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THE VALUES AND MEANINGS BEHIND SUPPORTING DRONES IN BOMBING ATTACKS

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METAPHORS WE BOMB BY:
THE VALUES AND MEANINGS BEHIND SUPPORTING DRONES IN BOMBING ATTACKS

A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

BY

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For my husband, who always believes in me. For my parents, who are always there for me. For my dog, who always keeps things interesting.

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Abstract

This study theoretically examines the metaphors and values associated with exceptional patriotism and Christians in order to examine the support of military drones in bombing attacks against terrorism. Utilizing George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's Metaphors We Live By, I used these identified values to explain the differentiating motives between those who do not support drones in bombing attacks against terrorism and, more particularly, those who do support drones. This study shows that historical, patriotic values support drones due to their strong ties to American exceptionalism. Therefore, military technology is quickly developing based upon traditional types of patriotisms, and despite more critical forms of patriotism.

With respect to its theoretical foundations, this study showed three significant expectations were upheld in binary logistic regressions. First, exceptional patriotism increased the odds of drones in bombing attacks against terrorism. Exceptional patriotism was defined by its patriotic values and American exceptionalism rhetoric. Next, against all other religious preferences, Christians had higher odds of supporting drones until its interaction with the white male variable was introduced into the final model. The addition of this interaction variable showed that being white and male was a significant moderating variable for Christians in drone support. Lastly, another expectation was met in the relationship between patriotic Christians in the West and drone support, as patriotic Christians in the West had higher odds of drone support. Using the observations of 1,970 respondents from data collected by the Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy of 2014, a series of binary logistic regression models were used to examine these expectations.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In my study, I examine the association between patriotic values and the support of unmanned aerial vehicles – also referred to as 'drones' – in bombing attacks against terrorism. Between the 9/11 attacks and the year 2011, nearly $1.3 trillion was approved for military spending. Although most of the money has gone into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, some of the money has been invested in dream projects such as drone technologies (Greenemeier, 2011). Additionally, since the attacks on September 11th, patriotic values and militaristic practices have developed a uniquely positive association with the perceived threat within the Southern region of the United States (Skitka, 2005). If these values and practices can significantly predict the support for particular types of military intervention, such as drones or the general use of robotic technologies, then it would be useful to further dissect these values and practices in order to examine the intentions or justifications for the armament and military use of drones.

In my research, I justify the importance of this research with a discussion of the ethical and moral concerns surrounding the military use of drones and robotic technologies. Next, I validate the examination of patriotic values and Christian identity by exploring the theoretical framework. Then, I discuss relevant past research on patriotic correlations as well as patriotism found in dominant groups. Empirically, I then discuss the process used in order to prove my hypotheses as well as define a new form of patriotism, "exceptional patriotism." Lastly, I provide a description of the results, concluding remarks, and a discussion over the implications of this research.

Chapter 2: Ethical Concerns

Although air warfare has been utilized for a little over a hundred years, there has been a consistent development of drone technology in order to decrease the overall need for humans to be physically present during war. Morally, this would decrease human casualty; logically, this would decrease the cost of training, housing, and incentives used by military recruiters. It was not until the early 1990's that the United States began investing in modern-day drones in order to gather information during the Bosnian war. In the beginning of the 21st century, drones were capable of streaming live video and being armed over Afghanistan to target enemy forces as well as gather information. Today, drones can be as small as an insect or as large as an airplane as well as have a variety of capabilities. A particular model is usually chosen based on the distance of the mission from military base as well as the nature of the mission (Bergen, 2015).

Within the academic and activist community, the arming of drones has sparked the discussion over who should have the authority to control such a vehicle. Society's understanding of efficacy and legalities affects how society understands and interprets the combative capabilities of drones such as targeted killings (Duval, 2014). Many people are hesitant to support drones in military interventions because of a 'responsibility gap,' defined by Robert Sparrow (2007) as the possibility that actions cannot be held completely accountable to a single human individual. Sparrow argues that the 'responsibility gap' would prevent any human being – whether the commander, the programmers, etc. – from being held legitimately responsible for a mistake made by an autonomous weapon. For example, because there is not a dependable way to ensure that it may function or be handled properly in the absence of a human being, mistakes

of an armed drone cannot be ultimately tied to one individual due to the large team of individuals who are typically involved in the execution of a drone. When there is a team of engineers and military personnel who are stationed hundreds of miles away from the mission, who are engaged with troops on the ground as well as intelligence analysts across the United States through Internet chat rooms, it would be difficult to hold an individual legitimately and solely responsible for an error made by the drone or in the mission itself (Miller, 2012).

Although Purves and colleagues (2015) try to consider the possibility of future autonomous robots as genuine moral decision makers, it can be argued that this would be highly improbable due to the fluidity of morality. When armed, drones and remotely piloted aircrafts are synonymously understood as autonomous weapon systems (AWS) which, by their definition, act upon robotic judgement in replication of a human moral judgement (Takahashi, 2012). Autonomous drones may be initially programmed to make decisions based upon morality; however, of whose morality are drones programmed? If one programmer is trusted with the morality of drones then the 'responsibility gap' may improve; however, many other issues may arise with a complete dependence on one version of morality.

Additionally, society remains ethically inconsistent of the use of robotic technology as objects of warfare. Results in a study conducted by Peter Danielson (2011) show that robotic technology during peace situations, such as robotic care for the elderly, was far less controversial and more acceptable than the use of robotic technology during war. Responses towards robots of war were consistently divided and contradicting, indicating a large lack of consensus over the correct use of robotic

technology as warfare. For example, respondents highly disapproved of the arming of remote-controlled aircraft as it possibly was seen as a disconnection from the decision of a physically present pilot.

As discussed by Chetan Bhatt (2012), the current use of drones in targeted killings may contradict international humanitarian laws in regards to the lack of judicial process and declaration of war upon an individual within any country. In his discussion, Bhatt (2012) refers to Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-Yemeni citizen hiding in Yemen, as a prime example of the unnecessary, inhumane use of an already controversial robotic weapon. Al-Awlaki was on the CIA's 'kill list,' and ordered to be killed by drone without a judicial process. Since the United States was not at war with Yemen, nor was the country at war in Yemen, the targeted killing of al-Awlaki took place outside of armed conflict. Without a judicial process and without a war, the United States is killing an individual based upon ambiguous ethical standards. Without an official declaration of war, the killing of an individual within a country that the United States is not at war with, nor at war in, would conflict with international humanitarian laws. Without this declaration, the killing of individuals without judicial process also opposes international humanitarian laws.

