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The Rise of Indian Nationalism

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Introduction

Reading about the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre always brings in different perspective depending on the nationality of the authors, with few exceptions. But the one thing that remains constant in most works is the rise of Indian nationalist movements after this event. This paper will examine the history behind the massacre and add to the discourse that this was a planned event by the British empire. This paper will also analyze Vol. II of the Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee source that has been available for 100 years and yet has been underutilized by the authors. Whether it is intentional or not could be argued, as the focus in the works researched for this paper has always been about the massacre and its instigator and not about the people. This paper will take one step towards focusing on the people from a social history perspective by adding a chapter focusing on that source. There has been some usage of the source by some authors (which will be shown further in this paper) but only to support the authors arguments. There has been nothing on it which gives the source justice in its usage in terms of social history or analysis of it. As this paper will have an overview of the massacre and the arguments made in those sources it will achieve the goal of summarizing the event while also having a special focus on the people that are left out of the narrative.

In 1919 Amritsar was the second most important city of the Punjab, with a population of 160,000 (One Lakh and Sixty Thousand). It was a famous religious town as the Golden Temple of the Sikhs was located there. Amritsar was also an important commercial center, but its trade had suffered due to the war and consequent price rise. The city had recently become important in a political sense as the Indian National Congress had established an office there. The 1919 All Indian Congress Committee annual meeting was scheduled to be held in Amritsar, and honor-bound to lead to greater political awareness within the city as it was led by Motilal Nehru (1861-

1931) president of the Indian National Congress.¹

Sunday, April 13, 1919, was the day of the Baisakhi festival, which marked the anniversary of the creation of the *Khalsa* or Sikh community.² Coinciding with the cattle and horse fair, this was the biggest *mela*, or Festival, in the province and every year it attracted thousands of visitors and pilgrims. Inside an open space, surrounded by buildings and a crumbling brick wall, a large Indian crowd of thousands had gathered around a Sikh man addressing his audience from a platform. There was a small, dilapidated temple within the square and few trees, and behind the rooftops, the unmistakable onion-domes of a mosque could be discerned. People were mostly dressed in varying white shades, yet the bearded men's colorful turbans provide a stark contrast to the drab grey houses behind them. Close around the speaker, the audience was sitting down while, on the outskirts of the crowd, people were standing or moving about, and a vendor was busy peddling his wares carried on a pole across his shoulder. Elsewhere in the city, an armored car emerged from a gate, followed by a military vehicle with two British officers in pith helmets and fifty Indian troops with rifles making up the rear. The cars and uniforms were all in the same khaki colors, and the slouch hat and pointed turbans of the troops revealed them to be Gurkhas and Baluchis. The engines' rumble merged with the soldiers trotting behind the cars' rhythmic sound as the column wound its way through the narrow streets of Amritsar. The commanding officer, the broom-mustachioed General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer (1864-1927) was sitting motionless in the car, looking straight ahead, as they drove past residents who stopped what they were doing and stared at the procession. General

¹ Savita Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 1919* (Surrey: Spantech and Lancer, 1998), 26

² Indian festival celebrated in by Hindu and Sikh mostly in Punjab and some parts of North India to welcome Spring Season. It is also the day that Sikhs celebrate the commemoration of the formation of Khalsa Panth of warriors under Guru Gobind Singh.

Dyer looked at the gathering and ordered the soldiers to fix the bayonets. As the first row of soldiers assumed a kneeling position, more people were getting up, visibly worried. Dyer gave an order to the Havildar-Major, and the double line of troops lifted their rifles to aim with one synchronized movement. After ignoring his inferior's request to give the public a warning, Dyer barked the order: "Fire!" All fifty troops fired simultaneously, and the sharp report of volley reverberated between the walls of the surrounding buildings. Panic set in among the people. Some tried to escape by scaling the wall, but Dyer promptly directed the fire towards them.³

Another important source to add to this narrative apart from the newspapers reports and the secondary work is an eyewitness account. A young kid aged 15, Lala Parmanand witnessed the event from the roof of a temple close by at a height of about 20ft. He mentions that a *Sikh* was addressing the gathering of about 20,000 and people were continuously pouring in to celebrate the *Baisakhi* festival. As he saw the *Gurkhas* armed with rifles forming two lines and pointing the rifles towards the crowd then he heard a sound of whistle followed by the report of firing lasting about 10 minutes. He went upstairs after the firing had ceased and saw 1,500 people lying wounded and dead all over the garden.⁴ This description aligns with most of the other descriptions that people saw from different location surrounding the *Bagh*.

April 13 is always remembered as the *Baisakhi* of death and an event that jump-started Indian Independence's movement from the British Empire.⁵ "It is important to remember that that massacre came after hundreds of thousands of Indians had fought alongside British troops in the First World War. At the time of the killings, Winston Churchill, British Secretary of State for

³ Kim A. Wagner, *Amritsar 1919: An Empire of Fear and The Making of a Massacre* (Yale University: New Haven, 2019), xiii-xiv.

⁴ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 93-4.

⁵ Religious festival in Hinduism and Sikhism. It is usually celebrated on April 13 or 14 every year since the sixteenth century to commemorate the formation of warriors under Guru Gobind Singh. The event is considered to be the harvest festival in Hinduism.

War, described the atrocity as a “monstrous event” that was “without precedent or parallel in the British Empire’s modern history.”⁶ The Bagh’s public meeting had been hastily arranged, showing the people’s spontaneous urge to lead a revolt against Britain’s Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, Sir Michael Francis O’Dwyer (1864-1940).⁷ He was the administrator in India at the time of the massacre. He was single-minded, dynamic, and skillful in organizing Punjab for the war effort.⁸ It is under his orders that Dyer executed this massacre.⁹

As a result of the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh, Secretary of State for India, Edwin Samuel Montagu (1879-1924) formed The Hunter committee. It consisted of honorable Lord William Hunter as President, Solicitor-General for Scotland and Senator of the College of Justice. Under him served the honorable Mr. Justice George Claus Rankin (1877–1946), the honorable Mr. Walter Francis Rice, Major-General Sir George Barrow, the honorable Pandit Jagat Narayan, the honorable Mr. Thomas Smith Sir Chimanlal Harilal Setalvad, and Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmed Khan. According to Mr. Montagu “the committee was chosen after the most careful consideration, with one single desire and motive, to get an impartial tribunal to discharge the most thankless duty to the best of their ability was, I maintain, such a body. I resent very much the insolent criticisms that have been passed either on the European Members, civil and military, or upon the distinguished Indian members, each of whom has a record of loyal and patriotic public service.”¹⁰

⁶ Emma Reynolds, Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 658 Parliamentary Debate House of Commons (6th ser) (2019) cols. 53WH.

⁷ Sir Michael Francis O’Dwyer (1864-1940), was born in County Tipperary. His Anglo-Irish background probably gave him pre-conceived ideas of his duties as lieutenant-Governor of Punjab. He was appointed to the post in December 1912 and held it until 1919.

⁸ O’Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–1940) May 25, 2006, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*

⁹ Raja Ram, *The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: A Premeditated Plan* (Chandigarh: Panjab University Publication Bureau, 1969), VII.

¹⁰ Official Report: Punjab Disturbances of Lord Hunter’s Committee, “The Parliamentary Debates: Army Council and General Dyer.” *Hansard Committee Debate*, London, 131, July 8, 1920.

General Dyer played a central role as he was the instigator of this Massacre of India's innocent people. While addressing the Hunter committee investigating his crimes at the Jallianwala Bagh, General Dyer stated "I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed, and I consider this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect it was my duty to produce if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand, the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral effect. From a military point of view, not only on those who were present but more specially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity."¹¹ The firing at Jallianwala Bagh continued without interruption for ten to fifteen minutes, during which 1,650 rounds were expended, killing an officially estimated 379 and wounding 1,200 men, women, and children. Dyer then immediately withdrew, leaving the dead, dying, and injured unattended.¹² According to Dyer (as he told in the Hunter Committee), this treatment was necessary to inflict a lesson that would impact India.¹³

The returning Indian soldiers from the First World War were supported by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Ji)'s (1869-1948) fury of non-violent marches and his political support by India's elites, like Jawaharlal Nehru, who later became the first prime minister of independent India in 1947.¹⁴ The soldiers felt betrayed by the Raj as their unarmed and peaceful families gathered to celebrate a festival were massacred, and the ones that could have been saved were

¹¹ Official Report: Punjab Disturbances of Lord Hunter's Committee, "The Parliamentary Debates: Army Council and General Dyer." *Hansard Committee Debate*, London, 131, July 8, 1920.

¹² Dyer, Reginald Edward Harry (1864-1927) May 24, 2008, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

¹³ William Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-20 Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate Disturbances in Punjab, Delhi and Bombay*, (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920), 8

¹⁴ Ji is written as a form of respect to the elders in the Indian Culture. As he is considered a Mahatma which is a great soul, I always write his name ending with Ji.; Encyclopædia Britannica, (2015), s.v. "List of Prime Ministers of India"; Official Report: Punjab Disturbances of Lord Hunter's Committee, "The Parliamentary Debates: Army Council and General Dyer." *Hansard Committee Debate*, London, 131, July 8, 1920.

left there to die.¹⁵ This brutality had shown to the people of India that their oppressors could no longer be tolerated, and they deserve a “Home Rule” in a world that fought for democracy.¹⁶ The Hunter Committee censured Dyer in support of Edwin Montagu but the question of whether to employ him or not was debated. This chapter will focus on the rise of Nationalism in India after this event and the spark that changed the British Empire’s fate forever while giving India her freedom in 1947. This chapter will further prove how it was a domino effect against the Raj, where they had to leave their dominance and slowly lost the Empire’s power. “Gandhi (Ji)’s joint efforts of non-violent movements and the knowledge of the English laws and military tactics with some of the violent protests by the revolutionaries like Udham Singh, who assassinated O’Dwyer, gave India the freedom she deserved.”¹⁷

It was not just the brutality of the massacre but also the brutal nature of the British towards anyone regardless of their age. An example of this is the statement from the youngest person, 13 years old Brij Lal. He was asked if he had given any statements before the police to which he said “Yes”, and he had to make the statement 20 days after the firing in Jallianwala Bagh when one Sub-Inspector and two constables came and took him to Kotwali. He was kept in custody there for 9 days and was never allowed to answer even call of nature without being attended by a constable. After being tortured to sleep on the bare floor and beaten and canned by constables he gave up and made a false statement to the Inspector stating that “If Hindus and Mohammadans (another name for Muslims) unite Government can do nothing”. This shows that the Amritsar Conspiracy Case was even though false, but people were being tortured to make it

¹⁵ Raj is a Hindi term which translates into the ruler/king/emperor/power. It was meant specially for the British as they ruled India for the longest time.

¹⁶ Encyclopædia Britannica, (2013), s.v. “Home Rule League.”

¹⁷ Singh, Udham (1899–1940) January 3, 2008, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

true in accordance with the hearing.¹⁸

During the Great War, Punjab provided 360,000 recruits, more than half the number provided by India's whole during the war.¹⁹ By the end of the war, one male Punjabi in every twenty-eight had been mobilized.²⁰ India's participation in the First World War as part of the British Empire carried profound implications from political, economic, social, and military perspectives. By December 1919, the Indians contributed a total of 1,440,437 (14 lakhs 40 thousand 437, 1.4 million) workforce, which comprised of 877,068 (8 lakhs 77 thousand and 68) combatants and 563,369 (5 lakhs 63 thousand 369) non-combatants. An estimated 239,561 (2 lakhs 39 thousand 561) men served in the British Indian army in 1914, making a total of 1,679,998 (16 lakhs 79 thousand 998) soldiers contributing for the war effort by the end of First World War.²¹ According to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission's annual report of 2007-2008, the soldiers identified burials were 8,054, and the soldiers that were commemorated on Memorials were 66,136. The total loss of life was 74,190 soldiers.²²

The contribution of the First World War towards the victory had not earned it respectability as a colony, but rather a burden of the poorer country. To those soldiers in Punjab, Jallianwala Bagh shattered the faith that the people had in the British sense of justice and fairness. To most native Indians, the unarmed massacre was a betrayal of the trust that they had placed on the British to rule them wisely, justly, and with fairness. "In the average Indian's eyes, the just, fair, and liberal Englishman suddenly turned into a ruthless, bloodthirsty tyrant who

¹⁸ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 64-6.

¹⁹ O'Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–1940) May 25, 2006, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

²⁰ O'Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis (1864–1940) May 25, 2006, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.

²¹ Santanu Das, ed., *Race, Empire and First World War Writing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 70.

²² Commonwealth War Graves Commission Annual Report 2007-08, July 31, 2008, 53.

could not be trusted.”²³ On this sense of betrayal, Gandhi (Ji) built his mass movement, which put a premium on breaking the rulers’ laws. It proved a spectacular problem on how to carry the Indian people in support of the war efforts. For the Indian leaders, it proved equally a complicated problem on how to support the government in its war objectives and fight for national aspirations.²⁴

According to a history study documentary written and directed by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), soldiering was an honorable tradition in India, and the British capitalized on this.²⁵ The British regimented India’s workforce as the backbone of their military power. Indian troops helped the British control their Empire, playing a crucial role in fighting for Britain right from November 1914 to 1919. Some recent research suggests that British rule had accomplished little for India in economic terms.²⁶

Indian soldiers returning from China, Egypt, France, East Africa, and Gallipoli after fighting the First World War under the British Empire felt the “othering” from the white soldiers as seen in the letters that they wrote to their families in India.²⁷ The letters also stated that they were treated like slaves because they were asked to do other soldiers’ chores and clean their quarters.²⁸ The returning soldiers saw the horrifying act of killing a non-violent crowd by an

²³ M. Venkaiah Naidu, “Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: The End Game,” *Mathrubhumi* (English Edition), April 13, 2019.

²⁴ Budheswar Patil, *India and The First World War* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publisher and Distributors, 1996), 1-2.

²⁵ Why was India so Valuable to the British Empire? Secondary Sources in British Broadcasting Corporation Teach, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/teach/class-clips-video/gcse-history-why-was-india-so-valuable-to-the-british-empire/zv2rwtY#:~:text=India%20was%20the%20jewel%20in,backbone%20of%20their%20military%20power.>

²⁶ Tirthankar Roy “The British Empire and the Economic Development of India (1858-1947),” *Revista De Historia Económica/ Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 34 no. 2 (2016), Cambridge University Press, 209–36.; Monica Roy, “Economic Impact of the British Rule in India,” *Indian History*, <https://www.historydiscussion.net/british-india/economic-impact-of-the-british-rule-in-india-indian-history/6317>.

