PATRICK J. HURLEY AND CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1944-1945

By

XIANSHENG TIAN

Bachelor of Arts
Henan University
Kaifeng, Henan,
People's Republic of China
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Master of Arts
State University of New York
College at Cortland
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Thesis Approved:

W Roger Biles
Thesis Adviser

John A. Sylvester

Thomas C. Collins
Dean of the Graduate College

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INTRODUCTION

"The policy of the United States toward China as represented by its ambassador Patrick J. Hurley is leading China to a crisis of civil war," Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, claimed in July 1945.[1]

The American policy of supporting the Nationalist government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek while forcing the Communists to submit to Chiang's control, Mao stated, had put in jeopardy the effort to bring about Japan's defeat and the unification of China. Mao pointed out that only because of the support of the imperialists like Hurley could Chiang stiffen his back a little, though much of the popular support he used to enjoyed at the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War had gone to the Chinese Communists. No matter how Hurley and the like attempted to "egg Chiang Kai-shek on," no matter how he had advertised it, the Chairman went on, the "Hurley-Chiang racket" was aiming at no other target but sacrificing the interests of the Chinese people, disturbing still more the unity of the Chinese people, and laying mines that were to touch off a large-scale civil war. The actions of the Ambassador, the Chairman pointed out, would not only damage the common cause of the anti-fascist war but also ruin the prospects of

peaceful co-existence after the war, in which the American people as well as those of other Allied countries were all interested. Such a disgusting duet was against the will of the Chinese people and could only be a washout, Mao predicted.[2] History seems to have confirmed his words.

The life and career of Patrick J. Hurley (1883-1963) is as interesting and colorful as any in American history. All through his life this native born Oklahoman worked his way up in society and left his personal mark in many aspects of the country's experience during the twentieth century. However, his role as President Roosevelt's personal envoy during World War II is the most important chapter of his career. His role in forming and carrying out the United States's policy in China during and immediately after the war has especially caught the attention of historians.

In the words of his authorized biographer, Hurley's life and career was a legend of a man "from poverty to fortune, from obscurity to fame."[3] Born in the Indian Territory, "Pat" Hurley's childhood witnessed the hardship of a poor farmer and coal miner's family. However, he grew up with a determination to succeed and made that dream come true. He became a successful lawyer and later served as the Choctaw Indian Tribe's Attorney General. He enthusiastically supported Herbert Hoover's Republican presidential nomination and later accepted the winning President's offer to serve in his administration. Within a short time he was promoted to serve as the country's Secretary of War. During the years when he was out of office, Hurley worked as

Sinclair Oil Company's representative and successfully settled the controversy over the Company's expropriated properties by the Mexican government. Though he criticized New Deal programs, he had something in common with the President from a different party. When later chosen as President Roosevelt's personal representative and "fact-finder," he faithfully carried out the orders issued to him and won the unquestioned confidence of the President.

Hurley had been working in twenty nations before he was sent to his last destination, China. He worked very hard as the President's special envoy and later Ambassador to carry out American policy in that country, but he failed in his mission despite the fact that he had employed every skill he had learned during his whole life. His lack of knowledge about this giant East Asian country, its ancient culture as well as its current politics, caused him to oversimplify his tasks. He underestimated the potential of the Chinese Communists, one of the two sides that were fighting to gain power in China. He put too much confidence in the other side, the Nationalists and their government. Such confidence led him to miscalculate the underlying currents that were changing rapidly during his stay in that country. Thinking that the two sides had more similarities than differences, he failed to see the nature of the struggle between the two sides and refused to listen to other people's advice. His almost blind trust in Russian leaders' promises that they would not support their Chinese comrades led him to propose a doomed line of policy.

However, he was not the only one to blame. The overall policy of the United States toward China had been caught in an embarrassing dilemma: the Americans had realized that the Chinese Nationalist government was corrupt and inefficient and had little hope of winning in China's domestic struggle, yet they could not abandon the regime, because there were no other alternatives---the United States just could not support a Communist power. Hurley was carrying out a policy that had little hope of reaching a successful conclusion. The determination of the Chinese Communists to reach their ultimate goals of socialism and communism, their status as an independent Communist party with their own interpretation and application of Marxist theory, and their special relationship with the Soviet Union were beyond the imagination of most of Hurley's contemporaries.

Hurley had been sent to China in 1944 with the mission of bringing about harmonious relations between the United States and China and the unification of that country in an effort to defeat Japan as soon as possible and rebuild China into a strong, united, and democratic nation. When he first arrived in China, many Chinese, including the Chinese Communists, had considered him "a kind of hope" in helping China to reach that goal. But in less than a year, Hurley's name had turned into the symbol of American imperialism in the Far East. It was also during this period that both the CCP and the KMT finally made up their minds to resume showdown on the battlefield instead of seeking compromises through negotiations.

Hurley's failure in China, as we understand it today, owed much to his lack of knowledge about that country. He failed to understand the nature of the Nationalist-CCP (Chinese Communist Party) conflict and the CCP-Soviet relationship; he had the slimmest idea about the Chinese Communists' ultimate goals in their struggle against the Nationalist Government; he miscalculated the Nationalist Government's credibility among the Chinese people during the 1940s; and he almost blindly believed in the Soviet Union's promises. However, we must see that it is unfair to blame Hurley alone for the failure of America's China policy. The overall American policy at that time had great difficulty in finding any satisfactory solution for the "China Tangle." Hurley's failure only reflected the general mentality of the American policy makers of the time.

The root of such failure in China during the mid-1940s, as historians have suggested, was that few Americans of the time realized that there was a revolution going on in China along with the resistance war against Japan. The resistance war "transcends" national independence, as Mark Selden has pointed out. The Chinese Communists' effort to lead the resistance as well as a social revolution "embodies a vision of man and society and an approach to development built on foundation of popular participation and egalitarian value."[4] It was in the war against foreign aggression that the Chinese Communists succeeded in combining the national independence with a full scale social revolution long overdue.[5] By mobilizing the long oppressed and exploited

Chinese peasantry, the Chinese Communists not only played an effective role in checking the Japanese war efforts but also helped initiate the Chinese peasants into an expanded role in China' political life. The CCP leadership thus obtained a great mass following that subsequently helped the Communists conquer all of China, as Chalmers Johnson has stated.[6]

While the Communists were successfully developing their policy of "mass line," the Chinese Nationalists headed by Chiang Kai-shek failed to carry out the mission that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had assigned for the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT), namely, "to arouse the masses (huan chi min chong) on the broadest possible basis to achieve a genuine revolution." During the late 1930s and especially during the 1940s, the KMT leadership became "increasingly and excessively preoccupied with military power and acquired the belief that the Party's military predominance was a prerequisite for implementing its political programs." This "obsession," as historian Hsi-sheng Ch'i pointed out, caused it to "delay, evade, and ignore the fundamental tasks of the socioeconomic and political reconstruction."[7] Although everyone, KMT members included, realized that popular resentment and people's demand for social justice were building up quickly during the 1940s, the KMT failed to take any effective action, thus losing popular support to the Communists.[8] Reading through Hurley's papers concerning his China mission, one gets no impression that the Ambassador had any idea about these developments at the time.

Most Americans then, including Hurley and the highest

policy makers, had the tendency to regard the Chinese Communists as "mere adjuncts of the Soviet Union." They scarcely saw and even less exploited the differences among the Communists from different nations. They simply believed that "Communism was an unnatural doctrine" that was "incompatible" with Chinese society. This made them underestimate the extent to which the CCP had come to represent powerful aspiration in China.[9] The policy the United States followed in China, as pointed out by historian Tang Tsou, was unrealistic and doomed to failure, because the United States not only lacked any real knowledge of China but also the will and the ability, military and economic, to see the policy through to its logical conclusion.[10] The Americans' expectation of keeping China active in the war and their deep concern over Soviet aims kept Washington adhered to its established policy of supporting the Chinese Nationalists only.[11] This was the policy that Hurley proposed except that he wanted a total American commitment to the Chinese Nationalists rather than a limited one that the American government adopted. With such a background and situation changing quickly in China, it seemed that Hurley was carrying out a "mission impossible," as Russell D. Buhite suggested.[12]

The thesis insisted upon by John Service that the United States had lost a chance in China when it committed itself to the Nationalist cause and alienated the Communists, thus leading to the Americans being driven out of China, does not have much support among historians except a

few.[13] But some recently "internally circulated" CCP documents and studies of them seem to suggest that the Chinese Communist leaders, being pragmatic realists who were strongly nationalistic and independent of Soviet instructions, had indeed considered some kind of compromise with the Nationalists and the United States.[14] Whether or not there really was such an opportunity for the United States to build some working relations with the Chinese communists still needs more study. However, one thing is clear. Hurley's proposal that the United States give large scale assistance to the Nationalists only made the Yenan leaders quickly give up their brief consideration of compromise, if this consideration did occur, and conclude that the United States was their enemy. This dissertation will try to use such recently available CCP sources and the Hurley Papers, as well as many other primary and secondary sources, to look deeper into the nature and purposes of many of the CCP and American policies, as well as Hurley's role as a mediator, during the mid-1940s.

Hurley's name, along with only a few other Americans' names, has been the symbol of American imperialism for a whole generation of Chinese people. Within the United States, he has also drawn a lot of criticism. Studies on this historical figure will be helpful both in furthering research in American foreign policy and informing hundreds of millions of Chinese people about their country's past that has long been distorted by radical Communist propaganda.

Mao Tse-tung predicted in the summer of 1945: "If Hurley's policy [of supporting the Nationalist government] continues, the United States government will fall hopelessly into the deep, stinking cesspool of Chinese reaction; it will place itself in opposition to the hundred of millions of awakened or awakening Chinese people, and become a hinderance to the Anti-Japanese War at present and to world peace in the future."[15] Twenty years later, the United States and China had experienced the bitter lesson of the Korean War, the isolation of China, the Cold War mentality, and the Vietnam nightmare. In the United States, few people could still remember Hurley's name. Only historians were still able to comb through his life and career to label him "superficially spectacular but actually rather average, neither an outstanding statesman nor a great man,...not the first American to go far on modest talent, nor the last."[16] But in China, when Mao launched his "Great Cultural Revolution" in the 1960s and all the people were forced to read his little "red book," Hurley's name became something that everybody knew. The native son of Oklahoma had never dreamed that his name, after so many years, could still be remembered by hundreds of millions of Chinese people. Unfortunately, his and a few other Americans' names were remembered and are still remembered only as the symbols of America's imperialistic design over China.

I. Formative Years

The Hurley family moved into the Indian Territory in 1882. Pierce O'Neil Hurley, the father, had fled his Irish home for the United States because of his involvement in a rebellion against British rule. After a few years of unsuccessful attempts at farming in Texas where he first landed in the late 1860s, he moved northward with his wife Mary Kelly and two children. The family finally settled down on a small farm rented from Ben F. Smallwood, a Choctaw Indian leader and later Principal Chief of the Choctaw Nation. Within a year, the Hurley family's diary added a new entry: "Upon Pierce and Mary Kelly, this 8th day of January, 1883, was born a son---Patrick Jay Hurley."[1]

Life was hard for the Hurley family. The young boy grew during the family's struggle on their farm against the unfriendly weather. After three successive years of drought, his father realized that he had to seek some other ways besides their small farm to support the bigger family. Soon he was digging coal in one of the coal mines a few miles away from their farm. In 1894 when Patrick was eleven years old, he joined his father and began working. The work was hard for the young boy. He had to labor for nine and half hours a day taking care of a machine that pumped fresh

air into the mine. For all that, he earned only seventy-five cents. "I often had no more than bread and butter, and occasionally a raw tomato." Hurley recalled.[2]

It was at Ben Smallwood's home, Smallwood Mansion, that young Hurley had the best time of his childhood. Smallwood became the Principal Chief of the tribe in 1888, and his home was the center of the tribe's social and cultural, as well as political, center. Unlike many of his tribal men who held those poor whites living in their territory in contempt, Smallwood had a deep affection for the small son of his Irish tenant. He invited Patrick to his big home and allowed him to wander around however long he liked. For the first time in his life, the young boy began to see the world beyond his family's small farm house and the dark coal mines. The Chief encouraged Patrick to use his big library and even took time to read to the curious boy, giving him advice and answers on all kinds of questions. "I learned that there were many things in the world," Hurley recalled many years later.[3] Through Smallwood Hurley also got to know many other people, some of them becoming his life long friends who would play a very important role in changing Hurley's life. His close relationship with the Choctaw Indians helped him learn about these people and form a much more thorough understanding of them as well as a serious concern about their fate. This was something that few of his contemporaries could achieve at the time.

At the turn of the century and in the early 1900s, Hurley's life experienced some big changes. In 1898 the

restless Patrick joined his friends in answering Theodore Roosevelt's call for the young men of the country to fight in the Rough Riders, but he was turned down because he was too young. The disheartened teenager did not return to his home. Instead, he wandered around among different Indian tribes in Oklahoma, working on a number of ranches as a cowboy. When his Indian friends found out that he was eager to get an education, they helped him to get enrolled at Indian University at Bacone, though the institution usually only accepted Indian boys and Hurley had little formal schooling. He had to work for the university in exchange for his boarding. However, his active participation in all kinds of school activities, his reputation for hard work, and his loyalty to friends soon made him one of the most popular persons among the young Indian men. His wide reading even enabled him to accumulate such an "unusual knowledge and appreciation of history" that the school authorities decided to put him on the university's payroll as a history instructor. Hurley graduated ahead of schedule, completing his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1905.[4]

Hurley did not want to remain as he was. After working as docket clerk for the Indian Services for a couple of years, the ambitious young man resigned and found his way to Washington, D. C. for law studies. He worked on different jobs (including driving a taxi in the capital city) to support himself and pay for the studies. In 1908 Hurley received his Bachelor of Law degree from the National University Law School in Washington, D. C. Upon returning

to Tulsa, Oklahoma, he succeeded in passing the bar examination. His knowledge of the former Indian Territory very soon made him a recognized expert on Indian land titles and access rights, which were hot topics in that booming oil town. In two years he had become one of the largest one-man legal practices in the area and the organizer and the first president of the Tulsa Bar Association.

The year 1911 saw a new turn in Hurley's life. The year before, the last elected Principal Chief of the Choctaw Nation had died. According to the Five Tribes Act passed in Congress in 1906, the position became appointive by the U.S. President. President Taft appointed Victor Locke, Jr., to the post. Locke, who had been Hurley's good friend since their childhood, named his "Huck Finn," Patrick, the National Attorney for the tribe. Hurley's long-time friendship with the Choctaws and his attempt to identify himself with the Indians in terms of White-Indian relations made him fully qualified for the job. The Indians, with their own strict standard of integrity and justice in judging people, had full trust in him.[5] They agreed that "Pat was probably the only white boy...who knew which choctaw was related to which other, and who was whose cousin."[6] They granted him a unique honor by adopting him as a member of the tribe in 1911, the same year when President Taft approved his nomination.[7]

However, what was waiting for the young attorney was a big challenge. The tribal affairs with the federal government were in a chaotic state due to the indifference of his

predecessors. A former attorney for the tribe, James F. McMurray, even sued the Choctaws for not paying him his "special services" for them. He had made many contracts with individual Indians. All these contracts stated that each of these Choctaws would pay him ten percent of all the proceeds derived from the sale of the "surplus" tribal land and any distribution of the tribal fund. The tribe was in danger of being deprived of $3,500,000 at least.[8]

The young Attorney General for the Choctaws believed he was on the side of justice. He argued that individual Indians had no authority to make any deal with the property still held by the tribe. The federal government, Hurley maintained, was bound by treaties it had made with the Indians to provide services and arrange settlement for Indian affairs. Thus, McMurray's claims were immoral, if not totally illegal. In 1913 Hurley put this idea into an amendment to the Indian Appropriation Bill, which successfully checked McMurray's attempt to collect any payment. When McMurray's contacting agent tried to bribe him, Hurley answered the offer with contempt. "In the first place," he told the agent, "it's my duty to protect the interests of the Choctaw Nation against such fraudulent contracts as these of McMurray's; and in the second place, I'm insulted to think that McMurray would have the nerve to offer me such an insignificant amount as only $100,000."[9] Hurley's testimony in behalf of the Indian interests and especially his heated battle of words with McMurray's supporters in Congress won him sympathy and support among many lawmakers.

On June 30, 1913, the Indian Appropriation Bill became law with the Gore (Hurley) Amendment. The McMurray contracts were denied and more than three million dollars were saved for the tribe.[10]

But there was no time for Hurley to take a breath of relief. An even greater task was waiting for him: this time it was the issue of the reopening of the Choctaw tribal rolls for the Mississippi Choctaws. Ever since the War of 1812, the U. S. Government, under pressure from land-hungry whites, had continuously tried to remove the Indians living in Mississippi. Few Indians wanted to trade their land where they had been living for ages. In May 1830 the Congress had passed the Indian Removal Act against the will of the Indians. The federal government officials' threatened that there would be no federal protection against hostile Mississippi state legislation if they failed to cooperate. The unhappy Indian leaders had no other choice but to consent.[11] But not everyone was willing to leave: while the majority of Choctaws move to the Indian Territory in Oklahoma, some preferred to stay in their Mississippi home.[12] Although land was promised in Article 14 of the Choctaw Treaty for those who stayed, that promise was never honored. The corruption among government officials, the maneuvering of land speculators, and the Choctaws' own unawareness of their situation caused them to lose most of their rights to the land in Mississippi.[13] Many of them chose to rejoin the majority in Oklahoma where the tribal rolls had been open.

However, the Indian territory proved not to be a safe refuge for the Choctaws either. In March 1893 Congress authorized the Dawes Commission to negotiate the end of the tribal government and allotment of the tribal land, looking ultimately toward the creation of another state.[14] The Indians were powerless to turn the tide. By the end of 1896 and early 1897, agreements were signed that set the procedure of termination of tribal government and division of the tribal land among the tribal members. The trust fund held by the federal government was to be paid out per capita. Congress amended and enacted these into law, known as the Curtis Bill.[15]

When the news spread that the Choctaws in Oklahoma might get rich through the per capita distribution of the tribal fund and other properties, a rush to enroll on the tribal rolls started. It turned out that the "rush" was created by some greedy agents and lawyers who did not consider it wrong to cheat and defraud ignorant Indians. Of the approximately 25,000 applicants, the Citizenship Court set up to determine the claims found out that only 1,634 legitimate Mississippi Choctaws were qualified to enroll. They were accepted, and rolls were officially closed in March 1907.[16] However, the process of distribution of the tribal fund to individual Choctaws met strong opposition from some Mississippi lawmakers. They blocked all the per capita payments and demanded the tribal rolls be reopened.

As the Choctaw National Attorney, Hurley led the struggle. With support from the Indians and the Congress-

ional delegation from Oklahoma, he once again plunged himself into the battle of words in the Congressional hearings. He argued that there was no such possibility that the few hundred Choctaws who had remained in Mississippi could have descended tens of thousands claimants. He urged the government to investigate a certain "syndicate" that had incited the "rush" and controlled most of the contracts made with those claimants. He pointed out that this organization was using the money derived from the sale of the contracts to lobby in Congress for the reopening of the tribal rolls so that it could draw a huge profit easily from the claimants if they could win the case.[17] Facing his opponents from Mississippi, Hurley made it clear to the lawmakers that those who posed as friends of Mississippi Choctaws were not friends with them at all. If they had "dealt justly with the Mississippi Choctaws and had accorded them their legal rights, the Mississippi Choctaws would now have far more [wealth] than any Choctaws in Oklahoma."[18] The finding of the government investigation into the "syndicate" issue supported Hurley's argument. The subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs recommended in early 1915 that the Harrison Bill, which had demanded the reopening of the Choctaw tribal rolls, be turned down.

Against some lawmakers' attempt to block the whole process if the tribal rolls were not reopened, Hurley pointed out that such an attempt was based on false reasons that some legitimate claimants had not gotten enough time to enroll. He reminded the lawmakers that this was not the

case. All those legitimate claimants had been given careful consideration without exception, and the action urged by the lawmakers "had been taken and those who have been found apparently equitably entitled to enrollment on the rolls ...were enrolled."[19]

Hurley's remarkable knowledge and amazing memory about Choctaw Indians' history, backed by his strong confidence as well as eloquence, won the day. No opponents of his could match him in these aspects. Using Hurley's argument and further testimony, Congress denied those Mississippi claimants' right to enroll and the demand that the tribal roll be reopened. The U. S. government finally ordered the distribution of the Choctaw tribal fund it had held for so long. The tribe's wealth was protected.

Hurley's remarkable work was fully recognized among the Choctaw Indians. They showed their respect for and trust in their young lawyer. When some tribal members suggested a change of National Attorney because he was a white man, a full-blood Choctaw convention resolved that such was "an unjust charge" and "the drawing of the blood line ... not a good policy," and thus "the dignity of the tribe has been insulted."[20]

His efforts also gained recognition across party lines. President Woodrow Wilson reappointed Hurley, a Republican, as the Choctaw Nation's Attorney General. He even commented publicly that "Patrick Hurley is one of the few men who has had a position of trust for the Indians without using it for his personal benefit."[21] Until the day Hurley left

Oklahoma, he "never acquired an acre of ground from a Choctaw Indian.[22]

Hurley was popular among many Oklahomans, especially the Republicans, but he was not willing to take an active part in politics. "Before I enter upon a political career, I want to be independent," he once told his friends. "I like public service but I do not want to be dependent on politics for a livelihood."[23] Many times he declined to seek public office, sometimes even against his friends' strong support and endorsement. However, this inactivity suddenly turned into energetic drive in 1928 when Hurley gave his support to Herbert Hoover as the Republican presidential candidate. Hurley admired Hoover as an efficient administrator and agreed with Hoover's political philosophy. He saw in this former engineer a bright future for the country. His efforts in Oklahoma were not so successful. But at the Republican National Convention at Kansas City, Hurley succeeded in persuading Senator Curtis to give up the presidential nomination to Hoover and to accept the vice-presidential nomination. The victorious Hoover did not forget Hurley when he moved into the White House, offering him the post of Assistant Secretary of War in March 1929. Within the same year, Hurley's superior, Secretary of War James Good, died. It was not long before forty-six year old Hurley became the first Oklahoman to serve in the cabinet as the fifty-fifth Secretary of War of the United States.

During his years in the Hoover Administration, Hurley was most famous for his role in resisting the drive for the

independence of Philippines and his handling of the 1932 Bonus March. At the time, some very effective lobbying groups representing American sugar, dairy, and other agricultural interests were pushing for the United States to grant independence to the Philippines. If such independence was granted, imports from these islands would have to pay a tariff instead of going into the United States tax-free. In the summer of 1931, Hurley was sent by President Hoover to visit the Islands and find out the real situation there. The conclusion he reached, which further supported the position of the Hoover Administration, was that "until the filipino people shall have made greater progress toward economic development, political independence would merely invite revolution and anarchy. ... The political and social institutions of the Filipino people are not yet developed to a point where the stability of an independent government would be reasonably assure."[24] He seemed to believe that "premature" independence, and thus the loss of the American market, would only bring about chaos in these islands. It was also possible that such a situation could be exploited by some great powers, especially the ambitious Japanese Empire.[25]

The situation in the Far East was such that Hurley could hardly miss the implication. On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kuantung Army initiated the Mukden Incident and soon occupied all of Manchuria. Hurley was in Shanghai preparing for the trip back to the United States when the news reached him that the Japanese had started its invasion

of China. Hurriedly he headed for Tokyo, a stop before returning home. His observations in Japan convinced him that the Japanese were determined to pursue their policy of imperial expansion. America's stay in the Philippines, he thought, could be a useful check to such Japanese expansion in Asia. But in spite of the Administration's resistance, Congress passed the Hams-Curtis Bill, over the President's veto, granting independence to the Philippines. It was only the Filipinos' reluctance and unwillingness to lose their current tariff status that delayed the independence until later. Hurley also criticized Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson and the famous Non-Recognition Doctrine after his name. He pointed out that the Japanese were "actually laughing at America's effort to stop by 'nice letters' Japan's well-designed and well-armed programs." Although Hurley's "take tough" opinion was not accepted by the President, he tried his best within his capacity to maintain the strength of the armed forces in the face of difficulties arising from the country's economy in depression and the pressure for disarmament.[26]

The Great Depression had put the Hoover Administration in a very difficult position, but it was also the time when America witnessed Hurley's most noticeable action as a cabinet member. When thousands of unemployed World War I veterans organized themselves into the Bonus Expeditionary Force and marched into Washington D. C. in the spring of 1932, the Hoover Administration faced one of its most challenging trials. The confrontation between the demon-

strators and the police seemed to be getting out of control and the civilian authorities of the District of Columbia requested federal troops for help. President Hoover authorized Secretary of War Hurley to take care of the situation. But in his order to General MacArthur, the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, Hurley exceeded Hoover's instruction by telling the Army to clear all the camps the veterans had set up within the city limits instead of just getting them out the old government buildings they were occupying. General MacArthur, in his own behalf, had also done more than he had been ordered to do. The scene of soldiers with bayonets marching alongside the rumbling tanks to drive away the helpless and hungry veterans and their families fatally damaged the image of the Hoover government, which was already in deep trouble because of its poor performance in dealing with the Depression. Hurley's eloquent defense of the Administration's action could not help much. Although his citing of little bloodshed and the "Communist conspiracy" among the demonstrators, as well as his call for patriotism, turned some people's opinion about Hoover's policy, there was no cure to save the doomed administration. Hurley would have to go, along with Hoover, in front of the victorious Democrats with their New Deal programs.

As a Republican and a supporter of Hoover's conservative policies, Hurley was among the critics of the New Deal. From time to time, he demonstrated his negative attitude toward the relief measures put forward by the New

Dealers. "Do not think for a moment I am not for those fellows who are down and out," Hurley testified before a Congressional hearing, " I have been one of them. But I am telling you that I do not want you to get my consent to the inauguration of a system that deprives American men and women of their spirit of self-reliance, or create a condition whereby they can live by the sweat of someone else's brow." But he also praised President Roosevelt for some other New Deal programs by saying that "the success of the Roosevelt Administration is essential to the welfare of this country" and "the economic policies of the chosen leader of the people entitled to cooperative action that transcends partisan politics."[27] Although he generally disagreed with the political aims and tactics of the New Dealers, his supportive attitude toward the President's policies caught the attention of Roosevelt. This may be one of the reasons why Roosevelt later picked Hurley out to help push forward his foreign policy.

Hurley's defense of his former boss's policies only took a very small fraction of his time after he left his cabinet post. Upon his return from Washington, D.C., he concentrated most of his time and energy looking after his law practice and real estate interests. The incident that put him again in the nation's attention was his handling of the negotiations with the Mexican government about a settlement on the oil expropriation issue. In March 1938 the Mexican government expropriated the properties of some American as well as some European oil companies operating in

Mexico, an action that had its deep roots in the Mexican Revolution. One of the American companies, the Sinclair Oil Company, turned to Hurley for help. The negotiations with the Mexican officials were hard. Acting as a "diplomat," Hurley followed a realistic policy and made friends among the Mexicans. It seemed he had realized that the days of America's "Big Stick" policy had gone and showed his respect for the sovereignty of Mexico during the negotiation. The result was a successful settlement of payment on the properties expropriated, satisfactory to both the Mexican Government and the Sinclair Company. Hurley also made great efforts to resist the attempts by other bigger oil companies to undermine the negotiated settlement, which later set the example for the settlements of all other oil companies and helped to divert a crisis in Mexican-American relations. For what he had done during this incident, the Mexican government awarded Hurley the highest military decoration of the country, the Order of the Aztec Eagle. His purse was also fattened by the fees paid him by the Sinclair Company.[28]

The former Secretary of War had always kept a good relationship with President Roosevelt despite his criticism of some New Deal policies. He criticized the Neutrality Acts, calling them "a cowardly surrender" in front of Nazi Germany and urged their repeal. He also supported the Lend-Lease Act as well as many other of President Roosevelt's measures, which made the President feel obliged to pay him back in some way. After Hurley's request for a military

command assignment was turned down by the War Department in favor of younger and better trained officers, Roosevelt stepped in to offer Hurley a job that he thought would fit the Oklahoman's adventurous spirit.

In January 1942, Hurley was promoted to Brigadier General and named U.S. Minister to New Zealand. But before he started out for New Zealand, the President wanted him to carry out a secret plan: to deliver supplies to General MacArthur and his besieged men in the Philippines. With the order the "personal representative of the Chief of Staff" left for the mission in high spirits. Arriving in Australia, where he set up his headquarters, he made every effort to collect any ships available to make the trip. Japanese air raids damaged some of the ships he had, and some crews refused to run into the Japanese blockade. But some ships did make "the run" and reached the Philippines despite heavy losses. "The defenders were never short of ammunition, owing to these efforts," Secretary of War Stimson later commented.[29] The mission to New Zealand had not much attraction for Hurley, but during his brief stay in that small country he acted as a good public speaker and helped improve the understanding between the New Zealanders and the Americans. Hurley also shared New Zealand's fear of the pending Japanese invasion. More than once he urged his government to reverse the European-first strategy, attack, and defeat Japan first. President Roosevelt realized Hurley's unwillingness to stay in New Zealand. Attempting to convince Hurley of the correctness of his grand strategy

and, in turn, to make Hurley convince the New Zealanders and the Australians, Roosevelt assigned him a new task. After a meeting with Hurley in Washington, the President ordered Hurley to go to the Soviet Union as his "fact finder."

Hurley arrived in Moscow in early November 1942, but had to wait for ten days to see Joseph Stalin on the fourteenth. During the long talks between the two men, Stalin expressed his belief in the importance of the defeat of Nazi Germany. He also indicated that the defeat of Japan would be the logical thing once Germany was defeated. He especially emphasized the need for all kinds of war materials by the Red Army for the planned offensive. Stalin even showed the intention of possible Soviet participation in the war against Japan, the first time the Soviet Union ever expressed interest in the Pacific front.[30] A kind of good feeling was building between the two men. Stalin jokingly called the American general "a tough baby" and eventually granted permission to Hurley's request to visit the Stalingrad front to see the Red Army in action. This is the first time that Stalin had ever allowed any foreign observers to do so in his country, something that may have been the result of the "good feeling" but more probably the Marshal's gesture to show his trust in his American ally. The ten-day tour of the battlefield deeply impressed the special envoy. Hurley reported to the President that the Red Army had high morale as well as enough manpower and good fighting skills, but was badly in need of better equipment and other war materials.[31]

Hurley's reports expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was an effective fighting ally in need of American assistance. They also gave people an impression that the special envoy believed that the Soviet ruler was a man worthy of American trust and any problems could be solved with him by logical and reasonable negotiation.[32] This attitude would develop during the following years and would play a great role in Hurley's understanding of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as between the Chinese Communists and their Russian comrades.

Instead of going on to his New Zealand office, Hurley asked and received permission to return to the United States in January 1943. Back in Washington, Hurley frequently conferred with the State and the War Departments as well as with the President himself, further expressing his trust in the Soviet leader. He also conferred with the Australian and New Zealand officials, doing his best to persuade them of the reasons and logic of the American strategy. After this trip, however, New Zealand, and even Australia, where he was offered the office of U.S. Minister, had become less attractive to Hurley. The President had another job for him in time. Hurley would again serve as the President's "fact finder," but this time to the Middle East and he would report directly to Roosevelt. "Your reports to me," the President wrote in his order to Hurley, " should include the results of your observation in the region above indicated with regard to all matters that affect the national interest

of the United States and the prosecution of the War."[33]

The general once again plunged himself into a job he really liked, trying his best to collect information and background material first and provide his views to the President. But before the end of the whirlwind trip, his lukewarm attitude toward, and even criticism about, the Zionist movement that aimed at establishing a Jewish state in Palestine had already drawn severe attack from the Jewish communities in the United States. Only President Roosevelt's advice for him to ignore those accusations by the powerful Jewish leaders and newspapers comforted the general. After a brief stay in the United States, Hurley asked to be sent again to the Middle East. His request was approved and he was ready once again to fly to the area, especially to Iran, a country with rich oil resources and a strategic position during the war. But before he set off, President Roosevelt decided he wanted to send Hurley first to Afghanistan, India, and China. The President wanted someone to investigate the supply problems in the China-Burma-India Theater, as well as the personal disputes between American and English officers in the area. He also wanted Hurley to visit Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China to seek the Chinese leader's agreement to come to Cairo for the meeting among the United States, Great Britain, and China in November.

To prosecute the war in Europe more effectively, the President felt the necessity to coordinate the Allies' military strategy. He also kept in mind the war in the

Pacific, the defeat of Japan, and the postwar arrangement in Asia. China occupied a large part in his mind. But the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan and had a neutrality treaty with that country. Stalin obviously did not want to cause any trouble with Japan while he was busy fighting Germany. Chiang, on the other hand, was also unwilling to sit together with the Soviet dictator, whom he considered one of the most serious threats to China. To avoid unnecessary embarrassment, Roosevelt decided that two conferences would be arranged: one in Cairo among the U. S., Britain, and China, and another in Teheran including the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union.

Hurley's experience in China proved that this arrangement was correct. He arrived in Chungking on November 7, 1943. In his talk with Hurley, the Generalissimo flatly refused to see Stalin though he agreed that Soviet participation in the war against Japan was welcomed. When Hurley unrolled the American postwar blueprint, in which the United States would support a free, strong, and democratic China as the stabilizing force in Asia, Chiang was very much pleased.

A message from the State Department traced Hurley to China. The late arriving message stated that he was needed at the international conference at Teheran "to act as advisor to President Roosevelt." With this special mission, Hurley was formally promoted to the "temporary rank of Major General in the Army" and had the title of "Special Representative of the President ... with the rank of Ambassador."[34] Hurriedly flying back to Cairo, Hurley had

two talks with the President. Their topics included what Hurley understood of the Communist-Nationalist conflict in China, the personal disputes between General Joseph Stilwell and General Claire Chennault, and the U.S.-British rivalry in the China-Burma-India Theater. But none of these discussions were in detail. When the Cairo Conference formally started, Hurley was sent to Teheran to prepare the next round of meetings. It was in Iran that Hurley did participate in some capacity in the formation of the American policy.

The Big Three came to many agreements at Teheran. They decided that the "Second Front" would be a cross-channel invasion into France and set the time for the invasion with the Red Army launching its offensive from the East. Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once the war in Europe was over. They also discussed the territorial issue of Poland and the occupation of Germany by the Allies. The issue that Hurley had his share of influence about was the Allied policy toward Iran.

Iran, with its rich oil resources and strategic position, had been a victim in many international conflicts since the beginning of the early twentieth century. During the First World War, Great Britain, which had big oil interests in Iran, and Russia, which was seeking a route to the Indian Ocean, occupied the country though Iran had declared its neutrality. When the Second World War started, Iran tried again to stay neutral. However, the Soviet Union and Great Britain once again invaded and occupied the

country under the pretext that Iran had been pro-Nazi and posed a threat to their security. Hurley recognized the ambition of the two powers over the oil-rich country and shared the Iranians' fear about imperialism. It had been Hurley's suggestion that Iran be made into an ally, so that the Russians and the English would feel ashamed to partition an ally's territory and abuse its sovereignty. At Teheran, Hurley felt it was a good opportunity to strike out a deal with the Russians and the English about the future of Iran, and he so advised the President.

Roosevelt believed that the principles he and Churchill listed in the Atlantic Charter should apply in Iran's case. By so doing, the people throughout the world would have a chance to see the sincere intention of the United States. He agreed with Hurley and asked him to prepare a plan on Iran. Working with State Department officials, Foreign Service officer John Jernegan in particular, Hurley drew up a plan regarding Iran. After consulting with Soviet and British officials, he obtained approval from both countries. Then he presented the document to President Roosevelt before the final session of the Conference. The President was satisfied and discussed the issue personally with the two heads of state who both approved it. As one of the last few documents signed by the Big Three at Teheran, "The Declaration of the Three Powers Regrading Iran" guaranteed "the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."[35] Hurley felt very happy and proud of his accomplishment. He thought the declaration

was a victory over the expansive policy of the imperialists and the communists, for both the British and the Russian ambitions over Iran were contained and once again the United States showed to the world that it was "the defender of the self-government principle and the protector of the territorial integrity of the smaller nations."[36]

The Declaration drew criticism from some professionals in the State Department who suspected that it was too idealistic and not a practical policy to carry out. But Hurley had the President's support. Roosevelt even considered sending Hurley back to the Middle East. However, Hurley's opposition to the Zionist movement had caused great controversy in the United States. Some other people even suspected that his oil connections had something to do with his interest in the Middle East. With the 1944 election year drawing closer, Roosevelt did not want to cause any unnecessary trouble and asked Hurley whether he would like to go to China. The President insisted that there was no other person more qualified than Hurley to carry out the task of harmonizing the conflicts in the China-Burma-India Theater. He promised, knowing Hurley's dislike of the State Department, that Hurley would go as a Major General in the U. S. Army and not under the jurisdiction of the State Department. Faced with Roosevelt's insistence, the Oklahoman accepted the offer. On August 18, 1944, Hurley officially received his order: he would serve as President Roosevelt's "personal representative with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek" and report directly to the President.

II. THE ORIGINS OF THE MISSION TO CHINA

Hurley had little knowledge of recent developments in China, nor had he any basic understanding of this huge country with the largest population and one of the oldest civilizations in the world. His appointment as the President's special representative originated from Roosevelt's confidence in his personality and his successes in carrying out the President's orders on different missions besides his long and mostly successful career in politics, law, and diplomacy. His nomination also had the endorsement of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General George C. Marshall, the Army's Chief of Staff. Both men had considered Hurley the right person to iron out the trouble developing in the China-Burma-India Theater.[1]

China in 1944 was at a critical moment in the war against Japan. The Nationalist Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was suffering from defeat in front of the invading Japanese armies in East China and the confusion caused by the mismanagement of the civilian policies regarding the country's economic life. The alliance with the United States was going through a bitter trial when different approaches from both sides collided to

cause so many troubles that the effective prosecution of war was under the threat of total collapse. To understand the situation of 1944 and the origins of Hurley's mission, it is necessary to review development in China far back before that year.

When the Japanese Kuantung Army initiated the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931 and pushed forward to occupy all of Manchuria (Northeast provinces of China), the Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist) Government troops under the personal command of Chiang Kai-shek were just retreating from their unsuccessful third "Bandit Extermination Campaign" against the Red Army under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In front of the foreign invasion, Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Japanese invasion was but the disease of skin while communism was the disease of heart for China. That is why he, facing mounting criticism all around, firmly insisted that it was "necessary to effect internal pacification before we could successfully resist external aggression."[2] So the Japanese invasion did not stop him from preparing for another campaign to wipe out the Reds.

At the same time, Mao Tse-tung, leader of the CCP, was proclaiming the birth of the "Chinese Soviet Republic" in the Communist-controlled areas in southern Ksiangsi. In the Chinese Soviet Constitution, the CCP declared its readiness to form a revolutionary united front with the world proletariat and all oppressed nations and proclaimed the Soviet Union to be its loyal ally.[3]

While pleading with the League of Nations for help in settling the conflict with Japan, the KMT government sped up its troops' movement in an attempt to encircle the Communist-controlled areas. After another unsuccessful try in spring 1933, Chiang adopted the strategy presented by his German advisers. Mobilizing about 900,000 troops and building hundred of miles of military roads and thousands of fortifications, the government troops began their fifth campaign in October 1933. This "fortification after every step" defensive-offensive strategy finally worked. The Communist-controlled areas were taken piecemeal, and the better-armed government troops gradually made their way deep into the red areas.

Suffering heavy casualties and faced with the danger of being devoured by Chiang's armies, the CCP leaders chose to break through and started their famous 6,000 mile "Long March." The Nationalist troops captured Ksiangsi but failed to wipe out the Red Army. Despite heavy losses, the Reds again and again outmaneuvered the Nationalist troops in fighting their way through. They overcame the most rugged terrain in the world and finally reached their destiny in Northern Shensi in October 1935, one year after they first started the march.