As a product of social values, humanitarian law must adapt to the technological developments in warfare in order to constitute "the battlespace as a legal, social and geographical space in which violence is considered to be enacted legitimately" (Bhatt, 2012: 826). The drone, according to PW Singer (2009), represents the large 'disconnect' between the societal expectation of war and the reality of robotic wars. With the creation of drones as well as general military robotics, society's understanding

of war has become outdated due to the new realities and technological revolution in war. In reality, the battlefield is no longer physically distinct and the knowledge of civilians is largely biased and antiquated due to the constant access to movies, news outlets, and other modes of media. Society believes that war is still solely dependent on human combatant whereas war is actually transforming into cyber interventions and robotic combat. In sum, because of this lack of understanding, social norms and values are not yet able to adapt to the new forms of military interventions.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

Cultural Lag Theory

According to William Ogburn (1966), society has created material culture, defined as all physical objects that people create (i.e. technical development), as well as non-material culture, defined as thoughts that people learn and practice as a product of their culture (i.e. moral and legal institutions). Cultural lag is the gap between material and non-material culture due to the rapid rate of technological development and the slow degree of cultural adjustment. Because non-material culture is often unquestioned by society, this lag is believed to be capable of increasing by months, years, or decades. In the event of cultural lag, Ogburn identifies four general processes of social change: invention, diffusion, accumulation, and adjustment. The invention process refers to the development of new technology; more broadly, the new technology is created entirely or through a mixture of old cultural traits. Diffusion refers to the dispersion process when the new technology becomes accessible. Accumulation occurs when the new technology is absorbed into the society, and values and concepts begin to adjust to the new cultural traits necessary to accept the new technology. In return, the invention also

absorbs into social usage, completing the adjustment process. In this process, cultural lag is typically found between invention and diffusion, before any process to accumulate or adjust may be considered. This lag can decrease or increase over time if the culture does not develop new norms in order to adapt to the new technology.

Although war has historically influenced the rapid rate of technological development, it has been developing at a much higher rate over the last century. Since the early 1990's, the United States military has been investing in a new model of warfare, referred to as the revolution in military affairs (RMA). With the intentionally high rate of development in military organization and tactics, surveillance, precision targeting, and force mobility, military technology is no longer developing based upon a current war but preparing itself for future wars. According to Joelian Pretorius (2008), this will become very problematic from a worldview perspective. The technological culture which drives the development of military technology will create bigger issues surrounding social responsibility. Using nuclear weapons as an example, Pretorius states that society had become blinded by the myth that military technological superiority provides security. Additionally, he argues that technology keeps society in a state of war preparation. Although newer drone technologies are being developed, the justifications to develop this technology have not.

Metaphors We Live By

Within the theoretical framework of this research, the most relevant example of non-material culture are the belief systems within the United States and the metaphorical meanings from which they are conceptualized. In Metaphors We Live By (1980), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson consider metaphors as an inherent way to

establish meaning in everyday language and communication. The metaphors are embedded in language in order to conceptualize the human experience and understanding, therefore helping to identify the roots of culture by how language is practiced. For example, arguments are usually described or engaged in as a battle of war such as "*He attacked every weak point in my argument*" or "*Your claims are indefensible*" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 4). By embedding this metaphor (*act of war*) into the description of the human experience (*an argument*), a person gains the understanding of the cultural experience of an argument as well as the source for war. Rather than conceptualizing an argument as a dance, Lakoff and Johnson describe Western culture's understanding of an argument as a battle.

Based on this principle, metaphors found in patriotic language is another example for how patriotism is understood and practiced in United States society. Language used in American patriotic songs provides insight in how patriotism may be culturally performed. In one of the many patriotic songs where the United States is directly referenced, Kate Smith's version of '*God Bless America*' (1938) requires a person to "*stand beside her and guide her*." Like many well-known songs or speeches, the country United States is humanized to the point where it is feminized with the use of gendered pronouns. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) would call this attachment of human characteristics to nonhuman entities as '*personification*.' This occurs when a nonhuman object is personified in order to metaphorically understand phenomena in human terms. In the case of feminizing America, 'she' is also typically described in terms of nature and landscape – "*O' beautiful for spacious skies, For amber waves of grain, For purple mountain majesties, Above the fruited plain*" (Bates and Ward, 1904) – which implies

concepts such as vulnerability and beauty. The gendered personification and nature-centered descriptions can be explained by *ecofeminism*, which considers women as closer to nature while understanding men in terms of a predisposition to control nature much like they do women (Zmroczek, 1987). Additionally, this gendered description of America is also explained by feminist analyses where the masculine and masculine language is associated with technology while the feminine and feminine language is associated with nature (Zimmerman, 1986).

Traditional femininity, such as the femininity that is associated with nature, places itself within the gender binary system as being protected and controlled by traditional masculinity. In the masculine role, a patriot must protect the femininized country by 'standing' beside her and 'guiding' her (Smith, 1938). These actions represent the roles ascribed to traditional masculinity: 'protecting' and 'controlling' the feminine. '*Protection*' is a key word used by patriotism in order to validate the use of military technologies such as armed drones (Kelly, 2012; Fuller, 2014). However, according to Thomas Burns (1999), the diversity found in members of various communities will likely affect the different ways that individuals understand concepts like '*protection*.' Because of this diversity, Burns refers to an '*attentional vote*' as an individual's decision to choose the message that coincides best with their own belief. Therefore, broad and indistinguishable messages in rhetoric, such as the protection of one's country, can be applied and personally understood by many individuals of many different backgrounds. For example, the patriotism conceptualized in songs such as '*America, the Beautiful*' could potentially be understood as a call to 'protect' the environment as a patriotic act; however, likely due to the historical context in which the

song was written, it would not be difficult for an individual patriot to understand the meaning of 'protection' in terms of action against out-group threats. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge different forms of patriotism which have interpreted "protection" in terms of outward action as well as a patriotism which has interpreted "protection" in terms of inward action.

When referring to one's country, patriotism generally does not identify a particular threat from which a country needs to protect. In this context, one's country is portrayed as the pure and beautiful; however, the ambiguity found in patriotism portrays outside entities as threats – "*'Cause the flag still stands for freedom and* they *can't take that away*" (Greenwood, 1984, emphasis added). Due to the implied passive role of the feminine country, the masculine patriot is expected to practice the traditionally active and aggressive role in order to defend the country. The pronoun '*they*' is a general word used in patriotic language that helps to distinguish the in-group from the out-group. In patriotic language, '*they*' is typically used to identify a vague enemy which the country needs to take action against. For example, in the State of the Union, George W. Bush states:

> Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not and will not allow it. (Bush, 2002)

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By excluding a description of 'terrorists' and providing a general picture where many individuals can imagine their own understanding of how and why freedom is in danger, Bush was able to convey America's responsibility to pursue these shadowy threats. The deeply rooted metaphors found in patriotic communication, therefore, translate into the American expectation to take outward action against any perceived threat in order to preserve the life and dignity of one's country. Because of the loyalty and action associated with masculine patriotism, this study shows that respondents who believe in patriotic values have higher odds of supporting armed drones due to his belief that one's country would be spared from harm and dishonor. Much like how a husband is to protect a wife – "*For this is my country, to have and to hold*" (Jacobs, 1940) – the patriot will go great lengths to defend one's country.

Regional Framework: American Exceptionalism

This study explores the combination of patriotic and exceptional values and their odds of drone support. By definition, American exceptionalism argues that the United States is uniquely superior based upon its wealth, power, political process, and moral compass. According to Godfrey Hodgson (2009), this exceptionalism is constituted by several different viewpoints. People claim that America's exceptionalism stems from its resources and material opportunity which could not be acquired by immigrants elsewhere. A second view states that American exceptionalism is demonstrated by America's absence of class divisions. Although this can be argued based upon events in American history, this point of view believes that a person is not confined to the disadvantages of a lower class unless by his/her own fault. Hodgson (2009) also discusses a third view which argues that social class did not infiltrate American politics,

much like how socialism played an important part in European politics. Generally, however, American exceptionalism can be most identified by the 'unique' aspect of its definition. Concepts such as freedom, liberty, and equality is perceived as particularly American, despite contradicting events which made each of these concepts only relevant to white, upper-class, male American culture.

