algerian Arabs for the next

several years were involved in a bitter war for independence

from France, and nothing of substance came from the resolu-

tion. Since Algerian independence in 1962, relations have

been fairly cool between the conservative monarchy in Morocco

and the left-leaning republican regime in Algeria.

While the international arrangements just mentioned

all demonstrated efforts at Arab political union, none of the

federations survived. Another unification attempt was made in

April, 1963, by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, when their leaders

signed a Syrian proposal for a so-called federal union with a

common foreign policy and a unified system of defense. Once

again the forces of disunion overcame the desire for unity,

and the proposed federation was never realized. The more

recent federation of Libya, Egypt, and Syria, proclaimed in

September 1971, is another attempt towards Arab political

union. The various unity developments just mentioned clearly

show that, even in the face of several failures, the idea of

Arab political union is still a strong force. More efforts

to implement the idea of one Arab nation-state can be

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[1]The Baghdad Pact was an anti-communist pact, directed
primarily against the U.S.S.R., formed in 1955 by the United
Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.

anticipated, although the obstacles to their success are real and almost equally persistent.

Review of the Literature

There is a vast amount of general geographical literature on the Arab World, but most of it does not deal directly with the topic of political integration and will not be reviewed here. A number of the more important general works have, however, been included in the bibliography. Most of the scholarly research on Arab political unity and/or disunity has been done by historians and political scientists. The interface of politics and geography in the Middle East and North Africa has not been given much attention and, as a result, misleading conceptions are common even on the subject of what territories might be included within one Arab nation-state.

A careful search of the available literature has revealed only a few publications which deal in some depth with the potentiality of one Arab nation-state. Perhaps the best of these is the previously mentioned book of Fayez A. Sayegh, which traces the origin and development of the Arab unity concept up to 1958 in a very scholarly and interesting way.[1] Being a political scientist, Sayegh emphasized in his work the theoretical, or ideological, development of the idea of one Arab nation-state. For him the political idea of one Arab

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[1]Sayegh, Arab Unity.

nation-state was spatially coterminous with the cultural area of the Arab World. He failed to see, or chose to ignore, disconformities which exist between the political action area of the unity idea and the political area of that idea. The main purpose of his book seems to be the propagation of a new ideological basis for Arab nationalism. According to Sayegh, the traditional concept of an Arab nation-in-being is a static concept, and he chooses to replace it with the dynamic doctrine of a nation-in-becoming. He sees a theoretical weakness in the traditional concept of Arab political union, reflected in the attitudes of some of the local political leaders, and regards it as the main stumbling block in the way to political unification of the Arab World.

Harold W. Glidden, a historian, seems on the other hand to be much more aware of the disconformity that has existed between geographical extent of the idea of one Arab nation-state and its likely political action area.[1] Glidden points out that from the very inception of the modern idea of one Arab nation-state, early in this century, any implementation would have resulted in at least two independent Arab states instead of one. He suggests that one of these might have been a constitutional monarchy including the entire area of present-day Iraq, Syria (with perhaps a special status for Lebanon), Jordan, Israel, and most of the Arabian

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[1] Harold W. Glidden, "Arab Unity: Ideal and Reality," The World of Islam, ed. James Kritzeck and R. Bayly Winder (London: Macmillan and Company, 1959), pp. 249-254.

Peninsula. A second state, the Kingdom of Hijaz, would probably have remained an independent kingdom as a home for the Arab Caliphate.[1] Husain, the Sherif of Mecca, in his correspondence with the British Government in 1915-16, based his demands on the above proposition. None of the North African Arabs were to be included within the two proposed states. According to Glidden, any strong desire for Arab political unity was largely confined to the Hijaz in the western fringe of the Arabian Peninsula.[2] With the passage of time, however, Arab nationalism has extended throughout the Arab World, and the sense of Arab cultural identity has intensified. On the other hand, inconsistencies continue to exist between the sphere of the political idea and its likely political action area in the near future.

During the time when there were still several Arab countries under colonial rule, some Arab nationalists thought that to achieve the Pan-Arab dream of political union all that was needed was the termination of foreign rule. Now that independence is a reality in all the Arab countries, Arab nationalists are becoming more aware of their differences and of the difficulties that lie on the way to political unification. Glidden puts it thus: "The reality is that while the British and French action exacerbated Arab disunity, it did not create it."[3] Similar views have been expressed by a number of authors, although they disagree somewhat on the

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[1]Ibid., p. 251. [2]Ibid. [3]Ibid., p. 249.

relative importance of the main factors of disunity, depending upon their academic field or special interest.

Henry Siegman points out the historical fact that since 756 A.D. there never has existed political unity among the Arabs.[1] He sees it thus:

> Arab nationalism postulates the existence of a collective
> Arab national consciousness which demands political
> self-realization in a single united state comprising all
> Arab lands. Arab history "argues against the existence
> of one Arab nation at any time."[2]

Although not arguing the unattainability of the goal of one Arab nation-state, Siegman sees it as important to bring the Arab nationalists back to reality so that "it may help to make the transition less painful."[3]

Fayez A. Sayegh differs with Henry Siegman in assuming the existence of a spirit of political unity of the Arab World when nearly all of it (except for Morocco and the Sudan) lay within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.[4] Sayegh does not regard the Arabs' urge for political unity as unique; rather, he sees it as "a normal desire, on the part of a given national community, for political unity in a world in which nationhood invariably strives for statehood."[5] As noted earlier, to Sayegh the static concept of Arab nationalism, i.e., the nation-in-being idea, is the main stumbling block to Arab political unity. The nation-in-being concept

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[1]Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," p. 48.

[2]Ibid., p. 59.   [3]Ibid.   [4]Sayegh, Arab Unity, p. 23.

[5]Ibid., p. 211.

is similar to the European concept of nationhood, the determinants of which are common language, history, culture, and territory. Sayegh writes that, based on this concept, some "Arab nationalists proclaimed the doctrine of an Arab nation-in-being," while the same concept was used "by other Arabs to vindicate particularistic ideologies of nationhood, to proclaim multiple nationhood in the Arab World, and to assert that the Arab World constituted not one nation but a family of kindred nations."[1]

H. A. R. Gibb regards "geography as the most important factor in the life of the Arab."[2] As he sees it, "the seemingly compact block of Arab lands breaks up, on close examination, into series of narrow and often discontinuous fringes of cultivable land, grouped in the east around a central core of desert and strung out in the west between a still vaster desert and the sea."[3] This geographical influence of the desert in isolating the Arab lands from each other is regarded by Gibb as responsible for each individual region's "developing a political life of its own."[4] He attributes to the environmental influence the development of two conflicting life styles, one nomadic, one sedentary. Nomadism is dwindling, however, as in the last decade great

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[1]Ibid., p. 86.

[2]H. A. R. Gibb, "The Future for Arab Unity," The Near East: Problems and Prospects, ed. Philip W. Ireland (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 71.

[3]Ibid. [4]Ibid., p. 72.

efforts have been made by the Arab governments to settle the wandering Bedouins and bring them more fully into the national scene.

In addition to the obvious settlement discontinuities associated with the desert environment, other divisive aspects of the Arab World have been noted by a number of writers. Emil Lengyel, like Gibb, points to the natural frontiers in the Middle East, and economic disparities.[1] Hans E. Tütsch calls attention to geopolitical problems resulting from local and regional nationalism and the presence of non-Muslim minorities.[2] Carlton S. Coon emphasizes sociological differences.[3]

Probably the most complete discussion of the divisive factors within the Arab World is that of Nabih Amin Faris and Mohammed Tawfik Husayn in their book published in 1955.[4] These writers have given ample treatment to cultural, religious, and political factors, but have not adequately recognized the role of geographical discontinuities. Some of

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[1]Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York: The John Day Company, Inc., Publishers, 1960), pp. 132-134.

[2]Hans E. Tütsch, "Arab Unity and Dissensions," The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 12-23, 26-27.

[3]Carlton S. Coon, Caravan: The Story of the Middle East (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1958), p. 352.

[4]Nabih Amin Faris and Mohammed Tawfik Husayn, The Crescent in Crisis (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1955).

the divisive factors Faris and Husayn recognized in 1955 no longer exist. There is, for example, no longer any active foreign imperialism in the Arab World.

The prevailing view is that the major unifying factors in the Arab World are the common Arabic language, the Islamic religion and culture, much common history, and the vigorous nationalist outlook of some of the modern Arab leaders. Faris and Husayn stress also the improved communication links and gradually merging economic interests as other unifying factors. No writer, however, seems to have analyzed with any thoroughness the unifying force generated by the common Arab interest in gaining control of oil fields and raising revenue from oil marketing. The increasing need for an Arab common market as a stimulus to regional economic development is also a somewhat neglected theme.

After examining the existing literature on the topic of one Arab nation-state, it seems clear that the following aspects deserve further attention from political scientists and political geographers:

1. The spatial character of the one Arab state idea and the political action area of that idea.

2. The significance of the lack of a predominant core area for the one Arab state idea, at least until the late 1950's.

3. The interplay of the specific divisive and unifying factors in the Arab World with particular attention to new emerging forces.

Justification

A study in depth of the idea of one Arab nation-state is of great significance because, as Henry Siegman puts it, "the powerful reality of the goal and the forces straining in its direction" themselves produce tensions and conflicts in the region.[1] It is in the interest of Arabs, and indeed of the world, to understand those tensions and conflicts and to be able to handle them in a peaceful way. For the Arabs, either future peace and orderly progress or dissension and retarded economic development among themselves is the future course--the one taken will depend on whether or not they understand the meaning of the competing forces. As for the developed world, Arab countries at peace can continue to supply the bulk of their demand for imported oil, without which the wheels of western industry would be brought to a halt. Strategically, the Arab World connects Asia, Africa, and Europe, making peace in this area of vital importance to everyone. The study which follows is an attempt to improve understanding of the geographical aspects of the problems of Arab political unity, without which there can be little political stability in the region.

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[1]Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," p. 49.

Approach

The study is basically an application of the political

geographic approach developed by Richard Hartshorne in his

Presidential Address to the Association of American Geographers

in 1949, modified slightly by the later related theories of

Jean Gottmann, Karl W. Deutsch, Stephen B. Jones, and Saul B.

Cohen and Lewis Rosenthal.[1] According to Hartshorne, after

carefully identifying the underlying idea or raison d'être

of the state in the analysis of a state area, the

> first concern is to determine the area to which the
> idea applies; then the degree to which it operates in
> the different regions, and finally the extent of
> correspondence of those regions to the territory actually
> included within the state.
> On this basis, we may approach the most elementary
> problem in political geography--namely that of distin-
> guishing within the legal confines of its territory,
> those regions that form integral parts of the state-idea,
> and those parts that must be recognized as held under
> control, in the face of indifference or of opposition
> on the part of the regional population.[2]

Many of the same ideas recur in the theoretical

writing of Jones and of Cohen and Rosenthal. All of these

writers agree with Hartshorne that political idea and

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[1]Richard Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Polit-
ical Geography," Annals AAG, XL (March, 1950), pp. 95-130;
Jean Gottmann, "The Political Partitioning of Our World: An
Attempt at Analysis," World Politics, IV (July, 1952),
pp. 512-519; Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some
Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration,"
World Politics, V (January, 1953), pp. 168-195; Stephen B.
Jones, "A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography,"
Annals AAG, XLIV (March, 1954), pp. 111-123; and Cohen and
Rosenthal, The Geographical Review, LXI (January, 1971),
pp. 5-32.

[2]Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political
Geography," p. 101.

political area are not necessarily synonymous in extent. Jones
uses the word "field" to express the political area where a
given political idea actually operates. Cohen and Rosenthal
use terms like "political action area" and "field of action"
for the same concept. In applying the Hartshorne terminology,
the whole Arab World from Morocco to Iraq becomes the politi-
cal area of the idea of one Arab state, and within it lie
smaller areas possessing various degrees of identification
with the one state idea. It is difficult to measure the
precise degree to which the political idea of one Arab state
is embedded in any given group of Arabs. It is hoped,
however, that a detailed examination of geographic, historic,
and economic considerations, of the distribution of non-Arab
ethnic groups in the Arab World, of the constitutions of the
Arab states, the speeches of important Arab political leaders,
and recent events like the referendum held in Egypt, Libya,
and Syria in 1971 on the question of federation, will together
provide a basis for reasonable judgments.

The study of the state-idea will be followed by a
critical examination of the core areas in the Arab World.[1]
The lack of focus, or central core, for the idea of one Arab

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[1]Derwent Whittlesey defines core area as "the area
in which or about which a state originates"; see The Earth
and the State: A Study of Political Geography (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1939), p. 597. For a general
theoretical discussion of core areas, see Norman J. G.
Pounds and Sue Simons Ball, "Core Areas and the Development
of the European States System," Annals AAG, LIV (March, 1964),
pp. 24-40.

nation-state has greatly hindered its uninterrupted development. Deutsch identifies eight uniformities in the growth of nations into states, one of which is "the social mobilization of rural population in core areas within them, and between town and country."[1] It is helpful if a single core area is present around which a nation can be built into a state. Political geographers like Norman J. G. Pounds have observed that "most states have grown from a central area," i.e., a core area.[2]

In the Arab World the development of several core areas prior to the emergence of the idea of one Arab state left the state-idea without a strong territorial focus. This deficiency was not corrected until the late 1950's when Egypt finally assumed an embracing Arab leadership and called through the voice of Radio Cairo for a closer Arab unity. Until recently, however, the idea of one Arab state was without an obvious core--as one writer put it, "around which other territories could build themselves up like the soft parts around the bones of a skeleton."[3]

In examining the state-idea and its important component part, the core area, the study analyzes those

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[1]Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," p. 172.

[2]Norman J. G. Pounds, Political Geography (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 172.

[3]Ibid., p. 171, quoting Lucien Febvre, A Geographical Introduction to History.

forces which have tended to bring the idea into the landscape
(i.e., the centripetal forces) and those which have tended
to keep the political divisions as they are or subdivide them
further (i.e., the centrifugal forces), with particular
emphasis on the new elements involved. The operative inte-
grative forces include nationalist movements, administrative
centralization, a homogeneous population, common language,
common religion, common history, sharing of economic interests,
common cultural heritage, the external threat of a common
enemy, a state-idea, and a powerful and influential core area.
The forces just enumerated may be found singly or in various
combinations. Almost every state, along with its binding
factors, has some active disintegrative forces. These
disintegrative forces may be regionalism, ethnic diversity,
multiple languages, divergent economic interests, ideological
differences, or physical geographic contrasts.[1] The
survival of a state, or the amalgamation of several political
units into one larger state, depends on which of these sets
of forces, disintegrative or integrative, proves the stronger.
An attempt is made throughout the study to emphasize the
dynamic character of the forces involved.

To achieve one Arab nation-state would mean the
successful political integration of the several existing
Arab states. Political integration, however, has meant

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[1]For a discussion of these integrating and disinte-
grating forces see Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in
Political Geography."

different things to different political theorists.[1] A

traditional view has been that even with a bare minimum of

cultural and political homogeneity among the people concerned,

well-designed supranational institutions would suffice to

bring about the desired unity. An alternate view of political

integration focuses its attention on the process of transfer-

ring loyalties to new political institutions rather than on

the specific institution created.[2] Following this point of

view, political integration means a process leading to a

condition where groups and individuals are more loyal to

their central institutions than they are to their local ones.

A third meaning of political integration, perhaps best

defined by Bruce M. Russett, is the "notion of responsiveness,

or the probability that requests emanating from one state to

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[1]For further comparative discussion of the different
meanings of political integration see Bruce M. Russett,
"Transactions, Community, and International Political
Integration," Journal of Common Market Studies, IX (March,
1971), pp. 224-245.

[2]This second view is illustrated in the work of
Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1958). Other theoretical works with
similar views are Amitai Etzioni, "A Paradigm for the Study
of Political Integration," World Politics, XV (Autumn,
1962), p. 44; Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of
European Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1963); and Leon Lindberg, "Political Integration as a
Multi-Dimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multi-Variate Measure-
ment," International Organization, XXIV (Autumn, 1970),
pp. 20-34.

another will be met favorably."[1] In a later publication

Russett has introduced another related definition of political

integration, that is, "unity of action in relation to the

external system."[2] Still a fifth meaning of political

integration is that given by Karl Deutsch. According to him,

political integration is the avoidance of war under condi-

tions of continued voluntary association. Deutsch's defini-

tion of successful integration is spelled out as follows in

Political Community and the North Atlantic Area:

> A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become "integrated."
> By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.
> By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group . . . that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change."
> By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.[3]

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[1]Russett, "Transactions, Community, and International Political Integration," p. 227. This idea was expressed by Russett originally in his two books Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), and International Regions and the International System (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).

[2]Russett, "Transactions, Community, and International Political Integration," p. 243.

[3]Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 2. For further discussion of political integration by Karl W. Deutsch see also his book entitled Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).

A security-community, according to Deutsch, can be
of two types. One type is the Amalgamated Security-
Community, e.g., the United States of America, involving a
"formal merger of two or more previously independent units into
a single larger unit, with some type of government after
amalgamation."[1] The second type is the Pluralistic Security-
Community in which the separate units retain their legal
independence and amalgamation occurs without full political
integration, e.g., the combined territories of the United
States of America and Canada.

On examination of these five definitions of political
integration, each seems to emphasize a different aspect of
the integration process. No political integration can be
achieved without supportive institutions, and neither can the
institutions survive without the substantial loyalty of the
people concerned. Likewise, political integration cannot be
achieved when two or more political units are periodically
engaged in warfare or under threat of warfare, any more than
when they are lacking in mutual responsiveness or unity of
action against an external threat.

For the purpose of this study, the achievement of one
Arab nation-state would mean the political integration of
Deutsch's theoretical Amalgamated Security-Community.
Although Deutsch uses the avoidance of war as his main

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[1]Deutsch et al., _Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area_, p. 2.

yardstick of political integration, he gives considerable attention to more positive aspects of integration as well. The writer has attempted to do likewise in the study which follows.

Chapter ii of this study deals with the origin and the dispersal of the Arab nation and brings into focus the important elements of the geography of the Arab World. Chapter iii traces the origin and the development of the idea of one Arab nation-state, with particular emphasis on the idea and its political action area. Chapter iv concentrates on the evolution of multiple core areas in the Arab World and the effect of this evolution on the later development of the idea of one Arab nation-state. Chapters v and vi, respectively, analyze the unifying and the divisive forces at work within the Arab nation. Lastly, chapter vii draws some conclusions and introduces some speculation on the future of the one Arab state idea.

CHAPTER II

THE ARAB NATION

Definition of the Arab People

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define
an Arab, because an Arab nationality still does not exist in
a legal sense. Citizens of Arab countries are still known
as Egyptians, Syrians, Iraqis, Jordanians, etc., in their
passports. The recent federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya
has given the people of these countries an Arab nationality
in a legal sense, but this federation is an exeptional case
within the Arab World.

The word "Arab" does not denote a universally
recognized meaning. It is mainly a linguistic term, but it
is also a term of cultural association.[1] Racially, Arabs are
of a heterogeneous stock which is dominated by a Semitic
strain in Western Asia and a Hamitic strain in North Africa.
Both Semites and Hamites are Mediterranean peoples. Sir
John Glubb has identified six areas of racial grouping in the
Arab World.[2] Among the six, only Central Arabia is inhabited

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[1]Izzeddin, The Arab World, p. 13.

[2]Sir John Glubb, A Short History of the Arab Peoples
(New York: Stein and Day, 1969), pp. 15-16.

by people predominantly of the original stock. In Lebanon,
Syria, and Palestine, where there have been numerous foreign
invasions, the Arabians from Arabia have mixed with Greeks,
Persians, Romans, and people from other Mediterranean countries.
Modern Iraq is inhabited by people largely of Persian and
other eastern origins, although the residents of Northern
Iraq are a mixture of Kurds, Turks, other early Indo-European
races, and Arabians. Egyptians, according to Glubb, were
initially the descendants of the Pharaohs with an admixture
of African blood which infiltrated northward down the Nile.
Later, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, Albanians,
and Circassians have mixed with the earlier population of the
valley. The South Arabians, or Yemenites, differ from North
Arabians in that they bear racial affinities to what Philip K.
Hitti calls the Alpine-styled Armenoid type.[1] The North
African Arab region west of Egypt is inhabited partly by
Berbers, but Greeks, Vandals, Italians, Byzantines, Spaniards,
and Frenchmen have also contributed individual elements to the
coastal population.

Perhaps the most acceptable definition of an Arab is
that given by George Antonius. In his words an Arab is,

> a citizen of that extensive world . . . whose racial
> descent, even when it was not of pure Arab lineage, had
> become submerged in the tide of Arabization; whose manners
> and tradition had been shaped in an Arab mould; and most

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[1]Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the
Earliest Times to the Present (9th ed.; New York: Macmillan
and Company, 1968), pp. 21-22.

decisive of all, whose mother tongue is Arabic. The term applies to Christians as well as to Moslems, and to the offshoots of each of those creeds, the criterion being not Islamization but the degree of Arabization."[1]

The Antonius definition states clearly that the main criteria are language and culture--that is, Arabization, not the Islamic religion or the Semitic-Hamitic race.[2] Gibb, however, prefers a definition in which religion is a major criterion. In defining an Arab, he says that "all those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire, and who in addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession."[3] This definition is being discarded at present by many of the Arab nationalists, but in areas like the Arabian Peninsula and certain parts of North Africa where religion is still very important, and national consciousness is still weak, the Gibb definition may be the more appropriate.[4] For the purpose of this study, the Antonius definition is the more useful one.

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[1]George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939), p. 18.

[2]Arabization is the process of spreading the Arabic tongue, and Islamization is the spreading of the religion of Islam. These processes have acted often together, making the distinction between them very difficult.

[3]Faris and Husayn, p. 177, quoting H. A. R. Gibb in his pamphlet, The Arabs (Oxford, 1940).

[4]Faris and Husayn, p. 178.

Most recent definitions of "Arab" are worded so as to
include all Arabic-speaking peoples in the concept. The
meaning of the word, however, has been changing steadily
through time.[1] During the rather short period of the Arab
Empire, the one formed in the seventh century, the term Arab
was used to designate all the inhabitants of the Empire.
After the disintegration of the Empire, however, the word
seemed to revert to an earlier meaning best symbolized by
"nomad." Before the recent awakening of a general Arab
national consciousness, the word Arab often meant simply
nomad. Until the 1940's the word Arab was sometimes used by
Egyptians and Iraqis in a derogatory way, as "denoting a
shiftless nomad, someone to be looked upon with contempt by
a people who had been settled cultivators from time immemo-
rial."[2] Not until 1943, in the second edition, did the Guide
to the Egyptian Parliament refer to a given member of the
Parliament as a "Shiekh of the Bedouins" instead of a
"Shiekh of Arabs" as was done in the first edition.[3] By the
time of World War II the word Arab had become respectable and
inclusive of all Arabic-speaking people. Now the Arab World

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[1]See Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (London:
Hutchinson's University Library, 1950), pp. 9-17.

[2]Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1962), p. 52.

[3]Ibid.

includes, perhaps with the exception of Mauritania and Chad, the residents of all of the predominantly Arabic-speaking states (Figure 1 and Table 1).

Origin, Dispersal, and Nucleation of the Arabs

Although the term "Arab," for the purpose of this study, has been defined, the question remains as to how a group so heterogeneous in ethnic character ever came to be known as "the Arabs." Who Arabized all those who live outside the Arabian Peninsula? To answer this question with any satisfaction, one must examine briefly the ancient history of the Arabian Peninsula, the territorial cradle of the Semitic people.[1] Most of Arabia is desert, but there is a narrow margin of habitable land along portions of its coast. Any increase in population beyond the normal, limited supporting capacity of the land, a disaster like the destruction of the Ma'rib Dam of Yemen (by a flood sometime around the middle of the sixth century A.D.),[2] or a periodic decline in trade forced the surplus population to migrate. Such factors as these have produced many waves of migration, almost always along or out from the east or west coast of Arabia, for the center of the peninsula is blocked by a nearly impassable desert. The earliest known of these migrations took place around 3500 B.C. from the area of al-Yaman, or modern Yemen (Figure 2). One wave moved along the Red Sea coast of

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[1]Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 8.   [2]Ibid., p. 64.

Fig.1

THE ARAB WORLD

The Arab World

:::::: **Arabic Speakers in Non–Arab Countries**
Mauritania—76.4 per cent
Chad — — —28.6 ,, ,,
Somali — — 1.5 ,, ,,

0   1350
Miles

The data for this map is taken from Bruce M. Russett,
et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, pp. 132–137;
Elisa Daggs, All Africa, p. 223.

TABLE 1

SPEAKERS OF ARABIC AS PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION

Country[a]	Percentage[b]	Year
Egypt	98.0 C	1942
Syria	92.1 A	1956
Tunisia	90.5 C	1946
Libya	90.0 C	1942
Algeria	78.1 B	1948
Morocco	77.4 C	1942
Mauritania	76.4 C	1942
Sudan	53.4 C	1942
Chad	28.6 C	1942
Somali Republic	1.5 B	1969

[a]In Iraq the proportion of Arabic speakers is thought to be around 90 per cent of the population. In other Arab countries not listed in the above table, it can be assumed that the proportion of Arabic-speaking people is close to 100 per cent.

[b]A--mother tongue, B--language currently or usually spoken in the home, C--ability to speak.

Sources: Except for the Somali Republic, Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 132-137. For the Somali Republic, Elisa Daggs, All Africa (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1970), p. 223.

Fig.2

After Philip K. Hitti, <u>History of the Arabs</u>, p. 69.

Arabia northwestward through the Hijaz (Hejaz) and Sinai into

Egypt, where Semites mixed with the local Hamites and

produced the Egyptians of history. Another wave went up along

the east coast of the peninsula and merged with the sedentary

people of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. This mixture of

Yemeni nomads with non-Semitic Sumerians became the Babylo-

nians, later famous for their skill in irrigation, architecture,

and writing. Approximately one thousand years later, around

2500 B.C., another wave of Semites called Amorites, including

tribes subsequently known as Canaanites and Phoenicians,

occupied Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Between 1500 and

1200 B.C. a surge of Aramaic people (the Arameans) moved into

Syria and the Hebrew tribes entered Palestine. Approximately

another millennium elapsed before there is mention of Arabs

from the south appearing in some numbers in the "Fertile

Crescent" as raiders and settlers. It was also about the

fifth century B.C. that the Arab-Nabataeans settled in the

northeastern part of the Sinai Peninsula. Although these

waves of Semitic migrants in various period of history have

been known by different names, they all had common roots,

originating from about the same place and the same basic Arab

stock. The successful deciphering of the cuneiform writings

of the pre-Christian era had been helpful in fixing the early

Arabs in time and place.[1] The Najd (Nejd) in the central

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[1]Anthony Nutting, The Arabs: A Narrative History from Mohammed to the Present (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1964), p. 5.

highlands of the peninsula or al-Yaman (Yemen) in southern

Arabia seem the most likely original home of the Semitic

people.[1]

So far in this brief history of Arabia the term Arab

has been used indiscriminately for both North and South

Arabians. A distinction, however, should be made. Hitti,

the historian, points out that a traditional differentiation

is made by the Arabs themselves between North Arabians and

South Arabians.[2] North Arabians are called Arabian Arabs

(aribah), and South Arabians are called Arabicized Arabs

(musta'ribah). This difference, according to Hitti, sur-

vived even after the religious unification under Islam.

Among the South Arabians the earliest kingdom, whose

date is put at around 3500 B.C., was that of the Sabaeans.

The Sabaean Kingdom was located in al-Yaman with Ma'rib as

its capital. This was the meeting place of the trade routes

connecting the frankincense and myrrh lands of al-Yaman and

Hadramawt (Hadramaut) with the Mediterranean ports, particu-

larly Ghazzah (Gaza) (Figure 2). According to Hitti, the

Sabaeans were the first of the Arabs "to step within the

threshold of civilization."[3] They were a sedentary farming

people domiciled in Yemen, Hadramaut, and along the neighbor-

ing coast. They spoke their own Semitic language, which was

quite different from Arabic. Their early development is

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[1]Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 13.

[2]Ibid., p. 32. [3]Ibid., p. 44.

attributed to the fertility of the land, its proximity to the sea, and its strategic location on the route to India.[1]

From about 115 B.C. onwards the Himyrites succeeded the Sabaeans and formed the Himyrite Kingdom, carrying on the commercial civilization which lasted until about 300 A.D. This Himyrite Kingdom prospered as long as it monopolized the maritime trade route through the Red Sea to India. It served as an entrepôt, collecting the products of the local area, as well as those of East Africa and India, and carrying them by land routes through Makkah (Mecca) to Syria and Egypt. The opening of the Nile-Red Sea Canal by Ptolemy II (285-240 B.C.), however, and the beginning of Egyptian shipping through it had already sowed the seeds of the decline of the Himyrite civilization. Later, Roman control of Egypt and the canal, and the resulting further increase in shipping, sharply accelerated the decline of the Himyrites. The decline in trade encouraged the displacement of some of the South Arabians to Syria, Iraq, and Abyssinia (Ethiopia). In Islamic literature this displacement is associated with the breaking up of the Ma'rib Dam in Yemen, which is also a symbolic expression of the cumulation of a long process of decline. The Abyssinians came to rule al-Yaman in 525 A.D., but they were ousted fifty years later. They built their capital at San'a which still continues its administrative function today.

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[1]Ibid., p. 49.

With the birth of Islam in the seventh century, the
center of historical interest moves north to al-Hijaz from
al-Yaman. Unlike the South Arabians, the North Arabians,
including the Hijazis of al-Hijaz, and the Nejdis of Nejd in
Central Arabia, were nomadic. They spoke Arabic and developed
the script used in the Koran. These North Arabians first
became prominent around 500 B.C. The Nabataeans were the
first of them to establish a kingdom. It stretched from
Aqaba in the south to Damascus in the north by the first
century A.D. In this period their capital city, Petra, gained
commercial supremacy over much of Arabia. The development of
Petra is attributed in part to its strategic setting, for it
is encircled on all sides by precipitous cliffs with only a
narrow winding entrance through them. For early travelers,
it was the only spot between Jordan and South Arabia with
plenty of pure water. Most important of all, Petra's promi-
nence relates to the patronage given it by the Romans.
Before attaining its supremacy, it had been one of the links
on the commercial route established by the Sabaeans and
Himyrites. The gradual shifting of the east-west caravan
trade to a more northerly route, and the north-south trade to
a more easterly path (corresponding approximately with the
present Hijaz Railway route), and the Persian conquest of
Mesopotamia all contributed to the decline of Petra and the

Nabataean state.[1] The new conditions favored the more

northerly situated town of Palmyra which next assumed promi-

nence.

The Kingdom of Palmyra, established in the Syrian

Desert to the north of the Arabian Peninsula, rose to its

height between 130 A.D. and 270 A.D. The city of Palmyra was

favored with an abundant supply of water and served as a

connecting poinc for east-west trade as well as the north-

south trade with South Arabia. The city flourished under

Roman vassaldom, but circumstances led to an uprising of the

residents against the Romans in 270 A.D. The Romans then

destroyed Palmyra, leaving it in complete ruins.

With the fall of Palmyra, Busra in Hawran and other

Ghassanid towns became prominent.[2] The Ghassanids claimed to

be descendants of the South Arabians who had fled al-Yaman

at the breaking up of the Ma'rib Dam. According to Hitti,

their capital at first was a movable camp, but may later have

become fixed at al-Jabiyah in the Jawtan, and for some time

was located at Jilliq.[3] The Ghassanid Kingdom had its

relative (of South Arabian origin) and rival in al-Hirah, the

Kingdom of the Lakhmids. Both attained their greatest

importance during the sixth century A.D.

Contemporary with and related to these two kingdoms

was a third rival, the Kingdom of Kindah in Central Arabia.

