

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF HAITI

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THESIS AND ABSTRACT APPROVED

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PREFACE

I undertook this thesis, "The American Occupation of Haiti", at the suggestion of Dr. O. A. Hilton. I have found it very interesting and have enjoyed doing the research and the writing of it. It attempts to explain the reasons for the occupation of Haiti and the accomplishments of the occupying forces. The Haitians seemed to acquiesce and be thankful for the occupation at first, and then rose in revolt against the occupation forces. I have endeavored to point out the reasons for this change by telling of the cruelties and abuses of the marines and the gendarmerie, especially during the corvee.

I wish to thank my advisers Dr. O. A. Hilton, Dr. Alfred Levin and Dr. George E. Lewis for their guidance, patience and understanding in helping me write this paper. I wish to thank, also, Mr. Alton P. Juhlin and the library staff of Oklahoma A. & M. College for helping me locate materials for this thesis.

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CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE OCCUPATION

Haiti won its independence from France during the time of the Napoleonic wars in Europe. The revolution which was led by Toussaint L'Ouverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Henri Christophe, was largely a revolt of the mulattoes and Negroes for equal rights. The French were driven off the island and the slaves emancipated. The island was freed in 1804 and after that time Haiti was never stable politically, as president followed president usually by overthrowing his predecessor in a revolution. Dessalines proclaimed himself Emperor Jacques I on October 8, 1804, and was assassinated in 1806 by Christophe who took the title as Henri I. In the period between 1806 and 1915 Haiti was headed by twenty-four presidents, seventeen of whom were overthrown by revolution. Five died in office, one it is said by poison; one in an explosion of the national palace; one died on the eve of his overthrow by revolution; one was torn to pieces by a mob. The six predecessors of President Sudre Dartiguenave (1915) averaged only about six months in office.¹ Only one of the twenty-four presidents, who served between 1806 and 1915, Michel Oreste, was a civilian; the rest were military men.

The government since the liberation of Haiti had been controlled by an elite class numbering about 30,000 and it was to this class that the offices of the government went and a chance to enhance their fortunes at the expense of the public treasury. Little provision was made for public

¹H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, The Story of Haiti (New York: Dodge Publishing Company, 1936), p. 243.

education, although there had been a law since 1864, providing for compulsory education. Most of the schools were maintained by the Catholic priests and sisters to which the government contributed sums of money from time to time. Admiral William B. Caperton and General Smedley D. Butler testified during the hearings of the Senate inquiry into the occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo that ninety-five to ninety-eight per cent of the people could neither read nor write.² Testimony was also given that teachers were employed who could not read or write, music teachers who knew no music and could play no instrument. The average wage paid to teachers was about seven dollars a month.³ Dr. George Sylvain, a lawyer, and Pierre Hudicourt, a lawyer and plenipotentiary to the Second Hague Conference, testified that the literacy rate was seventy-five per cent in the cities and twenty-five per cent in the rural areas.⁴

Money from abroad had been invested in Haiti as there was no capital available there to build railroads and for sugar plantations. Money was supplied generally by investors from France, Germany and the United States. Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State during Taft's administration, tried to discourage the entrance of non-American capital into Haiti because the island was important to the defense of the Panama Canal and our other interests in the Caribbean area. However, when the National Bank of Haiti was organized in 1910 during the administration of Antoine Simon six per cent of the bank stock was owned by investors from Germany, fifteen per cent by Speyer and Company, Hallgarten and Company, and La-

²U. S. Congress, Senate, Inquiry Into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo., Hearings Before A Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, U. S. Senate, 67th Congress, Pursuant to S. Resolution 112 (2 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office 1922), Vol. I, p. 541.

³Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1291.

⁴Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1471.

denburg Thalman and Company, American Banks with German affiliations, and five per cent by the National City Bank of New York, while seventy-four per cent of the stock was held by the Banque d l'Union Parisienne.⁵ In 1917 the National City Bank purchased the stock owned by the other three American parties and in 1919 it bought the assets of the French institution.⁶

President Antoine Simon in 1910 granted a concession to an American, James P. McDonald, to build a railroad from Port au Prince to Cap Haitien. McDonald secured another contract which gave him fifteen miles of land on each side of the railroad for the cultivation of bananas, and a monopoly on the export of them.⁷ The concession given to the railroad stated: "In the course of the first year after the promulgation of the law sanctioning the present convention the Company shall deliver at least one section (of the railroad to be constructed), and every twelve months thereafter an average of five sections, except in case of 'force majeure' duly verified and under penalty of foreclosure, so as to be completed in five years or earlier."⁸

The syndicate which formed the National Bank of Haiti secured an agreement designating the Bank as the banking agency of the government and was given the monopoly of note issue for fifty years.⁹ Article XIII of the agreement between the Bank and the government stated: "from the

⁵H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, p. 244.

⁶Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy-A Study in American Imperialism (New York: B. W. Huebach and the Viking Press, 1920), p. 135.

⁷Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLII (1927), pp. 228-258.

⁸Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 541.

⁹Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States 1714-1938 (Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1940), p. 201.

establishment and during the life of the concession, the government can neither issue paper money, fiduciary money, nor nickel."¹⁰ The Bank was the sole treasury of the government, and as such received all customs collections, and other government revenues, and was empowered to hold such moneys intact until the end of the fiscal year.¹¹ Out of the money collected from the customs duties the Bank was to advance funds to the government for necessary expenses.¹² The syndicate forming the National Bank of Haiti entered into another agreement with the Simon Government to loan Haiti 65,000,000 francs, about \$13,000,000, bearing interest of five per cent.¹³ The loan was to be used first, for the payment of the government's debt to the old bank; secondly, for the execution of a program of monetary reform, for which 10,000,000 francs were reserved; and thirdly, for the retirement of the internal debt.¹⁴ It was subscribed for by the syndicate at 72.3 per cent of its face value. The service of this loan was secured by a tax of one dollar gold on each hundred pounds of coffee exported, and by a special gold surtax of fifteen per cent on import duties.¹⁵ These taxes were to be received by the National Bank of Haiti, and the government obligated itself to set aside other revenues in case these taxes did not produce sufficient funds to meet obligations.

The United States watched Haitian affairs closely because of the interests of American investors in Haiti. The United States was afraid that a European nation would occupy Haiti if it defaulted on debts owed to its nationals due to the instability of the government. William J.

¹⁰Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, p. 234.

¹¹H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, p. 151.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

Bryan, Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson and Bryan's successor, Robert Lansing, took a good deal of interest in Haiti because of its proximity to the Panama Canal and were determined that no European power would get a foothold there.

Bryan in a letter to Wilson stated that because foreign capitalists were controlling the Government in Haiti and because Haitian officials were disturbing the peace of Santo Domingo by encouraging revolution he rather thought that action should be taken by the United States and that "this would be a better time than later".¹⁶ Bryan and Lansing held the view that the frequent revolutions had been instigated by foreign investors for private gain through the sale of bonds to the government. John H. Allen, vice president of the National City Bank, said, "It is no secret that the revolutions were financed by foreigners and were profitable speculations."¹⁷

In August, 1914, the Oreste Zamor Government found that the financial conditions of Haiti were deplorable. Haiti owed to foreign investors over \$30,000,000 and had an income of \$3,000,000 annually. The Zamor Government, because it needed money to pay expenses and salaries, and because the Bank refused to advance the necessary funds for these needs, suspended the retirement of paper money and authorized for the use "of current expenses", the interest on the 10,000,000 francs set aside for the retirement of government bills and the use of funds from the other duties. This action in so far as it affected the use of these pledged funds of the contract under which it operated was illegal because

¹⁶W. H. Calcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1928 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), p. 412.

¹⁷James Weldon Johnson, "Self Determining Haiti," The Nation, September 25, 1920, pp. 345-347.

it violated the agreement between the Bank and government. The Bank refused to pay out the pledged funds except as specifically provided in the convention.¹⁸

The government in retaliation and to meet current expenditures, introduced a bill for the issue of 12,500,000 gourdes, paper money. The Bank protested to the government that this was a violation of Article XIII of the Bank's contract, while the government asserted the Bank had violated the contract by suspending payment provided by the agreement and the suspension compelled it to resort to the measure because of the need for funds.

The Zamor Government was overthrown by Davilmar Theodore on November 24, 1914. The new government, also in need of money, introduced a bill for the issuance of 16,000,000 gourdes, paper money, about \$5,000,000.¹⁹ Because the Bank was controlled by American and foreign investors, Bryan instructed the United States Minister to Haiti, A. Bailly Blanchard, to discreetly discourage the issue of any paper money. The State Department was informed the Bank would refuse to receive it as legal tender.²⁰

The Bank, because the Theodore Government had made several attempts to seize the gold in its vaults and because the gold was not drawing interest, thought it advisable to transfer the gold to a safer place and somewhere it could draw interest. The National City Bank agreed to pay interest of two per cent.²¹ The United States sent the gunboat Machias to Haiti and \$500,000 in gold was taken aboard for transfer to the

¹⁸Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, p. 353.

¹⁹Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 361.

²⁰Ibid., p. 362.

²¹Ibid.

National City Bank of New York.²² Foreign Minister Solon Menos protested to the State Department that the action was an arbitrary intervention on the sovereignty of Haiti and was interference in a question which concerned a French corporation and the Haitian Government. The United States had no right to intervene, he stated, because Article XXIV of the agreement between the Bank and the government specified that all differences between the Haitian Government and the Bank were to be submitted to arbitration.²³ As a result of the Bank's action the Government of Haiti passed a bill for the issuance of 1,200,000 gourdes, paper money, and also for the creation of a new bank.²⁴

Minister Blanchard informed the State Department that the Theodore Government intended to foreclose on the National Railroad concession given to McDonald in 1910. The reason for the foreclosure was that the railroad had not carried out its contract with the government.²⁵ The State Department informed the Haitian Government that it would withhold recognition of the Theodore Government if this was done. Bryan pointed out that the government should not overlook the general disturbed financial situation and might well consider the consequences arising from summary action at this time in estranging available sources of financial assistance.²⁶ The Secretary of State said that recognition of the Theodore Government would be withheld unless a commission was sent to Washington to deal with the question of the National Bank, the National Railroad, in which the National City Bank held considerable stock, the

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 380.

²⁵Message from A. Bailly Blanchard to Secretary of State Bryan, September 30, 1914, Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 540.

²⁶Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 542.

Mole St. Nicholas, and a general agreement by Haiti to give protection from confiscation to the investments made by foreign companies.²⁷ Bryan and President Wilson had given much thought to the increased importance of Haiti because of the Panama Canal. Concerning the natural naval base of the Mole St. Nicholas, which it was understood that Germany "coveted", Bryan wrote to the President: "I am satisfied that it will be of great value to us and even if it were not, it is worthwhile to take it out of the market so that no other nation will attempt to secure a foothold there."²⁸ Wilson replied, "I fully concur."²⁹ In 1922 Robert Lansing, former Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson, wrote a letter to Senator Medill McCormick, trying to defend the action of the United States in occupying Haiti. Lansing said that on the eve of the declaration of war between Germany and Russia that several boatloads of German sailors had landed at Port au Prince from the German cruiser Karlsruhe to take possession of the Mole St. Nicholas. However, they had no more than landed when they were ordered elsewhere by the German Minister at Haiti.³⁰ Lansing also stated that it was the belief of American officials that most of the revolutions in Haiti during the past decade had been promoted by German merchants in Haiti in the hope of financial gain.³¹ The letter further said that the German charge' d'affaires at Washington, Dr. Haniel von Haimhausen, had intimated to the State Department that Germany would not be satisfied to be excluded from the customs control in Haiti if the United States assumed control of the customs collections.³²

²⁷W. H. Calcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States 1890-1928, p. 409.

