

MAKE A RURAL PEN: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL,
PHILOSOPHICAL, AND PRAXITICAL
EXPLICATION AND SYNTHESIS
OF THE FIVE LEVELS
OF CREATIVITY

By

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FOREGROUND

My point is that there are deeps in man, and in the attempt to plumb him, depths which tax the most disciplined of minds, as also, which is much more, the most enlightened souls. I am with those who wish for a larger cup to grasp the ocean. But . . . we do not enlarge the cup by a snap of the finger nor by a "fanciful, flowery and heated imagination;" only . . . "by careful and ponderous and solemn thoughts /and feelings, and flashes of intuition/." "By contrarieties . . . truth is made manifest."

--Truman G. Madsen

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NOMENCLATURE

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Abaddons: the place of lost souls; hell; the bottomless pit	294
abiogenesis: production of life from lifeless matter	293
à cheval: straddling	4
declivitously: fairly steep downward sloping	6
dimissory: giving permission to	99
exegesis: interpretation	61
facile princeps: easily the foremost	106
Fafnir: dragon (and enemy to Sigurd)	106
fainéants: lazy, idle persons	106
famuli: apprentice to a sorcerer or scholar	106
farrago: medley, mixture	106
fasciated: bound together	106
fasciculates: grows in bundles or clusters	106
laches: inexcusable delay in forwarding a claim	5
obliquy: abuse, vituperation	141
parcenary: partnership in inheritance	17
parturifacient: inducing or easing labor in giving birth	167
parturition: giving birth	167
primus: first basis	55
stenosis: a narrowing	138

Term	Page
Sigurd: slayer of Fafnir	106
solipsistic: looking inwardly only	6
sustenuto: sustaining	61
syndesmotically: bound together	103
syndetic: connected by conjunctions	102
tabescence: a drying up and withering away	160
talion: punishment that reproduces the crime (an eye for an eye)	4
zygosis: conjugation; joining together	2

CHAPTER I

THE FIRST LEVEL OF CREATIVITY

IMITATION

At length the Vision closes; and the mind,
Not undisturbed by the delight it feels,
Which slowly settles into peaceful calm,
Is left to muse upon the solemn scene.

--William Wordsworth

Introduction

Imitation is the attempt to realistically reproduce some object or some chronology.

Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. The truth of this second point is shown by experience: though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art, the forms for example

of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning¹

This learning aspect, on the part of the spectator (or reader) is important. As we shall later see, creativity in general and imitation in particular, can be the joining together, the zygo-sis, of more than one object or process. However, creativity more likely, more often, is the selection of one or more aspects from a whole context. Instead of joining, it is separating. In other words, the most realistic film ever made is a fantastical concentration and condensation of all that did occur or might have occurred in real life. By highlighting a selected single aspect of reality (or a zygo-sis of single aspects), the artist enables us to better comprehend. Thus, most importantly, the artist is always a teacher

¹Aristotle, The Rhetoric and The Poetics of Aristotle, with an Introduction and Notes by Friedrich Solmsen (New York: The Modern Library, 1954), pp. 226-7.

of "truths" (just as a teacher of truths is always an artist), never a purveyor of lies, such as can often be found.²

Therefore, imitation is a realistic, though highly selective, reproduction of something from life; and it is meant to "teach" one's fellow man.

Imitative Reality Versus Natural Reality

Imitation is not the rendering by the artist of reality itself, but rather a rendering of a simplification of reality. Thus, it is a new reality and a new kind of reality, no matter how closely it resembles the original reality. It is ontology axiolized by man. It is the liberation of reality by freeing it from its natural context with all of the contextual botanical, biological, accoustical, and visual fetters and frivolous accoutrements.

²In a lecture for one of this author's university classes, one such "poet" boasted confidently that to be a poet was great because being a poet meant that he could tell all kinds of gross lies and have people believe them; he then illustrated some of his lies contained in his own "poems." A systematic liar--as opposed to a teacher of

There can be doubts concerning the proper interpretation of an ontology when it is buried half or fully in its context and when we stand apart from it, in a different context, trying to decipher components--à cheval the gulf between. A particular ontology (or an aspect of it) buried in its immediate context is specific. Imitation dislodges a particular aspect or component from its particular aspect of context, and thus emancipates it from its particular and specific and idiosyncratic situation. By thus dislodging it from its particularity and specificity and idiosyncrasy, imitation frees and emancipates it so that it can belong to all, democratically. Thus, this dislodging of the particular from the specific, generalizes the particular into the universal.

Ontology, at least in its outward manifestations, is in a state of perpetual mutation because of its roots within a changing context. Imitation, by dislodging an aspect of ontology

truth--is not fit to reputationally live. Reputational death is a fit talion for those who murder accuracy and truth.

from its changing and evolving context, saves it from further mutation and thus gives it eternal and unchanging form; i.e., eternal life.

Tentativeness of our perceptions concerning a contextual aspect of mutational ontology and laches of conceptions are replaced by conviction of vision regarding eternal and unchanging form. Frustrated passion and raging, uncertain, baffled reason give way to calm and delightful musing. Obstinate resistance to flux, with its furious determination of realizing a system of security at a stroke, gives way to pregnant acceptance. Sufferings of incessant counteraction, inflamed by supposed natural or deistical treachery and artifice, wrought up to a desperate state of imaginings, are replaced by public happiness as an effectual ally of the individual. Individual motives to censure and complain are replaced by an altruistic concern for the true interest of mankind in terms of the emancipated aspect of ontology. Whatever of the flux of life has been secured into eternal form and life by the artist, we undertake to entail to both the latest and final posterity, reversing our genuine propensi-

ties for good from declivitously solipsistic revolutions to inclivitously altruistic radiation, and teaching us to look outward rather than inward.

Imitation arrests the human nature from degeneracy and advances it and teaches it to advance. It stabilizes the world and gives us intimations of that life which is perfection and completion.

The Synchronization of Inner and Outer Ontologies

The first level of creativity, whether of freshman composition, poetry, fiction, playwriting, engineering, studio art, chemistry, or media is imitation (or realism). In all of creativity, we can demarcate two separate, yet joined and all-inclusive areas of consideration: outer and inner ontologies--self and context. Although these are separate and dichotomized, they are yet co-joined in a true sense: one is not possible without the other; in fact, "self is the beginning of context . . . ;"³ "it is in the encounter of these two that creativity takes place: Creativity occurs

³Sasser, "Connotations," 1. 13.

in an act of encounter, and is to be understood with this encounter as its center."⁴ And "truth is merely the conformity of intellection with its object."⁵ That is, the perception of the outer (i.e., its therefore perceptual and perceptual existence) is only possible when there is an inner able to perceive it. Kant's four categorical imperatives explain this to us:

How . . . can there be in the mind an external perception, which is antecedent to objects themselves, and in which the conception of those objects may be determined a priori? Manifestly, only if that perception has its seat in the subject, that is, if it belongs to the formal constitution of the subject, in virtue of which it is so affected by objects as to have a direct consciousness or perception of them; therefore, only if perception is the unused form of outer sense.⁶

⁴Rollo May, "Creativity and Encounter," The Creative Imagination: Psychoanalysis . . ., p. 284.

⁵Etienne Gilson, "Creation--Artistic, Natural, and Divine," Creativity in the Arts, ed. by Vincent Tomas (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 57.

⁶John Watson (trans. and ed.), The Philosophy of Kant: As Contained in Extracts from his own Writings (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, Publishers to the University, 1908), pp. 26-7.

In other words,

We have experience when we hold together before the mind different sensible qualities as qualities of one object. This could not happen unless these qualities were given to sense. But equally it could not happen unless these qualities, given to different senses at different times, were held together before the mind in accordance with certain principles which cannot be given to sense at all and so are a priori.⁷

The outer ontology can consist of nature evolving, it is true, over millenia but unchanging and unchangeable at least in terms of human temporal perceptual spans--i.e., that is, the human life is not long enough to witness the evolution of species or the onset, duration, and result of an ice age.⁸ Other outer ontological aspects, these capable of human notation of their changing and changeability, are such things as other human natures, society, and psychologies.

⁷H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 22.

⁸Of course, a nuclear holocaust or destruction of the ozone layer by commercially manufactured sprays is capable of compressing change in nature so that it could be encompassed within the span of a human life.

We can characterize these aspects as the historical, or "soft" technologies.⁹

The Inner Nature

However, the "inner" nature, while capable of being considered a science if looking at the psychological aspect of it, yet has at least two other dimensions to it, which have so far eluded the scientific bounds of investigation: these two dimensions are the spirit (or soul), possessed by all, and the genius faculty, possessed by some. Here, the distinction is being made between creativity and genius.

Creativity and Genius

Bruner points out, and correctly so, that there is a difference between creativity and gen-

⁹"Technology" is being used here in its original sense: a systematic treatment. Physical nature of science can be considered in terms of applied science; society also can be considered by applying science to it, if we consider science as "fact" opposed to intuition or belief, and as a systematized corpus or process of knowledge based upon observation, study, hypothetical experimentation; "inner" nature (in this case, psychology) also can be considered in terms of applied science.

ius.¹⁰ Genius is some form of creativity, but a form of creativity raised to a much higher degree. Genius is creativity as creation. Creativity itself "is a process extended in time and characterized by originality, adaptiveness, and realization."¹¹ Creativity is effective surprise:¹² that is, suddenly we are surprised ontologically by an ideational and/or emotional reorganization of phenomena, which effects within us a new metaphoric effective perception; it is a predictive effectiveness: $A + B = AB$ or (C) .¹³ Any "creative act is an act of re-creation."¹⁴ "The necessary reconstruction [of one's conceptual world] is the beginning of a creative process"¹⁵ As we have pointed out several times before, everyone has (or at least had) this faculty of cre-

¹⁰On Knowing . . . , p. 29.

¹¹Mackinnon, p. 160.

¹²Bruner, On Knowing . . . , p. 18.

¹³Ibid., pp. 19-20.

¹⁴Jacob Bronowski, "The Creative Process," Creativity: A Discussion . . . , p. 13.

¹⁵Eyring, p. 1.

ativity, no matter how embryonic, stunted, or repressed: creativity "is the birthright of every person of average talent."¹⁶ It is therefore democratic.

Genius, on the other hand, "is a class formed of a single individual."¹⁷ Genius is the sudden astonishment of metaphysically and epistemologically ideational and emotional reorganization and the resultant new discovery and creation of existing noumena, which affects us with a new conception. Whereas "creativity is that ability to see (or to be aware) and to respond"¹⁸ and the disposition to make and to recognize valuable innovations,"¹⁹ the creative process of genius is

¹⁶Ernest R. Hilgard, "Creativity and Problem Solving," Creativity and its Cultivation . . . , p. 162.

¹⁷Gaston Bachelard, On Poetic Imagination and Reverie: Selections from the Works of, trans. with an Introduction by Collette Gaudin (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1971), p. 42.

¹⁸Erich Fromm, "The Creative Attitude," Creativity and its Cultivation . . . , p. 44.

¹⁹Harold D. Lasswell, "The Social Setting of Creativity," Creativity and its Cultivation . . . , p. 203.

the emergence in action of a novel relational product, growing out of the uniqueness of the individual on the one hand, and the materials, events, people, or circumstances of his life on the other.²⁰

Therefore,

creation is a genuine phenomenon and not, as the majority of psychologists and philosophers today believe, some sort of complex shuffling of what has already been acquired empirically. I believe that in the act of creation the mind adds something to what was there before the act took place.²¹

In this sense, something new has been brought "into birth."²²

Therefore, creativity, on its first level, is perception:²³ it allows and enables us to "see" anew what has always been there but not before beheld; it "discovers the essential corresponden-

²⁰Carl R. Rogers, "Towards a Theory of Creativity," Creativity and its Cultivation . . ., p. 71.

²¹Eliseo Vivas, Creation and Discovery (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. xi.

²²Rollo May, "The Nature of Creativity," Creativity and its Cultivation . . ., p. 57.

²³Robert B. Macleod, "Retrospect and Prospect," Contemporary Approaches to Creative Think-

dences that exist between separate entities . . . ;"²⁴
 it is thus a "synthetic activity,"²⁵ "a new com-
bination formed from pieces already in the mind
 by symbolic manipulation during dissociated thought."²⁶

In short, creativity is the appreciation of
 the world, while genius is the adding to the world,
 or on a lower level, a recreating of the world.
 It is "the occurrence of a composition which is
both new and valuable."²⁷ Creativity is the light
 of the sun allowing us to see what is already
 there; genius is the intensification and conden-
 sation of light until it becomes solid, like a
 laser. Genius is the creation of a new sun, or
 a new earth . . . new stars, new galaxies--the
 creation of a new heaven and a new earth. Crea-
 tivity allows us to perceive and appreciate this

ing: A Symposium Held at the University of Colo-
rado (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 190.

²⁴Philippe Malrieu, La Construction de l'
Imaginaire (Bruxelles: Charles Dessart, Editeur,
 1967), p. 227. Translation mine. The original
 is «Elle découvre les correspondances virtuelles
 qui existent entre les domaines séparés»

²⁵David Beres, "Communication," The Creative
Imagination: Psychoanalysis . . . , p. 212.

²⁶Haefele, p. 5.

²⁷Henry A. Murray, "Vicissitudes of Creativ-

new heaven and this new earth besides perceiving and appreciating our old heaven and earth.

Passion

Passion (that is, emotion) is important for both creativity and genius: passion is one's impulses expressing themselves in one's life through one's work;²⁸ it is "urgent vitality."²⁹ Certainly,

In art it is the feeling that creates, not the mind; the main role and the initiative in art belong to feeling. Here the role of the mind is purely auxilliary, subordinate.³⁰

Passion is the impetus for and the clarity of the reorganization of phenomena in creativity; passion is the bridge crossing the metaphysical dichotomy from phenomena to noumena in genius . . . it is the white hot heat burning away the dross

ity," Creativity and its Cultivation . . . , p. 99.

²⁸Bruner, On Knowing . . . , p. 24.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Stanislavski, Creating a Role, trans. by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood, with Foreward by Robert Lewis (New York: Theatre Arts Books, 1961) p. 8.

of phenomena until we have left a new epistemology, and consequently a new ontology. Because this new ontology is beautiful, we have a new axiology. Whereas creativity enables us to appreciate aesthetics, genius adds to the store and fund of aesthetic objects and thus incipient aesthetical experience, both on the part of the genius-facilitator and also on the part of the guest(s) of the genius-facilitator. In creativity, one assumes the joyous responsibility of the "Freedom to be dominated by the object."³¹ With genius, one becomes the object in one's creation of the object. When we look at a Gauguin, we are truly looking at more than just a piece of paint-covered canvas; we are truly looking at a part, ever a part (even though perhaps a small part) of the man and artist Gauguin. But even more, much much more, we are beholding--even now, years after the pictorial realization--the genius (or a manifestation of a part of it) of Gauguin.

Soul

Creativity is a revelation of the physical;

³¹Ibid., p. 31.

genius, of the soul.

What is soul?

Many things.

Soul, is among other things, the invisible bounds and visible function of a structure. Anything that is given discrete form and structure (and if it has awareness of other selves) has a soul. Once again, we must recall the activated complex in the theory of chemical reactions. Whereas, in a physical body any two molecules are held together by a chemical bond of reciprocal and reciprocating electrical charges, in the same body all of the molecules are held together in a form by similar reciprocal and reciprocating spiritual charges. The structuring into a form of moistened clay is itself the act of breathing into it the breath of life. Any half-way intelligent mechanic, for example, will tell you that an automobile has a soul. Of course the soul of an automobile or a house or whatever is as primitive and rudimentary in comparison to the human soul as is the machinery of the automobile or the physical construct of the house or whatever in comparison to the construct and machinery of the human body. But, nevertheless, primitive

and rudimentary though it may be, a soul is present in whatever form that is discrete and purposive.

Creativity is that gift, or faculty or facility, that enables us to perceive the discreteness and purposiveness and the uniqueness and beauty and marvel of the form and the wonder of its bounds, the soul. Genius is that gift that allows us to fashion and construct a beautiful, unique, marvelous, and discrete and purposive form and thus its bounds, its own soul.

Thus, creativity and genius are paracenary to soul; they are inner faculties that allow us, in the first place, to commune with the outer, and, in the second place, to re-create or create the outer. They are the inner means of, in the first place, perceptions of and communication with, and, in the second place, re-creation or creation of, the outer matter.

Soul determines soul. Soul is credited with feeling and willing and hence determining all creation.

The ideational and incipient and imminent noumenal soul of any object is the predetermined

shaper and former and predeterminer of its phenomenal, discrete, and purposive form. It is the Idea-meaning³² that calls forth the substance, or form, or axiologic bounds. The Idea originates in one soul; because it is the Soul (in its original meaning) that feels, thinks, and wills and thus determines all behavior. Thus, soul gives birth to Idea, which in turn gives birth to another Soul, which in its turn gives birth to its corporate manifestation, or form. In short, soul determines soul.

Perception

This first level of creativity, imitation (or realism), is not usually concerned with genius, but rather with creativity, on the part of perception (being able to see the object), and then of course talent, skill, and practice in rendering the object by means of boundaries. This level of creativity is, of course, of the

³²"Idea" here is used in its original meaning of form as opposed to substance, or content. It is "accident" rather than "matter." Form may or may not reflect substance.

most elementary kind. But this first, this elementary level, of creativity is the result of a keen power of observation and naïve receptivity.³³ This means that one both sees and accepts what he sees (both of which are, of course, very difficult for the vast majority of humans). The observation and receptivity are subsumed under one of the four major creative process stages, preparation.³⁴ "During the preparation stage, the individual is studious and gives sustained attention to the problem"³⁵

Practica

Our first exercise on this level of crea-

³³May Seagoe (1976) in Edward L. Meyen, Exceptional Children and Youth: An Introduction (Denver: Love Publishing Co., 1978), p. 482.

³⁴See J. J. Gallagher, Analysis of Research on the Education of Gifted Children (Springfield, Illinois: Superintendent of Public Instruction, 1960) and his Teaching the Gifted Child, 2nd ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975).

Andrew Crosby, in his Creativity and Performance in Industrial Organization (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1968), lists these four stages as a process of motivation (active and sustained search, p. 52-3), incubation (p. 60), illumination (i.e., insight, p. 61), and verification (both inner and outer, p. 62).

³⁵Meyen, p. 475.

tivity is seeing an object (or hearing, or feeling it), receiving and accepting what we see--with no distaste, skepticism, impatience, arrogance, scorning, or looking down our nose upon what we see--and then as accurately--but not yet as completely--as we can, rendering the object in a realistic yet simplified manner.

Line Drawing

Therefore, if we please, please, wherever we are, we must now stand up--and, if we happen to be inside of a building, we must walk to the nearest window and look out. We must not perceptually sweep the area. We must look straight ahead and then "see" the first object in our field of vision. Is it a tree? A building? A walkway? A lamp post? A telephone pole? Whatever it is, we must draw it now. We cannot draw? We should have a little faith in ourselves, should we not? Anyway, we are not after great art here. At this moment we are not even after art, great or otherwise. We are after a drawing, no matter how good or how bad. The correlation between our eyes and our hand may be out of synchronization. What do we expect, if we have not been practicing drawing a great deal lately? But time on task improves all concerned. Besides, this

is, presently, more of a practice in seeing than in rendering. Later, we shall expect achievement in both.

As we look out our window, what do we see? A large tree? That is what we see and here is our line drawing of it. (See Figure 3.) What is it characterized by? Verticality? Plumpness? What? What happens when we look at it? Does our eye round, continue, stop-start? What? In an examination of the tree and its outline, a number of features impose themselves on our consciousness. Perhaps first among these is the widespread leafage. Throughout the boundaries the tree is expressing itself in its abundant leaves. We consider, for example, the ratio of the distance from leaf edge to leaf edge with the diameter of the trunk.

If this narrative of leaves looks simple, it does so because it is. It is also a common narrative found in the Ideas of mushrooms, hairdos, nuclear explosions, clouds, pancakes, hamburgers, and so forth. We have seen it countless times, from our earliest nursing days to the present. It has become part of our perceptual and conceptual philosophy. It is an attractive narrative to us because it is so deceptively simple and because it has been an integral and prominent part of our perceptions for so long.



Figure 1. Tree

Thus far, our simple little exercise with pen has enabled us to practice briefly the first, the most elementary level, of creativity, simple imitation, or reproduction, in the visual mode (for use in drawing, painting, sculpting, ceramics, architecture, set design, and so forth). But we have yet to apply this concept of line drawing (that is, the simple rendering of boundaries), for example, to the practices of the literary and cinematic and television arts.

Literary Arts

For literary art, we can just begin and end with a drawing or design. If we look at the graphic arts of older books, we find so often design embellishments of the title page, chapter numbers and/or headings, and letters of the alphabet. Writers today must revolt against their present ignorance, laziness, intimidation, and subservience to the publishing cartel; writers must once again take an active and aggressive hand in the physical realization of their works (i.e., the actual printing of their own works). Why not? Indeed why not? Perhaps the present trend of writers publishing their own works on their own presses must continue, not as merely an expedient of getting their works before the

people, but rather as an integral part of the artistic process. This means that the literary artist must do everything in the preparation of the manuscript for printing, except possibly the press run itself, but even this he might consider as a desirable, if not necessary, part of the artistic process.

An analogy might be drawn with the life process of human beings: the act of sex is not the end of the life process, but rather might be merely the beginning; the conception itself is not the end either, but merely another step; the gestation period is still another one; even the birth itself is not the end of the process--so much, much more is to follow. How long is it before the child can be considered ready to go out on his own? The same is true of a literary work. Do we think that changing diapers is nasty work? Then we should not have children--because diapers is a part of the whole package. The same is true of printers ink. To see a beautifully bound volume of fine paper and type, one would never guess at the messiness of the ink and the type (and today of the preparation and development of the

plates), and the inking of the press. Who sees messy diapers when he looks at and appreciates a beautiful young woman in a bikini or an evening dress smelling deliciously of perfume? Who thinks of the nasty mess of a one-year old baby girl when he looks at the panties or bikini covering the same general area of an 18 year old young woman?

Therefore, we may, if we like, include our first line drawing as a part of a poem, essay, article, short story, or novel--just as well as we might include it as part of a drawing, a charcoal, pastel, or painting. We can also film it or tape it as part of the opening or closing of our film, or anywhere in between (as has been done before in films).

Photography, Film, and Television

But for photography, film, and television, we also have an equivalent. Remembering that this first level of creativity is simple reproduction or imitation, in cinematic or photographic or television terms, we can substitute the camera for our eye and leave out the line reproductive step; that is, instead of drawing a picture of a tree (or a house, or a face, or whatever), we merely frame the object

in the viewfinder of the camera and film it. The normal lens must be used because a wide angle or telephoto lens would distort (i.e., interpret the object); in like manner, we must not use any artificial lights or filters.

Acting

Remember our tree? We did not "realistically" reproduce the entire tree. We left out the individual leaves, the different colors, and so forth. We could have put them in had we so desired. But we exercised choice and selection. We did not want to copy the tree; we wanted to imitate it. Our task was to perceive and then to imitate (realistically replicate) only the boundaries (i.e., the outline) of the tree. Well, in acting we want to do the same thing: we go out and observe a person, animal, or thing. We choose one aspect of what we are observing: the way a person walks, eats, holds his head, and so forth. Then we mimic the broad, general "outline" of that one aspect. This is one way to start putting together a character.

Essay Composition

In like manner, if we are writing an essay and, furthermore, if we decide that it is going to be

a descriptive essay, then we describe our tree, or building, or whatever. If we wish to write a chronological theme or essay, then we record some process that we have chosen to imitate in words. If we wish to write a character essay, then we write a physical description of part or the whole of the person who is our subject. An opening paragraph containing a physical description places the subject in a context, introduces him to the reader, and provides a frame of reference--a set of boundaries--in which the reader may place or may anchor the subject so that it does not slip or slide away; such an introductory paragraph in a character essay provides the reader with a handle affixed to the subject so that the reader may hold fast the subject and steadily view it.

Note to Reader

There can be no other way: if we are true craftsmen (or wish to be), we shall do every exercise contained in this book. If we do not know music, then we must learn it. But we must be careful about taking music or any art--or anything--in a college or university: many incompetent and/or vicious little people are teaching them, and

they can really damage us. However, it is easy to protect ourselves: all we have to do is to march away and not come back and tell all of our friends. We must, however, look around and do some shopping because there are also many unbelievably good people teaching, people whom we need to meet and work with, and about whom we need to tell our friends.

Pedagogical Implications

Teachers and professors are, or should be, or must be, imitators much of the time. Their job, usually, is to simplify, ever how much is needed, so that the student may grasp and understand. If a teacher presents something and does not simplify--if simplification is needed or desired--then he is merely a copier or merely an empty conduit through which the lesson flows unimpeded. When a teacher explains anything to students, whether it be a poem by T. S. Eliot or Flanders' Verbal Interaction Analysis, that teacher is simplifying; and, when the teacher is simplifying, that teacher is engaged in imitation.

If the teacher, instead of simplifying, makes

more complex a lesson than what it is, then he is either an incompetent bungler, or, like Saul Maloff, trying desperately to show how much more he knows or how much more intelligent he is than the students.

Much of teacher training should be devoted to practice in imitation: in simplifying concepts and phenomena and processes.

The effective teacher is a good imitator (i.e., simplifier).

Conclusion

In short, imitation is our rendering of the boundaries of an Idea, a relationship of Ideas, or Ideas in motion.

CHAPTER IX

THE SECOND LEVEL OF CREATIVITY

TRANSPOSITION

. . . good sense is the
body of poetic genius, fancy
its drapery, motion its life,
and imagination the soul
that is everywhere, and in
each; and forms all into
one graceful and intelli-
gent whole.

--Samuel Taylor
Coleridge

Introduction

In the first level of creativity, imitation, we have adhered to and fulfilled six out of the seven divisions of praxiology: these seven divisions are cooperation, precision, purity, economy, coherence, simplicity, and struggle.¹ Our

¹These seven divisions of praxiology are

line drawing of the tree, for example, is simplicity itself; if we have any skill at all, the imitation is coherent (that is, it makes sense by being recognizable to most others); it is economical (only the outline, the boundaries, of the object has been used); it is pure (in the sense that no alien ingredients are included--it is just the outline, the boundaries, of the object, the Idea, itself); depending upon our skill and practice, it is precise; and it reflects our cooperation with the object (i.e., we have merely reproduced the object; we have not set up tensions between ourselves and the object, nor among ourselves, the object, and viewer, by abstracting part of the object (symbolism), nor by presenting all aspects of the object equally (cubism), nor by distorting the object or parts of it (impressionism or expressionism).

Transposition as Struggle

We are now ready to proceed on to the sec-

listed in Alicja Iwńska, "Praxiology and Curriculum," Curriculum Inquiry: The Study of Curricu-

ond level of creativity: transposition of imitation. On this level, we set up a struggle between an object in its unique, bounded form and the same object (or Idea) transposed to another form.

In drawing and painting and sculpture, for example, we take our first, original line drawing of the tree and look at it, steadily and easily, with fantastic, yet relaxed, intensity and concentration. To operationalize this perception of boundaries it is sometimes helpful to first determine the center of the horizontal and vertical thrusts of the Idea. (See Figure 2.) Once this centered nexus is discovered, we more easily may find its envelope (i.e., its outer narrative).

This procedure requires the establishment of an intersecting nexus that is complete and stable. If we establish such nexus and directions of thrust in light of our perceptions-plus-previous-knowledge, we conclude and summarize simplified rather than simplistic dynamics.

lum practice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1979), p. 288. Praxiology is "the general theory of good works (or efficient action) in all areas of human behavior.




Figure 2. Tree Showing Directional Dynamics

We are looking and searching for its feeling of form ultimately so that we may liberate the feeling of form from the form itself and from the boundaries in order to contextualize it into another yet related conceptualization. We find the feeling of form and sketch its flowing lines. (See Figure 3.)

The most important consideration of this principle is that the "goal" of the object (here, the tree) as manifested in its "will" must be discovered and as accurately as it is in our power replicated definitely, yet tentatively. This "goal" must be discernible to the audience as well as the artist--or at least, its value must be discernible. If this "goal" is not attainable by the artist (that is, if it is beyond the technical grasp of and rendition by the artist), then the artist must not attempt it just yet. Or, he must be aware that the attempt is beyond his grasp and that his attempt therefore is an "experimental" one (that is, a private exercise). But, even so, such experiments can be dangerous, for they may lead to frustration and self-doubt. Shall we experiment or shall we do? So many times the designation "experimentation" is merely a preëmp-
tive disclaimer in case the product is worthless.



