A Psychological Scar: Collective Trauma and Memory in Republican Rome, 390-55 BCE

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

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

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ABSTRACT

The sack of Rome by the Gallic chieftain Brennus in 390 BCE was the cause of a collective trauma that influenced all sectors of Roman society. The collective trauma and memory were, in part, responsible for policy changes, religious and ceremonial practices, and military campaigns. Additionally, the trauma influenced the Senate in political matters, such as Gaius Marius' five consecutive consulships (104-100 BCE) and Julius Caesar's ten-year proconsulship of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul (58-48 BCE). Each chapter demonstrates how the memory or trauma manifested itself in Roman history.

The introduction provides a synopsis of each individual chapter as well as a brief overview of various examples which support the notion that the collective trauma was present. The ways in which historians have perceived and understood La Tène Gauls are explored throughout the historiography in Chapter Two, as well as the influences outside the field of Gallic history that altered the study of La Tène Gaul. Chapter Three explores the sack of Rome in 390 BCE and the aftermath, including the formation of the trauma and the ways in which it influenced Roman society. Chapter Four seeks to understand the relationship between collective trauma, memory, and the three cases of human sacrifice (228, 216, and 114-113). Lastly, Chapter Five introduces the idea of the Just War and the way in which Caesar violated such a tradition. Additionally, it explores why the Senate willingly accepted Caesar's actions despite the genocidal nature of his war in Gaul. Several primary sources are referenced, including Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* (*From the Founding of the City*), Plutarch's *Lives*, and Caesar's *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* (*Commentaries on the Gallic War).* The Gauls quickly became "the Other" and were the focus of Rome's vengeance many generations after the sack. If we can understand how

humans behave in the aftermath of a traumatic event, we can better prepare for and respond to the traumatic events of our contemporary world.

"A Psychological Scar: Collective Trauma and Memory in Republican Rome, 390-55 BCE."

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Chapter One: Introduction

Collective trauma is a psychological reaction to an event that affects society as a whole. Unlike individual trauma, collective trauma affects those who did not live through or witness the traumatic event. The trauma is passed on to future generations who adopt their own memory of the source of the trauma. The sack of Rome in 390 BCE, at the hands of Brennus, the Gallic chieftain, was the genesis for such a trauma.[1] It created a fear of the Gauls throughout Rome. This fear was known as the *metus Gallicus*, 'fear of the Gauls.' The *fear* of the Gauls and the trauma created from the sack of Rome influenced both present and future generations in matters of politics, warfare, and religion. Furthermore, the trauma was manipulated by those who sought to benefit from the fear it created. The trauma led to the proclamation of new Roman heroes such as Camillus and Marius, and the institutions of long-lasting religious rituals and ceremonies, such as *supplicia canum*. Additionally, consuls and military commanders were handed carte blanche policies, which allowed them to conduct themselves in ways that were otherwise unsavory, and at times, illegal. Ultimately, the fear of the Gauls led to acts that were wholly antithetical to Roman customs, such as the three cases of human sacrifice in 228, 216, and 114-113. Additionally, Caesar was handed carte blanche policy for his war in Gaul, despite his violations of what Romans deemed a Just War. This thesis offers evidence that there was indeed a collective trauma present after the sack of Rome in 390. Additionally, the trauma and memory of the sack influenced Roman behavior and was manipulated by those who benefited from such circumstances.

Chapter Two serves as a historiography and literary analysis of historians' works in the field of Gallic history. This includes the ways in which historians' perspectives regarding the

[1] All dates BCE throughout, unless otherwise noted as CE.

ancient Gauls have shifted over time. Initially, Gallic history was viewed through a Roman imperialistic lens. The ancient Gauls left little to no written history behind. As a result, the extant primary source material is almost entirely Roman and Greek. The reliance on non-Gallic primary sources only complicated the early period of Gallic history. Additionally, early Roman historians typically parroted the slanderous language ancient historians used to describe the Gauls. Take, for example, Edward Gibbon's groundbreaking historical work *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Included within Gibbon's work are mentions of the Gauls and Germans of the late Republic and early Imperial period. However, Gibbon mentions them only in passing, and refers to them as barbarians or savages. He pays little mind to their many large cities or tribal infrastructure.

The field of Gallic history was continually influenced by outside sources during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, the British historians of the Seven Years' War, such as Gibbon, treated the Gauls rather harshly. In part, his prejudice was due to Britain's relationship with France at the time. The late nineteenth century was a period when the French redefined their national identity. Charles-Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III (r.1852-70), sought to establish a connection between his contemporaneous Frenchmen and their ancestral Gauls. To do so, he began a widespread archaeological effort to uncover notable Gallic sites that are referenced in Julius Caesar's *The Gallic War*. Napoleon's efforts were successful, and the field of Gallic history and archaeology expanded.

This expansion of Gallic history coincided with the rise of subaltern history. As the colonies crumbled across the globe and achieved independence during the early twentieth century, a new historical field began. The study of the subaltern opened new doors into Gallic history. Our understanding of La Tène peoples expanded once we stripped away the

imperialistic residue of the previous two millennia. The field has grown enough that general histories are being written, which make the ancient Celts more accessible to us than ever before.

Chapter Three, "The Gallic Sack of 390" relays the story of the sack of Rome in 390, which bore Rome's collective trauma. It is told to us through Livy's work *Ab Urbe Condita*. Also provided is a brief introduction to the psychological terms and definitions of "collective trauma" and "trauma," as well as how these terms apply to the Gallic sack. The sack was a product of Gallic migrations into the Po River valley during the late fifth and early fourth centuries BCE. Livy writes of the hero Camillus who defeated Brennus' Gauls after the sack and was subsequently proclaimed "The Second Founder of Rome." Additional analysis is provided for the story of Juno's geese which alerted the Romans of the Gallic assault. The story is the genesis of the ritual *supplicia canum*, "the punishment of the dogs." The punishment of the dogs was a yearly ritual where a dog was ceremoniously marched through the Roman streets via crucifix alongside a goose dressed in regal colors of purple and gold. *Supplicia canum* lasted well into Imperial Rome – a long time to punish dogs for their failure to bark. Additionally, the fear of the Gauls that grew from the sack of Rome was the impetus for the aggressive expansionism Rome displayed during the fourth century. Rome conquered its neighbors as the fear of Gauls kept the expansionist embers lit.

The sack also influenced the Senate and their legislation, particularly in matters of emergency. The *tumultus Gallicus* was implemented as a failsafe for a Gallic state-of-emergency circumstance. There were three variations of a *tumultus* (a hostile incursion or fear and panic). The first two, *tumultus Etruscus* and *Italicus*, instituted a cessation of business, an additional tax, and cancelled military leave in the event that Rome's Etruscan and Italian enemies attacked. The *tumultus Gallicus*, however, included an additional requirement the

previous two lacked. The declaration of *tumultus Gallicus* included that all non-military males, specifically priests, were required to bear arms alongside the regular military. The *tumultus Gallicus* was the only form of *tumultus* and declaration of war that included priests in military duty, which highlights the dire circumstances during the declarations of *tumultus Gallicus.* Furthermore, the anniversary of the Roman defeat at the Allia on 18 July 390 at the hands of Brennus' Gauls was declared a *dies Alliensis,* or a Black Day. The designation as a *dies Alliensis* meant that the anniversary was inauspicious, or unlucky, and all business ceased. The *metus Gallicus* influenced all sectors of Roman society in the aftermath of the sack of Rome.

This chapter includes an analysis of Livy. *Ab Urbe Condita* is a unique work. It is part historical, part fictional and mythological, and part narrative prose or rhetoric. To understand Livy is to recognize when he is intentionally shrouding the narrative with pro-Roman qualities. Additionally, there are verses where Livy alters the history that he writes to portray Romans as perhaps braver, or possessed of more *virtus* (courage) than what was historically displayed. One must question Livy's words and put forth effort to sift through historical fiction, propaganda, and historical fact.

The Fourth Chapter, "Hegemony, Hannibal, and Human Sacrifice," explores the relationship between the *metus Gallicus* and the three cases of human sacrifice in 228, 216, and 114-113. It argues that the fear, or *metus,* of the Gauls influenced such drastic measures as human sacrifice and Gaius Marius' five consecutive consulships. The first human sacrifice was the result of a Gallic resurgence, comprised of the Gaesatae, Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci, who rebelled and sought to eliminate Roman control of the Po River valley. The resurgence created a dire situation for Rome and the Senate. The memories, or trauma, from the sack of 390, along with the closely located Gallic resurgence, sparked panic throughout Rome. The result was the

first official case of Romans conducting ritualistic human sacrifice. The sacrifices of 228, 216, and 114-113, were not the cause of punishment or criminal behavior. Rather, the sacrifices were the result of widespread panic and fear that left Rome at its spiritual wits end.

The second case of human sacrifice, in 216, was the result of Roman losses to Hannibal, in conjunction with a Vestal Virgin's broken vows of chastity. The trauma, or fear, from the Gallic sack was mostly dormant during the Punic Wars. However, little was more cause for concern than a Vestal priestess who had broken her vows. When combined with the series of defeats as devastating as those that Hannibal commanded, Rome grew hopeless. A second human sacrifice arose from Rome's hopelessness and fear. The Roman Senate and people were stretched beyond what was traditional and crossed into intolerable territory – that of human sacrifice.

Nearly a century later, a Germanic coalition which consisted primarily of the Cimbri and Teutones marched into Transalpine Gaul (a Roman province in southern Gaul/France). The Germanic migration stirred the memories and trauma of the sack in 390. Like the sacrifice of 216, Rome found itself between what seemed to be an unstoppable foe and a Vestal who broke her sacred vow of chastity. Perhaps the *metus Gallicus* (fear of the Gauls) inspired paranoia about Vestal chastity. At any rate, this combination led to the final case of human sacrifice. What resulted from the Germanic migration was a decade of devastating Roman defeats. From 114 to 104, Rome suffered the loss of multiple armies and their commanders in a sweeping streak of defeats. These losses included the defeat at Noreia in 113 which initiated the Cimbric War. The decade also included the defeat of M. Silanus' army at Gallia Narbonesis in 109, the defeat and death of consul Cassius Longinus and his army at Burdigala in 107, and the most disastrous defeat in Roman history – the loss at Arausio in 105, where around 120,000 Romans

and their allies were killed. As the second century came to an end, a savior was needed. As a result, Gaius Marius was elected as consul for the year 104. Marius subsequently defeated the Cimbri over the next several years. Upon his final victory and with the Cimbri dispatched, the Senate and people hailed Marius as the Third Founder of Rome, just as they did Camillus for his victory against Brennus.

The Fifth Chapter, "Carte Blanche and the 'Just War'," argues that the nature of Rome was such that, when Gauls were the subject, the Senate willingly handed commanders and politicians carte blanche policies when they dealt with Gaul, particularly Julius Caesar. In other words, those who dealt with Gaul were free to act as they chose, regardless of the circumstances or repercussions. The chapter offers a brief literary analysis of Caesar's *The Gallic War*. Caesar's narrative use of the third person within *The Gallic War* is discussed. Additionally, several notable examples of military atrocities, such as the killing of noncombatants, are weighed against the Roman ideas of a Just War. Caesar's actions in Gaul, particularly those against the Belgae, Nervii, Usipetes, and Tencteri, were clear violations of the Roman Just War philosophy. However, the Senate willingly accepted and celebrated Caesar's actions, including indiscriminate killing of women and children, when Caesar targeted Gauls and Germans. Caesar offers a justification to meet the Just War tradition, despite his actions, for each misstep he took in Gaul. This habit raises the question, "Why did Caesar feel the need to offer justifications if the Senate offered him carte blanche for his war in Gaul?" The nature in Rome was such that, if Gauls were targeted, nothing was off the table, up to and including genocide, for which Caesar earned a triumph.

The chapters feature evidence for the ways in which collective trauma manifests itself in society throughout generations. The sack of Rome in 390 directly led to a fear of the "other." It

was the foundational event which sparked Rome's aggressive imperialistic demeanor. The trauma influenced legislation and policy changes, rituals and ceremonies, and military matters. Much can be learned about how humans cope with collective trauma and memory when analysis of historical circumstances is conducted. The outcomes of the sack of Rome in 390, and the panic that ensued suggest that a collective trauma was present, and that the memory of the event was manipulated by those who deemed it necessary.

Chapter Two: Historiography

Rome's initial encounter with the "barbarians" from north of the Italian Alps resulted in the notorious sack of the Eternal City in c. 390 BCE Brennus, the Gallic chieftain who led the invasion, not only defeated the Romans, he planted a nightmare within the collective-Roman mind that nearly brought the Republic to its knees during its relative infancy. The following three centuries were rife with military engagements, invasions, and legal reforms that sought to pacify the Celtic world (Gaul, Germania, and Britannia). However, the Celtic peoples transitioned from nightmarish invaders (c. 390-250 BCE), to the anvil of Rome's military hammer (c. 150-50 BCE), to citizens of the state with legal landholdings, voting rights, and marriage rights following Julius Caesar's conquest of the region (c. late 40s BCE).

Historians' and anthropologists' understandings and perceptions of the La Tène Celtic peoples vary as further knowledge is unearthed.[2] The goal with this historiography is to trace this transition and provide an understanding of the ways in which Roman historians, anthropologists, and other academics across time have viewed these "barbarians" from the middle of the Roman Republic to the beginning of the early Roman Empire, with particular focus on the first century BCE. The shifts within Celtic historiography can be attributed to external factors that influenced the way in which Celtic history and archaeology was studied, researched, and ultimately told. The three primary external factors that influenced the field include colonialist ideology (specifically during the Seven Years' War), France's search for a new national identity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the effort to preserve an otherwise decaying cultural and linguistic history.

[2] The La Tène peoples were known to the Greeks as *Keltoi* and Romans as *Galli*. In reference to Iron Age peoples of modern-day France, the terms *Celt* and *Gaul* are interchangeable.

Edward Gibbon, the preeminent British Roman historian of the eighteenth century, wrote the landmark historical work *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1788), in which Gibbon attributes the fall of the Roman empire to a moral decline of Romans and an invasion of Christianity. Mention of Gallic history within his writing is sparse. However, Gibbon is one of the few eighteenth-century historians who wrote about the Gauls of the late Roman Republic. Admiration for Gibbon's work is certainly plentiful. Perhaps the historian Andrew Roberts makes the loftiest of claims, "Edward Gibbon would have been a hero of mine even if he were not the greatest historian since Thucydides, and thus the greatest modern practitioner of my trade."[3] Despite his acclaims, however, Gibbon's work is flawed with prejudicial writings about Rome's enemies which permeated throughout eighteenth-century Roman historiography.

The first volume of *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* outlines the nations and societies that Augustus and his successors faced. Additionally, Gibbon writes a brief history of military conflicts with societies prior to Augustus. Notably, these include the Celtic societies to the north of Italy, like those of the Belgae, Gauls, and Germans, as well as the Parthians in the east. In reference to Germanic peoples during the rule of Emperor Augustus, Gibbon names these many societies and peoples simply as "barbarians." Gibbon states, "The forests and morasses of Germany were filled with a hardy race of barbarians…."[4] The term "barbarian" was commonly used by ancient Romans. It was not simply in reference to "the other." It was specifically directed to the peoples and societies who were both the "other" and lacking in Greco-Roman values and identity. Gibbon, who cites such notable primary sources as

[3] Andrew Roberts, "Edward Gibbon," *RSA Journal* 151, no. 5513 (2004): 42.
[4] Edward Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: Volume I*, London: ElecBook (1998): 20.

Livy, Strabo, and Suetonius, undoubtedly had access to the various Germanic societies' names. Regardless, in some cases, though not all, he refers to them simply as "barbarians."

Additionally, Gibbon uses words such as "savage" and "wild" to describe various aspects or attributes of the Gallic and Germanic societies. Referencing various peoples in Britannia, Gibbon states, "The native Caledonians preserved, in the northern extremity of the island, their wild independence, for which they were not less indebted to their poverty than to their valour."[5] In this particular passage, Gibbon chooses to name the Caledonians rather than labeling them as "barbarians." This is perhaps due to his familiarity with the Caledonians, who were among the ancient Scottish tribes. However, he chooses to describe their existence as "wild," as if they do not have any social constructs, traditions, or religion beyond simply existing as one with nature. Furthermore, we see it again in reference to the Libyans, whom Gibbon called "the most savage of mankind."[6] This was the ideology and perspective that permeated within the early Celtic historiography.

Archaeological evidence and understanding of the Celtic peoples were certainly limited during the eighteenth century. However, Gibbon unquestionably had access to the peoples' and societies' names, traditions, and even religions. As we see, he uses their appropriate names sparingly, and his access to primary source material was both adequate and extensive enough to presume Gibbon had the ability (should he choose) to refer to the peoples as anything but barbaric and savage. Despite this shortcoming within his writing, Gibbon is well-respected for balancing various components of historical writing: the erudite, the narrative, and the philosophical.[7]

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[5] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 22.
[6] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall,* 46.
[7] Daniel Woolf, *A Concise History of History: Global Historiography from Antiquity to the Present,* United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press (2019): 142.

Gibbon's negative biases toward the Gallic (ancestral French societies) enemies of Rome can be explained by British-French relations of his time. The Seven Years' War (1756-63) preceded the publication of Volume I of *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776) by little more than a decade. Put simply, the Seven Years' War was a series of wars and proxy wars in which Britain and France, and their respective allies, vied for global supremacy. Furthermore, Gibbon served as a British captain in the militia regiment of Hampshire *during* the war.[8] His service provided him with a deeper understanding of military matters, both contemporary and ancient. In addition, he developed an undeniable bias against the French – both contemporaries and those who are more ancient. It was this bias that clouded Gibbon's perception as he wrote *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

Additionally, Gibbon excludes any ethnographic information regarding the Gauls of Republican-era Rome. Not only were the French an enemy of Britain, so too were the indigenous French allies in the Americas and elsewhere. At the time of Gibbon and the global proxy wars, Britain maintained a conquering, colonizing mindset, similar to that of the Roman Republic. The French and Indian War (1754-63) in North America was one of the many proxy wars during the Seven Years' War in which France and Britain manipulated the local indigenous populations – both as enemies and allies.

The relations between France and Britain during the Seven Years' War influenced Gibbon and other British historians, and aided in the development of their biases against the Gauls. Firstly, the Gauls were the ancestral French population – the same France that was in competition for global supremacy against Britain. Secondly, the Gauls in Gibbon's perspective

[8] Mark H. Danley and Patrick J. Speelman, *The Seven Years War: Global Views*, Leiden: BRILL, 36.

were similar to North American indigenous populations. As Derek Woolf states while referencing the work of the French Jesuit Joseph-Francoise Lafitau:

> The direct linkage between the barbarians of antiquity and modern savages is illustrated in Lafitau's declaration that he found ancient text and modern observation to be mutually reinforcing, the practices and dress of contemporary natives providing insights into the textual descriptions by Greeks and Romans of long ago. This would be a theme much taken up in the eighteenth century.[9]

Gibbon, his colleagues, and contemporaries who laid the foundation of Gallic historiography perceived ancient societies like the Gauls as merely a people who were inconsequential to the cogs of history, and who were meant to be manipulated, for better or worse, by the Roman state. To British historians of the eighteenth century, the story of the Seven Years' War was primarily a story of Britain and France. Likewise, the story of the Roman Republic was solely Roman. Therefore, to Gibbon, the Gallic peoples, culture, and society were not central to the story, and were thus deemed unimportant.

The Roman and Greek primary sources, such as Livy or Plutarch, regarding Celtic peoples and religions were readily available to Gibbon, as evidenced by M. H. Gaidoz's "The Religion of the Gauls," published in 1887. Gaidoz's work attempts to uncover and sort through the available knowledge and understanding of the Gaulish religion known as *Druidism*. Gaidoz notes that, "The sources are in short of various kinds: there are first the testimonies of ancient writers, but these testimonies are rare, and they are the productions of men who, with the exception of Caesar, had only a superficial knowledge of Gaul, and who often spoke of it from hearsay."[10] Gaidoz continues, "The general character of the Gaulish religion is concisely given by Caesar, and Caesar is the best authority of the ancient world for all that concerns Gaul – we

[9] Woolf, *A Concise History of History*, 121.
[10] M. H. Gaidoz, "The Religion of the Gauls." *The Celtic Magazine* 12, no. 115 (1887): 356.

should even say the only authority, had we not Strabo after him."[11] It is evident that while Gaidoz writes almost exactly one century following Gibbon, Caesar and Strabo were available to both historians – the former being the only historian of the two to use them adequately enough to appropriately represent Rome's enemies to the north.

Gaidoz attempts to make sense of the Gallic religion and customs within his work – among one of the first historians to do so. He dedicates much of his effort to understanding the deities of Celts that Caesar first shone light upon, going so far as to highlight that each of the forests in France had their own Celtic names and deities dedicated to them. Gaidoz writes, "The forests were adored. The Black Forest was the Dea Abnoba; The Ardenne the Dea Ardvinna; the inscriptions Sex Arboribvs and Fatis Dervonibvs "the genii of the oaks" again testify to this."[12]

This begs the question, "Why did Gibbon not include such information?" Perhaps Gibbon simply overlooked Caesar's or Strabo's writings about the Celts. However, he certainly cited their works. Therefore, more likely, he simply did not deem the Celtic traditions and customs worthy or relevant to his topic. More sinister perhaps, Gibbon may have viewed them as the exact labels he bestowed to them, "barbarians" and "savages," and paid little mind to the people to whom he referred. To Gibbon, as is evident by his willingness to exclude any matter of details about the Celtic peoples, they were simply Rome's wild enemies to the north.

