A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE EDUCATIONAL THEORIES OF JAQUES-DALCROZE AND KODÁLY

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PREFACE

This research extends to teachers a philosophical interpretation of the writings of Emile Jaques-Dalcroze in *Rhythm, Music and Education* and of Zoltán Kodály in *Selected Writings of Zoltán Kodály*. The interpretation of the selected texts was made in light of the need for a rethinking of education. This rethinking offers others an opportunity for new and/or deeper understanding and recognizes that the understanding does not necessitate agreement, for insight is often gained through debate and questioning. The initial readings of the texts offered a phenomenological inquiry to determine the essence of the educational theories of the writer-musicians. A foundation is then developed for the interpretation of the texts from the writings of Georg-Hans Gadamer in *Truth and Method* and in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. The rethinking dwells in postmodern philosophy and calls for a rejection of the modernistic paradigm.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my major advisor, Dr. William Reynolds, for his mentoring and sharing, for his unconditional regard and support, and for his inspiration and friendship. My sincere appreciation extends to my other committee members, Dr. Kathryn Castle, Dr. Sally Carter, Dr. Sunny VanEaton, and Dr. Ed Harris, whose guidance, encouragement, and friendship are also invaluable. These committee members have had and will continue to have much influence upon the unfolding of my personal philosophical theories.

Moreover, I wish to express my gratitude for a father who loved learning, enjoyed sharing, and questioned everything. I extend to my mother my sincere appreciation for her support and encouragement throughout the entire journey of my life.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

My real concern was and is philosophic; not what we do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing. (Gadamer, 1975, p. xvi)

The questions of education should not be only concerned with how to make a living, but rather how to live a good life. "What is the reason for knowing or experiencing something, if it is not to live a better life?" (Schubert, 1986, p. 116). Herein, according to Schubert, lies the heart of the educational endeavor: philosophy. As early as 1916, John Dewey was calling education the testing ground of philosophy itself.

It is imperative that we, as educators, reflect upon our own philosophies. We possess a philosophy even if we choose not to verbalize our beliefs. It is evidenced in our actions (Schubert, 1986). Often, too, our verbalized positions are contrary to our actions. "We must realize that it is necessary to look continuously at our own thought and action and to discover more about its character and consistency" (Schubert, 1986, p. 117). Because of this, I have chosen to inquire into the educational theories of Jaques-Dalcroze and Zoltán Kodály. The writings of these musicians will be read from a phenomenological perspective. The writings will then be reread and interpreted in light of the hermeneutical philosophy of Georg-Hans Gadamer.

For approximately twenty-five years now, I have journeyed through life as a wife, mother, teacher, and musician. Since any philosophical endeavor is influenced by the person and personality of the writer and the particular situation of that writer, all of these perspectives will influence this writing. Much is also dependent upon the

writer's predecessors and his or her reaction to these predecessors. Since this endeavor is focused on a philosophical inquiry into educational theories, I want to disclose for the readers' understanding my ways of knowing and being in music. Since this inquiry will be approached through phenomenology and hermeneutical interpretation, I will state my understanding of these methods. Finally, I will convey the reasons for my concerns for a philosophical inquiry into two current music educational theories.

Understanding and Knowing of Music

From experience and observations of students, I understand that individuals construct their own knowledge. My own knowing of music has developed through several types of experiences and interactions. As a young child, many of these experiences came as a result of my environment or place of being in life.

Interlude Based Upon a Childhood Reflection

In the top of a closet, in a back bedroom of my home, is a box of mementos. Inside this box is a small envelope with folded notebook papers. The papers are filled with poems and numbers. The numbers represent the holes on my old black songflute. The songflute is still in the filing cabinet in my music studio. It is a prized possession from Miss Annie Guy Wisely's third-grade class.

She was old – teaching for a third generation, they said. Her hair was gray, her voice was soft, and her smile was contagious. Our classroom looked like a home. Pictures were everywhere: "The Boy with Rabbit" by Sir Henry Raeburn, "The Age of Innocence" by Sir Joshua Reynolds, and "The Blue Boy" by Thomas Gainsborough.

We learned much that year. I cannot remember how she taught it. And we sang. It seems as if we sang every day. She played piano, you know. When everyone was out of the cafeteria, she would take us there and we would sing. I cannot remember sitting down during these sessions. We just "hung around" Miss Wisely and the piano.

The winter came, and some days Miss Wisely thought it was too cold to be outside for the whole recess. "Just run down the playground and around the flagpole and back," she would say. "Then, we'll do something for fun inside." You should have heard those songflutes. We sounded great! At least, Miss Wisely said we did.

The Knowing Continued

To paraphrase Eleanore Stubley (1992), the experiences and interactions of my later years have been intentional acts in which I accepted the musical events as my own, shaping what was given in relation to my own fund of past experiences and knowledge. Stubley suggests three ways, or modes, of music knowing (1992). These are listening, performing, and composing. I suggest that the teaching of music has been another mode of knowing. For the teacher, the sharing adds a dimension to the listening, performing, and composing. During my sharing with students, I came to understand that some of my ideas concerning the discipline of music had little or no validity. Some of these ideas were merely social constructions to which I had given meaning. Through the process of determining the things that had no validity, I came to a better understanding of what was important.

Each of these modes of knowing began with a naïve understanding - perhaps a superficial listening, a shallow performing, a cursory composing, or an uncritical approach to teaching. These understandings, however, must not be demeaned or

discredited, for all knowledge construction has its beginnings. These beginnings might even have had incorrect ideas, but it is because of these incorrect ideas that one knows that knowledge is indeed constructed by the individual (DeVries, 1987). My personal knowledge of music is shaped by continued experiences in listening, performing, composing, teaching, and by continued sharing of music within my own social context. My current listening, however, can never be free of an early southern heritage with its exposure to the African-American spirituals and gospel songs. My performance can never be free of the initial experiences of hymn playing and group singing. My composing will constantly be influenced by the sheer fact that my understanding of thick, rich chords was constructed before the understanding of counterpoint. My teaching reflection is forever returning to the philosophy of early traditional teachers, who expressed the joys of learning before the importance of facts. Even though this understanding has grown because of exposure to former teachers and professors, I am still who I am because of the totality of my life experiences. This cannot be denied when beginning a philosophical endeavor.

Many of my early college experiences existed within the behavioristic paradigm. Those caring, pedagogical relationships within the private studios were the cherished exceptions. From these cherished encounters, I first developed an understanding of the teaching of music. From these encounters, I experienced examples of choice, mentoring, understanding, compassion, and more. From these encounters, I made my first decisions about how I would be with my own students. From these encounters, I first made conscious decisions concerning my own philosophy of teaching.

Interlude Based on a Cherished Encounter

She came into my life in the summer of 1984. I had been teaching in private schools and in a studio for several years. Even though I remained a studio musician, state certification seemed important. I hoped it would give more respect to my work. I needed a vocal teacher to help in my preparation for a recital. Carol Brice had been on Broadway and had traveled for several years. She had married Thomas Carey, and they had taken teaching positions at the University of Oklahoma at Norman. We met in early summer.

She was a large, African-American lady. Her vocal chords matched the frame. The sounds were a deep contralto, mellow and warm. Her speaking voice was the same. We met first in her campus studio. The first few weeks were spent in my vocalizing for her and in the learning of new material. In the weeks that followed, she informed me that she would be teaching at home. Nothing would change but the location. You see, she had cancer and things were not going well. "I need for you to just continue, as before," she stressed. "We must get through this recital."

She taught me the music, alright. She continued every week until the week before her death. These times were special. I cooked lunch at my home to share with her at her home – southern cooked beans and cornbread. She taught me "American Lullaby" in the African-American tradition. She made me cry; I made her laugh. She taught me music; I gave her purpose. She shared with me her knowledge; I shared with her the dying. We loved each other as student to teacher and friend to friend.

The Knowing Continued

At this writing, I cannot trace the sharing of my music to a beginning. It seems that it happened as naturally as sharing dinner with a friend. No great events, no big successes, no notable awards made music my life's work. I just continued as I had begun: seeing the world through music and song. It is "what happened" to me after the doing.

Hermeneutical Phenomenology

Even though one must recognize the historical origin of current philosophy, there is not a direct and unbroken continuation of it (Gadamer, 1975). The questions are no longer the same. Traditional philosophy was and is rooted in metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, aesthetics, and logic. Metaphysics asks: "What is real?" or "What does it mean to exist?" Epistemology asks: "What is the nature of knowledge?" Axiology asks: "What is valuable?" Ethics asks: "What is good and what is evil?" Aesthetics asks: "What is beautiful?" Logic asks: "What are the rules for correct reasoning." Current philosophy is asking different questions. "We have lost that naïve innocence with which traditional concepts were made to support one's own thinking" (Gadamer, 1975, xiv-xv). Therefore, this study will seek to do more than focus on concepts that support the writer's personal philosophy; it will focus on the things of which we can be clear and certain.

> *Although we cannot be sure of the independent existence of things, Husserl argues, we can be certain of how they appear to us immediately in consciousness, whether the actual thing we are experiencing is an illusion or not. . . .*

To grasp any phenomenon wholly and purely is to grasp what is essential and unchanging about it. (Eagleton, 1983, p. 55)

Curriculum study offers several forms for philosophical inquiry. This study, however, will look at music educational theory from a hermeneutical phenomenological perspective, for it is phenomenology that requires one to return to the most concrete – to the study of the things themselves (Eagleton, 1983). Eagleton calls it the "science of sciences" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 56). We take that of which we can be experientially sure and furnish the basis on which genuinely reliable knowledge can be constructed (Eagleton, 1983).

The term "phenomenon" is from the Greek. A phenomenon does not have to be scientifically described. You have only to sense it. The term "phenomenology" and its reference to philosophy did not appear, however, until the 1900s. The German philosopher Edmand Husserl wanted to understand how our consciousness works in order to better understand our experiences. Our consciousness is the things of which our minds are aware. These may be acts, feelings, or thoughts.

The phenomenologists look at experiences as having two parts. The first part consists of the things of which one is conscious: the phenomena. The second part consists of the "acts of consciousness, such as perceiving, believing, thinking, and desiring" (Ihde, 1984, p. 319). In his essay on "Life-World Perceptions," George Willis (1991) explains that phenomenological inquiry is an interpretive inquiry that comes closest to artistic inquiry. The attention is focused on the perception itself and the feelings that the perception evokes. Phenomenology is a descriptive analysis of subjective processes or intuitive suggestives. All metaphysical and scientific theory is

ignored. "In its most basic form, phenomenological inquiry investigates the distinctively human perceptions of individual people and results in descriptions of such perceptions which appeal directly to the perceptions of other people" (Willis, 1991, pp. 173-174).

Because humans have the capacity for experiencing their experiences, they may think through the "meanings of their perceptions and weigh alternative courses of action" (Willis, 1991, p. 174). As George Willis suggests, meaning and actions become autonomous when self-consciously considered (Willis, 1991). As human beings continue to consider and reconsider, change results.

> *These personal and inwardly perceptual portions of individual life-worlds are where our distinctively human experience begins. Everything flows from them. In this sense they are nothing less than the basic curricula of our individual lives. Although influenced by the external world, they are inward and autonomous. They are what phenomenological inquiry investigates.* (Willis, 1991, p. 175)

Phenomenology, however, is not enough for this philosophical inquiry into music educational theory. The inquiry calls for interpretation. When we engage in the activity of interpreting our lives and the world around us, we are engaging in what the Greeks called practical philosophy (Gadamer, 1983). The more one's phenomenological descriptions become interpreted, the closer one comes to this practical philosophy - hermeneutics (Willis, 1991).

The term "hermeneutics" became part of this author's vocabulary quite by accident. It occurred during one of my early visits to the seminary with my father.

The term was used by an "ole prof" in connection with the exegesis of the Scriptures. "Hermeneutic" is from the Greek word *hermēneutikos*, meaning "of or for interpreting." Actually, Hermes was the Greek messenger of the gods. In using the word, the "ole prof" wanted his young students to explain, to interpret, and to unfold the Scriptures to their parishioners. The meanings were to be found and explained. These interpretations were individual and personal. When "hermeneutics" was used in a class taught by Dr. Russell Dobson at Oklahoma State University in connection with the process of pedagogy, I understood its significance. The language for description was not, at that point, in my vocabulary; but the explaining, interpreting, and unfolding of music was. "In educational terms, the hermeneutic imagination throws open the challenge of inquiry into what we mean when we use words like curriculum, research, and pedagogy" (Smith, 1991, p. 188).

David G. Smith, in "Hermeneutic Inquiry: The Hermeneutic Imagination and the Pedagogic Text," offers an account of the long history of hermeneutics (Smith, 1991, pp. 189-194). Aristotle used the word in *Peri Hermenia*. The first "methods text" for hermeneutics was written in 1567 by Matthias Flaciu Illyricus. This book called for Protestant theologians to interpret the Scripture independently of the Roman Catholic Church. By the eighteenth century, the method was used "for the newly emergent understanding of sciences which characterized the Enlightenment" (Smith, 1991, p. 189). During the nineteenth century, the word "hermeneutic" was broadened to encompass not only Biblical interpretation but the problem of textual interpretation as a whole (Eagleton, 1983). After the writing of Friedrich Schleiermacher, three themes have been present in hermeneutic inquiry: "Namely, the inherent creativity of

interpretation, the pivotal role of language in human understanding, and the interplay of part and whole in the process of interpretation" (Smith, 1991, p. 190).

Wilhelm Dilthey led the way for hermeneutics in the twentieth century. Smith states that Dilthey was influenced by the historical philosopher J.G. Groysen, who "refined from von Humboldt a distinction still residual today in the so-called quantitative/qualitative debate in educational research" (Smith, 1991, p. 191). Droysen used the term *Verstehen* to refer to "understanding." This term was the appropriate method for the historical sciences. He used the work *Erklarung*, meaning "explanation," (Smith, 1991, p. 199) for the appropriate method for the natural sciences. Dilthey, under the additional influence of the aforementioned Husserl, began to explore "understanding" as a method.

When one begins to consider hermeneutics, one thinks of Husserl. Smith calls him the "most significant shaper of all of the interpretive streams of human science which have flourished since the turn of the century" (1991, p. 199). It was Husserl who took objective reasoning to task. One cannot separate one's subjective thinking from one's objective thinking, because one's subjective thinking has its being in the world of the object. It was Husserl who gave hermeneutical meaning to words such as "understanding."

Martin Heidegger was Husserl's student. According to Terry Eagleton, "to move from Husserl to Heidegger is to move from the terrain of pure intellect to a philosophy which meditates on what it feels like to be alive" (1983, p. 62). Heidegger's philosophy centered around the question of Being. In order to study Being, Heidegger analyzed human existence - *Dasein*. Existence is the form of Being, according to

Heidegger, that we can know best. It is through the interpretation of the nature of Being that we understand.

> *Heidegger's casting of interpretation as the primordial mode of human existence (he later [1977] allied the notion of interpretation to the Greek sense of "thinking") put Dilthey's project of a method for the human sciences into crisis because thereafter method could never attain a status independent of the project of thinking itself. Method could never achieve a kind of solitary stable state ready for universal application, because indeed it bore the same character and quality as that to which it sought access. This was the point taken up more fully by Heidegger's student Hans-Georg Gadamer, who in his landmark work* Truth and Method *(1979) argued that the appropriate method for interpreting any phenomenon could only be disclosed by the phenomenon itself through a kind of Socratic dialogical engagement between question and phenomenon.* (Smith, 1991, p. 192)

Gadamer expanded upon two important aspects of his teacher's work. Heidegger had explained that "human experience of the world takes place within a horizon of past, present, and future" (Smith, 1991, p. 193). We are able to make sense of the new things that we confront each day because of our understanding of the past. Gadamer elaborated on this idea. For him, our preunderstanding or prejudices are unavoidable. At this point, Gadamer is in direct conflict with the claim of natural science that knowledge can be free from human interest.