Figure 3. Flowing Lines

What do we see in these lines of feeling besides a tree? Many things, of course. One of the things that we see is a woman, with flowing lines, head inclined forward with tresses of hair falling forward and down. (See Figure 4.)

In literary art, Robert Frost has shown us, in his poem "Birches," how to so perceive. In that poem, the bent-over birch trees remind the poetic ego, first, of such trees as boys have swung in and bent down to the earth; then, the trees remind the poet of girls throwing their wet hair over in front of them so as to dry it in the sun.

The most important principle in such separating of form from Idea, is that the goal of the Idea must not be violated; its "will" must be absolutely definite; it must be recognizable by both artist and audience. What we are doing is accepting the large goal of the total Idea and then subdividing it so that the progress of a part of it is obvious to us all.

In its most basic aspect, this abstraction of lines of feeling from an Idea is a process designed to insure that any individual artist may determine for himself the validity and appropriateness of any Idea and its form.




Figure 4. Woman

We have transformed, by transposition, simple, direct imitation, or reportage, of a tree, first into an abstraction of its form and then into one of many manifestations of its incipient form (i.e., its flowing lines) and then, last, into a like, yet different realization of its essential form.

Narration

Such transposition is made possible by the metaphysical nature of form. All form is essentially narrative, in that form is composed of line and mass. Both line and mass have the dual attributes of interpenetration and alienation. The lines (and the resultant included, bounded mass) of our tree delimits, demarcates a tree:



Figure 5. Tree

We look at the tree itself or at our line drawing and perceive and conclude, "That is a tree." It is made up of a trunk, limbs, branches, and leaves. However, if we follow the narration of its vertical lines flowing down the form of the tree and then dramatically sweeping out horizontally, we are informed of the existence of the tree-form as part of a context--its narrative vertical lines sweep out into horizontal lines and become part of the ground, of the earth. (See Figures 6 and 7.)

Like most processes which involve a balancing of contrary sweeping and thrusting and flowing dynamics, narration can be perceived and conceptualized successfully only if preconceived notions and educational and artistic objectives are resisted and ignored. One mechanism for insuring such a clear perception is process freedom. The eye and emotions must be liberated from the beginning.

Process freedom, as the term implies, would never prescribe anticipated perceptual conclusions. In other words, process freedom establishes nothing except the joy of discovery. Thus, the emphasis is not on greater initial demands that the "correct" direction be determined at the outset.




Figure 6. Flowing Directional Lines




Figure 7. Flowing Directional Lines of a Tree

If we, with our mind's eye of imagination, continue the trunk's lines down vertically, flow-out of and through the bottom of the Idea, rather than allowing our eye the easy sweep of verticality flowing into the horizontality of the ground, we are informed of the existence of another part of the tree, below ground, a part that may or may not be (depending upon the species of tree) larger, smaller, or the same size as the part above the ground: (See Figure 8.)

The impact of this dual nature of reality takes different forms of course, but foremost is the impact on what is considered desirable in our world of perceptual values. Perceptual values whose quality is judged in terms of aesthetic response of the perceiver tend to emphasize what the eye sees. This means that the areas not seen are considered less important than those that are seen. Or it means that the unseen areas are regarded as nonexistent. At the primary level, art is replaced by "science." In education, art is considered a frill; science, a necessity. A football star is manly; a music virtuoso in the band, a half-time diversion. The highest salaries go to science professors and to manipulators of the tangible, administrators.




Figure 8. Tree with Root System

The portion of the tree above ground is the supra-structure, surstructure, or suprasystem of the entire Idea of tree; the part below ground is the subsystem or substructure.

Hidden Versus Revealed

That which is hidden is equal to (sometimes superior to) in mass that which is revealed. This is a hint to us of the metaphysical nature of ontology: what we do not see is nevertheless there and equal to (or greater, at least in importance, if not in actual size, than) what we do see, what is revealed easily to us. And what is revealed to us is directly dependent upon what is hidden from us. Most philosophers recognize and celebrate this truth. But we must also realize that what is hidden from us is just as dependent upon what is revealed, as what is revealed is dependent upon what is hidden. That is, the root system of our tree provides intake of moisture for the above-ground structure (and also provides security . . . so that it is not, for example, blown away); in its turn, the suprastructure, in this instance (specifically, the leaves), pro-

vides photosynthesis for the entire structure, and so forth.

Utility Versus Beauty

Whereas the primary axiological nature of the hidden subsystem of our tree and of all phenomena (and ontology) is its utility, the primary axiological nature of the suprasystem is its aesthetics.

We might apply all of this, by way of illustration, to another phenomenon: woman. (And of course, the following can be said equally well of man.) A man looks at a woman; depending upon the arrangement and texture of her outer (her revealed) being (her skin, shape, eyes, hair, lips, neck, arms, and so forth), the man receives an aesthetic and/or sensual impression and reaction. If this man, however, looks beyond (that is, below) her surface (her revealed) form, and could see the red and mucoused, and bloody arrangement of tissue, muscles, and her stomach filled with partly-digested food, and her white coiled, serpentine intestines and filling bowels and bladder--he might be impressed with the utility of all this that he perceives; but rare would be the man who would receive an aesthetic and/

or sensual impression and thrill from it. In fact, a man would, most likely, perceive this hidden physical reality of a woman with shock, if not disgust. (And of course we speak nothing of the hidden spiritual, moral, and psychological nature of woman.) A literary example of such a familiarization of the unfamiliar is the following:

Fred stood up, swayed. There were bells in his ears. There were spots before his eyes. He went into the bedroom, found his wife asleep in bed with her clothes on. She was drunk, and full of chicken and mayonnaise, as she always was after a luncheon with Amanita. Fred tiptoed out again, thought of hanging himself from a pipe in the cellar.²

The author in so presenting the substructure and subsystem of this woman (her stomach full of booze, chicken, and mayonnaise) is attacking her by shocking the reader. (The reader is shocked because the "grotesqueness" of the hidden part of the ontology of the woman has been revealed: metaphysically, reality has been reversed.)

²Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater; or, Pearls Before Swine (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 160.

Beautiful Versus the Grotesque

Thus, in creativity and genius, when we look at an object with the view of presenting it as part of a work of art, we must decide, select, which of its two general realities it is that we are going to present, or both; the metaphysical choice of its ontology will decide the impact, the reaction, on the part of the audience: whether the axiological impact will be aesthetic or "grotesque."

Anything that is familiar to the sight and expectant psychology of men and women may or may not be aesthetic; the hidden aspects of ontology may or may not be aesthetic; however, if the hidden side is of an aesthetic phenomenon, it will almost always impact the audience with the effect of grotesqueness. Another example is the natural smells of woman (to the male initiate) as compared with her cosmetized, perfumed, assumed fragrances.

Some of these hidden realities, such as the natural smells of a woman, can be experienced directly. But overwhelmingly, most of these hidden realities must be surmised, by a combination of reality and previous experiences through such things as other artists' or illustrators' repre-

sentations of the hidden realities or through the actual digging up of roots, or whatever. In other words, we learn about the "grotesque" either through knowledge first hand (empirical) or second hand (vicariously artistic, et cetera). But, when we dig up the root system of a tree, for example, even then we are experiencing only a part of the hidden reality of the tree; that is, we are experiencing this particular hidden reality out of its context and thus very incompletely. Therefore, we must use our intuition or creative insight to supply its discarded context and to replace the abstracted part back into its whole.

And too, we have just been talking about the hidden reality of phenomena; the other dimension to the hidden part of ontology, the spiritual aspect, we can never see with our physical eye (except infrequently such manifestations of it as ghosts and spirits); we must behold it with our inner eye of imagination.

Regardless of whenever an artist presents the hidden part of reality--whether phenomenal or spiritual--the reaction on the part of the

audience is shock (mild or severe) as a result of the grotesqueness of the hidden part of the ontology being suddenly revealed. Therefore, the purpose of the artist--whether aesthetic communion and celebration or grotesque shock--determines his choice of subject (or, to be more precise, determines which half of a particular subject will be presented, the revealed part or the hidden).

Summary

In summary, "Speaking broadly we can approach the world of reality directly and perceptually or we can approach it indirectly and conceptually."³ But the latter is dependent upon the former; we can only accomplish the second by way, by means, of the first. Indeed, unless we stunt ourselves (or allow others to stunt us) with bad education or other unfortunate life-traumas, there is an ineluctable progression or propulsion or propagation from the direct and perceptual approach,

³Nelson B. Henry, Community Education: Principles and Practices from World-Wide Experience, The Fifty-eighth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 288.

of the epistemology and ontology, to the indirect and conceptual approach. The first stage of the approach to reality is concerned with the areas of important societal functions such as education and information; the second stage of the approach (to the hidden ontology of phenomena) is concerned with--because of its "natural" affinity for narrative--to its true domain, the "mind" of God and man. Here, of course, we are conceptualizing "mind" in the way that Wordsworth did:

This spiritual Love acts not nor can exist
Without Imagination, which in truth,
Is but another name for absolute power
And clearest insight, amplitude of mind,
And Reason in her most exalted mood.⁴

Mind uses its power and insight and amplitude in accomplishing its perception of Ideas by grasping the narrative of each Idea.

Several Aspects of Narrative Considered

Freire brilliantly and correctly points out that "narrative" in an educational setting is an undesirable situation:

⁴The Prelude, 1850, XIV, 188-192.

A careful analysis of the teacher-student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, reveals its fundamentally narrative character. This relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students). The contents, whether values or empirical dimensions of reality, tend in the process of being narrated to become lifeless and petrified. Education is suffering from narration sickness.⁵

Opposed to this narrative oppression is dialogical liberation:

Liberating education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information. It is a learning situation in which the cognizable object (far from being the end of the cognitive act) intermediates the cognitive actors--teacher on the one hand and students on the other. Accordingly, the practice of problem-posing education entails at the outset that the teacher-student contradiction be resolved. Dialogical relations--indispensable to the capacity of cognitive actors to cooperate in perceiving the same cognizable object--are otherwise impossible.

Indeed, problem-posing education, which breaks with the vertical patterns characteristic of banking education, can fulfill its function as the practice of freedom only if it can overcome the above contradiction. Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to

⁵Page 57.

exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers. The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. In this process, arguments based on "authority" are no longer valid; in order to function, authority must be on the side of freedom, not against it. Here, no one teaches another, nor is anyone self-taught. Men teach each other, mediated by the world, by the cognizable objects which in banking education are "owned" by the teacher.⁶

All of the above is true; we must not, however, allow Freire's brilliance and verity in the situation and context that he has chosen, to blind us in other contexts. Narrative per se (as with anything per se) is not pernicious; it is only when narrative is frozen by false outside authority into an abstracted stasic fragment that it is bad. When narrative freely and fluidly changes back and forth between two or three or more agents, it is then that we have Freire's long-sought-for dialogue. When narrative is freely and mutually chosen at the moment by the concerned

⁶Ibid., p. 67.


agents, because of the exigencies of the context, it is liberating; when it is forced upon one or more agents by another agent, then it is oppression. When the narrative issues forth from a finite human agent, it is arrogant stupidity; when narrative is celebrated in a communion of finite agents in awe of the infinite nature or world, then it is liberating education. Nature is the true narrative; when man usurps this narrative, he falsifies it by breaking off what small, infinitesimal chunk of it that he is able to handle with his little dirty grimes. The person-agents must present themselves, clean of mind and soul, humbly before nature; then it is that nature will reveal its narrative to supplicating suppliants.

Teacher at most (if at best) only mediates, for a very short time, because of more experience, between student-agent and the cosmic narrative. The student-agent, because of freshness of perception, then, in the chronology, in thankfulness is willing to assume the teacher-mediation role and to, in return, mediate between the teacher-now-student and the narrative of the world and of nature. This priesthood of mediation is ever-

changing; if ever it becomes frozen, oppression and distortion and death are the inevitable resulting states.

What is this narrative of nature?

Narrative is continuous interpenetration; we are using "narrative" here, in this context, in a very specific and technical sense: it is the "relating" of a "story." A story is the sum of a connected series of discreti. In literature, discreti are a connected series of any of the following: events, descriptions, dialogue, commentary; in music, the most elementary discreti are tone, interval, and pitch; in speech and written language the most elementary discreti are tone, pitch, interval, phoneme (vowels and consonants); in drawing and painting, the simplest discretus is a dot--of whatever size--(a dot sustained over a period of space becomes a series of connected dots--or a line; that is, if at any place in a line or a mass of color we remove all except where an original pencil, pen, brush, charcoal, makes contact with the surface of the context--i.e., a piece of paper, canvas, and so forth--we have a dot.)

In whatever medium, the artist connects into a series discreti which are similar, dissimilar, or a combination of similar and dissimilar, into shapes, syllables, words, measures, and forms. In a line drawing of a tree, we first touch our pen to paper, resulting in a dot: •; we then sustain that dot over space:  And so forth.

In music, we sustain the original discretus (whether pitch, tone, or interval) over, not a spatial continuum, but rather over a temporal one.

This sustention in music has its counterpart in all creativity. Sustention is the gradual manifestation of narrative. It takes the form of a line (in drawing and painting), and a melodic line in music, and an expository, descriptive, or argumentative line of affective or rational reasoning in spoken (rhetorical) or written language (speech, novel, article, poem, short story, or whatever).

These discrete dots--no matter how sustained, nor for how long--remain the sustentacular primus of any form; these discreti always remain the sus-

tension of any Idea. (It is no gratuity that the first physical make-up of a television picture tube took the form of an arrangement of discrete dots.)

A film is a series of discrete static forms flashed in a succession of separate and frozen triads. Just as the mind joins these technological stati into a synthesized motion, just so does the mind (colored by the emotions of course) recognize and then synthesize into combinations the static discreti of the natural technology, the phenomena. This process of converting static discreti into continuous, flowing (i.e., joined forms--that is, Ideas) is called Phi-phenomenon: some theorists accounted for

the illusion of moving pictures by recourse to the theory of "retention of visual stimulus." Munsterberg characteristically went beyond this passive view to an active one in which the mind at its most primitive level confers motion on stimuli.

He recognized that the retina does retain visual impressions momentarily after a stimulus has been removed, as when we close our eyes after looking at the sun, but he shows that this passive phenomenon does account for this by emphasizing the active powers of the mind which literally make sense (motion) out of distinct stimuli. Mun-

sterberg describes this phenomenon by recounting some famous experiments in perception, but he never tries to explain it. The phi-phenomenon is for him a given. It shows that at its most basic level the mind has its own laws and constructs our world in exercising them. It shows as well that the technology of film implicitly recognizes these laws and works its effects on the mind itself. The complex machinery (camera, projectors, and all the processing gadgetry) producing intermittent still pictures has been developed to work directly on the raw material of the mind.⁷

Primary Particles

The fact that creativity is a succession of discreti should not surprise us since all of the natural world itself is made up of discreti, discreti which we call atoms:

atoms from which nature creates all things and increases and feeds them and into which, when they perish, nature again resolves them. . . . These atoms are the 'raw material', or 'generative bodies' or 'seeds' of things 'primary particles'⁸

⁷J. Dudley Andrew, The Major Film Theories: An Introduction (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 18.

⁸Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. and introd. R. E. Latham (New York: Penguin Books, 1951), p. 28.

In like manner, the various discreti which compose the various art forms are the raw materials, the generative bodies, the seeds of the artifacts, and the primary particles of the creative process.

The Process of Converting Discreti

The process of converting the natural discreti of a tree, or house, or landscape into a synthesized narrative is the result of the perceptual powers of an individual; to recreate this synthesis in an art form, it is first necessary to disconnect the series of discreti and then to reconnect them into a new synthesis; the new synthesis may not be isomorphic in regards to the original synthesis because the reconnection is a process of personal intent; and personal intent is just that, personal, idiosyncratic. The ideal is not artistic cloning but the aesthetic (pleasing) connecting of discreti into an aesthetic Idea. Skill and sophistication in art and also in valuation moves one's perceptualizings and conceptualizings more and more away from isomorphism to the idiomorphic.

The Communal Spirit

Of great importance to narrative is the communal spirit: this means that a narrative

representation of a tree is recognizable immediately by the artist's community (i.e., the people of his world's society); whereas, a presentation (whether symbolic, impressionistic, expressionistic, or whatever) of the same tree may or may not be recognizable by this community. The narrative representation of a tree presents a bounded Idea that represents the experience (and perceptive experience) of the group rather than merely an idiosyncratic, or personal, experience of the artist. Hence, on this level, of narrative Idea, we look not so much for individuality of style as of a momentarily frozen segment of our oscillation between experienced reminiscence and personal, though communally representative, improvisation of eye, mind, heart with the raw materials of object (tree, et cetera) and tools (paper, pen, and so forth). Because of the communal spirit saturating all, we don't mind the re-creation of the same common objects; we only ask that the artist's personal, idiosyncratic intent be manifest in his resynthesis of the discrete of the object into his Idea. The communal narrative has been classified as primitive; the more indi-

vidual, as sophisticated. Happy is that skilled artist who is master of both and thus able to use both in the same work, where needed and/or desired. (See an example of such in Dvorak's The New World Symphony, Symphony No. 5 in E Minor, Opus 95.) Primitive narrative is just as capable of allegory or symbol as is the sophisticated kind: the context (or background) in which the Idea is placed determines its significance of reference: a rose may be just a rose; or it may symbolize passion, or whatever. When is an island more than just an island? (See Watteau's Embarkation for the Island of Cythera.) Identification of context, or background, is essential. By merely labeling our tree, standing physically alone in the pasture, we infuse its content and boundaries with significance: loneliness, strength, and so forth.

Without context narrative becomes beset with tabescence.

The Partnership of the Gods

After having considered the nature of the contiguous and continuous ontology of phenomenal

objects, and have judged it to be therefore of a narrative nature, we now must look at the relationship of this narrative to the perceiving and perceptualizing creative artist. How shall we proceed? What shall be our method?

Because Freire's explication of dialogue is so beautiful and so true, let us use, initially, his explication as our form and by parallelism seek out and build our perception of the nature of the narrative interaction between artist and object. Thus we shall allow Freire to be our formal carrier until our exegesis organically assumes its own form and life.

Dialogue

Obviously, the essence of dialogue is the word;⁹ the word is not an instrument (a slave) of dialogue, doing its bidding (doing its work); rather, dialogue is the word continued in a temporal *sostenuto*; it is an interpenetrated series of temporal *sostenutos*: one word--in its true authentic and undegenerate form--contains two constitutive elements: reflection plus action.¹⁰

⁹Freire, p. 75.

¹⁰Ibid.

During the reflection of the word, the word's input and import are sustained and at the same time strengthened; during the action, the sustained and climactically strengthening reflection bears fruit in kinesis; this actional fruition contributes to and continues the temporal sustenuto.

An artist looks at an object. First, he must see it; if he sees it, he then must perceive it--he must perceive it as a boundaried mass contained within yet distinct from its context. If he perceives this, then he ideates its dimensions; this he conceptualizes into a word (such as tree, woman, hair, and so forth). This word evokes a combination emotion-idea. This much so far is intellectualism (on a very low plane, to be sure). If the ideator then reacts to the intellectual stimulus (goes to the tree, smiles at the woman--or kisses her, or whatever--strokes the hair, and so forth), kinesis has resulted. Reflection plus action has equalled praxis. If a person cuts down the tree without reflecting upon the nature of the tree and himself and upon the physical, moral, ethical, and philosophical implications of the act, he is guilty of activism (action with-

out reflection). Dr. Albert Schweitzer never sterilized his surgical instruments without regretting the multitude of bacterial life that had to be sacrificed so that a larger life, the life of a human being, could be saved. Such reverence for life is praxis supreme. When an Indian--back in the days before his conquest by the white man--would kill a deer, for example, he would ask its forgiveness, and explain the necessity for the deed--he and his wife and children needed the sustenance of the venison so as to live; the Indian would turn the head of the deer towards the east (the direction of Paradise), put a bowl of grain in front of it, and humbly request that it speak to the spirits about how well the hunter had treated it, in the dire tragic necessity of the hunt and kill. This is praxis perfected. Compare with the white men who shot and killed buffaloes (bison) from speeding trains. Such was activism. The valuation of praxis (here, moral praxis) versus activism is implicit in the preceding examples and needs no comment.

The naming of an object (please note the distinction of actively naming an object, on the one

hand, and merely accepting one's cultural designation, on the other) is an act of dialogue. One perceives a tree; the tree communicates its form and substance (its Idea) to the perceiver; the perceiver conceptualizes the Idea and gives it a name. The Indian's "communication" with the dead deer was a dialogue. Schweitzer's naming of his situation of sterilizing the instruments by killing a multitude of life was a dialogical ideation of the situation.

The world presents the artist with an object (such as a tree); this is a gift of communication; the artist paints the tree. This portraiture (or posterization) is also a gift, a gift to the world, to life. A dialogue has ensued here, also. Dialogue joins; interpenetration (and holism) is the constituent of life. Narrative, however, which does not become dialogue, is a process of dichotomization; dichotomization leads first to tabescence, and tabescence leads to ossification or death.

The artist, by engaging in dialogue with nature (painting an Idea of an object, or whatever) has transformed the world by adding to it. There

are two choices, with nothing in between: we either add to the world or we subtract from it. Adding to the world is not the right of an individual; it is his duty. Subtraction from the world is a crime, under which all classifications of sins, of all religions (including the ten commandments of one religion) are subsumed. Dishonoring one's father or mother subtracts from the glory and the fruit of their pain, sorrow, suffering, and sacrifice that the parents have endured in the process of their parenthood. Adultery subtracts from the happiness and stability of the present family unit; fornication subtracts from the happiness and stability of the immanent family unit; murder subtracts life from the world. And on and on. On the other hand, love adds; love--true and pure love--always adds; and by adding transforms the world. Subtraction does not transform; it deprives, warps, and destroys. No man is an island; there is no such thing as a private dialogue or a private sin. A pebble thrown into one ocean eventually sends its ripples into every one of the seven seas. There is always, no matter how precarious, a refuge and salvation

from thoughts; but once the thoughts have been crystalized into words and the words spoken, the chain has been forged and put into place . . . the Idea has assumed concretized reality.

It is in putting their words into action (such as painting a tree or stroking hair or kissing lips) that men--by adding to the phenomena of the world's ontology--thus transform the world, and in so doing begin to approach the status of gods. A man is never "just a man." He is always either more or less than a man. If he transforms the world by acting upon his reflection of a word or words, he is more; if like a brute he neither reflects nor acts upon the reflection, then he is a parasite, sucking his sustenance from the transformations of others, men-artists and God-artist; these parasites--like ticks on cattle--take from the world (subtract) and contribute only disease. Dialogue with the world and subsequent transformation of the world is therefore an existential necessity. (We here are using "existential" in its original, late seventeenth century meaning "of and pertaining to existence" and not in the more modern Sartrean or humanistic meaning.) Di-

alogue in this sense is man's encounter with his destiny, for a man forges his destiny by his reflective deeds: "By your deeds shall ye be known." A man thus lives his future in his present deeds: and his future is either metamorphosis and transubstantiation; or it is a regression into brutish senselessness. An oppressor is as much of a slave as is his oppressed. A man by transforming his world, through synthesis, leads himself and his fellows ever upwards towards liberation of mind, body, and soul; "freedom is a synthesis of spirit" ¹¹ A man by parasitically fastening upon the transformations of others drags himself and others down into the morass of insensitive bondage and spiritual and intellectual degradation. Transformation by word plus deed is creativity. Man is his own God, fashioning himself in the image of his finest and grandest conceptualized Idea, subject always to both the constrictive and liberating (inspirational) aspects of his context. This is literal and ultimate creativity: the self-liberation and self-actual-

¹¹Sasser, "Connotations," l. 4.

ization and self-realization in the conquest of one's self.

Dialogic narrative with nature and with fellow man as well as dialogic narrative with self is only possible as co-operant with deep, sincere, abiding, and profound love. Love opens one's eyes to what is significant and allows one to discard the irrelevant. Love can only function where there is mutual and communal equality of respect and admiration and wonder. Since the world of man and nature and god is one (that is, interpenetrative)--and one of admiration and wonder--love is a natural state and process, and will activate itself if not stifled by oppression and the opposite of love, hate and envy. This interpenetration of self and context--this openness and dynamicism of systems--is necessary for creativity:

Since it is a question of beauty, the first fact to observe is a sort of interpenetration of nature and of man. This interpenetration is of a singular nature, for it has nothing of a reciprocal absorption. Each of the two parties retain their identities, keep their essential identities and affirm them more strongly at the very moment in which each submits to the

contagion or impregnation of the other.
But each thereafter is no longer alone;
they are now mysteriously enmeshed.¹²

Creative scientists, for example,

have low body boundaries as measured by Rorschach, indicating that they maintain a more "open" relationship to the environment and do not conceive of their bodies as having a hard protective shell which separates them from the world. They do not develop as much as most people do a perception of themselves as distinct individuals interacting with other distinct individuals. Instead, the environment appears to remain as a "part of themselves" long after most people have withdrawn themselves more distinctly from the environment. So music may appeal to scientists because it promotes a feeling of "oneness" with the environment¹³

¹²Jacques Maritain, I'Intuition Créatrice dans l'Art et Dans la Poésie (Paris: Desclée de Brouner, 1966), p. 3. Translation mine. The original is, «Dès qu'il s'agit de beauté, le premier fait à observer est une sorte d'interpénétration de la nature et de l'homme. Cette interpénétration est d'une nature toute particulière, car elle n'a rien d'une absorption réciproque. Chacune des deux parties en cause reste ce qu'elle est, garde son identité essentielle et l'affirme même plus fortement, au moment où elle subit la contagion ou l'impregnation de l'autre. Mais aucune n'est plus seule; elles sont mystérieusement emmêlées.»

¹³David C. McClelland, "On the Psychodynamics of Creative Physical Scientists," Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking . . . , pp. 168-9.

True education is thus the participation in dialogic narrative, which is, in a very true sense, a revealing and a conceptualizing of ontology and consequently a participation in the creation of the world--a process never-ending but always continuing. By thus participating in the creation of the world, man becomes even as the gods; because nature also participates in this dialogue with man, nature too is a divinity, as has been pointed out by peoples from the beginning. In this process of dialogic narrative we have at least incipiently a cosmogony of godhood, investiture of which is a democratic process; creativity is democracy raised to the level of universal élitism (resulting in a higher dialectic); creativity is the apotheosis of nature and of man into coequality with God.

The Boundaring of Objects into Narrative

Thus, experience, or experiencing, is the ability, faculty, of the mind, by means of sensory impressions, to connect parts and, even more so, to place parts in their appropriate contexts, or wholes; the mind does this by its faculty of

Ideation: the bounding of "objects" into a narrative.

Munsterberg, also,

Like the Gestalt psychologists, whom he preceded by only a few years, . . . felt that every experience is a relation between a part and whole, between figure and ground. It is the mind which has the ability to resolve this relation and organize its perceptual field. He ascribes the sensation of viewing movement to the displacement of a figure on its ground and mentions that we can, through willed attention, reverse that relation, altering our perception of the movement.¹⁴

Munsterberg was an Idealistic Kantian: he felt that "the mind at its most primitive level confers motion on stimuli,"¹⁵ and that "the mind animates the sensory world with motion."¹⁶

When we transcribe our simple imitation, we either animate it, by our minds, with motion (or the semblance of motion) or we invest it with another dimension. Thus, our tree can be a woman's shape or an afro hair-do, or whatever; or, if we

¹⁴Andrew, p. 16.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁶Ibid.

are filming it, we can agitate it with fans to give it motion (if a wind is not handy).

Therefore, the first level of transcription is the changing of media for the representation or presentation of the object; the second, is the transcription of the narrative into another Idea.

Active and Passive Transposition

Transposition may be either active or passive: we may either actively transpose the simple lines of our line drawing of the tree, for example, into a woman, or a hair-do, or a cloud; or, we may seek into the object for its essential lines; these lines are true of many "narrative" forms: woman's physical shape, shape of an afro, or whatever. The point here is not a quibbling one; the point is that there are undreamed of dimensions and perspectives in each and every Idea; two, moreover, are better than one. The more ways in which we can see, equals the more that we can see; the more that we can see, the greater choices we have; the greater choices we have, the greater freedom we have; the greater freedom we have, the closer, as we have said before, we ap-

proach God.

For drawing and painting, we take our line drawing and search to perceive its outline; once found, we transpose it into another idea. We keep it simple. For sculpting, we similarly transpose the lines of our line drawing into another idea, on paper. Then we realize it in our sculpting medium, whether welding, clay, stone, or whatever. We do the same kind of process in ceramics, music, and rhetorical composition (whether written or spoken).