²⁸Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (8 vols., Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1927, Vol. II, p. 87.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰The New York Times, May 8, 1922, p. 19.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

Mr. Roger Farnham, who owned controlling interest in the National Bank of Haiti, testified before the McCormick Committee that German interests controlled the wharfs and docks at Port au Prince.³³ Reverend L. Ton Evans, missionary to Haiti, testified that the German element in Haiti had distributed \$350,000 to prevent the Haitian Government from giving the contract to build the railroad to McDonald.³⁴ He also testified that the revolution which overthrew the Simon Government had been financed by the Germans.³⁵

The objectives of Wilson and Bryan were twofold. The first was to forestall Germany and other European powers by taking this choice naval base "out of the market". This was more of an excuse than a reason because Germany and practically all of Europe were engaged in World War I. Even if Germany had wanted Haiti there was very little chance of occupying it with the British Navy ruling the seas. The other objective was to strengthen the Haitian Government so as to discourage and suppress revolutions.³⁶

The Government of Davilmar Theodore was replaced on February 22, 1915, by Vilbrun Guillaume Sam. Sam according to Admiral Caperton was financed by one of his uncles, a former president. He also received the support of some of the German bankers.³⁷ Sam had already earned a rather unsavory reputation for himself for his harsh methods and crooked tendencies. He had served one year of a life sentence imposed for falsifying government financial statements and causing a large overissue of bonds,

³³Hearings, p. 108.

³⁴Ibid., p. 158.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 340.

³⁷Hearings, p. 295.

the proceeds of which he had appropriated to his own use.³⁸ Because of the disturbed condition of the island and for the protection of American and foreign lives and property the transport Hancock and the U. S. S. Kansas under the command of Admiral William B. Caperton were ordered to Haitian waters.

Admiral Caperton arrived January 23, 1915. Although in the preceding revolutions there had been much pillaging of the towns and cities no foreigners had ever been molested or threatened. However, the stated purpose of the landing of American troops was to protect American lives and property. The Admiral was also to ask the British and French forces not to land their troops. The French warship Descartes was standing by in case French lives and property were endangered. Caperton was to assure the French that the American forces were ready to and would protect their interests in Haiti.³⁹ Admiral Caperton conferred with General Sam and his ally General Probus Blot and told them that fighting in the towns and cities would not be tolerated.⁴⁰ He took the precaution of having troops in each town from Cap Haitien to Port au Prince and General Sam was amazed to find an American officer awaiting him along the way who repeated the Admiral's warning. The towns were spared any serious disorder, but it is said that this new idea in revolutions mystified the "Caco", or revolutionary forces, or bandits as they were sometimes called, as much as it did the government forces.

General Sam was "elected" president of Haiti by the Haitians Senate. As soon as this was done negotiations were started between Sam and the American Charge'd'Affaires Richard Beale Davis concerning an agreement

³⁸Ibid., p. 293.

³⁹Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 475.

⁴⁰H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, p. 207.

not to alienate the Mole St. Nicholas and to arbitrate all foreign claims. The negotiations did not mention the customs question. The United States would defend Haiti and support the established government against insurrection.⁴¹

The Haitian Senate refused to ratify the agreement between Sam and the United States but proposed a loan in return for which concessions would be made to American investors including supervision by the United States of the collection of the customs duties. Bryan told the Haitians that he was not interested in more concessions but in stability and order.⁴² Sam proposed that if the State Department would encourage American investors to loan Haiti the necessary money to refund the national debt, reform the currency, and insure the full economic development of the country, Haiti would consult the lenders of the money on the choice of the higher customs officials.⁴³ As a result of these proposals of Sam to allow outsiders to control the collection of the customs duties, Dr. Rosolvo Bobo, ex-Minister of the Interior of Haiti, issued a call to revolution to the Haitians in July, 1915.

Admiral Caperton notified the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, that he had informed the revolutionary forces that fighting would not be allowed in the town of Cap Haitien in order that American and foreign lives and property would be safe and protected. If necessary, force would be used to support the demand and the factions were informed to that effect.⁴⁴ Caperton was ordered by Secretary Daniels to land

⁴¹Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti And The United States 1714-1938, p. 207.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Message from Admiral Caperton to Secretary of Navy, July 3, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 474.

troops at Port au Prince at the earliest opportunity to protect American and foreign lives and property there.⁴⁵

At the end of July, 1915, the threatened revolution broke with unexpected fury. President Sam had one hundred and sixty-seven political prisoners, including ex-President Oreste Zamor and three sons of the respected and loved General Etienne Polynice, massacred by his police under the command of General Charles Oscar Etienne. Because of this massacre, which aroused the anger of the people, Sam was forced to take refuge in the French Legation and Oscar in the Dominican Legation. The American Charge' d'Affaires Davis, sent word to Admiral Caperton that no government existed in the city of Port au Prince and that the revolutionary armies were waiting to attack the city and massacre the mulattoes.⁴⁶ During the thirty-six hours preceding the landing of the American troops Haiti had degenerated into anarchy and mob rule. General Polynice, in order to avenge the murder of his three sons, entered the Dominican Legation and killed General Oscar. Sam had been dragged from the French Legation and torn limb from limb by a mob, and parts of his body were paraded through the streets.⁴⁷ There is no evidence, however, that any American or any other foreigner was molested or threatened during all this confusion. When Admiral Caperton received knowledge of these events he landed troops to restore order in Port au Prince.⁴⁸

⁴⁵Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 475.

⁴⁶Message from Robert Beale Davis to Admiral Caperton, July 27, 1915, Foreign Relations, 1915, pp. 474-475.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 475.

⁴⁸Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 476.

CHAPTER II.

THE PACIFICATION OF HAITI

When the United States began its occupation of Haiti in 1915, anarchy and mob rule had turned Haiti into a chaotic state. Her foreign credit was poor as investors demanded high rates of interest on money loaned to Haiti, and in 1914 her bonds sold at little better than forty-nine per cent of face value. The government was a prize to any revolutionary leader who could rally the "Cacos" behind him. The sugar plantations had been destroyed by successive revolutions and had become overgrown with jungle. The elaborate irrigation works, mills, and factories which had been built by the French were in ruin. By 1915, not a single sugar plantation was in operation and although some sugar was produced for local consumption there was no sugar for export.¹ Coffee was exported but it was gathered wild. The government was corrupt and the total revenues were insufficient to pay the salaries of the government officials and the interest on the foreign debt. The courts were debauched, and neither the courts nor the government were strong enough to control the "Caco" bands or bandits who preyed on the peasant and were ready to support anyone for gain. Roger Farnham stated before the McCormick Committee that the influence of the Haitian Government did not extend very far from the district around the city of Port au Prince. The rest of the interior was divided into districts under the control of military chiefs. Women were taxed on the way to market and on the way back they had to

¹A. C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, p. 15.

contribute part of what they had bought.² Passes were required for passage from one district to another and after six o'clock in the evening at Port au Prince.³

The educated minority or elite could and did influence the uneducated voter, but elections, in the sense that an American understands them, did not exist. Most of the voting was done by the army and the soldiers were allowed to vote many times. The Haitian peasant was superstitious, and his religion was something between Roman Catholicism and voodooism. The Reverend L. Ton Evans reported that the only time he was threatened with harm in Haiti was when he tried to penetrate the mysteries of devil worship or voodooism.⁴

There was no system of sanitation. Garbage and human excrement was dumped into the streets. There were no hospitals and very little provision was made to take care of the sick. There were few doctors in Haiti and no facilities were available to take care of the insane. The occupation forces found that malaria, filariasis, and intestinal parasites, as well as gonorrhea, syphilis, yaws and tuberculosis, were prevalent. The country was relatively free of yellow fever and the bubonic plague, however.⁵

Such were the conditions in Haiti when Rear Admiral William B. Caperton began the occupation of Haiti on July 28, 1915. Caperton had at his disposal six ships and two thousand marines and bluejackets to preserve order in Port au Prince and the rest of Haiti. He had a meeting on July 29, with the Committee of Public Safety headed by General Poly-

²Hearings, p. 119.

³Ibid.

⁴Hearings, p. 153.

⁵Hearings, p. 1283.

nice. This Committee was serving as a provisional government until the Senate could meet and elect the President of Haiti. Caperton met with the Committee and Dr. Rosolvo Bobo and assured them that the landing of the marines was friendly and was designed only to preserve peace and order. The next day another meeting was held between the Committee and the Admiral, and it was agreed to disarm all Haitian soldiers before the night of July 30.⁶ Despite these agreements, the marines and bluejackets were fired on in Port au Prince by the "Cacos" or supporters of Bobo. Caperton and Charge' d'Affaires Davis felt that before peace and order could be enforced in Haiti, the occupying forces would have to be augmented by another regiment of marines.

Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, outlined the objects of the occupation to Caperton and Davis and indicated what Haiti would have to do to improve the state of the government and the people. He maintained that it was necessary to (1) place the Haitian finances on a solid basis, (2) pay adequate salaries to its officials, (3) establish a good school system, (4) build roads and generally facilitate the transportation and marketing of the products of the country, (5) extend and perfect the present telegraph lines and erect and maintain wireless stations, (6) undertake harbor improvements and municipal sanitation, and (7) carry on public works to furnish employment to the people.⁷

These were long range objectives; however, the immediate one, at least in Caperton's mind, was the pacification of Haiti by eliminating the "Caco" bands. He reported to the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, that the "Cacos" were still holding out in the north and trying

⁶Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 476.

⁷Survey of American Foreign Relations, p. 128.

to prevent supplies from reaching Port au Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, and other towns, and were demanding the immediate election of Dr. Rosolvo Bobo as President of Haiti. When the marines tried to open the railroad from Gonaives to Emery six "Cacos" were killed in the subsequent fighting, but no marines. Another engagement near Haut du Cap resulted in ten marines being wounded and forty bandits killed. Caperton considered these patrols necessary to insure the passage of food to the towns and did not regard them as actions of offense. Colonel Littleton Waller was ordered to take the offensive around Baho and St. Suzanne against the "Cacos" who had cut off food and water from Cap Haitien.⁸ The State Department told Caperton it was strongly impressed by the number of bandits killed but believed that patrols could maintain order without undue loss of life and suggested that action be limited to patrols unless necessary to take the offensive.⁹ Caperton promised to limit all action to patrols but added that he did not believe that a stable government could exist in Haiti as long as the "Cacos" remained a factor in the life in Haiti.¹⁰ He thought their elimination was a prerequisite to the successful negotiation of a treaty between the United States and Haiti. Lansing suggested that if the Haitian peasant was gainfully employed, he might be influenced to give up the life of a bandit as a means of making a living.¹¹

The supporters of Bobo were demanding that he be elected president, but Caperton did not think the time was opportune due to the unsettled conditions of the country. There were several candidates available, and

⁸Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 492.

⁹Ibid., p. 493.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 477.

¹¹Ibid.

it was Caperton's job to find out which would be the most cooperative and amenable to the will of the occupying forces. The State Department gave Caperton certain requirements to test each candidate. The future president must understand that the United States was interested in customs control and control of the finances of Haiti.¹² These two duties were to be carried out by a General Receiver of the Customs and a Financial Adviser. These were to be Americans and were to be appointed by the President of the United States. In order to carry out the customs control, Caperton was to assume the direction over the customs houses of Jacmel, Aux Cayes, Jeremie, Mirogoane, Petit Goave, Port au Prince, St. Marc, Gonaives, Port de Paix, and Cap Haitien. The seizure was to be done secretly and gradually to avoid further disorders.¹³ The funds collected were to be deposited in the National Bank of Haiti and be used for a constabulary, and public works, which would provide work for the unemployed and relief for the poor and needy, and thereby win support for the government.¹⁴

Among the candidates who were considered for president were: Mr. J. N. Leger, Sudre Dartiguenave, a senator, and Dr. Rosolve Bobo, who had led the revolution against Sam. When approached, Mr. Leger replied, "Tell the Admiral I will do everything in my power for Haiti, but I must watch and see what the United States will demand of Haiti and be in opposition to defend Haiti's interests in case the demands should be unreasonable. At this time I could not possibly accept the presidency. I am for Haiti, not for the United States."¹⁵ The Admiral asked Darti-

¹²Ibid., p. 479.

¹³Hearings, p. 334.

¹⁴Annual Report of the Secretary of Navy, 1920, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 257.

¹⁵H. P. Davis, Black Democracy, p. 176.

guenave, "In case Dr. Bobo should be elected, will you promise that you will exert every influence in your power to assist him for Haiti's good; that you will join him heartily and helpfully and loyally?" Dartiguenave answered in the affirmative.¹⁶ The Admiral then turned to Bobo and questioned him about his attitude and whether or not, he would accept the election of Dartiguenave should he be elected. Bobo shouted, "No, I will not! If Senator Dartiguenave is elected president, I will not help him. I will go away and leave Haiti to her fate. I alone am fit to be president; there is no patriotism in Haiti to be compared with mine; the Haitians love no one as they love me."¹⁷ Caperton believed that if Bobo were elected, that he would be the victim of a revolution in a short time, and he felt that if the United States withdrew, Haiti would lapse into anarchy again.¹⁸

Bobo then resigned as executive of the Committee of Public Safety on August 7, 1915; after having already dismissed his cabinet and ordered his followers to deposit their arms at Cap Haitien, and went into exile to Cuba. He was not a factor in the politics of Haiti thereafter.

