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TWO-LEVEL GAME

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TRANSNATIONAL AUDIENCE COSTS: RHETORIC, CONSTITUENTS, AND THE
TWO-LEVEL GAME

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY THE COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF

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*To my children,
May you create a better world than the one we left you*

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Transnational Audience Costs:
Rhetoric, Constituents, and the Two-Level Game

by
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Professor Colin Barry, Chair

How do domestic audiences respond to belligerent rhetoric by foreign leaders? I argue that when leaders of countries that are historically adversarial engage in belligerent rhetoric directed at the adversary it has a detrimental effect on the perception of the opposing state. This generates transnational audience costs which are costs created by foreign rhetoric and imposed on the domestic political leadership. These costs constrain the range of decisionmaking of domestic leaders that can hamper future cooperation. Advancing our understanding of the role that citizens play in shaping state foreign policy is important to more accurately identifying the components that shape the international system.

To identify this phenomenon, I have developed a novel method to examine elements of survey and discursive data that highlights the intersection between rhetoric, bilateral relations, and state-society relations. Specifically, I look at available survey data, media coverage, and individual interest over time via search inquiries to identify how interested people are in what others are saying about their country and how their political leadership's position toward the

other changed following the use of hostile rhetoric. Through three empirical chapters I cover a diverse range of historical rivalries to demonstrate the range of states and relationships transnational audience costs are present in. In the dissertation I look at the China-Japan, India-Pakistan, and Greece-Turkey relationships and how the effect of rhetoric on domestic audiences changed each's perception of the other over the time period of 2010-2019.

I conclude by outlining how I will continue to develop both the model and method used in this dissertation for use in future research. The preliminary findings presented in this dissertation highlight the importance of understanding the mutual constitutivity or inherent endogeneity of interactions at the state and international levels. Understanding this dynamic is critical to satisfactorily deepening our understanding of the effects of globalization across all levels of analysis and all players in the international system. With the diversification of ideas across the international system and their permeation of closed societies, global citizens have exposure to greater access to information and ideas to inform how they interact with their governments.

Chapter 1

Introduction

“Telling it like it is” or speaking one’s mind about issues regarding foreign policies with our arch-rivals is an ever present but recently louder stump tactic used by politicians and political elites across the world. More importantly, it is a *successful* tactic that comes at a seemingly low cost to benefit. Ranging from the hourly tweets of the 45th president of the United States, to the feelings of the mayor of Shanghai toward Japan, the outrage of Brazilian policymakers about the audacity of Argentinians to challenge the superiority of Pelé over all other soccer players in history, to Pakistani claims of a Hindu Nationalist agenda to annihilate Islam on the Indian Subcontinent or Greek rhetoric on the nonsensical claims by the Turks regarding sovereignty over Cyprus, these narratives are examples of micro-level exchanges bilaterally between pairs of states that aggregated, make up part of an increasingly *global* conversation between humans.

However, there is often a cost to engaging in this type of rhetoric. This cost has broader implications for the international system as a whole and our collective understanding of it. Before identifying these costs though, first the interrelational costs between the pair of participants needs to be addressed. The intersectionalism of identities that comprise a state often times place regimes and/or governments into a position where they must stay true to a narrative and use rhetoric about some “other” that, while we outsiders may find completely meaningless, is an integral part of their ontological identity (Mitzen, 2006). This is especially true in dyads, pairs of states, where one or more regime is either an autocracy or new democracy, and where there is an enduring rivalry present (Goertz and Diehl, 1993). With that said, national leaders often become trapped or locked in to a constructed narrative that deviation from would generate

audience costs. Audience costs in this specific sense, being the costs imposed by constituencies for deviating from the accepted public narrative.

Reflecting on the substantial literature about security dilemmas, spiral theory in international relations, and threat balancing, it seems logical that this would exacerbate tensions within these dyads. Further, given what we know about audience costs, the costs imposed on leaders by their real constituency for deviating from the institutionalized narrative of the regime, we can imagine that assuming these costs occur, that belligerent rhetoric may generate them within the dyad. Most interesting perhaps, is that not only may adherence to a domestic narrative have audience costs associated with it, but it may also generate reciprocal audience costs within the domestic space of the *other's* audience. *This* observation is the substance of this dissertation.

The puzzle I have identified, and the question I ask has a very modest goal. Does belligerent domestic rhetoric create audience costs for the “other’s” government and/or political regime? In this dissertation I explore this question with the specific purpose of probing the boundaries of existing theory, as well as contributing my own conclusions, to determine the presence of what I call transnational audience costs. They are transnational in that, purposefully or not, talking tough about how the rival should be handled may create concerns for the constituency within that rival state. This audience is not an official representative of the state nor does it interact with other states on their behalf. Therefore, their presence exists outside the control of the state they may physically exist within. To illustrate: if tribe A and tribe B are neighbors, and tribe A beats a war drum when preparing to attack tribe B, if members of tribe B hear tribe A beating the war drum, they will look upon their own leaders to prepare a response, whether that be preemptive action, or building defenses to stymie any anticipated attack. The dynamic of pressure placed on the leaders of tribe B by their members indirectly gives the

members a seat at the bargaining table with the leaders of the tribes, independent of those leaders.

I hypothesize that because of access to more information, regardless of whether it is factual or not, belligerent rhetoric does in fact create transnational audience costs within the rival state. However, given the multifaceted nature of theoretical assumptions built into this framework or model, the agenda for this dissertation is modest insofar as my ambition is to establish the plausibility of this phenomenon and identify its presence if possible. Furthermore, while I engage in supposition as to the source of greater information, it is not the focus of my hypothesis. What I focus on is whether or not the phenomenon is occurring. Does the real selectorate in state B react when the leader of state A engages in threatening rhetoric directed at state B? I assert that to the extent that I am able to fully identify and define it in this dissertation, it serves a simple purpose as a pilot for a broader body of work, therefore as a plausibility probe that will be followed by an even more robust and testable model in future iterations based leaping the following existing hurdles. 1) this is a largely new approach to understanding the two-level game, bargaining, and the relationship between bargaining and intersubjectivity that may not seem intuitive at first glance. 2) greater funding is needed to conduct the necessary field work and collect a moderately large sample of survey data to refine and reinforce the method of analysis I use in this dissertation. And 3) the framework I propose in this dissertation needs the refinement that only multiple iterations of peer review can provide.

That said, the broad agenda of this dissertation is ambitious insofar as building a foundation for a new body of work to build upon. It is important in its timeliness because our access to information and global interconnectivity as a result of technological innovations has fundamentally changed. This change has either created or revealed that transnational forces play

a much greater role in interactions, transactions, and perception of ourselves, each other, and the system than we have previously realized¹. In light of this, we must evaluate social behavior with an understanding that acknowledges from its starting point that audiences behave with greater awareness of how the world works than scholarship has typically done up to this point. And if not actual awareness, then at least a subconscious sensitivity of social structure. Past work has almost exclusively viewed audiences as a tool or a mechanism used by agents, whether it be political regimes or elite interests, overlooking the agency that audiences/selectorates themselves have. I demonstrate in the following chapters that proximal or passive indicators such as search engine analytics in conjunction with public opinion survey data and the intensity of media attention offers an improved approach for understanding the relationship between constituencies and rhetoric and how that shapes policy while avoiding many of the pitfalls from regime manipulation of the findings in our scientific inquiries. To be concise, I combine existing methods for data collection with search engine analytics as a proximal indicator to contribute to a less politically vulnerable and more stable barometer of audience beliefs and/or preferences.

There is a great deal of foundational work to be done within this document for future work to build off of. Returning to the narrower research question that is the focal point of the dissertation however, I investigate the role that transnational audiences play in shaping the two-level game. I weigh the plausibility of my hypothesis by examining the presence or lack thereof of this phenomenon in three empirical chapters, each consisting of one dyad, or pair of states. The one constant component that must exist in each dyad in the framework presently is an enduring rivalry. With that single prerequisite aside, my findings are generalizable and reveal

¹ I do not mean social media specifically when referring to technological change and access to information. Speaking from experience, social media as a source for information is unreliable and vulnerable to interpreting regime driven astroturfing as grassroots information diffusion.

that transnational audiences play a significant role in shaping not only a state's foreign policy, but the international system as a whole.

In identifying how transnational audience costs function within this diverse selection of dyads, future research can then extend out to pursue more ambitious goals, such as identifying linkages that work around the existing historical rivalry requirement. Refining the model to eliminate this prerequisite would enhance generalizability even further. This would expand our understanding of how transnational audience costs work beyond what this study is capable of. Additionally, these findings justify expending greater resources in terms of time and funding to continue improving this methodological approach to achieve an even greater degree of rigor than what is used in this pilot study.

In addition to the novel contributions of this model, I continue building upon a growing body of work that examines how and when leaders are held accountable, whether democratic or autocratic, and how leaders utilize their publics to strengthen their domestic political position. The scholarship I advance in this dissertation is a focus not on the dynamic between elites or policymakers and *their* domestic audience, but rather, what impact their rhetoric has on the *adversary's* policymakers and their domestic audiences. My approach to this literature is straightforward. Rhetoric is critical to the continued legitimacy of political elites across the cultural and institutional spectrum,² and they will say what is necessary to stay in power, regardless of their power to actually deliver. Further, in contrast to one of the ideas presented by the original framers of the audience costs literature, there are not always substantial costs to be paid for not following through. Because rhetoric has an institutional and cultural context, the

² This phenomenon takes place in all cultures and is practiced by decisionmakers and political elites across all formal governmental institutions, regardless of whether the rhetorician has the power to fulfill promises made or not.

nuance of instrumental or utilitarian rhetoric is trapped into being simultaneously subjective and intersubjective. Rhetoric can have a subjective meaning within a state, which is internal intersubjectivity, however it may also be lost in translation from the original words spoken from elite to audience to what is interpreted by the adversary's elites and audience. Or, as is usually the case, there is another layer of intersubjectivity of the rhetoric between state and society in both states in the dyad.

Some of the language of this phenomenon has been widely discussed within other areas of political science such as the study of American Politics, this calculus has overlap with ideas in international relations that should be incorporated or linkages be made (Mueller, 1973; Mayhew, 1974; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2004, 2011). My theoretical contribution is most relevant to the area of the international relations bargaining literature focusing on the role of domestic politics in international relations over the last thirty years. I contribute to a continued effort to build linkages between Putnam's 1988 article on two-level games, and continuing through the 90s, 2000s, and 2010s by scholars including James Fearon, Jessica Weeks, and Jessica Chen Weiss on audience costs. As domestic coalitions and politics become more polarized and partisan, political elites increasingly deflect popular frustration toward long-term rivals and/or newly emerging opponents (Mueller, pp 196 – 204).

Scholars within this literature argue that states bargain with each other to come to agreements of one sort or another. In the case of high stakes deals, when the public is aware, they become a player at the table as well. While national foreign policy leaders are the actors physically sitting in the chairs at this bargaining table, a multitude of domestic actors are keeping tabs on negotiations at home in this two-level game (Putnam, 1988). Other scholars have

identified that *democratic* national leaders are held accountable to domestic audiences³ during the negotiation or bargaining process (Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007), and a subsequent wave of scholars have expanded the scope of this literature to identify and include authoritarian states with certain characteristics (Weeks, 2008; Weiss, 2013). These domestic constituencies, within states ranging from the most democratic to even the most tightly controlled authoritarian states, possess real costs and consequences for leaders who make unfavorable agreements and/or appear weak with/to other states (Weeks, 2014). Extrapolating on Bueno de Mesquita's selectorate theory, even dictators are subject to a selectorate of some form.

The existing literature on audience costs has been substantiated frequently enough to be a reliable platform for use as a major component in the foundation of this framework. States collide, creating friction in the form of a dispute that requires a resolution, either cooperatively or aggressively. Regardless, leaders meet, discuss the options, and either come to some form of agreement, or in rare cases, engage in conflict whether it be a military action, a trade war, or some other form of aggression intended to cause material harm to the other. In the pages that follow I examine another aspect and group dynamic that is taking place during this process: the words that leaders are saying to their constituencies back home on the other side of the two-level game, and how that rhetoric informs the adversary's audience of the other leader's true feelings and intentions; and thus, the pressure that places on their leaders at the bargaining table.

How this rhetoric affects the adversary's domestic audience and their leaders sitting at the negotiating table contributes to relations between these two states within both this dyad.

Although I do not address it in this document, in future research I will examine the influence of

³ A political leader's home constituency who is receiving, processing, and interpreting the manner the national leader at the bargaining table is conducting his or herself in terms of representing their interests, as well as their collective conception of their national identity.

transnational audiences over multilateral organizations and within the international system as a whole as well. More generally, and returning to my research question, I take a step back and examine the attitudinal environment that has been shaped vis-à-vis domestic political rhetoric both prior, and following, the dispute resolution process. As I reveal in the subsequent chapters, there are times when belligerence is inherent to the very existence of the state, such as in the case of India and Pakistan, and in those cases, the question changes slightly to: why do they keep going?

The examination that follows in my empirical chapters, I use a method I have developed on my own largely using proximal indicators that inform us on how the dynamic of transnational audience costs function and vary from dyad to dyad. This method serves as a sufficient tool for establishing the plausibility of the presence of transnational audience costs and if they do exist, what should be done moving forward. It serves as a useful low financial cost method for justifying future funding into research in this area that will require a substantial amount of survey data and field work. I look at international news sources, domestic news sources, governmental press releases, survey data, search term interest over time, and more where available. This often includes drawing upon exemplars of statements by officials and citizens that fall within the scope of this study. I call this method a Survey, Media, Search (SMS) Analysis. I use the information gleaned from this method to make a case to justify further investment into my model through the examination of three dyads in three empirical chapters. I examine the Sino-Japanese dyad, the Indo-Pakistani dyad, and the Greco-Turkish dyad.

My empirical chapters reveal two very important observations. First, threat perception is often fueled by belligerent rhetoric from the leaders of a historical rival. And second, that audiences are capable of *deescalating* their leaders' responses instead of only escalating them

which previous literature has focused on. Belligerent rhetoric has been a pervasive contributor to exacerbating preexisting tensions and mistrust by parties in both states across all three dyads. Further, it has been words and shared histories, not a material balance of power, or preexisting cultural social constructs or “clashes of civilizations” that contributed to this spiral. Belligerent rhetoric is especially problematic given how attractive it is instrumentally to drum up general support and legitimacy by political leaders with their constituencies. While the audience costs literature has its detractors (Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Shultz, 2001), it has been resilient in illuminating the peculiarities of how states interact with one another.

Up to this point, no study has systematically examined the effect that belligerent rhetoric has on the relationship dynamic between the adversary’s state-society dynamic and how *that* dynamic influences foreign relations. Prior to my work, there has been a multitude of peripheral studies; however, nothing has exclusively targeted this dynamic. Previous work in various literatures has identified five related phenomena: 1) political elites use belligerent rhetoric to rally their constituency, especially their base within it (Mueller 1973; Goddard 2015; Goddard and Krebs 2015; Krebs; 2015). 2) Belligerent rhetoric is one component of a formula in a state’s calculus of its threat perception toward another state (Walt 1987). 3) Rhetoric is institutionalized as a component of the narrative a regime is held to by its citizens (Hopf 2012; Mitzen 2006; Gries 2004; Goode 2012). 4) Another is the general idea of audience costs. States harness their state-society dynamic to signal their resolve on a policy dispute to the other party in the dispute (Putnam, 1988; Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008; Weiss, 2013). And 5) Enduring rivalries create unique conditions to generate tension between dyads (Goertz and Diehl, 1993; 1995).

Although one can infer my thesis via the combination of these explanations with the audience costs literature, nothing has systematically focused on *specifically* how the dynamic that exists between a state and society is affected by external belligerent rhetoric. To rephrase that, prior literature has not focused on how what you as a leader say to your constituents shapes the type of pressure the other leader's constituents are going to place on them. Goddard and Krebs make the case that leaders are primarily concerned with maintaining legitimacy at home and practice legitimation strategies through narratives intended to maintain public support (Goddard and Krebs, 2015; Goddard, 2015; Krebs, 2015). In contrast to my argument, their work places a much larger emphasis on the domestic side of decision making and how it affects the state's foreign policy and shapes the international system. They focus on narratives used by leaders to maintain public support and heavily emphasize the resonance these narratives have within mass politics. So, while similar in many ways, Goddard and Krebs are inward looking whereas my work focuses on essentially a third dynamic, not inward between state and society, not state to state, but other society to other state, to put it crudely. Synthesizing this with another theme that builds an intersection to mine is Stephen Walt's. Albeit less direct than the other approaches, Walt's examination of state threat perception takes rhetorical strategies into consideration in terms of how states weigh foreign threat however the calculus he uses to examine threat and response to it relies more heavily on material capabilities than my own (Walt, 1987).

On the opposite end of the spectrum, scholars such as Jennifer Mitzen and Ted Hopf focus more directly on the state society dynamic. The case of Jennifer Mitzen's work focuses on ontological security as an explanation for why states find themselves in tension with one another. By ontological security, Mitzen is highlighting the presence of two phenomenon. First, that

agents base their feeling of security on how they believe reality works. And second, that the destabilization of a society's ontological security creates chaos, incentivizing leaders to adhere to an existing narrative regardless of whether or not they personally agree with it. This is important in the process of narratives being institutionalized. In this is an explanation of rationality in terms of explaining leader behavior. In addition to the utility of her ontological security model as a means of explaining the rationality of a state's preference for conflict, it is also useful in understanding the legitimation strategies state leaders utilize and direct toward their target audience. The two-level game between state and society is also exercising a form of ontological security in that a leader garners coalitional support from their domestic audience through successful legitimation strategies. This reduces audience uncertainty, and simultaneously, audience resonance reduces leadership uncertainty. As Ted Hopf explains in more depth, this two-way line of communication is important in understanding institutional configurations specific to states and/or nations in that both originate/exist within the same societal construct and are thus both aware of and likely share, the same norms and values that determine regime legitimacy (Hopf, 2012).

Hopf's thesis focuses even more exclusively on the linkages between state and society. His work captures what Taeku Lee similarly calls a two-way flow of political communication (Lee, 2002), also in many ways similar to John Zaller's Receive-Accept-Send (RAS) model of communication (Zaller, 1992). Based on this approach, Hopf argues that neither state nor society behave within a vacuum. The behaviors of each are contingent upon feedback loops or interaction from the other. The state, comprised of individuals socialized within the society of analysis, behave contextually to that society. Society, on the other hand, governs a *logic of appropriateness* for all who are plugged into it, and in terms of legitimacy, a *logic of*

consequence for deviations from appropriate behaviors and practices. This translates into policymaking that is constrained by society, even within authoritarian states. In sum, the primary distinction between the framework I propose here in contrast to the work of the scholars I have mentioned is the unit of analysis. We are examining a very similar, if not identical phenomenon, the primary distinction between my argument and these is the metatheoretical foundation the argument is built upon. My work intends to advance the dialogue in a specific sub-section of the impact rhetoric has on perception, focusing more on the mid-level rather than meta, and more importantly the relationship between a state and society in reaction to that of the external rather than internal. In layman's terms, from the perspective I am examining, the dialogue between elites and their audience would essentially be, "they have insulted and humiliated us, now what are you going to do about it?"

Key to the remainder of my theoretical proposal is the clarification of key concepts in subsequent chapters. First, to generalize and summarize the evolution of the audience costs literature, Fearon originally proposed, and Tomz later quantified, the observation that democratic leaders have an advantage in the bargaining process with other states due to the accountability that domestic elites, as well as their constituency, may hold them to if they talk tough and do not follow through. Weeks expands on this, that aside from autocrats with total control over all facets of the government, authoritarian regimes are held accountable to domestic audiences as well. This has since been expanded on even further, that *leaders*⁴ can utilize domestic audiences instrumentally in the bargaining process at the international level to signal constraints they face in compromising (Fearon; Weeks; Weiss). The state can manipulate the public to be either more supportive or more hostile to an issue that leaders are striving to make a deal on with other states.

⁴ Democrats and autocrats

By rhetoric, I mean instrumentalist discourse used to persuade an audience about the value of some action, the legitimacy of their governance, the validity of their candidacy, or a policy they are promoting. In simpler terms, rhetoric is a form of socially constructive *persuasive* speech utilized to achieve a specific outcome by the speaker (White, 1984). I will go into significantly more depth with these concepts as well as every other key concept of my model in my research design for the dissertation in the following chapter.

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 presents the research design to be used as a framework for evaluating my three empirical chapters. In it I clearly define variables and refine the framework to be as informative as possible within the exploratory constraints of the current iteration of my model. The biggest takeaway in this dissertation is in where in the bargaining dynamic we are identifying audience costs, who is causing them, and who the costs would be imposed upon. While a clearly identified dependent and independent variable are necessary features of any scholarly work, my objective in this dissertation is to identify a critical mechanism associated with the dependent variable rather than focusing on the strength of the relationship between the two itself. The two will always be important but the strength of this exploratory research is in attempting to pinpoint the location and intensity of *this* type of audience costs are. My model as it is presented is my current progress in capturing the sentiment and salience of audiences resting on the assumption of other foundational scholarship in this research area. As I will elaborate on in subsequent paragraphs, the key idea is that leadership behavior is constrained by audience costs. I will go into more depth explaining what audience costs are in subsequent chapters as well. What the costs are and the consequences of activating them are not the focus of my research, simply identifying them in the location within the dyad I am looking for them in is my purpose in this research. With that

said, I will briefly summarize the linkage between audience costs and the IV and DV in past literature, and then summarize the distinct direction I am exploring for future research.

The fundamental concept of what audience costs are does not differ in my research from the traditional scholarship. Audience costs exist within the bargaining literature. However, what we are looking at are similar concepts located in very different parts of the bargaining process. In past literature, audience costs are the perceived costs by leaders in state B that leaders in state A face as a result of tying their own hands via public statements signaling their resolve to not back down from a bargaining position. Put another way, state A and state B are trying to come to an agreement. State A has a specific preference they are not willing to compromise on. In order to signal to state B that they are unwilling to compromise, they will make statements that they want state B to perceive as hand tying statements where by publicly stating what they are willing and unwilling to accept, because their domestic constituency has the power to impose costs on them, they cannot back down from the statements they have made and thus their future bargaining position is constrained due to their intentional, self-inflicted, bargaining strategy. Typically, we should expect that the leaders in state A, who are tying their hands in this process are fairly confident about the actual costs that may be imposed on them. Regardless though, the costs themselves are not important, the act of engaging in this strategy, and the leaders of state B's *perception* that the audience costs state A have imposed on themselves are *credible* is what is important. In this context, the independent variable is state A signaling what they are willing and unwilling to accept through the bargaining process and the dependent variable is state B's response. Does state A's signaling change their position on the outcomes they are willing to agree to? Audience costs are a tool at state A's disposal to signal their unwillingness to compromise, *assuming that state B believes the costs are real.*

In contrast, in my model, I identify a phenomenon that exist on the other side of the bargaining process.⁵ In this exploratory model I propose that rhetoric that leaders in state A engage in, for whatever reason, is the independent variable and that it ties the hands of leaders in state B in terms of future bargaining engagements with state A. These are still audience costs but essentially an inverse of what has previously been explored. The audience costs I am looking at are the constraints placed on leaders in state B by rhetoric used by leaders in state A. Again, this research is still in the exploratory phase as I continue developing and refining the method for examining and testing this. However, the implications are substantial in terms of highlighting how speech acts leaders have no control over may constrain the options at their disposal when engaging in bilateral relations, as well as more substantive work on audience/selectorate agency further down the line. In my model the audience costs exist within state B and constrain the bargaining position of state B's leaders. State A engages in rhetoric for a multitude of possible reasons but what is important to my argument is that 1) it constrains the options available to leaders in state B when bargaining with state A, and 2) more importantly, these costs, or perceived costs, or how constrained the options state B has, are less certain for the leaders in state A engaging in the rhetoric. State A may or may not even be aware that the rhetoric they are engaged in is constraining their counterparts in how they are able to bargain in the future. The key part of this is that there is no way that leaders in state A can know for certain what effect their rhetoric is going to have in terms of hand tying for the leaders of state B. They may very well be counting on hand tying to occur, but they cannot know for certain to what extent that will occur.

⁵ I will touch on the idea throughout the model that this is applicable to other areas of dyadic interactions as well.

The important takeaway is in where the audience costs are located and who, how and why they are constraining leaders. The question I ask is: does rhetoric used by leaders in state A tie the hands of the leaders of state B insofar as their bargaining options with state A? In this model, audience costs are a consequence of state A's rhetoric rather than a tool for state A to signal their resolve, and they may not even be aware it has occurred. Therefore, in my model the independent variable is rhetoric in state A and the dependent variable is the creation of an audience cost mechanism or constraint on policy options available to state B's leaders for bargaining with state A. The overarching exercise in this stage of the theory development is identifying the appropriate data to collect as well as the most effective way to analyze and test it. For one thing, empirical case selection must avoid as Tomz phrases it, the problem of how to "study audience costs directly while avoiding the problem of selection bias" (Tomz, 2007). For another, the phenomenon I am looking at is not domestic politics but rather is transnational so requires a more flexible methodology that avoids the pitfalls of attempting to use a method that works in democracies that does not work in autocracies. What is required is a novel method that can capture, as unskewed by regime management as possible, samples of audience attitudes, and the sentiments and the saliency of their views on the issue associated with the constraint/cost. The preliminary cases I have utilized in this dissertation highlight some potential avenues for refining the overall model moving into more rigorous research down the line.

Additionally, I more deeply explore rhetoric conceptually, as well as in practice. The word rhetoric is frequently used but rarely operationalized. To avoid conceptual stretching or ambiguities, I fully operationalize rhetoric and define its role in the bargaining process, specifically its role influencing the *adversary's* state-society dynamic. I then fully explain my method and emphasize its preliminary and exploratory focus at this point in development, why

the cases I have selected are useful for this exercise, and how they are useful for continuing to develop and refine the method for rigorous (but very expensive) research and findings in future research. Within this document, the method is highly illustrative but illuminates avenues for continued exploration to best capture the dynamics of this model within robust and fully developed cases. As exploratory as the current version of my method is, it does its job well, which is to support continuing this line in inquiry moving forward. Lastly, the conclusion of chapter 2 offers further clarity of the contents of the subsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter 3 examines the Sino-Japanese dyad. In it I examine the history of the two countries, how their trajectories changed following their forceful opening by the West, and how their relations with one another changed as a result. I then focus the remainder of the chapter on how this past led to the contemporary narrative between the two countries and why they are often as hostile to one another as a result of this history. Chapter 4 examines the Indo-Pakistani dyad. In it I examine the fundamental components of the relationship and powerful historical linkage between the two to uncover why the relationship between the two is so complicated. I begin with the history between Muslims and Hindus on the subcontinent, examine the partition between India and Pakistan, the dissolution of East and West Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh, and examine the dispute over Kashmir. My analysis and the method I employ provides context for the hostile narrative within the dyad that never seems to wane. In chapter 5 I look at the Greco-Turkish dyad. I focus on the circumstances of Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire, the construction of a Turkish identity tied to a geographical state following World War 1, the relationship between the two in the interim between World Wars 1 and 2, post-war relations, the dispute over Cyprus, and the continued off and on, mostly on, dislike for one another over time. This case stands out because it offers the most complex case insofar as political regimes are

concerned. Further, it illustrates that not all audience costs escalate tensions. This aspect is important because if the framework is capable of greater generalizability, the roots for this should be present within this dyad. Finally, in chapter 6 I discuss the implications of this phenomenon in the context of its theoretical contribution generally speaking, dyadic relationships more generally, and international relations systemically. I also lay out my agenda for future research moving forward from this document. Finally, I conclude the dissertation in this chapter and summarize the content and narrative covered throughout the previous chapters.

Chapter 2: The Externalization of the Two-Level Game

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I lay out the theoretical foundation for my model and research design for how I will execute it throughout the remainder of the dissertation. The question I ask and explore is simple. Within a dyad, a pair of states, what effect does domestic belligerent rhetoric by one state have on their adversary's state-society dynamic. I will get into this notion of "domestic belligerent rhetoric" and "state-society dynamic" in the concepts section, but I'll break this question down more first. For a simple illustration, State A and State B are at a bargaining table. State A consists of its national leadership, A^1 and its constituency/audience, A^2 . State B consists of its national leadership, B^1 and its constituency/audience, B^2 . So, to break the question down into more manageable pieces, First, what are the consequences of belligerent rhetoric that A^1 uses, assumed in this mode to be intended to rally A^2 around their bargaining position, with B on the relationship between B^1 and B^2 ? Further, what constraints and audience costs does rhetoric in state A place on the leadership in State B (B^1) in how it will proceed to interact with A? In this chapter I develop a model for identifying and measuring this phenomenon.

This model is cradled within Putnam's two-level games model and given greater depth and nuance using an expanded conceptualization of James Fearon's audience costs theory. It does this by identifying when this phenomenon occurs, the extent or severity of it, and demonstrates how this phenomenon can be observed and tested methodically. I expand on this systematic historical scrutiny of each dyad with a method I have developed to address many shortcomings, gaps, resource strained institutions that fund research, as well as current restrictions on freedom of movement. This is my SMS Analysis framework which I will discuss in section 2.4 on methodology.

My model makes five basic assumptions: 1) that political constituencies, regardless of regime type, possess a mechanism for holding policymakers accountable for their decisions. This is the foundation of where the audience costs literature comes into play. 2) Both democratic and authoritarian leaders consciously utilize the perceived efficacy of audience costs to improve their bargaining position in bilateral relations.⁶ 3) The state and society of the adversary is aware of this dynamic to a sufficient degree that it affects their perception of threat from the other. 4) At the very least, in states with historical rivalries, there is an unintentional blowback effect in the targeted state which is the core of this dissertation, which I define as transnational audience costs. And 5) Regardless of whether leaders in the state that initiated the rhetorical brinkmanship are aware of these transnational audience costs, their rhetoric forms an institutionalized narrative that creates legitimacy costs if they deviate from it. A small caveat to this, to address an excellent point regarding audience costs by Snyder and Borghard (2011), though not explored in this dissertation, there is *some* threshold of believability, or a tether to reality might be a better way to phrase it, in terms of the credibility of belligerent rhetoric domestically. Further, though the institutionalization of legitimized narratives is itself an interesting subject worthy of exploration, and that I have investigated myself in the past, it is not the foci of this dissertation. My focus in this text is on the ripple effect in state B that rhetoric tailor made by leaders in state A for audience consumption in state A has on the audience in state B's threat perception.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I identify the meaning and boundaries of the key concepts I use throughout the dissertation. In some cases, the way I define these concepts may differ from how a previous author intended them or how the reader may understand them. I believe this disconnect happens much more frequently in the sciences than we

⁶ Evidence validating the existence of audience costs will be discussed sufficiently later in this chapter.

appreciate so eliminating or at least mitigating the impact of this misunderstanding as much as possible is something I actively engage in my work. I then discuss the theoretical assumptions I make in this text, how I understand key theories and models to function, how I synthesize them within my model, and what I contribute to the broader collective understanding of them in the social sciences. I then proceed to ground this discussing directly and concisely within my model to thoroughly explain it and define its parameters and boundaries. Finally, I outline and build my research design. I identify the dyads I have selected to examine in my empirical chapters, justify their selection, and go into further detail on why the approach I use in this text is the most appropriate for this framework in the present. Further, I explain my logic and justification for the data and evidence I use in my method for examining the dyads in the empirical chapters. I conclude by providing an outline for the structure and content on the empirical chapters that comprise the remaining substantive chapters of the dissertation.

2.2 Concepts

This section serves as a reference sheet of sorts that readers may refer back to throughout the document to refresh their understanding of how, and why if explained here, I am using a concept, what I mean when I use it, why I am using it in that manner and why that concept and not another. Again, while this process is often tedious for both the writer and reader, it is imperative that both build an intersubjective understanding of the meaning of words in context in text. By *intersubjective* I mean that a concept or idea has shared meaning between participants. This is in contrast to objective, which some would argue does not exist, but regardless, implies a collective understanding of a concept or idea by all, and subjective which is the way that a single entity understands a concept or idea internal to itself. While many of these are commonly used words within the discipline of political science and sociology variations and conceptual

stretching inevitably occurs over time. I have already provided a preliminary discussion of most of these ideas in a general sense in my introductory chapter, however, in this section I will identify them with more nuance and context insofar as how and why they are important components in my broader model. Put differently, this section devotes additional space to explain how key concepts are relevant to this text. I explain how they work, in relation to the other components I use, and interact with all of the moving pieces within the model.

First, a word that has been used a lot already, is *dyad*. A dyad is a pair of states (Russett and Oneal, 2001). Anyone familiar with work on the democratic peace theory is likely aware of this term, however, it needs to be secularized so to speak. There is no ideological implication to the use of the word in this dissertation. Some dyads contain a democracy and autocracy, or any combination of the two. It is simply a more concise way to refer to a pair of states or bilateral (*dyadic*) relations. An *audience*, is a constituency or group in general that is the target of rhetoric from elites, decisionmakers, leaders, etc. Audience is used in this work interchangeably with electorate, selectorate, constituency and public (Mayhew, 1974; Russett, 1990; Fearon, 1994; Aldrich et al, 2006; Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2011; Chen Weiss, 2013; Bausch, 2014). Further, in regards to *selectorate*, although most would dismiss the nominal selectorate as mostly irrelevant in authoritarian states, the general public that typically comprises it still has *some means* of obtaining accountability from policymakers, even if that accountability is collective action to topple the regime (Tarrow, 1988; Beissinger, 2002). In my work, perhaps it is a shift in generational understanding, or perhaps genuine autocratic slippage is taking place on a global level, but I seldom use the word electorate, preferring selectorate, when talking about constituencies. In terms of the word electorate, it is interchangeable with selectorate, but selectorate has so much more depth and richness as a concept for understanding

domestic bargaining, coalitions, constituencies, and win-sets for policymaking than electorate does. I use the term leader, decisionmaker(s) and policymaker(s) synonymously as well.

I define *rhetoric* as being instrumentalist discourse used to persuade an audience about the value of some action, the legitimacy of their governance, the validity of their candidacy or a policy they are promoting (Goddard and Krebs, 2015). *Discourse* is talk and text, or words and deeds, that take place between two or more actors. *Instrumentalism* refers to the discourse, talk and text, and actions, that decisionmakers engage in being a tool used to obtain a specific reaction out of the target audience. The policymakers' personal views on the idea being used are irrelevant, what matters is that whatever pure or symbolic speech utilized by decisionmakers, vis-à-vis their audience is used specifically to achieve a desired outcome (Conversi, 1995; Smith, 1996; Brown, 2004). Both Fearon and Bates address instrumentalism as well in their treatments of rationality and ethnic politics insofar as how elites will engage in narratives instrumentally to activate specific intersections of identities to push for the support of a policy, a regime, or some other idea that is in need of support. While not explicitly related here, some will read this and ask "how does one identify when instrumentalism ends and institutionalism begins?" especially in the context of ethnic and nationalist politics. Paul Goode's 2012 analysis on the institutionalization of nationalist narratives in post-Soviet spaces provides as concise of a line to demarcate the two as one can expect when discerning between when something is instrumentalist or has become institutionalized (Goode, 2012). *Astroturfing* is mass movements or mobilization that are constructed to appear grassroots, but are in reality controlled and manipulated by elites in general or the regime in power specifically (Howard, 2005; Ratkiewicz, 2011).