In poetry, fiction, playwriting, for example, we describe in words, that is, we transpose by transcribing the drawing (or the original object, preferably the original, but, regardless, with help from our simple imitation) into words and thought-units. Concerning our tree, we introduce it by placing it in its context; our concern in this instance is therefore object-centered:

Outside my window, in the pasture, on
the west side close to the fence that
separates my land from my neighbors,
stands a beautiful tree.

Or, we have other choices: we may introduce it by orientating it to the perceiving-ego's view-

point; it is, in this instance, subject-centered:

I can see out in my pasture, on the west side, near the fence that separates my land from my neighbors, that beautiful tree, under which I have the buckets of water placed for my calves to drink from.

Or we can introduce it by means of the context-centered orientation:

The morning sun, not yet hot, molds and causes to burst into cool green fire the leaves of the beautiful tree, that stands alone in my pasture, on the west side, near the fence that separates my land from my neighbors.

Or we can introduce it by means of the object-centered orientation in terms of its mood:

The big beautiful tree, stands quietly and lonely against the brilliant indifferent blue of the sky behind it. It stands off by itself, there in the empty pasture, for companionship, close to the fence, that separates its domain from the neighbor's busy chicken coup and fruit trees, hurrying to drop their fruit, fat pears and juicy peaches and tart cherries. Sweet cherries don't grow very well here, for some reason. It looks westward, towards man-lacking nature.

Or, we may introduce it by means of the subject-centered orientation in terms of the perceiver's

mood:

Sitting here at my desk, I watch the big beautiful old tree, standing out there, quietly and lonely against the brilliant indifferent blue of the sky behind it. It just stands there, on the west side of the pasture, close to the fence that shuts it out from the trees on our neighbor's land. It gazes westward. Ch, westward! How long it's been since I came this way from westward!

Or,

The rounded outline of that beautiful tree, standing out there by itself, reminds me of Dorothy's afro. Except that it is green, and Dorothy's afro was black. But she was green. Ch, and so was I! But I guess we ripened together . . . until we rotted . . .

Or, we can concern ourselves with the tree in motion:

The big, beautiful tree, standing alone in the pasture, on the west side, next to the fence that separates it from the neighbor's, sways in the southwest wind.

And so forth. Really, our choices are about limitless.

To transpose in photography, one way is to use a lens, other than a "normal" one, to "distort" the tree (or whatever object it is). With

a motion camera, we also can use a different lens. We can also use different camera angles.

Therefore, in summary so far, the second level of creativity (transposition) can involve changing media, such as making merely a simple verbal description of an object (e.g., transcribing a line drawing into words, or making a drawing from someone's writings) or it can involve transposing the boundaries of one Idea into another Idea (such as, turning the form of a line drawing of a tree into an afro hair-do).

Transcription is also called decadence.

Music

Transposition, the second level of creativity, is the first level of creativity on which we are able to compose music. In other words, the nature of music itself requires, at the very least, a translation.

Practicum

One way of beginning a music composition is to practice imitating a sound, any sound, and then to find its pitch, time (duration and interval) and limits on a music instrument; then we record it on music composition paper.

For example, there is a bobwhite bird that calls, from time to time, outside my window. I reply, sometimes, imitating its call as well as I can, which seems to satisfy him because we carry on, now and then, a kind of conversation. Now that I have his call down, pretty well (at least to our seemingly mutual satisfaction), I shall go down the hall into the living room and pick out its tone and pitch and direction on the piano. (We could do this also on a flute . . . or violin . . . or whatever we might have, or whatever we can find access to. If we happen not to have access to a musical instrument, then we must display initiative and aggressiveness enough to find access.¹⁷)

Here is my rendition, on the piano, of the call of my friend, the bobwhite; since he seems to be a serious fellow, let us put his call in

¹⁷Once, when I was sort of vacationing in the San Bernardino Mountains, I had need of a piano. I called around on the phone until I found a church willing to let me practice on its. And I am at least as shy and introverted as anyone alive today.


4/4 time:



We notice that the interval of the two notes is an octave. Actually, the bobwhite, on his high note, the C, glides into it from a lower pitch. Thusly:



Let us thumb through some songs to see whether there are any similarities. Sure enough, we find one right away. Skipping the introductory measures, we find exactly the same kind of beginning (in a different key, of course) in J. Massenet's haunting and beautiful "Élégie:"



We do not know where Massenet got his idea; the source of his idea, here, is unimportant. What is important is that we know where we can get our ideas. Whenever we find ourselves in trouble (not knowing which way to go or even how to get started), we can always return to our mother, nature. We may let ourselves down, now and then, but she will never.

Transposition and Intellectual and Imaginative Activation

Our focusing on an object with intent to transpose activates the mind's very way of working, which Munsterberg calls "attention,"¹⁸ and

which Habermas calls "knowledge."¹⁹ By so activating the mind in the correct direction we reverse the monologic process of abstracting fact from value; we place fact into a context of value.

By focusing on the sensation (taste, olfactory, visual, aural, tactile) of phenomena, our "attention" reveals to us the Idea (boundaries) of an object; then our memory (of similar or comparable Ideas) activates our imaginations, which then, either restructure the memory into slightly or grotesquely different Ideas or replace the Ideas into different contexts. Thus, the mental operations of memory and imagination have carried us "beyond a simple attention, to give this world [of phenomena] a sense, an impact, a personal direction."²⁰ This "personal direction" is important. On a level lower than the lowest level of creativity, we have, for example, the Hollywood, and correspondingly in the academic circles the Brustein, mode of copying of an imitation.

¹⁸Dudley, p. 19.

¹⁹Macdonald, "Curriculum and Human Interest," p. 286.

²⁰Dudley, p. 19.

Imitation Versus Copying

We had a good imitation of a nightmare in Hitchcock's film, The Birds. The film is distinctive; it is typically Hitchcock: it shows the personal direction of Hitchcock's imagination and creativity. Hitchcock did not merely copy into film du Maurier's novel; he transposed it. Then we had a whole host of copyings of Hitchcock's transposition: rats, ants, rattlesnakes, and so forth; and then that copying, not only of Hitchcock's transposition, but an almost-direct photostat of the plot from Melville's great work, Moby Dick, Jaws. Melville may or may not have read Reynolds' account of a large coffee-colored whale's attack on a ship;²¹ but he certainly had read Chase's account of an attack on a ship by a large whale,²² and he used it, openly and proudly (making explicit reference to it) in his own novel.²³

²¹J. N. Reynolds, "Mocha Dick," The Knickerbocker, New York Monthly Magazine, Vol. 13 (May, 1839), 377-392.

²²Owen Chase, Narrative of the Most Extraordinary and Distressing Shipwreck of the Whale-Ship Essex, of Nantucket; which was Attacked and Finally Destroyed by a large Supermaceti-Whale in

But he did not simply copy it; he incorporated it. He used it to help widen his own fabulous perceptions and conceptions and thus will remain immortal, and the novel, Moby Dick, will remain forever a living monument to the greatest of man's creativity. But who knows, who can remember who wrote (and produced and directed the movie versions) of the asinine Jaws or those other equally pitiful copyings? (Who would want to?)

Another example of unimaginative and un-intellectual copying is The Theatre of Revolt: the bit about dirty consciences being at the root of our present-day charities, Brustein copied from Eric Bentley,²⁴ without even giving him credit for it, attempting, we imagine, to fool us into thinking that he was capable (intelligent enough) to think of it himself. The general idea of the

the Pacific Ocean . . . (New York, 1821).

²³Melville makes extended reference to Chase's book in Chapter 45 of Moby Dick.

²⁴"From Strindberg to Bertolt Brecht," Theatre and Drama in the Making, ed. by John Gassner and Ralph G. Allen (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), II, 770.

entire book Brustein copied from John Mason Brown's The Modern Theatre in Revolt.²⁵ In general Brustein finds good copying in Gassner.

Almost everything Gleckner ever wrote was copied from someone else.

Why these people do this kind of thing can be explained by their lack of self-confidence or their lack of intelligence. Norman Rabkin takes concepts from the works of nuclear-physicists, and tells us forthrightly and proudly that he is doing so, and transposes these concepts of others into a magnificent critical work on Shakespeare, Shakespeare and the Common Understanding.²⁶ Rabkin shows us how it can be done.

Attention

In acting, we have an Archie Leach's personally-directed imitations and transpositions of characters; on his coat tails trying desperately to copy accurately we have--or had--a Tony Curtis. In fiction, we had Robert Ruark pathetically

²⁵(Port Washington, N. Y.: Kinnikat Press, Corp., 1929).

²⁶(New York: The Free Press, 1967).

trying to out-Hemingway Hemingway. In singing we have the Linda Ronstadts copying hit songs of the near-past, even down to the arrangements. In fact, in the seventies and early eighties, popular music is characterized by blatant copying.

Leach, Hemingway, Hitchcock, and Melville will always be remembered--because their creativity was personally directed; these other hacks are already forgotten (or soon will be)--as will be all hacks--because the work of parasitical hacks (among other reasons) have no personal direction; they merely have a suction action that enables them to hold onto other people's work for awhile, but then they inevitably slip away into blissful oblivion.

We have here artistic attention versus money attention. For an artist--or anyone with any talent--the perception of any Idea is a personal one, which then personally directs the rendering of that Idea into a medium; on the other hand, lucre attention is the same for everyone because lucre is the same for everyone (in this sense): it is filthy whichever way you wash it. Of course

money is necessary in our society; but it is nevertheless--maybe because it is outwardly necessary--filthy. And thus, since money-attention is the same, it is a "universal" rather than a personal attention: whatever manifestation it inspires will likewise be the same as it is. And thus we have the same tired copying of the creativity of others, that flows like diarrhea out of Hollywood, New York, "creative writing" divisions of English departments, and similar places. And like diarrhea, the tiny obnoxious germs of copying converts whatever is fed into the organism--steak and garbage alike--into the same putrid, runny, stinking mess.

Avoidance of Outside Impingements

Any work of art is a material analogue--or, if you will, objective correlative--of each stage of intellection and corresponding to each level of our creativity; it is the phenomenal manifestation of the individual perception and resultant personally directed rendering. Thus, the artist gives of himself to the world, to his fellow man and woman; he shares in a uniquely personal way

the most intimate of all sharings: his very inmost self. On the other hand, the Hollywood-New York-academic hack²⁷ shares--not himself--but the labors and intimate givings of others, disguised a bit to pass muster for payday.

The wise artist--whether fledgling or professional--would therefore be wise to avoid outside impingements, impacts, directions, and motivations when he is considering creating. These outer disturbances--and that is what they are, disturbances--destroy some or all of the necessary praxitic conditions for effective work; they destroy the purity of the "attention" by outside disturbances (i.e., the Idea can not be conceived, conceptualized, entirely--or maybe even partly--by an outside "authority" imposing itself and its repertory of ideas: what film made money in the past, for example) upon both the mental process of attention and the object itself. The economy

²⁷The only difference in these groupings seems to be that Hollywood and New York hacks have more courage (or connections) to go after the greater monetary rewards; the Bourjailys and others like are content with lesser rewards because their intellects are (even) smaller, their talents more modest, and their courage lesser.

of the attention and object is partly or wholly destroyed because the boundaries (and of course the context is determined by the boundaries--therefore, whenever we speak of boundaries we are by necessity also including the context) and the intent are complexed by considerations other than the (relatively speaking of course) faithful and true rendering of the Idea. With no outside adulterating and obliterating impingements, the intent to render an Idea is pure and economical and simple; the Idea tends to cooperation, especially once the boundaries are in process of being "drawn"; and the cooperation increases with the progressive forming of the Idea.

Outside impingements also include (besides the crass inducements of fame, fortune, full professorships, or departmental chairmanships) approbation from loved ones. Creativity is a lonely process, by definition. One cannot create so that loved ones will be proud. Finally, for oneself--singly and alone--is the process of creativity. Afterwards, there can be sharing of the glory. Of course there are times when we all desperately need encouragement. If it comes,

then we must appreciate and treasure it. But, if we must have it in order to function, then we are to that extent of whatever the necessity and requirement, a deficient artist. We should remember these words:

. . . I was as trusting and as stupid as a bird dog who wants to go out with any man with a gun, or a trained pig in a circus who has finally found someone who loves and appreciates him for himself alone. That every day should be a fiesta seemed to me a marvelous discovery. I even read aloud the part of the novel that I had rewritten, which is about as low as a writer can get and much more dangerous for him as a writer than glacier skiing unroped before the full winter snowfall has set over the crevices.

When they said, "It's great, Ernest. Truly it's great. You cannot know the thing it has," I wagged my tail in pleasure and plunged into the fiesta concept of life to see if I could not bring some fine attractive stick back, instead of thinking, "If these bastards like it what is wrong with it?" That was what I would think if I had been functioning as a professional although, if I had been functioning as a professional, I would never have read it to them.²⁷

Any act of creativity, even on the very lowest level, is one of journeying alone strange seas.

²⁷Hemingway, p. 209.

It takes a great act of courage and great strength to endure the loneliness of it and the suspicions and envy and misunderstandings and ridicule of fellow creatures and even sometimes on the part of one's loved-ones. It is a price that must be paid. Every act of creation is a decision that the effort is worth the cost.

Pedagogical Implications

The Enabling Strategy is an especially appropriate method of teaching to be used when transposition is utilized with it.²⁸ The enabling strategy is that teaching method in which "the students engage in some activity, most often under the supervision of the teacher. Generally and preferably the activity concerns a problem to be solved."²⁹ An example would be to have students take a laboratory exercise--such as frog dissection--and transpose it to literature. The students could use a "scapel" of the Neo-Aristo-

²⁸For a discussion of the three main types of teaching strategies--exemplifying, enabling, and presenting--see Hyman's "Teaching Strategies for Pluralistic Teaching," pp. 242-52.

²⁹Ibid., p. 245.

telian School of criticism (or any other school) and dissect a short story, or play, or chapter of a novel, or a poem, to see how the vertebral (plot line) joins together the head (introduction, or point of attack, or hermeneutic construct, et cetera), to the body (development, and so forth), and to the extremities (conclusion, answers, und so weiter); how the systems of organs (character, diction, music, spectacle) contribute; and how the cells (action and/or words) function.

Highschool biology and English teachers (and university physiology and literature teachers) could work wonders together. If the students could do their laboratory dissection on frogs first and then the next day go to literary dissection, what a transfer of learning could occur! What an association of ideas!

The same kind of dissective procedure could be performed on a painting, or a thunderstorm, or an organization of an economic or civic structure.

Students taking drama could act out the complementary structure and functioning of any pair (or pairs) of body muscles. (There is a famous play that enacts the functioning of the human

body, specifically the effects of a conflicting morality on the mind and heart. This play would be ideal for the team-teaching and cross-class learning of morality and ethics (religion), sociology, psychology, and physiology. Since this play, "The Theatre of the Soul," a monodrama by Nikolai Nikolayevich Yevreinov, first produced in 1912, is a Russian play, it would also be suitable for the study of cultural anthropology.)

A dance class could be used, not only for learning, practicing, and appreciating traditional dances, but also for the study of how atoms are linked together and how molecules and chains of molecules behave. In order to do this, students and teachers would first have to study chemistry and then they would have to do their own original choreography.

Natural philosophy, logic, and art as form can all be studied in terms of chemistry; and, in like manner, chemistry can be studied in terms of natural philosophy, logic, and the formal properties of art:

. . . organic chemistry can . . . provide a fascinating area of "natural

philosophy" for the student who wants only to obtain a broad liberal arts education you will find it to be an extremely stimulating intellectual pursuit. Organic chemistry has a highly logical structure We make much use of symbolic logic, the logical principle of analogy, and deductive reasoning

Finally, organic chemistry has a unique content as an art form. The building up of complex molecular architecture by appropriate choice of a sequential combination of reactions provide syntheses that are described as "elegant" and "beautiful." The design of an experiment in reaction mechanism can be similarly imaginative. Such elegantly conceived experiments can evoke that delightful feeling of pleasure that man obtains from the appreciation of man's creativity--but only in the mind of the knowledgeable spectator.³⁰

Science students could devise their own transposed activities, such as the writing and performing of plays concerning cellular activity, and so forth; literature students, besides dissecting literary works, could operate on and repair sick or injured or deficient or crippled works of art; sociology students could study the cooperative

³⁰Andrew Streitwieser, Jr. and Clayton H. Heathcock, Introduction to Organic Chemistry (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), p. 4.

systems of the multitudinous and multifarious symbionts in the human cells; government and civic students could chart the power and influence structures of ant colonies and compare with their own. The possibilities are endless.

The use of transposition in the classroom situation, not only could help prevent the atrophy of students' brains by boredom, but also could help combat teacher burn-out: the constant cutward pressure on pedagogical and intellectual and emotional boundaries can promote a freshness and cooling vigor within a teacher, in the face of the onslaught of student antipathy and lethargy, community fear and resentment, colleagueal vicious envy, and administrative cautious stupidity. This use of creativity will make the teacher a better person.

In addition, this use of creativity will make the students better people (because they are being self-actualized) and also, better students: one transposition would last a teacher and all of her classes for a full week. If a teacher does use an exciting activity for one class, every other one of her classes will, not

only hear about it, but come clamoring and demanding that it also be afforded the same participation.

Conclusion

Transposition, the second level of creativity, is simply the translation of an imitation of the boundaries of an Idea or a group of Ideas into something else: either another media or another Idea. It can be used for any art form; this is the first level of creativity that can be employed in music composition. Its possibilities in teaching are both numerous and exciting.

CHAPTER III

THE THIRD LEVEL OF CREATIVITY

SYNECDOCHE

God scatters beauty as he
scatters flowers
O'er the wide earth, and
tells us all are ours.
A hundred lights in every
temple burn,
And at each shrine I bend
my knee in turn.

--Walter Savage
Landor

Introduction

After imitation and transposition, the next level of creative complexity (and difficulty; i.e., requiring more intellectual and artistic perception and conception and manipulation) is synecdoche (a form of Romanticism), which is, on the one hand, the using of part for the whole with

the whole implied in the part, and, on the other hand, using the whole for the part, with the part implied in the whole.

Codification

In the process of converting--by condensing--the whole into a part (or by expanding the part into the whole), we have--by means of dialogue and dialectic--the simultaneous projection of two different situations by means of a symbolic code. This simultaneity reinforces our natural joy in the perception of the interpenetration of all life. This process of synecdoche presents the codified, specific essential by means of the derived contextual, auxiliary; or of the codified general essential by means of the specific. That is, when the young man asks the father for the hand of the daughter, he really and truly wants more than just her hand. Her hand is an auxiliary to that which the young man wants: her entire self--her body (probably all of it), her mind, and her soul. When the soldier appears, and the onlooker says, "Here's the army," the specific phenomenon is presented by means of the

general context. In the first issue, ontology is presented by litotes: the young man is very much understating what it is that he wants and desires. In the second issue, the carrier of the interpenetration is hyperbole. Litotes presents a quite serious interest and intent; hyperbole presents just the opposite: humorous interest and intent. Thus, artistic choice of either seriousness (litotic carrier) or humor (hyperbolic carrier) is determined by interest and axiological intent.

This reduction and compression of a whole into a part, yet still retaining the identity and complete set of whole implications--and the expansion of a part into a whole, simultaneously retaining the characteristics and implications of the part while adding to them the identity and implications of the whole--these are codifications of ontological aspects. Codification is the organization of interests into a perceivable and conceivable system of communication.

Thematics

In this process of codification and synthe-

sis, the participants--first the artist and then his audience--internalize their thematics. Thematics refer to the direction and activity of the reality that men perceive and by which they are thus mediated. Mediation is that process by which man is reconciled both to himself and then to other men, the former necessary both in and for itself and also as necessary for the latter. Mediation is the reconciliation by placing abstracted man back within his own natural context; within his context, man is then enabled to relate to himself because wherever he reaches and whatever he touches are part of his context and thus by spiritual conduction reaches and touches himself. Within his own natural context, man is enabled to reach out to touch and communicate with his fellow man because whatever he touches is part of himself and part of his fellow humanity, and thus his touch and his vibrations are conducted throughout the context and passes through all that is within the context. Context (and one dimension of this context is community) is a natural conductor of spiritual pulsations; whenever a man is abstracted from his context, the pulsating cir-

cuitry of spirituality is short-circuited, and the context is the poorer for it. There is no such thing as contextual dismissory abstraction; any abstraction is traumatizing and dilacerating of both the component and the context. Reconciliation back within context does not mean diluent loss of individuality, but rather, it is a diodic relationship in which reconciled man becomes a conduit through which may and does flow the spirituality of the context. Thus, excitation of each man is initiated and increased. It is in this sense that reality mediates between man and himself and other men. By binding together, it sets free. With no excitation, there is no life, no generation of thematics. Excitation enables an individual to make possible and promote more direct and increased flow of both spirituality and ontological insight; by so becoming and doing, a man is more a part of his community and general context; but he is also, by excitation, more of himself, and thus more of an individual.

Alienation Versus Contextualization

There is no true freedom in alienation; true

freedom is in contextualizing, because only in contextualization is a man involved in the process of being a man. In alienation, a part--a man--becomes the whole . . . without the accretion of context. By spiritual bloating he becomes his own context, but he is merely distending his idiosyncratic boundaries and distending the boundaries of his personal Idea--distortion and weakening are the inevitable results. In contextualizing, man--a part--also represents and symbolizes the whole--of his community and general context. By so doing, he adds to his individuality by surrounding it with context; he strengthens his personal Ideational boundaries by outside support rather than letting them distend until they burst like a balloon. With community and extended context, man becomes an open system, characterized by dynamic stability, adding to his own dimensions and strengths by receiving input from his community and context and at the same time strengthening and adding to his community and general context by giving of his self to them. This receiving and giving is the process of generating themes; and it becomes the individual's and his context's

partial thematic universe. In this state and process, reality is being shaped as well as shaping; reality is in a process of kinesis rather than a state of stasis. This generating of themes becomes dialogic and dialectical: in a free exchange between individual and context, complexities are defined, perceived (and thus divided) into conceptual levels, reconciled when perceived and shared with context in a new axiology. When another perceives one of my complexities, and conceptualizes it into its various levels and shares the process's results with me, I no longer have just the original complexity; I do have it still, of course; but I also have it illumined; and thus reality becomes enriched and doubled for me; and I am now a double possessor, a double owner. Extrapolate this example to all of situations, and we have the dialogic and dialectical ontology of thematic generation.

This process of the individual becoming more individualized by becoming more a part of the whole-- and of the whole becoming more of a whole by renewing itself in the individual--this is phenomena of the process of synecdoche. It is thus a

gathering together.

Synecdoche as a Doubling of Ontology

Synecdoche thus is an enriching, a significatizing, a pluralizing, a transforming, a simultaneitizing of different aspects of ontology into a holistic context of one, without fusing the boundaries of the component constituents. That is, synecdoche doubles reality by presenting it first as a part and then as a whole (with the part still distinct from the whole--or vice versa); this simultaneity of part plus whole (or whole plus part) enriches our perceptual process. There is in all of life a natural inclination to dispersion; synecdoche is the counter-inclination to this dispersion; synecdoche is inspersion, by reconciliation and combination. Thus it is syncretistic. The syndetic combination of part and whole is effected through thematic conjunction: the flow and direction of reality, for this reconciliation to be effected, must be incipiently confluent. When this confluence becomes patent rather than latent, no symphysis occurs--the individualities of the two comprisants certainly remain idiosyncratic.

Rather, now, the thematics hold the two comprisants together syndesmotically as a federation of equals.

Synecdoche is the reflected completion of the direction of reality from individuation to complementarity. Apparently superficial distinctions of boundary delimit potential action of each life-space. Because man's activity is an extension of his boundaried Idea, such activity is thwarted and stifled by false constrictive boundaries. If I see my boundaries as constricted and restricted within the confines of my physical self, then my actions are limited to whatever kines-
thetic activity my body is capable of. However, if I extend my boundaries to include the power of speech, the power of writing, of communicating, of thinking, of sending out messages of love-- then my powers are vastly increased. If my bound-
aries include my family, my beloved, my friends-- then how much more is increased the scope of my powers and influence? The extension of my bound-
aries out beyond my physical Idea increases my own existential experience and at the same time extends, expands, and increases the existential experience of others within the sphere of my ex-

tension; their existential experiences in turn react upon me, further extending my existential experiences. This symbiotic process knows no limits, and has never been tested--historically--to any noticable degree. It is an untapped source of power and transformational ability.

Such urgent potential needs more attention. The world--and man of course--is uncompleted. (Note: "un" rather than "in.") The process of completion (or perhaps, becoming) is ever continuing; continuation is its nature. The direction of continuance can be controlled by reflection. Reflection entails the simultaneity of perceptions and conceptions. Synecdoche enables me to separate part from whole without destroying either, but, rather, instead, augmenting and celebrating each by means of the other simultaneously. This process of synecdoche separates momentarily part and whole from their process of being, and thus allows for reflection upon the activity of being and becoming of part and whole as distinct from the activity of both as one and as only being and not as becoming. Metaphysical separation of part and whole--while simultaneous celebration

of part and whole as one--enables the perception of reflection on the process of becoming, rather than merely of being. It allows for the perception of the fact that activity is not merely an extension of being, but is an inseparable aspect of process. When this perception is internalized, it thus becomes an ability of the perceiver and thus enables him to transform ontology into transient matrices of Ideas; this in turn makes possible the next step of conceptualizing permanent Ideational constructs; these constructs, by being added to the world, transform the world.

This "objectifying" of subject into two spuriously and speciously distinct components challenges the perceiver by confronting him with a startling configuration of heretofore familiar phenomena or ideas. It requires the perceiver to take a risk in confronting and grappling with old as new, with familiar as exotic and bizarre. Risks are challenges; challenges awaken one to the possibilities of new thematics; challenges, if accepted, require commitment; and commitment requires both reflection and action. The resultant praxis disrupts, agitates, and redirects the flow of reality into new channels of new thematics.

New thematics revolutionize transforming intexts into contexts; and thus is the world transformed, and each man, caught up in the revolution, becomes a fabricant of a new society of Ideas; and the last become, by engaging in the revolutionary transformation, facile princeps; and factious elements are, during that moment of transformation, reconciled into harmony, and Fafnir lies down in love with a Sigurd; even fainéants are part to joyous ideational work; and the famuli become the sorcerer and scholar; the fasciated farrago of phenomena fasciculates in astonished turmoil and then centrifriculates into a harmonious and unified ontology.

This is true creativity.

Transformation of Ontology

In these moments, existence becomes atemporal; and the world is re-created and transformed by becoming self-conscious; the self-consciousness calls for reflection and then joy in new creation. The limits of intext and context are surmounted by the "here" and "now." This self-consciousness calls for and necessitates a dialo-

gic and dialectical process between the former determination of boundaries and limits and the present liberation, synthesis, and freedom. As part separates itself from whole, both are objectified in their activity as they locate their essences--in the process of separation--in their mutuality and interdependence; and by so doing they overcome their own finite limitations. Once well-perceived as mutually fettered, these now reveal their true nature as ontological independents but spiritual interdependents. Thus, in active separation plus integration, they negate their own static boundaries and renew again, vicariously, for man, man's ability to be both one and the other, simultaneously. Space is shattered; time and history thrown down, and eternity glimpsed. A critical perception is embodied in this activity, which inspires man to joy in intellected conceptions. The concrete is amortized in activity.

These transformations of reality supersede the old hierarchy of élitism; now each part democratically exists in equality with the whole, and even augments the worth of the whole.

An artist, by employing, or rather constructing or composing, synecdoche, exhibits a decisive attitude towards the world: he separates a part from the whole (or the whole from a part) and by so doing objectifies both in either process; and by so doing, he transforms both part and whole (in either process); and by so doing, he transforms this part of the world; and by so doing, he transforms--even if only in a minute way--the entire world. He intensifies the organic bond between the part and the whole by causing them each to interact more vigorously with the other; and in this way, he extends the organic bond to himself by causing himself to interact first perceptually and then conceptually with the part and whole; and in this way he extends the organic bond from the part and whole through himself out to his audience by causing the audience to interact more vigorously perceptually with the part and the whole and also with himself, the artist.

Before the synecdoche takes place, we have three distinct and discrete units, usually fragmented: artist, whole, audience. (See Figure 9.)




Figure 9. Artist,
Whole,
Audience

(Note the hierarchy.)

During the process of artistic synecdocheic perception, we still have, initially in the process, three distinct and discrete units, but one of the units is now having its boundaries broken down by a perceptual bond with the artist. (See Figure 10.)





Figure 10. Artist Moving Towards
Whole (Part)

(Note the beginnings of equality.)

During the actual process of synecdocheic reorganization, the boundaries of the whole have been broken, with its disgorging of its part; and we have interaction in dialectic of the components. (See Figure 11.)




