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POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER:  
EXAMINING RESPONSES TO LEFT AND RIGHT POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA

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POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER:  
EXAMINING RESPONSES TO LEFT AND RIGHT POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA

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## Abstract

This thesis tests the proposition that the Liberal International Order does not treat all norms equally, but rather values neoliberalism over others. I test this hypothesis through four case studies of Latin American populists post-1990: Fujimori and Bolsonaro (right-wing populists) and Correa and Chávez (left-wing populists). Right-wing populists are generally more neoliberal than left-wing populists. Populists were chosen to isolate the influence of other norm violations, as these four cases are all guilty of violating liberal democratic norms like press freedom and free and fair elections. I examine each of these cases to determine how international organizations respond to liberal norm violations, either with condemnation or sanctions. First, I find that left-wing populists are supportive of LIO norms minus neoliberalism. Fujimori is also supportive of LIO norms, while Bolsonaro is critical of global governance and multilateralism. I detect no noticeable pattern between the responses to left and right-wing populists. In fact, the leader most supportive of the LIO (Fujimori) was the most harshly punished for norm violations during his 2002 *autogolpe*. This suggests that the post-1990 global order does not emulate Cold War patterns of pro-neoliberal interventionism, but rather prioritizes democratic order. This could be possible due to the increasingly multipolar world and/or global contestations over neoliberalism.

## Chapter 1: Introduction

The Bolivian 2019 General Election was held on October 20, 2019. Two major parties participated: the leftist Movement for Socialism (MAS), led by 13-year incumbent Evo Morales, and the centrist Civic Community (CC) with Carlos Mesa, president from 2003 to 2005. The election followed a ruling by the Bolivian Supreme Court of Justice, which held term limits in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights, a treaty enforced by the Organization of American States (OAS) (Reuters Staff 2017). This interpretation was quickly contested by OAS secretary general Luis Almagro of Uruguay in a Twitter post (Almagro 2017). However, the ruling held, and Morales was cleared to participate in the 2019 election.

As the election went on, vote count transmission paused—ostensibly to prevent confusion as some regions completed tabulations while others continued counting—immediately triggering concern in opposition figures and OAS observers ("Bolivia elections..." 2019). Results were then released placing Morales 0.7% above the threshold to avoid a runoff election with runner-up Carlos Mesa (Valdez 2019). This prompted an audit by the OAS, backed by the European Union, United Nations (UN), and the United States (US) to verify the results. The audit was welcomed by Morales who said he would call a runoff election with Carlos Mesa should the report bring evidence of fraud ("Bolivia, OAS close to..." 2019).

The OAS released a preliminary report on November 10<sup>th</sup>, 2019, followed by a full report on December 4<sup>th</sup>, 2019 (OAS 2019b, 2019a). Both claimed to find significant evidence of fraud both on physical vote tabulations and in the computer system used to count and transmit the vote count. In the wake, persistent protests, police defections, and a lack of military support forced Morales to flee to exile in Mexico, resigning his position along the way (Londoño 2019).

President of the Senate Jeanine Áñez subsequently claimed the position of president as legitimate

under presidential succession rules, a move which Morales called a “coup” (“Jeanine Anez declares...” 2019). Áñez, politically right-wing but claiming no party, claimed that “God has allowed the Bible to come back into the palace” (Nugent 2019). In the following months Bolivian relations with the United States, then lead by conservative populist Donald Trump, improved as a temporary ambassador was named “for the first in more than a decade” while relations with left-wing Venezuela and Cuba withered (Ramos and Taj 2019).

The OAS report that sparked the 2019 Bolivian political crisis was hotly contested by thinktanks, Latin American leaders, and Morales himself. One high profile report from *The Washington Post*'s “Monkey Cage” blog, run by two researchers at MIT's Election Data and Science lab and subsequently hosted by the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) progressive Washington, D.C. based thinktank, argued that the statistical trends observed by the OAS report were entirely plausible given what regions were still tabulating votes, these regions being areas with high MAS support (Curiel and Williams 2020a, 2020b). The OAS directly responded to this report claiming that it contained “countless falsehoods, inexactitudes, and omissions” (OAS 2020). Argentinian president Alberto Fernandez the following year lamented Luis Almagro's re-election to the OAS secretary general seat by saying “That Almagro remains in the OAS is painful because they were accomplices of the coup in Bolivia” (Pressure Increases...” 2021). A senior Mexican diplomat echoed the concerns, while the Andean Parliament, the governing body of the Andean Community trade group, as well as the Grupo de Puebla, a left-wing political academic group, released their own statements (Pressure Increases...” 2021).

The following elections in 2020 were monitored by the OAS and found to have to irregularities. Luis Arce won over Jeanine Áñez, returning power to the MAS. However, Arce



made it clear that Morales remains president of the party but not the country, stating that “He will not have any role in our government” (Rochabrun 2020). In addition, Arce considered the necessity of austerity to combat a growing recession, a decidedly non-left position (although he assured the continuation of public investment). He also remains open to establishing diplomatic ties with the United States, although he waits for US initiative.

Intense contestation over the OAS’ election report raises concerns over its impartiality. In fact, this question about the OAS has been explored by researchers examining its role in US foreign policy (Boniface 2002; Slater 1967), international hierarchy (Hobson and Sharman 2005), and democracy promotion (A. Cooper and Legler 2006; Legler et al. 2007). Slater, along with the CEPR institute that issued the counter report, hint at the role of US anti-communist foreign policy and its potential influence on the OAS. The OAS evolved from “continentalization” of the Monroe Doctrine, becoming institutionalized in the Pan-American Union before finally becoming the OAS in 1948 at the beginning of the Cold War (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica n.d.). From there, it excluded Cuba in 1962 on grounds that “The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system” (OAS 1962), although the resolution was later lifted in 2009 (OAS 2009). This history of anti-communism, often at the expense of democracy, raises concerns about OAS activities post-1990. Are its activities purely about democracy promotion, does it pursue intervention against leftist governments like Morales’ in the name of democracy, or does it suffer from a conflation of democracy and capitalist, specifically neoliberal, economics?

This thesis does not seek to rehash debates about whether international organizations are tools of states or autonomous actors. The question I explore will not focus on the OAS as merely a tool of US foreign policy, although the US’ hegemonic role plays a part. Instead, I explore a

broader frame of the Liberal International Order (LIO) and its institutions, including the OAS and UN. As I will review, scholars have defined the LIO as a collection of norms post-1990. These are “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law” (Ikenberry 2011, 2). Other scholars have defined two main pillars of the LIO as “liberal democratic” and “neoliberal”, referring to political institutions and economic organization respectively (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018). Like a domestic society, the LIO also contains everyone practicing these norms. As such, there exists a community of practitioners supporting an overarching social structure defining appropriate practice. This community also holds identities related to their compliance with these norms.

Returning to the Cold War, two competing images of world order were pushed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Various nations aligned themselves with either bloc, were forced to be part of the bloc, or chose their own non-aligned position (such as India). These fundamentally opposed visions of world order, while concerned with political philosophies to an extent, were primarily about economic organization. Studies on the UN General Debate show that challenges and exit threats to the world economic order declined after the end of the Cold War, supporting the importance of economic organization as a central component of the conflict (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021). Political organization, on the other hand, appears to have taken a backseat during the Cold War as the United States backed military coups in Latin America against leftist governments (Levitsky and Roberts 2011).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Levitsky and Roberts define leftist actors as those “who seek, as a *central programmatic objective*, to reduce social and economic inequalities”. This is a definition that creates continuity with Marxist groups of the Cold War but accommodates the contemporary left that has engaged other forms of social inequality (race, gender, sexuality, etc.) and does not necessarily oppose private property.

As the Cold War ended in 1990, liberal democratic government largely became the only legitimate form of government (Levitsky and Way 2010) while neoliberal economic ideology, doctrine, and organizations gained prominence, including the Washington Consensus, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. These developments constitute the foundation of the US-led LIO. But just as one would not expect entrenched social practices to fade overnight, I do not expect Cold War practices supporting neoliberalism over democracy to end easily. In fact, modernization theory—a foundation theory in democratization studies that posits the role of economic development in democratization—still exists as a major theory in political science (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989). This theory comes close to conflating neoliberal economic and democracy, suggesting that post-1990 democratic impulses in the LIO are conditioned by the goal of opening markets. The Iraq War of 2003 demonstrates the point by combining liberalism’s drive to bring states into the democratic fold with the corporatization of Iraq following the failure to prop up domestic governments (Klein 2007).

## Hypotheses

Social practices are sticky things, based as they are in *habitus*. While the global social structure changed after the Cold War, foreign intervention likely persisted with leftist governments as their targets. At the same time, the rise of the LIO created new roles for International Organizations (IOs) in enforcing global norms. It stands to reason that democracy promotion in Latin America by the OAS could be conditioned by numerous factors, resulting in excessive focus on leftist governments. To take recent global trends into account, I investigate this by focusing on a small number of cases defined as “populist”: Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, Rafael Correa’s Ecuador, Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, and Jair Bolsonaro’s Brazil. Populists use an anti-elitist discourse based in popular sovereignty to justifying their rule. They are considered by

many scholars to be inherently anti-liberal-democratic, regardless of definition (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser n.d.; Mudde 2004; Weyland 2001). This controls for violations of liberal democracy as a reason for international condemnation. I hypothesize that, within Latin American populists, left populists in government are targets of more international condemnation, intervention, or sanctions than right-wing populists. I describe left populists as actors opposed to neoliberal economics, global hierarchy, and inequality. They can be nationalists to these ends, but do not emphasize it as a primary objective. Right-wing populists are primarily nationalistic, opposed to multilateralism and global governance, and often neoliberal in practice. The boundaries between these two groups can be fuzzy but I account for this through case selection in the methods chapter.

I also hypothesize that this pattern exists through the persistence of anti-communist/anti-leftist practices of foreign intervention from the Cold War against left-executives, particularly in the Western hemisphere. However, foreign intervention has evolved with the international system to emphasize rhetorical forms like condemnation and regulation by IOs and powerful LIO actors. Directly backed coups are rarer, or at least difficult to prove, but denunciations of non-neoliberal economic policies or violations of democratic norms are widespread. These utilize the power of shaming, social sanctions, and stigma to coerce compliance with LIO norms, all of which can also encourage domestic forces to revolt or stage coups. So the story goes, the international community exercises power through more indirect and diffuse methods than during the Cold War.

However, I also make alternative hypotheses explicit. This serves the primary purpose of aiding process tracing and discourse analysis which, as interpretive methods, must be approached inductively. Codifying alternative hypotheses opens my research to greater transparency and

primes interpretation with the possibility of other explanations. I first note that there may be a uniform, liberal democratic norm applied to all Latin American populists. There would be close to no difference between international denunciations of populists for their norm violations. Alternatively, more severe cases of norm violations would incur greater costs regardless of political ideology. Second, I note that the LIO may have changed or weakened between 1990 and 2000 as a result of the 9/11 terror attacks, Rwandan genocide, and NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia. These are broadly constructed to have harmed the LIO's legitimacy and induced a shift towards unilateral foreign policy actions such as the Iraq War (source). In combination with the rise of right-wing populists in Europe and North America, the enforcement of norms between 1990 and 2000 would be different than from 2000 onward. In essence, populists from 1990 to 2000 would have been equally sanctioned while post-2000 sees greater discrepancies in norm enforcement against left-wing versus right-wing populists. To account for this possibility, I select cases from both time periods.

