RE/SEARCHING THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION:

A HERMENEUTIC INQUIRY

By

NANCY J. BROOKS

Bachelor of Science in Education
Pittsburg State University
Pittsburg, Kansas
1972

Master of Library
and Information Studies
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma
1991

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Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
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Dissertation Approved:

Wen-Peng Hu

Dissertation Adviser

Natalia Y. Adam

Dean of the Graduate College

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A Note on Gender and Language

The primary texts of this study and many of the philosophical works framing it were written prior to 1970 and contain masculine gendered language. To make notations at each occurrence would have considerably lengthened this document without a proportionate yield in meaningful content. In this matter, I invite the gracious understanding of the reader.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

> Pressure for change [in education] is sometimes uncomfortably great. The pressure is inevitable and necessary. It builds from the conflict between established ways and emerging, previously unrecognized realities. (Huebner, 1964a, p. v)

In the last part of the 20th century the field of curriculum studies experienced radical changes, leading various authors to describe the field's condition as one of "conflict" (Eisner & Vallance, 1974, p. 2), "confusion" (Jackson, 1996, p. 3), "schism" (Hlebowitsh, 1998, p. 15) and "crisis" (Doll, 1983, p. 109). This turbulence has been generally attributed to a diverse group of scholars who have worked to introduce alternative modes of inquiry, modes that are generally more closely allied with the humanities and social sciences than the natural sciences. Scholars such as Michael Apple, William Pinar, and Janet Miller - new scholars in the field in the 1970s - were among the first to advocate these unusual approaches to curriculum inquiry. It could also be said they have been among the most influential in effecting change or, as Pinar (1988a) has put it, in "reconceptualizing" the field. Certainly Apple and Pinar have been among the most prolific curricularists in the last 30 years in the production of publications and in the mentoring of productive students. Miller's influence may be seen not only through publications, but also through her accomplishments as AERA Division B vice-president (1997-1999) and as the Managing Editor of the official journal of the "Reconceptualists," JCT, from its founding in 1978 until 1998.

These curricularists and many others of the reconceptualized field point to several scholars as the inspiration for their work of the last thirty years. The work of those scholars is the focus of this study. In an attempt to better understand the current chaotic state of the field, this hermeneutic inquiry explores texts that were written during the decade of the sixties by Maxine Greene, Paul Klohr, Dwayne Huebner, and James Macdonald. It is my hope that this exploration may "provoke new ways of seeing and thinking within a deep sense of tradition, bringing about new forms of engagement and dialogue about the world we face together" (Smith, 1991, p. 202).

Background

In spite of their cooperative efforts to "move the field away from its long-standing managerial, technocratic, and positivist orientation" (Miller, 1996, p. 6), Apple, Pinar, Miller, and others such as Henry Giroux and William Doll have never been of one mind in their views. Marshall, Sears, and Schubert (2000) have speculated that the only characteristic ever shared by "Reconceptualists" may have been an opposition to the "Tylerian status quo" (p. 161). Indeed, very early in the endeavor to change the field, disagreement and dissension began to flourish, leading to what Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (1995) call "a breakdown in the sense of collective effort" (p. 5). Referring to the "internecine struggles" of the time, Marshall, Sears, and Schubert (2000) comment, "Having succeeded in illustrating that their work was *not* about the dominant curriculum paradigm, many new curricularists were busy distinguishing themselves from each other as well" (pp. 162-163).

For example, much dissension arose over Pinar's use of the word "Reconceptualists" in the subtitle of his 1975 book Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists. Pinar himself has publicly rued his use of the term numerous times (1978, 1979, 1988a; 1988b), because it implies a degree of ideological unity that never existed. He feels a more accurate title would have referred to the scholars' work – The Reconceptualization – instead of to the individuals themselves (1988b). Curricularists working in the political sector of the field found fault with the "Reconceptualist" label and were further irritated by Pinar's use of the term "post-critical" to describe the existential/phenomenological work being done. Pinar (1998b) explains,

> In that volume, I differentiated between "critical" and "post-critical" theorists, placing the Marxists in the former group and those of us interested in the individual and related concerns in the latter. Of course the book implied that post-critical theorists were somehow more advanced, psychologically if not theoretically. (p. 160)

Today, Apple refuses the notion of a reconceptualization, preferring to think of his work as the continuation of "a very, very long and valuable tradition that has its roots in the very beginning of the curriculum field" (quoted in Marshall, et al., 2000, p. 103). He does, however, speak of his work to "transform" the basic curriculum question into a political one and of that particular "kind of generational shift" (p. 104).

Those opposed to the work of Reconceptualist scholars generally agree that the field has undergone a transformation. Hlebowitsh (1998) suggests, "There are of course, variations among all curricularists, but the fact that a reconceptualization in the field has been declared and that few scholars have disputed its validity, points to a new broad

perspective" (p.3). Wraga (1998; 1999a; 1999b) has been sharply critical of Reconceptualists' interpretations of the curriculum field. In spite of that, he admits that reconceptualized curriculum studies has acquired prominence in academic curriculum circles. He observes, "Now, reconceptualized curriculum theory dominates the program of Division B of AERA and annually appears more frequently on the program of the Professors of Curriculum meetings, especially those held at AERA" (1998, p. 26).

Clearly, there is agreement that a major shift has occurred in the curriculum field and, clearly, there is dissension as to the exact meaning of that shift for the identity of the field.

The State of Curriculum Studies

> I myself have wondered (only half in jest) whether there is such a thing as a "field" of curricular studies after all. (Jackson, 1996, p. 4)

Regarding identity, some scholars fear the curriculum field may have ceased to exist. Alluding to Schwab's 1969 diagnosis of the field, Davis (1999) declares the field has now attained the status of "moribunder." Barry Franklin (1999) worries whether curriculum studies remains a bounded and coherent field of research. From his personal experience with five universities, Franklin observes that none of them had departments that were devoted entirely to curriculum. Instead, curriculum was dispersed in various manners throughout other education departments in differing organizational patterns, none of which seemed to work. He concludes, "Maybe there's nothing of substance about the concept of curriculum and instruction anymore. Perhaps all we have really is a bureaucratic category that is useful for organizing schools of education and it doesn't

mean much more than that." Although he expresses approval of much of the inquiry being pursued in curriculum studies, he argues that "the very existence of the field is problematic."

With much less enthusiasm for newer modes of inquiry, Wraga (1999a) also expresses concern for the state of the field. However, he does not believe the field is disappearing. He believes it is being stolen. Interpreting the reconceptualized field as "holding theorizing aloof from school practice" (p. 12) and as having derailed the field's historic commitment to "improving the quality and effectiveness of the school experience," (p. 9), he laments, "The arrogation of the curriculum field continues" (1999b, p. 16). He warns the usurpers that they might "further alienate the practitioners they originally were to serve" and lose influence with policymakers and politicians (1999a, p. 12). With similar alarm, Hlebowitsh (1998) asserts the field is now "largely in schism" (p. 15), and predicts, "The effect on the field will be fatal if the new curricularists do not deal with the relativism toward the school curriculum they have helped to bring forward" (p. 20). He asserts the movement has not produced curriculum theory that is "responsive to the social and political realities of the school" (1997, p. 507).

This issue of the reconceptualized field's relationship to practitioners is a particularly sore point. Jackson (1996) suggests, "The latter remain relatively uninterested in what the former are doing and...the long-term prospect of a vast readership among practitioners for the kind of writing Pinar and his colleagues have been producing is not very good" (p. 36). Jackson believes curricularists should seriously consider the implications of this situation.

Ladwig (1998) claims Reconceptualists, who work in what he calls the "radical sociologies of school knowledge" (RSSK), have had little impact on schools themselves:

> It is quite possible that RSSK has had tremendous direct and indirect effect in specific locales and in specific issue struggles…However, as long as these struggles and debates remain specific and local, I would not be so ready to claim victory in the struggle to make U.S. education, and the U.S. more generally just. (pp. 35-36)

Not surprisingly, Reconceptualists' responses to these charges are varied. Some admit that contemporary curriculum theory has not changed school practice significantly (Miller, 1996; Pinar, et al., 1995). Grumet (1999b), on the other hand, has responded in detail to such charges. Among the positive changes that she feels Reconceptualists have helped effect are the site-specific determination of curriculum that exists in many schools, the creation of alternative schools, a renewed emphasis on the arts, and new possibilities for interdisciplinary curriculum. Grumet insists, "I don't think that our theory has added up to nothing, and I think that our schools are trying to be more humane, larger and more interesting places for both teachers and students."

But the fact that such dissension exists in the field is not considered a phenomenon to be lamented by some curricularists. Following Daignault and Gauthier (1982), some curricularists are rejecting the notion of a stable, unified identity for the field. Instead, as Lather (1999) noted in a reflection on recent trends in the field, an idea has emerged that *not* dissolving differences may be a good thing. Miller (1999) emphasizes the importance of a diverse curriculum field, advocating controversy, but

with mutual respect. She celebrates the "riotous array of theoretical stances" that have developed in the last thirty years.

Similarly, Schubert (1999) is not dismayed by the possible dispersal of the field. Rather, he suggests this might be a way of "getting the word out." He asks,

> If one of our fundamental concerns...is the basic question of what's worth knowing and why, is it better to try to...infiltrate lots of other places and not be a homogeneous field? Is it our purpose to make people uneasy and nervous and wonder about what they're doing, much like philosophy ought to be?

In summary, then, little or no agreement exists as to the current state of the curriculum field. Some believe it simply may not exist any longer, or that it has met a fate worse than death. Some believe it is simply diffused throughout the broader educational context. And some believe it is gloriously and contentiously diverse. General agreement does exist that some type of generational shift, renaissance, or reconceptualization has occurred in the field of curriculum in the last thirty years. However, its meaning for the field is not clear.

Purpose and Scope of the Study

> How I will be transformed depends upon my orientation and attitude toward what comes to meet me as new; whether I simply try to subsume or repress it within prevailing dispensations (a possible prelude to war or hostilities) or whether I engage it creatively in an effort to create a new common, shared reality. (Smith, 1991, p. 193)

> No single solution can be transposed from one age to another, but we penetrate or encroach on certain problematic fields, which means that the 'givens' of an old problem are reactivated in another. (Deleuze, 1988, p. 115)

Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (1995) have described the reconceptualization as a cataclysm that precipitated an identity crisis for the field. Although Pinar (1988a) has declared the reconceptualization complete, the identity crisis appears to linger. This study, therefore, is an attempt to better understand the present field through an exploration of works by scholars who are credited with inspiring the reconceptualization. Following Gadamer (1994a), I am attempting "to trace the contours of their thinking and thus learn to understand their, as well as our own, attitude toward [curriculum]" (p. 69).

The selection of a particular group of scholars means, of course, that other influential curricularists have been omitted. But a project of this nature must somehow be limited and the decision to include Greene, Huebner, Klohr, and Macdonald is based on their documented impact upon major Reconceptualist figures. A genealogical sketch by Marshall, Sears, and Schubert (2000) details the significant impact of each of these scholars upon the reconceptualized field. Rather than relate the entire genealogy, I will simply point out the following: As a professor at Ohio State, Klohr mentored both Pinar and Miller. Miller's dissertation (1977), Curriculum Theory of Maxine Greene, cites Greene and her work as "constant inspiration and encouragement" (p. iii). Huebner mentored Michael Apple at Teachers College. Macdonald advised Steve Mann, who mentored both William Doll and George Willis. More significantly, Reconceptualist scholars have made countless references to their indebtedness to each of these four curricularists (e.g., Beyer & Apple, 1998; Giroux quoted in Marshall, et al., 2000; Miller, 1996; Pinar, et al., 1995). Furthermore, all four took part in what is now considered to be the first Reconceptualist conference, which was held at Rochester University in 1973.

Their conference papers and comments were published in Pinar's first book, Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory (1974). All four were also major contributors to Pinar's landmark publication Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists. The contributions of Green, Huebner, and Macdonald were in the form of essays. Klohr's contribution came through his work with Pinar as co-editor, a position he held until a few months before the book's publication (Pinar, 1988b).

Volumes could be written about the work of any one of these scholars. It is obviously beyond the scope of this project to attempt such an explication. Rather, I have chosen to limit my study to their texts of the sixties, considering that decade as a critical moment in the coming together of influences contributing to the reconceptualization. Significantly, a number of scholars have referred to the late sixties and early seventies as the point of emergence for the movement (Jackson, 1996; Marshall, et al., 2000; Pinar, et al., 1995).

The selection of a particular span of time for study is unavoidably somewhat arbitrary. Eras or movements rarely have sharp beginning and end points. However, there is much to recommend this particular decade for a study that seeks to understand the emergence of the reconceptualization. All things considered, the decade of the sixties was a crucible of sorts for the field of curriculum. Although a more detailed explanation will be presented in Chapter 3, it is appropriate to mention here that the 1957 launching of Sputnik had a significant impact on the field. Most curriculum histories detail this impact as including the take-over of curriculum development by the academic disciplines, massive government funding to support the structure-of-the-disciplines approach, and increased pressure upon all academicians, curricularists included, to produce scientific

research. (Eisner, 1979; Klein, 1998; Kliebard, 1986; Lagemann, 1997; Marshall, et al., 2000; Pinar, et al., 1995; Schubert, 1986; Tanner & Tanner, 1990). In an interesting contradiction, while government and university administrations pursued the utopia of scientific inquiry, scientists in both the natural and the social sciences were recognizing the inadequacies and ambiguities of then current inquiry methods (Bernstein, 1976; Bubner, 1984). Furthermore, social unrest in the country was at perhaps an all-time high due to the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War protest.

The decade began with the publication of Bruner's Process of Education (1960/1963). According to Tanner and Tanner (1980), this report of the 1959 Woods Hole conference was "a veritable curriculum manifesto" (p. 523) for reform in elementary and secondary schools over the ensuing decade. Marshall, Sears, and Schubert (2000) describe the report as a "polite and highly professional dismissal of curriculum workers as people in need of support from disciplinary scholars" (p. 47).

The decade ended with Schwab's (1969) notorious declaration that the field was "moribund," (p. 1) and with what Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman (1995) have referred to as the year of the "critical upheaval in ASCD," (p. 208), which eventually led to curriculum professors' alignment with AERA instead. In addition, Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman refer to 1969 as the beginning of the "decade of the Reconceptualization" (p. 63). Marshall, Sears, and Schubert (2000) mark 1969 as the year of "curriculum revolution" (p. 92).

In summary, then, this study explores the texts of scholars who have been named repeatedly as the forerunners of reconceptualized curriculum theory. Although these scholars have written many influential texts since 1969, this study examines only works

written before the emergence of the reconceptualization. My purpose is to "return to the older texts of tradition in order to enter into conversation with them and to see where our prejudices differ from theirs, in the hope that we may find some new insight" (Gadamer, 1998, p. *xxx*). I also hope this project may provoke new lines of inquiry to deal with current curriculum dilemmas. In Rorty's (1979) words, it is imperative to "keep the [curriculum theorizing] conversation going."

Significance of the Study

> By bringing an awareness of the past into the present, the way into the future is more clearly perceived. (Huebner, 1964a, p. vi.)

Heidegger's (1993) concepts of throwness and projection suggest that our existence is shaped not only by the present as a sedimentation of the past, but also by our projects and projections, our willing of the future. Concern over the present condition of the curriculum field by so many scholars provokes an exploration of the past conditions that have brought us to our current situation. New insight from such a study can act recursively to transform what we see as possibilities for our future, as well as our present.

Beginning in the mid-20th century, curricularists complained that not enough attention was being given to the history of the field (Kliebard, 1975; Schubert, 1980; Tanner, L., 1989). While many scholars have begun working to resolve this problem, much work remains to be done. Apple (1995) refers specifically to the need for more attention to the work of the precursors of the reconceptualization: "I must admit to a bit of impatience with (perhaps unconscious) recapitulations of theoretical talk that we have

heard before in more sophisticated ways" (p. 131). Kliebard (1996) also points to the need for more attention to the field's history:

> But when the design of the curriculum is seen as part of a configuration of factors that is time-bound and context-specific, then ... a variety of trajectories may be plotted. Partially hidden behind each twist and turn that the curriculum took over the course of its history lay other trails, and historical studies of curriculum, rather than providing concrete object lessons, may help to clear the underbrush from those half-forgotten paths. (p. 181)

Furthermore, this particular study is significant because no comprehensive analysis of this type has been done. Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (1995) have described the important contributions of each of these scholars to the field in their survey of the field. Pinar has contributed introductions to recent collections of the work of Huebner (Hillis, 1999) and Macdonald (1995). He has also edited and introduced a collection of essays on the work of Greene (Pinar, 1998). Ayers and Miller (1998) have edited a collection of essays by scholars inspired by the work of Greene. This is in addition to Miller's dissertation (1977), a study of the major publications of Greene at that time. However, no comprehensive study has been done examining this particular group of texts as major influences during a time of fundamental change in the field.

Theoretical Perspective and Guiding Questions

> The art of questioning is the art of questioning ever further – i.e., the art of thinking. (Gadamer, 1960/1997, p. 367)

> Knowledge, power and the self are the triple root of a problematization of thought. (Deleuze, 1988, p. 116)

The hermeneutics of Gadamer provide the major perspective for the exploration of the texts in this study. According to Gadamer (1960/1997), hermeneutics is a dialectic; it is the art of conducting a conversation, the "art of the formation of concepts as the working out of common meanings" (p. 368). A useful understanding of the text itself is possible only if the text is seen in a limited field of inquiry. If we expect a response from the text, we must limit what we wish to learn from it by addressing specific questions to it: "The question has to be posed. Posing a question implies openness but also limitation. It implies the explicit establishing of presuppositions in terms of which can be seen what still remains open" (p.363).

I have drawn the questions for the limitation of this study from Gilles Deleuze' work on Foucault. Although Foucault and Gadamer worked out of different traditions, some scholars have found their approaches may be productively combined (e.g., Gallagher, 1992; Kogler, 1992/1999). This point will be further elaborated in Chapter 2. Deleuze (1988) explains Foucault's project as a history or problematization of thought based on a triple root of knowledge, power, and the self. To examine ways the past may explain present possibilities, he says Foucault asks the questions: "*What can I do, What do I know, What am I*?" (p. 115).

What can I know?

Deleuze actually breaks this into a two-part question: What is it possible to say, and what is it possible to see? For Foucault, knowledge is a "'mechanism' of statements and visibilities" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 51). As "what it is possible to say," *statements* are official pronouncements within systems of spoken/written rules (discourses). These rules control what it is possible to think and who is accorded the right and status to

create/pronounce official knowledge. As "what it is possible to see," *visibilities* are the content, rather than the expression, of an age. Institutions – as "practices or operating mechanisms" (p. 75) – are the most frequently given example.[1] Deleuze is clear that "Visibilities are not forms of objects, nor even forms that would show up under light, but rather forms of luminosity which are created by the light itself" (p. 52). However, in a moment of particularity, he does provide the example of a prison as an institution. The prison provides a form of *visibility* and its substance is prisoners. Likewise, penal law is the form of a *statement*, whose substance is concepts such as "delinquency" (p. 47). Knowledge is not formed within either statements or visibilities, but in the *relationship* between the two.

What can I do?

Deleuze elaborates on this question as follows: "What powers must we confront and what is our capacity for resistance?" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 115). Regarding power, Foucault insists we should not ask, "'What is power and where does it come from?', but 'How is it practiced?' An exercise of power shows up as an effect" (p. 71). These effects include the creation of categories, codes, sequences, and finally, the combination of these into "tactics" or "mechanisms in which the product of the various forces is increased by their calculated combination" (Foucault, 1975/1995, p. 167). While Foucault's prime example of this effectiveness is military tactics, he also illustrates the function of power to define what is normal and to "produce" individuals through the example of education.

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[1] In a published interview Foucault (1977/1980) defined the term "institution" as "generally applied to every kind of more-or-less constrained, learned behavior. Everything which functions in society as a system of constraint and which isn't an utterance, in short, all the field of the nondiscursive social, is an institution" (p. 197).

An important characteristic of Foucault's notion of power is that "it passes through the hands of the mastered no less than through the hands of the masters (since it passes through every related force)" (p. 177).

Who am I?

Is it possible to "bear witness to and perhaps even participate in the 'production of a new subjectivity?'" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 115). As Deleuze interprets Foucault: "The relation to oneself will be understood in terms of power-relations and relations of knowledge" (p. 103). For Foucault, the emergent subject "becomes" by being defined in discourse and disciplined by power. Knowledge and power are the dual aspects of the comportment-conditioning environment within which individuals act, and so within which subjects are formed and have their being. The following passage from Foucault (1975/1995) clearly illustrates the knowledge/power/self connection and is worth quoting at length:

> Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance...behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of force and bodies...We are ...in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism. (p. 217)

However, Deleuze (1988) points out that Foucault's later work – beginning with The Uses of Pleasure – suggests a "dimension of subjectivity derived from power and knowledge without being dependent on them" (p. 101). He refers to a certain capacity for resistance—a struggle for subjectivity which passes through a resistance to both knowledge and power. Everything is subject to variables and variation. Resistance cannot guarantee change in the desired direction and is in danger of being appropriated by the very force it resists. However, although Foucault's third axis of subjectivity does not annul the other two, it works at the same time they do. One force among forces. One variable among many others.

> To think means to be embedded in the present-time stratum that serves as a limit....Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able to finally 'think otherwise' (the future)." (Deleuze, 1988, p. 119)

Guiding Questions

For this inquiry into 1960s texts of the "pre-reconceptualization", I adapted Deleuze' questions to read as follows:

1. At that point in history what was it possible for these curriculum scholars to know, that is, "to say and to see"?
2. What powers were they confronting and what was their capacity for resistance?
3. What new subjectivity may have been emerging that they could bear witness to? That is, in the interplay of knowledge and power, what new "subjectivity" may have been emerging, not for the individual in this case, but for the field of curriculum studies?

Organization of the Inquiry

This chapter concludes with an account of the issues and personal experiences that have brought me to this particular study. In the second chapter, the epistemological foundations that shaped this inquiry are briefly outlined through a presentation of the various strands of hermeneutics since mid-nineteenth century, with special focus on the work of Gadamer and Foucault, the scholars most pertinent to this study. Chapter three, as befits a hermeneutic inquiry, presents the historical context of the texts explored for this dissertation. In chapter four, an account of each of the four scholar's 1960s work is presented separately, followed by a conclusion which attempts to synthesize the themes which emerge. Reflections on these themes as they pertain to the field today are presented in the final chapter.

My-self and the Reconceptualization

> The interpreter dealing with a traditionary text tries to apply it to herself. But this does not mean that the text is given for her as something universal, that she first understands it per se, and then afterward uses it for particular applications. Rather, the interpreter seeks no more than to understand this universal, the text; i.e., to understand what it says, what constitutes the text's meaning and significance. In order to understand that, she must not try to disregard herself and her particular hermeneutical situation. She must relate the text to this situation, if she wants to understand at all. (Gadamer, 1960/1997, p. 324)[2]

My entry into the realm of reconceptualized curriculum was something of an accident. My first experience with curriculum studies was in the seventies. After earning an undergraduate degree and embarking on a career as a high school English teacher, I

[2] Because of the personal application, I have taken the liberty on this quote of changing the gendered pronouns to the feminine form.

enrolled in a class in the curriculum department of a nearby university. As a new teacher in the early seventies I imagined that graduate study in curriculum would be immensely helpful and intellectually stimulating. I couldn't have been more wrong. The class was so dull that even the professor had trouble staying awake. Each afternoon he would take his seat behind a rickety wooden desk, drop his eyelids to half-mast and begin droning on about the topic of the day. Disillusioned, I finished the class but dropped out of graduate school.

Twenty years later, at the beginning of a doctoral program in educational administration, I braced myself for the boredom I expected to endure in the one curriculum course I was required to take. However, what I encountered in that class was unlike anything I could possibly have expected. The professor began by announcing that he was a Marxist. (Now, I believe he may have said "Neo-Marxist," but at that time the only thing that penetrated the Mid-Western/Bible-Belt filters on my ears was the M-word.) Throughout succeeding weeks he proceeded to "deconstruct" Western civilization and to present various "lenses" through which to view curriculum as different kinds of "texts"—political, racial, gendered, and phenomenological, to name just a few. Each night I left class feeling angry, confused, or frustrated – but never bored.

That was the beginning of my interest in contemporary curriculum studies. When I asked the professor if there was a "name" of the type of curriculum work he was doing, he said it had been referred to as the reconceptualization of curriculum studies. By the end of the semester, I was still suspicious of the "reconceptualization," but I was intrigued. My educational administration classes were not nearly as engaging. Nor did they deal with the questions that had nagged at me throughout my experiences as both a teacher and

as a parent of school-aged children. I had sensed that most of what happens in schools is not the result of some "way it should be," but rather the result of larger forces that were at work in our society. Observing the seemingly senseless distress experienced by many students, including my own children, I had wondered: What are the forces in operation to create the curriculum as it exists in schools? What are the forces working so that teachers adapt the curriculum as they do, or so that administrators and boards of education make the choices they do? As I began work on my doctorate, those were the questions driving my inquiries. After my somewhat mind-boggling exposure to my first curriculum class at Oklahoma State, I decided to finish the requirements for state certification as a school administrator and then change my program from a doctorate in administration to a doctorate in curriculum studies.

As a result, I felt prepared for leadership in schools, but I felt less prepared for the scholarly role of an academic. And so I set out upon what was, for me, a fairly intense two-year quest for an understanding of the context of contemporary curriculum theory. I discovered this meant learning the history and language of several fields, predominately philosophy, social theory, psychoanalysis, and literary criticism. As I became more familiar with the various discourses of curriculum studies, I found I was drawn to poststructuralism because of its recognition of the arbitrary nature of the accepted categories and assumptions of modern thought. However, I also discovered another approach that was compatible with my way of thinking, probably due to my background in literature and my interest in history. That approach was hermeneutics. And so I explored the variegated discourses of hermeneutics, eventually deciding that Gadamer's

philosophical hermeneutic approach was most appropriate for my exploration of the texts credited with provoking the reconceptualization of curriculum studies.