Secretary of Navy Daniels told Caperton to allow the Senate to choose a president, and also asserted that the State Department favored the election of Senator Dartiguenave.¹⁹ The Admiral was to tell the Haitian Government that the United States wanted to establish a firm and lasting government in Haiti, to help Haiti maintain its political freedom and territorial integrity.²⁰ The State Department preferred to defer the question of the Mole St. Nicholas until later. In a meeting with

¹⁶Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Annual Report of the Secretary of Navy, 1920, p. 253.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 255.

²⁰Ibid.

Caperton shortly after the landing of the marines the Haitian Senate had offered to accede to any terms offered by the United States. They would cede the Mole to the United States without restriction, grant the right to intervene when necessary, and control of the customs houses.²¹ They agreed that no government could stand without the support of the United States.

Senator Dartiguenave was elected President of Haiti, receiving ninety-four out of one hundred and sixteen votes. During the election the entire city of Port au Prince was patrolled by the marines because there were some rumors that the Bobo adherents would try violence to influence the election. Moreover, no one was allowed within a block of the National Palace and admittance to the Palace was gained by a pass signed by the President of the Senate, Stenio Vincent, and countersigned by Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, Commander of the Marine Brigade at Port au Prince.²² When asked by the Senate Committee if any pressure was brought to bear on the Haitians to elect Dartiguenave, Caperton said, "There was never any bargaining of any kind whatever with Dartiguenave, as far as I know. No pressure of any kind was brought to bear upon any Haitian elector in Dartiguenave's interest. The Haitians themselves without any outside influence or pressure, or bargaining, made him their president."²³ Caperton thought the election of Dartiguenave was the only fair and free election Haiti had ever had.²⁴ The newly elected president promised to govern for Haiti and to obey the constitution and laws of Haiti. He expressed appreciation for the American occupation

²¹W. H. Calcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, p. 415.

²²Hearings, Vol. I, p. 675.

²³Ibid., p. 317.

²⁴Ibid., p. 362.

forces.²⁵ Caperton, in the meantime, found it necessary to declare martial law at Cap Haitien and later over all of Haiti because of the "Caco" activities and the continuation of acts unfriendly toward the United States by the Bobo faction. He ordered the revolutionary committee to dissolve itself or they would be considered enemies of the United States.

As soon as the President of Haiti was elected, the State Department ordered Charge' d'Affaires Davis to submit the draft of the treaty to be agreed upon between the United States and Haiti. Davis was to impress upon Dartiguenave that as a guaranty of a friendly attitude and desire for a peaceful and orderly nation, that he and the Senate should accept the draft without modification. Davis was to tell the president that this acceptance was necessary in order to receive the formal recognition of the United States.²⁶ Davis found the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were unwilling to pass a resolution to accept the treaty draft without modification, and such a resolution was considered necessary before negotiations on the treaty could begin. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Solon Menos, claimed that the United States insistence on the resolution would result in the resignation of the president and his cabinet. The contentious point was the appointment of the General Receiver and the Financial Adviser. The original treaty draft stated that they were to be appointed by the President of the United States, and the Haitians were unwilling to agree to this. The General Receiver was to have power to collect, receive, and apply all customs duties on imports and exports accruing at the several custom houses and ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti.²⁷ The Financial Adviser was to have power to advise the Haitian

²⁵Annual Report of the Secretary of Navy, 1920, p. 255.

²⁶Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 431.

²⁷Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 329.

Government on the payment of debts, improved methods of collecting and applying the revenues, and make such other recommendations to the Minister of Finance as may be deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of Haiti.²⁸ The Haitians did not want to turn customs control over to someone else because it had always been a lucrative source of graft.²⁹ Davis, however, could see no point in making concessions, even if the government did resign.

Lansing informed Davis that if the Haitian Government did not accept the treaty draft as submitted, the United States would have to follow two alternatives; either establish a military government until honest elections could be held, or permit another faction, which would be more cooperative, to gain control of the government.³⁰ In the event the present government did resign, the State Department would instruct Admiral Caperton on which course to follow. The United States held that unless the control of the customs was turned over to an American, no foreign investor could be induced to risk his money because of the uncertainty of the future state of the finances of the government. As a result of the insistence of the United States on this particular clause, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Public Works resigned. Some modifications were permitted, however, at the request of the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Borno. Instead of the General Receiver and the Financial Adviser being appointed by the President of the United States, they were appointed by the President of Haiti upon the nomination of the President of the United States. This concession met favorably with the Chamber of Deputies, the president, and the cabinet.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 382.

³⁰Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 438.

While negotiations concerning the treaty were being carried on, Borno told Davis that the government had only six hundred thousand gourdes, or \$30,000, with which to meet expenses and to pay back salaries that were still owing for the fiscal year ending in September, 1915. The government needed money until the treaty was ratified, and an income was realized under its operation. Borno, basing his calculations on the amount already owed and the amount advanced by the Bank, said the government would need, to liquidate debts and for future running expenses, \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000.³¹ He added that if these funds were provided, it would greatly aid in the ratification of the treaty. The Secretary of State told Davis that after the ratification of the treaty, the United States would lend its good offices to secure a loan for the needed expenses. Lansing wanted a commission from Haiti sent to the United States to negotiate this loan and to settle differences between the National Bank of Haiti, the American Railway Company and the Haitian Government.³²

The Haitian Chamber of Deputies accepted the treaty by a vote of seventy-two to six, and treaty went to the Senate for approval. It was apparent that the Senate would be slow in its approval and Borno, the Foreign Minister, told Davis that the Senate wanted to reopen negotiations. Davis told Borno that this would be impossible in view of the time already consumed in the negotiations. Davis and Lansing feared that the Haitian Senate was waiting to ask the United States Senate to withdraw the forces of the occupation from Haiti. Lansing told Davis to call in Dartiguenave and try to ascertain the reasons for the delay and also

³¹Ibid., p. 447.

³²Ibid., p. 531

have individual conversations with the Senators. Finally, Caperton was ordered to meet with the president and his cabinet to present them with this ultimatum: If the treaty fails of ratification, the government of the United States had the intention to retain control in Haiti until the desired end is accomplished, which is the complete pacification of the country, to establish tranquillity and encourage industry for the economic growth of Haiti.³³ Bribery to defeat the treaty shall be met with stern and vigorous measures.³⁴ On the night of November 11, 1915, the Haitian Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of twenty-five to nine. The Patriotic Union of Haiti later attacked this treaty as being illegal because it was ratified under the threat of force.³⁵ General Cole and General Smedley D. Butler admitted they were present as well as armed members of the gendarmerie or constabulary, but denied that any force was put on the Senate to ratify the treaty.³⁶

Admiral Caperton appointed, with the acceptance of the Haitian Government, the following officers: Financial Adviser, Captain Edward L. Beach; General Receiver of the Customs, Paymaster Charles Conard; Senior American officer of the constabulary or gendarmerie, Colonel Littleton Waller; engineer for public improvements, Lieutenant Edward Garfield Oberlin; engineer for public sanitation, Surgeon Phillip Eugene Garrison.³⁷ Later the President of the United States nominated Mr. Andrew Maumus as General Receiver of the Customs and Addison T. Ruan as Financial Adviser.

In 1915, a commission composed of Solon Menos, Haitian Minister to Washington, President Auguste Magloire, administrator of finances at Port

³³Ibid., p. 533.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Hearings, Vol. I, p. 23.

³⁶Ibid., Vol. I, p. 634.

³⁷Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 533.

au Prince, and Pierre Hudicourt, a lawyer and plenipotentiary to the Second Hague Conference, arrived in Washington to negotiate matters concerning the American Railroad Company and the National Bank of Haiti.³⁸ The American Railroad Company was formed in 1910, and was formerly owned by James P. McDonald; it was now owned principally by Roger L. Farnham. The commission was to have power to arrange details for the operation of the treaty, to settle by using the good offices of the United States all differences between the Haitian Government and the American Railroad Company and the National Bank of Haiti, to negotiate with the United States all loans necessary to attain the aims of the treaty and to decide upon some plan to establish the finances on a firm basis.³⁹

In 1914, Farnham, who had interests in the National Bank of Haiti and the American Railroad Company of Haiti, informed the State Department that the Haitian Government was about to foreclose on the railroad for failure to live up to its contract of 1910. Bryan, then Secretary of State, protested to the government to reconsider the foreclosure movement. The railroad pleaded that it had been impossible to build the railroad successfully because of the destruction, damage and theft by both the revolutionary and government troops, because it was compelled to make payments unlawfully exacted from it by the various governments, the lack of police protection by the government of Haiti, the failure of the government to meet its obligations in respect to its guarantee of the bonds of the railroad, and the default on the interest of the railroad bonds. The railroad contended that the interest on the bonds should have been paid as each section of the railroad was finished, while the government said it was not supposed to pay anything until the whole rail-

³⁸Ibid.
³⁹Ibid.

road was finished and approved by the government. The Minister of Haiti to Washington, Solon Menos, denied the charges made by the railroad and stated the Haitian Government had been very lenient and had granted several extensions of time to the railroad. Menos contended that the railroad had permanently forfeited its rights and that the foreclosure was just. Farnham said that due to conditions in Haiti and the terrain of the country that only three disconnected sections had been built and that in 1914 the railroad had to suspend all operations.⁴⁰ Two years later negotiations between Farnham and Menos were closed amicably. The government dropped its foreclosure proceedings and agreed to make the six semi-annual payments on the bonds then in default.⁴¹

The Haitian Government wanted \$1,500,000 advanced from the customs duties collected and deposited to its credit in the National Bank of Haiti. The government contended it needed this money to meet expenses, to pay salaries, pensions, rents and indemnities. Minister A. Bailly Blanchard said the government needed \$500,000, but the State Department said that since the government had been advanced \$385,000 it would need only \$60,000. The Haitian Government wanted Caperton to turn over the funds held in reserve, which he refused to do. The funds, he maintained, were not set aside for the government but for the holders of the debts of the government. The Haitian Government scaled down the funds it needed to \$50,000 for salaries, for the months of November and December. Admiral Caperton was ordered by the State Department to release \$50,000 for this purpose; however, he was not to release the money to the government, but to pay the money directly into the hands of the employees and

⁴⁰Hearings, Vol. I, p. 109.

⁴¹Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 830.

to receive a receipt for the money paid. This was done because before the occupation the employees of the government were often not paid in cash but in government chits, which were bought at a big discount by speculators. Caperton said the chief speculator was Stenio Vincent, President of the Senate.⁴² To eliminate all unnecessary expenses, Caperton was told by Lansing to discontinue all salaries to the military and to abolish the offices of the Minister of War and Marine. Caperton complied, and disbanded the Palace Guard. One of the provisions of the treaty stated that in place of the army there was to be a constabulary or gendarmerie officered by American officers and non-commissioned officers. It was to be commanded by Colonel Littleton Waller of the United States Marines. Because American statutes did not authorize the use of American Armed Forces personnel in a foreign police force, Congress passed a law permitting the marines to serve in the Haitian gendarmerie.⁴³ The treaty provided that the Haitians were to be trained to take the place of the American officers, but very few were trained. General Butler said that this was not done because when the Haitians were placed in command of others they became abusive of their power.⁴⁴ The functions of the gendarmerie were: Preservation of order, control of the prisons, protection of property, prevention of smuggling and enforcement of the sanitary regulations and laws.⁴⁵

In addition to reorganizing the gendarmerie, the occupation forces set about improving and building new roads in Haiti so that agricultural goods and products could be taken to the markets and better communications

⁴²Hearings, Vol. I, p. 370.

⁴³The Statutes At Large of the United States of America, December, 1915, to March, 1917, Volume 39, Part I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), pp. 223-225.

⁴⁴Hearings, Vol. I, p. 533.

