

THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S
SPORTS AND PHYSICAL TRAINING POLICY ON
ORGANIZED ATHLETICS DURING
WORLD WAR II

By

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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the utilitarian martial purpose which was superimposed on the field of sport during World War II. The government of the United States manipulated the rationale for its pursuit as well as the number of people who felt the benefits of its practice. A postwar society was given to sport forms and expressions.

Federal agencies closely involved in the formation of sport policy were vastly influenced by the huge Army and Navy programs. War and Navy Department records on physical training located in the National Archives in Washington have proved invaluable. For a general overlay of sports policy as a component in overall war planning and regulation, I have relied largely upon the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt in Hyde Park, New York. In order to evaluate the overall impact of government on civilian sport, the records of the Professional Football Hall of Fame Library in Canton, Ohio, and those of the National Collegiate Association in Mission, Kansas, have been especially helpful. Much travel has gone into the research of this paper, and an investigation of the Paul McNutt Papers, Bloomington, Indiana, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers in Abilene, Kansas, and the George C. Marshall Papers in Lexington, Virginia, are among the far-flung sources which have been used in gathering information. I am especially grateful to Rear Admiral (Ret.) Thomas J. Hamilton for forwarding many of his documents on Navy athletics to me.

Special gratitude must be expressed to Dr. Odie Faulk for his

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: ATHLETICS IN THE WAR EFFORT

The experience of a nation in world war causes not only political, economic and spiritual tribulation, but also alters the social milieu of that country to accommodate new requirements for survival. Changing patterns of work, family living, and ideology force constant re-examination and evaluation of its cultural baggage. After the military, diplomatic, governmental, and business phases of a war have been examined, historians are left with evidence that points to social change as the lingering influence of war's dramatic upheaval.

During World War II, the American people were barraged with problems, each of which had to be countered with the military, economic, and ideological arsenal at their disposal. Within that phase of American social history, the seemingly uncomplex field of organized athletics had a symbolic and rhetorical appeal which harbored simple answers to a country beset with material and emotional burdens. Athletic events, representing the spirit of the American past, were used to train troops, raise war funds, satisfy public morale and physically equip the young generation. They represented a guide for the mobilization of opinion. Sport was believed to have unique qualities representing the moral and physical superiority of the United States. Therefore the nation's institutional leaders and its government worked to unleash and develop sport and physical training around the war effort.

Playing athletic games and attending sporting events were alternately considered to be a healthy continuance of normal national life and a means of preparing for defense. By the time the war was over, millions of men and women had been exposed to the ideals of physical training stimulated by the heritage of the American playing field. Countless others were indoctrinated with the symbols, myths, rhetoric, and euphemisms of athletics as related to the American victory.

When the United States turned to peacetime military conscription, competitive varsity athletic games between military bases became fundamental to preparedness. Designed to ease the transition between military and civilian life and act as a conduit for morale, a service-wide athletic plan had been completed by the Army only two days before the catalytic episode at Pearl Harbor.¹ This was only a portion of the wartime activity that was conveyed through sport. Before V-J Day, the War Department had committed the service to a massive demobilization training program in which young men from all over the country were introduced to organized athletics. The Navy made sport a part of its regular physical training regimen and also used rugged games as part of a psychological conditioning plan in aviation. The federal government made efforts to institute a national preparedness program through sport. This accomplished a feeble attempt to coordinate civilian sporting activity, which embroiled professional athletics in a myriad of war agency regulations. Colleges and universities furnished a base for intellectual thought in war-related physical training, and, in turn, the Navy saved intercollegiate athletics. Athletics were a means of raising revenue, conveying militant attitudes, enlivening weary war workers, and tilting morale toward occasional feelings of normality.

Through the impetus of preparedness spending, the year 1941 saw Americans partially recover from the physical and emotional doldrums of economic depression. In the late 1930s, professional and amateur sport returned to the boom which had marked its progress during the 1920s. Industrial sport grew rapidly, and projections were made that 40,000 semi-pro baseball games would be played on opening day in 1942.² The 1941 college football season had broken all attendance records. Attendance at minor league baseball games in 1941 peaked at over 15,000,000, a twenty-five percent increase from 1940,³ and horseracing had the "most successful year the turf has ever known."⁴ Pearl Harbor day found a record-breaking professional football crowd of over 55,000 attending the last regular season football game between Brooklyn and New York. Nearly 16,000 crammed Madison Square Garden to view the New York Rangers edge the Boston Bruins in professional hockey. Three weeks later Bobby Riggs and Frank Kovacs opened their professional tennis tour at the Garden before a crowd of 11,237.⁵ Nor was the sporting activity limited to civilian pursuits. Each of the nine Army Corps had a full complement of camp and division football activity.⁶ The Great Lakes Naval Training Station embarked on a "barnstorming" basketball campaign to initiate a recruiting drive for the Ninth Naval District, engaging such potent fives as the Universities of Kentucky, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Marquette, Minnesota, Bradley, Kansas and Notre Dame. The latter game for Navy Relief was played before 12,236 fans in Chicago stadium, a resplendent array which featured a one-hundred-voice Navy choir, military "brass," celebrated clerics, and a sixty-five-piece Navy band. The latter unleashing a deafening rendition of "Anchors Aweigh" as the silk-clad opponents took to the court.⁷

An idolizing public expected the war to spur enlistments of many of their sports heroes. Some university athletic teams enlisted en masse, notably the Sugar Bowl champion football team from Fordham University. Twenty-eight of these stellar youngsters were taken into the Army Air Corps flying program at Floyd Bennett Field, and were dubbed the "Flying Rams" to go with the "Flying Indians" from Dartmouth, the "Air Crusaders" of Holy Cross, and the "Navy Eagles" from Boston College.⁸ The Navy accomplished a public relations coup by enlisting Cleveland pitching star Bob Feller only three days after Pearl Harbor. Hank Greenburg, the American League's most valuable player in 1940, re-enlisted in the Army, and Heisman trophy recipient Tommy Harmon was accepted by the Air Corps.⁹ Military publicists rushed lists of enlistments to news media, with names of the athletes' posts and assignments.¹⁰ Athletes were expected to be quick and beneficial in their response to duty. Those who did not were often sanctioned. When Selective Service officials discovered one professional football quarterback having enlisted in the Navy Reserve in order to delay his induction until after the 1941 football season, the Bureau of Navigation took correction action. Instructions were relayed "to have this sterling character ordered immediately to active duty."¹¹

An ideology emerged which insisted that national morale and fervency could best be exemplified by those who had athletic backgrounds. Sportswriter John Kieran noted, "War is competition and the boys in this country grew up on a background of competition....We're not content to play a game, we want to win that game....To lose is intolerable." Athletic organizations were urged to "find out...how sports can contribute to the...American spirit as it is fostered in the developing

mind...."¹² The editors of Scholastic Coach insisted there was "no better way of building physical and moral fitness....," for sports were "indispensable in developing teamwork, tenacity, courage, leadership and loyalty."¹³ This "tenacity," to Arthur Daley of the New York Times, was an admirable national characteristic, like that of the Finns whose "grim unsmiling tenacity...was revealed in their distance runners" but not like the "fanatical persistency" of the Japanese or the "thoroughness and unscrupulousness of the Germans...."¹⁴ The most admirable trait was to be built through a program of "vigorous athletics that will develop a will to win, to carry on against overwhelming odds....," wherein an "athlete learns to discipline himself."¹⁵ One physical educator put these factors in terms of "total fitness," entailing the maximum development of the "physical, mental, social and spiritual...."¹⁶

These attitudes marked a surge of patriotic spontaneity from educators, coaches, and sportswriters, and if sport was to be one of the moral weapons through which Americans would be guided to victory, then the harder combative games were emblematic of a greater resiliency. "It goes without mention," noted one physical education editor, "that the combative sports--boxing, wrestling, jiu jitsu, fencing and jousting--can be utilized in military pursuits....All the well known team sports have an additional importance because of the group unity, fighting spirit and leadership they engender."¹⁷ George T. Stafford, a speaker at the national convention for physical educators, charged in April of 1942 that Americans had been "hoodwinked by an over intellectualized cultural influence" into accepting "lighter, softer sports." Noting that we needed "strong, sturdy men who can endure hardships" for a "philosophy of victory," this university administrator urged a program

of "defensive and combative activities for...endurance...and persistent and aggressive attitude."¹⁸ To imaginative sports writers, war fostered an image of a gigantic football game in which a "unified command [head coach]" was the "best way of winning the big game."¹⁹ Nor was this analogy lost on war leaders. Dwight D. Eisenhower, writing early in the war from his command post in Europe, mused: "This thing is a good deal like a football game....It takes thorough training, planning and tremendous hitting power to push the ball across the goal...."²⁰ In less symbolic terms, one cartoon in the Chicago Tribune displayed an army of Japanese invaders fleeing an onrushing group of football players carrying banners proclaiming "The American Gridiron CRUSADERS," and "Speed Quick Thinking, Fighting Heart, Endurance" with the caption "Why not a battalion of football stars? They are the fightingest men we have."²¹ Marine Corps recruiters even scoured college football teams to find "combative types" to serve as officers during World War II.²²

These stirrings were the foundation of a network of preparedness movements formed and maintained by the unique American sporting culture. The institutions of sport subtly affected efforts of Americans to mobilize their ideals into action. Prewar values were instituted into post-war structures. The issue of athletic fitness was promoted as the essence of the American character. A search for this characteristic was launched before the war began.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹"United States Army Special Services Division History" (micro-film), Vol. 5, "History of the Athletic Branch to June 1945," p. 7.
- ²John R. Betts, America's Sporting Heritage (Reading, Mass., 1974), p. 288.
- ³New York Times (December 4, 1941).
- ⁴Ibid. (January 1, 1942).
- ⁵Ibid. (December 27, 1941).
- ⁶Walter R. Okeson (ed.), The Official NCAA 1942 Football Guide (New York, 1942), pp. 18-20.
- ⁷Chicago Tribune (February 10, 1942).
- ⁸New York Times (February 14, 1942; February 22, 1942).
- ⁹Ibid. (December 10, 1941; December 11, 1941; March 4, 1942; March 26, 1942).
- ¹⁰Ibid. (March 6, 1942).
- ¹¹Bureau of Navigation letter--9LMN, Captain A. W. Dunn to Commander Elliott M. Senn, September 3, 1941, National Archives, Record Group 24, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹²New York Times (December 9, 1941).
- ¹³H. V. Porter, "Keep 'Em Playing," Scholastic Coach, XI (January, 1942), p. 3.
- ¹⁴New York Times (December 31, 1941).
- ¹⁵H. V. Porter, "Here Below," Scholastic Coach, XI (January, 1942), p. 3.
- ¹⁶Anne Schley Morgan, "An Open Letter to the Members," Journal of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, XIII (January, 1942), p. 3. Herein cited as JOHPER.
- ¹⁷"Practical Measures for War Needs," JOHPER, XIII (January, 1942), p. 22.

¹⁸George T. Stafford, "Implications for the Sports Program for Boys and Men," JOHPER, XII (June, 1942), p. 345.

¹⁹New York Times (February 5, 1942).

²⁰Letter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Elmer Oliphant, former USMA football player, September 28, 1942, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Box 61, personal folder.

²¹Athletic Journal, XIII (February, 1942), p. 3.

²²Donald J. Mrozek, "Rhetoric and Reality in the Defense Department's Use of Sport, 1945-1950" (Unpublished paper, Department of History, Kansas State University, 1974).

CHAPTER II

PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL PREPAREDNESS

THE RESPONSE TO WAR

When France suddenly collapsed before the Nazi war machine in June of 1940, many physical educators were among those Americans concerned about national preparedness. Although public school and college publicity had drawn attention to particular athletes of high achievement, much concern was directed to the physical capabilities of the average man. World War I statistics had shown one-third of the registrants to be unfit for military duty because of physical debilitation. The abundance of modern luxuries and conveyances gave rise to the fears that statistics would show American youth to be even further underdeveloped than in 1917. When high Selective Service rejections bore out some of these fears after the passage of peacetime conscription in the fall of 1940, there was some consternation that the American educational system could not operate a physical preparedness curriculum without infusion of federal funding and advice--a type of national mobilization in physical fitness and athletics.

Even the military was suspect. Many felt that the services could not stand the physical strain of modern war. Under Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, a former naval aviator, was convinced and even obsessed with the idea of moral fitness for combat bearing a direct relationship to physical training.¹ An acquaintance of Forrestal's,

former World Heavyweight Boxing Champion Gene Tunney, warned the Under Secretary early in September, 1940, that the physical and mental preparedness of American youth was not reliable for the defense of the nation against the physically indoctrinated youth of authoritarian states. He urged that a system of physical discipline be developed around American aims for defense.² It was Forrestal who inspired Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to issue Alnav 100, which became the well-spring of the Navy's future leadership in physical training. The directive of October 18, 1940, charged: "modern war required the Acme of physical fitness and fighting edge. Nothing shall be left undone to insure that all men are properly conditioned to meet the utmost demands of physical endurance." Knox charged that all "commands afloat and ashore" were to "immediately institute adequate and systematic exercises" including sports.³ The Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation formed a subcommittee on athletics the following spring to advise on the establishment of organized athletics in military camps, primarily in the Army. Almost simultaneously with the issuance of Alnav 100 and the first Selective Service drawing, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed John B. Kelly as a National Coordinator for Physical Training, a position that was brought into the office of Civilian Defense the following May.⁴ In December of 1940, the American Association of Health, Physical Education and Recreation began lobbying for a National Physical Preparedness Bill,⁵ and the National Collegiate Athletic Association devoted an entire session to "Intercollegiate Athletics and their Relation to National Defense."⁶

On January 3, 1940, legislation was introduced in the 76th Congress to authorize a survey of national resource facilities and personnel "for

purposes of improving assets in physical education and athletics." The measure, introduced by Representative William H. Sutphin of New Jersey, was in response to a study performed by the College Education Federal Committee.⁷ Hampered by the lack of an immediate crisis and smacking of New Deal planning schemes, the bill was not reported, but was replaced the following fall by H. R. 10606, supported by the AAHPER. Introduced by Representative Pius L. Schwert of New York, the measure was the result of planning by the physical education group and a committee which was chaired by Jesse Feiring Williams of North Carolina University. The bill, as drafted by the committee, was introduced on October 3, 1940, and provided for federal funding of public school physical education, including "preventative and developmental programs of physical activity including sports."⁸ That bill died in committee but was reworked from December 29-31, 1940, at a conference held in New York City, attended by representatives of the AAHPER, National Education Association, Parent-Teacher Association, American Legion, Elks Clubs, and the U. S. Office of Education.⁹

A revised document was reintroduced by Schwert on January 3, 1941, in the new 77th Congress as H. R. 1074. The measure appropriated federal revenues to be matched by the states within three years to "make adequate provisions through schools for physical education, including athletics; instruction and guidance in healthful living; wider recreational use of school facilities; and the development of school camps."¹⁰ A popular conception was that the camps would give "reality to the democratic ideals" and promote "national solidarity."¹¹ It was precisely this implication that the new proposal was designed to overcome, since it suggested work camps of physical culture and indoctrination similar

to the Hitler Jugend. This pitfall was softened by the guaranteeing of local control and by making participation of individuals and districts voluntary. The new Schwert bill also guaranteed equal facilities for women. Coaches were reminded that "athletics" rather than "sports" had become a major feature, a deference to varsity-type team play.¹²

Physical education and athletic groups lobbied for passage of the bill through the winter and early spring of 1941, and on February 13, 1941, Schwert requested the support and suggestions of the administration.¹³ Roosevelt was already committed to an alternative program through the Office of Civil Defense, which he created by executive order on May 20,¹⁴ and after Schwert's death in April, support for the bill in Congress scattered. Kelly, who headed the Physical Fitness Division in the OCD, had presented a similar program the previous October¹⁵ to be administered by an already established branch of the federal bureaucracy. The Kelly plan was primarily a promotion and coordination of existing agencies, leading Williams to charge that the "government expects to secure fitness in the nation by publicity," and that there was "no place in official circles for competence and experience in... physical education...."¹⁶ Raising Williams' ire was the well-publicized appointment of Kelly, who was a member of the 1920 Olympic rowing team and Democrat party fund raiser, to the office of Civilian Defense and the selection of former World Heavyweight Boxing Champion Gene Tunney to head physical training in the Navy.

In September of 1940, Roosevelt requested that Kelly submit a program to "toughen up America," whereupon the Philadelphia industrialist called together a number of figures from medicine, education and physical training to present a composite plan. The Kelly program devised a

formal and informal range of activity to include people from school age to sixty years, to be directed by each community with a federal commission acting as promoter. Kelly envisioned the actual inception of local programs to be launched through established organizations, including schools, clubs, churches and the medical profession. Practically the only innovative part of the proposal was the suggestion that the program coordinate existing facilities. Other than that, the Kelly committee recommended a program of health examinations, nutrition, recreation, and body building exercises for adults as well as compulsory school physical education, expansion of athletic facilities for students, and a six-weeks summer camp for boys.¹⁷

Without funds or personnel, Kelly could do little until his program was made a division in the OCD of the Federal Security Agency. In August of 1941, Kelly's office was upgraded to Assistant Director of Civilian Defense in Charge of Physical Fitness, and in September an advisory board was created from membership of professional physical fitness and athletic groups. Expansion was marked by the creation of a sports board headed by sportswriter Grantland Rice and including national coordinators for both men and women in the public schools and colleges, a director of physical training for women, and another for Negroes. The latter was headed by Jesse Owens, track and field star of the 1936 Berlin Olympiad. In October, 1941, Eleanor Roosevelt was named Assistant Director in charge of Voluntary Participation, which further diffused efforts for physical fitness came under her direction.¹⁸

The Physical Fitness Division of the Office of Civilian Defense, meanwhile, had neither the funds nor the authority to launch a unified national fitness program. Kelly sought to develop a physical

conditioning program for prospective draftees and to organize civilian fitness through the development of local athletic and recreational activities. This program, which was launched shortly after the country's entry into the war, was termed "Hale America," a gesture to President Roosevelt's remarks that the "wealth of a nation is in the strength of its people." The research necessary for fitness standards was carried out by college physical educators, notably A. H. Stienhaus of George Williams University and Nelson Metcalf of the University of Chicago.¹⁹ That program was eventually coordinated through the U. S. Office of Education. Therefore Kelly's activity was directed at coordinating and publicizing the various community centered fitness activities. The director appointed no less than sixty-two national coordinators for everything from handball and bag punching to ping-pong and hiking.²⁰ One professional baseball league, the Southern Association, agreed to wear the "Hale America" emblem on its uniforms.²¹

Jack Kelly's publicity-oriented "Hale America" operation received a boost when the Executive Committee of the United States Golf Association voted to drop its championship tour of the Open, Amateur, and Public Links championship to cooperate with "Hale America" in staging a national elimination tournament in Chicago.²² The event was staged from June 18 to 21, 1942, after 1,500 entrants paid the entry fee to participate in district elimination tourneys. Proceeds were turned over to war relief. Ben Hogan carded the victory in the national tournament, but 1,800 local "Hale" tournaments made the average American fitness conscious before the year was out.²³

The diversity of the Kelly effort made it hard to control, and criticism hit the operation early.²⁴ Funds were discovered being spent

for such physical culture as theatrical dance for kindergarten students, and this "fan dance scandal," attributed to "Eleanor's friends," was a source of aggravation to Kelly. Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia attacked the sanctioning of bowling alleys and charged that the fitness operation was "unbelievable as an integral program of national defense at a time of great peril to our country."²⁵ These problems paved the way for the administrative reorganization of Kelly's office, and in March, 1942, Federal Security Administrator Paul McNutt appointed the Philadelphian as Assistant Director in Charge of Physical Fitness in the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare Services.²⁶ Kelly's function was to advise the United States Office of Education on matters of school fitness and offer coordination to Recreation Division of ODHWS.²⁷ One of the primary objectives of the Office of Education was to promote guidelines for compulsory physical education in schools and colleges.

The early "Hale America" plan, developed under the Office of Civilian Defense, had come close to placing Kelly in the role of coordinator for amateur sport. However, the director was kept ensconced as a coordinator to various federally sponsored fitness conferences. Even there, Kelly's influence was minimal. Presidential Assistant Marvin McIntyre turned down the Fitness Director's draft for a Presidential statement at the War Fitness Conference in Cincinnati.²⁸ The gregarious Irishman tended to speak out on a number of items relating to sport, not confining himself to the narrow channel designed for him. This concerned McIntyre, who reminded the President that Kelly was "pretty much off the reservation," having failed to "click" with Manpower or War Planning operations.²⁹ Consequently the Physical Fitness Division was in danger of being phased out. Kelly appealed to Presidential Secretary

Edwin Watson in an effort to save his small operation,³⁰ a move which led the President to reprove the Fitness Office from the budget axe.³¹ On April 29, 1943, the office was transferred by Executive Order to the Office of Community War Services under the Federal Security Agency,³² thereby limiting Kelly's advisory role to the Office of Education. Concurrent with the transfer of Kelly's office, the President established the framework for a committee on physical fitness. The outgrowth of this was the National Council on Physical Fitness, established on June 16, 1943, which included the representatives of many amateur sports bodies.³³ It fundamentally served in the same promotional capacity as did the OCD program under Kelly at the war's outset.

This frustrated the Fitness Chief's designs for institutionalizing a national fitness program. Kelly was increasingly concerned about the number of Selective Service rejections, and he laid this to the tendency in the United States to foster "an aristocracy in sports." He did not see the stamina of American manhood running beyond "our first couple of million," and his office supported various concepts of neighborhood fitness groups which would break this "aristocracy."³⁴ The Office of Community War Services was an ideal locus for this type of program, which led to the organization of a number of locally directed sports clubs. This became a mechanism to break the monopoly of the Amateur Athletic Union, the elite power broker in American sport.

The AAU had launched a nationwide war fitness effort in December of 1942, and private athletic clubs were used to develop a competitive testing program in the martial skills for all participants between fourteen and fifty years of age. Obstacle races, endurance running, chin-ning, putting the shot, and a one-half mile race carrying a pack and gun

were designed for the membership, with club, community, state, regional and national competition included.³⁵ Although the AAU plan was never developed on this scale, its position as the arbiter for amateur sport policy was enhanced by its supervision over numerous war-time events, especially that of the national track and field meet. The OCWS plan on the other hand, had encouraged local athletic associations, financially self- or community-supported, developing community sports rivalries which would encourage mass participation outside of AAU control. This system had been nominally tried in New York to provide a "method of athletics for the working boy." However, one of the directors of the New York program, E. W. Hjertberg, alarmed at athletic union advancements in the same area, protested that the AAU method was designed to exploit the talents of returning troops. Fearing an inundation of the neighborhood concept, Hjertberg called for support of the club plan, thus preventing the "same old merry-go-round that has been going on... in athletics."³⁶

Another government venture in athletics had developed in the Navy Department with the appointment of J. J. (Gene) Tunney. That branch had appointed a recreation officer in each naval district in the summer of 1940 to organize a servicewide athletic program.³⁷ After the issuance of Alnav 100 in October of that year, the principles of athletic conditioning were introduced into regular Navy training program. The physical condition of the individual sailor was the responsibility of each commanding officer, but there was no unified system of conditioning and training. On December 12, 1940, Tunney was put on temporary assignment as the chief athletic advisor to the Navy, and on January 21, 1941, each training station was instructed to appoint a drill and

physical education officer.³⁸

Tunney was brought to Washington by the Chief of Naval Aviation Training and introduced to Assistant Navy Secretary James Forrestal, with whom Tunney was acquainted. Forrestal wanted Tunney to take over athletic training for student pilots, and after clearing the appointment with Knox, Reserve Marine Officer Tunney was commissioned a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy.³⁹ Although he was not a college educated physical educator, the well-read Tunney had valuable experience as a business executive, had worked widely with young people, and was in demand as a lecturer. A World War I Marine, the New York City native had won an AEF boxing championship before turning professional and was highly esteemed as boxing champion before retiring in 1929. Nevertheless, the fact that Tunney was not part of the Regular Navy and had little background in teaching and research was to prove a nagging problem, but it was through the Navy and its physical training program that the American people and the remaining services took much of their wartime and post-war philosophy of athletic competition.

Tunney was assigned to the Naval air station at Pensacola, Miami, Jacksonville, and Corpus Christi. Perceiving that the "stunts of battle flying" needed "modes of exertion all their own," he "devised a system of drill based on prize fight training."⁴⁰ Tunney's thirty minute morning period of "setting up exercises" were accompanied by a planned program of organized athletics in the cadets' off-duty time.⁴¹ In April, 1941, Lieutenant Commander Tunney was transferred to Washington where Captain Chester W. Nimitz placed him on duty within the Training Division of the Bureau of Navigation to assist in the physical development program at all naval stations.⁴² A non-commissioned rating

was created, Specialist Third Class (Athletic), to serve in base leadership capacities. Only four men held these ratings and an eight-week course of training had to be established at Norfolk, Virginia, to train other specialists. The first ten-man class was graduated in July.⁴³

The Bureau of Navigation was determined to use the former champion's thorough and personable manner to its best advantage, and he was sent in August, 1941, on a fifteen week recruiting tour throughout the eastern United States to bolster his "body building battalion." Each visit by the fitness chief was hailed by newspaper and radio interviews and publicity. By November 22, Tunney had visited thirty-three cities,⁴⁴ and the end of the year, fifty men per month were going through the Norfolk training.⁴⁵ It was during this period that criticism began to be heaped on the purposes of the Navy program.

Chief among the judgments was an understanding among civilian educators that the Bureau was recruiting incompetent, untrained amateurs to establish a professional physical education program. The presence of several famous name athletes among recruits bolstered the belief that the section was simply recruiting glorified "muscle boys." The Commander's own lack of professional training was ridiculed, as were some of his training methods. The Navy publicist had developed a series of personal fitness exercised based on controlled breathing and posture, and he was marketing a home physical fitness kit, the "Gene Tunney Exerciser." These exercise boards were purchased by BuNav, and fifty were distributed to shore and fleet units throughout the Navy with the admonition that "judicious use daily will insure the physical fitness of the user."⁴⁶

On July 18, 1941, Jesse Feiring Williams heatedly wrote Secretary

Know "about some of the ideas proposed by Commander Tunney for making and keeping the Navy fit." Williams alluded to newspaper stories describing Tunney's methods of physical training as a "principle of corrective suction" by which a "new hinge is created in the back." The educator stormed:⁴⁷

Whatever the Navy wanted...apparently professional competence was not of major importance.... It would be easy to name twenty-five men, any one of whom would have done the job that a prize fighter is unfitted for entirely.

Actually the Navy was committed to recruiting only specialists with degrees in physical education except in special circumstances when individuals like Bob Feller were recruited into the program for their publicity and leadership value. In addition, a physical testing program had been established at Norfolk along with thorough training in team sports and leadership of command.⁴⁸ The Navy Secretary responded, "The success which Lieutenant Commander Tunney has achieved in this direction is sufficient proof for the Navy Department that his selection for this job was proper." The Navy's purpose, the Secretary insisted, was to select a person who was an "example of physical fitness," since the "routine in the Navy is such that physical education as taught in the colleges and schools could not be similarly taught in the Navy."⁴⁹ Nevertheless, in September of 1941, a Civilian Advisory Committee was appointed by the Chief of BuNav to assist the training branch, ostensibly to assist in recreational matters. By January, 1942, its purpose had extended to advice in training.⁵⁰

The progress being made by the Navy to incorporate athletic training within the regular physical and military regime was noted by the Joint Army-Navy Committee's subcommittee on athletics. Tunney was

invited to the organizational meeting of that group on June 6 and 7, 1941, to explain his program. The other services had made athletics largely a part of the welfare and recreation (off-duty) entertainment, but the JANC subcommittee was interested in transferring features of the Navy program to the Army.

The JANC on Welfare and Recreation was the outgrowth of the War Department's desire to maintain military control over off-duty morale activities, unlike World War I, when civilian direction predominated.⁵¹ During that conflict, the Army had relied heavily on the personnel and resources of the Young Men's Christian Association. Later in World War I, the War Department had commissioned a civilian expert, Dr. Joseph Raycroft, as chairman of the Athletic Division, War Department Commission of Training Camp Activities. A similar position had been held in the Navy by Walter Camp. From that experience, the services knew the value of allowing an outlet to troops through athletics, as masses participated in athletic games for the first time. Athletics, however, in the Army came to be the responsibility of the Morale and Welfare Branch, which had been created under the Adjutant General's office in July, 1940, and after March, 1941, as a separate division,⁵² rather than under training as in the naval services.⁵³ Athletics in the morale branch were under the direction of Theodore Bank of the Army and James Pixlee in the Air Corps.

The JANC Subcommittee on Athletics was a "blue-ribbon" panel, unlikely to take a back seat on matters of advice on morale or athletics in training. It included as its chairman Philip O. Badger, Athletic Director at New York University and President of the NCAA; John Griffith, Commissioner of the Western Athletic Conference (Big 10) and

editor of the Athletic Journal; Grandland Rice, the nation's foremost sports journalist; Raycroft; and 17 other university coaches, administrators, club owners, sports writers and broadcasters. At its first meeting, the subcommittee took a stand on eliminating the distinction between recreation and training in athletics. There was general admiration for the Navy program and that of the Air Corps, which had been incorporating these theories through a civilian team of physical educators. The group also broadened its advisory latitude to include interest in relations between camps and communities and the preparation of young people for service. Additionally, the group suggested the enlargement of the headquarters staff for Army athletics.⁵⁴ In a subsequent letter to Frederick Osburn, Chairman of JANC, Badger declared "the importance of making clear to all commanding officers that the athletic program...was of key importance in the training of loyal, courageous, and physically fit fighting men."⁵⁵

In its first meeting the subcommittee had gone beyond the scope of expectations for the athletic program, and no one exemplified the militancy for military athletic training more than Griffith. The retired Army major, who had served as a bayonet and physical instructor during the First World War, carried out a personal campaign to have the Army athletic program incorporated into training. In October, 1941, he wrote the Assistant Executive Director of JANC insisting that the greatest proof in the soundness of his proposals lay in the example of the college physical training programs, which draft statistics in the previous war had shown to prepare a better trained fighting man.⁵⁶ Comparing an Army regiment to a university freshman class, in which the needs of every man were varied, the major urged a broad program of

intramural and varsity athletics with "emphasis on rugged contact sports." Griffith's primary rationale was based on the socio-psychological development of the recruit. In order to "develop a spirit of loyalty and aggressiveness," each commander could "utilize the average American's interest in sports as a means of aiding in the development of an efficient fighting force." Not only would this soldier "be able to meet the physical demands which will be made of him...," and to make any sacrifice in order to win an objective." Griffith foresaw such a program instituted along democratic lines in which the "inept, the fair and the superior" would each be given "full opportunity to progress to a group of greater efficiency, distinction and opportunity."⁵⁷

Despite Griffith's opinion that "the idea that athletics in the camps is only for exercise and...is erroneous,"⁵⁸ JANC officials doubted the Army would be willing to change its procedure to allow Griffith's World War I ideas of elan to be incorporated.⁵⁹ That branch was behind in setting up a comprehensive peacetime athletic program, a situation that concerned Chief of Staff George C. Marshall.⁶⁰ The slowness came because one high-ranking officer did not like the emphasis on varsity football.⁶¹ The athletic subcommittee continued to desire opportunities for advising the Army on incorporating athletics into military training. In December, Badger inquired of JANC officials whether a private foundation grant could be obtained to continue the subcommittee's active work. Associate Director Samuel Crocker warned the collegiate official that the JANC had "no other function except to be a liaison between civilian authorities and the...Army."⁶² After the Morale and Recreation Division was reorganized into the Army Special Services in

January of 1942, the role of the athletic subcommittee was further reduced.⁶³

Colleges were interested in the unique idea of military physical training through athletics. After the passage of the Selective Service Act in September of 1940, representatives of the Executive Committee of the NCAA offered to aid in the mobilization training effort. This overture was received coolly by Army officials, although representatives of some institutions did help a few encampments establish intramural programs of recreation. The colleges also were interested in preserving their own programs in the hope that the government would recognize the value of substituting college training with liberal doses of fitness and combative activities for military training. Higher education then would be able to maintain deferment for their students until graduation. Griffith insisted that "it is better for our young men, in addition to their academic work, to be given training that will make them physically strong and alert than to have them taken out of college...."⁶⁴ However, War Department officials could guarantee education deferments only until July 1, 1941.⁶⁵ Therefore, the NCAA convention of December, 1940, saw many calls for action by representatives of higher education to do something about military preparedness.

Outgoing NCAA President W. R. Owens called on member institutions to expand their sports programs. Drawing on the experiences of the First World War, he claimed: "That athletic competition develops the qualities which make a good soldier, has been demonstrated so conclusively, it no longer needs argument." Striking a chord that was to be repeated many times for those who saw team games as the epitome of the American spirit, he saw the "well trained athlete" as the "outward

result of an inner, mental and spiritual development." He urged that the colleges protect their guardianship over traditional values from regimentation by the State.⁶⁶ From "an examination of recent social trends," Owens warned that the "church and the family have lost many of their regulatory influences over behavior, while industry and government have assumed a larger degree of control."

The President of Lafayette College, William M. Lewis, suggested that it was up to athletics, more than any other academic department, to preserve civilization during a time of world threat to free inquiry by building a "strong mental purpose" and a "love for truth" in young American manhood. The educator declared, "We need as never before in the history of the world men who are unselfish; men who are kindly; men who are thoughtful." These qualities were represented by boys in team athletics whose loyal and appreciative qualities were superior to those "who spend their leisure time in smoke filled rooms--those pseudo-intelligentsia discussing what is wrong with the American way."⁶⁷ Griffith called on sports leaders to "develop a spirit of patriotism."⁶⁸

This preoccupation with the psychological and social conditioning was striking in pre-war days. Alarm was spread that American education had been overwhelmed by an "over-intellectualized culture." According to Wilson Staffer of Johns Hopkins University, it was time for a "new emphasis on the physical and emotional." His stand was militant. "We must insist on a ruggedness, develop new energies and hardihoods, refuse to allow softness to thrive." Shaffer's object was to "promote character development through play," the result of which would be

...the development of a vigorous courageous youth with a well developed social consciousness; a boy who has the hardihood courage to fight for his country but who has

also the tolerance for the point of view of others and a humane spirit which includes generosity, kindness, fair play and good will.⁶⁹

Through this eighteen-century idea of virtue, these American educators apparently hoped to develop an ideal man. John Griffith was apparently thinking of this when he referred to the rise of an "American type" based on the ideas of "athletic asceticism." This concept, taken from an essay by Stuart Sherman, was said by Griffith to represent the American "competitive system" rather than "collectivism" which was a "foreign ideology."⁷⁰

John R. Tunis attempted in 1941 to consolidate these views regarding the relationship of individualism to collective behavior in his essay Democracy and Sport. Tunis insisted that democracy stressed individual sports which allowed initiative in small groups, while the dictatorships of that day, communist and fascist, stressed mass demonstrations, "muscle flexing." Germany used this technique of "unthinking submission to discipline" to promote wars of aggression, thereby corrupting athletics through physical exercise into "a branch of military training."⁷¹

Just how American physical educators would be able to compromise individualism and mass attitudes on one hand against "collectivism" on the other is difficult to fathom. Raymond Gramm Swing struggled with this in the introduction to Tunis' book. Swing noted that sport called both for "intense individual effort...and team play, both of which are the foundations of successful democracy." On the one hand, sport submitted to "technical law," the rational concept of collective effort, and the other to the "spirit of fairness," the reference of which lay deeper in society, along lines of an emotional commitments to group

standards, "on a higher level than technical law."⁷²

By the eve of war, great faith had been placed in the ability of the American system of institutional and team sport training to respond to any international threat. Seward Staley of the University of Illinois was succinct when he wrote, "Any invader, of course, will be immediately annihilated. This conclusion is based on the belief that...a high percentage of the young men of this country are athletic, robust, and 'full of fire'."⁷³ Griffith, in his November, 1941, issue of Athletic Journal, ran a six page layout of statements by men in military, industrial, political, and academic leadership about the value of the trained athlete in national defense. These figures portrayed a lexicon of endorsements on victorious attitudes abroad in the field of physical competition. The athletic director at the University of Iowa, E. G. Schroeder offered a summation by writing:

Physical combat in war and competition in athletics have much in common. Both require arduous discipline and training...maximum action, instantaneous decision, a high degree of skill, emotional control at high pitch, and a complete coordination of the groups....⁷⁴

Not incidently, a militant portrayal of energetic youth ran concurrently with the endorsements, through which the full-throated cry of physical preparedness was given vision. From "The Soul of Football" rang the challenge:

I am the onrushing tide; the stern, tense,
immutable spirit of progress.
I am cooperation; I am teamwork;
I am the breath of energy,
The spirit of stamina and the supreme test
of endurance...
Who drive the enemy over his last line of resistance.
For I am the tide of conquest and victory....

I book no weaklings
 And my sons are strong men within whom
 is red running blood....
 And the will to do or die-
 Such are my men....

I am the spirit of perfect machine.
 I am Art, for I am perfection of body,
 And clocklike coordination of brain.
 I am the sport of gentlemen and the glory
 of young virile manhood....⁷⁵

Stamina, initiative, courage, resourcefulness, cooperation, self-discipline, generosity, sincerity, the will to win, quick and realistic thinking had all become words and phrases insipient in the athletic ethic. All that was left was the opportunity to incorporate them.

After the United States entered the war, schools and colleges were hopeful of obtaining unified direction in establishing physical preparedness programs for students. One metropolitan physical education director wrote that there should be a "physical fitness program that will enable them to step from school or college into combat training.... Even the skills and knowledge of army games ought to be taught and played...."⁷⁶ The Fitness Division of the Office of Civilian Defense was bogged in a morass of diverse effort, forcing education to turn to the military, particularly the Navy, in view of its combination of recreational athletics and physical training in a single network. The Navy made a plea for leadership in this regard through a circular letter urging college presidents to "institute...a regime of self-discipline and conditioning..." in order to correct "an era of soft living and rampant individualism."⁷⁷

The Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation was also anxious to serve as an official counseling agency for colleges. The group sought to mold the service philosophy around a system of athletic

physical toughening. On October 13, 1941, T. K. Cureton, one of the developers of the University of Illinois' fitness program, wrote the welfare and recreation group. He asked aid for "certain universities to lay down demonstration and experimental centers to train physical training leaders...." Although the Norfolk system had provided a workable program, doubt was expressed in the "rather incidental way in which Mr. Tunney has had to select leaders for his naval program...."⁷⁸ This criticism was passed to the Badger subcommittee.⁷⁹ Opportunity for action came on December 11, 1941, when BuNav Chief Nimitz directed that a committee appointed by JANC study the Norfolk program.⁸⁰

Tunney was still involved in an aggressive recruiting campaign, which was rapidly expanding the number of his physical training specialists. Two hundred men graduated from the Norfolk training school in the first month of 1942 and never less than 350 per month for the rest of the year. These versatile men served as physical conditioning leaders, recreation directors, coaches, and recruit training commanders throughout the Navy. Later they were to serve aboard ship and in other phases of combat.⁸¹ In this rapidly expanding situation, Tunney on March 4 was placed in charge of all Navy physical training in the Field Administrative Division under the Training Director of the reorganized Bureau of Personnel.⁸² Meanwhile, the Badger Committee assembled at Norfolk on January 19 and spent five days evaluating the program. The group including Raycroft, Staley, Charles H. McCloy of the University of Iowa, Frank S. Lloyd of New York University, T. Nelson Metcalf of Chicago University, and Dean Carl P. Schott of the Pennsylvania State University. Only McCloy and Staley were members of the original Civilian Advisory Commission that had provided liaison since the previous September.

The report, delivered on March 31, 1942, was sharply critical of the Navy program. The committee ridiculed the "Tunney morning exercises," concluding, "It does not seem desirable to use individual's names in connection with Navy programs." The members counseled instead the replacement of the regime with "another set devised by experts in the field." The study recommended expansion of sports and games on duty time and a lengthening of the physical hardening tasks. This latter philosophy was outlined in the panel's "concept...of the scope of Physical Fitness Program," in which "mental alertness, discrimination, initiative, determination and other like qualities...contribute to the development of a fighting spirit."⁸³ The Badger report was met by almost immediate hostility among Navy officials. The request by JANC to form a Joint Physical Training Board was rebuffed by Secretary Knox with the admonition that there were already too many such boards in the government. He defended the Navy's physical fitness program and threatened to rely on the advice of other civilian research groups and bypass the welfare and recreation committee.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, the Training Division of Navy BuPers refused to allow the release of the Badger Report on Norfolk unless the criticisms were removed.⁸⁵ Chairman Fowler Harper then drafted a letter to university presidents to show the Committee's leadership in the evaluation with an urge for them to "develop an intensive program of athletics and other physical training courses."⁸⁶ The Training Division quickly disclaimed this and its release for any reason by claiming the study was confidential.⁸⁷ As the summer wore on, Tunney became disgruntled and was convinced that the college and university representatives on the Joint Army-Navy Committee were trying to ram through their particular brand

of military training. He eventually junked the JANC program and started afresh with his own handpicked group of advisors in September, thus delaying the Navy Physical Training Manual until 1943. Schools and colleges continued with available data on conditioning.

The Army was initially cordial to the idea of a unified combat conditioning program, but General Marshall's philosophy toward athletics in training were generally unfavorable, for he feared these were a waste. However, the general had a well-developed sense of organizational pride and had been an outstanding football player at Virginia Military Institute. His ideas of group loyalty were fundamental to his concept of morale, and he felt that "active contests between units help build the aggressive, competitive spirit." Therefore he supported a broad off-duty program.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, while the Navy recruited well-known coaches, athletes, and physical educators, the Army officer in charge of athletics in a speech to the National Collegiate Athletic Association Convention in December, 1941,⁸⁹ was compelled to discourage applications for physical training duties. This policy was later to prove detrimental to the establishment of an Army-wide athletic program and actually retarded the training of ground combat troops, for it denied to that service "many thousands of men of the finest physical types and high degree of education and personal initiative."⁹⁰ The official history of the Army Special Services conceded to the Navy and even to the Air Corps a special advantage in this area.⁹¹ Writing after the war on the procurement of ground combat troops, official U. S. Army historians observed that the Army system of relying on Selective Service rather than on direct commissioning of specialists swung to the Navy and Marine Corps the advantage of maintaining the character of

handpicked personnel. Moreover, soldiers in ground arms were allowed to volunteer for Air Corps pilot training if they were of superior physique and intelligence. Most of these remained in that branch even after "washing out."⁹²

The commissioning of Frederick Osburn, who had been the civilian chairman of the Committee on Welfare and Recreation, as a Brigadier General commanding the Army Special Services Division gave the JANC an opportunity to introduce its testing program around results gleaned from the Norfolk study, a proposal which was approved by Osburn on April 13, 1942.⁹³ The tests were a tedious undertaking. Since the Army had no control or singular program for fitness training at that point, McCloy was sent out to run a battery of tests with various associates. This effort was carried out with 4,450 soldiers in different stages of training at ten posts throughout the country between May 8 and June 12, 1942. The testing was carried out entirely in the off-duty time of the troops.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, at the completion of these exhaustive tests, the Secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Committee proposed to Osburn and the Chief of Ground Forces that Special Services should train athletic and physical education specialists for assignment to training commands. In addition, a proposed merger of welfare and recreation with physical training was suggested. Neither proposal was followed.⁹⁵ The experience left McCloy perplexed. As a civilian, he had been met with suspicion. Furthermore, testing men in their off-duty time had left them disinterested in the tests. On June 25, 1942, he wrote the Secretary of JANC that "training in the Army is in a terrible mess" and complained that there was more "sabotage than constructive help...."⁹⁶ The professor found the Air Corps much more receptive, and his advice proved

valuable in establishing their program.⁹⁷

The Army proceeded to take test results from the McCloy investigation in order to set up its physical training manual, which was released in November of 1942.⁹⁸ It was devoted mostly to remedial and muscular conditioning work. The exercises were primarily a repetition of the tasks that an infantryman would face in combat. The assumption that Army forces would engage in athletics during training was developed within the manual, and participation in sports was "strongly advocated." However, it emphasized that men would "gladly engage in calisthenics, guerilla exercises or grass drills if they know they will be able to play speed ball, soccer, touch football, and push ball afterward." In other words, the Army circular emphasized athletics not for its motivational value toward combat but as a motivation instrument for participating in conditioning drills. The TC-87 manual outlined "total military fitness" as evidenced through technical, mental and emotional, and physical fitness." Physical fitness was separated from emotional fitness, which was largely filled along lines of morale activities. Combat tasks were simulated through strength, endurance, agility and coordination drills. Especially emphasized were "grass drills" and guerilla exercises" along with dual combatives and running, including relays.⁹⁹ However, even these tasks were athletic in nature, Ted Bank noting that the drills were "just about the same as the football coach uses...to get his men into shape."¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the Army method was an athletic innovation, for it operated on an "overload" principle similar to weight training, which became very popular after World War II had ended.¹⁰¹

While the Joint Army-Navy Committee was quarreling with the Navy about the best way to use athletics in conditioning troops, there emerged

a revolutionary method of military athletic training. Its sudden, spectacular, and doctrinaire techniques of military conditioning and its influence over athletic programs in American secondary schools and colleges were enormous. The program was known as Navy V-5 Preflight Training. It became a motivational school which would be a model in social engineering. The program did not have a staff organization until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, yet in little more than five months, four training facilities had been leased, instructors recruited and trained, a syllabus drafted, students procured, and training begun.