The Kindah Confederacy failed because it lacked inner

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[1]Ibid., p. 74.   [2]Ibid., p. 78.   [3]Ibid.

cohesion.[1] Hitti makes the comment that "Kindah's rise is interesting not only in itself but as the first attempt in inner Arabia to unite a number of tribes around the central authority of one common chief."[2] By the sixth century Arabian tribes had developed a common language, Arabic, quite different from some of the tribal dialects, uniting the Arab tribes into a single tradition with a shared, orally-transmitted culture. To the development of the common language, the Kingdom of Kindah contributed significantly.[3]

During the second half of the sixth century, the Euphrates Valley-Persian Gulf route was rendered difficult by the constant warfare between the Byzantine and Persian empires. The alternative route through the Nile Valley and Red Sea was also out of use because of disorder in Egypt.[4] The main course of trade consequently reverted back to the old, difficult, but peaceful route from Syria through Western Arabia to the Kingdom of Yemen. Yemen itself, however, had fallen under foreign rule. The Kingdom of Palmyra and the Nabataean Kingdom retained only the glory of the past. This combination of circumstances created a very favorable condition for Mecca to become the new trade center in Arabia.

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[1]Ibid., p. 96.   [2]Ibid.

[3]Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 31.

[4]Ibid., p. 33.

It was in this milieu that the religion called Islam was founded by the Prophet Mohammed (570-632 A.D.) in the seventh century. The hostility of the Meccans to Mohammed's preaching, however, forced him to leave for Medina, a lesser town some 200 miles to the north. In Medina the Islamic movement transformed itself into a militant polity, and Medina became the first Islamic Arab state.[1] Within a short period of time the Northern Arabs under the banner of Islam-- almost at once a symbol of Arab unity and victory, according to Bernard Lewis--carried out their remarkable conquest. In the last and the final phase of the great Semitic migrations, they extended their control to the Atlantic in the west and to the Desert of Sind and the Indus Valley in the east (Figure 3).[2]

Internal organization of the expanding Islamic Arab Empire was enormously handicapped by distance and weak communications. In 660 A.D. Damascus in Syria was made the capital of the Arab Empire by the Umayyad dynasty. The geographical limit of the Empire grew until 732 A.D. when Christian forces, marshalled by Charles Martel, defeated the "Moors" at Tours in what is widely regarded as one of the great turning points of Western history. In 750 A.D. the

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[1]Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 117.

[2]Lewis, The Arabs in History, p. 56.

Fig.3

Arab Empire

661 A.D.-750 A.D.

After John Bagot Glubb, Syria Lebanon Jordan, p. 50.

Abbasid dynasty took control of the Arab Empire and moved the capital to Baghdad on the Tigris River.

By 756 A.D., however, the Arab Empire had already started to disintegrate with the establishment of a separate Umayyad Caliphate at Córdoba in Spain (Figure 4).[1] Within the Empire, the Ismailites organized themselves into what was essentially an independent political state in Yemen as early as 760 A.D. In Morocco an independent kingdom was established by the Idrisids in 788 A.D. In the year 909 A.D. the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt was established as a direct challenge to the Abbasids in Baghdad.

By the sixteenth century, virtually the whole of the Arab World was under the rule of the Ottoman Turks (Figure 5). Expressions of Arab nationalism during the Ottoman period are discussed in chapter iii. Long before the Ottoman Empire disintegrated in 1918, some of the Western powers, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, had established large colonies in the Arab domains of North Africa. After 1918 the former Arab province of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East was divided among the colonial powers under the League of Nations mandate system.

The Arab Empire after 756 A.D. never again was able to achieve unification. Although the Arabs as a people failed to

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[1]The title of "caliph" (variously spelled calif, kalif, kaliph, and khalif) was used by Mohammed's successors for the secular and religious head of Islam. The domain under the caliph's control was the caliphate.

Fig.4

THE PERIOD OF
PRINCIPALITIES,
10th–12th CENTURIES

UMAYYADS
of
SPAIN

IDRISIDS

AGHLABIDS

TULUNIDS

FATIMIDS

ABBASIDS

N

0   600
MILES

After Yahya Armajani, Middle East Past and Present, p. 91.

Fig.5

ARAB LANDS UNDER
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
1680 A.D.

0   200   400
Miles

Based on Philip K. Hitti, History of Arabs.

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sustain their political unity, the process of Arabization and the expansion of the Arab World was a great cultural triumph which today has evolved into an Arab nation striving for statehood.

Political Divisions of the Contemporary
Arab World

The vast area now inhabited by the Arab nation is often designated by geographers and other scholars as the Arab World. According to the Arab League's booklet, The League of Arab States: A Hope Fulfilled, the Arab nation "extends from Casablanca on the Atlantic Ocean in the West to Basra on the Arab Gulf [Persian Gulf] in the East and from the Mediterranean Sea and the upper reaches of the Euphrates in the North to Central Africa and the Indian Ocean on the South."[1] As so delimited, the Arab nation occupies an area of 4,869,518 square miles and has a total population of about 110 million.[2] Twenty-four different divisions characterize the contemporary political landscape (Figure 6).[3] All of these are included in the Arab League, which developed out of

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[1]The Arab League, The League of Arab States: A Hope Fulfilled (October, 1962), p. 1.

[2]The figures have been compiled from the Statesman's Yearbook 1970-71 (London: Macmillan and Company, St. Martin's Press, 1970).

[3]These are Algeria, the states included in the Federation of Arab Republics (Egypt [the United Arab Republic], Libya, and Syria), the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman [formerly Muscat and Oman], and the Trucial States [Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras

Fig· 6

THE ARAB WORLD, 1973

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the Alexandria Protocol of 1944.[1] Membership in the League,
a loose-knit consultative body formed during the stressful
period of World War II, has been considerably expanded
during the past two years. Qatar, Bahrain, and the Sultanate
of Oman all took membership in the League in the latter part
of 1971, although still under British protectorship at the
time. In December of the same year, six of the seven Trucial
States, all except Ras al-Khaimah, formed a new confederation
called the Union of Arab Emirates and joined the League. Ras
al-Khaimah took membership in the Union and the League a few
weeks later, in February, 1972.

Not only is the Arab World presently divided into
several independent political entities, but it is also
characterized by a variety of forms of government. Broadly,
the Arab countries can be divided into two groups, the
republican states and the monarchial states, the latter group
including kingdoms, sultanates, shiekhdoms, and emirates.
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, the United Arab Republic, the Sudan,
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and South Yemen are all repub-
lics, while Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and all the Gulf
States political units are monarchies.

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al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain]), Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen), the Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the
Sudan, and Tunisia.

[1]The Arab League is the organization of the independ-
ent Arab states.

Algeria has a constitutional government with a national assembly whose members are all nominated by a single political party, the National Liberation Front. In the Arab Republic of Egypt an organization called the Socialist Arab Union, generally headed by the national president, governs the country. South Yemen is also governed by one political party, the National Liberation Front, through a five-man Presidential Council. Similarly, Yemen is governed through a top leadership of three men comprising the Republican Council. Tunisia is governed by the only political party in the country, the Neo-Destour Party. Similarly Iraq and Syria are ruled by one party, the Ba'th Party, with in each case some support from the army. Libya and the Sudan are each currently governed by a revolutionary council dominated by military personages. Jordan and Morocco are constitutional monarchies in which ultimate authority is retained by the king, and Saudi Arabia is governed by a traditional monarch with absolute power. Only Lebanon can be termed truly democratic with a responsible and effective parliament. Kuwait, a sheikhdom, seems to be heading towards a parliamentary system of government. Apart from Kuwait, all of the Gulf States, including the Sultanate of Oman, are governed by traditional monarchial systems.

The republican Arab states generally have three things in common, a one-party system, a socialist ideology, and a strong feeling of Arab nationalism. The degree of

commitment to socialism, however, as well as the intensity of the nationalist feeling, may vary from one country to another. The monarchial states, other than the Sheikhdom of Kuwait, are all traditional and ultraconservative in outlook. These states are anti-republican and anti-socialist. Within them, insofar as it can be judged, the sense of participation in a greater Arab nationalism is either non-existent, as in some of the smaller Gulf States, or very slight as in the case of Saudi Arabia.

No political unit in the Arab World, with the exception of the island state of Bahrein, enjoys the security or the convenience of natural boundaries.[1] Over much of the Arabian Peninsula the boundaries have never been demarcated to the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned (i.e., the boundaries between Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and South Yemen). To use Jean Gottmann's term, the development of the iconography of the Arab countries is still in a fluid state.[2] No deep identification with any particular regional iconography has taken place. A brief discussion of symbolism as seen in Arab flags is included in chapter vi.

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[1]Stephen H. Longrigg, The Middle East: A Social Geography (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970), p. 13.

[2]Gottmann, "The Political Partitioning of Our World," pp. 512-519. Professor Gottmann applies the term iconography to all those visible, oral, or written symbols (flags, songs, mottoes, etc.) which reflect the national feeling of a people.

Physical Diversity in the Arab World

The Arab World, which extends approximately 3,000 miles from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, across one huge continent and part of another, naturally exhibits a wide variety of physical environment. Broadly, three different types of environment can be recognized: (1) desert and semi-desert, (2) fertile river valley, and (3) seasonally humid with dry summers.

The desert is the single most important physical-geographic influence in the Arab World. With the exception of Lebanon, there is not a single country which does not share this desert environment, and several are totally dominated by it. West of the Nile is the Sahara, shared by Egypt, the Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. East of the Nile lies the Sinai Desert and the Arabian deserts of Nefud and of Rub al-Khali, the "Empty Quarter," shared by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, South Yemen, and Yemen. Between Damascus, Amman, and Baghdad lies the Syrian Desert. The nomadic Bedouin culture, which has traditionally existed and continues to survive to some extent from Morocco to Iraq, is a traditional human response to this desert environment.

The Nile River in Egypt and the Tigris-Euphrates in Iraq, with their abundant year-round supply of water, have turned these two great basins in the desert into cradles of early civilization and regionally prominent agricultural development. The irrigation environment with its sedentary

culture contrasts sharply with the desert life style of nomadism. Regular contact between the two, either by trade or by war, has been part of the long history of the Arab World. The ancestors of many of the people now settled in the irrigated lands were once nomads themselves.[1]

Most of the dry subtropical, or Mediterranean, climate regions in the Arab World are found along or near the coast. These humid to semiarid coastal tracts, generally narrow in extent, are present in Morocco, Algeria, Northern Tunisia, sections of Northern Libya, Lebanon, and Syria. In these areas the climatic regime is Mediterranean, with hot, dry summers and mild, somewhat rainy winters. Other rain-favored lands exist in limited areas of higher elevation such as the Asir Plateau of Yemen, parts of the Hadramaut, the Green Mountains or Jabal al-Akhdar in the Sultanate of Oman, the Imatong Mountains in the Southern Sudan, the Kurdistan Mountains of Iraq, and the Jebel el-Ansariye in Syria.

Overall, the vast empty spaces of desert contrast sharply with the green and densely-populated basins of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates, the narrow but fertile coastal areas, and the occasional scattered oases. Everywhere there is a strong contrast in population density between the

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[1] For a broad-gauge study of nomadism as a social phenomenon, see Douglas L. Johnson, The Nature of Nomadism: A Comparative Study of Pastoral Migration in Southwestern Asia and Northern Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research Paper 118, 1969).

intensive tillage areas and the regions of nomadic herding.
In some of the Arab countries (cf. Morocco, Syria, and Yemen)
the extent of highlands is such as to modify the temperature,
precipitation, and vegetation patterns for some millions of
people, but over most of the Arab World heat and aridity
are the overriding physical characteristics. Even with some
contrast in their climatic environments, a strong sense of
the desert predominates throughout the Arab lands. The
enormous expanses of desert between the populated areas act
as barriers to movement and obstacles to the political unity
of the Arab nation. Only the massive application of capital
and technology in such areas as transportation and communica-
tions can overcome these barriers.

CHAPTER III

THE IDEA OF ONE ARAB NATION-STATE

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origin
and development through time of the idea of one Arab nation-
state, with particular attention to the disconformity between
the political action area and the political area of the unity
idea as those terms are used in chapter i. Every government,
even every law, has a definite area of operation. If a
government fails to function effectively within a defined
territory, it is termed a failure. The area defined here as
that of the one Arab nation-state idea is the whole Arab
World, but due to a number of reasons the idea's actual field
of operation has been limited. (1) There was controversy
about the geographical extent of the Arab nation from the very
beginning of the unity idea until 1945. (2) The Arab movement
for unification has not reached to the whole of the Arab
World (Figure 7). (3) There are non-Arab nationals in geo-
graphically concentrated locations, such as the Kurds in
Iraq, the Southern Sudanese in the Sudan, and the non-Arabized
Berbers in the mountain pockets of Morocco and Tunisia.
(4) The Jews of the Arab World, now largely concentrated in
the coastal enclave state of Israel, obviously have no

Fig.7

Recent Political Federations in the Arab World

A.U. – Arab Union (1958)
U.A.R. – United Arab Republics (1958–1961)
U.A.S. – Union of Arab States (1958–1961)
F.A.R. – Federation of Arab Republics (1971–)
U.A.E. – Union of Arab Emirates (1971–)

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
interest in a Pan-Arab movement. (5) Among the people in all of the Arabian Peninsula, except perhaps in Kuwait and South Yemen, a strong feeling for the Pan-Arab idea is lacking. (6) Lastly, the peoples of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, although predominantly Arab, have never markedly identified with the idea.

Origin of the Idea

The Arab Empire created by the Umayyads after the death of Mohammed (632 A.D.) reached its geographical limit in 732 A.D. The Empire retained its political unity only until 750 A.D. In that year the Abbasids captured the caliphate, moved their capital from Damascus to Baghdad, and sowed the first seed of political disintegration. In 756 A.D. a survivor of the Umayyad family established an independent caliphate at Córdoba in Spain. This secession was later followed by that of several other areas, shattering the brief political unity of the early Arab Empire.

With the reawakening of Arab nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the new movement found a basis for its unity idea in the former short-lived Arab Empire. Revival of the Pan-Arabic movement seemed feasible because the early political disintegration was not accompanied by much cultural disintegration. On the contrary, the process of cultural unification, or Arabization, continued in spite of the political disunity of the Arab World. This

process of Arabization by the end of the nineteenth century
had successfully transformed nearly all of the population of
the present-day Arab states into one cultural group. They
were Arabs speaking the Arabic tongue. The reawakening of
the Arabs as a nation was accompanied by tremendous pride in
past Arab glory and a nostalgic desire for a modern version of
the old Arab Empire--one Arab nation-state.

Arab nationalist writers began to promote the idea that
the Arab people are the primary political entity, and that
since the Arabs are a nation they must therefore become a
state.[1] Négib Azoury published his idea of one Arab state
in 1905 in Paris. There are traces of the Pan-Arab idea in
the manifesto written by members of the Decentralization
Party and disseminated from Cairo at the beginning of World
War I.[2] A statement by the Arab National Congress in 1931
asserts that "the primary objective of (this cause) is to
achieve unity and independence of Arabs. . . ."[3] In a speech
in 1938 Amin al-Rihani called on all Arabs to practice

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[1]Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 36.

[2]For the text of the manifesto, entitled "Announcement
to the Arabs, Sons of Qahtan," see Haim (ed.), Arab Nation-
alism, pp. 83-88, presenting an English translation of Ahmad
Izzat al-Azami, al-qadiyya al-arabiyya (The Arab Question), IV
Baghdad, 1932), pp. 108-117.

[3]Document Number 3, "Statement by the Arab National
Congress, Jerusalem," (December 13, 1931), in Muhammad Khalil,
The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record,
Vol. II: International Affairs (Beirut: Khayats, 1962),
p. 8.

"Arabism before and above everything."[1] Edmond Rabbath of

Aleppo in 1937 wrote: We must make [the Arab race] a founda-

tion of the State and glory on it."[2] The concept of one Arab

nation-state found easy acceptance among many Arab national-

ists, but the controversy over what constituted the Arab

nation's territory was a long time in being resolved. For a

considerable time the idea was relevant only to its cradle or

cultural hearth, namely, the Fertile Crescent in the eastern

part of the Arab World.[3]

Development of the Idea

The military conquest by the Arabs in the seventh

and eighth centuries was accompanied by a combined process

of Islamization and Arabization. The religion known as Islam

was originally designed by the Prophet as a national faith for

the Arabs. The new faith did succeed in exalting national

unity among the Arabs who, although already somewhat conscious

of their common ties of origin and language, were still

utterly disorganized and recalcitrant to every move toward

political unity.[4] Later, as Islam spread over both Arab and

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[1]Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 36, quoting
al-Qaumiyyat (Essays on National Questions) (Beirut, 1956),
II, p. 160.

[2]Ibid., p. 37, quoting Edmond Rabbath, Unité
syrienne et devenir arabe (Paris, 1937), p. 43.

[3]Sayegh, Arab Unity, p. 62.

[4]Francesco Gabrieli, The Arab Revival (London:
Thames and Hudson, 1961), p. 10.

non-Arab lands, it modified its national character to a more universal one. With this change there developed a basic contradiction between Arab pride and the sense of Islamic universalism. The supra-national spirit of Islam naturally had its strongest appeal among the non-Arabs within the Arab Empire, but it was shared by many Arabs too.[1]

As described earlier, a struggle developed between Umayyads and Abbasids, both equally Arab, but there was a difference in that the latter had the support of some non-Arab elements. The Abbasids came out on top in the power struggle. This victory marked the beginning of the decline of unified Arab political leadership and eventually led to the breakup of the Arab Empire. In the Abbasid Period (750-1258) the emphasis was definitely on religious and cultural hegemony rather than political unity.[2] As a consequence, in spite of the political decline, there was a tremendous Arab cultural upsurge during this period. In spite of the cultural triumph of the Arabs, the Abbasid Period seems to have been marked by a decline in Arab national pride, for the rising universal Islam bluntly condemned local pride.[3] Emphasizing the universal character of Islam, non-Arabs found acceptance as political leaders so long as they were devotees of the Islamic faith. This emphasis made possible the growing power of the Turks who finally

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[1]Ibid., p. 12.   [2]Ibid., p. 14.   [3]Ibid.

gained control of virtually all of the Arab Empire. It likewise facilitated the extension of the Islamic faith to broad areas in South and Southeast Asia and to a number of cultural communities beyond the Sahara in Africa.

The historian George Kirk states that under the continued erosion of Arab pride, which lasted until the late nineteenth century,

> the idea of nationality was unknown; all were subjects of the Padishah, but no one thought of himself as belonging to a Syrian or an Iraqi, still less an Arab nation. Instead men were distinguished by their millet, or by the town of their origin: as Sunni Moslem, Orthodox, Jew, Druze, Armenian or Shi'i; as Baghdadi, Halabi (Aleppine), Shami (Damascene), or Misri (Cairene).[1]

The First Attempt--Search for an Arab Empire

Although the real drive for one Arab nation-state did not develop much vigor until the early twentieth century, Muhammad Ali's[2] attempt to unify all the Arabs in the Middle East under his rule in the nineteenth century could perhaps be termed the first modern effort to achieve an Arab nation-state. Muhammad Ali was not an Arab, but an Albanian-Egyptian, and he could not even speak the Arabic language. Thus the attempt by him and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to create an Arab Empire is not regarded by historians as truly

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[1]George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 99.

[2]Muhammad Ali, born in Macedonia, was a young Albanian officer in the Turkish army. He was made Pasha of Egypt in 1805 and retained power there until his death in 1849.

nationalistic in its nature.[1] His driving motive in subduing

the Wahhabis of Central Arabia and in his diplomatic intrigues

with France is now interpreted as personal ambition, and his

desire to revive the Arab Empire is viewed primarily as a

desire to acquire a larger family domain. Whatever Muhammad

Ali's motives were, some of his successes can be attributed

to the rudimentary existence of an Arab nation and to surviv-

ing memories of a great Arab Empire. Had his efforts been

successful, a real Arab nation-state might have come into

existence one hundred fifty years ago. According to the

British Consul-General at Alexandria, writing in January

1832, the plan of Muhammad Ali was as follows:

> His immediate object is to establish his authority firmly
> in the Pashaliks of Acre and Damascus; after which to
> extend his domain to Aleppo and Baghdad, throughout the
> provinces, where Arabic is the language of the people,
> which he calls the Arabian part of the Empire.[2]

The plan failed to materialize mainly because of two factors,

the low level of national consciousness among the Arab masses

and British opposition. By Muhammad Ali's time, the unifying

spirit of Islam, the perennial sustainer of political passion

among Arabs, had been worn away by the division of the faith

into several opposing sects. Arabs had yet to realize

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[1]Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 3; Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 27; and Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, p. 99.

[2]Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 25, quoting Public Record Office, F. O. 78/218.

themselves as a nation, and the idea of one Arab nation-state subsided until almost the beginning of the twentieth century.

The First Publication Proposing an Arab State

The concept of one Arab nation-state as an ideology and as a force in Arab politics is primarily, then, a recent development. In the modern period, the potentiality for one Arab nation-state was hardly conceived before the beginning of the twentieth century. Not until after the First World War did the real drive begin to constitute one Arab state out of all the Arabs.

According to Sylvia Haim, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1902), writing in the late nineteenth century, was the intellectual precursor of modern secular Pan-Arabism and the first to declare himself without ambiguity as the champion of the Arabs against the Turks. Concerning Kawakibi, Haim writes: "In his praise of Arabs there were no half tones: the Arabs were better people than the Turks and ought to have the primacy."[1] This was a clear break from earlier times when national pride was bluntly condemned in favor of Islamic universality. Kawakibi went as far as to suggest an Arab Caliphate but not quite so far as to propose an Arab Empire. He made a clear argument for the role of the Caliph as a spiritual head, devoid of political power. Kawakibi is even supposed to have taken a long journey on behalf of the

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[1]Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 27.

Khedive of Egypt, exploring the possibility of establishing

the Khedive as the temporal head of the Arab Empire.

Marmaduke Pickthall reported in 1914:

> In the year 1894-1896, I was in Syria "living native," as
> the English call it. I can remember hearing Muslim Arabs
> talking more than once of what would happen on the down-
> fall of the Turks. They looked to Egypt, remembering the
> conquest of Mahmet Ali, and the gospel of an Arab Empire
> under the Lord of Egypt which Ibrahim Pasha preached in
> Palestine and Syria. That gospel, I gathered, was still
> being preached in secret by missionaries from Egypt. . . .
> I gathered then and subsequently that the Sherif of Mecca
> was to be the spiritual head of the reconstituted realm
> of El Eslam, the Khedive of Egypt the temporal head. . . .[1]

The Pickthall report clearly shows that the idea of one Arab

Empire propounded earlier by Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim

Pasha had survived at least among some of the more politically

conscious Arabs.

The idea of al-Kawakibi was given more precision by

Négib Azoury (Najib al-Azuri), writing in 1905.[2] He went

further than al-Kawakibi by proposing for the first time in

modern history an Arab Empire "stretching from the Tigris and

the Euphrates to the Suez Isthmus, and from the Mediterranean

to the Arabian Sea."[3] Azoury, it should be noted, excluded

Egypt from his proposed Arab Empire. He reasoned that

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[1]Ibid., p. 28, citing The New Age (London), November
5, 1914, p. 9.

[2]Négib Azoury, Le Réveil de la nation arabe dans
l'asie turque en présence des intérêts et des rivalités des
puissances étrangères, de la curie romaine et du patriarcat
oecuménique (Paris, 1905), pp. 245-247, presented in English
translation by Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, pp. 81-82.

[3]Ibid.

Egyptians are not really Arabs, and that Egypt is separated
from the true Arab World by the natural frontier of the Suez
Isthmus. According to Azoury's plan there would be a reli-
gious Caliph for the whole of Islam who would also rule over
an independent political state including "the whole of the
actual vilayet of Hijaz, with the town and the territory of
Medina, as far as Aqaba."[1] The religious Caliph would have
moral authority over all the Islamic people of the world.
Another and larger political area including the territories
of Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, and the rest of the Saudi
Arabian Peninsula (except for an autonomous Lebanon) was
proposed by Azoury as another Arab state.

The Azoury book has been called the first publication
proposing the idea of one Arab nation-state. Had Azoury's
idea been carried out, however, it would have resulted in two
politically independent states instead of one. Furthermore,
Egypt was excluded as non-Arab, and so were all the other
countries of North Africa. The exclusion of the North Afri-
can Arab regions was a clear indication of the state of Arab
consciousness at that time. The Arabs as a larger nation had
not yet awakened, and the frontiers of the Arab nation were
still undefined. Even within the confined area of Azoury's
proposed Arab Empire, the consciousness of the Arab masses
and their desire for a truly Arab nation-state could hardly be

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[1]Ibid.

taken as pervasive or emotionally profound. On the contrary,
the idea was still largely confined to a few members of the
intellectual class. The contradictions and limitations evi-
dent in Azoury's scheme have hampered the idea of one Arab
nation-state for a long time.

Pan-Arab Societies and Organizations in the Early Twentieth Century

The early years of the twentieth century were
characterized by several Arab efforts to organize and popu-
larize the ideas of Arab nationalism through creating special
societies for that purpose. The Young Turks' Revolution of
1908, which ended the despotic rule of Abdul-Hamid, Sultan of
the Ottoman Empire, was instrumental in the organization of
some of these Arab societies. For instance, the Young Turks
helped to form a society called al-Alkh' al-Arabi al-Uthman
(the Ottoman Arab Fraternity), whose purposes were to promote
the welfare of the Arab provinces, to spread education in the
Arabic tongue, and to preserve Arab customs. This society
aroused the hopes of Arabs for greater freedom and autonomy.
Only eight months after its formation, however, it was dis-
solved to the utter disappointment of participating Arab
nationalists. During the latter months of 1909 al-Muntada
al-Adabi (the Literary Club) was founded in Constantinople.
Its objective was limited to providing a meeting place for
Arab visitors, but it exerted a good deal of political
influence as a recognized intermediary in negotiations between

the Arabs and the Young Turks.[1] Toward the end of 1912 another

society was founded in Cairo, this one under the name of the

Ottoman Decentralization Party. Its objective, as the name

suggests, was the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire and

the mobilization of Arab support for this decentralization.

This open-membership society exerted continuous pressure over

a period of years for greater public recognition of Arab

cultural and political identity. Meanwhile, two secret

societies came into being, one towards the end of 1909 called

al-Qahtaniya,[2] another called al-Fatat[3] founded in Paris in

1911. The goal of al-Qahtaniya was to turn the Ottoman

Empire into a dual monarchy.[4] The Arab provinces were to

form a single kingdom with its own parliament and local gov-

ernment and with Arabic as its lingua franca. The kingdom

was to be a part of a Turco-Arabic Empire similar to the

Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ottoman Sultan in Constantino-

ple would wear, in addition to the Turkish crown, the crown of

the Arabs. The society died of willful neglect after a

year's existence.[5] The objective of al-Fatat was to regain

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[1]Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 108.

[2]This society was named after Qahtan, one of the
legendary ancestors of the Arab race.

[3]The full name is Jam'iyat al-Arabiya al-Fatat, mean-
ing The Young Arab Society.

[4]Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 110.

[5]Ibid., p. 111.

independence for all the Arab countries from any alien

domination, Turkish or otherwise.

The Abortive Attempt to Create One Arab State
after World War I

The First World War provided a favorable opportunity

for Arab nationalists to take advantage of the situation.

It was in the interest of Britain to keep the routes to India

open and free from Ottoman interference. To achieve this

objective, the British Government saw an opportunity to

encourage the Arabs to break with Turkey and form an autono-

mous state, or chain of states, friendly to Great Britain and

extending all the way from the Mediterranean seaboard in the

west to the Persian frontier in the east. Such an Anglo-Arab

line, it was felt, could check the Turko-German advance in

the direction of the Persian Gulf. The interests of the

British were, on the surface, entirely compatible with the

Arab nationalists' desire to create an independent Arab state,

although Britain was still secretly hoping to gain colonial

control of them. The wartime situation, with Turkey an ally

of Germany and the Hapsburg Empire, encouraged Husain, the

Sherif of Mecca, to attempt, with the help of his sons, to

end Turkish domination and bring about the fulfillment of

the Arab nationalists' desire. Consequently, King Husain

submitted to Britain a proposal which was drawn up jointly by

al-Fatat and al-Ahd (the Arab Military Officers' Organization),

stating the conditions under which they would cooperate with

Britain. The conditions were the following:

> The recognition by Great Britain of the independence
> of the Arab countries lying within the following fron-
> tiers:
> North: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37°N and thence
> along the line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat
> (Ibn'Umar)-Amadia to the Persian frontier;
> East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf;
> South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden
> whose status was to be maintained);
> West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to
> Mersin.
> The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted
> to foreigners under the capitulations.
> The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great
> Britain and the future independent Arab state.[1]

The above proposal was accepted by Britain with some

reservations, and the government pledged its support in

establishing an independent Arab state.[2] With the British

pledge on hand, Husain led the famous Arab Revolt of June,

1916. On the second of November, Husain proclaimed himself

the King of the Arab countries. By 1917 Ottoman control in

the Arab regions had broken down completely. The Pan-Arab

dream of one independent Arab state seemed to be coming true,

but a rude awakening came at the end of World War I with the

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[1]"The McMahon Correspondence: The Sharif Husain's
First Note to Sir Henry McMahon, Mecca, July 14, 1915," in
Antonius, The Arab Awakening, pp. 414-415. This is a
translation by Antonius of the original Arabic text which was
lent to him by the late King Faisal.

[2]The British expressed an objection to the inclusion
of the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and to portions
of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs,
Hama, and Aleppo. In the exchange Husain gave up on the
districts of Mersin and Adana as not being purely Arab, but
stood fast on other areas objected to by Britain.

disclosure of the Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain,

France, and Russia. The agreement was a scheme to divide the

lands formerly under Ottoman control. According to the

agreement, most of the Arab lands were to be divided between

Britain and France (Figure 8). The spheres earmarked for

Russia fell outside the regions peopled by Arabs. The actual

division of the Arab lands, similar to the scheme devised in

the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was imposed forcefully upon the

Arabs in 1920 by Britain and France under the mandate system.

The arrangement was later approved by the League of Nations

in 1923 (Figure 9).

In the struggle for independence from the Turks,

Husain's son, Emir Faisal, was one of the most active leaders.

In a memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Conference on

January 1, 1919, Faisal wrote, in support of his father's

demand for independence, that "the country from a line

Alexandretta-Persia, southward to the Indian Ocean is inhab-

ited by 'Arabs'--by which we mean people of closely related

Semitic stocks, all speaking the one language Arabic. . . ."

He further added that "the aim of the Arab nationalist move-

ment . . . is to unite the Arabs eventually into one

nation[-state]."[1]

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[1]Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the
Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, Lebanon: Khayats,
1958), p. 125, quoting "Document 250" in D. H. Miller,
My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris, 1918-1919 (New
York, 1924), IV, pp. 297-299.

Fig. 8

Red Area – British Control
B   ''   ''   influence
Blue   ''   – French Control
A   ''   –   influence
Brown '' – International Control

Blue

A

Brown

B

Red

Sykes–Picot Agreement
1916

After George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p.247.

Fig.9

MIDDLE EAST
MANDATES
1920
BRITISH
FRENCH

CYPRUS

LATAKIA

LEBANON

S Y R I A

MEDITERRANEAN

Jebel
Druze

PALESTINE

I R A Q

TRANS-
JORDAN

A

R

A

B

I

A

N

PERSIAN
GULF

0   50   100
Miles

After George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 303.

It is clear from the above discussion that both Husain and Faisal were assuming the existence of the Arab nation and asserting its right to statehood. However, their concept of the boundaries of the Arab nation was far smaller than the reality. The demand made by Husain and Faisal on behalf of the Arab nation in fact was confined to the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula (Figure 10).

Perceptions of the Extent of the Arab Nation

The ease with which the Allied Powers succeeded in dividing the Arabs into several political units after the First World War demonstrated the lack of strength and organization among the Arab nationalists. Haim notes that "it was not until the 1930's that a serious attempt was made to define the meaning of Arab nationalism and what constitutes the Arab nation."[1] Outlining the extent of the Arab nation naturally brought with it the problem of defining its frontiers. In referring to the confusion of the 1930's and 1940's, Nutting wrote concerning the Arab frontiers: "People even argued as to what constituted the frontiers of the Arab nation, let alone which of its constituent countries should be the leader."[2]

In 1931 the first Arab National Congress, held in Jerusalem, showed some realization that all the North African

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[1]Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 35.

[2]Nutting, The Arabs, p. 402.