But the situation was serious for the Communists. Shensi was one of the poorest parts of the country, sparsely populated, with far fewer resources than the former Soviet in Kiangsi. The Red Army, 100,000 strong when they broke through the KMT encirclement, had fewer than 20,000 left to

meet their comrades in Shensi.[4] The KMT government was still pursuing its policy of "pacification internally first before resistance against external aggression." Chiang actually was planning another "blockhouse-fortress" campaign around the Communist base areas in 1936. It is hard to say that the Red Army could have survived another large-scale "extermination" campaign had Chiang's plan been carried out. The Japanese continuous aggression to occupy more of China's territory beyond the Great Wall finally changed everything.

On July 7, 1937 the Japanese Army started its invasion into China proper from the Marco Polo Bridge outside of Peking. China was faced with the danger of being totally defeated by Japan and becoming a Japanese colony. Mao Tse-tung immediately realized that the chance had come for the CCP to play its role and avoid the fate of annihilation. "When the national crisis reaches its most critical moment," Mao pointed out in a speech to the party, "split will take place within the enemy's (Chiang's KMT) camp ... Now it is the eve of great changes. The task of our Party is to unite the activities of the Red Army with that of the workers, peasants, students, petty-bourgeoisie and nationalist bourgeoisie and build a united front of national revolution."[5] The Chinese Communists, by so doing, were also following the line set by the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International. In January 1936 and later, Mao appealed to Chiang that if the KMT would stop fighting the CCP and start resisting the Japanese, "we are prepared to form a strong revolutionary united front with you as was the

case during the Great Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927, ...[That] is the only way to save our country today."[6]

Chiang ignored the offer. What he still believed was that internal pacification must be achieved first before he was able to do anything else. In regard to the resistance to the Japanese invasion, the Generalissimo had not much confidence at all. "Not only do we not have the necessary military weapon, but our economic, educational and political machinery---each fundamental for modern warfare---is not ready for a conflict with a modern state like Japan."[7] Those who insisted on resistance Chiang accused of "living in a fool's paradise."[8] What he counted on now was the interference from other powers. "[U]nless she [Japan] can completely subdue all the various Powers on interests in the Pacific, she cannot attain her objective of absorbing China and domination China."[9] The united front offer by the CCP, he thought, was aimed at forcing his government into "a premature war against Japan so that the Communists might gather strength enough to overthrow the government."[10]

Although Chiang, as the head of the Nationalist government, was unwilling to accept the idea of the united front, many others in China were eager to reach that goal. Some of these people were even high ranking government officials and military officers. In Sian, where the "Bandit Suppression Commission" was located, the commanding officers, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang of the Tung Pei (Northeast, or Manchurian) Army and General Yang Hu-cheng of the Hsi Pei (Northwest) Army, had already reached an actual

truce with the Red Army that they were supposed to destroy. They kept urging Chiang to give up the war against fellow Chinese and take up the defense against Japan. Angered by his generals' disobedience, Chiang flew to Sian in early December 1936 to see his sixth anti-Communist campaign carried out. Chang and Yang, upon his arrival, simply rebelled and captured their Commander-in-Chief on December 12. In a circular telegram sent to the government and across the country, the rebels demanded the reorganization of the government to allow all other parties' participation, a guarantee of liberty for the people, an end of civil war, and a policy of armed resistance against the Japanese.

The Communists answered positively and immediately. Their representative, Chou En-lai, went to Sian in a great hurry. Conferences among the CCP, the rebels, and Chiang started and later was jointed by the representatives from the government in Nanking (W.H. Donald, Chiang's Australian advisor, Mme Chiang, and T.V. Soong, Chiang's brother-in-law). Faced with intense pressure from all around, the involuntary guest, Chiang, agreed to the demands of the rebels and the Communists. However, it took Chou En-lai several days before he could persuade the lower-ranking officers among the rebels to agree that, apart from the Generalissimo, China had no one at the time capable of leading the country and it was in the country's best interest to release Chiang.[11] As the result of the conferences, an understanding was reached, though there had never been any formal agreement signed by the government and

the CCP.[12] In 1937 the Red Army was incorporated into the government troops as the Eighth Route Army (later renamed the Eighteenth Group Army), and the Communist-controlled areas were designated as the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. On September 22, 1937, the CCP formally dissolved the Soviet Republic and pledged its adherence to the Three Principles of the People of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Republic. Thus, the United Front against Japan finally was born, though both the CCP and the KMT demonstrated their wish that the other side should sincerely follow its own pledges.[13]

By that time the Japanese had moved deeper into China's interior after their initial successes at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lu Gou Qiao). The Chinese government troops, many of which were merely lately organized former warlords' armies, proved no match for the invaders. With the collapse of the KMT government's control over the areas invaded, a power vacuum was left, especially in the countryside of Northern China. It was this vacuum that the Eighth Route Army moved into. Following Mao's instructions on guerilla warfare strategy,[14] the Communist troops succeeded behind the enemy's line in restoring order and unity as well as setting up the "resistance base" areas with strong Communist control. In most cases, the Japanese could only control big cities and narrow strips along the major communication lines. Though they had tried many "mopping-up" operations against the Communists and other resistant forces, they could not improve their situation significantly. The Eighth

Route Army, wherever it went, always carried out the policy of mobilizing the masses in the resistant movement. They organized the peasants into guerrilla units and a local self-defense corps. Even women and children were encouraged to form their own organizations. Local governments were set up again with predominantly Communist influence, if not total control. By 1938, the Communist troops held the dominant military power only next to the Japanese in many parts of North China.[15]

On the government side, the situation was deteriorating. Forced to abandon much of the country's territory, the coastal cities and rich provinces, the KMT had also lost its power base, the country's major industry, transportation facilities, and many other resources. The numerous problems caused by the war, as well as by the inefficiency of the government, refugees, inflation, hoarding and corruption of every kind in the government, had put Chiang's government at a tremendous disadvantage. The high degree of devotion, discipline and hope among the lower-ranking civil servants and other groups of people gradually gave way to the increasing growth of cynicism.[16] Only the hatred against the Japanese helped the government to maintain its control over the part of the country that had not yet been occupied by the invaders.[17]

While the war progressed, the united front experienced ups and downs. Chiang had never forgotten his major goal of wiping out the Communists. The expansion of the Communists' influence and actual control behind the Japanese lines

worried him even more. Not only might the danger of the Communists' power stay after the Japanese were defeated, but the demand for democracy in the KMT-controlled areas would threaten his one-party rule. Skirmishes between the Communist troops and the Nationalist troops had never stopped. In 1941 the KMT troops even trapped and wiped out almost a whole Communist Army, the New Fourth Army, in southern Anhui in the name of enforcing military discipline and punishing insubordination. A new and more strict military blockade was put up again around the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. The two sides attacked each other militarily and verbally. The Communists' protests about the KMT assaults upon their troops, according to the U. S. Army observers, were "usually devoid of obvious propaganda distortion," while the Koumintang accusations against the Communists were "so full of obvious mis-statements that it frequently becomes impossible to distinguish between the grain of truth among the mass of falsehood."[18] This development began to lead more and more foreign observers to put more trust in the words in the CCP. It also diverted more of the people's sympathy from the Nationalist government to the Communists. The united front was not dead only because the Japanese were still there punching the two "united" foes.

The situation in the battlefields also worried Chiang. The government's insistence on position warfare in front of the Japanese offensive had exposed the very weak point of the Chinese troops. Lack of heavy weapons and air and

artillery support could only result in Chinese defeat in front of the technologically superior Japanese troops. The Nationalist troops were composed of those who were loyal to him personally as well as former warlord armies and other local forces. Conflict among these troops had never ceased. Chiang's playing favoritism could only hinder them from performing better. Those generals who were not Chiang's favorites were unhappy to see their own troops wiped out by the Japanese, while those loyal and close to Chiang got the most support and supplies. Sometimes they just quit fighting and retreated with their poorly-equipped and poorly-fed soldiers. Desertion and death because of malnutrition, illness, and officers' abuses rather than battle casualties reduced the strength of the armies at an alarming rate. Moreover, the government policy of "conscription by seizure" could only drive the vast masses of Chinese peasants away from the government. By late 1941, the Nationalist government's effective control was centered deep in the country's interior, with its troops mostly staying at inactive positions facing the Japanese.

When the Japanese bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, Churchill claimed the war would be won. In China many people also had the same feeling but in a different sense. "Pearl Harbor Day in America was Armistice day here," wrote American journalist Theodore White from China. Many people, especially Nationalist government officials, "felt that they need only wait until the enemy crumbled before American strength."[19] Immediately after the Japanese attack on the

United States, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent his message to the American President: "To our now common battle we offer all we are and all we have to stand with you until the Pacific and the world are freed from the curse of brute force and endless perfidy."[20] President Roosevelt, in his answer, expressed his praise of the "valiant struggle of resistance" the Chinese people had carried on for four and a half years against Japan. He also reminded the Generalissimo that "the struggle cannot be easily or quickly brought to a successful end." But he took pride in his country's association with China and Chiang himself.[21] A new alliance was born. Before the end of the year, the U.S. and Britain had proposed to China that Chiang become Supreme Commander of a United Nations' "China Theater." The happy Generalissimo agreed. But he also asked the United States to send him a high-ranking officer to serve as his Chief-of-Staff. General Joseph Stilwell was nominated and soon accepted by the Chinese government.

General Stilwell was an excellent soldier who had the full confidence of Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall, Army Chief-of-Staff. His experience as a military man, a language officer, a commanding officer of the U. S. force in Tientsin, China, and American military attache to China had given him first-hand knowledge of the country. His impatience with inefficiency had earned him the nickname "Vinegar Joe," but his knowledge of the Chinese language, his friendship for the Chinese people, as well as his persistence in carrying out his orders as a soldier, made him

the ideal person to go to China.[22] However, General Stilwell's mission was complicated. He was going to serve as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Joint (Allied) Chief of Staff for the China Theater, Commanding General of the U. S. forces in the China-Burma-India Theater, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, Commanding General of the Chinese Expeditionary Army in India, and its Field Commander in Burma. Besides all this, he was also going to supervise the lend-lease supplies to China and to assist in improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army that the Americans believed not to be an effective fighting force at all.[23]

This was a tremendously difficult task. To make things even more difficult, the Allied Grand Strategy put this theater almost the lowest on the list of war priority. The CBI Theater, as Secretary Stimson recalled, "was a poor third," far behind the other theaters of the Anglo-American Grand Strategy of fighting Germany first and the "amphibious movement" across the Pacific to destroy Japan. "Strategically the objective of American policy.. was to keep China in the war and so to strengthen her that she might exact a constantly growing price from the Japanese invader."[24] The American policy makers also realized that China's staying in the war meant pinning down a large number of Japanese troops that otherwise could become major obstacles for the American war efforts in the Pacific. So support to China was important, pointed out Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff of the President: "The strategic and political significance of

China was of enormous importance" to the United States. "The possibility of striking military and political success at a remarkable low cost" could be realized if a strong and friendly China emerged from the war, because such a friendly nation would serve as a power balancer in the Far East in favor of the United States.[25]

Unfortunately, this policy design was born with defects. To promote China into a Great Power to help protect American interests in Asia meant that China must be strong in material terms. However, its status as "a poor third" on the list of the Allied war priorities meant that only meager resources could go to the CBI theater and even less go to China. Furthermore, policy makers in Washington had never realized the complexity of Chinese politics and had hardly been aware of the magnitude of the task of turning China into a Great Power. General Stilwell was left to deal with all those difficulties. To carry out this policy, Stilwell, more than any other American Theater Commander, required "the constant and vigorous political support of his own government," as Secretary Stimson commented. But "less than any other Commanders did he get it."[26]

In March 1942, General Stilwell arrived in his theater, just in time to assume command over the American and Chinese forces in Burma to fight the campaign against the Japanese Spring Offensive. By May the advancing Japanese troops had broken all the Allied defenses and cut the last ground line of communication between China and the rest of the world.

The only communication line left was the so-called "Hump" airline over the highest mountains in the world. The newly arrived general was so angry and humiliated that he wrote down in his diary that "through stupidity, fear, and the defensive attitude we have lost a grand chance to slap the Japs back." The basic reason, Stilwell was convinced, was "Chiang Kai-shek's meddling," secret orders to his troops under Stilwell's command to the effect that they would often ignore the American's "little authority."[27] To carry out his orders from Washington, "to support China," Stilwell suggested to the Chinese as well as to the British and American governments that certain reforms be carried out to turn the Chinese armies into an effective fighting force. He proposed that an elite force of about thirty divisions be reorganized with full strength. American personnel and lend-lease supplies would be used to keep these divisions well-fed, well-trained, and competently led.[28] With an Allied offensive to retake Burma and reopen the line into China, with this elite force and even more American-trained and American-armed troops, Stilwell believed, China would become strong enough to fight Japan.

His proposal met no objection and even received some positive response from his superiors. However, there was no action taken. No supplies and manpower could be shared from the higher priority theaters except the President's word that "we intend to keep at it."[29] Stilwell was left alone to employ whatever resources he had on hand to perform his duties in Asia. Within his own Theater, Stilwell also had a

hard time carrying out his plan. He had to, as Theodore White described, "urge, plead, threaten and beg" both the English and the Chinese over whom he had only nominal authority. The Chinese, realizing that there would no large number of Allied troops to take part in the Burma campaign, were not willing to commit themselves. The British, on the other hand, were more concerned about defending India and had no more enthusiasm than the Chines in the plan to retake Burma.

The plan to reform the Chinese armies met no better fate. Immediately Stilwell found himself fighting against great odds. His plan meant a thorough shake-up of a system that probably had the most complicated network of relations involving feudalist tradition, warlord heritage, and personal loyalty, as well as profound political implications. Chiang's policy of governing by fear and favor, a policy of balancing powers among former warlords, local forces and his own elite divisions made it difficult, if not totally impossible, for anyone to reform it. The Generalissimo himself knew it best. An independent armed force, as Stilwell had proposed, would fundamentally upset the balance of power within Chinese politics. He was not totally unreasonable to be reluctant to move in Stilwell's direction. Many people have commented that Chiang lost one of the best chances to strengthen his forces, which could have been of great help for him to reunify China after the war and had an upper hand over his Communist opponents.[30] But if such measures as Stilwell proposed had been carried out, it might

have meant that Chiang could lose control before he had a chance to unify his country. It was not a surprise to see Stilwell, frustrated almost all the time, complain, "We are doing our damnedest to help him, and he makes his approach look like a tremendous concession."[31] However, against great odds, General Stilwell and his staff managed to set up a framework for the training programs by the spring of 1943. In spite of this progress, the Generalissimo was not much interested. He was looking away from the reform programs and becoming interested in some other ways to win the war. What appealed to him was the air power in the war.

The Commander of the Fourteenth U.S. Air Force in China, Major General Claire L. Chennault, had a different approach in fighting the war in China. Since 1937, the year he officially retired from the U. S. Army as a captain, Chennault had volunteered to serve China and helped found the famous American Volunteers Group (AVG, better known as the Flying Tigers). As a career airman and a close friend to both Generalissimo Chiang and his wife, Mme Chiang, the General believed that air power itself could stop and finally destroy the enemy at much lower cost in manpower and materials. In his message to Stilwell, he claimed that with a total of 500 bombers and fighters plus 100 transports, and with full authority, he would accept full responsibility for attainment of Allied war objectives in the theater. These objectives included: to destroy Japanese war material, help MacArthur's movement, inspire the Chinese forces to action, neutralize the Japanese threat to India, safeguard the

Allied transport line to China, and supply a successful offensive.[32] In his letter to President Roosevelt, he told his Commander-in-Chief that he needed only 105 fighters, 30 medium bombers and 12 heavy bombers to "accomplish the downfall of Japan."[33] Such a statement would sound like aimless boasting today. In the early 1940s, however, air power had quite a few admirers, including the American President himself. The brilliant performance of the 14th Air Force over China, despite a lack of supplies, had deeply impressed President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang. Both were considering how to reach their own objectives--for Roosevelt, to give the European Theater the top priority and at the same time keep China in the war; for Chiang, to win the war without significant changes in his power system.

At the Trident Conference in Washington during May 1943, President Roosevelt took every chance to repeat his emphasis that "the Allied Nations must not be put in the position of being responsible for the collapse of China" in the face of Churchill's lukewarm attitude toward the Burma campaign. He finally succeeded in convincing the British that the goal of keeping China in the war against Japan and treating her as a Great Power was necessary for the Allied victory.[34] Both Stilwell and Chennault had their chance to argue for their own plans. Stilwell insisted on the necessity of building up the Chinese ground forces while Chennault, with the approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, fought hard to gain maximum support for his air plan. The decision reached at the conference reduced the scale of

the Burma campaign. President Roosevelt also gave the green light to Chennault's air plan over Stilwell's army reform plan. The 14th Air Force would receive first priority on supplies flown into China over the "Hump," further reducing the resources Stilwell could use for his programs.

The War Department advised against Chennault's plan, pointing out that the air raids might well provoke the Japanese to launch an offensive to take the American air bases in China while the ability of the Chinese troops to defend these bases was really doubtful. But the President did not rule in favor of Stilwell in the end. Roosevelt simply told General Marshall, "Chennault should have his chance to do what he believes he can do."[35] However, it soon became obvious that the Allied resources in the CBI Theater were far from sufficient to support Chennault's air offensive while preparing for the offensive to retake Burma and, later, supporting the B-29 bombers that would attack Japan from the air bases in China.

Stilwell knew that he was handicapped by all these obstacles, but he did not give up easily. In a memo that he sent to the Generalissimo and the War Department, Stilwell presented his detailed plan for the reforms of the Chinese armies. He admitted that it was "a radical procedure"---he even recommended the firing of Chiang's many ineffective high-ranking officers so that the Chinese troops could become more like a fighting force. But he also emphasized that "without it, or something similar, the Chinese Army cannot be expected to pay [sic] its part" and it would be

"impossible for China to take her responsibility in undertaking major operations on the East Asiatic continent."[36] However, this attempt to press Chiang to move forward only caused more suspicion from the Chinese. Some even suggested Stilwell's recall from the CBI Theater. It took the mediation of President Roosevelt's representative, Brehon B. Somervell, to help reconcile the Generalissimo and the American general.[37] Realizing he could do little to influence anything in China, where Chiang continued to ignore the advice of his Chief of Staff personally and officially, Stilwell turned most of his attention to the Burma battlefield.[38]

In November 1943 the three Allies, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang, met at Cairo to discuss their common strategy. Accompanying his Chinese superior, General Stilwell also went to the conference and tried again to convince the Allied leaders of the necessity of a Burma offensive. He was only partially successful. The three allies agreed upon his plan for the campaign in which the British would land on the southern Burma coast and the Chinese would go down across the Salween River into Burma from the north while Stilwell and his American-trained Chinese troops would go through the Burma jungle to drive a way into China. But President Roosevelt paid little attention to Stilwell's plan of army reforms in China, although he promised (without any "definite commitment") that the United States would try to equip ninety Chinese divisions.[39] The Generalissimo was quite happy when he left

Cairo for home.

Things did not turn out as planned. When President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill went on to Teheran to meet their Russian ally, Marshal Stalin, for another conference, the plan for the Burma offensive fell into trouble. The British had never been really interested in a Burma campaign, which they thought could only tie down badly needed troops and achieve little or nothing for the British interests. Churchill was primarily interested in his plan to hit the "soft belly" of Europe, the Balkans. Marshal Stalin, on the other hand, insisted that there should be no more delay in opening "the Second Front," a cross-channel invasion into Europe (Operation Overlord). Taking the Soviet leader's promise to enter the war in Asia as a cause, Churchill argued that the Burma campaign could only be a diversion from the main effort in Europe, because the amphibious assault on the European continent needed more landing crafts to guarantee its success. After heated arguments between the Americans and the English, President Roosevelt finally allowed himself to be dissuaded to abandon his support for "Buccaneer" (the code name for the amphibious operation of Burma Campaign). Again, Stilwell was left alone to explain to his Chinese superior the dramatic reversal.[40]

The reaction of the Chinese leader was predictable. In his message to President Roosevelt, Chiang stated that such a decision had made his task "in rallying the nation to continue resistance...infinitely difficult." The General-

issimo continued to say that with the deteriorating military and economic situation, "it would be impossible for us to hold on for six months." Therefore, he insisted, the only solution was a one-billion dollar loan from the United States, "to strengthen China's economic strength and to relieve her dire economic needs." At the same time, the air forces in China (both Chinese and American) should double the numbers of their planes and have at least 20,000 tons of monthly supplies flown into China.[41] Chiang had repeatedly claimed that China would "bear an equal share of the war burden" and "not fall short of our allies expectation," especially after the United States and Great Britain ended their unequal treaties with China and relinquished their extraterritorial rights since late 1942.[42] But what the Nationalist government did had made its allies feel that most of the Chinese officials had adopted the attitude that "China had already done her part" and "America must help her faithful ally."[43]

Ever since the War started in 1937, significant enough assistance only came from the Soviet Union. Besides the two hundred million dollar credits during the period from 1937 to 1939, war supplies and even "volunteer" pilots came from the Soviet Union to China's help. Such aid came to an end only when Russia itself was under attack from Germany and Stalin felt too busy to help his Chinese friends. The United States had provided no real help until the end of 1940 when Washington granted one hundred million dollars in credits to China and Chennault's Flying Tigers was

organized.[44] Although President Roosevelt promised help to China after Lend-Lease became law in Spring 1941, a shortage of goods and the "Europe first" policy kept this promise from being honored.[45] By the time the United States got into the war, most of the assistance had gone to Europe, $1.5 billion to Europe as compared to $2.6 million to China.[46]

The Nationalist government turned out to be "a poor manager," as Arthur Young, Generalissimo Chiang's American advisor on economy, pointed out. It failed to carry out badly needed land reform and other reforms in the government system, "as the conservative elements were in power or close to the center of power." The wealthy class and civil and military officials had borne "far less than a fair share of the burden of the war."[47] Mounting corruption in every level of the government and out-of-control inflation made the Americans hesitate to grant financial assistance. Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador to China, pointed out clearly that "the government...is itself closely allied to banking and land holding interests so that any promise of clear-up campaign or reform would most probably become airy talks." Even Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of Finance and an early, enthusiastic supporter of China, doubted the honesty and efficiency of the Nationalist government. In his diary, he sighed that to give more money to the Chinese Nationalist government was "just like throw it away." To a comment like this, President Roosevelt could only answer, "I know but it is a question of face saving."[48] Though always sympathetic

with China in its war against Japan, the Finance Secretary concluded that without effective management, any more American assistance could "have had little effect except to give additional profits to insiders, speculators and hoarders."[49]

Chiang's requests did not force the United States to send in more assistance. The Allied objectives in Asia had been that "the main effort against Japan" and all other activities should support the first priority (Overlord), the supreme operation for 1944.[50] The Allied island-hopping campaign had also reduced the importance of China in the whole scene. Roosevelt's reply to Chiang's requests made it clear that the best the United States could do was to aid in the opening of a land line of communications to China. The United States would try to bring as many as supplies as it could to China, provided that the Allied troops in the CBI theater (meaning, the Chinese troops in Burma) could stop Japan's attempt to interrupt the airline over the "Hump." From then on, the American President began to show the tendency that he was leaning more toward Stilwell's, rather than Chennault-Chiang's, plan. He began to feel that China "must take the offensive in return for the Lend-Lease she had received."[51]

The Generalissimo's answer was generally negative. He refused to commit the Chinese Yoke Force (in Yunnan) if there was no Allied amphibious operation in southern Burma. But at last he agreed to give Stilwell the complete command of the X-Force (trained by the Americans in India) and allow

him to use it as the general saw fit.[52]

Stilwell went on with the reduced North Burma campaign without British landing. From January to June 1944, he was in the jungle personally commanding the Chinese troops he had trained in their assault upon the Japanese. For this he was criticized by the British and the Chinese, but to the General it was useless to argue with either. He felt it was more important to prod the Chinese troops to victory than to argue their worth in conferences. The progress in battle was impressive during the winter. For the first time, the Chinese troops had launched an offensive and succeeded. In his diary the American general proudly wrote: "Anyway I think I have proved that the Chinese can fight, and you many remember haw many people agreed with me on this point."[53]

But the progress was gradually bogged down by the monsoon rains and the stubborn resistance of the Japanese. The Generalissimo's reluctance to use his Y-force to attack from the North caused President Roosevelt to become more demanding of the Chinese. In message after message, the American President urged the Chinese leader to act. It had become obvious that Roosevelt had taken the quid pro quo approach proposed by Stilwell and Marshall. This change in the Americans' attitude might also reflect their belief that the Generalissimo's threat of dropping out of the war was but a bluff, for "China had too much to gain from the United States and nothing to gain and everything to lose by making peace with Japan."[54] The Americans insisted that the Chinese must "take definite aggressive action" with the

Lend-Lease credits and air support they obtained from the United States.[55]

By the time (April 1944) Chiang finally sent his Yoke-Force across the Salween River into Burma to Stilwell's aid, the Japanese had already started their ICHIGO operation, a campaign aimed at capturing the American air bases in East China and fighting to connect the Japanese-controlled areas from North China to the South, thus cutting China in half.[56] The Chinese forces that were supposed to stop the Japanese just collapsed, retreating further into the interior. Remembering years of abuse by the military, many Chinese peasants rose against their own armies and disarmed them by the thousands. From April to June the Japanese kept advancing at will and quickly moved to their objectives in East China. Some American air bases were abandoned, others were under serious threat. The poor performance of the Chinese armies, the supply problem of the Fourteenth Air Force, and the complex commanding problems among the Chinese troops just made effective resistance impossible. "Subsequent events had proved Stilwell to be right," General Marshall later commented.[57]

The development of the situation confirmed Stilwell's opinion about the Chinese armies and the government: a thorough reform was a must. A similar opinion was also held by Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador to China. Both men concluded that the crises in the field could not be solved by American aid alone and it was only the "end result of an almost total breakdown of principle, administration, and

policy in the Chungking government." They agreed that America was justified in its effort to demand "sweeping reforms within China in the name of the join war against the Japanese."[58] Stilwell even went further to point out that the "trouble is the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek. The only thing that keeps the country split is his fear of losing control."[59] Everyone knew that the Generalissimo was trading "space for time," the general remarked, "but he just can't see that the mass of Chinese people welcome the Reds as being the only visible hope of relief from crushing taxation, the abuse of the Army and [the terror of] Taili's Gestapo."[60] The American general regarded the Communist programs to "reduce taxes, rents and interests, raise production and standards of living, make possible the people's participation in government, and practice what they preach" as too sharp a contrast to the KMT's corruption, neglect, chaos, taxes, hoarding black market, and trading with the enemy.[61]

General Stilwell knew clearly that while the Japanese were rolling over East China and the Generalissimo was threatening to withdraw his Y-force from the Burma campaign, there were hundreds of thousands of government troops, some of the best in China, in the Northwest with the task of watching the Communists. This angered Stilwell. From time to time, he urged his Chinese superior to give sufficient supplies to the Communist troops and put them into effective fighting.[62] Although by this time the Generalissimo had claimed that the Chinese Communist problem was a purely

political problem and should be solved by political means,[63] he never let his political opponent loose for a moment. Stilwell's requests only fell on deaf ears. The American general had to turn to his own government for help and he got it.

In June 1944, President Roosevelt sent Vice-President Henry Wallace to China to urge the Nationalist government to lift the blockade against the Communists so that the two sides, the Communists and the Nationalists, would fight Japan rather than one another. The American President was happy to be "arbiters between the warring factions" and he told his Vice-President to "knock their heads together... and settle everything."[64] But after a few days of conferences, Chiang only evidenced a lukewarm response to the American urging. Though he would not consider America's participation in the KMT-CCP conflict as meddling in China's internal affairs, he warned that he had known the Communists too well and "they (the Communists) were not men of good faith---their signature no good." If President Roosevelt insisted on doing that, Chiang said, his prestige would probably suffer a great loss.[65] After listening to the Generalissimo, Wallace concluded that Chiang's charges were "full of bitter feelings [against the Communists] and poor logic" and the Chinese Nationalist government feared that reforms would "upset the status quo balance of power in China." The American Vice-President began to feel that "they [the Nationalists] would almost prefer to lose the war rather than to see the old Chinese system upset in any

way."[66] If the Americans were not prepared to "accept the loss of China as a base from which to support U. S. operation in the Pacific," Wallace told the President, "determined steps" must be taken to stop the steady deterioration of the East China situation.[67] Wallace also reported the bad relations between the Chinese leader and General Stilwell, as well as Chiang's intention to remove Stilwell and to have a special emissary become a liaison official between the American President and himself.[68]

But the situation in China in June 1944 was in such bad shape that President Roosevelt did not want to back down from supporting his general. Based on the proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially that of General Marshall, Roosevelt informed the Generalissimo on July 6:

> I think I am fully aware of your feeling regarding General Stilwell, nevertheless I think he has clearly demonstrated his farsighted judgement, his skill in organization and training and, above all, in fighting your Chinese forces. I know of no other man who has the ability, the force, and the determination to offset the disaster which now threatens China and our over-all plan for the conquest of Japan. ... I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American forces, and that you charge his with the full responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's advances. I feel that the case of China is so desperate that if radical and properly applied remedies are not immediately effected, our common cause will suffer a disastrous set-back.[69]

It would be hard for Chiang to give in to such a demand, as anyone who had some knowledge about Chinese politics would recognize. With deep nationalistic, if not ultra-nationalist, passion and knowing too well the

complexity of the Chinese power struggle, Chiang was preoccupied with the idea of keeping himself in power at any cost. To let a foreigner whom he did not trust take over the command of all the Chinese troops (which meant his political adversaries, the Communists, would be included) and be satisfied with the status of a figurehead was unimaginable to Chiang. As a survivor of the power struggle in twentieth century China, Chiang knew that power without the backing of guns was not power at all. If he surrendered command to Stilwell, who had openly challenged the power balance he had tried all his life to hold, it simply meant to give up his own career. His life-long experience also told him that the final competition for him was between his government and the Communists, not the war against Japan; he also believed that the war was won already when the United States became involved after Pearl Harbor.[70]

The factor of personality conflict also had its role in this struggle. Conservative as he was, Chiang had tried hard to maintain his reputation as a defender of Chinese tradition with its close connection with Confucianism. It was hard for him to accept Stilwell's straightforward criticism, "uncooperative attitude," and his lack of respect for Chiang's authority. Although Stilwell may have thought what he did with Chiang had always been "on a impersonal and official basis" and their differences were just on questions of tactics and strategy, Chiang was too much a traditionalist to agree with that. The demand was especially hard to swallow, because China had just been "promoted" to a "Great

Power" and Chiang himself was so proud to become one of the "Big Four;" he had always considered himself a far-sighted military genius and claimed to have single-handed led the war against Japan for more than four years before any help came.[71]

Chiang's reply was a typical reflection of his character. Never refusing any of Roosevelt's demands, the Generalissimo said that he "fully agree with the principle" of the American demands. However, he felt that "there must be a preparatory period in order to enable General Stilwell to have absolute command of the Chinese troops without any hindrance." He also asked Roosevelt to send him an "influential personal representative" to collaborate with him and adjust his relations with General Stilwell.[72] President Roosevelt was generally happy with this answer and urged Chiang to speed up the procedures agreed upon. At the President's urging, Chiang, in his July 23 memo, again accepted "in principle" the American demands. But this time he laid down some more specific conditions: 1) The Chinese Communist troops must agree to obey the Central government's orders before they could be under Stilwell's command; 2) Stilwell's relationship with the Generalissimo must be clearly defined and 3) the distribution of the lend-lease supplies should be placed entirely under Chiang's authority.[73]

The situation in the East China battlefield made the Americans decide to quicken the settlement of Stilwell's command problem. In early August, Hengyang, an important

Chinese stronghold and airfield, fell to Japan. The Nationalist government failed to organize any successful resistance to stop the Japanese. The fall of Hengyang made the allies worry about whether the victorious Japanese would advance to capture all the major air bases and even the Chinese wartime capital, Chungking. To meet Chiang's demand for a special presidential representative, putting his other demands away for the time being, Secretary of War Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General Marshall began their effort to find the "right person" for the job under the President's instructions. It did not take long before they picked out General Patrick J. Hurley.

It seemed that everybody thought that Hurley was the right choice. Stimson and Hurley had been colleagues in the Hoover Administration, the former as Secretary of State and the latter as Secretary of War. Their relations had always been good. Hurley's relations with the military were not bad; many of its members, including General MacArthur and General Eisenhower, had served under him when he was Secretary of War. President Roosevelt himself also had "much confidence in Hurley's reliability in accurately carrying out the duties assigned to him in the foreign field," as Admiral Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff during the war, noted in his diary.[74] The President's son, Elliott Roosevelt, held the same opinion, saying that his father wished "he had more people like Pat on whom he could depend."[75] The President, as some historians pointed out, might have believed that Hurley's prestige as a former

Secretary of War and his "vibrant extraverted personality" could help to reduce the tension between two strong characters, Chiang and Stilwell.[76] Hurley's successful bargaining with the Mexican Government on the issue of the American oil properties in Mexico may also have led Roosevelt to believe that Hurley was good at the negotiation table. His 1943 trip to China in arranging Chiang Kai-shek's presence in the Cairo Conference had left a good impression on the Chinese leader. When Hurley's name was formally presented to Chiang on August 10, the Generalissimo did not hesitate to give his approval. General Stilwell was also pleased with Hurley's nomination. In his reply to General Marshall, he even commented, "It takes oil as well as vinegar to make good French dressing."[77]

III. THE STILWELL AFFAIRS

On August 18, 1944, Hurley received from the President his formal directive:

> You are hereby designated as my personal representative with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, reporting directly to me. Your principle mission is to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell to facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of Command over the Chinese armies under his direction. You would be charged with additional and specific missions.[1]

The brief directive did not specify what "additional and specific missions" were, nor did it reflect the actual contents of the talk between the President and his special representative on that day. Later events would prove that the "additional" mission besides promoting harmonious relations between Chiang and Stilwell would become the major and the most controversial part of Hurley's mission to China. However, it was clear from Hurley's own statement that he was indeed assigned other duties during his talk with the President. One of these duties was to facilitate military unity, that is, between the Nationalists and the Communists, in an effort to fight Japan more effectively. Hurley later stated that he and the President had decided on a formula about this unity. The formula demonstrated clearly that because the Chinese Communists were aiming at the overthrow of the Nationalist Government to which the

United States had placed its support, lend-lease material could not be used to arm the Communists unless and until Chiang and his government were acknowledged.[2] But it is doubtful that this formula was really reached at that time. No other document could support or deny Hurley's statement, because many of the President's oral instructions had no written records. However, one thing is clear. During the talk, the two men agreed that on Hurley's way to China he should stop at Moscow and confer with the Soviet leaders to discover their attitude and probably shed some new light on the solution of CCP-KMT conflict.

Hurley also received a memo from the State Department on August 24, which described Vice-President Wallace's recent trip to China and his major findings about the situation there. Besides the suggestion of sending an American Army intelligence group to North China (the CCP-controlled areas) and the reconstruction in China, Wallace emphasized the importance of improving relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese government as well as between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists. John Vincent, the State Department official who sent the memo to Hurley, wished good luck to the new special envoy to China.[3]

Hurley was accompanied by Donald Nelson, former head of the War Production Board. President Roosevelt sent Nelson mainly to study the economic situation in China and to suggest any possible policy to help postwar reconstruction. The two special representatives arrived in Moscow on August 30 and immediately started their conference with the Russian

leaders. After the exchange of pleasantries with Vyacheslav Michailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the two Americans stated the purpose of their mission to China and their President's request that they explain it to the Russian allies. They also told Molotov that President Roosevelt had asked them to speak frankly with him and explain "anything he desired to know." Then the two sides turned their attention to the question of how to bring about China's internal unity so as to serve the purpose of winning the war as quickly as possible. When asked for advice on the unification of China, the Soviet Commissar replied that it was difficult for him to judge from Moscow and only studies on the spot could be of real help. It seemed that he was reluctant to express his opinion directly at first. His only comment was that "the Soviet Government could bear no responsibility for internal affairs or developments in China for which it at times has been unjustifiably held responsible."[4]

But on the issue of Communists, the Soviet Commissar expressed his idea that would bear heavily upon his American guests to the extent he had never expected. Molotov pointed out that in parts of China people were suffering from extreme poverty and starvation and living a miserable life. "They called themselves 'Communists' but they had no relation whatsoever to Communism. They expressed their displeasure at their economic condition by calling themselves 'communists,' but once their economic conditions were improved they would forget they were 'communists'." The

Commissar continued that if the United States assisted these unfortunate people there would be fewer "communists" in China. According to Molotov, the key to the entire problem in China was to improve the economic situation, and Chiang's government must work better to understand its people. He was sure once Hurley and Nelson became acquainted with the situation they would be convinced that he was correct.[5] The talk with the Russian leaders left a deep impression on Hurley. Molotov's comment that the Chinese Communists were not real communists but some economically dissatisfied people would stay almost all through his stay in China. From time to time, Hurley would call Mao and his followers "the so-called communists." His later remarks and actions in dealing with the Chinese internal conflict between the CCP and the KMT all showed that he was confident that the Chinese Communists were just seekers of better economic conditions. Such a group of people, without Soviet support, would easily become responsive to his proposals of co-operation with the Nationalist government. This judgment proved fatal to his later efforts in bringing the Communists and the Nationalists together.

