

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SANTO DOMINGO
WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON PRESIDENT GRANT'S TREATY OF ANNEXATION

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
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PREFACE

It has for some time been a conviction of the writer that the economic phase of foreign affairs is the guiding force in most international relations; and, that this force controls movements and attempted movements. It has been my purpose in this short history of Santo Domingo, to examine all of the sources at hand on the subject, paying particular attention to the period when consideration was given to the matter of annexation to the United States and the causes underlying this consideration.

In gathering this material for the study the writer wishes to express his appreciation for the uniform courteous assistance rendered by the members of the library staff of the A. and M. College. He also wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. T. H. Reynolds for counsel and guidance in the perspective which the writer now has of Pan-American relations, and to Dr. B. B. Chapman for the expert advice on historiography. The writer is also indebted to Mr. Earl Kelso for his untiring efforts in tracing sources, and, most of all to Mrs. J. E. Miller, who made valuable suggestions in connection with the writing of the manuscript.

J. E. H.

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CHAPTER I

EARLY INTEREST IN SANTO DOMINGO

In taking up the study of early Santo Domingo, many things make it very interesting to us. On this island was planted the first European colony in the New World. Here we find the first introduction of African slavery as well as the beginning of the great movement to break this bond of human servitude. Almost every European government has wielded its power over this island, but through all the bloodshed and war, cruelty and persecution, it stands today as beautiful and fruitful in its natural resources as when it was first discovered by Columbus. With the assistance of law and sound government, accompanied by intelligence, industry, and enterprise, Santo Domingo will take its place as one of the most favored of states.¹

Santo Domingo is a state in the West Indies, and occupies about two-thirds of the island of Haiti. The island was discovered by Columbus, who left a garrison there about January, 1493, but upon his return in November of the same year, he found nothing but ruin and the marks of death.² He learned after much inquiry that his men, losing all discipline after his departure, had so antagonized the natives by acts of licentiousness and

¹Samuel Hazard, Santo Domingo Past and Present with a Glance at Haiti, p.1, 1873.

²J. N. Larned, The New Larned History, I, 258, Springfield, Mass., 1922.

rapacity, that the Indians rose against them and annihilated the entire colony.

Santo Domingo lies in the Atlantic Ocean at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico. Next to Cuba in size of the Great Antilles group, its position and natural advantages place it first in rank of all the beautiful islands in these waters. The territorial extent of the whole island is about four hundred English miles; the extreme breadth of its widest part nearly one hundred eighty miles.³

For exact location, Santo Domingo is in $18^{\circ} 20'$ North latitude, and in $68^{\circ} 40'$ West longitude. It is about seventy miles southwest of Cuba, one hundred thirty miles northeast of Jamaica, and sixty miles west northwest of Puerto Rico. The peculiar formation of the island gives it almost every variety of climate. Its soils and vegetation are equally as varied.⁴

Products such as sugar, cocoa, tobacco, mahogany, cedar, satin-wood, gum, wax, and honey, as well as copper, gold, and other metals, are found in abundance in Santo Domingo. Rock salt is also a natural production, and salines are numerous.⁵

Under Spanish rule the Indians were reduced to slavery in the mines and on haciendas. The inhuman Spanish policy caused the death of thousands of the Indians. European diseases killed many also. Las Casas, the Apostle to the Indians persuaded the Spanish authorities to substitute negro slaves to take the place of the Indians. Thousands of Negroes were brought into

³Hazard, op. cit., p. 2.

⁴Ibid., p. 3.

⁵Congressional Globe, 41 Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 41, Washington, 1869.

the colony from Africa and by 1510 a regular form had been given to this traffic in human flesh.⁶

Some authorities of the time place the number of original inhabitants in Santo Domingo at from one to three millions.⁷ When Columbus discovered Santo Domingo, it was estimated to have at least a million inhabitants; fifteen years later this number was reduced to 60,000.⁸

There was a short period of prosperity. Before the middle of the century, however, the most enterprising of the colonists were enticed away by the superior attractions of Mexico and Peru. The country then began to suffer from attacks from English and French buccaneers who had established themselves on the small island of Tortuga near the northwest corner of Haiti. French power in this island took more rapid strides than did that of the English. Soon this power was extended from the island of Tortuga to Santo Domingo.⁹

Spain had at no time previous to the Peace of Ryswick recognized the right of any power to locate upon Santo Domingo.¹⁰ By the treaty, which all the allied powers of Europe signed in 1697, France came to acquire permanent hold upon the island. However, the Spanish inhabitants were steadily decreasing in number and their settlements were decaying, while the French were taking advantage of their opportunities with such vigor that they had become masters of the entire western portion of the island.¹¹

⁶Hazard, op. cit., p. 45.

⁷Ibid., p. 9

⁸Ibid., p. 38.

⁹Ibid., pp. 66-67.

¹⁰Dana Gardner Munro, The Latin American Republics A History, p.103.

¹¹Hazard, op. cit., p. 89.

At the time of the French Revolution, there were several elements of trouble in Santo Domingo. The colonists were dissatisfied under the government of a metropolis so far away, because it interfered with their proper development of commercial and agricultural interests.¹²

Freedom in the United States gave them new ideas of liberty and government. As a result, the colonists wished to constitute a national sovereignty for themselves and to command, in return for the riches they sent to the metropolis, an independence that they believed they merited.¹³

According to Hazard, the revolution of Santo Domingo is divided into three distinct epochs; the first comprises the revolution of the whites; the second, that of the mulattoes; and the third, the revolution of the negroes.¹⁴ Thus, three times the cry of freedom was raised in Santo Domingo; each time by different races. Each time this cry was followed by massacres, conflagrations and atrocious cruelties. The rich were driven out, and the whites were exterminated, but with their departure went riches and European civilization.¹⁵

The National Assembly met in 1789, and a petition was presented by the mulattoes, asking for civil and political rights. The president of the Assembly responded, "Not a single part of the nation should ask in vain its rights from the Assembly of the representatives of the French people."¹⁶

The Creoles in Santo Domingo did not await the sanction of the home

¹²Ibid., p. 115.

¹³Ibid., p. 115.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 115.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 117.

government to their independence, but formed Primary Assemblies, and afterward Provincial Assemblies representing the three great divisions of the island. These Assemblies, however did not permit the presence of a single colored man. The three Assemblies met in March, 1790, taking the name of the General Assembly of French Santo Domingo.¹⁷ This Assembly decided that if the French government did not send instructions within three months, it would assume the government of the colony.¹⁸

This was a deathblow to the hopes that the mulattoes had of securing their share in the "rights of man." The whites now placed themselves in open rebellion against the government of France, but the mulattoes, on the contrary, hoping in time to secure their rights legally, supported the Governor and the agents of the King.¹⁹

In May, 1790, the General Assembly of St. Mark published the basis of the Colonial Constitution, in which the ideas of independence were given, and assumed the powers of government to itself. This brought about two powers: the legitimate one of the King, and the assumed one of the Colonial Assembly. Those who wished the independence of the colony were called "patriots," and those who wished to maintain submission to the general government and the metropolis were called the "aristocrats."²⁰

In 1791 this decree came from France:

the colonial Assemblies actually existing should remain, but that the people of color shall be admitted to the primary and Colonial Assemblies of the future, if they have the requisite qualifications.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 118.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 118.

This was a bombshell thrown into the homes of Santo Domingo, and open
²¹
 revolt was now declared.

The English met a disastrous defeat in their first attempt to make
²²
 a permanent landing on Dominican soil in 1655. During the civil war in
 Santo Domingo, the "Patriotic Party" applied for help to the British at
 Jamaica. Some time later some planters had gone to England and asked
 aid of the British government. This aid had been refused until war was
 declared between France and England in 1793. The governor of Jamaica was
 then informed to receive inhabitants of Dominica who solicited British
 protection and to send a force to Dominica to hold such places as should
²³
 be surrendered to him.

England and Spain united to divide the island between them, in consid-
 eration of which the Spanish were to give the English their assistance in
²⁴
 the attack on Port de Paix.

In 1795 at the Peace of Basle, the French acquired from Spain, the
 Spanish end of the troublesome island of Santo Domingo. This treaty was
 known as the "infamous treaty of Basle."

An outstanding character in Dominican history of this time is Toussaint
 L'Ouverture, a former slave. He is said to have acquired the name L'Ouverture
 because he did his work so energetically and successfully that General Laveaux

²¹ Ibid., p. 118.

²² Ibid., p. 122.

²³ Ibid., p. 127.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 129-130.

²⁵ Congressional Globe, op. cit., XLI, 525.

exclaimed, Mais cet homme faite partout--But this man opens the way every-²⁶
where. From that time, he was called by the name, L'Ouverture.

Toussaint, who had been doing service for the Spanish government since the death of Louis XVI of France, was now asked by Laveaux, the French general, who was sorely besieged at Port de Paix by the English, to leave Spain and join him (Laveaux), promising to make him general of brigade. Toussaint, judging that the interests of the negroes would be safer under a²⁷ republic than with the Spanish, persuaded his followers to join Laveaux.

In 1797, the French government made Toussaint L'Ouverture general-in-chief of all French troops on the island. War was then resumed with greater vigor against the English. They made brave resistance against the French but were compelled to give up the island in 1798; but not until a treaty of peace and commerce had been formed on the part of the English government and Toussaint, by which Santo Domingo was recognized as an independent and²⁸ neutral power during the war.

Toussaint had organized a government in 1800 and had caused a constitution to be drawn and submitted to a general assembly of representatives from every district. It was approved and adopted, and later promulgated in the name of the people. In July, 1801, the island was declared independent with²⁹ Toussaint L'Ouverture as its supreme chief.

Napoleon Bonaparte, who was First Consul of France at this time, had his animosity aroused because of the honor bestowed upon Toussaint. His pride

²⁶Benson J. Lossing, The Horrors of Santo Domingo, Harper's Magazine, XLIII, 76, New York, June, 1871.

²⁷Hazard, op. cit., p. 131.

²⁸Ibid., p. 131.

²⁹Ibid., p. 139.

was also offended because Toussaint had organized a government and was made ruler for life, without previous suggestions or advice from him.³⁰ He began working on plans for rebuilding a colonial empire in America, and had for his first plan the re-conquest of the island of Santo Domingo.

The re-conquest of the island necessitated the re-enslavement of the negroes, which the Haitian planters requested. Napoleon dispatched an army of 12,000 soldiers under his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, but after ten months of warfare, Leclerc's army succumbed to the attacks of Toussaint's negroes and to the deadlier attack of the yellow fever.³¹

Under Toussaint's rule, a reign of order began in the island that was remarkable, but at his death, Dessalines, a negro chief, took over the affairs in the colony, holding much the same place as Toussaint had held.

Dessalines was a rude, uncultivated, illiterate negro, who became one of the outstanding characters in the history of Haiti. If he were otherwise good, his wholesale slaughter of the whites in the island, to whom he had promised protection, would cover his name with eternal infamy. His bravery, physical strength, and circumstances brought him into power and gave him the power of life and death over thousands of human beings.³²

Spain established herself anew on the eastern end of Santo Domingo in 1806, with Haiti remaining independent. Santo Domingo continued a Spanish possession until 1821, when under the authority of Columbia, a republic was proclaimed, and the Spanish withdrew. In 1822, the Haitian President, Jean Pierre Boyer, invaded Santo Domingo, joined it to Haiti, and ruled the entire island with force until his fall in 1843.