> *For Gadamer, prejudice (pre-judgment) is not a swear word, but rather a sign that we can only make sense of the world from within a particular "horizon"*

which provides the starting point for our thoughts and actions. Understanding between persons is possible only to the degree that people can initiate a conversation between themselves and bring about a "fusion" of their different horizons into a new understanding which they then hold in common. (Smith, 1991, p. 193)

Another point that Gadamer developed was the linguisticality of understanding. For Heidegger, language was more than a means for communication. Language was the dimension in which human life moved (Eagleton, 1983). For Gadamer, our understanding of our "effective historical consciousness" (*Wirkungsgeschichlisches bewusstsein*) (Smith, 1991, p. 193) is revealed in the structure and function of language. Our language is reflective of our past. "Gadamer might be described as the last writer of a hermeneutics of continuity, a hermeneutics which attempts to hold the structure of understanding together within a language of understanding" (Smith, 1991, p. 193).

It is from this understanding of the philosophical writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer that I will seek in Chapter Four to interpret the music educational theories of Zoltán Kodály and Emile Jaques-Dalcroze. For it is my firm position that any time we seek to interpret any part of our life, we are doing hermeneutical phenomenology.

Concerns for a Philosophical Inquiry Into Current Music Educational Theories

Most of the studies in general music education have been concerned with the comparison of one technique or method with another. Other studies have attempted to study the effectiveness of a methodology. Some general music teachers incorporate the

principles of well-known educators such as Pestalozzi and Dewey. Others are using specific approaches such as Jaques-Dalcroze or Kodály. *The Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning* defines methodology for musicians as "a body of techniques, methods and curricula that is based on a philosophical system and a foundation of research" (Constanze and Russell, 1992, p. 498). According to this same source, "although music educators have techniques, methods, and curricula that are effective for them, they are constantly in search of the perfect methodology" (1992, p. 498).

> *Until the artist is satisfied in perception with what he is doing, he continues shaping and reshaping. The making comes to an end when its result is experienced as good – and that experience comes not by mere intellectual and outside judgment but in direct perception. An artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in power of execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things. This sensitivity also directs his doings and makings.* (Dewey, 1958, p. 49)

Current music educators tend to accept the positivist conception of sciences as the basis for research. This is not to say that there is no place for quantitative research in music. One simply needs to be aware of questions that cannot be answered by this method. Bennett Reimer brought some awareness to this message in the early 1970s. Later, he wrote a book entitled *A Philosophy of Music Education* in which he discussed the durability of a philosophy, the limitations of a philosophy, and his attempt to offer a "philosophy which explains why the value of music and the arts for human life is

unique and essential for all people" (Reimer, 1989, p. 148). Reimer seeks to justify his position by stating that:

> *no subject that is not essential or not unique or not relevant for all people can expect to be regarded as basic. That is the way it should be; education cannot afford to spend more than small amounts of time on the thousands of potential learnings that are positive but secondary. So to the degree that a philosophy of music and arts education can establish the case for the essentiality and uniqueness and all inclusiveness of these subjects, it will aid in having them be regarded as basic in the education enterprise.* (Reimer, 1989, p. 149)

Gadamer would never seek to justify the value of music. For him, the truth of music or any art does not need verification. It must be admitted.

> *The positive task of* Truth and Method, *then, is to enable us to admit the truth of art and of tradition generally. This task involves, instead of proof, a clearing away of obstacles. What once prevented such admission were the universalist pretensions of science. Thus Gadamer writes, "The experience of art is the most important reminder to scientific consciousness to concede its limits."* (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 65)

It is imperative that music educators just admit the truth of their art and proceed. There is no need for justification. Music educators must move past the dwelling in superficial rhetoric and discuss the immanent questions of Being. Music educators must consider "what is happening" after the doing.

Several published studies in music have been done from a phenomenological perspective. These include *A Phenomenological Analysis of Musical Experience and*

Other Essays by Pike (1970), *The Experiencing of Musical Sound: Prelude to a Phenomenology of Music* by Smith (1979), *Fragments of a Phenomenology of Music* by Schutz (1976), and a journal article by Bartholomew on "Whole/Part Relations in Music: The Application of a Distinction" (in press). None seem to appear in music education.

(USA) Music education has been influenced by various theories since the 1960s. Most of these originated outside the United States of America. The theories most frequently mentioned in literature are the approaches of Shinishi Suzuki, Zoltán Kodály, Carl Orff, Emile Jaques-Dalcroze, Gordon Learning Theory, Comprehensive Musicianship, and the general music series textbooks. Some schools are now calling for a specialist within a specialty. Many teachers of music, however, continue to draw from several sources the ideas that they deem to be good. This has been a common practice since the publication of *The Eclectic Curriculum in American Music Education* in 1972 (Landis and Carder). "More specifically, the term 'eclectic' has been used to mean a combination of the approaches of Orff, Zoltán Kodály, and Emile Jaques-Dalcroze" (Runfola and Rutkowski, 1992, p. 698). The choosing of an educational theory seems to be based on its popularity within a region or on personal liking. The literature on these methods writes of their origin and is frequently concerned with the adaptation of the method to the United States.

If a teacher of music has concerns that extend to "what happens" after the doing, then it is necessary to try to understand the philosophical position of the writer of the theory. This position must be examined in light of the current questions of aesthetics, history, and language.

One of my personal aims as a teacher is to be autonomous. Autonomy demands responsible decision making, and responsible decision making comes by considering all the relevant factors in the decision-making processes. For teachers of music to grow in personal autonomy, they must consider their philosophical perspectives and those of their educational theories.

This inquiry will be limited to the writings of Zoltán Kodály and Emile Jaques-Dalcroze. Chapter Two will examine their original writings and statements of philosophy and seek to "peel away the onion" (Willis, 1991, p. 178). George Willis, in drawing this analogy of the peeling of the onion with the many "discernible layers" (1991, p. 176) in an phenomenological study, suggests that "once one has begun peeling, one needs to have some sense of when to stop" (1991, p. 176). Since this will be a new and different experience for me, and since I am young to the curriculum field, this "peeling" will seek to end before "too many tears" (Willis, 1991, p. 178). Chapter Three will set forth the hermeneutical philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer as expressed in his writings in *Truth and Method* (1975) and *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (1976). Chapter Four will call for a re-reading and interpretation of the writings of Kodály and Jaques-Dalcroze in light of Gadamer. Chapter Five will be a personal reflection upon Chapter Four and the possible implications of this research, for in the final analysis, "what man needs is not only a persistent asking of ultimate questions, but the sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now" (Gadamer, 1975, p. xxv).

CHAPTER II

THE SENSE OF JAQUES-DALCROZE AND KODÁLY

A study in phenomenology demands the return to the concrete. For this reason, this inquiry returned to the original writings in translated form of Emile Jaques-Dalcroze and Kodály. The book by Emile Jaques-Dalcroze chosen for study is *Rhythm, Music and Education*, copyrighted by the author in 1921. The work was translated from the French by Harold F. Rubinstein and offered in the United States by G.P. Putnam's Sons of New York and London. Jaques-Dalcroze also published the *Methode Jaques-Dalcroze* (five parts, 1907-1914) (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1920, 1922) and *Eurhythmics, Art and Education* (1931). *Eurhythmics, Art and Education* has added insight to this study, especially in regard to Jaques-Dalcroze's ideas about music education of the future.

The second book of consideration was *The Selected Writings of Zoltán Kodály*. These writings were first copyrighted in 1964 by Kodály in Hungary. In 1974, the book was published by Boosey and Hawkes Music Publishers of London. This edition was translated by Lil Halapy and Fred Macnicol and copyrighted by Mrs. Kodály.

The essence of a work must be found in the source. If one is to understand the educational theories of these men, it is imperative to read their writings. The "sense" of the theories would be in the text of the beginnings. This writing is simply my lived experience as I journey through these works. Each of the above mentioned writings were read with the following in mind.

- All metaphysical and scientific theory would be ignored.
- The writing would be my own perceptions of these readings.

- I would think through the meanings of these perceptions and verbalize the meanings.
- I would admit that these perceptions "might or might not be pure" (Willis, 1991, p. 177).

Two assumptions were made before beginning the writings contained in this chapter.

- "All individual phenomenologies are essentially alike" (Willis, 1991, p. 177).
- "These essences can be discerned through appropriate intuition of one's own perceptions" (Willis, 1991, p. 177).

This approach thus suggests that if one can appropriately discern one's own perceptual life-world, there is no need to inquire about life-worlds of others; indeed, such inquiry would be futile since one cannot experience another person's life-world, which in any case is essentially like one's own (Willis, 1991, p. 177).

The writings of these musicians were read in light of the following two questions.

- How do I perceive the writings of these musicians?
- What feelings do these writings evoke in me?

The Essence of the Educational Theories of Emile Jaques-Dalcroze

Biographical Information and Introduction

Emile Jaques-Dalcroze was born in Vienna in 1865 and died in Geneva in 1950 (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1982). He "studied at the Conservatoire of Music in Geneva, in Paris under Leo Delibes, and in Vienna under Bruckner and Fuchs" (Mark and Gary, 1992, p. 357). He became the professor of harmony at the Geneva Conservatory in 1892. After he taught his first few lessons at the conservatory, Jaques-Delcroze stated:

I noticed that the ears of my pupils were not able to appreciate the chords which they had to write, and I concluded that the flaw in the conventional method of training is that pupils are not given experience of chords at the beginning of their studies – when brain and body are developing along parallel lines, the one constantly communicating its impressions and sensations to the other – but that this experience is withheld until the time arrives to express the results in writing. (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. v)

Jaques-Dalcroze "was one of the first musicians to study the new science of psychology" (Mark and Gary, 1992, p. 357). His original method was devised for musicians, but his colleague and friend, Edouard Claparede, "recognized the potential of the Dalcroze method in teaching children" (Mark and Gary, 1992, p. 357).

It is true that I first devised my method as a musician for musicians. But the further I carried my experiments, the more I noticed that, while a method intended to develop the sense for rhythms, and indeed based on such development, is of great importance in the education of a musician, its chief value lies in the fact that it trains the powers of apperception and of expression in the individual and renders easier the externalization of natural emotions. Experience teaches me that a man is not ready for the specialized study of an art until his character is formed, and his power of expression developed.

(Jaques-Dalcroze in Mark and Gary, 1992, p. 357)

He was convinced that the method at that time for the teaching of musicians needed to be changed. He began to revise the methods for the teaching of harmony and developed a system of rhythmic education that he called "eurhythmics" (his word).

The pupils were given "exercises in stepping and halting, and trained . . . to react physically to the perception of musical rhythms. That was the origin of . . . 'eurhythmics'" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. vi).

Between the years 1906 and 1909, Jaques-Dalcroze presented training courses for teachers (Mark and Gary, 1992). At the end of these sessions, he would present diplomas to his students. According to Mark and Gary in their study of the history of music education, his methods were being offered in other parts of the world by persons whose standards Jaques-Dalcroze "felt were not equal to those of his own students" (1992, p. 358). Today in the United States, his methods and techniques are incorporated into other methods. In 1992, about 20 colleges offered Jaques-Dalcroze instruction. Four of these awarded Dalcroze certificates (Mark and Gary, 1992, p. 358).

The headings for consideration that are to follow were not determined prior to the reading of Jaques-Dalcroze's writings. They formed naturally during the course of the readings. The 14 chapters contained within *Rhythm, Music and Education* were actually written by Jaques-Dalcroze over several years – the earliest originating in 1898 and the latest in 1919. He called these various chapters the story of his researches, gropings, failures, and achievements (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921). He admitted in the "Foreward" that there were a number of contradictions in his early writings and some repetition of views that were expressed in different forms in the latter chapters (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921). He, however, felt that the developing of his story might be of interest to pedagogues and psychologists; consequently, he did not follow his progress through all its stages (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921). For Jaques-Dalcroze, "every thought is [was] the interpretation of an action" (1921, p. 8).

Jaques-Dalcroze was influenced by such educators and philosophers as Pestalozzi, Rousseau, and Montaigne. He quoted them frequently to add emphasis to his own theories. One notices the Pestalozzian influences often in his stressing of the moral and physical development of the student.

The Essence of Education

For Jaques-Dalcroze, the teaching of beauty is as important as the teaching of truth. It is dangerous, he concluded, to err in the teaching of both because "the progress of a people depends on the education given to its children" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 14). The underlying idea of the entire Jaques-Dalcroze system is that the education of tomorrow, his tomorrow, would teach children to know themselves (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921). These children would be capable of measuring "their intellectual and physical capacities by judicious comparison with the efforts of their predecessors" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. viii). These children should submit to exercises that would enable them to make use of their powers. In this way, they would "attain due balance, and thereby . . . adapt themselves to the necessities of their individual and collective existence" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. vii). For Jaques-Dalcroze, the role of reproduction is not enough. "Teachers should aim at furnishing them [the students] with the means both of living their own lives and of harmonising with the lives of others" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. vii). The role of education would include readjustment (Jaques-Dalcroze called this role "adaptation") and reconstruction. He felt it would be impossible to expect education to guarantee the safety of a people and their culture. In his judgment, "all our efforts should be directed to training our children to become conscious of their personalities, to develop their

temperaments, and to liberate their particular rhythms of individual life from every trammelling influence" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. ix).

> *More than ever they should be enlightened as to the relations existing between soul and mind, between the conscious and the sub-conscious, between imagination and the processes of action. Thought should be brought into immediate contact with behavior – the new education aiming at regulating the interaction between our nervous and our intellectual forces. Fresh from the trenches, soldiers should be able to continue the struggle in a new guise; and in the schools, our teachers, likewise, should be on the alert to combat weakness of will and lack of confidence, and to train the fresh generations by every possible means to fight for self-mastery and the power to place themselves, fully equipped, at the service of the human race.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. ix)

The work continually uses the metaphorical language of the military: training, power, submit, adapt, liberate, regulating, trenches, soldiers, fight, and service. In his preface to the American edition, Jaques-Dalcroze adds that

> *Education . . . should have as its chief aim the suppression of resistances of every nature which hamper the individual in the externalization of his character, and should . . . enable him in the most natural manner to give expression to his sensibility and temperament.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. xii)

Jaques-Dalcroze quoted Rousseau, Fenelon, and Montaigne to stress the idea that a child's education begins at birth (1921), but he considered the attending of "school a preparation for life" (1921, p. 165). When a student leaves the school, he/she should

be able to fulfill the obligations of social life and deal in practical affairs. All of these should be done without infringing upon the rights of others. The school should train the students' brains, bodies, wills, and sensibilities at the same time. None is dispensable. None is more important than the other. It was Jaques-Dalcroze's opinion that the ignoring of the training of sensibility in students resulted in problems relating to character development.