Figure 11. A Disgorging of a Part

But in the process of having its boundaries burst, the whole has had itself (in more than compensation) included within a greater boundary, the artist's perceptual-conceptual construct. (See

Figure 12.)




Figure 12. Beginnings of Synthesis

Then, the audience perceives the artist's synecdoche, and the formerly three distinct and discrete units have been organically confined under a common boundary. (See Figure 13.)




Figure 13. The Holism of Artist,
Part, Audience, and
Whole

The part (which formerly had had no existence of its own) now becomes the center of our new molecular atom of ontology. (See Figure 14.) The last has become first; the least, the greatest. But in so becoming, nothing is taken away from others. To the contrary, the others partici-




Figure 14. Molecule of Part and Artist, Whole, and Audience

pate and become greater themselves by being a part of the process and product.

Thus, the entire artistic process is completed. It is essential we understand that the entire artistic process includes and requires for completion, the audience interaction.

Therefore in this small portion of the universe is reality transformed; but even such a minute transformation sends its ripples out to the farthest corner of the cosmos, touching all in at least a little way. Each unit--artist, whole, part, and audience--subordinates itself for the good of the organic whole; but in such subordination each actually (and paradoxically) exalts its own uniqueness and strengthens it. Their individual, idiosyncratic product-self is subordinated to the satisfaction of the entire, organic process; such challenge of making a new addition to reality has stimulated each egoistical product-self into altruistic process, and by so doing enables each self-product to confront itself as part of an organic whole and process, and thus, by such confrontation, enables itself to be synthesized into organic exhaltation.

Only a process that results from the product of a being but does not belong to its usual manifestation (though this process may--or may not--bear its impress) can give a new perception of meaning to the context, which thus, in turn, slightly--or greatly--modifies, or transforms, the world. A process capable of originating from any such product (which thereby is necessarily "self-conscious") could no longer become if it were not in the evolution of becoming from and to; just as reality would no longer be in the process of being modified--or transformed--if this process did not operate.

The difference between products (which, because their activity has been segmented into a "finished" state, cannot generate processes detached from themselves) and processes (which through their action upon reality create the realm of products) is that only the latter are phenomena of conceptualizing; the former are objects of perceptualizing. Conceptualizing assumes prior perceptualizing and subsumes it under its process--as an a priori first step of function--and uses it as part of its creating process. Thus, it,

as the greater, is valuated the more. Conceptualizing, after incorporating perceptualizing, then reflects upon it and constructs a new relationship of whole and part, and thus creates a new construct. This reflection plus creation (action, here of mental, rather than physical, processes) is praxis. Praxis, "as the reflection and action which truly transforms reality, is the source of knowledge and creation."¹

Synecdoche, as a transforming and creative process, removes men from their permanent isolation from the world of outside reality, by involving them in the ideational flux of disgorging parts from the whole and reuniting them in an equality, with man, of valuation. It destroys the old spurious hierarchical valuation of the superiority of quantity, and replaces it with the celebration of equality of quality. It tri-dimensionalizes part, whole, and conceptualizer; it tri-dimensionalizes the temporal arrangement of reality by processing the past (whole, man), the present (whole, part, man), and the future (new construct

¹Freire, p. 91.

of concept) and the renewed flow and change of direction of reality.

Synecdoche, as a function of man's creativity, develops along a temporal path as a constant, yet fluxing, process of transformation within which discrete units separate only to re-synthesize in a higher order of existence. The Hegelian dialectic is perfected in that each thesis contains within itself its own antithesis, which, together, contain within themselves their own synthesis. How perfect! The old provincial nearsightedness of looking for ill and aid outside of one's own boundaries is discarded on the rubbish heap of falsity. Within the Idea, its own boundaries, are to be found its own Heaven and Hell, its own sickness and salutariness. Thus, the dialectic conflict of strength and growth are not closed units, which bombard those on the outside. They are merely latent or patent processes within each "organism,"² but also irretrievably linked to other organisms.

Synecdoche activates this natural dialectic.

²Such as cancer.

The artist, by employing the creative process of synecdoche, allows this dialectic to operationalize; and thus he promotes the evolution of process, thereby increasing the plenitude of the joy of life. Life (reality) is never naturally isolated, alien, or static; it rather is naturally a process or a series of processes causing objects to interact dialectically within themselves and without with other objects.

The conceptualizing of a new process and relationship of part and whole confronts reactionary complacency in a dialectical antagonism. The result is never guaranteed; but, before the harvest can be considered, the sowing must be completed.

Even the crude and uncomplimentary use of synecdoche (such as the use of the word "pussy" to designate a woman) causes man--on the one hand to celebrate the powerful nature of the form and function of sex in woman, but also to reconsider his attitude toward woman (belittling her humanity in relation to one of her anatomical functions).

Antagonisms between alienated beings--such as artist, world, reality, and audience--disappear

during the duration of the process of synecdoche. This occurs because their individual spiritual boundaries, instead of excluding the other two from the one, now include the three in a harmony of perception of conceptualized idea-construct. This climate of rationality and cosmopolitanism endures, not only during the duration of the synecdocheic process, but also beyond, fading of course with the temporal passage. But during this new climate, the new theme(s) of reality are infused with deeper and truer significance and are improved in terms of dynamic stability; each individual closed system--of the three--(before beset by entropy) is now infused with dynamic stability. This theme of a critical and dynamic view of ontology and axiology transforms discrete and fragmented reality into a holistic stability.

In the first and last analysis, these themes--of synecdocheic process--explode and dissolve limits and situations; the limits of idiosyncratic boundaries become porous and fluid, and merge with other boundaries; situations--forzen moments of product--dissolve and move in currents of thematic process. When false personal limits and situations

are revealed for what they are by the theme of synecdoche, and thus clearly perceived by all participants in the process of synecdoche, the corresponding tasks--man's responses in the form of transformation acceptance--can be both authentically and critically fulfilled. In this process, man is able to transcend his alienation--because--of--false--limits--and--situations, and to discover that beyond these falsities and falsehoods--and in contradiction to them--lies the feasibility of new heavens and new earths.

False Synecdoches

Of course there are--as with anything--false (or bad) synecdoches. The process is always true; but evil or cruel or ignorant men are always able to subvert and pervert the good, by diverting the true process into false and unclean channels. Thus, the synecdoche "pussy," for example, can work to destroy the dimensions of intellect and humanity and incipient divinity in women by reducing their entire being and process into a specific anatomical locale. In such a case certain men will unite their boundaries in glorification

of this falsehood.³ Such is a partnership and association, but never a triad, for the object--woman--never in its (her) entirety submits to the subsumption of her boundaries under such degrading and delimiting boundaries of the artist and audience. The frontier between man and woman thus is made less transversible but instead more desolate, barren, and dangerous.⁴ Such instances of wounded sensibilities preclude critical scrutiny and resultant critical movement and direction towards praxitcal feasibility.

Synecdoche and Direction

Synecdoche, with its generation of themes, thus can move either from the general (whole) to the particular and specific (part), or from the specific to the general. In either case,

³Of course, some individual women--maybe many--can adequately be so described (their essential worth and history and probable future) by this synecdocheic epithet of "pussy."

⁴The same is usually not true when woman uses the epithet "prick" to newly conceptualize man because man willingly joins in the triad here, because man is so concerned with desiring and having a large phallus. He gladly takes such a label literally. Thus the intended insult is gladly embraced by man as a compliment.

the mutual interpenetration of boundaries (of the triadic community) moves the triadic society from a provincial to a cosmopolitan one, from narrowness of existence to broadness of perception and conception. Fortuity gives way to teleology. Partial vision gives way to clarity of perception, with the fragments of ontology becoming holistic again:

When men lack a critical understanding of their reality, apprehending it in fragments which they do not perceive as interacting constituent elements of the whole, they cannot truly know that reality. To truly know it, they would have to reverse their starting point: they would need to have a total vision of the context in order subsequently to separate and isolate its constituent elements and by means of this analysis achieve a clearer perception of the whole.⁵

Synecdoche first places constituent elements back into their proper context, then separates the constituents, but by so doing reconciles in-text and context.

Properly done, synecdoche ideationalizes the significant dimensions of man's contextual ontol-

⁵Freire, p. 95.

ogy, the critical valuation of which, by man, enables him to end his subjugation to the blurred unknown, and enables him to facilitate the mutual interaction of the various intexts. This all makes possible a new critical attitude towards reality. This critical attitude in turn makes possible man's ontological dialectic, which is the first indispensable step towards a true dialogue.

The dialectic of, first, perception and, then, conceptualizing by means of coding requires the intellectual movement from abstract (and abstracted) acceptance to concrete criticality; this necessitates the moving from the whole to the part and then back to the whole (or from the part to the whole and then returning to the part). This maintenance of both elements (part-whole, or whole-part) as opposites yet the same, inter-relates them with themselves and with man dialectically in the process of reflection. Each subject and each object become their opposite: object and subject.

In all of these stages of coding, man interiorizes his view of the world; by so doing, the world contracts itself to within the bounds of

man and becomes part of him, rather than a hostile environment; in his turn, man expands his unnaturally contracted self to a space big enough to include all (or part of the world), and becomes, no longer, a small, insignificant alien in the face of a terrifying, overwhelming monstrosity of a world, but now an aegisifier of all the world. We must not make the mistake of believing that

themes exist, in their original objective purity, outside men--as if themes were things. Actually, themes exist in man in their relations with the world, with reference to concrete facts.⁶

Man is the prism that breaks down the white light of reality into the colors of themes; a rainbow of perception is a process, not a thing. This is an existential process by man:

The same objective fact could evoke different complexes of generative themes in different epochal sub-units. There is, therefore, a relation between the given objective fact, the perception men have of this fact, and the generative themes.

A meaningful thematics is expressed by men, and a given moment of ex-

⁶Ibid., p. 97.

pression will differ from an earlier moment, if men have changed their perception of the objective facts to which the themes refer. From the investigator's point of view, the important thing is to detect the starting point at which men visualize the "given" and to verify whether or not during the process of investigation any transformation has occurred in their way of perceiving reality. (Objective reality, of course, remains unchanged. If the perception of that reality changes in the course of the investigation, that fact does not impair the validity of the investigation.)

We must realize that the aspirations, the motives, and the objectives implicit in the meaningful thematics are human aspirations, motives, and objectives. They do not exist "out there" somewhere, as static entities; they are occurring. They are as historical as men themselves; consequently, they cannot be apprehended apart from men--it is necessary that the men concerned understand them as well. Thematic investigation thus becomes a common striving towards awareness of reality and towards self-awareness, which makes this investigation a starting point for the educational process or for cultural action of a liberating character.⁷

The tendency of pedagogues (on whatever level), because of self-conscious ignorance, tends to shift the true focus of the investigation from the process of creativity (here synecdoche) to either

⁷Ibid., pp. 97-8.

the artist himself, or to the object, the product of the synecdoche. We must always, however, start with the process. By so doing, we have creation rather than slavish and childish copying.


Creation is not a mechanical act; it requires the participant to discover the interpenetration of reality and promote the reconciliation of the abstracted and fragmented alien constituents of every context. The greater the synecdoche, the more comprehensive the perception of total reality.

The more effective the synecdoche, the more favorable must be the terms and thus the more sympathetic the activity of coding and reconciling. Sympathy here implies at base love and reverence of life. This thus includes satire. The artist who uses synecdoche to transform organic reality into inorganic appearance of reality (such as "pussy"), or what is really a process into what is a function, or life into product, or celebration into sneering--is a creature who fears reality. He sees in truth (i.e., reality), not a context but rather a threat. He does not want truth, for truth would force him to begin living;

living requires love of and respect for all life-forms. Such a perverted artist does not want to love or to live, because living and loving require spiritual commitment; and such a twisted artist has only, at best, a quivering and wounded spirit--at worse, a destroyed spirit. Thus, in retaliation (in revenge) he wishes the same for all other forms of life. He does not want to perceive and conceptualize; he only wishes to force the impress of his miserableness onto the forms of life, to brand, hurt, wound, and destroy. He wishes to think for others, rather than to promote the thinking of others. He wishes others to become consumers of his products, rather than producers of their own.

Synecdoche as Reflection

Synecdoche is reflection upon situationality and the subsequent conceptualizing of the particular out of the whole, the precipitation of the part to emerge from total submersion and to acquire the power to intervene both in the arrogance of the whole and the ignorance of the audience. Thus, first we have perception, then, conception

by the artist, next emergence from the total by the part (and intervention in the total and in the audience by the part), and then conscious reflection upon the entire process and present situation by the audience. Latent thought has become patent. In synecdoche, the content thus continually expands and renews itself in the dialectic process of thesis  antithesis; the componentalizing of thesis and its definition, and resolution; and the final synthesis--all of which leads to dialogue between thesis and antithesis: synthesis is the dialogic process perfected (i.e., completed).

Thus, the artist, by the process of synecdoche, sets context in motion and direction by setting up the part and the whole in a dialectic; the synthesis comprises the dialogue. The audience, by participating in the process (as first observers and then participants) also engage, as the tip of an isosceles triangle, with the other two angles, in a dialogic process. The product (i.e., the result) is a further process: first, thinking, and then celebration (i.e., appreciation). These two latter processes lead the audi-

ence to awareness; awareness in turn, leads to emancipation from non-thinking ignorance and intellectual apathy.

Synecdocheic Symbol Versus the Copied

Gimmick

This contrasts with the carpenters of creativity (who try to foist off on to the student, at best slavish imitation of the product of artists and at worse, a mere copying of the product with at the most substitution of terms). Thus, in one student playwright's pitiful copywork about a woman rag collector, we have the theft of Tennessee William's effective use of synecdocheic symbol of the ashes--all to the applause of the student's professor, the academic dean mentioned earlier.⁸ In William's play, The Rose Tatoo, the ashes are the symbolic part of the heroine's love, admiration, and passion for her dead husband (in addition to their identity as the literal remains of the same husband). After the revelation to her that her husband in life had been unfaithful to her, her love and admiration and passion for him become, suddenly,

⁸This play was the final half of the student playwright's Ph.D. thesis in the theatre department at a Big Ten university.

mere "cold ashes." (This situation is now comparable to the "cold ashes" of the husband's love for her while he was yet alive.) What magnificent shift in motion and change of direction! The whole had become the part (love and passion and a man to ashes); but then the part became the whole: cold dead ashes represents the sum of her love and passion for her dead husband.

However, in the student's play, the ashes are merely a sum total in themselves, a gimmick. The student playwright was successful in copying everything except William's talent.

This carpentry is antidiological and antidi-
alectical: the professor of playwriting deposited into the student playwright, who in turn tried to deposit in (or on) the audience. The student was trying to realize "artistically" his professor's view of the world (of drama).⁹ Regardless of whether the professor's view was muddy or clear, such attempt was doomed artistically before it began.

⁹In a private conversation with this author, the professor proudly took the credit for suggesting the gimmick of the ashes. It took, he boasted, three hours, for the gimmick of the ashes to come out of a conversation-exhortation he was

In contrast to this anti-dialectic and anti-dialogical product-carpentry and deposit-method of education, the program content of the dialectic and dialogical process-method is constituted and organized by the student's (the artist's) view of the world. The teacher, in this method does not oppress and dominate the student-artist by imposing his view of the world upon him; but, rather, in this system of education, the teacher liberates the student-artist by keeping out of his way and by supporting the student's efforts with love and appreciation for the struggle going on between the student and his context. In this latter method, the student's content constantly expands and renews itself because it is part of the process of the student expanding and renewing himself (and thus his perceptions). At most, the task of the teacher in this method of education is to work as a partner to the student only in the sense that he represents, by student invi-

having with the student playwright. Neither the professor nor the student saw fit to give any credit to Williams, from whom they had copied a product (i.e., the ashes).

tation, part of the student's context. The professor returns the context to the student, not as a solution, but as a problem. Such education is possible only when there is present mutual understanding and trust; any condescension or insecurity-based false feelings of superiority on the part of the teacher automatically and irrevocably destroys any possibility of productive work of merit on the part of the student. The student must be a volunteer in this educative setting; coercion and repression are murderers of creativity. The student-artist begins by gathering series of data about his context and about himself. This is best done in the mind and heart of the student-artist, not on paper or canvas.

Meanwhile, the teacher does not accompany the students on their individual journeyings into themselves and into their contexts; the teacher stands back and awaits the individual student's return. This is not to be misconstrued. The teacher does not stand up in front of the class and lecture and deposit rules into the student. The teacher does not teach only from a book. The teacher teaches from the context of the commun-

ity. He takes his students to the courthouse and observes trials; he takes them to the local jail; to communes; to drug rehabilitation centers; to retirement homes; and on and on and on. But on these voyages, although he accompanies the students physically, he does not accompany them intellectually, spiritually, emotionally, psychologically, and artistically on their individual journeyings within themselves. In short, we have two simultaneous journeys: the group journey into the community context, and each individual journey into the self.

The teacher never intrudes upon the student's creative process at least until there is a by-product left as the process continues; the teacher never looks at an unfinished work. How horrible and devastating and destructive when an art teacher looks over the shoulder of a student as the student draws or paints; how criminal when a teacher asks to see the first act or chapter of a work in progress, or the first draft, or an outline! Either such a teacher is vastly ignorant of and totally insensitive to the artistic process and of the artist in artistic heat or deadly vicious

in either a subconscious or conscious attempt to destroy any possible creative effort. The latter is far more common than one could dread. Little people trying to teach Godly creativity tend to try to prevent anyone from surpassing their own littleness. The student must become aware of this and avoid such evil people.

When an artistic by-product is ready and the student-artist is ready to share it, the teacher must act as a sympathetic observer, with at least an attitude or pretense of respect towards what he sees. While it is of course normal for the teacher to come to the class with values that influence his perceptions, this does not mean that he may transform nor impose upon another's artifact. Who can judge a work of art? Without the help of the passage of time? Time only can truly evaluate. The greater the work, the more original the creator; the more original the artist, the greater the work of art, and the less the audience (teacher included) can immediately understand or appreciate it. And then appreciation comes before understanding. The teacher is always just part of the audience; he is

not a boss. A truly original work of art is always an immediate shock to our sensibilities; such a work must educate and cultivate its audience's taste; education and cultivation both always require time to accomplish their ends. The greater and more original the work, the greater must be the education and cultivation; the greater the task of education and cultivation, the more time and effort required. A little humility on the part of audience (teachers especially) goes a long way. Arrogance equals stupidity. A tailor run mad with pride has no business being tolerated by any students. They must not tolerate such outrage. When so outraged, they must stand up quickly and vote no with their feet. Megalomania has no place in the arts or in education. Let it stay where it belongs, in business, politics, and religion.

The only dimension of the teacher's values that it is hoped that the student-artists will come to share and will want to share is a critical perception of reality, which implies a correct method of approaching ontology and metaphysics with a view to unveiling them. Such critical

perception cannot be dictated nor imposed. Therefore, from first to last, creativity is pursued as an educational process and as a cultural perceptualizing and conceptualizing activity.

Synecdoche as a Bridge of Thought

During the joint process of activating and exciting the creative process, both teacher and student must critically view the particular area of context chosen as though it were a vast, unique, organic, throbbing, living mass to be coded by means of perceptions. They must not forget the region of temporary rejection, but also must not let it intrude unduly. They must regard the area of context chosen as a holism, and by perception-after-perception, attempt first to discretize it, and then to separate a part out from the whole by analyzing the partial and total dimensions that impress the part and the whole with their identity and ideation. Through such a process, both teacher and student increase their awareness of how part and whole interact, interpenetrate, and symbiosize (and also potentially to mutually war and destroy); this perceptualizing will later (shortly) enable them to conceptualize a new re-

relationship of part and whole, or perhaps more accurately, faithfully reconstruct one of an infinite number of already existing though hidden relationships. The artist is to perceive and then in a work capture the very syntax of the relationship of part and whole (the very structure of their interpenetrative "thought"). Just as each entity has an Idea and soul, just so is each entity's relationship with another entity or within the whole characterized by thought, by thinking.

Thought here is the process of intending and purposing, and thus is the bridge between part and whole and between one and another. Synecdoche is the articulating of one aspect of thought between part and whole.

Artistic Perception

In all areas of education, we are after artistic perception.

Creative Stenosis

The artist (or anyone) narrows his attention and focus down upon one (or more) moments of the thought of the contextual area which he has chosen. It is essential that the student observe and perceive the context under varying circumstan-

ces. Here is one area in which the teacher can help. No essential activity of the context must escape the attention of the student; he must be awake and alert and seeing.

Such observation comprises the first stage of artistic perception.

Artistic Evaluation

The next step is artistic evaluation. The student (not the teacher) must now decide which components in the context are to be emphasized. This exposition challenges his previous preconceptions and prejudices.

Coding

The resulting synthesis is the coding of the reality, which is the third step. After the reconsidering through critical reflection of the selected components, the student codes his analysis of the reality and reinserts it dialogically, into the disjoined whole, thereby making a new totality, by having transformed (by coding) a part of it.

The more the artist divides parts from wholes and reintegrates the new whole, the more closely he approaches the synthesis of the principal and

secondary contradictions which involve the creative process. By approaching (and effecting) these syntheses of contradictions, the artist becomes more able to organize the constructs of content. Certainly, if the content-constructs reflect syntheses of part and whole, meaningful thematics are born. Artifacts produced by this process have life, whereas "artifacts" ordered from an oppressive and dominating authority (whether educational institution or Hollywood or Broadway or lover) are stillborn. The basic thing, starting from the critical perception of these latent syntheses of contradictions and the fulfillment of conceptualized reconciliation (which are both microcasms and correlatives of the contradictions within society, within man, within nature, within the cosmos, and within the relation of God and man), is to study, look, and reflect, thereby developing levels of awareness of these contradictions.

Contradictions. Intrinsically, these contradictions contain the unlimited processes; the artist, by not being circumscribed by the monolithic boundaries of an Idea, and able to see

contradictions within a whole, and able subsequently to entertain both realities, thus is able to incorporate harmoniously the ontological and axiological ambiguities of life and substance. Such ability springs man loose from the fatalism and fatality of boundaries and of limits. Through subjective perceptualizing and conceptualizing, man liberates himself from objective realities.

Such an unlimiting-process as a mental reality can transport individuals from and to different contextual areas, just as it transports parts from wholes. Synecdocheic awareness is true and real consciousness of reality; impenetrable blocks of context are the result of mental obliquity. The apprehension of the complex of contradictions is an act, not only of perceptive ability, but perhaps more so of courage.

The trick is to select a contradiction that most appropriately develops, by its synthesis, the proposed thematics of the artist. The codification of a contradiction will become the mediation between artist and audience, besides that of between nature and artist.

Such selection of contradictions must adhere

to certain principles. The first such principle is that the terms of the contradiction must be familiar to the audience, so that the members can easily grasp the situation. Secondly, the contradiction must be neither overly explicit nor overly implicit. The first instance would lull the audience to such a degree that the members would not be prepared to grasp the synecdoche of the terms of the contradiction. The second instance, overly implicitness, would so bewilder the audience that the members, again, would not be ready to grasp the synecdoche because their unfamiliarity with the terms of the contradiction would prevent their connecting the synecdoche (seeing it as a "natural" evolutionary result of the contradiction) with the contradiction. Synecdoche is a challenge, but a graspable and attainable challenge.

Defamiliarization of the Familiar. The synecdoche itself then reverses this familiar process by defamiliarizing the familiar. We are all familiar with a hand; the expansion of the idea of hand to include the entire person and all the complex relationships between two intimate people (or two people on the brink of the

intimacy of marriage) comes as a pleasant (and here, mild) shock of surprise and astonishment. Once the wonder of it has subsided, the third step (the familiar part \longrightarrow the familiar whole \longrightarrow fusion as one \longrightarrow astonishment [defamiliarization of the familiar]) is accomplished: the familiar-become-defamiliarized now becomes familiar. But the aura of the process of change never completely leaves the phenomenon. Thus, there is always that surprised appreciation lingering around the use of a synecdoche, no matter how much used and how traditional it has become.

In the process of decoding the synecdoche, each person in the audience externalizes his response by becoming a member of the audience which decodes the synecdoche. Each becomes a member of the reflecting community. By achieving this awareness, the audience comes to perceive reality differently; by broadening the boundaries of their perceptive faculties, the members discover, to their delight, the joys and growth in participating in a dialectic and dialogical relationship with one another (in their mutual awareness and

appreciation), with the artist, and with reality.

The same process is true of the artist: by perceiving the contradiction and then conceptualizing his synthesis of the synecdoche, and then sharing it all with his fellows (this last is crucial), the artist also externalizes his response to reality and thus realizes how he himself has acted while experiencing the process of perception of contradictions, conceptualizing his synthesis of it in a synecdoche, and then sharing the fruit of his artistic growth with his fellow man--and thus realizes how nature and God feel and experience: Out of contrarities did God fashion the world. In addition to becoming more of a man (by expanding his capacities for perceptions and feelings, and his abilities in conceptualizing and then realizing in artifactual form), the artist also approaches, as we have already pointed out elsewhere, the level of godhood.

Synecdoche makes for more awareness of the old reality at the same time that it makes for awareness of the new reality (the old transformed by art into the new). It concentrates systematically the often digressory nature of the human

intellect upon the synthesizing process. It links the relationship of their unfelt needs to the fulfillment of those needs.

Synecdoche as Simultaneous Projection

Synecdoche is the simultaneous projection of different situations; the auxiliary becomes the essential; and thus it communicates to the artist and audience the reality of totality. Individuals who were submerged in their contexts as merely parts, now rise above the fragmentary relationships with their contexts and perceive that even in the lowliest of parts can be and is contained the whole. The last becomes first; the lowliest, the highest; and the smallest, the greatest. And best of all, none of this at the expense of the first, the highest, and the greatest.

The education of the student-artist (and of all students) can begin only with the freedom and encouragement to enter into a dialectic and dialogical relationship with reality. The artist is our guide; we must not allow teachers to destroy our guides by simplistic and stupid criti-

cisms and comparisons of their products (their artifacts). Students need to be shown the possibilities of the creative processes and then encouraged to participate in them. Contradictions must not be avoided, as they are today. Rather, contradictory themes must be investigated and celebrated for the richness of their patent and latent syntheses and interpenetrations with other themes of contradictions found in reality. We must not allow teachers to sacrifice this vast and immense richness and powers to the fear of ignorant personal exposé. The important thing in true education is for the student to feel free to go to reality as master of his own thinking and to accept reality and its present realizations and latent potentials as co-equals.

Common Forms of Synecdoche

Paraphrase, praecis, quotation, summary, and plagiarism are all aspects of synecdoche. Each has two potential aspects: first, each can be a subtraction by us from the work of another so as to augment our own; and, secondly, each can be an addition to the work of another at our ex-

pense (or, stated in another manner, either an expression of part as the whole, or the expression of the whole in a part [of us]).

First, each of these common forms of synecdoche has the potential for being an expression of part of the whole. That is, in paraphrase, for example, we take all of another (all of his style and his content) and reduce this all to a part: to idea. That is, we try to take all of the idea of another, but not all of his content and not any of his style. We substitute our own style for his. (See Figures 15 and 16.)






Figure 15. Paraphrase

Or,

Another's content of ideas.



Another's carrier (style) of his content of ideas.



My reduction of another's content of ideas to an idea.

My carrier (style) of another's idea.

Figure 16. Paraphrase, Another View

By synthesizing our style with his central idea, we proclaim our equality of worth with the other author's. The whole now becomes compounded: I and the other author; the whole is now represented by two compounded parts: his idea and my style. This process is a derivative one: the original author perceived an aspect of reality and then conceptualized it into his construct (into a new form); I take his construct and modify it into my construct (but with his contribution still perceivable to the audience's eye). Thus, I have accepted his perception of reality (instead of making my own perception). I am therefore the helpmate of the original author; but the original author is also my helpmate. The whole of the author is implicit in the part which I have taken from him. In my work of art or of craft, such synecdoche produces echoes of greatness, which help to enrich my work.

However, this special process of synecdoche is an incomplete one because I have by-passed part of the complete process: I have not perceived; another has perceived for me. Thus, while such incomplete synecdoche enriches my work, still,

I must use it with caution and restraint, lest my work ends up with incompleteness as its dominant effect. In other words, it is "artistic" (effective) to use the work of my fellow artists and craftsmen to enrichen my work; it is quite another thing to use my fellow artist or craftsman to comprise all--or at least, the main thrust--of my project. I can use (and should use) another to help me, but not to substitute for the lack of my own original perceptions and initial conceptualizing.

