

INTEREST GROUP FORMATION THROUGH
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: THE CASE
OF THE COALITION TO RESTORE
COASTAL LOUISIANA

By

DAVID DOUGLAS HANNY

Bachelor of Arts
State University of New York
at Buffalo
Buffalo, New York
1980

Master of Public Health
The University of Oklahoma
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
1983

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
July, 1995

C O P Y R I G H T


by

DAVID DOUGLAS HANNY


July, 1995


INTEREST GROUP FORMATION THROUGH
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: THE CASE
OF THE COALITION TO RESTORE
COASTAL LOUISIANA


Thesis Approved:




Thesis Adviser









Dean of the Graduate College

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This student's doctoral committee has provided attention above and beyond the call of duty and I am indebted to each of them. Each one makes you want to learn and promotes an independent spirit of inquiry that is something apart from formal courses or projects. They are all pioneers in the development of the study of our environment. What a fitting place to meet them at Oklahoma State University and what an opportunity and privileged this has been!

In particular, Dr. James J. Lawler has provided inspiring guidance for this work. His devotion to the subject of environmental law and policy was the guiding light for this effort. Dr. Ted Mills's courses and personal tutoring are worth more than can be described. Dr. James H. Shaw, has a woodland ecology course that is more than training, it is an adventure in exploration. Way before I asked Dr. Larry Perkins to serve on my committee, I asked him for his bibliography on qualitative methods. He introduced me to the literature on this subject and on the subject of groups. During this training my family supported me and altered their lives. William and Muriel Hanny made this possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Overview	1
Summary of Objectives	6
What Study is Not	7
The Coalition: A Brief Description	8
Strategy for this Work	16
Research Questions	19
II. LITERATURE REVIEW	22
Overview	22
Group Formation and Collective Goods Dilemma	25
Non Profit Groups of the Seventies	31
The Coalition as a Test Case	33
III. METHOD	37
Overview	37
Choosing the Topic	41
Getting In	43
Acquisition of Interview Data	49
Deriving Categories	53
Rationale for the Case Study Method	55
IV. RESULTS	59
Legal Founder Incentives	59
LSU Ecologist Incentives	77
Grassroots Incentives	93
State Capital Network	112
V. CONCLUSION	121
BIBLIOGRAPHY	129
APPENDIXES	137
APPENDIX A - PERMISSION TO USE GIS MAP FROM CRAIG ET AL. 1992	138

Chapter

Page

APPENDIX B - LETTER OF BISHOP BOUDREAUX TO TO THE PRIESTS	140
APPENDIX C - LETTER OF THANKS TO THE INVESTIGATOR	142

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Craig et al's Estimate of Reduction in Bottomland Hardwood Wetlands in the Lower Mississippi, 1883-1991,	61
2. Newspaper Account (The Advocate) of Louisiana Geologic Survey's Estimate of Louisiana Coastal Wetland Reduction, 1853-1988,	79
3. Newspaper Account (The Bayou Catholic) of Louisiana Geologic Survey's Estimate of Louisiana Coastal Wetland Loss by 2133	80

INTRODUCTION

I. OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES

This is a study designed to understand the development of an organization called the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana (the Coalition). The Coalition's aim is to stop the literal sinking of much of coastal Louisiana through changes in government policy toward wetland use. Since 1988 when the Coalition incorporated, it has focused increased public attention on Louisiana's wetlands that are turning into open water and shrinking the state's geography.

Thousands of people live directly on or are protected by the coastal wetlands raising the possibility of inundation for coastal communities. The Coalition raised questions about how government water policy toward the Mississippi delta promoted the wetland's decline, and the Coalition has offered alternate solutions including legislation that may protect homes and preserve other important values of coastal wetlands. Since the Coalition began, its members have engaged in wetland advocacy. Coalition people attend legislative hearings, conduct public education, and publish information on the status of Louisiana's coast.

The actual means by which the organization itself arose

remains an unanswered question however, and highlights a gap in the study of political organizations. The gap is a lack of consensus on the reasons for political group formation in the study of interest group behavior. One line of thought has held that the American political system is permeable, that is, when a need arises like coastal wetland loss and enough people are concerned about it, then a group will form to represent people who have in common the wish to see the policy changed (Truman, 1951). Still another line stresses the difficulty in establishing representative groups like the Coalition since they advocate for a collective good -- a better environment through sustained coastal wetlands -- something potential supporters will obtain whether they join or not (Olson, 1965, 1982). Like other public interest organizations, the Coalition had to acquire resources by relying on people committed to a cause and organizational patrons.

Yet the Coalition is a successful organization. It has attracted and retained patrons interested in the wetlands cause. It has a paid staff, a budget and offices from which it prints and issues publications and conducts lobbying activities around Louisiana and Washington, D.C. An extensive literature on interest groups provides general insight on group structure, goals, number, distribution and political behavior of similar groups, yet that scholarship

has not provided much guidance concerning how non profit political groups become established operating organizations (Berry, 1977, 1989, Walker, 1992). The actual mechanics of making an organization and sustaining it in a social movement such as the environmental movement remains elusive.

Compounding the gap in the interest group building literature is the low level of studies on state level interest organizations and a lack of information concerning ties to state governments and national environmental organizations (See for instance Moe, 1980 p. 262). The majority of research on interest group activity -- theoretical models, case studies on particular groups and survey research -- has been conducted largely on national level organizations (Thomas and Hrebner, 1992). Existing research has illuminated aspects of how national interest groups behave, but it still leaves open questions about how state and regional interest groups happen in the environmental movement, that is, clear information on their development. Studies of state level interest groups suggest that they may be of even more policy importance than national organizations (Ziegler, 1983, Gray and Lowery, 1995). And, now that the federal government is again poised to remand power back to the states, it is crucial to understand state level environmental organization in ecosystems of national importance like the Lower Mississippi

Alluvial Plain. The Lower Mississippi is a crucial economic and biological resource for the United States more fully described later.

The aim of this work is to penetrate the Coalition using qualitative field research to show how it developed. The study argues that the Coalition obtained and employed resources successfully while not relying solely on mass appeal for membership support. Coalition entrepreneurs are good business persons who observed a common interest in tying aggregate group and individual interests into a functioning political organization to sustain the wetlands. What is unclear is how this happened. Studying the Coalition's development is an opportunity to improve the understanding of how an interest group can form from social movements by clarifying what the incentives for organization were. This work shows how the Coalition capitalized on the incentives.

The first goal of this study is the description of the Coalition supporters and their agendas to discern incentives for mobilization. Non profit public interest groups litigating, setting public agendas and influencing legislation is not news to interest group scholarship, but the incentives and the strategies of non profit organizational development for political ends need to be

better understood. This case study provides the opportunity for in depth assessment of these factors.

The second goal of this work is to use a broader unit of analysis to study the Coalition than has been the case with previous interest group case studies. Previous research frequently relied on individual members and their decisions to join as the unit of analysis, that is, the basis for predicting whether a group will form. Even the character of the group and its political activity are frequently viewed through the window of the individual it represents and how many individuals it counts as members. Rather than seeking only the selective benefits available to potential individual members to join the group, this study goes a step further by examining the incentives of the parent organizations allied behind the new organization, besides the incentives and behavior of the entrepreneurs. Through field research the study identifies strategic incentives in a fashion resembling Hula's (1994) approach to understanding national interest group coalitions. Using a broader unit of analysis stems from recent survey research used by Walker that relied on resource mobilization theory as it has been applied to study of social movement organizations (SMO's) (Gamson, 1975, McCarthy and Zald, 1978, Walker, 1992).

This study's thesis is that building the organization is

linked to benefits and strategies of a few entrepreneurs who represented parent organizations that promoted group alliance formation. The entrepreneurs' efforts, captured in field interviews, documents, and participant observation identify the incentives and how they moved the proponents of the Coalition toward an established incorporated organization lending support to a resource mobilization approach to the study (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, see Walker et al., 1992). The Coalition did not happen spontaneously or because of an eruption of concern for a good idea -- restoring Louisiana's coastal wetlands. Entrepreneurs created an organization using the wetland theme but also used foundation patrons, church groups and others. Rival hypotheses for the Coalition's development are examined in the conclusion of this work and are compared to resource mobilization theory discussed in the literature review.

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES:

The objectives of this study are to describe the Coalition as a product of entrepreneurship that keyed on promoting the selective and strategic benefits available to members and parent organizations and contrast this case against other rival theories of group formation. Specifically,

- 1) the study places the Coalition in a context of study of emerging organizations in the environmental movement,

- 2) it will show that the Coalition formed for reasons beyond the frequently used unit of analysis "individual decision to join" and emphasize the importance of parent organizational members of the Coalition and their strategic incentives to form and maintain the organization,
- 3) it will identify the individual selective benefits and strategic incentives of the individual and organizational components and,
- 4) it will explain how Coalition entrepreneurs used the selective benefits and incentives to build the organization.

WHAT THE STUDY IS NOT:

This work is not a study of lobbying or of the Coalition's impact on public policies, although the Coalition seeks to persuade government to adopt pro-wetland policies. The Coalition claims success in lobbying at the state and federal level and there is compelling anecdotal evidence that to a degree the Coalition moved the state and federal governments to change their wetland policies. However, the demonstration of policy change or impact by an interest group is a related but clearly different research endeavor.

Instead of looking at what the organization does or intends to do per se, the study focuses on the Coalition's

organizational development history from 1985 to 1992. The focus is how this group manifested to enter the political system. When lobbying activities are discussed in the study they are used to illustrate the incentives that lead to the group's formation. The data collected in coastal Louisiana show what factors were important in forming the Coalition in terms of the needs of the parent organizations.

Fieldwork interviews and other sources have provided sufficient information to examine research questions about the development of the Coalition. An abbreviated illustrative history of the Coalition follows, then two research questions about the Coalition are presented and the introduction then ends by explaining the strategy for the rest of this work.

II. THE COALITION TO RESTORE COASTAL LOUISIANA: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The Coalition is a mixture of people and organizations that became a 501 (c) 3 not for profit Louisiana corporation in 1988. National and local lawyers who represent the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the local Sierra Club chapter formed the initial instigating group and drew in collaborators. They drew in academically based ecologists, a group of scientists whose research had documented catastrophic change in the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain

to help them in developing their court cases in order to expand the wetlands' section of the Clean Water Act. The ecologists were brought in as partners and formed an informal association that continued after the Clean Water Act litigation in the seventies.

Local church groups whose fishermen and shrimper parishioners suffered from the change in coastal land forms (synonymous with wetland change), have a special relationship with the lawyers who represented their interests in keeping bayou fishing areas open for their livelihood. These church clients were brought in as the beginning of a grassroots connection for the Coalition. The fishing areas were closed off because of wetland decline and large companies subsequently asserting new property rights that excluded local fishermen. The local attorney who worked with national lawyers had represented their wetland access claim in court.

A network of local environmental organizations was brought in that includes the Louisiana Wildlife Federation, and environmentally active persons in the state capital of Baton Rouge. They comprise another circle of persons who had interests in the coastal wetlands. State environmental and natural resource bureaucrats helped the Coalition and have attended meetings, giving varying degrees of support to an

organization that was arguing for their policies to change and also increasing their budgets.

Each component group had an ongoing interest in the physical problem of Louisiana coastal wetlands years before the creation of the Coalition and each played a crucial role in the development of the organization. The relationship between the lawyers, LSU ecologists, local fisherman associated with Catholic Social Services and the state capital network was the raw material of formal organization.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAWYERS AND SCIENTISTS

The benchmark for the organization occurred in October, 1985 at a symposium at Louisiana State University (LSU) in Baton Rouge, where James T.B. Tripp, General Counsel for the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) in New York City called for the creation of an organization to sustain Louisiana's sinking wetlands. Tripp had been invited to the symposium by a member of the ecology faculty at LSU, John W. Day Jr., who had provided the technical expertise for some Louisiana wetland cases that Tripp had litigated for EDF in the US Fifth Circuit Court in New Orleans. Tripp's statement was the first public call for the creation of the Coalition and provided an organizational springboard for LSU scientists, local attorneys and national environmental groups that had been developing over 15 years.

Like other members of the big ten (environmental groups cooperating since 1980: EDF, NRDC, NWF, Izaak Walton, Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Environmental Action, Audubon Society, Greenpeace, Wilderness Society, See Ingram and Mann, 1989 p.146), part of EDF strategy is to litigate carefully chosen cases in important ecosystems to further define the 1970's environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act. The statutes have ambiguous sections such as the Clean Water Act's definition of wetlands. Wetlands are not mentioned at all in the act, but groups like EDF have continually asserted in the courts that they are covered under the acts language of "waters of the United States" and should be protected under the Corps' Clean Water Act (Section 404) permit system.

Tripp and other national lawyers like Oliver Houck of the National Wildlife Federation had commuted to Louisiana's vast swamplands and marshes for years focusing their case objectives on the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain. The national lawyers worked through New Orleans attorney Michael Osborne, who was also at the LSU symposium and had also received technical advise from John Day. Osborne's practice included work for the local Sierra Club chapter that he belonged to and he was well acquainted with the local judiciary particularly the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The implications for Louisiana are significant because close to 25% of the total land area of Louisiana is classified by the federal government as wetland area (Dahl, 1990). Also between 65 and 70% of the entire state population lives within fifty miles of the coast. Most, including the New Orleans metropolitan area, are very close to protective coastal wetlands (Craig, et al, 1979, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). Many homes are situated directly on the wetlands areas either suspended by pilings above the marsh or on eroding chenier beaches in southwest Louisiana. Because New Orleans is below sea level it is especially vulnerable to coastal land loss when faced by hurricanes. For instance, hurricane Camille in 1969 barely touched the area but generated a twenty foot tidal surge that killed many persons south of New Orleans (Davis, 1990). The less land available to break up the erosive power of the Gulf exposes cities like New Orleans, and Lake Charles to inundation. Small rural communities like Cocodrie in Terrebonne Parish face sinking as well. Coastal Louisiana is home to millions of people, much of the commercial navigation traffic of the country, 40% of the shell and fin fishery of America and wildlife refuges like Sabine Lacassine and Rockefeller noted for their biological diversity (Craig et al., 1979, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989).

Also in the early seventies Oliver Houck, now a Professor of Law at Tulane, commuted to New Orleans on an almost monthly basis from Washington, D.C. to help preserve the Atchafalaya swamp from the Old River Control Structure on the Mississippi to Morgan City on the Gulf. As cofounder and General Counsel of the National Wildlife Federation's legal arm in Washington, D.C., Houck concentrated on protecting the Atchafalaya swamp as he searched for cases throughout the country to help establish NWF's legal arm in many states. Houck also worked with Osborne and wrote one of the first major policy assessments of the declining coastal wetlands in the Tulane Law Review and other important contributions (Houck, 1983, 1988).

As the lawyers developed their interests in coastal Louisiana throughout this time, academic scientists pursued extensive new research on the declining Louisiana wetlands some of which was based on funding that some of them helped secure through the Louisiana legislature. Between LSU, Tulane and the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium (LUMCON) in Cocodrie, Louisiana, the academic scientists evolved into a loose wetland ecology group consisting of geologists, marine biologists, wildlife ecologists and others; one of them, a physical chemist, later became Louisiana Secretary of Environmental Quality when the Coalition organized. Some like John W. Day Jr., were sought

out by the lawyers and through extensive collaboration provided the them with technical expertise for lawsuits. The scientists sought interest and research funding to continue their discoveries concerning how the ecology of the Mississippi delta works.

1985 to 1988: THE COALITION AT OSBORNE'S LAW OFFICE.

Tripp met in Osborne's law office throughout 1986-87 along with the LSU ecology faculty and others whom Osborne selected through his knowledge of Louisiana environmental activists. Osborne invited people to the meetings whom he knew from his membership in the Sierra Club, associates and certain clients whom he had represented in environmentally related cases. Lawyers in the New Orleans area including Houck of Tulane were present, members of the Sierra Club Chapter including the Schoefflers who were active in the Lafayette United Methodist Church, and Rob Gorman from the Houma Thibodaux Catholic Diocese Social service office in Terrebonne Parish (a parish that could be submerged within fifty years)(Coalition to restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). The informal group was the nascent Coalition; it totaled about fifteen people and continued to meet in Osborne's office.

Houck set about the process of incorporation with the state of Louisiana and the Coalition became a 501 (c) 3 trust

organization. By December 1987, the incorporation papers had been filed and the IRS tax statement was being processed which would allow tax exempt contributions to help sustain the organization's staff and activities. At the end of this time the Coalition formulated its manifesto: "Coastal Louisiana, Here Today And Gone Tomorrow?: A Citizens Program for Saving the Mississippi River Delta Region, To Protect Its Heritage, Economy and Environment." (Hereafter called "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?") "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" generated over eighteen recommendations to alter public policy at the state and federal level. The recommendations included engineering changes based on ecological research and specific legal and administrative changes in the federal and state policies concerning wetlands.

The Coalition secured office space in Baton Rouge in an unoccupied office building, the Lamar Building, cost free for the first year. Foundation support grew to approximately \$100,000 to \$200,000 per year for the Coalition's budget from national foundations such as W. Alton Jones, Mary Babcock and The Rockefeller Family Trust. Eventually the Lamar company needed the building back and the Coalition obtained office space in a small plaza on Highland Road in Baton Rouge. In 1988 the Coalition hired a community organizer and a secretary and began to issue publications and hold additional meetings. To bring attention to the land

loss issue the Coalition sponsored a concert, a booth at the 1988 Republican National Convention in New Orleans and a series of educational programs as well as community meetings called the Coast Watch Program. The Coalition sponsored legislation at both the state and federal level and began a massive grassroots church campaign in the coastal parishes to promote legislative change concerning wetlands.

In 1989 the Coalition claimed it helped push the Louisiana Coastal Restoration Act that created a mineral tax on oil and gas to help restore coastal wetlands. The legislation was voted on later as a Constitutional Amendment that passed with over seventy percent support. The legislation also created a position in the Governor's office to promote coastal restoration and oversee wetland restoration functions which had been spread among several departments. In 1990 the Coalition claimed it helped pass the National Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (PL. 101-646, Title III) helped by Coalition supporter US. Senator John Breaux (Breaux, 1990). Breaux wrote a guest column in the Coalition newsletter underscoring the Coalition's support. Also Coalition member State Senator Ben Bagert (R), had secured a letter from George Bush during the 1988 convention pledging no new "net loss" of wetlands (Bagert, 1990). When the field work for this research was conducted in 1992 the Coalition had an office staff that

included an Executive Director, a Director of Science and Technology, and a Publications Editor and continued to rely on foundation support for its activities.

III. STRATEGY OF THIS DISSERTATION

To understand the crucial factors associated with the organization of the Coalition, this study takes the case and scrutinizes how resource mobilization worked in the Coalition. The study expands knowledge in two ways. First, it describes the Coalition as an interest group that emerged in an ecosystem of national importance with help from not only individuals but strategic interests of parent organizations. This is accomplished by emphasizing more complex organization formation than previous interest organization building study that relied mostly on individual members.