The Dominicans, in 1844, seeing the state of affairs in the west,

³⁰Hazard, op. cit., p. 76.

³¹Congressional Globe, op. cit., 525.

³²Hazard, op. cit., p. 149.

raised the banner of revolt; and the movement being popular and successful, total separation from the Haitian government was declared on
³³
 February 27, 1844.

After the natives had won a victory over the authorities of Haiti and had declared their independence in 1844, the revolutionists sent to Washington as their representative, Dr. J. M. Caminero, to seek the recognition of the United States. President Tyler sent John Hogan to the island to report on the geography, the character of the population, military strength, proportion of the various races in the population, and the financial condition of the government. When Calhoun retired, however, the agent
³⁴
 had not yet returned.

The spokesmen in Washington continued to press without success for recognition. Hogan now returned and his report, favorable to recognition, was presented to the Senate. The plea for recognition received the support of ex-Secretary, John C. Calhoun, who went so far as to ask ex-President Tyler to press the matter on President Polk. This, Tyler declined to do, but he expressed his conviction that

the experiment which the blacks have made of government has resulted in bloodshed and anarchy, and the most fertile island in the world is almost converted into a waste.³⁵

On Friday, March 12, 1849, we first hear of annexation. Mr Banks, in the House of Representatives, introduced a joint resolution (H. R. No. 5) concerning the annexation of the republic of Santo Domingo to the United States. This was later read a first and second time, ordered to be printed,

³³Hazard, op. cit., p. 171.

³⁴Senate Executive Document, No. 17, 41 Cong., 3 sess., I., 79.

³⁵St. George Leakin, James Buchanan, Samuel Flagg Bemis, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, V., 308, New York, 1928.

and to be referred to the committee on Foreign Affairs when appointed.

Several years were to pass before the real issue of annexation came up.

In the administration of President Pierce, Captain George B. McClelland was sent out by the War Department to survey the Bay and peninsula of Samana. He gave a valuable and comprehensive report.

The earlier years of the new republic were marked by the struggles between Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Baez, who with the exception of a few months under Jiminez, occupied the presidency in turn until 1861. In that year Santana, seeing that the approaching civil war would tie the hands of the American government, succeeded in effecting the annexation of Santo

Domingo by Spain. The Spaniards, however, did not long enjoy their sovereignty, for the harshness of their rule provoked a successful revolution under Jose Maria Cabral in 1864, and in the following year they withdrew all claim to the country. They destroyed most everything that could be destroyed. Even today there is hardly a spot in this island that does not bear the mark of the "time of the Spaniards."

J. Somers Smith, commercial agent of the United States in Dominica, was authorized February 26, 1867 by President Johnson to negotiate for the lease of Samana Bay, but his power was revoked May 8, 1867 because he had accomplished nothing.

In 1867 Admiral Porter and F. W. Seward, the assistant Secretary of State, were sent to Santo Domingo to secure the lease of Samana Bay for a

³⁶Cong. Globe, op. cit., p. 59.

³⁷Sen. Ex. Doc. 17, op. cit., p. 3.

³⁸Dana G. Munro, The U. S. and the Caribbean Area, p. 102, Boston, Mass., 1934.

⁴⁰Sen. Ex. Doc. 17, op. cit., p. 6.

naval station. They did not secure the lease, but the following year the President of the Dominican Republic sent an agent to Washington proposing annexation and requesting the United States to occupy Samana Bay at once. President Johnson advocated annexation of Santo Domingo in his annual message of December 9, 1868. A joint resolution to that effect was introduced into the House, but it was tabled without debate by an overwhelming
⁴¹ vote.

In 1865, Baez again assumed the reins of government in Santo Domingo, but he only served one year because of Cabral's attempt to provoke insurrection against him. He left the country and went to Curocoa, and Cabral, soon after, secured his own election as President. However, he seemed to be only the puppet of more designing men, and the country, during his rule, seems to have been constantly in trouble and no improvements made.

Matters were reduced to such a strait that Cabral endeavored to lease the Bay of Samana to the United States for two million dollars, but his government would not give him entire control over it. The matter was dropped for a time until, in 1868, Pujol was sent to Washington by Cabral to renew negotiations. It was stated that Cabral was desperate and must offer Samana to the United States. Baez issued a proclamation against this attempt to transfer the soil of the republic.
⁴³

Hazard says that a strong feeling at this time was manifested in favor

⁴¹ James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Message and Papers of the Presidents, VI., 689, Washington, 1897.

⁴²
⁴³ Hazard, op. cit., pp. 269-270.
Ibid., p. 271.

44

of annexation to the United States. The Dominican Secretary of State said that Santo Domingo wanted a strong government. He added further, that she would be unable to have a strong government so long as she remained isolated and exposed to the attacks of Haiti and the conspiracies of ambitious chiefs. The people of Santo Domingo hoped that with annexation to the United States they would have peace, immigration, capital, roads, and development of all the interests of the island.⁴⁵

William H. Seward, who was Secretary of State in 1861, received a dispatch from C. J. Helms, Consul-General at Havana, stating that the Spanish government had dispatched a vessel of war from the port at Havana with several companies of artillery for the island of Santo Domingo. Helm's idea was that the Spanish government was trying to take possession of Santo Domingo. Other troops were soon to be sent from Spain or from Cuba with the same purpose in view. Seward considered the Santo Domingo expedition as evidence of a scheme for acquisition. He knew the Southern desire for southward expansion, so he saw here the chance for a war that the cotton states might support. He wrote to Tassara, the Spanish minister at Washington, saying that this expedition

cannot fail to be taken as a first step in a policy of armed intervention by the Spanish government in the American countries which once constituted Spanish America,

and added that the President would be obliged

to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind, in regard to either the Dominican Republic or any part of the American continent or islands with a prompt, persistent, and, if possible, effective resistance.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 266.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 272.

⁴⁶Henry W. Temple, William H. Seward, Bemis, editor, op. cit., VII., 30.

On February 8, 1867, a treaty of amity, commerce and navigation and for the surrender of fugitive criminals was concluded between the United States and the Republic of Dominica. The purpose of this treaty was to tighten the bonds of friendship between the two countries and also to augment, by all the means at their disposal, the commercial intercourse of their respective citizens.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Senate Document, No. 47, I, 403, 61 Cong., 1 sess., Washington, 1909.

CHAPTER II
PRESIDENT GRANT AND THE
PROPOSED ANNEXATION OF SANTO DOMINGO

The internal troubles of the Dominican Republic brought President Baez again into power in 1868. He was so pressed on all sides by his rivals that he was willing to turn his country over to the United States¹ rather than to succumb to them.

The question of annexation that had arisen under the preceding administration was pressed from the beginning of Grant's term by agents of President Baez of the Dominican Republic. President Baez offered his country for annexation to the United States, in consideration of which he was to receive aid from the United States against his rival, Cabral. Coupled with the annexation question was also the one of the acquisition of a naval base at Samana Bay. There had been repeated offers of this² made by past governments anxious for American support.

The advocates of annexation soon won President Grant's support, through mixed motives. One of the motives was the conviction that if the black republic were brought under the American flag, it would help solve the negro problem because it would provide a field of emigration from the³ mainland.

¹ Joseph V. Fuller, Hamilton Fish, Bemis, editor, op. cit., VII., 129.

² Ibid., p. 141.

³ Ibid., p. 142.

This scheme for annexation met with little favor in the cabinet and Congress opposed it, or showed that attitude. There were those who maintained that the only sound policy of the United States is a strictly continental one, coupling a leading influence on the mainland of America with deliberate abstinence from extensions of territory. Then there were those who, considering the fact that the dominant population of the island was of negro descent, felt that our own emancipation problem was as great as that generation could handle or solve. Still others believed that we should not favor annexation because President Baez had no authority to negotiate under the constitution of his country. They also thought as did Charles Sumner that it was wrong to the colored race to take from them the territory which gave them the opportunity to work out the problem of their capacity for self-government.⁴

One day President Grant remarked, at a meeting of the cabinet, that the navy wanted Samana as a coaling station and that he intended to send Colonel Babcock, who was his private secretary, and former member of his military staff, to Santo Domingo to examine the coaling station and report upon it as an engineer. This suggestion, though not welcome, was given silent acquiescence. There was to be no publicity. A confidential report was to be made upon the country, its people and harbors.⁵

Before time for his departure, Grant told Babcock that the New York merchants who controlled the trade with the islands had offered him free passage on one of their ships. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, was

⁴Jacob D. Cox, How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney General, Atlantic Monthly, LXXVI., 165-170, New York, 1865.

⁵Ibid., pp. 164-165.

very much surprised and remarked that he considered it very undesirable that Colonel Babcock should be the guest of merchants having great trading interests with Santo Domingo, while he was on a confidential investigation for the President. The President agreed and ordered the Navy Department to furnish Babcock transportation on one of their vessels going down to join the West Indies squadron. A day or two later, it was announced that on account of the Colonel's inability to speak Spanish, an officer of the Inspector General's department would accompany him, and lastly it became known that Senator Columbus Cole of California was to be a member of the party. Rumors began to fly that business speculations were involved in the affair, but members of the government loyally suppressed their own doubts and attributed the rumors to the important purpose of Babcock's voyage.⁶

Accordingly, Babcock was sent on his mission in the summer of 1869, and the first thing Washington knew, Babcock was back with a treaty signed, sealed and delivered and needing only the ratification of the United States Senate to make the Dominican Republic part of the United States.

Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish could only gasp at Babcock's usurpation of power, and the cabinet supported Fish in his contention that the affair had been improperly managed.⁷ President Grant said:

I suppose it is not formal, as he had no diplomatic powers, but we can easily cure that. We can send back the treaty and have Perry, the consular agent sign it, and as he is an officer of the state department, it would make it alright.⁸

Babcock defined his document as a memorandum embodying their common

⁶Ibid., pp. 164-165.

⁷Ibid., pp. 164-165.

⁸Ibid., p. 167.

understanding of the terms of an ultimate agreement, but Grant and Fish commonly alluded to it as a "treaty." It provided two alternate choices for the American government: Annexation upon assumption of the public debt of \$1,500,000 or the purchase of Samana Bay for \$2,000,000." The Baez government undertook to deliver their country's national consent to annexation within four months, while Babcock pledged President Grant to use all of his influence for the acceptance of annexation by Congress.⁹

As consideration for the "option," Babcock agreed to this:

That his Excellency, President Grant assume the obligation to remit forthwith \$100,000 in cash and \$50,000 worth of arms to be credited against the ultimate payment on either alternative.

It was further provided:

In either case the United States will guarantee the safety of the country and the government against every foreign aggression or machination (the Cabral movement being regarded as supported by Haiti) in order that the present cabinet may carry into effect the obligation it contracts to obtain from the people the expression of the national consent.¹⁰

Secretary Fish tendered his resignation rather than direct diplomatic procedure, which he did not think right, but President Grant persuaded him to remain in office.

