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ANALYZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO POST COLD WAR

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A THESIS

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes NATO's evolution from a neorealist military alliance into a constructivist co-operative security organization and argues that it was this evolution that best explains NATO's persistence in the post-Cold War era. In light of the end of the Cold War, a litany of experts predicted the eventual demise of NATO. This did not play out in reality as NATO withstood the predictions of its expiration. The central argument of this thesis is that NATO has persisted in the post-Cold War era because it was transformed from a neorealist military alliance into a constructivist security co-operation organization built on the liberal values, norms and collective identity that its member states share. In this thesis, a constructivist approach is employed to analyze NATO's persistence, as it is the best theoretical approach to doing so. This thesis also employs a case study method to analyze NATO's transformation, persistence, effectiveness and the threats to its cohesion going forward. A strong emphasis is made on the constructivist approach to obtain the goals of the thesis.

Dedication

To my beautiful wife, Olivia Kalango.

Acknowledgement

This thesis has been a product of countless hours of research, and long nights. I could not be more grateful for my wife, Olivia Kalango who has been patient through those long days and nights devoted to making this thesis. I love you and you deserve my inestimable gratitude.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction

NATO was formed to act as a formidable fortification against the advancing interests of the Soviet Union in Europe. From its inception in 1949 to the end of the Cold War in 1991, it towered as the strong rampart against the expansionist Soviet bloc that sought to increase their sphere of influence around Europe and the wider world. In light of the end of the Cold War a litany of experts predicted the end of NATO. The alliance did not disintegrate like its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact. It survived and has persisted until today. The question my thesis seeks to answer is why has the alliance survived in the Post-Cold War Era?

NATO has persisted because it shifted its emphasis on collective defense security to a commitment to its constructivist identity, as a security co-operative organization, built on the liberal values, norms and collective identity that its member states share. In this thesis, a constructivist approach is employed to analyze NATO's persistence as it is the best theoretical approach to doing so.

Before the end of the Cold War, NATO would have been open to admitting states like Spain which were not democracies but however were in opposition to the Soviet threat. That was largely because the military alliance at the time had one raison d'etre - be a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. This has not been the case after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. More than ever, NATO has reaffirmed its identity as a western liberal bloc that places great emphasis on liberal democratic norms and values such as human rights, civil liberties, political freedom and the rule of law.

Although collective defense remains a core feature for the trans-Atlantic military alliance, its post-Cold-War military actions show that rather being an embankment against a defined security threat, it has metamorphosed into a guarantor of political stability within any realm that

identity that its member states share. I also offer the methodology employed in the thesis to confirm the assertion of the thesis. A literature review is also provided to give an overview of the scholarly sources used to build the thesis. The second chapter is an exposition on alliance theory and the theories that help explain the persistence of NATO in the Post-Cold War era. Different theories of international relations like realism, liberalism, institutionalism and constructivism are explored and analysis of how they fit in with the subject of NATO is done. In the third chapter, I offer a detailed history of the birth of NATO as that helps explain how a single cause helped define its mission and how that all changed after the elimination of the Soviet threat.

The fourth chapter broaches the topic of NATO's transformation from a neo realist collective defense alliance into a Western constructivist security organization. In the fifth chapter, I elucidate on NATO's persistence and the different theoretical perspectives that try to explain that persistence. In the sixth chapter, I employ a case study of NATO's operations in the Balkans to analyze how NATO was effective in its operations after the end of the Cold War. In the seventh chapter, I employ a case study on Turkey, a NATO member that has experienced a rocky relationship with its fellow NATO members and use the case to analyze cohesion in the alliance and how that will affect the long-term relevance of the alliance. Finally, the eight chapter concludes the thesis with findings, recommendations and a summary of the work done.

Methodology

This thesis employs the case study method to try to examine the persistence of NATO's resilience in the post-Cold War Era. A wide variety of sources were quoted to build this into a finished project. These ranged from books to scholarly journals, to newspaper articles, and to international relations magazine articles. This thesis examined the theoretical basis of NATO as an alliance, its transformation, and its persistence in the era after the dissolution of the Soviet

its member states consider the act of securitization. In this thesis I intend to show how NATO's post-Cold War military actions back up this assertion. A large focus of this research is centered on NATO's military actions in Bosnia as it was NATO's first test as an organization after the end of the Cold War. Bosnia was the location of many firsts in NATO's history. It was the first time NATO ever engaged in combat operations since its inception. It also represented the first time NATO went 'out of area', a move that although it was done grudgingly saved the reputation and identity of the alliance.

Some constructivists argue that Cold War NATO was not a military alliance, but rather a security community of liberal democracies that shared a common identity forged by their commitment to democratic norms. I do not believe that such an argument holds up under any inspection. The history of NATO and its foundations as detailed in this thesis shuts down such an assertion completely. I assert, however, that Cold War NATO was a military alliance made up of mostly democratic nations who shared a common identity and that the common identity they shared during the Cold War endured into the Post-Cold War Era. Even though the threat they faced together as a military alliance was gone, the bond and identity that they shared kept them together.

NATO evolved into a co-operative security organization by changing its military structural design and its mission as an organization. Rather than an alliance with a front foot defense, the former Cold War alliance became a security actor, both in the political, and military affairs of Europe. NATO's transformation was not instant. The 1991 Strategic Concept that guided the organization until 1999 when a new one was introduced still emphasized the possibility of a resurgent Soviet threat. By the end of the 1990's and with extensive military operations in the Balkans during that decade, it had become crystal clear that the Soviet threat

was no more. The organization did not have to seek for a purpose that would hold it together as institutionalists believe. NATO found a purpose in its identity, as a western group of trans-Atlantic nations bound by liberal democratic norms and values.

This transformation best explains the resilience and persistence of an organization many predicted would atrophy and go extinct. NATO has not only survived. It has thrived, expanded and carried out operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and the Gulf of Aden. How do these operations reconcile with the constructivist view? NATO as a security organization responded militarily in its post-Cold War operations to events that NATO deemed as threats to the norms established within the international system or by the domestic population. These threats include territorial violations as seen in Kosovo, humanitarian disasters as seen in Bosnia and Libya, and terrorism as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. The constructivist view espoused in this thesis contends that rather being driven by state interests as neorealists assert, these operations were driven by accepted international rules, values and norms. Within constructivism, there is an urge for action based on the socially constructed norms and values in the international system. This urge to act is therefore what resulted in the operations that NATO undertook. This paper therefore suggests that NATO's operations in the post-Cold War era align with the constructivist expectations of a co-operative security organization like NATO. This thesis aims to be a significant addition to the theoretical and constructivist literature that currently exists within the field of International Relations.

To further advance my argument, this thesis is divided into eight chapters. In this first chapter, I offer an introduction to the pivotal argument, which my thesis hangs on, which is that NATO has persisted because it was transformed from a neorealist military alliance into a constructivist security co-operative organization built on the liberal values, norms and collective

Union. This thesis critically details and analyzes the history of the birth of NATO and some of

the operations conducted by the alliance in the post-Cold War era, specifically the Balkan

operations. The case study method was employed because it offers the best chance at perusing

how NATO's post-Cold War operations defined its identity and resilience in the Post-Cold War

Era. Also, I used the tenuous relationship that a member country (Turkey) has with other

members of the alliance to explore internal cohesion within the alliance. Furthermore, this thesis

employs a constructivist approach to dissect the resilience of NATO. The result ascertained from

this research is that NATO persisted in the period after the Cold War because it was transformed

from a neorealist military alliance into a constructivist co-operative security organization which

acted based on its liberal democratic identity.

Literature Review

On the subject of alliance theory which is composed of alliance formation, alliance

maintenance and alliance dissolution, there had been a dearth of relevant literature until recently.

Only a few scholars stood out and for that reason they became thought leaders on the subject in

the world of international relations. These leaders and literature authors include Hans

Morgenthau who is seen as the modern leading figure on the subject of realism in international

relations. He is widely referenced and his works are the subject of constant analysis in

contemporary international relations theorist circles. His book called the *Politics Among Nations*

is a classic that has stood the test of time and is revered in eminent fashion in political

academics.

Another thought leader in alliance theories is Kenneth Waltz. Waltz is indeed another

highly revered colossus in the international relations field and his book called the T*heory of*

International Politics is a gem for understanding the theory of alliances and statecraft. Waltz is known as one of the eminent leaders of neorealism or structural realism. Waltz and Morgenthau are highly referenced in my work and essentially so since for one to be cognizant of NATO, one has to understand realism at its finest.

Another leading scholar or thought leader in the field of realism as connected to world order and alliances is George Liska. Through his groundbreaking books like *Expanding Realism, International Equilibrium*, and *Nations in Alliance*, Liska made his name on international alliance theories. Petr Kratchrovil states that "by exploring the work of George Liska, the once influential yet today almost forgotten realist scholar, that we can find answers to the question of the compatibility between classical realism and its purported neoclassical offspring" (Kratochvil 2007, 1). Although Liska may seem to not be as revered as other realists like Morgenthau and Waltz, he is a leader in the idea that realism has a normative side to it that requires some sort of idealistic component. This idealistic component of modern-day realism is one concept that Morgenthau does not subscribe to in his expose on realism. Kratochvil (2007, 2) goes on to assert that "Liska came to be one of the first realist scholars to try to develop a theory combining historicism and a structural approach to international relations."

George Snyder's works in the field of international relations are also a treasure for the study of alliances. In his own words, Glenn Snyder says this of his book called *Alliance Politics*. "This book attempts to fill the alliance theory void by deductive reasoning from certain essentials of the international system, by borrowing from several social science theories, and by empirical generalization from international history" (Snyder 1997, 3)

Robert Keohane was a giant leader in the liberalist tradition. Although he was largely neoliberal and neorealist in his early thoughts, he challenged constructivists "to produce more empirical research. Keohane argued that the future survival and success of constructivism would depend on its ability to explain real life phenomena" (Sinclair 2010). Vendulka Kubalkova is one also notable constructivist who answered Keohane's call to empirical constructivism. Her book called I*nternational Relations in a Constructed World* expands on how the relatively new constructivist theory can help explain major issues in international relations.

There also exists a plethora of information on the history of NATO from its beginnings to the current day. Lawrence Kaplan's book called *NATO 1948: The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance* is a valuable guide to the birth and founding years of NATO. Kaplan dissects the original hopes the founding states of the alliance had for it. He weaves through the intense and complex negotiations that the United States and its European partners conducted to get to the signing of the treaty. Literature like that of Kaplan was necessary for this paper as one has to understand the historical intentions of an alliance to fully grasp its function in the contemporary world. The official government sources also provide a detailed and comprehensive history of U.S relations with NATO and the European community. Although these sources are trusted and contain well documented information, they seem to have a favorable bias to U.S actions within the history of NATO.

On the subject of NATO's persistence, there is a trove of literature out there. However there seems not to be adequate literature on how effective NATO was in the immediate Post-Cold War era with regards to the Strategic Concepts of the alliance. This is the reason why this thesis is important. It will fill this gap in both NATO and alliance literature in the field of international relations. There is sufficient use of NATO documentation throughout this chapter

of the thesis as this is necessary to properly analyze how NATO's strategic concepts evolved and how the alliance adapted to these changes.

The chapter called *NATO in the Balkans* forms the core of this thesis. Although it starts out with a lot of history, first the history of the crisis in Yugoslavia and a history of NATO's role in bringing the conflicts to an end, it also offers an analysis of NATO's actions and the result thereof. The literature that the building blocks were adequate. On the subject of Turkey and its tenuous relationship with other alliance members, I mostly employ newspaper articles that report on the dealings between both parties. These were adequate and contained rich information to the workings of this relationship depending on the angle the news stories were covered.

Chapter 2: Alliance Theory and NATO

In order to analyze how NATO has been effective in any era, and based on this paper specifically; the Post-Cold War Era, a scholar has to employ alliance theory. George Liska (1968, 3) said "It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name." Alliance theory is very essential to the field of international relations as alliances have borne the most consequential decisions in the last 150 years. World War I was a war of massive alliances going against each other. The Central Powers were mainly composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. On the other SIDE were the Allies or the Entente composed of France, Britain, Russia, Italy, Japan and the United States. Russia left the alliance after the Bolshevik Revolution and the United States entered the war in 1917. In World War II, Germany allied with Japan and Tokyo in a tripartite alliance that would be known as the Axis.

Alliance diplomacy which is the relational politics of alliances has been a core element of international affairs for as long as nation states have existed. The formation of political alliances, whether they be military or cultural or economic, is an indispensable element of statecraft. The concept of alliance diplomacy is certainly very integral to any discussion of NATO.

I do not intend to review all of alliance literature in this chapter; I only seek to make brief expositions on alliance theories and especially those pertinent to NATO's persistence and effectiveness. A proper understanding of alliance theory will help us to decipher why certain alliances last the test of time and why others disintegrate. The alliance discussed in this work is NATO, an alliance that has certainly stood the test of time. As a military alliance it has been the most long standing of its magnitude in history. As we seek to analyze its persistence and relevance to contemporary times, the knowledge of alliance theory will serve our quest to peruse

the collective security alliance. This chapter will broach the subject of alliance formation, alliance maintenance and behavior, and the theories that seek to explain these concepts. To properly analyze the effectiveness and relevance of NATO in the 21st century, these theories and concepts will be employed. The first section of this chapter will dive into what alliance theory is and the various definitions of alliances. From that point on this chapter will explain why alliances are formed and the benefits they bring to the states that are part of them. Then, NATO as an alliance and a security organization will be briefly discussed. Then this chapter will explore certain international relations theories like realism and constructivism and how they help interpret alliances. Theories like the institutional theory and organizational theory will also be analyzed.

Definition of Alliances

Stephen Walt (1990, 12) defines an alliance as "an alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states." He explains that the reason for such a broad definition of alliances is that it serves a purpose of utility to do so. He outlines his reasons for doing so by saying: "First, many contemporary states are reluctant to sign formal treaties with their allies. To limit my analysis to formal alliances would omit a large number of important cases. Second, precise distinctions-for example, between formal and informal alliances-would probably distort more than they would reveal. There has never been a formal treaty of alliance between the United States and Israel, but no one would question the level of commitment between these two states" (Walt 1990, 12).

For Arnold Wolfer (1968, 268) an alliance is "a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states." International relations expert, Glenn Snyder (1997, 4) in his book, *Alliance Politics,* defines alliances in this manner: "Alliances are formal associations of

states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership." He went on to emphasize that "their primary function is to pool military strength against a common enemy, not to protect alliance members from each other" (Snyder 1997, 4). Another notable line from Snyder on the subject of alliances that deals directly with NATO is that alliances are "for meeting an external threat more effectively than could be done by their members individually. Alliances, of course, usually reduce conflict among their members, but that is a by-product" (Snyder 1997, 4). Based on Snyder's assertions here, this paper will later address internal threats to the standing of the NATO alliance. One of such is Turkey's recent aggressive postures around the Mediterranean even against some of its NATO allies. A question we will seek to answer is that based on Snyder's working theory here, can we deduce that the possibility of other NATO allies altercating with Turkey has been reduced since Turkey is a part of NATO?

Benefits of an alliance

Theories that indicate the benefits of an alliance like NATO show that alliances reduce the chances of conflict between nations bound in an alliance. Todd Sandler (1999, 728) writes in his piece titled *Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core* that "For the Cyprus dispute, the membership of Greece and Turkey in both NATO and the United Nations provided a mechanism for ending the hostilities and separating the forces. Except for the Cyprus incident, NATO has included friendly nations sharing democratic values, economic interests, and membership in a nexus of international organizations (e.g., the European Union, Partnership for Peace, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe." Jeremy Pressman (2011, 4) said "Alliances facilitate the exchange of information, allow for closer monitoring, and create channels for issue linkage and side payments."

Why do Nation States Build Alliances?