Second, the work examines two explicitly stated research questions about the organization's formation. The conclusion of the work matches rival explanations against this case in a "strong inference" mode (Platt, 1964, Eckstein, 1975). In both biology and political science, advocates of the case study method rely on ruling out rival hypotheses or extinguishing theories for a particular case under study.

This study is an empirical inquiry that is more than theory

verification. There is a lack of consensus on a unified theoretical approach to predicting the formation and maintenance of groups that seek largely political goods in American society with great implications for group behavior. The task here is related but much narrower however and familiar to many environmentally conscious people who get together to address an environmental concern: how did this new interest group form and mobilize in an ecosystem of crucial importance to many interests? How can a political organization such as the Coalition be built or can it be? Did these people just come together and assume they have things in common? Or as resource mobilization theory suggests was their a series of related incentives that brought about the organization called the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana?

Intensive interviews in Coastal Louisiana were conducted throughout the spring and summer of 1992 to search for incentives and how they might work. Organizational members were given a guided but simple and unstructured interview format and each asked at different times and locations how the organization developed. This afforded the ability to find interview data that had sufficient range, depth, specificity and personal context to identify the incentives (Merton et al, 1957). In addition, several months of participant observation yielded data in the marsh area near

Cocodrie, the Baton Rouge legislative and academic communities, and the New Orleans metropolitan area. In addition a Coalition staffer arranged for the investigator to attend a seventy-mile ride down the Mississippi River on a high water inspection aboard a tug of the US Army Corps of Engineers. In a collegial fashion, Coalition staff Dr. Paul Kemp and Sheree Ellison allowed the investigator into their offices for substantial contact with the staff and Coalition associates over the spring and summer of 1992.

The systematic examination of how the Coalition entrepreneurs organized specifies the incentives and strategies. The study examines the following hypotheses:

RESEARCH QUESTION I. Coalition organizational success is due primarily to the resources of organizational members guided by entrepreneurs from the Coalitions parent organizations rather than merely a mass appeal for support based upon potential individual decision to join.

RESEARCH QUESTION II. Reasons in addition to the loss of coastal wetlands provide the selective and strategic benefits that help build the Coalition and encompass incentives to: expand scientific knowledge through academic research grants, solve environmental law disputes that expand the federal wetland law, show that national

environmental interest groups has grassroots support, provide support for state level natural resource division bureaucracies, help political careers, and assist state level bureaucratic careers.

The study is divided into four remaining sections. In chapter two the literature on interest groups is analyzed beginning with the characteristics of group formation that are important to the Coalition and the relevant environmental movement factors surrounding the background of the problem.

The review of the literature in the next chapter shows the approaches to interest group studies that provide clues to explaining how the Coalition mobilized. The Coalition is seen as an example of a latent group that overcame Olson's "free rider" problem by using national foundation money guided by the efforts of a few Coalition entrepreneurs (Olson, 1965). The beginning of the review provides an overview of what is known about interest groups in general. Then the review suggests the public interest groups of the environmental movement have overcome the free rider problem to sustain themselves but insufficient research has been conducted to explain how this works. The Coalition then is a case study that provides additional information about group formation and maintenance where there is abundant

theoretical models, abundant survey research on aggregate group characteristics, but little empirical in depth field work to obtain knowledge about how such groups operate.

The method described in the third chapter shows how the data were gathered to conduct the case study. First the method for "getting in" the organization will be described in detail so that the qualitative techniques can be understood and reproduced. The investigator gained access to the organization by gaining the confidence of Coalition members who acted as gatekeepers to interview members. The interviews were supplemented by participant observation and the acquisition of Coalition documents.

The results are summarized in four sections: lawyers, their organizations and their incentives, ecologists, and their incentives, the Grassroots and their incentives and finally the State Capital Network. Each section begins with a participant discussing the problem and the Coalition. Then the issues are summarized with more discussion from the participants to elaborate on themselves and the problem and finally the incentives are summarized. A resource mobilization framework in the conclusion is weighed against other possibilities given the interview and other data.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

I. OVERVIEW

Whether an interest group like the Coalition forms and enters the American political system depends upon its overcoming several hurdles invariably encountered by political organizations (Olson, 1965, 1982, Mitchell, 1979, Moe 1980). Political organizations seeking collective goods -- goods that every potential member will receive whether they join or not -- must overcome obstacles of funding and membership support that are unique problems for them (see Walker, 1992). A theory that could account for the formation and continuance of political organizations, especially groups that come from social movements, is still a very ambiguous and elusive goal. A goal of this study is to take the existing arguments about interest group formation and maintenance and compare them to the results obtained from a qualitative analysis of the incentives of the Coalition. Alternative explanations will be excluded for the case of the Coalition, in order to find a more satisfactory explanation of its formation and maintenance in the last chapter of the study.

The elements of interest group formation scholarship span several fields representing a vast literature. Economics, the social psychology of small groups, organizational theories of entrepreneurship, political science, sociology, law and now ecological theories of organizational development have all tackled the group formation problem for organizations that seek collective goods (Olson, 1965, Moe, 1980, Walker, 1992). If there is any unifying theme among these literatures it is only a desire to know how to create and continue an organization based mostly on a social cause.

Unfortunately, viewed as a whole the scholarship on group formation has been characterized as showing a lack of consensus and the research demonstrates a lack of a uniform approach (Jenkins, 1986, Walker, 1992). For instance, Lowery and Gray (1992) studied the emergence of state interest groups *when they become politically active*, but some groups in their sample may not be organized primarily for collective action and represent a business group organized primarily for a non collective purpose. Political scientists have studied groups in one policy area or studied individual groups, but do not always measure the same phenomena. There are several incongruent definitions or topologies of interest groups that do very little to bring clarity to the study of political interests (Walker, et al. 1992).

Environmental non governmental organization (NGO) literature provides some insight on social organizations, but often does not address political questions important to understanding the organization's behavior (World Watch Institute, 1992, Snow, 1994). The NGO rubric unfortunately sheds little light on interest group formation and maintenance behavior in terms of why the organizations are being supported or how they can obtain support. NGO study by environmental scholars should be expanded because there may be serious behavioral differences between group types depending on how they are defined (Salisbury, 1984).

Salisbury's analysis of interest groups would enhance environmental managers' study of NGOs. Salisbury notes that the divide between governmental and non governmental groups and business or non business groups may mask different behavioral types within these group categories (Salisbury, 1984). The behavior of several categories of non governmental groups such as labor unions, not for profit corporations, businesses, coalitions or associations could vary widely.

Snow (1994) surveyed what he calls environmental NGO's to understand organizations "inside the Environmental movement," and extols a greater emphasis on NGO leadership training and planning. Yet Snow gives woefully inadequate

attention to political factors such as the incentives, motivations and institutional needs of potential patrons. Also Snow and others succumb to a "tenor of advocacy" in environmental interest organization study, which Ingram and Mann (1987) cautioned against in their review of the status of interest group behavior scholarship.

Two general orienting themes however, stand out in interest group formation and maintenance scholarship. Truman's pluralistic view that political groups happen naturally because of the aggregation of persons with like functions and responses to "disturbance" and Olson's perspectives that rational people will not form for purely collective benefits but form for some selective benefit to themselves (Truman, 1951, Olson, 1965). In the 1970s and 1980's cases studies and survey research began to clarify some aspects of where groups come from in the American political system, but how they manifest is still unclear. The chapter lists possible theories for the Coalition. It concludes by suggesting the Coalition is an interesting test case of existing theories.

II. GROUP FORMATION AND THE COLLECTIVE GOODS DILEMMA

Madison's theory of the Constitution relied on opposite and rival interests to balance each other out and maintain a balance of power and is regarded as an early group theory

(Madison, 1789). Voluntary associations have always characterized American society since Tocqueville observed them in the early nineteenth century and the country continues to see new groups forming to better some aspect of the national agenda (Tocqueville, 1848, Jenkins, 1986). Andrew McFarland's study of Common Cause linked that group to a history of reform groups that appear in America periodically (McFarland, 1984).

The systematic study of interest organizations is frequently associated with David B. Truman in "The Governmental Process", 1951). Groups come together and become "cohesive" according to Truman, because as society becomes more complex and there is increasing specialization of function, people with like functions associate to protect their interests. For Truman, it is essential for many interest groups to form in society because it promotes political stability when people belong to more than one group (Truman, 1951). But some scholars have suggested this process is fraught with problems for society. For instance, Schattschneider contends that the economic bias of groups is unfair; the rich can more often than not easily mobilize against others making the understanding of interest behavior important social inquiry (Schattschneider, 1960).

No matter what mode of group formation theory one follows

the importance of interest groups in society is even more important now than at other times in history. For instance, there has been a huge proliferation of groups that, depending on how the groups are defined, has seen at least a threefold increase in Washington, D.C. since World War II (Cigler and Loomis, 1994, Walker et al., 1992). Olson has viewed the proliferation of interests with alarm suggesting among other things that coalitions of interest groups stymie economic growth and lead to civil strife (Olson, 1982).

Truman's theory of interest group formation is a variant of the theory of voluntary associations (See Olson for a discussion of Truman on this point, 1965). Salisbury has noted that Truman's theory is actually a series of partial theories or fragments of a theory of group formation (Salisbury, 1969). Truman and his critics cite historical evidence of group formation and lack of formation to support their generalizations. Yet these are only theories, not evidence of group behavior that could help explain current environmental group formation.

Recent survey research shows that the universe of American interest groups is not uniform and much more complex than Truman or Olson envisaged (Berry, 1977, Moe, 1980, Walker, 1992, Lowery and Gray, 1995). Because of this diversity it is difficult to predict why some groups will form and other

do not (King and Walker, 1992). Walker et al. 1992 asserts that it is easy to understand why large business groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), labor unions, and agriculture groups form to represent their interests. But it is not obvious that a group such as the American Railway Passengers Association forms, more people ride buses and there is no bus passenger's association (Walker et al. 1992).

Walker asks troubling organizational questions based on his extensive samples: How does the railway group keep in contact with and derive support from its members? Why is there a National Association of Puerto Rican Volunteers? Why do people organize for poor children? Why are there organizations against the death penalty, most people in these organizations do not have relatives on death row and the hapless inmates do not have the education or money to join. And why for instance, does there exist no national body that advocates for the millions of unemployed? The small fraction of persons who are union members is a closed group and unions do not seek to organize the unemployed. Walker does not decry these groups and maintains that they are very worthy causes, but how did they get the resources to operate, print and mail out literature and pay personnel (Walker, et al. 1992)?

Olson's 1965 by-product theory changed the field of interest group research by describing the collective action dilemma that strongly shows why rational people should not organize (Olson, 1965). Mancur Olson developed the concepts of collective goods and selective incentives in a model that challenges Truman's pluralist tradition of easy formation of political interest groups. Olson argued that all purely political organizations strive for collective goods, the example in environmental politics is a better environment or in the case of the Coalition sustaining coastal wetlands. But a collective good might also be national defense, social welfare, or even the Army Corps of Engineer water projects along the Mississippi. These are all "collective goods" that everyone will obtain if the group's objectives are achieved.

The question that follows is: why should potential members invest the time and money to join if the good will be obtained anyway or if the potential member feels that their contribution would not help the group (Olson, 1965)? And, if enough people do not invest the time and money to build the organization's resources, how can any political organization happen at all? This is the collective action dilemma. Olson holds that persons who will receive a benefit anyway will be tempted to "free ride" that is, they will select to be a free rider rather than contributing the time and effort needed to support group formation and maintenance if they

act rationally (Olson, 1965).

According to Olson, political groups must have another non political reason to cause them to form, their political activities are a by-product of their organizations' real motivating purpose. Unions get power through the legal and physical coercion of members to join, farm groups offer cheap insurance and group commodity prices that produce economies of scale. Or there is a solidary purpose that is fraternal in nature. The point is that the organization exists for another purpose than the political goal publicly sought (Olson, 1965).

Until the 1960s political scholars took organizational formation for granted, if there was some need for like-minded people to organize they simply did so (Truman, 1951). Latham (1952) suggested that this natural coming together was the result of some natural group ordering in the political or social affairs. But Olson's writings demand that any serious scholarship not dismiss the collective goods dilemma and show how political organizations form. Even if a study supports Truman and interest organizations can gain access and permeate the political system, how did the organization overcome the collective goods dilemma specified by Olson? Clues are available from Clark and Wilson's 1962 elaboration of

incentives: material, solidary and purposive but specification of what and how these incentives work has remained too vague (Clarke and Wilson, 1962).

Empirical inquiries continued in the seventies with case studies and survey research that showed the limitations of theoretical models based on historical generalizations of Truman and Olson (Berry, 1977, Mitchell, 1979, Moe, 1980, Walker, 1983, Lowery and Gray, 1995). In particular the social unrest of the 1960's highlighted many organizations that sought political goals but simply did not fit existing mobilization models.

III. NON PROFIT GROUPS OF THE SEVENTIES CREATE NEW EVIDENCE

Public interest organizations that developed in the late sixties, the sheer volume of new groups and an increase in attention concerning interest group activity at the state level show a greater diversity of group formation phenomena that have only continued to frustrate the goal of a unified approach to predicting how political interests form (Mitchell, 1979, Cigler and Loomis, 1991). In Walker et al.'s 1980 and 1985 survey data, three principal modes of organization formation were observed. 1) Business groups, 2) Occupational groups like the American Medical Association and farmers and 3) groups spawned by social movements

(Walker et al. 1992). The Coalition came out of a social movement: the environmental movement.

Truman's voluntary association and Olson's by-product theory do not account for the rise in non profit groups such as the Fund for Animals, the Women's League for Peace and Freedom and Common Cause or the "big ten" environmental groups (Berry, 1977, Mitchell, 1979, McFarland, 1984). Also scant attention has been paid by these scholars to state level interest organization development, although these groups have been suggested to have more power than national ones (Gray and Lowery, 1992). McFarland's case study of Common Cause was an interesting study not only in mass membership strategies, but the techniques and interpersonal entrepreneurship of the organizers (McFarland, 1983). Walker and Hula have suggested at least at the national level that a better understanding of collective goods and selective incentives could come from expanding the unit of analysis "individual decision to join (Walker et al. 1992, Hula, 1994)."

Clues to public interest organizations development has been clarified by reliance on resource mobilization approaches described by (McCarthy and Zald, 1978, see also Walker et al. 1992 for a discussion). Resource mobilization theory is a broad category of moves by key actors in the social

movement process that are still ambiguous but provide a promising avenue for investigation. Resource mobilization tends to see social movement groups as the workings of coalition formation, entrepreneurship and a goal directed ordering of activities. There is according to this view a Social Movement Sector (SMS) of the economy and specific Social Movement Industries (SMI) (McCarthy and Zald, 1978) and importantly, Social Movement Organizations (SMO)'s. Even with the resource mobilization perspective, an explanation for the Coalition that would help show how the organization developed, perhaps even help the Coalition or an organization that wished to fight it, is not available.

IV. THE COALITION AS AN AVENUE TO TEST EXPLANATIONS OF INTEREST GROUP FORMATION.

Truman's theory that like minded people form associations because they have interests in common is an old theory in political science but one that could be compared with the experience of the Coalition. Olson's view that the group formed for another purpose can be compared as well. The ideas of complex resource mobilization might fit elements of both Truman and Olson if, as Moe 1980 asserts, the type of rational behavior or the incentive was better understood. A study of the Coalition provides the opportunity to test these theories.

The Coalition is an alliance of organizations. The study focuses on a coalition of organizations that formed a single new incorporated organization -- the Coalition and departs from the traditional focus of interest group research. Environmental law organizations, church groups, the academic community and people working for organizations around the state capital formed the Coalition for more complex reasons than the individual decision to join.

The Coalition is local and national in scope. Reports of widespread conflict between the managers of national environmental groups and local grassroots organizations have been noted by several observers (Ingram and Mann, 1987, Basso, 1989, Mitchell 1990). These scholars describe a professionalization of national interest group administrators and local persons who frequently believe that the cloistered national professionals are out of touch with the realities of everyday environmental advocacy. The study shows that the group formed at the local level with certain strategic national ties.

Empirical case studies that followed the Olson by-product challenge concerning the public interest movement, show Olson's model falling short, yet these case studies use the Olson logic as the starting point to explain their group's development through overcoming the collective goods dilemma.

Three decades after Olson's collective goods challenge, resource mobilization theory which developed almost as a response to the inadequacies of by-product theory has become useful for understanding social movements and social movement organizations. Moreover, political scientists have begun to apply resource mobilization approaches to their studies of interest groups who contest by-product theory. Recent systematic survey research by Walker (1992) that relies on resource mobilization theory, better explains why and how interest groups develop.

Yet that research is based on aggregate statistics and gives only a partial view of how resource mobilization accounts for group development. Put simply, few investigators have left theoretical models and survey research centers, ventured into the field and collected first hand assessments of not just what the organization says it does or why it formed, but how the organization's work and succeed. This chapter ends by showing that this study's hypotheses shed more light on the "how" of group formation for an emerging group in an ecosystem of national importance.

The Coalition overcame the free rider problem that is especially troublesome to non profit public interest organizations that need resources to grow. Potential members are always tempted to free ride because public interest

organizations do not provide direct benefits to their membership that induces organizational joining. For instance, in seeking the environmental goal of sustaining coastal wetlands, the Coalition has sought a "collective good," that is a good that will be available to people whether they support the Coalition or not. Yet the Coalition has induced organizations to join through as yet unidentified incentives.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

I. OVERVIEW

The participant observation strategy of this study allowed the investigator to gain access to the workings of the Coalition and its associated setting (Whyte, 1955, Lofland, 1984). The setting consisted of the social structure of an organization composed of people working in and around Coastal Louisiana and related parts of the Mississippi Alluvial Plain. The inquiry was initiated by driving to the research setting: the coastal parishes of Terrebonne, Bayou Lafrouche, Avoyelles, Cameron and others in Southern Louisiana, as well as the cities of New Orleans and Baton Rouge. Continual contact was maintained with the Coalition staff office on Highland Road in Baton Rouge.

The investigator approached the setting as a naive learner attempting to understand the wetland decline problem and the Coalition's role in improving Louisiana's coastal wetlands status. The investigator offered to do minor tasks for the organization such as driving staff to appointments or swamp tours or stapling literature like Whyte (1955). Because the

investigator portrayed himself as a non expert interested in the problem (which was true for most of the incentives for organization studied), he told everyone he needed their expertise to provide clues to the ecological problems of wetland decline and how the Coalition was trying to save them. The investigator then had the opportunity to observe the mechanics of the organization, gather its documents and interview its people.