R. Erskine's article "Latin and the Celt," published in 1926, discusses the ancient Celts from a racial perspective. He offers a description that, while generic, we simply do not see in Gibbon and Gaidoz; however, his description is created using primary sources, particularly Caesar. Erskine writes, "Caesar in his *De Bello Gallico* has sketched for all time the leading

[11] Gaidoz, "The Religion of the Gauls," 356.
[12] Gaidoz, "The Religion," 262.

features of the Celto-Germanic nature."[13] He continues, "According to the accounts of them [Celts of Republican Rome] that have come down to us from those times, these Celts were men large of limb, white-skinned, blue-eyed, and had hair which some observers describe as fair, others red, and yet more golden."[14]

Erskine compares and explores the relationship between the ancient Romans and Celts, as well as the Greeks – only secondarily. He does so by analyzing a matter of philosophical thought, the arts and written language (poetry), and their construction and infrastructure. Erskine is clear that in matters of nation building and infrastructural-focused labor, the Celts were simply outclassed by their Roman counterpart. However, their written and oral traditions and mythologies were quite similar to that of the Greeks, and their war-fighting ability, while not as perfected as the Romans, suited their needs based on the terrain upon which they fought.[15] It is clear that Erskine is lending credence to both Gallic society as well as their military prowess in the face of Roman imperialism.

The now-outdated work of Erskine is similar to that of Gaidoz. Both historians dedicate much of their writing to the Celts, especially in the case of Gaidoz. It is evident that the professional and academic exploration of the Celtic peoples was certainly growing in the first century-and-a-half after Edward Gibbon's groundbreaking work, albeit slowly. Value and importance were found within the ancient Celtic and Germanic societies that simply was overlooked or ignored in the work of Gibbon and those of his era.

The focus on Gallic ethnography in France during the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries can be attributed to the rise of a French national identity of the same era. The

[13] R. Erskine, "Latin and Celt," *Fortnightly Review* 120, no. 720 (1926): 829.
[14] Erskine, "Latin and Celt," 830.
[15] Erskine, "Latin and Celt," 35.

French state was superimposed onto the identity of the nation.[16] As a result, a new national identity was needed – one that was separate from the state and unique to the character of the population. Charles-Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III (r.1852-70) was perhaps the first who sought to establish a connection between contemporary France and the La Tène (late Iron Age) Gauls. To do so, Napoleon III financed three large-scale archaeological excavations at various Gallic settlements. Each settlement was the site of a significant event during the Gallic rebellion against Julius Caesar's conquest. The first, Gergovia, was the location of a major victory (52 BCE) over Caesar's legions. The second, Bibracte, hosted the Gallic coalition and their efforts to rally the various peoples and societies of Gaul to their cause. Lastly, Alesia was the site of the final stand of Gallic resistance to Roman conquest (52 BCE). It was at Alesia that Napoleon III commissioned a bronze statue and memorial to Vercingetorix, the leader of the Gallic rebellion. As Michael Dietler explains, "Napoleon's choice of Alesia (rather than Gergovia or Bibracte) as the site for the statue reveal his conception of the identity of the French nation and of the unity of this ancient conflict as a national symbol. It was, as he saw it, the site both of heroic self-sacrifice by the Gauls in the defense of their nation and of the ultimately beneficial, if temporarily painful, victory of Roman 'civilization' over 'barbarism'."[17] In other words, Dietler explains Napoleon's choice of Alesia as one that memorializes the Gauls bravery while simultaneously celebrating the modernization of the ancient French.

This connection unified France with a common identity, not of the state but of the people. As a result, scholars and academics of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries—such as the aforementioned Gaidoz and Erskine—explored the ancient Gallic traditions not simply out of

[16] Michael Dietler, "Our Ancestors the Gauls: Archaeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation of Celtic Identity in Modern Europe," *American Anthropologist* 96, no. 3 (1994): 587.
[17] Dietler, "Our Ancestors the Gauls," 589.

personal or professional curiosity, rather in part to reinforce France's connection to its ethnographic and indigenous past. The Gallic peoples were no longer the savages in Gibbon's histories. They were a people who were worthy of not simply understanding, but making connections to in an effort to reform, strengthen, and ultimately solidify a French or Celtic national identity.

As time progressed from the days of Gibbon and Gaidoz, so too did our understanding of Celtic traditions. Advances in history, anthropology, and archaeology, with a focus on France and Germany, have led to a deeper understanding of the Celtic peoples and settlements. Ian Ralston's "Central Gaul at the Roman Conquest: Conception and Misconceptions" attempts to connect several Celtic locations within Julius Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* (58-49 BCE) with archaeological evidence and findings.

Extensive excavations at sites such as Bibracte, on Mont Beuvray in Burgundy, and Avaricum, near the city of Bourges, France, shows evidence of large-scale, fortified population centers. Known to Julius Caesar as *oppida*, Avaricum and Bibracte were both cities and strong-holds during the Celtic La Tène – that is, second- and first-century BCE Iron Age culture.[18] The findings at Bibracte and Avaricum not only account for the literary and historical references within Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*, they discredit Gibbon's notion that the Gaulish foes of the Roman republic were merely wild savages. As Caesar notes, Avaricum held a population of around 40,000 inhabitants – vastly larger with a much more advanced infrastructure than Gibbon led his reader to believe, despite having access to *Bellum Gallicum*.[19]

[18] Ian Ralston, "Central Gaul at the Roman Conquest: Conceptions and Misconceptions," *Antiquity* 62, no. 237 (1988): 786-87.
[19] Julius Caesar, *The War for Gaul: A New Translation,* Translated by James J. O'Donnell, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 186.

As advances have been made in Celtic La Tène archaeology, so too has our understanding of the Gallic social structures and roles. Jane Webster's article, "At the End of the World: Druidic and Other Revitalization Movements in Post-Conquest Gaul and Britain," (1999) argues that there has been a misunderstanding of druidic standing during first-century Gaul (France). Despite the belief of many earlier scholars that the druidic class of Gallic society waned pre-Caesarian conquest, Webster believes that it was only after the conquest of Gaul that the druids faded into history. Her argument is substantiated by Caesar's own writing. Webster states, "According to Caesar, the druids were one of two elite social classes in Gaul (the other being the *equites*)." This is integral to her argument, as Caesar witnessed the strength of the Druidic class *prior* to and during his conquest rather than following it.

Additionally, druids did not simply handle matters of religion. As Webster notes, they acted as legal judges, educators, and were members of the political, ruling class.[20] Quite simply, one cannot accurately provide a historical account of the Gallic foes of Republican Rome without including the social structure of the former's society. Despite this, many early scholars (notably Gibbon) virtually exclude any details relating to the Gallic peoples. For example, the Druids are only mentioned once within Gibbon's manuscript and the reader is given no historical context or information regarding them or the role they enacted within their society. Perhaps Webster best summarizes the lack of an adequate representation of Gallic subjects within Roman historians' writings. She states rather bluntly, "It would seem (with some honourable exceptions) that the study of resistance to Rome still does not fall within the mainstream of Roman Studies, and the druids fall foul of this attitude."[21]

[20] Jane Webster, "At the End of the World: Druidic and Other Revitalization Movements in Post-Conquest Gaul and Britain." *Britannia* 30 (1999): 6.
[21] Webster, "At the End of the World," 17.

Webster was relatively unique in her acknowledgement of a lack of ethnographic studies within traditional Roman historians' work during the middle of the twentieth century. However, by the twenty-first century, historical and ethnographic studies of the Celts became commonplace amongst scholars. This can be attributed to the rise of postcolonial historiography. That is, historiography focused on finding the historical voice of peoples who were assimilated, forcefully or otherwise, by a colonial or imperial power. Traditional Roman historiography tends to homogenize non-Roman peoples, customs, and traditions.[22] Furthermore, much of the historiography focuses on the elites within society and the social structures of said elites. The benefit of postcolonial theory is it is heterogeneous by nature. As a result, when examining the Gallic enemies of Rome, the postcolonial approach to historiography allows scholars to dedicate more time to the subalterns whom were subjugated under Roman imperialism. Due to postcolonial (postimperial may be a more appropriate term for post-Roman imperialistic historiography) theory, Gallic history and archaeology benefitted from increased scholarly research and dedication.[23]

The matter of ethnography is rather convoluted and tricky to sort through, particularly when the subjects of the ethnography are ancient and left little to no written words behind. Such is the case with ancient Gauls. Gallic and Germanic migrations flowed across Europe in the last two centuries BCE, which allowed for various tribes to intermingle and settle new regions together. Additionally, the only extant ancient ethnographies are those written by Romans and Greeks. These are helpful, to be sure; however, much of their ethnographies, like those provided

[22] Andrew Gardner, "Thinking about Roman Imperialism: Postcolonialism, Globalisation, and Beyond?" *Britannia* 44, (2013): 7.
[23] Andrew Gardner, "Thinking about Roman Imperialism?" *Britannia*, 4.

by Julius Caesar in *De Bello Gallico,* are shrouded by propaganda or are tainted with general misunderstandings or a lack of knowledge regarding the ethnography's subjects.

The historian Erich Gruen focuses on ancient ethnography and cultural identity. Gruen notes the issues that arise in the field of historical cultural identity. As a result of the limited ancient sources, particularly those of Gallic origin, historians have worked to ascribe identity to those societies. The issue with this, as Gruen notes, is that we often miss what is most important in the discussion of identity. He claims, "Emphasis can be misplaced, and false or unproductive issues have taken precedence. Take, for instance, the matter of cultural theft. Who stole what from whom? A singularly pointless debate."[24] This raises a question: "Is biological ethnicity tied to cultural identity?" Those who shared an ancient, cultural identity often claimed to be descended from a common ancestor or shared origins. For example, the stories of Aeneas and the founder Romulus were collective origin stories that gave Romans a sense of community. As Herodotus claimed, Greek "kinship" relied on "blood and speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common, and the likeness of our way of life."[25] To put simply, Greek identity depended on whether or not a group of peoples shared common ancestry, language, and religion. If ancient identity relied on cultural traditions (such as origin stories and religion), are efforts to understand ancient *ethnic* or racial identities missing the mark? Erich Gruen's approach is perhaps more practical. The process of attributing our modern notions of *ethnic* or *racial* identity to ancient subaltern groups is often misguided. Rather, we should study these groups using the frameworks for identity and cultural ethnography by which they measured

[24] Erich Gruen, "Cultural Fictions and Cultural Identity," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 123 (1993): 2.
[25] Herodotus, *The Histories,* perseus.tufts.edu, 8.144.2.

themselves. As historians adopted postcolonial history and ethnographers rethought their approach to ethnicity, the understanding of Gauls only grew.

As a result, Gallic historiography achieved such a breadth to allow for a more general historiographic field to develop. Historians began studying the ancient Gauls without the looming and overwhelming shroud of Roman imperialism. This perspective allowed for a more honest historiography to form – one that was not rooted in the imperialist's perspective. General histories began to form which allowed for widespread distribution of knowledge and information. This has ultimately aided the preservation of La Tène history and language.

Peter Berresford Ellis' *The Celtic Empire: The First Millennium of Celtic History 1000 BC – 51 AD* (1990) is an ambitious and thorough work. It is a general history of the Celts. It details the dispersion of the Celtic peoples across Europe, their language, culture, and the ways in which the Celts interacted with various empires such as the Romans and Greeks. While it is a general history, Ellis argues that perhaps it is the first general history of the Celts aimed at educating the common reader.[26] The significance of *The Celtic Empire* cannot be overstated. The non-scholar has read of the Romans, Greeks, Egyptians, and the various Chinese dynasties for centuries. However, general surveys of the Celts are relatively recent. The significance of increased Celtic general history is not found in archives and scholarly articles. Rather, the significance is found amongst the populations of the modern-day Welsh, Bretons, and other Celtic peoples who today need not be academic to learn and understand the history of their people.

The growing field of general Celtic histories such as *The Celtic Empire* is due in part to an increase in the public's awareness and curiosity about the Celts. A general history simply

[26] Peter Berresford Ellis, *The Celtic Empire: The First Millennium of Celtic History c. 1000 BC—51 AD,* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1990), 2.

would not have an audience without a large-scale curiosity of the subject. Why, then, has there been an increase in the public's inquisitiveness regarding the ancient Celts? Jacqueline Borsje seeks to answer this question in her article "The Secret of the Celts Revisited." Her answer lies in three facets of social interest and the nature of human curiosity – religion, romanticism, and mystery.

Borsje argues that the mysticism and spirituality of the ancient Celts keep our modern collective-conscience hooked onto the *idea* of the noble and mysterious Celt. It was their mythos which keeps the Celts in the minds of non-academics throughout the world. Borsje states, "Both outsiders and insiders, scholars and non-scholars alike, have produced writings romanticizing 'Celtic' phenomena and this is an ongoing process, just as the study of Celtic culture is an ongoing process."[27]

Additionally, the ancient Celtic language is difficult to grasp and the literature and oral traditions are full of magic, druids, and a connection to nature. Any such language is innately shrouded by mystery. Furthermore, the languages of Gaul, including Celtic, Gaelic, and Welsh, were systematically repressed. As a result, little remains today. It is this mystery that scholars and academics have sought to preserve, lest any difficult language fade over time. As a result, the reality that the Celtic language is threatened is the very reason it is being preserved and studied. As Borsje notes, the native Celtic languages of Manx and Cornish are quite literally extinct.[28] The conservation and revivalism of ancient Celtic language and tradition has led to both an increase in academic and scientific scholarship, as well as general histories like that of *The Celtic Empire*.

[27] Jaqualine Borsje, "The Secret of the Celts Revisited," *Religion and Theology* 24 (2017): 151.
[28] Borsje, "The Secret of the Celts Revisited," 149.

Gallic historiography is one that is far more fluid and comprehensive than just a century ago. The external factors that coincided with the genesis and proceeding Gallic historiography directly influenced the ways in which the field developed and evolved. The rigidity and dismissive nature with which the historiography was originally written is due in large part to the militaristic and political rivalry of Britain and France and the English and the Celts. Therefore, much of the substance of Gallic history and archaeology was overlooked, ignored, or slandered by British historians. It was not until after Napoleon III and the search of a new national identity that Gallic history began to properly be researched and ultimately told. Following the rise of their newfound identity based on the *people* rather than the state, the historiography broke free from simply being told as a people whom were subjugated to the might of the Roman war machine. Furthermore, as postcolonial historiography grew, academics and historians placed more attention on understanding who the ancient Gauls were, beyond their politics and military affairs. This effort was in large part due to a desire and necessity to preserve a history and language that was on the verge of being lost. As a result, general histories are finally being written, making the ancient Gaul more accessible and understandable than ever before.

Chapter Three: The Gallic Sack of Rome, 390 BCE

The term *trauma* refers to the "disordered psychic or behavioral state resulting from severe mental or emotional stress or physical injury."[29] *Collective trauma,* while similar to individual trauma, is the psychological reaction to a traumatic event that affects society as a whole. According to Dr. Gilad Hirschberger, the collective aspect of social memory and trauma is different from individual trauma in that "collective memory persists beyond the lives of the direct survivors of the events, and is remembered by group members that may be far removed from the traumatic events in time and space."[30] In other words, collective memory is passed on within a society long after the generation who experienced the event is deceased. A traumatic event that is of significant proportions can unravel the fabric of the society which experiences the event. The collective trauma—or psychological scar—is created from fear and the unknown of future outcomes, possibilities, or circumstances as a result of the trauma. Likewise, for the survivors, it is kept alive across generations through societal memories, and the fear and trauma are passed down within the society which experienced the event.

The term *collective,* in collective trauma, refers to a family, a group or groups with a common and shared identity, or a society at a national, subnational, or trans-national scale.[31] Additionally, the trauma develops at varying levels throughout the society or group. *Trauma,* as defined by Sigmund Freud, leads to an anxiety of such measure that it cannot be controlled by the psyche, overpowers the ego, and produces a sense of helplessness.[32] The combination

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[29]*Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary,* s.v. "trauma," Accessed March 26, 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trauma.
[30] Gilad Hirschberger, "Collective Trauma and the Social Construction of Meaning," *Frontiers in Psychology,* August 2018.
[31] Brigitte S. Cypress, "Collective trauma: An evolutionary concept analysis," *Nursing Forum* (2021): 5.1.3
[32] Cypress, "Collective Trauma," 5.1.2.

of the effects of trauma on a group or society can lead to drastic measures born from a sense of loss of a national identity, a sense of dread, and a desire for revenge. As indicated by Ciano Aydin, "What becomes important is that through sharing the trauma, members of the group are linked together, making the trauma an inseparable part of the group's identity. In a worst-case scenario, this trauma is reactivated by a leader who uses it to instigate resentment and perpetuate otherwise unthinkable cruelty against others."[33] These characteristics of *collective trauma* may manifest themselves which will leave the society altered following such an event.

The initial sack of Rome in 390 BCE created a psychological scar which was born from the collective trauma. This trauma then resurfaced during the eras of Marius and Caesar in the first century BCE. In many ways, the collective trauma and fear led to Roman military incursions and legal reforms, both after the event in the 380, and later during the periods of Marius and Caesar. Likewise, this scar was the impetus for religious and cult practices and rituals. Those who stoked the trauma manipulated and molded it through various forms of propaganda for their benefit. The primary-source material of the first century BCE is rife with propaganda and slanderous language regarding the people of the La Tène (Gauls, Celts, and Germans).[34] The *metus* (Latin word meaning fear) of the Gauls also led to a deeper Roman understanding of the them, their practices, and their culture. We can analyze the propaganda of the Roman Republic to gather an understanding of how statesmen, such as Marius and Caesar, and writers, historians, and rhetoricians such as Livy manipulated the collective trauma.

[33] Ciano Aydin, "How to Forget the Unforgettable? On Collective Trauma, Cultural Identity, and Mnemotechnologies," *Identity* 17, no. 3 (2017): 131.
[34] The La Tène peoples were known to the Greeks as *Keltoi* and Romans as *Galli*. In reference to Iron Age peoples of modern-day France, the terms *Celt* and *Gaul* are interchangeable.

Unraveling the web of events and propaganda that followed the initial sack of Rome will provide an understanding of who the ancient Gauls were to the Romans.

Regarding Livy

Extant primary-source material regarding the sack of Rome in 390 is slim. Much of the story of the sack of Rome in 390—as well as the subsequent events—are relayed to us from Livy's work *Ab Urbe Condita* ("From the Founding of the City"). Titus Livius (b. 64-59) was a Roman historian and friend to Augustus, Rome's first emperor. Livy wrote his vast Roman history between 31 and 25. It is the most complete source remaining from antiquity in which the sack and subsequent fallout are included. Livy was not simply a historian, which is perhaps unfortunate for those who study history through his eyes. He was both a historian and a literatus. As a result, he was well-equipped with analytical eyes and a source-based methodology when he wrote his history. Likewise, his skills as a creative writer allowed him to craft particular narratives in such a way that, while perhaps fictional, are interpreted as historical or factual. As Archibald Allen states, "[L]ivy's history is something more than a source of information; it is also an interpretation of history."[35] He continues, "Even if we could not deduce it from the form of his historical narrative, we know from his Preface that he wrote the history of Rome from a point of view which was deliberately determined and consciously held."[36] In other words, we must not dismiss Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* as merely rhetorical or fabricated, but we must also not take the work as purely factual and historical. We must question Livy when necessary and ask ourselves what Livy's true intent was in each written passage. The truth, or at least Livy's truth and own knowledge of the events in *Ab*

[35] Archibald W. Allen, "Livy as Literature," *Classical Philology* 51, no. 4 (1956): 251.
[36] Allen, "Livy as Literature," 251.

Urbe Condita, are found between the sources Livy used and his persuasive and prose-based rhetoric.

Livy's historical method is somewhat lackluster (when compared to our standards today) for a number of reasons. A glaring weakness of Livy's writing is that while he cites other historians' works, he fails to reference the primary documentary evidence. One such piece of documentation that was available to Livy was the *annales maximi*, which was an outline of the history of Rome compiled into eighty books around 115. One can presume that Livy consulted the *annales maximi.* Contained within the eighty-book compilation were election details, eclipses and astronomical matters, prodigies, and perhaps summaries of military campaigns.[37] However, Livy fails to properly cite the *annales*, which leaves us to question the extent to which Livy referenced primary evidence.

Like the *annales maximi*, the *senatus consulta* were available to Livy in book form. Records of significant laws, legislations, and decrees of the Senate were collected and preserved. For example, Polybius claimed that he consulted the text of the treaty with Carthage, which dated to 509/8. Although Livy had access to the senatorial records, just as Polybius did, Livy makes no reference them, which further illuminates his negligence of such records. Rather than relying on the documentary evidence, Livy relies on other historians' secondary works. Livy quotes historians such as Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius. Additionally, he quotes L. Calpurnius Piso (c. 133) and Aelius Tubero. Tubero wrote matters of both law and history, and immediately preceded Livy. Therefore, it is probable that Livy relied on Tubero, particularly in matters of law and class conflict within the senate.[38]

[37] P. G. Walsh, *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 110.
[38] Walsh, *Livy*, 123.

Like Tubero's expertise on law, Polybius' works acted as the foundation of information for Livy when he wrote of matters in Greece and Sicily. P. G. Walsh notes, "Polybius, then, is only a subsidiary source in the early books of this decade, but from xxiv onwards he is frequently employed as a main authority." He continues, "Livy explicitly acknowledges his [Polybius] authority on Roman activities in Greece, and it is not surprising to find that he is followed whenever the narrative is concerned with Greece or Sicily."[39] Though Livy neglected documentary evidence, as is suggested by his lack of reference to them (though they may have been consulted), he makes use of appropriate sources when necessary – such as Tubero on matters of law and class conflict, and Polybius on matters in Greece.