Fig.10

Proposed Unification Plans in the Middle East
1905 - 1943

Najib al-Azuri   --------- 1905   - - - -
Husain (Sherif of Mecca) - 1915   ————
Nuri al-Said   --------- 1943
Amir Abdullah   --------- 1943   -·-··-

0   500
Miles

states were also an integral part of the Arab nation. A

statement by that Arab National Congress proclaims that the

Arab nation is "no less than 70 million people and situated

in the world's most favored regions of Asia and Africa.[1]

Although the statement does not spell out clearly the exact

areas involved, the 1931 Congress semms to have made the first

attempt to include the North African Arab states in the

national movement of the Arabs. In the covenant adopted by

the Arab Congress the first article states: "The Arab

countries constitute an indivisible unit; the (Arab) nation

does not acquiesce in any sense to the fragmentation which it

has been undergoing."[2] According to the published statement,

the primary objective of the Arabs was to be the achievement

of the unity and independence of all the Arab states. This

statement, however, did not end the confusion as to what

areas constituted the Arab nation. Neither did a coordinated

movement for political unity and independence emerge from the

Congress and spread throughout the Arab nation.

For several more years, the perception of the Arab

World remained a restricted one. As late as 1937, Amin

al-Rihani, a noted Arab nationalist and thinker, expressed

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[1]Document Number 3, "Statement by the Arab National
Congress, Jerusalem," (December 13, 1931), in Khalil, The
Arab States and the Arab League, p. 8.

[2]Ibid.

adherence to the same boundaries as had Sherif Husain.[1]

Shakib Arslan, another noted nationalist, in an address he

gave at Damascus in the same year, expressed a like opinion.[2]

He envisaged an Arab union among Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria,

Palestine, and Transjordan which the emirates of the Arabian

Peninsula would eventually also join. About Egypt he said:

"We do not think she would hesitate to link herself with this

great Arab nation, with firm military and economic links."

He further added: "Our unity [with North Africa] is no more

than religious, linguistic, cultural, and social."[3] It was

not until the 1940's that Sati' al-Husri, a noted nationalist

and writer, since credited with being the man who popularized

the idea of nationalism among the literate classes, undertook

in his writing to drive home the points that (1) Egypt is

part of the Arab nation, and (2) Pan-Arabism neither contra-

dicts nor is inimical to Islam.[4] Sati' al-Husri did not,

however, suggest that the other North African states were

within the Arab nation.

Even with the unceasing efforts of al-Husri, the

conclusion that Egypt was part of the Arab nation was brought

home very slowly, both to Egyptians and to other Arabs. In

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[1]Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 45, citing Anis Sayegh, al-Fikra al-arabiyya ti Misr (The Arab Idea in Egypt) (Beirut, 1959), p. 153.

[2]Ibid., citing Shakib Arslan, al-wahda al-arabiyya (Arab Unity) (Damascus, 1937).

[3]Ibid. [4]Ibid., p. 43.

the 1940's the attempts of Emir Abdullah, King of Transjordan,

and Nuri al-Said, the Premier of Iraq, to create an independ-

ent Arab state still excluded Egypt and the other North

African states. Their scheme was confined to the area of the

Fertile Crescent.

It was early in the year 1943 that Nuri al-Said

announced his Fertile Crescent Project, from which he excluded

both the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt. His reasons for exclu-

sion were expressed as follows:

> The states of the Arabian Peninsula have an economic
> system which differs from our own, though they are very
> close to us in respect to language, customs, and reli-
> gion. On the other hand, Egypt has a bigger population
> than that of backward states. It has also its (own)
> problems in the Sudan and elsewhere. Because of this, I
> have assumed that these states are not inclined to join
> an Arab Federation.[1]

According to Nuri al-Said's scheme, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,

and Transjordan would be united into one Arab state called

Syria. An Arab League would be created immediately with Iraq

and Syria as a nucleus, while the other Arab states would be

free to join the League in the future if they wished.

Emir Abdullah, King of Transjordan, proposed two

alternate arrangements, both somewhat similar to that of

Nuri al-Said. His project was divided into two parts. First,

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[1]Document Number 4, "Nuri As-Sa'id's Fertile Crescent
Project," (1943), in Khalil, p. 10, translating Nuri As-Sa'id,
Istiqlal al-'Arab wa Wahdatuhum: Mudhakkira fi al-Qadiyya
al-'Arabiyya (Arab Independence and Unity: Memorandum on the
Arab Cause) (Baghdad: Government Press, 1943), pp. 19-22.

the Allied Powers should declare "the independence of Syria in its natural boundaries," and a unified Syrian state should be formed consisting of the territories of northern Syria, Transjordan, Palestine, and Lebanon.[1] Next, immediately after the establishment of this unified Syrian state, an Arab federation should be created by merging Iraq and Syria, i.e., the whole of the Fertile Crescent, allowing other states to join the federation later if they wished. In case the proposed unified state could not be achieved, the King's second proposal provided for the establishment of a Syrian federal state with Damascus as its capital.

In summary, the development of the idea of one Arab nation-state until late in World War II was limited geographically to the Fertile Crescent. The Arab nationalists who started the movement assumed that Arab nationhood should be transformed into Arab statehood, but their view of the extent of the Arab nation was a restricted one.

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The Concepts of Nation and Nation-State
in Arabic Terminology

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The confusion that existed concerning the concept of an Arab nation can be judged by this quotation from Abd al-Latif Sharara who wrote in 1957:

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[1]Document Number 5, "Political Memorandum Concerning the Settlement of the Arab Question in General and the Syrian Question in Particular, Submitted to Amir Abdullah by a Number of Transjordanian Dignitaries," (Amman, March 6, 1943), in Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, p. 13.

There are four words which people confuse prodigiously
when they talk of nationalities. These are: nation
(umma), fatherland (watan), people (sha'b), and state
(daula). They frequently use the word "state" when they
mean "nation" and talk of "fatherland" to signify "people"
or speak of "people" when they intend the "nation,"
without distinction between the meaning of these vocables,
or precise realization of what they denote, or a firm
grounding in the differences among the respective con-
cepts.[1]

Traditionally, the word umma had denoted the politico-

religious community of Islam, but in contemporary usage it

denoted the whole Arab nation and was completely secular in

meaning. Arabs used to thinking of politics in terms of

religious divisions were naturally confused and perplexed by

the new concept of an Arab nation.[2] Similarly, the use of

quamiyya, loyalty to the whole Arab nation (i.e., Arab nation-

alism), in contradistinction to wataniyya, attachment to

fatherland, was equally perplexing to the Arab masses. The

word quam had denoted "the unit--in Bedouin usage [the unit]

to which one belongs and to which allegiance is owed specially

in the time of war."[3] The gradual change in the scope of the

meaning of quam to encompass the whole Arab nation was

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[1]Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, p. 227, presenting an
English translation of Abd al-Latif Sharara, Fi'l-qaumiyya
al-arabiyya (On Arab Nationalism) (Beirut, 1957), pp. 10-16.

[2]For a detailed discussion see Sylvia G. Haim, "Islam
and the Theory of Arab Nationalism," The Middle East in
Transition, ed., Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1958), pp. 280-311.

[3]Ibid., p. 296.

difficult to grasp for people who in the past had never looked beyond tribal loyalty.

The Arab League--A First Step Toward Unity

The pursuit of the Pan-Arab goal by Arab nationalists resulted in the creation of the Arab League on March 22, 1945. According to the pact of the League of Arab States, the purpose of the new organization was the "strengthening of the relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries."[1] The announced purpose fell far short of the hope of the Arab nationalists, that is, the political unification of the Arab countries.[2] On the contrary, in Sayegh's words, "it consecrated the principle of state sovereignty and enthroned it."[3] Nevertheless, the Arab League provided a forum for the discussion of Arab problems and, by enlarging its membership to include any independent state claiming to be Arab and desiring membership in the League, eliminated the

[1]Basic Documents of the League of Arab States (New York: The Arab Information Center, 1955), p. 10.

[2]Elie Kedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy," The Middle East in Transition, ed., Walter Z. Laqueur (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 102.

[3]Sayegh, Arab Unity, p. 109.

controversy as to what constitutes the frontiers of the Arab
nation.

The Ba'th Party and Modern Pan-Arabism

The Ba'th Party emerged as an officially constituted
political movement in Syria after the departure of the French
in 1946. It was the first political party dedicated to
bringing about the political unification of the entire Arab
nation. The basic principle to which the Ba'th Party has
continued to adhere is that, "the Arabs are one nation having
a natural right to live in one state and to be free to direct
its affairs."[1] Therefore, the Ba'th Party considers that
"the Arab homeland is an indivisible political and economic
unity."[2] The party resolves to keep its activities away from
individual country policies, except when they affect the
higher interests of the Arab nation. By so doing the party
aims to free itself from petty state squabbles and to work on
the unification of the whole Arab nation. In recent years,
the Pan-Arabic goal of the Ba'th Party to achieve compre-

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[1]Document Number 155, "Constitution of the Arab
Renaissance (Ba'th) Socialist Party," trans. Department of
Political Studies and Public Administration, American Univer-
sity of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, in Muhammad Khalil, The Arab
States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, Vol. I:
Constitutional Developments (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), p. 663.

[2]Ibid., p. 664.

hensive Arab unity has become the goal of all the Arab

nationalists.[1] Even President Gamal Abdel Nasser, in spite of

many specific disagreements with the Ba'th Party, once wrote

in a letter to Husain, King of Jordan: "We believe in Arab

nationalism as a true and geniune current moving towards

comprehensive Arab unity."[2] However, except in Iraq and

Syria, where it still holds power, the Ba'th Party has not

been able to extend its organization. Although the ideology

of the Ba'th movement is shared by many, the party itself

seems unable to cross the boundaries of Syria and Iraq to

other Arab countries. Nevertheless, its efforts have been

the first attempt by a political party to build a unified

movement throughout the lands of the Arab nation for the

political unification of all Arabs, and it has succeeded at

least in providing some ideological uniformity among a large

number of Pan-Arab leaders.

Present Territorial Extent of the Idea

As has been pointed out, membership in the Arab

League does not mean that all the territories of the member

countries can automatically be included within the political

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[1]Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 158.

[2]Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 208, citing Al-Ahram, March 31, 1961.

action area of the idea of a single Arab state. In fact,
among the member states, only Egypt, Libya, and Syria are
presently included in the political action area of the idea.

Egypt under the leadership of Nasser changed its
name to the United Arab Republic and has been in the fore-
front of the Pan-Arab movement since the mid 1950's.
Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, changed the name of the
state to the Arab Republic of Egypt, but its new constitution
of 1971 remains firmly committed to the Pan-Arab goal. The
constitution states: "The Egyptian people are part of the
Arab nation and strive to bring about its over-all unity."[1]
The change in name seems to be merely an attempt to make it
consistent with the new Federation of Arab Republics. Libya
under the dynamic leadership of Muammar Ghadhafi, and with
the confidence that comes from newly found oil wealth, has
played a vital role in constituting the present political
union of Egypt, Libya, and Syria.[2] Since the beginning of
his reign Ghadhafi has dissociated Libya from the Maghreb
states on the grounds that a separate block of North African
countries would be harmful to greater Arab unity. The Libyan
constitution of 1969 declares Libya to be a democratic and

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[1]"The Permanent Constitution of the Arab Republic of
Egypt," trans. Peter B. Heller, in Albert P. Blaustein and
Gisbert H. Flanz, (ed.), Constitutions of the Countries of the
World, IV (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc.,
1972), p. 1.

[2]Arnold Hottinger, "Colonel Ghadhafi's Pan-Arab
Ambitions," Review of Swiss World Affairs, XXI (June, 1971),
pp. 22-24.

free Arab Republic, whose objective is comprehensive Arab
unity. The new Syrian constitution declares that, as a part
of the Arab nation, Syria's continuing goal is the realiza-
tion of a wider Arab unity. The Ba'th political party which
rules this country has as its specific objective the political
unification of the whole Arab nation. The unity referendum
taken in the Federation of Arab Republics in September, 1971,
received an affirmative vote of 99.9 per cent in Egypt,
98.0 per cent in Libya, and 96.4 per cent in Syria. This
degree of unanimity amply demonstrates that the territories
of these three countries are the present political action
area of the unity idea.

Iraq and the Sudan share a common problem in that
each has within its boundaries areas inhabited by non-Arab
nationalities to whom the idea of Pan-Arabism is irrelevant.
In Iraq the territory inhabited by the Kurds has long been an
insurgent area demanding its own independence.[1] Only recently,
on March 11, 1972, it was reported that an agreement had been
reached between the Iraqi government and the Kurds' Democratic

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[1]Kurdestan, the territory inhabited by the Kurds as a
more or less homogeneous community constituting a majority of
the population, is today divided among Iran, Turkey, Iraq,
and Syria. In Syria, because of their small number, the
Kurds do not present a problem. For a recent review of the
Kurdish problem, see C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationals,"
Journal of Contemporary History, VI, No. 1 (1971), pp. 87-
107. A more detailed but somewhat older survey of the Kurd-
ish situation is Dirk Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdestan
(London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

Party for a ceasefire, with the granting of some form of

autonomous status for Kurdestan.[1] The presence of a non-Arab

Kurdish minority is regarded by Binder as Iraq's greatest

obstacle to unity with other Arab states.[2] In any case, the

Iraqi state is ruled by the Ba'th Party, shares its ideology

with Syria, and has a constitution which looks forward to a

"comprehensive Arab unity," the stated goal of almost all

the modern nationalists. Iraq can be said to have been first

in its initiation of political Pan-Arabism after the First

World War.[3] Except for its Kurdish territory, then, Iraq

lies within the political action area of the Arab unity idea,

but since it is not included in the Federation of Arab

Republics, it will be considered in this study as only a

highly potential area of the idea.

It seems necessary at this point to clarify somewhat

more the immediate circumstances associated with the forma-

tion of a three-way Arab union in 1970. On November 8, 1970,

the heads of state of Egypt, Libya, and the Sudan, all Arab

socialist-nationalist countries, announced in Cairo their

intent to form a federation. By the time the Federation of

Arab Republics came into official existence on September 1,

1971, the Sudan had dropped out of the projected plan. Syria,

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[1]"Chronology," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Spring, 1972), p. 168.

[2]Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East, p. 20.

[3]Ibid., p. 270.

however, had meanwhile decided to join the Federation with
Egypt and Libya. The failure of the Sudan to join the Feder-
ation was a result of the violent opposition of the Sudanese
Communist Party and the ongoing civil war between the Northern
and the Southern Sudan. The internal conflict brought on a
pro-Communist military coup in August, 1971, to be followed
almost immediately by a counter-coup.[1] The turmoil within the
country has kept the Sudan, at least temporarily, out of
the Federation. But the determination of the leadership of
the government of Sudan to join the Federation of Arab
Republics has not diminished. Al-Sayyad, one of Beirut's
newspapers, on January 9, 1972, reported Ja'far Numeiri, the
President of the Sudan, as saying that the Sudan's commitment
to join the Federation "is absolute" but that it may take
"several months, a year, several years."[2]

It should be noted, however, that approximately the
southern half of the Sudan is non-Arab, black, part Christian
and part animistic in religion, in contrast to the lighter-
skinned Arab Moslem region in the north. The cultural and
racial difference is significant enough that at times the
Southern Sudanese have demanded independence from the North.

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[1]Arnold Hottinger, "Numeiri's Changing Policies,"
Swiss Review of World Affairs, XXII (August, 1972), p. 17.

[2]"Chronology," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Winter,
1972), p. 42.

[3]Oliver Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

The struggle for independence by the Southern Sudanese
resulted in a long and bloody civil war. The war was finally
brought to an end by the signing of a peace agreement in
Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, between the Southern Sudanese
Liberation Front and the Sudanese Government on February 26,
1972. The agreement provides for a Southern People's Council
to govern regional matters while the central government is to
handle national defense, foreign policy, trade, currency,
transport, communication, and economic planning.[1] Obviously,
the idea of one Arab nation-state finds enthusiastic appeal
in the North, but to the people of the South it looks like
a plan which would bring increased Arab oppression.

Lebanon is an Arab state, but unlike any of the other
Arab states, has a large Arab Christian population existing
in a precarious balance with the Moslems.[2] Because of the
dual culture of its people, a special status of Mutesarrifate
(autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire) was estab-
lished for Lebanon in 1861.[3] After its detachment from the
Ottoman Empire, Lebanon retained its special status under the
French until the termination of the mandate in 1946 gave it

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[1]"Chronology," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Summer,
1972), p. 303.

[2]Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle
East, p. 19.

[3]Kamal S. Salibi, "The Lebanese Identity," Journal of
Contemporary History, VI, No. 1 (1971), p. 86.

independence. Many of the books and articles published about Lebanon have emphasized its uniqueness among the Arab states. In a recent article, Kamal Salibi argues that Lebanon continues to become more and more distinct as a Lebanese nation.[1] His conclusion is at least debatable. It could be argued that the influx of many Palestinian Moslem refugees has made it more Arab rather than more Lebanese. Still, it can not be denied that Lebanon is unique, and all of the previous unification plans have acknowledged this fact. As an Arab state in the midst of other Arab countries, however, if political unification does come to the Fertile Crescent, Lebanon for economic reasons will most likely choose to be part of it. The growing popularity of secular Arab nationalism enhances the probability that Lebanon will one day be incorporated into a greater Arab nation-state. Therefore, despite its special religious character, Lebanon is as much within the highly potential area of the Pan-Arab idea as is Iraq.

Jordan, like Lebanon, is a country in the Fertile Crescent whose constitution fails to express a commitment to the goal of Arab unity. But unlike Lebanon's constitution, which does not even mention the country as a part of the Arab nation, Jordan's constitution does so very strongly. In Jordan, where the majority of the residents are now

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[1]Ibid.

Palestinians, there is a highly politicized group of leaders whose cause is the general Arab cause, and for whom the sense of common bond with the Arab nation is very strong. Even before the influx of the Palestinian refugees, in the early and mid-1940's, King Abdullah, father of the present Jordanian monarch, campaigned vigorously for the unity of Greater Syria. The greatest obstacle to political unification with the larger Arab nation-state comes from the present monarchial leadership, which is fearful of losing its throne and privileges.

The Arab states in the Arabian Peninsula, to the south of the Fertile Crescent, with a few exceptions, are characterized by a lack of written constitutions, recognized political parties, and mass participation in the political process. The low level of politicization of the whole peninsular population makes it a little difficult to assess the status of the one Arab nation-state idea in this area. However, with the information that is available it is possible to make at least some tentative political judgments about the Peninsula.

In Saudi Arabia, the largest of the peninsular Arab states, political consciousness is beginning to appear, but it is still confined to a small sector of the population.[1] Lack of experience with foreign aggression since the departure

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[1]George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), p. 91.

of the Turks has hindered the development of Arab nationalism
or Pan-Arabism. For most Saudi Arabians the important dis-
tinction is still between Moslems and non-Moslems, rather
than between Arabs and non-Arabs.[1] This traditional attitude
is changing, however, although only very slowly. The inces-
sant broadcasts from the powerful Cairo radio station, the
Voice of the Arabs, on the importance of Arab unity reach an
ever-increasing number of listeners among the Saudi Arabians.[2]
Egyptian newspapers with the theme of Arab unity are being
read to an increasing degree by the literate Saudi Arabians.
Teachers, businessmen, and officials from other Arab coun-
tries, especially from Egypt, arrive and stay for varying
periods of time in Saudi Arabia, and no doubt have contrib-
uted to the general feeling of belonging to one greater Arab
community. The idea of one Arab nation-state is a rather new
concept in Saudi Arabia, however, and it is also contradic-
tory to the spirit of Islam which puts its emphasis upon the
universal community of the faithful rather than national
groups.[3] Islam, since Saudi Arabia is its birthplace,
naturally has a very strong hold on the population. In Saudi
Arabia written constitutional law is rudimentary, consisting
mainly of a set of Organic Instructions established in 1926
for al-Hijaz, and a decree of October, 1953, setting up a

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[1]Ibid., p. 311.   [2]Ibid.   [3]Ibid.

council of ministers.[1] Otherwise, all the national laws are derived from the Koran and other related Islamic writing.

Saudi Arabia, nonetheless, is the original home of the Arabs, and its people are proud of their Arab status. The first nationalist, armed revolt of 1916 was led by Husain, Sherif of al-Hijaz.[2] The present ruling family of Saudi Arabia has continually shown its willingness to identify with the larger family of Arabs and various Arab causes.[3] The expression of solidarity with other Arabs and their cause is not the same, however, as the acceptance of the Pan-Arabic goal of comprehensive Arab unity. The ruling family in Saudi Arabia is not at all receptive to the Pan-Arabic political goal, and political awareness on the part of most of the people is still to come. Hence, Saudi Arabia cannot be included within the highly potential area of the unity idea as can Jordan, Iraq, and the Sudan. But there still remains a real possibility that the people of Saudi Arabia will become receptive, even enthusiastic, to the idea as their political consciousness increases.

The situation in the peripheral states of the Peninsula is very similar to that in Saudi Arabia but with some

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[1]Ibid., p. 106.

[2]In 1922 the Husain family was driven out of Saudi Arabia by the Saudis.

[3]Saudi Arabia, along with Libya and Kuwait, agreed to provide $135 million a year to help support the poorer countries of Egypt and Jordan after the 1967 war with Israel.

variations. In the Persian Gulf States the political aware-

ness situation was described by Fahim Il Qubain as follows:

> The conception of nationality is a western contribution
> and a new arrival in the Persian Gulf. . . . It is still
> a vague idea and certainly has not replaced to any degree
> the existing loyalties. It manifests itself in two ways:
> first, negatively in a desire to expel the foreigner,
> . . . and second, positively, in a confused ideal of pan-
> Arab, pan-Islamic union. No clear distinction is drawn
> between the two . . . and the terms are used interchange-
> ably [but] the pan-Arab aspect of the ideal predominates.
> This new spirit of nationalism has had effect of creating
> a greater emphasis on unity among the native population.[1]

Although this was written in 1955, the statement still holds

true, for change comes slowly in these small countries. The

obvious awareness of some individuals in the Persian Gulf

States of being part of a larger Arab nation, and occasional

government pledges to strengthen ties with other Arabs,

certainly show a potential for the operation of the idea of

one nation-state. In the Provisional Constitution of the

recently formed Union of Arab Emirates, Article 6 states:

"The union is a part of the Greater Arab Homeland bound with

ties of religion, language, history and common destiny. The

people of the union is one people and is a part of the Arab

Nation."[2] Among the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, only

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[1]Fahim I. Qubain, "Social Classes and Tensions in
Bahrain," The Middle East Journal, IX (Summer, 1955), p. 273.
The term "existing loyalties" as used here refers to tradi-
tional tribal loyalties to a person rather than to territorial
allegiances.

[2]"The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab
Amirates," The Middle East Journal, XXVI (Summer, 1972),
p. 308.

Kuwait possesses a constitution which expresses a commitment to the furtherance of Arab nationalism.[1]

Four years before the Republic of Yemen became a republic, it joined Egypt and Syria in the Union of Arab States. More recently, Yemen experienced a long, bloody civil war (1962-1967) in which Egypt (on the republican side) and Saudi Arabia and Jordan (on the royalist side) fought each other by proxy.[2] Some observers have interpreted the civil war in Yemen as part of a continuing conflict between progressive and traditional forces which is going on throughout the Arab World. In any case, the civil war has brought some changes to the basically backward tribal society of Yemen. The traditional tribal allegiance is breaking down, the mobility of the people has increased, and Egyptian influence through radio broadcasts of the Voice of the Arabs is pervasive. Many Yemenis seem to have become discontented with conventional social and legal restrictions.[3] Reflecting these changes, a new Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic was announced on December 28, 1970. The very first line of the Preamble begins: "We the Yemenis are an Arab and

[1]"The Constitution of the State of Kuwait," trans. Eric B. Blaustein, in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (ed.), Constitutions of the Countries of the World, III (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1971), p.5.

[2]Edgar O'Ballance, The War in Yemen (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1971), p. 8.

[3]Ibid., pp. 208-209.

Muslim people. . . ." Article 1 of the constitution states that "the people of Yemen are a part of the Arab Nation," but Article 5 pledges only to realize Yemeni unity, i.e., unity between the Republic of Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).[1]

The situation in South Yemen is different in that there the Pan-Arab feeling is more predominant. This more developed political consciousness of South Yemen can be attributed largely to the struggle for independence against the British, whereas the territory of North Yemen was never colonized in the modern period.[2] On December 1, 1967, Qahtan as-Shaabi,[3] leader of the South Yemeni revolution, told a cheering crowd at al-Ittihad that the major policies of his government would be socialism at home, non-alignment abroad, Arab unity, the liberation of Palestine, the support of national revolutionary movements, and the "reunification of the Arab people in North and South Yemen."[4] If South Yemen

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[1]"Permanent Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic," The Middle East Journal, XXV, No. 3 (Summer, 1971), p. 389.

[2]The Ottoman Empire was nominally sovereign in Yemen from 1517 to 1918, but there appears to have been little interference in local affairs.

[3]In 1958 Qahtan as-Shaabi chose voluntary exile in Cairo in order to oppose the British sponsored Federation of Aden Protectorates. In 1962 he went to North Yemen to help the revolution, and for a time was a minister in the Republic of Yemen.

[4]Tom Little, South Arabia: Arena of Conflict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 181.

were contiguous to any of the Arab countries in the Fertile Crescent, or to Egypt or Libya, it could be included within the highly potential area of the unity area. The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen adopted November 30, 1970, however, does not call for the unity of the entire Arab nation, but limits its objective only to Yemeni unity, as is the case with the Republic of Yemen. Article 1 of the constitution makes its commitment "to bring about a united, democratic Yemen."[1]

Until recently, North and South Yemen, with the common objective of unification, have found themselves involved in armed conflict, each accusing the other of trying to impose unity by force. In October, 1972, after four weeks of armed clashes, both countries agreed in a meeting at Cairo to provide for seven committees to prepare plans within a year to merge all institutions in the two countries.[2]

The three remaining Arab states, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, even with a rather well developed political consciousness among the people, have failed to adopt and popularize the Pan-Arabic goal of comprehensive Arab unity. Rather, these countries conceive themselves as constituting a

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[1]"Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen," trans. David M. McClintock, in Blaustein and Flanz (ed.), Constitutions of the Countries of the World, IV, p.2.

[2]The Daily Oklahoman, October 24, 1972, p. 6.

separate regional Arab entity known as the Maghreb--the Arab

West. Morocco's constitution of December 14, 1962, states:

> The Kingdom of Morocco, a sovereign Muslim State, whose official language is Arabic, constitutes a part of the great Maghreb.
>   As an African State, moreover, it espouses the realization of African unity as one of its objectives.[1]

Not only does the Moroccan constitution not claim Morocco to

be a part of the larger Arab nation; it looks instead in the

direction of African unity. If the constitution gives any

indication of the state of thinking in Morocco, as it probably

does, the idea of one Arab nation-state clearly does not

apply there.

The Algerian constitution of September 10, 1963, like

that of Morocco, recognizes the geographical reality of its

location on the continent of Africa. But, unlike Morocco,

Algeria does not seem to aim for an all-African unity, and

does recognize itself to be a part of the Arab World.

Article 2 of the constitution states that the Algerian nation

"forms an integral part of the Arab Maghreb, of the Arab

World and of Africa."[2] Because Algeria was one of the latest

African states to gain independence from the French, and

has been geographically apart from the main stream of Arab

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[1]Amos J. Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations, Vol. I: Africa (3rd ed. rev. Dorothy Peaslee Xydis; The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965), p. 562.

[2]Ibid., p. 6.

political movements for a long period of time, it is doubtful that there exists any substantial desire there for one Arab nation-state. Gallagher writes: "Algeria is the example par excellence of a dual economy and a dual society."[1] The nation has been influenced by French culture more than any other area in North Africa.[2] French has been used as the major language of instruction and higher thought over such a long period that many young writers were and are unable to express themselves in decent Arabic.[3] Houari Boumedienne, current President of Algeria, was the first Algerian leader who could speak good Arabic. All these factors indicate a distinct Algerian national identity scarcely favorable to the development of ideas of political union with other Arab countries.

The Preamble to the Tunisian constitution of June 1, 1959, pledges the nation "to remain faithful to the teaching of Islam, to the unity of the Greater Maghreb, to its membership of the Arab family."[4] Article 1 of the constitution further states: "The Tunisian Republic is part of the

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[1]Charles F. Gallagher, "Report on North Africa," Middle East Report 1950, ed. William Sands (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1959), p. 63.

[2]Ibid., p. 62.   [3]Ibid.

[4]Constitution of the Tunisian Republic (Tunis: Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, March, 1968), p. 5.

Greater Maghreb and shall work for its unity, within the framework of common interests."[1] Like the Moroccan and Algerian constitutions, the Tunisian constitution does not mention Africa or African unity. It does acknowledge the nation's membership in the larger Arab family, but its commitment is clearly limited to working for the unity of the Maghreb. Therefore, one can only conclude that the idea of one Arab nation-state encompassing all of the Arabs does not as yet apply to Tunisia. President Habib Bourguiba, in an article written for Foreign Affairs in 1957 stated:

> Tunisia's policy is determined by its history and by its geography. Because Tunisia is a part of Africa, it tends to identify firmly with other North African nations, whose interests it shares. As a member of the Arab community, it has brotherly relations with the Arab countries to the East. And because it is situated in the "West" and is a neighbour to Europe, and in particular to France, it looks for security and economic progress in a close alliance with the free nations of the West. It is along these three lines that our foreign policy must develop.[2]

In a speech in 1965, Bourguiba, commenting on Middle East relationships said: "Tunisia freed herself centuries ago from the ties that bound her to Baghdad and Damascus. . . ."[3] If Bourguiba expresses the general sentiments of his people, which seems likely because of his demonstrated domestic

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Habib Bourguiba, "Nationalism Antidote to Communism," Foreign Affairs, XXXV (July, 1957), p. 653.

[3] Ronald Steel (ed.), North Africa (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1967), p. 97, citing "The Atlantic Report: Tunisia," The Atlantic (November, 1965), pp. 24-27.

popularity, he considers Tunisia to be a western nation, and part of the Arab World only by geographical accident rather than vocation.[1]

Among the North African Arab countries, the increasing distance from the Arab cultural hearth in the east seems to be reflected in their regional identification. Tunisia, the easternmost country of the Arab West, recognizes its cultural links with the larger Arab nation, but commits itself only to the unity of the Maghreb. Algeria, the middle country of the Arab West, acknowledges that it is a part of the Maghreb, the Arab World, and Africa, but in that order. There is no Algerian pledge to the unification of the Arab West as in the case of Tunisia. The westernmost country of the Arab West, Morocco, recognizes itself to be a part of the Maghreb, but also aims for African unity as one of its objectives.

In summary, the territories of the Arab nation can be divided into four different categories: (1) the political action area of the Pan-Arab unity idea, comprising Egypt, Libya, and Syria; (2) the high potential area of the idea, consisting of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and the Sudan; (3) the low potential area where the idea could be expected to spread if there were changes in political leadership, including all of the Arabian Peninsula; and (4) areas which are within the

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[1]Ibid.

political area of the idea but where the Pan-Arab goal of one

Arab nation-state seems to have the lowest potential, that

is, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Obviously, there exists

the Jewish state of Israel which has no potential for the

political action area, but which geographically finds itself

almost surrounded by the Arab World (Figure 11).

Fig.11

The Unification Idea And Its
Political Area

Political Action Area

High　Potential For Political Action Area

Low　"　"　"　"　"

Lowest　"　"　"　"　"

No　"　"　"　"　"

0　200　400
Miles

97

CHAPTER IV

CORE AREAS OF THE ARAB WORLD

In political geography the concept of core area was
first discussed by Friedrich Ratzel. According to Ratzel,
nation-states commonly evolve from small units which he chose
to call Zellen (cells) or Raumzellen.[1] What Ratzel termed
the cell, Whittlesey called the nuclear core, "the area in
which or about which a state originates."[2] Today, as noted
by Andrew Burghardt, there exists a great deal of confusion
in the use of the term core area. For the purpose of this
study, three different types of core area are recognized.
Nuclear core will be used as defined by Whittlesey, implying
organic growth from some smaller beginning. Original core
will be used as defined by Burghardt to mean "the original
core area of greatest political and/or economic importance,"
but which did not serve as the base for continued accretions

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[1]Andrew Burghardt, "The Core Concept in Political
Geography: A Definition of Terms," The Canadian Geographer,
XII (Winter, 1969), p. 340, citing F. Ratzel, "Gesetze des
raumlichen Wachstums der Staaten," Petermann's Metteilungen,
1896.