Babcock was sent back to Santo Domingo, carrying instructions for the negotiation of a treaty of annexation and an alternate convention for a lease, rather than purchase, of Samana Bay, together with full powers for their signature by the American government's representative in the Republic.¹¹

⁹ Senate Report, No. 234., 2 sess., pp. 188-189.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 188-189.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 188-189.

He brought a cargo of arms and a draft for \$100,000 and an authorization to instruct the commander of a naval force, dispatched for the purpose, to take whatever precautions he judged proper to protect the government and to assume possession of either the entire country or the coaling station as might ultimately turn out to be the case. The document was signed on November 29, 1869, and the station was at once set up at Samana Bay under the American flag. The forces of President Baez, armed and supported by the American government, proceeded to pacify the country, and to supervise the voting in a popular referendum, which, by February, 1870, had a safe
 12
 majority for annexation.

When the agreements negotiated by Babcock arrived, President Grant called personally on Senator Sumner to solicit his support, and when he was informed that as "an administration man," he would give the matter "the most careful and candid consideration," he understood this to mean that Sumner would support the measure. President Grant was greatly aroused when the treaty was transmitted to the Senate on June 10, 1870, without comment. After a day or two, the Committee on Foreign Affairs rendered an adverse
 13
 report on it, after Sumner had made a four hour speech condemning annexation.

Meanwhile in the House of Representatives, Mr. Orth, on April 5, 1869, asked the clerk to read the resolution that he had introduced to the House during the closing days of the Fortieth Congress. The clerk read:

¹²Sen. Ex. Doc. 17, op. cit., pp. 105-108.

¹³Joseph V. Fuller, Hamilton Fish, Bemis, editor, op. cit., pp. 145-146.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives,

That the territory belonging to the Dominican Republic shall, on application to the government and people of said republic, be admitted into the Union as a territory of the United States, to be called the territory of Santo Domingo on the conditions in the manner following:

First, the people of the said republic shall adopt a republican form of territorial government by deputies, in convention assembled for that purpose.

Second, the action by the people shall be with the consent and cooperation of the existing government of said republic.

Third, such form of government shall thereafter be submitted to Congress for its approval.

Fourth, the admission of said Territory shall be with the view to the ultimate establishment of a State Government, republican in form, in and over said territory, in conformity to the constitution of the United States, with the approval of Congress.¹⁴

Mr. Orth made a strong plea for the annexation of Dominica. He recited all the advantages of acquisition from a commercial standpoint. He also stressed the military importance of the Bay of Samana, their natural resources, especially the mines, their climate and seasons, which he described as "perpetual spring."¹⁵

In the following resolution, it seems that credence was given the rumors that business speculations were involved:

Resolved: That the President if in his opinion not incompatible with the public service, communicate to this House a copy of the list of privileges in the office of the Secretary of State accompanying or relating to the Santo Domingo treaty, giving the names of the parties and companies to whom have been granted land, mines, franchises, and privileges of all kinds by the Dominican government; also, the amount of money paid out by our government preliminary to and concerning the negotiation of said treaty, to whom and for what purpose, and out of what fund paid.¹⁶

¹⁴Congressional Globe, op. cit., XLI, 523.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 524- 525.

¹⁶Congressional Globe, XLII, 2238, 41 Cong., 2 sess., Part 3, Washington, 1869-70.

This is a part of President Grant's reply to the resolution:

---stated not to be compatible with the public interest to communicate the information asked for while the subject is pending in executive session.¹⁷

Mr. Cox seems to know something of the transaction also, for he has this to say:

---It has already been stated in the Senate that all the royalties of the island have been ceded away. It was stated by Mr. Sumner that the lots of the city of Samana were staked off, and given to different parties. It is generally believed that there is nothing left in the island of public lands, or of mines of salt, copper, and other metals. All are conveyed. This is notorious. It is common clamor.¹⁸

On the 6th of April, 1870, Mr. Butler of Massachusetts began supporting President Grant's policy of annexation and attempted to introduce a joint resolution to annex the republic of Dominica, with a view of its being referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He continued to try to get the unanimous consent of the group on every occasion. He tried in vain eight times. Someone would object every time he came forth with his proposition. He finally tried to get unanimous consent before announcing his resolution. Eldridge stated his objections and added: "I think it is about Dominica." The group laughed at the statement, and it was found when the resolution was read, that Butler was actually trying to introduce his same pet resolution. He was very persistent and when his tenth attempt was made on June 18, 1870, he finally succeeded in introducing the resolution (H. R. No. 339) to annex the republic of Dominica. This joint resolution was read a first and second time, and then referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ibid., XLII, 2468.

¹⁸ Ibid., Part I, p. 698.

¹⁹ Ibid., Part III, pp. 2442, 2495, 2547, 2602, 2660, 2861; Part IV, p. 3386; Part V, pp. 3977, 4442.

President Grant did not give up by what he termed Sumner's "breach of faith," but he exerted himself to undo its effects. When he failed to obtain the Senate's consent to ratification within the stipulated time, he procured an extension of the annexation treaty until the end of June. In communicating this additional article, on May 31, he accompanied it with a lengthy message enlarging upon the advantages of the acquisition. His message from James D. Richardson's "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. VII, follows:

Executive Mansion, May 31, 1870

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, an additional article to the treaty of the 29th of November last, for the annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States, stipulating for an extension of the time for exchanging the ratifications thereof, signed in this city on the 14th instant by the plenipotentiaries of the parties.

It was my intention to have negotiated with the plenipotentiary of Santo Domingo amendments to the treaty of annexation to obviate objections which may be urged against the treaty as it is now worded: but on reflection I deem it better to submit to the Senate the propriety of their amending the treaty as follows: First, to specify that the obligations of this Government shall not exceed the \$1,500,000 stipulated in the treaty; secondly, to determine the manner of appointing the agents to receive and disburse the same; thirdly, to determine the class of creditors who shall take precedence in the settlement of their claims; and finally, to insert such amendments as may suggest themselves to the minds of Senators to carry out in good faith the conditions of the treaty submitted to the Senate of the United States in January last, according to the spirit and intent of that treaty. From the most reliable information I can obtain, the sum specified in the treaty will pay every just claim against the Republic of San Domingo and leave a balance sufficient to carry on a Territorial government until such time as new laws for providing a territorial revenue can be enacted and put in force.

I feel an unusual anxiety for the ratification of this treaty, because I believe it would redound greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization, and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery.

The doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power.

The government of San Domingo has voluntarily sought this annexation. It is a weak power, numbering probably less than 120,000 souls, and yet possessing one of the richest territories under the sun, capable of supporting a population of 10,000,000 people in luxury. The people of San Domingo are not capable of maintaining themselves in their present condition, and must look for outside support.

They yearn for the protection of our free institutions and laws, our progress and civilization. Shall we refuse them?

I have information which I believe reliable that a European power stands ready now to offer \$2,000,000 for the possession of Samana Bay alone. If refused by us, with what grace can we prevent a foreign power from attempting to secure the prize?

The acquisition of San Domingo is desirable because of its geographical position. It commands the entrance to the Caribbean Sea and the Isthmus transit of commerce. It possesses the richest soil, best and most capacious harbors, most salubrious climate, and the most valuable products of the forests, mine, and soil of any of the West India Islands. Its possession by us will in a few years build up a coastwide commerce of immense magnitude, which will go far toward restoring to us our last merchant marine. It will give to us those articles which we consume so largely and do not produce, thus equalizing our exports and imports.

In case of foreign war, it will give us command of all the islands referred to, and thus prevent an enemy from ever again possessing himself of rendezvous upon our very coast.

At present our coast trade between the states bordering on the Atlantic and those bordering on the Gulf of Mexico is cut into by the Bahamas and the Antilles. Twice we must, as it were, pass through foreign countries to get by sea from Georgia to the west coast of Florida.

San Domingo, with a stable government, under which her immense resources can be developed, will give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of laborers not now on the island.

This labor will take advantage of every available means of transportation to abandon the adjacent islands and seek the blessings of freedom and its sequence-- each inhabitant receiving the reward of his own labor. Porto Rico and Cuba will have to abolish slavery, as a measure of self-preservation to retain their laborers.

San Domingo will become a large consumer of the products of Northern farms and manufactories. The cheap rate at which her citizens can be furnished with food, tools, and machinery will make it necessary that the

contiguous island should have the same advantages in order to compete in the production of sugar, coffee, tobacco, tropical fruits, etc. This will open to us a still wider market for our products.

The production of our own supply of these articles will cut off more than one hundred millions of our annual imports, besides largely increasing our exports. With such a picture it is easy to see how our large debt abroad is ultimately to be extinguished. With a balance of trade against us (including interest on bonds held by foreigners and money spent by our citizens traveling in foreign lands) equal to the entire yield of the precious metals in this country, it is not so easy to see how this result is to be otherwise accomplished.

The acquisition of San Domingo is an adherence to the "Monroe Doctrine;" it is a measure of national protection; it is asserting our just claim to a controlling influence over the great commercial traffic soon to flow from east to west by the way of the Isthmus of Darien; it is to build up our merchant marine; it is to furnish new markets for the products of our farms, shops, and manufactories; it is to make slavery insupportable in Cuba and Porto Rico at once and ultimately so in Brazil; it is to settle the unhappy conditions of Cuba, and end an exterminating conflict; it is to provide honest means of paying our honest debts, without overtaxing the people; it is to furnish our citizens with the necessaries of everyday life at cheaper rates than ever before; and it is, in fine, a rapid stride toward greatness which the intelligence, industry, and enterprise of the citizens of the United States entitle this country to assume among nations.²⁰

U. S. Grant

President U. S. Grant in this significant Message attempts to justify his plan to annex Santo Domingo to the United States. In an analysis of his Message one can arrive at the following conclusion:

Mr. Grant feared that some European power might seize the island as it was a weak power and had slavery which should be abolished. This would follow annexation. He would employ the Monroe doctrine in a uni-lateral manner in order to acquire the island not only to prevent a European power from seizing it but he would secure this strategic island because of economic considerations. This island was rich in natural resources, such as rich land, minerals

²⁰ James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VII, 61-63.

metals and tropical products, which the United States, a temperate zone needed. Moreover Santo Domingo would constitute a valuable market for the manufactured goods in the United States. The commerce with this island would help to create a favorable trade balance, which in turn would assist the United States in paying its debts. He even thought, according to his message that so important was this commerce that the foreign debts could be liquidated by control of the commerce of Santo Domingo. The acquisition of the island could be justified as a measure for the protection of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine he indicated would justify such action. "Our just claim to a controlling influence over the great commercial traffic soon to flow from east to west by the way of the Isthmus of Darien" could be secured by annexing Santo Domingo. Furthermore, he declared that the possession of this territory would not only end slavery in this nation; it would also make slavery in Porto Rico, Cuba and Brazil untenable. Then its acquisition would make it possible for the United States to assume a more important role in world affairs.