> *It is not the function of education to develop isolated individuals. Its aim is far removed and higher: nothing short of the progressive development of the race, the perfecting of its thought and taste. One cannot cure the disease of ignorance by increasing one's own knowledge. It is a question of taking precautionary measures for future guidance, of influencing the outlook and disposition of the coming generation, and so moulding it as to ensure the transmission to future generations of a strongly social instinct and more intense love of truth.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 169)

The Essence of Music Education

"There are many more musical children in the world than parents believe" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 95). Music education should awaken in the student a love for the art. The child should be taught "at school not only to sing, listen carefully, and keep time, but also to move and think accurately and rhythmically" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 8). It is not enough to just educate a few artists and amateurs of a country better than past generations were educated. This will not raise or even maintain the musical standard of a country. The most desirable method of teaching music would

enable pupils to "appreciate melodies, rhythms, and harmonies" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 33) as soon as possible.

> *If the masses are not capable of following – even at a distance – in the steps of that select few, an impassable barrier will sooner or later be erected between the two elements of a people that in these days must unite if they are to co-exist.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 13)

But in the early 1900s, according to Jaques-Dalcroze, music was "held in very light repute" (1921, p. 20) by educational authorities. This, he said, was due to the lack of understanding by the scholastic authorities. Persons who have untrained ears "cannot be expected to appreciate the necessity of furnishing others with an ear attuned to fine perceptions by the diligent practice of special exercises" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 24). The authorities are unable to read the language of music, and they will not allow others to read it for them. Since the selecting of teachers is decided by this group, music has "no share in the general prosperity of our education system" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 25). "That is why children learn neither to read, phrase, record, or emit sounds in our schools. That is why our sons and daughters grow up dumb" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 25).

Jaques-Dalcroze saw the children of his day who took private music lessons as basically children of "well-to-do" families (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 15). The parents of these children were motivated by their "snobbishness or by respect for tradition" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 15). The teacher, on the other hand, would not reject any student for studying because of the need of providing a livelihood for him/herself. He saw the amateur conservatories in the same light. Because of

affluence, Jaques-Dalcroze stated, many children who were "utterly unfitted for it" received musical education "to the serious detriment of the art" (1921, p. 15). Because of their socio-economic position, many children did not receive lessons. For this reason, Jaques-Dalcroze believed that "making music a compulsory school subject is [was] the only sure means of mobilising the vital musical forces of a country" (1921, p. 16).

With this belief in mind, Jaques-Dalcroze stated his ideas for possible implementation of a music program within the public schools. This implementation, he said, must be "undertaken in the right spirit, efficiently organised, and confided to intelligent and competent teachers" (1921, p. 16). After a few years of musical studies, children would be tested. Those whose tests scores showed talent would be given a musical education that would develop their musical abilities to the maximum. The remainder would be "relieved from the burden of lessons of no value to them, and thereby conferring an almost equal benefit on the art, in being debarred from meddling with it, and clogging its progress by ridiculous pretensions" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 16). These statements are restated only paragraphs later in a softer tone. Here, he states that educational authorities will provide music for "every moderately gifted child" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 17). The more talented ones will have more training. From these will issue "a host of embryonic teachers, of proved learning and appreciable talents" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 17).

He knew that some would object to teaching that involved questions of taste and aesthetics and would insist that these questions should be dealt with in higher levels of schooling than elementary. He knew that many felt that the study of technique was

more important for young children. He felt, however, that "initiation into the essence of beauty should be undertaken in conjunction with technical training" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 36).

The Essence of Teachers: In General and in Music

Jaques-Dalcroze thought the schools of his day had good teachers and bad teachers. The problems were with the competency and direction of "training of teachers" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 25). The bad teachers, he stated, produced bad students. All teachers, in his opinion, should receive "a musical education adequate for the artistic requirements of modern life, and for the application of natural faculties normally and logically developed" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 25).

The selection of teachers was an important process for Jaques-Dalcroze. For music to be taught as he envisioned, a "wholesale dismissal of the present staffs" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 31) would be necessary. He saw the music teachers in the primary schools as unfit for their work. Most of these teachers had established their qualifications for teaching every subject with the exception of music. If these teachers were deficient in music, they would "fail to awaken the musical instinct and taste of their pupils" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 31-32). This would cause a decline in music for generations. This, in turn, would influence the development of the entire country.

Since for Jaques-Dalcroze music was a body of knowledge equal with all other bodies of knowledge, the choosing of teachers was of highest importance. Teachers should "know how to develop every medium of physical expression" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 34) in their students. The teacher of music should be "an artist of taste and

talent, and a man of tact and authority, fond of children and knowing how to handle them" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 34).

In the teaching of music, rhythm was the element of highest importance for Jaques-Dalcroze. Rhythm was more than mental; it was physical. He saw children "delight" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 53) in games in which their bodies could participate. He felt that it was instinctive for man to feel rhythmic vibrations in his muscles. He summed up his beliefs by stating that "music is composed of sound and movement. Sound is a form of movement of a secondary, rhythm of a primary, order. Musical studies should therefore be preceded by exercises in movement" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 89). To only train the ear does not make a child love music. "The most potent element in music, and the nearest related to life, is rhythmic movement" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 115).

The Essence of Knowledge Construction: General and Musical

"The progress of the man is one of the results of his preoccupations as a child. Sound ideas instilled in the schoolroom are transformed into deeds . . ." (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 18). He discovered through his teaching that older students are hindered by "futile intellectual preconceptions" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. v). He also noticed that the hearing faculties in children developed with ease when they were at a "stage when every new sensation" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. v) delighted them and when they were full of curiosity . According to Jaques-Dalcroze, "intelligence is an important factor of progress; persistence in the utilisation of the intellectual powers is a still more important factor" (1921, p. xiv).

One cannot, according to Jaques-Dalcroze, attain "technical proficiency without a love for the object of its application" (1921, p. 36). A child should never study an instrument before he is trained to "appreciate rhythm and distinguish sound" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 104), and only experience can form and train the inner ear. He poses a question: "Can we not wait till a child is seven or eight before attempting to teach him the piano or violin?" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 106-107). He suggests that musical training begin on simple and natural lines from about the age of five or six.

> *The aesthetic sense should be cultivated contemporaneously with the study of the elementary laws of the art, and, from the first lessons, the child should be made to realise that the training is directed as much to the heart as to the brain, and that he must try to love as well as to understand.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 36)

The compulsory teaching of music in schools would allow latent talent to surface. For Jaques-Dalcroze, "it would be highly dangerous that . . . tuition should be the same for highly gifted, less gifted, and ungifted children indiscriminantly" (1921, p. 37). He quoted La Rochefoucauld in conveying his opinion that not all children are born artists. He believed, however, that dormant or concealed musical instincts can surface with careful handling. On the other hand, he believed that "most often training will only avail with children more or less predestined to come under its influence" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 37). He knew people would be afraid of the elimination of children in music. These threats are more apparent, he said, than real. He felt that at the most, only five percent of people are completely musically incapable. He conceded that an exam at the end of a year of music training would not be conclusive. "False

voices are curable by practice, while careful exercises will often rectify inactivity of the ear and insensibility to time" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 38). The teacher, instead of a test, would have to be the one to decide those totally incapable of "following the course, and . . . transfer them to special classes" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 38). After the initial elimination of "incurables," he saw the process as one of "successive classifications" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 38), depending upon the varying degrees in the sense of rhythm, the vocal accuracy, and the hearing capacity. Decisions about these classifications would be made by professional musicians. These musicians would not be infallible and therefore would make mistakes in their decisions. These mistakes would be unavoidable but necessary. He offered justification for his beliefs.

> *Everyone is liable to make a mistake. But be sure of this: Such mistakes as they may make will not have anything like such serious consequences as the mistakes of the present system, in allowing incompetents to clog the progress of classes. Besides, our examiners will commit errors only of detail, and these could easily be rectified by the regular teacher; and, if he should share in any serious blunder, pupils could always resort to private tuition.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 43)

He believed that this classification would be best for all concerned. The less capable of giving would not be pushed to do more than they were capable of doing. Others would be taken as far as they could go. The gifted would not have to associate with those who were doing "child's play" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 43). The born musician would not be tempted to slack by "permitting them to compete with their slower-witted companions" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 43). For Jaques-Dalcroze, some are naturally

gifted, and "to confine school music-teaching to elementary facts is to bring it down to the level of the mediocre, and impede the free development" (1921, p. 44) of these naturally gifted students. He quoted Montaigne's words: "The child's imagination should be stimulated to a frank curiosity as to the things we wish him to learn, and guided, by judiciously whetting his appetite for knowledge" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 45).

The musical education of a child would be based on hearing or on his/her perception of musical phenomena: "the ear gradually accustoming itself to grasp the relations between notes, keys, and chords, and the whole body, by means of special exercises, initiating itself into the appreciation of rhythmic, dynamic, and agogic nuances of music" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 109). The "child who forms a taste for singing and good music will retain it all his life" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 110). Jaques-Dalcroze's whole method is

> *based on the principle that theory should follow practice, that children should not be taught rules until they have had experience of the facts which have given rise to them, and that the first thing to be taught a child is the use of all his faculties.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 118)

He stated that the aim of his eurhythmics was to "enable pupils at the end of their course, to say not 'I know,' but 'I have experienced.'" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 119). He developed and wrote individual volumes of his methods of eurhythmics. These contain rhythm, solfege, and improvisation exercises and directions for their implementation. Repetition was important for Jaques-Dalcroze. "Utilisation of these

divers new rhythmic processes for purposes of musical composition will [would] be possible only after a careful process of assimilation" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 161).

The Essence of Social Issues

Education is not to "develop isolated individuals" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p.169). Education should aim for the progressive development of the race. It should perfect its thought and taste.

> *The characteristic musical tendencies of a race come to light in rhythm. The union of nations, socially so important, should be based on the interchange and balance of temperaments peculiar to the various races. Music, in the Greek sense of the word, is the art in which temperament is most concretely manifested.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. xiii)

It was because of the above stated belief that Jaques-Dalcroze felt that very race must have the means of externalizing its particular rhythm. This means would develop through special training. Acculturation, he believed, would be "disastrous for the intellectual progress of humanity" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. xiii). He saw international music education attempting to reduce the rhythmic habits of differing nations to a common type (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. xiii). This would not allow individuals to give expressions to their own sensibilities, and "the progress of a race depends on the persistence of each individual member in asserting his 'self' into harmony with that of his fellows" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. xiv).

For Jaques-Dalcroze, rhythmic training "should vary in its method according to the special needs of the country in which it is [was] given" (1921, p. xiii). He took

notice of the children of different countries singing his songs. According to Jaques-Dalcroze:

> *the children of southern climes have a natural aptitude of the accomplishment of supple and graceful movement, but lack precision and force in executing energetic and emphatic gestures; while children of northern countries possess the faculty of effectively punctuating rhythms by means of gesture but not that of balancing and shading successions of rounded movements. We may conclude from this that the rhythmic character of the music of a country will conform to the physical aptitudes of its inhabitants, for, as is well known, grace and flexibility (in conjunction with lack of continuous accentuation) are the distinctive features of the spirit of "Mediterranean" music, while the Teutonic musical characteristics are vigour and force of accentuation, allied to a too sudden and rapid opposition of forte and piano – that is, lack of flexibility in shading.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 91)

He felt that his eurhythmics could be of special benefit to the American pupils. He saw them as having a lack of knowledge of the qualities of "time" (1921, p. xiv).

As stated earlier, Jaques-Dalcroze believed that students should be grouped according to their abilities to achieve. Students who do not have natural gifts in music should be placed in special classes. He believed that children of average capacities had their "natural instincts of emulation damped by the knowledge that, however well they work, they can never come out on top" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 44). Once segregated, these students will "progress according to their power" (Jaques-Dalcroze,

1921,p. 44). They will leave school as intelligent "amateurs and members of musical societies" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 44).

The Essence of Control

Jaques-Dalcroze related the story of an incident that happened early in his teaching. It was common practice for professors of harmony to not allow their students to use the piano to work with chord progressions. One of Jaques-Dalcroze's students questioned this decision. The student asked why he could not use the piano and stated that he could not hear anything otherwise. Jaques-Dalcroze stated that a light descended on him.

> *I saw that any rule not forged by necessity and from direct observation of nature, must be arbitrary and false, and that the prohibition of the use of the piano was meaningless when addressed to young people lacking the capacity of inner hearing.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 3)

The Essence of a Future Perspective

> *In matters of art, I foresee that individual efforts will continue to attract a certain public, but I believe that a new demand for collective unity will drive numerous persons, formerly estranged from art, into association for the expression of their common spirit. And from that a new art will emerge, compounded of a multitude of aspirations, of different degrees of strength, but unanimous in the quest of an ideal and common outlet for emotion.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. ix)

During 1922, Jaques-Dalcroze wrote of his visits to England. He saw the United Kingdom as putting forth an effort to "infuse a more human character into school studies" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1931, p. 176). The child was given greater freedom of action and thought. He saw them educating both "will and imagination, to prepare the ground for a more complete expansion of physical and mental powers" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1931, p. 176). For Jaques-Dalcroze, England at this time was a land of liberty. Scholastic reform was welcomed with interest.

Jaques-Dalcroze, in Geneva, had ideas for new possibilities in the area of music education. He found it very difficult to persuade music teachers, however, to change. People, he felt, would not accept new ideas as long as the old ones gave self-satisfaction. The people often see the truths of tomorrow as the lies of today. But human thought does slowly develop (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921). His hope was that one day music teachers would "depend less exclusively on analysis, and more on the awakening of vital emotions and the consciousness of mental states" (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 9).

> *A true pedagogue should be at once psychologist, physiologist, and artist. The complete citizen should leave school capable not only of living normally, but of feeling life. He should be in a position both to create and to respond to the creations of others.* (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. 180)

The Essence of the Educational Theories of Zoltán Kodály

At the outset of this writing, it is extremely important to admit my personal background in regard to the Kodály approach. Colleges and universities within the United States often specialize in one particular musical learning theory. My

undergraduate and masters programs were both at universities that embraced the Kodály approach. Because of these experiences, I have a greater understanding of the historical background of this particular approach. I should also admit that my perceptions may be affected by my background in singing and by my exposure to the lectures of Sister Lorna Lemke of Silver Lake College, who reiterated for me in her own words the basic Kodály philosophy as she perceived it. "What is known in North America as the 'Kodály Method' was developed in Hungary in the 1940s and 1950s by the composer Zoltán Kodály, his colleagues, and his students as a comprehensive system of music education" (Choksy, Abramson, Gillespie, Woods, 1986, p. 70). Kodály himself said that this was not his concept. It was the Hungarian way of teaching.

Biographical Information and Introduction

The book chosen for inquiry, *The Selected Writings of Zoltán Kodály* (1974), is divided into four large sections: "On Folk Music," " On Predecessors and Contemporaries," "On Music Education," and "On Himself and His Works." In the section "On Himself and His Works," Kodály offered what he called "A Little Biography." He was born in Kecshemet and moved when only a few months old. He did not offer to tell that he was born in the year 1881 (Mitchell, 1984). His main concern was the relating of his travels and personal longings for the mountains. He passed away in 1967, bearing the titles of composer and teacher (Mitchell, 1984).

To review Hungarian history is to shed light on the writings of Kodály. The history is long and tragic. There were invasions, subjugations, and uprisings. During these times, national leaders would arise to fight for freedom and independence. The arts struggled fiercely to survive (Young, 1964). When the Celtic people lived in what

is now Hungary, they became the subjects of the Roman legions, who settled there to establish a boundary to the empire. When the power of Rome passed, the plains of Hungary were open to invading tribes: Huns and Magyars. "The Magyars, whose origins were the same Finno-Ugrian group as the Finns, ultimately gave their name to the Hungarian nation as a whole" (Young, 1964, p. 1). This connection between Hungarians and Finns can be seen in some aspects of vocabulary and speech structure.