²⁷ “Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?” TNA, Ref: IOR: MSS EUR F 143/86.

²⁸ “Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?” TNA, Ref: IOR: MSS EUR F 143/86.

English general whom they believed to be a close friend.²⁹ When the wives, daughters, sisters, and other family members were massacred in the name of disobedience in Amritsar, they observed this horror in disbelief.³⁰ In the witnesses' eyes, there could not be any justification that could be considered valid for General Dyer's actions, specifically the killing of the innocents in the name of obedience.³¹ After enduring the prejudice in the war, the returning soldiers from Punjab are horrified and angry as Dyer massacred the civilians of the *Bagh* gathered there for the *Baisakhi Festival*.³² The overarching theme of the war was Nationalism and the alliance of several countries, and Indian's felt betrayed as they were also part of Imperial society. At the same time, the soldiers had fought a war that had opposed Imperialism. The horrific massacre occurred between two World Wars, which makes the rise of Nationalism a crucial point in the literature of the last 50 years as the political aspect changed after the Indian independence from the British empire in 1947.³³ Consider, for example *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* by Manu Goswami published in 2004 and *Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgment, 1919-1920* by Helen Fein published in 1977.

Many scholars focus on Gandhi (Ji) as the center of the rise of Nationalism and his organization of the anti-British non-violent civil disobedience movement and the Gandhi-Irwin pact before the Second Round Table Conference in 1931 convened in London.³⁴ In this pact,

²⁹ Army Council and General Dyer, "Punjab Disturbances: Lord Hunter's Committee," *Commons Sitting*, July 1920, TNA.

³⁰ "Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?" TNA, Ref: IOR: MSS EUR F 143/86.

³¹ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol. II (Evidence), TNA.

³² Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol. II (Evidence), TNA.

³³ Helen Fein, *Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgment, 1919-1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1977), 72.

³⁴ Frederick G. Pratt, "The Indian Round Table Conference: Second Session," *Pacific Affairs*, 5, no. 2 (February 1932): 151.

Lord Irwin promised that if Gandhi (Ji) agreed to call off the Salt March campaign, which placed special strains on the British – not just because of the power that he had to organize millions but because civil disobedience may have slowed down the British offer to India for Dominion status that was given to the British Commonwealth nations.³⁵ The meaning of Dominion states that “The main characteristics of dominion status were complete legislative authority as provided in the Statute of Westminster (1931) and, in the executive sphere.”³⁶ While “Internationally, it connoted the recognition of the dominions (except Newfoundland) as separate states, entitled to separate representation in the League of Nations and other international bodies.”³⁷ As the countries that were once enslaved started to get their independence, “after 1947 the use of the expression was abandoned because it was thought in some quarters to imply a form of subordination, and the phrase “members of the Commonwealth” came into use.”³⁸

The Allies claimed they fought the war to make it safe for Democracy. According to Woodrow Wilson, “The real problem of Democracy, therefore, is how to devise and maintain in full efficiency the best means of intimate counsel between those who are to make and administer the laws and those who are to obey them...governments should retain their power as it is that [the citizenry] should be free...modern Democracy speaks always of the sovereignty of the people, and of rulers as the people’s servants...Modern Democracy is Government subject to systematic popular control.”³⁹ This news spread around the world. It was a powerful message that could easily be gleaned from the approximately 200 Indian English language newspapers.⁴⁰ From the

³⁵ Pratt, “The Indian Round Table Conference: Second Session,” 151-2.

³⁶ Encyclopædia Britannica, (2011), s.v. “Dominion.”

³⁷ Encyclopædia Britannica, (2011), s.v. “Dominion.”

³⁸ Encyclopædia Britannica, (2011), s.v. “Dominion.”

³⁹ Tony Smith, *Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 31.

⁴⁰ British Library, *Indian Newspaper Reports, c 1868-1942, from the British Library, London.* (Marlborough: Adam Matthew Publications, 2005), <http://explore.bl.uk/BLVU1:LSCOP-ALL:BLL01013361037>.

Indian perspective, however, the British had gone to war against the same people they had enslaved in the name of obedience and loyalty.⁴¹

The impact of race and racism was seen in many letters sent home to India, even after heavy censorship. On the one hand, the soldiers were grateful that they were serving their king in a war that was fought for freedom from the oppressors, while on the other, the soldiers felt the pressure and “othering” by the white soldiers.⁴² “Race and racism helped shape both the approaches of combatant nations to waging World War One and the experience of the war for millions of people among the European public and in European colonies in Africa and Asia. From the colour of their skins, to the content of their religious beliefs, colonized peoples’ attributes were of major concern to those making decisions about how and where to wage war. In fact, the very racial and cultural differences of non-European peoples gave European colonial powers a sense of entitlement to rule their colonial possessions in the first place.”⁴³

It is also imperative not to forget the terrible famines that devastated India. As the unrest among the Indians kept growing as shown above. These were partly the result of weather but partly caused by British policies. Food shortages came about because Indians were growing cash crops.⁴⁴ When famine struck in 1876-77 and 1899-1900, the Foreign Office was utterly overwhelmed and could not organize a significant enough relief effort. As well as these massive famines, there were many other smaller, more localized famines.⁴⁵ According to George

⁴¹ Harriet Sherwood, “Indians in the Trenches: Voices of Forgotten Army are Finally to be Heard,” *The Guardian*, October 27, 2018.

⁴² “Loyalty and Dissent: How did Indian Soldiers Respond to the First World War?”, Ref: IOR: MSS EUR F 143/86, TNA.

⁴³ “Race, Racism and Military Strategy”, British Library, 2014, <https://www.bl.uk/world-war-one/articles/race-racism-and-military-strategy>.

⁴⁴ Case Study 4 Background: Living in the British Empire, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) (Catalogue ref: Copy 1/59f.371).

⁴⁵ Case Study 4 Background: Living in the British Empire, TNA.

Harwood, in 1908 (Member of Parliament from Manchester), feeding the Indian population was the problem pressing upon the British. He stated that “in India, more than half the population were not only near the famine line but over it; and the nine-tenths of the working population were not fed. He did not see what could be done to avoid the famines that would occur almost yearly.”⁴⁶

The British considered the massacre as a singular event, and Derek Sayer’s insight is enlightening, in the words of Arthur Swinson, “This stems, I believe, from more than embarrassment in the face of one of the less glorious chapters in British history.”⁴⁷ “The construction of the Amritsar Massacre from the start as “singular and sinister” marginalizes it. There has been no need felt to agonize over Amritsar as in any sense a national shame because it is aberrant, in a category by itself, not part of the national history at all.”⁴⁸

The British passed the Rowlatt Act as an emergency measure to cope with the revolutionary outbreaks that British officials feared in India during the First World War.⁴⁹ Since the Sepoys were sent off to war and very few local police monitored people’s positions in Punjab and various parts of India.⁵⁰ The bills were focused on Punjab and Bengal as most protesters came from there, and there was anger amongst the people of Bengal because of the partition. The Rowlatt Acts, passed by the Imperial Legislative Council (the legislature of British India), allowed certain political cases to be tried without juries and permitted internment of suspects without trial and replaced the wartime Defence of India Act (1915) and were based on the report

⁴⁶ “British Rule in India: Mr. Harwood, M.P., On Some of The Problems Population and Famine India and Self-Government the Religious Question,” *The Manchester Guardian*, Feb. 24, 1908.

⁴⁷ Arthur Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of General Dyer and the Amritsar Affair* (London: P. Davies, 1964), 45.

⁴⁸ Derek Sayer, “British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920,” *Past and Present*, 10, (1970): 132.

⁴⁹ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol. I (Report), 1920, 24.

⁵⁰ Sepoys are the British way of saying *Sipahis*, which means soldiers.

of Justice S.A.T. Rowlatt's committee of 1918.”⁵¹


Gandhi (Ji) opposed the bills in a *Satyagraha* pledge that said, “Being conscientiously of opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, No. I of 1919, and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill, No. II of 1919, are unjust, subversive of the principles of liberty and justice, and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals on which the safety of the community, as a whole, and the state itself, is based, we solemnly affirm that, in the event of these Bills becoming law. Until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit. We further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.”⁵² Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the discontent caused by the city's many problems. It is possible to understand the use of such powers when all available fighting material had been removed from India to the battlefields of France and Mesopotamia, and when India's internal peace had to depend largely upon the loyalty and the peace-loving nature of the people.”⁵³

⁵¹ Encyclopædia Britannica, (2014), s.v. “Rowlatt Acts.”

⁵² Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, 26.

⁵³ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, 24.

Historical Analysis and the Undervalued Source



This chapter will focus on one of the most undervalued sources which has, though not entirely, but been overlooked by the authors. The Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub Committee of the Indian National Congress Vol II includes interviews from more than 500 people located in and around Amritsar during the month of April and March. These interviews are from people that either experienced the massacre firsthand and survived to tell the story and the people that were around Jallianwala Bagh during the Massacre. The interviews were conducted from different age group and different professions to provide a better understanding of the emotions of people. The age differentiation is from 13 years old to 75 years old.⁵⁴ One exception of *Kishan Singh* whose age is not provided but should be around 12 years from the information given.⁵⁵ The interviews also contain people from different professions, some are Barristers while some were shopkeepers around the Bagh. Some were students in universities and schools in Amritsar. There were also wives and fathers of the people that were killed, and their bodies were identified.

This source has been used by very few authors and still only a fraction of these interviews

⁵⁴ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 64 and 73.

⁵⁵ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 296.

has been utilized. Authors like Lloyd have only focused on it to support their argument about the horrors of the Massacre.⁵⁶ It is not utilized to its complete extent from a Social History perspective where the history can be looked at from bottom up. It has been used as a secondary source to substantiate the authors argument. Whether it is to support the horrors of the event or to show the unjust nature of the British Empire towards the Indians in the form of Rowlatt Act.

In this chapter, the focus will be to understand what the massacre meant to the people in Punjab and surrounding states and to prove that the rumors about retaliation were false. The rumors which is the basis of passing the Rowlatt Act. The interviewers were the members of the commission that included Mr. M. K. Gandhi. People were asked a series of different questions to know the details of their whereabouts and showcase the injustice and false information that British sources have provided. Questions were as simple as “where were you on the 10th of April?”, to “Kindly tell us what happened on the 13th?” and depending on the answers they were asked “Up until then, did you hear of any movement amongst the people in the villages to loot the city of Amritsar or to damage Government property in any way?”⁵⁷ Provided below are some of the interviews in their partial form focusing on the questions that matter to the *Satyagraha* movement, Rowlatt act and Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. An attempt to look at nationalism and or rebellion sentiment will be done if there is a clear answer towards it in the interviews.

There are also interviews from the Surgeons and assistant surgeons that noted the people being shot as they were running away or climbing over the walls which enclosed the Bagh. The examination of the wounds also led the Surgeons to believe that this must have occurred in the majority of cases.⁵⁸ The interviews are not only from Amritsar but, the same scenario was told

⁵⁶ Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, xxiii.

⁵⁷ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*.

⁵⁸ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 113.

by the people of Lahore and other cities going as far as Gujrat and Ramnagar.⁵⁹ One interview is from a Medical Practitioner, Dr. Gopi Chand, in Lahore where he lists the patients and their wounds on the day of the event as well as during the Martial law on 15th. He describes the wounds and their location starting from the tongue with three broken teeth going down to a punctured wound over the scrotum. Some wounds looked like they were probed by someone, probably in an attempt to remove the bullet that was One and a half inch deep. He treated kids below 12 with broken ribs while some older people had even lost their eye to the point that the eyeball was protruding. The wounds were 4” long, 2” wide and about 1” deep.⁶⁰

The history of the Amritsar massacre is analyzed by looking at articles and books from the sixties, with the exception of B.G. Horniman’s work, up until the twenty-first century as the secondary work regarding the massacre is written from sixties.⁶¹ Horniman’s work is included as it provides an immediate analysis of the event which is important to note as it is coming from a British nationalist perspective supporting Indian nationalism. The information before sixties is explained and analyzed in the sources mentioned below and for a proper analysis secondary sources will be used. There are several primary sources that are scattered all across the libraries in different parts of the world, but I found the most useful of the sources at Kew which was underutilized by the authors that will be mentioned in the final chapter. The focus on writing about the Massacre grew in the twenty-first century as the 100-year anniversary was closer. The political discourses started to include the remembrance of April 13, 1919, to attract a broader audience’s attention. There is no clear indication of why this happened, and it is too early to

⁵⁹ Gujrat is part of Pakistan now after the 1947 separation.

⁶⁰ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 226-8.

⁶¹ The works before the sixties will be excluded in this paper as I want the focus to be heavily on the massacre and works regarding it. I will also be excluding works relating heavily on Churchill’s views to avoid making the paper broad.

know a pattern. One notable news item that could have ignited the attention was when Theresa May expressed her regret calling it a “shameful scar.”⁶² However, the prime minister’s comments stopped short of an official apology, which Indians have been asking for since 1919. There have been ongoing debates in the House of Lords regarding the same.⁶³ It has been 101 years now and though academic discourse has changed enormously, it has been in the form of minute changes in the approach of authors as India’s social and political environment evolved from a British colony to an independent country.

There are several viewpoints of the Massacre and since the official inquiry began only after over five months, many relevant details would have either been obscured or forgotten.⁶⁴ The majority of the researchers are either Indian or British, but this incident has also been researched by some Americans and Canadians, showing its international importance. It is possible to see distinctive trends among these historians because none of the Indian historians justify the shooting.⁶⁵ The various descriptions of the shooting often contradict each other. There is no authoritative, fully substantiated account that stands out, but the nationalism and influence in perspective sway the version. The only exception to this is B.G. Horniman, whose book *Amritsar and Our Duty to India*, published in 1920, condemns the Massacre.⁶⁶ Being a British writer, such an attitude is seen only in Indian authors and not the other way around. B. G. Horniman was a journalist working for a pro-independence newspaper Bombay Chronicle and supported Indian independence, hence condemns the massacre. His main theme were complete

⁶² “100 years on, Britain says Jallianwala Bagh Massacre a ‘shameful scar’,” *The Statesman*, April 11, 2019.

⁶³ Reynolds, “Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 2019; “21st Century House of Commons Hansard Sessional Papers”, *House of Commons Hansard*, 366, 2001.

