HIERARCHICAL ABUSE OF POWER IN A

HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION:

A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY

OF SUBORDINATE

PERSPECTIVE

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DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
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
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CHAPTER ONE

DESIGN OF STUDY

Influenced by models of the efficiency-oriented policies of the factories, many other types of workplaces adopted scientific management (Morgan, 1986). Universities imitated factory management models by creating organizational hierarchies and bureaucratic practices. Examples of this adoption include the targeted recruitment of potential student markets, cost/benefit analysis used to make curricular decisions and the flawed argument that the student is a customer (Counelis, 1993).

Relationships between individuals situated at the top of the organizational ladder, called superiors for this study, and subordinates, those individuals located under superiors on the rungs of the organizational ladder are a central feature of organizational hierarchies. The superior-subordinate relationship is "a central one in the world of business... one that is often a source of tension in the workplace" (Borowski, 1998, p. 1632). Responding to the needs of a then recently automated workplace at the turn of the 20th century, industry leaders as Henri Fayol, Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford, developed top-down organizational structures, scientific models of management. These top-down organizational structures impacted the organizations as the

> division of labor at work...became intensified and increasingly specialized as manufacturers sought to increase efficiency by reducing the discretion of workers in favor of control by their machines and their supervisors. (Morgan, 1986, p. 23)

Hassard and Parker (1993) describe workers positioned at the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy as "basically machine animals who could be encouraged to

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perform with a more refined economic threat/reward system whose distinction lay in the precise specification of activity which would prompt threat or reward" (p. 90). In return for compliance with hierarchical organizational structures, workers of hierarchical organizations enjoyed the security of a stable workplace. The organization provided a stable work contract and a social identity (Morgan, 1986).

Inherent in this prescribed power structure are socially constructed parameters expecting subordinates to appreciate, value and blindly comply with the guidance of superiors. "All the 'thinking' is done by the managers and designers, leaving all the 'doing' to the employees" (Morgan, 1986, p. 30). This construct is the basis for patterns of policy development and execution where executives and upper management create and disseminate policy without input or regard for the needs of subordinates who must implement the policies. In this construct, workers become objects and have difficulty acting upon their own moral agencies (Maguire, 1999). This is potentially detrimental as "permitting superiors to function as a class of untouchables can superimpose patronage over productivity as the criterion of success" (Gunn, 1995, p. 29).

The meta-narrative supporting pyramidal organizational structures deserves critical examination, in part, because these structures present ample opportunity for organizational leaders to abuse power (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998). "Bureaucrats abuse their power by placing their performance above reproach while holding subordinates accountable for results" (Gunn, 1995, p. 28). Study of the behavior of subordinates in relation to organizational superiors is increasing as a result of this criticism and vulnerability to abuse (Brown & Jones, 2000; Jones, 2000; Knight & Auster, 1999; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998).

Several sources suggest that placing power in the hands of a few members located in the higher rungs of the organizational hierarchy provides ample opportunity and incentive for unethical behavior and abuse of subordinates for the purposes of personal gain (Gunn, 1995; Hendry, 1999; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998). Gunn (1995) suggests that this is a weakness of hierarchical organizations in that "the opportunity to abuse power for self-aggrandizement is provided in this authority structure by its paradigm which implies that administration is the measure of all things" (p. 29). Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) find that "the literature has addressed power, but that research has not incorporated the hierarchical, interpersonal abuse of power" (p. 1337). Gunn (1995), Hendry (1999), Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) seek to criticize top-down management practices, exposing them to be oppressive ideology from the framework of critical theory. These exposés intend to enlighten organizational subordinates, revealing and preventing the abuse perpetrated by hierarchical structures.

Institutions of higher education profoundly influence the lives of individuals and the society they serve through the production of research and scholarship, and the granting of academic degrees necessary for attaining professional status and a better life (Boyer, 1987). Coupled with this influence is a corresponding duty to guard the integrity and legitimacy of the institution and the academic credentials it sanctions (Ewell, 1994). The public trust in the integrity of a particular institution's courses, research, publications and academic degrees is essentially sacred. Tampering with the public trust negatively impacts all persons affiliated with the institution, including in most cases, thousands of alumni, current students, the professional legitimacy of past and present faculty, staff, administrators and members of governing boards (Kearns, 1998; Kennedy, 1997).

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Exposing abuses for the purpose of assessing their impact on institutions of higher education is vital as the institutions provide essential services to society, including the training and preparation of professionals, civic leaders and productive citizens (Boyer, 1987). These organizations have a duty to protect the integrity and quality of academic programs offered by higher education institutions (Kennedy, 1997).

Organizations and employees in higher education are not immune from ill treatment by superiors and those entrusted with managing their operations. In the mid to late 1990's, two powerful university presidents were forced to resign for reported abuses of power at Adlephi University in New York (Leatherman, 1995) and Hillsdale College (Van Der Werf, 1999). These events provide cogent examples of institutions where the abuse of power perpetrated by a chief executive officer perpetrated negative publicity for the institution and eroded the public's trust in the legitimacy of higher education. The Committee to Save Adelphi, a group composed of Adelphi University faculty, students and alumni, attributed a 25% decline in student enrollment, dwindling library acquisitions, a disenfranchised faculty, and eroded academic programs to the extreme preferential treatment of the President of Adelphi by the Board of Trustees (Leatherman, 1995). Preferential treatment of the President included the failure of the Board to execute regular performance reviews, and the provision of a salary that far exceeded that of chief executive officers of comparable institutions (Leatherman, 1998).

Media reports credit the recent resolution of the crisis at Adelphi University to the actions of faculty, staff, students and alumni of the university (Halbfinger, 1998). Members of these subordinate constituencies actively cooperated with each other in efforts to resolve the situation through collective activities intending to usurp abusive

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power. Subordinate responses to hierarchical abuse of power like those described in the Adelphi case are cursorily examined in the literature and include dissent (Kassing, 1998), whistle-blowing (Kassing, 1998; Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Sims & Keenan, 1998; Sprague, 1998), and ethical activism (Knight & Auster, 1999).

The tragedy at Hillsdale College, where the suicide of the President's daughter-in-law and alleged lover emerges as another seamy organizational story of abuse of Presidential power, unchecked by the relevant governing body (Van Der Werf, 1999). Echoes of Adelphi resound at Hillsdale; exorbitant executive salaries, nepotism, cronyism and ruthless, autocratic management practices.

The recent events at Adelphi University and Hillsdale College are remarkable when the unique nature of the governance of institutions of higher education is considered. The academy intends for mechanisms such as academic tenure, shared governance, and self-study practices required by accreditation agencies to protect against the abuse of power. It is contrary to the conventional wisdom of academe that abuses such as those reported at Adelphi University and Hillsdale College could exist with such duration and severity in spite of institutional safeguards. These circumstances suggest a need for institutions of higher education to examine for the purpose of understanding, the hierarchical abuse of power.

Statement of the Problem

Superiors in an organization are ultimately responsible for the health and well being of the organization. According to the meta-narrative supporting hierarchical organizational structures, organizational superiors are situated to be more knowledgeable about the needs of an institution as compared to organizational subordinates. Subordinates should

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not question the actions of superiors. Subordinates who resist the directions and guidance of organizational superiors are counter-productive to an organization and efforts by subordinates to undermine the efforts of a superior should receive prompt and effective intervention (Morgan, 1986; Gunn, 1995).

At the same time, both superiors and subordinates are organizational stakeholders and share responsibility for the health and functioning of an organization. Superiors and subordinates both benefit from productive, ethical institutions and both suffer from organizations that suffer from mismanagement (Freeman, 1984). Subordinates are as responsible as superiors are for reporting and intervening against unethical and detrimental workplace behaviors are. The contributions of all organizational members are valuable and a balance of power may protect the organization from unethical behavior and practices (Gunn, 1995; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998)

These conflicting paradigms suggest that the seat of power in any organization is dynamic and cannot be attributed to any one individual or constituency. A balance of power between superiors and subordinates is desirable for the prevention of hierarchical abuse of power (Gunn, 1995; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to identify and describe subordinate perspectives and responses to the hierarchical abuse of power within an organization using portions of the process model suggested by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) conceptualizing the hierarchical abuse of power in work organizations. The study will test "subordinate" propositions put forth by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) in an effort to expand understanding of hierarchical, interpersonal abuse of power in organizations. The

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propositions will lead the direction of inquiry, shaping interview questions, and influencing the development of research methodology.

Conceptual Framework

Critical theory provides a lens through which to interpret and explicate the workplace of higher education (Tierney & Rhoads, 1993). As a macro-theory, critical theory is applied to large social contexts whereas in this study critical theory is utilized at the micro-level to examine an organization of higher education.

The ultimate purpose of a critical theory is to emancipate and enlighten oppressed persons from a self-imposed "false consciousness" or ideology so that their true interests might be realized. The "false consciousness" is revealed or uncovered through agents who seek to inform self-reflection (Geuss, 1981). This study will use the lens of critical theory to challenge the Taylor meta-narrative advocating the uneven placement of most organizational power at the top of the organizational pyramid.

Critical theory, as proposed by Jürgen Habermas, a prominent member of the Frankfurt School, provides a framework for organizational members to challenge meta-narratives supporting pyramidal organizational structures that increase the institutions' vulnerability to hierarchical abuse of power. Habermas described and defined a system of critical theory whereby emancipation and enlightenment are attained through an "ideal speech situation… a situation of absolutely uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents" (Geuss, 1981, p. 65). The ideal speech situation

     is just the ideal condition for the development and exercise of human rationality;

     we can predict a priori then that *rational* human agents won't freely and

knowingly set up their society so as to prevent themselves from being as rational as possible. (Geuss, 1981, p. 70)

Emancipation and enlightenment as described by Habermas refers to a "social transition from an initial state to a final state which has the following properties:

(a) The initial state is one both of false consciousness and error, *and* of unfree existence.

(b) In the initial state false consciousness and unfree existence are inherently connected so that agents can be liberated from one only if they are also at the same time freed from the other.

(c) The "unfree existence" from which the agents in the initial state suffer is a form of *self-imposed* coercion; their false consciousness is a kind of *self-delusion.*

(d) The coercion from which the agents suffer in the initial state is one whose "power" or "objectivity" derives *only* from the fact that the agents do not realize that it is self-imposed.

(e) The final state is one in which the agents are free of false consciousness - they have been enlightened - and free of self-imposed coercion - they have been emancipated. (Geuss, 1981, p. 58)

The erosion of Habermasian false consciousness through self-reflection serves to free organizational subordinates from the absoluteness of compliance to hierarchy, providing subordinates the ability to create and support strategies for reducing and possibly eliminating the detrimental effects of hierarchical abuse of power.

Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) collected data concerning the hierarchical abuse of power in work organizations by surveying over 500 MBA students over a period of four years. The open-ended questionnaire asked respondents to report examples of abuse

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of power from their own organizations. The findings distinguished "two defining dimensions of the abuse of power: disrespect for individual dignity and obstacles to job performance and or deserved rewards" (p. 1339). These dimensions of power are similar to the constructs of procedural and distributive justice respectively. Per the Vredenburgh and Brender study, these dimensions are behaviorally expressed as follows (1998, p. 1339):

Dimensions	[Behavior]
Disrespect for individual dignity	Impose demands for illegal cooperation
	Physically harass
	Verbally harass or embarrass publicly
	Insist on attitudinal conformity
	Gossip harmfully
	Exact personal service
	Manipulate dependency
	Lie, exaggerate or make insincere promises
Obstacles to Job Performance or Rewards	Make arbitrary personnel selection decisions
	Assume credit for subordinates work deceptively
	Deprive subordinates of resources necessary for task performance
	Discriminate regarding performance appraisal
	Allocate rewards arbitrarily
	Attribute own poor performance to subordinates
	Require attendance at company events

In addition, Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) posit seven speculative propositions on the nature of hierarchical, interpersonal abuse of power emerged from the data.

Proposition 1: The subordinate's perspective should define the hierarchical abuse of power because it is his or her dignity or performance that is harmed. (p.1340)

Proposition 2: Hierarchical acts of power abuse, undertaken over time in a given organizational unit, lead to the formation of unit norms. (p. 1341)

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Proposition 3: Managers who abuse power do so in pursuit of select motives. (p. 1342)

Proposition 4: Select individual attributes increase the likelihood of an individual manager abusing power. (p. 1342)

Proposition 5: Powerholders' motives and individual attributes interact with organizational activating conditions and sources of power to frame power abuse decisions. (p. 1343)

Proposition 6: Organizational norms and considerations of risk can moderate decisions about abusing power. (p. 1343)

Proposition 7: Powerholders abuse power through the strategies of direct pressure, upward appeal, exchange, ingratiation and inspiration. (p. 1344)

Propositions 1, 2 and 7 refer to the perspective of organizational subordinates as opposed to speculations about the motives or personal characteristics of the powerholder. Research questions emerging from these propositions and the work context of higher education include:

1. How do subordinates describe and define the effects of hierarchical, interpersonal abuse of power on their dignity or performance/reward?

2. How do acts of hierarchical, interpersonal abuse of power undertaken over time influence the formation of unit norms?

3. What are the strategies of power holders who abuse power?

Research Context

The institution under study is a private, comprehensive university in the Southwestern United States, enrolling approximately 4000 students. The student enrollment is approximately 50% undergraduate, 37% graduate and 13% first professional. The characteristics of the student body are unusual in that approximately

23% of the total population are foreign nationals, primarily originating from the Pacific Basin and India.

The institution, close to financial collapse in 1979, has made a remarkable recovery from that point. However, at the time of the case, the institution's fiscal status remains precarious, as 93% of the operating budget depends upon tuition revenue. Small fluctuations in enrollment affect the fiscal health of the institution.

The institution employs approximately 160 full-time faculty and as many adjunct faculty. Seventy-seven percent of the full-time faculty hold a terminal degree in their field and 55% are tenured. The scope of curricular offerings is diverse as evidenced by the housing of two colleges and four schools within the institution, including the Colleges of Arts and Sciences and Music and Performing Arts and Schools of Business, Law, Nursing, and Religion.

Significance of the Study

Research is significant if it adds to or clarifies existing theory, adds to the knowledge base, and/or impacts practice (Hoy & Miskel, 1991). The following arguments support that this research study meets these:

Theory

The process model of the hierarchical abuse of power proposed by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) seeks to explore a potentially detrimental aspect of work organizations, specifically, hierarchical abuse of power. This process model encourages investigators to consider subordinate perspectives as valuable to organizational effectiveness. This study of hierarchical abuse of power will test and clarify the propositions presented in the conceptual model, potentially strengthening its usefulness.

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Findings of this research study will add to the embryonic body of literature empirically examining organizational subordinates in the context of hierarchical abuse of power. Vredenburgh and Brender suggest that "the importance of hierarchical abuse of power for individuals and organizations argues for making this effort" (1998, p. 1345). Once the three propositions set forth in the process model are tested and found to possess "explanatory utility" (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998, p. 1345), future research may seek to ascertain the prevalence of the hierarchical abuse of power, its impact on organizational culture, fiscal health and potential prophylactic measures.

Knowledge Base

This study will take portions of the Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) process model, concentrating on the nature of subordinate reactions to the hierarchical abuse of power within the context of the forced resignation of a university president. This examination will add to the burgeoning body of literature on hierarchical abuse of power and the workplace perspective of organizational subordinates.

This study will also add to the body of literature reporting subordinate perceptions and contributions to work organizations. Specifically, it will increase knowledge of the impact of hierarchical abuse of power from a subordinate perspective. This level of analysis is further supported by the work of Ogbonna and Harris (1998), finding that individual's perspectives of an organization's culture is influenced by the member's position in the hierarchy.

Practice

This study will be of interest to several constituencies. First, and most important, this study seeks to assist in preserving the autonomy from governmental intervention that

is enjoyed and desired by American institutions of higher education (Leatherman, 1996). Higher education institutions have a high duty to their students and alumni, governing boards, and the public, to maintain honest and ethical practices (Ewell, 1994). Hierarchical abuse of power causes institutions to be vulnerable to individuals who would subvert the best practices of academe for personal gain. The occurrence of highly publicized circumstances of Adelphi University where the New York State Board of Regents removed the entire board of trustees of a private university exposes higher education to increased regulation by government agencies for the purpose of protecting the integrity of the academy (Lewis, 2000).

Second, it will be helpful to stakeholders of an institution suffering from hierarchical abuse of power. These stakeholders may find parallel experiences in this study from which to make sense of their own circumstances. This "sense making" (Weick, 1995) will extend beyond the arena of higher education; this study will be applicable to virtually any organization, whether it be for-profit, non-profit or educational.

Finally, superiors within an organization may benefit from the insight this study provides. This study may serve as a mirror for those who are practicing hierarchical, interpersonal abuse of power, and are numbed by the conventional wisdom predicated by "rational" management practices, validating and encouraging behaviors detrimental to an organization. This study may provide tools of repair for superiors who find their images reflected in this work.

Organizational leaders will benefit from this study as it will further the recognition of the hierarchical abuse of power in the workplace organizations. In

recognizing this phenomenon, organizational members will be better equipped to diagnose organizational ills, such as confusion, distraction from tasks and conflicts between colleagues and develop effective interventions. The prevention of the hierarchical of abuse of power may be desirable in promoting healthier, more productive work organizations.

Summary

The forced resignation of a University President accused of hierarchical abuse of power provides a relevant setting for the investigation of subordinate perceptions of hierarchical abuse of power and its impact on the organization. The work of Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) precedes this investigation by proposing eight speculative propositions of which three will be explored.

The meta-narrative of top-down management is challenged by the need for accountability of productivity diffused through every organizational layer. This is particularly relevant in human-scale organizations like institutions of higher education where the product, a university degree, is not created by machine, but by the amorphous mechanism of human interactions and relationships.

Critical theory supported through qualitative research methods will elucidate previously unexamined perceptions of organizational subordinates concerning the hierarchical abuse of power. All stakeholders in the organization benefit from its successes and suffers from its failures. This study seeks to enhance the understanding of this important reality of organizational life.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

There are no studies that directly address the responses of organizational subordinates to hierarchical abuse of power, the abuse of power by virtue of one's position in organizational hierarchy (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998). Similarly, hierarchical abuse of power as a construct receives only cursory attention in the literature, including the conceptualization of a process model (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998), generalized descriptions from anecdotes (Conger, 1990; Hornstein, 1996), and evaluation of the phenomenon from a legal vantage point (Blades, 1967). In spite of the paucity of directly related works, studies in the field of organizational development concerning superior - subordinate relations serve to flesh out organizational descriptions of and reactions to perceived hierarchical abuse of power. Related works include studies of organizational justice, and subordinate reactions to perceived organizational injustices, such as coalition formation, boat rocking and whistle blowing. The subjective nature of this approach to reviewing the literature produces an interdisciplinary battery of relevant literature not intending to be completely inclusive of all possible constructs relevant to this study.

Although empirical studies examining subordinate responses specifically to hierarchical abuse of power were not found, Graham (1986) developed an extensive theory of "principled organizational dissent" where organizational members "utilize moral criteria to assess issues in the workplace" (p. 1) and then respond to the perceived organizational ills. In this theory, Graham (1986) hypothesizes that subordinate

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responses to breaches of moral criteria would include whistle-blowing, and upward influence.

According to Vredenburgh and Brender's process model (1998), hierarchical abuse of power is located within the relationship between organizational superiors and subordinates, and described from the perspective of the subordinate. The undeveloped nature of the superior-subordinate literature base is revealed by the inconsistent terminology used to name these relationships. These names include manager - subordinate (Allen & Lucero, 1998; Tepper, Eisenbach, Kirby & Potter, 1998; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998), supervisor - mid-level administrator (Johnsrud, Heck & Rosser, 2000), employee - management (Sprague & Ruud, 1988), employer - employee (Blades, 1967), employee - superior (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993), leader - member (Case, 1998), leader - constituent (Conger, 1990), leader - follower (Gabriel, 1997, 1998), worker - management (Kanungo, 1992), supervisor - subordinate (Maslyn, Farmer & Fedor, 1996). This extensive listing suggests a lack of coordination among researchers in operationalizing what this study calls superior-subordinate workplace relationships, the interpersonal interaction between two or more people situated at different levels in the hierarchy of an organization.

In contrast with the voluminous empirical work on organizational leadership, works contributing to "the less-developed theory of followership" (Gabriel, 1997, p. 317), are synonymous with the study of organizational subordinates. This direction of inquiry has examined the superior-subordinate relationships in context of subordinate dependency on visionary leaders (Conger, 1990; Gabriel, 1997), hierarchical position (Adler, 1999; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Gunn 1995), leader-member exchange (Lee,

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2001) maintenance communication (Lee & Jablin, 1995), morale and intention to leave the organization (Johnsrud, Heck & Rosser, 2000), upward influence (Maslyn, Farmer & Fedor, 1996), sources of power in downward and lateral relations (Yukl & Falbe, 1991), the unrealistic expectations subordinates attribute to organizational leaders (Gabriel, 1997), and the physical and emotional health consequences of being victimized by abuse (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Hornstein, 1996; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998). Studies of followership include forms of organizational dissent by subordinates, including work avoidance, whistle-blowing, boat-rocking and sabotage have been analyzed at both the individual level (Giacolone, Riordan & Rossenfeld, 1997; Graham ,1986; Johnsrud, et al., 2000; Sprague & Ruud, 1985) and the organizational level (Abraham, 1999; Ellis & Arieli, 1999; Footlick, 1997; Gabriel, 1997).

The behavior of superiors perceived to abuse power includes lying or giving false information (Hornstein, 1996, Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998), constraining activities external to the work organization, threatening harm for noncompliance, making subordinates the scapegoats of mishaps (Hornstein, 1996), cronyism, favoritism (Hornstein, 1996; Prendergast & Topel, 1996), patronage (Hornstein, 1996; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998), public humiliation (Hornstein, 1996; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998), insults (Gabriel, 1998; Hornstein, 1996), and demonstrating disregard or disdain of the subordinate (Gabriel, 1997; Hornstein, 1996; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998). Abusive leaders were described as poor managers, possessing an autocratic and dictatorial leadership style (Hornstein, 1996). They misuse authority, substitute personal goals for organizational goals, fail to manage details, attend to the superficial, are unavailable during stressful periods and take credit for the successes of others (Conger, 1990).

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Conflict is integral to a superior-subordinate relationship in which the superior is practicing hierarchical abuse of power (Gunn, 1995; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998). Within the context of critical theory, Honneth (1997) argues that deeply embedded within all social conflict is a struggle for moral recognition, or "the mutual respect for both the particularity and equality of all other persons" (p. 18). Honneth further explains that "in light of norms of the sort constituted by the principle of moral responsibility or the values of society, personal experiences of disrespect can be interpreted and represented as something that can potentially affect other subjects" (1996, p. 162). Norms serve as a "semantic bridge between impersonal aspirations of a social movement and their participant's private experiences of injury, a bridge that is strong enough to enable development of collective identity" (Honneth, 1996, p. 163).

"In order to describe the history of social struggles as moving in a certain direction, one must appeal hypothetically to a provisional end-state, from the perspective of which it would be possible to classify and evaluate particular events" (Honneth 1996, p. 171). One mechanism for disseminating "end-states" in higher education is through specialized professional organizations serving particular institutional constituencies. Professional organizations include the American Council on Education (ACE), the nation's coordinating higher education association; the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB), serving the chief executive officer and governing boards; the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), representing the interests and needs of faculty; and the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO), facilitating issues of importance to a variety of administrative professionals.

These professional bodies working independently, or in cooperation with each other, provide institutions with broad, normative statements. In general, these normative statements do not intend to be prescriptive, rather they are applicable to most institutions remaining respectful of the diverse landscape of American institutions of higher education. Issues such as shared governance (AAUP, 2001), faculty tenure and academic freedom (AAUP, 2001) the roles and responsibility of university governing boards and the scope of responsibilities attributed to university presidents (AGB, 1996), and governing boards, (AGB, 2001) and academic integrity in college admissions (AACRAO, 1996; ACE, 1991) are addressed by normative statements disseminated by professional organizations. Regional accrediting bodies serve as another source of normative values for institutions of higher education.

Members of the higher education community, both collectively and individually are also influenced by normative statements or contexts provided by respected peers reflecting on their experiences in higher education (Birnbaum, 1988; Boyer, 1987; Kennedy, 1999; Kerr, 1963; Rosovsky, 1990; Touraine, 1974; Wolff, 1992). In addition to tomes produced by wizened voices of experience, norms in higher education are extrapolated from empirically based works (Astin, 1978; Astin, 1997; Counelis, 1993; Knight & Auster, 1999; McCormick & Meiners, 1988; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991).

It is against this accumulation of normative statements that organizational subordinates of institutions of higher education evaluate their institutions' ethics, culture and values, juxtaposing these evaluations against what is perceived and what is normatively desirable. Deviations from expected norms render the "type of moral experience where subjects feel disrespected" (Honneth, 1996, p. 163). Hierarchical

interpersonal abuse of power creates a deviating and unjust circumstance where subordinate organizational members, individually and collectively, are vulnerable to maltreatment or disrespect (Gunn, 1995; Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998). "Circumstances experienced as 'unjust' provide the appropriate key for an initial anticipatory elucidation of the internal connection between morality and recognition" (Honneth, 1997, p. 23). Issues of justice within organizations have been extensively studied and is an evolving area of inquiry (Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000).

The bulk of the organizational justice research literature distinguishes between two forms of organizational justice: procedural and distributive. Procedural justice describes the reactions of individuals to the fairness of procedures used to determine the distribution of resources or recognition (Martin & Bennett, 1996; Schaubroeck, May & Brown, 1994; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Tremblay, Sire & Balkin, 2000; Welbourne, 1998). Distributive justice refers to perceptions of fairness and equity in the distribution of resources and benefits (Tremblay, Sire & Balkin, 2000; Welbourne, 1998).

Studies in procedural and distributive justice have almost exclusively focused on individual processes, or how individuals perceive organizational injustices (Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000). These forms of justice have been studied in the domains of gainsharing (Welbourne, 1998), subordinate reactions to organizational change (Schaubroeck, May & Brown, 1994), retaliation in the workplace (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), salary and benefits (Hartman, Yale & Galle, 1999; Tremblay, Sire & Balkin, 2000), job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Martin & Bennett, 1996); and individual self-esteem (Schroth & Shah, 2000).

The findings of research in organizational justice vary according to the type of organization under study and the relative importance or significance of the rewards, benefits or products to the subjects. In general, subjects expressed that "procedural fairness was more important for an unfavorable or low outcome, and distributive justice was more important for a favorable or high outcome" (Welbourne,1998, p. 326). Additionally, procedural justice is linked to attitudes about the organizational, and distributive justice seems to influence the organizational members satisfaction with rewards and benefits (Hartman, Yrle, & Galle, 1999). Martin and Bennett (1996) found that questions or issues about the fairness of institutional practices were found to override relative levels of job satisfaction. In the same study, procedural fairness was also an important antecedent for positive organizational commitment. In both instances perceived fairness was as important as "knowing for certain that a fair procedure was actually followed" (p. 101).

Hegtvedt and Johnson (2000) suggest expanding the study of organizational justice beyond the individual to embody the impact of forms of justice and injustice on the legitimacy of collectives, such as ethnic groups and females, within the framework of equity, equality and shared understanding. They argue that "the inclusion of legitimacy which is fundamentally a collective process, augments our understanding of justice" (p. 298). Such an extension of the organizational justice research agenda would support efforts within the context of critical theory to describe and explain the reactions of groups of organizational subordinates to the perceived injustices resulting from hierarchical abuse of power and other forms of injustice. "A struggle can only be generalized beyond

the horizon of individuals' intentions, to the point where they can become the basis for a collective movement" (Honneth, 1996, p. 162).

In an organization where individual organizational members perceive that organizational norms prescribing moral responsibility or social values are violated, "individual experiences of disrespect are read as typical for an entire group, and in such a way that they can motivate collective demands for expanded relations of recognition" (Honneth, 1996, p. 162). Coalition formation is a strategy where groups of individuals seek "through collective and concerted action, to affect broader organizational policy issues" (Cobb, 1991, p. 1074). Members of coalitions exchange information and incentives to shape future organizational behavior (Allen, et al. 1979). The efficacy of a coalition is highly dependent upon the competence of the leadership to sustain commitment (Mizahi & Rosenthal, 2001).

Coalitions can be legitimate (Yukl & Tracey, 1992) or illegitimate (Hirschhorn, 1992). Coalition forming has been identified in both upward and downward influence (Yukl, & Tracey, 1992). Cobb (1991) identified two complimentary questions subordinates ask themselves prior to forming or joining a coalition: "what do I want"(p. 1068) and "how will I get it" (p. 1069)? Individual response to these questions guided organizational members to cooperate with others who had similar responses to these questions.