The most glaring issue within Livy's work is his lack of knowledge regarding warfare and geography. This was certainly due to his lack of experience in both the political and military sectors. Walsh notes, "But the absence of such aids, and the inadequacy of such equipment [such as modern-day maps or topographical charts] as was available, was a severe handicap for a man with no personal experience of warfare, who apparently travelled little, and who held no political appointment."[40] The lack of Livy's real-world experience caused two primary weaknesses within *Ab Urbe Condita*: firstly, mistakes regarding military matters and geography were made, and secondly, Livy's tendency to rely too closely on a single secondary source builds his work with little scrutiny of his sources. In general, Livy follows a single source when describing events. However, he includes his own motivations and reorganizes the information into his personal style. Therefore, his main narrative is reliant on

[39] Walsh, *Livy*, 125.
[40] Walsh, *Livy*, 138.

the factualness and accuracy of a single authority at any given time, which can leave the foundation upon which he writes his narrative weakened.[41]

Additionally, Livy's close proximity to Augustus and the dawn of the empire facilitated his skills in such a way that he was a propagandist. A rather serious matter, Livy shrouds the truth of the events which he writes in the interest of patriotic or moral reasons. For example, he writes of men like Scipio Africanus and Flaminius as the Roman ideal of a great leader. However, he ignores their less than noble traits. Livy omits military actions that may otherwise seem unfavorable to Roman moralities or ideals. For example, Polybius writes the people *and* Senate were in panic after the loss to Hannibal at Lake Trasimene. However, Livy claims that the Senate remained calm and emergency measures were carried out.[42] He refuses to illuminate the fear of the Senate. Rather, he shows them as brave and contemplative in the aftermath of Hannibal's victory at Trasimene.

Therefore, these factors are cause for concern regarding the historicity of Livy, which has always been in question. It can be difficult to decipher when *Ab Urbe Condita* is written in a historical and factual manner, or when Livy is adding a propagandist flair to his historical narrative. Perhaps the phrase "based on true events" is a fitting preamble for various passages found therein. However, regardless of the written creativity of each passage of *Ab Urbe Condita*, Livy is perhaps our greatest historical ally and link to the founding of the Roman Republic. His uses of Tubero and Polybius as sources where necessary indicate that, at some level, Livy weighed sources against each other in an effort to choose the single most reliable source on a given topic. As a result of Livy's use of sources, the lack of references to primary documents such as the *annales maximi*, and his lack of real-world experience in military or

[41] Walsh, *Livy*, 141.
[42] Walsh, *Livy*, 152.

politics, Livy's work must be examined with skeptical eyes. That is not to say *Ab Urbe Condita* is unreliable. Rather, we must question what Livy tells us, and consult his contemporary writers' extant works to color an accurate portrait of the history of Rome.

Within Livy's fifth book of *Ab Urbe Condita* are the initial circumstances that led to the Gallic invasion of the Italian peninsula, details of the Gallic victory over the Romans at the River Allia (18 July 390), and the siege and ultimate capture of the Capitoline Hill – the heart of the city upon which the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus stood.[43] It was there that Brennus, the Senone Chieftain who led the raid, uttered the words "Woe to the conquered" ("*Vae victis*").[44] Regarding the Roman reception of Brennus' exclamation, Livy proclaimed that, "a saying intolerable to Roman ears was heard " (*auditaque intoleranda Romanis vox*.)."[45] This was a lasting phrase forever remembered in the collective mind of Roman society.

Gallic Migrations and the March Toward Rome

Gallic tribes' migrations for the purpose of settlement into the Po River Valley and Etruria (modern-day Tuscany, Umbria, and Lazio) were common enough in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. The tribes' migrations, along with the warbands they brought, caused skirmishes between Gallic forces and Italic states. The movement of the Gallic tribes prior to the sack of 390 is most completely told to us by Livy. The Insubres, who led other smaller cantons and tribes, were the first to migrate into Etruria c. 600.[46] This was not a distant migration, however,

[43] The traditional date for the sack of Rome, as provided by Livy, is 390 B.C. However, the exact date is unknown, and ranges from 390-86.
[44] Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* Vol. III, Book V, Translated by B. O. Foster. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 164.
[45] All translations of Livy are from B. O. Foster in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita,* Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949).
[46] T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c.1000-264 BC)* 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 377.

as Insubria (the region from which the Insubres were named) is modern-day Lombardy, some 500 kilometers from Rome. Various Gallic towns and strongholds were established in the Po River Valley, south of the Italian Alps. Likewise, Etruscan towns and cities were captured and taken by various Gallic forces. Subsequent migrations, primarily by the Boii and Lingones, were the first to cross the Po River from a need to find substantial real estate opportunities. As Livy states, "Then, over the Poenine Pass, came the Boii and Lingones, who finding everything taken between the Po and the Alps, crossed the Po on rafts, and expelled out not only Etruscans, but also the Umbrians from their lands [*Poenino deinde Boi Lingonesque transgressi cum iam inter Padum atque Alpes omnia tenerentur, Pado ratibus traiecto non Etruscos modo sed etiam Umbros agro pellunt*]."[47] The final substantial migration prior to the sack of Rome was led by the Senones, the tribe who struck at the heart of the city. The century of Gallic incursions into Etruria certainly did not go unnoticed by Roman eyes. The Senones spearheaded the expansion which first brought them to Clusium, 160 kilometers north of Rome. The Etruscan barrier between Rome and the Po River Valley migrations crumbled in the fifth century BCE

The question of why the Senones were as far south into the Italic peninsula as Clusium and then Rome is debatable. In his narrative, Livy claims that the Gauls were in search of fruit and wine – a rather simplistic explanation for such distant travel.[48] Livy's explanation for the encounter at Clusium also reads more like myth than a historical narrative. In 391, the Senones approached Clusium and demanded arable land upon which to settle. It is perhaps self-evident that such an arrival of an armed force whom the people of Clusium had never laid eyes upon caused alarm. Furthermore, Clusium was not ignorant of the Gallic incursions into the Italic

[47] Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* 5.35; 120.
[48] There are c. 300 kilometers between the Po River and Clusium (modern Chiusi) and another 160 kilometers from Clusium to Rome.

peninsula and Po River Valley north of them. A domino effect was in motion, and Clusium was the last domino to fall prior to the Gallic arrival at Rome.

As a result, an envoy was dispatched from Clusium to the Roman senate, which pled for assistance. Rome, in return, sent forth three ambassadors, the sons of Marcus Fabius Ambustus, to negotiate with the Celtic peoples.[49] The diplomatic mission quickly turned hostile. Weapons were drawn and a skirmish ensued. The actions of the ambassadors, according to Livy, were to blame for the disintegration of the negotiation.[50] Adding insult to the Gaul's injury, the three Fabii ambassadors were swiftly elected as Tribunes following the encounter at Clusium. This action greatly insulted the Senones. Consumed with wrath, as Livy states, the Gauls assembled their army and marched to Rome, posthaste.[51]

The Allia, a small tributary of the Tiber River, meanders lazily through Lazio, Italy. The confluence of the Allia and Tiber, some eighteen kilometers north of Rome, was the site of the first clash between a Gallic and Roman army of any sizeable significance. Livy's account serves as the most complete, extant source regarding the events of the clash and what came to follow. Upon meeting the Gallic army, *pavor* (fear and dread) saturated the Roman battle lines. The fear of the Gallic army forced the Roman columns to crumble. Interestingly, Livy's rhetoric, undoubtedly an attempt at saving Roman face through propagandist writing, disassociates from the soldiers who so quickly fled.[52] Livy claims the army fielded at the Allia had no "resemblance" to Romans. His characterization of the army having no resemblance to "true Romans" is an attempt to disassociate the perceived cowardice displayed at the Allia from Livy's

[49] Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* 5.35.5; 121.
[50] Livy states the ambassadors had acted, "Gallisque magis quam Romanis similes" [more similar to Gauls than Romans]. The implication is that Gauls traditionally act with violence and an irrationalness.
[51] Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* 5.37; 127.
[52] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita* 5.38.5; 131

contemporary and stereotypical brave and courageous Roman army, as well as the Roman army that defeated Veii under the command of Camillus. In any case, the outcome of the battle at the Allia was a decisive one. The soldiers, many of whom drowned in the flowing waters, fled across the Tiber, and those who did not were quickly slain in what Livy claims was a "great massacre" – *magna strages*. The defeat at the Allia was such that 18 July was forever marked on their calendar as the "Day of the Allia" – *die Alliensi*. The day was believed to be inauspicious, meaning that it was seen as a dark, cursed day. Business was halted and religious rituals were postponed as they were seen as unlucky during *dies Alliensi*.[53] The inauspiciousness of the date remained on the Roman calendar well into posterity. Without the collective trauma Rome surely felt, the date would have disappeared into obscurity rather than maintain a place on the Roman calendar. Rome and its citadel lay in the distance and the Gallic forces arrived prior to nightfall.

The swiftness of Brennus and the Senones left little time for the Capitoline to prepare for the siege. The Vestal Virgins, priestesses of Vesta, scurried to collect and bury sacred artifacts from the various temples. Able-bodied men and elders alike retreated to defend the Capitoline, while women, children, and men who were unable to bear arms retreated to the country-side. Others, including priestesses along with sacred artifacts, fled to the neighboring cities of Caere and Veii. Brennus' columns marched through the city and began a siege of the Capitoline, which followed the Roman flight. His speediness brought him from his victory against the Romans at the Allia to the gates of Rome far more quickly than the Romans could prepare for an assault. The blitzkrieg of Brennus surely sparked a fear in the Roman defenders. Not only was a Gaul physically at their gate (shocking enough on its own), his army marched far faster than any Roman anticipated. Likewise, the bravery, tenacity, and brashness of Brennus was something

[53] Gary Forsythe, "Evolution and Growth of the Roman State, 333-367 B.C," in *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 213.

few, if any, Romans had experienced. These attributes of Brennus' warband created a menacing enemy, the likes of which the Romans upon the Capitoline were ill-prepared to face.

Livy's narrative of the siege paints the Romans as brave and hopeful, as if they were meant to be divinely saved from Brennus, despite the lengthy siege. Whether a mythical or historical account, Livy uses the siege as an opportunity to remind his contemporary Romans of their pious duty. Gaius Fabius Dorsuo, Livy writes, descended from the reinforced walls of the Capitoline Hill and moved to the Quirinal Hill where a yearly sacrifice was to be made. Without fear, Dorsuo made his religious sacrifices proudly before retreating to the safety of Capitoline from whence he came. Livy was not the only historian to detail the account of Dorsuo. Appian (95-165 CE), Cassius Dio (155-235 CE), and Florus (*c.*74-130 CE) provided their own narratives of the event.[54] However, the sources used by these historians—along with Livy's—are lost to time, as they wrote some four centuries after the sack of Rome in 390. As a result, the historicity of the event is uncertain.

Manlius, Geese, and *Supplicia Canum*

Perhaps the first evidence of collective trauma that resulted in a psychological scar can be gleaned from the story of consul Marcus Manlius and Juno's sacred geese – assuming Livy's rhetoric can be trusted. The story of Manlius can be found in chapter forty-seven of book five. The Gauls, who grew weary of the siege and their hunger, performed a clandestine assault in the shroud of darkness. Warriors ascended the Tarpian Rock and sneaked past the sleeping Roman sentries – not even the dogs were alarmed. However, the sleeping geese—kept fed and provided for due to their sacredness to Juno—awoke and honked from their startlement. Juno's geese

[54] J. H. Richardson, "Dorsuo and the Gauls," *Phoenix* 54, no. 3/4 (2004): 284-86.

awakened M. Manlius and the Roman soldiers, who sprang to action. The skirmish ended quickly when Manlius and the sentries repelled the Gallic assault from the Capitoline.

The heroics in Livy's digression are credited to the geese, as were it not for the geese, Manlius and the soldiers would have certainly met their doom as they slept. Conversely, the dogs present at the time of the assault failed to rise. As a result, the "punishment of the dogs" (*supplicia canum*) was implemented. The yearly ritual, which took place every 3rd of August, was a ceremony in which a dog (or dogs, sources are contradictory) was sacrificed via crucifixion. Simultaneously, a goose dressed in purple and gold was carried on a litter.[55] The two animals were subsequently paraded along a procession route throughout the forum and city. Plutarch, who wrote nearly five centuries after the sack of Rome, witnessed the ritual even in his day.[56] At the time of Plutarch, the unlucky dogs chosen for *supplicia canum* were tied to wooden crosses in a crucifix position. However, it is believed that earlier and closer to the aftermath of the sack the dogs faced a far grimmer crucifixion in the form of a ritual sacrifice.

The significance of this ritual cannot be overstated as evidence of a long-lasting collective trauma. Indeed, if the genesis of *supplicia canum* is the story of Manlius, the geese, and the sack in 390 (as Livy claims), the ritual and ceremony were perceived to be important enough to be practiced for what was nearly a millennium – a lengthy time to punish dogs for their failure to bark. Pliny the Younger witnessed the ritual personally, some five centuries after the sack of Rome occurred.[57] Any ritual of such length is evidence of something deeply buried

[55] Nicholas Horsfall, "From History to Legend: M. Manlius and the Geese," *The Classical Journal* 76, no. 4 (1981): 308.
[56] Horsfall, "From History to Legend: M. Manlius and the Geese," 308.
[57] Lynn M. Snyder and Elizabeth A. Moore, "The Sacrifice of Dogs in Ancient Italy," in *Dogs and People in Social, Working, Economic, or Symbolic Interaction* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxbow Books, 2006), 133.

in the psyche of a society. In this instance, the capture of the Capitoline Hill was the impetus for such a trauma.

If we assume Livy's claim is untrue, however, it does not negate his perceived importance of the event. As Horsfall notes, at the time of Brennus' sack, the geese were already positioned and cared for at the Temple of Juno on the Capitoline. This location of the geese suggests their divinity.[58] Perhaps the tale of Manlius and the geese was merely a literary invention wherein Livy worked to explain a ceremonial ritual for which he otherwise had no explanation. Even if it were an aetiological case, it illuminates the importance of the event—and the trauma it created—whereby Livy saw it, as an adequate explanation for such a long-standing ritual. Perhaps, in such a case, Eli Edward Burris is accurate in his label of the ill-fated dogs of *supplicium*, "scape-dogs."[59] As for Manlius, the short period that followed his heroics during the sack was unsuccessful and abruptly brought him to an end. After the war, he was promptly put to death after a failed attempt to seize supreme power in 385-84.[60] It was not the first nor certainly the last time the Senate took action against an attempted coup d'état.

Marcus Camillus

Roman mythology offers several stories of heroic figures who by the slightest of margins saved Rome and ensured societal survival and progress. One only need to look at the foundation of Rome as told in Virgil's *Aeneid*. Aeneas, the Trojan hero, fled Troy as it fell to the Greeks. He carried with him his father and Trojan prince Anchises, along with the Penates and Lares –

[58] Ibid.
[59] Eli Edward Burris, "The Place of the Dog in Superstition as Revealed in Latin Literature," *Classical Philology* 30, no. 1 (Jan. 1935): 36.
[60] David Rankin, "Tumult, Prejudice, and Assimilation: Rome and the Gauls," in *Celts and the Classical World*, (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1996), 108.

statues of the household gods. Aeneas traveled the Mediterranean Sea after the fall of Troy, much like Odysseus in Homer's *Odyssey*. Upon reaching the Italian peninsula, he founded the city Lavinium. It was through Aeneas that Romulus and Remus descended. Romulus, of course, was proclaimed the "Founder of Rome."

The narrative of the sack of Rome in 390 includes such a hero. Marcus Furius Camillus, the Patrician soldier and statesman, is the hero of the event. Noteworthy historians of antiquity wrote of Camillus, such as Livy, Polybius (*c.* 200-*c.*118), Diodorus Siculus (*c.* 90-*c.* 30), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*c.* 60-*c.* 7), and Plutarch (46-119 CE). Further evidence of a collective trauma can be explained through Camillus' story, whether it is grounded in historical fact or a literary invention.

Camillus bravely defeated the city of Veii in 396, Rome's most bitter enemy and leader of the Etruscan League and their allies across a decade-long conflict. Upon victory, as Plutarch states, Camillus kept his vow to bring Juno's divine image to Rome from Veii, the same Juno whose geese spared the Capitoline line a couple of years after their relocation to Rome.[61] This story suggests, perhaps indirectly by Plutarch, that had not Camillus brought Juno with him in his return to Rome, the sacred geese would have been absent during the nighttime assault upon the Capitoline. The historicity of such a transfer or appropriation of deities, such as Juno, was factual enough. The ritual *evocatio,* "summoning forth," was a formal process by which the religions of a conquered state were invited by the victors to be worshipped at their state.[62]

Livy crafted his fifth and sixth books in such a way that Camillus' career is the centerpiece around which the chronological narrative is woven – the hero appears to have been

[61] Plutarch, *Camillus*, trans. by Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1920), Perseus Digital 6.1-2.
[62] Forsythe, *A Critical Historical of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War*, 210.

given center stage. As T.J Luce notes, "Book Five as a whole was composed in two contrasting sections. The first recounts the fall of Veii, Rome's greatest victory up to that time; the second relates her greatest defeat, the *clades Alliensis* [defeat at the Allia] and the sack of Rome. The two are linked by the commanding presence of Camillus, the *fatalis dux* [fated leader]."[63] Upon his victorious return from Veii, Camillus is subsequently exiled for a dispute over distribution of the loot won in numerous battles.[64] Shortly after the hero's exile, the men from Clusium arrive in Rome to seek help against Brennus' army. As Livy states, the one citizen of Rome who could have made the capture of the city impossible was now exiled on behalf of the people – rather inconvenient timing one could say. Perhaps this was Livy's attempt at fabricating a plausible cause in his written removal of a hero from certain disaster. In other words, Livy conveniently removes Camillus from the sack, only for him to rescue Rome from the Gauls on his return from exile.

Camillus, exiled in Veii, was sent for by messengers from Rome to rally an army and return from exile in an attempt to free Rome from the Gallic siege. Camillus, who seemed to have a knack for timely actions, arrived just as Brennus and his army carried away the Roman wealth some eight miles from the Citadel. The Gallic forces were defeated, and upon Camillus' return to Rome with the aforementioned stolen wealth, the Roman people proclaimed him the "*conditor alter urbis"* – second founder of the city.[65] Therefore, it is a logical conclusion that, based on Camillus' responsibility of the *evocatio* of Juno from Veii, he was the savior of Rome indirectly (in the form of the geese being on the Capitoline), as well as directly in the battle that followed the ransom. The fact that the entire Roman populace, including the Senate, proclaimed

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[63] T. J Luce, "Design and Structure in Livy: 5.32-55," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 102, (1971): 268.
[64] Livy, 5.32-3.; 113.
[65] Livy, 5.49.7; 167.

Camillus the "second founder" is evidence of how deeply the city was disturbed by the sack. Likewise, Camillus' victories against Veii as well as the Gauls were so monumental that he was perceived as something of a divine savior. However, like Manlius and the sacred geese, if the story of Camillus is a literary invention, it nevertheless displays how deeply the collective trauma cut into Roman psychology. As Jan Gaertner notes in "Livy's Camillus and the Political Discourse of the Late Republic,"

> Hence, from at least the second century B.C., the restoration after the Gallic Sack became viewed as a sort of second foundation. Once this view had surfaced, it was only natural to compare Camillus, as the major statesman involved in this refoundation, with Rome's mythical founder Romulus, and it is therefore hardly surprising that we find this comparison several times in Livy and Plutarch.[66]

It is evident that Livy and his contemporaries believed that Camillus, factual or otherwise, displayed such heroism and Roman identity, characteristics, and attributes, that he was worthy of a social standing equal to that of Romulus. Additionally, the perceived equality between Camillus and Romulus shows that Camillus' "salvation" of Rome from the Gauls was the equivalent of Romulus' foundation of the city.

The story of Camillus is most certainly a myth (whether invented by Livy or predating him) created as an attempt to ease the humiliating idea that Romans ransomed themselves to Brennus. Perhaps the story of Camillus is something of a King Arthur equivalent. That is to say Camillus is a form of a literary invention based upon tales, myths, and foggy historical fact that Livy and other historians used to weave the narrative of the sack of Rome together. Additionally, it is unlikely that Brennus and the Senones aimed to raze the city, as is evident by their willingness to both demand, and accept, a monetary bribe. As Livy's narrative suggests the

[66] Jan Felix Gaertner, "Livy's Camillus and the Political Discourse of the Late Republic," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 98, (2008): 37.

siege of the Capitoline was long and costly to the Gauls.[67] Perhaps they were unable to maintain the siege as food and morale declined. However, destroying the city would ultimately be counterproductive due to the regional economic crash that would have followed the destruction of a city such as Rome. Thus, several scholars, such as Timothy Bridgeman, argue that Brennus and his warband acted as soldiers for hire, or mercenaries.[68] It is certainly plausible, though the notion raises the question, "Mercenaries hired by whom?"

Dionysius I of Syracuse and his Mercenaries

Dionysius I (405-367), known as the tyrant of Syracuse at the time of the sack of Rome, is the prime suspect. Dionysius was the first recorded Mediterranean ruler to hire Celtic mercenaries to do his bidding.[69] As Timothy Bridgman notes, in 474, the Syracusans defeated an Etruscan army at Cumae in southern Italy, with the help of the Celts, in an effort to monopolize the flow of trade-goods and resources from Gaul and Greece through the Mediterranean. Ironically, the Syracusan victory at Cumae created a platform upon which Rome was free to expand throughout central and southern Italy.[70] Additionally, Bridgman claims, "Thus was laid the foundation of an extensive alliance between the Celts and Dionysius I of Syracuse which would continue on into the times of his son Dionysius II. Furthermore, Dionysius I settled Celtic mercenaries in Puglia after the sack of Rome. This may imply that Celts were already in his army and were being rewarded for their part in the sack."[71] Gallic armies continued to harass the

[67] Livy, 5.48.1-3; 161-2.
[68] Timothy P. Bridgman, "The 'Gallic Disaster': Did Dionysius I of Syracuse Order It?" *Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium* 23, (2003): 49-50
[69] Peter Berrestford Ellis, *The Celtic Empire: The First Millennium of Celtic History c. 1000 BC—51 AD*, (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1990), 110.
[70] Bridgman, "The 'Gallic Disaster,'47.
[71] Bridgman, "The 'Gallic Disaster,' 49.

Roman territories in the middle of the fourth century and into the third. If Syracuse was using Italic-based Gauls as mercenaries to harass the Italic peninsula, Roman territory (as well as the coasts of the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, and Ionian Seas) was surrounded by enemies bought by the Tyrant of Syracuse. Such a circumstance might lead to a trauma that extended beyond the initial sack of 390. If Brennus and his Celtic band were bought once, the Romans might have thought they could certainly be bought again.