Hans Morgenthau (1973, 182) answers this by saying: "An alliance brings precision, especially in the form of limitation, to an existing community of interests and to the general policies and concrete measures serving them." In saying this, Morgenthau was saying an alliance brings teeth to shared interests between countries and enforcement alongside it.

Chase Sung Chun (2000, 72) answers the question of this subsection by saying: "A state, for its national security, can decide either to independently build arms (internal balancing) or to create a formal alliance. Each option has relative benefits and costs. Based on a rational calculation directed towards the most-effective alternative, a state determines the best option."

For John Mearsheimer (2001), the weaker states generally forge alliances to balance power and the stronger states sometimes form alliances to increase their share of world power. Alliances work mostly as a win-win most of the time as the participants get to benefit and further their own interests, whatever that might be. So as Mearsheimer asserted, for the smaller country it might be that it gets to obtain a balance of power in a region thereby protecting itself and for a bigger state it may be that its power and influence on a global stage is accentuated. In both cases benefits are created for the other partner.

Theories of Alliances

Realism

Realism has an extensive and illustrious history. Even though the academic field of international relations was not established until the 20th century, highly acclaimed writers like Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes referenced this idea in their works. The

concept of realism within international relations is one that sees the world in an anarchic fashion where different states constantly jostle for power to preserve their own individual interests. For the political realist, interest is the modicum of power. A realist sees international politics as a game where nation states constantly make decisions that solely benefit or strengthen their own self-interests as opposed to a certain philosophical ideal or set of standards. Hence the driver of politics here is the national interest of a state rather than a political ideology or sympathy. Realism sees the world as an ungoverned sphere in which the interests of individual nations bring about the construct seen in reality.

Realism has evolved over the years into different forms and varieties. Although they are not all deeply linked to our topic, these are the six forms of realism as defined by the international relations community. The first is classical realism, the second neorealism, the third rise and fall realism, the fourth defensive structural realism, the fifth offensive structural realism, and the last being neoclassical realism. The reason for the various offshoots of realism is because realism has the capacity of openness, to change and be adaptable. For the purpose of this paper, we will only be employing classical realism and neorealism.

Classical Realism

Hans Morgenthau is widely seen as the modern father of realism. His book, *Politics Among Nations,* gives a comprehensive exposition on the concept of political realism and his writings have been a guide for all the realist writers that have come after him. Morgenthau is the quintessential classical realist. In *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau (1973, 5) declares that the major premise of realism is a nation-state's interest in stating that: "A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other popular fallacy of equating the foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies, and of deducing the former from the

latter." Morgenthau (1973, 8) further argued that "Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait." Lastly classical realists believe that states are in a constant state of struggle for increased capabilities and that this struggle is a result of the flawed nature of man who is selfish (Williams 2013). If this sounds a little Hobbesian, it is because it is an Hobbesian thought. After Morgenthau, a new school of realist writers in the latter part of the 20th century emerged and these realists were called neorealists.

Neorealism

Kenneth Waltz with his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics* became the thought leader in the school of realism. Kenneth Waltz modernized and built on Morgenthau's ideas. While Morgenthau had assumed that leaders of states were driven by their selfish desires which brought about anarchy, Waltz suggests that there is a system in play which brings about the anarchic results seen on the international stage. Neorealism which is also known as structural realism rather than looking at a flawed human nature as the source of the struggles between states argues that there is a structure already out there that demands states to constantly measure their actions based on the capabilities of other states within that system. For neo-realists like Waltz, the structure or international system determines how states act in response to the capabilities of other states. Other thought leaders in the field include Stephen Walt who will be referred to later on.

Liberalism

The concept of liberalism within international relations can be traced back to the 18th century enlightenment philosopher called Immanuel Kant. The concept of republicanism is very central to Kant's theory of liberalism. For Kant, the perfect state was a republican state. To him a

republican state was not one where the majority simply ruled. A monarchy could be a republican state. A republican state was one that had a government built on law and one with the separation of powers to ensure that the law is justly executed.

Liberalism looks at the world not as it is but as it should be: an aspiration of sorts. This explains why Kant's essay called *Perpetual Peace* reads more like a document of aspiration that society should try to live up to rather than an analysis of the current structures on the international stage. Thus, liberalism is an idealistic theory as compared to the earlier discussed theory of realism. Liberalism speaks to the idea of people sharing common republican values that will make them less likely to engage in conflict to settle disputes. For Kant, the more republican a state is, the less likely it is to go to war. Republican societies therefore will likely seek other avenues to garner a solution first before the war option is employed. This idea when placed within the context of republican states has proved to be truer than not, but it is no certainty. Bosnia and Kosovo were republican states but the ethnic tension present in the region was stronger than the fear of going to war. To be fair to Kant, he did argue that being republican was not sufficient to world peace: "The situation of international relations, its lawless condition, unstable power balances and especially the ever-present possibility of war endangered the republican state and made it difficult for liberal political orders to maintain their republican or liberal condition" (Williams 2013, 33). Kant did not want the wings of liberalism to rest at the nation-state level. He wanted such order at the international stage. For Kant, the motive for alliances should be republican states contending to create and maintain law regulated international relations (Williams 2013, 34).

Institutionalism

In response to realist assertions that in the absence of a former unifying threat, an alliance such as NATO would crumble, a new school of thought emerged. This theory would argue that a threat is not all that holds an alliance together, and that the institutional characteristics of an alliance can maintain such an alliance even in the absence of a common unifying threat. This theory is called institutionalist theory of alliances. With the creation and maintenance of any significant modern-day alliance comes a bureaucratic institution that consists of a staff, offices, and a financial budget for the day to day operations that keeps the alliance ticking.

With NATO, which is the alliance of focus, there is a Secretary General who presides over a sizable number of staff to keep the wheels of the alliance alive. In Brussels, there exists a NATO headquarters with thousands of staff to keep the alliance running. The people who staff these organizations consider the work they do their passion but also their livelihood and so that means by human nature they would be keen to self-preserve the institution that keeps bread on their table. As Stephen Walt asserts, they also possess a certain degree of autonomy and will strive to preserve that (Walt 1987).

Robert McCalla talks about this desire by actors within an alliance to strive to maintain the structure of the institution even if the main agenda of the alliance is gone. He says "a core proposition of the institutionalist literature is that regimes bring benefits to their members that can outlast their original purpose. Institutionalism explains the functional use of institutional cooperation for the benefits of state and sub state actors…….. The international institutionalist perspective looks at the interaction of NATO's organizational interests and its members' interests" (McCalla 1996, 463). Since the organizational setup of an alliance like NATO existed even after the end of the Cold War, an institutional theorist would have predicted that NATO

was going to survive because the people who made up the bureaucracy were not going to let it fail.

Institutionalists assert that international institutions matter, not just the intentions of member states of the institutions. Realists disagree and argue that only the interests of member states matter. Also, institutionalist theorists suggest that even after the dissipation of the threat to an alliance, the alliance is likely to carry on because member states could use the logistical and bureaucratic setup to counter future security threats that may not have been apparent at the disappearance of the threat that held the alliance together. This notion is proven true at the end of the Cold War. Even though the Soviet threat had disappeared in 1991, NATO remained a formidable alliance long enough to respond to a new security challenge which was going to be the war in Bosnia. By 1994, NATO had started getting involved in the Bosnian conflict and its organizational setup which had been preserved since 1991 was available to deal with another security issue. NATO's bureaucracy needed to adapt to respond to the new mission and challenges in front of them but there was no dissolution of the institution.

Constructivism

Social constructivism did not begin as a theory of international relations. It has its origins in the social studies field and in the past few decades made its way into the field of international relations. It gained notoriety in international relations because it could answer certain questions that classical theories of international relations like realism and its idealistic counterpart, liberalism could not adequately answer. One such question is how was NATO able to survive after the elimination of the Soviet threat and why it expanded its membership to other European states. Due to this adequacy, the constructivist approach forms the theoretical framework of this

thesis. Paul D. Williams (2013, 75) posits that "Within International Relations, constructivism is often more readily associated with the development of norms for global governance and the role of ideational factors in world politics generally than with the militarized power politics that characterizes realist accounts of global security in global politics." As Ted Hopf (1998, 172) suggests "Constructivism offers alternative understandings of a number of the central themes in international relations theory, including: the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world politics."

So, what then is constructivism within international relations? Keeping in mind that a widely varied definition of constructivism "waters down the analytic utility of concepts by including too much within the definition" (Barkin 2010, 14), this thesis will limit the definitions of constructivism employed in this thesis. Buse Kekin (2020, par. 1) writes that "Constructivism argues that identities are "collective meanings" that determine state interests and actions. This perspective holds the idea that "institutionalism is a cognitive process" of internalizing state identities and interests. As these identities and interests may trigger conflict in the international arena, shared values may, most likely, motivate states to act together" (Kekin 2020, par. 1). Within constructivism is this idea that elements within the international stage like security and interests are social constructions. Unlike realism and liberalism that place more emphasis on concepts like power, interests and trade, constructivism places greater emphasis on ideas.

For constructivists humans are social beings and so therefore social interactions are what create our identities as people. Constructivism places great importance on the process of socialization. Nicholas Onuf was the first to extensively address the idea of constructivism in his book, *World of our Making* in 1989. Since then other constructivist scholars have built on the

theory and its implications for international politics. Kubalkova (1998, 59) asserts that, "people make society, and society makes people." This socialization results in our political realities being shaped by our perception of the world (Pedersen 2011). By making ideas a central feature of the tradition, constructivists do not entirely dismiss neoliberal notions of power and interests however they believe that those notions gain their meaning, and importance in the context of ideas that they are made of (Tsereteli 2018). Hopf (1998, 200) argues that "In effect, the promise of constructivism is to restore a kind of partial order and predictability to world politics that derives not from imposed homogeneity, but from an appreciation of difference." To build a further understanding of constructivism, I will delineate on two concepts that are crucial to constructivism in the international relations stage and how constructivists view these notions. These concepts are identity and norms.

Identity

Central to the theory of constructivism is this idea of identity. A state's identity is a great indicator of its proclivities and its ensuing actions. As Hopf (1998, 175) asserts, "A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice." Constructivists believe that "interests are the product of identity, and that having an identity implies a particular set of interests" (Ratti 2009, 407).

Constructivists assert that the identities of actors in the international stage helps us to understand their interests and behaviors. Identities therefore reveal how international actors will behave and what their likely actions will be since their identity dictates the aforementioned actions and behaviors. Ted Hopf (1998, 175) describes it like this: "in telling you who you are,

identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains and with respect to particular actors."

This identity for constructivists can be seen in the cooperation between countries that results in organizations like NATO. Whereas realists see interests of states as the driving factor for co-operation between states, constructivists see identity as the driving factor. This identity therefore between democratic states results in co-operative institutions being formed and maintained.

What identity does NATO as a community share? After the fall of the Soviet Union, the member states of the alliance sought to rebrand themselves into a community that would stand as the guarantors of Western civilization (Kitchen 2009). Theorists like Michael Williams assert that this was the case since NATO decided to include culture as a central piece of security. Security for NATO was no longer restricted to the defense of physical and territorial borders but an assurance that democratic norms be upheld within and around member states.
For constructivists like Thomas Risse, the identity of NATO's member states as liberal democratic entities allowed these nations to form institutions like NATO and the EU which reflected their norms (Kappen 1996). Although some constructivists extend a full constructivist view of NATO to its birth, metamorphosis and enlargement. I think constructivism only best explains NATO's persistence and enlargement after the end of the Cold War.

Norms

Another notion central to the constructivist tradition is that of norms. Frank Schimmelfennig (2003, 71), another leading constructivist defines norms as "an idea that defines a collective standard of proper behaviour of actors as well as the appropriate means of action."
Constructivists believe that community security co-operations like NATO encompass the norms

that reflect their member states. These norms act as a guide as to what is right and wrong within the international system and that member states are thus influenced by these commonly accepted norms. Mark Webber (2009, 20) argues that in the case of NATO, norms of this type are seen as an outgrowth of the democratic character of NATO's members.

Gunther Hellmann in his article called A *Brief Look at the Recent History of NATO's Future,* writes about how certain shared norms between alliance member states form the heart and soul of NATO. He states that NATO is "an expression of an underlying community of shared values among liberal democracies built on mutual sympathy, trust, and consideration and expressed in institutions which externalize the internal norms of democracies. NATO's charter is more than merely an instrumental system of rules. The norms contained in it tell states what they are supposed to do, but what they are supposed to wish. Taken together these norms and values constitute the collective identity of a security community among democracies" (Hellmann 2006, 16). That sense of community Hellmann speaks of emerges from the norms and mutual identity these nations share. On the subject of how this connects to security, Veronica M. Kitchen (2009,1) argues that "the Atlantic community shares more than just dependable expectations of peaceful change. It also shares a reflexive political community within which the members see their security as intertwined and have a sense that their community is worth preserving in and of itself."

Alliance Formation and Maintenance

Kenneth Waltz (1979, 166) writes that: "In the quest for security, alliances may have to be made. Once made they have to be managed." To analyze and understand the formation, maintenance and behavior of alliances, we can employ international relations theories like neorealism, constructivism, and liberalism; some of which we have already explained above.

Realist/Neorealist perspective on Alliance Formation and Maintenance

The realist school of international relations has been known to be the best perspective to analyze and understand the formation and maintenance of alliances (mainly alliance formation). Kenneth Waltz, a neorealist thought leader postulates that "Alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common. The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states" (Waltz 1979, 166). The assertion by Waltz in the preceding statement about the formation of alliances accurately describes how NATO was formed. The nations that came together to form NATO were not initially uniform in ideology; however, they shared certain values that were common with each other and enough to distinguish themselves from a common enemy. In fact, just looking back just a little, although the Soviet Union and the Western allies in World War II were divergent on various ideologies, their common distaste and abhorence of Nazi Germany allowed these nations to come together in alliance. They all saw Nazi Germany as a country with ambitions to conquer their lands (France, Soviet Union and Britain). That was enough to foment an alliance against a common enemy.

Morgenthau argues that alliances are created and maintained due to the absolute necessity of it rather than the convenience of it. He states that, "Whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances, is then a matter not of principle but of expediency" (Morgenthau 1973, 183). In other words, he was saying that nations that join alliances don't just join it for the fun and prestige of it, but rather the necessity of joining it. The assertions of Morgenthau and Waltz hold true when it comes to NATO. The European nations who joined the alliance did so in order to halt Soviet aggression. NATO, therefore, was an alliance of collective defense and still is, although this portfolio has increased to include collective security and collective interests.