Coalitions can serve as a defense against cruel or ineffective leaders to manage anxiety (Hirschhorn, 1995). In contrast, subordinates whose power or authority within the organization is dependent upon the patronage of a leader incapacitated by illness use covert coalitions to maintain the authority of leaders. In this example, dependent

subordinates collectively conspire to conceal the magnitude of the leaders illness and subsequent inability to lead (Post & Robins, 1993).

Collective action within a coalition is not the only construct that individuals within an organization can organize resistance to hierarchical abuse of power. Acting independently, or in dyads, subordinate activism can include boat-rocking, whistle-blowing, and employing upward influence.

In contrast to a whistle-blower who covertly reveals dissent, a boat-rocker is "one who expresses dissent, in a direct, straight-forward manner, within the boundaries of an organization" (Redding, 1985, p. 246). Boat-rockers' reported reasons for acting out dissent included a high compulsion driven by ethics, fear the organization was in legal jeopardy, or to prevent the enacting of an ill-advised or ineffective decision. Contrarily, an oppressive organizational climate and fear of retaliation were conditions found within an organization that inhibited boat-rocking (Sprague & Ruud, 1985).

Willingness to boat rock is contingent on several factors. Organizational members with relatively high job security were more likely to boat-rock, or speak out about dissenting issues, while fear of retaliation was the most common reason expressed for failing to speak up (Sprague & Rudd 1985). In a review of the literature on boat-rocking, Sprague and Rudd (1985) cite Gouran, Hirokawa and Martz's (1986) description of subordinates who do not boat-rock because of prior futile experiences with expressing dissent and Hocker and Wilmot's (1978) findings that a predisposition to avoid conflict is also a factor influencing the individual decision to boat-rock

Whistle-blowing, another response to organizational discord, is the disclosure of illegal, unethical, or harmful practices in the workplace to parties who might take action.

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Whistle-blowers, by definition, must go either up the system or outside the organization" (Rothschild & Miethe, 1994, p. 254). The research literature on whistle-blowing is far too extensive for a comprehensive synthesis in this review of the literature, however, brief snapshots of findings relevant to this study follow.

Whistle-blowing is not uniformly defined in the literature. It has been described as pro-social (Brewer & Selden, 1998), anti-social (Miceli & Near, 1997), political behavior (Rothschild & Miethe, 1994), moral judgment (Brabeck, 1984), an act of nonconformity (Greenberger, Miceli & Cohen, 1987), and threatening to the upper reaches of hierarchy, (Gunn, 1995). In a positive vein, whistle-blowing may impact organizational effectiveness by illuminating solutions to problems (Graham, 1986; Miceli & Near, 1991).

The literature distinguishes two types of whistle-blowing. External whistle-blowing refers to the reporting of illegal or unethical activity within an organization to external constituencies, such as newspapers or regulatory agencies (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Sims & Keenan, 1998). Internal whistle-blowing refers to reporting illegal or unethical activities to officials within the organization (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998).

The literature on the personal characteristics of whistle-blowers as compared to non-whistle-blowers, describes them as are more likely to be men than women and organizational members with longer tenure (Sims & Keenan 1998). They are highly respected members of the organization and naïve in their belief that the organizational superiors truly believe in the mission of the organization and wish to protect it from fraud and dishonesty (Brabek, 1984; Rothchild & Miethe, 1994). In some cases, whistle-blowers saw the disclosure of wrongdoing as part of their work responsibilities (Jos,

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Tompkins & Hays, 1989; Rothchild & Miethe, 1994). External whistle-blowers display a high level or organizational commitment, loyalty and job satisfaction (Sims & Keenan, 1998). Whistle-blowers are more likely to be found in highly bureaucratic organizations (Miceli & Near, 1991).

Miceli and Near (1992) describe whistle-blowing as a four step process. First, an individual within the organization observes a triggering event of dubious nature. Whistle-blowing behaviors are often set in motion by triggering events such as receiving a below average job performance rating (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998; Miceli & Near, 1991). Second, the individual must make a decision as to whether the act involves wrong doing (Micelei & Near, 1992). Brabeck demonstrated that whistle-blowers display a higher level or moral reasoning (1984). Whistle-blowers often draw their values from external sources, such as their faith or professional training (Rothchild & Miethe, 1994). Third, the individual expresses dissent by exposing the wrong doing to either an individual inside or outside the organization. Lastly, the organizational members react to the whistle-blowing, either deciding to confront the alleged perpetrator or retaliate against the whistle-blower (Micelei & Near, 1992).

As the currency of the workplace shifts industry to information, job structures are increasingly "professionalized, specialized and expertise-based" (Rothchild & Miethe, 1994, p. 259). Bowman (1984) postulates that as "the one distinguishing mark of professionals is the ability to recognize ethical problems, to act as moral custodians of the organization in which they work, it should not be unexpected that a large number of cases of protest have involved professionals" (p. 2). Gunn (1995) predicts that concurrent with the evolution of this information-laden workplace, whistle-blowing behaviors within

work organizations will increase. Miceli and Near (1997) argue that whistle-blowing is not always pro-social and in fact, can be antisocial behavior motivated by self-interest. This anti-social form of whistle-blowing may increase concurrent with the passage of laws that monetarily reward whistle-blowers (Miceli, et al, 1999).

Whistle-blowing, as a response to abuse of power, and unethical or illegal organizational activities is "emerging as a distinct area of study" (Sims & Keenan, 1998, p.412). Ellis and Arieli (1999) confirmed a strong connection between a subordinates attitude toward reporting unethical behavior with perceived losses and gains. Subordinates who perceive that their supervisors support whistle-blowing indicated that are more likely to practice external whistle-blowing (Sims & Keenan, 1998)

Whistle-blowers are vulnerable to retaliations in the form of termination of employment or superiors and co-workers initiating events that will lead to termination or an untenable work environment (Near & Jensen, 1983). Another retaliatory tactic is to mandate that the whistle-blower be evaluated by a psychological professional whose services are funded by the employer. The psychological professional is prompted by management to believe the whistle-blower is severely unstable, biasing a potential diagnosis (Rothchild & Miethe, 1994).

In contrast to whistle-blowers who can be located at any level of the organizational hierarchy, organizational members seeking to use upward influence tend to cluster in the middle to lower levels. "After all, upward influence is exerted by subordinates who are lower in the formal organizational hierarchy than those persons who are targets of their influence" (Chacko, 1990, p. 253). Upward influence is defined as a "process in organizations by which participants attempt to gain compliance from

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those at higher levels in the formal organizational structure" (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988, p. 528). Most research on upward influence has involved attempts by subordinates to achieve personal benefits available from the supervisor, not to examine the use of upward influence as a challenge to unprincipled organizational behavior (Graham, 1986) such as hierarchical abuse of power.

Schilit and Locke (1982) found little difference between the methods used by supervisors in downward influence and subordinates using upward influence. Employing a cluster analysis, Kipnis and Schmidt identified three styles of influence used by both superiors and subordinates. The "Shotgun" style of influence is characterized by assertiveness, persistence and negotiating; the "Tactician" style of influence is patient and reasoned; and the "Bystander" style is marked by a hesitance to enact influence methods (1988). Assertive, repetitive attempts at influence were the least palatable and least effective in both upward and downward influence (Chacko, 1990; Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988) and had negative affects for the individual attempting to influence salary negotiations and work performance evaluations (Maslyn, et al., 1996). Of the three styles, "Tactician" style subordinates were rated by their superiors as having the highest levels of work competence, while "Bystander" style subordinates were rated the lowest of the three (Kipnis & Scmidt, 1988).

In a study of middle level managers in an institution of higher education, Chacko (1990) established a relationship between the type of method of upward influence selected by a subordinate and the leadership style of the superior. In the study, the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire – Form XII rated supervisors on Initiation of Structure (clearly defines own role and clearly expresses expectations) and Consideration

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(regards the comfort and well-being, status and contributions of subordinates). Subordinates of superiors who were high in Initiation and Consideration were more likely to use methods of reason, logic and coalition formations as upward influence methods. In comparison, subordinates whose supervisors exhibited low Initiation of Structure and Consideration leadership styles who were more like to employ threatening, assertive methods. Low Initiation of Structure and Consideration superiors were also more vulnerable to subordinates employing higher authority, or circumventing the recognized organizational hierarchy or chain of command as an upward influence method.

There exists a dizzying array of credible, research investigations pertinent to the subordinate response to hierarchical abuse of power. Due to the complex nature of human behavior and the specificity of the organizational context presented in this qualitative study, synthesizing all subjectively relevant literature would be unwieldy and potentially unproductive. The more one digs, the deeper becomes the hole.

Although the research literature does not directly address constructs of hierarchical abuse of power and corresponding subordinate responses, a myriad of tangential studies provide contexts and tools for understanding and explaining. The notion that hierarchical abuse of power results in the type of injustice, or disrespect for moral recognition as theorized by Honneth (1996) is a logical result of melding the theoretical constructs of Habermas (1981) and Honneth (1996) with the conceptualized process model of Vredenburgh and Brender (1998). Interdisciplinary organizational studies examining issues of justice or more precisely, injustice, infer subordinate responses in the form of coalition formation, boat-rocking, whistle-blowing and upward influence. This list of potential responses is not to be assumed to be complete.

Hegvedt and Johnson (2000) describe one discernible trend in the organizational justice literature, a move from studies examining individual to collective justice perspectives. This may foretell a meta-theoretical movement toward an organizational literature base where the level analysis is predominately rooted in the organization as a whole. The inclusion of all organizational members is a logical progression in concert with expanded understandings of subordinate contributions and value to the organization and the import of the superior-subordinate relationship to organizational efficacy.

When viewed as individual pieces, the research studies presented in this review are a disjointed lot of picayune works. When viewed holistically, they represent the dense fabric of human experience and heroic efforts to understand and improve the human experience. Each research study in the organizational literature represents a brick with its own qualities of reliability, solidity and credibility. A consolidation of bricks, forms a never-to-be-completed structure, representing the increasingly solid foundation of our understanding humanity.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This qualitative, descriptive case study investigates the perceptions of organizational subordinates employed by a private, church-related, liberal arts university who participated in activities or witnessed others participating in activities directed toward forcing the resignation of the institution's President because they perceived that he was practicing the hierarchical abuse of power. Lincoln and Guba (1985), explicate the purposes of case study reporting:

> ... we believe that the ultimate purpose of any report is to improve the reader's level of understanding of whatever the report deals with, whether some research finding, evaluative judgment, or policy formulation.... They permit the reader to build on his or her own tacit knowledge in ways that foster empathy and assess intentionality, because they enable the reader to achieve personal understandings in the form of "naturalistic generalizations", and because they enable detailed probing of an instance in question rather than mere surface description of a multitude of cases. (p. 358)

Research Design

The explanatory case study method is appropriate to this investigation because the phenomenon under study is unique, context-bound and focuses on the experiences and perceptions of organization subordinates, a subset of organizational members who have received scant attention in the literature pertaining to higher education (Vredenburgh & Brender 1998). "A *descriptive* [italics in original] case study is one that presents a

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detailed account of the phenomenon under study.... They are useful... in presenting basic information about areas of education where little research has been conducted" (Merriam, 1988, p. 27).

The unit or level of analysis focuses on individuals employed at the institution at the time of the event under study. Vredenburgh and Brender suggest that "because individuals perpetrate abuses and individuals suffer abuses, the appropriate unit of analysis for initial research into the abuse of power is the individual" (1998, p.1340). Other literature on power (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993) supports examining the "micro-level view" as well, focusing on the behavior of individuals as a legitimate research context for the study of power.

The construction of the study followed McCracken's (1988) four-step method of inquiry. The first step in McCracken's model involves an exhaustive review of the literature. A preliminary review of the literature was conducted to examine issues of power and subordinate perspectives in hierarchical organizations. Other themes in the literature emerged from this preliminary review and as the data collection progressed.

In McCracken's second step, the researcher becomes familiar with his or her personal view of the circumstances of the case under study (1988). At the time of the events under study, I was employed as a mid-level manager, allowing me a deep understanding of the culture and history of the institution, permitting the unearthing of nuances and ambiguities of the case. In this secondary stage, I reviewed materials collected at the time of the event to become familiar with the events leading to the resignation of the President.

McCracken (1988) states that the third step involves conducting a "pilot" of the study. A pilot of this case was conducted in Spring 1999. Data for analysis included media reports and observations from the site. The pilot study helped me specify and clarify the research problems and develop a research strategy.

McCracken's fourth step of inquiry involves analysis of the data, including investigator observations taken at the time of the event, media reports, personal correspondence of participants, inter-office memoranda and interview transcripts (1988). Analysis of the data for this study was conducted continuously throughout the study as various forms of data were collected.

Researcher

The investigator is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis and as such must possess certain characteristics in order to produce a good case study. The investigator must have an enormous tolerance for ambiguity, must be a good communicator, and must be highly sensitive to context, to the data, and to personal bias. (Merriam, 1988, p. 52)

In this case, the investigator's role as the primary instrument of data collection was both facilitated and impeded by the duality of being an employee of the institution under study, or "native" of the research site, and researcher. The researcher's native experience included being a graduate of the institution, and a mid-level administrator of the institution. The researcher adopted a participant-observer stance as described by Spradley (1980),

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The participant observer comes to a social situation with two purposes: (1) to engage in activities appropriate to the situation and (2) to observe the activities, people, and physical aspects of the situation"….

The complexity of social life requires that the ordinary participant exclude much from conscious awareness….

The participant observer, in contrast, seeks to becomes explicitly aware of things usually blocked out to avoid overload. (p. 54 - 55)

The flexible nature of designing qualitative case studies was helpful in moderating the participant - observer/native researcher dualism and ambiguities typically associated with qualitative research. The resulting problem of this study unfolded like an unidentified flower, opening one petal at a time. The shape, color and scent of the bud are not sufficient to reveal the flower's genus or species until it is completely open.

Embedded in the process of assuming the role of participant-observer, I had to routinely imagined myself as a "fly-on-the-wall" to maintain the necessary explicit awareness as described by Spradley (1980). This focusing technique required me to frequently remind myself that I was observing events for the purpose of research and to widen the scope of what I saw and heard, much like a bored right outfielder in baseball who must frequently refocus his mind to the task at hand. My intentionality in achieving explicit awareness is also demonstrated in the ongoing collection of documents and media reports collected over the course of the event for the purpose of research.

Throughout the entire study, the investigator purposely engaged in careful reflection upon the threat of her native researcher stance to the integrity of the investigation and periodically sought out the formal and informal advice of peer

debriefers both familiar and unfamiliar with the events of the study. The purpose of these reflections and consultations was to maintain an awareness of the inevitable bias in the face of the inevitable confusion emerging from the tensions of simultaneously being a participant and the researcher. The outcome of these consultations was to provide the researcher additional insight and clarity from the perspective of other participants and to maintain explicit awareness as described by Spradley (1980).

Data Collection Procedures

Given that "any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing or accurate if it is based on several different sources of information" (Yin, 1994, p. 92), a variety of data collection methods were used in developing this study. These sources include sensemaking (Weick, 1995), media reports, inter-office memos and interviews with organizational members (Yin, 1994).

My being a native of the organization under study had positive and negative affects on the study. Being an insider facilitated the procurement of documents and identifying potential contributing interviewees and other miscellaneous issues of access. In particular, the time spent interviewing subjects was enhanced because the interviewee did not have to take time to explain who was who and what was what. The interviewee could move quickly through details, providing extensive rich and thick descriptions.

On the downside, being a native researcher of an event that invoked strong emotional responses among other organizational members posed risks to the job security and work relationships of the researcher. By the time the investigation began to take shape in the year following the actual events under study, many of the members of the

organization who would have been threatened by this investigation were no longer employed at the institution.

The biases of the native researcher about the organization and the people within it and the invisible interpersonal dynamics between the interviewer and interviewees who are also familiar colleagues shape a slippery slope. Inherent in the biases and dynamics are my personal values. These values are the seasoning of the soup called for by the recipes that cook up qualitative inquiry. "But when the investigator recognizes and acknowledges the part that values play, even to the point that the inquiry may be characterized as avowedly ideological, the strong sense of the impact of personal values is invoked" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 174). The selection of critical theory as the framework of this investigation is evidence of the my acknowledgment that it is the "*values undergirding the substantive theory* [italics in the original] that guides the inquiry... "(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 176).

Selection of Subjects

In this case, a combination of purposive sampling (Merriam, 1988) and a snowball technique (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) were used to select organizational members subordinate to the President who actively and purposely sought his resignation or were privy to the actions of those seeking his ouster by their physical proximity or interpersonal relationships. Interviews were initially conducted with organizational members identified through media reports as being involved in the events surrounding the forced resignation. Additional interviewees were identified through a snowball method (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) where interviewees were asked to recommend other potential subjects to the researcher. This method produced additional interview subjects

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previously unknown to the researcher as participants in the event under study. Identified research subjects included academic deans, tenured and untenured faculty, administrators at both the executive and middle levels of the organizational hierarchy, classified staff and a student who wrote an article related to the event for the campus newspaper.

The selection of subjects was limited by certain factors, such as the recency of the events under study, the sensitive nature of the case and the need to protect the privacy of interviewees. To protect the study and subject privacy, I utilized my tacit knowledge and the opinions of other organizational members to avoid inviting the participation of subjects who might compromise the study by revealing the names of subjects.

Thirty-two potential subjects were contacted by telephone and invited to participate in this study and 22 individuals agreed to be interviewed. One of the reasons given for declining the invitation to be interviewed was the fear of repercussions. Other subjects did not wish to relive the distasteful memories elicited by the events of the case, or because they felt participation would be disloyal to the ousted President.

Each interview lasted no longer than one-and-a-half hours and was conducted in a location selected by the interviewee. I personally transcribed the recorded interviews.

I originally intended the study to be a bounded case study beginning with the point in time where the University President suffered his stroke and ending with his forced resignation. Upon interviewing several subjects, it became clear that a case bounded by those parameters would not adequately represent the events under study. The majority of the interviewed subjects felt compelled to relay what they considered to be important precipitous events to the forced resignation. Given the preponderance of the collected data predating the event originally intended for study, and the salience of the

"bonus data" shared by the subjects, the researcher expanded the boundaries of the case to include all of the time frame described in the interviews.

Institutional Setting

The events of the case took place from approximately 1978 until 1996 at a small to mid-size, private, church-related, liberal arts institution. The institution has struggled for survival from the time of it's founding by devout Christian pioneers possessing meager fiscal resources but sufficient Protestant vigor, conviction and work ethic necessary to stay one step ahead of closure. In it's nearly 100-year history, financial exigency loomed at least three times. The first near closure occurred early in the institution's founding, the next near miss arrived during the Great U.S. Depression of the early 1930's and most recently, in the late 1970's following the exodus of students from the Middle East who made up a large proportion of it's revenue base.

Undoubtedly, this hardscrabble institutional history influenced the events and people of this case by self-selecting leaders and subordinates who could withstand the challenges inherent in under-funded organizations, such as low wages. The persistent shortness of funds caused the institution to be vulnerable to the whims and demands of potential sources of revenue, regardless of the quality or credibility of the potential revenue source.

Juxtaposed against this organizational dependence on scraping up funds from every possible source are institutional subordinates who dared to question the efficacy, ethics and direction of the institution's leadership. Much like an abused woman who believes she deserves to be beaten, the subordinates wonder if they themselves are

responsible for the institution's ills. Indecision, insecurity and isolation rests like an unmoving storm cloud over the institution until the threat becomes too great.

Data Analysis Procedures

Media reports were analyzed to create an accurate chronology, to verify and confirm the occurrence of events, and to identify interviewees. The interpersonal documents, such as inter-office memos, e-mail correspondence, and institutional documents were analyzed for the verification of events and to deepen the understanding of the subjects and the institutional climate. The collection of data ceased when sufficient data was amassed to achieve redundancy (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

After creating a timeline of the events as described by interviewees and media reports, the researcher used a cut and paste method to collate all of the data relevant to each event into a file. The constant comparison method as advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1981) and cited by Lincoln and Guba (1985) was employed as a means to produce "continuous and simultaneous collection *and* [italics in the original] processing of the data" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.335) was employed side-by-side with Spradley's domain/taxonomic development of cultural themes (Spradley, 1980).

Trustworthiness

The purpose of establishing that a qualitative research project is trustworthy is to ensure that the project will be useful to potential readers. Establishing trustworthiness does not guarantee consumers of the project that the findings and conclusions will be absolutely true, but that the construction of the study, analysis of the data and resulting findings were conducted with rigor and reflection employing acceptable research methodology. To summarize:

… trustworthiness is a matter of concern to the *consumer* [italics is original]

of the inquirer reports. It is that person who might wish to use the research

paper… who must be convinced that the study is worthy of confidence.

(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 128)

Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe four criteria from which the researcher can establish

trustworthiness: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.

Credibility

Credibility refers to the likelihood that the study can be believed by the consumer

(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In this study, credibility was established through the my deep

and prolonged understanding of the culture and events under study, balanced by the

feedback of peer debriefers. At the time of the events under study, I had been employed

at the organization for over 12 years and was in close proximity both in terms of physical

space and interpersonally to the actors in the case. My deep involvement on the part of

the researcher was tempered by the use of several peer debriefers, disinterested

individuals who forced me to expand the scope of my analysis, exposing my biases and

aspects of the organization that I may not have critically examined.

The triangulation of data sources was also used to establish credibility. Whenever

possible, I used more than one source of information to verify and enhance various

aspects of the case (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The sources included information provided

by interviewees and documents or media reports.

Finally, credibility was established through the use of member checks, "…

whereby data, analytic categories, interpretations, and conclusions are tested with

members of those stakeholding groups from whom the data were originally collected…"

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(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 314). Member checking occurred continuously throughout the project. Interviewees were offered an opportunity to review their interview transcripts to check for accuracy and to offer clarifying comments. Early drafts of the case were provided to interviewees who were asked to challenge researcher bias and to identify events important to the case that were not adequately described or missing.

Transferability

According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), it is the responsibility of the consumer of the research report to ascertain the transferability of a project. It is the responsibility of the researcher to provide ample rich and thick descriptions for the consumer to make an informed decision as to the usefulness of the study to his or her particular circumstances. My native familiarity of the organization was an advantage in providing thick and rich description for this study. This deep familiarity with the structure, players and history of the organization reduced the need for interviewees to provide background information, thus allowing the interviewee to efficiently provide richly detailed accounts of the events under study.

Dependability and Confirmability

The dependability of a study can be verified through the likelihood that the events described can be verified and that the documents utilized are authentic. Ascertaining the dependability of this case is limited by the need to protect the privacy and identity of the subjects of the case. The confirmability of the study is evidenced by the extensive use of documents and interview texts embedded in the construction of the case, the steps taken to avoid native researcher bias, and that the conclusions are based on logical inference emerging from triangulated data.

Ethical Considerations

The confidentiality of subjects was assured using a variety of methods. The name of the institution, and significant identifiers, such as location were altered. Transcriptions of interviews are stored under lock and key until the completion of the dissertation, when the audio-tapes and transcriptions will be destroyed.

Each interviewee signed a document indicating that their participation was voluntary and that they had the right to withdraw from the study upon request (Appendix A). Each interviewee was assigned a pseudonym by the researcher. Efforts were made to provide neutral pseudonyms to mask salient identifying features of the interviewee, such as ethnicity and position titles.

Summary

The descriptive, qualitative case study method is appropriate to this investigation because of the unique, context-bound nature of the event understudy. The researcher-human instrument adopted a participant-observer stance for the purpose of collecting data and maintaining the trustworthiness of the study. A variety of types of data were collected, including documents and media reports and subject interviews. A combination of the constant comparison method (Glaser & Strauss, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and Spadley's (1980) domain/taxonomic analysis for the purpose of developing cultural themes were employed for analysis of the data. The researcher used a variety of techniques to enhance the trustworthiness of the study, including prolonged engagement, peer debriefers, triangulation of data sources, member checks and finally, used rich, thick description in writing the case.

CHAPTER IV

WHEN PUSH CAME TO SHOVE

The Board of Trustees of Midwestern Christian University (MCU) held it's regular quarterly meeting in mid-March of 1979. Dr. Thomas Mathis, a local businessman and managing trustee of MCU, recommended that the Board declare a state of financial exigency for the institution. "The school anticipates an operating deficit of $650,000 for the current year, and a $1.6 million deficit for the 1979-1980 school year" (AA, Tuesday, March 23,1979, p. S8). Dr. Mathis explained the fiscal circumstances to the full Board:

> MCU's financial crisis had developed as a result of three factors: annual unrestricted gifts had remained constant over a period of five or six years; the dollar had declined approximately 30 percent in value during these same years; and, enrollment had declined during this period. (AB, 1984, p. 217)

The Board asked Dr. Mathis to develop a strategic plan to save the University. Dr. Mathis, and several other trustees, many of whom were prominent civic leaders, developed an austerity program that included:

> Cutting about 20 of the 116 faculty positions. Increasing tuition fees about 9 percent.... Placing the schools of management, music and performing arts and the [college of liberal arts] under one administration.... Two deans, some staff personnel and the faculty position eliminations [sic] will save the school $250,000 annually. (AA, Tuesday, March 23, 1979 p. S8)

In addition to reorganizing positions, the trustees embarked on "an ambitious 10-year, $25 million fund-raising campaign" (AA, Tuesday, March 23, 1979 p. S8).

Midwestern Christian University, is a private, church-related, liberal arts university, located in a large urban area in the midwestern portion of the United States. MCU is affiliated with a Christian denomination organized into districts, each presided over by a Bishop. The churches in MCU's district, under the supervision of the Bishop had a long history of supporting MCU through apportionment and considered MCU it's flagship institution. At the Annual Meeting of the leaders of the district churches held in late May of 1979, the Bishop:

> … set aside the printed agenda and spoke about the problems at [MCU] institution,   saying he had not come to [the state] to close [Midwestern Christian University]. He told of the institution's academic record and it's impact on the life and leadership of the conference, then asked the members of the [district] to help raise $3 million over the next eighteen months. He concluded with an announcement that the next day at 4:30 p.m. the business of the [district] would be suspended and members would be asked to give both their prayers and their pledges to save [Midwestern Christian University]…. The response was electrifying. People moved out from the pews to fill the aisles of the sanctuary and crowd the stairways from the balcony…. It was a never-to-be-forgotten spiritually moving experience for everyone present. Pledges totaling almost $200,000 were laid on the alter that day and more came in later that week…. The [district] voted to increase the annual apportionment for [MCU] to $750,000. It was obvious that [the denomination's members] were not going to permit another

[Christian University] to close.... A miracle of faith and commitment had saved the school. (AB, 1984, p. 221 - 223)

MCU secured fiscal solvency by December of the following year, largely due to successful fundraising efforts of prominent Mason City leaders and significant donations made by statewide Churches. The local business newspaper hailed the fiscal turn-around as a "dramatic rescue" and quoted Dr. Mathis, "It's a miracle" (AC, October 28, 1980, p. 1).

Integral to the recovery plan was finding a suitable replacement for the retiring MCU President Dr. Lemuel Jones. Dr. Patrick Wheelock, an alumnus of MCU had served in a variety of instructional and administrative positions at various private, church-related institutions. At the time of his appointment to MCU, he had completed his fifth year of service as president of a small church-related college in a neighboring state. At a press conference held to introduce him to the community, Wheelock prophetically quoted Samuel Johnson, "The future is purchased by the present" (AB, 1984, p. 224).

Strategies for Success

The positive press clippings contrasted with the rudimentary tensions developing between President Wheelock and the MCU faculty early in his administration. The misgivings expressed by faculty employed by MCU at the time of the exigency extended far beyond regret for lost academic programs and colleagues terminated in the wake of the financial crisis. From the beginning of his presidency, some MCU faculty perceived that Wheelock conveyed distrust, dislike and disrespect for them and processes of shared governance.