Perhaps the strongest evidence for a collective trauma can be found in Roman legislation and their efforts of crisis management. As we have seen, Gallic southward incursions into the Italic peninsula were a common occurrence well before the sack in 390. Additionally, Gallic tribes, including mercenaries hired by Dionysius, settled and raided in an envelope that encompassed Roman territory after the initial sack of Rome. Roman ally and foe alike succumbed to raiding parties and Gallic migrations whose goal was to acquire more arable land upon which to thrive – at any cost. It is worth noting that Gaul was separated from the Italic peninsula by the Italian Alps. As a result, few Romans had ever personally encountered Gaul, or its inhabitants, except in northern Italy and those who ventured south for trade. The Gallic migrations, many of which were benign to Roman security, seemed as an invasion of peoples who were little seen and even less understood. The Gallic peoples crossed the Alps – a wall-like barrier with nearly inhospitable conditions. The Alps acted as a barrier between the known world and that which was beyond. The siege of the Capitoline, in conjunction with the aforementioned events that both predated and followed the sack, brought that which was beyond the Alps into central Italy. This was the impetus for an all-too-real and deeply imbedded *metus* – fear, anxiety, and dread.

Tumultus Gallicus

The *metus* had an impact beyond campfire ghost stories and tales told to misbehaving children of a Gallic boogeyman. Protocol was in place that—while not the only instance of its use—was unique due to the specific *metus Gallicus* (fear of the Gauls). Like any functioning, pragmatic and well-prepared governmental system, the Roman Republic was equipped with various protocols which could be enacted if Rome's well-being or values were threatened. The *tumultus* was one such application that sought to stymie the threats of a state-of-emergency circumstance. The Oxford Latin Dictionary provides the translation of *tumultus* as: "1. Commotion, fuss; 2. Hostile incursion; 3. A confused state due to fear, panic, alarm." When the Senate declared *tumultus,* the military was allowed to draft additional men into combat roles in the case of emergency. It is clear that implementing a mandatory draft was the most applicable approach to such a state-of-emergency event.

With the implementation of *tumultus* came the necessary exemption of daily Roman functions. State business was halted, tax was imposed, and military leave was cancelled.[72] In effect, it was an all-hands-on deck approach to an immediate threat. As previously stated, there were several variants of *tumultus*. These included *tumultus Italicus* (reaction to an enemy who crossed the Alps and into Italian territory), *tumultus Etruscus* (reaction to Etruscan enemies), and *tumultus Gallicus* (Gallic enemies who entered into the Po River valley).[73] However, the *tumultus Gallicus* was unique in that it was the only *tumultus* to include priests and the elderly within the mandatory draft period. In no other instances did a threat of such perceived magnitude revoke priestly duties, other than the declarations of *tumultus Gallicus*. As Plutarch

[72] Veit Rosenberger, "The Gallic Disaster," *The Classical World* 96, no. 4 (2003): 367.
[73] Bernt Kerremans, "Metus Gallicus, tumultus Cimbricus? The Possible Promulgation of a "tumultus' in the Cimbrian War (105-101 BCE)," *Mnemosyne* 69, no. 5 (2016): 827.

notes when referring to a battle between Gallic and Roman forces thirteen years after the sack in 390, "At any rate, so great had their [Romans] terror been that they made a law exempting priests from military service, except in case of a Gallic war."[74] In other words, priests were included within the military when presented with the unique circumstances of *tumultus Gallicus*.

The inclusion of priests in military duty—as well as the cessation of religious rituals—in the proclamation of *tumultus Gallicus* is evidence of a Gallic-specific *metus*. With normal declarations of *bellum* (war) came necessary and mandatory religious rituals, both prior to and after the declaration. Celebrations and events such as horse races were held on the Campus Martius in honor of Mars, the god of war and agriculture. Sacrifices were made to Mars for an upcoming victorious and prosperous war season. Likewise, augurs conducted rituals, ceremonies, and observed auspices sent from the Gods as a divine confirmation or refusal for the declaration of war. These were mandatory in the event of war. *Tumultus* bypassed these rituals in the name of haste and immediate danger. *Tumultus Gallicus* not only bypassed the rituals, it uniquely demanded conscription of the priests themselves. Such an act would be unnecessary, if not for a deeply encompassing *metus* of the Gauls – one that was the result of the sack in 390.

David Rankin argues that the sack and its aftermath marked another turning point in the Roman Republic. According to Rankin, the initial event may have sparked the process by which, due to the destruction of land and wealth that immediately followed the sack, plebeians began the process to arrange that one of the two consuls every year put forward must be a plebeian.[75] Prior to this, both consuls had always been members of, and represented, the patrician class. Plebeians were then at the mercy of a wealthy and powerful class who controlled the military, religious, and legislative sectors of society. Additionally, as Ulrike Roth notes, "Interestingly, the plebeian

[74] Plutarch, *Camillus*, 41.6.
[75] Rankin, *Celts and the Classical World*, 108.

contribution to the ransom, and the quarrel over its later 'redistribution' by (and amongst) the patricians, might expose another, otherwise subdued narrative strand, namely that the plebeians had a clear stake in the rescue of a city that was destined to rule the world—whatever the contribution of the patrician nation heroes, Camillus and Manlius, to Roman success."[76] Beginning in 287, the plebeians were—in theory—guaranteed representation in the highest office of the Senate and wrangled a portion of legislative power away from patrician hands. While not directly related to the psychological trauma Rome felt, it was perhaps a result of the physical destruction of the sack and subsequent, albeit brief, collapse of Roman economy and infrastructure. Whatever destruction befell the city and economy, the plebeian class both contributed to the ransom and rebuilt the city. The sack was a turning point for the ways in which the Senate elected those who ran for office. The plebeian class argued for greater representation, which they felt they were owed in the aftermath of the sack and the rebuilding of the city.

Conclusion

Collective trauma is a psychological phenomenon that affects every level of society. It manifests in various forms and is liable to various modes of transmittal long after the generation who experienced the genesis of the trauma and lasts well into posterity. The trauma can be felt at an individual level, as well as by the community and the society as a whole. In the case of the initial sack of Rome, the legislative and military branches were affected by such a trauma. Likewise, the religious sector was not exempt from alterations in the event that a similar

[76] Ulrike Roth, "The Gallic Ransom and the Sack of Rome," *Mnemosyne* 71, no. 3 (2018): 78-9.

circumstance to 390 arose. The evidence for the sack of 390 as the impetus of a 'psychological scar' is clear when Livy and his contemporaries' writings are analyzed.

Firstly, Rome witnessed its northern allies and enemies cede territory to the Gallic migrations during the sixth and fifth centuries, at least a century prior to the sack. The migrations created a situation where Rome, her allies, and the Etruscan league were no longer the only city-states and societies vying for increased control of the Italic peninsula. Additionally, how these Gallic migrations began was something of a mystery to the Roman public. Resource flow and trade from beyond the Alps occurred; however, the arrival of a people with whom Rome had little to no previous contact from beyond the towering Alps surely must have been shocking. To the Romans, the migrations that flowed across the busted dam that was the Alps must have felt equally eerie, worrisome, and cause for concern.

The evidence that the sack of Rome created a scar in the minds of Roman society begins with Manlius and his geese. An event of such a traumatic magnitude can be used to explain *supplicia canum*. A religious ritual that spanned a few generations would perhaps be expected. However, a yearly ritual—one that saw the mock crucifixion and parading of a dog, no less—lasted well into the Imperial era. It did not stop at the dog. The lucky goose, cared for by priests and priestess at the Temple of Juno, was draped in purple and gold, colors of royalty and the divine. The public spectacle that was *supplicia canum,* and the sheer length of its existence, would certainly have been unnecessary if not for such an entrenched trauma.

Like *supplicia canum,* the implementation of the *tumultus Gallicus* arose from the fear the Gallic sack brought forth and lasted well into posterity. Not only did the *tumultus Gallicus* evoke a mandatory military draft and a state-wide tax, it revoked priestly duties and even required them to pick up arms. It is in this of state-of-emergency legislation that the sheer *metus*

is evident. Without such a *metus*, the cessation of religious rituals and priestly duties would not have been altered and outright removed for the time being. The uniqueness of *tumultus Gallicus* is evidence of the severity Romans placed on the Gallic threat. Furthermore, the Roman defeat at the Allia on 18 July 390 was marked as the holiday *dies Alliensis* – an inauspicious day on which no business was conducted.

The story of Camillus speaks volumes about how highly Romans valued his victory over the Gauls immediately following the sack. Not only did the Romans bestow on Camillus the title "Second Founder of the City," they positioned him in the same company as Romulus. Perhaps most importantly, Romulus was believed to be descended from Aeneas who was descended from goddess Venus herself. While Camillus was not of divine bloodline, placing him next to Romulus presents a sort of equality the Romans felt between the two "founders." Thus, the sack of Rome was not merely a military defeat, nor was it viewed as a political misstep. Rather, the sack, and subsequent rebuilding of the city, can be viewed as a rebirth. Just as Romulus metaphorically (or perhaps mythologically) cemented the Roman foundation on the Italian country-side, Camillus freed the city of the Gallic noose. It was with his victory that Rome rebuilt – thus, a second foundation was possible.

The sack was certainly the most destructive defeat Rome faced in its first three centuries of existence. It was a humiliating defeat, one that Livy worked intently to minimize for his contemporary readers. Additionally, Polybius notes the Romans used the sack as a springboard for their militaristic and aggressive stance. It was the sack of Rome that sparked their lust for expansionism. Polybius states, "The Romans, after making a truce on conditions satisfactory to the Gauls and being thus contrary to their expectation reinstated in their home and as it were now started on the road of aggrandizement, continued in the following years to wage war on their

neighbours."[77] The next century was host to Rome's near complete victory against and subjugation of the Italic Celts, enemy Etruscan city-states to the north, and the remainder of the southern Italic city-states. If the sack served as a second foundation—or a renewal of the Republic—then Camillus must certainly have been the founder upon whom Rome's new ideals were modelled.

Even if the historicity of Livy is in question, the mere fact that he connected certain factual aspects of his contemporary Rome such as *supplicia canum*, the proclamation of Camillus as the second founder, and the *tumultus Gallicus* to the sack of 390 indicate the sheer weight and importance the event had on Romans in terms of trauma long after the event itself. Rome implemented several changes in the immediate aftermath of the sack, such as *tumultus Gallicus* and *supplicia canum.* Likewise, the story of Camillus as the second founder of Rome, whether factual or otherwise, was believed to be true well into the Imperial period of Rome. Furthermore, the economic fallout that resulted from Brennus' siege perhaps led to additional plebian representation in the senate. These alterations and additions to the Roman way of life make evident the depth to which Rome was affected. The definition of *collective trauma* is undoubtedly suited to the Gallic sack of Rome in 390. However, the effects and immediate reactions of the sack were just the beginning for the Roman Republic. The following two centuries were hosts to various peoples and events that prodded and further manipulated the psychological scar if it meant that their goals would be met.

[77] Polybius, *Histories*, 1.6.3

Chapter Four: Hegemony, Hannibal, and Human Sacrifice: Third and Second Centuries BCE

The Italian Peninsula and surrounding Mediterranean coasts were home to many specific peoples and cultures at the time of Brennus' sack of Rome in 390. The countryside was carved with defined boundaries that separated the dominions of each city-state. The Gauls of the Po River valley held fast in their newly conquered lands south of the Italian Alps. The Etruscans, who found themselves at the foot of the Po River's Gallic cantons, clung to their territory despite the Gallic incursion. East of the central Apennines lay the Samnites and Sabines, two ancient cultures who were witnesses to Rome's foundation and growth. The iconic southern boot of the Italian Peninsula was home to the Lucani and Brutii. At the time of the Sack in 390, the southern region was an amalgamation of southern Italians and Greek peoples. Carthaginian and Syracusan ships patrolled and fished the Tyrrhenian Sea and the eastern Italian coast. Lastly, Rome found herself in the center of the aforementioned nations at the time of the sack – the worst defeat Rome suffered since the city was founded. Rome's central location provided a foundation from which they could quickly expand. The *metus Gallicus,* or fear of the Gauls, served as the spark that initiated Rome's aggressive disposition. Additionally, the fear was, in part, responsible for such drastic actions as human sacrifice.

Roman Hegemony Begins

The sack instilled a collective trauma in the Roman psyche. Furthermore, as Gary Forsythe notes, the marauding Gallic activity caused a disruption among the relations of the Italic peoples during the decades that followed.[78] However, despite the defeat and the economic fallout the city was subjected to, the sack was only a minor setback. The sack of Rome

[78] Gary Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 256-57.

emboldened the expansionist ideology by which Rome later lived and thrived. The 380s were host to numerous military encounters between Rome neighboring city-states, particularly the Etruscan states.[79] Additionally, Rome was the victor in several skirmishes and battles with the Volsci, who resisted Roman expansion until the Latin War in 338. As the decades continued, Rome marched on the combined forces of Caere, Tarquinii, and Falerii during the 350s. The victory, marked by a century-long truce with Caere and a forty-year truce with Tarquinii and Falerii, against the coalition provided Rome with control of northern Latium. Rome, however, quickly turned its sights to the eastern region of Latium. This region was the first location where Rome took steps aimed at retribution against the nearest Gallic force.

The city of Tibur, some eighteen miles northeast of Rome, seized an opportunity to increase its own influence in the region after of the failed coalition of Caere, Tarquinii, and Falerii. To do so, Tibur formed an alliance with the regional Gauls. Simultaneously, the Gauls erected a large encampment near Pedum, a neighboring city. Rome's war against Tibur and the allied Gauls ended in 354 with their surrender to the Romans. With this victory, Rome secured Latium and all but eradicated the Gallic forces therein. In celebration, the victorious dictator Sulpicius Peticus dedicated a monument on the Capitoline created from the golden torques and armlets of captured Gauls.[80] As a result, the large city-state of the Samnites, along with their territory, surrendered via treaty to Rome in 354.[81] The treaty was short-lived, however. Rome launched and ultimately won the First Samnite War (343-41) and the Latin War (340-38) in a forceful effort to gain complete control of Latium. As Forsythe notes, "Even though Rome's earlier conquest of Veii marked the first major step in Roman expansion, the First Samnite and

[79] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita,* trans. by B. O. Foster (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), 6.16-17; 249-51.
[80] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome,* 277.
[81] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 7.19.3-8; 421.

Latin Wars stood at the beginning of a complex series of events which led to Rome's conquest of peninsular Italy in less than eighty years."[82] It is evident that whatever fallout was the result of the initial sack of Rome in 390, the city-state quickly rebounded. The sack, while the most disastrous affair in Rome's history at that point, served as an impetus for Rome's expansionist ideology. The clash that brought Rome and Gaul together poses an unanswerable question: "If not for the sack of Rome and the Gallic fear, would Rome have evolved into an expansionist state nearly as quickly as it did?"

Rome repelled several incursions by Gauls and their neighboring Latin allies in the 300s. Tempers ebbed and flowed and temporary peace treaties were signed, such as the short-lived peace between Rome and the Senones in 334. However, the frequency of Gallic attacks increased and the treaty ended in defeat for the regional Senones. After the defeat of the Senones, a Roman colony at Sena Gallica was founded in 283.[83] Rome's regional pacification and absorption of surrounding Gallic and Latin colonies alike proved successful. However, the attempts were simply temporary and the potential of another Gallic uprising was ever present.

The third century began with yet another anti-Roman alliance, one in which the Samnites joined forces with a relatively recent Gallic migration into the Po River valley. Furthermore, in 298, the alliance absorbed additional Etruscan colonies and the Lucanians. As Peter Ellis summarizes, the alliance created a "hostile ring around Rome."[84] The next several decades saw a series of Gallic-Latin resurgences that sought to weaken Rome's influence in the region. While victorious battles were had, each resurgence ultimately ended in defeat for Rome's enemies.

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[82] Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome,* 281.
[83] Barry Cunliffe, *The Ancient Celts,* 2nd ed. (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2018), 141.
[84] Peter Berressford Ellis, *The Celtic Empire: The First Millennium of Celtic History c. 1000 BC—51 AD,* (Durhamn, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1990), 32.

The Sibylline Books and the First Human Sacrifice

Here, a significant disturbance in Roman religion is to be found. The disturbance was a reaction to the lingering century-and-a-half old psychological trauma Rome felt after the sack in 390. The trauma resurfaced as the Gallic cantons of Cisalpine Gaul continued their resurgences. Human sacrifice was as rare as animal sacrifice was common in ancient Rome. There are only three occasions of live-human sacrifice during the seven centuries of pre-Imperial Rome. As Celia Schultz notes, "On three occasions during the Republic (228, 216, and again in 114 or 113 BCE), the Romans followed instructions from the Sibylline Books to bury alive pairs of Gauls and Greeks, one man and one woman of each, in the Forum Boarium."[85] The causes of these sacrifices include Gallic victories in 228, Hannibal's destruction of Roman legions in 216, and the broken vows of Chastity made by the Vestals in 114 or 113.

The notion that a book or a collection of ideas and the spoken word have influence over a society is rather familiar to our modern world. Many religions have such texts, and cultures across the globe hold said texts in high regard. The Christian Bible, the Quran, and the Torah are modern-day examples of works that consist of guidelines by which one should live his/her life, and the way in which the respective religious practices are performed. The Sibylline Books were the ancient Roman equivalent. They guided religious practices and taught those who needed a ceremony when, why, and how to complete them.

Roman religion was a complex and convoluted web of religious practices, one in which religious signs, or prodigies, were found everywhere, and there were rituals for every facet of life. Susan Satterfield summarizes Roman religious life rather simply: "Understanding Roman religion requires a great leap of imagination. Imagine living in a world where cows and chickens

[85] Celia E. Schultz, "Roman Sacrifice, Inside and Out," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 106 (2016): 68.

spoke; where milk, lead, or meat rained down from the sky; where five-legged mules carried messages from the gods. The Romans lived in such a world."[86] Satterfield continues, "A prodigy could be any breach in what the Romans thought was the natural or divinely ordained order of the world – either an aberration in nature, like the birth of a hermaphrodite, or a disaster that affected the Roman state, such as a plague or a terrible defeat in battle."[87] The Sibylline Books were a collection of prophecies and guidelines spoken by Greek oracles that Romans—sometimes on the floor of the Senate—used to direct and dictate the ways in which their religious practices were performed. Therefore, with this knowledge in mind, it is rather understandable how a book or collection of the spoken word led the Romans to commit human sacrifice.

The reasons *why* the sacrifices of 228, 216, and 114-113 were performed are more difficult to answer. Perhaps the potential for another successful Gallic resurgence aimed at the heart of Rome was enough to push Roman religious practices beyond the scope of what was, until 228, considered normal. Afterall, collective trauma, particularly on the large, societal scale, has the ability to transform society. The *metus Gallicus,* fear of the Gauls, drove the prophecies and auspices and directly influenced the ways in which the Romans applied the Sibylline Books and the oracles' proclamations. Andrzej Gillmeister notes, "Since then [the sack of 390] each threat of the Gallic attack, be it real or imagined, provoked the emergence of a *prodigium* [an omen or prophetic sign] to expiate which *decemviri sacris faciundis* [Keepers of the Sacred] were called."[88] The sacrifices of 228 were a direct result of the Gallic resurgence which grew in the Po River region of Italy. A certain oracle offered a grave warning to the Romans who listened. The oracle predicted that Rome would fall to Greeks and Gauls, which was surely

[86] Susan Satterfield, "Rome's Own Sibyl: The Sibylline Books in the Roman Republic and Early Empire," Order No. 3332416 (Princeton University, 2008), 15.
[87] Satterfield, "Rome's Own Sibyl," 15-16.
[88] Andrzej Gillmeister, "The Sibylline Books and the Gauls," *Res Historica* 29 (2010): 58.

enough to stir the memories of 390.[89] Practically, however, this prediction seemed rather apt for the situation Rome found herself in, as the Gauls were mounting an offensive to push south from the Po River into Roman territory. So, under the influence of *metus Gallicus* and under the direction of the Sibylline Books, Rome buried alive a male and female pair of Gauls and Greeks in 228 – an action that, until then, was foreign, taboo, and unprecedented.

The combined forces of the Gaesatae, Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci formed what was perhaps the largest invasion of Celtic forces into the heart of Italy.[90] Ultimately, the confederation found themselves between two Roman armies at Telamon (modern Talamone, in Tuscany) in 225 BC. Polybius ends his summary of the battle as follows: "But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to flight."[91] Some 40,000 Celts were killed at Telamon with an additional 10,000 taken as prisoners, including Concolitanus and Aneroestes, the kings of the Gaesatae. Concolitanus was captured, and Aneroestes and a small band of survivors retreated from the battle and ceremoniously took their own lives.

The major victory at Telamon energized Roman spirits and a counter-offensive began. In 224, just a year after the battle of Telamon, Rome defeated the Boii and forced them to submit. The following year Rome launched an offensive against the Insubres, when in 222 Rome captured the Insubrian tribal center of Milan and an unconditional surrender was put forth. In the immediate aftermath of their conquest, Rome raised strongholds throughout Cisalpine Gaul,

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[89] Gillmeister, "The Sibylline Books and the Gauls," 60.

[90] Polybius, *The Histories Book II*, translated by W. R. Paton, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 4.8. 10-9.5; 318.

[91] Polybius, *The Histories*, 4.8. 3-10; 317.

including Ariminum, Placentia, and Cremona.[92] The timing of said pacification of Cisalpine Gaul was ideal and Roman spirits were high. Rome overcame the battle at Telamon, as well as pacified the Boii and Insubres, after the human sacrifice. Human sacrifice was used yet again, when Rome felt as though no other option would guarantee Roman's divine protection. This was short-lived, however, as Hannibal and his Carthaginian army quickly approached.