This is where the works of Gleckner and Brustein, for examples, fall short: they merely "stylize" (and sometimes further develop) the original perceptions and conceptions of others. To briefly illustrate: the importance of viewpoint in William Blake was first pointed out and presented by Northrop Frye in 1947; Gleckner then took this concept from Frye and puffed it up and further developed and refined it.¹⁰

Praecis is similar to paraphrase, differing

¹⁰Brian Wilkie, "Blake's Innocence and Experience: An Approach," Blake Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring, 1974), p. 119.

only in that we take--not the whole of one segment of another's ideas--but just part, and then add our style. Summary carries praecis even further.

All of the above general process is the first aspect of synecdoche: appropriating the content of ideas and then supplying the style. This amounts to a subtraction from the original and an addition to the derivative: $A - a \rightarrow B + a$.

The other aspect of these types of synecdoche is this subtraction from one so as to add to the ideas of another.

The simplest form of this aspect is the process by which we, in our words (our own style), explain to another what is not apparent to him when he considers the original; in this way, we go beyond the expression of the original author. Or, in the case of the classroom, the teacher or professor, in his own words, gives part (the main ideas, or some relevant or pertinent portion) of some author to the students, who do not have the time (or have not had the time) to read the original for themselves.

In quotation, we take a part of the whole

of another's work, and in so doing bring to bear upon our text the entire weight of, not only the text from which we have borrowed, but also, in the instance of a well-known artist or thinker, his entire corpus of work and his reputation as well.

Plagiarism can be in the letter or the spirit of the law: in the letter of the law, we quote or paraphrase from another without properly identifying (i.e., without acknowledging the source of our theft.)¹¹ The spirit of the law is fulfilled when we paraphrase, quote, praecis, or summarize without proper acknowledgement but such proper acknowledgement is not needed. When we borrow something that is well known, we do not need to explicitly acknowledge the source because everyone knows so well the source and is well aware of our borrowing.¹² An example of this is Dickens' use, in Little Dorrit, of the quotation, "'tis distance lends enchantment to the view . . . ,"

¹¹When we borrow--quote, paraphrase, praecis, or summarize--without using quotation marks or proper acknowledgement of the original source, it is theft.

¹²We are not concerned here with legal defini-

from Thomas Campbell's The Pleasures of Hope.

This line was so well-known and famous in that day that Dickens could rely upon his reader's supplying of the footnote. Such practice enriched his work and it has enriched and can enrich the works of others.

Style can also be plagiarized: Ruark aped Hemingway's unique style (as did a whole host of people); Weaver appropriates style from Jews without Money and Some Call it Sleep to infuse his fine short story "The Day I Lost my Distance"; Cassill appropriates Faulkner's convoluted, rambling style of his mature years, for parts of his Pretty Leslie.

Quotation, paraphrase, praecis, and summary are beautiful techniques, not only in art, but also in rhetoric, freshman composition, and science; in using them artistically or at least skillfully, we go into partnership with our fellow artists and craftsmen; we celebrate their worth by joining it to ours. But these techniques can never be substituted for our own lack of intelli-

tions.

gence or talent. They can complement and enrichen but not take the place of.

Pedagogical Implications

The very practice of teaching itself takes the form of synecdoche: for example, we teach, in English, the Romantic Period; but the poets taught are only a selected few. A part (a few of all the many poets who wrote at that time and in "that way") is presented as representing the whole. This is true in all of the disciplines. We teach Shakespeare by requiring the reading of Hamlet, Julius Caesar, and several others. But what about Titus Andronicus? That is Shakespeare also. How many teachers present a part of Stanislavski entitled "The Method" as the whole of Stanislavski?

But what subject can any man (or woman) master in his lifetime even if he spends every waking moment studying it, muchless present it all to a class within the time limits of a course. Pedagogical synecdoche is a time-saver.

In educational supervision, any one method of observation considers necessarily merely a

part of the teacher's teaching methods; yet this part usually is used to judge the whole. Flanders Verbal Interaction Analysis, for example, observes and records only seven categories of verbal modes.¹³ Body language, and so forth, are not even remotely considered.¹⁴

Models are instances of the use of synecdoche in theory. Models "are miniature representations that summarize¹⁵ data and/or phenomena and thus act as an aid to comprehension."¹⁶ Some examples are the working model (of the structure of molecules, solar system, et cetera); the conceptual model (systems); mathematical model ($E=mc^2$, and so forth); and graphic models (sentence diagramming, maps, and such).¹⁷ No area of learning or culture or everyday thinking is free from

¹³Ned A. Flanders, Interaction-Analysis in the Classroom: A Manual for Observers (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1965).

¹⁴See Hyman, "Teaching Strategies," p. 241, and all of Hyman (ed.), Teaching: Vantage Points for Study, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1974).

¹⁵Italics mine.

¹⁶Zais, p. 91.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 92.

the influence of synecdoche.¹⁸

Summary

Synecdoche, the third level of creativity, is the process by which we present the whole by means of a part (with the whole implied in the part) or the part by means of the whole (with the part implied in the whole). Such a process, by elevating in importance the part, nevertheless also glorifies the whole. It entails, first, a perception of the possibility, and, secondly, a realization in a construct of the perception.

¹⁸Michael A. McDaniel, "Tomorrow's Curriculum Today," Learning for Tomorrow, p. 111.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOURTH LEVEL OF CREATIVITY

CLASSICAL MODELING

From memory men can get experience; for by often remembering the same thing they acquire the power of unified experience. Experience, though it seems quite like scientific knowledge and art, is really what produces them; for, as Polus rightly says, experience brought art, and inexperience, luck. Art is born when out of the many bits of information derived from experience there emerges a grasp of those similarities in view of which they are a unified whole.

--Aristotle

Introduction

Classical Modeling differs from quotation, paraphrase, praecis, and summary in that it con-

tinues from the point at which these latter forms leave off: these latter merely reproduce the perceptions and conceptualizings of others; classical modeling, however, accepts the perceptions of the community (and of other artists) but then conceptualizes its own artifacts. Romanticism excitingly and adventurously and daringly sweeps away the conventions of traditional perceptions and codifications; classicism accepts these conventions, separates them by dialectic, and then resynthesizes them into a new conceptualization.

The Original Classical Modelers in Western Culture

The Greeks accepted the myths of their society but reconceptualized them individually and uniquely. Sophocles was not the only Greek tragedian to write a version of the Oedipus story; the Romans, in turn, used the Greek plays as their models (as their given perceptions of the context of the dramatic and comic spirits) and reconceptualized their own works from them; and then in turn,

the plays of Plautus and Terence provided models for the Renaissance dramatists, and playwrights in Italy, France,

England, and elsewhere translated and imitated the Roman plays, adapting their plots and characters to new and original creations. Ariosto, Molière, Shakespeare, and Ben Jonson are among the many dramatists who . . . built their works upon the works of the Roman artists.¹

This was because the Romans

had nothing of their own that deserved the name of literature and so, when they came into contact with Greek culture and Greek literature, they were naturally eager to imitate and adapt the Greek masterpieces. The Romans may have lost some strength and realism by their generous use of Greek writers but they doubtless saved much time by entering quickly on their heritage, and early writers like Naevius and Plautus brought vigor and originality to the literary types taken over from the Greeks.²

Similarly, all modern writers are indebted in some way, either directly or indirectly, to the Greeks:

The beginnings of Roman literature are sometimes criticized as imitation and translation but it is worth recall-

¹George E. Duckworth, The Nature of Roman Comedy: A Study in Popular Entertainment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. v.

²Ibid., p. 4.

ing that the Greeks by the third century B.C. had already invented, developed, and brought to a state of perfection almost every conceivable literary form--epic, drama (both tragedy and comedy), lyric, elegy, epigram, pastoral, history, oratory, philosophical dialogue and treatise. The literature of ancient Greece is the one truly original European literature and in a broad sense all later literatures of western Europe are and must be imitative in that they are all indebted to Greece, directly or indirectly, for their literary forms.³

The artists who choose to be indirectly indebted to their culture and community are Romantics; those, however, who choose to be directly indebted are Classicists.

Acceptance of Heritage

Classical modeling entails the submerging of the artist into the powerful heritage of art and the influence of the entire milieu of his society so that his own unique personality may steep and color itself:

there must be interaction with one's environment: social learning, social invention, and a progressive and devel-

³Ibid., pp. 3-4.

oping wholeness, harmony, integration.⁴

In this way, he does not primarily concern himself with the problems of values and perspectives--these are givens (unless of course he is utilizing only the forms and not the contents), but only of the different levels and kinds of value perspectives involved in perceptions. Thus, he builds upon the work of others: "One's successes are always related to and built upon the findings of others."⁵

Recognition of value-concerns forms the design of his priorities established among the basic referents of perception. Thus, content is a set of value judgments that prizes cultural and social heritage over idiosyncratic interests.

Value Commitments

At another level, the recognition and acceptance of cultural justification entail value commitments. Communal value positions result

⁴Harold H. Anderson, "Creativity as Personality Development," Creativity and its Cultivation . . . , p. 14.

⁵Eyring, p. 8.

in the describing of content constants in both similar and different patterns, but mostly similar patterns. This can be illustrated easily with the three basic artistic positions one may take: a realistic (a factualist or imitationist), Romantic (an essentialist or valuator), and Classicist (a formalist or modeler).

Theory of creativity is essentially an attempt to construct a theory of value processes, whereas designs (artifacts) of creativity are patterns of value judgments and processes. The task of justifying the creative pattern is not completed simply by making the judgments. In Classical modeling, values must be clearly identified before the specification of process rather than used as results of the pattern-making process.

The Two Levels of Value

Thus, there are two levels of values that we must focus on at this time as illustrations (recognizing of course that there are still other cogent value levels as well) and these are considerations of value at both the theory and design levels: these two levels are structural perspectives and rational values.

At the level of structural perspectives, we approach the world or mediate reality through fundamental and traditional perceptual structures. We are from the very beginning asserting an orientation to ontological traditions. That is, if the artist accepts the community's (or society's) orientation, he mediates reality through the values of society (including society's other artists).

Also, at the rational value level we mediate reality. We may dispute the value of a given design, but we never dispute that the design has or has not value; we dispute only on the grounds that the design may not meet the criteria of a good design, or we dispute the criteria that have been applied to examine the specific design. In either of these cases we have non-disputable orientations upon which are founded our logical and value activities. Perhaps these foundations are a kind of communal propaganda, but the propaganda--if such it be--has already been securely personalized so that it is more than merely cognitive in its effect upon us.

When we move to the level of perceptual de-

signs, the value components are even more given. It is clear that artists who promulgate such supposed value designs as ontological and axiological givens are basing and deriving considerable thematic direction on and from these "outer" value positions which they have internalized. Thus, value designs appear clearly here as a source of content and as directionals of significant elements in the constructs of the value designs. Perceptions thus are not the problem, but rather their realizations into "realistic" forms.

It is clear that communal orientation has clarified the problems of value, a luxury the Classical artist enjoys over the Romantic. It is probably primarily this success that gives Classical modeling its unified linear character. We are often, for example, creating at the same or similar value and design levels and thus, not only sympathize with, but more often coincide with one another's affecting and perceiving. And it has clearly been realized that the most fundamental level, structural perspectives, is also grounded in a some sort of communal value matrix. Thus, we assume that we all share the same basic vision

of life.

Communal and Artistic Consensus

This fundamental acceptance that we are all working with the same basic structures and that it is sufficient simply to reason together for everything to become clarified and agreeable leaves us in the enviable position of starting from a given position, rather than having to begin by finding or creating our own position. Classical modelists thus have a running jump on the Romantics, who first must construct their own race track.

Obviously knowledge cannot be divorced from human interests; neither can fact be abstracted from value. Classical modeling has as one of its constitutive basics, communal consensus. It is inimicable to the orientation of the positivistic methodology of science, which has misled us into denying the knowledge base of the arts, thus reducing the understanding of meaning and perception to a monologic constriction:

. . . monologic . . . means the abstraction of fact from value and the creation of theory explaining facts in an empir-

ical-analytic fashion. The process of verification is a linear one called, variously, for example, education, induction, or abduction. A formalized language (e.g., calculus) is used to facilitate objectivity.

Hermeneutic understanding of meaning arises in the context of different cultural life expressions such as ordinary language, human actions, and nonverbal expressions. All of these experiences carry symbolic meanings, which, however, need a dialogic interpretation rather than monologic verification. The methodology is circular rather than linear in that the interpretation of meaning in hermeneutic understanding depends on a reciprocal relation between "parts" and a diffusely preunderstood "whole" and the correction of the preliminary concept by means of the parts. It is a method that discovers the empirical content of individual conditions of life while investigating grammatical structures.⁶

The grammar of ontological and axiological designs is a given: the forms of structures of the perceptual designs are interdependent; the arrangements of the systems of thematics is a customary one; the systems of rules is nonnegotiable; and the elementary principles of the field of knowledge are unchallenged. For the Romantics, grammar is still evolving; the burden of communication lies primarily with the audience; the Roman-

⁶Macdonald, "Curriculum and Human Interest," pp. 286-7.

tic is a pioneer searching out the rules, principles, and arrangements of systems of thematics.

For the Classical Modelist, the grammar of the systems and designs of life are the alpha and omega of conception, just this side of parturition; this grammar is a parturifacient medicine for the creative act--for the creative fait accompli.

Facts are never separate from the values and grounds of activity and even more importantly from value. Thus, facts do not fetter but rather liberate. The Classical Modelist is free; at the same time, he welcomes the limits of facts; thus, the greatest Classical Modelists of them all, the Greeks, held fundamental convictions that, while, on the one hand, freedom was their most precious possession,⁷ yet, on the other hand, believed "that limits were good."⁸

For the Romantic, however, who has to assign his own individual values to facts, facts tend to fetter and to destroy: "Thoughts keep alive.

⁷Edith Hamilton, The Echo of Greece (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 16.

⁸Ibid., p. 18.

Only facts kill--deeds!"⁹

Classical Modelists are intellectualists: they consciously and rationally use the forms and constructs of others (the physicalities, if you will) upon which to build and into which they infuse their great spiritual feelings. In this way, they fulfill our human natures and thereby more nearly synthesize the two parts of man, which more fully completes both.

The Romantics, by having to construct first their ontology and then to infuse it with axiological thematics, are exhausted, their work limited by the sheer exertion of such total and vast creativity. The Classical Modelists, by using an already existent foundation, find their work of creativity easier: it is, in fact, an immense stimulus to creative activity.

Classical Modelists tend to combine and synthesize the knower and the already-known (the already realized and manifested) with fact and value. The one is the cause of the other; the great natural teleological concatenation is ex-

⁹Eugene O'Neill, Welded, 1931, Act II, Scene 2.

ploited into practical means-ends continuities. Both serve a critical interest, since both accept the status quo as descriptively given and as integral with the knower. The methodology of this synthesis is self-reflective. Thus, the artist begins with a metaphysical construct that is empirically (and conventionally and traditionally) verifiable and which provides a systematically generalizable schema that accounts for the interpenetration of part and whole and spirit and fact.

This allows the audience to make contributive exegetical suggestions to themselves concerning life by way of the mediating artifact, exegetical suggestions that, without the artifact, they would not be able to make. These suggestions are verified by the individual's and the communal acceptance and adoption of them into their consciousnesses. In this methodology the created object participates in the creative process as both the subject and as the means; it is both the message and the metaphor.

One basic proposition about this level of creativity is that at all perceptual levels and specifically at the levels of structural perspec-

tives and rational values, the basic phenomenon that underlies creativity is the existence of communal vision and interest that precedes, accompanies, and results in the creative process.

In this way, three basic cognitive interests are satisfied: first, outside control is achieved without outside oppression; this is achieved because the thematics and designs are givens for the artist (and gladly accepted as such by the artist)--they thus control the shape and direction of his creative process and activities.

This is made possible because of consensus: both the artist and his community agree that the thematics and designs are correctly structured and valued; their mutual perspectives are not just confluent, but rather congruent. Thus, consensual control results in the emancipation of the artist: he is free to conceptualize as he desires the already-existent perceptualizations.

At the level of structural perspectives in creativity where our artist transcribes the limits and variables of which the thematics and designs are composed and sets the ground rules for conceptualizing, he is perhaps most implicitly

influenced by human concerns sifting through the perceptual forms prescribed by his community (i.e., tradition, environment, and personality). He is more able and willing to categorize by creating his work at different levels. Here, the major creative thrust in the critical cognitive interest is in the supportive realm. Control potential is in only the facts, but nevertheless takes on a more institutionalized or formalized aspect. The control aspect is associated with both subject matter and form; when it degenerates into an association with only forms or societal institutions, then the result is neo-classical modeling.

Consensus Versus Individuation

Whereas much of Romantic creativity entails the search for perceptual patterns concerning the place of individual as part of the societal whole but becoming, by abstraction from that whole, a fragmented whole (alienated and lonely), Classical Modeling creativity concerns itself muchly with the conceptualization of the problems of given social (including the cosmic society) issues designs and thus reflects a fundamental interest and preoc-

cupation with consensus, or reconciliation of conflicting elements within the social boundaries and expectations, as opposed to the Romantic preoccupation with individuation and the coming to terms of an individual with his alienation and aloneness.

Reconciliation and Synthesis

For the Classical Modelist, the resolution of conflicts as artistic problems are not determined ahead of the process of reconciliation or at least the movement of thematics in that direction (of reconciliation), but the a priori expectations of conciliatory dialogue and dialectic are a built-in feature directing the process towards consensus in culmination. Such designs reflect a practical concern for reconciliation rather than the more hard-to-attain concern for synthesis, although synthesis is also a good, albeit a less immediate one. Romantics, on the other hand, tend to leap over reconciliation in their obsessive quest for synthesis.

The Romantic pattern of thematic design, individual subject centered, or abstracted needs, is more closely associated with emancipatory in-

terest. In this instance, the process of developing individual and part potential or of strengthening self-realization is embedded in a creative interest in liberating individuals and parts from whole limitations and in creating new relationships and contexts. This fundamental preoccupation gives movement and direction to the concomitant implied values of the constitutive segments and processes.

Process Context

In both situations, Romanticism and Classicism, we have a process context. In both, reflection is a central preoccupation: in Romanticism, it is primarily reflection on self; in Classicism, it is primarily reflection on object. Both levels of creativity are political in thematic movement in that in both processes the artist is attempting to facilitate his own and also his audience's idea of the nature of true life by creating social (part with whole) processes and conceptualizing an environment, for synthesis. All that is proposed, has to do (finally) with emancipation of life. The means employed in each instance--the

correct position and process--actually posits that some fragment of actual consequences--a fragment arbitrarily chosen because the heart has been wounded by it--authorizes the use of processes to fulfill it, without the consequences of the choices predetermining the consequences. It thus enfold in a striking manner the truth disclosed in the process that values dependence and interdependence of part and whole as distinct from causal efficiency.

By accepting and beginning with the patterns and thematic designs already institutionalized by society, the artist is already deeply rooted in "fact" as means rather than as ends, and thus his activities are a part of the whole and are already synthesized with the whole--to an extent. He already has ready at hand his raw materials--perceptual designs--and is ready to begin work:

No human activity operates in a vacuum; it acts in the world and has materials upon which and through which it produces results. On the other hand, no material--air, water, metal, wood, etc.--is means save as it is employed in some human activity to accomplish something. When "organization of activities" is mentioned, it always includes within itself organization of the materials

existing in the world in which we live. That organization which is the "final" value for each concrete situation of valuation thus forms part of the existential conditions that have to be taken into account in further formation of desires and interest or valuations. In the degree in which a particular valuation is invalid because of inconsiderate shortsighted investigations of things in their relation of means-ends, difficulties are put in the way of subsequent reasonable valuations. To the degree in which desires and interests are formed after critical survey of the conditions which as means determine the actual outcome, the more smoothly continuous become subsequent activities, for consequences attained are then such as are evaluated more readily as means, in the continuum of action.¹⁰

The artist images a picture that emerges from apparently frenetic communal activity and which enjoys a growing acceptance by the powerful and restrictive bureaucracy of society, as an ideal of excellence and a source of inspiration. It becomes a dominant metaphor for educational and reconciling theory in present day. It becomes a "standard product" because it has been fashioned according to the design specifications and factual basis of the existing structure and process

¹⁰Dewey, On Education . . . , p. 107.

of present society. It becomes an institution of thematic design, on the one hand, and, on the other, a lubricating process for the vast and cumbersome machinery of society, whose business it is to transform the wild and crude mass of emerging adulthood (children) into useful social components, and also to maintain order within and between adults in the face of the chaos of life.

When the social structure is a good one, as in Classical Greece, creativity is predominantly honest and truthful in its propagation of useful communal patterns and processes; when the social structure is oppressive, creativity becomes an evil process, aiding by self-justifying propaganda in the process of subjection and oppression. The artifacts resulting from Classical Modeling, in these opposites of societies, are also opposites in value and intrinsic worth. Compare and contrast Aeschylus with Pope.

Classical Modeling in a just society strengthens the community-centered society and with it the ideal of the individual (and the individual artifact) as the legitimate legacy of the past and present, and as the essential outgrowth

of previous good. It strengthens the individual by giving him a measure of recognition in and as an essential of a community-centered society. By basing a work of art upon the designs of society and the perspective structure of another work of art, the artist responds to change by making it a process of what already exists, and thereby transforms both without destroying either.

Certainty and Familiarity

The great virtue of Classical Modeling is two-fold and complementary: first of all, it is certainty and familiarity. The design and perspective structures are familiar to the audience. However, the unique conceptualizations into new constructs by the artist of these familiars defamiliarizes them sufficiently to produce mild shocks of astonishment and pleasure, but not so much that any audience is dismayed by losing its thematic orientation.

Every Classical Greek knew the story of Oedipus. What they came to the theatre for was to see how each artist reconceptualized the common knowledge-possession by all into a new vision.

This is also the appeal of present-day traditional Eastern theatre and drama.

An essential aesthetic of "narrative" art is the necessary preparation at the beginning of the work of art for the audience to know at least generally the direction in which it is going, the direction of the thematic universe of the work of art. This has been called foreshadowing. Classical Modeling makes use of form with which the audience is familiar, and thus the audience recognizes immediately the direction of the work's thematic universe. Classical Modeling makes this necessary chore of foreshadowing by the artist very easy; and it makes the chore of participation on the part of the audience also very easy.

Within the boundaries of such a directed thematic universe (of the work of art) great variety, diversification, intensity, and abundance are, not only possible, but terribly desirable--in fact, difficult to avoid, for an artist with at least a little talent. The possibility of cognitive dichotomy, because of disorientation or ignorance, between ends and means is sharply re-

duced. The efficiency of the artistic process and also the audience process is greatly enhanced, leading to more immediate satisfaction of both than is possible--or at least probable--in the Romantic process. The sense of delight in thematic activity (within the work) is strengthened by a sense of urgency in arriving at an organism resulting from the creative process. The thrill of the pursuit is seen by the audience as concomitant to the ecstasy of completion. The wonder of the journey is enhanced by the relentless (because recognized as such) progress of the thematic direction of movement.

Classical Modeling humanizes the thematic designs and reconciles means and ends, fulfills intellectual and emotional curiosity, and rewards both artist and audience for their knowledge of existing thematic patterns and their insights in synthesizing the given (the traditional) with the new. The autonomy of the individual (and of the new) is reasserted and celebrated by recognizing its relationship to the whole of the past and of the old and the traditional. Opression of the new by the old and of the individual member

and work (the part) by the whole (of society and the corpus of past created works) is avoided and by-passed by the recognition and celebration of the new and of the individual and of the part as a further extension, reflecting growth, and glorification of the old, of the whole, of the traditional. The particularization of a conceptualization of traditional perceptual designs does not trivialize the whole but rather synthesizes both particular and general into a new generalization of cognition and celebration. History and product are justified by the glorification of progress and process.

Thus, communal experience is exalted. From this experience, one is able to identify the major activities of life and to isolate present problems and connect to them past solutions or at least past consolations. Classical Modeling becomes communal activity analysis, its complex requirements of equally complex skills being divided up into component parts and then the reflection of these parts reincorporated back into the whole of the experience of the society. This gives training to both the artist and the audi-

ence in valuating.

Control, and New from the Old

Because control is a given (the communal perceptual design and perspective constructs are the compounded basis for Classical Modeling), no energy is wasted on seeking or rejecting outside control. The outside control has been synthesized with inner control. The consequence is not standardized outcomes, but rather brotherly journeying; it is not positivistic and autocratic and subjugating cause and effect, but rather mutual heuristic activity. Classical Modeling is an affable interaction between part and whole, between new and old, between manifestation and immanentization. Classical Modeling is the emergence of new conclusions by means of old assumptions. Classical Modeling provides for the continuance of continuity of life and the world. A new orthodoxy is not imposed but rather a variety of new mutations and new conceptualizations and methods arise to help us appreciate the richness and interpenetration of life, which are useful for revealing to all of us the subtleties of consequences. Classical

Modeling provides a fresh vantage point from which old questions can be appreciated and new ones solved. It provides a trusted vantage point from which we can with confidence, safety, and security view lands for individual and communal exploration and conquest.

The old and acceptable contents and contexts, whether values or empirical dimensions and conclusions from past-experienced reality, in the process of new conceptualized narration become rejuvenated and revived. Stagnation is avoided. Communal reality becomes agitated into motion again, kinetic, generalized, and dynamically unpredictable (within certain broad confines). A topic alien to the community is revealed and explained by commonly shared terms. Contents and contexts become again attached to reality, connected with the totality that originally engendered them and gave them their significance. Words, concepts, and designs are again filled with concreteness and relevancy, and become solid, reconciled, and enfranchised.

Style

The creative emphasis in Classical Modeling

is on style: emphasis shifts from ontology to axiology. Because the end of the particular work is already foreseen, the sensibilities of the audience (and previous to that, the artist) become attuned to a primarily aesthetic orientation, based on admiration for the direct experiencing of a predictable conclusion, simply and efficiently. Style is fundamentally aesthetic; it is achievement and restraint realized by valuation of in-text by context. Romanticism, to the contrary, being primarily concerned with establishing an ontology rather than with refining style, tends to be characterized by excesses.

Classical Modeling, by concerning itself with communal objectives (rather than primarily personal objectives of the artist), thus frees the artist to infuse these objectives with his own individual personality and therefore, in substance, transform these objectives, in fact, into subjective forms. This contrasts dramatically with the behavioral objectives of imitation or copying, which are held strictly separated from personal and subjective "contamination"--all in the name of science and objectivity.

Thus, imitative and copying (e.g., behavioral) objectives--which by their very nature are impersonal (i.e., objective--separate, distinct from the subject)--are replaced by subjectives, which concern style. Style is the exact antithesis of objectives: objectives are fragmentations, abstractions; style infuses the whole and synthesizes parts with parts and parts with wholes and wholes with parts, and wholes with wholes; objectives (especially behavioral objectives) are non-committal; style is sharing--it is open; objectives justify the means; style is the means--it is sowing, without worrying about the harvest, knowing that, with good sowing, the harvest will come of its own accord; objectives are the hell-for-leather getting there "tomorrow"; style is enjoying reality and life, the enjoying of "today"; objectives are non-restraint; style is restraint; objectives represent a mechanistic control over; style, organic autonomy; objectives are clear-cut; style is characterized by ambiguities; objectives are characterized by standards and by comparisons; style, by values; objectives represent kinesis (activity); style, praxis; objectives are pedes-

trian, the attainment of the lowest level of information; style is knowledge; objectives represent a hierarchy; style is collegial--a partnership of artist and material, of process and product, of product and audience; objectives is ego plus the exploitation of abstractions; style, ego plus partnership of holistic context; objectives entail a struggle to win the battle, to overcome obstacles so as to attain the objectives; style is peace: overcome nothing--rather, become all, incorporate all; objectives are one-dimensional; style, multi-faceted; objectives are egoistical; style, altruistic; objectives are hard, shiny little products; style, expressive activities and process; objectives represent the unwillingness to take a chance--they equal insecurity; style is a willingness to take a chance, and thus equals security and serenity; objectives are isomorphic; style, polymorphic and idiomorphic; objectives is a closed system (entropy)--style, an open one (negentropy); objectives are as narrow and confined as Wordsworth's thimble--style as inclusive as the world; a person takes objectives, but a person gives style.

Style surmounts objectives; it does not assume nor presume; it is. Style enables the artist to clothe and then to present beautifully ambiguities. Ambiguity, as we have seen, is the nature of life. One has no intellectual maturity until he is able to deal comfortably with ambiguities and apparent contradictions.¹¹ Style combines with kinesis to aid in praxiology and praxis. Behavioral objectives, in whatever form, have no restraint: au contraire, they are to be achieved, period; their attainment is everything. This is a positive charge only. Attainment plus restraint, however, represent complementarity. With restraint one is both under and in control. Nature itself is characterized by restraint (except for such things as tornadoes, erupting volcanoes, and so forth); good society and good manners are characterized by restraint; also good government and good business are characterized by restraint.¹²

¹¹Aubrey Menen, The Mystics (New York: Dial Press, 1974), pp. 113 and 133. Consider also Keats' Negative Capability.