Theoretically, preflight training was based on the idea that a man was psychologically prepared to dedicate extreme measures of effort in physically demanding situations when symbolic meanings of emotional recall were recreated through athletic training. Its morphology lent great importance to the ability of the group to create cohesion based on natural leadership and the sharing of common emotional experiences. Fully one-third of the training and most of the off-duty time was devoted to rugged athletic sports and games or combatives. It was purely and simply a case of the troops being trained for war with athletics.

The V-5 philosophy had come straight from the American sporting culture. Its potential had been spotted during World War I by Joseph Raycroft. Raycroft was director of the War Department Commission on Training Camp Activities and had been instrumental in setting up an experimental two-week camp for aviation officers in physical drill, group games, and mass athletics had been devised against a battery of tests which measured a man's ability to concentrate on a spoken order and his reliability in reproducing a complicated set of orders. From this experiment the Army War Plans Division had issued a circular which ordered

physical training to include "competitive games as a means of a common end, namely, the development of the greatest possible efficiency and power in offensive combat." His standards of efficiency were influenced by his discrimination between results obtained by "education" and those obtained by "exercise." His motivational athletic climate went beyond mere "exercise" and entered the realm of "education." According to Dr. Raycroft, the man through education "gets orders just as truly as he did in his physical drill, except that these orders are expressed in terms of changing conditions during the progress of the game."¹⁰² Thus Raycroft relied on athletics to teach men the cooperative sharing response to roles and tasks. As early as 1940, this theory was repeated by Thomas Wintringham who urged the British Army to adopt the American game of football in its training program rather than soccer or rugby because "it has more points of resemblance to war than any other sport that I know." Astounded at the swiftness and broad deployment of German troop movements in Poland and France, Wintringham, a mercenary soldier, called for the abandonment of rigid methods of drill and the substitution of physical games to teach men initiative. Seeing in this a means to instill "a large dose of democracy" in modern war, the military writer tied sports training to "voluntarily, understood and thinking discipline and elastic tactics based on initiative and independence...."¹⁰³

The novel American V-5 program was the brainchild of Arthur Radford, Head of Aviation Training in the Navy during the fall of 1941. The scope of pilot training had become so large that coordination difficulties had grown between the Bureau of Navigation, which maintained authority over training, and the Bureau of Aeronautics, which directed

tactical deployment. On November 21, 1941, Radford was given responsibility for aviation training, jointly responsible to BuNav, BuAero, and the Chief of Naval Operations. This enabled him to implement a nationwide system of preflight training centers with physical training independent of that run by Gene Tunney under the Director of Training in BuNav.¹⁰⁴ Shortly after the declaration of war, Radford met with one of his pilots, Thomas J. Hamilton, who was stationed in Washington, and asked him to submit a training syllabus outlining his plan for pilot training. Hamilton was then dispatched to the NCAA Convention of December 29-30, 1941, to recruit instructors and administrators for the program. Radford maintained that in order to obtain the superior qualities needed by pilots and flight crews, there needed to be developed a system of training based on sports, with emphasis on competitiveness.¹⁰⁵ He noted later to John Griffith that "we want men who'll drive into a fight not veer away from it."¹⁰⁶ Hamilton proved to be the ideal selection for Director of Physical Training. He had been head football coach at the Naval Academy and a star on the 1926 gridiron team. He also was a carrier pilot with an ideology suited to the program. Hamilton wrote in 1974:

Admiral Radford...was way ahead of the other services and of our time in his concept of utilizing the skills, disciplines, teamwork and training methods of sports to develop or enhance the qualities of trainees. He obtained many of the results of close order drill...in far greater degree by this...method.¹⁰⁷

His tentative syllabus elicited all the attributed one would expect a combative physical toughening program to have. Hamilton proposed four preflight centers on abandoned college campuses, redistributing students there to other educational centers. He noted that "it will detract greatly from the purpose...of our program if our Spartanlike life

discipline and hard work is paralleled by modern college life...." Liberty and privileges were to be restricted and the cadets subjected to a rigorous hardening program to loosen them from a "soft, luxurious, loose-thinking, lazy, peacetime life...." The competitive athletic part of the plan was to be arranged around the principle of building "mental alertness, agility, initiative and a sporting competitive spirit" to contend with enemy youth who were "stronger, tougher, better physically trained in a nationalistic and fanatical frame of mind...." Every prospective pilot was to engage in a daily physical regime including an hour and a half of running, wood chopping, calisthenics and hard labor followed by up to another hour and a half of instruction in team sports and dual combatives. After a day of physical drill, infantry drills, and academic instruction, each man was required to engage in two hours of competition in intramural or varsity practice. Forty-mile hikes and survival training were to conclude preflight.

The campuses were to be run like an accelerated version of the Naval Academy, and its extreme form of military regimen was similar to that institution. Separate departments for the administration of academics and athletics were established. A Director of Athletics was to supervise an eighty-three-man physical training and coaching staff. Each physical training officer and, indeed, each instructor was expected to be an example of strength and virility, and each was to engage in the same physical regime as his men. Practically the entire staff, initially, was taken off college campuses, for they were not to have "pacifistic" or "communistic learnings." Daily chapels were designed for spiritual reflection directed by a "fighting parson."¹⁰⁸

Huge quantities of athletic gear, as well as a ten-man medical

staff to attend the trainees, were required. The cadets were to be given the best attention for injuries, returned to training rapidly, and provided the best food with up to 5,100 calories per day.¹⁰⁹ Similar athletic facilities were urged to become part of the fleet. Hamilton noted that benefits from such an athletic plan would go beyond men in training and "provide much valuable publicity and interest for the general public...." Hamilton conjectured, "The caliber and scope of inter-collegiate athletics will undoubtedly fall off, so thus the Navy has an excellent chance to capitalize on the situation."¹¹⁰

Although the Preflight proposal was not approved by the CNO until March 13, 1942,¹¹¹ it was well on its way by then. Possible sites for training centers were being examined before Christmas of 1941, selections were made in February of 1942, and expansion of facilities began almost immediately.¹¹² Hamilton described his program to the NCAA delegates at Detroit on December 29 and 30, 1941, where his speech was "the highlight of the convention." The Naval Academy became the training ground for prospective staff. A group of civilian experts in athletics convened with Hamilton at the academy in February, using the staff and facilities at Annapolis as a guideline for organization. Bernie Bierman of the University of Minnesota, perhaps the most celebrated football coach in the United States at that time, was called to active duty as a Marine major in January of 1942 and met with the group. The advisory list included four university athletic directors: William Bingham of Harvard, Ray Eckmann from the University of Washington, Jack Meagher of Auburn, and L. W. St. John of Ohio State. Also included were Elmer Mitchell, Director of Intramurals at the University of Michigan, as well as Griffith, Dr. Raycroft, and Schott. This team served as the

initial selection board for staffing the Physical Training billets. After that body worked out the organizational and training problems, the path was cleared for the first staff trainees, who arrived in March of 1942 for a month's training in naval customs, military drill, and mastery of the training syllabus.

On April 19 the first two-hundred graduates of the instructor's program were turned out. Unlike those in the regular Navy physical training program, they were commissioned reserve officers. Rank was designated according to responsibility in the various training schools. Athletic directors were ranked as lieutenant commanders, head coaches as Navy lieutenants, assistant coaches as lieutenant (j. g.), and physical instructors as ensigns. This instruction was carried on through July of 1942 at Annapolis, at which time it shifted to the preflight school at Chapel Hill, North Carolina. After September of 1942, orientation was carried on at the individual schools.¹¹³ Over 25,000 men applied for commissions in the instructional phrase of Preflight, but only ten percent of them were accepted. Annual and semi-annual turnover of staff brought hundreds of new coaches and administrators into the athletic program. Transfers served with the fleet or in advanced bases, spreading their philosophy throughout the Navy.¹¹⁴

Four preflight bases were established in the spring of 1942. They included centers on the campuses of the University of Iowa, Iowa City; the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; the University of Georgia, Athens; and St. Mary's College, Moraga, California. The latter matched Hamilton's desire for a rural, monastic environment perfectly. Another base was commissioned in 1943 at Del Monte, California, near San Francisco, and survived the war as a type of "post-graduate" facility. The

first training battalions were aboard by May 28, 1942, and soon classes in all units had been inaugurated. Many of the first cadets were students who had been enrolled in the Reserve V-5 program, one of the several "V" programs launched by the Navy to obtain trained personnel from colleges. Thus "V-5" came to be a code word for Preflight Training.

Friends of athletics were enthralled by the operation. The American Association of Health, Physical Education Recreation unanimously sanctioned it at its New Orleans convention on April 18, 1942. Casting aspersions on the myriad war programs "sponsored by persons not professionally trained," the resolution did "approve and give wholehearted support to that type of program consisting of combat activities, rugged team and individual games, track and field athletics, and the necessary conditioning exercises...." Jesse Feiring Williams, one of the measure's backers, got in a further joust at regular Navy physical training with the provision that urged the government to use "competent and professionally trained personnel." The AAHPER directed a letter to Navy officials claiming that the preflight program "best represents this point of view."¹¹⁵ One sportswriter, Arch Ward of the Chicago Tribune, said of V-5, "Its success or failure will determine the outcome of the war... [because] it requires leaders who speak a language young America understands."¹¹⁶

Some educators were politely cautious at first. While the training program was being considered by the advisory committee at Annapolis, Seward Staley cautioned Hamilton to use veteran physical educators over thirty years of age as his training cadre because of rumors that the program would provide "cushy commissions" for big-time coaches and

athletes. Yet the University of Illinois professor complimented the naval commander for being "on the right track" in training aviation cadets through physical regimentation.¹¹⁷ While assuring Staley that no eligible aviator would be assigned to the program, Hamilton responded by defending the use of younger officers because of the physical demands of leadership. The former football coach corrected Staley by indicating that his was "not a program of physical education," but rather "strictly one of physical training and physical fitness." Hamilton preferred the appointment of coaches because preflight had "placed a great deal of emphasis on competitive athletics...." As an aviator, he was convinced of the value of athletics to flying, pointing out that "the flyer must not only be strong and fit but must be instilled with a mental urge which will force him to surmount any difficulties...."¹¹⁸

As the physical training program at the V-5 schools was established, practical instruction was stressed in at least nine sports. The aim of these activities was designed, according to the sports program manual, to show every cadet that "there is no substitute for winning." The outline continued, "Gracious defeat that has been a definite part of the sportsman code during peace-loving days must be forgotten.... There must be developed rugged, ruthless, determined competitors." The guidebook featured competition for all hands, varsity, junior varsity, squadron and platoon. Every man was required to participate in realistic game competition "requiring rigorous body contact and strenuous physical effort." This social engineering was also intended to give the cadet "objective interests and outlooks" by directing the individual's attention away from himself and toward outside interests. Not only was this considered a good remedy for homesickness, but also it helped the

aviation candidate to form definite group ties. The sports program was considered a requirement for maintaining common objectives and sharing symbolic ideals.¹¹⁹

Each activity in the program had its purpose. Football was paramount, for it taught mental and physical aggressiveness, coordination, alertness, discipline and teamwork. Basketball was used for hand and eye coordination, training for "instantaneous and correct decisions," agility and endurance. Speed and timing were aims of track, while boxing taught self-assurance, courage, self-reliance, and an "aggressive combative nature." Gymnastics were ideally suited for pilot training to orient students to unusual attitudes as well as to promote daring. Soccer was taught because of the dexterity required and for its international appeal.¹²⁰ There were three sports the training purposes of which were so unique that they represented the character of preflight training. These were wrestling, military track, and football.

Military track was an adaptation of track and field and cross country to military skills. Teams of thirty men competed for honors in running obstacle races which used speed, endurance, coordination, and strength to surmount, in the course of one or two races, everything that a track participant might do in the course of an entire meet in several events. Obstacle races were scored as cross country meets, and the cadet participated in contests such as the caber toss and tug-of-war.¹²¹ Consequently, each preflight school generally had an outstanding varsity track and field program. One V-5 cadet, Cornelius Warmerdam, topped the world's record in the pole vault while on duty with Iowa City.¹²²

Wrestling, preflight style, included normal collegiate wrestling, "rough and tumble," knock-down, catch-as-catch-can contests, and the

teaching of bone-breaking holds. The purpose of these exercises was to expose the normally sedate American civilian to a pressurized situation. Wrestling in the V-5 schools demanded that one take advantage of an opponent whenever possible, aggressively and mercilessly."¹²³ Hamilton called the sport the "nearest thing to actual war" approached by man.¹²⁴

The epitome of the athletic concept for V-5s, however, was football. If wrestling was the nearest thing to war, then football was war. Commander Hamilton viewed football, Navy, and war as analogous to modern combat. He wrote in the NCAA Football Guide in the summer of 1942: "The analogy of football and war is becoming more and more apparent each day. The benefits of training in football are helping many American soldiers, sailors and marines in their wartime duties." The strategies of offense, defense, strong and weak points, versatility in attack, along with speed power, and deception, were noted for their carryover values in pilot training.¹²⁵ All hands were instructed in the game in every season of the year, in pads, throughout the V-5 system. Two-thirds of the men had never participated in such activity, but according to Bierman, since all men had exhibited some form of admiration for the athletic hero, their participation in football would eliminate any tendency for them to have an "inferiority complex," which had been allegedly brought about through a philosophy of physical education of not encouraging a boy to do something he was supposedly unable to do.¹²⁶

Every cadet was required to participate on an intramural or varsity team in either football or soccer. Regulation football was held on the squadron level at every base. Teams were named for Navy aircraft, such as "Devastator" or "Vindicator," and leagues playing a round-robin schedule were constantly in operation. Each team having thirty members,

there were approximately 350 men, not counting varsity, constantly engaged in football practice year-around at each of the four or five installations. Counting seasonal varsity squads of over sixty men, nearly 6,000 cadets per year were receiving instruction and game experience in football. Instruction was amenable to mass demonstration, and each platoon had a coach. Teaching was "by the number." The initial drill featured demonstration of stances, blocking maneuvers and ballhandling. The second drill was devoted to tackling and passing, the third to footwork and defensive charges, and so forth, with constant review. The teams finally worked their way to "scrimmage" by the eighth drill. Over three-hundred football games per year were played in the sports program.¹²⁷ Another three-hundred were played in the instructional phase.

Military track also proved to be fundamental to the training regime. There were 4,419 meets held in the first year alone. The cadets also participated in 9,139 boxing matches, 3,276 swimming meets, 2,828 gymnastic events, 2,003 basketball games and 875 soccer matches.¹²⁸ One observer wrote:

Thus from one end of the day to the other there is a sports picture without parallel in the history of this or any other nation...You see a great panorama of sports being used for a utilitarian martial purpose and no lover of athletics could fail to look with pride upon this program.¹²⁹

Willis Hunter, a former athletic director at the University of Southern California, concisely placed the sports program with a pattern of functional analysis through which athletic games were to project an entirely different "philosophy" to the participant:

In this plan, geared to a war-time necessity, sports for sports sake was out, and in its place came a new philosophy of sports for what they will contribute to the war effort. The development of stamina in the war-time

sense of the expression definitely involves a mental as well as a physical aspect. If physical, it depends upon a well-developed body, made strong by such contact sports as soccer, football, etc., if mental it is built by an abiding belief that the mind and body are prepared.... The approach is different as is the emphasis. Time is made available, participation made compulsory, definite progressive lesson plans adopted, teaching procedures intensified and the tinsel removed as the sports are categorized by the contributions which they make toward the war effort. Those which cannot contribute are eliminated.¹³⁰

All games were designed for as much body contact as possible. The rules were often altered to suit this purpose. In soccer, body checking was allowed, and fouls often were not called in basketball. Cadets were encouraged to think offensively and "break down years of playing under involved rules." This concentration on offense was stressed continually in all sports. High scoring and number of goals were valued highly.¹³¹

The intramural sports program itself was one of magnitude. Each base had dozens of playing fields and courts constructed. Gymnasiums operated all through the day and evening as competition was stressed throughout the waking hours. One intramural football team arose at 4:00 a.m. to play off a tie game. The logistical and planning support was meticulously detailed. Accurate records of participants, scores, standings, statistics, brackets, schooling time, and location were centered in a huge intramural hall. Outstanding squadrons in each sport were selected at each facility. Each team received extra compensation for members of their unit to be selected for a varsity squad.¹³²

The varsity itself was a "super" team, the "cream" of 1,750 trainees in each sport. Football was the chief varsity sport and was financed through "Preflight Athletic Associations," modeled after the athletic associations in the military academies and similar to booster clubs at major universities. An executive committee administered the varsity

program. Membership in the associations were extended to duty officers on base, instructors, and "public spirited citizens." Dues were collected, and any surplus was returned to the Bureau of Personnel.¹³³

Plans for a varsity football program were laid before the first student was aboard. Originally, until modified by BuPers, each station was to play thirteen games, mostly against intercollegiate competition. Well-known coaches were recruited to coach the teams, and they, like the cadets, were with the team but one season before going on to spread their particular talents throughout the fleet and shore stations. The first four mentors assigned to the V-5 schools were Bierman, James Crowley of Fordham, Harold (Tex) Oliver of Oregon University, and Ray Morison of Southern Methodist. Others who followed as head or assistant coaches included Don Faurot, Charles (Bud) Wilkinson, Raymond (Jack) Sutherland, Paul Brown, Paul (Bear) Bryant, Woodrow (Woody) Hayes, Jim Tatum, Raymond (Bear) Wolf, Warren Woodsen, and Madison (Matty) Bell. Younger coaches like Wilkinson and future President Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford went on to serve aboard combat aircraft carriers, Wilkinson aboard the Enterprise, Ford on the Monterey. Such an array of Navy talent was awe inspiring, leading John Kieran to write whimsically, "Uncle Sam won't need to maintain a standing Army, all he'll need to do is to muster all the football squads and name MacArthur and Nimitz as the quarterbacks."¹³⁴

Varsity athletics were intensified in the Navy during the 1942 football season. Unhampered recruiting and the unification of athletics with physical training made leadership exceptional. With its air stations leading the way, a service-wide gridiron record of fifty-two wins, twenty-eight losses, and four ties was chalked up in the fall.

The preflight schools, although not dominating their college schedules as many had predicted, were still very good. None lost more than three games, and two, St. Mary's and Chapel Hill, were undefeated until the last game. Iowa City Preflight had a seventy-man team, which included twenty-three officers, some of whom were former professional players.¹³⁵ The dashing "Seahawks" captured the fancy of sportswriters in the first game of the season by toppling mighty Minnesota, Major Bierman's former club, with the aid of five former Minnesota stars.¹³⁶ However, Jim Crowley was not able to do the same trick for the Chapel Hill team. The "Cloudbusters" fell to the coach's old Fordham squad in New York City in the season's finale despite the presence of ten former "Ram" players playing for the Navy unit.¹³⁷ The V-5 teams played major college football schedules and gave that last "normal" wartime football season an air of quality. The Big Ten, with Griffith's leadership, made special provision for expanding their schedules to accommodate the preflight teams. Iowa City played five from that league, plus three from the Big Six, in addition to Notre Dame, St. Mary's, North Carolina Preflight, and Ft. Knox.¹³⁸

The aviation training institutions thoroughly dominated the four campuses on which they were located, although all colleges continued to hold classes. The Navy had control of most of the athletic facilities; jurisdictional disputes between the university and the service over their use favored the Navy, for the campus was technically a military reservation.¹³⁹ The Navy added its own improvements, which included, at St. Mary's, an Olympic-size swimming pool, twelve outdoor basketball courts, and "many acres of athletic fields."¹⁴⁰

By the end of the 1942 football season, Tom Hamilton was recognized

as the individual most responsible for the preservation of collegiate athletics. Although he was Radford's surrogate in the matter of preflight ideology, Hamilton's organizational and recruiting worth, as well as his ability to span the gap between military needs and civilian interests, had gained him wide respect in college athletics. Not only was he named the "Man of the Year" by the Football Writers Association, but also the National Soccer Coaches Association gave him the same honor for their sport.¹⁴¹ The preflight concept was university admired by sportswriters and had gained authority as a method of training.

The commandant at NAS Pensacola informed the Director of Aviation Training in December of 1942 that the preflight cadets received at the base not only showed superiority in military bearing, but also were physically advanced over non-preflight students. Although noting the cadets admitted to having "far too much" athletic training in the V-5 schools, he observed them to have "higher standard of military bearing" and a greater degree of "endurance and stamina."¹⁴² "The enthusiasm with which these college coaches of other years discuss Commander Tom Hamilton's preflight program," observed journalist Arthur Daley, "demonstrates more emphatically...its eminent correctness."¹⁴³

Preflight became a laboratory for contemporary thought in athletic coaching. The administration of the schools initiated an annual series of coaching clinics. The first clinics were held from August 3-15, 1942, and public school and college coaches were invited to live at the bases, observing and participating in the program first-hand. Curriculum for the workshops included fundamentals of team and combative sports and military drill. The purpose of the project was to "enable the civilian physical training specialists to learn how to adapt their

school and college training programs to the nation's wartime need for stronger, keener, more rugged youth."¹⁴⁴ Procedures at the school were well received, and many physical educators applied the obstacle courses and the hardening exercises directly to their own athletic programs.

The clinics were complemented by the issuance of a bulletin outlining the V-5 system for use in the public schools. The document, which appeared in August of 1942, was the first systematic guideline issued by the government for war fitness. It included lesson plans and coaching procedures for each sport, physical characteristics for obstacle courses, and measurement and rating charts. This was later expanded into a series of lesson plans for each sport in the preflight school, which were widely used long after the war as clinical guides for athletic coaching.

By late autumn, Hamilton's training system for pilots had drawn wide admiration, through the spectacular performances of their gridiron teams, of the superb condition of the men who had completed the training. W. J. Bingham observed, "When I saw the program outlined on paper...I wondered if our peace-trained youth could take this grueling [sic]." Amazed that no officers club existed and that discipline was outstanding, Bingham admitted that Hamilton had "the best training course yet devised for aviation cadets," and that "their taut muscles, their tanned bodies convincingly refute the softness of our youth." Washington officials were treated to a display of physical stamina of these men during a cold November football halftime at Chapel Hill in 1942 as the men, stripped to the waist, went through a spectacular of physical display.¹⁴⁵ One observer, former Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels, was thrilled that "athletics had gone to war and is doing a

fine job...", editorializing, "one of the great training jobs of World War II is being accomplished." The aviation training program, according to Daniels, was "more carefully planned, more rigorously administered, more successful in the accomplishment of its objectives," than any other activity. The victims of the "juke box, convertible coupe era" were fit examples to challenge the Axis.¹⁴⁶

The NCAA meanwhile had voted at its Detroit convention in December of 1941 that colleges require at least three hours of compulsory physical education.¹⁴⁷ This was followed by the Baltimore meeting of college presidents on January 4, 1942; they resolved that "all colleges and universities should take such steps as will be necessary to bring each ...student to his highest possible level of physical fitness."

The NCAA convention at Detroit outlined its program as "Inter-collegiate Athletics: Their Contribution in a Crises." John Griffith wielded statistics which showed that a high proportion of officers in the previous war had won their college letter, and Philip Badger keynoted the meeting by pointing out that the primary contribution of college athletics was institutional loyalty and leadership qualities including "self-sacrifice, team play...and respect for law and order." He pleaded to keep colleges open to develop these self-evident benefits. Thurstien Davies, President of Colorado College, noted that the college's chief bequeathment to the prospective draftee was a sense of "Pride," and a "zest for action," while Charles H. McCloy dwelled on the "spiritual" asset of "character."¹⁴⁸ If the college were to be a place to physically condition the prospective soldier, then it was going to have something to say about his social outlook.

In order to coordinate these programs, the Office of Education

Wartime Commission asked forty-seven representatives of colleges and professional organizations to form a committee on physical fitness. This group, which was organized on May 7, 1942, brought in its report on September 1. Unlike the Navy programs, the report did not deal with physical fitness as "hardening" but with physical fitness in terms of "health," which included the prevention of disease, correction of defects, nutrition, mental health, morale, "basic motor skills", muscular strength, and endurance. However, the committee reported as far as prospective draftees were concerned, "The competitive spirit developed in athletics is a contributing factor in the will to win which is so essential in military service. Guidelines were practically the same as the versatile Navy program, conditioning and strength exercises, combatives, swimming, "obstacle relays," recreative sports, running, gymnastics, and reorganization of intramural and intercollegiate athletics to "full playing opportunities for all students." Colleges were asked to place health and fitness above other curricular requirements and to administer athletic programs as they would academic divisions.¹⁴⁹

The University of Illinois plan, which had been set up before Pearl Harbor by Seward Staley and associates, was perceptive in regard to the committee recommendations. This rugged program included a "20 to 44" club draft registrants.¹⁵⁰ The September report also found a scattering of other programs in the fall of 1942. The University of Michigan maintained a thrice weekly ninety-minute hardening unit. Every graduate and undergraduate student was organized into platoons for mass exercise and competitive games, and the notion of supremacy was constantly emphasized. Purdue and Indiana University had similar activity.¹⁵¹ Obstacle courses were widely utilized in college toughening courses and varsity football

practices, and by the end of 1943 were widely used as a conditioner.¹⁵²

In many respects, high school athletics continued on a much more normal plane than did colleges with their manpower shortages. In some areas, such as eastern Ohio, high school football had a wider appeal than did some of the major colleges with crowds of over 15,000 not uncommon.¹⁵³ Mass participation was stressed, and some high schools emphasized interscholastic competition with more than one team in a sport from each school. These plans were frustrated by a power shortage of another kind, that of physical education teachers and coaches. In 1944, the state high school athletic association in Oklahoma maintained that 100 schools were planning to curtail athletics for the duration.¹⁵⁴ In December, 1942, William L. Hughes of Columbia Teacher's College suggested women teachers for boys' physical education, as well as student leaders, and the bringing of teachers from other disciplines into coaching. Many state associations dropped requirements that only school district employees could coach and accepted volunteer help.¹⁵⁵ One high school in Salina, Pennsylvania, did indeed hire a twenty-two-year-old woman, Pauline Rugh, as head football coach.¹⁵⁶

The Office of Education encouraged secondary schools to make their high school athletics programs part of the victory effort. Nine regional fitness institutes were held during the fall and winter of 1942-1943. The Boston institute, held on November 11 under the faculty leadership of armed services fitness leaders including Theodore Bank, James Pixlee, and two Navy representatives, initiated the "Victory Corps" hardening program. A pamphlet developed from this program, Physical Fitness through Physical Education for the Victory Corps, became the standard government advice on the preparation of high school boys for service.

The plan recommended the attendance in "one school period daily of instruction in physical education...supplemented by a participation program including intramural...and interscholastic athletics...for at least ten hours each week." Activities for boys were developed from the training manuals of both major services, with aquatics, including swimming fully clothed for long distances, cross-country obstacle races, athletic sports, wrestling, and other combatives coming from the Navy experience. Running, "ranger exercises," "grass drills," apparatus work, conditioning, and response drills were representative of Army recommendations. Many of these activities were recommended for women, including cross-country obstacle runs, soccer, speed ball, basketball, field hockey, and gymnastics.¹⁵⁷ The Office of Education also recommended the establishment of a mass exercise field wherein one instructor on a platform could observe a melange of activities, including individual conditioning movements, strength and obstacle tests, gymnastics, obstacle runs, track and field exercises, and grenade throwing.¹⁵⁸ One educator favored a program of "controlled school sports" which would supplement "play programs" and develop "exercises that have a definite relation to body building...and obedience to orders, with its corollary respect for authority."¹⁵⁹ Another plan for mass participation, developed in Rhode Island, was called "Quadromnium Competitive Track." Every able-bodied boy in school was required to participate. Standard track events were combined with a sprint-type obstacle run. Scoring was between classes and schools with each boy's performance affecting his team's average.¹⁶⁰ Ideas and problems in school conditioning were discussed at the first War Fitness Conference held in Cincinnati in April of 1943.¹⁶¹

However, there was something less than unanimity for the school fitness activities. One educator warned that balance between militarism and the elements of American democracy had to be preserved by identifying "patriotic loyalty with...basic elements of our tradition."¹⁶² Another criticized "misguided school administrators" for imposing "hardening and toughening courses" on high school boys with the assumption "that they can be put in athletic condition ready for immediate military duty..."¹⁶³ The Victory Corps program, which designed the regimentation of many school activities behind the war effort, decreased in importance as the crises point of the war emergency passed. By 1944, obstacle courses were decreasingly emphasized, and the Office of Education expressed concern about "poorly taught" boxing instruction and the emphasis on inter-scholastic athletics over physical education.¹⁶⁴

Athletic games were an important part of the psychological, social, and physical conditioning of Americans during the war effort. Only the amount of emphasis marked differences in opinion. Were sports for preparedness, or were they for play? The American and his government struggled for an answer.

FOOTNOTES

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³ALNav 100, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to All Commands, October 18, 1940, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Director Folder.

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⁵"Our Associations Program of Legislation for Preparedness and National Defense," JOHPER, XI (November, 1940), pp. 523-527.

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⁷U. S. Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1940, LXXVI, p. 16.

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⁹Undated Publicity Release of Rep. Pius L. Schwert, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Roosevelt Papers, file 107.

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¹¹"Here Below," Scholastic Coach, X (October, 1940), p. 3.

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¹³Letter, U. S. Rep. Pius L. Schwert to Roosevelt, FDR Papers, file 107.

¹⁴U. S. Government Manual, p. 70.

¹⁵[John B. Kelly], "A Suggested Program for National Physical Fitness," FDR Papers, file 107.

¹⁶Jesse F. Williams, "Report from the Legislative Committee," JOHPER, XII (September, 1941), p. 407.

¹⁷Letter, John B. Kelly to Roosevelt, October 2, 1940, FDR Papers, file 3983; Kelly, "A Suggested Program for National Physical Fitness," FDR Papers, file 107.

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¹⁹Draft of Speech, John B. Kelly to Philadelphia Sports Writers Association, January 29, 1942, FDR Papers, file 262.

²⁰New York Times (March 14, 1942).

²¹Chicago Tribune (February 24, 1942).

²²New York Times (January 11, 1942).

²³Chicago Tribune (June 21, 1942); (June 25, 1942).

²⁴New York Times (February 7, 1942).

²⁵New York Times (March 14, 1942).

²⁶Letter, Paul McNutt, Chief, Federal Security Agency to Roosevelt, February 24, 1942; Letter, James Landis, Regional Director, FSA, to Roosevelt, February 26, 1942; Roosevelt Papers, file 4564-D.

²⁷"Improvement of Health and Physical Conditions for All," Education for Victory, I (July 15, 1942), p. 3.

²⁸Undated Memorandum, McNutt to Early, with notation, "Turned down by Dr. McIntyre," FDR Papers, file 4565-D; Draft of proposed presidential statement to the War Fitness Congress, dated March 22, 1943, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

²⁹Memorandum, McIntyre to Roosevelt, April 14, 1943, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

³⁰Letter, John Kelly to Edwin M. Watson, Assistant to the President, April 8, 1943, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

³¹Letter, Watson to Kelly, April 14, 1943, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

³²Executive Order dated April 29, 1943, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

³³National Collegiate Athletic Association, The 1943 Yearbook, p. 24.

³⁴Letter, Kelly to Watson, dated 8, 1943.

- ³⁵The Amateur Athlete, XIV (January, 1943), p. 3.
- ³⁶Letter, E. W. Hertzberg, Neighborhood Athletic Club Administrator, to Louis Schroeder, Asst. Chief, State and Local Organizations, Committee on Physical Fitness, National Archives, Record Group 215, Office of Community War Services Records, Box 10, Chairman's File.
- ³⁷National Collegiate Athletic Association, Proceedings of the 37th Annual Convention (1941), p. 96.
- ³⁸Bureau of Navigation letter 143-RN, P11-1(2195), January 21, 1941, Chief of Bureau of Navigation to all training commands, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Directives Folder.
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- ⁴¹T. H. Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II" (Unpublished official report), Appendix A-3, U. S. Navy Archives, Washington Navy Yard, Command File World War II.
- ⁴²BuNav letter 147-MHB, P2-5(269), March 31, 1941, Chief of BuNav to all training commands, Physical Training Correspondence, Physical Training Directives Folder.
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- ⁴⁴Form draft to Navy recruiting stations, Physical Training Correspondence, Command File.
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- ⁴⁶BuNav letter 147-HNC, July 3, 1941, from Chief of BuNav to All Ships and Stations, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File. Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II," Appendix A-5.
- ⁴⁷Letter, Jesse F. Williams to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, July 18, 1941, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ⁴⁸Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II," pp. 8, 16.
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- ⁵⁰Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II," p. 17; BuNav Memorandum 147-RAC, January 13, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Box 42, Civilian Advisory Committee folder.
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⁵⁵Draft of letter of Philip O. Badger, Chairman of the Athletic Subcommittee, to Frederick Osburn, Chairman of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, JANC Records, Subcommittee on Athletics folder.

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⁶¹Letter, Badger to Samuel Crocker, Associate Executive Director, Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, December 23, 1941, JANC Records, Badger folder.

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CHAPTER III

THE RETURN OF WONDERFUL NONSENSE

SPORTS PROGRAMS IN 1942

The continuance of sporting events was questioned. Which activities were seen as frivolity and which were valuable in their recreative aspect? How could sport, so highly visible, yet so abstract, be mobilized? Who would decide? Many organizations decided for themselves, their limited appeal leading to suspended competition amidst an air of patriotic self-congratulation. Others like the Indianapolis Speedway closed "for the duration," being confronted with obvious logistical scarcity, although dirt track racing and motor boat continued into the late spring in some areas.¹ The military, especially on the West Coast, moved to limited activities where large crowds might gather, thus providing a security and transportation problem in case of air attack.

Americans generally sought their government's guidelines in matters relating to recreation, physical fitness, and entertainment. When these criteria could be ascertained, the public followed them. The war revealed, however, that sport, games, and athletics of all kinds were part of the institutional fabric of the United States, and any mobilization for war would have to accommodate them.

Just after Pearl Harbor, Fourth Army Commander General John L. DeWitt forced the altering of many sporting events, much to the consternation of promotional groups. The New Year's Day Rose Bowl was moved to

Durham, North Carolina and the East-West football game to New Orleans. California Governor Culbert L. Olsen canceled the winter meeting of the Santa Anita race track, stranding 1,400 thoroughbreds in California when box cars were preempted.² A bane on the West Coast, the Rose Bowl proved to be a boon to the East. One advertisement offered to "Combine the ROSE BOWL GAME with a WEEKEND AT PINEHURST," attracting the country club set to a holiday of golf and gridiron.³

Californians did not take DeWitt's limitations lightly. One Congressman complained to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the "restraints placed by the military upon the normal recreational activities of the people of the West Coast...are breaking down the morale of these people." Some observers noted the inconsistency of allowing large gatherings in the East and not in the West since "no military purpose" seemed to be served in DeWitt's prohibitions against large crowds, especially since such gatherings could be seen in shopping centers "at almost anytime of the day or night...."⁴ The Los Angeles County Council of the American Legion objected to the transfer of the Rose Bowl from Pasadena, and Congressman Leland Ford revealed in a letter to the Secretary of War that California had been unfairly singled out since such events "go to the very existence and economics of our State." Moreover, he insisted that "these things are actually carried on in England under strenuous raiding," prompting an observation that "California has been given a bad deal here."⁵ By spring, DeWitt had relented enough to allow the Pacific Coast League to have night baseball under a number of safeguards,⁶ but the war boom in the area continued to create tensions between authorities and the private sector.

Prudence dictated that sporting entertainment continue as long as

games were not used for "bomb proofing" able-bodied athletes. Professional sports supposedly gave "relaxation" to war workers and inspiration to young people. John Kieran obligingly wrote that any activity that did not contribute to the war effort should be stopped, but "happily few sports fall into such categories."⁷ Morale was an elusive term, used for whatever rationale people needed to justify their activity, leading sportswriters to demand that "morale be hanged!" They charged that the term was "misleading and irritating."⁸ One sports promoter huffed, "This would be a hell of a country if we had to have fights and ball games and races to get us all worked about winning a war...."⁹ Even in the darkest hour of the Pacific peril, after the fall of Bataan, the Gallup poll found only twenty-four percent of its respondents wanted professional sports discontinued.¹⁰

Participation in sports was restricted more by such factors as a shortage of rubber (thereby limiting trips to games and eliminating the vital ingredients in tennis shoes and golf balls) than by governmental edicts. Sports represented normalcy, and despite a brief interdiction of West Coast activities professional and amateur athletics returned to normal. For those who did not want to decide what to do about it, the President was a convenient savant. Yet Roosevelt had no comprehensive policy independent of the war agencies that were growing more numerous by the month. Nevertheless, the Chief Executive had a steady trickle of mail asking him to make a pronouncement on the value of some activity or another to the war effort. One who got a reply was crochety Judge Keneshaw Mountain Landis, whose antiquity and authority as Commissioner of America's most revered game of baseball demanded an answer. This became somehow symbolic as a "green light," which it was not. College and

amateur sport boosted "big-time" programs on the basis of "morale" and "fitness." Baseball and other professional operations were concerned about morale and stability.

College authorities insisted on the essentiality of their programs. Both Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of War Newton Baker had urged continuance of collegiate activities during World War I and the burning oil at Pearl Harbor was still smoldering when Asa Bushnell, Executive Director for Eastern Intercollegiate Athletics, wired FDR in hopes that he would urge colleges to "maintain and...intensify their programs...."¹¹ Retention of college athletics indicated the pace of the national mobilization effort. Amos Alonzo Stagg, the seventy-nine-year-old coach at the College of Pacific, urged his college president to continue such student activity, reminding him of the importance of maintaining "the same tempo of life" as a "healthy, sane, and desirable thing for the individual, the family, and the community...."¹² All pre-war championship events were held, and out of the 559 schools listed as having football squads, only fifty-two dropped the sport for the 1942 season. The trend to keep athletics was emphasized at the NCAA Convention of December 29 and 30, 1941; the Executive Committee, encouraged by the appearance of Lieutenant Tom Hamilton of the United States Navy, felt duty-bound to make the athletic training grounds a seminar for potential leaders.¹³

Although some institutions, through the loss of revenue from reduced student enrollment, were forced to abandon some phases of intercollegiate athletics, no general move to suspend activities was seen. Students at the University of Omaha boycotted classes because of the President's decision to suspend football,¹⁴ and a skirmish in the Georgia

Board of Regents to abandon the game at state institutions was successfully resisted. Governor Robert Talmadge used sports as an example of elitist privilege and threatened to put "debutantes to hoeing potatoes." However, University Chancellor S. F. Sanford supported athletics by arguing, "Army and Navy officers...want young men trained in college so that they will be tough when they start training...."¹⁵ The notion that football harbored such warlike qualities was an old one; Allison Danzig was inspired to call for coaches to "foster football as it has never been fostered before in order to get every possible boy in college on the football bandwagon." Stagg, noting that "every war has been a factor in stimulating sports," reminded that "martial strife has been the direct motivating factor in every impetus given to American athletics."¹⁶ By May, 1942, the NCAA had been given a tentative go-ahead by officials representing government policy on manpower and transportation,¹⁷ and by summer the physical preparedness theme was well entrenched in the rationale of college athletics.

Professional baseball sought means to save its game. The last month of the season had been suspended by government decree in 1918, and care was taken to place the activity on sound footing with Washington. As early as April, 1941, Washington Senators club owner Clark Griffith suggested a presidential statement on the value of baseball in the defense effort.¹⁸ A drive launched soon after the war declaration to provide "bat and ball kits" for servicemen marked this effort. Griffith, who headed the initial drive, placed orders for 18,000 balls and 4,500 bats with the observation that the equipment was the "best we can get--none of that cheap stuff for the soldiers and sailors...."¹⁹ This cooperation led Baseball Commissioner Keneshaw Mountain Landis to

inquire in a letter to Roosevelt "what you have in mind whether baseball should continue to operate?" Landis's scrawled, handwritten missive pled the professional game's intentions with simplicity and sincerity, asking no special consideration for "individual members of this organization whose status in this emergency is fixed by law...."²⁰ Satisfied that baseball was in harmony with the war effort, the President hastily responded with a statement which was heartening to the sporting world, declaring, "I honestly feel that it would be best for the country to keep baseball going." Roosevelt looked favorably upon minor league ball, and urged the essentiality of night games to give "an opportunity to the day shift to see a game occasionally." The President clearly recognized the responsibility of individual players to enter military service and emphasized that skilled tradesmen "ought to serve the Government."²¹ After Landis wired the President his "grateful appreciation," the major leagues got on with their program to "justify" the action.²² After being hosted by a sportswriters gala to bask in the sun of their newfound importance to the country, owners got down to the business of formulating a wartime welfare program which included the expansion of nighttime contests and extension of the "bat and ball fund." This was financed through a second seasonal "All-Star Game" and the voluntary allotment of paychecks for the purchase of interest-bearing defense stamps.²³

Representatives of other sports were anxious for the President to say their pursuits, too, were essential. One racing sheet writer was told by Presidential Secretary Stephen Early that the "whole subject of sports is now receiving careful consideration" and interpreted the statement to mean that horseracing would be considered a sport.²⁴ This

led Foster Grant to cable the White House that "this is an insult to baseball...."²⁵ Such confusion led Early to request that Archibald MacLeish, of the Office of Facts and Figures, check with the morale branches of the armed services and the Office of Civilian Defense in order to "formulate a statement of policy."²⁶ John Kelly pressed for a strong statement for the continuance of college athletics and, although the original draft of the statement contained references to the value of competitive athletics in building up "necessary physical development," as well as "traits of self-reliance and leadership," that text was deleted and the White House stuck mainly with the major entertainment spectacles and the morale issue. Sports were compared with dramatics, concerts, vacations, and other recreation and amusements. The brief, released on March 10, 1942, noted the President's beliefs that "within reasonable limits,...the war effort will not be hampered but actually improved by sensible participation in healthy recreational pursuits," while warning that all activities except those concerned with the war effort must "be considered secondary."²⁷

The presidential policy hardly covered the broad spectrum of amateur sport, and jurisdiction by the Amateur Athletic Union over various events caused some irritation. The AAU led in the promotion of the 1942 Pan-American Games planned for Buenos Aires during November and December as a substitute for the canceled 1940 Olympiad. Avery Brundage, President of the United States Sports Federation, gave hope that the games would continue by proposing the airlife of two-hundred athletes to Argentina.²⁸ However, the State Department advised against the move, and the chairman of the federation's finance committee, Jeremiah Mahoney, appealed to the President, reasoning that the

abandonment of the games would damage American relations with Latin America which would be "playing into the hands of Nazi Germany."²⁹ Roosevelt responded cautically on March 28, 1942, that "organizing and sending to Buenos Aires even a modest team of athletes" would not contribute toward that end. "In fact," the President retorted, "reports reaching me from other American republics indicate that there is question in the minds of many as to the reason why this Government has not recalled and put into the Service the young men of draft age already visiting those countries on sports of cultural projects if this country is serious in its determination...."³⁰ Brundage officially announced cancellation three weeks later.³¹

The AAU likewise did not help itself by suspending Army athletes for playing in post pickup games against professionals. This flap began over the amateur standing of a soldier based at the Aberdeen (Maryland) Proving Ground who was suspended from an AAU tournament in March, 1942. The Morale Officer for the Third Corps Area charged that the "suspension smacks of Axis efforts by a fifth column..." but AAU President Lawrence DiBenditto countered that the Army was not going to "get away with calling us Axis agents and fifth columnists." An Army Special Services Officer, commenting that "the whole thing smells," threatened to pull Army boxers out of the amateur tournament so the Union wouldn't have anyone to "help swell their receipts...."³² The controversy passed quietly when the Third Corps Commander proposed a freeze on eligibility of athletes entering the Service, unless the individual participated for profit. Both the AAU and the Commanding General agreed to the necessity of liberalizing rules during wartime.³³ The AAU Board of Governors soon restored the athlete in question and in June, 1942, the War

Department announced an agreement to freeze the competitive status of Army athletes.³⁴

Actually, the Army and Navy soon had many of the erstwhile Amateur athletes, and control by the athletic group was a moot point. The AAU was able to continue its championship events in the United States through the cooperation of these branches in providing athletes. The first wartime national track and field games were laced with military entries. By 1944, eighty-five percent of the entrants were members of the armed services.³⁵ The AAU continued to hold its national basketball tournament, and from 1943 to 1945 six to eight military teams annually participated in the event.³⁶ The Amateur Athletic Union did relieve the services of the tactical problem of maintaining a stateside athletic program, thereby allowing them to concentrate on physical training and the utilizing of their recreation and athletic specialists in developing programs for war.