Hannibal at Rome's Gate and the Second Human Sacrifice, (216)

By the middle of the third century BCE, Romans had conquered the majority of their surroundings on the Italian Peninsula. However, another power threatened Rome. The north African city-state of Carthage (what is today a ruined suburb of Tunis, Tunisia) was ever-present and expanding. The two states were on a collision course for control of the western Mediterranean, because each maintained aggressive expansionist ambitions. Carthage had gained control of Sicily, and thus maintained a close proximity to Italy. The Punic Wars, as they are now known, were a series of three conflicts between Rome and Carthage that spanned the third and second centuries, from 264 to 146.

Syracuse, a city-state in modern-day Sicily, was one of Rome's greatest rivals. The Syracusans had previously been a thorn in Rome's side during the fourth century when Gallic mercenaries sparked fear throughout Italy on behalf of Dionysius of Syracuse I and his successors. Dionysius of Syracuse employed Gallic mercenaries, frequently. After he gained control of the Etruscan port of Adria, Dionysius established a colony at Ancona, firmly rooted in Senones' territory. The settlement at Ancona provided a base from which Dionysius hired and

[92] A. H. McDonald, "The Roman Conquest of Cisalpine Gaul (201-191 B.C.)," *Antichothon* 8, (1974): 46.

enrolled Gallic mercenaries, as needed.[93] Primarily, the mercenaries were used throughout the Italian peninsula. However, in 367, Gallic mercenaries fought on behalf of Syracusan interests in the conflict between Sparta and Thebes, which showcases how widely employed they were.

The First Punic War (264-241) was mostly confined to the Tyrrhenian Sea and the surrounding islands of Corsica, Sardinia, and Sicily. In short, the Syracusan occupation of the Greek city of Messana (modern-day Messina) prompted its inhabitants, the Mamertines, to call for aid from Rome to relieve said occupation. Rome answered the call and quickly relieved the Syracusan pressure on Messana. However, Carthage reinforced their Syracusan ally, which led to battles throughout the Tyrrhenian Sea. The next two decades were host to the largest naval war in antiquity, as well as the costliest war Rome experienced at that time.[94] The end result of the First Punic War was Rome's victory in Sicily and the expulsion of the Carthaginian forces.

The decades that followed were not calm, however. Rome spent much of the 230s and 220s repelling the Gallic and Italian coalition forces throughout Italy. Simultaneously, Carthage regrouped and, under the leadership of the Barca family—brothers Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago—sought to regain control of what was lost during the First Punic War. Their aim was to engage in war with Rome in an effort to be the sole empire which commanded the western Mediterranean, including the alliance with and control of the various Italian states.

After the Carthaginian defeat in the First Punic War, Hannibal and the Barcas focused their military efforts on the Iberian Peninsula. Iberia served as a springboard for an attack into Italy.[95] Just as Hannibal strengthened his Iberian grasp, so too did Rome place a stranglehold on Cisalpine Gaul and the tribes therein. If Rome controlled the Alpine province, they could control

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[93] Barry Cunliff, *The Ancient Celts* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University press, 2018), 141.
[94] Dexter Hoyos, *Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013), 68.
[95] E.T. Salmon, "The Strategy of the Second Punic War," *Greece and Rome* 7, no. 2 (1960): 131.

the northern frontier of the Italian Peninsula, which meant that the doorway to Spain and Gaul was under Rome's watchful eye. The foundations of the colonies of Cremona and Placentia in 218 were located purposefully to keep the Gauls north of Po River in check. Additionally, Salmon notes that while the colonies' immediate purposes were to weaken the Gauls north of the Po River, they were also intended as a defensive front against an enemy invasion across the Alps. In particular, they were to discourage a Carthaginian invasion from Iberia – one that Hannibal began that same year, 218.[96] Hannibal's Carthaginian army, along with Spaniards, the famed Numidian Cavalry under the command of Mago, and the Gauls he absorbed as they marched, headed for Italy.[97]

Livy writes of Hannibal's march through Etruria in a menacing and forewarning manner, imagining the ways Romans must have perceived Hannibal's impending approach. Livy writes, "[H]e proceeded to lay waste the heart of Etruria and exhibited to the consul from afar all the havoc that fire and sword could possibly effect."[98] He continues, "Hannibal laid waste the land between the city of Cortona and Lake Trasumennus with every circumstance of cruelty known to war, in order the more to whet his enemy's anger and prompt him to avenge the sufferings of his allies."[99] Hannibal's campaign of destruction, as Livy writes it, surely sparked the memory of the similar occurrence at the hands of the Gauls in 390 – particularly with the knowledge that Hannibal absorbed the Gallic cantons into his own army as he continued to march to Rome. His aim was to alleviate Roman hegemony in Italy. The idea of breaking Roman hegemony caused intrigue among the Gallic peoples. Hannibal used this to his advantage, and he persuaded the

[96] Salmon, "The Strategy of the Second Punic War," 134.
[97] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita,* 7.21.2.
[98] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita,* 22.6.; 219-20.
[99] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita,* 22.4.; 213.

regional Gauls to join his effort, and thousands poured into his ranks.[100] The Gauls' familiarity with the horse made them a sought-after commodity, of which Hannibal made great use. As Barry Cunliffe notes, "The value of the Celtiberians as mercenary troops was well appreciated by the Carthaginians, who employed substantial detachments in their various campaigns."[101] Dionysius of Syracuse was the first to hire (on a large scale) Gallic mercenaries to do his bidding throughout the Italian peninsula in the middle to late fourth century. Rome, again, faced an army that included a highly-reputed Gallic cavalry as Hannibal marched toward Rome.

As 218 came to a close, a series of three major battles were fought across the next two years: Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae. The Roman defeats during this series of battles led to the second human sacrifice in Rome's long history. In late December 218, Hannibal and his Carthaginian army found themselves at the Trebia river, a tributary of the Po that cuts through modern Liguria. The Trebia flows near the settlement of Placentia, the same settlement that was raised as a deterrent to invading enemies in northern Italy. Simultaneously, a Roman army commanded by Sempronius Longus met Hannibal's army on the banks. Hannibal, with his assemblage of Carthaginian soldiers, Numidian cavalry, Spaniards, Gallic infantry, and war elephants routed Sempronius' army. As rain and snow fell, many of those who fled for safety to Placentia succumbed to the elements. Livy summarizes Rome's response to the failed battle at Trebia as one of terror. He writes, "To Rome the news of this disaster brought such consternation that people looked for the immediate appearance of the hostile army before their very City, and knew not which way to turn for any hope or help in defending their gates and walls against its onset."[102] To summarize, the defeat at Trebia left Rome somewhat hopeless.

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[100] Hoyos, *Mastering the West: Rome and Carthage at War,* 108-9.
[101] Cunliffe, *The Ancient Celts,* 348.
[102] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita,* 21.56-7; 169.

Hannibal's army continued to march closer to Italy. Livy's words tell us that Romans knew neither what to do nor where to turn. The memory of the sack in 390 mirrors Hannibal's victory at Trebia. Both armies, Brennus' in 390 and Hannibal's after Trebia, were right around the corner from Rome. The fear was that, yet again, Hannibal would bring down the gates of Rome and claim the Capitoline just as Brennus did in 390.

Hannibal continued his march toward the heart of Italy. The winter was as unkind to his forces as it was to Sempronius', however. More harm seems to have been dealt to Hannibal's army by the elements than the Roman army at Trebia. His Celtic infantry bore the brunt of the Roman legions, a worthy sacrifice in the eyes of Hannibal, for his Carthaginians were relatively unscathed. Unfortunately, however, the rain and the snowfall that proceeded the battle and march into Italy took the lives of a great number of men, and all but one of Hannibal's war elephants.[103] In fact, Trebia was the only battle of the Italian peninsula that included his elephants. Trebia was just one of three battles that rustled the trauma of the past and pushed Rome towards their spiritual wits' end.

Hannibal approached central Latium in the spring of 217. Prior to his arrival at Lake Trasimene—the second of the three decisive victories for the Carthaginian army—Hannibal applied the scorched-earth approach. The Carthaginian army burned their way through the countryside with, as Livy notes, every circumstance of cruelty known to war in an attempt to draw the Roman army to battle.[104] Hannibal burned and pillaged the Roman territories as he marched through the countryside of Latium. Just as the Gauls did prior, Hannibal's torrent caused panic both at Rome and throughout allied Roman territory. The strategy proved

[103] J. F. Lazenby, *Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War*, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 57.
[104] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.6; 213.

successful, and consul Flaminius marched to Lake Trasimene to meet Hannibal on the field of battle.

The northern shore of Lake Trasimene snuggles itself against the slopes of low-lying hills with a rather narrow pass between the two. It was the pass on the northern shore of Trasimene that Hannibal used as his vise against Flaminius' legions. Livy summarizes the battleplan as follows:

> And now he had reached a spot designed by nature for an ambuscade, where Trasumennus [modern-day Lake Trasimene] approaches closest to the mountains of Cortona. Between them is nothing but a very narrow track, as though room had been left expressly for this purpose; the ground then widens into a little plain; beyond this the hills rise steeply. At this point he laid out a camp in the open, for himself and his African and Spanish troops only; the Baliares and the rest of his light-armed forces he led round behind the mountains; the cavalry he stationed near the entrance to the defile, where some hillocks formed a convenient screen for them, so that when the Romans should have entered the pass, they might block the road, and trap the entire army between the lake and the mountains.[105]

As the sun rose and fog descended into the pass, consul Flaminius roused his legions and pressed into the narrow plain on what is presumed to be 23 June 217. A frenzy erupted as the Carthaginian army—some 60,000 men in total, hidden among the trees—cut off the entrance to the pass. Simultaneously, dense fog shrouded the air and the Gallic infantry rushed down from the wooden slopes and into the legions. The suddenness of the ambush, from the front, side, and rear, as well as the dense fog that rendered the visibility null, left the Roman Centurions and Tribunes confused and unable to react appropriately. Many of the legionaries were slain in their marching order, as they had inadequate time to form ranks and prepare for battle.[106] Livy uses his prose to highlight the intense nature of the battle, claiming that fighting was of such ferocity that even an earthquake—one that toppled towns and rerouted rivers—went unnoticed by the

[105] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.4.6; 214.
[106] Polybius, *The Histories*, 3.83.7 – 84.8; 205.

combatants.[107] The end result was a total defeat for consul Flaminius.[108] Nearly all of the Romans who marched into the pass were killed or taken prisoners, including c. Flaminius.[109] Conversely, Hannibal lost just 1500 – 2500 soldiers, many of whom were Gauls.[110]

When the news of the defeat reached Rome, the Senate, via the *rostra,* announced the great defeat. The immediate reaction was to abandon the yearly consular elections and put in their place a *dictator*. An issue arose, however. The appointment of a *dictator* came at the behest of a consul. Rome, however, was without consuls after the defeat at Trasimene. Flaminius was killed, and Servilius, the second consul, had his route severed by Hannibal's march to the Adriatic after Servilius' failure to reinforce Flaminius. As a result, for the first time in Roman history, the selection of *dictator* came to a popular vote.[111] Quintus Fabius Maximus, who previously served as consul in 233 and 228, as well as dictator in 221, won the election. The reason for his election is due in part to his success against Gallic forces. In 233, Fabius was awarded a triumph for his victory over the Ligurians, Gallic peoples in the Cisalpine province. Additionally, the 220s were a decade of Roman conquest and expulsion of Gallic forces within the Cisalpine province for which Fabius was both consul in 228 and dictator in 221. His successes against Gallic forces were all that were needed to be elected dictator. The Senate and people hoped he could recreate the successes of the previous decade in Cisalpine Gaul in his new war against the Carthaginian army.

Quintus Fabius Maximus believed that the previous two defeats at the hands of Hannibal were not due to negligence on behalf of the consuls and tribunes who marched against him, nor

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[107] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita,* 22.81-6;219.
[108] The abbreviation "c." represents the title of Consul, e.g Consul Flaminius
[109] Polybius gives the figures as some 15,000 Romans were killed, and another 6,000 taken prisoner, 205-7.
[110] J. F. Lazenby, *Hannibal's War*, 65.
[111] J. F. Lazenby, *Hannibal's War,* 67.

were the defeats due to Hannibal's advantage in strategy. Rather, Fabius Maximus blamed the defeats on Flaminius' neglect of the gods and necessary religious ceremonies. Livy tells us, "Taking up first the question of religion, he [Fabius] convinced the Fathers that the consul Flaminius had erred more through his neglect of the ceremonies and the auspices than through his recklessness and ignorance." He continues, "When the decemvirs had inspected the Books of Fate [found within the Sibylline books] they reported to the Fathers that the vow which had been made to Mars on account of this war had not been duly performed, and must be performed afresh and on an ampler scale."[112] As a result, Maximus, in his newly-acquired position of dictator, demanded that Rome make a vow to Mars, hold festivals for Jupiter, and dedicate temples to Venus Erycina and to Mens. The dedication to Mens ("Mind") is an interesting one. Romans prayed to Mens for modesty and good sense – notable qualities that Flaminius lacked during his defeat at Lake Trasimene. Additionally, the dedication to Venus Erycina (or Eryx), who was the patron goddess of Carthage, was equally as interesting. Maximus, at the advice of the Sibylline Oracle, built the grand temple to Venus Erycina in an attempt to persuade her to change her allegiance from Carthage to Rome. Once fully assimilated, Venus Erycina became Venus Genetrix, the ancestral mother goddess of the Romans.

Fear and panic flowed through Rome after the massive defeats at the Trebia and Trasimene. The deaths of numerous tribunes, along with consul Flaminius, were disastrous. Rituals and festivals were enacted to gain favor from the Gods, and surely meant protection from Hannibal. Dictator Fabius, however, was confident and regrouped quickly to meet Hannibal once more.

[112] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.7-11; 231.

With religious ceremonies completed and celebratory festivals held, Fabius began his military strategy. The Fabian strategy was one of guerrilla warfare. The legions of Fabius focused not on pitched battles and open engagements; rather, the strategy was one of attrition and hit-and-run tactics. Hannibal, far from home and in hostile territory, relied heavily on long supply chains. His difficulty of securing a long supply chain was exacerbated by his need to absorb the various Latin peoples and persuade them to turn against Rome. As a result, he simply could not plunder, loot, and resupply from every Latin city, town, or farm he marched across. He needed the Latin peoples to provide supplies and grant passage of his supply chain. Fabius focused his efforts on Hannibal's long supply chains. He harassed and severed them when possible. Additionally, any and all Latin agricultural fields that were within marching distance of Hannibal's use were burnt and destroyed. Overtime, Fabius hoped Hannibal would slowly starve and his ability to absorb Latin allies diminish.

The Fabian strategy proved successful for nearly a year (217); however, the Senate, his soldiers, the people of Rome, and his own *Magister Equitum*, Minucius, scorned Fabius for his tactical approach, and in some ways, worked to undermine it.[113] Robert O'Connell notes, "Their entire orientation was offensive; they [Romans] were acculturated to seek battle; they had been conditioned to believe their military system would triumph over any general, no matter how clever. They were also farmers, whose instincts were to protect, not burn, their fields. Everything Fabius proposed, while prudent in the face of military genius, went against the Roman grain."[114] As 217 drew to an end, so too did Fabius' dictatorship. New consuls took the helm and were left with the question of whether to continue the Fabian strategy or to revert to the

[113] Robert L. O'Connell, *The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic*, (New York, NY: Random House, 2010), 125.
[114] O'Connell, *The Ghosts of Cannae*, 122-3.

Roman ideal of offensive aggression. The consuls, Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro, quickly swelled the numbers of Roman legions under their command, and absorbed whatever Latin allies agreed to join the cause. The consuls raised eight Roman legions for the march to Cannae, separate from the Latin allies who joined the ranks. The eight legions consisted of around 5,000 soldiers each – the largest army raised in Roman history at that time.[115] Hannibal, with his supply lines harassed and weakened, far from home, was one catastrophic defeat away from losing his grip on Italy. The potential for an annihilation of the Carthaginian menace was too enticing for Lucius Paullus and Gaius Varro. The two of them, with the largest Roman army fielded in Roman history at the time, marched from Rome with the hope of one final pitched battle against Hannibal.

Cannae (today Canne della Battaglia) was a small village on the eastern coast of Italy. The village nestles itself against a colossal, flat plain to the northwest. The plain, large enough to host a pitched battle with some 140,000 participants, was the site upon which Paullus and Varro met Hannibal for what they hoped would be a final and decisive battle. Each took to the plain and battle ensued. In summary, the right wing of the Roman army was quickly annihilated. Hannibal commanded his cavalry to flank on the left and the right as the Roman legions pressed the center. His maneuver created an envelope which surrounded the Roman legions entirely. This led to the slaughter of the Roman legions. Livy notes that 48,000 Romans were killed.[116] Polybius, for his count, claims a loss of 70,000.[117] Surely the figure for Roman losses is somewhere in the middle. Regardless, the largest army ever fielded by Rome was annihilated. Included in the slain were both quaestors of the consuls, twenty-nine tribunes, eighty senators

[115] Polybius, *The Histories*, 3.107.8-9; 265.
[116] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.49; 363.
[117] Polybius, *The Histories*, 3.116; 289.

and office holders who were fit for a potential consulship in the near future, the former consul Marcus Minucius, the primary commander of the central Roman legions Servilius Geminus, and one of the two consuls who led the battle, Aemilius Paullus who refused to flee from the battle and willingly died with those under his command.[118] Conversely, just 6,700 of Hannibal's forces fell.

The catastrophic loss at Cannae shocked the Senate and people of Rome to their core. Many current and future senators and potential politicians were lost, along with the largest Roman army assembled at the time. Additionally, Hannibal hoped to weaken Roman hegemony and persuade Latin and Italian allies of Rome to join his cause – and persuade he did. Numerous southern Italian city-states joined Hannibal's cause after his victory at Cannae. Additionally, Philip V, King of Macedonia, aligned himself with Carthage.[119] However, unfortunately enough for Hannibal, the city-states that immediately surrounded Rome, including the Etruscans and Umbrian peoples, along with Rhegium and Neapolis, the Greek cities on the Tyrrhenian Sea, chose to maintain their alliance to the Eternal City, rather than with the invader from North Africa and his Gallic companions.

Romans made a second human sacrifice shortly after the catastrophe at Cannae. In the same configuration as the previous sacrifice of 228, a male and female pair of Gauls and Greeks were buried alive in a sacrificial process and in accordance with the Sibylline Books. What followed the defeat at Cannae were two instances of the utmost sacrilege: two Vestal Virgins were convicted of unchastity. The violation of their vows to chastity polluted, as Livy explains, the events of 216 with misfortune. Livy states, "They [Romans] were terrified not only by the

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[118] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.49; 363.

[119] Lukas de Blois, and R. J. van der Spek, "Further Expansion and New Social Tensions (264-133 BC)" in *An Introduction to the Ancient World.* 2nd ed. (London: Routledge Press), 169.

great disasters they had suffered, but also by a number of prodigies, and in particular because two Vestals, Opimia and Floronia, had in that year been convicted of unchastity."[120] He continues, "Since in the midst of so many misfortunes this pollution was, as happens at such times, converted into a portent, the decemvirs were commanded to consult the [Sibylline] Books, and Quintus Fabius Pictor was dispatched to Delphi, to enquire of the oracle with what prayers and supplications they might propitiate the gods, and what would be the end of all their calamities."[121] The combination of the defeat, as well as the broken chastity vows of the two Vestals were enough for Romans to turn once again to sacrificing humans. Livy details the sacrifice as such: "In the meantime, by the direction of the Books of Fate, some unusual sacrifices were offered; amongst others a Gaulish man and woman and a Greek man and woman were buried alive in the Cattle Market, in a place walled in with stone, which even before this time had been defiled with human victims."[122] The pairs of Gauls and Greeks were escorted into their stony tomb and sealed inside, where they slowly perished.

Livy quickly attempts to disassociate the Romans of his day from the act of human sacrifice. He claims that the sacrifice of humans was, "…minime Romano sacro (a rite scarcely Roman)."[123] *Immolatio,* or the act of human sacrifice, was forbidden by 97. As a result, the ritual was out of favor for more than a half-century prior to Livy's writing in the late first century BCE. Additionally, his disassociation lends itself to an inference that perhaps Livy is purposefully showing the depths of depravity the Romans were willing to plumb when threatened by such a foreign menace. Romans performed many types of ritualistic sacrifices of a

[120] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.57; 385.
[121] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.57.2-6; 385.
[122] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.57.6; 385-7.
[123] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.57; 387.

wide-range of objects. Perhaps the most famous, *Devotio*, for example, was the act of taking one's life as a self-sacrifice. According to Celia Schultz, *devotio* was "viewed positively by Romans as a selfless, almost superhuman act of true leadership."[124] She continues, "Of the various forms of ritual killing that were part of their religious experience, the Romans only reacted with disgust to that form they identified as human sacrifice, a distinction in value sometimes lost when all these ritual forms are grouped together under the rubric 'sacrifice.'" Was the circumstance in Rome of 216 so dire, with the combination of the Vestals' broken vows and the defeat at Cannae, that only the most perceived horrific and disgusting act in Roman religion sufficed to pacify the Gods? Perhaps. Additionally, Hannibal's horde, with its foreign members from Iberia, Africa, and Gaul, sparked memories of the loss at the Allia and the sack in 390. No foreign enemy from beyond the Alps had encroached as closely to Rome as Brennus had in 390. The Eternal City was once again under threat of destruction, the first time since Brennus approached the Capitoline.

Despite the threat Hannibal posed, he did not follow through with an attack on the Capitol city, and instead continued his march south. Rome rebounded and pushed Hannibal to the sea and back to North Africa. In 204, Rome launched their amphibious invasion of Carthaginian North Africa, in what E. T. Salmon refers to as Rome's D-Day invasion.[125] Publius Cornelius Scipio (known as Scipio Africanus for his victory in North Africa) led the invasion. In October 202, Scipio met Hannibal at Zama (in modern Tunisia), in what culminated in a grand victory and the destruction of Carthage during the Second Punic War. With the victory, Rome defined necessary economic and territorial reparations as punishment for the war. A fifty-year

[124] Celia E. Schultz, "Roman Sacrifice, Inside and Out," 71.
[125] Salmon, "The Strategy of the Second Punic War," 142.

payment plan was placed on Carthage which was planned to be insurmountable. Additionally, the Roman senate stripped and absorbed all of Carthaginian territory in Europe, Iberia, and the Tyrrhenian Sea. Ultimately, Rome was victorious despite the grand losses at Cannae, Trasimene, and Trebia. However, with the sacrifices of 228 and 216, a precedent was set. The Senate issued human sacrifices, despite the despicable nature of them, when the Senate found itself in dire straits.