⁶⁴ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 1919*, 10-11.

⁶⁵ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 10.; Brian Bond, “Amritsar 1919,” *History Today*, 13, no. 10 (1963): 668.; Ian Duncan Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer* (Chandigarh: Unistar books, 2006).; Arthur Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of General Dyer and the Amritsar Affair* (London: P. Davies, 1964).

⁶⁶ B. G. Horniman, *Amritsar and Our Duty to India* (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1920).

freedom and parliamentary democracy for India.⁶⁷ Since the book is published in 1920, which is only a year after the incidents, nationalism does not play a large role in the book but is approached from his personal experience. Before going into the actual event, there is some background information needed to understand the situation.

The historical and geographical importance of the Punjab has been very rich. It may be considered one of the most important provinces of India. It was here that the Aryans of Vedic times first made their home. It was here that the hymns of the Rig Veda were first chanted. It was to this province, at the great University of Taxila, that seekers after knowledge flocked from various parts of the world. It was in this province that the Pandus and the Kaurus, the great heroes of the Mahabharata, fought out their great battles. It was here that Osiris, King of Egypt, first touched Indian soil and Semiramis, Queen of Assyria, who at the head of her vast armies tried her fortune for the dominion of India, suffered a crushing defeat. The Scythians and Tartars and Persians had to measure swords with the sons of Punjab in their attempts to penetrate into India. It was in this province that Alexander the Great, though victorious, for the first time met a foe, under King Porus, who shattered his dream of a worldwide dominion.⁶⁸ The Punjab was a vital region of British India, partly because of its religious diversity, which incorporated substantial numbers of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. It also had to be a strong strategic point as the province bordering Afghanistan. During the war, disaffection had visibly grown in Punjab. Some blame this on the strict administration of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab. He ruthlessly suppressed the Ghadr (Ghadar/Gadar- rebellion) movement in 1914, which had been launched by Sikhs in North America, and severely restricted the Indian press

⁶⁷ "B. G. Horniman," India Video: Visual Gateway to India, <https://www.indiavideo.org/text/b.g.-horniman-1083.php>.

⁶⁸ "Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress," National Archives, 1, TNA.

after the movement in 1914. About a third of all Indian army recruits came from Punjab during the war, a suspiciously high figure. O'Dwyer's recruitment methods were often criticized. Many claim that bribery, corruption, and force were used in enrolling recruits.⁶⁹

Horniman stated that O'Dwyer held a "reign of terror" over Punjab and his deliberate plan of concealment.⁷⁰ Which is also seen in one of the interviews of the Secretary of Punjab Mutual Hindu Family Relief Fund, Lala Tola Ram, "In my opinion, Lahore did nothing to warrant the application of Martial Law. Lahore acted in the true spirit preached by Mr. Gandhi. There was no conspiracy whatsoever. The whole thing was a reign of terror and a continuous agony for the law-abiding and peace-loving citizens."⁷¹ This proves that the nationalist identity grew amongst people of Punjab and in surrounding places when hearing the news about the Massacre and the unjust nature of Martial Law after that. This view was also substantiated by Indian historians like V. N. Datta and Raja Ram, who see O'Dwyer's harsh rule as a direct cause of the Punjab disturbances in 1919.⁷² Raja Ram goes even further in stating that this was a premeditated plan by the British under O'Dwyer's supervision in Punjab. However, many British writers, most noticeably Colby, Swinson, and Bond, disregard this factor as seen in most authors, and newspaper articles published in Britain. In this, they follow the lead of the *Majority Report* of the Hunter Committee, which firmly stated that O'Dwyer's recruitment campaign had no connection with disturbances.⁷³ There were also other hardships outside human control, which contributed to the general state of discontent in Punjab. The worst outbreak of malaria since 1908 hit the region in the autumn (Fall) of 1917. Simultaneously, Influenza ravaged the province

⁶⁹ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 17.

⁷⁰ Horniman, *Amritsar and Our Duty to India*, 14.

⁷¹ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 246.

⁷² V. N. Datta ed., *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances In 1919: Volumes VI and VII of Disorders Inquiry Committee Evidence* (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1960).; Ram, *The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*.

⁷³ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, 7.

claiming a million lives, which will be discussed later in the paper.

A significant number of reasons for discontent and confrontation within Punjab existed in 1919, but most importantly, a fundamental change had occurred within Indian Politics. As Helen Fein stated, “Not until the second decade of the twentieth century was the British Raj challenged by a concerted drive for self-government on the part of the Indian political Elite.”⁷⁴ The British response to the Rowlatt agitation signifies that they were unaware of the changed political atmosphere. Their use of force and repression instilled in the new political elite even more determination and gave all Indians a reason to unite against the Raj.⁷⁵

The satisfactory account of the incident can only be understood by looking at several different arguments made by people worldwide. Since this event attracted historians and authors from other parts of the world, it gives us a perspective that cannot be overly biased towards one nationality. Next, we will try to understand what caused the Massacre and was it one incident that happened quickly or was it a succession chain of events that led to it.

Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the discontent caused by the city’s many problems. The plight of Miss Sherwood is an incident particularly emphasized by imperialist writers. An attack on a woman was viewed as much more terrible than an assault on a man. She was also an upstanding citizen who in no way provoked her attackers. Her experience is often sensationalized to show how wild and lawless the crowd was. Swinson described the scene dramatically: “Somehow she managed to rise and ran on a little way, but the mob, howling and screeching like savages, returned to the attack.”⁷⁶ This helps to build up to a justification of Dyer’s action. Miss Sherwood’s suffering can also be an explanation of Dyer’s

⁷⁴ Helen Fein, *Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgement, 1919-1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1977).

⁷⁵ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 21.

⁷⁶ Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset*, 28.

harshness, as noted by Draper. “The safety and protection of the women in the event of an explosion was drummed into him [Dyer] so well that it almost became an obsession.”⁷⁷ Dyer was appalled by what had happened to Miss Sherwood and wanted to prevent any more similar occurrences. It could be that this concern helped him justify the shooting at the Jallianwala Bagh, in his mind, at least.

British writers also tend to treat the event as singular, even those who attempt to justify the action, and therefore should see no reason to marginalize it. Arthur Swinson, however, realized that the massacre was, in a sense, inevitable. “What Amritsar exploded was the coy myth that one nation could govern another in a decent, civilized manner; it showed that sooner or later, domination led to barbarity.”⁷⁸ Generally, though, British writers stuck to considering the event solely in relation to Dyer and the occurrence of April 1919, rather than as part of the imperial system.⁷⁹

Related to the disagreement over whether Dyer’s actions were singular or not is the debate over Dyer’s motives for ordering the shooting. Dyer himself seems to have been confused over the issue. In this report, he wrote to his superiors on April 14, and he stated, “I realized that my force was small and to hesitate might induce an attack. I immediately opened fire and dispersed the crowd.”⁸⁰ This motive is substantiated by evidence in *A Letter from India* by Edward Thompson. After dining with Irving one evening, Thompson asked him what Dyer had said to him after the shooting. Irving replied casually that Dyer came to me all dazed and shaken up and said, “I never knew there was no way out.”⁸¹ He explained that when the crowd did not

⁷⁷ Alfred Draper, *Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj* (London: Cassell Ltd., 1981), 22.

⁷⁸ Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset*, 205.

⁷⁹ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 49.

⁸⁰ William Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-20 Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate Disturbances in Punjab, Delhi and Bombay*, (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920), 28

⁸¹ Edward Thompson, *A Letter from India* (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1932), 102.

scatter but held its ground, he thought it was massing to attack him, so he kept firing.⁸²

Dyer's story, however, was not the same in front of the Hunter Committee. Then he claimed that "if they were coming to defy my authority after all I had done that morning, I had made up my mind that I would fire immediately to save the military situation."⁸³ Instead, the self-defense motive had disappeared, and General Dyer claimed that he had decided to take drastic action before arriving at the Bagh to produce a moral effect. Rupert Furneaux's theory that Dyer's judgment was damaged in the Jallianwala Bagh incident by arteriosclerosis, the condition which finally caused his death, depends on the belief that Dyer imagined that the crowd was about to attack him and his troops.⁸⁴ He tries to account for the change in Dyer's explanation of his motives by stating that the effect of the "hero" status, the passage of time, and belief that the later explanation was more valid made him change his story.⁸⁵ Raja Ram, however, disregard the self-defense theory, which would make the whole incident the result of a misunderstanding, and believe that the shooting was planned and deliberate.⁸⁶ The necessary acceptance of this motive makes the affair controversial: Dyer is either a hero who saved Punjab from rebellion or a figure of brutal repression.

Raja Ram claims that Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, thought out a stratagem consisting of two successive stages: to provoke the innocent masses to commit violence somehow, and then make that a pretext to pounce upon them and crush them through force.⁸⁷ Though Raja Ram tries to prove the existence of this conspiracy theory, his argument is not very convincing as there are not many sources to support his argument.

⁸² Thompson, *A Letter from India*, 102.

⁸³ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee of the Indian National Congress* (Lahore: K. Santanam, 1920), Vol. III, 126

⁸⁴ Rupert Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), 164.

⁸⁵ Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar*, 178.

⁸⁶ Ram, *The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 138.

⁸⁷ Ram, *The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 138-9.

The possibility of a plan put together by British officials was considered and investigated by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress. Still, the members of that committee could not find enough evidence to claim that a plot existed in their report. None of the Indian writers condoned the violence of April 10. But it also does not give the British writers an excuse to claim that European lives are valued more than the Indian lives as seen in Draper's work.⁸⁸ The circumstances surrounding the deaths of both nationalities were indeed different, but that does not disregard that Indian lives were taken. At the same time, they were in a non-violent protest, the protest happened because the British captured their leader. After killing twenty to thirty Indians, the rebellions were enraged and acted the same way the British acted with them in violence.

Suppose no-one except Dyer was involved in the planning and motivation behind the incident. In that case, it can be considered as a one-off event carried out by one man and therefore marginalized. However, a piece of writing by George Orwell can be used to throw light on many of Dyer's motives for carrying out the shooting and to show that it did stem from the widely held attitudes of the British in India. In "Shooting an Elephant" George Orwell recalls an incident that occurred while working as a sub-divisional police officer in Burma. The event he describes involves an elephant on the rampage, which he is expected to shoot. By the time Orwell arrives on the scene elephant has quietened down, so there is no real reason for it to be shot. Orwell states "every white man's life in the East, was one long struggle not to be laughed at."⁸⁹ He also concludes that his primary motive for finally killing the elephant was "to avoid looking a fool."⁹⁰ In the British struggle to retain a superior pretense, and therefore paternal

⁸⁸ Draper, *Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj*, 65

⁸⁹ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 42-3.

⁹⁰ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 43.

(authoritarian) justification of India's domination, saving face was fundamental. It was a primary concern for Dyer, as he showed in the evidence to the Hunter Committee. "I could disperse them for some time, then they would all come back and laugh at me, and I considered that I would be making myself a fool."⁹¹ This may seem like a ridiculous reason for shooting hundreds of people but being laughed at was not a fear peculiar to Dyer. They were, in fact, commonplace among the British in India.⁹²

In front of the Hunter Committee, Dyer claimed that his actions were deliberate. "I had issued this proclamation, and it had shown that I tried to prevent them from meeting; therefore, when they disobeyed law and order, I shot."⁹³ Once again, Orwell can throw light on why Dyer chose this line of argument. "A sahib (someone who is considered elder/ a leader amongst everyone) has got to act like a sahib; he has got to appear resolute, to know his mind, and do definite things."⁹⁴ The British in India could not afford to make mistakes; they had to appear in control at all times to maintain the face of authority. Perhaps Dyer realized the importance of these factors in preserving the British Empire and changing his story accordingly. The two incidents' targets could not be more diverse — thousands of people in contrast to an elephant — but the reasons behind the shootings are very similar. This suggests that the values that caused Dyer's actions were not unique. They seem to have been typical of the British in India. Therefore, the event cannot be written off as singular.

Miles Irving, Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar District responded to this event on April 18 by issuing a notice that stated "the government is sorry that some innocent persons were seduced by wicked people to go there and got killed. But everyone should bear in mind that

⁹¹ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol. III, 117.

⁹² Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 81-2.

⁹³ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol III, 131.

⁹⁴ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 43.

obedience to the order of the General *Sahib* (Sir) is obligatory, and the General *Sahib* will not, in future, put up with any kind of unrest.”⁹⁵ It also stated that “false rumors have been going around and it is the duty of the Government that the real facts are known.”⁹⁶ While there were people that had heard of this proclamation and thought it to be a scare tactic while some believed it and did not go. But, most of all did not know or hear any proclamation because it was not read everywhere. The Bagh had people coming from as far as Ramnagar which is more than 200 kilometers (136 miles).⁹⁷

In the 1960s, sources focused on Gandhi (Ji)’s political philosophy and his teachings and a growth of non-alignment in the world affairs under Jawaharlal Nehru. The author W. H. Morris-Jones in his article “Mahatma Gandhi - Political Philosopher?” though he denies that he was not evaluating Gandhi (Ji)’s life and does not associate with his teachings, he does consider Gandhi (Ji)’s moral judgments and behaviors in South Africa and India. Morris focused on Gandhi (Ji)’s life after The Rowlatt Bills, followed by the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in 1919 while emphasizing that he lived his life mostly under the Union Jack. He is mainly citing from the court hearing statements that Gandhi (Ji) had given in 1922 when he was sentenced to six years of imprisonment because of his sedition against the British government. This article critiques Gandhi (Ji)’s life and his political decisions heavily which helps us in understanding the political environment as he becomes the leader of Indian nationalist movement.

Though the author does not favor the decisions, he acknowledges that these were few of the many choices made by Gandhi (Ji).⁹⁸ The author questions Gandhi (Ji)’s use of the

⁹⁵ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 119.

⁹⁶ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 556.

⁹⁷ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 556.

⁹⁸ W. H. Morris – Jones, “Mahatma Gandhi - Political Philosopher?” *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 21, no. 3 (September 1960): 208.