Hungary became Christian under the influence of the Carolingian Empire. The centralized state came into being about the tenth and eleventh centuries. There was still internal dissension, but the ordered ecclesiastical life provided much for Hungary. The circumstances of geography put the country at the mercy of others. It became the barricade for the pagan east against the west. Each side wanted Hungary. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Turks had unsuccessfully tried to invade. János Hunyade, a nobleman of Wallachian descent, came to command and established himself as a loved national hero. His son, Mátyás, became king. It was Mátyás who introduced to Hungary the "rising impulses of Renaissance culture" (Young, 1964, p. 3). "It may be said that from the Renaissance until relatively modern times, the Latin language has occupied a special place in Hungarian culture" (Young, 1964, p. 3). Kodály often recalled this tradition in the dedications of certain works.

After Mátyás, weaker governments come. The Turks became stronger. Finally in 1526, the Hungarians lost their independence. The country remained a Turkish province until 1699. At that time, Hungary was given to Austria. Times were hard for the people of Hungary.

The Hungarians, inspired both by their own traditions and the general ferment of the Reformation, threw their pride, courage, resentment, and passion into literature, and three great names stand out in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: those of Péter Bornemissze, Bálint Balassi, and Miklós Zrinyi. These are honored as patriots, as the founders of a literature in the vernacular, and are all to be met within the choral settings of Zoltán Kodály. (Young, 1964, p. 3)

The art-music up to the seventeenth century was based on plainsong and minstrelsy. After the battle that lost their independence in 1526, most of the Hungarian-born composers took their talents to other countries. "In Hungary the musical genius of the people found its expression in liturgical music" (Young, 1964, p. 4).

The songs that were sung in the seventeenth century are still, having been unconsciously absorbed into the common practice of peasant music-making, a living part of the Hungarian tradition. Now, as then, the folk tradition reflects almost every influence that has played a part in Hungarian musical life, whether sacred or secular. (Young, 1964, p. 4)

Ference Rákóczi won independence for Hungary for a short while. Soon, the Austrians were in charge again. The German language was compulsory, and the Roman Catholic Church was supreme. The one small pocket of Calvinism was Debrecen. This little city of resistance strongly influenced Hungarian popular music. It also influenced Zoltán Kodály.

In 1867, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was established. It was Joseph Haydn, an Austrian composer, who made Hungarians music-conscious. In the small Hungarian towns, young school boys who could play violin played Haydn. Kodály believed that "Haydn was the first to announce to the world at large, in his music inscribed all'ongarese, that a musical mode of expressions, specially Hungarian and differing from any other, had come into being" (Young, 1964, p. 7).

In spite of the political turmoil, Hungary continued to move forward in music. The founders of modern Hungarian music were Liszt, Mosonyi, and Erkel. Hungary continued to be dominated by larger countries. Often their music and literary art were controlled or influenced by them. Hungary had to wait a long time to gain her independence. "That Hungarian music now exists in its own right is almost entirely due to the work of two men, Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály" (Young, 1964, p. 23).

Frigyes Kodály began working for the railway in 1870. His relaxation was playing the violin. In 1879, Frigyes married Paulina Jalovecsky. She was an accomplished pianist and singer. Three children came from this marriage: Emilia, Zoltán, and Pál. Zoltán made his first public appearance as a composer while he was still a student in the sixth form of the grammar school (Eósze, 1962). He had written an overture for the school orchestra. Upon graduation, Kodály decided to study to become a teacher and continue his composing in his spare time. In Hungary at that time, it was "pretty generally felt that the making of music was 'no occupation for a gentleman'" (Eösze, 1962, p. 14). Kodály enrolled at the university in Budapest. He chose philosophy with literary interest in Hungarian and German language and literature as his subjects. He also took the entrance exam for the Academy of Music.

After four years, Kodály received his diploma in composition. He spent from 1900 to 1904 at Eötvös College, a training college for forty exceptionally gifted teachers. After he finished college, he started work for his teachers' diploma. He passed the examination in 1905. He was equally educated in music and the philosophy of teaching.

Kodály's theories were adapted for the United States by several people. Let us return to his original statements, however, for the essence of these educational theories. The headings used for consideration in the writings of Emile Jaques-Dalcroze were put aside when beginning the reading of Zoltán Kodály. Initially, new headings were indicated - headings such as "good music," "nationalism," "folk songs," and "history." All of these were present. But as the readings continued, these new headings seemed to merge into basically the same themes that were considered with the reading of Jaques-Dalcroze. With few exceptions, the essence of these writings cannot be separated from their Hungarian heritage. They were written by a Hungarian, from a Hungarian perspective, with the country of Hungary in mind.

The Essence of Education

"The greatest deficiency in our culture is that it is built from above. . . . There are no leaps in nature. Culture is the result of slow growth" (Kodály, 1974, p. 127). Because of this belief, Kodály was convinced that "the work of the kindergarten is [was] indispensable" (Kodály, 1974, p. 129). The kindergarten offered, in his opinion, an "adjustment to the human community" (Kodály, 1974, p. 129). He felt it was impossible for the family to provide this adjustment. Children, he urged, need to learn early that human beings should live for one another, not just for themselves.

Kodály saw the soul of the child as pure and therefore believed that the child should be considered sacred. If anything bad were to be implanted in the child, his/her soul would be poisoned for life (Kodály, 1974). "Souls cannot be reshaped by administration. But souls reshaped by beauty and knowledge are easy to administer" (Kodály, 1974, p. 147).

Nationalism was of utmost importance to Kodály. For him, it was imperative that the children of his country be taught to be Hungarian. He saw that it was the task of the kindergarten to provide a good early childhood education for the nation. His education would also be a Hungarian education. He did not see the Hungarian public taking schools seriously enough. He perceived the public as viewing school and life as separate entities. For Kodály, school stood for life. He stated:

> *Anyone who is hurt there may not recover from the hurt till the day of his death. And if we sow a good seed in him, it will flourish all his life. A three-year-old human being is nonetheless a human being. The earlier we enclose him in an imaginary world, the more difficult will it be for him to find his bearings in the real one later on.* (Kodály, 1974, p. 148)

It is at this point in his writings that Kodály offers a reprimand to the reader:

> *Let us take our children seriously! Everything else follows from this. True, in theory we profess: only the best is good enough for a child. But in practice, this is mostly reduced to: "anything is good enough for a child; he will play even with a button."* (Kodály, 1974, p. 148)

The Essence of Music Education

Music in the School

If adults are to avoid the sickness of the soul caused from musical ignorance, the schools must "administer immunisation" (Kodály, 1974, p. 120). Kodály felt that the Hungarian schools of his day spread the disease of soul sickness. Music did not hold the central place in the curriculum that the Greeks had previously given it. It would therefore be necessary for the framework of the Hungarian school to change for proper music education to ensue. Since for Kodály "powerful sources of spiritual enrichment spring from music," (1974, p. 120) no effort must be spared "to have them opened for as many people as possible" (1974, p. 120). He firmly stated that no other subject could do for a child what music could do. The teaching of rhythm and the proper use of the throat and lungs for speaking and breathing makes music a subject comparable to gymnastics. Kodály posed his own question: "What is to be done?" (1974, p. 120). He gave his own answer:

> *Teach music and singing at school in such a way that it is not a torture but a joy for the pupil; instil* [sic] *a thirst for finer music in him, a thirst which will last for a lifetime. Music must not be approached from its intellectual, rational side, nor should it be conveyed to the child as a system of algebraic symbols, or as the secret writing of a language with which he has no connection. The way should be paved for direct intuition. If the child is not filled at least once by the life-giving stream of music during the most susceptible period – between his sixth and sixteenth years – it will hardly be of any use to him later on. Often a single experience will open the young soul to music for a*

whole lifetime. The experience cannot be left to chance, it is the duty of the school to provide it. (Kodály, 1974, p. 120)

Kodály reminded his readers that institutions of higher education and academies of music can offer a country professional musicians; but if there are no consumers, the professional has no one in the audience. For the music culture of any country to develop, the schools must carry out a systematic program for the children. Children must be brought to an understanding of the phenomenon of music very early. This start, Kodály believed, must be as early as kindergarten.

The Song

Kodály firmly believed that the "great masses" (Kodály, 1974, p. 123) must be led to music. This could never be accomplished through instrumental music. Even at this time, instruments were too expensive for many, and the number of children learning to play an instrument was becoming less. Those children who could not afford instruments, he felt, should not be deprived of music. In reality, children are often, according to Kodály, driven from music by instrumental lessons. Kodály compared the folk song to a proverb: "Proverbs condense centuries of popular wisdom and observation, so, in traditional songs, the emotions of centuries are immortalised in a form polished to perfection" (Kodály, 1974, p. 145). He did not believe that the masterpieces could replace the traditional songs. It was and is through folk songs, he believed, that people could and should preserve their originality. The texts of the songs that are taught to kindergarten children should "start from the soul of the child and his view of the world" (Kodály, 1974, p. 142). Young children enjoy musical forms when they do not care about the meaning of the texts. One can notice young

children humming "senseless words (senseless, that is, for us)" (Kodály, 1974, p. 142). He stated that this does not mean that children should only sing songs with meaningless words. Rhythm is what is important in kindergarten. "By the time the singing voice has evolved, every child could be developed into a veritable virtuoso of rhythm without any great effort, by means of polyrhythmic games . . . and with simple percussion instruments" (Kodály, 1974, p. 143).

Using the Piano

Several things happen to young children when the piano is continually used to accompany singing: (1) children are deprived of the "pleasure and profit in independent singing" (Kodály, 1974, p. 150); (2) the piano does not follow the drop in pitch that normally happens when children sing; (3) the piano is usually out of tune, which "cannot lead to correct singing" (Kodály, 1974, p. 151); (4) the piano hinders the need to create a feeling of open space; (5) "anyone who gets accustomed to looking for the representation of external processes in music will never understand music itself" (Kodály, 1974, p. 151). It is much greater fun for children to accompany themselves on their own instruments.

Foreign Music

If teachers are going to use music from another country, they should use only masterpieces. Composers within a country should compose music within their own national idiom. Foreign music is a means for knowing and understanding people of other nationalities.

The Essence of Teachers: In General and in Music

The qualification requirements for music teachers within the schools during Kodály's time were very poor. Consequently, those who wanted to understand the music curriculum had to take personal responsibility for learning more than what was required. This situation, according to Kodály, was "aggravated by the fact that in appointing teachers it is [was] not the best that are [were] chosen; 'influential friends' are [were] decisive" (1974, p. 124).

> *Thus it is natural that absolutely unsuitable people hold important posts and to have the right man in the right place is virtually a chance phenomenon. And yet today only personal eminence could make up for the deficiencies in the curriculum and qualifications.* (Kodály, 1974, p. 124)

It is more important to have a good teacher for the school children than to have a good director at the opera house. Directors, good or bad, can sometimes fail. But if a teacher is poor, he/she can kill the love of music in children for generations. If good teachers are to be encouraged to teach music, then they must be given equal positions with other teachers. The kindergarten teacher, Kodály felt, needed many "years of study in many fields and a cultured taste" (Kodály, 1974, p. 149). The work of the teacher of small children was [is] high-level, intricate work" (Kodály, 1974, p. 149).

Kodály stated that it was the custom to try to solve all problems in education by more money from the government. He offered suggestions to improve music that did not cost more. One suggestion involved the teachers: Teachers might give a little additional time to their work after the ringing of the final school bell. He called this additional work a "spiritual need" (Kodály, 1974, p. 126).

Interlude on the Characteristics of a Musician

It is important when considering the teacher of music to reflect upon Kodály's personal observations concerning musicians as a whole. He uses the word "haughtiness" as the descriptive word, and he suggests that this description is not rare. "The fewer the people who are proficient in the craft, the more valuable they feel" (Kodály, 1974, p. 128). These musicians, Kodály tells us, despise the people who do not understand their profession, and yet they are often unwilling to do anything about it. "They consider it particularly beneath their dignity to be interested in schools" (Kodály, 1974, p. 128).

> *The haughty, anti-social artist will never become a prophet. He lives in his ivory tower waiting for times to change for the better. He thinks that some popular concerts will do the job of "musical mass education." However, it is not only among the people but also in our educated society that musical illiteracy prevails, and this ill can hardly be cured by efforts to popularise high-grade symphonic music. Anyone who has not been prepared for it will not understand much of it, nor will the belletristic pseudo-professional literature, so fashionable with us now, take him nearer to it.* (Kodály, 1974, p. 128)

The Essence of Knowledge Construction

Because of his interest in psychology, Kodály was convinced that the years between three and seven were the most important years in education. He believed strongly in the importance of the kindergarten. "If the soul is left uncultivated up to the age of nearly seven, it will then not yield anything that can be grown in it only by

earlier cultivation" (Kodály, 1974, p. 129). For the teaching of music, the kindergarten is "irreplaceable" (Kodály, 1974, p. 129). Timing is of the essence in the development of the natural sense of music. If this time is lost, the sense becomes stunted.

Musical Development in Children

It is rare to find "pure enthusiasm and naïve instinct" (Kodály, 1974, p. 122) in grown-up artists. However, it is found in every healthy child. "Below the age of fifteen, everybody is more talented than above it; only exceptional geniuses continue to develop" (Kodály, 1974, p. 122). The adult who sang as a child carries the enthusiasm with him/her. He/she also remembers that results are obtained from work. The child "is the most susceptible and the most enthusiastic audience for pure art; for in every great artist the child is alive - and this is something felt by youth's congenial spirit" (Kodály, 1974, p. 122). As food is more carefully chosen for a child than an adult, so only "art of intrinsic value is suitable for children! Everything else is harmful" (Kodály, 1974, p. 122). Kodály claimed that in 50 years of experience, he never observed a tone-deaf Hungarian child. He felt that those older children who had trouble matching pitch could have been taught to do so when they were younger. He also believed that the Hungarians excelled in regard to rhythm. This was evidenced by their marching. Kodály spent much time discussing the proper material to use in the teaching of music. Folk songs with ranges of five to six notes are considered best for children's voices, and there seems to be an abundance of folk songs with this range. The pentatonic scale was and is the basis for much of the folk music. This scale contains no "fa" or "te." The movable "do" is also very basic. This principle calls

for the use of the same solfege syllables in any key. Hand signs that represent the solfege syllables are used as a tool as long as they are needed.

Language Development

Kodály firmly expressed his position that children can have only one mother-tongue. This includes the musical mother-tongue. He voiced strong statements about exposure to more than one language before the age of ten.

> *Anyone who has been brought up on two will never know either. Anyone who has learned a foreign language at an age under ten will only mix up the different structures of the two languages, their different ways of shaping images.* (Kodály, 1974, p. 131)

He concluded that children under ten who learn two languages will lose one language, and that lost language will only contaminate the mother-tongue. Multiple languages should be experienced later than childhood.

The Essence of Social Issues

The village children of Hungary, Kodály felt, were the closest to art because most of the music that they heard outside of school was the folk music of their country. Their contact with bad music came through recordings and radio. This "bad taste in art," he considered a "veritable sickness of the soul" (Kodály, 1974, p. 120). "It seals the soul off from contact with masterpieces and from the life-giving nourishment emanating from them without which the soul wastes away or becomes stunted, and the whole character of the man is branded with a peculiar mark" (Kodály, 1974, p. 120).