¹²An example of the lack of restraint in business is the glutinous price gouging by the cartel of seven American oil companies, which is destroying the Detroit automobile industry (the

Style equals value; style equals the man (Le style est l'homme). Style is the connective between artist and his content; it is the synthesis between discrete forms; the reconciliation of part and whole. It is the avoidance of applying a standard because it, the standard, makes a judgment.

There are three characteristics of style. It is, first of all, a particular spiritual quality existing under specified and special spiritual conditions; it is a value. In the second place, style is a measure of general quality. Finally, style defines content with respect to quality. But it is an internal attribute as well as a public one. It follows, because of the presence of an intrinsically and yet publicly ascertainable attribute, that both subjective and objective frames, as well as reflections and critical judgments, of the idea are possible. Style is the critical judgment placed upon a process by the artist; it involves a venture, courage, a hypothetical processing. It is directed outwardly to an artifact, yet it originates from within and

capitalistic basis of the American economy).

is very, very personal. It is concerned with an individual object; it is intrinsic even though originating from without the object; rather than being imposed upon, it is infused throughout. It is the organization of the thematics of the work. It is not an imposition of an external pre-established rule from one external to another. The artist, because of the element of venture, reveals and gives of himself in his creating.

Style need not precede artistic action; style may grow out of action. Unfortunately, our cultural tendency to eschew content and praise style makes it sometimes difficult to perceive that style cannot be justified in its own abstracted right and why in a broad sense it may be considered only as a synthesized producing form of artistic activity.

Exegetical Dissection

Are there ways of appreciating style and content that are free of the kinds of criteria that require dissection? Of course. Dissective exegesis is appropriate for some types of critical analysis, but it is in no way adequate and final

for conceptualizing the majority of our most cherished creative aspirations. When it is appropriate to formulate specific and component types of exegetical exercises that aim at particular and definable parts and problems, the use of dissective exegesis may be warranted: one must understand the crucial role of olfactory receptors in the communication between different creatures before he can understand the establishment of relationships; one must understand and recognize anagnorisis before he can perceive and comprehend peripetia. But one should not--either as audience member, or as artist, or as teacher--attempt to exclusively, nor initially, nor finally, appreciate, create, or teach thus reductively. To do so robs our goals of the very qualities of perceptualizing that we are seeking to foster.

The above problem-solving approach (exegetical dissection) is effective on low-level creativity, teaching, and appreciating. But, finally, it is expressive activity that we are after. Problem-solving is finite; expressive activity, infinite. The first is inward looking; the latter, outward. In the former, it is true, the

shape of the problems, their solutions and their forms are highly variable and varied; in the latter, the activity is determined by the expression, and thus is more integral to the process and remains a synthesized part and form of both content and process. Alternative solutions are possible in exegetical dissection; in expressive activity, there is always one solution more preferable to all the rest.

In exegetical dissection we have critical control; in expressive activities, we have creative artistic support and the providing of resources. In exegetical dissection, fragmentation and reification; in expressive activities, the discovery and promotion of teleology, interpenetration, and holism. In the first, formal considerations; in the latter, both formal and informal--essence; end in itself, the beginning; referrant. The one is "egoistic" (the critic assumes prominence) and ruthless and mechanistic; the other, altruistic and empathetic and humanistic. The one is one-dimensional: the particular dissectional task at hand . . . and optimism is the official program (i.e., the exegesis will be successful);

the other embodies complementarity (+, -, o): negative capability is one of the ideals. In the first, ends predominate (exegetical dissective conclusions that are "successful" are a must); in the second, means and process predominate. In the former, the tendency is towards assigning the role of scapegoat (i.e., accountability--of both critic and artist--is foremost: was he--am I--successful? . . . is the work--or the scene, or character, or song, or observation--successful?); in the latter, communion of a community is what is important. In the former, an external, segmented hierarchy and bureaucracy results: we have first an audience waiting . . . then an artist coming forth to try to satisfy . . . then his attempt to satisfy (i.e., his work) . . . then the exegetical dissection to determine success of the work . . . the result: this results in the hierarchy: the audience is least important because its reactions, finally, are unimportant--the judgment of the critic takes precedence (in similar fashion, what the students feel about a teacher is, finally, unimportant; what is important is what the "critic"--that is, the administrator--feels)--likewise, the

contribution of the artist is unimportant unless the critic says otherwise; the top role is that of the critic (or administrator, or officer): he has the final pronouncement on the work, the artist, and the audience. This results in a real bureaucracy: for example, four theatrical critics in New York City have the power of life and death over a stage production; three out of the four must pronounce the work worthy in order for it to continue. This bureaucracy is connected to others in other cities and in other arts. For an artist (or teacher) to succeed, he must submit himself and his work to this bureaucracy of critics (or administrators) and submit his fate and the fate of his work to their hands. Whereas, in expressive activities, the audience, artist, and work form an internal organism, a unified collegial democracy (with each one equal in voice and importance). Dissective exegesis separates art into us (the audience, the work, and the artist) and them (the critics), whereas expressive activities joins all into "we." The first raises to preëminence the organization (of critics and criticism); the latter, the individual constitu-

ents (the people).

Dissective exegesis, in practice, tends towards extrapolating from previous works so as to give the creator a set of criteria or specifications and mandating a specific outcome before the process. In such situations the potential answers are known beforehand. What is not known nor considered is the problem; what constitutes appropriate problems remains to be seen only after the mandated solutions have been delivered. In such cases, the criticism is not criticism at all, nor are the supposed-critics really critics. What we do have is reviewing and reviewers. In all reviewing, this type of solution-solving activity is the norm.

Such reviewing (dissective exegesis) is synecdoche at its worst: a part (a dissected and abstracted part) is foisted off on to the audience and really onto the artist himself as the whole work. Even the reviewer (the pseudo-critic) seems unaware of this confusion of part and whole. It is a monstrous perversion of ontology: the whole can and should contain the part, but never should nor can the part contain all of the whole. (Re-

viewing is a ridicule of itself and has no place in a Classical epoch.)

In true creativity (including true criticism) the solution to the artistic problem is never definite before it is realized. Thus, the problem is a genuine one, not one conjured up merely to justify the predetermined solution. The solution should always be, on the one hand, ineluctable (given the problem), and yet, on the other hand, at least a mild astonishment and surprise--until the synthesis of it with its problem is perceived. After the synthesis, the reaction then is one of appreciative astonishment. This is as true for the artist, in his creating, as it is for the audience.

General Thematics and Individualized Particulars

This is self-evident in Romantic sensibility. But how is this reconciled with Classical Modeling, in which the entire outline and outcome are communally known to and shared by all before the artist ever applies himself to his individual rendition of the community knowledge?

Shared general thematics are not the same

as individualized particulars: all the Greeks knew that Oedipus had been exposed to die as a baby, but had grown up as a prince, had murdered his father and married his mother and sired four children. But what was not known was Oedipus' reaction to all of this, and whether he had died or whether he had died and been resurrected, or whether he had not died at all but had instead been whisked off in a divine apotheosis to become a benign, governing, guarding spirit (daemon). One version of the Iphigenia myth has Iphigenia being sacrificed (murdered) by her father, Agamemnon, so that the gods would let the Greek fleet set sail for Troy; another version has it that the gods substituted a deer and that, while the Greeks were blinded and sacrificing the deer to Artemis, Iphigenia was whisked off to an island, where she lived as a priestess.

Pure Romantic creativity would "write" the play, including its plot; the Classical Modelist would accept an already-written play (or at least its plot outline) and add his originality by the way in which he had characters act their parts.

Thus Aeschylus and Sophocles use existing

communal myths to praise the gods, whereas Euripides uses the same materials to scathingly attack them. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides use their communal mythology to produce monumental celebratory tragedies; whereas, Aristophanes uses the very same mythology to create screamingly funny comedies and satires. The contemporary play Equal Toilet Stools takes a tragic chapter out of the history of black persecution and discrimination and murder in the United States and Classically models it by casting it into the form of Aristophanes' Lysistrata. This thus coalesces the past and the present, synthesizes life and art and history, tradition and daring experimentation. Compare this with the episode on NBC's "Little House on the Prairie,"¹³ in which this same Greek play, Lysistrata, is "adapted." But in this instance, the original Greek play is not used to make a contemporary and original comment, but rather, the television hacks merely exploited the plot, simply watering it down to fit the men-

¹³Monday, January 5, 1981.

tality of their insipid series.

On the other hand, Equal Toilet Stools uses Lysistrata as a vehicle for incredibly original and devastating satire of a modern societal ill; Little House on the Prairie used it as a substitute for having to think up anything original.

The same thing is true when the movie script Flight 747 takes the Medieval morality play Everyman and applies it to Every Artist. Flight 747 acts therefore, not as a diluent, but rather as an intensifier, expander, and synthesizer. The opposite happens in the case of the movie Heaven Can Wait. This film seems to obviously take form and components, not from the first play, Everyman, but from the contemporization of Everyman, Flight 747 (in addition to an earlier version of Heaven Can Wait). But, unfortunately, Heaven Can Wait copies nothing else except plot and components; nor does it add anything of its own. The result is a simple little private movie that has already been consigned to the dust heaps.

These examples most beautifully illustrate what William Blake says about Classical Modeling:

No one can ever Design till he has learn'd the Language of Art by making many Finish'd Copies both of Nature & Art & of whatever comes in his way from Earliest Childhood. The difference between a bad Artist & a Good One Is: the Bad Artist Seems to copy a Great deal. The Good one Really does Copy a Great deal¹⁴

What Blake means, of course (besides a great many other things), is that great artists take other works of art (other than those of their own) and incorporate them into their own work, whereas, hacks merely steal from the works of others because they lack the imagination or ambition to do original work.

Heaven Can Wait seems to merely have copied clever and imaginative ingredients from another work; Flight 747, with expressive activities, uses a previous work, Everyman, as part of its raw materials, to be worked up in new and exciting and imaginative and brilliant ways.

Expressive activities is an engagement with process. It is an intentional, courageous engagement undertaken--not to provide the creator with mammon--but "to provide a fertile field for per-

¹⁴Annotations to Sir Joshua Reynolds's Dis-

sonal purposing and experiencing."¹⁵ Flight 747, although a universal, or if you will, a cosmic portrayal of the ever, the timeless, agony of the artist, is, nevertheless, infused and saturated with the personal, autobiographical experiences of one artist.

There is great merit in the courageous engagement of cultural sharing to provide a personal mode of expression, not knowing in advance how the personal mode will make use of the communal property. Such a practice prevents the single-mindedness of the politician's pursuit, which forever focuses on lucrative objectives that are easily obtainable.

The artist takes communal activities that are seminal for him, and allows them--infused with his personality and autobiography--to generate whatever thematics are appropriate to them. Community sustains our creativity and provides for depth of achievement. Our obligation, in return, is to infuse this heritage with as pure

courses, [1807-97].

¹⁵Eisner, p. 103.

a creativity as we are capable of.

Dangers of Community

Here is the danger: if an "artist" submerges himself in his community, he may become a propagandist for that community, such as true with the Hollywood or Broadway hack. Not only are their objectives--to make money--determined by their community, but even the form of their activities is likewise determined. What product that comes out of either of the above-factories is not based upon a previous "successful" product, most usually also of either of those two factories? Even worse, their content--when not explicitly based on another propagandistic work--is based on the community itself, on a glossy, sentimental version of that community life, such as Light up the Sky, I Love Lucy, et cetera, ad infinitum.

These very same dangers exactly are present in the classroom and in the educational institution.

Community as Inspirational

"Mitochondria"

The point of Classical Modeling is not to

have the artist submerged in his community (although this of course can be done successfully, as in the examples of Aeschylus, Shakespeare, and Stevens, among others), but rather to have the community penetrated into the thought and feeling and expressive processes of the artist.

How best to illustrate this?

By this means: whatever is true in the natural world has its counterparts in various forms in the intellectual, moral, and societal worlds. Therefore, having society penetrate as a benign help in the artist's life and creative processes is the counterpart of what in nature? Of many things, of course. Let us examine one. In a strict biological sense, the human organism cannot function, cannot even exist, without being penetrated by its surrounding community of microscopic organisms; the living human organism is a living organism only because it shares its boundaries with its community of other organisms:

A good case can be made for our nonexistence as entities. We are not made up, as we had always supposed, of successively enriched packets of our own parts. We are shared, rented, occupied. At the interior of our cells,

driving them providing the oxidative energy that sends us out for the improvements of each shining day, are the mitochondria, and in a strict sense they are not ours. They turn out to be little separate creatures, the colonial posterity of migrant prokaryocytes, probably primitive bacteria that swam into ancestral precursors of our eukaryotic cells and stayed there. Ever since, they have maintained themselves and their ways, replicating in their own fashion, privately, with their own DNA and RNA quite different from ours. They are as much symbionts as the rhizobial bacteria in the roots of beans. Without them, we would not move a muscle, drum a finger, think a thought.¹⁶

These mitochondria

are stable and responsible lodgers the other little animals, similarly established in my cells My centrioles, basal bodies, and probably a good many other more obscure tiny beings at work inside my cells, each with its own special genome, are as foreign, and as essential, as aphids in anthills. My cells are no longer the pure line entities I was raised with; they are ecosystems more complex than Jamaica Bay.¹⁷

No man can be an island:

We live in a dancing matrix of viruses;
they dart, rather like bees, from or-

¹⁶Thomas, p. 2.

¹⁷Ibid.

ganism to organism, from plant to insect to mammal to me and back again, and into the sea, tugging along pieces of this genome, strings of genes from that, transplanting grafts of DNA, passing around heredity as though at a great party. They may be a mechanism for keeping new, mutant kinds of DNA in the widest circulation among us.¹⁸

And this is what the components of the community do in an artist: dart around from artist to artist, from artist to citizen, and so forth, pollenating all, and resulting in beautiful blossoms and honey, and causing new yet mutant artistic forms. We do not have the huge breaks in tradition as we did in modern art. Thus the continuity of audience participation is sustained and maintained, preventing outbreaks of élitism.

Artists who choose alienation from their communities risk loss of orientation, as can be seen in the lives of such artists as Herman Melville, Sean O'Casey, and Ezra Pound, among others. Certainly, "The individual isolated from the surrounding social environment is not and cannot be whole."¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁹Buchen, p. 143.

Thus, the culturally unified organization of the community is a kind of single cell, just as the earth is:

I have been trying to think of the earth as a kind of organism, but it is no go. I cannot think of it this way. It is too big, too complex, with too many working parts lacking visible connections. The other night, driving through a hilly, wooded part of southern New England, I wondered about this. If not like an organism, what is it like, what is it most like? Then, satisfactorily for that moment, it came to me: it is most like a single cell.²⁰

And, if we are to understand the Classical Modelist in his relationship to his community and to his society, we must view him as a single cell, with the components of his society and his culture entering his artistic self and germinating and pollinating his genes. And so, when the moment of artistic and creative conception occurs, the process and the product are programmed by the "DNA" in his genes, which previously had been programmed by the "viruses" of his community and culture.

Further, if we are to understand society, we must likewise view it as a single cell, with the individual--especially the artist--as a for-

²⁰Thomas, p. 4.

eign yet still necessary part of the cell--as viruses that program and enrichen the DNA of the society's genes.

The same is true of, not only educational institutions, but in fact of the classroom itself. Such an awareness might serve to deflate some of the pomposity and arrogance of some faculty; some public school teachers might better come to terms with their classroom invironments if they had such an understanding. What would such comprehension do for the students?

Viewing both of these phenomena together, we see the holism and complementarity: "We do not have solitary beings. Every creature is, in some sense, connected to and dependent on the rest."²¹

The individual creator, by joining with his community and with his tradition of art and culture, not only augments his own individual powers, but also becomes part of a larger, functioning organism, and by becoming a part of it, increases its intelligence and productivity. A counterpart

²¹Ibid., p. 6.

is found in the world of the insect, in both ants and termites, for example:

A solitary ant, afield, cannot be considered to have much of anything on his mind; indeed, with only a few neurons strung together by fibers, he can't be imagined to have a mind at all, much less a thought. He is more like a ganglion on legs. Four ants together, or ten, encircling a dead moth on a path, begin to look more like an idea. They fumble and shove, gradually moving the food toward the Hill, but as though by blind chance. It is only when you watch the dense mass of thousands of ants, crowded together around the Hill, blackening the ground, that you begin to see the whole beast, and now you observe it thinking, planning, calculating. It is an intelligence, a kind of live computer, with crawling bits for its wits.²²

Termites are even more extraordinary in the way they seem to accumulate intelligence as they

gather together. Two or three termites in a chamber will begin to pick up pellets and move them from place to place, but nothing comes of it; nothing is built. As more join in, they seem to reach a critical mass, a quorum, and the thinking begins.²³

The same thing is true in our world of ar-

²²Ibid., pp. 12-3.

²³Ibid., p. 13.

tists and thinkers.

Golden Age

When artist-and-thinker-counterparts similarly gathered together in ancient Athens, the result was the Golden Age of Greece. When several professors joined together, we had the New Criticism; when some more professors of like mind joined together at the University of Chicago, we had as a result the New Chicago Critics. The gathering together of American expatriates in Paris in the 1920's resulted in perhaps the greatest outpouring of great white American art. The congregating of blacks in Harlem during the same period gave the world the greatest flowering of black art in its history.

However, with the exception of Classical Athens, none of these produced a Golden Age in this or any other country. Why? What is the difference between Classical Athens and these more-modern instances of man's creativity? In Athens the entire community appreciated what was happening and participated in it with both acceptance and enthusiasm. In these later instances,

however, bourgeois society (in its mean materialistic mentality), not only did not participate with acceptance, appreciation, enthusiasm, and love, but, in fact, rejected these sub-communities of artists and thinkers, and alienated them from the center of communal activity. And in the case of the Harlem Renaissance, white bourgeois society went even further, and exploited the blacks.

For a true Golden Age, the creative nucleus must be accepted and loved by the community as a whole. Interpenetration by and synthesis of both groups must result in a holism of mutual participation of both in each other's affairs and concerns and most of all in mutual love and respect.

Creative people will always tend to congregate together for the same reason that creatures like termites gather together: as a group they achieve a critical mass and thus are able to accomplish great things individually. This is the reason that creative people tend to move to "centers" of art, so that they can live close to other artists. It is not choice; it is a necessity for creative survival and productivity.

When a society (or even a university department--in any field) accepts its creative people, and they all interact in mutual appreciation, we have the beginnings of a phenomenon such as Classical Greece (the Golden Age of Mankind), in which the flowering and perfection of all creative, critical, scientific, and educational aspects (music, painting, architecture, sculpture, pottery, drama, theatre, humanism, politics, and so forth) reach an apotheosis unparalleled in the history of the world.

Pedagogical Implications

A classroom is a community also. Within that classroom (any classroom)--if it is one of mutual respect, appreciation, and love--fantastic things can be accomplished. For example, a beginning English teacher in a highschool in Gary, Indiana, in one semester, in all of his classes, both the "good" and the "bad" (one of these ninth-grade classes was composed of students from the ages of 15 to 19, some of whom had already been in juvenile homes), had poetry readings to jazz recordings, singathons of poems set

to music, and the publication of a thick volume of original poems. Every single student (even the most-hardened, long-haired, hippie juvenile delinquent) participated in every one of these events. Was it all "fun and games"? Two students won essay contests. Besides completing in full the entire departmental syllabus, every student read three outside books: On the Beach, Exodus, and Dr. Zhivago. Even the "dumb" students who could not read, read these novels and understood them beautifully.

This all happened because the teacher knew his tradition and art and humanities (and was creative himself and understood creativity) and because this teacher was a loving young man who believed sincerely in the worth of all human beings as individuals and who expressed and communicated this love and appreciation to his students, to the juvenile delinquents as well as to the students from "good" families. And the students responded in kind. All this in one semester of teaching.

Happy ending?

Well, this young teacher's colleagues, af-

ter initial astonishment and disbelief, banded together (at least several of them) and presented a united front to the administration, and, after an aborted dismissal attempt of the teacher that first spring, did succeed the next year after. The larger community of the highschool faculty did not accept the sub-community of this individual classroom of humanism and creativity.

With a more intelligent and humanistic and creative faculty and administration, all things are possible.

Conclusion

Classical Modeling, the fourth level in our taxonomy of creativity, represents a maturity of both artist and community. For the artist, his identity is not threatened by his use of his heritage and tradition. His inner security and self-confidence are great enough that he sees his culture, not as a threat, but instead as a challenge (which he gladly welcomes), a challenge of using this culture as raw materials so as to better realize his creative promptings. The thematics and codes of his community and culture

he accepts as the bases of his own individual conceptualizations. The artist accepts these, not blindly as a stooge or hack, but because they are generally valid.

Thus, the first prerequisite of an atmosphere in which Classical Modeling is possible is that the community have legitimate and valid thematic and codes. This means that the value system of the community is a correct one.

The artist (instead of being scorned by a bourgeois mentality as a lazy trifler who refuses to work for a living or feared by religion, big business, or corrupt politics as a reformer or, worse, a revolutionary and either ostracized or exiled or murdered) is welcomed and installed in his rightful position as revered and honored and loved prophet (one who renews and freshens and reinterprets the basic thematic and codes of the community). This he does so that all may, in a communion of joy, love, and appreciation, celebrate the validity and worth of their lives and endeavors in the face of chaos.

Classical Modeling is the refashioning of community and cultural values into newer and fresher

and cleaner modes of perception. It is the making of the new out of the old, without discarding the old but rather celebrating the old. It is the infusion of the group accomplishment by the individual spirit. It is, in fact, the active heart, mind, and soul of a culture and tradition.

CHAPTER V

THE FIFTH LEVEL OF CREATIVITY THE REORGANIZING OF OUR INNER CHAOS

I am certain of nothing
but of the holiness of
Heart's affections and
the truth of Imagination.
--What the imagination
seizes as Beauty must be
truth--whether it exis-
ted before or not--for
I have the same Idea of
all our Passions as of
Love; they are all in
their sublime, creative
of essential Beauty.

--John Keats

Introduction

The reorganizing of our inner chaos has tra-
ditionally been called "mysticism." Mysticism
is the apotheosis of creativity: it is percep-
tion and conceptualizing to the highest degree.

It is also a perfection of Classical Modeling in that by means of it the artist returns to become--for the short duration of the experience-- a part of his true community, the Universal Mind and Soul; it is also a record of the artist's return to his true community; also, the artist, by returning home to his true community and participating in his true community glorifies and strengthens it. We have seen earlier how synecdoche begins the process of synthesis; we shall see now how mysticism completes it by joining part to whole completely in a true unboundaried holism. Finally, mysticism, because of its great participation in feeling and soul, is Romanticism, but Romanticism no longer separate and fragmented and alienated; it is now Romanticism joined once again with its true community and context: itself-- which is a part of the Universal Mind and Soul, and to which all now alive or who ever have lived or ever shall live, belong.

Inner Chaos

Each human being has within himself an inner chaos.¹ That there is a chaos of inner life and

that this chaos has expression (that is, language) is as incontrovertible and as provable as that there is wind blowing across the face of this earth. Just as we know where there is a fire and the reason for the fire (that is, its supply of combustibles), just so we know when there is inner language and its reasons (i.e., its supply of comestibles); we know when the fire has gone out and we know when the inner chaos of life has ceased.

Ultimate reality transcends what can be expressed in words.² In the beginning (sometime, somewhere) was consciousness (or, mind: a memory; being mindful of);³ how this consciousness, or mind, became manifested in individual boundaries is debatable. But this consciousness was universal, perhaps completely detached originally from form. Let us assume that it was. This

¹Moffett, p. 278.

²Burttt, p. 194.

³Richard Maurice Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness: A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind, with an Introd. by George Moreby Acklom (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., Publishers, 1901),

universal mind . . . has always existed, is unborn and indestructible . . . and has neither form nor appearance. It does not belong to the categories of things which exist or do not exist, nor can it be reckoned as being new or old. It . . . transcends all limits, measures, names, speech, and every method of treating it concretely It is like the boundless void which cannot be fathomed or measured It is bright and spotless as the void, having no form or appearance whatsoever This universal mind is no mind /in the ordinary sense of the word/ and is completely detached from form It is void, omnipresent, silent, pure; it is glorious and mysterious peacefulness, and that is all which can be said.⁴

Thus, man is a transcendent being because he has "the Divine within," a "true Self" or "Atman" or "Oversoul," awareness of which the individual may come to have through experiencing altered consciousness, thus recognizing it to be one with the Divine.⁵

How can we explain the origin and nature of this original consciousness? We cannot; but we, as others, can try. Some have told us that

p. 67.

⁴Burttt, pp. 195-7.

⁵Harmon, p. 122.

the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.

And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.⁶

Others believe that this consciousness was originally a kind of absolute music, a harmony that encouraged all beauty and meaning. This would explain the urge of all creatures to make music:

If, as I believe, the urge to make a kind of music is as much a characteristic of biology as our other fundamental functions, there ought to be an explanation for it. Having none at hand, I am free to make one up. The rhythmic sounds might be the recapitulation of something else--an earliest memory, a score for the transformation of inanimate, random matter in chaos into the improbable, ordered dance of living forms. Morowitz has presented the case, in thermodynamic terms, for the hypothesis that a steady flow of energy from the inexhaustible source of the sun to the unfillable sink of outer space, by way of the earth, is mathematically destined to cause the organization of matter into an increasingly ordered state. The resulting balancing act involves a ceaseless clustering of bonded atoms into molecules of higher and higher complexity, and the emergence of cycles for the storage and release of energy. In a nonequilibrium steady state, which is postulated, the solar

⁶Genesis 1:2 and 3.

energy would not just flow to the earth and radiate away; it is thermodynamically inevitable that it must rearrange matter into symmetry, away from probability, against entropy, lifting it, so to speak, into a constantly changing condition of rearrangement and molecular ornamentation. In such a system, the outcome is a chancy kind of order, always on the verge of descending into chaos, held taut against probability by the unremitting, constant surge of energy from the sun.⁷

This constant surge of energy from the sun continues to bombard us (in the form, not only of light radiation, but also in the form of light energy converted into caloric energy). Our inner being, always on this verge of chaos, yet struggling to retain an order, must have an outlet. Input must be balanced by output for an organization (even of atoms and molecules) to retain a steady equilibrium (a dynamic stability). Too little input, and the result is inplosive entropy in the form of tabescence; too little output, and the result is explosive entropy in the form of disintegration and dispersion. Song (music, or creativity in action) from the artist

⁷Thomas, pp. 27-8.

is output:

. . . I am open to wonder whether the same events are recalled by the rhythms of insects, the long, pulsing runs of birdsong, the descants of whales, the modulated vibrations of a million locusts in migration, the tympani of gorilla breasts, termite heads, drumfish bladders. A "grand canonical ensemble" is, oddly enough, the proper term for a quantitative model system in thermodynamics, borrowed from music by way of mathematics.⁸

In our present human condition, some of us refuse to believe in anything that is not comprehensible by our physical senses. Whereas our senses can be open doorways to this Universal Mind, they can also be closed doors, preventing us from beholding this Mind:

This pure mind, the source of everything, shines on all with the brilliance of its own perfection, but the people of the world do not awake to it, regarding only that which sees, hears, feels, and knows as mind. Because their understanding is veiled by their own sight, hearing, feeling, and knowledge, they do not perceive the spiritual brilliance of the original substance. If they could only eliminate all analytic thinking in a flash, that original substance would

⁸Ibid., p. 28.

manifest itself like the sun ascending through the void and illuminating the whole universe without hindrance or bounds.⁹

Thus, the nature of the senses and their appropriate functions must be realized and understood, or they become hindrances:

Therefore, if students of the Way only regard seeing, hearing, feeling, and knowing as their proper activities, upon being deprived of these perceptions, their way towards an understanding of mind is cut off and they find nowhere to enter. You have but to recognize that real mind is expressed in these perceptions, but is not dependent on them on the one hand, nor separate from them on the other. You should not start reasoning from such perceptions, nor allow your thinking to stem from them, yet you should refrain from seeking universal mind apart from them or abandoning them in your pursuit of the Dharma. Neither hold to them, abandon them, dwell in them, nor cleave to them, but exist independently of all that is above, below, or around you, for there is nowhere in which the Way cannot be followed.¹⁰

We shall soon take up our inquiry on how to make use of the senses to help reverse our inner chaos of language, and to give articulation

⁹Burt, p. 197.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 197-8.

to it. There are two approaches: the one, mystical; the other, intellectual. But first, we must consider further the nature of this inner chaos.