Rationality, rationalism, or to be rational is used here to mean that: "every agent...whether an individual, a party, or a private coalition...behaves rationally at all times; that

is, it proceeds toward its goals with a minimal use of scarce resources and undertakes only those actions for which marginal return exceeds marginal costs (Downs 1957, pp 137). Narrowing this down to recognize how culturalism, socialization, identity, etc. factors in, I use Bates' typology which highlights the cultural, institutional, and/or structural context that rationality exists within (Bates et al 1998, pp 628). And most importantly, that agents behave rationally based on their learning, socialization, and the information that is available to *them* which may not be available to us, which accounts for the observer's perception that the agent has made suboptimal decisions when in reality there is a separate game going on in addition to the game within our unit of analysis (Tsebelis 1990, pp. 24-39). I fully acknowledge that I am significantly streamlining Bates' bounded rationalist vs. Tsebelis' nested games to use them as synonymous with one another, but within the context that I use them, they are used straightforward and simply to acknowledge that there is not a universal rationalism, neither culturally as in the case of Bates, nor temporally as in the case of Tsebelis. Rationalism is the underpinning of *bargaining* which identifies and explains the negotiation and cost-benefit analysis that policymakers weigh when determining whether their optimal decision is war, or some *negotiated* alternative (Fearon 1995, pp. 380). Further, and a matter which I will discuss further later, given the stigma against rationalism that still glows faintly following the post-paradigmatic clash between rationalism and constructivism, it is necessary, especially in IR, to avoid the pitfall of strawmanning rational choice theory and the scholarship that utilizes this epistemology based on cleavages constructed in IR constructivism's infancy.

2.3 Theoretical Assumptions

With the basic concepts fully defined and operationalized so to speak I will now touch upon the major theories, models, and frameworks that comprise this research design. This is

especially important for this dissertation because 1) I cover a broad swath of literature in the social sciences, and 2) I do so with my own subjective understanding of them which necessitates that I elaborate on and justify my understanding, interpretation, and usage of them throughout this dissertation. I will touch on the big ideas, the exemplary pieces that stand out within each specific body of work to identify the origin so to speak, and then discuss the mid-level theorizing that has taken place within that area of research since, up to the present, to lay out how exactly I arrived at the conclusions I have arrived at with each, and what my work adds or contributes to each.

2.3.1 Enduring Rivalries

The first major theoretical idea that needs to be addressed is a relatively small, but extremely important, literature for this model. Throughout all of the scrutiny I have subjected my general hypothesis to, which is that domestic belligerent rhetoric creates audience costs in the adversary's country from their constituents forcing them to take tougher positions in terms of bilateral policies, the only limitation thus far preventing it from obtaining total generalizability is the necessity for the presence of a preexisting historical rivalry. As such, I will discuss the general thesis of the theory, how it applies to this model in general, and how it is relevant to the dyads I have selected to examine in my empirical chapters.

The foundational works of the enduring rivalries literature are the papers by Goertz and Diehl in the 1990s and again, has since been brought into the broader rivalry literature. Generally speaking, the enduring rivalries literature has been consolidated within the broader literature on rivalries in general, “dropping the modifiers and simply uses the term rivalry” (Findley et al, 2012). The modifier remains critical to this model however. Further, I use enduring rivalry and historical rivalry interchangeably in this text. Rivalries exist in many forms and the way this

affects bargaining varies based on type. More recent works such as Findley et al. focus on the use of terror tactics in the bargaining process between rivals. Krainin and Ramsay examine rivalries that exist based on asymmetries in resources, thus creating rivalries (Krainin and Ramsay, 2012). However, in the case of rhetorical threat perception in terms of transnational audience costs, a historical narrative, context, and past incidents or confrontations shape and inform the other on rhetoric used insofar as its credibility, what sort of triggering effect it may have, and other factors discussed in each of the upcoming chapters highly specific to that dyad. For example, Chinese have an understandable anger toward certain Japanese practices in Shintoism in terms of its ties to the Yasukuni Shrine, however 1) this is independent of the state, which does not share a common meaning in Japan, and 2) this is perceived by Japanese not as being unapologetic for the atrocities the Japanese military committed in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the role that Japanese political elites and common people played in those atrocities, but rather as the Chinese Communist Party attempting to restore the regional power dynamics of the Early Qing Dynasty and the tributary system that existed in East Asia during this time.

Goertz and Diehl's work deals specifically with enduring rivalries. They define enduring rivalries as "repeated conflict among the same set of states, or what we refer to... as 'enduring rivalries'" (Goertz and Diehl, 1993). Their work highlights repetitive or recurring conflict within a dyad that stretches over an extended time period. In their 1993 piece, they casually discuss the India-Pakistan rivalry and the Israeli-Arab rivalry. They delve more into the theoretical side and engage the broader literature on the topic in their 1995 article (Goertz and Diehl, 1995). Also within this literature is greater precision on what is meant by an enduring rivalry which is one that involves frequent multi-generational clashes (Geller, 1993; Huth and Russett, 1993).

What is important in this model though is that, building on what I said, there is a shared, intersubjective understanding of dyadic discourse and the rhetorical devices that are interwoven within that discourse. Discourse again being, the words and deeds that take place between states. Rhetoric in a vacuum does not necessarily carry significant meaning. However, rhetoric that exists within a discursive space contained in an enduring rivalry dyad, consistently maintains a constant, continuous, *stable* meaning to the parties involved. In other words, whether the pattern will hold this time, *historically* this rhetoric has indicated that the next move will be x, y, or z. While this forecast can never be certain, what matters in this model is that at the societal level, the public perceives the rhetoric to be likely enough that transnational audience costs are generated and brinkmanship within the relationship increases. Future research should examine the applicability of quantitative approaches that construct an algorithm that sheds light on this relationship between discourse, rhetoric, and brinkmanship behavior in this type of scenario. I say algorithm due to the work flow, decision tree, conditional variables, and the nature of how those variables are operationalized would need to take place. Regardless, that is not the objective of this text, but it is certainly a topic worth exploring within the broader boundaries of this model at a later date.

2.3.2 The Selectorate

The next theoretical assumption I address is that political constituencies possess a mechanism for holding their policymakers accountable (Mayhew 1974; Bueno De Mesquita et al, 2004; Gallagher and Hanson 2015; Wong 2018). While distinct in makeup, both democratic and autocratic leaders must satisfy the preferences of the “winning coalition” within their electorate or selectorate base, depending on regime type. These scholars show not only evidence of the degree of effort that leaders invest into satisfying their constituency, but also the

mechanisms of accountability that constituencies in both democratic and authoritarian states possess.

In democracies, the voting participants within society possess the means of peacefully deposing leadership that they determine to no longer satisfy the conditions for administering the state (Dahl 1971 pp, 2-10). When policymakers in democracies do not deliver, those who were once their coalition oftentimes defect and punish them via voting them out of office (Key 1963 pp, 9). The legitimacy of this institution/mechanism is evident in the level of consideration that policymakers devote to fostering the support of their constituency (Mayhew 1974 pp, 5). Finally, contrary to the popular misconception, (someone) a strong case has been made and supported via empirical data that the electorate, public, or audience are attentive to the foreign policy decision making of their leadership (Russett 1990, Aldrich et al 2006).

Within my framework, as with other established theoretical concepts that I have utilized, I argue that a separate distinction between electorate and selectorate is unnecessary. Rather, an electorate is merely one component within the selectorate theory model (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2011). Depending on the true level of democracy that exists within a state,⁷ an electorate could be either the nominal or real selectorate. In a pure democracy, which is one with a Polity score of 10, such as Germany, the electorate may in fact be the real selectorate, whereas in an anocracy, which is not a democracy, such as the United States or Russia, the electorate is subjected to significant hurdles to mitigate its impact, or obstruct who can participate, sufficiently that it is at best, a nominal selectorate. I will not extrapolate on this in greater length than necessary, but to address raised eyebrows in my saying this by some members of my audience, through increasingly aggressive gerrymandering, partisanship that puts party before

⁷ I base democratic scores on the Polity V index which I refer to throughout the dissertation.

constitution or governmental institutions, a hyper-politicized “supreme” court, and a mechanism in the upper house of the US congress (the filibuster), minority parties are able to wholly obstruct parties that win elections, even decisively enough to warrant a governing mandate, that the “will of the people” (electorate) can be canceled by approximately 2/5ths of that congressional body, or an almost absolutely unchecked judicial system.

That said, further explanation of selectorate theory, especially insofar as my usage, is warranted. Selectorate theory places participants in the selection process for leaders into three categories, the nominal selectorate, real selectorate, and winning coalition. Regardless of regime type, all states possess a selectorate. In a typical democracy, the nominal selectorate is usually the average voter. More influential personalities or elites comprise the real selectorate, and those who voted for the winning candidate are a member of the winning coalition (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2011). On a linear spectrum from most democratic to least, what changes is the *size* of the selectorate, and therefore, the winning coalition. Shedding additional light on this though, it should be clarified that being a member of the winning coalition requires more than just voting for the correct candidate. The winning coalition implies agency that members of the nominal selectorate, aka the interchangeable, and likely the real selectorate as well, typically do not possess independent of one another, or more often, without an extra “push” from an even more powerful circle of elites. Future research should explore an expansion of selectorate theory given the increasing sophistication of authoritarian system since the late 1990s - early 2000s.

In the case of autocracies, absent an electoral mechanism, governments are still built upon the foundation of at the very least winning coalitions, and these coalitions are complicit in the actions undertaken by policymakers and have, to some varying degree, the means of deposing unsatisfactory leaders (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004). Typically, a rent of some

sort is necessary to maintain the favor of the coalition however ideological considerations matter as well (Bausch 2014). The important take away for the purposes of this project is that there is the presence of a mechanism for people not currently or directly in power to hold those in power accountable for every decision and area of discursive space they venture in to. Couched better in the vocabulary of this text, audiences are synonymous with selectorates and therefore while size may vary, there is always going to be an audience within a state, a coalition of supporters, that must be satisfied with the policies of the leader(ship).

2.3.3 Instrumentalism in Perceived Costs

The second assumption is that leaders in both democracies and autocratic regimes use both their knowledge A^1 and their bargaining adversary's knowledge B^1 that this mechanism exists, as an advantage in obtaining the most favorable outcome in negotiations. This is a very concise summarization of audience costs theory (Fearon 1994a; Schultz 2001; Tomz 2007; Weeks 2008; Chen Weiss 2013; Weeks 2014; Chen Weiss 2014). Audience costs scholars argue two main points. 1) That leaders interact with their domestic audience instrumentally to create their desired reaction as evidence to other leaders at the bargaining table that their hands are tied and they cannot back down from their position. And 2) by intentionally placing themselves in this vulnerable position, leaders are *signaling their resolve* of what the boundaries of acceptable terms in the bargaining process are (Fearon 1994a; Fearon 1994b; Fearon 1997).

Fearon's original thesis on domestic audience costs made the observation that democratic leaders can use their domestic rhetorical tools to their advantage in the bargaining process with other states. He argues that, in contrast to the two previous predominant arguments by previous scholars, 1) that leaders conduct a balance of power and capabilities calculus with their adversaries (Waltz 1979, Walt 1985, Walt 1988, Mearsheimer 2001) And 2) that leaders are

victim of cognitive biases that impair their decisionmaking during negotiations (Jervis 1976, Snyder and Diesing 1977, Lebow, 1981, and Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). In sum, leaders make decisions based on a calculus of reductionist or single-minded threat perception rather than on the slew of complexities that factor into a leader's strategy. An excellent illustration of the complexity and nuance that goes into a decisionmakers calculus is Saddam Hussein's bluff regarding his possession of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam viewed Iraq's position and security in the Middle East in terms of its adversaries as more critical than the overwhelming force the United States could throw at it. His decisions were wholly rational and calculated, he was simply placed in an impossible situation.⁸ Based on this logic, foreign policy decisionmakers are wholly rational and calculating in their conduct of relations with other states (Fearon, 1994a, Fearon 1994b). Decisionmakers engage in a "rational" bargaining process with their counterparts. Further, democracies possess an exceptional advantage when bargaining with autocratic decisionmakers because: A) the democrat's constituency has institutional mechanisms to punish their leader for obtaining an unsatisfactory agreement; and B) democracies possess the institutional transparency within their media, from elites who dissent from the primary decisionmakers, and other expressions of dissatisfaction that the domestic audience, or public, possesses. This provides decisionmakers an inherent advantage in the bargaining process. Furthermore, the key part of Fearon's argument, is that democratic leaders use this to their advantage, and engage in tough talk with their audience regarding the adversary, to signal their resolve to their counterparts at the bargaining table (Fearon, 1994a pp, 579-581).

Fearon's work has since been built upon to account for the comparable dynamic within authoritarian states. Building on the selectorate theory discussed in the previous section, *all*

⁸ See "Articles on Saddam's Bluff" section in appendix 1.

regimes have an audience they are accountable to. The primary distinction between democracies and autocracies is the size of the audience, and the means for communicating their preferences to leaders. Credibility adds an additional complexity in terms of whether the autocrat rallying their base to protest and demonstrate against backing down is viewed as legitimate or not by their counterparts in the bargaining process. Weeks argues that previous literature on audience costs underestimates the degree that they also affect authoritarian regimes. Whether or not audience costs exist, and possess instrumental value to the regime depends on three factors, 1) whether or not domestic audiences have the means and will to hold leaders accountable, 2) whether they view compromise as a negative outcome or not, and 3) and most importantly, *whether their counterpart believes that their audience costs are credible*. Weeks demonstrates empirically that democracies hold no exceptional advantage in terms of audience costs when signaling their resolve to their counterparts (Weeks, 2008).

The specific mechanics of how autocratic audience costs work is explored in even further depth more recently (Chen Weiss 2013). Authoritarian regimes such as China utilize demonstrations and violent outbursts, combined with their *domestic* calls for calm from the outraged masses during an important strategic or unexpected confrontation. The demonstrations, which are widely publicized and known about, are allowed to occur in order to demonstrate to their adversary “the dog they are desperately trying to hold on its leash” when confrontation and need for bargaining occurs. The take away from this analysis is not anything to do with the level of support or anger about a particular situation the Chinese people feel about whatever the issue may be, the important variable is that the regime *allowed* the protests to occur and opened the discursive space for the public to express their feelings on an issue in the first place.

There are five key observations that can be identified from this. 1) This is a prime example of how governments use audience costs to negotiate in international disputes. The Chinese government is pursuing a bargaining strategy that utilizes the nominal selectorate as their rhetorical mouthpiece toward their adversary. Rather than becoming confrontational and belligerent in the negotiation process, they use the Chinese public to do it for them. 2) This process is also beneficial in shoring up domestic legitimacy when the regime can appear to have been responsive to the public's demands by walking away with a better deal than what was allegedly on the table.⁹ 3) The information and narrative the average participant in these demonstrations is exposed to is constructed or tailored specifically to evoke the response they want. In this context, audience costs can be even *more effective* when used by autocrats than by democrats. Their ability to control the information the people have access to makes it easier for them to solicit the response they desire. The Chinese government effectively utilizes public outrage to signal its resolve during confrontations. The Chinese government encourages and even guides these demonstrations in order to signal their inability to make concessions on an issue understood. 4) Even if this strategy is astroturfing rather than grassroots mobilization, it does not mean that it is costless for the regime. Legitimacy is on the line at that point. Therefore there are still very real consequences for utilizing an audience cost bargaining strategy, and the whole point of using this strategy in the bargaining process in the first place is intended to communicate to the adversary how seriously the leadership takes the issue. 5) Finally, just because this process is inorganic doesn't mean that the alternative is better. The absence of this strategy does not mean that the regime would not get punished for not using this approach and instead making a more positive sum deal. While literature previous to mine, which focuses on

⁹ I discuss the legitimacy dynamic in other work I have done on the relationship between netizens and the state in China that existed in the early 2010s.

domestic audience costs outside of “the other” in a manner of speaking, with transnational audience costs, by virtue of conjured discursive space generating the traction that it does indicates that there are very real and legitimate sentiments on this issue and if the weaker position the government was taking in these negotiations became known, it could be disastrous for the regime.

2.3.4 The Cost/Benefit Calculus with Audience Costs

Expanding on the previous assumption, and critical to tying all of this literature together is the assumption that leaders are typically acting rationally even when it appears they are making suboptimal decisions. What makes their decisions rational may be outside the scope of the observer’s criteria. Utilizing the logic of bounded rationality and/or nested games, the puzzle of why leaders use belligerent rhetoric to shore up domestic support at the expense of the foreign policy negotiations they are engaged in makes sense (Bates, 1983; Tsebelis 1990). We should assume that decisionmakers are *always* acting rationally, and rather than isolating and dismissing or discounting their behavior, instead investigate the target audience within that discursive space and the instrumentality of engaging in that rhetoric by leaders. In terms of the model, the payoff for leaders, A^1 in utilizing rhetoric to mobilize the selectorate or audience, A^2 , may be what the objective of A^1 was in the first place. Further, in spite of or even in contradiction of audience costs, on occasion it is more beneficial for leaders, A^1 to deviate from the narrative they have constructed with their audience, A^2 .

Within this area of scholarship are exemplars such as Mueller’s work on the relationship between the US president and the public in terms of the rally around the flag effect, Tsebelis’s work on nested games which demonstrates the rationality of perceived irrational behavior by political leaders based on their interactions with others when in reality rationality is still present

because leaders are satisfying a different audience at the expense of the actor they are bargaining with, and Russett who goes into great detail about the symbiotic relationship between the US president and the public in shaping the foreign policy of the United States (Mueller 1973; Tsebelis 1990; Russett 1990; Nacos 1990; Aldrich et al 2006).

A concern that often comes up when bridging literature designed for democratic regimes with actions and behaviors of autocratic regimes is that the systems of government and institutional configurations within them are fundamentally different. However, while this is most certainly true, I utilize these tools here as mechanisms and processes that exist in almost if not all states, albeit to varying degrees. The regime type plays a part in how interactions work within the model, but the pieces themselves are similar enough to fall under the same umbrella of understanding. In the subsequent chapters I identify the presence of solid empirical evidence that these same constraints are present with authoritarian leaders in addition to those within democratic states.

2.3.5 Tangible Consequences

The fourth assumption is that the audience costs highlighted in the previous points can be severe, up to and including the loss of regime legitimacy. Once a political regime becomes “locked in” to a narrative they have constructed, it can be disastrous to back pedal or contradict that narrative. This is the point where the audience costs the previously mentioned scholars come into effect. A wealth of knowledge and research has been done within this area, albeit not in the context of the audience costs literature, rather, in terms of narratives, discourse, rhetoric, and legitimacy (Hopf 2012, Mitzen 2006, Goddard 2015, Goddard and Krebs 2015, Goode, 2012). Scholars of this area include those such as Ted Hopf with his distinct and signature approach to discourse analysis. Hopf utilizes this methodology to illustrate the connection between, and the

mechanics of state and society, and in his particular case, within the Soviet Union. Mitzen identifies the idea of “ontological security” which is the perception of security or insecurity of state and society in a dyadic or even systemic relationship. Her work adds an entirely new dimension to understand constructed narratives in the international system. The narrative of the other in a dyad or one’s place in the system isn’t just contingent upon how its place and the others places are defined and redefined, but the entire conception and understanding of one’s existence with others and within the system as a whole. Goddard and Krebs examine the linkage between rhetoric and legitimacy within states. They argue that a state’s grand strategy is a product of a regime’s legitimacy and the rhetoric and narrative needed to maintain that legitimacy. In sum, *why* a state moves from position/posture A to position/posture B is dependent upon the regime’s legitimacy at the time of A and B is the result of the necessary measures both in words and deeds that are required to stabilize its position. Paul Goode’s examination of the institutional constraints that nationalist narratives have on future regimes’ “rhetorical toolkit” highlights a mechanism of accountability present in states of *all* regime types, whether democratic or not.

2.3.6 A Spiral of Fear: The Outcome

The fifth and final assumption is that the belligerent rhetoric of leaders in state A heightens threat perception of the audience within state B. The threat perception of the audience/selectorate in state B toward state A constrains the range of policy options available to state B’s leaders with the leaders of state A (Schelling 1960; Schelling 1966; Jervis 1976; Cohen 1979; Walt 1985; Walt 1988; Schelling 1984; Davis 2000; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). Placing threat, and threat perception, into a broader context, threat is a specific type of promise. A promise is a guarantee of an outcome in response to a behavior, a threat is when that

guarantee and response are negative (Davis 2000). Change in threat perception is not the only type of response an audience may have, but threats are what we most often associate with “belligerent” rhetoric in terms of promises. Finally, regardless of how credible state B’s leaders’ view the promise, what matters is the constraining effect it has on them based on how state B’s audience interprets the rhetoric. Schelling identifies three primary characteristics of promises:

1. What is promised must appear to the second party, the one to whom the promise is made, as being in his interest. (Incurring an obligation to punish in the event of his misbehavior we would call a threat.)
2. What is promised should be something that one would not ordinarily be expected to do or to bring about, absent the promise: promising is vacuous if I always go home on time for dinner and there is no reason to suppose that today is different.
3. What is promised should be something that the second party perceives to be within the promisor’s control. My promising that the sun will be eclipsed at noon should not affect your expectation that that event will happen nor get me any credit for having brought it about (Schelling 1989/Davis, 2000).

These characteristics sum up what comprises the threat side of the threat perception calculation.

Summing this up concisely, Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero infer from this that threat is “a situation in which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on another agent or group” (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). Extrapolating on this, threat *perception* is the perception and subsequent anticipation by the receiver or inflictee, of the above-mentioned outcome for noncompliance with the inflictor’s preferences. Specifically, within the context of my model, the threat is delivered via A¹’s rhetoric to its target audience, A², and is weighed and interpreted by B² in terms of the threat’s credibility and severity. B²’s assessment shapes the pressure that it places upon B¹ and the *costs* it may impose for B¹’s failure to properly respond, whether that response be saber-rattling in return all the way to something more material and severe such as sanctions or military confrontation. In sum, in the following three chapters, I examine 3 dyads empirical to highlight different ways this framework functions. My selected dyads are diverse, allowing for the model to run in different scenarios

where history is more or less important, regime type, religion, etc. I also weigh alternative explanations in order to explore the scope of possible types of relationships between state A's rhetoric and state B's response, *as a consequence of A's rhetoric on audience B*.

2.3.7 The Collateral Damage of the Two-Level Game

Building on these assumptions, I incorporate my model into Putnam's two-level game (Putnam 1988). The contribution I add, is identifying the effect of belligerent rhetoric on the bargaining counterpart's audience, and how that effect complicates the domestic side of the interstate bargaining, narrowing the win-set range between actors. This results in an even broader "Transnational Two-Level Game" which I will investigate further in future research. In this case, Transnational means that agency outside of the direct control of the state, e.g., the selectorate, aka audiences, have a role to play in Putnam's win-set model, hence, the transnational aspect. Framed more clearly in the Putnam's terminology, my model identifies a third dynamic in the two-level games model. There is the statesmen dynamic in state-to-state interactions, the domestic dynamic in statesman to domestic constituency dynamic, and there is a third variable, transnational audiences. Transnational audiences exist outside the bounds of the traditional state model in spite of their simultaneous role in another portion of the game. They do not just influence their statesmen in the bargaining process, they also signal independently to the other side in the bargaining process what range an acceptable agreement will fall within. Although this creates a more complicated dynamic in the bargaining process, when transnational audiences are vocal, it provides more information to the statesmen sitting at the state-to-state table.

So, to tie everything together, a confrontation of some sort occurs between state A and state B necessitating negotiations and thus, bargaining, between the two begins. During this bargaining process a complex series of transaction costs are occurring. Each state must determine

what their optimal outcome is. The outcome is the “win-set” that they must obtain. Further, it is an outcome that is acceptable both to their bargaining counterpart as well as their domestic audience. The domestic audience is not simply a party that must be satisfied in the bargaining process, but is also a bargaining chip in and of itself. Each side will frame the negotiation to their domestic constituencies in a manner that achieves the desired effect for them to signal their resolve to not budge from some specific outcome with the counterpart. This on one hand, determines what the domestic audience is willing to accept, and on the other, what the minimum the negotiators with the other state will accept. The resolve dynamic is based on the knowledge of the counterpart that once those domestic commitments have been made, that the state cannot back down without sustaining significant costs from their domestic audience.

Meanwhile, while all of this is going on, each state is utilizing the negotiation to shore up domestic legitimacy. It’s just as possible that the entire initial confrontation was manufactured to build up domestic legitimacy as it is that a genuine incident occurred.¹⁰ Either way, the incident serves as an opportunity for the regime to reify its commitments and promises to its constituency. Each side utilizes an instrumental rhetorical device to inflate the perception of its responsiveness to the public and advance the state/society’s prestige in the relationship and/or world. As will be discussed in the following empirical chapters, this rhetoric is oftentimes not followed up upon or enforced by the audience or the *real* consequences of the tough talk are not widely known, either in democratic or autocratic states. For example, US presidential candidates talk tough, but very rarely follow up on these campaign promises once in office. Also, something that cannot be

¹⁰ Such as the Belgrade Bombing of the Chinese Embassy by US aircraft or the mid-air collision between a US surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet.

emphasized enough, audience costs do not always constrain decisionmakers to respond with belligerence. Audiences can pressure leaders to deescalate rather than escalate a crisis.

This final point cannot be emphasized enough. Throughout my examination of my model through a multitude of dyads, I continued to run into a major obstacle which I at first identified as an indicator of a null hypothesis or the spuriousness of my model. In many cases, audiences, at first glance, were totally indifferent to rhetoric. They did not care. I first saw this in an investigation of the British-French dyad. Historically, Britain and France have been rivals at many points. France has often been Britain's bridge of contact with continental Europe. Based on that I assumed that Brexit and the rhetoric associated with it would have placed a strain on Anglo-French relations. However, that was not the case. While British politicians, political pundits, and elites and other circles were pontificating on the disastrous consequences EU membership was having on Britain's economic, political, and global well-being, French audiences were unmoved and unphased by any of it. They legitimately did not care. This pushed me in a new direction where I slightly restructured my hypothesis that perhaps in addition to an enduring rivalry, an autocracy must also be present in the dyad. This was troublesome given that India and Pakistan both score highly on democracy in the Polity Index, however it was in my examination of the Greece-Turkey dyad that the obvious explanation finally occurred to me.

Thanks to Turkey's autocratic slippage due to Erdoğan's leadership, an endless stream of belligerent rhetoric from an autocratic state was being directed at a historical rival. However again, just as in the British and French case, there was no outcry from Greeks to escalate based on rhetoric. However, what *did* happen, and what reestablished a greater degree of generalizability within my model, was that audience costs *DID* have an effect, just the opposite that we have all been looking for in trying to describe them. Audiences can impose costs on

leaders not only for not taking a tough position in response to belligerent rhetoric, they can also punish leaders for taking a tough position when it is not necessary, given the emptiness of the threats being made. So, looking back at the British-French dyad, or any other dyad where it appears that audience costs are irrelevant, it is not that they do not matter or are not present, it is that they are in fact working to deescalate tensions rather than escalate. I will discuss how I will be moving forward with investigating this in greater detail in the conclusionary chapter when I outline where I go from this dissertation.

2.4 Model for the Dissertation:

Transnational Audience Costs and Beyond

With the important concepts nested within my framework, and the major theoretical contribution I use from others bounded in terms of my application of them, I now proceed to present the compiled framework of my transnational audience costs model. Put another way, with all of the literature I synthesize, borrow from, and add to appropriately discussed and cited, I can proceed throughout this section with an uninterrupted explanation, avoiding the necessity of rejustifying each concept and theory I touch upon in the framework and thoroughly cite and discuss each as I have done so already in the previous section.

In summing up the model, in this dissertation I propose an expansion of our understanding of the audience costs literature as part of a broader research agenda that will span multiple bodies of work. This initiative will further build on the two-level games literature, the selectorate theory literature, the bounded rationality literature, nested games literature, and societal constructivism literature. Again, I will discuss all of this in much greater detail in the conclusionary chapter. Insofar as this text, it is the foundation for building out. I expand the scope of audience costs in several ways.

Audience costs prior to my work refers to a mechanism of state-to-state bargaining where the leaders of country A *publicly* state the boundaries of what they will compromise on in order to signal to the leaders of country B that their resolve is so strong on this issue that they have placed themselves in a position where for them to compromise after making these public claims, they would suffer electoral or selectorate punishment for backing down. Snyder and Borghard rightly point out problematic issues with this in terms of how the original proposal did not set a satisfactory upper and bottom limit on the spiral. “Could this lead to nuclear war based on ‘signaling resolve’”? Snyder and Borghard ask similar questions to this one highlighting the need for refinement of the theory. Furthermore, international relations has lacked a solid standardization of terminology in terms of identifying, acknowledging, and accounting for the role that the public, via electorate, nominal selectorate, real selectorate, winning coalition, win-set, etc., as indicated by the plethora of terms that only scratches the surface of terms IR scholars have used. Expanding audience to serve as a general term for “the people that hold leaders accountable” provides a concise terminology for discussing the role of constituencies. I also create a typology or categorization for discerning different types of audiences and the associated costs. Domestic audiences, foreign audiences, and in this case transnational audiences. Transnational in the sense that a constituency is, insofar as one can, applying pressure to a state via their own state, whereas domestic audience costs are an audience applying costs to their own leadership and foreign audience costs would be more on par with public boycotts of goods from another country, e.g. Americans refusing to buy goods manufactured in states that engage in Apartheid such as South Africa in the 1980s or Israel more recently.

Transnational audience costs are a phenomenon where belligerent rhetoric in state A causes the audience in state B to impose costs on their own leadership for reacting in a way that

is not consistent with their expectations, and by proxy of this or proximally to this, costs on state A for engaging in the rhetoric in the first place. And to emphasize again since this is the most underdiscussed aspect of this phenomenon, audience costs do not occur solely from not escalating. They can also occur *because* leaders escalated. And again, transnational audience costs are a component of a much larger framework around transnational two-level games. Transnational two-level games opens the door for a substantial number of new research areas ranging from the constituencies that I discuss in this dissertation, to NGOs, which is incredibly important insofar as democratization and other areas of transnational behaviors. Transnationalism in terms of NGOs is such a powerfully important field of study that the N in NGOs has become increasingly fuzzy as evidenced by US affiliated NGOs tampering with Russian and Chinese politics in the 1990s and 2000s, their expulsion from Russia in the 2000s, their expulsion from China in the 2010s, and the US expulsion of Russian and Chinese NGOs in the US that has picked up momentum beginning in the latter half of the 2010s, due primarily to election interference in the case of Russians and surveillance of Chinese nationals in the case of the Chinese. There is more to that picture, and while it will be revisited in the conclusion, that is largely a topic to be discussed elsewhere.

2.5 Methodology: Survey, Media, Search Analysis

2.5.1 SMS Analysis

The method I employ in this dissertation is a homemade mixed-method small-N quasi-statistical inferential approach for collecting data that tests the boundaries and validity of the general hypothesis and framework in general of this dissertation. That is quite a mouthful when describing the methodological approach used! But I describe it this way to be both forthcoming and concise about what it is I am doing so and being transparent about both the strengths and

limitations of this method. The main strength is that identifying linkages within the presence of everything within these three very different types of data collection provides a powerful inferential conclusion and a strong plausibility probe for further investment, both time and money, into constructing more robust (expensive) survey models and accurate (ethnographic field work) investigations into domestic interests in topics. Given the current circumstances in terms of safety for potential interviewees within the states I discuss in my empirical chapters, both in terms of surveys and discursive analyses, and the substantial financial resources necessary to conduct the ideal version of this project; which likely necessitates work from others in addition to myself, this method is best suited for the present task. To put it concisely and straightforward, this method and the cases¹¹ I selected are illustrative of my theory to justify further exploration and investment so I can continue to more rigorously test my hypothesis down the road.

The time frame that I examine as part of the actual analysis using the method is from January 1st, 2010 to December 31st, 2019. I will go into more specifics in the following subsections but I predominantly use Lexus-Nexus for media data, Google for search trend data, and PEW for survey data. There is a major caveat to this however. First, a minor note, there are some deviations throughout each chapter when more meaningful information is available from better sources, however I will acknowledge and justify why those sources are better when those instances occur. The major caveat is the chapter immediately following this one, Chapter 3 on the China-Japan dyad. That relationship, and China in particular, has been a consistent focal point of almost all of my research, in many different types of studies, over the past 10 years of

¹¹ It is more important to think of these as empirical exploratory chapters, not rigorous case studies since the data needed for that level of rigor does not yet exist for the reasons I have laid out.

work. Additionally, the method I employ throughout the following two empirical chapters is largely stymied by the ingenious but nefarious methods the Chinese government has employed to prevent any flow of traffic, either Chinese looking out, or those outside of China looking in, from interacting with the Chinese internet. It should in fact, be more appropriately be considered an “intra”net due to the credentials needed to use it. I will discuss the nature of this chapter in more detail in a preface prior to the chapter. Just as a reassurance, it is the only chapter that has such a preface. Given the challenges with this dyad though, while I have employed the same method as I did in the chapters following it, it relies much more heavily on a broader historical analysis. This will be explained in detail in that preface.

2.5.2 Survey

The primary reason for the method I have designed for this dissertation is, which I have already touched upon briefly, that survey data is sparse when trying to find public barometers that are not superpower-centric. Many readers may initially be skeptical about this claim but I will be the first to thank anyone that finds a reliable source of valid survey data that provides barometer data on bilateral relations unrelated to superpowers. An expression I may be guilty of using again later in this dissertation is thank conductors of valid international surveys have persisted with what could cynically be called an obsession for continuing to paint the world in broad strokes of a three-world system. What was once “Team USA”, “Team USSR”, or “Unaffiliated” has merely had the USSR category replaced with PRC. Outside of barometers on how countries across the world feel about the US in relation to China, survey data is inconsistent. If regular temperature checks could be conducted, the other two prongs of the SMS Analysis would likely be redundant. Rigorous and robust surveys which ask informative questions about

local feelings and record feedback from participants would provide as good as, if not a better picture of relations based on media inference and search inquiries.

The consistent source of survey data that I will be using is from PEW. There are more regionally focused polls available that vary by dyad and region, for example Eurobarometer data on European countries, Genron data on Japan, and other local sources in Southern Asia. I use all survey data within the 2010 to 2019 range that serves as a barometer in any way, either directly or indirectly to indicate public sentiment toward the other during this time range. Another expression I may be guilty of saying more than once is a common reference made by astrophysicists. The way we know black holes exist is due to the effects they have on space-time around them, the proximal indicators, not the blackhole itself as it is so efficient at preventing any leakage of information from occurring. Often times, in addition to a lack of interest, funding, or whatever the cause may be, some states do not want public sentiment about issues to be obtained by third party organizations that may present a narrative different than the one they would present. Which is why the other two portions of this method are so important.

2.5.3 Media

First and foremost, there will be some variation in media data throughout the empirical chapters. I say that merely to be completely transparent. Ideally there would be complete standardization between every chapter but there are two shortcomings with that on opposite ends of the same spectrum. On one end, that level of standardization is just much less interesting. On the other end, it would present a less clear picture of what is going on because relatively speaking, it would be more nonsensical. There are regional and local nuances in terms of how information is shared and media utilized that elude large scale data bases like the one that I used. That said, I did use the same data base for all three empirical chapters and included any

substantive addition from them that present a clearer picture of the events that took place in that dyad during the 2010s.