Dr. Gary Singleton, a professor with over 25 years of service at MCU, serving more than half of his career in various positions of leadership in faculty governance told of his first meeting with Dr. Wheelock which occurred within the first few weeks of Wheelock's appointment:

We went over to see the President to tell him that we were very happy that he was here and see if there was anything we could do to help him firm up the academic standing of the University. In that group was, [two professors], I was there and there may have been one or two others. We liked to think of ourselves as some of the real academics here at the University. We were down in his office that was not yet refurbished. I remember him sitting at a woeful desk, not even as nice as mine.... He was telling us about his plans for the University. I thought it was a very cordial meeting at this point. He wanted to start a Master of Liberal Arts program here. They had one at Johns Hopkins, and couple of other places, maybe the University of Rochester, and he thought he could make it work here. I said… "I think that if we started an MLA, that in order to establish it's credibility, it probably ought to have sort of a thesis attached to it". I think it was in the context that, we are not a Johns Hopkins so to bring credibility it ought to have a thesis. He was sitting here, and I was sitting to his left, and he turned and said, "that's just about the most ignorant thing I've ever heard." (GS, 2/15/01)

As plans to pull the institution out of financial exigency developed and decisions to eliminate academic programs progressed, one MCU faculty member recalled an incident concerning his perception that Wheelock manipulated the University's system of shared governance:

The first time [I was personally threatened] was when I headed the Faculty Senate Financial Exigency hearings on faculty dismissals. [Wheelock] personally called me into his office and told me flat out that I was responsible for holding the faculty in line. He told me that the University stood to lose large donations if the committee did not vote to sustain the administrations position on the firings, mentioning the owner of [a large company] as one in particular. I and everyone else would lose their jobs. When the Faculty Senate voted against the University and I reported it to the administration, I was forced to reconvene the Faculty Committee hearing and tell the committee that the Wheelock Administration had left documentation required by the Hearing Committee under my door when the committee voted against the University. To make the act of delivery appear genuine and done before the adverse vote, a University notary backdated the affidavit accompanying the documentation. The Hearing Committee then on the basis of the documentation voted to reverse itself and sustained the University. Under threat I had to carry alone the burden of deciding what I was told was everyone's dismissal or the dismissal of two people (to whom I apologized and confessed in person years ago)[parenthesis in original]. (Correspondence from former MCU faculty member to AR, 2/19/98)

Faculty accounts of university-wide gatherings held early in Wheelock's tenure perhaps reveal what would become a nearly two-decade long, rancorous relationship with the MCU faculty. Dr. Singleton describes Wheelocks's first address at an Honors and Awards Convocation, "It was a gathering and there were adults there. He talked about

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faculty plagiarism and dishonesty and that was a major pitch. I don't know why he was talking about it….He talked about the faculty being lazy" (2/15/01).

Another recollection of another early meeting with faculty presided by President Wheelock further reveals his attitude toward the faculty of MCU. "I remember he had a meeting in the Chapel with the full faculty, and gave a belligerent attack on faculty and one of the quotes that stuck in my mind was 'you ought to thank me for your job's" (LS, 7/15/00). At this meeting, Professor Lewis Speer responded sarcastically to the President's request for questions, "Yes I have [a question], but first I'd like to thank you for my job" (LS, 7/15/00). Another speech denigrated the profession of law, "he reminded the law school faculty of the number of lawyers who belonged to Hitler's SS" (GS, 2/15/01).

Faculty discontent with Wheelock's administration swelled in 1983. The Faculty Senate Executive Committee (FSEC) was pushing for a vote of censure against Wheelock because of his administration's failure to address the recommendations made by the visiting team of the recent accreditation self-study report:

Instead [of censure] we contrived a letter to the President outlining our concerns and how the University was not addressing concerns by the North Central Association…. We had a big meeting of the faculty, and I mean a big meeting, we had I would guess, eight out of ten faculty members were there campus wide crammed into [a meeting room]. A vote was taken on this letter which was thrown up on an overhead projector. There were no copies of this letter floating around…. They were sort of typing up the letter as the meeting was starting. It was a very close thing as to whether we were going to get this. We had a pre-

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meeting meeting after a series of other meetings. And so we wanted faculty to approve this letter of concern with explicit, one, two three four, like that. And they did, as I remember, by unanimous vote. The faculty wanted this letter taken to the president. Now the way we did was, there were no copies of this letter, literally no copies of this letter. The original plus the transparency…. They voted to have this letter carried to the president in person. And that was my job. (GS, 2/15/01)

The letter Dr. Singleton hand-carried contained a laundry list of issues including:

- A 3 year budget plan designed to raise faculty salaries by 20% while simultaneously minimizes instructional increases and reductions in the College of [Liberal Arts].

- The need to re-affiliate the athletic program from the National Collegiate Athletic Association to the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.

- Law School accreditation with the American Bar Association.

- Strengthening the role of faculty governance in the budget process. (Memo to President Wheelock from FSEC, 4/25/84).

The following year, the FSEC called a meeting to discuss the progress, or what they expressed as a lack of progress on the issues of concern. The President and the Academic Vice President, James Aldridge, represented the administration:

Nothing had been done. The President sat at one end of the table and [James Aldridge] sat at the other end. The President had the agenda ahead of time. Which may or may not have been a smart thing to do. And he said [James], would you read to them the letter, or something. So [James], like a toady, read a

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paper that indicated that all of these major concerns had all been addressed, that there were procedures in place. I had allowed myself to just be caught just like this, just completely. I couldn't even look up. (GS, 2/15/01)

During this period, FSEC's efforts were not limited to criticizing Wheelock's unwillingness to respond to the concerns of the visiting team of the 1982 accreditation self-study report. The FSEC and President Wheelock were engaged in a battle of wills over the representation of faculty voice to members of the MCU Board of Trustees. Members of the FSEC wanted to exclude members of the administration from meetings of the Trustee-Faculty Liaison Committee (TFLC) because they felt the presence of administrators beholden to Wheelock chilled the dialogue.

[Singleton] and I had several meetings with a long-time trustee who was chair of the [TFLC]. We spent two-hours of a three-hour meeting swapping stories, [and] then each school reps would be able to present what was going on in their school... a dog and pony show. At this point, the schools' representatives had no connection to the FSEC. In other words, you could have nine people on FSEC, six faculty on the TFLC and none of those people would overlap. Every item discussed was in the presence of the current Academic Vice President. I didn't know any better, but I quickly learned that everything you said went across the hall [to President Wheelock]. Out of the private conversations that [Singleton] and I had with [the chair of the TFLC], we were able to get that changed to an arrangement where the six school reps on FSEC were automatically on the TFLC.... and we would meet without the presence of the administration. (AR, 6/21/00)

Faculty Life

Faculty concerns about the Dr. Wheelock's leadership escalated late in 1985, five years after his appointment. In addition to his expressed dislike for faculty, the FSEC felt he was ignoring the promotion and tenure process and challenging tenets of academic freedom. In the 1984-1985 academic year, Wheelock summarily denied tenure and/or promotion to five junior faculty whose candidacies had received positive endorsements from all appropriate committees and the Deans of their respective schools or colleges. The FSEC responded to concerns forwarded by the University Promotion/Tenure Committee by initiating a war of correspondence with the President. An unsigned, undated, hand-written comment attached to an original copy of one of the deferment letters expresses one of the concerns, "Wording of the letters of deferment gave no indication of the weaknesses to be corrected, of the tasks to be performed. The candidates are essentially in limbo."

Correspondence forwarded to President Wheelock from the FSEC warns that he ignored criteria for promotion outlined on page 25 of the 1984 MCU Faculty Handbook:

These criteria are:

- academic competence in the faculty member's discipline;
- effectiveness in teaching; service to the faculty members profession;
- service to the University community and/ or larger community within which the University is located....

Any exceptions to the above criteria for promotion must be approved by the President after recommendations by the dean, appropriate academic unit promotion/tenure board, the University Promotion/Tenure Board, and the Chief

Academic Officer.... Additionally, we feel strongly that in any case the burden of proof is on the administration when it makes a recommendation that is contrary to a unanimous chain of opinion. It is incumbent upon the administration, we think, to show cause why a consistently favorable or unfavorable series of recommendations should not be followed.... The Executive Committee of the Faculty Senate now asks you to respond in writing to the concerns we have described in this letter. (Memo to the President from FSEC, 9/27/85)

The Chair of FSEC during this time period explained the events following the President's receipt of the memo:

What I remember happened, there went out a request for specific reasons [explaining the denial of tenure and promotion], because [FSEC] was approached by the aggrieved people, and we were acting in their behalf and I was writing the letter for the [University Promotion and Tenure Committee]. My letter was toughened by some members of the Committee and I then worked with it and sent it out over my name. No response came back, so a second letter went out. A response came back from the President, basically not giving us what we wanted. Then a third letter went out from me to the President. Not pleading as in pleading, but pleading the case for this. And it was probably that third letter that by that time had some bite in it from me. Now I have never written hostile letters but this was simply more stark .... The committee was pushing me the first time. Then I guess I was getting impatient. Finally, I may or may not have shown the last letter to the committee. It was sort of, this is wearing thin. When you reference earlier letters and that you have not gotten a response, right away, that's

racheting up, that's tightening the language. I do not remember if I got a response to the third letter. I may have. (GS, 2/15/00)

All five of the faculty whose tenure and promotions were deferred in the 1983-1984 academic year received tenure and promotion in the 1984-1985 academic year without incident.

In late spring of 1985, a search committee composed of faculty, MCU administrators and trustees forwarded the names of three candidates to Dr. Wheelock for the top post in the School of Law. Wheelock ignored the three candidates recommended by the search committee, instead selecting a candidate who the committee ranked low as compared to the other candidates. Dr. Singleton, chair of FSEC at the time of the selection describes Wheelock's reaction to faculty criticism of the decision:

The [search committee] went through a search process, presented their top three names to the President and to [Tom Mathis], who was sitting on this sort of administrative group.... Now [Harry Hindeman] was on that committee that met with the president and I distinctly remember [Harry] telling me at graduation that Spring, we were in our robes about to walk into the [facility] where the graduation ceremony was going to be held and [Harry] telling me that the President told him and maybe two other members of that law school committee that they were dirt stupid, the search committee, and that [Mathis]... told them that if they, the [search] committee, did not accept [the selected candidate], they would begin winding down legal education at [MCU].... Winding down legal education if you don't accept this man, is an explicit threat. (GS, 2/15/00)

Wheelock not only ignored tenure and promotion procedures and academic search

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committee protocols, he was not particularity sensitive to issues of academic freedom and free speech. A faculty member who served on the FSEC described President Wheelock's disregard for the tenets of academic freedom and freedom of speech when early in1986, a dissident Chinese student organization issued an invitation to a speaker. The local chapter of Amnesty International supported the invitation:

> A student organization heard of [the invitation], students who supported the government of Taiwan. They threatened the administration with loss of funds and loss of students. I knew about this because of a work study student in an administrative office who sneaked a copy of a letter from the Chinese student organization who gave it to somebody who gave it to me…. I took the sneaked out letter to FSEC and probably wrote a resolution, a good bit of it got gutted, but a letter resulted, addressing issues of freedom of speech. We should use this situation as a learning experience, and not kowtow to threats. (AR, 6/21/00)

The Chinese dissident was not permitted to speak at MCU, however, policy creating procedures for the approval of speakers was developed by the FSEC and approved by the Board of Trustees as a result of the conflict (MCU Student Handbook, 1988, p. 11).

Dr. Mary Warren's description of the first meeting she attended of the MCU chapter of the American Associations of University Professors (AAUP) provides another example of the chilly climate felt by faculty at MCU:

> I spent my first year in my office with my door closed as much as possible In between students just trying to prepare eight new courses. I really didn't do much of anything else, except I went to AAUP because I just assumed everyone else did…. My Dad was a professor and AAUP was a real big deal…. I went to AAUP

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even after I discovered only six people went, because I thought that that was something I should do. The very first meeting I went to, two people brought up that they were afraid to tell anyone that they went to an AAUP meeting because they weren't tenured. Would AAUP impact their ability to get tenure? I thought that was just ridiculous. How could that possible affect tenure? And there was sort of this sense that, no people who have come before have gotten tenure…. it really was a sense of "I hope nobody notices [we are meeting]." (MW, 3/18/01)

The International Connection

Nearly a decade after his appointment in 1979, President Wheelock was credited with substantial accomplishments in reviving the fiscal health of the institution through fund-raising efforts and increased enrollment. In 1988, MCU was midway through an impressive financial campaign whose goal was to raise $60-million dollars. An introduction to a published book chapter authored by President Wheelock stated, "Under his leadership the budget has been balanced every year since 1980, the permanent endowment quadrupled, enrollment increased 27 percent, new academic programs have been instituted and new facilities built" (AD,1988, p. 64).

A local weekly newspaper feature story on President Wheelock published in 1992 continues the recounting of his accomplishments.

Since 1979, the University's endowment has shot from $2.7 million to $38 million. The law school has survived; the library has been revamped and plans for a new law school building loom on the horizon. Enrollment has jumped from 2,600 students in 1978 to 4,195 last year. (AE, July 2, 1992, p. 3)

A prominent feature of this progress toward to fiscal health was the vigorous effort to recruit students from the Pacific Rim. Emulating the previous successes of the Latin American Studies program at the University of Texas at Austin, Wheelock embarked on an aggressive strategy to procure students from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (AE, July 2, 1992, p. 1 - 6).

Chris Daniels, the Vice President for International Services (IS), served as point man for these entrepreneurial international recruiting efforts which were highly successful from the standpoint of increasing enrollment. The infusion of students from the Pacific Rim to MCU began in 1984. International students paying full tuition invigorated the struggling coffers of MCU. The seemingly incongruent relationship between a small mid-western Christian university and students from Asia was mutually beneficial.

Chris Daniels' staff developed efficient internal administrative procedures providing the required immigration documents for international students in a matter of days. Moderate tuition expenses as compared to similar institutions, a nurturing academic environment and mid-western hospitality appeared to suit the needs of overseas students hungry for American academic degrees. Each year, from 1984 to 1996, the number of enrolled international students at MCU increased. The aggressive recruitment strategy expanded to other parts of the world, garnering students from a high of 72 countries in 1995, and making up over 25% of the total student enrollment (MCU Internal Enrollment Reports, 1984-1996).

Competing Elites

In addition to strengthening the institution's fiscal health through aggressive recruitment of international students, Wheelock was building an executive team to help him manage the growing university. In a published article, Wheelock wrote of his method for creating this team, a strategy he called the "competing elites":

This approach enables you to address complex administrative and academic problems that require analysis from many points of view and that encompass a variety of specialties….. a variety of sources provides both analyses and possible solutions that ultimately compete for assent and actualization…. to create an environment that will enable faculty and staff members to create and realize individual opportunity…. It is management's responsibility, in short, to create the circumstances that allow individuals and segments of the institution to develop and execute successful plans and programs that enhance their well-being in particular and that of the college or university in general. Management should not be expected to deliver successful programs in which faculty or staff passively participates. Colleagues who understand this should be rewarded, those who fail to understand the nature of managerial responsibility should not be rewarded. (AD, 1988, p. 70)

Logical prerequisites to the successful implementation of such a method are "elites" or senior staff members who are highly competent experts in their areas of supervision. In the eyes of some MCU faculty and administrators, the efficacy of this decision making method at MCU was dubious as most senior administrators lacked the

qualifications and experience as compared to peers in similar positions in academe (PM, 6/23/01). By 1995, Wheelock's administrative cabinet was composed of an executive vice president, Dr. Everett Williams, who was also his first cousin, and seven vice presidents overseeing administration, finance, church relations, public relations, international services, enrollment management and academic affairs. The Bishop in consultation with the President appointed the vice president responsible for Church Relations. The remaining seven cabinet members were selected through a search process. All were appointed directly by President Wheelock, absent formal consultation with any appropriate campus constituencies.

MCU faculty also shared concerns that several of the handpicked cabinet members did not have adequate academic preparation as compared to similar positions (SD, 6/9/00). The executive vice president, the vice president for international services and the academic vice president held terminal degrees, one vice president held a masters-level academic degree and remaining three had only completed bachelor degrees. Two of the vice presidents holding bachelors degrees completed their academic work in the MCU adult degree completion program (1995-97 MCU Catalog). One academic dean described how he perceived the "competing elite" methodology operated in practice:

> Well, there was very blatant favoritism as to raises, positions, and allocating of resources. [Wheelock] practiced the classic "patrone" system. You had to get what you wanted from the "Patrone". That's what he wanted. You had to go to him to get things. That was the source of power, you grant favors, or you withhold them. If granted, [the receiver was] beholden to him. Look, he did something nice for you, and in return you owed him at minimum loyalty, and he

might expect something. Loyalty to him, was not to question him. You could disagree with him, but you had to do it in a very indirect way. People who survived learned how to do that. It was very skillful. You had to first of all disconnect him from the idea and attribute the idea to someone he did not like. Then you could attack the idea as long as it wasn't his idea, he wasn't involved with it you could get him to agree with you. After [Aldridge] was gone, it was very easy to remind [Wheelock] that the idea was [Aldridge's] idea. He still liked [Aldridge] so you had to couch it in terms like [Aldridge] had these charming characteristics, but he was a little crazy. He would go home over the weekend and whip out a redesign of the University. [Wheelock] could accept that. You could never tell [Wheelock] directly that an idea that he was still attached to or attached to any of his buddies was bad. (SD, 6/9/00)

Wheelock also had a habit of being late for meetings:

It was a commonly known that if you had a meeting scheduled with Wheelock, you called ahead to the president's secretary to see if he was ready for you before going over there. Sometimes it would be hours after the appointment time before she let you know he was ready. Once you received an audience, rather than listen to you, he would go through his mail. (PM, 6/23/00)

[A vice president] told me a story once that he was [with Wheelock in his office] and they were looking at a men's clothing catalog. [The vice president] reminded him that he had somebody waiting to see him, and [Wheelock] said "Screw them, I'll bring them in when I choose to." (EL, 6/15/00)

"He was always late." (SM, 6/26/00)

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An academic dean who personally admitted his appointment was the result of patronage describes another method Wheelock used to gain compliance:

I was being interviewed by the trustees for the [dean's] position. I was asked what I saw to be one of the biggest problems in the [school] and I gave a very honest answer which was, the language skills of many of the international students. The interviews went quite well and I was feeling very good about that. I got a call from [Wheelock] the next day to have lunch with him and I did. To my surprise, for some reason [Chris Daniels] was there. We sat down for lunch. [Wheelock] looked at me and said, 'well, I am going to cut right to the chase', he said, 'I can't tell you how much damage you did to us yesterday by suggesting that there was a language problem with the international students'. He demanded that I write a letter of explanation to him as to what I meant about the problem of language with international students.... I sent him that letter very promptly and then about a week later he called me and said, 'I want this letter changed. What I want for you to speak to is the problem of language of American students'... It was highly manipulative and it was something that concerned me a great deal.... he was demonstrating to me that he was in charge and he could have me do whatever he needed me to do.... And if he had any back problems from my interview then he would have this selection of two letters. Well, that was somewhat embarrassing. (EL, 6/15/00)

Upon the unexpected resignation of long-time Academic Vice President, James Aldridge, Dr. Wheelock appointed Dr. Harold Goodenow, a member of the faculty in the School of Management as his replacement. Dr. Goodenow made it clear to the President

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and the campus that he was not interested in a permanent appointment to Academic Vice President. Dr. Wheelock thought otherwise and spent the next part of the year trying to convince him to accept the position permanently (HG, 2/16/01).

Dr. Goodenow abruptly resigned from the Academic Vice President position after serving for approximately one year. His resignation was partially due to his incredulity and disappointment over the funding of a non-academic program to be directed by Anita Satterley, who was known to be a close, personal friend of Dr. Wheelock (HG, 2/16/01). In a memo addressing the proposed program, Goodenow warned the President that the pro-forma submitted to justify the program was flawed and feared the program would unnecessarily cost the University money:

> In summary, I think there are many problems associated with this project. The pro-forma attached is a *very, very, very best case scenario* [italics in the original]. I think the income levels are overstated and the expense projections are understated. As far as the contract is concerned, in my opinion, it has been written in favor of [Dr. Satterley]. (Memo to Dr. Wheelock from Dr. Goodenow, 5/3/94)

In the wake of the Goodenow resignation, and without consulting faculty, Wheelock appointed Dr. Robert Habecker to the post. Most recently, Habecker held the presidency of a private college affiliated with the same denomination as MCU that had just lost it's regional accreditation because it was fiscally viable. Habecker's arrival eroded the previous work of Professors Singleton and Redmond to exclude administrators from meetings of the TFLC:

When [Habecker] came, he began to make a deal out of [the agreement that administrators not be present in the Committee meetings]. [Habecker] said, 'you don't do things like that'. At some point, [Wheelock] made a deal out of it in writing. [The previous chair] was gone and [Donald Fetter] was chair [of the TFLC]. [Fetter] as I understand it, to comply with Wheelock's insistence that administration be present, and on the other hand to insist that [Wheelock] not be present, a deal was worked out, which I was not always comfortable with it. [The Academic Vice President] would always be on call when this Committee met. The Committee would have time to meet before she came in. It got to the point in some meetings, that I would call [Fetter] and say that the faculty has nothing it wishes to discuss without the presence of an administrator. (AR, 6/21/00)

Habecker had a difficult, brief tenure as Interim Academic Vice President. His appointment without search or consultation was a serious point of contention for MCU faculty and staff (AR, 6/21/00; RH, 3/18/01). His perceived lack of effectiveness due to a lack of credibility with the faculty was complicated by limits imposed on him by Wheelock:

...One of the problems I had when I was [Academic Vice President] was my values include mutual support, I believe in it, and I have worked on it myself.... But I could not be supportive to the Deans the way I wanted to be supportive. I felt the Deans [were hesitant to cooperate with] this 'Wheelock' appointment who came from nowhere and suddenly is our [Academic Vice President]. You know, there was no search, and we are just expected to accept you, and even at that they did. They worked with me, they encouraged me, they informed me, they argued

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with me, all of those forms of respect that occur on a campus. When I wanted act in return to provide information that they needed as Deans to do their job, then I was most always vetoed at the presidential level. That bothered me. (RH, 3/18/01)

Wheelock's management of academic issues also stifled Habecker. After visiting with officials of MCU's regional accrediting body for the purpose of repairing a relationship damaged by James Aldridge, Habecker forwarded a memo to Dr. Wheelock:

[Wheelock] really didn't understand what was at stake. So, when I got back from [the out-of-town offices of the regional accrediting body] and wrote about the issue, he came flying into my office, just in a rage! [He said], 'What the hell do you think you are doing'? [I said], 'What are you talking about'? [He said], 'Well, this memo about our international student program. What do you know about that'? [I said], 'Well, not very much but I am investigating, I found this and that'. He said, 'this is none of your business, this is [Chris Daniels'] office'. I said, 'well fine, but they involve academic issues'. I was upset at this point. 'Aren't you interested in the truth'? He said, 'of course, just don't put it in writing'. So I am learning a lot about the culture of [MCU] and others subsequently told me, 'when you know something, tell [Wheelock], don't put it in writing'. Well then I learned also some other incidents with faculty and so forth and part of the problem is we don't have anything in writing. And neither did the faculty, and that is why they were feeling so vulnerable, and they should. Well, for just that reason. No one had a paper trail. (RH, 3/18/01)

The FSEC sought clarification from Wheelock as to whether the appointment of Dr. Habecker was temporary or permanent. Subsequently, Dr. Wheelock promised to begin conducting a search for a permanent academic vice president and that faculty voice would be included in the search. Dr. Habecker's name was included in the list of candidates along with Dr. Karen Henderson, an academic dean from a small church-related university in a neighboring state (AR, 6/21/00).

> I think there was a better [Wheelock] self... he knew that this was the way things ought to be, and occasionally did things right. Sometimes he made appointments of people that he knew were going to get him into difficulty. But at times he would really go with a good person for a job.... He may have felt that at some point he had it under control. At any rate, it happened that the two trustees on the search committee.... were very open to the faculty voice.... it ends up instead of having one faculty on the committee we had two.... Anyway we had those two faculty and trustees saying, 'hey wait a minute, this [Karen Henderson] is pretty good'. And it's out of hand. (AR, 6/21/00)

Dr. Henderson was a finalist for the academic vice president position. During the interview process a question and answer session was provided to all interested faculty. One faculty member described his recollection of the meeting:

> I essentially warned her in the faculty meeting, that she didn't want this job, and that she didn't know what she was getting into. She would be dealing with an unethical administration. I actually said those things in front of the entire faculty during her interview. A lot of folks thought I said those things because I didn't like her. The truth of the matter is, I said them because I liked her. (JB, 6/11/00)

A female staff member expressed a similar thought, "I met [Henderson] during her campus visit and really liked her. I joked to [another staff member], that we should call her up and tell her what it's really like to work here" (PM, 6/23/00).

Dr. Karen Henderson was appointed Academic Vice President of MCU in the Spring of 1995. Her appointment was a satisfactory victory in favor of strengthening shared governance, but some faculty and Deans were apprehensive about Dr. Henderson's ability to swim with the sharks in the "competing elites" environment. She was only one voice among eight scrambling for limited resources and she was the only one of the seven not directly appointed by Dr. Wheelock.

<center>The International Connection (Revisited)</center>

One charge of the University Probation and Retention Committee was to consider appeals from students seeking reinstatement after being dismissed for academic reasons. Committee protocol required that dismissed students submit a letter of appeal to include factors negatively impacting their academic performance and a description of their plans for elevating their grade point average to the required level for satisfactory progress. Students who appealed to have an academic dismissal overturned were allowed to appear in person before the committee if they desired.

In attendance at a meeting of the University Probation and Retention Committee held late in the Spring of 1996 were Dr. Karen Henderson, Susan Josephs, an academic counselor, Dr. Brian Sturdivan, Assistant Dean of the College of Business, and several other faculty and staff. Elena Belen Almarez, a junior, computer science student from Argentina appeared before the committee after the end of the Spring term in 1996. She

was academically dismissed from the undergraduate program for failing the necessary 2.000 cumulative grade point average.

In her appearance before the committee, Ms. Almarez explained that she failed her computer science courses because she simply did not understand her computer science assignments. This revelation was incongruent with the transfer check sheet in her admission file indicating she transferred sufficient credit hours in computer science and general education requirements from the Universidad del Sol Oro in Argentina as preparation for the MCU courses she failed. The committee had difficulty confirming the nature of the work completed because many of the Spanish academic documents were not translated into English. Her responses to questions from committee members about her academic experiences were very vague and sometimes contradictory (PM, 6/23/00). In an internal memo to President Wheelock documenting the case, Dr. Henderson wrote,

> The inconsistency of her competency in her courses that were supposedly taken at the Universidad del Sol Oro and the competency that she demonstrated in the MCU computer science department led one member of the committee to question the validity of the document during our first meeting." (Memo to Dr. Wheelock from Dr. Henderson, 5/21/96)

Dr. Henderson assigned to Susan Josephs the task of securing a reliable translation of the academic documents found in the file of Ms. Almarez. Susan took the file to an adjunct professor of Spanish who verified the concerns of the committee. "What we learned was that this was not a transcript at all, but a degree checklist indicating the courses that were involved in that particular degree" (Memo to Wheelock from University Probation and Retention Committee, 5/21/1996). Susan had discovered,

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with the help of the translator, that Ms. Almarez only earned nine credit hours from the Universidad del Sol Oro and that staff in the International Services [IS] inappropriately credited her with 53 hours of transfer credit. This verified the committee's suspicions that something was amiss with the statements Ms. Almarez had previously made to the committee.

Dr. Henderson reconvened the University Probation and Retention Committee to discuss Susan Josephs' findings. The committee members interviewed members of the IS staff involved and determined that the circumstances leading to the error involved more than a simple clerical error. Josephs' investigation revealed IS staff accepted transfer credit for Ms. Almarez based on an evaluation performed by a Spanish-speaking work-study student from Argentina who was a personal friend of Ms. Almarez. The flurry of questions from members of the Committee brought about by this discovery are documented in the following memo outlining concerns of the case:

The committee is concerned about the practice of allowing students to be involved at all in the translation and/or transcription of student records. It was not difficult for us to locate a qualified instructor of Spanish. Why did [IS] find it acceptable to take the word of a student who also happened to be a friend of the person who would benefit from the translation? Why did two [IS] staff members verify the "transcript" when the student's name was not on the document? …. The only explanation that an [IS] staff member gave the committee was that Elena kept returning to his office again and again without translation and he finally agreed to accept the work study students' translation because he had confidence in him. The fact that the IS staff member saw no potential conflict of interest in this

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situation is very disturbing to the committee members. (Memo to President from University Probation and Retention Committee, 5/21/1996)

Compounding the committee's concerns was the finding that as a matter of practice in the IS office, work-study students frequently translated academic documents and accepted credit for transfer coursework. A memo to President Wheelock from Dr. Henderson, and members of the University Retention and Probation Committee suggested three recommendations for preventing similar problems in the future:

No translations of transcripts by students should ever be accepted.... No work-study students should be involved in the handling of any student's academic record, this includes copying data from transcripts.... and a translation by a reliable third party not associated with the admissions arm of the university should be a requirement for admission to the university. The entire records keeping unit of the institution has relied on the credibility of the Office of [International Services] to verify the transcripts of our students. This case suggests some major modifications need to be enacted in order for us to have confidence in the integrity of our degree-granting process. (Memo to President from University Probation and Retention Committee, 5/21/1996)

Neither the President nor Chris Daniels from the Office of International Services responded to the memo nor it's recommendations. Due to the seriousness of the circumstances, Dr. Henderson continued to press the issue, writing a follow-up memo to update Dr. Wheelock on the case:

We recently received the letter from the [Universidad del Sol Oro] confirming the fact that [Ms. Almarez] had only completed 9 hours with a grade of C in each. In

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my June 21, 1996 memo to you, I outlined several recommendations that the committee made to keep such a situation from happening again. Now that we have the official word from her university, I would like to reiterate our recommendations. (Memo to Dr. Wheelock from Dr. Henderson 9/15/96)

This second memo from Henderson earned a written reaction from Daniels. In a memo to Dr. Wheelock and copied to members of the University Probation Committee and Cabinet, Daniels downplayed the issue:

> Four years ago [when Ms. Almarez was admitted], we were still developing a system for transfer of credits, which is now in place and we believe very successful. If the [Almarez] case were done today, a separate check sheet would be added, which would translate those courses into credit courses....