In fairness to the commercial interests, we shall consider some of their arguments for annexation. Here is what Senator Chandler has to say:

But Mr. President, there is one other way in which we might increase our commerce--one that is simple--and that is by enlarging it. If we see fit to enlarge our own domestic commerce, we shall increase it. We must enlarge it by enlarging our borders. Take in the islands of the Gulf; take in the Sandwich Islands; in process of time, take in the Dominion of Canada; take in Colombia; and you will enlarge your commerce immeasurably. But Sir, one thing at a time. An opportunity is now offered you by a simple vote of enlarging your commerce, and enlarging it tremendously. Does any man here comprehend the vast importance that the traffic with San Domingo would be? Why Sir, in 1789 the commerce of San Domingo was immensely greater than the commerce of Cuba at the present day.²¹

²¹ Cong. Globe, op. cit., p. 408.

In June, 1870, President Grant asked for the resignation of the Attorney-General, E. Rockwood Hoar of Massachusetts, because his neutrality to the President's policy was not held sufficiently benevolent; and also he wished to appoint A. T. Ackerman of Georgia, in order to win the votes of the Southern senators for the ratification of a treaty annexing Santo Domingo to the United States.²² This move of President Grant made his "weak cabinet" weaker, because Hoar was an outstanding man in his cabinet.

Hamilton Fish remained loyal to the President, but the whole affair was so painful to him that he again asked to resign, but was once more dissuaded.

In Grant's second annual message to the Senate and House of Representatives on December 5, 1870, he spoke of the treaty for the annexation of the Republic of San Domingo, which had failed to receive the requisite two-thirds vote of the Senate during the last session of Congress. He said:

I am thoroughly convinced that the best interests of this country, commercially and materially demand its ratification. Time has only confirmed me in this view. I now firmly believe that the moment it is known that the United States has entirely abandoned the project of accepting as a part of its territory the island of San Domingo, a free port will be negotiated for by European nations in the Bay of Samana. A large commercial city will spring up, to which we will be tributary without receiving corresponding benefits, and then will be seen the folly of our rejecting so great a prize.²³

He suggested that by joint resolution of the two houses of Congress that the President be authorized to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with the authorities of San Domingo for the acquisition of that island, and that an appropriation be made to defray expenses of such a commission. The question may then be determined either by action of the Senate upon the treaty

²²Cox, *Atlantic Monthly*, op. cit., pp. 162-173.

²³Richardson, op. cit., VII, 99.

or the joint action of the two houses of Congress upon a resolution of
 24
 annexation.

On December 20, 1870, the Secretary read the joint resolution
 (S. R. 262) authorizing appointment of commissioners; a part of which reads:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the President of the United States be authorized to appoint three commissioners, and also a secretary, the latter to be versed in the English and Spanish languages, to proceed to the island of San Domingo, and to inquire into, ascertain and report the political state and condition of the Republic of Dominica, the desire and disposition of the people of the said republic to become annexed to and to form part of the people of the United States; the physical, mental and moral condition of the people; the resources of the country; general character of the soil; the debt of the Government.²⁵

Sumner opposed this resolution and flayed the President's policy in his speech of December 21, 1870. He has this to say:

Sir, this is a most serious business. Nothing more important to the honor of the republic has occurred for long years. How many of us are now hanging with anxiety on the news from Europe? There stand matched in deadly combat two historic deadly foes, France and Germany, France now pressed to the wall; and what is the daily report? That Bismark may take Louis Napoleon from his splendid prison and place him again on the throne of France, that he may obtain from him that treaty of surrender which the republic never will sign. Are we not all indignant at the thought? Why, Sir, it was only the other day that a member of the Cabinet, a much honored friend of mine, at my own house, in conversation on this question said that nothing could make him more angry than the thought that Bismark could play such a part, and that France might be despoiled by this device. And now, Sir, this is the very part played by the American government. Baez has been treated as you fear Bismark may treat Louis Napoleon. You call him "President;" they call him down there "dictator;" better call him "emperor" and then the parallel will be complete. He is sustained in power by the government of the United States, that he may betray his country. Such is the fact and I challenge any Senator to deny it. I submit myself to question any challenge the Senator from Indiana, who, as I have already said, champions this proposition, to deny it. I challenge him to utter one word of doubt of the proposition which I now lay down, that Baez is maintained in power in the United States, and that being in power, we seek to negotiate with him that he sell his country. It cannot be denied. Why, Sir, the case has a parallel in earlier days.

²⁴Ibid., VII, 101.

²⁵Ibid., XLIII, 183, Part 1, 41 Cong., 3 sess., Washington, 1871.

Mr. Morton rose. He was the senator from Indiana. He has this to say:

Mr. Sumner,

Allow me to give one more illustration and then the Senator may interfere. It has a parallel in earlier days, when the British Government selected the King of the Mosquitoes as their puppet on the margin of Central America. They called the Indian Chief a king and actually sent to him certain "regalia" and other signs of royal honor, and then acting under him, or pretending to act under him, they claimed the jurisdiction of that region. Are we now treating Baez in some measure as England treated the "Mosquito King?"

Annexation seems to have been favored by big business and President Grant.

Speaking further on this day concerning the treaty, Mr. Sumner has this to say:

The treaty, therefore, had no effect until ratified by the Senate, and I repeat, every attempt at jurisdiction in those waters was a usurpation and an act of violence. I think I should not go too far if I said it was an act of war. If a Commodore leaves his quarter-deck and goes ashore and, with his guns commanding a town, threatens to blow it down, is not this an act of war? I have called it an act of war, Sir, made by the executive without the consent of Congress.²⁶

Senator Morton of Indiana made a lengthy speech answering Mr. Sumner, and defending the President and his policy.

At this time there was considerable discussion in Congress about referring the resolution to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mr. Thurman called the attention of the Senators to the fact that the resolution would be worthless, because the Senate had already turned the annexation treaty down. Mr. Thurman maintained that he could see no use in sending out people to inquire into government, debt, physical and moral condition of the people of Santo Domingo, the mineral wealth, and climate of the island, if the Senate was not willing to admit Dominica as a state.

Sumner's speech of December 21, 1870, widened the breach between him and President Grant but despite Sumner's opposition, the resolution to appoint a

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Ibid., XLIII, pp. 228-229.

27

Ibid., XLIII, 190.

commission passed, and in January, 1871, Senator Wade of Ohio, President Andrew G. White of Cornell, and Samuel G. Howe were appointed and left for Santo Domingo, where they remained until the end of February.

During the debate in Congress over the annexation of Santo Domingo, Representative Wood asked to have an extract read from the New York Evening Post, a leading Republican journal, of January 5, 1871.

The Clerk read as follows:

News from Santo Domingo--We have before us several letters from Santo Domingo, which relates strange news. It is asserted in these letters, which are from respectable men favorable to annexation, that--

First: Several warships of the United States are lying on the Dominican coast, at the service and orders of Baez, and used by him as though they belonged to him.

Second: That these vessels were used to intimidate the people when they were asked to vote on annexation, and that the vote sent to Washington was obtained by such intimidation.

Third: That Baez could not maintain his power if it were not for the open threats of the commanders of the United States Naval vessels to destroy the towns on the coast in case a rising is attempted in them.

Fourth: It is asserted that half a million of paper money printed in the United States, reported publicly, but of course falsely to be guaranteed by the United States as a means of giving it value, has been received by Baez and he was about to put it in circulation.

Fifth: It is reported in San Domingo that the United States Government has paid Baez \$150,000 as a second year's rent for Samana Bay. Also, it is asserted there and not denied, that the best lands on and near Samana Bay are already in possession of Cozeau, Fabens, Babcock, and Baez.

Sixth: We are assured that the Dominican public debt, which amounted in 1868, according to the Comptroller, to \$2,000,000, has been largely increased, and that during the last six months numerous old claims against the Government have been allowed, and these claims have since been bought up at a very low rate by persons conspicuous in urging the annexation.

Seventh: There seems to be no doubt that Admiral Poor in the Severn, was sent to tell the Haitian Government that if it interfered with the schemes of the United States and Baez in Santo Domingo, it would bring

²⁸ Fuller, Hamilton Fish, op. cit., VII, 162.

trouble upon itself. This is as though if Napoleon said to the United States, that if they interfered with his schemes in Mexico, he would declare war against us. Yet General Grant thought it would be wise and right to send American troops to drive the French out of Mexico.

"The persons who made these charges are Dominicans and are favorable to annexation to the United States. They think, however, that the United States is using too much force in the matter and that bad men are using the power to advance their own selfish ends. The people of Santo Domingo who will resist annexation and cause trouble, would gladly consent if wisely managed, but when they see themselves coerced by our navy and sold to Baez, it makes them indignant and dissatisfied." Thus spoke Mr. Wood.

From the foregoing, there appeared to be considerable grounds for the assumption that big business would greatly profit by the annexation and it is not greatly to be wondered at that they favored it.

As further indications of conditions we have only to follow Mr. Wood, who says:

Large concessions have been made, not only to English subjects, but to Americans also. Why, Sir, I can take you to the City of New York and introduce you to twenty persons, who will offer you stock in every conceivable scheme to develop the resources of San Domingo; and if you listen to these brokers and agents of various companies, that have been incorporated in San Domingo, and some of them also by the laws of the State of New York, you will soon reach the conclusion that what the Government is to obtain, after the Corporations secured the valuable grants made to them; would be very much like taking the shell while the speculators and schemers take the oyster.³⁰

The following gives some idea of other leaders in Congress in January, 1871.

January 10, 1871, a joint resolution was adopted by the Assembly of Indiana

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³⁰ Cong. Globe, op. cit., XLIII, 387.

Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 3 sess., Part 1, p.388, Washington, 1871.

urging their Senators and Representatives in Congress to oppose the proposed annexation. It was read and ordered printed January 23, 1871. On January 27, 1871, Mr. Kelly of Pennsylvania made a strong appeal in the House for the acquisition of Santo Domingo, citing her climate, industries, mineral and agricultural productions, population, and geographical position. Mr. McCormick of Missouri opposed annexation and made a lengthy speech about the proposal.

On March 9, 1871, the Republican Caucus voted to exclude Sumner from the Committee on Foreign Relations, in order to diminish the effectiveness of his opposition to the President's designs. This loss of Sumner's position, which gave him such control over the destinies of diplomatic agreements did not affect his influence over policies which had not yet reached that stage, so he opened fire again on the new Dominican project before the Commissioners submitted their report.

On March 24, 1871, Mr. Sumner submitted resolutions against the misuse by the Executive of the military power. He also denounced the employment of naval forces to coerce the Dominican people. His resolution in part follows:

---That in obedience to correct principle, and that republican institutions may not suffer, the naval forces should be withdrawn from the coast of San Domingo during acquisition negotiations----that the employment of navy to maintain Baez in usurped power while attempting to sell the country to the United States is in violation of the Dominican Constitution and is morally wrong----that the Equality of all Nations, without regard to size, power, or population is an axiom of international law, therefore, any treatment of the Republic of Haiti by the Navy of the

³¹Cong. Globe, op. cit., XLIII, 792-798.

³²Fuller, Hamilton Fish, Bemis editor, op. cit., VII, 162-163.