The myriad activities revolving around athletes during the spring and summer of 1942 were reminiscent of sports' "Golden Age" during the 1920s. Few moves were made to limit sporting activities by the government, and many of those participating in civilian activities were not sought for induction. Fathers were deferred from the draft until the spring of 1943, and youths under twenty years were not required for conscription until November, 1942. Consequently supplies of manpower did not diminish rapidly. College students continued their activities. Many enlisted in the organized reserve or belonged to the ROTC. These enlistments were so frequent that the Selective Service moved to cut them off by the end of summer of 1942. However, other deferments were allowed for specialized majors in chemistry, engineering, and medicine.³⁷

"Fitness" had become such a popular morale term that all sorts of athletic activity seemed to have a patriotic aura. Famous athletes called to the colors quickly found their way into benefit performances promoted by military or relief groups. With United States offensives stymied on the war fronts until mobilization could be completed, relief extravaganzas were spectacular ways to capture public attention. If one were to take 1942 as a barometer of normalcy in the face of war, little change had actually taken place. Arnold Gingrich, editor of Esquire magazine succinctly stated on April 22, 1942:

...a heavy responsibility has been placed on sports. Sports are now asked and expected not only to help maintain civilian morale, but also to occupy a major role in actual military training. Consequently, instead of sports damping off for the duration, there is every reason to believe that we are on the verge of a tremendous sports boom all over the country.³⁸

Events devoted to Army or Navy relief began with the All-Navy Pearl Harbor Relief boxing show held on December 16, 1941.³⁹ By the summer of 1942, most athletic and sporting organizations had their war relief plan in operation. The Navy Relief Society activated a \$5,000,000 campaign. Stanton Griggs, Chairman of the Board of Madison Square Garden, directed a Special Events Committee which included Grantland Rice, Gene Tunney, and boxing promoter Mike Jacobs. Coordinators for each major professional sport and college athletics were also appointed.⁴⁰ Sports "carnivals" promoted relief. One at the Polo Grounds in New York featured exhibitions by Joe Louis, a service baseball game featuring Bob Feller, and other professional sports.⁴¹ The service relief funds received huge sums from two Joe Louis title fights in the winter of 1942 and from horseracing throughout the year. One of the richest and perhaps the biggest spectacle was promoted by the Chicago Tribune through its

College All-Star football game. Nearly half the college representatives in the game were already in uniform and were given leave to participate. A crowd of over 101,000 at Soldiers Field netted \$160,000 to Army and Navy Relief in the pageant, which featured a brilliant patriotic show including the card trick formation of an American flag by 2,500 sailors.⁴²

Baseball's money raising attempts in behalf of war relief were both successful and erratic. The major leagues raised \$613,000 in seventeen games, but they did not reach their goal and actually raised less than the lesser known National Football League, which accumulated \$680,000 in fewer games.⁴³ Some fans did not take the baseball benefits seriously, and criticism was directed at club officials for not having benefit games on holidays, nights, or Sundays when large crowds could come.⁴⁴ The minor leagues were anxious to aid in the war effort and preserve some semblance of organization. A letter from the president of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, W. G. Branham, reminded Senator James Mead of New York that they too had a "bat and ball" fund and allowed free admission to men in uniform.⁴⁵ However, manpower and transportation problems hit the minors' ability to function, and fifteen of the forty-one leagues failed to open in 1942, seventeen others suspending operation before the end of the war.⁴⁶

The war-enriched racetracks carefully returned an impressive amount to relief agencies. John Kieran suggested that promoters of gambling sports would have to come up with something sound as an essential industry or a contribution to government revenue or face public outrage. The racing community was cognizant of this and by April of 1942 had formulated a war plan through the unification of breeders, track owners, and

jockeys into the Turf Committee of America. This was directed by Herbert Bayard Swope, Chairman of the New York Racing Commission.

Swope, a wealthy newspaperman, art patron, and Democrat campaign contributor, consolidated a mechanism through which war relief would receive an outright gift from racing, a percentage of the take, and the establishment of relief days when entire gate receipts would be turned over to Army and Navy Relief and United Service Organizations (USO). Receipts from the tracks ran from \$100,000 to \$300,000 on relief days, and promoters sought to stage munificent entertainment for their guests, which included generals, admirals, and politicians.⁴⁷ War Relief contributions assuaged the otherwise abrasive appearance of race track betting, especially in industrial areas where absenteeism was ostensibly affected. Tracks raised over \$2,000,000 in the first year of the war, an amount that swelled to over \$4,000,000 in 1943.⁴⁸

Swope was appointed in June, 1942, to a public relations job with the War Department, where until the suspension of racing in January, 1945, it was possible for him to have a moderating effect on official opinion. The wealthy New Yorker argued that the races were an anti-inflationary check on "explosive purchasing,"⁴⁹ and reminded the crippled Roosevelt of the tracks' care in including polio contributions among its endowments. In March, 1944, he penned the President's personal secretary this message:

When I saw The Boss a few weeks ago he told me he wanted to see the Infantile Paralysis Fund helped whenever possible..... I shall see it is included in the Victory check that we give at the close of the season in New York.....⁵⁰

So many "sports attractions" were added to the Army-Navy Relief bandwagon that the War Relief Control Board prohibited any further

solicitation after November 15, 1942.⁵¹ The War Bond Drive replaced the Relief measures and proved to be popular among sports patrons. Baseball raised over one billion dollars in the Fourth War Loan, and subsequent efforts were met with even more enthusiasm.⁵² The War and Navy Department promoted some of the more spectacular relief engagements through sporting events, and none captured more fanfare than the much publicized donations by World Heavyweight Boxing Champion Joe Louis. The "Brown Bomber" personified the public's belief in the unity of the races behind the War,⁵³ and his contribution of two title defense purses to Navy and Army Relief early in 1942 was amazingly unselfish.

Prizefighting practically disappeared after the first few months of war. Almost all American champions, including Lous and Billy Conn, the Light Heavyweight Champion, were inducted. The military, especially the Navy, became a vast arena for competition as well as training. A sensation-hungry public was fed a final diet of Louis title defenses at the behest of the service relief agencies. In September, 1941, as citizen Joe Louis Barrow, the champion had been classified 1-A, eligible for immediate induction. William Hastie, Negro civilian aide to the War Department, desired to protect Barrow's interest by having him assigned to the Morale Branch (Special Services). Barrow had contracted for a January 9, 1942, title defense against Buddy Baer, so the trick was to hold the fight and acquire the purse before the champion could be drafted. Mike Jacobs, head of Twentieth Century Sports, promoted a "deal" with the War and Navy Departments to turn over part of the fight proceeds in return for deferring Barrow until after the bout. General Marshall found neither the Selective Service nor Secretary of War Stimson sympathetic to such a scheme.⁵⁴ Therefore the terms of the Louis-

Baer fight, released on November 13, 1941, provided for Navy Relief to receive the net proceeds.⁵⁵

Outrage erupted in the Negro press over the arrangements, since Barrow had to contribute his purse to an auxiliary of a branch that did not accept his race in positions other than messmen and other servile stations. It was speculated that Barrow had been bribed with the promise of a commission as a physical instruction officer in the Navy by Gene Tunney. Barrow supposedly had turned this down because of the sea-going branch's history of racial discrimination. The Pittsburgh Courier, which circulated this rumor, proposed that the champion had decided to use the bout as a means of "exposing the prejudice in the Navy."⁵⁶ The Bureau of Navigation was compelled to deny the allegation and disclaimed motives of taking advantage of Barrow's draft status and abusing his race. Tunney ridiculed the mention of a commission as "preposterous." (Barrow, a draft-age young man, with no prior service, was supposedly offered a Lieutenant Commander's stripes.)⁵⁷ An official of the National Committee of the Patrons of the Negro offered to soothe ruffled feelings on the matter by offering guidelines to BuNav, whereby Tunney could praise Barrow's motives without referring to the young black's relations with the Navy. This steered attention clear of the commandant of the Third Naval District, Adolpheus Andrews, who offered "controversial" explanations to the patrons regarding the fighter's relations with the Navy.⁵⁸ Pearl Harbor occurred in the meantime, and the Bureau of Navigation's draft for Tunney's signature was an appeal for solidarity. Joe Louis Barrow was praised in making the "greater sacrifice" in financial remuneration, through which he had "proven himself, first an American" and an "example...of his race."⁵⁹

Barrow's induction was staved off long enough for him to knock out Baer in the first round of their star-spangled engagement in New York City. He reported to the Army the next day after contributing \$89,000 toward Navy Relief.⁶⁰ This earned the champion the plaudits of an admiring white public, Kieran noting Joe Louis's "complete obedience" and "complete humility," the "supreme virtue of the warrior called to duty."⁶¹ Barrow's first five months in the Army found him virtually at the disposal of the War Department. Public relations appearances, exhibition boxing matches, and another title defense were included before the new draftee could even finish basic training. Hastie expressed concern in the handling of the Joe Louis matter. The War Department aide urged the Second Corps Commander to transfer Barrow to a Special Services detail rather than divert his recruit training to publicity ventures that could be damaging in the eyes of the public. Learning of Army Relief plans to set up a title match with Abe Simon, Hastie, while agreeing with the benefits, cautioned Second Corps Area Commander Irving J. Phillipson: "Much concern has been expressed, lest private interests exploit this soldier. I have explained that you have assumed personal responsibility for avoiding any such consequences."⁶²

Terms of the bout were announced on February 25, 1942. Private Joe Louis Barrow was detached for four weeks of intensive training at Fort Dix, New Jersey, for the fight which took place on March 27. Joe's sixth round knockout earned for Army Relief 100 percent of the champion's prize money and 87½ percent of Simon's, a total of nearly \$65,000. The boxers' "contribution" amounted to less than fifty percent of the total gate receipts, the rest of which went to promoters for expenses.⁶³

Billy Conn enlisted in the Army on March 7, and Barrow's money making activities in behalf of the government led to suggestions that he be allowed to contract another title fight to pay off his personal creditors, including the Department of Internal Revenue. Secretary of War Stimson temporarily altered these plans on June 18 by ordering the heavyweight champion to complete his basic training after a final money raising exhibition at Fort Upton, New York. War Department Civilian Assistant Truman Gibson arranged plans for the later Louis fight, which was set for October 12, 1942.⁶⁴

The War Department had not discovered the wisdom of demanding the total receipts of any relief type engagement by men under its jurisdiction. Consequently the proposed Louis-Conn bout turned into a fiasco of the first order. Misunderstandings occurred when the War Department agreed through its Welfare and Recreation advisor to allow the two fighters to have a moderate amount of their prize money for the October 12 bout applied to debts. AER was to receive the rest. Apparently War Department liaison Alexander Surlis thought this amounted to but \$34,000. Contracting of the fight, however, was turned over to a group of New York sportswriters, chaired by Grantland Rice, known as War Boxing, Incorporated. This group agreed to provide a total of \$135,451 to the creditors, three-fourths of which was to go to Jacob's Twentieth Century Sports and the rest to Joe Louis's handler John Roxborough. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was not included. Rice resigned from the group rather than be a party to the agreement wherein the committee, with John Kieran as chairman, unwisely went ahead with the promotion.⁶⁵ Barrow and Conn were furloughed for training on September 9, 1942. On September 18, newspaper publicity noted that net proceeds would not go

to relief.⁶⁶ By September 23, General Marshall had been aroused, and he advised both Surles and the director of AER of his opinion that arrangements be called off, a procedure which was accomplished on September 26.⁶⁷ Leaves of both boxers were canceled, and Barrow dejectedly went back to the old cavalry remount station at Fort Riley, Kansas, where he lamented that his "fightin' days" were over.⁶⁸

It was to be nearly a year before his unique talents were to be used for his country in any form of fighting. Jacobs' promotional schemes were not quelled. The fight promoter assured the chairman of the War Relief Control Board in February, 1943, of the Army's desire that he furnish ring equipment for the Service through the promotion of a series of boxing matches. This proved to be news to the War Department and the offer was declined.⁶⁹

The brouhaha created over the Louis-Conn fight was mild compared to another sad War Department error, War Football, Incorporated. Euphoric over the seeming success of the two Joe Louis bouts in January and March, 1942, General Surles embarked the Army on an ill-conceived professional football venture which diverted nearly two-hundred men from training duties for up to seven weeks for a net profit to Army Relief of \$241,000. Originated as a means of "glamorizing" the American soldier, War Football, Incorporated, in conjunction with relief officials, informed professional football club owners on March 28, 1942, of their intentions to promote an All-America team of Army talent to play a full schedule against National Football League teams the following fall.⁷⁰ The scope of the plans then were reduced, and on June 15 the War Department directed the assembling of two All-Star teams to play a series of games between August 28 and September 20.⁷¹ Details

of the Army maneuver were released on July 15 at a meeting of the Football Writers Association, which was meeting with coaches and military officials in New York. Plans were announced for the formation of a western Army team, coached by Major Wallace Wade, formerly the coach of Duke University's Rose Bowl team, and an eastern squad, headed by Colonel Robert (Bob) Neyland, celebrated coach at the University of Tennessee. The War Department entrusted promotion to Grandland Rice and his sportswriters, the same group which had arranged the Joe Louis episode, and known as War Football, Incorporated. Rice announced an Army Emergency Relief goal of from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000 in a series of four games by each team.⁷²

The two squads assembled early in August at Yale University in New Haven and at Camp Cooke, California.⁷³ As the coaches assembled their squads, training commands all over the country resisted tampering with their men. The Personnel Division in Services of Supply, out of deference to the War emergency, requested permission of each commanding officer for the detachment of football players, rather than issue orders directly. Since commanders were reluctant to release men from training, the Chief of Staff was asked, with the exception of officers, to direct the assignment of personnel to the football project.⁷⁴ This created a bottleneck which threatened the cancellation of the entire operation. The Chief of Staff was flooded by protests from training commands on the assignment of essential men, particularly those involved in technical training. This problem and the insistence of a task-master such as Neyland that the Army team have the best material available, led to a constant turnover of men in the football camps. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Air Corps, recommended that the project be

dropped. Arnold's argument was based on the shortage of officers in all branches, the interruption of training continuity, endangering of men to injury, particularly student pilots, and the fact that the War Department operation was initiated "by the direct action of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations without the knowledge or concurrence of the commanders concerned." Such junkets could not be fitted into the war picture. The General warned:

This activity...if used by individuals hostile to, or dissatisfied with the progress of the War Department in the war effort, will place the War Department in an indefensible position. No military necessity can justify the employment of military personnel to play professional football while other members of the Army are fighting abroad.⁷⁵

As squad members had already been assembled at New Haven, the decision was reached on August 12 to continue the operation. Recognizing that "hasty action on the part of certain officers forced the War Department to go along with the project," a study recommended "a football team that will perform satisfactorily."⁷⁶

Neyland had assembled a unit which could perform more than satisfactorily. The Colonel shuttled nearly one-hundred players into his training camp before settling on a squad of fifty-three. The group was laden with talent. Twenty-three former professional football players were on the roster, which was eight more veterans than the New York Giants had in the Stars' second game. Wade had Chicago Bears Quarterback Norm Standlee and the entire "T" backfield from Texas A & M's great 1940 squad in the camp. The Army had been scoured for prospects. Representatives from forty-five camps were on the Eastern roster, including seventeen privates, eleven corporals, two sergeants, twenty-two lieutenants, and a captain.⁷⁷ Kieran, tongue in check, commented:

This double barreled All-Army football team is starting with good men who have been over the terrain.... It will not be surprising if more men of similar experience are brought up for this military mission.⁷⁸

Surles bragged, "The War Show is tops in the carnival line...."⁷⁹

Results of the "Show," although good, were somewhat less than expected. The squads had to travel to four cities in two weeks to play with three weeks practice. Crowds were not great; the West team averaged only 24,000 per game, and the accelerated schedule took its toll, the Army boys losing three of their last four contests.⁸⁰ Profits were discouraging. All receipts amounted to over \$317,000 but team expenses ran to more than \$76,000.⁸¹ The College All-Star game alone netted two-thirds of the amount raised by the eight Army contests. The War Department was disenchanted, and a warning was issued not to make the effort a precedent.⁸² The wartime Army off-duty athletic program was endangered by high level reactions to the mismanagement, and the Air Corps summarily canceled the 1942 football schedule at the Technical Training Schools.⁸³

The Navy's emphasis on recruiting physical instructors and athletically trained pilots led to a heavy concentration of college trained athletes in that branch. By December of 1942, when the Navy was ordered to procure enlistments through draft volunteers,⁸⁴ the short stations had already been deluged with enough talent to have a formidable athletic program. Some NCAA districts had as many as two-thirds of their coaches go into Navy programs.⁸⁵ This trend was further encouraged by the Bureau of Aeronautics athletic training and later by the V-12 college program. The Navy appealed to many professional athletes as well. In the spring of 1942 the Norfolk Physical Instructors School had a

baseball team equal to many major league teams. Professional football players tended to enlist in that service as well. Out of 511 players and officials from the National Football League who served the country, 259 saw duty in the Navy or Marine Corps, 178 in the Army, and 56 in the Air Corps, despite the fact that the naval branches were much smaller.⁸⁶

Gene Tunney was a persuasive recruiter and frequently was pictured in the press surrounded by athletes who were products of his searches.⁸⁷ Since these efforts were not subtle, great leeway was opened to interpretations of the motives of these enlistments. Some individuals, disgruntled that they were not accepted into the Tunney program, accused the Navy of recruiting "muscle bound" and "muscle brained" athletes while bypassing other men with advanced degrees in physical education.⁸⁸ One gentleman protested, "These young huskies...can do more for their country in the front line with other men.... It's a disgrace, a farce, that most of the young athletes...are being taken in the Physical Fitness Department." John Kieran, a frequent booster of the contribution of athletes in service, shrugged that perhaps Commander Tunney could "come forward with a report to prove that the scheme is working...."⁸⁹

Actually the Navy program attracted extremely competent people, although non-college-trained men with prominent reputations and character were frequently recruited for the morale and publicity value that accrued. After basic training and physical instructor's school, these men often were set to work performing on base athletic squads before being shipped to combat zones. With the demand for instructors outstripping the supply, others remained to instruct new recruits. The requirement

that these teachers be college graduates majoring in physical education was changed in February, 1943, to the trainee's having had a minimum of two years and experience as a teacher in physical education or as a college varsity team member in at least one "highly competitive" sport. These requirements were waived in May of 1943, and potential leaders were selected on the basis of physical characteristics and graduation from high school.⁹⁰ Thousands of these men were vocationally trained in athletics and physical training.

Norfolk was loaded with good athletic teams despite attempts by the Bureau of Navigation to rotate prominent athletes to different stations.⁹¹ One recruiting product, who epitomized the recruiting bonanza for the Navy, was Bob Feller. The young Iowa "fireballer" was the sensation of the American League and, being prime draft material, was wooed by all branches of the armed services. Feller's boss, Alva Bradley, owner of the Cleveland Indians, was interested in seeing his property in a Navy uniform and contacted Tunney about the twenty-two-year-old right-hander's prospects in Navy physical training.⁹² Feller was sworn in by Tunney on December 10, 1941,⁹³ and his utilization became the source of much pride and confusion. Playing in his first game for Norfolk on April 3, Feller drew a crowd of nine-thousand fans to see him pitch three innings against the University of Richmond.⁹⁴ After he broke his own strike-out record by "fanning" twenty-one batters from a minor league team,⁹⁵ he was requested for transfer to the sprawling training base at Great Lakes where former Connecticut Reds manager Gordon S. (Mickey) Cochrane had been commissioned to build a powerhouse baseball team. A struggle developed between the commandants of the two bases to keep the strikeout "ace." Assistant BuNav Chief L. E. Denfield

suggested that Feller had been "boasting" of his imminent transfer to play ball.⁹⁶ Great Lakes Commandant John Downes was insistent that he have Feller and the Director of Training justify the move in order to "give all stations the advantage of having stars of his type...."⁹⁷ Denfield held firm, and Feller was transferred instead to Newport, Rhode Island.

The Great Lakes program was lavishly promoted under Downes. The 1941-42 basketball team won thirty-one and lost five against the best collegiate competition in the United States. The games, ostensibly played as Navy Relief charity, raised little for that fund and were actually used by Downes to boost recruiting in the Ninth Naval District and to re-establish a reputation in athletics at the giant base. The commandant claimed that such sports appearances "spurred" Navy enlistments by as much as twenty to forty percent,⁹⁸ but this was rejected by the Chief of Naval Personnel who cynically noted that public interest in the war effort was more than likely the cause. Secretary Knox received "flak" from a member of Congress, and BuPers was getting increasingly uneasy about the "practice of assigning athletes to permanent duties at a station for the purpose of strengthening the team on which they play...." Noting that the "primary responsibilities of all officers and personnel of the United States Navy is toward the successful prosecution of the war," the bureau insisted that "professional athleticism in whatever cloak it adopts is never in the best interest of the Navy."⁹⁹

Despite objection to such "barnstorming," Great Lakes continued to push its varsity program. The baseball team played a seventy-seven game schedule during the summer of 1942, posting sixty-three wins. Only

professional clubs could compete on equal terms against Cochrane's team. All service opposition was defeated. As late as June 16, base publicists were still claiming ten to thirty percent boosts in recruiting everywhere the team appeared. On September 1, 1942, the Blue-jackets announced a twelve-game football schedule which included eleven college teams, seven from the Big 10 plus Notre Dame, Missouri, and Pittsburgh universities.¹⁰⁰

Remembering how the Army was to run into difficulty because of War Football and War Boxing, Inc., the Navy was determined to avoid such embarrassment. The Secretary of the Navy on May 30, 1942, requested wide leeway for the use of the service's extraordinary athletes for war relief functions.¹⁰¹ However, pressure was building within BuPers Division of Training to put a cap on such activities. In early June the highly combative and virtually untouchable preflight program had thirteen-game football schedules announced for the fall.¹⁰² Criticism over this was matched by objection to the numerous promotion of athletes as non-commissioned physical training officers. Officials in BuPers received "numerous letters from wives of regular enlisted men, making strenuous objections to the rating of these Specialists as Chiefs...." Other commanding officers objected to Bob Feller and other athletes, protesting "that they are not in the Navy to do a job of work in the rating assigned, but to swell the coffers of Navy Relief...."¹⁰³

Due to the hardships of the United States forces in the Pacific, strict clamps were placed on the transfer of men from training to special projects. On June 11, 1942, BuPers toughened its earlier stand on assignment of athletes to duty stations. It considered "extremely undesirable" commitments of individuals and teams "especially qualified

in a particular sport beyond their normal period of training or assignment."¹⁰⁴ The order served to threaten the Major League-Military All-Star game scheduled for July 7, 1942, at Cleveland, a public relations attraction for War Relief promoted by professional baseball. The Navy's attitude wavered to the degree that Commissioner Landis intervened by calling the Secretary of the Navy Knox "without letting Tunney know" to make "damn sure these fellows get to this place...ten days beforehand...."¹⁰⁵ The game was publicized as a stellar attraction but was met with suspicion by the Navy. The Bureau of Personnel was chaffed that several players were solicited through the Navy Secretary's office rather than through the Bureau of Personnel, which was contrary to the BuPers circular of May 30, 1942. The Bureau called participation in the game "...a comedy of errors from the beginning.... The Bureau of Naval Personnel gave no such authorization to any officer in connection with the baseball game on July 7th...."¹⁰⁶ To make matters worse, the major league stars easily won, blasting Feller off the mound early in the game.

Quickened by this insensitivity to authority, Bureau Chief Randall Jacobs moved to impose a forty-eight-hour limitation for absences as a guideline for any other athletic activity that removed men from training. This action threatened the cancellation of the highly successful College All-Star game of August 28, 1942. Jacobs refused to allow the assignment of men on duty to the required three weeks of drill needed to prepare for the game. Twenty Navy men, standouts of the 1941 college football season, were required to be diverted from various phases of training for the event. The matter was particularly sensitive because the civilian chairman of the Illinois Navy Relief Society had promised

as early as May 15 that Navy men could be used. Promoters of the event had gone so far as to sell 1,000 seats for \$100 each in a grand display of patriotism.¹⁰⁷ The Director of Training appealed to the BuPers Chief to allow men to arrive in time to prepare for the game. On August 7, the Bureau of Personnel invoked its forty-eight hour rule to "avoid any unnecessary delay in getting trained fighting men to the front lines."¹⁰⁸ This was followed by an extensive BuPers directive which placed all athletic and recreation programs under training.¹⁰⁹

Although the All-Star game compromised its requirements enough so that enough men were on hand to make the game a resounding success, it and other circumstances fairly unnerved Tunney, who was constantly prodding BuPers to back away from such fanfare and get serious about training men for combat. The source of much of Tunney's antagonism lay in his pique toward preflight training, which had escaped his direction, but the former pugilist was genuinely concerned about the mood the public attitude toward the war was taking. With Marines grimly holding onto a jungle airfield on Guadalcanal after eight months of almost unchecked Japanese expansion and Nazi troops rolling up the Caucasus toward Stalingrad, the American people were having their Armed Forces play games. On August 19, 1942, Tunney exploded: "You cannot win a war...by reviving the recreational sports of the 'era of wonderful nonsense'." Requesting that the "sports world" refrain from its incessant demands on athletes in service, Tunney accused promoters and newspaper media of "athletic boondoggling," which he claimed not only diverted men from valuable training time but also did not correlate with the type of individual discipline for which sport was considered useful. He stormed, "If professional athleticism could win a war, we would have won this one

by now."¹¹⁰

Such an attack inflicted wounds in many directions, and sports-writers interpreted Tunney's offensive obliquely. Rice was astounded and infuriated that a sportsman would slash away at relief projects and accused Tunney of lack of "team play" in what Rice felt was an attack on War Football, Incorporated.¹¹¹ Perhaps ignorant at that point of the terms in the Louis-Conn contract, Kieran suggested that Tunney was guilty of an unfair attempt to deprive Joe Louis Barrow a chance to pay his income tax.¹¹² In September, 1942, the Physical Training Director presented a position paper to the Bureau of Personnel, arguing that athletes involved in any phase of training not be permitted to participate in "public sports events." The physical training chief was primarily concerned with the expeditious preparation for war. Alluding to the mounting allied war setbacks, Tunney insisted that Americans should make no less a commitment than the Germans and Japanese, who were sending their famous athletes to the front. Tunney was fearful that allowing "several thousand young officers and men, most of them the cream of our physical crop," to play games, would indicate that "we are not too deadly serious about this war." He also painted a specter of the breakdown of morale in military ranks because of the coddling of a "pet class," and in labor, which would not meet production schedules in the face of government lassitude. He concluded, "In an era of wonderful nonsense we were a happy, luxurious, time-consuming, sports minded nation. Now we must harden ourselves quickly."¹¹³

Tunney had mainly the preflight program in mind. Navy Relief had already met its quota for the year, and BuPers had already stifled the reassignment of personnel for sports contests. Tunney himself was in

direct control of the physical training curriculum, while welfare and recreation programs had been steadily drawn into unified physical training since January of 1942. Only one division had the "cream" of "several thousand young officers and men" engaged in spectator sport while in training, the Division of Aviation Training and its V-5 schools. Tunney had tried to get the preflight football schedules canceled since the previous year. Therefore with uproar of "boondoggling," he felt the time was ripe for another try.

The struggle for control of aviation training between the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Personnel caused the physical training programs of the two naval divisions to become the arena of contention. The functions of both bureaus had rapidly expanded after Pearl Harbor. The training problems of BuAero were infinitely more complex than BuPers, as were many other planning and operational procedures. The Navy Department's restructuring of the Bureaus' relations in October, 1941, in which Aviation Training operated independently of BuPers with only liaison responsibilities, had grown unwieldy. Aviation training had necessarily taken the initiative to become independent of the BuPers training function. Yet the Bureau of Personnel still maintained the responsibility for assigning billets to men already trained. Since BuAero was commissioning its own physical training cadre, BuPers insisted on having a voice in their assignment, as well as placing its own physical training specialists within the preflight schools. Both bureaus operated independently in respect to training, with aeronautics becoming steadily more self-contained until October 15, 1943, when aviation training was placed under the command of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air).¹¹⁴ The Bureau of Personnel was reduced to rendering

logistical support only. Through this time, Tunney's authority technically overlapped that of Tom Hamilton and his successors in the Bureau of Aeronautics' athletic training program. Much to Tunney's exasperation, the V-5 schools were beyond his reach.

Actually, Commander Tunney's differences with the preflight training ran much deeper than questions of authority. The former AEF Marine had a different conception of the purpose of athletics in training than Hamilton had in aviation. Hamilton firmly believed that mental "toughening" was achieved by participation in hard-hitting contact games. Students were urged to rid themselves of selfish inhibitions and socially developed sanctions against aggression. The physical exercises concurrent with the mental conditioning involved in sport, especially team games, were a valuable incidental product leading to complete "flying fitness." Great emphasis was placed on the role of the team and the group reenforcement of roles, tasks, and outstanding performance. Although great physical demands were placed on prospective pilots, willingness to endure physiological stress proved to be a means of gaining status within the group. Hamilton's program was motivational training at its zenith, and external direction had to play a key part. Moreover, a fully trained combat pilot was equipped to spread destruction far greater than an ordinary seaman. His training and equipment were expensive, yet he had the latitude to interpret orders through a wide range of options. Since he had the opportunity to view a "bigger picture" of the effort of his efforts, the pilot had to be well indoctrinated on the necessity of his mission. Commander Hamilton held that placing an athlete on the field of varsity participation, with the pressure of large crowds, was a crucible through which a man might sift out

the primary reasons for his effort. This, in turn, had carryover value in perceiving a mission.

Although Tunney's physical training program was sports oriented, the athletics involved were emphasized more for the popular participation rather than the achievement of varsity teams. Although this was largely true in the preflight situation also, Hamilton was suspicious of the intramural concept as dangerously leveling, encouraging achievement without sacrifice, similar to socialism. Hamilton used the intramural program of the V-5 schools as a means through which a cadet sought to attain higher levels of participation. In defense of the varsity concept, Hamilton wrote the Director of Aviation Training:

...a straight intra-mural program (while being excellent in theory) has never worked out satisfactorily in practice. Every college, which has eliminated outside competition for intra-murals alone, has become a complete flop as far as athletic interest.... The mental attitude of students at such schools has also followed a trend toward 'parlor pink' thought.¹¹⁵

Tunney, on the other hand, was interested in getting men trained quickly. His philosophy of physical training was directed toward self-discipline. He called this approach of internal motivation the "warrior psychology." His allusion to this attitude in an August 19, 1942, press interview was widely misinterpreted to mean that Tunney was against organized sport in wartime. Tunney actually supported a wide realm of such activity in training camps but did not feel that emphasis on these was necessary to build the psychology of the fighting man. Rather his leadership in the physical training section was directed toward instituting a regime of activity toward which, if a man followed with complete obedience, a level of strength and self-confidence would be reached which could not be shaken.

No matter how important the group was in determining a man's actions, the former boxer felt that the key to a man's success in combat would be his ability to preserve himself. A man had to see himself within the mass, accept his role within it, then occupy himself with his own sense of duty. In 1941, Tunney wrote in Arms for Living: "Adjustment is a condition favorable to the development of self. Out of mass discipline, self-discipline. Out of mass action, individual action."¹¹⁶ The perfect statement for this self-denial was found in the writing of French Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch, which the commander often quoted and also attached to orders relating to physical fitness: "The first condition to obeying is...to visualize all the order received and nothing else, then to find the means of complying with it, irrespective of personal opinions, difficulties or obstacles."¹¹⁷ It was around this type of single direction that Tunney perceived his "warrior psychology." In a speech on February 17, 1942, he noted, "...I think that maybe we should now divert--or confine--our efforts to developing war psychology--the warrior psychology." He went on to say:

...physical fitness does not mean expertness on the baseball diamond nor unflinching skill and great courage on the gridiron. Nor does it mean outstanding qualities in any particular branch of athletics--including boxing. I think when we get men physically fit, it has to be done the hard way. There is no substitute for going through the daily grind.... When you are in a conflict where the stakes are mortal, there is the fundamental urge of self-preservation which guides your every act.¹¹⁸

Commander Tunney's views on physical development were reinforced by Dr. George Stienhaus, a critic of the athletics in training principle and a devotee of the "overload principle," which was the physiological cousin to Tunney's "warrior psychology." Stienhaus, with whom Tunney met after the Commander's early January joust with Hamilton, expounded

his theory of physical development as "the exercise of psychological sensibilities." Stienhaus taught that this conditioning could be achieved through bringing about a physiological overload in a short period of time, "providing the trainee was provided proper motivation through the encouragement of his group."¹¹⁹

Tunney and Hamilton ran head-on in this conflict of theory shortly after the New Year began in 1942. Following Hamilton's appeal for enlistment of physical training instructors and administrators for the NCAA and American Football Coaches meeting in Detroit on December 29-30, 1941, Admiral Radford was "swamped with applications." Because no one had been assigned to handle that phase of training, Hamilton was transferred from his job as Operations Officer at the Anacostia Naval Air Station to BuAero headquarters to direct the program. Writing in 1974, he attenuated the circumstances of his meeting with the Navy Physical Director:

I went over to meet Tunney, but discovered that he had greatly different ideas about running a physical training program. This was unfortunate that the Navy had two programs but the aims of Admiral Radford could not be accomplished under Tunney's philosophy....Tunney wanted only mass exercise and recreational activities, and wanted to execute and man his activities mostly with enlisted specialists....We believed competitive sports could supply the qualities in the fighting men we were training, and we recruited the best coaches and physical educators available who were going to be teaching officer candidates and they were well qualified in every respect for officer rank.¹²⁰

Radford made the decision to procure officers for the program through the Bureau of Aeronautics rather than through Tunney's Norfolk school despite the fact that on January 6, 1942, BuPers (then BuNav) had claimed "primary responsibility of administering and directing such policies pertaining to...physical fitness...."¹²¹ Meanwhile, Tunney

procured the record jackets of men whom the Physical Training Section found satisfactory for commissioning in the preflight program. However, on January 30, without BuNav's knowledge, representatives of Aviation Training proceeded to Norfolk to interview candidates independently, apparently before requesting jackets from BuNav. Hamilton's plans for preflight had included the assignment of enlisted specialists from the Norfolk school as instructors in physical drill and other duties, and he interviewed a limited number of graduates for prospective commission as well.¹²² BuAero requested only two hundred physical instructors from BuNav. The Director of Training in BuNav, aware that people in Aviation Training were talking in terms of 1,200 instructors, was alarmed that BuAero intended to procure that number of officers' billets in physical training through its own initiative. The Director of Training insisted that only fifty chief specialists per school were necessary for the type of physical drill recommended by the Physical Training Section and probably was not aware of the scope of the preflight sports program.¹²³ The matter reached the "boiling point" when on February 26, 1942, the Training Division directed a memorandum to the Chief of BuNav outlining its difficulties with the Bureau of Aeronautics in the matter of commissioning officers for V-5 instruction. The memo accused BuAero of bad faith in interviewing enlisted specialists without the knowledge of the Physical Training Section, of assigning men not properly trained for the job that was required, and for not giving Athletic Specialists a chance to be interviewed for commissioning on an equitable basis. The Director of Training demanded that BuAero communicate definite requirements for recruiting so that the former could assist in procurement.¹²⁴

As BuAero went about the job of recruiting its own athletic

officers, Commander Tunney gradually became aware of the substance of the aviation physical conditioning program. His initial reaction was arbitrary. On February 3, 1942, he wrote Radford that "the qualities that you have outlined for development in the early training makes excellent reading." Tunney raised the issue of "flying fitness" by warning Radford against letting prospective pilots engage in hard contact sports, including football and boxing. The Director of Physical Training specifically referred to research advanced by the German physiologist, Ernst Jokl, which promoted the thesis that boxing could cause "pin-point hemorrhages" related to the condition of being "punch drunk." Tunney had reviewed Jokl's findings with Stienhaus in mid-January and concluded that the research was valid as an argument against football in training. Tunney insisted:

...it is the responsibility of those in charge of the training of those pilots to pause before giving the command to continue that sport....They cause pin-point hemorrhages which leave scar tissue on the brain. It is my honest belief that a warrior flyer must not have had too many pin-point hemorrhages.¹²⁵

Actually, no one exactly knew what "flying fitness" was. The conflict over physical training methods would have been fought out no matter what forum was used, for unknowingly, the correspondents in the *imbroglia* had raised the old question of sports versus apparatus methods of training. On the one hand, the feeling that a man had to be motivated to be trained and, on the other, that a man had to be trained, then motivated. Actually, both men believed in both methods but on a different scale of application. If Tunney felt that emphasis on sports during war was foolish, play advocates thought his methods archaic, smacking of totalitarian regimentation. Hamilton said of his own program, "...Our enemies have raised boys by regimentation and made them

tough....We hope to make our boys tough through sport."¹²⁶ However, the issue of flying fitness was not so simply answered.

On March 24, 1942, Dean John W. Bunn of Stanford University questioned the aviation training program in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy "because it has been considered essential in the development of superior flyers." Bunn challenged the use of "football fitness or basketball fitness" and the other demands that were to be made of V-5 cadets because no one yet knew what "flying fitness" was. He argued for a scientific testing procedure at the preflight schools in which fitness could be discovered in terms of "strength, endurance, agility, balance, bodily coordination and motor skills...." Referring to Jokl's studies for the South African Air Force, Bunn criticized football in training "because of the punishment about the head which some football linemen incur."¹²⁷ This latter theme was also expressed by the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery a few days earlier. The medical chief compounded the criticism through his understanding of preflight's motivational approach, which he understood was a "teaching of hate" comparable to "German methods."¹²⁸

This medium of debate was also perplexing Air Corps training, though not on the adversary level. General Henry H. Arnold and General Ira C. Eaker had noted to prospective air cadets in 1936 that "no definite set of physical characteristics can be tabbed as truly characteristic" of pilots. According to Arnold, the football player was not more likely "to possess the flying requisites than the tennis player or the track man...." No single body type fitted flying requirements "since the flying type is possessed of a particularly fine coordination of mind and muscle." Although both Hamilton and Tunney dwelled at

length on social and psychological qualities of the fighting man, the Air Corps generals gave no hint as to how these qualities might be attained, although they did object to the "effeminate or unmanly" or those who were "sullen, morose, or antatonic in personality...."¹²⁹

It was precisely those concerns of the "coordination of mind and muscle" that became the physiological rationale for the naval air athletic program. As in the regular Navy physical discipline, Hamilton was interested in strength. Superficially the sport training method appeared to be mostly motivation in nature, with strength accruing through the regimen of preparation. Like many coaches the commander believed that repetition of neuro-motor tasks under stress would lead to a reflexive conditioning of performance. He wrote to the Director of Aviation Training that catching a punt in front of a crowd of 50,000 people was one type of training which would teach the aviation cadet to "deliver in the 'clutches'." To test this thesis the schools later set up tests of stimulus related to time of reaction down to hundredths of a second. To bridge the gap between motivation and activity, experimental courses in relaxation were also used.¹³⁰ These latter concepts were of particular value to pilots in training and were a significant difference in the need of aviation for different approaches to combat preparation.

On February 17, 1942, Tunney made his "war psychology speech" in Birmingham. His rhetoric was more antagonistic against varsity sports in training than his earlier letter to Radford. In it he ridiculed the idea that there was any psychological carry-over value in combat from playing team games. He proclaimed:

You cannot transfer the courage and skill of the gridiron or the prize ring or the baseball diamond to the battle field....In one place you are playing with the honor of

the alma mater or playing for the highest title...but in the other place you are playing with mortal stakes. Therefore, all the training that you get in competitive sports is absolutely of no help.¹³¹

If anything, as far as student pilots were concerned, Tunney held that they did not need any more recklessness and courage than they already had. In his experience in physical training in his pre-war days at naval air stations, he had perceived an abundance of spirit and confidence that detracted from the discipline that pilots needed to obtain flying fitness.¹³²

Because preflight schools had not yet opened, Hamilton could not defend his syllabus from an operational standpoint. The commander instead suggested that journalistic reporting of his program had been misleading, causing "some doubts as to the wise administration of all the problems involved in training pilots physically."¹³³ The Navy carrier pilot continued to support the advisors in his program, and it was apparent to some that a full blown struggle was abroad between the two systems of training. On April 3, 1942, Jesse Feiring Williams began a telegram and letter writing campaign to rally support for Hamilton's methods among physical educators. Marking the necessity of his desire to the "effort by Tunney to take over the Hamilton program," Williams sparked a series of laudatory messages regarding the sports training regime to Secretary Knox and the Directors of Training in BuAero and BuPers.¹³⁴ Soon afterward, Williams was able to acquire unanimous passage of a supportive declaration in the American Association Health Physical Education and Recreation convention meeting in New Orleans.

By late April, 1942, the first BuAero instructors had been schooled and assigned to preflight centers; yet the hiatus had widened between the two physical training sections. Williams had injected a derogation

of Tunney's ideas on posture training¹³⁵ to which he had alluded in an earlier attack on the ex-champion. This focused attention on the personality of Tunney rather than the strengths or weaknesses of the regular Navy physical training concept.

The basic tenets of Tunney's promotion were basically sound, and the commander found one of his biggest supporters in C. H. McCloy, who was the most active individual in the early stages of the war in setting up physical training in all services. Although McCloy was a member of the Joint Army-Navy survey team which had issued the critical report on Navy physical training on March 31, 1942, the University of Iowa professor defended the foundation of the training as fundamentally sound except for its short length, the blame for which he laid to other figures in the training establishment. Tunney had continued to enlist some of the best administrative personnel in physical education that he could find for his rapidly expanding section. Of the Hamilton program, which still existed only on paper, McCloy had the darkest suspicions of its purpose, which he believed wasteful athletic adventurism. He wrote AAHPER official Jay Nash of the New York University:

...those who sing extravagant praises of the Naval aviation program know little concerning that program. So far as we can find out here, nobody knows anything about it, including the men who are planning it. This much is known, however, that they are planning a series of glorified varsity teams...they expect to have ninety men on a football squad capable of playing Minnesota and other Big Ten teams. In my humble opinion, any man who is in good enough condition to play Minnesota has no business hanging around a training camp: he should be at an aviation camp learning to fly. This diversion of manpower seems to me to be completely inexcusable and smacks of the worst of athleticism grown wild.¹³⁶

Despite McCloy's opposition, the V05 philosophy had captured the imagination of the American patriotic spirit, and its rhetoric seemed

about to eclipse the older Navy program. By early June, 1942, the schools were operational and the sports program was being organized at preflight centers. One syndicated columnist, Bill Cunningham, suggested that Tunney's authority had already been superseded by aviation training and that the fitness leader was "far from amused."¹³⁷ Stung, Tunney and the Bureau of Personnel were involved in a three month effort either to gain control over the personnel functions of aviation training or to interdict the varsity athletic schedules before they began.

On June 3, 1942, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed BuAero to turn over all personnel functions to the Bureau of Personnel.¹³⁸ Then on June 11, DuPers circulated its directive which indicated it would use its authority to break up concentrations of athletes at training stations as well as invoking the forty-eight hour rule on travel. This was followed on June 29 with another directive that all stations were to coordinate their physical training program under the direction of an officer assigned through BuPers.¹³⁹ Commander Tunney used his new-found power in a move to have the embryo varsity football schedules scrapped at the V-5 centers.¹⁴⁰ The cadet selection board had been quite aggressive in seeing to it that the best athletic material available would enter the preflight centers at the beginning of football practice, and individual coaches had been active in procuring top flight players for their bases.¹⁴¹ Any attempt by Tunney to interfere with this practice was blocked when the Chief of BuAero persuaded the Vice CNO to cancel his directive of June 3.¹⁴² Therefore the Director of Training, at Tunney's suggestion, moved to unify all physical activities under direction of the Assistant Drill Commander (Physical Trainer) at each base. Not only did this run counter to the training syllabus of the preflight schools, but

also it struck at the heart of the varsity program, for the Assistant Drill Commander was empowered to take control of the Welfare and Recreation program under which varsity sports operated.¹⁴³ The latter was under an academic department in V-5 training, and the precedent of BuPers usurping an administrative function in aviation training was clear.