To summarize: Hypothesis 1 observes an uneven pattern in norm enforcement between right- and left-wing populists. Against this is Alternative Hypothesis 1, which argues that international norms are applied equally regardless of the political identity of the populist in question. Hypothesis 2 argues that the mechanism for Hypothesis 1 lies in the persistence of anti-communism and anti-communist practices. Alternative Hypothesis 2 argues the pattern results from post-2000 shifts in the international order as the LIO experienced internal contestation from right-wing populists. This rightward shift brings attention against Latin American left-populists but does not apply to the period from 1990-2000.

## The Plan of the Thesis

Chapter 1 situates this thesis in studies of hierarchy, international legitimacy, and the Liberal International Order. I review sociological theories of International Relations (IR) that support the concept of the LIO as well as its power over actors within it. This historical development of the LIO is explored as well. I then discuss historical and contemporary studies of hierarchy, especially with regard to the role of international organizations in enforcing/creating hierarchy. I examine how the international order is legitimated and contested through rhetoric and action to place Latin American populist norm contestation in context.

Chapter 2 describes the theoretical and methodological basis for the thesis. Drawing on social constructivist literature, I describe the Liberal International Order as a group of norms, community of practitioners, distribution of identities, “audience of normals”, and a regionally bounded community with international aspirations. I then explore how actors challenge the LIO through their identities and rhetoric. Ideological components of identity are especially important in opposing the world order, while rhetoric in forums like the UN General Debate (UNGD) provide the opportunity to make opposition public, proselytizing alternatives to the order and forming communities of deviants. I finally discuss populists as a particular type of challenger and the implications for this analysis.

Next, I base my theory in a case study research design that uses discourse and content analysis as well as process tracing. Discourse and content analysis assess the meaning and frequency of norm contestation in documents. I choose documents from the UNGD to identify what norms each case is contesting as well as other countries’ responses. I also research the creation of regional organizations, foreign policy speeches, and campaign speeches as evidence of norm contestation. This allows me to tie statements against multilateralism or neoliberalism to

particular political actors and their ideologies. In the response, I can examine the reasons behind why states and international organizations (such as the OAS) respond to norm violations. By paying attention to the frequency at which these occur I can assess differences between right- and left-populists. I then use process tracing in combination with historical accounts to determine likely reasons for other international responses like UN or OAS resolutions or multilateral sanctions against actors. By specifying alternative hypotheses, I allow for other explanations during the tracing process. Process tracing is a useful framework for evidence analysis that ties specific detail to causality. An important part of establishing plausibility is the chain of events. The order in which events occur is one of the most useful tools in eliminating hypotheses and is a key aspect of process tracing. Finally, I discuss my case selections.

Chapter 3 dives into the details of each case by making a summary of events. I examine documents from the UNGD and the OAS as part of my discourse analysis. Evidence is presented in tables containing total results and in representative examples. This includes justifications for case selection, coding for ideologies, and discourse analysis results for norm contestation. Responses to states are included next to draw connections. My results then compare cases and responses to identify patterns relevant to my hypothesis. The final chapter concludes by summarizing the main conclusions of this Thesis. Then there will be a discussion of the main theoretical and further research implications for the comparative politics field.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory

This thesis works at the intersection of literature on the Liberal International Order (LIO), social sanctioning literature, and international norm contestation. By examining patterns in how populists contest international order and are subsequently socially sanctioned by international organizations, I can deduce different characteristics about the LIO.

The LIO has been defined as a collection of various international norms such as multilateralism, national sovereignty, neoliberalism and liberal democracy (Ikenberry 2011). Similarly, the contemporary international order is also made up of fundamental, constitutional norms that take various forms throughout history. This structure contains an organizing political principle, a notion of achieving justice between states, and a paradigm for cooperation. In the LIO, these take the form of national sovereignty, international law, and multilateralism, respectively (Reus-Smit 1999).

Other scholars have chosen to describe the global order in more expressly ideological terms. For example, Hopf et al. (2018) have taken a neo-Gramscian approach to this, saying that the LIO is chiefly supported by a distribution of liberal democratic and neoliberal identities among elites and masses within states. This question of identity raises the issue of social sanctions. In smaller scale social life, individuals are often stigmatized because of their chosen identities if they deviate from the “norm” (Goffman 2009). This mechanism has been demonstrated internationally as well. States are often stigmatized for their behavior or domestic nonconformity (Adler-Nissen 2014). In fact, stigmatization has been proposed as a fundamental feature of the Western international order (Zarakol 2014).

This historical view prompts further questions. The global order in terms of power distribution was bipolar from the end of World War II (circa 1945) as the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union solidified. This was also the era of “embedded liberalism” supported by the Bretton Woods institutions (Ruggie 1991). During the Cold War, free trade between countries was encouraged while welfare spending, capital controls, and international lending increased. To support this international system that largely aligned with the US-led Western bloc, the United States engaged in foreign interventions throughout the world (Owen



2010). The US intervened often in Latin America, where they supported right-wing dictators over left-leaning democrats such as Salvador Allende in Chile (Gill 2004). While researchers like John Owen argue that these were motivated by strategic power politics, I argue that they were also likely motivated by economic ideology.

The Cold War ended in the 1990s. With it, scholars have posited that the LIO changed from a system of embedded liberalism and national sovereignty to one of dis-embedded markets and supranational governance (Börzel and Zürn 2021). Neoliberalism became the dominant economic paradigm through the Washington Consensus and loan conditionalities requiring structural adjustments in favor of cutting welfare spending, regulations, and state investment. The Washington Consensus developed in 1989 to emphasize market reform including a list of ten policy prescriptions broadly understood to be neoliberal such as reductions in public spending for domestic social welfare programs and promotion of private property rights (Springer, Birch, and MacLeavy 2016). The LIO became more interventionist politically as the Right to Protect was proposed, the European Union developed, and international organizations broadly took on more responsibilities.

In the Americas, a liberal democratic norm was established that replaced the US with international organizations as the enforcer, thus supposedly removing self-interest as a motivating factor in compelling democratic domestic political systems. This democratic system has been studied extensively (Boniface 2002; A. Cooper and Legler 2006; Legler et al. 2007). The American democratic system is a regional manifestation of the LIO with its own organizations dedicated to norm enforcement like the OAS, the Rio Group, and CELAC.

To summarize, the setting for this thesis is the LIO defined as a set of norms outlined above, but particularly liberal democracy and neoliberalism. The order manifests in the Americas

through a regime primarily designed for democracy defense. However, there is a strong history of intervention in the hemisphere by the United States in support of liberal economic systems. The LIO as it stands today is more interventionist and more in favor of economic interdependence. This sets the stage for both norm contestation and social sanctioning.

The LIO is dynamic. New norms are proposed often, while old norms are opposed, modified, or augmented (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Sikkink 1998). Broadly speaking, contestation in this context refers to opposition to some facet/norm of the LIO. Contestation can take many forms and occurs for many reasons. First, actors can oppose the framing of norms or their content (Krebs and Jackson 2007). They can critique an institution's enforcement of a norm or attack the foundation of the norm itself (Börzel and Zürn 2021). States can threaten to leave organizations over normative disagreements, campaign for reform, express support, or list compliance (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021). Finally, states can attempt to shift the boundaries of authority within the order (Zürn 2018).

Studies of contestation also consider the conditions under which contestation occur. For some scholars, disagreement is an endogenous product of the LIO's complex authority relations (Zürn 2018). Contestation is an unavoidable result of the LIO's active, interventionist disposition. Power relations heavily condition what appeals states make in that their ability to contest the order depends on the resources they have at hand and the position they hold vis-à-vis hegemony (Börzel and Zürn 2021). This is an especially important concern for Latin America, which exists in many ways under the shadow of the United States. Contestation has also been explored through UNGD statements about the liberal economic order (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021). These found that threats of exiting the order decreased after the Cold War once the alternative to liberal economics exemplified by the Soviet Union disappeared. This study also

found that most criticisms of the liberal economic order post-1990 came from Latin America leftists like Chávez, Correa, and Morales.

Type and content of contestation are important for understanding the next piece of the puzzle, which is social sanctioning. Actors can choose to contest aspects of the LIO by appealing to its ideals, often resulting in *reform* or *pushback* (Börzel and Zürn 2021). This does not reject the LIO *per se* but rather seeks to change it to better conform to the ideals of multilateralism, human rights, national sovereignty, etc. Actors can also exit the order by pulling out of institutions, or they may choose to attack the roots of the LIO, sometimes by proposing alternative norms. An example of this would be opposition to neoliberalism by supporting alternative systems like socialism.

As discussed, Latin American leftists are critical of the neoliberal norm (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021) even as they participate in the United Nations, regional institutions, and human rights regimes (Sikkink 2014; Söderbaum, Spandler, and Pacciardi 2021). On the other hand, Latin American conservatives, populist right, and fascists are more critical of multilateralism, and support neoliberalism. This parallels European right-wing populists, who emphasize national sovereignty over supranational governance (Finke 2022; Mudde 2010). However, some scholars have found that populists share opposition to supranational governance, although I expect there to be qualitative differences in the rationales behind this stance (Otjes and Louwse 2015).

These qualitative differences are expected to produce patterns in social sanctioning between right and left populists. Social sanctioning is used to punish deviants from international norms. For example, “naming and shaming” is a strategy used by INGOs against states. This produces various effects, among them reductions in Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) (Barry, Chad Clay, and Flynn 2013; Lebovic and Voeten 2009). Sanctioning was also used against non-

Western states in such a way that contributed to the creation of “Orientalism” (Said 1979; Zarakol 2014). Sanctioning in the form of stigmatization is not always successful from the sanctioner’s perspective as it can be weaponized and contested (Adler-Nissen 2014).

International organizations are an important source of sanctioning, as under the LIO they are granted a rational-legal authority to make judgements about what actors are complying with international law (Zürn 2018). Social sanctioning is thus biased in the sense that IOs vary in when sanctions are applied due to a myriad of factors such as pathologies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999), domestic conditions (Levitt 2006), internal policy (A. Cooper and Legler 2006), uncertainty (Donno 2010) and regional hegemony (Boniface 2002, 2007).

This thesis differs from existing literature by inferring a hierarchy of norms in the LIO. I take a broad view of social sanctioning to ask when transgressors are punished for contesting international norms. This analysis is historically informed by viewing the practice of foreign intervention in Latin America to promote neoliberalism as a potential motive for IOs to sanction states despite other ostensible reasons. In the next section, I define my terms for the purposes of this analysis, such as the LIO. I frame the discussion by pointing out which actors are relevant to my analysis including IOs as representatives of the LIO. Definitions for both left and right populists are provided. Finally, I describe the mechanisms for social sanctioning I expect based on my measurement schema.

### Hypotheses and Causal Arguments

As the Soviet Union dissolved into its constituent states in late 1991 the preeminent ideological rival to a liberal vision of the world passed away as well. Yet, the following three decades for a Liberal International Order (LIO) were far from secure. Challengers to the LIO arose in the giants, China and Russia, while other smaller states sought to forge their own

ideological paths. Latin America in particular has experienced waves of ideological change, from the Pink Tide of left-wing governments to the Turn to the Right of nationalists.

Both movements saw their share of populists opposed to the LIO. However, I expect international responses to these populists to be uneven. Many scholars have argued that populism is antithetical to liberal democracy. Many populists are also nationalists, which often conflicts with multilateralism and global governance. Despite the fact that right- and left-wing populists should share these features, I hypothesize that international responses to populism in Latin America are skewed. I further hypothesize that left-wing populists are the subject of sanctions and international condemnation more often than right-wing populists. If the case, this is surprising given concerns over populism in general. This would likely be due to the circumstances of the LIO's birth: the decline of communism. Anti-communism had been a global norm in the West for the duration of the Cold War lasting from 1947 to 1991. It stands to reason that the LIO, a decisively Western invention, remains anti-communist. This is apparent in the neoliberal pillar of the LIO which is opposed to state control over the economy. As a corollary, right-wing populists are able to find allies within the LIO because they appeal to anti-communism and other right-wing sentiments. This source of partnership protects them from the degree of condemnation that left-wing populists incur.