United States inconsistent with this principle is an infraction of international law and should be disfavored by the United States government----that the President of the United States does not have the power to declare war without an act of Congress, hence the employment of the Navy without authority of Congress in acts of hostility against a friendly foreign nation is an infraction of the constitution of the United States and a usurpation of power not conferred upon the President---that in any proceedings for the acquisition of part of the island of San Domingo there must be no exercise of influence by superior force, nor any violation of public law, whether international or constitutional----that instead of seeking to acquire part of the island of San Domingo by belligerent intervention, without the authority of an act of Congress, it would have been more in accord with our principles of Government, and our missions of peace, had our Government striven for the establishment of tranquility throughout the whole island, so that the internal dissensions of Dominica and Haiti might be brought to a close. ³³

Sumner's resolutions were tabled, but the exposition which accompanied them had discredited the whole policy of annexation.

When President Grant transmitted, on April 5, 1871, the highly favored report of the Commission of investigation, he recommended only its publication with a view to informing the people as to the merits of the case. He enumerated the things that he considered favorable to annexation, such as fertility of the soil, good climate, abundance of tropical fruits, exports and congenial home for the black race. ³⁴ With the exception of two speeches made on the subject, it was not heard of again until in his last annual message of April 5, 1871, President Grant expressed his regret that the opportunity for annexation had been neglected.

Mr. Hazard, who was in San Domingo at the same time the United States Commissioners were, observed this first hand:

Here we found the members of the United States Commission busy in seeking that information they were sent out to obtain; and never was

³³ Senate Mis. Document, XXXV, 42 Cong., 1 sess., Part 1 and 2, pp. 1-2

³⁴ Richardson, op. cit., VII, 411-413.

a nation more earnestly and honestly served than this body of experienced gentlemen, who, without hope of reward or profit, and at much inconvenience to themselves, earnestly and conscientiously availed themselves of every means and opportunity to seek the truth of the island.³⁵

He also has this to say of Mr. White, one of the Commissioners:

Mr. White, one of the Commissioners, in going across the country of San Domingo was often called on to address large crowds of earnest people about the possibility of their becoming "Americanos." All that is necessary to say of those addresses in various parts of the island is, that they were extremely practical and to the point; and that these people heard some very "plain talk" about themselves and what they would have to expect as part of the American Union. The remarks of Mr. White were everywhere received with honest appreciation.³⁶

The facts have been given, both for and against the proposed annexation of Dominica. Now in order to get President Grant's personal feeling and attitude about the matter, let us consider his personal message to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, on April 5, 1871.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I have the honor to submit herewith to the two Houses of Congress the report of the Commissioners appointed in pursuance of joint resolution approved January 12, 1871.

It will be observed that this report more than sustains all that I have heretofore said in regard to the productiveness and healthfulness of the Republic of San Domingo, of the unanimity of the people for annexation to the United States, and of their peaceable character.

It is due to the public as it certainly is to myself, that I should here give all the circumstances which first led to the negotiation of a treaty for the annexation of the Republic of San Domingo to the United States.

When I accepted the arduous and responsible position which I now hold, I did not dream of instituting any steps for the acquisition of insular possessions. I believed however, that our institutions were broad enough

³⁵Hazard, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 318.

to extend over the entire continent as rapidly as other people might desire to bring themselves under our protection. I believed further that we should not permit any independent government within the limits of North America to pass from a condition of independence to one of ownership or protection under a European power.

Soon after my inauguration as President I was waited upon by an agent of President Baez with a proposition to annex the Republic of San Domingo to the United States. This gentleman represented the capacity of the island, the desire of the people, and their character and habits about as they have been described by the Commissioners whose report accompanies this message. He stated further that, being weak in numbers and poor in purse, they were not capable of developing their great resources; that the people had no incentive to industry on account of lack of protection for their accumulations, and that if not accepted by the United States--with institutions which they loved above those of any other nation--they would be compelled to seek protection elsewhere. To these statements I made no reply and gave no indication of what I thought of the proposition. In the course of time I was waited upon by a second gentleman from San Domingo, who made the same representations, and who was received in like manner.

In view of the facts which had been laid before me, and with an earnest to maintain the "Monroe Doctrine," I believed that I would be derelict in my duty if I did not take measures to ascertain the exact wish of the Government and inhabitants of the Republic of San Domingo in regard to annexation, and communicate the information to the people of the United States. Under the attending circumstances I felt that if I turned a deaf ear to this appeal I might in the future be justly charged with a flagrant neglect of the public interest and an utter disregard of the welfare of a downtrodden race praying for the blessings of a free and strong government and for protection in the enjoyment of the fruits of their own industry.

Those opponents of annexation who have heretofore professed to be pre-eminently the friends of the "rights of man" I believe would be my most violent assailants if I neglected so clear a duty. Accordingly, after having appointed a commissioner to visit the island, who declined on account of sickness, I selected a second gentleman, in whose capacity, judgment, and integrity I had, and have yet, the most unbounded confidence.

He visited San Domingo, not to secure or hasten annexation, but, unprejudiced and unbiased, to learn all the facts about the Government, the people, and the resources of that Republic. He went prepared to make an unfavorable report or a favorable one, if the facts warranted it. His report fully corroborated the views of previous commissioners, and upon its receipt I felt that a sense of duty and a due regard for our great national interests required me to negotiate a treaty for the acquisition of the Republic of San Domingo.

As soon as it became publicly known that such a treaty had been negotiated, the attention of the country was occupied with allegations calculated to prejudice the merits of the case and cast aspersions upon those whose duty had connected them with it. Amid the public excitement thus created, the treaty failed to receive the two-thirds vote of the Senate, and was rejected; but whether the action of that body was based wholly upon the merits of the treaty, or might not have been in some degree influenced by such unfounded allegations, could not be known by the people, because the debates of the Senate in secret session are not published.

Under these circumstances I deemed it due to the office which I hold and due to the character of the agents who have been charged with the investigation that such proceedings should be had as would enable the people to know the truth. A commission was therefore constituted, under authority of Congress, consisting of gentlemen selected with special reference to their high character and capacity for the laborious work intrusted to them, who were instructed to visit the spot and report upon the facts. Other eminent citizens were requested to accompany the commission, in order that the people might have the benefit of their views. Students of science and correspondents of the press, without regard to political opinions, were invited to join the expedition, and their numbers were limited only by the capacity of the vessel.

The mere rejection by the Senate of a treaty negotiated by the President only indicates a difference of opinion between two coordinate departments of the Government, without touching the character or wounding the pride of either. But when such rejection takes place simultaneously with charges openly made of corruption on the part of the President or those employed by him, the case is different. Indeed, in such case the honor of the nation demands investigation. This has been accomplished by the report of the commissioners herewith transmitted, and which fully vindicates the purity of the motives and action of those who represented the United States in the negotiation.

And now my task is finished, and with it ends all personal solicitude upon the subject. My duty being done, yours begins, and I gladly hand over the whole matter to the American people and to their representatives in Congress assembled. The facts will now be spread before the country and a decision rendered by that tribunal whose convictions so seldom err, and against whose will I have no policy to enforce. My opinion remains unchanged; indeed, it is confirmed by the report that the interests of our country and of San Domingo alike invite the annexation of that Republic.

In view of the difference of opinion upon this subject, I suggest that no action be taken at the present session beyond the printing and general dissemination of the report. Before the next session of Congress, the

people will have considered the subject and formed an intelligent opinion, deliberately made up, it will be the duty of every department of the Government to give heed; and no one will more cheerfully conform to it than myself. It is not only the theory of our constitution that the will of the people, constitutionally expressed, is the supreme law, but I have ever believed that "all men are wiser than any one man;" and if the people, upon a full presentation of the facts, shall decide that the annexation of the Republic is not desirable, every department of the Government ought to acquiesce in that decision.

In again submitting to Congress a subject upon which public sentiment has been divided, and which has been made the occasion of acrimonious debates in Congress, as well as of unjust aspersions elsewhere, I may, I trust, be indulged in a single remark.

No man could hope to perform duties so delicate and responsible as pertain to the Presidential office without sometimes incurring the hostility of those who deem their opinions and wishes treated with insufficient consideration; and he who undertakes to conduct the affairs of a great government as a faithful public servant, if sustained by the approval of his own conscience, may rely with confidence upon the candor and intelligence of a free people whose best interest he has striven to preserve, and can bear with patience the censure of disappointed men.³⁷

The interested imperialism of President Grant in connection with San Domingo, may be illustrated by analyzing his Message of April 5, 1871, to the Senate and House of Representatives, as quoted in the preceding pages. The President did not use terms which President Theodore Roosevelt employed when referring to "chronic wrongdoing" of the people of San Domingo. As a matter of fact Grant characterized the Island people as peaceable and desirous of annexation to the United States. He said when he accepted the responsible position he held, he did not dream of instituting steps for the acquisition of insular possessions. He thought our institutions broad enough to extend over the entire continent as rapidly as other peoples might desire to annex themselves to our union, meaning the European danger which might result in the loss of the Island's independence. At this same time the President had also asserted in this Message that the President of Santo Domingo, Baez, had

³⁷Richardson, op. cit., VII, 128-131.

approached him on the proposition, saying that the island was too weak to protect its property and that they desired annexation to the United States. The commissioners whom he had sent to study the situation on the island had represented it just as President Baez had represented it. President Grant also indicated in this message that he would have been derelict in his duty had he not ascertained the facts about annexation sentiment of the people and government of the island. Moreover President Grant added that after learning the true situation that "national interests required me to negotiate a treaty for the acquisition of the Republic of San Domingo." The President criticized his critics by alleging that they had made statements in the press which gave the public incorrect ideas on the annexation and that since the treaty was discussed in secret in the Senate, the allegations made by opponents were not answered. President Grant asserted that he had sent impartial agents to San Domingo and that after investigation the commission had recommended annexation of the island to the United States. He referred to charges of corruption against the President's agents who had the investigation of conditions in San Domingo, saying that more than mere differences between co-ordinate branches of the government of the United States was involved. He declared furthermore that investigation of the matter had shown that the critics were not correct in their charges. He concluded by saying that his convictions were the same as before he initiated the movement to annex San Domingo to the United States. He suggested at the last, that action by Congress in this matter should be suspended until Congress and the people had time to form an intelligent opinion on annexation, after which all departments of the government should abide by that decision.

This aggressive policy of Grant's ante-dates the imperialistic policies of the United States government by over half a century, and are the first heart beats of United States imperialism of more modern times.

CHAPTER III

LATER INTEREST IN SANTO DOMINGO

The territory of the island of San Domingo has probably seen more revolutions of the "soldier of fortune" type than any area in the world. The history of the country is an almost continuous series of revolutions, bloodshed and anarchy, followed by peace imposed by lawless dictators.¹

Baez was succeeded by Gongalez (1873-1879) under whom the country enjoyed a period of tranquillity, but this did not continue for long before renewed internal disorders arose. In 1882, this was terminated with the election of Ulises Heureaux, a negro and capable statesman who established a brutal and despotic regime which lasted until his death in 1899.