This sickness, Kodály thought, was incurable in adults. People who were considered educated in other areas were often ignorant in music. People who were well educated in the visual arts and literature would accept "trashy literature in music" (Kodály, 1974, p. 119).

Social Solidarity

For Kodály, the choir is the perfect example to demonstrate social solidarity. People unite to accomplish something that a single person is incapable of doing. Everyone is of equal importance, and the error of one can destroy the whole. He used British society as an example of a country whose strong society fostered a choral heritage of 600 years. He did not imply that this solidarity was a direct result of the choral heritage, but simply suggested that there might be a connection. He saw Hungarians as people who did not like to unite. He called this a "fatal error" (Kodály, 1974, p. 121). In considering choral groups in relationship to schooling, Kodály suggested that it "is the most rewarding subject because it gives the greatest rewards for the effort expended on it" (1974, p. 121).

Nationalism

Kodály admitted that people might think of him as chauvinistic when he wrote of Hungarian music education. He knew and admitted that art, especially music, was international. He quickly pointed out musical examples that were identical in every part of the world. Next, he proceeded to offer an explanation for his nationalism in his writing concerning Hungarian music. Different people have their own tonal system. Different things are played on the same kind of piano in different ways in different

parts of the world. People are the way they are because of who they are. National roots are found in all performing artists. If artists are not given a solid foundation in their national culture, they soon "become lost in the sea of peoples and are absorbed" (Kodály, 1974, p. 152) by other countries if they choose to go abroad to perform. So "a child nurtured on mixed music will not feel musically at home anywhere" (Kodály, 1974, p. 153). "The road from Hungarian music to the understanding of international music is easy, but in the opposite direction the road is difficult, or non-existent" (Kodály, 1974, p. 154).

For Kodály, it was imperative that children of his country become Hungarian in every sense of the word. Music offered a major contribution to this aim. No other subject could replace it. He was not referring to "banner-waving" (Kodály, 1974, p. 130) songs. He spoke of "implantation of subconscious elements of being Hungarian" (Kodály, 1974, p. 130) - elements that could be gradually developed. "It is here, as it were, that the subterranean foundations of the edifice of our Hungarian character are to be laid. The deeper these foundations are built, the firmer the building will be" (Kodály, 1974, p. 130). Language and music were the two elements in which the foundation could be laid for the subconsciousness of being Hungarian, and he felt that folk traditions were the best for laying the foundations of subconscious nationalism.

For many years, the song-books for the schools in Hungary were mostly those of the German tradition. Some were translations of the German songs. Kodály felt strongly that the songs taught to younger students should be songs of the Hungarian tradition. This was the place of beginning, for he believed that the more the Hungarian children were exposed to Indo-Germanic music, the "more they became alienated from

Hungarian music; because not sufficient Hungarian music was taught to counterbalance it" (Kodály, 1974, p. 138).

> *Do not let us steal other peoples' songs, we have plenty of our own; let us use them rather to get to know other peoples better. The children should sing "Fuchs du hast die Gans gestohlen" . . . in its original language, when they are learning German. There it will be of valuable service; here, disguised into Hungarian, it only does harm.* (Kodály, 1974, p. 145)

Kodály set forth three personal observations directly related to social class and music.

1. "In the present-day condition of society in Hungary, only the farming people and the workers form the sort of larger homogeneous group, united in thought and feeling, without which choral singing cannot flourish" (1974, p. 158).
2. Folk and workers' choruses offer a great contribution to the Hungarian singing style because "this style can evolve only from the singing of people who can speak and sing only in their mother-tongue, but within that, with superior assurance" (1974, p. 158). The trained Hungarian singers have foreign qualities mixed into their singing.
3. "It is common knowledge that the greatest vocal talents have usually stemmed from the very poorest classes all over the world" (1974, p. 159).

The reasons for observation number three, according to Kodály, are understandable:

> *In the classes striving upwards, the tension and energy are much greater and this make their every manifestation more intense, more direct, more free, while the brake of education and "good upbringing" is inclined rather to dull*

everything and make it grey from generation to generation. Apart from this, the physical preconditions of the singing voice and biological superiority, a good constitution, strength and perseverance are more likely to be produced in the hard life than in the enervation of prosperity. (Kodály, 1974, p. 159)

The Essence of a Future Perspective

Kodály left little doubt about his feeling for the future. In 1947, he wrote an essay entitled "A Hundred Year Plan." His aim was the Hungarian musical culture. The means for this aim was "making the reading and writing of music general, through the schools" (Kodály, 1974, p. 160). Simultaneously, there would be training for both the artist and the audience. This would also include raising Hungarian public taste in music. In so doing, the country would move toward what was better and what was more Hungarian.

The next part of the plan included the masterpieces of world literature. These would become public property for every person of every kind and rank. This total picture would be the Hungarian musical culture of the future.

Kodály realized the time involved in this plan. He reflected that it took 250 years for every Hungarian to learn to read. He believed, however, that music reading could be attained in a somewhat shorter time. He asked a thought-provoking question:

But what curse is upon us that always make us do things wrongly at first?! Why is it always the incompetent people that force their way to the scene of action, spoiling things to such an extent that twice as much work is needed to put things right again than would have been required to do them well at the first go? (Kodály, 1974, p. 160)

Our age of mechanization leads along a road ending with man himself as a machine; only the spirit of singing can save us from this fate. . . . it is our firm conviction that mankind will live the happier when it has learnt to live with music more worthily. Whoever works to promote this end, in one way or another, has not lived in vain. (Kodály 1974, p. 206)

CHAPTER III

GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS

Current curriculum inquiry centers around such topics as phenomenology, critical theory, deconstruction, semiotics, conceptual analysis, and autobiography. But whether we recognize the activity as such, we are all involved in hermeneutic inquiry. We are all interpreting our lived experiences. Since Chapter IV of this research is a hermeneutical interpretation of the works of Emile Jaques-Dalcroze and Zoltán Kodály, this chapter lays the foundations for this interpretation.

> *As opposed to the self-conscious reasonings typical of logical induction in the natural sciences, the human sciences arrive unconsciously at their conclusions. Their induction requires an instinctive psychological tact, and they rely on memory and on the authority of others, whereas the natural scientist utilizes his own reason alone.* (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 67)

This study establishes its foundation for interpretive authority on the writings of Georg-Hans Gadamer as conveyed in his books *Truth and Method* (1975) and *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (1976). *Truth and Method* was originally published in Germany in 1960 as *Wahrheit und Methode*. The book used in this study, however, is a translation that was edited by Garrett Barden and John Cumming from the second (1965) edition. *Philosophical Hermeneutics* is a collection of essays from *Kleine Schriften* and translated by David E. Linge.

This chapter is prefaced with a short discussion of the problem of method as related to the human sciences. The chapter then offers a discussion of the concepts listed by Gadamer as necessary components for interpretive tact. The third section

presents the concept of the aesthetic experience as a way of knowing. The fourth addresses the connection between hermeneutic interpretation and history. Finally, the chapter examines the role of language in this interpretation. The foundation laid here is, in essence, the author's hermeneutical phenomenological interpretation of the writings of Gadamer. It is impossible for it to be more.

The Problem of Method

Gadamer tells us that the need to understand and interpret is a concern for all (Gadamer, 1975). His development of a hermeneutic is not to offer a methodology for the study of human science. It is "an attempt to understand what the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and what connects them with the totality of our experience of world" (Gadamer, 1975, p. xiii). The experiences of the human sciences are not the same as the experiences of the natural sciences. They are connected with areas such as philosophy, art, and history. "These are all modes of experiences in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science" (Gadamer, 1975, p. xii). When Gadamer discusses the subject of art, he does not seek to prove its truth. He simply admits it.

> *The work of art and its expressive power cannot be restricted to its original historical horizon, in which the beholder was actually the contemporary of the creator. It seems instead to belong to the experience of art that the work of art always has its own present. Only in a limited way does it retain its historical origin within itself. The work of art is the expression of a truth that cannot be reduced to what its creator actually thought in it. Whether we call*

it the unconscious creation of the genius or consider the conceptual inexhaustibility of every artistic expression from the point of view of the beholder, the aesthetic consciousness can appeal to the fact that the work of art communicates itself. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 95-96)

Gadamer is not suggesting here that the methods of natural science have no relevance to the world. He is not denying that these methods have some application to the world of human science. The difference is in the "objectives of knowledge" (Gadamer, 1975, p. xviii). It is important

to discover what is common to all modes of understanding and to show that understanding is . . . subjective behaviour . . . towards its effective history – the history of its influence; in other words, understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood. (Gadamer, 1975, p. xix)

It is important that one have a "sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now" (Gadamer, 1975, p. xxv).

Gadamer explains that inquiry into the human sciences often seeks to establish an increasing knowledge of regularity. This, he says, does not give a proper grasp of their nature. It is not only important to establish regularity in order that predictions can be made, but the "ideal is rather to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical concreteness" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 7). Gadamer credits this distinction to Hermann Helmholtz and states that Helmholtz was making a psychological distinction between the two. Both make inductive conclusions, but the conclusions are arrived at by different means.

Hence the practice of induction in the human sciences is tied to particular psychological conditions. It requires a kind of tact and other intellectual qualities as well, e.g., a well-stocked memory and the acceptance of authorities, whereas the self-conscious inferences of the natural scientist depend entirely on the use of his own reason. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 7)

Components of Interpretive Tact

Used as a noun, "tact" refers to one's "ability to say and do the right thing at the right time" (Mello, 1980, p. 931). If the adjectival form – "tactful" – is used, it describes the sensitivity of the person. Gadamer offers four concepts as explanations for acquiring interpretive tact.

Bildung

Translators of *Truth and Method* (1975) use the word "culture" as the idea expressed by *Bildung*. Sometimes translators choose not to suggest an English equivalent. To use this German word when discussing the writings of Gadamer conjures a host of ideas that belong to the concept and history of the word itself. Cassell's *German English Dictionary* (1966), however, offers such suggestions as formation, education of the mind, culture, knowledge, learning, accomplishments, and attainments (Sasse, Horne, and Dixon, 1966). With time, this word has taken on new and additional meaning. Johann Gottfried von Herder's (1744-1803) "basic definition" was "reaching up to humanity" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 11). A sensitive ear would detect the difference in the meaning of the German word *Kulture* (culture, civilization) and *Bildung*.

> *But if in our language we say* Bildung, *we mean something both higher and more inward, namely the attitude of mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavour, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character.* (Humboldt in Gadamer, 1975, p. 11)

Here, Gadamer says, the meaning of *Bildung* no longer means "culture." The word "calls rather on the ancient mystical tradition, according to which man carries in his soul the image of God after whom he is fashioned and must cultivate it in himself" (1975, p. 12). It becomes a process of formation and cultivation and therefore remains in a constant state of further continued *Bildung* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 12). As one is acquiring *Bildung*, he/she loses nothing, but rather collects and keeps everything. The concept "has no goals outside itself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 12). It is within this frame-work that the human sciences have their "condition of existence" (Hegel in Gadamer, 1975, p. 13). *Bildung*, for Hegel, was not only a theoretical attitude as well as a practical one, it was "the essential determination of human rationality as a whole" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 13). It becomes, therefore, man's task to raise *Bildung* to the state of universality. Particularity must be sacrificed. Every profession has tasks that one might not choose to do out of his/her own private desires. But *Bildung* requires attention to these tasks.

> *Practical* Bildung *is seen in one's filling one's profession wholly, in all its aspects. But this includes overcoming the element in it that is alien to the particularity which is oneself, and making it wholly one's own. Thus to give oneself to the universality of a profession is at the same time "to know how to*

limit oneself, i.e., to make one's profession wholly one's concern. Then it is no longer a limitation." (Gadamer, 1975, p. 14)

Sensus Communis (Common Sense)

Basing his discussion of common sense on the writing of the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, Gadamer explains that there are two elements present in wisdom: common sense and the idea of eloquentia (1975). For Vico, "talking well" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 19) not only means saying the truth, but saying it well. Vico did not deny the importance of science, but he stressed the impossibility of attempting to proceed without the wisdom of the past. *Sensus communis* is also based in community. It is not "nourished on the true, but on the probable" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 21).

> *According to Vico, what gives the human will its direction is not the abstract generality of reason, but the concrete generality that represents the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race. Hence the development of this sense of the community is of prime importance for living.*
> (Gadamer, 1975, p. 21)

Sensus communis can, therefore, be understood as the "sense of the right and the general mood that is to be found in all men, moreover, a sense that is acquired through living in the community and is determined by its structures and aims" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 23).

Gadamer also feels that the moral element continues to be a part of *sensus communis*. This is important since "it is a kind of genius for practical life" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 25). He reminds us that adjustment is necessary when considering what is right. But with "adapting general principles to reality, through which justice is

realised, a tact . . ." (Gadamer, 1975, p. 25-26) is developed that is necessary for society.

Gadamer offers the writing of the Swabian Pietist Oetinger as an exception to the narrow concepts of *sensus communis* of the nineteenth century. For Oetinger, *sensus communis* "is concerned only with things that all men see daily before them, things that are concerned both with truths and statements, ways and forms of expressing the statement . . ." (Oetinger in Gadamer, 1975, p. 27). Oetinger distinguishes sensible truths from rational truths. He calls it "communal sense" based on "instincts" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 28). Mathematical relationships can be governed by rules that are outside of God, but *sensus communis* operates with God, because the instincts necessary for *sensus communis* are gifts of God (Gadamer, 1975).

Judgment

The concept of "judgment" is closely connected to *sensus communis*. A person of judgment applies "correctly what he has learned and knows" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 29). Gadamer expresses the ideas of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in telling us that what "judgment recognizes is the sensible individual, the unique thing, and what it judges in the individual thing is its perfection or imperfection" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 30). This decision regarding perfection is inherent. It is what Kant called "reflective judgment" and later says this "sensible judgment of perfection is called 'taste'" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 30).

Taste

"Taste offers a special avenue of knowledge in that it is judgment of the 'individual case'" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 78). Gadamer suggests that our acceptance or rejection because of differentiation of taste "is in fact not merely an instinct, but strikes the balance between sensory instinct and intellectual freedom" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 33-34), and that like the mind, taste can be cultivated. One has taste. It is not learned through hearing a description or seeing an illustration of it. It is sure of itself and needs no validation from others. It does not and cannot offer reasons for its reactions. Taste is offended by lack of taste. Gadamer suggests that the counterpart to taste is not "bad taste" but rather "no taste." "The phenomenon of taste is an intellectual faculty of differentiation" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 35).

Taste also operates within community. This, according to Gadamer, is not to suggest that one follows the changing ideas of others, but taste is closely related to fashion. "Thus it is primarily a question of taste not only to recognize this or that as beautiful, but to have an eye to the whole, with which everything that is beautiful must harmonise" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 36).

Summary

When one combines the four components of tact (*Bildung*, common sense, judgment, and taste), he/she has a way of knowing, or to better express the concept, it is a way of being in the world. Weinsheimer in his interpretation of Gadamer states that this mode of knowing is not innate. It is like a "consciousness in that it is educable" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 79-80).