Although the above stated assertions of both theorists have held through, not all of their assertions about alliances have stood the test of time. The assertions of Morgenthau and Waltz on alliance maintenance can be challenged. Morgenthau (1973, 185) had said that: "There exists a correlation between the permanency of an alliance and the limited character of the interests it serves; for only such a specific, limited interest is likely to last long enough to provide the foundation for a durable alliance." If this was true, NATO would not have lasted as long as it has done so far, because the limited interest the trans-Atlantic alliance had before 1991 was to keep the Soviets out. Since 1991, however, NATO's interests have not been limited. Realists like Glenn Snyder (1997, 192) have postulated that "alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response." Since the end of the Cold War, the alliance has not only survived, but it has expanded and thrived. Realists predicted that NATO would suffer an eventual demise after the end of the Cold War. This has certainly turned out to not be the case. Kenneth Waltz, however, answers institutionalist critics of realists who indicate that the dire predictions of the realists concerning NATO didn't come true in saying:

> One of the charges hurled at realist theory is that it depreciates the importance of institutions. The charge is justified, and the strange case of NATO's (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's) outliving its purpose shows why realists believe that international institutions are shaped and limited by the states that found and sustained them and have little independent effect. Liberal institutionalists paid scant attention to organizations designed to buttress the security of states until, contrary to expectations inferred from realist theories, NATO not only survived the end of the Cold War but went on to add new members and to promise to embrace still more. Far from invalidating realist theory or casting doubt on it, however, the recent history of NATO illustrates the subordination of international institutions to national purposes. (Waltz 2000, 18)

Neorealism and Alliance Cohesion/Disintegration

As seen above, neo-realists believe in the anarchic international system, where states come together to form an alliance based on a common interest which could be an enemy more likely than not. This of course would result in such an alliance being a defensive alliance like NATO was against the Soviets. The formation, behavior, and actions of NATO during the Cold War largely supported the assertions of this theory. For example, cohesion within the alliance was always at its highest whenever the Soviet threat was more pronounced. Although the assertions of neorealists as stated above were the case during the Cold War, they have not always been the case after it. Neorealists predict the doom of any major alliance after the disappearance of its major threat. One such theoretical example is given thus:

> according to neorealists a reduction of the threat faced by an alliance leads to its disintegration for two reasons: it affects the trade-off between security and independence and it makes cooperation among allies more difficult. A declining threat diminishes the utility of alliance membership because it reduces the dependence on the protection expected from one's partners. Accordingly, a declining threat diminishes also the willingness of members to accept the constraints on their freedom of action which membership entails. States are less inclined to commit themselves to their partners' defense and less prepared to accept their partners' preferences in coordinating foreign policies, military strategies, and force planning. (Hellmann and Wolf 1993)

Balance of Power Theory

This theory posits that "states form alliances to balance the power of other states, especially when they are unable to balance power through their individual efforts or when the costs of such internal balancing exceed those of alliance membership" (Williams 2013, 344). Glenn Snyder (1997, 17) on the theory of balance of power said "If any state or alliance becomes dangerously powerful or expansionist, others will mobilize countervailing power through arms or

alliances. Even when there is no 'great disturber,' states will ally to improve their security, and the system tends to divide into two opposing camps." This theory is a realist theory that looks at the world stage and sees states constantly trying to shore up their positions to deter much bigger powers or alliances from feeding unjustly off them. To preserve what they have, these states will join up with others of similar ilk, whether in ideology, values, or size. In connecting a cord between alliances and balance of power theory, Hans Morgenthau (1973, 78) said "Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple state system."

Balance of Threat Theory

Although the balance of power theory helped explain certain phenomena associated with the formation and maintenance of alliances, it didn't answer every question asked. The holes it could not fill led to the development of a more complete version of it called balance of threat theory. The champion of this theory was Stephen Walt. For Walt, power was not the only variable that caused states to ally together. Walt believed that the commonality of threats faced by certain nations caused them to form alliances. For Walt, the factors that determine how much of a threat one state is to another are its aggregate power, geographical proximity, its offensive capabilities, and the aggressiveness of its intentions (Walt 1985).

Walt's balance of threat theory was not only applicable to the formation of alliances. It was applicable to the maintenance or durability of an alliance. Just like balance of power theorists argue, balance of threat theorists argues that the frittering away of a common threat that an alliance faces will result in the decline of that alliance. In other words, the decline in the threat's offensive capability and a moderation of the threat's intention can result in the decline of the alliance that came together to counter the aforementioned sources of threat.

Chapter 3: History of NATO

One may ask what the comprehensive and detailed history of NATO has to do with understanding NATO's effectiveness today. NATO was created as an alliance with a singularity of purpose. Its sole purpose or raison d'être was to be a bulwark against Soviet expansionism after World War II. For over four decades, deterrence against the Soviet threat was the central goal of the alliance. After the end of the cold war, this purpose disappeared. NATO was not going to be just a neorealist military alliance. It was going to become a co-operative security organization with a western democratic identity. Through its operations, it was going to be an agent for global political stability. To properly analyze this transition and how the alliance has defined itself in this era, I had to give a detailed account of what originally drove the alliance.

Tensions Are Born

After six bloody years of fighting, the guns in Europe fell silent on May 8, 1945. The brutal war that started with the Nazi invasion of Poland had come to an end on the European front. Although it would take until September of that year before Japan would officially surrender to the Allies, it was only a matter of time before the war would come to a complete halt. World War II had been the largest and most deadly war the world had ever seen. The war had caused over 75 million people to lose their lives, and the devastation in Europe from the war was enormous. Europe laid shattered and in the midst of the ruins, the Allies stood victorious.

The Allies that had become a victorious alliance was composed mainly of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union had allied with the United States and western European nations like Britain and France to stop the Nazis in the world's biggest war ever, there remained tensions within the alliance. These tensions were always bound to intensify. The West (U.S and Britain) saw the world with a totally

different lens as compared to the Soviets. The Americans were preachers of liberty and economic freedom. The Soviets held a communist ideology which put them at odds with the Americans who detested the idea of communism and saw it as the sister ideology of Nazi and fascist totalitarianism. The then Senator Harry Truman (D-MO), in an utterance to the media on June 22, 1941, said "If we see that Germany is winning the war, we ought to help Russia; and if that Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible" (Whitman 1972, par. 35). This was before the U.S entered World War II in December 1941.

The Soviets also deeply distrusted the Americans during the War, even though it didn't play out significantly in the open. An AP article revealed that World War II cables now possessed by the National Security Agency indicated a deep distrust of Allies by Joseph Stalin (Rothberg 1995). The Potsdam conference in 1945 saw the Big Three (Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin) meet together to decide the fate of Germany. Germany had unconditionally surrendered, and it was time to decide its fate. After the conference, it was apparently clear that the West and the Soviets had two opposing goals for Germany and the whole of Europe.

According to James E. Miller (1989, 1), "by 1947 the United States and the Soviet Union had clashed over nuclear disarmament, the nature of the postwar economic and political settlement in Central and Eastern Europe, Iran, and the shape of peace treaties with the defeated Axis nations." The tensions between the Soviet Union and the West were clearly getting to a boiling point, and soon the Cold War was going to be born.

Experts differ on who they thought was the primary nation or nation bloc that paved the way for NATO. Lawrence Kaplan (2019, par. 3) argues that "despite the frequent charges that

NATO was a product of America's imperial reach after World War 2, it was Europe's initiative –

not that of the United States-which opened the way to NATO." Others argue a little differently

and give more credence to the notion that the United States was the key factor in the founding of

NATO. Strobe Talbott (2019, par. 2) argues that "The United States has been the key architect

and master builder of the institutions undergirding the Atlantic Community."

From the assertions of diverse historians and experts on the topic of NATO'S history, it is

easy to state definitely that the merging of the interests of Western Europe and the United States

was what led to the creation of the Trans-Atlantic alliance. The dire situation Europe found itself

meant that the Western European superpowers were having a hard time holding their centers of

power, and they were certainly not going to be able to ward off Soviet expansion on their own.

Britain knew when it had come to the end of its formerly expansive strength.

The Truman Doctrine

In February 1947, Britain sent a cable to the American State Department notifying the

U.S that it no longer had the financial resources and troops to support Turkey and Greece. Dean

Acheson who would soon become Harry Truman's Secretary of State remarked "The British are

finished. They are through" (Adamthwaite 1985, 231). The American response to the withdrawal

of the British was the introduction of the Truman doctrine which was declared on March 12,

1947. For Truman, the United States was the only country able to support countries like Greece

and Turkey, thereby creating a formidable resistance to the spread of communism around the

countries just North of the Mediterranean. When Truman spoke to Congress to ask for aid,

Turkey was in a tempest and close to buckling to Soviet pressure to share command over the

Dardanelle Straits. The Dardanelle Straits was very critical because it links the Aegean and

Mediterranean seas to the Black Sea. Greece was in economic and political turmoil as it was

going through a civil war where a communist faction intended on running the country. In his speech to Congress President Truman stated that, "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Truman 1947, doc. 171). The preceding line became the theme of the speech and encapsulated what is known today as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine speech convinced Congress to authorize $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey.

The Marshall Plan

The U.S was equally concerned with how weak the economies of western European nations like Germany and Italy were and how that could lead to them falling into the hands of communism. Although the war had ended for almost two years, these European nations were still in dire straits. With the Americans realizing that significant aid to Europe would bolster their interests and protect against the spread of communism, the U.S Marshall Plan was introduced.

Three months after President Truman had given his Truman Doctrine speech which convinced Congress to send aid to Turkey and Greece, U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall issued a clarion call for the United States to provide significant aid to Western Europe. In the speech given to a crowd of about 15,000 people at Harvard University, the statesman said, "It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace" (Marshall 1947, par 3). His rallying cry was heard a year later when Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 and was signed into law by President Truman on April 3, 1948.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan now showed that the Americans were interested in helping Europe from falling into the claws of communism. Paul C. Avey (2012, 51)

asserts that "Because the Soviet system posed the greatest obstacle to the American liberalizing impulse, U.S. policy quickly became a crusade against Communism." It is important to know that despite doubt on the part of the Americans, the Soviets were also invited to participate in the Marshall Plan, but unsurprisingly they declined the offer.

The Czechoslavakian Coup

Czechoslovakia was a democracy after World War II. Although it tried to maintain an non-aligned foreign policy, the shadow of the Soviet Union stood strong around it. The United States was open to providing aid based on the Truman doctrine to the central European country, but the Soviets adamantly did not want this to happen as they feared that the union would come under the influence of the United States and the West. Stalin had been consolidating his communist hold on countries like Bulgaria, Poland and Romania and the Czech nation was not going to be an exception.

Then president of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš was forced to replace his cabinet with members of the Soviet backed Communist party in what was a bloodless coup on February 25, 1948. He would go on to resign on May 7, 1948, as he refused to sign a new constitution that the Communist party was forcing him to sign. This coup in Czechoslovakia brought a reckoning to the United States and the West which saw that Stalin was intent on expanding the sphere of his influence and more specifically that of communist ideology. This coup was a wakeup call to the countries of Western Europe that they needed to band together in an alliance with the United States in order to check Soviet aggression and expansion. A few weeks later after this coup, the Brussels treaty was signed.

The Brussels Treaty

The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was one of the precursors to the founding of NATO. The objective of the treaty, which was signed on March 17, 1948, was to create an alliance of Western European nations that would come to the aid of each other in the case of an external attack. This was an ideal that would later be entrenched as NATO's Article 5, which has become one of its most significant features. The pact was signed by the United Kingdom, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium. In one way, the treaty was a tool to engineer more support for an alliance in which the United States Congress had interest. The Western European countries knew that they needed the United States in an alliance with them in order to stand up to any expansionist dreams by the Soviet Union.

Berlin Blockade and Berlin Airlift

It was the year 1948, and tensions between the Soviets and their western counterparts were high. Because of their liberal ideals, the Western powers, U.S.A, France and the United Kingdom, were trying to shift their controlled zones of Germany towards becoming a unified self-sustaining liberal democracy. The western Allies intended all of West-Germany to become one as it had been separately administered by the three different countries to that point. Talks were held between these countries in what is now known as the London Program talks. These talks were ultimately successful and to the derision of the Soviets who did not want to let go of their power over their administered regions of Germany.

In what is seen by many historians as the first conflict of the Cold War, the Berlin blockade stands as a major historical moment for both the Soviets, and the Western Allies (History.com 2010). The Soviets had been very displeased about the developments on the side of the Western Allies and how they were gearing up for a free and economically rebuilt Germany

with new currency reforms that would help buttress against Soviet advancement. In response to all these developments by the Western Allies, Joseph Stalin decided to institute a blockade of goods and people from both going into West Berlin and coming out of it. Stalin's goal here was to frustrate the allies' vision of seeing a reunited Germany and so he intended to play the card that he had. The Soviets through this blockade were going to block goods, food, electricity, basic supplies and people, everything that a city would need to survive and thrive. Stalin was hoping that the blockade would force the Western Allies and in particular the United States out. However, the reverse was the case.

In response to the blockade, the United States and Britain carried out what historians deem as the largest logistical operation in history. It has come to be known as the Berlin Airlift. From June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949, millions of tons of food, machinery and essential supplies were airlifted into West Berlin to keep the city going. By late spring of 1949, the Soviets realized that their plan had been rendered totally ineffective and lifted the blockade. The airlift was a gigantic and momentous win for the Western allies. This had been a peaceful yet firm response to the actions of the Soviets, and a renewed sense of belief and validation grew amongst the Allies. Most importantly to this paper, the actions of the Soviets with the blockade and the eventual success of the Berlin airlift became one of the significant reasons for the formation of NATO. Jim Garamone argues that the Berlin blockade which "was a form of clear Soviet provocation created the urgency for collective defense of Western Europe." (Garamone 2019, par. 11).

Formation of NATO

Several actions from the Western Allies on both sides of the Atlantic occurred to pave the way for NATO to be created. The Office of the Historian (U.S State Department) states that "In

May of 1948, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenburg proposed a resolution suggesting that the President seek a security treaty with Western Europe that would adhere to the United Nations charter but exist outside of the Security Council where the Soviet Union held veto power" (Office of the Historian, 2020). The resolution brought by Senator Vandenburg succeeded and negotiations that would lead to a NATO treaty started after that. On the European side of the equation, the signing of the Brussels treaty in March of 1948 showed that Europe was very serious about creating and maintaining a collective security mechanism that could stand up to the Soviets.

The birth of the alliance did not come easy. The dream of a western alliance that would stand against the Soviets took robust and extensive negotiations between the founding parties before it came to fruition. All the major countries that would form the alliance had their reservations and scruples concerning what would be in the articles of the treaty. The American representatives in the negotiation were dragging their feet about the expansion of membership of the alliance to Nordic and Scandinavian countries like Norway, Sweden and Denmark. However, others urged the participation of the stated countries as it would help with logistical supply of U.S aid into Europe (Kaplan 2007). U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson had to convince Britain and France of Portugal to get into the alliance despite them being fascist.

The U.S had reservations with Article 5 as it saw it as a possible interference with the constitutional obligation of Congress being the branch of government authorized to declare war rather than the executive. France feared a resurgent Germany after the formation of NATO. Another issue that seemed to be on an obstacle was the duration of the alliance. Different models were offered: a 50 year model which was not liked by the U.S but favored by France and a 20 year model which allowed for a review of whether to leave or not after 10 years, on which the

country which reviews could leave after 20 years (Kaplan 2007).

By early September 1948, the articles of the treaty had largely been drawn up, but the U.S presidential election that was to be held in November meant that negotiations and a final resolution on the treaty had to wait until after the election. After robust conversations that had lasted for almost a year and were done largely behind the scenes, a new treaty was about to be created that would change the world and define history. The Americans through agreeing to this treaty were giving up about a 160-year tradition or policy of not entangling with European affairs. These were ideals that began with the first U.S President George Washington when in his farewell address he said

> The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities (Washington 1796)

These ideas were reaffirmed by the third U.S president, Thomas Jefferson, in his inaugural speech when he said "Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political: —peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none" (Jefferson 1801, par. 4). This policy of non-entanglement and isolation would go on to be reaffirmed in the Monroe doctrine, formed in the mid 1800's and 16 decades down the line it would come to an end with the United States joining NATO. On April 4, 1949, in a ceremony in Washington D.C., the Washington treaty was signed, creating a new formal transatlantic alliance called the North Atlantic Treaty organization. The United States had teamed up with 12 other countries to form the pact. The founding countries alongside the U.S

were: Britain, Belgium, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Great Iceland, Italy,

Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal. Turkey, Greece and West Germany would join the

organization in the following years.

The new alliance had a singular clear purpose. In the famous words of Lord Ismay, the

first Secretary General of NATO, the alliance existed "to keep the Russians out, the Americans

in, and the Germans down" (NATO 2020). Those renowned words made by Lord Ismay became

the singular focus and purpose of the trans-Atlantic alliance. (Wheatcroft 2011).