### Liberal International Order

The first task is to define an image of the LIO based on its traits, characteristics, and arrangements enunciated in recent political science International Relations (IR) scholarship. The LIO has numerous relevant traits such as “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, [and] the rule of law” (Ikenberry 2011, 2). Many of these norms are considered to

be interrelated. For instance, open markets are often considered necessary or conducive to democracy. These norms form the social structure through which international actors—in this case, states—understand what is appropriate, what constitutes their identity as a state, and what behaviors they may be sanctioned for. While there may be variation among states in their degree of support for this structure, they are aware of what behavior is tolerated, what is expected, and how they should act, just like people in a domestic society.

The LIO is supported by practice and discourse. States that consistently act in accordance with these international norms reproduce them by granting them legitimacy and encouraging other states to behave similarly. This order is also propped up by a favorable distribution of identities in agreement with these norms (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018). Because the LIO is the hegemonic ideology among states, their elites, and their masses, it gains widespread legitimacy that opposes ideological change. Importantly, not all states have internalized these norms. Nonetheless, most have to reckon with their hegemony as I explore later. These three groups (states, elites, and masses) identify with the LIO thereby incorporating it into their sense of self. This makes it subject to a preservationist instinct best described by Giddens' "ontological security" (Giddens 1991). In an effort to preserve their sense of self i.e., their ontological security, states will alter their behavior to protect the LIO against threats. Just as threats to a religious community may mobilize believers (who identify with the religious community) to its defense, so too will states protect their social structure.

These identity and norm theories explain another key feature of the LIO: hierarchy. The LIO can be conceptualized in two different ways; it is either a structure of global governance or a normatively limited community. As a theory of global governance, the LIO includes all states but necessarily values some over others. In this world, states in noncompliance with central aspects

of the LIO (open trade, democracy, rule of law, etc.) are subject to various social sanctions from other members and institutions (Adler-Nissen 2014). They are essentially pariahs in a community with strict rules (Capasso 2021). As they have neither institutions nor the states of North America and Europe on their side, they often occupy lower levels in a global hierarchy shaped by the vestiges of colonialism, unequal development, and the Cold War (Zarakol 2014).

Thinking of the LIO as normatively bounded leads to similar conclusions. In this frame, states are separated into ‘core’, ‘semi-peripheral’, and ‘peripheral’. Adler-Nissen and Zarakol define the first two categories as “societies that feel a strong cultural ownership of both the label and the symbols associated with the term West” and “states that could be classified as Western (or have been at times) but could also be classified as non-Western (or have been at times)” — core and semi-peripheral respectively (Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2021, 612). The third category can be defined similarly as ‘states that have at no time been classified as Western’. Like the LIO as a global order, this framework brings hierarchy as well. Adler-Nissen and Zarakol argue this point in the same article, where they posit a “recognition hierarchy” associated with global social status. This is a fact semi- and peripheral states are aware of and dissatisfied with.

Use of the term ‘West’ risks confusing a geographical and normative definition for the LIO. While compliance with LIO norms follows the boundaries of the ‘West’ quite clearly, norm diffusion suggests that the community can grow beyond the bounds of North American and Europe. This illuminates, for example, liberalism’s impulse to bring outside states into the democratic community (as exemplified by democratic crusading around Iraq). Many of the LIO’s norms, such as human rights, are universal and aspirational in that they hope to bring *all* states into compliance (Donnelly 2013).

It is this second definition that provides the clearest picture of the LIO. This approach is one to demarcate inner and outer states (core and peripheral), identify outside and inside challengers, and provide a granular view of how norms are accepted, rejected, or re-defined across regions. Many of the characteristics discussed in the literature review are brought to light as well. For instance, Levitsky and Way's discussion of 'ties to the West' in *Competitive Authoritarianism* can be considered more clearly when the LIO is a regional arrangement rather than a global, permeating social structure. Democratizing pressure from the LIO is mediated by these ties that function regionally in many cases (Levitsky and Way 2010). Even the "black knight" case of Russia—a counter-democratizing force—is better understood as an outside challenge to the LIO rather than a subversive actor from within (Levitsky and Way 2020). The same can be said for China's challenge to the LIO (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018).

To summarize: the Liberal International Order is a regional social order comprised of open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic community, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, the rule of law supported by a robust community of practicing states and institutions identifying as members of the LIO/Western. It sits atop a global normative hierarchy, with the Global South and East beneath.

### Challenging the LIO

The next task is to define what constitutes deviation from LIO norms. In particular, what actions or rhetoric place states in opposition to the LIO. The primary concern of this thesis with regard to deviation is with state identity. State identity is one of many concepts attributed to the state across research paradigms by assuming that various organizations, including governments, possess similar characteristics as individuals. This is a broad point of agreement among IR scholars—and it is an assumption made here as well (Wendt 2004).



A state's identity thus functions similarly to a person's identity. State identity is relational. To an even finer point, a state's identity must address the predominance of the LIO in global politics by defining a relationship between them. This is done variously. States may internalize the LIO in a way that makes it a core part of their identity, thus subjugating it to the logic of ontological security. States may also understand themselves as leaders in the order, such as with Germany or the United States. They may also choose to oppose or modify the order through various actions or rhetoric (Paris 2020). Finally, actors could recognize their own position in relation to the order and seek to change it, either by jockeying for power, exiting the order, or redefining it in their favor (Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2021).

Regardless, one primary avenue for defining the state's relationship with the LIO is through ideology. Ideology is a seemingly core aspect of political identity. Political leaders and parties appeal to liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and many other ideologies to signal their intentions and positions relative to other actors. The left-right framing of political ideology is a clear expression of this positionality. Ideologies can also guide political actors to agreement or disagreement based on the perceived identity of other actors. In the case of the LIO, one could reasonably expect actors on the bottom end of the international hierarchy to oppose various norms based on what they deem harmful, inappropriate, or antithetical to their ideology. Without assigning preeminence to either structure or actor, a state's position to the LIO shapes their identity and guides further opposition.

A clear example of this dynamic existed during the Cold War. Recently decolonized states found themselves at the bottom of a racial hierarchy in the mid-1900s. Their former colonizers had been the 'Western' capitalist world in the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, and many other states. As such, many decolonization movements found support in the Marxist

doctrine of the Soviet Union, the primary challenger to the Western world.<sup>2</sup> Marxist ideology was taken, innovated, and adapted to decolonial struggles to form a new locus of decolonial identity initially shaped by opposition to the Western world. The dual forces of a bipolar world and indigenous decolonization shaped these new state identities to not only oppose Western decolonization and economic doctrine but to take up the mantle of Marxism. This is an oversimplification that ignores other decolonial approaches, such as Nasser's Arab nationalism, but nonetheless illustrates the potential for an oppositional co-constitution of identity.

This ideological aspect of identity—including its oppositional characteristics—is the key independent variable in this thesis. Starting from a broad quality and filling in granular details about what specific norms are opposed, what alternatives are provided, and what actions support this rhetoric is the main predictor for how the LIO will respond. Hence, the next question: how does the LIO respond to its opposition?

### Social Responses to Challengers

First, the LIO can respond as an “audience of normals”. This is a term borrowed from Adler-Nissen’s “Stigma Management in International Relations”, where it is loaned from sociologist Erving Goffman (Goffman 2009). As she puts it effectively:

The ongoing stability of international society requires an "audience of normals" to shut away and exteriorize particular features or ideologies. These features resemble those of the "normal" state... I define it [the audience of normal] as the group of states that attempts to impose stigma... The "audience of normals" is constituted by those that do not depart negatively from a particular social expectation. Consequently, an "audience of normals" is not a settled social group but is established and confirmed in specific cases

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<sup>2</sup> Notable examples include Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso and the People's Republic of Angola (1975-1992).

through the very process of stigmatization. This often involves heated debates over the justification for imposing stigma and the choice of instruments for disciplining "transgressive" states (Adler-Nissen 2014, 152).

Stigma is a significant part of LIO responses examined in this thesis. However, I do not limit myself to stigma as a response generated by an audience of normals. This is covered more in-depth in the Methods section of this chapter.

Notably in Adler-Nissen's description of the "audience of normals" is its necessity. A cohesive social group is required, according to her, to maintain international social stability. This involves setting boundaries for what are acceptable ideologies, rhetoric, and behavior. This lines up neatly and inspires to some extent my conceptualization of the LIO and identity. The LIO sees itself as an order that aspires to sanction states into social submission, involve them in the international community, and enforce existing hierarchies through stigmatization among other means (Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2021; Zarakol 2014; Zürn 2018).

When the LIO responds to transgression, or rather, seeks to impose transgressive status on states, it often targets presidents and prime ministers as symbols of the state. 'Putin' or 'Xi Jinping' stand in for Russian and Chinese aggression, 'Obama' or 'Trump' for US leadership, and 'Chávez' or 'Maduro' for Venezuela as a 'rogue state'. Beyond the assumption of the state as a person, these leaders represent national identities in nuanced ways. In democratic states, a plurality of voters can choose the leader that best personifies their vision of the country. In this sense, the politician can represent both the elite and popular idea of national identity (Hopf and Allan 2016). In authoritarian states, leaders live with, at minimum, tacit elite support. They also represent elite national identity to some extent.

Strictly speaking, when the LIO reacts against transgressors they are acting against state foreign policy elites. After making theoretical assumptions about the personhood of the state, they respond to transgressive state identity. Narrowly, they respond against the head of state and their identity. They also respond to state policies as a display of intent. However, following the literature, the ‘state as person’ approach is adopted here.

### The Populist Challenger

Populism is an analytical category imposed by researchers on subjects. It is problematic for many reasons to meld the concept of populism and the identity of ‘populism’ for many reasons. Most populists do not call themselves by that name, potentially because it has come to carry a negative connotation in academic literature and the media. However, the concept of populism as described by Cas Mudde is defined inductively with appeals to rhetoric and ideology. Mudde argues that populism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). The exercise in finding populists thus becomes a close reading of their writings, speeches, campaigns, etc. I define left populists as actors opposed to neoliberal economics, global hierarchy, and inequality. They can be nationalists to these ends, but do not emphasize it as a primary objective. Right-wing populists are primarily nationalistic, opposed to multilateralism and global governance, and often neoliberal in practice. The boundaries between these two groups can be fuzzy but I account for this through case selection in the methods chapter.

I take this label for granted for many reasons. First, the specter of populism as a threat to the LIO is widespread. If states and institutions in the LIO consider certain cases to be populists

then they are likely to treat them similarly. However, if there is variation within responses to populist cases as understood by LIO actors, I have effectively controlled for variation on the basis of LIO case perception. To clarify, I avoid imposing populism as a research category by looking for cases the LIO considers populist. This removes LIO perception of state identity as a confounding variable.

In some cases, LIO perception may actually work as a mediating variable between state ideological identity and international response. Within cases that academics have called populist, the LIO may selectively use the label to rationalize harsher responses. Thus, a left-populist (as defined by academics) may be called a populist and punished harshly, while a right-populist (again defined by academics) may avoid the term and hence a harsh international response. When comparing cases across the actor-constructed boundaries of populism, this mechanism is likely to be present.