The Final Human Sacrifice

The *tumultus Gallicus* was mostly absent during the Punic Wars. Some Gauls rode with Hannibal, true enough; however, they were not the core threat to the Republic. Carthage was a tangible threat, one on which Roman eyes were fixed for centuries. Conversely, Roman eyes rarely peered upon the Gauls of central and eastern Gaul, far away from the towering Italian Alps and the door into Italy. As the second century came to a close and Rome destroyed Carthage, a new menace appeared – the Germanic peoples of the Cimbri and Teutones.

Around 120, the Cimbri, Germanic peoples from modern Denmark, migrated south. They progressed slowly, over months and years, to the Danube River, which led them toward southern Gaul and the Alps. The Cimbric migration, with some three hundred thousand fighting men, along with women, children, and elders, searched for land and cities in which to settle and thrive.[126] Such a sizable migration is, at the very least, curious and alarming to those who stand in the way of such a movement. As a result, the Senate dispatched Gnaeus Papirius Carbo to trail the Cimbri and protect Rome's northern border at the Alps.[127]

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[126] Plutarch, *Lives: Marius*, trans. by Bernadotte Perrin, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (1920), 11.2-5; 489.
[127] Mike Duncan, *The Storm Before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic* (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2017), 100.

In 113, a trap was sprung near Noreia, Noricum (modern southern Austria), one which Carbo hoped would catch the Cimbri unaware. The legions were no match for the sheer number of Cimbri and were quickly and utterly defeated. As Mike Duncan notes, the Cimbri did not continue their pursuit of the Romans. Rather, after the victory, the Cimbri regrouped and continued to search for land upon which to settle. This supports the idea that the migration was intended as a peaceful one.[128] The humiliating defeat brought great shame to Carbo. Subsequent to his prosecution for his poor generalship, Carbo committed *devatio* – suicide in an attempt to hold on to whatever pride, honor, and integrity he had after he did not fall on the battlefield with his men.[129] The Roman defeat at Noreia initiated the Roman-Cimbric wars that lasted the entirety of the decade which followed.

The third and final act of ritualistic human sacrifice came in 114-13. Like the sacrifices of 228 and 216, Romans put to death a pair of male and female Greeks and Gauls. Likewise, the sacrifice took place in conjunction with another broken Vestal vow of chastity – the same vow broken in 216. The Vestals who broke the vow were put to death, the usual punishment for such offenses. Celia Schultz argues that, due to the repeated coincidence of the sacrifice of Greeks and Gauls, and the punishment of death for the Vestals, the two forms of ritual killing were linked.[130] The question of *how* they were linked is much harder to answer, however. The punishment of the Vestals is understandable, as broken vows of chastity among the Vestals were a grave sin to Roman spirituality. Furthermore, J. S. Reid argues that the sacrifice of Gauls and Greeks was not simply a matter of preparation for war.[131] After all, the Roman Republic was in

[128] Duncan, *The Storm Before the Storm*, 101.
[129] Richard Evans, "Rome's Cimbric Wars (114-101 BC) and Their Impact on the Iberian Peninsula," *Acta Classica* 48 (2005): 40.
[130] Schultz, "Roman Sacrifice Inside and Out," 70.
[131] J.S Reid, "Human Sacrifice at Rome and Other Notes on Roman Religion," 39.

perpetual combat and no such human sacrifices were made beyond 228, 216, and 114-13. Therefore, the sacrifices in 114-13 were the result of something much deeper than the superficial reason of preparation for war. Surely the news of a Vestal—the holiest of holy—breaking a sacred vow was enough to send a shockwave of fear and dread across Rome. Likewise, the knowledge that a massive migration of peoples was slowly marching toward Rome's northern border must have sparked memories of a similar occurrence in 390 which nearly brought the Republic to its knees. Here, the link can be found. The broken vows of the holy, aligned with the Cimbric migrations that drew nearer and nearer to the Alps by the month, was enough to reignite the collective trauma that was buried in the Roman psyche after the sack in 390. The *metus Gallicus,* though relatively repressed during the Punic Wars, returned. As a result, the final ritualistic human sacrifice was made.

The Cimbric Wars and The Third Founder of Rome

The defeat at Noreia in 113 initiated the conflict between Rome and the alliance of the Cimbri and Teutones. In 109, Rome suffered a second defeat at the hands of the Cimbri, in which M. Iunius Silanus and his army were routed in the Roman province of Gallia Narbonesis (modern Languedoc and Provence, France). The defeat was of disastrous proportions for Silanus and his legions. Diodorus Siculus summarizes the state of the Roman people after the defeat: "After so many men had been killed, some were crying for sons or brothers; others, orphaned by the death of their fathers, lamented the loss of their parents and the desolation of Italy."[132] In 107, more defeats followed. The most devastating came at Burdigala (modern Bordeaux) where the consul Lucius Cassius Longinus Ravalla fell in battle. Cassius Longinus was yet another

[132] Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica,* trans. by Francis R. Walton, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1946), 35.37; 141.

consul, along with his army, who succumbed to the Cimbri. The string of defeats in the decade from 114 to 104 were a calamity for the Senate, to put it mildly. In 114, C. Porcius's army was destroyed in Thrace by the Scordisci. The defeat of Carbo in Noricum came a year later, in 113. In 112, L. Piso and his army were destroyed in Spain. Jugurtha, in 110, defeated Albinus and his Roman army. The previously mentioned defeats of Silanus and Cassius followed, which included the death of ex-consul L. Piso.[133] Numerous legions were destroyed in several theaters of war, along with their command (notably the consuls), and the Cimbri continued their march into the Transalpine province unobstructed. The decade of defeats was also a prelude to both Rome's greatest defeat, which resulted in drastic changes to the Republic and left a dark reminder on the Roman calendar, and their greatest savior.

In 105, the town of Arausio (modern-day Orange, France) acted as the doorway into Gallia Transalpina, the Roman province north of the Italian Alps. The Cimbri and Teutones, with the string of victories throughout the province during the previous decade, found themselves at Arausio. Should they pass through Arausio unchallenged, they would be that much closer to controlling the province and would have the ability to cross the Alps and enter Cisalpine Gaul – northern Italy. Likewise, due to the location of Arausio, the migrants had quick and easy access to the Rhone River. The Senate reacted quickly to the Cimbric threat, due to the Cimbri's decade-long streak of victories and their encroachment toward the doorway to Gaul. Gnaeus Mallius Maximus, one of two consuls for 105, raised an army and marched to meet the Cimbri. Mallius Maximus, a *novus homo,* was not only personally inexperienced in matters of warfare and strategy. Additionally, as a *novus homo,* Maximus lacked a familial lineage and consular

[133] Elizabeth Rawson, "Religion and Politics in the Late Second Century B.C. at Rome," *Phoenix* 28, no. 2 (1974): 198-99.

example by which he could follow.[134] By the time of Mallius' consulship, he was only one of four *novi homines* elected between 191 and 107.[135] His inexperience proved costly at Arausio. Additionally, his subordinate Servillius Caepio refused to cooperate and showed nothing but disdain for Mallius' *novus homo* standing. The result was the largest army raised in Roman history (nearly 80,000 legionaries, not counting the additional auxiliary forces of allied Latins and Gauls, with more than 20,000 support members) was parted between Caepio's ego and Mallius' inexperience while they approached an enemy over 300,000 in number and filled with confidence after a decade-long streak of victories.

Caepio, due to his hubris, provoked the Cimbri to battle on 6 October 105, despite envoys sent from Rome who demanded his submission. Likewise, Caepio refused to either aid or work in tandem with Mellius due to his lack of respect for the newly elected consul. Mike Duncan summarizes Caepio's shortcoming as such, "He never once seemed to realize that the Romans were about to face hundreds of thousands of Cimbric warriors and that even combined, the Romans would be outnumbered."[136] Whether his lack of awareness or overconfidence is to blame, Caepio and his legions were overcome and forced backward into Millius'. The two armies faced a nightmarish scenario. Of the 120,000 legionaries and support personnel, very few managed to escape. Almost no Roman made it out alive.[137] Nearly twice as many Romans fell at Arausio as at Cannae. The significance of the defeat at Arausio was second only to the Gallic sack of Rome in 390. More lives were lost at Arausio than in the Gallic sack. However, the gates of Rome did not fall as they did in 390. It was the second greatest disaster from the

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[134] *Novus homo,* or "new man" was a distinction given to those who were the first of their lineage to serve in the Roman Senate, and more specifically be elected as consul.
[135] Duncan, *Storm Before the Storm,* 125.
[136] Duncan, *Storm Before the Storm,* 126.
[137] Ibid.

founding of Rome in 753 until 476 CE when the Western Roman Empire fell. If their defeat at Cannae had been an emergency, as it seems to have been, the loss at Arausio was a disaster for the Senate and people of Rome – the likes of which had not been experienced since 390.

In the immediate aftermath, Rome went through a series of alterations to compensate for the defeats that left the doorway into Italy open. While an official proclamation of *tumultus* was absent, the processes associated with such a proclamation were followed. The consul Rutilius Rufus ordered that all young men of fighting age take an oath to remain within the Italian peninsula. Additionally, the coastal cities and harbors were under strict regulations not to allow men under the age of thirty-five to board a ship and leave for work, travel, or any other circumstances that may have taken them away from the peninsula.[138] The legions' ranks swelled quickly to counter the losses at Arausio, and the forcefulness with which those who were not soldiers were forbidden to leave the peninsula ensured that people of fighting age were present in the event that another army fall and the Cimbri marched on the city. Furthermore, Rufus improved the military standards for fitness and training by hiring gladiatorial instructors into his legionary training.[139] It is clear from how quickly these changes were implemented that a nerve was struck. The trauma and fear of the Gauls was alive and well.

The defeat by the Cimbri proved, however, that the size of the Roman legions fielded in battle was irrelevant. Rome needed a savior. Their previous choices of commanders, Caepio, Carbo, and Silanus, were impaired by arrogance and incompetence. The savior the Senate chose was Gaius Marius, one who was respected for his generalship by friend and foe alike (despite being a *novus homo*). Marius' consulship of 104 began with a military triumph against King

[138] Bernt Kerremans, "Metus Gallicus, tumultus Cimbricus? The Possible Promulgation of a "tumultus" in the Cimbrian War (105-101 BCE)", *Mnemosyne* 69, no. 5 (2016): 830.
[139] Lawrence Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books (1984), 59.

Jugurtha of Numidia (modern Algeria), the long-time enemy of Rome. Further trauma is evident in his election to consul. Firstly, it was forbidden by law that a man should serve a second consulship within ten years of his previous election. Marius, however, was reelected within the ten-year interim period. Secondly, a candidate for consulship was required to be present within Rome to be eligible for election. The Senate ignored both laws and elected Marius *in absentia,* in what was a legally unprecedented election. Likewise, his co-consul for 104 was Gaius Flavius Fimbria – another *novus homo.* The year marked the first in which two *novi homines* ("new men") served as consul together. After an unprecedented election year, a savior was chosen, the legions rebuilt, and Rome was yet again ready to face their *metus* and marched on the Cimbri.

The remainder of the Cimbric Wars, from 104-01, were a collection of sweeping victories for Marius. The legions, with their increased dedication to a higher standard of conditioning and training, finally had the opportunity to serve under a leader who displayed competence and ingenuity. While the Cimbri remained the same during the two-year interim between hostilities, the Roman army which met them in 102 was entirely reformed. To ensure his leadership and the safety of Rome, the Senate proposed Marius for another consular election. The people quickly voted and approved their selection. Marius' successful election made him the consul from the election of 105 to 100, consecutively. As previous stated, *mos maiorum* (traditional customs) ensured that consuls could not be elected twice within a ten-year period. Although it was not a legal decree, it was aligned with customs and traditions which dated to the founding of the Republic. Few exceptions were made throughout the centuries; however, no examples of consecutive consulships were as dramatic and irregular as Marius' successive tenures. Nathan Rosenstein notes, "Soon afterwards, he was elected to a sixth consulship – equaling a record set

in 299; yet no man had ever held office five times in a row."[140] Such a prolonged tenure explains that an intense and substantial panic was felt throughout Rome.

With his triumph against the Cimbri and his five consecutive consulships, Rome proclaimed Marius to be the "Third Founder of Rome." Plutarch summarizes the proclamation as such: "Above all, the people hailed him as the third founder of Rome, that peril which he had averted from the city was not less than that of the Gallic invasion; and all of them [Romans], as they made merry at home with their wives and children, would bring ceremonial offerings of food and libations of wine to Marius as well as to the gods, and they were insistent that he alone should celebrate both triumphs."[141] The gravity of such a proclamation simply cannot be overstated. Perhaps Mike Duncan best summarizes what such a proclamation meant: "Marius was hailed as 'the Third Founder of Rome,' elevating him to a hyper-elite pantheon of heroes that included only Romulus himself and the legendary Marcus Furius Camillus, the man who had brought Rome back from the brink of extinction after the traumatic sack by the Gauls in the 380s."[142] The Cimbric migrations and the string of Roman defeats prior to Marius' consulships certainly created a dire situation in Rome. The Senate both ritualistically sacrificed humans for a third time and proclaimed Marius the third founder of Rome due to the Gallic and German menace.

Conclusion

The collective trauma which remained after the sack of Rome in 390 lay dormant until necessary factors and circumstances ignited the embers. Roman hegemony expanded throughout

[140] Nathan Rosenstein and Robert Morstein-Marx, *A Companion to the Roman Republic,* Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, Ltd. (2010), 175.
[141] Plutarch, *Marius,* 27.5
[142] Duncan, *The Storm Before the Storm*, 150.

the third century as the Republic absorbed the neighboring peoples and city-states. However, by 228, the Gallic enemies of the Po River valley were in the thick of a resurgence. The expansion of the Gallic cantons, as well as Rome's Italian enemies, created a situation in which enemies surrounded the Republic. The coalition of Gallic cantons, the Gaesatae, Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci, launched an invasion into the heart of Italy. The ensuing *metus Gallicus* directly influenced the ways in which the Sibylline Books were read and the religious rituals were performed. The trauma of 390 contributed to the dire shift in Roman religion beyond what was normal, resulting in the first human sacrifice in 228 – something that Romans considered unspeakable and deplorable just a decade prior.

Likewise, from 218 to 216, Hannibal seemed as an unstoppable force. The Carthaginian victories at Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae, certainly sparked memories and trauma of the sack in 390. The ambush at Lake Trasimene came as swiftly as Brennus had arrived at Rome's doorstep 173 years prior. Additionally, the catastrophic loss at Cannae was the partial destruction and blow to Rome's leadership class and left the Roman army, the largest ever fielded at that time, where it fell. Over eighty senators and potential senators were killed. The defeat not only threated the city of Rome and its army, it had the potential to threaten the city and its leadership into posterity. In conjunction with the momentous defeat, two Vestals broke the sacred vow of chastity. Certainly, the commitment of the gravest sin of Roman religion was enough to spread panic in the streets. In conjunction with the defeat of Cannae, all must have seemed lost. It was in the midst of this *tumultus* that the second human sacrifice was committed in 216.

The dramatic nature of human sacrifice, and the Romans' perceptions of it, are present within Livy. Livy's attempts to create distance between Romans and the sacrifice are evidence

that, although the sacrifices happened, they were events that were met with abhorrence and repugnance. Regardless, the sacrifice was made for a second time in just a little over a decade. The *metus Gallicus* and the trauma intensely resurfaced during the Second Punic War and Hannibal's march through Italy.

No threat was as great, whether physically or perceived, as the Gallic and Germanic tribes and their migrations. The migrations culminated in the movement of Cimbri and Teutons' across Gaul and into the Roman province of Transalpine Gaul. The migration, which included a population of around 350,000 fighting men, along with women, children, elders, and baggage trains, sparked fear in the Roman Senate. After a decade of Cimbric victories against the Romans, the city faced their most disastrous defeat yet on 6 October 105. The battle at Arausio was a catastrophe of the greatest proportions. The Roman defeat, in conjunction with the broken sacred vows of the Vestals, led to the third and final human sacrifice. The sacrifices of humans were forbidden by law in 97, a little over ten years after the last sacrifices were made. Zsuzsanna Várhelyi notes that "although *immolatio,* as it corresponded to bloody animal sacrifice, would not cover live burials [as how Vestals who broke their vows were punished], this official disclaimer on the part of the Roman elite through legislation unmistakably marked how Hellenized Romans had grown uncomfortable with the involvement of human victims as part of a legitimate religious ritual by the first century BCE."[143] Additionally, the anniversaries of the defeat at Lake Trasimene (21/23 June 217) and Arausio (6 October 105) were marked as *dies atri* (Black Days) on the Roman calendar.[144] *Dies atri* were days upon which businesses, marriages, and other private and public sectors of society were voided due to the unlucky nature of said

[143] Zsuzsanna Varhelyi, "The Specters of Roman Imperialism: The Live Burials of Gauls and Greeks at Rome," *Classical Antiquity* 26, no. 2 (2007): 284.
[144] H.H. Scullard, *Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic,* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1981), 46.

days. This suggests that the defeats were not merely Romans who were outclassed in battle. The defeats were so significant that they were perceived as a sort of divine punishment and the days upon which they occurred were viewed as tainted or cursed.

The Senate, which needed a savior after Arausio, proposed Marius for the consular election, for what was a staggering five consecutive years. The initial consulship in the string of repeated elections (105) was unprecedented. Not only was he elected *in absentia*, he was elected before the ten-year limit was met for reelection. After Marius' victory and ultimate defeat of the Germanic Cimbri, the Senate and people proclaimed him as the Third Founder of Rome. This title and distinction placed Marius in the most exclusive pantheon of Rome, along with Romulus and Camillus, two men who were likely mythological and literary constructions. The sheer extremes that both the Senate and religious sector willingly pushed, at three various instances of the third (200s) and second (100s) centuries BCE, suggests that a collective trauma not only existed, but grew and expanded when the necessary circumstances were met.

Chapter Five: Carte Blanche and the 'Just War'

"[A]t the present minute fears of war in Gaul are the main topic: for 'our brothers' the Aedui have had a disastrous battle recently, and the Helvetii are undoubtedly in arms and making raids on our province." (Cicero, *ad Att.* 15 March 60 BCE)[145]

The *metus Gallicus* that influenced human sacrifice, *supplicia canum*, and Marius' acquisition of the title 'Third Founder of Rome' had transformed by the time of the late Republic (c. 130-31). Rather than a cause, or influence, of grandiose acts that were far and few between in the third and second centuries BCE, the then-residual memory created a situation where the normal disposition of Romans (and particularly the Senate) was such that a carte blanche policy was granted to those who dealt with Gaul. In other words, those who dealt with Gaul did so with complete freedom to do as they saw fit, regardless of the circumstances or repercussions of their actions. For example, Marcus Tullius Cicero faced an uprising of the Gallic Allobroges during the Catilinarian Conspiracy (63-2), to which he responded with executions of citizens without trial. The executions of citizens without trial were strongly antithetical to Roman law and tradition. Likewise, as Julius Caesar reached the consulship in 59, the Senate offered him carte blanche for his war in Gaul and willingly tolerated his ten-year proconsulship of the region. The war included atrocities and genocides directed at warriors and civilians, alike. Furthermore, several events during the war were violations of what Romans deemed a Just War. Caesar offered various justifications that sought to meet the expectations of a Just War, but with each atrocity the Senate turned a blind eye. The Senate (and civilians) were marred with the residual *metus* so much so that, despite his naysayers, Caesar was allowed to conduct himself (and his army) however he chose.

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[145] Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* trans. by E. O. Winstedt, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1956), 1.19; 83.

Cicero, Catiline, Gaul and Executions Without Trial

The events of 63 sparked questions and debates in Rome that deeply resonate with us today. Should personal civil rights, like our right to privacy, be sacrificed in the name of our nation's security? Do those whom we deem terrorists have the right to a fair trial, regardless of their transgressions? One need not look further than America's controversial Patriot Act.[146] The Patriot Act, signed into law in 2001, allows the government to conduct surveillance on domestic phones (among other things). Additionally, the act negates the need for warrants to search a person's property, with or without their knowledge or understanding of the search. The discussion of whether or not a terrorist should be granted a fair and speedy trial continues to be a matter of political debate. The Catilinarian Conspiracy, and Cicero's actions in the aftermath, raised these questions just as the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, did.

The Catilinarian Conspiracy was a political and ideological clash, which quickly turned violent and sought to spark revolution in Rome. At the forefront of the conspiracy was Lucius Sergius Catilina (referred to as Catiline moving forward). A man of distinguished lineage, Catiline traced his ancestry to Sergestus, who fled Troy with Aeneas and thus tied himself to the mythical foundation of Rome. Additionally, his great-grandfather was a hero of the Second Punic War and fought with what was the first documented prosthetic hand.[147] Catiline was once a promising politician; however, by 63, he neared bankruptcy and his criminal behavior, which

[146] Formally named as "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001.
[147] Mary Beard, *SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome* (New York: Liveright Publishing Co.), 27.

included murder and adultery with a Vestal Virgin, was more relevant than his familial lineage.[148]

After a string of consular defeats, and as his debt mounted, Catiline took his revolution outside of the Senate and onto the streets. In short order, he garnered support amongst the poorest civilians and created a secret society of upper-class representatives who sought to weaken senatorial power.[149] The ultimate goal, the institution of a monarchy, required an army which Catiline quickly raised. As Mary Beard notes, "And there was no end to his [Catiline] rash promises of debt relief (one of the most despicable forms of radicalism in the eyes of the Roman landed classes) or to his bold threats to take out the leading politicians and to put the whole city to flames."[150] His boasts were not without weight. Cicero, his most outspoken and fervent enemy during the Conspiracy and subsequent rebellion, won the consulship for the year 63. Catiline responded with an assassination attempt against Cicero on 7 November 63, which Cicero narrowly dodged with the help of an informant.[151] The following day, Cicero roused the Senate with the first of four, now famous, orations against Catiline, which ultimately forced Catiline's hand and a militaristic revolution was born.