As these plans were being embodied, Hamilton drafted a lengthy defense to the Director of Aviation Training. The naval aviator argued that the honor of the air service was at stake. The foundation of the entire training syllabus had been laid on the athletic training idea, men had been recruited under the alleged premises of the program, and varsity games contracted. He reminded his superiors that any regression of principle would be misrepresentation to the students and instructors who had enrolled in the program, the colleges which had scheduled the games, and the public which had looked toward the air arm for leadership in physical training. Affirming that "outside competition has been one of the pillars of the foundation on which the whole physical training program was built," Hamilton was steadfast in his belief that a highly promoted varsity program would add unmeasured benefits to morale in naval air by reducing individualism and establishing loyalty to its institutions, thereby making "its atmosphere strong, virile and manly." The commander urged that the preflight varsity program be expanded to advanced bases and under certain conditions to operations bases. He hoped that an advantage in athletic sports and games could be reaped for the Navy, a benefit which he thought would help recruiting and could not be repeated.¹⁴⁴

The "showdown" between the two divisions of training occurred during August, 1942, the occasion being the lengthy BuPers directive of

August 15 in which the Bureau required that the "program of Welfare and Recreation and of Physical Training...must bear a direct relationship to the primary purpose of training men to do the job for which they were recruited." The directive recognized that sport, as recreation, played a distinct role in physical fitness. All duty-time physical training was limited to direction by enlisted specialists. However, it recognized the value of welfare and recreation programs in training, and conceded to individual stations the prerogative of the commanding officer to carry on physical activities in the form of athletic games during off-duty time. It was assumed by BuPers that many of these men would be available for duty as assistant coaches in the welfare and recreation athletic programs.¹⁴⁵ Tunney was pessimistic about the reception that such a plan would have in aviation training. He felt that the need for unification made it obligatory to eliminate all overlapping in function between physical training and athletics. To him the issue was clear; no yielding was justified on the matter. Nor did he expect BuAero to yield, noting "it is the belief that the Naval Aviation Training Stations will continue with their present programs" despite his efforts to the contrary.¹⁴⁶

Tunney was desirous of real unification rather than a conciliatory proposal by the Bureau of Personnel. Recalcitrant, he felt that the whole preflight idea was unnecessary and wasteful. He had broached this "problem" in a June, 1942, letter to Elwood Craig Davis of the University of Pittsburg physical education department. In it he proposed that technical training and physical training be combined in aviation training in order to reduce the time needed to prepare pilots for operation.¹⁴⁷ Two months later, after Davis's commissioning and appointment

as Physical Training Officer for the Third Naval District, Davis broadened Tunney's concept in the form of a memorandum for "Unifying the Navy's Program of Physical Training." In it Davis prepared for Tunney a broadscale attack on the philosophy of the preflight concept. The thesis rested on the approach that there was no transfer of training between the "character" and skills displayed in a team contest and those needed in flying. Davis postulated that such an idea rested on a "false hypothesis" and a "common error," insisting instead that "modern psychologists are in agreement...that such a trait as courage is specific not general." He insisted that football and boxing courage could not be equated with flying courage "because there are almost no identical elements between football and boxing on one hand, and flying on the other." The lieutenant insisted that the general coordination skills for which athletic preparation strove were vastly unlike those needed for flying, athletic skills requiring "explosive" action; flying on the other hand demanded a "fineness" of coordination which militated against the "courage and recklessness" of sports training. Davis pointed out that only when there were one or more similar situations present to those problems encountered in training could courage be transferred to the conditions met. He doubted that this could be done through athletic training.¹⁴⁸

Without action of the Secretary of the Navy to change the relationship of the Bureau of Personnel to the training function of aviation, all Tunney could do was vent his feelings on sport within the service. BuPers managed to separate training funds from the preflight varsity operation, which the schools accomplished through the "Athletic Associations," and on September 1 the Chief of BuPers demanded the submission

of all preflight football schedules from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. On September 11, 1942, the Navy Department finally acted to transfer the administration of its schools to BuPers, but to transfer the administration of its schools to BuPers, but the transfer was a slow process and BuAero never turned over complete control of its training program.¹⁴⁹ On September 15, 1942, Tunney acknowledged that the two systems of training would coexist.¹⁵⁰

The success of the preflight and other Navy athletic programs continued to cause consternation in the Bureau of Personnel. Such activities had to be kept within limits of propriety. Although Air Corps teams were allowed to compete in civilian "bowl" games, the Navy set the precedent of not allowing its men to participate when Athens Preflight was forbidden to play in the 1943 Cotton Bowl game.¹⁵¹

If there was misunderstanding in the Navy Department on the role of athletics in training, the situation was even more obscured in civilian circles. The colleges were anxious to help in the physical training effort, but the services resisted civilian attempts to dictate particular philosophies of training. Such had been the occasion of the Navy Department's encounter with the Joint Army-Navy Committee research commission on Navy physical training, a prelude to another division between the two principals over the continuation of college athletics. During the summer of 1942, with the fine record being made by Navy athletes in relief benefits and the brilliant publicity over the preflight program, college athletic administrators saw the Navy as a guiding light for preserving college athletics. The subcommittee on athletics of the JANC on Welfare and Recreation, having fallen short in its attempt to direct the philosophy and methods of military fitness, redirected its efforts to persuade

the services to sanction intercollegiate sport as a vital tool in preparing the prospective inductee. The Joint Committee moved on June 5, 1942, to ask the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments to issue declarations of support of spectator type activities in the schools as a means of ministering to "physical fitness and mental well being of servicemen and civilians." The NCAA that same month decided in its Executive Council to intensify and emphasize competitive athletics as a practical application of physical hardening programs, the military offering guidelines, the college offering incentive and enthusiasm. Since the president and secretary of the NCAA, Badger and Griffith, were members of the JANC subcommittee on athletics, efforts of the Joint Army-Navy Committee to work with the services on the matter were representative of the National Collegiate Athletic Association.

To implement this approach, the JANC requested that the War and Navy Departments issue a declaration commending "the continuance of inter-college and inter-camp athletics, if they constitute a proper part of a universal physical training and athletic program sic in college and in the services."¹⁵² Badger asked that such activities be declared "an appropriate part of the war effort."¹⁵³ Both departments returned glowing endorsements. Naval Secretary Knox stipulated that such sports should be continued "where such athletics constitute a proper part of the universal physical training and athletic program of the nation." Although it was clear that Knox expected athletics to be continued on the basis of a war fitness rationale, Stimson was not as committal, casually commending the recreational aspects of such wartime activities in civilian life, and in military camps "whenever such activities do not interfere with essential training."¹⁵⁴ John Griffith viewed these

letters with an opportunity to accomplish his aims. On July 10, 1942, he contacted Committee Chairman Fowler Harper and proposed that the JANC offer guidance on the matter by circulating a letter among college presidents urging them to make physical training compulsory at their institutions. Major Griffith regarded this as a means for preserving college athletics and the role of higher education in maintaining the moral and social fiber of American life during the war.¹⁵⁵ On August 7 the Joint Committee composed a letter to college heads seeking clearance for its issue. The letter commended the continuance of intercollegiate sport and incorporated the Stimson and Knox statements in the text.¹⁵⁶

By using this method of military authority, Badger seemed to be pushing for some sort of uniform physical "toughening" policy in training by the services so that the guidelines might prove useful to colleges and universities. The Navy had already threatened to take a separate road from such civilian advice in training technique, while the Army had remained unconvinced that such methods of athletic training recommended by JANC were useful.

Representatives of the several services met with the Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation on August 18, 1942, to settle differences. By the time the meeting was held, however, the influence of the Joint Army-Navy Committee on either civilian or military athletic training had disappeared. The athletic subcommittee of JANC had not met as a whole in a year and a half, and it became obvious that Badger was operating independently through his position of subcommittee chairman. On August 14, 1942, Executive Director of the JANC E. M. Crocker revealed that the Morale and Recreation Branch of Army Special Services

opposed Badger's involvement in its planning.¹⁵⁷ Tunney also went ahead with plans to reorganize a Civilian Advisory Committee outside the Joint Army-Navy Board's cooperation.¹⁵⁸ These moves spelled the end of any independently conceived physical training projects by the Joint Committee on Welfare and Recreation quickly diminished in importance. On August 31, 1942, the Navy Department rejected the Committee's request to circulate Knox's strong statement on athletics, insisting that the July 14 release "was not intended for publication,"¹⁵⁹ and on September 21, Crocker decided to drop the project rather than carry Stimson's statement alone.¹⁶⁰

Tunney carried out plans for his own advisory committee. Crocker, who had tried to mediate the deteriorating situation, was alarmed over Tunney's bypassing the athletic subcommittee. On September 11, 1942, he observed, "I believe that Gene is making a great mistake and may stick his neck out permanently. After all, this Committee, and the subcommittees connected with it, are appointees of the Secretary of War." Nevertheless, Tunney convened his committee on September 15. The commander initially ignored Griffith and Badger, two of the best men on the JANC Committee most interested in physical training, claiming that the Navy was "to busy fighting a war to bother with civilians." Tunney eventually compromised on Badger, who was invited as an advisory member but eliminated Griffith, the start of a running verbal battle between the two. Tunney's other "civilians" included Dr. McGloy, whom the commander installed as chairman, Dr. Stienhaus, Dr. Nielson, and Dr. Crocker, who was made an honorary member. The committee, Tunney's outburst on "civilians" notwithstanding, voted full membership to Badger at the first meeting.

Navy physical training was in desperate need of reduction. The August 15 BuPers directive swept the whole realm of off-duty athletic games under the control of that section. Tunney, having recognized BuAero's prominence in training its own people, reorganized his division around a distinctive philosophy of leadership. By the fall of 1942, both the administrative section and its trained personnel had grown beyond the ability of Tunney and other non-professional physical educators to handle it. Almost 4,000 physical instructors had been trained at Norfolk, but the lack of trained administrators had kept the Navy from incorporating the philosophy of physical training and maintenance programs to all its branches.

One of the ironies of Tunney's leadership in the Navy fitness program was the ability of the Bureau of Aeronautics to "out recruit" him in the matter of commissioning civilians. Tunney, the innovator, was outmaneuvered by Aviation Training, which offered commissions on a highly competitive basis to nearly 2,500 trained educators. Commander Tunney, caught up in the philosophy of conservative "black shoe" Navy, held back, relying on enlisted specialists until nearly too late.¹⁶¹ Only after the September 15, 1942, meeting, in which he acknowledged that "we have a serious problem," did the BuPers program literalize its recruiting campaign to attract top-flight talent. Most of the administrators of the Navy program turned out to be men with athletic figures, C. Max Farrington, Athletic Director at George Washington University as Chief of Administration and Instruction, and C. E. Forsythe, State High School Athletic Director from Michigan, Director of the Physical Maintenance Program. One early appointee, Ray Flaherty, Head Football Coach for the Washington Redskins, escaped the BuAero net and became the

Assistant Drill Officer and Football Coach at the Farragut, Idaho, Training Station.¹⁶² A BuPers order of September 23, 1942, also assigned physical training assistants to each Naval District and brought other top-flight men into the Tunney program.¹⁶³

The Civilian Advisory Committee, along with a competent professional staff of officers, expanded the Navy training curriculum. An extensive stress-load testing series was begun, the physical training regime was increased through all phases of training (already undertaken by BuAero) one hour per day, a physical maintenance program was launched for operations bases, and a program was begun for the Women's Reserve.¹⁶⁴ The latter was developed under the direction of Mary J. Shelley of Bennington College.¹⁶⁵ In November, 1942, testing standards were modified and incorporated into the Physical Fitness Manual for the U.S. Navy, which was ready for distribution on September 23, 1943. Although interdepartmental rivalry and civilian suspicion had delayed its publication for a year, the Navy circular was the most comprehensive athletic and physical training document published by the government during the war.

The "nature" of the fitness program included freedom from disease, muscular endurance, strength, cardio-respiratory efficiency, agility, flexibility, and speed. The document associated all these needs for modern war with those "skills developed through the continued practice of sports and athletic games," which were related to the "ability to respond quickly to combat situations; with poise and alertness; with aggressiveness, initiative, and resourcefulness; with teamwork...and group morale." The importance of athletics in training was signified by the suggestion that sports and games be utilized to the "utmost," and that

they "be so organized that they will be available to all men in training." Swimming and boxing were featured in the publication, and both these sports were expanded to great length in the Navy. The pledge, "every man a swimmer," was not an idle one, and the service's achievements in this area were exceptionally good. A full chapter on boxing began with the rudimentary illustrations on how to make a fist, advancing to mass drills, maneuvers, and stances. The acceleration in training of large numbers of men at the recruit depots had necessarily reduced Tunney's original interest in recreational sports as a part of training, but sports were unified with training. One chapter of the manual was devoted to these activities, which were largely recognized as part of the maintenance and morale program of established posts and bases. Wrestling, combatives, running, including obstacle and relay races, and weight lifting rounded out the athletic emphasis.¹⁶⁶

Little had been done within the Physical Training Branch to change the traditional Navy approach to the Negro seaman, which had led to the assignment of these sailors to the more servile ratings, and, although 400 men per month were being graduated from the Norfolk facility by the summer of 1943, none were black. Requests by Negro enlistees for training as Athletic Specialists had to be channeled through the Navy Department.¹⁶⁷ Inquiries to the Bureau of Personnel about qualified black enlistments received the standard polite reference to apply for "general service."¹⁶⁸ Negro Congressman Arthur W. Mitchell of Chicago, who was alerted of the reluctance of the Navy to enlist members of his race as Athletic Specialists, protested this discrimination on July 22, 1942, in a letter to Secretary Knox:

I am frank to tell you that the morale among the Negro civilian population, and many of the enlisted men with whom I have talked, is very low. This is because of these rank racial discriminations practiced by our government, and in which the Navy takes the lead.¹⁶⁹

This indictment was brought to President Roosevelt,¹⁷⁰ who deferred to Knox, signing a prepared response sent to him by the Navy Secretary.¹⁷¹

The President's reply was evasive to the question of why Negroes were not accepted for physical training billets. The Knox proxy simply read that the "same basic training, including physical and vocational training, is afforded all recruits."¹⁷² This policy continued until February of 1944 when the first Negro specialists were brought through the Bainbridge training school for the establishment of a "colored" training program.¹⁷³

The women's program in the Navy existed only through guidance rather than directive, and male specialists were initially given duty in the training function for the women's physical maintenance program. Initially twelve men were assigned to this activity, but by August, 1943, this number had increased to thirty-three.¹⁷⁴ The Training Division made participation mandatory through a circular issued on October 2, 1943, and the operation was placed under the supervision of a trained physical educator, Jenny E. Turnbull of George Washington University.

The "aims" of the WAVE regime were not as versatile as those of the regular Navy, maintenance recognizing "needs of women as contrasted to the demands made upon men." The provision of "endurance and strength to meet the demands of the routine jobs and...additional duties," were the criteria for the Women's Reserve. Conditioning exercises, swimming and "games" were outlined for the mandatory three hour per week tasks. Participation in folk and modern dance and "stunts" accompanied

mass games, such as push ball, and regular athletics, including dual sports. As these guidelines were incorporated into the training program, the female personnel faced an implementation of athletic training from games of low skill, endurance and coordination to those of a higher development of movement. Running was introduced in the first week of training, volleyball in the second, and softball and basketball in weeks three through nine. The maintenance program also included field hockey and soccer.

The Physical Training Section issued guidelines for women's sports in March of 1944 which were taken directly from the conservative standards as established by a committee on women's athletics in the American Association of Health Physical Education and Recreation. The outline established play days, sports days, and telegraphic meets as ideal for women's competition.¹⁷⁵ By late 1944 the maintenance program was no longer regarded as essential for women, and WAVE participation on the staff of the Physical Training Section was dropped.¹⁷⁶

In the summer of 1943 the Bureau of Personnel submitted to disparate activities of all naval posts to regulations designed to standardize athletic procedure. The BuAero conflict forced BuPers to request that the Secretary of the Navy issue a directive designed to channel all requisitions for athletic equipment through the personnel division, a measure that was accomplished in July of that year. That month also saw the issuance of a letter ordering stations to confine their athletic competition within established NCAA districts. The order included a reiteration of the forty-eight hour travel rule, a prohibition against air travel for athletic contests, the disallowance of competition against professional teams, and limiting of contests to the home fields of

competing squads.¹⁷⁷ These regulations brought the Navy into cooperation with Office of Defense Transportation guidelines on civilian travel while also correcting another confrontation of "barnstorming." The Bureau Chief insisted upon "a program that provides athletics for all of the men on the station and utilizes station team athletics only for the purpose of providing entertainment...."¹⁷⁸

The Bureau of Personnel, however, could never control the utilization of men that the Naval Air Stations sought to fill billets at their posts. On December 14, 1942, the Bureau objected, without success, the awarding of a commission to a professional football coach, George Halas of the Chicago Bears, for an assignment in athletics at the Norman (Oklahoma) Air Station.¹⁷⁹ Some air station commanders frustrated the duties of physical training specialists assigned through the Bureau of Personnel with a multitude of irrelevant tasks, which the assistant officer in charge of physical training characterized as everything from "glorified janitors to elevator operators."¹⁸⁰

The first year of World War II for the United States was one of drama, vulnerability, and crises. Yet America did not suffer extensively nor did its people know the grip of real sacrifice or hardship. Except for the military reverses in the Pacific, which involved comparatively few men of the Armed Forces, there was little real extensive fighting. The economy of the United States boomed. Socially, except for the drama of divided homes, most of 1942 differed little from the last year of peace. In a sense, the American sporting scene represented the glimmer of hope that the world would be as it once was: conflict reduced to the level of team play, values exhibited and exchanged on the symbolic levels of high ideals, people still in control of their cherished institutions,

and governments, both foreign and domestic, conceived in terms of ideology, rather than of commitment, demand, and sacrifice. Sport was not changed greatly by war in 1942, quality of civilian play being diminished marginally. By November, however, this facade of "wonderful nonsense" was over, the reality of war was to bring to an end for at least three years the sporting normalcy that helped soothe the shock of world disorder.

Force of arms and the demands for support had brought people face to face with what real physical wage such conflict demanded. The American invasion and the British counter-attack in North Africa, the waste of Stalingrad, naval battles in the Solomon Sea, the fight for Guadalcanal--all had their demands: rationing, full industrial capacity, regulation, and the eighteen-year-old draft. Organized athletics were changed by these events largely through a rationale and exposure to countless numbers of men. The physical and social reorganization of American sport, sparked by the government on foundations of long cherished principle, was a development that took its place among other circumstances that would mark World War II as a dividing point between the old and the new in American life.

FOOTNOTES

¹New York Times (December 30, 1941; February 24, 1942; May 3, 1942, May 19, 1942).

²Ibid. (December 13, 1941; December 14, 1941; December 15, 1941; December 16, 1941).

³Ibid. (December 17, 1941).

⁴Letter, U. S. Representative Mon C. Wallgren to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 6, 1942, National Archives, Record Group 407, Records of the Adjutant General, file 353.8.

⁵Letter, General Leland Ford to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, March 31, 1942, AG Records, file 353.8.

⁶New York Times (March 25, 1942).

⁷Ibid. (January 22, 1942).

⁸Ibid. (March 8, 1942).

⁹Newsletter of the Central Office for Intercollegiate Athletics, January 19, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Central Office for Intercollegiate Athletics folder.

¹⁰New York Times (April 15, 1942).

¹¹Telegram, Asa Busnell, Eastern Association for Intercollegiate Athletics, to Roosevelt, December 9, 1941, FDR Papers, file 109.

¹²Chicago Tribune (April 3, 1942).

¹³Christy Walsh (ed.), College Football and All-America Review (Culver City, California, 1949), pp. 33-937; Harold Claasen (ed.), Ronald Encyclopedia of Football (New York, 1961), pp. 37-655; NCAA Proceedings (1941), pp. 123-130, 132-133.

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¹⁵Ibid. (March 24, 1942; April 2, 1942).

¹⁶Chicago Tribune (April 3, 1942).

¹⁷NCAA Proceedings (1942), p. 32.

- 18 Letter, Clark Griffith, owner of the Washington Senators, to Roosevelt, April 14, 1941, FDR Papers, file 1413.
- 19 New York Times (December 31, 1941).
- 20 Letter, K. M. Landis, Commissioner of Baseball, to Roosevelt, January 14, 1942, FDR Papers, file 227.
- 21 Samuel Roseman (ed.), The Letters Papers and Speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1950), Vol. XI, p. 62.
- 22 Telegram, K. M. Landis to Roosevelt, no date, FDR Papers, file 227.
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- 25 New York Times (February 18, 1942).
- 26 Memorandum, Early to Archibald MacLeish, Director, Office of Facts and Figures, January 17, 1942, FDR Papers, file 189.
- 27 Memorandum, Early to Office of Facts and Figures, January 30, 1942, FDR Papers, file 262; Draft of Presidential policy statement, March 4, 1942, FDR Papers, file 189.
- 28 New York Times (February 7, 1942).
- 29 Letter, Jeremiah T. Mahoney, U. S. Sports Federation, to Roosevelt, March 13, 1942, FDR Papers, file 4868.
- 30 Letter, Roosevelt to Mahoney, March 29, 1942, FDR Papers, file 4868.
- 31 New York Times (April 19, 1942).
- 32 Ibid. (March 25, 1942; March 26, 1942).
- 33 Ibid. (April 9, 1942; April 10, 1942); The Amateur Athlete, XIII (April, 1942), p. 8.
- 34 New York Times (May 6, 1942; June 28, 1942).
- 35 Ibid. (June 20, 1942; June 21, 1942; June 14, 1942).
- 36 The Amateur Athlete, XIV (April, 1943), p. 4; XV (May, 1944), p. 8; XVI (May, 1945), p. 7.
- 37 Local board memorandum no. 123, April 21, 1943; local board memorandum no. 163, November 16, 1943; local board release no. 83,

January 12, 1942; local board release no. 144, August 20, 1942; Local Board Memoranda (Washington, 1945).

³⁸ Tulsa Daily World (April 28, 1942).

³⁹ New York Times (December 17, 1942).

⁴⁰ Ibid. (April 28, 1942).

⁴¹ Ibid. (June 15, 1942).

⁴² Chicago Tribune (August 29, 1942; August 30, 1942).

⁴³ New York Times (July 7, 1942; August 25, 1942; March 28, 1943).

⁴⁴ Ibid. (May 21, 1942; May 30, 1942; August 3, 1942; August 4, 1942; August 5, 1942).

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⁴⁶ Robert Objoski, Bush League: A History of Minor League Baseball (New York, 1975), pp. 21-23.

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⁴⁸ Ibid. (December 16, 1942; December 26, 1943).

⁴⁹ Ibid. (December 31, 1943).

⁵⁰ Letter, Herbert Bayard Swope, War Department Public Relations Assistant, to Grace Tully, Secretary to President Roosevelt, March 17, 1944, FDR Papers, file 331.

⁵¹ New York Times (September 26, 1942).

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⁵⁴ Memorandum, Marshall to Stimson, November 5, 1941, Marshall Papers, Secretary of War Folder.

⁵⁵ Letter, James E. Boyack, Patrons of the Negro, to Gene Tunney, Director of Navy Athletics and Physical Training, November 24, 1941, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney file.

⁵⁶ Pittsburgh Courier (November 22, 1941), as quoted in Bureau of Navigation Public Relations Sheet, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.

- ⁵⁷ BuNav letter 1471-REB, Chester W. Nimitz, Chief, BuNav, to Tunney, November 29, 1941; Letter, Tunney to Nimitz, December 1, 1941, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ⁵⁸ Letter, Boyack to Tunney, November 24, 1941, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File. In a letter to Grolier Encyclopedia, Tunney later accused Louis of having disobeyed orders to report to induction in Michigan, arranging to escape punishment by reporting in New York; Letter, Tunney to S. Edgar Farquhar, Grolier International April 29, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence Tunney File.
- ⁵⁹ Draft of BuNav letter for Tunney, dated December 9, 1941, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File.
- ⁶⁰ New York Times (January 10, 1942; January 13, 1942); Baer contributed one-sixth of his purse.
- ⁶¹ Ibid. (January 13, 1942).
- ⁶² Letter, William Castin, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, to Irving Phillipson, Chairman, Army Emergency Relief, February 16, 1942, Special Services Organization Records, file 353.8.
- ⁶³ New York Times (March 28, 1942; March 29, 1942).
- ⁶⁴ Ibid. (March 8, 1942; June 19, 1942; June 20, 1942).
- ⁶⁵ Memorandum, Phillipson to Marshall, September 23, 1942, National Archives, RG165, Chief of Staff file 353.81.
- ⁶⁶ New York Times (September 10, 1942; September 19, 1942).
- ⁶⁷ Memorandum, Marshall to Alexander Surles, Public Relations Director, Army Emergency Relief, September 23, 1942, Chief of Staff, file 353.81; New York Times (September 27, 1942).
- ⁶⁸ New York Times (October 13, 1942).
- ⁶⁹ Letter, Joseph E. Davies, Chairman War Relief Control Board, to Stimson, February 24, 1943; letter, Stimson to Davies, March 1, 1943, Chief of Staff File 353.81.
- ⁷⁰ New York Times (March 28, 1942).
- ⁷¹ Memorandum, War Department Deputy Chief of Staff to Marshall, June 15, 1942, Chief of Staff File 353.86.
- ⁷² New York Times (July 16, 1942).
- ⁷³ Ibid. (August 6, 1942).
- ⁷⁴ Memorandum, War Department Deputy Chief of Staff to Marshall, July 30, 1942, Chief of Staff File 353.86.

- ⁷⁵Memorandum and enclosures, Assistant Air Chief of Staff to Chief of Staff, August 9, 1942, Chief of Staff File 353.81.
- ⁷⁶Memorandum, War Department General Staff to Air Chief of Staff, August 12, 1942, Chief of Staff File 353.8.
- ⁷⁷New York Times (September 12, 1942; September 6, 1942; August 3, 1942; August 31, 1942).
- ⁷⁸Ibid. (August 2, 1942).
- ⁷⁹Ibid. (September 10, 1942).
- ⁸⁰Ibid. (September 14, 1942; September 20, 1942; September 21, 1942).
- ⁸¹Ibid. (November 8, 1942).
- ⁸²Memorandum, War Department General Staff to Air Chief of Staff, August 12, 1942, Chief of Staff File 353.81.
- ⁸³New York Times (August 21, 1942).
- ⁸⁴Local Board Memorandum no. 172, Local Board Memoranda.
- ⁸⁵NCAA Proceedings (1942), p. 66.
- ⁸⁶National Football League, NFL Record and Rules Manual 1945 (Chicago, 1945), pp. 2-8.
- ⁸⁷See especially New York Times (January 23, 1942).
- ⁸⁸New York Times (February 14, 1942; February 15, 1942).
- ⁸⁹Ibid. (February 11, 1942).
- ⁹⁰T. H. Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II," p. 5.
- ⁹¹BuNav letter 1473-RBM, from Chief of BuNav to various training commands, March 28, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ⁹²Tunney to Reynolds, November 12, 1941, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File.
- ⁹³New York Times (December 11, 1941).
- ⁹⁴Ibid. (April 4, 1942).
- ⁹⁵Ibid. (April 27, 1942).
- ⁹⁶Memorandum and annotation, Director Naval Training to Director of Enlisted Personnel, April 27, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.

- ⁹⁷ Memorandum, Director of Training to Assistant Chief of BuPers, April 29, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ⁹⁸ Memorandum, John Downes, Commandant Great Lakes NTS, to Chief of BuNav, May 1, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ⁹⁹ BuNav Memorandum 6-MFC, Chief of BuNav to Director of Training, May 13, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹⁰⁰ Chicago Tribune (June 16, 1942).
- ¹⁰¹ BuPers letter 140-REB, P8-2(E)(69), Chief of BuPers to Shore Stations, May 30, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Directive folder.
- ¹⁰² Chicago Tribune (June 15, 1942).
- ¹⁰³ BuPers Memorandum 63-OWC, A. M. Bledsoe, Captain, BuPers, to C. F. Russell, Captain, BuPers, June 13, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹⁰⁴ BuPers letter 140-REB, from Chief of BuPers to All Major and Minor Short Stations, June 11, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹⁰⁵ Telephone memorandum, K. M. Landis to Secretary of the Navy, June 10, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹⁰⁶ Undated BuPers letter draft 140-REB, Chief of BuPers to Commandant Ninth Naval District, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹⁰⁷ BuPers Memorandum, 140-REB, Director of Training to Chief of BuPers, July 27, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹⁰⁸ Official U. S. Navy Press Release, August 7, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹⁰⁹ BuPers letter 1472-DR, Chief of BuPers to various commands, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Directives folder.
- ¹¹⁰ New York Times (August 20, 1942).
- ¹¹¹ Ibid. (August 25, 1942).
- ¹¹² Ibid. (August 22, 1942).
- ¹¹³ "Reasons why use of Army and Navy men who are athletes should not be permitted to interrupt [sic] their training...", draft proposal dated September, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ¹¹⁴ Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, p. 285.
- ¹¹⁵ BuAero letter TR-6-FLS, from Head of Physical Training Section to Director of Training, June 29, 1942, Hamilton files.

- 116 Tunney, Arms for Living, p. 72.
- 117 Postscript on discipline attached to AlNav 100, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File, Physical Training Program folder.
- 118 Address of Gene Tunney to the Catholic Men's Luncheon Club of Birmingham, Alabama, February 17, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File.
- 119 "Address of George Stienhaus," The Amateur Athlete, XIV (March, 1943), p. 24.
- 120 Hamilton Correspondence, May 4, 1974.
- 121 Restricted BuNav letter 1476-PD, PIO(17), from Chief of BuNav to Various Commands, January 6, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- 122 BuNav Memorandum 147-R1, John Reynolds, Chief, Enlisted Personnel Div., BuNav, to Chief of BuNav, February 26, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- 123 BuNav Memorandum 147-R1, from Director of Training to Chief of BuNav, February 17, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- 124 BuNav Memorandum 147-R1, February 26, 1942.
- 125 BuNav letter 1474-RHS, Training to Arthur Radford, Director of Aviation Training, February 3, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File, BuAero folder.
- 126 New York Times (September 29, 1942).
- 127 Letter, John W. Bunn, Stanford University, to Frank Knox, March 24, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, BuAero folder.
- 128 Navy Bureau of Medicine letter P2-5(103), from Chief of BuMed to Chief of BuNav, March 14, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- 129 Henry H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, This Flying Game (New York, 1936), pp. 108-109. Donald J. Mrozek summarized the General's opinions by noting: "It was not type, a function of ideal preconceptions, but capacity to perform, a function of practical utilitarian training that concerned them." Mrozek, pp. 6-7.
- 130 Correspondence, Thomas Hamilton to author, May 7, 1974.
- 131 Tunney address of February 17, 1942.
- 132 Tunney, Arms for Living, p. 15.
- 133 BuAero letter Tr-6-NJD, Tom Hamilton, Director of BuAero Physical

- Training, to John Bunn, April 2, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence; Command File, BuAero folder.
- 134 Telegram, Jesse F. Williams to SecNav, April 3, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, BuAero folder.
- 135 Letter, Williams to SecNav, April 3, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, BuAero folder. Williams' frequent references to Tunney's posture training theories of "creating a new hinge in the back" were a source of embarrassment to Tunney.
- 136 Letter, C. H. McCloy to Jay B. Nash, President of the AAHPER, May 8, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, BuAero folder.
- 137 Daily Oklahoman (June 2, 1942).
- 138 Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, pp. 284-285.
- 139 BuPers letter 140-REB, NM(A) P16-1(38), Chief of BuPers to Commanding Officers of All Naval Training Stations, June 29, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Directives folder.
- 140 Hamilton Correspondence, May 4, 1974.
- 141 BuAero letter TR-6-FLS, from Head of Physical Training Section to Director of Aviation Training, June 29, 1942, Hamilton files.
- 142 Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, p. 284.
- 143 BuPers letter 140-REB, July 24, 1942, Director of Training to C. W. Magruder, Commandant NTS Newport, R.I., Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- 144 BuAero letter TR-6-FLS, June 29, 1942.
- 145 BuPers letter 1472-DR, Chief of BuPers to All Naval Districts and Commands, August 15, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Directives folder. This was modified on October 6, 1942, to clarify varsity athletics as coming under Welfare and Recreation. BuPers letter 2231-R1, October 6, 1942, Chief of BuPers to various commands, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- 146 BuPers Memorandum 140-REB, Tunney to Director of Training, August 14, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File.
- 147 BuPers letter 140-REB, Tunney to Elwood Craig Davis, University of Pittsburgh, June 21, 1942, Physical Training Correspondence, Tunney File.
- 148 BuPers Memorandum 1402-EMR, Davis to Tunney, August 22, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Box 28, Entry 445.

- 149 Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, p. 289.
- 150 Minutes of the Civilian Advisory Council for Navy Physical Training, September 15, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File, Civilian Advisory Council folder.
- 151 In this case, it would have caused a one month delay in training since preflight transfers occurred early in December.
- 152 Letter, Fowler Harper to Stimson, June 26, 1942, JANC Records, Letter to College Presidents folder.
- 153 Badger to Keppel, August 12, 1942, JANC Records, Letter to College Presidents folder.
- 154 Letter, Stimson to Harper, July 9, 1942, JANC Records, Letter to College Presidents folder.
- 155 Letter, John Griffith to Harper, July 10, 1942, JANC Records, Letter to College Presidents folder.
- 156 Proposed letter to College and University Presidents, dated August 7, 1942, JANC Records, Letter to College Presidents folder.
- 157 Letter, Samuel Crocker to Keppel, August 14, 1942, JANC Records, Badger folder.
- 158 Wesley Brown, "What Bone-Breaking Wrestling Holds Should Be Included in Physical Fitness Program for Prospective Draftees," NCAA 1942-43 Wrestling Guide, p. 4.
- 159 Letter, Assistant Secretary of the Navy to Harper, August 31, 1942, JANC Records, Letter to College Presidents folder.
- 160 Telephone memorandum, Keppel to Crocker, September 21, 1942, JANC Records, Letter to College Presidents folder.
- 161 Telephone interview with Rear Admiral (Ret.) Thomas J. Hamilton, June 15, 1975.
- 162 T. H. Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II," Appendices C-1, H-1.
- 163 BuPers letter 140 REB, P11-1(2588) Chief of BuPers to All Naval Districts, September 23, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Directives folder.
- 164 Minutes of the Civilian Advisory Council, September 15, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Civilian Advisory Council folder.
- 165 Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II," Appendix C-2.

166. Navy Department, Physical Fitness Training Manual for the U. S. Navy (Washington, 1943), pp. 1-2.
167. BuNav memorandum O-MM, L. E. Denfeld, Assistant Bureau Chief to All Divisions, January 17, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney File.
168. BuPers letter 617-JAM, Randall Jacobs to Alva B. Johnson, faculty member, Storer College, July 6, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence.
169. Letter, U. S. Rep. Arthur W. Mitchell to Frank Knox, July 22, 1942, FDR Papers, file 481.
170. Letter, Mitchell to Roosevelt, July 22, 1942.
171. Memorandum, Roosevelt to Secretary of Navy, July 27, 1942; letter, Knox to Roosevelt, August 1, 1942, FDR Papers, file 481.
172. Letter, Roosevelt to Mitchell, August 4, 1942, FDR Papers, file 481.
173. Letter, Officer in Charge, Physical Instructors School to T. N. Metcalf, Ninth Naval District Hq., February 29, 1944, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
174. Civilian Advisory Council Minutes, September 15, 1942, Hamilton, "The Navy and Physical Fitness in World War II," Appendix D-1.
175. BuPers letter 444-jh, Asst. BuPers Chief to various commands, March 30, 1944, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
176. BuPers to All Continental Shore Stations, October 2, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Directives folder; "History of the Physical Training Section, Field Administrative Division, Training," Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File; "The Physical Training Program of the W.A.V.E.S.," JOHPER, XIII (November, 1943), p. 472.
177. BuPers letter draft 22-R1, PIO-1(A), Director of Training to Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File; BuPers letter 1012-PL, PIO-1(A), Chief of BuPers to Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, July 16, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Directives folder; BuPers letter PIO-1(C), from SecNav to various commands, July 29, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Physical Training Directives folder.
178. BuPers letter 2231-ED, Arthur T. Noren, Lt. Cmdr., Bureau of Personnel, to H. A. Badt, Commandant, NTS Sampson, N.Y., December 19, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.

179 BuPers letter 244-BA, E. L. Canaga, Director of Training Division, BuPers, to C. C. Haughman, Captain, Bureau of Aeronautics, December 14, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, BuAero Letters File.

180 Letter, Max Farrington, Assistant Director of Navy Physical Training, to Frank Wickhorst, Director of Physical Training, Bureau of Aeronautics, December 14, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Farrington File.

CHAPTER IV

THE NAVY SAVES COLLEGIATE SPORT

THE 1943 DEBATE OVER

COLLEGE ATHLETICS

As American college athletics entered the war years, there existed a simple faith in American institutions to overcome the threat of foreign peril or alien ideologies. The nation's colleges and universities accelerated their academic schedules in order to speed technically trained graduates into service and industry. The best characteristics of voluntary effort were ascribed to the sporting community, which was expected to turn competitive skills from the playing field to the battleground. Writing in the Journal of the American Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation, athletic director George Venker of Iowa State College saw the opportunity to impart these prospective soldiers the "qualities which may tend to bring them back to us," which included the standard catch-phrases of "initiative, quick thinking, courage of the highest order, calmness and coolness in a crisis, and loyalty...."¹

Hard contact sports were glorified as the zenith in forcing a psychological orientation toward the denial of physical comforts. Lou Little, the Head Football Coach at Columbia University, established the format for a war rationale for which he expounded an emphasis on contact games because they bolstered the ability to take "physical punishment."²

He urged that a combative character be associated with football, which would have to be played "hard and intensively with even more savage will to win" than in peacetime. The analogy of football as a "combat game" did not escape its supporters, and its usefulness in teaching "the determination not to lose no matter how tough the going" as well as the knowledge of enemy strategy and tactics were commonly attributed to it.³

Coaches were urged to make their programs as physically demanding as possible, and the closer a sport could be shown to the martial skills, the more beneficial it was considered. This hardening psychology also was revealed in the image of the Spartan mother whose example of conditioning would instill in her children the desire for competition. Amateur Athletic Union official Fred L. Steers observed in a treatise entitled "The Hand that Rocks the Cradle":

Women's athletics should be encouraged and extended, not only for the physical, moral and mental advantages to be gained...but also to the mothers...from the time of the dawn of reasoning of their offspring, to instruct and encourage them in the technique and spirit of competitive sports, to the end that in their dealings with their fellows, they may be aggressive in the promotion of their ideals, tempered always with consideration, graciousness in defeat, and humbleness in victory. Then we will always be physically fit to meet aggressors, and morally equipped to carry out our American traditions.⁴

In the fall of 1943 the NCAA Wrestling Guide published an article from a preflight coach teaching "what bone breaking wrestling holds should be included in physical fitness programs for prospective draftees,"⁵ and at the University of Nebraska, fundamentals of hand to hand combat were included in the regular wrestling program to such a degree that its coach recognized a "disturbing factor" which would require that men "reject many uncouth habits if they are to get back into the spirit

of amateur wrestling."⁶ This emphasis of a warrior's code became so common that cries to cease the teaching of materials that had "values for war only" were heard. Even so steadfast a supporter of the sport training concept as Major John Griffith cautioned against letting a war psychology cause rules and sportsmanship to be "shoved aside for the duration."⁷

Another principle popularly estimated as inherent in athletic conditioning was the characteristic of "teamwork." This was a reference in terms of loyalty to the group, willingness to accept responsibilities, and the sublimating of self within a broadly conceived plan.

This was the foundation on which the preflight concept was based, and the building of such strong group ties and emotional support was emphasized as the undercurrent for civilian physical training as well.⁸

D. O. (Tuss) McLaughry, a Marine Corps major, insisted that some troops felt a "competitive urge" following the initial uneasiness of combat, similar to waiting on the "opening whistle of a football game."⁹ Marine Colonel Emery E. (Swede) Larson described the assault on a Pacific atoll as the coordination of signals between the Fleet Admiral, the "Quarterback," and the members of his Marine team. To Larson, the message "signals on" was a "beautiful" illustration of teamwork for troops to "hit that beach right on the ticket." He declared, "...All movements show that teamwork is essential--teamwork with the ability to think, with ability to do, with ability to understand what is coming, and with ability to hold up or to go ahead as the situation demands." In this respect the former Naval Academy coach was grateful for boys "who were ready to play when the ball game started..., who had been in the hands of the coaches...boys who knew something about teamwork...."¹⁰

Grantland Rice stirred this emotion of cooperation with the rallying call:

'Come on, Team! -'
 Here were the words they knew, and understood,
 The final answer to a captain's dream,
 Suiting the moment and the fighting mood,

 A call far-echoed from remembered ways
 That had no part of foxhole, tank or ship.

 When it was one for all, and all for one,
 Lifting them high above all doubts and fears
 Until the game was over and the fight was won.¹¹

Henry Steele Commager saw this spirit of athletic leaders stirred to war as the finest example of ethics, which was "almost an Anglo-American invention." Commager insisted that sports competition was rehearsal for defending the principles upon which the American civilization was built. These principles included sympathy for the underdog, refusal to quit when behind, playing by the rules, and punishing violators.¹² To John Griffith these virtues traditionally set the United States apart from "Socialist" thought which lacked the content needed to protect freedoms when they were threatened.¹³ Those that opposed athletic games were the same levelers whom Griffith equated with socialism and pacifism, which was the "philosophy of the people who felt that combat games should be abandoned."¹⁴

Fred Steers expressed suspicion of "so called liberals which have infiltrated many of our public institutions," and who wished to bring about a condition of equality "as a principle of communism" through the "suppression of athletics." Calling for "this crowd to be driven from the place they infest," Steers asked that "we take stock of competitive sport for what it is" and "use our equipment and manpower to make youth strong and conscious that the will to win brings the reward of

accomplishment...."¹⁵ Representative LaVern Dilweg, a former Marquette University football star and a member of Congress from Wisconsin, declared it was "patriotic to play." In a warmly received speech on the House floor, Dilweg praised sport for giving "our American boys plus values that make them the best soldiers and sailors in the world." Calling football "warfare on a friendly scale," the Congressman credited combative and team sports with developing an appreciation of the components of strategy, which included teamwork, initiative, discipline and perseverance. A success oriented ethic, desirable in American society, was stressed by which youngsters learned leadership, the following of orders and the inspiration to individual excellence.¹⁶

Egalitarianism subject to authority, freedom with discipline, equality without leveling--all were attributes attached to the need to emphasize sport within the great crusade against authoritarianism. To Robert McCormick these attributes of athletics made the American soldier "superior to the fighting men of other countries." This publisher of the Chicago Tribune assumed that "the player of games has learned the necessity of discipline--that some one must direct the games and the others must obey," yet he insisted that "here no sense of inferiority exists."¹⁷ Within this context sport alone was regarded as crucial in the creedal struggle of gaining the peace. The benefits of sport, according to Grantland Rice, were important enough to serve as a motive for "enforced athletic training, nation wide from the ages of twelve, sixteen, or eighteen," which would include a "rough body contact sport...before fifteen or sixteen."¹⁸

Thus colleges were encouraged to continue athletics for the pre-induction benefits such activities afforded. This was one of the themes

at the National Institute on War and Education, which opened in Washington on August 28, 1942, shortly after the beginning of the accelerated fall semester. Dean Joseph W. Barker of Columbia University, Special Educational Assistant in the Navy Department, urged the five hundred secondary and higher education representatives to provide "preconditioning" in physical fitness for "especially those students who must anticipate going to the armed services."¹⁹ This offered a chance for athletics to prove its worth in higher education. One coach at a state institution, Dewey (Snorter) Luster of the University of Oklahoma, planned to organize a special one hundred man "Junior Varsity" football squad composed of students who ordinarily would not have played "to ready additional fighting men for war."²⁰

So popular was the belief that athletics had something mystical in defining the American purpose that few serious debates were fostered over it. Yet with the increasing exigencies of war leading to government controls over the individual, a dialectic occurred during the winter of 1942-1943 which was important in the approach of colleges in continuing athletics. This was the struggle between the advocates of institutional team athletics and those supporters of mass games, calisthenics, intramurals, and the like, which appealed, supposedly, to people who desired to place controls on team games because of the abuses they represented. An October, 1942, report of college administrators, urging intramurals instead of athletics, the Victory Corps and college fitness programs of the Office of Education, which emphasized intramurals over interschool contests, the ongoing debate in the Navy over athletics, and the failure of the Army to utilize athletics in training, made this an emotional issue. A defender of the capitalist order in

America, John Griffith, feared the impact of new deal social experimentation in physical training, noting: "Just as certain bureaucrats are using the war as a pretext for promoting social and economic changes in our national life which they plan to make permanent, so are advocates of mass athletics attempting to destroy interscholastic and intercollegiate sport, one of the few things we have left of the old order in America."²¹

The conflict between aviation training and regular Navy physical training became central to the issue. Sportswriters, who were chauvinistic advocates of the Preflight program, were quick in the criticism of Gene Tunney, whom they considered one of the major spokesmen in opposing organized athletics in wartime, often at the expense of completely misinterpreting his views. Coaches, convinced that team play was necessary for the ideal balance between strength and motivation in physical conditioning, scoffed at the commander, whom they felt believed only in calisthenics. "Sports versus calisthenics" indeed became the paramount issue in determining the necessity for continuing normal sporting activities. One football coach, Bob Zuppke, of the University of Illinois, explicated the paradigm simply by saying, "I bet football players, who don't know how to twist their bodies and count one, two, three, four, still would wipe out a lot of Japs."²²

In September of 1942 Griffith accused Tunney of raising the calisthenic-athletics question. On the one hand, according to Major Griffith, stood team play, with its "social qualities," which included "courage, reliability, special adaptability, intelligent thinking under stress," "individualism" and "freedom." On the other side stood mass calisthenics, which included "muscle flexers" and "dumbbell swingers,"

who believed in the "soft life of regimentation," "collectivism," or worse.²³ Tom Hamilton, the doctrinaire planner of sport in training, spoke in terms of "incentive to excel," which he was sure could not come from "calisthenics or jogging."²⁴ Tunney's methods were widely and popularly used for the training of large numbers of troops in all branches of service, but there was wide misinterpretation and interchanging of the terms used to describe mass physical drill. Tunney was accused of emphasizing "setting up exercises," a type of manual of arms in calisthenics popularized in Scandinavia and associated with regimentation.²⁵ Griffith warned the NCAA Executive Committee in December of 1942 that high-placed people in the military and the government were trying to promote methods of the German Turnverein, a cultural mechanism largely associated with mass gymnastics, thus opening a political suspicion associated with World War I type hysteria.²⁶ "Would it not be the irony of fate," he queried in his Athletic Journal, "if Germany gave up her regimented calisthenics as a basic program and substituted sports...and we made our sports secondary and voluntary...?"²⁷

In December, 1942, a private query proposed that Griffith and Tunney debate the sports issue in print. Tunney replied with the accusation that Griffith "is confusing varsity football with the term competitive sports." Denying any feeling for stopping college sport, Tunney insisted instead that he was opposed to the holding over of "athletes in uniform...at training stations to be part of a glamour football team, while the poorer conditioned youngsters are sent to the front."²⁸ For Tunney such activity was representative of privilege and elitism. With the United States at war, he felt that the purpose of physical training was to prepare men as quickly as possible under the

same general conditions. Born the son of poor Irish immigrants, the commander sympathized with the nameless mass whose menial talents, although intensely valuable in their own right, were not well recognized. In two lengthy letters to Griffith he defended and broadened this stand. Charging that the use of spectator sports in training was a ruse to "give exercise to the few and neglect the many," Tunney charged that the entire spectator sports establishment was designed to aid people in pursuing their civilian occupations in the guise of military service.²⁹ The athletic training concept was considered deviationist in principle, and those officers engaging in athletics were considered to be using that philosophy as an "excuse" to unnecessarily delay their training. Tunney observed in a letter to Griffith:

It would assist our country immeasurably if a great sports authority like you were to encourage athletic idols to get out and face death for their homeland. We have too many sports promoters desirous of carrying on box-office sports-as-usual--too many sports writers who wish to fight off any encroachment on their domain, too many headline coaches unwilling to submerge themselves in the anonymity of actual combat.³⁰

Tunney also took issue with the argument of the psychological conditioning afforded by rugged type sports. In a letter to Dr. McCloy, he defended his "warrior psychology" around this principle, "all the Hamiltons and semimorons in the world, whether they be sports writers or amateur psychologists" to the contrary.³¹ "Sports writers and football coaches refuse to be logical," he wrote Boy Scout executive, E. B. DeGroot:

Training an Army of 7,500,000 and a Navy of 2,500,000 for ten hours a day, six teams scrimmaging simultaneously for one hour on an indestructible gridiron would require the armed services to erect 15,150 gridirons for football.³²

Tunney was called to account on the merits of his beliefs by no less a figure than Captain Arthur Radford, the Bureau of Aeronautics Chief. Commander Tunney had made a speech to the Touchdown Club of New York City on December 16, 1942, in which he explicated at length on his "war psychology." Reports in the press, which he attributed to a drunken "pie eyed" reporter, had endowed his speech as an attack against the aviation training program, which Tunney was compelled to deny in a letter to Radford.³³

Caught in the "cross-fire" of debate on the athletics-calesthenics issue, the physical training director was an easy target for sports writers because of the eloquence of beliefs, his image of fitness, and his reluctance to defend himself publically because of Navy ties. To Tunney then, the sports writer, a greedy, manipulative, alcoholic liar, became the image of wasteful athleticism, detrimental to the war effort. He saw the writer as part of a broad conspiracy of corporate greed, feeding off the tragedy of war. In this "Sports Trust," he included "sports writers, coaches, athletic goods manufacturers, radio sports-casters and newspapers,"³⁴ but representative of this group was always the sports writer, "these hateful parasitic scribes" who "never had much logic and...cannot understand the exigencies of war."³⁵ Isolated in his belief by "press agent coaches," the sagacious Tunney accused the hated writers of supporting unsound philosophies and provoking "false issues" because "material to write about is slipping from them." Defining himself a "war symbol" who was "born a warrior," the pugnacious Horatio felt he represented "the monstrosity that it is taking from them their living."³⁶

Notwithstanding Commander Tunney's prosaic defense of stoic self-

discipline, the opinion was well formed by January, 1943, that a conspiracy to eliminate college athletics was joined, the correspondents being the Army and Navy advocates of mass physical training, the United Office of Education, and after the October, 1942, Philadelphia meeting, college presidents. The leading advisors to the Education branch through the Office of Civilian Defense were the same men who either advised or served highly in the Navy Physical Training Section, most notably Charles McCloy, George Stienhaus, N. P. Neilson, Nelson Metcalf, and Tunney, who attended numerous conferences on fitness. Most of these men were affiliated with the physical education arm of the National Education Association (the AAHPER). The other element of physical education leader, athletic coaches, largely identified themselves with the National Collegiate Athletic Association or the various state high school coaching groups.