⁴⁵Hearings, Vol. I, p. 79.

provided. The roads and highways that had been built by the French had been allowed to deteriorate, as noted above, or return to jungle. To get the road constructed the occupation forces fell back on an old, but rarely used Haitian law which legalized a corvee system such as was used in Europe before the French revolution. The law stated public highways and communications shall be maintained and repaired by the inhabitants, in rotation, in each section through which these roads pass and each time repairs shall be necessary.⁴⁶ The peasants were recruited by the gendarmerie and put to work. Notification cards and lists of the names of the citizens who should work on the roads were given to the gendarmerie and the Haitian civil officials of that district. The gendarmes then delivered these cards notifying the peasants that on a certain date they would report to a given place to do their work or pay a stated tax.⁴⁷ The length of time to work was for three days and the men were to be fed and housed.⁴⁸ They were not supposed to be bound over to work in other districts than their own but since Haiti was more thinly populated in some districts than others, the men were forced to work in other districts for longer than three days. To insure that they stayed on the job, the peasants were placed under guard day and night; when they tried to escape they were punished by the gendarmerie.⁴⁹ Reverend Evans reported that he saw the men roped together and driven like cattle to their jobs. He disputed Farnham's statement that many wished to stay on the corvee because they were well fed.⁵⁰ Evans testified that the men were afraid to leave their homes to go to church for fear they would be forced into

⁴⁶Annual Reports of the Secretary of Navy, 1920, p. 237.

⁴⁷Hearings, Vol. I, p. 530.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹E. H. Gruening, "Conquest of Haiti and Santo Domingo", Current History, p. 885.

⁵⁰Hearings, Vol. I, p. 164.

the corvee.⁵¹ The abuse of the corvee system led the peasant to believe that he was being forced back into slavery and he reacted very violently. The abuse of the corvee system led to the "Caco" revolt of 1918 and 1919 in which hundreds of Haitians were killed and which finally brought about its abolition by Marine Commander Colonel John Russell in 1919.

In 1916, President Dartiguenave proposed that a new constitution be adopted by the Haitians which would conform more closely to the changes made by the occupation forces. The president thought that the number of senators and representatives should be reduced and ownership of land by foreigners, which was forbidden by the Constitution of 1889, be permitted. He argued that foreigners should be permitted to own land in order to encourage the flow of money into Haiti. The new constitution would provide for reforms of the judiciary and civil service.⁵² Because Dartiguenave knew that the Senate opposed the proposal for a new constitution he dissolved it and locked the doors of the Senate hall to prevent its meeting. To replace the Senate he appointed a council of state of twenty-one members and convened the Chamber of Deputies to sit as a constituent assembly. The National Assembly was opposed to the clause permitting foreigners to own land and refused to act as a constituent assembly. When the deputies refused to act, Dartiguenave decided to hold elections with a reduced number of senators and deputies to be elected. He signed a decree dissolving the National Assembly and gave it to General Butler to deliver to Stenio Vincent, the President of the Senate.⁵³ According to Butler, Vincent, instead of reading the decree, launched into a tirade against the American occupation. Butler denied that either he or Cole

⁵¹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 166.

⁵²Hearings, Vol. I, p. 415.

⁵³Ibid., p. 537.

was armed, although he was accused of waving a pistol around, but he did admit that the gendarmes who were standing guard around the hall twice loaded their rifles. Finally, Vincent read the decree and the National Assembly was dissolved.

A new constitution for Haiti was written by the State Department, the United States Naval Department, the Haitian president and his Council of State. The new constitution gave foreigners permission to own land in Haiti; the number of deputies was reduced from seventy-two to thirty-six and the senators from thirty-nine to fifteen. Under the old constitution the senators had been appointed by the Chamber of Deputies; now they were to be elected by popular vote. Constitutional amendments could be proposed by either of the two houses or by the president and adopted only by popular vote. All acts by the occupation forces and the decrees by the president were validated by the constitution. Popular elections were to be held on an even numbered year to be fixed by the president, and thereafter every two years to elect a legislative assembly.⁵⁴ In the meantime, Haiti was to be governed by the president and his Council of State. A plebescite was held in 1918, under the watchful eyes of the gendarmerie, which approved the constitution by an overwhelming majority of 69,337 to 335 votes. Critics of the constitution, such as Reverend L. Ton Evans, Solon Menos, Pierre Hudicourt, and Stenio Vincent, maintained that the constitution was illegal because it had been adopted by a plebescite and not by the National Assembly.⁵⁵ The Patriotic Union of Haiti held that two types or colors of ballots were used; white for "yes" and pink for "no", and that the gendarmes distributed

⁵⁴A. C. Millsbaugh, Haiti Under American Control, p. 75.

⁵⁵Hearings, Vol. I, p. 43.

only the white ballots to the voters.⁵⁶ Evans testified that the Haitians regarded the election as a farce because only sixty-nine thousand out of five hundred thousand eligible voters cast their ballots in the plebescite.⁵⁷ He asserted that the feeling was prevalent that the marines had cast the negative ballots to make the election look legal.⁵⁸ Until elections could be held Haiti was to be ruled by the President and his Council of State. This situation was rather anomalous because the Council of State was appointed by the president and was responsible to him, yet it had the power to elect the president in the absence of any National Assembly. The provision to hold elections every two years was completely ignored by Dartiguenave and his successor, Louis Borno, who ruled from 1922 to 1930.

One of the aims of the occupation was to help put Haiti's finances on a solid basis and to aid Haiti to settle the questions involving the National Bank of Haiti such as a loan, currency problems, and the \$500,000 transported to the National City Bank of New York in 1914. Lansing stated that as soon as the treaty between the United States and Haiti was approved a commission should be sent to Washington to settle these questions between the Bank and Haiti. The commission composed of Menos, Margloire, and Hudicourt, which has been referred to earlier, arrived in Washington on December 17, 1915. They immediately opened negotiations for a loan. The State Department referred them to the representatives of the Bank as the only place to get an unsecured loan until the end of the year. The bankers were asked to immediately advance a half a million dollars from the redemption fund which they refused to do until the Bank

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Hearings, Vol. I, p. 193.

⁵⁸Ibid.

was reinstated in its contract. This was not acceptable to the commissioners.

The commission negotiated with the representatives of the Bank, Maurice Casenave, President of the National Bank of Haiti, and Roger L. Farnham of the National City Bank of New York, and vice president of the board of directors of the National Bank of Haiti. Four months were required before an agreement could be reached. The point in dispute was the six per cent commission charged on the sixty million franc loan of 1910, and pressure had to be applied by the State Department through President Dartiguenave before the agreement was reached, with the following provisions: The monetary reform provided by the contract of 1910, was to be carried out by means of the 10,000,000 franc loan. The Bank was to restore the money shipped to New York in 1914, plus two per cent interest. The Bank was to be the depository of the customs collected by the Receiver General and was to serve as the treasury of Haiti as was provided in the original contract. All losses incurred by the Bank in exchanging foreign currencies were to be borne by the State. The Bank was to hold in deposit \$500,000 for the government's use bearing one-half per cent monthly interest. The Bank was to retain its privilege of issuing bank notes and might avail itself of it upon making an agreement with the government as to the expediency of the issue and the denomination of the notes. The gourde was pegged in the agreement at five to one American dollar.⁵⁹

One of the biggest problems in Haiti was the control of the customs and the expenditure of the funds collected. One of the terms of the treaty signed in 1915, was that Haiti should not increase its debt except

⁵⁹Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 539.

by previous agreement of the United States. Haiti should not contract any debt which its ordinary revenues could not defray.⁶⁰ The problem was even bigger because Haiti's national income depended upon the duties collected on imports and exports. The duties on coffee contributed almost one-third of that income. Addison Ruan, the first Financial Adviser, presented a plan of revising the internal revenue taxes of Haiti, but it was rejected because it placed the administration of the internal revenue system under American control and the schedules of taxation proposed were too high.⁶¹ McIlhenny, Ruan's successor, said that when the occupation began, the borrowing capacity of Haiti at home and abroad was exhausted. Its paper money was practically worthless. Eighty per cent of her revenue was pledged to pay interest on her foreign debt, while twenty per cent was required to meet the expenses of the government.⁶²

In 1919 the National City Bank proposed to buy out the Franch stock, but before the purchase was approved the State Department proposed some modifications of the charter which it considered detrimental to the interests of the Government of Haiti.⁶³ The proposed changes were: (1) new provisions regulating the issue of fractional currency by the Haitian Government, (2) new provisions for compensation to the bank for the treasury service, (3) new provisions imposing upon the bank reasonable restrictions to safeguard the public interest and assuring proper supervision by the government.⁶⁴ The issue of bank notes was not to exceed three times the amount of the bank's paid-up capital. The bank was re-

⁶⁰Statutes At Large, Vol. 39, Part 2, p. 1657.

⁶¹Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1422.

⁶²Ibid., p. 1223.

⁶³Ibid., p. 1421.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 1422.

quired to increase its note circulation, if necessary to meet the demands of commerce, and was obliged to replace any notes which became unfit for circulation through physical depreciation. The financial adviser was to have supervision over the retirement of the government's paper money.⁶⁵ For acting as treasury of the government the bank received around \$100,000 a year. The new agreement reduced this charge. When the total receipts of the government reached \$6,000,000 the bank was to receive \$68,000 for the treasury service, for each additional \$1,000,000 the bank was to receive \$10,000. At no time was the bank's commission to exceed \$100,000.⁶⁶ The old bank charter paid the government no interest on its credit balances. Under the new agreement the government was to receive two per cent interest.⁶⁷ The financial adviser was to have the right to inspect all the operations of the bank and to call for such reports from the bank as he might deem necessary.⁶⁸ If at any time the National City Bank desired to sell its stock it agreed to give preferential right to buy it to the Haitian Government.⁶⁹

The "retrait" clause caused the most trouble and was most objected to by the Haitian Government. The clause provided that to avoid the possibility of any monetary crisis during the period of the retirement of paper money, and so long as such retirement should be in process, the government obligated itself to prohibit importations or exportations of all non-Haitian currency, except such as might be necessary, in the opinion of the financial adviser, for the needs of commerce. The government

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 124.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 1418.

opposed the "retrait" agreement because it was not in the economic interests of the country, prevented the entrance of capital, conferred upon the bank monopolistic powers, and placed too much control of the financial affairs in the hands of one man, namely, the financial adviser.⁷¹ McIlhenny said the purpose of the agreement was to prevent speculation of the gourde and to keep the unit of currency in Haiti the gourde instead of the dollar. The government refused and made the American dollar legal tender in violation of the bank contract, the "retrait" agreement, and the law making the gourde the legal unit in Haiti.⁷² Because of the opposition of the government and its making the dollar legal tender, McIlhenny suspended the salaries of the president, the cabinet and the Council of State.⁷³ Three months following the suspension of the salaries, the president approved the convention.⁷⁴

On September 16, 1922, an issue of sixteen million Haitian thirty year bonds at six per cent, constituting part of the \$40,000,000 loan authorized between Haiti and the United States in 1919, was awarded to the banking firm of Lee, Higginson and Company of New York City. The bonds were to be sold and would not mature until 1951 and would not be callable for fifteen years, except for the sinking fund. The bonds were to be free of all Haitian taxes.⁷⁵ The Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society which was working to end the occupation of both Haiti and Santo Domingo, deplored the loan and said it had automatically extended the occupation for thirty years. The purpose of the loan was to pay the

⁷¹Ibid., p. 1425.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 1430.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Foreign Relations, 1922, p. 507.

interest on her internal debt, something that had not been done since the occupation began, to take care of the payments on the railroad bonds and be a saving on her foreign debt. It was also to be used on a public works program. Pierre Hudicourt pointed out that after the retirement of the French debt, the debt to the railroad, the internal debt, and the National City Bank note, the Haitian Government would realize only \$1,564,800.⁷⁶ The loan was approved and the National City Bank of New York bought the bonds at 92.137 per cent of face value or six per cent interest.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1465.

⁷⁷Foreign Relations, 1922, p. 507.

CHAPTER III.

THE REACTION TO THE OCCUPATION

The occupation of Haiti had received very little publicity in the newspapers of the United States and the Political parties ignored Haiti for the more controversial issues of neutrality, World War I and the League of Nations. Newspapers in Haiti were under strict censorship in which they were not allowed to publish anything detrimental concerning the occupation, its officials and officials of the Haitian Government.¹ General Butler said that this censorship was necessary because the newspapers of Haiti had been publishing inflammatory articles designed to arouse the people of Haiti against the United States.² The censorship reached such proportions that a Jolibois Fils was thrown into jail for merely publishing the fact that Ruan had been removed as Financial Adviser.³ It was the question of the United States entry into the League of Nations which started a controversy concerning Haiti's constitution and the policy of the occupation forces in Haiti. On August 19, 1920, the New York Times quoted a speech made in Butte, Montana, by Franklin Roosevelt, vice presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, concerning the League question.