Nearly twenty years of experience with/in schools provide the background for my inquiry into this subject, and I admit that investment is obvious in my conclusions. I also admit I received inspiration to pursue this inquiry through a conversation with Paul Klohr who, though in his eighties, has continued to live out his commitment to education by tutoring GED students and by acting as a resource for former students and other curriculum workers.

These issues and personal experiences are what have brought me to the study of pre-reconceptualization texts and these aspects of my personal history have both assisted and resisted my work on this project. As Smith (1991) explains,

> Within the hermeneutic agenda...the purpose is not to translate my subjectivity out of the picture, but to take it up with a new sense of responsibility – to make proposals about the world we share with the aim of deepening our collective understanding of it. (p. 201)

It is my hope that, through this study, I have deepened our collective understanding of the possibilities for that endeavor we call "curriculum studies."

CHAPTER TWO

HERMENEUTIC INQUIRY

> What is at issue here is that when something other or different is understood, then we must also concede something, yield – in certain limits – to the truth of the other. That is the essence, the soul of my hermeneutics: To understand someone else is to see the justice, the truth, of their position. And this is what transforms us.
> (Gadamer, 1992, p. 152)

Hermeneutic inquiry recognizes the interpretive nature of meaning. That is, no attempt to communicate meaning—whether through linguistic, graphic, numeric or other forms—is immediate and transparent; rather, meaning is (re)constructed by whoever perceives the representation. Opinions differ as to how accurately it is possible to reconstruct an author's "original meaning" or even as to how aware authors can be of their "real meaning." Although some theorists today maintain that the purpose of interpretation is to reproduce the exact meaning of the author, this is an Enlightenment viewpoint, in which knowledge is seen as a technical project. Since the "interpretive turn" of the social sciences in the mid-twentieth century, knowledge is considered by many researchers to be "inescapably practical and historically situated" (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1987, p. 2). This latter viewpoint is compatible with the approach of this study. In this approach, language limits our interpretive powers and keeps us from gaining absolute access to any textual meaning. As Gallagher (1992) explains, "We never achieve a complete or objective interpretation since we, limited by our own historical circumstance and by our own language, are inextricably involved in the interpretive conversation" (p.

9). In this chapter I will contextualize this study's approach to inquiry by presenting a brief history of hermeneutics, followed by 1) a synopsis of various contemporary hermeneutic perspectives, 2) an explanation of the approach of this study, and 3) implications of that approach.

Historical Roots of Hermeneutics

To attempt a brief history of such a complex subject is necessarily to highlight the artificial nature of the form imposed upon it. Following advice from Nancy Partner (1998), I admittedly present this account as an act of representation, cognizant of my creation of a plot with neat beginning-middle-end. Truth and objectivity do exist within this artificial form, but "as part of the culture, not outside in some preverbal higher reality" (p. 87). The purpose is to provide a context for understanding current hermeneutic philosophy by examining recent scholarship on its history.

Hermeneutics has its roots in ancient Greece and the literary interpretation of Homer and other poets. However, the main impetus for its development in the modern world was as an aid to biblical exegesis (Bleicher, 1980). Schleiermacher's (1768-1834) work with Greek and biblical texts led him to believe that grammatical exegesis alone could not reveal an author's special insight, which was the original reason for the composition. Interpreting a text meant more than merely deciphering words. It meant understanding the unifying spirit which initiated and controlled an author's writing. He referred to this as understanding at the "divinatory" or "psychological" level (Howard, 1982). This necessary "sense of the text" (Schleiemacher, quoted in Slattery, 1995, p. 111) is present in each portion of the work. The interpreter begins with only a part and

gains some understanding of the total sense, which s/he then uses to interpret other parts. The procedure becomes a part-whole-part movement and later came to be articulated as the "hermeneutic circle" (Bleicher, 1980; Howard, 1982; Hoy, 1978; Smith, 1991).

Comprehending the author's intent is a psychological task, not an historical one, according to Schleiemacher. The essential link between author and reader, no matter how great the time difference, is a common humanity, a common psychological makeup. Such psychologism, with its dependence upon a transcendental ego, is a Kantian notion rejected in much recent work in hermeneutics. However, Schleiemacher is credited with transforming interpretation from a strictly technical task of reconstruction to a philosophical one of understanding, paving the way for contemporary developments (Howard, 1982; Slattery, 1995; Smith, 1991; Pannenberg, 1986).

Schleiemacher's intellectual heir, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), retained his psychologism but extended the sphere of hermeneutics to include all events, claiming every event, like a text, can be considered an expression of an acting person. Pannenberg (1986) explains, "Dilthey could comprehend all events of history as expressions of human behavior because he held...that all historical events are to be understood as workings of the human spirit in which the historian also shares" (p. 119).

Thus, through Dilthey, hermeneutics developed from a system of interpretation relevant only for theology and philology into the methodology of a new science, Geisteswissenschaften, the "human sciences." From Droysen (1808 - 1884), Dilthey adopted the crucial distinction between the natural sciences and the human sciences (of which history was the most important). The goal of the natural sciences is to seek causes, asking for explanation; the human sciences seek understanding by means of

interpretation. Believing that Kant had accomplished the meta-philosophical task of "explanation-theory" for the natural sciences, Dilthey set himself the task of composing "understanding-theory" for the human, or "cultural" sciences. Howard (1982) summarizes Dilthey's influence in this regard:

> History, as the most conspicuous record of life and mind, was the primary discipline of the cultural sciences and the proper place to begin. Writings, as the primary objective datum for the historian, became the focus of reflection. Philosophical hermeneutics, then, would be a metatheory of the understanding of life-experiences as they are given in linguistic expression. (p. 22, emphasis added)

Both Dilthey's emphasis on life-experiences and his focus on the intention of the author are consonant with the phenomenology of Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl's main insight, according to Bubner (1984), is that, "The life-world is the forgotten foundations of meaning for science" (p. 33). The life-world encompasses all the orientations which we take for granted and have been practicing from an early stage. Without prior orientation in such a grounding, no sciences would be possible.

Smith (1991) describes Husserl as "the most significant shaper of all of the interpretive streams of human science which have flourished since the turn of the century" (p. 191). As the most important of Husserl's projects, Smith cites his attempt to overturn the Enlightenment ideal of objective reason. Through his theory of intentionality Husserl aimed to show that we never reason or interpret in general as a rhetorical activity that has no necessary connection to the world. Instead, reasoning and interpreting are always precisely about the world. This has implications for the Kantian notion of the subject/object distinction. Smith explains,

> I cannot abstract thinking itself out from what it is that I am thinking about. A clear split between subjective thinking and objective thinking is ridiculous because my subjectivity gets its bearings from the very world that I take as my object.
>
> (p. 192)

Thus, Husserl posits in the life-world a level of experience anterior to the subject-object relation. Terms like "understanding," "interpretation," and "meaningfulness" are, since Husserl, embedded in a sense of the intersubjective and dialogical nature of human experience.

Matthews (1996) has explained Husserl's phenomenology as the investigation of "phenomena" which are both the objects of consciousness and the way those objects are presented to consciousness. Phenomenology therefore requires a "transcendental reduction," in which we mentally separate off, or "put in brackets," any assumptions about what is external to consciousness in order to concentrate on consciousness itself (p. 62). The point is to concentrate only on our own experience and discover its essential structures, as opposed to the method of natural science which focuses on describing things and states of affairs. The ultimate aim is to overcome the preconceptions of science and commonsense and reach an ultimate primordial level. As such, Husserl's project was still one of a Cartesian subject utilizing method to attain meaning.

Husserl's student, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), radically transformed the phenomenological project. According to Bubner (1984), the significance of Heidegger for contemporary philosophy is his development of phenomenology into hermeneutics or what Bleicher (1980) calls "hermeneutic philosophy." Heidegger was dissatisfied with the

lack of concreteness of Husserl's phenomenology and, furthermore, he contended that it clung firmly to the subject-object distinction. Believing that Husserl's phenomenology lacked a foundation, Heidegger set out to ground phenomenological analysis. The result was a turn to ontology, rather than epistemology. Understanding became primarily a way of being, rather than a way of knowing.

Adopting the term "hermeneutic" from Dilthey, Heidegger described the philosophical project of Being and Time as hermeneutic phenomenology, in order to distinguish his own approach from Husserl's (Bubner, 1984, p. 29). In this sense, "hermeneutic" is not used qua Dilthey to mean only "the methodology of the historical humanistic disciplines" (p. 85). Rather, Heidegger intends it to refer to a more primordial philosophical hermeneutics, one that is the foundational practice of Being itself. Interpretation is the means by which the nature of Being and human be-ing is disclosed. Thus, interpretation as method was made subordinate to Heidegger's new broader notion of hermeneutics, and the idea of method as a simple instrument under our control was impugned:

> In the sciences, not only is the theme drafted, and called up by the method, it is also set up within the method and remains within the framework of the method, subordinated to it....Method holds all the coercive power of knowledge. (Heidegger quoted in Gallagher, 1992, p. 175)

This point was later developed more fully by Gadamer (1960/1997), one of Heidegger's students. Smith (1991) notes the importance of two other Heideggerean themes that are prevalent in contemporary hermeneutics: the historico-temporal quality of human existence and the linguisticality of understanding.

In summary, then, by insisting upon the importance of the subjectivity behind the text, Schleiemacher transformed hermeneutics from a technical task of reconstruction to a philosophical one of understanding. He also contributed the notion of the "hermeneutic circle," that is, the interplay of part and whole in the process of understanding. Dilthey elevated the importance of the hermeneutic process by seeking to make it the methodology of the human sciences, which he contended were interpretive rather than explanatory disciplines. He emphasized written historical records as the primary place to begin in understanding any realm of human experience. Husserl also emphasized the importance of lived experience, believing it to be the foundations of meaning for all science. Through his phenomenological method, he sought to reach a level of experience prior to the subject-object relation implied in the scientific method. His focus upon this anterior level of experience has contributed to the notion of interpretation as an intersubjective and dialogical process.

Heidegger brought together the hermeneutics of Dilthey and the phenomenology of Husserl, transforming them both in a turn from epistemology to ontology. Interpretation is, before anything else, our way of being-in-the-world. Methodology cannot attain a status independent of the project of thinking itself. After Heidegger, Smith (1991) explains, "Method could never achieve a kind of solitary state ready for universal application, because indeed it bore the same character and quality as that to which it sought access" (p. 192). Although elements of Heidegger's work have influenced scholars as disparate as Derrida and Gadamer, two of his themes that are especially important for this study are the temporal quality of human existence and the linguisticality of understanding.

Contemporary Hermeneutic Perspectives[1]

"Hermeneutics is a loose and baggy monster" (Bruns, 1992, p. 17).

E.D. Hirsch, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida have all done extensive hermeneutic inquiry, and yet their views of what it is and what is possible within it vary widely. On this polysemic nature of the discipline, Wachterhauser (1986) has commented,

> Despite the fact that there are many debates within the movement and that hermeneutics is not firmly united behind a single theory or personality, advocates of hermeneutics share a family of critical concerns and perspectives that make their philosophical program a strongly unified one. (p.1)

The common themes that he identifies among hermeneutical thinkers are those of history and language, which "are always both conditions and limits of understanding" (p.2). The debates, however, stem from the variety of possible definitions of and relationships between these two phenomena.

Conservative Hermeneutics

In a sector of the field that Gallagher (1992) labels "conservative hermeneutics" (p. 9), educational reformer E. D. Hirsch and legal historian Emilio Betti are optimistic that the effects of time and differences in language can be suitably overcome with proper methods. This style, which may be described as "hermeneutics as method" (Bleicher,

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[1] The realm of hermeneutic inquiry has been classified and described in various ways by a number of scholars, e.g. Bleicher (1980), Howard (1982), Gallagher (1992). For the purpose of organization I have used Gallagher's survey of perspectives as a guide for this section because of its recency.

1980), follows in the tradition of Dilthey, and aims to reproduce the author's original, "willed" meaning of the text (Hoy, 1978). More closely aligned with the scientific method than other types of hermeneutics, this style assumes there can be only one correct understanding of a text. Although interpreters may express themselves differently, basically they must be talking about the same thing. Following the phenomenology of Husserl, Hirsch (1967) holds that the intentional structure of consciousness is deeper than language. Rejecting what he calls the "radical historicism" of Gadamer and Heidegger (p. 44), Hirsch adopts a stance that, in principle, there must be unchanging authorial meaning that can be reproduced.

Betti (1980) has supplied several "canons of hermeneutics" to attain the necessary objectivity for understanding an author's intentions and recovering his or her original meaning. According to these canons, the interpreter should (1) be of a similar intellectual and moral stature as the author, (2) possess an "intellectual open-mindedness" that enables adoption of the most suitable position for investigation and understanding, 3) take a stance that is both "ethically and theoretically reflective and which can be identified as unselfish and humble self-effacement, as it is apparent in the honest and determined overcoming of one's prejudices and certain attitudes that stand in the way of unbiased understanding" and (4) "strive to bring his [sic] own lively actuality into the closest harmony" with the object of interpretation (p. 85).

Moderate Hermeneutics

In contrast to Hirsch and Betti's hermeneutics of method stands the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer. This approach has been variously labeled "moderate hermeneutics" (Gallagher, 1992, p. 9), "hermeneutic philosophy" (Bleicher, 1980, p. 1),

and "ontological hermeneutics" (Howard, 1982, p. 120).[2] In Gadamer's landmark treatise Truth and Method (1960/1997), he argues that no method can guarantee an absolutely objective interpretation of a text, because as readers we are embedded in traditions that influence our attempts at understanding.

Relying on the key concept of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein, variously translated as "historically effected consciousness" and "effective-historical consciousness," Gadamer (1960/1997) explains the way prejudices are brought into play in a hermeneutical situation:

> Historical consciousness must become conscious that in the apparent immediacy with which it approaches a...text, there is also another kind of inquiry in play, albeit unrecognized and unregulated. If we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon from the historical distance that is characteristic of a hermeneutical situation, we are always already affected by history. It determines in advance both what seems to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation. (p. 300, emphasis added)

He adds that our need to become conscious of effective history, that is, our "prejudices," is a task that can never be absolutely fulfilled. This is not due to a failure in reflection, but to the historical nature of our being:

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[2] In addition to noting that Gallagher's label of "moderate" belies his own bias toward this approach, I point out that he has also placed the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur in this same category with Gadamer's. Bleicher (1980) agrees that the two share the same fundamental viewpoint but believes that where Ricoeur differs is in his "rejection of Gadamer's dichotomy of truth and method, which prevents him [Gadamer] from 'doing justice to a critique of ideology as the modern and post-Marxist expression of the critical approach'" (p. 233).

> To acquire an awareness of a situation is, however, always a task of peculiar difficulty. The very idea of a situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any knowledge of it.... To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete. (p. 302, emphasis in original)

An adequate understanding of historically effected consciousness is dependent upon another of Gadamer's key concepts, the linguisticality of understanding. Our prejudices are not simply a matter of our situatedness. Beyond that, they are embedded in our language. As the mediation of past and present, linguisticality discloses our world to us. There is no world outside language. Putting it succinctly, Gadamer (1960/1997) states, "Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man [sic] has a world at all" (p. 443, emphasis in original).

Thus, Gadamer assigns a dual function to language in interpretive inquiry. While it shapes and limits our worldview, it also acts as the medium through which we have some access to meaning. It provides us with the capacity to enter into the conversation that is at the heart of the hermeneutic situation. Gadamer (1960/1997) proposes that this dialogue requires the art of questioning, rather than a scientific method.

> That a historical text is made the object of interpretation means that it puts a question to the interpreter.... To understand a text means to understand this question.... Thus a person who wants to understand must question what lies behind what is said. He [sic] must understand it as an answer to a question. If we go back behind what is said, then we inevitably ask questions beyond what is said. (p. 369-70, emphasis in original)

The dialectic of question and answer demonstrates how understanding is a reciprocal relationship of the same kind as conversation. Gadamer recognizes that a text does not speak to us in the same way as a "Thou" (p. 377) but notes it is our responsibility to make the text speak, to ask a question that "breaks open the being" of the text (p. 362) and elicits possibilities of meaning. Such a question is not arbitrarily formed on our own initiative but is related to the answer that is expected in the text. A particular lack of knowledge from a particular perspective leads to a particular question, thus demonstrating the working of effective-historical consciousness or "prejudices."

The goal, guide, and source for this dialogical process is the Greek concept of phronesis, translated variously by Gadamer as "practical judgment" or "moral knowledge." Drawing from Aristotle, Gadamer (1960/1997) distinguishes this kind of knowing from the theoretical (episteme), that is, from "knowing on the basis of universal principles"
(p. 21). Gadamer explains, "Primarily, this means that [phronesis] is directed towards the concrete situation. Thus it must grasp the 'circumstances' in their infinite variety" (p. 21). Gadamer also distinguishes phronesis from technical knowledge (techne), the kind that can be taught and is knowable in advance.[3] Phronesis varies from techne in several important ways: 1) It is not a technique to be learned as a means to a specific end, such as a craft; it could be better described as the ability to choose the right thing in the midst of a difficult situation; 2) It includes an important element of self-knowledge not required by technical knowledge, once again calling attention to the importance of effective-historical

[3] In his interpretation of Gadamer, Bernstein (1985) sets phronesis as "ethical know-how" against techne as "technical know-how" (p. 277).

consciousness, and 3) It involves an element of sympathetic understanding, as Gadamer explains,

> The person who is understanding does not know and judge as one who stands apart and unaffected but rather he thinks along with the other from the perspective of a specific bond of belonging, as if he too were affected. (p. 323)

Another phenomenon that both affects and is effected by the dialogical process is the "fusion of horizons." In this process the interpreter first establishes her horizon of understanding by becoming aware—to the best of her ability—of prejudices resulting from her own historical conditions. Then, in the dialogical process, she seeks to become aware of the horizon of the text, eventually enabling the fusion of horizons, which creates for her a new and broader horizon of understanding. The process never stops, because as we acquire new understanding, our tradition "is constantly becoming other than it is" (Gadamer, 1990, p. 288). This fusion does not abolish the distinctions between interpreter and text, but affirms their difference. In engaging in discourse with an Other, I am, of course, aware of the Other as having its own ideas, distinct from mine, and which may thereby disturb my egoistic world. As Levinas suggests, "The ethical relationship which subtends discourse is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates from the I; it puts the I in question. This putting in question emanates from the other" (quoted in Matthews, 1996, p. 161). The point is that as the Other is understood, we "see the justice, the truth, of their position" (Gadamer, 1992, p. 152) and we gain a new, richer understanding.

Critical Hermeneutics

Habermas (1980) protests that Gadamer's "dialogue-that-we-are" is "also a context of domination and as such precisely not dialogue" (p. 204). He calls for a depth hermeneutics capable of penetrating false consciousness for the purpose of emancipation. Growing out of the work of the Frankfort School of Critical Theory, Habermas's approach has been called "critical" (Bleicher, 1980, p. 3; Gallagher, 1992, p. 11) or "psychosocial" (Howard, 1982, p. 91) hermeneutics. While he accepts much of Gadamer's hermeneutic critique of the human sciences, Habermas (1990) dissents on the role of prejudice:

> Gadamer's prejudice for the rights of prejudices certified by tradition denies the power of reflection. The latter proves itself, however, in being able to reject the claim of tradition. Reflection dissolves substantially because it not only confirms, but also breaks up, dogmatic forces. (p. 237)

Habermas also proposes to transcend hegemonic distortions in the social "dialogue" by the use of a method provided by psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis "presupposes a theory of communicative competence.... [that] covers the forms of the intersubjectivity of language and causes of its deformation" (p.264). Gadamer has responded, however, that a problem may arise in the translation of psychoanalysis from a science of treating individuals into one of treating social groups with competing interests. In "Reply to My Critics," he points out, essentially, that the problem would be which group gets to play doctor, deciding what is normal and what is distorted.

Radical Hermeneutics

Rejecting the humanism inherent in Habermas's psychoanalytic approach, Gadamer's dialogue, and Hirsch's authorial intent, "radical hermeneutics" is practiced by deconstructionists and poststructuralists like Derrida and Michel Foucault (Caputo, 1987, p. 4; Gallagher, 1992, p. 10). In this approach, "original meaning is unattainable and the best we can do is to stretch the limits of language to break upon fresh insight" (Gallagher, 1992, p. 10). Indeed, the whole interpretive endeavor is brought into question. Foucault was deeply aware of the "necessity and dangers of the interpretive position" and strove to develop an approach that could go beyond it (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xxvii). I will develop his position in more detail in the next section.

Derrida is certainly just as radical in his critique, which extends not only to hermeneutics, but to the entire history of Western thought. Although Gadamer and Derrida both draw from the work of Heidegger, their opinions diverge on the interpretation of Heidegger's notion of deconstruction which, in Gadamer's view, "originally meant to defrost the frozen language of metaphysics" (Gallagher, 1992, p. 23). Gadamer believes his hermeneutic concept of dialogue or "conversation" is more true to Heidegger's original intent than is Derrida's, which Gadamer (1989) says is a "shattering of metaphysics, a destruction of conversation" (p. 109).

Indeed Derrida is scornful of the notion of dialogue (Steele, 1997). His project of deconstruction does not aim to find truth or consensus but to expose the hidden operations in a text of concepts such as unity, identity, or meaning. The point is to put the words of the text into play and resist the metaphysical urge to stop the game in order to impose meaning, which Derrida would consider an "irreducible act of violence" (Derrida

quoted in Steele, 1997, p. 54). Although Derrida's criticism of hermeneutics is sharp, Caputo (1987) believes,

> He does not undo hermeneutics; he releases its more radical tendencies.... With deconstruction, hermeneutics loses its innocence and in so doing becomes even more faithful to the appointed way, which as the young Heidegger said, means to remain faithful to the difficulty in life. (p. 5)

Understanding and Power

Smith (1991) suggests that in many ways Gadamer prefigures post-modern hermeneutics and, indeed, that he "stands as a link between the totalizing proclivities of hermeneutics up till the last quarter of the twentieth century and the contemporary hermeneutics of play and desire signified in postmodern writers" (p. 194). Paslick (1994) comments that Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy "rests ultimately on a radically postmetaphysical ontology and the fusion of horizons is possible only because human experience is radically finite and decentered" (p. x). This study works at the intersection of Gadamer and the postmodern. I have relied upon Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as a theoretical perspective. However, as Bernstein (1985) points out, Gadamer is "virtually silent on the complex issues concerning domination and power" (p. 156). Therefore, because this study seeks insight into what it is possible for us to be and to do as curriculum workers, I have imported Foucault's questions which are formulated to inquire about power relations.

It is true that Gadamer and Foucault work out of two different philosophical traditions. Gadamer was schooled in the phenomenology of Husserl and the existential

phenomenology of his mentor, Heidegger. However, he admits that to some small degree he derives his inspiration from German Romanticism (Gadamer, 1960/1997, p. 388). He is known as both a philosopher and a literary critic with a "deep commitment to his principal vocation as teacher-listener" (Paslick, 1994, p. ix). In describing his work, he says, "My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing" (Gadamer, 1960/1997, p. xxviii).

In contrast to Gadamer, Foucault has a reputation for not fitting easily into recognizable categories. Throughout his life he reinforced this reputation by refusing to spell out the theoretical presuppositions underlying his work and insisting upon his right to change (Marshall, 1996). However, the scholarship of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983), supported by Foucault, identifies phenomenology, structuralism, and existentialism as important movements in various moments of Foucault's work. It is the phenomenology of Heidegger rather than Husserl that Foucault credits as an influence. As for structuralism, which attempts to find objective laws in systems which govern human social activity, Foucault (1966/1994b) vehemently rejected that label for any of his work. He did admit, however, that "perhaps he was not as resistant to the seductive advances of structuralist vocabulary as he might have been" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. xii). Another major influence, marxism, was at times supported by Foucault for its value as a critique, but was more often rejected as an example of enlightenment humanist thought (Marshall, 1999). Other major influences in Foucault's life were Georges Canguelheim, philosopher and historian of science, and Fernand Braudel of the famous Annales School of historians.

Indeed, "historian" was one of the few labels Foucault gave himself, designating his prestigious position at the Collège de France as "Professor of History of Thought."

In spite of these differences in approach, Kögler (1992/1999) suggests that Gadamer's notion of interpretation as dialogue and Foucault's conceptualization of the structures of discourse/power can be combined to create a new "critical hermeneutics." For another type of project, Gallagher (1992) proposes that Foucault's notion of power can be successfully incorporated into Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics to provide the principles for an educational theory. The following comparison of the work of Gadamer and Foucault suggests further support for the feasibility of successfully combining elements of their work. It is beyond the scope of this study to do justice to a through comparison of these two scholars. This section will present a summary of the some of the topics that are most pertinent to this study.

Subjectivity

Sturrock's (1998) assessment of Foucault's position here is "Discourse maketh the man, not man the discourse" (p. 68). However, he admits "there is a certain humanism in Foucault" (p. 65). Olssen (1999) emphasizes, "Foucault doesn't see subjectivity entirely in terms of discursive formations.... Although he sees history and discourses as prior to and constitutive of the individual subject, the subject cannot be reduced to such discursive factors" (p. 172). Drawing from a variety of Foucault's writings and interviews, he shows that Foucault has always been interested in explaining the autonomy of the subject in the context of its embeddedness in social structures. Foucault (1984/1997) suggests the possibility for his work is that we may be able to

> separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think…it is seeking to give a new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom. (pp. 315-316)

This description of Foucault's work appears to agree with Gadamer's notion that we are embedded in cultural traditions, unable to look at the world "objectively," and yet able to exercise a certain degree of autonomy (i.e., becoming aware of certain of our prejudices). In addition, they agree on a common goal – freedom. This is a theme that Bernstein (1985) sees becoming more and more pronounced in Gadamer's work in recent years. However, while Gadamer (1960/1997) takes a positive view of the cultural traditions that shape our subjectivity, allowing that they enable us to enter into a common conversation, Foucault (e.g. 1977/1980; 1984/1995) is much more suspicious of the power relations at work within them.