Although almost everyone interviewed was enthusiastic and discussed their role in the organization and knew that the investigator was studying the Coalition and its efforts; it was unclear to many participants exactly what the investigator wanted from them. Although they were told that the investigator wanted to know how the Coalition organization occurred, mention specifically of things that were called incentives was not discussed. This stance allowed the investigator to be lead by Coalition participants into understanding the organization and lessen the introduction of bias from asking potentially leading questions about the Coalition organization.

The investigator lived for several months at a time in 1992 in Louisiana and conducted interviews with Coalition organizers in their homes and offices. When a personal interview could not be arranged as was the case with James

Tripp in New York City an extensive telephone contact was made. The investigator lived sometimes in his car, a low cost (\$10 per night) research station Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium (LUMCON) in Cocodrie, Louisiana, and a low income apartment in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Cocodrie, Louisiana, is not on many maps but is on route 56 about five miles south of Chauvin, Louisiana in a brackish marsh area that abuts Terrebonne Bay).

In Baton Rouge the investigator obtained a community library membership at Louisiana State University and was able to conduct interviews at the University with Paul Templet, Coalition headquarters in Baton Rouge as well as the state capital. The investigator befriended the Coalition staff gaining access to its records and then used the Coalition's social network to gain access to interviews. The investigator left Cocodrie, Louisiana approximately one month before Hurricane Andrew directly struck the coastal hamlet in August 1992. The area did not suffer damage that would prevent a re-evaluation of people and institutions. No one was killed and most people in the area still live and work there (1995). Although there was serious damage to shrimp and fish processing units in the area, the resumptions of normal economic activities has continued.

II. OBJECTIVES AND THE METHOD USED

The logic and procedures presented here form a qualitative case study that is designed to cite existing interest group formation theories and match them against the experience of the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana. Data collection commenced from January 1992 to July 1992 in several locations in Louisiana in order to describe the organization, interview Coalition participants, acquire documents and subsequently identify incentives associated with organizational formation and maintenance. The incentives depict a picture of an organization and its supporters.

The data are organized around the occupational categories of the participants: lawyers, academic ecologists, grassroots groups that networked with Michael Osborne in New Orleans and a general category of people in the capital who work with the Louisiana legislature called the state capital network. The state capital network is composed of a variety of professional categories who interact continually around the state legislature, natural resource agencies and Governors office in Baton Rouge. The interview data are presented as results in the next chapter.

The rest of this chapter is broken into three remaining sections: 1) selecting the case, gaining entrance to the organization, a description of the research setting, how

members were discovered and how they were interviewed. 2) Deriving categories from the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and explaining the procedure for testing a crucial case (Eckstein, 1975). 3) Finally the rationale and usefulness of the case study method and its applicability to the study of the Coalition are briefly discussed (Eckstein, 1975, Yin, 1983, Feagin et al, 1990).

III. CHOOSING THE TOPIC:

The topic was chosen because the biologically diverse bottomland hardwood forests of the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain continued to decline catastrophically with serious implications for biological diversity, federal wetland law, and the capacity of the political system to act in a mature and judicious fashion to sustain the wetland resource (Shaw, 1985 p. 236, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1988, 1994, EDF, 1992). Many different disciplines and groups have a stake in what happens to the wetlands, and the Coalition represents several of them: lawyers, academic ecologists, state and federal politicians, natural resource agencies and the people who live near and literally on the wetlands.

Further, over 50 years of political science inquiry directed at Army Corps of Engineer water projects in the Lower

Mississippi has gleaned information describing important regulatory processes, and describing the character of "iron triangles" between the Corps of Engineers, local officials and congressional committees. (Maass, 1951, McCool, 1987, Ripley and Franklin, 1991). In addition, some political scientists have recently suggested that the nature of traditionally low conflict federal water policies is changing to a high conflict regulatory one without specifying instances of how this is occurring in the lower Mississippi (Ripley and Franklin, 1991). Ripley and Franklin (1991) allude to this change in the "Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy" but do not specify examples of how the increase of political tension could be observed in one of the most important federal water systems in the country. The Coalition experience described later in the results sections provides a good example of this change.

The study of the emergence of the Coalition then, contributes to a long line of research in the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain that seeks to understand policies surrounding the area's wetlands through federal water policy. Academics from a variety of disciplines have demonstrated interest in the lower Mississippi for a very long time. It is significant that EDF had litigated a major wetland case that impacted the implementation of the Clean Water Act (*Avoyelles Sportsmans League v. Alexander* 1979).

EDF saw, along with other members of the "Big Ten," that Louisiana was as important an area as the Grand Canyon or Niagara Falls. This study argues that an incentive of James Tripp of EDF and others of the national legal group were in Louisiana for symbolic reasons as much as any other.

A recent instance of political organization in this setting, that involved the national and state actors involved in policy change provides additional light on water policy change activities. Also the relationship of this organizational activity can be related to existing theory on the formation of groups.

IV. GETTING IN AND ACQUIRING THE DATA

Telephone contact was initiated in October 1991 with the general counsel of EDF in New York to determine if he was pursuing any political activity related to their wetland litigation demonstrated in *Avoyelles Sportsmans League v. Alexander* (1979), a case strategically brought by EDF to sustain the declining bottomland hardwood forest. Prior to *Avoyelles*, the Corps did not regulate the taking of bottomland hardwood forests which have been drastically reduced since the turn of the century because of water projects and agricultural policy (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1988).

The general counsel advised that EDF was still pursuing wetland preservation efforts in cooperation with the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana; that since the bottomland hardwoods were nearly gone, attention had shifted to the declining Louisiana coastal wetlands also subject to section 404 under jurisdiction of the Corps. The general counsel pointed out that 40% of U.S. coastal wetlands are in Louisiana. The general counsel suggested that Dr. G. Paul Kemp, Coalition Director of Science and Technology, should be contacted for information about the Coalition's activities. After gaining telephone confidence with Dr. Kemp in Baton Rouge, he suggested that a dissertation be conducted concerning how the Coalition came about because few of the people involved really had a grasp as to how the whole effort evolved. He added that the investigator should come to Louisiana but did not know how to fund such a study.

Data were obtained in person in Louisiana three times in 1992. First, a one week exploratory visit to Baton Rouge, Houma in Terrebonne Parish and Constance Beach (south west Louisiana) was undertaken by automobile to establish contact with Coalition members. Second, in March and April 1992, lodging was secured at the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium (LUMCON) in Cocodrie, Louisiana, twenty five miles south of Houma, Louisiana in a marsh near the Gulf of Mexico in Terrebonne Parish a few miles from Bayou

Lafrouche. From LUMCON interviews were conducted in New Orleans (one hour away from Cocodrie) and Baton Rouge (two hours away from Cocodrie).

On April 9th an all day trip with the Army Corps of Engineers down the Mississippi between Old River and Donaldsonville was conducted where the investigator interacted with Coalition supporters, concerned citizens and the Army. The investigator obtained an extensive interview at this time with Rob Gorman, a principal Coalition founder and organizer and Associate Director of Catholic Social Services in Houma, Louisiana. Gorman had been invited to an all day inspection of the lower Mississippi and to interact and have lunch with Corps officials. Also, the investigator met Mousmus Clavrie an attorney and Debra Callahan of the W. Alton Jones Foundation. In addition, the investigator had several lengthy conversations with General Patrick Stevens, Commander of the Lower Mississippi Valley Division. General Stevens is the son-in-law of General Clark the former Chief of the Corps of Engineers nationwide and the architect of the Corps' community participation effort of the 1970's. The Army had asked Dr. Kemp to bring his associates along and he had invited the investigator.

The LUMCON field work allowed interviewing marine scientists in the course of their investigations and visiting local

landowners who were losing their property because of coastal wetland decline. LUMCON through the assistance of Dr. Paul Samarco, provided a room where the investigator kept his PC and stored documents and other supplies. The third trip from May to July 1992 involved brief visits to LUMCON (one with faculty members from Oklahoma State University) and a prolonged stay in a low income apartment in Baton Rouge that had to be abandoned in July due to a flood. Because of Hurricane Andrew striking LUMCON in August 1992 plans were abandoned to revisit the site in the fall. Although a brief visit was made in late July as the investigator left Louisiana.

Documents and interviews were gathered at Coalition headquarters in Baton Rouge, member offices and homes throughout Louisiana and via telephone. Participant observation techniques (Lofland and Lofland, 1984) were conducted to familiarize the researcher with the organization and its social and physical environment through living and working in Coastal Louisiana. During the field work time a catalogue of Coalition documents at organization headquarters on Highland Road in Baton Rouge and member offices was obtained and access for interviews to Coalition members was secured.

The first exploratory two week visit to the Coalition in

Baton Rouge was conducted starting January 12, 1992. The Coalition's office was located in a small shopping center on Highland road in Baton Rouge about ten miles from the state capital complex and seven miles from Louisiana State University. The Coalition has a fax machine and the editor of the Coalition's publications was sending fax notices to members to alert them to impending legislative changes at the state capital.

At first no one was available and the Coalition's publication editor did not know what to do to support the investigation, or house the investigator. After talking with the editor, she volunteered the entire collection of Coalition board minutes, including financial papers along with the Coalition's public documents.

The initial collection of Coalition documents spanned December 1987 to October 1992 and included personnel matters and financial statements that indicated where some of the Coalitions funding came from. The Coalition booklet "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" was obtained and contained eighteen engineering/science and legislative goals. The editor indicated that Mr. James Tripp was instrumental in developing the booklet "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" and that he had persuaded the Coalition membership to create such a document.

From the board minutes and other records, names of the participants were gathered to interview at their businesses and homes throughout Coastal Louisiana. The investigator sought and obtained permission to interview the members by being introduced to them by the staff at headquarters. Two days later, Coalition Executive Director took the investigator to lunch and outlined the development of the Coalition and his need for grant funding. He volunteered his personal vitae as well as that of other Coalition members and indicated that the investigator could use the Coalition office to make telephone calls.

As an example of Coalition activities, the Science and Technology Director drove the investigator to one of the Coalitions "Coastwatch" programs that is a public hearing conducted by Coalition members in a Catholic Church in LaRose, Louisiana, in Bayou Lafrouche Parish. The hearing was conducted by Robert Gorman, a social worker and Associate Director of Catholic Social Services for the Houma Thibodaux Diocese. Persons attending the hearing were angry about many wetland regulations and the difficulty in obtaining building permits. The session was taped on local TV and showed the identity of the investigator who was then known to many residents throughout the area because of the TV exposure.

V. ACQUISITION OF INTERVIEW DATA

Each person selected for an interview was told that the interview would be taped and that the investigator wanted to know what happened as the Coalition developed. They were asked specifically before taping what their role in the Coalition had been and if they could recount how the organization came about. They were told that the purpose of the investigation was to understand the Coalition's role in wetland preservation and what everybody did to help the Coalition do this as the Coalition developed.

Coalition members identified for interviews through board minutes and staff suggestions were:

Mr. Rob Gorman, Associate Director of Catholic Social Services, Houma-Thibodaux, Catholic Diocese. Mr. Gorman, a social worker trained at UNC-Chapel Hill, helped local fisherman in Bayou Lafrouche Parish to organize themselves and eventually seek legal help from Michael Osborne to open up fishing areas that became sealed off because of wetland decline. The areas were closed off because large property owners subsequently asserted new land rights when a canal was dug. The status of coastal wetlands created a property change that hurt the fishermans' take from oyster beds, shrimp and other fish and sending them to Catholic Social

Services for food.

Dr. John Day Jr., Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge and LUMCON. Dr. Day was approached in the gallery of LUMCON and interviewed. A later follow up interview was conducted in his room. Dr. Day provided a capsule review of the coastal declining wetlands of Louisiana and reasons for their decline emphasizing canals from oil and gas exploration. Dr. Day commented on his association with the environmental lawyers going back several years and his education in Marine Science at UNC-Chapel Hill where he graduated around the time of Earth Day 1970.

Mr. Michael Osborne, Attorney in Baton Rouge and founding board member. Mr Osborne invited the investigator into his office in Prytania Street in New Orleans where he provided an extensive interview. He described meeting Professor Houck when he was commuting from Washington, D.C., Working with James Tripp and several cases that they had collaborated on since the early 1970's.

Professor Oliver A. Houck, Tulane Law School, Editor of the Tulane Environmental Law Review and former co-founder of the legal arm of the National Wildlife Federation in Washington, D.C.. Professor Houck granted a lengthy interview and provided documentation about his efforts on the Atchafalaya

Swamp while at NWF.

Dr. Paul Templet, Professor of Environmental Studies at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, author of articles on Coastal Zone Management in the Journal of Coastal Resources, Coalition member and former Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality under Governor Buddy Roemer. Trained at Duke University and LSU in chemistry. Dr. Templet's office was very close to the investigators apartment in Baton Rouge and afforded numerous instances of interviews. Dr. Templet left office because Governor Buddy Roemer had been defeated for re-election by Governor Edwin Edwards in a three way election that featured David Duke.

Mr. James Tripp, General Counsel of the Environmental Defense Fund in New York, Coalition member and frequent visitor to Coastal Louisiana. Mr. Tripp introduced the investigator to the Coalition. Obtained several telephone interviews with Mr. Tripp.

The Reverend Kirby Veret of the Methodist Church in Dulac, Louisiana. Attended Easter services in 1992 in church that had been under water in Hurricane Juan. Reverend Veret was a board member of the Coalition. Reverend Veret conducted an Easter service that the investigator went to in Dulac,

Louisiana.

Mr. Joel Laporouse, fisherman and retired Oil worker of Cocodrie Louisiana. Attended the annual boat blessing in Chauvin, and spent the day on Lake Boudreau with the Laporouse family discussing the economic conditions of the area. Mr. Laporouse is a shrimper, trapper and oil field worker and had his daughter drive the investigator around the area.

State Senator Ben Bagert, New Orleans trial attorney. Coalition member who ran for office talking about the decline of the wetlands. Bagert produced a letter from George Bush at the 1988 Republican National convention to him promising "No New Net Loss" of wetlands. He introduced the Coalition's adopted wetlands restoration bill in the state legislature.

Dr. Paul Kemp, Coastal Geologist and Professor, Louisiana State University, Former Director of Science and Technology of the Coalition, Kemp advocated the ideas of restoring marsh by using oil field pipelines to spread dredged Mississippi sediment. Kemp's remarks were taped on numerous visits to wetland areas and Coalition functions, but are generally not used. Dr. Kemp acted as an ecological mentor and introduced the investigator to his wife mother and

sister. Dr. Kemp's ideas on oil pipelines as sediment diversion techniques are covered as are comments about Dr. Kemp from other Coalition members.

Ms. Eloise Wall, Director of Citizens for a Clean Environment, in Baton Rouge. Ms. Wall was interviewed twice in her home in Baton Rouge. Ms. Wall, Coalition member, is a lobbyist at the state capital in Baton Rouge.

V. DERIVING CATEGORIES AND ORGANIZING THE DATA

The emergence of categories became apparent in the participant observation and interview stages of the work when each interviewee described how the organization happened and their role. This is the technique of building theory from the data that has been advocated by Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Most people interviewed and observed discussed their interest in the Coalition based on an occupational category. For example, both Houck and Tripp describe coming to Louisiana from the east coast for the purpose of litigation for their organizations. They are lawyers. Houck even mentioned the fact that he was always trying to put some coalition together throughout the seventies concerning the Army's plans to divert water in the Atchafalaya.

Both Gagilano, and Templet described getting the legislature to fund scientific research. Gorman was Associate Director of Catholic Social Services that was being hard pressed for resources in their food bank because shrimper parishioners could not get access to their fishing areas.

The Coalition's booklet "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" lists eighteen objectives for the Coalition ranging for calls for an end to canal building to modifications in marsh management plans. Some specify engineering activities. Together they espouse the purposive or expressive benefits of the organization. By joining the organization a person or an organization is linked to regulatory, administrative and public engineering goals.

VI. RATIONALE FOR HOW THE DATA ARE USED

Four sets of data categories can be recognized from the people contacted, literature obtained, and that which emanate from the interviews. They are activities and incentives associated with occupational categories. First, the legal domain of the case that involves the three attorneys and their incentives, second, the ecology faculty of Louisiana State University and their incentives, third, the grassroots groups of who represented Osborne clients or his environmental friends are also an important category.

Finally, a diverse group of people herein called "the State Capital network." The State Capital Network is a group of lobbyists, and legislators allied with the current Governor that work in various state agencies and Baton Rouge Organizations.

RATIONALE FOR THE CASE STUDY METHOD

VII. Case studies for political inquiries are a serious mode of acquiring new knowledge about social phenomenon such as interest group behavior, yet are often depicted as the weak cousins of "better" quantitative studies. Even though there are serious threats to the validity of quantitative studies, particularly the inductive fallacy, a trend toward quantification exists in social science research. The frequent criticism is that it is wrong to make generalizations from a particular case when discussing a "one shot case study" (Campbel and Stanley, 1966, Nachmias and Nachmias, 1988). Also, case studies are frequently seen as mere adjuncts to quantitative work and not seen as essential avenues to new knowledge in their own right. This is unfortunate because the role of theory in political science is the development or building of what Merton (1968) calls middle level theory, a theory that is more powerful than an ad hoc proposition but not as strong as perhaps natural selection or quantum theory. Theories of deviance,

role sets, bureaucratic behavior, legislative behavior and the subject of this investigation interest group theory must develop into usable middle level theories.

Eckstein (1975) takes exception to this trend and provides an exhaustive defense of the varieties of qualitative case study method in political science and the weaknesses of a reliance on quantification. Eckstein cites Platt's (1964) use of the method of "strong inference" for political inquiries using a case. Eckstein argues that using a crucial case that makes possible the exclusion of several rival hypothesis has the property of increasing the speed at which new knowledge is obtained. Although Platt advocates the case study for advances in high energy physics and molecular biology, Eckstien and others have pointed out that much of the improvement of middle level theory has been obtained through the case study method (Platt, 1964, Eckstein, 1975, Baily, 1992).

The examples of case study that are important to political science are extensive. Selznick's (1949) "TVA and the Grassroots: A Study of Politics and Organization," Hunter's (1953) "Power in the City" and Dahl's (1962) "Who Governs" usually come to mind immediately as examples that continue to beckon for renewed investigations and have withstood the test of time (Selznick, 1949, Hunter, 1953, Dahl, 1962).

More recent case study research on interest groups such as McFarland's "Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest" or the two interest groups Berry studied using participant observation highlight the importance of direct empirical case study investigation known also as qualitative methods (Berry, 1977, McFarland, 1984). Frequently several case studies are employed such as Mitchell's powerful critique of Mancur Olson's by-product theory using the "big ten" environmental interest groups.

Criticisms of qualitative case studies such as: they can only account for "one point" or observation on an x,y axis in a quasi-experimental research design and therefore may not be a close or even relevant observation concerning a theory under study, ignores the strengths of case studies -- and the weaknesses of quantitative ones. Glaser (1978) has summarized the reasons why case studies are important and not weaker cousins of quantitative ones. The ways to new knowledge are more than the theory verification used in quantitative studies and involve obtaining more accurate evidence, refining existing concepts, and making empirical generalizations (Glaser, 1978).