Catiline sought alliances anywhere possible as war broke out. One such alliance (or so Catiline believed) was with a Gallic tribe, the Allobroges. The Allobroges wanted to maintain their alliance and patronage with Rome, however, and chose to ally with Cicero and the Senate. As a result, they collected evidence that included three sealed wax tablets of the plots to assassinate opponents and ambush the standing Roman army, which they quickly handed to

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[148] Catiline's criminal history prior to the Conspiracy included the murder of his brother-in-law during Sulla's proscriptions, and the murder of his wife and son in an attempt to marry Aurelia Orestilla, the daughter of consul Aufidius Orestes, in 71. Lastly, in 73, he faced trial and was acquitted for adultery with a Vestal Virgin.
[149] Beard, *SPQR*, 28.
[150] Beard, *SPQR*, 28.
[151] Steve Bonta, "Cicero, Catiline, and Conspiracy," *The New American* 20, no. 25 (2004).

Cicero.[152] The letters implicated the leading conspirators Lentulus, Cethegus, and Statilius, among others (Catiline, at this point, had fled to the country-side with his army). After debate, the conspirators were executed without a legal trial. Several members of the Senate, including Caesar, argued that life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence. While treachery and terrorism were perhaps worthy of execution, the men implicated *were* Roman. Several senators believed that the execution of fellow Roman citizens was too 'unRoman' of a punishment. Those, like Caesar, who voted for life imprisonment were outvoted and Cicero swiftly had the conspirators whisked away and unceremoniously strangled to death. His punishment was met with vitriol by some. Metellus Nepos (a tribune in 63), with support from Caesar and other likeminded senators, attacked Cicero for his execution of citizens without trial, and even blocked Cicero's valedictory speech – something that was granted to all departing consuls.[153] Despite the distaste some of the senators held for the executions, as a whole, the Senate praised Cicero for ending Catiline's rebellion, going so far as to call him the Father of Rome. The end of 63 was essentially a mad-dash filled with fear, paranoia, and personal ambition. Catiline's portrait as the vilest villain is equal to that of Cicero's ambition. In a matter of three months, Cicero had delivered four of the most famous oratories of the western world, executed some of the most treacherous Romans since Sulla's proscriptions, and managed to wrangle the Allobroges into maintaining their Roman alliance. The Catilinarian Conspiracy was perhaps Cicero's finest hour. Regardless, as 63 ended, it was clear that the Senate was willing to accept something as egregious as the execution of citizens without a fair trial. As the middle of Republican-era Rome

[152] Mark Everson Davies and Hilary Swain, *Aspects of Roman History 82BC-AD14: A Source-Based Approach* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 94.
[153] Mark Davies, *Aspects of Roman History 82BC-AD14,* 99.

continued, the Senate's ability to accept and support actions that were previously deemed distasteful, or outwardly illegal, only increased.

The Beginning of Caesar's Gallic War

Turmoil rippled across Gaul as 60 came to an end. The previous year, in 61, the Sequani, a Gallic tribe whose homeland was in the Franche-Comté and Burgundy regions of France, defeated the Aedui with the help of the Germanic King Ariovistus.[154] The defeat of the Aedui was a blow to Rome, as the Aedui were their most reliable ally in the region. Additionally, the clash between the Aedui and Sequani sent other Gallic peoples on migratory-movements. Some, like the Helvetii, moved toward the Roman Transalpine Province.

The clash between the Aedui and Sequani was not the sole cause of the Helvetian migration, however. The Helvetii, comprised of some 400,000 members, along with their smaller tribal allies, outgrew their native lands in eastern Gaul (modern Switzerland). While the Swiss Alps corralled the Helvetians' land, the Germanic Suebi, with Ariovistus at their helm, drove into Gaul from western Germany, which forced the hand of the Helvetii.[155] As Julius Caesar notes of the Helvetian situation in his *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* (*Commentaries on the Gallic War,* shortened to *The Gallic War* forward), "In such circumstances their range of movement was less extensive, and their chances of waging war on their neighbours [Suebi] were less easy."[156] Their options were rather simple, it seems. To remain in their homeland meant exhausting the region's carrying capacity and leaving them in too-close-for-comfort proximity to Ariovistus and the encroaching Suebi, or migrate west of the Rhone to more peaceful lands and

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[154] Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 204.
[155] K. M. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars: 58-50 BC* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003), 26.
[156] Julius Caesar, *The Gallic War* trans. by H. J. Edwards, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1930), 1.2; 5.

distance themselves from Germanic incursion. A migration of such size is destabilizing to both land and geopolitics alike. The political turmoil in Gaul in 60 was only exacerbated by such a large movement of people. Furthermore, when the migration came to an end, the Helvetii planned to seize lands from the already-settled Gallic tribes in the region.[157]

South of the Alps, in Rome, the defeat of the Aedui spurred only negative news and concern. The previous movement of Germanic tribes (the Cimbri) into southern Gaul was responsible for a decade of defeats, including the disastrous defeat at Arausio, until Marius' offensive in 104, for which he was ultimately titled the "Third Founder of Rome." Additionally, just as political matters swirled in Gaul, so too did those in Rome. The governor of the province *Gallia Narbonesis* (Transalpine Gaul, southwestern France), Metellus Celer (103-59), succumbed to an untimely death. The geographic location of "Our Province" as it was known, was key to both political ambitions and the wellbeing of Rome.

Lex Vatinia and the Proconsulship of Caesar

Julius Caesar (100-44), who was the consul of 59 alongside Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus (102-48), was the governor of Cisalpine Gaul (northern Italy) at the time of Celer's death. Additionally, the *lex Vatinia* (also known as the *lex Vatinia de provincia Caesaris*), or Vatinian law, allotted to Caesar a five-year proconsulship of Illyricum (the modern region includes Albania, Servia, Croatia, and Slovenia, among others). Caesar's status as both consul and the governor of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum provided him the opportunity to absorb the Transalpine Province into his governorship, as well. The absorption of Transalpine Gaul placed Caesar at the leading edge of the Gallic turmoil. The positioning was all-too perfect for a man with such

[157] K. M. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars*, 26.

militaristic ambitions. With Transalpine Gaul came an additional legion, Caesar's fourth, and some 400,000 Helvetii with a warring disposition. Additionally, as war mounted in Gaul and Caesar's term came to end, the Senate gave him proconsular powers in his recently-acquired Transalpine Province for ten years. A proconsulship, offered to consuls whose term came to an end, extended all of the military powers of a consul and, most importantly, protection from prosecution. With this, Caesar was not only given carte blanche for his war in Gaul which was sure to come, but the Senate allowed him to retain the fullest extent of consular military power *without* the risk of prosecution for the next ten years. If it was revenge on Gaul the Senate wanted, revenge they would surely get.

Literary Analysis of Caesar's *The Gallic War*: A Question of Perspective

"Gaul is a whole divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and a third by a people called in their own tongue Celtae, in the Latin Galli" (*Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur*).[158]

The introduction to *The Gallic War* is one of the more infamous introductions to a historical text. It is the beginning to a text that is rather difficult to categorize and place within a genre. Cicero labels it as "commentaries*"* (*commentarios*).[159] So too did Aulus Hirtius in the eighth book of *The Gallic War*, which he wrote in place of Caesar. It is linear in its narrative meaning that each book follows the previous, chronologically. Each book summarizes the

[158] Caesar, *The Gallic War*, 1.1; 3.
[159] Cicero, *Brutus*, Translated by G. L. Hendrickson. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 226.

military campaign of the corresponding year. For example, the first book summarizes the year of 58, the second summarizes the year of 57, and so on.

Peculiar in his narration, Caesar speaks entirely in the third person in *The Gallic War*. A third-person narration is not wholly unique to ancient texts. Herodotus, for example, provides a third-person account in his *History*. However, he interjects in the historical narrative with first-person asides and comments. Similarly, Thucydides uses first and third person in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*. The duality of *The Peloponnesian War* is that Thucydides assumes two roles: the narrator and a historical actor. As narrator, he uses first person. As actor, he writes himself into the narrative using third person. Perhaps the most adequate comparison of such a use of third person is Xenophon's *Anabasis*. The work is narrated in third person, true enough. However, the speeches Xenophon delivers within *Anabasis* revert to the first person. Caesar continues his use of the third person when he narrates his own speeches, maintaining a certain impersonal distance from them.

Lastly, and where the strongest contrast can be found between *Anabasis* and *The Gallic War*, is that, as Debra Nousek notes, it is believed that Xenophon used the pseudonym Themistogenes of Syracuse.[160] Caesar, of course, published *The Gallic War* during or shortly following the events that he narrates. This makes the use of third person even more peculiar. The Roman public had no doubt Caesar was the author. Even more watchful was the Senate, who received his campaign notes and summaries after each campaign season. Despite this, Caesar maintains a rhetorical separation between himself and the literary subject of "Caesar" in *The Gallic War*. This suggests that as much as it was propaganda for the Senate and the people

[160] Debra Lynn Nousek, "Narrative Style and Genre in Caesar's 'Bellum Gallicum,'" Rutgers the State University of New Jersey – Brunswick. Dissertation, 2004.

of Rome, it was also written for those who lived long after the Republic fell. The uniqueness of *The Gallic War*, then, is perhaps summarized most adequately by John Marincola. Marincola states, "The evidence, though not vast, is uniform, and there is no example before Caesar in which the writer of a *commentarius* uses the third person."[161] It is both a grandiose historical account for those who came after Caesar and a propagandistic spin for his current audience.

A Reoccurrence of Justification: Gauls, Germans, and Propagandic Provocations

There is a reoccurring theme within *The Gallic War* of Caesar clearly stating his justification for his actions. These justifications, more often than not, came at the onset of the upcoming military campaign against particular Gallic and Germanic tribes within the narrative. The justifications are rather straightforward. However, whether they are legitimate causes for military action or propagandistic manufactures in an attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of the Senate (and the public) is another matter. As Caesar's war in Gaul continued through the 50s, more propagandistic justifications were spun. However, in 58, as Caesar marched to confront the Helvetii in Transalpine Gaul and initiate his campaign, little propaganda was needed.

The Gallic War contains several justifications for Caesar's actions and decisions *during* the war, but beyond the migrations of the Helvetii there is little stated reasoning for the initiation of the campaign. Andrew Riggsby notes, "On this theory, a successful war against barbarian tribes, as the Gallic wars would surely have been viewed at the time of the publication of *De Bello Gallico*, would never have needed explanation or justification; Caesar had merely to stress the scale of victory and the extent of his responsibility for it."[162] If the belief is that justification

[161] John Marincola, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 196.
[162] Andrew M. Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, (2006), 158.

for the initiation of the campaign in 58 was not needed, one is left with the presumption that the Roman Senate (and the public) tolerated and supported a military campaign in Gaul. If Gauls were the subject of Roman aggression, the generals who aimed the aggression (in this case Caesar) were given carte blanche by the Senate. Additionally, the state of Gaul at the onset of the Helvetian migration presented a situation wherein an initiation was self-justifiable, in a sense.

Firstly, the Aedui and Sequani, both of whom were Rome's strongest allies in Gaul, bordered the Transalpine Province.[163] The Helvetian migration, if hostile, would disrupt Rome's alliance with the Aedui and Sequani. Additionally, should the tribes fall to the Helvetii, Rome's foothold in southern Gaul would be loosened. The possible negative outcomes of the two Gallic allies in the event the Helvetii wanted conquest were rather limited: ally with the Helvetii if they presented the tribes with a peaceful option or defend their territory against 400,000 Helvetii and risk defeat. For Rome, either of these outcomes would have been disastrous for their relationship with and political standing in southern Gaul. Secondly, the province's stability was still recovering from the recent rebellion of Catiline, and the Allobroges' alliance was viewed with skepticism, despite their helpfulness during Cicero's consulship. A hostile takeover would further disrupt the economy, trade, and political relationships which had just been shaken. The network of the alliances between tribes extended beyond that of the Aedui and Sequani, as well. The Helvetian migration had the potential to drastically alter the framework of peace among the Gallic tribes. Likewise, the Helvetians' reputation as brave warriors and the sheer size of the tribe had the capability to persuade the regional Gauls to unite as one and potentially rebel

[163] Goldsworthy, *Caesar*, 208.

against Rome. As Goldsworthy notes, "Nor was it in their [Rome's] interest for the tribes of Gaul to unite independently of Rome."[164]

The fear of such a unified Gaul after the Helvetian migration was more than tangible. A Gallic triple alliance was a reality prior to the Helvetiis' appearance. Caesar notes that Orgetorix, the self-proclaimed leader of the Helvetii, worked to first gain kingship within the Helvetii and secondly, form a Gallic coalition in central and southern Gaul prior to the migration. Orgetorix persuaded Casticus, the son of the king of the Sequani (and friend of Rome), Catamantaloedes, to seize the kingship. Likewise, Orgetorix offered his daughter for marriage to Dumnorix of the Aedui, which solidified their alliance. Caesar summarizes the alliance: "Swayed by this speech [given by Orgetorix], they [Casticus and Dumnorix] gave a mutual pledge, confirming it by oath; and they hoped that when they had seized their kingship they would be able, through the efforts of three most powerful and most steadfast tribes, to master the whole of Gaul."[165]

Like many Gallic tribes, the Helvetii "despised" monarchies and were governed by elected magistrates.[166] Orgetorix's planned coup d'état was foiled and he faced trial. Rather than risk conviction and subsequently be burned alive as punishment, he took his own life. Regardless, the bond between Dumnorix and the Helvetii was solidified through marriage. As the Helvetii migration approached, Dumnorix persuaded the Sequani to allow the migration to pass safely into the Transalpine region. The Aedui, along with the Allobroges and Ambarri,

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[164] Goldsworthy, *Caesar*, 208.

[165] The Tigurine, a tribe within the Helvetii collective, were responsible for the defeat of Cassius. Caesar, *BG*, l.3; 7 and 1.12; 19.

[166] Ludwig Heinrich Dyck, "Caesar's First Great Campaign," *Military History*, 20 no. 6 (2004) *para*. 5.

pleaded with their Roman allies for aid as the Helvetii laid waste to their lands. Once notified, Caesar marched quickly to meet the Helvetii before they could do more harm to Roman allies.

It is evident that the initial invasion of Gaul was acceptable, and in the case of protecting Roman interests, even necessary. Additionally, Caesar makes a specific note of consul Lucius Cassius' defeat and death at the hands of the Helvetii during the Cimbric War in 107, not once but twice.[167] Caesar's mention of Lucius Cassius tied the Roman defeat in 107 to the Helvetian migration in 58. This serves as an attempt to remind the Roman public of the potential stakes at play. Little could rally the Roman public and the Senate like the defeat and death of a consul and their legions. Furthermore, to strengthen the connection between the migration that faced Caesar and the defeat in 107, Caesar makes the claim that the leader of the Helvetian migration, Divico, was the same commander who dealt Lucius Cassius his defeat. Following the conveniently placed connection is the dialogue between Caesar and Divico at a conference that took place prior to combat. Caesar narrates what he claims are Divico's own words during the meeting:

> If the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii, they would go whither and abide where Caesar should determine and desire; if on the other hand he [Caesar] should continue to visit them with war, he was advised to remember the earlier disaster of the Roman people [in 107] and the ancient valour of the Helvetii.[168]

Not only does Caesar remind the Roman people of the defeat of Cassius, he directly taunts them through the words of Divico. Caesar uses the dialogue as both a threat and a provocation. Since the Senate and people of Rome read Book I of *The Gallic War* after the campaign season of 58 (as some historians argue, though there is contention) this written provocation works as a justification of his actions against the Helvetii.[169] Not only was the migration a realistic threat to

[167] Caesar, *The Gallic War*, 1.7; 13.
[168] Caesar, *The Gallic War*, 1.14; 23.
[169] Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*, 9

Gallic stability, the Helvetii directly insulted the Roman people through Caesar's dialogue. Rarely does Caesar use *The Gallic War* as a historical text to reflect on, or narrate, past events. The callback to Cassius, along with the connection between Divico, his role in both the defeat in 107 and the migration of 58, and the dialogue Caesar provides, are examples of Caesar inserting a justification into his narrative. The justifications were not for his march into Gaul. Rather, they are for his actions that came against the Helvetii, which can simply be summarized as what was nearly a genocide.

After the final battle and victory against the Helvetii and their tribal coalition, Caesar came into possession of a census that stated 368,000 people partook in the migration. Of that sum, only 110,000 were allowed to return home after the Helvetii's defeat.[170] Strabo claims the total number of Helvetii warriors who survived only amounted to 8,000.[171] It is impossible to know whether those numbers are accurate. Regardless, tens of thousands of the Helvetii were killed, including the indiscriminate killing and enslaving of women and children. Our modern audience undoubtedly treats such numbers as nothing less than horrific. However, for Caesar's Roman audience, such a victory was met with cheers and a sigh of relief. The Province and surrounding areas were secure once more and tribal stability returned, even if for a short time.

The campaign of 58 did not end with the Helvetii, nor was the defeat of the Helvetii the final appearance of Caesar's genocidal tendencies of the year. The German warlord Ariovistus, who commanded a German and Gallic coalition of tribes, crossed the Rhine at the invitation of several Gallic nations.[172] However, he quickly created a fiefdom with which he terrorized

[170] Caesar, *The Gallic War*, 1.19; 45.
[171] Strabo, *Geography*, trans. by H.C. Hamilton, *perseus.tufts.edu* 4.3.3.
[172] The coalition included the Harudes, Marcomani, Triboges, Vangiones, Nametes, Sedusii, and the Suebi tribes.

surrounding tribes, and he pillaged and enslaved tribal cities and small nations.[173] It was believed that the Germans, particularly those under the command of Ariovistus, were the bravest with the strongest warring disposition. Appian notes the Germans' embracement of warfare and claims, "[A] people who excelled all others, even the largest men, in size; savage, the bravest of the brave, despising death because they believe they shall live hereafter."[174] The Roman army, so uneasy about a war with the Germans, threatened mutiny in the event that Caesar ordered them to advance. Caesar states, "So great was the panic, and so suddenly did it seize upon all the army, that it affected in serious fashion the intelligence and the courage of all ranks." Caesar continues, "Some had even gone so far as to declare to Caesar that when he gave the order for camp to be shifted and standards advanced the soldiers would not obey, and by reason of cowardice would not move forward."[175] The scenario Caesar painted of his trembling men is believable enough. The Romans had a familiarity with the Gallic tribes. However, few if any of the legionaries had encountered Germans. Marius' war with the Cimbri was the most recent conflict against Germans (nearly five decades prior), and the first decade of the Cimbric War went quite poorly for the Romans until Marius received his command. Additionally, the Gallic friends of Rome held a great fear of the Germans, particularly Ariovistus. Caesar uses this opportunity in the narrative to deliver a speech to his men. Caesar notes within his speech that he does not need an army to face the Germans. Rather, Caesar and his Tenth Legion would march alone.[176] The speech, when taken at face value, works to inspire his army. In the larger context and with the understanding that both the Senate and people in Rome were going to read

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[173] Kurt A. Raaflaub, "Caesar and Genocide: Confronting the Dark Side of Caesar's Gallic Wars," *New England Classical Journal* 48, no. 1 (2021), 8.
[174] Appian, "From the Gallic History" in *Roman History* vol. I trans. by Horace White, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1958), 4.3; 103
[175] Caesar, *The Gallic War* 1.39; 61.
[176] Caesar, *The Gallic War* 1.40; 65

The Gallic War, the speech can be interpreted as a message meant for them – regardless of how large and intimidating the enemy, they should maintain their faith in Caesar. He uses the speech to craft his image in a particular light. Perhaps he remembered the speech verbatim by the time he sat to write Book I. Far more likely, however, he crafted his narrative in such a way that Rome was presented with an honorable and brave image of their dear leader. Furthermore, Caesar does not shy away from narrating the potential mutiny of his army. A mutiny, regardless of the reason, is cause for concern. However, his choice to include it in the narrative portrayed him as an honest reporter of the events, and created trust between himself and his audience. As Bryan James notes, "Yet if he can convince the audience of his authorial 'honesty', then he has taken one more step toward fashioning an audience for his text that is open to his own interpretations of events, while successfully adding the quality of openness to the collection of facts that constitute his public and historical persona."[177] To put it simply, if Caesar were to convince his audience of his honesty and openness, then they would be more likely to believe his personal narrative, which would allow Caesar the room to manipulate the story.

Furthermore, showcasing the legions' fear works to justify the actions Caesar subsequently took against Ariovistus. It gave Caesar an excuse to make an example of the tribes – one that both restores confidence and morale in his army and maintains the Senate's faith in his generalship and decision-making. After the final battle with Ariovistus, Caesar boasts about the near annihilation of Ariovistus' followers, including women and children. He states, "[A]ll the rest our cavalry caught and slew [those who fled]. There were two wives of Ariovistus…. [B]oth wives perished in the rout; of his two daughters one was slain, and the other taken prisoner." Ariovistus escaped; however, the Germans who managed to escape with him were scattered,

[177] Bryan James, "Speech, Authority, and Experience in Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 1.39-41," *Hermes* 1 (2000), 11.

without supplies, and away from their homelands across the Rhine. The campaign season of 58 was certainly a success, both for Rome and for Caesar's ambitions. Originally a humanitarian issue, Caesar's motivations for the destruction of the Helvetii were undoubtedly seen as acceptable in the eyes of the Senate. Additionally, little justification was needed to combat the Germans, particularly with Caesar's reminder that the Germans were the cause of Lucius Cassius' defeat in 107. However, as the campaign seasons continued and the Roman army ventured deeper into Gaul, Caesar's genocidal tendencies grew more prevalent, and the Senate, who originally turned a blind eye to the actions began to take note – particularly after what befell the Nervii, Usipetes, and Tencteri.