Hurley and Nelson arrived in India in early September. Accompanied by General Stilwell, they headed for Chungking and arrived there on September 6, 1944. With a minimum of ceremony, they immediately plunged into the negotiations the next day. The Generalissimo was pleased to see the American President's personal representatives. He told Hurley that he would comply with President Roosevelt's proposals and

give General Stilwell the command of all Chinese forces. Hurley replied that President Roosevelt hoped that Stilwell would have the Generalissimo's full authority and confidence to take the commanding post. Chiang agreed but added, as he told the Americans earlier, that any Communists who would serve under the American General must submit first to his (Chiang's) control.[6]

After the first conference with the Generalissimo, Hurley and Stilwell prepared an agenda for the coming negotiation on September 8. The agenda, which they presented to the Chinese on September 12, consisted of ten points:

1) The paramount objective of Chinese-American collaboration is to bring about a unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the liberation of China.
2) To cooperate with China in bringing about closer relations and harmony with Russia and Britain for the support of the Chinese objectives.
3) The unification of all military forces under the Command of the Generalissimo.
4) The marshaling of all resources in China for war purposes.
5) Support efforts of Generalissimo for the political unification of China on democratic basis.[7]
6) Submit present and postwar economic plans for China.
7) Definition of the powers of General Stilwell as Field Commander.
8) Definition of General Stilwell's power as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo.
9) Prepare for presentation a diagram of command.
10) Discuss future control of lend-lease in China.[8]

Hurley was optimistic about the good start and the progress he was making. On the same day he sent President Roosevelt his first progress report. With great confidence he told the President that Chiang was already prepared to give Stilwell "actual command of all forces in the field in

China...and his complete confidence," though he also admitted that some "details" remained to be ironed out. About the Communist problem Hurley also showed his optimism. When he noticed Chiang's deep concern about the Reds, Hurley immediately told the Generalissimo that his talk with the Russian leaders had demonstrated that Russia was not giving support to the "so-called communists." He assured the Chinese leader that the Russians had told him the "so-called communists" were not communists at all and the Soviet Union desired "more cordial relations" with China. However, Hurley noticed that Chiang was not convinced and that "the G'mo still seems skeptical regarding the Communists and stated definitely that any so-called communist troops serving under Stilwell would have to submit definitely to the control of the Generalissimo and the National Military Council" and "this condition would be a primary requirement for the unification of command and would apply to all forces in China." But it appeared that Hurley did not realize any potential problems regarding Chiang's emphasis on this issue. Maybe he considered it another one of the "details" he could "iron out" soon. "There is a good prospect for unification of command in China and G'mo shows a definite tendency to comply with your wishes," he told the President at the end of the report.[9]

While the negotiations in Chungking continued, the situation in the battlefield became serious. In East China, the Japanese were carrying out the second phase of their ICHIGO campaign. After capturing Hengyang, they continued

to drive southward. At the same time, the Japanese occupying Canton in the south also began their movement northward. The attempt was apparent: They wanted to pincer out the Fourteenth Air Force's air bases at Kweilin and Liuchow that were located between the two marching columns. The Chinese resistance was not successful at all. Some of the troops continued to retreat without any serious fighting, in many cases to conserve themselves "for the future." The Fourteenth Air Force fought bravely, but by early September, Japanese fighter reinforcements from the homeland had provided enough air cover for their troops and supply lines. As the Chief of Staff of the China Theater and Commanding General of the American forces in China, Stilwell had to make the painful decision to prepare for the demolition of U. S. installations at Kweilin and retreat from even more positions.[10]

The battle in Burma was also at its most critical moment. The Allied spearhead to open a line into China was not far from the Chinese border. Actually, the Chinese Y-Force was only a few days' travel away. But the Japanese resistance also became more and more stubborn. While Stilwell was urging the Y-Force to hurry up their movement from the north to meet the Allied forces so that the line into China would be reopened, Chiang in Chungking began threatening to withdraw his Y-Force from Burma and use it to defend east China. Stilwell argued that such action would end all the Allied efforts, but he failed to convince Chiang. Nor was he successful in appealing for Chiang to

use some twenty divisions, some of Chiang's best, that were used to watch and blockade the Communists in North China.[11] On September 15, the angry American General reported to Washington: "Situation...[is] now hopeless....The disaster south of the Yangtze is largely due to lack of proper command and the usual back-seat driving from Chungking. The trouble continues to be at the top."[12]

The arrangement for Stilwell's command was also in jeopardy. The experience of the last two years had made Stilwell skeptical from the beginning whether the Generalissimo would give him any real power at all. During the conferences in early September, attended by Hurley, Stilwell and T.V. Soong, Stilwell once again emphasized what he wanted as commander was "nothing less than full power, including the right of reward and punishment" and the Generalissimo "must refrain from any interference in operation." But soon he learned, this time from Soong, what Chiang really wanted. Angrily he put down in his diary: "What the Peanut (the nickname he gave to Chiang) wants is an over-all stooge, apparently foisted on him by the US, with a deputy commander for the Chinese Army! T.V. [Soong] let that cat out of the bag."[13]

Stilwell's September 15 telegram reached the President in Quebec, where he was meeting Churchill for the Octagon Conference. The United States and Britain had just reached an agreement to launch a large-scale campaign against the Japanese in Burma. With the over-all objective of forcing Japan's unconditional surrender, the Americans and the

English agreed that blockade and bombardment would be employed to lower Japanese will to resist before an ultimate invasion took place. Naval and air action would be increased to avoid wherever possible any commitment to a costly land campaign. China would serve mostly as the support base for the main advance across the Pacific. It seemed apparent by now that campaigns in China had fallen further into the back seat, because it was no longer vital for the winning of war against Japan. But the Japanese troops on the China mainland were still a great threat if not pinned down there. This could explain why the Allies were still insisting on the reopening of the communication line to China as soon as possible so that the Chinese would be able to continue their fighting. Chiang's threat to withdraw his troops from Burma obviously would make the Allied plan useless. It also helped make up the Americans' mind that some stern messages should be sent to him. Many weeks had passed since Chiang first promised to give Stilwell the full command over all Chinese troops. If he now still did not put the promise into action, there would be no time before the Japanese could overrun China. President Roosevelt decided he should address the Generalissimo directly once more.

Roosevelt's message to Chiang arrived in China on September 19. Drafted by General Marshall and signed by the President, the message was stern in tone. Stilwell was so excited to see the President backing him that he put down in his diary, "At long, at very long last, F.D.R. has finally

spoken plain words and plenty of them, with a fire-cracker."[14] The message stated that the situation both in north Burma and east China were indeed in a critical condition. The President warned that unless reinforcements were sent to the Burma battlefield, any chance of reopening communication lines into China would be in jeopardy and the responsibility of such consequences would be Chiang's to bear. Roosevelt continued that the Chinese leader's reluctance to place Stilwell in command of all forces in China might very well lead to the "possible catastrophic consequences" of losing all of east China. He urged Chiang to take immediate action to reinforce the Burma front and give Stilwell "unrestricted command." Such action, he stated, "will fortify us in our decision and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you."[15]

Stilwell immediately drove to Huang-shan, Chiang's residence in Chungking, where he found the Generalissimo and Hurley as well as several other Chinese officials having a meeting. He asked Hurley to step outside and read the message to him. Hurley at once realized the tone of an ultimatum. He tried to persuade Stilwell that it would be a better way if the message was presented with "verbal explanation." But Stilwell insisted he was carrying out an order to present the message to Chiang in person. The two rejoined the gathering a few minutes later. After the exchange of a few words of general greetings, Stilwell handed the message to the Generalissimo. Hurley tried to

limit the open humiliation. To avoid the Chinese translation of the "ultimatum" being read aloud in front of the Chinese officials, Hurley took the translation from the Chinese interpreter and handed it to Chiang, saying that it would save much time if the Generalissimo could read it by himself. Chiang's only remark after reading the message was, "I understand." Silence followed. Once again Hurley tried to soften the embarrassment by saying "President (Chiang) may need more time to consider it. We'd better leave." Hearing the translation of Hurley's words, Chiang raised his eyes, made a forced smile, and said, "Okey, let's talk later." The meeting was over in cold silence.[16]

No one seemed to realize the significance of the unhappy event at the time. Stilwell was happy that he had been vindicated finally for his long and frustrated experience in China. "I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut and then sat back with a sigh," he wrote in his diary. "It was a clean hit...beyond turning green and losing the power of speech, he did not bat an eye."[17] The Chinese officials, including Chiang's top advisers, knew little about what actually happened except that the Generalissimo was in a bad mood, as he usually was. Only Hurley seemed to be an exception. Talking to a Chinese official over dinner on the same day, he murmured that the United States had done something that should not have been done. "The problem was complicated from the beginning. Now with one more trouble, it becomes even harder to solve." To all this his Chinese company could only show a puzzled

expression.[18]

It seemed to Hurley that Roosevelt's message and the way Stilwell delivered it had ruined a good chance to solve the problem of Stilwell's command. Meeting the Generalissimo later in the evening of the same day, Hurley felt his suspicion was confirmed. From his talk with Chiang, he concluded that Chiang had already reached a decision favorable to the American request that is, to unite the military units (including the Communist troops) and to appoint Stilwell, though against his "better judgment" when General Stilwell came in "in a peremptory manner, demanded that the Generalissimo should do what the Generalissimo had already agreed to do."[19] In Hurley's eyes, "it was a subordinate handing a superior an ultimatum demanding the superior give him immediate authority."[20]

However, Hurley did not stop his effort to bring the command problem to a satisfactory resolution. In his message to President Roosevelt on September 21, Hurley reported that he was still working according to the agenda he had set when first arrived in China. He even drafted the Generalissimo's order to all the field commanders and directive to Stilwell to take the commanding position.[21] The Generalissimo did not issue or reject either of them immediately, as he usually had done before. Chiang's silence began to make Hurley realize he was facing a difficult task. To save the situation, he advised the Chinese leader not to respond to Roosevelt's message in a hurry so as to cause a deadlock, and Chiang agreed. Also in his message to the

President Hurley reported that the trouble was caused by "two strong personalities...so involved in the question of distribution of authority." Chiang and Stilwell, he said, "appear to be personally and fundamentally incompatible" and suspicious of each other."[22] For some unknown reason, Hurley did not mention the strong reaction of the Generalissimo when the President's message was delivered.

Stilwell had also begun to realize the worsening situation when Chiang kept his silence. Deadlock could help nothing. So he tried to contact Ho Ying-chin, Chief-of-Staff of the Chinese Army and asked him for his opinion. Not knowing very much about the details of the problem, the Chinese general suggested that the deadlock might have something to do with the Americans' refusal to give the Generalissimo the control over the lend-lease supplies that Britain and the Soviet Union enjoyed. Stilwell agreed, quickly prepared a new agenda for the negotiation, and sent this handwritten agenda to Hurley. Besides giving the lend-lease distribution authority to the Generalissimo, Stilwell even went further to compromise by offering to go to Yenan himself to urge the Communists to fight under "the supreme authority" of Chiang Kai-shek and accept command through Stilwell. He also proposed that "both the KMT and the Reds ... drop discussion of political matters until the Japs are beaten.[23]

The situation did not "iron itself out" as Hurley expected. Chiang had made up his mind that Stilwell must go. The conflict between the two persons had long been

there. Ever since Stilwell started his mission in China, his way of doing things had shaken Chiang's whole power system. The American General's insistence that he must be given full authority to reform, train, command, and supply the Chinese troops had made Chiang unhappy. His demands that all those ineffective commanders, many of whom were Chiang's loyal followers, be relieved would doubtlessly turn Chiang's commanding structure upside down. Stilwell's proposal to arm and use the Communist troops in the war even further upset Chiang, who had always considered the threat of Communism his number one problem. Chiang did not break with Stilwell in the past only because he was afraid that his conflict with the American General would lead to the breakdown of the relations with his powerful ally, the United States.

Now the Generalissimo thought that the moment had arrived, and he wanted to speak out. Talking to his lieutenants, Chiang commented that "all other Americans are good. Only Stilwell is an imperialist. He wants to interfere China's internal affairs and even wants to rule China himself."[24] As a nationalist Chiang had regarded the "task" of getting rid of the foreign powers as one of the most important goals of the Kuomintang. He was very critical of many around him who were "depending upon and blindly following the West." From time to time he would call upon his followers to show "a proper dignity and self-respect" with the aim of standing firmly on their own feet.[25] Such issues as Stilwell's command problem occurred

"only because the Americans never treated us as an equal."[26] Stilwell's last- minute compromises had no effect on the Generalissimo. Using a thick-pointed pen Hurley wrote on Stilwell's memo, "Too Late!"

On September 25, Chiang made his intention clear. In an "Aide Memoir" he sent to Hurley for delivering to President Roosevelt, he stated that he had made the "final decision" that he would "agree to the choice of an American General Officer as Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese-American forces," but he could not "confer this heavy responsibility upon General Stilwell." He demanded Stilwell's resignation as Chief of Staff of the China Theater and the relief of Stilwell's duty in the area. The reason for this decision, Chiang explained, was that Stilwell had "no intention of cooperation" with the Generalissimo and "thought he was being appointed to command the Generalissimo." He was also disappointed at Stilwell's military judgment and convinced that Stilwell was "unfitted for the vast, complex and delicate duties which the new command will entail." The Chinese leader also asked President Roosevelt to replace Stilwell with a "qualified American officer, imbued with that spirit of genuine inter-allied collaboration which Americans have exhibited on so many battlefields."[27]

In his letter to the President, along with the "Aide Memoirs," Hurley expressed regret at his inability to bring about harmony between Chiang and Stilwell. He also informed the President that it was his opinion that the General-

issimo's decision not to appoint Stilwell was final. He insisted that the Chinese leader's action was the direct result of Stilwell's delivering Roosevelt's message on September 19. He also endorsed the Chinese officials' explanation about the event: "On policy American and China are in complete agreement, but it is equally essential to find the right man for implement the policy." This was, however, obviously an action that refrained from any objections to the American demands diplomatically. At the end of the letter, Hurley conveyed the generalissimo's desire to submit the names of three American generals, one of whom would replace Stilwell.[28]

It took quite a few days before the President answered Chiang's message. General Marshall and his staff had prepared a sharp "rejoinder" for the President to refuse Chiang's demands. But Roosevelt declined to send it.[29] He chose not to back his own words. In his message on October 6, Roosevelt showed his surprise and regret at the Generalissimo's reversal of the previous agreement to appoint General Stilwell. He went on to say that the United States should not assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of the Chinese forces as the situation on the battlefield was deteriorating drastically. However, the President made a real concession by accepting Chiang's proposal of relieving Stilwell as Chiang's Chief of Staff and his responsibility in connection with lend-lease. Yet the American President suggested that Stilwell be given command over the Chinese forces in Burma

and the neighboring Chinese province of Yunnan. He insisted on this latter issue and told Chiang that "should we remove Stilwell from the Burma campaign the results would be far more serious than you apparently realize."[30] Hurley delivered this message to the Generalissimo on the same day. Chiang listened to the message as it was interpreted in Hurley's presence, but the Chinese leader refused to comment. Hurley could feel that Chiang was not satisfied with the American response.

Hurley thought he had the answer to the Generalissimo's silence. On October 2, Chiang had openly told his officials during a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT that he would definitely not appoint Stilwell as the Americans had demanded. In a public speech a few days later, the Generalissimo also made it clear that he would not allow himself to be influenced by "a section of foreign opinion that had confused views" on the military and political affairs in China. The Generalissimo went on to call upon his people not to be influenced by other countries' praise or reproach, saying "our self-confidence must not be shaken." Talking about China's status among nations, Chiang predicted that the war in eastern Asia could not be fought successfully without China's participation and the future of world peace was closely linked with the success or failure of China. He asserted:

> The objective and basis of our struggle are unchangeable. Fighting alone or fighting in collaboration with our allies, we shall always maintain an inflexible determination to overcome all difficulties... It is necessary for us to realize that in this war against

> aggression, what is needed is a nation which can stand on its own feet and undertake its own responsibilities, and not a nation which has lost the spirit of independence and has to rely on other. The strength and spirit exhibited by China today is capable of removing all difficulties. Let us not underestimate ourselves and defeat our own purpose.[31]

It was obvious that Chiang was committed to his decision not to back down this time. The reason why Chiang took a different tone, one with firmness, Hurley said, was that Chiang had heard something from his agent in Washington. Hurley told the President that T. V. Soong had passed him the news that at a dinner party on October 1 in Washington, Dr. Kung had a very important conversation with Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's close adviser. While talking about the Stilwell command issue, Hopkins told Kung that the President had received the Generalissimo's "Aide Memoir" and Hurley's accompanying letter and that the President intended to comply with the Generalissimo's request for the recall of General Stilwell and his replacement by another American officer. "The Kung message," Hurley reported, "undoubtedly prompted the G'mo to advise the Council of his decision regarding Stilwell which, up to that time, had been known here only to his most intimate advisors and myself. ... I am convinced that it has definite bearing on the position in which the G'mo now finds himself and therefore upon the nature of his reply."[32] After he made his decision public, it was clear that Chiang could hardly reverse himself again, for that would mean a humiliating loss of face in front of all the people of his country.

The official Chinese reply to President Roosevelt's message of October 6 reached Hurley three days later. The Generalissimo expressed again at the beginning his willingness to meet American wishes by appointing an American officer to command all Chinese forces. But Chiang made more than clear that he still stood on his original request that Stilwell must be removed, because the American General lacked "the all-essential qualifications." Along with the reply, the Chinese sent Hurley another "Aide Memoir." In this document Chiang recalled in detail what had happened in the China Theater as well as between Stilwell and himself. With a critical tone, the Generalissimo denounced the allied strategy (in southeast Asia and in China), which he considered the cause of the loss of east China. Stilwell, Chiang emphasized, was mainly responsible for this disaster, because the American General had provided President Roosevelt and the War Department with inaccurate information concerning the military situation in China. The Burma campaign, he said, had never had an agreed strategy between himself and General Stilwell. What the Americans had done in Burma (capturing north Burma to open a line into China) had cost China almost half of her territory. The Generalissimo made it clear that he had come to the conclusion that Stilwell was "not competent to envisage or to deal with a problem of such range and complexity." He claimed to "not only have no confidence in general Stilwell, but also lack confidence in his military judgement."[33]

The Generalissimo pointed out to the Americans that the

situation in east China was not as serious as President Roosevelt had suggested and the American government did not have to worry about assuming any responsibility if China refused to appoint Stilwell and a Chinese defeat occurred. "No matter what happens, no matter what command arrangements are adopted," Chiang said, "I cannot personally escape ultimate responsibility for the future of the China Theater. Even the responsibility of General Stilwell's errors must be borne by me since I allowed myself to be overpersuaded against my judgement to countenance them." At the end of the "Aide Memoir", Chiang requested again that another American general be sent to replace Stilwell. With such "a qualified American officer," he said, "we can work together to reverse the present tread and achieve a vital contribution to the final victory."[34]

By now Hurley had realized that the first part of his mission had failed. A reconciliation between Chiang and Stilwell seemed impossible. However, he tried to make the Generalissimo's message sound more acceptable to Washington by asking the Chinese officials to modify the first two drafts of the "Aide Memoir." "A hell of a diplomat he turned out to be," Stilwell commented acidly, "in not letting the first scurrilous draft of the Aide Memoir pass him ... making it a first class state paper and hard to handle."[35]

Accompanying this Aide Memoir, Hurley sent to the President his own comment:

I have been in almost constant conference with the

> G'mo. Our discussion of the Stilwell matter have been continuous... By studying the situation here I am convinced that there is no Chinese leader available who offers as good basis of cooperation with you as Chiang kai-shek. There is no other Chinese known to me who possesses as many of the elements of leadership as Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell are fundamentally incompatible. Today you are confronted by a choice between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell. There is no other issue between you and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek has agreed to every request, every suggestion made by you except the appointment of Stilwell.[36]

There was a suspenseful waiting period before the American's answer came back. During this period, President Roosevelt might well wonder what to do with Chiang, whose blaming Stilwell for the east China debacle seemed too obvious a criticism of the highest decision makers in Washington. It was impossible that Chiang and his close advisers could regard the Allied strategy in Asia as Stilwell's personal work. During the same period, Roosevelt's military advisers were gradually diminishing China's role in the final victory in the Pacific. It had become more and more apparent that China's contribution to the war was becoming increasingly peripheral as MacArthur's island-hopping operation was drawing the fighting daily closer toward Japan. This fact might also have made Roosevelt feel, as historians have guessed, that the alliance with China was now "primarily a sort of insurance policy to be drawn on if anything went wrong with the central Pacific offensive. ...The policy should be kept in force, but there was no need to pay an exorbitant premium."[37]

The President's military advisors had strongly opposed

any compromise with Chiang. General Marshall made repeated efforts to convince Roosevelt that "Vinegar Joe" was the best general in the Army to deal with the Chinese situation. Secretary of War Henry Stimson also insisted that the disaster in East China was largely due to the failure to support Stilwell's plan of training adequate Chinese forces.[38] However, as the single most important supporter of making China a Great Power so as to serve American interests in Asia, Roosevelt still felt he should be careful in making any decision regarding China. Maintaining the wartime alliance with China appeared larger in his eyes. Because it seemed impossible to keep both Stilwell and friendship with Chiang, Roosevelt decided he would be in favor of keeping the latter.

The Americans in China were also seeking solutions. Stilwell suggested to Washington that a joint Sino-American committee be set up in China so that measures concerning putting China and the Generalissimo on the same status as other allies would be effected. This would also mean that Stilwell, now as purely a field commander, would have much more authority to ensure that his plans and policies in the battlefield could be carried out without any interference. According to Stilwell, the Generalissimo's action to remove him was merely delaying tactics to avoid any active military efforts, and Chiang would not move unless he was pushed to do so.[39]

Hurley also sent in his assessment of the situation. In his October 13 message to the President, Hurley concluded

that Chiang and Stilwell were "fundamentally incompatible." He praised Chiang, whom he thought reacted favorably to logical persuasion. "You can do business with the G'mo," he told Roosevelt. But he also warned the President that the Generalissimo was reacting violently against "any form of coercion, 'squeeze plan' or ultimatum." The special representative also criticized General Stilwell, calling him "incapable of understanding or cooperating with Chiang politically." Stilwell's fundamental mistake, he pointed out, was in "the idea that he can subjugate a man who has led a nation in revolution and who has led a ill-fed, poorly-equipped, practically unorganized army against an overwhelming foe for seven years." He went on to warn the President that sustaining Stilwell would run the risk of losing Chiang and possibly losing China with him. Any effort to force Chiang to back down publicly from his demand, which he had made public while believing the American President had already approved it, would further reduce his prestige and usefulness after the east China debacle. Using a confident and comforting tone, Hurley told the President that the situation in China was chaotic but not hopeless. The United States could keep China in the war, reorganize the Chinese Army, and work things through with the Generalissimo. "But we cannot do this with Stilwell," Hurley emphasized at the end of his letter. "He is not the man for the job."[40]

The special representative's opinion tilted the final balance of alternatives before the President. There were

also fewer reasons to continue forcing the Chinese into active military effort by now. In early October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that there would be no great necessity to land either in Taiwan or on east China coast. The successful allied campaigns in the Pacific had mad that landing less necessary.[41] Although General Marshall and Secretary Stimson and others were still insisting on support for Stilwell, President Roosevelt believed that his personal representative's report was more convincing: the Generalissimo would not tolerate Stilwell. If the United States wanted to keep its overall objectives in Asia, Stilwell would have to go. The very next day, Roosevelt cabled Hurley through the radio of the U. S. Navy China Group instead of the usual Army channel. In the telegram the President expressed his thanks to Hurley for his assessment and recommendation. He also asked Hurley to send immediately three names of officers for replacing Stilwell. After consulting Chiang, Hurley cabled back to the President, also through the Navy radio, that the Generalissimo had chosen Alexander M. Patch, Albert C. Wedemeyer, and Walter Kruger.[42]

Four days later, the official reply from President Roosevelt reached Chungking. The American answer was a complex one. The American President agreed to recall General Stilwell as the Generalissimo wished. But he pointed out that General Stilwell was not responsible for the decision on the North Burma campaign, which was "made by the combined British and American Staff, and was fully

approved by the Prime Minister (Churchill) and myself." He made it clear that the United States would not assume any responsibility in the present situation, so there would be no American to take command of all Chinese forces. However, the United States was willing to provide a qualified officer, General Wedemeyer, to serve as the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff as well as the commanding general of all American forces in China. Further, President Roosevelt informed the Chinese that the China-Burma-India Theater would be separated into two theaters "so far as American interests are concerned," with China as one and India-Burma as another. With a cold, business-like tone, Roosevelt told Chiang to keep his Chinese Y-force in the campaign that would open communication lines into China very soon.[43]

At the same time, General Stilwell got his orders from Marshall. Stilwell had predicted the result of the controversy. Farewell letters had been ready for days. When Hurley started to use the Navy radio instead of that of the Army, Stilwell realized it was time for him to go. In his letter to his wife, the disappointed general wrote, "Peanut has gone off his rocker and Roosevelt has apparently let me down completely." [44] Marshall's telegram informed Stilwell about the President's decision and ordered Stilwell to return to the United States without delay.[45] "Hurley feels very badly," Stilwell wrote in his diary. "Told me he had lost me the command. See [sic] his mistakes now -- too late."[46]

It is interesting that the victorious Generalissimo

turned to the leaving American General and offered him China's highest decoration. It might have been just for show but more probably a means to mend up somewhat the damaged relations with his American ally. Stilwell turned down the offer, explaining that he thought it unwise to get any foreign decoration as a U. S. Army officer of his rank (four-star general).[47]

Chiang had won a victory, not on the battlefield but in diplomacy. But this victory cost him dearly, though that was not so obvious at the moment. President Roosevelt had announced that the United States, or any American individual, would not take the responsibility for whatever happened in China now. By driving Stilwell out of China, Chiang had lost a very good opportunity to get his troops thoroughly trained and equipped by the United States. Though there was always the risk that his power structure would be altered, such risk might be worth taking in the long run in terms of China's future. He would also lose the last chance to reform the whole government system so that he could regain the heart and mind of the Chinese people who had been increasingly alienated. It is ironic that such reforms did not take place until the KMT government was forced out of mainland China and fled to Taiwan. His insistence that the Communist problem was his number one task was not unreasonable, as he was correct to realize that the Chinese Communists' ultimate objective was to get power and rule the country. But by estranging his American ally, he had made the possibility of Communist rule into a reality.

The business-like and progressively colder tone of President Roosevelt apparently suggested that he, as the sole champion of promoting and sustaining China's status as a Great Power, was now losing interest in his original ideas. This change of attitude was a factor that continued until the end of his life and very well explained why he could make such an easy deal with the Soviet Union about China's territory and interests at the Yalta Conference later. Stilwell's recall, as historian Tang Tsou pointed out, symbolized a turning point in American policy toward China, with the resultant "reemphasis of the traditional view that China was not important to the U.S. either as an ally or as an enemy ... not within the reasonable limits of her capability to save Chiang from defeat." The seeds of Chiang's downfall were planted.[48]

Chiang seemed also to have felt a little uncomfortable about such a scenario. Taking the chance of reopening the Burma-China road, he named the road after his old opponent, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. Though he still did not like the general, he instructed his officers who had been working with Stilwell in Burma to keep in touch with him. "His (Stilwell's) position and his war area are very important. It is very possible that his troops are among those that will land on our coast."[49] But his apparent victory in the Stilwell Affair had ironically made Chiang believe that the United States was dependent on him and Washington would not abandon him and his regime. He came to feel that if he insisted on doing something, the bluffing Americans would

always gave in in the end.

The Stilwell command problem was settled at last as a personality problem. General Wedemeyer arrived in China to take up what Stilwell had left. However, the problem in China was far from its solution. Chiang's insistence that Stilwell must go was beyond just personal conflict, though Stilwell did use such words as "Peanut," "crazy little bastard," "stubborn, ignorant, prejudiced, conceited despot," and so on to describe Chiang, and the Generalissimo very probably knew about it. Stilwell's sympathy for the Communists might be the most important factor that caused Chiang to make the final decision to remove the American general. To Hurley Chiang had expressed his conviction that Stilwell was " in conspiracy with the Communists" to overthrow his government.[50] It was true that General Stilwell was sympathetic with the Reds. However, it was not from an ideological point of view but rather a purely military expedience --- the Reds were actively fighting behind the Japanese line and had the support of the local people. Even the Chinese Communists today still agree, fifty years after the general's departure from China, that the most meaningful contribution of Stilwell to China is "that he could put aside ideological differences" in "urging the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China to jointly wage a war of resistance against the Japanese."[51]

Hurley's suggestions influenced President Roosevelt's decision in the Stilwell Affair. His good relations with Chiang Kai-shek and his trust in the Generalissimo's words

caused him to report what he thought was the real situation, taking Chiang's words at their face value. His assessment of the conditions in China stood in sharp contrast to the attitude and opinion of almost all other Americans in China. His lack of understanding of the complicated situation in China was obvious, for he regard the Stilwell issue as a simple personality problem. Such lack of understanding led him to simplify his job and to take an approach that would prove to be impractical, not only for the Stilwell command issue but also for the rest of his mission.

IV. THE YENAN TRIP

"I have the so-called Communist question under discussion at the present time and I am satisfied that we will arrive at a solution of that problem,"[1] Hurley told President Roosevelt optimistically when he was winding up the Stilwell command settlement in mid-October. In early September when he had just arrived in China, the Communists sent him their first message. In a telegram through the Dixie Mission of the U. S. Army stationed in Yenan, General Chu Teh, Commander of the Communist Eighth Route Army (or, the Eighteenth Group Army, as it was also called), presented "a most cordial invitation," on behalf of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, New Fourth and 8th route Armies, to Hurley to come to the Communist-controlled areas for "a personal investigation." Claiming control over large "liberated areas" with a population of 80 million, the Communist General told the Special Envoy that his 500,000 regular troops supported by two million People's Militia were beating off Japanese attacks repeatedly in contrast to the defeats suffered by the Nationalist armies in east China. "Your arrival in China at this time," General Chu continued, "will have an important bearing on the plans for a quick victory over Japan and is most opportune." He told

Hurley that the Communist troops could "play an important role in cooperation with the allied nations in the coming counteroffensive and at present time can cause the enemy serious loss and impede his advance, ...if supplied with certain necessary equipment."[2] Hurley was pleased that he had some leverage already even before he had really settled down to work.

After the first half of his mission had failed with Stilwell's recall, Hurley was determined to achieve something in the second half, the unification of China. However, he still believed that the failure of his effort to "harmonize" Chiang-Stilwell relations was mostly a problem of personality. He either neglected or took too lightly the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists. Even many Americans had realized that the Stilwell-Chiang controversy originated from the question of how to deal with the Communists.[3] But Hurley felt that the two sides had more similarities than differences and it would not take much effort to bring them together to face the external threat from Japan. The briefing he had received from the State Department and what he had managed to learn about the situation in China were too far away from the reality in that country. His distrust of the Embassy members and American reporters also limited his access to the real developments in the field, but his belief that the favorable Russian position would make things much easier especially kept him from realizing the seriousness of the problem. This underestimation of the CCP-KMT conflict would prove to

be fatal to his mission and the American policy in China.

"A war within a war" had been actually going on in China. While both the Communists and the Nationalists were both claiming that they were fighting the Japanese actively, a war between these two sides was going on all over China. The "honeymoon" of the second CCP-KMT alliance after 1937 was a short one. After the fall of Hankow in 1938 the reactionary elements in the Kuomintang had gained an upper hand over the liberal wing within the party. Except one or two CCP representative groups, all the Communist or pro-Communist organizations and activities had been banned in the KMT-controlled areas. In the eyes of foreign observers, the Nationalist Government was gradually but steadily returning to its pre-war policy of one-party dictatorship. The skirmishes between the Communist troops and the government forces had never stopped. There was no open breakup of the alliance only because neither side wanted to appear to be hindering the anti-Japanese war. But the war of words was always going on, with the KMT charging the Communists with failing to follow the government orders and the CCP criticized the Nationalists' inactivity on the battlefield, its dictatorial rule, and repeated attempts to prevent the Communists from playing a more active role in the war.

The two sides were following their own distinctive policies that were contrary in their effect. The Communists were active in carrying out their operations of expansion in the areas behind the Japanese lines and the areas where the Nationalist government's control was too weak to stop them

from getting in. At the same time, they were also promoting a campaign of urging the reform of the government so that China would become a "democratic" nation. On the other hand, the KMT government answered the challenge by resuming its policy of restriction of the Communists. In the KMT-controlled areas, the Reds were once again forced out of the scene and went underground. A new blockade around the Communist Border Region was set up again in the summer of 1939.[4]

Confrontation and then conflict were inevitable. Anywhere the Communist troops and the Nationalist troops met, there would almost always be some skirmish between the two sides. Charges against the other side became almost daily news in the newspapers the two sides published. The Communists' expansion into the areas beyond where they had been assigned was watched by Chungking as a dangerous sign. In January 1941 a determined Generalissimo finally gave his green light to his troop commanders to trap and almost wipe out the whole Communist New Fourth Army south of the Yangtze River. Chiang stated that the incident was "entirely free from any political character" but a move for "the preservation of sound discipline."[5] But it was obvious even to the foreigners in China that the incident could be nothing but an attempt on the Nationalist side to punish, or if possible, to get rid of the Communists. The Nationalists knew it was unpopular and probably impossible to wipe out the Communists at the time when the Japanese were trying to conquer China. However, they were determined to terminate

the Communist problem as soon as Japan was defeated.[6]

The Communists also knew the alliance with the Kuomintang was but a temporary one. They had never given up their ultimate goal of taking control of the entire country, that is, the overthrow of the KMT government once the Japanese were gone.[7] Although they were still claiming that the whole country should support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of resistance as well as post-war reconstruction,[8] it was clear the Communists had never let their own leadership over the local people and especially over their own troops be curtailed by the Central Government. Since late 1939 the Communists had appealed to the Nationalist Government again and again to stop its policy of restricting and attacking the Communist forces. They had also warned all their troops and the people under their control "to get ready to take the counteroffensive, with both military force and propaganda, against the Nationalists' efforts to invade the "liberated areas."[9] They openly demanded that the KMT abandon its one-party dictatorship and call upon the whole country to unite and work for a democratic government so that a civil war could be avoided and the war against Japan could be carried out without any hinderance.[10] To these demands, Chiang answered that the only solution to the problem was to have "a unified military command and political unity," that is, the Communists must obey the orders of the Central Government and surrender their command over their troops to Chiang.[11]

Knowing well that the war of words could lead nowhere,

the Communists sought to keep up their expanding momentum and, in most cases, successfully increased their influence in more and more formerly KMT-controlled areas where they set up new guerrilla bases. At the same time, the Nationalist troops stationed to blockade the Communist Border Region had become an "intolerable burden both to the Government and the people." The demoralized government troops were so unpopular and even hated that when the Japanese launched their ICHIGO campaign in the summer of 1944, many of the local people did not support their own government troops but turned on them and disarmed them by divisions.[12] The demoralization of the Nationalist troops and the Communists' expansion had put Chiang and his government in a very difficult position when his American ally requested that he start as quickly as possible an effective resistant effort.

The Chinese Communist Party's policy during the 1940s was very successful in winning the confidence of the people throughout the country. Their claims that the communist forces were fighting against fifty-eight percent of the Japanese and ninety percent of the puppet troops were a kind of exaggeration, though they did tie down a large portion of the Japanese troops.[13] However, their concentration on winning the "hearts and minds" of the people was undeniably a success. Parallel to the united front with the KMT, the CCP's policy within the areas under its control was also a "united front." Ever since the war against the Japanese started, the CCP had put away their policy of class struggle and land confiscation and put forward the policy of reducing

land rent and interest rates in the countryside. Holding the poor and lower-middle peasants as the core force around the party, the Communists did their best to unite the middle and rich peasants. The policy toward the landlords had also changed. The party followed a kind of "hit and appeal" policy, a policy of "divide and rule," in dealing with the landed class. By protecting some of the landlords' interests, the Communists succeeded in winning over a large portion, neutralizing another, and isolating the most conservative portion of the landlords. This policy strengthened their government and encouraged public participation within the areas they had controlled.[14] The blockade put up by Chiang's troops did not strangle the Communists. Instead, it only made them more self-reliant, self-sufficient, and much stronger.[15] With the popular support they gained the Communists developed a vast system of intelligence and armed millions of peasants, and they turned the war into a real "people's war". That is why they could succeeded in strengthening their military force and won battle after battle over the Japanese and the Nationalist troops.

Pressure from within and outside the country was forcing Chiang to consider a negotiated settlement with his political opponents. The CCP and other political forces were asking for a more democratic society, a clean government, and an effective resistance, which had much popular support. Even the liberal wing within the KMT was urging Chiang to reach a settlement with the Communists so that

some 300,000 of the government's best troops could be freed from their task of watching over the Communists and at the same time make it possible for the Communist forces to fight the Japanese. Dr. Sun Fo, son of the late Sun Yat-sen and the leader of the liberal wing of the KMT, told the Americans in China that he had made severe criticism of Chiang's policy and such criticism seemed to have made the Generalissimo consider a negotiated settlement with the Communists. He felt that American opinion in this aspect would be of great help.[16] China's allies, the United States in particular, fearing that a civil war in China would ruin its plans in the Pacific war, also pressed Chiang to keep his forces from further blockading and attacking the Communist forces. General Stilwell even suggested that the Reds be armed with lend-lease supplies and put into more effective use in the war. The Communist problem could not be ignored any longer.

The Americans in China had spent a lot of time studying the Chinese Communists. A group of talented diplomats--John Service, John Davies, and so on--had fully used their knowledge about the country to provide valuable information for their government. In early 1944, they proposed to send an American observer group to the Communist area.[17] During Henry Wallace's visit to China during the early summer of the same year, the American Vice-President also urged Chiang to allow such a mission to be sent. Badly in need of American help, a reluctant Generalissimo agreed. The U. S. Army Observers Group, code named Dixie Mission, arrived in

Yenan soon after. The reports sent out by the Army observers were much in favor of the Reds, just like those sent out by a group of foreign reporters a little earlier. John Service, as the mission's political officer, reported, "We have come into a different country and are meeting a different people (than we do in Chungking)."[18] The friendliness and informality they encountered deeply impressed the Dixie Mission members. The popularity the Communists enjoyed among the people even more confirmed their belief that the CCP had a pretty good chance to defeat the KMT in the future. Because they saw the peasants in the Red areas were convinced that the CCP was fighting for their interests, they put their trust and confidence in the Yenan government. They believed that "time is on the side of the Chinese Communists."[19] In late August they proposed that the U. S. cooperate with the Communists and supply them with American arms instead of continuing the fruitless effort to push "the weak, incompetent and uncooperative" KMT to carry out effective reforms for the purpose of war.[20]

These proposals and some earlier pressure from the United States had actually moved the KMT policy to change. In September and October of 1943 Chiang had claimed that the Chinese Communist problem was a purely political problem and political, instead of military, means would be taken to deal with the Communists. At the same time, efforts would be made to form a constitutional government. Negotiations with the Communists, without Americans as go-betweens, had started in early 1944. By the time the Dixie Mission's

report was finished, negotiations about reform and unification of military command had made no satisfactory progress. In Chou En-lai's words, "there is not any solution on any single issue."[21]

By the summer of 1944, China was at a critical moment to survive the Japanese ICHIGO offensive that had successfully cut China in half and seemed very likely to continue toward Chungking, China's wartime capital. The possibility of China's being knocked out of the war appeared imminent. Although by this time China's position in the American eyes had been much devalued in terms of strategy than before the allied victory in the Pacific, Japan's defeat of China would very likely prolong the war, which, in turn, would mean a much higher cost both in human lives and materials to the United States. That explains why the Americans still wanted to make great efforts to keep the Chinese united and go on fighting. Some Americans had noticed the fact that both the KMT and the CCP by late 1944 were more interested in preserving their respective strength than carrying on the war against Japan. "Each party is more interested in its own status," Congressman Michael J. Mansfield reported after his fact-finding mission to China, "because both feel that America will guarantee victory."[22] The reality made Washington determined that something must be done to change this situation.

It was under such circumstances that Hurley started the second half of his mission. In his report to the State Department, Hurley outlined his understanding of the mission

as well as American wartime policy to China as a whole:

1) To prevent the collapse of the National Government;
2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies;
3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American commander;
4) to promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse, and
5) to unify all military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan.[23]

He was determined to follow this line of policy and optimistic that he would be successful. After some initial contacts with both the Nationalist government and the Communist representatives, Hurley was happy to find that both sides were willing to accept American mediation. The change of the Generalissimo's attitude from a stubborn hostility toward the Communists to "a reconciliatory attitude" was a very promising sign in Hurley's eyes. He believed that such change was due largely to his own efforts to convince the Generalissimo that the Soviet Union was not supporting the "so-called Communists" in China and the Russians were desirous of establishing friendly relations with his government. During his entire mission in China, Hurley never changed his belief that the "Russian attitude is the chief factor that makes possible a settlement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist leaders." The Communists' willingness to settle the issue through negotiation, he thought, was also because of the signals sent from Moscow. "For the first time," the confident special envoy reported to his President, "it begins to look as if unification of all military forces in China is possible."[24]

By late summer of 1944 the Communists had decided on

their policy toward the Nationalist government. In the instructions to its representatives in Chungking, the CCP Central Committee made it clear that "the opportunity is ripe now for us to put forward the proposal of government reforms to the Kuomintang and people at home and abroad." The proposal urged the KMT government to hold a national conference participated in by all the parties, all factions, all armies, and all the local governments to end one-party rule. With this new government in power, the proposal went on, a National Congress would be called and constitutional rule would be established so that resistance could be effectively carried on and the counteroffensive launched. The Communists knew clearly that "such proposals are unacceptable for the KMT right now." However, they also realized that all other small parties, local interest groups, the progressive elements abroad and at home, and even China's allies would welcome these terms. Such proposals, the Communists believed, would become part of their long-term goals in China's political struggle so that the KMT would be unable to maintain its one-party rule and keep its control over the National Congress and the Constitution.[25] The purpose of the Communists' move was obvious: to reduce the KMT's influence and gain sympathy and support both within and outside the country.

The Nationalists also felt compelled to settle the communist problem. In one of his speeches in September 1944, Chiang Kai-shek admitted that "the military reverses" had occurred on the battlefield and the "present period in

our Resistance is the most difficult one." The Generalissimo emphasized that China must have national unity: "A unified China is needed for the winning of the war---a unified China is needed for post-war reconstruction and international cooperation." But he also made clear what he meant by "national unity." The basis for the realization of it, Chiang pointed out, was in the "observation of national laws and decrees." The Eighteenth Group Army (the Communist 8th Route Army) "must obey the order of the National Military Council," that is, the KMT or Chiang's order.[26] He was thinking about his actual control over the Communist armed forces through the negotiations.