Merton (1968) argued that the role of the social sciences is to build theory because social science has not yet achieved the power of theories in the hard sciences. Social

scientists should be like Darwin, going out into the field to gather evidence and build theory from that evidence. The Coalition provides an avenue to obtain more evidence about an interest group's formation and maintenance in a social movement and an ecosystem of national importance.

CHAPTER IV RESULTS

LEGAL FOUNDERS INCENTIVES

I. WETLAND LAW CHANGES AND GROUP FORMATION INCENTIVES

A change in federal water policy gave environmental law organizations the opportunity to induce more rigorous administration of the Army Corps of Engineers policy toward wetlands. The Clean Water Act of 1977 changed the mix of responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers that had built water projects under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and destroyed wetlands in the name of navigation and flood control. The traditional relationships of the Corps, members of congress from the lower Mississippi and navigation and flood control interests faced a new set of environmentally concerned actors from the environmental groups that Houck (National Wildlife Federation NWF), Osborne (Sierra Club Local Chapter) and Tripp (Environmental Defense Fund EDF) worked for.

Traditionally the Corps had authority over all the "waters of the United States" to serve the commercial navigation interests on the Mississippi. Lawsuits and congressional testimony from environmental groups such as EDF, NWF, and

National Resources Defense Counsel (NRDC), brought the Corps into federal court in a way that changed its wetland taking rules (Holland V. US 1974, NRDC V. Callaway, 1975, Avoyelles V. Alexander, 1979). Since 1970, Houck, Tripp and Osborne spent significant portions of their careers working for or in association with organizations that tried to shape the Clean Water Act's wetland application. The reasons for a new local organization for Houck, Tripp and Osborne are grounded in this policy change.

Since the turn of the century the pork barrel projects of navigation and flood control and bottomland hardwood forest wetland conversion to soybean, corn and cotton fields, aroused little public attention or indignation. Political scientists call this arrangement an iron triangle because the three policy components -- a congressional committee, the Corps of Engineers, and local officials -- worked together to allocate large sums of money to reclaim wetlands and build water projects that helped all three parties in a quid pro quo (Maass, 1951, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1988, See Shaffer et al. Figure 1). Lowi (1972) referred to this type of arrangement as a low conflict "distributive policy" where an iron triangle allocates project money to an area like the lower Mississippi and all three parts of the iron triangle benefit. For over one hundred years the Rivers and Harbors Act iron triangle (and other policies like




Figure 1. Estimate of Reduction in Bottomland Hardwood Forest Wetlands in the Lower Mississippi, 1883-1991, by Craig et al. (1992)

agriculture subsidies), provided congressmen reelection benefits, the Corps and the Agriculture Department appropriation benefits and local officials and businesses benefited through Mississippi navigation and other economic growth (See Maass, 1951, McCool, 1987, Ripley and Franklin, 1991).

Yet during this time much of the bottomland hardwood forest wetland area and the coastal wetlands of Louisiana was being drastically reduced at least in part because of the projects (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1988). Now that the rich bottomlands are largely reduced, the coastal wetlands are going too and groups like EDF and NWF see the area as a symbolic place to litigate nationally significant cases.

EDF, NRDC, Sierra and NWF knew it was crucial to organize in order to put pressure on the Corps and state and local governments. The Corps did not embrace the spirit of wetland preservation in the 1972 and 1977 acts until it was forced to do so in court cases, one of which was: Natural Resources Defense Council NRDC V. Callaway (1975). In Callaway the Corps and the EPA contended that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act pertained to "navigable waters" as the agencies had narrowly defined them and therefore wetlands would be excluded from their jurisdiction. But in deciding against the government, the Callaway court found that Congress:

"...asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the extent permissible under the commerce clause for purposes of the water Act; and the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers acted unlawfully and in derogation of their responsibilities under the water Act by adopting a different definition [of waters of the United States]. (NRDC v. Callaway, D.D.C. 1975), Bean 1983, p. 212, EDF 1992).

James Tripp's EDF colleague Michael Bean (1983) has noted, the Corps' response to Callaway was to move very slowly to carry out the section 404 process and issue a new class of permit called a general or nationwide permit. Because of this alternative to the normal section 404 process, parcels of wetlands under ten acres or of "minor environmental significance" began to be routinely allowed by the Corps (Bean, 1983). This selective application of the law has allowed the Corps a way around strict permitting administration thus allowing vast wetland areas to not be protected. Because of its public interest review process, the Corps has several ways it can administer the law marking part of a great policy divide in which the Corps decides what counts as a possible wetland regulatory area (See Ablard and O'Neil p. 57, 1976). The Corps engages in a balancing act between pro business wetland decisions and environmental organization ones depending on a particular situation. The Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana became an organization in part designed to encourage the Lower Mississippi Valley Division of the Corps, with its extensive permitting activities, to administer the act in a pro

wetland fashion and set an example for other Corps offices.

In contrast to the cozy low conflict wetland conversions to agricultural and improved navigation, the wetland implications of the Clean Water Act are highly controversial and are what Lowi (1972) called a high conflict "regulatory policy" (Lowi, 1972). Moreover, the Clean Water Act has extensive legal ramifications because of the untested latitude of the agencies powers and the continuing advances in the ecological understanding of wetland science (Houck, 1988). The statute has the potential of a major impact on *private property* interests depending on how agencies and courts define its scope and limit its use. As Oliver Houck noted in a 1988 Colorado Law Review Article, section 404: ". . . lies like an open wound across the body of environmental law, one of the simplest statutes to describe and one of the most painful to apply." (Houck, 1989, p.773). The lower Mississippi has a vast wetland area that has been reduced by both government and private actions over the last century and the administrative delineation of what "taking" means in these circumstances begs for definition. Houck has noted elsewhere that most of the wetland permits issued by the Corps of Engineers are issued from the Lower Mississippi Valley Division of the Corps in Vicksburg, Mississippi whose jurisdiction includes the state of Louisiana (Houck, 1983). Louisiana is not only wetland rich, it is also legally ripe

for action.

II. HOUCK, OSBORNE, TRIPP AND THE NEED FOR AN ORGANIZATION

There were other members of the big ten interested in the new water policies nationwide, but both Tripp and Houck targeted Louisiana and had been commuting there regularly since 1970. Since Louisiana has the second largest wetlands surface area in the lower forty-eight states and because there was a legal history of significance to wetlands destruction by government policy there, Louisiana like Florida has been crucial legal ground for wetlands policy development throughout the nation. Tripp and Houck commuted to Louisiana separately for their national environmental law organizations and were impressed by the magnitude of Louisiana's national importance and are recorded in congressional testimony in 1978 referring to the need for preservation of the bottomland hardwoods and the coastal marshes of Louisiana, (Congressional Record, 1978).

Houck initially came to Louisiana because of the destruction of the Atchafalaya that was being exacerbated by the Corps of Engineer's intent to put a new flood control structure through the area. He related in an interview for this study

in April 1992 how he became interested in Louisiana and the Coalition organization:

HOUCK: ". . . [I was] a federal prosecutor for four years, at the end of which I was really burning out on criminal prosecution and Earth Day was hitting 1970-71 and it started kindling old flames in me for the environment. I've always been attracted by the out-of-doors and spent a lot time in the out-of-doors. So, it was a natural for me to shift from criminal prosecution to what I considered to be environmental prosecution, seemed to be the imbalance that we were spending so much time in trying to keep the junkies from taking T.V. sets and Exxon was walking away with the Rocky Mountains."

"It seemed the big criminals were unattended to, so I went over and with another fellow, we started a legal arm of a large environmental organization, The National Wildlife Federation. I became their General Counsel and I directed their legal programs for ten years. By 1981 it was a very strong outfit. Located in lots of states. All of the environmental litigating and action organizations grew in the 1970's and in '81 I came down to Tulane. The reason I came down was that the very first case I picked up in 1971 was a Louisiana case, saving a big swamp west of here [Interview in New Orleans at Tulane University Law School], which was a part of the coastal zone of the Atchafalaya swamp. It was the conservation issue of Louisiana for the 1960's and 1970's and I had been commuting down here on that issue once a month for ten years and it went through all phases. I mean we made a movie, we litigated, we went to countless public hearings, we created teach-ins, love-ins, canoe-ins, speak-ins, media coverage of all types, we just fought the war. We emerged with a victory in 1981, a plan that would save the basin that the federal government adopted, and abandoning a very old bad plan. At that time the Louisiana coast wasn't a gleam in anybody's eyes, nor was Louisiana's pollution a gleam in anybody's eye. I came down, took a leave in 1981 to come down to solve [the Atchafalaya], to cut a deal with the Governor [David Treen], the land owners, the gas companies, the timber companies . . . "

That deal involved a skirmish with Interior Secretary James

Watt who apparently thought the old bad plan was a good one even though Watt did not prevail (Boulard et al. 1981).

Houck became a Law Professor at Tulane and has contributed extensively on the subject of wetlands in legal journals.

Professor Houck expanded on reasons for coming to Louisiana and discussed EDF and its counsel James T.B. Tripp.

HOUCK: "There was no national attention to Louisiana. We [NWF, EDF] had been busy as national environmental organizations, putting ourselves in Denver, Colorado, Boulder and San Francisco, and in New York, Washington, but we had no southern presence, no knowledge, no awareness of Louisiana, and here was this incredible treasure [the Louisiana Environment], going down the tube."

"The first reports started coming in the late '70's about land loss [coastal wetlands] in the range of about 7-8 square miles a year. By the early '80's they were coming in the 20-20 square miles a year, by the mid eighties they were coming in the 50-60 square miles a year . . . "

"Everything I thought Exxon was doing to the Rocky Mountains they were doing to the coast of Louisiana. The bewildering part of it, and the difficult part of it was that nobody knew anything. Louisiana was going down like some great natural resource such as the Titanic, and nobody was even sending out the radio signals, it was just going to go. And we're talking about wintering habitats for the Mississippi flyway which is half the nation's ducks. We're talking about a quarter of the nation's fisheries, we're talking about enormous resource systems collapsing and nobody paying any attention to it."

"There were two national groups paying attention to it; me, the National Wildlife Federation, and Jim Tripp for EDF [Environmental Defense Fund]. Jim, and I throughout the seventies and continuing into the eighties were kind of a collaborative long range team and sort of a "Operation Louisiana" and we came down like some kind of medical emergency unit and pump a little oxygen in to this place every once in a while, but there wasn't any constituency to work with and

nothing would be left in place when you left. I must have spent half my time on the Atchafalaya just trying to build a coalition to stay in place . . . "

As Houck fought the "war," which included the bottomland hardwoods area in the Atchafalaya and coastal wetlands, he got technical advice from Sherwood Gagliano, a geomorphologist from Louisiana State in Baton Rouge that worked with an LSU Ecologist Paul Templet, who has published articles on wetland decline. Gagliano was one of the early principal investigators of massive land loss in the Mississippi delta in 1964 (Coleman and Gagliano, 1964). Gagliano's work is still cited by people studying coastal land loss whether they agree with the claims of continued massive loss or not (Ramsey and Penland 1990, Penland et al. 1992). Gagliano's pioneering studies as well as others helped frame much of the initial goals of the Coalition and contributed to the ecological debate about wetland decline.

Houck also befriended and collaborated with Michael Osborne. According to Osborne, as Houck was trying to get things organized in Louisiana for NWF he called his house one night and said words to the effect ". . . you don't know me but I need to come over and sleep on your couch tonight (Osborne 1992)." From that time on they collaborated on cases and they all shared a growing relationship between professors at Louisiana State who provided technical expertise for their legal work that concerned the ecology of the lower

Mississippi.

THE AVOYELLES CASE: AN EXAMPLE OF THE GROWING RELATIONSHIP

One of the legal contributions that stemmed from this coterie was the Avoyelles Sportsman's League V. Alexander case, which James T.B. Tripp and Michael Osborne saw in 1979 as a way to expand section 404 to Bottomland Hardwood forests (Avoyelles Sportsmans League v. Alexander, 1979). This case masked a change in public policy and signaled the importance of the relationship between the law and science within what would become the Coalition. Tripp for EDF and Osborne got a federal court to expand section 404 by relying on the ecological expertise of another Louisiana State University professor John W. Day Jr.

Prior to Avoyelles, much agricultural activity which converted bottomland hardwood forests was ignored by the Corps. This seemed easy to do because subsection (f) of section 404 exempts "normal farming and silvicultural activity" from the 404 program. But Tripp and Houck recognized that the Corps of Engineers was being too selective in their interpretation of the statute. With Day's expertise they induced the court to find that the conversion of bottomland hardwood forests was destroying a wetland and required a permit from the Corps like any other wetland. The

Corps, following its historical destruction of bottomland hardwood forests, simply did not interfere with the landowners.

In Avoyelles the Corps was named as a public defendant and the Elder Realty Co. and Bayou Lafrouche Inc. were named as private defendants. From the case record, the land subject to the case was a 200,000 acre tract in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, owned by Elder Realty Company and Bayou Lafourche Inc. A bottomland hardwood forest, the land was biannually flooded by water from the Red River. Much of the vegetation in the area had already been cleared by logging and the tract in question represented twenty five percent of the remaining forested area in the Bayou Natchitoches Basin (Avoyelles Sportsmans League V. Alexander, 1979).

In 1978 the private defendants began to clear the tract to convert it to a soybean field. It was then that the federal district court for the Western District of Louisiana issued an injunction that stopped the activity at the behest of Tripp, Osborne and their clients. The judge bifurcated the issues and then ordered two separate trials, one with respect to the activities of the defendants and a second trial that would decide if the tract in question was wetlands. Although the trial court was reversed in part and affirmed in part, after the defendants appealed to the 5th

circuit as Avoyelles Sportsmans League V. Marsh 1983, new wetland policy ground had been broken.

Using John Day's scientific expertise the court got into the wetland definition and regulation business. Summarized here the trial court made policy by several of its holdings: 1) the defendants use of bulldozers, dicing equipment, and ditch excavation equipment to clear the land were held to be point sources of pollution under section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 2) sheared trees, vegetation, scraped soil and leaf litter were held to be dredged and fill material under section 404 and required a permit from the Corps, 3) wetlands included the vegetation that "grows thereon," not just the whole swamp and requires a section 404 permit, hence cutting trees is not to be ignored as a wetland altering function, 4) the defendants effected the navigable waters surrounding the area, because disturbing the wetlands altered the water that flows between the wetland and adjacent streams, thus violating section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, and finally 5) the defendants could farm on land already cleared.

The first trial's holdings dealt with the activities that the owners were engaged in and thus the Corps should be regulating. The second trial was to decide whether the area was a wetland area and if it amounted to a taking. The

Avoyelles Sportsmans League group lead by Tripp and Osborne prevailed at booth trials and expanded the Corps policy whether the Army liked it or not. In a partial reversal, the appeals court chided the lower court for ruling that the area was a wetland and not letting the EPA make that determination. The appeals court had ordered the lower court to accept the agency's expertise and judgment on wetland status. In the meantime however, the EPA had found what the lower court had found and included bottomland hardwood forests as wetlands and clearing activities as taking wetlands for purposes of section 404.

What is not clearly understood without carefully examining the case record and interviewing the participants is this: much of the court's ruling is the scientific work of John Day. Day's ecological analysis was used by the court to write the opinion and describe ecological processes. The text of the decision goes on at length with scientific data explained as a legal act of environmental education. The case defines detritus, speaks of broadcast spawners in backwater areas being harmed by silt, discusses rates of erosion, the importance of the presence of certain types of vegetation and how these factors relate to each other. That was from the first trial where regulated activities were the issue, the second trial to decide wetlands status continues the trend.

While the appellate court revolted at the lower federal court doing the job of EPA and discussing the situation in ecological terms, by the time it reversed the lower court on some points, the EPA had assumed the same regulatory position as the plaintiffs (Tripp and Osborne) and the Corps changed its stance toward bottomland hardwoods as a wetland that they would regulate under section 404. Thus the use of ecological information to get the Corps to change nationwide wetlands policy was made.

In an interview for this work, Michael Osborne pointed out that they relied heavily on their LSU Ecology colleagues.

OSBORNE: "Well, Day had been a witness of ours and Dr. Templet I don't think we ever used him as a witness . . . but he had been a good, . . . he was a source of information "

". . . well you got to know him on a first name basis and you felt free to call him, and he would call us on occasion. Day of course being a witness, and of course, we got familiar with everybody out at LSU because, you know if you'd go see Dr. Day you'd stop in and see Dr. Gosslink "

HANNY: "The Wetland Resource Center up there [LSU]?"

OSBORNE: "Yes. And you know how its set up, there's one big long hall, and everybody's office is on the other side. You can't hardly . . . you know, they'd think you were discourteous if you walk by and the doors open and you didn't say hello. Then of course when the Avoyelles Sportsman's League came along, we had any number of witnesses from LSU."

While the Avoyelles Sportsman's League case was unfolding

the years that Houck had spent on the Atchafalaya were coming to a close, and Houck began to summarize the emerging data on land loss being reported on coastal land loss in a legal policy treatise (Houck, 1983). The area is dominated by marshes and swamps that are indisputably wetlands but still nothing was being done.

Tripp played a lead role in writing "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" and likened the wetlands of the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain to one of Americas great national "treasures" such as the Grand Canyon or Niagara Falls. Houck was so interested in Louisiana that he actually moved there after working on preserving the wetlands from his National Wildlife Federation Washington office. Osborne a Sierra Club member, was a graduate of Tulane and a member of the local bar with an office on Prytania Street in New Orleans.

III. SUMMARY OF INCENTIVES FOR ORGANIZATION

The symbolic goals of wetland preservation change at the federal level pointed Tripp and Houck in the direction of Louisiana for cases for their organizations. There is material benefit to the national organizations -- EDF, NWF and Sierra -- to be affiliated with an active group in Louisiana. As Tripp notes in "Here Today Gone Tomorrow?" Louisiana is a "National Treasure" like the Grand Canyon or Niagara falls (Coalition to restore Coastal Louisiana,

1989). This was a symbolic or purposive goal highlighted by a permanent organization that enhanced the prestige of the national organizations and results in strategic material benefits. The benefits were great cases and affiliation with an active group in an ecosystem of national importance. The Coalition organization is a cooperative extension of the national organizations that can claim on Capital Hill and at the Pentagon that they are "in" Louisiana. Also the Coalition organization can claim to local Corps officials in Vicksburg and New Orleans that they have connections in Washington -- which they do.