To Gilbert Obertauffer of Ohio State University, the Victory Corps and college advisory manuals for fitness were suspect from the start. Accusing the Office of Education of promoting "unusable" guidelines, the professor viewed the Victory Corps plan with disgust because it recommended a compulsory hour of organized mass drill and only a voluntary period of organized athletics. "The damage done," cried Obertauffer, "to school and college programs by the free and compulsory use of calisthenics and phony 'conditioning' exercises will take years to repair."³⁷ Outraged at the circulars and guidelines for fitness, he called them "sterile and stupid," an attempt to "imitate the axis."³⁸ Spokesman, however, abounded for the mass discipline as well. Edwin Henderson, lone Negro member of the JANC subcommittee on athletics, was not fearful of voicing admiration for the training techniques of an

authoritarian nature. Complimenting Tunney, who "has encourage [sic] participation of thousands who previously had received their hardening exercises vicariously," Henderson also voiced admiration for Soviet Russia's model of training wherein "physical training indulged in on a family basis" helped explain that abused nation's ability to resist German aggression.³⁹ E. B. DeGroot concluded that "price tagged...heroic public entertainment," such as football, had "glaring limitations" as a conditioner for masses. Although missing the point of group discipline so highly emphasized in the preflight schools, DeGroot was skeptical of the benefit of football for developing "abandon and intrepidity," which he feared would lead to a "false belief" for the athletically trained soldier "that all they need to win out in this war is participation in football and gun in hand." Warning Americans of Kipling's lament in World War I over the "flannel fools at the wicket" while a generation of English youth died, DeGroot forewarned of "Pigskin Chasers at the Trough."⁴⁰

Professional educators were interested in the rapid development of strength. Since the colleges were asked, at a time of reduced enrollments and funds, to train all men for potential service, they asked which was most efficient: varsity sports or mass physical drill and intramural games? Many of those who desired the varsity sport concept urged one hundred percent participation. The question hinged on the development of muscular efficiency. "What is the least common denominator of physical condition?" posed Charles McCloy. Was it

Strength? Muscular endurance? Cardio-respiratory endurance? Agility? Speed? Flexibility?...This war has caught the American people far off base...the responsibility for this rests with those...who have been solely concerned with...training everyone for skills in sports ...while finding no place in the program for physical training.⁴¹

It is a "straw man," responded Obertauffer to the McCloy statement, "to imply a separation between the athletic group and the physical educators." Accusing Dr. McCloy of "scoffing at 'social development,' 'character,' 'psychological values'--," Obertauffer protested his concern for "the educational values in education," and equated sports with "the development of the extroverted objective type of mind," which would "save" young people "from calisthenics and gymnastics aimed only at their muscles."⁴² Jesse Feiring Williams, Tunney's old nemesis, concluded that such "division in the ranks" was a false issue and blamed such deviant thinking on Tunney, "who began his 'leadership' in physical education by announcing that he had invested 'a new principle of corrective suction' by means of which he could 'create a new hinge in the back'," and the Office of Civilian Defense, which "lead us into a most unfriendly mess."⁴³ The athletics-calisthenics debate prompted research by Dr. Ernest Wilbur of the City College of New York, who discovered in findings published in October, 1943, that sports methods of training were superior for developing strength indices of fitness in four of the seven indices of measurement and were found to be equal in the other three.⁴⁴

Neither physical education nor athletic advocates could be accused of mindless insensitivity to social needs. The editor of Scholastic Coach concluded that the men who framed the Victory Corps program were "the most sports conscious educators in the nation." Despite criticism, he noted:

The V. C. embraces the broadest, most intensified physical fitness program in the history of education. Sports, gymnastics, rough and tumble activities, calisthenics, and other basic conditioners all have their place in this program.⁴⁵

Educators welcomed the chance to reach a compromise between the theoretical poles of fitness and the convening of the War Fitness Conference of April 16, 1943, partially healed the rift between the two groups. The Army's Theodore (Ted) Bank struck a moderating note between the two schools of thought. Bank accused the public schools and colleges of doing too little in promoting "rugged" programs of training of all types in both sports and mass curriculum outlines. Perceiving that dogmatic fears of various training methods had attracted educators away from the real job of preparing young people for military service, he stated, "There is no desire or tendency on the part of organized physical education to abandon emphasis on 'competitive games, sports, and combat activities.'" Colonel Bank insisted that if anything, both "instructional" and "after-school" physical training was at the "point of universality."⁴⁶

By the fall of 1943, contention had subsided. The Victory Corps program failed to receive funding to have more than a mere advisory role in developing school programs, thus removing suspicion that the government would regiment play activity out of youth programs. The Armed Services had also grown so large that compulsory game activities for troops in training was patently unfeasible, and civilians went back to worrying over how best to administer their own programs in the presence of wartime exigencies. Charles McCloy loyally defended Tunney as a long suffering, innovating administrator who had been maligned far too much in respect to the training job which he was achieving. "Commander Tunney has been...misinterpreted by newspaper writers as badly as any physical educator of our time," McCloy wrote. Tunney was credited with establishing shipboard training programs, inaugurating the first

physical training school, instituting a testing program, and recruiting thousands of specialists. McCloy could not think of any difference in values of the type of mass physical training used in the Navy and "the preparation for a sport like football," which consisted of "monotonous over and over rehearsal of details." The only difference was that one type of preparation was identified as "educational" and the other was not.⁴⁷

Despite the draft, little impact was made on college athletic rosters until the fall of 1943. The 1941 season went smoothly, and the 1942 schedule was carried out under near normal conditions except for a drastic reduction in attendance due to the lack of replacement rubber for tires. Until November, men under the age of twenty years were not liable for conscription. This protected most freshman and sophomore students and some juniors from induction. Military policy, especially that of the Navy, encouraged enlistment into Reserve training programs for college students in order to guarantee a supply of trained technicians and officers for induction. These enlisted reservists were not called to service until early 1943 while certain officer candidates were allowed to complete spring semesters as well. Civilian athletes were not swept off the campuses until the summer of 1943. This left only seventeen-year-old and a very few eighteen-year-old students, plus a scattering of deferred medical and engineering trainees or "4-F" registrants.⁴⁸

The Navy V-1 and V-7 training programs were particularly influential in keeping young men in college long enough to guarantee the relative stability of the sport for 1942. The Navy Department supplemented its regular Reserve Officer's Training Corps with the V-1 program,

inaugurated in June of 1940. The V-1 permitted the student to finish a prescribed group of studies providing he enlisted in the organized Reserve. Induction was postponed until after graduation. After the United States entered the war, the V-1 Reserve program was modified by the "V-7" system. Colleges and universities approved by the Navy Department were allowed to train seventeen-to twenty-year-old applicants through their sophomore year for subsequent induction into the Reserve program. Examinations for placement into the V-7 or the V-5 (aviation cadet) course of study were approved, which allowed the student to complete requirements for graduation before induction. The Marine Corps followed similar guidelines. Both the Army and Air Corps were authorized to accept limited number of enlisted reservists for deferred duty under direction by the War Department. The Navy plans were popular because of the guarantee that upperclassmen would have an opportunity to finish studies at their schools of matriculation. Underclassmen making satisfactory progress were promised continued training either with their current college of enrollment or transfer to other campuses designated by the Navy Department.⁴⁹

Rosters of the 1942 football season were influenced by these various enlisted Reserve policies. Twenty members of the forty-nine Northwestern University squad were enrolled in Reserve programs, including ROTC, V-7, and Marine Reserve,⁵⁰ and other colleges had similar situations. Of Oklahoma A & M's forty-five-man game roster, seventeen were under twenty years old, sixteen were in Army ROTC, five were in the Marine Reserves, while only five were draft eligible. Another was a deferred engineering student.⁵¹ A similar situation existed at Oklahoma University where fifteen were ROTC or reservists, mainly Marine

and V-7.⁵² Eighteen others on the forty-three man squad were under draft age. In answer to public inquiries, OU publicist Harold Keith replied, "We doubt if we will hurt this fall. Next fall is the danger year unless they find a substitute for tires." Noting that Oklahoma lost only five men from its 1942 team to the military, and the University's proximity to a metropolitan area and to seven new air bases, Keith expected good crowds and foretold "no difference in the caliber of play." Although some opponents (notably Fordham and Kansas State University) had been depleted in personnel by mass enlistments, Keith noticed that "every team has been hurt so that proportion won't be noticeable...."⁵³

Steps were taken during the summer of 1942 to bring more college students into the armed forces. On August 20, 1942, the Navy ceased to take enlistments into its Reserve programs,⁵⁴ and the War Department announced plans on September 10 to induct its enlisted reservists upon completion of the fall semester.⁵⁵ The draft age was lowered to eighteen years by Congress on November 16, 1942.⁵⁶ The result was a drastic curtailment in college athletics. One basketball team on December 12 listed only eleven Army ROTC and three enlisted Reserve students as prospects.⁵⁷ By May, 1943, even these were gone after the Army called its ROTC students to active duty, a process that was completed in all colleges by the following September.⁵⁸

Suddenly normalcy had yielded to the demands of war, and college coaches and administrators were perplexed at the war role that they would be able to play. Hundreds of coaches followed their students into the Navy, many as enlisted physical training specialists or as aviation DV(s)--Deck Volunteer (Specialists)--in aviation physical training. One

major university that normally had over one hundred candidates for spring football had only thirty-six in 1943, and almost all of them did not expect to be there for the fall. The track coach at the same school issued a call for volunteers and found only fourteen men who would respond.⁵⁹ Spring activities were the first to feel the effect of broad curtailment. Only thirty-one major outdoor collegiate invitational track and field meets were held, compared to forty-seven in 1942 and sixty-two in 1941.⁶⁰ College baseball was practically eliminated.

Other traditional events including the football bowl games and the Army-Navy gridiron classic appeared on the way out. In September, 1942, the Pasadena Business Men's Association expressed opposition to continuing the Rose Bowl,⁶¹ and in December all managers of such pageants were urged by the Office of Defense Transportation to limit sale of their tickets to the areas where the games were played.⁶² Noting increasing austerity, the New Orleans Item suggested that the local Sugar Bowl game be discontinued.⁶³ On August 18, 1942, Brehon Somervell, commanding Army Services of Supply, also tagged the Army-Navy game a drain on essential transportation needs for the service and requested that General Marshall suspend the game for 1942. This was to be followed by canceling the entire 1943 service academy football schedule.⁶⁴ Although the 1942 contest was played, it was clear that the War Department did not exactly favor its continuance. The affray was moved from Philadelphia, where it normally drew crowds of nearly 100,000, to Annapolis, where attendance was held to 12,000. Except for three cheerleaders, no cadets were allowed to make the trip from West Point. The Office of Price Administration forbade attendance to any but midshipmen

and residents of the immediate Annapolis area, and OPA officials checked license tags on cars at the stadium parking lot to apprehend violators. Several "Middies" were forced by such circumstances to rent a truck to bring their dates from Washington, which, according to Jack Clary, was "reminiscent of a scene from a Russian movie."⁶⁵

Speculation held that all college athletics would be abandoned during the war. Despite the urging of athletic administrators that football and other "combative" sports be incorporated as a toughening regime for men awaiting the draft, a special meeting of the Association of American Colleges resolved on October 29, 1942, for the suspension of intercollegiate athletics in exchange for a system of "intramural games" as a "general rule for the duration of the war." The Philadelphia meeting of college presidents, deans, and professors was held in an emergency move to find answers for the increasing problems of survival of the American campus in wartime.⁶⁶ Enrollment had dropped steadily since the national emergency began in 1940. With the lowering of the draft age and the call up of Army enlisted reservists, the colleges, faced with economic starvation, were forced to place their hopes on continuation of the Navy training plans. Austerity was hard to communicate with the continuation of "unnessential" programs such as varsity athletics. Some higher learning centers had practically ceased to exist. One state university, Wyoming, had more military students (698) than civilians (637). Even with this infusion, the institution suffered a one-third drop in enrollment. A private college, Muhlenburg, enrolled only 142 non-military students for the 1943 fall semester and had an influx of 440 Navy men.⁶⁷

Football was on loose footing. The game was subject to critical

evaluation in the professional journal School and Society. Doubt was expressed that such rugged games prepared men for the Armed Services, regarding them instead as a wasteful diversion from accelerated academic programs and the demands of military reserve duties.⁶⁸ On January 11, 1943, the Louisiana State Board of Regents banned intercollegiate athletics, recommending that coaching staffs devote all their energies to "well-balanced" physical education courses.⁶⁹ The students themselves probably preferred the continuance of sports. Respondents to one poll at the University of Oklahoma favored the maintenance of such activities by a two to one margin; only twenty-seven percent of those favoring abolishment held such views on account of "more important things to do" or "loss of time." Most opponents objected to the expense or transportation difficulties involved and some merely to "mediocre football."⁷⁰

The main question was over who was to be served by the programs. By June of 1943, every varsity athlete at Oklahoma A & M had been inducted or had left school for war work. The college, which had sixty freshman football players alone in the fall of 1941, dropped its restrictions against freshman participation in 1942 and maintained its football with that same number of varsity participants. Thirty-seven of this group were gone by January of 1943, and the remaining athletes on campus left with the induction en masse of the ROTC Cadet Corps in May and the call-up of Marine Reserves in June.⁷¹ Coaches were forced to adopt a rationale for operating intercollegiate athletics without the presence of highly skilled recruits.

The NCAA, the main representative for intercollegiate athletics, was never on solid footing with those officials primarily responsible for orchestrating the wartime approach to higher education. A committee

from the athletic group had moved in January of 1942 to impress the national meeting of college and university presidents of the unique qualities that sports offered to education in a crises but had received a decidedly "cool" if not impatient reception,⁷² an attitude that changed little by the time of the October conference of presidents and deans. Neither had the NCAA taken part in any unified way to develop the Office of Education guidelines for physical training in the college. Advice to the colleges came primarily from the Office of Civilian Defense, the American Association of Health, Physical Education and Recreation, and the War Department. A government report which appeared in February of 1943 made a weak stand for the maintenance of athletics in the fitness plan.⁷³

The football issue was central to the survival of intercollegiate athletics. Its coaches' group was more active, its economic impact more profound, its participants more numerous, and its organizational makeup more sophisticated than other team sports. Football's survival had greater impact on the philosophical approach to the war. Measures taken to save football were indicative of the interest in saving the values which had marked its evolution. With manpower dwindling, its advocates, who were some of the most patriotic of citizens, dared not justify any diversion from the war effort in either men or material. Therefore they were forced to put the ideal of "athletics for all" into operation to save their games. The game had barely survived in World War I at the sufferance of the War and Navy Department because it had sprung from an era of the noble sportsman. This philosophy continued to guide organized sport in the Second World War. In 1917 Secretary of War Newton Baker had demanded that "the gospel of college athletics should be

athletics for all,"⁷⁴ and in a remarkable speech at the NCAA convention, President William H. P. Faunce of Brown University laid down a creed which is similar to the philosophy stressed during World War II:

Now under the stress of the urgent mobilization of all the powers and resources of the people, we are asking of every institution and every method: 'Can it, does it serve the nation?' Unless college sports can demonstrate today that they are more than trifles, more than costly advertisement, more than a pedestal for individual notoriety, unless they can be shown to make better citizens and so better soldiers, unless they can produce men capable of democratic, whole-souled cooperation in devotion to the ideals of the nation, they will be sent to the scrap heap by an indignant people. If they are the costly luxuries of a leisure class, we will fling them aside during the war and long years after. If they are essential to the building of a democratic and justice-loving nation, they are more needed in a long and desperate struggle than in all the piping times of peace. Do they produce men resourceful and self-reliant, courageous yet restrained, virile yet courteous, aggressive yet patient--do they make a man captain of his soul?⁷⁵

It was within this heritage that the executive committee of the Football Coaches Association resolved on November 25, 1942, to "extend the values of competitive football to all physically qualified male students in the schools and colleges...for the training of young men for military service."⁷⁶ This was followed on December 9 by a similar measure by the members of the Eastern Intercollegiate Football Association, who proposed that "an extensive program of intercollegiate competition in combat sports should be maintained as an essential contribution in training for war...."⁷⁷ This was echoed three days later by members of the collegiate Lacrosse group, whose keynote was "fight for Lacrosse."⁷⁸

The NCAA convention, which met on December 29, 1942, was saddled with the responsibility of developing a concrete plan to keep athletics going. The NCAA was not in unanimity over its exact stance. One

faction wanted to promote a war program aggressively; others wanted to wait for advice from the Office of Education. One representative demonstrated the group's perplexity by observing the need for having "something in writing from our government officials, because in times of war, we are all accustomed to taking orders."⁷⁹ Recriminative discussions were aimed at the Army and the U. S. Office of Education for their lack of positive leadership in the field of athletic training. War Department representatives at the meeting chastised the collegiate representatives for not fighting for their own needs. Air Corps athletic officer James Pixlee argued that the colleges should enlarge without apologies on any guidelines, and he criticized the attitude of waiting for someone in Washington to tell them what to do.⁸⁰ Another Army delegate urged the NCAA "to get in there and fight" for a War Department directive on athletics for student trainees.⁸¹ John Griffith warned those who favored a moratorium on athletics that there were those who would use the occasion to "end the administration we have of our intercollegiate athletics." Griffith reflected the mood of the meeting by insisting, "If we do not fight for it, nobody else will. We cannot expect the fellows that are engaged in the other courses of education to come out and battle for what we believe...."⁸² The response was a twofold attraction to encourage the participation in athletics of Army and Navy trainees, who were to be assigned to college campuses. The main feature was a resolution aimed at the government and alluding to "statements of officers on the armed forces," which indicated that "competitive sports...have developed in our college athletes, qualities which have made them better leaders and fighters." The resolution asked member institutions to "preserve the values to the armed services already demonstrated in

competitive sport, by continuing programs...wherever the facilities and equipment permit, and wherever such competition is consistent with the limitation imposed by the war effort."⁸³ The group also waived its one-year residence rule for eligibility to accommodate the new students.⁸⁴

An NCAA committee led by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Thurstien L. Davies, who was on leave from the presidency of Colorado College, met with Army and Navy officials early in January, 1943, to promote the resolutions. Although not receiving definite assurances of cooperation, the envoys were encouraged by both branches.⁸⁵ Although some colleges were deciding to abandon their programs, others optimistically went ahead, aiming to use athletics as part of their war readiness programs. Athletic Director Dale Arbuckle of the University of Oklahoma announced OU's perseverance in wartime football with the admonition that it enabled prospective soldiers to acquire "an instinctive combativeness that is difficult to teach soldiers who haven't been in sports."⁸⁶ Coaches at most midwestern universities invited all interested students out for spring football as preparation for military service.⁸⁷ Some held drills even though anticipating the suspension of football in the fall. Of the eighty candidates at the University of Oregon, fifty did not even contemplate attendance for the following academic year.⁸⁸

On February 12, 1943, the War Department crushed hopes of the athletic enthusiasts when it announced that students in its Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) could not participate in inter-collegiate contests because of an intense training schedule. This was later attributed by Secretary Stimson to advice given to the War Department from deans of engineering schools.⁸⁹ The announcement was interpreted by one writer as "a knockout blow to college football,"⁹⁰ and

Arthur Daley remarked that the prospect for intercollegiate sports "never had so bleak an outlook...."⁹¹

The ASTP had been approved in September, 1942, in anticipation of the lowering of the draft age. Its operation supposedly guaranteed a continuous flow of technically and professionally trained men for the prosecution of the war. However, after its formal establishment in December and the contracting with colleges for facilities, General Leslie McNair, director of combat training for the Army, objected to it because of the plan to direct men already in training into college courses.⁹² According to General Marshall, the situation aggravated an already critical situation in combat arms, for prime "physically fit men, capable of rapidly absorbing training for combat," would be diverted into a not too convincing civilian type training exercise.⁹³ The ASTP was also a political arrangement which struck a compromise between civilian college administrators, the War Manpower Commission, and the War Department. The result was an austere program by which the War Department had its men gain the most benefit in the shortest amount of time, and the WMC avoided criticism for an unnecessary diversion of physically fit young men from the war effort while it drafted married men with children. The ASTP college advisory board had no choice except to go along with an accelerated and highly regimented program, which left no room for "frills," such as participating in collegiate activities separate from the Army curriculum. McNair still made one last attempt to stop the training program on January 25, 1943, shortly before its announcement to the public.⁹⁴

Not being privy to Army personnel needs, Griffith was sure the culprits in the disappointment to college athletics were college

presidents who had helped draft the ASTP curriculum. He suspected that they had advised Army officials to take a stand against college athletics.⁹⁵ He accused the presidents of an educational theory which insidiously used military training to strip students of their home-induced values. Griffith's conservative bent made him suspicious of social experimentation in the guise of national emergency, and he exclaimed,

...is it better for the schools to conduct a satisfactory physical training program for all of the students thus leaving the boy in the home and under the influence of the church and the school, or is it better to send him to a military camp where a great deal of time will be spent building him up physically?⁹⁶

The Big Ten Commissioner was certain that the ASTP was a facade for the government to inaugurate a type of universal military training for seventeen to nineteen year-old youths which could be easily manipulated into a peacetime program at the war's end. Its "anti-athleticism" was seen as a means for stifling free expression, and he blamed it on the educationist leadership of the "liberal" presidents of several universities, including those from Johns Hopkins, Harverford, Stanford, Florida, Fordham, Wisconsin, Penn State, and Carnegie Tech.⁹⁷

Physical drill for students in the Army schools included competitive team sports, as well as body building exercises. Although not meeting collegiate sport advocates' wishes for Army participation in regular campus varsity play, it was a significant departure from previous Army policy, which had denied sports participation in training and allowed it at advanced bases only on off-duty time. The program included several contact type games and was justified for the same "social" reasons so often emphasized by Griffith and others.⁹⁸

Fortunately for college athletics and the boosters of training in "social" qualities, the Navy took a far different approach in launching its V-12 schools outline. Its announcement, on February 21, 1943, took place only days after the Army declaration and allowed Navy students to participate in a wide range of campus activities, including such extra-curriculars as fraternities and varsity athletics. The V-12 plan was a continuation of the Navy's "V" programs, replacing the earlier plans with the pool of enlisted reservists still in college under the old V-1, V-7 and V-5 curriculum, as well as the enlistment for active duty of college-age youth between seventeen and twenty-three years of age. Following the suspension of Navy enlistments in February, 1943, the draft made heavy inroads into the potential supply of Naval Reserve officers. It was circumvented by the V-12 plan which filled the Navy's need for men for replacement into the Reserve midshipmen's schools and for direct commissions. Most of the 84,016 commissioned officers in the Navy as of December 31, 1944, had come through the V-12 related colleges.⁹⁹ These so-called "ninety day wonders" trained at the contracting institutions for periods ranging from four months to two years, depending on their subject speciality.

Although the V-12 subjects were uniformed Naval personnel drawing pay and allowances, their presence was an absolute boon to college athletics. Although some form of physical training was required daily, students were "permitted to take part in all college athletics and other activities of the campus on the same basis as civilian students." Other military drill was kept at a minimum, and the Navy students were allowed to enter their college of preference. Although this selection was limited to the colleges which held V-12 contracts or courses of study

and billets open to the individual schools, it allowed certain students, including athletes, to stay in the college of their matriculation.¹⁰⁰ The waiver by the Bureau of Personnel of its compulsory daily physical training for men who participated in varsity sports was a major victory for proponents of the V-5 system of sports conditioning. If the combined military schools operation had saved higher education in World War II from economic disaster, then surely the Navy saved college athletics.

Member schools of the NCAA, eager for the recognition and financial remuneration that would come from attracting military students, dropped all pretense of maintaining eligibility standards. Prohibitions against professionalism was the only exception. Freshmen had been eligible since 1942, and in the spring of 1943 other barriers were dropped, including regulations restricting transfers, the residence rule, minimum enrollment hours, and grade requirements. These had been part of long years of reform. Eligibility for military personnel with only a casual relationship to the college was urged.¹⁰¹ Although the latter was resisted, there was generous bending of the rules in some cases, all in the name of keeping athletics alive. Even non-students participated, if, as in the Big Ten, they could show their intent to enroll for the October semester under the wartime acceleration of summer registration.¹⁰² This "patriotic" move prompted Gene Tunney to wryly observe: "...The trouble with the Big Ten...is the fear of losing revenue. These fellows insist upon remaining adolescents."¹⁰³ By late August, 1943, even the academically rigid Southern Conference yielded to the suspension of the rules by a narrow vote.¹⁰⁴ This type of indulgence was too much for some staid eastern institutions such as Harvard

and Yale, which severed their relationship from intercollegiate athletics, allowing teams only to operate on a club basis.

By July, 1943, at least 374 colleges had been selected for military training, only 131 of which were Navy.¹⁰⁵ It was obvious that these with Navy programs would be able to keep athletics, while those with purely Army students would not, and this question was the cause of a lively effort to persuade a change in Army policy. Griffith feared that the Army's failure in this regard would kill college sport. An advertisement in the May, 1943, issue of his Journal, placed by the "Athletic Institute" of Chicago, was headed by the admonition that "Gremlins Must Not Sabotage Our American System of Sports." The "institute" proclaimed, "Today our American sports machine is a 'war machine'...physically trained...and mentally schooled...to make victorious decisions...in major campaigns or hand to hand combat."¹⁰⁶

The lobbying directed at the ASTP program kept the athletic controversy alive, and struggle over ASTP athletics lasted well into September, 1943. The ASTP program had already engendered enough appearances of wasted effort without attaching the issue of sport, and Congressional efforts to get the War Department to rescind the prohibition reached a surprisingly high pitch. Representative Samuel Weiss of Pennsylvania, a former star college player and a game official for the National Football League, protested the decision in a letter to Stimson on May 4, 1943, pointing out the inconsistency of the Department's policy in respect to that of the Navy. Weiss promoted the familiar theme that sports would "bring about a greater degree of development in our soldier boys because of physical combat and competition." The Congressman was also concerned about an intriguing element in the

ability of the United States Government to influence the American psyche through the control of institutions. Weiss pointed to letters from American soldiers stationed in England who expressed surprise in the broad number of normal athletic events, including soccer matches with crowds ranging up to 105,000, despite that country's nearness to the war zone.¹⁰⁷

Stimson's "categoric denial" to the Weiss request for ASTP athletics pointed out that the Army was not collegiate in character, colleges being used to train such military units "only because military facilities are insufficient...." Taking note of the large number of colleges reducing their programs due to transportation exigencies, the Secretary questioned the propriety of military excesses in that area and its impact on the attitude of troops fighting overseas.¹⁰⁸ Undaunted, Weiss was joined in his protest by fellow Representative Lawrence Dilweg of Wisconsin and A. S. (Mike) Monroney of Oklahoma, who petitioned the Assistant Chief of Staff and Under Secretary Robert Patterson in the interest of saving "our American way in athletics."¹⁰⁹

Meanwhile the Secretary of War left for a tour of American military bases in England and, having attended a football game between American units there, was thought to have had enough of a first-hand knowledge of the morale issue to influence Marshall's ideas on physical training requirements for the ASTP. The issue was raised again in mid-summer when some schools made known their intention for proceeding with fall football schedules by relying on the Army students since no "official" ruling had been made against it.¹¹⁰

A committee headed by Weiss, and including Dilweg, Monroney, F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana, and C. W. Bishop of Illinois, circulated a

petition among the House membership for submission to Stimson upon his return. Weiss, in another letter charged the Army with inconsistency both in the matter of its own off-duty time practices at other posts and comparisons with Navy training. This letter and a later telegram to President Roosevelt on July 15, 1943, was accompanied by the petition, for which Weiss claimed two hundred names.¹¹¹ In it the Pennsylvania democrat observed the "present discrimination existing between the A-12 and V-12 Army and Navy athletic programs."¹¹² The more protests directed against the operation of the ASTP plan, the more muddled it became. Scheduled to begin on college campuses as early as March 1, 1943, it bogged down due to manpower deficiencies in combat training caused by reduction of spring induction quotas and the discharge of thousand of overage and limited duty service men.¹¹³ By late May it was still "struggling to get started."¹¹⁴ Whenever the college training did begin in July, public opposition to boys in uniform attending classes on college campuses while fathers were being drafted "created a situation" in some college communities, according to Selective Service Director Lewis Hershey as "difficult to describe."¹¹⁵

Driving on to a finish in the matter, eastern athletic directors moved down the Army chain of command to present their case. On July 28, 1943, they conferred with the director of the Army schools program, who argued that the Army curriculum would have to be redrawn completely to accommodate the requests of athletic promoters. Support for the athletic directors continued to pour in to the War Department. John B. Kelly lent official sanction to the reorganization idea,¹¹⁶ and one member of Congress described the situation as "working against the Army in that many fine young prospects for the service are choosing the

Navy" for the reason of college athletics alone.¹¹⁷

Roosevelt did not answer Weiss's communication of July 15, preferring to let Stimson make the final disposition. A friend of organized athletics in the War Department, New York baseball executive Larry MacPhail held out hope that the President might reopen the ASTP training question,¹¹⁸ but Stimson delivered the final blow to the football and athletic question in a letter to Weiss on August 11. In it Stimson relayed responsibility for the physical training decision on to the committee of deans and presidents which devised the curriculum around intramural training. Stimson was particularly concerned that competitive athletics in the program would cause the disruption of the entire curriculum to satisfy "simply the 3 or 4 percent who might qualify for intercollegiate athletics," thereby detracting from the War Department's serious concerns on obstacles to training men in the least amount of time.¹¹⁹

The Stimson fiat loosed a flood of decisions by college officials not to have their institutions continue in college football, the standard bearer of college sport. This was an indication of the austerity that the American people would have to admit on the social front if they were to adopt a "war psychology." The colleges with the 70,000 V-12 trainees continued football. For the most part, those with the 140,000 "A-12" students did not. Michigan State, one of the major colleges to suspend the sport, had only one of 135 students remaining who had played freshman or varsity football in 1942.¹²⁰ They were joined by the universities of Alabama and Tennessee, both major "Bowl" schools, as well as the majority of colleges in the Southeastern and Pacific Coast conferences. Altogether, 321 of the 360 schools to suspend

football in World War II made the decision in 1943.¹²¹ A total of 356 teams had been suspended by that fall. This included but 20 of the 124 Navy colleges.¹²² The remaining 336 were those with Army or purely civilian constituency.

Despite directives against it, several "A-12" complements engaged in varsity games of one sort or another, usually disguised as intramural or club activities, and the controversy over bringing the men into the regular college activities never really abated. On September 13, 1943, War Mobilization Director James Byrnes suggested to Stimson that it "would be a wise thing if the Army and Navy could get together and agree upon a policy as to intercollegiate athletics."¹²³ Stimson was bemused that such a "gigantic subject" could have such wide range of interest without a final answer, even to the point of cabinet level discussions with the President, and he implored Byrnes not to "shake his gory locks" about it.¹²⁴ In October, Stimson promised action on the subject through the Army-Navy Personnel Board before the following spring.¹²⁵ Army acceptance of the ASTP function itself, however, was waning. McNair was not able to resolve his difficulties in the training of enough combat infantrymen for the spring invasion of German-held France, and he placed increasing pressure on Marshall to raid the ASTP for troops.¹²⁶ The War Department on February 18, 1944, ordered the colleges swept clean of "A-12's" except for a few students in dentistry, medicine, and engineering. They were replaced by seventeen year old pre-induction reservists, with a complement not to exceed 35,000 men.¹²⁷ Although the ASTP remained, the question of their participation in varsity sport on college campuses was largely a moot one, and, according to School and Society, their reduction "posed...the most serious problem

that the higher institutions have had to face since Pearl Harbor."¹²⁸

Army units assigned to the campuses were intensely trained in both academic and physical subjects, leaving little time for intercollegiate games despite civilian protests to the contrary. Organized study and physical training took up fifty-nine hours per week,¹²⁹ in addition to other military duties, leading one trainee to complain that only an hour and fifteen minutes free time daily was left.¹³⁰ The rugged physical training program was designed for six hours per week plus intramural sports. Unlike the Navy schools, this was handled by mostly civilian college instructors, many of whom were coaches without regular teams to direct.¹³¹ One such program included two hours of swimming instruction per week plus ju jitsu, wrestling, boxing, and "alley fighting," as well as intramural basketball and football. Another student speculated that two and a half years of college were crammed into forty-eight weeks.¹³²

That college football did carry on in a limited fashion in 1943 was a credit to the V-12 innovators as well as to ideologists of competitive sport such as Tom Hamilton, John Griffith, and Columbia's Lou Little. Little keynoted the 1943 effort in an article which appeared in that year's 1943 NCAA Guide entitled "College Football Is at War." With almost all collegiate athletes of that season destined to be either V-12 or pre-inductees, their paragons had managed to build football into little short of ideological and combat training. Little, writing in such a vein, called 1943 the "most important year the sport has ever had" and foresaw an end to the brand of physical education philosophy that failed to utilize competition in a hardening program.¹³³

However, problems associated with manpower continued to harass

athletic programs. Many schools revised their game contracts to call for holding games in nearby population centers rather than tax transportation facilities.¹³⁴ Although overall attendance was reduced 18.4 percent by transportation restrictions, the 1943 football season was hardly affected by disinterest. In well-populated areas, such as the East and West Coasts, attendance remained relatively normal despite the decreased caliber of play.¹³⁵ The University of Pennsylvania averaged 43,475 spectators for eight home games.¹³⁶ It, along with Michigan, Army, Navy, Notre Dame, and Southern California, played to crowds ranging from 70,000 to 90,000 people.

Athletic participation at the Navy schools enjoyed a veritable boom. A record 113 football players reported at Purdue, 105 came out for Harvard's club team, eighty of them V-12's, as were sixty of Princeton's one hundred man squad.¹³⁷ Colleges waited with apprehension for the number of trainees each service allotted to them. The academic specialties of the student determined how much extracurricular activity would be in the offing. The University of Oklahoma was assigned 1,013 Army and 695 Navy trainees, but 465 of the Navy men were engineers or pre-medical trainees, an indication of little time for the frivolity of varsity games.¹³⁸ Only thirty-four "Sooners" reported for football, including twenty-six V-12's, three seventeen-year-olds, and four deferred students.¹³⁹ Notre Dame, on the other hand, was assigned 1,851 Navy trainees, more than any other college except Dartmouth, which had 2,000.¹⁴⁰ In this number was a huge complement of Marines, which included most of the returning players and a number of transfers from other schools. Needless to say, the "Irish" enjoyed a successful season, and their Marine quarterback, Angelo Bartelli, won the Heisman trophy.

The Navy also enlarged facilities and equipment inventories, bringing numerous well-trained physical training staffs to assist with the athletic programs. With the deficiency in civilian staffs, the colleges, although contracting with the Navy to furnish physical education and coaching personnel separate from the Navy, were forced to rely on Naval people. Villanova University could muster but one civilian coach for its 578 V-12 students, whereupon six physical specialists served as assistant football coaches.¹⁴¹ Other civilian employees in athletics took a back seat to the Navy leadership in such circumstances. The Assistant Navy Director for Physical Training wrote that this practice amounted to a "pension" for some contracted instructors.¹⁴²

Some universities almost took on the identity of the Navy, and, for all practical purposes, the V-12 commandant ran the athletic programs. Practices were limited to one hour per day by Navy authorities, inasmuch as duty time physical conditioning had already prepared men for peak effort. The commandant also dictated academic eligibility rules for his troops, determined how long they could be absent from base and whether or not they could play when injured. The University of Oklahoma was not allowed to play its star halfback in an important Big Six conference game because he had a bad cold. After much wrangling with the commandant, Coach Dewey (Snorter) Luster managed to forge an agreement allowing the boy to play two plays, one in each half. Subsequently, the "Sooners" got the ball down to the one yard line on those occasions, and the lad obligingly scored two touchdowns.¹⁴³ This type of contention led Luster to refer to the Navy official not so affectionately as "old Gold Almighty."¹⁴⁴ More often than not, however, a great deal of pride was attached to the institutional affinity with the Navy,

and the men were urged to "give them a good Navy fight."¹⁴⁵

Other schools placed their programs under austerity discipline. Princeton allowed a seven-game schedule, but the dean of the college limited practices to one hour per day, allowed no games during examinations, and tolerated no absences to follow the team.¹⁴⁶ These factors extremely limited the 1943 schedule. Only 197 of the prewar 560 teams played, and they averaged but six games each, compared to nine games in 1941 and eight in 1942.¹⁴⁷

Without the V-12 men, there would have been no athletic schedules. As 1942 was the year of the V-5, 1943 was the "year of the V-12." There were three ways colleges could "beef up" their rosters: with V-12's, as was the case for Notre Dame, Georgia Tech, Purdue, Duke, Michigan, Northwestern, Dartmouth, Texas, College of Pacific, Southern California and Oklahoma; with seventeen-year-olds, the situation that existed with Texas A & M, Louisiana State, and Indiana; or with the 4-F's, the most notable example being Tulsa.¹⁴⁸ The futility of operating programs without Navy boys can readily be seen in their dominance on rosters where they were matched against the civilian talent available. In the Big Ten, 236 V-12's saturated rosters, compared to 268 civilians,¹⁴⁹ but in individual schools, the influence was more preponderant. Duke University had a huge Navy-Marine contingent of over 1,500 men,¹⁵⁰ and 118 reported for the football team, the largest in the school's history. The squad was divided for two separate schedules. Marine representation led to the holdover of "Blue Devil" talent plus numerous transfers from over the South, including representatives from Auburn, Mississippi State, Wake Forest, Tennessee, Georgia, and South Carolina universities.¹⁵¹

Men were transferred from school to school and wound up playing for erstwhile bitter rivals. Colleges without Navy programs found their former stars making spectacular plays against their own war-weakened teams on Saturday afternoon. Dartmouth had representatives of fifteen other colleges on its varsity, including half the 1942 Fordham team, which had to drop football when its enrollment decreased to 450 civilians and 850 ASTP's.¹⁵² Such "lend-lease" players showed up everywhere. Michigan enjoyed the services of Bill Daley of Minnesota, who made All-American, and Elroy "Crazy Legs" Hirsch of Wisconsin.¹⁵³ Ten former Wisconsin students helped Michigan give the Badgers a terrible beating.¹⁵⁴ All Big Ten Fullback Tony Butkovich and five other Purdue players were from Illinois,¹⁵⁵ and Georgia Tech's Sugar Bowl team had starting players from Tech, Alabama, Vanderbilt, and Texas A & M.¹⁵⁶ The star halfback for the University of Oklahoma's Big Six Champions was a V-12 physical instructor, Bob Brumley, who enrolled in some graduate courses following a successful career at Rice Institute. He gained an extra year of eligibility under loose wartime rules.¹⁵⁷

The V-12 course lasted but for months for most cadets, and graduation took place the last of October, resulting in the transfer of men in the latter stages of the season. What the V-12 gave, it could also take away. Texas Christian University lost eighteen players and finished the season with twenty-one men.¹⁵⁸ Undefeated Southern California had its season spoiled by another seagoing outfit, the San Diego Navy, the week after a number of the USC troops were transferred.¹⁵⁹ Another oddity saw the University of Pennsylvania's team captain transferred to Cornell the week before Penn was to play there.¹⁶⁰

Some small colleges became "over-night" football powerhouses as a

result of Navy policy. Marine Corps V-12 units were often isolated in small schools. Since the "Leathernecks" attracted the "cream" of college athletes, these tiny institutions wound up with outstanding football squads. Colorado College, Rochester University, Southwestern Louisiana Institute, and Southwestern University of Texas had two years of fame under the service athletic policy. Colorado Springs, whose president was a Marine Lieutenant Colonel, served as a bastion of football in the Rocky Mountain region where most schools abandoned sports due to manpower and travel difficulties. The "Tigers" had former players from Brigham Young, California, Utah State, Utah, Colorado, and Stanford universities, and eight of them were listed on the eleven-man All Rocky Mountain team.¹⁶¹ The "student body" was made up of 384 Marines and 225 civilians.¹⁶² Southwestern Institute had a collection of seventeen former Rice men, plus star LSU halfback Alvin Dark and many others from major universities;¹⁶³ Southwestern of Georgetown, Texas, defeated Southwest Conference Champion Texas University by using many members of the 1942 "Longhorn" team.¹⁶⁴

None of these schools received national recognition for wartime athletic exploits. The Navy forty-eight-hour rule excluded a bowl appearance for Colorado College, and no major bowl would invite the others. The Georgetown school got into the Sun Bowl and defeated the University of New Mexico, and the Oil Bowl in Houston was initiated to "showcase" the SLI talent from Rice.¹⁶⁵ Southwestern Louisiana, since it defeated the Georgetown "Pirates" and tied Randolph Field,¹⁶⁶ one of the nation's best military clubs, could have laid claim to the National Championship, if it had played more "known" teams. However, as one coach said, "Big name teams don't like the idea of getting licked by a

little college, even in wartime."¹⁶⁷ The two Southwestern schools later played their own "mythical" collegiate championship game with SLI and the "mysterious Marines" of Georgetown playing to a 6-6 tie in the 1945 Oil Bowl.¹⁶⁸

The "real" championship of 1943, at least in the eyes of the Associated Press, was won by the Marines of Notre Dame, which had more material than any other college team, including the military academies. The "Irish" were able to retain much of their 1942 squad and won handily over the Naval Academy before 82,000 at Cleveland,¹⁶⁹ the last game before Bartelli's transfer to boot camp. They easily beat Army and upset powerful Iowa Preflight after his departure. Ironically the "Fighting Irish" were edged in their last game by Greak Lakes Navy, a game in which a Notre Dame player of the previous year, Emil Sitko, played a key role for the "Bluejackets."¹⁷⁰

The dominance of the Navy in collegiate sport was displayed in the Heisman football trophy voting. Eight of the top nine candidates were Navy trainees, and the other was an Annapolis student.¹⁷¹ Eight of the eleven Associated Press All-Americans were also V-12 or V-5 undergraduates, one was an Academy midshipman, and another was an Army Cadet.¹⁷² Every ranked team in the final football poll was associated with the Navy.¹⁷³

Other clubs trusted that the Selective Service would allow their seventeen-year-old freshmen to become eighteen-year-old sophomores. Ohio State had sixty of the tender youngsters and another five "4-F's" as their sole entry into intercollegiate football,¹⁷⁴ and Oklahoma A & M coach Jim Lookabaugh invited every seventeen-year-old player in the state to the "Aggies'" accelerated summer practices.¹⁷⁵ Such teams

could hardly compete with the Navy teams, and many refused to play the V-12 powered schools. Some who could were Texas A & M and LSU, which played each other in the Orange Bowl, and Tulsa University, which was barely beaten in the Sugar Bowl by V-12 Georgia Tech.