Media data illustrating the narrative of the relationship and the rhetoric utilized is collected from Lexis-Nexus using the search engine to identify all texts from January 1st, 2010 to December 31st, 2019. I use dyad specific terms that have intersubjective meaning between both groups within the pair. For example, for my chapter on the India-Pakistan dyad, I search for the term Hindutva which is the world for Hindu Nationalism. Hindu Nationalism is an issue that has invoked anxiety among non-Modi¹² aligned politicians in India who fear it is the most likely cause for conflict on the Indian Subcontinent between India and Pakistan, and for Pakistanis and Indian Muslims, Hindutva represents a literal existential threat. I will discuss why in more detail in chapter 4. So, in this case, my Lexus-Nexus search would first have a constant term, being the countries within the dyad so it includes both the name of the country and a conditional OR for the name of the people so the keywords India OR Indian AND Pakistan OR Pakistani OR Pak AND Hindutva. There will also always be an AND condition for War and Rhetoric. War is also used as a constant to capture additional results that use *belligerent* rhetoric, and rhetoric is included because the type of media that is being searched is that which identifies that rhetoric is being used. Results are further narrowed, when possible, to only include exchanges by the BBC, NYT, CNN, and the Guardian. In some cases, this is not possible, for example in chapter 3, CNN is not an option that is available so it is replaced by articles from the Japanese Economic Newswire. Unless otherwise specified, the database is also further narrowed to include international relations and international security. International organizations is excluded to avoid

¹² Modi is the current Prime Minister of India.

noise from international organizations that may be misrepresenting the domestic and dyadic narratives.

2.5.4 Search Data

Finally, in terms of search data, search data is data generated from Google trends based on “Interest Over Time”. With the exception of the Greece-Turkey chapter, I limit my search into areas pertaining to “law and government”. Narrowing the search analytics down to law and government is critical because it eliminates search hits for inquires for topics including the word “war” that were used in reference to a popular Disney-Marvel movie that came out during that time period with that word in the title. In the Greece-Turkey chapter, expanding the search beyond “law and government” was necessary because some of the search terms used were relevant to bilateral relations but not necessarily intersubjectively understood in the context of law and government, for example, “the Aegean Sea”.

Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point of the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means it was half as popular as at its most popular. A value of 0 means there was not enough data to score this term during this time period. Within the spreadsheets, there is also a value of <1 which I scored as 0 for being insufficient data. Although in this preliminary examination I am using Google Trends due to language and location/access obstacles, the most popular search engine in some countries or regions may be different. This is only relevant in the China – Japan chapter, however in all three chapters I utilize data from statcounter which aggregates the market share size of each relevant search engine in the region. In with the exception of China and Japan, Google has over a 90% share of the market in the other 4 countries. That said though, future research using this method should examine key terms in the multitude of languages spoken

across all of these regions, *especially* the Indian Subcontinent, to determine any discrepancies and what we may infer from these variations, e.g. what class, caste, race, religion, etc who speak each language has more or less interest in different terms at different times.

2.5.5 Selection of Dyads

As with any case study or case study-like document, justifying case selection is of course necessary so that the reader understands the logic I used and to explain how this is not a phenomenon that exists only in these three dyads. While my empirical chapters are not cases in the methodological sense, for the purpose of clarity and to be concise I will temporarily refer to them as cases. The cases I selected represent a diverse selection to capture a broad swath of case types available. They are illustrative of my model and identify the current boundaries of its applicability based on existing data. Future investigation will expand on this study in multiple ways. For starts, I will say up front that in the subsequent book version of this text, I also hope to include, what will by then be actual cases, cases from Africa and South America. This expansion will yield a larger sample of cases and information in general for further refining the methodology employed in this dissertation, or even reveal how to better couch the existing data in more formal and traditional modeling approaches.

That said, the cases I selected for this study are still diverse and provide an acceptable range of cases to illustrate the plausibility of my model and why it warrants further scrutiny in future research. The Sino-Japanese dyad was selected due to the very long shared history between the two countries, the way they were similarly forcibly opened via Western imperialism, the divergence in how they responded to that, the atrocities that one committed against the other, and the proximity of this relationship to 21st Century great power politics. If there ever were to

be a war of superpowers in this century, China and Japan will almost certainly be a focal point in that conflict.

The India-Pakistan dyad was selected because, frankly, it is one of the most interesting cases to select for this type of study due to the number of paradoxes involved. The peoples in this case share a common identity insofar as both belonging to the Indian Subcontinent. They were both under British administration when the subcontinent was unified. They both score highly on the Polity democracy index but how democratic either country is, has been the source of much scholarship within the field of Comparative Politics¹³. There are more languages spoken and more ethnic groups within these two countries than most of the rest of the world combined. This is probably the most hostile and potentially violent political and military relationship while simultaneously being the most culturally complimentary relationship by Indian and Pakistani migrants, with intermarriage between the two in other parts of the world being a not uncommon occurrence. And finally, it is a great case in terms of the amount of data available outside of survey data, academic interest, and as a way to look at a case with many secondary variables such as democratization, new democracies and old democracies, ethnically diverse democracies, and nationalism.

Finally, the Greece-Turkey dyad was selected for a multitude of reasons. This has been the most dynamic, fastest evolving, and least stable case of the three over the past decade. Few would dispute that democracy in Turkey has almost if not entirely collapsed in Turkey in the span of ten years. However, in spite of that, Turkey possesses many robust democratic institutions that, while failing, have proven to be more robust than may have been expected.

¹³ This is addressed in some depth in Chapter 4.

Greece and Turkey have come the closest of the three cases to an actual hot war over the decade, but, have been the FOIL case among the three. This, in many ways, makes it the most interesting for the framework as a whole, and most definitely makes it the most important case in terms of expanding its generalizability.

Perhaps future research will demonstrate that the transnational audience costs Greeks imposed on the relationship were the *sui generis* variable rather than the variable that brings generalizability to the model, but absent that unlikely scenario, Greek transnational audience costs were the key to the realization that audience costs can constrain leaders to deescalating options in response to incidents rather than continuing disputes. As Erdoğan continued to ramp up the rhetoric against Greece, the EU, and Cyprus, Greeks, while generally interested in Turkey from a cultural standpoint, did not respond in kind, similar to how the French did not respond to British anti-Continental rhetoric. None of the indicators I examined suggest that Greek views of Turks declined because of *rhetoric*. There were military confrontations as I mentioned, but those were synchronous with military maneuvers after rhetorical antagonism consistently failed to elicit a response. That makes this case the most valuable in terms of new contribution to the framework.

2.6 Conclusion and Layout of the Remainder of the Dissertation

In this chapter I have laid out the research design of my model, my methodology, and the states I examine in my empirical chapters. I elucidated my use of concepts that are often understood differently in different disciplines, may not be used, or may be discipline specific jargon in need of clarification. I engaged the theoretical areas that I bring together to present my model, justify why I used them, how they fit, and what I have added to them. I then presented a concise explanation of my model in a clear and short summary following the explanation for

how these ideas all fit together. Following this I outlined my method, how it works, and why it is the most appropriate for this study, and how it may be useful in future studies. Finally, I discussed my case selection. Each of these cases tests the flexibility of the model along different boundaries as well as revealing how this model better informs our understanding of other mid-level theories in international relations. The model I have presented here expands on existing literature in a direction that represents uncharted waters for establishing linkages between domestic politics and the international system, specifically, how domestic audiences act as transnational agents in what may be a phenomenon of an increasingly globalized world. This will be revisited in the conclusion.

The remainder of the dissertation is simple and straightforward. Chapters 3-5 are my empirical chapters. In chapter 3 I examine the China-Japan dyad. In Chapter 4 I examine the India-Pakistan dyad. And in chapter 5 I examine the Greece-Turkey dyad. Finally, in chapter 6, I discuss my findings, the implications, summarize the key takeaways, and discuss future plans for this research area as well as this text specifically. The future research section of this dissertation contains what I think to be a relatively ambitious agenda for moving forward with this research. While I do not believe that I have created anything revolutionary or groundbreaking in any extraordinary way, the exercise of writing out this document has inspired me in terms of a multitude of future avenues of research spinning off of, and continuing the momentum of this work.

Chapter 3

Chinese-Japanese Relations

3.1 Introduction

In this first empirical chapter, I examine the relationship between China and Japan and how it has evolved from opening up to the West to the present. I utilize the SMS Analysis I laid out in chapter 2 to examine the impact of transnational audience costs on bilateral relations. Due to the current state of access to data in China, I am unable to identify how Japanese attitudes and rhetoric may feedback in to China. Due to this, there is a trade-off in my analysis of the dyad. I spend significantly more time discussing the historical context of the case from the perspective of China since I cannot examine the 2010 time series among Chinese netizens the way I can internet users and public opinion in other countries, and conversely, since I can obtain this information in the case of Japan, I spend less time examining the historical context through their lens. Regardless, identifying transnational audience costs is the main goal and these three empirical chapters present unique circumstances in their own ways while utilizing slightly different approaches with the same methodology. In the chapter over India and Pakistan, and even more so in the chapter over Greece and Turkey, the use of the SMS Analysis is much clearer and more consistent with how I discussed it in the research design given greater access to information in both countries within the dyad. The third empirical chapter on Greece and Turkey adds another layer of generalizability by highlighting how the presence of transnational audience costs are not dependent upon the presence of autocracy. Additionally, audience constraints do not always lead to brinkmanship. The most important take away from that final empirical chapter is the *generalizability* of this phenomenon. The current single limitation on the model is the presence of an enduring rivalry, which will be the next obstacle to generalizability to eliminate with further refinement of the model and method.

Given the limitations present in this chapter, as well as the history of the countries involved, I conduct a considerably more in-depth historical analysis of the dyad. Sovereign India and Pakistan did not exist until 1947. Modern Greece did not exist until 1823. And in the sense of a nation, there was no such thing as a Turk until the 20th century and the construction of their nation-state via genocide and ethnic cleansing had not stabilized physical geographical boundaries until 1923. China and Japan however, have existed in the international system as sovereign entities for as long as this unit of analysis has existed. Certainly longer, but that goes beyond the scope of this study. To summarize, there is a substantially larger amount of historical context to understand when one asks why China and Japan have the relationship they do, and the divergence in how they handled their unsolicited addition to the 19th century international system is fundamental to understanding the two countries now, and how they interact with one another.

In addition to the SMS analysis over the 2010s, I give more attention generally to the downward spiral that has occurred between the two countries throughout the 21st century. Although there have been recent attempts at reconciliation, in the aggregate the relationship has suffered a significant decline following the progress at repairing the relationship following the Second Sino-Japanese War, which began in earnest in 1937, and eventually spilled over into World War 2 as the Pacific Theater in 1941. In this chapter I examine how anti-Japanese rhetoric in China has contributed to an increase in threat perception by Japanese citizens toward China. Building on the work by China specialists in IR, in this chapter, all of the negative rhetoric I discuss directed toward Japan from China that is publicized is considered to be a product of the state (Chen Weiss, 2013, Wallace & Chen Weiss, 2015; Reilly, 2013). These scholars along with the anecdotal common knowledge of studying Chinese politics is that almost all

internal/domestic information that gets through the “Great Firewall” has been instrumentally allowed to get through by the Chinese government.

As of the writing of this chapter, people outside of mainland China, including Chinese from Hong Kong, are completely barred access to the use of China’s primary search engine “Baidu”, it’s primary chat and social media platforms, “WeChat” and “Weibo”, and no person without identification credentials from the CCP are allowed access. Due to this, not only is getting access impossible outside of China, it has become increasingly dangerous for non-Chinese inside of China to smuggle this information out into the broader world, and it is unethically dangerous for scholars to rely on Chinese colleagues to use as proxies for access to these materials. To illustrate this shift, my personal experiences in China in the 2010s were that the use of virtual privacy networks (VPNs) which generate or use internet addresses outside of China in order to gain access to non-Chinese social media in order to get information out, or more likely, just to access one’s YouTube or Facebook page was tolerated within very generous reason. As of 2019, directly from the report from the US Embassy in China from 2019:

The government continued efforts to limit unauthorized virtual private network (VPN) service use. While the government permitted some users, including major international companies, to continue to utilize authorized VPNs, many smaller businesses, academics, and citizens were prohibited from using these tools. In March a Henan court charged Sun Dongyang with the crime of “illegally providing a tool for intruding into a computer information system” because he ran a website that promoted VPNs and other methods of circumventing the government’s firewall (US Report on Chinese Human Rights 2019, 36).

This is in contrast to six years earlier when bars and coffee shops were permitted to have VPN services to provide their patrons! This lengthy illustration serves as a tool to elucidate how the metaphorical tap has been completely sealed off in a very short period of time. Due to this, it is almost always true that the information that has been permitted to be released was done so only because it came through official channels or organs of the government and has found its way out of China due to it being consistent with the state's narrative. This does *not* mean that the CCP wanted the information to be directed toward the audiences of other states, only that they lack the mechanisms or filters to prevent their own rhetoric designed for regime legitimation to escape their shores.

As I demonstrate consistently throughout this chapter, the political rhetoric used by Chinese elites has eroded all of the progress made in repairing relations with Japan from the declaration of the People's Republic of China in 1948 until perhaps the first wave of sporadic anti-Japanese protests in the 1980s and 90s, and certainly by the anti-Japanese riots in 2005. This chapter proceeds with the following objectives. First, I discuss the brief history that has occurred since China and Japan's introduction to the modern state-centric international system in roughly the middle of the 19th century.¹⁴ This culminates with the actions by Japan and especially its military during the 1930s and 40s that enabled the construction of a narrative useful for externalizing domestic troubles onto Japan's actions during that timeframe. Second, I discuss the reconciliation phase that took place between China and Japan from the 1950s to 70s for sure, and still, but less enthusiastically¹⁵ in the 80s and 90s. Finally, I demonstrate the plausibility of my

¹⁴ Both China and Japan were coerced to open trade relations with the West in the 19th century. The Westphalian State System and the structure of bilateral and international relations had been completely foreign to both countries prior to being forcefully opened.

¹⁵ Perhaps political tides were changing or Chinese politics went through a phase of pluralization that permitted more voices to speak out against Japan.

thesis based on the changing narrative of Chinese elites since the beginning of the 21st century and how it has soured the perception of Japan's domestic audience, who have since began pressuring the Japanese government to take tougher measures against China. Based on the logic of my model, not only is it non-rational for China to intentionally damage trade, tourism, and diplomatic ties as well as economic and security benefits with Japan based on what is to be discussed, it is unlikely that it was their intention. As I describe further in the chapter, based on my model, their objective in using the rhetorical narrative they did was domestic legitimation that was neither suited nor tailored to foreign audiences. Those well versed in the history of China and Japan up to the June 4th Protests in China may find it useful to move directly to page 36 from this point.

3.2.1 The Path to Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations

To briefly summarize the initial “first”¹⁶ meeting between Great Britain and the ruling Qing Dynasty of the Chinese empire, George Macartney led the mission to establish a permanent embassy and official relations with China (Kitson, 2013). The meeting was challenging diplomatically given the notion of the Chinese officials' misconception of the nature of the British mission as well as not understanding their actual position in the world in terms of material power as well as the innerworkings of the Western state system or the efficacy and extent to which Western imperial powers had developed in terms of maintaining remote colonies across the world. China had operated for centuries on a system of international relations throughout their periphery known as the Cefeng (Tributary) System.¹⁷ The Chinese Tributary

¹⁶ Western traders had contact with China but they were confined to trade through Guangzhou and no formal agreement had ever been made between the British and Chinese states, but nothing to the extent of their meeting with George Macartney.

¹⁷ Alternatively, I have found the term gongguo (贡国) used for this system in contrast to the previous author's term however I use their term throughout the document for consistency with the original work.

System centered around the idea that China was the center of power in Asia and every country in their sphere of influence was required to participate in a scheduled meeting where the envoy to China would kowtow to the Chinese emperor to acknowledge their status in the region (Hevia, 1995). Inferring from the events that followed, the British refusal to conform to the practices of countries within China's Cefeng System was not the warning signs of a paradigmatic shift taking place that it should have been, but was instead dismissed.

Western gun boat diplomacy was also used in the process of opening Japan up to the West as well (Wilson, 1957; Kornicki, 1998). The incident of the Phaeton in 180 and intrusion of American warships in 1837 compelled the Japanese to take the opposite response to Western confrontation than China (Kornicki, p. 246). The opening of Japan to Western trade culminated in Matthew Perry's 1853-54 confrontations and ultimatum to the Japanese to open trade relations. The Japanese acquiesced but believed the only way to push Western influence out of Asia was by immediately beginning the process of industrialization to be able to fight back (Beasely, 1982).

In the case of both countries, they were both forced by the barrel of a gun to allow both the virtues and vices to enter their countries. Ultimately both China and Japan moving toward westernized industrialization following these meetings, however whereas the Qing stayed in power and moved at a comfortable pace to learn the power the West had used to expand their empires across the globe, the Japanese embraced the tools of the West, spelling an end to the taido and kaikido eras and traditional Japanese conceptions of politics and war, and the beginning of the Meji Era, Japan's industrialization and armament, and ascent as a global great power (Takano, 2010). In terms of their interaction with the West and integration into the West-centric international system, Japan rose in prestige to a premier great power with their defeat of

the Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905; (Steinberg, 2008; Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 2005) whereas China became mired in a greater and greater struggle to maintain independence. For China, this was their Century of Humiliation. Their descent saw them fall from the “Middle Kingdom” of the planet, to a colonized land ripe with resources to be exploited at will (Kaufman 2010). The Qing Dynasty sustained defeat after defeat starting with the Opium Wars in the mid-19th Century and culminating with the collapse of the Chinese Imperial Era and the beginning of the Republic of China in 1912 when Westernization began in earnest (Dreyer, 2003; Wilkinson, 2000).

3.2.2 The Empire of Japan and the Sick Man of Asia

While China and Japan were both victimized and exploited by Western states who possessed power beyond what they had previously experienced, their perception of the world both shifted greatly and impacted the nature of their relationship. Japanese disdain for China became more and more apparent throughout the late 19th and into the 20th century, however even during the era of the Cefeng System, Japan refused to accept the role of tributary to China (Nakajima, 2018; Banno, 1973). Prior to their opening to the West, relations between the two countries were relatively obscure (Yo, 2000; Yoda, 1996). However, given the opposing paths each took in the face of Western imperialism, Japan soon saw opportunity and the potential for empire building in the failing Qing Dynasty China. Japan and China’s first major negotiation was concluded in the Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty of 1871 as a treaty between equals who had been treated unequally by Western powers (Fairbank et al, 1970; Banno, 1970; Yo, 2000). However, relations deteriorated due to mutual contempt and lack of respect for one another. Inevitably, contentions arose between the two.

3.2.3 The Ryukyu Islands

Throughout China's Century of Humiliation, Japan increasingly became the focus of Chinese hatred for imperialism. One point that should be further emphasized though is that while Japan did hold China in low regard during this period, their imperial aspirations were not focused or devoted exclusively against China and conquering the periphery of the Qing empire, but rather, placing as much of Asia under their administrative control as they could to prevent the West from gaining an even more solid foothold in the region than they already had. In a lot of ways, for good or bad, this resembled the US strategy for enforcing the Monroe Doctrine throughout the Americas.¹⁸ With that in mind, the first major point of friction between China and Japan was over Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands in the 1870s (Hirano, 2007). The Ryukyus had de facto administration over their own territory, however culturally and vernacularly they aligned with Japan while also maintaining tributary status with China. Given this paradoxical position and the opportunism of Western imperial aspirations in the region, Japan rendered the issue moot and began consolidating control over the island chain throughout the 1870s (Hirano, 2007; Pak-wah Leung, Edwin, 2011; Newman, 1963; Kiyosawa, 1993; Katsuta 2003).

3.2.4 Korea

The next territorial dispute involved the fate of Korea. Initially, the Japanese sought merely to establish a concrete definition of Korea's sovereignty status in 1875. Chinese diplomats affirmed Korea's independence, albeit as a tributary, and ability to establish their own

¹⁸ The reader should keep this context in mind going throughout this section of the chapter. Although Japan's intentions were no doubt imperialistic, it can be argued, as in the case of the US in the Western Hemisphere, that their actions were defensive rather than opportunistic. That being said, any scholar familiar with the US impact and damage that lasts to this day can appreciate that this acknowledgement is not an endorsement of this practice. Both US preemptive action in the Americas and Japanese action in Asia were aggressive and led to instability and suffering throughout the region, in spite of being under the sphere of influence of a regional actor rather than a European power.

foreign affairs with Japan and other countries (Wang, 1987; Jansen, 2002). Chinese leaders later realized their blunder and claimed that Korea was part of China but by this time the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty (Ganghwa Treaty) had already been concluded and normalized relations favorable to Japan and excluding China were established (Okamoto, 2004). The result of this was the deployment of Chinese troops to maintain its influence over China and Japanese overtures to the Korean government to establish closer non-Sinocentric relations between the two countries (Okamoto, 2004). This was followed by a coup to push Chinese influence out of the Korean peninsula and bring it more under Japan's control in 1884 to which China responded with military action (Kimura, 2007). The military conflict resulted in a British mediated treaty between Japan and China to both withdraw forces from the peninsula and recognize Korean sovereignty in 1885 (Takahashi, 1995). Between the stalemate, Japan's recognition of its need to restructure its military system, and concern being redirected from expansion onto continental Asia to defending Japanese territory from Russian incursion, Japan was preoccupied in the years leading up to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Additionally, the Japanese recognized following their military confrontation with China in 1885 China's regional military superiority, especially in terms of its navy, within the China, Japan, Korea triad (Toyama, 1951; Hirayama, 2004; Sakai, 2007; n.a., Kobun ruisan, 1891).

3.2.5 The First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95

Ever since the initial China-Japan Amity Treaty in 1871, relations gradually deteriorated between the two countries. China focused on maintaining its cultural worldview in a changing world and establishing the integrity of its borders spanning from Taiwan in the East to Xinjiang in the West. In contrast, Japan sought to synthesize its own culture with Western ideas of industrialization, military organization, and imperialist territorial control. Whereas China

struggled to maintain the integrity of its borders, Japan sought security through expansion. The collision of these opposing perspectives of the circumstances and world that they found themselves in following the end of their isolation from the West culminated with a decisive shift in the balance of regional power in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.

The catalyst for the eruption of conflict that ensued was once again in Korea, this time over the Donghak Rebellion in 1894. Both the Chinese and Japanese dispatched troops to protect their poles and interests on the peninsula, however following the stamping out of the rebellion, to the objection of both China and Korea, Japan refused to withdraw its troops without substantial reform of Korea's political system and the nature of its relationship between China and Japan. This led to the establishment of a pro-Japanese government in Korea with the result of military conflict between China and Japan in July of 1894 and a formal declaration of war on August 1st (Banno, 1973). Prior to the formal declaration, much of Japan's subsequent success can be attributed to its skillful political maneuvering, especially with the British, prior to the beginning of formal hostilities with China (Denby, 1906).

The conflict established a new precedent within the Japanese government of heavily emphasizing military funding and Japan's commitment to obtaining its objectives in the war led to additional unexpected gains. What started as a conflict to push China out of the Korean Peninsula resulted in the occupation of additional territory on the Liaodong Peninsula, Weihaiwei, where China's northern blue-water navy was stationed, and Taiwan. On March 26th, 1895, Japan seized control over the Penghu Islands as well and stipulated that any cessation of hostilities was contingent upon China's ceding control over Taiwan to Japan. The losses China endured and Japan obtained in the First Sino-Japanese War were significant and cannot be overstated. China had completely lost a substantial amount of strategic territory, and only after

threats of Western intervention was the Qing Dynasty spared total collapse (Banno, 1973; Liu; Xu). This brought the war to a close and resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Kang, 1957).

The importance of the Treaty of Shimonoseki cannot be overstated and the effects are still felt today with issues such as the conflict between China and Japan over resource rights in the East China Sea and Taiwan's unique role in terms of its autonomy/sovereignty. China lost any influence it had still retained at that point over the Korean peninsula, the Island of Taiwan, islands south and east of the Ryukyus including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and was forced to open many previously unexposed cities in China such as Suzhou and Hangzhou to Japanese trade and influence (Osato and Son, 2006). The war and subsequent "unequal" treaty was the first major confrontation with Japan that became an important piece of their victimization and anti-Japanese narrative in contemporary political rhetoric. China's Century of Humiliation had begun with their losses to the British in Opium Wars, losses to other Western countries in the interim, but now they were being attacked and losing influence to a country they had lumped into their sphere of influence in terms of the Cefeng System. In other words, with the ink still wet on the paper of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, any last vestiges China had maintained in its world view in terms of regional and global dignity and power were broken. The Qing Dynasty had been dealt a fatal blow and was on a rapid path to collapse. Finally, the terms of the treaty inspired the narrative of China's victimization even before the collapse of the Qing, and led to increasingly powerful calls among Chinese, especially the Han, to remove the Manchus from power and revive Chinese territorial autonomy and regional hegemony, which is also a major part of China's victimization narrative, that also touches on its relationship with Japan, today.

The war was also a turning point for Japan in terms of representing a milestone in its self-realization and emergence as an imperial power in Asia. They had achieved substantial gains throughout the Eastern seaboard of China. They had pushed Chinese influence out of the Korean peninsula, which they would later annex in 1910 (Kawashima, 2006), they acquired the Island of Taiwan and the surrounding islets, and they gained the authority to establish structures in cities previously left untouched by external powers. Additionally, for monetary spoils and reparations the Qing owed them for waging a war against them, the Japanese obtained large sums of gold, which led to Japan's transition to the gold standard, and gave them a base of currency used to fund further colonial activities throughout the western Pacific region (Banno 414; Osato and Son).

3.2.6 The Interim Years from 1895 – 1931

Japan remained active in reinforcing and strengthening its position in continental Asia following the First Sino-Japanese War. They participated heavily in the Boxer Rebellion, in part, to ensure their interests were left intact in light of the heightened Western military presence in China. In terms of conduct in putting down the rebellion though, Japan's conduct of war and the practice of decapitating enemies in Japanese warfare was disconcerting to some members of the predominantly western alliance. Although most members of the Eight Nation Alliance that put down the rebellion to protect their colonial interests in China remain scorned for participation to this day, no member's conduct rivaled the sheer brutality and depravity that Japanese soldiers engaged in during the conflict (Cohen, 1997; Leonhard, 1900).

By the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, it was apparent to all in East Asia that Japan was a rising power. However, this observation was not realized among the Western powers until Japan's shocking defeat of the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War. The

causes of this war centered primarily again, on Japan's preoccupation with preventing Russian expansion into East Asia, de facto control over Manchuria and the rail lines extending across the region, and solidifying Japanese control over Korea (Nish, 1987). The war proved to be very costly for Japan although their victory solidified their position as a great power among the Western powers. Not only had they defeated the Russians at sea, but also, and more impressively, on land. The costs of this on Sino-Japanese relations however were significant. The Japanese generally held that the Chinese should have been grateful for pushing the Westerners out of Northern China, however resentment for Japan's conduct toward them during the First Sino-Japanese War, the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the Boxer Rebellion were but a few obstacles that prevented this victory of an Asian nation against the Westerners from resonating throughout China (White, 1968).

Relations normalized for some time following the Russo-Japanese War, and even the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the creation of the Republic of China did not initially upset the equilibrium that had been established within the relationship. The initial contestation over control of the Republic of China was a dispute that Japan largely stayed out of. However, when war broke out in Europe in 1914, Japan opportunistically seized control over German holdings throughout China and solidified their control over former Russian assets in the Northeast, increasing the tension between the two countries (Coox and Conroy 1978). Japan's role in WW1 focused almost exclusively on seizing control of Qingdao in Shandong province where Germany had port and troop quartering rights. The confrontation took place in the form of Japan's 21 demands that redefined the relationship between China and Japan in lieu of them pushing out a Western colonial power in China and renegotiating the terms of the Sino-Japanese relationship including porting privileges, rail road control, access of other countries to China's ports, and a

few other relatively minor revisions (Saito, 2001; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1965; Usui, 1972). The surrender of all German held Chinese territory to Japan was a substantial blow to both China's perception of the international system as well as their bilateral relationship with Japan. This was a *critical* point in the relationship because it led to the May 4th movement which was the first major, organized protest against Japanese imperialism in China (Kawashima, 2004; Tang, 1998).

In the brief interim between the end of the first world war and Japan's abandonment of any façade of doing anything other than seizing control of as much territory as they could, the blood-letting of warlord squabbling in the north coincided with the tug-of-war struggle between Yuan Shikai and Sun Zhongshan for control of the Republic of China government in the South. Meanwhile, various Chinese factions claiming to be the legitimate government of China refused to work directly with Japan to revise the 21 demands and Japan's control over assets in territory in China via third parties (Masuda 1995; Hattori, 2001). Eventually, the battle for control in the south spilled over into the international realm. Initially, the civil war was a cause for only moderate concern for the Japanese, however in the First National Assembly of the Chinese Nationalist Party¹⁹ (KMT) in 1924, the KMT overtly stated their claims to seek out Soviet support (Hattori et al, 2007). This measure by Sun Zhongshan was a call for help for unifying and consolidating KMT control over the remnants of the carcass of the Qing Dynasty's Chinese empire. Following Sun's call for Soviet help consolidating power over China under the KMT tensions between China and Japan heightened to new levels and the Japanese felt they must intervene to prevent the spread of Russian influence back into Asia proper. This is one of several catalysts for the actions of Japan in the 1930s and 40s (Bunker, 1972). By the time Jiang Jieshi

¹⁹ Pinyin: Guomingdong; Wade-Giles: Kumingtong

consolidated control over the KMT and began pushing north, the Japanese perception of this new threat solidified the discourse among the inner-circle of Japan's government of a need for increasing control over China and stabilizing China's political system on favorable terms for themselves (Bamba, 1973). The remainder of the 1920s can be summed up by Jiang's Northern Expedition to reunify China and Japan's preoccupation with control over assets and rail lines in Northeastern China and their holdings along the Chinese coastline (Hattori, 2005; 2006; Yoshino, 1995). Additionally, and also of paramount importance, the Japanese military increasingly began operating autonomously/without authorization for operations from the Japanese government. The "slow coup" of the Japanese military against its government would result in the circumstances it found itself in over the next two decades (Kato, 2007). To sum up the complications in Sino-Japanese relations up to this point, Northeast China, i.e. Manchuria, was becoming more and more of a chink in Japan's imperial armor; its Achilles heel. And this vulnerability alongside unchecked actions by the Japanese military created the cascade of events that led to some of the worst atrocities in human history being committed, but more to the point, the emergence of China's current government, and the climax to the victim's narrative of the Chinese Communist Party's novel on "the Japan question".

3.2.7 Invasion of Manchuria 1931

Japan's preoccupation with their rail infrastructure and settlements in the Northeast region of China known as Manchuria, along with the increasing disregard that the Japanese military had for the government led to the first major event in the build up to the Second Sino-Japanese War. On September 18th, 1931, one of Japan's railway holdings in Manchuria was

bombed. The attack was carried out by two Japanese officers from the same unit²⁰ that had previously operated without authorization from the government. The Guandong Army²¹, which was responsible for the defense of Japanese railways in the region blamed the bombing on Chinese forces and used this premise as an excuse to seize the city of Shenyang, then known as Mukden which was the capital city for Manchuria (Hata, 1981). Evidence revealed after the events leading up to the Second Sino-Japanese War had been untangled indicate that this operation had been planned by the Guandong Army for some time (Kobayashi and Shimada, 1964). The logic of Japanese military forces in the region were that the Chinese nationalist forces posed a threat to Japan's control over the region, that securing full control over Manchuria was necessary to protect the Japanese islands from any Soviet attacks, and finally, that the event would force the Japanese government to back the military in opposition to international law at the time established by, among others, the League of Nations (Tobe, 2011). Relations between the government and military in Japan became so bad that mid-level officers of the Japanese military attempted to depose the Japanese government the following month, effectively seizing control of the government even though the coup had technically failed (Tobe, 2011). Lastly, in the face of tepid opposition from the League of Nations, China, and others, rather than openly annexing Manchuria, Japan installed the deposed Chinese emperor from the end of the Qing Dynasty, Puyi.

²⁰ From this point on the unit may be referred to as the Guandong Army.

²¹ I believe I have an obligation due to any lack of discussion of this unit beyond clinical commentary by the authors who reference this unit that the Guandong Army, also known as the Kwantung Army, was the Army that Unit 731 was attached to. Unit 731 engaged in atrocities against the Chinese people that were at the very least on par with anything the Nazis engaged in, including at Auschwitz, in Europe. Although not the focus of this chapter, greater attention needs to be placed on the atrocities this unit committed to provide better contextual understanding and justifications of how these scars still weigh on the collective spirit of the Chinese people to this day.

In sum, the maneuver of the Japanese Army at the tactical, strategic, and political levels revealed three critical points. First, the army was able to operate autonomously outside the control of the government. Second, the army succeeded in its first major operation to take over a large portion of Chinese territory, indicating that China lacked the military strength, political will, or both, to properly defend themselves. Finally, the international organizations put in place to prevent future aggression such as that committed by the Japanese Army during the Mukden incident indicated that the Western powers nor the Soviet Union had the desire to go to war at the defense of China. The Mukden incident was a significant event and turning point in the balance of power within Japan's political system, representing a shift in power away from the civilian government and to the military leadership. Japan's actions over the following years included military engagements across the government including a pitched battle in Shanghai (Huang 2002; Tokito 1983). League recognition of Manchukuo, Japan's puppet state in Manchuria, and the assassination and collapse of the civilian government of Japan. Lastly, the culmination of events in spite of protests from the League of Nations finally resulted in the withdrawal of from the League, with their new government in place, in 1933 (Uchida, 2006; Inoue, 1994).

3.2.8 The Marco-Polo Bridge Incident

From the Japanese withdrawal from the league in 1933 to the official beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, several major military engagements occurred between China and Japan spanning across a wide span of Chinese territory. Simultaneously, Jiang continued to appeal to leaders in Japan to come to a peaceful resolution rather than continue to lose ground and troops to Japan as well as consolidate control over China more thoroughly. Jiang also reached out to the Soviets for aid but the division of power in China between the nationalists under Jiang and the communists under Mao, placed the Soviets in a position of helping both

sides in hopes that they could stymie Japanese aggression across north and eastern China and create a stable government over the country. The events leading up to the beginning of the war were confrontations between Japanese and Chinese forces in Northern China as far south as Beijing, a perceived loss of face (面子 mianzi) by both the Chinese and Japanese forces as a result of these confrontations, and a commitment among Japan's military leadership that if any subsequent clashes were to occur, the Japanese army would fully commitment and begin a full assault on China (Hata, 1996; Usui, 1998).

The Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred in Hebei province under a separate government than the territory of China under the control of Jiang and the Nationalists. On July 7th, 1937, a confrontation on opposing banks of the Yongding River in proximity to the Marco Polo bridge broke out between Japanese army and Chinese local military forces in the area. Throughout the evening and into the morning, the Japanese continued to escalate the situation and by 5:30am on July 8th, the Japanese high command ordered an all-out assault on Chinese forces in the vicinity as well as geographical objectives to seize in order to shore up their gains from the confrontation (Hata, 1996; Senshi, 1975; Yasui, 1993; Teradaira, 1970; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA) 1993). On the domestic political front, the Japanese military's actions and political maneuvering forced the government into a full commitment to a campaign against Chinese forces in the area and ultimately, an expansion of the conflict throughout China. This decision was reached not only because of the political maneuvering of Japanese military leaders, but also inaction and/or apathy on the part of the League of Nations, the United States, and the Soviet Union (MoFA 1966; Shoji, 1988; Imai, 1964).