Truth

The key to this issue may not be the question "What is truth?" so much as it is "How does the concept of truth function in the works of each scholar?" In regard to the first question, Prado (1995) finds a resemblance between Gadamer and Foucault:

> Foucault is not unique in seeming ambiguous about truth and puzzling us with pronouncements and modes of presentation apparently at odds with his perspectivism…. For instance, there is a similar ambiguity in Gadamer's hermeneutical work, where one finds uses of "true" and "truth" that sound objectivist in nature and at odds with Gadamer's hermeneutical principles. (p. 142)

Beyond this similarity, it could also be said that the two agree on what truth is not. Both reject the idea of an objective truth. Both agree that the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the human sciences corrupt the way society sees truth function (Foucault, 1977/1980; Gadamer, 1960/1997).

Answering the second question is more complicated. In a sense, Gadamer (1960/1997) redefines truth from a certainty yielded by method to a kind of knowledge that is always in a process of becoming. While Foucault (1977/1980) basically agrees with Gadamer on how truth is produced (i.e., through cultural traditions), he treats truth as primarily a mechanism of power which enforces and legitimizes exclusion. It appears their main difference may be in attitude. Gadamer is much more optimistic.

Textual Agency

Both Foucault and Gadamer endow text with the ability to do much more than its author intended originally. Foucault's project concerns the investigation of discourses. In "On the Ways of Writing History" (1967/1994) he describes text in terms of having an agency of its own—as a set of elements such as "words, metaphors, literary forms, groups of narratives" that can be interpreted in ways to "bring out absolutely new relations, insofar as they have not been controlled by the writer's design and are made possible only by the work itself as such" (pp. 286-97).

Gadamer's (1994a) metaphor of the text "claiming" or "gripping" the reader imparts a type of agency to the text, also (p. 155). In addition, new meaning can emerge from each interpretation because, "Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text belongs to the whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which it seeks to understand itself" (1960/1997, p. 296). Gadamer also points out that a

later age's understanding of a text is not a better understanding, only a different understanding.

History

Foucault is known as the "historian of the gaps" (Sturrock, 1998, p. 65), who approaches history with the intent of displaying its ruptures and discontinuities. However Olssen (1999), citing Gutting, notes that in The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault does not deny all continuity in changes between epistemes, acknowledging "transitional" modalities of expression, as well as "transitional theories," which enable a "bridge" between one episteme and another (p. 78). Gadamer may be seen to be at odds with Foucault if his notion of tradition is interpreted to imply a present smoothly unfolding from the past. However, the role of language in the transmission of tradition disrupts such a notion. Hoy (1978) explains,

> Language is a major factor in the very continuity of the tradition concerning the past and the present. Yet the language does not overcome the differences; it does not completely bridge the gap, for as it brings certain features of each world or horizon to light, it conceals other features. (p. 99)

To conclude this section, I note Prado's (1995) comparison of Foucault and Gadamer:

> Philosophical hermeneutics, as the theory of interpretation, shares with archaeology the cardinal concern with understanding alien interpretation schemes. But unlike Foucault's oppositional objective, Gadamer seeks a "fusing of horizons," a consolidation of a remote perspective on the world with our own. (p. 160)

Because my approach to this study is conversation-seeking, rather than oppositional, I have adopted Gadamer's perspective. His reliance on language and tradition to open up texts in new ways is consonant with my purposes. But Gadamer also recognizes the necessity for every age to understand a text according to its own necessities, and the interests of this present age require a theory of power such as that of Foucault.

The Language/History Connection

Since the "interpretive turn" in the social sciences (Rabinow & Sullivan, 1987, p. 1) a revolution has occurred in the way history is understood. That revolution, also called the "linguistic turn" (Berkhofer, 1995, p. 1), is especially pertinent to the analysis of historical texts. Therefore, this section will explain the nature of the "turn" and list its implications for this study.

Gadamer (1960/1997) emphasizes that we experience our history, or tradition, through language. In addition to verbal language, we experience the past by examining texts that are brought to us through written language. Thus, language is a major factor in the continuity of the tradition connecting past and present. With this recognition of the interrelatedness of history and language have come new attitudes toward the analysis of each, along with a blurring of the borders among such disciplines as history, literary analysis, and philosophy.

Historians such as Hayden White (1973), Robert Berkhofer, Jr. (1995), Mark Poster (1997) and Peter Burke (1992) have advocated the use of techniques of literary criticism in historical analyses. In regard to this phenomenon, Poster (1997) has explained the relationship between history and literature: "Texts do more and less than represent:

they configure what they point to, and they are configured by it. To the extent that discourse configures what it indicates, it is a fiction as much as a representation" (p. 9).

For literary theorists, the relationship between history and text has long been a controversial issue. In some eras the prevailing thought was that an understanding of the author's life and time was central to gleaning the "true meaning" from the text. In other times, the dominant belief was that the text is self-contained and any analysis of it should not go beyond the pages of the work itself. However, in the late 1970s a brand of literary analysis called New Historicism appeared, one that may well have been the offspring of the hermeneutical union of history and language.

Literary theorist Louis Montrose (1998) explains that what was "new" about this style of criticism was "its refusal of unproblematized distinctions between 'literature' and 'history,' between 'text' and 'context,'" plus an attitude of resistance toward a "tendency to posit and privilege a unified and autonomous individual - whether an Author or a Work..." (p. 780). In this description the influence of French literary critic Roland Barthes is evident. Barthes is known for his essay "The Death of the Author" (1967/1986), which effectively dissolves the role of author by defining it as the product of socially based discursive practices. Later, in S/Z (1970/1975) Barthes argues that readers rewrite texts based on their own intertextuality, suggesting that readers are constituted by a plurality of textual connections.

Although New Historicists are an eclectic group—much like contemporary curriculum theorists—Montrose (1998) characterizes them as commonly having a "reciprocal concern with the historicity of texts and the textuality of history" (p. 781). He concludes that their project is "to analyze the interplay of culture-specific discursive

practices—mindful that it, too, is such a practice and so participates in the interplay it seeks to analyze" (p. 782).

As for the field of philosophy, Gadamer's work has already been outlined. Ricoeur (1984-88) has also written extensively on the intersection of hermeneutics, history and literary criticism. The compatibility of his work with the New Historicists is clear. For example, as Gallagher (1992) explains Ricoeur's concept of distanciation, "The text lives a life of its own, beyond the intention of the author, beyond the conditions of its origination, beyond its original audience....providing unlimited possibilities of interpretation that come from reading"(p. 130-31). In addition, in the three-volume work Time and Narrative, Ricoeur (1984-88) argues that all written history, even that of the structuralist sort, necessarily takes some narrative form and he takes care to point out the issues of literary theory involved. A final but important point is Ricoeur's notion of expanding the concept of text to include meaningful action. Gallagher (1992) summarizes the implications for the human sciences: "The accompanying claim is that the same kind of process involved in our understanding of a written text is involved in our understanding of the world" (p. 7).

The contemporary concept of history as text, then, has emerged from these common understandings concerning language and history in a variety of fields.[4] Aspects of this concept that are important for an interpretive inquiry such as this one include the following:

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[4] Although I have chosen to limit my discussion to the fields of history, literary theory and philosophy, other fields such as linguistics and anthropology have been a part of the evolution of this concept.

1. In a textual analysis, the analysis may extend beyond the single work to a broader notion of "text as meaningful action." In the analysis of curriculum texts, it may be helpful at times to look beyond the written text to the text of the professor's work, life, etc.
2. Authors and readers are both thought of as being products of a plurality of textual connections. In an interpretive inquiry, the interpreter recognizes her situatedness in this web of textuality. I have reflected upon my own "prejudices" and have included an account of that reflection in Chapter 1.
3. Not just one meaning can be assigned to any text from or about the past. When it leaves the author's hands, it takes on the potential for multiple meanings. I am not looking for, nor could I find, *the* author's single and intentional meaning of the texts I am exploring. As I have read these texts, I have been reading them in light of my present worldview.
4. History is not teleological; there is no grand design unfolding throughout time. Just as the present does not have a *single* past, it has many possibilities for the future. As Sarason (1994) has said, "The present is not pregnant with *a* future: it is pregnant with many futures" (p. 153). I recognize that the history of curriculum studies as I have read it is not the only version. I also hope that this inquiry will provoke new insights concerning the future of the field.
5. Because we are embedded in language and in history, we do not have an "outside view." Therefore, we cannot say *now* is better than *then*. History is not seen as a grand narrative of progress. This means that a reconceptualized curriculum field is not necessarily a better curriculum field. It also means that

this interpretation is not better than any previous interpretations, only different.

Truth and Method

Gadamer (19601997) suggests that a dialectical approach guided by the nature of what is being understood evolves through a questioning responsiveness. While hermeneutics is not a methodology, Gadamer does discuss several themes of hermeneutical inquiry that guide any interpretive endeavor:

1. The interplay of part and whole or the "hermeneutic circle." This principle holds that the projection of meaning from what we already understand provides a context to which we can relate the unfamiliar. The circle might also be described as the dialectical interchange of transcendence and appropriation. To generate meaning from a text, we move from whole to part and back again, the "whole" providing a backdrop against which we give significance to the "part."
2. The pivotal role of language. Because "our language contains the story of who we are as a people" (Smith, 1991, p. 199), it both limits and opens up the possibility of interpretation. Stylistic elements as metaphor, analogy, and structure are important, as well as content.
3. The horizon of understanding. All researchers, including those who claim objectivity, bring their own prejudices to any project. These prejudices both constrain and enable our inquiry. An awareness of her own hermeneutic situation is a precondition for any researcher's project of understanding.

4. The fusion of horizons. For Gadamer, all understanding is interpretive. The interpreter and the text contain their own individual horizons. Within a dialogue between the two, these horizons are "fused" so that something is expressed that is not only the interpreter's or the author's, but fresh insight created from the two. Although the process is transformative, this is never in an absolute way.

Conclusion

The psychologism of the nineteenth century hermeneutics of Schleiemacher and Dilthey has given way to a recognition of the historical/linguistic nature of being and understanding. However, in spite of this recognition, hermeneutics remains a "loose and baggy monster" (Bruns, 1992, p. 17), with various advocates defending multiple interpretations of exactly what it is. From this wide array of perspectives I have selected the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer and the questions of Foucault as a guide for my inquiry. As hermeneutic philosophy requires, I turn next to the task of providing an historical context for the texts of this study.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CON/TEXT

> There is always a world already interpreted, already organized in its basic relations, into which experience steps as something new, upsetting what has led our expectations and undergoing reorganization itself in the upheaval. (Gadamer, 1994 b, p. 15)

> When a new formation appears, with new rules and series, it never comes all at once, in a single phrase or act of creation, but emerges like a series of 'building blocks' with gaps, traces, and reactivations of former elements that survive under the new rules. (Deleuze, 1988, p. 21)

As Munro (1998) comments, even though "history is a myth, it continues to operate as fact" (p. 284). Her reference is to the notion that history, as a collection of shared cultural stories and traditions, expresses and serves to organize shared ways of conceptualizing things and states of affairs. Invariably, such stories create a narrative framework that focuses on selected persons or events and omit others. I do not deny that the narrative presented here might be interrogated for assumptions of progress and for categories that erase marginalized individuals and groups. However, that is not the purpose of this project. As Ricoeur (1980) notes, "Every reading of a text always takes place within a community, a tradition, or a living current of thought, all of which display presuppositions and exigencies" (p. 236). My intent in this chapter is to provide some sense of the tradition or "living current of thought" which underlies my understanding of the context of the 1960s work of Green, Huebner, Klohr and Macdonald.

The history that is presented here, as gleaned from recent curriculum scholarship, has become a part of our field's "mythology." It creates the lens through which we as

curriculum scholars view ourselves and our place in the world. I do not mean to imply that all curriculum historians present a unified account of our past. Rather, curriculum histories are disparate enough to lead Hlebowitsh (1997) to claim them to be "the startling side effects of a field gone mad with overtly ideological constructions" (p. 510). However, many issues exist upon which there is agreement. As for the differences, I have attempted to use as wide a "lens" as possible by drawing from the work of a variety of curriculum scholars for this chapter.

Curriculum and the National Welfare

If only one event could be credited with making the curriculum field vulnerable to a reconceptualization, Pinar (1988a) suggests that event would be the 1957 launching of Sputnik. The national panic that ensued led to the curriculum reform movement of the sixties, which removed responsibility for curriculum making from the hands of curriculum professors and practitioners and placed it squarely in the hands of subject matter specialists. Most scholars agree that Sputnik had an enormous impact on the field (Klein, 1998; Kliebard, 1986; Lagemann, 1997; Marshall, et al., 2000; Pagano, 1999; Pinar, et al., 1995; Schubert, 1986; Tanner & Tanner, 1990).

But why did this event precipitate such a crisis in the field? The Sputnik era was not the first time that concern for the national welfare influenced curriculum-making. In fact, most historical accounts highlight concern for the national welfare as the very raison d'etre of American public schools (Pinar, et al., 1995; Schubert, 1986; Tanner & Tanner, 1990; Willis, Schubert, Bullough, Kridel, & Holton, 1994). Apple and Franklin (1979) comment, "If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must acknowledge that the

curriculum field has its roots in the soil of social control" (p. 47). Furthermore, Jackson (1996) cites Hamilton's research to show that one of the earliest Western uses of the word "curriculum" was tied to the increased need for social efficiency when European university studies were brought under greater state control.

It is typical for curriculum histories to focus on such concerns as curriculum as content (e.g., the classics vs. the practical), arrangement (e.g., subject disciplines vs. integration), or perspective (e.g., Kliebard's four currents of curriculum thought, Schubert's three orientations). However, woven within each historical account is the story of curriculum as the servant of the national welfare. That means sometimes people try to use the school curriculum as a vehicle of social control, for example, to suppress internal conflict by securing a common morality or to conserve society by passing on the values of the status quo. At times, people try to use the curriculum as an agent of change—to reconstruct, rather than conserve society. Sometimes, people expect the curriculum to serve the national economy by providing a docile and well-trained workforce. And often people try to use the curriculum to strengthen the country's infrastructure to protect against external threats. It is the case, of course, that usually more than one of these attempts is operating at the same time. This relationship between curriculum and the national welfare will be the focus of this brief historical survey.

The Colonial Period

In recent synoptic curriculum texts, little is written about curriculum work during the early years of this nation. This is probably due to the fact that public education did not begin to take hold until mid-nineteenth century. In addition, curriculum as a field of study

did not actually emerge until the 20th century, according to most scholars (Jackson, 1996; Kliebard, 1986; Schubert, 1980, 1986; Tanner & Tanner, 1990).

Tanner and Tanner (1990) provide the most comprehensive account of the nation's earliest curriculum history. They note that the foundations for our public school system were laid in Massachusetts in 1647 with the establishment of a statute requiring townships of a hundred or more householders to maintain a Latin grammar school. The main purpose was to produce God-fearing citizens: "An additional curriculum objective, however, was to promote the welfare of the state by making citizens capable of self-government" (p. 31). The importance of public education to the national welfare was also a conviction of Thomas Jefferson, who "saw more clearly than anyone of his time that a free society cannot survive unless the people in general are educated" (p. 33).

Some of the most extensive curriculum work in the colonial period was done by Noah Webster, who produced grammars, readers, dictionaries, and the famous blue-backed speller. The driving force behind this work was Webster's conviction, following the War for Independence, that "Every engine should be employed to render the people of this country national" (quoted in Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 35). Emphasizing the egalitarian nature of Webster's motives, the Tanners note that a common language without accents is necessary for a classless society. Nevertheless, Webster's concern for the national welfare is highlighted in a quote from Commager: "The United States, dedicated to the unprecedented experiment of republicanism in a vast territory, a heterogeneous population, and a classless society, could not afford differences of accent or language" (quoted in Tanner & Tanner, p. 36, emphasis added).

The Common School

The notion of leveling out personal differences in order to preserve the new nation and its democratic experiment grew stronger in the nineteenth century. Schubert (1986) points out, "The rise of nationalism is often accompanied by universal education as a means to sustain patriotism" (p. 69), and so it was. According to Tanner and Tanner (1990), the supporters of public education used a two-pronged argument to advance their cause. To the commoners, they presented universal education as a means of self-advancement and as a ladder to positions of power within the fledgling democracy. But to the economically dominant group, they argued that employees who had learned obedience and honesty as children in school would work more cheerfully and productively. Citing Ponder, Tanner & Tanner note "the justification that schools could 'help create a national character' by the 'intentional inculcation of conformity to certain norms and habits.' Both the industrial and nationalizing functions of social control were stressed by reformers" (p. 39).

Through the persistence of public figures such as Henry Barnard,[1] support for public education grew. Barnard and others emphasized that "common schools would help increase the general wealth, decrease crime and other social problems, and make all citizens able to participate in a healthy political democracy" (Willis, et al., 1994, p. 39). Horace Mann, who conducted a nation-wide "campaign of public education about public education," also emphasized the country's need for moral elevation which could be met

[1] Barnard was the first Secretary to the Board of Commissioners of the Common Schools of Connecticut in the 1830s, worked in a similar capacity in Rhode Island in the 1840s, and was made the first U.S. Commissioner of Education in 1867. (Willis, et al., pp. 39-40)

through universal schooling (Cremin, quoted in Willis, et al., p. 43). Mann was set on eliminating sectarian religion from common schools, but he was equally convinced that schools must propagate the historical Protestant virtues.

That many educators agreed with Mann was evident by the popularity of the McGuffey reading series, which Kliebard (1986) points to as a profound standardizing influence on the curriculum of nineteenth century schools. Quoting from Buetow's work, Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (1995) note, "William H. McGuffey (1800-1873), through his millions of reading books, helped shape the national mind in forging an ever-closer bond between schooling and Protestant virtues" (p. 610). This situation led to tensions with the Catholic community—who saw public schools as hostile to Catholicism—and contributed to the formation of the Catholic parochial school system (Pinar, et al., 1995). Nevertheless, the institution of public education steadily gained acceptance. By 1850 all northern states and a few southern states agreed that public education was essential to the well-being of a society with universal manhood suffrage (Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 39). Acceptance in the south came more slowly and did not spread extensively until Reconstruction after the Civil War (Pinar, et al.).

Of Science, Industry, and Social Progress

In 1860 Herbert Spencer posed a question for America that has since become a "mainstay of curriculum inquiry" (Schubert, 1986, p. 18). His question served as the title of the essay which attempted to answer it: "What Knowledge is of Most Worth?" The answer, Spencer proposed, was science, a subject that received the least attention in the school curriculum at that time (Schubert, 1986; Tanner & Tanner, 1990). His answer was

based on the idea that "the only purpose of education was to prepare for complete living" (Pinar, et al., 1995, p. 73). He suggested the only way to determine the success of an educational program was to classify and prioritize the leading activities of life and to evaluate the program based on its ability to provide preparation for that life. His prioritized classification of activities is as follows:

1. Those ministering directly to self-preservation.
2. Those securing the necessities of life (ministering indirectly to self-preservation).
3. Those which aid in the rearing and discipline of offspring.
4. Those involved in maintaining one's social and political relations.
5. Those which occupy the leisure part of life, gratifying tastes and feelings. (quoted in Tanner & Tanner, p. 53)

By identifying science as the knowledge of most worth in educating for self-preservation, Spencer boosted the stature of science as a subject in the curriculum (Schubert, 1986; Tanner & Tanner, 1990). However, Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman (1995), citing Hamilton, point out that Spencer's work was significant for several other reasons: 1) for the contribution of the idea that curriculum involves a selection from available knowledge, 2) for the notion that curriculum should be determined with regard to secular, not spiritual, purposes, and 3) for renunciation of the pre-Enlightenment view that curriculum was a spiritual journey and the embracing of the notion of curriculum as a means of social engineering and progress (p. 74). In other words, Spencer helped promote the idea of curriculum as a means of social control.

NEA Report of 1876

The importance of science in the curriculum was accepted much more readily by the general public than it was by the universities, which continued to cling to a humanistic, literary course of study warranted by faculty psychology.[2] As common schools accepted the claims that universal education would "promote equality, reduce crime, and contribute to the material well-being of the nation as a whole" (Willis, et al., 1994, p. 73), they increasingly offered a more practical curriculum, creating a gulf between them and the colleges. A report issued in 1876 by the National Educational Association took colleges to task for not yielding to the needs of the age. Referring to the era for which most college curricula were created, the report states:

> At that time very little development had taken place in the sciences of nature and man; English literature had not yet become a great power among the people; the printed page in the form of the newspaper and magazine had not yet opened to the individual the great possibilities of continuing his theoretic education. (quoted in Willis, et al., 1994, p. 77)

After pointing out that the course of study in colleges had changed very little since their beginning, the report went on to state, "In the common schools so much has been added to the disciplinary studies as completely to change the course" (p. 77). The report proceeded to propose a course of study from the primary school through the university,

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[2] Faculty psychology or "mental discipline" was the theory that the mind consisted of separate faculties, or powers, that were developed by exercise. Its adherents held that certain subjects (most notably the classics and mathematics) had the power to strengthen faculties such as memory, reasoning, will, and imagination. Just as the body's muscles could be strengthened through exercise, so the mental muscles could be trained through proper mental exercise. (Kliebard, 1986, p. 5)

one that would come closer to meeting the needs of the times. While it was the product of a three-member committee, Willis, Schubert, Bullough, Kridel, and Holton (1994) suggest it was clearly the statement of its presenter, William T. Harris, one of America's foremost Hegelian philosophers, who firmly believed "individuals were obliged to subordinate themselves to the needs of the existing social and economic institutions" (Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 106). While the report had no immediate results, it did feed into the controversy that resulted in an even more important NEA report in 1893—the report of the Committee of Ten.

The Committee of Ten

A dramatic rise in secondary school enrollments during the last part of the century brought the situation to a head. Tanner and Tanner (1990) report that some scholars believe a demand for uniform college requirements came from secondary school administrators wishing to streamline their procedures, while others claim that colleges feared high schools were beginning to set college standards by refusing to teach certain subjects, such as Greek. Undoubtedly, a major impetus for the establishment of the committee was the educational reform effort of its chairman, Charles Eliot, president of Harvard, and an active member of the NEA (Kliebard, 1986; Tanner & Tanner; Willis, et al., 1994). Eliot had been attempting to influence public school curricula for years. The 1876 NEA report had used Eliot's 48th annual president's report at Harvard to bolster their suggestions for changes in college curricula. In that report, Eliot spoke of the role that leading colleges could have in effecting positive change at all levels of public education:

> As soon as those colleges unite in demanding of candidates for admission a thoroughly good training in English no less than in classical subjects, the schools which feed the colleges will in turn be able to exact from the lower schools an efficiency which they now greatly lack. The service which American colleges could thus indirectly render to America education it is difficult to overestimate. (quoted in Willis, et al., p. 78)

After deliberating, the committee recommended four different courses of study for secondary schools: Classical, Latin-Scientific, Modern Languages, and English. The major differences concerned language instruction. While the Committee indicated the latter two courses were inferior because they did not require Latin, they indicated all four courses were equally acceptable for college admission. Eliot's influence is evident here—unlike most faculty psychologists, he did not believe any subjects were inherently better than others. The committee also refused to advocate any curricular distinction among students based on aptitudes or goals. True to the doctrine of mental discipline, they believed that the best preparation for college is also the best preparation for life (Kliebard; Pinar, et al., 1995; Schubert, 1986; Tanner & Tanner; Willis, et al.).

Curriculum scholars vary in their presentations of the significance of the report. Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman (1995) and the Tanners (1990) mention that it set in place the continued domination of the subject matter specialist, as it refused to entertain any notion of integration. Both also mention that the freedom to build new curriculum in the high schools was sharply curtailed once the connection was formalized between secondary curricula and college entrance requirements. However, Kliebard (1986) says the report represented a "moderate departure from the traditional curriculum

of the nineteenth century" (p. 16), and Willis, Schubert, Bullough, Kridel, and Holton (1994) emphasize that the report helped move high school curricula away from traditional adherence to classical humanist studies and toward a greater selection of modern subjects, including the sciences.

What curriculum historians do not emphasize, however, is the influence of industrialization and the national economy in bringing about the Committee of Ten. Perhaps this is because their overall judgment is that the report of the Committee of Ten merely solidified the status quo in curriculum. However, the same social influences that birthed the Committee of Ten continued to work, chipping away at the traditional humanist doctrines of the universities. By 1908 these forces had influenced Eliot to recant his position on curriculum differentiation, and by 1918 humanism had lost its dominant role in the American curriculum (Kliebard, 1986).

An exploration of these social influences may show additional significance to the work of the committee. For this exploration, I have looked to an educational historian who is not a curriculum scholar. According to Perkinson (1976), the pressure for change on colleges was visible as early as the 1850s, when a special committee of the Massachusetts House of Representatives formally criticized Harvard College for failing to provide practical instruction and, consequently, admitting too few students. At that time Harvard offered the traditional humanist course work in classical languages and mathematics. Extremely few "modern" subjects such as English literature were offered and science was not even permitted to be taught. Such a curriculum was not preparing its graduates to be leaders in the emerging industrialized society. It was only under threat of extinction from competition with the newly established Massachusetts Institute of

Technology that Harvard eventually changed. One of the first steps the Board of Overseers took was to hire Charles Eliot as president of the college. Eliot was a graduate of Harvard and a professor of chemistry at MIT, a fact that was disconcerting to many of the humanistically oriented faculty.

Eliot's goal was to transform Harvard from a college into a university that would provide America with needed professionals, experts in their various fields. In his inaugural address he stated,

> As a people, we do not apply to mental activities the principle of division of labor; and we have but a halting faith in special training for high professional employments.... This lack of faith...in the value of a discipline concentrated upon a single object, amounts to a national danger. (quoted in Perkinson, 1976, p. 140, emphasis added)

Eliot's plan was for the university to take its cues from the "manpower demands" [sic] of society (p. 140). Yet, this would not put the university in a subservient position, for it would be the university that would determine the criteria for each profession. Working diligently, Eliot set out to modify not only Harvard's system of education but the common school system as well. The quote above from the NEA Report of 1876 illustrates his understanding of the influence that universities might have upon public education. For him, the work of the Committee of Ten was a continuation of his efforts to improve the high schools which were to prepare those students, "small in number, but very important to the welfare of the nation—who show themselves able to profit by an education prolonged to the eighteenth year" (p. 157).