[2]Whittlesey, The Earth and the State, p. 597.

of territory.[1] Contemporary core will be used to designate

the area "which is currently of greatest political and/or

economic significance.[2] By itself the term core will be

used in a general sense to include all three of these concepts.

This chapter will show that there was no dominant

core area to provide a focus for the development of the one

Arab nation-state idea until the mid-1950's. It appears that

the idea of one Arab nation-state preceded the emergence of

a core area, unlike the process of historical development in

most of the nation-states of Western Europe.[3] In the discus-

sion which follows, the core areas of the Arab World will be

identified as original, nuclear, or contemporary (Figures 12

and 13). Because a country with a true nuclear core generally

experiences historical continuity over a period of several

decades, and not infrequently over several centuries, it

develops distinct characteristics which make it difficult

to unite politically with other areas.

The Arab Empire of the seventh and eighth century

seems to have lacked a durable nuclear core, while more

recently the coming into being of several core areas has

hindered the one Arab nation-state idea from evolving into

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[1]Burghardt, "The Core Concept in Political Geography,"
p. 350.

[2]Ibid.

[3]See Pounds and Ball, "Core Areas and the Develop-
ment of the European States System," pp. 24-40.

Fig.12

THE ARAB WORLD

Core Areas

CONTEMPORARY
NUCLEAR
ORIGINAL
C + N + O
C + O
C + N

0   200   400
Miles

Fig.13

Important Towns Of The Arab World*
(Past And Present)

- Important Towns
- ○ Capitals

*Cities and towns shown on this map are those mentioned in
Chapter IV.

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reality by depriving the region of a common focus. Instead, there has been competition among core areas, each seeking influence over and control of the intervening territories. At times this competition has led to interregional hostilities.

Most states that developed before the twentieth century evolved naturally from and about a nuclear core. Italy grew from Rome, China from the Wei Ho Valley, the United States from the Atlantic coastal region, England from the Thames Basin, and France from the Île de France.[1] In most, if not all, of the above cases, it is apparent that the idea of the state followed the emergence of a core area. In the case of the Arab World, however, the emergence of the modern idea of one Arab state, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, took place without any supporting core area and, hence, without a focus.

In the evolution of a state, the people and institutions of the core area typically play a vital part in keeping the state viable. Once the nuclear core emerges into a coherent unit, Hartshorne writes:

> It has marked strength, whether of influence or direct power, over adjacent regions less effectively integrated; it has the power to grow, to expand geographically not

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[1]Lucile Carlson, Geography and World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), p. 76.

merely as a political realm, but as an area of coherent political integration.[1]

In assessing the role of a core area in the evolution of a state, Hartshorne writes:

> A core area is neither sufficient nor essential to the evolution of a nation or state. What is essential is a common idea that convinces the people in all the regions that they belong together. Historically in certain states a core area may have played a major role in spreading that idea to other regions and it may continue today as in France, Argentina, or Mexico, to focus the interest of the regions on itself as the center of what has become a functioning unit, but the common idea for a state may develop where no core area exists.[2]

Although the Arab countries have not become a functioning unit, most Arabs are aware of a "sense of common belonging" and have an obvious desire for a nation-state. This common sense of belonging, according to Hartshorne, should have been sufficient to have set in motion the evolution of one Arab nation-state. Perhaps it would have been sufficient if foreign powers had let the evolution take its natural course and had not divided the Arabs into several political units and then tried to perpetuate the division. Since this was not the way things evolved, the Arab unity idea needed help in the form of a core area, a territorial base from which to propagate and promote the idea among the Arabs. Modern federation attempts, beginning in 1958, may be said to have

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[1]Richard Hartshorne, "Morphology of the State Area," Essays in Political Geography, ed. Charles A. Fisher (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 31.

[2]Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography," p. 116.

been the result of Egypt's acceptance of itself as an integral
part of the Arab nation. The emergence of a Pan-Arab core in
Cairo, with an influential radio transmitter and an inter-
national press has done much to foster the idea.

The Historical Core Areas of the Arab Empire

Pre-Islamic al-Hijaz had three urban areas, al-Taif
(Taif), Mecca, and Medina, all frequently visited by Bedouins
for the purpose of exchanging goods (Figure 13). Of the
three centers, Mecca, although situated in an inhospitable
and barren valley with an unattractive climate, was the most
important, being the sanctuary and religious center of North
Arabia.[1] In addition to being the home of many pagan gods,
Mecca was the place of the Ka'bah, which later became the
Palladium of Islam.[2] The pilgrimage to Mecca became one of
the most important religious practices of the Bedouin nomads.
The frequent trips of the Bedouins to Mecca, particularly
during the four months of Holy Truce (the first three months
for religious observances and the fourth for trade), incul-
cated in them the local beliefs, the rites of the Ka'bah,
and the practice of offering sacrifices.[3] Thus, even before

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[1] Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 101.

[2] The Prophet Mohammed destroyed the pagan images of
the pre-Islamic era and built in their place the Ka'bah, a
cube-shaped stone structure, and declared that the Prophet
Abraham had erected it and made it the focal point of a pil-
grimage required of all the faithful.

[3] Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 102.

the rise of Islam, Mecca was functioning as a unifying element among the Arabian nomads. The situation of Mecca midway between Ma'rib and Ghazzah on the old Spice Road, greatly enhanced its function as a religious and commercial center.[1]

A little to the east of Mecca, al-Taif, "nestling among shady trees at an altitude of about 6000 feet, a bit of Syrian earth," was as it still is, the summer resort of the Meccan aristocracy.[2] Among the products available at al-Taif were honey, watermelons, figs, grapes, almonds, peaches, and pomegranates. Although also situated along the old trade route between Ma'rib and Ghazzah, al-Taif did not assume the regional prominence of Mecca. Its special character was that of a resort rather than a religious center.

The town of Medina did not assume any particular prominence until the rise of Islam. Situated in the desert about 300 miles north of Mecca, it was simply known as another station on the Spice Road. Nature, however, was more favorable to Medina than to Mecca. It was known as a veritable oasis, well-adapted to the cultivation of date palms.[3]

The Prophet Mohammed, although born in Mecca, was rejected by the Meccans and was forced in 622 A.D. to escape

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[1]Ibid.   [2]Ibid.   [3]Ibid., p. 104.

to Medina where he was received by the Medinese as an honored chief.[1] Mohammed quickly took political control of Medina and soon transformed it into an Islamic state. Having established himself firmly in Medina, he soon began to carry out an expansion program based on his teachings concerning the mission of Islam. In 630 A.D. Mohammed and his followers conquered Mecca, an accomplishment essential to success in their missionary effort. In pre-Islamic days, as we have seen, Mecca was a very important power center with considerable influence on the Bedouins, and without taking it Mohammed probably could not have succeeded in gaining the allegiance of the Bedouins as easily as he did. The fall of Mecca initiated the "year of delegations" (630-631 A.D.) when many Bedouin chiefs from all over the Arabian Peninsula came to offer allegiance to the Prophet.[2] By 632 A.D., the year of his death, the Prophet Mohammed's domain extended over the entire Peninsula. Although Mecca was the original core, it was clearly the Medina community which formed the nuclear core of the new Arab Empire.

Medina, however, did not remain for long as the nuclear core of the growing Arab Empire. In 656 A.D., thirty-four years after Mohammed's arrival at Medina, the accession of Ali to the Caliphate led to his removal of the

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[1] Ibid., p. 116.

[2] Ibid., p. 119.

capital to al-Kufa in Iraq.[1] This move was regarded as essential, since far-flung conquests had shifted the center of gravity of the Empire farther to the north. Medina and Mecca never resumed their previous political importance and remained predominantly religious centers within the extensive domain of Islam. The selection of al-Kufa as the capital instead of Damascus generated envy in Damascus, and the result was a power struggle between leaders in the two centers.[2] In 661 A.D., with the assassination of the Caliph Ali, Damascus emerged as the capital and the seat of the victorious Umayyad dynasty.

Damascus at this point assumed the functions of a nuclear core for the expanding Arab Empire. Vast new territories were brought under its domain, including Tunisia and Morocco in the west, Spain in the north, and the Indus valley in the east (Figures 3, 14, and 15). The Arab character of the state was emphasized by changing the language of the public registers in Damascus from Greek to Arabic, and from Pahlavi to Arabic in Iraq and the eastern provinces. A new coinage with Arabic inscriptions was created for use throughout the Empire.

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[1]Originally al-Kufa was a military camp built by order of the Caliph in 638 A.D. It was built not far from the ruins of Babylon and the Lakhmid capital of al-Hirah.

[2]Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 180.

Fig.14

THE EXPANSION OF THE ARAB EMPIRE

(7th – 8th centuries)

Conquests Under Mohammed

"   "   the First Four Caliphs(632–656A.D)

"   "   "   Umayyads (661–750A.D.)

0   200   400

Miles

After Philip K. Hitti, The History of the Arabs, p. 216.

Fig.15

THE ARAB EXPANSION*

———▶ **Conquest Routes**

*Arab conquests of the present non-Arab areas are not shown on this map.

Based on J.B. Glubb, The Great Arab Conquests.

The capital of the Arab Empire was returned to al-Kufa with the overthrow of the Umayyad Caliphate by the Abbasids in 750 A.D. Al-Kufa was soon replaced by al-Anbar as the seat of Abbasid power, although this too was a temporary location, and in 762 A.D. Baghdad was finally made the capital of the Arab Empire of the Abbasids.[1] Such frequent relocation of the capital within the Tigris-Euphrates Valley was possible because of the developed state of the whole area, which had served as the seat of several ancient civilizations. Here had flourished the thriving capital city of Babylonia as early as the third millennium B.C., and much later, in the seventh century B.C., the nuclear core of the Assyrian Empire, Nineveh on the upper Tigris. The Arab Empire centered in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley did not show any organic growth after 750 A.D., and hence Baghdad can not properly be designated as a nuclear core. The defeat of the Arabs, the so-called "Moors," at Tours on the Loire River, it will be recalled, was eighteen years earlier, in 732 A.D. The Tigris-Euphrates basin, however, is certainly an original core with regard to the formation of the early Arab Empire.

Within the vast, mostly desert domain of the Empire, competing dynasties made their appearance. During the time of the Abbasid Caliphate several new core areas emerged, and

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[1]Gaston Wiet, Baghdad: Metropolis of the Abbasid Caliphate, trans. Seymour Feiler (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 12.

some of them established their independence. In 788 A.D. the
Idrisids declared their own independent state in Morocco, and
from this time on Morocco was never effectively ruled by
either the Abbasid Caliphate centered in Baghdad or its
successor, the Ottoman Caliphate in Constantinople. The
later Fatimid dynasty ended the rule of the Baghdad Caliphate
over Egypt in 969 A.D., and that Nile basin state remained
independent until the Ottoman Turks came in 1517. What was
left of the Baghdad Caliphate was finally overthrown by the
Mongols, a new force out of eastern Asia, in 1258 A.D.

The Mongols, however, did not remain as effective
rulers. The end of the Baghdad Caliphate in 1258 led to the
breaking up of the medieval Arab Empire into several unstable
political entities, a condition which continued until the
sixteenth century when the Ottoman Turks took over at least
nominal control of all the territories of the Arab Empire
except Morocco. The core area of the Ottoman Empire was in
Turkey, at Constantinople, in a non-Arab region, and it
remained there until the twentieth century.

The process of dividing the Arab-Turkish lands among
the European colonial powers started long before the First
World War (Figures 16 and 17). European interest in the
lower Nile basin and the Sinai Peninsula area was obvious
during the period of the Napoleonic wars. The occupation of
Algiers by French troops in 1830 marked the beginning of an
aggression that eventually extended throughout North Africa

Fig.16

COLONIALISM
in
THE ARAB WORLD

1900

British
French

Contested by France and Spain

Ottoman

Wahhabis

Anglo-Egyptian Condominium

N

0   200   400
Miles

Fig.17

COLONIALISM
in
THE ARAB WORLD
Maximum Extent

- ▒▒▒ British
- ▓▓▓ French
- ⋮⋮⋮⋮ Italian
- ▬▬▬ Spanish

1881-1957

1921-1946

1920-1932

1923-1946

1899-1961

1853-1971

1830-1962

1912-1956

1911-1951

1882-1922

1898-1957

1839-1967

N

0   200   400
Miles

113

and involved no less than four European powers. The defeat of
Turkey, which fought on the side of the Central Powers in
1914-18, saw the separation of the Arab portion of the Turk-
ish domain into several political entities under the rule of
the French and British governments as provided for by the
League of Nations mandate system. Since then, a number of
core areas have appeared in the Arab World, competing with
each other for prominence and influence over the intervening
territories. Independence has not brought an end to this
competition.

Core Areas of the Modern Arab States

North Africa

Morocco

During Idrisid rule in the northwestern highlands of
Africa, as early as the eighth century, the town of Fez
emerged as an important commercial center and a flourishing
capital. Fez stands at the crossroads of two important routes
of communication, both influenced somewhat by local features
of the terrain.[1] One of these routes runs from the Mediterra-
nean to the Sahara and beyond, the other from the Atlantic to
the Eastern Maghreb. The city itself is located in the center
of an arable and fertile region.[2] The relative importance of

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[1] Roger Le Tourneau, Fez in the Age of Marinides,
trans. Besse Alberta Clement (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1971), p. 3.

[2] Ibid., p. 5.

the Idrisids declined after the death of Idris II in 828, but
their capital city saw the completion of the great Karaouine
mosque with its fourteen gates. The university at Fez was the
foremost intellectual center in the Maghreb throughout the
Middle Ages.

A competing center of early political and cultural
prominence in the western Arab World was Córdoba, on the
banks of the Guadalquivir River in southern Spain. Under
the Umayyad dynasty it prospered as a prominent cultural
center for nearly three centuries, but after its conquest by
Ferdinand III of Castile in 1236 its great mosque became a
Christian cathedral. Although there are many architectural
remains of the Moorish period in Córdoba, Seville, Granada,
and other Spanish cities, Spain as a whole has been separated
from the Arab World for nearly five centuries. Following
the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate in Córdoba in 1031 the
Almoravids, Berber nomads from the western Sahara, became
prominent and consolidated their rule over much of northwestern
Africa. The Almoravids' first power base was in southern
Morocco. They established Marrakesh in 1062, made it their
capital, and extended their conquest toward the north,
occupying Fez sometime soon after 1075. They made the city
of Fez a base of operation for their military campaigns in
northern Morocco and in central Algeria.[1] In 1145 another
Berber tribe, the Almohads from the Atlas Mountains, unlike

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[1]_Ibid._, p. 9.

the Almoravids a settled people, came into prominence on the

Moroccan scene.[1] Like the Almoravids they kept Marrakesh as

their capital and used Fez as a base of operations in the

north. Under the rule of both the Almohads and the Almoravids,

Fez flourished as a commercial, cultural, and military center.

In the thirteenth century the city came under the control of

the Marinids who made Fez, their capital, one of the most

important Islamic centers in the Arab World. Fez maintained

its prosperity until the middle of the sixteenth century

when it was conquered by the Sa'adians. Marrakesh was once

again made the capital, and from this point on Fez was subor-

dinate to it. In 1603 a conflict within the Sa'adian family

led to the division of Morocco into two parts, the southern

half ruled from Marrakesh and the northern half from Fez.

This division among the Sa'adians was exploited by the

Alawites whose rule was subsequently established over all of

Morocco, and which has continued until today subject only to

the French protectorate of the early twentieth century

terminated in 1956. The Alawites made Meknes, thirty-three

miles west of Fez, their capital. Fez, however, remains an

important center of Moroccan political life since its atti-

tudes reflect the interests of the urban Arabs and sedentary

rural population in the interior north. Since it was from

Meknes that the Alawites expanded their state, Fez-Meknes may

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[1]Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 103.

be said to constitute the nuclear core of Morocco.[1] The

contemporary core, however, is on the coast and includes

Rabat (1969, pop. 435,000),[2] the present administrative

capital, and Casablanca (1969, pop. 1,320,000), the great

French-developed commercial metropolis. In line with the

terminology adopted at the beginning of this chapter,

Marrakesh can properly be called the original core of Morocco.

Algeria

After the overthrow of Carthage in 146 B.C. the

Romans formed a North African province corresponding more or

less closely to present-day Tunisia. About the same time, a

Numidian Kingdom controlled by the great Berber Chief

Massinissa and his successor Jurgurtha for the first time

constituted a united and independent realm corresponding

approximately to modern Algeria.[3] The capital of the Numidian

state was Cirta (Constantine). The Romans conquered Numidia

in 46 B.C. and then divided their Maghreb domain into several

administrative units.[4] The Roman conquest was followed by

that of the Vandals in the fifth century, and the Byzantines

in the sixth century. In the seventh century, the Arabs

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[1]Ibid., pp. 224-236.

[2]All the population figures used in this section are derived from the Demographic Yearbook 1969 (New York: United Nations, 1970).

[3]Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa (The Maghrib) (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 295.

[4]Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 32.

arrived. At the time the Arabs overran it, the whole of North
Africa west of the Nile was still a great rural region inhab-
ited mostly by nomadic shepherds with little in the way of
towns.[1] Following the seventh century conquest, the territo-
ries of present-day Algeria were nominally under centers of
authority in either Morocco or Tunisia. This situation
prevailed until the thirteenth century when the Zayanids,
one of the Berber tribes, succeeded in establishing their own
independent state with a capital at Tlemsen. This state
extended over the entire present coastline of Algeria, from
the Mulawiyya River on the west to the Summam (Wadi-al-Kabir)
on the east.[2] During the period of the Zayanid state,
Tlemsen, situated a short distance in from the coast at an
altitude of about 800 meters, with cool dry air and a
favorable position for commercial activity, flourished as
the capital and commercial town, with a population of perhaps
100,000. Before the founding of the Zayanid state in the
thirteenth century, within the present limits of Algeria, only
Oran seems to have had any outside commercial contacts.
Established by Andalusian sailors in the tenth century, Oran
had been frequented to some extent by merchants of Genoa,
Pisa, Marseilles, and Barcelona.[3]

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[1]Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa, p. 209.

[2]Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 152.

[3]Ibid., p. 153.

Although frequently attacked and temporarily occupied
by other tribes, the Zayanid state survived until the Turkish
conquest in the sixteenth century. The survival capacity of
the Zayanid state over a period of some three centuries has
been attributed by historians less to its own inherent
strength than to the power balance between the Turks to the
east and the Spaniards to the west which prevented either
party from annexing Tlemsen.[1] Much of the time, it appears,
the real control of the Zayanid state did not extend beyond
the limits of the capital.

The coming of the Ottoman Turks in the early six-
teenth century shifted the Algerian power center from Tlemsen
northeastward along the coast to Algiers. Under Turkish rule
Algiers was transformed from a small and relatively unimpor-
tant seaport into a flourishing and prosperous capital. From
Algiers the Turks gradually extended their control to the
interior and eventually came to rule an area more or less the
size of present-day Algeria. Their control was effected
through a military type of administration.[2] The country was
separated into three administrative divisions with their
repective provincial capitals, Oran, Constantine, and Midea.
Although the countryside was little affected by Turkish
administration, the extension of Moslem customs and laws

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[1]Ibid., p. 167.

[2]Ibid., p. 176.

created some homogeneity among the various tribes.[1] Clearly,
the present territorial unit of Algeria took its shape during
the time of Turkish rule. In Barbour's words, in this period,
"Algeria entered history as a distinct entity."[2] French
colonization of Algeria in the nineteenth century did not
bring much change to the territorial extent of the state,
although under the French the present-day boundaries were
demarcated, and the tribal Algerians were transformed by
their hostility to the French into staunch nationalists. The
history of Algeria shows clearly that the original core of
Oran-Tlemsen did not act as a nuclear core. It was Algiers
(1966, pop. 903,000) which served that role and which has
given its name to the country. Today the contemporary core
of Algeria extends all along the densely settled coast.

Tunisia

A few miles from Tunis, the modern capital of Tunisia,
is the site of Carthage. For thirteen centuries in antiquity,
Carthage served as a capital city under the Phoenicians, the
Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, and the Byzantines.[3]
The prosperity of Carthage, founded by merchants from Tyre in
the ninth century B.C., was especially evident during the
time it served the Carthaginians as capital of their vast

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa, p. 211.

[3] Ibid., p. 295.

empire just prior to the Roman conquest in 146 B.C. Around

500 A.D. a partially rebuilt Carthage was a capital city for

the Vandals, and for a brief period in the sixth century it

was in control of the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, even

before the Arab conquest the northern plains around Carthage

had assumed the character of a core area. The recurring

emergence of an independent state based on this core is a

characteristic feature of Tunisia's long history.

During the Arab campaigns in the Maghreb the Berbers

of Tunisia resisted for a time, but eventually they were

subdued, opening the way to the western Maghreb. In 705 A.D.

a few miles southwest of Carthage, Arabs founded the city of

Tunis, which was to become the base of the Arab fleet and

which eventually gave its name to the nation of Tunisia.[1]

Following the conquest, however, the Arabs were not able to

maintain complete control of the Tunisian territory. Until

909 A.D. the Aghlabids, ruling most of Tunisia from their

base, Qairawan (Kairouan), maintained their autonomy in

relation to the central government of the Arab Caliphate in

Baghdad.[2] At the beginning of the tenth century the Ismailis,

descendants of Fatima, daughter of Mohammed, established their

own independent state centered in Tunisia.[3] Between 958 and

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[1]Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 70.

[2]Qairawan was one of the military camps established in
an earlier Arab campaign.

[3]Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 80.

969 A.D. the Ismailis extended their rule westward over
Morocco and eastward to Egypt where they built al-Qahira
(Cairo) as their administrative center. Having chosen
al-Qahira as their principal capital, the Fatimids left the
Zirids to rule in their name a stable state area consisting
of all of present-day Tunisia and part of adjacent Algeria.[1]

The Zirids declared their independence from the
Fatimids in 996 A.D., but by this time their state was
already in decline. In the twelfth century Tunisia fell
under the control of the Moroccan Almohads, but from 1207 to
1221 the Hafsids, another Berber tribe, ruled Tunisia inde-
pendently of Marrakesh. By 1258 the Hafsids were successful
in establishing a fully independent and relatively stable
state with Tunis as its capital. Commenting on the Hafsid
Kingdom, Nevill Barbour writes:

> In general, the Hafsid Kingdom seems to have had a more
> specifically Tunisian character than its predecessors and
> may be thought of as foreshadowing the Tunisian state of
> today, though the dynasty, and with it the independence
> of Tunisia, collapsed at the end of the fifteenth century
> under simultaneous blows from the Spaniards and the
> Ottoman Turks.[2]

Hafsid rule lasted until the Turkish conquest in the
fifteenth century. Under the Turkish regency the local rulers,
the Husainids, after about 1705 assumed the characteristics of

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[1]Ibid., p. 85.

[2]Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa, p. 296.

independent sovereigns.[1] Turkish domination for all practi-

cal purposes became non-existent. From Tunis, the Husainids

developed an effective, centralized administration of the

Tunisian territories.[2] Under the French protectorate,

established in 1881, the Husainid beys at Tunis retained

considerable authority.[3] The city of Tunis, then, has

definitely functioned as the nuclear core of Tunisia. Tunis

(1966, pop. 468,997), along with nearby Carthage, could be

termed the core of Tunisia in every sense of the word--

original, nuclear, and contemporary.

Libya

From the seventh century, when it was invaded by the

Arabs, through the fifteenth century, when it was taken over

by the Turks, Libya was nothing but a passageway for conquer-

ors, merchants, and pilgrims. Sheer desert except in the

semiarid northwestern corner and the Jebel el Akdar platform,

it had a predominantly nomadic population. Local and tribal

particularist feelings were very strong. The regional history

of the area forming present-day Libya begins only with

Ottoman rule in the middle of the sixteenth century.[4] Except

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[1]Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 183.

[2]Ibid., p. 313.

[3]Under Turkish rule the northwestern part of Africa
(Ifriqiya) was divided into three regencies, Tripoli, Tunis,
and Algiers, and the frontiers of the divisions have remained
more or less the same up to the present.

[4]Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, p. 189.

for the brief period between 1931 and 1939, when the Italians who had taken over from the Turks in 1912 subdued the Senussi tribesmen in the Kufra oases, Libya had not had the experience of living under a common political authority in an effectively united state.[1] Tribalism and the inhospitable desert expanses separating the few minor urban settlements made the achievement of a centralized administration beyond the means of the conquerors either from the east or the west. After the defeat of Italy in World War II and a period of British and French occupation, the present Libyan state was assembled by the United Nations by joining Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan in 1951. The ruler of the Senussi tribe in Cyrenaica was proclaimed king, but he was overthrown in 1969 by a Revolutionary Council. Thus, there is no real nuclear core. The coastal plain around Tripoli, however, could be called the contemporary core of Libya.[2] The modern city of Tripoli has a fairly good harbor, controls an important east-west coastal route, and is a point of departure for trans-Saharan caravans. The discovery of oil a few years after independence has provided Libya considerable wealth in the recent period. Bengazi is the main outlet and market center for the more prosperous western and northern part of Cyrenaica. That

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[1] Ibid., p. 378.

[2] Harm J. de Blij does not show any kind of core in Libya in his book Systematic Political Geography (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 398.

Tripoli and Bengazi currently serve as twin capitals is further evidence of the lack of a nuclear core in Libya.

Sudan

The ancient kingdoms that sprang up in the Middle Nile valley, in what is now the Sudan, are today of little more than historic interest. The first Kingdom of Kush came into being in 750 B.C. and lasted until 250 A.D., with its first capital at Napta (Napata) and a later one at Meroe to the north of Khartoum, both by the side of the Nile (Figure 13). By 540 A.D. the successive Christian kingdoms of Nubia, with their capitals of Dongle (Dongola), Aloa, and Soba, had come and gone, leaving hardly any traces. Another Sudanese power arose in the sixteenth century, the Fung Sultanate of Sennar (1504-1821) which, with its base of power in the Gezira region between the White Nile and the Blue Nile, was able to assemble a loose confederation of several tribes. The tribal alignment and, more importantly, the gradual adoption of Islam brought about by this confederation is still evident in the cultural pattern of the northern Sudan. The confederacy eventually disintegrated in internal strife, however, and Mohammed Ali of Egypt was taking advantage of this situation when he captured Sennar, the capital. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the future shape of the Sudan was laid under the Fung Sultanate of Sennar located in Gezira, the most fertile land in the middle Nile region. Gezira

clearly seems to have performed the function of a nuclear core in bringing the various parts of the Sudan under its rule. Egyptian administration, which lasted until 1885, gave the Sudan a better organized structure under a single ruler. Following the Mahdist revolt, Egyptian troops were forced to evacuate Khartoum in 1885, but in 1898 the Mahdist dervishes were subdued and the Sudan was ruled under an Anglo-Egyptian condominium until 1955. During this period of Anglo-Egyptian rule, Khartoum (1968, pop. 194,000), which lies on the northern edge of Gezira at the confluence of the White and Blue Nile, was made the capital, and the city continues in this function today. The contemporary core and the nuclear core of the Sudan are the same area.

Egypt

Of all the Arab countries, only Egypt has enjoyed a substantial continuity in culture and political institutions from antiquity. This historical continuity, according to Harris. is the result of "the dependence of agriculture upon a single source of water, the Nile," and, "the required highly centralized control of the river, a pattern of authority which was carried over into the political sphere."[1] The state system that developed to supervise the distribution and use of Nile water was highly centralized under the Pharaohs

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[1]George L. Harris (ed.), Egypt (New Haven, Connecticut: HRAF, 1957), p. 11.

in the Lower Nile Valley of Egypt.[1] As the seat of this cen-
tralized state system, the Lower Nile Valley since ancient
times has been the most densely settled and the most populous
area in the whole Arab World. This concentration of popula-
tion, together with the experience of thousands of years of
centralized administration, has produced a more homogeneous
population than in any other part of North Africa and the
Middle East. The Lower Nile Valley with its millions of
people, its productive agriculture, historical continuity,
and developed administration served as a nucleus for Egypt
long before the practice of demarcating boundaries came into
existence. Clearly, as De Blij puts it, "the core area of
Egypt requires no elaboration, as it is one of the best
defined in the world."[2]

Because of Egypt's location at the crossroads between
East and West, it has been plagued by many foreign rulers.
The first important foreign occupation of Egypt was that of
the Persians in 525 B.C. Since then, Greeks, Romans, Byzan-
tines, Arabs, Turks, Albanians, and Circassians have ruled
Egypt. But despite these foreign regimes, and much recent
pressure from Western Europe and the Soviet Union, the basic
life patterns of the Nile Valley of Egypt were never destroyed,

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[1]Wood H. Jarvis, Pharaoh to Farouk (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1955), p. 3.

[2]De Blij, Systematic Political Geography, p. 398.

and the state of Egypt has evolved with little interruption
in the great valley where it originated.[1]

The first capital of the Pharaohs was Memphis, a few
miles south of Cairo. Later it was moved to Heracleopolis
(ca. 2445 B.C.) and from there to Thebes three hundred miles
south of Memphis. Alexander the Great built Alexandria
(present pop. 1,803,900) on the western margin of the delta
as his capital of Egypt, and it remained here under the
Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines. With the coming of the Arabs
a new Egyptian capital was built in al-Fustat. The Fatimids
in 969 A.D. selected a site near al-Fustat and founded Cairo
(present pop. 4,225,700) (al-Qahira), which now for more
than a thousand years has performed its function as a great
capital city.

The core area of Egypt, following the terminology
employed in this study, is at the same time a contemporary
core, an original core, and a nuclear core. Only the spe-
cific administrative center has been moved. However, with
the emergence of Egypt, renamed in 1958 the United Arab
Republic and in 1971 the Arab Republic of Egypt, as leader of
the Arab countries and as the nucleus of the recently formed
Federation of Arab Republics, the real possibility has been
raised that the Nile Valley of Egypt may be assuming the role

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[1]Harris (ed.), Egypt, p. 11.

of a nuclear core for a much larger and still evolving Arab state.

Arabian Peninsula

Saudi Arabia

The core area of Medina-Mecca in the Hijaz is not the nuclear core of the modern state of Saudi Arabia. With the end of Turkish rule in Arabia after World War I, five states came into being, the Kingdom of Hijaz, the Sultanate of Nejd, the Imamate of Yemen, the Territory of Asir, and the Principality of Shammar. These five states covered all the inhabited areas of the Peninsula with the exception of the Aden colony, the Aden Protectorate, and the Persian Gulf principalities. The tribesmen of the state of Nejd were adherents of Wahhabism, a puritanical and conservative Islamic movement, and were still not affected by the larger national aspirations of the early twenties.[1] Ibn Saud was the head of the vigorous Wahhabi movement whose missionary activities reached beyond Nejd into surrounding states. Leading this vigorous and powerful religious surge, Saud conquered all the states except the Imamate of Yemen, and from the vast territories under his control formed the new state of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the region of Nejd, and particularly the area around Riyadh (1965, pop. 225,000), the capital, situated in Wadi Hanifa at an elevation of 1700 feet above sea level, could be designated

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[1]Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 328.

as the nuclear core of Saudi Arabia. Mecca-Medina, with

regard to the modern state of Saudi Arabia, is only the

original core. The contemporary core is on the west coast,

centered on the port of Jiddah (1969, pop. 250,000), fifty

miles from Mecca.

Yemen

Yemen has a long historical record of existence as

an independent kingdom. Around 3500 B.C. Yemen was the

center of the Sabaean Kingdom with Ma'rib, located along the

ancient Spice Road, as its capital (Figure 2).[1] The Himyrites

succeeded the Sabaeans in 115 B.C. and shifted the seat of

power to the town of Zofar in the highlands of Yemen, along

the Spice Road and near the present Yemeni city of Yarim.[2]

The coming of the Abyssinians (525-575 A.D.) shifted the seat

of power to San'a, which has since remained the capital of

Yemen. In the seventh and eighth centuries the peoples of

two Islamic sects, the Zeidis and the Shafeis, settled in

Yemen. Generally. the Zeidis established themselves on the

high plateaus, in particular at Sada and San'a, while the

Shafeis inhabited the southern lowlands and the coastal

plains.[3] For a period of time the power struggle between

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[1]Richard H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 240.

[2]Ibid., p. 239.