3.2.9 The Second Sino-Japanese War

The escalation of the Marco Polo Bridge incident resulted in a combination of mission creep, sunk costs, and opportunism on the part of the Japanese military which had, by this point, become de facto autonomous from the civilian government. The action resulted in the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Even following what is regarded as the beginning of this war, normalized diplomatic relations did not cease, and neither did attempts or overtures for peace between the two. The Chinese government under Wang Jingwei, and the Japanese government both, did not want to engage in a full-scale war and attempts at reconciliation were made throughout the duration of the war. Japan's primary focus was on crushing the KMT, and all sides had a shared interest in both destroying the Chinese Communist Party, and preventing Soviet influence from expanding into Asia proper (Tobe, 1983; Boyle, 1972; Bunker, 1972; Morley, 1983; Lee, 1967). Although there is no doubt that Japan sought to, and pursued, control over Asia, their military actions in China were less about conquering the entirety of the country, something that no one in Japan even considered given the magnitude of China in terms of land territory, population, and administrative leadership abilities of Chinese willing to work with Japan. That said, the Japanese did seize control of important and strategic ports and points of Chinese territory spanning from Beijing in the north in what was left of northern China, through Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta, and down to Guangzhou at the near the southern-most extent of mainland China during this period.²² This strategy nonetheless resulted in Japan becoming bogged down across large swaths of Chinese territory that created the circumstances for atrocities to occur. Japan's Referring to the sources I have discussed so far, many scholars

²² I exclude Hong Kong and Macao because these territories had not been under Chinese control for some time and the fights to secure them were with their Western rulers rather than China.

had dedicated a significant if not the entirety of their scholarship to this one period in history. Given this reality, this chapter will only summarize the major relevant incidents which form the bulk of Chinese anti-Japan narrative.

To call Japan's conduct of the Second Sino-Japanese War barbaric would be both an understatement and disrespectful to the suffering and hardship that Chinese victims endured during this period. However, in regards to the war and, of greater relevance, the narrative that Chinese have used against Japan since then, the following incidences or issues have remained salient. First and foremost, and the most widely shared issue by countries across Asia was the comfort women issue. Second is the Nanjing Massacre and other similar atrocities that may touch on the periphery of this to demonstrate that this was a systemic issue with Japan's conduct of the Second Sino-Japanese War. And finally, I will discuss Unit 731 and use this as an umbrella to illustrate the scope and depths of the horrors that the Japanese Army committed against the Chinese.

Although in the case of China, Japanese atrocities are a toss-up between the comfort women issue and the Nanjing Massacre, in terms of Japanese conduct throughout the entire theater of the war, the comfort women issue is the most prominent and consistent among all countries that were victimized by Japan during this time period and make claims consistent with one another and only contradictory to Japanese scholars of the magnitude of the issue. This is important because governments from every part of the political spectrum from highly democratic to highly autocratic hold similar perspectives of what happened. This undermines Japan's claims, primarily against China, that the PRC embellishes the issue for instrumental purposes. So most likely then, the war crimes committed were more egregious than what Japanese scholars and the government are comfortable with accepting.

3.3 The Key Narratives

The comfort women issue was one of the worst crimes that Japan committed during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific Theater of World War 2 more generally. Through a multitude of strategies ranging from kidnapping, promises for education, promises for good jobs, promises to emigrate to Japan, women went to the Japanese to participate in these programs, only to find themselves in bondage and unable to escape, to be used for the rest of their lives, or, if they survived, the duration of World War 2 (Agribay, 2003; Yoshiaki, 2000; Fackler, 2007). Aside from the obvious, this issue remains controversial because of the momentous discrepancy between the number of victims the Japanese claimed and the numbers of other countries (Hata, 2007; Rose 2005). These women were held against their will as sex slaves to “service” the Japanese Army. No serious scholar debates that this happened, it is the scope and severity that is debated, and what stirs up further anger in countries across Asia, *why* Japan would continue to publish such different numbers from other scholars across Asia.

The second major contribution to the contemporary anti-Japanese China narrative is the “Rape of Nanjing” or the “Nanjing Massacre”. This event has gained attention throughout the world for being one of the worst recorded events of the 20th century. The statistics are not the focus of this chapter, but it is included here for three reasons. First, symbolically, it represents both a literal and physical rape and emasculation of China and the Chinese people. Second, the atrocities committed reflect the conduct of Japanese soldiers across the Asian continent. Ranging from the treatment of POWs to civilians in occupied areas. Being under Japanese rule or being a Japanese prisoner was a fact of life many endured and quite a few did not survive.

Finally, is the existent of Japanese military organizations that, normatively, could be considered sadistic at best and blatantly evil at worst (Barenblat, 2004). The activities conducted

by Unit 731 included a range of crimes against humanity such as injecting Chinese victims with diseases such as bubonic plague, exposing them to biological weapons, and even vivisectioning a living pregnant woman (Harris and Paxman, 2002; Tamura 1992; Kristof, 1995; Parry, 2007). The findings and data collected by members of Unit 731 and units like it were even used in bio-weapon attacks against Chinese cities such as the Kaimingjie Germ Weapon Attack in 1940 in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, China (Gold, 2004; Pua, et al, 2017). Their legacy, and the legacy of more groups of this nature continue as an artifact in contemporary China as ground breaks on new construction projects and old Japanese chemical weapon shells are hit and explode, creating victims of Japan's legacy in China to the present (Hongo, 2007; Asahi, 2003; Brombach, 2011).

The Second Sino-Japanese War remains to this day the most consistent action by Japan that is instrumental for anti-Japanese rhetoric throughout Asia. Grievances and narratives of Japanese aggression are maintained in Mainland China, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. However, none, I argue, have cultivated these grievances to the extent of the post-Tiananmen Chinese government. To summarize, following the near collapse of the Chinese Communist Party during the Tiananmen Square Protests from April to June 1989, the ideological foundation of the party became increasingly perceived as illegitimate and no longer resembled the same party that claimed to have righted many of the wrongs done to the Chinese people by predatory warlords, the Qing Dynasty leadership, the Nationalists under Jiang, or foreign powers (Gries, Steiger, and Wang 2016). Post-Tiananmen, the opium dens were gone, the comfort women were gone, the artifacts of Qing culture such as foot binding and cues were gone, nearly all and all remaining colonial holdings of Chinese territory were gone or being negotiated to be returned,²³ the people were

²³ Macau was surrendered to the PRC by Portugal in 1999 and Hong Kong by the British in 1997.

literate, educated, and the standard of living of the Chinese people had increased by an order of magnitude.²⁴ Throughout this period of unmatched economic growth in the known histories of the modern nation-state, the CCP had increasingly abandoned the social programs that helped to pull the Chinese people from the ashes and embers of the Qing Dynastic and Republic of China eras in favor of economic growth. This growth proved insufficient for maintaining the support of the Chinese people given the increasing disparity of wealth that was developing, so the party increasingly leaned on nationalist narratives of restoring Chinese cultural, economic, and military power. The rhetoric utilized in these narratives predominantly targeted Japan and the United States and as such, has created a comparably less positive perception of China than that which Deng helped shape in the 1980s.

3.4.1 History in Mao and Deng's Chinas

Relations between China and Japan have been confusing and inconsistent since the end of World War 2. The Chinese narrative regarding Japan and its role in China's Century of Humiliation have been used instrumentally in the form of a victor's narrative (Meisner, 1999) or a victim's narrative (Gries, 2004). Following the conclusion of World War 2, the Soviet Union seized control of Mongolia, Manchuria, and other parts of what had been the Qing Empire. At the time though, the people of China were more preoccupied with stabilizing control of their country, their people, and their territory before grievances could be addressed. Generally speaking, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (KMT) had been fighting one another for control of the China since the 1920s (Li, 2012). Both sides claim to have been the victors over Japan, and both sides accuse the other of holding back against the Japanese

²⁴ Based on World Bank figures, China's GDP expanded from 1979-1989 and 1989-1999 from 178 billion USD to 348 billion USD and 348 billion USD to 1.1 trillion USD respectively.

to save resources for the resumption of the fight for control following the defeat of Japan (Meisner, 1999; Keck, 2014; Ye and Berry, 2003; Buss, 1972). All of this ended with the CCP emerging as victorious in 1948-49, and consolidating power and declaring the People's Republic of China (PRC)²⁵ in 1949 (Westad, 2003; Elleman, 2001; MacFarquhar et al, 1991).

Following the CCP's victory in their war with the KMT and the ascension of Mao to the role of chief leader at the head of the People's Republic of China, the CCP legitimately made great strides in increasing the standard of living for the Chinese people. They crippled the crime syndicates, got rid of the opium dens and had great success at suppressing the drug trade and its usage in China. They forced foreign powers out until new terms were negotiated. They brought parts of China under organized governance for the first time in over a generation, they firmed up and secured their borders, and they restored the dignity of the Chinese people. They even fought the most powerful country in the world into a stalemate on the Korean Peninsula in the Korean (Sino-American) War (Meisner, 1999). Whether it was a gamble, an acceptable risk, or wisdom, Mao and the CCP were able to fight American forces in Korea back to the 38th Parallel without the Americans resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, even over the pressure on Truman from MacArthur to do so (Tannenwald, 1999; Polmar and Norris, 2009). China's victory also ensured a buffer zone between Chinese territory and US forces. Although the USSR and China were ideologically allies, China's success in the Korean War also acted as a useful deterrent against future Soviet aggression against them (Wang, 2005).

²⁵ The People's Republic of China or PRC is referred to by Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau as the Mainland and its people Mainlanders.

3.4.2 1950s – Informal Overtures

The relationship between China and Japan in the 1950s was almost exclusively informal. Officially, Japan, as much of the rest of the world, recognized the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei, Taiwan as the legitimate government of the mainland until the Western pivot to recognize the PRC in 1971 when they took over the China's seat and delegation in the UN. China's contact with Japan dealt primarily with the Chinese returning Japanese prisoners, discussing fishing rights, and China's support of left-wing parties in Japan (Barnouin, 1988). Both the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan upheld the policy of not recognizing diplomatic relations with states that recognized the other rather than themselves. Given that Japan recognized the ROC in Taiwan, relations with China were extremely limited, however there is no evidence to suggest that the CCP harbored any negative feelings toward Japan over the Century of Humiliation era.

3.4.3 1960s – The Sino-Soviet Split

The 1960s were a tumultuous time period in China for a multitude of reasons. The second 5 Year Plan of the PRC had been a fantastic tragedy known as the Great Leap Forward where millions of Chinese, especially farmers, died of starvation due to a famine in combination with a culture of fear constructed around Mao during the era. Further, Stalin's death the ascent of Khrushchev, de-Stalinization, and Khrushchev's change of foreign policy doctrine from Stalin contributed to Sino-Soviet Split (Meisner, 1999; Lorenz, 2008). This, in conjunction with the PRC's isolation from the UN, and because of its One China policy, led the country to be left with very few allies in the world. On top of all this was Mao's Cultural Revolution in his move to reconsolidate power around himself and purge those who had pushed him out of power following the Great Leap (Meisner, 1999). Given these realities, China and Japan participated together in a

goodwill gesture in the Liao-Takasaki Agreement which expanded trade between the two as well as some of the first Foreign Direct Investment from China into Japan (Itoh, 2012).

3.4.4 1970s – Rehabilitation

Probably the most course altering decade in the PRC's history was the 1970s. In terms of international relations and Chinese foreign policy, the decade is important because of two major events in 1971. First, was the push by several countries led by Albania to switch recognition of China in the UN from the ROC government on Taiwan to the PRC government on the mainland. The passage of this resolution gave the PRC all of the diplomatic privileges and roles that had been enjoyed by the ROC, including a permanent seat on the Security Council (UN Res 2758, 1971). The second, was one of Nixon's major backroom deals where he began the process of the United States normalizing relations with Mainland China (Dube, 2011). With diplomatic relations restored with the PRC and relations developing between China and the US as part of the US strategy to exploit the Sino-Soviet Split and increase strategic pressure on the Soviet Union, many countries began normalizing relations with the PRC. Toward the end of the decade, Mao died, which led to a temporary power vacuum and interim period where Mao's handpicked successor ascended to the top leadership position, followed by Madam Mao's coup with the Gang of Four coalition, and all which was finally ended with the ascent of Deng Xiaoping back to the head position of the PRC. This led to the Opening and Reform movement where Deng reversed or modified many of Mao's policies in order to stimulate economic growth, enhance the stability and security of the PRC, and rehabilitate China's image to the rest of the world (Meisner, 1999).

Specific in regard to Sino-Japanese relations, following China's recognition by the UN, normalization in relations with the US, and the transition in power to Tanaka from Sato in Japan,

relations between the two changed rapidly and dramatically. This began with the Japan – China Joint Communique in 1972 which established several agreements related to war reparations initially demanded by China, Japan’s agreement on China’s one China policy, as well as recognition of Taiwan as China’s territory (Communique, 1972; Kim 1975; Hsiao, 1974). Subsequent agreements led to a significant expansion in trade relations, FDI, and ODA between the two countries as well as successful diplomatic negotiations on a moratorium over contested territory in the East China Sea including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and an anti-hegemony agreement between the two in regards to Soviet influence in Asia (Masuda, 2003; Overview of Japanese ODA to China, 2016; Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, 1978). The opening of relations between the two countries is critical to the examination of this case because it presents the first data on the perspective of Japanese citizens toward China. In 1978, a poll was conducted of Japanese citizens on their feelings toward China. 62.1% of respondents felt friendly feelings toward China while 25.6% did not have friendly feelings toward China. This identical survey was conducted again in 1980 with 78.6% of Japanese having friendly feelings toward China and 14.7% did not have friendly feelings toward China (Dreher et al. 2017).

3.4.5 1980s – Normalization

The transition of the 1970s led to normal relations between the PRC and Japan in the 1980s and everything that entails, including the occasional friction over disagreements. Trade, FDI, and ODA continued to flourish between the countries throughout the decade, contributing greatly to the rapid growth of China’s economy throughout this time period (Hagström, 2005). The two also worked jointly in opposition to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, and (Girard, 2018) bilateral opposition to Soviet deployment of military forces into Asia (Zagoria, 1986).

Generally, there was a strengthening alignment between China and Japan, and in light of concerns in Beijing of US-Japanese defense agreements, an alignment between the US, China, and Japan, on policies in opposition of Soviet foreign policy. All of this said, in addition to the emergence of friction between China and Japan over the status of islands in the East China Sea in 1978, two other major fault lines appeared that demonstrated that while Japan's imperialist legacy may have been forgiven, it was not forgotten, nor should the Japanese government allow it to be forgotten by Japanese citizens. In this period, the Japanese textbook controversy and Japanese head of state visits to the Yasukuni Shrine to the chagrin of Chinese citizens (Masalski, 2001; Jameson, 1985). Whether this information was state sanctioned and provided to the Chinese people for instrumental purposes is unclear as this period overlapped with a brief moment in history under the leadership of Hu Yaobang and Zhang Ziyang. Under their leadership, the Chinese population got a brief glimpse of the relaxation of CCP censorship and restrictions on citizen participation. Since the creation of the Chinese modern nation-state in 1949 though, based on my assessment of politics and state-society relations in the People's Republic of China, this time period was the closest that Chinese ever came to experiencing anything resembling a relaxation of restrictions and regulations or a liberalization of the that relationship. It is also the closest China and Japan have ever been in their long history in terms of friendliness and cooperation. However, as the Communist pole in the international system collapsed around the world, a knee-jerk reaction by the CCP would alter China's course and its relationship with Japan up to and including the present-day relationship.

3.4.6 The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989

On April 15th, 1989, Hu Yaobang, who had been the head of the Communist Party until student protests between 1986-1987 when he was removed for the way he handled the protests.

His death was considered suspicious by students because it was following his removal and during a politburo meeting (Calhoun, 1989). Hu had been a major reformer within the Communist Party and had pushed for the expansion of liberalization from oriented solely at economic reform to also include political reform and personal freedoms. Students initially gathered in the square to mourn Hu's death and call for reforms to reduce corruption, introduce free speech and press, and increase government transparency (Zhang, 2001; Zhao, 2001). After the number of students in the square expanded in size the students were asked to leave and those who refused were coerced by police with batons and the square was closed until after Hu's state funeral (Zhao, 2001). In spite of the square being closed, over 100,000 students in the Beijing area from Tsinghua University, Beijing University, Renmin University, and others gathered during Hu's state funeral to then Communist Leader Zhang Ziyang's eulogy (Zhao, 2001).

The protests continued to expand in size with increasingly ambitious demands. Zhang discussed amicable solutions with other party leaders including the de facto successor to Mao, Deng Xiaoping. Deng is reported to have been receptive to reforms until the students, whose number had grown to over 300,000 by this point, declared a hunger strike on May 13th, two days before a state visit from Gorbachev (Zhao, 2001; Cheng, 2009). Alarming for the party leaders, the protest movement was also beginning to spread to other cities as well. On May 17th and 18th, over a million people across China, in over 400 cities, including not only students but also average Chinese citizens, many NGOs across the country, workers, and even soldiers in the PLA came out in support of the movement (Zhao, 2001). This escalation created a schism between Zhang and the other members of the Politburo. Li Peng made an appearance in the square on May 18th and called for the students to disperse and allow the authorities to take students sick from the hunger strike to the hospital, however this achieved the opposite effect from the student

leaders who now began calling for the specific removal of Deng and Li from the leadership (Brook, 1998; Pye, 1990; Wu, 2011). In light of the continuing escalation the majority of politburo members agreed that the only option they had remaining was to declare martial law and disperse the students with the military. Zhang however, refused to declare and execute this order and personally appeared in the square to make a direct appeal to the students to disperse. His break from the party line and direct meeting with the protesters led to his deposal, and the final resolve by Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and other members of the leadership to declare martial law and use military forces to disperse the protests in the square (Zhao, 2001; Li, 2010; Nathan, 2002; Zhao, 2009).

The situation continued to spiral out of control for the CCP due to initial failure of the army to disperse the protesters. On May 20th, approximately 250,000 soldiers were moved into Beijing, however, they were blocked from the square and dispersing the protesters by Beijing residents throughout every entry point into the city (Wu, 2009; Richelson and Evans, 1999; Brooks 1998; Thomas, 2006). This was the most critical point of the entire incident and the reasoning for providing so much depth of the events that transpired. The five remaining leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, following the removal of Zhang Ziyang as General Secretary of The CCP, the expansion of the protests in both size, diversity²⁶ and magnitude in the number of cities now involved, and the failure or refusal of the military to move with force against the residents of Beijing who were blocking access to the square, realized that their government was on the brink of collapsing and chose to declare the students to be counterrevolutionaries and move into the square and disperse all protesters with all necessary force (Wu, 2010; Zhang, 2001; Matthews, 1989). Deng, Li, and the others met with military leaders and issued the decree

²⁶ By this point the students had been joined by Chinese workers, farmers, intellectuals, and soldiers.

that military units were to begin converging on the square at 9 pm on June 3rd, reach the square by 1 am on June 4th, and for the square and all protesters to be cleared no later than 6 am. They were not to allow any person to impede their progress toward the square regardless of the consequences (Wu, 2010).

The events that followed have been engraved in history by all sides, and recorded for posterity by many Westerners and embellished as a marker for how autocratic the Chinese government was and is by others in the West. However, it is critical that scholars analyzing this event, even 30 years later, appreciate a) how close the Chinese government was to collapsing, and b) to question realistically, if governments throughout even the “democratic West” would have accepted the literal collapse of their government. Inferring from a multitude of protests across Europe, Canada, and the United States over this time span and up to and including violent clashes with police in the United States from May to July of 2020; it is unlikely that most governments even in the West would have accepted the total dissolution of their governmental system rather than dispersing protesters by any means necessary.

The fallout from the entire incident, especially the military action from June 3rd through 5th, permanently altered the trajectory of China’s development. Arms embargoes were placed on the PRC (GAO, 1998). Trade ties were damaged, (Naughton, 2007; Foot, 2000; Kelley and Shenkar, 1993) and a general negative stigma across the West toward China developed, perhaps unfairly when reflecting on the direness of the situation, resulting in the PRC’s isolation from the West (Zhang, 2001; Cabestan, 2010) and the manifestation of resentment among CCP leaders, and even average citizens of current day China toward the West, especially toward western media (Nathan, 2002, Nathan 2009, Bodeen 2019; Goodman 1994; Brook, 1998; Miles, 2009).

Overall, the incident resulted in the end of political liberalization in China, which 30 years later has not recovered, increasingly sophisticated police surveillance, media censorship, and expansion of the power of the military, ministry of state security, and police in general toward the civilian population. The most important realization by all however was the bankruptcy of the legitimacy of China's political system at this time. Deng's opening and reform movement of the late 1978s, the liberalization of economic activity and general relaxing of restrictions up to the incident created a paradox within China's state-society dynamic. The laws never changed but enforcement of them was loosened which created the inaccurate assumption of Chinese citizens of the late 1980s that political reform and liberalization were on the brink of realization. This was never the intent by Deng and the inner-circle of Chinese leaders however and upon reflection realized that the vacuum left by waning Marxist-Leninist and Maoist doctrine had to be filled by something, leading to the Patriotic Education Campaign and the CCP's pivot toward three major rhetorical narratives. First, the growth of the economy, second, an endless campaign to purge corruption, which has increasingly become politically convenient, from the CCP, third, the restoration of China to its rightful position as a leader of the international system, and finally, that the CCP was the only institution capable of executing these objectives (Wang, 2008; Sneider, 2013; Zhao, 1998; Dor, 2015).

3.4.7 Post-Tiananmen CCP Embellishment

In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests and the CCP leadership's realization of the need to construct a new narrative to legitimize their continued governance, they increasingly began to adopt, or revive narratives focused on externalizing domestic tension onto foreign forces or influences. The overarching narrative of the CCP on its relationship both with itself and the rest of the world transitioned from a victor to a victim's narrative. Mao's China was

one of a victor who had survived and overcome colonization, imperialism, exploitation, and atrocities. Post-Tiananmen China emphasizes a victim's narrative focused on a century of humiliation and the need for all Chinese to unite as *one*²⁷ China and return to its rightful place in the world. This narrative has emphasized the need for China to oppose any who attempt to obstruct its return to a prominent position in the world. It also emphasizes China's ascent as a super power capable of reshaping the world order on equal terms and to set aside internal strife and differences in the interim (Gries, 2004; Ikenberry, 2008).

The primary target of this tactic has been the bilateral relationship between the PRC and Japan. Upon examining evidence in the empirical section of this chapter there is a significant relationship between the shift in China's national conversation about Japan and the perspective of both the Japanese government and citizens toward China. It is plausible and in need of empirical testing beyond the scope of this chapter how statistically significant the relationship between China's rhetoric and Japanese perspectives on the relationship are. Future research will test this when better data becomes available, either due to better technology or a relaxation in China's censorship policies.

China's anti-Japanese rhetoric has primarily centered on three main issues. First is the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine. Second, is the Japanese textbook issue. And finally, is the narrative that Japan is generally unapologetic about its imperial legacy. China is not alone in its issue with these issues, Korea and Taiwan also protest about Japanese conduct on them, but nothing to the extent of China. China's diplomatic approach in this issue area is consistent with what Peter Gries describes as China's "apology diplomacy" (Gries, 2004). Another issue that has become

²⁷ The People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc.

less relevant in the 21st century was Japan's reemergence as a global power in the 1980s and 90s. I will touch on this briefly in the empirical section due to its relevance to contributing to a decline in relations, but has not been as large of a factor for the past 20 years or so. Once discussions of adding Japan to the security council and other measures that would have expanded Japan's influence over international relations had diminished, that subject became a tapped well for anti-Japanese rhetoric. Related to that is the end of Japan's economic growth in the 1990s and the relative equilibrium they have lingered at since then. Another complexity that doesn't help the situation is Chinese rhetoric on the prominence of Japanese nationalism in antagonizing the Chinese and heightening tensions in the region. Finally, are the territorial disputes that exist between China and Japan in the East China Sea. This issue is made even more complex by China being locked in, audience costs-wise, on Japan's claims being an artifact of its imperial legacy, and Japan's on these always being a part of Japan. This is an issue that will also be discussed that factors greatly in to the current tensions between the two countries.

For the Japanese, the key issues are Chinese Nationalism, Chinese Militancy, territorial disputes in the East China Sea, and China's disregard for Japanese sovereignty by giving Japanese the impression that the Chinese government is under the perverse conception that they have the authority to approve or disapprove of Japanese norms and practices. The idea of writing historical textbooks in a way that does not paint Japan to be monstrous in the first half of the 20th century is misleading, but so are American historical textbooks that leave American primary school students thinking that the United States single-handedly won World War 2. It is highly improbable that not ingraining into Japanese youth the extent of the massacre that their country conducted from 125 to 75 years ago is going to increase or decrease the likelihood of resurgent

Japanese imperialism in the western Pacific. Casual conversations in China about wiping Japan off the map on the other hand, that might.

The idea that China has the authority, or even the Japanese government has the authority for that matter, to regulate religious practices in Japan, and the way that Japanese citizens engage in those religious practices, even in the context of the Yasukuni Shrine, while again, the practice is unpalatable, the reality is that it is absurd to suggest that a modern state has the authority to regulate religious practices that they disapprove of in another state, and to the Japanese, appear to be characteristics of Chinese Nationalism and heightened militancy. Finally, the dismissive nature of China toward both Japanese territorial claims in the East China Sea and *international law* has caused grave concern about the future intentions of the Chinese state. These are the terms I examine in my SMS analysis in the subsequent section.

To conclude the historical analysis of the Sino-Japanese relationship, prior to the 19th century, both countries existed in the Chinese tributary system of international relations. However, following their forced opening by the west, both countries began to change. China was essentially colonized in terms of the concessions they were forced to give in response to losing wars to Western powers. Japan's response was to force industrialize as quickly as possible and they became a global power less than 50 years after their exposure to the West. This was followed by Japanese imperialism across East-Asia and creating a legacy that they still bear the consequences of to this day. Following World War 2, China began to stabilize relative to the previous 100 years and relations between the two countries began to improve until after the Tiananmen Square Protests and subsequent crackdown in 1989. Following the emergence of the Patriotic Education Campaign in the early 1990s, Chinese rhetoric toward Japan has become more and more belligerent and Japanese perceptions of China are at an all-time post WW2 low. I

will now discuss the model in the context of this case and then move on to an examination of the Chinese rhetoric that has damaged Sino-Japanese relations.

3.5 The Model

Given that this is the first empirical chapter, I discuss in depth the model, the data I collect, and the way in which I collect it in more detail to eliminate the need to do so again in subsequent chapters. Revisiting the theoretical literature, the narratives utilized by the state, China in this case, are necessary for creating practices and narratives of legitimation. Practices in terms of means for elites and the mass public both to engage in the state, and narrative in terms of what these practices are grounded in and what their contexts are. Legitimacy, the noun, and legitimation, the verb describing how a regime attempts to create or build upon its legitimacy, are challenging concepts to measure. Insofar as legitimacy is concerned, I would argue it is impossible to empirically or positivistically, measure legitimacy. We can create a typology and categorize the types of legitimacy a regime has, (Weber, 1958) but beyond that a regime's legitimacy cannot be extrapolated on. It has it, until it no longer does and is deposed. It may wax and wane, but again, how would one measure it? It is tautological insofar as determining whether or not a regime has it. Either it does or it does not. Legitimation is a bit less subjective. It is an action rather than a thing that exists or does not exist, and we can identify types, build a typology, and measure the intensity of the action relative to other data points throughout time, but temporality affects the need for action, the intensity of it, and the resources needed, available, and expended for it so this is challenging to measure as well (Goddard and Krebs, 2015).

Of the three narratives mentioned, economic development, war on corruption, and nationalist (patriotic) sentiments, the nationalist narrative is the focus of this case. The nationalist narrative in China is directed at four main targets or target areas. First, is the focus on nationalist

discourse within the state-society narrative between members of the government and the corresponding elites in their relationship with mass politics within society. Second is a civic nationalism which appeals to Chinese citizens as belonging to the Chinese state. Third, is ethnic nationalism which focuses on the state-society discourse on what being Chinese actually means. And the final, and primary focus is on state-led, pragmatic nationalism which emerged in light of the decline of Communism culminating with the Tiananmen Square Incident (Zhao, 2004).

The first three nationalist narratives focus on different angles of the same question/problem. What is Chinese and what does it mean to be Chinese? In the era of the modern nation-state individual and group identities insofar as how they relate to the state has been a challenge to regime legitimacy insofar as the willingness and ability of individuals or groups to “buy in” to the regime or state. This is most clear with the tension between ethnic and civic nationalisms, the first encompassing people who are “ethnically Chinese” in this case, Han, vs, the other minority groups in China, predominantly the Tibetans and Uyghurs. The first relates to the discourse between state and society on these two. The final however, is again, to narrow down the scope of this analysis, is the primary focus of the model. China’s state-led, pragmatic nationalism began as an instrumental attempt to restore the legitimacy to govern of the CCP following the post-Tiananmen collapse of their communist roots from their inception to the death of Mao. This began in earnest with the previously mentioned Patriotic Education Campaign which to reiterate, became an essential piece to the CCP’s legitimacy narrative following the Tiananmen Square Incident (Zhao, 1998; Fifield, 2019; Fifield and Shih, 2019). Some scholars have since argued that the narrative and practices involved evolved it into an institutionalized narrative (Gries, 2004; Gries et al., 2016) however regardless of its institutionalization or if it is

still only instrumental and the shape that it takes is whatever it is the CCP deems necessary at the moment, the focus of this model is its instrumental use.

China's posture, primarily toward Japan and the United States, but with some belligerent rhetoric directed toward European countries, has been constructed on the core belief that Japan severely handicapped and stunted China's growth for the 50 years of its imperialist aggression, and the United States has attempted to contain and prevent China's rise ever since the CCP gained control of the country. Both of these narratives are contradictory to the CCP's rehabilitation of both relationships between the 1960s up until 1989, however this also highlights the instrumentalism present in their current discourse. This chapter focuses on the Sino-Japanese relationship; however, the following chapter will examine the Sino-American relationship and how that has been impacted by the same phenomenon. In both cases, the pivot of the CCP away from cooperation and toward confrontation, away from a victor's narrative and toward a victim's narrative, has damaged the relationship with both.

In sum, China's anti-Japanese rhetoric has been instrumental in maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP and providing a convenient distraction to externalize domestic turmoil (Brulé and Williams, 2009). Based on the model I presented in chapter 2, theories on Democratic Diversion are approximately equally applicable when discussing authoritarian states insofar as both rely on a selectorate of some sort and both are accountable, so both will engage in similar types of tactics. So, to summarize, the CCP was forced to change its legitimation strategy post-Tiananmen from a communist narrative to something else. The alternative it selected was a nationalist narrative. This provided the CCP with a method of regime legitimation to appease its selectorate during times of domestic trouble or for any other instrumental purposes. This is

consistent with the literature on democratic diversion theory as mentioned by Brule and Williams as well as many others. It can also be summed up well by Zakowski who says:

There is no easy answer as to why Chinese citizens had become so sensitive about historical issues... (which also included) state policy. Together with the gradual introduction of a free market economy, communism became only a hollow slogan and the CCP leaders needed to find a new way of legitimizing their power. Due to the democratization of Taiwan, the communists no longer could refer to the Guomindang as an external threat, because it became a potential ally against the independence movement led by the Democratic Progressive Party. One way of legitimizing CCP rule and strengthening national solidarity was to bolster patriotism by educating Chinese society about the Japanese invasion during the Second World War (Zakowski, 2012).

China adopted a belligerent rhetoric directed toward other states for instrumental domestic purposes. And finally, the primary target of this rhetoric has been Japan. The effect of this has been a deterioration of relations between China and Japan. With the historical analysis and contextualizing of the model, I will now examine the rhetoric specific to this case. I will then discuss the impact this rhetoric had on generating transnational audience costs in Japan. Following this, I will discuss what the Japanese government has done in response to the feelings and threat perception of Japanese citizens. From there I will conclude the chapter.

3.6.1 The Rhetoric

Generally speaking, China's anti-Japanese rhetoric has centered on three primary issue areas. First, is what they say is Japan's lack of remorse for its imperial past. Second, are accusations that Japan continues to maintain claims to territory obtained in its imperial past. And last, is its post-World War 2 resurgence as a powerful country. Of course, Japan, as any other country, is going to portray their history positively as much as possible,²⁸ and this is not going to conform to the CCP's school curriculum on history, however to act invasively into another

²⁸ Even though German schools are emphatic about the atrocities that Germany committed during the second world war, they still teach the positives about German history, philosophy, and culture as well.

state's school curriculum and societally held beliefs with the conception that they can influence or alter it is by general agreement a gross violation of another state's sovereignty. Further, coming from China, the state that takes the state sovereignty position to justify all of its activities across the world, it is both ironic and extremely convenient. In other words, generally speaking, while it is not unnecessarily unfounded, it is nonetheless hypocritical. In this section on Chinese rhetoric directed toward Japan I will list and discuss examples pertaining to each of those issue areas, and in the next section I will discuss the reaction of Japanese elites and the public to this political rhetoric followed by how, based on that reaction, Japan has responded.

3.6.2 Japan's Rise in the 1980s and 1990s

Following its occupation by the United States in 1945, Japan was tasked with almost completely rebuilding their country from the ground up. They had to adopt a new way of trade consistent with the international trade framework laid by the United States in various UN affiliated organizations as well as the WTO and the IMF. They had to abide by a new, democratic, constitution written by Americans that they had to conform their society to, and they had to accept a new reality of permanent demilitarization. They would no longer be allowed to possess the means to defend themselves by the great powers and instead would be dependent upon aid from the United States in the event that their territory or sovereignty in general were to be threatened. In spite of all this, from the 1950s through the 1990s the Japanese economy began to grow at an astounding rate. Ironically, it was Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s that American IR realists would identify as the emerging security threat to the US, not China. However, depending on how one phrases it, it could be said that Japan went into a recession in the 1990s it has never truly recovered from, or it could be said that economically speaking, Japan reached economic equilibrium and has maintained a relatively stable rate of growth that reflects

other growth indicators of the country. In other words, Japan's population is not growing sufficiently to make much significant annual GDP growth however there has not been any major contractions outside of exogenous shocks since the 1990s. Given that, the issue of Japan's rise is important to note because of how China's reaction to it aided in souring the relationship between the two countries beginning post-Tiananmen, however it is no longer a major topic of discussion so I will briefly summarize it for context rather than conduct a full examination as with disputes over historical revisionism and territorial disputes.

In the 1990s and building up into the Anti-Japanese Riots of 2005 in China, the CCP engaged in a rhetorical assault on Japan focused on "the rising threat of Japan" throughout the period. Fueled by a narrative of Japan's lack of remorse over its wartime atrocities, China constructed a narrative about Japan's desire to restore its military and its dominance over Asia. The myth of Japanese militarism during the period permeated discourse from the politburo level down to chat rooms by Chinese netizens in internet cafés throughout China. As James Reilly discusses in his book on this specific subject, Japan was a convenient target for the post-Tiananmen CCP to utilize to redirect frustration on domestic issues to external forces instead, in this case Japan (Reilly, 2012). The catalyst that pushed the issue over the edge however was diplomatic discussion and pressure to grant Japan a seat on the UN Security Council in the early 2000s (Shirk, 2007; Reilly, 2012; Starr, 2011). This culminated in the Anti-Japanese Riots of 2005 which saw the most violent outbreak of protests by Chinese since the CCP had assumed leadership over the country in 1949.

Consistent with the logic presented in this dissertation, China was using its domestic audience, and the angry feelings it had fostered within the Patriotic Education Campaign to prevent Japan from obtaining any positions of parity with it in the international realm as well as

distracting the Chinese public from issues on the domestic side including censorship which many in China correctly associated with the unnecessarily high infection rate of SARS from 2002-2004, dam construction for hydroelectric power primarily across the south which led to the loss of considerable land where communities had previously been, and increasing pressure on national leaders to crack down on political corruption at the local and provincial levels of governance (Mertha, 2010; Cai, 2010; Saich, 2011). The allowance of the protests proved to be effective for the CCP which helped prevent Japan's ascension to a leadership position in the international system and avoid domestic criticism throughout the period. Although it prevented Japan from obtaining its political objectives at the time, it generated costs insofar as how Japanese perceive China. Although China succeeded in delaying Japan's bid for increased stature in the world for over a decade, making this category a non-issue moving into the present, it facilitated the declining view of China that may have been less intense contemporarily had they not been blocked from a literal seat at the table.