American exceptionalism is practiced as a way to differentiate the United States against all other nations and, historically, against Europe. Based on this premise, many of the values and characteristics associated with American exceptionalism are also found in patriotism. However, American exceptionalism also has a deeply rooted relationship with Christianity as New England Puritans first applied the concept of 'exceptionalism' in order to use the opportunity of a new land – their 'Eden' – as a way to also create a society of 'Adams' (Lewis, 1959). For example, the rhetoric found in John Winthrop's 1630 declaration associates New England as a "[City] upon a Hill" in order to depict the individuals of New England as subjects and examples of God. As examples, the world is watching New England as a testament of their Christian God: if New England fails, then the world will blame their God – "*wee shall be made a story and a byword through the world, wee shall open the mouthes of enemies to speake evill of the ways of God and all professours for Gods sake*" (Winthrop, 1630) – however, if New England succeeds, then they will be blessed. According to Winthrop and early believers of American Exceptionalism, the people of New England have been chosen by God to be the superior example of the world.

With the help of Jonathan Edwards, the rhetoric of American exceptionalism soon adjusted to new generations of Americans as well as to the general traits of

patriotism, with new concepts such as individualism, self-reliance, and libertarianism (Vandivinit, 2014). This development gave purpose to a new nation "without a past, a people without a common customs, a territory without clear boundaries, and an economy without a stable center" (Bercovitch, 1978: 140). Though useful for the American Revolution, this developing definition of American exceptionalism also justified residential expansion in the United States. According to Vandivinit, the notion of self-reliance particularly deemed the westward expansion as necessary, "not only as a territorial affirmation and definition of God's will but also as an exercise in spreading the new ideological consensus" (Vandivinit, 2014: 170). Further, exceptionalism was also used to unify the United States in the midst of ethnic and religious diversity which arguably turned into a way to conform the American individual to an exceptional tool of American society.

The West

A product of Manifest Destiny and westward expansion, the West was founded based upon the United States' belief that the American people have an inherited responsibility based upon the new American rhetoric of exceptionalism. By expanding westward, the common man could gain economic prosperity and autonomy. However, resonating its roots with Christianity, the west symbolically represents a place of biblical rebirth. Much like the purity and rebirth associated with baptism, the west was perceived as a frontier, "untouched by civilization" and, therefore, a place of resurrection (Vandivinit, 2014: 171). The west was also perceived as a place where a man could reach his full potential, much like how earlier New England Puritans associated their God-given responsibility to represent Him in their new world.

Therefore, the West region is a historical product of American exceptionalism, deeply entrenched with Christian metaphors.

According to Linda Skitka (2005), flag-display behaviors in the West showed a particularly large increase of flag-display behavior after 9/11 based upon one's self-reported love for country and non-flag-related value-affirming behaviors such as donating blood and charitable donations. Additionally, the extent of flag display was associated with lower levels of education and high levels of income (Skitka, 2005).

The South

Linda Skitka (2005) also discussed the South's relationship with flag-display behaviors after 9/11, which could be explained by self-reported patriotism as well as an adjustment to fears of threat. Perceived threat was conceptualized by measurements such as the degree of worry that people felt about future terrorist attacks, being in tall buildings, and the personal safety of themselves and their family. The South's patriotism was also uniquely associated with negative outgroup attitudes which appear nationalistic; however, the South's flag-display behavior was only significantly associated with self-reported patriotism and value-affirming behaviors which indicates patriotism rather than nationalism. Stitka's (2005) distinct results in the South's can be explained by Finell and Zogmaister's (2015) description of blind patriotism which characterizes a blind patriot's imagining of the country as "[having] fought for its freedom against an overwhelming enemy" (Finell & Zogmaister, 189, 2015). Due to the majority of the South's historical participation in the American Civil War, the South may be more vulnerable to a traditional form of patriotism which shows an unquestioning allegiance to country.

Although some argue that the American Civil War was in no way unique, different, or exceptional based upon the objective commonalities of the North and South – same language, same legal system, an interconnected economy, same history – Stephanie McCurry (2012) argues that the Civil War was particularly exceptional based upon the events that occurred post-war. Instead of mass trials for treason or political repression like that found in other civil wars, the South was still allowed to form opposition political parties and Andrew Johnson issued blanket amnesties. The United States not only allowed anti-North stories and reminiscences of the war, but encouraged them. Before the war, the South situated itself against the North which further contributed to their subjective application of morality and religion to state institutions; by the sanctioning of Civil War stories and anti-North political parties, the post-war South was able to continue their practices as well as engage in a collective memory of the Civil War (McPherson, 1983; McCurry, 2012).

Because the post-war South was still able to regulate their own institutions such as education, they were also allowed to continue their objection to many of the progressive actions that were associated with the North. Therefore, today's South still practices many of their pre-Civil War values and beliefs associated with separation of church and state as well as agriculture (McCurry, 2012). These values contribute to the South's fear of outside aggressions as well as the South's perception that the government reflects their dominant Christian group which, in turn, will contribute to their support of drones in combatting terrorism. Because of the historical exceptionalism which founded the West and the historical implications of the South, I

infer that the “exceptional patriotism” found in the West and South regions is the most supportive for the use of drones in bombing attacks.

Altogether, the symbols and rhetoric used to encourage occupation in the West as well as maintain a Southern identity can be explained by Thomas Burns and Terri LeMoyne (2003) who refer to faith in authority: “… the masses, unable to deal with the overload of social information, search eagerly for simplification strategies. These simplification strategies make them more likely to acquiesce to emotional appeals” (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003: 83). In the midst of information technologies, people learn to make sense of their proper behavior by prioritizing symbols that are most related to their morality. Therefore, the religious symbols and rhetoric in American exceptionalism justify the expansion to the West as well as endorse the South’s freedom to integrate subtle religious morality. Political leaders and strategists, in both situations, used masculine rhetoric with religious symbols to allow the South and West to “implement their constructs in their own thoughts and speech” (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003, 84). Therefore, the West region will support expansion strategies while the South will oppose further uprising against the Union based upon the summary interpreted by their personal morality (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003).

Chapter 4: Review of Past Research

Patriotism

Many studies have identified demographic backgrounds and attitudes which can predict patriotism. Additionally, patriotism has been used in order to predict attitudes and behaviors. Lastly, because of the wide variety of measurements for a love one’s

country, researchers have also identified different types of patriotism in order to acknowledge a person's motivations and values pertaining to patriotism.

In order to examine dominant/subordinate social structures and various levels of patriotism, Yoshito Ishio (2010) expands on the group dominance perspective by proposing the 'generalized group dominance perspective.' Using an individual's perception that one's personal values correspond to the country's values as an indicator of one's sense of ownership of the country, an individual may have a strong or weak ownership of the country which in turn would affect an individual's patriotism levels. Additionally, some of the strongest values are based upon one's religion, indirectly affecting an individual's overall patriotism (Schwartz and Huismans, 1995).