[3]Eric Macro, Yemen and the Western World since 1571
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. xiv.

these groups remained undecided. In 893 A.D. the first Zeidi
Imam founded the Rassid dynasty, which ruled an independent
Yemen from San'a with varying success until modern times.
Only in 1919 did the Rassid dynasty become successful in
controlling the greater part of the territory from its power
base in San'a. So it is San'a (1956, pop. 60,000) that must
be designated the nuclear core of the Republic of Yemen, a
nation which in recent years has been much torn by civil war
and external pressures.

South Yemen

The present People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is
an outgrowth of British colonization efforts in the southern
part of the peninsula between 1839 and 1967. Under the
British, the territories now included in the People's Demo-
cratic Republic of Yemen were known as the Crown Colony of
Aden, a strong point guarding the south entrance to the Red
Sea, and the Aden Protectorate, sometimes divided into the
Eastern and Western Protectorates. The Eastern Protectorate
covered the picturesque valley and plateau of the Hadramaut,
with seven main treaty areas.[1] The Western Protectorate,
which lay generally north of Aden, had nineteen separate
chiefs of state.[2] The fragmented Aden Protectorate was given
some centralization by London, and the constant bloody

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[1]Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula, p. 213.

[2]Ibid., p. 218.

feuding between the various chieftains was stopped by British colonial authority. After World War II the British attempt to create a single political structure out of the feuding Arab states met with brief success in the creation of the Federation of South Yemen in 1963, which did not include the crown colony of Aden. In 1967 Britain was pressured to withdraw from Aden, and intense Arab nationalists now rule the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Nowhere is there any evidence of organic growth from a single nuclear core, but the well equipped seaport of Aden (1968, pop. 150,000) is definitely the contemporary as well as the original core of the new nation.

Persian (Arabian) Gulf States

All the Persian Gulf principalities including Kuwait, as well as the Sultanate of Oman outside the Gulf, were once British protectorates, and their modern survival can probably be attributed entirely to British protection in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In all of these small states, if the core areas are to be sought, they will be found in the respective capital cities, some of which are no more than forlorn little coastal towns. While some of them control fabulous wealth from recent oil discoveries, others are as poor as they have been for centuries. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar are members of the United Nations, and in 1971 the sheikdoms of the former protectorate known as the Trucial

States merged voluntarily in a new confederation called the
Union of Arab Emirates.

Fertile Crescent

All of the present states in the Fertile Crescent
are an outgrowth of regional organization under the League
of Nations mandate system following the defeat of Turkey in
World War I. They are arbitrary states with no historical
organic growth but, instead, with arbitrary boundaries
created to fit the geographical framework of preconceived
ideas.[1] Thus the core areas of these states are either
original or contemporary or both. Although the districts of
Damascus and the Tigris-Euphrates Valley were, respectively,
a nuclear and an original core of the early Arab Empire, in
terms of the present state of Syria, Damascus (1968, pop.
789,840) is the original and contemporary core. Baghdad in
the Tigris-Euphrates Valley has a similar role in relation
to Iraq. The core area of Jordan around Amman (1967,
pop. 330,220), built on either side of the small perennial
stream of Seil 'Amman, can only be regarded as a contemporary
core.[2] Not until 1921 was Amman made the headquarters of the
state of Transjordan, a separate mandate carved out of Greater

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[1]Pounds and Ball, "Core Areas and the Development of
the European States System," p. 24.

[2]Jane M. Hacker, Modern Amman: A Social Study, ed.
John I. Clarke (Research Papers Series No. 3; Durham College
in the University of Durham: Department of Geography, 1960),
p. 5.

Syria by Britain, in order to provide a throne for Abdullah

ibn Hussein. Amman lacks long historical continuity as a

populated urban center.[1] The independence of Transjordan,

later Jordan, came with the termination of the mandate in

1946.

Because of its large Christian population, Lebanon

was granted autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire in

1861, and its territory was later expanded when it became a

French mandate. Beirut, the capital city, together with a

narrow coastal region adjacent to it, is the contemporary and

original core of Lebanon.

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Emergence of a Core for the Political
Idea of One Arab State

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For a long time the idea of one Arab state extending

from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean was without the

core necessary to success in its development. Egypt, which

seemed likely to be a natural core for the Arab state because

of its size, location, population, stability, relative secu-

rity, and intellectual leadership within the Arab World, for

a long time did not even consider itself to be Arab.[2] Issawi

explained it like this:

> For many years Egypt had been looked upon as the natural
> leader by many Arabs, but such sentiments had found
> little response in Egypt itself. Throughout its long
> history, Egypt always had a very sharply defined

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[1]Ibid., p. 12.

[2]Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle
East, p. 205.

individuality and one which clearly marked it off from its neighbours.[1]

Anwar G. Chejne comes to a like conclusion, suggesting that despite Egyptian leadership in the formation of the Arab League in 1945, Egypt was not committed to a vigorous Pan-Arab policy until 1954.[2] Chejne provides ample evidence to support his conclusion. As early as 1881 Zaghlul, who lived until 1927, led a nationalist movement in Egypt to achieve complete independence from the British and founded the Wafd political party. Throughout his political career, however, Zaghlul avoided identification with either Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism. In 1918, when delegates from the Fertile Crescent approached him at the Paris Peace Conference to unite their efforts for independence, they were told by Zaghlul that an Egyptian problem was not an Arab problem.[3] This kind of separatist and isolationist sentiment lasted throughout the period between the First and the Second World War. Even at the time Egypt was playing a leading role in the founding of the Arab League in 1945, it was considered by many Arab leaders as only a nominal partner in the Pan-Arab movement.[4]

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[1]Charles Issawi, "The United Arab Republic," Current History, XXXVI (February, 1959), p. 65.

[2]Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism," Middle East Journal, XI (Summer, 1957), pp. 253-268.

[3]Ibid., p. 253.

[4]Ibid., p. 254.

The Egyptian separatist attitude, according to Chejne, was mainly due to three historical factors. First, although nominally under Turkish suzerainty, Egypt had considered itself a political unit separate from the Ottoman Empire beginning with the period of Muhammad Ali. During the modern colonial period, Egypt was under the control of Britain, and its political movement for independence was directed primarily against the British. The other Arab countries, except for the Persian Gulf protectorates, were under French, Italian, or Turkish domination up to the time of the First World War. Second, during the period of Ottoman rule the Arab countries under the Turkish domain had the freedom of unrestricted movement within the Arab province of the Empire, whereas Egyptians, under effective British control after 1882, did not enjoy that unrestricted movement to and from other Arab countries. Third, with the discovery of many ancient Pharaonic relics after the invasion of Napoleon, the "Pharaonic movement," or Egyptology, came into existence.[1] This cultural movement found deep roots in some intellectuals who looked back into their distant past with pride and inspiration. To them Egypt was the first and last, and the word Arab was not infrequently used to denote backwardness.

Egyptian nationalism continued for some time even after the formation of the Arab League. Following Egypt's

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[1]Ibid.

defeat at the hands of the Israelis in the 1948 war, the First Secretary of the Arab League, Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam of Egypt, resigned from his post due to increasing pressure from the Egyptian isolationists. Although 'Azzam was an enthusiastic supporter of Pan-Arabism, when asked about different nationalisms, he said: "We are Egyptians first, Arabs second, and Muslims third."[1] As late as 1952 some Egyptians were asking for liquidation of the Arab League and the withdrawal of Egypt from it.[2] It was only after the Baghdad Pact in 1954, which put the hated British in a military partnership with an Arab state, that Egypt made Pan-Arabism its cause under the leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Even Nasser's speeches, according to Binder, were not addressed to Arab questions until 1955 when the controversy over Iraq's adherence to the Baghdad Pact broke out in full fury.[3] With the new constitution of 1956 Egypt was finally clearly identified as an integral part of the greater Arab nation.

The process which brought Egyptians to think of themselves as Arab took a long time. During the decade of the 1930's, when Arab nationalism was becoming a strong force in the Fertile Crescent Egypt, as we have seen, was still not

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[1]Ibid., p. 254, quoting Sati' al-Husri, al-urubab awwalan (Beirut, 1956), p. 68.

[2]Ibid., p. 260.

[3]Binder, The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East, p. 209.

considered Arab. The idea of a single Arab state was without
one vital component for its successful evolution--strong
leadership from a distinct core area. Ever since Egyptians
started thinking of themselves as an integral part of an Arab
nation, in the mid-1950's, Egypt has been strongly inclined
to function as a core for the political idea of one Arab
state. As a logical consequence to this new situation, sev-
eral political unification attempts have been made in the
Arab World during the past fifteen years.

In summary, for a long time the political idea of one
Arab state did not have a core, i.e., the solid territorial
base necessary to success. The Arab states which in
chapter ii were included in the present political action area
and the highly potential area of the unity idea, correspond
approximately to that group of Arab states without nuclear
core areas of their own. Exceptions include the Sudan and
Egypt, the latter of which provides the only probable nucleus
of sufficient strength and prestige for the idea of one Arab
state to have much chance of success. The correlation just
noted may be incidental but more likely it is not. It is
assumed here that countries without nuclear cores, such as
modern Libya, will be the most ready to accept political
integration. The correlation reinforces the probability that
the states within the highly potential area will become part
of a greater Arab state earlier than will other parts of the
Arab World.

CHAPTER V

INTEGRATIVE FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD

This chapter is concerned with the integrative forces
in the Arab World working towards the fulfillment of the idea
of one Arab nation-state. Two important unifying forces, the
state-idea and the recognized core area, have already been
dealt with in some detail in chapters iii and iv. Both of
these forces will be reviewed here briefly in a somewhat dif-
ferent context before proceeding to an examination of three
other integrative forces, the issue of Israel, the control
of oil, and the development of international administrative
structures which promote cooperation between Arab countries.

Many scholars of political integration, among them
Bruce M. Russett and Ernst B. Haas, agree that the failure of
the one Arab state idea to materialize is not a symptom of
the lack of commitment on the part of the Arabs but rather a
result of their inability to translate this commitment into
tangible integrative economic and political institutions.[1]

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[1]Russett, International Regions and the International
System: A Study in Political Ecology, p. 184, and Ernst B.
Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Uni-
versal Process," International Political Communities:
Anthology (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966),
p. 112.

Russett and Haas both made their observation in the mid-
sixties. Since then, many changes have occurred to speed the
progress of the integration idea. The Federation of Arab
Republics has been formed. Libya and Egypt have agreed to
carry out a total merger sometime in 1973. The Arab Fund for
Economic and Social Development has been established to aid in
the economic development of the Arab countries and promote
the success of the Arab Common Market. A further common mar-
ket agreement came into force on January 1, 1971, between
Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.[1] All these integrative acts, however,
still fall far short of transforming the Arab states into a
single, cohesive, smooth-working political unit. Still, the
course of events of the past few years do seem to have
enhanced the prospect for more integration among the Arab
states.

The State-Idea in Contemporary Arab Thought

In his analysis of centripetal forces, Hartshorne
came to the conclusion that of the various cohesive forces
which help to form a nation-state and hold it together, the
most important is the presence of a state-idea among the
people, a widespread feeling for a national raison d'être.
As he put it, "The basic centripetal force must be some con-
cept or idea justifying the existence of this particular
state incorporating these particular regions; the state must

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[1]Egypt and Iraq have established trade exchange coor-
dination bureaus to facilitate the trade between the two.

have a _raison d'être_--reason for being."[1] Hartshorne's statement was basically directed towards explaining states already in existence, but its applicability to a nation-state in process of formation is obvious. The idea of one Arab nation-state, deeply engraved in the minds of many Arabs, is based on pride in their past glory, their former military successes, their common Arabic language, their past artistic and scientific achievements, and their common cultural heritage and religion. Although there are both Christian and Moslem Arabs, the overwhelming majority of the Arabs are Moslem, and this to some extent at least provides a common bond among them. Arab nationalism then is based on the reality of Arab cultural unity, and the achievement of one Arab state forms one of the Arab nation's three basic objectives, the other two being freedom from foreign domination and more rapid socio-economic progress. The vigor of the state-idea has already been shown in the formation of the Arab League, the Federation of Arab Republics, and various other functional Arab organizations.

The Lower Nile Valley, an Emerging Core Area

The core area role of the Lower Nile Valley, centered on Cairo, a city of 4.5 million people, is now widely recognized, and that area's dominance is real or implicit in

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[1]Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography," p. 110.

political, social and economic activities throughout the Arab
World.[1] Cairo is the first city of North Africa as well as
of the Arab World. Although its pre-eminence as a regional
air transport center may be challenged by Beirut, Cairo is a
major focal point of international air communications in the
Arab World.

The Egyptian broadcasting service centered in Cairo
is the most extensive establishment of its type in the Arab
World. It is a government monopoly which aims to implement
the socialist revolution which began in 1952 with the over-
throwal of the monarchy by a revolutionary junta. For more
than twenty years the broadcasting service has forcefully
presented an Arab point of view with regard to world issues
in general.[2] The service includes overseas transmission in
six different languages. There is a variety of programs
directed to the Arabs in general from the Voice of the Arabs,
The Middle East Broadcasting Service, and Radio Cairo. Among
these stations, the Voice of the Arabs, which began trans-
mission in 1953, probably has the widest following. As its
name suggests, its programs are heavily oriented to the Arab
issues. The Voice of the Arabs transmits daily for twenty-
two hours and thirty minutes. It has served as the most

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[1]John A. Haupert, "The United Arab Republic," Focus
on the Middle East, ed. Alice Taylor (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1972), p. 55.

[2]U.A.R.:   The Year Book 1966 (Cairo: Information
Administration, 1966), pp. 234-238.

effective single medium for cultivating Pan-Arab feelings among the Arab people.

In addition to the influence of the Egyptian broadcasting services, some of the Cairo newspapers, like Al-Ahram (The Pyramid), with a circulation of about half a million; Al-Akbar (The News), with a circulation of 400,000; and Al-Gomhouriya (The Republic), with a circulation of 80,000, are read throughout the Arab World.[1] Al-Ahram is by far the most influential of these newspapers. The Al-Ahram enterprise produces several other publications including Al-Iqtissadi (The Economist), an economic world affairs review with a circulation of 8,000 copies; Al-Siyassah al-Dawliyyah (International Politics), a quarterly modeled on the New York Council on Foreign Relations' Foreign Affairs, with a circulation of 10,000 copies; and Al-Taliah (The Vanguard), a monthly representing socialist ideology, with a circulation of 12,000 copies.[2] All of the above publications circulate among the political, academic, and social elites throughout the Arab World.

All newspapers in Egypt are government operated. The Arab News Agency, formerly under the direction of the Hulton Press Organization in London, has been placed under government

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[1]The Europa Yearbook 1972: A World Survey, Vol. II (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972), p. 467.

[2]Nancy B. Turck, "The Authoritative Al-Ahram," Aramco World Magazine, XXIII (September-October, 1972), pp. 4-9.

control. The Middle East News Agency is under the supervision of the government of Egypt. This new agency was established to perform public relations services in the Arab World, transmitting general news and Arab public opinion. With a controlled press, the Egyptian government has been consistently cultivating the Pan-Arabist movement since 1952.

Egypt has some of the best institutions of higher education in the Arab World. Other Arab states send a large number of university students to those institutions. There are five large universities, three of them located in Cairo. These are Ain Shams University, Al-Azhar University,[1] and Cairo University. The other two, Alexandria University and Assiut University, are also located in the Nile delta area. These five institutions have a combined enrollment of about 150,000 students, some 30,000 of whom come from other Arab countries.[2] The government of Egypt spends a large sum of money to encourage non-Egyptian Arab students to enroll in Egyptian institutions. In 1964-65, for instance, the government alloted $1,435,000 in scholarships and special grants for them.[3]

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[1]Al-Azhar, established in 970 A.D., is the most prestigious center for Islamic studies in the Arab World and the oldest continuously operating university on earth. Houari Boumedienne, the present head of the state of Algeria, is a graduate of Al-Azhar University.

[2]International Handbook of Universities (Paris: The International Association of Universities, 1971).

[3]Louis Barron, Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Africa (New York: Harper & Row, Worldmark Press, 1967), p. 341.

In addition to the international influence of Egypt
in the fields of journalism, education, and broadcasting,
thousands of Egyptian teachers and technicians are employed
throughout the Arab World. In 1960, 106, and in 1961, 111,
university professors from Egyptian universities were "on
loan" to Morocco, Libya, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.[1]
In 1960, 3,000; in 1961, 3,520; and in 1964, 4,302 carefully
selected teachers went out from Egypt to other Arab countries
where the primary and the secondary curricula are almost
identical and the same textbooks are used. At least some
Egyptian teachers are serving in all the other Arab countries,
without exception, and they are involved with all levels of
instruction. Egyptian lawyers have written the civil codes
of Syria and Iraq. Egyptian contracting companies have
undertaken large scale public construction projects in Jordan.
Egyptian agronomists and irrigation engineers have served in
the Sudan. In short, Egyptian technical personnel are working
in almost every Arab country.

Egypt is also the dominant social and cultural center
of the Arab World. Most of the Arab films are made in the
studios of Alexandria. Egypt has the only cinema institute
in the Arab World which trains experts in the various
branches of the film industry. With its broad range of edu-
cational and cultural resources, Egypt has an enormous

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[1]*Education in the Arab States* (New York: Arab Infor-
mation Center, 1966), p. 286.

advantage over the other Arab countries. It is not surprising, then, that educated Arabs everywhere maintain a high regard for Egypt and its cultural contributions. Bint al-Shati' cited by Faris and Husayn, emphasizes the regard of the Arabs for Egypt:

> On the Persian Gulf, on the extreme east of the Arabian Peninsula, in al-Qatif, are active learned men and literators who look to Egypt, hail its name, and applaud its contribution in the arts and the sciences. They are especially proud, as stated by Hasan ibn-Ali abu-al-Su'ud, of the bonds of blood, language, and religion which exist between them. They esteem Egypt, and find in Egyptian culture a rich source of refreshment and light. The same idea was expressed by another learned man of al-Qatif, Muhammad Sa'id al-Shykh al-Khunayzi, when he stressed the importance of the link of thought and spirit which binds the learned men both, in spite of the vast deserts and seas which separate them.[1]

The Arab League is centered in Cairo, as are eighteen of the other Arab organizations listed later in this chapter. The lower Nile Valley is thus a kind of focus for the entire Pan-Arab movement, and Cairo can reasonably be called the capital of the Arab World, the heart of Arabism.

Israel--The Integrative Value of a Common Hostility

Since the creation of Israel in 1948 the Arab governments have found a common cause in their desire to eliminate that Jewish state and regain Palestine as a home for the hundreds of thousands of Arab Palestinians now living in

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[1]Faris and Husayn, p. 180, quoting Bint al-Shati', Ard al-Mujizat ("Igra'," No. 104; Cairo: September, 1951), pp. 122-123.

refugee camps. Distance from Palestine and different levels of involvement with the refugee problem make the Israel issue of varying urgency from country to country, but the Arab nations are nearly all in theoretical agreement on the desired solution to that problem. In order to develop the capacity to liberate Palestine, unity among Arabs has been recognized as needing high priority. It is common knowledge that, up to now, political differences among the Arab states have made their struggle against Israel ineffective. Despite variations in the intensity of feeling about the matter, Arab governments have been forced to take a common stand against Israel by the popularity of the cause among the Arab masses. Out of their common opposition to Israel, Arab governments have taken the following steps with varying degrees of participation and success: (1) non-recognition of Israel, (2) maintenance of a "state of belligerency" within the limits allowed by the Armistice Agreements, (3) cooperation in military action against Israel, (4) diplomatic and economic boycott, and (5) denial of Arab waterways to Israeli shipping.[1]

Even before Israel came into existence, the Arabs tried to block the creation of a Jewish state. On December 2, 1945, the Arab League decided to boycott Jewish products produced in Palestine and established a special committee to supervise the boycott. With the announcement of the

[1]Fayez A. Sayegh, Palestine, Israel and Peace (New York: Arab Information Center, 1970), p. 19.

end of the Palestine mandate in 1948, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, with varying levels of mili-
tary involvement, intervened in an effort to destroy the new
Jewish state but with no success. The lack of co-ordinated
military action among the Arab leaders left Egypt fighting
almost alone to a humiliating defeat. Egypt signed the
General Armistice Agreement in 1949. Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria all followed Egypt's example by signing separate
Armistice Agreements.[1] Since they had no common border with
Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not sign the agreement,
considering it to be unnecessary.

The military defeat came as a great shock to all
Arabs. Increasing numbers of educated Arabs started to reap-
praise their social, economic, and political condition as
they sought an explanation for the obvious Arab weakness.
Some of them became very discontented with their findings on
the state of social, economic and political life. In Syria
there was a considerable agitation among the young army
officers favoring greater Arab unity. By the end of March,
1949, an anti-government riot had forced the Syrian govern-
ment to resign, and a segment of the army took control

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[1]For a detailed, reasonably impartial analysis of the
Arab-Israeli dispute, see Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli
Dilemma (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), and for
the documentary records of the dispute see Walter Laqueur, ed.,
The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle
East Conflict (New York: The Citadel Press, 1969).

through a military coup. Abdullah, the King of Trans-Jordan, accused of being a traitor to the Arab cause, was assassinated on July, 1951. A year later, in July, 1952, a group of army officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy of Egypt. The idea of greater Arab unity found an increasing number of followers among Arab leaders and laymen alike.

After their unsuccessful military operation, the Arabs concentrated their efforts on an economic and diplomatic boycott of Israel. Iraq stopped pumping oil through the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline. Syria and Saudi Arabia likewise cooperated in preventing Arab oil from reaching Israel. Israel was forced to bring oil for its own domestic consumption from Venezuela, 5,000 miles away, at much higher costs. The Arab governments cut off all kinds of contact with Israel. They discouraged Western firms doing business with Israel by threatening to prevent them from carrying on any business within the Arab World. Very strict regulations concerning the boycott were agreed upon by the Arab states. Although not all the Arab governments enforced the boycott as strictly as possible, they complied with it sufficiently to make it a fairly successful undertaking. Israel could have been badly hurt by the Arab boycott, but massive financial aid from Jews all over the world and from certain western governments saved it from disaster.

The Arabs found justification for the boycott in the interpretation of the Armistice Agreements, emphasizing the

following points: (1) the agreements were dictated exclu-
sively by military considerations, (2) the demarcation line
established by the armistice was not to be construed as a
political or territorial boundary that would affect in any
way the rights and the claims of the Arabs in the final
settlement between the two parties. The Arabs thus contended
that the Armistice Agreement of 1949 ended only the military
phase of the dispute, and technically the state of war con-
tinued to exist. Under this interpretation, Arabs justified
their boycott of Israel, their refusal to let Israeli ship-
ping pass through Arab waterways, and their continuance of a
"state of belligerency."

Along with their boycott of Israel following the
armistice of 1949, the Arabs pushed toward developing a joint
military organization. In 1950, the Arab League established
a Joint Defense Council, consisting of all the foreign
ministers and defense ministers of the Arab countries. In
the same year, a Permanent Military Commission was formed to
draft the joint defense plans to be submitted to the Defense
Council for approval. The Commission consisted of military
representatives from the general staffs of the Arab countries.
These military organizations, however, continued to be inef-
fective because of some mutual distrust among the Arab
leaders and marked differences in their political and eco-
nomic outlook. The Israeli invasion of the Sinai in 1956, in
collaboration with Britain and France, following Egypt's take

over of the Suez Canal did not prompt other Arab countries to
send assistance. One of the consequences of this short-lived
war was the phenomenal rise of Nasser as the most influential
champion of the Pan-Arab unity idea. All over the Arab World
Pan-Arab sentiments were strengthened. In 1958 Syria and
Egypt voluntarily merged to form the United Arab Republic.
In the same year Pan-Arabists came into power in Iraq after
overthrowing the conservative regime of the monarchy.

The hostilities between Arabs and Israelis continued.
In late 1963, when the Israeli project to divert Jordan River
water for irrigation in the Negev was coming to a rapid com-
pletion, some of the Arab governments decided to react. They
realized that the Negev project would deny badly needed water
supplies to Jordan and that by increasing its irrigation
capacity, Israel would be able to absorb more immigrants,
thus enabling the Jewish state to increase its military
potential. The Arab political leaders held a summit meeting
in January, 1964, and decided to help finance an Arab water
diversion scheme of their own on the major tributary of the
Jordan River which would deny water to Israel. At the same
time they decided to create an Arab Unified Military Command
to coordinate subsequent military action in case of an
Israeli attack. At their summit conference in September,
1964, the Arab leaders agreed to go ahead with the Yermak
River diversion plan, with Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria collab-
orating on the engineering work. This action naturally

intensified the water dispute between the Arabs and the
Israelis. Sabotage and guerrilla attacks on the part of
Arabs, and military reprisals on the part of Israel, became
everyday occurrences. Considering the dangerous situation,
Egypt and Syria signed a defense pact in 1966. Some months
later, in May, 1967, Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt
despite King Husain's general distrust of the Egyptian
regime. War broke out once more in June, 1967, over the
question of Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba, and once
again the Arabs went down to a humiliating defeat. Following
its lightning six-day military success, Israel took control
of more Arab lands, occupying the Sinai Peninsula and the
Golan Heights, and creating many more refugees (Figure 18).

When the Arabs realized that direct military
confrontation with Israel was not to their advantage, Pales-
tinian guerrilla organizations were encouraged as a substi-
tute.[1] Among the many guerrilla organizations, Al-Fatah is
the largest. The existence of so many separate organizations
with the same purpose, that of "liberating Palestine," shows
the lack of united action among the Arabs. In 1970 an attempt

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[1]At least eleven separate guerrilla organizations have
been formed, including the Black September Movement whose
existence came to be known only in 1972 after the Olympic
tragedy in Munich. The other ten are, Al-Fatah, As Saiqah,
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular
Front, the Palestine Arab Organization, the Action Group for
the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab Liberation Front, the
Popular Liberation Forces, and the Popular Struggle Front.
See the New York Times, June, 12, 1972, p. 13.

Fig.18

Israel's Changing Boundaries

▨▨▨ Areas occupied by Israel, June, 1967

▤▤▤ Jewish state, 1947 UN Partition Resolution

------ Boundary of Israeli territory established by 1949 UN Armistice Agreements. Enclosed white areas were Arab under 1947 UN Partition Resolution

After Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, p. 357.

was made to reorganize all the liberation organizations and
put them under a centralized command but with only moderate
success.[1] The support of the Arab masses, however, continued
to strengthen the guerrilla movement. In Jordan, the increas-
ing role of the guerrillas seriously undermined the authority
of King Husain. As a result, Husain took strong military
action against the guerrillas in 1971, and completely elimi-
nated them as an organized force from his kingdom. Husain
was able to take this action even though Palestinians consti-
tuted the majority of the population of Jordan because the
well trained and well equipped Bedouin army is loyal to the
monarchy and has a traditional dislike for the urban Pales-
tinians. The firm action of King Husain against the guerril-
las was condemned as treason throughout the Arab World. Syria
even intervened militarily on behalf of the guerrillas in a
brief encounter, backing away only because of a serious
warning from the United States. Despite Husain's action and
Israel's periodic military reprisals, guerrilla activities
continue from Lebanon and Syria.

The Palestinian refugees continue to command an
intense emotional support from the Arab masses of all the
Arab countries. This emotional support for the Palestinians
and equally emotional hatred of Israel is now becoming more
and more a common experience and supplementary basis for Arab

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[1]New York Times, June 13, 1970, p. 12.

unity. Before the 1967 June War there were approximately
1,500,000 Palestinian refugees, of whom 1,300,000 were regis-
tered with the United Nations Refugee Works Agency. Their
distribution among the neighboring countries was as follows:
Jordan, 722,687; Egypt (Gaza Strip), 316,776; Lebanon,
160,723; and Syria, 144,390. After the June War, additional
Arabs joined the ranks of the refugees. Over 250,000 natives
of the West Bank of the Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula, and the
Golan Heights of Syria, areas newly occupied by Israel, plus
about 150,000 Palestinian refugees who had been in camps in
those areas, had left Israeli-held territories by December,
1967.[1] These figures do not include 300,000 Egyptians with
homes on the west bank of the Suez Canal who were moved into
safer locations. A substantial scattering of refugees over
the Arab World spread the feeling of frustration and hatred
for Israel directly to the Arab masses, putting increasing
pressure on Arab governments to act in unison on issues
concerning Israel. Their presence will continue to prolong
the Arab-Israeli dispute, radicalizing and uniting Arabs more
and more.

The Arab military defeat of 1967 was followed by
significant political changes favorable to greater Arab unity,
as happened after the previous two wars of 1948 and 1956.

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[1]Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, July 1966-30 June 1967.
GA, OR 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 13 (A/6713), Table 2, p. 60.

Muammar Ghadhafi, the most ardent advocate of Arab unity since Nasser, led a successful military coup in Libya in 1969. Since then he has worked towards Arab unity with the fervor of a zealot. He was the spearhead for and main architect of the Federation of Arab Republics formed in 1971.

Oil--OPEC and Efforts at Joint Economic Planning

Oil is a very cohesive factor of great political importance in the Arab World. Reasons for this importance, as listed by the Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology, are four:

> (1) Oil is the main source of natural income for Arab countries and it is the basic resource for their economical and social development. It is the main income for the execution of industrial and agricultural projects and for the expansion of services.
> (2) Oil will introduce Arab countries to modern technology and science. If the Arabs will carry-out the oil industry correctly and efficiently, they will make up for the lost progress in these and other fields.
> (3) Oil still maintains and will continue to maintain its international economic power for long periods as a main source of energy, lubricating oil, road bitumen, petrochemical derivatives and raw materials for Industry and Agriculture in the world. The Arabs must exploit this situation wisely, particularly that they have the main oil reserves.
> (4) Oil is the Arabs' effective tool for economical and social freedom which are not less important than political freedom which cannot exist without them.[1]

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[1]Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology, "Economical Importance of Coordination and Unification of Standardization in the Field of Petroleum Products," Paper No. 82(A-1) from Seventh Arab Petroleum Congress, "Papers of the Seventh Arab Petroleum Congress Organized by the Secretariat-General of the League of Arab States, Kuwait, March 16-22nd, 1970," Vol. I: "Economics," p. 13.

Besides the four reasons for the importance of oil
listed above, a fifth could be added. The need to maximize
income from oil through joint action on prices and procedures
is an important cohesive force among the Arab states. The
oil-producing countries of the Arab World all share the same
interest in fighting against domination by foreign companies
and strive to increase domestic control of production,
refining, and marketing so as to acquire greater revenue from
their mineral wealth.[1] Out of this unity of interest the
Arabs have developed a set of common attitudes toward the
major oil companies--attitudes which have been successfully
translated into concrete policies and specific demand by the
Arab governments. These demands are listed by George
Lenczowski as follows:

(1) Intermittent demands for an increase in the host
countries' share in the profits of the companies. After their
successful effort in the 1950's in forcing the oil companies
to adopt a profit sharing formula, the producing countries
have been able through continuing negotiations to decrease
further the margin of profit of the oil companies and so to
gradually raise their own revenues.

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[1]There are several non-oil-producing Arab countries,
among them Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco,
although Syria has begun development of the recently discov-
ered Kartchouk field. Some of these non-producers, however,
have oil pipelines which pass through their territories and
provide a significant amount of revenue for their governments.

(2) Demands for a guaranteed minimum rate of growth of oil production.

(3) Demands for the introduction of new concession patterns. Old concession patterns that were highly favorable to the oil companies have been revised and replaced by new ones which include the partnership concept and shortened concession periods. Joint operations have been extended beyond mere exploration and production.

(4) Determination to end the dominance of a few big international companies, mostly American and British-Dutch, by negotiating concessions with independent corporations and governments. More and more concessions are being granted to Italian, French, Soviet Russian and Japanese firms.

(5) Insistence on joint bargaining with the foreign oil interests. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960 to increase the bargaining power of the surplus oil producing states. Later Arab governments formed their own Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1962. By the summer of 1970, its membership included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Dubai. OAPEC amended its membership requirements on December 9, 1971, to permit entry by states with "important export revenues from oil," thus eliminating the earlier requirement that members' oil production be their "principal and basic source" of revenue. Since

then Egypt, Iraq, and Syria have been granted membership in OAPEC.