Satyagraha movement and what that meant. Gandhi (Ji) used this movement to show that his fight is with the evil itself and not with evil-doer, in this case, the British Empire. While Morris-Jones agrees that this was in benefit of the Indian Nationalist movement, he does not agree with it, stating that “One of the consequences of this view was Gandhi (Ji)’s insistence that the resister must always be willing to negotiate, for the end of non-violent struggle is always an agreement, never dictation, much less humiliation of the opponent.”⁹⁹ While Nehru’s approach associated with the policy is explained in Damodaran’s article. Damodaran makes him a prophetic figure and yet focuses on the relationship between Nehru and Gandhi (Ji) to understand the moral basis of Indian Nationalism whereas Morris-Jones do not focus on the contribution of Nehru as much. Damodaran’s focus is not only to showcase that the Nehru-Gandhi relationship was strong, but to highlight the effects that Nehru’s movements had even though seeing some failures in overall political environment of the country. His view of their strengths as “The Gandhian contribution to this fascinating political experience was not only non-violence, but also morality and good faith; Nehru’s assets were information, sensitivity and awareness of the less well-known aspects of foreign policy issues, in other words, a certain breadth of vision, a magnitude of tolerance. Such a combination of attitudes finds it impossible to accept ideological differences as absolute and military confrontation as inevitable.”¹⁰⁰

Writing in the 1970s are focused on the events that happened in Amritsar before the Massacre. Authors were justifying in a way the nature of the crowd being peaceful. Though there is no mention of Raja Ram’s work suggesting the Empire’s planning nature, the pieces are written, indicating a chain of events that led to the Massacre. Helen Fein states that the “crowd

⁹⁹ Morris – Jones, “Mahatma Gandhi - Political Philosopher?”, 216-217.

¹⁰⁰ A. K. Damodaran, “Jawaharlal Nehru and Non-Alignment,” *Indian Quarterly*, 39 no. 1 (January – March 1983): 44.

milled around the bridge,” which suggests a lack of organization or real direction on the crowd’s part.¹⁰¹ Fein, the American author, seem to agree with Indian views over the crowd’s nature. The opinion is backed up, to a certain extent, by an official document entitled *Reports on the Punjab Disturbances*, which states “the crowd passed several Europeans on the way (to the Hall Gate Bridge) but did not molest them.”¹⁰² This proves that between going to the bridge and leaving it, the crowd’s character changed and the most obvious explanation for this is the shooting.¹⁰³ Which explains the Dyer’s planned nature of the massacre as explored by Raja Ram in his work.

During the 1980s, the topic was approached differently because of the economic reforms that were ushering in the country as Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister for her second term. The focus on Punjab became central because of the riots of 1984. Punjab has faced several problems under British rule with the Massacre being the biggest attraction. Then as the partition between India and Pakistan happened in 1947, it was Punjab that was divided and in turn created riots among the Sikh and the Muslims of India. The sentiment and the history behind the riots are explained in Cynthia’s article where she connects the contribution that Punjab has had in Indian Nationalism and the clashes with Indians politics.¹⁰⁴ Ian Talbot’s book *Punjab and The Raj, 1849-1947*, though, does not focus on the Amritsar Massacre but showcases the close relationship that the British had with their allies, especially India. His focus on *Punjab* (Sometimes written as Panajab in his work) helps understand why there were most soldiers in the Indian Army from this state. He focuses on the Unionist Party and the importance of local powerholders as collaborators with the Empire. He explores the provincial and communal

¹⁰¹ Fein, *Imperial Crime and Punishment*, 41.

¹⁰² Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, VolIII, 3.

¹⁰³ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 41-2.

¹⁰⁴ Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, “Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order,” *Asian Survey*, 29, no. 3 (March 1989): 326-340.

structure of Punjab and how it was formed. His detailed introduction about the state gives an insight into the massacres and independence movements and why Punjab became the earliest central hub for the beginning of the Indian National movement apart from Gandhi (Ji)'s rallies marches from Gujarat. The geographical representation provided in this book with the British's arrival gives a great insight into the growth and the losses that Punjab had to endure under the Raj showcasing the importance of India as a colony. This is essential in understanding the importance of Punjab for the British in terms of military power.

The 1990s brought a profound change in the discourse surrounding the Massacre. Beginning with Derek Sayer's focus on the British reactions to the Massacre and how the perception of Amritsar's singularity has dominated the English Historiography.¹⁰⁵ Then Tuteja's article describes and focuses on how Jallianwala Bagh became a critical juncture in the rise of Nationalism in India.¹⁰⁶ Tuteja's focus remains on the social phenomenon of the event when viewed as part of the larger historical process in Punjab. Besides the works on the Massacre, Tuteja also includes works that are not explicitly about the event but showcases how the Massacre became an important event in turning the Indian reaction towards the Empire. Like Narain, Tuteja focuses on Punjab's rich history beginning from the East India Company's annexation in 1849.¹⁰⁷ Tuteja also addresses the idea that the Nationalist movement was weak in Punjab even after the Massacre, arguing that because "communitarian consciousness which had emerged in Punjab during the last three decades of the nineteenth century had a real potential for the evolution of a nationalist perspective which could manifest itself quite emphatically during

¹⁰⁵ Derek Sayer, "British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920," *Past & Present* No. 131 (May 1991), 132.

¹⁰⁶ K. L. Tuteja, "Jallianwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in the Indian National Movement," *Social Scientist* Vol 25, No. 1/2 (Jan – Feb 1997): 25

¹⁰⁷ Tuteja, "Jallianwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in the Indian National Movement," 28-9.

certain stages and phases of its development.”¹⁰⁸ Narain’s book on the Historiography of the Massacre provides Hunter committee’s account in London and the Punjab Sub-Committee in India. She focuses on the different sides and their opinions. British, Indians, and authors’ reactions from Canada and America and their response to the Massacre.¹⁰⁹ This book has been used as a source in most books in twenty – first century. This account explains in detail the position of Punjab before and after the Massacre. Narain also cites the debates that have been still going on in The House of Commons regarding the same.¹¹⁰ Though she is of dual heritage, British and Indian, she has tried to keep her biases aside and focus on other authors’ biases about the Massacre. Narain emphasizes a gap of five months between the official enquiry and the event itself, which has made the details obscure or forgotten.¹¹¹ She also points out some of the works by the British authors condemn the Massacre, which is very unlike than the normal discourses due to cultural and national influence.¹¹² Narain’s work being a historiography adds to the overall analysis done for this paper in pointing out different reactions to the massacre. The focus on the massacre provides a gap that is covered in this paper in form of people’s interviews.

As the 100-year anniversary approached closer, the twenty and twenty-first-century work started to focus on the British Empire’s injustice and how there has been no official apology from the English government. These works focus on the primary sources written immediately after the Massacre and India and Britain’s committees. Nick Lloyd’s work *The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day*, starts addressing the massacre and its scenario. Lloyd’s works is one of the few that have looked at the Interview report of the Indian National

¹⁰⁸ Tuteja, “Jallianwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in the Indian National Movement,” 36.

¹⁰⁹ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 57-9.

¹¹⁰ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 44-6.

¹¹¹ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 9-11.

¹¹² Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 10.

Congress Sub-Committee, Vol. II of 1920. He mentions the eyewitness accounts and what they saw after and during the massacre to support the argument about the nature of the event. His work contains very few of those accounts, from more than thousand interviews.¹¹³ The authors personal visit to the Jallianwala Bagh in 2007 makes it a notable account as his viewpoints become comparable to the history of that place.¹¹⁴ Lloyd reiterates what the authors in nineties have written about the massacre condemning General Dyer and his actions with the exception of Nigel Collett who wrote the first biography of Dyer since 1929.

Collett though agreeing on the horrific act of Dyer supports his actions and showcases that he ordered the fire “not because he was callous or bloodthirsty,” but because he interpreted the violence in Amritsar and the gathering as a “challenge to his way of life and everything he stood for.”¹¹⁵ Lloyd’s claim that his book is the first comprehensive account of the disorders of 1919 to be written is not unfounded as seen in the aforementioned works. He makes a valid point in saying that the background to the massacre was not one of the ruthless imperial control but was carried out in a situation where the British Raj was introducing a variety of reforms. This had increased the Indian participation as promised by the Montagu-Chelmsford reform and this places a greater emphasis on nationalism opinion.¹¹⁶

Lloyd’s inclusion of the interviews is a great example of how the source is underutilized as he did not include some of the interviews that truly explain the horrific nature of the massacre. Like the account of a widow, Ratan Devi, showcases the horrors that people had to endure even after the massacre. Her testimony is one of the most heart wrenching narratives of the event and

¹¹³ Nick Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), xxii-xxiii.

¹¹⁴ Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, xxv-xxvi.

¹¹⁵ Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, xxvii.

¹¹⁶ Lloyd, *The Amritsar Massacre*, xxviii.

the aftermath of it. Devi testified to having heard of the shooting while she was sitting in her house waiting for her husband who had gone to the Bagh. She instantly ran with two other women to help her. She saw heaps of bodies upon arriving at the Bagh and immediately started to search for her husband. After finding the dead body which was past a way full of blood and dead bodies, she asked other people to bring her a *charpai* (cot) to carry the body of her husband home. She also had sent the two women home to bring a cot but as it was already past 8 o'clock and no one could come out of the house because of the curfew order. She asked some other people who were looking for their sons' body to help her move the body of her husband as it was drenched in blood to a drier place. She stayed near the body as she witnessed three other men writhing in agony, a buffalo struggling in pain, and a boy of about 12 years old in agony. The boy entreated her to not leave the place as he would be alone. The clock kept ringing every hour as the time passed and at around 2 o'clock a *jat* (People of agriculturally based community are called *Jat*) asked her to raise his leg as he was entangled in a wall while he was trying to escape. She returned to her husbands' body after helping him. No one had come to their help until 6 a.m. then the people from her street had brought the cot and took her husbands' body home while hiding from the police. She said that "It is impossible for me to describe what I felt. Heaps of dead bodies lay there, some on their back and some with their faces upturned. A number of them were poor innocent children. I passed my night, crying and watching. What I experienced is known to me and to God. I cannot say more" and that was the end of the interview.¹¹⁷

The crowd's initial nature and whether the shots fired were justified are matters of disagreement among historians. Some consider that the crowd was on the rampage even before any shots had been fired.

¹¹⁷ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 116-8.

Alfred Draper describes the “mob” as “frenzied” and “half-crazed” before any of them were killed or injured.¹¹⁸ Arthur Swinson pictures the crowd with an “excited, rapt look in their eyes which is the prelude to murder.”¹¹⁹ Such descriptions that dramatize the event make the shooting seem necessary. The *Hunter report* takes a less definite line of argument, stating that the crowd was “excited and angry” but “had not as yet resolved on anything definite.”¹²⁰ These interpretations suggest that the crowd was volatile but not murderous until after soldiers opened fire.¹²¹ The *Congress Report* portrays a different type of gathering: “it was a crowd of mourners - bareheaded, many unshod and all without sticks.”¹²²

Indian opinions agree with this report. They state that the actions of the British caused violence in the crowd. The only British writer to support this view is B. G. Horniman. He describes the gathering as “a wholly peaceful and not very large crowd of demonstrators.”¹²³ However, as most reports agree that the crowd consisted of tens of thousands, perhaps Horniman’s account cannot be considered entirely accurate at this point.¹²⁴ As written in Woolf’s work about the Indian historians looking westward for models and methods in writing, they adopted both the disciplinary practices and the civilizing program of the British. This falls accurate into all the works that have been looked at for this historical analysis. Though it is about the change of how an event important in the Indian National movement is looked at and written about, it also falls under the umbrella that the Indian authors are participating in pro-imperialist writing.

All the major works are written in English which is not the main language spoken in

¹¹⁸ Alfred Draper, *Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj* (London: Cassell Ltd., 1981), 64.

¹¹⁹ Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset*, 20.

¹²⁰ Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar*, 53.

¹²¹ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 37.

¹²² Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, 48.

¹²³ Horniman, *Amritsar and Our Duty to India*, 88.

¹²⁴ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 41.

India and yet they condemn the British for bringing in this cultural change in India.¹²⁵ This work though falls under imperialistic writing, it does not associate with the Subaltern studies as suggested by Gayatri Spivak and Daniel Woolf in their writings.¹²⁶ Spivak's work adds value into the studies of subaltern and giving them voice, but she fails to provide the actual voices of the people. In her work she critiques the Imperialist writings and their understanding of the Indian culture from a western man's perspective.¹²⁷ It was a great attempt in giving voices to the people of India but without the people. This paper is about the massacre and its impact in the Indian Nationalist Movement and not about the retaliation of the Indians against British policies.¹²⁸ In part it can be seen as the retaliation because of the agitation against Rowlatt Acts, but it was present because it was an unjust Act to suppress the Indians that they were no longer ready to tolerate. These works explain the form of writing that is supported by the twenty-first century authors in India and yet fails to note the importance of people's lives lost in that event as covered in this paper in form of the interviews provided by Vol. II of the Indian National Congress.

¹²⁵ Daniel Woolf, *A Concise History of History: Global Historiography from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 200.

¹²⁶ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (1988): 271-313.

¹²⁷ Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", 271.

¹²⁸ Woolf, *A Concise History of History*, 313.

Rowlatt Act

This chapter showcases the importance of the Rowlatt Acts and how this became a plan by the British Empire to oppress mainly people in Punjab and Indians in general. Jallianwala Bagh Massacre has been an important event in the history of Indian Nationalism. It focuses on the Rowlatt Acts and the series of events that led to the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, igniting the Indian Nationalist Movement's fire. There is no clear indication whether the acts affected the people of Amritsar as the questions regarding it were not asked in the interviews by the Punjab Sub-Committee. It is also important to note that the Vol. II focuses on people that were affected by the massacre and hence that is more central to the argument.