Selective use of labels by international actors and even within academia has been shown to support international hierarchy (Capasso 2021). Making a distinction between actor-constructed and academic-constructed boundaries of populism becomes somewhat problematic. Both groups work within the same, dominant system of knowledge production and in fact share information with each other frequently. Political scientists and former government officials swap places and bring their experiences into each other's workplaces quite frequently. However, it is important to consider situations where the academic construction may differ from the political construction, as this could lend support to my hypothesis that different types of populists are treated differently due to their political ideology.

States that scholars consider populist *should* be treated similarly by international actors. Populist states are often anti-liberal democratic nationalists; this implies an opposition to

democratic norms, multilateralism, and global governance. LIO actors are likely to respond with sanctions, stigma, condemnation, and various other forms of punishment. For instance, the Organization of American States may convene a special session and release a report on an undemocratic election. The United States may condemn human rights violations. The United Nations may lash back against criticism of global governance through many different means. The *type* of condemnation is not necessarily important so much as its *frequency* and *severity* must be noted. All things equal between right- and left- populists in Latin America, my exploration of the frequency and severity of reactions against norm violations should be similar. However, as I argue above these responses are conditioned by a persisting anti-communist norm that induces more severe responses to left-populists. This is in spite of greater norm violations by right-populists.

## Chapter 3: Methodology

### Research Design

Focusing on rationales lends greater power to determine *why* variation in international condemnation occurs. Rationales as characterized by post-positivist research are necessarily qualitative, discursive, and rhetorical. States and international organizations can coerce others into conformity for a myriad of reasons including power politics, perceived norm violations, and economic domination. Using an interpretive approach explores stated reasons for international action. In combination with a historical approach, I see to reconcile thought with action to discern the normative reasons behind international condemnations of populists, which is possibly unevenly applied. In this section, I outline why discursive tools and process tracing are used to examine the line from state identity to international response. I emphasize how these methods complement one another to bypass the need to determine an actor's true intent and instead to

focus on the intersubjective meaning of their actions. This is done through the careful collection of documents from international forums, IO bulletins/press releases, and other highly visible sources. Temporally, these documents are paired with each case. I will collect data across a broad time frame from 1990 to the present. This will be broken up into four distinct time frames corresponding to each case. For example, documents regarding Fujimori will come from 1990 – 2000. Because I am collecting data from numerous forums, it represents the full range of international norm contestation and organizational response to each case.

The data will be coded by document by using the coding scheme from (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021). In their codebook they explain that challenges to the international order are coded for the order at large and for specific institutions representing the order. In this thesis, challenges are coded for the LIO broadly and for specific international norms including multilateralism, global governance, neoliberalism, and liberal democracy. I also code challenges to institutions representing these norms like the OAS, UN, IMF, WTO, etc. The purpose of this is to capture broad and narrow criticisms from populists which will be compared to test whether neoliberalism takes precedence over other norms like democracy. Finally, each of these is coded similarly to Kentikelenis and Voeten's article by using loyalty as endorsement, loyalty as cooperation and participation, calls for reform, challenges, and exit threats. This is bolstered by secondary analyses of Latin America populist movements and international responses to them. I also employ process tracing; this is a qualitative method that weighs historical evidence against four tests with various implications for causal inference and thus my hypotheses. This method is explored in depth later. I track the development of my data analysis using an audit trail (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation n.d.). This documents data collection, coding, and interpretation from

start to finish. Finally, I discuss my case selection including their spatial and temporal boundaries as it relates to the historical development of the Liberal International Order.

### Case Selection – Most Similar Design

Binding case selection to Latin America controls for regional variation that may complicate process tracing, but it also introduces challenges. The region famously experiences ‘waves’ of different political ideologies, such as the “Pink Tide” of the early 2000s, the conservative wave of the 2010s, then left resurgence in 2018 (Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Madrid 2010; Moraes and Luján 2020). This makes selecting congruent cases difficult as left- and right-wing leaders coexist in small time frames. Narrowing my analysis to populists to control for liberal democratic norm violations exacerbates the issue further by restricting available cases to congruent left- and right-populists. For these reasons, I opted to select cases based on their exploratory power. I follow Seawright and Gerring’s 2008 *Cross-Case Methods of Case Selection and Analysis* to choose and classify cases based on their potential to support or disprove my hypotheses with alternative explanations in mind (Seawright and Gerring 2008).

Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) is my first case of a left populist. Venezuela is an “Extreme” case, meaning it “exemplifies extreme or unusual values” of my dependent variable: negative international responses. The country has been the subject of numerous OAS and UN reports and resolutions regarding its democratic decline, humanitarian crises, and alliances with international outcasts like Russia. Venezuela is the archetypal “pariah state” of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Capasso 2021). It is also hostile to neoliberalism, friendly with communist Cuba, and notable for Chávez’s “Socialism of the 21<sup>st</sup> century”. Chávez is also a picturesque populist who opposed and was opposed by US foreign policy.



The next case is Ecuador under Rafael Correa (2007-2017). Correa has also been described as a populist who advocates “Socialism of the 21<sup>st</sup> century”. Ecuador is classified as a “Deviant” case, which “deviates from some cross-case relationship” that has the power to “disconfirm a deterministic argument”. Along with other deviant cases, Ecuador has the power to disprove my hypotheses and potentially confirm alternative hypotheses. It is classified as deviant because, despite championing socialism and vociferously opposing international criticisms, Correa left power without significant international interventions. However, process tracing may uncover greater opposition than initially thought.

Digging into right populists, my third case is Fujimori’s Perú (1990-2000). Perú was a clear case of neoliberal populism, i.e., right-populism, that occurred in the post-Soviet decade. This case is also classified as “Deviant”. However, depending on the results of process tracing and discourse analysis of the international response, this case has the power to support a robust democratic norm in the Americas pre-2000. This case’s deviancy thus provides an opportunity for granularity in my argument. Should there be a pattern of anti-leftism except in this case, it suggests that my Alt Hypothesis 2 may be correct—the international order had no issues responding to anti-democratic populists pre-2000, but an international shift to the right in the 21<sup>st</sup> century skewed enforcement against left-populists. This case could also support Alt Hypothesis 1, that a strong liberal democratic norm has existed since the end of the Cold War.

My next case rounds out a 2 – 2 case selection: Bolsonaro’s Brazil (2019 – present). Brazil is a later case, closest only to the end of Correa’s Ecuador. It captures many of the nuances of the 21<sup>st</sup> century by coinciding with the latest surge in right-wing populism in Europe. Bolsonaro has been described by some scholars as fascistic (Carnut 2021; Neto 2020; de Souza 2020). These claims must be taken seriously, as fascism was highly taboo in post-war Europe.

This could lead to a different type of international reaction than against a right-populist Brazil. This particular distinction will be discussed in depth in the case analysis chapter. Brazil is a “Typical” case in that it has not been widely condemned by international actors including state and IOs. This is in spite of anti-democratic threats and deforestation in the Amazon for land speculation. Bolsonaro is also more broadly right-wing as a Christian fundamentalist and cultural conservative. For these reasons, support for Brazil must be examined closely through the primary sources to ascertain its source. This case is also not over in the sense that Bolsonaro is not left office. Depending on the events of the next election, international support for Bolsonaro may decay and end up contradicting my Hypotheses.

An important aspect of my case selection is the inclusion of deviant cases. This was done for two, interrelated reasons. First, process tracing works best when alternative hypotheses can be identified and tested against a primary hypothesis (Collier 2011). This will be examined in greater depth in the following section. Discourse and content analysis work similarly in that pre-existing themes, phrases, and concepts should be identified early. Both of these, in order to avoid errors like confirmation bias, should be performed as inductively as possible. Realistically speaking, this means specifying alternatives early on for transparency. This is part of a reflexive methodology emphasizing self-critique during the research process (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009).

### Discursive Tools and Process Tracing

As entertained above, discourse analysis and process tracing are helpfully disposed towards inductive analysis. Discourse analysis is defined as “the analysis of language 'beyond the sentence'” (Tannen n.d.). This means delving into the meaning behind a text including its speakers, phrases, utterances, concepts, and structure. What a speaker means by “democracy”

may be different from a speaker from another time, place, or even someone in the same conversation. It requires a significant amount of background knowledge, particularly of discursive structures. For example, a speaker's claim that Asian countries suffer from "Oriental despotism" may appear a harmless statement that Asia has a higher frequency of authoritarian governments than Europe. However, by understanding a discursive structure like Orientalism, this statement can fit into a broader process of Othering Asian states, perhaps for some geopolitical purpose (Said 2003). Other factors can be considered as well, such as the audience, or speaker background, social status, etc.

Discourse analysis has been shown to be useful inductively by political scientists studying identity (Abdelal et al. 2009; Hopf and Allan 2016), rhetorical strategy (Krebs and Jackson 2007), and ontological security (Steele 2005). Taking Hopf and Allan's *Making Identity County* as an outstanding example, analysis of elite and mass texts are used to broad national discourse around democracy, neoliberalism, corruption, and status. Notable political references in these texts are identified and coded into categories that are then aggregated into meta-narratives of national identity. In an ideal approach, this method would use intensive inter-coder reliability testing. For the purposes of this thesis, secondary sources are used as a stand-in. Arguments made by historians, social scientists, and professionals regarding the nature of my cases will lend further weight to my interpretations. Additionally, I will keep an extensive log (an audit trail) of notes that will be available upon request.

This method used in this thesis to clearly code norm contestation is the United Nations General Debates (UNGD). For example, I analyze statements from the 54<sup>th</sup> session in 1999 to the 68<sup>th</sup> session in 2013 made by "Hugo Chávez Frias" or his representatives to identify how this actor contests multilateralism, neoliberalism, global governance, or liberal democracy. The

UNGD is an important international forum where heads of state broadcast their issues with the international order, such as the Liberal International Order, for various reasons including seeking ideological companions, signaling policy intents, directly contesting norms, or resisting social stigma. The UNGD is timed to last 15 minutes once every year. Whatever actors say in this limited, valuable time is sure to be of personal, national, and international importance. I also use statements made outside of this forum that can be reasonably construed as targeting an international audience as evidence toward political identity. For instance, proclamations of an international nature, campaign speeches about global issues, and other instance of global norm contestation are valuable evidence. I use these to characterize my cases before examining international responses. As part of process tracing, the content of these documents will be placed in historical context to determine their specific references. Meaning cannot be gleaned from the data without reference to contemporary political milieus.

Process tracing and discourse analysis come together as I parse the meaning and reasons behind international responses to my cases. First, discourse analysis must be used to clarify the reasons behind international action or condemnation. UN and OAS resolutions make up the bulk of my data for this section of the analysis. These texts are parsed for meaning, hierarchies of importance, and motives in directing international condemnation and support using the coding scheme described above. I use process tracing in the temporal dimension of this task.

Process tracing works by applying four main tests to assess causal inference. These tests can be either sufficient, necessary, or both to establish causality. They have implications for primary hypotheses and rival hypotheses through passing or failing. First is “Straw-in-the-wind”. Evidence qualifying as this type slightly strengthens a primary hypothesis and slightly weakens its rival. For example, a foreign intelligence officer’s presence in a country pre-coup *could be*

evidence of a foreign-backed plot but is not decisive. It is neither sufficient nor necessary to prove foreign intervention. In an alternative test, the “Smoking gun”, one could presume that material support would have been a likely path in supporting a coup. Diving deeper, we may find that the foreign country lacked the needed networks in-country to support arms imports or financial backing. Failing this test, the primary hypothesis would be reasonably rejected. However, relaxing this assumption may weaken the test into a “Straw-in-the-wind” that somewhat supports rival hypotheses. The “Smoking gun” is necessary but not sufficient for proving causal inference. While supplying arms to domestic opposition is strong evidence that a coup was done with foreign backing, it is not necessary.