(6) Demands for a greater voice in the determination of posted prices. At present, fluctuations in the oil supply from the Arab countries, competition from non-Arab exporters such as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia, and the disruption of the supply route through the Suez Canal have intensified this demand.

(7) The creation of state-owned (i.e., national) oil companies to develop oil resources outside the old concession areas, either directly or in partnership with new foreign corporations. Iran made the first move in this direction by establishing the National Iranian Oil Company in 1951. Now other Arab countries have followed suit and have gone one step further by attempting to establish joint Arab companies.

(8) Pressures for greater attention by the oil concessionaires to develop petrochemical industries and for capturing and using more of the flared gas.

(9) More vigorous planning for the establishment of national tanker fleets.

(10) Substituting national for foreign agencies in the local distribution of oil products.[1]

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[1]George Lenczowski, "Multinational Oil Companies: A Factor in Middle East International Relations," California Management Review, XIII (Winter, 1970), p. 39.

The foreign oil companies have, on the one hand, provided a target for joint Arab governmental efforts, and on the other hand have, by their control of the oil, molded the attitudes of the Arab people into one single outlook towards them. Although Lenczowski talks about two different attitudes, the conservative attitude of the conservative regimes and the radical attitude of the radical regimes, the conservative attitude seems to be limited to those states with ruling royal families, whereas the radical attitude, characteristic of the socialist and republican regimes, seems to pervade the general population of all the Arab countries. The conservative outlook, according to conventional Western criteria, might be called a realistic and pragmatic approach. While desiring an increase in oil revenue, the conservative regimes want to continue a good relationship with the foreign oil companies. These governments are dependent on oil revenue not only economically, but also politically. They think that the international oil companies' stake in the petroleum industry is so great that the democratic governments of the Western world, both American and European, would assist them--should internal crises develop--in preserving the political status quo. This confidence gives them a sense of security against either subversion or revolution from the inside or foreign intervention from the outside. The attitude of the radical regimes, which is also shared by many politically conscious Arab people in the monarchial states, is that the foreign oil

companies are not something desirable to be perpetuated forever. This attitude, according to Lenczowski, is based on the following circumstances:

> the presence in the host country of a large alien personnel enjoying salaries and amenities much above the local average;
> an undue weight held by a single foreign company in the country's economy;
> an excessive portion of the national wealth "siphoned off" the country;
> the companies' alleged insincerity in promoting native personnel to higher responsible positions;
> their cold-heartedness in treatment of local labor;
> their alliance with reactionary elements in society;
> their alleged political interference.[1]

Valid or not, the reasons listed above represent the prejudices of the radical outlook, and these feelings seem to be shared by the great majority of the Arab people.

From recent developments, it is becoming increasingly clear that even between radical regimes and conservative regimes the common purpose has narrowed their differences of approach in dealing with the oil companies. Radical regimes have resorted to quick nationalization whereas the conservative regimes are seeking the same objective through a more gradual approach.

In 1961, Iraq nationalized the North Rumalia oil concession area formerly controlled by Western oil companies. In February, 1971, Algeria nationalized the holdings of all the French oil companies operating in Algeria, seizing 51 per cent of their shares. Libya nationalized all the

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[1]Ibid., p. 41.

assets of the British Petroleum Company within its territory

in December, 1971.[1] In June, 1972, the Iraqi government

nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company owned by a composite

of the Royal Dutch Shell Group, Compagnie Française des

Pétroles, British Petroleum Company, Mobil Oil Corporation,

Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Exxon), and the Gulbenkian

Foundation. Iraq took the action in response to IPC's deci-

sion, for market reasons, to lower the oil production which

would have reduced Iraq's oil revenues. In appreciation for

France's stand toward the Arab cause, Iraq kept the door open

to France for negotiations over its share in IPC. The

other ten OPEC members, seven of which are Arab countries,

not only supported Iraq's nationalization but also threatened

to cut their own oil production if Western oil companies took

any legal retaliation such as an embargo to hamper the flow

of Iraqi oil. Western oil companies, fearing the threatened

production cutback by OPEC countries, refrained from imposing

any embargo and agreed to limit their negotiation to the

appropriate level of compensation. Several of the OAPEC

countries agreed to give financial help to the Arab states

adversely affected by the nationalization, Iraq, Syria, and

Lebanon. The last two of these also nationalized the IPC

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[1]Libya took the action to retaliate against the
British government's inaction which allowed Iran to take over
two Persian Gulf islands, Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb,
twenty-four hours before Britain's defense treaties with the
Persian Gulf Emirates were scheduled to expire.

pipelines and terminal installations on their territory.

Libya and Kuwait cut their oil production level, reasoning

that lowering production would force acceptance of national-

ized Iraqi oil in the world market. The Eighth Arab Petro-

leum Congress held in Algiers in June, 1972, announced its

full support of Iraqi nationalization and urged other Arab

countries to take full control of the oil industry along the

line of Algeria's example.

The conservative oil-producing countries, on the

other hand are negotiating for part ownership of the oil

companies operating in their territories. The growing energy

demand and the increasing threat of nationalization, which

was given an added credence by Iraq's recent action, have

forced the Western oil companies to grant the Arab countries'

demand for participation. It was reported on October 23,

1972, that the Western oil companies consisting of British

Petroleum Company, Compagnie Française des Pétroles, Gulf

Oil Corporation, Mobil Oil Company, Participations & Explora-

tions Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell Group, Standard Oil

Company of California, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,

and Texaco Inc., have agreed to a 25 per cent participation

demand which is to rise to 51 per cent by 1983.[1] In a press

interview, Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabian oil minister and

the negotiator on behalf of the Arab countries, was reported

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[1]The Wall Street Journal, October 23, 1972.

to have said that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi would assume 25 per cent participation in all oil companies operating in their territories, effective on January 1, 1973.[1] Yamani also said that whatever happened in the continuing negotiations, the demand for 25 per cent participation was not negotiable. If the signing of the agreement were delayed, according to Yamani, the participation would be retroactive. Iraq was also involved to some extent in the negotiations. Except for its already nationalized IPC, Iraq was reported as willing to go along with the participation agreement in regard to Basrah Petroleum which was still operating in the South Rumalia oil field. The 25 per cent participation agreements became effective on January 1, 1973.

Existing Functional Integration--
A Modest Beginning

The Arab League

During 1943, after the campaigns of World War II had moved out of North Africa into Europe, some Arab leaders assembled to explore the possibility of Arab unity with a view towards translating the popular yearning for a greater national expression into concrete political reality. In the deliberations, everyone agreed on the principle of unity but disagreed on the appropriate methods for achieving it. Additional meetings followed. According to the Arab States

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[1]Ibid., December 18, 1972.

Delegations Office Information Paper #1, <u>Introducing the</u>
<u>League of Arab States</u>, "the idealistic concept of outright
and immediate unity, championed by the pan-Arabists was not
even seriously considered by the conferees at Alexandria and
Cairo (1944-1945)."[1] The Arab leaders instead chose limited
functional unity as a goal and gradualism as a method.[2] By
adopting this course, the Arab leaders chose to include all
the Arab states in a loose economic and political union,
rather than to form a more binding compact and a more effec-
tive organization with fewer Arab states.

Thus was born the Arab League, with "the triumph of
universalists, as far as the territorial scope was concerned,
and of gradualists and moderates, as far as functional scope
was concerned."[3] The League charter does not, however, prevent
or obstruct a more compact and effective unity between two or
more willing parties holding membership in the League. The
charter members of the Arab League when it was founded in
1945 were: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Yemen (presently the Arab Republic of Yemen). Since
then, Algeria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar,
the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen have joined the League.

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[1]Research Department, Arab States Delegations Office,
Information Paper #1: <u>Introducing the League of Arab States</u>
(ed. rev.; New York: The Information Center, July, 1962),
p. 8. (Mimeographed)

[2]<u>Ibid.</u>   [3]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 9.

Although the Arab League was a partial inplementation

of the idea of one Arab nation-state, the League itself is

only "a regional organization of sovereign states designed to

strengthen the close ties linking those states, and to coor-

dinate their policies and activities and direct them towards

the common good of all the Arab countries."[1] The League's

announced goal is certainly not the creation of one Arab

state, although this idea helped inspire it. But to its

credit, it has worked to bring about limited functional unity

which ultimately will help to bring the one Arab state closer

to reality.[2]

The Council is the supreme body of the Arab League

and is composed of representatives of all member states, each

state having a single vote. The Council convenes in ordinary

session twice a year, in March and October. It also convenes

extraordinary sessions upon the request of the members. The

main task of the Council is to see the realization of the goals

of the League. The Permanent Committees are charged with the

task of laying down the principles of agreement among the

member states, and then presenting them to the Council prior

to their submission to these states. The Secretariat is

headed by the Secretary-General who prepares the draft of the

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[1]Ibid.

[2]For a detailed analysis of the working of the League
see Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States: A Study
in the Dymanics of Regional Organization (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1965).

League's budget and submits it to the Council for approval.

The Secretariat is responsible for implementing the various

decisions and resolutions of the respective committees

(Figure 19).

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┌────────┐                ┌──────────┐
│COUNCIL ├────────────────┤SECRETARY-│
├────────┴──────────┐     │ GENERAL  ├──────┐  ┌───────────┐
│PERMANENT COMMITTEES│    └──────────┘      └──┤SECRETARIAT│
└────────────────────┘                         ├───────────┴─┐
                                               │ DEPARTMENTS │
                                               └─────────────┘
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(Political, Cultural,
Economic, Social, Military,   (Economic, Political,
Legal Affairs, Information,   Cultural, Social and Labor
Health, Communications, and   Affairs, Petroleum, Finance,
Arab Human Rights)   Palestine, Health, Press and
                                   Information, Secretariat,
                                   Communications, and Protocol)

Fig. 19.--Structure of the Arab League

In implementing the structure shown in Figure 19, a

considerable number of specific functional organizations have

been established by the League. These include the following:

    Economic Council
    Council of Arab Economic Unity
    Joint Defense Council
    Permanent Military Commission
    Arab States Broadcasting Union
    Federation of Arab News Agencies
    Arab Financial Institution for Economic Development
    Arab Postal Union
    Arab Telecommunications Union
    Permanent Commission for the Problems of the Arab Gulf
        Emirates
    Arab Labour Organization
    Arab Board for the Diversion of the Jordan River
    Arab Unified Military Command
    Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology (ASMO)
    Arab Council for Civil Aviation
    Arab Air Carriers' Organization (AACO)
    Arab Union of Automobile Clubs and Tourist Societies
    Arab Engineering Union
    Arab Cities Organization
    Arab Organization for Administrative Sciences

Administrative Tribunal of the League
Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
Arab Regional Literacy Organization
Institute of Arab Research and Studies
Institute of Arabic Manuscripts
Permanent Bureau for Co-ordination of Arabization in the
    Arab World
Museum of Arab Culture
Bureau for Boycotting Israel
Pan-Arab Organization for Social Defence against Crime
The International Arab Bureau for Defence against Crime
The International Arab Bureau for Narcotics
The International Arab Bureau for Police Dealing with
    Crime.[1]

This list of Arab organizations is impressive, but it

has not brought actual, effective functional integration to

the Arab states. The decisions and resolutions passed by

these various organizations are not automatically binding on

all the member states of the Arab League. They are binding

only on the contracting member states. Even when a resolution

is accepted by a member state, there is no international

machinery for implementing it if the signatory government

later chooses to ignore it. With such diverse and conflicting

economic and political systems as still exist among the

members, not many resolutions are actually implemented.

Nevertheless, the international organizations formed under the

impetus of the Arab League do provide some important forums

for consultation by the member states. Some of the functional

organizations have even shown real signs of effectiveness,

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[1]This list of organizations is from The Europa
Yearbook, 1972: A World Survey, Vol. I (London: Europa
Publications Limited, 1972), pp. 112-113.

as for instance, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, the

Bureau for Boycotting Israel, and the Joint Defense Council.

Several annual conferences by Arab Lawyers, physicians,

engineers, and educators have a profound influence in bringing

the various Arab countries closer together. In the year 1969

alone there were a total of fifteen meetings or conferences

of various League-related organizations, and several other

meetings of Arab political leaders.[1]

The Arab Common Market

During the 1950's and the 1960's, after several

decades of continued disintegration of Arab economic ties,

attempts were made by the Arab governments to increase inter-

Arab trade. Several bilateral and multilateral trade agree-

ments were signed.[2] Within the framework of limited economic

integration that has been achieved since 1950, only the multi-

lateral agreements contracted under the supervision of the

Arab League will be mentioned here.

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[1]The Bureau for Boycotting Israel committee and the
OAPEC committee each met twice. The Arab Economic Council,
the Arab Economic Unity Council, the Arab League's Informa-
tion Committee, the Arab League's Council of Foreign Minis-
ters, the Arab League (as a whole), the Arab League Agricul-
tural Ministers, the Joint Defense Council, the Chiefs of
Staff of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria, the Arab Health
Ministers (their First Conference), and Arab oil experts
each met once in the year 1969. There was also that year a
summit meeting of the Arab heads of state.

[2]A list of the bilateral trade agreements signed by
the Arab countries between 1920 and 1963 is given in Alfred G.
Musrey, An Arab Common Market: A Study in Inter-Arab Trade
Relations, 1920-67 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969),
pp. 150-151.

In April, 1950, a Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation among the states of the Arab League was signed by Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen.[1] As a direct consequence of this treaty, an agreement was reached to establish an Economic Council for the Arab States. Following its creation, the Economic Council organized two important conventions.

In September, 1953, delegates assembled at a Convention for the Facilitation of Trade Exchange and Regulation of Transit Trade among States of the Arab League.[2] The convention concluded a treaty, signed by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, providing for: (1) the exemption from import duties of agricultural and livestock products as well as natural resources, provided their origin is in the contracting Arab states; (2) most-favored nation treatment among Arab countries in regard to import and export permits, and reduced tariff schedules on Arab industrial goods; and (3) the facilitation of transit across the territory of the signatory countries by every means of transport,

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[1]Document Number 43, "Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation among the States of the Arab League," in Khalil, Vol. II: International Affairs, pp. 101-105.

[2]Document Number 50, "Convention for the Facilitation of Trade Exchange and the Regulation of Transit Trade among States of the Arab League," in Khalil, Vol. II: International Affairs, pp. 122-125.

in accordance with the internal rules and regulations of the contracting state.[1]

Another convention held in 1953 concluded an agreement for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions and the Transfer of Capital among States of the Arab League.[2] This agreement aims to facilitate the international transfer of capital by providing for the transferability of credit accounts involved in multilateral trade. The treaty was signed by the same six Arab states which ratified the trade treaty.

Several additional economic agreements followed these two. In 1957 the Arab Financial Institution for Economic Development was established to consolidate the existing economic ties and to accelerate the economic development of Arab countries. In 1962 the Arab Economic Unity Agreement was signed by Jordan, Tunisia, the Sudan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, Morocco, and Kuwait. The objective of this agreement was a remarkable one--to

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[1]Three lists of articles were annexed to the convention: (a) agricultural products and natural resources which are exempted from import duties; (b) industrial products which are subject to a 25 per cent reduction in import duties; and (c) industrial products which are subject to a 50 per cent reduction in import duties. For the three lists, see Musrey, An Arab Common Market, pp. 156-168.

[2]Document Number 51, "Convention for the Settlement of Payments of Current Transactions and the Transfer of Capital among States of the Arab League," in Khalil, Vol. II: International Affairs, pp. 125-127.

establish a complete economic unity among the signatories.[1]

In order to achieve complete economic unity the contracting

parties agreed to create a single customs unit under one

unified administration with a common customs tariff and

common customs laws and regulations, to unify import and

export policies and regulations, to unify transport and

transit regulations, and to pursue a common economic policy.

To carry out the objectives of the Arab Economic Unity Agree-

ment, a Council of Arab Economic Unity was established in

June, 1964.

A substantive step was taken by the Council of Arab

Economic Unity in August, 1964, with the creation of an Arab

Common Market. Its objectives as stated in the Arab Common

Market Resolution were as follows:[2]

> 1. The freedom of movement of persons and capital.
> 2. The freedom of exchange of domestic and foreign goods and products.
> 3. The freedom of residence, work, employment, and exercise of economic activity.
> 4. The freedom of transport and transit and of the use of the means of transportation and of the ports and civil airports.[3]

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[1] See the text of the Arab Economic Unity Agreement in ibid., pp. 169-177.

[2] In 1964 the Arab Common Market Resolution was rati- fied by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Syria. Kuwait's National Assembly, however, voted in 1965 not to implement the terms of the agreement. The Sudan became a signatory of the agreement in 1968. Lebanon, with its free enterprise economy, is hesitant, but has expressed willingness to join in some other form of economic association.

[3] The full text of the Arab Common Market Resolution may be found in Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 178.

The objectives of the Common Market were to be
achieved in five successive stages starting January 1, 1965.
Items on List A, specific agricultural products annexed to
the Convention for Facilitating Trade Exchange and Regulating
Transit between the States of the Arab League, were to be
exempted from customs duties immediately, and the products
not included on List A were to be subjected to a 20 per cent
annual reduction in five successive years. The products
contained in Lists B and C were to be subjected to an immedi-
ate 35 per cent reduction followed by a 10 per cent annual
reduction. The final 5 per cent reduction was to take place
on July 1, 1971 (Table 2).

In the spirit of the Arab Common Market Resolution,
there has, since 1965, been a significant reduction of
tariffs on industrial products; dues and other administrative
restrictions on agricultural, animal, and natural wealth
products have been removed; and the list of products exempt
from customs tariffs has increased to more than 570 items.
The goal of complete economic unity, however, is still to be
achieved. A provision was included in the Common Market
Resolution for the contracting parties to retain the right to
reserve, with justifiable reasons, certain of their products
from exemptions or reductions in the customs duties and other
duties, as well as from the removal of administrative
restrictions. Under this provision, the Arab governments have

exercised a great deal of discretion in selecting the items
to be included at each stage of tariff reduction.

TABLE 2

RATE OF REDUCTION IN THE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND OTHER
DUTIES ON THE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
CONTAINED IN LISTS "B" AND "C"

Date of Reduction	List B	List C
1/1/1965	35%	60%
1/1/1966	45%	70%
1/1/1967	55%	80%
1/1/1968	65%	90%
1/1/1969	75%	100%
1/1/1970	85%	. .
1/1/1971	95%	. .
7/1/1971	100%	. .

Source: Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 182
(Appendix I, Arab Common Market Resolution).

Political instability within the Arab states, occa-
sional conflict among some of them, and the scarcely compati-
ble economic systems of the socialist and non-socialist
economies of the Arab states have greatly slowed the process
of economic integration. Thus, July, 1971, did not, as
anticipated, see the complete abolition of tariffs among the
Arab Common Market countries. Intra-Arab trade, during the

period of tariff reduction, even failed to show a marked increase.

Complete economic unity, then, even among the Arab Common Market signatories, remains unfulfilled. Although full economic integration is still far from achieved, the effort to achieve it continues. In August, 1970, the Arab Economic Unity Council adopted a resolution favoring an agreement on the free movement of capital, formation of an Arab Investment Company, establishment of a Union of Arab Airline Companies, and co-ordination in the production and marketing of pharmaceutical products. In May, 1971, Jordan, Kuwait, the Sudan, Syria, and Egypt signed an agreement setting up an Arab Establishment for Investment Insurance to be based in Kuwait with a capital of 10 million Kuwaiti dinars.[1] In August, 1971, the member states of the Arab Economic Unity Council decided that in 1975 they will start co-ordinating economic and social development plans. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, with a starting capital of 100 million Kuwaiti dinars, became operational in February, 1972. The Arab countries participating in this fund are Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, the Sudan, Libya,

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[1]Besides these multilateral agreements, a number of belateral and trilateral agreements between Arab states have been signed.

Lebanon, and South Yemen.[1] Hard currency earnings by the

OAPEC countries are at such a level that a considerable

expansion of the fund may be anticipated.

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[1]The contributions from the participating countries
are as follows: Kuwait, 30 million dinars; Egypt, 7 million
dinars; Iraq, 5 million dinars; Syria, 2 million dinars;
Algeria, 2 million dinars; Jordan, 1 million dinars; the
Sudan, 1 million dinars; Libya, 1 million dinars; Lebanon,
600,000 dinars; and South Yemen, 10,000 dinars. "Middle East
in Transition," New Outlook, XIV (September, 1971), p. 52.

CHAPTER VI

DIVISIVE FORCES IN THE ARAB WORLD

The preceding three chapters have analyzed respec-
tively the idea of one Arab state, the core area situation
within the Arab World, and the cohesive forces at work
within that region. On examining these aspects alone, it
would seem that the Pan-Arab idea is moving toward fulfill-
ment. Certainly the present Federation of Arab Republics,
which involves a functional unity of Egypt, Libya, and Syria,
could be taken as partial fulfillment of that goal. Complete
fulfillment of the unity idea is still hindered, however,
by the strong divisive forces operating in the Arab World.
Even within the present political Federation of Arab Repub-
lics, the functional integration has not kept pace. The
divisive forces that are obstructing the idea of Arab unity
can be grouped under four main headings--geopolitical and
spatial factors, factors deriving from the presence of non-
Arab minorities, political factors, and economic factors.

Geopolitical and Spatial Factors Hindering the Political Idea of One Arab State

Geopolitical and spatial factors hindering the devel-
opment of the idea of one Arab state are the following:

external (i.e., big power) strategic considerations within the Arab World, the overall low population density and the vast expanses of desert separating populated areas, the developing local loyalties and rigidities which follow achievement of national sovereignty, and the particularly acerbic discontiguity of the political area of the idea caused by the establishment of Israel.

Strategic considerations

The strategic importance of the Arab World lies primarily in its position as a crossroads controlling important intercontinental corridors of air and sea transport, in the availability within it of several major airfields and naval bases capable of supporting global military operations, and in the presence of huge reserves of oil. The strategic position occupied by the Arab people has led the world's great powers into contention for influence and control of the area. This contention has adversely affected realization of the political idea of one Arab state, and has tended to divide the region into antagonistic spheres of influence.

Following the end of World War II the Arab World, particularly the Middle East portion of it, was widely regarded as one of the most important strategic areas in the world. A passage from John C. Campbell's Defense of the Middle East argues the point:

"So far as the sheer value of territory is concerned
there is no more strategically important area in the

world...." These frequently quoted words of General Dwight Eisenhower with reference to the Middle East were spoken in 1951. It is a conclusion which would seem to be the lesson of history. Over the centuries the great powers of the world have sought to establish themselves in this critically situated zone astride the communications linking three continents and two oceans. In and across it France, Britain and Russia struggled for positions of vantage throughout the 19th century. It was in the Middle East that the Western Allies in World War I first cracked the resistance of the Central Powers and opened the way for Germany's ultimate defeat. It was by holding the Middle East in World War II that they opened a vital supply route to Russia, prevented a junction of German and Japanese forces, and made possible the assault on Europe from the south. Its role in any future war between the West and the Soviet Union would seem to be crucial.[1]

This view was also supported by some of the general geopolitical ideas prevalent at the time. The conflict between the Communist nations on one hand and the United States and its allies on the other was often viewed as a struggle between the "Heartland" and the "Rimlands."[2] The Soviet Union and China were seen as dominating the Heartland in the Eurasian land mass, where it was surrounded by non-Communist power, controlling the coastal areas, or Rimlands. Specific examples of the interest of the large powers in the region during the period are: the Soviet desire for a share in the

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[1]John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 167, quoting U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, United States Foreign-Aid Programs in Europe, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., July 7-23, 1951 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 277.

[2]Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Holt, 1942), and Nicholas Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1944).

defense of the Turkish Straits, British and American concern
with the outcome of the civil war in Greece, the Truman
Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey, the British sponsorship
of the Baghdad Pact, the British and French intervention along
with Israel following the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal,
the American intervention in Lebanon, and the Russian offer
of military and economic assistance to Egypt.

By the 1960's the geopolitical situation had changed
somewhat. Soviet Russia was no longer contained within the
bounds of Mackinder's Heartland and had made a significant
penetration of the Rimlands. Egypt, Iraq, and Syria had
become friendly partners of Russia, and their airports and
naval bases had become available for Soviet use. From the
point of view of the United States and its allies, the devel-
opment of intercontinental missiles and nuclear-powered
submarines lessened the necessity of having as many advanced
air and naval bases on the immediate periphery of Communist
Russia. Changing military technology does not mean, however,
that the Middle East region has lost its political, economic,
or even military importance for either of the great powers.

Analyzing the global strategic situation of the early
1960's, Saul Bernard Cohen referred to the Middle East as the
"Shatterbelt," a term more often applied to east central
Europe. The Shatterbelt, according to him, is a "large,
strategically located region that is occupied by a number of
conflicting states and is caught between conflicting

interests of the Great Powers."[1] Cohen excludes the Maghreb,
i.e., Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, from his Shatterbelt,
preferring to include northwestern Africa within the same
geopolitical region as Maritime Europe. Combining the Maghreb
and Maritime Europe as one geopolitical region now seems no
longer in accord with reality. There is a common sharing of
the Mediterranean Sea, and there remain substantial trade
ties, particularly between the Maghreb states and France.
The Maghreb, however, is still an underdeveloped area, like
some of the eastern Arab states rich in oil and other mineral
resources, but largely dependent for its development on the
capital and managerial skills of the industrial countries and
with a modest level of general maritime trade. Furthermore,
the Maghreb is contiguous to the Arab states of Cohen's
Shatterbelt, has quite similar political, social, and cultural
characteristics, and is an area of comparable interest to the
great powers. To this writer it seems appropriate to include
all the Arab World in the Shatterbelt concept. In order to
justify this designation, the Arab states do not have to be
in conflict among themselves. It is sufficient that they
occupy a region of contention between the two antagonistic
great powers or power-blocs.

The nuclear era has no doubt seen some lessening of
the military-strategic importance of the Arab World, but

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[1]Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a
World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 229.

economically the region possesses even more importance today
to the great powers than it had ten or twenty years ago.
The economic importance of the Arab lands to the world as
a whole lies primarily in their control of vast oil reserves
which appear essential to the survival of the industrial
nations of the Free World during the balance of the twentieth
century. Of the total estimated oil reserves of the world,
543,000,000,000 barrels, the Arab World alone accounts for
322,000,000,000 barrels, 59 per cent of the total.[1] Of the
Free World average daily production of 45,000,000 barrels in
1970, non-Communist Europe produced only 322,000 barrels
and the United States only 9,610,000 barrels. In the year
1970 the Arab World countries produced an average of
15,000,000 barrels per day, or almost 40 per cent of all
Free World production. With the exception of Canada, the
only major country in the industrialized Free World which
does not import most of its oil is the United States. In
1972, because of looming shortages, the United States was
importing about 25 per cent of its total consumption.
According to Otto N. Miller, chairman and chief executive
of the Standard Oil Company of California, United States
imports are expected to increase to around 50 per cent of
consumption within ten years.[2] On the basis of present

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[1] "World Trend," World Oil, CLXXIII (August, 1971),
p. 50.

[2] The Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1972.

data, according to a recent article in the Wall Street

Journal, the declining reserves of the forty-eight contiguous

states of the United States have a life span of perhaps

twelve years. It is estimated that even including the North

Slope oil of Alaska, the nation in 1980 will still be produc-

ing at about the 1970 rate. A rapidly increasing dependence

on foreign imports seems virtually certain.[1] Recently, in

the face of decreasing home production, the United States

Government lifted the oil import level in order to stabilize

the domestic price and assure an adequate supply.

The dependence of West European countries on imported

oil, particularly oil from the Arab World, for their economic

survival may be illustrated by the example of France. In

recent years more than three-fourths of France's oil supply

has come from the Arab World (Table 3).

The Western World as a whole is dependent on Arab oil

for most of its present oil supply. Experts do not see any

feasible substitute for oil for at least another ten or

fifteen years and possibly not until after the year 2000. By

1980 the world oil demand is estimated to rise from the

present forty-five million barrels per day to about eighty

million barrels per day. To meet this demand an additional

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[1]Ray Vicker, "Coming Conflicts over Arab Oil," The
Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1972.

fourteen or fifteen million barrels per day will have to be supplied by the Arab World.[1]

TABLE 3

SOURCES OF FRENCH OIL IMPORTS IN 1966-1967
(Figures in Thousands of Tons)

Sources	1966	1967 (Jan.-June)
Algeria	19,180	10,237
Iraq	10,581	4,029
Kuwait	8,335	4,997
Libya	7,572	4,095
Qatar	1,852	722
South Arabia	3,046	2,076
Other Arab countries	3,454	1,800
Total Arab World	53,820	29,956
Total sources	68,662	35,973

Source: New Outlook: Middle East Monthly, II (February, 1968), p. 54.

To satisfy their need for oil, the Western World countries have a huge private and public investment in petroleum exploration, drilling, marketing, refining, and transportation. Table 4 illustrates the size of the Western World's economic stake in the oil industry in countries outside the Western World. Nearly 82 per cent of the OPEC

[1]Oil and Gas Journal, LXX (April 24, 1972), p. 38.

countries' oil production is owned by the eight big Western

oil companies listed in the table. Only Iran, Indonesia, and

Venezuela are non-Arab OPEC countries.

TABLE 4

WESTERN OIL COMPANIES' SHARE OF
OPEC PRODUCTION, 1970

Company	Percentage
Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon)	18.3
British Petroleum	15.5
Royal Dutch/Shell	11.5
Gulf	9.5
Texaco	8.7
Standard Oil of California	8.1
Mobil	5.3
Compagnie Française des Pétroles	5.0
Total	81.9

Source: "Is a Cartel Next for Oilmen?" Business
Week, January, 1971, p. 70.

In 1971, among the international oil companies,

Standard of New Jersey (Exxon) made a net income of

$1,516,600,000; Royal Dutch/Shell, $847,000,000; Mobil,

$540,800,000; Texaco, $903,900,000; Gulf, $561,400,000;

Standard Oil of California, $511,000,000; and British

Petroleum, $357,000,000.[1] Half of the oil distributed on the

world market is produced and sold by the American firms.

Two-thirds of this is extracted by American companies opera-

ting in the Middle East and North Africa.[2]

What goes on in the Arab World then is vital to the

strategic military and economic interests of the Western

World. Campbell, on viewing the recent trend toward closer

ties between Soviet Russia and the Arab countries, cautions

of the possible consequences:

> Should the trend continue . . . , it would be a
> catastrophe for the United States and the Western World.
> The whole uncommitted world would see the writing on the
> wall. NATO would be outflanked. Once in control of
> Middle Eastern oil, Moscow would have its grip on Europe's
> jugular vein. It could hardly be long before our European
> allies would be forced to consider accommodation on Soviet
> terms which would leave the United States isolated.[3]

In spite of warnings from Campbell and other Western

analysts, Russian influence in the Arab World has continued

to increase, with only minor setbacks. To be sure, most of

the Russian military personnel assigned there as advisers

were ousted from Egypt in August, 1972. The ouster has been

interpreted in part as Egyptian retaliation for Russia's

refusal to supply certain long-range offensive weapons, and

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[1]"The Middle East Squeeze on the Oil Giants,"
Business Week, July, 1972, p. 54.

[2]"Middle East in Transition," New Outlook, XII
(January, 1969), p. 61.

[3]Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 161-162.

in part as an expression of Egypt's earnest expectation that the ouster of Russians will prompt the United States to pressure Israel to come to some sort of permanent territorial settlement. No prompt settlement was forthcoming, however, to the utter disappointment of Egypt. Neither was Egypt successful in obtaining the needed military equipment from the Western World. Little choice was left for Egypt but to start mending its relations with Russia. In the past several months Egypt has been doing just that. The August, 1972, ouster of Russian military advisers from Egypt could have been a major setback for Soviet-Egyptian relations, but conditions subsequent to the event have turned it into a minor one.

The Soviet Union, with its multi-pronged attack including military assistance, economic assistance, diplomatic pressure, a strong naval presence, and, most recently, its offer of a market for Arab oil, has penetrated the Arab World far more deeply than it had in 1968 when Campbell made the statement must quoted. The latest move of the U.S.S.R., offering another outlet for Arab oil, may well have far-reaching consequences. It could greatly accelerate the process of nationalizing Western operations, because the need to have assured markets for the oil has been the biggest deterrent to Arab nationalization in the past. Nationalization, a process which has now begun (chapter V), may be

expected to lead to sharply higher fuel costs for the oil consumers in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.