The Tulsa story is one of the most remarkable of wartime sport. The "Hurricanes" relied on twenty-four men who were unable physically to meet the requirements for active duty. They were all "4-F's."¹⁷⁶ The city was a petroleum center and, during the war, became a leading aircraft production center for McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. Leading business men and boosters of the University saw the war as an opportunity to gain recognition for the rapidly growing young city through wartime excellence in athletics.¹⁷⁷ The tiny university attained its first national recognition during the 1942 season by nearly beating the University of Tennessee in the 1943 Sugar Bowl. Whereas Tennessee abandoned intercollegiates, Tulsa took the opportunity to recruiting physically deferred boys from neglected football programs all over the country.

Many of the younger men wanted war industry work, and the team's coach, Henry Frnka, solicited married men with family deferments to work in local war plants and also attend college part-time. Other deferred students, including the star quarterback, were brought into the college of petroleum engineering.¹⁷⁸ The "baling wire boys" arrived from at least ten other colleges, as well as high schools from all over the Southwest.¹⁷⁹ The maladies of the "4-F's" included that of a one-armed guard, Ellis Jones, who made some All-American teams. The team's star fullback had a severed Achilles tendon, another back had osteomyelitis, a tackle had one lung, and others had ailments including a

withered arm, perforated eardrums, and bad eyesight. The Tulsans also used some of the best seventeen-year-old freshmen around and an overweight 290 pound eighteen-year-old. The roster also included some discharged service men.¹⁸⁰ This unit was good enough to outclass Big Six Champion Oklahoma and tie the Georgetown Marines enroute to an undefeated season,¹⁸¹ drawing the awed admiration of the nationally syndicated press and the boosterism of local writers.

Much criticism was directed at the synthetic nature and the wartime propriety of such campaigning. Forrest "Phog" Allen, Athletic Director at the University of Kansas, claimed that such efforts took advantage of lax wartime eligibility codes.¹⁸² A Tulsa writer answered barbs with "so long as the revised rules are obeyed no one will look good criticizing anybody else...",¹⁸³ while Stanley Frank of the New York Post was quoted as saying that "Tulsa probably deserves recognition as the No. 1 college team of the year because it is one of the very few teams that really belongs in that category." Frank gouged some of the more prosperous universities for their timidity, claiming that some "football powers...ran for cover at the first hint of danger to big box office receipts." He condemned the hypocrisy of those who pointed to the "idealistic fervor" which college sports engendered only to junk games "when their students never were in greater need of such benefits."¹⁸⁴ Another writer, Ed Danforth, was quoted after the Sugar Bowl as saying, "If those Tulsans were 4-F, then the Army has been sound asleep. They would make ideal commando troops."¹⁸⁵

Financial support for higher education among Negro schools, already marginal, was particularly difficult with reduced enrollments,¹⁸⁶ and all but a few colleges suspended intercollegiate activity.

Thirty-six of the fifty black college football squads suspended play during the war. Only fifteen opened the dismal 1943 season, and three of them were unable to finish their schedules. Unlike white schools, Negro colleges were not assigned V-12 units, and the few ASTP outfits could not offer much help for extracurriculars.¹⁸⁷ Black colleges used the same incentives to continue as did their white counterparts. Paul W. Jones, Superintendent of Cincinnati's Colored Industrial School, declared that the "great war boosted football morale and fighting spirit." Victory was the "obligation of all teams."¹⁸⁸ Tuskegee Institute of Alabama and Wilburforce College of Ohio, early in the war, played in a special game for Army Relief at the huge Soldier's Field in Chicago,¹⁸⁹ an enterprise that white colleges avoided except on the "All Star" level.

The scarcity of opponents forced black athletes to contest other colleges two and three times per season as well as engaging a number of "colored" military units. Some of these bases, located on or near college campuses, became surrogates for the Negro's need for identity with college teams and the war effort. The two most prominent were Hampton Naval Training Station and Tuskegee Army Air Base.¹⁹⁰ The Colored Intercollegiate Track Meet attracted only six teams in 1944, and officials combined it as an invitational for the outstanding Negro military bases.¹⁹¹ The paucity of schedules gave opportunity to develop friendly rivalries with willing white schools, a barrier that was overcome by Delaware State College as early as the 1943 football season.¹⁹² However, only Morgan State College of Baltimore developed anything close to normal collegiate activity in 1943, remaining a strong leader among black schools throughout the war.¹⁹³

The Winter of 1943-44 was a drought for sport, and intercollegiate basketball was submerged by military and industrial play. Forty-one percent of the colleges dropped basketball, despite its low demand on manpower, and many of those who continued had to be satisfied with a liberal scheduling of non-college teams. Oklahoma A & M's National Invitational Tournament squad lost its only regular season games to Naval Air Station teams, which had almost all the good material. Some clubs, notably the universities of Loyola at New Orleans, San Francisco, and Arizona, played their entire schedules against service or factory clubs.¹⁹⁴ Universities with V-12 units had superior talent among the school boys, and one state institution had over one hundred young men report for the squad.¹⁹⁵ Army schools again had to get by with student volunteers, a difficult situation since the seventeen-year-olds often qualified for the draft by turning eighteen before the second semester. One small college, Rider of Trenton, New Jersey, found only six boys to make up a team, and five of them were inducted before the season was over.¹⁹⁶ Oklahoma A & M utilized eligibility of an Air Force captain, a parttime enrollee, and a freshman too tall for the draft to build a strong team.¹⁹⁷

Little Gonzaga College defeated every Pacific Coast rival with an all V-12 team, and unknown Muhlenburg reached the NIT with an all Navy and Marine unit.¹⁹⁸ Iowa State College successfully mixed six V-12's, four V-5's, a 4-F, and three boys aged sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen to reach the NCAA Championships.¹⁹⁹ Dependency on the V-12 basketeers proved hectic. One mentor confessed to feeling like "a youngster who has found a bag of candy and is afraid someone will take it away from him at any minute." Complaints were also heard that the Navy boys were

drained from lack of sleep in this strenuous academic and physical regime.²⁰⁰ It seemed to an athletic director in the Great Plains that the forty-eight-hour rule was keeping basketball players "on the train all the time," and the track teams in that spacious area often were required to ride in cars all night enroute to or returning from meets in order to return students under the deadline.²⁰¹

With educational institutions having trouble maintaining amateur leadership in the roundball game, attention was focused on the rising strength of military-aid AAU programs. Many war-related industries sponsored semi-professional teams to participate in the national amateur tourney. The Phillips "66'ers" of Bartlesville, Oklahoma, and the Vultee Aircraft "Brakettes" of Nashville, Tennessee, dominated men's and women's play during the war.²⁰² The Dunkel collegiate rating system proclaimed Great Lakes and Norfolk Naval Training Centers as the first- and third-best "fives" in the United States. In addition, fifteen Navy and six Army facilities were ranked in the top fifty.²⁰³

The interest of the military in the survival of collegiate sport was indicated by the continuance of the Chicago Tribune All-Star football game. For all practical purposes, the game should not have been able to continue past 1942. Manpower from recent college graduates was practically nil. There were not enough 4-F's to contend a good professional champion, and the Navy, after 1943, forbade trainees to play in any contest not on a military reservation. The Office of Defense Transportation, distressed over the 101,000 who had shown up for the Army-Navy Relief game of 1942, forced its removal from Soldier's Field to Dyche Stadium in suburban Evanston.²⁰⁴ Starting in 1943, the game's sponsors had to reply on leaves for troops selected to play in the War

Bond exhibitions. Initially undergraduates played, many of them V-5 and V-12 men with college eligibility remaining. As the Navy phased its men out, the Army, despite its unhappy experience with War Football, Inc., filtered more men into the program to guarantee its success. By 1945, the game's sponsors were borrowing liberally from the Air Corps. Some of the ex-collegians played in as many as three of the wartime games on the "college" side.²⁰⁵ By 1943, the "college" stars were able to rout the draft-riddled National Football Champion Washington Redskins.²⁰⁶

By the Fall of 1943 programs of off-duty time varsity athletics held sway at large military bases in the United States, and representatives of the camps sat in on collegiate athletic meetings in order to solicit games. The Big Ten accommodated them by allowing member institutions to play extra contents against Army and Navy clubs. Such games were often scheduled as on-base entertainment for troops, the colleges receiving good expense contracts.²⁰⁷ The 1943 preflight teams again were superior, especially Iowa City, which had six former professional players, its only loss coming to the Notre Dame V-12's by one point. However, the Navy's decision to strictly enforce its forty-eight-hour rule made it impossible for the V-5's to play intersectional contests. The Chief of Primary Air Training also kept the preflight teams from using officers or ships company on their squads. This practice had been common in 1942. Tom Hamilton argued that this limitation would endanger the superiority of cadet athletic programs in their competition with the colleges as well as detract from the practice of having officer-instructors engage with their men on an equitable basis in the training field. Hamilton pled for the allowance of at least five officers to serve with cadets during the varsity games. Restricting play to one or

two officers at a time would have allowed preflight teams "to meet their schedules with an equal change for success."²⁰⁸ Although the request was denied, the schools continued their social and psychological training through athletics. The Bureau of Aeronautics consolidated other training into the V-5 system, lengthening the syllabus to one of twenty-six weeks and restricting entrants to men who had shown proficiency in civilian air training programs. Hamilton was detached from physical training position on June 1, 1943, after a brilliant term of ideological and organizational leadership. He was succeeded by a former academy football teammate, Frank Wickhorst, who served until 1945.

Navy facilities dominated military football play in 1943. Great Lakes, after defeating Notre Dame, was conceded the top spot among service teams.²⁰⁹ Recreational programs benefited from the branch's physical training and college activities. The normal run of participation ran from the undergraduate Reserve programs through the V-12, often from there to preflight, and then to base recreational activities. This was followed by overseas all-star or command teams, often in Hawaii, which was the recreation center between combat engagements. The Bureau of Personnel adamantly opposed this activity. Its Assistant Chief, Captain L. E. Denfeld, was so incensed at this practice during the 1943 football season that he ordered Great Lakes and Norfolk to report the names of all "first string" players to the Bureau for transfer to combat zones in the Pacific. The two big Naval bases at Norfolk had engaged in a so-called "Navy World Series" the previous September, leading Denfeld to wonder about the necessity of having "professional or near-professional athletic teams" held so long at one institution.²¹⁰

The success of Navy and Marine recruiting is easily seen in the

athletic rosters of some of its teams. Twenty-seven of the thirty-two men on the 1942 Bainbridge team had been college football players, nineteen of whom could be classified as "major" university.²¹¹ Thirty-four of the Camp Lejeune Marine team had college experience, including twenty-five from the "major" ranks.²¹² Camp Lejeune was in its first year of "bigtime" competition, yet it had no less than 175 men report for the base football squad. The Marine facility embarked on a major athletic expansion program, which by the fall of 1943 included three football fields, nine baseball and eleven softball diamonds, eighteen tennis courts, twenty-six volleyball courts, and four swimming pools.²¹³ Marine athletes also made up a large part of the athletic rosters at Navy facilities, the Jacksonville NATTC listing thirty-one on a squad of forty-three.²¹⁴

The Air Corps, relenting from its 1942 decision, allowed training commands to participate in football during 1943. Although prospective flyers were forbidden to take part in contact sports, enough material was on hand to have several outstanding teams. Randolph Field of San Antonio and March Field of California were the most prominent. Randolph played a tie game against the University of Texas in the 1944 Cotton Bowl on New Year's Day. Seventeen men on the thirty-five man roster had played major college football, some of whom had already participated in the Cotton Bowl while in college.²¹⁵ Its leading player, Glenn Dobbs, had played for Tulsa University in the 1942 Sun Bowl and 1943 Sugar Bowl, Randolph Field in the 1944 Cotton Bowl, with the Third Air Force in the "Bond Bowl" in New York City in December of 1944, and in the Army Air Corps-Navy "Poi Bowl" at Honolulu in 1945. Dobbs completed his circuit by becoming an outstanding professional player for

the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1946. The Fourth Air Force at March Field decisively defeated both Southern California and College of the Pacific, reigning as the outstanding team of the West Coast. The COP game in behalf of the All-Pacific Recreation Fund was matched to determine this superiority.²¹⁶

The continuance of collegiate programs under wartime conditions drew mixed reactions. Griffith sensed their value as a contribution to the war effort because it proved "that seventeen and eighteen year-old youths were men."²¹⁷ In a highly charged article Johnny Lackner, the football coach at Hamline University, proclaimed that sports no longer needed "apologists, but clear thinking expounders." Attacking "'die-hard' enemies of intercollegiate sport," who had denied "the idea that competitive sport adds anything of value to the make-up of the American soldier," Coach Lackner presented the idea that the "virile doctrine" of wartime athletics was correcting the abuse of peacetime years, when American youth were rapidly becoming "lounge lizards," "dancing to the latest jazz band," and creating the fashion "to frequent the speakeasy rather than the church." Lackner emphasized the "spirit values," which he insisted were lacking in "formal physical education," because that philosophy did not teach "group thinking...and the subordination of individual interests to the welfare of the group." Referring to the intangible assets of spiritual commitment in the life of St. Paul, the coach portrayed the American Army as "permeated by a great competitive spirit." Perceiving a decadent society which would be revived by a return to the virtues of the open field, he wrote:

This zest for winning was not obtained by drinking sodas in the corner drug store or by observing Hollywood leg art in the latest movie. It came from only one place--

the fields of competitive sport! Sports have always taught that honest ideals were worth fighting for; that victory on the gridiron or hardwood were worth the physical sacrifices associated with them.²¹⁸

Other collegiate representatives had reservations about the free pursuit of athletics. A. W. Hobbs, NCAA district representative from the University of North Carolina, expressed doubt that "residence in a play camp for four years" contributed to the understanding of "the complex matters of national policy."²¹⁹ Other athletic leaders, who had rushed into continuing programs for the students, were disappointed with the inequity of competition and the abuse of recruiting rules. One collegiate spokesman found no glory in pitting seventeen-year-old boys against service trainees, some of whom had been professional and collegiate stars.²²⁰ Hobbs questioned the V-12 programs as "hardly to be considered a student activity at the present time."²²¹ A New England representative to the NCAA Convention in 1943 disdained the holding of a regional conference on athletics and proposed that the Army decision to forbid its trainees to participate was judicious.²²² In July, 1944, the wizened Forrest Allen assailed the motives of those who wished to keep sports at any price. The Kansas basketball coach suggested that the nationwide "proselyting" of 4-F's and seventeen-year-olds was irregular and dishonest. Some coaches, he noted, "are indulging in frantic flag-waving while posing as developers of young men, aiding the war effort through physical conditioning programs of athletic games," and he charged them with "playing for huge financial stakes, 'Bowl' games and tournament money."²²³

The University of Georgia was fined by the Southeastern Conference for using five transfer students whose colleges had suspended football. Ironically, Georgia, which did not use Navy trainees, could not have

had a team otherwise.²²⁴ The Southern Conference rectified its late August lapse and reimposed a ban on civilian transfers as soon as the 1943 football season ended, and the Big Ten forbade its undergraduates to participate in the college All-Star game against professionals.²²⁵ Navy administrators, increasingly sensitive about its spectator sports philosophy, moved to crack down on abuses of the V-12 forty-eight-hour rule before the 1944 football season.²²⁶

Many major colleges, which had hastily aborted their sports programs in 1943, retrieved them as war news improved. By 1944, the number of teams rose to 325 compared to 197 in 1943.²²⁷ Hobbs, however, was skeptical that such a move would really help the United States with its physical or moral commitments. Speaking in the January, 1945, NCAA meeting, he rebutted the claim of "athletes taking a leading part in the war" being related to their physical and mental training through sport. He held such a claim to be spurious because "physical coordination is very likely an accident of birth, and the fighting spirit is a result of an inherited mental attitude, fortified by environment and training."²²⁸

Had sports taken a turn, contributing only to the expediency of the moment? This was a question asked late in the war, and it was queried as one of propriety. The determination, however, of American college and military athletic leaders to maintain the values attributed to the competition during the war years was remarkable. Their reasoning and methods captured the organization epic which had sparked industrial America to give use to such activities, a reminder of the survival of the group in a simpler day. The Navy had, indeed, saved

collegiate sport. But had this zeal, as reflected by Hobbs, "allowed athletics to distort" the purpose of education?

FOOTNOTES

¹George F. Venker, "The Role of Athletics in Our Military Program," JOHPER, XIV (January, 1943), p. 26.

²Lou Little, "College Football Is at War," NCAA 1942 Football Guide, p. 23.

³Walter Okeson, "War Values of Football," NCAA 1942 Football Guide, pp. iv-v; D. O. McLaughrey, "A Coach's Satisfaction," in W. J. Bingham (ed.), The Official NCAA 1944 Football Guide (New York, 1944), p. 31.

⁴Fred L. Steers, "The Hand that Rocks the Cradle," The Amateur Athlete, XIII (November, 1942), p. 6.

⁵Wesley Brown, "What Bone-Breaking Wrestling Holds Should Be Included in Physical Fitness Programs for Prospective Draftees," NCAA 1942-43 Wrestling Guide, p. 4.

⁶Jerry J. Adam, "Wartime Wrestling at Nebraska," in R. G. Clapp (ed.) The Official NCAA Wrestling Guide 1943-44 (New York, 1943), pp. 11-13. See also Lloyd O. Appleton, "Wrestling Is Hand to Hand Combat," NCAA 1943-44 Wrestling Guide, pp. 17-18.

⁷John Griffith, "Competitive With and Without the Rules," Athletic Journal, XIII (January, 1943), p. 17.

⁸Murl E. Bonney, "Psychological Factors in Total Fitness in War," JOHPER, XIV (May, 1943), pp. 254-255.

⁹McLaughrey, "A Coach's Satisfaction," p. 23.

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¹³John Griffith, "Two Different Points of View," Athletic Journal, XXIV (September, 1943), p. 14.

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³⁴Letter, Tunney to Andrew Leary, January 2, 1943; Tunney to Radford, December 28, 1942; Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney Personal File.

³⁵Letter, Tunney to C. Ward Cross, January 2, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney Personal File.

³⁶Letter, Tunney to McCloy, December 29, 1942, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney Personal File.

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³⁸New York Times (January 22, 1943).

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⁴⁰E. B. DeGroot, "How Right Was Commander Tunney When He Walloped Football," JOHPER, XIV (April, 1943), p. 206.

⁴¹C. H. McCloy, "A Common Denominator of Physical Education," JOHPER, XIV (February, 1943), p. 87.

⁴²Delbert Obertauffer, "An Open Letter to Mr. Schrader and Mr. McCloy," JOHPER, XIV (June, 1943), p. 310.

⁴³Jesse Feiring Williams, "Who Are Our Friends," JOHPER, XIV (June, 1943), p. 311. Williams frequently raised Tunney's ire by reference to Tunney's principles on posture development. McCloy, eager to defend the former Champion, was told by Tunney that these "corrective exercises" were obtained from a Dr. Robert Osgood of Boston. Commander Tunney was aghast that the JOHPER would allow a "disgruntled windbag" like Williams to attack him. He considered Williams "too fat and dull to even catch a tail of the bandwagon." Letter, Tunney to McCloy, March 2, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney Personal File.

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⁴⁶"War Fitness Conference," School and Society, LVII (June 12, 1943), p. 675.

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⁵²University of Oklahoma Football Roster for 1942, University of Oklahoma, Office of Sports Information, Football file (1935-46).

⁵³Undated Public Relations Draft, University of Oklahoma, Football File (1935-46), Football (1942) folder.

⁵⁴Local Board Release no. 144, Local Board Memoranda.

⁵⁵Oklahoma Daily (September 10, 1942; February 17, 1943).

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⁵⁷Basketball Scrapbook for 1943, Oklahoma State University, Department of Sports Information.

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- ⁶⁷Raymond Walters, "Statistics of Registration in American Universities and Colleges for 1943," School and Society, LVII (December 25, 1943), p. 484.
- ⁶⁸Edwin J. Brown, "Football in a War Program," School and Society, LVII (January 2, 1943), pp. 20-22.
- ⁶⁹New York Times (January 12, 1943).
- ⁷⁰Oklahoma Daily (December 5, 1942).
- ⁷¹Stillwater (Okla.) News Press (November 12, 1972; November 19, 1972; November 26, 1972).
- ⁷²NCAA Proceedings (1942), pp. 50-51.
- ⁷³"National Association News," JOHPER, XIV (January, 1943), p. 37.
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- ⁷⁵National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1917 NCAA Yearbook, p. 53.
- ⁷⁶New York Times (November 26, 1942).
- ⁷⁷Ibid. (December 10, 1942).
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- ⁷⁹NCAA Proceedings (1942), p. 42.
- ⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 47-49.
- ⁸¹Ibid., p. 52.
- ⁸²Ibid., p. 33.
- ⁸³Ibid., pp. 26-27.
- ⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 56-59.
- ⁸⁵NCAA Yearbook (1943), pp. 21-22.
- ⁸⁶Oklahoma Daily (February 17, 1943).
- ⁸⁷New York Times (March 21, 1943).
- ⁸⁸Ibid. (April 11, 1943).
- ⁸⁹Stimson to Weiss, August 11, 1943.
- ⁹⁰New York Times (February 12, 1943).

- ⁹¹Ibid. (February 15, 1943).
- ⁹²Palmer, pp. 30-31.
- ⁹³Letter draft, George C. Marshall to Lewis Hershey, Selective Service Director, dated October 5, 1945, Marshall Papers, ASTP File.
- ⁹⁴Palmer, p. 32.
- ⁹⁵New York Times (February 20, 1943).
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- ⁹⁷Ibid.
- ⁹⁸New York Times (April 3, 1943).
- ⁹⁹Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, pp. 275-277.
- ¹⁰⁰U. S. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1948, XCI, pp. 1378-1382.
- ¹⁰¹NCAA Proceedings (1942), pp. 56-63.
- ¹⁰²New York Times (May 16, 1943).
- ¹⁰³Tunney to Andrew Leary, President, Wilson Bottling Co., May 18, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Tunney Personal File.
- ¹⁰⁴New York Times (August 22, 1943).
- ¹⁰⁵Ibid. (February 13, 1943; May 30, 1943); V-12 Schools List dated July 12, 1943, Physical Fitness Correspondence, V-12 File.
- ¹⁰⁶"Gremlins Must Not Sabotage Our American System of Sports," Athletic Journal, XXIII (May, 1943), pp. 20-21.
- ¹⁰⁷Letter, U. S. Representative Samuel Weiss to Secretary of War, May 4, 1943, AG Records, file 353.8.
- ¹⁰⁸Letter, Stimson to Weiss, May 14, 1943, Chief of Staff file 353.85.
- ¹⁰⁹New York Times (May 27, 1943).
- ¹¹⁰Ibid. (July 3, 1943).
- ¹¹¹Letter, Weiss to Stimson, July 8, 1943; telegram, Weiss to Roosevelt, July 15, 1943, AG Records, file 353.8. The President's copy of the petition carried but 118 signatures. FDR Papers, file 189.

Weiss later claimed 256 signees, more than half the House membership.
New York Times (July 30, 1943).

112 Weiss Petition, FDR Papers, file 189.

113 Letter, Hershey to Marshall, October 9, 1945, Marshall Papers,
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114 New York Times (May 22, 1943).

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- 205 Tenth Annual All-Star Game Program, 1943, 11th Annual All-Star Game Program, 1944, 12th Annual All-Star Game Program, 1945, Professional Football Hall of Fame Library, College All-Star Game File. Beginning in 1944, various discharged veterans played in the game on the college side. The 1943, 1944 and 1945 lists of participants offer good indices in the progression of government manpower policy. (See Appendix).
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CHAPTER V

A MATTER OF PROPRIETY: BIG TIME

ATHLETICS 1943-1944

Despite the restrictions which hampered the younger collegians, professional sports managed to continue with some success. Professional football and baseball operated at something approaching normalcy until mid-summer of 1943, at which point manpower and transportation strictures reduced their appeal. Attendance remained high for professional contests, largely due to their location in metropolitan centers where war workers spent inflated earnings. Although attendance figures for the 1943 baseball season decreased by 13.4 percent, this figure can largely be attributed to the decline shown by the three New York clubs. In other cities where industrial and military facilities were located, attendance was up. Detroit led both professional leagues in crowd attraction, while Philadelphia and Washington, with their shipping and bureaucratic nerve-centers, showed the greatest increase.¹ Chicago and Pittsburgh showed large advances. Professional football actually increased the average attendance for 1943 after a six percent drop in 1942.²

The Office of Defense Transportation was anxious to see professional sports reduce the amount of passenger miles traveled, and proposals to divide the professional baseball leagues into eastern and western divisions reached the talking stage in December of 1942.³

Baseball Commissioner K. Mountain Landis stayed off drastic curtailment of travel by proposing his own plan to save mileage through rearrangement of schedules. Meeting with Office of Defense Transportation Director Joseph Eastman in late December of 1942, and with professional owners a few days later, the venerable Judge Landis developed a solution which satisfied the government for the duration. The two-point policy included limiting spring training to points north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers and east of the Mississippi (the Landis-Eastman line), which was made easier by postponing the opening of baseball season until the fourth week of April. Each team also agreed to limit travel.⁴ There was much grumbling about this Landis-Eastman dictate. Sports-writers and owners talked as if Landis was submitting the league to be "pushed around" by the ODT, that savings in transportation was "nil," and that Landis had submitted the proposal unilaterally without ODT prodding.⁵ By March of 1943, even Senate friends of wartime sport were proposing more drastic measures such as suspending the World Series,⁶ and it is doubtful if Landis, who took his response to Roosevelt's earlier "green light" edict seriously, could have come up with a more politically pragmatic plan.

The key to baseball's survival, however, was manpower. Most professional owners waited expectantly for their rosters to be denuded when the Selective Service moved in April of 1943 to draft fathers,⁷ a commodity on whom clubs almost exclusively relied to keep parks open. Only the occupation of such men in deferred war work during the off-season was considered a viable reason to exclude them from induction. A number of non-deferrable activities were listed by Selective Service for previous January, a list that included auxiliary personnel for the

maintenance of sport facilities.⁸ A Selective Service decision declaring the non-essentiality of ball players was considered likely, thus forcing all such men into year-around war industry. During the winter of 1942-1943, the likelihood of baseball opening the 1943 season was considered remote by many. Babe Ruth indicated that even if the clubs opened they could not finish.⁹ Followers of the sport expected a "work or fight" directive, thus leaving the activity to youthful or older participants. Some sources indicated a desire for McNutt to declare baseball unessential so that Commissioner Landis would "freeze" player contracts for the duration, thereby staving off massive post-war reorganization. This seemed the only course open to minor league clubs which were being forced out in droves. Georgia Senator Richard Russell suggested the move in a letter to presidential assistant Marvin McIntyre on February 12, 1943, as a possible answer to the wartime problems of the minor leagues.¹⁰

It seemed the only way for baseball to continue a normal course otherwise was for the game to be declared an "essential" industry, a move that Federal Security Administrator Paul McNutt was unwilling to make. This forced each individual participant to stand on his own merit in contributing to the war effort. Since Roosevelt's so called "green light," a feeling had developed among some baseball men that such morale-building professions enjoyed a sort of exclusiveness for the national interest. The President's reply to Landis in January of 1942 had clearly indicated that baseball's interest would be subordinate to manpower policy, a guideline conveniently lost on those officials following the confused path of the "green light" in the winter of 1942-1943. Many baseball officials were adamantly opposed to the industry being given

avored treatment, but others, while espousing sacrifice, waffled on the nature of such "sacrifice." Leo J. Bundy, president of the New York Giants organization, although insisting that "baseball...has never maintained that it is an essential industry," nevertheless contended that "we would not say baseball was absolutely unessential."¹¹ This logic attracted Brooklyn's Branch Rickey who considered "essentiality a relative term." The question was, reasoned Rickey, "where can the player...do the most good," and he insisted that "we need to hold on to all such diversions...to reduce us from the increasing sorrows of war."¹² Arthur Daley of the New York Times was more militant, arguing that the sport could not exist by "mere suffrance," and he encouraged the owners to grasp the "entire loaf" rather than a few "crumbs," by forcing government officials to reveal "how green" the light was.¹³ This "suffrance" kept the game alive, a condition quite noticeable when McNutt, a former college baseball pitcher, agreed to substitute for Roosevelt in throwing out the first ball for the 1943 season.¹⁴

Chances were that the ball McNutt heaved did not bounce high, if at all. Civilian sporting goods were patched up versions of the "real thing." By 1943, most sport hardware was being produced for military sources. Steel for golf clubs, rubber interiors and leather for balls, and yarn for uniforms was increasingly difficult to obtain for civilian needs. The War Production Board allowed only twenty tons of scrap rubber to be used in construction of new baseballs. Added to the surplus rubber cores of used golf balls, this amount was not enough to last the professional game through the 1943 season, leading to the experimentation with a ground cork and balata centered product.¹⁵ This "baloney" ball had "as much...resiliency to it as a grapefruit falling off the

kitchen table,"¹⁶ and was roundly condemned. The spheroid was soon scrapped for a livlier ball, but this and other problems had already led to demand for some federal agency to regulate wartime sport.

Few moves had been made in that direction. In June of 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation moved to prohibit intercity bus charter service from serving athletic fans. This directive was enlarged in September, and the policy was extended to school buses by December, 1942.¹⁷ Widespread misunderstanding about the "green light" had led to a feeling that just about anything, the objective of which was to maintain public "morale," was not objectional as a diversion. The White House was reluctant to issue a policy statement beyond the general guidelines issued to Landis in 1942. Instead presidential assistant Stephen Early maintained that "the individual conscience of the individual members of every community must be one determining factor," rather than having the President "lay down any general policy."¹⁸ The American people apparently had no overwhelming objection to the continuance of certain activities, and any interference with private sporting pursuits would likely have been met with suspicion. Only twenty-eight percent of the respondents of a Gallup Poll released in April, 1943, indicated that professional baseball should be discontinued,¹⁹ and the "Spokane Athletic Club" claimed that its survey, taken mostly among Navy men, showed ninety-five percent approval for the national pastime's continuance.²⁰ The White House ran a survey on English sport which indicated that the British had not placed severe restrictions on its practice. Horse-racing ran almost unchecked there, as well as the holding of traditional rugby, soccer, and cricket matches. The British took advantage of sports' natural qualified to organize national

fitness clubs which emphasized all kinds of games as part of the defense effort for pre-military training. The limiting of games to weekends and holidays and the maintenance of "spotter" wardens were the only limitations.²¹ This English example led McNutt to qualify the government's position on sport by asking "when do men play and what do they do in between...?"²²

An effort was made to fit sporting activities into the national bureaucracy on war planning. McNutt, recognizing that "comfortable and contented workers are more efficient workers," held recreation as "vital to the war program."²³ The Office of Economic Stabilization included outdoor sports in its planning on minimum civilian needs. Professional baseball and football were projected for operation of seventy percent of their economic vitality. This was more than college football, which was estimated to be cut to twenty percent and race tracks to ten.²⁴ Representative Samuel Weiss was the leading advocate for sanctioning athletics, and he constantly prodded various branches of government to make positive decisions on sport throughout the war. His efforts to preserve the Army-Navy gridiron classic and the use of Army trainees in intercollegiate athletics were accompanied by his enthusiasm for a uniform sports policy. On March 1, 1943, remarking through the Congressional Record, he demanded that the "government permit spectator sports to continue for the duration." Weiss claimed that ninety percent of the industrial workers in his congressional district and soldiers whom he had interviewed overseas favored the continuation of baseball and football. The "daring courage, initiative, and fighting spirit" displayed by participants in those games, insisted the Congressman, were the "same invaluable qualities now displayed by our fighting men

and can be attributed as one of the major reasons success of our soldiers, sailors, and marines on the battlefronts...."²⁵ Weiss accompanied his remarks with a letter to the President asking that the matter of civilian sports be opened for discussion.²⁶ Roosevelt referred the matter to Byrnes, but the matter became backlogged²⁷ and Weiss was forced to write another letter on April 7. Pointing out the efforts by both the British and Russians to make sports part of their war program, Congressman Weiss called for more coordination between manpower and civilian sports needs.

Although Weiss was interested in keeping the ballparks open, he also was disturbed at the prospect of professional sport laboring under the false impression that government sources desired that they operate, while "floundering" beneath increasing manpower and travel restrictions at a great economic loss.²⁸ Minor league officials were alarmed that unless the President suspended the leagues' operation, player contracts would be voided from the inability of the "folded" organizations to meet their obligations, making the men free agents.²⁹ Minor league officials were by no means unanimous in their desire to shut the activity down for the duration. The president of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, W. G. Branham, struck at "gloomy predictions" for the future,³⁰ and Rogers Hornsby, president of the Fort Worth "Cats" of the Texas League, accused some owners of "talking about manpower" while having their "eye on money." He charged that the owners were not "willing to fight and take a loss in order to keep the game going."³¹

By the opening of the baseball season, little serious consideration had been given to the problems of organized sport. Presidential

assistant Johnathon Daniels exchanged notes with McIntyre on the necessity of a Federal Sports Coordinator. National Baseball League President Ford Frick captured Daniels' ear and apparently suggested baseball's willingness to consider the expansion of major league operations into war impacted urban areas. Daniels was particularly impressed with Frick's lobbying efforts, which included a claim that baseball had made over \$1.3 million in "cash contributions to various war causes...."

Daniels was uncertain exactly what organized baseball actually wanted outside of a "statement of national policy" on the value of spectator sports, which he laid to their desire "to continue the industry on some sort of profit basis."³² The White House deferred a decision to McNutt, whose Federal Security Agency coordinated the need for essential government services. John Kelly, serving under the Indiana democrat, was anxious to expand the power of his Physical Fitness Division from a mere advisory role to one of real authority, and he claimed the coordinator's role for himself.³³ This move, although favored by FDR, was opposed by McNutt and Marvin McIntyre. Mayor LaGuardia, Kelly's former Chief in the Office of Civilian Defense, favored the appointment of General Philip B. Fleming, a former official in the Public Works Administration, for the job.³⁴ Unwilling to commit himself to a political decision on the matter, the President submitted to the informal advice of McIntyre and Daniels in liaison with appropriate war agencies and the military. Washington Senators owner Clark Griffith proposed a format close to the one eventually adopted by the White House. The Griffith measure called for a committee headed by a civilian coordinator with sub-coordinators to carry out government policy for each sport.³⁵

On May 18, 1943, the President announced plans to appoint a three-

man committee for the regulatory task,³⁶ a move which was accompanied by uneasy stirrings among sports enthusiasts as to the purpose of the committee. Wisconsin Representative Laverne Dilweg, suspicious of the regulatory motive, warned that athletics were "so much a part of American way of doing things that to abandon them now...would mark a serious set back in our drive to victory."³⁷ New Jersey Congressman Frank Sundstrom objected to the coordinator proposal, seeing it as an unwarranted interference in private and local affairs. "Leave farming to the farmers, business to the businessmen, and sports to the sportsmen," the former Cornell athlete protested.³⁸ He charged that the government would use its authority to "create an agency for the regimentation of youth," and an unwelcome addition to an increasing federal bureaucracy.³⁹

The issue was finally left to Daniels, who collected an extensive list of precedents and guidelines as developed by the Army, the Office of Defense Transportation, the War Manpower Commission, the Office of Price Administration, and the Rubber Director. This list offered a general guideline for the presidential committee, which was headed by George E. Allen, and offered no significant departure from established policy.⁴⁰ The exaggerated "Coordinator of Sports" scheme fell by the wayside, becoming the subject of occasional humorous jibes between government officers.

Baseball was temporarily mollified by the government's position. The Army Special Services, represented in the policy decision by Alexander Surles, was especially grateful for baseball's well-publicized equipment donations, charity games, and gratis entertainment for servicemen.⁴¹ The Selective Service stood temporarily on the premise that

professional athletics was a "useful" occupation, though non-deferrable, and allowed those men with family dependents to engage in sports without penalty.⁴²

Professional baseball, thanks to McNutt's suffrance in war manpower, made it through 1943. Enough men throughout the leagues were allowed to leave war jobs for the summer without losing their draft proof status, making the quality of entertainment passable.⁴³ Although Selective Service issued new regulations allowing only occupational or physical deferments, men were not required to report for war jobs until October 1, a date which coincided with the end of baseball season.⁴⁴ By the end of the 1943 season, the game was only a shell of its pre-war image, nearly all the good men having been inducted. The minor leagues alone reported nearly 3,700 men in service or in war industry retirement.⁴⁵ Veteran observer Allison Danzig dolefully predicted in May that "if the Allies do not bring Germany to her knees by the end of summer, the baseball owners will probably abandon plans for a 1944 season."⁴⁶

It became obvious that, unless baseball served an extra dosage of war service accompanied by an intense lobbying campaign by its friends, it would fold for the duration, wreaking havoc with its hopes for post-war reorganization.

With the future of the game in question, promoters pressed the contributions of the game to official attention. On May 17, 1943, Clark Griffith wrote a bombastic letter to McIntyre, declaring the absolute essentiality of baseball in the war effort. Offering the dubious claim that "professional baseball is Number One" in the public demand for "outdoor recreational sports," Griffith assumed "that our Government

and Army and Navy heads realize that true value of baseball as a morale asset to our citizens."⁴⁷ Listing an array of baseball contributions in the war, the assertive official pled for baseball's continuance through the use of "older men with families of children." Griffith claimed that ninety percent of the players then participating were of this class and could perform a "double duty" of summer baseball and winter war production. Baseball's reserve list for 1944 enumerated no more than twenty percent of these "older men"; by the end of 1943, it was obvious that baseball would have to use a more reasonable approach. Illinois Senator Scott Lucas presented baseball's case in Congress, listing the "Part of Baseball in Promoting the War Effort." This impressive assortment included contributions to all relief and service agencies as well as War Bond sales, the equipment fund, a breakdown of admissions tax revenue, the collection of scrap metal, rubber, and fats, the gratis admission of servicemen, and blood and scrap drive donors.⁴⁸

National League President Ford Frick proposed a scheme to McIntyre and Daniels "with an idea for a year-round sports program that would enable us to put sports into the war."⁴⁹ This developed into a proposed overseas tour of players and officials, an ambitious enterprise considering the restrictions being placed on domestic operations and the war's increasing transportation demands. In September, 1943, the War Department announced its approval of a Pacific tour,⁵⁰ but it soon backed down when political opposition referred to it as a "new deal trip."⁵¹ Baseball scaled down its earlier plan and accepted a five-man Christmas tour of Alaskan bases under the auspices of the USO.⁵² The precedent established, baseball sent twenty-eight more players and officials to war zones in the fall of 1944.⁵³

The issue of "essentiality" led to a demand for draft deferments from a few people associated with baseball. In January of 1944, J. Taylor Spink, editor of The Sporting News, requested that President Roosevelt classify baseball as an essential industry in order to relieve players employed in war plants for summer play without penalty.⁵⁴ Although Spink did not ask deferment for able-bodied men of prime draft age, his query produced a tempest among the game's leaders. In a publically released letter to Selective Service Director Lewis Hershey, Landis denied any association with any "scheme for the exemption...or special treatment of baseball players."⁵⁵ Griffith stormed at the betrayal of the national pastime's honor, denying that Spink had any "prerogative" in "speaking for baseball."⁵⁶ Spink was probably doing the big league moguls a favor by bringing the issue into the open. Defending himself from knee-jerk jealousy of "prerogative," the editor opened an issue to which the commissioner and others were unwilling to admit publically, that if professional athletes "jumped" defense work for the upcoming season they would be drafted.⁵⁷

Spink was perceptive. Early denied the necessity for the President to make a "supplemental statement" on baseball, asserting that "we have traveled a long way since the President wrote to Judge Landis more than two years ago," and pronounced the Chief Executive's intention of following Selective Service guidelines on the matter.⁵⁸ These guidelines, according to the Daniels' brief of the previous June, made professional sports only as valuable as the demands of the next draft call. So while Landis at the New York baseball writers conference earnestly insisted that his industry wanted "no preferential treatments," Senator Lucas assured those same writers that if baseball was declared non-essential,

"supporters of such a move will be [in] for a battle in Congress...."⁵⁹

By the spring of 1944 baseball was in a delicate position. Although its political support was such that there was little chance that the sport would be shut down, there was the possibility that the leagues would have to close their gates due to manpower losses or repel public opinion through an inferior product or by keeping able-bodied service-age men in the lineups. A War Manpower Commission decision in October, 1943, relating to professional football and hockey helped clarify the manpower picture. The WMC ruled that athletes on professional teams in Chicago could not be prosecuted for "job jumping" by leaving defense plants in order to join clubs to which they were under contract.⁶⁰ However, the Selective Service stayed clear of any outright declaration of essentiality, and baseball opened the 1944 schedules with much trepidation. The game received a cushion several weeks after the season opened when a Philadelphia draft board handed St. Louis Cardinal outfielder Danny Litwhiler what amounted to an essential job deferment. The administrator, perceiving that "baseball as a whole gave a sizeable sum to Army Athletic funds," concluded that professional ball playing contributed to "public welfare, health and interest," thereby qualifying certain registrants a "2-A" classification.⁶¹ Although this decision was rescinded three months later by a presidential appeals board,⁶² it was hailed as a deliverance to the major leagues and produced momentum to aid the profession through the 1944 season.⁶³

It is doubtful if the "low form of comedy" which passed for baseball in 1944 could have been aided materially by the decision, for game days found few familiar faces in the lineups. The defending world champion Yankees were decimated when nine of its players were drafted

during a nine-day span of spring training.⁶⁴ By April the entire pre-war starting team was in service, and only three 1943 regulars were left.⁶⁵ By the year's end, there were more active players in the military than on the playing fields. The 1945 reserve list contained only 1,753 men compared to 5,298 in 1941.⁶⁶ A few young stars remained undrafted by obtaining work in defense plants during the off-season, Stan Musial being the leading example; but mostly the game got along with 4-F's and over-age "re-treads." Although some of these men were very good, there were hardly enough of them to ensure a passable form of entertainment. Good military clubs, such as Great Lakes, beat the best of them, and an assortment of soldiers from Ft. Custer and "sandlot" players from the Ford Motor Plant defeated Detroit in mid-season.⁶⁷

The 4-F reigned supreme. Hal Newhouser of the Detroit "Tigers" had a heart murmur, which kept him at home and at the top of pitching charts. Epileptics, men with ulcerated stomachs, mangled throwing arms or oversized feet found new life in the professional game. This led to unpredictable if not skillful pennant races. "Sluggers" dominated the heavy-footed defenders, and a record number of errors were committed.⁶⁸ Teams walloped each other by astounding scores, and managers went to all lengths to find better players, thereby opening postwar play to new talent. Roosevelt's desire for night baseball was finally fulfilled, the "pros" agreeing to unlimited nocturnal contests midway through the 1944 season.⁶⁹

Landis had to take steps early in March, 1944, to protect sixteen-year-old American Legion players from professional scouts.⁷⁰ This did not prevent the New York "Giants" from holding tryouts for fifty youngsters between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.⁷¹ A desperate manager

from the Cincinnati club even inserted a fifteen-year-old high school boy, Joe Nuxhall, into a game with the Cardinals.⁷² The tempestuous Griffith found a loophole in the draft law and recruited twelve Latin Americans on travel visas. Selective Service regulations required all aliens of ninety days residency to register for the draft; and when this article was enforced, all but one of the men left.⁷³

The season had a poetic ending. The downtrodden St. Louis "Browns" won their only American League pennant with a holdover cast of deferred men, ten of whom were over thirty years old. They later acquired a one-armed short-stop, Pete Gray, who had been named the "most valuable player" in the Southern Association.⁷⁴ The 1944 "trolley car series" between the Browns and the Cardinals was made to order for the ODT, which ruled that only bonafide city residents could attend.⁷⁵

The poor quality of play in the major leagues contributed to the growth of interest in amateur and Negro baseball. The scarcity of white ball players led some observers to call for integration of the major leagues, while the influx of workers into metropolitan areas led to the creation of well-financed semi-professional teams. The public, hungry for superb entertainment, turned out in record numbers to see such Negro teams as the Homestead "Grays" and the Kansas City "Monarchs," which their legendary pitcher Leroy "Satchel" Paige. The National Baseball Congress, which had begun a tournament for amateur players in 1935, held its festivities in the aircraft center of Wichita, Kansas, attracting military and sandlot clubs from across the United States.