The other two tests begin to explore the elements necessary to affirm causal inference. For instance, communication with rebel groups would be necessary to convey support for a coup. In a “Hoop test”, which is necessary but not sufficient for establishing inference, open channels of communication with opposition groups would support the possibility that foreign interference occurred. However, without more detail it is unclear what purpose the communication served. With a “Doubly decisive” test, causal inference is all but assured. This would include declassified documents showing that a foreign nation clearly expressed support for a coup through these open communication channels. The alternative hypotheses, perhaps that material support was helpful but foreign permission was not given or that the coup was not supported at all, are entirely eliminated. This type of evidence is rare but the most valuable.

An important part of establishing plausibility is the chain of events. The order in which events occur is one of the most useful tools in eliminating hypotheses. In my analysis, international condemnation that happens *before* economic reforms or democratic backsliding cannot be caused by them. If Fujimori had not yet committed to his *autogolpe*, or Chávez had not

coined his “Socialism of the 21<sup>st</sup> century” and begun criticizing neoliberalism, then international condemnation would not be relevant to those actions. On the other hand, if condemnation occurs after and directly references certain events as it often does then it would be sufficient to establish causality. If content analysis shows that an OAS resolution references democratic backsliding or human rights abuses in Venezuela but not nationalization, then that is strong evidence towards a democratic norm rather than enforcement of neoliberal policies. Process tracing, discourse and content analysis, and historical methods fit neatly together for these purposes.

## Chapter 4: Case Study Analyses, Results, and Conclusion

Each case study will proceed with an overview of trends in General Debate (UNGD) speeches which are then integrated with economic and political policies across each executive’s tenure in office. This describes each nation’s intents and actions related to the Liberal International Order (LIO). International responses to policy and rhetoric are placed into this context, which will provide information about the priorities of these organizations in punishing different LIO norm violations. The time periods for each analysis are as follows: Chávez from 1999 – 2013, Correa from 2007 – 2016, Fujimori from 1989 – 2000, and Bolsonaro from 2019 – 2021. These align with their tenures and corresponding UNGD speeches.

### Case 1: Chávez’s Venezuela

#### Chávez’s International Identity

Former President Hugo Chávez’s speeches in the United Nations general debate show multiple notable attitudinal trends towards international norms and institutions associated with the LIO. First, Chávez begins as an ardent supporter of the United Nations in tone even as he advocates for robust reform. As time passed, Chávez became more disillusioned with the institution. His rhetoric changed from one of reform to one of hopelessness. Chávez was highly

critical of the LIO (neoliberalism) from the beginning, but he shifted from supporting fundamental reform to support for exiting the system entirely while building a regional support system to replace it. Through all of this, Chávez espoused the virtues of democracy, multilateralism, and human rights. He viewed these norms positively and used them to criticize the failures of the United Nations, neoliberalism, and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the IMF and World Bank. Overall, Chávez fits the leftist paradigm that supports global governance, national sovereignty in development matters, democracy, human rights, multilateralism, and socialism all while opposing neoliberal economics and the power imbalances manifest in international institutions like the United Nations. The following analysis demonstrates these points with quotes from specific UNGD speeches, cited below.

Venezuela from 1999 to 2012 across nineteen UN General Debate speeches was a consistent voice of challenge against the United Nations (Member States on the Record - Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) n.d.). While representatives of the nation like Chávez and foreign affairs ministers frequently expressed their support for the foundations of the UN, their proposals for reform were fundamental enough to warrant more severe coding. For instance, in Venezuela's speech in 2000, Chávez said "...Venezuela adds its voice to the clamor of the wretched of the Earth, as Frantz Fanon would say, to call for a *structural transformation* of the United Nations, a *radical* change of the Organization. We must democratize and expand the Security Council so that we can find the truth for all" [emphasis added] (A/55/PV.5).

In support of the United Nations and in condemnation of the 9/11 terror attack in the US, Chávez says, "We are calling for reflection so as to ensure that we act within the norms of international law and the mandates of the United Nations. We cannot throw that overboard" (A/56/PV.44). Similarly, "Inspired by the values of social justice, democracy and peace, on

behalf of the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez Frías, I wish to reaffirm our support for the United Nations from a position that is critical yet unambiguous and totally consistent with its loftiest goals” (A/58/PV.14).

Chávez’s criticism of the institution became more severe, especially following the launch of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A/60/PV/14). By 2005, the push for positive change i.e., democratization of the Security Council, faded as vitriolic attacks against negative aspects of the UN increased. Democratization remained the solution to the UN’s legitimacy crisis in Chávez’s view, but it increasingly became an “oligarchic and, very often, autocratic” institution that acted contrary to the wishes of most countries. This issue was a matter of survival for the UN. Chávez argued that its authority was fading and “its very existence depends on the successful resolution of this issue” (A/60/PV.14). This plateaued in 2006 when Venezuela argued that “Hardly anybody here can defend the United Nations system. Let us be honest and accept that the system born after the Second World War has collapsed. It is worthless” (A/61/PV.12). By 2011, following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing intervention in Libya, the “illness” within the UN had become “fatal” (A/66/PV.29).

Chávez’s critique of the international economic order is similarly caustic, yet there is little talk of reform beyond abandoning the institution and constructing alternative, regional financial institutions. The clearest illustration of his attitude comes from 2001: “We in Venezuela have been saying that we must also review the economic models that some tried to put in place among our peoples. *Is neoliberalism the way? Yes — it is the way to hell.* Let us traverse the streets and cities of Latin America and we will see the consequences of neoliberal policies run wild” [emphasis added] (A/56/PV.44).



Problems with the economic system are clearly tied in these arguments to other issues plaguing the global system, like terrorism, democracy, and climate change. Following the 9/11 attacks, Chávez's condemnation of terrorism clearly identified the economic struggles behind the choice to engage in terrorism. Combatting terrorism must go "hand in hand" with the war against poverty, which itself is hindered by excessive military spending and "external debt" from IFIs (A/57/PV.5). Similarly, Chávez draws on United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reports from 2004 to argue that "more than half of Latin Americans would prefer dictatorship over democracy if an authoritarian regime would solve their economic problems". Conversely, Chávez's political program combats "neo-liberalism's devastating experiment" in Latin America, which has increased support for democracy in Venezuela between 1996-2004 (A/59/PV.10). In terms of human rights including the right to development, neoliberalism or "market totalitarianism" privatizes everything and removes rights to work, healthcare, and food. This is the "economy of the casino" that changes everything into speculation and gambles with public services (A/65/PV.5).

The solution to neoliberalism, Chávez argued which finds its roots in US hegemony, is socialism rooted in radical democracy. Chávez consistently advocated for popular democracy as a foil to the "oligarchy" of the UN and the "totalitarianism" of neoliberal markets. On the international level, Chávez supported reforming the United Nations to *democratize* it. This would dilute the influence of major powers like the United States that evangelizes neoliberalism. In 2005, Chávez notes this influence of the United States in organizations like the OAS: "President of the United States attended a meeting of the Organization of American States, and he proposed to Latin America and the Caribbean an increase in trade measures and the opening up of markets. In other words, he proposed neo-liberalism... It is neo-liberal capitalism of the Washington

consensus that has increased dire poverty and inequality” (A/60/PV.6). Reforms like placing greater power in the UN General Assembly (A/55/PV.28) would reduce the ability of hegemons to push neoliberalism and military interventions like those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.

Chávez’s democratic vision is domestic as well. His populist democracy is “based on popular participation, ethics, justice and equality” (A/56/PV.44). It works for the people in direct opposition to two-party democracy under the *Puntofijo* Pact parties, Democratic Action and COPEI, that had led the country for nearly three decades. For Chávez, democracy is “the best remedy for hunger”, and thus is intimately tied to his vision of socialism (A/59/PV.10).

Capitalism “only benefits a minority and excludes the majority”, destroys the environment, and destroys lives, while socialism creates “an economy that serves human beings” (A/63/PV.16). It reaches across borders and recognizes the “pain, anguish and anger of millions of our brothers in the United States” (A/64/PV.6).

Finally, Chávez was an ardent supporter of national sovereignty and multilateralism. His speeches in support of the UN, while qualified, were informed by a strong belief in cooperation between states. He denounced unilateralism multiple times, typically in connection to the US’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also provided an alternative to the global economic system once he lost faith in the United Nations. Multilateralism thus took the form of robust regional cooperation in rhetoric and action. For instance, in 2010, Venezuela “[attached] particular importance to the process of union and integration in Latin America and the Caribbean... The union of our peoples — the peoples of the South fighting for independence, freedom, sovereignty and self-determination — is a priority of our Simon Bolivar national project, as enshrined in our first socialist plan for the period 2007 to 2013” (A/65/PV.24). This was explicitly framed against the “credit monopoly maintained by the Bretton Woods institutions” by forming new multilateral

organizations like ALBA-TCP, the Bank of the South, Petrocaribe, and South-South cooperation more generally. Many of the organizations he championed, like CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) and Mercosur (Southern Common Market), also intended to reduce the influence of the US and organizations perceived to be captured by it, including the OAS (Söderbaum, Spandler, and Pacciardi 2021)

The rhetorical trends explored through UNGD speeches was accompanied by domestic action, including nationalizations of cement and food production, and utilities in the late 2000s and early 2010s (Reuters Staff 2012). Furthermore, Chávez threatened to leave the IMF and World Bank in 2007 (Chávez pulling Venezuela out of World Bank and IMF 2007; Hudson 2007). This came after Venezuela's national debts were paid off early. Domestic economic policies coincide with the positive side of Chávez's denunciations of neoliberalism. In UNGD speeches, he frequently spoke of needing alternative models for development. This accompanied constant references to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) adopted by the United Nations in 1974 but largely unrealized in the following decades (A/65/PV.5). In pursuit of these goals and in search of an IMF/World Bank alternative, Chávez assisted in founding the Bank of the South with Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, and other Latin American countries as co-founders (Mares and Trinkunas 2016). He also contributed to founding SUCRE, a regional currency designed to reduce Latin American dependence on the dollar. One specific case in which Venezuela was successful in pursuing development goals is its commitment to the Millennium Development goals of 2000, for which the UN and OAS have repeatedly praised Chávez.

To summarize: Chávez was a regular critic of the LIO. This only increased in severity over time. Chávez's criticism of neoliberalism was borne out through his domestic policies, where he nationalized industries, instituted price controls, and increased social spending

dramatically. His views of other international norms were far less severe. Chávez participated readily in the United Nations, supporting this with reverence for the foundations of the UN: multilateralism, cooperation, sovereignty, human rights, and international law. This was not without criticisms. Chávez advocated strongly for increased democratization by eliminating the Security Council veto and expanding membership, an endeavor he eventually lamented as impossible. He also engaged in regionalism at the expense of the United States and OAS but in accordance with international norms about cooperation and multilateralism.

### *Responses to Chávez*

Given the hypothesis that international organizations should respond more harshly against anti-neoliberal rhetoric and policy, one should expect denunciations against Hugo Chávez to be particularly harsh given the intensity of his opposition to neoliberalism coupled with flagrant breaches of diplomatic ‘decorum’ and intense criticism of the United Nations. However, contra this expectation, international opposition to Chávez was weak (Hawkins 2016).. In fact, most critical responses aimed at Chávez from international organizations were mixed or unenforceable. These reports focused almost exclusively on political problems, such as descriptions of human rights abuses and media freedom which are examined later. Little time was given to Chávez’s criticisms of neoliberalism outside of a lost arbitration case with two oil companies which took nearly 10 years(Chavez 2012). This came after fourteen years of Chávez’s tenure, during which assets from most sectors of the economy experienced some form of nationalization.