3.6.3 Controlling Shintoism

China's grievance that Japan lacks of remorse for its imperial past is illustrated by primarily by continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese elites, especially its prime ministers, comfort women who were sex slaves, usually either Chinese or Korean, and by Japan's "historical revision" in its textbooks. Both of these issues are simultaneously very subjective and very political. I will briefly explain what the Yasukuni Shrine is, why it is important, and what the grievances that China and other East Asian countries have against visits by heads of state and other important Japanese figures to the shrine. I will then discuss specifically the issue that China and others have with the information written in, and image painted of Japan in history, in their textbooks.

The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto Temple located in Tokyo. It was founded in 1869 and was called Shokonsha until the Emperor Meiji's visit to the shrine in 1874. It was at that time that the shrine was renamed Yasukuni. Avoiding getting into the intricacies of Shinto spirituality, the shrine is considered to be the literal home of 2,466,000 souls of Japanese who have fallen in battle for Japan since that time. This includes every Japanese killed in: the "Boshin War, the Seinan War, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, World War I, the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident, and the Greater East Asian War (World War II)." The maintainers of the shrine add that: "These people, regardless of their rank or social standing, are considered to be completely equal and worshipped as venerable divinities of Yasukuni." ("Yasukuni Shrine," n.d.). Importantly, not only does this include every Japanese soldier who fell in battle for Japan, it also includes the leaders of Japan who led these war efforts. Framing this in a different, but equally tinted lens, the Yasukuni Shrine, based on the Shinto religion, is the home of every soldier and leader of soldiers who were killed during Japan's era of imperial conquest including leaders such as former prime minister Hideki Tojo who was executed for war crimes during World War 2 during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Pritchard, Zaide, and Watt, 1981). So, based on Shinto, when people visit and pay respects to the memory of Japanese killed in combat, they are worshipping people including him, and every other soldier who had ever committed atrocities and killed in combat. Both Taiwan and Korea also take issue with state visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and this is why.

Chinese responses to Japanese state visits to, and even the continued existence of, the shrine have been vehemently negative. This has been communicated to the Japanese both in words and deeds. A visit to the shrine in 2001 by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi led to the Chinese Foreign Ministry issuing a complaint that "the visit caused damage to the political

foundation of Sino-Japanese relations and hurt the feelings of the Chinese and other Asian nations,” and that it “will affect the future development of healthy bilateral relations.” (Uchiyama, 2010). A later visit was condemned directly by then Chinese leader Jiang Zemin as being an injury that can never be forgiven²⁹ (Shimizu, 2003). Statements such as these are much graver in meaning in Chinese and in Asian international relations in general than their English translations can convey. Similar to the word *schadenfreude* in German, there is no English equivalent. Many scholars infer that this is what led to changes of China to adopt the Japanese Bullet Train design for its high-speed rail system in the early 2000s. Instead, they gleaned what they could from the Japanese design and made their own version, which even has the same colors on the train as the genuine Japanese trains, but are not of Japanese construction or up to Japan’s specifications (Hood, 2007; Zakowski, 2012; Hong, 2007).

3.6.4 Political Convenience and an Unescapable History

Another heated issue is that of the enslavement and use of comfort women, typically Chinese or Korean, primarily during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese military on the Asian continent took part in the capture or enticing with false pretense, Chinese, Korean and Filipino women whom they used as sex slaves. For example, job flyers would be put out seeking women for administration assistant positions, only to find themselves literally in chains as forced prostitutes for the Japanese army (Agribay 2003; Mitchell, 1997). Some were recovered by advancing Allied troops as far away as Burma where they discovered that approximately 800 Korean women were deceptively recruited to relocating to Burma under the pretense that they would be visiting the wounded in hospitals, rolling bandages, and generally making the soldiers

²⁹ The original statement was 不能原谅 “bu neng yuanliang”.

happy (Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report 49, 1944). Conditions for these women were egregiously inhumane, ranging from being raped and beaten, forced abortions and sterilization, and in some cases even being the victims of cannibalism by the Japanese Army (Ruff-O'Herne, 1994; Hicks, 1996; Nelson, 2007). To summarize, this was a terrible practice by the Japanese military, and many, including philanthropists all the way up to the Japanese government itself has made apologies and paid reparations to try to help the victims, but it remains a sensitive subject. The puzzle is not that people are angry and sensitive about the issue, it is that, as has been said and will be said again, why was this not something that was focused on with the same severity from the end of World War 2 up until the 1990s?

Since the Japanese apologies directed toward Korea in regards to the comfort women issue, China has become increasingly assertive in the victimization of Chinese women forced into the practice (Morgan, 2018). The Chinese government has dedicated entire sections in white papers on the issue insofar as how to exploit the issue in improving its position relative to both Japan and the United States (Dreyer, 2018; Qiao and Wang, 1999). The CCP has also invested heavily in organizations such as the Confucius Institutes in the US and other similar types of organizations across the world (Rogin, 2017; Ward and Lay, 2019; Moteki, n.d.; Shimbun, 2018). *Some* of these organizations have been used to spread anti-Japanese propaganda across the world. Not all parts of all organizations, such as the Confucius Institutes have been involved in this, but some have (Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago, 2014; SCMP, 2014). As recently as 2018, after seventy years of issuing apologies and reparations, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to issue statements that Japan has not done enough to make up for its misconduct during the Second Sino-Japanese War/World War 2 (Shim, 2018). In a final example, China's foreign ministry repeated calls for Japan to own up to

its crimes during the war, while state media in China played off of this dismissing “the deal as geopolitical puppetry by U.S. officials seeking to contain Beijing (Wong, 2015). The worst part of this particular issue is not that the Chinese government is wrong, what the Japanese did during World War 2 is unforgivable. However, the *instrumentalist* use of these crimes by the government to redirect frustration with the CCP and toward someone else is counterproductive toward attempting to repair relations between Japan and every country and their peoples that they victimized 75 plus years ago.

The final example in terms of using Japan’s wartime actions to fuel current day anger is the controversy over a revised version of history textbooks by Japan which began in 2001. Issues of textbook revisions include the figures and narratives of incidences such as the Nanjing Massacre, forced suicides on Okinawa, comfort women, Japan’s annexation of Korea and advance into China in the 1930s, etc (Saaler, 2005). The common denominator in these cases is a reaction to, and over-inflation of a resurgence in Japanese nationalism in more recent years. There is no evidence to support that there is a mass movement or wave of nationalism across Japan, however that is the picture that the CCP has painted, and quite successfully, convinced the Chinese people that this is a major systemic problem going on. Given the level of censorship in China as of 2020, it is understandable that Chinese believe that this nationalist movement in Japan is larger than it really is. The censorship issue in China has become so challenging at this point, that not only do Chinese have difficulty accessing information outside of China, it is impossible for non-Chinese and even people from Hong Kong to access information on internet sites inside of China. With this I conclude my discussion of how the treatment of history between China and Japan has escalated tensions between the two. From here I move in to discussing

territorial disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea. Specifically, I examine the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands controversy.

3.6.5 The East China Sea and Economic Exclusion Zones

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are 8 islands situated in the East China Sea near the Ryukyu Islands. They are claimed by both China and Japan. The grounds for China's claim go back to historical records they claim to be from the Ming Dynasty which ruled China from (1368-1644) and the Cairo Declaration which mandated that Japan surrender all Chinese territory it had annexed. Additionally, it demarcated the boundaries between the two countries in terms of islands in the East China Sea based on how they were situated on the continental shelf. Japan's grounds for claiming the islands goes back to the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was *not* part of the Cairo Declaration, in which Japan took control of Taiwan and other islands off the Chinese coast. Additionally, Japan claims specifically that the islands were *terra nullius* prior to their occupation, unlike Taiwan which have a preexisting indigenous population. They further substantiate this claim in international law based on the US's return of administrative rights over the Ryukyus and other islands in the region, including Okinawa and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, in 1972. They also assert that the line of demarcation in the continental shelf argument supports their claim based on international maritime law (Gries et al, 2016). To summarize, M. Taylor Fravel writes that:

China and Japan hold conflicting claims over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. Japan asserts that the islands were determined to be unoccupied and *terra nullius* ("as empty land") in 1885 and formally incorporated into Japan in 1895. China claims discovery of the islands under the Ming dynasty and asserts that they were ceded to Japan along with Taiwan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and thus returned to China at the end of World War II. From 1945 to 1972, however, the United States administered the islands directly as part of the Ryukyu Islands (which included Okinawa) and used one of the islets as a bombing range. With the conclusion of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, the islands have been administered by Japan since May

1972. China (People's Republic of China) issued its first formal claim to the islands in December 1970, after Taiwan (in the name of the Republic of China) and Japan both issued claims in bids to ensure access to nearby petroleum resources (Fravel, 2010).

Protests over the islands occurred as early as 1971 in a confrontation between Japan and Taiwan over the islands resulting in the Japanese navy removing reporters raising a flag on one of the islands. The issue was also brought to light by vocal anti-Japanese protestors in Hong Kong as well. However insofar as the PRC is concerned, when the issue was brought up during the normalization of relations between the Mainland and Japan in 1972, the two sides agreed to table the issue for later when wiser minds less attached to history were able to negotiate the dispute. The first public outcry in Mainland China over the uninhabitable islands took place as the Patriotic Education Campaign began to reap its results with the 1996 Chinese book "China Can Still Say No" (zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu 中国还是能说不). This was the beginning of the territorial dispute between the Mainland and Japan that continues on today (Gries et al, 2016).

The most severe of the incidents regarding the islands came following the collision of a fishing boat with Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the vicinity of the Islands in 2010. This began a cascading downward spiral over the issue over the next few years. The fishing boat incident was not the first such action that had the potential to create friction within the dyad on the issue however in this case, it overlapped with domestic issues simmering under the surface on the Mainland. In this case, the CCP chose to spotlight the issue to the public and the showmanship of the audience costs game began. China's initial statements began with relatively benign statements such as its "indisputable sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands which have been an inherent part of China since ancient times." And that Beijing "had raised solemn representations and protests with Tokyo over the (issue)" (China Protest at Japan Dispute Islands, 2012). The

CCP also began taking more forceful material measures over the issue including maritime fishing vessel probes of the islands (Ma, 2012). In April of 2012, Tokyo's governor, Shintaro Ishihara, himself one of the marginalized nationalists in Japan that China has projected to be a widespread movement previously mentioned, announced that the city would buy the islands (Janowski et al, 2012). This contributed to a chain reaction of belligerent rhetoric and brinkmanship over the subsequent year.

As the year progressed, the Chinese discourse on the dispute moved from what could be construed as unemotive statements of fact to threats of military confrontation over the islands. An important note to reinforce that cannot be emphasized enough, these islands are uninhabitable. They are situated in an area that are thought to contain significant petroleum reserves under the sea bed but the issue over the islands themselves is exclusively a clash of identities and the constructed narratives of each participant. By the 2010s Japan and the Japanese people had begun suffering fatigue or burnout over apologizing profusely for actions their country committed 65 years earlier, actions which the actual offenders of had mostly long been dead by this point. Japan has grown weary of apologizing and, increasingly perceived by the Japanese people, being asked to kowtow to China regarding those past offenses. This clashed with an increasingly aggressive and wealthy mainland China that resembles an imperialistic state each year as they move to "retake" territory lost to China since its Century of Humiliation began.

Ishihara's justification of his announcement to purchase the islands was that "the purchase of these islands will be Japanese buying Japanese land in order to protect it. What would other countries have to complain about? (Dickie, 2012). The CCP responded by saying that "any unilateral action taken by the Japanese side would be illegal and invalid," and that "China would not hesitate to take any necessary measures to safeguard sovereignty over the

Diaoyu Islands.” (Wang, 2012). They further remarked that “given the complex and sensitive nature of the issue... Japanese politicians at both the central and local levels... should exercise caution in their remarks and should not take any provocative moves (Wang, 2012). Rhetoric in China continued to escalate throughout the year. In July, a Chinese individual was quote in the state-controlled media that “diplomatic protests are not enough. We should not be afraid of Japan’s possible fierce reactions. After a few rounds, Japan will have to rethink its sense of propriety (Yao and Ma, 2012). Another statement read:

From the Chinese perspective, no matter whether the Tokyo metropolitan government or Japanese government purchases the Diaoyu Islands or nationalizes them by other means, it’s still a step to consolidate the legality of Japan’s control and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands. China won’t indulge such behavior, and will inevitably take strong countermeasures

By a month later in August, the narrative that was circulating in China about the CCP’s “weakness” on the issue due to the priorities of personal enrichment of Chinese politicians by the West (Henochowicz, 2012). This specific point is important because with this statement, China had not only signaled its resolve on the grounds of its nationalist legitimacy, but it now also invoked the narrative of corruption in the Chinese government. This was a critical escalation.

Other statements over the next few months included Chinese protesting with banners with messages such as “defend the Diaoyu Islands to the death,” and “even if China is covered with graves, we must kill all Japanese (Henochowicz, 2012). Tong Zeng, a fervent Chinese nationalist was even commented in the media, suggesting that the government “does not echo the patriotic enthusiasm of the public, and that needs to change.” This astroturfing³⁰ was followed in September with statements directly from Chinese officials that “China’s will and determination

³⁰ Refer back to Jessica Chen Weiss’s book “Powerful Patriots” (2014) on the CCP’s staging of these sorts of demonstrations.

to defend its territorial sovereignty is unshakable,” and that “China is watching the situation and will take necessary measures to protect its territorial sovereignty” (Takenaka, 2012).

Additionally, they threatened to begin a trade war as well (Zhu and Yao, 2012). Following violent protests in mid-September the CCP, as I among others argue having sufficiently signaled its resolve on the matter, began to crack down on the “grassroots protests” and “uncontainable anger of the Chinese people” (Wee and Duncan, 2012). A foreign ministry spokesman called on Chinese citizens to “express their demands in a legal and rational way” (Li and Wang, 2012).

In sum, to bolster domestic support and deflect criticisms by Chinese toward the CCP, the government initiated and allowed several months of escalation of protests over this territorial dispute before they began to restrict access to the narrative once the message had been sufficiently communicated to Japan. The territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is just one of many such disputes that China is currently involved in. This is not a sui generis phenomenon that is unique to China and Japan’s history, it is a tactic that China employs in every one of its territorial disputes regarding territory along its periphery. These disputes change from areas of the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea, and with countries including Japan, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc. In every one of these instances, China’s rhetoric has resembled that presented in this chapter, and in every case, it has created transnational audience costs for China, which is increasingly causing it to contain itself rather than creating a situation like Stephen Walt may have posited where a country such as the United States, in cooperation with all these countries on China’s periphery, cooperate to balance the threat China presents and contain it. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, that is not the logical flow of what is taking place. Rather, China is inadvertently creating situations where it is containing itself by the audience costs it creates in other states. With this illustration in mind, I

will now move into examining the transnational audience costs that the CCP has created. Specifically, I discuss the declining perception and warm feelings of Japanese toward China throughout this time period, and then move in to how the Japanese government has responded.

3.7 Survey, Media, Search Terms (SMS) Analysis

In this chapter so far, I have highlighted the historical origin and context for Chinese hostile rhetoric toward Japan, and how the CCP has exploited that history to its advantage, predominantly in the Post-Tiananmen Square Crackdown era. The argument so far has illustrated the advantages the CCP gained by using its anti-Japanese rhetorical strategy. However now I move into the costs. The Japanese people and government have not sat by idly throughout this period. The feelings and perceptions of Japanese from the political elite level down to the average worker has deteriorated drastically since the mid-1980s. In the survey section I discuss what the costs have been in terms of Japanese perceptions. Following the SMS analysis, I highlight notable measures the Japanese government has taken to protect itself from an increasingly belligerent China and an increasingly uninterested or apathetic United States.

I employ my SMS Analysis framework to gauge how much of an impact Chinese rhetoric had on the Japanese public in the 2010s. I first look at, as will be a recurring theme, the limited available survey data to examine the impact over time. I then combine that with a look at media coverage of rhetoric and Japanese response. And finally, I look at search terms and interest over time based on search term analytics throughout the 2010s. I use Google Trends to do this and will discuss the validity of using that search engine data in that section. The terms I examine are China, and War as constants insofar as these are terms that should covary with the terms interpreted by Japanese as being associated with Chinese belligerent rhetoric which are Chinese nationalism and Chinese militancy. There should be an increase in Japanese discussion over

these two topics that correlates with increased rhetoric which will be examined in the media section as well. Given the fairly exhaustive historical analysis I have done already in this chapter, my media analysis will be brief in comparison to the next two empirical chapters. Additionally, feelings about China in Japan have largely been static since the already heavily discussed Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute and broader dispute over claims in the East China Sea.

A key point that will be reiterated throughout each empirical chapter is how future, rigorously conducted analyses, using the survey, media, and search method can be combined to better capture the dynamic between leadership political rhetoric and issue sentiment and salience within the audience/selectorate of the adversary state. Although what I demonstrate of my model at this point in development is largely an illustration of its potential, with sufficient funding and resources this method may greatly expand our understanding of the complexity of state-society relations and two-level games in the international system. What I present in this chapter and the subsequent empirical chapters are an exploratory exercise to serve as a plausibility probe of both the model and method for future research. Without a question, the main methodological contribution of my dissertation is the emphasis placed on the search interest passive indicator as a method that a future iteration will be useful for measuring issue saliency among audiences/selectorates. I am not suggesting that this approach will ever be 100% free from elite manipulation, only that passive indicators, like search interest over time, are a novel alternative method for measuring issue salience while avoiding elite manipulation as much as possible.

Starting out will be the survey data which uses traditional survey data by organizations conducting valid scientific surveys. Media data is traditional and social media sources, primarily traditional, that discuss the topics, in this case Chinese nationalism and/or Chinese militancy. Media is collected from Lexis-Nexus using the search engine to identify all texts from January

1st, 2010 to December 31st, 2019 that include the keywords China OR Chinese OR Japan OR Japanese AND Japanese Self-Defense Forces OR Japanese Constitution OR Article 9 of Japanese Constitution AND rhetoric. Results are further narrowed to only include exchanges noted by the BBC, NYT, CNN, and the Guardian. Finally, to conclude the SMS analysis I utilize the search term approach using the terms mentioned to identify patterns across all three data types. Additionally, my criteria for search term data is narrowed down to searches related to law and government.

One major caveat before proceeding: my absence of data in this section or this chapter in general should in no way be inferred as support for the Japanese position in this dispute and in the dyad in general. I do not support one side over the other and I do not believe that Chinese grievances are not valid and justified. To think so would be to deliberately or ignorantly ignore history, the atrocities committed by Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and their generally unapologetic attitude since then. The reason that this chapter has been structure this way is the same reason my data analysis section is absent any data that speaks on behalf of the Chinese perspective. At this current time, there is just no reliable primary source data available that can be determined with any degree of confidence to not be a direct statement by the Chinese government. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, by seizing total control over the narrative about China, the Chinese government has taken the voice of the Chinese people, and what is viewed as important, away from “China” and which is instead viewed as a direct reflection of political regime, in this case, the CCP. Given that this dissertation is specifically scrutinizing a phenomenon closely associated if not directly synonymous with public opinion, it cannot be determined at this time what public opinion is in China that is independent of the Chinese government.

3.7.1 Survey Data

I utilize polling and survey data conducted by Pew, and the Genron NPO³¹. I also look at changes in Japanese trade, investment, and export data from the Japanese External Trade Organization. I use Pew as a baseline due to its high visibility as a survey and polling agency. I use the Genron NPO to use as a validity check to ensure consistency between Pew and the findings of Pew. Finally, I use the data provided by the Japanese External Trade Organization to illustrate that the survey data is not limited to the respondents of an aggregation of Japanese society, but also includes *tangible* changes to how Japanese interact with Chinese as well. I used data exclusively from the 2000's to narrow the scope and reduce the number of epiphenomenal variables influencing Japanese public opinion such as the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises. As unstable as a great deal of politics in the 21st century have been, the period has been relatively consistent based on a metric of internal comparison in contrast to the influence that unaccounted for systemic shocks may have had on survey and polling data.³²

Beginning with the Pew data, examining three separate Pew Surveys from 2016, 2018, and 2019, Japanese perception of China has fallen substantially (Pew 2018; 2019). In 2002, 55% of Japanese citizens had a favorable opinion of China which has fallen to 14% by 2019. Looking at this compared to the major flare ups in anti-Japanese rhetoric in China in 2005 and in 2012-2013 this matches up perfectly. The narrative of Chinese elites following the first fruit to mature from the Patriotic Education Campaign began in the early 90s shows that Japanese perception of China fell as China's rhetoric became more and more belligerent. Following the Anti-Japanese

³¹ A Japanese think tank that tanks surveys on Japanese public opinion on relevant policy issues to the country. <https://www.genron-npo.net/en/aboutus/>

³² For example, the fall of the Soviet Union, collapse of the Japanese economy, rapid growth in Chinese hostility toward Japan in the 1990s, or what the long-term consequences of COVID-19's impact on politics across the world will be.

Riots of 2005, the CCP appeared to change its position and move away from that narrative which many scholars observed hopefully (Reilly, 2012). However, in 2012 the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sparked a new way of belligerent rhetoric and Anti-Japanese Riots and at the height of that dispute Japanese perception of China had risen to its peak of a 93% unfavourability opinion of China at the end of 2013.

Fig. 3.1






Fig. 3.2



The Genron survey data paints an almost identical picture. This is important for two reasons. First, because generally speaking, the Pew surveys and Japanese surveys mirror one another well, supporting the validity of the findings of each. Second, the Genron survey was conducted by Japanese which challenges any potential concerns about the findings of a western survey organization as opposed to an indigenous organization. The Genron findings are nearly identical. Their data, across several years of polling, identifies the same pattern where public opinion toward China declined substantially following the flareup in tensions in 2005 and 2012 with a respite relative to other time periods between 2006 and 2011. An interesting observation that is not part of my analysis but nonetheless lies on the periphery is that Chinese public opinion toward Japan follows much of this trend lending credit to my hypothesis about elite rhetoric attempting to shift public opinion. It is also a strong indicator that elite rhetoric in China

is driving the perception of threat of both audiences that Chinese public opinion toward China mirrors Chinese elite rhetoric whereas Japanese perceptions remain bad following the CCPs changing tone toward Japan. Whereas following the flareups the percentage of Chinese who view Japan negatively drops quickly as the narrative changes, Japanese threat perception remains consistently high even after the CCP’s rhetorical priorities shift toward other targets (Genron Public Opinion Surveys 2010-2019). Since the Japanese survey looks at public perception in both countries, it provides a strong indicator that this plausibility model is accurate given the back-and-forth perception of Chinese, whereas Japanese public opinion holds a stable extremely unfavorable view of China.

Fig. 3.3



Finally, looking at graphs highlighting business practices and prospects for future exports both in jobs and products from Japan to China, there has been a significant shift in Japanese confidence in China both as a manufacturing center as well as a consumer base. Looking at data

from the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) throughout the 2010s, China's share or stake in Japan's economic priorities has dropped significant (JETRO Trade Surveys 2010; 2019). Japanese exporting destinations by exporting firms dropped by 10% from 69% down to 59% over the time period and even more significant is the decline in Japanese manufacturing centers in China which dropped from 76.3% of companies with bases in China down to 56.4% over the span of the decade. On its own this data could be interpreted an infinite number of ways, and even now there is no hard indicators based on the data provided that these shifts are due to tensions between the two countries, however the correlation between the two is strong enough to justify further investment in research on this model.

Fig. 3.4





Fig. 3.5



3.7.2 Media Data

As previously stated, this section will be short relative to the following two chapters given the already extensive discussion throughout the chapter on key issues. Therefore, I will keep this as concise as possible. The theme of the 2010s in Japan in relation to China revolved around security in the East China Sea, the credibility of US reassurances to support Japan in the event of a confrontation with China over disputed territory between the two, and related to the uncertainty of US credibility to defend Japan (Japanese Economic Newswire, 2010). Specific to this was whether the Japanese Constitution should be amended, more precisely, Article 9 on the

question of having a standing military force. From the collision between the Chinese fishing boat with a Japanese Coast Guard ship in 2010, to the standoff between Chinese naval and air force units against their Japanese counterparts, to what can objectively be called a destabilizing consequence of the Trump foreign policy in the Western Pacific, Japanese discussions on their relations with China turned increasingly toward the need for a genuine Japanese military force to supplant the existing self-defense force, which would require amending Article 9.

Proponents of amending Article 9 in light of Japan's confrontation with China over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the intense and often violent rhetoric erupting from China over the issue faced substantial resistance from anti-war and anti-military groups domestically (the Guardian, 2012; Lee, NYT, 2012; Soble, NYT, 2015). Anti-war activists had maintained the argument that the United States had consistently assured Japan that they would provide any necessary security for the country. However, following Trump's pivot away from the Western Pacific, confusing relationship with North Korea, and China's filling of the void left by what appeared to be a departing United States, Japanese uncertainty increased and more and more Japanese voices began to support an independent Japanese military force (Japanese Economic Newswire, 2016). A specific piece of evidence in regards to this shift was Trump's departure from 70 years of US foreign policy in the region and offers to sell Japan large amounts of US military equipment (Landler and Hirschfeld Davis, NYT, 2017a; Landler and Hirschfeld Davis, NYT, 2017b; Japanese Economic Newswire, 2018; 2019).

All of this considered though, North Korean belligerency in the last part of the decade caused a brief shift in focus from the militarization of Japan. It was replaced by a call for greater cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries on dealing with the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. However due to the deep-rooted historical grievances between Japan, South Korea, and

China, the respite was short-lived and Japanese leaders resumed calls for amending Article 9 (Japanese News Wire, 2019). In sum, Chinese anti-Japan rhetoric throughout the 1990s, 2000s, and extending into the early 2010s led to a serious conversation among Japanese about how to respond to their rhetorical brinkmanship and increased calls for the country to remilitarize. Compounding this issue was the inconsistent signals the Japanese received from the United States and a heightened uncertainty about whether the US would continue to provide security, or whether Trump was telling them they were on their own. The issue became moot before it could be exacerbated any further following the COVID-19 outbreak and the usual decrease in bellicose rhetoric during Summer Olympics hostings, but what the future holds for Sino-Japanese relations is unclear.

3.7.3 Search Term Data

As I mentioned previously, there is only data available for Japan. In the following two graphs, I illustrate one measure of validity of using Google search analytics as an accurate representation of interest over time. It is clear from the data the graphs illustrate that it would indeed be misleading to use Google analytics to evaluate Chinese interest over time in the key terms. In Japan on the other hand, Google has a respectable 75% market share footprint from 2018 onwards. Yahoo! has an outlier level of market share presence in Japan relative to the rest of the world for reasons beyond the focus of this dissertation. Further, Google's market share variation in Japan compared to the India and Pakistan dyad and Greece and Turkey dyad has significance that future research should investigate. I speculate that there is likely a cultural characteristic or hurdle with using Google that is present in East Asia that is not present in other parts of the world, but it is a puzzle to be investigated at a later time.

Fig 3.6





Fig 3.7



Interpreting these graphs, first, with China, Baidu clearly maintains the majority of the market share in China throughout the 2010s. However, there are some discrepancies with to what extent that majority exists given the spikes by Shenma and Sogou. In the case of the former, the statcounter analysts note issues with artificial inflation of numbers with their spike in market share, further calling into question the reliability of this data as well as how much competition Baidu actually faces from minor third-party companies. Most importantly, Google has a 2.4%


market share as of 2019. In contrast, in Japan, Google ends the decade with a 75% market share which is commanding, but is still puzzling given A) this variation compared to the other four cases in this dissertation where it enjoys over 90%, and B) that Yahoo! was the company that was in almost parity with Google in terms of market share mid-way through the decade. Regardless, Google's footprint is sufficient that we can infer the interest of the Japanese public over time throughout the decade.

Going over the data for Japan, there is a pattern that needs to be accounted for before moving forward. Yahoo! Japan's market share was significant until late 2016 when it began to decline. This was in conjunction with the announcement that it would no longer contain a search engine function in 2017 (ITmedia, 2017). This being the case, some data in the following graphs will be skewed as a result. However, given that variables are moving in relation to one another, there is still a trend that emerges. Furthermore, what would look on these graphs to be small trends would be much greater when looked at prior to the influx of higher Google usage prior to the termination of Yahoo! search engine usage.

In the first graph, the terms China, War, and Japan Self-Defense Forces are examined together. The most notable change in Japanese search interest over the time period is in regards to Japan's Self-Defense Forces. The peaks in interest correspond almost exactly with rhetorical exchanges involving China, Japan, and the United States. During the early 2010s, China greatly ramped up rhetoric insofar as their territorial claims over the East China Sea, especially in regards to a fishing boat collision between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese Coast Guard ship. These events created pressure on Japanese leaders to respond from Japanese citizens and is illustrated in greater search interest. The disputes in the East China Sea kept up steady interest in the topics throughout the mid-2010s, followed by a spike during the 70th anniversary of "Victory

Over Japan day” in 2015. Furthermore, toward the end of the decade, when Trump said in no uncertain terms that Japan was on its own insofar as defense was concerned, we see the most extreme spike in the data on this subject. Finally, as I will mention periodically, the drastic dip in the spring of 2021 corresponds with the transition in Emperors in Japan which diminished Japanese search interest in any other topics.


Fig 3.8



In the second graph, Fig 3.9, I keep the same search terms from Fig 3.8 but remove the war term to better illustrate how closely the Japan Self-Defense Forces and China (interest over time) terms move in relation to one another. With the exception of the 2011 spike related to the fishing boat incident, the two terms move almost identically. An interesting observation that warrants further investigation in future research is why Japanese interest drifts to defense rather than research into China when tensions flare. I myself would likely begin by investigating intersubjective understanding of ideas, rules, and norms between the two as well as investigating how much, if at all, the narrative has changed within a longer timeline to suggest that it’s likely


that the rhetoric out of China has been consistent for a long enough duration that Japanese no longer feel uncertain about China, but rather about their country's capability to take care of itself.

Fig 3.9




In fact, although not a search term included in the analysis, if plugged into the list of terms, interest in the United States over time conforms even more to Japanese interest in their Self-Defense forces than China does, which, inferring in relation to the preponderance of supporting evidence in multiple formats throughout this chapter, demonstrates that Japan has historically been reassured by US commitment to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, but that as this reassurance has waned, interest in remilitarization has increased.

Fig 3.10



Insofar as the massive trough in early 2019, interest in the abdication of Emperor Akihito and the ascension of his successor pulled interest away from almost every topic from February until April 2019. Finally, there is a weak but noticeable pattern between war, Article 9, and Constitution that has no discernable relationship with any of the rhetoric analyzed.

Fig 3.11



In sum, this brief exploration on limited data into the shift in perception by the Japanese public toward China strongly corroborates with the model proposed in this dissertation. Not only has public perception of China been harmed by Chinese rhetoric, it has had tangible economic damage as well. Using these distinct types of indicators across multiple sectors suggests that there is not a short-term epiphenomenal correlation conforming the data to my model or any other covariation in general. That said, more significant testing, with drastically more rigorous standards will be necessary to provide a quantitatively valid picture and indicate whether these changes shed light on Sino-Japanese relations in conjunction with rhetoric, what percentage of the picture they reveal, and whether or not they are meaningful in any way and statistically significant. Even in light of the black hole China has become in terms of obtaining reliable data,

conducting an inverse examination of the impact of Chinese rhetoric against others has had is a useful starting point. Further research and data collection using a combination of polling and more relevant survey data, in conjunction with a rigorous content analysis and supplemented by a discourse analysis of what rhetoric is making its way through the filter from China to Japan could quantitatively confirm the preliminary findings of this plausibility probe.

In addition, although not the objective of this dissertation, future research that has the necessary technology or resources should systematically examine any correlation between domestic tension in China with a rise in anti-Japanese rhetoric. The probability that Chinese anti-Japanese rhetoric is a diversionary process by the CCP to redirect domestic criticism is crucial to the long-term objective of this model. In the case of both public opinion surveys and declines in business activities, there is a correlation with this narrative and domestic issues, which again, should be explored in future research. The years leading up to the 2005 protests were mired with a tug of war between an increasingly active social media culture in China and the official party line of the CCP. Similarly, 2012-2013 saw a rocky transition in power from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping which included a coup attempt by other party elites attempting to prevent Xi's ascent to supreme leader in China. In sum, there is sufficient evidence to explore the idea that Japan is a convenient target to create a foreign diversion or target for domestic frustration.

3.8 From Goodwill to Rearmament

Before concluding this chapter, it is worth briefly noting that the Japanese government has responded to growing concern in Japan about the threat that China poses to Japan. Many have argued that China's belligerence, *not* simply its rise in power relative to Japan and the United States, necessitates Japan to increase its capabilities to go it alone if necessary (Nadeau, 2020). From the Japanese perspective, US credibility as the ally that will come to its aid in a time

of need has been severely undermined throughout the past 15-20 years to the point where countries such as Japan and Taiwan have less confidence that the United States will come to their aid in time of a crises with China (Schelling, 1966).

In light of this, since the intense confrontation between China and Japan in the East China Sea in 2012-13, the Japanese government has pushed to amend their renunciation of war in Chapter 2 Article 9 of their Constitution which states that:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (Japanese Constitution, 1947).

Although Japanese opinion on the issue remains mixed, with many seeing amending Article 9 as causing more problems than it would solve, the debate has gained traction over the years, especially as China has penetrated deeper and deeper into Japan's territorial waters (Cai, 2012). Other Japanese politicians including Abe's primary competitor Shigeru Ishiba have called for completely removing paragraph 2 of the article (Murao, 2018). Although the Japanese public has maintained a highly unfavorable perception of China throughout most of the 2010s, they have remained hesitant to amend Article 9. Whether through wisdom or fear, the Japanese people have not reached the point where they are willing to accept the consequences of the paradigmatic shift to their country's image that the expansion of their military capabilities would create for the region. The key though, is that the conversation has become increasingly common, especially since the crises in the East China Sea in 2012-13 and all incidences since then. With more data, and more directly related data, the opinion of the Japanese people may be different. Further, a more in-depth analysis may yield a forecast of how various scenarios could play out leading to or

preventing the future rearmament of Japan in response to Chinese aggression, whether it be in response to the impact that Trump's presidency could have moving into the 2020s and the negative perceptions Japan has of that, (Silver and Devlin, 2020) or, a military confrontation with China.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the relationship between China and Japan to explore the plausibility of the model proposed in this dissertation. In this case, I looked at the relationship between historical rivals with a contested and bloody history where one is on the rise in the international order and the other has remained static or is declining. Beginning with the opening of China and Japan to western influence and the industrialization of both countries, I discussed the backdrop to still harbored feelings of animosity in the relationship, as well as the persuasive and prevalent anti-Japanese narrative that has flourished in China, especially post-Tiananmen following the beginning of the Patriotic Education Campaign. From the beginning of the 1970s to 1989, relations and cooperation between the two countries grew increasingly closer. However, following the crackdown on the Tiananmen Square Protests and the subsequent reimagining of itself the CCP underwent, relations began a steady decline between the two leading to where we are now, with approximately 85% of the Japanese public holding negative views of China and increasingly viewing them as a threat. This time period endured two very significant rhetorical incidences in 2005 and 2012-13 where the Chinese government opened the floodgates of the animosity of the Chinese people that it had cultivated throughout the 1990s. In response to this, trade has suffered and talk within Japanese politics about amending Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which prohibits the creation and maintenance of a Japanese standing military. Broadly speaking, this case is a culmination of years of research that I have collected on the

Sino-Japanese relationship. This dyad has a long history of rivalry and animosity, as well as including the possibility of IR realist theory shedding more light on this relationship than non-realists would care to admit. Conversely, the more refined iteration of my method may reveal that there is merely covariation between the variables I have identified and examined in this chapter at best. As such, I will now shift focus onto chapter 4 which focuses on a static power that does not have a long-shared history of violence and harbored resentment.