"The Republicans are playing a shell game on the American people," the nominee said. "They are still circulating the story that England has six votes to America's one. It is just the other way. As a matter of fact, the United States has about twelve votes in the Assembly of the League.

¹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 73.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 232.

"Until last week I had two of them myself, and now Secretary Daniels has them. You know, I have had something to do with the running of a couple of little republics. The facts are that I wrote Haiti's constitution myself, and, if I do say it, I think it is a pretty good constitution."⁴

Roosevelt said that Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Panama, and the rest of the Central American Republics, which have at least twelve votes in the League, all regarded Uncle Sam as a guardian and big brother, and that this country practically would have their votes in the League.⁵

Warren G. Harding, the Republican candidate for President, made a speech at Marion, Ohio, on August 29, 1920, in which he promised that he would not empower an Assistant Secretary of Navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies, and then jam it down their throats at the points of bayonets borne by the United States Marines. He further promised that he would not use the executive power to interfere in the affairs of our neighbors.⁶ Harding in a later speech on September 18, claimed that the marines had killed thousands of Haitians during the occupation.⁷ Roosevelt denied making the remark concerning Haiti's constitution attributed to him, and said Harding's remarks were mere drivel. He defended the Caribbean policy of Wilson and said that it was only an extension of the policy of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, the Republican predecessors of Wilson.⁸ Harding apologized for quoting the newspaper account of Roosevelt's speech but continued to attack Wilson's policy in the Caribbean.⁹ However, The Nation contended that Roosevelt did make the remark as quoted by the Associated Press and said that the Haitians referred to the Constitution of 1918 as Mr. Roosevelt's

⁴New York Times, August 19, 1920, p. 15.

⁵Ibid.

⁶New York Times, August 29, 1920, p. 1.

⁷Ibid., September 18, 1920, p. 14.

⁸Ibid.,

⁹Ibid., September 22, 1920, p. 3.

constitution.¹⁰ Oswald Garrison Villard, publisher of The Nation, in his memoirs attacked the occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo as "polite conquest" and he charged the United States had suppressed freedom of speech and press. Villard accused the United States Marines with having killed the Haitians indiscriminately since the occupation had begun.¹¹ He claimed we had no right in Haiti because the Haitians had harmed no Americans, had defaulted on no debt and had violated no obligation to the United States.¹² The Literary Digest added fuel to the fire by publishing in 1920, the demands of the Patriotic Union of Haiti against the occupation. The demands included: immediate abolition of martial law and courts-martial, immediate reorganization of the Haitian police and military forces, and withdrawal of the occupation forces, abrogation of the 1915 convention, and convocation within a short time of a constituent assembly with all the guarantees of electoral liberty.¹³ The Union demanded that the gendarmerie be reorganized because they claimed that a number of the gendarmes were criminals and were wanted by the law.¹⁴ The Patriotic Union also charged that the American marines had committed atrocities and had confiscated a half million dollars in government funds and that the occupation forces were directly or indirectly responsible for the deaths of nine thousand Haitian prisoners.¹⁵ They demanded that the Treaty of 1915, should be abrogated because the United States had

¹⁰George Sylvain, "A Plea from Haiti", The Nation, November 7, 1923, p. 525

¹¹Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Years, Memoirs of a Liberal Editor (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), p. 480.

¹²Ibid.

¹³"Haiti Charges Us With Misrule," The Literary Digest, June 18, 1921, p. 12.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

not lived up to its terms.¹⁶ This was the first time anything unfavorable to the Haitian occupation had appeared in a periodical other than The Nation. Following this unfavorable publicity in the Literary Digest and the charges made by the Patriotic Union, President Dartiguenave, in 1920, charged that Bailly Blanchard and John McIlhenny, who succeeded Ruan as Financial Adviser, had sabotaged any program which was necessary to the development of the natural resources of Haiti, as they were to supposed to do under the terms of the 1915 treaty. He asserted that neither one had undertaken measures to put Haiti's finances on firm basis and that McIlhenny in 1920 had arrogantly held up the salaries of the president and his cabinet because they had refused to approve a contract with the Bank prohibiting the importation of foreign gold into Haiti. The charge said that McIlhenny had wasted public money, for example, by employing two rat catchers in Port au Prince for \$250 a month even though the city had never had a case of the plague.¹⁷ McIlhenny had refused appropriations for three associate professors from France, who were offered to the Haitian Government by the French Government for the Lycee of Port au Prince.¹⁸ Dartiguenave stated further that McIlhenny had made no inquiry into the validity of the Haitian debts, had recommended no perfected method of banking the revenues, and made no recommendations for the welfare and prosperity of the Republic.¹⁹ Two years before in an article for the American Academy of Political Science, Villard had said that the occupation forces had not paid the interest on the domestic

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷New York Times, November 23, 1920, p. 17.

¹⁸"The Political, Economic and Financial Conditions in Haiti." The Nation, May 25, 1921, p. 760.

¹⁹New York Times, November 23, 1920, p. 17.

and foreign debt, but were using \$95,000 a month for expenses.²⁰ McIlhenny said that his insistence on the clause forbidding the importation of foreign gold into Haiti was because he wanted to stop speculation on the gourde and to put the gourde on a firm basis of five to one American dollar.²¹

On October 2, 1919, Major General George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote a personal and confidential letter to Colonel John Russell, Commander of the marines in Haiti, concerning two privates, Walter E. Johnson and John J. McQuilken, who were accused of illegally killing prisoners. Barnett said that the counsel for the two privates, Lieutenant F. L. Spear, had stated that practically indiscriminate killing of the Haitians had gone on for some time. The letter further stated: "I think judging by the knowledge gained only from the cases that have been brought before me, that the Marine Corps has been sadly lacking in right and justice, and I look to you to see that it is corrected at once."²²

The court martial showed that Privates Johnson and McQuilken had not killed any prisoners and that the guilty one had been a Lieutenant H. T. Brokaw, who had been later judged criminally insane. The two privates were convicted of striking a prisoner. If there was a penalty assessed it was not stated.²³

The letter from Barnett to Russell was made public by the Secretary of the Navy in October, 1920. The "indiscriminate killing" clause created such a furor that the Secretary of Navy ordered a Naval Court of

²⁰Oswald Garrison Villard, "The Rights of Small Nations in America," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1917, p. 168.

²¹Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1418.

²²Annual Report of the Secretary of Navy, 1920, p. 179.

²³Ibid., p. 183.

Inquiry to go to Haiti. The Court was to determine whether any unjustifiable homicides had been committed by any of the marine personnel, also whether any other unjustifiable acts of oppression or of violence had been perpetrated against any of the citizens of Haiti, or any unjustifiable damage or destruction of their property had occurred.²⁴ The Naval Court of Inquiry consisted of Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Rear Admiral James H. Oliver, Major-General Wendell C. Neville of the Marine Corps, and Major Jesse F. Dyer, Judge Advocate. In spite of the instructions issued by the Secretary of Navy, the Court did not seem to be overly anxious to discover much information. The Court opened its meetings at Port au Prince and was to continue on to Cap Haitian which it did not do. No reason was ever given why it did not continue on the Cap Haitian.

Most of the testimony concerned the "Caco" revolt of 1918 and 1919 under the leadership of Charlemagne Peralte. The latter had escaped prison at Port au Prince and had aroused the "Cacos" around him to revolt against the American occupation. Peralte organized a provisional government in a rather inaccessible region near the Dominican border with a cabinet and army under him. The revolt collapsed when Peralte was killed in 1919 in an operation carried out by the marines. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Williams testified that the reasons for this revolt were illegal application of the corvee, racial antagonism between the Negro and the white, virtual loss of national independence, and economic conditions brought about by the war, which greatly affected the foreign trade of Haiti.²⁵

The other part of the testimony concerned conditions around the

²⁴Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1587.

²⁵Hearings, Vol. I, p. 501.

districts of Hinche and Maissade where cruelties to prisoners had supposedly taken place. These districts had been under the command of Major Clark E. Wells. Wells was accused by Lieutenant Frederick C. Baker of giving orders not to take any prisoners and not to include all the casualties on the reports sent in to headquarters.²⁶ Wells had also ignored the order of Russell on October 1, 1918, to abolish the corvee.²⁷ Baker said that he had not obeyed the order concerning the prisoners but had heard other marines and gendarmes talk of murdering prisoners.²⁸ Another marine member of the gendarmerie testified that he had been ordered by Wells to kill all prisoners.²⁹

Further testimony given by the Haitians before the Court accused a marine Corporal Freeman Lang and Lieutenant H. T. Brokaw with torturing and killing prisoners at Hinche, in 1917.³⁰ One witness testified he saw Lang shoot prisoners with a machine gun and torture others with an electric current to make them talk.³¹ Corporal Lang denied killing prisoners but did admit killing one bandit chief when he tried to escape, and also admitted that he dropped coins into a bucket of water into which an electric current was applied, then encouraging prisoners to try to get them.³² Brokaw, incidentally, at the time of the inquiry had been committed to an asylum for the criminally insane.

It was further revealed by a member of the gendarmerie who testified that he saw marine Sergeant Dorcas Lee Williams beat a prisoner to death in 1919. Williams, was being held at Quantico, Virginia, awaiting a

²⁶Ibid., Vol. I, p. 465.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 469.

³⁰Herbert J. Seligman, "The Conquest of Haiti", The Nation, July 10, 1920, p. 35.

³¹New York Times, November 18, 1920, p. 1.

³²New York Times, November 19, 1920, p. 27.

court martial growing out of a charge brought against him by Lt. General John A. Lejeune, one of the marine commanding officers in Haiti. The charge involved cruelty to prisoners. Williams asserted that he had not beaten the prisoner, Jean Garnier, to death, but that he had died from a wound received in a fight with the "Cacos".³³ The corvee question was discussed by Brigadier General A. W. Catlin who had heard it was still in operation at Hinche and he ordered Major Wells to send a report within ten days about the situation.³⁴ Wells reported that there was no corvee. He said that the men were volunteer workers and were paid one-half gourde a day for their labor.³⁵ Catlin, however, visited Hinche and found the corvee was still working and that the sight of a gendarme uniform was enough to make the peasant run and hide.³⁶ Major Wells testifying in his own behalf said that to the best of his knowledge the corvee was not continued after the order abolishing it.³⁷ The laborers were paid by the week by him and were fed and housed.

On testifying about the shootings of prisoners Major Wells held that he knew nothing about this and that he gave no orders to execute any prisoners. He said the natives were better treated than they had been before, no one was put in jail without a trial, the communes had more money, the taxes were collected regularly, trails and roads were made passable, bandits were stopped in their pillaging, and disputes among the natives were settled.³⁸ Major Wells presented several letters from General Butler commending him for his work on roads, prisons, also letters from Bailly

³³Hearings, Vol. I, p. 502.

³⁴Ibid., p. 483.

³⁵Ibid., p. 488.

³⁶Ibid., p. 483.

³⁷Hearings, Vol. I, p. 488.

³⁸Ibid., p. 490.

Blanchard.³⁹ Major Thomas Turner, Adjutant of the First Marine Division, swore that 1,132 Haitians had been killed since 1919, although orders had been issued against maltreatment of prisoners and natives.⁴⁰ It was understood that all statistics before 1919 would be suspect because there was no adequate system in the records.⁴¹ Turner said that he did not believe that Wells had issued the order concerning prisoners. He thought a lot of the talk was hearsay evidence because, in his opinion, the Haitian was a very unreliable witness and apt to use his own imagination in repeating what he had heard.⁴² Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, Military Representative of the United States in Haiti, defended the record of the Marine Corps in Haiti. He said that only about three thousand Haitians had been killed in a period of five and one-half years, and that in that number there were no women and children.⁴³

General Lejeune said that only in isolated cases was there evidence of cruelty or undue violence. He did admit that at Hinche in 1918-1919, there had been illegal executions of prisoners by members of the gendarmerie and he recommended court martial proceedings be brought against the offenders. He testified that the military situation and the conditions in the prisons were good. No offensive action was being taken in 1920 and when patrols were sent out it was only to reassure the people that they were being protected. He declared that some banditry still existed and recommended the marines be allowed to stay in Haiti.⁴⁴ Lejeune emphasized that the marines had done their job efficiently,

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 507.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., p. 479.