A key period during which responses to Chávez *could have* been severe, assuming discontent with his anti-neoliberal politics, is the 2002 coup d’état against him. The 2002 coup followed violence against anti-Chávez protesters at a rally in Caracas on April 11<sup>th</sup>. It was led by

“discontented military officers” who propped up Pedro Carmona Estanga, a business leader, as president (Rohter 2002). There was initial confusion about the event, as statements by the military said Chávez had resigned his office. The coup was short lived and lasted only two days, yet it provided a pretense for irritated international actors, including the OAS or UN staff, to remove Chávez by accepting Mr. Carmona as the legitimate president. This is arguably what happened with the United States who endorsed Carmona and said it was Chávez’s comeuppance (Levitt 2006, 112). Put in other words: “President Chávez's rejection of neoliberal economics and the willingness of actors in the Venezuelan crisis to wage economic warfare on their adversaries raise the question of whether the collective defense of democracy regime can survive regional challenges to neoliberal economics” (Parish, Peceny, and Delacour 2007, 208).

However, as scholars have found, the coup was not used by institutions of the LIO as an opportunity to punish Chávez for rejecting neoliberalism. In fact, enforcing democracy against the coup qualifies as a difficult case as Chávez’s anti-neoliberalism had regional support, Venezuela was profiting heavily off of state-owned oil companies, and the US broadly opposed Chávez’s policies (Parish, Peceny, and Delacour 2007, 215). Had the OAS refused to engage in pro-democracy activities in Venezuela, deducing the difference between practical issues and normative complacency would have been challenging. However, OAS support for Chávez instead provides strong evidence towards a genuine enforcement of democratic norms over punishing neoliberalism. Had the United States been the sole arbiter of democracy in Latin America, Carmona likely would have had international legitimacy purely by fiat. The United States clearly hesitated to condemn the coup but nonetheless band wagoned once OAS support for Chávez developed (Levitt 2006, 111–13).

Because the coup fell apart after two days, OAS support for Chávez came as he came back into power on April 14<sup>th</sup>. Deliberations among member states took up most of the April 13<sup>th</sup> meetings, where El Salvador and Colombia alongside the United States hesitated to bring Chávez back into power. However, information gradually flowed into the OAS indicating that Chávez had not willfully abdicated the presidency, making the coup a guaranteed disruption of the constitutional order. Under this condition, Chávez was recognized as the democratically elected leader of Venezuela. The United Nations expressed support for the return of democratic governance as well (UN 2002).

Yet, OAS actions in support of Venezuelan democracy did not end in 2002. The following years saw continued protests against the Chávez regime culminating in a referendum to recall Chávez in 2005. This process was overseen by an OAS observer mission, the Carter Center, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The referendum was resolved in support of Chávez by a margin of 59 to 41 points, with results confirmed by the three organizations above (Parish, Peceny, and Delacour 2007, 224). It was met by resistance from the United States, who sought to create the capacity in the OAS to monitor democratic quality beyond simply elections. This was countered by Chávez through proposing the Social Charter of the Americas, a document which recognized the economic and social foundations of democracy. This emphasized internal development, social policy, and human rights as keys to democratic growth in contrast to an OAS mechanism for monitoring democracy. Notably, despite the fact that this was proposed by Chávez and was largely in line with a non-neoliberal, left-wing social agenda, it was ratified by the OAS over the US's opposition.

International organizations' responses to the 2002 coup against Chávez did not insulate him from criticism in the nine years following. Chávez's rhetoric against neoliberalism,

imperialism, and the flaws of the United Nations became more severe during this decade. However, most of the backlash against Chávez came in response to perceived democratic erosion, human rights abuses, and economic instability. For example, United Nations experts released reports on judicial independence and media laws in Venezuela in 2009 that brought concern about the separation of powers and the right to free and open media (UN 2009a, 2009b). The OAS Secretary-General, Jose Miguel Insulza, criticized a law allowing Chávez to rule by decree in 2011. The law was used to seize private property in the wake of massive flooding to provide housing to displaced citizens. It thus may be loosely connected to concern over property right—making it economic in nature; however, criticism was justified by Insulza as being “not within the spirit or the letter” of the Inter-American Democratic Charter’, suggesting a democratic focus rather than a backlash against anti-neoliberalism (Chavez condemns OAS ‘interference’ in Venezuela 2011). Insulza’s comments were vigorously opposed by Chávez.

The OAS IACHR body echoed concerns over political abuses, yet lauded Venezuelan progress on poverty, literacy, and health in the same report (IACHR - OAS 2009). Progress along these fronts came through increased social spending funded by state-owned oil companies—seemingly a rejection of neoliberal development and a success for the Social Charter of the Americas. Earlier, in 2007, Chávez threatened leaving the IMF and World Bank in order to rely primarily on the Bank of the South, seemingly with little backlash (Tran 2007). The plan was, in fact, supported by a former World Bank economist Joseph Stigler (Carroll 2007).

Chávez’s death in 2013 was followed by an outpouring of support from heads of states and international organizations including the United Nations and OAS. These press releases, likely following social decency norms observed during a recent death, noted Chávez’s deep commitment to the Venezuelan people (OAS 2013; UN 2013a). The United Nation General

Assembly saw multiple representatives laud Chávez's economic policies, plans for regional integration, and international leadership (UN 2013b). The United Nations also congratulated Venezuela on combatting hunger despite reported market shortages (Rueda 2013).

The literature surrounding Chávez's Venezuela concerns itself with democratic backsliding captured by measures like Freedom House, Varieties of Democracy, and Polity IV. These capture both liberal and electoral aspects of democracy such as competitiveness, media freedom, and human rights. All of these are valid concerns borne out by the data as Venezuela became more authoritarian under Chávez (Levitsky and Loxton 2013, 124–25). Concerns over democracy were echoed by international institutions like the UN and OAS, but no concrete action was taken by IOs against Hugo Chávez from 1999–2013 (Hawkins 2016, 253–56). This is in spite of robust criticism of the United Nations itself and the international economic order i.e., neoliberalism. Chávez attracted praise for his support for regional integration through multilateral institutions, both in theory and practice. He was also praised for economic advances including extreme poverty reduction. This is in spite of economic losses in later years as oil prices fell and government spending suffered as a result. Finally, support for Chávez during the 2002 coup after he had already shown his socialist tendencies suggests that the UN and OAS were far more committed to protecting democracy in Venezuela than they were protecting neoliberalism. Chávez is a left-populist with a weak response against him, contrary to my hypotheses. At the time, international condemnation of Chávez was weak (Ellner 2002), while the image of Chávez as the destroyer of Venezuela developed following Maduro's ascension to the presidency (Capasso 2021).



## Case 2: Correa's Ecuador

### Correa's International Identity

Rafael Correa, as seen through UNGD speeches, is a left-populist critical of the international economic order, reform-minded with regard to the United Nations, and ardently supportive of multilateralism, human rights, and democracy (Where can I find statements made by Ecuador during the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly? n.d.). Correa shares these traits in common with Chávez, who overlapped Correa in tenure from 2007-2013 (6 years). However, Correa is less vitriolic, profane, or impolite than Chávez with his acerbic witticisms. Nonetheless, Correa is as fully populist as Chávez by most definitions (Levitsky and Loxton 2013, 111). He was equally as willing to speak out on the global stage against neoliberalism, advocated for socialism, and was in favor of UN reform (Simon and Garcia 2009).

Correa was deeply supportive of the campaign to democratize the Security Council. His vision of reform was fundamental in that it involved expanding the UNSC, giving greater power to the UNGA, and democratizing the UN's satellite organizations (A/63/PV.15). This would theoretically empower the UN to "respond to the great challenges of the twenty-first century" (A/64/PV.12). These reforms would make the UNSC more representative, democratic, and efficient; in essence, the goals of the UN Charter would be better fulfilled with a "revitalization" of the Assembly (A/64/PV.12). This demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and global governance. By 2011, Ecuador argued that multilateralism was in crisis due to a poor response to "political crises that have occurred in particular in the Middle East" referring to the Arab Spring revolts (A/66/PV.29).

Correa identified another problem with the United Nations that called for dire reform:

“...illegitimate political exploitation of UN bodies by certain Powers, which continue to exert political and economic pressure and...to intervene militarily in sovereign States whose Governments criticize the international status quo or focus on different ideologies from those promoted by some Powers, or whose public policies are opposed to the economic interests of large transnational companies. Such pressure delegitimizes the system and distorts multilateralism itself” (A/67/PV.20).

Events like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and intervention in Libya “distorted” the image of the UN, multilateralism, and the LIO into systems, norms, and organizations that served powerful economic and political interests. While his focus was on state action, Correa essentially identified the central argument of this thesis: that the LIO cracks down on “different ideologies” and those critical of the status quo through ostensibly neutral IOs representing the LIO.

Ecuador’s voice of criticism against neoliberalism emphasizes the domestic inequalities that its policies produce. This is countered by robust social programs like those described in 2007:

“...perhaps the best way to reduce poverty with dignity is to reduce social, economic, territorial, environmental, and cultural gaps. One of my Government’s main goals is thus to reduce inequality in an endogenous development framework of economic inclusion and socio-territorial cohesion, domestically as well as within the global system...the long and sad neoliberal night proposed from an existential perspective with its consequent absolutism of the market — social programs that ended up by breaking up society into as many parts as there are social groups” (A/62/PV.7)

Beyond being a mechanism of international domination, neoliberalism has a fragmentary effect of societies. Correa believes that reducing inequality along social, environmental, and cultural axes will produce power against the “absolutism” of the market. This “challenges the concept of ‘development’” by turning the causal arrow from economic growth to social development on its head, thereby making popular conceptions of economic growth (read: neoliberalism) completely unnecessary (A/71/PV.19).

The international component of contesting neoliberalism aligns with other left-populists in the region. Neoliberalism’s hegemony reflects power imbalances between the Global North and Global South. From 2016, Correa challenges the “paradigms of a neoliberal ideological foundation” which “has an ability to generate consensus and common understandings” in order to “impose a political and moral agenda upon the planet”. Defining development is one example of such power, and part of it is convincing people development is a “technical issues, when it is primarily a political problem” (A/71/PV.19).

Another aspect of the imbalance is the disproportionate negative impact the “casino economy” in the Global North has on the rest of the world. The core of the problem is in speculation, which creates money for its own sake rather than producing goods to meet human needs (A/66/PV.29). Following the 2008 financial crisis, Correa believed the gravity of the crisis should have pushed the UN into taking a greater role in global economic governance through radical reform. Once again, the UN failed to rise to the challenge. Instead, bailouts and cosmetic changes to the Bretton Woods institutions took the space that should have been afforded to regulation, coordination, and the creation of a “new world economic order” (A/66/PV.29).

Ecuador consistently supported multilateralism and human rights on the global stage, particularly with regard to regional cooperation and indigenous rights, respectively. Latin

American integration through multilateral organizations like UNASUR and CELAC are imperative concerns of the Ecuadorian government, as are South-South relations more broadly (A/69/PV.20). The UN's failures are also framed as weakness in fulfilling multilateral promises. Human rights are also a strong rhetorical device used by Correa to criticize the failures of the UN and neoliberalism. In themselves however, human rights declarations like the "Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (resolution 61/295)" are valuable goals to be pursued (A/62/PV.7). Correa in fact seems inspired by indigenous philosophies in his speeches about environmentalism and human rights.