Chapter 4

Indo-Pakistani Relations

4.1 Introduction

Continuing the same process as before, in this chapter I examine the Indo-Pakistani dyad and the nature of rhetoric within this relationship. I briefly examine the historical evolution of the two countries, from a British colony on the Indian Sub-continent, to briefly, a singular entity, and then two sovereign states that have engaged in military conflict numerous times since their independence and even proliferated nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the other. Similar to the case of the Sino-Japanese dyad, elites in both countries exploit the relationship vis-à-vis belligerent political rhetoric for political capital within their constituency. Going beyond what was possible in the Sino-Japanese chapter, in this chapter I will examine the flow of rhetoric in both directions. This is possible due to less restrictive control over citizen access to information. This is likely due to a less sophisticated system of censorship relative to China; regardless however, it provides an opportunity to see how political rhetoric affects constituencies in both autocratic and democratic states. Therefore, in this chapter I examine the impact of transnational audience costs in both India and Pakistan. That said, this chapter provides less of a robust historical treatment relative to the Sino-Japanese case. This is the result of 1) a shorter history as sovereign independent states, and 2) lessened emphasis on history and more emphasis on religious and ethnic, particularly vernacular, cleavages between the two states. I begin by providing a background treatment of the dyad. Following this I will provide and discuss some examples of political rhetoric used by political elites in both countries. More specifically, I will identify contentious issues between the two countries to provide a context for the rhetoric used. I then discuss the presence of transnational audience costs created by this rhetoric. Finally, I discuss the implications of transnational audience costs specific to this chapter, as well as how

this dyad impacts the hypothesis proposed in the dissertation. The most critical contribution of this chapter is the examination of transnational audience costs from the perspective of both sides.

4.1 Background

The foci of belligerent rhetoric in the Indo-Pak relationship revolve around 1) the territorial dispute over Kashmir, 2) other sporadic territorial clashes between India and Pakistan, 3) India's role in the Bengali declaration of independence³³ in 1972, and most importantly 4) the nature of the partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 and the tremendous loss of life that took place therein, especially in terms of migration of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindus into India. Tensions between Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus dates back to the introduction of Islam to the subcontinent. Further, narratives of mass scale persecution of Muslims by Hindus that do not acknowledge the opposite as well are incredibly misleading. While non-Abrahamic religions may be less oriented toward conversion, Hindus in India have nonetheless viewed Indian Muslims as apostates and thus frequently persecuted them in the form of anti-Muslim pogroms (Jaffrelot, 1999; Gaikward, 2013; Hansen, 1999). In sum, since the existence of cleavage between the ethnic groups of the Indian Subcontinent as a result of the expansion of Islam, the people who comprise these groups have had a tense and violent relationship.

One of the often-discussed features of the relationship is the perceived "democraticness" of India and the rocky political instability of Pakistan. As of writing this, India scores a 10 out of 10 on the Polity Index with Pakistan at a 7. For comparison, the US is at a 5 and Russia is a 4 (Marshall et. al., Polity V). Generally speaking, however, this does not tell us much. It does not illuminate the tedious process of maintaining democracy in a country as diverse both ethnically

³³ East Pakistan became Bangladesh.

and vernacularly as India, and it does not portray the institutional adversaries jockeying for power in Pakistan. Although I will not discuss those issues, it is important to highlight that they exist for the purposes of noting both how fragile democracy is in both countries, and, what this dissertation *does* spend some time discussing, what glue holds these states together. If not ethnicity, and if religion is only part of the picture, what is keeping the system intact and in a relative state of equilibrium? The stability of the governments in both India and Pakistan relies on nationalist rhetoric that is sufficiently belligerent enough to keep the main body of the state focused on the other rather than more carefully scrutinizing domestic policies. Some have argued that India's democracy is relatively stable through deals made between the many ethnic groups (Chandra, 2005) and others have discussed how brittle and fragile Pakistan's political system is (Hussain, T, 2018; Cheema et. al., 2015; Aqdas, 2020; Shah, 2014; Hussian, Z. 2020), but taking a more quantum, big picture view of the whole puzzle, the primary distinction between India and Pakistan politically speaking is that given India's hyper-diversity, the political system tends to be more flexible and adaptable, thus making it less in danger of undemocratic political change (Chandra, 2005).

On a side note, in passing, future research on democracy in Pakistan should investigate the military presence in Pakistan in terms of a how Pakistan's threat perception has legitimized or justified the military having a greater presence in everyday life as a result of their history and proximity with India. What sort of institutional configurations has Pakistani threat perception and perceived need for a strong military presence created in the structural environment that a democratic regime type must try to survive within? In other words, is the presence of India as a proximal and ontological threat the primary obstacle to more robust democratic institutions in Pakistan? Finally, even following military coups in Pakistan, often times, this has been a

stabilizing measure meant to reorient the country back toward democratic institutions in order to prevent religious fundamentalists from controlling the country as has happened on a number of occasions in the past. In *that* light, one could even argue that Pakistan is even more stable than India, given Pakistani wariness toward entertaining religious fundamentalism relative to India's absolutely essential necessity to sate the appetite of Hindu nationalists (Jaffrelot, 1999; Gaikwad, 2013; Hansen, 1999). Lastly on the discussion of Pakistani democracy, it should be noted that all of the overt conflicts with India have taken place while Pakistan was under military control rather than democratic control. Once the transnational audience cost model has been further validated based on more consistent data, future research should explore regime type and the stability of the regime's selectorate in other applications of model, e.g., differences in how democratic and autocratic selectorates impose costs.

In sum, the reality of politicking done on the ground in both countries is much different than how it is portrayed through a Western lens, and India is not the great democracy and Pakistan the constantly stumbling younger brother. The countries are relatively similar in terms of the government to society dynamic, which, is not surprising considering they occupy the same space and were part of the same "country" for most of their history. This final point can be even further emphasized with the magnitude of migration that took place after partition in 1947. The political boundaries on the map between the two countries have taken a great deal of time to sort, and that did not magically happen with the arbitrary drawing of a line on a map in 1947. With the case made about how to perceive these two countries through this chapter being organized, I will now focus on how transnational audience costs operate within this dyad. Moving into the next section, I summarize the primary areas of contention between the two groups.

4.2 Key Narratives

4.2.1 Kashmir

Kashmir is a region in the Northwest of the Indian Subcontinent, consisting of contested territory in the Northwest of India and Northeast of Pakistan. The region was formerly the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir prior to the partition of the Indian Subcontinent. The territory is partially to wholly claimed by India, Pakistan, and China (Chang, 2017), and primarily occupied by India, followed by Pakistan, and finally China claiming control over the Northeastern-most portion of the region (Margolis, 2004; Hobbs, 2008; Snow, 2016). The origin of the conflict, like almost all tension between India and Pakistan, is linked to the 1947 partition. Almost immediately following the partition, dispute over the fate of the region came under the scrutiny of the UN and the Security Council who, in UNCIP Resolutions on 5, January 1949, and 13, August, 1948, determined that there would be a popular referendum in the region to decide its fate in the partition. Both India and Pakistan agreed to remove strategically placed nationals and military forces out of the region in order to ensure that the vote accurately represented the local population of the region. However, neither party reached a point where they were satisfied that all conditions had been met for the plebiscite to proceed and thus the vote was never held, leading to the state of relations in the present (Schofield, 2000; Radnock, 1998).

The dispute over the territory has contributed to several wars between India and Pakistan as well as the 1962 Sino-Indian War (Verma, 2006). Wars between Pakistan and India over the territory, excluding insurgencies, intifadas, and other internal conflicts, include the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, a multitude of minor confrontations, local uprisings, and protests, and more recently, the 2020 India-Pakistan Border Skirmishes (Bukhari and Naqash, 2020; Al Jazeera, 2020)

The most pressing question related to this dispute, as with most others that seem arbitrary from the outside, is why? Why is this mountainous region of the Himalayas so hotly contested that it has led to this long string of conflicts resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands to millions of people? To summarize the dispute concisely within the context of this chapter, the dispute comes down to the construction of a primordial feud between Hindu identity and nationalism in opposition and violent contention with the presence of Islam on the subcontinent, as evidenced in part by the fact that a majority of the region as a whole is Muslim (BBC, 2019; Esposito, 2004; Komireddi, 2019).

4.2.2 Other Provinces

Although the territorial dispute over Kashmir is the predominant territorial dispute, there has been friction in other areas as well. I will speak briefly on the water crisis and Afghanistan, and then I devote an entire subsection to the discussion of the Bengal Crisis. Water has been a subject of concern throughout the 2010s with uncertainty going into the future. The water sources that flow into Northeast Pakistan move through Indian controlled Kashmir which has harnessed the flow water for power generation. As inevitably occurs with significant dam projects, this has caused major water issues downstream, which, in this case is Pakistan, further fueling fragile relations. It has been taken as a rally cry by military tacticians and jihadists alike in Pakistan for stoking the flames for continuing to fight against, what they claim to be, India's strategy for ceasing their existence (Economist, 2011). Thus far however, the two countries have been able to find diplomatic solutions for the problem and avoided conflict. This has primarily been accomplished through the Indus Waters Treaty (Haines, 2017; Guardian, 2002) however there has been growing concern about continued dam projects such as the Nimoo Bazgo

Hydroelectric Plant which was finished in 2014 and has continued to contribute to the diminishing fresh water supply in the northern provinces of the two countries.

The topic of Afghanistan has been a complex issue for the two countries given both their shared origin and contemporary adversarial relationship. To most concisely sum up the subject of Afghanistan in terms of the Indo-Pak dyad, Afghanistan is a historical rival of Pakistan and both India and Pakistan have used the Afghans to engage one another asymmetrically, similar to the proxy conflicts between the Saudis and Iranians in the Middle East. Politically, excluding any role or influence of the US, historically, Pakistan has supported the Taliban and India the Northern Alliance (Withington, 2001; Ians, 2021). Afghanistan has been a training ground for insurgency groups utilized by both India and Pakistan to conduct attacks against the other. This has been most publicized in terms of terrorist attacks against India including the 2001 Indian Parliament Attack, and the 2008 Mumbai Attack, among many, many others. While important to understanding the full context of the dyad, it is not a primary source of tension, but rather a tool that both sides use to conduct relatively insignificant but high-profile operations against one another (Al Jazeera, 2021; Business Standard, 2021; Business Standard India, 2020; Byman, 2005; Noor, 2007; Adil and Sajid, 2021; Mahadevan, 2017; Dmello et. al., 2020).

4.2.3 Bengali Independence

Friction regarding Bangladesh is ingrained in the history of the region, was part of the partition issue, was a prominent issue during the era of East Pakistan and West Pakistan, and continuing to have a minor role in contemporary Indo-Pak relations. During the Dominion of India era when the Indian subcontinent was still under British rule, the primary clusters of Muslims resided within the eastern and western territories of India. Following partition, these clusters formed Pakistan, known formally as East Pakistan and West Pakistan, but under one

government. This formed a non-continuous state with a large population with two very diverse groups of people whose primary similarity was their religion and not much else. In terms of how this played into the Indo-Pak dyad, first, similar to the large migration of Hindus and Muslims that took place in the west, a similar exchange took place in the east, again, contributing to a significant humanitarian crisis, a great deal of human suffering, and loss of life. This was followed by the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 which played a significant role in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 (Nawaz, 2008; Rashiduzzaman, 1972).

Since the partition, there had always been tension between East and West Pakistan given their immense cultural differences³⁴ and given the political pole of Pakistan centering on its contemporary territory, this contributed to increasingly loud calls for the Bengali people to separate from Pakistan in pursuit of their own self-determination and independence. Pakistan responded to this by executing who they saw to be the leading Bengali nationalist ringleaders. In common tit for tat relations both sides continued to retaliate against one another which ultimately ended up involving Hindus living in East Pakistan and thus, spilling over the border into India leading to the Indian intervention in the conflict and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 which saw the independence of Bangladesh, led by the Bengali nationalists that India had backed, and icier relations and resentment within the India-Pakistani relationship (Lyon, 2008; Kemp, 2010).

4.2.4 Partition of the Indian Subcontinent

Of all issues that contribute to tension between India and Pakistan, all paths lead back to the 1947 partition. Many volumes have been written on this subject. My attempt here is to emphasize its importance and uncontestable primary role in poor relations between the two

³⁴ Pashtuns and Punjabis vs Bengali predominant ethnic groups.

countries rather than try to rehash the story, recount the narratives, or lose sight of the topic of this chapter for the sake of sufficiently communicating the importance of the partition itself. In sum, this section needs to be relatively short because it is impossible to discuss the issue in a subsection of a single chapter and satisfactorily explain anything. It is the most important issue in this dyad and there is little to no debate about that being fact.³⁵

The overarching question leading into Indian independence was whether or not there should be a partition. The British had initially wanted to preserve a single India to exist as part of the British defense network, known as their imperial defense, similar to the role Canada and Australia have played (Roberts, 2003; Darwin, 2011). Gandhi and many other Indian nationalists also wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of the Indian Subcontinent as one state (Stein and Arnold, 2010; Khan, 2007). However, there were legitimate fears among Indian Muslims about Hindu dominance over the political system and the marginalization and persecution of Muslims in a single Indian state (Talbot and Singh, 2009). The debate over the fate of Indian Muslims devolved into violence and atrocities committed by Hindus against Muslims, Muslims against Hindus, and attacks by other groups fighting for autonomy and a place at the bargaining table. Ultimately, the British accepted the partition, as did Gandhi³⁶ and the lines began to be drawn, and great migrations both voluntarily and involuntarily of Hindus and Muslims began as each moved to their respective new state. Additionally, though, there were many accounts of ethnic cleansing that also took place to “purify” the respective territories to reflect the correct ethnic majorities across both countries and especially within the border territories (Talbot and Singh, 2009).

³⁵ A basic introduction to the topic should include Sekhara, 2004; Bose and Jalal, 2004; Brown, 1994; Dyson, 2018; Peers, 2006; and Robb 2002. There are many books and an entire section of literature on this one topic.

³⁶ Which played an important role in his assassination (Brown, 1991; Cush and Robinson, 2008).

The conduct of both Hindus and Muslims and the Indian and Pakistani governments during the partition and generally, and predominantly regarding the migration of peoples across borders, contributed to the general disdain between Pakistanis and Indians to this day. However there have been instances of thawing in the relationship, which has always been countered by refreshed, reinvigorated, or rejuvenated sentiments of hostilities in the relationship. It is at this cross-section where the theoretical foundation of transnational audience costs comes in to play.

4.2.5 Factoring in to Transnational Audience Costs

In the case of India and Pakistan, more so than almost any other dyad, belligerent political rhetoric has been pivotal in the conduct of both domestic and international relations in both countries. Indian leaders talk tough on Pakistan to Indian citizens, Pakistani leaders talk tough on India to Pakistani citizens, and leaders in both countries continue to have their fears of political instability due to very real and tangible domestic problems assuaged due to the strength at which these frequently invoked narratives resonate with. Consistent with other dyads that fall within the enduring rivalries framework, India and Pakistan have a solid foundation of atrocities, tragedies, and rivalry to use against one another. Also similar to the Sino-Japanese dyad, the majority of these events are still fresh within the collective memory of both societies. Another recurring characteristic in these cases is their instrumental use to deflect domestic tensions onto regional/international issues.

4.3 Regime Structure:

Basic Regime Characteristics in India and Pakistan

Both India and Pakistan rank as democracies as of the most current Polity score in Polity V with India scoring a 10/10 and Pakistan a 7/10. India is considered to be an older, more stable democracy in contrast with regular political disruptions and upheavals in Pakistan. That said

though, both countries have strikingly similar political systems. Both countries have a hybrid Parliamentary-Presidential system. In India the role of the President is mostly symbolic in spite of the president's role as commander-in-chief due to a robust constitution. Power has consistently been held by the Prime Minister of India who is the head of government in contrast to the president's role as head of state (Granville, 2003; Kulke and Rothermund, 2004).

Pakistan also has essentially an identical system in theory, with a strong constitution and a parliamentary head of government in the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Pakistan as head of state (Crilly, 2013). However, that said, the president, also acting as commander-in-chief, has on occasion seized control of the government and assumed responsibilities as head of government from the prime minister during periods where the balance of power via constitutional checks and balances between the competing civilian political institutions, the intelligence sector of the government, and the military has broken down (Hirschl, 2010; Baxter, 2003). In spite of this, Pakistan has maintained a relatively stable democratic system and avoided backsliding into the system of theocratic governance as was the case in the 1980s due to similar political upheaval, again attributable to a disequilibrium between constitutional institutions in the government.

In spite of increasingly robust democratic institutions however, the pivot to belligerent rhetoric is pervasive between these two countries. Restating the general thesis of this dissertation, the question is if the rhetoric antagonizes the other state's domestic audience. Further, the recurring theme and question throughout this examination remains: how can we tell? Within the research design and the subsequent empirical chapters I examine public opinion as well as proxies for how well rhetoric resonates with external audiences, how external the public

or domestic audience's access to this actually is vs how much of it is astroturfing, in terms of statements, protests, rallies, and other means of public outcry.

4.4 The Model

Transnational Audience Costs Between India and Pakistan

The remainder of this chapter will examine belligerent rhetoric utilized by both India and Pakistan. Similar to chapter 3, I have covered the foundation of the narratives used in this relationship and I will focus particularly on 2010s. One of the most interesting aspects of this dyad is how much political change has occurred in these countries, in the region, and in international relations over this time, however even through significant changes to the political regime, the rhetoric toward each other has remained consistent. This presents an interesting observation insofar as it goes a step further than the Sino-Japanese relationship because the level of autocracy or democracy has not influenced the use of this rhetoric. It is possible that this is still consistent with the categorization of new democracies as being comparatively volatile with autocracies and in contrast to old democracies, but that is something that can be revisited later.

The literature on political rhetoric within this dyad has primarily emphasized tension related to Kashmir. Based on a careful examination of the general relationship and shared history between the two countries, Kashmir is more of a substantive, tangible manifestation of preexisting adversarial sentiments between the two countries rather than a battle over a highly strategically significant territory (Komireddi, 2019). Therefore, although the primary area of discourse and/or general narrative is on the Kashmir issue, this should be understood as an outlet or pressure valve so to speak in the dyad rather than a self-sustaining issue. Put another way, Kashmir is symptomatic of a more systemic issue.

As is the case with all of the empirical cases I use but especially in this chapter, identifying the independent variable of the model within this dyad is challenging given how two dyads emerged from one. The additional layer of shared history makes unlinking and isolating political rhetoric from the whole of reciprocal tensions more problematic. This being the case, within this dyad, belligerent rhetoric is discussed with the understanding that it does not exist in a vacuum; and in the proto-theoretical stage of this model currently, it is not yet isolatable from the broader narrative. Therefore, I identify belligerent rhetoric being exchanged and parallel it with existing tensions while acknowledging that at this time I cannot further isolate the relationship or plausibility of a relationship to even a correlation without substantially more data and scholarly expertise about the relationship these two countries share. In layman's terms, tough talk about the other is such a common feature in this relationship that without further specialization specific to this dyad, I am unable to satisfactorily isolate the relationship between the dependent and independent variable. However, I will illustrate how important the narratives of hate are to both India and Pakistan and how popular sentiment in both countries reflects these narratives while being upfront that I am limited on concretely establishing the boundaries between the dependent and independent variables at this time.

Narayanan provides an excellent summary of the state of relations between India and Pakistan up to 2010 (Narayanan, 2010). This covers all of the most significant flare up in hostilities within the dyad, however generally speaking, they maintain a Wolfers "billiard ball-esque" presentation of each state. Dissecting domestic politics was not their aim so this is understandable, however it doesn't capture how more or less meaningful political rhetoric, leaders sticking to the narrative, and its reaction from the other actually is. *However*, what it does capture is how little work has been done in this sort of treatment on this dyad. Scholars of

international relations and comparative politics have been enraptured by the dynamics of each state, the bilateral relations between them, and mass-elite exchanges within each state, however no one has provided a meaningful analysis of how these narratives resonate with the others audience. This is an oversight that my model will correct in future research following a deeper, more robust, and sufficiently adequate analysis. However, that is not the agenda of this project. It is one for another day. I will spend the remainder of this chapter discussing exchanges and how they have a relatively stable self-sustaining chain reaction. A curiosity to explore for future research will be to pose the question: what would happen if one side refused to continue “playing the same game” and did not continue the rhetorical engagement? Could this lead to a legitimate thawing of relations? Or would it result in an inevitable toppling of the regime that refused to continue perpetuating this narrative? In other words, how much is the legitimacy of each state, both of which are currently categorized as “democracies” at the moment, tied to maintaining the belligerent quid pro quo?

4.5 SMS Analysis

In this section I share and discuss the findings of my SMS Analysis approach. As with the other two empirical chapters, the state of my method as it has been deployed within this dissertation is exploratory and for illustrative purposes only. The purpose is to show that passive indicators that are better able to overcome elite manipulation in capturing audience/selectorate issue sentiment and saliency is a plausible possibility in the future. This is combined with an examination of media and *NGO* survey data where available to act as markers or time stamps that do not themselves inform us of anything but do suggest there could be a connection between examining audience/selectorate issue sentiment and saliency alongside search data and media

coverage. Given the challenges of operationalizing the audience costs variable, a method that takes both types of data into account is essential.

I first examine rhetoric and the political narrative based on a sample of media data to build a timeline of the relationship in the 2010s. I then provide existing survey data. Following this I provide graphical depictions of search engine interest over time over key terms in India and Pakistan. Finally, I contextualize these three components in relation to one another to provide as in depth of a picture as possible of the transnational audience cost dynamic within the dyad.

Media data illustrating the narrative of the relationship and the rhetoric utilized is collected from Lexis-Nexus using the search engine to identify all texts from January 1st, 2010 to December 31st, 2019 that include the keywords India OR Indian AND Pakistan OR Pakistani OR Pak AND rhetoric. Results are further narrowed to only include exchanges by the BBC, NYT, CNN, and the Guardian. Search data is data generated from Google trends based on “Interest Over Time”. I limited my search into areas pertaining to “law and government”. Narrowing the search analytics down to law and government was critical because it eliminated search hits for inquires for topics including the word “war” that were used in reference to a popular Disney-Marvel movie that came out during that time period with that word in the title. Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point of the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means it was half as popular as at its most popular. A value of 0 means there was not enough data to score this term during this time period. Although in this preliminary examination I am using Google Trends due to language and location/access obstacles, the most popular search engine in some countries or regions may be different. In both India and Pakistan however, Google has a 99% share of the market in terms of search engine usage. That said though, future research using this method should examine key

terms in the multitude of languages spoken across the Indian Subcontinent to determine any discrepancies and what we may infer from these variations, e.g., what class, caste, race, religion, etc who speak each language has more or less interest in different terms at different times.

Lastly before beginning the analysis, the terms selected follow a thorough preliminary review of salient topics that have intersubjective meaning between these neighbors on the Indian Subcontinent. Both view the other as simultaneously the greatest threat to their existence as well as a defining characteristic of their existence. Terrorism is a constantly recurring theme in their relationship. In spite of other issues such as drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other much more frequent and devastating regional issues, terrorist attacks maintain a disproportionate place on the stage in the spotlight of bilateral relations. Hindu Nationalism, or, Hindutva, embodied by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), is the most significant ideological destabilizer within the region, even greater than Islamic Fundamentalism according to scholars and Indian statesmen alike (Leidig, 2020; Kuncheria, 2010; BBC, 2010). Finally, and perhaps intertwined, are the topics of War, and Jammu and Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir are the two provinces that are understood in the West to be “the Kashmir Issue”, but are, like the very existence of one another, are foundational to the necessary and adversarial relationship between the two. And war of course, is a term used to gauge the saliency of bellicose rhetoric from each country over the time series. It is used for illustrative purposes and does not necessarily correspond with what is actually salient in either country at this time. There are too many alternative possibilities including simple issues such as how each phrase might be worded differently in Hindi vs. Urdu.

4.5.1 Media Analysis

Prime Minister Modi and Hindu Nationalism

Early in the 2010s many scholars were hopeful that the movement toward greater democracy in Pakistan would contribute to a thawing of relations and realize greater cooperation (Waraich, 2018). In spite of any supposition we might engage in, it remains a “coulda, woulda, shoulda, scenario given that within the same time period, the Hindu Nationalist Party (BJP) and their current leader and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have gathered increasing support throughout the decade (Danziger, 2020; Kaiffee, 2019). To nurture support from his base, Modi has made statements including that “India has successfully managed to isolate Pakistan in the global arena,” and that the blame for the human catastrophe in Kashmir, and terrorism throughout India rests solely on Pakistan. Further, he has said that “it would be a big mistake to think Pakistan will start behaving after one fight. It will take a long time for Pakistan to start behaving (Kaiffee, 2019). Modi has also revoked Kashmir and Jammu’s special status and relative autonomy within India, which was essential to any stability in bilateral relations with Pakistan. He says that “economic well-being requires a strong nation, which requires, in turn, overcoming hurdles to the nation’s strength such as minority appeasement, anti-nationalism, or stone-pelting Kashmiri youth.” India’s Home Minister Amit Shah has also remarked that “Kashmir will now move on the path of development. If anyone tries to create any disturbance in Kashmir, remember our soldiers are standing by.” (Tremblay and Bonner, 2019). Domestically, this nationalist narrative has increased the amount of sectarian violence in India toward non-Hindus. Within the Muslim world, it has been met with alarm and frustration.

Pakistani Reaction: Synchronized Rhetoric or Responding to Threats?

The rise of Modi and the BJP has been paralleled with the rise of nationalist populism in Pakistan as well. In 2013 the nationalist Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and Pakistan Movement for Justice (PTI) won a large enough share of the Pakistani parliament to form a coalitional government. The coalition first went with the leader of the nationalist PML-N Nawaz Sharif who has since been succeeded by the populist Imran Khan who has ramped up nationalist rhetoric even more than his predecessor in his anti-Indian rhetoric. Initially Khan had made overtures to thawing relations with India by pursuing peace through boosting trade (Waraich, 2018). However, with Modi ramping up rhetoric and shoring up support from his base, Khan's goodwill gestures have increasingly turned to a hardening resolve, going so far as threatening a military response to India's "Hindutva Supremacist Fascist ideology" (Danziger, 2020; India Today, 2019). Khan's response has been consistent with general sentiment in Pakistan toward India both in the political and secular spheres as well as the military increasingly. Generally, more reserved and removed from bellicose political rhetoric by civilian leaders, the Pakistani military has become increasingly unhappy with the idea of friendly relations with India. Given the military's role as a final arbiter in foreign policymaking by the Pakistani government, these sentiments are consistent in timing with Modi's nationalist narrative. The challenging aspect of an empirical analysis of the India-Pakistan dyad however is determining who is leading and who is following. In all of these relationships it is challenging to impossible to determine where the origin of bellicose rhetoric lies at within bilateral narratives, however this dyad is particularly challenging given its existence prior to statehood.

The Paradox of Pakistan's Rhetoric

Even within the 2010s, Modi and the BJP's rhetoric in India has not originated from a vacuum. The narrative they have embraced within domestic Indian politics is based on hardline rhetoric from Pakistan, interference in Indian politics from Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), terror attacks from ISI trained paramilitary cells, * skirmishes along the border with the Pakistani Border, and nationalist rhetoric from Pakistani political leaders. Further, the ever-looming fear in India is grounded in a tangible reality, that there are more Muslims that live in India than there are in Pakistan (Danziger, 2020). The challenge for future research following further development of this model should also be capable of isolating political rhetoric from these other factors to more precisely measure their impact on bilateral relations.

The rhetoric utilized by Pakistan's secular political government, from the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Asif Ali Zardari, through Sharif's PML-N, to Khan's PTI, has consistently expressed anti-Indian sentiment regardless of Indian rhetoric. In spite of overtures for peace during the tenure of Zardari in Pakistan and Singh as India's Prime Minister, Zardari continuously failed to follow through on overtures made toward the Indian PM, empty promises that the Pakistani coalitional government could not nor would not deliver on, and ultimately contributed to the circumstances, similar to Singh's, which led to both leaders being ousted for leaders in both countries utilizing the "correct" othering narrative within the dyad (Dhar, 2015). Subsequently, Pakistani leaders have gone tit for tat with India's Modi in ramping up rhetoric go so far in 2020 to promise false flag attacks and joint operations with China against India to thwart India's nationalistic policies (Sarkar, 2020).

* The ISI also uses terror cells domestically to influence Pakistani politics, attack US troops in Afghanistan, and shape Afghani politics so this practice is not unique to India.

4.5.2 Survey Data

What is and will remain a recurring theme throughout this dissertation is the sparse availability of survey data on bilateral relations, public opinion, or an overall barometer of people in most parts of the world on their views. One of the few exceptions to this is views on Superpower politics. Conductors of valid international surveys have persisted with what could cynically be called an obsession for continuing to paint the world in broad strokes of a three-world system. What was once “Team USA”, “Team USSR”, or “Unaffiliated” has merely had the USSR category replaced with PRC. Outside of barometers on how countries across the world feel about the US in relation to China, survey data is inconsistent. If regular temperature checks could be conducted, the other two prongs of the SMS Analysis would likely be redundant. Rigorous and robust surveys which ask informative questions about local feelings and record feedback from participants would provide as good as, if not a better picture of relations based on media inference and search inquiries.

To rephrase and hopefully add further clarity to this, what is needed to capture the least manipulated image as possible of public opinion is survey data collected by NGOs external to state influence. Further, to be even more precise a time series analysis conducted over a realistic but meaningful period of time would be needed although this would be a greater challenge to accomplish. What I have utilized in this dissertation is survey data that serves the sole purpose of comparing the data in the other collection methods to look for consistency. Short of a robust discourse analysis or ethnographic study that looked at how the other is viewed, regularly retested survey data would best represent actual views of each country, in this case India and Pakistan, vis-à-vis one another. That being said, the occasional global attitudes data conducted by PEW illustrates a largely negative and mutual feeling toward one another. These graphics

illustrate the negative sentiments held by Indians and Pakistanis toward one another and how much they view one another as threats.

Lastly on the survey data available, frankly, I do not have a sufficient amount of the type of survey data I would prefer to have to draw anything stronger than a plausible inference. In addition to limitations in the type of questions asked, there is not a time series with consistent plot points across the time period I examine between 2010 and 2019. Further, the independent NGO survey data I have included in this chapter is exclusively by PEW and is limited largely to Global Attitudes surveys from 2017 and 2018 with the exception of a graph depicting a time series of mutual sentiment from 2009 to 2014. That in combination with the 2017 and 2018 global attitudes surveys gives us a preliminary idea of what we might expect to see from a more robust survey done asking specific questions targeted or refined to focus on identical operationalized variables with the media and search data prongs of the analysis.

Rather than commenting generally on each graph, I will say that what the graphs associated with PEW's survey data tells us is that Indians and Pakistanis continue to hold a great deal of distrust toward one another. Furthermore, it the one graph that presents an actual time series, it is plausible that there may have been a decline in ill will between the two countries but the pivot back toward strong distrust in the relationship mirrors the rise of Modi in India. This is not suggesting that there is a causal relationship between these two variables, only that it is plausible that there could be a relationship. There could be other yet to be identified variables involved as well though.

Fig. 4.1

Indians favor hard-line stance in Jammu and Kashmir

In dealing with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian government should use ___ military force than it is using now




Note: Volunteered category "Should not be using force at all" not shown.
Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, Q110.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Fig. 4.2

Indians' mixed views of other countries

Views of ...




Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, Q12a, c, e, k-l.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Fig. 4.4

Concerns about India on the Rise Again

Which is the greatest threat to Pakistan?




Source: Spring 2014 Global Attitudes survey, Q117.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Fig. 4.3

Prior to Pulwama attack, there was great concern over Pakistan

How serious of a threat is Pakistan to our country?



Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey conducted among Indian adults from May 23-July 23, 2018, Q76b.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The last graphic in particular highlights how Modi and the BJP's rise in 2014 mirrors an increase in Pakistani distrust toward India. This also mirrors the graphs in the search analysis section as well. On a side note, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship between the rise in threat perception toward the Taliban in relation to the perception of India. How PEW operationalizes threat perception in Pakistan would be important to know insofar as how informative this graphic actually is. Furthermore, future work that better operationalizes the perception of threat posed by India toward Pakistan that doesn't score different threats but the intensity of the feeling of threat instead may be more accurate in identifying the sentiment of feelings in both directions, which in combination with a search algorithm that effectively captures the saliency of issues, can yield stronger, more valid results, about how each country feels toward the other, and ultimately, whether the audience/selectorate is holding leaders accountable, i.e. if there are costs or constraints placed upon them.

4.5.3 Search Terms Interest Over Time

In my examination of this dyad, based on the narrative and rhetoric highlighted in the media section as well as further information in the survey data section, the terms I use and discuss are: war, terrorism, nationalism/BJP/Hindutva, Jammu and Kashmir, and the other country. As discussed at length in the previous portions of my SMS analysis, these are the most qualitatively significant and cross cutting terms that resonate in both countries. Also, briefly restating as a reminder, Google holds 99% of the search engine market in both countries so this data is more significant than it would be in China where it holds 2% of the market. I will annotate each graph with discussion of the illustration as well as providing linkage between the graph and the other components of the SMS analysis. As previously mentioned, Google holds approximately 99% of the search engine market in both India and Pakistan. Finally, just to

further emphasize the illustrative nature of this data, the Google Trends data does not tell us much because that is not what it was designed to do. It was not built by a team using identically operationalized variables to examine across multiple data collection methods so in this stage of development, what is being displayed is a demonstration of what is possible, not a causal relationship or clear connections between data collection methods.

Fig. 4.5






Fig. 4.6




This first graph on search term interest over time depicts Indian and Pakistani interest in each other. This graph illustrates that the saliency of each state as a general topic of interest toward each other declined throughout the early 2010s but began to pick up in intensity in the latter half of the decade, specifically with spikes in 2016 and 2019 that parallel major political changes in each country in terms of the intensity of rhetoric in 2016 with the rise of Imran Khan in Pakistan and then in 2018-2019 in rhetorical exchanges between the two in mutual threats during this time period. Both made overtures toward finding common ground following this though which again, is consistent with the de-escalation of tensions throughout the end of 2019. The search data results make a strong case within this exploratory model that the rhetoric that was used by both leaders resonated and was salient among their audiences/selectorates. This graph suggests that audience costs may have had a constraining effect on leaders in both countries generally and especially during major flare ups in rhetoric.

Fig. 4.7



The second graph depicts the saliency of war as a search topic in both countries. There is not a strong trend in the case of either country, however there is a stronger trend in India than in Pakistan. This moves along the same timeline as when tensions flared briefly over Kashmir again in 2018-2019. Lastly, if my model is accurate, rhetoric directed toward India had a more constraining role, e.g., a more substantive presence of audience costs, however it is not clear whether those would be traditional or transnational audience costs based on the available data.

Fig. 4.8




As mentioned, there is an identical spike in interest in the term “war” in Spring 2019, especially in India. This suggests that Indians have been consistently more sensitive to the topic than Pakistanis have. The discrepancy here most likely is less interest in the topic in Pakistan, likely due to greater interest in terrorism and the activities of terror groups such as the Taliban in the western provinces, however there could be a translation issue insofar as how people would

phrase the question in Pakistani English or Urdu as opposed to Indian English or Hindi. It could also be that how Pakistanis conceptualize war could be associated with a term outside the scope of this examination such as genocide, armed conflict, territorial skirmishes, nuclear war, or some other specific culturally nuanced phrase. That being said however, based on *this* term, heightened Indian belligerency did not translate into increased interest or concern on the topic of war in Pakistan while it appears to have domestically in India.