Military clubs initially entered the NBC tourney in 1941.⁷⁶ In 1942 six of the top eight finishers were from aircraft industry or Army posts, Boeing Aircraft of Wichita winning the title. For the first time,

a majority of the sponsors represented industrial firms rather than town or community organizations.⁷⁷ The sandlot character of the tournament was lost when former "pro" players serving in the armed forces were allowed to participate under military eligibility rules.⁷⁸ All nineteen representatives of the Camp Campbell, Kentucky, team in the 1943 tournament had been major or minor league players.⁷⁹ A public relations sergeant claimed the 1944 classic had more major leaguers playing in Wichita than in the "big leagues."⁸⁰ Record crowds resulted, and profits for the enterprise climbed.⁸¹ Service clubs dominated the national tournament as the war lengthened. Out of twenty-six entries in the 1943 elimination, twelve were military, and this number swelled to nineteen in 1944.⁸² Boeing Aircraft of Wichita, Northrup Aviation of Hawthorne, California, Camp Wheeler, Georgia, and Sherman Air Field of Kansas, won championships of the first four war-influenced tournaments.

The Negro sports spectacles had become fixed in the public eye in 1941, and World War II accelerated public demand for performances. The Negro all-star game was a record-setting affair in 1941,⁸³ but Brooklyn "Dodger" president Larry MacPhail predicted that the boom itself would keep white clubs from signing star black players.⁸⁴ The plentitude of wartime funds led several groups of performers to strike out on their own. George Herman (Dizzy) Dean organized a team of "barstormers," playing the "Monarchs" and other colored notables; and in 1943, the St. Louis "Stars" were suspended from the National Negro League for this practice.⁸⁵ The granite-like Landis was offended by the popularity of games operating beyond his control and ordered major and minor league organizations not to lease their parks to groups promoting games "allegedly playing for relief but actually a commercial enterprise."⁸⁶

The black leagues were vulnerable to government transportation edicts because of their dependence on chartered bus service. Office of Defense Transportation Chief Joseph Eastman informed league officials in March, 1943, that such conveyances could not be used.⁸⁷ Popularity for Negro baseball continued to soar. The 1943 East-West game, held at Chicago's Comiskey Park, established an all-time record of 51,723 in attendance, and thousands were turned away. The twelve major clubs played more games in 1944 than at any time in their history up to 1950. Kansas City played many "home" contests on the road. This led an Oklahoma City columnist to write:

It has been the same all over the country--full house after full house... [and] increased earnings of the Negro teams best fans--those of their own race....We grant that the Negroes are good entertainers and that they play fine baseball. But clubs like the [Norman] Skyjackets and Fort Riley, laced with big leaguers, play airtight baseball before a comparative handful of fans....There's no denying the fans like a crowd and they'll go where the crowds go.⁸⁸

The Monarchs played over one hundred games in 1944, including numerous exhibitions against Army posts.⁸⁹ Wendell Smith, Sports Editor of the Pittsburgh Courier, proposed that the War Department send black players abroad with the white major league troupe, but the plan did not reach fruition.⁹⁰ Demands that the players be given a chance in the white leagues were current throughout the war. Negro newspaper columnist Dan Deleighbur even scolded black club owners for not promoting wartime opportunities because of their fear of "giving away players."⁹¹ The colorful Bill Veeck reportedly back off from an initial move to purchase the Philadelphia Phillies and sprinkle them with black stars,⁹² and a bill was proposed for the New York legislature to prohibit discrimination in the big league circuits in 1945.⁹³ Although two men did receive

tryouts with the Dodgers in 1945,⁹⁴ it was not until after the war that Brooklyn manager Branch Rickey challenged the color barrier in the white leagues.

Professional football, perhaps drawing response from the "war psychology" of the time, reaped benefits from the period. Despite manpower deficiencies, the game came out of the era with a greater distribution of teams, leagues, and popularity. Although minor league football underwent a demise, war plants financed the organization of "semi-pro" teams which thrived easily on a schedule made up of the numerous military units. Some industrial teams operated at a level previously impossible. One group, the Electric Boat "Diesels" of Providence, Rhode Island, acquired such notables as Clark Hinkle of Green Bay and claimed that the war had changed the days when "the club didn't have the material to cope with the high salaried stars other teams boasted."⁹⁵ The professional brand of gridiron play moved also into areas previously void of activity. The Aero Parts Manufacturing Company of Wichita sponsored a club because of the "large number of college stars working in the local aircraft industry."⁹⁶ The Pacific Coast League grew in the impacted West Coast manufacturing and military complex,⁹⁷ and by the end of the war air travel had led to the creation of three "major" football corporations to accompany the National Football League.⁹⁸

The National Football League attempted to stave off ignominy. Rosters were hacked from thirty-three to twenty-five, and four clubs joined forces temporarily to skirt manpower deficiencies. Many men were able to work at aircraft and munitions factories during the week, practice at night and play on Sundays before voracious crowds. Sammy Baugh continued to run his vital Texas ranch during the week, flying to

the Washington Redskins games on weekends.⁹⁹ This formula ideally suited the manpower czars' conception of morale activity, and the NFL was able to add two franchises in the spring of 1944.¹⁰⁰

Professional football had to forego the younger college graduates who went directly into service. The professional football personnel draft obtained only thirty-four of the two hundred collegians drafted for 1942, and many of them did not finish the season.¹⁰¹ This number slipped to twenty out of three hundred in 1943,¹⁰² after which the selection process was dropped for the duration, the clubs going after discharged veterans and retired players. The 1942 season operated near normal with the use of 235 family deferred men and sixty-nine military reservists out of a roster of 370.¹⁰³ The draft of fathers during the spring and summer of 1943 changed this, and lineups were drastically altered. As in baseball, the franchises operating with older men were most successful. The 1944 champion Green Bay Packers retained twenty-one from its 1943 team, fourteen from 1942, and ten from 1941. The runnerup New York Giants maintained sixteen, seven, and four respectively, while the winless Brooklyn Tigers kept but eight from 1943, only one from 1942, and none from 1941.¹⁰⁴

Even the college game made a startling comeback in 1944, attendance increasing 38.5 percent over depressed 1943. A net gain of 114 was made in schools sponsoring football teams with institutions such as Tennessee, Syracuse, Alabama, and Michigan State returning to the fold.¹⁰⁵ Ohio State University established a record attendance mark, and the University of Wisconsin had a 150 percent increase. The University of Pennsylvania again led the nation by attracting 379,000 in eight games.¹⁰⁶ The loose eligibility rules continued in 1944; only the Southern Conference

returned to the old standards. The V-12 program again served as an important feature in keeping civilian sports alive.

Unlike austerity-ridden 1943, college football in 1944 was able to locate manpower sources separate from campus trainees. Except for the military academies, it was the year of the deferred student, following the "year of the V-5" and the "year of the V-12." Ohio State University had groomed a number of these deferred men from seventeen-year-olds recruited the previous year. The Buckeyes were thus able to win the Western Athletic (Big Ten) title, decisively beat Great Lakes, and finish second to Army in the Associated Press writers poll.¹⁰⁷ A pre-dental student at Ohio State, Les Horvath, won the Heisman trophy. Two other eighteen-year-old halfbacks, Bob Fenimore, a 4-F from Oklahoma A & M, and Claude "Buddy" Young of Illinois were also acclaimed. The electric Fenimore was the product of Jim Lookabaugh's talent search the year before but developed a calcified left leg which forced his deferment.¹⁰⁸ The "Aggies" defeated V-12 laced units from Oklahoma, Texas, and Texas Christian universities, the latter in the Cotton Bowl, losing only to the Norman Navy Base. Tulsa's 4-F's again captured the nation's fancy, tying Southwestern's Marines and besting V-12 Georgia Tech in the Orange Bowl. They lost only to Oklahoma A & M and the V-5's from Iowa Preflight. Wake Forest and Indiana also fielded good civilian elevens.¹⁰⁹ An emphasis on student-body participation returned, thus fulfilling the expectations of many of the sport's boosters who had hoped to make football a type of pre-induction training. Northern Illinois, a college which had a student body of only ninety, fielded a team; and many club teams were organized. Boston College had ninety civilians try for football out of a student body of three hundred. When

the Eagles played Harvard, 44,000 fans turned out for this type of "informal" competition.¹¹⁰

Even the Navy schools had compliments of civilians regaling in sports activity. Pennsylvania had seventeen seventeen-year-old civilians on its V-12 dominated program.¹¹¹ Iowa State had forty-seven trainees and twenty-five civilians.¹¹² Although teams from the Navy colleges were generally better than their civilian counterparts, the Navy Department by 1944 had stripped the colleges of the veteran prewar athletes. Those who remained were serious medical and engineering students or boys scarcely older than other freshman material of the day. The only exception was the assignment of some battle-hardened veterans to the V-12 schools as the result of competitive officer examinations.¹¹³ The Bureau of Personnel took a "no nonsense" approach to the duty of V-12 cadets. Transportation restrictions were tightened, and physical training officers and ships company were denied permission to compete in collegiate athletics.¹¹⁴ By October, 1944, the Selective Service was empowered to draft slower V-12 students directly out of the Naval program.¹¹⁵ Southern California, with its Navy-Marine team, proved to be the strongest V-12 outfit, overwhelming a squad of undefeated seventeen-year-olds from Tennessee in the Rose Bowl. Michigan and Duke were the only other Navy schools to approach the strength of the 1943 service dominated teams. Faced with a dearth of good college football, the Associated Press chose to select its outstanding teams from among all non-professional organizations, including military bases. Only ten collegiate institutions were chosen in the top twenty, and but two of these were truly civilian. Two were the military academies, Army and Navy, which ranked first and fourth; and six represented V-12 schools.¹¹⁶

Military football teams dominated the civilian athletics during the fall of 1944, and more than one hundred "stateside" varsity elevens were fielded. The military academies dominated the collegiate scene, and the huge base and command teams from the Navy and Air Corps were far beyond the ability of contemporary professional clubs. The Bainbridge Navy squad, with its bevy of physical trainees, was said by one NCAA representative to be "the best team this observer has ever seen play."¹¹⁷ The excellence was also maintained by the Norman (Oklahoma) Navy Base, which also was undefeated. James Crowley was transferred from the Pacific theater to the coaching position at Sampson Navy Base and promptly scheduled three games against professional teams. Paul Brown was assigned to Iowa Preflight, then to Great Lakes as a grid coach. George Halas, founder of the Chicago Bears, coached at Norman Navy as did Paul W. Bryant at North Carolina Preflight in 1945.¹¹⁸

The Air Corps committed itself to a broad scale football program. Using air transportation to ferry its teams, the service placed small limitation on the activities of its units. The Second Air Force of Colorado Springs, the Fourth Air Force of March Field, California, and Randolph Field, Texas, fielded successful elevens. Fans clamored for a post-season national championship game between Bainbridge and Randolph but, due to Navy policy, had to settle for the "Bond Bowl" between the Second Air Force and Randolph. Played in mid-December in New York City, the game was a financial flop.¹¹⁹ Randolph also contested March Field in a Pacific Recreation fund game held in Los Angeles before 50,000 fans, including General Arnold. It had a handpicked roster of players.¹²⁰ No less than twenty-three members of its team had appeared in a bowl game of some description. Its defensive backfield alone

included four college All-Americans, including Bill Dudley, the number-one professional draft choice of 1942.¹²¹ The Third Air Force of Morris Field, North Carolina, was "three deep in pretty good men," including eight major college players on its first eleven.¹²² Colorado Springs played in front of 175,000 troops from 105 bases in a fifteen game, eight state schedule.¹²³ The University of Nevada was flown 1,650 miles to play an Air Transport Command team in Edmondton, Alberta.¹²⁴

Frustrated in their attempts to bring together Army and Navy elevens in the States, welfare and recreation officials brought the men together in a Hawaiian Benefit game on New Years Day, 1945. Dubbed the "Poi Bowl," it was actually an All-Star game between the plethora of stars then playing in the Air Corps and Navy varsity programs. Players were shipped out of Bainbridge so rapidly that one Navy official waggishly suggested that the Pearl Harbor coach was probably needing to "plug some weak spots in his team."¹²⁵ The clash, held at Nimitz Bowl in Honolulu, featured seventy-seven gridiron gladiators, sixty-four of whom had played college football, including sixteen professional players and an equal number of All-America performers.¹²⁶

With this panorama of sports unfolding in the United States, it is natural that the "dogface" in the trenches would soon begin to wonder what was going on back home. Despite repeated assurances of sports writers citing some popularity poll indicating that the infantryman or sailor wanted sports to continue, the pursuit of these apparently "non-essential" activities began to be questioned, especially the participation by 4-F men. The 4-F was a much discussed phenomenon in both collegiate and professional sports. "How good is a 4-F?" was an important question to those whose investment in sport was a major business. The

answer often was "very good." Journalist Bob Considine, although admitting that the boys in the trenches wanted civilian athletics to continue, was bewildered by the response of "why ain't that guy in uniform," when a prominent baseball player's name was mentioned among those same troops. Considine remarked:

It's an understandable attitude when you look at some of the G. I.'s and stir up visions of the traditional lean limbed, strong jawed athlete, you see a bag bellied, flat footed sad sack...training perhaps to be knocked off, and he reads about some much finer physical specimen still at home...He thinks that...Joe Blow the fan winds up with the gun and the muscular superman of the stadiums is given permission to stay home, make big dough and have the good time.¹²⁷

This was a sensitive point in the War Department, and General Marshall took time out from the Cairo Conference in November, 1943, to request a special inquiry. Marshall, having read of the exploits of a deferred major league catcher (probably Bill Dickey of the Yankees), whose broken fingers dictated a limited service deferment, charged, "If he can't handle a machine gun, I am no soldier." He determined to have the Inspector General review induction policy to see if Army doctors were involved. "I don't want any damn nonsense about this thing," the General fumed. "I have seen dozens of men with half a dozen serious complaints, in addition to their years, passed by Army doctors--and now to find great athletes, football and baseball, exempted is not to be tolerated."¹²⁸

War Department policy was to blame for the confusion existing around deferments. Beginning in August, 1943, the Army started a wholesale policy of discharging men with physical defects rather than carry out a complex reassignment or retraining program. However, the service was unable to attract the high physical quality man that it had expected,

thus leading to pressures to replenish forces with men previous rejected. Athletes were in the forefront of those called for review, and much publicity was given their passage or failure of examination procedures. Misunderstanding about what constituted a deferrable disability led to suspicion that certain professional athletes were malingering.

An example was the case of Frankie Sinkwich, an All-American half-back at the University of Georgia, whose World War II career closely approximated the fluctuating policies of the military services and the manpower agencies. Sinkwich had won the Heisman trophy as a senior during the 1942 college football season and accepted the uniform of a Marine reservist. Much publicity accompanied Sinkwich's report to boot camp in June, 1943, but due to a case of flat feet and a heart murmur he was discharged after only two months of service. He subsequently played professional football, performing in a Detroit Lion uniform only twelve days after his medical discharge. Criticism of Sinkwich's activities and an abrupt change in Army policy was followed by his induction into that branch the following spring, but he again was discharged for medical reasons. The professional athlete attempted to enlist in the Maritime Service but again was rejected. Meanwhile, the Army again inducted Sinkwich in July of 1944. Rejected once more, Sinkwich was again free to play--and stand out--in the professional football season of that year. By January, 1945, the Office of War Mobilization, sparked by a "work or fight" psychology began to review 4-F's again. Sinkwich was called in April and finally passed his induction physical. In August, he had been trained and assigned to his military task, playing football for the Colorado Springs Air Base.¹²⁹

The fevered opposition to civilian athletes was involved in the move by Congress to pass a national service bill and a directive by Office of War Mobilization Director James Byrnes that the War Department review previous rejections of 4-F men, particularly athletes. By March of 1944, General Marshall, plagued by the shortage of trainees for combat arms caused by inefficiency in the conscription process, was forced to empty the colleges of ASTP pupils to meet demands for the European invasion. At the same time, the War Manpower Commission was disturbed at the number of draft eligible men who were exempted from military duty for work in war industries, jobs that could have been held by men unable to pass draft physicals. The pool of unemployed men began to run out, and both the OWM and the Army were forced to consider new measures to guarantee national mobilization. In April, 1944, Congress rejected the Bailey-Brewster Bill, which had called for drafting physically unfit men for essential war work.¹³⁰ General Marshall was opposed to the measure because of the logistical problems it would bring for the Army. His immediate problem was the acquisition of infantry trainees as the Army still had an abundance of men unacceptable for combat tasks.¹³¹ However, by the next fall both the Chief of Staff and OWM Director James Byrnes were ready for drastic mobilization measures. Allied reverses in the Ardennes pointed to the necessity of increasing the supply of material to the front. Marshall, expressing distaste for the deferment of certain professional athletes from the draft, reversed his stand of the previous March. Having previously resisted efforts to induct more physically disqualified men, Marshall pivoted, inquiring of his deputy, "Is there not some approach...that might be made in the case of famous athletes whom the medical officers are about to turn down?"

Complaining that he frequently saw "soldiers well up in years who... lack the stamina necessary to arduous service....At the same time we have athletes engaging in most sport of football and the strenous sport of baseball...who have been exempted." The general insisted that such men should have their exemption "cleared by higher authority."¹³² Byrnes advised Lewis Hershey on December 9 that it had been "difficult for the public...and certainly it is difficult for me to understand how these men can be physically unfit for military service and yet be able to compete with the greatest athletes of the nation in games demanding physical fitness."¹³³ Peeved with shortages at the front and angered over the rail walkout of December, 1944, the general's attitude demonstrated the government's mood. Roosevelt on January 11, 1945, asked Congress to enact national service legislation in his State of the Union message.¹³⁴

Urged on by the War Department, Byrnes issued a "work of fight" directive on December 23, 1944. He wrote later that a "bottleneck in the critical programs," such as the crash race for atomic weaponry, could be broken by "two hundred thousand able bodied men, willing to do hard work."¹³⁵ Just after the Germans launched their counter-offensive in Belgium, the mobilizataion chief ordered both the closing of race tracks and an investigation by General Hershey of "the large number of young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, allegedly unfit for military service who were featured in professional athletics."¹³⁶ This situation, according to Marshall, had turned "the physical exemption business...in some cases of almost a racket."¹³⁷

On December 15, 1944, Selective Service Director Hershey had directed local boards to "review the classification of men known to be

engaged in professional athletics...."¹³⁸ Hershey's memorandum to local boards on December 23 was timed with Byrnes's announcement and directed attention to the fact that "many registrants who are deferred as physically or mentally disqualified for military service...are, despite their apparent physical defect, engaged in the principal occupation of professional athletics."¹³⁹ Hershey's order for the review of these men had the cooperation of Secretary Stimson, who viewed the regulations as a "work or fight" incentive, thus challenging more men into war jobs.¹⁴⁰ Stimson foresaw little necessity for actually processing these people into the military as a penalty for refusing work in defense plants. Such a plan was contrary to his policy which honored military service as a patriotic duty. Although 12,000 such men had been inducted, a move to channel such overage and physical misfits into a labor draft never materialized.¹⁴¹ The Byrnes-Hershey-Stimson plan added fuel to the administration's drive to have a national service bill passed. The House gave the measure easy approval soon after the New Year, but by spring enthusiasm for the act waned.

Compliance with the spirit of national service was forced without the bill. Numerous athletes found themselves classified 1-A in the draft after a review of their defects. "A man may have a trick knee," observed the acid Byrnes, "but if he doesn't get tricky on a football field, the chances are, he won't get tricky at Verdun or in Belgium."¹⁴² The government's seriousness was indicated when featherweight boxing champion Willie Pep was reinducted despite a medical discharge from the Navy.¹⁴³ The campaign against professional baseball players was almost a purge, and the threat of compulsory national service drove many into essential work.¹⁴⁴ A minimum of 320 players appeared to be necessary

for the leagues to open the 1945 pennant race, and the Associated Press speculated that 462 of the 530 major leaguers were subject to review by Selective Service. Arthur Daley called it the "End of the Trail" for organized baseball; and when on January 9, the Office of Defense Transportation called for a ban on "conventions" of more than fifty people, it looked as if "blinkers" had been applied to the "green light."

The sporting community, which had viewed itself as the leading supporter of war measures, was stunned. Grantland Rice mused that it was because after three years the United States was still fighting only a "60 percent war." On Christmas Eve of 1944, he wrote: "It took the sudden, unexpected and additional loss of life to wake up our home front--to let it know that 60 percent was not nearly enough in the way of a winning effort!" Record sports crowds and an increase in betting were an indication to Rice that the U. S. was not engaging in "an all out war."

"I have never been able to tell just what part of big-time sport is a morale builder and what part is a morale wrecker," said Rice. "We simply overdid it...." The Tennessee sage admitted that many men returning from the front were asking the question of why "clerks and filling station workers could fly planes, carry guns, and storm pill-boxes" while "such fine athletic specimens...were allowed to play professional baseball or professional football."¹⁴⁵

As the reasons for the Byrnes directive became clear, opposition to the new War Department purpose gathered. Resentment gathered over the regulatory measures which suggested a fascist-type regimentation. Government motives were characterized by Arthur Daley as a "discriminatory

ukase."¹⁴⁶ NCAA President Philip Badger suggested that 4-F athletes were being "singled-out" for unjust treatment, but he cautioned member institutions from an inclination to "cling to 4-F's to strengthen athletic teams."¹⁴⁷ Rice accused Byrnes of placing these unfortunate men in a "false position." In an editorial of January 17, 1945, he attacked the War Department for attempting to place restrictions on the pursuit of civilian sporting events on the grounds of war manpower needs while sheltering "more than 480 star athletes" in Special Services programs.¹⁴⁸

Organized baseball had been cautious not to appear self-serving, but its officials abandoned their stand of passivity. Clark Griffith forwarded a brief on baseball's position in the defense program, and National League President Ford Frick abandoned his previous reticence by engaging in talks with government officials in order to gain a redefinition of baseball's position.¹⁴⁹ Griffith claimed that the American way of life was threatened by the elimination of baseball and offered extensive abstractions on baseball's national service record, some parts of which had surely escaped everyone's attention except Griffith. His spectrum of benefits included the combatting of juvenile delinquency, the entertainment of shut-ins, and the maintenance of a substantial part of the communications industry, including sports pages and sports movies. Griffith dredged out the issue that baseball was a "morale builder," claiming that 4,500,000 service men had been given free admission to its games. The sports executive recommended the appointment of a coordinator to direct the shuffling of professional athletes between essential industries and seasonal sporting entertainment, the elimination of all "stigma attached to their participation," and the direction from

Washington of a wartime sports program.¹⁵⁰ Rice, too, called for a "sports coordinator," but expressed doubt that professional sport would "want any such policy" directed by the government. The relationship of sports with the bureaucracy was paradoxical. Federal spokesmen voiced vocal support for the continuance of athletics, but its mechanism hampered the continuance of activities.¹⁵¹ Elements of the steel industry defended the essentiality of baseball, and Congressman Melvin Price of Illinois endorsed ball playing "as a wartime morale builder" which would guarantee worker efficiency and relaxation through "clean sports."¹⁵²

Congress battled over the labor draft issue until April 3, 1945, when the Senate rejected the May-Bailey Bill by a 46 to 29 vote.¹⁵³ With German resistance crumbling rapidly, the reasons for such measures were largely moot. The ban against horseracing was lifted after V-E Day, and baseball's reprieve came in a presidential press conference of March 13, 1945, when Roosevelt responded to the question to whether the "big leagues" would be allowed to operate. "Why not," answered the President. "It may not be as good a team, but I would go out to see a baseball game played by a sandlot team--and so would most people...."¹⁵⁴ The pronouncement was followed a few days later by McNutt's decision to allow baseball players in war plants to return to their summer occupations without losing deferments.¹⁵⁵ Only those holding family type deferments were considered for this allowance according to a War Department release of April 5,¹⁵⁶ and the discriminatory draft of 4-F athletes continued until May 11 when the War Department under threat of investigation by the Inspector General, announced the suspension of its January guidelines to the Selective Service.

The regulation of sport shifted to the Office of Defense

Transportation, whose director, Monroe Johnson, was adamant about reserving public conveyances for necessary travel. On May 12, 1945, Johnson predicted the suspension of bowl games, the world series, and all-star games until six months after the defeat of Japan. He also wanted to allow the holding of the Kentucky Derby on a "trolley-car basis" only. Although these threats were not enforced, major athletic enterprises were startled into submitting travel plans and other fuel saving measures to the ODT for approval.¹⁵⁷ The immediate impact on amateur sport was paralyzing, travel in the last summer of the war being virtually at the whim of the ODT. Unable to invite a single out-of-state amateur baseball team to its 1945 tournament in August, 1945, the popular National Baseball Congress became an elimination tournament for military teams. Twenty-five of the twenty-seven clubs were Army and Air Corps personnel.¹⁵⁸

Had it not been for the well-publicized race-track gambling, organized sport may have escaped some of the restrictions with which it was affected. More than any other sporting event, horseracing reached new levels of public attraction, and the war-inflated economy made race-track gambling a pastime for many workers. Record bets were placed during each year of the war with a peak of \$1.4 billion wagered during 1944.¹⁵⁹ The ODT was constantly concerned with the movement of unnecessary traffic to facilitate track operation, and the OWM questioned the diversion of man hours by the location of the tracks near to defense plants. Racing's chief protagonist, Henry Bayard Swope, served as a public information officer in the War Department, while coordinating racetrack charities as Chairman of the "Turf Committee of America." In November, 1944, the suave and urbane Swope in a letter to FDR claimed

\$16,000,000 in war relief and promised "a healthy cut" to the Infantile Paralysis Foundation to curry the President's favor. However, the operation of certain tracks in the impacted Los Angeles area aroused enough indignation to force Byrnes to order the closing of all tracks until after the defeat of Germany.¹⁶⁰ Although the Greater Los Angeles War Manpower Committee had advised its acceptance of a racing season at Santa Anita,¹⁶¹ worker absenteeism for the parimutual window had raised the ire of the Pasadena city government, which demanded a crackdown.¹⁶² The Byrnes order was implemented by January 3, 1945; and on January 16, Paul McNutt of the War Manpower Commission requested the horse breeding and training industry "release for employment in other industry all males under 46 years of age."¹⁶³ Like alcoholics, thirty customers lapped up the last few days of track operated betting. Over \$5.1 million was wagered in the last eight days of the season in Florida's Tropical Park raceway, a record \$857,414 in the last day alone.¹⁶⁴ Much betting was shifted to foreign tracks until May 9, 1945, when racing was again allowed, just in time for the Kentucky Derby.¹⁶⁵

It was not civilian sport, however, but the military that defined the American sporting purpose during World War II. With mobilization completed, the War Department was set to launch a massive athletic program of its own. Propriety aside, the Army was prepared to seize the initiative in wartime athletics.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹New York Times (October 22, 1943).
- ²Ibid. (December 7, 1943).
- ³Ibid. (December 16, 1942).
- ⁴Ibid. (December 30, 1942; January 6, 1943).
- ⁵Ibid. (August 21, 1943; October 28, 1943; March 12, 1944; August 9, 1944).
- ⁶Ibid. (March 2, 1943).
- ⁷Local Board Memorandum no. 123, April 21, 1943, Local Board Memoranda.
- ⁸Local Board Release no. 181, January 30, 1943, Local Board Memoranda.
- ⁹New York Times (January 26, 1943).
- ¹⁰Letter, U. S. Senator Richard Russell to McIntyre, February 12, 1943, FDR Papers, file 170.
- ¹¹New York Times (February 3, 1943).
- ¹²Ibid. (February 4, 1943).
- ¹³Ibid. (February 7, 1943).
- ¹⁴"Batter (If Still There) Up!," Newsweek (May 3, 1943).
- ¹⁵"War Changes Baseball," Science Newsletter, XLVII (February 13, 1943), p. 110.
- ¹⁶New York Times (April 23, 1943).
- ¹⁷"General Policies with Regard to Spectator Sports," FDR Papers, file 189-A.
- ¹⁸Letter, Stephen Early to Bob Considine, syndicated journalist, January 16, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189.
- ¹⁹New York Times (April 7, 1943).

- ²⁰Ibid. (March 3, 1943).
- ²¹"Wartime Changes in British Sport," report dated February 2, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189.
- ²²New York Times (February 11, 1943).
- ²³Draft of speech, Paul McNutt, Chief, War Manpower Commission, to Lions Club, dated April, 1943, University of Indiana, Lilly Library, Manuscript Department, Paul McNutt Papers, chronological file.
- ²⁴New York Times (February 26, 1943). Non-sporting entertainment was assigned a higher percentage of prewar levels of priority including ninety percent for motion pictures and eighty percent for theater and opera.
- ²⁵U. S. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., XCI, p. 1538.
- ²⁶Letter, Weiss to Roosevelt, March 1, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189.
- ²⁷Memorandum, Roosevelt to Byrnes, March 4, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189.
- ²⁸Letter, Weiss to Marvin McIntyre, April 7, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189.
- ²⁹Letter, Hughes Spalding, lawyer, Atlanta, Ga., to U. S. Senators Walter George and Richard Russell, January 19, 1943, FDR Papers, file 170.
- ³⁰New York Times (January 21, 1943).
- ³¹Ibid. (February 16, 1943).
- ³²Memorandum, Johnathon Daniels, Assistant to the President, to McIntyre, April 14, 1943, FDR Papers, file 170.
- ³³Letter, John Kelly, Director, Office of Physical Fitness, to McNutt, April 15, 1943, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.
- ³⁴Memorandum, McIntyre to Roosevelt, May 4, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189-A.
- ³⁵Clark Griffith draft on Sports Coordinator in letter, Griffith to Roosevelt, May 17, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189-A.
- ³⁶New York Times (May 19, 1943).
- ³⁷U. S. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, XCI, p. 4606.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 2600.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 3807.

⁴⁰ Letter, Johnathon Daniels to George E. Allen, Chairman, Presidential Committee on Sports, June 28, 1943, and draft entitled "General Policies with Regard to Spectator Sports," FDR Papers, file 189-A.

⁴¹ Memorandum, Alexander Surlles to McIntyre, June 25, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189-A.

⁴² "General Policies with Regard to Spectator Sports," FDR Papers, file 189-A.

⁴³ David Quinton Voight, American Baseball (Norman, Oklahoma, 1970), II, p. 260.

⁴⁴ Selective Service Memorandum no. 115-A, August 30, 1943, Local Board Memoranda.

⁴⁵ New York Times (November 24, 1943).

⁴⁶ Allison Danzig, "Sports Carry On, But the Picture Changes," New York Times Magazine (May 23, 1943), p. 23.

⁴⁷ Letter, Clark Griffith to McIntyre, May 17, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189-A.

⁴⁸ U. S. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, XCI, pp. 9515-9517. The meticulous breakdown of baseball's contribution was listed as war relief - \$2,289,702; war bonds - \$1,027,923,225; income and admissions taxes - \$2,289,702; free admissions - 673,677; scrap metal - 654 tons; scrap rubber - 2,813 lbs.; baseball bats - 40,473; balls - 13,491 dozen; mitts, masks and protectors - 1,438 sets.

⁴⁹ Letter, Ford Frick, National League President, to McIntyre, May 4, 1943, FDR Papers, file 189.

⁵⁰ New York Times (September 16, 1943).

⁵¹ Telegram, Fred Jeny to Harry Hopkins, Land Lease Administrator, October 3, 1943, 1944, FDR Papers, file 170.

⁵² New York Times (December 6, 1943).

⁵³ Ibid. (September 21, 1944).

⁵⁴ Letter, J. Taylor Spink, publisher of Sporting News, to Roosevelt, January 28, 1944, FDR Papers, file 170.

⁵⁵ New York Times (February 12, 1944).

⁵⁶ Letter, Clark Griffith to Spink, February 9, 1944, FDR Papers, file 170.

- ⁵⁷ Letter, Spink to Early, February 11, 1944, FDR Papers, file 170.
- ⁵⁸ Early to Spink, February 1, 1944, FDR Papers, file 170.
- ⁵⁹ New York Times (February 7, 1944).
- ⁶⁰ Chicago Tribune (September 17, 1943; October 13, 1943; October 17, 1943).
- ⁶¹ New York Times (June 8, 1944).
- ⁶² Ibid. (September 2, 1944).
- ⁶³ Ibid. (June 10, 1944).
- ⁶⁴ Ibid. (March 27, 1944).
- ⁶⁵ Ibid. (April 18, 1944).
- ⁶⁶ Ibid. (March 4, 1945).
- ⁶⁷ Ibid. (July 18, 1944).
- ⁶⁸ Voight, p. 263.
- ⁶⁹ New York Times (July 12, 1944).
- ⁷⁰ Ibid. (March 24, 1944).
- ⁷¹ Ibid. (March 28, 1944).
- ⁷² Ibid. (June 11, 1944).
- ⁷³ Ibid. (April 16, 1944; July 17, 1944; January 19, 1945); Selective Service Memorandum no. 112, June 3, 1942.
- ⁷⁴ Lingeman, p. 316.
- ⁷⁵ New York Times (August 20, 1944).
- ⁷⁶ National Baseball Congress, Official 1942 Guide (Wichita, 1942), p. 22.
- ⁷⁷ National Baseball Congress, Official 1943 Guide (Wichita, 1943), pp. 13-27, 162.
- ⁷⁸ Wichita Eagle (August 19, 1942).
- ⁷⁹ Ibid. (August 6, 1943).
- ⁸⁰ Ibid. (August 30, 1944).
- ⁸¹ Ibid. (August 31, 1944).

- ⁸² National Baseball Congress, Official 1944 Guide (Wichita, 1944), pp. 4-5.
- ⁸³ Robert Peterson, Only the Ball Was White (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), p. 298.
- ⁸⁴ Daily Oklahoman (July 28, 1942).
- ⁸⁵ Peterson, p. 300.
- ⁸⁶ New York Times (June 5, 1942).
- ⁸⁷ "General Policies with Regard to Spectator Sports."
- ⁸⁸ Daily Oklahoman (August 11, 1943).
- ⁸⁹ New York Times (January 23, 1945).
- ⁹⁰ Letter, Wendell Smith, Sports Editor, Pittsburgh Courier, to Truman Gibson, September 21, 1944, Special Service Records, file 353.8.
- ⁹¹ Tulsa Eagle (September 4, 1943).
- ⁹² Peterson, p. 180.
- ⁹³ New York Times (April 25, 1945).
- ⁹⁴ Ibid. (April 7, 1945; April 8, 1945).
- ⁹⁵ Football game program, Long Island Clippers vs. Electric Boat Diesels, October 25, 1942, Pro Football Library, World War II Minor League File.
- ⁹⁶ Wichita Eagle (August 2, 1942).
- ⁹⁷ Football game program, San Francisco Packers vs. Oakland Giants, November 16, 1944, Pro Football Library, Pacific Coast League File.
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- ⁹⁹ Ibid. (October 20, 1944).
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid. (April 23, 1944).
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid. (December 15, 1942).
- ¹⁰² Ibid. (January 13, 1944).
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- 132 Memorandum, Marshall to Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, January 3, 1945, Marshall Papers, Selective Service folder.
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CHAPTER VI

MILITARY ATHLETICS 1944-1945:

THE ARMY TAKES OVER

Military athletic events had extended throughout the world by 1944. Although the Navy had seized the philosophical initiative in using sports for training, the Army off-duty program rapidly became the largest athletic enterprise ever developed. Early Army planning led to the Special Services Division being given charge of recreational activities through the assignment of special mobile units to service the various Army detachments in the field. This differed substantially from the Navy plan, whose commanding officers largely directed morale activities through athletic specialists under their command. The Army scheme was slower to take root because most of the athletic activities were outside the purview of training. Units going overseas were allowed to requisition the Army "A" kit, which included recreational and sports equipment. Once abroad, the mobile athletic specialists moved in to organize inter-unit and intercamp competition.¹ By March of 1942, training of these specialists was underway at the Army Special Services School at Fort Meade, Maryland;² and by April, the Army had launched a nationwide search for professional administrators in athletics and in physical education.³

Athletics in the Army were technically under the peacetime plan developed in December of 1941; a new outline was not authorized until March of 1944.⁴ Bases both at home and abroad carried on athletic programs

with whatever guidance and advice they could muster. Even under the loose-knit Special Service guidance, athletics in war theaters still grew extensive and contributed to raising the morale of the men. Initiative was seized with whatever material was available. On Midway the organization of Army, Marine, and civilian groups into baseball leagues helped raise morale for the completion of defense facilities.⁵ Even the American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers) in China found time to play a basketball game for refugee relief.⁶

By the spring of 1943, Special Services units around the world had established popular off-duty programs. The European Theater had priority (Special Service deemed the Southwest Pacific too hot for active sports), and in April of 1943 the Special Service field officer sent out a "secret" memorandum calling for more softballs, football bladders, basketball and baseball shoes, and boxing gloves. Basketball was so popular in England that a British Isles championship was played in London's Albert Hall in front of 5,000 people. Such "big league" activities were so prevalent that field representatives feared that "we may walk into trouble and criticism thoughtlessly and needlessly by attempting to set up in the U. K. too extensive an American sports program."⁷ American brass encouraged the morale building activities, and on May 8, 1943, the first "big time" American football game ever held on British soil was played by two Army teams at London's White City stadium before 25,000 spectators, including much of the ETO general staff. The charity game, won by the Artillery "Crimson Tide" over the Engineers "Fighting Irish," even featured girl cheerleaders from the Red Cross.⁸ Not to be outdone, Army and Navy grid squads duelled for the Australian championship on Independence Day in front of a comparable crowd,⁹ and activities

"down under" included a Signal Corps basketball team that played sixty games.¹⁰

Air Corps Special Services Corporal Henry (Zeke) Bonura proved that heat was no obstacle to baseball in North Africa by scavenging enough materials to build twenty ball diamonds within months after the fall of Tunis.¹¹ The enterprising Bonura also promoted the "hottest bowl game in history" on January 1, 1944, one of many New Year Day games held around the world by servicemen. The attraction, played in Oran, was dubbed the "Arab Bowl," but due to a lack of equipment featured a touch football doubleheader. The clash attracted 15,000 curious servicemen, Frenchmen, and Arabs. Halftime activities included parachuting and camel races, the latter between Red Cross and WAC girls.¹² The 1943 sports boom in the Middle East found nearly all units engaged in boxing, swimming, and baseball, which even the British began to popularize.¹³

Bowl games overseas rivaled in number those in the United States by New Year's Day of 1945. The sports-minded G. I. viewed football matchups from Hawaii to Bermuda, as well as in London, Florence, and Marseilles. The dungaree clad WACs had grown sophisticated, donning scanty majorette costumes and vying for football queen, much to the delight of the homesick doughboy.¹⁴ An estimated 25,000 men participated in the sport of basketball in the United Kingdom during the winter of 1944-1945, and when eliminations were held to determine a champion of the American bases there, the 2,000 teams involved made it the largest sports set-up ever to be unified in a single American effort. One team alone, the Troop Carrier "Pipers," by January of 1945, had recorded 135 games, losing only seven.¹⁵

The European Theater featured baseball leagues, basketball

tournaments, "bowl" games and track meets. American and British boxing teams pounded out the ETO championship, and major league players were matched in the first ETO World Series played in Britain during the fall of 1943.¹⁶ General Mark Clark's Fifth Army, bereft of track shoes, even staged a track and field championship in Rome's Mussolini stadium only a fortnight after its capture.¹⁷

Sergeant Joe Louis Barrow and Corporal Walker Smith (Sugar Ray Robinson) were detached to Special Services for exhibition tours in Army camps in the fall of 1943; then Louis was sent overseas for an eight-month tour of bases in the ETO, arriving back in the States in October of 1944. The Louis troupe visited 275 units and hospitals on the tour, and the champion continued to provide fight exhibitions for troops throughout the United States until the end of the war.¹⁸

It is hard to assign a value to sports in the military effort. Off-duty sports were seemingly popular. One Navy official placed participation just below letters from home and movies as a source of morale,¹⁹ and overseas publications constantly offered a heavy dose of sports news. Well known sporting author, John R. Tunis, however, placed sports in last place in interest among front-line troops. He claimed that they would much rather have heard about general home-front news, or news of the war and international affairs and stories of fighting by individual units. Tunis ridiculed "the promoter who says his sport is necessary to the war effort...."²⁰

Army researchers in 1944 discovered that ninety percent of the enlisted men in the United States believed that sports were an aid to preparing men for combat, although over half did not participate in athletics either on or off duty.²¹ The Army published material that

was at least superficially supportive of this theory. A postwar evaluation of the performance of American troops in combat showed that of all men whose performance fit a "best adjusted" scale, sixty-two percent participated a great deal in at least one body-contact sport. Conversely, only five percent of the combat troops who had symptoms of neuroses indicated that they had engaged in such activity. Further evaluation revealed that incentives for combat were closely associated with group solidarity, goal accomplishment, and "duty," all of which may also be closely identified with sporting behavior, especially team sports. Lower incentives were derived from the need for survival, "idealism," vindication, and discipline, which, although not outside the realm of sport, did not seem to be as closely associated with team play. References to home and community also were high as a motivating force, a possible indication of high primary group involvement.²²

Facilities for Army athletic competition either in or out of training were inadequate until late in the war, much equipment being held for use in the massive demobilization plan. If combative sports were emphasized, they had not been overwhelmingly accepted by troops in training. Football ran fourth in an Army survey of the popularity of off-duty games. It ranked only ninth as a pastime when all recreational sports were considered, while boxing was tenth. A control group of aviation cadets ranked them second and fourteenth respectively. Softball, basketball, and swimming consistently surpassed the major contact sports in popularity.²³

Although the Army increased its emphasis of athletics in 1944 and 1945, the Navy was not immobile. The sometimes harsh dialectic between advocates of combative varsity sports and those of intramural games had

stilled, and the Navy's unique conditioning activities were firmly entrenched in theory. Any doubt as to where the Navy stood with regard to football and other rugged contact sports was erased by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox in a speech to the Washington Touchdown Club on January 11, 1944. Specifically disagreeing with War Secretary Henry Stimson, who had been reluctant to find a place for team sports in the Army, especially football, Knox remarked:

...We think there is a definite relationship between the spirit which makes great football players and the spirit that makes great sailors and soldiers....We in the Navy definitely believe in the type of physical exercise and sports which involves bodily contact with your opponentAnd I don't know anything that better prepares in peace for bodily contact, including war, than the kind of training we get on the football field.²⁴

Performance reports of V-5 trained pilots were extremely complementary, and there was a widespread acceptance of the Navy athletic program. Frank Wickhorst, who succeeded Tom Hamilton as Director of Physical Training in BuAero, defined the athletics-trained pilots as "marvelous."²⁵ They were "flying fools," remarked Commander William R. (Killer) Kane, Navy ace, who was to head the training program in 1945.²⁶ Kane's own battle experience as well as his athletic background lent credibility to preflight athletics. Kane offered a precise analogy between combat flying and sports. He reduced the carrier pilot's formula for aerial proficiency to four characteristics: "aggressiveness," "coordination," "discipline," and "toughness." "Flying tight formations," he wrote, "calls for timing and coordination that is duplicated on the football field by the offensive play of the lineman, the menace of the backs ahead of the ball carrier, the open field running of the ball carrier himself." To Kane, this discipline was of the type maintained by the group, teamwork in which there was no room for "an individualist, a

non-conformist, [who] becomes a menace to his own mates."²⁷

It was the team, the group, which inspired men both to play hard and fight hard. Not only was Kane aware of this, but so was Hamilton, who used his athletic-influenced philosophy in replacing carrier pilots in the Pacific. Detached from the Enterprise to serve as training officer for Pacific Air Command during the last six months of the war, Hamilton soon perceived that the keeping of fighter divisions together as combat teams worked better than replenishing one or two men in each four-man division.²⁸ Morale and efficiency were kept at an optimum.