Thus, the significance of the Committee of Ten may be more than that it solidified the status quo of school curriculum or that it continued the domination of a subject matter orientation in curricular matters. It may also be significant as a visible effect of forces at work to meet the needs of a society undergoing significant change. It makes visible the way the public school/university connection was forged—through the concern of a legislature that one of its institutions was not being responsive to society's economic needs, through the efforts of a group of educators striving for social progress, through the determination of one man who was convinced that professional expertise held the key to the national security.

Curriculum and the Individual

Naturally, curriculum work has not been exclusively concerned with the national welfare. It has also included significant enterprises attempting to address the needs of individuals. These stories have been told, especially by the more "celebrationist histories" of education that were written prior to the seventies (Kanter, 1999). While those instances are not the focus of this chapter, a few examples should be mentioned.

One early attempt to focus on the needs of the student was the infant school, an innovation imported from Great Britain in 1816. Although it originated in schools for three and four-year-olds, William Russell sought to extend its methods into the elementary schools where, he said, the "intellect had been forced into arbitrary channels, and accustomed to mechanical influence and morbid habits" (quoted in Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 47). The idea of the infant school was to keep the children active and happy with such activities as singing and dancing. Russell stressed that instruction should follow the

tide of the child's natural tendency to learn, not go against it. He promoted the idea that the child was inherently good, not evil. Unfortunately, not all infant schools conformed to the model. In 1830 a Massachusetts manual for infant school education explained "there is a tendency to evil in the human heart" (quoted in Tanner & Tanner, p. 49). Suggested disciplinary methods were based on fear, and instruction was catechetical.

Later in the nineteenth century, a group of educators began to promote their version of the ideas of Johann Freidrich Herbart, known as the father of both the science of education and of modern psychology (Schubert, 1986). While the Herbartians' work focused more on curriculum synthesis than on the needs of the individual child, they are significant for helping to dislodge the dominance of the mental discipline approach (Kliebard, 1986; Pinar, et al., 1995). But what is more pertinent here is the impact that Herbart's work had on one of the most important advocates of the child-centered curriculum, Colonel Francis Parker.

Parker's unorthodox methods made him famous while he was superintendent of schools in Quincy, Massachusetts, in the 1870s. He instituted the word method of teaching reading, threw out grammar, and adopted conversation and writing as learning activities. He embraced Herbart's views on curriculum synthesis but insisted the child's needs should be the central concern of curriculum, leading Dewey to later dub him the "father of progressivism" (Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 91). He believed the goal of curriculum developers should be to build on the child's instinctive learning activities. However, while Parker's system was child-centered, it was not asocial. He believed that "the common school is the embryonic democracy" (p. 112). This connection of democracy and education was to be a major theme in the work of John Dewey.

Even more than Parker, Dewey endeavored to develop the notion that the good of the individual was not in conflict with the good of the society. Dewey was like Parker in that he viewed the child and the curriculum as two aspects of a single process. He saw the school as a democracy in microcosm and believed education is a social process and a social function (Pinar, et al, 1995; Tanner & Tanner, 1990). But he cautioned that, unless our ideal of society is clear, the notion of education as a social function would fit as well in a dictatorship as in a democracy. And even in a democracy, the "social aim" of education might become corrupted into a narrow national aim (Tanner & Tanner, p. 112). As the great experiment in democracy, America afforded each individual a plethora of opportunities. Dewey asked how a balance might be struck that would secure the opportunity of individual freedom and still maintain a civilized society that would continue to afford that freedom. He was optimistic that schools could be part of the answer to that question and felt that curriculum should not be centered around any single member of the triad child-society-subject matter. Rather he believed the three should be treated as interdependent (Kliebard, 1986; Schubert 1986; Tanner & Tanner).

Although Dewey's views were similar to Parker's, he had a healthy disrespect for some aspects of the child-centered movement. He felt some advocates of the movement implied that things children were uninterested in should be sugarcoated so children would attend to them. Dewey criticized this approach, contending that the child "soon learns to turn from everything which is not artificially surrounded with diverting circumstances. The spoiled child who does only what he likes is the inevitable outcome" (quoted in Kliebard, 1986, p. 55). In contrast, Dewey proposed that educators "should first discover the child's own 'urgent impulses and habits' and then, by supplying the proper

environment, direct them 'in a fruitful and orderly way'" (p. 56). Dewey was also critical of those who felt children should be surrounded with materials and then left to their own devices. "Such a method is really stupid," he said, "for it attempts the impossible which is always stupid" (quoted in Tanner and Tanner, 1990, p. 150).

Another wing of the child-centered movement focused on the scientific study of the child. G. Stanley Hall, foremost among these theorists, believed the curriculum should be individualized from the moment the child entered the school (Tanner & Tanner, 1990). One of the central tenets of Hall's theory was "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny," the idea that children develop through a series of stages that parallel the intellectual and moral development of the human species. The educational application was "cultural-epoch theory," which drove curriculum design through the selection of materials and activities appropriate to the child's developmental stage (Kliebard, 1986; Tanner & Tanner). Dewey scorned this idea, contending that "the theory was focused on human cultural development, but inferences were being made about child development, inferences that had no basis in fact" (Tanner & Tanner, p. 102).

Dewey had even more serious differences with Hall, whose penchant for individualization was actually based on his belief in hereditary determinism. Hall vehemently protested the Committee of Ten's recommendation for undifferentiated instruction, commenting that schools contained a "great army of incapables, shading down to those who should be in schools for the dullards or subnormal children" (quoted in Kliebard, 1986, p. 14). Unlike Dewey, he did not believe the schools could remedy social ills. Rather, they could identify the gifted students, the "best blood," and give them better educational opportunities (Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 107). Dewey objected to

Hall's plan to educate children for special roles in society based on assumed natural capabilities:

> The society for which the child, today, is to be educated, is too complex, makes too many demands upon personality to be capable of being based upon custom or routine without the utmost disaster. We must educate him [sic] by giving him the widest possible powers and most complete tools of civilization. (quoted in Kliebard, p. 54)

In summary, then, it is clear that concern for the individual existed among educators throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. Some educators attempted to design curriculum that was tailored to students' needs, that appealed to their interests and allowed for the greatest personal growth. However, the debates around these attempts suggest that concern for the individual may also 1) promote questionable pedagogical practices, 2) be perverted into doctrines that restrict, rather than promote, individual freedom, and 3) distract attention from social issues of importance to individual freedom. We turn now to the more immediate context of 1960s curriculum work—the emergence and development of curriculum as an academic discipline.

A New Dynamic

With the 20th century came an important new dynamic in curriculum work: the founding of curriculum as an academic field. Schubert (1980) marks the 1902 appearance of Dewey's The Child and the Curriculum as the "initial appearance and legitimation of curriculum as an area of study" (p. 4). Others place the emergence of the field in 1918 with the appearance of Franklin Bobbitt's The Curriculum, since it was the first modern

book devoted exclusively to curricular matters (Jackson, 1992; Kliebard, 1986). Pagano (1999) notes that curriculum did not achieve the status of an academic specialty until the 1930s.

In general, however, the decade just before the stock market crash of 1929 is considered an important moment in the formation of the field. For example, Tanner and Tanner (1990) characterize the decade as being "marked by the emergence of the curriculum as a field for systematic study in the United States" (p. 199). In spite—or perhaps because—of this spurt of growth in the field, curriculum was not a bounded, coherent field, even then. Bagley referred to this period as the "curriculum revision jamboree" (quoted in Tanner & Tanner, p. 196).

The 1927 publication of the Twenty-Sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, edited by Harold Rugg, demonstrates the fragmented state of the field. Although a consensus statement appeared in the text, individual follow-up statements clearly stated contributors' divergences from the statement and from each other (Kliebard, 1986; Pinar, et al., 1995; Schubert, 1986). Major differences among the contributors involved whether the curriculum should be centered around the learner, the society, or the subject matter, in spite of Dewey earlier argument that all three should be treated as interdependent. Some semblance of unity was achieved among those who called themselves progressives by a common stance *against* the subject matter approach. But in the end this negative platform was a contributing factor to their demise (Tanner & Tanner, 1990).

In spite of the fact that the stock market crash of 1929 initiated a period of widespread economic decline, curriculum historians point to the 1930s as a time of

important developments in the field. In 1938 Teachers College at Columbia University founded the first Department of Curriculum and Teaching. In 1935 Caswell and Campbell published the first synoptic curriculum text, Curriculum Development, a development Schubert (1986) attributes to a greater influx of students into secondary schools and a burgeoning eclecticism of curriculum literature. According to Tanner and Tanner (1990), "a providential outcome of the Depression was that it provided a badly needed sense of direction for curriculum development" (p. 216). The two most touted outcomes of this new sense of direction were a series of textbooks designed by Harold Rugg of Teachers College and the Eight-Year Study.

Rugg and George Counts were among the leaders of a wing of the progressive camp called social reconstructionists. Like the early proponents of public education, this group saw curriculum as a means social control, albeit they were not inspired by a desire to provide docile workers for industry. In contrast, they "saw the curriculum as the vehicle by which social injustice would be redressed and the evils of capitalism corrected" (Kliebard, 1986, p. 183). A significant achievement of this group during the 1930s was the development and publication of Rugg's social studies curriculum, Man and His Changing Society. In this integrated approach, a fused social studies served as the intellectual core of the curriculum. Playing down the memorization of facts, it promoted less reading about problems and more active participation in solving them. Kliebard (1986) emphasizes Rugg's textbook series as the "single greatest victory in the attempt by the social reconstructionists to reform the school curriculum with their social ideals" (p. 204). Between 1929 and 1939 1,317,960 copies of the text were sold. Tanner and Tanner

(1990), on the other hand, emphasize its importance for achieving curriculum synthesis through problem-focused study.

The Eight-Year Study was "perhaps the major curriculum study in the history of the field" (Pinar, et al., 1995, p. 133). Commissioned by the Progressive Education Association, the study was an attempt to encourage more curriculum reform at the high school level. The commission gained the cooperation of more than three hundred colleges and universities in 1932, and a plan was developed to forego entrance requirements for the graduates of a small number of secondary schools that were willing to participate in curriculum revision experiments. The association provided curriculum specialists for the schools who asked for help, thus originating the in-service workshop[3] which "quickly became recognized as an effective instrument for the in-service education of professionals" (Tanner, L. quoted in Tanner and Tanner, 1990, p. 235). The evaluation of the college performance of participating students, led by Ralph Tyler, showed,

> On a multitude of measures, ranging from academic to personal and social adjustment and accomplishment, students from the experimental schools equaled or excelled students from the control group of traditional high school students, except in the foreign language area. It should be kept in mind that experimental

[3] Mackenzie (1970) explains that these workshops "brought together teams of people from various school systems for periods of six weeks or more to live, work, eat and recreate as a group. The idea was that during this period of group living they would develop common understandings, common goals, around a common language, and programs which on their return they could put into operation in their schools. Later the term workshop came to be used indiscriminately to cover many other kinds of professional gatherings." (p. 4)

schools often did not have courses in areas emphasized by most of the colleges but traditional high schools had such courses. (Schubert, 1986, p. 81)

The results of the study were published in 1942. Unfortunately, at that time Americans' minds were too preoccupied with another national emergency to pay much attention.

World War II

The depression as an internal threat seemed to provide more impetus for action in curriculum work than did the external threat of the war. Historians are still puzzled as to why the results of the Eight Year study did not provoke more curriculum revision programs at the high school level. Most allude to claims that the war drew attention away from the results (Kliebard, 1986; Pinar, et al., 1995; Tanner & Tanner, 1990). Tanner and Tanner also point to a growing conservative criticism of the progressive movement which began before the war and increased in a climate of international instability.

One casualty of this criticism was the Rugg social studies series. As a reconstructionist, Rugg had wanted to call attention to the critical social problems America faced and to inject a vision of a new America and a new world. His approach has been labeled left-wing by both Kliebard and Frances Fitzgerald. Race, class and gender were very much central to his presentation. Kliebard (1986) describes volume one, Our Country and Our People, as emphasizing America as a nation of immigrants, with an effort to break down stereotypes of various immigrant groups by stressing all of their contributions. In volume four, America's March Toward Democracy, Rugg (1937), suggests that students think of the early colonists as divided into three rigid social classes and points out the contempt of the wealthy for most of the masses. One of the activities in

the pupil workbook is to complete a chart describing the struggle among classes in the various colonies. Such criticisms during wartime were seen as unpatriotic, and the series rapidly lost popularity after 1940 (Kliebard, 1986). Dewey's objections that using "class struggle as a framework for teaching was out-and-out indoctrination" (Tanner & Tanner, 1990, p. 222) may have aided in the conservative backlash that brought the series down.

As a result of the war, the curriculum in the schools placed "greater stress upon aeromechanics, aeronautics, automechanics, navigation, gunnery, and other aspects of modern warfare" (Smith quoted in Kliebard, 1986, p. 241). Students participated in paper collection and scrap metal drives, Red Cross work; they received training in first aid. A general trend was away from the humanities—a trend that lasted into the sixties (Pinar, et al., 1995), and perhaps the hope placed in science and technology was one of the greatest legacies of the war.

In this atmosphere of concern for national security and trust in science, the progressivists lost the strong presence in the field of curriculum that they had maintained throughout most of the twenties and thirties, and the "social efficiency" camp gained more power (Kliebard, 1986, p. 24). This group looked to science to create an efficient society, promoted a standardized curriculum, and preached the need for a greater specialization of skills and differentiation in the curriculum. Their influence was evident in the emergence in the mid-forties of the phenomenon called "life-adjustment education."

According to Tanner and Tanner (1990) this title was "destined to become the most unfortunate label ever associated with the new education" (p. 247). It originated at a conference sponsored by the Vocational Education Division of the U. S. Office of

Education in 1945. A great deal of concern was expressed at the meeting about high-school students who were on the "general track"—those who were neither in the college-preparatory track nor the vocational education track. In his report on the proceedings of the conference, Charles Prosser asserted that 20 percent of the nation's youth were being well prepared for college and only another 20 percent for skilled occupations. As the official conference spokesman, he called for the formation of a new program for students whose needs were not being met. "We do not believe that the remaining 60 percent of our youth of secondary age will receive the life adjustment training they need and to which they are entitled as American citizens" (quoted in Kliebard, 1986, p. 249).

In that era, Tanner and Tanner (1990) say,

> "adjustment" had decided overtones of passivity and acquiescence rather than the mastery of one's own environment. Throughout the thirties and forties the term emotional adjustment was used interchangeably by many progressivists with a well-integrated personality. This was anathema to the social reconstructionists. (p. 249)

Mental health was an acceptable goal, but the goal of adjustment clashed with the Deweyan goal of environmental mastery. Contrary to how it sounded, the goal of life adjustment was not to produce conformity and adjustment, but a more appropriate program for high school students. Unfortunately, in an era of great national uncertainty, environmental mastery held much more appeal than a program that seemed to imply "passivity and acquiescence."

The fact that high schools were not meeting the needs of many students in the mid-forties seemed apparent, since only half of the students who entered ninth grade

graduated four years later (Tanner & Tanner, 1990). If life adjustment supporters had just added to or tinkered with the curriculum, the reaction against them may have been less intense. However, they envisioned a program that would focus on the full curriculum of the school, transforming general education from "subjects representing common elements of the cultural heritage...to functional areas of living" (Kliebard, 1986, p. 258). This attempt to completely transform the structure of the curriculum, rather than simply tack on a life adjustment program may have aggravated the backlash against the movement (Kliebard; Pinar, et al., 1995). In addition, the program represented what Lagemann (1997) has called an "unchecked trend away from academics" (p. 10), producing courses that covered little more than topics such as manners, speech, dress, use of alcohol, and hygiene.

The reaction stirred up by life-adjustment education dealt several swift blows to the educational establishment. In 1949, popular author Mortimer Smith published And Madly Teach, criticizing education leaders of anti-intellectualism. In 1953, Arthur Bestor's Educational Wastelands appeared, criticizing schools for failing to emphasize intellectual development for all students. By 1955, with the publication of Rudolf Flesch's Why Johnny Can't Read, the American public was ready to believe that, "just as war is 'too serious a matter to be left to generals,' so...[is] teaching ...too important to be left to...teachers and teachers' college professors" (quoted in Lagemann, 1997, p. 10).

In a climate already tense due to McCarthyism and the Cold War, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover began a series of speeches in 1956, warning of Soviet technological advances and pointing to the superiority of the Soviet educational system. Like Bestor and Smith, he decried the schools' lack of emphasis on intellectual development, but he

especially emphasized the neglect of the gifted and talented students. Kliebard (1986) explains,

> After making a count of Nobel prize winners in physics and chemistry through 1955, Rickover concluded that the combined "brain power" of Germany, England, France, Denmark, and Italy was precisely "eleven times as rich as we" in those scientific fields. (p. 264)

It may be difficult for many of us in the field today to understand the sense of a "profound scientific revolution" (Bruner, 1960/1963, p. 1) that the country was experiencing at mid-century. In the short span of thirty years, everyday life had been transformed by the wonders of radio, television, talking pictures, and the automobile. Indeed, in the form of "the bomb" technology had taken on a Frankenstein's monster-life of its own. But if we could only contain it, the superhuman power of science surely held the answers to all our problems. Then, fears induced by WWII and the ensuing Cold War created doubt as to the kind of job professional educators were doing. The doubt turned into a true crisis of confidence when the American public learned that the Russians had put the first successful satellite into orbit around earth.

The Sputnik Missile Crisis

The Soviets' success in launching Sputnik I stunned Americans and turned a new spotlight on the curriculum of the nation's schools. Lou Rubin recalls, "With Sputnik, curriculum in particular and education in general became much more of a political issue because it was at that point that we began comparing the achievement of American youths...with the communist block" (quoted in Marshall, et al., 2000, p. 41). According

to Tanner and Tanner (1990), "The post-Sputnik curriculum hierarchy and emphasis on academic excellence blurred the diversity of human beings and pushed the non-academically inclined adolescent into a dark corner (if not out the school door)" (p. 291).

According to Kaestle (1999), the Sputnik crisis helped establish the reality that the federal government had special capacities and responsibilities in education. On September 2, 1958, one year after Sputnik I was launched, Congress passed the National Defense Act, aimed at revising curriculum in math, sciences, and foreign languages. As a measure designed to meet a national emergency, massive amounts of money were involved. However, control of this money did not fall to professional educators, who had lost their credibility with the American public and politicians. Much of the money for curriculum revision was funneled through the National Science Foundation and into the hands of discipline-based scholars. According to Lagemann (1997), this fostered a fundamental reorientation of curriculum research:

> [Discipline-based scholars] assumed that curriculum, or at least the basic outline of school courses, could be generated centrally and then disseminated via improved materials and institutes to train teachers. The new overall aim of curriculum revision was to anchor the school subjects in the structures of the disciplines rather than in one or another theory of curriculum. (p. 12)

The passing of the torch of curriculum work from curriculum professors to academic scholars is evidenced by the absence of any of the former at the historic Woods Hole Conference in 1959. Chaired by Jerome Bruner, a cognitive psychologist, the conference was organized and financed by the National Academy of Sciences, the U.S. Office of Education, the Air Force, the National Science Foundation, and the Rand

Corporation (Marshall, et al., 2000, p. 47). Its espoused purpose was to "discuss how education in science might be improved in our primary and secondary schools" (Bruner, 1960/1963, p. vii). However, in spite of its focus on possibilities for curriculum planning, only three educators—none of them from the field of curriculum—attended the conference. Indeed, most curricularists learned about the conference through the 1960 publication of Bruner's report, The Process of Education (Marshall, et al.). As Bruner (1960/1963) saw things, educational psychologists were reasserting a place in curriculum planning that they had deserted earlier in the century for the study of aptitude and achievement in education.

In addition to their "polite and highly professional dismissal" at Woods Hole (Marshall, et al, 2000, p. 47), curriculum workers lost significant ground in other ways. New funds that became available through philanthropic organizations like the Ford Foundation attracted scholars outside schools of education, leading to more involvement on the part of social scientists. Hopes ran high that education would be substantially transformed now that the scientists were involved. David Clark, director of the Cooperative Research Program established by Congress, stated in 1961, "By 1970 it may be possible to state that more was learned about education in the 1960s than had been learned in the previous history of education in this country" (quoted in Lagemann, 1997, p. 12).

This new optimism was soon deflated, however, when politicians began to call in the mid-sixties for evaluation studies to prove that federally funded programs really were accomplishing their goals. The results of these studies undermined confidence in programs based on stage-like, top down models that ignored teacher input, leading to a

decline in funding for fundamental research. From 1969 to 1972, Office of Education funds for this purpose declined from $10.7 million to $5 million (Lagemann, 1997, p. 13).

In summary, the aftermath of Sputnik I brought a swell of public opinion against professional educators. A new emphasis and hope in research was fostered through massive funding by the government and private agencies, but little of this money was available to professors of curriculum. Instead, discipline-based scholars received the research funds, as well as the confidence of the American public. As a result, faith was again placed in science and a new structure of the disciplines approach. However, by the end of the sixties, the reputation of discipline-based education and funds for educational research were both on the decline, due to the results of newly legislated evaluation studies.

Conclusion

> If we are to be honest with ourselves, the curriculum field has its roots in the soil of social control. (Apple, 1979, p. 47)

It appears that from the beginning concern for the national welfare has driven much of the curriculum work in this country. The justification for this has been that an educated, united citizenry is necessary for the survival of a democracy. But a byproduct of this process has been an effort to level personal differences, that is, to cast all individuals in the same mold concerning values, language, and personal expectations. Another by-product has been the manipulation of people's destinies by providing them with an education determined by the nation's workforce demands and/or the dominant group's expectations. Some efforts have been made to provide for a curriculum that promotes

personal freedom and growth, but these have had limited success and some have even been perverted into doctrines that restrict the individual's freedom.

Once curriculum emerged as an academic discipline in the early twentieth century, allegiances were forged that represented all of these various concerns. Those who were persuaded that individual freedom had been too limited may have reached their peak of influence during the 1920s and 1930s. However, the outbreak of WWII signaled a change in national attitude that subordinated the needs of the individual to those of the country. A variety of conditions helped to sustain that attitude after the war. The government's massive entry into curriculum work after Sputnik gave considerable weight to the notion of curriculum as servant of the national welfare.

While curricularists of the mid-20th century may have been aligned into various camps, they were still united by their disciplinary status. They wore the identity of "curricularist." Since the 1930s, the academic curricularists had graduated with degrees in curriculum and had taken positions as curriculum professors. But with the turnover of their responsibilities to subject matter specialists after Sputnik, their collective identity was threatened. The loss of curriculum workers' previous responsibilities and the potential of permanent changes in the field due to government intervention combined to create a crisis in the post-Sputnik era.

It was in this era that Joseph Schwab (1969) made his famous declaration that the curriculum field was "moribund"; and it was in this milieu that the first glimmerings of the reconceptualization became visible in the form of work done by scholars such as Greene, Huebner, Klohr, and Macdonald.

CHAPTER FOUR

UN/DISCIPLINED THINKING

> Let us pervert good sense and allow thought to play outside the ordered table of resemblances. (Foucault, 1970/1977, p. 183)

Curriculum historians have presented the structure of the disciplines movement as the defining phenomenon of the post-Sputnik era. As such, it was the foil for much of the curriculum theorizing that was produced in the sixties. One of the greatest objections to the approach was that it not only imposed a rigid form upon the treatment of individual subjects, but it also eschewed consideration of the curriculum as a whole. A factor that curriculum workers found even more troubling was the power of the forces impelling the movement. The scholars whose texts are explored here did not call for the abolishment of the disciplines approach. Rather, from their position outside the movement, they sought to examine the movement's discourses, institutions, and practices and to understand the implications of those for students, schools, and society.

This chapter is an inquiry into the 1960's texts of four scholars credited with provoking the reconceptualization of curriculum studies: James Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Paul Klohr, and Maxine Greene. Guided by Foucault's triple root of power, knowledge and the self, I present a hermeneutic exploration of their work, followed by a conclusion that synthesizes my interpretation of their collective texts. My approach is to begin with the two scholars with the greatest volume of work on curriculum theorizing, James Macdonald and Dwayne Huebner. Paul Klohr's work is next, followed by that of

Maxine Greene who, although a prolific author, did not consider herself first and foremost a curriculum theorist.

James Macdonald

> Curriculum theory should be committed, not neutral. It should be committed to human fullness in creation, direction, and use. (Macdonald, 1967, p. 169)

James Macdonald received his Ph.D. in education from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1956. As a student he was advised by Virgil Herrick, co-host with Ralph Tyler of the 1947 Chicago Curriculum Conference that has been called the birthplace of curriculum theory.[1] During the sixties (1959-1972) Macdonald was affiliated with UW-Milwaukee, first as an associate and later as a full professor. For part of the decade he also served as the university's Director of School Experimentation and Research. In an autobiography videotaped before his death in 1983, he identified four stages of his work: scientism (which he eventually felt excluded too much), person-centered humanism, sociopolitical humanism, and transcendentalism (Brubaker & Brookbank, 1986). The breadth of his scholarship is impressive, spanning the fields of sociology, psychology, anthropology, and both analytic and Continental philosophy.

This breadth of scholarship qualified him to be an astute observer of post-Sputnik events. Although I would characterize Macdonald's tone as generally optimistic, his writing verifies curriculum historians' depiction of the sixties as tough times for

[1] Schubert (1986) credits this opinion to Beauchamp (1981) and notes that it is a point of disagreement among curricularists.

educators. In the following example he speaks of the effects of the "onslaught of social forces" upon professional educators:

> We are impatient, pressured, anxious....We are pushed, driven, compelled beyond the usual 'doing' to a sort of frenetic activity. We are a group in search of prescriptions for symptoms of problems we perceive and symptoms we are told we possess....We have accepted the social diagnosis of illness rather than demise, and we are busy listing our symptoms and describing them. (1965b, p. 571)

The "illness" he was speaking of, of course, was the purported condition of schools, which had been blamed for America's international embarrassment during the Sputnik crisis. While curriculum specialists "simply tried to stay upright on the slopes" during those times (Pinar, et. al., 1995, p. 161), the onslaught of social forces moved in to correct schools' putative deficiencies.