In this graph, the first half of the decade parallels the greater concern in Pakistan about terrorism in the frontier provinces mentioned earlier with a general lull throughout the decade and a small spike in India in 2019 consistent with the media discussion over fears of Pakistani coordinated terror attacks as discussed by Modi. In this example, a much clearer case could be argued that Khan’s rhetoric generated transnational audience costs in India and led to greater constraints on Indian policy makers than had previously been the case.


Fig. 4.9



Again, Indians almost always had more interest in this topic than Pakistanis. Of note, Pakistanis were more interested following major attacks that many, including Pakistani citizens, could or would be tied back to Pakistan, whereas after Khan came to power in Pakistan, Indians became more concerned about future terror attacks consistent with Khan's threats.


The next graph shows interest in BJP/Hindutva/Indian Nationalism. The three words are synonymous with each other but by searching for them this way it contributed search hits from all three terms. The graph suggests that the ideology was salient in India where it was an important part of the political system and could have created audience costs on Indian leaders to conform to the ideology, or constraints on political decisions to be consistent with the ideology. There was no interest in this subject in Pakistan. Further, it demonstrates essentially no audience costs based on Indian rhetoric on Pakistani leaders.

Fig. 4.10



This final graph displays how salient the search term of Jammu and Kashmir were in India and Pakistan throughout the 2010s. The issue has always been extremely important to both countries, as they have fought several wars over the issue, however there is a dramatic spike in 2019 in Indian saliency of the issue which corresponds to when Modi ramped up rhetoric on the subject. Further, while it was not generally a salient topic of interest in Pakistan among people’s search histories during the same time, there was a noticeable increase there as well. In this graph, it is much more plausible that audience costs/constraints were imposed on leaders based on rhetoric.

Fig. 4.11



The graph also suggests, similar to a previous point, that the phrasing of the issue might be different in Pakistan than in India which would explain why an issue that is so important in Pakistan had very little saliency in terms of search interest. Alternatively, the average citizen of Pakistan may just view alternative subjects as of greater importance than the dispute over Jammu


and Kashmir. Examples include fundamentalism in the frontier provinces, the democratic stability of the government, or the cleavages between the ISI, military, fundamentalist, and secular political factions of the Pakistani government.

The data presented in the previous graphs illustrates the plausibility of a pattern between rhetoric by Indian and Pakistani leaders. Another interesting observation is how search interest in Pakistan is lower relative to India across all search inquiries. There are many possible explanations for this. It could be a censorship issue we are not aware of, search terms being blocked from non-VPN IP addresses, a translation or transliteration issue, or Pakistanis may just generally be interested in other subjects such as sporting events or concerned about US activities in Afghanistan throughout the decade, etc. However, in spite of the low numbers in Pakistan, the graphs highlight that a relationship exists within the discursive space between political elites in both countries and the audiences of each. That being said, further research should explore why there is not a more significant relationship present. It could be, and most likely is, as suggested, that the specifically nuanced words are not being used. Pakistanis and Indians may use different words that technically have the same meaning. Another possibility is that other countries do not research topics the same way that Americans do, or they rely more heavily on information from other sources. I will provide an example from the US to illustrate the contrast between our cultural understanding of how to find information compared to India or Pakistan. This contrast is also relevant to the Greece/Turkey chapter as opposed to the China/Japan chapter which is an outlier within this empirical analysis.

This graph shows US search inquiries on Vladimir Putin over the same time period. Note the 100 score that corresponds with the same time as the 2018 Helsinki Conference between Trump and the Russian President in July. The way that this graph better conforms to what we

would expect to see in relation to transnational audience costs could be one of the two explanations proposed, or, while unlikely at this point, could be that this phenomenon is more impactful in the Western world than in other regions.

Fig. 4.12



A final point in all of this is that while there is little movement in search inquiries in Pakistan, there was significant movement electorally in the rise of Imran Khan and his nationalist party in Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) or Pakistan Movement for Justice party. Adding that factor into the picture, the heightened interest in all of these topics in Indian, which Khan has also opined on frequently, may very well have as much to do with his rhetoric in addition to or instead of Modi's. However again, a more in-depth field analysis or additional information supplied by specialists, primarily comparativists who specialize on India and Pakistan, would provide more nuanced connections to support or refute these preliminary findings.

4.5.4 SMS Conclusion

To summarize the SMS analysis, this chapter makes a strong argument for the validity of the transnational audience costs framework. Furthermore, it suggests what will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter, a broader framework that transnational audience costs are saddled in, transnational two-level games, where Putnam's two-level games model, the subsequent work done on it, and how it is defined in this dissertation, are expanded to include in even greater detail, the nominal selectorate in Putnam's win-set. Finally, this chapter, being able to examine *both* parties in the dyad unlike the previous chapter, begins to show the utility of the SMS Analysis approach for inferential analyses within international relations. To restate a previous criticism of a great deal of IR literature, far too much focus is placed on top-down understandings of IR and the international system rather than microtransaction events between states and the components that comprise these "states" such as domestic audiences.

4.6 Dyadic Implications and Broader Theoretical Implications

Given the nature of verbal exchanges and pandering to domestic nationalistic narratives, it is unclear how much if any reaction is taking place. The largely genial relations between Zardari and Singh from the early 2010s was replaced by belligerent rhetoric on both sides with the timing making it unclear who is responding to who, or perhaps the support base of neither government was ever in favor of the thawing of relations? This suggests the possibility that countries may instead get locked in to institutionalized narratives that they must adhere to in order to avoid losing power. Regime legitimacy is derived from remaining consistent with the preconstructed narrative and any deviation from that narrative will result in regime change. That reality would point to greater agency within the electorate/selectorate suggesting a more complex

state society dynamic exists than what has thus far been proposed by the transnational audience costs framework.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the Indo-Pak Dyad through the lens of the transnational audience costs framework. This dyad is particularly complicated given that there has not been a period at any point where brinkmanship was not a central characteristic of the relationship. Further, the issue framing on both sides of the relationship is focused on survival rather than dominance or superiority. In this sense it is on par with a reality where Israel and Palestine had two of the most powerful militaries in the world, and both possessed nuclear arsenals. Unlike many other scholars, I do not think the nuclear arsenal aspect is particularly compelling in terms of the relationship being complicated, but it does create greater geopolitical ripples when they feud because other statesmen do take it seriously. The narratives that the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent got more than their fair share in terms of territory, that Hindu Nationalism poses an existential threat to Islam on the subcontinent, and that there are enough Muslim citizens of India to tear the country apart are what dominate the airwaves and cyberspace. Not how many nuclear warheads each side possesses and what their payloads are.

The feelings of hatred and distrust toward each other extend into the very existence of the Pakistani people in general. From being viewed as apostates against their people, to thieves of their land, to political and military adversaries on increasingly equal terms, the relationship is a prime example of existential. Additionally, territorial disputes over territory claimed by both sides as well as forces within, which are suspected of being plants for the other side, calling for their own independence, continue to be a convenient outlet for diverting domestic strife onto an “other”. Finally, the complexity of their history in relation to the partition, the secession of

Bangladesh from Pakistan, as well as other geopolitical conflicts and terror attacks aided by the other have left them in a state of total inability to construct and inlands toward a peaceful relationship. In sum, the Indo-Pak Dyad presents perhaps the most obvious choice for an exploration into the boundaries of the model, but ultimately in ends up demonstrating how much more work is necessary to further refine it. This dyad further strengthens the hypothesis that in the case of enduring rivalries transnational audience costs are a very real phenomenon. However, the task still remains that future research needs to determine how to satisfactorily contain, or hold constant, other variables in order to identify and avoid covariation that may not be properly or sufficiently isolated or accounted for within the analysis.

This concludes chapter 4 and the second empirical chapter of the dissertation. The final empirical chapter examines the Greco-Turkish dyad. This final empirical chapter will probe the boundaries of the regime aspect of the transnational audience costs framework. It is still constrained to the enduring rivalry characteristic; however, it provides a long, broad look at how political rhetoric may or may not be affected by the relative amount of democratic institutions present in each state at any given time. Following that, I will conclude the dissertation with a summary of the research design, theory, empirical chapters, their implications for international relations, and how future research should proceed within this framework. Most importantly, is it tethered to this somewhat sui generis enduring rivalry typology or upon further refinement, can transnational audience costs be identified in other categories of dyads as well?

Chapter 5
Greco-Turkish Relations
5.1 Introduction

Concluding the empirical chapter section of the dissertation, in this chapter I discuss Greco-Turkish relations. This chapter is perhaps the most interesting insofar as its contribution to, and refinement of, the theoretical model presented in this dissertation. Specifically, this chapter adds substantial clarity to the criteria for transnational audience costs to occur, the scope and criteria of enduring rivalries at the mid-level of theorizing, and how both concepts interrelate and can be operationalized moving forward into future work on both concepts/phenomena.

The relationship between Greece and Turkey is complicated, challenging to categorize in any systematic sense, and very dynamic. The regime types of each state have been in constant flux, the fundamental identity of the players involved has been altered at the foundational level at different points, and there is an inherent cultural tension between “east” and “west” in addition to the charisma of leaders, political identities, shared history, and political institutions. However, that said, eerily similar with different aspects of the China-Japan dyad and the India-Pakistan dyad, the Greece-Turkey dyad includes a history of revolution, genocide, ethnic cleansing, population exchanges, territorial wars, territorial secessions and concessions, and religious oppression and suppression. These are a few of the multitude of complicated characteristics of the relationship that shape the environment that politics subsequently occur within.

Put another way, each state in the dyad is being dealt cards from a deck containing only bad hands with little to no chance of favorable or positive sum outcomes. This is a consistent parallel among all of these cases though. Each pair follows a similar narrative. A history of violence, hatred, and poor relations, combined with the uncertainty that opaque political

institutions create that lead to uncertainty because neither state nor society in either country is sure what is genuine rhetoric, threats, promises, or other overtures of discourse, vs a bluff. The reason why transnational audience costs can be overcome outside of the conditions of enduring rivalries combined with autocratic or newly democratic regimes is because others have both history and institutional transparency to look to for reassurance that belligerent rhetoric is instrumental for domestic purposes rather than something that poses a genuine threat to their wellbeing. While future research will most certainly better refine the boundaries of where transnational audience costs exist, this body of work has shown that they do within dyads that meet these conditions.

In this chapter I will first discuss the history of modern Greco-Turkish relations. What makes this chapter most complicated is the overlap and confusion, both intentional and unintentional, of Turkey with the Ottoman empire and Greece's and Greek people's place within the Ottoman empire. Separating the Turks from the Ottomans and the narratives of Greek independence highlights the fuzzy boundaries of identities within the dyad. Greece gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, the Ottoman Empire existed until just after World War 1, but had been collapsing in Soviet/Post-Soviet fashion for decades. This has complicated the narrative of the imperial legacy of the Turkic people of Asia minor/Anatolia in relation to the Greeks, so discerning Turk from Ottoman in the eyes of the Greeks is drastically different from that of the Turks who also view themselves as separate from the Ottomans (Kadioğlu, 1996; Karsavuran, 2019).

Following this historical overview and exercise to essentially “operationalize” the Turkish identity in order to separate it from that of the Ottoman when and where possible, I examine the politics and political leaders of Turkey, the history of relations between the two

since there existed a Greco-Turkish dyad in the first place when the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923 (Hakan, 2011). Finally, as with the dyadic analyses conducted in the previous two empirical chapters, I examine the relationship and rhetoric between the two throughout the 2010s to identify, discuss, and add refinement to the transnational audience cost model. I conclude the chapter by discussing the key characteristics of this dyad that contribute to the clarity it adds.

5.2 Background

5.2.1 A Lite Look into the Construction of Modern Greece

Similar to other countries with a rich historical existence that comprised one of many characteristics that led to modern state building like Greece itself, Israel, Palestine, China, etc., modern Greece emerged from an ethnic and/or vernacular based identity/group that had occupied political and geographic space in a past time. In the case of Greece, the Greek language evolved but existed continuously throughout time however an independent Greek state occupying the territorial space it currently occupies had never existed in a unitary state sense, had only loosely existed in a confederal sense and then enjoyed brief unification under Macedonian rule by Philip II and his decedents before being conquered by the Romans and continuing the Roman empire until the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 (Thomas, 2010; Bury and Meiggs, 2000).

Greece and Greek culture have always maintained a historical presence in the territory traditionally understood as Greece as well as vernacular preservation, all very similar to China. The political system became unstable and the country was colonized by an imperial Ottoman Empire like the Chinese, however there was never the destruction, diaspora, and construction of a largely new and distinct identity as in the case of the Israelis. Further, the entire period, just shy

of 400 years, that Greece found itself under Ottoman rule, the Greeks made continuous attempts to regain independence (Woodhouse, 1968). Successful momentum for Greek independence began in a protracted, decade long campaign starting with the Filiki Eteria plot in 1821, followed by the intervention by the Great Powers³⁷ in 1827, and ultimately the destruction of the Ottoman Navy and surrender of Ottoman forces in 1829 leading to the London Protocol of 1830 which restored the autonomy of the Greek people and the resumption of sovereignty.

The challenging aspect of Greece's war of independence against the Ottomans is that it was against the Ottomans, not the Turks. While the Turkey is considered in a layman's sense to be the successors, decedents, or next step from the Ottoman Empire, it nonetheless is not, and while Turkey has been blamed, paralleled, compared, or confused with them, they are not the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was a multinational, multiethnic, empire, similar to the Austro-Hungarian Empire or Soviet Union, consisting of many different people who would later form sovereign states (Soucek, 2015). Nonetheless, the Republic of Turkey took up the yoke of carrying the burden of the Ottomans against the peoples they had held under their rule and anti-Ottoman sentiment became anti-Turkey sentiment, for right or for wrong. This holds true for Greece in addition to others and this anti-Turkey sentiment will be explored further in the chapter. Suffice it to say for the moment that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it became expediate for Greece to project and/or redirect anti-Ottoman sentiment toward Turkey.

5.2.2 Rise of the Turk-centric Identity

The Turks, ironically considering popular understanding of Asia minor (Soucek, 2015), began their own pursuit for independence from the Ottoman Empire to establish a distinctly

³⁷ Britain, France, and Russia

Turkish identity throughout the late 19th and early 20th century via the Young Turk movement (Hanioglu 1995). Although the Young Turk movement initially began as a multi-ethnic organization in the Ottoman Empire pushing back against the monarchy, (Rabo, 2005) following fracturing, rising ethnic tensions, and the seizing of power by nationalist factions of the Young Turks, the movement became increasingly centered on an exclusively Turkish identity within an exclusively Turkish state (Wilson, 2009). With the total collapse of the Ottoman empire following World War I and the population shifts that followed, Turkish nationalism became increasingly intense leading up to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Ozkirimli and Sofos, 2008).

5.2.3 World War I

World War I was a decisive event both within the Greek-Turkey dyad as well as its contribution to the formative years of Greek and Turkish nationalisms. For the Greeks, who sided with the allies, WWI represented an opportunity to retake Constantinople and the other Greek enclaves in Anatolia (Asia Minor). For the Ottomans, it was a chance to restore the face of the empire, to spite the allies that had interfered with their territorial and political integrity via supporting opposition to their rule, and to potentially regain lost territory (Yasamee, 1995; Trumpener, 1968). Interestingly or perhaps confusingly, the war was important for the Turks within the Ottoman empire as well, as it served as an opportunity to depose the sultanate and create a Turk-centric modern nation-state following the war. With very little room for debate, Turkish nation-building is what contributed to genocides against the Armenians, Assyrians, and Anatolian Greeks throughout and just following the war (Schaller and Zimmerer, 2008; Bryce and Toynbee, 2000; and Walker, 1980). This observation highlights an interesting question about

the relationship between genocide, ethnic cleansing, differentiating between the two, and nation building.

Insofar as a singular event's impact on the construction of a dyad, World War I and the events immediately preceding and following it are that event between Greece and Turkey. Although many issues, incidences, and undiplomatic exchanges have taken place over the subsequent years, it was the nation-building that took place with Turkey after World War I enacted by a group of political and social elites who formed an opposition coalition to the continuance of the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I. This time period saw this nation-building that I touched upon, in terms of the ethnic cleansing of non-Turks from Asia Minor, a decisive victory for the Turks over the city of the Black Sea, Istanbul, and mass genocides, all of which are of utmost importance in shaping how relations between states and feelings between societies would progress moving forward. The vast majority of modern historical animosity between the Greeks and the Turks have their roots in this upheaval to the same degree that the partition of the Indian Sub-continent did. Finally, World War I saw the splintering of almost all non-Turk ethnicities from the Ottoman Empire from the Arabs to the Armenians. Somewhat ironically, World War I was the single-most important event for Turk nationalism and the creation of the Republic of Turkey. Not just because the allies forced the disbanding of the Ottoman Empire, but because it gave the Turks the distraction to solidify and secure their territorial boundaries (Üngör, 2011; Kaiser, 2007).*

* Ethnically cleanse Asia Minor.

5.2.4 Republic of Turkey

The Republic of Turkey emerged from the ashes of the Empire and was a push back against allied imperialism insofar as the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and allocating territory to the victors of World War I. Underscoring the distinction of the Ottomans from the Turks is the Turkish War of Independence from 1919 to 1923 where the Ottoman Turks organized as the Turkish National Movement under the leadership of remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) lead by Kemal Atatürk constructed the modern nation-state of the Republic of Turkey through politics, open warfare, and genocide (Zürcher, 1984; Avedian, 2012). Specifically, the actions undertaken by the CUP were in response to the Treaty of Sèvres which, in addition to dividing up and partitioning the Arab territory of the Empire, partitioned Asia Minor, returning Anatolia to the Greeks, seizing control of Constantinople, and occupying other territories throughout the region (Helmreich, 1974). The extent of the partition almost completely eliminated Turkish control over the region as depicted via the map below (Steiner, n.d.).

Fig. 5.1



This partition unified the Turks under a nationalist banner to protect their territorial boundaries and to eliminate, primarily through genocide but also population transfers, the ethnic groups who had been awarded territory formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire under the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres. Following the advances of Turkish nationalist forces across Asia Minor, they were able to renegotiate the terms in the Treaty of Kars and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 establishing the contemporary borders of Turkey and eliminating Greeks, Armenians, and Christians in general from their territory (Kieser, 2010; Lawrence, 1924). The Treaty of Lausanne caused further controversy in the case of Greece due to the islands of Imbros and Tenedos being awarded to Turkey in spite of the fact that the population of Imbros was completely Greek and the majority being Greek on Tenedos. These populations were marginalized and stripped of participatory power by laws requiring that island representatives speak Turkish to qualify for leadership positions (Alexandris, 1980). Further, similar with the case of the partitioning of the Indian Peninsula between India and Pakistan, the partition of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent conflict between the Turks and the Greeks extended the adversarial relationship beyond the Ottomans and into continuation with the Turks.

5.3 Key Narratives

Post-Independence Tension

5.3.1 Cyprus

Following the consolidation of the Turkish state and Greece renouncing claims to territory relations improved throughout the interim period between wars, during WW2, and immediately following the Cold War, to the extent that both states were, and remain, members of NATO. However, the relationship began to fracture over the issue of Cyprus in the 1950s, which remains one of the chief issues today. The majority population on Cyprus is Greek and as early

as the 1930s there were nationalist movements calling for Cypriot union with Greece (Holland, 1988). In the 1950s the issue again flared up and members of the Cypriot Greek majority began a paramilitary campaign against British occupation as well as the Turkish minority population on the island (Karyos, 2009). Turkish nationals in Turkey responded to this by launching the Istanbul Pogrom in 1955 which further resulted in Greece dissolving all bilateral relationships³⁸ with Turkey which led to the collapse of the Balkan Pact (de Zayas, 2007; 2010; Yaman, 2014). The conflict over Cyprus further spiraled with the Greek Cypriot declaration of Union with Greece and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 resulting in Turkey occupying the Northeast one-third of the island (Morelli, 2011). The invasion, occupation, and expulsion of Greeks from the occupied portion of Cyprus has remained one of the major issues of tension between Greece and Turkey to the present.

5.3.2 The Aegean Sea

Another area of tension between the two countries is issues with delineating control over the Aegean Sea and determining who has control of which parts, primarily in consideration of resource rights in the area. Aside from the two islands mentioned earlier, Imbros and Tenedos, Greece has had control over all islands in the Aegean following the Balkan Wars of 1913 (Farrar, 2003; Michail, 2017). Control of these islands awarded Greece almost total and uncontested control over most of the Aegean Sea. The primary issue of contestation over the Aegean is control over territorial waters. Based on the current agreement, each side has control of 6 nautical miles off their respective coasts, however, Turkey only recognizes the 12-mile line in accordance with the International Law of the Sea in the present day. An even more pressing and present issue is control over the continental shelf for the purposes of resource exploitation. Also

³⁸ Does not include NATO which is a robust multilateral organization.

of issue is the question of airspace. Greece currently claims 10 miles while Turkey only recognizes 6 miles (Acer, 2006). These territorial disputes over the area have resulted in numerous incidents, accidents, military actions, and general political and military brinkmanship between the two up to the present (Nedos, 2020; Cenciotti, 2020).

5.3.3 Other Issues

Other issues of tension between the two spans over a variety of issues. These range from issues of illegal immigration, false flag attacks intended to invoke military conflict between the two countries, and the question of Turkey's admission into the European Union.³⁹ The issue of illegal immigration is primarily a result of Turkey and then Greece being the primary land transit route for illegal immigrants from Africa and Southwest Asia into Europe. The Greeks accuse the Turks of not properly securing their borders and even encourages immigration which then transits through Greece and creates local instability they claim (Kitsantonis, 2009; Becatorosa, 2021). Discussion of Turkish ascent into the European Union have also been an area of contestation. After 1996, even Greek diplomats supported discussion of the idea of Turkey joining the EU, even despite only 25% of Greeks supporting Turkey's incorporation into Europe (Repa, 2005). Again, paradoxically it would seem on the surface, in spite of Turkey's continuing shift into authoritarianism and embrace of religious fundamentalism, Greek leaders have continued to caution other European countries, especially Germany, of terminating talks with Turkey about joining the EU (Hurriyet Daily News, 2017). The objectives of Greek diplomacy on the matter have become more transparent in recent time as an attempt to utilize ascension into

³⁹ Whether this is an issue that anyone still discusses or is under consideration is unclear.

the EU as an enticement for Turkey to renounce its claims in the Aegean and in Cyprus (Nikas and Tugwell, 2020; Meinardus, 2021).

5.4 SMS Analysis

5.4.1 Where's the Survey Data?

Moving on from the historical to the empirical analysis of this chapter. Greek-Turkey relations in the 2010s offer an interesting insight insofar as the devolution of a country within one of the dyads being examined from a high democracy score to being expelled from the category completely while Greece has maintained a perfect 10 since 1986 (Polity V). This dyad is especially useful for the transnational audience costs model due to its ability to expand beyond the autocratic or new democracy characteristic previously thought necessary as components necessary for the phenomenon to occur. This increases the generalizability to incorporate democratic dyads as well. Further, as also mentioned in chapter 2, in addition to the applicability of this model to democratic dyads, it also supports the portion of the research design thesis that unlike the scholarship of other political scientists, transnational audience costs can constrain leaders to respond with more *OR* less belligerent responses. Elaborating on this, the dynamic between leadership and audience costs can have a mitigating effect in a dispute rather than bolstering conflict by constraining leaders to options that require a peaceful outcome.

Furthermore, again to reiterate, the proposed explanation for this goes back to an even older line of research on complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1979). The final piece of the puzzle that the Greece-Turkey dyad further clarifies is that transnational audience costs are a phenomenon existing under a larger umbrella of two-level games which I have referenced as transnational two-level games. The purpose for incorporating the transnational denomination in the terminology is based on the emphasis of who the key players are. Putnam's two-level games

thesis began the line of research on expanding the number of players in the game, looking states as more than relatively unitary actors, and examining the role of constituencies. The use of transnationalism is to note that game extends to non-state actors in the sense that individuals and groups within states that have their own agency independent of the state play a role in win-sets and winning coalitions in addition to the formal and state-level agents participating in the bargaining process (Putnam, 1988)⁴⁰.

With all that said, again, where is the survey data? My time-series covers the 2010s exclusively and neither PEW nor Eurobarometer which are the NGO polling agencies that I examined for this time period conducted any surveys that fit within the scope of my variables or how I have operationalized any of the key concepts of this dissertation. With that said, there are many surveys that have been done, but none by impartial observers about strategically salient issues. Via the media and search sections I make a case that this subject matter is important to both Greeks and Turks, this is just an odd segment of time where there is a deficiency in survey data for whatever reason. As I continue to develop the method and this chapter specifically however, survey data will of course need to be included, or the time series expanded beyond ten years,⁴¹ or a different case selected.⁴²

In light of this review of the model, the Greek-Turkey dyad demonstrates the range and flexibility of its explanatory power. At the beginning of the decade, although they still fit neatly into the enduring rivalry framework, both states were strong democracies with Greece enjoying its score of 10 and Turkey being rated at a 9 (Polity V). Throughout the decade, as the trajectory

⁴⁰ The citation here is abbreviated to Putnam but includes every source of scholarship discussed in the research design in chapter 2.

⁴¹ This runs into relevancy issues given the volatility of the geopolitical landscape.

⁴² A different case may be needed but that would represent a significant loss to the broadness of the scope of this study in its current form.

of Turkish politics became increasingly autocratic, rhetoric between the two countries became more and more bellicose and the perspective of the other became cooler between constituencies. However consistent with the nuance of the model's ability to account for the efficacy of the two-way flow of communication, calls for conflict did not resonate with the public, who remained indifferent to issues leaders were pushing, or committed to peaceful resolution of issues in spite of policymaker rhetoric, which has led to a moderation of policymaker rhetoric more recently (Al Jazeera, 2021; Hacaoglu and Tugwell, 2021).

The Greek-Turkey dyad is particularly interesting because on the surface the relationship appears paradoxical. Throughout the 2010s, especially after the ascension of Erdoğan to power, belligerent rhetoric between Greek and Turkish leaders increased, and even the narratives encouraged by non-governing elites within the policy and news apparatuses of each state became more bellicose. However, while scant, no credible polling data suggests a relationship, or even a correlation, between public opinion and elite rhetoric. In fact, quite the opposite, Greek and Turkish citizens consistently stated a preference for finding peaceful solutions and positive-sum outcomes between their states (Nedos, 2021; Ferentinou, 2020; Athens Bureau, 2021; Grigoriadis, 2021). The data collected in these polls reflect the sentiments of each country's respective publics over the previous decade and the consistent pattern in every single poll is a strongly expressed desire by both Greeks and Turks to find a way to move forward together to improve relations.

This realization captures the flipside of my transnational audience costs model and again, more generally, transnational two level games, that audiences do not just play a role in exacerbating or heightening tensions; they can also moderate the position of the state and pressure policymakers to take a more cooperative approach to dealing with historical rivals. The

Greek-Turkey dyad supports the hypothesis that domestic audiences can encourage and incentivize leaders to take a cooperative approach to dealing with a rival rather than an aggressive approach. This is significant for two major reasons, first, for my model, and the second, related to this dyad. As far as the model is concerned, it highlights that the transnational audience costs model, within the broader transnational two-level games framework, is generalizable across all cases. Previous scholarship including my own has focused on audiences and their role in signaling state resolve couched more in terms of brinkmanship, however, as this case and others that are even less extreme such as that between Britain and France, show that public support for cooperation translates into governmental policies consistent with this preference. So, audience costs are not inherently negative nor do they inherently imply that states are willing to, or are trapped into, engag(ing) in conflict, but just that they have an influence over what the final outcome of the state will be. In the case of Greece and Turkey, and many other dyads that were examined as candidates for discussion in this dissertation, they moderate tension rather than amplify it.

Second, and specific to this case, it leads to a follow up question for future research, which is, why do countries like Turkey support authoritarian leaders like Erdoğan if they want to work together with their rival? My off the cuff hypothesis here is entirely supposition, but I suspect that the rationale is consistent with the confidence of the Turkish people in the resiliency or dependability of international organizations and regional organizations that make Greek policy predictable and viewed as stable to the Turks, freeing them up to be concerned instead with Kurdish and Levantine concerns across the southern and eastern portions of the country. Erdoğan's tough talk on Greece was tolerated because more generally, he has supported viewpoints and policies more favorable to religious organizations within the state and a

restoration of Turkey's place in the Islamic world, as well as policies of pushing back against the Kurds and the PKK and stabilizing their southern border with Syria. These two issues present much more proximal concerns for Turkey than anything related to Greece does.

5.4.2 Media Analysis

Consistent with the recurring theme throughout this dissertation, I will state as I have in all previous chapters that future research should identify or create more survey data to draw upon than what is presently available to more rigorously substantiate the validity of my findings. Using the SMS Analysis approach, I analyze and discuss the key components of this historical rivalry identified earlier in the chapter. They are: Aegean conflict, Cyprus, Immigration, Military conflict, and Turkish admission into the EU. For Google Trends searches I will also include searches of the other by each country. I will proceed by breaking the analysis down via major shifts throughout the decade, use a small sample of incidences, and examine the association between rhetoric and the SMS criteria. I will finish this section of the chapter by adding in and reviewing the search trend data and summarize how it follows the narrative of the other portions of the analysis. These are depicted graphically and use the key terms previously mentioned.

Early 2010s

At the start of the 2010s, bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey were not a priority to either country substantiated by an absence of rhetoric, positive, neutral, or negative, directed toward one another. Turkey was battling an emerging anti-secular political movement that began with the ascent of Abdullah Gül as president of Turkey in 2007 (Friedman, 2011; Gül - CNN, 2007; Gül - BBC, 2007). Meanwhile, Greece was at the center of a stalling EU economy following the housing crises and was increasingly the focal point of these struggles and resentment by other EU members (Greek Economy – BBC, 2010; Smith, 2009; Greek Austerity

– BBC, 2010; Crumley, 2010). In conjunction with the limited amount of survey data and media attention, scholarly research was hopeful for a growing trend in rapprochement and détente in the relationship with the dyadic partners building better relations based on common agendas (Larrabee and Ries, 2010; Koukoudakis, 2015). One report in 2010 espoused Greek concern over an Islamic slide in Turkey that in hindsight foreshadowed the events of the decade (Peloni, 2010).

Aside from this, in absence of direct jabs at one another, a significant proportion of Turkish rhetoric in the early 2010s focused on Cyprus and resource extraction in and around the island (BBC, 2011; 2012; Smith, 2013). It was also around this time when Erdoğan first began engaging in Turkish nationalist rhetoric as well as Pan-Islamist remarks and an Islamic world centered on Turkey again (BBC, 2012; Baydar, 2013; Akyol, 2013; Tastekin, 2013; Gultasli, 2013). He even went so far as to remark on a resurgent Ottoman Empire at one point (Karagul, 2011). Erdoğan also commented during this time that Turkey should end its EU bid (Today's Zaman, 2013). Lastly, it was at the end of this period, in 2013, that many in Turkey began to express concern over the future of Turkish democracy (Yilmaz, 2013; Dagi, 2013). In sum, even prior to Erdoğan's succession as President of Turkey, he was already making moves and engaging in threatening rhetoric as prime minister.⁴³

Erdoğan's Presidency and the latter half of the 2010s

Erdoğan rose from the position of Prime Minister to President of Turkey in 2014. Following his ascension to the role of president, he substantially intensified his use of belligerent rhetoric. For the remainder of this analysis of rhetoric in the Greek-Turkey dyad, I will be

⁴³ Erdoğan successfully transferred power from the prime minister position and parliament to the president during his transition and Turkey now has a presidential political system.

focusing only on examples that are specific to the dyad and not anything indirectly related. Furthermore, it should be noted that in sorting through the plethora of politicking conducted by Greece and Turkey in relation to one another, and mineral and resource exploration in and around Cyprus in and around the Aegean Sea, that there was a substantial amount of discourse on the rise and goings on of the Islamic State which I have excluded as much as possible. Again, to maintain the focal point of the picture on the dyad rather than peripheral issues external to it. Throughout the remainder of this section, I will focus on Turkish *and* Greek belligerent rhetoric when Greek rhetoric is available but to be upfront from the start, the Greek's have approached relations without being antagonistic more often than not.

2014

Erdoğan's presidency began a new era in belligerent rhetoric from Turkey directed in every direction internationally but focusing specifically on relations with Greece, 2014 focused primarily on Cyprus. In one report, in a flurry of agitating statements toward everyone ranging from the statesmanship of the German President to the genocide of the Armenians, Erdoğan assured his supporters that he would resolve the Cyprus issue one and for all, regardless of who resisted by the following year (Today's Zaman, 2014). He later continued steering Turkey away from EU membership in a speech in front of the body about how Turkey's enemies in the EU meant to bound Turkey to EU laws through admittance which was no longer in Turkey's interest (Baydar, 2014). Meanwhile, Greeks' espoused frustration with the incompetency of their government to deal with geopolitical issues harming domestic agriculture from the Russians to the Turks (Mason, 2014). Erdoğan continued his calls for Ottoman restoration in his pandering to Turkey's Islamic revival (Yetkin, 2014).

Later in 2014, Greece passed an anti-Racism bill which Erdoğan responded with the threat that “any references to the genocide of the Pontic Greeks as an aggressive step that would poison bilateral relations...” and that Anatolian Greeks were conspiring with the PKK (Kurdish Liberation Forces) to destabilize Turkey (Pelsoni, 2014). Cyprus continued to call upon the UN to intervene in Turkish aggression against their island (CNA, 2014). Finally, Erdoğan again stoked tensions with Greece with his resurgent Ottoman rhetoric and claims that Cyprus belonged to the Turks, playing on tensions with the Greeks extending back to clashes in the 60s, and near misses on wars in the 1980s and 1990s (Taraf, 2014; Konstandaras, 2014). In sum, the theme of 2014 was claims of imperial grandeur by Erdoğan regarding neo-Ottomanism, reimagining Turkish boundaries and Turkey’s position in the Islamic world as that it had once held prior to its collapse, and reenergizing tensions with the Greeks which had been on the decline earlier in the 21st century.

2015

2015 began with Greek audiences channeling anxieties over regional insecurity through the discursive space of the 2015 elections, looking to rely more on the EU for security but simultaneously still angry over what was considered German mercantilist policies during the austerity measures of the early 2010s (Smith, 2015). Erdoğan congratulated Greece on selecting a new government but promised that his country would maintain the same intensity and pressure on Greece over salient and key issues of conflict between the two countries (Karakus and Ozer, 2015). Turkish leadership expressed further doubt later in the year over the sincerity of Greek calls for improved relations while Greek leaders paralleled Turkey’s resurgent Ottomanism to the rise of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s (Yinanc, 2015; Nougayrède, 2015). Erdoğan also restated Turkey’s position on Cyprus and continued the country’s pivot away from Secularism

and Europe and toward Islam and the Middle East (Kanli, 2015; Yurttagul, 2015; Demirtas, 2015). Another jab at the Greeks by Turkish elites was that Greece was the model for Turkey to avoid following in terms of civilization, from ancient to contemporary society and that Greece's debt problem was an unavoidable consequence of the flaws of Greek culture (Emre, 2015). The remainder of the year focused on threats by Erdoğan to open the Turkish borders to allow the free flow of Syrian refugees into Europe through Turkey (Allen, et al, 2015; Ignatieff, 2015; Traynor, 2015; Anderson, et. al, 2015).