Many Americans in China understood why the KMT was willing to start talks with the CCP. In his message to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Gauss reported that the Generalissimo was "concerned with regard to the state of relations with the Chinese Communists who he is wont to regard as an ever-growing menace to his regime." Chiang was far less worried about the military and economic situation than the political situation, that is, the Communist question. The Generalissimo had showed great "sensitiveness" to external criticism of the situation in China, Gauss noticed, and "there can be little doubt but that the Generalissimo entertains great anxiety as to the future attitude of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union toward the Chinese Communists." The Ambassador predicted that Chiang would not "countenance external advice or dictation in regard to the Communist problem" and the

Generalissimo was "almost certain to oppose any attempt of the Powers to supply the Chinese Communists...failing some kind of settlement whereby the Communists undertake to comply with the military orders issued by the Generalissimo." Gauss concluded: "The prospects for a KMT-Communist settlement, hitherto far from bright, appear to have been further dimmed as a result not only of Yenan's diatribes but of the Generalissimo's continued *intransigence.*"[27] (Gauss's emphasis)

To help the President's special representative to have a better understanding of the complex situation in China, the U. S. Embassy prepared a brief document for Hurley. The "Suggestions," as the document was entitled, recommended that Hurley hold a talk with the Communist representatives in Chungking and tell them the attitude of the American and Russian governments concerning the Chinese Communist Party. Hurley might also ask them whether they desired his (Hurley's) good-office to bring about a settlement with the government. If they did, "Suggestions" went on, Hurley then could put forward a proposal of settlement, "provided he can obtain a previous assurance from the Chinese government that the latter would not object to his making such a move." The Embassy would like to give Hurley "full account of what the government has conceded and may possibly concede regarding the various points of dispute" before he proceeded to draft such a proposal. The Embassy also warned him to be careful "not go beyond what we may possibly persuade the government to accept."[28]

Hurley himself agreed that the success of his mission "to unify all the military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan" depended on the negotiations already under way between the Nationalist government and the Communists.[29] However, the seeming eagerness of both sides encouraged him. Beside General Chu Teh's welcome telegram, the Communists in Chungking had also contacted Hurley and showed their readiness to open direct discussions with the Americans. The Nationalist side too had expressed to him their willingness to reach some agreement with the Communists. On October 21, Wang Shih-chieh and General Chang Chih-chung, the Nationalist government representatives for the negotiations, handed Hurley a Nine-Point "Proposals" for the settlement of the differences between the Nationalists and the Communists. Two days later, the Communist representatives in Chungking, Lin Tsu-han and Tung Pi-wu, also handed Hurley the Communists' main demands in the negotiations.

The differences between the demands from the two sides were too obvious to be ignored. The twelve demands of the CCP can be summarized as the following:

1) The realization of democracy in a nation-wide scale:
   a) the freedom of speech, press, assembly and organization;
   b) the legalization of the Communist Party and other political parties and the release of political prisoners;
   c) the practice of genuine local self-government.

2) The 470,000 troops of the Eighth Route Army be reorganized into at least five corps (sixteen divisions) since the nationalist government would not accept the sixteen corps (47 division) plan.

3) The National government's recognizing of the Border Region and the local governments elected by the people in the rear of the enemy.

4) The lifting of blockade against the Border Region.

5) A reasonable share in arms, munitions medicines, etc., supplied by the allies.[30]

The Nationalist government's terms did not deal with much of the Communists' political demands. Some of those demands were even labeled as attacks on the government. The Nationalists wanted to reorganize the Eighth Route Army into only four corps (10 divisions) and use them "collectively." The rest of the troops would be disbanded within a certain time limit. They also demanded that the Communists abolish many of their local governments established behind the Japanese lines and surrender power to the Central and provincial governments. The only response to the CCP demand for democracy was that the government would, according to the KMT Central Committee's decision, call a National Congress to write a new constitution and begin the constitutional government after the war was over. The Communist Party, then would be treated just as any other political parties if it "follow the National law and pledge again its four promises she had made in 1937."[31] All later demands of the Nationalists followed this line, and little retreat was made. The Communists expressed their disappointment by saying that the government's terms were impractical, too far away from the CCP demands, and thus unacceptable. They urged the KMT to practice democracy immediately, which they insisted was the only cure for the KMT-CCP relations and

also the only way to unite the whole country to defeat Japan.[32]

Whether or not Hurley had realized the difficult situation he was faced with is hard to measure, but one thing is certain. He considered "keeping Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic of China, and preventing the collapse of the National government, and seeking unification of all the military forces in China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek" the core of his mission as well as the basis of American wartime policy toward China. This he made clear to the Nationalists. The very pleased Generalissimo then wrote to President Roosevelt via Harry Hopkins that he hoped that

> General Hurley's assignment as your personal representative will be on a more permanent basis, and that he will be given a directive broad enough that he could cooperate with me on many vital questions involving our military relation with the United States. ...I am relying on him for assistance in negotiation with the Chinese Communists with whom he is already conferring. ...General Hurley has my complete confidence. Because of his rare knowledge of human nature, and his approach to the problem, he seems to get on well with the Communist leaders. As Your personal representative, possessing my full confidence, his contribution in solving this hitherto insoluble problem [Communist problem] would be of greatest value to our war effort.[33]

A telegram from the President on November 17 announced that Hurley would become the new American Ambassador to China, taking the post left by Gauss who had resigned his office on November 1.

Even before the President's decision to appoint Hurley as Ambassador, the special envoy had already closely involved himself with the CCP-KMT negotiation. After consulting

with the Nationalist government officials, he drew up a five-point "Basis for Agreement" for the coming talks. With some corrections by the Nationalist officials, the five points included: both the Government of China (the KMT) and the CCP would work together for the unification of all military forces in China; the Communist forces would observe and carry out the orders of the Government; both sides would support the democratic principles of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen; there would be only one government and one army in China with equal treatment from the government; and the CCP and all other political parties in China would be legalized.[34] Both the KMT and the CCP representatives consented to the "Basis." This made Hurley think he had made a very good start in mediating the CCP-KMT conflict.

By the end of October, Hurley thought he had acquainted himself thoroughly with the situation and was ready to move forward. Just at that time, a telegram reached him from John Davies, the Second Secretary of the Embassy, who was then in Yenan. In the message, Davies urged Hurley to visit the Communist capital, saying: "Of such immediate and long range strategic importance that it warrants your personal visit in info [sic] that can be obtained here and which you cannot get in Chungking. ... I do know that you can take significant information and proposals back to the President vitally affecting the war and future balance of power in Asia and the Pacific, if you will visit Yenan."[35]

The message further helped making up Hurley's mind to accept the Communist leaders' invitation of September 10th.

So on November 7th, acting Ambassador Hurley flew to Yenan to meet the Communists' highest leaders. Before departing, he enthusiastically told the Chinese government officials seeing him off, "I will bring back some good news for the Generalissimo."[36]

The unannounced arrival of the Special Emissary of the American President in Yenan surprised everybody there. Colonel David D. Barrett, the head of the Dixie Mission in the Communist capital described the scene:

> [After the plane] had landed and the door opened, there appeared at the top of the steps a tall, gray-haired, soldierly, extremely handsome man, wearing one of the most beautifully tailored uniform I have ever seen, and with enough ribbons on his chest to represent every war, so it seemed to me, in which the United States had ever engaged except possibly Shays's rebellion."[37]

The Communists at Yenan airport were puzzled. Chou En-lai, who was at the scene, asked Barrett who the American Major General was. On learning that the distinguished guest was Hurley, Chou told Barrett, "Please hold him until I can bring Chairman Mao," and rushed back into the town. In a short time, every important red leader available was at the airport. Mao arrived by possibly the only motor vehicle in Yenan, "a beat-up truck with an enclosed cabin," together with General Chu Teh, Chou En-lai, and General Yeh Chien-ying (Chief of Staff of the Communist forces). Hurley then was greeted with due ceremony: a hastily assembled Guard of Honor received the American general's review while "a make-shift band" kept on playing. However, the Communists were once again surprised by the American guest. After he had returned the salute of the officer of the Guard of Honor,

Hurley "drew himself to his full impressive height, swelled up like a poisoned pup, and let out an Indian warwhoop."[38] The same piercing and blood-curdling Comanche war cry had entertained the Russians while he was visiting the Stalingrad battlefield a year ago.[39] However, to the Chinese, who had been raised in their tradition developed under the Confucian influence, such behavior for an important person was almost unimaginable. "I shall never forget the expression on the faces of Mao and Chou at this totally unexpected behavior on the part of the distinguished visitor."[40]

On the way back to the town of Yenan, both the Communist leaders and Hurley tried to get acquainted with each other. When the truck passed a flock of sheep along the road, Chairman Mao recalled his childhood in which he had once been a shepherd. Hurley immediately told his host that he had been a cowboy. However, Col. Barrett, now acting as the interpreter, found it difficult most of the time to make the Chinese understand Hurley's "salty remarks" and "the unusual language in which he expressed himself." Seeing country people along the road would remind the General of his early years and the names of his old friends in Oklahoma. Watching an old man attempting to hold his frightened mule would lead him to yell, "Hit him on the other side, Charley!" When Mao tried to tell the excited guest that the Yen River that they were crossing rose and dried up in different seasons, Hurley at once countered with his description of rivers in Oklahoma: they were "so dry

during the summer that when a school of fish swam upstream it was possible to follow their course by watching the cloud of dust they raised." In spite of his years of training in spoken Chinese, Col. Barrett was almost totally lost how to convey to the Chinese such remarks, which he commented, were "by no means connected by any readily discernible pattern of thought."[41]

The evening saw a banquet the Communists set up in honor of Russia's November Revolution. Hurley once again became the focus of attention, partly because of his "occasional bellowed Yahoo."[42] He appeared pleasant and confident. While engaging Col. Barrett in a conversation, Hurley even boasted that he had been paid a million dollars by the Sinclair Oil Company for his successful negotiation with the Mexican government, which finally ended the controversial issue of the Mexicans' attempt to expropriate the Company's property in their country during the 1930s. It seemed that he had not realized that the differences between the Communists and the Nationalists were much greater and the two sides were much more reluctant to solve their differences than the Mexicans and the Sinclair Company.

The CCP did hope some outside force could be employed to help keep the KMT in line, but its real aim was still the expansion of its influence. Just before the end of September, the Central Committee issued its order to the Party's Central China Bureau, instructing the Communist forces in Kiangsu, Chehkiang and Anhui to prepare for the offensive that was aiming at the control of the east China

coastline. Some experienced cadres and veterans of guerrilla warfare from other "base areas" had also been sent to help in the new areas. The purpose of this move was clearly defined--"to prepare for our [the Communist troops'] counteroffensive and make the favorable conditions for the Allied landing along the coast."[43]

The obvious confidence of the Communists about their strength and their belief in a bright future in front of them can be seen in their optimistic tone. Speaking on the Double-Ten Day (the National Day for the Republic of China,) Chou En-lai had taken the occasion of the government troops' defeat in east China to restate the CCP's demands of the KMT government. The loss of east China, Chou pointed out, was due to the Nationalist government's policy of passive resistance, dependence on foreign aid, and making civil war. It was also because of the government's unwillingness to give up its one-party dictatorship, its suppression of different opinion, as well as its disastrous financial and taxation policies. It was not that the Chinese soldiers were not good fighters, Chou argued. Why could the Chinese armies behind the Japanese line [Communist troops] and the troops under General Stilwell in Burma fight so well and win one victory after another? It was the strategic mistakes, the selfishness, and the incompetence of the KMT government that caused the defeat in east China. "We need to get some outside assistance. But such outside assistance must be obtained upon the basis of self-reliance and should be given to those who fight the best... Otherwise, more aid could

only make those unwilling to fight begin to accumulate their supplies and keep their own strength---a factor that could not help bring about the victory of our resistance war but increase the danger of a civil war." While the KMT troops met defeat in east China, Chou emphasized, the Communist troops had recovered more areas behind the enemy lines and raised 100,000 more troops. With its 570,000 regular troops, supported by 2,200,000 militia and several million more local "Defense Corps," Chou claimed, the CCP had an effective control over ninety million people in fifteen "liberated base areas" that covered about two thirds of the Japanese-occupied areas. There is no wonder that Chou was so confident to demand that the Nationalist government hold at once an Emergency National Conference participated in by people from all ranks and groups and that one-party rule be abandoned and a coalition government established.[44]

Only a few days before Hurley's arrival, Mao Tse-tung had given an interview to Theodore H. White of Time. During the interview, the Communist leader made it clear to the American reporter that he had no illusion about untying the knot that tangled CCP-KMT relations. "The KMT is only using the negotiation as a false front to deceive," Mao commented. "Its second purpose in the negotiation is to delay. They [the Nationalists] hope that the United States will defeat Japan, and they can turn their forces to wipe out the Communist Party in China."[45] The future for the coming negotiation was dark, according to the Communist Chairman. It was filled with the possibility of a CCP-KMT split after

the Japanese were defeated. The only bright spot was what he called "the external factors" that would influence the KMT to change--the pressure of the United States. "Up to now we have hoped that this [pressure] would have some effect. We thought that Hurley's visit [to China] would have some effect."[46]

After Hurley's arrival in Yenan, White told this story to the special envoy and warned about the possible failure of the KMT-CCP negotiation. But such warning did not reduce Hurley's confidence. The only comment he made on White's report about his interview with Mao was that White's intent was "definitely against the mission which I am charged."[47]

On the morning of November 8, 1944, the formal meeting between the American representative and the Communist leaders started. Hurley's introductory remarks were impressive. Taking an impartial stand and being pretty fair to both the Nationalist government and the Communists, he expressed his and his government's intention not to participate in China's internal politics. As a believer in democracy and government of the people, by the people, and for the people , Hurley claimed, he thought he should encourage the development of democratic processes in China. The major goal of his mission would be "to attempt to bring about a unification of the Chinese military forces for the defeat of Japan in cooperation with the United States."[48] He went further to praise Mao and Chiang, calling both men sincerely patriotic Chinese who desired to see their country unified and at peace. Then he presented Chairman Mao the

five-point "Basis of Agreement" he had made with the correction by the KMT representatives. He told the Chairman that it was "a brief outline of the basis to which Chiang Kai-shek will agree with Chairman and General Chu." [49]

There was no doubt that the Communist leaders at once noticed the unusual phrasing of the five points, which were much closer to the CCP demands that had so far almost always been denied or shelved by the KMT government. Chairman Mao immediately asked Hurley whose idea the five points was. Hurley admitted that it was his idea, "but it had been worked on by all of us," probably meaning Chiang and his close advisers as well as himself. Noticing the Communist leaders' obvious suspicion, Hurley went on to explain that the five points were "just a basis for discussion and not a 'take it or leave it' document." Mao did not give up and asked if the Generalissimo agreed to all the points in the document. Hurley's answer was a clear "Yes." He explained that his whole purpose had been to get a unification of China to defeat Japan and, more than that, he hoped the unification would make China free and would prevent a civil war. By so doing, China would be able to assume its place as one of the four Great Powers in the world. He told the Communists that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, though he violently opposed the Communists, was "desirous of peace and unity in China" and believed "both he and the CCP were working for the same goal--to uplift the welfare of the common people ... and to avoid civil strife, dissention and civil war." Hurley told Mao that Chiang had even expressed

the desire to meet Mao personally so that they could prove this point to the whole world. Chairman Mao expressed his gratitude toward the American general for his effort to come to China to help unify China to fight Japan. But, the Chairman pointed out , "the idea is *how* to unite the forces in China and the United States forces for the speedy defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China. This is the fundamental idea."[50] The first conference adjourned at noon in a pleasant atmosphere.

The afternoon session was a different story when it started at 3:00 p.m. Chairman Mao took over the lead immediately after the meeting began. After beginning with the usual polite preface, as most Chinese do when giving a speech, the Communist leader turned his aim at denouncing the KMT government and Chiang Kai-shek himself. China had tremendous manpower and natural resources, the Chairman said, "the only problem is how to unite all forces to fight against Japan." China needed unity. But to attain such unity, Mao emphasized, China must follow the way of democracy. China's current defeat in front of the Japanese summer offensive was due to the KMT government's unwillingness to adopt democracy and to abandon its own one-party dictatorship. It was the government's policy of this kind that prohibited the unity of China. The main efforts of the Nationalist government, Mao pointed out, had been to watch over, hinder, and even destroy the Communists' efforts to fight the war. As for the Japanese, the government was hoping that somebody else would beat them, Mao remarked.

Such a policy of the Nationalist government, as well as the corrupt government system, was solely responsible for the defeat on the battlefield and the crisis in the KMT-controlled areas. The only way out, the Communist leader claimed, was "a change in regard to the policy of the government and the organization of the government," a united government including all parties and non-partisan people. It was the "minimum basis," Mao insisted, and without such a solution, any agreement could not have a "solid foundation."[51]

"General Hurley has come for his trouble such far distance for the sake of promoting unity of the Chinese nation," Mao remarked, "all of us in Yenan are extremely thankful for General Hurley. But we feel it is necessary to tell General Hurley the real conditions." Chairman Mao ended his monologue and laughed at the KMT government's offer to give the Communist troops after their reorganization the same treatment it had given to all the government forces. The Communist leader sneered at such an offer by saying he would rather not let his soldiers be treated equally to the government troops, for most of the government troops were poorly-fed, poorly-clothed, and poorly-led while the Communist soldiers had enough food and clothing and much higher morale.[52] By then Hurley seemed to realize what kind of people he was talking to and how difficult his task would be, saying: "The issue seems to be so deep that it seems useless to talk about it." But he was clever enough, as a lawyer by training, to kick the ball back to the

Communists. He told his host that he thought he should not be more eager for a united, peaceful and strong China than the Chinese themselves. Instead, the leaders of the two sides, the CCP and Nationalist government, should come together and discuss the situation "dispassionately" among themselves to see if a union of the parties in China was possible. He told the Chairman that he would like to know specifically what the CCP wanted the government to do before he returned to Chungking to speak to the Generalissimo. If the situation was impossible, Hurley remarked, then everybody should not waste a lot of time about it.[53]

However, it seems that Hurley could not help but start to defend the Nationalist government, though quite tactfully. He pointed out that the east China debacle was partly due to the fact that a lot of troops and materials had to be sent to north Burma for the campaign to open the road into China. Chiang was not what Mao had described but was willing to reorganize the army and the civil government. Hurley agreed with Mao that China lacked and needed unity and democracy. But he asserted that the Chairman's remarks about the situation sounded much like that of the enemy's propaganda currently circulating in the country. He emphasized again that it was essential for the leaders of the two sides to find a basis on which they could agree. He told the Communist leaders that if they would work with him and get Chiang Kai-shek to cooperate, they could bring unity in China, clear up the corruption and cause the development of democratic principles in China. The key was that they

must work together.[54]

The official record does not tell how the Communist leader reacted to Hurley's assertion, but Col. Barrett's memoirs show that Mao was "somewhat shaken" by Hurley's response to his attack on Chiang and the KMT government. After a brief hesitation, the Chairman came back by saying what he said had been said by Roosevelt, Churchill and Madam Sun Yat-sen. Once again Hurley showed his skill as a negotiator. He told Mao, who was a little annoyed, that he had misunderstood the Chairman's remarks and he agreed with him that there did exist some corruption in the Nationalist government. Perhaps he had realized that it was no use arguing with the Communists over the criticism that they had advanced for years or that the Chairman's reply had really hit the mark. Anyway, the talk did not break up and the atmosphere seemed still to be friendly.

When Hurley told Mao that the Generalissimo was prepared to give the CCP a seat on the National Military Council (the nominal controlling agency over all Chinese government forces), Mao at once "pooh-poohed" the offer. Hurley argued that this would give the CCP "a foot in the door." But the Chairman countered very effectively by saying that "a foot in the door meant nothing if one's hands were tied behind one's back." The offer meant nothing, Mao insisted, because Chiang and his close advisors had the final say on every decision and the Council had not functioned much for some time already.[55] Hurley then suggested the Chairman give him a statement like the one he

had brought from Chungking. Mao replied that he would like to do that and he even had "some news" for the American general: "Some points can be accepted in full."[56] After a lengthy discussion about the wording of the document, the three-and-one-half-hour conference came to its end with everything appearing alright.

So far no one knows what the Communists' revised proposal really looks like. The one that appears in the official record, better known as "The Communist Five-Point Proposal," reads as follows:

> Agreement Between the National Government of China, The Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] of China and the Communist Party of China
>
> 1) The Government of China, the Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China will work together for the unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.
> 2) The present National Government is to be reorganized into a Coalition national Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and non-partisan political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for reforms in military, political, economic and cultural affairs shall be promulgated and made effective. At the same time the National Military Council is to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of all anti-Japanese armies.
> 3) The Coalition National Government will support the principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government of the people, for the people and by the people. The Coalition National Government will pursue policies designed to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, the right of writ of Habeas Corpus and the right of residence. The Coalition National Government will also pursue policies intended to make effective those two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want.
> 4) All anti-Japanese forces will observe and carry out the orders of the Coalition National Government and

its United National Military Council and will be recognized by the Government and the Military Council. The supplies acquired from foreign powers will be equitably distributed.

5) The Coalition National Government of China recognizes the legality of the Kuomintang of China, The Chinese Communist Party and all anti-Japanese parties.[57]

One may immediately notice something unusual in the document, especially in point three. "A government of the people, for the people and by the people," "freedom of conscience...," " the right to petition the government...the right of writ of Habeas Corpus..." One may begin to wonder about the skillfulness of the Chinese Communists in mastering the English language as well as the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States, especially those legal words, "writ of Habeas Corpus!" One may also recall that there was a trained veteran lawyer in the conference.

Colonel Barrett's memoir once again revealed that Hurley played an important role in making the Five-Point Proposal what it looks like today. After careful thinking and discussion with other CCP leaders, Mao revised the original "Five Points." When Hurley received this modified proposal and read over the terms, he remarked, "The proposals seem to me entirely fair. I think, however, that they do not go far enough. If Chairman Mao has no objection, I would like to study them carefully and make some suggestions which I shall present tomorrow morning." There was no objection from the Communists. Hurley immediately turned to work over the terms of the proposals. The document, the one that later appeared in the official

record, was presented to the Communists during the last meeting on November 10. Colonel Barrett reported that it was evident that the Communist leaders were greatly pleased after reading the document modified by Hurley. They might have never expected all those rights to be included in the proposal, but now the representative of the United States had put them forward. The remainder of the meeting turned into "mostly a love feast, with everyone in a most happy mood." Barrett admitted that the only sour note made in the pleasant atmosphere was his remark that the only thing left to be accomplished was to "induce the Generalissimo to accept the terms."[58]

Obviously Hurley's confidence and enthusiasm had reached their full capacity. However, the special envoy had another move before his departure back to Chungking, according to Barrett. "Chairman," Hurley said to Mao. "I think it would be appropriate for you and me to indicate, by signing these terms, that we consider them fair and just." Mao complied without hesitation. A blank space was left with the typed name of Chiang Kai-shek for the Generalissimo's approval, if he would approve it. Whether or not Hurley really believed he could persuade Chiang to accept this proposal is unknown. However, before signing his name, he turned to the Communist leader and said something that sounds like a precaution: "Chairman Mao, you of course understand that although I consider these fair terms, I cannot guarantee that Generalissimo will accept them." Chou En-lai, the top diplomat in Red China, also raised a note of

caution, telling Hurley to present the document directly to the Generalissimo himself before showing it to any KMT officials, especially T. V. Soong.[59] This advice Hurley failed to follow later in Chungking.

Mao Tse-tung had refused Hurley's suggestion to go to Chungking with him. Instead, Chou En-lai was sent as the CCP representative for the coming negotiation with the KMT. The Communists were more optimistic than before about the talk with their political opponents, but they never showed it to outsiders. Though Chou was sent to conduct the negotiation, he never publicly admitted this but claimed that his major task for coming to Chungking was to escort to Yenan the People's Political Council investigation party. He never appeared optimistic about the consequence of the coming negotiations.[60] The Communists' suspicion of Chiang and his party was so deep that they had hardly thought to rely on the results of the talks. Even the enthusiasm and encouragement of the American mediator seemed unable to help convince them a little bit.

The part Hurley played in revising the proposal proved a big mistake, as we can see in hindsight. The mutual distrust and suspicion between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists were built upon their fresh, bloody memories. The goals of the two sides were so far apart that only great efforts employed to narrow and not to widen these differences were possible to be accepted by both sides. As a mediator Hurley probably had broken one of the most important rules of peacemakers: making changes himself in

favor of one side while keeping the other side uninformed. Such action, with the circumstances as those existing between the CCP and the KMT, could only bring about even more trouble rather than help smoothing over the differences. Hurley's underestimation of the depth of the CCP-KMT conflict had led him to such errors. But he was not the only one who thought in this way. Had not the President told his men to come over to China and "knock their heads together" to make a deal? The Stilwell affair had made many Americans realize the difficult and complex situation of Chinese politics, which was far more than a personality problem. Hurley, however, seemed to have not learned this point, or his hope and confidence were still strong enough to make him ignore the difficulties of the task in front of him. He still believed he had some good news to bring back to Chungking.

V. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND "SABOTAGE"

Hurley's visit to Yenan enhanced the hope of China's unification. In spite of its guarded optimism, Yenan could not hold back its excitement. In a letter that Mao asked Hurley to send to President Roosevelt, the Chinese Communist leader expressed his feeling about the President's special envoy's trip to Yenan: "Through the good office of General Hurley we have suddenly seen hope of realization [of the CCP's desire to reach an agreement with the KMT government]. It is with great pleasure that I express my high appreciation for the excellent talent of your Personal Representative and his deep sympathy towards the Chinese people."[1]

Hurley, too, was openly optimistic about the future of the negotiations. In his letter to Mao Tse-tung, he told the Communist leader that he was very grateful for "the splendid cooperation and leadership" that Mao had shown during the conferences in Yenan. "Be assured, Sir," Hurley told Mao, "that I have appreciated those qualities of mind and of heart that you have brought to bear on a solution of a most difficult problem. Your work is a contribution to the welfare of a united China and to the victory of the United Nations."[2] It sounds as if he was thinking that the

success of the mission was already within his reach. However, Hurley seemed to have failed to notice, or just ignored, some part of Mao's open letter to the American President. The Communist Chairman had put down in his letter that the Chinese Communist Party had just **"unanimously accepted** the whole text of the proposed agreement" and was "prepared to fully support and make it effective."[3] The Chairman was trying to tell the Americans that the CCP did not initiate all those terms but just accepted them when the American representative presented them at the Yenan conferences.

What was waiting for him in Chungking greatly disappointed Hurley. After returning to China's wartime capital, he sent a copy of the Five-Point Proposal to T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister of the Nationalist government and the very person whom the Communist wanted the most to bypass. "The Communists have sold you a bill of goods," Soong told the surprised special envoy. "Never will the National Government grant the communist request."[4]

"Situation is difficult," Hurley cabled the President on November 16. He told President Roosevelt that Chiang himself also seemed to hold the opinion that the proposed agreement would eventually result in giving the Communists control of the government despite the American argument that a reasonable agreement with the Communists was necessary. "I found that the offer was not completely acceptable to the Kuomintang or to the National government," he reported to President Roosevelt. But he did not want to make the

President discouraged, reporting that he believed that the Generalissimo personally was "anxious for a settlement with the so-called Communists" although a majority of Chiang's advisors bitterly opposed any kind of negotiated deal with the Reds. In a comforting tone he told the President that he was talking to Chiang and his advisers "almost constantly" and he believed that he would be able to convince them. "I am still seeking a formula that will accomplish unity without giving the appearance of defeat to any of the major factions," Hurley told Roosevelt, but admitted that such an effort itself was a major problem. However, he promised that he would be patient with all factions and at same time pushing them for an early agreement.[5]

Hurley did not succeed in convincing either Chiang or his advisors. Instead, he received from them a set of counter-proposals. According to the KMT proposals, the CCP would have its legal status as a party and both the KMT and the CCP would follow the late Dr. Sun Yat-sun's Three People's Principles; the Communist troops would be incorporated into the government forces with equal treatment. But the counter-draft emphasized that the Communists must "give over control of all their troops to the National government," that is, to Chiang himself.[6] There was no mention of the Communists' demand of a coalition government. The Communists' terms regarding a "bill of rights" were only faintly reflected in the counter-drafts with the condition that all these rights were "subject only to the specific

needs of security in the effective prosecution of the war against Japan."[7]

It seemed that Hurley really considered that the proposals he had brought back from Yenan were fair. At least he believed that they were something that could form a reasonable basis for the negotiations if not fully applicable. He might have also believed, according to the correspondence between Hurley and the President, that he had a good chance of convincing the Generalissimo. At the time, he seemed to be a fair mediator when he said that he was "patient with all factions" and trying to reach an agreement "without giving the appearance of defeat" to any party involved. He was not backing the Nationalist government without reservation, as some later critics suggested. Actually, he was trying to persuade Chiang to accept the idea of coalition government. He even went so far as to say in mid-November that he sincerely believed that the Yenan proposals were "entirely fair" and if there was any breakdown in the negotiations it would be "the fault of the government and not the Communists."[8]

The special envoy, frustrated at his first try in Chungking, thought he also had some good news. On November 17 President Roosevelt formally appointed him American Ambassador to China, the post he had hoped to get since the earliest days he was sent there.[9] In his telegram to Washington, Hurley expressed his gratitude to the President and accepted the appointment "with a full realization of its significance in the present critical situation."[10]

On the same day, Hurley reported to the President that there were some signs of progress in China. Not wanting to give the Communists credit for having forced him to reform his government and armies, the Generalissimo had begun making "a drastic reorganization" of the China's political and military systems. Hurley told the President that "more dynamic and progressive personnel" would be brought in to form a "more efficient government that would cooperate better with the United States." The new Ambassador emphasized that such reforms on the government side were taking place before a settlement with the Communists, which meant that the American demands were at work. "Your present policy in China is bringing results," Hurley told the President.[11]

But such phenomena in the Communists' eyes were something only for show and nothing essential had actually changed. What the KMT was doing, they asserted, was "to hold even more firmly to its one-party dictatorship and defeatist policies that are against the will of the people throughout the country." Mao pointed out that the KMT was still refusing to accept any suggestion that could help the resistance war, the unity of the country, and democracy in China; meanwhile the most important thing, the negotiations between the KMT and the CCP to bring about a coalition government, "made no progress."[12] The third counter-proposal of the KMT, which was the result of Hurley's effort in persuading Chiang to be more conciliatory, turned out to be almost the same as the previous two except that it

promised to appoint "some high ranking officer" from among the Communist forces to serve in the National Military Council.[13] This was not what the Communists had hoped for. Unsatisfied, Chou En-lai requested the CBI Headquarters to furnish him air transport back to Yenan, thinking there was no need for him to stay in Chungking any longer. Only unfavorable weather conditions repeatedly delayed his departure.

Hurley did not expect that there was much trouble ahead; at least in his report to the President the Ambassador showed no sign of worrying. The delay of action on the pending agreement between the Nationalist government and the Communists, he thought, was due largely to the bad weather that had kept Chou and his party from going back to Yenan to get the consent and approval of the Central Committee and Mao himself.[14] On December 4 Hurley, together with General Albert C. Wedemeyer, General Robert B. McClure, and Colonel David Barrett, met with Chou En-lai. They tried hard to persuade the Communist representative that Yenan would be in a better position if it accepted the Nationalists' Three-Point Proposal. But Chou was not impressed. The Ambassador then turned to Colonel Barrett for help, instructing him to go with Chou and try to convince Mao in Yenan to accept the government terms. The Colonel agreed but doubted whether he could do anything helpful if the Ambassador himself and the American commanding officers could not succeed.[15]

Chou sent his message from Yenan after he had reported

to Mao and the Central Committee. The Communists' answer was not expected by many American observers. The Communist leader informed the American Ambassador that any possibility for him to go back to Chungking to continue the negotiation had gone, because Chiang had refused the CCP's five-point proposal and put forth his own three-point counter-proposal. The two proposals were so fundamentally different that it was impossible to find a common basis to resume talks. In order to attract public attention, and thus change the government's attitude, Chou told Hurley, the CCP intended to publish their five-point proposal.[16]

Chou's letter made Hurley realize that the negotiations were in danger of breaking up and he must act immediately to keep them going. In his letter to Chou, the American Ambassador told the Communists that there might be some misunderstanding while he was in Yenan talking with them through an interpreter. He said he was unwilling to give his consent to the Communists' intention to publish the five-points. He reminded them that Chairman Mao had promised not to publish the points while the negotiations were pending. The Ambassador also stated that he believed that the negotiations were not concluded unless the attending parties wished them to be concluded. He told Yenan that the Chungking government was still willing to continue the talks and he thought neither proposals, the five-point nor the three-point, should be considered final, "take it or leave it" propositions but only "steps" in the negotiations.[17]

This development he reported to the President immediately. From this report we can tell that Hurley was still considering the five-point proposal fair. He told the President that the CCP offer had not been treated "with due consideration by the KMT or the National Government," and he had told Chiang personally that the KMT government had "failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Communist Party for a settlement." He also reported the Communists' claim that the KMT government's refusal of the five-point proposal and insistence on its own three points were "equivalent to asking the Communist Party to surrender to the National government." Their voice could not be heard, Yenan insisted, if democratic processes were not functioning in China. The only solution was still "genuine coalition government" in which the CCP was accepted "on a basis of equality." Hurley also tried to comfort the President in his report, as he often did, by saying that Chiang had apologized to him for not giving enough attention to the proposed settlement and promised him that the KMT government would take the settlement with the CCP as "the first order of business" if the Ambassador could still use his good office to help reopen the negotiation.[18] It is fair to say that Hurley was still impartial as a mediator in the negotiations and not backing the Nationalists to force Yenan to surrender as the Communists thought.

Historical reasons explained why the Communists refused to yield to Chiang's proposals. The history of the cooperation and confrontation between the two parties was a fresh

memory stained with blood since the 1920s. Even at the high tide of the anti-Japanese alliance of 1937-1938, conflicts had not stopped. Hundreds of thousands of government troops were still holding a blockade around the CCP's Border areas and it was an open secret that Chiang was still planning to eliminate the Communists--if not now, after the Japanese were gone. The Communists understood very well that their survival to a great degree depended on their armed forces. To give up their troops to Chiang, they were reasonable to think, was to put their very lives at risk. Many Communist leaders had seen their family members and relatives killed by the Kuomintang; among those killed were Mao's wife and brother. There were too many broken promises in the history of the two parties. The concessions made by the Generalissimo, then, seemed only like another attempt to round up the Reds and get them disarmed and eliminated as Chiang had done in Shanghai in 1927.

Such consideration was fully reflected in Colonel Barrett's interview with Mao and Chou after the American officer's return to Yenan with Hurley's instruction. Pushing aside the Colonel's efforts to convince him of the necessity to accept the KMT's three-point proposal, the Communist leaders pointed out that the United States as a mediator had offered the Communists "absolutely no guarantee of safety" under those terms. Mao made it clear that he had no trust in the Generalissimo's words and lectured the American that anyone who had carefully studied the history of the relations between the CCP and the KMT would reason-

ably understand why. Unconditionally accepting Chiang's terms, the Chairman continued, would leave the Communists with "little or nothing" and even the only means of self-defense--the Communist armies--would be gone.[19]

While refusing the Nationalists' terms, the Communist leaders demonstrated to their American guest their belief that Chiang was "the rotten shell" and was "doomed to failure," although they would still cooperate with him as long as he was fighting against the Japanese. But such cooperation, they insisted, must be based on the CCP proposals, "we cannot fight with our hands tied." Mao stated that he would feel sorry if the United States chose not to cooperate with the Communists, but it would make no difference in his feelings toward the Americans. The CCP was willing to cooperate with the Americans and receive supplies. But if the United States was not willing to help, Mao seemingly warned, there were still England and the Soviet Union. He also told the American that if the CCP's coalition government proposal was refused, the Communists would go ahead to form a separate government, a "United Committee" representing all the areas under Communist control. Colonel Barrett felt that his doubts at Chungking when receiving Hurley's order had been proved: he could do little to persuade the Communists. He left the Chairman's simple meeting room feeling that he had talked to "two clever, ruthless and determined leaders who felt absolutely sure of the strength of their position."[20]

The Communists did feel confident of their own strength

and their position. By that time, the CCP claimed to have a regular force of 650,000 supported by more than two million militia and even larger Self-Defense Corps. Even when Hurley was still in Yenan talking with the Yenan leaders about a negotiated settlement with the Nationalist government, the Communists had made a decision to have all their regular troops go through formal training and to double the militia's force to the level of 4,500,000 (about five percent of the population under Communist control). All the people within the "red areas," except the old, the sick, and the children who were too young, would be organized into the Self-Defense Corps. Knowing they were occupying important strategic positions in north China, the Communists were determined to expand, "to liberate all the occupied areas and if possible, to confine the enemy within a few big cities and along the important communication lines." They were also determined to keep and strengthen their control over the "liberated areas." Beside the policies of united front and tax and rent reforms, the Yenan government also asked the people as well as its troops to start a "Great Production Movement." By so doing, the Communists believed, their government, their economy, and the popular support they had would last as long as the war went on and the Communists would be in an invincible position.[21]

As for the Nationalists' offer of high office to the CCP leaders in exchange for control over the Communist troops, Yenan made it clear that such a thing would never happen. In their telegram to their representatives in

Chungking, Mao and Chou stated: "We will never make such a cheap deal to sacrifice our coalition government policy and our democratic principle and to betray our people for just a few offices in Chungking. The principles of our party have always been so and we hope our American friends will not try to make us do so."[22]

The Communist leaders agreed not to publish the five-point proposal if Hurley did not want them to. Talking to Colonel Barrett a few days before, Mao had hinted that he might not only publish the five-point proposal but also the page on which his and Hurley's signatures appeared. He said that he wanted the public to know that much of the proposal was the idea of the American representative. When Hurley learned of this later, he was furious and even burst out: "The Mother------, he tricked meh!"[23] Obviously the Communists did not want to offend the American President's personal representative and Ambassador after a second thought. Mao and Chou told their representative to explain to Hurley that they had no intention of splitting with him. They had wanted to publish the document only because they thought such an action would help to mobilize the people of the whole country to make the Nationalist government move ahead instead of holding its rigid and pointless policies. They even wanted the Americans to know that they had postponed the suggested move to organize "the United Committee," their plan to form a separate government in their own areas.[24]

The Communist leaders informed Hurley all about this in

their formal reply on December 16, but they also reaffirmed their position on the problem of the negotiations. The major obstacle, they insisted, was "a lack of sincerity on the part of the Kuomintang to predicate itself on the will of the people...to forsake the one-party rule and to receive the proposal of a democratic coalition government." The Ambassador might regard the shift of personnel within the Nationalist government as a step toward freedom and democracy, Chou continued, "but to this we take exception ...No personnel change under the present Kuomintang one-party rule can change the present National Government and its policies. This is the crucial point in our negotiations." Only the five-point proposal, Chou emphasized in particular, was the minimum demand for mobilizing and unifying all the anti-Japanese forces in China. Because Chiang and his government had flatly refused it, Chou felt it useless for him to return to Chungking.[25] Mao also reminded Hurley that President Roosevelt had told the Communists in his reply to their congratulation for his reelection that the United States was willing to cooperate with **all** anti-Japanese forces in China, a hint that the American Ambassador should not side only with the Nationalist government.[26]

Hurley did not believe that the CCP position was immutable. "They will probably be willing to retreat somewhat from their original proposal provided that they are convinced that the Generalissimo is genuinely desirous of meeting them on an equitable basis," he reported to the

Secretary of State.[27] He also sent to the State Department some information he had received from his staff members, in which the Yenan leaders were described as "capable, tough, and intelligent" and would make a much larger contribution in the war if aided with even modest supplies. Hurley did not give any comment on the report, and it was not known by then whether or not he agreed with such opinion. If his action of transferring this information was not a sign of his inclination that the CCP would play some important role in the future, then he was doubtlessly correct to say that whether or not the future negotiations could succeed would depend on the Generalissimo's willingness and ability "to make sufficiently drastic concessions to satisfy the Communists." He was obviously confident that he would persuade the Generalissimo to make such concessions when Chiang indicated to him that the KMT intended to continue to seek a "rapprochement."[28]

The Communists' reply to Hurley's plea to reopen the negotiations must have greatly disappointed the Ambassador. In his telegram Mao Tse-tung informed Hurley that Chou was busy preparing an important conference in Yenan and not available for the negotiations. Mao also said that another reason for Chou's not going back to Chungking was that "the National government does not yet show sincerity in carrying on negotiations based on our five-point proposal." The Communist leader suggested that Colonel Barrett be sent back to Yenan for consultation with the CCP.[29] Chou En-lai also informed Hurley that the Communists were no longer willing

to continue those "abstract discussions." Instead, they wanted the KMT to show its determination to make a new start by immediately 1) releasing all political prisoners; 2) withdrawing all its troops surrounding and attacking the Communists; 3) abolishing all the repressive regulations and 4) stopping all special secret service activities.[30]

The Communists were talking tough, because they had a realistic assessment of the situation and their strength. In its instruction to the lower party organizations, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had given a detailed analysis of the current conditions in China. The "Instruction" pointed out that while Nationalist troops had decreased to fewer than two million, with even lower morale, the Communist regular troops had increased to 650,000 with the possibility of becoming one million in 1945. People from all ranks of life in the KMT-controlled areas were becoming increasingly disappointed with the Nationalist government and hoping that the CCP could raise some effective measures. The CCP was winning the confidence of the people, including many industrialists, university professors, and even some KMT members. The Nationalist government's repressive policies had alienated more and more people and its economic policy had led the country's economy to a destructive dead end. Peasant uprisings had become more frequent and harder to suppress, and many local KMT forces had shown the signs of semi-independence from Chiang's control.[31]

During the previous eight months, the "Instruction"

continued, the balance of political power in China had changed greatly. A near-equilibrium between the KMT and the CCP had been reached, and the momentum was clearly in favor of the latter. "Our Party has indeed become the decisive factor in our resistant war," the "Instruction" went on, "within a few years we will become the strongest political force that will be able to decide China's future." As for the negotiations with the KMT government, the Central Committee stated that the coalition government proposal would continue to be the minimal condition. The door for negotiations would be kept open, although there had been no meaningful results so far. The "Instruction" called upon all the party members and all the people within the "liberated areas" to make a determined effort to carry on the CCP's policy of self-sufficient production. It also encouraged outward military penetration and expansion into the Japanese-occupied areas, especially into big cities "because we cannot be the final winner until after we have captured those big cities." The Communists were absolutely confident that they would have a well-trained, well-disciplined, and self-sufficient military force of about one and one half million within one or two years. With this force, they claimed, "China's fate will be in our hands."[32]

Many of the American "China Hands" agreed with the Communist assessment. John Davies, the Second Secretary of the American Embassy, predicted in a memo in early November that the Chinese Communists would very probably keep their control over "at least North China." Facing the Japanese

offensives and the KMT blockade, the Chinese Communists had not only survived but actually grown dramatically. They succeeded because they had the support of the people. Davies warned that the moderation and willingness of the Communists to make concessions "must not be confused with softness or decay." They were "the toughest, best organized and disciplined group in China," and "they offer cooperation to Chiang out of strength not out of weakness." Chiang was no match for the Communists, Davies remarked. If the Generalissimo chose a civil war with the reds, it would very probably end in China being divided into at least two camps with Chiang reduced to the position a "regional warlord." The victory of the CCP was a very real possibility that should not be overlooked. "The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs," concluded Davies.[33]

Other China experts agreed. Colonel Barrett, head of the Dixie Mission of the U. S. Army in Yenan, reported to Hurley that he had been informed that the Communists wanted the American President and his people to see the reality in China. They urged the Americans to realize "how little the Generalissimo represents the Chinese people and to what an extent he has lost their support." Barrett obviously agreed with the point.[34] John Service also supported the idea by pointing out that the Chinese peasants "support, join, and fight with the Communist armies because they have been convinced that the communists are fighting for their interests and because the Communists have created their

conviction by producing some tangible benefit for the peasants."[35] He believed that "the Communists are certain to play a large, if not dominant part in China's future."[36]

Hurley seemed to have no such impression. What he found was that Yenan was becoming harder to deal with. Not only did the Communists refuse to reopen the negotiations but proposed four more new terms to the Nationalist government. The puzzled Ambassador reminded Yenan that the new terms were "a departure from our original procedure which was to arrive at an agreement on general principle before discussing any specific details." He tried hard to convince the Yenan leaders that the Nationalist government was "sincerely desirous of making concessions on its part as will make a settlement practicable.[37] He even suggested that a conference between the two sides be held in Yenan if Chou En-lai could not make the trip to Chungking. Mao refused Hurley's suggestion. Instead, he proposed that a preparatory meeting be called in Chungking so that a "National Affairs Conference," with the participation of all parties, would become possible. If such a proposal was acceptable to the Nationalist government, Mao said, Chou En-lai would be ready to go to Chungking for detailed discussions.[38] Hurley became frustrated and began to wonder whether something had gone wrong somewhere. Before long he thought he had the answer: some Americans were making deals with Yenan behind his back.