⁴³Report of Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, in Annual Report of the Secretary of Navy, 1920, pp. 222-320.

⁴⁴Hearings, Vol. I, p. 142.

zealously, and courageously. He said large delegations of Haitians had expressed their gratitude for the work done by the marines in establishing peace and order in Haiti.⁴⁵ President Dartiguenave in his testimony before the Court declared he had no knowledge of the charge of the indiscriminate killings of Haitians by the marines. He said generally the Haitian people rejoiced over the effects of the American occupation.⁴⁶ Major Dyer submitted to the Court twenty-seven cases in which marine personnel had been tried and convicted of murder, assault and various crimes.⁴⁷ He cited twenty-five other cases in which the accused had been acquitted of similar charges for lack of evidence.⁴⁸

The findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry were: (1) that two unjustifiable homicides have been committed, one each by two of the personnel of the United States Naval Service; that sixteen other serious acts of violence have been perpetrated against citizens of Haiti during the period of occupation by individuals of such personnel; (2) that these offenses were all isolated acts of individuals and that in every case the responsible party was duly brought to trial before a general court-martial, convicted and sentenced; (3) there is no evidence of the commission of any other unjustifiable homicides or other serious acts of oppression or of violence against any of the citizens of Haiti or unjustifiable damage or destruction of their property caused by any of the personnel in question.⁴⁹ The court held that: (1) for the first time in over hundred years, tranquility and security of life and property may be said to prevail in Haiti, (2) the Haitians themselves welcomed the coming of

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶New York Times, November 13, 1920, p. 8.

⁴⁷Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1587.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 1667.

our men and are unwilling to have them depart, and (3) the marines have done a good job in bringing peace and security to Haiti.⁵⁰

When the findings of the court were announced General Barnett modified his statement by saying that he didn't mean to indicate promiscuous killing of the Haitians, and that his letter had been misinterpreted.⁵¹

The Nation and the Patriotic Union of Haiti, as well as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, attacked the report and findings of the Court as a colossal whitewash, and contended the Court had excluded the Haitians who could and would give accurate testimony concerning the killings, brutalities, robberies, and cases of arson and rape.⁵² Although the Court had stated that no women and children had been harmed, The Nation reported at least fourteen women and children molested and killed.⁵³ It also said that in a period of 1918-1920, at Cap Haitien, more than four thousand prisoners had died and at Chabert during the same period 5,475 had died.⁵⁴

Generals Butler and Lejeune had discounted reports on ill treatment of prisoners in their reports to Daniels and said that the prisons were clean, well disciplined, and orderly. In the National Prison at Port au Prince the prisoners were taught a vocational trade such as leather work, furniture making, automobile repair, cloth weaving, basket making and agricultural work.⁵⁵

Prisoners, except murderers, were allowed to spend the night with

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 1668.

⁵¹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 434.

⁵²"The Political, Economic and Financial Conditions in Haiti." The Nation, May 25, 1921, p. 765.

⁵³Ibid., p. 768.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Hearings, Vol. I, p. 539.

their families. Earnings of the prisoners were turned over to their families.⁵⁶ They commended the marines and the native gendarmerie for their work in establishing peace and order, for building new roads and repairing old ones and for making the cities and towns cleaner and healthier places to live.⁵⁷ Daniels defended the marines and said that they had done a real service to the people of Haiti.⁵⁸ No action was taken by the United States Government as a result of the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry. The marines were not withdrawn and the policies of the occupation were not changed.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 142.

⁵⁸New York Times, September 19, 1920, p. 18.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SENATE INVESTIGATION

The occupation of Haiti which became one of the minor issues in the election of 1920 continued to be an issue in the United States Government when the sixty-seventh Congress was convened in 1921.

Several memorials had been sent to Congress by the Patriotic Union of Haiti, Stenio Vincent, the former president of the Haitian Senate, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The statement of Vincent called for: The abolition of martial law and the courts-martial, immediate reorganization of the Haitian police and military forces and withdrawal within a short period of the United States military occupation, abrogation of the convention of 1915, convocation within a short period of a constituent assembly, with all the guarantees of electoral liberty.¹ Three American societies, the Foreign Policy Association represented by Felix Frankfurter and the Popular Government League and the Good Government League represented by Senator Robert L. Owen from Oklahoma, charged cruelty and inhuman acts by the United States Marines. They said the military forces were being used by the New York bankers to exploit Haiti and they demanded we withdraw as soon as possible.²

Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, in a speech at Carnegie Hall said, "American policy was not framed for the correction of any existing evils, but was calculated to make this country the ultimate possessor of the island. I have been unable to satisfy myself as to why we went into Haiti

¹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 7.

²New York Times, April 28, 1922, p. 1.

and I feel we ought to get out."³

Senator William King of Utah offered an amendment to a Naval Appropriation bill providing that it should not be used to keep marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo beyond December 31, 1922. The amendment was defeated forty-three to nine.⁴

So many charges and counter charges had been made that finally on July 19, 1921, Senator Medill McCormick of Illinois introduced a resolution into the Senate calling for a committee of three, later amended to five, members to hold hearings in regard to the occupation and its policies in Haiti and Santo Domingo.⁵ The resolution was adopted in July, 1921, and the President of the Senate appointed Senators Medill McCormick, Tasker L. Oddie, Atlee Pomerene, and Andreus Jones and William King to serve on this committee.

The committee held its first meeting at Washington on August 3, 1921. Those attending were Ernest Angell of the Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society; the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Stenio Vincent of the Patriotic Union of Haiti; Oswald Garrison Villard, representing the Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society; and Major Edward McClellan, United States Marine Corps, custodian of the reports bearing on Haiti.⁷

One of the first witnesses called to testify was Roger L. Farnham of the National City Bank of New York, the National Railway of Haiti and the Bank of Haiti. He testified that several ventures of American inves-

³New York Times, May 2, 1922, p. 7.

⁴New York Times, May 13, 1922, p. 3.

⁵Congressional Record-Proceedings and Debates of the First Session of the 67th Congress of the USA. Vol. LXI, Part 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921), p. 8467.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Hearings, Vol. I, p. 3.

tors in Haiti had been almost complete failures. The railroad since its inception in 1910 had never been successful. Only three disconnected sections had been completed because of the insurmountable difficulties having to do with the rough terrain and frequent revolutions and financial difficulties.⁸ The railroad in the face of all these troubles had had to suspend operations altogether in 1914.⁹ Although business had resumed with the occupation the railroad was still a failure.

Farnham said that although the land was the most fertile in the world, and could produce more through irrigation, attempts at irrigation had failed also. For example, an American firm put some two or three thousand acres into cultivation for cotton. The cotton was from American seed and seemed to be flourishing, when all at once disease struck and the crop was a complete failure. What was even more remarkable the Haitian cotton in the next field did well and produced a good crop. The failure caused a loss of over one million dollars.¹⁰ A try at sugar refining was also a failure due to labor troubles and insufficient amount of cane.¹¹

Farnham also testified that the occupation had done many things for Haiti. Peace and order had been created out of chaotic conditions. Roads had been built and a stable government established. Conditions in Haiti were deplorable before the occupation. Market-bound women were taxed going from district to district, which were under the control of generals d'arrondissement or governors. Passes were required to be on the streets of Port au Prince after six o'clock at night.¹² Roads were

⁸Ibid., p. 105.

⁹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 109.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 111.

¹¹Ibid., p. 112.

¹²Ibid., p. 119.

bad and travel into the interior, even in an ox cart, was well nigh impossible.¹³ Now one could go from Port au Prince to Cap Haitien, a distance of one hundred and forty miles, by automobile. The road had been built and improved by the marines with corvee labor. He had never seen any abuse of the corvee laborers and he understood that they had been so well fed that many had requested permission to stay beyond their three day period.¹⁴ He attributed the bad feeling between the whites and Haitians to the talk of the military chiefs and generals who told the Haitians the white man was trying to enslave him again.¹⁵

Since the occupation had begun Port au Prince, Cap Haitien, and other towns had been cleaned up, roads and streets paved and some of the buildings equipped with sanitary facilities.¹⁶

Farnham asserted that one of the disappointments of the occupation was the failure of Washington to adopt a well-defined plan to develop the agricultural and economic resources of Haiti. Nothing had been done to educate the people along this line and most of the education was still in the hands of the Catholic Church. Dartiguenave and the occupation officials had done a good job, as well as could be expected with no direction from Washington along the lines of a definite policy. Farnham said that he himself had gone to Washington to urge that a better policy be adopted, and that, in his opinion, the failure to do so had resulted in the renewed revolutionary activity in 1918.¹⁷ He also believed that if the United States withdrew from Haiti the result would be anarchy.¹⁸

¹³Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 125.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 115.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 116.

The people did not have the education to govern themselves successfully and would be at the mercy of the professional politicians again.¹⁹

Reverend L. Ton Evans, who had been missionary to Haiti from 1908 to 1912, and again from 1917 to April, 1919, testified that conditions in Haiti were bad and that there were periodical disturbances and bloody fights. Evans said that back of these were the merchants and bankers who loaned money and sold guns to encourage the revolutions.²⁰ He had found that the average Haitian was gentle, simple and peace loving. He had travelled all through the country unmolested without a pass and was attacked only once when he tried to interfere with some voodoo rites.²¹ He understood that others had to have passes to move from district to district, but being a missionary, he was never troubled about one.

On his return to Haiti in 1917, he was struck by the great change made in Haiti. Towns that had once been filthy and dirty and full of stagnant pools were now clean, free of decayed vegetation and well drained. He was amazed at the order and quiet that prevailed and the contentment of the people, who were free of the fear of revolution. The people seemed grateful for the occupation.²² But in 1918 there was a change in the attitude of the people toward the occupation. This change was brought about by the forced adoption of the 1918 constitution, the corvee system, the dissolution of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.²³ He said the corvee was worse than anything. He testified to having seen men and women roped together being dragged off to the corvee. This, he said, led

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 153.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 161.

²³Ibid., p. 162.

the people to believe they were being forced back into slavery. He knew of none who had requested permission to over-stay their allotted time and said they were not well fed. He attacked the gendarmerie as a brutal organization and said this was true due to poor supervision, no requirement for reports and the poor choice of men to serve.²⁴ He had not actually seen the marines commit atrocities but had heard of them. In his point of view as a missionary, whiskey and women were demoralizing factors in the lives of the marines. The gendarmerie and the corvee system had so terrorized the district around Hinche, Jacmel and Maissade that the men were afraid to go to church.²⁵

In Evans' opinion, one of the failures of the occupation was the lack of attention to public education. Another misfortune was the censorship which still continued. He realized that it was necessary during the war in Europe but was a burdensome thing now. He said he did not believe the United States should withdraw entirely from Haiti, but it should replace the military men with civil officials and reduce the marine force to about two hundred men of the highest type.²⁶ Haiti, he said, could advance under a sympathetic and understanding policy on the part of the United States.²⁷

While the committee was still in session in Washington, the question of lifting martial law during its visit to Haiti had been raised. Reverend Evans, Ernest Pierre Angell, Pierre Hudicourt, and Stenio Vincent felt that the order for martial law, which had been in effect since the occupation, should be lifted. They advocated this because the natives

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Hearings, Vol. I, p. 167.

²⁶Ibid., p. 166.

²⁷Ibid., p. 198.

might be afraid to testify for fear of reprisals.²⁸ This would give the Committee a fair opportunity to ascertain what had taken place and afford the people a full and fair opportunity to come before the Committee with whatever testimony they deemed pertinent and important.²⁹ The lifting of martial law was opposed by General Butler and General Cole. Cole said an occupying power needed to protect itself, especially in Haiti where the lower courts were so venal and unreliable. The courts in Haiti, in his opinion, would have to be reorganized before martial law could be lifted. Cole remarked that, "It has not weighed heavily on the poor; it has not weighed heavily on the innocent; it has not weighed heavily on anybody except their fears."³⁰ The Committee felt that if martial law were lifted it would give some faction a chance to make trouble; Angell did not agree.³¹ He maintained that the Committee would not get the facts unless martial law was lifted. Butler did not fear factional trouble but did anticipate individual reprisals.³² When the argument over the abolition of martial law was over the Reverend Evans had these suggestions to make; that small native ownership of land be created by the United States, schools be established to teach the Haitians agricultural and vocational subjects, all forced labor except among prisoners and known criminals be abolished.³³

Admiral Caperton admitted that the year he had been in Haiti there had been no payment on the foreign or domestic debt because there had been no instructions from Washington to pay such debts. He denied that

²⁸Ibid., p. 239.