The solidary benefits are also apparent. Coalition people speak highly of each other. Lawyers are associated with ecologists that are being published in a cutting edge science. The scientists are not just publishing in journals for other academics to pass on their tenure. Their science is being used. When Governor Edwards visited LUMCON in May 1992 the author taped his remarks about the future of the organization. LUMCON is mostly under the budgetary auspices of Louisiana State University. Edwards was very candid about the great work the LSU scientists were engaged in but said that it must be related to the state's economic goals (Edwards, 1992). He described the freshwater diversion being conducted at Bonnet Carrie Spillway that enhances oyster production in very positive terms. His message was that LSU

scientists had to do research that benefited the state. It remains for the lawyers and other Coalition partners to find ways of translating the merit of preserving wetlands into recognizable material benefits to Louisiana residents and Coalition supporters.

LSU ECOLOGIST INCENTIVES

I. ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

Academic members of the Coalition, largely ecology professors at Louisiana State University, played a role in the formation of the organization by providing technical guidance concerning the Coalition's goals of diverting sediment to build marsh. An appreciation of the public problem of wetland loss when litigating or engaging in policy advocacy, required assistance from experts who were studying the wetland ecology of the area. Because they were a part of the development of the Coalition organization, it is essential to try to understand why the ecologists supported the organization and what they gave it. Ecologists are concerned about publishing new knowledge about the natural world in refereed scientific journals and have incentives for their actions too.

Conducting their research careers as one might expect independently of one another, these members of the Coalition collectively helped to build a body of knowledge about the Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain and its wetlands. They identified evidence of massive coastal wetland loss and its repercussions and wanted these findings to be more widely known though their findings were published within the

scientific community. After Sherwood Gagliano and his collaborators identified massive loss in a geology journal in the 1960's, whole careers at LSU and elsewhere were devoted to the geology, biology, and wildlife ecology of the changing Louisiana wetlands much more so than had previously been the case (Coleman and Gagliano, 1964).

What they found through the seventies looked very bad for the state of Louisiana. Land loss rates vary in terms of rate and extent, but one estimate shows the City of Houma, thirty miles' inland, becoming a coastal town by 2040 (See Figure 3, 4, 1990, Louisiana Geologic Survey). The same map shows a large area of Louisiana to be in danger of going under water with New Orleans much closer to open sea water than now. Within the last one hundred years land loss has been in the words of one conservative scientist "catastrophic" (Penland et al., 1992). Within the next century at least four coastal parishes (counties) will be largely lost according to some reports (Gagliano, 1981).

Research that validated those observations -- and challenged some of those assumptions -- continues today (See for instance Penland et al., 1992). The facts surrounding wetland loss held by the Coalition represented an approach to public policy because the studies in "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" were used to suggest government policy changes.




Figure 2. Newspaper Account (The Advocate) of Louisiana Geologic Survey's Estimate of Coastal Wetland Reduction 1853-1988

The Bayou Catholic

Houma, Louisiana

April 18, 1990 Vol. 10, No. 40




Figure 3. Newspaper Account (The Bayou Catholic) of Louisiana Geologic Survey's Estimate of Louisiana Coastal Wetland Loss by 2133

Some of the Coalition's actions have been adopted such as a mineral tax to provide marsh restoration and an office within the office of the Governor to fast track coastal restoration efforts. Some of the Coalition's goals such as a review of the value of marsh management activities and an emphasis on broader sediment deposition activities have not been adopted. Day contributed to the writing the scientific aspects of "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" with Tripp and others. In an interview for this work in 1992 at LUMCON he commented on working on the document and said:

DAY:" . . . I do remember working on draft after draft of that thing and, you know, getting it going and was very active in the Coastal Coalition up until two years ago [interview April 1992] when I have been less active and more active in my research, but the research is producing information that is directly relevant to how we solve some of the problems of the coast."

Since "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" was written new information has been generated in the scientific dialogue. For instance, some investigators question the rate at which coastal land loss is now occurring and the relative importance to causes of loss (Penland et al. 1990). Greater attention is being placed on the importance of barrier island loss and the relative importance of different kinds of loss producing factors (Penland et al. 1992). Yet the issue is far from solved and during a visit to Chauvin, Louisiana, in the spring of 1992 the investigator witnessed

local businesses several inches under water when there is a light south wind. Local residents such as Joel Laparous complained that his front yard is inundated too and that this never happened before.

The incentives of the ecologists of the Coalition are visible in the debate with state agency officials over how best to remedy the wetland loss. After a brief review of the general principles of delta land building ecology the participants state their views and the incentives are identified.

II. THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM AND THE NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION

There are aspects of the physical problem that most of the investigators agree on. What is coastal Louisiana today is the result of thousands of years of sediment deposition by the Mississippi River that supports a complex arrangement of landforms and associated vegetation (Chabreck, 1988).

Vegetation such as marsh grasses frequently support the land forms from the erosive powers of the Gulf of Mexico. When marsh deteriorates, what is nearby ground is also in danger and everything south of an east west line going through Baton Rouge Louisiana, is subsiding at different rates. According to environmental writer Marc Riesner: ". . . much of southern Louisiana barely qualifies as land (Riesner,

1991)."

In an elaborate mosaic, Louisiana's salt, brackish, intermediate and fresh water marshes buttress swamps and are near the once vast bottomland hardwood wetland forests to the north (Chabreck 1988, Templet 1990, Craig et al., 1979). This biologically diverse area contains transition zones that require vegetation adapted to different conditions and the biological diversity is extraordinary (Chabreck, 1988). The vastness of the coastal wetlands is also extraordinary. Alexander et al. (1986) calculated that 3800 square miles of coastal marsh existed in Louisiana as of 1986, which is 40 percent of all US coastal marshes. The Mississippi ejects into the Gulf of Mexico the third largest volume of water on earth behind only the Amazon and the Congo (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). The total sediment load is huge and is derived from the drainage of 41 percent of the adjoining states in the Mississippi watershed.

The loss of coastal Louisiana threatens 40 percent of America's shell fishery and fin fishery, and the lives and livelihoods of thousands of people whose homes will go underwater in the next fifty years if present trends continue (Coalition to restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). Almost 25% of the state's area is adjoining to or is a wetland and 60% to 75% of its population lives within 50

miles of the coast, most very close to protective coastal wetlands (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). Many low income people and native Americans practically live in marsh areas that are frequently inundated such as the Houma Indians in Dulac, Louisiana five miles from Cocodrie. At a 1992 Easter service, Reverend Kirby Veret, pastor of the United Methodist Church in Dulac said his church was under water eight feet when Hurricane Juan came through a few years back (Veret, 1992).

In the past few thousand years the delta building process resulted in a series of lobes making up the alluvial fan of Louisiana. During intervals of about a thousand years, successive delta lobes formed at the shallow mouth of the river as it moved in a whip saw motion. While the sediment creates a new delta the remnants of the old delta lobes deteriorate but can still be discerned as major parts of the landscape thousands of years old (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). While this process occurs forming the deltaic plain, the inshore currents of the Gulf of Mexico wash escaping sediment to the west. The inshore westward movement of Mississippi sediment has created the chenier plain of southwestern Louisiana that is a series of ancient beaches. At Constance Beach in Cameron Parish, erosion has left only one remaining chenier that protects the Sabine Wildlife Refuge and Coalition member Rod

Gilbeaux's house. Both human and natural causes of land loss in Louisiana are recognized but little effort has been made to address the relative importance of each cause (Penland et al., 1990).

In only three locations are Mississippi River sediment loads available to replenish the marsh areas: The Atchafalaya River mouth at Morgan City, Louisiana, South Pass at the distal end of the Mississippi, and the north eastern section of Lake Ponchartrain (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989, Templet and Meyer-Arendt, 1988). Consequently, these are the only areas in the Mississippi delta where any land building is occurring. Because the Mississippi sediment moves into areas of depth and currents not directed at the deltaic and chenier plains of the coast and because the sediment from spring flooding that would replace lost material inland moves into the Gulf is lost delta building declines (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989).

Over the last several millennia delta building has resulted in a 1 to 3 square mile increases in overall delta land area (Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989). Even as the lobes of the Mississippi deteriorated over the last seven thousand years, new land was forming which resulted in overall land gain until the turn of this century (Coleman and Gagliano, 1964). Delta building forces consist of

additional amounts of sediment being deposited before the delta sinks and the arrival in the sediment load of nutrients that allow the establishment of plant growth. As nutrient rich sediment loads nourish coastal wetlands, land building occurs which is called accretion. As a final protection against land loss force the bed load (large river bottom sediment) gradually forms barrier islands off the coast. Barrier islands, which have also been subject to increased land loss, perform a crucial function in protecting the whole coastal wetland system from being subject the land subsidence forces of the Gulf.

The levee building has been followed by extensive canals for navigation and this disturbance increases land loss because the canals are not fed by marsh nourishing sediment from the Mississippi. To compound the problem extensive canals have been built to get at oil and gas deposits in the marsh areas. In the last century the Corps and the oil and gas industry built so many canals that Louisiana now has one quarter of all the inland navigation area in the United States (Midboe, 1992). In the twenties, the oil and gas industry began to extract these resources from the delta and much canal construction occurred. During the seventies the petroleum industry created even more canals and typically the canals were not filled thus increasing land loss. When canals are built for oil and gas wells they frequently are

not repaired thus increasing land loss and leaving an eyesore.

The New Orleans metropolitan area along with hundreds of smaller delta communities are contained within the shrinking wetlands so the issues of land loss and sinking property are critical to millions of persons. Coalition member Paul Templet has noted in a refereed scientific journal that a major hurricane striking New Orleans with greatly decreased wetland protection from Tidal surge is a serious policy problem that needs re-examination (Templet and Meyer-Arendt, 1988). Even without increased vulnerability to natural disasters data suggest that at least four coastal parishes (counties) will be under water in the next fifty years (Coalition to restore Coastal Louisiana, 1989.)

Davis (1990) noted that Hurricane Camille, a 1969 force five that missed a direct hit on New Orleans, caused many deaths from flooding by just grazing it. While Camille went past the area and struck between Pass Christian and Gulfport Mississippi, it caused a twenty foot tidal surge that struck St. Bernard Parish just below New Orleans, an area that had experienced significant land loss. Most of the Louisiana deaths from that storm happened there. Mazmanian and Nienaber (1979) used this storm's aftermath to build one of a series of five case studies on Corps of Engineers

community involvement efforts. It showed public rage at the continuance of a thirty-year navigation canal project known as MR-GO (Mississippi River - Gulf Outlet).

Angry residents believed MR-GO conveyed tidal water from Camille to St. Bernard Parish and that extension of this canal was a great threat to them. They went to a public meeting to express this strong feeling to their congressman. Congressman Hebert, (HAY-BEAR) who was trying to push the Corps of Engineers project as a boon to development, left public life rather than ever again subjecting himself to the treatment he received by the voters at the open meeting (Mazmanian and Nienaber, 1979). At the same time then Governor Edwin Edwards -- a Hebert friend -- was trying to impress the same assembly with the need for the Corps water project which would improve navigation to New Orleans.

II. THE NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION

Michael Osborne commented on why he thought the scientists testified and became politically involved and provided an insight into the motivations of Coalition ecologists.

OSBORNE: " . . . its validating their science and putting their science to use, making it pragmatic rather than academic, I mean the article you write in the international journal . . . or something. It gets bounced around. It gets criticized because you did a two-year study instead of a three year study. You

started your study and had a hurricane come down in the middle of it . . . "

"Of course there are many scientists who believe it is beneath the dignity of a scientist and inappropriate for any scientist to assert his views in sort of a political form, it's demeaning."

But scientists associated with the Coalition wanted to work and collaborate with the lawyers and did not feel demeaned. They made numerous public contributions so that their findings would be given to government and the public. John Day, noted earlier, helped James Tripp write "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" as did Paul Templet. Day helped Tripp and Osborne in the Avoyelles case mentioned previously. Day invited James Tripp to an LSU symposium in October 1985 where Tripp called for the Coalition. John Day and other associates made contributions on the consequences of coastal land loss that still serve as benchmark work and used the data to advocate for policy changes (Craig et al.'s 1979).

Yet here there is a great divide in scientific opinion that illustrates another one of the incentives of Coalition scientists. Government money for research on restoration programs known as marsh management by the Louisiana department of natural resources DNR have created doubts in the minds of many ecologists. The ecologists of the Coalition see marsh management as a band aid approach and may even be harmful (Herkes, 1994). The remedies of the Coalition are more research on marsh management options and

perhaps more expensive sediment diversion projects that may impinge on navigation and oil and gas interests. Day commented on marsh management and state government in the spring of 1992 for this work:

DAY: " . . . Part of the impetus for the Coastal Coalition was not only the fact that there was a critical land loss. Everybody knew that, but that the feeling that a lot of government programs were simply misdirected. They were bogged down in governmental bureaucracy, and this is the kind of thing I want you to cover me on. What I would think (and a number of people have said the same thing) is that mythologies have built up about what ought to be done and some of them are just plain wrong."

HANNY: "In terms of marsh management?"

DAY: "Yes, exactly."

HANNY: "Impoundments . . . "

DAY: "Impoundments and . . . partially because of the pressures of the Coalition a big study was funded. Maybe you've heard about it: The Minerals Management service and Myself and Don Cahoon, you've heard his name, and Herb Mendelson, who is a scientist at LSU and some others. We went in and actually looked at these marshes. We looked at two areas . . . "

" . . . a lot of what we found was directly contradictory to what people had said these marsh management plans actually accomplished."

Interviewed extensively for this work, Paul Templet had recently returned as a professor of environmental studies at Louisiana State in March 1992, after being the Secretary of Environmental Quality under former Governor Buddy Roemer who had just lost the election to Governor Edwin Edwards (the man who was for the MR-GO project as Governor in the

1970's), who had made a come back. Since Templet has published on coastal land restoring over twenty years and has been in and out of government besides his Coalition work, he was asked to comment on standards for scientific evidence when making public policy decisions on wetlands. After mentioning Al Gore's "Earth in the Balance" Templet was prompted to comment on how government institutions should respond to the weight of scientific evidence.

TEMPLET: "You do what scientists do. You look for the refereed literature and you see what that is telling you. Right now, the refereed literature is saying, 'Sediment diversion. Sediment in the marsh is the solution to the problem.' If you ask the marsh management people [state officials in the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources], 'show me a paper in the refereed journal that says that marsh management works', they can't point to one. So it's pretty clear. That's how our science works. That is, you're supposed to publish your results, put it out there for everybody to see and criticize, and if it holds up, you are probably right. If that hasn't been done then you gotta wonder about the case."

So the scientists associated with the Coalition have worked with the lawyers for years in Baton Rouge and elsewhere to change the attitude and direction of the government and what they regard as a quick fix of giving government millions for marsh management projects.

III. INCENTIVES: GOOD SCIENCE FOR TENURED FACULTY OR MONEY FOR MARSH MANAGEMENT AT STATE AGENCIES

Professors with tenure need to get research published that

passes the scientific scrutiny of peer review. The solidary benefit of scientific credibility is a motivating factor which allows them to communicate in the special dialogue with other scientists. It would be a material benefit if the scientists did not have tenure. The greatest benefit that Louisiana State University can receive is a reputation of strong scientific credibility, an arbiter of technical questions for society.

GRASSROOTS INCENTIVES

My Dear Brothers in Christ:
I would like to encourage you to attend the meeting of the Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Interfaith Stewardship Plan. As you well know, much of our Diocese is at risk of disappearing under water in the next fifty years. We have lost much already. We need not accept this. As a matter of fact, we are morally obligated, as stewards of God's gifts, to protect and restore our coastal wetlands. I will be attending and hope that you can join me and our brothers and sisters from other denominations.

-- Letter of Catholic Bishop Warren Boudreaux to the Priests of the Houma-Thibodaux Diocese, February 1989

Some people are more directly impacted by coastal wetland loss than others but they still needed to be mobilized into an organization. The organized Coalition starts at Michael Osborne's Prytania street law office in New Orleans. James T.B. Tripp, of EDF in New York, Osborne and Professor Oliver Houck of Tulane, pressed for a local organization using Osborne's law office. Osborne recognized that the ingredients of a local organization could be created through his friends in the Sierra Club, the Louisiana Wildlife Federation as well as some of his clients, such as the Catholic Church associated Organization of Louisiana Fisherman that had recieved leadership training from Rob Gorman Associate Director of Catholic Social Services. While it was Tripp of the Environmental Defense Fund who pressed for the creation of the Coalition in 1985 and shepherded the writing of "Here Today,

Gone Tomorrow?," it was Osborne's understanding of personal chemistry among local people that caused the Coalition to start in early 1986. Osborne was the intersection between local and national groups on the road to the Coalition.

The mobilization for a formal organization followed Tripp's October 1985 call for a Coalition at a wetlands symposium at Louisiana State organized by Professor John Day. When asked who started the Coalition Professor Paul Templet said:

TEMPLET: "Well I think Tripp was the motivating force. Oliver Houck was one of the motivating forces. Then the technical people got involved."

" . . . he and Tripp were instrumental. And then the technical people like John Day and myself, and we can agree on what the solutions are to be, and then Tripp gave us a vision of what the institutional arrangements ought to be, and if you got those two things together your in pretty good shape."

Osborne invited people that became a small working group which eventually facilitated a coordinated movement to induce thousands of Louisiana citizens to contact their elected leaders. All of this transpired with the assistance of Houck who filed the incorporation papers and who operated conveniently across town at Tulane Law School which Osborne had graduated from 26 years before.

The Coalition was the final amalgamation built and executed conjointly by the lawyers and the scientists with leadership from Tripp. It provided coordination of organized

people who had similar interests and who could eventually exert organized and synchronized pressure on government. As Oliver Houck said when asked about who the lawyers wanted to recruit into the Coalition in a April 1992 interview for this research:

HOUCK: "In terms of the local people, we had people that we knew we wanted involved, but one of them ran a Catholic services and another would be doing scientific work out of Baton Rouge. They didn't talk to each other. They didn't know each other, and there wasn't any central unifying theme for coastal land restoring . . . "

In terms of the leadership and structure of the Coalition

Houck said:

HOUCK: "It's less a coalition of groups. It's almost built from the top down. It was the brain child of Jim [James T.B.Tripp] and it was imposed on in a, not in a coercive way, but a persuasive way. It was imposed top-down by Jim on people who thought it was a good idea and then took the ball and ran with it but it remains the idea of maybe 5 or 6 people who implement it."

Early in 1986 Osborne began to hold meetings in his fourth floor conference room on Prytania street. Following his pattern of twenty years of legal collaboration, Tripp was at the table as was Houck, John Day, Paul Templet and a few other interested persons. The meetings were almost bi-weekly and included discussions of what goals should be placed in an organization publication as well as who should be invited.

Sierra Club members, Sarah and Harold Schoeffler, who were friends of Osborne, showed up at the meetings. Sarah Schoeffler was active in the Methodist church in Lafayette

and had community organizing skills that were to prove invaluable. Harold Schoeffler owns a Cadillac dealership in Lafayette and provided the expertise of a successful businessman. Templet was asked to recall how the Schoefflers got involved.