Mind

When several or more molecules form a chain, and this chain appropriates a tiny bit of the Universal Mind and thus becomes an independent, living organism, the inner chaos is already in existence. Whenever a part is taken from the whole and assumes holism within its own boundaries, intrinsic chaos is inevitable. How can a part become a whole without inner chaos? One necessary function of this part-become-whole is to attempt to bring order to itself.

Mind (that is, having the quality of being mindful, aware, of) is always considered to be an organizing faculty of joined-into-a-form (i.e., in a functioning form) molecules. It is indeed the faculty of infusing molecules--by way of neurons--with awareness and purpose, by freeing the individual cells of autocratic functioning decisions; it is especially the faculty of maintain-

ingconsentaneous purpose among the diverse molecules. If there continues an idiosyncratic diversity of purpose among the molecules, there results inevitably dissolution or disintegration (as in the case of cancerous cells, which do not heed the consentient purpose of the rest of the cells of the body as communicated by the "mind"). When cells do not act unitedly in purpose, when they cease to exist consensually, the tendency is for groups of cells, one after the other to go down. We call this death: "Death is not a sudden-all-at-once affair; cells go down in sequence, one by one."¹¹

When death does occur, the part of the universal mind either goes back to the whole or it becomes infused in another chain of molecules:

. . . there is still that permanent vanishing of consciousness to be accounted for. Are we to be stuck forever with this problem? Where on earth does it go? Is it stopped dead in its tracks, lost in humus, wasted? Considering the tendency of nature to find uses for complex and intricate mechanisms, this seems to me unnatural. I prefer to think of it as somehow sep-

¹¹Thomas, p. 58.

arated off at the filaments of its attachment, and then drawn like an easy breath back into the membrane of its origin, a fresh memory for a biospherical nervous system¹²

If a present action (or process) does not represent a previous one, if an occasional action does not manifest a continual explosion of a process, a continuing narrative, there is no life.

Imagination

What is needed is a freeing of the conduit of mind so that perception and memory become habits, continuing ways of functioning. The fundamental process corresponding to mind is not surprise but instead, fulfillment. The value of an action is measured by the extent of its imaginary roots. Thanks to the imaginary, actions and process are essentially continuous. And this is what imagination is: the activation of the part of the universal mind so that it stimulates and infuses, as a holistic radiation, its particular chain or chains of molecules. Imagination seeks

¹²Ibid., p. 61.

out "behind the visible images the hidden one, going to the very root of the image-producing force."¹³

First, we have boundaries, which we call form; and this form incloses an Idea. Such an Idea is an individual. This is the reason, therefore, that the notion of individuality is always attached to the notion of form. And why not?

Is there not an individuality in depth which makes matter, even in its smallest particles, always a totality? Contemplated in the perspective of its depth, matter is not merely the lack of a formal activity; it is precisely the principle which can detach itself from form. It remains itself in spite of any deformation or fragmentation. Furthermore, matter can be imbued with values oriented in two directions: in the direction of depth, and in the direction of height. In the former, it appears as something unfathomable, as a mystery. In the latter, it appears as an inexhaustible force, as a miracle. In both cases, meditation on matter develops an open imagination.¹⁴

In the human realm of mind and process, imagination is the very experience of renewing memory

¹³Bachelard, p. 11.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 11-2.

and memory of perception and conceptualizing. More than any other power or attribute, it determines the human worth. Therefore, imagination (the activation of the bond between the part and the whole of the universal mind) is not a faculty nor ability as such, but rather is the human existence itself. Without it, we merely exist. With it, we live--in the very fullest meaning of the word.

This imagination, adhering to materialism (that is, to matter, to a chain or chains of molecules), forms the temporal fabric of both intellect and spirituality and consequently develops the dialectic and dialogue of materialism plus intellectuality and spirituality, which forms the very fabric of reality.

Image

Subsequently, or perhaps, more often, concomitantly, this dialectic and dialogue that we call reality produces a spark that we call an image. A chain of these images, corresponding to the chain of material molecules, join together in a definite form so as to assume the characteristics of a present perception. This chain of images is never stable nor complete. Thus, the

imagination is essentially an aspiration to new images, fulfilling the natural need, newness, and renewal.

Mysticism

To be able to perceive--in a flash of intuition--images and perceptions is truly a blessed gift (one which we call mysticism). Those who are so enabled should continue to do with courage and thankfulness. Sometimes, however, the dross of sin (sin being the "unnatural" activities and state of mind of an individual) clogs our minds, and we lose (if we ever had) this blessed mystical ability to either perceive and to justly value what we have perceived.

There is a lot of silly debate over mysticism, despite its existence for at least as long as man has kept records of his experiences. Let us take a commonsense look at the process of nature which has been called mysticism. All that mysticism means is that we rejoin our minds (a part) to the universal mind (the whole).¹⁵

¹⁵The following discussion of mysticism is

Mystics do not believe that Nature is God's Imagination (or, if we prefer, we may substitute here "universal mind") any more than that Man is God's Imagination. Instead, he believes that God's Imagination dwells in Nature; this Imagination is the Wisdom and Spirit of the universe. The first-hand experiencing of and communing with this wisdom and spirit of the universe constitutes a mystic vision. These mystic visions are a result of the joining of a human's imagination (a very small bit of God's Imagination, or the Universal Mind) with the whole of the Supreme's, the Omnipotent's Imagination. Several conditions and factors are necessary for this mysterious union. Not all of the following conditions are to be found in every occurrence of a mystic experience, but usually they are present during such times.

First of all, the prime requisite is the intrinsic gift of Imagination. Perhaps all peo-

taken, for the most part, from this author's "Fair Seed-Time: Wordsworth and the Night" (Unpublished master's thesis, Indiana University, 1960), pp. 16-32.

ple have this gift; certainly it is active in creative individuals to some extent. Those in whom Imagination is active are connected "in a mighty scheme of truth," and each has

his own peculiar faculty,
Heaven's gift a sense that fits him to per-
Objects unseen before.¹⁶ ^{ceive}

Imagination is the Divine Vision; spiritual love cannot act nor exist without Imagination. The Imagination (of Man, Nature, and God) is twofold: sensitive and creative. The sensitive is the "passive or attentive," the incoming phase or function; the creative is the "active," or outgoing, function.¹⁷ The two combined constitute an organization and process in a state of steady, dynamic equilibrium.

The sensitive phase of the Imagination receives the mystic visions, recognizing their nature but not their revelations.¹⁸ The revelations

¹⁶The Prelude, XIII, 303-5.

¹⁷Newton P. Stallknecht, Strange Seas of Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958), p. 46.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 49.

are revealed later by the more important creative phase:

The highest vision is superinduced upon this in a state of ecstasy, in which the light of sense goes out and the soul feels its kinship with that which is beyond sense And this great spiritual experience comes generally not immediately after the sense experience which has inspired it, but perhaps years later, when the original emotion, recollected in tranquillity, is rekindled.¹⁹

In later years, dwelling upon the vision, the creative phase of our Imagination brings about an "'ennobling interchange' between the inner and outer powers."²⁰ The mystic's Imagination unites "the finite-mind with its environment"²¹ in both the sensitive and creative phases. But in the creative phase his Imagination "imitates, even perhaps participates in, the divine creation, which is also an imagination" ²² The mys-

¹⁹Ernest De Selincourt, The Prelude, Or Growth of a Poet's Mind by William Wordsworth, Edited from the Manuscripts with Introduction, Textual and Critical Notes (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 541.

²⁰Stallknecht, p. 49.

²¹Ibid., p. 126.

²²Ibid., p. 33.

tic's Imagination is "an integral part of an organically interrelated universe."²³ And "it is in this elemental commerce of his imagination with a kindred creative power"²⁴ that a mystic's religion is to be found.

The sensitive phase makes "sense out of this undifferentiated manifold of sensation by organizing it into individual objects or things."²⁵ The creative phase permits the soul of the mystic to "see things as they are not seen by the senses and give them a significance which they do not in themselves possess,"²⁶ "transfiguring the beauty of the natural scene, adding to it 'a virtue not its own.'"²⁷ The creative phase therefore con-

²³M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 104.

²⁴Willard L. Sperry, Wordsworth's Anti-Climax (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), p. 201.

²⁵Frederick A. Pottle, "The Eye and the Object in the Poetry of Wordsworth," Wordsworth: Centenary Studies Presented at Cornell and Princeton Universities, ed. Gilbert T. Dunklin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 27.

²⁶R. D. Havens, The Mind of a Poet: A Study of Wordsworth's Thought with Particular Reference to The Prelude (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1942), p. 169.

tributes to the "sense-impression given from without"²⁸ and thus eventually to the Imagination of the Universe. Again, it is usually a long time before the creative phase is activated.²⁹

The sensitive phase of Imagination is the perceptualizing phase; the creative, the conceptualizing.

The mystic finds in his Imagination "the very heart of the moral life":³⁰

Imagination can . . . foster, what both Wordsworth and Spinoza call "intellectual love," which is the emotional support of the highest achievements.³¹

This is why mystics usually do not have to live by man's morality: the Universal Mind by means of the mystic visions stimulates the mystic's

²⁷C. H. Herford, Wordsworth (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1930), p. 102.

²⁸H. W. Garrod, Wordsworth: Lectures and Essays (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1927), p. 130.

²⁹January Searle, Memoirs of William Wordsworth (London: Partridge and Oakey, 1852), p. 34.

³⁰Stallknecht, p. 101.

³¹Ibid., p. 24.

Imagination and thus fortifies his soul.

Secondly, solitude is usually necessary for mystic visions. Solitude is necessary simply because there is less distraction: it isolates the mystic, "physically and spiritually, from worldly concerns; . . . [if subdues] the trivial and the transitory."³² It is necessary because "a mind distracted by the many cannot apprehend the One."³³ Solitude also intensifies the individual's "consciousness of the enduring [and everlasting] in the external world, and of the Eternal, the One, which lies behind it."³⁴

Thirdly, silence (or relative silence) is usually necessary for the same reason that solitude is necessary. Also, to the mystic, silence is a Power; it belongs "with those eternal things wherein only we can find the joy and rest for which we were created."³⁵ "Outward stillness

³²Havens, p. 3.

³³Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness (London: Penguin, 1927), p. 173.

³⁴Havens, p. 3.

³⁵Ibid., p. 58.

[is] essential to inward work."³⁶

Fourthly, some aspect of the visible is necessary. The Visible is that part of Nature which can be beheld by the senses. The Visible is a necessary screen between man and the Invisible, the Universal Mind. Man could not live beholding constantly before him the Invisible. The Visible, in addition, is necessary to make the mystic aware of beauty, awe, fear, or the like,³⁷ so that his sensitive Imagination will begin to function. To grasp the Spirituality of Nature and thus the Universal Mind, it is first necessary to grasp the concrete of Nature (including human nature). One cannot separate entirely, cannot abstract, any part of the cosmic Universe any more than one can set up a particular object in Nature as an individual--Nature is in solido.³⁸ The Invisible (the Universal Mind) is the reflex image of the Visible (i.e., the physical). The

³⁶Underhill, p. 83.

³⁷Stallknecht, p. 99.

³⁸Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 121.

two are connected. To reach one, the mystic must traverse the other. The surface self, the Visible (the physical), is called the Animus; the other, the Anima.³⁹ These two aspects are opposites, but opposites that are connected. Boehme declared

that the Absolute God is voluntarily self-revealing. But each revelation has as its condition the appearance of its opposite: light can only be recognized at the price of knowing darkness Hence if Pure Being --the Good, Beautiful and True--is to reveal itself, it must do so by evoking and opposing its contrary: as in the Hegelian dialectic no idea is complete without its negative.⁴⁰

So that to attain

union with the One This union is to be attained, first by co-operation in that Life which bears him up, in which he is immersed. He must become conscious of this "great life of the All, "merge himself in it Hence there are really two distinct acts of "divine union," two distinct kinds of illumination involved in the Mystic Way: the dual character of the spiritual consciousness brings a dual responsibility in its train. First, there is the union with Life, with the World of Becoming: and parallel with it,

³⁹Underhill, p. 67.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 40.

the illumination by which the mystic "gazes upon a more veritable world." Secondly, there is the union with Being, with the One: and that final, ineffable illumination of pure love which is called the "knowledge of God." It is through the development of the third factor, the free, creative "spirit," the scrap of absolute Life which is the ground of his soul, that the mystic can (a) conceive and (b) accomplish these transcendent acts. Only Being can know Being: we "behold that which we are, and are that which we behold." But there is a spark in man's soul, say the mystics, which is real--which in fact is--and by its cultivation we may know reality.⁴¹

In communion "with nature the self can reach a new dimension of optimism and a new recognition of the creative way of life."⁴² Communion with Nature also permits "communion with the creator."⁴³ As with the Imagination, Nature is, not only passive, but also active.⁴⁴

⁴¹Ibid., p. 41.

⁴²Clark Moustakas, "Creativity, Conformity and the Self," Creativity and its Cultivation . . . , p. 94.

⁴³Catherine MacDonald MacLean, Dorothy and William Wordsworth (Cambridge: The University Press, 1927), p. 109.

⁴⁴Arthur Beatty, William Wordsworth: His Doctrine and Art in Their Historical Relations, Uni. of Wis. Stud. in Lang. and Lit., No. 17 (Madison, 1922), p. 52.

Fifthly, well-developed senses are a necessity,⁴⁵ and moreover an activity of these senses. "The natural world speaks not to the intellect, but to . . . our senses."⁴⁶ The senses are necessary to bring to an intense point one's awareness of the beauty⁴⁷ and awe of Nature and the Universe and the awareness of something bigger than the Universe. The senses nourish the sensitive, but they prevent the creative (as shall be pointed out a little later). A door is both an obstacle and a means of entering. So it is with both the senses and the Visible. Senses are "useful servants" but dangerous guides.⁴⁸ The mystic must transcend the "sense-world."⁴⁹ To be sure,

The full spiritual consciousness
of the true mystic is developed not
in one, but in two apparently opposite

⁴⁵Herbert Read, Wordsworth (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1930), p. 93.

⁴⁶Stallknecht, p. 62.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 62.

⁴⁸Underhill, p. 6.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 35.

but really complementary directions:--

". . . io vidi
Ambole corte del ciel manifeste."

On the one hand he is intensely aware of and knows himself to be at one with that active World of Becoming, that immanent Life, from which his own life takes its rise. Hence, though he has broken forever with the bondage of the senses, he perceives in every manifestation of life a sacramental meaning; a loveliness, a wonder, a heightened significance, which is hidden from other men. He may, with St. Francis, call the Sun and Moon, Water and Fire, his brothers and his sisters: or receive, with Blake, the message of the trees he can truly say that he finds "God in all and all in God"

On the other hand, the full mystic consciousness also attains to what is, I think, its really characteristic quality. It develops the power of apprehending the Absolute, Pure Being, the utterly Transcendent: or, as its possessor would say, can experience "passive union with God." This all-round expansion of consciousness, with its dual power of knowing by communion the temporal and eternal, immanent and transcendent aspects of reality--the life of the All, vivid, flowing and changing, and the changelss, conditionless life of the One--is the peculiar mark, the ultimo sigillo of the great mystic, and must never be forgotten⁵⁰

Sixthly, some sort of stimulus is required.

"Imagination and stimulation are linked."⁵¹ U-

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 36.

⁵¹Bachelard, p. 68.

sually this stimulus is joy and delight. Joy and delight aid in bringing about intense passion and excitement. Sometimes in place of joy and delight, fear and terror work the same result.

Seventhly, passion, emotion, is absolutely necessary.⁵² Passion is necessary because "From Nature doth emotion come."⁵³ Nature and the Universe are alive, full of movement and passion. The Invisible also is alive and full of passion:

O Soul of Nature! That, by laws divine
Sustained and governed, still dost overflow
With an impassioned life⁵⁴

Passion therefore "is the link which connects the sensible world with the Imagination and makes possible their action upon each other."⁵⁵ Emotion is also important because "the unsatisfied psyche in her emotional aspect wants . . . to love more" ⁵⁶ All emotions are ancillar-

⁵²Jerome S. Bruner, "The Conditions of Creativity," Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking . . . , pp. 12-3.

⁵³The Prelude, XIII, 1.

⁵⁴The Prelude, XII, 102-4.

⁵⁵Havens, p. 34.

⁵⁶Underhill, p. 45.

ies of the one central emotion, love. To excite one ancillary enough is also to excite its main stem, love. And love is that essential bond, pathway, to the One:

Love's characteristic activity--for Love, all wings, is inherently active . . . --is a quest Intimate communion, no less than worship, is of its essence. Joyous fruition is its proper end.⁵⁷

The proper work of emotion is

the movement of desire passing over at once into the act of concentration, the gathering up of all the powers of the self into a state of determined attention, which is the business of the Will This act of perfect concentration, the passionate focussing of the self upon one point, when it is applied "with a naked intent" to real and transcendental things, constitutes in the technical language of mysticism the state of recollection: a condition which is peculiarly characteristic of the mystical consciousness, and is the necessary prelude of pure contemplation, that state in which the mystic enters into communion with Reality.⁵⁸

Emotion makes the mystic feel a strong attraction towards

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 46.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 48-9.

the supersensual Object of his quest: that love which scholastic philosophy defined as the force or power which causes every creature to follow out the trend of its own nature. Of this must be born the will to attain communion with that Absolute Object. This will, this burning and active desire, must crystallize into and express itself by that definite and conscious concentration of the whole self upon the Object, which precedes the contemplative state.⁵⁹

Eighthly, night though not essential is a most potent agent because it aids in detaching the mystic from his context and from his own Idea. This is essential in creativity in general⁶⁰ and mystic visions in particular. Night aids in blocking out the Visible which lays hold of the senses and the Intellect and stimulates them and keeps them functioning. The senses function in terms of the Visible. If nothing is visible, then Man cannot see; if he cannot see, his sight, a sense, is not functioning. The sense which Man most relies upon is his sight. He must see to believe. The Night does away with this some-

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 49.

⁶⁰Mary Henle, "The Birth and Death of Ideas," Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking . . ., pp. 45-6.

time--most pernicious sense. This is why Man is afraid in the night, why he is afraid of the dark: he cannot see. He can hear better, he can smell better, he can sense better--but he cannot see. One might wonder if darkness should be substituted for night as a requisite of mystic experiences. It depends. Night is darkness. But darkness is not necessarily night. To shut oneself up in a dark room is not the same as wrapping the mantle of night about oneself. A dark room is man's darkness--artificial. Night is God's darkness--natural. This is the difference. A difference as great as that between an artificial and a real flower. All the difference in the world.

Ninthly, a suspension, not a diminution, of the senses is necessary. When such a suspension occurs, anything beautiful or impressive "is carried to the heart with a power not known under other circumstances,"⁶¹ and the mystic's soul lives "in union with the life of the Universe."⁶²

⁶¹Thomas De Quincey, Recollections of the Lake Poets, ed. Sackville-West (London: J. Lehman, 1948), p. 144.

⁶²Mary Moorman, William Wordsworth, A Biog-

The senses and the Visible are the steps to the Invisible. The steps are necessary to reach the threshold, but they must be passed over. So long as there is one more step to be taken, the summit has not been reached and the seeker thus cannot conceive of God; consequently he always asks, "How can it be so?" The Imagination of man is of God. With it only can a man hold true intercourse with God. Imagination has nothing to do with the bodily senses. The mind, the intellect, does. It is through the senses that the intellect exists and grows. Thus, to remove this block between man and God, it is necessary to remove the senses. Passion and emotion are what accomplish this. But, it must not be forgotten that the senses are the necessary steps to reach the Invisible: it is through the senses that passion and emotion originate. Once a mystic attains the threshold of the Invisible, the intense passion and emotion of the moment suddenly suspend the functions of his senses. In this moment it

raphy: The Early Years, 1770-1803 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 65.

is that he beholds the Invisible; this is the moment of contemplation perfection:

in such strength
Of usurpation . . . the light of sense
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed
The Invisible world⁶³

When this happens to the mystic, such a profound and holy calm overspreads his soul that his bodily eyes are completely forgotten and what he sees

Appeared like something in myself, a dream,
A prospect in the mind.⁶⁴

And his "inner eye" awakens and sees: an auxiliary brightness comes from his imagination and bestows new splendor and beauty on life.

Contemplation is

for the mystic a psychic gateway; a method of going from one level of consciousness to another. In technical language it is the condition under which he shifts his "field of perception" and obtains his characteristic outlook on the universe in some men another sort of consciousness, another

⁶³The Prelude, VI, 599-602.

⁶⁴The Prelude, II, 351-2.

"sense," may be liberated beyond the normal powers we have discussed. This "sense" has attachments at each point, to emotion, to intellect, and to will the "mysterious eye of the soul" by which St. Augustine saw "the light that never changes."⁶⁵

During this contemplation, the unnatural boundaries of the human being (the mystic) dissolve, and he flows into the Universal Mind and the Universal Mind flows into him:

The fully developed and completely conscious human soul can open as an anemone does, and know the ocean in which she is bathed. This act, this condition of consciousness, in which barriers are obliterated, the Absolute flows in on us, and we, rushing out to its embrace, "find and feel the Infinite above all reason and above all knowledge," is the true "mystical state." The value of contemplation is that it tends to produce this state, release this transcendental sense; and so turns the "lower servitude" in which the natural man lives under the sway of his earthly environment to the "higher servitude" of fully conscious dependence on that Reality" in Whom we live and move and have our being.⁶⁶

Contemplation is that moment or moments, or longer,

⁶⁵Underhill, pp. 49-50.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 51.

in which the trinity of the Will, the Emotion, and the Intellect of the mystic combines and fully asserts itself and thus crosses that threshold and beholds and holds communion with the Invisible.

Reversal of Inner Chaos

It is during such moment or moments that the mystic's inner chaos is reversed; and the reason that it is reversed, at this time, is the following: the reason for it being chaos in the first place is that it has been separated, abstracted, alienated from a whole--it has been made to assume the ontology of a whole whereas in truth it is merely a part, and an infinitesimal part at that. As a part, it has been required to represent the whole. This unnatural and illogical synecdoche has thrown it into chaos. During the mystic experience, however, it is once again joined to its whole; once again, it is oneiric. Thus the inner chaos is reversed because the part is no longer the whole but part of the whole.

Penultimate Summary

To conclude, this formula--solitude
+ relative silence + some aspect of the Visible

+ keen awareness by the senses + stimulus of either joy and delight or fear and terror + intense passion and emotion + sensitive activity of Imagination + the Night + a sudden suspension of the senses + contemplation = mystic experience + creative activity of Imagination = mystic revelation-- is applied without difficulty to most mystics' experiences. During these mystic experiences and by means of them, inner chaos is reversed.

Taxonomy of Mysticism

Thus, we have here a taxonomy of mysticism. (See Figure 17.) What place does such a taxonomy have in our curricula and in our lives? Its place is wherever we shall allow. Why do schools and teachers and professors and administrators--indeed all of us--so often, pursue simplistic, mechanical, and rational solutions to complex educational and life problems? Part of the answer lies with the assumption of the superiority of reason on the part of those who are in charge of curricula.

This assumption, based on fear, is rooted historically in the fall of Classical Greece and has continued its academic power and influence, with few exceptions, ever since.




Figure 17. Taxonomy of Mysticism

Pedagogical Implications

Each student, in whatever grade and in whatever subject must have the opportunity for solitude and relative silence: "schools need a variety of places, all under supervision, so that students may choose quiet or less quiet places."⁶⁷ Solitude allows each of us to become aware that he is in a very true and literal sense alone. And, when each of us is aware that he is alone, "totally alone, not belonging to any family, any nation, any culture, any particular continent, there is that sense of being an outsider."⁶⁸ When each of us is aware that he is an alien, then he begins to long to go home, to return to the Universal Mind.

This solitude and silence can be also inner; that is, the student does not require a silent classroom all to himself (although it would be nice). In India, where there is no such thing

⁶⁷Trump and Vars, p. 238. See also both of the following: Clark E. Moustakas, Creative Life (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1977), p. 97; and, Bachelard, p. 35.

⁶⁸Menen, p. 163.

as societal or familial silence and solitude (because one always lives with a host, a multitude, of relatives in a restricted space), an individual achieves inner solitude and silence by sitting down in a comfortable position, closing his eyes, and meditating. This can be accomplished anytime and anywhere:

"You can meditate anytime, anywhere," she [the swami Yogeshwarananda] tells her pupils, as do all the genuine teachers of the Upanishads. But she adds something peculiarly her own. "And when you do," she says, "Home is just where you are."⁶⁹

And home is what we are all looking for, but few find. Students come from organizations that sometimes loosely (and humorously) are called "home." and come in contact with teachers, many of whom, not only themselves come from unhappy homes, but now are also a part of an unhappy home (i.e., an unhappy marriage). And each (student and teacher) does his best to punish the other for it, when the unhappy home of each is neither's fault.

Therefore, the teacher must not keep an eagle

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 226.

eye open for any student who might be daydreaming. Daydreaming is not a mystic vision; neither is meditation (as such). But both are headed in the right direction. Daydreaming by a student may be nothing more than a sexual fantasy; or, it may be an escape from the brutal boredom of the class. But it may also be a dreaming, a reverie of flight,⁷⁰ that trajectory back into

the nucleus of childhood which remains at the center of the human psyche. That is where imagination and memory are most closely interwoven. That is where the childhood being weaves together the real and the imaginary and lives in the fullness of imagination the images of reality. All these images of his cosmic solitude react in depth within the being of the child; separated from his being for men, there is created, under the world's influence, a being for the world. That is the being of cosmic childhood. Men pass by, the cosmos remains, an ever-primal cosmos which the greatest sights of the world will never efface through the entire course of life. The cosmic nature of our childhood remains in us. It reappears in our solitary reveries. The nucleus of cosmic childhood exists in us therefore as a false memory. Our solitary reveries are the activities of a metamemory. Our reveries which turn toward childhood seem to reveal a being pre-existing our own [i.e., the Universal Mind], an entire

⁷⁰Bachelard, p. 96.

perspective of antecedence of being.⁷¹

Thus, if anything, we should allow students to daydream (if not at least tacitly encourage them to).

Thus,

We may therefore give as a general law that every child who shuts himself in desires imaginary life: it seems that the smaller the retreat in which the dreamer confines himself, the greater the dreams /It is beautiful and most worthwhile./ this dialectic of the dreamer withdrawing into his solitude and initiating waves of reverie in search of immensity.⁷²

Dreaming in reverie is a giant step towards contemplation: "We dream before contemplating."⁷³

If we, the teachers, should happen to say anything of interest⁷⁴ to the student, the student will undoubtedly promptly withdraw his attention from his daydreaming and return it to the classroom. And in his return, he will bring back with him lingering fragrances and memories

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 96-7.

⁷²Ibid., p. 99.

⁷³Ibid., p. 36.

⁷⁴You notice u that I did not say "relevance."

of eternity.

We must not forget that every thing carries within itself (or as its shadow) its potential opposite. Therefore, the potential opposite of our taxonomy on page 248 is the one in Figure 18.

Everyone seems concerned with each revealed taxonomy but appears unaware of its shadow. However, with lack of concentration and activeness on the part of the teacher (or learner), the shadow taxonomy proves itself the stronger, and before one is quite aware, exerts itself and usurps the place and power base of the revealed taxonomy. Instead of being the latent shadow, it becomes the patent taxonomy. We must be attentively aware of each shadow taxonomy and its potential power.

It is, in fact, the lurking power and influence of the shadow taxonomy that so often sets the intellectual and affective tone and direction of the learning situation. It does so negatively. When this negativity is properly respected and appropriately set off in opposition to the positiveness of the revealed taxonomy, its power can be useful and complementary. When its lurking and shadowy presence is disregarded, however, the results can be surprising and disastrous.




Figure 18. Inverted Taxonomy

Whichever taxonomy is in effect in a classroom (and there is always some taxonomy in operation) is the direct result of the conscious, subconscious, or unconscious choice of the teacher.

Rational Reorganization of Inner Chaos

We can by-pass the mystical experience and still reverse, by rational means, our inner chaos. We must realize that, just as there is in organization the natural tendency to move towards chaos, so is there in chaos the natural tendency to move towards organization. Chaos longs for any movement from without to aid its tendency to move towards organization. We can provide such initiative by rational means. But such undertaking requires great faith and courage: faith that such is the tendency and longing and possibility of our inner chaos, and courage to proceed on this faith alone.