Macdonald (1966c) observed this onslaught and assessed its implications. He pointed out the "socially expedient" nature of the reform movement (p. 1) and noted, "The format for change is increasingly toward centralized direction in the hands of an oligarchy of scholars and bureaucrats buttressed by the immense expenditures of federal monies for centrally selected purposes" (p. 1). His use of the terms "oligarchy" and "bureaucrats" was obviously pejorative, as he referred to the discipline-based scholars and the political and business leaders who were "usurping the major emphasis in curriculum development" (1966e, p. 20). Elsewhere, he referred to these as "critics and outside newcomers" who were "vocal and powerful" (1965b, p. 576). His emphasis upon increasingly "centralized direction" and "centrally selected purposes" implied the dangerous movement away from America's tradition of locally controlled schools.

In addition, Macdonald noted that the reform movement was not operating with the benefit of insights from extant knowledge in the curriculum field. He believed their decision to select Dewey as their antithesis was "reason to doubt the acuity of their awareness of Dewey" (1966c, p. 1) because of their similarities with him. Specifically, they believed in the same central idea of progress through rational problem solving and in the idea that the worth of an action lies in its consequences. He also pointed out the failure of Bruner (1960/1963) and the Woods Hole scholars to make any reference to A. N. Whitehead's or Charles Judd's historical statements about structure of the disciplines. Pointedly, he concluded, "In all, the performance has been a very unscholarly one on the part of scholars" (Macdonald, 1966c, p. 3).

Through his own understanding of the field and of social theory, Macdonald realized that curriculum as social control was not a new development or an intrinsically negative one. He observed that schools are sub-systems of the general social system and, as such, have predominantly a maintenance function; they are organized to conserve and pass on the traditions and knowledge needed in the society at large (1966d, 1969a, 1969c). Indeed, in one of his earliest texts of the sixties he used this structuralist notion to beautifully execute a refutation of the idea that the disciplines could ever logically be the referent for the curriculum. Using action theory (Olds, 1956; Parson & Shils, 1952), which drew from the highly popular discourses of systems theory and behaviorism, Macdonald (1962) made the argument that subject matter is not a motivated system. This means that action may only reside in individuals (personality systems) or in society (social systems), but not in subject matter (cultural systems). Subject matter, as a value system, rather than a motivated system, would be internalized in individuals and/or

institutionalized in social systems. He then went on to subtly emphasize the importance of the child as the basic referent for the curriculum:

> If we grant that the units of a system have different patterns of movement and are in different phases of action at any given time, then we can assume that the personality systems of individuals will demand different objectives, selection, organization and evaluative mechanisms at any given time....Thus, subject matter is only a guide to the teacher. It is a pattern of symbols which the teacher may utilize to direct the child toward better personal and social integration. (pp. 76-77)

This quote is found in the middle of the piece, framed by emphases on the social behavior theory of the day. In fact, Macdonald's closing lines emphatically defer to the then dominant school of thought:

> At present our teaching perceptions are so limited that we as teachers cannot really know what our basic goals are nor how to achieve them. The only hope to improve teaching lies in a greater understanding of what is involved in human behavior. (p. 78)

In this text, Macdonald demonstrated his skills as both a scientist and as a politician, using the social science "lens" of the era, but in a way that worked against the reductionism and determinism that was typical of much theory of the time (e.g., systems theory and behaviorism).

Discourses as Metaphors

In spite of his objections to the structure of the disciplines movement, Macdonald did not reject every aspect of it. He recognized its obvious productivity. As he put it, "It is stupid and senseless to quarrel with the suggestion that we ought to know what we know

in a formal and organized sense. Thus, the structure of a discipline can be a useful pedagogical tool" (1966c, p. 3). What he objected to was the particularly uncritical use of the structure of the disciplines approach as the approach to curriculum development. Rather, he called for the recognition that it was one among many discourses or "metaphors," that is, ways of looking at the world (1965a, p. 1; 1965b, 1967). Drawing upon the work of fellow curricularist Dwayne Huebner, as well as philosophers of symbolism and semanticists of his era, such as Langer, Cassirer, and Korzybski, and philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Bronowski, Macdonald argued that disciplines do not reflect reality. Instead they are "special languages to deal in special ways with aspects of reality" (1966d, p. 45). Although these metaphorical ways of speaking and thinking are helpful for revealing certain aspects of the world, they also place restrictions upon our thinking. He cautioned, "Our ideas about curriculum are limited by the accustomed ways we have of talking about it" (p. 45).

Emphasizing both the productive and destructive capacity of such metaphors, he noted:

> Man has developed great power and control by metaphor making. His power and control are so vast today that the fact of his ability to destroy all life and perhaps the planet he inhabits gives ghastly witness to the creative development of metaphor. (1965a, p. 1)

In this passage Macdonald has once again has shown his political prowess by his capacity to recognize the validity of a theory in vogue and undercut it at the same time. While giving credit to the power of the scientific metaphor he simultaneously tied it to responsibility for the hysteria brought about by the Sputnik crisis.

Macdonald felt we are vulnerable to the destructive capacities of our metaphors when we fail to recognize the "word is not the thing" (1965b, p. 572) and proceed to prescribe action on the basis of our metaphors as if they were reality. He believed our metaphors achieve the status of myths, "when they are accepted uncritically without subjecting them to some reasoned, or phenomenological, or empirical process of validation" (p. 572). In "Language and Meaning" (1966c) he suggested that the disciplines metaphor was clearly "not as useful as it was first thought to be" (p. 2) and criticized its advocates for failure to even attempt to produce any empirical validation for their project. Here he put his finger on the very weakness that brought about their eventual downfall (Lagemann, 1997). Furthermore, in view of their lack of validation, he accused the disciplinary scholars of using their strength and authority to project an experiment onto the schools:

> The scholars' behavior could almost be said to be irresponsible. It is at least possible that it would have been more useful in the long run if the scholars had reorganized their material for courses at the college level and tried it out with their own students before they moved so definitely into other levels of the curriculum. Public education is providing them with an opportunity to learn a great deal at the expense of others. (Macdonald, 1966c, p. 2)

He then suggested that universities appeared unwilling to extend their own cherished academic freedom to other levels and concluded with a cut at the expert status of the academic scholars:

> Does the university professor (or his graduate assistant) know so much that no syllabus or course of study is necessary for him in contrast to the public school

teacher? Charity begins at home and the college student is suffering ills that need the expert attention of the scholar. (p. 2)

These passages may possibly reflect the frustration of a scholar whose own expertise has been passed by or one who has lost influence in his former arena of command. However, Macdonald is calling upon the scholars of the disciplines to hold themselves to their own standard of accountability and examine their own assumptions. He is also demonstrating a concern for the subjects of their "experiment" – children – that is evident throughout the rest of his work. He increasingly insisted that the person should be the predominant concern in educational discourse.

Behaviorism

In addition to the structure of the disciplines approach, Macdonald critiqued the discourse of behaviorism. He explained the general public's positive regard toward this discourse by the climate of acceptance of psychology at the time and, perhaps even more, on the need for educators to present "respectable rationales" (1965b, p. 574). Citing recent work by Bruner (1960/1963), Macdonald (1965b) pointed out that learning theory[2] is descriptive, which does not guarantee its utility for the prescriptive status it was being afforded. In addition, B. F. Skinner's work in programmed instruction had done little at the time to validate its superiority over usual approaches. Macdonald also rejected the idea of prescribing educational approaches by stage theories of human development. Drawing upon the relatively new field of humanistic psychology represented by Maslow, Rogers, and Allport, and upon the work of existential philosophers such as Buber and

[2]"Learning theory" as used here refers to the Lockean tradition that behavior is formed from the outside. Two of its major proponents were Pavlov and Skinner.

Tillich, Macdonald (1964c) proposed that man has a self-actualizing and creative capability not limited solely by biology or conditioning:

> The process of human development is considered here to be a process of becoming (Allport, 1955). As such, the process cannot be described by analogy as an unfolding of an organism along predetermined paths. It is, rather, a process whereby the person is always in a transactional relationship with his environment. This relationship includes individually unique choices and the vagaries of unpredictable circumstances as well as the mechanisms of biological growth and the predominant socialization process of a society. (p. 30)

This was the "Image of Man" that Macdonald (1964c) proposed – an image that endowed each person with both purposefulness and personal responsibility. Based on this image then, Macdonald felt that the very purpose of setting out to change a person's behavior was a moral issue. In another artful political move he suggested that, morally, the focus of some educators upon the manipulation of human behavior through conditioning was not far afield from the "brainwashing" techniques being attributed to the Chinese Communists (1966b). He also believed the assumption that children's learning is a controllable outcome is "impractical, unintelligible, and personally disastrous for the student" (1966d, p. 44, emphasis in original). It is impractical because schools do not have control over the predispositions for learning that students bring to school; it is unintelligible because teachers have no direct access to the personal meaning systems of students; and it is disastrous to students because of the many prejudicial factors affecting achievement, such as race, class, gender, and aptitude.

The practices that operate in conjunction with the behaviorist discourse lead to the creation of the "individual," as opposed to the "person," according to Macdonald (1966d, p. 39). By categorizing students by their developmental rates, personalities, and learning styles, we establish the "uniqueness" of the individual. Or as Foucault (1975/1995) was to say a decade later, we make individuals "visible" (p. 184). We treat them as objects for our study and control. The categories are determined, of course, through examinations, case histories and observations in the classroom. Macdonald objected to this creation of the "individual" and proposed instead to treat students as "persons," as subjects rather than objects (p. 40). Persons are valued because of what they share in common with all others: the human condition. He quoted the French religious philosopher Emmanuel Mounier,[3] to emphasize the difference:

> When I treat another person as though he were not present...or when I set him down in a list without right of appeal – in such a case I am behaving toward him as though he were an object, which means, in effect, <u>despairing of him</u>. But if I treat him as a subject, as a presence – which is to recognize that I am unable to classify him, that he is inexhaustible, filled with hopes upon which he alone can act – that is to give him credit. To despair of anyone is to make him desperate; whereas the credit that generosity extends regenerates his own confidence. (p. 40, emphasis added)

[3] Mounier (1905-1950) advocated a philosophy he called "personalism," which rejected the concept of humans as a mere species of physical objects subject to causal laws. According to Matthews (1996), Mounier believed the fundamental nature of the person lies in communication with other persons, whereas liberal individualism sees humans as isolated from each other.

I have included the entirety of this quote because I believe it communicates so clearly the difference between how students are treated in school and how they might be treated. I fear, however, that our current system of "individualization" in the school may be so entrenched that educators may be unable to see this difference. Macdonald saw it and understood the damage that was being done to students by individualization. By his account, educators have justified the damage done to "individuals" by appealing to another discourse, that of technorationality.

Technorationality

The educational discourse/practice that Macdonald most often cites as an example of technorationality is the Tyler rationale (1965b, 1966a, 1966d). This discourse values efficiency and effectiveness. The behaviorist discourse focuses upon learning outcomes. Educators' reasoning, according to Macdonald (1966b), has been that behaviorist practices produce greater profit in the learning outcomes of children and are thereby justified: "The 'profit' of increased learning outcomes is the central criterion of the worth of actions x, y, z" (p. 3). However, he suggested the weaknesses in this argument are 1) educators had little, if any, knowledge of certain x, y, z chains that will result in specified behavior, 2) they did not agree that learning outcomes were the only criterion of worth, and 3) they were still not sure how the learning of new behavior takes place or whether schools had the right to demand such behaviors if that were known.

Macdonald did not completely discount the usefulness of technorationality, or of any discourse for that matter. He considered each of them – including psychology, sociology, anthropology, biology, philosophy, and theology; sociological, psychological, anthropological, philosophical, biological, and theological discourses (1967) -- to hold

potential for providing helpful understandings of our world. He insisted upon the importance of "conceptual pluralism" (1965b, p. 617) so that we might enrich our conceptualizations of curriculum and instruction. However, perhaps because technorationality was (and is) the dominant discourse of education, he insisted that we should be aware of its limitations. Among these limitations he included the fact that one of its major assumptions is the ability to explain, predict, and control objects in relation to each other. As such, it is based on the closed systems metaphor, which scientists had agreed by the mid-sixties was not "an adequate portrayal of truth, regardless of its usefulness" (1967, p. 167). Technorationality alone, therefore, would no longer be considered adequate for long-range theorizing. Also, drawing from Marcuse, Macdonald cautioned that too much dependence upon technorationality might lead us to

> come to see ourselves as objects or the representation of objects that we find useful for our purposes. In time...we will learn to know ourselves only as the representations we make. We will then become what Marcuse called 'One-Dimensional.' (p. 167)

This caution was based on the idea that, unlike physical elements, humans are information-processing creatures. When we learn that the elements of water are hydrogen and oxygen, the nature of water is not changed. But when a new piece of information about humans is fed into our information system—for example, that the first few years of children's lives are the most crucial—it changes the ways we see ourselves. Unfortunately, that piece of information is actually reinforcing the present system. Within the closed systems thinking of technorationality, the capacity for critical thinking and oppositional behavior withers.

Although these limitations of technorationality must be kept in mind, Macdonald believed there was a place for it in the field of curriculum. I will discuss that in the next section.

Curriculum and Instruction

Tanner and Tanner (1995) have depicted Macdonald's explanation of curriculum as simply "those planning endeavors which take place prior to instruction" (p. 157). On the contrary, throughout the sixties Macdonald proposed a much more sophisticated notion of curriculum. He consistently referred to curriculum as a "context" (1962, 1964a) or, as he became more influenced by the ideas of Marcuse and McLuhan, an "environment" (1966a, 1966d, 1967, 1969b). In the early sixties, Macdonald (1963) provided definitions for both curriculum and instruction that he built on throughout the next few years:

> Curriculum has the greatest scope. Our understanding of curriculum extends from the politics of legislative bodies through the curriculum setting and developing activities in the school year itself. Ideally, curriculum finds its fruition in student learning, but in actuality there is a considerable segment of what we talk about in curriculum that is prior to and/or removed from classrooms. (p. 5)

The definition for instruction gave it a narrower range of concerns:

> Instruction, then, would be the active process of goal-oriented interaction between pupils, teachers, materials, and facilities. This is meant to describe the ongoing classroom situation in its entirety, which includes teacher behavior and reflects curriculum decisions and activities. (p. 5)

Two years later, he provided a more sophisticated explanation, a "four system action space" (1965a, p. 4), incorporating the additional concepts of teaching and learning. Curriculum remained the broadest concept, but he did not elaborate much beyond his previous definition, as the focus of that particular article was instruction.

However, the next year, in a proposal for a person-oriented curriculum, Macdonald (1966d) did elaborate upon his previous definition for curriculum. He began with the basic definition of "the contrived environment and its directed influence upon the person in the schools" (p. 40). He explained it is contrived in that it is neither the immediate "real" world of the student nor the "real" world of the creators of the meanings, symbols and skills which are the substance of the curriculum. In addition, it is contrived because the person is socially influenced through the teachers and other educators and through the criteria used to select textbooks, materials, activities, etc. Thus we create a contrived environment through selections of certain aspects of the world and then, in the classroom context, we try to influence the student toward certain ways of encountering this contrived environment. Macdonald felt there was no escaping the curricular dimensions of a contrived environment and social influence as long as schools maintained the form of their times, but he believed that a curriculum decision-making pattern could be constructed that maximizes the creation of conditions for the growth of the person. This type of curriculum would be committed to the values of freedom and choice for the student, but within boundaries. He explained, "The concern for freedom has too often been twisted by the psychological concept of permissiveness. It has carried the connotations of primarily free physical movement and social divergence" (1966d, p. 43). In contrast, within the notion of the contrived environment, Macdonald was referring

to the freedom to "pursue knowledge with commitment" (p. 43). Thus, the moral expression of the curriculum is the creation of the social, physical and cultural conditions necessary for personal freedom to flourish.

In his most sophisticated treatment of curriculum theory in the decade, Macdonald (1967) proposed that the decisions for creating these types of conditions must be guided by both technological and aesthetic rationality. Aesthetic rationality was based on man's capacity to cope rationally with the world on an intuitive, rather than strictly scientific, basis. Drawn from the work of Marcuse, it included strong Hegelian and phenomenological components, which allowed for new perceptions of reality. As Macdonald (1967) illustrated:

> A theory is projected which is applied...in reality. Through its application and the grappling with world phenomena, new insights arise which raise questions about the adequacy of the theory. Through this movement from theory to phenomena, new schemes emerge. Then, the emergence of new theory signifies the beginning of a new cycle in the dialectic of curriculum thinking. (p. 168)

According to Macdonald (1967), curriculum planning should be guided by technological rationality prior to instruction to create maximum conditions for the experiencing of the learning process as an aesthetic phenomenon. Then, guided by an aesthetic rationality, the instructional setting would allow for students to discover their potentialities through their creative interactions with ideas, things and other people. Macdonald (1969a, 1969b, 1969c) published three subsequent articles detailing how such an approach to curriculum might actually look in both elementary and secondary schools. He was aware, however, that the creation of such curriculum environments would not be

easy and any attempts toward such a goal would call for considerable courage. However, he not only emphasized the necessity for educators to take risks, he believed we have no alternative (1964a, 1966b, 1966f, 1969c). To do otherwise, would be to allow the "accidental curriculum" to operate (1969c, p. 38). He exhorted curriculum workers:

> Curriculum is being constructed by competing forces beyond the school's control, and beyond the control of integrated humanism. As humanists, we may retreat to liberating personal reflections or withdraw to unreflective interpersonal love; or face the responsibility of planning and implementing a humanistic curriculum, both in spite of and in response to the human situation. (p. 38)

Summary

> Curriculum theorizing calls for immersion in the concrete data of curriculum experiences; awareness of general ideas and developments in such areas as psychology, sociology, anthropology, biology, philosophy, and theology; knowledge of the historical and contemporary developments and theories in curriculum; and a willingness and ability to utilize both aesthetic and technological rationality in the process of theorizing. (Macdonald, 1967, p. 169)

By providing this excellent summation, Macdonald has detailed how he saw curriculum work emerging in the sixties. His work demonstrates a commitment to curriculum theory tied to the concrete, lived experience of life in schools. Due to the breadth of his scholarship, he was able to apprehend a wide variety of discourses and forces as they impinged upon curriculum work in the sixties. He showed an understanding of the political, economic, social, pyschological, and technorational influences that worked upon the field from both within and without. Not only was he knowledgeable in these various discourses, but he recommended their use and was himself competent at utilizing them to further his own political agenda, which was

centered solidly on issues of personal freedom. While he admitted that powerful forces were at work to socially influence students, he believed curricularists could construct discourses and structures to allow for an environment more conducive to personal freedom.

Dwayne Huebner

> This human situation [between teacher and student] must be picked away at until the layers of the known are peeled back and the unknown in all its mystery and awe strikes the educator in the face and heart, and he is left with the brute fact that he is but a man trying to influence another man. (Huebner, 1966a, p. 20)

Dwayne Huebner was a masters student at the University of Chicago at the time of the 1947 curriculum theory conference, co-hosted by Herrick and Tyler. A short time later, he began his doctoral program at the University of Wisconsin - Madison, working with Herrick who had gone there from Chicago to start a new elementary education program. Huebner's undergraduate work had been in physics and mathematics; his master's work and teaching experience were in elementary social studies. He describes his doctoral program as "primarily positivistic – empirical and statistical and good" (1975/1999b, p. 448). However, by the time he received his Ph.D. in 1959, he had developed an interest in philosophy, psychology, and social theory, reading Talcott Parsons, Donald Hebb, Susanne Langer, Ernst Cassirer, and Bertrand Russell. He describes his subsequent intellectual development as "strange, rather subconsciously self-directing and increasingly alienating from my colleagues in education" (p. 448). Studying the mystics, Merleau-Ponty, Jaspers, Sartre, and the theology of Paul Tillich, he grew more and more uncomfortable with the basic operating assumptions of curriculum

thought. He wondered, "How could one plan educational futures via behavioral objectives when the mystical literature emphasized the present moment and the need to let the future care for itself?" (p. 449). He describes his discovery of Heidegger's Being and Time as something of an epiphany: "New ways of thinking became available – new questions, new modes of speech" (p. 449). In 1957, his first year as an assistant professor at Teachers College, he and Arno Bellack taught a new course in curriculum theory. Bellack worked from the perspective of analytic philosophy; Huebner's approach was through phenomenology and political science. These twin interests would be the driving forces behind his curriculum work of the sixties.

Curriculum as Environment

Like Macdonald, Huebner (1966b, 1967, 1968, 1966/1970) defined curriculum as an environment. Although he chose the expression "educative environment" (1966b, p. 94) rather than "contrived environment" (Macdonald, 1966d, p. 40), Huebner left no doubt that he also saw curriculum as a means of social control:

> Curriculum has been identified as a position, course of action, or series of events which has a stability, a truth value, or some more or less absolute value....It seems more efficacious to conceptualize curriculum as social policy - a continual realization through classroom actions of the beliefs, values, expectations and desires of those in positions of control. (1964/1999i, pp. 95-96)

Recognizing that the educative environment was determined by the desires of those in power he, like Macdonald, took the stance that curricularists should provide discourses and practices that promote personal freedom. By his definition, curriculum work is "inherently a political process by means of which the curricular worker seeks to attain a

just environment" (1966b, p. 94). Due to this commitment to the individual, Huebner was quite critical of technorationality[4] and its "handmaiden" (1966b, p. 97), learning theory. He accepted them as necessary and beneficial points of view, but objected to their prohibitive nature when they are used as the exclusive languages for curriculum work. Indeed, because of their use to the exclusion of other ways of thinking, Huebner (1966a) once called these discourses "two tyrannical myths" (p. 10) that "serve demonic forces" (p. 11). He believed the purpose of education is "transcendence" (1966b, p. 103), that is, he believed teachers are to help students grow in their capacity for personal evolution and change. The languages of technorationality and behaviorism are, instead, more useful for conforming students to others' expectations. Dismayed with most educators' reliance upon those languages, Huebner agreed with Kafka that "probably all education is but two things: first, parrying of the ignorant children's impetuous assault on the truth and, second, gentle, imperceptible, step-by-step initiation of the humiliated child into the lie" (quoted in Huebner, 1961/1999e, p. 12).

Power/Knowledge in Curriculum Studies

Huebner's focus on the political aspects of education and his study of philosophy produced sophisticated explorations of the power/knowledge relationship nearly two decades before it became a popular topic in curriculum studies. Among the many aspects of knowledge Huebner explored were 1) its Janus-faced nature to both reveal and to hide, to edify as well as corrupt, (1966b, 1962/1999f, 1969/1999h), 2) its function of creating

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[4] Because Huebner seldom referred to this rationale by the same label or explained it in exactly the same terms, I have substituted the now more familiar term "technorationality." At various times Huebner used descriptors such as "technique," "technical rational," "economic model", or "myth of 'purpose'" for this type of thinking.

artificial categories (1966b, 1962/1999f), and 3) its tendency to be characterized by humans as spatial (stable) rather than temporal (changing) (1962/1999f). Furthermore, he emphasized that humans access knowledge through various languages or "symbol systems," such as math, art, the various sciences, and poetry, all of which act as screens to reality. As such, they shape our thoughts and constrain our practices (1966a, 1962/1999f, 1962/1999g). Admitting the paradox that we have only language to talk about language, Huebner (1962/1999f) nevertheless insisted that curricularists must explore this biased nature of knowledge, for knowledge reified and revered as a picture of reality is enslaving and dangerous. Long before Lather (Lather & Smithies, 1997) suggested we should be "troubling" our categories of thought, Huebner (1966b) was maintaining that "existing categories need to be upset, maybe even destroyed, so new questions and problems can emerge" (p. 99).

Huebner (1964/1999i) believed curricularists were generally unaware of the importance of the connection between symbol systems and power. He explored ways that power operates in and through symbol systems (i.e., discourses), specifying several inter-related functions I have called production, solidification, provocation/constraint, and valuation.

Production

Huebner explored the productive capacity of discourses, suggesting, as did Foucault (1975/1995), that power be recognized as a positive force. Quoting from Charles Merriam, he defended the exercise of power: "Power is positive, rather than negative, creative rather than destructive" (Merriam quoted in Huebner, 1962, p. 89). In addition, Huebner (1964/1999i) chided curriculum workers for shying away from the quest for

power, once again adumbrating Foucault in his insistence that power is available at all levels of the hierarchy:

> The professional curricular worker should be less defensive when he awakens one day to find that curricular decisions are being made by someone else, for this fact simply implies that the professional has lost control by default or by not recognizing that power and influence are never permanently institutionalized, but always available to the individual who has the know-how to gain it. (p. 95)

A few years later, some of Huebner's students were to take his words to heart and make a place for the production of new discourses and practices within curriculum studies in the universities. That has yet to happen within the common schools.

Solidification

Discourses may also function to provide a basis for group solidarity and collective security. Huebner (1962) pointed out that educators' abandonment of earlier identification symbols – as they moved "hook, line, and sinker into the search for [scientific] truth" (p. 93) – may have loosened their cohesiveness and contributed to the marginalization of a whole body of legitimate, albeit nonscientific, educational knowledge. Huebner (1962, 1966b, 1964/1999i) insisted that curriculum workers must be politically savvy and not shy away from the use of power. One way to do that is to gather around certain symbols and symbol systems. Huebner (1964/1999i) suggested, "To realize that one shares the same beliefs and secrets or knowledge as another may create a bond which facilitates group cohesiveness and consequently increases the effectiveness of political action" (p.99). The notion of action leads to the third function.