Aesthetic Experience as a Way of Knowing

Joel Weinsheimer, in his reading of *Truth and Method* (1975), calls this knowing – the aesthetic experience – "The Truth about Art" (1985, p. 91). Previously limitations had been placed on ways of knowing. Kant had limited "the province of knowledge to pure natural science" and since "art lies outside that realm," it offered "no access to reality" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 92). But Gadamer tells us that "where art rules, it is the laws of beauty that are in force and the frontiers of reality are transcended" (1975, p. 74). He credits the "phenomenological criticism of the psychology and epistemology of the nineteenth century" for the "liberation from the concepts that prevented an appropriate understanding of the aesthetic being" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 75).

> *But the phenomenological return to the aesthetic experience teaches us that the latter does not think in terms of this relationship but sees, rather, actual truth in what it experiences. It is in accordance with this that the aesthetic experience cannot, by its nature, be disappointed by a more genuine experience of reality.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 75)

The aesthetic experiences for Gadamer are more than an illusion or a dream. They are more than just appearance. And, he continues to write:

> *If the aesthetic is mere appearance in this sense, then its power – like the terror of dreams – could last only so long as there was no doubt of the reality of the appearance, and would lose its truth on waking.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 75)

Helmholtz characterized the difference in the work of the natural sciences from the human sciences as "artistic" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 75). Gadamer calls the relationship

"aesthetic consciousness" (1975, p. 75). "For as the art of the 'beautiful appearance' is opposed to reality, so the aesthetic consciousness includes an alienation from reality – it is a form of the 'alienated spirit,' which is how Hegel understood culture" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 75).

> *To be able to adopt an aesthetic attitude is part of the educated consciousness. For in the aesthetic consciousness we find the features that distinguish the educated consciousness; being raised to the universal, distancing from the particularity of immediate acceptance or rejection, the acceptance of what does not correspond to one's own expectancy or preference.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 75-76)

Gadamer discussed "taste" in this same light. Taste, however, operates within certain rules. Aesthetic cultivation "consists precisely in no longer permitting any criterion of content and dissolving the connection of the work of art with its world" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 76). The aesthetic experience seeks to ignore the "extra-aesthetic elements" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 77) – purpose, function, meaning – of work. It focuses on the work itself. In his 1964 essay "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics" (Gadamer, 1976), Gadamer explains that a work of art and its meaning cannot be restricted to the historical era of the artist and his/her contemporary beholders. The aesthetic experience belongs instead to the experience that the work has in its own present. When one ignores the roots of a work of art, only the work itself is visible. The work can then "exist in its own right" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 76). This is "aesthetic differentiation" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 76), and this differentiation requires abstraction.

For the aesthetic experience, not only must the world of the artist be extracted, the world of the beholder must, as much as possible, be ignored.

At this point, let us take note of Gadamer's feelings concerning abstraction. For him, "abstraction until only the 'purely aesthetic' is left is obviously a self-contradictory process" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 80). He reminds us that we all see "what is given to us individually by the senses in relation to something universal" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 81). The aesthetic experience is not the response to a stimulus experienced by a person. This response is limited. The response of the aesthetic experience is not a "mere mirroring of what is there" for the experience requires "an understanding of something as something" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 81). Sometimes in this experience we remove things from sight that are there, and sometimes we "read in what is not there at all" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 82). In the aesthetic experience, one dwells on the experience. "Lingering vision and assimilation is not a simple perception of what is there, but is itself understanding . . . the mode of being of what is observed 'aesthetically' is not presence-at-hand" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 82). Gadamer offers the following as an example.

> *Even if we hear absolute music, we must "understand" it. And only when we understand it, when it is "clear" to us, does it exist for us as an artistic creation. Thus, although absolute music is a pure movement of form as such, a kind of auditory mathematics where there is no content with an objective meaning that we can discern, to understand it nevertheless involves entering into a relation with what is meaningful. It is the indefiniteness of this relation that is the specific relation to meaning of the kind of music.*

Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions which artificially reduce phenomena. Perception always includes meaning. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 82)

Richard Palmer offers a critique of Gadamer's idea of aesthetic consciousness. This consciousness, he says, "opens up the world" (1969, p. 167). It is not just a "gaping in sensuous pleasure at the outside of forms" (Palmer, 1969, p. 167). "As soon as we stop viewing the work as an object and see it as a world, when we see a world through it, then we realize that art is not sense perception but knowledge" (Palmer, 1969, p. 167).

Gadamer uses the concept of "play" to explain the way of being of a work of art. This playing is not just engaging in activity that provides pleasure, even though one must admit that it can provide pleasure. It refers to the "mode of being of the work of art itself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 91). A game as just a game is not serious; but when one begins to play the game, there is a kind of seriousness. "It is a self-defining movement of being into which we enter" (Palmer, 1969, p. 172). When one plays a game, he/she is not the object, but the game becomes the object as it is played through; and the purpose of the game is fulfilled when the player of the game becomes lost in his/her playing. Hence, the aesthetic experiences of art are quite similar to the experience of being involved in a game. The player may choose a game, but upon entering the playing, he/she is lost in the world of the game itself. The game can only exist in and through the players, and the game drives the players forward. So art has its own "authentic being in the fact that, in becoming experience, it transforms the experiencer; the work of art works" (Palmer, 1969, p. 174). The game is such. It has its own

independence, as does a work of art; but each - the game or the work of art - transforms the experiencer.

Gadamer takes the analogy a bit further by discussing the playing of games. He tells us that certain games are not intended for audiences, for example, a card game. These games are played for the benefit of the players themselves. Some games even become distorted by viewing and become "a show" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 98). An example would be a ballgame. Some play, however, requires an audience; without it, the play would not be complete. This would be true of stage dramas or movies. They have the structure of a game, but the game is not complete without the audience. "When a play activity becomes a play in the theatre, a total switch takes place. It puts the spectator in the place of the player. He - and not the player - is the person for and in whom the play takes place" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 99). This is not to suggest that the player cannot experience the role that he or she is playing, but it establishes the presumptive necessity of an audience. "Artistic presentation, by its nature, exists for someone, even if there is no one there who listens or watches only" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 99).

As a play is played, the viewer puts him/herself in place of the players. Because of this, Weinsheimer explains, "no one can predict how a game will be played; no one can predict what a play will mean" (1985, p. 107). The meaning of the play does not belong to the players. This is not to suggest, however, that the meaning belongs to the audience (Weinsheimer, 1985). "Rather, the spectators, as Gadamer says, belong to the full meaning of the play. They belong to it, not it to them" (Weinsheimer, 1985,

p. 107). It is in this context that truth emerges. Weinsheimer poses the question for consideration and then answers it.

> *But how is it possible to make or recognize a true interpretation when the criterion of truth is not and cannot be given? Decision on the basis of non-given rule is the function of taste, judgment, and common sense as Gadamer has explicated them, as we saw earlier. . . . Whether an interpretation is true is a matter of taste. If this seems to denigrate truth, that is only because we have denigrated taste as a cognitive capacity able to arrive at the truth. It is only because we have thought truth is exclusively something that has been or can be proven.* (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 111)

Weinsheimer suggests that Gadamer maintains two theses. The first says that there are true interpretations that belong to the work of art itself. "In them the interpretation, representation, or medium is undifferentiable from the work itself" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 112). The second thesis states that "when an interpreter interprets, he is being interpreted and himself belongs to the continuing life of the artwork that embodies itself, its own possibilities, in the variety of its interpretation" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 112). Each generation finds new meaning in a work of art. To understand another age takes work, and yet it is this same work that allows us to understand our own age" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 115). We interpret in the light of our own world: our religious backgrounds, our moral values, our history, and our understanding of language. For in interpreting works of art, we interpret ourselves (Gadamer, 1975).

The Relationship of History to Hermeneutical Interpretation

It is typical of Gadamer to give a detailed background history of his topics for discussion. His analysis of understanding in light of history is no exception. It is also important to realize that this history is necessary for our own understanding. Gadamer reminds us that the "theological hermeneutics of the fathers and that of the reformation were techniques" (1975, p. 157). Friedrich Schleiermacher, founder of modern Protestant theology, called his hermeneutics a technique, but Gadamer tells us that Schleiermacher meant it in a "quite different, systematic sense" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 157). Predecessors of Schleiermacher felt that "hermeneutics was determined by the content of what was to be understood" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 157). For Schleiermacher, however, "the effort of understanding is found wherever there is no immediate understanding, i.e., whenever the possibility of misunderstanding has to be reckoned with" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 157).

> *Schleiermacher's idea of a universal hermeneutics starts from this: That the experience of the alien and the possibility of misunderstanding is a universal one. It is true that this alien quality is greater and more open to misunderstanding in artistic than in nonartistic utterance, greater with written than with oral utterance, which is, as it were, continually interpreted by the living voice.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 157)

By the end of the nineteenth century, philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey were rejecting the ideas that anything with meaning required some form of scientific basis. Dilthey believed history could be understood and meaningful. According to Gadamer, "the tension between the aesthetic, hermeneutic element and that of the philosophy of

history reaches its height with Wilhelm Dilthey" (1975, p. 192). Dilthey "was always attempting to justify the knowledge of what was historically conditioned as the achievement of objective science, despite the fact of the knower's being conditioned himself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 204). Gadamer tells us that the end result of Dilthey's interpretation of history, using hermeneutics as his model, was the reduction of history to "intellectual history" (1975, p. 213). It became "a deciphering" and not "an historical experience" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 213). It was not that Dilthey did not see the importance of the individual and experiences in interpretation, but that he defined them privately. "The conflict that he tried to resolve shows clearly what pressure the methodology of modern science exerts and what our task must be: namely, to describe more adequately the experience of the human sciences and the objectivity they are able to achieve" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 214).

Gadamer sees phenomenological research as the means for overcoming the epistemological problems. He walks one through the concepts of Husserl, Graf Yorck, and Heidegger and lays a foundation for a theory of hermeneutical experience. It is in this walk that Gadamer reminds the reader of Heidegger's references to "fore-having," "fore-sight," and "fore-conceptions." It is not important to safeguard "ourselves against the tradition that speaks out of the text" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 239). What is important is keeping "everything away that could hinder us in understanding it in terms of the thing. It is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to the language that speaks to us in tradition" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 239). All understanding, Gadamer states, involves prejudice. This is what "gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 239). The big problem with the Age of Enlightenment was

the "prejudice against prejudice itself," which, according to Gadamer, "deprives tradition of its power" (1975, p. 204). The having of prejudice in interpretation does not mean that one is making false statements. The prejudice itself can have a positive and a negative value. One must accept that all experiences are restricted or modified by the past.

> *Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 245)

The Enlightenment drew a distinction between trust in authority and the use of one's own reason. No one denies this difference. Gadamer explains that this, too, can be a prejudice.

> *If the prestige of authority takes the place of one's own judgment, then authority is in fact a source of prejudices. But this does not exclude the possibility that it can also be a source of truth, and this is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 247)

In a further examination of personal judgment, Gadamer uses the analogy of a "horizon" to explain the limitations of a person's vision of a particular situation. "The horizon," he says, "is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point" (1975, p. 269). If a person has "no horizon," that

person is not able to see beyond him/herself. If a person has "a horizon," that person "knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, as near or far, great or small" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 269). That person is able to see beyond what is nearest to him or her. In the understanding of history, we seek to "see the past in terms of its own being, not in terms of our contemporary criteria and prejudices, but within its own historical horizon" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 269-270). It is therefore necessary to place ourselves in the historical horizon of a text or experience when interpreting, or we misunderstand what it has to say. This does not necessitate agreement, only understanding. Horizons cannot be differentiated into differing spheres: one's own horizon and the horizon in which one might chose to place him/herself.

> *It is, in fact, a single horizon that embraces everything contained in historical consciousness. Our own past, and that other past towards which our historical consciousness is directed, help to shape this moving horizon out of which human life always lives, and which determines it as tradition.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 271)

If one accepts this concept, then he/she must deal with the question of "fused horizons" in contrast to the concept of "formation of a single horizon." "Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness involves the experience of the tension between the text and the present" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273). This tension must not be covered up, but brought out. "This is why it is part of the hermeneutical approach to project an historical horizon that is different from the horizon of the present" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273).

If one is aware of history, he/she is able to distinguish his/her own horizon from the horizon of tradition. But one must be aware that his/her personal horizon is "only something laid over a continuing tradition" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273). The two actually combine and become one.

> *The projecting of the historical horizon, then, is only a phase in the process of understanding, and does not become solidified into the self-alienation of a past consciousness, but is overtaken by our own present horizon of understanding. In the process of understanding there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed. We described the conscious act of this fusion as the task of the effective-historical consciousness.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273-274)

Understanding in the human sciences is "essentially historical, i.e., that in them a text is understood only if it is understood in a different way every time" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 276). The task of historical hermeneutics is "to consider the tension that exists between the identity of the common object and the changing situation in which it must be understood" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 276). He gives several examples, one of which is the performance of music.

> *No one is able to . . . perform a piece of music without understanding the original meaning of the text and presenting it in his reproduction and interpretation. But, similarly, no one will be able to carry out this reproductive interpretation without taking account, in the translation of the text into appearance, of that other normative element that limits the demand for a*

stylistically correct reproduction through the stylistic values of one's own day. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 277)

For Gadamer, cognitive, normative, and reproductive interpretation become one phenomenon. Historical hermeneutics brings everything together. It seeks to unite the interpreter, who is separated in history from the text, to the text itself. It seeks to triumph over the estrangement that the meaning has for the interpreter because of the passage of time. Gadamer takes this a step further when he explains "that the fusion of the horizons that takes place in understanding is the proper achievement of language" (1975, p. 340).

The Role of Language in Interpretation

People engaging in conversation have some control over the manner of the discussion. In the final analysis, however, the conversation directs the participants more than they direct it. They are never sure of what will happen.

> *Understanding or its failure is like a process which happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was a poor one. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language used in it bears its own truth within it, i.e., that it reveals something which henceforth exists.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 345)

Understanding takes place in a conversation when the persons involved agree about the object of the discussion. Gadamer reminds the reader that "mastering understanding" belongs to the sphere of grammar and rhetoric (1975, p. 345). "Language is the middle ground in which understanding and agreement concerning the object takes place

between two people" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 345-346). Gadamer uses the example of a translator to clarify the importance of interpretation.

> *Here the translator must translate the meaning to be understood into the context in which the other speaker lives. This does not, of course, mean that he is at liberty to falsify the meaning of what the other person says. Rather, the meaning must be preserved, but since it must be understood within a new linguistic world, it must be expressed within it in a new way. Thus every translation is at the same time an interpretation.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 346)

Spoken language "interprets itself by intonation, accent, and reference to the circumstances in which it is spoken" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 223). The written word is open for misinterpretation. It can be somewhat free, however, in that the reader is not distracted by the speaker and that it can form "new relationships" and acquire "new addresses" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 223). "The horizon of understanding cannot be limited either by what the writer had originally in mind, or by the horizon of the person to whom the text was originally addressed" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 356). The reader sees the written word as addressed to him. "What he understands is always more than an alien meaning; it is always possible truth" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 356).

The understanding of a conversation or of a written text is also a linguistic process. When one interprets, he/she is "finding words and concepts to explain the meaning of a text or historical event" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 223). This makes interpretation subject to the limitations of the current language. This cannot be solved by dropping the present language or by assuming the language of the past. "The alternative to both that makes right understanding possible consists in the fusion of

horizons, which we have seen is a fusion of language" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 224). Weinsheimer also reminds one that the present language is the sole language for interpretation. When the language of the past and language of the present are fused, "something happens to both, and that event - itself a historical event - is historical understanding" (Weinsheimer, 1985, p. 224).