In recent years, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, the Sudan, Syria, and both Yemens have received economic and military assistance from the U.S.S.R.[1] A 1972 tabulation of Soviet aid shows about one hundred projects under way in Egypt, eighty in Algeria, seventy in Iraq, fifty in Syria, and forty in South Yemen.[2] In May, 1972, the U.S.S.R. strengthened its ties with Syria by signing a new military treaty, and with Iraq by signing a fifteen-year treaty of friendship. Somewhat earlier, in May, 1971, the Soviets signed a similar treaty with Egypt. Only Algeria among the major Soviet aid recipients, has rebuffed any binding treaty with the U.S.S.R. Nonetheless, Algeria too leans more towards the East than the West.

In the past the U.S.S.R.'s interest in Middle East and North African oil was viewed by the Western World as only a negative one: to hamper the delivery of Arab oil to the Western World. The Soviets could then utilize their dominance for their own political ends in the region.[3] The Soviet Union for many years has regarded the Western presence in the

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[1]Morocco also has received token amounts of Soviet aid, but it is accepted to satisfy the leftist element inside the country rather than for any other purpose.

[2]The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1972.

[3]Mordehai Nahumi, "The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East," New Outlook, XI (September, 1968), p. 10.

Arab World, particularly Western military bases there, as a
threat to the vulnerable Soviet Moslem borderlands.[1] Now the
situation has changed. Commenting on some of the recent
Soviet agreements with Arab World countries, Mordehai Nahumi
states:

> The U.S.S.R.'s oil needs will increase as it goes
> deeper into the automobile age; its large distances are
> liable to lead it to prefer to import oil for certain
> regions while exporting her own oil and oil products from
> other places. The U.S.S.R., like France, is interested
> today in sharing in the distribution . . . of oil. This
> undoubtedly, is a source of growing conflict between
> America (and England) and the Soviet Union in the region.[2]

On examining the great power competition for influence
in the Arab World, one has to recognize a present division of
the Arab countries into three groups. One group, consisting
of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen is dependent on the
U.S.S.R.'s supply of military equipment. Another group, con-
sisting of Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,
the Sultanate of Oman, and the Union of Arab Emirates, is
similarly dependent on the United States and other Western
countries, particularly the United Kingdom and France. The
remaining Arab countries do not fit in either group. Algeria
and Libya are not committed to the Soviet Union by a treaty,
as are Egypt, Iraq and Syria, but they are extremely opposed
to United States, British, and West German support for

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[1]Geoffrey Wheeler, "Soviet and Chinese in the Middle
East," The World Today, XXII (February, 1966), p. 76.

[2]Nahumi, "The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle
East," p. 12.

Israel. The Sudan is considered anti-Soviet because of its rebuff to the Communist coup of 1971, but it is still hardly on friendly terms with the United States. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar maintain friendly relations with the Western countries.

Natural and man-made barriers to Arab world unity

Richard Hartshorne once asserted that: "Of human barriers, the most common is the absence of humans."[1] The Arab World includes vast voids where few or no people live. The extent of the empty or near-empty space in the Arab World can be visualized by the armchair traveler with a cursory look at the map (Figures 20 and 21). More than 80 per cent of the land area of the Arab World has a density of less than five persons per square mile. Large portions of that land area receive four inches or less of precipitation per year and are almost without natural vegetation. The start natural barriers within the Arab World, however, have never been completely effective as a means of separation. On the contrary, widespread nomadism was a form of adjustment to the environment. The mobility of the nomads created instability in the Arab World, and there were periodic invasions throughout history until political boundaries firmly dividing the Arabs into several units were finally drawn by European

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[1]Hartshorne, "The Functional Approach in Political Geography," p. 107.

Fig.20

Natural And Man-made Barriers

Areas of 8 inches or more rainfall
Deserts
    Plantless
Political Boundaries
Israel

Fig.21

POPULATION
DENSITY

N

More than 50 person per sq. mi.

5-50 person per sq. mi.

0-5   "   "   "   "

THE ARAB WORLD

0   200   400

Miles

After Desmond Steward, The Arab World, p. 10.

powers within the past century. A major consequence of the unrestricted movement of the people in the past was the spread of the Arabic language throughout what we now call the Arab World.

In the modern period, the number of nomads and the range of their migrations have been drastically curtailed by the settlement policies of the responsible governments. Political boundaries have taken on cultural, economic, and legal meaning, and Arab nomadism is now inadequate to produce the harmonizing and unifying effect it had in the past (See Figure 22 and Table 5 for the areas of nomadism and their distribution by states).

The political area of the idea of one Arab nation-state extends approximately 4,000 miles from east to west and 2,000 miles from north to south. Within this tremendous area, the distance factor is a very significant hindrance to communication and contact. The frequency and density of transactions--visits, messages, or interactions of any kind diminish with distance. The political significance of such transactions on the formation of political attitudes has been noted by Karl Deutsch, Edward Soja, and a number of other writers.[1] While Cairo has become a major focal center for the Arab

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[1]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), and Edward Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya: A Spatial Analysis of Social, Economic, and Political Change (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968).

Fig.22

THE ARAB WORLD

Areas of
NOMADISM

0   200   400
Miles

Based on William B. Fisher, The Middle East: A Physical, Social and
Regional Geography, p. 152, and Mansell R. Prothero, A Geography of Africa, p. 68.

TABLE 5

NOMADISM IN THE ARAB WORLD[a]

Country	Total Population	Number of Nomads
Algeria	12,943,000	135,000[b]
Egypt	31,500,000	50,000[c]
Iraq	8,500,000	300,000[c]
Jordan	2,100,000	25,000[c]
Libya	1,802,000	255,000[b]
Morocco	14,580,000	20,000[b]
Saudi Arabia	7,000,000	100,000[d]
Sudan	14,770,000	260,000[e]
Syria	5,652,000	350,000[c]
Tunisia	4,660,000	3,000[b]

[a]The number of nomads shown should be considered an approximation, since no official count is available.

[b]UNESCO, Nomades et Nomadisme au Sahara (Paris, 1963), p. 22.

[c]W. B. Fisher, The Middle East: A Social and Regional Geography (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1971), p. 103.

[d]Taylor, ed., Focus on the Middle East, p. 102.

[e]Arab News and Views, XV (August-September, 1969), pp. 1-12.

World, the frequency of transactions between Cairo and the other Arab communities obviously diminishes with distance.

The presence of several existing political units within the political area of the idea is obviously a further obstacle to unity of either thought or action. Jean Gottmann and Boyd Shafer have discussed in convincing detail the role of human ingenuity and common cultural experience in building political consciousness. [1] Each political unit tends to create its own symbols, or iconography, in the form of, for example, patriotic slogans, a national flag, and a national anthem. These symbols reflect pride in past glory, historical or religious events, national heroes, and prominent cultural figures. Once the iconography is created, it resists change. Because of their characteristic youth as political entities, the Arab countries demonstrate their iconography mainly in their national flags--which came to exist, however, only in the twentieth century. For the most part, Arab iconography, based on pride in past Arab glory, the Prophet Mohammed, the Koran, and the Arabic language, is shared by all Arabs. Even the symbols used for the national flags are the same in two of the Arab countries, Iraq and Syria (Figure 23). Egypt's flag has two stars and Libya's has none--otherwise these two are identical with the flags of

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[1] Jean Gottmann, La politique des états et leur géographie (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952), and Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality.

Fig. 23

Flags Of Arab States

Syria and Iraq. The national flags of the Sudan, Yemen, and South Yemen also bear a notable similarity to the four others just mentioned. The flags of all of the countries that are within the political action area and the highly potential area as defined in this study, except for the flags of Jordan and Lebanon, could be assimilated into one with only minor modifications.

National boundaries not only hinder international movement and encourage separate systems of iconography, they also tend to create what Rejai and Enloe have called "state-nations" instead of nation-states.[1] These writers see the developing countries within spatial frameworks left by the colonial powers as states with fixed political boundaries where the process of nation-building is having to take place after the establishment of the state. In most of the European countries, the nation preceded and helped to create the state, whereas in the developing countries more typically the state has preceded and is creating the nation.

Some elaboration of this distinction is perhaps in order. Most of the developing countries were once under colonial rule, and their present political boundaries were drawn by the colonial powers. The boundary lines were either

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[1]Mostafa Rejai and Cynthia H. Enloe, "Nation-States and State-Nations," International Studies Quarterly, XIII, No. 2 (1969), pp. 140-158, and Rupert Emerson, "The Problem of Identity, Selfhood, and Image in the New Nation: The Situation of Africa," Comparative Politics, II (April, 1969), pp. 305-310.

internal administrative boundaries of convenience, or they were compromise lines separating spheres of imperial influence. The removal of colonial rule left many of the developing countries a citizenry consisting of heterogeneous cultural elements. Even where the population was relatively homogeneous, it was still politically undeveloped and disorganized. The new and often inexperienced national leaders have had a formidable task in trying to integrate the population successfully into cohesive nation-states.

In the process of creating a state-nation, separate administrative, legislative, judicial, and military personnel are a necessity. There develops a group of elites with vested interests in maintaining the state, who recognize that political integration with other states would raise the possibility of losing their newly acquired positions of privilege. Individuals in the elite groups tend to resist political integration unless they see a hope for even greater personal opportunity within the larger unit.

One of the reasons given by Tibawi for the breakdown of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961 was the opposition of the Syrian elites to the intended land reform program.[1] Although this program was meant to bring about a more uniform system of land ownership throughout the new United

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[1] A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960), p. 107.

Arab Republic, and so to be an important step in promoting a
real integration between the two countries, it threatened to
undercut the economic power of the Syrian elites who ulti-
mately broke the union.

Thus, it is often from the top that the sense of
nationalism is cultivated, and the feeling for it has had to
infiltrate downward instead of through the reverse process as
in the case of many of the European countries. Independent
native rulers have literally undertaken to create their own
nation. In the process of creating a nation, the leadership
has had to adopt a pattern of administrative structure, a
national educational system, a common body of law, a common
language, and a unique set of patriotic symbols in order to
justify a state-nation as an entity distinct from others.
Quite understandably, the independent Arab leaders have
emphasized and sometimes magnified the distinctive character
of their respective states. To illustrate, one might call
attention to the rise in the early 1950's of Pharaonism in
Egypt and of Phoenicianism in Lebanon. In the fashion just
described, some Arab leaders may have created strong state-
nations which will not easily open themselves to the
political idea of one Arab state.

Man-made or natural barriers to movement can be
largely overcome, however, as they have been in the interior
southwest of the United States by providing adequate means of
transport and communication. The existing system of

circulation in the Arab World is still rudimentary and inade-
quate to support a greatly expanded interchange of goods,
messages, and people. Large areas of the Arab World are
still empty of any modern means of transportation. Consider-
ing Egypt the heart of the Arab World, the Maghreb is almost
detached from it. There is only a single two-lane road
linking the core areas of North Africa. Equally tenuous is
the linkage between Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and the
Fertile Crescent because of Israel's interruption of the land
continuity. In addition to the inadequate transportation
links between the Egyptian heart of the Arab World and the
other Arab countries, there is a critical inadequacy of
transportation facilities within most of the Arab states as
well (Figure 24).

Discontiguity created by the presence of Israel

The coming into existence of the state of Israel by a
United Nations Assembly resolution in 1947, and its de facto
enlargement by military action in 1949 and 1967, has broken
the contiguity of the political area of the Arab unity idea
into two parts, one being the Arab states of North Africa
and the other consisting of the Arab states of Asia. This
break in contiguity of the Arab land space is a handicap to
the successful political and functional integration of exist-
ing Arab countries. It is particularly so because of the
continuing regional hostility and the essentially non-Arab

Fig.24

TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
in
THE ARAB WORLD

Airports
- ⊕ Over 100 landings per week
- ○ 50 - 99
- ○ 25 - 49
- ○ 1 - 25

Pipelines _____

Railroads - - - - - -

Roads _____

| 0 | 150 | 300 | 600 | 900 |

MILES

nature of the Israeli state. From antiquity the interconti-
nental land bridge of the Sinai Peninsula has served as the
main route for Arab invasions and caravan travel between the
Asian and North African settlements. If it had not been for
this land continuity, the North African states would quite
probably never have been Arabized. For the past quarter of
a century the Sinai link has been severed completely by
Israel, and there is no prospect of re-establishing this link
in the near future.

The general question must be raised as to whether or
not an Arab state separated into two parts by a small but
powerful and hostile country could successfully overcome the
political and functional problems which would result from its
geographical discontiguity. In the world of 1973, apart from
certain island-based nation-states, there is only one major
state still in existence whose land continuity is signifi-
cantly interrupted. The American state of Alaska is separated
by Canada from the rest of continental and contiguous United
States. This situation is tolerable because of existing
friendly relations between the United States and Canada, and
because of the very sparse population and undeveloped nature
of Alaska. Different conditions prevail at the Sinai discon-
tinuity. Israel, as was mentioned, is powerful and hostile,
and the two separated groups of Arab states contain densely
populated areas with developed administrative systems of
their own. The recent demise of East Pakistan and the

emergence of an independent Bangladesh, in part as a conse-
quence of geographic separation, raise further doubts as to
the chance for survival of one state whose continuity of
territory is interrupted by a hostile and powerful foreign
state.

It is not uncommon to encounter the comment of a
Western observer that the only element of unity among the
Arab states is their common opposition to Israel. It is quite
true that opposition to Israel does provide a popular politi-
cal cause around which the Arabs can rally. Thus, while
Israel has given the Arabs a common political cause, its
existence serves to break the political area of the idea, an
interruption which could continue to be significant in the
long run.

However desirable--and it is desirable--territorial
land contiguity is not absolutely essential for the survival
of a state. Navigable waterways can provide an acceptable
mode of movement between the parts of a political area.
Japan, Denmark, and Italy are all successfully unified nations.
The Philippines and Indonesia, each with thousands of islands
within its national political area, have recently evolved
into nation-states. The Arab World could do the same. It is
even possible that the Arabs will be able to bring about some
kind of land contiguity, either by destroying Israel, which
seems highly unlikely, or by negotiating a treaty with Israel
which would provide for unrestricted movement along a corridor

through Israel's territory, in return for recognizing Israel's right to exist and acknowledging firm boundaries. At present, of course, Arab-Israeli relations are at an impasse and, until this has been broken, none of the possible solutions suggested here can be realized.

Minorities in the Existing Arab States

Few if any areas as large as the Arab World are without linguistic and religious minorities. The Arab World has its share, although these minorities are small in relation to the whole. According to A. H. Hourani, to be in the minority in the Arab World means to be one who is not a Sunni Moslem in religion,[1] or one who does not have Arabic for his native language, or one who is neither Arabic speaking nor Sunni Moslem (See Figure 25 for Hourani's list of minorities in the Arab World).[2] This study, in view of contemporary political attitudes in the region, considers an Arabic-speaking person, brought up in Arab lands, as an Arab irrespective of his religious affiliation. Therefore, only the linguistic or

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[1]Islam is divided into numerous sects and subsects, Shia and Sunni Moslems being the two major divisions. Sunni Moslems are in a majority in the Arab World as a whole. Shia Moslems constitute a majority in Iraq, provided the Kurds, who are mainly Sunnis, are excluded. Shias believe that succession ought to remain hereditary within the family of Mohammed and recognize Ali, the Prophet's nephew, as the rightful Caliph. Ali was murdered by the Sunnis who believe the succession should have been elective. Since this seventh century split, Shias have felt persecuted by the Sunni majority.

[2]A. H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 1.

Fig. 25

MINORITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD

A. Sunni Moslems, but not Arabic-speaking:
      (1) Kurds
      (2) Turcomans
      (3) Caucasians: Circassians
                             Chechens

B. Arabic-speaking, but not Sunni Moslems:

   I. Heterodox Moslems:
      (1) Shias
      (2) Alawis
      (3) Ismailis
      (4) Druzes

   II. Christians:
      (1) Greek Orthodox
      (2) Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites)
      (3) Coptic Orthodox
      (4) Nestorians (Assyrians)
      (5) Roman Catholics of the Latin rite
      (6) Maronites
      (7) Greek Catholics
      (8) Coptic Catholics
      (9) Syrian Catholics
    (10) Chaldean Catholics
    (11) Protestants: Anglicans
                           Presbyterians, etc.

  III. Jews and semi-Judaic Sects:
      (1) Rabbanite
      (2) Karaites
      (3) Samaritans

   IV. Other religions:
      (1) Yazidis
      (2) Mandaeans
      (3) Shabak
      (4) Baha'is

Fig. 25.--Continued

C. Neither Arabic-speaking nor Sunni Moslems:
    (1) Persian-speaking: Shias
                                Baha'is
                                Jews
    (2) Kurdish-speaking: Yazidis
                                Shabak
                                Alawis
                                Syrian Orthodox
                                Syrian Catholics
                                Jews
    (3) Syriac-speaking: Nestorians (Assyrians)
                                Chaldaean Catholics
                                Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites)
                                Syrian Catholics
    (4) Armenian-speaking: Armenian Orthodox (Grego-
                                      rians)
                                    Armenian Catholics
                                    Armenian Protestants
    (5) Hebrew-speaking: Jews
    (6) Jews speaking various European languages:
                                Yiddish
                                Spanish
                                Italian, etc.

Source: A. H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 1-2. In this list of minorities, the North African Arab countries are not included.

other national minorities are considered to be antithetic to
the political idea of one Arab state. In reality, some reli-
gious minorities such as the Maronites (Christian Arabs) in
Lebanon and the Druzes have resisted Arab political and
cultural assimilation.

Linguistic minorities

Fortunately for the Arab unity movemement there are
not many important enclaves of non-Arabic-speaking people in
the Arab World. Commenting on the enclaves in the eastern
Arab countries, Longrigg writes:

> In all the range of the (eastern) Arab countries
> (excluding, therefore, the southern Sudan) the sole
> considerable enclaves of non-Arab-speaking peoples are
> those of the north Iraqi Kurds and Turkomans, the
> recently-intruded Jews of Israel, and, at the extreme
> southwestern fringe, the partly-Arab bilingual grazing
> tribes of the central Sudan, the African-type Nubas of
> Kordofan, and the Nubians of the Middle-Nile banks.
> Elsewhere Arabic speech and consciousness is practically
> universal.[1]

In the western Arab countries, except among a few isolated
pockets of Berber population, Arabic speech and consciousness
are practically universal (Figure 26). With regard to the
Berber peoples of Morocco and their place in Moroccan life,
Legum writes:

> The Berbers can hardly be considered to have a
> minority status in Morocco, and thus their position does
> not require discussion under this heading. The fate of
> Berber culture, the nature of rural administration and
> participation, are issues in contemporary Morocco; but
> the membership of Berbers in the national community is

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[1]Longrigg, The Middle East, p. 98.

Fig. 26

Non-Arabic Speaking Areas
In
THE ARAB WORLD

Berber
Hamitic
Hebrew
Kurdish
1.Nubian
2.Beja
3.Dinka
4.Zande
5.Tibbu

Based on William B. Fisher, The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and
Regional Geography, p. 12-13, and Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North-West Africa,
p. 2.

not. This is so, of course, in virtue of their sharing
in a wider Muslim culture, rather than through being the
descendants of the country's proto-population.[1]

Frank Ralph Golino makes a similar statement about the

Berbers and other minorities of Libya: "Despite the particu-

larism represented by the Berber, Tuareg and Tibu, however,

Arabic represents the dominant cultural linguistic element in

the pattern of Libyan national identity formation."[2] The

Berber people in Tunisia are fully Arabized. They have been

completely assimilated culturally and linguistically into the

Arab identity. The same can be said with reasonable accuracy

of the Berber population of the central and western Maghreb.

Even though the Berber tongue is still spoken by a large

portion of the population in Morocco (35 per cent) and in

Algeria (30 per cent), the Berbers in these two countries are

mostly bilingual and do not represent a significant cultural

or political minority.

In the eastern Arab countries there are only small

numbers of resident Europeans. The European settlers (mainly

French, Spanish, and Italian) in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,

and Libya since independence have emigrated to a point where

they are not significant politically today. Until the inde-

pendence movements of the 1950's, the Europeans in the

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[1]Legum (ed.), Africa, pp. 44-45.

[2]Frank Ralph Golino, "Patterns of Libyan National
Identity," The Middle East Journal, XXIV (Summer, 1970),
p. 345.

Maghreb numbered about two million. Today, they are estima-
ted to number fewer than 500,000. Excluded from considera-
tion here are the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla which
together contain another 150,000 Europeans.[1]

The actual number of French people in North Africa
has diminished considerably since independence, but their
cultural influence has not decreased as rapidly. When civil
war broke out in 1954, Algeria had 1,200,000 French among its
population, most of whom had come to think of themselves as
Algerians. The French element at the time constituted 10 per
cent of the entire Algerian population.[2] Some writers have
speculated that there might have been no rebellion had the
requirements for full French citizenship not been somewhat
discriminatory toward Algerian Moslems.[3] The speculation is
indicative of how far Algerians had and have been assimilated
into French culture. The French cultural impact in Algeria is
such that French-speaking Arabs there--in the opinion of many
writers--will find it hard to identify with the political
idea of one Arab state for a long time to come.

Religious minorities

Among the Christian communities in the Arab World,
the Maronites of Lebanon are probably the most important

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[1] Steel (ed.), North Africa, p. 25.

[2] Ibid., p. 18.

[3] Ibid.

because of their strong resistance to assimilation. The
Maronites, who number about 650,000, constitute the largest
single community in Lebanon. They are the only Christians in
the Middle East who have managed to preserve an autonomous
Christian life and resist the tendency to social assimila-
tion.[1] They are French educated, prominent in every sphere
of national life, and perhaps the most westward-leaning
cultural group in all of the Middle East.[2]

In the history of Islam the development of a new sect
has often been a convenient vehicle for mounting political
power. Therefore, the presence of different sects within
Islam has commonly reflected political differences in a given
Arab community. This was particularly true in the past, but
it is evident even today. Among the Middle Eastern religious
minorities are the Shias of Iraq; the Druzes in Lebanon, a
heretical sect of Ismaili Moslems who several centuries ago
took on tinges of Christianity; the Zaidis, a Shia offshoot
of some prominence in Yemen; and the Alawis, another Shia
derivative, numbering about 300,000 and found mostly in north-
western Syria. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia are a recent
addition to the list of religious minorities. Often called
the "Puritans of Islam," the Wahhabis, after two centuries of
rather obscure existence as a desert group, became prominent

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[1]Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, p. 66.

[2]Longrigg, The Middle East, p. 107.

under the leadership of King Saud of Arabia in the early twentieth century.

In spite of their internal differences, the various communities of Islam tend to view the world in terms of Moslem versus non-Moslem. Since all the Moslems, irrespective of their sectarian affiliations, are Arabs in the Arab World, they do not present an unsurmountable danger to the idea of Pan-Arab unity.

The indigeneous Jewish population, once found in almost every town in the Arab World, has decreased to near insignificance since the creation of Israel. Although they existed since ancient times, the Jewish communities of Iraq (numbering over 100,000 before 1948) and Yemen (50,000) have dwindled to a few thousands in each country, and the Jews of Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (formerly at least 100,000) have been reduced by more than four-fifths.[1] Before the Second World War, half a million indigeneous Jews lived in the northwest African countries. Today their number has diminished to less than 120,000.[2]

Some of the minorities listed by Hourani (Figure 25) are not politically significant in considering the Pan-Arab idea for one or more of the three following reasons: (1) They are not by nature antagonistic to the majority, that

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[1]Steel (ed.), North Africa, p. 25.

[2]Longrigg, The Middle East, p. 109.

is, the Sunni Arabs; (2) they are not concentrated in a certain geographic location in sufficient numbers to constitute a significant threat to the majority; and (3) their numerical strength is small and scattered. Discussing the problems of minorities in the Arab World, Hourani wrote in 1947:

> The Copts, the Greek Orthodox Christians and the heterodox Moslems are already a long way on the road to assimilation, and will go further if the majority allows them. The Kurds, Turcomans and Circassians of Syria also may be expected to become Arabized in course of time as so many of their fellow-nationals have done in the past. It seems probable that the Armenian question will be solved by emigration of the majority of Armenians to the U.S.S.R. There remain two communities which are likely to resist assimilation: the Maronites in Lebanon and the Kurds in Iraq. Will their problem be solved by the grant of autonomy?[1]

The question Hourani asked a quarter of a century ago still remains a valid one. The Kurds of Iraq, like the Southern (non-Moslem) Sudanese, have forced their government after long guerilla warfare to give them a measure of autonomy. But the minority problem still exists, and the assimilation question remains. Will these groups be satisfied with their present degree of autonomy, or will they insist on even more? Still another future possibility is a decision of the responsible governments to attempt forced assimilation.

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[1]Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, p. 122. Besides the Maronites and the Kurds, there is another minority which the writer does not mention, the Southern Sudanese community, which presents a real problem of assimilation.

Divisive Political Factors

Since the modern movement for Arab political unification began, in the early 1920's, there have been dynastic rivalries between the Hashemites and the Saudis, and important differences in point of view between the independent and one-time colonial Arab states. The European colonial design to create and perpetuate divisions within the Arab World long frustrated the Arab nationalists' efforts. Neither of these divisive factors is important today. All of the Arab states including the former British protectorates on the Persian Gufl have become independent, and dynastic rivalries between the Hashemites and the Saudis have virtually disappeared. Foreign powers, now without legal authority, are less effective in their effort to control or influence the Arab countries, and their methods have changed from military action to diplomacy and subtle--or not so subtle--economic pressure. However, a new divisive political factor has appeared to replace the old ones, political differences among the Arab states themselves.

Today the nation-states of the Arab World can be separated into two contrasting and sometimes conflicting camps, the monarchial Arab states and the republican Arab states (Figure 27). The monarchial states are invariably conservative, anti-socialist, and pro-Western in outlook, whereas the republican Arab states are mainly pro-communist or leftist, socialist, and revolutionary. Only a few Arab

Fig. 27.--Political structure
and attitudes in the Arab World.

	Monar-chial	Repub-lican	Revolu-tionary	Conser-vative	Pro-West	Pro-communist	Socialist	Anti-socialist
Algeria		*	*			*	*	
A.R.E.[1]		*	*			*	*	
Bahrain	*			*	*			*
Iraq		*	*			*	*	
Jordan	*			*	*			*
Kuwait	*				*			*
Lebanon		*			*			*
Libya		*	*				*	
Morocco	*			*	*			*
Qatar	*			*	*			*
Sudan		*	*				*	
Sau. Ar.	*			*	*			*
Sultanate of Oman	*			*	*			*
Syria		*	*			*	*	
Tunisia		*			*		*	
U.A.E.[2]	*			*	*			*
Yemen, P.D.R.		*	*			*	*	
Yemen, Rep. of		*	*				*	

[1]Arab Republic of Egypt.

[2]Union of Arab Emirates.

states like Lebanon, Kuwait, and Tusisia do not fit clearly
in either of these two camps. Lebanon and Tunisia, unlike
the other republican states, are usually quite pro-Western in
their attitude, while Kuwait, although a shiekdom, tends to
be progressive in its economic policies.

The two Arab camps can be further subdivided into
subcamps. The republican states can reasonably be grouped
according to the degree of their socialist commitments, their
pro-communist or leftist leanings, and their revolutionary
fervor. Similarly, the monarchial states can be divided
according to the degree of their conservative social and
political attitudes, the extent of their anti-socialist
administrative measures, and the intensity of their pro-
Western policies. No close examination is needed to see that
Iraq and Egypt, both socialist states, have their differences.
Sill other differences separate the Hashemites of Jordan and
the Saudis of Saudi Arabia, in spite of their common monar-
chial system. Let the political scientist specify the degree
of difference among the two major political groups. It is
sufficient here to point out that there are differences even
among countries within the same political camp.

The philosophical diversity of the Arab states is
highly significant in the evaluation of the short range pros-
pect for the unity idea. One political philosophy cannot
coexist with another that is in sharp contrast to it within
the same political unit. The monarchial states are

fundamentally different in their internal operation from the
republican states. There is no political system known today
which can reconcile and unify these contradictory systems
into a single viable political unit.

Examining the historical trend of the twentieth
century, it seems likely that sooner or later the stern and
autocratic monarchial system, as it prevails today in Jordan,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Coastal States, will
undergo change. There is little contemporary evidence from
any part of the world to suggest that republican states will
revert back to monarchies. Spain may be about to return to a
monarchial system, but it is not changing from a republican
socialist pattern. The republican states in the Arab World
tend to encourage any movement within the monarchial states
which might eliminate the throne. Consequently, the monar-
chial states are afraid of the republican states and their
talk of one all-encompassing Arab state. They do whatever
they can to delay or discredit the Pan-Arab movement because
the continuity in power of their own regimes depends on the
failure of the one Arab state idea. Conflict between the two
philosophical camps now characterizes the politics of the
Arab World, seriously hindering what in this study has been
called simply the "idea of Arab unity."

To show how the separation of the Arab states into
two rival political camps works to obstruct the idea, some
events of recent years should be recalled. In 1958 the

United Arab Republic of Syria and Egypt was formed. In

response, the two existing Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan and

Iraq formed the Arab Union, a kind of dual alliance as a

counter to the merger of the two republican states. A mili-

tary coup toppled the Hashemite monarch of Iraq later in

1958, and this was the end of the Arab Union. King Husain of

Jordan, fearing a coup in his country, charged that Egypt was

plotting against him and called for British help. Britain

immediately responded by landing troops in Jordan to help

protect the throne of Husain whose own military force had

been essentially a British creation. In 1961 the union

between Syria and Egypt broke down, in part, according to

A. L. Tibawi, as a result of the complicity of Jordan and

Saudi Arabia.[1]

In 1962 the Imam of Yemen was deposed and apparently

assassinated by a republican coup. The coup initiated a

civil war between the royalists supporting the Imam's heir,

Mohamad al-Badr, and the republicans, a war which lasted

until 1967. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia and Jordan,

supporting the royalist side, and Egypt, aiding the republi-

can side, fought each other by proxy, furnishing the belliger-

ents troops, planes, and other military equipment.

After the War of June, 1967, the conservative oil-

producing states voted to end the selective embargo on oil

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[1]Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria, p. 109.

exports to Western markets, preferring instead to compensate Egypt with the rough financial equivalent of its lost canal dues. They rejected the alternative course proposed by Iraq which had been to stop all exports of Arab oil for three months.[1] Implementation of the Iraqi proposal would have badly hurt the NATO allies of the United States. It was undoubtedly the pro-Western attitude of the conservative Arab states which led them to back away from the Iraqi proposal.

The conference of the Arab ministers which assembled in Cairo in May, 1968, decided to establish an Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development with an initial capital of fifty million Kuwaiti dinars. Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia refused to participate.[2]

In March, 1972, King Husain of Jordan proposed the reshaping of his domain into a federal state, the United Arab Kingdom, with two autonomous regions, one on either side of the Jordan River.[3] The proposal was made without any previous consultation with the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank or with other concerned Arab governments. Naturally, King Husain's action was interpreted by the Palestinians as a move to counter their revolutionary ambitions, and by the existing

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[1] J. E. Hartshorn, "Oil and the Middle East War," The World Today, XXIV (April, 1968), p. 153.

[2] New Outlook, XI (July-August, 1968), p. 73.

[3] The Daily Star (Beirut), Thursday, March 16, 1972, p. 1.

revolutionary governments as a covert reactionary move to make peace with Israel at the cost of the Arab cause. It is well known that without military and economic support, such as is presently given by the United Kingdom and the United States, Jordan could not survive for long. The complete dependence of Jordan on Western assistance and Husain's frequent conciliatory gestures toward Israel are regarded by the revolutionary Arab states as a shameful and even traitorous obstacle to the cause of Arab unity. A cartoon published in one of the Cairo newspapers clearly sums up the Arab revolutionary states' view of Jordan and its principal supporter, the United States (Figure 28). In November, 1972, there was an unsuccessful coup in Jordan. The government of Jordan accused Libya of master-minding and financing it.

Along with the conflicting political systems of the Arab states, the internal political instability so characteristic of many of them greatly hinders progress towards the Arab unity idea. Internal political instability is clearly manifest in the frequency of military coups. Only a few of the Arab states have not experienced a military coup at least once since their independence. Tunisia and Lebanon among the republican states are the only ones which have not experienced military coups. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf principalities among the monarchial states have remained fairly stable, disregarding the occasional forced transfer of power among their own royal family members. Most of the Arab states,

then, have experienced military coups, coup attempts, or threats of coups.