> At [IS], we do regret this error. I am afraid that I will not be able to guarantee that this is the last error that we will make, but I hope that we can be forgiven considering that we process over 2000 applications from 70 different countries per year. That is 500 applications per foreign student advisor. To this end, I appreciate and applaud the discovery made by the [University Probation Committee]. I believe these findings will certainly heighten our reasons to be more aware and diligent of such problems. However, outside of that, I believe the procedures we currently have in place are sufficient in offering the University "confidence in the integrity of degree granting process" [quotation marks in original]. (9/30/96).

The Stroke

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on March 26,1997, Estelle Wheelock discovered her husband on the floor of their master bathroom. He was conscious, but could not move his left side. Emergency room physicians treated him for stroke. The following morning the hospital listed him in critical condition. Physicians treating Wheelock expected him to make a full recovery (AA, 3/28/97, p. 10).

Mark Adams, Chief of University Police relayed descriptions of the scene at the Wheelock's home and the hospital:

They found him crumpled on the floor, so they called me quickly. I made it over and followed them over to the hospital and one of the first memories that sticks in my mind is [Estelle] hugging me and we sat in a little room, listening to gospel music. [Estelle] immediately began thinking of people to call and we began to go down the list of [MCU] VIPs, calling them all. The dispatcher made a lot of the calls and we had all the VIPs trickling in. We were there into the early hours of the morning, two or three a.m. The next day, what struck me, they actually had it set up to the point, he really couldn't have visitors, everyone was just hanging around up there, they actually had food service from [MCU] catering at the hospital. They took over an entire waiting room, it was a long room. I remember hearing a story once about when Stalin was in Russia and there was a party meeting. He made a speech and the hand clapping went on for four or five hours. No one wanted to stop clapping or they might get shot. (MA, 6/25/01)

Other University officials, present at the hospital in the days following the cerebral accident voiced similar uneasiness, "I felt very uncomfortable, sharing this discomfort. I don't know why we were there" (SM, 6/26/00).

I definitely felt like I had to make daily appearances. I remember my boss… checking with me to remind me to make my daily appearance[at the hospital]. Not that I had to, but saying have you been up today? You better get up there. (MA 5/9/00)

Other staff members shared their observations about the behavior of the President's wife at the hospital:

We were all called to the hospital on that Saturday, the day of the surgery. We were all in the waiting room of the floor. Food service was bringing in food. People were all milling around, and my perception was that [Mrs. Wheelock] was more concerned with what she was going to wear to church the next day. It was just crazy. I wouldn't want everyone my husband worked with there if I was worried that my husband might not survive…. This event should include personal friends and family members. I don't think [the Wheelock's] had any friends. All of their friends had to do with the University. When your whole life is tied up being the head person, you can't give it up. (SM, 6/26/00)

Mrs. Wheelock surprised another staff member because she seemed to be concerned about peripheral matters to her husband's health,

It was more like she was having a party with all these people and every now and then there would be some concern about her husband…. I went over to her and she said, "I just need to get away for a little bit, can we go someplace"?…. And

one of the things we did was go to the florist and pick up corsages for the girls

because it was real important that they had corsages because they had always had

corsages at Easter. And I thought, "why are you even thinking about that"?"

(WH, 7/12/00)

Several days after the initial stroke, the President's condition worsened, and he

"underwent weekend brain surgery to remove a clot and to lessen pressure in his brain

cavity" AA, 4/1/97, p. 12). Contrary to optimistic newspaper reports predicting a full

recovery, Wheelock's cousin, Dr. Williams secretly began coordinating the plans for a

funeral (HG, 2/16/01).

MCU Executive Vice President, Everett Williams was named Acting President.

Written notification of this appointment was not distributed to the campus community,

however, academic deans reported that the appointment was accepted as common

knowledge:

I never saw the memo that told me that [Everett Williams]… would be in

charge… [it was announced] individually to cabinet members in the hospital and

that [Williams] would be meeting with him on a regular basis, reporting things

indirectly through [Williams]. But that Everett had the authority to make

decisions. (SD, 5/9/00)

William's was acknowledged as the acting president and the academic deans immediately

began cooperating with him:

It was clear to me that [Williams] was in charge to the extent that there was some

official action on the part of the University…. I saw [Williams] as the desirable

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person to be in charge. I worked with him immediately and continually. (BF, 6/21/00)

One week to the day after the stroke occurred, Estelle Wheelock sent a campus-wide voice mail updating the health of the President. The first message "was very mild… they appreciated the flowers and such. A lot of us were thinking the information did not match the reality" (MA, 6/9/00). The campus continued to receive voice mail messages about every two or three days for several weeks:

> We kept getting the strangest, most embarrassing voice mail messages from her about his condition. They were embarrassing… She would say things like "oh, I just love my honey so much"… and I would think, this is not her persona…. They were embarrassing to listen to. (WH, 7/12/00)

Not only were the messages as incongruent with what members of the campus had observed of the Wheelock's marital relationship, they felt the messages were increasingly offensive:

> I remember that [Estelle] just said that if you want to help my husband, don't send flowers, send money to the general fund…. a little crass to raise money on the back of a sick man to balance the budget. (JC, 6/16/00)

The services of one staff member responsible for an aspect of campus telecommunications were sought out for relief from the solicitous messages, "people asked me, 'can't you do anything', and I said, I can't do anything" (DS, 6/16/00).

The voice mail messages ceased after staff and faculty began to complain to the acting president, Dr. Williams. A rumor floated that a faculty member informed a golfing buddy who happened to be a trustee of the offensive messages. A conversation

somewhere between the first hole and the clubhouse of a local golf course was widely

credited with the cessation of the solicitous messages (PM, 6/23/00).

About one month after his surgery and subsequent hospitalization, Wheelock was

transferred to a rehabilitation center.   His first public appearance was May 27, 1997

(AA, June, 4, 1997, p. 11).

I couldn't jive what Mrs. [Wheelock] was saying about his recovery with what I

knew from a professional standpoint. Oh he's walking around, he's doing this

and running around. Then in May, he came to the [MCU barbecue]. I took one

look at him and knew that everything Mrs. [Wheelock] was saying about him was

not correct to begin with. (SM, 6/26/00)

In early June, Wheelock was released from the rehabilitation center and allowed

to live at home, yet remained partially paralyzed on his left side. "[Wheelock] says he can

walk using an ankle brace, although 'most of my activity is confined to a wheel chair"

(AA, June 4, 1997, p.11). Although Wheelock assured the Board of Trustees, "I'm

pleased to update you now that I am making significant progress in my rehabilitation"

(Memo to Board of Trustees from Wheelock, 6/2/97), his daily physical therapy routines

disrupted the operations of the campus police:

They didn't want to hire anybody to take him in and out of the car, so they asked

for volunteers to take him back and forth. I was told that I was volunteering....

I was there, the only director-level person the rest were [vice presidents] getting

trained on how to take him in and out of his wheelchair.... I learned that [the

training] had all been a big sham. Basically, it was me and my department

transferring him back and forth to his therapy. Never once did a [vice president

who went through the training] help…. When I complained to the higher ups about the overtime, I was told to make it happen, we are not giving any extra to see that this comes off. When I complained that it was taking away from [the responsibilities of the campus police], I was told that it was the most important thing. (MA, 6/9/00)

Requiring the campus police to assist with the President's physical therapy negatively impacted the morale of the department and exposed President Wheelock's physical condition to public scrutiny. The messages provided by Wheelock's wife and his closest staff members were in contrast to the experiences of the campus police officers assigned to assist with his recuperation:

The campus was left with a thin campus [police force]. The officers had no training with physical therapy. They are trained to carry guns and deal with law enforcement. The officers were threatening to quit in mass. Our morale was low and they were furious at me for letting it happen. I wasn't a leader because I didn't stand up and say we are not going to do this. I tried to help as much as I could. I would do my share of the shuttling back and forth. I wasn't asking them to do anything I wouldn't do myself, but that didn't help….It further really killed morale around here. The guys were seeing first hand that the man couldn't walk, or even control drinking. They would try to do nice things for him like go to [an ice cream shop] to get him an ice cream and he would spill it all over himself. They would come back [to campus] where the official line was still coming out, that he was walking. It was right in this period where they held a mandatory training for staff. I don't remember who did it, but they stood up and announced

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that he had actually run a few steps. It wasn't just good enough to be walking, he was almost back to normal. And it was just a big joke in our department. (MA, 6/9/00)

A New Academic Program

Shortly after his return home from the rehabilitation hospital, Dr. Wheelock involved himself in the operations at MCU even though Dr. Williams was still Acting President. Wheelock asked Dr. Henderson to visit to the physical therapy department at Rockhill University for the purpose of assessing the feasibility of implementing a similar academic program at MCU. "He demanded that we start a physical therapy school [at MCU].... [Henderson] told him, '[Rockhill] is starting school soon just like we are, if we wait to visit they will be more willing to talk to us" (SM, 6/26/00). Dr. Wheelock interpreted Dr. Henderson's lack of enthusiasm for the physical therapy program as disloyalty (BF, 6/21/00). Faculty became nervous about the prospect of the adding a program without adequate resource allocations:

Clearly, we were nervous about it, because in the sciences we were severely understaffed.... We already serviced nursing, pre-med and we had about 50 majors. We didn't have enough faculty.... Some programs can be put in place because you don't need facilities. Physical therapy is not one of those programs. (JC, 6/16/00)

Dr. Henderson, with assistance from Sarah Markum, Dean of the Nursing School initiated a half-hearted study of implementing a physical therapy program. One of the first professionals Sarah Markum contacted was a high level administrator of a regional, public, school of allied health. The official discouraged the notion saying, "you don't

want to touch [physical therapy] with a ten foot pole…. I am losing almost a million dollars a year on the program'… then it turned out they weren't even accrediting any more Bachelor of Science programs [in physical therapy]" (SM, 6/26/00). A memo written by Wheelock to members of his cabinet justifies adding a physical therapy program and perhaps reveals his frame of mind, "It's a lost enterprise that assumes we'll be serving the same market with the same project in five years time. Killing time murders opportunities" (Memo from Wheelock to Members of the MCU President's Cabinet, 9/2/97).

<div align="center">Transfer Credits Under Fire</div>

Not only did Henderson and Wheelock disagree over the possibility of adding a physical therapy program, their conflicts over practices concerning the evaluation of international student transcripts and subsequent acceptance of transfer credit for required MCU general education courses were escalating. Within the MCU organizational structure, the function of recruiting and admitting students was bifurcated into divisions serving specific student populations each supervised by a different vice-president. The Offices of Undergraduate and Graduate Admissions recruited domestic students and were under the supervision of the Vice President for Enrollment Services. The Office of International Services was responsible for recruiting undergraduate and graduate international students and was supervised by Chris Daniels.

IS was responsible for more academic-related responsibilities than those areas responsible for recruiting and admitting domestic students. Whereas IS had the authority to accept academic transfer credit from international universities, domestic students submitted requests for the acceptance of transfer credit to individual academic

departments. This distribution of responsibility evolved in the early 1980's when most of the institution's international students were enrolled in the School of Management. Dr. Mathis, the newly appointed Dean for the School of Management did not get along with a long-time Associate Dean of the School of Management whose responsibility it was to evaluate the acceptance of transfer credit for international students:

[Iris Keagan] was the [Associate Dean of Overseas Programs], and when [Dr. Mathis] came to be the Dean, [Iris] and [Dr. Mathis] didn't like each other. So [Wheelock] decided to solve the problem, because both of them were popular. So he created an office in International Services called the Dean of International Programs. And when [Iris] was over there [the acceptance of transfer credit] was okay because [Iris] had some sense in transferring this stuff. (BS, 2/20/01)

Moving Iris Keagan from the School of Management to IS effectively transplanted an academic function into a unit responsible for recruitment. This move eventually led to what some MCU faculty considered a breakdown of checks and balances necessary to protect academic integrity at MCU. "After [Iris] retired, she gave [the position] to [Steven Gerry]. Over time, Steven Gerry deviated from the norm and did things he really shouldn't do" (BS, 2/20/01).

In early June, Dr. Sturdivan, Associate Dean of the School of Management met with a Lebanese undergraduate student who was having difficulty being certified for graduation:

[The Lebanese student] was lacking an accounting course. He took the accounting course three times and couldn't pass the course. He dropped, he got an "F", he had an incomplete [grade], all different kinds of things. He wanted to

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transfer an accounting course from another institution. Based on the residency requirements I told him he had to complete the course [at MCU]. After he left, I went back and looked at his file. I discovered that he was given credit for two prerequisite accounting courses. I saw that they were not really valid for transfer courses…. it was June and…I didn't have much to do…. I pulled files, file after file. I spent the afternoon and looked at fifty files…. Some files from Sweden transferred trade/hotel management courses…. One course, Bar and Wine Management was given for Business Ethics, or something like that. (BS, 2/20/01)

As in the Maria Belen Almarez case, the findings of Dr. Sturdivan's audit of the international student admission files demonstrated that the office of IS inappropriately accepted course work from institutions outside the United States for transfer credit at MCU. A Swedish student:

"was awarded 45 hours of transfer credit from the [Swedish School of Hotel Management]. This credit included Religion and Philosophy credit, one course in Economics II, a course in business ethics, three business electives, and four upper-level business electives…. From the [Management School] perspective, the idea of granting upper level business electives for these courses was more than a bit disconcerting. Try as we might to find some correlation between the transcript and the credit given, we still could not even find a course remotely resembling Business Ethics, Economics II or Philosophy/Religion (unless they were counting Wine and Bar since some religious rituals use wine in their ceremonies) [bold in original]. (Memo from Dr. Henderson to Dr. Williams, 6/19/97)

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The same memo outlined findings from Dr. Sturdivan's audit where transfer credit was awarded for unrelated courses, "**There were no business courses listed on the Punjab transcript, yet he was awarded credit for nine business courses**" [bold in original] (Memo from Dr. Henderson to Dr. Williams, 6/19/97). The discrepancies in the awarding of transfer credit were so numerous that it was obvious that this was not an isolated mistake but, indicative of a systematic practice of inappropriately over-awarding transfer credit for the purpose of recruitment. One MCU faculty member who reviewed the findings of Dr. Sturdivan's audit noticed a pattern:

> I was extremely pleased to see that when it came to systematic [awarding] that philosophy, psychology and religion were departments that were being circumvented in the [awarding of transfer credit]. There were a lot of reasons for that. It wasn't just the difficulty of the courses, but I would like to think that at least a part of it had to do with the fact that [the liberal arts faculty] were upholding standards.... we monitored what was going on and we talked to people. So that gave [IS] extra incentive to doctor things in our areas. So I was pleased that when the shit hit the fan, those three were the three named as the three areas in which the abuse was most systematic. Basically [IS was] taking anything. In the case of religion, I am sure it was not just the case that the faculty was involved, but that [international student] didn't want to take the religion requirement. It was utterly foreign to them. (JB, 6/11/00)

Alarmed by his initial findings after reviewing about 50 files, Dr. Sturdivan and his staff conducted an intensive audit of the admissions files of international students recently admitted to the University. They reviewed over 150 files and found "almost all

of them had questionable issues regarding transfer credit into the [MCU] curriculum"
(Memo to Dr. Williams from Dr. Henderson, 6/19/97). A follow-up memo written by Dr.
Henderson lays out an argument against the transfer credit acceptance practices in the IS
office, citing the handbook of MCU's regional accrediting body:

The Commission's General Institutional Requirements (GIRS) reflect the
Commissions basic expectations of all affiliated institutions of higher education,
whether candidates or accredited (*Handbook of Accreditation, 1994-1996, p. 19*)
[italics in original]. The GIRS that apply to this particular issue are GIR #16 and
GIR # 17....

The Commission defines general education thusly (emphasis mine) [in
original] 'General education is general in several clearly definable ways: **it is not
directly related to a student's formal technical, vocational, or professional
preparation: it is a part of every student's course of study, regardless of his
or her area of emphasis,** [bold in original] and it is intended to impart common
knowledge, intellectual concepts, and attitudes that every educated person should
possess'....

GIR #17 reads as follows: 'It has admission policies and practices that are
consistent with the institutions' mission and appropriate to its educational
programs' (*Handbook of Accreditation, 1994-1996,* p. 24) [italics in original].
The [*1994-1996 MCU Catalog*] describes the centrality of the General Education
program to the university.... all students are required to undertake a portion of
their undergraduate course work in a general education program.... Designed to
initiate the student into those disciplines and traditions of western culture which

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have proven to be valuable resources in the individual search for meaning and self-understanding. Accordingly, such disciplines as literature, philosophy, psychology, history, government, economics, mathematics and science are presented as living, dynamic human processes, ways of structuring thoughtful inquiry into the nature of the human condition. Actual course requirements vary with the degrees offered by different undergraduate faculties of the University. [*MCU Undergraduate Catalog, 1994-1996, p. 46*] [italics in original]…

We cannot therefore, simply assign a number of transfer hours and ignore the general education component of the undergraduate curriculum. That is not an acceptable solution [Bold in original]. (6/19/97)

Acting President Williams called a meeting to discuss the matter with Dr. Daniels, Steven Geery, the academic deans from the School of Management, the University Registrar and Karen Henderson. Drs. Henderson and Sturdivan recommended reassigning the responsibility for evaluating transfer credit for international students from IS to academic personnel under the authority of the School of Management:

[IS] personnel could assign raw hours that will transfer in to MCU but the individual school must determine how and if the hours convert to their specific programs in the MCU curriculum. In fact, this recommendation corresponds with the practice followed in [the MCU office responsible for domestic undergraduate admissions]. (Memo to Dr. Williams from Dr. Henderson, 6/19/97)

Steven Geery, the IS staff member whose acceptance of courses taken overseas for transfer credit were criticized by Henderson and Sturdivan defended the IS transfer credit practices by downplaying Sturdivan's findings. Referring to the case of the

Lebanese student, Geery "admitted the mistake but said that this was only one mistake out of thousands that he had done correctly" (Memo to Dr. Williams from Dr. Henderson, 6/19/97). Vice President Daniels expressed concern that moving the acceptance of international student transfer credit to the School of Management would negatively impact the ability of his office to quickly admit students and ultimately reduce the flow of tuition revenue. Dr. Williams concluded the meeting by asking that the parties conduct more research on the problem and formulate a solution.

While away at a professional meeting in Los Angeles in early July, Drs. Henderson, Sturdivan and Williams discussed the matter. Dr. Williams agreed that the inappropriate acceptance of transfer credit violated accreditation standards requiring that students earning degrees complete the particular institutional general education requirements. To prevent future violations of this accreditation standard and to make the practice consistent for domestic and international students, he agreed to relocate the authority to accept transfer work for MCU credit from IS to the School of Management. Williams also authorized the creation of a new position to be supervised by the Dean of the School of Management, responsible for reviewing the academic records of admitted students and acceptance of transfer credit in accordance with established MCU curricula (KH, 2/4/01).

Chris Daniels reacted to Dr. Williams' decision to shift the transfer credit responsibilities from his administrative unit to the School of Management by notifying Dr. Wheelock of the decision:

[T]here was a late night visit that [Daniels] and his wife made to [Wheelock] and [Estelle]. To say to [Wheelock], whatever you can do to get back over there, you have to do it. The troops are in wide scale mutiny.... (RH, 3/18/01)

Through a series of memos written while he was recuperating at home, Wheelock put the brakes on William's mandate shifting the responsibility of evaluating transfer credit from IS to the School of Management:

I have reflected at length at length on the matter wirth [sic] care and have determined that such a transfer of responsibility is not in the best interest of the University and will not take place [underline in original]. While I am open to discussion on this matter, my opinion is firm. (Memo from Dr. Wheelock to Dr. Williams, copied to Karen Henderson and academic deans of School of Management, 7/30/97)

Henderson countered Wheelock's edict which effectively squashing the transfer of responsibility:

I am glad that you are open to discussion on the matter of transfer credit evaluations. After we complete the opening school activities, I will set a meeting with you to discuss the various facets of this matter. There are significant accreditation issues regarding the process that must be addressed by Midwestern Christian University. I know that when serious academic issues arise you want a detailed analysis from your chief academic officer. (Memo from Karen Henderson to Dr. Wheelock, copied to Dr. Williams, and two academic deans for the School of Management, 8/1/97)

Wheelock's response to Henderson's concerns warned of the consequences to the efficiencies of recruiting international students should his decision in the matter continue to be questioned:

I look forward to meeting with you concerning the matter of transfer credit evaluations. It is important for you to know that I have already made a careful review of the question. These [sic] are serious questions concerning efficiency in the student recruitment process that we will ignore at our peril. These concerns outweigh other concerns in this matter. (Memo from Dr. Wheelock to Dr. Henderson , copied to Chris Daniels, Dr. Williams and the Dean and Associate Dean of School of Management, 7/30/97)

The President Returns

About eight weeks after his return home from the rehabilitation center, the local daily newspaper announced Wheelock's return to campus following his illness, "[MCU] President Returns Sooner Than Expected". The article described the circumstances of his return" (AA, August 3, 1997, p.9). The newspaper article described his work schedule and physical condition:

Months ahead of schedule, the President of [Midwestern Christian University] is back on the job. As of this week, he spends four hours a day pursuing administrative duties at the 4,700-student liberal arts university at [Mason City], four hours in an office at his nearby home, and two to four hours in outpatient therapy. (AA, August 3, 1997, p.9)

A hand-made banner hanging in the living room of the president's welcomed the President home, "[Patrick Wheelock], We love you, You ARE [MCU]. With the word

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'are' in all caps. It brought to mind for me the old Louis the 14th saying…'I am France'. That he was [MCU]" (MA, 6/9/00). One of Estelle Wheelock's former staff members speculated that Mrs. Wheelock was instrumental in encouraging her husband to return to work:

> She was very aware that if he was out, she was out, and power was very important to her. Therefore, I think that she was trying to influence him to come back. On the other side of that…I would hope what every woman would feel about her husband is just this tremendous will or wish that he would come back fully the way he was…. I can't discount that. But I also know that that loss of power was a clear and present danger…. That he would lose power, therefore she would lose power. (MW, 3/18/01)

Wheelock's return was accompanied with many changes to the physical landscape of the campus and solidified concerns about the prognosis for his recovery:

> By August he was coming in on partial days. The physical plant was trying to dash around putting wheelchair ramps all over campus. Which was an irony in itself because as early as 1995, the previous director [of the campus police] had spent a day trying to go around campus in a wheelchair to demonstrate how wheelchair ramps needed to be put in. The American Disabilities Act came out in the 90's requiring that we be handicapped accessible. [Wheelock] wouldn't have anything to do with it until he was absolutely forced. I remember an incident….we had a basketball game in the field house and a man in a wheelchair who was a fan of [another university] complained that there weren't any accessible bathroom facilities in the field house. [Wheelock] came up with some

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alleged compromise that would hush up the guy. No real changes were made and there was a very hostile attitude toward handicapped people. He's in a wheelchair now, we had to scramble to put in ramps everywhere, an officer available to wheel him wherever he needed to go on campus. Which at the time is ironic, because they are still putting out the lines that the man could walk. Now people were seeing him in a wheelchair. I think the line was that he was just resting. He was so weary from doing his physical therapy. (MA, 6/9/00)

The MCU Faculty Workshop was scheduled for the week following Wheelock's return to the presidency. For many faculty, it was an onerous, mandatory dog and pony show whose only redeeming qualities were a free lunch, meeting new faculty and reconnecting with good colleagues after the long summer (PM, 6/23/01; JC, 6/16/00). The 1997 Faculty Workshop was scheduled one week after Dr. Wheelock's surprise resumption of presidential responsibilities. A member of the FSEC recalls the days prior to the Workshop:

> I'll never forget this. It was two days before faculty workshop, I got a call from Andrew Redmond [current chair of FSEC]….He called and said that [Wheelock] was going to name [Laura Hansen] Provost and she would be over [Karen Henderson]. That started a whole chain of events. From an academic viewpoint, I thought it was very detrimental to the course of the University. [Laura Hansen] didn't have a terminal degree, she had no experience, and frankly we thought she was chosen to be a "yes" man and that [Henderson] had been too strong in her interactions with the President. Clearly he wanted to minimize her power or influence. (JC, 6/16/00)

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Dr. Henderson was also distressed about the impending announcement of the Provost appointment. She learned of the proposed position during the first cabinet meeting that Wheelock held upon his return. The job description outlining the Provost's duties which was distributed by Wheelock (Document outlining Provost duties, undated), was a blatant aggregation of her job responsibilities and those of Acting President Everett Williams. In addition to feeling her own position threatened, Henderson was concerned that a reasonable, standard protocol for creating and selecting such a position had not been followed. By any reasonable standard, the selection of such a high-ranking position in an institution of higher education would involve a search that included appropriate campus constituencies, and the candidates would be required to possess a terminal academic degree and significant administrative experience. Barry Firestone, Dean of the School of Law informed her that Wheelock planned to announce the appointment at the Faculty Workshop (BF, 6/21/00). It was clear to Henderson that the stage was being set to push her and Dr. Williams out (KH, 2/4/01).