During the regime of Baez in 1869, he got the London bankers, Hartmont and Company, to float a loan of \$3,788,000 for the government. The Dominican treasury was to get about one-half or \$1,600,000. Yet they agreed to pay over a period of 25 years, in interest and principal, the sum of \$7,362,500.² Hartmont and Company were to receive a commission of \$500,000, but actually the Dominican government received but \$190,000, the greater part of the remaining having been misapplied by the promoters or lost through failure to dispose of the bonds. The loan had gone into default in 1872.³

¹Munro, op. cit., p. 102.

²Jacob H. Hollander, Financial Difficulties of San Domingo, Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, XX, 93-105, Philadelphia, 1907.

³Munro, op. cit., p. 103.

Now when the new dictator, Heureaux, came into power, he tried his hand at high finance. He adjusted the claims of the bondholders from the proceeds of a new loan floated by the Amsterdam firm of Westendorp and Company, and a second loan from the same company in 1890, to construct a railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago, and gave the customs-collection as security. Both loans went into default in 1892.

In the following year the interests of the Dutch firm were turned over to an American corporation known as the San Domingo Improvement Company, and the outstanding bonds were refunded at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ %, and the collection of customs placed in the hands of the San Domingo Improvement Company to secure the payment of interest and amortization. The contract provided that in case of default the company might ask the Dutch, Belgian, British, French, and American Governments to appoint members of a financial mission to control the customs.⁴

The floating debt increased with every revolution and was soon beyond the Government's capacity to pay. In fact, under Heureaux's regime the debt had reached the sum of \$20,000,000,⁵ so when he met his death in 1899, at the hands of an assassin, the Republic was in an inconceivable state of helplessness and bankruptcy.

After Heureaux's assassination in 1899, a period of several years was filled with internal dissension. Jiminez came into power succeeding Heureaux in 1899, but was driven out by General Vasquez in 1902. Vasquez, in turn was deposed by a revolution headed by General Y Gil, who became President

⁴Ibid., p. 103.

⁵Chester Lloyd Jones, Caribbean Interests of the United States, p. 109, New York, 1927.

in 1903, but was overthrown by Jiminez in November of the same year. In 1904 Jiminez was expelled and C. F. Morales became President.

In 1901 proposals were made for a new adjustment on the bonds but failed because the bondholders opposed a further reduction in their claims, so the government removed the agents of the Improvement Company from the customhouses. This, of course, led to diplomatic intervention by several foreign governments on behalf of their bondholders and the Dominican government was forced to sign an agreement with French and Belgian bondholders in 1901, giving them a mortgage on the customs revenues at Santo Domingo City and Macoris; in 1903 to negotiate a protocol with German, Italian, and Spanish Governments, providing for payment of specific monthly sums to their nations; and, in May, 1904, the Italian Government obtained a new agreement specifying 10 percent of all customs revenues and creating a lien on those⁶ at Samana for the benefit of Italian claimants.

On September 12, 1904, Minister Dawson reported to the State Department that the debt of Santo Domingo was \$32,280,000, the estimated revenues from customs receipts \$1,850,000, and the proposed budget for current expenses \$1,300,000, leaving only \$550,000 to meet payments of interest, then accruing and in arrears, amounting to \$2,600,000. About \$22,000,000 of this debt was to European creditors, who were pressing for the recognition of their⁷ claims.

It appeared that the only effective method of collecting the interest on the foreign debt would be the seizure and administration of the Dominican

⁶Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 387, Washington, 1906.

⁷Ibid., p. 302.

Custom houses by some foreign power or group of foreign powers. So, President Theodore Roosevelt concluded that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt American republic in the hands of a receiver, the United States must undertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of its⁸ finances.

In his annual message of December 6, 1904, President Roosevelt states his policy:

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.⁹

About the same time Minister Dawson was directed by Secretary Hay to suggest to the Dominican government that it request the United States to take charge of its customs. Carlos Morales, who had obtained a precarious hold on the presidency a few months earlier, was entirely willing to place the customs houses under American control. In fact, he had made such a suggestion in the spring of 1904, believing that revolutionary movements might be discouraged if the leaders could no longer obtain the customs revenues at ports which they might seize.¹⁰ And, too, the Dominican Government had failed to carry out the agreement made with European nations in 1901-1904, so she was in constant dread lest those countries should take over by force the customs houses which had been assigned as security.

⁸John Holladay Latane, American Foreign Policy, p. 546.

⁹Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 41, Washington, 1905.

¹⁰Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 300

Several of these companies had already protested against the taking over of the customhouse at Puerto Plata by the United States as a violation of their own rights. In President Roosevelt's annual message of 1905, he has this to say of the situation:

There was imminent danger of foreign intervention. The previous rulers of Santo Domingo had recklessly incurred debts and owing to her internal disorders she had ceased to be able to provide means of paying the debts. The patience of her foreign creditors had become exhausted, and at least two foreign nations were on the point of intervention, and were only prevented from intervening by the unofficial assurance of this Government that it would itself strive to help Santo Domingo in her hour of need. In the case of one of these nations, only the actual opening of negotiations to this end by our Government prevented the seizure of territory in Santo Domingo by a European power.¹¹

Thus, with a national debt of more than \$32,000,000, the government defaulting on interest payments, various foreign governments pushing for the collection of their claims, the Dominican Government turned to the United States for help in 1905.¹²

This appeal for assistance led to a plan of adjustment whereby the customhouses of the Republic were to be placed in the hands of American officials. A treaty was signed February 4, 1905, constituting the United States the receiver for the bankrupt republic. Fifty-five per cent of the Dominican customs were to be applied to the liquidation of the debt, and the other forty-five per cent to be used for current expenses.¹³

This proposal met with strenuous protest in the United States Senate because the Senators feared some sort of American imperialism. And, although they refused to ratify the treaty, the President went ahead with the plan

¹¹ Foreign Relations, 1905, op. cit., p. 334.

¹² Jones, op cit., p. 111.

¹³ Senate Doc. No 47, Acts of Congress, Treaties and Proclamations, 60 Cong., 1 sess., Part 2, pp. 500-504, Washington, 1909.

I called upon President Morales and we entered upon a full discussion of the international situation and the internal politics of this country as affected financial obligations. I did not disguise from him my convictions that European creditors would wait no longer for their money.

President Morales informed Dawson that he was of the opinion that European governments would not take any guarantee which he could offer and that he desired the United States' control over custom houses of Santo Domingo.¹⁴ Mr. Dawson stated that he was aware of the deep-seated political difficulties President Morales had to confront. "There was deeply grounded prejudice against any sort of intervention by the United States." The suggestion for United States intervention in Dominican affairs must come from Morales. The leaders of the opposition to United States intervention must be brought to the support of the plan of Mr. Hay. The plan which Mr. Dawson himself had in mind was to have:

First, full control not joint control over the customs. Second, sixty percent of the customs must be allocated to creditors' claims and forty percent to administration.¹⁵

President Morales had approached the United States government on the possibility of intervention in the island affairs in order to bring order out of the financial chaos in that republic. The Department of State, January 5, 1905, instructed Mr. Dawson to proceed as he knew about the unrest and the imminent danger of foreign intervention on the part of European creditors for the purpose of securing a settlement of such claims. "This government," said John Hay, "is now disposed to assist Santo Domingo in the work of regulating its finances."¹⁶ The United States would lend the Republic assistance in reestablishing its credit. President Morales must not change the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 299.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 301.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 302.

tariiff or tax laws of his country except upon consent of the United States and he must visit the North coast and confer with leading men of the opposition and try to enlist their consent for the financial reform under United States jurisdiction.

The Santo Dominican minister was informed that joint control of the customs would not be acceptable to the United States government in view of the abuses in collections and because of the critical international situation.¹⁷ The United States would consequently have to collect all customs revenues. The creditors of other nations, as well as United States citizens were demanding that strong measures must be adopted in order that creditors and concession holders might be satisfied. At the end of each year after all obligations had been met the balance would be turned over to the Dominican government.

Mr. Dawson felt that the internal situation might not remain the same for two days, and so instructions from the United States were withheld from President Morales until after the arrival of Commander Dillingham. President Morales was then informed as to the United States demands. Whereupon he agreed to United States control of collections. President Morales also informed the United States that he would abolish internal customs and the abuses, such as paying chiefs for this duty. He was of the opinion that more should be spent on roads and schools and that export controls on tobacco, cacao and coffee should be removed. This would aid the island in establishing industry upon a sound basis and thereby make the country more prosperous. These measures, he asserted, would cause the masses to accept United States' control over Santo Dominican customs.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 303.

The abolition of export duties was necessary in order to prevent an agricultural revolution. The agricultural situation was so grave that their Governor Cespides resigned. The masses were restless. News was circulated that Samana Bay would be annexed to the United States. Incendiary articles were published, charging that Santo Dominican officials had "sold out their country without consulting the people" but quiet continued in the streets. Mr. Dillingham wired Washington that an agreement had been reached. The plans of intervention of the United States in Santo Dominican affairs was to be withheld from the masses until it happened.¹⁸ Meanwhile a United States warship was called for by Dillingham. "The political situation and the attitude of the public were such that we could not feel safe until Velasquez, the Foreign Minister affixed his signature."¹⁹

The United States government guaranteed full integrity to Santo Domingo's territory but took complete control over collection of revenues, and promised to restore the credit of Santo Domingo. After February 1st, the Dominican authorities were responsible to the United States. There was some criticism according to Dillingham. The great mass was friendly but opposition leaders, Arias and Rodriguez prepared to resist United States control. The warship, Detroit was called upon to sail to Monte Cristi, the scene of trouble.²⁰ Dawson and Dillingham wrote Francis B. Loomis, Assistant Secretary of State that:

The Dominican government had insisted that we were obliged to guarantee the complete integrity of the Republic of Dominica. This was necessary in order to assure the people of the Island that we did not intend to annex the territory to the United States.²¹

¹⁸ Ibid., p.305.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.307.

²⁰ Ibid., p.307.

²¹ Ibid., p.308.

Punishment of Dominican officials for failure to perform their duties was to remain under Dominican law which, according to Mr. Dawson would have little value. The foreign creditors would suffer unless the plan succeeded. So would property values on the Island. The expenditures of the Republic were to be controlled by the United States. The Dominican commissioners did not favor revision of their tariff duties for fear that they would be forced to revise them in favor of American interests. The Project or Agreement provided:

1. The United States Government will assume responsibility for all claims, debts, foreign or domestic.
2. United States control of collection of customs duties.
3. The Dominican Government cannot regain jurisdiction until all claims have been met.
4. Receipt of customs must be signed by United States and Dominican agents.²³

Commander Dillingham then wrote to President Morales the United States Government would restore order and reestablish the credit of the nation. The commander was also instructed to say that the "President of the United States desires the prosperity and happiness of your beautiful country." The details of administration of the Plan were given in this enclosure.²⁴

Albert C. Dillingham
 Thomas C. Dawson
 Juan F. Co Sanchez
 Federico Velasquez

A treaty was signed February 4, 1905, constituting the United States the receiver for the bankrupt republic. Fifty-five percent of the Dominican customs were to be applied to the liquidation of the debt, and the other forty-five percent to be used for current expenses.²⁵

²² Ibid., p. 308.