During December 1944, the representatives of the U. S. Army and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had two

secret conferences with the Communists in Yenan. The use of the Communist troops in the war against Japan had been the desire of President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs since 1943. Such an idea had not been changed, even with Stilwell's recall. General Wedemeyer and especially his Chief of Staff, General McClure, played an important role in forming such projects as providing the Communists with munitions and small arms, using American airborne units alongside the Communist guerrillas behind the Japanese lines, and so on. Chiang's response to the Americans' idea was predictable, but the Generalissimo did not want to offend the Americans so often. He merely replied that the time was not ripe for such proposals, but as soon as it was, he would tell General Wedemeyer.[39] In the meantime, the OSS was also interested in using the Communist troops whose record as a guerrilla force had impressed the OSS officers very much. So in mid-December 1944, both the Army and the OSS took action. General McClure ordered Colonel Barrett to get the message across to the Communist leaders. Lt. Colonel Willis H. Bird, representing the OSS, also received his orders to go to Yenan.

The two men arrived in Yenan on December 15 (Barrett came again on the 27th) and immediately held several conferences in which the separate plans of the Army and the OSS were presented. The proposed plans called for landing 4,000 to 5,000 American paratroopers, mostly well-trained technicians, within the Communist-controlled areas. They were supposed to cooperate with the Communist guerrillas on

missions of demolition and sabotage of Japanese installations and communications. Barrett, on his second trip to Yenan on December 27, brought an even greater plan. General McClure wanted him to inform the Communists that after the defeat of Germany, a whole American paratroop division, almost 28,000 strong, might leave Europe and be sent to China as part of the final attack on the Japanese. The Americans wanted to know whether the Communists were able to take care of the supplies for the paratroopers before the U. S. Army supply agency could take over.

The answer from the red leaders was an assured "yes." The prospect of a large American force fighting in their areas and possible American supplies made the Communist leaders pleased, "but not as much so as I had expected them to be," Colonel Barrett noticed when he explained, as he was ordered to do, that such plans were "purely of an exploratory nature." He also told the Communists that the plans were just offered for their reaction only and were not being formally presented by the U. S. government.[40] However, even such a prospect was enough to encourage Yenan leaders, who had been quite confident about their own strength vis-a-vis the Nationalist government.

Signs of the restrained excitement of the Communists could be seen in their newspaper. Liberation Daily, one of the most important newspapers of the Yenan government, stated on December 31: "If we could finally get new equipment and supplies from our allies, we would be able to take up the task of launching final counteroffensive and driving

the enemy out of our country."[41] The Communists' desire to deal directly with the Americans was obvious when John Davies arrived in Yenan together with Barrett and Bird. He had several long conversations with the Communist leaders. General Yeh Chien-ying, the Communist Chief of Staff, even asked Davies whether it would be a good idea for the Chinese Communists to visit the United States. Davies got a strong impression that the Yenan leaders "would like to go to the United States," but he reminded his hosts that he could scarcely see the possibility of the Central Government (the Nationalist government) providing the necessary visa for them because the United States government only recognized the Nationalist government in Chungking.[42]

The uncertain future of cooperation with the United States also made the Communist leaders puzzled. Such cooperation would surely strengthen their position in dealing with the Nationalist government and make their names known to the world. But they did not know how far Barrett and Bird were authorized by the American government to present those plans. They believed that they needed some access to the highest policy makers in Washington. Obviously Hurley was not the right person to pass their messages. Some time during December, the Communists had ceased to trust Hurley as an impartial mediator. Their distrust of Hurley may not have been justifiable at that time. But when Hurley asked them to consider a coalition with the Nationalists on the basis of the KMT three-point proposal, which had nullified the five-point proposal he and

the Communists had worked out in early November in Yenan, they had enough reasons to believe that the American representative had sided with the Nationalists. Hurley's explanation that he took both proposals only as the basis for further discussions could not convince the Communists and only made them believe that the Ambassador had committed himself to their opponents' cause. Though they had not showed their displeasure publicly, their distrust in Hurley could be seen in Mao's instruction to the CCP representatives in Chungking when he wanted the Americans to know that the Communists would never give up their principles in exchange for a few government offices. "I hope our American friends will not make us to do that," Mao emphasized.[43] In spite of Hurley's repeated efforts to convince them that the Nationalist government was going to make real concessions, the Communists just did not believe him anymore. They wanted to present their case to the highest policy-makers of the United States instead of an Ambassador who had already gone to the side of their opponents.

With the negotiations in deadlock, the Communists, on December 15, publicly appealed to the whole country to rise up and "cry" for changes in the policies of the KMT government. Mao told the country that "negotiations alone" were not sufficient for the country's future. The people must be called upon to raise new ideas and push the KMT forward toward a genuine coalition government. It was on the same day that Barrett and Bird arrived in Yenan with their separate plans for possible cooperation with the

Communist forces. When the Communists were trying hard to find a new approach to the solution of the stalemate, such a move from the American side very probably led Yenan to decide to bypass Hurley "the little whisker" (the nickname the Communists called Hurley) and establish connections with the highest level of the American leadership.

On January 9, 1945, Major Ray Cromley, acting Chief of the Dixie Mission, transmitted to the Headquarters of General Wedemeyer the message that the Chinese Communist leaders requested to be sent to the highest American officials:

> Yenan government wants [to] dispatch to American [sic] an unofficial group to interpret and explain to American civilians and officials interested in the present situation and problems of China. ...Mao and Chou will be immediately available either singly or together for exploratory conference at Washington should President Roosevelt express desire to receive them at White House as leaders of a primary Chinese political party.[44]

The Communists desired that such a request be kept secret so that nobody would know they were willing to go to Washington "in case Roosevelt invitation not now forthcoming." They also requested air transportation for proposed travel to the United States if the invitation were extended to them.[45]

Uncertain about direct cooperation with the Americans in the future, Yenan needed to clarify such possibilities. More than that, it was also an attempt to gain recognition by the United States government and, in turn, by the whole world. Such recognition, if really granted, would definitely raise the status of the Chinese Communists and make it easier for them to reach their objectives in the deadlocked

negotiations with a biased mediator.

Hurley had been aware of the Army's proposed plan to use the Communist forces. General McClure had informed him about the plan as he had done to some key KMT government officials[46] It had been a part of the agreement between Hurley and General Wedemeyer that they would exchange information.[47] Hurley was furious when he learned that the representatives of the Army and the OSS had visited Yenan without letting him know---especially when he learned this from Chiang's secret service. He thought that such action by the military had undermined his diplomatic effort. When he learned that Yenan had also tried to bypass him to contact Washington directly, his anger was uncontrollable. Complaining to the President, he said that such actions by the Army and the OSS had encouraged the Chinese Communists to continue their opposition to the negotiations that he was trying to reopen. Direct talks and cooperation with Yenan by the Americans, Hurley asserted, would mean recognition of that regime; it would only help to encourage the Communists' uncooperative attitude toward the American effort to bring about unification in China. In short, it was against the American war policy in that country.[48]

The quick response from Washington caused a general review of the Army's operations in China. General Wedemeyer admitted that his officers' "unauthorized loose discussion" with Yenan could have contributed to Hurley's difficulties in bringing about a solution to the KMT-CCP problems, but he did not think the incident "the main cause of the breakdown

of the negotiations" as Hurley insisted. As the result of the check-up, all Army officers were ordered to avoid "any assistance, cooperation, or even discussion in any way with Chinese political parties, activities, or persons, without authorization." After Hurley blamed the Army for the breakdown in negotiations, General Wedemeyer became increasingly "wary" of any suggestion that had political or diplomatic implications. When Chiang and Hurley later asked for his help to persuade the Communists, he simply turned down their request and told them he "did not wish to jeopardize their success" that Hurley thought imminent.[49]

Yenan might also have learned a lesson from this incident. The Communists were aware of their unfamiliarity with the field of diplomacy. The year of 1944 had seen the foreign journalists' visit to Yenan and later on the arrival of the Dixie Mission. Taking such events as the beginning of their diplomatic relations with the outside world, the Central Committee issued its order to all the Communist officials warning them to pay great attention to "the most unfamiliar work: diplomacy." The Central Committee urged the party officials, as well as army officers, to "learn to extend our influence so as to gain international co-operation." Both anti-foreign attitudes and xenophobia should be guarded against while dealing with the allies. Nobody would be allowed to ask for material assistance, the order went on. "We are not going to ask for that [supplies] right now. We should not behave like the KMT that is begging for something everyday. They [the Allies] will

respect us and then offer their help, although such help might not be available due to the KMT's opposition." The order also required all the officials dealing with foreigners to be honest when asked to provide any information. "Those [pieces of information] that we can give, we will give with full trust; but those that belong to our party and national secrets we will refuse to provide and try our best to avoid such topics." All the officials were asked to be "polite, friendly, and thoughtful" to their foreign friends. But they must also be alert and vigilant all the time. The treatment of the foreigners should be kept as warm and enthusiastic as possible, but should also avoid unnecessary waste. Most important, any negotiation and cooperation with the foreigners must be reported to the Central Committee for authorization.[50]

During this incident, the Communists seemed to have over-extended themselves when they attempted to bypass Hurley to reach Washington and the American military directly. They were confident of their daily increasing strength and encouraged by the possible cooperation with their American ally in the near future. They seemed to be thinking that they had found a new way, a shortcut, to reach their objectives---international recognition and a coalition government. These two objectives, once obtained, would guarantee a first step toward reaching their ultimate goal of gaining power to realize their socialist and communist society.

An analysis of the situation shows that Yenan's attempt

to get connections with Washington, though seemingly too hurried an action, was not illogical from the Communists' viewpoint. By the end of 1944, the situation in China and in the world seemed to be favorable to the Communists. The Soviets were pushing back the Germans into East Europe, and Germany's final defeat had become only a question of time. Yet in China, Japan remained undefeated because the demoralized troops of the KMT government, if they had not collapsed in front the Japanese offensive, could put no pressure on the invaders. Although the allied offensive in the Pacific seemed to be moving fast, the high cost both in lives and material made Washington estimate that even higher cost would occur once the battle moved to the Japanese islands or the Japanese troops in China could not be pinned down. Washington still needed an effective fighting ally in China. This, in turn, led Washington to the conclusion that a unification of all China's military forces, instead of a civil war, was necessary.

Yenan saw this clearly. The Communists concluded that it was an opportunity to force the KMT government to accept their demand for a coalition government. However, when they found out during the negotiations in November and December 1944 that the American Ambassador was trying to persuade them to accept the KMT terms instead of considering the CCP's five-point proposal, they were disappointed to feel that "negotiation [with KMT] only was insufficient" and "some other approach must be found."[51] Just at that moment the American military's feeler reached Yenan with very

promising signs of future cooperation with the United States. That explained why they said publicly that they were able to carry out the task of a final counteroffensive and drive the enemy out of China once they "obtained new equipment and supplies from the allies."[52] As Hurley was still asking them to accept the KMT terms and return to the negotiations that they thought meaningless, they began to wonder whether Hurley had provided Washington with the facts in China and thus causing Washington to decide to support the KMT only. They might also have wondered whether or not the Ambassador's words really reflected the newest policy of the United States government. They felt the need to go around him and reach the highest leaders of the United States to present their case and explain their policies. They wanted to show Washington that they, the Communists and not the Nationalists headed by Chiang Kai-shek, represented the future of China.

The Chinese Communist leaders had indeed showed their interest in cooperation with the United States, if such cooperation was possible. Portraits of Franklin Roosevelt could be seen on the walls of "cave-rooms" in Yenan, and there was even a celebration on the Fourth of July in honor of America's independence. If these were only for propaganda purposes, the Communists' curiosity and interest in China's ally across the Pacific were too obvious a sign of the desire to get to know the Americans. As early as November 14, 1944 when President Roosevelt sent to Yenan his telegram in answering Mao's congratulations on his re-

election, the Communist leaders had been deeply impressed when they noticed that the American President was looking forward to "vigorous cooperation ...with **all** the Chinese forces against our common enemy."[53]

The very existence of the Dixie Mission in Yenan had also been an encouraging sign to the Communists. Mao had said that he was glad to have the American observers in Yenan, because it would help to beat Japan. He once even said frankly that "there is no use in pretending that--up to now [summer 1944] at least--the chief importance of your [observers'] coming is not its political effect."[54] In Mao's mind, the observers' staying in Yenan not only helped prevent the KMT's military attack on the Communists but also helped open the way for Yenan to be recognized by the world.

Mao Tse-tung had on various occasions expressed his opinion on American strength and influence in Asia as well as in the world. Once he told John Service, political officer of the Dixie Mission, that "the hope for preventing civil war in China ... rests to a very great extent---much more than ever before---on the influence of foreign countries. Among these, by far the most important is the United States. Its growing power in China and in the Far East is already so great that it can be decisive."[55] Mao had made it clear that the Chinese Communists "could not risk no conflict with the United States." He had left a deep impression on John Service that Yenan was very pragmatic in considering the United States as the strongest power in the Pacific area and the ablest to assist China

economically, as well as the most capable nation to help unite China. By late 1944, Yenan surely wanted to know whether the United States would support the CCP.[56]

However, Yenan did not want to know this through Hurley, whom they had identified as an ally of Chiang Kai-shek. This distrust was obvious when Chou En-lai emphasized in a follow-up telegram to General Wedemeyer that he hoped that "General Hurley not get this information as I don't trust his discretion."[57] Of course, Wedemeyer would not bypass Hurley as the Communists had hoped. Hurley and Wedemeyer had agreed to exchange every piece of information they had. Hurley read the telegram as well as the telegram from the Communist Commander-in-Chief, Chu Teh, asking Wedemeyer for a twenty million dollar loan in American currency to finance the communist project of destroying and bringing over puppet forces in 1945. The angry Ambassador, however, succeeded in blocking Yenan's attempts. He also convinced the President that he would be able, by blocking such Communist attempts, to make the Communists return to the negotiation table.[58] Tired and already sick, President Roosevelt had been overwhelmed by numerous problems, such as the occupation of Germany, the Polish borders, and the Soviet demands of having more seats in the United Nations. He preferred to let his trusted Ambassador handle the situation in China as he had always done despite the differing opinion from the State Department.

Yenan must have felt disappointed when there was no response to their requests. Their distrust in Hurley also

deepened after the incident. On the other hand, Hurley's attitude toward the communists also took an obvious turn to a more negative direction. The once optimistic Ambassador became increasingly watchful when dealing with Yenan and inclined to confirm the American commitment to supporting Chiang and his government. The negotiations reopened in late January after Hurley once again promised Yenan that the Nationalist government was ready to make "important and concrete concessions as to make a settlement really practicable."[59] Mao simply agreed to send Chou to Chungking without any comment.[60] However, the coming negotiations would be no less stormy than the ones in 1944.

VI. THE REOPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

> In order to mobilize and unify all the anti-Japanese forces in China, to cooperate our allies in defeating Japanese aggressors, to save the current crisis, concrete procedure is in urgent need to be discussed. On behalf of the [Chinese Communist Party] Central Committee, I am going to Chungking to present to the National Government, Chinese Nationalist Party and Chinese Democratic League our proposals: to hold a conference participated by all parties as a preparatory meeting so that we can start formal discussion on a National Affairs Conference and the procedure of the organization and realization of a coalition government. ...We hope the National government will 1) abandon the one-party dictatorship immediately; 2) organize a democratic coalition government and a united military command; 3) recognize the legal status of all anti-Japanese parties; 4) abolish all suppressive laws that are against people's freedom; release all political prisoners; 5)withdraw all government troops that are surrounding and attacking Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region and the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and 6) recognize all the anti-Japanese forces and the popularly-elected governments within the liberated areas.[1]

This was the statement that Chou En-lai made to the public when he was leaving Yenan for Chungking for the reopened negotiations in late January 1945. The terms he proposed in the statement included all the major demands the Communists had made on the Nationalist government, which meant that Yenan was not making any concession on the original terms that Chiang's government had refused even to discuss. Chou also emphasized that if their demands were not met, the CCP did not think there were other ways to effective mobilization and unification of the whole country,

the defeat of the enemy, and cooperation with the allies.[2]

On the KMT side, Chiang had made some nominal concessions in early 1945. The Generalissimo promised that he would appoint some Communists to a "War Cabinet." A three-man system was going to be formed that would have one American officer and two Chinese officers (one from the KMT and one from the CCP) with the responsibility of making recommendations regarding the reorganization, equipment, and supplies of the Communist troops. Communist troops, after the reorganization, would be under the command of an American officer. But the old condition was still there: the Communist troops must observe and enforce all government orders and have the personal approval of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for their movement.[3] It seemed that the negotiations had to start all over again after so many things had happened during the interruption around the turn of the year.

The new round of conferences made no significant progress in the spring of 1945 in spite of Hurley's effort. Both sides tried hard to hold to their original terms while making only nominal concessions. In the Communists' eyes, Chiang's concessions were "too hollow and meaningless." Chou En-lai pointed out that the so-called National Government was actually the KMT's government and the Army the KMT armies. To give the command of the Communist troops to the government, Chou insisted, was equal to giving it to Chiang himself, and it made no difference whether or not there was an American officer in the three-man committee. The

Communists argued that the KMT government's insistence that the Communists must give up their troops before getting their party's legal status was senseless: without a democratic system and a real coalition government, even representation in a war cabinet had no real meaning at all, because Chiang had always had the final say on any decision.[4]

The American Ambassador, however, seemed to believe that the KMT's argument was more reasonable. Hurley concluded that the KMT thought that the real purpose of the Chinese Communist Party was not the abolition of one-party rule by the Kuomintang but rather, as indicated by all the maneuvers made by the Chinese Communists, to overthrow the Kuomintang and obtain one-party rule of China by the Chinese Communist Party itself.[5]

On March 1 Chiang stated that the KMT was ready to return the power to the people through "the instrumentality of the National Assembly." In the meantime, he said, the KMT was glad to "admit other parties to a share in the government," but it "definitely cannot abdicate and give the power to a loose combination of parties."[6] Chiang urged the CCP to accept his terms. He even told the American Ambassador that he would call a meeting in May for the purpose of taking steps to draft a constitution to pass control of the National Government to the people, thus ending the one-party rule of the Kuomintang.[7] The Communists refused to listen, charging the Generalissimo with playing games. The two sides reached no agreement except that they decided to form a "Political Consultation

Conference" to have more discussion on the questions of 1) the winding up of the period of political tutelage of the KMT and establishment of a constitutional government; 2) the common political program and the unification of armed forces, and 3) the form in which other parties would take part in the National Government.

The American Ambassador was losing his patience with both sides as they continued their war of words. Hurley told Chiang that he could not afford the valuable time and that the KMT should "make political concessions and shorten the period of transition (of power) in order to obtain control of the communist forces." He told Chiang very frankly that he (Hurley) still considered the "five-point proposal" he and Mao made in Yenan "the only instrument heretofore with which he could have worked with the Communists"--because it was the only document that the Communists had signed agreeing to submit control of their troops to the National Government. Yet the American Ambassador also stated that the United States's policy to support the National Government and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek would not change and that China must "furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions and be responsible for her own domestic and international policies."[8]

Through January and February, Hurley tried to bring the two sides closer but in vain. The idea of the Political Consultation Conference seemed promising with the CCP's approval. In essence, however, neither side had backed down from their original positions. They were just making more

promises, breaking them, and then accusing each other of breaking their own words. "Both the Communists and the KMT have a long way to go," the impatient American Ambassador commented, "if we know the way, if we are clear minded, tolerant and patient, we can be helpful. But it is most difficult to be patient at a time when the unified military forces of China are so desperately needed in our war effort."[9]

Many others were also getting impatient about developments in China. More and more Americans began to consider some change in the United States' policy in China so that the American objectives in that country, the unification of Chinese military forces and quick defeat of Japan, could be obtained sooner. As early as May 1944, O. Edmund Clubb of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the State Department had suggested that the United States should not have "committed to support the National Government in any and all circumstances," although the United States should continue its support for China in its resistance against Japan. In November 1944 John Davies also recommended that the United States "must be realistic." The Second Secretary of the Embassy in China strongly urged his government to avoid in China the type of error committed by the British in Europe. Although he did not recommend abandonment of Chiang and his government for the time being, he made it more than clear that the United States "must make a determined effort to capture politically the Chinese Communists rather allow them to go by default wholly to the

Russian," especially when the Soviet Union was about to enter the war in Asia.[10] John Service also criticized American policy in China. "Our dealing with Chiang Kai-shek," he said in a memo in October 1944, "apparently continue on the basis of the unrealistic assumption that he is China and that he is necessary to our cause. ... It is time, for the sake of the war and also for our future interests in China, that we take a more realistic line."[11] He pointed out that the United States could not hope to deal with Chiang's government successfully and solve China's problems without considering the opposition forces--namely, the Communists and other liberal forces.[12] George Atcheson, the Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy in China, agreed with such an opinion when he reported to the Secretary of State in November 1944 that many in China believed that "the KMT is becoming weaker while they [the Communists] are not, and that continuing deterioration in the government armies in face of Japanese advances...might conceivably result in the end of the KMT regime in a perhaps not very distant future."[13] By the end of 1944, John Davies was urging his government to tell Chiang Kai-shek "unequivocally that we will work with and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese forces we believe can contribute most to the war against Japan."[14]

News from the Soviet Union seemed to push Washington to make decisions too. W. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, reported in December 1944 that Stalin was critical of the KMT regime. The Ambassador

warned that if no arrangement between the KMT and the CCP was made before the Russians joined the war in Asia, "it must be assumed that the Soviets will back the Communists in the North and turn over to them the administration of the Chinese territory liberated by the Red Army." Then, Harriman predicted, the situation would be "progressively difficult" for Chiang and his government.[15] Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius also reminded the President of the urgency of a unified Chinese military force. He recommended an overall American command over the Chinese forces, Nationalist and Communist, saying, "It would be highly advantageous to have such an American overall command rather than a disunited Chinese command if Russia comes into the war in the Far East."[16] As a result of these recommendations, Washington began to consider some other approaches to a satisfactory solution to the problems in China. President Roosevelt, when leaving for the Yalta conference, was definitely concerned about reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union regarding the Far East as part of the blueprint of his new world order after the war. But in China, Hurley could not see such a perspective.

On January 27, 1945, the State Department issued a document to interpret the United States' short and long range objectives in China. The short-term objectives remained assistance to China for the war against Japan and political and military unity in China. The long-term objective was to assist in the development of "a united, democratically progressive, and cooperative China" that

would contribute to security and prosperity in the Far East. The document stated that the American mission in China should be focused upon the short-term objective for the time being. However, it also emphasized that the plan of re-armament in China should extend to "all Chinese forces willing to fight the Japanese." The unsatisfactory relations between the National Government and the CCP had made this measure impolitic but, the document suggested, the American military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese forces that they believed would be helpful in fighting the Japanese. Unification of China was necessary for both short-term as well as long-term objectives of the United States, but "it does not necessarily follow that China should be unified under Chiang Kai-shek." Realizing the lack of alternatives to Chiang's leadership, the writer of the document suggested that the United States "maintain a degree of flexibility which would permit cooperation with any leadership in China that would offer the greatest likelihood of fostering a united, democratic and friendly China."[17]

Hurley did not like such flexibility. Actually, he thought that it was against the American China policy as he understood it. The Ambassador insisted that the major point of this policy was to uphold the National Government headed by Chiang Kai-shek and "all armed warlords, armed partisans and the armed forces of the Chinese Communists must without exception submit to the control of the National Government before China can in fact have a unified military force or

unified government." So it was logical, Hurley argued, to refuse the requests for aid from any groups other than the National Government, "no matter how reasonable they may seem to be."[18] His lack of success, the Ambassador thought, was a result of such opposition to his efforts to realize this goal. Besides the opposition from the "standpat elements within the KMT and the CCP," as well as "the representatives of all the imperialist governments" in China, the Ambassador thought, the most damaging opposition was mostly coming from some of the American diplomatic and military officials "who sincerely believed that the Chiang Kai-shek's government must fail." He thought that these officials' opinion was "based on erroneous and unsound premises" and had "misled" Washington with the result that the negotiations of unification in China could not achieve any effective result.[19] During February, Hurley also learned from some military personnel that "a far-reaching betrayal of China's interests and America's honor" was taking place. He did not know what actually was going on at Yalta, but he was determined to find out "the truth or fallacy" of the reports about the secret agreement among the allies regarding China. Accompanied by General Wedemeyer, Hurley set out for Washington on February 19, 1945.

However, Hurley's insistence that the United States must support Chiang's government could not stop his subordinates from expressing their opinions. On February 28, when Hurley was still on his way to Washington, a telegram from the American Embassy in Chungking had reached

the State Department. Signed by George Atcheson, American Charge d'Affaires, but mostly written by John Service and Raymond Ludden, the telegram spoke on behalf of all the political officers of the Embassy. It pointed out that the current policy of the United States in China, which gave people the impression that the United States was "intent upon the definite support and strengthening of the Central Government alone and as the only possible channel for aid to other groups," had encouraged Chiang's "unrealistic optimism" about his strength and his "lack of willingness to make any compromise." Such a policy had also made the Communists conclude that the American government had committed itself to Chiang, therefore they had turned to a line of action that actively increased their forces and expanded their control into southern China in the name of "self-protection." The telegram also pointed out that, although the American policy of supporting the KMT only had good intentions and was diplomatically correct, it would only cause chaos in China and an outbreak of disastrous civil conflict. To be practical, the telegram recommended, the United States government should make the immediate and paramount consideration of military necessity "the basis for a future step in American policy," namely, "cooperation with the Communists and other groups who have proved themselves willing and are in position to fight the Japanese." The authors of the telegram urged the President to inform the Generalissimo "in definite terms" that military necessity required American cooperation with other groups besides the

KMT, and the United States was "taking direct steps to accomplish this end."[20]

Such action on the part of the United States, a "modus operandi," the telegram went on, would "bridge the present deadlock in China and serve as a preliminary move toward full solution of the problem of ultimate complete unity." Such action could also "greatly raise the morale and prestige of the liberal groups," and the United States would abe able to "exert the strongest possible influence throughout these internal forces to impel Chiang to put his own house in order and make the concessions necessary to unity." The telegram reported that the majority of the Chinese believed that "the settlement of China's internal problems is not so much a matter of mutual concession as reform of the Kuomintang itself," and even some KMT members were talking about the Generalissimo being "told, not asked" about American aid to Yenan, which they thought would "do more than anything else to make the Generalissimo come to terms with them [the Communists]." The telegram concluded that such a change of American policy in China, if such change really took place, would secure the cooperation of all China's forces, "hold the Communists to our side rather than throw them into the arms of the Russians," and bring about the unification that would "provide the basis for peaceful future development toward full democracy."[21]

The February 28 telegram was the result of long time conflict between Hurley and his staff members on the issue of American policy in China. The Ambassador had heard much

from his subordinates about the corruption and inefficiency of the KMT government. He thought that was not Chiang's fault, but a consequence of what the Generalissimo had inherited from an ancient society and an exhausting war. The Foreign Service officers argued that support of Chiang was "but one means to an end,"--that is, through Chiang to marshal the full strength of China against Japan. They pointed out that such support was not an end itself and that the present American policy had showed "a tendency to confuse the means with the end" and, therefore, there should be "an immediate adjustment" of such a policy so that "flexibility of approach to the primary objective could be obtained."[22]

Hurley did not agree with that opinion. To the criticism that Chiang and his government had failed to make any necessary concessions with the result of a deadlock in the negotiations, Hurley argued that Chiang had indeed gone a long way from his original stand and would go further.[23] Any plan to supply the Communists, he insisted, could only encourage them to think they could bypass the National Government and the American Ambassador to obtain Washington's recognition without first reaching an agreement with Chiang's government.[24] The established policy of the United States, which was "to prevent the collapse of the National Government and to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the government and Generalissimo of the armies," would be defeated if such plans were adopted.[25] This he had repeated many times to his superiors in the State Department and his

Embassy staff. He was convinced that the established policy was correct and would not agree to any principles or support any method that "would weaken the National Government or the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek."[26]

Hurley's prejudice against the State Department and the career diplomats was well known. When he was sent to China by the President, he insisted on keeping his military rank so that he would not be responsible to the State Department.[27] After he arrived in Chungking, this prejudice developed to such a degree that his subordinates began to feel that he had "a fixed idea within him that the Foreign Service officers and American military officers were in opposition to him." For a long time he did not show to his staff his telegrams to the President about progress in the negotiations between the KMT and the CCP. He did not even report to the State Department until the Embassy staff persuaded him that an Ambassador also had an obligation to report to the Secretary of State and not only to the White House. When he finally began to communicate with the State Department, however, he did not forget to report the "opposition" of the Foreign Service officers in China.[28]

The Foreign Service officers, as well as other Americans in China, also formed their opinion about the Ambassador. Hurley's frequent blood-curdling Indian "yahoos" disgusted them. His lack of knowledge about China and his arrogant behavior also caused many to despise him. He pronounced Mao Tse-tung's name "Moose Dung" and for quite a long time referred to the Chiangs as Mr and Mrs Shek.[29]

The Chinese he knew also began to lose respect in him. The Communists in Chungking called him Hsiao Hu Tse, "little Whisker." Even the Nationalists gave him a not so flattering nickname: Ti Erh Ta Feng, "the Second Big Wind."[30] When the negotiations could not produce any breakthrough, he lost his temper frequently. He argued with the Nationalist representatives and American correspondents in Chungking and once almost engaged General McClure, Chief of Staff for General Wedemeyer, in a fist fight in front of many Chinese officials at a dinner party. Even General Wedemeyer could not escape the Ambassador's outburst of temper; for some disagreement, Hurley refused to speak to the General for days although by that time he was still sharing the same house with Wedemeyer.[31]

Hurley was sixty-two years old in 1945. The unfriendly weather in Chungking, the wet, bone-piercing cold winter and steaming-hot summer, gave the old man a lot of trouble. He became tired easily, and his teeth and poor eyesight bothered him almost all the time. He preferred to have somebody read aloud the documents he must read and disliked reading anything long. He disapproved of many of the Embassy staff's reports and frequently lectured them about what he thought was the correct American policy. Such action, along with his bad temper and arrogant behavior, soon made him the most isolated American in Chungking. No one denied that Hurley worked hard for a man of his age, but most people also agreed, as Theodore White remarked, that his effort was but "the tragedy of a mind groping desperately at problems

beyond its scope."[32]

Hurley did see his lack of success in China. However, he blamed the fruitless efforts on career diplomats and some military officers. He also suggested to the President that the United States should get Stalin and Churchill to agree to the policy he was trying to carry out in China. If an agreement could be secured, he felt that the American objective in the Far East would be achieved.[33]

Hurley was furious when he arrived in Washington on April 3 to learn that his Embassy staff had "rebelled" against him. He charged that the telegram was a disloyal action of his subordinates and it was done behind his back.[34] He refused to listen to the State Department officials' explanation that the Foreign Service officers were simply doing their own job of reporting the situation and the American policy did need some reevaluation. Hurley insisted that he could not tolerate such disloyalty and wanted to get rid of all those who had been involved in the plot that went against American policy established by the President.[35]

Upon Hurley's insistence, many Foreign Service officers, a group of talented China experts, were finally "Hurleyed out of China," one after another. Almost all of them would suffer to different degrees later as the victims of the anti-Communist witch-hunting in the late 1940s and early 1950s for the "loss of China." Some would see their careers be totally destroyed.[36] Even General Wedemeyer, who had no high opinion of the Foreign Service officers either,

felt very uncomfortable when Hurley blamed his failure on the General's political advisers and had their careers ruined.[37] No evidence showed that President Roosevelt was opposed to Hurley's actions. But it was clear that without Presidential approval, Hurley could not have been so successful in making the State Department transfer those "disloyal" officers.

President Roosevelt gave Hurley the green light to purge his staff perhaps because of the President's own distrust of the career diplomats. It might also have been because Hurley had convinced him that the policy they agreed upon was still valid if the United States tried harder to carry it out. During his stay in Washington, Hurley had more than once expressed his conviction that "the rebellion in China (the Communists) could be put down by comparatively small assistance to Chiang's Central Government."[38] When such statement got the support of General Wedemeyer and Admiral Milton E. Miles (head of the Navy China Group), it had significant influence on the mind of the Washington policy makers--although different voices could still be heard from the State Department.

Before leaving Chungking for Washington, Hurley had another thing on his mind. From questions asked by the Generalissimo, the Ambassador had an impression that the Chinese leader had known the progress at the Yalta Conference. From the information he received from the American military personnel travelling through China, Hurley also felt that some secret decisions concerning China's fate had

been concluded in the Crimea.[39] He was determined to uncover what he considered a sell-out in regard to China's interests, according to his own record. "I went over, with my ears back and my teeth skinned, to have a fight about what had been done," Hurley later recalled.[40] But when he finally saw his beloved President, he was shocked to find out that Roosevelt's once "fine, firm, strong hand" had turned into "a very loose bag of bones" and "skin seemed to be pasted down on his cheek-bone." Hurley admitted that all the fight he had in him went out at this scene.[41]

According to his own account, Hurley had discussed with President Roosevelt the secret agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, which he thought would destroy the territorial integrity and political independence of China and assure Communist conquest of that country. At first, Roosevelt denied that there was such a secret agreement, according to Hurley. But the Ambassador finally managed to obtain a copy of the agreement. The document, Agreement Regarding Japan, guaranteed the status quo of Outer Mongolia, the Russian pre-eminent interests in Dairen and lease on Fort Arthur, and the Soviet-Chinese joint venture on the Easter and Southern Manchurian railroads in exchange for Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Hurley later stated that Roosevelt was disturbed by the agreement when he carefully read it and immediately gave his trusted man a new order: to go to London and Moscow, speak to Churchill and to Stalin, and seek a way to ameliorate the betrayal of China and return to

the traditional American policy in the Far East.[42] Hurley left Washington on April 3, 1945 to carry out this last task Roosevelt gave him. But on his way, the news of the President's death reached him.

Strangely enough, however, Hurley did not mention the main objective, "to ameliorate the betrayal of China," in his telegram to the Secretary of State. In this telegram, dated April 13, 1945, Hurley expressed his sorrow over the President's death and stated that he was carrying out the late President's mission to Britain and Russia with the objective "to obtain cooperation from British and Soviet governments for the American policy to support the Nationalist Government of China; to unite the military forces of China to bring the war with Japan to a speedy end and to support all reasonable efforts of Chinese leaders for the purpose of creating a free, united, democratic China."[43] Whether Roosevelt was really upset about the secret protocol of the Yalta Agreement or the President really meant to send Hurley to seek some change in the agreement was open to question, as there were no records of their conversation or of the President's oral instruction.

But it seems clear that Franklin D. Roosevelt depended heavily upon Hurley for any information about China. In early March 1945, the President gave an interview to Edgar Snow, an American journalist who had spent a lot of time in China, especially among the Communists. During the interview, the President told Snow that he had never gotten a chance to know Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek very well.