Yoshito Ishio argues that people with a Christian faith have a stronger sense of ownership of the country and, therefore, a stronger patriotism due to their status as a dominant group. Further, those who are not Christian or not religious, may have a weaker sense of ownership and a weaker patriotism. Empirically, Ishio (2010) found that, when focusing on white Americans, Christian identification had a significant effect on an individual's level of patriotism. As the dominant religious group, individuals with a Christian faith perceive their government as representative of their religious values. American Christians are able to establish their status as the American civil religion due to God's name on governmental institutions or practices such as the pledge of allegiance and forms of currency (e.g. coins) (Bellah, 2005).

Intolerance for cultural diversity also has a positive relationship with patriotism within the white population. Wiong Li and Marilynn Brewer (2004) empirically tested a sample of white respondents on nationalism, patriotism, and their tolerance for cultural

diversity. Surveys were handed out with two varying priming conditions: one condition expressed the need to focus on what it means to be an American (*core essence condition*) while the other condition focused on the need to fight terrorism and work together (*common goal condition*). Under the 'core essence' definition of American unity, Li and Brewer (2004) found that patriotism was positively associated with derogatory attitudes towards other nations and intolerance for variation from a common cultural standard within the nation. Under the 'common goal' definition of American unity, patriotism was less associated with nationalistic values and uncorrelated with diversity. In any case, with or without the conditions of American unity, Li and Brewer (2004) state that patriotic and nationalistic identity combined are related to less tolerance to cultural diversity, negative attitudes toward minority groups, and restricted criteria for identification as a "true" American.

Similarly, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) found that patriotism and nationalism were two different dimensions based upon attitudes, feelings, and motives. Demographically, they found that foreign born individuals had higher levels of nationalism than respondents who were born within the United States; however, respondents who were born within the United States had higher levels of patriotism. Additionally, respondents in high school had higher levels of nationalism whereas respondents in college had higher levels of patriotism.

Two forms of patriotism that have been of particular interest are blind and constructive patriotism. According to Staub (1997), blind patriotism is the rigid and inflexible attachment to country through its unquestioning positive evaluation.

Constructive patriotism, on the other hand, is defined by a critical loyalty where criticism is hoped to create positive change for the country (Staub, 1997).

In a study done by Livi and colleagues (2014), blind patriotism was been found to be positively correlated with ideologies associated with right-wing authoritarianism, individuals who value uniformity and favor group authority, as well as social dominance orientation, the tendency to subject others to an individual's anti-democratic authoritarianism. Values conceptualizing tradition were found to have a significantly positive effect on blind patriotism whereas universalism had a significantly negative effect. Constructive patriotism had opposite results; constructive patriotism was negatively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Additionally, universalism had a positive effect on constructive patriotism. In another study, Schatz and colleagues (1999) found that both blind and constructive patriotism are positively correlated with national attachment; therefore, these patriotisms are different expressions for the same national attachment to country. Although blind and constructive patriotism are positively correlated with national attachment, Schatz and colleagues (1999) blind patriotism are a significantly strong relationship than constructive patriotism. Politically, Schatz and colleagues (1999) also show that blind patriotism is positively associated with conservatism and Republicanism; constructive patriotism, however, did not vary based upon political ideology or party identification. Furthermore, in a hierarchical regression analysis, significant results showed that blind patriotism was highly correlated with nationalism, national vulnerability, and cultural contamination (e.g. the perception and worry of foreign threats to the national culture). Within these variables, cultural contamination

was a significant negative predictor of constructive patriotism. Constructive patriotism showed positive associations with political efficacy, political knowledge, political information gathering, and political activism. Blind patriotism was either negatively related or unrelated to these variables.

Christopher Parker (2010) found that blind patriotism is distinguishable against symbolic patriotism despite their analytical similarities. He concluded that blind patriotism is driven by fear and insecurity, particularly in times of conflict, whereas symbolic patriotism functions as an expression of core values. For example, blind patriotism works as an adjustment to a perceived threat while symbolic patriotism works as an attempt to identify with national values. For example, past research shows that blind patriotism is associated with continued support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, confidence that the United States will win the War on Terror, as well as a perceived threat against one's country (McFarland, 2005; Sahar, 2008; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Additionally, Parker (2010) found that blind patriotism holds a xenophobic and ethnocentric bias which also suggests the importance of race when examining the different types of patriotism.

Chapter 5: Design and Methods

Expectations

Because of the ethically ambiguous nature of drones as a means for how the United States combats terrorism, I will look at several independent variables which may influence the continued support for drone strikes. When considering Lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors We Live By, are values and meanings associated with patriotism, Christianity, and dominant group identities strong enough to validate the ethical and

legal concerns of the use of drones in bombing attacks? When considering the theoretical and historical foundation for values associated with patriotism, American exceptionalism, Christianity, and dominant group identities, I have a few expectations of selected variables and their effect on drone support. Due to the rhetoric in American exceptionalism and the values associated with patriotic metaphors, I expect that exceptional patriotism will have a positive effect on drone support. Further, because of the Christian undertones of American exceptionalism and research on Christians as a dominant group (Ishio, 2010), I also expect that Christians will have a positive effect on drone support. Because of the metaphors in patriotism, I expect that white males will increase exceptional patriotism's and Christians' positive effect on drone support. Because of the masculine responsibilities assigned through patriotism, white males are expected to feel particularly obligated to protect their country by all means necessary. Therefore, due to their prioritizing of symbols and metaphors, white males will increase the effect of exceptional patriotism and Christians. Lastly, because of the historical implications of patriotism and American exceptionalism on the South and West regions, I expect that exceptional patriotism and Christian identification will be significant in the South and West regions when examining the odds of drone support.

Data and Sample

The sample used for the study comes from the Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy of 2014. According to the Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy of 2014 Codebook, the target population of the Chicago Council Survey was non-institutionalized adults who live in the United States, and included an oversample of

Hispanic adults. In total, 3,146 households were sampled with a 61% completion rate (i.e. 1,914 completed surveys). Additionally, 142 cases were excluded by failing at least one quality check. These checks include: 1) Completing the survey in 10 minutes or less; 2) Failing to answer 50% or more of the survey; 3) Not accurately inputting a "4", refused, or skipped a question entirely; 4) Refusing one or more full battery of 5 attributes or more; and 5) Straight-lining their responses to a battery of grid questions. In the results, I examine 1,970 respondents throughout the models to investigate the same respondents in the final model.

Variables

Dependent Variable

Drone Support. The dependent variable in this study is whether or not respondents show support for the use of drones in bombing attacks that are said to combat terrorism. Respondents were asked the following: *In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures – Drone strikes to carry out bombing attacks against suspected terrorists.* (1) *Favor;* (2) *Oppose*. For this study, *drone support* was coded into a dummy variable; respondents who favor drone strikes were coded as (1) and respondents who oppose drone strikes were recoded as the reference category (0).

Independent Variables

Exceptional Patriotism. Patriotism is measured by the highest, unequivocal evaluation for one's country even when comparing to other countries. Based on past literature, the language found in patriotism is very similar to the language practiced with American Exceptionalism. My conceptualization of *exceptional patriotism* will

encompass patriotic language as well as the language engaged by American Exceptionalism. The following question are used for the *exceptional patriotism* variable: *Some people say the United States has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world. Others say that every country is unique, and the United States is no greater than other nations. Which view is closer to your own*: (1) *The U.S. is the greatest country in the world*; (2) *No greater than other nations*. *Exceptional patriotism* was recoded into a dummy variable with the reference category being respondents who do not believe that the U.S. is the greatest country in the world.