CHAPTER IV

REVISITING JAQUES-DALCROZE AND KODÁLY

Within the English language, the word "visit" and all of its derivations conjure an image. The "visitor" is the one arriving. The "visitation" is the act that takes place – the coming and going. "Visiting" as an act requires an object of the action. These acts of visiting may be simple "comings and goings," or they may entail a lingering – a sojourning. During this research, the author has done both. The initial visits required several "coming and going" events in order to inspect the texts. The visit for this chapter required an extended stay, for it resulted in a hermeneutical interpretation of the texts.

> *A person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell him something. That is why a hermeneutically trained mind must be, from the start, sensitive to the text's newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither "neutrality" in the matter of the object nor the extinction of one's self, but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings.* (Gadamer, 1975, p. 238)

The Author's Historical Prejudices

The discipline of music is conservative. By use of the adjective, I am suggesting that the discipline is strongly in favor of retaining the existing ways of being. For many years, women were not allowed to enter the public music world. Until the

beginning of this century, women were not allowed to play in orchestras with the possible exception of the harp. There was no regulation of private music teachers in the nineteenth century, and there is really no consistent regulation even today.

My own experiences were not much different. I was allowed to take private piano lessons at the age of seven. My teacher had no obvious credentials except that she had taken lessons herself. Our times together were pleasant and full of sharing. The love for singing entered through another avenue. Several of my elementary teachers were fond of singing. They were not "professionals" as such, but merely shared what they knew. Because of the ambiance of these moments, I associated singing and playing the piano with joy, happiness, pleasure, fun, and release. For me, these were the expressions of the good things. They were initially my pleasure and later became my work.

Ralph Tyler's *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* (1950) paved the way for the behavioristic paradigm of my high school years and undergraduate college experiences. But my home environment fostered critical thinking, questioning, asking, investigation, and autonomy. When I sought to analyze the maxims of behaviorism, I could never find meaning. Consequently, I refused to participate in their continuation. Autonomy became the aim of my being and teaching.

Graduate studies offered a language for expressing this way of being. The first encounter was with William Schubert's book, *Curriculum: Perspective, Paradigm, and Possibility* (1986). This reading encouraged me to search for other writings, and those writing were found by authors connected to the Reconceptualists movement. Their ideas challenged the existing traditions of education and called for a reconceptualization of the field. These educators understood that society had moved to

a post-industrial age and that culture was in a postmodern paradigm. It was time for education, therefore, to move from modernity toward a postmodern philosophy. The questions were no longer questions of objectives, planning, and evaluation. The questions posed by these writers were questions of gender, racism, values, theology, self control, political theory, phenomenology, aesthetics, and hermeneutics.

The Author's Language

English is my mother tongue. During early childhood, there was some exposure to German and Yiddish, but the contact did not require understanding for communication. I elected to study Spanish as part of the high school experience. The first studies centered in Castilian, and the remainder in the Mexican dialectic. Schools of music are conventionally centered in the European tradition. Vocal performance requires singing in different languages, and translation of texts is required prior to performance. Entrance into this discipline demanded the continued study of diction that expanded to Latin, Italian, French, and German.

Through these experiences, I became keenly aware of the problems related to translations and interpretations of writing. Knowledge of these problems embellishes the importance of visiting and revisiting a translated text to understand its essence before beginning an interpretation.

The Bias of This Interpretation

The interpretation of the selected texts will be made in light of the need for a rethinking of education. This rethinking for the author seeks to avoid the exercising of power by a dominate culture, the segregating of knowledge into departments, and the

propagandism of cultural myths. It is not seeking control, compliance, linear thinking, sequential learning, transmission of knowledge, an end product, or efficiency. It seeks, instead, to promote autonomy, questioning, and openness. It refuses to fear uncertainty or ambiguities. It is open to paradoxes and uncertainty. William E. Doll, Jr., in his discourse entitled "Curriculum Beyond Stability: Schon, Prigogine, Piaget," examines the "assumptions modern theorists are making about an unstable universe, one filled with randomness, chaos, and nonlinear order" (1988, p. 115). He explains that these qualities may offer a new way of looking at curricula. This interpretation refuses to remain closed in thinking and compliant in action and seeks, as Doll suggests, questions that may not have immediate answers.

The Importance of Any Interpretation

The reading of any legitimate interpretation of text gives an opportunity for new and/or deeper understanding. The reader, however, must make a personal decision concerning the legitimacy of an interpretation. In so doing, the background of the interpreter must be considered. This consideration does not necessitate agreement, for insight is often gained through debate and questioning.

The Revisiting of Jaques-Dalcroze

It was the desire of Emile Jaques-Dalcroze that people learn from his experience. A return to Chapter II of this research reminds one that he referred to these experiences as stories of his achievements as well as failures. It was the progress of his journey that he saw as important. Throughout these experiences, he referred to the influence of other people upon his life. Postmodernism also stresses the importance of

the "lived experience." And autobiography is currently playing a major role in the sharing of these experiences. This is evidenced by such writings as *Teacher Lore* (1992) by Schubert and Ayers, *Reading and Writing the Self* (1991) by Robert Graham, and *The Having of Wonderful Ideas* (1987) by Eleanor Duckworth. It is important to remember that a teacher teaches him/her self. He/She cannot teach anything else.

Much of the philosophy of Jaques-Dalcroze fits within the postmodern paradigm. Since he believed that education begins at birth and progresses with age, he might well be part of this movement if he were alive today. For him, all bodies of knowledge are equal. Recall that he urges the teaching of beauty as well as truth and warns that to omit either is an error. The most important part of education, however, is for children to know themselves. It is in his notion that children will evaluate themselves by comparison to others from the past that Jaques-Dalcroze falls back into modernity.

Like those calling for reconceptualization, Jaques-Dalcroze knew that reproduction was not sufficient for education. Children need to be able to liberate themselves from restricting or limiting influences. His mode for accomplishing this, however, is rooted in the language of the military. He goes so far as to suggest that resistance should be suppressed. This poses several unanswered questions: what and whose influence does he consider restricting and limiting? How does he define resistance? How would this resistance be suppressed? He obviously wants children to become autonomous adults, but one can be sure that a military-type atmosphere cannot result in this type of individual. One understands Jaques-Dalcroze's desire for students to be strong and confident but questions whether adaptation, submission, and regulation foster these characteristics. He had a definite understanding of the concept of the "whole person."

One can see this through his reference to the relationship between soul and mind (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921). He did not, however, see this relationship as a construction made by individuals. He perceived it as something that could be attained through education by regulation. This philosophy is very much centered within the behavioristic paradigm. In light of Piaget's (1948, 1972) writing concerning knowledge construction, we know that children do not come to see life as an integrated whole by training. Their knowledge is constructed through interaction with their environment.

Jaques-Dalcroze did have a strong sense of the need for community. Remember that Gadamer also suggested this need in order for people to acquire *Bildung*, common sense, judgment, and taste. Jaques-Dalcroze knew that people could not function as isolated individuals. This idea is strongly connected to the postmodern philosophy. But, once again, Jaques-Dalcroze tells us that this can be accomplished through molding and transmission. How can one be molded to "love truth?" How does one transmit "taste?" Whose ideas of "taste" would one transmit? This sense of community is a developing moral stance. In discussing moral development, Jean Piaget speaks of two types of morality. One is a morality of constraint; the other is a morality of cooperation or autonomy (Piaget, 1932, 1965). For children to develop a lasting idea of justice, the morality of cooperation is a must. In *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932, 1965), Piaget describes in detail the problems related to punitive punishments. These punishments, aimed toward restraint, result in compliance, weighing of chances, or open rebellion. These do not seem to be the results desired by Jaques-Dalcroze. In light of this consideration, I must believe that if Jaques-Dalcroze could witness the results of coercion and molding within our society, he would seek to

encourage self-discipline and regulation. Herein lies the true sense of community, for self-regulation requires that one always have consideration for others.

Jaques-Dalcroze's description of the discipline of music and those connected with it reads as if one were reading current literature. Private music lessons are still frequently the privilege of an elite group of children. The music programs within public schools are sometimes nonexistent. Those that do exist are often plagued by problems resulting from lack of support by government, by society in general, and by public educators. This process is self-perpetuating. Persons who have no understanding of music cannot be expected to make decisions that are favorable to the discipline. Often we as music educators have aided this process. We have refused to share with people in ways that help them understand. During this last year, I conducted 20 in-depth interviews with elementary teachers. My findings showed that institutions of higher education require little or no instruction in the discipline of music for elementary classroom teachers. It also showed that music classes designed for elementary teachers are not sufficient background for the teaching of music to their students. Given opportunity, these elementary teachers suggested college courses in music that differed from the ones offered to them. Judging by their experiences, music education is not deemed as important as other disciplines. Jaques-Dalcroze's suggestion for this dilemma was to make music a requirement for the students of public schools. According to Jaques-Dalcroze, the school leaders of his day had little understanding of music; consequently, the school administrators were not concerned when the teachers that they selected had little understanding. Even if requiring music were an appropriate alternative, I am not sure how Jaques-Dalcroze intended to initiate

the plan. If students are to value music, it is imperative that their teachers and society value it. If teachers are to value music, then the universities must value it. If one is dwelling within the postmodern paradigm, then he/she accepts all bodies of knowledge and thus will value all art forms. This accepting must start with persons who have constructed an understanding and valuing of all ways of knowing the world.

The early designs of Jaques-Dalcroze's public music programs are rather harsh. Children would be labeled and segregated according to their test scores. Those who did not test well would be removed from music. One can recall from Chapter II that he later restated his position in softer tones, but these softer statements still contained elements of labeling. He envisioned these music classes as improvements for students. Today, we realize that testing stresses lower- rather than higher-order thinking (Kamii, 1990). Jaques-Dalcroze definitely did not have lower-order thinking in mind. The spirit of his writing would demand dismissal of testing and labeling from current educational practice.

Postmodern literature contains many articles on the use of games for teaching. Rheta DeVries's and Lawrence Kohlberg's (1987) writing on group games is only one example. Chapter III of this research shows the analogy of games to aesthetic understanding. Jaques-Dalcroze observed several years ago that children "delight" in games. He saw the interrelatedness of musical rhythm with the rhythm of the body and the world. He keenly observed that young children learn faster because they are full of curiosity and delight in learning. He also observed that older children are hindered by preconceptions that have no useful result. He offers very little as explanation for this change that occurs, but we know educational practices can stifle the desire to learn.

According to Constance Kamii, schools are not encouraging thinking. When children are coerced into giving "right" answers, they become "convinced that truth can come only out of the teacher's head" (Kamii, 1982, p. 80). Curiosity is replaced by placid acceptance. Jaques-Dalcroze knew that students must love what they are doing in order for proficiency to develop. Postmodernism calls for a return to this understanding of child learning – love of learning as well as understanding of knowing that includes experiencing.

Jaques-Dalcroze saw diversity in race, and he praised the differences. He saw international music as reducing people to common types. With the tension of the racial climate within the United States, educators would be wise to read and reread Jaques-Dalcroze. He states and explains well the implications of reducing people to common types. Books such as Arthur Schlesinger's *The Disuniting of America* (1992) call for a move toward a central tendency within the United States. In his book, Schlesinger uses such terms as "fusing," "liberating," and "Americanizing" to describe the process of making this "new race." The British set the "mold" (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 27). This average American would approve of the same laws, endorse the same institutions, share the same political ideas, become knowledgeable of the same literature, treasure the same customs, follow the same precepts, recite the same prayers, and speak a common language. This is accomplished by "melting" each individual in a cauldron and forming a standard character. Indoctrination would insure its perpetuation. The "enabler" for the central tendency in the United States at present seems to be the public school system. The people in power determine who will teach, what will be taught, how it will be taught, when it will be taught, and where it will be taught. Textbooks

are written from a European perspective and normally from a Newtonian scientific approach. Jaques-Dalcroze warned his readers against an ideology of this perspective. He warned teachers of music to be aware of international music that attempts to reduce the rhythmic habits of differing nations to a common type (Jaques-Dalcroze, 1921, p. xiii). Postmodern writers offer the same warnings. Sonia Nieto's *Affirming Diversity* reminds us that schooling is "a dynamic process in which competing interests and values are at work every day in complex and often contradictory ways" (1992, p. xxix).

The Revisiting of Zoltán Kodály

Let me remind the reader that this author has been exposed to the techniques of Zoltán Kodály for over ten years. Many of Kodály's ideas have been incorporated into my teaching, and I can never be free of their influence. We share a common passion: the love of song. It is, therefore, important that I admit that this interpretation is affected by my background in singing. My thoughts, however, have also been the opinions of many musical masters and educators of note. Kodály himself was fond of quoting Robert Schumann, for it was Schumann who said, "Listen to all folksongs attentively, for they are the treasure trove of the most beautiful melodies and through them you can get to know the character of peoples" (Kodály, 1974, p. 187). Even *The World Book Encyclopedia* tells us that singing is "as much a natural function of the human voice as speaking is. The spontaneous singing of young children and the humming of adults may occur without any cultivation of the voice or technical training" (Singher, 1984, p. 392).

It is also important to remind the reader that the original Kodály concept cannot be separated from its country of origin - Hungary. Kodály had extreme feelings of nationalism. At times he appeared to be consumed by its importance. If one is to overlay the historical tradition of this musician with his/her own tradition, he/she must remember with Gadamer that the projecting of the historical horizon is only part of the process. The current horizon of understanding must overtake the history of the past and allow a fusing. For this fusion to take place, the reader might see Kodály's nationalistic fervor as a devotion to the good of his country. Our fervor might become the affirmation of our own diversity, for in understanding Zoltán Kodály's hurting for Hungary, we can come to a greater understanding of the hurting of the minorities of our own United States. The Hungarian resentment of the German tradition is easily compared to the resentment of the Eurocentric tradition forced upon many minorities within our own country.

The last few year have offered greater understanding of the importance of early childhood. Rheta DeVries and Betty Zan, in their book *Moral Classrooms, Moral Children*, explain that moral classrooms are those "classrooms in which the sociomoral atmosphere supports and promotes children's development" (1994, p. 7). This atmosphere includes all the relationships: teacher-child, child-child, child-academic, etc. Kodály offers more than support for early childhood advocates. He is adamant about the importance of kindergarten. His belief concerning the character of the young child is parallel to that of the philosopher-musician Rousseau: the child is good. It is our responsibility to nurture this goodness. Kodály's reprimand concerning the treatment of children is consistent with current concerns. The hurt inflicted upon

children by teachers is very difficult, if not impossible, to reverse. The current treatment of children within our own public schools is a major concern. At one extreme we find children physically abused; at the other we find a system of token rewards with a goal of behavior modification. In 1974, Kodály asked his readers to understand that children are human beings and that their learning is not a "top down" regiment, but a construction from the bottom up. If *Bildung*, common sense, judgment, and taste are to be understood by society, we must nurture the forms and images that aid their construction in small children. This nurturing should be within a caring environment. The teacher and author Nel Noddings offers education an alternative approach – an approach where the ethics of caring are understood through modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation (1992).