A strategic planning session for the Deans' Council was scheduled the day following the cabinet meeting where the proposed Provost's job description was distributed. The Deans voluntarily set aside the pre-arranged agenda and discussed the upending Provost appointment. One dean concluded, "[Laura Hansen]… was perceived as being just a ventriloquist dummy for [Wheelock]" (BF, 6/21/00). Another dean expressed concerned for Hansen's welfare:

> It wasn't appropriate. [Laura] took the job on good faith, [Wheelock] needed her
> help and she had no understanding about what she was walking into…. I told her
> that this was a mistake that the President was trying to get her to push

[Henderson] to the side and the Deans would not support her and that I would guess that there would not be any support among the faculty because she was so unknown…. Everyone saw it as a political ploy on the part of [Wheelock]. (SD, 6/9/00)

On the way to her office the morning following the Deans' Council's planning session, Dr. Henderson made a pivotal decision. Barely greeting her staff, she went straight to her office and began composing a letter to Dr. Wheelock, protesting what she believed was an illegitimate appointment. Mid-way through her composition, Dean of the School of Law, Barry Firestone telephoned her to discuss an upcoming American Bar Association accreditation visit. She confessed to him that she was preparing the letter. Firestone asked if he could include his signature on the letter and suggested that the other deans would also like to be included (BF, 6/21/00; KH, 2/04/01). Within hours, the letter was signed by all nine of the MCU deans and associate deans and was hand-delivered to the President's home (PM, 6/23/00). The letter read:

After careful consideration of the proposed appointment of Professor [Laura Hansen] as the Provost of Midwestern Christian University, we have the following strong objections:…. It is inappropriate for a person without a terminal degree to have authority over the entire academic program…. The lack of any higher education administrative experience, beyond the department chair level makes this proposed appointment of [Laura Hansen] inconsistent with the credentials of university provosts…. The suddenness of the structural change… without seeking input from the Deans Council and the Faculty Senate Executive Committee will not generate confidence in the [MCU] academic community with

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this appointment. We strongly urge you to postpone any official announcement until a thorough discussion of the job description and the credentials of the Provost be discussed with the appropriate academic constituencies. (Letter to Wheelock from Dr. Henderson and Academic Deans, 8/14/97)

In addition to fueling the impetus of the protest letter, Dr. Firestone had a private conversation with a member of the Executive Committee of the MCU Board of Trustees, Anthony Roberts:

[Wheelock] was also working some of the trustees, and I remember now that things came to a head at the time of the opening of the academic year. I decided at that time that [Karen Henderson] was on the verge of getting fired. I talked to [Anthony Roberts]. [Anthony] was a big supporter of [Karen Henderson].... I told him exactly what was happening to the best of my knowledge. I told him that [Karen] was going to be fired by [Wheelock], probably within hours. [Anthony], I know talked to [Karen]. He learned enough to know that I was telling the truth. [Anthony] then called or spoke to [another trustee], and prevailed upon [him]. Anthony and [the other trustee] talked to [Wheelock] and told him that he was not going to fire [Henderson]. [Henderson's] position was saved at that time. (BF, 6/21/00)

Dr. Firestone explained his rationale for alerting Anthony Roberts of his concerns:

I weighed the benefits and risks of doing that very carefully before I talked to [Roberts]. I thought the risk was obvious, I could be fired. The benefit I think was saving the institution from incalculable harm. Losing [Henderson] would have been an unbelievable tragedy. For [Henderson] for sure, but also for the

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institution itself. It would have entrenched [Wheelock].... [He] was back... doing whatever he wanted to do. Having established that no one could stop him, who knows what he would have done to the institution. (BF, 6/21/00)

The anticipated announcement of the provost position did not materialize during the Faculty Workshop as expected. Wheelock addressed the faculty:

I remember at Faculty Workshop, he got on this little jag... how he always talked to the faculty, that we were going to have a physical therapy program and that we better get with the program. Either get on board about this or leave [MCU]. I remember he was very dogmatic in his presentation.... I had a very clear picture that he was not acting in the best interest of [MCU]. (JC, 6/16/00)

As the weekend progressed, Wheelock made appearances at other events related to the opening of school and staff members formed their opinions as to the appropriateness of his return to duties:

There was that staff function where [Wheelock] got up on stage and started crying, and everyone was so sad. I remember seeing them wheel him into the lobby, and I thought, 'here is this big man who is used to everyone looking up to him, and now he is the one who had to look up'.... He spoke a little and then got upset, everybody was real emotional. He thanked everyone for the cards and all that. (NJ, 4/11/01)

At the [dinner], he was trying to speak, and [Mrs. Wheelock] was kind of telling him what to say. I know that was typical, but he rambled more than he had in the past, like he was totally unaware and he wasn't just doing it to intimidate or show power, he was just unaware and kept rambling. And she sitting there and holding

papers for his speech and it seemed so clear to me and probably most of the people in the room, that this man was not fit to be back on the job. And he certainly wasn't fit to make the type of decisions he would have to make for an institution like this if he was having trouble doing some of these things. (MW, 3/18/01)

Members of the campus community continued to question Wheelock's readiness to resume his presidential duties when he gave his traditional opening of school speech:

[Wheelock] always made a speech at matriculation. He always wrote the speech and delivered it. He insisted on doing this now. [Mrs. Wheelock] and [Laura Hansen] took over the public relations aspect of putting the best face on this…. We had to have a special ramp so he could be wheeled up to the stage of the Chapel…. They changed out the podium and got a little table for public relations purposes. They asked me to sit beside him and hold the speech. I was to wheel him up there and turn each page while he read it. I was given a copy of the speech so that I could be familiar with it when he read it. I had never thought his speeches were inspiring…. [The speech] had a fable in it. It would go like a broken record where you are playing along and somebody bumps the needle to another tract and it goes along and gets bumped to another tract. (MA, 6/9/00)

Wheelock activities were not limited to public appearances for the opening of school. He telephoned a member of the Deans' Council:

He called me and was very threatening over the telephone in terms of the resources that were available to the school. He said, "obviously this [international

student transfer issue] is going to affect our enrollment" It was extraordinarily uncomfortable. (EL, 6/15/00)

A staff member recalls another telephone conversation from Wheelock to an academic dean:

> The whole thing was kind of ugly. After that letter [protesting the Provost appointment] went out, I remember standing in [Ed's] office. The phone rang and it was [Dr. Wheelock]. I could hear [Dr. Wheelock] and I could hear [Ed]. [Ed] would give an occasional yes, his face was red and I could see his blood boiling and I did hear [Wheelock]. He was talking very loudly. He was telling [Ed] that he ought to fire him, and that he wouldn't get another job in education or in this town and that he could get loyal people like [Chris Daniel] a job tomorrow, in no time at all, because he was so competent and [Ed] was so incompetent. (WH, 7/12/00)

Two of the academic deans attempted to smooth things over by making a personal visit to Wheelock in his office:

> So [Ed] and I did meet briefly with him about this.... [Wheelock] was pissed off at everyone. 'You guys made a big mistake'.... We wanted to lower the level of the rhetoric and start talking about how we are going to deal with the problem that brought all of this on. He just dismissed us. We never got a chance to reason with him at all. [Wheelock] sent out a counter memo, reinforcing the Provost position and my guess is at that point, the only thing he realized that he had not done was to get Board approval. He brought it to the Board of Trustees (BOT) for approval, and the BOT did not automatically grant approval. The factions on

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BOT that wanted [Wheelock] out for other reasons saw this as an opportunity. (SD, 6/9/00)

A former member of the cabinet describes Wheelock's treatment of Dr. Henderson during a cabinet meeting held several days later:

It was the first cabinet meeting where [Wheelock] was so explicit in his feelings of anger. He had been angry before, but not anger directed very personally and directly at someone.... so it all kind of caught us, because in spite of all the sexist jokes, and panty jokes and innuendoes, he never used vulgarities or expletives in cabinet. Of course there were other times, but never in cabinet. So when this occurred, [Karen Henderson] began to write. And he mumbled loud enough for us to hear, 'Oh there, the President said a naughty word and Miss [Henderson] is going to write it down. There will probably be others, you better keep your pencil ready'. I mean it was such a dressing down. It was degrading. (RH, 3/18/01)

Penny Moore was working late that evening when a puffy-eyed Dr. Henderson returned to her office after the cabinet meeting. Rather than stay and chat with Penny as was her usual practice, Henderson closed her office door and composed a formal grievance against Dr. Wheelock (PM, 6/23/01). The next morning, the MCU Director of Human Resources found the confidential complaint from Dr. Henderson waiting on her desk. In the written statement, Henderson accused Dr. Wheelock of promoting a "hostile work environment" (8/16/97). She listed several complaints in the letter. First, she protested the creation of the Provost position whose responsibilities included her own and Dr. Williams. She accused Wheelock of making threatening phone calls to the academic deans under her supervision. Finally, she expressed concern that Wheelock conducted a

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covert search for a faculty member to fill the position to be vacated by provost appointee Laura Hansen (Memo to MCU Director of Human Resources from Karen Henderson, 8/16/97).

Members of the Executive Committee of the MCU Board of Trustees met with Everett Williams to discuss Karen Henderson's grievance against Wheelock and the issues raised by Henderson and Sturdivan concerning the granting of illegitimate transfer credits for international students. Williams verified to the trustees that the claims of violations of academic integrity had merit. The trustees at the meeting gave Williams two instructions. The first instruction involved resolving the international student transfer credit issue, and second, to keep Wheelock away from Henderson (RH, 3/18/01). Williams called Henderson, Chris Daniels, Brian Sturdivan, Ed Larson and three other vice presidents to a meeting for the purpose of tackling the international transfer credit problem:

> The Board made it clear, and I was in one of those conversations when one of them said to [Williams] 'You are the President'. There was an [international transfer credit issue] came up that [Williams] was to chair and several of the cabinet were to be in there. But [Wheelock] was not to be in there. [Williams] was checking and he was told by the Chairman of the Executive Committee, 'No, you are the president, [Wheelock] is not'. 'Well has he been told?' 'Yes, he has been told he is not to be part of this meeting'. When we got to the meeting [Wheelock] was already there. When [Williams] made the point, [Wheelock] said,

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'No, he was not leaving. This was his office and he was not leaving'. [Williams] left the meeting, which I felt was proper. [Williams] was responding, I felt, to the trustees admonition, 'No [Williams], you are the Acting President. We have named you'. [Wheelock] subsequently left, but we never got around to what the meeting was about. Back to [Williams], I thought he acted properly. He was under direction of the Board to be the Acting President, and secondly, more specifically, convene and conduct that meeting in the absence of [Wheelock], and when that didn't happen, if [Williams] would have stayed we really would have been in a mess.... I think [Williams] had to remove himself. (RH, 3/18/01)

Another attendee of that meeting provides more detail:

I was present when we talked about the transfer credit deals. [Chris Daniels] was trying to find documentation that the [School of Management] was doing the same thing.... But we were prepared. We had files ready and I had the secretary ready. If we called [the secretary] we would actually haul files to the [meeting room]. The meeting was planned completely by [Daniels]. They had files, their own admission files where they had track sheets that I had signed. And I told [Wheelock] that in April of the same year, [Chris Daniels] and [other staff] were overseas. [Daniels and the staff] had faxed about 120 applications with transcripts [from overseas to MCU]. And [IS staff] asked [staff in the School of Management] to approve [the admissions]. [Another IS staffer] I believe, organized this [meeting]. We all met in [a meeting room] and [IS staff] asked us to sign [approving the admissions]. In an afternoon, [School of Management staff members] and myself signed about 120 [admissions]. The [admission files] didn't

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have our handwriting, but they had our signatures…. [IS] said 'we need to fax these back as soon as possible and get these students over here'. [An IS staffer] was in the room, and when I looked at [the files], I said "these are not the things that we are doing in the school, this is not agreeable". And [the staffer said] said, "Oh, Steven Geery has been doing it this way for a long time. If you have any problems we are going to talk about it later". We had to sign, because if we did not, [IS staffers] would go to [Wheelock] and say "[the School of Management staff members] didn't sign these and we could have had 120 students". That was what they brought. I told [Wheeelock the story], and he said, "No, no, no, you are not better than Daniels".... and he said it in front of everyone else. Then he left… someone told him to leave because he as having problems with [Henderson] and he had to leave. After that, it became a contest of who was loyal to [Wheelock] and who was not. That was the most bizarre situation that I saw. [One vice president] said, "I am loyal to the President not the University". [Another vice president] had his oath of loyalty also…. I thought, "why am I here." (BS, 2/20/01)

Upon producing evidence that staff in IS were not alone in making illegitimate admissions decisions, Chris Daniels distributed a document seeking a written apology from Karen Henderson for maligning Steven Geery's professional integrity. Then, he announced that Steven Geery would receive a promotion accompanied with an increase in salary of about 29% (Memo to a Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees from the Deans' Council, 9/19/97). Henderson and the Deans' who were

present at the meeting were shocked and surprised by the announcement. (KH, 2/4/01; BS, 2/20/01)

Daniel's request for an apology from Henderson strengthened her resolve that Wheelock should be removed from his position (KH, 2/04/01). She candidly and purposefully shared her observations of Wheelock's demeanor and concerns about his ability to make rational decisions with members of the FSEC and campus chapter of the AAUP:

[Henderson] came to us at FSEC and asked us to try to do something…. We [FSEC and Henderson] had several meetings, at least three. [Wheelock] would say derogatory things to [Henderson] and he would be contradictory. She just felt that he couldn't do the job…. She didn't come on strong. She said, 'this is what's going on in cabinet'. She didn't talk much about policy, just his behavior. And then there was of course, all tied up with this, a bad decision about the transcript analysis. That was the other thing that was going on…. People in the programs weren't allowed to make decisions about whether this class met the college level course…. (JC, 6/16/00)

Concurrent with informing the members of FSEC about events as they transpired, Henderson distanced herself from the activities of the Deans' Council as their concern for the health of the institution grew:

[Henderson] did not want to be a part of the Deans' [Councils] meetings, because she had filed a grievance. She wanted to give the Dean's activity credibility by not being involved. Also, at the same time she didn't want it to look like she

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instigated it. It was unanimous. We did not have a defector in the whole deal.
(BS, 2/20/01)

For the Deans, the appointment of the Provost was a catalytic event in mobilizing
them to become very purposeful in orchestrating Wheelock's removal. "That's where
the Dean's said 'no. This was enough. [Laura Hansen] doesn't have the qualifications to
serve as Provost, and if you think she does then all of your thinking is flawed" (SM,
6/26/00). In addition, the Dean's wanted to protect Henderson's job:

> Well, we were basically protecting [Henderson], so she couldn't be isolated and to
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> let the President know that there would be repercussions far beyond this one
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> thing…. Power complicated by bad health... [Before the stroke] we were able to
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> anticipate which way the wind was blowing and set our sails accordingly.
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> [Wheelock] is now unpredictable. I think we also had the likelihood that
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> [Henderson] would not be saved under those kind of conditions…. it was a
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> collection of motives. (SD, 6/9/00)

Concern for the well being of the institution was only one of the motives for having
Wheelock removed that were expressed by members of the Deans' Council:

> It evolved over the summer. We [the Deans' Council] started to become close
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> over the summer, as we were concerned about [Wheelock's] efforts to resume
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> leadership of the University and take control. We became to suspect that
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> [Wheelock] was strongly motivated by fear that Williams and Henderson were
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> effectively running the University without him and that they were making
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> decisions that were not theirs to make. Most important, that he would be
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> perceived to be non-essential, which he could not live with…. I thought that

[Wheelock] was an absolute disaster for [MCU]. I thought that he was one of the

worst college presidents that I had ever seen, and he was, on his better days, a

sociopath. I thought that his return under any circumstances, particularly while he

was physically and mentally incapacitated would be devastating to a university

that was already in financial stress.... I actually believe [Wheelock]...was at that

time, a mentally ill man.... mentally unleashed, doing whatever he wanted to do,

having established that no one could stop him, who knows what he would have

done to [MCU]. (BF, 6/21/00)

Sarah Markum shared her colleagues opinion that Wheelock was no longer fit for office

and that the academic deans should take action:

I think it was at this time that it crept into our consciousness that we were going

to have to do something to change the perception of the trustees that [Wheelock]

was able to carry on functions of the Presidency" (SM, 6/26/00).

Wheelock's decision to appoint Laura Hansen as Provost and his usurping of

Acting President William's authority in the international student transfer issue

disintegrated their relationship. Dr. Williams beseeched the President to stop working

and return to a more intensive regimen of recuperative therapy to improve his prognosis

for recovery. In a fit of anger, Wheelock dismissed his therapist and forced Williams to

take an indefinite vacation (HG, 2/16/01). Williams sudden departure increased campus

uneasiness. "Here we have [Wheelock] coming back to work and the man who had been

at the helm was immediately on vacation.... A person who could connect you back

would be put on vacation immediately. What's the message here?" (SM, 6/26/00)

The attempted appointment of Laura Hansen as Provost and the forced vacation of Dr. Williams provided the Deans' Council with clarity of purpose (SD, 6/9/00; SM, 6/26/00). They began to meet frequently without Dr. Henderson for the purpose of orchestrating the removal of Dr. Wheelock (SD, 6/9/00; BF 6/21/00). Members of the Deans' Council shared information with each other for the purpose of presenting a united front:

> Everyone got [each other's] phone numbers, work, home and emergency number. If you heard something that you thought no one else knew, then you were supposed to call everyone…. we didn't want to be off-guard. Everyone believed that [Wheelock] would do something to neutralize everything. (BS, 2/20/01)
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> [The members of the Deans' Council wanted to] present a solid front to the President. We all felt that if he could remove the Academic Vice President, then he could do it to any one of us. We all had to be in this together…. What we thought was that if he could do that to anyone, that we were all vulnerable. If you pissed him off about something, he would get you. Plus, I think [we] really believed that people with strokes were very volatile and that this was a problem [Wheelock] always had a megalomaniac personality, and worse, now we had to trust him not to make decisions based on his own self-interest. (SD, 6/9/00)

Another strategy of the Deans' Council was spawned by necessity. In spite of their seemingly unified coalition, there were internal suspicions that one of their own members was leaking information about their actions to President Wheelock (SD, 6/9/00):

Well, we really didn't know that for sure. We just accepted that as a possibility because the President seemed to know our every move…. The rest of us thought that even if this was true, it was probably to our advantage. It was probably good that [Wheelock] got reports every day, because that kept the pressure on him. He knew that we were not wavering; there were no cracks in the dike. On many occasions he tried to call everyone to intimidate them, try to do anything to break the solidarity. We felt it was better that he knew we weren't going to cave in and that we had complete and total consensus. It didn't really matter if what was said was told to him, because if we lost, we were all sunk. Plus, [the alleged mole] ostensibly agreed with everything we were saying. He signed everything. He did not refuse to sign anything. He probably just had a lot of ambivalence about the situation. He was just straddling the fence. He wanted to make sure that if this didn't go, I've got a little bit to cling to. (SD, 6/9/00)

The Deans' Council was not the only campus constituency acting to stop the impending appointment of Laura Hansen. Dr. Henderson shared her concerns with Dr. Mary Warren, who served on both the FSEC and was the president of the local chapter of the AAUP. Dr. Warren presented documents collected from Dr. Henderson at the first AAUP meeting of the academic year. These documents included Henderson's timeline of events related to the transcript evaluation issues, sample of the transcripts evaluation checklists and photocopies of transcripts from Dr. Sturdivans audit, and the letter signed by Dr. Henderson and the members of the Deans' Council protesting the appointment of Laura Hansen:

After an FSEC meeting [Henderson] pulled me aside and said she had some genuine concern. She gave me a copy of this timeline…. I presented it at the AAUP meeting the next day…. I went to Gary Singleton and show him what I had…. He recommended that I not use actual transcripts, but that I discuss the issues, talk about what [Henderson] had showed me on a timeline about transcripts evaluations… basically [students] were given credit for things they did not earn. [Work-study] students were evaluating transcripts when it is inappropriate to have students evaluate them. The faculty wanted control… [Wheelock] has decided it won't happen and [Henderson] is appealing to discuss it more and he turns her down. There's also the issue of [Laura Hansen] being appointed as a Provost without really consulting with anyone and [Wheelock's] decision to do that, so that's part of the timeline…. it wasn't a confidential meeting, that AAUP members and other interested faculty were welcome to attend. As I recall, the room was stuffed…. we usually had 6 people come to an AAUP meeting, and this time [the room] was packed. (MW,3/18/01)

Minutes from the AAUP meeting outlined concerns emerging from the discussion and possible actions to be taken. The first issue discussed concerned the international student transcript evaluation. Discussion centered upon the risks and benefits of calling for an audit of past international student admission files. "There was considerable support for calling for an audit…. It was also agreed that having the same office in a university do both recruiting and transcript analysis opened up the appearance of a conflict of interest" (Minutes of 8/21/97 AAUP meeting). The second issue concerned the appointment of Laura Hansen, "there was considerable concern expressed about the

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creation ex-nihilo of a position which takes all academic responsibilities from the [AVP], and most operating duties from the Exec. VP. [Abbreviations in the original]" (Minutes of 8/21/97 AAUP meeting).

Three motions were passed by unanimous vote. The first motion carried was that the MCU AAUP chapter forward letters to the Board of Trustees and FSEC, calling for an external audit of the international student admission files. The second motion called for AAUP leaders to make an appointment with Dr. Wheelock "to discuss the role of faculty in the creation of the new position of provost and the process of filling the position". Finally, it was moved that the AAUP Executive Committee "consider the possibility of calling for a medical audit of Dr. Wheelock's physical fitness to resume the full duties of the Presidency of the University" (Minutes of 8/21/97 AAUP meeting). Andrew Redmond described how this AAUP meeting served as a temperature reading for the FSEC:

> Warren, to my surprise and worry, laid out a good bit of [the issues] in an AAUP meeting. And there weren't any apparent repercussion from that, no faculty really getting upset about this. I think that was a clue that the faculty would be behind this. I was really concerned about her sharing as much as she shared. I was worried about. But then [no retaliation from faculty] happened. (AR, 6/21/00)

Amid growing concern for the health and integrity of the institution, and buoyed by the interest shown by the MCU faculty at the AAUP meeting, the FSEC became more actively involved with the efforts to remove Wheelock. They began meeting two or three times per week, in out-of-the- way places, often as early as 7:00 a.m. so they would not be observed (JC, 6/16/00; LS, 7/15/00). In contrast to the collegiality and camaraderie of

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the Deans' Council, these FSEC meetings were punctuated with strife and disagreement. Although the FSEC overtly discussed a shared desire to remove Wheelock, two extreme camps of opinion regarding how to proceed with forcing his removal emerged:

[Two of the members of FSEC] were very dogmatic that we had to call for a vote of no confidence right away. We tried to not do that…. We were just hoping that [Wheelock] would have the good sense to just walk away. A vote of no confidence is very serious and not done very often in Universities. It's bad publicity, especially given that the [local daily newspaper] liked to bash us. You don't want a no confidence vote against a man who clearly was involved with bringing the University back to health. It was very complicated. We had some people on [FSEC] who didn't even want to consider it…. So we would get in long arguments about what to do. Then some of us like [Warren] and I thought we should talk with the faculty, and [others], you know, I felt like the secret underground. 'We can't tell anybody about what were doing'. It was very stressful, because I viewed my job was to represent what the faculty wanted. [Warren] and I, we just went against what the others said, and talked to others, even though [these other FSEC members] gave us these directives not to, we did it anyway. (JC, 6/16/00)

There was also a good bit of dispute about how much of this to go public with…. All of the stuff in the newspaper wasn't going to do anything. First of all, if the move to get rid of [Wheelock] was successful, it would unnecessarily besmirch the University. The University would survive [Wheelock] and now the University has it's dirty laundry hanging out in the press. I didn't want that. 'Let's get

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[Wheelock] out and do good things for the University'. And the other thing was, if it didn't work, it would increase the bitterness. The worst thing about [going public], it would reduce the chances of the whole project working. Because stuff had to be done behind the scenes. Once the stuff is all over the press all over the newspapers, then [Wheelock] gets his whole entourage, all of the hangers on, everybody he has ever smiled at, and it's a big battle. And if you want to do this, you want to have all of your troops lined up and motivated before the other side has it's troops lined up and motivated, otherwise you lose. So that's why I wanted to keep what the FSEC was doing very quiet…. The people who needed to know, knew that we were there to help, make strategic moves and to facilitate communication. (LS, 7/15/00)

Several members of the organization described being fearful of having their activism against Wheelock discovered during this period of time. One FSEC member described the paranoia that emerged from the clandestine plotting to remove Wheelock:

Because we were frankly so concerned, I mean you talk about a culture of paranoia existing here since 1980, because of the bullying and because of a Nixonesque type of enemies list, because there certainly were sycophants among the faculty, and people who were perceived to be moles within the faculty… The climate of paranoia had accelerated to such a level, that people were genuinely fearful that offices might have been bugged and that telephone lines might have been bugged. In conversations with people in this office, I gave code names to the president, the [academic vice president], and the deans…. I think [Wheelock] was the man in the Far East because he was on the far east side of campus and he

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was in the Far East a lot.   A lot of meetings happened in this office here. So we

would speak in code here, we thought the office was bugged. (LS, 7/15/00)

Faculty were not the only campus constituency to describe a climate of paranoia. A

reporter for the campus newspaper described a similar experience:

I was kind of paranoid about campus police. I didn't mark down names in my

interview notes, just initials, and I lived in on-campus housing, and of course they

could go through my room. I wasn't expecting that they would, but I thought it

was a possibility. I had a friend who was running the computers at the time....

He told me that they had had some disagreements with the [administration]. For

weeks after that, he would hear mysterious clicks on the telephone when he would

be talking to people. So I thought this was a real possibility. (ME, 7/14/00)

Concurrent with the formal actions taken by the AAUP, FSEC and Deans'

Council, some individuals were taking informal, covert actions for the purpose of having

the President removed:

Different of us talked to different trustees, different deans, faculty. We were sort

of a clearinghouse. There was a network of church people, there was a network

of faculty, deans, and there was a network of faculty who weren't on FSEC and

we did this and we got all of the information together and we passed along

information to other individuals and entities that were similarly minded. (LS,

7/15/00)

Dr. John Bixby, a member of the faculty described his efforts to have Wheelock

removed:

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I knew three trustees well enough to pick up the phone and call them. I asked

[Henderson] if things were bad enough to schedule an independent meeting with

the three trustees who I knew would be willing to listen and believe the story.

This was after the news about [Laura Hansen] had come out. [Wheelock] already

tried to fire [Henderson] and discovered he couldn't without a vote of the trustees.

[Henderson] first said 'it may come to that', then [Henderson said], 'Let me hold

off on that'. Then things got worse and she said 'all right, schedule a meeting'.

And so I did. The meeting did not happen as it turned out. She called me and

said there had been some break through that was going to make things better. (JB,

6/11/00)

Journalism 101

In addition to contacting trustees, Bixby utilized his relationships with students to

speed up what he hoped to be Wheelock's removal. He met with a student writer for the

campus newspaper, Mason Ewell:

I was feeding [Mason Ewell] all of the information he needed…. He was reacting

like any cub reporter would. I mean it was juicy. Basically, I would tell him who

to go talk to and what questions to ask. He was the one who was getting the story,

but I was the one telling him where to go and what to ask. I told him who he

could play off against who. (JB, 6/11/00)

The first submission Mason Ewell, a MCU senior, made to the MCU student

newspaper in the Fall of 1997 was an editorial which earned a response from Vice

President Henderson:

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I wrote this kind of manifesto. My, I am going to get kicked out of school manifesto. I said a reporter had to be ready to ask tough questions and this sort of thing and a few days later, this letter arrived from [Dr. Henderson] in my campus mailbox encouraging me in my endeavor. (ME, 7/14/00)

Buoyed by Dr. Henderson's encouragement, Mason Ewell began to investigate the events surrounding Wheelock's return:

… there was so much going on at the University that was right. It was such a contrast. Like what was going on in [the college of liberal arts] was about standards and rights, and then the thing with international students… was completely different treatment. I thought things should be universally applied. I absolutely wouldn't have been involved in the story if it weren't for people I felt were kind of voiceless, but were trying to do the right thing. (ME, 7/14/00)

Motivated by what he perceived to be wrong-doing and perhaps to thwart authority, Mason explained the circuitous nature of the process of researching the story:

I worked out my very own method, and I am sure that other people have done this before, but it was this kind of stepping stone method where one person would say something completely off the record as background information… Then I would go to the next person and ask, can you confirm this? Then they would and then I would go to the next person and say, ok, can you confirm this on the record, but without your name attached to it and eventually I would got to someone with standing … to say what I knew and get them to confirm it. I guess you can understand why it took so long. (ME, 7/14/00)

Unbeknownst to Mason Ewell, Professor Bixby was aiding him in his journalistic investigation by covertly funneling documents and snippets of information to Ewell:

I have to confess that one of my standard sources of information that I then passed on to [Mason] was [a staff member]. I never told [Mason] where I was getting the information. Sometimes it was [Henderson] sometimes it was [Warren], sometimes it was [Moore].... [They unknowingly] were just funneling it to him and letting him get the story. [The faculty advisor for the campus newspaper] was very good about knowing when a person does and does not have the story. He was handling [Mason] from the other side saying - you gotta have this, you gotta have that. His mentoring through that was really, really good. (JB, 6/11/00)

Bixby was clear about what he was doing, and why he was doing it:

It took a lot of guts for [Mason] to do what he did. On the other hand, it wouldn't have happened if I hadn't given him the information and told him where to go. You have to have a certain kind of kid to do that sort of thing, but even a certain kind of kid without the information couldn't do it.... It was extremely risky. At this point I felt like I had nothing else to lose.... it was worth getting fired over. I was not going to sit around and watch [Henderson] get fired. If she had been fired, I would have had to quit. Not because anyone would have forced me out, but because I wouldn't have been willing to stay.... Here I was a tenured faculty member, I had plenty to lose, but to me what I would have lost, wouldn't have been worth keeping. I would rather be unemployed than sit idly by while that happened. (JB, 6/11/00)

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Howard Martin, the faculty advisor of the newspaper, demonstrated his resolve when the newspaper staff expressed concerns that the University would quash the printing of the newspaper containing Ewell's expose:

Martin had contingency plans. He was going to pay for the printing with his own money. Instead of putting all the papers out at once, we could stutter the distribution. So from the beginning, the paper gave me the green light. (7/14/00)

The President's Cabinet

Schisms were evident among the handpicked members of Wheelock's cabinet. Of the eight members, Everett Williams, the outcast Executive Vice President was away from campus on a mysterious, indeterminate leave, and Karen Henderson, the Academic Vice President had filed a grievance against her own leader. Of the remaining six, the two remaining females held clandestine meetings with their contacts on the Board of Trustees, confirming Henderson's concerns that Wheelock was not fit for the presidency (BF, 6/21/00; EL, 6/18/00). Wheelock was furious upon discovery of this high treason and characterized the women as "enemies" and their whistleblowing as a "female conspiracy" (Memo to Co-Chair of Board of Trustees from Deans' Council, 9/19/97). "I was pleased to see [the female vice presidents] become involved, I wasn't pleased to see that they got beat up a bit, but they took a stand. That was pleasing to me because that helped the cause (EL, 6/18/00).