Christian. *Christian* is conceptualized by a respondent's religious preference in the survey. Respondents were asked their religious preference with the following options: (1) *Christian*; (2) *Jewish*; (3) *Muslim*; (4) *Hindu*; (5) *Other*; and (6) *No religion*. In order to conceptualize *Christianity identification*, Christian was recoded as (1) while Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Other, and No religion were recoded into the reference category (0).

Patriotic Christian South. In order to encompass respondents who were exceptionally patriotic and Christian while living in the South, three dummy variables were interacted. In order to capture respondents who live in the South, a regional variable was used based upon the four regions United States Census Bureau: the *Northeast* (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania); the *Midwest* (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota), the *South* (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama,

Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas); and the *West* (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington). The *South* variable was created by recoding the regional variable into a dummy variable; South was recoded as (1) while the other regions were recoded into the reference category. To create the interaction variable, *Patriotic Christian South*, the product of *exceptional patriotism*, *Christian*, and *South* were calculated.

Patriotic Christian West. To create a variable for respondents who were exceptionally patriotic and Christian while living in the West, three dummy variables were interacted. The *West* variable was created by recoding the regional variable into a dummy variable; West was recoded as (1) while the other regions were recoded into the reference category. To create the variable *Patriotic Christian West*, the product of *exceptional patriotism*, *Christian*, and *West* were calculated into an interaction variable.

Moderating Variable

White Male. *White male* is measured by two questions. In order to conceptualize male, gender was recoded as a dummy variable: (1) *Male* and (0) *Female*. In the survey, race/ethnicity was originally coded as (1) *White, Non-Hispanic*; (2) *Black, Non-Hispanic*; (3) *Other, Non-Hispanic*; (4) *Hispanic*; and (5) *2+ Races, Non-Hispanic*. To capture respondents who are *white*, race/ethnicity was recoded into a dummy variable with *White, Non-Hispanic* as (1) while other the other categories were recoded into the reference category (0). After recoding these variables, they were combined into an interaction variable in order to encompass respondents who are both white and male while all other variations of gender and race are the reference category.

Control Variables

Following past research, my study includes control variables that may affect *drone support*. These control variables include political conservatism, education, access to the internet, income, and age.

Conservatism. The following question is used: *In general, do you think of yourself as* (1) *Extremely liberal*; (2) *Liberal*; (3) *Slightly liberal*; (4) *Moderate, middle of the road*; (5) *Slightly conservative*; (6) *Conservative*; and (7) *Extremely conservative*. Based upon literature in political leanings (Fiorina, 2010), most individuals should be considered moderates based upon issues that are often defined 'polarizing.' Therefore, when conceptualizing *conservatism*, I used the categories that used language which definitively described the respondent as conservative (i.e. *Conservative* and *Extremely conservative*) rather than including a respondent who, realistically, could be politically moderate. Therefore, *Conservative* and *Extremely conservative* were recoded into (1) while all other options were recoded into the reference category (0).

Age. In this study, the *age* variable is used as the only continuous variable. It is used in its original form in order to see its relationship with *drone support*.

Education. Educational attainment may also have a relationship with *drone support*. The following scale is used: (1) *Less than high school*; (2) *High school*; (3) *Some college*; and (4) *Bachelor's degree or higher*. In order to explore the educational attainment's contribution to the logistic regression models, three dummy variables were created: *Less than high school*, *High school*, and *Some college*. *Less than high school* is a variable with respondents who did not receive a high school diploma or GED recoded as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The *High school* variable was

created by recoding respondents who have a high school diploma or GED as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The *Some college* variable was created by recoding respondents who have completed a variation of years in college or have an associate's degree without being granted a Bachelor's degree as (1), and the other categories are recoded as (0). With the combination of these dummy variables, respondents who have a Bachelor's degree or higher are the reference category.

Internet Access. The dataset recorded the households' internet access status. This question was recoded as a dummy variable: (0) Household does not have internet access and (1) Household has internet access.

Income. The income of the respondent was based upon the respondent's household income. Response categories are: *Less than $5,000*; *$5,000 to $7,499*; *$7,500 to $9,999*; *$10,000 to $12,499*; *$12,500 to $14,999*; *$15,000 to $19,999*; *$20,000 to $24,999*; *$25,000 to $29,999*; *$30,000 to $34,999*; *$35,000 to $39,999*; *$40,000 to $49,999*; *$50,000 to $59,999*; *$60,000 to $74,999*; *$75,000 to $84,999*; *$85,000 to $99,999*; *$100,000 to $124,999*; *$125,000 to $149,999*; *$150,000 to $174,999*; and *$175,000 or more*. Using a quartile split in order to create an income variable that is reflective of its sample, the original responses were split into the following three categories: 1) Respondents whose income is less than $34,999; 2) Respondents whose incomes are between $35,000 and $59,999; 3) Respondents whose incomes are between $60,000 and $124,999; and 4) Respondents whose incomes are more than $125,000. In order to explore income's relationship in the logistic regression models, three dummy variables were created: *Income less than $34,999*; *Income between $35,000 and $59,999*; and *Income between $60,000 and $124,999*. *Income less than $34,999* is a

variable with respondents whose household income is less than $34,999 who were recoded as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The *Income between $35,000 and $59,999* variable was created by recoding respondents who have a household income between $35,000 and $59,999 as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The *Income between $60,000 and $124,999* variable was created by recoding respondents who have a household income between $60,000 and $124,000 as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). With the combination of these dummy variables, respondents who have a household income over $125,000 are the reference category.

Religious Attendance. The following question is used: *Apart from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?* (1) *More than once a week*; (2) *Once a week*; (3) *Once or twice a month*; (4) *Several times a year*; (5) *Hardly ever*; (6) *Never*. A *religious attendance* variable was recoded as the following: 1) Respondents who reported going to religious services at least once a week were recoded into the first category; 2) Respondents who reported going to religious services once or twice a month were recoded into the second category; 3) Respondents who reported going to religious services several times a year or hardly ever were recoded into the third category; and 4) Respondents who reported never going to religious services were recoded into the fourth category. From this variable, three dummy variables were created in order to look at its relationship with *drone support*. The *sometimes attends* variable was created by recoding respondents who go to religious services once or twice a month as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The *hardly attends* variable was created by recoding respondents who go to religious services several times a year

or hardly ever as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The *never attends* variable was created by recoding respondents who never go to religious services as (1) while the other categories were recoded as (0). With the combination of these dummy variables, respondents who attend religious services at least once a week are the reference category.

Analytical Strategy

First, I estimated a binary logistic regression to examine the effect of *exceptional patriotism* on drone support. Next, I ran another binary logistic regression to examine the effect of *Christian* on *drone support*. Third, I included the *white male* variable in a binary logistic regression by interacting *exceptional patriotism* and *white male* in order to calculate the change of effect that *exceptional patriotism* has on *drone support*. For my fourth expectation, I estimated another binary logistic regression with *white male* by interacting *white male* and *Christian* in order to examine the change of effect *Christian* has on *drone support*. For the fifth and sixth expectations, I examined the effects of *Patriotic Christian South* and *Patriotic Christian West* on *drone support*. Odds ratio values were used to examine and report the results.