"Destroyed in Name and Race"

The term "Belgae," as used by Caesar, is a collective term that refers to the people of northern Gaul, in what is today Holland and northern France. Caesar makes the claim that the tribes of the Belgae conspired to challenge Roman power in central and southern Gaul. Much like the justification Caesar gave for his war against the Helvetii, such a claim would have been credible to the senate. The uprising of the Belgae was suppressed relatively quickly.[178] However, the Nervii, the largest of Belgic tribes, refused to surrender and launched their own offensive in an attempt to ambush Caesar and his legions.

Caesar states that the Nervii were both Gallic and German. Particularly, he notes that the Nervii claimed they were the only tribe to resist the Cimbri and Teutons. Secondly, Caesar claims that the Nervii were descendants of the Cimbri and Teutons who passed through Gaul,

[178] The entire campaign is narrated from 2.29-33.

which lead to the Cimbric War.[179] The correlation Caesar made between the Nervii and the Cimbri, whether factual or otherwise, was perhaps an attempt to portray the Nervii as more dangerous and of a higher priority than they may have been. If his claim was false, however, it was portrayed in such a way that Caesar received support from the Senate for his military campaign against them. Regardless of whether or not Caesar's claims were honest, the Nervii assembled a tribal confederation which consisted of the Atrebates, Atuatuci, and the Viromandui and marched toward their site of ambush.

The Nervii, who were the greatest in number prior to the battle, were almost entirely annihilated. As Caesar notes, "This engagement brought the name and nation of the Nervii almost to utter destruction."[180] This suggests that along with nearly all of the 60,000 fighting men of the Nervii, their baggage trains, along with women and children, were destroyed and killed. The Atuatuci, who had retreated from the battle, sought refuge in a nearby *oppidum* (a fortified town or city). The Atuatuci subsequently broke a peaceful truce and attempted to trap the Romans inside the *oppidum.* As a result, Caesar sacked the town and sold the entire population, some 53,000, into slavery.[181] Caesar is specific in placing the blame on the Belgic nations. Firstly, the Nervii refused surrender, and secondly, the Atuatuci broke their truce. Regardless, the Belgic rebellion resulted in the destruction of no less than two entire nations in less than a single campaign season: one via warfare and the second via enslavement. Caesar reported that Gaul was pacified once again, and the Senate celebrated such a victory with an "unprecedented" 15-day thanksgiving.[182] Like the celebration of Cicero after he executed

[179] Goldsworthy, *Caesar*, 238.
[180] Caesar, *The Gallic War* 2.28; 125.
[181] Caesar, *The Gallic War* 2.33; 133.
[182] K. M. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars 85-50 BC*, 38.

citizens without trial, the Senate hailed Caesar as a hero despite the annihilation of the Nervii (including women and children) and the enslavement of the entire Atuatuci.

The Genocide of the Usipetes and Tencteri

The Usipetes and Tencteri were Germanic tribes who, through no fault of their own, were forced to migrate across the Rhine and into northern Gaul. Forced away from Germania and across the Rhine, the Usipetes and Tencteri numbered nearly 430,000 and hoped for a peaceful respite from the Suebi. Perhaps the most notoriously fierce tribe in *The Gallic War*, the Suebi were conquering western Germania indiscriminately.[183] Once he heard of the migration of the Usipetes and Tencteri, Caesar moved quickly and refocused his advance deeper into Gaul and toward the two wandering tribes in 55. It was a repeat of both the Helvetii and Ariovistus' Germans. The fear for Rome was that a new, sovereign tribal entity would be persuasive enough, through diplomacy or violence, to sway regional Gauls to their cause. This had the potential to spawn a coalition with anti-Roman sentiments in Gaul. Caesar had already spent five or so years working to 'pacify' rebellious Gallic tribes. As a result of the migration, the Usipetes and Tencteri became Caesar's greatest priority.

The encounter began with a truce. A council made of the tribal leaders convened with Caesar and brought peaceful requests. They were willing to avoid conflict if they could first meet with the leadership of the Ubii, another Germanic tribe who peacefully settled west of the Rhine. Caesar denied these requests and continued to slowly creep his legions closer to the Germans' settlement. After several days of failed negotiations and the continued encroachment of Caesar and his legions, a skirmish ensued. The fight was short and little damage was done.

[183] Caesar, *The Gallic War* 4.1; 181.

However, in response, every member of the leadership council among the Usipetes and Tencteri met with Caesar for a good-faith apology and to continue the truce in the hopes of a successful negotiation.[184] Caesar ignored the truce and subsequently arrested every member of the tribal representation and quickly marched his legions to battle. Goldsworthy correctly characterized the ensuing violence as one sided. "The Usipetes and Tencteri were surprised and leaderless, so what followed was more of a massacre than a battle."[185] The men, caught by surprise and confusion, put up little resistance. If the number of 430,000 that Caesar gives is accurate, this implies that nearly 100,000 men were killed in the battle. The remainder of the tribal peoples, women, children, and elders, numbered some 300,000. Caesar summarizes his actions in a straightforward manner and does not shy away from the bluntness of what befell them. He states, "[T]he remainder, a crowd of women and children, began to flee in all directions, and Caesar dispatched the cavalry in pursuit." He continues, "The Romans, with not a man lost and but a few wounded, freed from the fear of a stupendous war—with an enemy whose numbers had been 430,000 souls—returned to camp." As always, these numbers should be met with skepticism. It is important to note, however, that the Senate and people of Rome were privy to these same figures. Therefore, despite understanding that a massacre of such magnitude would be seen by everyone in Rome, Caesar refused to shy away from the act itself. Philip Dwyer summarizes Caesar's nonchalant demeanor: "These strikingly similar examples, where the civilians in a camp or in wagons were vulnerable to attack, reveal clearly that Caesar felt no empathy for the plight of civilians caught up in the fighting, and in the last example he presents the women and children as legitimate military targets." He continues, "In fact Caesar seems to

[184] Goldsworthy, *Caesar*, 274.
[185] Goldsworthy, *Caesar*, 275.

have inspired his men to slaughter, since he sometimes personally led the charge to cut down fleeing non-combatants, and he boosts the impact of the numbers of the enemy killed by including the deaths of civilians in the overall tally."[186] His actions prior to what befell the Usipetes and Tencteri were, as a whole, deemed acceptable by the Senate. However, his most outspoken opponents maintained their opinion that Caesar needed to be restrained. None more so than Cato, who enthusiastically demanded Caesar be brought to Rome, tried, and handed over to the same Germans he had just slaughtered.

Marcus Porcius Cato (95-46), known as Cato Minor (*minor* distinguishes him from his great-grandfather Cato the Elder), was Caesar's most formidable political opponent. Notably, Cato practiced Stoic philosophy, which was the foundation upon which he conducted himself. A staunch conservative and strong opponent of corruption and personal ambition, he was tenacious in his criticism of Caesar throughout much of their political lives. While much of the Senate clamored about Caesar's success in Gaul, Cato and his conservative supporters sought to bring an end to Caesar and a war they believed was no longer just.

Cato took great issue with the fact that Caesar knowingly and willingly attacked the two Germanic tribes during a period of truce and without their leadership council which Caesar apprehended during their attempt at a peaceful apology. Cato went so far as to demand Caesar be handed to the Germans. Plutarch states, "Cato urged them to surrender Caesar to those whom he had wronged, and not to turn upon themselves, or allow to fall upon their city, the pollution of his crime."[187] He summarizes Cato's speech to the Senate shortly after the situation with the Usipetes and Tencteri. Plutarch states that "he declared that it was not the sons of Germans or

[186] Philip Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan, *Theatres of Violence: Massacre, Mass Killing and Atrocity Throughout History* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books Inc., 2003), 41.
[187] Plutarch, "Cato the Younger" in *Plutarch's Lives* trans. by Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1962), 51.1; 359.

Celts whom they [the Senate and civilians alike] must fear, but Caesar himself, if they were in their right minds."[188]

What Cato argued for was *deditio,* which was the surrender of a Roman citizen to the enemy who had been wronged. *Deditio* was the religious process whereby the Senate voted to send the wrongdoer to the fetial priests whose purpose was to decide whether or not actions, such as truces and warfare, were carried out with good faith. The priests then decided whether or not to send the wrongdoer to those who were wronged.[189] Cato argued that Caesar committed a breach of *fides* when he attacked the Germans, due to the truce that was in place. Additionally, Caesar's apprehension and bondage of the German councilmembers who sought to deliver an apology violated and mistreated the rights of peaceful ambassadors. Both cases were worthy of *deditio*. Plutarch's statement that Cato sought to rid the city of 'pollution' suggests that Cato believed *deditio* was absolutely necessary and that Caesar's breach of *fides* would undoubtedly bring misfortune from the gods. The Senate, as a whole, had no desire to hand over such a victorious commander as Caesar. Regardless, Cato's vitriol and continued criticism of Caesar was a threat to his *dignitas*. Additionally, Cato repeatedly argued for the prosecution of Caesar once he relinquished his *imperium*, which removed prosecutable protection. Despite Cato's efforts, the Senate continually entertained Caesar's actions, despite his breach of the Roman idea of a Just War.

[188] Plutarch, "Cato the Younger" 51.3-4; 244-5.
[189] Kit Morrell, "Cato, Caesar, and the Germani," *Antichthon: Journal of the Australian Socitey for Classical Studies; Adelaide* 49 (2015), para. 5-6.

Caesar's Abuse of the 'Just War'

The theory, or philosophy, of the Just War is something that still exists today. For example, rules of engagement followed by most militaries around the world state that only combatants are engaged with lethal force. Likewise, international treaties such as the Geneva Convention are supposed to ensure that a war is fought only when necessary, and against only those who are identified as enemy combatants. Our Just War theory today, in many ways, mirrors that of the Roman Just War philosophy. A series of necessary steps were taken to ensure a Roman war was legal, righteous, and fought in good faith. Caesar's actions in Gaul pushed, and at times violated, the boundaries of the Just War. He meticulously offered justifications for each action when the necessary steps of the Just War were not taken.

What was the Roman theory of Just War, and what were the requirements to legalize military conflict? Cicero tells us in *De Officiis (On Duties*), published in 44, that, "As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; and from this it may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made."[190] In other words, no war is just unless it has been reviewed and accepted by fetial priests, and must include an official notice, followed by a formal declaration. The fragmentary remains of Cicero's *De Republica* (*On the Republic*) claim, "Those wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation. For only a war waged for revenge or defense can actually be just."[191]

[190] Cicero, *De Officiis* trans. by Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1961), 1.36; 39.
[191] Cicero, *On the Republic*, 3.35.

In the case of the Helvetian migration, a formal declaration of war was not given, nor were the Helvetii outwardly aggressive toward Rome. However, Caesar creates for his readers a sense of revenge in the narrative of *The Gallic War* within the introduction to the war with the Helvetii. He craftily inserts the claim, not once but twice, that the Helvetii were responsible for the defeat of Lucius Cassius in 107. Furthermore, the narrative of the conflict with the Tigurini uses a similar theme of revenge. That is, the Tigurini were responsible for the defeat and death of Lucius Piso, Caesar's great-grandfather-in-law, in 107. He states, "And so, whether by accident or by the purpose of the immortal gods, the section of the Helvetian state which had brought so signal a calamity upon the Roman people was the first to pay the penalty in full."[192] By Caesar's own words, perhaps it was fate or divine intervention that led to revenge against the Tigurini. Cicero, too, justifies the war in Gaul with revenge. Andrew Riggsby notes, "Cicero had used this kind of historical reference to suggest that war with Gaul was in a sense ongoing and had been so for some time, that the Romans had not avenged, or at least had not adequately avenged, previous injuries (*iniuria*)."[193] The theme of treachery, and preemptive actions against treachery, weigh equally as heavily in *The Gallic War* as revenge.

Caesar justifies the massacre of the Usipetes and Tencteri due to their treacherous actions, despite Caesar's slow and steady aggression which provoked them. Despite the fact that Caesar gave them a deadline to discuss a truce amongst themselves and their leadership, he crept his army closer and closer to their *oppidum.* The slow, prolonged aggression took place during a period of ceased hostilities. Caesar, for his part, argues that he expected treachery, and therefore was correct in his preemptive strike.

[192] Caesar, *The Gallic War,* 1.12; 19.
[193] Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome,* 176.

Caesar recalls the deception the Germanic tribes used to claim the territory of the Menapii, in which his battle occurs, in chapter five of the fourth book. In short, the Usipetes and Tencteri feigned retreat and "pretended to retire to their own homes and districts."[194] It was the deception that allowed the Germans to catch the Menapii unaware. This same deception, as Caesar notes, influenced his skepticism regarding the Germans' attempted truce. He paints them as wholly untrustworthy and creates a situation that the reader can interpret as Caesar having no other option but to act as though they attempted to deceive him just as they had the Menapii. The small skirmish that ensued when the Germanic cavalry were metaphorically backed into a corner was of no great consequence. Few men, just seventy-four, were killed and afterwards the Germanic council met with Caesar's command to offer an apology.[195] Caesar responded with arrests and the massacre of the inhabitants of the *oppidum*. Perhaps Caesar lacked outright justification, hence his steady provocation. If Caesar's words are true, the Germans did indeed break the truce with the Cavalry skirmish. However, Caesar's advancement left them virtually no choice but to attempt to gain space with which to breathe. He skillfully created a situation, both in practice and in the narrative of the fourth book, wherein he was fully justified, though extremely over-the-top, in his actions. K.H. Lee summarizes the narrative of the encounter with the Germanic tribes in this manner: "In the foregoing fifteen chapters Caesar has skillfully tried to defend his behavior."[196]

At each potential misstep, Caesar offers a justification to meet the requirements of a Just War. This is peculiar. The Senate all but handed him carte blanche for the war in Gaul. The Roman audience undoubtedly supported such a campaign, as well. However, his use of

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[194] Caesar, *The Gallic War,* 4.5; 185.
[195] K.H. Lee, "Caesar's Encounter with the Usipetes and the Tencteri." *Greece & Rome* 16, no. 1 (1969), 3.
[196] Lee, "Caesar's Encounter with the Usipetes and the Tencteri," 4.

justifications, such as revenge and treachery, do not justify the initiation of the war, for which carte blanche applied. Rather, it was for the moments where Caesar appeared 'unjust' in his actions. The Senate, aside from Cato the Younger, not only accepted such behavior, but celebrated it. Why? As previously mentioned, Cicero believed that Gaul had not yet faced adequate revenge for past transgressions. Caesar equally reminded Romans of the death of Cassius and Piso. Additionally, he made careful and specific note that the Nervii, alone, both had defended against the Cimbri and Teutons at the end of the second century, and were from whom they descended. It was the residual *metus Gallicus* that Caesar exploited during the Gallic War. Perhaps Rome was in such a state, after centuries of the *metus*, that Caesar understood the Senate would tolerate such actions and the massacre of Germanic tribes or the indiscriminate and purposeful killing of non-combatants. It was the residual trauma and memory of the Gauls that spurred the Senate's willingness to tolerate not only genocide, but Caesar's ten-year proconsulship.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

A traumatic event, when experienced on a large social scale, has the ability to create a collective trauma that can and will influence the society that experienced it. Furthermore, the trauma is malleable and easily manipulated. Those in power can shift public opinion based on the ways in which they stoke the trauma. The sack of Rome in 390 BCE was such an event. Brennus imbedded a psychological scar of fear and trauma when he exclaimed "Woe to the vanquished!" at the steps of the Capitoline. It influenced all sectors of Roman society, and, at times, pushed Rome beyond what was culturally and traditionally acceptable.

The defeat at the Allia just prior to the sack of Rome was forever remembered as a Black Day on the Roman calendar. Businesses, for example, were closed due to the inauspiciousness of the anniversary. Additionally, after Camillus defeated Brennus' warband and recovered the ransomed loot, he was proclaimed the Second Founder of Rome for his victory. The title of Second Founder placed Camillus alongside Romulus as one of the two mythical founders of Rome. New legislative policies were made, including the declaration of *tumultus Gallicus*. The *tumultus Gallicus* was unique in that it was the only version of *tumultus* to press priests into military service, which suggests just how impactful a Gallic attack would have been. The sack, as describe by Livy, was also the genesis for the ritual ceremony *supplicia canum*. The punishment of the dogs lasted well into the days of the empire, more than five centuries later. The ceremony celebrated Juno's sacred geese that alerted the Roman soldiers who slept during Brennus' attack on the Capitoline and punished the dogs yearly for their failure to bark during the assault. Finally, the fear that the sack of Rome generated sparked the Senate's imperialistic ambitions.

The *metus* was mostly dormant during the Punic Wars. However, the 230s were a period of Gallic resurgence. Rome faced the threat of a second sack as pressure mounted from the Gallic coalition. As a result, and with little hope, the Romans sacrificed a male and female pair of Greeks and Gauls in 228 for a last-ditch effort to gain divine aid. It was a drastic departure from what was considered traditional. Livy went so far as to proclaim the process of human sacrifice as "scarcely Roman."[197] Slightly over a decade later, and after numerous defeats at the hands of Hannibal and broken Vestal vows, the Senate sacrificed humans for the second time in 216. The end result of the Punic Wars was a victory for Rome. Human sacrifice, however, was a drastic detour. It suggests that the fear and panic felt in Rome was of such magnitude that they willingly committed an act that was otherwise believed to be incomprehensible.

The Cimbri and Teutons wreaked havoc across Transalpine Gaul as the second century came to an end. From 114-104, Rome and her armies suffered devastating defeats that rocked the Senate. Rome's desperation grew after each defeated army and each consular death. Ultimately, Gaius Marius was elected to a five-year consecutive consulship to deal with the Cimbri. The nature of Marius' election itself suggests that the *metus* stirred. Marius was elected *in absentia*. This was rare, as the potential consuls were required by law to be present within Rome at the time of the elections. Furthermore, the Senate waived the requirement of a ten-year interim between consulships. Both traditions, the ten-year interim period and the required presence of a consular-elect, were disregarded as quickly as possible. After Marius won the Cimbric War, he was proclaimed the Third Founder of Rome which placed him within the pantheon of Camillus and Romulus, both mythical figures. This suggests that Marius' victory

[197] Livy, *Ab urbe Condita*, 22.57; 387.

against the Cimbri was of equal value to both Romulus' foundation of Rome and Camillus' rescue of the Capitoline.

Lastly, by the middle and end of the first century, the memory and trauma had transformed. Previously, the trauma manifested itself through grandiose, but sparse, events or actions. These included the three cases of human sacrifice in 228, 216, and 114-113, policy changes, and two additions to Romulus' pantheon. However, as Caesar began his war in Gaul, the memory and trauma were such that, regardless of the circumstances, the Senate allowed carte blanche to those who dealt with Gaul. Prior to Caesar's war in Gaul, the Senate accepted Cicero's executions of civilians during the Catilinarian conspiracy. Perhaps the executions of those who were deemed treasonous or terrorists were appropriate sentences. However, those who were executed by Cicero had no formal trial. As a result, the executions were, at the very least, rash and ill-thought out. At worst, however, the executions of Roman civilians without trial was shocking and illegal. Regardless, the Senate accepted Cicero's judgment and his call for execution. Why did the Senate overlook, or stand idly by, during the executions of Roman citizens without trial? Perhaps this was due, in part, to the potential threat of a Gallic rebellion under Catiline's leadership. The Allobroges inevitably placed their eggs in the Senate's and Cicero's baskets. However, the potential threat posed by an Allobroges rebellion was enough that Cicero and the Senate sought to end Catiline's conspiracy and revolution via any means necessary, including the execution of potential innocent civilians.

Much like Cicero's executions of citizens, the Senate repeatedly overlooked, accepted, and praised Caesar's actions in Gaul and Germania. Caesar routinely violated the idea of a Roman Just War, which included his indiscriminate killing of noncombatants and genocidal tendencies. Despite his actions, the Senate rewarded his behavior with triumphs and praise, so

much so that Caesar was handed a ten-year proconsulship in Transalpine Gaul. Such a long proconsulship suggests that there was not much that the Senate would deem unnecessary when it came to a war with Gaul. Caesar's proconsulship ensured that he retained command and full consular powers, despite his unsavory and illegal actions, if it meant the pacification of Gaul. To put simply, Rome was in such a state that any flinch that occurred in Gaul was met with the full might of the Roman hammer, even if it included what some, such as Cato the Younger, deemed an illegal war. Two notable examples of such events are the genocides of Nervii in 57, and the genocides of the Usipetes and Tencteri in 55. In each case, Caesar violated the notions of a Just War. As a result, he offered justifications for his actions which reflected the responsibility of the destruction of the tribes back onto themselves. The Senate, for their role, allowed Caesar to conduct himself in such a manner, as long as Gaul was pacified. Cicero, himself, claimed that Gaul had not received an adequate punishment, or that Rome had not avenged previous Gallic transgressions to the fullest.[198] This suggests that as much as the war in Gaul provided Caesar a foundation upon which to gain acclaim, it equally provided the Senate with their own retribution, as long as it was Caesar who got his hands dirty.

The initial sack of Rome in 390 created a collective trauma that permeated all facets of Roman life. It left behind a psychological scar that influenced and persuaded the Senate, consuls, and the people of Rome. Additionally, it was partially responsible for alterations within the political and religious sectors of society. The Senate and those in power manipulated the memory of the sack however they saw fit. One can use the sack of Rome as a case study for the ways in which a society responds to a traumatic event. Furthermore, the ways in which the memory and trauma manifested itself was dependent on those who stoked the trauma. The Gauls

[198] Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome*, 176.

quickly became “the Other” and were the focus of Rome’s vengeance many generations after the sack. If we can understand how humans behave in the aftermath of a traumatic event, we can better prepare for and respond to the traumatic events of our contemporary world.

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