Analysis

The Soviets' refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan and their adamance in not

allowing the states under its sphere of communist control to participate in the Marshall Plan

showed Soviet distaste for the ideals of the U.S and western Europe. Some analysts wonder if

there would have ever been a need for NATO if the Soviets participated in joint economic relief

programs like Western Europe did. I concur with experts who say that the Soviet Union would in

no way have participated in any scheme or program that would make it look slightly subservient

to the United States and the West. Both bastions of power had polar opposite ideas of how they

were supposed to carry out the governing of their peoples.

Although the Soviets and its Western World War II Allies (U.S.A, Britain, France)

fought against Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime for freedom, their notions of freedom were

strikingly different. This explains why even during the war as earlier stated, Soviet distrust of the

Americans existed. U.S distrust of the Soviets was also sky high. This distrust, which began

during the war, would grow like a malignant tumor into what is known today as the Red Scare or

McCarthyism. This fear would only be calibrated by Soviet actions like the installation of Soviet

governments in Europe and Asia, and the testing of a nuclear bomb by the Soviet Union on August 29, 1949.

In analyzing the history of the birth of NATO, I assert that strong international obligational agreements need initial shows of good faith from the different parties in order for trust to be established. These shows of good faith could be smaller and lighter treaties or public resolutions. Each show of good faith inspires the other parties to believe that there could be more cooperation between the parties.

The various resolutions, agreements and treaties passed in Western Europe before NATO were necessary for an organization like NATO to come about. Up until the moment after World War II, Western Europe had been a place of constant strife and bloody feuds. Although the United States was open to helping Europe from falling into the claws of communism, economic and political catastrophe, it was hesitant about a long-term military alliance due to Europe's rivalry laden history.

The NATO alliance would be the first and most inclusive of its type and for that to happen both sides (U.S and Western Europe) had to prove to each other that they would be willing to come to each other's aid as needed. This alliance was going to be quite the bargain between both sides. The Dunkirk treaty between Britain was a minor precursor that established good faith. This good faith would grow into the Brussels Treaty which included even more countries. The Brussels Treaty at least for the Western Europeans proved that they were ready for an alliance like NATO which would defend the interests and freedom of its members.

On the American side, the Truman Doctrine was a sign that America could be more involved in European affairs with the objective of helping western Europe get back to its feet. Public speeches by statesmen like George Marshall and Dean Acheson also proved that the

Americans could be committed to the defense and welfare of Europe. World War II had seen the Americans come to the aid of Western Europe with the invasion of Normandy being a hallmark moment in the history of the war. The Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan solidified the faith Western Europeans had in the fact that an alliance between the two blocs on either side of the Atlantic was going to be possible. It was not only the Soviet threat that brought these two parties into unison. It was the liberal democratic values they shared, and the immense help that one (the U.S) had provided the other that sealed the deal.

Chapter 4: NATO's Transformation

By 1989, the handwriting was on the wall for the Soviet Union. NATO realized that it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would disintegrate. President George H.W. Bush's visit to West Germany might have not been as revered in history as that of Ronald Reagan. In his 1987 speech by the Berlin Wall in West Berlin, President Ronald Reagan uttered one of history's most famous words by an American president. It was "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall" (Reagan 1987). Those words rang loud in every capital across Europe, and signified the eventual downfall of Soviet rule, and the reunification of Germany. President Bush, however, gave a speech that would also be historic and mean so much for NATO's direction going forward. In his speech he proclaimed that NATO's new mission would be to make sure that Europe was whole and free. Speaking with the assertiveness for which he was known for, President Bush said, "But the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever. The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and free. To the founders of the alliance, this aspiration was a distant dream, and now it's the new mission of NATO." (Bush 1989)

Rebecca Moore (2007, 1) captures the changes that the months after brought for NATO: "Although the preservation of liberal democratic values had long been central to NATO's larger mission, developments within the alliance between 1989 and 1991 marked an important expansion of that mission." By 1990, the NATO allies had begun to link their security to all of Europe's security. This was a seismic change in the calculations for the alliance. Rather than take a seat of Soviet deterrence and collective defense of its member states, NATO was now supposed to take a front foot to ensuring a secure and stable Europe. The NATO leaders were responding to the call of President Bush who had declared that with NATO's help, Europe would be whole

and free. In order for this wholeness and freedom to take place the multi-ethnic and centuries old strife that was still plaguing the central and eastern parts of the continent had to come to an end. In a sense, NATO had a vision of a central and Eastern Europe that looked like Western Europe.

NATO's member states began to theorize and deliberate on what the military alliance was going to represent after the Soviet threat was gone. President Bush had signaled a path and the rest of the alliance would follow. In November of 1990, the heads of States in the alliance met to discuss the way forward. At the London conference, the NATO Secretary General said

> Europe is not yet immune from future risk or danger. This Alliance, which has contributed so much to overcoming Europe's painful division, must play its full part alongside other Western institutions in extending the stability and security we enjoy to all European nations. There are many potential instabilities, both within and without Europe, that we must plan for prudently today if we are not to be their victim tomorrow. (Worner, 1990)

By the end of the conference member states had agreed that a change in thinking and approach was direly needed. The alliance made the following proclamation which would become known as the London Declaration:

> Europe has entered a new era. […] Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt…………… Our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes." (London Declaration, 1990)

Also, by linking NATO's security to the security of Central and Eastern European states, NATO was saying that its new mission was one that encompassed the stability and security of all Europe. The London Conference confirmed what new identity NATO was going to embrace.

What would the alliance that had successfully deterred Soviet expansion for decades do to transform itself into in order to preserve its existence? It was going to be an organization on the front foot in pursuit of a whole and free Europe. NATO knew it needed to adapt to the current security situation and transform in order to outlive the predictions of its demise. To augment this notion, Veronica M. Kitchens (2009, 106) writes that "By the end of the Cold War, conflict in Southeastern Europe had been redefined as conflict in Europe, and thus the instability brought with it, reminders of Europe's past, together with the urge to do something, especially as human rights came to be seen as more and more important in the narrative of the transatlantic identity."

In order to solidify this shift in strategy, one unlike the alliance had ever taken up, a change to the Strategic Concept had to be made. Strategy making was at the heart of what NATO did. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer (2019, 5) writes that,

> Nowhere is the Alliance's constancy of purpose more evident than in the process of strategy-making that has underpinned NATO's commitments and arrangements, in changing circumstances, over seven decades. Strategy-making is the political and institutional genetic code that enables NATO to attain three overriding objectives concurrently: deter potential adversaries; assure individual Allies; and not least, in pursuing the first two objectives, ensure a shared awareness and understanding of the *strategic intent* underpinning a concept, a plan, a cooperative undertaking or an exercise

The Strategic Concept is NATO's brain and heart. It is like a handbook for the alliance. It encapsulates the goals, objectives, desires and grand strategies of the alliance. NATO defines the Strategic Concept as "an official document that outlines NATO's enduring purpose and nature, and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces" (NATO 2018, par. 1).

The 1991 Strategic Concept was the first to be made public as all four concepts adopted during the Cold War were shrouded in secrecy. From 1949 to 1991, which was the end of the

Cold War, the military alliance had created four strategic concepts. These strategic concepts represented the thinking and calculations of member states as regards the security situation of member states. Since this was the era of the Cold War, all four strategic concepts were mainly guided by the collective defense of member states. They were all defined by defense and deterrence (NATO, 2018). Since the end of the Cold War, three NATO Strategic Concepts have been issued by NATO. All three post-Cold War strategic concepts have been based on the current security situations around the world at the time of their release.

The 1991 Strategic Concept and NATO's Shift to Collective Security

The 1991 NATO Strategic Concept was completely based on the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe at the time. It allowed NATO to take up a more active role in the crisis in the Balkans, both in Bosnia and Kosovo. It affirmed that collective defense was still at the heart of what NATO was about but that its security policy would be "based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defense as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace" (NATO 1991). This reinforces the constructivist idea that this thesis espouses.

NATO was not just expanding its security map because it could. NATO believed that instability around the continent, even those not within NATO nations, could bring about "crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance" (NATO, 1991, par. 13). This new strategic concept sought to make NATO a trans-Atlantic forum for security issues around the continent. The Strategic Concept also affirmed that NATO was going to remain "one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to

impose hegemony through the threat or use of force" (NATO, 1991, par. 22). The portfolios of peacekeeping and crisis management in out of area operations was going to be part of NATO's new security functions.

The **1999 Strategic Concept and NATO's Move into the 21st Century**

Although the 1999 Strategic Concepts contained much of what the 1991 Strategic Concepts had, it was a more expansive security document. It opened the door for more NATO membership, embraced a peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and crisis management role. Even as the new strategic concepts expanded NATO's roles, the Article 5 mission of collective defense of member states still remained at the heart of NATO's existence. For the European nations that would later join NATO, the security that Article 5 guaranteed was still the golden prize. With the 1999 Strategic Concept, and NATO's actions in the Balkans, NATO had grown into a co-operative security organization. Even though it had completely gotten rid of the Soviet Union being a threat, it still strongly emphasized its Article 5 function of NATO protecting its members against external aggression. This would come in handy as the United States would trigger Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks just two years after the 1999 Strategic Concept was adopted.

The **2010 Strategic Concept and NATO's Modern-Day Adaptation**

The 2010 Strategic Concept came after a decade of NATO'S involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. By 2004, NATO's Stabilization Force troops had handed over a more peaceful Bosnia to the European Union's Euro Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new century and decade had brought NATO new sets of challenges that required adjustments. The 2010 Strategic Concept sought to prepare NATO to "address the increasingly complex threats facing the allies, including nuclear terrorism, cyber-crime, and global climate change, as well as the institutional changes necessary to maintain NATO's relevance in the 21st Century" (NATO 2010).

Chapter 5: NATO's Persistence

Charles Krauthammer (2002, par. 12), the Pulitzer prize winning columnist, said "NATO is dead; it may still have a marginal role to play as an incubator for Russia's integration into Europe and the West, but as a military alliance it is a hollow shell." Gunther Hellman and Reinhard Wolf spoke to the fact that NATO would disintegrate and cease to exist. They posited that

> NATO may either break up or gradually dissolve because of differences among its members about how to organize for the common security in the post-cold war environment. Most member states would no longer rely on the alliance as the central institution for the coordination of national security policies and the institutional underpinnings of the alliance (integrated command, force planning, etc.) would gradually unravel. Whether or not an organization with the name 'NATO' still existed would be irrelevant because the defining norms and principles of the alliance would have ceased to be credible to member governments" (Hellmann and Wolf 1993). John Mearsheimer (1990, 52) forecasted the imminent decline of NATO in saying: "It is the Soviet threat that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it headed for forty years may disintegrate (Hellmann and Wolf 1993, 2).

The skeptics of NATO's persistence indeed have always had viable reasons as to why they expressed such skepticism of NATO's survival past the cold War. NATO has always offered reasons as to why it may die out. Just right after the Cold War, realists who had gotten their view of the world verified in the Cold War felt that in a unipolar system in the world, an alliance like NATO would never thrive, and with what had happened in history to that point, their assertions possessed validity. With the Soviet Union dissolving, the alliance had dealt the Soviets a death blow. NATO had achieved the goals for which the alliance was created. It was widely expected that the alliance would also come to the end of its course. This was the basis of the neorealist predictions of the demise of NATO. The truth though is that their predictions have not come true almost thirty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Before NATO's

intervention in Bosnia, many wondered why the alliance even existed as it did not do much to help the security and political stability in central and Eastern Europe. The fact that the members of the alliance had to struggle amongst themselves to come to an agreement concerning strikes on Bosnian Serb positions in Bosnia showed that the alliance was possibly on its last legs. The success of NATO in this conflict reversed that outcome.

Why NATO Persisted

Despite all the predictions of death and demise of the alliance as seen above, the alliance survived, and has at times thrived. The analysts who were optimistic about NATO's adaptation and survival won the day. NATO has not just survived; it has thrived and expanded. There are a few theoretical explanations for this outcome.

Institutionalist (Organizational) Perspective

The first reason for NATO's persistence can be justified based on the organizational or theory of alliances. For this purpose of this paper I will merge the institutionalist and organizational theory of alliances as one as the differences between them are very little. This view as opposed to the neorealist view espouses that a threat is not all that holds an alliance together, and that the institutional characteristics of an alliance can maintain it even in the absence of a common unifying threat. As opposed to realists like Glenn Snyder (1997, 192) who asserted that "alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response," institutionalists believe that organizations like NATO can take on a life of their own, hence enjoying a certain degree of autonomy. Nobel prize winner, Douglass C. North proposes that "institutions are created by utility-maximizing individuals with clear intentions. Yet once institutions exist, they set parameters to further action" (Koelble 1995, 232). For institutionalists like Robert McCalla, the persistence of NATO is no surprise. McCalla believes that NATO had

the capabilities to adapt to the new security environment thereby preserving the existence of the alliance even though the broad purpose and mission of the alliance was changed. In Robert McCalla's piece called NATO's *Persistence after the Cold War*, he suggests this about NATO's organizational desire to survive:

> Like other large organizations, its employees belong to various social clubs, identify themselves as part of a community (international in nature) centered around NATO, and form subgroups based on professional and personal interests. These employees identify with NATO and will have an incentive to see NATO continue to function, as their personal and professional self-interests are at stake. Addition- ally, they are likely to feel that NATO performs a valuable function and be willing to support it. Many people, civilian and military, are assigned to NATO for three- or four-year terms and they, as well as those who follow, are also likely to work to ensure that NATO continues to function. This furnishes a large reserve of NATO supporters who can be expected to resist challenges to the alliance and promote its interests. (McCalla 1996, 457)

In support of the institutionalist perspective the Brookings Institute (2001, 7) writes that "Politically, the Alliance has sought new missions to retain its relevance – from peacekeeping to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the process, NATO has not only survived but been transformed into a politico-military entity that differs in many significant ways from the organization that stood ready to meet a Warsaw Pact tank assault across the Fulda Gap." In simple terms, this school of thought suggests that NATO has persisted because its bureaucracy has persisted.

The Realist Perspective

The realist perspective promotes the idea of American hegemony as the reason for the persistence of NATO. The relationship between NATO and the U.S is not extensively discussed in this paper and it is a relationship that has had a considerable amount of literature dedicated to it. However, it is notable to say that realists believe that NATO has survived because it is part of

an American grand strategy to preserve its hegemony in European and world affairs. It is no secret that the United States is the main contributor to the alliance both militarily and financially. Without the involvement of the United States, there would barely be an alliance standing. Realists claim that for American primacy to be maintained especially in the world of security, NATO has to be kept running.

Realists in opposition to the institutionalist perspective will argue that the bureaucracies that still exist, only exist because it is in the interest of the states. The bureaucracy and institution therefore are not preserved by sheer will of its own but rather either by the toleration or calculations by member states that the continual upkeep of the alliance is in the good interest of the states. The words of John Kornblum, when he was the U.S. Senior Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for European Affairs perfectly describes the realist view of NATO's persistence: "The Alliance provides a vehicle for the application of American power and vision to the security order in Europe" (Waltz 2000, 20).

The realist perspective on NATO's persistence can be easily rebuffed. As realist predictions for a post-Cold War NATO came to be of no viability, so is realist analysis of NATO's resilience. There have been times when American presidents have completely disregarded the need for NATO. These were times when U.S leaders felt that NATO was not in the best interests of the American state. In those moments it was the bureaucracy that saved the day for NATO. The derision that President George W Bush had for NATO's slow process is well documented for all to see. He hated the 'war by committee' process that NATO worked by. Even though U.S presidents have seen the alliance as a vehicle to implementing their global interests as neo-realists argue, they have also been times where they wished the little restrictions of being part of such an alliance were not present. Another example is President Donald Trump. When

President Trump took the office of president in 2017, he wanted nothing to do with NATO. He felt it was an organization for Europeans to parasitically live off the U.S contribution without them paying their fair share. In his defense, this had been a contention of most of the presidents preceding him, albeit their criticisms were presented in a candid manner. In light of this approach by President Trump, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made it his mission to soften the blow of Trump's rhetoric about NATO and to try to appeal to the president to see NATO'S benefit. This was a case of someone in the NATO bureaucracy fighting for the reputation of the alliance. This supports the institutionalist theorists who assert that organization members will do all they need to do in order to preserve the viability or existence of the organization.