²³ Ibid., p. 309.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 312.

²⁵ Senate Doc. No. 47, Acts of Congress, Treaties and Proclamations, 60 Cong., 1 sess., Part 2, pp. 500-504. Washington, 1909.

This proposal met with strenuous protest in the United States Senate because the Senators feared some sort of American imperialism. And, although they refused to ratify the treaty, the President went ahead with the plan under an executive agreement with the Island, appointing a confidential agent to investigate the finances of Santo Domingo and authorizing Secretary Taft to nominate the officer to collect the revenues. The President then announced to Congress that such arrangement would continue until the Senate should take action on the treaty. He was roundly abused in the Senate for this piece of "executive usurpation," but the success of his policy was so complete that the Senate ratified the treaty on February 25, 1907.²⁶

This revised treaty omitted the territorial clause, but provided that the President of the United States should appoint a general receiver of Dominican customs and such assistants as he might deem necessary; that the government of the United States should afford them such protection as might be necessary for performing their duties; and that until the bonded debt should be paid in full, the Dominican government would not increase its debt without the consent of the United States.²⁷

During the period of political disturbances a \$30,000,000 debt had been created. Some of these claims were just while some were unjust. The same conditions prevented the collection of customs duties, so that the debt continued to increase by accretion of interest and "are a grievous burden upon the people of San Domingo and a barrier to their improvement and prosperity."

²⁶Foreign Relations, 1905, op. cit., p. 298.

²⁷Cong. Record, XL, 1174-1178, Part 2, 59 Cong., 1 sess., Washington, 1906.

This treaty provided that foreign creditors receive \$12,407,000 for their part, whereas internal creditors would receive \$21,000,000 in claims and debts. The holders of internal debts were to receive a total of \$17,000,000. The Dominican Republic agreed to sell bonds to the amount of \$20,000,000 at 5%, payable in fifty years and redeemable at 102½%. After ten years, customs receipts were to be used in liquidating these debts, adjusting claims, paying for harbor monopolies and for building railroads which would help develop the country. The United States agreed to assist in the collection of customs receipts. The President of the United States was granted power to appoint customs receivers for the above purposes until such claims were paid. The payment of receivership; interest on bonds was an obligation upon San Domingo. Such collections must not cost San Domingo over 5%. The Dominican government agreed by law to give all necessary protection of said customs. The United States on its part would provide protection to said receivers. Dominica must not increase its public debts until said bonds and claims were paid in full.

Thomas Dawson
 Enullano Tejera
 Federico Velasquez

The following excerpt from more recent historians and writers give their ideas as to the agreement with Santo Domingo.

Frederic L. Paxon says:

The Santo Domingo agreement was an attempt to reach a reasonable balance among the conflicting forces of the Monroe Doctrine, the strategic conditions of national safety, the defense of the Panama Canal, the tending of American capital to seek investment outside

²⁸ Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, Etc., 1910-1923, Vol. 3, p. 412.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 418-419.

the United States, and the property interests of Europeans in the Latin countries. It prepared the way for a new "dollar diplomacy" and a great though irregular extension of American authority around the shores of the Caribbean Sea.³⁰

Chester Lloyd Jones wrote:

Under the American receivership the Dominican treasury received more from the 45% of the customs receipts turned over to it by our collector than it had received from its own corrupt officials who had handled the entire revenues. The claims of the creditor countries were scaled down to \$17,000,000 and the interest obligations were promptly met.³¹

President Roosevelt, referring to the 1905 Protocol, wrote:

The treaty now before the Senate was concluded with Santo Domingo's earnest request repeatedly pressed upon us, and was submitted to the Senate because in my judgment it was our duty to our less fortunate neighbor to respond to her call for aid.³²

Hon. Francis B. Loomis, Assistant Secretary of State, in an address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, said:

The Republic of San Domingo has entered upon a new period of its history. Under the protection of the United States there can be no fear of further bloody struggles for power. By coming to an agreement with Washington, President Morales has done his land a great service which will call for the gratitude of the present and future generations of Dominicans.³³

The Editorial comment in the "Outlook" for 1907 has this to say of of the treaty:

Our Government's success in this role has already proved the wisdom of President Roosevelt's action. Perhaps for the first time in Dominican history, the revenues have been regularly collected. This, in turn, has naturally tended to improve foreign relations for the Dominican half of the island of Hayti, and has also brought about

³⁰Frederic L. Paxson, Recent History of the United States, p. 325, New York, 1929.

³¹Chester Lloyd Jones, op. cit., p. 117.

³²Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo, p. 26, New York, 1928.

³³Francis B. Loomis, Attitude of the U. S. Toward Other American Powers, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXVI, 23, Philadelphia, 1905.

better internal conditions of self respect and order. Certainly the Santo Dominican government has had more available money during the period of our operation of its finances than at any other time in its history.³⁴

President Taft said in his annual message to Congress on December 3, 1912, that the revolution in Santo Domingo following the assassination of President Cacaes, the preceding year had brought the Dominican Republic to the verge of chaos. It was necessary to send special commissioners to the island to reestablish the customhouses with guards sufficient to insure needed protection to the customs administration. These Commissioners were instrumental in bringing the contending parties together and furnishing a basis of adjustment, "which it is hoped will restore normal conditions, and result in permanent benefit to the Dominican Republic."³⁵

The civil war continued through June and July, 1913, extending into new areas, with increasing danger to foreign lives and property as time passed. On July 29, the President of the United States asked that hostilities be suspended to afford an opportunity to present a plan for the restoration of peace. A general armistice was signed at Puerto Plata on August 6.

On August 15, two new Commissioners, ex Governor Fort of New Jersey, and Mr. Charles Cogswell Smith set sail for Santo Domingo on an American warship. A document known as the "Wilson Plan" was given them on their departure.³⁶

³⁴The Santo Dominican Treaty, Editorial in the Outlook, LXXXVI, 85, New York, May 18, 1907.

³⁵Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1912, pp. 339-390.

³⁶Munro, op. cit., p. 116.

The Government of the United States desires nothing for itself from the Dominican Republic and no concessions or advantages for its citizens which are not accorded citizens of other countries. It desires only to prove its sincere and disinterested friendship for the republic and its people and to fulfill its responsibilities as the friend to whom in such crisis as the present all the world looks to guide Santo Domingo out of its difficulties.

It, therefore, makes the following earnest representations not only to the existing de facto Government of the Dominican Republic, but also to all who are in any way responsible for the present posture of affairs there:

I. It warns everyone concerned that it is absolutely imperative that the present hostilities should cease and that all who are concerned in them should disperse to their several homes, disbanding the existing armed forces and returning to the peaceful occupations upon which the welfare of the people of the republic depends. This is necessary and necessary at once. Nothing can be successfully accomplished until this is done.

II. It is also necessary that there should be an immediate reconstruction of political authority in the republic. To this end the Government of the United States very solemnly advises all concerned with the public affairs of the republic to adopt the following plan:

(1) Let all those who have any pretensions to be chosen President of the Republic and who can make any sufficient show of exercising a recognized leadership and having an acknowledged following agree upon some responsible and representative man to act as Provisional President of the Republic, it being understood that Mr. Bordas will relinquish his present position and authority. If these candidates can agree in this matter, the Government of the United States will recognize and support the man of their choice as Provisional President. If they cannot agree, the Government of the United States will itself name a Provisional President, sustain him in the assumption of office, and support him in the exercise of his temporary authority. The Provisional President will not be a candidate for President.

(2) At the earliest feasible date after the establishment and recognition of the provisional Government thus established, let elections for a regular President and Congress be held under the authority and direction of the Provisional President, who will, it must of course be understood exercise during his tenure of office the full powers of President of the Republic; but let it be understood that the Government of the United States will send representatives of its own choosing to observe

the election throughout the republic and that it will expect those observers not only to be accorded a courteous welcome but also to be accorded the freest opportunities to observe the circumstances and processes of the election.

(3) Let it be understood that if the United States is satisfied that these elections have been free and fair and carried out under conditions which enable the people of the republic to express their real choice, it will recognize the President and Congress thus chosen as the legitimate and constitutional Government of the Republic and will support them in the exercise of their functions and authority in every way it can. If it should not be satisfied that elections of the right kind have been held, let it be understood that another election will be held at which the mistakes observed will be corrected.

III. A regular and constitutional government having thus been set up, the Government of the United States would feel at liberty thereafter to insist that revolutionary movements cease and that all subsequent changes in the Government of the Republic be effected by the peaceful processes provided in the Dominican Constitution. By no other course can the Government of the United States fulfill its treaty obligations with Santo Domingo or its tacitly cancelled obligations as the nearest friend of Santo Domingo in her relations with the rest of the world.---³⁷

The following is a telegram sent to the Commissioners by the Secretary of State on August 13, 1913.

You are instructed to observe and follow out with utmost care plan which has been presented you by the Secretary of State. No opportunity for argument should be given to any person or faction. It is desired that you present plan and see that it is complied with. - - - ³⁸

The "Wilson Plan" referred to above asserted that violence reigned in Santo Domingo and that the United States asked the people who were involved in such violence to return to their homes immediately. This Plan also asserted that the United States was unselfish, desiring nothing from the people or government of the Island. This by implication is very similar to Theodore Roosevelt's statement that "the United States is interested only in law abiding republics in the Western hemisphere." Grant's definite

³⁷ Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 247.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 247.

interest in annexation as interpreted elsewhere in this thesis, does not square with the facts. He said on more than one occasion that he would use the Monroe doctrine for annexation purposes in relation to his Santo Domingo plans. Moreover he declared himself in favor of direct intervention in Santo Domingo's internal affairs unless the factions could agree upon one man for President. This reminds the writer of this thesis that Grant was as imperialistic in his views as regards weak Latin American republics as was Theodore Roosevelt, who threw Santo Domingo into the hands of the receiver in 1904. His attitude, had he been permitted to have his way was similar to that of President Wilson when he said that the United States government would send its own representatives into Santo Domingo to inspect election returns, and of President Coolidge who sent U. S. Marines into Nicaragua over half a century later. This statement of policy is what was actually done in several weak republics during the period from 1898-1934. Reference is made here to United States intervention in Santo Domingo in 1904 and for several years later there as well as in Nicaragua, Panama and Cuba.

The "Wilson Plan" was accepted and Dr. Ramon Baez was inaugurated Provisional President on August 28, 1913. Arias, who had caused so much confusion in the Republic, had not been included in the Conference. However, he had agreed to recognize the authority of the new administration after the United States Government had proposed that American Marines should assist in arresting him. The presidential election, which was observed by representatives of the commission, gave Juan Isidro Jimenez a small majority over his chief opponent, Horacio Vasquez.

³⁹
Munro, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

In a note from acting Secretary of State, Polk, to Minister Russell, September 17, 1915, Polk said that the current indebtedness of from five to seven millions of dollars had been contracted and a struggle to obtain control of the Government and Government funds had resulted in a state of revolution "so continuous as almost entirely to interrupt all national development in the Republic." He suggested that the best remedy would be a new convention, broader than that of 1907, but if that could not be arranged, then the United States might interpret the Convention of 1907 to give it the right to check the growth of the debt through the appointment of a financial adviser and to establish order by the creation of a Constabulary.⁴⁰

This note was virtually an ultimatum. It was presented by Russell to the Dominican Government on November 19, 1915, and its demands were rejected as threatening invasions of the National sovereignty. The situation became more complicated because of the revolutionary activities of Arias, Secretary of War in the cabinet of President Jimenez. It became an axiom of American policy that Arias should not come into control of the Dominican Government.