Children are not blank slates on which an adult takes the privilege of writing. Children are not little vessels to be filled with what adults deem appropriate. Children are not animals to be trained by a system of rewards and punishments or by stimulus and response. Children are small human beings whose intuition must be nurtured. Noddings explains that "not all individual children can learn everything we might like to teach them . . . but all students already want to learn; it is a question of what they want to learn" (1992, p. 19). Kodály admonishes us to offer the experience of music to all children. It must be shared so that it becomes a joy. His admonition, as seen in Chapter II of this research, is that it must not be approached from its mathematical perspective or from the perspective of its symbolic language (Kodály, 1974). The initial exposure to music should result from the natural tendency or impulse of the

child. This advise could be extended to any body of knowledge. It is not our privilege as educators to determine what children want to learn, but to offer them choices.

In a recent encounter, I was asked a question concerning education that presupposed an answer: "Now, math is more important for making a living than other subjects, for example, music. Isn't it?" "Not for me!" was the reply. "It is the way I make a living." A look of amazement resulted. For this type of reasoning to cease, the public must have exposure. Kodály tells us that having professional musicians is not enough. The masses must have understanding. Currently, as in the time of Kodály, the affordability of instruments is a problem. Singing offers a natural means for "coming to know" that does not have a monetary basis. This is not meant to demean the playing of instruments. Increased understanding of music would naturally result in the increased playing of instruments. This author is simply offering a simple, yet natural, means for sharing. In the early development of children, instruments such as the piano do not allow for the natural development of singing. (Kodály tells us that young voices naturally drop in pitch as they sing. Refer to Chapter II.) As Jaques-Dalcroze stated and Kodály reiterates, rhythm is a natural part of the child, and the use of rhythmic games and percussion instruments offers an obvious means of sharing music with children.

Kodály, like Jaques-Dalcroze, stresses the importance of teacher education in music. The situation in teacher education with regard to music has changed only in that institutions of higher education are offering music educators a chance to become specialists in the field. Currently there is not an extensive job market for these specialists. Current literature takes two positions on this dilemma. One suggests that

entrance gate-keeping requires more. This position accepts the small demand for musicians and assumes that gate-keeping will results in "fewer but better." This "fewer but better" will have a more positive input in the field, resulting in eventual growth. The second position sees the need for educating the masses about music. One group seeks to convince people that music is worthwhile by showing that it strengthens math skills, produces higher test scores, etc. Others, myself included, see this educational process as a sharing with others your own understanding of the importance of the aesthetic experience. We must avoid what Kodály referred to as "haughtiness." Remember that he suggests that the lack of proficient musicians can give us a false sense of personal value. My being the youngest organist in a small midwestern community does mean that I am valued; however, to take pride in this is to refuse to acknowledge the meaning of the situation. To have masses of people uneducated in the aesthetics is to have masses of people who are limited in their understanding of the world. To paraphrase Kodály's words, we must not despise these people who do not understand. We must share our understanding with them. It is our responsibility to discover a means for communication.

Early childhood educators experience the enthusiasm of young children for learning. The writings of Kodály offer supporting statements and invaluable information on age-appropriate materials. Because of his Hungarian history, however, Kodály expresses very biased opinions concerning language development. Many children within the United States live in multiethnic homes. These children function equally well in both languages.

Kodály's writing also expresses the belief that certain people, himself included, can determine what music is "good music." Obviously one might have better judgment of what music is in "good taste" in particular situations. One's increased exposure to an art form might broaden one's horizons. A deeper understanding of technicality might open one to more complex structures. Any music, however, might serve a purpose. Attitudes expressing superiority of certain types of music are often viewed by the general public as "haughtiness." Attitudes that alienate people make it impossible for communication to exist. It is in communication that the musician is able to share his/her art form. Kodály saw the choir as a means of uniting people. Let me suggest that any sharing effects an understanding, and any understanding results in uniting. Remember from Chapter II that Kodály stated that "bad taste in art" resulted in a "veritable sickness of the soul" (1974, p. 120). He saw this sickness as incurable in adults. This belief must assume that learning is not a continuous process, at least in the aesthetics. Personal experience negates this premise. This premise also espouses hopelessness in education. Paulo Freire, in *Pedagogy of Hope*, tells us that when hopelessness becomes a program, it "paralyses us, immobilizes us. We succumb to fatalism, and then it becomes impossible to muster the strength we absolutely need for a fierce struggle that will recreate the world" (1994, p. 8).

In spite of his strong nationalistic feelings, Kodály had an understanding of the international elements found within music. He was so possessed, however, with making little Hungarians within his native land that he feared exposing young children to other cultures before they were deeply rooted within their own. Our country has had enough fear of its own. We were born in diversity. The explosions in other parts

of the world have stemmed from old hatreds. These hatreds are entrenched in linguistic and religious differences. They have taken many forms, but at times they have threatened the existence of the nation in which they occurred. Within our country, we owe acknowledgement to many nationalities. The United States has always been an asylum for the oppressed and persecuted. Immigration is in the heart of most Americans. Even those who oppose immigration today were born of immigrants themselves. There is no denying our history. Kodály had nothing to fear in diversity, for we have knowledge of many things that we do not do, and we have witnessed many things that we have not become. There is no fear in knowing the heritage of others. There is fear when others stifle the desire of a race to know of their own heritage. This in itself provokes anger, resentment, and paranoia. If something is denied, what are the reasons? I not only want people to understand their heritage and backgrounds, I want them to understand mine. If they understand mine, hopefully they will accept me as I am. This understanding and knowing brings unity, not division. "It is not their (the) differences that make them (us) marginal but rather the value that has been placed on those differences by the dominant society" (Nieto, 1992, p. 27).

CHAPTER V

REFLECTION UPON THE INQUIRY INTO THE EDUCATIONAL THEORIES OF JAQUES-DALCROZE AND KODÁLY

Reflection Upon the Musician Emile Jaques-Dalcroze

The biographical information of Chapter II tells the reader that Jaques-Dalcroze was one of the first musicians to study psychology. He was born in 1865, and psychology as "a science based on careful observation and experimentation" (Mass, 1984, p. 750a) did not develop until the late 1800s. Behaviorism was introduced in 1912, and Jaques-Dalcroze died in 1950. Understanding the historical era of this musician gives insight into his searchings. The reading and rereading of his writings reflects a person characterized by vision, hope, and openness. The essence of the writing would suggest that the reader glean from the experiences, question them, and construct his/her own understandings and philosophies. The spirit of the writing would suggest a moving forward in light of our own history, not a dwelling in the behavioristic paradigm of the early 1900s. The dwelling in behaviorism for Jaques-Dalcroze was part of his own experience. His sharing of this experience does not offer us a foundation for its success in teaching, for in light of our own history, we understand its inappropriateness and failure to nurture the aesthetic consciousness of students. After reading Jaques-Dalcroze, one would assume that had he experienced the affects of behaviorism upon subsequent generations, he would seek other methods for sharing. His dwelling in behaviorism, however, does not negate the possibility of our learning from his writings.

Reflection Upon the Musician Zoltán Kodály

Teachers of music have written books adapting the Kodály concept for the United States. These books contain rhymes, proverbs, and songs from a variety of ethnic groups within our country and other countries as well. In Lawrence Wheeler's and Lois Raebeck's *Orff and Kodály Adapted for the Elementary School* (1977), a warning is issued by the authors.

> *It is not their* [our] *intent to have the very explicit experiences suggested herein be treated as strict formulae for teaching. Rather, it is to be hoped that teachers will read and explore the ideas for experiences suggested, and will then adapt them to meet their own classroom situations in the most creative way.* (Wheeler and Raebeck, 1972, 1977, 1985, p. xi-xii)

Kodály reminded readers and students that he was not teaching a methodology. He was sharing a concept – his personal concept. This concept is also steeped within the behavioristic paradigm and must be studied in light of this understanding.

Reflection Upon the Rethinking of Education

Reflection Upon the Questions of Gender and Race and Our Multicultural Society

In 1950, music educators set forth a document that stated the rights of children in regard to public school education. This document was revised in 1991. The goals of these educators were noble. To date, we have not accomplished any of them. Any progress toward these goals has been slow. Support for the cause is almost nonexistent. There is no equality in music education in this country. There is, however, overt discrimination in age, class, race, and gender. We must admit these transgressions.

Even though we understand the need for early exposure to music, the case is that often kindergarten is neglected. The offerings of music in the middle school are also very limited. At this age, children are too soon categorized as having talent or as being nonmusical.

There is not only age discrimination in music offerings, there is class discrimination. Actually, the nation's music programs seem to be of two varieties: "haves" and "have-nots" (Lehman, 1992, p. 32). The "have-nots" are "usually the districts with lots of young people who are poor, who are surrounded by violence and abuse and drugs, who have no one who really cares about them or speaks up on their behalf, and who have no place to go that's safe and comfortable" (Lehman, 1992, p. 32). The major cities are, without exception, the "have-not" districts. Many of our poorest and more disadvantaged children are being deprived of "experiences that could have brought beauty and joy into their lives, qualities that they don't easily find elsewhere" (Lehman, 1992, p. 3).

Dr. Lehman (1992) says that the largest groups are the "have-less-than-before." The arts are not being promoted by the people who should promote them. "It is time we seized the initiative, set the agendas, and charted our own course for the future of our profession" (Ross, 1992, p. 28).

Race discrimination in music has existed for so long that it is almost an accepted phenomenon. The traditional curricula has basically been the art-music of Europe. New curricular formats have been proposed to broaden the scope of music literature in the classroom; however, teachers are still divided in their approaches to multicultural music education.

Let us not forget gender discrimination! Do you realize that J.S. Bach actually had daughters who were composers? Carolynn Lindeman (1992), in *Teaching About Women Musicians*, states that women have been ignored for too long in the music classroom. She states that she, Ms. Lindeman, never performed a work by a woman composer while she was in grade school, high school, or college. There has been very little information concerning women composers until recently. Future musicians are not given women as role models. The general public may think of the field of music as open to women, but this is true only if they follow traditional roles.

Reflection Upon the Questions of Value and Political Theory With Reference to the Classroom and Teaching

From my early years of teaching, I observed that students have very personal ideas about music. Each came to his or her own perspective through experience. These students were capable of making choices in many areas of their lives. It is important that children develop *Bildung*, *sensus communic*, judgment, and taste, for without these elements, the continuation of a democratic society may be threatened. Intellectually autonomous people can think for themselves. They have the ability to remain convinced of their own ideas even when ridiculed. How can students function autonomously when they are forced to be heteronomous in most of their learning situations? With this question in mind, it is imperative that music educators question any philosophy that promotes behavioristic manipulation of students. To foster autonomy in children, a teacher must be autonomous him or herself. "Teachers who are autonomous professionals will use their knowledge to inform their teaching practices. They will act out of their own set of beliefs" (Wilucki, 1990, p. 280). Autonomy cannot

develop in coercive or controlling relationships. It grows out of cooperation (DeVries and Zan, 1994). It cannot develop in an atmosphere of dictatorship. It flourishes in conflict and resolution, in group rule and decision making, and in mutual respect.

In discussing the importance of teachers in society, the book *The Foundations of American Education* states that "our nation looks to teachers to provide the education essential to sustaining our society" (Johnson, Musical, Dupuis, and Hall, 1994). The implications of this statement are enormous! To put it in the words of Kozol, "truth . . . is something which occurs when actions take place; not when phrases are contrived. . . . Truth is not a 'right word' which can be printed. It is (it is only) a 'right deed' which can be done" (1990, p. 200). The questions then arise: What type of education is essential to sustain our democratic society? What actions are necessary to educate toward democracy? What "right deed" can be done?

> *Schools that have evolved the most sophisticated pretenses of freedom are often those whose pupils are least free, and educators who devise the most intriguing methods of "free learning" are today the most effective narcotizers that we have.* (Kozol, 1990, p. 31)

My "right deed," as I understand it, is to encourage my students to not allow this deception in their future classrooms and to set the example by not allowing it in mine. Someone must cease to lie. Someone must allow students to say "no!" My simple expressions of concern must be replaced or expanded to include compassion and care.

Reflection Upon the Sharing of the Lived Experience

The emergence of the new paradigm within education impresses upon us the importance of our continued sharing. The sharing will provoke reflection upon one's

personal philosophical positions, and this reflection will result in a deeper personal understanding of this position. It is imperative that our dialogues be characterized by openness experienced in critical caring conversations. Hopefully, in these conversations, our imaginations will expand. Hopefully, we will dwell in that "imaginativeness" that "is not a well-developed, distinct function of the mind, but is rather a particular flexibility which can invigorate all mental function" (Egan, 1992, p. 36). Hopefully, our dialogue will enable us "to imagine conditions other than those that exist or that have existed" (Egan, 1992, p. 47).

> *This is the "postmodern" task of the critical educator – to live with courage and conviction with the understanding that knowledge is always partial and incomplete.* (Burbules and Rice, 1991, p. 413).

Reflection Upon the Writing

This research has been a personal exercise in reading and writing of the self. "For if all knowledge begins in self-knowledge, or is a function of self-knowledge, then we cannot be said to truly know something until we have possessed it, made it our own" (Graham, 1991, p. 3). To use the words of Britton to express the experience, the writing and the resulting dialogue have been a process of "making finer and finer distinctions, and so building a more and more complex picture of the world" (Britton in Graham, 1991, p. 12). Since over half of my life has been in the world of modernity, it has been difficult to learn to use the language of self.

Reflection Upon the Questions of the Writing

If teachers seek to foster an education for the sustaining of a democratic society, if teachers seek to be autonomous individuals and to encourage autonomy in their students, if teachers seek to expand their imaginations and the imaginations of their students, and if teachers agree that knowledge is never complete, then questions must be addressed. Does the teaching of methodologies or theories as examples of "how to" have a place within curriculum? How should one approach the study of methods and theory? Is it moral to hire only those teachers who adhere to and are trained in specific methodologies? What are the purposes for studying the methods and theories of others? Will new ways of understanding any body of knowledge develop in a climate of reproduction? Is it possible to make the educational theories of another your own? Are there differences between theory and practice?

Reflection Upon the Implications of the Questions

The above posed questions suggest areas for study for students of curriculum theory. This research does not seek to provide a model for philosophical inquiry, but may aid in the understanding for those interested in pursuing their own critical processes. From my personal philosophical perspective, it would be improper to give specific recommendations for future research. Asking questions, however, is part of my personal sharing. It is this author's fervent hope that the questions will provoke thought and that the thought will result in new understanding that will be shared with others.

Reflection Upon a Future Perspective

We are never the same from one moment to the next. We can, therefore, relish the prospect of becoming. We can limit our backward reflection to its prospect for growth or possible change, for the importance of studying the writings of others is not to be like them. It is to understand. "Never does an event, a fact, a deed, a gesture of rage or love, a poem, a song, a book, have only one reason behind it. In fact, a deed, a gesture, a poem, a painting, a song, a book are always wrapped in thick wrappers" (Freire, 1994, p. 16). So it is with the educational theories of the musicians Emile Jaques-Dalcroze and Zoltán Kodály. They are "wrapped in thick wrappers." In studying them, we must remember the history, examine the prejudices, and consider the language of the writers. It is equally important that we remember our own history, examine our own prejudices, and consider our own language of dwelling. It is impossible to totally embrace the personal philosophy of another. We must not, therefore, seek to be clones or to make clones of others, but rather to unfold into new and different persons for having encountered many different philosophies. Out of our personal experiences will develop a philosophy that is individual and unique. The horizons will have fused, and greater understanding will have resulted for having experienced the encounter.

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Doctor of Education

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MAJOR FIELD: Curriculum and Instruction

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