We know that whatever is truly bound in this world by faith is bound in the next world also. And whatever occurs on one level of our existence is paralleled on all levels of our existence.

Therefore, here is our procedure; we shall

illustrate by the written medium, but it is just as easy to proceed in this manner in film, audio, studio art, music, and so forth. We take another's reversal, or organization, of inner chaos and communally use it as a like polarity to draw and pour into patterns and matrices of organization our own inner chaos. Ideally, we select a piece of writing that we have never read nor even seen before. This calls for the optimum of faith and courage on our part. It also allows our inner chaos to organize on its own terms and according to its own potentials and logic rather than having our conditioned intellects try to impose patterns of organization upon it. And, also, by this means we avoid merely parallel copying.

For our example here, I pull the short stories of Hemingway off of my bookcase at my right elbow and open it at random to a short story that I have never read. The very first word of the title is "Mr." It is essential that we take only one word at a time; we must not look beyond one word at a time. Again, this calls for faith and courage. Since we are trying to reverse our inner chaos, we shall reverse each word of the al-

ready-written piece of writing, until our inner chaos has reversed itself enough to continue on its own (on its own momentum) the process of reversing itself, its own chaos. We do not know what the reversing will produce because we do not know the nature of our chaos. We use this knowledge to determine our procedure of rationally reversing another's model. When we reverse our written model, we provide by our process of reversal an opposite, not the opposite, but an opposite. There is no specific opposite for anything, only a choice of opposites.

When we isolate one word and provide an opposite, the opposite may seem to our consciousness to be an arbitrary one. We know, however, that nothing is arbitrary, but rather that everything, even the most trivial choice, reflects our innermost and essential nature. Each rational choice, reflects our subconscious; and--since all things are interpenetrative, including our own being--our subconscious is connected, not only to our consciousness, but also to our inner chaos. Therefore, our conscious choice of a reversal (of an opposite), reflects, at least to a very

small degree, our subconscious choice--which in turn, reflects perhaps to an even smaller degree, the choice--or at least the consent--of our inner chaos. The more that we--with faith and courage in our total being (including our subconsciousness and inner chaos)--strive, with all our being to unite our fragmented selves, the more easy the process becomes and the more willing and able our subconsciousness and inner chaos are to synthesize and engage in this process.

Therefore, my choice of an opposite for "Mr." is some form of young-man designation, since "Mr." refers to an older man. It is a title of respect. If we condescend, we use one's first name. Therefore, I shall substitute a first name for "Mr." Which one? My own. Since I know me better than I do anyone else. Or something close to my own first name, "Denver." What cities do I know are close to the city of Denver? Hays. Provo. Aurora. Hays is a masculine name (Aurora, a feminine). Let me proceed. The next word in the title is "and." My choice of a reversal (an opposite) of "and" is "but." So far I have "Hays but" The next word is "Mrs." My oppo-

site choice is "Miss." So far: "Hays but Miss."

Or, I could reverse the "Mr." to "Master" (a young, unmarried man). Or to "Miss," a young unmarried woman as the opposite of an older man. Or, "Mrs." as an opposite of "Mr." All of these possibilities I shall hold in suspension for a while.

The couple in Hemingway's story is married. I shall reverse them to an unmarried state: "Master but for Miss Aurora." The first word of Hemingway's first line of his first paragraph is "Mr." I reverse to "Master." Let me proceed, one word at a time: and (but for) Mrs. Elliot (Miss Aurora) tried (didn't try) very (not very) hard (hard) to (to) have (keep her) a (from having a) baby (baby) (from being a parent).

And so we continue. The way we are heading, we are going to have a story about a young man who had his youth taken away from him because he got a young girl pregnant. That is, he was forced into premature adulthood. Our own story is almost ready to take off on its own. When it is so ready, we must let it go. And then, if at any time, we are unable to proceed on our own,

we can go back to our original impetus-model or another one to get our story going again by means of reversed parallelism.

Another example might be the following:

The opening paragraph of Anna Sidak's "The Tribes of Night"⁷⁵ is as follows:

. . . it seemed I lay awake long moments
 . . . listening, as I listen now, in a
 stillness broken only by the ticking of
 the clock. Neath the parlor's closed
 door wrote a pencil of slender light
 . . . It was the summer of the dry wells;
 the sheets were damp, the pillow sod-
 den under my head. In the distance
 coyotes howled and, in the barnyard,
 King answered, challenging; ears thrown
 back, good eye closed; the craters of
 his forehead shadowed in the moonlight,
 King having got to be the way he is
 two years this May. "They told me he
 was going around in circles down in the
 field," Clay said. "I went down there.
 His collar was gone. I put him in the
 back of the pickup and he turned around
 and around to make a nest for himself
 in the scrap of lumber I had there.
 The vet kept him ten days. He couldn't
 save the eye." King still gentle for
 all of that. The cattle, tormented
 beyond endurance by the flies of that
 summer, were restless and gaunt. Those
 yet blinded pawed at the earth and end-
 lessly shook their heads as the stit-
 ches slowly dissolved and, in the north-
 west, a shelf of thunderheads swept

⁷⁵Beyond Baroque 782: A Magazine of Nascent
 Literary Trends, Vol. 9, No. 2 (July, 1978), p. 12.

down . . .

Reversing this word by word (and then editing),

I come up with the following:

. . . I knew that you sat sleeping out there, for short moments at a time, out there, all around me . . . speaking, as you speak even now, in a sound made whole only by the ticking of the trickles of the ice-cold stream. The top of the open window of the tent's foyer drew a painter's brush of fat darkness . . . It was the fall of the early snow powder in the Grand Tetons; the sleeping bags were wet, the socks sodden on my feet. In the nearness, silence whispered and, in the campground, sleepers answered, agreeing, heads laid back, weak nearsighted eyes closed; the wrinkles of foreheads smoothing a bit in the darkness; campers having got to be the way they are in a lifetime of few years. This August. The whispering: "I told you autumn was going away jerkily in swirling white quadrilaterals up in the aspen forests, above your heads," Eartha whispered to me. "You came up here. And found my girdle. You took hold of me on the front of my chemise but I stood still, uncomplainingly, and stiller still, so as to destroy the void in yourself of me, on your soul where flowers should have been." I answered, "Thank you. We're not very nice to you. The forest ranger kept watch over you for seven days, but he couldn't save your wild life, not even that tree that that wretched fellow cut down with his hatchet." The Queen still wild for all of this. The people, however, placated beyond reason by the absence of flies that fall, were restful and fat.

Clouds still with clear sight looked down at Eartha and finitely nodded their minds as the moon-lit incisions quickly healed and, to the northeast, a cherry-blossom of snow quietly fell on the Tetons.

Imagine my surprise, when after I had reversed my model, to discover that I had written a paragraph about my camping out in Targhee National Park, Wyoming, a few years ago!

This is one process of reversing our inner chaos, and in so reversing it, organizing it into a coherent expression.

Summary and Conclusion

We began our consideration of the fifth level of creativity (reorganizing, or reversing inner chaos) by explicating a mystical approach to organizing our inner chaos, and we ended it by investigating a rational reversing approach.

This is the highest, and most difficult, and most complex level of creativity.

CHAPTER VI

TRANSPOSING A BEHAVIORAL OBJECTIVES MODEL INTO A CREATIVE PROCESS MODEL

We read the thoughts of the heart, we catch the passions living as they rise. Other . . . writers give us very fine versions and paraphrases of nature: but Shakespeare, together with his own comments, gives us the original text, that we may judge for ourselves: This is a very great advantage.

--William Hazlitt

Introduction

Much of what is written about in modern curriculum and instruction theory and practice concerns either, on the one hand, systems approach and instructional technology, or, on the other hand, humanistic, existential process. It seems

to me, that most of the specific models proposed are of the former persuasion. There are many such instructional or systems curriculum design models: those of Gagné, Banathy, Hoetker, and Briggs come quickly to mind. All of these models are primarily concerned with behavioral objectives, resources, evaluation, and the like.¹

Let us take a look at a systems management model; let us arbitrarily select one such model that is used extensively in media technology, Kemp's instructional design. At first glance, it seems to be (and is) a progeny of Tyler's model, which means that it has a reputable origin. Kemp's model is as follows, in Figure 19.²

It is good to arbitrarily select a model for close scrutiny because so much of education is arbitrary. Oppositional strategy follows generally two main courses: the first is to meet the opposition (or opposite force) head-on; the other is to avoid and circle around behind. (So much of education is merely circling around behind and avoiding at all costs a coming to grips with the situation.) One form of the collision strategy

¹See Apple (1979), especially Chapter 6, and Koetting (1979), especially Chapter 3, for an explication and critique of systems management and instructional design models used in curriculum development.

²Page 9.




Figure 19. Kemp's Behavioral Objectives Model

is to adopt the modus operandi of the opposition.
This shall be our method.

Control

The overwhelming attribute of this model is of course teacher (power structure) control over students. This, certainly, is a characteristic of behaviorism in general. Thus, such models as this one of Kemp's, are authoritarian, élitist hierarchies; Kemp's model represents bank depository, oppressive education: the teacher makes his version of reality, much abbreviated from the original of life, of course, and orders (and coerces and tries to force) the students to master it; the teacher (as an agent of the school) is the one who decides what general goals are to be pursued; next, in Kemp's model, it is the teacher who decides what are the capabilities (i.e., the degree of student stupidity) of the class; then the teacher decides on the subject content; then the teacher preassesses the achievement levels of the students; then the teacher decides on the appropriate activities and support systems necessary or at least, in her eyes, desirable to achieve the general and specific objectives; and then the teacher evaluates how well the students employed the teacher's activities to achieve the teacher's objectives. The objectives are

the controlling force of the entire model. And the objectives are set by the power structure (teacher and/or administration).

This model, while good for teaching students extremely low-level, Pavlovian-type of stimuli and responses, comes up lacking if learning (as opposed to information) is desired. It is good because the teacher can justify his existence in a tangible way to the administration: if students succeed (more of them than fail), then teacher really is a good teacher; if more students fail, however, than succeed, then it is easy to put the blame on the students (i.e., "The objectives were clear; the students just were not intellectually capable"). The administration in turn has tangible statistics to present when trying to get pay raises for themselves or a bond issue passed. Behavioral objectives are also good because they give teachers something "intellectually" within their capabilities for conversation with other teachers at lunch or in the Teachers' Room or in a bar. (They are also good for trying to strike up a relationship in a bar: "I'm just not appreciated: I knock myself out presenting clear and

concise objectives and really interesting learning experiences, and the students--those little . . . --they just don't care!") Such a model also enables the teacher to exist without having to think; it also helps with discipline by requiring the students to busy themselves without the opportunity to think. It also gives the students a good reply at home in the evening (or on the weekends for college students) when mommy or daddy asks, "And what did you learn in school today?"

It is a good model . . . for educational mediocrity.

For the teacher with enthusiasm and ability, however, we need something of more substance and with more challenge.

Therefore, let us transform Kemp's model by liberating it from its product domination and oppression. We all know--or should--that life is made up--not of products--but of processes. Any product, not only is a by-product of a process, but is itself also in a process of constant change. Ergo: what we need is a model for process, not product.

The center of Kemp's model is empty (in-

deed!). However, Kemp did not explicitly put teacher in the middle of the wheel of his model, but there is where she is in practice. Shall we kick her out and put there instead the student? No. Better than that, let us have a collegial democracy, with both teacher and student there equally. (See Figure 20.) By arranging the learning situation into a democracy, we do not reduce the teacher's importance. To the contrary, the teacher--by allowing the students to rise to a position of co-equality, demonstrates his exciting sense of self-confidence.

Once having experienced the need for integration and interpenetration of power structure and students, one is hard pressed to neglect the powerful and enticing incentives for continuing such a practice (of such an ideal). Such a co-mingling is bound to have consequences because those individuals allowed such training will come to consider personally adequate and even desirable such a process in the educational institution. Co-equality and fraternity will not be lessons in idealism but rather standards by which to judge their lessons. The lesson is contained within the learning situation itself and not produced at the close of it.




Figure 20. Beginning of Process Model

Liberation

What follows is of course descriptive and suggestive, rather than prescriptive and legislative. First of all, the teacher and students together discuss what possible processes they would like to play with; there are, as we now know, five levels of creative processes, applicable to any and all endeavors: these processes are, of course, imitation; transposition; synecdoche; classical modeling; and the organizing (or reversing) of inner chaos. Thus we have the first satellite of the immanent galaxy of student-teacher-process. (See Figure 21.)

The essential characteristic of this first step of our process model is that it does not comprise the beginning of a planned, sequential series of steps that lead to ends that are known and expected in advance and that are completed with a maximum of management efficiency. There is a great difference in the quality of coal and diamonds. Coal has been produced with a vast greater efficiency (of time) than have diamonds.

With predetermined outcomes to be achieved the management model becomes in practice an instrument for a testing situation. However, we want a learning process rather than a testing situation.




Figure 21. First Step of Process Model

Next, the teacher and his students consider both of their desires; this is not a search for consensus. It is a dialogue or, if need be, a dialectic. If there are no areas of general interest at all, then this is the wrong teacher for this class (or the wrong class for this teacher). A mutual exploration is what is desired here. (See Figure 22.)

In this step we are not seeking to follow a tradition; the thrust of our work is not technical either. Our thrust is a focus on who should form objectives--not on how the objectives are to be formed. There is no worry about finding or creating the correct sequence of regimented tasks for students. There is no concentration on providing training or practice in basic skills. Basic skills become indistinguishable from desires.

This is a step in the process of hope and desire. In this way schools cease from disguised baby-sitting and actually do function as educational institutions. There is no neutrality; none is desired. Direction is provided by inner necessities; and personal directions are shared and group activities become personal. There is true give-and-take because there is no imposed




Figure 22. Second Step of Process Model

constraint or restraint. Any constraint or restraint arises because of the exigencies of the time and place and personality and are thus natural.

Next, they mutually choose one or more specific processes, which they think may help them to attain their desire(s); the specific process is chosen from one of the five levels of creativity (such as imitation, or synecdoche, and so forth). (See Figure 23.)

This specific choice is a natural one because it arises from the inner desire of the individual student and from the outer necessity of the area to be explored. It undoubtedly is not necessary to demonstrate, on the one hand, the hopelessness of an imposed objective and, on the other, the great and indescribable power of inner choices. Inner choice is the harmony of the personal with group; with the individual and society and nature. It is an engagement of personal inquiry and analysis with outer phenomena; it is personal precision.

Specific choice here is a narrowing of attention and attendant direction. It is the setting in motion of latent and, hopefully, restless desire.




Figure 23. Third Step of Process Model

Then teacher and students decide upon an appropriate context to which they will apply the process; appropriateness is determined by interest. (See Figure 24.)

The consequences of personal appraisal of appropriate areas of one's context extend beyond the issue of what "subject matter" should be emphasized. In many instances they influence how perceptions and consequent behavior will be organized and how valuation will occur. If one conceives of context as a kind of supermarket of materialism that is stocked at differing prices, then it appears reasonable to make out a shopping list in accordance with what one is willing and able to pay, and in accordance with what one feels needs to be restocked in the larder. This involves generally replenishing what one is already familiar with.

We need to consider our context as an extended part of ourselves. We are not shopping, but rather are exploring ourselves. We are not adding to ourselves from without, but instead are actualizing what we are. Since the process of contextualizing is an inner one, the rewards are also inner and therefore a permanent part of ourselves.




Figure 24. Fourth Step of Process Model

Next, Kemp's pre-assessment is thrown out. Who cares where the students have been or are? We are interested only in where they are going. Thus, the individual student's (and teacher's) desires will dictate where he is and where he shall end up. The process decided upon by each student (and teacher) is a natural process, of course. (All creative processes are natural; and creativity is a natural possession by all.³) The specific application of a process will be by each student and thus within the capabilities of each student. (For example, every student can imitate; some probably can imitate better than others.) Thus, we next decide upon activities. (See Figure 25.)

If a student should choose a process or activity beyond his development, so what? If failure results from inner miscalculation (rather than outer oppression), the result is merely a learning experience.

³David Ausubel, "Learning by Discovery: Rationale and Mystique," National Association of Secondary-School Principles, Vol. 43 (Sept.-Dec., 1961), p. 39.




Figure 25. Fifth Step of Process Model

The teacher must do everything that the students do. Instead of peeking over shoulders with folded arms on bosom, the teacher instead will participate in the process activity. It is preferable that he do so.⁴ If poetry is the process, then he too will compose. He will share his process and progress with those of the students, not for comparison's sake, but instead for mutual encouragement. (See Figure 26.)

This egalitarian and cooperative pursuit of process is indescribably beautiful. For the student, he has company--older and wiser and more-experienced companionship--on his exciting and perhaps frightening journey over strange seas of thought and feeling. For the teacher, life becomes again an alive participation rather than a progressively boring spectatorship. Every day, the teacher must anew take on the sweet and powerful struggle of life and its processes. The student develops strength; the teacher strengthens already-developed virtues.

⁴Hyman, p. 249.




Figure 26. Sixth Step of Process Model

The teacher will provide support necessities, such as, paper, camera, tools, and so forth, whatever the participants feel they need. Because this is one of the prime raisons d'être of a teacher, he should take this responsibility quite seriously. This does not preclude the students' helping in this area also. In fact, their help and cooperation and participation are essential here also. (See Figure 27.)

What must not occur is that administrators and teachers accept (or worse, propagate) the assumption that they are merely managers or facilitators. They must view themselves as co-workers with students. As workers they must protect themselves from the easy (and lazy) way of assuming exploitative managerial roles. They must constantly affirm their identity by combating the organization of outside oppressive power, whatever form it may take. Time and effort previously wasted on working out and defending both silent and articulated tentative agreements between distinct parties are now redirected toward synthesis and manifested accomplishments. Adversarial distinctions disappear in cooperative interests.




Figure 27. Seventh Step of Process Model

And, last, is, not evaluation, but mutual celebration and enjoyment and reflection on the process and by-product. This not only completes the model, but also strengthens, among the participants, the general processes of creativity. Therefore, it is, not only the final step in the model, but it is also, in a true sense, the first step in another sequence of the process of this model. (See Figure 28.)

Celebration assures the departure from the preoccupation with standardized outcomes. The huge, puffed-up testing industry will be punctured and deflated, requiring teachers and administrators (and students) to support the students' cultivation of their positive idiosyncracies. This all makes possible a truly individualized form of teaching.

Celebration dismisses the consequences and thus rewards of curricular interest in control and measurement. This enables the process to operate of retaining complex tasks in toto, thus enabling and encouraging the refusal to break up such complexities into microunits of behavior. Such retention of total complexities renders curriculum more natural and consequently more interesting to the students (and teachers).




Figure 28. Completed Process Model

All of the satellites in Kemp's model are, he claims, interdependent;⁵ in my process model, however, the satellites (and the sun) are inter-independent while at the same time interpenetrative. The differences, therefore, between the Kemp model and the Sasser model are dramatic and oppositional: Kemp's model is one for the programming of automatons--Sasser's, a model for creativity; the first model is an instrument (at least it has been in practice) for the oppression of the helpless by the power structure--the other is a mutual liberation (the teacher from oppressing, and the students from being oppressed); the one is a closed system (whose natural end is entropy)--the other is an open system whose growth is negentropy; one is totalitarian--the other democratic; the one is prison--the other, freedom; the one is preparation for life--the other, life itself; the one is constructed--the other, natural; and, finally, the one is fragmented and contrived while the other is organic and holistic.

⁵Kemp, p. 9.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The time which is contracts into a mathematic point; and even that point perishes a thousand times before we can utter its birth. All is finite in the present; and even that finite is infinite in its velocity of flight towards death. But in God there is nothing finite; but in God there is nothing transitory; but in God there can be nothing that tends to death. Therefore it follows that for God there can be no present. The future is the present of God, and to the future it is that he sacrifices the human present.

--Thomas De Quincey

Creativity and Freedom

Creativity is both a natural and necessary process for the optimum realization and actual-

ization of the human condition; it needs to be encouraged, but even moreso to be allowed to function. Because it has been and is being tampered with and stifled and oppressed, in order to get it back to its natural state we need to theorize about it so as to discover how it best operates. And in so doing, we shall best be able to, not only foster and encourage it, but also to allow it naturally to function. Schools are an ideal place for teaching. What better endeavor for teaching is there than creativity, the basis of all things and processes?

The Creative Taxonomy

Creativity can be considered as a taxonomy, having five levels: imitation (realism), transposition, synecdoche (Romanticism), Classical Modeling (Classicism), and the reorganization of our inner chaos (mysticism). Although theoretically we may reduce creativity to this taxonomy, in practice there is of course more to it than just this; and also these theoretically separate levels in practice many times overlap. And the mystery of each of these levels is, ultimately,

that it is beyond our intellectual comprehension.

Humanism

Creativity is more probable when the creator is infused with humanism, a love and respect for and appreciation of all living matter and spirit and mind. Humanism provides, not only the psychological motivation for creativity, but more importantly the bond between creator and his raw materials through which his creativity may flow.

In recent years, critics have intensified some tough considerations and criticisms of education, one group even challenging the worth of schools to exist. These critics usually challenge either the subject areas or social and psychological milieu of schools. Such criticism betrays the fragmentation, not only of the schools, but also of the critics' perceptions. These critics (and others) are on surer ground when they attack the inhumanity of the school systems. It is this lack of humanity and humanism that causes this fragmentation. All of life is a process of education. We live to the extent that we learn. If we do not learn much, we are not

living much. When we cease to learn at all, then we cease to live at all.

Flux

Humans, although related to dogs and rats, are not dogs or rats. There is more to learning than salivating. Simple stimulus and response, although valid and proper for certain low-level aspirations, cannot contain the whole of the human condition and process of learning. To insist upon a foregone conclusion in the form of a product is to attempt to freeze a segment of time into a space. Life is flux. Any attempt to freeze this flux can result only in death:

life is flux, and . . . the only way for a human being to be an individual is to flow and change with this flux called life. However, whenever a human being "assumes" an "individuality" (such as that of teacher, priest, lawyer, or whatever), he has frozen himself, and thus taken himself out of the flux, out of life, and therefore is no longer alive (i.e., in a state of flux). Madness also is death because it excludes one from reality (i.e., the flux of life).¹

¹Sasser, "Flux and Freeze in Pirandello's Henry IV (Unpublished essay), p. 1. See also

To change a process (life, learning, creativity) to a product is to reify it; and reification is death (or madness).² The silliness of teaching process as products becomes tragic when it is institutionalized. For example, when a university department chairman (who is supposedly also a professional "artist") claims that creativity is a result of learning products (theme, denouement, climax, and so forth), then it is that only those students of his who are true dullards can survive such reified and Pavlovian training to earn the degrees and then to go out, like little Skinnerian rats, and get the few available positions and proceed to continue wreaking such criminal regimentation and ignorance and stupidity upon young, unsuspecting, and innocent people.

Our "most immediate and gratifying memories [of schooling] include those times when classroom

R. D. McMaster's introduction to his edition of Charles Dicken's Little Dorrit (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1969).

²Alvin F. Poussaint, "A Negro Psychiatrist Explains the Negro Psyche," Who Am I? Essays on the Alienated, passim.

learning became synonymous with creative production.³ Creativity "is a basic human instinct";⁴ true learning can only be creative.

The Near Future

Although the curriculum field of schooling is still cursed with interlopers, who believe in intellectual and creative abiogenesis (such as those who feel that rote learning equals creativity but who confess that they do not know what "creativity" is), or who believe that schools (on any level) are not the place for creativity, the time is opportune for the emergence of intelligence and creativity.

Fragmentation is an ugly condition, one that needs to be addressed by all of us, especially teachers; synthesis, interpenetration, holism, and oneirism--these are what a bleeding world and humanity need. This is what we all must strive for. The very nature of creativity is one of

³James Morrow and Murray Suid, Media and Kids: Real-World Learning in the Schools (Rochelle Park: Hayden Book Co., Inc., 1977), p. 133.

⁴Ibid., pp. 133-4.

synthesis, interpenetration, holism, and oneirism.

Thus, our desire and search for a process of creativity and of teaching creativity (that is, "teaching" period) are not questions of economic or personal exorbitance or oppression or deprivation. Creativity requires no great legislative effort. It is apolitical. We do not need monied programs for the gifted, talented, and creative; we need only teachers with humanism and intellect and creativity. We need theory to guide, where and if needed, these humane and intellectual and affective and creative teachers--on all levels. The constitutive subject areas must be subsumed under the broad process of creativity. Our schools are the places where humans may most easily confront reality and truth; therefore, our schools must optimize this encounter; they must liberate with process rather than oppress with reification and product. They must cease to be Abaddons.

Since creativity is the basis for life, we must respect and nurture this process, allowing it free rein in all aspects of our lives. Those who are threats to creativity, we must have the

courage to strive against. Those who are creative and who promote creativity, we must love and revere and strive to emulate. We must celebrate, continually, creativity.

Scope and Method of Study

Focusing upon the universal need for creativity, this study has presented the theory and philosophy of creativity. It did so by dividing creativity into five levels, beginning with the simplest and progressing through to the most complex. By dividing creativity into its five general and comprehensible levels, its process is more easily observed. This study began with an assessment of the need of creativity in education (including curriculum and development, the disciplines, and the fine arts) and adjacent areas, such as the field of business. It then defined creativity and situated it in the essence of the educative and personal development process. In the first part of the study, great reliance was placed upon the scholarship of the literature, striving to build a strong and valid base for the intuitive theorizing of the second part of the study. The placement and possibility of the utilization of each level in

the classroom situation was posited. The necessity of humanism in the creative process was explored. The binary opposition between the product-orientation of behavioral and systems management theorists and the process-orientation of the humanist was fully considered.

Findings and Conclusions

Close scholarly investigation of the literature reveals, on the one hand, a felt need for creativity in the general field of education (on all levels and in all fields) and in other fields, such as business, but, on the other hand, a lack of both a precise and concise yet complete definition of creativity and of a lack of specificity in curricular possibilities. Also, the heavy over-reliance in education of behavioral and systems management theory tends to preclude the practical appreciation and utilization of creativity. Most pressing of all, there is nowhere to be found a comprehensive theory of creativity.

Creativity can be considered theoretically and philosophically. This study does so, presenting a taxonomy of its five levels and considering practical applications of the five levels in curriculum and in the disciplines and fine

arts. The five levels of creativity are imitation, transposition, synecdoche, Classical Modeling, and reorganizing of inner chaos.

There is the possibility that appreciation and utilization of these five levels of creativity as components of joint teacher-student liberation have potential for revolutionary changes within the institution of education itself and also within the individual.

Summary

There is such a thing as creativity; it is natural and common to all; it is both desirable and necessary; it can be analyzed and theorized; it should be analyzed and theorized; it can be taught; it should be taught; it can be and should be the essence of all pedagogy; and school is one of the most opportune places in which to teach creativity.

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APPENDIXES

It might be useful, as a quick reference guide, to arrange each level of creativity into an individual taxonomy and all of the levels combined into one taxonomy. Furthermore, it might also be useful to arrange the taxonomies into two different kinds of compositions: the Christmas tree arrangement for former systems management advocates who still have trouble thinking and visualizing in terms other than behavioral objectives and straight-line endeavors; and the more organic, circular arrangement of sun and satellites.

Therefore, Appendix A will contain the Christmas tree arrangements of the taxonomies of the individual levels of creativity; Appendix B will contain the sun-and-satellite pictorial presentation of the taxonomies of the individual levels of creativity; and Appendix C will contain both kinds of arrangements of the combined levels.

APPENDIX A
TAXONOMIES OF THE FIVE LEVELS OF
CREATIVITY IN LINEAR
REPRESENTATION




Figure 29. Imitation




Figure 30. Transposition




Figure 31. Synecdoche




Figure 32. Classical Modeling




Figure 33. Reorganizing of Inner Chaos

APPENDIX B

TAXONOMIES OF THE FIVE LEVELS OF
CREATIVITY IN ORGANIC
REPRESENTATIONS




Figure 34. Imitation, Organic View.




Figure 35. Transposition, Organic View




Figure 36. Synecdoche, Organic View




Figure 37. Classical Modeling, Organic View




Figure 38. Reorganizing of Inner Chaos, Organic View

APPENDIX C

SYNTHESIZED LINEAR AND ORGANIC GRAPHIC
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE
FIVE LEVELS OF
CREATIVITY




Figure 39. The Five Levels of Creativity, Linear View




Figure 40. The Five Levels of Creativity,
Organic View

VITA

Denver Glendaire Sasser

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

Thesis: MAKE A RURAL PEN: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL,
PHILOSOPHICAL, AND PRAXITICAL EXPLICATION
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PLEASE NOTE:

Record available for
consultation at the
Library of Oklahoma
State University.

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