Correa's rhetoric has seen some follow-through in the areas of oil extraction and regional integration. Ecuador has challenged foreign oil companies for their assets through contract renegotiations or court cases, both of which shift these assets into the hands of the state oil company, Petroecuador (Kozloff 2009, 31). Two examples are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp (Oxy). Oxy was challenged based on breach of contract allegations. The Ecuadorian government argued that Oxy sold part of its oil assets without state authorization before using the pretense to seize oil wells in the area (Kozloff 2009, 31; Reuters Staff 2008). Similarly, Ecuador accused Chevron of massive oil pollution in the Amazon before suing in domestic courts. The alleged oil pollution occurred under Texaco, which was subsequently acquired by Chevron. The Ecuadorian Supreme Court ruled in the country's favor before it was contested in The Hague's Permanent Court of Arbitration. Both Oxy and Chevron won their cases in 2016 and 2018, respectively (Chevron wins Ecuador rainforest 'oil dumping' case 2018; Reuters Staff 2016).

Correa was a strong advocate of regional integration in multilateral organizations like the Rio Group, UNASUR, and CELAC. On two separate occasions, Correa argued that the OAS was becoming obsolete and would soon be replaced by these other regional organizations free from

Washington domination (Ecuador's Correa forecasts the end of OAS and promotes the Group of Rio 2009; Organization of American States (OAS) n.d.). While further action to enforce these threats did not come, Correa's participation in regional organizations excluding the US reflects broader trends among Pink Wave leaders.

In summary, Correa is part of the Pink Wave defined in part by Chávez. He shares deep disappointment in the United Nations, which does not uphold the values of human rights and multilateralism that he supports so vigorously. He is very critical of neoliberalism for its role in enforcing international hierarchy and its fragmentary societal effects. His criticism of the "casino economy" is rooted in the historical moment following the 2008 global financial crisis. Finally, he advocates for regional integration like other Pink Wave leaders, but is (rhetorically) supportive of human rights, especially indigenous rights in the way that many Andean left leaders are.

#### *Responses to Correa*

As with Chávez, there are numerous flashpoints that present opportunities to examine international attitudes towards Correa. These examples once again contradict the hypothesis that left populists will receive more condemnation due to their opposition to neoliberalism. Despite the ire with which Correa denounced neoliberalism and the actions he took against international corporations, international organizations stepped in to support him in a 2010 coup attempt.<sup>3</sup> The United States expressed support for Correa through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton despite rocky Ecuadorian-US relations (Clinton Voices US Support for Ecuadorian President, Democratic Rule 2010). Similarly, while Correa took action against foreign oil companies in the name of resource nationalism, international outcry was limited. International organizations like the OAS and UN were silent on the issue.

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<sup>3</sup> Whether or not this qualifies cleanly as a coup is up for debate. Nonetheless, the facts indicate it is a disruption of the constitutional order that presented an opportunity for a change of power. This matter is discussed later.

The 2005 coup event can be summarized as follows: On September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010, police officers struck over a new law regulating pensions and promotions. President Correa went from the presidential palace to the police barracks to make a speech. The police became angry, at which point Correa tore open his shirt and said ““If you want to kill the president, here I am if you have the guts to do so.” He was apprehended as he tried to leave when a tear gas canister went off. The president’s security took him to the nearest hospital, part of the same compound, where he was surrounded by police who refused to let him leave. Correa denounced this as a coup and called a state of emergency. Much like Chávez, protesters mobilized but were pushed back by police. Eventually, soldiers from various operations units rescued the president. Things quickly moved back to relative normality the next day (Becker 2016).

Reactions to this event from international organizations were swift despite confusion over whether or not it truly constituted a coup. The OAS took a strong stance “[repudiating] any attempt to alter the democratic institutional system” in Ecuador (OAS 2010b). In a special session resolution, the Permanent Council “firmly support[s] the Republic of Ecuador and the government of President Rafael Correa Delgado in its obligation to preserve the institutional democratic order and the rule of law” (OAS 2010a). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon similarly showed support for Ecuador the following year when he commended Ecuador’s democratic consolidation since the incident (UN 2011). Finally, Latin American leaders expressed support through an emergency meeting through UNASUR, including leaders ideologically opposed to Correa like Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos (Romero 2010).

Another issue unrelated to anti-neoliberalism that generated controversy was the granting of political asylum to Julian Assange, a divisive figure running media leak website Wikileaks famous for hosting classified information critical of many governments, most notably the United

States (Reuters 2022). Assange was wanted for sex crime allegations in Sweden, which has an extradition treaty with the United States. Correa granted asylum to Assange in Ecuador's London embassy, effectively protecting him from extradition to the US. This resulted in significant blowback culminating in an OAS motion designed to defuse tensions between the UK and Ecuador (Press Association 2012). Although Assange's asylum was controversial in the UK, US, and other similarly aligned countries, the OAS statement falls clearly on the side of Ecuador against the threat of UK intervention against "the inviolability of embassies" (OAS 2012; OAS decides to hold ministerial meeting on Ecuador-UK conflict next week 2012).

Most criticism against Correa has come from political scientists sensitive to democratic erosion, human rights organizations concerned about press freedom, and Indigenous groups critical of oil drilling. Notably, while not neoliberal, Correa continued oil drilling under the state oil company, which attracted the ire of indigenous groups in the Amazonian regions of Ecuador (Ecuador oil spill pollutes river, protected Amazon area 2022). This raises parallels with Bolivia under Morales, who practiced resource nationalism in opposition to neoliberalism (Gustafson 2020).

Numerous political scientists have noted the danger Correa's populism poses to liberal democracy in Ecuador. Press freedom is the primary concern. Correa was a vociferous critic of news organizations critical of his government (de la Torre 2013). As with other populists, media became part of the oppressive "Other" that upholds the status quo against populism's liberatory goals. Anti-terrorism laws were also used to suppress dissent against indigenous protesters, further harming democratic expression (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Organizations like Human Rights Watch noted reports from the UN and OAS of extrajudicial executions and police torture,

although the extent to which these are tied to Correa is unclear if they are tied to him at all (Human Rights Watch 2011).

International organizations rallied around Correa during the events of September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2010. Criticism directly against him is concerned primarily with press freedom and police abuse. The sole danger presented to Correa's anti-neoliberal programs came from international arbitration court's ruling against his seizure of foreign oil assets. In summary, there is no evidence that intervention or criticism was levied against Correa for his anti-capitalist beliefs. Correa was supported in power by IOs even in moments of potential change.

### Case 3: Fujimori's Peru

#### *Fujimori's International Identity*

Fujimori's Peru was an advocate for the United Nations, a supporter of the international economic system, and an active member in multilateralism. This differs from contemporary right populists that are more opposed to international activity. Fujimori's domestic policies are right-wing in that they were neoliberal. Like many Latin American countries, Fujimori spoke in favor of the UN Charter and its principles. However, he agreed with the need for Security Council reform in order to democratize decision-making. He is broadly considered a right-wing populist, but differs from others like Bolsonaro, or indeed his own daughter, Keiko Fujimori, in that he professes an "inclusive" populism that wishes to bring the outcast People back into the political fold rather than an "exclusionary" populism focused on protecting the People from an Other (Braga 2021).

Peru during this time desired reintegration into the international financial system via neoliberal reform. This is reflected in UNGD speeches, which demonstrate support for the Bretton Woods institutions (Where can I find statements made by Peru during the General



Debate of the United Nations General Assembly? n.d.). The United Nations features heavily in this as a central coordinating body (A/46/PV.16). He couched support for the UN in the standards of the charter, which dictates that the UN function as “a genuinely multilateral association of sovereign nations with equal rights and duties as provided for in the Charter” (A/47/PV.16). The UN charter’s potential should be supported by coordination with regional organizations and an empowered General Assembly (A/49/PV.11). In this way, the UN is supported through international links between integrated continents (A/51/PV.5). Integration is part of his financial visions as well. Trade, capital, and market liberalization is intimately tied with his vision of global integration, otherwise known as “globalization” (A/52/PV.11). Overall, Fujimori’s rhetoric on the UN is supportive and standard for the cases examined here.

Domestically, Fujimori instituted “Shock Doctrine” reforms that very quickly reduced inflation at the expense of increased poverty, lowered wages, and severed social spending. This was an intentional effort to cause short-term pain for long-term economic gains at the guidance of US economic advisors who were part of the “Chicago School”, infamous for their involvement in guiding economic policy in Russia, Chile, and Poland among others (Klein 2007).

Fujimori also strongly supported regional institutions *per se* as part of South-South dialogue through multilateralism. This was a greater vision of changing sovereignty in the face of globalization. For Fujimori, political decisions were willingly delegated to supranational institutions in an evolving sense of national sovereignty. This represented a new era of political decision-making in what scholars have called the “LIO II” (Börzel and Zürn 2021). The shift to greater IO interventionism is reflected in Fujimori’s rhetoric, beginning by saying, “We live in a day of marked change in the organization of power and of globalizing trends in the international

system which require, in keeping with the Charter, a scrupulous egalitarianism in relations between States and, accordingly, multilateral policies in keeping with the times as an appropriate means of conferring priority on the common goals of mankind in our era” (A/52/PV.11). This changes how national sovereignty is used: “States, in the exercise of that plenary competence known as sovereignty, are voluntarily delegating the exercise of specific jurisdictions to an international organization for the greater good of a particular international space” (A/50/PV.7).

Fujimori is unique as a right-wing populist that values supranational governance. Yet, his vision of national cooperation is influenced by his thoughts on neoliberalism; as demonstrated, Fujimori was a strong advocate of international financial governance to solve humanity’s problems, namely development. His decidedly pro-LIO rhetoric makes international reactions to his attempted *autogolpe* all the more interesting, as he was spared nothing in their condemnation.

#### *Responses to Fujimori*

Fujimori is a test case for a strong reaction against a right wing neoliberal populist. This is apparent in reactions to Fujimori’s 1992 *autogolpe* wherein he abolished the legislature and ruled by decree. International organizations like the OAS reacted quickly and strongly in perhaps the most robust response in any of these four cases. Following the coup, the OAS denounced Fujimori’s actions and a meeting was called under Resolution 1080 to decide how to respond. The foreign ministers of Latin American states at this meeting agreed to establish a mission for returning Peru to its democratic institutional order (Levitt 2006, 103–4). The OAS also rejected a proposal by Fujimori to ratify the coup through a referendum, unlike their support for a referendum under Chávez in 2005. The OAS did not impose sanctions. However, IFIs like the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, and IMF suspended loans *despite* Fujimori’s

adherence to their economic guidelines (Levitt 2006, 104). Furthermore, the United States cut aid to Peru as a form of sanctioning, presenting the harshest response of my cases (Crossette 1992).

The OAS was similarly critical of the 2000 elections in Peru. These elections were considered undemocratic, unfree, and unfair by OAS observers (A. F. Cooper and Legler 2005). However, the OAS' reaction in 2000 was more limited for various reasons. Other scholars have linked their inaction to internal dissent as well as an outdated form of "club multilateralism" (A. Cooper and Legler 2006). It is also possible that election tampering was minor enough to evade major repercussions—a tactic outlined in other research (Levitsky and Way 2010). Regardless, Fujimori's regime collapsed under corruption allegations and Fujimori was eventually jailed after fleeing the country (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Importantly, a Peruvian Supreme Court decision to commute Fujimori for health reasons was criticized in strong terms by the UN as an insult to human rights victims (Peru n.d.; Taj 2022).

#### Case 4: Bolsonaro's Brazil

##### Bolsonaro's International Identity

With only three UN General Debates since Bolsonaro's election, the available documents for determining his "international image" are far sparser than the other three cases. However, trends can still be gleaned despite this by combining rhetoric at the UN against his policies. First, Bolsonaro does not engage in the campaign to reform the UN, nor does he criticize neoliberalism. Brazil, as a founding member of the UN, is "committed to the basic principles of the UN Charter: peace and international security, cooperation among nations, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. As the organization reaches its 75th anniversary, we now have the opportunity to renew our commitment and loyalty to these ideals (A/75/592). As evidence for Brazil's commitments, Bolsonaro cites Brazil's participation in numerous peacekeeping

operations from Africa to the Caribbean (A/75/592). He also affirms his commitment to the free market, which he sees as vital to political freedom as well as economic freedom (A/74/ PV.3). This includes commitment to the World Trade Organization and trade liberalization policies (A/75/592).