Fig. 28.--Arab political cartoon

العربي – ماتتعبش نفسك الشــاكوش اللي في ايدك هو أي حايتكسر !!
بريشة : صاروخان

(Don't try to break the Arab Federation--
the only thing that will break is the tool you
are using!!)

Source: Arab Youth (Cairo), May 1, 1972, p. 2.

Since its independence in 1932, Iraq has experienced sixteen successful or abortive coups, the latest in July, 1968. Syria has been equally afflicted, with a total of eighteen coups or coup attempts since independence in 1946. The latest military coup in Syria occurred in March, 1969. On March 11, 1970, the General Command of the National Liberation Front of South Yemen announced that a reactionary coup

d'état was imminent and accused the United States and Britain of instigating it. Since Nasser's death, in September, 1970, Egypt has been politically shaky. The first major action of Nasser's successor was to imprison all of his possible rivals, .accusing them of plotting against him. In January, 1971, Moroccan officials reported uncovering a plot by non-Moroccan Arab elements to overthrow the government. A few months later, in July, 1971, an attempted coup again failed to topple the Moroccan monarch. In August, 1971, the Sudan went through a quick succession of coup and counter coup, which events deterred the Sudan from joining the Federation of Arab Republics as had been planned. In November, 1972, the King of Jordan was alerted to a coup plot and successfully broke it up.

In summary, it seems clear that most Arab countries have so far failed to develop political institutions capable of solving problems of political succession in a peaceful way. All too often Arab leaders are either planning a coup or fending off one, thereby wasting energy and money which otherwise could be used to strengthen Arab unity and economic development. Probably the political differences between the Arab states and the internal instability which characterizes so many of them are the two most important obstacles to the rapid success of the one Arab state idea.

Divisive Economic Factors

The legacy of
historical disunity

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the close of
World War I was followed by the division of the Turkish Arab
lands into several political units. Iraq, Palestine, and
Transjordan came under British administration in accordance
with the League of Nations mandate system, while Lebanon and
Syria became French mandates. Egypt, which had become a
British protectorate in 1914, was declared independent in
1922, although military rights were retained by Britain at
Alexandria and Suez. Yemen also became independent after the
First World War. Saudi Arabia, as we know it today, came into
existence in the 1920's. Kuwait, once nominally part of the
Ottoman Empire, became a British protectorate in 1899. The
Maghreb, progressively occupied by European powers after the
French occupation of Algiers in 1830, was integrated for
several decades into the economy of France and Spain.

The modern colonization of the Arab World brought
about separate customs territories with different units of
currency. It did not, however, significantly alter inter-
Arab trade relations during the period of the 1920's when
inter-Arab trade still constituted a substantial portion of
the total trade of most of the Arab countries.[1] The economic
ties between the Arab countries were given recognition by the

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[1]Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 15.

mandate system, under which trade preferences were forbidden.
Thus, until about 1930, the League of Nations maintained a
semblance of an Arab regional market, at least in the eastern
Mediterranean area.

Economic disintegration followed, however, in the
1930's. The Arab countries under the occupation of the man-
datory powers, France and Britain, followed most of the
Western states in the adoption of a high tariff policy.
Under the competitive international tariff system that
evolved during the 1930's no attempts were made to maintain
the regional economic ties which had prevailed in the Arab
World. No new preferential treatment was devised to serve
the Arab countries or help bind them together. The only free
trade relations in the Arab World during the 1930's were
between Egypt and the Sudan (under the Anglo-Egyptian condo-
minium), between Lebanon and Syria (under the French mandate),
and between Transjordan and Palestine (under the British
mandate).

During World War II some Arabs got a glimpse of the
workings of a regional economy through observing the opera-
tion of the British-directed Middle East Supply Center, which
was mainly designed to maintain the Allies' war effort in the
area. This war-induced respite from commercial competition
did not last, however, and when the war was over the economic
disintegration of the Arab lands continued. In the early
post-war period, with the exception of the founding of the

Arab League, there was a virtual absence of either bilateral
or multilateral agreements among the Arab states. A signifi-
cant exception was the operation of a customs union between
Syria and Lebanon during the early years of their independence,
but even this was terminated in 1951.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's a system of
protective tariffs and import licenses characterized the
regional trading scene. The Arab countries during this
period were completely tied to the economies of the former
mandatory powers. A series of devaluations of British and
French currency tended to reduce the trade among the Arab
states. By 1951, nearly all of the Arab countries were func-
tioning as separate political and economic entities vis-à-vis
each other. The only preferential trade ties that survived
were between Egypt and the Sudan, and these were terminated
in 1957 after the Sudan's independence.

Recent inter-Arab trade--
competition and complementarity

The fact that the Arab states have predominantly
competitive rather than complementary economies has led a
number of scholars to argue that successful political integra-
tion is not possible among the Arab states. This line of
argument is based on the assumption that political unifica-
tion can not succeed without economic integration, and that
economic integration is not possible without complementary
economies. If we examine the above assumption critically,

however, we find at least some evidence that political unifi-
cation is possible without complementary economies in under-
developed areas, although perhaps not in highly industrial
areas.

Underdeveloped countries are generally characterized
by self-sufficient subsistence economies and a pattern of raw
material exports supported by capital investment of outside
interests. The countries commonly compete with each other in
the world market with their surpluses of agricultural, forest,
and mineral products. The existence of competitive economies,
however, is not necessarily a divisive factor. The Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, an association of
unlike cultural and political systems bound by the common
desire to export oil at maximum prices, is sufficient proof
that underdeveloped states can unite in safeguarding their
joint interests.[1] Even the European Common Market, compris-
ing a group of highly industrial countries, was formed to
help avoid unnecessary competition among the member countries
and not primarily as a result of complementary economies.

It is true, of course, that greater economic interde-
pendence among the Arab countries would be a very favorable
factor for the success of the idea of one Arab state. The
present extent of trade among the Arab states is certainly

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[1]OPEC was formed in 1960 with a charter membership of
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
Its membership has subsequently been expanded to include Abu
Dhabi, Indonesia, Libya, and Qatar.

less than what could be called functional integration

(Table 6 and Figure 29). In 1969, only Jordan, Lebanon,

Syria, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen had

trade with other Arab countries amounting to more than 20 per

cent of each one's total foreign trade. In all of the other

Arab countries, inter-Arab trade in 1969 amounted to less

than 10 per cent of their respective totals. Algeria,

Morocco, and Tunisia had less than 6 per cent of their trade

with other Arab countries. Even Egypt and Libya, two of the

three members of the recently formed Federation of Arab

Republics, had trade with other Arab countries amounting to

less than 7 per cent of their individual total trade. As

shown by the statistics compiled for the period since 1962,

trade among all of the Arab countries has remained relatively

small (Table 6). Particularly disappointing to the support-

ers of the Arab unity idea is the fact that during the past

decade there has been no consistent pattern of increasing

trade among Arab countries. Saudi Arabia's trade with the

rest of the Arab World has consistently decreased. In con-

trast, the six members of the European Common Market in 1966

had from 31 to 56 per cent of their individual trade with

other members of the bloc.[1]

The small amount of existing trade among the Arab

states, and the absence of increasing inter-Arab trade is

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[1]"Common Market Statistics," Common Market, VI
(February, 1966), p. 44.

TABLE 6

INTER-ARAB TRADE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TRADE
OF CERTAIN ARAB STATES, 1962--1969[a]

Country	Year							
	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Algeria	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2
Iraq	3	4	4	4	4	4	6	7
Jordan	22	27	23	25	28	26	27	29
Kuwait	13	10	11	10	10	10	12	11
Lebanon	23	25	24	23	22	28	29	26
Libya	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Morocco	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3
Saudi Arabia	17	17	16	11	11	10	10	9
Sudan	8	5	7	7	7	7	6	7
Syria	18	21	24	24	29	22	24	20
Tunisia	2	3	6	5	4	3	5	5
U.A.R.	6	7	7	6	7	7	7	6
Yemen (P.D.R.)	26	23	22	14	14	25	20	26

[a]Compiled from: Yearbook of International Trade
Statistics, 1966 and 1969 (New York: United Nations, 1968,
1971). Comparable trade figures for the Republic of Yemen,
the Sultanate of Oman, and the Persian Gulf States seem not
to be available.

Fig. 29

INTER-ARAB TRADE
(as a percentage of total trade of the Arab countries)

Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1966, and 1969.

largely due to the lack of regional economic specialization.
Tables 7 and 8 show that the principal imports and exports of
the Arab countries tend to be similar rather than complemen-
tary. Most of the Arab countries primarily export oil or
agricultural products, items destined for industrial countries
because of the lack of effective demand in the Arab World.
At the same time, the industrial goods needed by the Arab
states have to come largely from outside the region, because
the Arab countries, with the partial exception of Egypt, have
not reached the stage of being able to produce them. However,
with an increasing level of industrialization, the regional
economic specialization among the Arab countries could be
greatly increased.

Besides the small amount of trade between the Arab
countries and the lack of a noticeable trend for this trade
to increase, there is still, from the point of view of the
Pan-Arab movement, an undesirable residue from the colonial
period. That is, many of the Arab countries are still to a
substantial extent tied by trade to the former imperial
powers. In 1969, France continued to absorb more than 50 per
cent of Algeria's total export trade, more than 40 per cent
of Morocco's, and approximately 30 per cent of that of Tuni-
sia. Similarly, Italy was still the single biggest trading
partner of Libya, accounting for more than 30 per cent of
that country's total trade in 1969.

TABLE 7

PRINCIPAL COMMODITY IMPORTS OF ARAB COUNTRIES 1969[a]

Commodities	Algeria	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Sau. Ar.	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	Yemen (PDR)
Cereals		5			7		9				10	2	
Animals and vegetable oils		9										6	
Tea				4				5		7			
Paper products	8	8						7					
Mineral products		5					8						
Chemicals and chemical products	3	2		10			5		5				1
Wood, hide, and rubber													
Machinery	7	1				2	1			1			
Transport equipment	6	4		3	1	9			2			5	
Iron and steel	4	6								4		4	
Pharmaceutical products				5						8	7		
Boilers and engines				1									
Automobiles and parts				2									
Timber				6					5				
Metallic minerals					1								
Non-electric machines	1				5							1	
Textiles	5				4	3		10	6		2	4	
Grains and legumes					6								
Food manufactures					7								
Clothing					7	8							
Spices					11								
Electric machines					9						3		
Food and animals						4	4						
Beverages and tobacco						6	10	8			9		
Crude materials, inedible except fuel						5	7						
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related material						8							1
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material						2							3
Miscellaneous manufactured articles						3							
Precious metals, stones, jewellery and coins						1							
Vegetable products						4						8	8
Non-precious metals and products						5							
Animals and animal products					2	7	6						
Industrial chemical products						6							
Mineral products													
Machinery and electrical apparatus											2		
Manufactures							2						
Coffee								8					
Wheat								9					
Petroleum								4		3			
Foodstuff	2								1				
Building material									3				
Wheat flour										10			
Sacks and jute										6			
Fertilizers										11			
Sugar				3					2	5		7	
Tires										9			
Base metals and manufactures											3		
Vehicles								1			6		
Mineral fuel								6			5		
Miscellaneous								3		4	1		

[a]Numbers indicate the ranking by value of the import category shown in the commodity column. For instance, machinery is the leading import of Egypt, and cereals are the second most valuable item imported by Tunisia.

Source: The Europa Year Book 1972: A World Survey, Vol. II: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australasia (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972), and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1969 (New York: United Nations, 1971).

TABLE 8

PRINCIPAL COMMODITY EXPORTS OF ARAB COUNTRIES 1969[a]

Commodities	Algeria	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Sau. Ar.	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	Yemen
Food and live animals									6	5		3	
Cotton, ginned										1			
Cotton, raw		1	6								1		
Cotton, yarn		5											
Cotton seed oil									9				
Cereals											7		
Rice		2											
Cotton piece goods		4											
Onions		5											
Edible fruits	4	9									5		
Dura										10			
Barley				5									
Cotton seed										8			
Dates				9									
Straw and fodder				7									
Raw wool				4									
Hides and skins			3	9			2		7				
Animals and vegetable oils and fats											3	5	
Tomatoes						2		3					
Lentils						4							
Vegetables and fruits						3	1				5		
Sesame										3			
Animals and animal products						8				8			
Textile and products						5					4		4
Beverages and tobacco						4					7		
Groundnuts							3	4					
Castor oil seed							4						
Wool and other animal hair							5						
Fertilizers												4	
Fresh vegetables								5					
Preserved foods, beverages, and tobacco											6		
Citrus fruits								2					
Preserved fish								4					
Wine	2							7					
Preparation of fruits and vegetables	8												
Natural gas	3												
Petroleum products	7												1
Metallic ores and slags	5												
Iron ores	6							8				6	
Mineral fuels, lubricants, related materials													2
Petroleum, crude	1	8	1		1		1		1				
Precious metals										9			
Manganese and phosphate				10									
Benzine, kerosene, and mazout				7									
Cement				6	2								
Phosphate				1				1					
Cigarettes				5									
Electric accumulators				8	8								
Precious metals, stones, and jewellery and coins						7							
Machinery and electrical apparatus						2							
Non-precious metals and products						5							
Transport vehicles						6							
Manganese ores								9					
Lead ores								6				8	
Cork and cork products								10					
Refractory materials												3	
Olives						6							
Bananas						7							
Oil seed cake										5			
Watermelons						10							
Gum arabic										2			
Others													1

[a]Numbers indicate the ranking by value of the export category shown in the commodity column.

Source: The Europa Year Book 1972: A World Survey, Vol. II: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australasia (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972), and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1969 (New York: United Nations, 1971).

Although there is no definite trend toward increasing
trade among the Arab countries, substantial changes are tak-
ing place in their trading patterns. Trade with the U.S.S.R.
is increasing steadily, while trade with the Western world,
including the United States, is decreasing at almost the same
rate. In the case of Egypt and Syria, the U.S.S.R. has
largely displaced the United States and the United Kingdom.
It has recently become the biggest trading partner of these
recently merged Arab states, accounting in 1969 for 25 per
cent and 14 per cent respectively of their total foreign
trade.[1] The foreign trade of Iraq shows a similar trend
away from the West. The North Rumalia petroleum concession
area was nationalized by the Iraqi government in 1961.
Recently developed by the U.S.S.R., it went into production
in April, 1972. The first cargo of oil from this field,
amounting to 157,000 barrels, was hauled to market by Russian
tanker. A fifteen-year friendship treaty between Iraq and
the U.S.S.R. was signed in May, 1972. Later in the same
month, the Iraqi government nationalized the Iraq Petroleum
Company owned by the Western oil companies. Other Arab
countries showed only minor changes in their trade pattern
between 1962 and 1969, except for Saudi Arabia's increasing
trade with Japan.

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[1] Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969.

Although the inter-Arab trade is small in general,
and has not shown an increasing trend, one can identify two
major groups of Arab countries within which there is a signif-
icant amount of intra-group trade (Table 9). These trading
groups seem to have developed as a response to proximity.
The first group consists of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The second cluster includes
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Other Arab countries which do
not fit in the above groups, such as the Sudan and Libya, have
significant trade with only a few Arab countries. The Sudan,
however, has a fairly important trade with Egypt and Saudi
Arabia. Libya trades mainly with Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia.
Only Egypt of all the Arab countries, has some trade with each
of the other Arab states. Table 9 clearly shows that the
existing economic interdependence among Arab countries is
slight. Since the volume of trade between countries is an
important indicator of the degree of economic interdependence,
as well as an indicator of potential economic integration,
real economic integration of all the Arab countries seems
highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. There is progress
toward integration, however, within the two trading groups
just mentioned. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria fall
within the same trading group, and they are also the countries
of the high potential political action area and the present
political action area. By way of Egypt, Libya and the Sudan
maintain a considerable trade with this group. Hence,

TABLE 9

TOTAL VALUE OF TRADE BETWEEN ARAB COUNTRIES--1969
(Figures in Millions of U.S. Dollars)[a]

	Algeria	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Sau. Ar.	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	Yemen
Algeria													
Egypt	9.5												
Iraq	..	17.5											
Jordan	..	4.5	5.5										
Kuwait	..	5.0	12.5	6.5									
Lebanon	1.0	12.0	34.0	17.0	21.0								
Libya	1.5	3.0	..	..	..	8.5							
Morocco	25.5	0.2	0.1	0.3	..	..	1.0						
Sau. Ar.	..	5.5	1.7	15.0	11.0	61.5	..	0.0					
Sudan	..	19.5	0.6	0.6	..	2.5	..	..	7.5				
Syria	..	11.0	29.5	15.5	7.5	46.5	0.7	..	11.0	0.4			
Tunisia	6.5	0.5	..	..	0.0	0.4	13.0	1.8	0.0	..	..		
Yemen (PDR)	1.5	3.5	2.0	0.0	15.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.2	0.2	..	

[a]Calculated from: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969 (New York: United Nations, 1971).

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expansion of the present Federation of Arab Republics within
the high potential political action area seems quite possible.
There is also a move on the part of Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia, the Maghreb countries, towards creating some kind of
economic community.

Different economic systems

The existence of different economic systems among the
Arab countries is one of the primary obstacles to their eco-
nomic and/or political integration. Egypt, Iraq, Algeria,
Syria, and Libya have socialist economies involving owner-
ship, control, or regulation by the state of various sectors
of the economy. Egypt has been in the process of converting
its former capitalist economy to a socialist economy since
the second half of the 1950's. Today virtually all aspects
of its economy, including manufacturing industries, public
transportation, foreign trade, banks, insurance companies,
and even agriculture, are owned and operated, or are very
closely controlled, by the government. The central adminis-
tration has also taken over most of the wholesale and retail
trade through government-controlled co-operatives and
government-owned department stores. Pricing of both domestic
products and export products is controlled by the government.
In Algeria, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, similar socialistic meas-
ures are being undertaken by the regimes in power.

In contrast to the predominantly socialist economies

of several of the Arab countries are the economies of the

remaining Arab states, ranging from the laissez-faire economy

of Lebanon to private enterprise economies with varying

amounts of state participation. Recognizing the variety of

economies existing among the Arab states, Alfred G. Musrey

analyzes the difficulty of economic integration in this way:

> Since planned trade through state agencies acting within the framework of an over-all economic plan has replaced, or is gradually replacing, tariffs and speci- fied quantitative restrictions as the regulator of access to and of export from the socialist countries, reductions in or the removal of such artificial restrictions by these countries have and could have a very limited effect on facilitating access to their markets. Moreover, restrictions on the use of foreign capital in these coun- tries and governmental ownership and control at the pro- duction, wholesale, and retail levels have constituted and could constitute further inhibitions, as could the price structures gradually evolving within these coun- tries that reflect to a large extent fixed prices.
>   On the other hand, unlimited access to and egress from the markets of the socialist countries, as advocated by the private enterprise countries, would be incompat- ible with the economic planning involved in pursuing a policy of socialism. For the socialist countries to per- mit private companies to establish agencies in the social- ist countries and freely import and sell their products would be tantamount to discarding over-all economic planning.[1]

Different levels of
economic development

Unequal industrial development among the Arab

countries has created fears among government and business

leaders in the less-developed Arab states that integration,

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[1]Musrey, An Arab Common Market, p. 119.

economic and/or political, would bring a further concentra-
tion of the major industries in the more-advanced Arab
states. Because of these fears, justified or unjustified,
even if integration would offer a larger market for their
products, the less industrialized Arab countries have not
been willing to abolish custom duties or offer tariff
reciprocity.

Tariffs as the main source
of government revenue

The unwillingness of most Arab governments to abolish
tariffs in order to promote greater trade among themselves
arises in part from fear of dominance by more-advanced Arab
countries, but it is mainly due to a heavy dependence on
tariffs as a source of government revenue. The fear of domi-
nance by stronger trading partners is particularly evident
in the case of the oil-poor Arab countries. During the 1960's
excise taxes and customs duties were responsible for about
40 to 60 per cent of the revenue available for the ordinary
budgets of most Arab countries. Direct taxes provided only
about 10 to 12 per cent. Customs duties in many cases were
the most important single source of revenue, accounting for
approximately 20 to 40 per cent of the total revenue avail-
able for ordinary budget expenditures. Because of this heavy
reliance on the revenues from tariffs, and the reluctance to
impose stiff property or personal and corporate income taxes,

Arab governments have been very hesitant about negotiation of substantial tariff reductions, even among themselves.

The shortage of convertible currencies--an obstacle to economic integration

Apart from their heavy dependence on revenue from tariffs, most Arab countries, excluding such oil-rich ones as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya, have limited access to convertible currencies. According to Musrey, the shortage of convertible currencies impedes economic integration in the following way:

> In order to increase their supplies of such currencies, most of these countries have applied prescription of currency requirements to their most important exports, as well as to products in short supply domestically, necessitating payment in a convertible currency. Conversely, in order to conserve and allocate these foreign exchange earnings, most of these countries have applied rather comprehensive systems of quantitative controls to imports and other current transactions, as well as to capital movements. For balance-of-payments purposes, many articles have been prohibited from importation or have been subject to restrictive quotas or licensing. Due in part to these import and export controls, the Arab countries have found it exceedingly difficult to increase their trade with each other.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 122.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The idea of one Arab nation-state began to emerge as
a political force during the early twentieth century in the
Fertile Crescent in the course of the struggle for independ-
ence from Ottoman rule. Later, after the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire following World War I, the idea took deeper
roots among Arabs during the struggle for independence from
the European colonial powers.

Much to the disappointment of Arab nationalists, when
the Ottoman Empire dissolved in the 1920's the dream of one
Arab nation-state was not realized. Instead, the colonial
powers succeeded in dividing the Arab domain of the Ottoman
Empire into several political units, hence obstructing ful-
fillment of the unity idea. Administration of the North
African Arab regions had been taken over somewhat earlier by
the European powers, Morocco by France and Spain, Algeria and
Tunisia by France, Libya by Italy, and Egypt and the Sudan by
the United Kingdom. The presence of several colonial masters
and a number of colonized political units prevented the inde-
pendence struggle from emerging into a united and co-ordinated
movement among all Arabs. Each political unit struggled on

its own to achieve independence with little or no coordina-
tion of action among Arabs of different colonial affiliations.
Only in the mid-1950's did the already independent Arab
states, particularly Egypt, through the Arab League and on
their own, start assisting those countries still under colo-
nial rule in their struggle for independence.

In the 1920's the political disintegration of the
Arab movement was almost complete. This political disinte-
gration of the early post-war period was followed by the
economic disintegration of the 1930's. Increasingly, the
economies of the colonized Arab territories became tied to
those of their masters. Inter-Arab trade declined, making
increasingly difficult the restoration of the closer economic
relationship which had existed in the past.

The political and economic disintegration of the
1920's and 1930's under colonial rule was not the only obsta-
cle to the Arab unity idea. Other hindrances to the idea
included the contrast in political outlook between the colo-
nial Arab regions and the independent Arab states, the dynas-
tic rivalries between the Hashemites and the Saudis in Arabia
and the Fertile Crescent, the lack of a powerful core area to
disseminate the idea among Arabs due to the fact that Egypt
still was not considered Arab, controversies about what
should constitute the Arab nation and where its frontiers
lay, and the persistent contradiction between universalistic
Islam and particularistic Arab nationalism.

The idea did not die, however. Instead, it gained added vitality and became a viable political force during the 1940's. During this decade all of the Fertile Crescent countries except Iraq, whose official sovereignty dates from 1932, gained their independence, and the League of Arab States was organized. The controversy about the definition of the Arab nation and its frontiers was on its way to resolution. Comprehensive Arab unity became a clear-cut goal of the Pan-Arabists, irrespective of the country to which they belonged or the political party with which they were affiliated. However, all the developments that took place in the Middle East in the 1940's were not favorable to the unity idea. The state of Israel was created in 1948, and its creation gave birth to one of the most difficult and explosive international problems of this century. Dynastic rivalries continued among the independent Arab states. These states and the colonial Arab territories continued to diverge in their economic and political outlook.

In the 1950's Libya, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia achieved independence. Immediately after independence, however, the new local rulers, with their vested royal interests, often seemed little concerned about anything beyond enjoying their thrones and the accompanying privileges and perquisites. A certain amount of lip service was paid to the idea of one Arab nation-state, but there was little tangible action to back it up. Egypt and Iraq overthrew their monarchs and

joined Syria and Lebanon in becoming republican states.
Egypt by the late 1950's had accepted itself as an integral
part of a greater Arab nation. This acceptance made a power-
ful core, the Lower Nile Valley centered on Cairo, available
for propagandizing and cultivating the idea among other
Arabs. Communication media like the Voice of the Arabs and
the Cairo newspaper, Al-Ahram, vigorously promoted the Pan-
Arab idea. The idea was given an added potency throughout
the Arab World by the charismatic leadership of Nasser.
Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958 and,
although the U.A.R. broke down in 1961, the unity idea
remained a viable force.

The decade of the 1950's saw some decline in the
dynastic rivalries, and by the 1960's these had virtually
disappeared. Attempts were being made, mostly under the
impetus of the Arab League, to restore some of the past
inter-Arab trade and to encourage a free trade relationship.
Awareness of the need for Arab unity and regional economic
development was on the increase. The economic disruption of
the last several decades, however, was still much in evidence.
The division between the republican, socialist, and pro-
communist Arab states on the one hand, and the monarchial,
conservative, pro-Western Arab states sharpened. Political
instability was characteristic of many of the Arab governments,
and a lack of organizational experience on either the national
or international level plagued them all. The idea of the

Maghreb as a separate entity started to develop, and was par-
ticularly apparent at the 1958 Tangier Conference.

During the 1960's Yemen became a republican state, as
did Algeria and South Yemen when they rid themselves of impe-
rial authority. The Arab Common Market was established in
1964 and, although its development has been slow, the legal
structure is in place. The humiliating defeat of Arabs in
the June war of 1967, and the loss of much Soviet-supplied
military equipment, brought even the conservative oil-rich
Arab countries to assist in the rescue of the devastated
economies of the Arab states most affected. The Palestine
liberation movement, supported by various guerrilla groups,
became an active political cause which commanded widespread
support among many of the Arab countries. Most significant
of all, probably, was the growing power of oil. Oil became
perhaps the most important element in Arab life, for the
revenues from it provided a means of bringing social, eco-
nomic, and political change to the whole Arab World. The
geological accident of its presence put into the Arabs' hands
a political-economic weapon to use against anybody who would
oppose their causes. Recognition of the power of joint action
in their policy on oil concessions, oil pricing, transporta-
tion and refining facilities, and oil marketing is a powerful
cohesive force among Arab countries now, and it may be an
even more powerful force in the near future.

Although political differences among some of the Arab states continued through the 1960's, there was favorable movement toward the unity idea. The republican and socialist states of Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and the Sudan moved closer in their formulation of both internal and external policies, raising the possibility of some kind of federation among them.

The early 1970's finally saw the achievement of independence from colonial rule for all the Arab states. The Federation of Arab Republics, linking Egypt, Libya, and Syria was established in 1971, raising the possibility that this federation might emerge as the nucleus for a single Arab nation-state. A Union of Arab Emirates, still a rather loose-knit confederation, was formed by several of the former British protectorates on the Persian Gulf, although Bahrain and Qatar chose to remain on their own as sovereign states with separate UN membership.

The idea of one Arab state is applicable to the whole Arab World in the sense that the people are aware of their common belonging to an Arab community, and they all express the desire and the need for Arab unity. On closer examination, however, only in the territories of Egypt, Libya, and Syria has the idea of one Arab state become an accomplished fact. Thus, the territories of the new Federation of Arab Republics can be termed the "field" of the one Arab state idea in the terminology of Stephen B. Jones and the "political

action area" in terms of the Cohen and Rosenthal analysis.
According to Deutsch's definition of political integration as
an "Amalgamated Security Community," the territories of Egypt,
Libya, and Syria have not become completely that, but they
are moving towards it. With regard to the Arab community as
a whole, there is still no all-Arab "Pluralistic Security
Community." Syria, in June, 1971, attacked Jordan, but
backed away after a strong warning from the United States.
Yemen and South Yemen fought a brief but bloody war in Octo-
ber, 1972. Until recently, the Sudan and Iraq were beset
with civil strife. Nevertheless, it can be said that the
Arab community as a whole is moving towards Deutsch's Plural-
istic Security Community through the functional-organizational
structures of the Arab League.

Since Egypt accepted itself as an integral part of
the larger Arab nation in the 1950's, the core area of the
Lower Nile Valley, focused in Cairo, has provided cultural,
political, and social leadership for the Arab World. Through
the efforts of this core, the cultivation of the Pan-Arab
idea among the Arab masses has finally become effective. The
youthfulness of the independent Arab states and their still
rather limited local iconography make it possible for the
Pan-Arab idea to become a political reality in a wide region.
Many Arab students in the United States known to the writer
are planning to return to the Arab World to seek employment
but not necessarily to the specific lands of their birth.

Through various social, cultural, economic, and
political organizations already established by the Arab
states, including the Federation of Arab Republics, the move-
ment of goods and people, in the judgment of the writer, will
continue to increase throughout their extent, bringing a
greater degree of functional integration to them. In the
process, the idea of one Arab state will gain added vitality.
The unity idea continues to gain ground among the Arab masses,
based in part on their common hatred of Israel and the con-
tinuing plight of the Palestinian refugees. Oil is increas-
ingly providing a common interest for all the Arab states,
conservative and socialist alike, in their attempt to gain
control of their own resources and in their fight for the
maximization of the oil revenue. If internal political sta-
bility can be achieved by the three republican states
involved, the present Arab federation could rapidly develop
into a strong cohesive unit. Iraq and the Sudan will then be
likely candidates for joining the Federation. Even the con-
servative monarchial states will have to reckon with the
unity idea, imposing fewer hindrances to it, if not actually
assisting in its progress.

Some conclusions that can be drawn from this study of
the idea of one Arab nation-state are the following:

1. It is clear that any reference to the success or
failure of the one Arab nation-state idea must take into
account its entire political area rather than the political

action area alone. There is little or no prospect for a
single Arab nation-state reaching from the Persian Gulf to
the Atlantic Ocean in the near future.

The political area of the one Arab state idea can be
visualized in schematic fashion as shown in Figure 30. The
Federation of Arab Republics, consisting of Egypt, Libya, and
Syria constitute the political action area of a still evolv-
ing single Arab state. Although the Federation has only
three Arab units at present, its future prospect for func-
tioning as a nucleus of a still larger Arab federation cannot
be minimized. To some extent the Sudan, and Iraq in particu-
lar, within the high potential political action area, having
granted autonomy to their troubled minority peoples, and thus
having established some internal stability, may well be on
their way to joining the new Federation. Two other Arab
countries of the high potential political action area, Jordan
and Lebanon, will remain outside the Federation until their
economic and political systems become compatible with those
of the socialist Arab republics of the Federation. The
chances for a further merger with the countries of the low
potential action area remain negligible as long as the social,
economic, and political systems of Saudi Arabia and the smaller
Persian Gulf principalities maintain their present contrasts
and tensions. The lowest potential political action area,
consisting of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, may never join
the Federation. There is a possibility that Chad and, in

Fig.30

Political Area
of the
One Arab State Idea

Political Area of the One Arab State Idea

particular, Mauritania, both with a high percentage of Arabic-speaking people, may some day join the Arab League and become part of the Arab World.

2. There is an evident trend toward regional federations within the political area of the Pan-Arab idea. The Maghreb countries, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, which regard themselves as separate entities, are moving towards their own regional federation, although at an exceedingly slow pace. The recent formation of the Union of Arab Emirates and consideration of a united Yemen, to include both the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Republic of Yemen, are other examples of the trend toward regional federations within the political area of the idea.

3. The Arab-Israeli conflict should also be viewed as an attempt on the part of Arabs to achieve their cherished dream of one Arab state without interruption of its political area. This drive for territorial contiguity and integrity helps to understand why, among other reasons, Arabs oppose the existence of Israel so tenaciously.

4. Lastly, it can be concluded that even with various regional federations within its political area, and with many strong disruptive forces still at work, the idea of one Arab nation-state is a viable force. This force will continue to shape political and economic events among the Arab states, and thereby to influence the political geography of the Arab World.

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