Provocation/Constraint

Discourses may both provoke and constrain actions, and Huebner (1962, 1966b, 1964/1999i) recognized this works on multiple levels. Just having a professional group identity can lend credibility to recommendations for courses of action. Even those who do not understand the details of a proposal may be more sympathetic toward it because it comes from a professional group with a research base. But on another level, as Huebner (1964/1999i) points out, those who most skillfully produce discourse have the advantage in provoking action:

> By making available coherent and seemingly meaningful philosophies, theories, impassioned appeals, and criticism, those who control the symbol systems enable teachers to structure classroom action and provide value frameworks against which people outside the classroom assess information originating in the schools. (p. 99)

The implication is that those who favored a behaviorist, economic model for classroom learning had done a better job of producing a coherent and meaningful discourse than curriculum workers. It appears that is still true today. Huebner (1964/1999i) also recognized there is an element of irrationality in the determination of social policy – people are not swayed simply by intellectual arguments – and he suggested there was a need to also "mobilize emotions, feelings, and actions through nondiscursive symbols" (p. 96). This is an approach that, as yet, has not been widely used.

Another level at which provocation and constraint work is the way in which a dominant discourse constrains even what action is thought possible in the classroom. As an example, Huebner (1966b) mentions the limiting discourse of the Tyler Rationale,

which "determines our questions, as well as our answers" (p. 12). While a discourse makes certain actions or practices possible, it also must provide justification for them. That is, it must provide a value base for them.

Valuation

Huebner (1966b) suggested that value tends to remain hidden without the activity of criticism. Therefore he included the concept of criticism as a part of this function. A discourse contains within it a set of expectations – "hypotheses, images, conceptions, myths" (1963, p. 157) which give direction to decision-making. This framework functions to legitimate certain courses of action, to forbid others, and to hide others. Huebner believed (1962/1999c) the teacher's main challenge was to develop and maintain valued action. In "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" (1966a), he considered five discourses that provide value frameworks for making decisions about action. He proposed that two of these discourses were overvalued, that one is always in operation, albeit covertly, and that two were undervalued and should be given more consideration. He believed educational activity would be richer if all five categories were recognized and utilized.

Technical. This was (and is) the dominant curricular ideology in schools, represented by the Tyler Rationale. It operates on a means-ends rationality or what Huebner sometimes called an "economic model" (1966a, p. 14). Objectives are spelled out in curricular terms and activities are designed to produce those ends. The discourse is one of legitimation and control, and evaluation functions as a kind of quality control. While Huebner considered this kind of valuing valid and necessary, he argued that to use

only this one form is "to weaken the educator's power and to pull him out of the mysteriously complex phenomena of human life" (p. 15).

Scientific. Because activity in this discourse has an empirical base, it is valued for the knowledge it produces. While the technical discourse aims to maximize change in students, the scientific aims to maximize the attainment of knowledge for the educator. It is also helpful and necessary, but Huebner (1963) warned of the consequences of its overemphasis:

> The potency of mass communication in shaping the individual's grasp of his world, the deadly efficiency of scientific thought and the consequent desire to internalize only scientific thought, and the relative impotence of art in today's culture point to a tendency to standardize man's way of making sense of his world, and hence to deny the individual the freedom to make his own sense within limits. (pp. 155-56)

To only rely upon scientific thought is to greatly diminish our understanding of the world.

Political. This discourse often operates in curriculum thought more covertly than overtly. It exists because educators are in positions of power and control and because they are responsible to others who have power and control. Therefore, they select educational activities based on the support or respect it brings them. Huebner (1966a) pointed out that this is not inherently bad and that all teachers act in a political manner: "The teacher who claims to be immune is so only because he is in equilibrium with his educational community" (p. 16). It is when power and prestige are sought as ends, rather than as means for positive influence that "evil and immorality may be produced" (p. 16).

Aesthetic. This type of framework is often ignored because it is not highly prized in our society. Huebner (1966a, 1966b, 1966/1970, 1962/1999a) describes aesthetic valuing has having the following dimensions: 1) Psychical distance - the aesthetic object (here, the educational activity) is considered apart from the world of use, with no functional or instrumental significance. It has a beauty of it own and is "the possibility of life, captured and heightened and standing apart from the world of production, consumption, and intent" (1966a, p. 18).

2) Wholeness and design - because it stands outside of the functional world, the educational activity has a totality and unity which can be criticized in terms of balance, harmony, composition, design, integration, and closure. One of the concrete examples Huebner (1962/1999a, 1962/1999c) provided includes the consideration of classroom activities in terms of the use of time. As an alternative to the technical view of goal assigned/minutes to complete, a teacher might think in term of the shape of the "duration" or "rhythm" of the activities (1962/1999a, p. 31; 1962/1999c, p. 69). Several possible rhythms to consider might be "participation-isolation-participation," "challenge-routine" and "tension-resolution-relaxation" (1962/1999c, p. 70).

3) Symbolic meaning - any aesthetic object is symbolic of meaning. It reflects the meanings of the artist as an individual, as well as the meanings of the artist as a member of the human race. The educational activity may also be valued for the meanings it reveals about the educator as an individual and the meanings it reveals about the educator as a representative of the human race. Huebner (1962/1999a) emphasized that children are never the teacher's media for creation, for they are never to be "formed" (p. 32).

Rather, the educator's media are such things as books, charts, maps, displays, and the educator's language and movements.

The form of rationality that accompanies aesthetic valuing carries categories of meaning that are quite different from traditional curriculum rationales. The intent within this rationale is that the teacher creates an aesthetic object – an educational activity – to which the students respond. Likewise, their responses may be critiqued by the teacher as aesthetic objects. Drawing upon the French poet/intellectual Paul Valery, Huebner (1966a) described the execution of the educational activity as a "transition from disorder to order, from the formless to form, or from impurity to purity, accident to necessity, confusion to clarity'" (p. 23). Knowledge, which has beauty in addition to power, can be viewed as the ordering of bits of chaos. Thus, as Huebner explained, "The student seeks to dominate his newfound chaos by his own intelligence, and as a critic the teacher responds with critical concern but sympathetic intent. Classroom activity unfolds in a rhythmic series of events, which symbolizes the meanings of man's temporal existence" (p. 24).

Ethical. Here the value of the educational activity is based on its quality as an encounter between human beings. Unlike the other forms discussed, the goal is not to produce change, discover new knowledge, enhance prestige, or be symbolic of anything else. As the essence of life, the encounter simply "is." The teacher meets the student as one human being to another. This type of valuing inheres in a form of rationality that demands the human situation be uppermost. The educator recognizes that s/he is influencing a fellow human being. This rationale provides the base and the theme for the

whole of Huebner's work of the sixties. Given its importance, I have set it apart as a separate section.

Education as Transcendence

Huebner's antipathy toward learning theory was based on his idea that it interfered with the natural learning process that was inherent in all human beings. As he explained, "Man is a transcendent being, i.e., he has the capacity to transcend what he is to become something he is not. In religious language this is his nature, for he is a creator" (1967, p. 326). Huebner felt the problem was not to explain why humans do not "learn" – that is, respond to conditioning. Instead, the question was what makes a free creature submit to conditioning. He noted,

> This, I believe, is the function of the "learning" category. It attempts to explain man's conditionedness, the patterning of his behavior. By raising questions about learning how to learn or be creative, man is probing the very nature of what it means to be a human being and hence delving into metaphysics and theology. (p. 326)

And so, ironically, Huebner illustrated for scientists the metaphysical nature of their project. They would manipulate students in the same way a chemist would create change through the manipulation of natural elements. But when the results were not predictable and controllable, they were forced back upon the metaphysical question of the nature of human beings.

Huebner (1967) also objected to learning theory because it conceived of education as "doing something to an individual" (p. 327). This, he argued, made the assumption that the individual is separate from the world and develops in such a way as to have power

over it. This was in opposition to Huebner's Heideggerean notion of a person as a "being-in-the-world" (p. 327). Drawing also upon the religious existentialists Martin Buber and Paul Tillich, Huebner (1963) pointed out that humans' relationship with their world as a "subject-object" relationship had been beneficial for the advance of science. However, because humans have approached each other this way, as in learning theory, "Man has become lost in the enterprise" (Tillich quoted in Huebner, 1963, p. 160). The capacity of humans to grow and become had been neglected because of the subject-object mindset. Rather than trying to manipulate students, Huebner believed educators should assist them in their growing and becoming by helping them apprehend their freedom in a responsible way. He suggested educators should keep in mind several factors that serve human beings' transcendence.

Social Interaction

When I encounter the world with a subject-subject attitude, I do not see other individuals as objects to be manipulated or conditioned. I meet them with what Buber called the "I-Thou" relation in contrast to the "I- It" relation (quoted in Huebner, 1963, p. 160). Those I meet are other subjects to be met face-to-face and to be spoken to and listened to. The consequence of these encounters is growth:

> Inherent in each human confrontation is the possibility of growth and transcendence, for as man meets man, he meets the other....The thinking, feeling, and seeing of other...suggests that the world that I think is out there is not the same world that the other thinks is out there. The inherent tension...can be the source of new life and possibility. (Huebner, 1966b, p. 104)

Thus, in a dialectical process the world calls forth new responses from the individual, who in turn calls forth new responses from the world. A human being does shape the world, as in the subject-object relationship; but the world also shapes the human being or, as Huebner (1966b) suggested, the "human becoming" (p. 99).

Because of this human ability to respond to the world, Huebner (1966/1999d) proposed that schools should set an example of being "responsibly responsive" to the world (p. 119). Particularly considering the emphasis of the times upon change and innovation, he felt educators should model a "sense of being aware of one's obligations as an historical being for the continual creation of the world and the sense of being accountable for one's acts" (p. 120). This type of accountability, though, is informed by Arendts' concepts of "promise" and "forgiveness" (quoted in Huebner, 1966b, p. 100). As educators make decisions based on an awareness of the history and destiny of their given situation, they realize they are influencing other human beings. They also realize that a part of man's temporal being is its unpredictability and irreversibility. They must accept the possibility of error, both in the way they influence others and the way others influence them. Huebner (1966b) contrasts the ethical values of promise and forgiveness with the technical values of demand and expectation:

> Forgiveness unties man from the past that he may be free to contribute to new creation....As long as man is finite, promise must be accompanied by the possibility of forgiveness, otherwise only the old, the known, the tried and tested will be evoked. (p. 23)

Huebner's words ring true in classrooms today that labor under the burden of accountability, unaccompanied by the values of promise and forgiveness. Little

opportunity of transcendence exists for teacher and students who must fear taking a chance on trying something new.

Conversation

The second factor that serves the transcendence of human beings is conversation, both with other humans and with their creations. In our encounters with others, we come face to face with those who speak differently, want other things, and have other ways of life. Through conversation we have the opportunity to conceptualize the world differently. Going even beyond that, existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers considered communication to be the "medium for developing selfhood" and a "living community" (quoted. in Huebner, 1963, p. 161). Referring to the turmoil of the sixties, Huebner (1963) emphasized the importance of developing the art of conversation in classrooms. Humans who do not learn to converse eventually resort to other ways of dealing with the Other, ways such as rebellion, resistance, and conflict.

Individuals may also encounter Others through their creations. This includes both artwork and languages. Huebner (1966b) suggested that two major vehicles of transcendence found in language are science and poetry:

> In both, man reaches beyond himself through language. Through both, he contributes to the evolving of others by making new language patterns available. By means of both, he can become aware of what is yet hidden in his world of possibility. (p. 103)

Both science and poetry are "imaginative disciplines" (p. 103) that provide new vantage points from which old problems disappear and new questions may emerge. Huebner (1962/1999a) noted that artwork may provide the same kind of stimulus to the

imagination when "through the art of another a mind is borrowed and the world seen and heard and felt anew" (p. 19). The emphasis on science in schools to the exclusion of the other "languages" such as poetry and art places considerable limitations on students' possibilities for transcendence.

The Capacity for Wonder

Huebner (1966b, 1966/1970, 1962/1999a, 1961/1999e) emphasized our capacity for awe and wonder, which points us to a world beyond our understanding. Although we may experience wonder through art, science, and religion, Huebner (1966b) believed the confrontation of humans with the "non-man made" was its source (p. 105). To have our eyes opened by a new scientific discovery or a new work of art – to see revealed "that which was there all the time" (p. 105) – is awe producing and humbling. At that moment we realize how inadequate our existing modes of behavior and thinking are. Why is it then, that such moments of wonder do not always result in transcendence and growth? Huebner (1966b) believed, "Probably not because man has not learned to respond, but because the world of awe and wonder has been hidden by necessity, technique and truthless language" (p. 105). Teachers may help their students dwell on and wonder at the awe-fullness of the world, but

> To do this the teacher must live with the intricacies, absurdities, and dissonances of life, without seeking to reduce them to neat formulae or maps. The teacher needs what Keats called the quality of '...Negative capability, that is, when man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.' (Huebner, 1962/1999a, p. 24)

Huebner is not suggesting that teachers should cease leading their students into scientific ways of discovery. He is simply saying they should help children understand that not all aspects of life are reducible to formulae and maps. The mysteries of life belong to the domain of art, which can "discover sense and meaning in a world that at times seems senseless and meaningless" (p. 25). Once again, science is only one vehicle to serve our transcendence.

Curriculum Work

Huebner (1964b, 1966b, 1962/1999g) demonstrated a strong effort to be an optimist where the structure of the disciplines approach was concerned. He emphasized that a wide variety of frameworks for thinking was important. Although Huebner (1962/1999g) definitely supported the idea that the disciplines approach was not appropriate for elementary children, his main emphases were that all ways of knowing should be given equal weight and that approaches to learning should aid students in transcending their given worlds. He believed, "The problem faced by teachers is how to teach in such a fashion that children become freer by using knowledge, rather than embedded in new cultural chains" (Huebner, 1962/1999f, p. 39). He felt this called for an appropriate degree of freedom and choice for students, but clarified,

> The content of our curriculum should be the vehicle by which we help the child establish ties to the rest of the world. A curriculum focusing only on the child's interests, on individual needs, is a curriculum which fosters egocentricity and selfishness. A curriculum focusing only on skills, concepts, and understanding is one which fosters estrangement from the world and schizophrenia. (1961/1999e, p. 13)

So although personal freedom was Huebner's theme, it was freedom with responsibility toward the world.

According to Huebner (1966b), the curricularist's role was to promote this freedom by being a "fabricator and designer of educational environments," who seeks a just environment for all students (p. 111). Elsewhere, he phrases this as a responsibility to "design and criticize" environments (1967, p. 329). Because this entails grappling with the major social and intellectual problems of the day, it requires all of our knowledge, skill, and wisdom. Huebner believed, "The educational leader must be aware of the prevailing ideologies and educational debates, and...be prepared to use them as a vehicle in his policy making" (1966/1970, p. 140). Here, like Macdonald, he advocated that curricularists should use the popular trends of the day to accomplish their purposes.

As noted earlier, Huebner did not shy away from advocating that curricularists seek ways to increase their professional power. He advised (1966/1970) that curriculum work was political work, involving both personal and professional risk. Furthermore, Huebner (1966/1999d) proposed,

> Educators have been too willing to limit their visions to what is simply possible, thus constricting the emergence of new possibilities. They have been too eager to please others, rather than venture out into the unknown world of the future. (p. 123)

The political maneuvers that Huebner encouraged, however, were not to be undertaken in the spirit of manipulating others, but in a spirit of conversation and being "responsibly responsive" to the world.

Summary

> Any single source of knowledge is not a carrier of wisdom, just of power and penetration. Only when multiple sources of knowledge are used, and consequently various types of power are available, can decisions be wise and the educational environment viable and responsive. (Huebner, 1966/1970, p. 147)

Huebner's background in science and math, the social sciences, and philosophy qualified him to speak on the danger of restricting our way of looking at the world to only one view. He viewed curriculum as social policy, that is, as the realization in the classroom of the beliefs and desires of those in power. Therefore, he believed curriculum to be explicitly political work. Inspired by his study of Heidegger, he analyzed the way language and other symbol systems are inextricably intertwined with the power issues of curriculum work. Throughout his explications of the power/knowledge connections he urged curriculum workers to be more political by understanding and using the way such connections operate. He encouraged such tactics as the use of symbol systems to create group solidarity, the gaining of credibility through the formation of official professional groups, and the production of coherent and meaningful discourses as a basis for action.

In the area of curriculum design and critique, Huebner strongly advocated the use of a variety of rationales, including the technical and the scientific. But his major emphasis was on the necessity of providing a curriculum that served as a vehicle for personal transcendence, that is, a curriculum that would allow individuals to change and grow as they encountered the world. He believed this kind of work required the curricularist to understand the major social and educational issues of the day and to be able to effectively communicate their implications.

Paul Klohr

> I have always liked as a goal Simone de Beauvoir's view that "one's own life has value so long as one attributes value to the life of others, by means of friendship, indignation and compassion." I have tried, as best I could, in the Whiteheadian sense, "to get hold of the big ideas and put them to work." In the last analysis, this makes me a rather optimistic, "born again" pragmatist. (Klohr, 1994, p. 38)

Klohr's texts of the sixties are well-informed by direct experience in and with K-12 schools. His own experience teaching high school led him to propose a doctoral program for himself at Ohio State University that included work in both elementary and secondary curriculum studies. Klohr (1996) recounts that the graduate student grapevine advised against such a plan, but he felt his experience as a classroom teacher suggested its necessity. Advised by Harold Alberty (secondary) and Laura Zirbes (elementary),[5] Klohr received his Ph.D. in 1948 and took a position with Syracuse University. In the early 1950s, feeling the desire for "direct experience in a real-life system" (Klohr, 1994, p.27), he decided to return to Columbus to serve as the curriculum director for Columbus schools. Two years later he was called to be director of the K-12 lab school at Ohio State. He refers to the ten years he was affiliated with the school as the most exciting years of his professional career (p. 28). When for political and financial reasons the lab school was closed in 1962, he and Alexander Frazier established a new field of graduate studies at Ohio State—Curriculum and Instruction: K-12. Klohr has pointed out, "Until then, there

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[5] Klohr (personal communication, October 23, 1998) actually credits Ralph Mooney and his pioneer work in the implications of phenomenology for educational research as being the greatest influence on his own professional career. Mooney was Klohr's colleague at Ohio State and is known for his work in the area of creativity.

were only such courses in either elementary or secondary departments. We proved that a K-12 perspective better met the needs for adequate theory building and improved practice" (p. 29).

Teaching was not just a career for Klohr. It was, as one of his former students describes it, a "calling" (Bullough, 1996, p. 265). His dedication grew out of a genuine sense of care for his work and his students, not from any attempt to build a "kingdom of self." Bullough notes that Klohr's students were not "groupies," for he would not have them (p. 259). His style was to pose questions, point in the direction of possible answers and spent a great deal of time listening. "He was a teacher, first and foremost. He did not entertain; he was no showman; instead he sought and quietly nurtured talent" (p. 264). One might expect a professor who invested so much into individual students to be selective in which students he would accept. But this was not true of Klohr, who would take any student he felt needed his help.

Klohr also took an active role in the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD), which was founded in 1946, while he was still a graduate student at Ohio State. When the organization made the decision to decentralize in order to better reach local schools, he was working with the national office and began traveling to various states, helping them set up regional affiliates. Klohr (personal communication, October 23, 1998) estimates that he probably invested a third of his time working with ASCD to promote curriculum reform. However, the work was aimed at total curriculum development, which seemed to be at odds with the technical rationale of the structure of the disciplines movement. This created a situation that Pinar (1975) has described as "complicated," "thankless," and "discomforting" (p. xi) for curricularists like Klohr. In

the end, Klohr's dedication to schools and to his own students left him little time for writing of his own, resulting in smaller body of written text than the other scholars in this study. However, Sears (2000) believes Klohr has left another kind of legacy in the lives of his students who possess the common characteristic of "curriculum courage."

The Big Picture

Klohr's texts demonstrate a process consistent with their content. You might say, Klohr practiced what he preached. The ever-present theme in his work is that educators need to step back and look at the big picture, the larger context, of whatever curriculum problem they are considering. His own texts consistently demonstrate this approach. As a result, they provide a picture for us of what curriculum work was like in the sixties in both schools and the academy. An important point to note is that there did not seem to be a boundary between these arenas to Klohr. Curriculum work was about schools. Noting this about his mentor, Pinar (1995) has said, "Paul has disagreed with what he regards as my underinvestment in 'practice.' No doubt his enduring commitment to the schools and to practice has helped keep my drift away from the institution of schooling from being complete" (p. xviii).

Klohr's texts paint the picture of a curriculum field scrambling to gain some sense of its role in a post-Sputnik society. Curriculum workers felt they should be optimistic about the great wealth of new technical and content knowledge available (Klohr, 1965a; 1965b; 1969b) but some, like Klohr, worried about the overall effects of the reform approach. For example, as Klohr (1965b) saw the situation, there was little concern to assess whether the innovations implemented were consistent with one another or that they fostered common purposes. He suggested the structure of the disciplines emphasis

aggravated the piecemeal approach of the reforms, fragmenting the curriculum even further (Klohr, 1969b). In addition, Klohr (1959; 1960; 1965b; 1969b) feared that, due to the climate of the times, change in and of itself had become the value driving many reforms.

Klohr (1965b) felt that some aspects of the reform efforts were of special concern. One of these was the stress put on "bigness and comprehensiveness" (p. 25) as the best way to meet individual needs. He cited Barker and Gump's 1964 study, Big School, Small School, as evidence that bigness and comprehensiveness may not provide the versatility of experience needed to meet individual differences. He then observed presciently:

> More often than not, it seems that the comprehensiveness we have sought to provide for variety leads us down the road to increased standardization in order to cope with the resulting complexity of program. As a consequence, there is a very real danger of overstandardization. (p. 26)

In these days of national standards, state standards, and increasing "accountability," it is possible to see what Klohr meant.

But perhaps even more disconcerting to Klohr was the technological rationale that was being woven into the very warp and woof of educational thought. Drawing from the literary critic, Sypher, Klohr (1969b) spoke of the "'menace of the technological frame of mind'" (p. 97) that assumes the right method will bring us the right results, enabling us to rule out the unexpected and predict human behavior. Although Klohr did not use the Foucauldian terminology, he pointed out that a special cause for concern is due to an aspect of the power/knowledge relations in this situation. This technological frame of

mind can absorb our resistance to it. The technician calculates and provides for our resistance in his program. Thus we may be actually stripped of our choices, believing we are free when we are not. Klohr noted, "In short, the technician dreads surprises. He predicts everything and thereby discovers nothing" (p. 98). He referred to the overemphasis on setting behavioral goals for all learning outcomes as an example of this mindset.

Perhaps due to Klohr's involvement with and commitment to schools, he took special note of the effects of post-Sputnik reforms upon them. He observed educators experiencing increasing pressures from a complex situation in which they were suddenly deluged with more content information than ever before, a new structural approach to using it, and directives from educational psychologists on coping with variations in cognitive styles (1965a). He also noted,

> There is a pervasive tendency for many supervisors and curriculum workers to feel alienated from the educational scene. They frequently act in ways that almost deny their sense of being - personal and professional. Such denial renders individuals powerless and prevents them from tapping their many potentials for knowing and experiencing. In short, individuals in this condition are unable to actualize themselves as leaders. (p. 144)

This passage not only provides a picture for us of conditions in the schools then (and now, some would argue), but it also contrasts Klohr's view of educators with the view of the academic scholars and bureaucrats who had assumed control over curriculum. He saw educators as human beings with the capacity for growth and self-actualization, rather than as line workers in need of direction from experts. Klohr pointed out the almost

anonymous role assigned to teachers by some curriculum reforms, citing "teacher proof" materials as just one illustration (p. 144). In some instances, teaching was "cast in a mechanical, almost paraprofessional role" (Klohr, 1962, p. 93). In a look back at the decade, Klohr (1969a) observed that curriculum directors had been bypassed in curricular decision-making, teachers with special competence in curriculum development had been ignored, and role conflicts regarding instructional leadership in school systems were "widespread" (p. 323).

In an era of such turbulence, Klohr (1965a) advised curriculum specialists to be able to project a clear picture of their unique professional functions as technical supervisors, as analysts, and as leaders. Such a projection was necessary, he believed, if they were to "move ahead on significant problems and issues" (p. 147). They needed to have a clear vision of their role and be able to verbalize it to others in order to effect change. He also suggested that a clear projection of roles affords a kind of "protection" for the instructional leader working as a change agent (p.150). In other words, it was only through the ability to <u>see</u> and <u>say</u> clearly what they were about that they would be able to resist current trends and effect change.

<u>The Need for "More Adequate Conceptual Tools"</u>

In the science-worshipping milieu of the sixties, the search was for better theory, or conceptual frameworks, to guide curriculum development. Although he eschewed the exaltation of science, it was still in these terms that Klohr appealed to curriculum workers to examine curriculum development in its larger context. He recognized the difficulties involved here, however. One was that many supervisors had not had specialized professional preparation. Although extensive efforts had been made in fifties and sixties

to improve the higher education preparation of administrators and guidance counselors, the same was not true of programs for curriculum supervisors (Klohr, 1965a). Also, the problem of understaffing in school districts often meant that curriculum directors were assigned a wide variety responsibilities, leading them to feel they had little time for "armchair theorizing" (Klohr, 1965a, p.145). However, Klohr persisted in pointing to the need for thinking about curricular problems through some type of conceptual framework. In response to those who would prefer to just stick with the "facts," he quoted Benne and his associates:

> "Facts" are always, in truth, observations made within some conceptual framework. Concepts are invented in order to fix a particular slant on reality and to guide in the production of new facts...Common sense is itself a loose collection of conceptual schemas and is the end product of cultural accretions, of folk wisdom, habitual modes of thought and hidden assumptions about human nature. (quoted in Klohr, 1965a, p. 151)

Furthermore, Klohr (1967a) exhorted curriculum workers not to be "lured away from the basic task of studying and theorizing about curriculum phenomena in all of their complexity" (p. 200) as ready-made curriculum innovations flooded the educational market. In keeping with his own "big picture" style, he gleaned evidence of the need for theorizing from the literature of the field: Goodlad's four functions of a conceptual framework demonstrated the need for identifying and classifying major questions to be answered (Klohr, 1962); Cremin called for a "look at curricula in their entirety", and Broudy asserted that "curriculum is more than a collection of subjects," (Klohr, 1967a, p. 200); Foshay suggested the "shape of the curriculum as a whole" should be analyzed in

the same way its various parts had been in the past decade (1969b, p. 92). Klohr himself reasoned that the use of a conceptual framework would be the first step to building a "research base" (1962, p. 96), provide a "perspective for a sense of direction" (1965a, p. 145), and free curriculum workers to lead, once they had "come to terms conceptually, or theoretically, with the a priori matters" (1965a, p. 145). In addition, Klohr pointed out that the only conceptual tools available in the field were those that had evolved from curriculum development efforts from at least twenty years earlier. While he noted the need for historical analysis, he believed "more adequate conceptual tools" were necessary for handling curriculum problems of the times (p. 150).