Of the four remaining cabinet members, the vice-president appointed by the Bishop stayed out of the fray, and attempted to provide Wheelock with caring counsel (PM 6/23/01). Chris Daniels demonstrated his loyalty to Wheelock by conjoining him in his struggle to maintain power in the international student recruitment area. Another

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vice president remained loyal to Wheelock, "[He] was the consummate 'yes' man and big old lap dog. There was no question where he came from" (EL, 6/18/00).

<center>Push Comes to Shove</center>

President Wheelock was not sitting idly by as Karen Henderson, the Deans' Council, AAUP and FESC, and individual faculty and staff members marshaled efforts for his removal. Wheelock continued attempts to appoint Laura Hansen to a position in the President's Office. Rather than make her Provost, he changed the position title to Special Assistant to the President. A memo announcing this proposed appointment described Ms. Hansen's qualifications, but not a description of the duties of the position (Memo from Wheelock to Members of the Faculty and Staff and members of the Board of Trustees, 9/21/97).

Wheelock also publicly addressed Henderson's concerns about the international student transfer evaluations promising to conduct an objective evaluation:

There has been concern expressed to me regarding international student transfer evaluations. This important exercise determines which credits each individual transfer student can bring into the various degree programs of the University from previously earned credits at other universities, those largely being from international institutions. I have requested that the files in question from the [International Services] Office and in question from the [School of Management] be brought to my office for review with as much objectivity as possible by two respected and knowledgeable individuals. Dr. [Harold Goodenow], formerly [Academic Vice President] and now Professor of the [School of Management] and Iris Keagan, formerly Professor of [the School of Management] and Dean of

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International Programs at [MCU] and now a trustee will conduct the review. (Memo from Wheelock to Members of the Faculty and Staff and the MCU Board of Trustees, 9/21/97)

Goodenow described the events surrounding his commission to co-author the objective review with Iris Keagan:

I still had a lot of compassion for [Wheelock] and would go visit him on occasion. And then I guess as the heat really started brewing.... I knew that [Henderson] and the Deans were meeting, but I did not know that they had pushed that to the point that they were threatening to go to [the regional accrediting body] with the admissions policy and academic regulations. So [Wheelock] called and asked if I would come over and see him and he began to tell me about this problem with international admissions and so forth.... He wanted to put everybody's mind at ease about it, knowing that I knew what was going on and what had gone on. He asked if I would join [Iris Keagan] who he thought had some stature. I don't know among the faculty, as much as among the Board. I think he [selected me] because I would trust him, or he could trust me. It may have been that he knew of my compassion for him.... [Iris] and I spent a whole day over there going through transcripts. It was not very popular among faculty. But we called it as we saw it. We spent a whole day looking at it. I thought well, yeah we've got a few problems, but here is how it all happened. The one about the [Wine and Bar Management].... that was the really nasty one where they gave him religion credit for something. That was really off the wall. (HG, 2/16/01)

Harold Goodenow and Iris Keagan submitted the report to Dr. Wheelock on

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September 24, 1997. The report confirmed the discrepancies first alleged by Dr. Sturdivan in his initial audit, however, justified the transfer credit evaluation procedures as practiced by the Office of IS:

It should be noted, however, within an historical context of [Midwestern Christian University's] effort to serve the educational needs of international students, especially those from the Asian countries of the Pacific Rim, such transfer practices have not been exceptional or unusual. In fact, we share the opinion that if one were to review all of the many thousands of transcript evaluations processed by University officials over the past 20 years, whether in the Office of the [Academic Vice President], the [International Services], or the [School of Management], one would find similar transfers of credit. Since the inception of the University's International Student program, enlightened flexibility regarding the distinction between upper level and lower level courses as well as allowing business courses to substitute for non-business electives has been the *rule*[italics in original] rather than the *exception* [italics in original]….

The rationale supporting this approach was that there are significant differences between the curriculum design of western universities and eastern universities, and that if [MCU] were to be competitive within Eastern markets, it would need to recognize and accommodate those differences…. Thus policies in most Western universities that distinguish between upper level and lower level courses seemed inappropriate. They served only as barriers of entry for international students by expanding the length of their academic programs as they retake courses they have already completed….

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Thus, even though we readily acknowledge irregularities in the many transcript evaluations we reviewed, we think it important that these irregularities be considered within their historical context…. Civility and respect for conflicting opinions must guide the discussion…. Equally important, collaboration by *all* [italics in the original] segments of the University must be achieved, for unless it can agree as to whom it wants to serve and how it can best compete within target markets, it is doomed to divisiveness. As we all know, rarely, if ever, does divisiveness lead to success. (Report on review of international student transcript evaluations, Iris Keagan and Harold Goodenow, 9/24/97)

The distribution of the Keagan/ Goodenow report, otherwise known as the "enlightened flexibility" report to the campus community did not reassure the faculty about the international transfer credit issue as Wheelock had intended. Faculty scoffed at the report's attempt to justify what they believed to be challenges to the institution's academic integrity and shunned Harold Goodenow for his participation. "The day after the report came out I went to a [FSEC meeting], we had pizza… and let's say it was a cold day in terms of respect and credibility" (HG, 2/16/01). On the other hand, Goodenow was genuinely convinced of the merits of his argument for lenient acceptance of courses from international institutions for MCU transfer credit, and was skeptical of the motives of Henderson and the Deans' Council:

Henderson felt that [the transcript evaluation procedures] had no academic integrity, if [international students] wanted an American degree, they should do the things Americans do. "We shouldn't be substituting this for that. That lacks academic integrity". But I'm convinced that really wasn't the reason she was

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doing that. I am convinced the Deans hated [Chris Daniels] because he would ride herd on them. [Daniels was] so arrogant, he would tell them "to go to hell". They would bitch about something, and he would say "I bring in your paycheck. You want to lose three million dollars this year? What do you want to do"?(HG, 2/16/01)

Sturdivan, the Associate Dean of the School of Management who initially brought the transfer credit issue to the administration, defended his criticism of the practices of IS, denying that he had a personal vendetta against Chris Daniels:

Some people thought that was a personal attack against the [IS]. To this day they believe that it was a personal attack. It was clear [the acceptance of credit for transfer] was too blatant. Maybe part of it was [School of Management] neglect, that we allowed that to go for that time. We didn't pay attention to that because it was done somewhere else. (BS, 2/20/01)

In a memo to Wheelock, the FSEC laid out specific criticism of the "enlightened flexibility" report:

Because we have historically granted international students course credit they have not earned does not make this practice acceptable. The FSEC does not accept the premise that inappropriate assignment of credit hours is excused because it has gone on for a decade or more. We are concerned that the substitution of course credits is inconsistent with the rules of the [regional accrediting] agency. (Memo to Wheelock from FSEC, 9/29/97)

Responding to the increased pressure from the academic units to require undergraduate international students enrolled at MCU to complete the full course of

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general education requirements as described in the MCU catalog, Chris Daniels forwarded a proposal to lower the minimum entry age requirement of the University's adult degree completion program. This degree program allowed adults to earn an undergraduate degree through a combination of regular classroom attendance, independent studies and awarding course credit for life and work experiences. The flexible curriculum offered working adults convenient options for earning a degree. The minimum entry age requirement at the time of Daniels' proposal was 25. Wheelock supported and justified the proposal by casting doubt on the legality of the age limit,

> I have asked for a legal opinion on whether the existence of an age requirement for admission to the [adult degree completion] program presents any legal problems for the university and I am appointing a committee to investigate the impact, repercussions, and advisability of opening the program to a more diverse student body. (Memo from Dr. Wheelock to Members of the Faculty and Staff and Members of the Board of Trustees, 9/21/97)

Wheelock's appointment of an ad hoc committee to consider the proposal brought a negative response from the University's General Education Committee:

> The General Education Committee expresses concern about the creation of *ad hoc* [italics in original] committees to deal with issues related to academic programs. The current governance structure authorized by the Board of Trustees establishes committees to monitor and regulate the academic program of the university.... The recent *ad hoc* [italics in original] committee which received the [adult degree completion] proposal, as well as the *ad hoc* [italics in original] committee to investigate international student transcript evaluation, while competent,

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circumvent the current governance structure of the university. We ask that legitimate governance structures be employed and that some compelling rationale be given when they are circumvented. (Memo from University General Education Committee to Dr. Karen Henderson, 10/1/97)

Some faculty and MCU administrators saw the proposal as an attempt by Daniels to protect his ability to recruit large numbers of international students:

> This is another of those convenient changes. My understanding is that this is being done to make it easier for people to be admitted through the international programs without having to conform to the same criteria in terms of transfer course work. (AF, 10/3/97, p. 3)

The University General Education Committee responded to the academic merits of the proposal:

> Because the proposal to adapt the [adult degree completion program] to younger students significantly impacts the centrality of the General Education Curriculum at [MCU], the General Education Committee asks for a thorough consideration of the proposal by all relevant oversight bodies within the legitimate governance structure of the university before action on the proposal is taken. The General Education Committee cannot support a university policy waiving General Education requirements nor a policy of questionable apportioning transfer credits for those requirements. This dilution of the General Education Curriculum threatens the mission of the university....

> We would like the [adult degree completion program] to offer a clear and

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compelling rationale that is consistent with the mission of the university so that we may seriously consider their proposal. (Undated Memo from General Education Committee to Members of Ad Hoc Committee reviewing adult degree completion proposal)

Within a three-week period, three independently orchestrated efforts to remove Wheelock converged to a crescendo. The Deans' Council forwarded an eight-page memorandum to one of the Co-Chairs of the Board of Trustees, calling for Wheelock's resignation. The AAUP forwarded their own letter requesting Wheelock's resignation and the FSEC moved toward holding a vote of no confidence. The lengthy memo from the Deans' Council begins by articulating their responsibilities to the organization:

We are deeply concerned that the conduct of President [Wheelock] since April is undermining the integrity and good name of MCU, and threatening [MCU's} financial viability.

.... President [Wheelock] is a man who has long served as a great leader of this University. He has brought [MCU] from the brink of bankruptcy to a place of prominence.... It would be irresponsible of us, indeed a violation of our duty to the University, not to bring these concerns to your attention.

.... A university's good name is its most precious asset. Lose that, destroy the integrity of the degree, and the university has nothing to offer students. This University's good name has been placed at great risk by the conduct of [International Services] and by the action of President [Wheelock] in rewarding that conduct. The disregard for academic integrity, the willingness to debase the mission of this University, and the willingness to jeopardize its accreditation,

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constitute not only a harmful conduct but a breach of fiduciary responsibility. (9/19/97, p. 1)

The complaints outlined in the letter focused on five issues including: the granting of international transfer students general education credits to which they were not entitled; mistreatment of senior staff; insubordination to the Board; and [Wheelock's] autocratic management style; and his desire to add an undergraduate degree program in physical therapy:

> … President [Wheelock] determined, without the benefit of any market analysis, and without consulting any knowledgeable University officers, the University should launch a new degree-granting program in physical therapy. Apparently, it was the responsible decision of Vice-Presidents [Williams] and [Henderson] to proceed with a careful investigation of the proposed program, rather than hastily commence it, that in part precipitated President [Wheelock's] unexpected return. (Memo to a Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees from the Deans' Council, 9/19/97, p. 3)

The memo describes Wheelock's management of the international student transfer credit issue:

> The handling of transfer credits by [IS], and President [Wheelock's] discovery of the problem, strikingly reflects the threats to the University and illustrate why the Deans are so concerned.
>
> Over the summer, Associate Dean [Sturdivan] and Vice-President Henderson discovered that [IS] through [Steven Geery] had been granting foreign transfer students general education credits to which they were not entitled. This

granting of illegitimate credits was a matter of serious concern for a number of reasons. First, [IS's] act unambiguously contravene the standards of our accrediting agency. The agency *will* [italics in original] find out about the improper grants at its next inspection (unless the University proposes to engage in further acts to cover up the violations). Second, [IS's] misdeeds devalue the [MCU] degree. Because of the misconduct, this University has granted a substantial number of baccalaureate degrees to individuals who simply did not complete the degree requirements. Third it *will* [italics in original] become known that the transcripts of the degree recipients reflect it. If it becomes widely known that [MCU] disregards academic standards in granting degrees to foreign students, an [MCU] degree will come to have little value – it certainly will have no value to our core constituency, [state residents] seeking a quality liberal arts education. (Memo to a Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees from the Deans' Council, 9/19/97, p. 3 - 4)

The description and ensuing consequences of the transfer credit issue in the memo were followed with a laundry list of Wheelock's mishandling of the situation, reading in part:

- He precipitously decided, without trying to learn the facts, that the improprieties should continue unimpeded. Even before resuming the office of President, well before he had been briefed on the problem by Vice-Presidents [Williams] and [Henderson]; and at a time when his *only* [italics in original] source of information was the Vice-President ultimately responsible for the improper practice; President [Wheelock] announced unambiguously in writing

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that he had made up his mind and that there would be no change in the way transfer credits would be handled.

- He made no effort to investigate the problem, sought to prevent further inquiry into the problem, and repeatedly asserted that the questionable practice should be ignored because it involved a source of revenue for the University....

- He has rewarded the wrongdoers. He has rewarded the chief culprit with a promotion and promise of a 29% raise – at a time when salaries have been frozen campuswide – and he continues to represent to Trustees and others that the Vice-President for [International Services] – the person ultimately responsible for the misdeeds – is the savior of the University. (Memo to a Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees from the Deans' Council, 9/19/97, p. 4 - 5)

Other accusations against Wheelock listed in the memo include the mistreatment of senior staff with threats and slander, his insubordination to the Board of Trustees, and finally criticism of his management style.

- The preference of President [Wheelock] for surrounding himself with officers whose most salient feature is loyalty or devotion to him.

- His tendency to treat disagreements with him as personal affronts and acts of disloyalty.

- His practice of making decisions without careful study of financial consequences.

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- His willingness to make decisions that alienate the faculty and that gratuitously breed resentment and unhappiness campus-wide. (Memo to a Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees from the Deans' Council, 9/19/97, p. 7)

The conclusion of the memo prescribes the conditions in which the resignation should take place:

We believe that the actions described above raise serious questions about President [Wheelock's] continued capacity to lead. The actions also raise serious questions as to whether the President will accept direction from the Trustees, in view of his behaviors which were in direct contravention of what we understand to be his instructions. The Deans and the faculty leadership are unified in their serious concern about the actions described above and what those actions may portend for the University.

We do not believe it is a solution to place the president on a medical leave of absence. His conduct in attempting to run the University from a hospital bed, and the past behavior of certain Vice-Presidents [sic] in attempting to circumvent the authority of an acting president, show that half-way measures would not solve the problem. Therefore, we ask that the Trustees take immediate action to appoint an interim chief executive with the responsibility and authority to lead the University. This must be a strong person with academic experience. In addition, during the interim period, steps must be taken to assure that President [Wheelock] is removed totally from the operations of the university, so that the interim chief

executive is not subjected to the same untenable situation to which Dr. [Williams] was subjected.

In sending this letter, we realize that we are placing ourselves in professional jeopardy, particularly in view of President Wheelock's current state of mind. However, we feel that our concerns are sufficiently important to warrant us taking this risk. (Memo to a Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees from the Deans' Council, 9/19/97, p. 8)

In spite of their earlier reluctance, the FSEC conducted a straw poll to determine the feasibility of a vote of no confidence against [Dr. Wheelock]. An FSEC representative from each school quietly polled faculty from his or her respective school to gauge the outcome of a vote of no confidence. Results of the straw poll indicated that over 80% of the university faculty would vote for no confidence against [Wheelock] (Memo to FSEC from AR, 9/27/97). In a letter, the Chair of the FSEC, Andrew Redmond informed the Chairman of the TFLC, Donald Fetter of the certainty of such an action occurring absent Wheelock's resignation:

It is with deep regret that the Faculty Senate Executive Committee must inform you that we have today adopted by unanimous vote a resolution expressing our lack of confidence in President [Wheelock] and urging his dismissal....

To our knowledge, a vote of no confidence in the university's president is entirely without precedent in its almost century-long history.

.... we recognize that a vote of this nature would necessarily carry with it the potential for adverse publicity and we would like to avoid taking this step if possible.... We are confident that our resolution is one that would be adopted by

an overwhelming majority of the full Faculty Senate and, of course our unanimous vote speaks for itself.

.... We believe it important, however, that you and the other trustees of the university understand that the events that have precipitated the present crisis are simply the most recent illustrations of a style of management by Dr. [Wheelock] that has been consistently characterized by arbitrariness, autocracy, intimidation, and cronyism.

.... We do not now, and never have, denied or in any way belittled the enormous strides that the University has made during the eighteen years that Dr. [Wheelock] has served as its president. We would like to see him given the respect and honor that he has earned. But we cannot permit our recognition of his past service to blind us to the fact that he is not now, has not been for some years, and cannot become the leader the university must have if it is to continue to progress. We would urge the trustees to recognize this fact and, if necessary, to take the appropriate measures to conclude Dr. [Wheelock's] employment by the university. (Memo to Donald Fetter from FSEC, 9/24/97)

Donald Fetter used the threatened vote of no confidence from the faculty to convince his colleagues on the Board of Trustees that Walker's time as president of MCU was over:

The way it played out, that particular no confidence vote was being used by [Fetter] in the discussion. I had many one-on-one phone conversations with [Fetter]. In my estimation, he is kind of the unsung hero in this whole deal.... from the moment of convincing [one of the co-chairs of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees]. At that moment you have a serious breach in the

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executive committee. [One co-chair] on one side, and [one co-chair] on the other. (AR, 6/26/00)

The MCU chapter of the AAUP also submitted a letter seeking [Wheelock's] resignation, but for very different issues than those forwarded by the Deans' Council:

The members of the local chapter of the American Association of University Professors believe that the current administrative turmoil poses a unique and serious threat to the foundation of our academic programs. The most talented, mobile, often younger faculty, adjuncts, and staff are seeking positions at other institutions. Some turnover is expected in the normal course of things, but too many of our colleagues view the present crisis as likely to damage the reputation of the University and to jeopardize their academic careers.

The academic calendar for hiring is such that, if the situation is not resolved quickly, faculty who would prefer to stay will be forced soon to choose between the volatile and difficult conditions here or more stable and congenial conditions at other institutions. We will not recover for years from the effects of an exodus of talented faculty. Weeks are critical at this juncture and proper action may save a decade of rebuilding.

Academic reputations are fragile. They are difficult enough to achieve and more difficult to rebuild if damaged. The longer the crisis continues, the more likely is such damage. We faculty can only advise from our special vantage point [sic]. The power to assure the future of the University as a respected academic institution rests with the Board of Trustees.

We recognize the President's past contributions in restoring the University to prosperity. We believe that we understand the facts of the current crisis and we perceive that the crisis is not an acute phenomenon brought on by the president's stroke or a peculiar set of circumstances. Our collective experience is that the stroke has magnified those aspects of the president's behavior that have been problematic for several years.

With confidence that we act for the good of our University, and with sadness and full recognition of the gravity our request, we ask the Board of Trustees, with all deliberate speed, to remove President [Wheelock] from any position of governance at [Midwestern Christian University]. (Correspondence to the Chairman of the TFLC from MCU AAUP Officers, 9/26/97)

As various trustees received this collection of memoranda, Mason Ewell's investigative report was published in the campus newspaper. The article included a quote from the Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees who was opposed to removing Wheelock:

Although allegations being made against [Dr. Wheelock] are taken seriously by the Board of Trustees, it is important to remember that allegations against a university president or any powerful leader are not unique. Indeed, complaints are often the price of success.

Some of the complaints against [Dr. Wheelock] have been heard before and some of the allegations are based on incomplete information and, in some instances, on personal opinion and conjecture.

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Our task as members of the Board of Trustees is to consider the best interests of [Midwestern Christian University] both now and in the future. (AF, 10/3/97, p. 4)

As MCU faculty and staff read and re-read the campus newspaper, trying to come to terms with the circumstances, the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees was wrapping up the loose ends of the resignation of President Wheelock:

[The president's secretary] called and said 'where is your resume?.... [The executive committee] are over there meeting with [Wheelock] and they want your resume'. I said [to the secretary], 'God forbid, what are they over there doing'? [Wheelock] was the one who wanted me to be the interim president. In fact, [Estelle Wheelock] went over to the cafeteria that very day and said 'we got everything we wanted. [Wheelock] is Chancellor and [Goodenow] is the President. We got everything we wanted'. I thought I could do this for a year.... I knew I had to separate myself from [Wheelock]. (HG, 2/16/01)

Wheelock's resignation was first announced publicly in the local newspaper on Sunday, October 4, 1997. The headline read: "President of [MCU] Resigns, Action Comes Shortly After Deans Complain". The newspaper article, a hybrid of the Ewell article published in the campus newspaper two days earlier, included six complaining issues expressed by the Deans' Council, FSEC and AAUP and quoted Wheelock:

[Wheelock]... said he is leaving his post... to assume the position of chancellor. His duties will be limited to public relations and development.... 'This will give me an opportunity to concentrate my efforts in areas that will provide maximum positive impact for [MCU]. (AA, 10/4/97, p. 1)

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In a related article in the MCU alumni magazine Wheelock is quoted,

> I had planned on stepping away from the day-to day operations and focusing on
> my special interests at some future time. Because of my health situation, I have
> advanced my decision…. I now look forward to serving [MCU] and our
> constituents in this new role". (AG, Fall 1997, p.10)

Unfortunately, the announcement of the resignation did not signal the beginning
of the end of the turmoil at MCU, rather, the appointment of Harold Goodenow as
interim president consternated the Deans' Council, FSEC and AAUP. These bodies felt
that Goodenow's appointment was evidence that the Board did not recognize or
acknowledge the seriousness of the international student transcript issues (KH, 2/4/01).

> Then [Wheelock] resigned and [the no confidence vote] became mute…. Then,
> of course, at that point it was still difficult because people didn't want
> [Goodenow] to be interim. I think [Redmond] did talk to [Donald Fetter] about
> out concerns. We were afraid that [Goodenow] would be a yes person for
> [Wheelock]. We worried that [Wheelock] would be telling [Goodenow] what to
> do. See, the [enlightened flexibility report] was what made us think he would be
> a puppet of [Wheelock]. He turned out not to be like that, I think. But that was a
> concern. It was not anything about [Goodenow's] personality…. You know,
> [FSEC] met with [Goodenow], and that was pretty confrontational. [One FSEC
> member] just came in like an attack dog and attacked him, 'because of the worry
> that [Wheelock] would be telling [Goodenow] what to do. See, because of the
> [enlightened flexibility report], with all due respect we just think you are just a
> puppet of [Wheelock]'…. and even though that meeting was bad at least at the

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beginning, it got better. One thing that came out of it was [Goodenow] said that he was going to be the interim president of this university, and [Wheelock] is not going to be allowed to stay on-campus. 'I will not be the interim if he is going to be on-campus'. So he clearly knew it was a problem, knew he had to be firm and I actually felt better about things after that meeting because it was clear that he was not loyal to Wheelock. (JC, 6/16/00)

Goodenow recalled his encounters with MCU faculty, deans and Henderson, in the days immediately following his appointment:

[Andrew Redmond] who was the chair of FSEC called me at 8:00 am. 'If you don't resign today, we are going to have a motion of no confidence in you Monday morning'. I said '[Andrew], well that's a nice way to approach it…. do what you have to do, but could I meet with you before you do it?'…. So he set that up 3:00 Monday. In the meantime, [Henderson] and the Deans set up a meeting…. my first meeting with them was rather abrupt. They were demanding that I sign off on a document that said something about what I was going to do with the admission policy for international students. I said I would sign it, but not until we have had a chance to work through it together. But I am not just going to take something because you submitted it here. You see, they knew I was [Wheelock's] friend. They were afraid that [Wheelock] was going to call me in the morning, tell me what to do and that's what will be done. What hurts about that is I had thought people knew me better than that. I never had kowtowed to [Wheelock]. I would tell him what I thought. My first problem was to calm down the Deans and [Henderson]. And we had a lot of meetings and we finally

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came to some agreement where we hired someone in the [School of Management]. It was something I thought we could live with and not bankrupt the school. (HG, 2/16/01).

Wheelock and the remaining members of the cabinet who were still loyal to him had trouble accepting that he was no longer president. Goodenow recalls the early weeks of his presidency:

> [Wheelock] called every morning. [Wheelock] had a network going. [One of the cabinet members] would go to [Wheelock] and say this is what [Goodenow] is doing now. Here is how it worked. [The cabinet member] would tell [Wheelock], [Wheelock] would call [one of the Co-Chairs of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees], who would call me and say 'what's this going on?' Everyday. [This continued] even after [the cabinet member] was gone. I was so glad [that cabinet member resigned], I could not believe it. (HG, 2/16/01)

In the weeks following Wheelock's resignation, local and campus newspapers published dissenting letters to the editors which lambasted the role the Deans' Council played in his ouster. The editor of a local weekly society tabloid called the members of the Deans' Council "bumbling ingrates" (AH, 10/17/97, p. 4), and a student authored letter in the campus newspaper called them "cold-hearted", accusing the Deans' of taking advantage of Wheelock because he was wheel-chair bound (AF, Friday, October, 31, 1997). One vice president who remained loyal to Wheelock roamed the halls of the administration building trying to drum up support for Wheelock by making disparaging remarks about the actions Dean's and Dr. Henderson (PM, 6/23/00).

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Meanwhile, with his wife's assistance, Wheelock was searching for on-campus office space suitable for a chancellor:

There was the short period where [Wheelock] was made chancellor, and [Goodenow] was interim president, and everybody was trying to maintain good feelings. The first thing that happened was [Wheelock] called a security officer and said she needed help picking an office for [Wheelock]. So they wheeled him all over campus as they barged into people's offices where they were conducting business to discuss what would be good for them.... [Estelle] decided that [a particular space] was the only place that would work for him. Apparently, [the occupant of the office] was in a meeting and [Estelle] just informed her that this would be [Wheelock's office] and immediately started rattling off how they would have to put up curtains, change the carpet, it didn't look chancellory enough, widening doors, this huge budget, and planned on relocating [the staff member]. [Estelle] was oblivious to anybody's schedule she was interrupting. (MA. 6/9/00)

Wheelock's continued presence on-campus also interfered with Dr. Goodenow's efforts to restore harmony to the campus and move the institution forward:

I was in the position where I knew what I needed to do. I had to separate myself from [Wheelock]. And I did. And so [Wheelock] called and I said 'Patrick. I am not going to listen to you'. He was trying to get me to fire someone. 'I am not going to listen to you. Your position as chancellor is to be involved as I invite you to be involved. Now I am not inviting you to be involved. And if you keep calling over here. I am going to hang up on you' And I said, 'did you understand

what I told you?' And I hung up on him. And I mean he was just crushed. So then I finally went to the first Executive Committee [of the Board of Trustees] meeting and I said, 'you guys, I need your help'. I said, 'this ain't the deal I struck. I struck the deal that [Wheelock] is out. And I don't take orders from anybody but the Board, and if you have changed that I am resigning.' The Bishop was like whooa. Then the final blow was that [Wheelock] showed up at a fund-raising luncheon about a month later. He was not on the program. He just wheeled in and wanted the microphone. [Someone asked] 'what are you going to do?' I said, well you are going to give it to him. We are not going to have a scene in front of our friends'. So [Wheelock] started talking, this bowlegs stuff and all that, and he went on for 45 minutes, and [one of the trustees] was just pacing at the back of the room. Now [this trustee] does understand money. And it was over and I said '[to the trustee], I need to see you and the Bishop today'. I said 'I am going to send him a letter saying he is not to participate in any function on this campus until I tell him otherwise'. They didn't like it, but they went along with it. And from that point on, he began looking for houses to move and so forth. I wouldn't give him an office on campus. He wanted to be in the library where [another office] was. I said, 'you're not coming on this campus'. I said 'you just come around here and hate and destruction comes. I can't have you around here'. Well he didn't understand that and [Mrs. Wheelock], shit, she didn't understand that. So, we got through the first two months and he kind of began to disappear. Of course, he would go to the ball games and play like he could walk. I felt so sorry for him. (HG, 2/16/01)

In preparation for the impending appointment of a new president for MCU, Goodenow knew he had to take action. In a difficult meeting, he clarified to Wheelock his new role as chancellor:

[Goodenow] broke the news to [Wheelock] that he was not getting an office, chancellor is a title only, you have to quit having things to do with [MCU]. [Wheelock] thoroughly broke down, like he was having a nervous breakdown. He was sobbing and was just totally broken, and then they had to wheel him back to his house. [Estelle] was there and she was spitting nails. (MA, 6/9/00)

In a memo to the MCU Board of Trustees and MCU Faculty and Staff, Goodenow announced the Wheelock's departure from the MCU campus,

I know each of you will join me in wishing them well as they depart from their home of 18 years. May God be with them on their journey; may He continue to bless them as they adapt to these dramatic changes in their lives. (1/15/98)

Summary

In 1979, Patrick Wheelock was appointed the fifteenth president of Midwestern Christian University, an institution on the verge of closing due to fiscal problems. In the seventeen years he served the institution, the institution's endowment tripled, new academic programs were added and enrollment nearly doubled. Four new classroom buildings and three buildings housing student services were constructed and three existing campus structures were renovated under his watch. For most outsiders to the institution, the turn-around to institutional health was remarkable.