Also, realism cannot explain why NATO has enlarged its membership in the aftermath of the Cold War. If the common threat that brought members of the alliance together as a bulwark against communist expansion has disappeared, there may not be a need for an enlarged NATO that may only likely stretch the capacities of a hegemonic state like the United States. Due to the failure of classical theories of international relations being able to properly explain the new security environment and NATO's persistence in the Cold War Era, a new school of thought emerged that did that. In the next section one of those approaches, an approach which will be the theoretical basis of this thesis, will be explored.

The Constructivist Basis of NATO's Persistence

NATO's foundation as an alliance can indeed be sufficiently explained through a realist lens. The persistence of NATO however beyond the Post-Cold War era cannot be adequately analyzed through the lens of realism. The best theoretical foundation out there that captures NATO'S persistence despite predictions for its demise or withering away is the constructivist tradition. Thomas Risse (1995, 223), a leading constructivist, had this to say about NATO's

persistence: "the Western Alliance represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies."

A realist would certainly argue that NATO cannot exist or thrive without a formidable enemy such as the former Soviet Union. This thesis which is built on constructivist ideas seeks to dismiss such predictions and argues as to why NATO has been persistent. For one to understand NATO's persistence, there has to be an acknowledgement of the fact that although the alliance still retains some core ideals like the collective defense principle, it has largely metamorphosed into a cooperative security community that acts based on the shared beliefs, norms, values and identity of its member states.

The military actions and civilian initiatives it has carried out after the end of the Cold War point to this transformation and modern-day reality. No NATO post-Cold War operation exemplifies this more than the military operations of NATO in the Balkans. What was the causative factor for NATO's increased engagement in the Balkans? It was the shared identity of NATO: the identity of the *liberal West club* that was to stand up for democratic norms and human rights. The common identity NATO members shared which was built on liberal democratic principles caused them to intervene in the Balkans to preserve what they saw as a challenge to the norms and identity of the security community.

Although one could argue that it was in the interest of individual states for NATO to get heavily involved in the wars in the Balkans, this argument would lack depth and adequate reasoning to it. If the different variables of state interests and norms that theorists may use to explain NATO's involvement in the Balkans are isolated objectively, norms being the causal factor wins the day. As stated further on in this thesis, the member countries of the alliance dithered initially on an expansive NATO role in the war. The United States for one under the

leadership of both President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton did not want to in any circumstance deploy troops on the ground. After the Dayton Accords, however, U.S troops still constituted the largest quota of NATO's Implementation Force on the ground in Bosnia in late 1995. It was the shared norms and values of member states that resulted in this action.

As a theory, constructivism began as a retort to some of the assertions of realists and aimed at incorporating more ideational factors in the field of international relations and politics (Sinclair 2010, 142). Constructivists wanted to answer questions that realists could not adequately answer, especially questions regarding international institutions such as NATO. The constructivist view argues that members of an alliance like NATO have had commonality of purpose, and over time, the values and norms that they have shared have bound them together. This common set of shared values and norms creates a feeling of community and identity that binds them together. For NATO, these common values are freedom, respect for human rights, equality, and justice. Emmanuel Adler (2008, 197) speaks to the nature of common values and practices among NATO members when he suggests that "while survival and adaptation played a role in NATO's transformation, the nature of the survival and adaptation strategies were to a great extent dictated by the practices that NATO adopted at the end of the Cold War." Christoph O. Meyer (2005, 523) suggests that "The surprising resilience of NATO despite the disappearance of its main enemy testifies to the resilience of strategic norms and their power to sustain large institutional structures in search of a purpose."

Frank Schimmelfennig (2005, 25) asserts that the constructivist view proposes "that the design of international institutions will vary with the collective identities and norms of the international community that establishes them and with the requirements of community-building and community representation." When applying this view to NATO, the alliance is therefore the

epicenter of European security and the guarantor of such security for the Euro-Atlantic liberal international order. The common values that Schimmelfennig (2005) speaks of predates the Cold War, and the elimination of the Soviet threat need not be the reason for the disintegration of a body bound by those common values. As long as those member states share the similar values that they have always done, such an organization need not atrophy. The constructivist will argue that the shared values NATO possessed resulted in it intervening in the Balkans and expanding its membership to states that would seek to be in a similar position as the NATO members.

It is important to note that no theory can fully and adequately explain the resilience and persistence of NATO. No tradition holds a monopoly in explaining NATO's actions and existence in the post-Cold War era. Through this thesis I assert, however, that a constructivist perspective is the best lens through which a student of the field can analyze NATO's post-Cold War persistence. By applying and reinforcing the constructivist approach with NATO, I do not intend to proclaim constructivism as a far more superior theory in explaining the persistence and resilience of NATO, however I believe that the constructivist approach represents the best perspective for analyzing NATO in the Post-Cold War era.

Chapter 6: NATO in the Balkans

The Balkans has been fraught with ethnic tensions for much of the 20th century. This strife and tension would come to a head in the war known as the Bosnian War. In no other place was the strife and tension between ethnic groups displayed more than in former Yugoslavia. After World War II, the Balkans came under the cloak of communism that was spread by the Soviets.

The economic crisis in the 1980's fused with ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo created a conducive environment for conflict. The Albanians who were the majority in Kosovo began agitating for full autonomy and a secession from the Yugoslav union. However, there was a significant population of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo and the Serbs viewed a secession for the Albanians as a move that would endanger the Serbs who lived in Kosovo.

Josip Bros Tito ruled the multiethnic country for decades as a communist dictator, but after his death, ethnic tensions emerged. The tensions in Yugoslavia began as a result of the rise of ethnic nationalism that was spurred by hardline nationalists across Yugoslavia. After World War II, the kingdom of Yugoslavia was broken up into "a federation of six nominally equal republics: Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. In Serbia, the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomous status in order to acknowledge the specific interests of Albanians and Magyars, respectively" (Lampe 2003).

After the death of Tito in 1980, the presidency of Yugoslavia became a collective presidential system which was a complex rotating one. Under Tito, governmental powers were centralized in him as he was president for life. However, after his death the rotating system of president was introduced where every member of the eight-state federation would have a chance to lead the entire country. That meant that the representatives of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia would each have a chance to be president of the federation.

In March 1989, the Serbians decided to change their constitution to one where the smaller autonomous states in Serbia, which were Kosovo and Vojvodina, would lose their full autonomy and be much more controlled by the government of Serbia. The league of communists of Yugoslavia was essentially the governing party of all of Yugoslavia. One could find its similar peer in contemporary times to the Chinese Communist Party which essentially controls the Chinese government. After the dissolution of this party due to member states not being able to agree, multiple parties were born which only planted greater confusion, strife and animosity within the federation. The governments of the different states therefore became more nationalistic as the former bond that held them together was broken.

In their book, *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri (2004, 79) speak of the rising ethnic strife that was visible in Croatia between ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs: "In the preceding year leading to the election, Croatian intentions towards the Serbs living in Croatia (the Krajina) became increasingly ominous, including anti-Serb propaganda, discrimination in the workplace, and arbitrary arrests."

The rise of a Serbian former Communist official known as Slobodan Milošević to power marked a shift in the course of events for Yugoslavia. He would later go on to assist the Bosnian Serbs in their atrocious war against the Bosniak Muslims and Bosnian Croats. In Croatia, the president, Franjo Tuđman, agitated for an independent Croatia. This upset the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević who argued that Tuđman was going to be a totalitarian leader who would persecute the ethnic Serbs who lived in Croatia. This rhetoric eventually led to an arms race and violence as Croatian separatists who were mostly ethnic Serbs formed a self-appointed

autonomous region that would be called the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (SAO)(Paukovic, Kolsto 2013). The SAO was vigorously supported by Serbian president Slobodan Milošević who was the self-proclaimed defender of all ethnic Serbs.

An independence referendum was held in Croatia with the mass majority of Croatians voting to secede from the union to become an independent state. A short while after this, Croatia declared independence from the former Yugloslavia. Also, Slovenians held a synonymous independence referendum like Croatia and both countries declared independence on June 26, 1991 (Dusko, 1991).

In response to Croatia declaring independence, ethnic Serbs living in Croatia declared that they would secede from Croatia to form their own independent state. The Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (SAO) was the major group and the Croatian government found this unacceptable. It wanted to be more closely tied to the government of Serbia rather than a new state of Croatia. This led to a war between the Croatian government and the Serb Croats who had declared an autonomous state for themselves.

The Balkan Wars Begin

With ethnic strife and animosity at its peak, and the recent declarations of independence by former Yugoslav states, Croatia and Slovenia, war throughout the region was at the doorsteps in the months of 1991. March 31, 1991 saw the war between the former Yugoslavia state which was mainly a Serbian controlled state and Croatia begin. For the Croatians it was a war of independence, and for the Serbian government of Yugoslavia, it was taking back territory in order to re-establish it under the Republic of Yugoslavia.The Slavic historian, Srdja Pavlovic had this to say about the developments.

> On June 25, 1991, Croatia seceded from the Socialist Federal Republic of
> Yugoslavia (SFRY) and declared independence on October 8, 1991. What

followed were years of bitter fighting for ideologies and territories between Serb and Montenegrin volunteers and paramilitaries coordinated and supplied by the Serb-controlled JNA on the one hand, and Slovene, Croat, and Muslim forces on the other. (Pavlovic 2020)

Pavlovic described the unfolding conflict in saying that "In July and August of 1991, the military situation in Croatia worsened due to numerous attacks organized by various Serbian paramilitary forces supported by the JNA" (Pavlovic 2020).

The Yugoslav People's Army which had been the military of Yugoslavia for decades was now mainly controlled by ethnic Serbs. Another set of people would be very essential to the history of this civil war. These were the Serbian paramilitaries who worked hand in hand with the Yugoslav National Army throughout the War.

The Yugoslav People's Army which was the federal army of Yugoslavia responded to the independence declaration of Slovenia and sought to overturn that declaration but the war here which was between the Slovenian territorial forces and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) was brief with the YPA retreating. The YPS turned its sights to the much bigger conflict with Croatian forces. Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri (2004, 80) write that "Fighting erupted in Croatia and worsened in late July and August 1991, with Serbs gaining 15 percent of the territory. Soon, more than a fourth of Croatian territory was seized by the combined efforts of Croatia's Serbs, the federal army, and troops from Serbia and Montenegro."

The capture of those territories meant that the ethnic Serb population in the captured territories grew exponentially as ethnic Croats were forced to leave. In response the Croatians also forced ethnic Serbs out of their territory.

The Croatian war of independence had seen brutal fighting in the year 1991. Many Croatian towns like Vukovar, Dalj, Logas, and Erdut saw massacres which led the international

community to realize that ethnic cleansing had begun in the Balkans. Towns with civilian populations were shelled daily and war crimes became rampant and were mostly executed by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNP). In response to the war which had become brutal and unforgiving, alongside all the ethnic cleansing that had been taking place, the United Nations decided to intervene. This intervention brought about a ceasefire that went into effect on January 2, 1992. Afterwards, the UN sent a peacekeeping force called the United Nations Protection Force which brought much needed stability to the region. The fighting largely ceased after that and the war slowly dissipated after that even though no full resolutions to the war had been made. The year 1991 would see the EU, the US and the wider world community recognize Croatia's independence.

It is important to note that at this time in 1991 and early 1992, NATO was in no way involved as the situation was seen as one out of NATO's jurisdiction or *out of area*. With Croatia and Slovenia achieving independence the breakup of Yugoslavia was accelerating. The third domino to fall was Bosnia. Just like its fellow sister states had done, Bosnia held a referendum in March and February of 1992 to determine if it would secede from the federation of Yugoslavia or not (Lobell and Mauceri 2004). The referendum results were a vote to secede from Yugoslavia and become independent. Just like its response to Slovenia and Croatia, the federal army decided to initiate an offensive against Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were a minority of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they had a lot of power since the federal government was controlled by ethnic Serbs. The process of independence did not go as smoothly for Bosnia as it did for Slovenia. After the declaration of independence, the European Union quickly recognized the legitimacy of an independent Bosnia. Bosnian Serb nationalists and Croat forces originally fought a united defense against Bosnian Serb advances. However, relations

broke down in 1993 and this smaller war against the Bosniaks within the bigger Bosnian war would last until March 1994 where it was brought to an end through the Washington Agreement.

In response to Bosnia declaring independence, the Serbian president Milosevic initiated a military offensive by the YPA against Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the beginning of the war in Bosnia. He also declared the independence of a Bosnian region full of ethnic Serbs which he called Republika Srpska. The president of this region would be a Bosnian Serb known as Radovan Karadžić, the man people would come to call the butcher of Bosnia.

By the spring of 1992, the United States and most of the European community had recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This did not deter Serb nationalists in Bosnia or the Serbian president, Milosevic. Although Serbian president Milosevic was the one who initiated the war, he did not use the YPA to fight the war directly. In fact, the Yugoslavian People's army relinquished command of its 100,000 troops in Bosnia, effectively creating a Bosnian Serb army (NY Times 2020). The war was mainly fought by the army of Republika Srpska and other paramilitaries loyal to the cause of the Republika Srpska. These paramilitary groups were of diverse factions and were made up of both local and foreign fighters who had joined the cause for different reasons.

President Milosevic was a very smart and cunning man. Adam Michnik (1993) said "He correctly recognized the weakness of the democratic world; its inability to take risks, its failure to recognize the seriousness of the threat, and lastly, its cowardly egoism have created a situation in which fanatical nationalism and cynicism seem to be triumphing."

Although President Milosevic indirectly led and supported the war's efforts, Radovan Karadžić who was the president of the newly self-proclaimed state called Republika Srpska

prosecuted the war directly. With a self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb state fighting against the Bosnian government made up of mostly Bosniak Muslims, a civil war had begun.

The Siege of Sarajevo was one of the defining conflicts of the war. The army of Republika Srpska laid siege to the well populated city of Sarajevo on April 5, 1992. It was a siege that would last for almost four years. Heavy fighting ensued in Sarajevo between the Bosniak defenders and the army of Republika Srpska. As the war became more vicious with civilians being shelled indiscriminately, the war started to gain world recognition and interest. It is said that "International clamor for action in the former Yugoslavia grew in the late summer of 1992 amidst reports of enormous violations of human rights in Bosnia, primarily conducted by Serbs against Muslims" (Hammond 2004, 163).

Indecision and Alarm in NATO

Andrew Hammond (2004, 158) in his book, *The Balkans and the West,* had this to say about the state of affairs and the opportunities present at the time: "By 1991, with Russia confronting huge internal challenges, the Atlantic democracies were the only powerful state actors capable of responding to a major crisis in the Balkans. They had a military alliance, NATO, and an economic instrument, the European community, capable of promoting democratic and peaceful agenda for peace."

The international recognition the war got resulted in sanctions placed by the European community and the United Nations. The Europeans voiced their dissent against Serbia's support of the war in Bosnia but it was met with no response from the Serbs. They moved to implement trade sanctions against Serbia to no avail. The UN also put trade sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia) in action. With the preceding actions having no effect, the UN decided to banish

Yugoslavia from being a member of the United Nations and placed a naval blockade around

Serbia and Montenegro.