But like the dedicated teacher he was, Klohr did more than to just encourage curricularists to search for better curriculum theory and show them the need for it. He also provided examples. In a chapter for the 1965 ASCD yearbook, Klohr (1965a) provided a wide variety of possibilities for curriculum theorizing, drawn from the best minds in the field, such as Herrick, Taba, and Macdonald. He also drew on examples of theorizing in other fields, such as that of Parsons and Shils, and pointed toward the possibilities they held for curriculum theorizing. Demonstrating the usefulness of the "propositional inventory," he reported on work done by Klohr and Lawhead in an analysis of most of the major publications of the field for 1963 and 1964 (Klohr, 1965a, p. 156-57). While Klohr noted that their project did not claim to have identified the most significant propositions in the field, he did believe it provided a useful conceptual tool. It also demonstrated, once again, the depth of his commitment to the big picture. In the same chapter, Klohr emphasized another theme of his work of the sixties, the need for openness to new experiences and new ways of thinking (1965a, 1967a, 1969a, 1969b).

Other Ways of Knowing

Klohr's work at Ohio State with Mooney and his study of philosophers such as Michel Polanyi had convinced him of the possibility, indeed the necessity, of other ways of knowing besides science and/or "common sense," as per the definition of Benne, and associates, had described it. Drawing on the work of Mooney, Macdonald, and Frazier, he stressed the need for leaders to question their accustomed ways of looking at the world and to cultivate an openness to new experiences. From Mooney's work on creativity, he wrote of the

> willingness to understand what is going on in oneself and...a desire to get out on the edges of conscious realization and to feel a way into the unknown, an interest in new ideas and fresh perspectives, a spirit of play and experimentation. (Mooney quoted in Klohr, 1965a, pp. 159-60).

He conceded that this type of leadership called for "a deep commitment, with the inevitable risk that goes with it," but emphasized its possibilities for cultivating "oneself as an instrument of inquiry" (p. 161).

Perhaps this reaching for new modes of thinking was spurred on by Klohr's frustration with the inadequacy of science to deal with curricular questions. As a member of the ASCD Commission on Curriculum Theory, Klohr participated in 1965 in a seminar on curriculum theory. No consensus was reached regarding the nature of curriculum theory. However a similar ASCD commission on instructional theory did meet about the same time and agreed on a scientific base for theory development in instruction. Two years later, Klohr chaired the Ohio State University Curriculum Theory Conference, which he described as an effort to bring in an alternative direction in theorizing (personal

communication, October 23, 1998). In his published remarks, "Problems in Curriculum Theory Development," Klohr (1967a) called for theory-building to support an approach toward overall design, rather than piecemeal development of parts of a program. Searching for a set of criteria to judge the adequacy of theory, he cited the work of the Instructional Theory Commission:

> An example of a good set of criteria is that developed by Gordon and ASCD Instructional Theory Commission, who define theory as a set of statements based on sound replicable research, which would permit one to predict how particular changes in the educational environment would affect learning....In effect, these criteria reflect a rigorous, scientific approach. (p. 201)

However, having diplomatically commended the commission's definition of theory for instruction, Klohr moved on to declare its scientific nature "too limited" for the preactive realm of curriculum design. Similarly, with regard to the formulation of goals, Klohr pronounced the Instructional Theory Commission's measurement-based criteria to be irrelevant to curriculum events in the planned realm. Instead, citing Gross and Biderman on social change, he pointed out:

> in the name of rigor, we may rule out certain kinds of data in the indicators we develop and in the conceptual schemes we design to obtain the indicators....the availability of a simple indicator, although highly rigorous in term of meeting certain criteria, might 'smother' out more complex information. (1967a, p. 202)

Foreshadowing further concerns of contemporary curriculum theorists and demonstrating again his person-centered approach, Klohr also problematized typical research operations of the time which cast students as subjects, rather than clients. He

ended by acknowledging that the problems discussed are clearly related to the matter of values, which will also have to be dealt with by curriculum theorists.

Two years later, Klohr (1969b) elaborated on the limitations of scientific thinking for curriculum work. He maintained that, in order to be useful, discussion of curriculum design would have to reflect what "would be seen as compromises by those who equate sound theory with instrument-mediated measuring operations" (p. 94). He specified three points:

> a) that we are willing to recognize that undefined, primitive entities will precede the formulation of curriculum design data language,
>
> b) that data language terms will have reference to both logical and empirical procedures instead of solely to empirical referents;
>
> and c) that there must be some kind of prejudgment to guide our choice of the logico-empirical operations of what kinds of entities are most likely to exhibit orderly relations among curriculum design phenomena. (p. 95)

Klohr suggested the work of Glaser and Strauss in grounded theory as a picture of the way this type of theorizing might look.[6]

But even more significantly, Klohr (1969b) put forth an example of his own, a model that he suggested might be used as an overlay for analyses of curriculum design proposals. In it, he proposed that curriculum be visualized as having two separate, but interrelated, dimensions: "energizing and integrating" (p. 99). The model is based on an ecological view, in which the student is seen "as a creator engaged in continuous

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[6] This type of theorizing maintains the primacy of the generation of theory, rather than its verification.

transaction with his environment" (p. 102). With the student in the center, processing his/her own experience, transactions involve the processes of openness (energizing) and centering (integration). Once again, Klohr's humanistic approach was evident as he chose to put the learner in the center, processing his own experience, rather than being acted upon, as in behaviorism. Drawing from the work of poet John Ciardi, Klohr concluded by asking whether the question for curriculum design might be the same as that for a poem. Not what does it mean, but how does a curriculum design go about being a performance of itself: "How does a curriculum mean?" (p. 104).

Summary

> Transcendence gives others as well as ourselves a vision of social alternatives and the courage to undertake change....One is not required to choose between theory-building at the metatheoretical level...and theory building that might be characterized as middle range in the development realm. Both levels are crucial if the field of curriculum is to be reconceptualized and if the inevitable relationship to social-political action is to be more fully realized. (Klohr, 1974, p. 170)

Klohr's texts from the sixties reveal a decade of prompting, prodding, and persuading curriculum workers to produce better curriculum theory or – as he variously expressed it - to look at the larger context, develop more adequate conceptual tools, or create a framework for thinking. But his goal was always to improve the total curriculum in schools for the benefit of both students and educators. His search for more helpful curriculum theory led him to study cutting edge work in the social sciences and philosophy, especially the implications of phenomenology for educational research. He committed himself to ensuring that other curricularists understood the implications of such scholarship and also to distributing information on the best scholarship in the

curriculum field. He promoted such work through university-sponsored conferences and through the only national curriculum organization at the time, ASCD.

Klohr's texts project a picture of the sixties as a time of adjustment for all curriculum workers. Having been relieved of their responsibilities in schools, they found themselves standing on the sidelines of curriculum development. Klohr's advice was that they take the opportunity to back off and analyze the implications of what was happening, something the academic scholars and bureaucrats were either unwilling or unable to do. Certainly their distance from the public schools left them less qualified for that job than curricularists who had been working in the schools. It is obvious now that the next generation of curricularists took Klohr's advice on backing off seriously; perhaps, he might say, a little too seriously.

All in all, Klohr spent less time writing about curriculum work and more time living it. This look at his "text" of the sixties suggests that curriculum is about an openness to new ways of understanding, commitment to schools and the people in them, and a dedication to leadership that dares to risk personal and professional status.

Maxine Greene

> We may be like observers in the chamber of a camera obscura, watching the lens at one end cast an image on the screen at the other.... This does not mean that the projected images are more "real" than what is out there in the sun. It simply means that we can see in new ways in the darkness – and that the outside world may never be quite the same again.
> (Greene, 1965a, p. 8)

Greene is the only scholar in this study who was not specifically a curricularist. In fact, she distanced herself from the reconceptualist movement when it appeared some

might make a "guru" of her (Ayers, 1998, p. 8; Miller, 1996). However, her impact upon the work of key figures in the reconceptualization is well documented (Benham, 1981; Huber, 1981; Marshall, et al., 2000; Mazza, 1982; Miller, 1977, 1996). While she is well-known as a philosopher of education, with the distinction of being one of the few women presidents of the Philosophy of Education Society, that seems almost too narrow of a designation for her. Ayers (1998) has said, "She embodies relationship, connectedness, attentiveness, aliveness to possibility, engagement with complexities – her own life project of citizen philosopher, activist, teacher" (p. 8).

After receiving her Ph. D. from New York University in the mid-fifties, Greene taught history and philosophy of education and literature courses at NYU and Montclair State College in New Jersey. In 1962, she took a position at Brooklyn College in the Department of Educational Foundations. In 1966, she went to Teachers College of Columbia University to edit the Teachers College Record and teach in the English and the social sciences departments. She was quite "poignant" about not being hired in the philosophy department, especially since she was about to be installed as president of the Philosophy of Education society (Greene, 1998, p. 165). But they had never hired a woman in the Philosophy and Social Sciences before so, at Lawrence Cremin's request, she accepted a position in English and taught in both departments until they would hire her in "the right department" (p. 165). She had experienced discrimination early in life due to her Jewish ethnicity and also later on for her political activism and existentialist brand of philosophy. For that reason, she admits there were times when she did not immediately recognize when gender was an issue.

The Times – They Are A'Changin'

> This is a generation highly sensitized to the broken promises, sharply aware of the fact that the Enlightenment faith in intelligence and the benefactions of science has been exposed. (Greene, 1969c, p. 120)

As a native New Yorker, activist, and humanities scholar, Greene provides another perspective for us of events of the sixties. Her texts are liberally sprinkled with reminders of the ambience of a time marked by "alienation, faithlessness, and distrust" (1968a, p. 62). It was the decade of Howl magazine, love-beads, campus riots, and consciousness-raising. The assassination of a president, the murder of civil rights workers, the horrors of war, the draft, deception by government officials – all of these contributed to a situation that would make "those in search of a stable framework, a sustaining cosmos, sometimes lose their nerve" (1965b, p. 418).

For teachers also, the times were changing. They faced "apathy and withdrawal in their classrooms" (Greene, 1967a, p. 16). In spite of the fact that behaviorism provided more theory than ever before about teaching and learning, teachers had fewer guarantees than ever. They could no longer motivate disinterested students with the promise of financial success nor could they motivate idealistic ones with inspirational lectures. Students calling for "free expression of feeling and sensuality" proclaimed, "Do your own thing" as the rule, and considered education "a mode of exploitation, a means of processing [them] in accord with culture's demands" (Greene, 1969a, p. 433).

On another front, teachers were pressed by technocrats to relinquish control of curriculum making. Rather than considering requirements of individual children, they were expected to plan their curricula via national policy considerations, administer "countless tests," and classify students "in ever more elaborate categories" (Greene,

1967a, p. 16). As Macdonald (1966d) and Huebner (1963) had pointed out, this classification had little to do with treating the student as an individual of worth and dignity, as in Buber's I-Thou relationship. This was a demonstration of the I-It relationship, in which the student was treated as an object to be sorted and efficiently processed.

Greene (1965a) observed that a fundamental reorientation had transpired concerning the goal of education:

> It is as if now, after the concentration camps, Hiroshima, Sputnik and the rest, after the cumulative attacks on the school, educators have experienced a confrontation.... To know has come to mean to be familiar with cognitive forms. To be has come to be identified with inwardness. (p. 164)

Greene consistently pointed to two major reasons for the educational problems that emerged during this reorientation. Those reasons, which are related, are 1) a basic contradiction between the view of human nature espoused in educational policy and the view emerging in society and 2) an insistence that science and the language of science were the only acceptable discourses of reality.

What View of Humanity?

According to Greene (1962, 1965a), the American common school was founded upon Enlightenment values. This included a belief in the worth of the individual, who was "naturally good and rational" (1962, p.84), and thereby equipped to participate responsibly in social and political life. However, this view had been based upon the Newtonian notion of an orderly, mechanical universe in which God-given natural laws were considered equivalent to mathematical principles. The rational individual was

presumed to be specifically equipped to know those laws. Among them were laws that sanctioned human liberty, human dignity, and human rights – it followed naturally that individuals could be certain of their worth.

Greene (1962) proposed that such a view was "archaic" (p. 84). To base our educational principles upon them "may have been appropriate when one could say 'the heart of the American value system is faith in and respect for the common man.'; or the 'avowed democratic standard is allegiance to the supreme worth of human personality'" (p. 81). However, she maintained there was evidence those statements no longer reflected the norms of American society. As such, she cited reports of cynicism among American prisoners of the Korean War, the alienation of the youth culture, and artistic representations of the "unheroic hero" (p. 81). In addition, she noted that World War II had shattered our country's great confidence that "intelligence could create a lasting, human order to serve all of mankind" (1965a, p. 162). Thus, our educational system was founded upon an image of human nature that was no longer operative in our culture.

Science as Reality

A second problem highlighted by Greene (1960, 1963, 1965b, 1968b) was the limitation of "reality" to the universe described by the sciences. With the declaration that "God is dead" (Nietzsche quoted in Green, 1965b, p. 416), people turned to science to discover Truth. However, not only was the language of modern science highly specialized, it was becoming increasingly mathematical and abstract. The result: "What is called 'reality' has become unnameable, unspeakable" (1968b, p. 17). The masses had no constructs such as Dante's three-tiered universe or the Newtonian cosmic schema about which to order their understanding of reality. Lacking visualizable models and constructs

with affective significance, people were more susceptible to feelings of despair and alienation.

While Greene did not disparage scientific discourse, she did insist upon recognizing that it was only one way, among many, to reveal reality. Citing Cassirer's "varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human experience" (quoted in Greene, 1960, p. 56), she proposed there are several ways of seeing and thinking, each one with its appropriate symbol form. It was necessary to recognize this, in order to understand the urgency of people's questions that could not be answered by science, questions of an existential nature. Such questions, she felt, may even lie unrecognized by those who lack a symbol form to help them emerge. In addition, Greene suggested there are two kinds of experience available to us: "that which can be systematically known and that which can be freely and spontaneously apprehended" (p. 60).

A Different Vision

Drawing upon existential philosophy and her literary background, Greene sculpted a quite different approach to education than did the behaviorists and bureaucrats. She insisted the arts were needed in addition to science, so that students might experience "full reality" (Greene, 1960, p. 59). Unlike science, art allows for "chance, novelty, and inspiration" (1961, p. 168), which are as much a part of our lives as scientific concepts. While she conceded that art is always a subjective rendering of the artist's particular world, she maintained that it is a mode of "transmuting some of the stuff of human experience into symbolic and expressive form" (1967b, p. 274-75). Appealing as it does

to the senses and the feelings, as well as the mind, art is a message which cannot be paraphrased, a "message about the human condition" (p. 275).

Through this ability to communicate affectively, as well as cognitively, art increases a student's range of understanding. Greene (1960) explained:

> My point is that resources of feeling, imagination, impulse and memory may be utilized in cognition if the emotive, distinguished but not divorced from the descriptive, is allowed to complement literal meanings, if it is ascribed a creative power to help in ordering the world. (p. 59)

Speaking to the noncognitive, art can begin to heal modern humanity's alienation and despair. The structures inherent in poetry and painting may create pathways for response to the human longing for order and sense.

In addition, as a different way of "seeing" reality, a work of art may shock students into self-confrontation, causing them to break with "the comfortable, habitual ways of seeing and thinking" (Greene, 1968b, p. 15). As they are able to distance their own experience, they may find the unrecognized questions surfacing. Or they may find the material of their own consciousness formed in a new way, so they are in some way "remade" (p. 16). What students learn may not be stateable as learning outcomes and operationalized, but they are enabled to see differently than before.

Thus, Greene proposed art could be a way for students to conceive a "plan of living" (1967b, p. 276) against the backdrop of meaninglessness that modern society was projecting. And this, she noted, may be the most significant thing that teachers can help students achieve. Schools may have an aggregating function, providing a kind of common vision. But for Green (1967a), teaching is to focus on students' "manifold possibilities,"

rather than upon what is "common to all" (p. 44). "We have discovered," she wrote, "that to teach is not, by definition, to impose a code or a way of life – that it can be a process of enabling students to learn" (1965a, p. 81). This does not require a commitment to the abstract "mankind" of the Enlightenment viewpoint – "'Mankind' means little to me," Greene wrote, "because it says nothing about men in their diversity and complexity," (1969b, p. 264). It requires a view of humanity more suited to the era in which we live. And this view, Greene proposed, was that of the "concrete, developing, ambivalent person in his unique potentiality" (1962, p. 87).

Thus Greene's existential vision for education emphasized the use of the arts and sciences to develop the potential of students who are unique individuals learning to act, to choose, to value. As her book The Public School and the Private Vision (1965a) makes clear, she well-understood the dreams that inspired the common school movement, and she did not disparage those dreams. Symbolically the book ends with the reader attaining a dual vision: one through the eyes of the individual, Nick Carraway, narrator of The Great Gatsby; the other through "magnified, bespectacled gaze" of Doctor Eckleburg's likeness, brooding from a billboard over the Valley of Ashes (p. 166). The broad vision is complemented by that of the individual, giving us greater understanding of our being-in-the-world.

Greene was, however, quite dismayed about educational trends of the sixties. In her presidential address to the Philosophy of Education society in 1967, she expressed concern that the notion of education as social control might be tightening its grip on the institution of American education:

> The conception of education espoused by most informed educators may soon be unable to exert even a countervailing influence. By that I mean the view of education as a process of personal development or growth....to the end of learning how to make authentic and effective choices in a highly organized, increasingly differentiated world. (1967c, p. 141-42)

This situation was being precipitated by the use of claims such as national security and economic productivity to justify most educational decisions. Green felt that more than ever before, schooling was being linked to socioeconomic, military, and political ends.

Her emphatic response was that educators ought to be political, that their role was to critique what was happening. This was not with the expectation that such critique would assuredly "solve the complex problems of educational policy-making," but that it might "help explicate and disclose what is happening at the seats of power when power plays upon the schools" (1967c, p. 144). As an educational historian, Greene was well aware of the role that skillful explication had played in the history of the public schools. In The Public School and the Private Vision she had detailed the effectiveness of McGuffey and Mann, who were able to make themselves heard because they "spoke a language familiar to thousands" (1965a, p. 56). In the midst of the post-Sputnik educational reforms, Maxine Greene took the stance that educators ought to subject educational policy to severe critiques. She concluded her presidential address, "There are times when anger is necessary, rage, what Wallace Stevens once called the 'rage for order' – for order, rationality, and truth. I think this is one of those times" (1967c, p. 160).

Summary

> I believe in pluralism and human possibility, as I believe in freedom. I want to see human beings become aware of themselves in their innerness and choose themselves continuously in the midst of tension, strain, and change. I hope to see more and more persons appropriate from the swelling store of knowledge those concepts which will enable them to widen their perspective on the world. (Greene, 1967c, p. 160)

As a philosopher and humanities scholar, Greene produced an account of the sixties that foregrounds elements ignored by technocratic discourses of the times. Politicians, business leaders, and academic scholars focused on the creation and maintenance of educational practices that would efficiently draw schooling into the service of national goals. In contrast, Greene wrote of the struggles of the individual person who sought some kind of perspective in an era of rapid change, characterized by cultural manifestations of alienation and disillusionment. It was not that she disapproved of the focus on national goals. Rather, it was the strength of the current pulling that direction that concerned her.

The discourses of the technocrats drew mainly from the sciences and provided little of substance for the masses. In addition, Greene felt an important part of "reality" was neglected by the exclusive use of those discourses. She proposed the arts, especially literature, as another type of symbol form that could open up vital new realities for individuals. Moreover, artistic symbol forms tap into the affective realm, enhancing operation of the cognitive. In effect, such discourses would provide a mode of resistance to the prevailing forces of the times, countering both the loss of personal freedom and the existential sense of despair that seemed so prevalent. As an educational leader, Greene

took seriously her responsibility to resist such forces and she exhorted other educators to take up their own responsibilities in that area.

Conclusion

> It is doubtful that any other major social institution in America has received as much concerted social pressure for change as education has during the past fifteen years. Further, it is doubtful that directed changes in the operations within an institution have ever been as great over so short a time span as those which have taken place in the field of education in recent years. (Macdonald, 1964b, p. 59)

The texts in this study paint a picture of scholars in the sixties who were trying to coach schools in a curriculum reform game in which the rules had suddenly changed. Not only that, so had the owners and the major players. In fact, as the decade wore on, it was clear that the entire ball game had moved to a different park, leaving some curricularists looking "for something to do" (Schwab, 1983, p. 239). In the interpretation of this transition through the texts of this study, certain themes have emerged. Expressed within the framework of Foucault's power/knowledge nexus, I present these themes below.

What Was It Possible To See and Say?

These curricularists' breadth of cutting-edge scholarship made it possible for them to glimpse the role that discourse plays in creating reality. Although their greatest influence was undoubtedly existentialism, the sources they drew from included analytic and continental philosophers (e.g., Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Buber), philosophers of science (Kuhn, Bronowski, Polanyi), social theorists (Parsons, Marcuse), psychologists (Rogers, Maslow, Bloom), and anthropologists (Hall, Sapir). At mid-century all of these fields were at least beginning to explore the nature of the language/"reality" connection

(Bernstein, 1976). In addition, they drew from literature and the arts. The use of these sources broadened their scope of understanding concerning both what was happening in the field and possible directions for the future. They also showed a familiarity with the mainstream literature in all areas of education, including administration, educational psychology, and evaluation,[7] not just curriculum or a subset of it. While they did not agree with what was happening in the mainstream, they were familiar with it and attempted to work through that discourse also, as we see, for example, in Macdonald's use of action theory (1962).

Much of the work of these scholars is a critique of the dominant discourses of science (particularly behaviorism) and technorationality (as manifested in the dogmatic interpretation of Tyler's four steps). However, they were not objecting to the use of these discourses so much as they were the use of them to the exclusion of any other discourses. Drawing from phenomenology, which was beginning at mid-century to find its way into the American social sciences through the work of Alfred Schutz (Bubner, 1984), these scholars proposed other ways of knowing besides the scientific way. They recognized that science, like any way of knowing, both discovers and conceals. As Husserl described the great scientific "discoveries" throughout history: "All this is discovery-concealment, and to the present day we accept it as straightforward truth" (quoted in Bernstein, 1976, p. 128).

[7]As is evident from this study, these fields have expanded since the sixties, while curriculum – as connected with schools – has ebbed (Bruner, 1960; Klohr, 1965a; Lagemann, 1997).

Drawing from the most recent scholarship of the era, the curricularists in this study postulated multiple ways of seeing and thinking, "each one carving out an appropriate symbol form" (Greene, 1960, p. 56). The use of one or two symbol forms greatly limits our ability to see and understand our life-world. As Huebner (1966/1970) noted, the use of only one source of knowledge is not a carrier of wisdom, but of power. Multiple sources are needed for making wise decisions. These curricularists also objected to the exclusive use of science and technorationality because of their reductionism. Scientific thinking seeks to explain, to reduce the complexity of life. It was this feature, Caputo (1987) says, against which Heidegger's Being and Time "irrupted with a fury" (p. 1). It is also this feature that threatens to create Marcuse's "One-Dimensional Man" (Macdonald, 1967, p. 167).

These scholars also objected to the assumption of behaviorism and technorationality that individuals were simply affected by outside influences and could be trained like Pavlov's dogs. Their view of human nature was drawn from humanistic psychology and from existentialism – although they did not necessarily embrace the completely autonomous individual of the early Sartre (Matthews, 1996; Morris, 1998). By their view, individuals are in a transactional relationship with the environment and possess a self-actualizing and creative capability not limited solely by biology or conditioning. Therefore, they sought a more person-centered curriculum. No doubt there are those who consider this solipsistic. They may protest that if there is one thing we do not need more of in schools, it is self-centeredness. In regard to the humanistic approach of Carl Rogers, Postman (1993) has objected: "The culture is already so heavy with the burden of the glorification of self that it would be redundant to have schools stress it" (p.

187). But the discourse put forth by Greene, Huebner, Klohr and Macdonald is not a plea for more emphasis on self. Rather is for an "educative environment" (Huebner, 1966b, p. 94) that assumes an I-Thou relationship among educators and students, rather than the I-It relationship of behaviorism and technorationality. Macdonald (1966d) explicitly rejected the equation of freedom with permissiveness.

In addition to multiple modes of seeing, the scholars in this study also promoted multiple perspectives. That is, they believed in the importance of both micro and macro issues of curriculum. Macdonald (1966d) and Huebner (1966b) explicitly defined curriculum as an environment. Macdonald's definition illustrates the macro and micro perspectives: Curriculum is the "contrived environment and its directed influence upon the person in the schools" (1966d, p. 40). The "contrived environment" refers to anything that would influence life within schools. The assumption was made in these texts that curriculum was social policy; therefore any powerful force within society had the possibility (and probability) of affecting the curriculum. The second part of the definition – "its directed influence upon the person in the schools" focused on the concrete, lived experiences of students and educators in schools. Most of these texts explicitly demonstrated that concern, also. The theme of the total curriculum, as opposed to piecemeal reform within the disciplines, was one of these concerns. This was a project of curricularists in the years before the Sputnik crisis, but has not been seriously addressed since prior to the structure of the disciplines movement.[8]

[8] Klohr (personal communication, October 23, 1998) notes Ted Sizer's Essential Schools Coalition and the Getty Transforming Education Through the Arts Challenge as two current efforts in this direction.