The Rowlatt Acts are important because they show the most impact on the following events and were condemned by the press and people worldwide in newspapers like *The Manchester Guardian*, *The Scotsman*, and *The Christian Science Monitor* in the form of protests in India. The combined force of Gandhi (Ji)'s non-violent *Satyagraha*, the people's march, and The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre made the British realize their mistake and repealed the Act in 1922.¹²⁹ They are also important to understand the massacre as one of the interviews that focused on the acts were of a High Court pleader aged 75, Lala Kanhya Lal Bhatia. According to his testimony he was supposed to give a lecture in the Jallianwala Garden without him being consulted. He called the proclamation false as no one had consulted him before giving out the information. He was compelled by the British to act as a special constable along with all the members of the local bar. The appointment for it was made on April 22, when there was no necessity for the maintenance of peace and order in the city. The police force was enough and as

¹²⁹ "British Rule in India," 1908.; "Pacifying Punjab by Martial Law: In Tracing Causes of Outbreaks, Authorities Said to Concede Rowlatt Crimes Act Has Been "Mere Stalking Horse" Causes of Revolt The Army or Jail Loaning Under Pressure in the Post Office Compound." *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 1919, 7; "Rowlatt Acts: Government's Position" *The Scotsman*, April 1915, 5.

a matter of fact, the city was quiet on those days. They were abused and were made to carry tables and chairs from one place to another. This added to their sufferings of the old age and the order was meant to punish the Bar. They were part of public affairs and took prominent part in the Rowlatt Agitation which made them a target by the British administration.¹³⁰

Authors like David Arnold, Durba Ghosh, and John F. Riddick talk about the acts in their works and suggest the direct impact these acts had on Indian Nationalism and Jallianwala Bagh Massacre.¹³¹ They offer that it was because of these acts that General Dyer ignored his junior officers' requests to not fire and gave the order to open fire on a non-violent crowd. His subordinates knew that the crowd gathered there was not violent and celebrating the *Baisakhi* festival. Gandhi (Ji) also opposed these acts in his *Satyagraha* movement.¹³²

The British Raj undermined India's contribution to the First World War as they passed such acts and policies. As stated by Vohra, "At the end of the war, the government, in an unbecoming hurry, passed the infamous Rowlatt Acts, which every Indian in the Imperial Legislative Council had voted against."¹³³ Whether the impulsive nature was intentional as they believed "plotting against the Empire" was getting stronger or because, if they took some more time to revise the acts, the agitation in Punjab and *Satyagraha* movements would crush the Rowlatt Acts is debatable. The Acts were "intended to crush subversive movements, these acts provided for stricter control of the press, arrests without warrants, indefinite detention without trial, and an *in-camera* trials of political prisoners, without juries. There is no clear indication of what the *in-camera* trials meant but reading the texts can be understood that the camera

¹³⁰ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 73-4.

¹³¹ David Arnold, *Gandhi: Profiles in Power* (London: Pearson Education, 2001), 109-115.; Durba Ghosh, *Gentlemanly Terrorist: Political Violence and the Colonial State in India, 1919-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 25-47.; John F. Riddick, *The History of British India: A Chronology* (London: Praeger Publishers, 2006), 102-103.

¹³² Means "Holding onto truth" and a non-violent protest started by Gandhi (ji) against British Rule.

¹³³ Ranbir Vohra, *The Making of India a Historical Survey* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 134.

represents a room. So, there would be no audience except the British officials, and the details of such trials would not be released to the public.

The contribution of the First World War towards the victory did not make it a respectable colony but a burden of the poorer country. To the returning soldiers in Punjab, Jallianwala Bagh shattered the faith that the people had in the British sense of justice and fairness. To most native Indians, the unarmed massacre was a betrayal of the trust that they had placed on the British to rule them wisely, justly, and with fairness. In the average Indian's eyes, the just, fair, and liberal Englishman suddenly turned into a ruthless, bloodthirsty tyrant who could not be trusted. On this sense of betrayal, Gandhi (Ji) built his mass movement, which put a premium on breaking the rulers' laws. It proved a spectacular problem on how to carry the Indian people in support of the war efforts. For the Indian leaders, it proved equally a complicated problem on how to support the Government in its war objectives and fight for national aspirations.¹³⁴

Moreover, these acts denied the accused the right to know who his accusers were or to challenge the evidence on which he was being tried while requiring ex-political offenders to deposit securities and forbidding them to take part in any political, educational, or religious activity."¹³⁵ The British reasoning to pass these acts was unfounded, as explored in detail by the commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress in their report of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre.¹³⁶ The notable committee members included Mr. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi as the Barrister-at-law, Hon'ble Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya, as the ex-officio President of the Punjab sub-committee, and an additional member of the Imperial Legislative council.

¹³⁴ Pati, *India and The First World War*, 1-2.

¹³⁵ Vohra, *The Making of India a Historical Survey*, 134.

¹³⁶ K. Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress* (Bombay: Karnataka Printing Press, 1920), 1-2.

The previous paragraphs clarify that the people of the Punjab were subjected to a variety of pinpricks by the local administration. It had made it well-nigh impossible for the people's natural leaders -- the educated classes -- to control the populace by its studied contempt for them. It was in this atmosphere that the Rowlatt bills came upon the Punjab. It is common ground that when these two Bills were published, there was little or no revolutionary crime in India. Indeed, for years, it had ceased to affect any part of India other than Bengal and the Punjab. In Bengal, the party of violence came into being when content over the partition of Bengal the party of violence came into being when discontent over the partition of Bengal grew to white heat. In the Punjab, it was due to the Local Government's various measures, which deeply dissatisfied the people. It became severe, owing to the gross ill-treatment of the proud Sikh settlers of Canada. They infected some local men, too, with their discontent, and the forcible interference with the returned immigrants: *ex Komagata Maru*, brought it to ahead.¹³⁷ The causes of violence in each case were well defined and, in the opinion of the Punjab Sub-Committee, avoidable, and remediable. Any way violence both in the Punjab and in Bengal was brought under complete check, as the Government contends, under the powers taken by them in virtue of the Defence of India Act.¹³⁸

Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the discontent caused by the city's many problems. "This Act was passed as an emergency measure to cope with revolutionary outbreaks, that were feared during the war. It is possible to understand the use of such powers when all available fighting material had been removed from India to the

¹³⁷ The events in Vancouver illustrated the widespread assumption among white Canadians that Canada was "a white man's country." The whole story also exposed the fundamental unfairness of British rule in India, then the most prized colonial possession of the British Empire. It was one more proof for many South Asians of their second-class status within the Empire.

¹³⁸ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 36.

battlefields of France and Mesopotamia, and when India's internal peace had to depend largely upon the loyalty and the peace-loving nature of the people.”¹³⁹ The prominence of this agitation is explained by a journalist, Sardar Sardul Singh, who is also associated with some of the important political organizations of the province. He was also a member of the Provincial Congress Committee, Indian Association, Sikh League and other similar societies. He was at Lahore during the last disturbances as well as spoke at two of the meeting held to protest against the Rowlatt Bills when they were not passed into Acts. “It is very important to note here that nothing untoward happened on the day of April 6, because the authorities put their faith in the public leaders and gladly accepted their advice and cooperation.”¹⁴⁰ He goes on to blame the “officials in their pin-prick behavior towards the people of the Punjab and had the police and the military not been brought in the city, as advised by the leaders (the British administration), no occasion would have arisen that day for such occurrence.”¹⁴¹ The people had been shot on some occasions before the massacre but nothing was that magnanimous and obnoxious.¹⁴²

The Act that raised a storm of opposition is the Section 42 that states “orders made under the Act shall not be called in question in any Court and “no suit or prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done under this Act. The powers given by the Act are to be cumulative and not in derogation of any other powers conferred upon the local Government.”¹⁴³ The Government could use all means reasonable to them against any person or group and enforce compliance without any people's questions.

It has been contended on behalf of the Government that there have been

¹³⁹ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, 24.

¹⁴⁰ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 256-9.

¹⁴¹ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 256-9.

¹⁴² Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 259.

¹⁴³ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol. I (Report), 1920, 236.

misrepresentations and exaggerations connected with the Act. We hold that the Act hardly lends itself to widespread misrepresentation. It has undoubtedly been misrepresented on the official side. A typical exaggeration that we have seen complained of is a cryptic phrase, “*na appeal, na dalil, na vakeel,*” meaning “no appeal, no argument, no pleader.” In our opinion, no self-respecting person can tolerate what is an outrage upon society. The crime of Government became complete when they persisted in it in the face of unanimous widespread opposition. We would note, too, that the Viceroy has enough powers employing ordinances to deal with extraordinary situations. The Government was wholly unjustified in placing on the Statue book, on the eve of liberal reforms, an exceptional measure to deal with anarchy, as if lawlessness had been endemic instead of being rare in India.¹⁴⁴

A popular opinion as discussed in this chapter is seen in one of the testimonies by Hon’ble Rai Bahadur Raizada Bhagat Ram, a Barrister-at-law of the Punjab Legislative Council. “The people observed the *hartal* with the sole object of giving expression to their sense of humiliation and disappointment, due to the attitude adopted by the Government towards the people’s unanimous opinion with regard to the Rowlatt Act. There was absolutely no idea of any violence. The leaders in Jullundur then assured the local authorities that no breach of the law was at all in contemplation, and also of their readiness to cooperate with them to maintain “peace and order.” The authorities were further assured that no disturbance would take place, if the people were not gratuitously insulted, or otherwise provoked by the officiousness of the Police and their agents.”¹⁴⁵

The most prominent leaders of the Anti-Rowlatt movement in Amritsar were Dr.

¹⁴⁴ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 34-6.

¹⁴⁵ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners Volume II – Evidence*, 931.

Satyapal and Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew.¹⁴⁶ Both men had been prohibited from speaking in public, but the Punjab government did not consider this restriction enough.¹⁴⁷ On the evening of April 9, Irving received orders for the deportation of the two doctors. When questioned by the hunter committee, Sir Michael O'Dwyer justified this move with the precedent of the deportations of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh, which had quietened the disturbance of 1907.¹⁴⁸ However, in this case, the banishment of Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal was a mistake, and many see the action as a direct cause of the Jallianwala Bagh shooting.¹⁴⁹

Dr. Safi-ud-din Kitchlew is a Muhammadan Barrister enjoying a considerable practice. He is a Doctor of Philosophy of Munster and a graduate of Cambridge. He was also a student at Aligarh. He is 35 years old, is married, and has got two children. He has been interested himself for several years in Hindu Muhammadan Unity.¹⁵⁰

Dr. Satyapal is a Hindu, Khatri by caste. He is a B. A., M. B. (Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery) of the Punjab University. He held the King's Commission for one year at Aden during the War as Lt. I. M. S. (Indian Medical Service). He was a co-worker with Dr. Kitchlew and became famous because of having carried on a successful agitation against the stoppage of the issue of platform tickets to Indians at the Amritsar Railway Station. Both became much more popular during the Rowlatt agitation, and both approved of Satyagraha. There is no doubt that at Amritsar, as elsewhere, the Rowlatt agitation began to draw a much larger audience than before. As the agitation gathered force, by their continuous activity, they became the idols of the people.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Dr. Satyapal came from a middle-class Khatri family. Dr. Kitchlew was a Kashmiri Muslim. Together they were striving for Hindu-Muslim unity.

¹⁴⁷ Dr. Satyapal was prohibited from speaking in public on March 29, Dr. Kitchlew on April 4.

¹⁴⁸ Datta ed., *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances In 1919*, 129.

¹⁴⁹ Narain, *The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 31.

¹⁵⁰ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 45.

¹⁵¹ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 45-6.

The situation was tense since the last week of March; large meetings were held, during which backing for the passive resistance grew. A *hartal* was held in Amritsar on March 30, even though Gandhi (Ji) postponed his plans for a national strike on that day as the news had not reached the city on time.¹⁵² Therefore, a second *hartal* was held in the town on April 6. On both days, the protest remained peaceful.¹⁵³ The only antagonistic gesture noticed by the British authorities was a procession by a group of men dressed as Turks, which was taken to signify support for the *Khilafat* or *Caliph*.¹⁵⁴ However, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Sir Miles Irving, still found the course of events disturbing despite the protest's peaceful nature. On April 8, he requested military reinforcements from the Punjab government in Lahore. On April 9, Ram Naumi day, his uneasiness increased.¹⁵⁵ As a sign of Hindu-Muslim unity, not only Hindus but also Muslims were celebrating this Hindu Festival.¹⁵⁶ A fantastic scene of fraternization occurred, including the sharing of water vessels, which is considered a breach of caste (because India was always believed to be a firm believer in caste systems among Hindus itself, but with Hindu and Muslim, it was marketed as a great sin, and such acts were looked at very cynically in society). Hindu's have an understanding of the scriptures of different castes. In contrast, Muslims in India have a caste system that separates some people as "untouchables."¹⁵⁷ These two great religious groups did not get along because of their differences in social structure, food habits, and religious beliefs even though there are some similarities with fasting and pilgrimage.)

¹⁵² *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, s.v. "hartal."

meaning concerted cessation of work and business especially as a protest against a political situation or an act of government.

¹⁵³ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol. I (Report), 1920, 41.

¹⁵⁴ The name given to the Muslim movement which supported the Caliph of Turkey, then the head of the Muslim faith. Britain had defeated Turkey in the war and Muslims were worried for the future of the Caliph.

¹⁵⁵ Ram Naumi, the day on which Hindus celebrate the birth of Ram, a deity widely worshipped in India.

¹⁵⁶ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, Vol. I (Report), 1920, 43-6.

¹⁵⁷ Untouchables are the lowest caste of people in India, they were considered as the "other" people who if touched by any other caste members would be considered bad. B. R. Ambedkar, and Gandhiji broke this system and officially added them in the larger caste system of "Labour Party".

While the information provided in the secondary sources is easy to understand the chronology of events, but they do not justify the feelings that people had about Rowlatt Act. That can be found in one of the interviews of an Honorary Magistrate, Mian Feroz Din of Amritsar. When asked about whether he thought at all likely knowing the people of Amritsar and the circumstances that there was conspiracy? He replied that it was not at all likely as he has lived there for 60 years and know almost everybody by name in that area. He focuses on one point that “The people were certainly desirous of having the Rowlatt Act repealed, but there could not have been any conspiracy like what you (Interviewer) suggest.¹⁵⁸ When asked about the Massacre and proclamation he said that “I heard later on from my son, that a proclamation was made in certain places in the city, prohibiting meetings or assemblies of any kind. I did not hear of any meeting at Jallianwala Bagh till the evening, when I was told in my house about it.”¹⁵⁹ This confirms the rumor that British had said about the proclamation was heard by everyone while Indian authors emphasized on what Feroz Din had said.

On April 10, at ten o’clock in the morning, Irving invited the two doctors to his bungalow. When they arrived, they were informed of the deportation orders and immediately sent to Dharamshala by car.¹⁶⁰ News of their arrest spread quickly and coincided with Amritsar’s rumors that Gandhi (Ji) had been prohibited from entering Punjab.¹⁶¹ The people were outraged, and crowds began to gather, demanding the release of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew. A massive crowd — V. N. Datta claims that it numbered 50,000 — collected by the Hall Gate Bridge.¹⁶² This bridge incorporated a footbridge and a carriage-bridge. The people wanted to cross the

¹⁵⁸ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners Volume II– Evidence*, 21-2.

¹⁵⁹ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners Volume II– Evidence*, 22.