In addition to these primary sources, political science scholars have explored Brazil's foreign policy vis-a-vis the LIO to great success. Scholars Casarões and Farias have explored the three pillars of Bolsonaro's foreign policy, concluding that it rejects multilateralism, multiculturalism, and regionalism, despite Bolsonaro's pro-UN rhetoric in UNGD debates. This is opposed to LIO norms. It also fundamentally challenges the LIO as discussed below. There is little evidence that Brazil is eager to participate in left-leaning international organizations like CELAC and UNASUR (now obsolete). Against these norms, Bolsonaro proposes anti-globalism, anti-Communism, and religious nationalism; the first two of these undermine the LIO while religious nationalism proposes an alternative vision of the global community (Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021).

This alternative set of norms appears to overlap with the characteristics of fascism, particularly the concept of a global Communist elite i.e., an "Other". The defining trait of fascism is a revolutionary appeal to return to a glorious, national past based on societal "purity" and rule by a dominant and hierarchical group. This appears in Bolsonaro's rhetoric enough to be noticeable to journalists and scholars (Grieco 2020; Neto 2020; Phillips 2018). However, Bolsonaro deviates from European fascism by using neoliberal economics rather than a state-centered economy (Chatzky 2018; de Souza 2020). Finally, the line between right-populism and fascism blurs in appeals to national sovereignty. Fascism represents "the people" through a strong leader, which populism claims to do as well (Wodak 2021). Suffice to say that scholars

place Bolsonaro in the area of populism and fascism, although the distinct differences between Bolsonaro and Fujimori are taken into account in this analysis.

### *Responses to Bolsonaro*

Unlike the other cases, there is no clear example of a coup or any event that can be used to test my hypotheses. However, there are some identifiable issues that could spur international condemnation around Bolsonaro's neoliberal economic policies, even if they may intersect with other issues. For instance, Bolsonaro's expansion of logging, mining, and fishing in the Amazon may run into environmental and Indigenous rights concerns, which is exactly what happened (Downie 2022). But the issue in this case *primarily* has to do with how state-encouraged industry expansion—something that arguably loosely fits with neoliberalism through privatization as well—damages the environment and violates community rights rather than with neoliberalism *per se*. Beyond domestic groups, Bolsonaro's actions have generated criticism from the United Nations and Amnesty International (“Bolsonaro's Rhetoric Is a Blow to Human Rights and Climate Justice” 2019; UN 2022). While not a *per se* criticism, this is still stigmatization. Even though technically outside of my data collection window, the OAS IACHR also expressed concerns about Indigenous and women's rights prior to Bolsonaro taking office (Reuters Staff 2018).

Outside observers additionally expressed concern with democracy in Brazil. Following the 2020 election in the United States, Bolsonaro tried to emulate former president Donald Trump's strategy of delegitimizing the upcoming election. This involved claims of voter fraud and the mobilization of supporters, sometimes to do violence against anti-Bolsonaro protestors (UN 2022; Boadle 2021). Bolsonaro also cultivated ties with the Trump administration through his son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, who was received favorably. Crowds were also mobilized against

the Brazilian Supreme Court during decisions on voting laws. However, no coup came to pass despite international concerns (“We Are Gravely Concerned about the Threat to Brazil’s Democratic Institutions.” 2021). Finally, Brazil reluctantly voted to condemn Russia over their invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Bolsonaro initially expressed support for Russia which drew the ire of the United States, yet avoided international condemnation by voting to oppose Russia (Paraguassu 2022).

Overall, Brazil was treated by international organizations with the same attitude as other cases. If anything, Brazil’s neoliberalism created friction with indigenous and environmental interest groups. Democratic erosion occurring under Bolsonaro was criticized as well, especially with respect to press freedom and trust in institutions(Daly 2019; Hunter and Power 2019). No significant action was taken to sanction, stigmatize, or punish Bolsonaro.

## Results and Discussion

These four cases studies were tested at key points where Chávez, Correa, and Fujimori could have been removed from power more easily than at other points in their tenure. Bolsonaro is the exception, but is valuable for reasons summarized below and described in the analysis. Table 1 below give a brief summary of each case and whether or not they were sanctioned at those points:

**Table 1:** Summary of Results

| <b>Case Name</b>   | <b>Description</b>   | <b>Social Sanctions and Criticism?</b>   | <b>Description</b>   |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
| Venezuela – Chávez | Opposed to neoliberalism; supportive of UN qualified by strong desire for radical reform; engaged in multilateral regionalism. | Yes, criticism regarding civil liberties and elections by both UN experts and INGOs. Praised for social advances by UN. No sanctions regarding anti-neoliberalism. | Chávez was supported during the 2002 coup by the OAS. The United States passively opposed Chávez. Most criticism targeted political repression against opposition and media. Chávez was praised for social advances. |
| Ecuador - Correa   | Opposed to neoliberalism; supports UN with reform; vocal support for multilateralism   | Yes, criticism regarding media abuses by INGOs. No major sanctions outside of two international arbitration cases for anti-neoliberalism.                          | Correa was supported by the OAS and member states during the 2010 disruption. He was criticized for media abuses. There was little political spillover due to Ecuador losing the oil nationalization                 |

|                    |   |   |  |
|--------------------|---|---|--|
|                    |   |   | cases in international arbitration courts  |
| Peru – Fujimori    | Strong neoliberal support; supported UN and multilateralism   | Yes, condemnation primarily for an attempted <i>autogolpe</i> by international organizations like the OAS and UN. No sanctions for neoliberal policies. Tangible financial sanctions through aid cuts from the United States. | Fujimori was strongly criticized by international organizations and states for the 1992 <i>autogolpe</i> . Following loss of power in 2000, Fujimori fled the country. He was arrested in 2009, and his pardon in 2017 was condemned by UN human rights experts. |
| Brazil – Bolsonaro | Ideologically (likely fascistic), policy-wise strongly neoliberal; critical of UN and multilateralism | Yes, criticism for environmental damage and violating Indigenous rights by UN experts and INGOs. None <i>explicitly</i> for neoliberal policies.  | Bolsonaro has been criticized by IOs for environmental damage in the Amazon as well as violating indigenous rights. Otherwise, he has received support from far-right politicians and media figures.   |



There is a pattern of IO involvement in violations of democratic norms in the cases of coups or disruptions. Both Chávez and Correa were criticized for civil liberty violations that make up the “liberal” aspect of liberal democracy. Chávez was further criticized for Venezuela’s elections, which were seen as favoring his incumbency. Nonetheless, the political turmoil following the 2002 coup attempt was actively managed by the OAS. Chávez was supported during this time period into the 2005 referendum. This referendum was seen as fair by international observers. Both leaders were criticized by the United States, but this did not spill over into international organizations that could have been sensitive to US influence.

Fujimori was an aggressively neoliberal populist that was heavily sanctioned by both international organizations and neighboring states for his attempted *autogolpe* in 2002. Sanctions against him did not target his neoliberal policies, yet they did not protect him either. The OAS took a very active role in reversing the *autogolpe* and preventing Fujimori’s rule by decree, as did the United States, who took the most concrete steps in all of these cases to punish a populist by cutting financial aid. Later, the United Nations would go so far as to criticize Peru pardoning Fujimori, arguing that it was an insult to victims of his government. Finally, Bolsonaro has been criticized for environmental damages and assaults against indigenous rights. This comes closest to criticizing neoliberalism, as Bolsonaro’s policies in both of these areas spring from privatization and logging, mining, and fishing expansions into the Amazon. However, none of these social sanctions target neoliberal *per se*, merely its effects, and without mentioning neoliberal policies explicitly.

These results weigh heavily against my primary hypothesis. There is no pattern of intense social sanctioning against left populists among my four cases. Each case was criticized for issues common among populists, like press abuse, human rights, and democratic erosion. Little if any

attention was explicitly given to issues of neoliberalism or lack thereof. This implies that other theories of IO behavior hold greater validity, which also prevents me from inferring a hierarchy of norms within the LIO. Regarding the OAS, literature suggests that domestic factors are a more powerful determinant of its involvement in disruptions of the democratic order (Levitt 2006). My cases support the thesis that Fujimori was a test case allowing the OAS to practice for later cases, such as Venezuela in 2002 and Ecuador in 2010 (A. F. Cooper and Legler 2001). My results are even more surprising given that the OAS did not have an explicit legal basis to intervene in democratic crises until the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001. Until that point, the OAS relied on Resolution 1080 to intervene.

## Conclusion

The goal of this thesis was to explore the possibility that some norms matter more than others to actors in the LIO. Specifically, I examined the possibility that enforcing neoliberalism was the driving factor behind the responses of international organizations to left and right populists. Left Latin American populists, as demonstrated, were and are highly critical of the international economic system characterized by a neoliberal paradigm since 1990. They were supportive of the United Nations but believed it to be exploited by powerful states in the Global North. They emphasized multilateralism, human rights, and national sovereignty through regional cooperation. This contrasts with an image of right populists as opposed to multilateralism, global governance (such as the UN), and supportive of national sovereignty and neoliberalism. However, I discovered a rift between my two right populist cases. Fujimori from the 1990s was very supportive of all norms discussed here, even going so far as to propose a new national sovereignty based on voluntary concessions of state power to supranational organizations. Bolsonaro, by contrast, was rhetorically supportive of the LIO but opposed it in

practice and in domestic speeches. Speaking generally, Fujimori was the most supportive of the international system, followed by Chávez and Correa, then Bolsonaro.

The results of my case analyses are surprising then, in that the most supportive populist (Fujimori) received the most criticism and condemnation for his actions. In fact, Fujimori was the only populist to incur tangible sanctions: IFIs suspended their loans and the United States halted aid to Peru. The other three populists were subjected only to criticism from INGOs; criticism is certainly impactful, but pales in comparison to direct economic responses. None of these cases were punished for their neoliberalism or opposition to except for Bolsonaro, who was indirectly criticized for his policies' effects on the Amazon.

The implications of these results for my hypotheses are as follows: first, there is no discernable pattern of IO actions against left-populists *among these case studies*. Because of the failure to identify this pattern, its mechanism cannot be discussed. My alternative hypothesis was that the LIO experienced a rightward shift in the 2000s. This would bring further attention to left populists like Chávez and Correa but would make an exception for responses against Bolsonaro. This was also not observed as both left populists pursued their anti-neoliberal agendas relatively unmolested.

These results suggest that other theories are far more successful in explaining IO sanctions, criticism, and condemnation than a theory of neoliberal preeminence is. Alternative theories are discussed in the results but generally argue that regional powers such as the US and Brazil are influential, domestic variables condition IO actions, and uncertainty on the ground prevents action.

However, further research should be done on Latin America's new "Pink Tide" as of July 2022. Bolsonaro's international ties suggest that right populism in North America and Europe may be gaining ground in such a way that Latin American left populists could suffer more condemnation. Indeed, the image of Chávez as the destroyer of Venezuela appeared almost exclusively post-2010 in conjunction with growing right-wing extremism abroad. As discussed earlier, right-wing media in the Global North have used Chávez as an international example of the dangers of 21<sup>st</sup> century socialism. The rightward shift of the LIO may appear in the 2020s, or right-wing discontents may decide to dismantle this system of norms altogether.

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