In summary, then, these scholars were able to "see" curriculum work through the expert knowledge of the day, most notably behaviorism and technorationality. However, due to their familiarity with scholarship in phenomenology, existentialism, current social theory, and humanistic psychology, they were able to also see curriculum in other ways and to "say" or express curriculum work in new discourses. The alternative discourses they created were rejected by the mainstream educational establishment. However, the existence of a reconceptualized curriculum field today suggests that their discourse found spaces within which to work. The next section will address that issue.

What Powers Were They Confronting? What Was Their Capacity for Resistance?

The powers of efficiency and control worked with/in the scientific and technorational discourses of the decade. The source of such powers is too grand a project for consideration here, but it is clear that historians believe the panic inspired by Sputnik contributed greatly to the acceptance of these discourses as "common sense." The practices working with/in these discourses included much sorting and classifying of both subject matter and students.

Foucault (1975/1995) believes resistance is possible, but the results of such efforts are not predictable. In this case, it does not appear that these curricularists expected their resistance to create a gap between their work and work in schools. Their texts are clear that the focus of their concern is the everyday life of schools. Whether or not they expected their resistance in the sixties to contribute to a reconceptualization and the fragmented field of today is not possible to tell. However, they understood that resistance always entails risk, which was frequently mentioned in their texts.

These scholars understood that to resist meant skillful use of discourse. Their efforts to create alternative discourses created new categories through which others could think about curriculum work. This is obvious since many curriculum workers in the last thirty years have chosen not to worship the "idols of the laboratory" (Langer quoted in Huebner, 1967, p. 324). In addition, these scholars were skillful at using mainstream discourses, which may have helped them be heard – and published – to the extent that they were. As Huebner noted, "The man who tries to shape society beyond its limits of tolerance is out of tune with his society" (1967, p. 330). Perhaps more than any of the others, Huebner wrote about the skillful use of power. He suggested strategies such as the creation of discourses to promote group solidarity, the gaining of credibility through professional groups and the production of coherent and meaningful discourses as a basis for action. The emergence of the reconceptualist movement has demonstrated the skillful use of the first two of those suggestions.

Greene also practiced resistance and demonstrated an understanding of it. One explicit instance was her presidential address to the Philosophy of Education Society (1967c), in which she called for educational leaders to be involved in politics. In her book The Public School and the Private Vision, she attributed Horace Mann's successes to the fact that, like other successful education reformers he possessed an awareness of what the people he addressed were thinking. She also included an interesting instance of resistance by Kirkegaard in her edited collection, Existential Encounters for Teachers:

> I let that be...printed in the newspaper...because it seemed to me important to get attention provokingly fixed upon that point, which is something one does not accomplish by ten books.... But any one who desires to accomplish anything must

know the age in which he lives and then have courage to encounter the danger of employing the surest means. (Kierkegaard quoted in Greene, 1967a, p. 25)

These scholars also resisted by using the structures that were in place in that era. Klohr and Macdonald were both active in ASCD and, while Klohr (personal communication, October 23, 1998) is disappointed with the results of their efforts there, it may have been networks created in that organization that led to the other structures of resistance, such as the AERA SIG on Creation and Utilization of Curriculum Knowledge, created in the early seventies by Edmond Short, assisted by Klohr (Short, Willis, & Schubert, 1985). The 1967 Ohio State Curriculum Conference is another example of using existing structures and practices. The results were published in a special edition of Theory into Practice, a journal published at Ohio State University.

In summary, these scholars resisted the structures of the discipline movement and the scientific/technical discourses of the day through skillful use of mainstream and alternative discourses. They also used existing institutions and publications. Preliminary results of these efforts became visible by the early seventies with the ASCD split, the creation of the AERA SIG, and the meeting of the first reconceptualist conference in Rochester (Pinar, et al., 1995).

What New Subjectivity for the Field of Curriculum?

In the interplay between power and knowledge, what new subjectivity could these scholars bear witness to? It seems evident that they saw themselves faced with a much smaller role in curriculum development in the schools. This situation not only inspired them to step back and look at the big picture, it also necessitated it. Therefore, due to these circumstances and the hegemony of science in American society, these scholars

began to see themselves more clearly as curriculum theorists. This was not a new thought. The adviser of Huebner and Macdonald, Virgil Herrick, had co-sponsored an important curriculum theory conference in 1947. But having been relieved of the job of curriculum development, curricularists turned to theorizing as a top priority.

In doing so, they dedicated much of their work to the creation of new categories for curriculum thought. They remained focused on the public schools, but the consideration of curriculum as "environment," widened their arena of concern. Perhaps more than ever before, it became necessary for curricularists to be aware of "general ideas and developments in such areas as psychology, sociology, anthropology, biology, philosophy, and theology; knowledge of the historical and contemporary developments and theories in curriculum" (Macdonald, 1967, p. 169).

With the Sputnik crisis, the notion of curriculum as social control tightened its grip on the public schools. These four scholars saw the inherent dangers in such an approach to education and sought to work against those dangers: Not by separating education from its role in the national welfare, but by providing discourses and suggesting structures for both understanding and working against those dangers. Partly due to the pressures around them, the work of curriculum scholars was becoming much more political. Along with this came risk, a notion they acknowledged and a responsibility they accepted. To do the task these scholars set for themselves would take "curriculum courage" (Sears, 2000).

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

> The text brings a subject matter into language, but that it does so is ultimately the achievement of the interpreter. Both have a share in it. Hence, the meaning of a text is not to be compared with an immovably and obstinately fixed point of view that suggests only one question to the person trying to understand it.... The interpreter's own thoughts have gone into re-awakening the text's meaning. (Gadamer, 1960/1997, p. 388)

This inquiry has been an attempt to better understand the present curriculum field through an exploration of works by scholars who are credited with inspiring the reconceptualization of curriculum studies. Although the selection of these scholars was based on their documented impact upon major reconceptualist figures (Beyer & Apple, 1998; Giroux cited in Marshall, et al., 2000; Miller, 1996; Pinar, et al., 1995; Sears, 1992), it cannot be said they are the only scholars whose work had an impact. However, studies such as this must be limited, and in a search of the literature the names of these four appeared most often. Naturally, if the configuration of scholars had been changed in any way, some difference may have been seen in the interpretation.

Gadamer (1960/1997) maintains that no absolutely objective interpretation can be achieved because as readers we are embedded in traditions carried in our language that influence our attempts at understanding. Therefore, this study has not attempted to present what these four scholars really meant by their texts. Rather, as Gadamer describes the process, I have brought my particular questions to the text and, in the dialogical process, have sought a new and broader understanding. That understanding was presented in chapter four. Because this inquiry has been an attempt to better understand today's

field through an exploration of its past, I present my reflections on that topic in this chapter.

An Historical Irruption

During the sixties, the academic field of curriculum underwent a major shift. In Foucauldian terms, it could be said that the expert knowledge of the field of academe became separate from the expert knowledge of the common school curriculum. Prior to the sixties, curriculum as an "institution" defined academic curriculum workers as experts who were qualified to speak about curriculum in the common schools. However, a disruption occurred of the power relations that had once made that possible. Since the seventies, the work of reconceptualized curriculum studies has been accused of being irrelevant to the everyday experiences of school children (Hlebowitsch, 1997; Molnar, 1992; Sears, 1992; Wraga, 1999b). The fact that these charges come from inside the field may mean they are a case of curriculum egos; nevertheless, the fact that such a charge can be made – and appear as the lead article in Educational Researcher (Wraga, 1999b) – seems to be cause for concern.

While we hear little these days about the "structure of the disciplines," the fragmentation of the curriculum remains. Curriculum is in the hands of the bureaucrats and subject specialists, although perhaps more completely in the hands of the marketplace, as teachers accept textbook and prepackaged materials as "the curriculum." States adopt core curricula and national commissions set standards in subject areas, which are then incorporated into materials that are marketed to schools. Postman (1993) comments,

> The curriculum remains a hodgepodge of subjects, without an explicit moral, social, or intellectual center: No one provides a clear vision of what constitutes an educated person, unless it is a person who possesses 'skills.' In other words, a technocrat's ideal – a person with no commitment and no point of view but with plenty of marketable skills. (p. 186)

It appears we have conceded schooling in America to the "accidental curriculum" (Macdonald, 1969a, p. 38).

Since the sixties, the expert knowledge of the common school curriculum has, to a great degree, developed separately from the expert knowledge of the academic curriculum field. School reform movements developed a discourse and structures of standards, accountability and assessment. The academic "reform movement" -- the reconceptualization -- developed a discourse of a variety of macro and micro analyses of sociocultural phenomena that influence school curriculum.

The fact that curriculum development was taken out of the hands of curriculum specialists after Sputnik was undoubtedly one of the major influences in effecting this divergence. Astute curriculum specialists were left to justify the notion that proper curriculum work could not be done without the understanding that it was much more than just the development of a scoped and sequenced content to be passed on to students. Curriculum specialists began responding to the need to examine assumptions behind curriculum work. They had to make visible the nature of curriculum – that it was more than just neutral subject matter. It was as Macdonald (1966d) called it, a "cultural heritage" (p. 42), that carried the values and assumptions of our culture, and its enactment had great implications for both our society and for individual students.

The structures that developed, however, demonstrate clearly the inscription of the field within the power/knowledge apparatus of the modern age. Although the focus of a multitude of reconceptualized curriculum discourses has been the common school curriculum, the structures that have developed with/in these discourses have almost exclusively furthered the goals of the 20th century technorational mindset they protest.

Inscription

> It would be a tragic mistake to sever the head of the educational establishment from the body under the mistaken notion that the hands and feet would be freer, or the heart would become more functional in the process. (Macdonald, 1965b, p. 617)

In work produced during the seventies, Macdonald (1995) identified three characteristics of modern consciousness that we may use to demonstrate what has stifled academic curricularists' ability to influence the world of schools. The first characteristic, technological production, is defined by Macdonald as the "knowledge and skills we produce" (1995, p. 115). These are mirrored in our work. By this definition, in the academy technological production would manifest itself partially through conference presentations and publications. In this regard, the curriculum field seems to be doing well. Marshall (1999) notes that prior to 1968 most curriculum literature could be found in ASCD publications, such as Educational Leadership, School Review and Interchange. However, since that time, no less than five more refereed curriculum journals have begun publication, including JCT, Journal of Curriculum Studies, Curriculum Inquiry, Journal of Curriculum & Supervision, and Journal of Critical Inquiry into Curriculum & Instruction. In addition, in the fall of 1999 The American Association of Teaching and

Curriculum began publication of the Curriculum and Teaching Dialogue. On the basis of journals alone, technological production appears vigorous.

The second characteristic Macdonald (1995) identified is bureaucracy. The bureaucracies of an institution deal essentially with social relations or politics. They are analogous to "party politics, law, and access to power in decision making" (p. 116). Significantly, they are also agencies which often serve to classify and sort their members. Prior to the 1970s, the main curriculum organization in the United States was the ASCD. However, during that decade the allegiance of most curricularists in the academy was shifted to what eventually became Division B of the AERA; for the most part, curriculum practitioners in the schools remained at ASCD (Pinar, et al., 1995). Thus occurred the classification that designated more clearly a difference between academic curricularists and K-12 school-based curricularists.

In addition to this, a further classification among different varieties of academic curricularists began to emerge. During the seventies, JCT began officially sponsoring the annual Bergamo conferences "as a viable space for curriculum theorists who wished to pursue work that was considered out of the curriculum mainstream" (Miller, 1996, p. 7). Within AERA, the Creation and Utilization of Curriculum Knowledge SIG was formed, and in 1977 the first meeting was held of the Society for the Study of Curriculum History. In 1993 the American Association for Teaching and Curriculum was formed, according to Marcella Kysilka (1999),

> as an organization specifically focused on the scholarly field of teaching and curriculum. The members of AATC believed that the time was long overdue to

> recognize teaching and curriculum as a basic field of scholarly study and to constitute a national learned society for the scholarly field. (p. 1)

Now, with the year 2000, comes the announcement of a new "annual" Curriculum and Pedagogy Conference, sponsored by former Bergamo scholars. The increase in the number of curriculum organizations and conferences indicates that bureaucracy is also alive and well in the curriculum field.

Macdonald's third characteristic of modern consciousness, facilitated by the interactions of production and bureaucracy, is the concern--or even demand--for consumption. Nothing is wrong, per se, with organizations or the production of knowledge. Indeed, they contribute to the change in consciousness that must precede social change. But in the demand for consumption that they create, Macdonald explained, what is often consumed is precious living time, as we focus on "the abstractions of life, rather than productive realities" (1995, p. 115). If the point of our work is change in schools, we seem to be diverting precious quantities of time and other resources into academic exercises -- abstractions that are subverting the goal of producing real change.[9]

I believe it is a fair observation to say that our postmodern state within the academy entails our collusion with the demands of modern consciousness. In our honest quest to better understand curriculum, we became caught up in technological production, bureaucracy, and the demand for consumption, which drained valuable time and energy and diverted us from the actual embodied experience of life in schools. Although

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[9] James Sears has complained that the field has failed to "reshape contemporary curriculum theory on the anvil of school practice," due to "diverting valuable intellectual energy" to "factional in-fighting" (1992, p. 211).

Macdonald (1965b, 1971) was at the forefront of those calling for reconceptualized curriculum theory, he also stressed the importance of the concrete, lived-experience in schools (1962, 1966a, 1969b).

This absence of curricularists from K-12 schools has been a point of discussion in the field during the last decade (Miller, 1996; Molnar, 1992; Sears, 1992). Ayers (1992) has commented:

> The entire reward structure at most colleges of education pulls faculty away from any direct contact with schools or school teachers.... It is a neat split—if an old one—this mind/body duality. Education fractures along lines of thinking and doing, venues and concerns divide, everyone's vision and capacity narrows. We become Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid—the classic macho male relationship—either all brains or all body in a sick symbiosis. (p. 261)

The last thirty years have broadened the academy's vision of what curriculum is. But if the only change in curriculum that we can observe after thirty years is that we have more theory, perhaps the field has only experienced a change in degree rather than a change in nature. Some might say it has only been radicalized, rather than reconceptualized.

I am not expecting a return to a narrow focus on curriculum development; I would imagine that those days are over forever. Nor am I suggesting that curricularists become more active in offering their "expert advice" to "practitioners." I am expressing a hope that the time may soon be near for academics to become involved in schools in ways that are completely new and as yet unimagined. Ways that have as yet been impossible to

think. Ways that will powerfully combine the expertise of both academics and classroom teachers. Looking forward to such a time, Pinar (1999) has said,

> When we speak of the relation of theory to practice, let us imagine a day when traditional and unjust divisions of labor are memories only, when [university educators] regard [K-12 educators] not as practice to be guided...but as equal and respected colleagues engaged in that complicated conversation with our children that is the curriculum. (p. 16)[10]

Achieving such a goal will not be easy, as any such attempt will be vulnerable to being co-opted by the dominant institutional systems of our time. However, our option is for students to be subjected to the accidental curriculum, which is shaped and implemented by forces beyond the school's control.

Edgerton has observed that becoming too connected with schools may prevent us from theorizing independently, but theorizing independently without any sense of what is happening in schools may prevent our voices from being heard. We must find a way, she suggests, "to connect with schools while also trying to simultaneously disconnect to some extent, to work back and forth between those, and to *translate*" (Edgerton quoted in Marshall, et al., 2000, p. 239, emphasis added).

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[10] The words that have been replaced here – "men" and "women" – are part of a metaphor Pinar used to illustrate the hierarchical/patriarchal relationship that has existed between universities and schools. I believe my substitutions retain the sense of what he was saying.

Translation

Is it possible to translate contemporary curriculum discourses from the academy into the public K-12 schools? Or could it be these discourses "emerged in protected academic environments and are not adaptable to life in the Great World" (Reid, 1988, p. 10). One of the major themes emerging in this study was that there are many ways of knowing and each has its appropriate symbol form. Green, Huebner, Klohr, and Macdonald sought to create new curriculum discourses through which to "think curriculum." Their aim was to resist the curriculum of social control and to make the school more "person-oriented" (MacDonald, 1966d, p. 38). But since the sixties, curricularists and schools have only moved farther apart. Schools have become more technocratic, with educators' feet held to the fire of accountability. If we are truly "educators" then it seems we must attempt translation. Heidegger (1927/1993a) said, "Logos as speech means...to make manifest 'what is being talked about' in speech. Logos lets something be seen" (p. 78). If we can translate curriculum discourses into speech that makes unseen things manifest in the classroom, that might give teachers "some places to take hold" (Klohr, 1969a, p. 325).

But many scholars are pessimistic, even derisive, about the possibility of translation (Bernstein, 1971; Derrida, 1967/1997; Pinar & Grumet, 1988). Gadamer (1960/1997) and Heidegger (1927/1993a) are more optimistic, but stress that translation is interpretation, not simply reproduction: "The requirement that a translation be faithful cannot remove the fundamental gulf between the two languages.... Translation, like all interpretation, is a highlighting" (Gadamer, 1960/1997, p. 386). In addition, Gadamer cautions, any serious translation attempt will be clearer and flatter than the original; in

other words, it will lack some of the overtones that vibrate in the original. These problems are due to the nature of languages. They are not simply tools of use, but they are language worlds, the context in which the speaker lives. On this point, Gadamer stresses, "You understand a language by living in it" (1960/1997, p. 385). This last point makes translation especially problematic for academics. While many of us have been teachers in the past, the daily embodied experience of living in schools and speaking "school language" fades from our "felt" experience, out of which language and understanding grow.

Possibilities

> "Curriculum lies at the heart of an educator's desire to make a difference in human lives" (Marshall, Sears, & Schubert, 2000, p. 2)

> Curriculum is being constructed by competing forces beyond the school's control, and beyond the control of integrated humanism. As humanists, we may retreat to liberating personal reflections or withdraw to unreflective interpersonal love; or face the responsibility of planning and implementing a humanistic curriculum, both in spite of and in response to the human situation. (p. 38)

The cutting edge scholarship of Greene, Hueber, Klohr, and Macdonald in philosophy, social theory, psychology, and the arts made it possible for them to suggest new visions and discourses. Such work, which resists and transcends the discourses of society's dominant forces, is imperative if the focus of education is to remain on the person, as well as the society. Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman (1995) have emphasized the importance of such work: "Curriculum as a field cannot progress unless some segment of the field explores phenomena and ideas that perhaps few will comprehend and appreciate, certainly not at first and perhaps never" (p. 852). However,

without such scholarship being translated into the schools, it would seem that its raison d'etre has disappeared.

Mooney (1967) described such esoteric theorizing, as it was emerging in the sixties, as poetry:

> First, there is the need to arrive at a germinal center from which new systems of order can be born. The poet comes first and, then, the rational man. The curriculum builder is now poet; the rational order can come to show in time. (p. 211)

Mooney may have been drawing from the work of Susanne Langer (1942/1976) who suggested that young ideas may appear half-poetic: "Really new concepts, having no names in current language, always make their earliest appearance in metaphorical statements" (p. x-xi). Today, we might say that these early metaphorical statements make a space for the more rational structures which may develop from them.

Had Mooney been writing in this era, he may have alluded to Foucault's idea of "epistemological thaw" (1975/1995, p. 185). It is an edifying, if somewhat unsettling, metaphor. Foucault refers to the "textual character" (p. 186) of medicine, prior to the association of physicians with hospitals. Without the structures and practices provided by the institution of the hospital, the discipline of medicine was dependent for its identity upon "the tradition of author-authorities" (p. 186). As the practice of the physicians' irregular and rapid hospital visit became transformed into "a regular observation that placed the patient into a situation of almost perpetual examination," it became possible to extract knowledge (i.e., data) from/about individuals. This knowledge quickly grew into a knowledge base that became a source of power. Foucault explains, "It is a double

process, then: an epistemological thaw through a refinement of power relations; a multiplication of the effects of power through the formulation and accumulation of new forms of knowledge" (p. 224). He attributed the same epistemological thaw to the science of education when "the school became a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination" (p. 186).

There was a time when learning theory still maintained a "textual character." It was, so to speak, "poetry," or that which was still abstract and beyond a clear, rational understanding. With its entry into the schools, it attained an extraordinary structure through which to develop practices and a multitude of individuals through which to produce knowledge. It is an excellent example of Foucault's reference to the multiplication of the effects of power through the formulation and accumulation of new forms of knowledge.

As contemporary curriculum theorists, it is much more comfortable to think of ourselves as poets, than as seekers of the apparatuses and practices through which we can multiply the effects of power. However, the fact remains that schools are under the control of the "accidental curriculum," which is shaped and implemented by the dominant forces of society. Any reshaping of that curriculum entails the use of resistance, a form of power.

It has been suggested that curriculum theorizing may some day have an impact on classroom practice through a sort of "trickle-down" effect from reconceptualized theorizing in the academy (Benham, 1981, p. 168). However, considering the success of the "trickle-down" technique in other areas of our society, it would appear that some more effective tactics of resistance should be sought. The work of Greene, Klohr,

Huebner, and Macdonald may provide an excellent place to begin. These scholars understood that resistance required the skillful use of existing discourses and structures. In addition, their efforts to create alternative discourses created new categories through which others could think about curriculum work. That their students took them seriously is evident from the change effected in the field during the last thirty years. Since this has been possible in the academy, it should give us hope that some degree of change can be effected in schools. Obviously, the inertia that exists there is great. Foucault (1975/1995) refers to the mechanisms and strategies of power that allow an institution "to meet any attempt to transform it with a great force of inertia" (p. 305). However, he insists that does not mean it cannot be altered.

A few instances suggest that some educators are already at work to effect a "second wave" (Pinar, 1988a, p.13) of reconceptualized curriculum studies within schools. For example, a recent issue of ASCD's practitioner-oriented journal, Educational Leadership, carried an article by Donaldo Macedo (1999), and other articles which cited Giroux, Bowers, Freire, and Ogbu (Tell, 1999; Wagner, Knudsen, & Harper, 1999; Wardle, 1999). By itself, this would not be particularly impressive, as ASCD has made occasional nods toward the minority members of its constituency. But there are other bright spots, as well, such as the type of practitioner inquiry supported by Cochran-Smith and Lytle who describe their work as follows:

> Fundamental to our perspective on this is the idea...that groups are using inquiry as a way to make the kind of arrangements of schooling problematic and to question who constructs knowledge, whose knowledge counts, who gets to judge,

> who decides what knowledge is important, who decides who is a knower, etc. (Cochran-Smith, 2000)

Such work not only questions current schooling practices, but it also has professors supporting teachers in an expert role of curriculum developer, decision-maker, analyst, and school leader.

Another example is the work of the John Dewey Project on Progressive Education, directed by Kathleen Kesson and supported by an advisory board that includes many scholars who have worked in the reconceptualist tradition including, among others, William Doll, Maxine Greene, Petra Munro, and David Purpel. The group states their purpose as follows:

> To build on the knowledge base and heritage of progressive education begun by Dewey and others....Our concern for justice, equality, human development, creativity, care, and ethics frames our critical examination of contemporary educational issues. (The John Dewey Project on Progressive Education,1999)

The project proposes to bring a more balanced view of educational issues to policy makers and others who are influenced by the many right-wing think-tanks producing research designed to promote their agenda (Kesson, personal communication, June 21, 2000).

These efforts all demonstrate ways that contemporary curriculum discourses may begin to find their way into the mainstream. Significantly, they work in ways that do not violate the "first wave" of curriculum theorizing, as Miller (1996) has cautioned. They are not agendas that "lay out a linear, sequential, developmental progression" (p. 7), nor do they violate the concern for the situated and relational work that has characterized

reconceptualist curriculum theorizing. Certainly, there must be many other ways still to be discovered. One particular vehicle that has yet to be significantly explored is the use of affective means of communicating contemporary curriculum discourses. The scholars in this study were emphatic that the use of the affective was an important aid and extension to our usual cognitive means of communication.

Concerning the possibility of bringing contemporary curriculum discourses to bear on classroom practice, Jackson (1996) has made the following suggestion, which is certainly in line with the texts of Greene, Klohr, Huebner, and Macdonald:

> Perhaps what is needed are new means for bringing the best of [contemporary curriculum] writings to the attention of practitioners. These would include new kinds of publications, new forms of advertising, new educational efforts by teachers' unions and professional organizations, and more. Perhaps there are lessons to be learned in this regard by studying the myriad ways in which works of art and literature are brought to the attention of the public at large. (p. 36)

Without a doubt, such efforts will entail risks, a fact noted by all of the scholars in this study. It would be necessary to heed Huebner's advice to pay attention to the historical rhythm of society and not try "to shape society beyond its limits of tolerance" (1967, p. 330). In addition, following Foucault, those who make such efforts should also be suspicious of their own inscription within the power/knowledge apparatus at the very moment they are developing their oppositional instruments. That does not mean such instruments are ineffective, however – only that one must keep "a sharp eye out for the moment when the limit of their utility is reached" (Bove, 1988, p. xxvii).

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VITA

Nancy J. Brooks

Candidate for the Degree of
Doctor of Education

Dissertation: RE/SEARCHING THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION:
A HERMENEUTIC INQUIRY

Major Field: Curriculum and Instruction

Biographical:

Education: Received Bachelor of Science in Education degree from Pittsburg State University, Pittsburg, Kansas in December, 1972; received Masters of Library and Information Studies from the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma in August, 1991. Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Education degree with a major in Curriculum and Instruction at Oklahoma State University in July, 2000.

Experience:

1998-present Teaching Assistant: Oklahoma State University
1999 Fall Instructor: Oklahoma State University
1998-1999 Research Assistant: Oklahoma State University
1991-95 Adjunct Instructor: Freshman Composition I & II, Tulsa Community College
1991-98 Library Media Specialist, Catoosa Upper Elem., Catoosa, OK
1987-89 English and Journalism teacher, Iola High School, Iola, KS
1985-87 Lead Teacher K-12, Faith Christian Academy, Fort Scott, KS
1973-74 English and Journalism teacher, Jayhawk-Linn High School, KS

Professional Association Memberships: American Educational Research Association, American Association of Teaching & Curriculum, American Educational Studies Association, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development