¹⁶⁰ Dharamshala is a city in the Himachal Pradesh state of Now India, it was probably under the British control as seen in the map provided in Narain’s book.

¹⁶¹ On April 9 Gandhi (ji) was stopped at Palwal station and escorted out of the Punjab.

¹⁶² Datta ed., *New Light on The Punjab Disturbances In 1919*, 374.

bridges to the Civil Lines to go to the Deputy Commissioner's Bungalow and appeal to him to release their leaders. In anticipation of trouble, however, the authorities had put a premeditated plan into action to defend the Civil Lines. Therefore, the crowd found itself stopped at the bridges by armed pickets. The mass of people began to push forward, and some threw stones at the soldiers. After a while, the pickets considered that it was necessary to shoot. In all, two volleys were fired, killing around twenty to thirty people.¹⁶³

As written in several books and articles cited in this paper, it was prominent that there was little or no revolutionary crime in India when the acts were passed. However, the Act was passed as an emergency to cope with the revolutionary outbreaks feared during the War. Such power is understandable when all available fighting material had been removed from India to France and Mesopotamia's battlefields, and India's internal peace depended upon the loyalty and peace-loving nature of the people. But, this Act was passed in March 1919, after the soldiers had returned home to India from the War.¹⁶⁴ With an ongoing tension regarding the riots from the people of India, the British Raj enforced these Acts but were matched with an equal force of opposition by Gandhi (Ji)'s *Satyagraha* movement. Gandhi (Ji) seized this opportunity and made the bold decision of freeing himself from the role of recruiting sergeant and announced his opposition to the Rowlatt legislation. On February 24, 1919, he informed the Viceroy of his intention to resist this and other unjust laws. His call for a *Satyagraha Pledge* attracted a substantial number of people, mostly in Bombay and western India. Then, he decided to extend the protest on March 30 to an all-India *Hartal*.¹⁶⁵ This movement, though, was a success. There were reports of small violent outbreaks in many places, and that upset Gandhi (Ji). Right after the

¹⁶³ There are no accurate figures of the number killed, indicating little administrative concern over the numbers of dead and injured.

¹⁶⁴ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 24.

¹⁶⁵ Meaning mass protest.; David Arnold, *Gandhi: Profiles in Power* (London: Pearson Education, 2001), 110.

protests, the massacre made him warier about starting any movements without previously establishing adequate organizational support.

One such account of what the emotion was towards the Rowlatt Act is noted in the interview of Lala Hari Saran, owner of Donald Graham & Company and the resident of Amritsar. Being an owner of a shop, he was concerned about when they could open them without upsetting the government and insulting the *Hartal*. “On the 13th of April, as I was sitting at my house some people came and said that all the shops would open that day and there would be a meeting in Jallianwala Bagh, presided over by Lala Kanhya Lal, Pleader (his account is noted above). When I heard that the shops would open, I went to a friend and asked him to go with me to the Bagh, as the meeting must be about, the opening of shops. I heard not one word about the proclamation.¹⁶⁶ Another testimony that suggest the lack of attention towards the proclamation by General Dyer. The following statement showcases the belief that people had in their Government that was the British Empire. “The speaker was saying that we should approach Government to release our leaders. He was not saying against Government. At that time an aeroplane (Airplane) passed over, and all the men got up, the lecturer said, “We need not fear anything. The *Sarkar* (meaning Government) is our father and mother: why should Government kill its own children?” Five minutes later a Doctor spoke, saying, “You must all pray to God that Rowlatt Act might be repealed and leaders might be released.” About 15 minutes after the aeroplane had passed over, the Gurkha troops came running in. Just as we were running away, they at once fired. Many were running at the time. An old man near me was shot in the head. I saw it was no use running and fell flat.”¹⁶⁷

The Punjab contributed sixty percent of the 1.3 million soldiers sent to fight the First

¹⁶⁶ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners Volume II – Evidence*, 110.

¹⁶⁷ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners Volume II – Evidence*, 110.

World War under the British Raj.¹⁶⁸ Then, under Michael O'Dwyer's administration, Punjab faced economic hardships when recruiting soldiers for the War. As the Lt. Governor of Punjab, he adopted a very hostile attitude towards the urban middle class. The economic hardships that the people in Punjab had suffered during the War also heightened their anti-colonial consciousness. The first significant issue of common concern was the steep rise in the prices of essential commodities in this Province. For instance, there was a 100% price rise in the case of food grains between 1917 and 1919, but the artisans and workers' wages increased only by 20-25 percent. It caused deep economic distress to the lower middle classes, artisans, workers, and other fixed-income groups living in the cities, particularly in Amritsar.¹⁶⁹ This hardship, followed by the Rowlatt act and *Satyagraha*, made it even worse as Punjab was among the major cities where the *Hartal* on April 6 was very successful and attracted many crowds. Then, the massacre followed on April 13, which was the last spark that ignited the fire of Nationalism in India, and Gandhi (Ji) attacked the Raj in full force with his marches and rallies of non-violent movements.¹⁷⁰

This sparked a sense of betrayal amongst Punjab people since most people in the army came from there. The Massacre gave Gandhi (Ji) a tool to attack the British rule with his movements, and he soon became the Father of Indian Nationalism for India. The British called him the Father of Indian Unrest.¹⁷¹

Some works suggest that the Massacre happened because of the non-violent movements conducted by Gandhi (Ji). These threats to the stability of the Empire became intolerable to the

¹⁶⁸ Shashi Tharoor, "Why the Indian soldiers of WW1 were forgotten," *BBC News*, 1 July 2015.

¹⁶⁹ K. L. Tuteja, "Jallianwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in the Indian National Movement," *Social Scientist*, 25 no. 1/2, Feb. 1997, 39-41.

¹⁷⁰ Vohra, *The Making of India a Historical Survey*, 134.

¹⁷¹ Martin Deming Lewis, *Gandhi: Maker of Modern India?* (Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1966), 10.

British. “India waited after the war; resentful, rather aggressive, not very hopeful, but still expectant. Within a few months, the first fruits of the new British policy, so eagerly waited for, appeared in the shape of a proposal to pass special laws to control the revolutionary movement. Instead of more freedom, there was to be more repression. These bills were based on the report of a committee and were known as the Rowlatt Bills. But very soon, they were called the “Black Bills” all over the country, and were denounced everywhere and by every Indian, including even the most moderate. They gave great powers to the Government and the police to arrest, keep in prison without a trial, or to have a secret trial of any person they disapproved of or suspected.”¹⁷²

In a speech given by O’Dwyer on April 7 to the council before his intended departure. He cynically spoke about his recruitment and “achievements” in Punjab while saying on the expatiated inoffensive nature of the Rowlatt Act. He noted that it was not true that it conferred on the police no arbitrary arrest powers, search, or interference. Everyone who has read the Rowlatt Act knows that it does contain such powers and that it is because by the people. Sir Michael, however, was not satisfied with his fanciful description of the Rowlatt Act. He wanted to show what he felt about the great demonstration of April 6, which was semi-religious for thousands upon thousands because of the fast. He laughed at it in this manner: - “the recent puerile demonstrations against the Rowlatt Act in both Lahore and Amritsar would be ludicrous if they did not indicate, how easily the ignorant and the credulous people, not one in a thousand of whom knows anything of the measure, can be misled. Those who want only to mislead them incur a serious responsibility. I would remind them of President Lincoln’s saying, “you can, if you are very clever and very unscrupulous, mislead all people for some time and some people for all time, but you cannot mislead all people for all time. Those who appeal to ignorance rather

¹⁷² Lewis, *Gandhi: Maker of Modern India?*, 1.

than to reason have a day of reckoning in store for them.”¹⁷³ No other Head of Government in India laughed at the people on April 7. Everyone but Sir M. O’Dwyer realized more or less the meaning of the April 6. Still, Sir Michael’s one desire was to provide “a day of reckoning” for those, who he thought, were appealing to passion or ignorance rather than to reason.¹⁷⁴ He goes on saying that those of you who have studied that law know-how baseless that agitation from what took place a few days ago at Multan, when the Rowlatt Bill agitation was made a pretext for offering an insult to gallant Punjabi Muhammadans, Sikhs and Goorkhas, that had returned from the front, after fighting the battles of India. These insultors had, as we know, no martial spirit themselves and no appreciation for the valor and loyalty of those who had been safeguarding their hearths and homes. Their object is to attack the Government and insult those who are true to their salt. Loyal men must and will oppose their evil designs. I would, therefore, ask you to explain the motives and policy of Government, as shown in that law, to those within your influence, and to expose the campaign of falsehood that is being carried on in certain quarters to mislead the ignorant and credulous masses and the scum of the bazars of the towns and to incite them to crime and disorder.¹⁷⁵

One of the main questions in the discussion between Gandhi (Ji), Montagu, Chelmsford, and Annie Besant were India’s self-government after the War.¹⁷⁶ As the war was fought for democracy and its ideals, the British promised their colonies some self-rule aspect after the War.¹⁷⁷ The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms took one of the main actions for the same. The secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, had proposed to gradually expand self-government

¹⁷³ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 7-8.

¹⁷⁴ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 7-8.

¹⁷⁵ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 8.

¹⁷⁶ Arnold, *Gandhi: Profiles in Power*, 107.

¹⁷⁷ “World War I: Role of Indian Army in Britain’s victory over Germany”, *India Today*, July 2017.

in India by increasing the numbers of Indians in every part of the administration. This idea was supported by the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford. He entailed that giving a greater representation to Indians in provincial assemblies would be beneficial. Montagu announced in August 1917 that the British Government desired “the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India, as an integral part of the British Empire.”¹⁷⁸ Most Indians saw this as recognition and reward for the cooperation, money, and men their country had given towards the war effort. In the summer of 1918, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were published. These much-anticipated moves were soon found to be very disappointing. Annie Besant voiced their general reception when she stated that they were “unworthy of Britain to offer or India to accept.”¹⁷⁹ Around the same time, the findings of the Rowlatt Committee were published. Still, this generated resistance from the Indian Civil Service members and the provincial governors, notably Michael O’Dwyer. As governor of Punjab, he argued the reforms would encourage continued protests and rioting that had broken out in many provinces. He supported the Rowlatt Acts, and as they were passed, the hope that the Indians had towards the Empire vanished, and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were forgotten in the rage against the Rowlatt Act.¹⁸⁰

As described by Erez Manela in his work, when the British authorities, concerned with the growing agitation for home rule, moved to enact a series of Acts that extended the Government’s wartime powers of internment without trial.¹⁸¹ The acts were based on a committee report, submitted in July 1918, which would allow the Government to continue to

¹⁷⁸ *The Parliamentary Debates*, Official Report, 5th series, 67, Col. 1695.

¹⁷⁹ Datta ed., *New Light on The Punjab Disturbances In 1919*, 28.

¹⁸⁰ Susan Kingsley Kent, *Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918-1931* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 64-5.

¹⁸¹ Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20017), 168.

suppress “conspiracy and political outrage” once the war was over. The reports were made into law on March 21, 1919. The response to the acts must be understood in the context of the anticipation of far-reaching change that had built up among Indians during war years. Both the Indians and the British made the connection between the Wilsonian moment’s rhetoric and the Indian campaign against the Rowlatt Acts.¹⁸² As the All-India Congress Committee president wrote after the events at Amritsar, a complete understanding of Indian discontent and its causes must realize how “cheered and encouraged” Indians had been by Allied declarations the aims of the Great War were self-determination for all.¹⁸³ Indians felt betrayed by the widespread opposition to the self-governance rule by the official and nonofficial British communities in India and abroad.¹⁸⁴

The tensions in India were increasing since the armistice. The British Empire’s promise about the self-governance was seeming to be a lie. Michael O’Dwyer’s recruiting methods had put an economic strain in Punjab, which had upset people. The most significant blow was the massacre of the thousands of innocent people gathered at the Bagh on April 13, 1919, during the *Baisakhi* festival. This resulted from the Rowlatt acts as the British were agitated by the misinformation that people are in a revolutionary mindset. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were a light of hope in the darkness of death and oppression, but that didn’t matter as the Rowlatt Acts were passed as most British administrators wanted to put Indians in the oppressed state rather than what Montagu and Chelmsford were proposing. There is no indication in the readings whether Montagu-Chelmsford opposed the Act, but the impact that the Act had was that this gave the British the freedom to prosecute anyone they wish without the trial. The Acts were the

¹⁸² Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 169.

¹⁸³ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 160-9.


¹⁸⁴ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 168-9.

opposite of what the Indians had hoped for. The administrators like Madan Mohan Lal, Gandhi (Ji), and Jawaharlal Nehru with the Indian people were disappointed and agitated that they did not receive the promised self-governance. Instead, their families were massacred, and they were forced to go to prison for crimes that were not committed. The Indians, in exchange for their contribution to the First World War and in keeping the peace during the war era, received the Rowlatt Act and Jallianwala Bagh Massacre.

From a military viewpoint, if there is a protest that turns violent, then the police could disperse the Indians with *lathi charge* (beating with wooden batons) or use any means to disperse the crowd. But if the protest is non-violent, then any measures that the British take to disperse would be considered extreme, further supporting Independence from the oppressor British Raj. In Dyer's eyes, he saw fit to fire upon a crowd even after they dispersed to make an example that would be remembered, but he forgot that his proclamation did not also reach all the parts of Amritsar city. His expectancy that the neighboring villages would hear his announcement is unfair and misjudged. This shows that General Dyer wanted to present the obedience and morality question by massacring thousands of innocent people gathered in a place to celebrate a festival they have celebrated every year without the knowledge of any proclamation was only in the head of General Dyer. He slaughtered them by order of O'Dwyer, his superior. This event can be considered as the fire that started the domino effect of events, starting from the beginning of 1919; then, the Indian Independence was the snowball effect of the Massacre. The sense of betrayal and the price of loyalty paid in the Massacre by a British general was the spark needed for Gandhiji to make it into a wildfire of nationality brought in the Home-Rule in India. She got that Independence in 1947.