Hammond (2004, 165) mentions the reason why the war in Bosnia was mostly brutal and

involved genocidal actions: "Under Radovan, the self-styled republic of hardline nationalists

preferred to hold out for total victory and would become increasingly reckless and savage in their

tactics when it appeared to be slipping from their grasp." A big turn in events happened when the

Bosnian Croats who were formerly backing the Bosniak Muslims in their war against Serbia and

Republika Srpska started a war against the Bosniak Muslims. Their fight was over the territory

that the Serbs had not conquered. Now the Bosnian government had to contend with two issues.

NATO in the Bosnian War

NATO came into the war a little bit late. This was for several reasons that will be

unpacked in the next few pages. For NATO, the war in Bosnia contained many first ever actions

militarily. The United Nations had been involved in the war since September of 1991 when it

placed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. By January 2, 1992, the U.N. encouraged Cyrus Vance

who had formerly been the U.S. Secretary of State to negotiate a ceasefire agreement. This

agreement which is called the Vance Plan allowed the Croat Serbs to keep their territory but

allowed U.N peacekeeping forces to be deployed to the area. This agreement was never fully

implemented and it concerned Croatia mainly and not Bosnia and Herzegovina where a war

started after the Vance Plan was agreed on. As has been made clear earlier, the war started with

skirmishes and a siege of the city, Sarajevo, by the army of Republika Srpska. The U.N.'s naval

blockade of Yugoslavia and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the U.N. did nothing to stop the

war. By this time, it was widely known that the U.N. had been ineffective in trying to bring

peace, stability, and an end to the conflict. NATO's first involvement in the crisis, apart from the verbal condemnations of the war, was to support U.N. peacekeeping forces that were in the region.

NATO's Naval Standing Force in the Mediterranean began assisting the United Nations in monitoring the territorial waters around Yugoslavia. This naval force was there to enforce the sanctions like arms embargo that the United Nations had placed on Yugoslavia in response to the war. The operation was called Operation Maritime Monitor (Pike 2011). This operation was ineffective as it could not do much to prevent the shipping of arms into Yugoslavia and therefore gave way to a tougher operation known as Operation Maritime Guard. Under Operation Maritime Guard, NATO's naval forces in the area had the authority to stop and inspect all maritime cargo going towards the shores of Yugoslavia. This was meant to stem the flow of weapons into the region that allowed the crisis to go on. NATO also conducted deterrent operations in the sky. Through the Operation Deny Flight, NATO's air force would seek to enforce the no-fly zone restrictions that the UN had sanctioned. This was intended to stop the aid of Serbian airpower that helped the Bosnian Serbs in their fight against the Bosniak Muslims. On April 12, 1993 this mission began and "the operation's implied objective was to demonstrate UN and NATO determination to stabilize the situation in Bosnia so that a peaceful settlement could be achieved. An air option was the cleanest way to get NATO involved without exposing its troops to a hostile ground environment" (Beale 2004, 19).

NATO's actions under the Operation Deny Flight increased in response to further requests from the UN. Anthony M. Schinella (2019, 14) speaks of these actions by NATO that increased at the request of the UN: "A major milestone with particularly far-reaching consequences was reached on June 4, 1993, when the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 836

declaring six Bosnian cities and towns—Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihać, Goražde, Srebrenica, and Žepa—to be 'safe areas'. The resolution directed NATO to provide close air support 'in and around the safe areas' to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate."

1993 was a year that should have seen peaceful progress in the war but didn't. The Vance-Owen plan was agreed with even the Bosnian Serb president giving his approval. However, the Bosnian Serbs in a referendum rejected the plan. Later on, in the year peace talks were held in Geneva but they failed to come to an agreement. The war raged on. By early 1994 NATO's involvement in the war had increased significantly. On February 9th of that year, NATO gave an ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy guns from Sarajevo or they would be hit by NATO airstrikes, a demand which the Bosnian Serb president, Radovan Karadzic, eventually complied.

February 28, 1994, was a monumental day in the history of the military alliance. NATO, an alliance that was created to deal with Soviet expansion into Europe, had never engaged in actual combat operations. However, on that day, NATO shot down four Serbian fighter jets. This was done in response to the Serbs destroying a factory under the possession of Bosnia. Not even during the Cold War did this ever happen. It also was the first NATO air combat operation, and it was American F-16 jets operating under Operation Deny Flight that engaged and took down the Serbian jets. NATO had for once backed up its threats with action. From that moment on, NATO responded to Serb actions with retaliatory airstrikes throughout the year and into the year 1995. Some of these airstrikes were done in synchronization with the U.N., and a few others were done solely at NATO's discretion.

The year 1995 was a decisive year in the war and it saw the war officially come to an end with the Dayton Peace Accords in Ohio in the latter end of the year. The year 1995 began with a

truce between all sides and that was a result of the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's mediation efforts. After the ceasefire expired, the conflict restarted as the sides could not come to an agreement to extend the ceasefire. After the resumption of the war, the fighting only became more brutal, one where genocide and mass expulsion of people from their lands happened commonly. As people fled their homes because of the war, the refugee situation in the region got worse and many civilians were caught in the cross hairs of the conflict.

The Srebrenica Massacre and a Decisive NATO Response

The massacre of Bosniak Muslim civilians in the town of Srebrenica by Bosnian Serbs certainly represented the moment where NATO decided something more aggressive had to be done to end the war. It was Europe's most deadly and ghastly massacre since World War II and it brought chills to observers around the world. So how did it happen?

As the war raged on, the Bosnian Serbs had made huge strides and the Bosnian Serb president, seeing how dogmatic and diffident the UN and NATO had acted, sensed that there was an opportunity to take over a U.N. safe zone and a Bosnian town called Srebrenica. On the orders of Bosnian Serb general and commander Ratko Mladic, Bosnian Serbs carried out a massacre over four days of men and boys. It was estimated that over 8000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys were killed with some buried alive in the massacres (Hammond 2004, 165). Before the Bosnian Serbs overran UN soldiers to take the town, thousands of residents had already begun fleeing the town to other Muslim controlled territories. In a four-day spree, Bosnian Serb soldiers rounded up Bosniak Muslims and expelled women and children. This forced expulsion has been described by many as ethnic cleansing, an analysis which definitely seems to describe the situation (Smith 2010). A lot of the men and boys in and around the town were rounded up and killed. The massacre was a barbaric murder spree that Europe had not seen since World War II

and only till the expelled Muslims who lived in Srebrenica got to other Muslim controlled zones did word spread that masses of people had been displaced and killed. A nearby town called Potočari which some of the refugees from Srebrenica went to also witnessed barbaric rape and killings.

The Srebrenica massacre prompted NATO to act more decisively in the conflict. The North Atlantic Council OF NATO arranged a meeting in London to discuss the way forward in Bosnia. NATO again warned the Bosnian Serbs that if any safe zones were attacked, that NATO would respond decisively. In a press statement, the NATO secretary General said "Today, following intensive work by the NATO Military Authorities, the North Atlantic Council has approved the necessary planning to ensure that NATO air power would be used in a timely and effective way should the Bosnian Serbs threaten or attack Gorazde. We have also invited the NATO Military Authorities urgently to formulate proposals on how this planning could be applied to the other Safe Areas, in view particularly of the current very serious situation in Bihac" (NATO 1995).

Although the Srebrenica massacre got NATO to change its strategy in the war, the Markale market shelling by Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo was what lit the fuse for NATO sustained air bombardments of both Serb military targets and Bosnian Serbs advancing on any safe zones in Bosnia. In response to the incident at the market in Sarajevo, NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force. It was meant to be a sustained aerial bombardment campaign to punish the Bosnian Serbs for yet another violation of international law. Ryan C. Hendrickson (2005, 3) describes the operation here in a brief but detailed manner: "Almost all the then 16 NATO Allies contributed in some way to the campaign, which involved a total of 3515 sorties and the dropping of 1026 bombs at 338 individual targets." Operation Deliberate Force represented a

colossal moment for NATO's involvement in the war. Its previous actions had been mostly retaliatory and deterrent but limited in scope and continuity. This was a game changing move as it forced the Bosnian Serbs to stop their advancement and get to the negotiating table.

The NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs in Operation Deliberate Force was not the only reason why the Bosnian Serbs gave in to negotiations rather than continue the war. A couple of other factors were at play as well. This war had always been very complex as it had so many pieces to it. While the Bosnian Serbs were waging war on Bosniak communities and areas marked as safe zones by the U.N., Bosnian Croats who at different times fought both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs started making advances on territories that had been occupied by Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Croats had at different times in the conflict fought on both sides. They basically fought for whatever side favored their interests at the time.

Just before Operation Deliberate Force began, the Bosnian Serbs had begun signaling that they might be ready to talk. They gave permission to Slobodan Milosevic who had cut ties with them some months back to talk on behalf of them with external mediators like the United States. From August 30, 1995, NATO warplanes blitzed the Balkans' skies, raining down bombs on Bosnian Serb strongholds and starving them of breathing space. As the NATO offensive continued, Bosnian Croats and Bosniak Muslims allied again to take territories held by Bosnian Serbs. It was the right opportunity to attack the Bosnian Serbs who had been pinned down by NATO airstrikes. These attacks by Bosnian Croats and Bosniak Muslims on Bosnian Serb held territories like Krajina were devastating to the Serbs. They lost about 1,500 square miles of Serb held land, and Bosnian Serb lands that had been about 72 percent of Bosnia were now reduced to about 50 percent (Pomfret 1995). With NATO constantly bombing Bosnian Serb positions, and an encroaching army of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims taking over Serb held lands in

Bosnia, the Serbs realized the handwriting on the wall and decided to agree to negotiations that would result in the end of the conflict.

It is important to note that although NATO had only been an assisting participant to the efforts of the U.N. before, that initial subservience to the U.N. also played a role in why NATO had not acted faster and in a more aggressive manner. Anthony M. Schinella (2019, 24) had this to say about the notion asserted above: "The drawdown of UNPROFOR troops and military observers from vulnerable outlying positions in Bosnia was a critical enabler for the NATO air campaign, substantially increasing NATO's freedom of action and giving the international community much greater latitude to initiate forceful intervention without fear of the hostage-taking debacles that had hamstrung NATO's attempts to use coercive air strikes in 1994 and earlier in 1995." Later on, in Kosovo, NATO had realized this obstacle and decided to wage the war against Milosevic on its own terms rather than that of the United Nations. As can be seen in analysis later on, the U.N.'s response was a disaster in Bosnia. In a 155-page report commissioned by the U.N., the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said, "Through error, misjudgment and an inability to recognize the scope of the evil confronting us, we failed to do our part to help save the people of Srebrenica from the [Bosnian] Serb campaign of mass murder" (Annan 1999, 111).

The Bosnian Serb capitulation did not come easy, though. After a few days of bombing, French General Bernard Janvier who was the commanding U.N. general in the war had negotiations with Bosnian Serb general, Mladic. They had agreed that the Bosnian Serbs would lift their siege of Sarajevo and withdraw their guns, ammunition and artillery. In return the NATO bombings would stop, the Bosniak Muslims wouldn't be allowed to retake Sarajevo and the U.N. would take control. The pause in NATO bombings also produced a lot of disagreements

between decision makers in NATO and those in the U.N. The NATO members wanted to continue the bombing without stopping till the Bosnian Serbs capitulated. The U.N. group, mainly Bernard Janvier, wanted to see his agreements with the Bosnian Serbs realized. This was not the case as the Bosnian Serbs continued their offensives and their siege of the city of Sarajevo. The bombing resumed after the Bosnian Serbs failed to keep their part of the agreement with Janvier. NATO did not only wage war with airstrikes although it was a major part of the NATO response. The use of artillery was also the case on the ground. Mainly British and French artillery pummeled Bosnian Serb positions that the airstrikes could not cover. The NATO shellacking of Bosnian Serbs continued until mid-September. The Bosnian Serbs gave in and decided to remove their siege machinery from Sarajevo and also agree to negotiations. With the Bosnian Muslim Croat alliance making huge inroads and NATO pounding the Bosnian Serbs to their knees, capitulation was certain. By late October of 1995 the warring factions were on their way to the U.S. to negotiate for peace and a resolution to the bloody conflict. A ceasefire was agreed between the sides on October 5th, but it would take a few weeks for a more significant agreement of peace to be instituted.

With a ceasefire and an end to the conflict in most areas in Bosnia, NATO was not done yet. Negotiations for a peaceful settlement started in October and lasted through November 1995. A final resolution was reached on November 21, 1995. This resolution meant that there were going to be governmental changes in Bosnia which would have it divided into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The country was going to be governed centrally with most powers delegated to the autonomous level. This accord that brought peace eventually to the region was called the Dayton Accords because it was officially signed in Dayton, Ohio, on December 14, 1995.

The signing of the Dayton Accords paved the way for NATO to carry out the second part of its mission and objective in the region which was to ensure peace in Bosnia. To do that, troops had to be deployed and so on December 4, 1995, NATO troops for the first time were deployed outside their original sphere of member countries. The troops that arrived in frigid conditions that day would be the first of a 60,000 strong NATO peacekeeping force that would arrive in Bosnia to ensure the peace.

The Dayton Accords and IFOR

The Dayton Accords were very significant for restoring peace to Bosnia. Looking back twenty-five years on from the end of the crisis, the nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is peaceful despite the miniscule ethnic tensions that still exist. The Dayton Accords have been a resounding success, way more than NATO and the international community dreamed they could ever be. For the Dayton Accords to be implemented successfully, NATO knew it had to deploy its troops to guarantee the success it envisioned.

The Dayton Accords consisted of several objectives. First, it sought to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into two autonomous principalities even though Bosnia and Herzegovina would still remain one country. The two autonomous principalities would be the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They would both share rotating presidencies but the major amount of the governing would remain in local hands. Under the Dayton Peace Accords, the organization tasked with ensuring peace and stability was NATO. The future hopes of the agreement was also the return of refugees to their homelands, but this took a few more years to be realized. The Accords also mandated that individuals who had perpetrated war crimes like rape, genocide and ethnic cleansing be given up to the Hague where they were to be prosecuted for their alleged crimes against humanity. This stipulation of the Accords meant that Ratko

Mladić, the Bosnian Serb general who had ordered the Srebrenica massacre, was on the run as he had been indicted by the Hague for war crimes. The agreement also sought to ensure the respect of human rights so as to avoid the violations that had occurred in the war. Another goal was to see disputes in the country resolved through peaceful legal means rather than violence. For this to happen, the weaponry on both sides had to be reduced significantly.

The Dayton Accords brought hope to a war torn and ethnically inflamed region and sought to achieve these goals of peace and stability, Operation Joint Endeavor was launched. This operation involved NATO's 60,000 troops and some other non-NATO troops. It is important to note that even though the largely ineffectual U.N. peacekeeping forces withdrew from Bosnia to give way to NATO peacekeeping troops, the Dayton Accords and NATO's subsequent operations received the full endorsement of the United Nations. In order to ensure this peace and stability, NATO formed the Implementation Force which were the 60,000 troops that had a one-year lease in Bosnia. Operation Joint Endeavor was very significant for many reasons. First, it was composed of about 2000 troops from Russia, which had been the primary foe of NATO for decades (Hendrickson 2005). This showed that the operation designed to ensure the peace in Bosnia was widely recognized and accepted in the international community, even amongst its former bitter rivals in Russia. Just like NATO military actions during Operation Deny Flights constituted many firsts for NATO, Operation Joint Endeavor also did the same. It was the first time that NATO had ever deployed troops *'out of area.'* It also was NATO's first ever ground combat operation. Operation Joint Endeavor was also NATO's first partnership with other non-NATO countries and countries in its own sponsored program called the NATO's Partnership for Peace which has helped promote peace and cooperation rather than war for settling disputes (Papacosma 1996).

With a deployment that lasted for only a year, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was very successful in implementing its objectives in accordance with the Dayton Accords. Zachary Marc Silberman (2014, 100) outlined the specific achievements of SFOR in Bosnia when he wrote "NATO improved its operations and nearly 723,000 refugees returned, oversaw open elections, captured and indicted 21 war criminals, and successfully removed 120,000 mines and 11,000 small arms."