²⁹Ibid., p. 526.

³⁰Hearings, Vol. I, p. 705.

³¹Hearings, Vol. I, p. 526.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid., p. 133.

Farnham had exercised any influence over the policies of the occupation and said that he had never met Farnham.³⁴

Robert E. Forrest, of the United West Indies Corporation which was interested in a castor bean project to produce castor oil for aviation, was the next witness. He was also head of the company that had tried to grow 2,500 acres of long staple cotton. The project turned out to be a complete failure.³⁵ The United States had not lived up to its treaty obligations in developing the agricultural and mineral resources of Haiti.³⁶ Much remained, he thought, to be done in the field of education and in straightening out the land system. There had been no survey of land and no adequate way to tell who owned what land. Haitian law recognized that possession for twenty years became ownership.³⁷ The main objection to the occupation was a notable lack of a definite policy and the absence of anyone to take direct responsibility for formulating and directing a policy.³⁸

James W. Johnson of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People backed up this statement by saying that while the occupation had built roads, improved hospitals and prisons, cleaned up the cities and towns, there had been an absence of a definite policy. Nothing had been done to further education and build an adequate school system. Even with these deficiencies the United States could not withdraw unless a reorganization of the gendarmerie was brought about.³⁹ H. M. Pilkington of the American Development Company of Haiti thought that

³⁴Ibid., p. 370.

³⁵Ibid., p. 749.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Hearings, Vol. I, p. 789.

³⁸Ibid., p. 757.

³⁹Ibid., p. 784.

Russell, McIlhenny, and Bailly Blanchard should be removed because they had suspended the salaries of the President, the Cabinet, and the Council of State.⁴⁰ Haiti should be under civilian control.⁴¹

Cole, Butler, and Wells testified before the Committee and said that the marines as a whole had done a good job in Haiti. The conditions, when the marines went in, had been one of chaos, out of which they brought peace and order and stability.⁴² There had been no roads and the occupation had built roads at little cost with corvee labor. All agreed that there had been abuses in the corvee but none had personally seen the marines or gendarmerie commit any. They had heard rumors of abuses around Hinche, Maissade and Jacmel, but most had considered the rumors hearsay and groundless. General Catlin had inspected at Hinche and Maissade and had found the corvee was still being used. At least the men found there had stated that they had been forced to work and wanted to go home, and he had allowed them to do so.

Caperton, Butler, and Cole denied that any force had been used to get Dartiguenave elected president, to approve the treaty, or in the dissolution of the National Assembly. But General Cole did admit that if Dartiguenave had not issued the decree to dissolve the National Assembly, he would have done it anyway.⁴³ They maintained that martial law had been declared at the behest and with the approval of Dartiguenave and that they said the changes in the constitution had not come at the suggestion of the occupying power but at the request of the President of Haiti.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 792.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., p. 515.

⁴³Hearings, Vol. I, p. 703.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 69.

Caperton maintained that the censorship of the press had been instituted for several reasons: (1) the worsening situation in Haiti and the prevention of the development of an unfortunate military situation, (2) the printing of scurrilous and insulting articles concerning the gendarmerie and the government, (3) so-called patriotic meetings which vilified the Haitian Government, the occupation, and the gendarmerie, (4) lack of any attempt of the Haitian Government to stop them, (5) knowledge that the Haitian courts would not support the government, (6) general dislike of the black man for the white man, (7) the prevalent belief the occupation would soon be withdrawn, (8) the support of certain so-called patriotic societies by persons or organizations in the United States, and (9) the poor economic conditions in Haiti, leading to unemployment.⁴⁵ The censorship was tightened by an order of Colonel John Russell which read as follows: "While the freedom of speech and press are practically unrestricted, articles or speeches that are of an incendiary nature are prohibited."⁴⁶ A message from Dartiguenave to Russell showed his approval: "I have this day received your proclamation. It has my full and entire approval, and I desire that it be given its full and entire effect."⁴⁷

Lejeune asserted that the prisons which had once been filthy and unsanitary were now clean and orderly. Apparently no prison records had been kept up until the time of the occupation. Complete records were now kept. The prisoners were well fed and were taught various trades such as furniture making, leather work, shoemaking, basket weaving, and other

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 70.

⁴⁶Hearings, Vol. I, p. 73.

⁴⁷Ibid.

skills.⁴⁸ What the prisoners earned was turned over to his family. All except murderers were allowed to stay with their families overnight.

Butler and the others did not advocate the lifting of martial law. Neither did they recommend withdrawing from Haiti in the near future. Withdrawal now would mean that Haiti would drift back into anarchy again. Most seemed to feel a distrust for the upper Haitian, the one who wore shoes. The average Haitian peasant was more honorable and trustworthy than a member of the elite class, in their opinion.⁴⁹

The Senate Committee moved on to Port au Prince on November 28, 1921. They were greeted by demonstrators carrying signs with inscriptions such as: "Shall Haiti Be Your Congo," "Shall Haiti Be Your Belgium," and "Shall Haiti Be Your Ireland," which Senator Oddie asked Dr. George Sylvain who had prepared the signs and sponsored the demonstration. The latter informed him that it was "The Patriotic Union of Haiti." Senator Oddie told Sylvain that the Committee would not be influenced by signs and slogans, but concrete facts.⁵⁰ He wondered if the Patriotic Union was sponsoring a candidate for the coming election in 1922. Dr. Sylvain replied that the Union was a patriotic organization and not a political one, and therefore did not recognize anyone for the presidency.⁵¹ Dr. Sylvain complained that no guarantee had been given to witnesses that they would be protected from reprisals. The people did not feel free to come before the Committee to testify because martial law had not been lifted.⁵² Senator Oddie declared that the Committee came to get the facts and not mere opinions or hearsay evidence. "We will not assume

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 539.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 680.

⁵⁰Hearings, Vol. II, p. 838.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., p. 832.

anything until we have proof that violations of military and civil law have occurred."⁵³ Sylvain disputed the testimony concerning the literacy rate and the lack of schools given by some of the witnesses. He said schooling was obligatory from the age of seven and compulsory through four years of elementary school.⁵⁴ He admitted that the literacy rate was much lower in the interior but contended that this was because of the inaccessibility of the region, and not through any lack of policy on the part of the government.⁵⁵ He said that if the Americans withdrew the Haitians would preserve a stable government as a result from the experience gained from the occupation.⁵⁶

The Committee then questioned and heard testimony concerning brutalities committed by marines and gendarmes. One of these witnesses was a Catholic priest, Abbe Louis Marie Le Sidaner. The Abbe told of seeing a village burned by the gendarmerie and marines, which was thought to be sheltering "Cacos". The village consisted of about two hundred and fifty houses and was completely destroyed.⁵⁷ The inhabitants were so terrified that they ran into the woods.⁵⁸

Polidor St. Pierre of St. Marc told of being hung by his wrists for five days. He passed this period without food or water. After this he was given the water cure and tortured with a red hot iron, the scars from which he exhibited to the Committee.⁵⁹

Dilon Victor of Mirogoane was hung by his wrists for twenty-seven days.⁶⁰ A woman said the marines tied her husband to the rafters of their

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 841.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 844.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 846.

⁵⁷Hearings, Vol. II, p. 850.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 860.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 886.

house and set it afire. She admitted that she had not seen the act but was told that the marines were responsible.⁶¹

All in all, the Committee examined about twenty-four witnesses, who told of false arrests, false accusations, beatings, killings, and various other crimes. Some were reporting only hearsay evidence which they only admitted under cross examination by the Committee. For instance, some of the witnesses would speak of a little brother and then admit that the "little" brother was a grown man of twenty-five or thirty years. Another would maintain that he saw something happen and then admit that he had been told of the incident.

After about three or four days of questioning, the Committee left Port au Prince and went to Santo Domingo City in the Dominican Republic, which was also occupied by the United States because of financial and political difficulties. The Committee arrived back in the United States December 21, 1921.

Senator Medill McCormick had this to say in a preliminary report concerning the occupation of Haiti:

"The members of the Committee are unanimous in the belief that the continued presence of the small American force in Haiti is as necessary to the peace and development of the country as are the services to the Haitian Government of the American treaty service officials appointed under the treaty of 1915. There can be no abrogation of the treaty and, at this time, no diminution of the small force of marines.

"It is important that steps should be taken forthwith to coordinate the labors of the representatives of the United States Government in Haiti and the so-called American treaty officials. There should be appointed a special representative of the President, a high commissioner in whom should be vested the usual diplomatic powers of an envoy extraordinary, and to whom, furthermore, all the American officials appointed under the treaty as well as the commandant of the marine brigade should look for direction and guidance."⁶²

⁶¹Ibid., p. 891.

⁶²New York Times, December 26, 1921, p. 8.

The Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society denounced the preliminary report of the McCormick Committee as a disgrace to the United States.

The Committee resumed its hearings at Washington by calling Ernest H. Gruening, Managing Editor of The Nation to testify. He found that the Haitians were astonished at the situation and that a majority of the population felt the United States should get out. However, he felt that the United States should stay long enough to create an effective gendarmerie, officered by Haitians and to establish Haitian finances on a sound, efficient, and modern basis.⁶⁴ Gruening held that the Haitians had learned a lesson and would remain peaceful if the United States should release the island.⁶⁵ He thought that when the Haitian President's term ended in May, 1922, a constituent assembly should be elected and empowered to draw up a constitution and elect a president.⁶⁶ In Gruening's opinion the occupation forces should be withdrawn from Haiti entirely in six months, but not until an effective gendarmerie had been organized to preserve peace and order.⁶⁷

The next witness called was Dr. Carl Kelsey of the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Kelsey had gone to Haiti at the request of the American Academy of Political Science and had stayed there for about six months. Dr. Kelsey had talked with the Haitians, Americans, and Europeans, and while he did find some discontent among the Haitians, on the whole, he believed that most of them were grateful for the occupation. Very few of the Haitians had seen any abuses occur. Dr. Kelsey felt that the Haitian

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Hearings, Vol. II, p. 1201.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 1210.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 1214.

⁶⁷Ibid.

emphasized the cruelties for the effect it would have on the American people, not because he particularly cared about his fellow Haitians. As for all the hue and cry about freedom of the press and martial law the Haitians had not had these freedoms before the occupation and some of the more prominent Haitians approved of the censorship.⁶⁹ Dr. Kelsey declared that there had undoubtedly been cruelties, murders and other atrocities. Among the most common were: (1) drunkenness and accompanying disorders from which ninety per cent of the troubles arose, (2) sexual assaults for which severe punishments had been meted out to the offenders, and (3) third degree methods which had been used to obtain evidence.⁷⁰ Our policy had failed because we did not publicize the fact that the guilty had been punished.⁷¹

Kelsey testified that local residents, both native and foreign, complained that there had often been a lack of tact and courtesy on the part of American officials, arbitrary actions, and decisions, and refusals to take advice. Some said it was due to the Southerners sent to Haiti. Kelsey felt the fundamental cause for the trouble had been a lack of understanding of the problem and lack of direction from Washington.⁷²

Kelsey, nevertheless noted that there had been some real accomplishments made by the occupying forces. Among these were: the maintenance of order, establishment of the gendarmerie, the honest handling of the revenues, roads, regular payment of the government employees, sanitation work, the stabilization of the paper gourde.⁷³ He asserted that either

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 1245.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 1300.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid., p. 1307.