However, a trend that began to emerge this year was Turkish dissent against Erdoğan's rhetoric as well as Turkish recognition of the general apathy of Greeks toward his antagonisms. One critic spoke about how the Turks owed reparations to Greek Istanbulites who had been forcefully ejected from the community and their property seize (Yurttagul, 2015). And finally, another critic spoke of the pitfalls of Erdoğan's delusions of Ottoman restoration, his Islamist base, his ambitions for empire building, and the damage he had already caused to Turkish – European relations and specifically Greek – Turkish relations (Bozkurt, 2015).

2016

2016 saw Erdoğan attempt to pivot back toward Cyprus again, however the Greek leadership refused to react to the rhetoric and maintained their position and that of the Greek people that the issue was already decided under EU law and would be treated as such (CNA, 2016; Kanli, 2016). Greece further utilized EU rule of law regarding the refugee issue, calling for cooperation among EU members rather than divisiveness as Erdoğan had pushed (Hurriyet, 2016; Corriere della Sera, 2016). By the midpoint in the year Turkey had conceded on the issue and began talks with the EU on the immigration issue (Rankin and Oltermann, 2016). This was followed by terror attacks in Istanbul, terror suspects picked up by the Greek Navy heading

toward Greece, and challenges from the Greek and Cypriot presidents against Erdoğan on his belligerent rhetoric how it was neither helping nor obtaining any traction in either of the two countries (Anderson et al, 2016; Bash et al 2016; ANA-MPA, 2016; CAN. 2016). Against all of this Erdoğan began talks with Greece and the EU about cooperation to handle the migrant crisis and 2016 ended on what was a primarily positive tone (ANA-MPA, 2016; Hurriyet, 2016). That said however, the terrorist attacks in Istanbul turned out to be a failed coup attempt to oust Erdoğan from the presidency by the Turkish military who was able to survive via his Islamic fundamentalist support base. Erdoğan praised his supporters for helping stymie the coup and proceeded to purge the Turkish military, which had been responsible for ousting 3 other autocratic leaders in Turkey in the 20th century, of dissidents (Arango and Yeginsu, NYT, 2016).

2017

2017 saw talks to remove Turkish soldiers off of Cyprus continue, in spite of the fact that Erdoğan continued to antagonize all parties involved. The situation devolved to the point where no country working to mediate the issue was willing to work with him directly on the issue (CNA, 2017; Hurriyet, 2017). 2017 also marked the first visit by a Turkish president to Greece in 65 years, however rather than being an occasion to try to reconcile and reduce tensions, the occasion was marked by war-drum rhetoric and red line threats by both sides (The Guardian, 2017). Erdoğan was also called out for interfering in elections in Europe to which he responded by accusing the Europeans of being Nazis in the literal sense (CNN, 2017; 24 Chasa, 2017). Overall, however, 2017 was a relatively quiet year from Erdoğan aside from election meddling and attacking the legitimacy of European political systems. The vast majority of primary source data throughout the year focused on Trump's rhetoric on election meddling and attacking the legitimacy of European, and American, political systems (CNN, 2017; BBC, 2017; NYT, 2017;

News et al, 2017). Furthermore, as will be discussed in the 2018 section, Turkish media and information about Turkey in general declined following the 2016 coup attempt for a significant period of time afterward (Gall, NYT, 2018a).

2018

2018 saw the first substantial push back against Erdoğan domestically following the failed coup and the additional powers he sought for his position in power by another right-wing candidate, Meral Aksener. Although right-wing, Aksener, an ethnic Turk whose family was resettled in Turkey from Greece following population exchanges in 1923, promoted conservative ideals without the nationalist and anti-Greek rhetoric (Gall, NYT, 2018a). Gall continued her investigation in a follow up about the divide in Turkey among those in support of Erdoğan and his style of international brinkmanship as opposed to those in Turkey opposed to antagonizing regional neighbors (Gall, NYT, 2018,b). Erdoğan deflected the domestic challenge by heightening tensions with Greece even further, adding military might to his rhetoric and changing the narrative from simply anti-Greece, to Greece as a violator of Turkish sovereignty over islands and territory in the Aegean owned by Greece according to international law (Charalampakis, Ta Nea, 2018). Erdoğan then extended his threats to Italy as well over exploration and drilling anywhere in the vicinity of Cyprus (Hazou, Cyprus Mail, 2018). He then challenged Greece's historical claim to territories in the Aegean and that based on the severity of the Greek defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1921, the Greeks should have no claim to any of the islands in the sea, thus, challenging the legitimacy of these claims. He stated further that if not for the European Union that Turkey would easily secure control over the islands and return them to their rightful owners (BBC, 2018). He then used the Turkish claims over Cyprus as

justification for Turkish claims over all sea territory in the area and threatened military confrontation to any who breached the area, threatening war against the Greeks (BBC, 2018).

The Greek response to Turkish belligerency was to condemn the actions, condemn Turkish interference with the issue of Macedonia, and call upon Greeks to support military spending to defend Greece's territorial integrity in light of Turkish militancy (BBC, 2018). Greek political parties rallied together under this banner and line of rhetoric opposed to the words and deeds from Erdoğan over previous years and responded to the threats that they were not afraid of any country and would not hesitate to defend their territorial space (BBC, 2018; ANA-MPA, 2018; Greek Cypriot Press, 2018). This would seem to indicate that collectively, Greeks were prepared to respond in kind to any belligerency by the Turks. This verbal exchange was followed by territorial incursions by Turkish military forces into Greek territory (Kingsley, NYT, 2018a; Kingsley, NYT, 2018,b). Greek politicians grew wary in light of the escalations of upcoming Turkish presidential elections (Hurriyet, 2018). Greek audiences began to react to the years of antagonizations by Erdoğan as the mayor of Greece's second largest city was beaten and hospitalized by Greek nationalists during a commemoration of remembering the genocide of Anatolian Greeks on Asia Minor during Turkey's genocide of non-Turks during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Kitsantonis, NYT, 2018).

By the middle of the year tensions had begun to decline and move back into the political realm. Greece continued to rely on rule of law in response to Turkish belligerence and they pressed the Russians on obstructing peace in the region (BBC, 2018; ANA-MPA, 2018). Further, Turkey, and Erdoğan specifically, fell into the crosshairs of the US and Germany both based on his inflammatory rhetoric, damaging the Turkish economy, and diminishing Turkey's regional presence (Kollewe, The Guardian, 2018; Bennhold, NYT, 2018a; Bennhold, NYT, 2018b; BBC,

2018). With the close of 2018, traditional and social media had come to two conclusions. First, authoritarian, right wing, nativist politics were on the rise and corroborated with public sentiment (BBC-Twitter, 2018; Polakow-Suransky, *The Guardian*, 2018; Smoke, *The Guardian*, 2018). Second, popular opinion in Greece had already begun to calm down on the topic of Turkish belligerence as many in Greece were dismissing Turkey as being relegated a second-tier player in the Mediterranean region (BBC-Twitter, 2018).

2019

The beginning of the final year of the 2010s began with the same story that had been going for the latter half of the decade. Democracy was under assault by autocracies across the world, strongmen were acting antagonistically toward rivals and international organizations, and statecraft in general was drifting back toward *realpolitik* relative to prior time periods of emphasis on multilateralism. In terms of bilateral relations, the end of the 2010s remained a continuance of the new status quo set in 2018, Erdoğan's continued use of anti-Greek, anti-European, and anti-Western rhetoric, and general Greek apathy when tangible territorial threats were not present (BBC, 2019; BBC-Turkish Social Media, 2019). At one point the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, engaged in anti-Turkish rhetoric which not only gained no traction among the Greek populace, but was unpopular from the standpoint of engaging the Turks in their own game (BBC, 2019). This stalemate, if it should be called that, was how the rhetorical narrative of Greek-Turkish relations ended at the end of 2019. In the next section, I examine search interest by Greek and Turks over time using Google Trends. This information is helping at shedding some light on how the interests of Greek and Turkish audiences correlated with rhetoric and actions by political leaders in each country. That being said, this is a preliminary investigation. As noted in the other empirical chapters, relying solely upon Google Trends for

search engine analytics could possibly portray an inaccurate picture on the interests of audiences within these countries as a nuanced field study might reveal. Future research should build upon the data displayed in these graphical and rhetorical depictions to determine how these analyses appear from an indigenous perspective compared to an outsider's.

5.4.3 Search Terms Interest Over Time

Below are graphical data for the key terms for this chapter that will be referenced throughout the remainder of this section. The terms I examine correspond with the areas of common importance to each with an intersubjective understanding of the term. In other words, both Greece and Turkey find the topic in the term to be important, and they have a shared understanding of why it is important. These terms are, as with the other two chapters, 1) EU interest over time, 2) the Aegean Sea, 3) Cyprus, 4) interest in each other, and 5) War. Interest in each other and war are the constants insofar as these terms carry the same meaning across the temporal space of this analysis. Interest in the EU is important for two reasons. First, it is important because until recently, Turkey's trajectory was moving toward EU admission which would depend on several conditions being met in terms of governance, acknowledging and reconciling with the ethnic cleansing the founders of Turkey engaged in to establish its territorial boundaries, as well as the issue of Cyprus. Second and not independent of the first, potential EU membership had historically been a mechanism that Greece could defer to insofar as mediations over disputes between the two.

The Aegean Sea is important in terms of resource wealth in proven reserves, strategic control over the waterways around the Black Sea, and historical ties to the territory within. The final of which has been much more important to the Greeks and interwoven into their culture and history. This is clearly present on the graph below. Finally, is the issue of Cyprus. The Cyprus

issue has been problematic historically based on general Cypriot identification with Greece, but conflicted because of a miniscule Muslim population that served as a point of contestation for Turkey that evolved from contestation, to a challenge to extracting themselves from based on the institutionalization of Cyprus as part of the Turkish narrative, and more recently, as a point of contestation again to rally Turks around a banner of Islamic resurgence in Turkish politics.

The graphs depicted focus on the dyadic perspectives of each of the five terms used in the search engine analysis. They are scaled in relation to the other's search interest to more accurately illustrate scaling instead of scaled to 100 in order to better identify the discrepancies in interest. Prior to examining the search term data however, to illustrate the reliability of Google Trends as a reflection of search interest in each country, I have included graphs from statcounter of Google's search engine market share in each country. In the case of Greece, Google has a solid 99% share of the market. They also remain above 90% in Turkey as well, however have been declining with the introduction of domestic search engines that happen to overlap with the decline in democratic institutions within domestic politics. I am not inferring anything from it at this time, but note its presence nonetheless. Lastly, echoing previous disclaimers, the graphical data in these charts is for predominantly for illustrative purposes for demonstrating the scope of what a funded version of this method could reveal to us with a consistent set of operationalized variables going into the study across the three collection approaches.

Fig 5.2






Fig 5.3



As illustrated above, Yandex, a Russian webservice, acquired approximately 15% of the market share over the last 24 months of the decade. From here, I move into the search term graphs.

First, is Greek and Turkish interest in the EU:

Fig 5.4



Based on this graph, interest in the EU earlier in the decade is predominantly related to each country's individual friction with it rather than their relationship with one another in relation to the EU. Greece was struggling with the debt crises which was salient among Greeks and Turkey was under heightened scrutiny around the same time period due to the growing pan-Islamic movement from the EU toward Turkey. Later on in the decade, small spikes occur in relation to Turkish challenges to international law in regards to Greek territorial claims and legal disputes which they consistently referred back to international law and agreements conducted through the EU. This graph illustrates the plausibility that references to, and interactions with, the EU via rhetoric represented an audience cost, i.e., a constraining factor, on both Turkey and Greece during this time period.

Next, is interest in the Aegean Sea:


Fig. 5.5



This graph illustrates that the Aegean Sea as an issue in and of itself has been a salient issue among Greeks but not among Turks. The fluctuations over time reflect several concerns among Greeks in relation to the Aegean. First is fishing and territorial claims to the area, second is how important the region is to Greek tourism, and finally, as reflected by a resurgence in interest toward the end of the decade, is Erdoğan's challenges to Greek sovereignty over the area in the latter half of the decade as highlighted in the media section of this chapter. This exploratory model highlights the plausibility that Erdoğan's belligerent rhetoric created heightened costs, i.e., constraints, on Greek leaders insofar as the scope of their bargaining positions on the issue with Turkey. As I argue throughout the dissertation, even if Erdoğan intended to antagonize the Greek public, it is unlikely that he could know with certainty what specific degree of constraints this would impose on Greek leaders. Lastly, this issue did not resonate at all among Turks.

Next is interest in Cyprus:


Fig. 5.6



In this graph, similar to the issue of the Aegean, there has been some interest over the issue in Greece while essentially none in Turkey. This suggests the possibility that Erdoğan’s rhetoric has not resonated among Turks or that it has but based on a topic more directed to Turks specifically such as the fairness or unfairness of Turkish treatment by the EU and/or Greece generally speaking whereas based on the rhetoric actually used, as referenced in the media section, has caused interest, especially in 2013 when Erdoğan launched a strong challenge to Cypriot independence and their relationship with Greece over what he argued should be Turkish resource extraction rights on and around the island. Again, this did not generate any interest among Turks, but did generate interest among Greeks. However, in this case, as highlighted in the conclusion, the constraining effect may have been a moderating effect via Greek audiences constraining Greek leaders to use the EU and international organizations to moderate the issue.

The next graph depicts how Greeks and Turks view each other:

Fig. 5.7



In this graph, there is a clear pattern increasing search interest in each other at the same time that rhetoric increases. What is interesting, just as a plausible explanation at this point, is that aside from the flare up that nearly resulted in an armed conflict between the two in 2018, this is main graph where there is significantly greater interest or saliency in terms of search interest by Turks relative to Greeks. Just as speculation, the interest by Turks over this topic area could be associated with citizens attempting to substantiate Erdoğan’s rhetoric in relation to what people in Greece actually thought vs what he said Greeks thought. Aside from that, this graph highlights the plausibility that audience costs played an increasingly constraining role on rhetoric by both Erdoğan and Greek leaders in this time period. The more audiences/selectorates paid attention, the more tempered rhetoric became.

Finally, is the search interest in war over time in Greece and Turkey.

Fig. 5.8



Toward the beginning of the decade, interest in war as a topic searched by Greek and Turkish citizens appear to be unrelated and the media analysis over rhetoric does not really explain why war was so salient in Turkey during the early 2010s. What *could* explain why war was so salient during the early part of the 2010s in Turkey would be the Arab Spring, destabilization of Syria along Turkey’s southern border, a rise in Kurdish separatism, and the influx of foreign military forces in the region as well as the emergence of ISIS. However, toward the latter half of the decade the two countries begin to follow a similar trend in terms of peaks and troughs although they are higher in Turkey. These peaks correspond with rhetoric by Erdogan regarding territorial claims in the Aegean, in Cyprus, and resource claims throughout the entire region. This highlights three possible explanations. First, the topic of war may just be what resonates more strongly among Turks, and imposes a constraining role of Turkish leaders. Two, while interest increased in Greece over time, it typically was geared more toward constraining Greek leaders to

act within international law rather than unilaterally. And three, it was not something that was perceived as of important of an issue by Greeks as it was by Turks.

Furthermore, examining the data from each segment of the method utilized reveals important implications that need to be emphasized. As I have stated elsewhere, audiences/selectorates have agency in their relations with state leaders. And audiences can enact costs on leaders in a multitude of ways, not just based on the classical audience costs literature insofar as signaling resolve. This chapter more than any other offers the most compelling evidence that audience costs rest comfortably in the broader domestic politics literature within the subfield of international relations, specifically in the two-level games model. Further, when taken in combination with BBDM's selectorate model of domestic politics, understanding the fluidity of nominal and real selectorates as well as winning coalitions becomes more apparent. Groups that have marginal relevance at best one year may play an integral role in governance just a few years later. Turkey, once a fiercely secular country within the Islamic world slips further and further into the grasp of a leader pandering on Islamic fundamentalism to the present. In this chapter, I have shown through significant empirical evidence that it is appropriate to infer that transnational audiences were never swayed by the rhetoric of a belligerent leader and maintained a course for pursuing diplomatic solutions based on a common rule of law to solve problems. The takeaway from this is that the leadership of that transnational audience conformed to the same tack at dealing with the belligerent. The metatheoretical implications of this will be discussed in the conclusionary chapter of the dissertation.

5.5 Conclusion

In summary, in this final empirical chapter I have examined the Greek-Turkey dyad. In contrast to the previous two empirical chapters, the public barometer has leaned toward

moderating relations rather than exacerbating them. Consistent with the previous two empirical chapters, state policy position has shifted in the same direction, along-side with public perception, and has been reciprocated by the transnational audience. The very substantial take-away from this chapter being that audience costs do not necessitate belligerency, rather, they simply require sentiment in country A to be reciprocated by the audience, and ultimately, policymakers and elites, in country B. Future research on Greek-Turkey relations should examine why the publics within this dyad support cooperation whereas the publics in the China-Japan and India-Pakistan dyads do not, or are at least less likely to do so. It should explore characteristics that encourage cooperation, which I have suggested, could be related to international organizations, relations with great powers, or more pressing proximal threats. Perhaps if China became more aggressive toward India, Indians would be more open to cooperation with Pakistan? Future research should also investigate how leaders like Erdoğan are successful in spite of the fact that they engage in belligerent rhetoric that is inconsistent with public sentiment, which I suspect is related to the previous statements.

I will now move on to my final thoughts in the conclusionary chapter on the audience costs model, the two-level games framework, and how these empirical chapters inform us on these areas of research, on the enduring rivalries literature, on the roles that democracy and authoritarianism play in relation, and how future research should advance moving forward. In my conclusion I make the case that these empirical chapters present an untapped well for scholars of international relations and comparative politics in understanding how and why states cooperate, compete, or conflict, what specific nuances can be taken away for scholars of each of these countries, and the next steps for structuring the transnational audience costs and two level games framework into a larger, book sized body of work to more fully examine each of these

dyads in rigorously constructed and methodologically tested cases to draw conclusions that, while they may remain small in sample size, still possess strong p-value and r^2 levels of probability and statistical significance.

Chapter 6:

6.1 Implications and Conclusion

This chapter concludes the dissertation. In this chapter I will summarize the implications of my findings in the empirical chapters, discuss in great detail my research agenda insofar as future research based on this dissertation, and conclude with parting thoughts. The work completed in this document turned out to be much more insightful, thought provoking, and centering for future projects than I had anticipated. Numerous branches have been created to explore a multitude of topics to engage in even more mid-level-centric work than was presented here. As of my writing of this, there are 193 states recognized by the United Nations, an almost countless number of ethnicities, and between all of them, dyads that can be explored further. This fact has created the abilities for future projects to push even further beyond the largely qualitative, small-N quantitative, and mixed method approaches I have already and intend to continue using in future studies, and expand out into large-N purely quantitative analyses shedding light on this model from an entirely different direction and perspective.

In chapter 1 I introduced the topic to be discussed and identified, albeit in an informal sense, my dependent and independent variables. I briefly touched on some concepts that I went on to expand on in the following chapter. Finally, I outlined the remainder of the dissertation. In chapter 2 I presented my research design. First, I explained and justified how I used concepts throughout the dissertation. I then expanded on this to include theoretical assumptions based on existing literature across the social sciences. From there I concisely laid out my model and framework that this dissertation proposed. Next, I described in depth how my SMS Analysis works and why it was the appropriate method for this project. Then, I identified, justified, and discussed the dyads I analyzed in my empirical chapters. And finally, I summarized and laid out

my agenda for those empirical chapters as well as what my intentions were for this chapter. From here I will present my findings and their implications.

6.2 Findings and Implications

In this dissertation I set out to substantiate further inquiry into conceptualizing audience costs as a transnational phenomenon that extends beyond national borders and acts as an intervening variable between players engaged in two-level games in the bargaining process. Absent material resources to conduct surveys, use more recent algorithmically based methods to measure public sentiment about issues that leaders bring up and the saliency and diffusion of those issues, etc. I have used publicly accessible data to illustrate ways that costly but much more effective data can add greater validity to the two overarching arguments I have made a case for throughout the body of this text.

First, that transnational audience costs exist. Leaders are constrained by, or take into their decisionmaking calculus, what the constraints exist on their decisions from their audience/selectorate, and what costs they may impose if leaders make decisions outside of those constraints. Second, that audience/selectorate sentiment on issues and the saliency of those issues is affected by belligerent rhetoric from foreign leaders. To restate from the introduction, leaders in state A may very well attempt to manipulate and generate audience costs in state B for the leaders in state B but this strategy on its own would be risky in that even if it were done consistently and a predictable pattern were clear, that future constraints would not create a different outcome than what had previous been the case. An interesting case study to consider for future research could be using a Graham Allison-esque three views model to look at the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 from the perspective of US leaders, Iraqi leaders, and public sentiment

and salience of the prospects of invasion in the months leading up to the attack. This is just one example though.

Although the model and method are still in development and in need of further refinement to provide some semblance of explanatory power, we can conclude that both aspects merit further exploration. With access to adequate resources to work with existing NGOs or independently conduct narrow and targeted surveys, a more valid survey component that captures audience/selectorate sentiment can be incorporated into the study. Furthermore, working with existing organizations to utilize search algorithm models, issue saliency among the audience/selectorate can also be better measured. Essentially, how I have applied my model and method in this dissertation has illustrated what it can evolve into. Regardless of the findings, having identically and consistently operationalized variables across all three approaches of the SMS Analysis will greatly expand our understanding of how audience costs work within state-society relations. Even if the findings determine that there is no relationship among these variables, they will still greatly advance our understanding of to what extent audience costs constrain leadership decision making. Finally, these findings will be relevant to both the traditional audience costs literature as well as my transnational audience costs model.

All told however, the empirical chapters explored in this dissertation each make a case in their own way for further exploration. Each empirical chapter that was covered in the dissertation revealed a new way of understanding transnational audience costs and informed how future research can continue to expand on the model. The Sino-Japanese chapter illustrated how long memories can be for people's understandings of themselves in relation to the other. It also revealed more than in the other empirical chapters given the longevity of this relationship, how destructive nationalist rhetoric can be on relationships, how substantial of an obstacle these types

of narratives can be toward rehabilitating the relationship, and how costly they can make that reconciliation process. Secondly, it highlighted how imperialism affected countries with what Westerners would consider to be very similar cultures, and what each of these countries would agree are very similar cultures relative to Western culture, differently. Japan was the first mover that very quickly became a global power after their opening whereas China was a slow riser who, perhaps because of rather than in spite of a more conservative approach, has created a substantial global footprint in the international system in less than 75 years.

The Indo-Pakistani chapter revealed that the complexities of partition and population exchanges can sow long lasting adversarial relations. Ethnocentric ideologies and religious cleavages created a perceived need by Muslims on the Indian Subcontinent to view a need to possess sovereign territory to ensure their survival, and Hindutva in India has only reinforced that over time. Further, the intersectionalism present in this case reveals that how we label democracy can be a little shallow insofar as putting forth theories that argue for a clear relationship between peace and cooperation, and democracy. It also highlights how complex categorizing a state as a democracy actually is. While the Polity Index scores both very high on the democracy scale, India and Pakistan's intersubjective understanding of the other as being democratic does not concur with those scores. Both espouse the value of democracy and neither views the other as being one. Rhetoric has played a significant role in continuing to fuel mistrust in each other, as well as leaving both open to third party manipulation to keep tensions high. Secondly, the complex process of partitioning and transferring populations creates distrust and hatred that extends far beyond the generations that personally experienced it. This held true in the case of the Greco-Turkish dyad, although it was emphasized less than between India and Pakistan.

The Greco-Turkish chapter reveals that nation building can be an ugly process that can, as of now, permanently stigmatize a group that goes about it in certain ways. Turks and Turkic peoples have existed for a far longer time than this study examines, but a Turkish state has only existed since 1923 and it came into being via Turks within the dying Ottoman Empire's government conducting genocides against non-Turkish people in Asia Minor to create clear geographical boundaries for their existence. What many do not realize is that these genocides included Greeks as well as Armenians and other ethnic groups in the territory. Greek settlements in Anatolia had existed for thousands of years and were wiped out permanently to facilitate the creation of Turkey. Even after a century, the narrative around this event has persisted and facilitated an inherent other for leaders to target in order to increase a sense of unity within a state and a sense of insecurity within another. What this chapter reveals most significantly however, is that domestic and international institutions, as well as transnational audiences that can see prospects for cooperation beyond a single leader's tenure, can reduce the impact that belligerent rhetoric has on that audience. Further, transnational audiences can marginalize the impact of a leader's belligerent rhetoric rather than simply heightening tensions.

6.3 Speaking to Existing Literature

This dissertation has been an intensive exercise in identifying and engaging in mid-level theorizing and how in that context, this model functions within empirical cases. However, the broader, metatheoretical implications, as well as where more precisely this study fits in that literature, need to be more satisfactorily identified. Moving from general to specific, small to big, first and foremost, this dissertation rests within the bargaining literature within international relations. Further, it bridges a gap and offers a means for reconciling differing paradigmatic epistemologies prevalent in the field. By this I mean rationalism and constructivism, and more

specifically, how constructivist securitization of norms and ideas fits within the rationalist bargaining model. The fit is highly complementary and while what I have addressed throughout this body pays no particular homage to either approach per se, I have pursued an application focused agenda to say in this conclusion that these ideas can complement each other and present a means for deeper understanding of the motivators for bounded rationality and nested games.

More broadly, I have presented a single component of a much broader and more ambitious theoretical agenda. In this dissertation I have discussed transnational audiences, the costs they impose on leaders, and their impact on the international system. However, this is couched within a broader expansion of existing literature on two-level games. I argue throughout this text that this third component represents an intervening variable that expands the two-level game, to warrant expanding our scope and understanding of it in terms of transnational two-level games. Following this logic, as future work continues to build on this model and the foundation of the transnational two-level game, questions of complex interdependence are illuminated. Not necessarily in terms of economic transactions, supply chains, and import-export needs, but more specifically, in terms of the exchange of ideas. What is taking place that domestic constituencies have transnational influence over international relations? The implications here are not “the effect of domestic politics on international relations” or “the effect of international bargaining on domestic politics”. Rather, how do audiences, in a secondary and separate identity from that as a component of the state or state-society relations, affect the international system? What is causing this?

Put concisely, is what we are seeing new? Is this a product of globalization? Or is this something that has always existed that we perhaps did not account for? A case can be made for both. It does not require a citation to observe with consensus that technology is shrinking the

world that we live in. People has access to information globally at almost no cost and that takes place almost, if not exactly, in real time. Entire books by scholars, myself included, have asked whether increased access to information due to advances in technology and communication is changing the way international relations works, leading to an explosion in transnational actors (deLisle, et al. 2016).

So, this leads to the point where perhaps there is an answer to the question, or statement, that Francis Fukuyama proposed with the collapse of the three-world system (Fukuyama, 1992). Is this the end of history and the birth of a liberal international order? The abundance of data in this dissertation is a strong and resounding no. Yes, globalization has altered the way that we conduct international relations. But rather than leading to a cosmopolitan global polity, quite the opposite, it has led to entrenchment, the embrace of illiberal ideals, and authoritarian slippage. *Or* perhaps, that was always there, and the access to technology we have now has not caused anti-Globalization to occur, it has just provided us better access to information that globalization is something no one ever wanted or asked for. Based on that logic, transnationalism in general, and transnational two-level games specifically, is not a product of globalization, rather, it is something that always existed and we simply have the means to identify it now.

I argue the former case to be true, and the expansive body of social constructivism in international relations offers the broad, ontological lens for identifying this phenomenon. Identity is essential to the cohesion of polities, beyond just a rational understanding of agents, and more so about the entire worldview of whole societies, or their ontological security as Mitzen phrases it, has been challenged. Rather than autocrat after autocrat falling to the unstoppable momentum of justice cascades holding leaders accountable, or constituencies harnessing the institutions of humanitarian rights and international law to hold bad leaders accountable, they have done quite

the opposite and rallied around illiberal leaders promising a return to relatively tribal politics, nationalist politics one might say, promising a return to a moment in time where greatness had been achieved that globalization has sullied (Sikkink, 2011; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

The constructivists were right about the broad phenomenon that was occurring in terms of an expanding footprint of international organizations, of transnationalism, of idea and norm sharing, and greater awareness and accountability of leaders as a result of globalization and the resulting norm diffusion. However, what they got wrong was the normative aspect of this phenomenon. Yes, globalization is occurring, yes, it is the catalyst that has activated these previously non-existent transnational actors, but no, this is not leading to a cosmopolitan future, democratization, greater accountability for war criminals, or the *adoption* of diffused liberal norms. My position is reserved and cautious about stating in any certain terms about what is happening. We are in the middle of a transition, but a transition to what is not yet clear. That said, quite the opposite of liberal norm diffusion could be argued and there is an abundance of data, in this document that you have read and in the cases that have not yet been added to this study, that globalization has led to the diffusion of autocratic norms as witnessed with decaying democratic institutions across the entirety of the international system. The United States, China, Brazil, Turkey, Britain, France, Russia, and so on, have all pivoted right and imposed jingoistic restrictions on groups within their borders that are “not us”, engaged in institutionalized nationalist identity boundary policing, and attempted to disenfranchise and strip agency from out groups within territorial borders over the past decade. Globalization has created the environment and circumstances for transnational audiences to rise up, and they have done so without requiring

provocation from the state, to reject *cosmopolitan globalization*, and rather, embraced a tribal reaction to it and rejection of a global shared identity.

6.4 Future Research

As mentioned frequently throughout the dissertation, this preliminary analysis opens the door for a wide range of research agendas. First and foremost, however likely the most ambitious, is to conduct the same analysis with the same empirical chapters again, but with fresh survey data collected on my own, or, to obtain survey data collected by others for the same timeline I used while conducting field work to add local insight into the relationship, structured in a classic case study approach that relies more greatly on primary source data than the current study does. This would be useful for two reasons. First, if the findings are similar or perhaps identify an even stronger correlation, this would further strengthen the validity of this study. Secondly, depending on the variation relative to the method employed in this dissertation, it could validate this alternative method for analyzing cases by demonstrating how comparable the results were relative to a classic fieldwork case study approach.

Second, as this dissertation is transformed into a book manuscript, additional chapters that examine an even more diverse set of dyads should be included. Although mentioned cheekily in the introduction, investigating relationships in South America especially would be interesting insofar as the type of regional nuances it could contribute. Anecdotally, a lot of Brazilians and Argentinians express a strong dislike for one another, and often, football comes up in these conversations, digging deeper into that particular dyad would be useful for expanding the boundaries of the project. Is it just about football between the two or is there something deeper and more significant going on? While my knowledge on Africa is even more limited than on South America, identifying historical rivalries on that continent to study would be interesting.

Finally, given the revelations uncovered in the Greece-Turkey chapter, going back and conducting the Anglo-French study would be interesting insofar as what the results might reveal. This extends the study into two additional avenues for future investigation.

First, would be to expand beyond states and examine dyads of ethnic groups. This could be intrastate, interstate, or both, and look at the variation between dyads in these circumstances. Do we see similar patterns in terms of rivalries and pressure on group leaders between rival ethnic groups? And is there a discernable difference between if the dyad extends beyond state borders or exist completely within a single state? Both offer further opportunities to strengthen the model. Second, is to continue to explore ways to generalize beyond the historical rivalry requirement. Under what *other* circumstances do dyads incur transnational audience costs against one another. Do strategic or resource logics open the door for rhetoric to be costly whereas before it might not have been? For example, if two countries that border each other and generally enjoy genial relations with one another come into a situation where one stumbles upon an increasingly scarce resource that the other is dependent on, does that change the dynamic of the relationship significantly? Do they cooperate as some within IR would argue, or do they compete to secure unilateral control over the resources as others argue? How much does geographical proximity play in this calculus? As is often the case in these types of situations, typically contested territory comes in to play. While not the primary focus of this study, contestation over portions of the East China Sea strain Sino – Japanese relations and contestation over portions of the Aegean Sea, islands within it, as well as Cyprus, play a role in the Greco-Turkish dyad. Focusing on material objects rather than words would also be an interesting direction to go.

Further, plugging a very classic, defensive realist model into this model would be interesting insofar as examining Walt's balance of threat model and testing the resiliency of both

by testing them together. The findings from this dissertation strongly reinforce Walt's thesis on threat perception, however it does so based on words rather than capabilities. On that note, a paper on this model in relation to the classic paradigmatic approaches could be interesting. My work does not ascribe wholly to any one paradigm, and I would argue strongly that the discipline is long past the paradigmatic debates, and most metatheoretical debates in general, at least for the moment. However, does any one theory, realism, neoliberal institutionalism, or constructivism resonate more strongly than the others? What about simplifying the question to rationalist or constructivist understandings of the discipline? Or individualist vs. structuralist epistemologies? These present some potential metatheoretical avenues into future research.

More interesting are the multitude of mid-level theorizing that can be advanced here. Just a few, in addition to those already mentioned, would be to look at what differences if any autocratic vs. democratic leaders use? Nationalist rhetoric as opposed to other types? Perhaps nationalist as opposed to globalist, or cosmopolitan, or a multitude of other concepts that can be considered as a FOIL to nationalism? What role does a country's Polity score play? Do new democracies behave significantly different than old democracies? Does this inform us of anything new about the democratic peace theory? Or what about theories of democratic diversion?

The primary recurring source for saying throughout the dissertation that something should be investigated in future research is based on just how much ground needed to be covered in this initial proposal. Assuming that substantive work can be done that translates into peer-reviewed publications, or the publication of this document once transformed from dissertation to book, would cover a lot of exposition that could be left to a large degree in a citation or reference rather than having to methodically go through every characteristic of concepts, theoretical

linkages, and the histories in cases. Moving forward, the two paths to be covered for certain are 1) expanding case selection and the development of more robust and rigorous cases, and 2) putting together a proposal for funding and resources to conduct survey work and/or a strong discourse analysis. Regardless though, the one certainty moving forward is that the feedback provided for this document, in combination with the first proposal of a transformation into book form with more cases, and more rigorously structured cases will be incorporated into the next step for this body of work. In addition to that, a more extensive examination of expanding the transnational logic to the two-level game will be incorporated into the book manuscript version. That will likely also be submitted in an article form as well. Following that, as mentioned, there are numerous avenues of future research to explore.

The overall macrolevel takeaway from this document is that we are in the midst of a paradigmatic shift in the structure of the international system. The role of the state as the singular sovereign has been diminished and transnational actors from corporations, to organizations, and to domestic constituencies have a permanent seat at the bargaining table. This work has only examined one component of transnational two-level games that has created a framework for identifying other actors, how they fit into the power dynamic, and what their implications for the international system as a whole might be.

6.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, in this dissertation I proposed that scholars of IR and social science generally should think about audiences/selectorates in an agential sense moving forward. Further, there is a typology of audiences. Within this is a third category. In addition to domestic and foreign audiences, there are transnational audiences that play a role in the two-level game. The process I used to identify the presence of transnational audiences and their impact on both

dyadic foreign policy as well as the international system as a whole, was by examining the threat perception of transnational audiences, measured by their cost or constraining role on the policy position of their state, as the dependent variable of my study with belligerent rhetoric by leaders in the rival state being the independent variable. I have developed a novel method still being refined to operationalize audience costs. In my empirical chapters I approached each case in a slightly different way to explore different ways to operationalize, or, take into consideration additional characteristics, such as regime type. In this stage of model development, I did not explicitly identify and operationalize conditioning or contextual variables. However, the variation between approaches suggests incorporating additional conditions or context into the model might lend itself to more precise findings in the future. With this, I have highlighted the next task for bringing this framework to the social science community and how I will advance this scholarship moving forward.

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