Chapter 6: Results

Variable Descriptions

A complete description of variables can be found in Table 1. Out of 1,970 respondents, 1,336 favored drones in bombing attacks against terrorism (64.2%). *Exceptional Patriotism* responses were available for 2,046 respondents (67% exceptionally patriotic; 33% not exceptionally patriotic). *Christian* was available for 2,046 respondents (69.6% Christian; 30.4% not Christian). A total of 657 respondents

identified as a *white male* while 1,389 respondents identified as not white and male. Out of the respondents being used, 35.7% of the respondents live in the South region of the United States while 25.3% respondents live in the West.

In the controls, the dummy variable *Less than high school* shows that 12.2% of the respondents had less than a high school diploma or GED while the dummy variable *High school* shows that 31% of the respondents have a high school diploma. Additionally, the dummy variable *Some college* shows that 25.3% of the respondents have less than a Bachelor's degree; however, some of these respondent's may have an Associate's degree. *Bachelor's degree or more*, a dummy variable conceptualizing the reference category, shows that 31.5% of the respondents had at least a Bachelor's degree.

Next, Table 1 also shows that 80.7% of the respondents had access to the internet in their household. As a continuous variable, *age* had a mean of 48.83 and a standard deviation of 17.13.

Next, the Income dummy variables also show a few distributions: the *Income less than $34,999* dummy variable shows that 28.6% of the respondents have a household income of less than $34,999; the *Income between $35,000 and $59,999* dummy variable shows that 21.8% of the respondents have a household income between $35,000 and $59,999; and *Income between $60,000 and $124,999* shows that 34.8% of the respondents have an income between $60,000 and $124,999. The reference category, *Income more than $125,000*, had 302 positive responses. There were 673 respondents who reported a high attendance level while 1,411 respondents reported a lower attendance level. 2,108 respondents had data for *Gender* (50.7% male;

49.3% female) as well as *Race/Ethnicity* (62.3% White, Non-Hispanic; 7.7% Black, Non-Hispanic; 3.8% Other, Non-Hispanic; 23.6% Hispanic; 2.6% multi-racial, Non-Hispanic). *Political leaning* also had data for 2,108 respondents (23.2% Conservative; 76.8% Not Conservative). A total of 1,970 respondents had complete data for the final model of this analysis.

In the religious attendance dummy variables, 8.1% of the respondents are coded as *Sometimes attends*, 39.3% of the respondents are coded as *Rarely attends*, and 20.3% of the respondents are coded as *Never attends*. As the reference category, *Often attends* shows that 32.1% of the respondents go to religious services at least once a week.

In these observations, 51% of the respondents are male while 49% are female. Also, 62.5% of the respondents are white while all other races as well as Hispanics encompass 37.5% of these observations.

Lastly, our conservatism variable shows that 23.4% of the respondents are conservative while 76.6% of the respondents are not conservative.

Model Results

Table 2, Model 1 shows that *exceptional patriotism* was independently associated with *drone support*. With an odds ratio value of 3.435, patriotic respondents have 243.5% greater odds to support drones than unpatriotic respondents (p-value: 0.000). With a Chi-Square value of 150.831, this model is significant with a p-value of 0.000. Without controls, this model shows that respondents who are exceptionally patriotic have greater odds of drone support than respondents who are not.

Table 2, Model 2 shows that *Christian* are independently associated with *drone support*; Christian respondents are 88.5% more likely to support drones than

respondents who are not Christian (p-value 0.000). Additionally, this model has a Chi-Square value of 38.445 with a p-value of 0.000. According to this model, we can state that the *Christian* variable has a significant effect on the odds of *drone support* without controls.

In Table 2, Model 3, the addition of *white male* does not increase *exceptional patriotism*'s odds ratio coefficient. This model shows that *exceptional patriotism* still has 241.0% higher odds of supporting drones than respondents who are not exceptionally patriotic. By block, the model's Chi-Square value is 60.962 with a p-value of 0.000, showing that the addition of *white male* has an effect on the fit of the model. The increase and significance of the Chi-Square value shows that the inclusion of this interaction variable is significant in determining the odds of *drone support*. This model also shows that the *white* and *male* dummy variables have a significantly positive effect on the odds of *drone support*. Although the *white male* interaction variable is not significant in terms of odds, this model shows that *whites* have 109.8% greater odds of *drone support* than all other races and *males* have 106.8% greater odds of *drone support* than females. Because the interaction variable is not significant, the dynamic of being white or male is stronger in the odds of *drone support* than being white and male in this model.

In Table 2, Model 4, the interaction variable with *white male* and *exceptional patriotism* is included in a binary logistic regression. By block, the inclusion of this variable increased the Chi-Square value by 2.011 (p-level = 0.156). After I calculated the *Akaike Information Criterion* ($-2LL + 2(p + 1)$), the AIC between Model 3 and 4 only slightly improved. In sum, the inclusion of the interaction variable has no effect on

the fit of the model. Although the inclusion of this variable increases the significance of the *white male* variable, the *white male * exceptional patriotism* variable is not significant. In this model, *white males* have 41% lesser odds of *drone support* than all other combinations of race and gender. By this variable, alone, we can see that white males do not significantly support drones. Additionally, the *white male* and *exceptional patriotism* interaction variable may imply that white males are not supporting drones based upon their high regard for country.

In Model 5, *Christian* is also significantly associated with *drone support* even with the *white male* variable. Christian respondents have 80.4% greater odds of supporting drones than non-Christians respondents with a p-value of 0.000. The *white* as well as *male* dummy variables also are significant in the odds of *drone support*; males have 111.0% greater odds of *drone support* than females while whites have 109.5% greater odds of *drone support* than all other races.

In Table 2, Model 6, the inclusion of the *Christian*white male* interaction variable shows a block Chi-Square value of 9.917 (p-value: 0.002). Additionally, the AIC score decreases from 2,412.55 to 2420.47, indicating a better fit with the inclusion of this variable. Christian respondents have 45.7% greater odds in *drone support* than non-Christian individuals. The *white* and *male* dummy variables continue to be significant in their relationship with drone support, showing that males have 112.0% greater odds of drone support and whites have 106.0% greater odds of *drone support*. Like Model 4, the *white male* variable significantly shows that white males have 56.2% lesser odds of *drone support*. However, Model 6 differs from Model 4 due to the significantly positive effect that the *Christian*white male* interaction variable has on the

odds of *drone support*. This variable shows that the interaction with *white male* increases the effect of *Christian* on *drone support*. By interacting the variables *white, male,* and *Christian* into a variable, the variable has 104.9% greater odds of *drone support*. Because the prioritization of symbols may be based on the background of an individual, individuals who are Christian white males may be prioritizing symbols which increase the odds of *drone support* (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003).