Even during the Cairo Conference where the two leaders met each other, what Roosevelt really heard was Mme Chiang's phrasing of her husband's thoughts. "I got to know her," Roosevelt recalled, "but this fellow Chiang--I never could break through to him at all. I'm hoping Pat Hurley will be able to tell me a little more when he gets back."[44]

Snow got the impression that the President was very interested in the Communists in China when one question after another about the Chinese reds flew out of the President. When Snow asked him whether all the American supplies should be sent to the fighting forces only through Chiang's Central Government because of the United States's sole recognition of the National government, Roosevelt answered that, though he would not repudiate Chiang's regime, he was going to give the Communists direct help in the concluding phase of the war. "Well, I've been working with two governments there," Roosevelt said emphatically, "and I intend to go on doing so until we get them (the CCP and the KMT) together."[45] It was obvious, according to Snow, that President Roosevelt was not insisting on the policy of supporting Chiang's government only but was very flexible in his dealing with the situation in China. He died too soon to leave any clue if he had been convinced by Hurley that the established policy of supporting Chiang only should be carried on and some changes should be made in Yalta Agreement concerning China's interests.

Hurley's own statements that the President was on his side lack strong supporting evidence. However, it seemed

that at the time he did achieve some approval from the President about his argument. This was obvious on April 2 when Hurley gave a press conference in which he stated that the United States's policy in China would remain the same. "There can be no political unification in China as long as there are armed parties and war lords who are still strong enough to defy the National government," he said, and that the Americans in China and the Chinese National Government were "all one team with one objective---the defeat of Japan."[46] He stressed that the United States would "recognize the National Government of China and not any armed war lords or armed political parties in China."[47]

Hurley left Washington the next day after the press conference for London and Moscow. He was satisfied that both the British and the Russians indicated that they would support the American policy in China for the unification of the Chinese armed forces and the creation of a free, united, and democratic China. While in Moscow, Hurley told Marshal Stalin and V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, that the information the Russians had provided him regarding China's political situation was valuable and proved true. He also told his Russian hosts that he had informed Chiang about the Soviet Union's desire to have friendly relations with China and that the Generalissimo was pleased about that. The unification negotiations in China had dragged on and no real results had been achieved, Hurley told Stalin and Molotov, and he hoped that the Soviet Union could "assist in bring[ing] about the consolidation and

unification in China." The Marshal replied that he was ready to give his "complete support" to the American policy. Hurley was greatly inspired and regarded the Marshal's reply as "the best news he had received."[48] From the record of the conversation in Moscow, we can only tell that Hurley was happy about the result of his visit. He seemed to believe sincerely that with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin speaking in one voice, the policy he was trying to carry out in China would have a much better chance to succeed.

It is also strange to note that, throughout the conversation, there was no mention of what Hurley later claimed to be his major task: to ameliorate the Yalta Agreement regarding China's interests. Averell Harriman, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who was present at the conference, later testified that Hurley had never indicated to him that President Roosevelt was disturbed about the Yalta Agreement and desired the document to be revised.[49] What Hurley told Stalin was that his "main purpose" of the visit was to make sure when Chiang should be informed of the Yalta Agreement. The final decision they reached was that Hurley would not communicate the document to Chiang until he had consulted, through Ambassador Harriman, with Marshal Stalin.[50] All this made Hurley's later statement questionable that he had the President's order to try to ameliorate the Yalta Agreement. Hurley's later insistence that this was the case, as a historian has pointed out, might well have stemmed from his own notion of his self-importance and provided him a way to fling conspiracy charges against

career diplomats and some army officers, yet "exonerate" Roosevelt, whom he liked personally and who seemed to "reciprocate the feeling--even to the extent of trusting Hurley with major tasks."[51]

In any event, Hurley was happy when he hurried back to Chungking: he had just assured confidence of the new President; he had obtained the support he needed from both Britain and the Soviet Union to carry out what he considered to be the correct policy in China; and the "trouble-making" Foreign Service officers in China had either been transferred or silenced. What was left seemed to be just a little more effort to knock together the heads of the two foes in China and make a real deal. However, things did not turn out that way.

There was no breakthrough in the negotiations in Chungking while Hurley was in Washington. Just as his staff members reported in their "rebellion telegram," Chiang Kai-shek's feeling of strength had increased with the rapid development of the United States Army's plans to rebuild the Nationalist troops, the cessation of the Japanese offensive, the opening of the Burma Road into China, the expectation that the Nationalist Government would participate at the San Francisco Conference to create the United Nations, and especially the conviction that the United States was determined to support and strengthen his government only. The Nationalist Government was becoming increasingly unwilling to make any real concessions in the talks. In a speech he made on March 1, Chiang stated that he was ready

to admit the CCP and other non-partisan leaders to participate in the government. But he made it clear again that the KMT would not relinquish its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convention of the National Assembly when the supreme power of the government would be returned to the people. As for military unification, Chiang suggested that a commission of three officers, one each from the National government, the CCP, and the United States Army, be organized to make plans for the incorporation of the Communist forces into the National Army. The Communists could, if they wished, join a "War Cabinet" and a "Wartime Political Council," but that was the limit. The KMT could allow other parties to a share in the government, but it "definitely could not abdicate to a loose combination of parties." Chiang also declared that the National Assembly would be convened on November 12 of that year (1945) to inaugurate a constitutional government .[52]

The Communists immediately responded. Yenan labelled Chiang's statement "a dictator's speech." The National Assembly that Chiang seemed so fond of was nothing but an attempt to put on a show, the Communists claimed. They pointed out that any observant person would notice that the representatives of the Assembly were still those chosen by the KMT in 1936 before the war against Japan had started. Contrary to his statement, the Communists remarked, Chiang had not actually accepted a single suggestion put forward by the Communists. The declaration to convene a National Assembly was "an effort to put on a democratic overcoat to

cover his (Chiang's) ugly fascist body." The real purpose of the action, the Communists asserted, was nothing but an attempt to keep the power and interests of Chiang as the head of the most reactionary group in China. They called Chiang "a crazy man" to suggest a "three-man commission" to reorganize the Communist troops. The troops that should be reorganized, they insisted, should be the Nationalist armies that had never won a battle. "We do not think it fair to invite a foreigner to suppress an opponent and the people would not agree with that," the Communists said.[53]

Under such circumstances, the CCP turned more attention to their plans of expansion instead of seeking result at the negotiation table. During late February, the Central Committee of the CCP issued several orders to its troops. Considering the landing of the American troops along the east China coast something "definite" to take place, the Central Committee ordered its troops in central China to complete as soon as possible their training and replacement and start moving southward into southern Anhui, eastern Chekiang, and southern Chiangsu where the Americans were most likely to land.[54] While expansion in the countryside was important, the Central Committee also reminded its commanding officers not to forget the importance of the underground work in the enemy-occupied big cities. By strengthening the underground work there, the party leaders predicted that the Communists would be in an advantageous position from which they could either launch a successful counter-offensive or retreat to the countryside without

worrying ever about attacks from the rear.[55]

At the same time, orders were also issued to the Communists in the KMT-controlled areas. The Central Committee realized that the condition was not ripe to force Chiang and his government to make any significant concessions--there was not yet any important "international pressure" on the KMT and the Soviet Union had not entered the war in Asia. So the party members in the KMT-controlled areas should not indulge themselves in wishful thinking that the negotiations with the KMT could bring about any result soon. "What we are doing," the orders went on, "was to use this open negotiation to assist the development of the democratic movement in the Greater Rear (KMT-controlled areas) while insisting on our proposal of a coalition government."[56] In mid-March, the Communist leaders had come to the conclusion that the establishment of "the United Committee of Chinese People's Liberation," a separate government, had become necessary and issued orders to all ranks of the party organizations urging for immediate preparations.[57]

During May 1945 Chiang and his government tried to do something more "to demonstrate the sincerity" of the KMT on the issue of political and military reforms, with or without any result from the CCP-KMT negotiations. On May 5 the Kuomintang inaugurated its Sixth Plenary Session of the Party Congress. In the resolutions it passed, the Nationalists reaffirmed their pledge to transform the government into a constitutional one. Measures would be taken to

abolish all the KMT organizations within the armies, schools, and government, and the National Assembly would definitely convene in November. The Generalissimo made no direct reference to the Communist problem in his speech during the meeting, although the resolutions passed by the Congress did criticize the CCP for its "persistence in armed insubordination."[58]

As usual, the Communists immediately charged that the KMT Congress only disappointed all those who wished China to be united, strong, and democratic. "The 'democratic posture' the KMT was taking, they sneered, was "an ugly show of hypocrisy. No matter what the KMT was talking about reforms, there was actually no change of the essence of the KMT one-party dictatorship." The changes that the KMT was making were just another attempt to "nationalize" the KMT control over everything in China. The Communists pointed out that Chiang had done nothing to reform his government but just shifted his power "from his left hand to his right hand." They jeered that Chiang's lecturing all the KMT representatives at the meeting and ordering them to stand up to "elect" him as the party president was "the most stupid farce ever seen."[59]

In the meanwhile, the Communists also convened their own Seventh Congress. At that meeting, the party formally announced that Mao was the unarguable leader and his thought the general guiding line over all the party's policies and everyday work. They also declared their policy line in the future: "to mobilize the people, to consolidate the people's

strength, to defeat the Japanese imperialists, and to build a new democratic China." They had made up their mind, more confidently than ever, that they were going to defeat ALL their enemies and build a new China according their own design.[60] Like the KMT, they did not say they were not going to continue the negotiations either.

Hurley seemed to have failed to see these signs. He felt that "logical events"--the KMT's reform efforts and the American policy--"seemed to be convincing the Communists that their best interests as a political party may be served by coming to an agreement with the National Government rather than attempting to destroy it. ...the situation seems definitely improved."[61] It was possible that he was still thinking that, after some more effort, he would be able to help bring about some tangible results from the negotiations. However, the Ambassador's pro-Nationalist attitude began to appear more apparent during the early summer of 1945. He was also becoming more careful in dealing with Yenan, perhaps as the result of his experience with the Communists over the issue of the five-point proposal. Many people, the Communists and even some Nationalists, had stopped regarding him as an impartial mediator.

In mid-June, the Communists refused to take part in the People's Political Council meeting scheduled to begin in early July. Yenan simply stated that the CCP was not going to sit down together with the KMT that had paid no attention to the Communists' proposals, which had the wide support of the country's people. The Communists complained that the

KMT had refused to end its one-party rule and to form a coalition government. It even failed to inform the CCP and other parties about the schedule of the Council's meeting. The Communists asserted that the KMT was planning to force the Council to pass a series of policies that would make it possible for the KMT to control its single-handedly organized National Congress. Such action was not only anti-democratic but also dangerous, because it would ultimately lead to an even stronger one-party dictatorship and bloody civil war. Because of all this, Yenan declared, the CCP would not participate in the Council's meetings at all.[62]

Talking with Wang Jo-fei, the CCP representative in Chungking, in late June, Hurley urged the CCP not to be so rigid in its demands. To join in the Government's efforts could only benefit the Communists, he said; they could "advise throughout the transition period (remainder of the 'period of tutelage') and suggest ways and means to improve the government." He claimed that he was still "the best friend" the Communists had in Chungking "notwithstanding all those unjust and untrue accusation" against him. However, the Ambassador could not help but start to defend the Nationalists again. He told the Communist representative that Chiang had withdrawn some of his troops from north China; there was considerable freedom of speech and press in the KMT-controlled areas; and the Nationalist government kept its secret police simply out of wartime necessity to deal with security matters, just like the FBI in the United States and Scotland Yard in Britain. He felt that it was

illogical for the CCP to insist on their four demands put forward by Chou En-lai in late December 1944.[63] He felt that the CCP could simply give up their four demands and come to an agreement with the KMT on the original five points they proposed with Hurley's "help" in Yenan the year before. By so doing, he told the Communist representative, the CCP would be able to become part of the government and take a hand in the settlement of questions including their four demands. When Wang asked Hurley to persuade the Generalissimo to accept the CCP's four demands as a precondition to further negotiations, the Ambassador flatly refused. Later on, Yenan put forward two more demands in early July asking the Nationalist government to call off the National Assembly scheduled for November and summon a political conference composed of members of the KMT, the CCP, the Democratic League, and other independent parties with equal rights. The impatient Ambassador became angry about this delaying tactic. He concluded that Yenan was "playing for time" and waiting for the result of the Chinese-Soviet conference that was going on in Moscow, hoping their Russian comrades would give them a hand.[64]

The American Ambassador was still refusing to listen to his Embassy staff, although the most "trouble-making" members had gone. But reports still kept coming to him. The reports showed that Chiang had recently given secret speeches coupling the Communists with the Japanese as enemies of the state who should be shown no mercy. They also showed that the breakout of civil war was more likely

than ever, as both the KMT and the CCP considered that there was no possibility of or no necessity for a peaceful settlement when the United States would continue its policy of unlimited support of the KMT government. Hurley disagreed with this opinion. What was happening, he insisted, was nothing new and that was why he was in China. The situation was not worse but better than it had been when he first arrived in that country. "For my part," the Ambassador remarked, "I believe that the Communist controversy can be settled satisfactorily and without civil war if some of our American ideological crusaders will permit the American policy to become effective."[65] He reported to the Secretary of State that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had assured both General Wedemeyer and the Ambassador himself that he was using his best efforts to avoid trouble and that strict orders had been issued to his troops to avoid engagement with the Communist forces. In his report, the Ambassador could not help pouring out his disgust and hatred toward those who had "exaggerated" clashed between the KMT and the CCP and "fanned disagreements into the proportions of civil war."[66]

In reality, the threat of a civil war did develop during the early summer of 1945. The CCP Central Committee, in its instructions to its Southern China Bureau, clearly explained that the Party's current plan was "to build a 'southern wing' of the [CCP] base areas so that the KMT troops can be tied down once the civil war break out." The instructions ordered the Communist troops to penetrate into

south China by taking the gaps left between the KMT forces and the Japanese or puppet troops and to keep prepared all the time to grasp any opportunity and overcome all kinds of difficulties to establish a firm foothold in the South.[67] Yenan had never said anything publicly about giving up the negotiations. Obviously, however, the Communists by the summer of 1945 had been very close to the conviction that negotiations would not bring about any benefit to them and the only place to deal with the Nationalists was on the battlefield instead of at the negotiation table. They knew there would be some difficulties in the future, but the expectation of difficulties could not prevent them from taking an optimistic view of their future.

On the KMT side, what the Embassy staff reported to Hurley turned out to be true. Later development proved that Chiang and his government had also regarded the negotiations with the Communists a waste of time, and they were making plans to take the allied landing on the China coast as a golden chance to deal with the Communists.

The American Ambassador ignored or refused to see this reality and maintained his optimism. The delay of any fruitful results from the one-year-long negotiations since he had arrived in China, Hurley thought, was the Communists' "playing for time" while waiting to see the result of the Chinese-Russian conference in Moscow. He deeply believed, as he had always, that "the influence of the Soviet [Union] will control the action of the Chinese Communist Party." Once the United States got the guarantee that the Soviet

Union would not support the CCP when it entered the war in Asia, he thought, Yenan would finally be forced to settle with Chiang's government.[68] Once again, he proved wrong in his calculation.

VII. THE RUSSIAN CARD

Through the summer of 1945, Hurley once again took up the role as the mediator in the negotiations between the two Chinese foes, the Nationalists and the Communists. While the two sides across the negotiation table were fighting their war of words with less enthusiasm for peace and more interest in settling the issue on the battlefield, the American Ambassador was still optimistic, thinking he had found the key to the hard problem of unification in China: the influence of the Soviet Union must be taken into consideration for any solution in China.

Hurley had long insisted that the Chinese Communists were under the direct influence of Moscow. Even before he began his mission to China as President Roosevelt's personal representative, he went to see Stalin for advice and assistance. During his visit in the Soviet Union in August and September 1944, he obtained the Soviet leaders' promise that they would support the American policy in China that aimed at a unification of all anti-Japanese forces under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. More important, he was deeply impressed by the Soviet leaders' guarantee that Moscow would not support the Chinese Communists whom they considered not real Communists at all.

They made the President's envoy believe that Yenan's followers were but a group of patriots pursuing economic improvement. From then on, Hurley had started using the words "the so-called Communists" whenever referring to the Chinese Communists.

In April 1945, the American Ambassador visited Moscow again on his way back to Chungking after his consultation in Washington. Once again he had the Russian dictator's word that the Soviet Union was "ready to assist in every possible way" the American effort in bringing about the unification of the military forces in China. With the "best news" he had ever received, Hurley thought that success of his mission was not far away.[1]

When there was no significant progress he had expected to occur during later spring of 1945, the Ambassador concluded, in his telegram to the Secretary of State, that "my opinion is that ... it is their [the Communists] way of playing for time awaiting the result of [T. V.] Soong's conference at Moscow."[2] In the same telegram, Hurley told the Secretary that he was convinced that "the influence of the Soviet Union will control the action of the Chinese Communist Party." Although the Sino-Soviet Conference was going on in Moscow with the Nationalist Government representing China, "the Chinese Communists do not believe," Hurley stated, "that Stalin has agreed or will agree to support the National Government of China and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek." He believed that Yenan was still expecting Moscow to support the Chinese Communist cause

against the Nationalists and "nothing short of the Soviet's public commitment [to the Nationalist government] will change the Chinese Communist opinion on this subject [unification]." Hurley also believed that once the Nationalist government reached an agreement with the Russians, it would also be easier for him to persuade the Generalissimo "to be very generous" in making political concessions in the negotiation with the Chinese Communists, which Chiang had been unwilling to make at the time.[3]

Hurley seemed to take Stalin's promise not to support the CCP with full confidence as he reported to the White House and the State Department through 1944 and 1945. Realizing that the CCP still believed it had the support of the Soviet Union, the American Ambassador concluded that only a formal treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Nationalist Government, "in which the Soviet agrees to support the National Government," could finally force the Yenan leaders to sit down to talk and convince the Nationalists to be realistic enough to make necessary concessions to keep the negotiations going.[4]

Hurley did not forget to criticize his "opponents," whom he believed to have always tried to sabotage his efforts, charging that many professional diplomats, some Army officers, and almost all American journalists in China had "in large measure" accepted the Communists' statements in regard to the military and political strength of the CCP. The Ambassador strongly believed that "the strength of the armed forces of the Chinese Communists has been exaggerated.

The areas of territory controlled by the Communists has been exaggerated. The number of the people who adhere to the Chinese Communist Party has been exaggerated." He warned his government that the Communists' strength was at a state in which "with the support of the Soviet Union the Communists could launch a civil war while without such Russian support they would eventually participate as a political party in the National Government."[5]

Hurley's confidence in Stalin and his active effort to promote Soviet-Chinese [Nationalists] good relations worried some people both in Washington and elsewhere. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew advised Hurley to avoid giving the Nationalists an impression that the United States was assuming responsibility as "advisor" in their relations with the Soviet Union. He told the Ambassador that the United States considered the "most satisfactory course" was for the Nationalists to reach an agreement with the Communists. Such an agreement would strengthen the Nationalists' position when dealing with the Russians.[6] Hurley did not agree with the Secretary. He reminded Grew that his mission from the very beginning had something to do with the role of mediator between China and the Soviet Union and "that is exactly what we have done and what we are doing" according to the policy laid down by the President. He pointed out that the State Department had failed to realize that "the attitude of the Soviet Union was and is the paramount factor precedent to any agreement between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party."[7]

There were other people who felt uncomfortable about Hurley's confidence in what he described as the "unqualified" support of the Soviet Union. George Kennan, the American Charge d'Affaires in the Soviet Union, after careful studies of Hurley's reports, commented that the attitude of the Ambassador toward China might in a way "contribute to a misunderstanding of the situation in high quarters at home." He pointed out that "words meant different things to Stalin than they did to the Americans." Stalin was prepared to express his support for the principle of a unification of armed forces of China, Kennan remarked, because the Russian leader knew clearly that such unification was "practically feasible only on terms acceptable to the Chinese Communists." As for the Soviet Union's support for a free, united, and democratic China, he continued, Stalin was also clear that these words could be interpreted in his own way: the goal of a "united" China could be a reality only if Yenan's demands were met and the meaning of the words "free" and "democratic" was also clear to any one who had experience in dealing with the Communist Russians. Kennan predicted that the Soviet Union would keep the policy it had followed for some time: "a fluid, resilient policy, aimed at the achievement of maximum power with minimum responsibility on portions of the Asiatic mainland lying beyond the Soviet border." In Kennan's opinion, it was very probable that the Soviet Union would re-acquire all territorial and diplomatic assets Czarist Russia once possessed on the Asiatic mainland and acquire control over

North China excluding other powers' penetration. Kennan was obviously worrying about Hurley's trust in the Russians' promises when he said: "It would be tragic if our natural anxiety for Russian support at this stage, coupled with Stalin's cautious affability and his use of words which mean all things to all people, were to lead us into an undue reliance on Russian aid or even Russian acquiescence in the achievement of our long term objective in China."[8]

John Davies, the Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow after he had been forced out of China, also expressed an opinion supporting Kennan's assessment. He pointed out that the guarantee Hurley had obtained from the Soviet Union could mean nothing because of "the dual nature of the Soviet system": the Soviet Government (the state apparatus) could "quite easily repudiate Yenan publicly without basically altering Yenan's intransigent attitude" because the Russian Communist Party could "do just the opposite, whispering discreetly in the appropriate ears that it's all for show and need not be allowed to affect realities." If the Soviet government and the Soviet party both publicly repudiate Yenan, or even if all foreign support was withdrawn from Yenan, Davies continued, the Chinese Communists would still remain what they were because they had been growing all through those difficult years without any outside assistance anyway and they were much stronger at the time than during the period of 1927-1937. Davies felt that Hurley had overestimated Soviet influence and that "the indigenous strength, vitality and obstinacy of

Yenan is a factor not to be ignored and one which, in the last analysis, means that if China is to be unified through negotiations, Chungking is going to make the bigger concessions."[9]

Another outsider also expressed his opinion concerning American policy in China. W. H. Donald, an Australian who had worked in China since 1903 and played an important role in that country in the twentieth century, disagreed that Yenan was operating and functioning with the backing and favor of the Soviet Union. The former personal advisor to Sun Yat-sen, Marshal Chang Hue-liang, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had no high regard for the Chinese Communists. In his opinion, the Russian influence over the CCP had much declined since Moscow withdrew its support of the Chinese Communists in 1936 in favor of the Nationalists. What remained in Yenan was "a hangover" minority trading on former Russian influence, each striving for personal gains and influence. Donald did not flatter the KMT either. There was no progressive spirit but a definite lack of nationalism among the Nationalists, Donald remarked, and "ninety per cent of the present Kuomintang should be booted out." He also reminded the Americans that Chiang had long been fighting the Communists and would continue to do so; "the United States should learn this, the sooner, the better."[10]

Secretary of State Edward T. Stettinius also cautioned Hurley. The Secretary stated that it was logical for Stalin to give his support to American policy in China when he was

preoccupied in Europe and the basis for Soviet Union's post-war position in Asia had not been appreciably affected by the KMT-CCP issue. But once the Soviet Union entered the war in the Far East, Stettinius continued, the Russians might "re-examine their policy and revise it in accordance with their best interests." The Secretary of State asked Hurley to "take special pains" to inform Chiang Kai-shek of the possibility of change of Soviet policy when telling the Generalissimo about this Russian guarantee.[11] The purpose of the Secretary's instruction was clear: the United States wanted to impress upon the Generalissimo the necessity of the early political and military unification, not only for the sake of war against Japan but also for relations between the Soviet Union and China after the war.

The highest ranking policy makers in Washington shared Hurley's view that Soviet concurrence in American policy toward China was important, but they were not so sure about Stalin's real intention despite Hurley's optimistic assessments. President Truman and the State Department decided they needed to make sure the Soviet leader would keep his word. So Harry Hopkins was sent to Moscow in late May in an attempt to obtain such a promise on promises. The news Hopkins sent back seemed encouraging. In his message to Hurley, President Truman said that he was happy that the Ambassador's assessments about Soviet attitudes had been proved correct by Hopkins's visit to Moscow. The Russian leader, he told Hurley, had made a "categorical statement" in which Stalin said the USSR would support Chiang as leader

of a unified China both during and after the war; the Soviet Union had no territorial claims against China and would welcome the Nationalist government's representatives in Manchuria to facilitate the organization of the Chinese administration once the Red Army defeated the Japanese.[12] Hurley could not hold back his happiness and excitement after hearing this news.

In spite of the similar anxiety about the Russian policy concerning China, however, Washington and its Ambassador in China were not actually thinking in the same way. What concerned Washington was that if the unification of China failed to materialize before the Soviet Union entered the war in Asia in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, Moscow might very conveniently build up its sphere of influence in northern China by simply supporting the Chinese Communists against the Nationalist government. On the other hand, Hurley thought Soviet support necessary, because he believed that the only effective way to force the Chinese Communists to come to terms with the Nationalists was to cut off Yenan's hope of Russian support if it chose to face the Nationalists in the battlefield. Hurley firmly believed, even after he left China, that he had reached his goal---he had obtained Stalin's assurance of support and the Soviet Union would support Chiang's government and not the Chinese Communists.[13] Later developments in China proved both Hurley and his superiors in Washington wrong in regard to Russian promises. Hurley's confidence in Stalin's words helped Washington to take the Russian leader's words at

their face value when we consider that Hurley was Washington's major source of information concerning China and there was no longer any different voice in the Embassy after his purge of the Foreign Service officers in early spring.

Hurley's effort to bring about some success in China with Russian support continued. According to instructions from the State Department, he informed Chiang about the terms of the Yalta Agreement on June 15, although he was not happy to tell the Generalissimo the truth at such a late time when the Chinese leader seemed to have known everything the Ambassador was going to say.[14] The response from Chiang was that he wanted the United States and Britain, if possible, to participate jointly in the use of Manchurian ports and be parties in the Sino-Soviet Treaty that would be signed at the end of the negotiations in Moscow. The Generalissimo's deep distrust of the Russians made him put forward such a proposal to curtail any misbehavior on the part of the Soviet Union. Hurley obviously agreed with such a proposal,[15] but Washington refused to consider Chiang's plea for help, stating that it appeared "doubtful that the Soviet Union would consent to a tripartite or multilateral pact, since the purpose of such a pact would be to regulate Sino-Soviet relations."[16] However, when the Chinese representatives met rough treatment in Moscow and were under heavy pressure from the Soviet leaders to make more concessions, the Americans became alert. In a very tough tone, President Truman told the Generalissimo to carry out the

Yalta Agreement and not to make "any concessions in excess of that agreement."[17] Ambassador Harriman in Moscow also reminded the Soviet leaders about their pledge to support America's "open door" policy in China and other promises they had made through 1944 and 1945. This probably helped the Chinese a little bit when Stalin lessened his pressure and made some compromises.[18] On August 14 the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was formally signed in Moscow. The treaty stated that the two governments, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Nationalists, would work in friendly collaboration and mutual respect in the postwar period; they would respect each other's sovereignty and refrain from interference in each other's domestic affairs; and the Soviet Union would give moral and material support in the future "entirely" to the Nationalist government. The treaty also specified that Port Arthur was to become a jointly used naval port and Dairen a "free port" with Russian privileges, and the Manchurian railroads would be under Chinese-Russian joint ownership.[19] Hurley was delighted to hear this because his main objective had been achieved: the Soviet Union had formally given its support to Chiang's Nationalist government only. Soon after the treaty was signed, he reported to the State Department that the Generalissimo was "generally satisfied with the treaty" and thanked the American Ambassador for all his help in bringing about the rapprochement with the Soviets.[20] Later Hurley suggested to the State Department that the Sino-Soviet Treaty and related agreements be made public as soon as

possible. He believed that the publication of those documents would demonstrate conclusively that the Soviet government supported the Nationalists, thus forcing the Chinese Communists back to the negotiation table[21]

Hurley was anxious to have the Sino-Soviet Treaty published because he saw the situation in China turning worse. As the war against Japan was drawing to its end, the relations between the Nationalists and Communists deteriorated. Once the threat from the foreign enemy was gone, the two allied foes began to find themselves preparing to settle the account with each other. In June and July, Yenan's criticism of the Nationalists and Hurley reached its peak. The Communists charged that during the first half of the year, China had been pushed to the brink of civil war by "the Hurley/Chiang policy." With Hurley's encouragement, Yenan stated, Chiang had given his January 1 and March 1 speeches that were in essence calls for a civil war.[22] Mao Tse-tung also publicly charged that Chiang and Hurley were trying to hammer out unification under the Nationalist terms, calling such a cooperation a "Hurley-Chiang Duet." No matter what Chiang and Hurley were talking about, Mao asserted, the dictatorial system in China had not changed at all and the threat of civil war was ever greater.[23] The vehement attack of the Communists on Hurley seemed to suggest that, by that time, Yenan had concluded that the American Ambassador had already committed himself to the Nationalist cause. Whether or not they really thought so, such an assault on Hurley only led to one result: the

Ambassador did begin to take a more and more anti-Communist and pro-Nationalist stand in the following rounds of talks.

The Yenan leaders also began to warn the whole party about the possibility of a large-scale Nationalist offensive once the resistance war against Japan was over. They believed that there were only three factors that could help ease the dangerous situation and avoid civil war: the armies and the people in the "liberated areas" unified their strength to expand the areas under their control; the democratic forces in the KMT-controlled areas combined their efforts; or the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union took a unified effort against civil war in China. Realizing that the Soviet Union was about to enter the war, the Central Committee of the CCP also ordered the Communist troops to "grasp this great historic opportunity" to expand the "liberated areas." If met with any opposition from the Nationalist forces, the troops were ordered to "push them aside or just wipe them out." Apparently the Chinese Communists did hope with some confidence at the time that their Russian comrades would give them some kind of help in dealing with the Nationalists to offset the American assistance to Chiang [24]

August of 1945 witnessed the most dramatic events in modern history. On August 6 the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima when Japan rejected the allied ultimatum of surrender. Two days later, the Russian Red Army rushed into war piercing into the Japanese defense lines. The next day Nagasaki was fatally damaged by

America's second A-bomb. The demoralized Japanese armies finally surrendered on August 14.

In China the race to accept the Japanese surrender started immediately. On August 10 and 11, Chu Teh, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist troops, issued seven orders to his field commanders throughout the country to move their troops forward "to cooperate with the Soviet Red Army in the battles and prepare to accept surrender of the Japanese and Manchurian puppets."[25]

Even before Japan formally surrendered, the CCP Central Committee had notified its party members to be ready for the "very severe fighting against the Nationalists who would come to 'recover' the lost land" once the Japanese laid down their arms. Faced with such a situation, Yenan ordered its troops "to abandon the guerrilla warfare immediately,... combine all the troops available in the most urgent terms" to expand the "liberated areas" and force the Japanese and puppet troops to surrender to the Communists. To deal with the large-scale KMT offensive, the Central Committee decided to reorganize its military commanding system so that it could maneuver its troops better and mobilize more militia. As for the negotiations with the KMT, the Central Committee warned its party members not to have "any illusion" about Chiang Kai-shek and be prepared spiritually and materially to face the civil war if Chiang was going to start one. The Central Committee also suggested that new tendencies in international and domestic situations be studied urgently yet carefully, and before the party's final decision was

made, criticism against the United States and the KMT government was supposed to be moderate in its terms. Yenan made it very clear that priority should be given to the plans of territorial expansion and acceptance of the Japanese surrender.[26] Whether or not they wished they could get Russian assistance, it was clear that the negotiations with the KMT were low in Yenan's list of priorities and the Communists were determined and prepared to meet the Nationalists on the battlefield. A policy of "talk while fighting" was in its making, which would become one of the most important tactics of the Chinese Communists in their struggle to obtain ultimate national power during the second half of the 1940s.

The Communists' attempt to accept the Japanese surrender ran against the allied decisions at Potsdam. The Allies had given Chiang and his government the sole responsibility to take the Japanese surrender in the China Theater. The order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Wedemeyer clearly stated that the Japanese surrender could only be accepted by "agencies and forces accredited by the Central [Nationalist] Government" and dealing with Chinese forces and agencies other than those of the Central Government "will be strictly limited to requirements of military situation." The same directive also ordered Wedemeyer to assist the Nationalist government "in rapid transport of Chinese Central Government's forces to key areas in China," although there would be no U. S. ground forces to be involved in any major landing campaign and the United States would not support the

Nationalists in any civil strife.[27]

The orders Yenan issued to its troops to accept the Japanese surrender also worried Hurley. He felt that such activities on the part of the CCP would easily lead to a civil war in China. If the Communists were allowed to capture the weapons of the surrendered Japanese troops, all the American efforts in the past to avoid arming the Communists so that they would negotiate with the Nationalists would be totally ruined. He suggested to his government that the United States issue necessary orders to the Japanese warning them against laying down their arms to any forces other than the Nationalist government. He also rushed to Washington Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's demands bearing similar terms.[28] Hurley thought that such action plus Wedemeyer's active support for the Nationalists to regain control in north China, and the coming publication of the Sino-Soviet Treaty would finally convince the Communists that the negotiation table was the only place where they should go to put forward any demands in earnest. Obviously, the American Ambassador by this time had openly sided with the Nationalists.

The Communists strongly condemned Chiang for his ordering them "to remain at present posts and wait for further directions" while giving the former puppet troops authority for "maintaining order in occupied areas." They publicly called Chiang "the Fascist Chieftain" who was preparing to start a civil war against the will of the Chinese people.[29] Yenan's reaction to the allied decision

to authorize the Nationalists only to accept the Japanese surrender was serious. General Chu Teh sent a memo to the Ambassadors of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union on August 15. In the memo the Communist Commander-in-Chief asked the allies to pay attention to the reality in the China Theater when they were making decisions. He stated that the Nationalist government could not represent the people and the anti-Japanese forces in the liberated and enemy-controlled areas. Those anti-Japanese forces, he insisted, had the authority to accept the surrender of the Japanese whom they were fighting against. They should also have the right to attend any United Nations meeting concerning Japan and China. The memo especially asked the United States not to give any assistance to the Nationalist government if that government chose to start a civil war in China.[30]

The vague response or no response at all from the Allies must have disappointed Yenan, but the publication of the Sino-Soviet Treaty on August 24 probably was the most powerful shock the Chinese Communists had received for quite a long time. There are few published written records about the CCP's reaction to the treaty at the time. Even the documents released recently show little sign of the party's response to the Soviet Union's statement of supporting Chiang's government only. However, Mao and his comrades were a group of men who had experienced far more disadvantageous situations in their revolutionary careers. After the possible initial shock at the news, the Chinese

Communists were able to adjust their strategy and policies quickly in a very pragmatic fashion that by 1945 had become very typical of the CCP reaction to changing situations.

Yenan openly expressed its approval of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, and within a few days instructions had been issued from the Central Committee to all the party district bureaus and field commanders informing them of the adjustment of policies. The instruction issued on August 29 told the party and its armies that "the Soviet Union, bound by the Sino-Soviet Treaty and for the sake of peace in the Far East, has to transfer the administration of the Northeast (Manchuria) to the Nationalist government. Therefore, the Soviet Red Army will surely be unwilling to give us help or even accept our formal contact." However, the instructions pointed out, the Soviet Union's statement that it would not interfere with China's internal affairs had left some space for the Chinese Communists to maneuver. "If our activities do not affect her diplomatic commitment, the Soviet Union would very probably take a sympathetic attitude and give us a free hand," the instructions said. The Nationalist troops were still far away from Manchuria, the instructions went on; therefore a very good chance existed there for the Communists to obtain actual control of Manchuria. The Communist troops were ordered to use the names of Manchurian Army or Manchurian Volunteers when entering the area, if they met no opposition from the Red Army. There would be no publicity or news release about the troops' movements. The troops were asked not to take the train to big cities;

instead, they should take country roads to occupy the countryside and medium or small towns where there was no Red Army garrison, and local governments and local armed forces should be organized as soon as possible. The instruction went on to emphasize that no one was allowed to contact the Soviet Red Army for help in any formal fashion: "We must do everything possible not to put the Red Army in an embarrassed position in terms of diplomacy and law. It will be satisfactory if the Red Army does not make it public or severely oppose our activities."[31]

But in Chungking Hurley was thinking that he finally had obtained the important leverage he needed to make the Communists sit down at the negotiation table. In mid-August, having learned of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Hurley urged Chiang to invite Mao Tse-tung to come to Chungking, predicting that the Communist leader would not refuse to come and "the armed conflict between the Communist Party of China and the National Government may be reduced to a political controversy."[32] To his satisfaction, Mao did accepted the invitation, though the Communist leader demanded a guarantee of safety. The happy Ambassador volunteered to fly to Yenan and accompany Mao and his comrades back to Chungking to protect them against any personal harm. He was indeed pleased that "the inexorable logic of events...is working" and the talks could resume again.[33] On August 27 Hurley flew to Yenan again and returned the next day with Mao and Chou.[34]

The negotiations resumed with much publicity. Chiang

and Mao, two political enemies who had not seen each other except in battles since 1927 when the first Nationalist-Communist alliance broke up, sat together across the same table and stories and pictures of them occupied the headlines of newspapers every day. When people throughout the country saw the two long time foes toasting at the Chungking banquet, they had the impression that the negotiations must be going on very well and that China would finally achieve the hope of peace at last. However, differences between the two sides were only covered by polite diplomatic terms while a severe struggle for power was actually proceeding. In September, the Communists presented their terms, which showed they did not make any real concessions from their original demands. They still asked for legal status of the CCP and its authority in the "liberated areas," the nationalization of all the armed forces, and the democratization of the current National government. But they also went further to ask for the Communist troops' authority to participate in accepting the Japanese surrender and the redemarcation of garrison zones with the Communist forces in control of north China and the Nationalist south China. Mao did not mention coalition government, a demand that Yenan had insisted upon since November 1944. This absence of the former major demand was probably a sign that the CCP had adjusted its policies for more practical plans. The Nationalists were not more willing to make concessions either. They accepted a few but refused the most important terms of the CCP and gave some very vague promises only.

Reading the documents of the talks could only give people a false impression that everything was moving in the right direction, but if one was able to read between the lines he would realize that the differences between the two sides were still so great that hope for a quick and satisfactory conclusion for the negotiations was no more realistic than a year before.[35]

The Communists realized that the negotiations could bring about little tangible result. That they were not insisting on the coalition government reflected that they had other plans. While the talks were still going on, Yenan informed the whole party and its troops not to expect any satisfactory results from the negotiations in Chungking. The major effort for the party, the Central Committee stated, was "to strengthen the just struggle of the people in the liberated areas and the KMT-controlled areas so as to obtain the advantageous position in the Chungking negotiations as well as for a peaceful and democratic China." To do that, Yenan told its party members to expect the nationwide strategy of the party be adjusted to the changing situation. "We will expand to the north while taking a defensive posture toward the south. The major task of the whole party and the whole army at this moment is... to expand and to try to control whole Northeast (Manchuria)." If such control were realized, the Central Committee predicted, the Communists would be able to coordinate the struggle of the liberated areas and the people throughout the country, and then the victory would be guaranteed.[36]

Through September, orders from Yenan reached all Communist forces in China. Large groups of troops entered the Northeast provinces, using the name of the Manchurian Army or other local Manchurian troops.[37] The Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies also began large-scale recruitment, according to Yenan's orders that each army was to expand by "several hundreds of thousands" and combined their once small guerilla detachments into much larger and mobile troops (brigade or division size).[38] The troops that occupied the areas covering the transportation lines were ordered to destroy the railroads and highways so that the Nationalist troops' effort to enter Manchuria would be stopped or slowed down dramatically. If the Nationalist forces attempted to force their way through, the Communist troops had orders to "wipe out one or two divisions of them [Nationalist troops] with overwhelming superiority" so that "more time will be saved for our preparation for future victories."[39] During September when the United States and Britain decided to help the Nationalists to get to Manchuria by air and by sea and to give or sell the Nationalists planes and ships and other lend-lease supplies,[40] Yenan concluded that "it is obvious the enemies (the Japanese), the United States, and Britain are now combining their efforts to support Chiang in the struggle for the control of Northeast." To deal with such a situation, the Military Committee of the CCP instructed the Communist troops "to put the center of our plan (to control whole Manchuria) on building base areas for extended struggles." These base

areas, according to the Central Military Committee, should be in the cities, towns, and the countryside that could use the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, and Korea as their "supporting rears" from where the move to capture big cities in southern Manchuria would start.[41]

"Hurley and Wedemeyer are very reactionary," Yenan informed the whole party. "Their policy is to support Chiang firmly against the Soviet Union and the Communists." But the Communists also felt they still had the sympathy and support of many other Americans, including those within the United State government and public opinion generally. So they decided "not to expose them (Hurley and Wedemeyer) publicly at this moment," hoping the Americans would ultimately change their policy in China.[42] In order to coordinate the Party's efforts at Chungking, the Central Committee also required its propaganda machine "not to criticize the KMT and the United States with sharp words" while insisting the Party's demands on the Nationalist government.[43] It is really amazing to see how fast and skillfully the CCP could adjust its strategies and policies in the changing situation, something the Nationalists had never been able to do as well as the Communists.