SFOR for Long Lasting Peace

The Operation Joint Endeavor by NATO's Implementation Force's deployment brought an end to the fighting and a withdrawal of the armies of all the warring factions within a year, thereby drawing the curtain of war in the country to a close. The deployment of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) for a year in Bosnia had been successful and even ensured peace with elections held in Bosnia in September 1996. NATO realized that a peacekeeping force was still needed in the country longer to ensure tensions did not flare up again while giving the civil aspects of NATO's mission time to rebuild shattered political institutions. This gave birth to the force that would replace IFOR, and it would be called Stabilizing Force (SFOR). According to NATO, the mission of SFOR was to prevent the emergence of a new conflict between the formerly warring parties, to promote a climate conducive for peace and return of refugees to their original lands, and to assist the civilian organizations on the ground whose goal was to ensure peace, stability and peaceful elections (NATO 2020). SFOR was to consist of only about 32,000 which was just over half of the force size for IFOR. Despite the reduced size of the force, its presence in the formerly war-torn country ensured that refugees returned to their lands, that conflict abated and that war criminals were captured and sent to the Hague for trials. NATO's SFOR was slowly reduced in the following years and in 2004 the SFOR brought NATO's

military involvement in Bosnia to an end as it handed over peacekeeping duties to the European

Union's Euro Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Schinella 2019, 41).

Analysis

The Balkans was my main case study in the analysis of NATO's resilience and

effectiveness post-Cold War because the conflicts there were essential to the evolution that

NATO had to undergo to remain relevant. The Balkans proved to be a very formidable testing

ground for the will, tenacity, and effectiveness of the decade's old alliance. It represented a

transition moment for NATO from simply a neorealist military alliance to a constructivist co-

operative security organization. NATO's adaptation and evolution to its leading role in the crisis

was not smooth, but no matter how bumpy it was, it sure was a successful one. The Balkan war

had a potential impact on developments in other regions and conditions for continued stability

(Papacosma 1996, 5). NATO had to show up and respond in a way that was key to its moral

standing. Veronica M. Kitchens (2009, 106) captures the constructivist reasoning for NATO's

increased involvement and eventual full engagement in the Balkans: "The killing in Yugoslavia

had to be stopped not because it posed a direct threat to European or transatlantic security

(though it did pose an indirect one), but rather because it posed a threat to Atlantic sensibilities

and the narrative of the values-based identity." She further suggests that "The rhetoric of

responsibility and common values the allies used both justified the survival of the Atlantic

community and ultimately led them to a situation where they had to act in order to maintain the

identity of that community" (Kitchens 2009, 109).

Some experts argue that NATO at the time (1991-1993) was not well prepared to take on

a security role in the Bosnian war. Victor Papacosma (1996, 4) in his piece called *NATO in the*

Post-Cold War Balkans said "An alliance based on collective defense and conceived for the

international challenges of the Cold War, NATO had no prescribed charge in the Yugoslav situation." Papacosma (1996) doesn't deny that NATO had the military structure or resources needed to secure the peace in Bosnia and bring the belligerent sides to the table. He even asserts that NATO was however the organization that could doubtlessly produce the most conclusive results if it was called on to act assertively by its members. For Papacosma (1996), the strategic mission for the organization had to be redefined and given a clearer direction that accompanied the issues of the day.

Although NATO was ultimately successful in the Balkans, on further inspection of the crisis it can be ascertained that it had some minimal failures. The minimal failure of NATO in both Balkan conflicts, and specifically the Bosnian war, was the slow leggedness and initially tepid response that the alliance had to the conflict. NATO succeeded in Bosnia and Kosovo eventually, but more could have been done earlier that would have saved more lives and hence ensured a resounding success for the alliance in the Balkans. The issue was not whether the alliance had the capability to be effective. It certainly possessed that; the issue was if it could exercise that ability to achieve much needed results. NATO eventually did achieve the results of peace after the Dayton Accords agreement but could have accomplished more if certain bureaucratic and calculative thinking within the organization had been eliminated.

The Operation Joint Endeavor conducted after the signing of the Dayton Accords brought great repute to NATO. For an organization that before and during the early stages of the war was commonly discussed as having no relevance after the fall of the Soviets, it certainly gained a reputation as an organization capable of bringing about peace and political stability to war-torn regions. NATO could not just do it; it also had the capability and structure to successfully get it done. Phillip Gordon backs up my assertion here when he writes that NATO's role in the

Balkans was one that "arguably saved NATO from obsolescence in the 1990's" (Gordon 2002, par. 7).

One of the reasons for NATO's slow response to the crisis was the intricate complexity of the conflict and the moral and strategic calculations that the Western allies had to make in respect to the unfolding situation. From a moral perspective, would an alliance that based itself on the promotion of human rights, individual liberties, equality and democratic values turn a blind eye to the atrocities being committed by mostly Bosnian Serbs in the Balkans? Even though it was not a conflict right in their strategic sphere of influence, were the members of NATO going to merely make moral proclamations without actions to back up their assertions? When the crisis began, the decision to intervene or not was not a geopolitical choice. It had not become large enough to warrant a military response under the auspices of a threat to a member state. As the crisis grew into 1995, it was increasingly becoming geopolitical as well.

The Blame Game and an Initial Lethargic Response

Bickering and blaming amongst major alliance members were a constant feature of NATO's initial response to the war. This can be said to be NATO's main failure and a reason for objective analysts to criticize NATO's effectiveness in the mid 1990's. Veronica M. Kitchen (2010, 64) in her book called *The Globalization of NATO* said "The Yugoslav crisis was defined early on as an European problem. Initially, it was hoped that the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe's new conflict resolution mechanisms could be used to find a solution, but these hopes were quickly dashed in the summer of 1991."

Dana Allin (2002) links the slow and initial lethargic response of the NATO alliance to a concept called mutual paralysis. She says "Mutual paralysis even in the face of great evil - is in the nature of a democratic alliance. This suggests that crises must truly 'ripen' before outside

powers can come together to address them. Once they have ripened, however, much of the opportunity for an effective intervention will have been lost" (Allin 2002, 33).

One thing the big guns in NATO (U.S., Britain, France) all agreed on initially was that this crisis was one firmly in Europe's backyard and one not meant for U.S. intervention, hence not a NATO issue. If NATO was militarily involved, it is not a secret to know that the U.S. was going to be extensively involved. For every NATO operation, the U.S. was the commanding power in terms of logistics and assets employed. Later the U.S. would not back down from Europe as the U.S. could not help but get involved militarily and diplomatically, as the Dayton Accords in 1995 would bring an end to the genocidal civil war. Was the Bosnian crisis an opportunity to let European regional powers lead the way? Some analysts would argue that it was, and some out of a neoliberal tradition would argue against that. Going back to the point of the fact that all the major guns shared the view that this was a European problem, this was indeed true at the time. U.S. Secretary of State at the time, James Baker, famously said "One option is not to intervene at all: Our vital interests are not at stake, we've got no dog in this fight" (Schmookler 1996, 2).

The Europeans opposed intervention in part because of their definition of the conflict as a civil war, and they did not want the Americans to intervene in this conflict in Europe's backyard On this notion, Veronica Kitchen (2010, 66) says that "French policy was still tied up with Gaullist conceptions of grandeur, and the French were interested in building European security structures, independent of the United States, which afforded them a position of leadership."

The Americans, on the other hand, were very leery of using ground troops for a mission where the conflict did not directly threaten American or NATO interests. This created an intense debate about the use of airpower between the allies. Before 1993, President H.W. Bush was

guarded about involving U.S troops as he thought that he might have expended political capital

for a conflict with the invasion of Kuwait against Iraq. For President Bill Clinton, the Black

Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu where 18 marines were killed after their helicopter was shot

down by rebels had made him very leery of putting U.S boots on the ground. These events made

the Americans more open to relying on air power rather than ground troops to achieve their

military objectives. Veronica M. Kitchen (2010, 66) said it best about this discord between the

allies when she said, "For the French and the British, it was a source of constant irritation that

Washington, while apparently eager to join the war from the relative safety of the air, refused to

risk its own ground troops."

NATO and the UN in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This paper doesn't seek to stake out differences between the U.N. and NATO in

international politics, however I believe it would be a very significant omission to not elaborate

on the U.N.'s failures in Bosnia and the role that NATO played in changing the trajectory of

events in the region. A major difference between the actions of NATO in Bosnia and in Kosovo

is that the U.N. was heavily involved in the calculations of NATO'S actions in Bosnia. In

Kosovo, the aerial bombing campaign was done without the U.N. sanctioning the operations of

NATO. This speaks to the response and effectiveness of NATO in the different campaigns and

signifies a huge difference in how both campaigns are analyzed. In Bosnia we see that the U.N.

influenced NATO's actions in the war even though the influence of the U.N. was not the major

factor that got NATO to carry out sustained airstrikes against Serbian targets. The influence of

the U.N. on NATO's air activities was progressive. First, it started with NATO agreeing to help

support the UNPROFOR. After that NATO got more involved as it tried to implement U.N.

sanctions like flight zone restrictions and the maritime cargo inspections. After those actions did

not get both sides, especially the Bosnian Serbs to agree, it was the U.N. that again asked for sustained NATO strikes on Serbian and Bosnian Serb positions to bring an end to the war.

This show of influence by the U.N. on NATO shows that a larger international body can have a positive impact on the decisions and actions of a smaller but very powerful military alliance. In the war in Bosnia, NATO's effectiveness post-Cold War can be seen as it was the only viable vehicle that the United Nations called upon to carry out what it thought were its intended goals. Whether it was monitoring the import of arms into Yugoslavia to enforcing the sanctions that the U.N. had placed or sustained airstrikes forcing the Serbs to the table for discussion to enforcing the peace accords that had been agreed, NATO was the U.N.'s most effective ally in bringing about a peaceable solution to the crisis.

In Bosnia, NATO showed the world that it was a better vehicle for the achievement of political stability in a region. Despite all the shortcomings of the alliance, NATO as an organization had a better impact on the war because it had a better structure and more effective military capabilities. It could do things that the U.N. could not do on its own even though this is due to a wide variety of reasons. The U.N. was an utter failure in Bosnia as its own 155-page report indicated. NATO which had basically begun its involvement in Bosnia as an alliance to support the activities of the U.N. became the saving grace for the Bosniaks and the region at large. Srebrenica, the town that experienced the massacre of 8,000 people, was a U.N. designated "safe zone" guarded by U.N. forces when it was easily overrun by Bosnian Serbs who went on to commit the monstrous atrocity of genocide.

It is important to understand that the US played a huge role in NATO's decision to strike Bosnian Serbs who were advancing on Bosnian towns and cities. As the war raged on, President Bill Clinton wanted to escalate the air campaign on the Serbs and force them to the negotiation

table. When the U.S. decided to take on the reins of the leadership on the war through NATO from Britain and France, the organization saw a shift in how things were handled. While the Europeans wanted to see an expanded military footprint in addition to what the U.N. already had on the ground through its UNPROFOR, the Americans favored an airstrike campaign targeted at Serb positions that would severely weaken the Bosnian Serbs and bring about a peaceful solution. The difference in ideas on the topic of options have been explained above. The American policy that President Clinton used that brought about the Dayton Peace Accords is known as coercive diplomacy. For President Clinton, the use of force to bring about negotiation was the most effective tool to ending the war. The Dayton Peace Accords ended up being an effective agreement between Croatia, Serbia and the government of Bosnia.

NATO also showed its effectiveness in Bosnia in that it was and still is the only long-standing military alliance that is willing to use force to achieve peace and stability even though it has done so grudgingly. The U.N. showed itself as a very ineffective organization in sectarian conflicts such as the Bosnian crisis. The swiftness and lethality with which NATO was able to respond to the actions of the Bosnian Serbs shows that NATO is an alliance that is here to stay. In the U.N. commissioned report on the Bosnia Herzegovina war and the U.N. response, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan (1999, 111) said "The cardinal lesson of Srebrenica is that a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means, and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion."

Bosnia showed that the use of non-military methods doesn't always bring about desired results in conflict. This was also one of the criticisms that the Americans had for their European counterparts in the alliance. Dana H. Allin (2002, 21) in her book described it this way "Some

Americans argued - until it became a refrain that in the face of determined aggression, diplomacy

not backed by force was quickly revealed as empty posturing." There was a feeling among the

Americans that the Europeans were too pacifist in their approach as opposed to US President Bill

Clinton at the time who sought to engage in coercive diplomacy which involved using force to

achieve desired goals.

Chapter 7: A Case Study of Turkey and Its Threat to NATO's Alliance Cohesion

Mark Webber in his article "Thinking NATO through Theoretically" speaks about the two notions of constructivism, namely identity and norms, and how they influence alliance cohesion. Webber (2009, 22), speaking about identity and alliance cohesion from a constructivist perspective, says "the institutionalization of cooperation varies according to how far the members share a common identity. And from this a corollary then follows: where the object of cooperation reaffirms that identity, the cohesion of NATO will be strengthened; where, conversely, the object of cooperation undermines that identity, the cohesion of NATO will be weakened."

In speaking about the shared norms between NATO members he argues that "shared norms underpin the cohesion of NATO. If the norms governing member state behavior are respected then NATO will develop positively; if, conversely, these norms are repeatedly violated then NATO's development will be adversely affected. The future of NATO, in other words, depends on the continuous reaffirmation of its underlying norms" (Webber 2009, 22). If based on constructivist theories espoused by this thesis, NATO has persisted because of the common values its members share, what then does Turkey's drift away from those common values portend for the alliance? That is what this chapter seeks to uncover. In what ways has Turkey actively stepped away from the values that NATO as constructivist security organization champions?

One of the major challenges to the effectiveness and resilience of the trans-Atlantic alliance over the years has been the concept of cohesion. For an alliance that requires unanimous consent from all the member states before military operations are carried out on a large scale, cohesion is absolutely essential. Victor Papacosma (1996, 245) was precise when he said,

"Ultimately, NATO can only be as strong as the collective will and objectives of member-states allow it to be." Since the withdrawal of the French from NATO's integrated military structure, no other action by a member state has threatened the cohesion of an alliance like Turkey's recent anti-democratic actions have. Recently, Turkey which at times has the second largest army of the alliance has engaged in actions antithetical to the values and norms of the alliance. In this chapter those actions will be analyzed to determine how those actions affect cohesion within the alliance.

Steven Erlanger (2020, p.1) refers to Turkey's recent aggression as "NATO's elephant in the room." In that editorial piece, Steven Erlanger (2020, p.1) further says that "Turkey has become increasingly aggressive and nationalistic under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey has recently grown to become a thorn in the side of its NATO allies. For an alliance built on western values, Turkey, an integral partner has taken actions that has raised eyebrows and drawn a flurry of rebukes from its other NATO allies."

These actions of Turkey are being spearheaded by the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In a bid to ramp up support for his government as the country's economy roils in turmoil, President Erdogan has engaged in rhetoric and actions that have dismayed the allies. Turkey, although having a very sizeable Sunni Muslim majority, is a secular country. The man regarded as the father of Turkey and its first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, sought to reshape the image of Turkey in a secularism fashion and he did that successfully. He was determined to separate Turkey from its Ottoman past and he did that successfully. Today, President Erdogan chooses to go a different route in triggering Islamic and nationalistic sentiment as he presides over this Euro-Asian country.