In Table 2, Model 7, *exceptional patriotism* has 201.4% greater odds of *drone support* than respondents who are not exceptionally patriotic. Christian respondents do not have significantly greater odds of *drone support* and *white males* had 53.9% lesser odds of supporting drones than all other varieties of race and gender; however, the interaction between *Christians* and *white males* is significantly positive in its odds of *drone support*. The interaction variable showed that Christian white males have 76.7% greater odds of *drone support*. The significance of this interaction variable, in addition to its controls and all former independent variables, shows that being a white male will increase the odds of being a Christian who supports drones. As stated previously for Model 6, the positive significance of this variable contributes to the idea that individuals prioritize symbols which may be affecting their support in other areas such as military technology (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003). In particular, these Christian individuals are prioritizing symbols which are closely associated with their white male identity. By being a Christian white male, these individuals will have higher chances of supporting drones than individuals who are only Christian. Next, the interaction variable between *white male* and *exceptional patriotism* has a low contribution to the model as well as the odds of *drone support*. Because of the insignificance of this interaction variable to the

model as well as in the odds of *drone support*, it is dropped from future models. Lastly, Model 7 shows that the *white* and *male* dummy variables also continue to be significant in the odds of *drone support*. In this model, whites have 102.4% greater odds of *drone support* than other races and males have 104.7% greater odds of *drone support* than females.

In Model 8, *exceptional patriotism* have 217.1% greater odds of supporting drones than respondents who are not exceptionally patriotic, even with the introduction of the *South* and *South* interaction variable. Secondly, *Christians* have 54.0% greater odds of *drone support* than all other religions. Model 8 also shows that neither the *South* nor the *Patriotic Christian South* variables are significant in the odds of *drone support*.

In Model 9, *exceptional patriotism* has 201.5% greater odds of *drone support* and *Christians* have 39.9% greater odds of *drone support*. Although the *Patriotic Christian West* variable is insignificant in its greater odds for *drone support*, the *West* variable shows that respondents from the West have 36.5% lesser odds of *drone support* than all other regions in the United States.

In Table 4, Model 10, *exceptional patriotism* significantly has 177.2% greater odds of *drone support* while *Christians* have 41.5% greater odds of *drone support*. Similar to Model 9, the *West* has 33.5% lesser odds of *drone support* than other regions; however, the interaction between *exceptional patriotism* and *Christian* shows that this interaction was significant with the *West*. Respondents who are exceptionally patriotic and Christian in the West has 69.2% greater odds of drone support than respondents in the Northeast and MidWest regions. This may show that Christians who identify with patriotic values and exceptional rhetoric have greater odds of supporting drones. Based

on theory, this relationship may be key to associating certain values with ethically ambiguous military technology. The dummy variables *white* and *male* were significant in the odds of *drone support*; *whites* have 52.0% greater odds of *drone support* and *males* have 97.8% greater odds of *drone support*.

In Table 4, Model 11, I included the interaction between *Christian* and *white male* in order to examine its contribution to the model, with *white male* as a moderating variable. This interaction was significant in the odds of *drone support*, with respondents who are Christian white males having 101.3% greater odds of drone support. *White male* proves to be important in examining the relationship between *Christians* and *drone support*, as the interaction between *white male* and *Christians* has a greater odds ratio than the *Christian* and *white male* variables alone. Because the *white male* variable has significantly lesser odds of drone support and the *Christian* variable has become insignificant, the use of the *white male* variable as a moderator variable is very beneficial to the increased effect of *Christian* in the odds of *drone support*.

In addition to the moderating effect, *exceptional patriotism* has 169.0% greater odds of *drone support* and the *West* has 34.6% lesser odds of *drone support*. Because of this opposite effect in the odds of *drone support*, the interaction of *Patriotic Christian West* is of particular interest due to its significance and positive effect on *drone support*. Although the *exceptional patriotism*, *Christian*, and *West* dummy variables may have differentiating effects on the odds of *drone support*, this interaction shows that respondents who are exceptionally patriotic, Christian, and live in the West region have 82.8% greater odds of drone support. Because of the negative effect of the *West* on the odds of drone *support*, this interaction shows that *exceptional patriotism* and Christian

identification has a particular effect on the odds of *drone support* with an individual who lives in the *West*.

Other Findings

In addition to the results pertaining to my expectations, Models 10 and 11 show interesting relationships between control variables and drone support. In both Model 10 and 11, every year increase of *age* will increase the odds of *drone support* by 2%. This relationship was signification with a p-value of 0.000.

In Model 10, respondents with a household income between $60,000 and $124,999 had 34.5% greater odds of drone support than respondents whose incomes were less than $34,999. Additionally, respondents with an income of more than $125,000 had 50.9% greater odds of drone support than respondents with incomes less than $34,999. This trend was also shown in Model 11: respondents with incomes between $60,000 and $124,999 had 34.7% greater odds of drone support and respondents with incomes more than $125,000 had 55.3% greater odds of drone support. This implies that greater incomes may increase odds of drone support.

In Model 10, respondents who rarely attend or never attend religious services have significantly greater odds of *drone support* than respondents who often attend religious services apart from weddings and funerals. Respondents who rarely attend religious services have 54.3% greater odds of *drone support* while respondents who never attend religious services have 54.9% greater odds of *drone support*. Model 11 also shows this same relationship between levels of religious service attendance and *drone support*. Respondents who rarely attend religious services have 52.7% greater odds of drone support while respondents who never attend religious services have

63.8% greater odds of drone support than respondents who often attend religious services.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

With data collected by the Chicago Council Survey of the American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (2014), I was able to examine certain values which positively affect the odds of drone support. After reviewing historical and theoretical frameworks of patriotism, American exceptionalism, and Christianity, I expected that the prioritization of values and rhetoric associated with these concepts would increase a respondent's odds of supporting drones. After estimating binary logistic regressions, I found that my conceptualization of *exceptional patriotism*, a patriotism with undertones of American exceptionalism, had significantly greater odds of drone support. In the final model, *exceptional patriotism* had 169.0% greater odds of drone support. The continuously significant and positive effect of *exceptional patriotism* on *drone support* provides evidence that values and rhetoric associated with patriotism and American exceptionalism will result in greater odds of supporting ethically ambiguous military technology such as drones.

In addition to *exceptional patriotism*, Christian identification had greater odds of drone support in many of the models. In the final model, the interaction of *Christians* and *white males* remained significantly positive in the odds of *drone support*. In Model 11, this interaction variable shows that Christian white males are 101.3% greater odds of drone support than all other combinations of religion, race, and gender. While the Christian variable was insignificant and the white male variable was significantly negative in the odds of drone support, this interaction may be a valuable contribution in

how individuals prioritize values and, in turn, why individuals may support drones in bombing attacks. The *white males* variable increased the positive effect of Christian on drones; therefore, rhetoric or values associated with being a Christian white male may influence individuals who are Christian white male to support drones.

Lastly, the combination of *exceptional patriotism* and Christian identification had a particular effect on respondents in the West region. When the *West* variable was interacted with *exceptional patriotism* and *Christian*, its effect on the odds of *drone support* were significantly positive. Alone, the West variable was significantly negative in the odds of *drone support*. Therefore, the combination of *exceptional patriotism* and Christian identification was key in the positive effect on the odds of *drone support* within the West. With the same interaction with the South variable included in the model, the West's interaction with *exceptional patriotism* and *Christian* shows that this combination has greater odds of *drone support* than respondents in the NorthEast and MidWest regions. According to the theoretical and historical frameworks of this study, the values of patriotism, the traditional use of Christian symbolism, and the rhetoric of American exceptionalism may have an effect on the West's odds of *drone support*.