⁷³Ibid., p. 1314.

of three general policies might be adopted. The United States might withdraw and refuse to accept any responsibility for what happened; refuse to intervene and refuse to let any other country intervene; withdraw and refuse to intervene again, but let other countries do as they please in regard to the collection of debts or the establishment of naval bases; continue the intervention, promising to withdraw as soon as conditions make possible the restoration of autonomy.⁷⁴

On June 26, 1922, the Committee gave its report on Haiti to the Senate. The Report very mildly condemned the Marine Corps as a whole. It held that while abuses did occur they were in a limited area around Hinche, Maissade, Jacmel, during a period of the worst of the "Caco" outbreak from 1918-19, and took place within a six month period.⁷⁵ The report would admit that there were only two cases of unjustifiable homicide that were judicially proven and that eight more cases were highly probable.⁷⁶ There were no proven cases of torture in which Americans took part. The Committee said that some of the incidents developed when the gendarmerie lacked proper supervision by white officers.⁷⁷ Killings of innocent people in the campaign against the "Cacos" probably took place, but were accidental and unavoidable.⁷⁸

The Committee did not have a high regard for the average Haitian as a witness. They considered him as unreliable and likely to repeat unfounded accusations as fact.⁷⁹ The Committee severely criticized the various patriotic and independence societies because they tended to adopt as true any baseless rumor of cruelty and tried to bring into disrepute

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 1336.

⁷⁵New York Times, Current History Magazine, August, 1922, p. 839.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Ibid.

the American naval forces.⁸⁰

The corvee was a blunder, the Committee reported and so was the failure of Washington in not choosing a more sympathetic type of official toward the Haitians.⁸¹

On the other hand there had been several real accomplishments, such as the building and repairing of the highways, stabilizing the currency, increasing the revenues and trade of Haiti, and providing for the peace and security of person and property in Haiti.⁸²

The Committee recommended that a High Commissioner be sent to Haiti to direct the policies and supervise the activities of the occupying forces, both civilian and military. It proposed that the Haitian government should be warned against allowing foreign interests to acquire great land holdings in Haiti.⁸³ Finally it asked that the provost courts should be abolished, but not until an effective reorganization of the Haitian Courts was attained.⁸⁴

As a result of the recommendations of the McCormick Committee, President Harding appointed Colonel John Russell as High Commissioner. He was instructed by the State Department to make a prompt and effective reorganization of the powers and duties of the United States treaty officials, to stabilize Haiti's finances, to effect a gradual withdrawal of the forces of the occupation and the enlargement and the improvement of the Haitian gendarmerie, and to carry out plans for the prosperity and economic development of the Haitian Republic.⁸⁵

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid., p. 241.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Foreign Relations, 1922, Vol. II, p. 463.

The Haitians hoped to have both the presidential and assembly elections in 1922; however, no assembly elections were held because the Department and Borno felt the time was not right. The Council did elect Louis Borno as president in April, 1922. McIlhenny resigned as Financial Adviser after the presidential election and John S. Hord was appointed in his place.⁸⁶ In 1923, Dr. W. W. Cumberland, Financial Adviser and Director of Customs of Peru and manager of the Reserve Bank of Peru, was appointed Financial Adviser and General Receiver of the Customs.⁸⁷ Louis Borno governed Haiti until 1930 without ever calling an election of a National Assembly, although the constitution called for elections every two years on an even year to be designated by the president. In 1930, Borno decided to postpone the elections again and the decision touched off riots at Aux Cayes where some Haitians were killed.

President Herbert Hoover, as a result of the disorders, appointed W. Cameron Forbes, Henry P. Fletcher, Elie Vezina, James Kerney, and William Allen White to investigate the problems in Haiti. The Forbes Commission arrived in Haiti and was greeted with a demonstration just as the McCormick Committee had been in 1922. Banners carried by the demonstrators demanded that elections be held and an end brought to the occupation.⁸⁸ The Commission reported to the president that it was not convinced that the foundations for democratic and representative government were broad enough in Haiti for a stable government. The educated public and literate minority were so small that any government formed in these circumstances was liable to become an oligarchy. The literate few too

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 472.

⁸⁷Foreign Relations, 1923, Vol. II, p. 394.

⁸⁸Foreign Relations, 1930, p. 210.

often looked to public office as a means of livelihood. Until the basis of political structure was broadened by education, the government must necessarily be more or less unstable and in danger of political upheavals.⁸⁹ Poverty and ignorance and a lack of tradition or desire for orderly government were forces creating bandit gangs in Haiti.⁹⁰

The Forbes Commission recommended that the detail of Naval and Marine officers be created for a minimum of four years, that appropriation for roads be continued, that reductions be made in customs duties, internal revenue taxes, especially those on alcohol and tobacco if the condition of treasury warranted.⁹¹ Subsequent steps recommended by the Forbes Commission were: the president declare himself in favor of a Haitianization program; officers without racial antipathies should be chosen for duty in Haiti; at the expiration of Commissioner Russell's tour of duty the office of High Commissioner be abolished and a non-military minister be appointed.⁹²

The Committee next met with the Federated Committee of Patriotic Leagues of Haiti and President Borno to discuss how to go about electing a provisional president. It was proposed that the Federation prepare a list of Candidates, and the Committee its own list. The lists of candidates were prepared and on both the name of Eugene Roy appeared.⁹³ The Council of State opposed the candidacy of Roy for president, but Borno insisted that if Roy was not elected he would follow two plans: resign and dismiss the Council of State, or adjourn the Council of State and

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 225.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 326.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid., p. 210.

dismiss certain members, replacing them by men who would vote for Roy.⁹⁴ Borno chose the second plan and appointed twelve new men to the Council of State. Roy was elected President of Haiti on April 16, 1930,⁹⁵ and immediately issued a decree calling for an election of the National Assembly on October 14, 1930. The election was held and won by the Cartelists who had been in opposition to Borno. The National Assembly met and elected Stenio Vincent as President of Haiti on the fourth ballot.⁹⁶

A series of agreements soon released Haiti from United States control. In October of 1930 an agreement between the United States and Haiti was signed transferring three of the five treaty services to Haiti, leaving only finances and the gendarmerie under the control of the United States.⁹⁷ In 1932 a further agreement was reached to withdraw as soon as possible.⁹⁸ The next year a meeting was held between Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, and Stenio Vincent, at which they agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute that could not be settled by ordinary diplomatic channels.⁹⁹ The agreement stated that all fiscal representatives of the United States would be withdrawn and the National Bank of Haiti would handle the continued payment and amortization of the outstanding foreign bonds of the Republic amounting to approximately \$11,000,000.¹⁰⁰ It was also agreed to turn control of the gendarmerie over to Haiti and to withdraw all American troops by November 1, 1934. This operation was carried out.¹⁰¹

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 243.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 255.

⁹⁷H. P. Davis, "Haiti and the Good Neighbor Policy", Literary Digest, April 28, 1934, p. 8.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS

The conditions in Haiti in 1915 were indeed chaotic. The office of the president belonged to the one who controlled the army. In ordinary times Haiti might have been a rich prize to a nation interested in colonies. However, the year 1915 was not normal because most of Europe was involved in World War I and so Robert Lansing's excuse that there was a fear that Germany would occupy Haiti was not valid. Germany, in 1915, was hardly in the position to occupy anything involved as she was in Europe and the British Navy ruling the seas. The excuse that the United States landed troops to protect American and foreign lives and property was not plausible because in all the revolutions the Haitians had scrupulously avoided killing anyone but Haitians. All who testified before the Naval Court and the McCormick Committee confirmed this.

Although Caperton maintained that the United States did not use force in order to get Sudre Dartiguenave elected president, the fact remains the State Department did lay down some conditions to which the president would have to agree. Lansing also sent word to Caperton to interview the three principal candidates in order to determine the one which would be the most cooperative. The Admiral found that neither Dr. Rosolve Bobo nor Solon Menos were agreeable to the terms demanded by the United States which were control of the finances and control of the gendarmerie. Sudre Dartiguenave was elected by a Senate with the gendarmerie looking on and the area around the hall cleared of all except those with a permit. Caperton asserted that this was a free and fair election. Later, however, when the Dartiguenave government balked at signing the

treaty, the State Department threatened to depose it and hold an "honest" election.

Probably the weakness was not in the operation of the treaty's conditions but in the men that were in charge of administering it. The almost natural antipathy between the whites and blacks would be aroused, especially the southern whites who were most numerous in positions of authority. The desire to get something done and the feeling of superiority over a backward nation and a seemingly, at least to the whites, backward people would almost inevitably result in bloodshed. The Haitians were proud of the fact that they had been the second nation to win their independence from European domination and their reaction was one of violence when they saw that independence threatened. The upper class Haitian was very proud of his culture and classical education. The Haitians did not like to be pushed into a secondary position by what they considered an illegal usurpation of power by the United States. They could not understand why they were snubbed by the occupation officials and the color line drawn against them at their clubs.

Another weakness of Washington's occupation policy was the fact that there was no guiding policy and no one designated to assume the responsibility in formulating one. Roger Farnham and others complained about this and were almost unanimous in holding that the United States had not carried out its promise to better the education system in Haiti. They complained that instead of improvements in the penal system, to which all the marine officers pointed with pride, something should have been done to improve educational standards. It was not until 1922 that Colonel John Russell was appointed High Commissioner to Haiti by President Warren Harding that we had a responsible official in Haiti. This followed a recommendation of the McCormick Committee. However, the Committee had in mind

a civilian, possibly someone from Tuskegee, Alabama, who would promote agricultural and vocational training in Haiti, for the appointment. Harding, however, appointed a military man.

There were some real material benefits to Haiti. The government was made and still is one of the most stable and orderly in the Caribbean. Peace was brought to the countryside; no longer is the peasant a victim of "Caco" bands. Roads were built and restored, although some opponents of the occupation asserted they were of more military value than commercial use. The occupation forces admitted that the system of roads made possible the rapid transit of troops from one place to another but they also claimed that it was possible to move goods to the market easier and faster. Hospitals were built and medical care made available to the peasant. Town and cities were cleaned up and sewers built, stagnant pools were drained to abolish the mosquito as nearly as possible. Even L. Ton Evans admitted that great strides had been made in the sanitation work. The currency was stabilized and the gourde pegged at five to one American dollar. Haiti's bonds, which had sold in 1914 at forty-nine per cent of face value, were sold at a little more than ninety-two per cent of face value in 1922.

Some of the opponents of the occupation maintained that the United States had occupied Haiti for the benefit of certain financiers and investors such as the National City of New York. If this was true, and Caperton and others denied it, the occupation was largely a failure. The Haitian Railway was never a success, the attempt to grow cotton resulted in a loss of over a million dollars and the National City Bank finally sold its interest in the National Bank of Haiti to the Haitian Government at a loss.

The Naval Court of Inquiry was not expected to reveal anything too

damaging to the armed forces. Would Admiral Henry T. Mayo, who was so high handed in his dealings with the Mexicans, condemn anyone who was dealing equally as high handed with the Haitians?

The Senate Committee under Medill McCormick was hardly more effective. The Senators questioned just about the same witnesses and heard principally the same testimony and arrived at about the same conclusions. They did recommend some changes in the administration of the occupation of Haiti. The Republican administration headed by Warren G. Harding did almost nothing to alleviate the situation. There was nothing done to get elections held in order to obtain a truly representative government until 1930 during the administration of Herbert Hoover. Neither was there anything done about building schools or furthering education. Here the obstacles were tremendous. There were practically no school buildings and no teachers. Another difficulty arose from the fact that while the language of the elite class was French the language of the peasant was a patois, a mixture of French and African. Because of this it was difficult to devise an adequate alphabet and to write textbooks.

Secretaries of State William J. Bryan and Robert Lansing expressed the fear that Haiti or the Mole St. Nicholas would fall into unfriendly hands. Bryan in a letter to Woodrow Wilson said that the United States had better take the Mole out of circulation before some European country did. If this was an object of the occupation nothing was ever done about it except to insert a clause in the treaty in which Haiti agreed not to sell, lease or otherwise alienate any of her territory to any European power. When the United States withdrew we did not retain any naval base and nothing was said about the Mole.

Why did the United States occupy Haiti? Were we there at the behest of Roger Farnham and others who had financial interests? Caperton, as

well as others, denied this. If it were dollar diplomacy nothing much was done to help business to get a foothold and stay there. Territory was not in the question or the United States would have demanded airfields and naval bases.

It is apparent from the testimony given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, the McCormick Committee, and the Forbes Commission that there were two motives for the occupation of Haiti, to forestall seizure of Haiti by a European power and to restore peace and stability. The first was very nebulous considering the European War. The second was successful because Haiti has had the most stable and peaceful government in the Caribbean area since the American occupation.

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