TEMPLET: "He [Harold Schoeffler] had been doing Sierra Club stuff for years, and I knew about him, but I didn't know that much about him, and then, I didn't know Gorman at all, like I said. I met him at one of the first meetings of the Coalition."

In May 1986 Osborne invited Rob Gorman, the Assistant Director of Catholic Social Services in Houma to attend the meetings. The Schoefflers and Gorman represented two different modes of established local organization which enhanced the structure of the developing Coalition. Gorman had already organized local fisherman in Terrebonne and Lafrouche Parishes through a series of one on one meetings that turned into group meetings. The Schoefflers were a part of another religious network that turned into a mass awareness and letter writing campaign called the Interfaith Stewardship Plan. Gorman's mode of organizing was a few hundred dedicated fisherman who could be counted on in litigation and to show up at meetings. The Interfaith Stewardship was an organized multi church meeting program.

Gorman had worked with Osborne trying to get justice for coastal fisherman who had been locked out of their

traditional fishing areas in the area of Houma and Bayou Lafrouche. Since the move by corporations to lock fisherman out was the result of terrain changes caused by wetland decline in a case called the "Tidewater Canal," the lawyers thought that they might enlist the fisherman and others through Gorman's encouragement in the effort to restore wetlands. Moreover, Gorman represented the Catholic Church in an area that was heavily catholic. Together with the Methodist inspired Interfaith Stewardship lead by Sarah Schoeffler, the religious organizations represented an untapped resource to mobilize people for coastal land restoring. Both Gorman and the Schoeffler's efforts overlapped each other. The grassroots groups like the Organization of Louisiana Fishermen and the Interfaith Stewardship provided what science and law could not -- organized community support directed at elected officials and agencies.

The Organization of Louisiana Fisherman grew out of the declining marshes of Terrebonne and Lafrouch parishes and got a push from Catholic Social Services in the Houma-Thibodaux diocese. Gorman's job required helping with the social needs of coastal parishioners such as providing food to needy families. Fishermen were putting increased pressure on Catholic Social Services for assistance because they were getting removed from their economic base of fishing and shrimping.

The culture of coastal Louisiana presents some unique problems for outsiders to get people organized and pressuring government. Fisherman and shrimpers in coastal parishes put most of their money into boats. They live usually in small modest houses and their income comes from their catch, although when furs were fashionable, Joel Laparouse of Cocodrie stated in April 1992, that he use to trap in the winter and receive an additional income (Laparouse, 1992). In communities like Golden Meadow, French is still spoken, an outsider (the author) can go into a quick-stop in Chauvin, which is also a bayou boat stop, and get food while whole groups of patrons speak in French.

The potential cultural barriers of the community were overcome by Gorman. Since 1978, the fisherman here have endured economic problems in an area of great abundance, because many of them are now denied access to traditional fishing areas. Some have been arrested for trespassing into areas where large corporations now stake out and control access (Gorman, 1992). Arrests have occurred as recently as 1992 when this field work was conducted. Yet they have fished here for years gaining access through the public trust doctrine which and when a marsh area changes, such as when a canal closes off or is cordoned off by an oil business, they stumble across a company asserting its new "rights." Large corporations, many of which are headquartered out of the state, take advantage of the

changing terrain features and claim enhanced property rights.

Shortly after Gorman became Assistant Director of Social Service, the Catholic Church recieved grants from the Bishops Campaign for Human Development, the goal of which is to improve peoples lives through militating for social justice issues. Gorman related how he helped fisherman to organize that he eventually represented at Osborne's office during an interview conducted on the Army's Mississippi high water inspection. Gorman was asked how his people were organized in the spring of 1992, during the inspection which is a day long trip down the Mississippi River:

GORMAN: "I work with Catholic Social Services and what we do is a combination of social services, which is helping people in need, and what we call social justice work, which is changing unjust institutions . . . "

" . . . when I first got there in 1982 we'd been, setting up a food bank, helping people who were out of food. Well, around 1983 or so, we started noticing fisherman coming by to get food and that was very unusual."

"Fisherman are pretty independent guys. People were telling us it was unusual to see fisherman coming in, so what we did was, in any organizing what you do is one to one meetings. That is the building block of any organizing effort, is a one on one meeting, where you try to find out just what's going on and see what are the common threads"

"Well, as we'd do these one on one interviews, what we were finding was the fishermen had had a poor trawl season, that was one thing, but also they were being locked out of waterways that they traditionally used. We started saying, 'Well, its fine to give these folks food, but we also need to look at the root causes of the injustice that's causing them now to come to the food bank in the first place.' One of the problems is they can't fish where they used to fish because land owners

are locking them out."

"So we started saying, 'Well, maybe we ought to help the fisherman do something . . .'"

HANNY: "And by this time, you have a population [of fishermen] whom you have met on a one to one basis?"

GORMAN: "Right."

HANNY: "Who works with you when you do that? Was it just you or do you have a staff?"

GORMAN: "It's just me in this case. Working with the director of our agency who was working with me on some of the interviews, and a field rep from the Campaign for Human Development was going on some of the interviews."

HANNY: "How many interviews . . . ?"

GORMAN: "Oh, maybe 20 or 30."

GORMAN: "Just local folks. At a pivotal meeting there was a guy named Herman Dardar [fisherman] and he invited me to his house. One of the people on our board had said, 'Herman's the man you need to talk to.' So, I called Herman who I didn't know from the man on the moon, he lives in Golden Meadow, and I said, 'Herman your name has been given to me. Could I come down and meet with you?' Herman doesn't speak a lot of English. His English is Okay but he prefers French. He says, 'Yeah, come on down.' When I said I was with the church, that made me kind of okay because it's a real Catholic area. So, he said 'I'll sit down with you.'"

"I was expecting to do a one on one. When I get into his living room, there's about 10 or 15 really tough looking guys. Some of them are Indian, some of them are Cajun guys, most of them are speaking French when I walk in. Nobody's speaking English. I walked into the room, this young white dude from up north and my only entree is that I work for the church and they are all Catholic, and I said, 'I'm here to listen to whats going on.' So they started telling me about all these problems, and I said, 'Well, what are you doing about it?' They said, 'You know, its hard to do anything.'"

"So I said 'there are two ways to get power. One is if you have money, and one is if you have numbers.' and you all don't have a lot of money but you have a lot of numbers. Do you have any organizations down here?' They said 'No, there used to be one called The

Organization of Louisiana Fishermen, but its kind of on the ropes. It hasn't been doing much.' I said, 'Well, why don't we see what we can do about that.'
"So Herman's son Isadore [Isadore Dardar], and I started going around doing one on one's with the fishermen and we called a meeting at the fire hall in Galiano."

HANNY: "This is 82-83?"

GORMAN: "Yes, probably 83-84. Its not 82. Isadore is a local guy. A trawler. Everybody knows him. He'd go around speaking French to all the fishermen. I'd sort of nod my head and say, 'we really need to organize' and listen to what they were saying, and say 'Well if you want to keep getting locked out do nothing. If you want to do something about it, you better get together, and there's an organization called The Organization of Louisiana Fisherman that had been active for a while but now, its sort of dead, but the organization structure is still there and that could be a big one.' So, we called a meeting and we had about 150 fishermen show up at the meeting."

" . . . Right there they elected some officers and said, 'lets do something.'"

After that description Gorman allowed how they worked together:

GORMAN: " . . . we had all those fishermen and I just acted as an organizer, sort of giving them leadership training along the way on how to run a meeting and how to research issues, how to access the resources. I mean what they wanted to do was focus on this place called the Tidewater Canal, and open it up. So, I put them in touch with Legal Aid. I remember at one of the early meetings . . . I was sitting on a crab trap, on a dock . . . we were all sitting on crab traps listening to this lawyer from Legal Aid talk about how we were all going to open this thing up."

Legal Aid did not prove to be a successful means for the fishermen to reopen access to the Tidewater Canal and the Organization of Louisiana Fishermen hired Michael Osborne. Gorman described how he found Michael Osborne through a Jesuit attorney.

GORMAN: "So we contacted Mike. Mike got hired. Then Legal Aid got cold feet and backed out after about six months or a year. In the meantime we had also brought in the Attorney General's office through Kai Miboe."

When asked at Prytania street how he found Gorman which is about an hour away from New Orleans, Osborne said:

OSBORNE: "We immediately identified each other as soul brothers, . . . [the] thing that sticks out in my mind is he [Gorman] was concerned about the social problems that came from coastal deterioration and the anti-public trust movement . . . as he put it to me in one of the very early conversations, he said 'we have parishioners who have been self sufficient for generations and whose family have been self sufficient for generations and now they're coming and saying can't we please give them some money because the daughter's going to be starting school and doesn't have any shoes?'"

So started the professional relationship with the fishermen through Gorman that Osborne could call on later when creating the Coalition. Gorman related how he got involved in the Coalition:

GORMAN: "So anyway we weren't involved in this wetland stuff . . . strictly access and then Jim Tripp from EDF came down, and he and Osborne have known each other, as I told you, for years, and found that the environmental groups were here, the landowners and everybody else were over here, and there was nobody who could bring them together, because everybody was pigeon holed. So Osborne got me into it, by saying, 'If we don't have the wetlands anymore, your fishermen don't have jobs.' That made sense so I went to some meetings and eventually because of my position with the church, they figured, I could be sort of a neutral coalition builder."

With Gorman on board and attending meetings at Osborne's office, the lawyers had brought the resources of the Catholic Church along with the Scheofflers. Gorman and the Scheofflers got the Catholic Diocese and the Methodist Conference to pass resolutions to protect and restore coastal

wetlands in 1987.

The Catholic Bishop's resolution was crucial because it put coastal wetland organization in Rob Gorman's job description thus allowing him to devote official duties to the effort. After his church's resolution, Gorman began to go to work on community organization for the Coalition, and Sarah Schoeffler started a drive to hold meetings across coastal Louisiana in all churches. At the end of her effort in 1989 she had a mailing list of over 1500 people in different denominations spread across the coast. Gorman commented on the Schoeffler effort:

GORMAN: "The real credit for that [Interfaith Stewardship] goes to Sarah Schoeffler, [she] was the person who really did the ground work on that. I was involved in this environmental work. OK. And I figured . . . I really needed to know where the church stands on this. You know, I'd really like to have some back-up for this kind of work. I don't know if the bishops are with me on it, so I wrote a resolution for the Louisiana Catholic Conference to get the bishops to pass about wetlands. how it was a social justice issue, a moral issue, and they passed it unanimously, and just about blew me off my seat."

"So that gave me backing and I went to the Methodist pastor, who was a friend of mine, and said 'why don't you do the same thing?' "I said [to him] 'the Methodists have great social justice writings in history, so why don't you do something with wetlands?'"

That was in 1987 and Gorman's Methodist friend mentioned the Schoefflers.

GORMAN: " . . . he said ' I know a woman in Lafayette who is real active. Sarah Schoeffler. Let's get Sarah.' I had some language in there [the resolution] about organizing, but at the time, I really didn't have the time to organize the churches. So Sarah came in and said

'Lets organize the churches.' She promoted it. John [Gorman's Methodist friend] presented it to the Methodist church and they passed it, and several other denominations passed it, but Sarah was really the one that took the bull by the horns and said 'Well lets organize this thing.' . . . 'its just a piece of paper right now, you know, and Rob you're out there doing your thing, but lets get the churches as churches involved in setting up an organization.' I had brought Catholic Social Services into the Coalition. But Sarah said, 'Lets get all the churches into an organization and really look at the theology of this.'"

The Scheoffler Interfaith effort was systematic and involved many more people than the Organization of Louisiana Fishermen. At Interfaith church meetings were scientists and others in the Coalition who gave a presentation on coastal wetland loss and then showed the participants how to contact their elected representatives. She included a sample letter to send to U.S. Senators and House members and representatives in the State Legislature concerning coastal wetland loss.

The connection between religiosity, fishing and politics was captured in this work by a visit to a Mass at 9:00 o'clock in the morning for the Spring 1992. The Boat Blessing on the banks of Boudreaux canal in Chauvin, Louisiana, started an annual event that lasted all day and culminated in an eating and drinking party of over two hundred fishing boats on Lake Boudreaux. Boat Blessings are held every spring in coastal towns to bless the fleet for a safe and bountiful season. Losing ones family in the Gulf is a remote yet serious consideration in the area. Almost all boats are taken on

parade and blessed by the village priest. At the Cocodrie boat blessing, Monsignor Fred Brunet conducted the service which connected the main industry -- fishing -- with biblical passages. The need for the residents of coastal Louisiana to use the ecosystem for their subsistence is clearly intertwined in the sermon which keys on Christ's resurrection and what the apostles (who like many local residents were fisherman) did with Christ's crucifixion. The service was attended by over many people with a small cajun band that played Amazing Grace with two singers, an electric guitar and zedeyco style accordion.

BRUNET: "So he went back home to Galilee on the Lake of Gannessaret and the angel told them at the tomb, he said 'go to Galilee, the Lord has gone there before you, he will see you again.'"

"And so they went back home, and we get the impression, you know, in spite of all the wonderful things that had happened, life had to continue and they had to go back home and face the daily routine, not only Easter Sunday but the Monday. And as they get back into their routine, I'm sure there were many thoughts and questions in their minds, . . . well what are we to do about all of this?"

"Christ has come, he preached, he has taught, he has been resurrected from the dead, he has appeared to us, but what are we to do? And as they were thinking about all this, they are back home in Galilee, and John says something I think we can all relate to: 'I'M GO'IN FISHIN!' . . . That's what he said 'I'm goin fishin!' . . . And the others too said: 'wer'e going with you!' And so they go back out on the lake, and they fish all night, and they catch nothin. And then, early in the morning, as the dawn is breaking, there's a stranger on the shore and he says to them, 'cast your nets on the starboard side.' That wasn't unusual because many times in that area they didn't have to fish to far off shore and sometimes those on shore could see better the movement of the fish, than they could from the boat. So they did as the stranger suggested, they threw their nets, but when they caught SO

MANY fish after having caught nothing all night, a light went on and John in the boat says, as he looks back at the shore, 'it's the Lord!' . . . I'm sure that morning when John saw that, and looked back at the shore, he said 'it's the Lord.' They recognized him in the catch. In that first catch . . ."

After repeated fishing analogies Brunet concludes:

". . . recognize Jesus in the catch, in the fish, in the shrimp, in the providing for us, have that faith in him, and then share that with our families, our community, our church, and brothers and sisters. Then this day I think, will take on a much more beautiful and deeper meaning for us. As we bless the fleet today and ask Gods help that they will have a safe season, and that they will have a most profitable season, so that they can, in turn, share and feed our community."

The scientists, the lawyers and the local groups were now part of the Prytania Street organization. The initial meetings included Randy Lanctot of the of the Louisiana Wildlife Federation -- a Baton Rouge resident -- the Schoefflers from Lafayette, Drs. Paul Templet and John Day as well as Houck and Tripp. The meetings centered on three themes: organizational progress in terms of financial support, a not-for profit incorporated organization structure with a staff located near the capital in Baton Rouge, and the writing of the Coalition's "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?," the organization's plan.

Throughout 1986 and 1987 the meetings continued and efforts and fundraising began. Gorman and Sarah Schoeffler began their efforts with mostly their own resources based upon a

preliminary draft of "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?." It was agreed that the group would apply for section 501 (c) 3 not-for-profit status and James Tripp began to put together the basis for "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" Houck and some of his associates at Tulane started the incorporation process at this time.

Throughout 1986 and 1987 the Coalition continued to meet and much of the work was carried out by the board members. Meeting and planning "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" consumed most of their time and there developed a consensus that a permanent office of paid staff would have to be situated in Baton Rouge. But the organization required an income and that commenced a search for funding that continues today. Tripp made available his contacts in New York who were members of the Rockefeller Family Trust and the Tortuga Foundation which resulted in start up matching funds in the amount of \$50,000. Lanctote made available the bank account of the Wildlife Federation to keep incoming grant money.

December 1987, the first recorded meeting of the Coalition took place. Houck reviewed the progress of the incorporation process. Gorman was selected as the organization's chairman of the board. There were twenty two people that attended the meeting. Besides the Schoefflers, Tripp and Houck and a few legal colleagues, Osborne had also

invited Paul Kemp, a coastal Geologist from Louisiana State who specialized in the chenier plain and David Chambers a wetland scientist who studied nekton communities in brackish water. Kemp promoted elaborate plans of restoring damaged wetlands in the Coalition meetings which served as a communications center for interested scientists and government officials. Among the ideas Kemp advanced were the use of existing oil pipelines to transport discarded sediment to provide for marsh nourishment.

Financial commitments were recorded for several of the attendees. Dr. Barry Kohl and Tripp described their progress on the draft mission statement and the rest of the meeting was devoted to fundraising.

The federal and state governments were targeted in January 1988, for education efforts on the need for coastal restoration legislation. Tripp recommended that a contact be made with Ed Osann, an attorney for the National Wildlife Federation in Washington and that a permanent liaison be maintained between Osann and the Coalition. Randy Lanctot, whose Louisiana Wildlife Federation was in Baton Rouge, chaired a committee to coordinate legislative and executive efforts at the state level in Baton Rouge.

With respect to a state legislation the group wanted an

office of coastal restoration set up preferably in the Department of Environmental Quality. Also they resolved that a funding source for this purpose be created through a tax on state mineral revenue, and that pollution from oil and gas activities into coastal wetlands be eliminated.

In February preparations were underway for a forum at the National Wildlife Federation Conference in New Orleans. The Coalition sponsored the forum entitled "Coastal Louisiana, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow" with Randy Lanctot and Ed Osann as moderators. Work continued on the document the Coalition was putting together and the Scheofflers and Gorman continued to talk and meet with groups across the state.

The group selected a community organizer and received free office space in Baton Rouge where the meetings switched from Osborne's law office. While the community organizer was getting acquainted with his responsibilities, Gorman and Sarah Schoeffler were already at work state wide to alert the public and drum up support. In addition, the group got booth space at the Republican National Convention in New Orleans in the summer of 1988 to press their cause.

At a meeting on the twenty first of June 1988 the legislative chairman Randy Lanctot said the session "yielded a big zero" in terms of accomplishments for the Coalition.

The Coalition thought a better strategy might be to set up a coastal restoration office directly inside the Governor's office. Several members wanted to schedule a press conference to express dissatisfaction with the legislature's and the administrations lack of support.

In September, state Senator Ben Bagert, a New Orleans attorney, began to attend meetings and Jim Tripp continued to commute from New York. Louisiana Governor Buddy Roemer had changed his party affiliation to Republican and Bagert was one of his friends in the legislature. Bagert reported to the Coalition membership that he was getting "good vibes" from the Governor's office and that he thought a position for coastal restoration could be created through the Governor's office. He then read a letter to Roemer that spelled out a bill he would introduce to make the Governor's position permanent, have the office oversee all coastal restoration in other state departments and create a tax for restoration. Bagert's bill would allow a part of the objectives in "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" to happen. At the same meeting Tripp argued for a concerted effort on the Louisiana Congressional delegation.