Many institutional insiders believed the achievements belied serious systemic problems for MCU. Faculty members were dissatisfied with Wheelock's autocratic

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management style and his disregard for venerable bastions of higher education such as, regional accreditation, shared governance, tenure, academic integrity and academic freedom. Wheelock's dissenters feared that the methods used by Wheelock to achieve fiscal health were dubious and renegade, creating a fragile appearance of stability. These insiders believed that Wheelock abused his power by virtue of his position in the organizational hierarchy and that the institution's academic reputation and fiscal health were vulnerable to a variety of calamities.

Wheelock used a variety of strategies to move MCU toward fiscal health, including spinning information to create a positive image for the use by the press and chilling the voices of his dissenters through threats and intimidation. He cultivated a close group of insiders who were poorly prepared and unqualified for their posts, yet were loyal to Wheelock or be returned to lower-paying and lower-status employment. This protective layer of power rubber stamped his initiatives without regard or consideration of good practices in higher education. He commandeered institutional resources for his personal use or to forward his agenda, ignoring the dignity and integrity of institutional members accountable for the misused resources. In the final analysis, he placed institutional subordinates in the untenable circumstance of either enduring the consequences of reputing him or complying with him. The subordinate placed in those circumstances was in a no-win situation.

Wheelock ultimately lost his stronghold of power at MCU when several independent cabals of institutional subordinates coordinated their resources and challenged his authority and infallibility through formal grievance processes. For example, the Academic Vice President filed a formal grievance against Wheelock,

alleging he was creating a hostile work environment, the FSEC had conducted a straw poll suggesting an impending vote of no confidence and all of the institution's academic deans called for his resignation in written correspondence to Co-Chairmen of the Board of Trustees. In this case, the resources available to the cabals for the purpose of having Wheelock removed from his position included interpersonal relationships, and the threat of formal, organized grievance actions. such as a vote of no confidence and a formal personnel grievance. Wheelock was not removed to prevent him from abusing subordinates, or because he was an incapacitated leader. Ultimately, he was forced to resign because as the target of several emerging formal grievances, he was becoming an institutional liability.

CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This qualitative case study presents a series of events occurring within a private, church-related university leading up to the forced resignation of the institution's president. The narrative of this case describes these events solely from the perspective of organizational subordinates who actively sought to have the president removed from office because they believed he was abusing his power. Because the organizational literature rarely considers the viewpoints of organizational subordinates relevant or pertinent (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998), consumers of this study may find the need to routinely adjust their vertical and horizontal hold buttons to maintain focus on the organizational orientation of this study. "Insofar as the subordinate suffers the wrong when a manager abuses power, the subordinate's perception of the manager's exercise of power should indicate the presence of abuse" (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998, p. 1340).

Critics of this approach may demand a balanced perspective, drawing from a variety of viewpoints up and down the ladder of hierarchy and from supporters of the president. This desire for balance is deeply rooted in unseen and unacknowledged adherence to the unquestioned supremacy of organizational leaders positioned at the highest levels of hierarchy and unchallenged dependence on organizational structures where power is diffused down from the top of the hierarchy. In the tradition of Habermas, presenting the experiences of the oppressed in a free speech situation and challenging the legitimacy of tyrannical structures is necessary for achieving enlightenment and emancipation (Geuss, 1981).

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Theoretical Overview

Two salient features of critical theory, the Habermasian "ideal speech situation" (Geuss, 1981) and Honneth's struggle for moral recognition as motive for collective rebellion and resistance (1996) serve as the conceptual framework from which the data collected for this case was analyzed. In explaining the struggle of social groups against oppression, Axel Honneth described how injuries or threats to the moral recognition of individuals shared within a particular social group are motives leading to the collective resistance or rebellion against of oppression (1996).

In Habermas' critical theory, individuals are oppressed because they are prisoners of their own unexamined assumptions, or "false consciousness":

> A social institution or practice can be extremely repressive – it may thwart and frustrate the agents in the pursuit of many of their strongest desires – and still be accepted by the members of the society because they take it to be legitimate, and they take it to be legitimate because of certain normative beliefs deeply embedded in their world-picture. (Geuss, 1981, p. 59)

Habermas describes the "ideal speech situation", as a condition necessary for members of a social group to achieve freedom from their false consciousness, a psychic enlightenment which results in the emancipation of the group from oppression (Geuss, 1981). "The way in which they are to be freed from this false consciousness is by being brought to realize that parts of their form consciousness are reflectively unacceptable" (Geuss, 1981, p. 64). In ideal speech situations, individuals suffering from false consciousness, or unseen assumptions about their social order, are enlightened through self-reflection resulting from free, open and un-coerced discussion.

As described by Honneth (1996), demonstrated disrespect for the values of the community accumulates to the point where members of a social group are compelled to compare the injuries to their moral recognition. From these discussions emerges what Honneth calls a "semantic bridge", the engine through which individuals create a shared vocabulary serving as the vehicle which drives collective action to resist oppression. "Hurt feelings of this sort can, however become the motivational basis for collective resistance only if subjects are able to articulate them within an intersubjective framework of interpretation that they can show to be typical for an entire group" (Honneth, 1996, p. 163).

Testing Critical Theory

The events of this case serve to as an appropriate setting for interpreting and testing critical theory as described by Habermas and Honneth (1996). "Understanding and interpreting the findings of a case investigation in light of established theory serves to test theory" (Merriam, 1988. p. 58). The subjects interviewed for this case described being oppressed by the president of the institution because he abused power by virtue of his position in the organizational hierarchy. Respondents expressed concerns that the hierarchical abuse of power was oppressing as it silenced dissent and generated fear. The president ignored the norms and values of the community, such as academic freedom, procedures for determining tenure and promotion, the recommendations of regional accrediting bodies and tenets of shared governance. In the tradition of Honneth (1996), rebellion and resistance formulate where the disrespected morals and values extend beyond the individual and impact a larger group or culture.

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An example of the false consciousness reported by subjects interviewed for this case is rooted in the institution's tenuous fiscal circumstances. Throughout its history, Midwestern Christian University (MCU) has struggled to maintain fiscal viability. This struggle was particularly salient when Dr. Wheelock assumed his presidency because the institution was in a state of financial exigency. Twenty faculty positions, some tenured, had been eliminated and the organization was undergoing significant reorganization (AA, Tuesday, March 23, 1979 p. S8).

Dr. Brian Sturdivan, an associate dean for the School of Management, illustrates the institutional false consciousness associated with the institution's fiscal precariousness. When he discovered that staff in the International Services office inappropriately awarded transfer credit for MCU general education courses, he describes his personal psychic struggle with moral ambiguity. Sturdivan knew that the practices were inappropriate but questioned the wisdom of revealing them. Faculty members in the School of Management believed that international students were MCU's market niche, and most reliable revenue producer, so they were afraid to do anything to jeopardize their recruitment:

> Whatever [International Services] did was accepted because we needed the students. I knew that the transfer credit practices jeopardized the school's reputation and accreditation, but I worried that I might cause more damage by bringing it to light because we would lose money. (BS, 2/20/01)

This example reveals Dr. Sturdivan's assumption that challenging Wheelock and his administration would fiscally damage the institution or individual schools or departments. This assumption provides an example of the Habermasian "false consciousness". The

gravity of the assumed consequences, in this example, fiscal damage to the institution, caused Sturdivan to feel helpless and behave helplessly against what he perceived as unethical and potentially damaging organizational practices.

This unexamined assumption is also evident when Wheelock ignores the recommendations of a search committee for a new Dean of the School of Law, and selects a candidate whose name was not forwarded by the committee. The threat from Wheelock, restated here, was very explicit:

> ...the President told him and maybe two other members of the law school
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> committee that they were dirt stupid, the search committee, and that... if they...
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> did not accept the selected candidate they would begin winding down legal
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> education at [MCU]. (GS, 2/15/00)

It can be assumed from the absence of challenge to the hiring of the dean on the part of the MCU Faculty Senate Executive Committee (FSEC) and law school faculty, that the threat was effective for Wheelock in his exercise of power.

False consciousness is also manifest in the helplessness subjects felt in response to fear engendered by President Wheelock's insults, falsehoods and disrespect for procedure. For example, when Wheelock denied the tenure and promotion of five faculty whose tenure and or promotion was approved by the appropriate faculty committee and administrators, in effect, he dared the faculty to challenge him. Wheelock's non-responsiveness to memos forwarded by the FSEC concerning the denials, is a demonstration of power and in this case, the social group responds with helplessness instead of taking the issue to a higher level of challenge, like the Board of Trustees.

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Dr. Mary Warren's account of meetings of the American Association of University Professors she experienced early in her career at MCU are indicative of the fear subordinates reported resulting from Wheelock's denial of tenure:

The very first meeting I went to, two people brought up that they were afraid to tell anyone that they went to an AAUP meeting because they weren't tenured. Would AAUP impact their ability to get tenure? I thought that was just ridiculous. How could that possibly affect tenure? And there was sort of this sense that, no people who have come before have gotten tenure…. it really was a sense of "I hope nobody notices [we are meeting]." (MW, 3/18/01)

For the faculty at MCU, Wheelock's bold shows of power and seemingly callous disregard for protocol instilled fear which was accompanied by unquestioned, paralyzing helplessness, or a false consciousness which sustained the vulnerability of the community to abuse of power.

In addition to failing to comply with policy stated in the faculty handbook in cases of tenure and promotion, subjects reported that President Wheelock ignored and circumvented the norms and values of the community. Examples of this include the appointments without a search committee of Robert Habecker to Academic Vice President and Laura Hansen to Provost and falsifying reports of his administration's response to the recommendations of the visiting team of the regional accreditation body (GS, 2/15/01). Wheelock's abuse of power is particularly salient when he unequivocally supports the illegitimate practices of International Services staff inappropriately accepting transfer credit from international institutions for general education

requirements necessary for the completion of undergraduate degrees. In restating the charges made by the Deans to a Co-Chair of the Board of Trustees:

> [Wheelock] precipitously decided, without trying to learn the facts, that the improprieties should continue unimpeded. Even before resuming the office of President, well before he had been briefed on the problem by Vice-Presidents [Williams] and [Henderson]; and at a time when his *only* [italics in original] source of information was the Vice-President ultimately responsible for the improper practice; President [Wheelock] announced unambiguously in writing that he had made up his mind and that there would be no change in the way transfer credits would be handled. (Memo to a Co-Chair of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees from the Deans' Council, 9/19/97, p. 4)

These charges and others reveal that organizational subordinates perceived they were oppressed by the hierarchical abuse of power perpetrated by an organizational superior. Habermas describes the "ideal speech situation", as a condition necessary for members of a social group to achieve freedom from their false consciousness, a psychic enlightenment which results in the emancipation of the group from oppression (Geuss, 1981). "The way in which they are to be freed from this false consciousness is by being brought to realize that parts of their form consciousness are reflectively unacceptable" (Geuss, 1981, p. 64). In ideal speech situations, individuals suffering from false consciousness, or unseen assumptions about their social order, are enlightened through self-reflection resulting from free, open and un-coerced discussion. This self-reflection created by the ideal speech situation described by Habermas creates an environment allowing for what Honneth (1996) calls a "semantic bridge," the engine through which

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individuals create a shared vocabulary serving as the vehicle which drives collective action to resist oppression.

Wheelock's demonstrated disrespect for the values of the community accumulated to the point where organizational subordinates were compelled to discuss and compare the injuries to their moral recognition. From these discussion emerged what Honneth identified as a shared vocabulary oppression, or a "semantic bridge" (1996, p. 163). "Hurt feelings of this sort can, however, become the motivational basis for collective resistance only if subjects are able to articulate them within an intersubjective framework of interpretation that they can show to be typical for an entire group" (Honneth, 1996, p. 163).

In his dismissal of the concerns related to academic protocol, academic integrity, academic reputation and the authority of external agencies such as regional accrediting bodies, of MCU, Wheelock challenged highly valued norms of the institution and the community of higher education. This disrespect for norms and values represents the type of moral injury that Honneth (1996) identifies as the motivation for collective action and rebellion. Inherent in the identification of moral injury, is Habermas' notion of the ideal speech situation. "The way in which they are to be freed from this false consciousness is by being brought to realize that parts of their form of consciousness are reflectively unacceptable" (Geuss, 1981, p. 64). The ideal speech situation is exemplified in subject's descriptions of the meetings of the Deans' Council and FSEC for the explicit purpose of speeding Wheelock's resignation. In the confines of these meetings, members openly discussed among themselves the perceived injuries to the norms of the community and explicitly discussed strategies for orchestrating Wheelock's removal. Members of FSEC

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describe their disagreement over whether or not to go to public with their concerns and plans:

> The strategy to go to the campus newspaper, my God, the stupidest thing I've ever seen. Let's go blab to the campus newspaper and let's talk about all kinds of hypotheticals. If he does this, we'll do this. Let's let him know what we were going to do. I couldn't think of anything stupider. (LS, 7/15/00)

On the other side of the table were officers of FSEC who advocated a more public approach:

> So we would get in long arguments about what to do. Then some of us like [Mary] and I thought we should talk with the faculty, and [others did not]. You know I felt like the secret underground. We can't tell anybody about what were doing. It was very stressful, because I viewed my job was to represent what the faculty wanted. [Mary and I] just went against what the others said, and talked to others, even though [they] gave us these directives not to, we did it anyway. (JC, 6/16/00)

Embedded within this conflict are elements of the ideal speech situation described by Habermas. A high level of trust existed among the participants to feel secure in sharing concerns and disagreements without reprisal. The discussants practiced a free, uncoerced exchange of ideas and beliefs.

In contrast to the conflict-laden discussions of the FSEC, the members of the Deans' Council described their interactions with each other as very collegial and coordinated. All of the members of the Deans' Council reported that they felt a kinship and collegiality. To restate one description of the Deans' Council, "It evolved over the

summer. We [the Deans' Council] started to become close over the summer" (BF, 6/21/00). In another restatement, "[The members of the Deans' Council wanted to] present a solid front to the President" (SD, 6/9/00).

Findings

Organizational subordinates interviewed for this case reported being oppressed by the practices of President Wheelock. This oppression was manifest in a false consciousness manifest in the belief that challenging Wheelock could bring harm to the institution. Subordinates also reported helplessness from believing that appealing to higher authorities such as external professional associations or the Board of Trustees would not repair the situation, but only lead to personal harm.

It is reasonable to argue that one of the findings of this case is that injuries to collective moral recognition, or values and culture, motivated rebellion as expressed by individual faculty and administrators cooperating together to force the President's resignation. The discovery of these injuries resulted from inter-member discussions leading to the discovery of accumulated shared injuries, however, the Habermasian description of the ideal speech situation is utopian when compared to the nature of the discussions members of the oppressed group at MCU encountered. To restate, Habermas envisioned "a situation of uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents" (Geuss, 1981, p. 65). In this case, many of the discussions were held in secret, and not all members of the community were invited or encouraged to participate. The agents were neither free nor were they equal. In this case, subjects participated in a permutation of the ideal speech situation as envisioned by Habermas with the expected results, the lifting of false consciousness.

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The behavior of respondents for this case are congruent with critical theory as presented by Habermas (Geuss, 1981; White, 1990) and Honneth (1996). Within the organization under study, unquestioned oppression fostered a fearful culture where members felt helpless and morally adrift, similar to the false consciousness described by Habermas (Geuss, 1981) and Honneth (1996). As the oppression accumulated, the organizational members entered into critical discussions in the tradition of the Habermasian "ideal speech situation" through which developed shared understanding (Honneth, 1996). Fortified by this shared understanding, the organizational members developed strategies of resistance and rebellion against the perceived oppression, ultimately resulting in the forced resignation of the president.

While the use of critical theory in examining this case is helpful in explaining events, it is also limiting in that the heroes and villains of critical theory are always pre-destined. Critical theory is victimized by it's own false consciousness where those who hold power are always oppressive and those who are not in power must struggle against the empowered to be emancipated. This absolute itself deserves a critical appraisal.

Comparison of Emerging Themes and Existing Literature

Although there are no empirical examinations specifically examining the subordinate perspective of hierarchical abuse of power (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998), the literature related to organizational justice, boat-rocking, coalition formation and whistle-blowing are relevant to examinations of the behavior or organizational subordinates acting against hierarchical abuse of power in this study.

The literature concerning organizational justice distinguishes between procedural justice where organizational members are concerned about the fairness of procedures and

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distributive justice which concerns issues of fairness in the allocation of organizational rewards and benefits. The findings of this study do not support the findings reported in the literature identifying procedural fairness as an antecedent for positive organizational commitment (Martin & Bennett, 1996). In this case, organizational members displayed a high level of commitment in spite of clearly articulating that the institution's procedures were unfair. Responses to procedural justice within institutions of higher education may be unique due to the influence of academic tenure on the professorate. The organizational commitment demonstrated by organizational subordinates in this case may be more a function of the peculiar impact of academic tenure on employment patterns as compared to workers in non-academic settings.

A salient finding in the organizational justice literature suggests that individual perceptions of justice are shaped by perceptions of fairness learned from co-workers (Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000). This finding closely aligns with the development of the movement against Wheelock developed in the Habermasian ideal speech situations reported by organizational subordinates in this case. As subordinates shared their concerns with each other, coalitions formed and a shared vocabulary of dissatisfaction with Wheelock's procedural justice developed.

The behaviors of both the Deans' Council and FSEC are reflected in the literature on coalition formation. Both groups utilized upward influence through conversations with members of the MCU Board of Trustees and downward influence in interacting with other faculty and staff (Yukl, & Tracey, 1992). Additionally, the coalitions served as a defense against abusive leadership (Hirschhorn, 1995).

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Boat-rocking is expressing dissent within the confines of the organization (Spague & Ruud, 1985). The FSEC letter writing campaign in response to Wheelock's denial of tenure and promotion without explanation to five faculty serves as one example of this type of dissent. The impending vote of no-confidence following Wheelock's refusal to address the recommendations of the visiting team of the regional accreditation team provides another example (GS, 2/20/01). In spite of these examples, given the intensity of the dissatisfaction with the Wheelock administration expressed by respondents more boat-rocking would be expected. According to the literature, a climate of fear (Gouran, Hirokawa & Martz, 1986) and futile attempts to boat-rock are both deterrents to boat-rocking (Hocker & Wilmot,1978). Contrarily, this case does not support Sprague and Rudd's (1985) finding that a high level of job security was a positive correlate to boat-rocking. Faculty members with academic tenure enjoy a high level of job security relative to members of the labor force, however; boat-rocking was not reported to be practiced frequently by faculty at the institution under study.

Whistle-blowing is distinguished from boat-rocking in that it involves moving outside the boundaries of the organization, either by skipping over rungs in the organizational hierarchy (internal whistle-blowing) or by revealing questionable organizational practices to external agencies, such as the media or a governing body (external whistle-blowing) (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998). Karen Henderson's grievance against Dr. Wheelock closely approximates Miceli and Near's four-step process of whistle-blowing (1992). The first step involves a triggering event, or an event of dubious nature. This step was met by Wheelock's illegitimate appointment of Laura Hansen as

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University Provost, which was a direct threat to Henderson's job security and his subsequent lashing out at her during a cabinet meeting.

Miceli and Near's (1992) next step requires the individual making a decision to act. Henderson's deciding to respond to the triggering event by filing a hostile workplace grievance against Wheelock. Her delivery of this grievance to the University's Director of Human Resources met the condition of the third step – exposing the wrongdoing. Finally, the organizational members either decides to confront the perpetrator or retaliate against the whistle-blower. Both of these outcomes are present in this case, as Henderson's grievance escalated an institutional jihad, one side against Wheelock and the other side fiercely loyal to him. Wheelock tried to terminate Henderson concurrent with his opposition trying to have him removed from his position.

The findings are directly related to the existing literature reviewed for this study related to organizational justice, boat-rocking, coalition formation and whistle-blowing. With few exceptions, the findings support and enhance the existing literature. Conclusively, these behaviors are associated with the subordinate perspective of hierarchical abuse of power.

Hierarchical Abuse of Power

Vredenburgh and Brenders's conceptual framework of hierarchical abuse of power shapes the organization of the data (1998). Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) identified two dimensions of power related to hierarchical abuse of power, the disrespect for individual dignity and obstacles to job performance and behaviors respective to those dimensions. This study tests Propositions 1,2 and 7 as suggested by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) and are restated here:

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Proposition 1: The subordinate's perspective should define the hierarchical abuse of power because it is his or her dignity or performance that is harmed.

Proposition 2: Hierarchical acts of power abuse, undertaken over time in a given organizational unit, lead to the formation of unit norms.

Proposition 7: Powerholders abuse power through the strategies of direct pressure, upward appeal, exchange, ingratiation and inspiration.

Subordinate perspectives on hierarchical abuse of power

The experiences described by the subordinates resulting from the perceived hierarchical abuse of power perpetrated by the university president in this case support the dimensions of hierarchical abuse of power suggested in Proposition 1 of Vredenburgh and Brender's (1998) conceptual framework, "The subordinate's perspective should define the hierarchical abuse of power because it is his or her dignity or performance that is harmed" (p. 1340). As reported by the subordinates, behaviors of the president affected both the dignity of the individual subordinates and impeded job performance and organizational rewards.

Wheelock's demands for attitudinal conformity and demands that subordinates cooperate with schemes or plans that lacked integrity negatively impacted subordinate dignity. One respondent reported his feelings of self-doubt after a meeting where Wheelock falsely reported that he and his staff had complied with the recommendations of a recent accreditation team, "Well you know my voice was like this [speaking softly], I was a mealy-mouthed pissant... I was completely non-plused. I don't know what to say now" (GS, 2/15/01).

In another circumstance, a respondent expressed remorse over his illicit compliance with Wheelock's demand that he alter procedures related to the termination

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of two faculty members in the midst of the institutions financial exigency in the early 1980's. According to the respondent, his cooperation was coerced under the threat of great harm to the institution:

> Under threat I had to carry alone the burden of deciding what I was told was everyone's dismissal or the dismissal of two people (to whom I apologized and confessed in person years ago). (Correspondence from former MCU faculty member to AR, 2/19/98)

In addition to placing subordinates in compromising positions, Wheelock's use of insults created feelings of insecurity of the most talented faculty. After describing an event early in Wheelock's tenure where he publicly responded sarcastically to one of Wheelock's insults, a senior faculty member who earned his academic credentials from Ivy League institutions revealed his uncertainty of Wheelock's appreciation for his work:

> I mean if I was working and stayed around to sweep the sidewalks till 11:00 at night he would have this sort of generic appreciation on his part... He, of course as you know, perceived himself as some sort of intellectual. His speeches were always laden with as X once said, and X would always been some thinker or theologian. He was a megalomaniac. It wouldn't surprise me to discover that he felt he was great on all spectra. I suppose to that extent he would appreciate that more than if I were sweeping sidewalks. He knew, at least he had a grip on, who was working and making his life easier. To the extent that I sweep sidewalks, that would make his life easier, to the extent that I published fancy articles, that would get attention for the [university] and attract more students, that made his life

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easier. So my relationship with him began contentiously, but I think he appreciated me too. (LS, 7/15/00)

An academic dean also described being insulted by Wheelock and his feelings of helplessness in the face of the disrespect:

I am an old dog and I've handled myself well in numerous tough situations, but I was an amateur verbally with [Wheelock]. I had great difficulty handling [him], he was probably the most verbally vicious person I have ever met…. He would just treat you like you were an absolute idiot if you disagreed with him…. If it was name-calling, I could deal with that. If you disagreed with him he would come up with a litany of reasons why you were the stupidest, most myopic person that he had ever come across. It was not something that was very comfortable. There was one other trapping however that made me absolutely crazy. It didn't matter whether I had the first appointment of the day, or the last appointment of the day, or any other appointment. I was never kept waiting less than a half hour, and then I had to endure a half hour worth of stories of many of which I had heard before. All that was, was a demonstration of power. Look , "I'm in charge and you are my servant and if I choose to make you wait I will". (EL, 6/15/00)

Wheelock also used his power to make subordinates dependent upon him through the exercise of appointment by patronage. The academic dean who admitted to earning his appointment through patronage and was required by Wheelock to write contradictory letters of explanation of statements he made to trustees about the English language skills of international students tells of his feelings about that event,

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[Wheelock] was demonstrating to me that he was in charge and he could have me do whatever he needed me to do.... if he had any problems from my interview then he would have this selection of two letters. Well, that was somewhat embarrassing. (EL, 6/15/00)

The findings of this study support the conceptualization of hierarchical abuse of power as suggested by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) in revealing subordinate perceptions that Wheelock demonstrated a lack of respect for the dignity of individuals. As proposed by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998), Wheelock's disrespect for the individual dignity of subordinates was manifested in his insults, attempts require attitudinal conformity and coercing unethical behavior from participants whose personal security was threatened should they elect not to cooperate with him. Respondents in this study expressed feelings of powerlessness, helplessness, remorse, professional insecurity and humiliation in response to this treatment.

Wheelock's intereference with subordinate's job performance and receiving of rewards further supports Proposition 1 of the Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) model. Not only did Wheelock's treatment of subordinates negatively impact the individual dignity of MCU subordinates, his capricious use of institutional resources and arbitrary dispensing of performance rewards impeded job performance and the subsequent securing of rewards. One example of his interference with the performance of subordinates is found in the use of maintenance personnel as caretakers of his children (AR, 6/21/00). It is a logical assumption that caring for children while performing job tasks will have a negative impact on completing work functions.

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Wheelock's misuse of institutional resources also had a negative affect on the ability of subordinates to lead and manage the staff in their respective areas. His commandeering of the university police force for the purpose of transporting him to his physical therapy appointments following his strokes serves as another example of this type of misuse. The director of campus security explained how this impacted his ability to lead his staff,

It grew, it took on a life of it's own. When it started, [Mrs. Wheelock] would pick him up and we would take him [to his physical therapy appointment]. Actually, originally she would ride with him and so we just basically help if she needed it. She lugged him around like a sack of potatoes. It trickled off and [Mrs. Wheelock] wasn't going anymore. In no time, we were not only expected to take him, shuffle him back and forth, undress him for his pool periods, the man at that point still couldn't control drinking. When I complained to the higher ups about the overtime, I was told to make it happen, we are not giving any extra to see that this comes off. When I complained that it was taking away from [the responsibilities of the campus police], I was told that the most important thing. It was so abusive. The campus was left with a thin campus [police force]. The officers had no training with physical therapy. They are trained to carry guns and deal with law enforcement. The officers were threatening to quit in mass. Our morale was low and they were furious at me for letting it happen. I wasn't a leader because I didn't stand up and say "we are not going to do this". I tried to help as much as I could. I would do my share of the shuttling back and forth. I

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wasn't asking them to do anything I wouldn't do myself, but that didn't help. (MA, 6/9/00)

In addition to gaining the compliance of subordinates in misusing institutional resources, subordinates reported that Wheelock's infrequent adherence to university policies and procedures served as an obstacle to job rewards, such as promotion and tenure. A salient example of this was Wheelock's failure to comply with standards set forth in the faculty Handbook related to informing faculty denied tenure or promotion of the deficits in their performance (GS, 2/15/01). Without explanation, he denied the tenure and/or promotion of faculty members who had received unanimous approval from their departments. The faculty who did not receive tenure or promotion faced serious consequences in terms of lost income potential and employment security and they had no idea as to how to remedy their deficiencies as perceived by Wheelock.