Chapter 8: Discussion

Examining the effects of drone support will contribute to the meanings behind the use of technology in military interventions and, eventually, the meanings behind the recreational use of military technology. As discussed by Joelien Pretorius (2008), technology should be understood as a social process. Aside from understanding drone technology or drone engineers as products of the time, Pretorius urges the consideration of meanings associated with technology in terms of necessity. At a time when social

institutions are beginning to domestically incorporate drones for legal or recreational use, the values used to justify the current use of drones need to be examined.

This study has revealed opportunities for future research. First, the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy dataset focuses on drones in regards to its use in foreign policy; hopefully, future research will be able to capture the attitudes towards drones in regards to domestic policy. At a time when drones are being used by local law enforcements, issues surrounding 'right to privacy' are particularly relevant when studying a sample's attitudes towards drones (Bennett, 2011; Takahashi, 2012). More research should be done on the militant application of drones on American citizens and how it affects people's attitudes towards drones.

The dataset offers *Christian*, *Jewish*, *Muslim*, *Hindu*, *Other*, and *No religion* as options for respondents; however, variations of each of these religious preferences are not offered. For example, my study will not be able to elaborate on the differences between a Methodist, Baptist, or Catholic Christian which may provide interesting results in the West and South regions. Additionally, mainstream and evangelical Christian are unaccounted for. Further research must be done to examine the different identities within religious preferences.

Lastly, the main focus of this dataset is to identify people's attitudes; however, it does not incorporate self-reported behaviors. Because of the similar environment, pilots and engineers typically use video games such as *Killbox* to prepare themselves for the execution and functionality of a drone (Evans-Thirlwell, 2015). Due to the similarities found between video games and the actual control of drones, the popularity and

widespread use of video games could have an effect on people's attitudes towards drones. Video games may alleviate the hesitancy to support drones due to the similar technologies between ominous drones and the common video game.

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Appendix A: Tables

Table 1: Frequency Distribution

Variable	Frequency	%	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent				
Drone Support	Supports= 1,313	64.2		
	Does Not Support= 657	32.1		
Independent				
Exceptional Patriotism	Exceptionally Patriotic= 1,371	67.0		
	Not exceptionally patriotic= 675	33.0		
Religious Denomination	Christian= 1,423	69.6		
	Not Christian= 623	30.4		
White Males	White Males= 657	32.1		
	Else= 1,389	67.9		
Region of Residence	South= 731	35.7		
	West= 517	25.3		
	Else= 798	39.0		
Control				
Education	Less than High School= 249	12.2		
	High School= 635	31.0		
	Some College= 518	25.3		
	Bachelor's Degree or More= 644	31.5		
Household Has Internet Access	Yes= 1,652	80.7		
	No= 394	19.3		
Age			48.83	17.13
Income Level	Income less than $34,999= 586	28.6		
	Income between $35,000 and $59,999= 446	21.8		
	Income between $60,000 and $124,999= 712	34.8		
	Income more than $125,000= 302	14.8		
Religious Attendance	Often Attends= 656	32.1		
	Sometimes Attends= 170	8.1		
	Rarely Attends= 804	39.3		
	Never Attends= 416	20.3		
Male	Male= 1,044	51.0		
	Female= 1,002	49.0		
White	White= 1,278	62.5		
	Else= 768	37.5		
Conservatism	Conservative= 478	23.4		
	Else= 1,568	76.6		

Source: *Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2014*

Table 2: Binary Logistic Regressions of Selected Variables on Drone Support, Models 1 – 4

Drone Support	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Exceptional atriotism	3.435***		3.410***	3.102***
	(0.102)		(0.103)	(0.123)
Christian		1.885***		
		(0.102)		
White			2.098***	2.095***
			(0.143)	(0.142)
Male			2.068***	2.066***
			(0.160)	(0.159)
White Male			0.708	0.590*
			(0.207)	(0.243)
Exceptional patriotism * White Male				1.381
				(0.228)
Intercept	0.917	1.301**	0.454***	0.482***
	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.128)	(0.134)
AIC	2361.5	2473.88	2308.54	2308.524
Chi-Square	150.831***	38.445***	211.793***	213.804***

Source: *Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2014*
N = 1,970
Reported in odds ratio values
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05

Table 3: Binary Logistic Regressions of Selected Variables on Drone Support, Models 5 – 9

Drone Support	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Exceptional patriotism			3.014***	3.171***	3.015***
			(0.124)	(0.112)	(0.108)
Christian	1.804***	1.457**	1.251	1.540***	1.399**
	(0.104)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.114)	(0.114)
White	2.000***	2.060***	2.024***		
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.144)		
Male	2.110***	2.120***	2.047***		
	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.159)		
White Male	0.706	0.438**	0.461**		
	(0.201)	(0.250)	(0.280)		
Patriotism * White Male			1.185		
			(0.234)		
Christian * White Male		2.049**	1.767*		
		(0.228)	(0.241)		
South				1.128	
				(0.138)	
Patriotic Christian South				1.005	
				(0.199)	
West					0.635**
					(0.145)
Patriotic Christian West					1.493
					(0.230)
Intercept	1.057	0.767*	0.429***	0.690**	0.857
	(0.88)	(0.130)	(0.151)	(0.117)	(0.230)
AIC	2420.47	2412.554	2294.513	2351.751	2343.187
Chi-Square	99.857***	109.773****	231.814***	168.576***	177.140***

Source: *Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2014*
N = 1,970
Reported in odds ratio values
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05

Table 4: Binary Logistic Regressions of Selected Variables on Drone Support, Models 10 – 11

Drone Support	Model 10	Model 11
Exceptional Patriotism	2.772***	2.690***
	(0.128)	(0.128)
Christian	1.415*	1.157
	(0.149)	(0.165)
South	1.115	1.096
	(0.159)	(0.159)
West	0.665*	0.654**
	(0.165)	(0.165)
Patriotic Christian South	1.063	1.115
	(0.217)	(0.218)
Patriotic Christian West	1.692*	1.828*
	(0.251)	(0.252)
Christian * White Male		2.013**
		(0.246)
White Male	0.757	0.474**
	(0.213)	(0.268)
White	1.520**	1.559**
	(0.155)	(0.155)
Male	1.978***	1.988***
	(0.164)	(0.163)
Conservative	1.170	1.137
	(0.135)	(0.136)
Age	1.020***	1.020***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Less than High School	0.960	0.967
	(0.193)	(0.193)
High School Diploma or GED	0.958	0.948
	(0.143)	(0.144)
Some College	1.121	1.112
	(0.143)	(0.143)
Internet Access	1.052	1.045
	(0.148)	(0.149)
Household Income: $35,000 - $59,999	1.094	1.116
	(0.153)	(0.154)
Household Income: $60,000- $124,999	1.345*	1.347*
	(0.149)	(0.149)
Household Income: More than $125,000	1.509*	1.553*
	(0.190)	(0.191)
Sometimes Attends Religious Services	1.387	1.375
	(0.207)	(0.208)
Rarely Attends Religious Services	1.543**	1.527**

Table 4. Continued

	(0.131)	(0.131)
Never Attends Religious Services	1.549*	1.638**
	(0.171)	(0.173)
Intercept	0.114***	0.130***
	(0.310)	(0.312)
AIC	2261.072	2254.975
Chi-Square	293.256***	301.353***

Source: *Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2014*
N= 1,970
Reported in odds ratio values
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05