In May, 1916, the United States government intervened in Santo Domingo by military force. Marines were landed there to quell a revolution of Arias, who with his forces were occupying the City of Santo Domingo. He was compelled to withdraw, and when, despite protests of the American minister, Congress chose a friend of Arias for President, Admiral Caperton

⁴⁰U. S. F. R., 1915, pp. 321-339.

announced that the troops would remain until all revolutionary activity had been stamped out, and reforms to insure order and prosperity adopted. ⁴¹

In the meantime the general receiver of customs had extended his control over all the revenues. On the 18th of August, he was instructed to suspend all disbursements to the Dominican government until the latter had reached an agreement with the United States. On August 26, Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, cabled that the Provisional Government would not be recognized till it had accepted the American view as to control (of finance), constabulary, and other reforms, and proved itself free from dominion of Arias. ⁴² ----

By November, 1916, it was evident that the Dominican government would make no concessions to American control, and that the elections called for in December would probably give Arias control of the Government. Secretary Lansing went over the matter with Mr. Stabler, Chief of the Latin American division of the State Department, and had Stabler put their views into a letter to him of November 21, 1916, which he then sent to President Wilson. In this letter Stabler said that after careful consideration of the matter that he thought the only course left open would be "the declaration of martial law and placing of Santo Domingo under military occupation." He based his belief on the interpretation which the United States has given to the Dominican Convention of 1907 and also upon the present unsettled conditions in the Republic. ⁴³ ----

⁴¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, p. 231, Washington, 1925.

⁴² U. S. F. R., 1916, p. 235.

⁴³ Ibid., 1916, p. 242.

To this proposal President Wilson replies:

The President to the Secretary of State

The White House

Washington, Nov. 26, 1916

My dear Mr. Secretary: It is with the deepest reluctance that I approve and authorize the course here proposed, but I am convinced that it is the least of the evils in sight in this very perplexing situation. I therefore authorize you to issue the necessary instructions in the premises.

I have stricken out the sentences in the proposed proclamation which authorized the commanding officer to remove judges and others in certain circumstances. It may be necessary to resort to such extreme measures, but I do not deem it wise to put so arbitrary an announcement in the proclamation itself.

Faithfully yours,
Woodrow Wilson-----⁴⁴

Immediately Captain H. S. Knapp of our navy declared the Dominican Republic under the military administration of the United States. There was a profession that "no designs against the sovereignty of Santo Domingo were contemplated," but on November 29, the Captain suspended the Dominican constitution and appointed American naval officers to the various cabinet positions. The following regulations were issued:

Whereas Santo Domingo has always had independence and sovereignty and Whereas the United States has no intentions of attacking the independence of Santo Domingo, the two governments therefore establish a Plan or Modus operandi, June 30, 1922.

Whereas Santo Domingo has never delegated its sovereignty to any foreign power, never-the-less Santo Domingo recognizes the fact that the internal interests of the country makes validation of the regulations issued by the United States necessary.⁴⁵

The United States government and San Dominica then agreed to the designation of delegates William Russell, Envoy Extra-ordinary and Don Horacio Vasquez, Provisional President of Santo Domingo.

⁴⁴United States Foreign Relations, 1916, p. 241.

⁴⁵United States Statutes at Large, 69th Congress, 1925-27, Vol. 44, Pt. 3, p. 2194, Washington, 1927.

Concerning the military occupation of Santo Domingo by the United States, Minister Russell has this to say to the Secretary of State on December 14, 1916:

I am impressed with the manner in which the people have accepted the new order of things. The petty politicians are the only people dissatisfied. I am convinced that the present military government or a "de facto" government with an American governor supported by the military should go right ahead for a year at least, working out complete reforms necessary, with the voluntary aid of patriotic Dominicans. At the end of this time if it has been shown that the country is in a position to have "de facto" government presided over by a junta of the best native element, then this could be done and after a period of trial for this junta the country should be ready for elections, then proceed with the elections for president.----46

For six years Santo Domingo was ruled by the Navy Department of the United States. On October 21, 1922, Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos was inaugurated Provisional President, the executive departments were turned over to Dominican officials, and Admiral Robison sailed away from the island, leaving a guard of 1500 American marines to preserve order. In April it was announced that the marines would be withdrawn before July 1, 1924. But with the election in March, 1924 of General Horacio Vasquez as constitutional President, the military government came to an end, and on January 20, 1925, Secretary Hughes was able to say:

Of course we could have remained in control had we desired, but instead of doing so, we have been solicitous to aid in the establishment of an independent government so that we could withdraw and, such a government having been established through our efforts, we have withdrawn.----47

The American occupation of Santo Domingo gave important social, economic and financial reforms. Admiral Snowden in his report to Secretary Daniels in December, 1920, told of the four hundred miles of roads built, and the

⁴⁶ United States Foreign Relations, 1916, op. cit., p. 249.

⁴⁷ Charles Cheney Hyde, Charles Evans Hughes, Bemis editor, op. cit., X, 340.

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new bridges, piers and wharves. Between 1906 and 1916 the republic had spent only an average of \$400,000 a year on public works, but in the next three years the figures had risen to \$1,250,000. There were 18,000 children in the schools in 1916 and 100,000 in 1920. But on the other hand, the political liberty of the island had been suspended. A rigorous censorship had been introduced. There were complaints of imprisonments and punishments visited upon the natives. Ruinous rates of interest, sometimes as high as 19% had been charged on American loans. All of this caused a distrust of the American attitude toward the Latin American countries.

J. N. Larned has this to say of the results of the occupation by the United States:

For five years Americans held Santo Domingo in the iron bondage of martial law. Public meetings were forbidden, the press censored, protestors court-martialed. Every governmental function was taken over by American marines. During this period, also, the occupation built excellent highways, cleaned up towns, and greatly improved the school system, using Dominican funds for these ends. Many Dominicans were killed in action. The occupation held all Dominicans killed in action to be bandits: the Dominicans considered them patriots. The Dominicans never ceased to protest before the world against the occupation of the country.----49

David Muzzy says:

We have yet to learn how to exert over troubled republics like Santo Domingo a form of supervision which shall be both adequate to our responsibility under the Monroe Doctrine for defending them against intervention by foreign powers and acceptable to the native population as a manifestation of a disinterested friendship. The task is one of enormous difficulty, but on its solution depends our reputation for good or evil in the eyes of Latin America.⁵⁰

⁴⁸David Saville Muzzy, The United States of America, II, 558. (Primary source not available in Oklahoma A. & M. College Library.)

⁴⁹Larned, op. cit., IX, 7525-7526.

⁵⁰Muzzy, op. cit., II, 137-138.

President Vasquez increased the foreign debt, first by an issue of \$3,300,000 in 1926, mainly for the purchase of electric light plants at Puerto Plata and Santiago, and by two other issues of \$5,000,000 each in 1927 and 1928 for the construction of various public works. In order to permit the issue of new loans under more advantageous conditions, the 1907 treaty was replaced by a new convention, very similar in its terms,⁵¹ signed December 27, 1924.

Notwithstanding the fact that the republic's revenues were far greater than ever before, reaching more than \$15,000,000 in 1927 to 1929, still expenditures had also increased and the prospect for the future was rather unfavorable owing to the decline in sugar prices. Early in 1929, President Vasquez invited General Charles G. Dawes to organize a financial commission to recommend methods of improvement in the system of economic and financial administrative organization, both national and municipal, for the installation of a scientific budget system and for an efficient method whereby the government may control all of its expenditures.⁵²

Mr. Dawes accepted with alacrity and before the end of March, 1929, had marshalled a committee of twelve and was on his way to Santo Domingo. This commission remained on the island for 21 days and presented a two hundred page report to President Vasquez but withdrew before it was translated into Spanish.⁵³ The report was accepted, however, and in less than a month the five new laws proposed had been enacted by the legislature, and

⁵¹Treaty Series, No. 726, Washington, 1924.

⁵²Munro, op. cit., p. 138.

⁵³Roy Veatch, Mr. Dawes in Santo Domingo, The Nation, CXXIX, 110-112. July 31, 1929.

the Chief Executive was taking vigorous, almost violent measures to carry out all the recommendations of the report.

Mr. Dawes, when asked by newspaper editors, who recognized only one way of curing a nation's ills, how large the loans would be, replied bluntly: "Economy does not mean another loan. It is what makes loans unnecessary."⁵⁴

"One more problem for President Hoover!" exclaimed many American editors on February 26, 1930, when the Dominican Republic again indulged in the forbidden luxury of revolution.⁵⁵ It is significant, however, that the United States did not rush marines to Santo Domingo at the first sign of trouble. The Hoover administration thus gave a concrete example of its unwillingness to interfere in the internal affairs of a Caribbean country. "Whether this meant that the United States will abandon its insistence upon recognizing only Constitutional Governments in the Caribbean remains to be seen."⁵⁶-----

After having given much study and serious consideration to the Dominican question, it is the conclusion of this writer that the proposed annexation was advocated and sponsored by individuals and firms, who were actuated by the monetary gains to be derived therefrom. Economic forces within the United States were linked to those of London bankers. Chaos in Santo Domingo made for insecurity of European bond holders and this in turn invited seizure of the Santo Dominican custom houses. Grant therefore

⁵⁴The World Over, editor, Living Age, CCCXXXVI, 249-250, June, 1929.

⁵⁵Revolution in Santo Domingo, editor, Literary Digest, CIV, p. 7, March 8, 1930.

⁵⁶Raymond L. Buell, The Dominican Revolt, Foreign Policy Association News Bulletin, IX, 2, March 28, 1930.

applied the Monroe Doctrine. The Congress of the United States, the Senate in particular, manifested an independent spirit with Senator Charles Sumner leading the opposition, and Grant did not get the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification of his two treaties. These treaties, one providing for the annexation of the Dominican Republic, and the other for a ninety-nine year lease of Samana Bay, signed by the Santo Dominican government, indicated that the Dominican people approved the proposed agreement by an overwhelming majority. In essence, President Grant's policy was interested economic imperialism similar to that of the period from 1898-1934.

From the earliest declaration of the United States policy to the period of the "big stick" policy, any threat in the Caribbean has been a concern of the United States, and the Monroe Doctrine, the pedestal of the United States, has been applied. President Grant was as bold as Theodore Roosevelt when he created the "big stick" policy for the Caribbean. Later President Wilson laid the basis for modern Pan-Americanism, yet he intervened by force on several occasions, as did President Coolidge who would intervene to collect debts due American citizens. President Franklin D. Roosevelt though said that had he been a citizen of any South American country from 1898-1934, he would have regarded the United States as an enemy to his country.

One can therefore conclude that President Grant's policy was in line with that of other presidents of the United States, until modern Pan-Americanism developed under the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

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