By February 1989 the final edition of "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow" was developed and in print. Much of the shepherding of the document was handled by Tripp, although Day and Templet played major roles in developing the technical

objectives. Templet had earlier developed an area wide management approach to coastal restoration which had summarized many of the remedies in "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow" and provided a framework for moving ahead (Templet and Meyer-Arendt, 1988).

TEMPLET: "They [EDF and James T.B. Tripp] can't do it all from New York. So Tripp's role in this was to see the bigger picture, and once he had, he could see that there needed to be an organization that could continually put its efforts into guiding state and federal agencies to do the right thing for wetlands. And the way he saw to do that was to get the technical people to agree on a set of solutions, which he did, and he wrote that report, and I helped him and some others helped him. In fact in 1988, I did this paper, which I'll give you a copy of, and Tripp used this as a kind of springboard to pull together some probable solution from which came the first report."

HANNY: "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?"

TEMPLET: "Yes, that was it."

The incentives of the fisherman and the religious groups to support the Coalition are both material, purposive and solidary. People need to eat and care for their families. The church needs parishioners and not be drained of its resources completely. Osborne needed to build an organization for national policy goals that he, Tripp and Houck shared and were discussed before. Osborne used his existing environmental relationships to help create the entity called the Coalition.

STATE CAPITAL NETWORK

I. COALITION MEMBERS WHO WORK AROUND THE STATE LEGISLATURE

What happened around the state capital and the federal government to persuade government to adopt Coalition positions demonstrates another closely knit group of Coalition people who work around the state capital complex in Baton Rouge. New Orleans State Senator Ben Bagert developed the legislation. He had gotten Candidate George Bush to make a no net loss of wetlands pledge at the 1988 Republican National Convention in New Orleans. Bagert leads off describing in an interview in his office on the twentieth floor of the Pan Am building in New Orleans how the Coalition came to work with him:

BAGERT: "See that little brochure that I had put out [coastal wetlands' primer for the lay public]?"

HANNY: "That had a bunch of pictures?"

BAGERT: "Yes. What I found was that I needed some sort of primer. That brochure to me was like a catalyst. What it did was gave people who knew that there was a problem, didn't know exactly what the problem was, some sort of better understanding of what the problem was and it gave them something to talk both to each other, to write about to various opinion-making organizations, which is newspapers, call-in talk shows and then also it gave them something, some information, new information to draw upon when they petitioned their elected officials, wrote letters to their legislators, senator, representatives."

HANNY: "There are a couple of things I'm trying to get after . . . you seem to be at an important crossroads on the coalition's road. I was wondering if you could tell me why you did this and why you have an interest in this stuff and, and what were the mechanics of the bill

that you led the charge for?"

BAGERT: ". . . never quit on fishing, which dates back to my boyhood in Gentilly. I've been hunting less and fishing more and I started seeing the result in loss of these things especially when I got active in fishing again back in the early 80's."

". . . but the key thing was that I had to find this little island and when I went back after the spring and the summer was over and I switched back to the other side of the river, this island which was about a half acre in size was gone. It was dark that morning and the sun hadn't come up and I thought I had gotten lost and somehow run aground. A lot of trouble, messed up my motor and I was terribly annoyed when I found out that I was on top of the island and it was no more. That was when I decided that I was going to do something about it. That happened in 1986."

"The first legislation that I filed during the session was either 1986 or 1987, but I got my brains beat in, I was ostracized by the president of the Senate [Sammy Nunez]. At the time I thought that since his District had a lot of wetlands and since he was involved with oil and gas and distributors, his exclusive domain shouldn't be mine, Johnny come lately. The bill that I filed was a bill that dealt with requiring mitigation and there were wetlands by people who destroy the wetlands for their economic benefit. That bill didn't pass. I got killed for that."

HANNY: "When the Act finally, I think, what [they] call Act 6 finally went through you had folks join you didn't you?"

BAGERT: "Yes, what I recognized was that I had no public support for myself. I had to go to the people and make this an issue, educate the people in Louisiana and then having done that, go back with my legislation. The biggest piece of legislation I think that I ever passed got no notoriety at all, no one knew anything about it."

Coalition members Rob Gorman and Eloise Wall of Citizens for a Clean Environment described how the bill passed.

HANNY: "Now when it came time for a constitutional amendment [state amendment to protect the wetland trust fund which was a part of the bill that passed] and other coalition achievements did you do anything with this group of people [Organization of Louisiana Fishermen]?"

GORMAN: "Yes. There were several major issues to work on, one of those was the constitutional amendment, the other was national legislation, and so the constitutional amendment, we kept working with the legislators, and then one of them, Ben Bagert, introduced this constitutional amendment . . ."

" . . . the coalition isn't the only group that got that through, but it wouldn't have gone through without us, and a pivotal piece there was that Ben [Bagert] was pushing this legislation and we were up there [at the state legislature] trying to educate people about the importance of it . . ."

Bagert's bill was sitting in the Louisiana Senate going nowhere in the spring of 1989. The Coalition members Paul Kemp and Rob Gorman met Eloise Wall, who lives in the state capital and spends much of her time lobbying on environmental issues for her organization: Citizens for a Clean Environment. Eloise Wall, like Randy Lanctote knew all of the important legislators at the state capital and had worked with them for over 7 years. She had lived in Baton Rouge for over 26 years. Wall started Citizens for a Clean Environment and got Paul Templet on its board. Even though Wall had an emphasis on pollution policy she embraced the problems associated with ecosystem restoration in coastal wetlands.

Wall recognized why the previous year the Coalition had been unsuccessful and also why Bagert's bill was going

nowhere. The legislature did not understand the problem and Bagert, an aspiring politician whom George Bush had asked to run against David Duke in the Republican primary, was envied by many. Wall described the scene:

WALL: "Ben Bagert had a meeting of a focus group. Ben was the one who was basically the brains behind this. He put a lot of time into it, and he had a wonderful booklet and he formed this group of coastal legislators, and I thought that this was just going to take off and that it was being handled."

"My initial thing . . . that must have been when Rob Gorman called me. I attended with someone from the Coalition, and Randy Lanctote from the [Louisiana] Wildlife Federation, this focus meeting."

". . . it had gotten put to the back burner so to speak, because a lot of stuff was going on, so Ben had this focus group and I went to get all the coastal legislators back together again. I went to the breakfast [part of the focus group] that morning, and I mean, this was a big, big issue, and when I looked around that room, there were not that many coastal legislators in that room, and I knew all the coastal legislators who were interested in that issue."

Wall was disturbed that there was not more involvement from legislators whose constituents were going underwater. Asked about who was there and she said:

WALL: "I was really really surprised that no one was there. And so, we left the room and then, we, Rob and I started talking, and then I . . . this is when I started to help. So I couldn't figure this out, and I went and asked the other legislators who had been in the room, 'where were the other guys?' and they said, 'Well ask them.' And so I did. And they said that they were just, for one reason or another, they were irritated with Ben Bagert."

Wall commented more on how Bagert was responsible for the policy's formulation:

WALL: "Bagert was interested in this on his own. I mean, he did . . . the guy should be given credit. He did a tremendous amount of work on this and he put together this wonderful booklet that anyone could understand. He went to Washington. He did a lot of work on this . . ."

Wall then described the curious feeling she felt at the behavior of legislators that morning.

WALL: "Back to the legislature. We [the Coalition] went about trying to get these legislators back into the focus group and they said they were definitely interested, but they were not that interested in working under Ben Bagert. So that was a little problem."

The biggest problem was that a 40 year member of the legislature and Bagert antagonist was the head of the committee that Bagert's bill would have to successfully get through. To make matters worse, at that time he [the Senator] had a history of being what Wall characterized as anti-environmental.

WALL: "He was head of the appropriations committee where all the budget [decisions] in the Senate where this would go and he and Bagert did not get along. Every time this [Bagert's bill] would come up, [the Senator] who is not a coastal legislator would, I mean, he has his way of mocking people and getting you out of his hair. He would not hear the bill. I mean, we went probably three times to his committee, had all these people up there, he just had a way of getting rid of it, finding something wrong with it, or just not hearing the bill. So I was getting very frustrated, so Ted Buckner of the Sierra Club [lobbyist], and I, left one of these meetings and went to lunch and came back and Ted was saying, 'Well do you really think its worth it? We've already talked to them. They didn't give us support on the Senate side?' And then, I just said, 'what the heck, what will it hurt? Lets just go again.' So on the way over [to the House] walking across the hall, I started thinking, 'What we ought to do is to ask them [sympathetic legislators] to take it over.' And I knew, and I was really upset about this, this would really anger Ben, because it [the bill] was his baby. I said 'Ted, what do you think about asking

them to start it in the house? ' And he said 'I think it's a real good idea, but what are we going to do about Ben?'"

"So we decided that was the way to go, because we felt the animosity between [the Senate appropriations committee chairman] and Ben that it would never happen in the Senate, and we had a very short period of time [the legislative session was ending]."

"So we got over there [to the house] and the very first guy I saw was Sammy Theriot, and Sammy had been at the focus meeting, and so we said to Sammy, 'Why is no one helping us? ' And he said, 'You know why.' And I said, 'Would you all consider taking the bills and starting them here? ' And he said, 'Oh gosh. Well, yes, I guess we . . . ' I said, we don't have any more time and it's got to be done.' So, he called every coastal legislator that he saw on the floor right then, and there were about four of them altogether, and they came over and he said to them, 'What do you think about this? ' and they said, 'Yes, we will do it.'" So then, somebody said, 'Well it will never go unless we have the Governor.' So I saw Bob Munson, who was a guy who worked for the Governor, we called him over. He says, 'The Governor [Roemer] is definitely interested in this, ' and he said, 'Sammy [Theriot], you have an appointment with the Governor this afternoon. Why don't we discuss this? ' So that is in fact what happened."

Gorman, in a separate interview validated Wall's recollection:

GORMAN: " . . . so Ben introduces this bill, and at that time Ben had a reputation as kind of a maverick within the legislature, and sometimes other legislators would be against something just because Ben was for it. So, one of the things the Coalition had to do, and we were key in this, mostly Eloise Wall, was to take that bill and get some other legislators to have ownership of it, so it wasn't just Ben's bill, and Eloise played a, I can still remember the day, we were all up there. There were several of us, and Eloise was saying, 'Look, these people are going to kill this thing just 'cause they don't like Ben. We've got to get some other people and get them to get their name on it and they can sort of some credit for it. So we got to spread the credit around.'"

HANNY: "Those majority Democrats in the legislature and Bagert was a Republican."

GORMAN: "That didn't have a lot to do with it, it was more of personality, and they knew he was running for

some other kind of office and he wanted to get all the credit for this, and he deserves a lot of the credit for it, but he was not a coalition builder. So, we kind of took his bill and a couple of other folks attached their name to it, and then it started to move. When other people got some ownership of it, with us pushing them to do it, this was sort of back cigar, smoked filled rooms, then it moved. That was a pivotal time, that day, getting those other guys to get some ownership saying, 'We'll recognize you. The Coalition will give some recognition to other legislators who endorse this. We're not tied just to Ben Bagert, Ok. We want you guys to share the glory for this. This is a wonderful thing. It will do great things. We'll heap praise on you.' And they did, and we did, and the sucker passed through the legislature, and Ben still had a lot of ownership of it. And then it had to go public [as a constitutional amendment] and the state had to vote for it, and everybody was working on that. The coalition didn't play the key role in getting it out to the public. We were just one of the players. One of the many players, in getting it passed. And damn, if the thing didn't pass 3-1."

Gorman was then asked what tools were used to influence the views of the legislature and the public.

GORMAN: "All this was preceded by a couple of years of the Coalition's raising this whole issue to saliency within the general public."

Wall had gotten the bill on the legislative agenda and eventually got Senate President Sammy Nunez, who represents a coastal district, to co-sponsor the bill in the Senate. There were other minor problems in the house. David Duke signed on as a cosponsor but was removed before the bill was voted on. The efforts by Republican state legislators to isolate Duke as an embarrassment deserve to be more widely known but are beyond the scope of this work.

In the spring of 1989, after the Coalition had educated

the legislature and gotten extensive media coverage from the *Times-Picayune* (1989) and the (Baton Rouge) *Advocate* (1989) the bill passed. Later that year the wetlands trust fund part of the bill, which created a tax from mineral revenue, passed as a statewide constitutional amendment 3-1. Constitutional status made it hard for the state to use the money for a separate purpose. The money from the tax went to the state department of natural resources that frustrated the Coalition because the state's version of marsh management programs are not congruent with the Coalition plans in "Here Today, Gone, Tomorrow?" The money is spent on projects that impound marsh areas and do not, according to John Day, build marsh.

Simultaneously as the state action was happening the Coalition board also decided to educate the Louisiana delegation in Washington. Senator John Breaux introduced legislation that was essentially objective eighteen of "Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?" The National Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act of 1990 was signed into law by George Bush, in November 1990. The Act created a task force representing all federal agencies including the Corps and the state of Louisiana to develop a plan for coastal Louisiana. It raised wetland restoration and protection to a level equal to all other Corps values including navigation and flood control, and it provided a

budget increase to the Louisiana district office in excess of thirty five-million dollars.

STATE CAPITAL INCENTIVES

Ben Bagert, Eloise Wall and Randy Lanctote were members of the Coastal Coalition. Before the Coalition began, Ben Bagert had been interested in coastal restoration as a policy issue he could build upon. Bagert got George Bush to write a letter concerning the Bush stand on "No Net Loss" of wetlands. Eloise Wall is an environmental advocate who entered the world of environmental politics because her daughter had an illness that she ascribed to pollution in the Baton Rouge area. Eloise Wall lives a few blocks from the legislature and is well known among the representatives. Bagert wants to be elected and advance the environmental cause, Lanctote represents the members of the Louisiana Wildlife Federation and needs to a advocate for his membership. Eloise Wall has her own organization: "Citizens for a Clean Environment." A coalition of common interests provided the rationale for a material benefit of passing a wetland bill that would satisfy all parties.

CONCLUSION

I. THE CASE OF THE COALITION AND THEORIES OF INTEREST GROUPS

The Coalition formed for reasons far beyond the individual desires of the members and represents the agendas of parent organizations applied skillfully in an ongoing incorporated entity. The Coalition is a specific type of organization -- a political organization -- created in the environmental movement to satisfy several organizational agendas. By facilitating the incentives available to the constituent members, the organization was formed and maintained by a small group of persons. Each organization: law, science/academic, grassroots religious or lobbyist had a strategic incentive to support the Coalition.

As an individual case of political mobilization, the ability to generalize to other organizations, let alone the American political system is very limited. But as a theory building activity, the opportunity to generalize about the Coalition as a forming group beckons. The Coalition may represent a new type of national local organizational partnership that is developing as the environmental movement has "matured." As Bosso (1987) and Mitchell (1990) have argued, much of the

agenda of the environmental movement has been accepted by the public and now environmental organizations are having to become creative to continue. The Coalition is allied with many political actors in Washington, D.C. and Baton Rouge and continues today and their methods for staying together to sustain the coastal wetlands are working because they are still in business.

The thesis is that building the Coalition organization is linked to benefits and strategies of a few entrepreneurs who represented parent organizations that promoted group alliance formation. The unit of analysis was broader than the characteristic of individual decision to join the group and represents people who have occupations that benefit from an alliance and maintain that alliance. The four categories of occupation: environmental law organizations, research scientists in the LSU academic setting, the organizations of Rob Gorman, and the Interfaith Stewardship efforts of the Schoefflers and the State Capital Network were largely mobilized by a small coterie. The Coalition did not happen because of good intentions or the existence of a problem. The problems, organizations interested in them and the interested people existed before the Coalition happened. Without careful goal directed acts of entrepreneurship it is doubtful that the organization or a similar organization would have occurred.

II. THE RESULTS AND EXCLUDING ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS

David B. Truman's (1951) theory that an organization like the Coalition formed and continued because of likeness of function certainly does not hold. The Lawyers, the scientific community the grassroots religious groups, the fishermen, all had the problem of Coastal wetland decline. These people are however, are very different in terms of occupation, training, economic base and culture. In the end the group cannot stay together merely because the people in it are the same; they have little in common but the fact that they are in Louisiana and they do not like the declining wetlands.

The organizations that the people represent are different as well. The Environmental Defense Fund, Tulane Law School and Osborne's law practice have functions in common but not with the ecologists at Louisiana State. Truman's view that likeness causes cohesion does not explain the Coalition. Neither does Truman's partial theory of disturbance. The disturbance of massive environmental change caused everyone to come together but they did not do so without encouragement from the lawyers. There may have been a general disturbance -- an ecological problem -- but people and organizations needed coordination. Someone like Michael Osborne and James Tripp had to find people whom they could

put together as an alliance.

Olson's collective action dilemma was overcome for each group in the Coalition because of incentives of the members but mostly because of the incentives for parent organizations. The Environmental Defense Fund and the National Wildlife Federation had sought a presence in "National Treasure" locations throughout the seventies and eighties. It was a national material benefit that they were closely allied with a Louisiana organization. First, they could claim to national policy makers, particularly the Louisiana congressional delegation, that they were "in" Louisiana. Second, EDF in association with Ed Osann of the National Wildlife Federation, got Rob Gorman and others to come and testify in Washington, D.C. (Coalition Board Minutes, 1989). In addition, EDF could show national policy makers that the State of Louisiana would become involved with coastal land restoring and that the federal government would not bear the total cost (Part of the National Coastal Wetlands restoration Act was to get the state of Louisiana to assume some cost). The National Organizations found that it was a great benefit to litigate and organize in Louisiana that afforded them many benefits, purposive, material and solidary.

The law practice of Mr. Osborne, already well established

and well known in New Orleans became the focal point of joint national, state and local action to improve the environment. Michael Osborne has been along with Oliver Houck and James Tripp an environmental enthusiast all his life. Michael Osborne canoed for years as a Sierra Club member in Arkansas and Louisiana and had almost a religious calling to save the environment. Oliver Houck is also a well known outdoorsman. The investigator found people all over Louisiana who had not been associated with the study who were aware of Houck's canoe trips down the Atchafalaya.

The needs of grassroots groups were obvious because they were threatened physically and economically. People are slowly sinking because of wetland decline. Fishermen are running out of food because they are being denied access to fishing areas caused by the wetland decline. Catholic Social Services is running out of money because it has assumed the humanitarian task of helping the fishermen. And as Bishop Boudreaux says "the diocese is going under water. . . (Boudreaux, 1989).

The wetland ecologists saw their research being taken seriously by the public who now understand that there is a problem. The wetland ecologists understand that now that people understand more about the problem, the state is spending coastal restoration funds with scientific support

and program evaluation.

The persons at the State Capital Network claim they successfully helped pass legislation, that they had something to do with national legislation being passed as well. These incentives were recognized by Michael Osborne, James Tripp, Oliver Houck, Rob Gorman as well as others. Together they fashioned a social network that continues to support the declining wetlands of coastal Louisiana.

III. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE STUDY

The Coalition organized as a complex act of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship of high mindedness, solidary or fraternal rewards and specific material benefits that accrued to members from the negative effects of a declining coast. Mancur Olson said that people were motivated in limited ways by public goods. In a critique, Mitchell (1979) suggested, based on qualitative analysis of the big ten that people can be motivated by public bads. Public bads motivated the Coalition participants.

Most all people interviewed in the study expressed sincere desire to see the wetlands of the Mississippi delta preserved. The resources of the Coalition members were

mobilized by selective employment of individual and strategic incentives recognized by a small group.

To acquire more knowledge about group formation from this study an additional inquiry needs to be conducted. Other Louisiana groups such as the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation as well as ad hoc groups like Concerned Crabbers and Common Claws in the Jeanerette, Louisiana, area need to be compared to the development of the Coalition. Another study of the Coalition's activities to compare the selective incentives also needs to be conducted in the years ahead to discover if the same patterns continue.

The Coalition board minutes would also serve as an excellent quantitative study to understand maintenance incentives. The incentives could be mapped in the board minutes over time to see what incentives were the most important to the organization. A serious issue for the group that was not directly addressed in this study was Coalition funding levels. Seventy percent of the Coalitions budget came from east and west coast foundation grants that the Coalition applied for. James Tripp sits on the board of the Rockefeller Foundation where some early Coalition money came from. Michael Mileke, a former Coalition director who is not discussed in-depth in this work, worked to obtain grant funds that were substantial from W. Alton Jones (\$200,000)

for three years, the Babcock foundation, the Hewlitt Foundation and others. A substantial part of Coalition maintenance funding coming from these sources was crucial. The grant getting function in the Coalition needs to be explored more.

A possible strategy is mapping the foundation grant money and comparing it with the Coalition board minutes to see if specific pattern of individual and organizational activity corresponds with money received by the Coalition over time. Another issue that could be mapped from the board minutes would be attendance and the activities of the members. It is possible that attendance and level of commitment could be compared to Coalition activities even without looking at the money received to learn how the Coalition could be sustained. Understanding how the Coalition continues is another task.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Avoyelles Sportsmans League v. Alexander. 473 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. La. 1979) and 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. La. 1981).

Ablard, C.D. and B.B. O'Neil. 1976. Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance. *The Vermont Law Review*. Vol., No. 23. pp. 51-115.

Bailey, M.T. 1992. Do Physicists Use Case Studies? Thoughts on Public Administration Research. *Public Administration Review*. Vol. 52, No. 1 January/February. pp. 47-54.

Bean, M.J. 1983. *The Evolution of National Wildlife Law*. Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Praeger.

Bentley A. 1908. *The Process of Government*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Berry, J.M. 1989. *The Interest Group Society*. 2d Ed, New York: Harper Collins.

Berry, J.M. 1977. *Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Bosso, C.J. 1991. Adaptation and Change in the Environmental Movement. In Cigler Alan, J. and Loomis, Burdett (Eds) *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. pp 151-176.

Boulard, G., Compliment, A., Courtney, N., Pinckley, D., Swift, G. and M. Yanuck. 1981. Houck vs. Watt: Battling over the Environment. *Tulanian*. Winter, pp. 3-5.

Campbell, D.T. 1975. Degrees of Freedom and the Case Study. *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 8, pp. 173-193. July.

Campbell, D.T. and J. Stanley. 1963. *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Chabreck, R.A. 1988. *Coastal Marshes: Ecology and Wildlife Management*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cigler, A.J. Organizational Maintenance and Political

Activity on the "Cheap": The American Agriculture Movement. In Cigler Alan, J. and Loomis, Burdett, (Eds) *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. pp 81-107.

Clark, P.B. and J.Q. Wilson. 1962. Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. Vol. 6 pp 129-166.

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1376 (Supp. V. 1981).

Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, editors. 1989. *Coastal Louisiana: Here Today And Gone Tomorrow? A Citizens' Program for Saving the Mississippi River Delta Region, To Protect its Heritage, Economy and Environment*. Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 70 pp.

Colemen, J.M. and S.M. Gagliano. 1964. Cyclic Sedimentation in the Mississippi River deltaic plain. *Transactions of the Association of Gulf Coast Geologic Societies*. Vol. 14, pp. 67-80.

Craig, N.J., Creasman L., Pashley, D., Shaffer, G., Swain, M. and D. Llewellyn, 1992. *Restoration of the Mississippi River Alluvial Plain as a Network of Functional Ecosystems*. The Nature Conservancy of Louisiana. Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Craig, N.J., R.E. Turner, and J.W. Day jr. 1979. Wetlands Losses and Their Consequences in Coastal Louisiana. *Z. Geomorphology N.F.* Vol. 34, p. 225-241.

Dahl, R.A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, T. 1990. *Wetland Losses in the United States, 1780's to 1980's*. US Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service. Washington, D.C. 13. pp.

Davis, D. 1973. *Louisiana Canals and Their Influence on Wetland Development*. PhD Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 199 pp.

Davis, D. 1990. *Coastwise*. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: The Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana.

Downs, A. 1967. *Inside Bureaucracy*. A Rand Corporation Study. Boston: Little Brown.

Eckstein, H. 1975. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, (Eds) *Strategies of Inquiry*. pp.79-137. (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley).

Environmental Defense Fund. 1992. *How Wet is a Wetland? The Impacts of the Proposed Revisions to the Federal Wetlands Delineation Manual*. New York: The Environmental Defense Fund/ World Wildlife Fund. January.

Feagin, J.R. Orum, A. and G. Sjoberg. 1991. *A Case for the Case Study*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.

Gagliano, S.M., K.J., Meyer-Arendt and K.M. Wicker. 1981. Land Loss in the Mississippi Deltaic Plain. *Transactions of the Gulf Coast Association of Geologic Societies*. Vol. 31, pp 295-300.

Gamson, W. A. 1990. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. (2nd ed). Belmont California: Wadsworth.

Glaser, B. G. and A. Strauss. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.

Glaser, B. G. 1978. *Theoretical Senitivity*. Mill Valley California: The Sociology Press.

Gray, V. and D. Lowery. 1995. The Demography of Interest Organization Communities: Institutions, Associations and Membership Groups. *American Politics Quarterly*. Vol. 23, No. 1, January. pp. 3-32.

Hannan, M.T. and J. Freeman. 1989. *Organizational Ecology*. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Hiske A. L. and Hiske, R.P. 1986. *Science Technology and Policy Decisions*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Houck, O. A. 1983. Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes Consequences and Remedies. *Tulane Law Review*. Vol. 58, No.1, pp.1-168.

Houck, O. A. 1984. With Charity for All. *The Yale Law Review*. Vol. 93, No. 8, pp. 1415-1545.

Houck, O. A. 1989. Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean water Act and Similar Environmental Laws. *The University of Colorado Law Review*. Vol 60., pp. 773-840.

Hula, K. 1994. Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Forging Interest Group Coalitions in Washington. In Cigler Allan J. and Loomis Burdett, A. (Eds) *Interest Group Politics*. Washington D.C.:Congressional Quarterly Press.

- Ingram, H. and D. Mann, 1989. Interest Groups and Environmental Policy. In Lester, James, P. 1989. (Ed) *Environmental Politics and Policies: Theories and Evidence*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. pp. 135-157.
- Kemp, K. 1981. Symbolic and Strict Regulation in the American States. *Social Science Quarterly*. Vol 62., September, pp. 516-526.
- Knoke, D. 1986. Associations and Interest Groups. *Annual Review of Sociology*. Vol. 12 pp. 1-21.
- Laparouse, J. 1992. Personal conversation on his boat during the Chauvin, Boat Blessing.
- Latham, E. 1952. *The Group Basis of Politics: A Study of Basing Point Legislation*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Lester, J.P. 1989. (Ed) *Environmental Politics and Policies: Theories and Evidence*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
- Lofland J. and L. Lofland. 1984. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth.
- Lowery, D. and V. Gray. 1994. The Nationalization of State Interest Group System Density and Diversity. *Social Science Quarterly*. Vol. 75, No. 2, June, pp. 368-377.
- Lowery D. and V. Gray. 1995. The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States. *American Journal of Political Science*. January.
- Lowi, T.J. 1972. Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice. *Public Administration Review*. 32(July/August), pp. 298-310.
- Maass, A. 1950. Congress and Water Resources. *American Political Science Review*. 44 September, pp. 576-593.
- Maass, A. 1951. *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nations Rivers*. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Mazmanian, D.A. and J. Nienaber, 1979. *Can Organizations Change?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- McCool, Daniel, J. 1987. *Command of the Waters: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development and Indian Water*.

Berkeley: University of California Press.

McFarland, A.S. 1984. *Common Cause: Lobbying in the Public Interest*. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.

McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M, N., 1978. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology*. 82, pp. 1212-1241.

McPhee, J. 1989. *The Control of Nature*. New York: Noonday Press.

Meilke, M. 1991. Open Letter to the Coalition Membership. *Coastwise*. Summer. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: The Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana.

Merton, R.K. [1957]. 1968. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. 1968 Enlarged edition." New York: The Free Press.

Merton, R.K., Fiske, M. and P.L. Kendall 1990. *The Focused Interview: A Manual of Problems and Procedures*. 2nd edition. New York: The Free Press.

Midboe, K. 1992. Louisiana Secretary of Environmental Quality. Personal Communication.

Mitchell, R.C. 1990. "Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990's?" In Vig, Norman, J. and Michael E. Kraft. 1990 (Eds). *Environmental Policy in the 1990's: Toward a New Agenda*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. pp. 81-99.

Mitchell, R.C. 1979. "National Environmental Lobbies and the Apparent Illogic of Collective Action." In Clifford S. Russell (Ed), *Collective Decision Making Applications from Public Choice Theory* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future), pp 87-121.

Moe, T.M. 1980. *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moe, T.M. 1981. Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups. *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 43, pp. 531-543.

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).

Olson, M. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Olson, M. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Penland, S, H.H. Roberts, A.H. Sallenger, Jr, Cahoon, D, Davis, D. and C.G. Groat. 1992. Coastal Land Loss in Louisiana. *Transactions of the Gulf Coast Association of Geologic Societies*. p. 685-699.

Penland, S. and K.E., Ramsey. 1990. Relative Sea Level Rise in Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico. *Journal of Coastal Research*. Vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 323-342.

Ripley, R.B. and G.A. Franklin. 1991. *Congress, The Bureaucracy and Public Policy*. 5th ed. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks Cole.

Platt, J. 1964. Strong Inference. *Science*. Vol. 146. No. 3642. October, 16.

Popper, K. 1959. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. New York: Basic Books.

River and Harbor Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 401,403 (1976).

Salisbury, R.H. 1969. An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. Vol 13. pp. 1-32.

Salisbury, R.H. 1984. Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 78. pp. 64-76.

Salisbury, R.H., Heinz, J.P., Laumann, E.O. and Robert L. Nelson. 1987. Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 81, pp. 1217-1234.

Schattschnieder, E. E., 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realists View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wintson.

Scholzman, K. L. and J.T. Tierney. 1983. More of the Same: Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change. *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 45, pp. 351-377.

Scholzman, K.L. and J.T. Tierney. 1986. *Organized Interests and American Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.

Scholzman, K. L. and S. Verba. 1979. *Injury to Insult: Unemployment, Class and Political Response*. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Shaiko, R.G. 1991. More Bang for the Buck: The New Era of Full Service Public Service Organizations. In Cigler Alan, J. and Loomis, Burdett (Eds), *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. pp 109-129.

Shaw, J.H. 1985. *Introduction to Wildlife Management*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Selznick, P. 1949. *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study of Politics and Organization*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Templet, P.H. and K.J. Meyer-Arendt. 1988. Louisiana Wetland Loss: A Regional Water Management Approach to the Problem. *Environmental Management*. Vol. 12, no. 2, pp 181-192.

Tocqueville, A. 1969 [1848]. *Democracy in America*. J.P. Mayer (Ed). New York: Harper and Row.

Thomas, C.S. and R. J. Hrebenar, 1992. Nationalization of Interest Groups and Lobbying in the States. In Cigler Alan, J. and Loomis, Burdett (Eds) *Interest Group Politics*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press. pp 63-80.

Truman, David. 1971 [1951]. *The Governmental Process*. 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A.Knopf.

United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).

U.S. Department of the Interior. 1988. *The Impact of Federal Programs on Wetlands. Vol. I The Lower Mississippi Alluvial Plain and The Prairie Pothole Region, A Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Interior*, Washington, D.C., October.

U.S. Department of the Interior. 1994. *The Impact of Federal programs on wetlands. Vol. II. The Everglades, Coastal Louisiana, Galveston Bay, Puerto Rico, California's Central Valley, Western Riparian Areas, Southern and Western Alaska, The Demarva Peninsula, North Carolina, Northeastern New Jersey, Michigan and Nebraska, A Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Interior*. Washington D.C., March.

Vig, N.J. and M.E. Kraft. 1990. *Environmental Policy in the 1990's: Toward a New Agenda*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Walker, J.L. 1992. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Walker, J.L. 1983. "The Origin and Maintenance of Interest groups in America." *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 77 pp. 390-406.

Whyte, W.F. 1955. *Streetcorner Society: The Social Structure of An Italian Slum, Enlarged Edition*. The University of Chicago Press.

Wilson, J.Q. 1973. *Political Organizations*. New York: Basic Books.

Yin, R.K. 1984. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Zald, M.A. and R. Ash. 1966. Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decline and Change. *Social Forces*. Vol 44. pp. 327-341.

Zald, M. N. and J.D. McCarthy. 1980. Social Movement industries: Competition Among Movement Organizations. *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*. Vol. 3, pp.1-20.

Zigler, H. 1983. In Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines (Eds). *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis*. 4th ed. Boston: Little Brown.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

PERMISSION TO USE GIS MAP FROM CRAIG ET AL. 1992



LOUISIANA

April 6, 1993

David Haney
214 N. Fir Street
Jenks, Oklahoma 74037

Dear Mr. Haney:

As discussed in our conversation it will be fine for you to use the map depicting the presettlement and current extent of forested wetlands in the Mississippi River Alluvial Plain. Because the article Dr. Shaffer mentioned has not yet been accepted by a journal for publication the best citation to use would be:

Craig, N.J., L. Creasman, D. Pashley, M. Swan, G. Shaffer, and D. Llewellyn. 1992. Restoration of the Mississippi River Alluvial Plain as a Functional Ecosystem. The Nature Conservancy of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, LA. 83pp.

Best of luck on your dissertation. I would definitely appreciate a copy of your dissertation as it sounds like it will provide some excellent information for our work.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Lisa Creasman".

Lisa Creasman

P.O. BOX 4125

BATON ROUGE,

LOUISIANA 70821

(504) 338-1040

FAX 338-0103

printed on recycled paper

APPENDIX B
LETTER OF BISHOP BOUDREAUX TO THE PRIESTS



Diocese of Houma - Thibodaux

Post Office Box 9077
Houma, Louisiana 70361

Phone (504) 868-7720

February 13, 1989

To the Priests
Diocese of Houma-Thibodaux

My dear Brothers in Christ:

I would like to encourage you to attend the meeting of the Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Interfaith Stewardship Plan. As you well know, much of our Diocese is at risk of disappearing under water in the next fifty years. We have lost much already.

We need not accept this. As a matter of fact, we are morally obligated, as stewards of God's gifts, to protect and restore our coastal wetlands.

I will be attending and hope that you can join me and our brothers and sisters from other denominations.

Fraternally yours in
Christ,

Warren L. Boudreaux
Bishop of Houma-Thibodaux

WLB:yd

APPENDIX C
LETTER OF THANKS TO THE INVESTIGATOR



Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana

8841 Highland Road, Suite C • Baton Rouge, LA 70808 • 504 / 766-0195 • Fax 504 / 766-0229

1 August 1992

Mr. David Hanny
9106A South Urbana
Tulsa, OK 74137

Dear David,

Your visits to the Coalition in Baton Rouge this year have been delightful--and your interest in our work is most appreciated. Hopefully, our files and interviews were of use of you in your research. We look forward to future visits from you, and your "hands-on" trips to Baton Rouge and the coastal Louisiana area last January and this spring/summer were most productive from our viewpoint.

I'm about to start production of our next magazine, *CoastWise*, which will feature an article written about you by the Houma Courier. They have graciously given me permission to use the story they wrote about you. A companion article on our visit to the Honey Island Swamp Tour will also highlight the many things you learned about the Mississippi Delta. I do appreciate your assistance with the photography on that "mission."

The many interviews you gave with our founders and "bailiwicks" should provide you with much material on our organization. The Coalition has accomplished so much in such a short time and much of the credit goes to our volunteer board members.

The best of luck with your thesis. Please call if you need more information. Perhaps next time south Louisiana's rains won't flood you out of your housing arrangements.

Sincerely,

SHEREE HOHN ELLISON
Administrator
Editor, *CoastWise*

Turn the Tide on Wetland Loss by the Year 2000!



VITA

David Douglas Hanny

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis: INTEREST GROUP FORMATION THROUGH RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION: THE CASE OF THE COALITION TO RESTORE
COASTAL LOUISIANA

Major Field: Environmental Science

Biographical:

Education: Graduated from Cassadaga Valley Central High School, Sinclairville, New York, in June 1976; received Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology from the State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York, in June, 1980. Received Master of Public Health degree from the University of Oklahoma Health Science Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in December, 1983. Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major in Environmental Science at Oklahoma State University in July, 1995.

Professional Experience: Associate Director, Area Health Education Centers Program of the College of Osteopathic Medicine of Oklahoma State University, Tulsa, Oklahoma, May, 1985 to June, 1988. Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, August, 1989 to May, 1991. Awarded Fellowship, Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, Oak Ridge Associated Universities conducted at the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Public Health Service, Atlanta, Georgia, July, 1993 to October, 1994.

**OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW**

Date: 05-08-95

IRB#: GU-92-007

Proposal Title: INTEREST GROUP FORMATION THROUGH RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: THE CASE OF THE COALITION TO RESTORE COASTAL LOUISIANA

Principal Investigator(s): James Lawler, David D. Hanny

Reviewed and Processed as: Modification

Approval Status Recommended by Reviewer(s): Approved


APPROVAL STATUS SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY FULL INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD AT NEXT MEETING.

APPROVAL STATUS PERIOD VALID FOR ONE CALENDAR YEAR AFTER WHICH A CONTINUATION OR RENEWAL REQUEST IS REQUIRED TO BE SUBMITTED FOR BOARD APPROVAL.

ANY MODIFICATIONS TO APPROVED PROJECT MUST ALSO BE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL.

Comments, Modifications/Conditions for Approval or Reasons for Deferral or Disapproval are as follows:

Signature:


Chair of Institutional Review Board

Date: May 15, 1995