Jallianwala Bagh

General Dyer related to the Indians as he was born in India and did his schooling there. He later joined the ranks in the Bengal army that became part of the British army. He served with the Punjabi's and the Bengali's together. This connection made him a "perceived" friend in the Indian population's eyes, especially in Amritsar, while he was posted there as general.¹⁸⁵



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On the morning of April 13, Brigadier-General Dyer, who had arrived at Amritsar on the night of the April 11, gave testimony that he had given the following proclamation on April 13, and it was read aloud in *Urdu* in few parts of town which stated that it is hereby proclaimed to all that no person residing in the city is permitted or allowed to leave the city in his own private or hired conveyance or on foot, without a pass from the higher level officers. These included The Deputy Commissioner, The Superintendent of Police, The Deputy Superintendent of Police, The Assistant Commissioner, some notable Magistrates, and the Police Officer in charge of the City

¹⁸⁵ Ian Duncan Colvin, *The Life of General Dyer* (Chandigarh: Unistar Books, 2006), 1-11.

¹⁸⁶ Narain, *The Historiography of The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*.

Kotwali. No person residing in the Amritsar City is permitted to leave his house after 8 p.m. and if found in the streets after 8 p.m. are “liable to be shot.” No procession of any kind is permitted to parade the streets in the city or any part of the city or outside of it at any time. Any such processions or any gathering of 4 men will be looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly and “dispersed by force of arms.”¹⁸⁷


“This proclamation was read out with troops led by the Brigadier-General personally, who left his quarters about 9 a.m. for this purpose and returned to them about 1.30 p.m. about an hour before his return quarters in Ram Bagh. It is said that many people on hearing this proclamation read did not treat it seriously, but that remarks were made that it was bluff, that the General would not fire and not to be afraid.”¹⁸⁸

Brigadier-General Dyer had heard that, despite his proclamation, residents and neighboring villagers intended to hold a large meeting at the Jallianwala Bagh at 4.30 p.m., that afternoon. At 4:00 p.m., he received a message that a crowd of about 1,000 had already assembled there. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Brigadier-General Dyer marched from the Ram Bagh with picketing parties (as he had previously determined to picket the city’s main gates). With a special party consisting of 50 Indian Infantry armed with rifles, 40 Indian Infantry armed only with “Kukris” (short swords), and two armored cars. He proceeded straight to the Jallianwala Bagh, dropping his picketing parties en route. On arrival, he marched his infantry through a narrow lane into the Bagh, which is the town square and a place where the *Baisakhi* festival is celebrated every year and deployed them immediately to the right and left of the entrance. He left the armored cars outside, as the lane was too narrow to admit them.

¹⁸⁷ William Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee, 1919-20 Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate Disturbances in Punjab, Delhi and Bombay*, (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920), 41.

¹⁸⁸ Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee*, 41-4.

Having deployed his troops, Brigadier-General Dyer at once gave orders to open fire and continued a controlled fire on the dense crowd facing him in the enclosure (which he estimated at 5,000 persons) for some ten minutes, until his ammunition supply was at the point of exhaustion. One thousand six hundred fifty rounds of .303 Mark VI. Ammunitions were fired. The fatal casualties resulting from this auction are believed to be 379; the number of wounded has not been precisely ascertained but is estimated by Lord Hunter's Committee at possibly three times the number of deaths. "The Evening of April 13, when the people gathered in Jallianwala Bagh for the Baisakhi festival, Dyer arrived there with his troops and opening fire to the crowd of 20,000 and firing 1,650 shots. Most of the dead bodies were collected on the morning of April 14, and the people of Amritsar were told to bury or cremate them quietly. No attempt was made by the authorities to count the number of those killed, so there is no general agreement. Dyer had issued a curfew order, and nobody wanted to go out to help the wounded on the 13th."¹⁸⁹



Eastern walls of Jallianwala Bagh where the casualties were the heaviest as the crowd was the biggest and had no means for escape.

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¹⁸⁹ Narain, *The Historiography of The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*, 31.

¹⁹⁰ Narain, *The Historiography of The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre*.

This sparked a sense of betrayal amongst Punjab people since most people in the army came from there. The Massacre gave Gandhi (Ji) a tool to attack the British rule with his movements, and he soon became the Father of Indian Nationalism for India. The British called him the Father of Indian Unrest.¹⁹¹

These bills were opposed by Gandhi (Ji)'s non-violent movements in the form of *Satyagraha*. The statements taken from the people by the Punjab Congress Committee shows the unfair treatment by the British. These are the eye-witness accounts of Amritsar, Lahore, Gujranwala, and surrounding places from April 10, 1919, until the event and the area's residents. "I say the firing was unjustifiable. The Deputy Commissioner himself was present when the fire was opened... after the first few shots, the crowd rushed back, but the firing was continued even after they began running away... I witnessed many pathetic scenes and some gruesome sights. I heard a dying man gasping "*Hindu Musalman ki Jai*."¹⁹² "When the soldiers had left the place, I came out of my hiding place and ran back to my house. I came to know that my son, Madan Mohan, was not in the house, and, as in the evening, he used to play near the above mentioned Bagh... Then somebody told me that the corpse of my son was lying in the Bagh. Accompanied by my relatives, I hurried up to the Bagh, where I found his corpse among hundreds of others."¹⁹³

This agitated the people in India as the news started to spread about the Massacre. A statement from Dr. Satyapal, a political leader and a physician in Punjab, shows how this event was nothing but a failed attempt to suppress the Indian crowd. "Another point to which I wish to

¹⁹¹ Lewis, *Gandhi: Maker of Modern India?*, 10.

¹⁹² Translation: Praise to Hindu and Muslim people.; Indian National Congress, "Statement of Mr. Maqbool Mahmood, Pleader High Court", *Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee of the Indian National Congress*, Lahore: K. Santanam, Vol. II (Evidence), 1920, 29-31.

¹⁹³ Indian National Congress, "Statement of Dr. Mani Ram, Dental Surgeon", Vol II (Evidence), 103.

allude is that the idea of a rebellion is chimerical, an apparition without a reality. People had no mind to rebel...the Government had withdrawn the Police and Military from the city on the 10th, and the city was, as stated by the officials, in the hands of the city people, and yet not a single case of mischief happened... “Rebellion” existed only in the brains of officials imbued with bitter feelings against the people.”¹⁹⁴

The people of the Punjab were incensed against Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s administration because of his studied contempt and distrust of the educated classes, and because of the cruel and compulsory methods, adopted during the war, for obtaining recruits and monetary contributions and by his suppression of public opinion by gagging the local press and shutting out the nationalist newspaper from outside the Punjab. The Rowlatt agitation disturbed the public mind and shook public confidence in the Government’s goodwill; this was shared by the Punjab in a fuller measure, perhaps than elsewhere...The arrest and internment of Mr. Gandhi and the arrests and deportations of Drs. Kitchlew and Satyapal were unjustifiable and were the only direct cause of widespread hysterical excitement.¹⁹⁵

According to the Hunter committee, the disorders that started from the beginning of 1919 led to the Massacre, whereas Independence for India began from here. In the British’s eyes, this event was the final nail in the series of events that came before it. For the Indian soldiers that returned from a war fought against oppression, and for the people who knew about the war, this was the hypocrite Empire that massacred thousands of innocent non-violent people, which sparked a sense of Nationalism and a weapon for Gandhiji to fight against the British Raj. “For four years and more, the resources of India, like those of the other members of the British

¹⁹⁴ Indian National Congress, “Statement of Dr. Satyapal, B. A., M. B., Physician and Surgeon”, Vol II (Evidence), 724.

¹⁹⁵ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. I (Lahore: K. Santanam, 1920), 157-8.

Empire, had been strained to the utmost in the prosecution of the war. A large effective army had been supplied, the Punjab itself making a substantial contribution of 400,000. India has raised three war loans and contributed £100,000,000 as its quota to the Empire's war expenses. Besides the direct contributions in men and money, there were indirect contributions of a substantial character in various ways."¹⁹⁶

Following is an excerpt from The Hunter Committee that was placed to judge the crimes of General Dyer. The Hunter Committee, Lahore, November 19, 1919: General Dyer is sitting under a Union Jack hung on the wall, in a large courtroom, facing a panel of Commissioners: Lord Hunter, Mr. Justice Rankin, General Barrow, a British civil servant, and an Indian barrister. Behind Dyer, who looks somewhat detached, there is a small audience of British officers. Sitting behind the long table filled with legal documents, Justice Rankin asks the first question: "General Dyer, is it correct that you ordered your troops to fire at the thickest part of the crowd?" General Dyer staring woodenly at the panel, confirming, with the slightest nod of his head: "That is so." Slightly taken aback by the attitude, the mild-mannered Rankin rubs his hands and reads out from his notes: "One thousand five hundred and sixteen casualties with one thousand six hundred and fifty bullets?" General Dyer replies with conviction: "My intention was to inflict a lesson that would have an impact throughout all India." A small murmur arises from the officers behind the General, who nod in approval. Rankin looks at Dyer with a degree of disbelief, but the General's expression reveals no emotion whatsoever. The Indian barrister asks the next question: "General, had you been able to take in the armoured car, would you have opened fire with the machine gun?" Dyer responds after a slight pause, "I think, probably - yes." The barrister stares at the General for a moment, then simply lowers his eyes. For the first time, the

¹⁹⁶ William Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee*, 151.

presiding judge, Hunter, now addresses Dyer: “General, did you realize there were children - and women - in the crowd?” “I did,” Dyer responds, without a hint of regret. Rankin intercedes: “But that was irrelevant to the point you were making?” Dyer seems almost pleased that someone understood his reasoning: “That is correct.” There is an awkward silence before Rankin picks up the questioning once more: “Could I ask you what provisions you made for the wounded?” Clearly stumped, Dyer replies after a moment: “I was ready to help any who applied.” Baffled by what he was hearing, Rankin asks rhetorically: “General how does a child shot with a .303 Lee-Enfield apply for help?” For the first time, Dyer seems uncertain of himself.¹⁹⁷

The idea of Nationalism has been present in the minds of Indian princely states and the undivided India. Some authors have written about the start of the Independence movement after 1857, but if that is the case then India would have gotten her freedom earlier. According to Samuel Martin Burke in his book *the British Raj in India*, in 1857 there was no Indian nation and consequently no country-wide feeling of Nationalism. The recipients of western education, who later became the standard-bearers of Indian Nationalism, were, at this stage, tiny in number, without an organization of their own to give them weight, and too full of admiration for the blessings of British rule to oppose it.¹⁹⁸

From that point forward – a nationalist movement simmered led by mostly Gandhi (ji) at the beginning and then joined by the social revolutionists like Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sukhdev and the trio popularly known as Lal-Bal-Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai of Punjab, Bal Gangadhar Tilak of Bombay, and Bipin Chandra Pal of Bengal, changed the political discourse of the Indian

¹⁹⁷ Wagner, Amritsar 1919, xv-xvi.

¹⁹⁸ Samuel Martin Burke and Salim Al-Din Quraishi, *The British Raj in India: An Historical Review*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), 36.

independence movement.¹⁹⁹ “It was an important and momentous moment in the history of India’s struggle for freedom. With Gandhi(ji) came new technique and new orientation of spirit. His emergence as a leader was felicitated by the circumstances of the day. It was the revolutionary situation in India caused by the Montague Declaration, Home Rule Movement, spread of plague and influenza resulting in the death of millions of people, forcible recruitment of Indians in the army, Rowlatt Act, Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, and the Khilafat agitation which necessitated a man, having the trust of his people in him. In 1920 a union was made between Khilafat leaders and the Indian National Congress, the principal political party and trailblazer of the nationalist movement. Mahatma Gandhi and the Khilafat leaders promised to work and fight together for the causes of Khilafat and Swaraj. Seeking to increase pressure on the British, the Califates became a major part of the Non-cooperation movement — a nationwide campaign of mass, peaceful civil disobedience. The support of the Califates helped Gandhi and the Congress ensured Hindu-Muslim unity during the struggle.”²⁰⁰

While looking at the nationalist identity and/or sentiment after the Massacre the testimony of S. M. Habib, who was the editor of Daily *Siyasat* paper in Gujrat. “In the course of my journalistic experience, I have found that it is almost impossible for an independent journal to exist in the Punjab. Sir Michael O’Dwyer’s Government prohibited the circulation of newspapers published inside the Panjab, if they dealt with the methods of recruiting. Again, the nationalist papers, such as the “Amrit Bazar Patrika,” were also stopped.”²⁰¹ The nitpicking by British administration can be seen here when Habib reports that “During the February of 1919, I

¹⁹⁹ Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 80.

²⁰⁰ Dr. S D Choudhury, “An impression of the advent of Gandhi in Indian National Movement”, *Social Science Research Network*, 2019, 1-2.

²⁰¹ *Siyasat* means “having political relations with another party/state/city/country.” *Patrika* means paper in the form of leaflet.

advertised the issues of a new daily the “Siyasat” at Lahore. It was advertised that it would advocate *Satyagraha*. Thereupon, the security of the press which published the paper was enhanced from Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000. Later, before any issue of the paper was published, the security was illegally enhanced to Rs. 2,000. The paper is being issued subject to precensorship.”²⁰²

The prices of life necessities and other commodities of daily use increased immensely due to the war, pressing very heavily on the middle classes and people of limited means.²⁰³ While the war was on, all the restraints and hardships, though felt bitter, were suffered patiently, because of the common purpose of winning the war. But the people generally had hoped that Germany’s defeat and the successful ending of the battle for the Allies would immediately end the abnormal conditions and bring into existence a happy and prosperous era. After the armistice was concluded in November 1918, the prevailing abnormal conditions, instead of vanishing, became aggravated, particularly concerning high prices. The ordinary people naturally became dissatisfied with their lot. There was widespread famine in the country due to the monsoon’s failure of the monsoon of 1918, and the prevalence of influenza and other epidemics had resulted in very heavy mortality... As already observed, the Punjab had supplied the most significant number of combatants by far than the other provinces in India. It is quite natural that due to casualties amongst them, war-weariness would be more pronounced in the Punjab than in any other region... On January 18, 1919, what is popularly known as the Rowlatt Bills were published and were introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council on February 6, 1919. The bills evoked almost universal opposition in the country.

²⁰² Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners Volume II - Evidence*, 916-7.

²⁰³ Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee*, 151.