This seemingly arbitrary denial of performance rewards and dismissal of university procedures served to promote the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty as described by Dr. Mary Warren:

[On my previous campus] we had faculty meetings and other kinds of things that were very open, and people yelling and screaming in the open. So I thought initially this is a really polite place until I realized people were so fearful of [Patrick Wheelock]..... [A colleague] told me a story about going to [Wheelock] over some argument and from then on he was a troublemaker. [Wheelock] would not talk to him. Constantly people would make little side comments, sort of looking around to make sure no one was listening. In the faculty dining room there would be hushed discussion. It wasn't like people immediately said "watch

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out for [Wheelock]", but that was clearly the sense you got from the
secretiveness.... Over time, people told me they felt this was a very punishing
place. People felt that [Gary Singleton] had been punished in many ways because
he was on FSEC. (MW, 3/18/01)

Another instance of disregard for process involved Wheelock's arbitrary attempt
to appoint Laura Hansen to the position of University Provost. Within the normative
values of a community of higher education, it would be expected that such an
appointment would involve an organized search, in consultation with the Board of
Trustees and to a lesser extent, the faculty, in the case of the provost appointment. In
addition, candidates for such a position would hold a terminal degree in their field. These
circumstances impeded the ability of the collective and individuals to perform their jobs
by placing subordinates in the position by placing leadership of the institution in the
hands of an ill president and an unqualified provost whose leadership decisions would be
vulnerable to the whims of the president.

The Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) model is also supported by Wheelock's
discriminatory appraisal of individual performance. One such example is found in
Wheelock's unfailing support for the practices of the office of International Services and
Chris Daniels in spite of evidence suggesting that the practices were detrimental and
challenged the academic integrity of the institution and jeopardized its accreditation
status. This behavior significantly impeded the job performance and rewards of others in
a variety of ways. First, Brian Sturdivan, Karen Henderson and others were compelled to
challenge the practices. Collecting the necessary evidence for the challenge took energy
away from promoting positive programs within the institution. In addition, the practices

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jeopardized the reputation of the institution, thus endangering the professional careers of many subordinates and the integrity of the academic degrees granted to thousands of previous graduates. Wheelock's unquestioned support of Daniels was a serious impediment to both work performance and reward.

Wheelock's discriminatory practices influenced the arbitrary allocation of rewards. A salient example of this favoritism and patronage may be inferred from a critical examination of the academic credentials of his executive staff. As described in the case, at the time of his stroke, only the Academic Vice President, Karen Henderson had been selected through a legitimate search process. Two highly unusual features of his senior staff relative to normative values in institutions of higher education were that three of the seven members possessed only undergraduate degrees and one member was his first cousin. According to Vredenburgh and Brender, "The abuse of power may be indirect, i.e., not involving direct interaction between manager and subordinate. When one or more subordinates receives undeserved preferential rewarded treatment, for example, those being comparatively deprived suffer an abuse of power" (1998, p. 1339).

Requiring attendance at company events is another feature of the Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) model supported by the findings in this case. There are at least two instances of this occurring, the first being that senior staff perceived mandatory visitation at the hospital immediately following the president's stroke:

> I remember having one conversation with [two deans], over in the corner, discussing the fact that it was required to put in a certain amount of time.... The vigil was still going on and at that point it was Easter weekend. The real diehards were still [at the hospital]. [One vice president] made a big production about how

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few people were there for Easter Sunday. He was complaining that the other vice presidents had not shown up…. [Requiring my attendance] was more than tacit, my boss basically told me to be there. (MA, 6/9/00)

It is important to note that the Estelle Wheelock, the president's wife orchestrated these command performances. This is salient in that it demonstrates the under-current of tensions surrounding Mrs. Wheelock as she derived and demanded power from her husband.

In conceptualizing the hierarchical abuse of power, Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) propose that the hierarchical abuse of power is manifest in two dimensions, disrespect for individual dignity and obstacles to performance or rewards. Behaviors of the president including imposing demands for illegal cooperation, humiliation, insistence on attitudinal conformity, exacting personal service, manipulating dependency and lying demonstrate the disrespect for individual dignity. Behaviors of the president such as making arbitrary personnel decision, discriminate regarding performance appraisals, allocating rewards arbitrarily and requiring attendance at company events all support the Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) dimension of obstacles to job performance and reward.

The influence of hierarchical abuse of power on unit norms

Vredenburgh and Brender's second proposition states that "hierarchical acts of power abuse, undertaken over time in a given organizational unit, will lead to the formation of unit norms" (1998, p. 1341). For the purpose of this discussion, unit norms are defined as organizational practices, procedures or standards developing over time in a given organizational unit,

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Because of the importance of power, patterns of abuse lead over time to the formation of unit norms. The frequency and visibility of abusive power acts within a unit give rise to norms about the exercise of power resulting in some degree of expectation and acceptability. (Vrendenburgh & Brender, 1998, p. 1341)

In this case, subordinates addressed abusive circumstances chose one of the following three strategies: challenge, ignore or avoid, or subterfuge. The selection of one of these strategies began at the individual level and then was transmitted to and replicated by entire units, thus becoming unit norms. The selection of a strategy was accompanied with risks and consequences relative to both of the dimensions proposed by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998); the disrespect for individual dignity and obstacles to job performance and rewards.

One strategy involved challenging the abuser. This is exemplified early in the case when Gary Singleton and FSEC question Wheelock's denial of promotion and tenure to faculty approved by their deans and departments. The FSEC was the relevant unit of appeal in this case and as a group they instigated a letter writing campaign, attempting to have the President explain his decisions and provide the denied faculty information concerning the deficits in their performance leading to the presidential denials. This ultimately resulted in the tenure and promotion of all faculty in question, but most likely had a negative affect on the relationship between the president and FSEC as a unit.

The shifting of responsibility of the evaluation of international student transfer credit from the staff of the School of Management to International Services provides an

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example of the strategy where a unit ignores or avoids the abuse. When Wheelock transferred the school's Associate Dean Iris Keagan to International Services there was no protest. Eventually this transfer of personnel led to the erosion of academic integrity as it relates to the admission of international students. When International Services staff asked Associate Dean Brian Sturdivan and his staff to sign admission letters without appropriate documentation, they did not protest because they assumed consequences:

> [Chris Daniels] and [his staff] were overseas. They faxed about 120 applications
> with transcripts and they asked us to approve them. We all met in the [meeting
> room] and they asked us to sign [the admission letters].... They said "we need to
> fax these back as soon as possible and get these students over here".... We had to
> sign because if we didn't we would be accused of losing 120 students. (BS,
> 2/20/01)

This cooperation came back to bite Brian Sturdivan when he attempted to challenge the practices of Chris Daniels. Rather than demonstrate the danger to academic integrity of Daniel's practices, Sturdivan's cooperation with Daniels implied agreement. In this agreement, Sturdivan's complicity involved the cooperation of the entire unit and served to maintain and sustain the unwanted status quo.

A third strategy identified in this case is subterfuge. Subterfuge, in this case, is similar to internal whistle blowing (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998) in that persons who perceive themselves to be aggrieved seek to inform others related to the organization who might be able to assist them. Several faculty and senior staff reported that they secretly visited with trustees to inform them of the abuses (LS, 7/15/00; SD, 6/9/00). Subterfuge in this case also took the form of external whistle blowing (Dworkin & Baucus; Sims &

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Keenan, 1998) as evidenced by the faculty member who leaked information and documents to the press (JB, 6/11/00). According to several respondents, the subterfuge led to organized, orchestrated efforts to force Wheelock's resignation, included the formation of coalitions and networking (BS, 2/20/01; LS, 7/15/00). The following table reflects the impacts of these three strategies:

Table I
The Effect of Unit Norm Strategies on Individual Dignity, Job Performance and Reward.

Strategy	Type of abuse on Individual dignity	Effects on job performance and rewards
Challenge or question abuse	Subject subordinate to insults and verbal harassment.	Deprive subordinate of resources and rewards.
Ignore or avoid abuse	Negatively affect credibility of individual. Impose demands for illegal cooperation.	Maintain status quo of abuses.
Subterfuge	Subordinate experiences negative feelings and paranoia.	Negatively affect subordinates job security.

Strategies of power holders who abuse power

Vredenburgh and Brender's seventh proposition suggests that power holders abuse power through the use of direct pressure, upward appeal, exchange, ingratiation and inspiration (1998). All of these strategies except upward appeal are revealed in the data. Upward appeal was not found in the data, but that may be due more to the organization of the study as only the subordinate perspective was employed. Subordinate respondents to this case may not have access to instances of upward appeal due to their subordinate positions in the organizational hierarchy. Specifically, the subordinates interviewed for this case did not have access to the trustees or donors who would be the most likely targets of upward appeal conducted by the President.

In this case, the power holder abused power using some of these strategies within the framework of strategies for success that included collecting a loyal inner circle, controlling information resources and intimidating subordinates. The strategies proposed by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998), exchange, ingratiation and inspiration were

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employed on the members of the president's inner circle, or as identified in this case, members of his senior staff.

Exchange, or the giving of something for something else, ingratiation, establishing oneself in the good graces of others, and inspiration, the act of animating or influencing were intertwined. In this case, the President exchanged high-paying, high-status, high-power positions for loyalty and complicity. The result of his efforts was to develop an inner circle of senior staff who were place-bound at MCU by virtue of their inadequate academic qualifications and unconventional practices. The loyalty of these senior staff members is exemplified in the reported loyalty oaths they pronounced at the meeting concerning the evaluation of international transcripts in which Wheelock attended in spite of instructions to the contrary from the Board of Trustees and was subsequently removed.

> After [Wheelock was escorted from the meeting], it became a contest of who was loyal to the president and who was not. That was the most bizarre situation that I saw…. [One vice president] said "I am loyal to the president, not the university". (BS, 2/20/01)

Exchange and ingratiation were not always effective strategies. Wheelock miscalculated when he attempted to exchange loyalty for position when he hired Ed Larson as Dean of the School of Management. At first, Wheelock was able to manipulate Dean Larson, as evidenced by the incident where Wheelock required Dean Larson to produced to two contradictory written explanations for comments he made in the presence of Trustees concerning the language skills of international students. Larson,

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however, struck back as one of the authors of the letter from the Deans' Council requesting Wheelock's resignation.

Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) identified the deprivation of resources necessary for task performance as an abusive behavior. Information was a resource that was frequently withheld as an obstacle for performance however, Wheelock's manipulation of information went beyond the Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) model. In addition to making task completion difficult, Wheelock withheld information as a stall tactic to have his way with policy decisions and resource allocation. This practice is evidenced in the instances where Wheelock did not respond to memo forwarded by the FSEC concerning the denial of tenure and promotion and the investigation of the Elena Belen Almarez tarnscript. His failure to respond created circumstances where the passing of time diminished the salience of the issues and skewed the outcomes. For example, the denial of tenure became moot the following year when the denied faculty were granted promotion and tenure. In the Almarez case, by stalling his response, Wheelock bought time for a counter-attack on the practices of the School of Management.

The findings of this case support propositions 1, 2 and 7 of the conceptual model of hierarchical abuse of power as presented by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998). In this case, the university President utilized three primary contexts for perpetrating abuse for the purpose of gaining power. These organizing mechanisms included developing a loyal inner circle, controlling institutional information and intimidating subordinates through the threat of withholding or losing resources. Table II summarizes the behaviors suggested by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) aligned in an associated context.

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Table II

The Three "I's" of Hierarchical Abuse of Power

Context	Behaviors related to impacting individual dignity	Behavior related to obstacles for job performance and rewards
Inner Circle	Impose demands for illegal cooperation. Insist on attitudinal conformity. Manipulate dependency.	Make arbitrary personnel decisions. Discriminate regarding performance appraisal. Allocate rewards arbitrarily.
Information	Lie, exaggerate or make insincere promises.	Deprive subordinates of resources necessary for task performance.
Intimidation	Verbally harass or embarrass publicly. Gossip harmfully.	Require attendance at company events.

The president of the institution behaved consistently with the propositions as proposed by Vredenburgh and Brender's hierarchical abuse of power (1998) thus supporting that work. Analysis of the data revealed an additional behavior, stalling requests for responses to memos regarding policy and procedures. In stalling, the president effectively waited out the issue until the context was altered sufficiently to suit his needs.

Summary

The organizational subordinates responding to this study perceived that they were victimized by hierarchical abuse of power as perpetrated by the University President. The participants reported the developing of a social movement and rebellion for the purpose of forcing the resignation of the President that parallels the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas (Geuss, 1981) and Axel Honneth (1996). The movement involved

subordinates who experienced a false consciousness resulting from oppression. As the oppression accumulated, organizational subordinates were enlightened from the false consciousness by sharing their concerns with each other. They unified in a common movement with the purpose of emancipation by forcing the resignation of the President.

The literature related to this study supported by the findings of this study. In particular, subordinates who actively sought the President's resignation engaged in boat-rocking, coalition formation and whistle-blowing. The findings were not supportive of the literature related to distributive justice, but this may reflect the contextual uniqueness of tenured faculty employment.

The findings further verified Vredenburgh and Brender's conceptual model of hierarchical abuse of power (1998). Both dimensions of abuse, disrespect to individual dignity and obstacle to reward and performance were reported by organizational subordinates. Additionally, the proposed behaviors Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) associated with each dimension were manifest in the perceptions of organizational subordinates.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND COMMENTARY

This chapter summarizes the design and implementation of this study and reviews the research questions, process model and conceptual frame utilized for analyzing the phenomenon and events. The conclusions include an explanation of the decision paths organizational subordinates took in seeking the resignation of the university president and institutional warning signs of hierarchical abuse of power. The implications of the findings of the study on critical theory and the knowledge base are described and practical steps for institutional practice follow.

Study Summary

This qualitative, descriptive case study explores the perspectives of organizational subordinates who actively sought the resignation of a university president accused of abusing power by virtue of his position in the organizational hierarchy. The problem involved the conflicting interests and power differentials of organizational members located at varying positions on the organizational hierarchy. Dissenting organizational subordinates served as the unit of analysis. Construction of the study followed McCracken's four-step process to include a review of the existing literature, the researcher gaining familiarity with the subject of the study, conducting a pilot and analysis of the data.

The data collected for this study included media reports covering the events reported in the case, internal memorandum and 22 open-ended interviews with individuals employed as organizational subordinates at the time of the events under

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study. The data collected was enhanced by the researcher's native experience in the institution under study and was a participant-observer of the events reported in this case.

The case is set in a private, urban, church-related liberal arts institution with an annual enrollment of about 4000 students, 50% of which are graduate students. The institution employs approximately 160 full-time faculty and about as many adjunct faculty. The institution was highly dependent on tuition revenue, of which foreign national students who constituted roughly 23% of the student population generated a substantial portion.

Organizational subordinates interviewed for this case expressed dissatisfaction with the President's leadership in spite of the growth of the institution during the President's administration. From the time of his initial appointment up to the time of his resignation, the institution enjoyed remarkable growth in student enrollment and the institution's endowment increased from $2.7 million to $38 million (AE, July 2, 1992, p. 2). In addition, the physical plant was enhanced with several new instructional facilities and renovations to several of the existing buildings.

The data analysis techniques used included the constant comparison method Glaser and Strauss (1981) and Spradley's domain/taxonomic development of cultural themes (1980). The organization of the study involved creating a timeline of the reported events. Next a paper file was created for each identified event. Data pertaining to a particular event from all sources was aggregated in a file for the purpose of enhancing the triangulation of the data and developing a complete picture of the events under study.

The critical theories of Jürgen Habermas (Geuss, 1981) and Axel Honneth (1996) serve as the lens through which the study is framed. Habermas' "ideal speech situation"

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and Honneth's theory of moral recognition explain the developing collective action of the organizational subordinates leading up to the president's resignation. Vredenburgh and Brender's (1998) conceptual framework describing the hierarchical abuse of power provides guideposts and frames for the study. Three of seven speculative propositions suggested by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) were tested using the data collected for this study. The propositions examined were:

Proposition 1: The subordinate's perspective should define the hierarchical abuse of power because it is his or her dignity or performance that is harmed (p. 1340).

Proposition 2: Hierarchical acts of power abuse, undertaken over time in a given organizational unit, lead to the formation of unit norms (p. 1341).

Proposition 7: Powerholders abuse power through the strategies of direct pressure, upward appeal, exchange, ingratiation and inspiration (p. 1344).

Conclusions

These conclusions are framed by the following restatement, "In order to describe the history of social struggles as moving in a certain direction, one must appeal hypothetically to a provisional end-state, from the perspective of which it would be possible to classify and evaluate particular events" (Honneth, 1996, p. 163). The interacting proposition of the problem statement of this study suggests a hypothetical "end-state" where organizational power does not rest in one individual, but lies balanced between members at all levels of the organization. As Gunn suggested, an organization is vulnerable to abuse of power when the bulk of power rests in a few at the top of the organizational pyramid (1995).

In this case, the uneven distribution of power created two distinct classes of organizational member, those who had resources and gained reward, and those that had

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few resources and did not receive rewards. Due to the design of the study, which investigated the perceptions of organizational subordinates, the voices of other organizational constituencies, such as members of the governing board, students, and alumni where not included. In this case, under the confines of critical theory and its requisite division of good and evil, the subordinates are heroes and the president and his cronies the villains. It is arguably, however, that the subordinates themselves were a privileged, empowered social group, and that students, particularly international students, are the truly oppressed organizational constituency emerging from these events.

The findings of this study concurred with the Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) conceptual model suggesting that hierarchical abuse of power would negatively impact the individual dignity of organizational subordinates and would establish obstacles to their performance and rewards. The distribution of members within a particular class was not based on merit, but on fidelity to the offending superior. Gunn describes this as an undesirable state because, "Such a stance establishes an adversarial relationship between superiors and subordinates undermining the collaboration, co-operation and teamwork necessary for achieving high output" (1995, p. 29).

One prevailing conclusion related to this hypothetical end-state emerges from the findings of this study. Although organizational subordinates are uniquely situated to identify and suffer from hierarchical abuse of power, they are in a relatively powerless position to prevent it or stop it without participating in counter-productive, time-consuming activities such as sharing information through coalition formation, boat-rocking and whistle-blowing. When a powerful organizational leader is perpetrating hierarchical abuse of power, it is to his benefit to block or eliminate legitimate routes of

leader accountability long before the "false consciousness" (Geuss, 1981) of organizational subordinates is sufficiently awakened for them to recognize the extent of the damage.

Ultimately, it was not the perceived harm to organizational subordinates inflicted by the President's hierarchical abuse of power, or the potential threat his management practices gave to the academic integrity of the institution that led to his resignation. The integrity of the academic programs, the satisfaction of university employees or the negative workplace climate did not appear to be considerations in asking the President to step down. Rather, the Board of Trustees calculated that the President's accumulating liability outweighed his continued worth. It is logical to assume from the events of this case that the abuse as perceived by organizational subordinates would have continued absent the growing liability to the institution resulting from the formal charges forwarded by Karen Henderson's grievance and the whistle-blowing and coalition formation of organizational subordinates.

If the prevention or avoidance of hierarchical abuse of power is a desirable state, then it is valuable to identify discernible warning signs of hierarchical abuse of power emerging from this study. These warning signs are presented in the context of a hierarchical organizational structure as abuse of power would not be hierarchical in a flattened structure:

Warning Signs for Governing Boards

An organization may be at risk of hierarchical abuse of power if:

- There are few, if any, formal, legitimate opportunities for members of governing boards to discuss the operations of the institution with subordinates without the presence of senior staff members.

- Subordinates seek secretive meetings with members of governing bodies, asking for anonymity and protection. Subordinates withdraw from meeting with board members when anonymity cannot or will not be assured.

- The governing boards as a unit does not follow its own established procedures and protocols.

Warning Signs for Organizational Subordinates

An organization may be at risk of hierarchical abuse of power if:

- Appointments, promotions and allocations of resources such as raises and benefits are arbitrary and do not appear to be equitable.

- It is not unusual within the organization for a superior to insult or harass a subordinate.

- Subordinates who are victimized by arbitrary resource allocation or insults are afraid to challenge superiors.

- Superiors withhold information from subordinates or arbitrarily fail to respond to requests for information.

Implications

The events of this case provide institutions of higher education with an argument for closely scrutinizing their internal operations for the purpose of enhancing organizational efficacy, the preservation of academic reputations and process, and the support of the dignity of organizational subordinates. The implications are rooted in the

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assumption that is morally desirable to respect individual dignity and effectively desirable to provide organizational subordinates with an environment where merit and honesty are valued.

Theory

The findings and conclusions of this study expand the understanding of critical theory, in particular, the Habermasian notion of the "ideal speech situation" (Geuss, 1981). Respondents to this case reported participating in discussions for the purpose of enlightenment and emancipation from the hierarchical abuses perpetrated by the President. These discussions are described in rich, thick detail illustrating that "ideal speech situations" occur in a variety of settings and permutations. Discussions described in this case were cooperative and collegial as evidenced by the camaraderie and friendship described by members of the Deans' Council, and conflict-laden and contrary as described by members of the Faculty senate Executive Committee (FSEC). The varying nature of these discussions juxtaposed against common purposes reflects the rich fabric of human behavior and supports Honneth's contention that purposive collective action for a common cause leads to rebellion and resistance of oppression (1996).

Knowledge Base

The findings of this study also expand our knowledge of hierarchical abuse of power by testing the process model set forth by Vredenburgh and Brender (1998). Respondents identified behaviors and feelings congruent with the dimensions of hierarchical abuse power, violation of individual dignity and obstacles to resources and rewards. Vredenburgh and Brender (1998) take this issue one step further in suggesting that the prevention of abuse does not only contribute to organizational efficacy, but

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serves a moral purpose in assuming that preserving the dignity of individual subordinate. "If individuals deserve dignity in and of themselves, workplaces should not allow the managerial exercise of power to devalue the worthiness of a subordinate" (Vredenburgh & Brender, 1998, p. 1344). The implication is that preventing the hierarchical abuse of power has holistic import for organizational functioning.

Describing hierarchical abuse of power through the eyes of dissenting organizational subordinates is useful in enhancing the understanding of this phenomenon but is far from providing a complete explanation. By establishing a congruent test of Vrdenburgh and Brender's process model, this study establishes impetus for multi-level analysis to include the impact of hierarchical abuse of power on the organization as a whole and as seen from a variety of vantage points such as members of governing boards and perpetrators.

Practice

The events of this case illustrate that institutions of higher education would benefit from avoiding and preventing the distractions and discord that accompanies hierarchical abuse of power. Achieving this end-state would require evenly distributing organizational power across the organizational hierarchy for the purpose of creating a climate of institution-wide accountability. Specifically, this can be achieved by requiring bottom-up performance evaluations of senior staff in addition to bottom-down evaluations, regularized audits of administrative and academic units, the administration of climate studies and an adjudication system which fairly and equitably addresses inter-organizational conflicts (Gunn, 1995). The implementation of such processes would

establish formal, legitimate channels for the identification and amelioration of hierarchical abuse of power.

Commentary

The hierarchical abuse of power is an undesirable organizational phenomenon that is difficult to address because the perpetrator has access to the organization's source of power and controls information and resources. The phenomenon is difficult to study because the very climate of intimidation and fear described by victims of hierarchical abuse of power has a chilling affect on subordinates, preventing them from speaking candidly without fear of retaliation. Using the perspective of dissenting subordinates, this study shines a light on the unexamined assumptions of organizational hierarchy which support pyramidal leadership and do not encourage challenge from subordinates.

This study is particularly salient in its demonstration of the vulnerability of academic integrity in the face of hierarchical abuse of power. In this case, the value of academic tenure in protecting and preserving an institution's academic integrity is evident as the employment security afforded dissenting faculty members allowed them to take risks that untenured faculty and staff might hesitate.

Finally, although this study does not address the role of governing boards in perpetrating or preventing the hierarchical abuse of power, or balancing the power differentials of administration and faculty, the events described by dissenting subordinates bring to question the efficacy of lay governing boards and shared governance. In his empirical examination of the forced resignation of the President of Adelphi University in 1996, Lionel Lewis summarizes the present state of the balance of power in institutions of higher education,

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It is difficult to imagine that it would be in the best interest of the public if faculty were granted complete autonomy. If not lay boards, someone is needed to protect the public of an autonomous faculty. At the same time, faculty must be given more than token power. This could begin with facing the fact that at present they have little. What is needed is true shared governance whereby faculty have clearly delineated responsibilities and authority that cannot be readily abrogated. Clearly, administrators need some power, but what they need to manage is a good deal less than what they have now. (2000, p. 183)

In conclusion, the events of this case form a strong argument for identifying, preventing and correcting the perpetration of the hierarchical abuse of power. Such behavior threatens academic integrity, organizational efficiency and employee morale. Institutional safeguards include the development of an engaged accessible governing body, formal, bottom –up evaluations, strict adherence to personnel policies and practices related to hiring, promotion and rewarding personnel and systems of program review that ensure accountability for all institutional units.

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CAST OF CHARACTERS

Name	Position Title
Mark Adams	Chief of University Police
James Aldridge	Academic Vice President
Elena Belen Almarez	Student
John Bixby	Faculty, College of Liberal Arts
Jan Cutter	Faculty, College of Liberal Arts
Chris Daniels	Vice President for International Services
Steven Dorsey	Dean, College of Liberal Arts
Mason Ewell	Student Reporter for Campus Newspaper
Barry Firestone	Dean, School of Law
Donald Fetter	Trustee, Chair of Trustee/Faculty Liaison Committee
Steven Geery	Unclassified Staff, International Services
Harold Goodenow	Faculty, School of Management, Interim Academic Vice President, Interim President
Robert Habecker	Interim Academic Vice President
Wendy Haney	Classified Staff
Laura Hansen	Provost Appointee
Karen Henderson	Academic Vice President
Harry Hindeman	Faculty, School of Law
Mary Warren	AAUP President
Nancy Jernigan	Classified Staff
Susan Josephs	Unclassified Staff
Iris Keagan	Dean of International Programs
Ed Larson	Dean, School of Management
Sarah Markum	Dean, School of Nursing
Howard Martin	Faculty Advisor for Campus Newspaper
Thomas Mathis	Former President, Co-Chair Executive Committee Board of Trustees
Penny Moore	Unclassified Staff
Andrew Redmond	Faculty, School of Religion, Chair of FSEC
Anthony Roberts	Trustee
Anita Satterly	Program Director
Gray Singleton	Faculty, School of Liberal Arts, Chair of FSEC
Lewis Speer	Faculty, School of Law, Member FSEC
Brian Sturdivan	Assistant Dean, School of Management
Estelle Wheelock	Wife of President of Midwestern Christian University
Patrick Wheelock	President of Midwestern Christian University
Everett Williams	Executive Vice President

APPENDIX B

References to Printed Materials Tied Directly to the Case

AA	Local daily newspaper
AB	Historical book about Midwestern Christian University
AC	Local weekly business newspaper
AD	Monograph chapter authored by MCU President
AE	Local weekly newspaper
AF	Campus Newspaper
AG	MCU Alumni Quarterly Magazine
AH	Local weekly tabloid newspaper

APPENDIX C

Oklahoma State University
Institutional Review Board

Protocol Expires: 5/31/01

Date: Wednesday, May 31, 2000   IRB Application No: ED00276

Proposal Title: HIERARCHICAL ABUSE OF POWER: A POST-MODERN CASE STUDY OF
SUBORDINATE PERSPECTIVE

Principal
Investigator(s):

Elizabeth A. Donnelly   Adrienne Hyle
314 Willard   314 Willard Hall
Stillwater, OK 74078   Stillwater, OK 74078

Reviewed and
Processed as: Exempt

Approval Status Recommended by Reviewer(s): Approved

Signature:

Carol Olson, Director of University Research Compliance   Wednesday, May 31, 2000
                                              Date

Approvals are valid for one calendar year, after which time a request for continuation must be submitted. Any modifications to the research project approved by the IRB must be submitted for approval with the advisor's signature. The IRB office MUST be notified in writing when a project is complete. Approved projects are subject to monitoring by the IRB. Expedited and exempt projects may be reviewed by the full Institutional Review Board.

VITA

Elizabeth Ann Donnelly

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

Thesis: HIERARCHICAL ABUSE OF POWER IN A HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTION: A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY OF SUBORDINATE PERSPECTIVE

Major Field: Higher Education

Biographical:

> Personal Data: Born in Norman, Oklahoma, on March 15, 1959, the daughter of Ancel and Ann Buchanan.

> Education: Graduated from Newbury Park High School, Newbury Park, California in 1976; received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Health and Physical Education from San Diego State University in May 1981 and a Master of Education from Oklahoma City University in May 1987. Completed the requirements for a Doctor of Education degree with a major in Higher Education Administration from Oklahoma State University in December, 2001.

> Experience: Head Women's Volleyball Coach, 1984 - 85; Director of Student Activities and Intramural Sports, 1985 - 1989; Assistant Dean of Students, 1989 - 1996; Director of Institutional Research, 1996 – 2000; Director of Student Academic Support Services, 2000 to present at Oklahoma City University.

> Professional Memberships: American Association of Higher Education, Association of Institutional Research, National Association of Academic Advisors, and the Oklahoma Association of Academic Advisors