In many different ways, Turkey's recent actions have made it at odds with NATO allies, and in a few cases a pariah. Expanding further on this rift will explain how the alliance has been

held together so far, what threatens the alliance's cohesion and if the bond that binds the NATO nations can be broken. NATO as an organization has always prioritized the promotion of democracy and individual liberty. NATO at its core is an institution built to fight for democratic values and norms. Rebecca Moore (2007, 41) said it best, when in her book, *NATO'S New Mission*, she said, "Although the defense of democracy and individual liberty has always been fundamental to NATO's mission, concern for individual rights now plays an increasingly prominent role in NATO's conception of security and, consequently both its political and military activities." The democratic values that NATO is embedded in is clear for all to see. However, Turkey under Erdogan has been drifting away from this and in the next successive paragraphs, the patterns Turkey is displaying that threatens the cohesion and the effectiveness of the alliance will be analyzed.

The first way that Turkey has departed from NATO's democratic values is in the arena of press freedom. President Erdogan and the government of Turkey have intensified attacks on the press and media that seem unfavorable to or are highly critical of the government. Although the attacks on the press started before 2016, in the aftermath of the 2016 short-lived and unsuccessful military coup in Turkey, censorship of critical media became all too common. Publications like the *Daily Zaman* were taken over forcefully by the government and its publication ceased thereafter. In response to these attacks on the media, then President Obama according to Politico made remarks on how he was troubled by the situation in Turkey. He was quoted as saying "there are some trends within Turkey that I've been troubled with. I think that the approach they've been taking toward the press is one that could lead Turkey down a path that would be very troubling" (Toosi 2016, par 7).

The second way Turkey has been departing from NATO's democratic values is the

refocus on nationalism and Islamist ideals of governance. Max Hoffman, Michael Werz, and

John Halpin (2018, par. 1) in their piece on Turkey's recent rise of nationalism state that

"Security threats and populist leadership have left Turkey in a defensive crouch and driven the

emergence of a new, conservative nationalism." In describing the situation on the ground, they

go on to state the following:

> President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan exercises near absolute control through the
> parliamentary majority of his Justice and Development Party (AKP), his influence
> over a politicized judiciary, and a stranglehold on news media and political dissent.
> President Erdoğan was further granted expansive emergency powers by Turkish
> Parliament in the wake of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. These factors have
> allowed Erdoğan and the AKP to rule by decree, sideline political rivals, and enact
> sweeping changes to the Turkish state, constitution, and economy (Hoffman, Werz
> and Halpin 2018, par. 1).

Any objective observer looking at these actions can clearly note that President Erdogan and the

AKP party have made Turkey a far more authoritarian state than it is a democracy.

Although not a full-fledged authoritarian state, as elections are still held, the shift towards

authoritarian values which is at odds with NATO values is clear to see. NATO's values are

rooted in liberalism and a desire for the free world to thrive. Todd Sandler (1999, 728) writes in

his piece titled *Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core* that "The requirements for

Partnership for Peace membership, a precursor to NATO membership, mandate that entrants

possess democratic principles and not have territorial disputes with neighbors." The existence of

a program such as the Partnership for Peace and the requirements for joining it as asserted by

Todd Sandler (1999) above shows that liberalism and democratic values are core to NATO's

belief system. It is what binds NATO as a co-operative security organization today.

President Erdogan has also made recent moves to stoke up support from his nationalistic

and Islamist base in the country. One such popular move was the decision to convert the famous

Hagia Sophia building into a mosque. The Hagia Sophia which was originally built by the Byzantines as a church served as an iconic structure for Orthodox Christians until the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453 and converted it into a mosque. In 1934 in the early days of the Turkish republic, it was converted into a museum and became a UNESCO historic site. On July, 10, 2020, the BBC reported that "the world-famous Hagia Sophia museum in Istanbul - originally founded as a cathedral - has been turned back into a mosque" (Guerin, 2020, par. 1). The decision made by President Erdogan and approved by Turkish courts signaled a growing display of highly nationalistic and Islamist tendencies that had been kept at bay for a while. The decision drew a lot of backlash from the international community, ranging from the Pope to the Russian Orthodox patriarch, the governments of the U.S and Greece, and many others.

The third way Turkey has departed from NATO'S democratic values is in its rhetoric to its perceived foes, those within the alliance or those outside of the alliance. First, Turkey in recent years has addressed its perceived foes within the alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is widely seen as a core alliance of the West. With the alliance being composed of North American countries like the USA and Canada and their European counterparts, the consensus on NATO says it is truly a hallmark of the West. Although Turkey has been part of NATO since 1952, President Erdogan's remarks about the West makes it seem like Turkey is an enemy of NATO and the West. President Erdogan in his bid to cement his power in the country has adopted a rhetoric that is very hostile to the West. This was done to strengthen his hold on both religious conservatives and nationalistic conservatives. This rhetoric was made very clear in 2014 when Erdogan in a speech to the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (COMCEC) said, "Only we can solve our problems. I speak openly; foreigners love oil, gold, diamonds, and the cheap labor force of

the Islamic world. They like the conflicts, fights and quarrels of the Middle East. Believe me, they don't like us. They look like friends, but they want us dead, they like seeing our children die. How long will we stand that fact?" (Presse 2014, par. 1).

President Erdogan loves to paint the West as the antithesis of what Turkey is, and what it should be and, in this way, he has sought to defy the Kemalist ideas upon which the modern-day Turkish Republic was founded. Those Kemalist ideals have allowed Turkey to be an integral member of NATO since 1952, but President Erdogan looks to have Turkey go alone in its own way. For Erdogan, the West is the source of all the ills that Turkey faces. He has laid the blame for Turkey's economic struggles on the West. In like fashion, he has attributed the rise of the Islamic State, the reemergence of the PKK conflict, and the military coup attempt of July 15, 2016 to the West.

Outside of NATO and Western institutions, Erdogan has really ratcheted up his rhetoric against the Kurds. His rhetoric here is even more dangerous because it has been translated into action several times. In October of 2019, DW (2019, par. 1) reported that President Erdogan "was threatening to clear out Kurds at the Syrian Border." For Erdogan, the YPG, which is the central unit of the Syrian Democratic Forces, is a wing of the terrorist group, PKK. For decades, the PKK which Turkey and others consider a terrorist organization has carried out attacks on Turkey, with Turkey also retaliating heavily. Although the YPG is linked to the PKK, it is not directly a PKK group and it has been one of the major U.S allies in the fight against ISIS.

Turkey's military expedition against the Kurds was eventually launched with Turkey driving deep into northwestern Syria and displacing thousands of residents in the process. The arrival of Russia in the area and the policy reversal of the United States made it harder for the Turks to make further inroads in Syria. The episode described above shows that Turkey under

Erdogan is willing to engage in population displacement, intense fighting and the creation of

instability to achieve its goals in the region. Max Hoffman (2020, par. 2) in his piece on

President Erdogan had this to say about Turkey under Erdogan: "Under his leadership, virulently

anti-Kurdish and anti-American positioning would likely remain a durable feature of Turkish

conservatism."

With such vitriolic rhetoric towards its perceived foes which sometimes translates into

action, Turkey makes itself increasingly at odds with its NATO counterparts. One question that

is established throughout this chapter is if Turkey can last long as a NATO member if it keeps up

this rhetoric.

In the aftermath of the July 2016 coup, President Erdogan and his AKP led government

began a clampdown on citizens of Turkey that were perceived to be linked to the coup. This

represents the fourth way that Turkey is diverging from NATO values. After the coup, the

Turkish administration cracked down on people who remotely seemed like they were connected

to Fethullah Gulen, a cleric who the government says was the mastermind behind the coup. The

harsh crackdowns and forceful purging of academics and clerics from their jobs without trials

show signs of an authoritarian regime, and this does not align with NATO's values.

The fifth and perhaps the most significant way that Turkey is misaligning itself from

NATO is in the area of military expeditions and arms trade. When it was first reported that

Turkey was looking into purchasing the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system, a lot of

negative backlash to the idea arose. NATO and more specifically the United State voiced very

strong objections with threats of sanctions against Turkey being thrown out as an option. Turkey

dismissed those concerns and went ahead with the expensive purchase of the Russian made S-

400 system. The main concern NATO and the United States have about the S-400 system is that

it was built specifically to target the stealth capability of fighter jets like the American F-35 jet. The United States was also worried that the use of both systems simultaneously would lead to the Russians having access to the covert American technology since Turkey also has and utilizes F-35 jets. This fear prompted U.S lawmakers to threaten sanctions against Turkey. Lara Seligman (2019, par. 2) reported that "Congress stopped short of imposing sanctions but signaled it may act unilaterally if Trump does not."

In response to Turkey's purchase of the S-400 missile system, the United States kicked Turkey out of the F-35 fighter jet program. An official statement from the White House released by the Press Secretary stated that "Unfortunately, Turkey's decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible. The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities" (Grisham 2020, par. 3).

The current United States' administration argues that it has been "actively working with Turkey to provide air defense solutions to meet its legitimate air defense needs, and that the Trump administration has made multiple offers to move Turkey to the front of the line to receive the U.S. PATRIOT air defense system" (Grisham 2020, par. 4). The statement goes on to indicate that "Turkey has been a longstanding and trusted partner and NATO Ally for over 65 years, but accepting the S-400 undermines the commitments all NATO Allies made to each other to move away from Russian systems" (Grisham 2020, par 5).

Dorian Jones through Voice of America News reported on May 7th of 2019 that NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg visited the Turkish government in a last-ditch attempt to dissuade the Turks from continuing their purchase of the S-400 system. Jones reported that "In an interview with Anatolia Agency, Stoltenberg said "Decisions about military procurement are for nations to

make, ……. But as I have said, interoperability of our armed forces is fundamental to NATO for the conduct of our operations and missions" (Jones 2019 par 2).

In further defiance of the United States and other NATO allies, Turkey began testing the S-400 missile battery systems against the American made F-16 and F-4 Phantom fighter jets. On October 6th of 2020, Arab News reported that "the visit of NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg coinciding with the emergence of footage showing the transit the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system through the Black Sea city of Samsun on Tuesday points to the tension between Turkey's defense priorities and the security of the transatlantic alliance" (Tokyay 2020). That move of course brought great displeasure to Turkey's allies in NATO. The backlash does not seem to influence Turkey's intentions and actions, yet it shows how the relationship between Turkey and its NATO allies is being severely strained. The purchase and eventual use of the Russian made S-400 system was a move the Turks knew would irk their allies and yet they chose to continue on that path. The question for the rest of the other NATO countries in the nearest future will be: "Do we keep backing down and only bark at Turkey's rogue and stray actions or do we apply harsh actions to hold them accountable?"

NATO knows that there is no justifiable way that the S-400 system could be incorporated into its defense systems. In fact, in order to fully operate these systems, Turkey has to bring in Russian experts to execute the operation of the missile battery system. For Turkey's NATO allies, this is a source of huge risk for NATO in terms of information sharing, alliance capabilities, secrets, and security.

The purchase of Russian weapons is not the only wedge between Turkey and its NATO allies. Tensions with Greece, which is also a NATO member nation, have flared up again. Historically, Greece and Turkey have had many clashes and even a full-fledged war from 1919-

1922. Recently, tensions have flared up due to a dispute of territorial waters and aggressive

drilling by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and also in waters around Rhodes, which is

a Greek island. With President Erdogan becoming increasingly assertive and aggressive, Turkey

has used drilling ships in waters that it claims as its economic zones, zones deemed by the UN as

territorial waters of other nations like Greece. These aggressive drilling adventures by Turkey

and arguments over maritime claims have brought the country to a tense standoff with fellow

NATO ally, Greece. All of a sudden, countries sworn to protect each other in the case of a

foreign enemy attacking are now threatening to go to war against the other. Joseph Hincks (2020,

par. 12) reported that "Greece's foreign minister Nikos Dendias accused Erdogan of advancing a

"neo-Ottoman" strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean as part of an "attempt to implement

expansionist aims against neighbors and allies."

Analysis

These aggressive actions and the antagonistic posture by Turkey has led many NATO

ambassadors to assert that "Turkey now represents an open challenge to the group's democratic

values and its collective defense" (Erlanger 2020, par. 6). Erlanger (Erlanger 2020, par. 7) goes

further to say "A more aggressive, nationalist and religious Turkey is increasingly at odds with

its Western allies over Libya, Syria, Iraq, Russia and the energy resources of the eastern

Mediterranean." This posture has led many in the alliance to question if the alliance is still

viable. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, due to this tenuous relationship has described

NATO as a brain-dead organization. This tension within the alliance has the potential to grow

into something bigger that could potentially threaten the future of the alliance if not resolved.

It is fascinating to note that it was not always this way. Turkey in the last 70 years has

had an essential relationship with NATO with both parties benefiting mutually. Turkish writers,

Müge Kınacıoğ'lu and Aylin G. Gürzel (2013, 590) argue that Turkey has had an active role within NATO over the decades that has mutually benefited both parties. "Turkey's active role in NATO's military operations as a dedicated ally has served Turkey by keeping its sense of prominence in the protection of the values of the civilized world; namely, the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law as indicated in the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty." With Erdogan, however, this once mutually beneficial relationship has become toxic. Any one studying this relationship can objectively assert that a resolution to this issue has to be generated sooner rather than later. The question then is what solution would that be?

Lucas Ratti (2009, 408) asserts that: "social constructivists regard NATO as a security community whose essential identity and cohesion is based upon common cultural and democratic bonds, not primarily upon a shared military threat." What then is the future for Turkey in NATO given that it is a security community with values as such described above. There is no clear answer to this, but the question is too big to ignore.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The subject of NATO is one too wide and extensive for one book or academic paper to cover. For that reason, I decided to focus my work on NATO's evolution and persistence after the Cold War, and how a change in its mission allowed it to be resilient in the Post-Cold War era. The analysis and conclusions from this thesis can help guide policy decision makers connected to the NATO community.

NATO's programs in the continent of Europe have allowed countries to carry out reforms that have made them more transparent, democratic and protective of minority and human rights. One could strongly argue that without the incentive of NATO membership, a lot of these eastern European countries may have not partaken in the necessary reforms that they undertook. Because of NATO, Europe is a lot more whole and a lot freer than what it was two decades ago.

An inquisitive reader of this project might want an answer as to whether NATO should continue in the post-Cold War era. As defined throughout the paper, this project suggests that NATO is a security organization that should continue, but an organization that could learn from previous mistakes in order to be a better and stronger cooperative institution going forward.

This paper sought to analyze the persistence and effectiveness of NATO in the Post-Cold War Era. It wanted to explain how NATO survived in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War and how the former Cold War alliance has stayed resilient despite predictions of its demise. The argument of this thesis is that it was NATO's shift from an emphasis on collective defense commitment to a constructivist security commitment in the post-Cold War era that best explains its resilience. Although the organization remains a military alliance in function, it is now driven mostly by its shared values and norms rather than a commitment to collective defense and security.

The threats to NATO since the end of the Cold War have ranged from out of area threats to non state actors like radical terrorists and state actors. Despite the organization's successes, the lessons from the failures, both large and small, can help steer the alliance in the right and effective direction in the future. NATO's accomplishments after the Cold War are laid bare for all to see. The alliance begrudgingly intervened in the Balkans to stop ethnic cleansing and brought peace to the region. It went on to respond to an invocation of Article 5 by its premier leading country, the United States, to play security roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. It launched an airstrike campaign to save innocents from a possible genocidal advancement by Muammar al-Gadhafi in Libya. It has helped save innocent lives in war torn regions in Africa and has responded to modern day threats like cyber terrorism and a host of other mini security threats.

The threats NATO has had to deal with after the Cold War have not all been of the same nature. In Afghanistan, NATO launched the International Security Assistance Force to help bring about security and stability in the mountainous country. They would also be involved in the War in Afghanistan fought against the Taliban insurgency. After the Balkans, the majority of threats NATO had to deal with were non-state actors like ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Through all of this, it was the common identity of the organization that defined its response. It was the shared norms and conception of what the international scene should be like that indicated the actions carried out by NATO. A constructivist view therefore best explains the resilience of the decade's old organization in the Post-Cold War Era.

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