Some Americans suspected that the new round of negotiations could produce better results. Edwin A. Locker, President Truman's personal representative in charge of the American Production Mission in China, felt that "Chiang would rather fight than make major concessions to the Communists. He understands the use of force and his record

shows that in the past he has inclined toward military method of settling issues." Unless powerful pressure was put upon him from outside China, Locker predicted, Chiang would "fight the Communists at the first favorable opportunity."[44] He was also sure that the Communists would not hesitate to take up Chiang's challenge: "They (the Communists) will not enter a government that does not make broad and intensive economic reform a sincere national policy, ... and above all they will not put their army under the Central Government, as Chiang insisted, unless they are given extensive share in military command. Evidence suggests that no offer of cabinet posts in the Central Government can alter their determination to retain the protection of armed forces until the military leadership of the Central Government is no longer a threat to them."[45]

But Hurley did not think so. He ignored the long history of distrust between the KMT and CCP and failed to realize that courteous words did not necessarily mean the two sides were really willing to cooperate. In his mind, everything would be alright as long as the two sides were willing to sit together and talk. In spite of the deep differences behind the polite and brilliant rhetoric of the official bulletins, Hurley believed that "favorable developments" were occurring.[46] He also believed that the two sides had reached agreements on "numerous questions," except some minor issues such as the Communists' demand to have the right to appoint, select or elect any Communist governors or mayors in certain provinces and cities and the

number of divisions of the Communist troops should have once included in the peace-time National Army. He told Secretary of State James F. Byrnes very proudly of the overall achievement in Chungking, implying his efforts, had been "to keep the Communists and the Nationalists talking peace-time cooperation during the period for which civil war has been predicted by nearly all of the elements who are supporting a policy to keep China divided against herself."[47]

In Hurley's opinion, the Communists would remain in Chungking, the negotiations would continue, and agreements would be reached ultimately. This meant a satisfactory period would be put on the record of his peace-making mission in China. When requested by both the Nationalists and the Communists to stay longer to render assistance in reaching some agreements, Hurley was happy to comply. He concluded that the spirit between the negotiators was good and "the rapprochement between the two leading parties of China seems to be progressing and the discussion and rumors of civil war recede as the conference continue."[48]

The Ambassador was so excited about what he predicted would be a success that he told the representatives from both sides not to attempt to settle too many details. Too much attention to details, he said, would only "in all probability lead to interminable debate." So he encouraged the two sides to agree on basic over-all principles and work out details later in accordance with those principles.[49] It is apparent that Hurley had failed to see or willfully ignored the fact that both the CCP and the KMT had always

been "willing" to agree on "principles," such as following Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles and working for a democratic China and much less willing to make any essential concessions throughout the entire negotiations between the two parties. "Details," such as who would command the military forces and control local governments, were actually what they were fighting for. Each side could easily claim that it was following the principles set forth at the negotiation table while the other side had violated them, because each side could interpret those "principles" in its own terms and for its own needs and purposes. However, Hurley returned to the United States with the firm belief that, with the official declaration of Russian support for the Chinese Nationalist Government in the Sino-Soviet Treaty, his mission would finally see a successful ending.

VIII. THE END OF THE MISSION

There were several reasons that led Hurley to go back to the United States, leaving behind him the success that seemed so close in sight. He was troubled by the news that his old "rebellious" aides whom he had thrown out of China, John Service and George Atcheson, had recently been assigned to serve as General Douglas MacArthur's political advisers in the Supreme Allied Command in Asia. This the Ambassador thought was an obvious attempt by some State Department officials to sabotage his mission in China. He protested to Washington, but felt he still needed to go back to find out what was going on there.[1] He had also been unhappy to read in the newspapers that some rumors were spreading indicating his resignation, because of "his deep dissatisfaction with arrangement in the China Affairs Section of the State Department."[2] He thought that such news could not come from anywhere but some of the State Department officials who disliked his work and his ideas about China. Besides, he was also worried that some of these officials were giving up the late President's principles of the United States' foreign policy regarding self-determination and imperialism.

Hurley had always been bothered by the allies' intentions in Asia. Ever since he took his mission to China,

he had kept reporting about the "imperialistic moves" of the British, the French, and the Dutch in China as well as in Southeast Asia. He pointed out that these allies contributed little to the American effort to defeat Japan but used lend-lease supplies to strengthen themselves for the restoration of their former colonies in the area, which, according to Hurley, had been one of the late President's major concerns. Hurley was not happy about the result of the Yalta Conference. He thought that the United States delegation had not stood up against, but instead supported, the allies' ambition to regain their colonial interests. When his reports and comments did not get support from the State Department and the new President, Hurley concluded that a conspiracy was at work that had distorted or even betrayed the traditional American policy toward China.[3]

Soon after he returned to the United States, however, Hurley let his superiors know that he wanted to resign as the Ambassador to China, citing bad health and ineffective support from the State Department as the reasons. Both President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes urged him to reconsider. Truman even went so far as to say, according to Hurley's account, that the Ambassador "could fire any one that interfered his effort." But the Ambassador complained that his firing them could only make them stronger, indicating the case of George Atcheson and John Service. When President Truman promised him that those Hurley had problem with would be reassigned to other positions that had no important influence on the China policy, Hurley felt

satisfied. When his request that the United States government issue a public statement regarding American policy in China was also accepted, Hurley was happy to say he was going back to China.[4]

But historians have pointed out that Hurley's attempt to resign might also reflected the Ambassador's own calculation about his future in public service. The "rumor" circulated in the news about his possible resignation seemed to him an indication that Washington was not satisfied with his work and some authorities intentionally leaked the news. He figured that he was going to be fired anyway if he did not resign. On the other hand, he might also think he had "nothing to lose but everything to gain" if he left the office at the time. The situation in China appeared much better than at any time while he was in that country and he could get out while he was ahead.[5] Anyway, when the President and the Secretary of State promised what Hurley wanted, the Ambassador accepted their advice to have a good physical check-up and a rest in the New Mexico sun and then return to China to carry on his mission. On October 13, the State Department announced that Ambassador Hurley was going to return to China very soon.[6]

It seems that Hurley's change of mind was clearly linked to change of situation in China. When the Ambassador left Chungking on September 22, the atmosphere did appear promising. Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek, two long time bloody adversaries, had finally sat down to talk across the table for the first time since 1927. Both parties seemed to

be more interested in settling problems than ever and the negotiations did not break up but continued after the Ambassador's departure. By early October Hurley had received from his Embassy staff some reports telling him that much progress had been made in the negotiations, including military unification and establishment of a political council that would consider and recommend policies concerning a draft constitution, a people's congress, and a policy for peaceful reconstruction. The Communist representative, Chou En-lai, even said that the only principal point remaining unsolved was the question of the (Communist) governments in the "liberated areas."[7] On October 11 the Nationalist Government officially released the text of the CCP-KMT agreement entitled "Summary of the Conversation between the Government and the Representatives of the Chinese Communist Party," better known in China as the "Double Tenth Agreement."[8]

Despite the fact that differences did exist, such as on the reelection of all delegates to the National Assembly and the legalization of the local governments in the liberated areas, the terms of the two sides in the agreement were the closest ever since the talks started. The two sides also agreed that they would continue to seek a solution acceptable to both sides on the unsettled issues.[9] The American Charge d'Affaires in China, Walter S. Robertson, reported that the Communist representatives were "definitely much more optimistic than they had previously been" with respect to the likelihood of an eventual agreement between the

Central Government and the Communists. He also told Hurley through Secretary of State Byrnes that the Communists welcomed the Ambassador's return to China. In another telegram, Robertson informed his boss again that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had paid tribute to the Ambassador's efforts in China by stating that Hurley was "primarily responsible for present state of the discussion." Robertson told Hurley that the Embassy staff were also delighted at the news of the Ambassador' coming back.[10] Taking all this into consideration, Hurley had reason to reconsider his decision. It was logical, at least at that moment, that he should think about returning to China to see his mission finally come to a successful conclusion.

But the seemingly promising prospect soon turned dark. The agreements that had just been reached, as we can see today, served in reality only as a cover for the worsening situation. While their leaders were still toasting each other in celebration of the signing of the Double Tenth Agreement, their troops, Communist and Nationalist, were getting ready to move forward. On the same day that Chiang and Mao signed the agreement, Liu Shao-chi, a CCP leader remaining in Yenan in charge of the Party's daily work, sent his instructions to the CCP field commanders reminding them that "after Japan's surrender the opponents on the battlefield will be the KMT armies." He urged the Communist generals to study Mao's works on revolutionary warfare and be prepared all the time to use their leader's strategies and tactics in fighting the KMT troops.[11]

Immediately after Mao returned to Yenan from Chungking, the Central Committee issued orders to the whole party and the armies warning them of the inevitability of large-scale military conflict with the KMT troops. "Although the Double Tenth Agreement has obtained for the people many democratic rights, they are only things on the paper now," the instruction stated. The Central Committee made it more than clear to the Chinese Communists that "it is our unchangeable principle that we must keep every single gun and bullet of our troops no matter what happens. ... As for the military unification [incorporating into the Nationalist forces], we have our own plan to reach this goal of keeping every single gun and bullet." In spite of the terms in the agreement that required both the KMT and the CCP to reduce their troops respectively, the Central Committee told its armies to continue their plan of aggressive recruitment and expansion. Some areas in southern China had to be given up according to the agreement, the instruction went on, but it was only used for the purpose of "showing our sincerity of making concessions" and also to help concentrate strength to build base areas in Manchuria and north China in accordance with the Party's plan issued earlier.[12] The main tasks for the Communist troops, then, had become "focusing on demolition of railroads and highways to stop and destroy the KMT troops attempting to force their way northward."[13] If the Nationalist troops ever tried to enter Manchuria by sea, the CCP troops had orders to stop them and destroy them if possible.[14]

On the Nationalist side, preparations were also being made. On September 17 when Mao and Chiang were talking about the terms of their agreement, a Nationalist Army plane mistakenly landed in the Communist-controlled areas in Honan. The captured KMT documents showed that the plane was on its way to the Shansi Headquarter of the Nationalist troops. The commanding general there, Yan Hsi-shan, was ordered by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to prepare another "bandit-extermination campaign" as soon as the Japanese surrender was accomplished. On October 13, two days after the Double Tenth Agreement became public, the Nationalist government issued orders along with a "Bandit-extermination Handbook" to all its commanding generals, making it clear to them that the next step for their troops was to fight their way into north China and recover the Communist-controlled areas. This information soon became known to the Communists through a Nationalist general who rebelled against Chiang's order and turned to the Communists with his troops.[15] Once again the peace terms in the agreement gave way to armed struggle, a scene that had repeated itself countless times between the Communists and the Nationalists, with or without American mediation.

Obviously Chiang Kai-shek's objective had always been the elimination of the Communist threat in China and securing Nationalist control over all Chinese territory. But the United States's decision at the war's end played an important, if not decisive, role in helping Chiang make up his mind to get rid of his Communist adversaries immediately

after the Japanese were defeated. After the war was over in China, President Truman, advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made an exception of the American policy of stopping lend-lease supplies when the war was over. By doing so the American government hoped the Chinese government troops would be able to participate effectively in accepting the Japanese surrender. This decision extended six more months of lend-lease supplies, including stocks of ammunition, airplanes and ships, as well as other equipment, that were left in the China and India-Burma Theaters. General Wedemeyer was also authorized to help transport the Nationalist troops to north China and Manchuria. After President Truman's General Order No. One telling the Japanese in China to surrender to the Chinese Nationalist government only, this new decision, against the Communists' strong protest, definitely boosted Chiang's confidence in his strength. Despite the fact that the American policy makers' unwillingness to get involved in the Chinese political struggle and civil war, as stated in the directive to General Wedemeyer, Chiang apparently took this decision as an all-out American commitment for his government. He simply could not believe that the United States would fail to support him in fighting communists.[16]

The Communists, on the other hand, seemed also determined to strengthen their control over north China. Realizing that the nationalist government was determined to move into Manchuria and north China, the CCP Central Committee set the policy line clearly for its party

organizations and all its troops: "We must overcome and wipe out large numbers of Nationalist troops attempting to enter north China and northeast China (Manchuria) so that we will achieve advantageous positions for our troops in the above areas and force the other side (the Nationalists) to recognize such positions. Only after this is achieved can we force the Nationalist government to make compromises which will make the peaceful reconstruction possible." It is obvious that the Chinese Communists by October 1945 had adjusted their strategy again, aiming at controlling the northern part of the country to force the Nationalist government as well as the whole world to recognize their strength and power. It is noticeable too that the Central Committee also told the whole party not to "regard the current large-scale military conflicts as the beginning of a civil war." It seems that they were genuinely satisfied if a state of partition of the country could be achieved, although such a hope was soon given up with the development of a new situation.[17]

In late October and early November news of clashes between the Communists and the Nationalist troops began to reach the United States. The Communist representative in Chungking, Wang Ping-nan, complained to the American Embassy that the negotiations with the Nationalist government had made no progress recently because the KMT "apparently intended to play for time while securing military control of areas liberated by the Communists." He also expressed Communist resentment over "the American intervention" in

favor of the Nationalists by transporting their troops to north China, indicating that the United States was responsible for "recurrence of civil strife in China."[18] The CCP and KMT once again started their war of words. The scheduled People's Consultative Council had to be postponed, for Yenan refused to reply to Chungking's demands and asked the Nationalists to stop attacking the Communists first.[19] They resumed their attack on Hurley personally too. The American Ambassador had made a speech in New Mexico in which he stated that "the armed units of the Communists attempted to set up an independent government or to overthrow the government of the Republic of China." Yenan was angry to hear that, though Hurley might have just said what they were thinking. The Communists launched "a stern protest" against Hurley, charging that his statement was "absolutely unfounded and there was no facts to confirm it." They also stated that "the democratic people" in the United States should be "entirely justified for his dismissal."[20]

Hurley had kept himself informed about the development in China. When he left Washington for New Mexico to take a short break in mid-October, he stopped pressing for his resignation. President Truman's expression of confidence in him while they talked in Washington made Hurley happy and excited. News from China during mid-October also showed good signs of progress. It looked promising if he returned to China to bring about a successful completion of his mission. But the later reports seemed finally to make up his mind not to go back to the country where he was

stationed.

Besides the news of the clashes between the Communists and the Nationalists, the "uncooperative attitude " of the Soviet Union in Manchuria also helped tilt the scale when Hurley was making his decisions. In telegrams sent to the State Department in late October and early November 1945, the Embassy in Chungking reported that the Soviets had broken their promise to let the Nationalist troops debark at Yinkow, a Manchurian port, forcing the American transporting ships to turn back and unload the Nationalists at ports much farther away from their destinations. The report also noted that the Chinese Communists appeared in Manchuria in large numbers. Although the Soviet authority insisted that these Communists were just civilians, the report went on, they "appeared well-armed, probably with Japanese arms that the Soviets either turned over to them or let the Japanese hand over." With still more Communists moving into the areas, the report said, the Nationalist government might well face a Communist government that had a firm control over Manchuria once the Red Army withdrew from China. In addition, Yenan had also started calling for immediate withdrawing from China of American forces, insisting that "the primary responsibility for civil strife in China rests on the United States."[21] Obviously a crisis graver than ever was developing in China. It was only logical for Hurley to decide not to go back to China to assume such responsibility.

The United States was then forced to make decisions with few options. To support the Nationalist government in

China, there was little possibility of success unless an all-out commitment was made to Chiang's cause. Such an alternative, at a time when almost every American was expecting fast demobilization as the war was finally over, was impossible. To withdraw completely from China, however, could only bring about a faster win for the Communists, which was also something Washington did not want to see. This was especially true when the American leaders noticed what was happening in East Europe where the Soviet Red Army was successful in setting up Communist governments under its close control in the countries it had occupied. Hesitating to make decisions that would have significant consequences, the heads of the War, Navy, and State Departments answered General Wedemeyer's urgent request for a clear-cut directive by telling him to give an assessment of the Chinese situation first. Wedemeyer had lost much of his confidence in the Nationalists since his April visit to Washington when he believed that just moderate American aid could bring the Chiang's government to victory. He frankly told his superiors that the Generalissimo's government and his armies did not have the capacity to exercise successful control, at least in north China, without effective American support. However, if the United States did choose to support the Nationalists, Wedemeyer pointed out, it could not avoid involvement in China's civil war, because everybody knew how and where Chiang Kai-shek was going to use the American weapons and other supplies. Wedemeyer's implication was clear: there was only one course in China that could

preserve American interests and those of the free world---"unequivocal assistance" to the Chinese Nationalist government. He called again for a definite directive that would reflect a clear and resolute American China policy, either full-scale support for Chiang or a complete pull-out.[22]

But the policy makers in Washington had a hard time in late November making that decision. There was strong pressure to withdraw American troops from China, but there was also strong opposition to the idea. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal argued that if the United States pulled out from that country, "we invite a vacuum of anarchy...and it is obvious that into that vacuum ultimately either the Japanese or the Russians will flow. At the moment of course it will be the Russians."[23] The United States's final decision turned out to be one that suffered "on-the-one-hand-on-the-other-hand" disease that symbolized America's China policy during that time. It recognized the fact that there was no way to support the Nationalist government without getting involved in China's civil war, yet it gave the green light for supporting Chiang, though the United States "does not wish to support the National Government directly against the Communists who represented an important popular movement and that the United States could not openly combat it without suffering disastrously under the charge of 'imperialist meddling.'"[24] Washington was not ready to give up in China, but it was equally unwilling to get involved in another war in the Far East. It seemed that the only way out was still to pursue the policy of uniting the

Nationalists and the Communists by whatever means.

With the decisions made, the person who was to carry them out became the topic. Secretary of State Byrnes decided that Patrick Hurley would still be his choice and the Ambassador should return to China as soon as possible. There were no suggestions among the top leaders that Hurley should be relieved, something the Ambassador had suspected. Though the leaders noticed Hurley's inaccurate assessment of the Russian cooperation in Manchuria, they did not take it for an excuse to fire the Ambassador. On the contrary, they hoped that he would resume his work as soon as possible to bring about the unity that they considered the only resolution to the China problem.

But by that time Hurley had decided he was not going back to his work in Chungking. The reports from the Embassy in China had indicated that the once promising signs of success for his mission had gone. He felt he was also seeing many unfavorable signs against him in the United States. He was told that Secretary of State Byrnes had declared privately that he would prefer to have an Ambassador in China who agreed completely with the Yalta and Potsdam policies, most probably "a deserving Democrat." An American Communist newspaper had also criticized Hurley's work in China, using the information that the Ambassador believed could only come from the "top secret" of "eyes only" reports he sent from China to the State Department and the President. Other newspapers, including New York Herald Tribune, Detroit News, and The Buffalo Evening News, also

printed articles criticizing his mission in China.[25] All this revived Hurley's belief that some officials in the State Department had altered America's traditional anti-imperialist policy and were trying to sabotage his effort in carrying out that policy. He decided that it was time for him to resign.

Hurley handed in his resignation letter on the morning of November 26, 1945, the time when the top leaders of the country were making the decision to send him back to China to implement the policy they had just worked out. Secretary of State Byrnes was shocked when he learned that Hurley was resigning as Ambassador to China. He refused to accept Hurley's resignation letter and assured the Ambassador that he would have the full support of himself, the Department, and the President. As for Hurley's charges that confidential information had been leaked to the outsiders, the Secretary promised to have the issue investigated. Byrnes also assured Hurley that there was no change of American policy in China and gave him a copy of the statement of policy that was still under discussion. Hurley returned to the Secretary's office in the afternoon, agreeing that he had seen "no change in policy" after he read the statement. He told Byrnes that he would go back to Chungking after he delivered a scheduled speech to the National Press Club on November 28.[26]

But on the next day things took another turn. Hurley read in the newspaper a speech given by Congressman Hugh Delacy of Washington. The "pro-Communist" legislator

criticized Hurley for his "full-scale" support of Chiang's "reactionary government," which he claimed would ultimately lead China to civil war. Delacy also attacked Hurley for the "reversal" of the late President's policy and his purge of the Foreign Service officers. The Ambassador was deeply hurt. He felt strongly that someone in the State Department must have had a hand in this kind of attack on him, because he thought that the information Delacy used could only come from those confidential documents he sent to the State Department. That meant, he concluded, that he would not have the support he needed to carry out his mission in spite of Byrnes' promise of departmental support.[27] Immediately, Hurley called a press conference and released his statement of resignation.

In his letter of resignation Hurley told the President that there was a "wide discrepancy" between the United States's announced policies and its conduct of international relations, although the higher echelon of policy-making officials nearly always had clearly defined objectives. In China's case, Hurley stated that he had been directed by President Roosevelt to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist Government and to keep the Chinese Army in the war. "Both of these objectives were accomplished," Hurley told the President. But he complained that "the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department" who he believed to have "sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialistic bloc of nations whose policy was to keep China divided

against herself." The opposition to his effort, Hurley stated, chiefly came from the career diplomats in the Embassy in Chungking and in the Chinese and Far Eastern Division of the State Department. He managed to have some of them relieved from China, Hurley said, only to see them promoted in the State Department and become his supervisors or assigned as advisers to MacArthur's Supreme Command in Asia. This, he told President Truman, was one of the reasons why American foreign policy announced by the highest authority often turned out to be ineffective. The resigning Ambassador stated that "the weakness of American foreign policy has backed us into two world wars and there is a third world war in the making." Allowing the current American foreign policy and its implementation to continue, Hurley warned, "we are permitting ourselves to be sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism." Concluding the letter, Hurley reminded the President of the urgent need for "a complete reorganization" of American policy making machinery "beginning at the lower official levels." A weak American Foreign Service, Hurley predicted, could only lead to the tragedy that America's economic strength was used all over the world to defeat American policies and interests, unless American economic and diplomatic policies were coordinated and America's strength was not allied with any predatory ideology."[28]

Hurley's dramatic action took the Washington leaders by surprise. On his way to a cabinet meeting, President Truman

heard the news of Hurley's resignation. He was "astonished" and considered Hurley's action "an inexplicable about face," for he had just heard from Secretary of State Byrnes that Hurley had agreed to return to China as soon as possible. The cabinet meeting's agenda was put aside and the whole session was focused on how to deal with the consequences of Hurley's resignation. Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson recommended that General George Marshall be chosen as the replacement. The consensus was soon reached, for everyone at the meeting realized that the General's choice, with his fame and prestige, could easily capture the news headlines and smooth out the shock caused by Hurley's action. President Truman accepted Hurley's resignation on the same day when he nominated General Marshall, who had just resigned as the Army Chief of Staff.[29] The Truman Administration, facing criticism from the pro-Nationalist groups in the United States for its ineffective policy in China, wanted to show to the public that the administration was paying enough attention to problems in China by choosing Marshall as American representative to China.[30]

After his resignation, Hurley continued his charges against the State Department officials. His actions, which had no precedent in America's diplomatic history, were aimed at "causing a crisis with in the government," according to Hurley himself. What he hoped was that "before the excitement died away, to have awakened indignation of the American people at the misconduct of foreign relations to the point where a thorough investigation and cleansing of

the Department of State would be unavoidable."[31] His attempt to attract attention worked. During December Congress held a series of hearings on Hurley's charges. As the key witness, Hurley criticized the career diplomats and the State Department officials, alleging that they had formed a "pro-Communist, Pro-imperialist" faction. Such a group, Hurley asserted, was responsible for the leaking of confidential information to the outsiders, altering America's traditional China policy, sabotaging his effort to carry out that policy. Secretary of State Byrnes also came out to testify. He argued that the State Department had not changed American policy in China; the Foreign Service officers were not disloyal but expressed their judgement on China's problems, and the Department's investigation about Hurley's charge of information leaking had found no evidence at all.[32]

To Hurley's great disappointment, his dramatic but vague charges could not persuade the lawmakers. After Secretary Byrnes testified, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted that more hearings would be held but in the privacy of executive sessions. This was not what Hurley wanted. What he hoped, as he said, was public hearings so that the whole country would be "informed and awakened." Despite his insistence, the committee hearings drew to an early end, which in turn resulted in the former Ambassador's personal defeat. "I took a real beating," Hurley admitted. After the end of the hearings, Hurley was so discredited that many newspapers were no longer

interested in publishing his articles. But it did not take long before the United States plunged itself into a nation-wide anti-Communist campaign. Hurley's charges against the State Department officials and career diplomats would soon become one of the major causes of the "Red Scare" and witch-hunting at the end of the 1940s and the early 1950s.

General Marshall accepted his nomination and arrived in China on December 20. He had a directive with few differences from the previous ones. It still aimed at "a strong, united, and democratic China" while sustaining the Nationalist government at the same time. Owing much to his personal prestige, Marshall was able to bring the two fighting sides together again to arrange a truce in early January 1946. He also promoted the Political Consultative Conference by urging a broadening of its political base to allow all political groups to be included. It seemed for a while that even the almost dead issue of coalition government and ultimately a constitutional government also came to life again.[33]

Marshall's strenuous effort to remain neutral in China's internal political process and at the same time uphold the supremacy of the Nationalist government without being used by it caught the Chinese Communists' attention. During November and December, the Communists had concentrated on attacking the "Hurley/Wedemeyer policy of armed intervention in China." They charged that the American military's activities of helping the Nationalist government helped "expanding China's civil strife, maintaining China's

most reactionary dictatorship, undermining China's democratic unification, and promoting another world war." They cheered Hurley's downfall. But they welcomed Marshall's nomination and many of the General's arrangements later in the procedure of the negotiations.

The CCP documents at that time show that the Communist leaders realized that the United States had also adjusted its own policy in China. In the instructions to its party members on the changes in America's China policy, the CCP Central Committee reported that President Truman's statement on December 15 had declared that United States hoped the civil war in China would end, the KMT one-party rule had to go, and the American military's activities would finish soon so that it would not have any influence on China's civil strife. The Central Committee thought that these "changes" were favorable to the Communist cause and should be taken into serious consideration. But the Central Committee once again warned the party members not to have any illusions about the Americans, for the United States government, "even Roosevelt himself," had always followed the line of supporting Chiang's regime. The same instructions also ordered the Communist troops not to launch any "strategic offensive or any other large-scale offensive actions" so that the Nationalist government would be unable to find any excuse to prolong its military action against the Communists. However, the Central Committee made it clear to its troops that any Nationalist force that attempted to take advantage of this Communist restraint would be "wiped out

without mercy" and "the news be made public immediately." The Communist troops were ordered to get prepared by mid-January 1946 for any possible Nationalist attack.[34]

The Nationalist government was also preparing to take advantage of the allied post-war arrangements in China to claim its control over all of China. Since the surrender of the Japanese in August, the American military in China had engaged in transporting the Nationalist troops to the key areas of China and occupying some coast cities for the Nationalists' takeover. These activities in reality had given the Nationalists effective support against the Communists.[35] More important, such activities on the part of the United States, plus the transferring of large quantities of lend-lease arms and ammunition as well as other equipment and supplies, had greatly boosted the Nationalists' confidence in their superiority over the Communists and their determination to settle finally the issue of communism in China. Some of the Nationalist generals even predicted that they could wipe out the "red bandits" within three to six months.[36] Such confidence also helped Chiang to ignore General Wedemeyer's advice that he should concentrate on strengthening Nationalist control in southern China and sending his best administrators, not only the best troops, to northern China (south of the Great Wall) before making any movement into Manchuria.[37]

The activities of both the CCP and the KMT soon broke the truce Marshall had managed to bring about, and clashes, some of them very severe and on a large scale, began anew

while the American General was away in the United States for a very short period of time. Though Marshall tried hard to arrange another truce in June 1946, it turned out to be a short-lived one. Chiang Kai-shek by that time had made up his mind that he must destroy the Communist threat in China at any cost. Even American pressure, including Marshall's embargo of arms and ammunition proved ineffective to stop him from carrying out his plans. The Communists, closely following their line of policy set by the Central Committee, kept on fighting, in many cases very successfully. By the end of 1946, General Marshall concluded disgustedly that there was nothing more he could do, and thus formally ended his mission to bring about unification in China.

Although the pro-Nationalist elements in the United States pressed for more support to the Generalissimo's cause, the Truman Administration knew it was unable to do much to change the situation without full-scale American involvement in China's internal struggle. That was something that the American people were least prepared to accept. American aid to the Nationalist government continued, but on a limited and reduced scale. It was largely a political measure, for the Truman Administration had to keep such assistance to Chiang in exchange for a Republican-dominated Congress' support for the President's programs in Europe, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

The situation in China became clearly favorable to the Communists after a short period in which the Nationalists seemed to have achieved an upper hand. Corruption, demoral-

ization, desertion, and surrender kept deleting more and more Nationalist troops. Life in the KMT-controlled areas also deteriorated steadily. Hyperinflation, along with rampant corruption within the government, very soon devoured what was left of the people's morale and their confidence in the Nationalist government.[38] Chiang's unwise decision and the demoralization among the Nationalist troops soon led to the biggest debacle in world military history: hundreds of thousands of troops were wiped out just in days. By early 1949, the Communists controlled China north of the Yangtze River. On October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung declared the birth of the People's Republic of China, and within two months the last remnants of the Nationalists were driven to Taiwan.

To the amazement of Americans, a country they had hoped to help become an ally friendly toward the United States turned out to be another Communist power in only a few years. Many regarded it as "a national disaster," especially when they were under the intensified fear of the atomic bomb and Communist espionage and saw the high tide of the Cold War all over the world. The "Red Scare" during the late 1940s and early 1950s kept haunting the United States for decades. American foreign policy also followed a rigid line under the influence of the general mentality of an anti-Communist ideology. It remained unchanged until after another two wars in Asia, in Korea and Vietnam, and a new generation of leaders assumed power. America's experience in China, then, became a topic that caused the most heated debates among scholars, historians, and politicians.

IX. CONCLUSION

Patrick J. Hurley came to China as President Roosevelt's personal representative in September 1944. Two months later on November 17 he became the American Ambassador to that country. He resigned his office one year later on November 27, 1945. This period was one of the most critical times in the development of American-Chinese relations. The United States for the first time began to make a real effort to look into the problems in China and tried to influence the political situation there. It also saw the Chinese Communists formally start their diplomatic work in an attempt to assert themselves in the power struggle in China. It was also during this period that both the CCP and the KMT finally made up their minds to give up negotiations as a way to solve their long time conflict and resume their duel on the battlefield.

As the key representative of the United States and major source of information for Washington, Hurley played an important role during this period. However, his lack of understanding of that country, his over-simplifying of a complicated situation, as well as his mannerisms in dealing with others, led him and the American policy makers to miscalculate the situation when the United States was trying

to formulate a workable policy in China. By the time Hurley left China, the United States government had adopted a policy that would set the general patterns of relationships among the United States, the Chinese Communists, and Nationalists for the following years. Events that ran against the Americans' initial will in China would take place during those years. Hurley's ideas about China's problems and his activities there paralleled the gradual formation of the American overall foreign policy following the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War and led to the beginning of confrontation between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Hurley came to China with the tasks of preventing China's collapse, keeping it as an effective fighting ally and helping China work out its political problems "such as the relations of the Central Government under Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists."[1] He failed in this mission. His failure, as we see today, was largely due to his innocence about China, its culture, its people, and its politics, although Hurley was by no means alone in such ignorance. Even the most experienced Foreign Service officers who had been working in China for years also made bad judgments sometimes. But such ignorance by Hurley as the major representative of the United States caused much more lasting and damaging consequences.

Hurley's mission originated from Chiang Kai-shek's demand that he needed someone whom he could trust to help improve his communication with the American President. By

that time, the conflict between the Generalissimo and the American commanding officer in China, General Joseph Stilwell, and the situation in the battlefield following Japan's 1944 summer offensive (ICHIGO) had reached the point that urgent solutions were called for. To realize the goal of keeping China active in the war as part of its global strategy, the United States had chosen to support Chiang as, the American believed, the only one who "could keep the Chinese armies in the field against the Japanese." Besides, President Roosevelt also regarded China as an important part of his postwar world order, a nation friendly toward the United States and a power balancer in the Far East.[2] His insistence on making China one of the Big Four in the face of the opposition from Britain and the Soviet Union fully proved this. However, the debacle the Chinese armies suffered in front of the Japanese offensive in 1944 forced the United States to ask Chiang to give full command to General Stilwell so that effective fighting could be organized before China was knocked out. Chiang's refusal to follow American demands had made things complicated. That was why Hurley was sent to "harmonize" relations between the American general and the Chinese leader.

Hurley helped President Roosevelt reach the conclusion that the United States had to give up its general to keep a fighting ally. His warning to the President that any attempt on the American part to sustain Stilwell would end in losing Chiang and China with him tilted the balance when Roosevelt had to make this difficult decision.[3] Although

the recent allied victories in the Pacific and the Soviet Union's promise to enter the war against Japan had indeed reduced the importance of China as a base from where the final drive to Japan would start, the American President had never changed his mind about supporting China. He could not afford to lose China. Hurley's warning had just hit the issue about which the President worried the most. As Lt. George M. Elsey, the White House staff action officer, said, "Hurley's presence [in China during the Stilwell Affair] strengthened Chiang's hand and helped him ride out the storm." Roosevelt finally upheld Chiang and sacrificed one of his most talented generals. Hurley's reports had made him believe that "the support of Chiang was worth more in the long term."[4]

The decision reduced American influence in China and also damaged Chiang's image and the respect he had enjoyed among the Americans during the earlier time. But the most serious consequence was that the American decision to back down encouraged Chiang and some of his followers to believe that the United States could not afford to abandon their regime. This, in turn, made them less willing to compromise and made the United States's effort to unify the Nationalists and the Communists an even more difficult goal to achieve.

Like most Americans, their leaders included, Hurley failed to see that the Communist movement in China possessed the dual essence of a nationalistic struggle and a social revolution. The masses of peasants, more than ninety

percent of the whole population, had suffered greatly under the oppression and exploitation by the wealthy classes and the government. Foreign aggression ever since the mid-nineteenth century, especially the Japanese invasion after 1931, had pressed the Chinese peasants to the point that their frustration and indignation could almost find no vent except in another big explosion like those countless peasants uprisings in the Chinese history of "dynastic cycle." A social revolution with an anti-foreign flavor was taking place in the mid-1940s, but few Americans really realized this at the time.

By 1944 the Chinese Communist party under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung had matured itself through the hard years and begun to pursue a relatively independent line of policy away from the Soviet influence that had directed the CCP's movement in the 1920s and 1930s. Mao had begun to develop his own theory built upon China's reality rather than copying the ready model of the Soviet Union. He realized that the survival of the Chinese communist movement relied primarily on the Chinese peasants, without whom the Communists would become "fish out of water". This explains why the CCP followed the line of mobilizing and organizing peasants in carrying out the party's ultimate goal of obtaining power to end China's semi-feudal and semi-colonial status and to become a strong socialist and communist society. The CCP was successful in choosing this policy line and carrying it out. As Theodore White summarized: "If you take a peasant who has been swindled, beaten, and kicked

about all his waking days and whose father has transmitted to him an emotion of bitterness reaching back for generations---if you take such a peasant, treat him like a man, ask his opinion, let him vote for a local government, let him organize his own police, decide on his own taxes, and vote himself a reduction in rent and interests---if you do that, the peasant becomes a man who has something to fight for, and he will fight to preserve it against any enemy."[5] The Chinese Communists did just that, which made it possible for them not only to survive under the hardest conditions but also develop and strengthen themselves through difficult times.

Hurley could not see this fact, nor was he willing to listen to those who could, largely because of his arrogance toward and distrust of the professional diplomats. He believed that the Chinese Communists were not real Communists at all but a group of patriots pursuing economic improvement. He "learned" this when he visited Moscow and talked to the Soviet leaders in September 1944 and again in April 1945. The Russian leaders' statement that CCP members were not real Communists and their promises that the Soviet Union would support the American policy in China and would not support the Chinese Communists pleased Hurley. Such promises also led him to adopt a strategy in the negotiations of forcing the Communists to come to terms with the Nationalists by cutting off Soviet support for Yenan. He did not see that Yenan in the mid-1940s was largely out of Moscow's direct control, although the CCP still followed

Leninist rhetoric and nominally cooperated with the Soviet Union in world politics.[6] The independence of the Chinese Communists was proved when Stalin himself had to admit that he had made a mistake by trying to influence the Yenan leaders to seek "a modus vivendi" with Chiang Kai-shek and dissolve their troops. The Chinese Communists did not listen to this advice, which "proved that the Chinese Comrades and not the Soviet comrades were right," admitted the Russian dictator.[7] Failing to see the fact that the Chinese Communists were pragmatic realists who would not blindly follow ideological doctrines but adjust their policy in accordance with the changing situation caused Hurley to think that his Russian card would finally work, which turned out not to be the case.

The directive Hurley received from the President was vague and open for interpretation at best, for Roosevelt had on different occasions admitted that he had no clear idea about the situation in China and had to depend on his special representative for information. In fact, Hurley had quite wide latitude to maneuver in his mission. But Hurley's simplistic idea about the problems in China's politics and the nature of the struggle between the two sides caused him to make moves that turned out in many cases to be more a hindrance than a help for his efforts.

The Five-Point Proposal Hurley helped to develop in Yenan in November 1944 reflected his underestimation of the Chinese Communists. The proposal raised the Communists' expectations. This is true when we consider that the

American President's special representative on his own edited, modified, and amplified the demands the Yenan leaders made on the Nationalist government and volunteered to sign the document to show his approval. His belief that the Chinese Communist were not real Communists, but some agrarian reformers, made him think that the proposal would be good enough for them. He never realized that the CCP proposal for a coalition government was a smart move, which would serve as an easy way for them to obtain some power with the popular appeal of the proposal. It would also help them to avoid direct military conflict with the Nationalists when the CCP was still not strong enough.

Hurley did not really understand either until much later why the Nationalists just would not accept his master plan. To the end of his mission, he firmly believed that Chiang's government was willing to reach a peaceful settlement with the Communists, neglecting the most important precondition set by the Generalissimo: the Communists must first give up their armed forces. In Hurley's eyes, this was just one of the details that could be dealt with later. However, it turned out to be the most critical issue in China's political struggle in which "bullet is ballot" and "power comes out of a gun barrel." Without knowing what objectives the two parties had in mind--the KMT aiming at elimination of the Communist threat and the CCP establishing their own power to overthrow the Nationalist government--the American mediation could by no means be effective and was doomed from the outset.

Hurley's attempt to please the leaders of both sides also proved harmful to his mission. His effort to modify the Five-Point Proposal and sign it made the Communists happy. His assurance to Chiang later that the Generalissimo did not have to worry about the Chinese Communists, as his "well-equipped divisions will have a walkover in their fight with the Communists" after the Japanese were gone, also pleased the Nationalists.[8] But by doing so Hurley had gone too far as an impartial mediator. His action only caused great suspicion among the Communists and encouraged the Nationalists to take a disastrous course.