They were opposed by almost all the Indian members of the Imperial Legislative Council, under the leadership of Vithalbhai Patel of all shades of political opinion in the country. In India, it was felt that, when she stood steadfastly by the Empire in the war and had thereby proved her right to be treated as an equal member of the Empire, this character's repressive legislation was hurriedly passed. In contrast, the reforms scheme for the installment of Self-Government had not till then materialized.²⁰⁴ "While the bill was still before the Legislative Council, Mr. Gandhi joined the agitation against the bills, which thereby received a great accession of strength... On the evidence before us, we are of the opinion that there was no rebellion in the sense we have mentioned nor any organization for that purpose; further that there was no organization even for bringing about the disturbances and the atrocities which were committed by the mobs seized by the frenzy of the moment."²⁰⁵

From a military viewpoint, if there is a protest that turns violent, then the police could disperse the Indians with *lathi charge* (beating with wooden batons) or use any means to disperse the crowd. But if the protest is non-violent, then any measures that the British take to disperse would be considered extreme, further supporting Independence from the oppressor British Raj. In Dyer's eyes, he saw fit to fire upon a crowd even after they dispersed to make an example that would be remembered, but he forgot that his proclamation did not also reach all the parts of Amritsar city. His expectancy that the neighboring villages would hear his announcement is unfair and misjudged. This shows that General Dyer wanted to present the obedience and morality question by massacring thousands of innocent people gathered in a place to celebrate a festival they have celebrated every year without the knowledge of any proclamation was only in

²⁰⁴ Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee*, 153.

²⁰⁵ Hunter, *Report of the Disorders Inquiry Committee*, 151-8.

the head of General Dyer. He slaughtered them by order of O'Dwyer, his superior. This event can be considered as the fire that started the domino effect of events, starting from the beginning of 1919; then, the Indian Independence was the snowball effect of the Massacre. The sense of betrayal and the price of loyalty paid in the Massacre by a British general was the spark needed for Gandhiji to make it into a wildfire of nationality brought in the Home-Rule in India. She got that Independence in 1947.

The national movement was not limited to men and politics, women also had a huge role in moving this movement forward as the killings of women and children in the massacre resonated with British women too. Antoinette Burton is one of the many names in history that helped shape the identity for women in the First World War and after the massacre. In her work *Burdens of History*, she writes about the British feminists and their representation of themselves by the way in which they represented an Indian female Other; their construction of an Orientalist “sister” became critical to a feminist agenda. Just as British feminists asserted a role for women in the public sphere at home, to aid the poor and needy, so the images they projected of an oppressed colonial womanhood forged a feminist imperial burden that necessitated a parliamentary vote for British women at home.²⁰⁶

The idea of combining cultural identities and national identities into one unified movement was something that did not resonate with people pre-First World War, there was a disturbance in 1857 with the mutiny of the Sepoy's but that was shut down. Was it shut down completely or not could be argued and researched in a further paper but with the readings and the publications it can be understood that it was not forgotten. The people of India were longing for freedom from

²⁰⁶ Dorothy O. Helly, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915* by Antoinette Burton, *The American Historical Review*, 101, No. 2 (Apr. 1996): 492.

the British Raj and fighting for the freedom of other countries from the Nazi Germany put that point in the forefront and the massacre ignited the fire that was already presented among the soldiers in *Punjab* and the Sepoys of *New Delhi*

The Jallianwala Bagh massacre changed the view of Indian people towards the British forever. It sparked a sense of Nationalism that was not seen before amongst the Hindus and the Muslims together. The historic and one of a kind Gandhi's knowledge of law and understanding of the English language helped him combat the British in their own game.²⁰⁷ The returning soldiers of the First World War in Punjab felt betrayed, and on the other hand, the Hindus and Muslims joined hands together to overthrow their oppressors. While there was a focus on non-violent movements from Gandhi's supporters (Ji), some revolutionaries wanted an eye for an eye because of the families killed in the Massacre. It can be argued whether which method was more successful vs. productive, but the result, as seen, is that India got her freedom, and the Empire was forever weakened. This paper's focus on the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre as the beginning of the rise of Nationalism in India proves that even though there were several rallies, marches, and movements against the British rule. Nothing impacted more than seeing the families and loved ones of the returning First World War soldiers massacred in a festival gathering. This showed the impact that, even with over a million soldiers' contribution was not enough for the British to see that India was a colony that had more to give. Still, if poorly treated, the same province becomes the reason for the downfall of an Empire where the sun never sets.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁷ Indian National Congress, *Report of the Commissioners*, 36-40.

²⁰⁸ Frank Fioritto, "The Empire on Which the Sun Never Sets", History of World War II Study Programs, May 2019, <https://u.osu.edu/wwiihistorytour/2019/05/20/the-empire-on-which-the-sun-never-sets/>.

Conclusion

To understand what caused the massacre and was it one incident that happened quickly or was it a succession chain of events that led to it, I looked at the chronological events that took place in India. The undervalued source was also utilized to an extent where this paper does not become a monograph. Beginning at the return of soldiers from Egypt, France, and Gallipoli. Then, the Anti-Rowlatt agitation gained rapid support in Amritsar, partly due to the discontent caused by the city's many problems. In the last week of March, large meetings were held, during which backing for the passive resistance grew. A *hartal* was held in Amritsar on March 30, 1919, even though Gandhi (Ji) postponed his plans for a national strike on that day as the news did not reach the city on time. Therefore, a second *hartal* was held in the town on April 6. On both days, the protest remained peaceful. The only antagonistic gesture noticed by the British authorities was a procession by a group of men dressed as Turks, which was taken to signify support for the *Khilafat*.²⁰⁹ However, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Sir Miles Irving, still found the course of events disturbing, and on April 8, he requested military reinforcements from the Punjab government in Lahore.

This information is parallel to what Sardar Sant Singh, B.A., L. L. B., *Vakil*, High Court of Lyallpur had said in his interview.²¹⁰ His account is another example of the brutality that the Indian people had to endure, regardless of their age. He covers the incidents starting from April 2 and 3 until June 10 when the Martial Law ended. According to him the meeting that was held on

²⁰⁹ The name given to the Muslim movement which supported the Caliph of Turkey, then the head of the Muslim faith. Britain had defeated Turkey in the war and Muslims were worried for the future of the Caliph.

²¹⁰ Bachelor of Arts – Bachelor of Legislative Law, and *Vakil* meaning Judge.

either April 2 or 3 was called to consider the advisability of publishing the message of *Mahatma Gandhi* and of holding a mass meeting of the citizens of the town. When asking the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur permission to hold public meetings on April 5 and 6 he was given permission with a written warning that “no procession would be permitted, no inflammatory speeches to be made in the meetings transgressing the limits of war, and no shop-keepers should be coerced, or undue pressure brought upon them to suspend their business.”²¹¹ Everything went smoothly until the April, 10. On April 11 as the news of the arrest of *Mahatma Gandhi* started spreading, followed by the confirmation by newspapers on April, 12 and the arrest of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew disturbed the public mind. The Massacre on April 13 and firing on the crowd on April 14 created an excitement in town that was not seen before.²¹² At that moment people wanted revenge and fast, their intentions were not to have a national identity separate from the British, but it can be considered Nationalist movement from an Imperial perspective of the twenty first century. Sant Singh’s interview continues to explain the events as they were after the Massacre and during the Martial Law. The sentiments that people had was considered as disturbances by British administrators and several people were jailed during that time, some as little as 12 years old kids.²¹³ To add to all the suffering people were made to pay the Imperial War Relief Fund which was Ten Rupees per square of land owned.²¹⁴

On April 9, Ram Naumi day, his uneasiness increased.²¹⁵ As a sign of Hindu-Muslim unity, not only Hindus but also Muslims were celebrating this Hindu festival. Fantastic scene of fraternization occurred, including the sharing of water vessels, which is considered a breach of

²¹¹ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 635.

²¹² Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 635-7.

²¹³ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 637-8.

²¹⁴ Santanam, *Report of the Commissioners*, 649.

²¹⁵ Ram Naumi, the day on which Hindus celebrate the birth of Ram, a deity widely worshipped in India.

caste (because India was always believed to be a firm believer in caste systems among Hindus itself, but with Hindu and Muslim, it was marketed as a great sin and such acts were looked at very cynically in society.) The most prominent leaders of the Anti-Rowlatt movement in Amritsar were Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Saif-ud-din Kitchlew.²¹⁶ Both men had been prohibited from speaking in public, but the Punjab government did not consider this restriction enough.²¹⁷ On the evening of April 9, Irving received orders for the deportation of the two doctors. When questioned by the hunter committee, Sir Michael O'Dwyer justified this move with a precedent of the deportations of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh, which had quietened the disturbance of 1907.²¹⁸ However, in this case, the banishment of Dr. Kitchlew and Dr. Satyapal was a mistake, and many see the action as a direct cause of the Jallianwala Bagh shooting.

On April 10, at Ten O'clock in the morning, Irving invited the two doctors to his bungalow. When they arrived, they were informed of the deportation orders and immediately sent to Dharamshala²¹⁹ by car. News of their arrest spread quickly and coincided with Amritsar's rumors that Gandhi (ji) had been prohibited from entering Punjab.²²⁰ The people were outraged, and crowds began to gather, demanding the release of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Kitchlew. A massive crowd collected by the Hall Gate Bridge. This bridge incorporated a footbridge and a carriage-bridge. The people wanted to cross the bridges to the Civil Lines to go to the Deputy Commissioner's Bungalow and appeal to him to release their leaders. In anticipation of trouble, however, the authorities had put a premeditated plan into action to defend the Civil Lines.

²¹⁶ Dr. Satyapal came from a middle-class Khatri family. Dr. Kitchlew was a Kashmiri Muslim. Together they were striving for Hindu-Muslim unity.

²¹⁷ Dr. Satyapal was prohibited from speaking in public on March 29, Dr. Kitchlew on April 4.

²¹⁸ Datta. *New Light on the Punjab Disturbances in 1919*, p. 129. This book contains Vols. VI and VII of the Hunter Committee Report, which were withheld from publication by Montagu at the request of Chelmsford. O'Dwyer's evidence was included in these suppressed vols.

²¹⁹ A city in the Himachal Pradesh state of Now India, it was probably under the British control as seen in the map provided in Narain's book.

²²⁰ On 9 April Gandhi (ji) was stopped at Palwal station and escorted out of the Punjab.

Therefore, the crowd found itself stopped at the bridges by armed pickets. The mass of people began to push forward, and some threw stones at the soldiers.²²¹

On the evening of April 13, when the people gathered in Jallianwala Bagh for the Baisakhi festival, Dyer arrived there with his troops and opening fire to the crowd of 20,000 and firing 1,650 shots.²²² Most of the dead bodies were collected on the morning of April 14, and the people of Amritsar were told to bury or cremate them quietly. No attempt was made by the authorities to count the number of those killed, so there is no general agreement on this matter. Dyer had issued a Curfew order, and nobody wanted to go out to help the wounded on the 13th.

A Singular Event? British considered the massacre as a singular event, and Derek Sayer's insight can be seen as enlightening, which states that this stems, I believe, from more than embarrassment in the face of one of the less glorious chapters in British history.²²³ The construction of the Amritsar Massacre from the start as "singular and sinister" marginalizes it. There has been no need to agonize over Amritsar as in any sense a national shame because it is aberrant, in a category by itself, not part of the national history at all.²²⁴

As to the facts, there is no doubt and no dispute, and it is only necessary here to summarize them very briefly in their baldest form. On the morning of the April 13, Brigadier-General Dyer, who had arrived at Amritsar on the night of the 11th, issued a proclamation forbidding *inter alia* processions to parade in or outside the city and declaring that "any such procession or gathering of four men will be "looked upon and treated as an unlawful assembly and dispersed by force of arms, if necessary." This proclamation was read out at various places

²²¹ There are no accurate figures of the number killed, indicating little administrative concern over the numbers of dead and injured.

²²² *Disorders Inquiry Evidence*, Vol III, 127.

²²³ Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset*, 45.

²²⁴ Sayer, *British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacre*, 132.

in the city in the course of progress through the streets of a column of troops led by the Brigadier-General personally, who left his quarters about 9 a.m. for this purpose and returned to them about 1.30 p.m. about an hour before his return quarters in Ram Bagh, Brigadier-General Dyer had heard that, despite his proclamation, it was intended to hold a large meeting at the Jallianwala Bagh at 4.30 that afternoon. At 4 p.m., he received a message that a crowd of about 1,000 had already assembled there. Shortly after 4 p.m., Brigadier-General Dyer marched from the Ram Bagh with picketing parties (as he had previously determined to picket the main gates of the city) and with a particular party consisting of 50 Indian Infantry armed with rifles, 40 Indian Infantry armed only with "Kukris" (short swords), and two armored cars. He proceeded straight to the Jallianwala Bagh, dropping his picketing parties en route. On arrival, he marched his infantry through a narrow lane into the Bagh and deployed them immediately to the right and left of the entrance. The armored cars were left outside, as the lane was too narrow to admit them. Having deployed his troops, Brigadier-General Dyer at once gave orders to open fire and continued a controlled fire on the dense crowd facing him in the enclosure (which he estimated at 5,000 persons) for some ten minutes, until his ammunition supply was at the point of exhaustion. One thousand six hundred fifty rounds of .303 Mark VI. Ammunition was fired. The fatal casualties resulting from this action are believed to be 379; the number of wounded has not been precisely ascertained but is estimated by Lord Hunter's Committee at possibly three times the number of deaths.

General Dyer says, "I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed, and I consider this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral and widespread effect it was my duty to produce if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand, the casualties would have been greater in proportion. *It was no longer a question of merely*

dispersing the crowd, but one of producing an enough moral effect. From a military point of view, not only on those present but more especially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity.”

From this explanation, it is safe to say that it was not a question of whether this was a singular event. It was a question of insecurity and the Empire’s inability to keep a stronghold in India after Indian soldiers saw what the great war was about and the idea behind it. Yet, they suffered the same type of treatment at home. It was not just a massacre; it was the Empire’s show of desperation. This showcases that Indians felt betrayed by this incident, and that gave Gandhi (Ji) the tools and power to fight against the oppressors that were British Empire.

The source that I wanted to shed some light on has been undervalued as shown in the chapter. As more people start to address this source and examine it closely it would give a better understanding in social history and Subaltern history. Looking at it from the lens of social historian it would bring about a change in dialogue that people felt about national identity and supporting Gandhi (Ji) for the same in the form of his *Satyagraha* movements or several marches after that until the independence in 1947. Meanwhile Subaltern studies is about the dialogue that the indigenous people say or write, and this is the perfect source for that. This source focuses on the people’s sentiments and testimonies regarding the unjust nature of the British Empire.

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
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Appendices

Figure 1.



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225 Map of India in 1929 provided in Atlas by "India. Propr. Artistico-letteraria del T.C.I. Ufficio cartografico del T.C.I."