While Hurley underestimated the ability of the Chinese Communists, his understanding of the Nationalist policy also proved inadequate. Ever since the start of the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had more than once made his idea clear about the situation in the Far East. He believed that Japan could not finally conquer China, but China, by herself, could not defeat Japan either. While this was the case, Chiang believed that the participation of other powers in the struggle against the fascists was in China's favor, as the Western countries had conflict with the Japanese over their interests in the area. Among the nations, he knew the United States was the most powerful and the most able to give any effective assistance to China, for other powers had their own troubles in Europe and other places. The Chinese leader also realized that the United States was eager to keep China in the war, especially after Pearl Harbor. Then he logically concluded that he should

follow a policy that would take advantage of the Americans' desire and their material support to strengthen his government both in the war against Japan and in his domestic struggle against the Communists. He needed American support, but he had never failed to show that he would not let the Americans make decisions for him. Instead, he would take any chance to exploit the Americans' goodwill for his own use. From Hurley's numerous reports covering this period, one cannot conclude that the American Ambassador came to realize this fact, at least during his stay in China.[9]

What Hurley believed about the situation was that both the Nationalists and the Communists were in pursuit of similar principles. The only differences between the two parties were in their approaches to achieving the same goals. To show the scant difference that existed, he even compared the Chinese Communists to the Oklahoma Republicans by stating that the only difference between the two was that the latter were not armed.[10] When the Nationalist government flatly refused the CCP's Five-Point Proposal that Hurley had helped make, the Ambassador quickly turned to the Nationalist side and tried to persuade Yenan to accept the Nationalists' Three-Point Counter-proposal. This was because, in Hurley's eyes, the two proposals were "similar in principle." Although he was a little unhappy to see "his" proposal put aside, he was ready to abandon it when Chiang insisted, for he thought that he was just carrying out his directive of supporting the Nationalist government

under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and those "details" should not be taken too seriously.

Hurley's efforts throughout his mission had focused on the unification of China by persuading the Nationalists to make political concessions so that the Communists could have a share of the government in exchange for their armed forces. While trying hard to reach this goal, however, Hurley did not have the idea that the two parties across the negotiation table were both seeking to use diplomacy as a weapon to improve their position in their domestic struggle that had been going on since the 1920s. By late 1945, the CCP had defined its purpose of participating in the negotiations with its domestic enemy as being "to exploit Washington's desire to avoid civil war in China so as to restrict Chiang."[11] Chiang, on the other hand, had always kept in mind that Communism was his number one problem and he would try his best, at times by showing his willingness to compromise, to enlist American political and military assistance so that he would be able to wipe out the Reds and maintain his one-party rule.[12] To mediate without knowing the attending parties' real intentions and purposes would almost surely guarantee the failure of any effort.

The basic idea behind U. S. policy in China was to keep China in the war and to make this Asian country an effective fighting ally in the war against fascism. From this idea came the American attempt to intervene in China's domestic politics so that a unified war effort could be achieved and a civil war avoided.[13] It was on this point that the

Americans differed on what approach they should take to realize their goal. The liberals, mostly represented by the Foreign Service officers and some of their superiors in the State Department, desired that China should follow the model of the United States to become a "united and democratic" country. What they observed in China, the Nationalist government's corruption, inefficiency, and oppressive or even fascistic policies, made them believe that such a regime was not ideal at all as an ally--not to mention its unpopularity among the Chinese people. That explained why they looked to other alternatives in China, namely the Chinese Communists, for possible solutions. On the other hand, conservatives in the United States regarded Chiang as a reliable ally against Communism. They lobbied to give the Nationalist regime more aid, overlooking the fact that the regime was losing popular support at an alarming rate. The years of 1944 and 1945 saw this conflict develop to its highest watermark throughout the American experience in China.[14]

Policy makers in Washington were in a dilemma when they had to decide what approach they should take in China to guarantee the overall victory of the United States's global strategy. Realizing that aid to the Nationalists was an almost hopeless effort in helping a losing cause and that it was also impossible to support the Communists only, American leaders took a middle way. The United States did deliver some assistance to the Nationalist government but asked this government to make a fundamental overhaul both politically

and militarily. The assistance was not enough to uphold the Nationalist regime, but it was enough to convince the Chinese Communists that the United States had officially sided with their enemy and thus become their enemy too, for the Nationalists would use every ounce of that assistance in their struggle against the Communists. Such American aid to the Nationalists also helped the Yenan leaders to become even more determined to follow a line of "self-reliance," which would become the symbol of the Chinese Communist foreign policy later on.[15]

Many Chinese scholars on the mainland agreed that Hurley played an important role in creating for the Chinese Communists an impression of a hostile imperialist United States.[16] Hurley's superficial understanding of the nature of the struggle in China was obvious. He took a pro-Nationalist position soon after he had started his mission. He also rejected the analysis and advice of the experienced Foreign Service officers and blamed them for any breakdown in the negotiations. His reliance on the promises he obtained from Moscow caused him and helped Washington to miscalculate the situation in China. As the major source of information for the American leaders, his overestimation of the KMT strength and its sincerity for genuine reforms and his underestimation of the CCP's potential and popularity all helped him and Washington to follow a policy that proved to be ineffective and later on disastrous.

Hurley's mission to China ended in failure. Later efforts of the United States to continue unifying China

proved also fruitless, for by the end of 1945, both the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists had already decided what policies they were going to follow regardless of intervention from outside. But to blame Hurley for the American failure in China during the mid-1940s and the following years is unfair or simplifying a complicated problem at least. His role in the whole event was not a deciding one, though he did help promote the policy that would see its total defeat in a few years.

The policy was made in Washington anyway, in many cases quite independent of Hurley's influence. The tendency to simplify a complicated problem like China's unification was apparent among America's top leaders. Roosevelt had more than once told Hurley to just go ahead and "knock those oriental heads together" until they made a deal, and Truman knew little about China when he stepped into the White House.[17] President Roosevelt's by-passing the bureaucracy to get information and give instructions had puzzled his subordinates in the State Department from time to time. The fact that there were three Secretaries of State and one Acting Secretary of State during the period of 1944 to 1945 also contributed to the confusion in regard to the making of American policy in China. Generally speaking, Hurley had followed his directive that focused on upholding the Nationalist regime for the purpose of building a "strong, united, and democratic China."

However, it seemed Hurley did not realize that his beloved President was a pragmatist who had his "realpolitik

face" in spite of the high ideals he expressed in the Atlantic Charter.[18] Obviously Hurley could not catch up with his President. His later charge that some American officials had betrayed Roosevelt's anti-colonial foreign policy reflected his lack of deeper understanding of the realistic side of the President. But we may notice that Hurley seemed to be correct when he warned against the possibility of the United States being "sucked into" a power struggle on the side of colonial imperialism against communist imperialism.[19] The police action in Korea and the Vietnam nightmare proved his prediction. However, his own recommendation that the United States give all-out support to the Chinese Nationalist government just contradicted what he had warned against. With hindsight we may also say that it was fortunate that the United States government did not follow Hurley's recommendation, thus avoiding a much larger "Vietnam problem" for the Americans in China.

The American policy during the mid-1940s to unify China's political parties and their military forces for the sake of the war and against civil strife was in accordance with the United States's national interests. However, the whole process of policy making and its enforcement were largely built upon an underestimation of a very complicated problem. The divergence in the aims of the Chinese Nationalists and Communists was so wide and their ideologies so irreconcilable that even a person much more sophisticated than Patrick Hurley would have found it hard to handle. It demanded a high degree of mutual trust and masterful

diplomatic skill, which neither side seemed to possess. As the State Department's China White Paper stated, it was beyond the ability of the Americans to see their policy reach a successful conclusion. Considering all this, historians have summarized that Hurley's mission was almost an "impossible task" that was beyond the competence of any American to fulfil.[20]

But recently released CCP documents covering the mid-1940s and studies of them show that Mao and other CCP leaders did consider improving their relations with the United States and the Nationalists. Although they had never changed their ultimate goal of gaining power in China, they were serious when they called upon the whole party to take advantage of "a favorable international environment unprecedented in history" to meet "the new era of peaceful democracy" after "a transitional period."[21] It was what they considered as the United States's all-out support of the Chinese Nationalists, as recommended by Hurley, that led them to give up this brief consideration of compromise and take the approach of armed expansion to stay in the game.[22] They warned the Americans to stop the policy followed by Hurley. They also expressed their hope that the United States would adopt a new policy that would mend up the damage Hurley had done to the relations between the United States and China.[23] However, the Communists' lack of trust in the Americans' words was obvious when the CCP Central Committee and the Central Military Committee immediately issued another directive ordering their troops to quicken

their preparation for the final showdown with the Nationalists.[24] They succeeded in that final showdown, because they masterfully blended their ideology into their programs of anti-imperialist struggle and social revolution and enjoyed the popular support among the Chinese people.

What Hurley "accomplished" in China was that he made an already difficult situation even harder to deal with: the Nationalists became more uncompromising and the Communists came faster to the conclusion that the United States was their enemy. He contributed his share to the tragedy that the two big countries, the most populous and the most powerful, had to face each other in hostile terms for decades, while his name remained in the minds of hundreds of millions of people as the symbol of American imperialism.

NOTES

Introduction

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17. Stilwell diary entry, September 19, 1944, Stilwell Papers, 333.

18. Hong Ming, The Chiang Dynasty, 227.

19. U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Military Situation in the Far East (82th Cong. 1st sess. 1951), 2868-2869 (hereafter referred as Military Situation in the Far East).

20. Notes on the Happening on September 19, 1944, November 3, 1944, Hurley Papers.

21. Hurley to Roosevelt, September 21, 1944, ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Stilwell to Hurley, September 22, 1944, Hurley Papers; Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, 451.

24. Hong Ming, Chiang Dynasty, 224-225, 229.

25. Chiang, China's Destiny, 81, 229-232; Wartime Messages, 549.

26. Hong Ming, Chiang Dynasty, 225.

27. "Aide Memoirs," September 25, 1944, Hurley Papers. The message had been modified twice before it was finally sent out. This change was upon Hurley's strong suggestion. By so doing, Hurley thought that the language of the document would not offend the American leaders. See Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, 452.

28. Hurley's letter to Roosevelt accompanying "Aide Memoir", September 25, 1944, Hurley Papers; Military Situation in the Far East, 2876.

29. Stimson diary entry, October 3, 1944, On Active Service, 537.

30. Roosevelt to Chiang, October 6, 1944, Hurley Papers.

31. Chiang, Wartime Messages, 801-803.

32. Hurley to Roosevelt, October 6, 1944, Hurley Papers; also see Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, 456.

33. Chiang's "Aide Memoir," October 9, 1944, Hurley Papers; also see Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, 462.

34. ibid.

35. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 299.

36. Hurley to Roosevelt, October 9, 1944, Hurley Papers.

37. Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, 463.

38. Leahy, I Was There, 270-272; Stimson, Active Service, 537-538.

39. Romanus & Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problem, 464.

40. Hurley to Roosevelt, October 13, 1944, Hurley Papers.

41. Feis, China Tangle, 196; Stilwell by then also got to know this change of strategy. See note 26 on the same page.

42. Roosevelt to Hurley, October 14, 1944; Hurley to Roosevelt, October 15, 1944, ibid.

43. Roosevelt to Hurley for delivery to the Generalissimo, October 18,1944, Hurley Papers.

44. Undated letter from General Stilwell to Mrs. Stilwell, Stilwell Papers, 339.

45. Marshall to Stilwell, October 18, 1944, Hurley Papers.

46. Stilwell diary entry, October 18, 1944, Stilwell Papers, 339.

47. Ibid, 346-347.

48. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 123-124.

49. After returning to the United States, Stilwell was named the Commander of the Tenth Army fighting in the Pacific. Hong Ming, Chiang Dynasty, 229.

50. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 305.

51. Huang Hua, former Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, gave the speech at a "Stilwell Seminar" held in Chongqing (Chungking) in 1992. See China Today (February, 1992), 32.

Chapter IV

1. Hurley to Roosevelt, Oct. 13, 1944, Hurley Papers.

2. General Chu Teh to Hurley and Nelson, Sept. 10, 1944, Hurley Papers.

3. Hong Ming, Chiang Dynasty, 231.

4. Van Slyke, Chinese Communist Movement, 69-71.

5. Chiang, Wartime Messages, 554.

6.Van Slyke, Chinese Communist Movement, 81.

7. Interview with Mao Tse-tung by Theodore White, Nov. 2, 1944, Hurley Papers.

8. "Declaration of the CCP Central Committee on the Fifth Anniversary of the Resistance War," July 7, 1942, Selected Documents of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949 (Beijing: The Chinese Communist Party Central Archives, 1985-1992), Vol. 12, 107. (Hereafter referred as Selected Documents of the CCP)

9. "Telegram from Commander Chu Teh to Chiang Kai-shek," July 6, 1943; "The Central Committee's Decision to Launch a Campaign of Anti-KMT Propaganda," July 8, 1943, Selected Documents of the CCP, vol.12, 262-263.

10. Van Slyke, Chinese Communist Movement, 86.

11. Chiang, "Basis for Political Settlement," Sept. 16, 1944. The Wartime Messages, 798-799.

12. Slyke, Chinese Communist Movement, 97.

13. "The Comparison of Fighting Results between the KMT and the CCP" and "The General Information about the CCP's Fighting against the Puppet Troops", August 24, 1944, The Selected Documents of the CCP, vol.12, 335-339.

14. "The Central committee's Instruction on How to Carry Out the Decision of Our Land Policy," Feb. 4, 1942, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 12, 19-23.

15. White, Thunder Out of China, 200.

16. White Paper, 61.

17. Davies, Dragon by the Tail, 300.

18. Service, "Report No. 1," July 28, 1944, Lost Chance: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service (New York: Random House, 1974), 179.

19. Service, "Report No. 22, Sept. 4, 1944, Lost Chance, 218-219.
Davies, Dragon by the Tail, 323.

20. Service, "Report No. 16" Aug. 29, 1944, Hurley Papers.

21. Chou En-lai, "Reply to the Xinhua News Agency," Aug.13, 1944, Selected Documents of the CCP, 567.

22. White Paper, 61.

23. Ibid.

24. Progress Report from Hurley to Roosevelt, Oct. 19, 1944, Hurley Papers.

25. The Central Committee to Lin, Dung, Wang "About the proposals of Reforming KMT Government and the Plan to Carry them Out," Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 12, 580.

26. Chiang, "Before Final Victory," Sept. 5, 1944; "Basis for Political Settlement," Sept. 16, 1944, Wartime Messages, 792-799.

27. Gauss to Secretary of State, Oct. 17, 1944, USFR, 1944, Vol. VI, 647-650.

28. "Suggestions" prepared in the Embassy in China, Oct. 17, 1944, USFR,1944, 650.

29. China White Paper 73.

30. "The Suggestions of the CCP to the National Government," June 5, 1944, Selected Documents of the CCP, 593-596; Also see "Lin and Tung to Hurley," Oct. 21, 1944, USFR, 1944,

Vol. VI, 655.

31. "The Nationalist Government's Proposal to the Political Settlement with Communist Question," June 5, 1944, Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol.12, 597.

32. "Lin to Wang and Chang," Aug. 30, 1944, Selected Documents of the CCP, 601-606.

33. Chiang to Roosevelt, Oct. 25,1944, see Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 309.

34. "Basis for Agreement" by Hurley with KMT correction, Oct. 28, 1944, Hurley Paper; also see USFR, 1944, Vol. VI, 659.

35. Davies to Hurley, Oct. 27, 1944, USFR, 1944, Vol.VI, 659.

36. Hong Ming, Chiang Dynasty, 233.

37. David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley: University of California, 1970), 56.

38. Ibid, 57.

39. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 179.

40. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 57.

41. Ibid; also see Lohbeck, Patrick. J. Hurley, 312-313.

42. White, Thunder out of China, 253.

43. "The Central Committee's Instruction to the Central China Bureau about Development in Su-Che-Wan Areas," Sept. 27, 1944, Selected Documents of the CCP, 615.

44. Chou En-lai, "Speech on the Double-Ten Day," Oct. 10, 1944, Selected Documents of the CCP, 617-627.

45. Interview with Mao by White, Nov. 2, 1944, Hurley Papers.

46. Ibid.

47. Memorandum by Hurley, Nov. 8, 1944, USFR, 1944, Vol. VI, 673-674.

48. "First Conference with the CCP officials," Nov. 8, 1944, Hurley Papers.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 61-62.

53. Ibid.

54. "Second Conference with the Communist leaders," Nov. 8, 1944, Hurley Papers; Also see USFR, 1944, Vol. VI, 678-687.

55. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 61.

56. "The Second Conference with the Communist Leaders, " Nov. 8, 1944, Hurley Papers; Also see USFR, 1944, 678-687.

57. Revised Draft by the Chinese Communist Party Representatives, November 10, 1944, USFR,1944, 687-688.

58. Barrett. Dixie Mission, 62-63.

59. Ibid.

60. Gauss to Secretary of State, Nov. 13, 1944, USFR,1944, 690.

Chapter V

1. Mao Tse-tung to Roosevelt via Hurley, Nov. 10, 1944, Hurley Papers.

2. Hurley to Mao, Nov. 10, 1944, Hurley Papers.

3. Mao to Roosevelt, Nov. 10, 1944, ibid.

4. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 315.

5. Hurley to Roosevelt, Nov. 16, 1944, Hurley Papers.

6. The First, Second, and Third Counter-drafts by Chinese government representatives, Nov. 15, 17, and 21, USFR,1944, 697-698, 703-704, and 706-707.

7. Ibid, 707.

8. Davies to the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent), Nov. 14, 1944, USFR,1944, Vol. VI, 693.

9. Memo of Stettinius to the Secretary of State, August 3, 1944, USFR,1944, Vol. VI, 247.

10. Hurley to Roosevelt, Nov. 17, 1944, USFR, 1944, Vol. VI, 700. Hurley did not present his credentials to the Chinese National Government until January, 1945.

11. Hurley to Roosevelt, Nov. 17, 1944, Hurley Papers. He also informed President Roosevelt that he had done what the President asked him to do---to impress Chiang by telling him that "a working arrangement" between the KMT and the CCP was the desire of the United States Government and that of the Soviet Union. Hurley reported that he did emphasize the word "Russians" when talking to the Generalissimo and the result was "effective" though he thought the Generalissimo's terms were still "too stiff." See Roosevelt to Hurley, Nov. 18, 1944 and Hurley to Roosevelt, Nov. 29, 1944, Hurley Papers.

12. Mao Tse-tung, "Our Tasks in 1945," Dec. 15, 1944, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 642.

13. The Third Draft by Chinese Government Representatives, Nov. 21,1944, USFR,1944, 706.

14. Hurley to Roosevelt, Nov. 29, 1944, Hurley Papers.

15. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 70.

16. Chou En-lai to Hurley, Dec. 8, 1944, Hurley Papers.

17. Hurley to Chou, Dec. 11, 1944, ibid.

18. Hurley to Roosevelt, Dec. 12, 1944, ibid.

19. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 71-75.

20. Ibid.

21. Mao Tse-tung, "Our Tasks in 1945," The Selected Documents of the CCP, 642-651.

22. Mao and Chou to Wang Jo-fei, Dec. 12, 1944, ibid, 641.

23. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 75.

24. Mao and Chou to Wang Jo-fei, Dec. 12, 1944, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 641.

25. Chou to Hurley, Dec. 16, 1944, Hurley Papers.

26. Mao to Hurley, Dec. 16, 1944, USFR, 1944, 740-741.

27. Hurley to Secretary of State, Dec. 13, 1944, ibid, 737.

28. Ibid, 737-8.

29. Mao to Hurley, Dec. 23, 1944, Hurley Papers.

30. Chou to Hurley, Dec. 28, 1944, Hurley Papers.

31. "The Central Committee's Instruction on Current Situation and the Tasks," Dec. 25, 1944, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 655-657.

32. Ibid.

33. Memo by Davies, Nov. 11, 1944, USFR, 1944, 670-671.

34. Barrett to Hurley , Dec. 30, 1944, Hurley Papers.

35. Service Report No. 22, Sept. 4, 1944, Lost Chance in China, 218-219.

36. Service Report No. 39, Oct. 9, 1044, ibid, 247.

37. Hurley to Mao and Chou, Jan.1, 1945, Hurley Papers.

38. Mao to Hurley, Jan. 11, 1945, Hurley Papers.

39. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out for CBI, 74.

40. Barrett, Dixie Mission, 77; Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 250-251.

41. "The Year of Great Victories Behind the Enemy Lines," (Liberation Daily), Dec. 31, 1944, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 663.

42. Memo by J. Davies, Dec. 27, 1944, USFR, 1944, 754.

43. "About the Principles of Our Party in Negotiation with the KMT," Dec. 12, 1944, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 641.

44. Dixie dispatch to Wedemeyer, Jan. 9, 1945, Hurley Papers.

45. Ibid.

46. Memorandum of Conversation, Dec. 19, 1944, USFR, 1944, 741-743.

47. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports !, 303.

48. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 252.

49. China White Paper, 78; Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 253.

50. "The Central Committee's Instruction on Diplomatic Work," August 18, 1944, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 573-576.

51. "Our Tasks in 1945," Dec. 15, 1944, ibid, 642-643.

52. "The Year of Great Victories behind the Enemy Lines," Dec. 31, 1944, ibid, 663.

53. Roosevelt to Mao, Nov. 14, 1944, Hurley Papers.

54. Interview with Mao Tse-tung by John Service, August 23, 1944, Lost Chance in China, 304.

55. Service, Report No.15, August 27, 1944, ibid, 297.

56. Service, Report No, 34, Sept. 8, 1944, ibid, 308.

57. Chou to Wedemeyer through Dixie Mission, January 10, 1945, Hurley Papers.

58. Hurley to Roosevelt, Jan. 14, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol.VII, 172-177.

59. Hurley to Mao, Jan. 20, 1945, Hurley Papers.

60. Mao to Hurley, Jan. 22, 1945, ibid.

Chapter VI

1. Chou En-lai, "Declaration before Leaving for Chungking," Jan.25, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol.13, 13.

2. Ibid.

3. Wang Shih-chieh to Hurley, Jan.24, 1945, Hurley Papers.

4. Chou, "Statement before Leaving Chungking," Feb. 15, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 25-26.,

5. China White Paper, 81-82.

6. Chiang, "Unity and Constitutionalism," March 1, 1945, Wartime Messages, 828-829. Chiang had declared earlier (Jan.1, 1945) that he though it necessary to call a People's Congress to adopt a constitution so as to transfer the power of the government to the people. See "Victory and Democracy," on page 816 in the same book.

7. China White Paper, 80.

8. Ibid, 82.

9. Ibid, 86.

10. Memo by Davies, Nov. 15, 1944, USFR, 1944, 695-697.

11. Memo by Service, Oct. 10, 1944, ibid, 709-711.

12. Ibid.

13. Atcheson to Secretary of State, Nov. 24, 1944, ibid, 715.

14. Memo by Davies, Dec. 12, 1944, ibid, 734-735.

15. Harriman to Roosevelt, Dec. 12, 1944, ibid, 737-738.

16. Stettinius to Roosevelt, Jan. 4, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 154.

17. "U. S. Short and Long Range Objectives in China," Jan. 29, 1945, Hurley Papers.

18. China White Paper, 86.

19. Hurley to Roosevelt, Jan. 14, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 175; Hurley to Secretary of State, Jan. 31, 1945, ibid, 197.

20. Atcheson to Secretary of State, Feb. 28, 1945, ibid, 242-246.

21. Ibid.

22. Ludden and Service to Wedemeyer, Feb. 14, 1945, ibid, 218.

23. Hurley to Secretary of States, Feb. 7, 1945, ibid, 205.

24. Ibid.

25. Hurley to Secretary of State, Feb. 17, 1945, ibid, 223.

26. Hurley to Secretary of State, Feb.18, 1945, ibid, 223-230.

27. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 278-279.

28. Leahy, I Was There, 337; Atcheson to Secretary of State, Dec. 8, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 732-734.

29. Shek is only part of Chiang's given name, Kai-shek.

30. Big Wind---some one who boasts too much.

31. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports !, 307-312; White, Thunder Out of China, 246-248.

32. White, Thunder Out of China, 247.

33. Leahy, I Was There, 287.

34. Military Situation in the Far East, 3256.

35. Memo by Ballantine (Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), March 6, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 260-261.

36. George Atcheson was transferred to other position. John Service was recalled from China and later arrested because of his involvement in the Amerasia case. Though later cleared of all of the charges, Service could never remove the taint upon his name. John P. Davies, who was also forced out of China, had to resign later from the Foreign Service without a pension. By 1960, he was still trying hard to support his family (a wife and seven children) by making furniture. John Emmenson and John C. Vincent also had their career cut short. See E. J. Kahn, Jr. The China Hands: American Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them, New York: The Viking Press, 1972. Also see Gary May, China Scapegoat, Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1979.

37. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports !, 311-312, 318.

38. Leahy. I Was There, 337.

39. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 366.

40. Military Situation in the Far East, 2884.

41. Ibid.

42. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 367-368.

43. Hurley to Secretary of State, April 13, 1945, Hurley Papers.

44. Snow, diary entry, March 3, 1945, Random Notes on Red China (1936-1945) (Harvard University Press, 1957), 126-128.

45. Ibid.

46. Transcript of Press and Radio News Conference by the Ambassador in China, April 2, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 317-322.

47. Ibid.

48. Conversation between Harriman, Hurley, Stalin and Molotov, April 15, 1945, Hurley Papers.

49. Military Situation in Far East, 3335.

50. Ibid.

51. Buhite, P. J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy, 205.

52. Chiang, Wartime Messages, 827-830.

53. "On Chiang Kai-shek's March 1 Speech," March 2, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol.13, 35-40.

54. "The Central Committee's Instruction on Strategy and Policy of Expansion into Southern Anhui, Eastern Chekiang and Southern Chiangsu," Feb. 24, 1945, ibid, 27-30.

55. Ibid.

56. "Central Committee to Wang Jo-fei about Helping Democratic Movement within the KMT-controlled Areas," Feb. 25, 1945, ibid, 731-732.

57. "The Central Committee's Instruction on the Establishment of the UCCPL," March 15, 1945, ibid, 47-48.

58. Chiang, Wartime Messages, 933-835; China White Paper, 101; Hurley to Secretary of State, May 19, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 387-388.

59. "Comment on the Sixth Plenary Session of the KMT Congress," May 29, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 75-79.

60. Mao, "On Coalition Government," June 11, 1945 (New York: International Publishers, 1956), Vol. IV, 318; Also see "A Congress of Unity, A Congress of Victory," Liberation Daily editorial, June 14, 1945, ibid, 80-88.

61. China White Paper, 102.

62. "The Statement of the CCP about not participating in the People's Political Council," June 16, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 93.

63. Chou's demands were: release all political prisoners; withdraw KMT troops surrounding and attacking the Communist Border Region and the Communist forces; abolish all repressive regulations, and stop all special secret service activities.

64. China White Paper, 105.

65. Embassy staff member Robert L Smyth and Arthur R. Ringwalt had sent in these reports. Hurley criticized them as "apparently persisting ...in the old diehard attempt to bring about the collapse of the National Government in China." Hurley to Secretary of State, June 9, 1945 USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 406-410.

66. Hurley to Secretary of State, June 17, 1945, ibid, 415.

67. "The Central Committee's Instruction on the Strategy of Building Southern Base Areas," June 24, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 95-96.

68. Hurley to Secretary of State, July 10, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 430-432.

Chapter VII

1. Hurley to Truman, May 10, 1945, Hurley Papers.

2. Hurley to the Secretary of State, July 10, 1945, USFR, 45, Vol. VII, 430.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Grew to Hurley, Feb. 6, 1945, Hurley Papers.

7. Hurley to the Secretary of State, Feb. 12, 1945 (sent on June 9, 1945), ibid.

8. Kennan to the Secretary of State, April 23, 1945, USFR, 45, Vol. VII, 342-344. Also see George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1967), 237-239.

9. Davies to Harriman, July 26, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 439-440.

10. Memorandum by Col. S. V. Constant, Director, Security and Intelligence Division, Headquarters, Second Service Command, July 31, 1945, ibid, 441-444.

11. Stettinius to Hurley, April 23, 1945, ibid, 344-345,

12. Truman to Hurley, June 9, 1945, Hurley Papers.

13. Military Situation in the Far East, 2894-2895; China White Paper, 99.

14. Grew to Hurley, June 9, 1945; Hurley to Grew, June 13, 1945, Hurley Papers.

15. Hurley to the Secretary of State, June 15, 1945, ibid.

16. Grew to Hurley, June 18, 1945, ibid.

17. Truman to Chiang via Hurley, July 24, 1945, ibid.

18. China White Paper, 118-120.

19. The text of the treaty can be found in China White Paper, 585-587.

20. China White Paper, 120.

21. Hurley to the Secretary of State, Sept. 6, 1945, ibid, 120.

22. Hsin Hua News Agency, "On Current Situation," The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 109.

23. Ibid.

24. The Central Committee's Instruction on Capturing Cities and Communication lines after the Soviet Union Enters the War, August 10, 1945, ibid, 115.

25. Yenan Headquarters Order No. 1-7, August 10-11, 1945, ibid, 116-122.

26. The Central Committee's Decision on the Party's Tasks after the Japanese Surrender, Aug. 11, 1945, ibid, 123-125.

27. The Joint Chiefs of Staffs to Wedemeyer, Aug. 10, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 527-528; President Truman also informed Chiang via Hurley such moves, see Truman to Chiang, Aug. 12, 1945, Hurley Paper. This directive turned out to be one of the most contradictory or inconsistent examples of the American policy in China. While pledging its continued support for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government, including military assistance, the directive also emphasized that the American forces "must not be involved in fratricadal [sic] warfare." Political stability under a unified and fully representative government was regarded as a basic consideration governing American assistance. General Wedemeyer complained that this policy had put the cart before the horse. In his opinion, stability in China could be assured only with American aid and support to the Nationalist government. He insisted that to make American help depend on political stability, or in plain words, depend on the Nationalist government's coming to terms with the Communists, was not practical at all. See Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports !, 359-360.

28. Hurley to Byrnes, Aug. 12 and Aug.13, 1945, Hurley Papers.

29. Army Observers Group (Dixie Mission) despatch, Aug. 14, 1945, ibid.

30. Memo by Chu Teh to the Ambassadors of the U. S., Britain, and the USSR, Aug. 15, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 132-134.

31. The Central Committee's Instruction on Entering the Northeast and Controlling the Countryside, Aug. 29, 1945, ibid, 138-139.

32. Hurley to the Secretary of State, Aug. 16, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 445-446.

33. Hurley to the Secretary of State, Aug. 21, 1945; Mao to Wedemeyer via Dixie Mission, Aug. 24, 1945, Hurley Papers.

34. Hurley office log, Aug. 27-28, 1945, ibid.

35. Important points presented by Chou En-lai and Mr Wang Jo-fei on Sept. 3, 1945; Government Reply to the Communist "Important Points," Sept. 5, 1945, USFR,1945, Vol. VII, 459-462.

36. The Central Committee's Plan on Northward Expansion and Southward Defense, Sept. 19, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 147-148.

37. The Central Committee's Instruction to Shantung Bureau about Sending Four More Divisions into Manchuria, Sept. 11, 1945, ibid, 146.

38. The Central Committee's Instruction on Recruitment and Organization of Field Armies, Sept. 21, 1945, ibid, 149-150.

39. The Central Military Committee's Order on Complete Destroy and Control of Railroads and Highways to Slow Down Chiang's Armies,
Sept. 29, 1945, ibid, 153-154.

40. Memo by the Acting Secretary of State to the President, Sept. 13, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 559-562.

41. The Military Committee's Instruction on Strategy and Arrangement in Manchuria, Sept. 28, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 151-152.

42. The Central Committee's Propaganda Department's Instruction on Current Propaganda Policy, Sept. 29, 1945, ibid, 155-156.

43. Ibid.

44. Memorandum by Edwin A. Locker, Aug. 20, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 448-453.

45. Ibid.

46. Hurley to the Secretary of State, Sept. 18, 1945, Hurley Papers.

47. Hurley to the Secretary of State, Sept. 23, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 466-468.

48. Ibid. A few days before he left Chungking for Washington, Hurley once again helped the two sides draw up a new nine-point proposal, which covered most of the important issues in discussion as a basis for the final settlement. Also see "Nine-Point Proposal by Hurley," Sept. 18, 1945, Hurley Papers.

49. Ibid.

Chapter VIII

1. Hurley to Truman, Sept. 16, 1945 (not sent), Hurley Papers.

2. U. S. Information Service new bulletin, Sept. 9, 1945, ibid.

3. Hurley to Roosevelt, Nov. 26, 1944 and Jan. 1, 1945; Hurley to the Secretary of State, Jan.31, May 10, and Aug. 13, 1945; Hurley to Truman, May 13 and Aug. 21, 1945; Truman to Hurley, Aug. 22, 1945, ibid.

4. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 422.

5. Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy, 260-261.

6. Military Situation in the Far East, Part 4, 2936.

7. The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Oct. 2, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 470.

8. The text of the agreement can be seen on pages 577-581 in China White Paper.

9. Ibid.

10. Robertson to the Secretary of State, Oct. 15 and 16, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 474, 475.

11. Liu Shao-chi to Cheng Wei-san and Li Hsian-nian, "On Studying Chairman Mao's Military Works and Mastering the Principle of Overwhelming the Enemy by Maximum Forces," Oct. 10, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol 13, 163.

12. "Our Tasks and Policies after the Double Tenth Agreement," Oct. 12, 1945, ibid, 165-166.

13. The Central Committee's Instruction on Destroying Communication lines to Prevent the KMT Troops' Northward Movement, Oct. 15, 1945, ibid, 168.

14. The Central Committee's Instruction to the Northeast Bureau on Concentrating our Troops to Fight the KMT in Liaoning and Antong areas, Oct. 19, ibid, 170.

15. Lu Ting-yi, "Against the Civil War, Against the Armed Intervention," Dec. 9, 1945, ibid, 131.

16. Oral Statement of President Truman to T. V. Soong, Sept. 14, 1945, China White Paper, 939; Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports !, 359-360; Wedemeyer to Marshall, Aug. 17, 1945, USFR,1945, Vol. VII, 519-520.

17. The Central Committee's Directive on Current Situation and Our Tasks during the Transitional Period to Peaceful Reconstruction, Oct.20, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, Vol. 13, 180-183.

18. The Charge in China (robertson) to the Secretary of State, Oct. 29, 1945, USFR, 1945, Vol VII, 480, 481.

19. Robertson to the Secretary of State, Oct. 31 and Nov. 10, 1945, ibid, 482, 483,

20. Digest of Yenan Broadcast Monitored by the Federal Communication Commission, Nov. 11, 1945, ibid, 486.

21. Paraphrase of the secret telegram to the State Department by the Embassy in Chungking, Nov. 10, 1945, Hurley Papers.

22. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, 359; also see Appendix IV in the same book.

23. James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, Walter Millis, ed. (New York, 1951), 108.

24. Ibid.

25. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 426; Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy, 265.

26. Baltimore Sun, Nov. 28, 1945, as quoted in Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy, 266-267.

27. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 426; Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy, 267-268.

28. Hurley's letter of resignation, China White Paper, 581-584.

29. Truman to Hurley, Nov. 27, 1945, Hurley Papers.

30. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, 113; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1958), 66.

31. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, 437-438.

32. Both Hurley and Byrnes testified in front of the Senate. See Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dec. 5,6,7,10, 1945, Hurley Papers.

33. John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 308-309.

34. Lu Ting-yi, "Against the Civil War, Against the Armed Intervention," Dec. 9, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 236; The Central Committee's Instruction on the Changes of America's China Policy and Our Reaction," Dec. 17, 1945, ibid, 247-248; The Directive of the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee on Smashing the Large-scale Military Offensive of the KMT, Dec. 12, 1945, ibid, 237.

35. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, 395.

36. Lu Ting-yi, "Against the Civil War, Against the Armed Intervention," Dec. 9, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 229-236.

37. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports !, 345-346.

38. In September, 1945 the volume of currency issued by the Nationalist government was 465 times that of July 1937; In late 1948, prices rose 85,000 times in six months. See Fairbank, The United States and China, 312-313.

Conclusion

1. The last task did not appear in Hurley's official directive. However, it was in the White House staff report reproduced in The President and the U. S. Aid to China, 1944 by former White House staff member George M. Elsey (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc. 1979), 42.

2. Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions that Shaped the History (New York: Harper, 1951), 151.

3. Elsey, The President and the U.S. Aid to China, 1944, 55.

4. Ibid.

5. White, Thunder out of China, 201.

6. A more detailed discussion can be found in Robert North's Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), 201-240.

7. Vladimir Dedijer, Tito, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), 322.

8. Michael Schaller, The U. S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 209.

9. Zhang Baijia, "Chinese Policies toward the United States, 1937-1945" in Harry Harding & Yuan Ming, eds, Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of A Critical Decade (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1989), 14-28.

10. Military Situation in the Far East, 2894-2896.

11. Qiang Zhai, "The Making of CCP Foreign Relations" in The Journal of American-East Asian Relations (Chicago: Imprint Publications, Inc., Winter, 1992), Vol. I, No. 4, 473.

12. See Paul Varg's The Closing Door: Sino-American Relations, 1936-1946 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1973), 155-156, for detailed discussion.

13. Elsey, President and U. S. Aid to China, 55.

14. For a discussion on the situational and ideological tendencies in policy making during the time, see Steven Levine's "Chinese Communist Policy: Introduction" in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 182; Also see his "On the Brink of Disaster: China and the United States in 1945" in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds. Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1989), 1-13.

15. James Reardon-Anderson gives a very interesting and informative discussion on the evolution of Communist foreign policy in his book Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). According to Reardon-Anderson, the development of the Communist foreign policy was much more "situational" rather than ideological. The

weakness of the KMT government, the Japanese invasion and later collapse, and the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union into the Chinese politics all had their influence on the Yenan leaders when they were making their foreign policies in a realistic way concerning their relations with the great powers.

16. See Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955, 14, 31, 51, 78, 143, 289.

17. Jim Bishop, FDR's Last Years (New York: Random House, 1974), 450.

18. Elsey, President and U.S. Aid to China, xi, xiii.

19. See Hurley's resignation letter, China White Paper, 582.

20. Varg, The Closing Door, 292 and Buhite, Hurley and American Foreign Policy, 317.

21. The Central Committee's Directive on Current Situation and Our Tasks during the Transitional Period to Peaceful Reconstruction, Oct. 20, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 182-183. The "favorable international environment" refers to the CCP's view on the anti-fascist alliance of the United States, the USSR, and Britain and the powers' unwillingness to see civil conflict break out in China. Also see Niu Jun, From Yenan to the World: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations (Fuzhou, China: Fujian People's Press, 1992), 128.

22. This was especially apparent after Hurley gave his April 2 (1945) speech in Washington when he declared that the United States would recognize the Nationalist government only and there would be no political unification in China as long as there were armed political parties and warlords who were still strong enough to defy the Central Government. See USFR, 1945, Vol. VII, 317-319. See Lu Ting-yi, "Against the Civil War, Against the Armed Intervention," Dec. 9, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 234-235.

23. Ibid, 236.

24. The Directive of the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee on Smashing the Large-Scale Military Offensive of the KMT, Dec. 12, 1945, The Selected Documents of the CCP, 237-239.

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VITA

Xiansheng Tian

Candidate for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Thesis: **PATRICK J. HURLEY AND CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1944-1945**

Major Field: History

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born in Kaifeng, Henan Province, People's Republic of China, October 14, 1954, the son of Runlin Tian and Zhiyun Mu.

Education: Graduated from Kaifeng's No. 25 High School, Kaifeng, in May 1973; received Bachelor of Arts degree in English from Henan University in December 1981; received Master of Arts degree from State University of New York at Cortland in May, 1989; completed requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at Oklahoma State University in July, 1994.

Professional Experience: Instructor, Department of Independent and Correspondent Studies, Oklahoma State University, January, 1993 to July, 1994.

Teaching Associate, Department of History, Oklahoma State University, September, 1989 to May, 1992, and September, 1993 to May, 1994.

Lecturer and Program Coordinator, Department of American Studies and University Foreign Affairs Office, Yellow River University, Zhengzhou, China, January to December, 1987.

Instructor, Department of English, Henan Univer-

sity, Kaifeng, China, January, 1982 to July, 1985.

Memberships: American Historical Association
Society of Historians of American Diplomacy
Phi Alpha Theta International Honor Society
Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society
China's American Historical Studies Society