The Bureau of Medicine also sought evidence for the efficiency of preflight training. Late in 1944 four BuMed psychologists were assigned to the Pacific combat zone to obtain performance evaluations of 1,354 pilots with physical training records. It was discovered that pilots with high performance ratings had done better in preflight athletic training than those whose ratings were not as high. The same men also proved to have participated more in high school and college athletics and were bigger and stronger than their lower performing counterparts. However, the psychological testing proved inconclusive because a larger number of low athletic achievers had also performed well in combat flying, and it was difficult to measure the impact of the athletic training on those performance. There was a great deal of confidence shared in the value of athletic training, and nothing had occurred to discredit the method although the thrust was to keep men in training longer.²⁹

The Navy moved early to establish athletic accommodations for its forward areas. In a letter to New York Times sports editor Arthur Daley, former preflight coach James Crowley wrote that within days of establishing a base in the South Pacific, Navy Seabees had gouged out "ten ball

fields, four volleyball courts, one soccer field,...boxing and wrestling accommodations."³⁰ In addition to regularly scheduled games, the Navy sponsored an All Pacific boxing championship on Guadalcanal on Christmas night, 1943, in which twenty-four boxers from twelve divisions battled for medals awarded by the Chief of Physical Training, Gene Tunney, who was on tour of Navy athletic facilities.³¹

Throughout the Pacific, Naval forces utilized sports in training. The Marine Corps, in particular, used athletics to maintain combat readiness. The Marine philosophy of training included "battlefield teamwork," which built, as in Navy pilots, "an aggressive fighting spirit," along with "confidence, the will to win, and the ability to think and act quickly and effectively under fire." Marine Corps assault teams were demanded to be in top-flight condition, and its physical training, although modeled in organization after that of the Navy, had its own internal structure, and several collegiate football coaches were closely involved with it. Marine amphibious divisions usually had three to four months between operations; and one, the Fourth Marine Division, was regrouped during the fall of 1944 between the Siapan and Iwo Jima Operations. All forms of supervised athletics were used to build each man back to his normal weight, strength and maximum physical stamina. Each battalion was encouraged, with the effort of small unit leaders, to put together league teams in baseball and football. This was essential to keep the men in fighting trim. Athletic and morale officer Pat Hanley, former football coach at Northwestern University, saw that every available space was bulldozed for games. The division football squad went on to win the championship of the Pacific Ocean area, and the team was part of the amphibious forces to hit the beaches on

Iwo Jima in February, 1945, losing ten dead and twenty-one wounded.³²

Hawaii was the recreation area of the Pacific, and the Navy dedicated the Nimitz Bowl on May 23, 1944, as the showplace facility for its recreational sports program. Beginning with an All Pacific Boxing Championship in May, the services unified their Pacific theater activities on Hawaii with a series of Army-Navy championship events, including two track meets in 1944 and 1945, a 1944 baseball "World Series" and the 1945 Poi Bowl. The baseball series was held between September 22 and October 5, 1944, and a host of professional players played. They included Joe Gordon, Phil Rizzuto, and the Dimagio brothers, Joe and Dominic, for the Army. Among the Navy players were John Mize, Johnny Vander Meer, LeRoy "Pee Wee" Reese, and Virgil "Fire" Trucks.³³ The popular nine-game series prompted a military publicist to call for the St. Louis Cardinals to "abandon the title of world champion...or come on out here and prove their right to it,"³⁴ and one baseball manager suggested that a presidential trip to Hawaii was made so that the diamond fan FDR could "see a major league game."³⁵

It was obvious that the Navy version of wartime baseball was superior to the major leagues. During spring training in the states, one base, the Curtis Bay Coast Guard, won five out of five against major league teams, most of which were incredibly weak. The New York Giants won only two of five exhibitions against military teams, and the all amateur West Point team shut out the Brooklyn Dodgers.³⁶ The sports-loving Admiral Chester Nimitz was anxious for the 1945 world series to be played in the Pacific, and a task force of Navy and Marine Corps representatives held meetings with baseball officials in June, 1945, to work out the details. The Navy proposed that the series be played in

rotation from Pearl Harbor, Guam, and the Philippines for the benefit of military personnel, the eventual world champion then touring the Pacific in exhibition play against service teams.

The Marine officer in charge of the meeting suggested that the Navy meet baseball's objections to the arrangement by playing on its vulnerability to public criticism. Marine Major R. C. Torrance wrote that "a ball player that is fortunate enough to have played baseball during the war period certainly now should be willing to take a few risks for the benefit of others who...would probably be playing organized ball under normal conditions."³⁷ The baseball representatives countered by proposing a tour of forty all-stars, a plan the Navy judged "too excessive," and was turned down by Nimitz with the aside that "such teams are already available from among the services in the area." The war soon ended, and speculation on the project ceased.³⁸

The Navy was anxious to slow down its free-wheeling sports operations at about the same time the Army and Air Forces were promoting such public relation events. The Bureau of Personnel prohibited the use of ship's company in collegiate athletics at the beginning of the 1944 football season; and on March 14, BuPers Chief Randall Jacobs attempted to dissolve aggregations of well-known athletes by forbidding their retention beyond the "normal period of duty or training in a particular command..."³⁹ BuPers did not back down on its insistence of military purity in the sports arena, and immediately after V-J Day a long directive was issued by Secretary Forrestal which substantially codified wartime guidelines for the peacetime Navy.⁴⁰ This order was liberalized in April of 1946 when Forrestal issued a "sports for all hands" order and removed travel and participation restrictions.⁴¹

There was much admiration within Special Services for the Navy programs as well as the initiative shown by the Air Corps in utilizing the athletic talent that it had for publicity and training purposes. There were other advocates of a unified and planned athletic program for the Army. Chief athletic officer Ted Bank emphasized interunit competition in both training and in the field all the way down to the squad level. Bank, in a speech to the NCAA on December 29, 1941, had advocated cross country competition in training on the platoon level and was a great advocate of football.⁴² He idealized it as a war game involving the strategy of offensive thrusts, organizing of strong points in the main line of defense, combining ground and air operations, and maintaining a mobile reserve.⁴³ Bank's hope for the combination of athletics and training were marked by conditions in some early war fronts. Long periods of inactivity between engagements and the build-up of men and supplies in some areas had given rise to boredom, physical inactivity, and frustration.

In a confidential report to the Chief of Special Services training, Bank argued for the integration of physical training with military drill through organized athletics. Citing conditions in the Southwest Pacific where, once acclimated, men had organized extensive sports and games, Bank pointed out that "more emphasis on planned physical training in SWPA can have an important effect on the conditioning of troops."⁴⁴ The only real unification of athletics with physical training had been through ill-conceived War Department public relations ventures, and anything that smacked of those schemes was rejected outright. A plan by Special Services to conduct an All-Army boxing tournament in 1943 was opposed by General Marshall as a diversion from training.⁴⁵ Although

prevented from incorporating his athletic theories with training, Bank closely identified the physical activity of an infantryman with those of the athlete. In a speech to the Amateur Athletic Union on December 7, 1942, Bank compared the conditioning activities in training to the "overload principle," in which a man is conditioned to do more than he would be normally capable of doing due to the positive shouts and encouragement of his comrades. These types of calisthenics, along with "ranger exercises," "grass drills of the football conditioning type," running, relays, combatives, rope climbing, tumbling, aquatics, and various doses of competitive sports, had been combined to create the Army physical training program.⁴⁶

Special Service Chief Brehon Somervell launched a program to integrate athletics into duty-time as well as off-duty activity. General Somervell directed that an Army-wide plan be placed into operation in March of 1944. The syllabus for a twenty-six-week program was submitted to the general on July 26, and it began on September 3, 1944. The unification of athletics was designed to implement standardized instruction. Participation was held from the platoon through service command tournaments, including championships for both the Army and Air Corps. Trained Special Service Units carried out the program. An Athletic Branch was created within the Special Services Division in August, 1944, to supervise the plan.⁴⁷

An Athletic Steering Committee was created from civilian sports leaders, and the Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation reactivated the old subcommittee on athletics (renamed the Athletic Advisory Council) to lend advice to the new operation for interservice cooperation and logistics. The JANC subcommittee retained a nucleus of

of its old membership, including Philip Badger, Charles McCloy, Seward Staley, and John Griffith, and the Negro representative, Edwin Henderson, among others. The Army Steering Committee was offered ex-officio membership. The latter was a publicity and entertainment oriented sports group, and it included a number of collegiate athletic directors as well as Badger, Delbert Obertauffer of Ohio State University, Arthur Daley of the New York Times, National League President Ford Frick, and Avery Brundage of the Sports Federation.⁴⁸ There was Navy objection to Henderson's participation on the Council, but Army insistence kept him on.⁴⁹ Henry Clark, Chief of the Army Athletic Branch, directed the Steering Committee's deliberations. The presence of Daley as well as Arch Ward of the Chicago Tribune on the groups guaranteed that the operation would catch the public's attention. The purposes as outlined by the steering group were formulated in New York from August 14-19, 1944. These included the provision of a mass athletic program, the teaching of sports skills, and the organization of another inter-allied games as had been done after the Armistic of 1918. A plan for accompanying the demobilization of troops abroad was also begun. Personnel for administering the program were derived from the Ft. Meade program and the Army schools for personnel services at Lexington, Virginia, and Camp Sibert, Alabama. Training included courses in the organization and administration of athletics, equipment maintenance, public relations, game theory, conditioning, and physical efficiency testing.⁵⁰

The main departure of the Army effort was that for the first time athletics were established as an "integral and necessary part of the daily life of each soldier-during duty-time" as an acceptable and

enjoyable means of properly conditioning troops, during leisure-time as a vehicle for providing activities, facilities and programs for recreation" (Italics added). Emphasis was placed first on the combative sports for their physical and psychological conditioning value, then on the recreational for their civilian carryover thrust. Every soldier was required to participate in swimming and boxing. Selection of activity in another major sport, including football, basketball, baseball, volleyball, or softball, was mandatory.⁵¹ Competition was organized through three outlets. The overseas program, including the demobilization effort, and those for the Zone of Interior and for Army civilian facilities.

The latter program was unique in that civilian employees of the Army competed. It was the one program developed by Special Service in which the Women's Army Corps was significantly engaged. A morale-raising venture, it was one of the first successes in the service-wide unification project. Beginning in April of 1944, thousands of clubs representing uniformed and civilian personnel were soon engaged in softball and basketball contests in community leagues across the country. Supported by dues-paying athletic associations, this effort occupied an estimated fifty percent of the civilian employees. By October 15, 1944, 1,608 assorted teams had played in 11,915 contests involving 15,623 individuals.⁵² The sport of softball was popular in this operation, and the war helped to spread the game as Special Services emphasized the distribution of manuals throughout all commands.⁵³ No less than 67,000 military softball squads were formed during the war, twenty-five winning state championships of the Amateur Softball Association. One team, from the Hammer Field Reception Center in California, won the National

Championship in 1943 and 1944.⁵⁴

The neglect of women in Army physical training was partially absolved by the softball program. The official Army position was that women did "not know how to play most games well enough to get much exercise out of them." Therefore Army physical fitness concentrated on body conditioning exercises and left "sports and games as the dessert of the program." Consequently instruction in physical fitness for women concerned such subjects as lifting heavy objects and learning how to fall down without getting hurt.⁵⁵

Prior to the effort generated by the creation of the Athletic Branch in 1944, the Army relied largely on post squads sponsored by base athletic clubs to carry on its athletic program. This voluntary program reached up to sixty percent of the men on some bases with the club concept reaching as far down as the company level.⁵⁶ Some individual officers demanded that off-duty time emphasize athletic games. However, few Army posts could field the veteran material in varsity football contests afforded to their Navy and Marine counterparts. Generally collegiate material and officers were scarce on Army squads.⁵⁷

The Army Air Corps was ahead of the Army in perceiving advantages from athletics in physical training. Commanding General H. H. Arnold heartily emphasized athletics, although flyers were held out of contact sport. Arnold directed the beginning of a strong emphasis on physical conditioning in February, 1941, and the next month a suitable training center was organized at Maxwell Field, Alabama.⁵⁸ A series of exercises for prospective pilots was devised, including calisthenics, coordination drills, dual combatives (with emphasis on strength and coordination rather than ruggedness as in the V-5), track and field, swimming,

tumbling and trampoline, mass games, and reflex drills.⁵⁹ Six-man football was extensively used on the intramural level,⁶⁰ and Arnold encouraged varsity athletics at giant air bases. Later in the war, their activities expanded into airborne continental championships between Air Forces and Bomber Commands. The Air Corps, with Arnold's insistence, was the only branch of service to allow its teams to participate in civilian football bowl games. The precedent was set when Second Air Force from Ft. George Wright, Washington, was given an enthusiastic sanction to participate in the 1943 Sun Bowl in El Paso, Texas, by Arnold and Chief of Air Staff George Stratemeyer.⁶¹ This later led to Randolph Field's trip to the 1944 Cotton Bowl. Arnold was even in favor of handpicking a number of Army players to test the powerful Great Lakes Navy eleven for one of Joe E. Brown's relief drives in 1943.⁶² The Air Corps in 1944 also gave impetus to its sports program by integrating its unique physical training setup with Special Services athletic projects.⁶³ By that fall the Air Branch was committed to the concentration of famous athletes at particular bases, the organization of elite coaching staffs, and the use of transport aircraft to fly teams long distances for play.⁶⁴ Plans for an Air Force "super football conference" were announced on June 17, 1945, which included the four continental Air Force commands, the Training Command Air Transport Command, and the Personnel Distribution Command. The Air Corps liberally assigned men to perform in all-star games and championship tournaments, the "Poi Bowl" in Honolulu on New Years of 1945 being a leading example. That branch practically saved the 1945 National Amateur Baseball tournament from being extinguished by sending eighteen of its top-flight teams to the finals in Wichita, Kansas.⁶⁵ Plans for an even broader scale series

of events began through the Steering Committee in August of 1944. Special Services detachments had already been sent abroad to assist support troops and men in training to utilize their off-duty time, but the decombatization project required more precise organization.

The Special Projects Section of the Athletic Branch was activated on October 15, 1944. Its first priority was to contact and organize civilian and military sports celebrities to entertain and instruct troops in the various theaters. A number of sports films for the project were acquired, and five instructional teams left the United States in November. A key component of the overseas program was the Army Athletic Staff School, established by order of Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower on February 8, 1945. This school opened in Paris at the Cite Univeritaire on March 8. Its staff of ten officers and civilian experts and ten enlisted men taught classes in major sports for the orientation of athletic officers of the various commands. The one-week school was then offered to Special Service personnel down to regimental level. By May 27 twelve classes of 100 students each had turned out 1,200 trained athletic officers, including three classes of WAC instructors. After closing temporarily, the school reopened on June 11 for four weeks with a format aimed at training coaches and sports officials. Although the Air Corps version of this plan began as early as February 27, 1945, V-E Day initiated the Army operation, replacing combat field maneuvers and close order drill with sports and games.⁶⁶

The demobilization sports program began for combat troops as soon as feasible after their operating areas were secured. Some divisions switched to this type of training in mid-May, 1945; and by June this most extensive athletic program in the history of American sport was

well underway. Army press releases suggested that sports would "decom-
batize" the soldier. Sports writer Arthur Daley, who had advocated
sports for the psychological war conditioning they gave, welcomed the
new plan as ideal for eliminating "anti-social" behavior, giving the
"G. I. Joes a wholesome outlet for their animal spirits and vigor..."⁶⁷

So rapid was the adoption of the reconditioning project that, de-
spite the stockpiles in the Army warehouses, Special Services was caught
without enough equipment. Welfare and recreation equipment was not al-
lowed for use in the physical training program, and appropriations the
previous November had not been soon enough to avert extensive shortages.
On March 9, 1945, enough athletic equipment for 500,000 men was re-
quested for the Army Ground Forces, but this was denied by the War De-
partment. On May 19, the Department denied any further use of recrea-
tion equipment for duty-time activity despite the fact that much of the
gear used by the ground troops had been hauled uselessly around Europe
during a year of combat and was quickly scavenged.⁶⁸ Another appeal on
June 19 by AGF for extra equipment was denied, but a compromise was
reached by which a fixed percentage of enlisted men welfare funds was
attached for the purchase of physical training material. The "foul up
was not corrected until September of 1945 when the appropriations were
activated. By this time the war had ended, and there was a greater de-
mand than ever for equipment which made the plight of the Special Ser-
vices operation "disappointing in the extreme."⁶⁹ Facilities for the
sports venture were not as great a problem. In Germany, where physical
culture was well established, American units appropriated stadiums,
olympic size swimming pools, and running tracks as booty, renaming them
after their units and "living off the fat of the land."⁷⁰

Half the training day was often devoted to the sports program. The activities of several units are indicative of this philosophy. After securing its occupation zone on and around V-E Day (May 7, 1945), the Forty-Fifth Infantry Division distributed all athletic equipment on hand, appropriated the use of a sports stadium, and sent its Special Service staff to the school in Paris. One regiment alone organized twenty softball teams.⁷¹

The Army zone of the interior program went into operation on April 5, 1945, replacing the "peacetime" plan of 1941. A minimum of four hours per week was recommended to be devoted, and an outline of seasonal competition was devised. Traveling sports clinics were organized, made of teams of three to five men, in order to familiarize base operations with organization of teams, teaching techniques, and rules. Service Command Championships were established for varsity team sports, and a national championship was held for track and field. Varsity athletics were organized from the regimental level on up, with intramurals developed down to platoon.⁷²

Equipment for this vast enterprise constantly lagged behind the demand. In June, 1941, the Quartermaster Corps began working on a list of specifications for Special Services sporting goods; after the war began, Army bidding occupied producers up to a year in advance to catch up with the need.⁷³ From February, 1942, to April, 1944, \$20,000,000 worth of athletic supplies were reportedly shipped out of the Kansas City Quartermaster establishment, including \$1,000,000 worth of softballs and \$1,700,000 in basketballs and footballs.⁷⁴ When the vast demobilization duty time program was planned in the summer of 1944, new appropriations had to be made since Army regulations prohibited the use

of recreational equipment in training. An initial budget of \$7,800,000 was granted, ninety percent of which was directed to the European theater. Included were expenditures for 563,000 softballs, 240,000 mitts, 360,000 softball bats, 183,000 volleyballs, 100,000 baseballs, 34,000 basketballs, 65,000 basketball uniforms, and 17,000 sets of football togs. After this first response, the Quartermaster Corps began to stockpile equipment for the demobilization program, and inventories by November, 1944, had surpassed the initial allotment. Readied for shipment among other items were no less than 457,000 athletic supporters and 360 vaulting poles.⁷⁵ Enough equipment for 238,000 softball teams, 65,000 baseball squads, and 30,000 football units had been produced by 1945; and all services were ordering at a rate of \$38,000,000 worth of sports equipment per year.⁷⁶

The peacetime athletic syllabus which guided Special Services in the organization of athletics did not intervene in the segregated conditions that existed between white and "colored" troops in the Army. Black troops participated in the off-duty recreation program, but athletic contests held were in conjunction with other Negro units. War Department historian Charles Lee wrote, "Negro units with athletic teams...sometimes found their morale lowered rather than raised by virtue of having teams." With no sanction to play against white units or to use post facilities at the same time as whites, Negro athletic squads took on a vagabond image, frequently having to play reformatory, prison, high school, or college teams of their own race when post clubs were not available.⁷⁷ The controversial Army War Football, Inc., had no colored players, a fact noted by the black press. Attempts by Negro citizen groups to raise a segregated Army team of their own to play for

war relief were made, and a promotion for an "All-Star Negro Army Football Team" was appealed to President Roosevelt by the "Pigskin Club," which promoted education benefits for black youth.⁷⁸ Although this appeal went unheeded, progress in the field of interracial athletic competition within the Army was made.

Edwin B. Henderson, lone Negro member of the Joint Army-Navy subcommittee on athletics, requested credentials to inspect athletic facilities in Negro camps shortly before Pearl Harbor and within days after his committee appointment.⁷⁹ Henderson, who was the Chairman of the High School Physical Education Department for Washington, D. C., and had authored sporting literature for Negro youth, immediately became an "activist" in promoting increased opportunity for black soldiers. Henderson prepared a paper which posted the advantage of wartime social change to the advantage of interracial reconciliation through the use of recreation.⁸⁰ In a letter to War Department Negro Civilian Aide William Hastie, Henderson developed this same approach for the creation of social harmony within the Army.⁸¹ Hastie encouraged Henderson to develop this theme through the JANC subcommittee with the suggestion that Henderson limit the scope of his recommendations to selected camps on a trial basis.⁸² Henderson quickly submitted his plan in a letter to subcommittee Chairman Philip Badger in which he observed that since many colored troops paralleled the treatment of Negroes in America with Nazi discrimination against European minorities, sport could be used to bring about mutual respect between the races among American combat forces. Henderson argued:

In a short while colored and white soldiers will be serving our Nation on many battlefields. In some combat zones white and colored soldiers will be called upon to do battle

or rescue where race lines will be obliterated. Why not begin in the training camps to eliminate some of these traditional resentments that have grown up and lie dormant in the minds of many soldiers in separate units? Why not try this plan of using athletic competition to cement a unity of purpose and good feeling between our armed forces before they arrive on fields fighting our common enemy.

Henderson's plan was developed around the theory of encouraging athletic contests between individuals "that have the least number of elements of friction," then proceeding to the more combative dual sports, and from there to team or group contests in which the progression from physical dexterity to a combination of skill and aggressiveness were again emphasized. Henderson's suggestions were initially rebuffed by Philip Badger, who cautioned the black educator that the athletic subcommittee was only advisory.⁸³ Having been refused in his initial effort to secure a tour of camp recreation facilities, Henderson repeatedly requested the opportunity for "evaluating some of the programs and making suggestions of possible value."⁸⁴ Following meetings with representatives of Special Services on July 2 and again on July 3, 1942, Henderson's tour was authorized.⁸⁵ Although the educator's tour was screened to include the less delicate cantonments, he was impressed enough by the few examples of interracial athletics to write Badger a hopeful letter on September 16, 1942, in which he declared, "I am still of the opinion that through sports we can overcome intolerances that may seriously handicap total war effort."⁸⁶

Henderson's efforts were partially vindicated when on March 5, 1943, the War Department ordered the desegregation of all Army recreation and athletic facilities.⁸⁷ Camps in the States continued to offer segregated athletic programs, and those operations became notable in their own right. Individual Negroes participated on white post teams as

early as the fall of 1942,⁸⁸ and by the following autumn, completely integrated football squads were organized overseas.⁸⁹ In the Army, Negroes from the Ninety-Second Infantry Division dominated the Fifth Army track and field meet at Rome in 1944,⁹⁰ and all four amateur boxing champions in the ETO all-allied meet held in December, 1944, were colored, including Light Heavyweight Champion Ezzard Charles.⁹¹ Charles, an infantry private, later earned the world heavyweight title.

Several outstanding football teams representing black establishments graced the domestic scene in the fall of 1943; one which consistently caught the public eye was the Tuskegee Army Airfield "Warhawks" of Tuskegee, Alabama. The Warhawks represented the elite among black military establishments in the United States; by 1944 they commonly played before large football crowds, ranging as high as 20,000 to 22,000 people. Coached by former Ohio State University tackle William Bell, the Warhawks were representative of aggressive Air Corps measures to emphasize athletics. In 1944 Tuskegee defeated both Wilberforce and Morgan State colleges to claim the unofficial title of Negro football champion in the United States.⁹² By 1945 the base claimed one of the most powerful units in the United States, either white or black. Having lost only one game to a black service team in two years, the Warhawks, despite official Navy opposition, successfully matched a game against the New London Submarine Base gridders for Thanksgiving Day. Inclinations by the Bureau of Personnel to torpedo the encounter on the basis that the Polo Grounds in New York City was not the official home playing field of either team were overcome by the "delicacy of the problem" and the "racial factor involved." The Submarine Base game became a landmark test for interracial athletics, since both a Navy establishment and a

test of supremacy were at issue. Tuskegee won the grid encounter 14 to 7.⁹³ The war frequently brought white and black men together on the athletic field, especially overseas; although integrated infantry platoons did not appear until January of 1945, fighting men were commonly associating on the fields of vicarious sporting combat long before that time.

The most spectacular project of the Athletic Steering Committee was the organization of an Army demobilization program for all theaters. As the federal government was concerned about reconversion, the military was interested in "decombatizing" the soldiers with sports. This paradoxical program was implemented in Olympian proportions. On the one hand, sport forms had been used to prepare men psychologically for combat; on the other, the demobilization activity meant to use group games to return men to the rules and orderly behavior of society. As armed forces ground to a halt with the defeat of the Axis, it was feared that occupational boredom would affect the discipline, efficiency, and motivation of troops. Special Services planned a massive program of duty-time sports to be implemented upon the surrender of Germany for ground combat troops. This concept had been utilized after World War I through the Interallied Games.⁹⁴ By July, according to reports from the 222nd Infantry Regiment, a "majority" of all men was taking part in some phase of the duty-time sports program. Consignments of athletic gear increased immediately after V-J Day (September 2, 1945), and schedules were adjusted to give all men a chance to participate. By September 26, 1945, "every man" in the 222nd was taking part.⁹⁵ The weather, availability of equipment, facilities, and the mass participation of personnel dictated an emphasis on the sports of softball and track and field.

Baseball was played on the varsity level, regimental boxing teams organized, and golf tournaments held before the summer was out. Men of the Forty-Fifth Division staged sixty-six softball games in one eleven-day period, and it was not unusual for two hundred men to participate in a battalion track meet. A surprising number of soldiers gamely tried their skills on the cinder turf with a minimum of training. One regiment held seven of these contests in a single month. Usually an entire day would be spent at a sports stadium in town with plenty of rooting, music, girls, and drinking. Pageantry was provided by ingenious contestants. When the Twenty-Ninth Division held a meet at Rothholz, Austria, the winning battalion was festooned in Hitler Jugend shirts, trunks, and combat boots.⁹⁶

In the fall, troops turned their attention to football, and the game was welcomed as a symbol of home. One Army sports writer insisted on the importance of the grid sport to troop morale:

With every man in the division...sweating out home, it is the responsibility of the Third Army...to insure a football league that will hold general interest. Balanced football competition can help immeasurably to prevent a severe case of 'occupational boredom' from setting in.... The games should be held in as near of a collegiate setting as possible, with plenty of attached color, rooting sections, bands, beer, and coffee....⁹⁷

General Patton's Third Army was subsequently issued 9,000 footballs and enough uniforms to outfit two hundred teams. Whatever happened to diminish the activity in the United States had its antithesis in Europe. Two hundred men tried out for the Seventy-First Division team, and full competition was held on regiment, battalion, and even the company level for the homeward-bound men.⁹⁸ All-star games satisfied the thirst for post-season action.

The first post-VE-Day championships were held in July and August

of 1945. The Seventh Army splashed to a win in the swimming meet in Nuremburg on July 29.⁹⁹ Corporal Lloyd Mangrum won the golf tournament in Paris on August 3,¹⁰⁰ and the Third Army was triumphant in the ETO track and field games at the great Nuremburg sports stadium on August 12. (General Patton dramatically kissed the hand of one champion on the victory platform.) A crew of speedsters from the all Negro Ninety-Second Division paced the Fifth Army to the Mediterranean crown but fell short in the all Europe meet.¹⁰¹ A summer-long baseball elimination tourney ended the European victory events when the Oise Base All Stars won the ETO "World Series" in September over the Seventy-Fifth Division.¹⁰² Redeployment and troop rotations eliminated a championship from the highly successful football program. However, the demobilization effort was only the beginning of Special Service training efforts for a peacetime Army in Europe. The success of the operation, according to the junketing Representative Samuel Weiss, would "stimulate a desire for competitive athletics among our European Allies which will aid in bringing together a closer spirit of cooperation and fellowship in building a lasting peace."¹⁰³

With the Army emphasizing sports in training, West Point won recognition as the overwhelming intercollegiate athletic power. Many young men sought transfer from other institutions into the various service academies. With the curtailment or suspension of normal athletic activity, the regular officer schools at West Point, Annapolis, and New London, Connecticut, were blessed with an inordinate number of superior athletes. The Army and Navy academies in particular became so dominant over collegiate sport that they took on the image of national universities. Their athletic teams were able to exemplify the national unity

involved in the war effort.

A large number of officers of the highest command echelons during World War II had been athletes in their undergraduate years at the academies. This led to wide-ranging support of athletics there during the war. Included in this number were Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, George S. Patton, Omar Bradley, Joseph Stillwell, and Emmitt (Rosie) O'Donnell, as well as Admirals William F. (Bull) Halsey, William Ghormley, and Earnest J. King.¹⁰⁴ MacArthur, a former superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy, had memorialized sport in epic terms for the academy grounds with the inscription:

Upon the fields of friendly strife,
Are sown the seeds,
That upon other fields, on other days,
Will bear the fruits of victory.¹⁰⁵

Nevertheless, there was speculation that athletics in the academies was a non-essential luxury. General Brehon Somervell, of the Army Services of Supply, considered that they were a waste of manpower and transportation, recommending their abandonment upon the completion of the 1942 football season.¹⁰⁶ The spring of 1943 were crucial days for the continuance of intercollegiate athletics. Academy superintendents insisted that their military appropriations committees in Congress include sports in academy budgets. On March 2, 1943, Representative J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania, a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, wrote Secretary Stimson to suggest "that we put no curb on athletics, at Annapolis and West Point."¹⁰⁷ No less a figure than Navy Bureau of Personnel Chief Randall Jacobs requested that the Appropriations Committee increase academy athletic employees and expenditures.¹⁰⁸ In May, West Point Superintendent Francis B. Wilby appealed to Somervell to remove his objection.¹⁰⁹

Although athletics were continued, the academies were not allowed to exploit their annual football clash for the public. The "big game" in 1943 was again held in virtual isolation, this time at West Point. Only 15,000 local residents and cadets were allowed to attend.¹¹⁰ Demands that it be returned to Philadelphia, where 100,000 urban patrons would ensure huge sums for a bond drive, were ignored. Congressman Weiss, the Pennsylvania gadfly, began pestering War and Navy Department brass in July, 1943, to make the spectacle a national event for unity and fund raising.¹¹¹ The services steadfastly refused due to the crowds involved, a rather asinine stand since Navy had already played before 80,000 fans in Cleveland against Notre Dame, and Army had drawn huge crowds in New York City. Such myopia was pointed out in a letter to Secretary Stimson from Congressman John E. Sheridan of Pennsylvania who was flabbergasted that both academies could play the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia but not each other. He asked, "Is this just another instance of where the reasoning and the logic cannot be justified on the facts--or another demonstration of the 'Army' way of doing things...?"¹¹² Stimson's decision that moving the corps of cadets to Philadelphia was out of the question dictated instead that a huge press corps move into virtually empty Michie Stadium to report the game to an intensely interested public as well as servicemen abroad.¹¹³

In 1944 the demand that the Army-Navy spectacle be moved to an urban center became overwhelming. The two football squads were far the best on the impoverished national scene, and Weiss began his annual appeal in August, 1944, stating that the game "should be bale to sell at least a billion dollars worth of war bonds."¹¹⁴ Navy Secretary James Forrestal tried to dampen the suggestion on August 30 by announcing that

the game would be held in Annapolis.¹¹⁵ This time, however, a number of Congressmen took an active interest in its movement, and press commentary for the promotion of the spectacle was incessant. Weiss compared Forrestal's "edict" as comparable to the "hysteria that enveloped this nation after Pearl Harbor."¹¹⁶ Weiss and Representative A. S. (Mike) Monroney of Oklahoma led a move during September to rally support for moving the tilt. They were joined by Joseph Martin of Massachusetts, who suggested a War Bond game, an idea backed by officials of the Treasury Department. By November, 1944, Weiss and others began to budge military officials. This was much to the chagrin of ODT Chief Monroe Johnson, who considered the transfer an "outrage."¹¹⁷ When Governor Herbert O'Connor of Maryland proposed in a telegram to the Navy Department that it be held in Baltimore, an alternative site to Navy's home stadium, the issue was virtually settled. Two days later on November 17, with Roosevelt's urging, the Navy Department assented.¹¹⁸

The game, held on December 1, 1944, was won by Army 23-7 and was witnessed by over 66,000 people, including the top staff echelons of the military.¹¹⁹ Only 17,000 or so of the crowd was made up of the general public that had apparently demanded the event. Immediate residents of Annapolis and high officials of the Army and Navy, as well as numerous governmental and civic functionaries, predominated, tickets being almost non-existent within a day after the site was approved. The price of seats included the purchase of up to \$1,000 in bonds, and fifteen box seats were sold for \$1,000,000 in War Loans each. Over \$58,000,000 were raised by the event. The game was broadcast to far-flung American troops around the world and was filmed for viewing in isolated war fronts.¹²⁰

The Army team which won that day's contest was considered to be one of the greatest aggregations to appear on the collegiate football scene, possibly the superior of any service and professional squads.¹²¹ The success of the Army football program was in large measure the responsibility of its coach, Coach Earl (Red) Blaik, and pre-war academy superintendent General Robert Eichelberger. Foreseeing the United States' entry into the war, Eichelberger hoped to upgrade the football program at West Point, deeming it inadvisable for the institution representing the American fighting man to be a gridiron doormat, which it was. There was also suspicion that any activities at the "Point" which were not serious parameters of achievement would be axed by Marshall for an accelerated wartime academy program. Blaik, a successful coach at Dartmouth, was hired by Eichelberger in December of 1940. He was given free rein to promote football over other sports and crack down on discipline.¹²²

Eichelberger left in January, 1942, to assume command of a combat unit but continued to keep up with Blaik's progress. After hearing of the Navy's V-5 pilot training program, the general was certain that therein lay the secret of turning out top-flight field commanders. On July 5, 1942, he wrote Blaik insisting that "competitive athletics in our schools and colleges simply cannot be allowed to fall by the wayside if we are to go through to a win against the Axis." He further wrote:

Earl, I must take time to go on record with you that there is nothing which we can do in the educational field with our youth which will do more toward winning the war than production of leadership qualities, courage, initiative, force, and all the other things that go to make up a man. That as a mechanism for

this education there is nothing that can touch competitive athletics and, among this group of sports, nothing can touch football.¹²³

Blaik's task of recruiting was made much easier, for attending the academy was one of the few ways left for a college student to complete his career uninterrupted. Age, height, and weight requirements were often waived, and many hardened battle veterans were appointed to the school directly from the field.¹²⁴ Other football stars transferred directly from their places of matriculation, including Felix (Doc) Blanchard and George Poole from the University of North Carolina, Max Minor from Texas, Bobby Dobbs from Tulsa, Dean Sensanbaugher of Ohio State, and Dick Walterhouse of Michigan.¹²⁵ The already demanding academic and military schedule was telescoped from four years to three, and flight training was added. There was less time to spend on football, but added physical demands made the super-talented crew invincible on the gridiron by the war's end.¹²⁶

Navy's situation was similar. George Whelchel took over from Marine Major Emery (Swede) Larson just after Pearl Harbor as the Midshipman coach. Navy enjoyed the privilege of its man having an extra year of eligibility due to NCAA rules, a situation much to its advantage in the 1943 season. Due to the success of the V-12, Navy was able to attract even more athletes through its officer program.¹²⁷ Not only did the Annapolis school offer an outstanding gridiron team throughout the war, but its other teams were among the best, especially wrestling, which was considered the finest in the country for the 1944 and 1945 seasons. So dominant were the academies that Navy, Army and the Coast Guard took the first three places in the 1945 Eastern Intercollegiate Wrestling Championships.¹²⁸ Navy's transfer program was even more

liberal than Army's. Its football squad was loaded with transfers. The roster was sprinkled with men who had already been standouts at such universities as Notre Dame, Alabama, Texas, Vanderbilt, Princeton, Indiana, and Cornell.¹²⁹ Some transferred to other schools at the war's end, including Navy's Clyde (Smackover) Scott to Arkansas and West Point's Ed (Shorty) McWilliams who went back to Mississippi State.¹³⁰

Navy won the 1942 and 1943 football clashes with Army. However, 1944 found the two academies sitting firmly astride the college football world. An otherwise unbeaten Notre Dame team could not compare to the service titans. Army beat it 59-0, as did Navy 32-13. No team came close to Army, and Navy lost but once, so it was fitting that football supremacy should have been decided between the two. Blaik referred to the 1944 Cadets as the "greatest collection of football players I ever coached."¹³¹ Two complete teams of equal ability could be placed on the field. Ten men made at least one All-America team, and there was little to choose between its second-string backfield of Arnold Tucker, Dale Hall, Walterhouse, and Dobbs, and the first group of Glenn Davis, Dale Kenna, Max Minor, and Blanchard. Army averaged fifty-six points per game, and four of its backs, Blanchard, Davis, Kenna, and Minor, made All-American.¹³² With news of the "Black Knights'" victory over the Midshipmen, General MacArthur wired, "THE GREATEST OF ALL ARMY TEAMS STOP WE HAVE STOPPED THE WAR TO CELEBRATE YOUR MAGNIFICENT SUCCESS."¹³³

The success of the service elevens continued through 1945. Both entered their annual clash unbeaten. The game was awarded to Philadelphia shortly after the defeat of Japan, and the meeting became something of a national victory celebration. Over 100,000 fans

attended, some of whom paid as much as seventy dollars to "scalpers" for admission. Republican Senator William Langer was so disturbed by the latter practice that he proposed a bill to move the annual classic around the country as a free show for the public. The Cadets won and repeated as national champions.¹³⁴ Blanchard, whose bulky size had led to his rejection to the V-12 in 1943,¹³⁵ won the Heisman trophy in 1945, as did Davis for the 1946 team. The fabulous Army team revolutionized college football, and their team and individual offensive records were thought to be out of reach in peacetime. Some people were rankled by Army's gridiron success, and the cry of "slacker" occasionally was directed at the elite youngsters.¹³⁶ Notre Dame deprived Army of a third consecutive championship by tying it in 1946, but the heritage of World War II continued to uphold West Point's athletic greatness during the post war period.

The war had made physical combat on the athletic field seem both desirable and necessary. Not only had a rhetoric of national ideals been verbalized through the use of sport euphemisms and examples, but popular American games became representative of the kind of desirable attributes needed in physical training.

First the Navy, then the Army symbolically led the United States in athletic methods for the maintenance of physical fitness. The great armies of the United States and its elite officers had trained on the "fields" of friendly strife." This was to mean much to postwar America. A nation not given to fitness had been greatly committed to fitness, physically and psychologically. Hordes of its soldiers and sailors, once given to this type of inspiration, would not forget it easily.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹"History of the U. S. Navy Special Services," V, p. 1.
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- ³Letter, Brehon Somervell to Commanders of All Corps Areas, April 24, 1942, AG Records, file 353.8.
- ⁴"History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, p. 3.
- ⁵Nell Murbacher, "Sports on Midway," Scholastic Coach, XIV (February, 1945), p. 5.
- ⁶New York Times (April 7, 1942).
- ⁷Letter, Halleck Lefferts, Captain, Special Services, to Frederick Osburn, April 13, 1943, Special Service Records, file 353.8.
- ⁸NCAA 1943 Football Guide, pp. 24-25.
- ⁹New York Times (July 5, 1943).
- ¹⁰Ibid. (March 17, 1943).
- ¹¹Ibid. (October 23, 1943).
- ¹²Joseph N. Bell, Bowl Game Thrills (New York, 1963), pp. 95-101.
- ¹³Field Memorandum for Flynn Andrew, Lt. Col., Special Service Training Branch, September 24, 1943, Special Service Records, file 353.8.
- ¹⁴New York Times (January 2, 1945).
- ¹⁵Ibid. (January 20, 1945).
- ¹⁶Stars and Stripes (June 11, 1943; August 30, 1943). The first "world series" concluded on September 30, 1943, had the Field Force "Yankees" defeating the Fighter Command "Thunderbolts." New York Times (October 1, 1943).
- ¹⁷New York Times (June 21, 1944).
- ¹⁸"History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, p. 42.
- ¹⁹New York Times (June 3, 1944).

- ²⁰John R. Tunis, "Sport in War Time," New Republic, CX (April 3, 1944), p. 467.
- ²¹"What the Soldier Thinks" (January, 1944), a monthly digest of War Department studies on the attitudes of American troops, Eisenhower Papers, Miscellaneous Historical Materials File, Box 2.
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- ²⁴Navy Department transcript of Frank Knox speech to the Washington, D. C. Touchdown Club, January 11, 1944, Hamilton files.
- ²⁵New York Times (May 19, 1944).
- ²⁶Ibid. (January 28, 1945).
- ²⁷William R. Kane, "Football Pays Off," NCAA 1945 Football Guide, pp. 41-43.
- ²⁸Hamilton Correspondence, May 4, 1974.
- ²⁹"Cadet Physical Training Performances as Related to Combat Criteria Classification," in BuMed letter VX-AK, P2-5/A21, Chief of BuMed to Chief of Naval Operations, March 22, 1946, Hamilton files.
- ³⁰New York Times (May 23, 1943).
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- ³²Speech of F. A. Hart, Brig. General, USMC, in National Collegiate Athletic Association, Yearbook of the National Collegiate Athletic Association and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention (January, 1946), pp. 108-111.
- ³³New York Times (May 24, 1944; September 22, 1944-October 5, 1944).
- ³⁴Ibid. (October 8, 1944).
- ³⁵Ibid. (August 22, 1944).
- ³⁶Ibid. (March 29, 1945; March 30, 1945; April 5, 1945).
- ³⁷Memorandum, R. C. Torrance, Major, U. S. Marine Corps, to Timothy J. O'Brien, Captain, U. S. Navy, June 11, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Athletic File.
- ³⁸BuPers letter 51121-GAS, Randall Jacobs to A. B. Chandler, Commissioner of Baseball, August 11, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Athletic File.

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⁴⁰ Navy letter 5-MD P10-1(c), Secretary of Navy to All Navy Commands, September 7, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File, Physical Training Directives folder.

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⁴² NCAA Proceedings (1941), pp. 90-95.

⁴³ Theodore P. Bank, "Army Football," 1942 NCAA Football Guide, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Memorandum, Theodore P. Bank, Chief of Army Athletic Branch, to Chief of Special Services Training, Special Services Records, file 353.8.

⁴⁵ Memorandum, Marshall to Secretary of War, February 6, 1943, OCS file 353.8.

⁴⁶ "Address of George Stienhaus at the AAU Convention," The Amateur Athlete, XIII (February, 1943), pp. 5, 10-11, 13. Steinhaus taught the overload principle as the exercise of "psychological sensibilities."

⁴⁷ "History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, p. 4.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 77-78; Membership list of Athletic Advisory Council, Records of Army and Navy Boards, Athletic Advisory Council folder; Letter, Henry Clark to Philip Badger, August 8, 1944, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.

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⁵¹ Henry W. Clark, "The Army Athletic Program," 1945 NCAA Guide, p. 39.

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- ⁵⁹M. D. Seil, "Physical Education for Fledgling Flyers," JOHPER, XIII (May, 1942), pp. 288-289.
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- ⁶¹Memorandum, George Stratemeyer, Chief of Air Staff, to Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General Air Corps, December 22, 1942, Chief of Staff file 353.8.
- ⁶²Letter, Arnold to Joe E. Brown, Chairman, Pacific Recreation Fund, June 24, 1943, Chief of Staff file 353.8.
- ⁶³"Proposed Merger of Physical Training and Special Services in the Training Command," dated February 5, 1944, Chief of Staff file 353.81.
- ⁶⁴"History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, p. 47.
- ⁶⁵Out of the twenty-seven team tournaments, the Army furnished seven, and there were two civilian clubs. BuPers travel rules eliminated Navy competition. Wichita Eagle (August 10, 1945).
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- ⁶⁷New York Times (May 16, 1945).
- ⁶⁸Palmer, p. 645; Special Services folder for May 1-10, 1945, Eisenhower Library, 45th Infantry Division, After Action Reports.
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- ⁷⁰"History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, p. 37.
- ⁷¹Special Services folder for May 1-10, 1945, 45th Infantry Division, After Action Reports.
- ⁷²"History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, section on "Army Service Forces Manual" (M211-1A), pp. 1-18.

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- 82 Letter, Hastie to Henderson, December 29, 1941, Records of Joint Army and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder.
- 83 Letter, Badger to Henderson, January 6, 1942, Records of Joint Army and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder.
- 84 Letter, Henderson to Keppel, May 26, 1942; Confidential memorandum, Keppel to Theodore Bank, January 28, 1942, Records of Joint Army and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder.
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- 88 NCAA 1943 Football Guide, p. 115.
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- 90 New York Times (June 21, 1944).
- 91 Ibid. (December 17, 1944).

- ⁹² NCAA 1945 Football Guide, pp. 127-128.
- ⁹³ BuPers letter 5112-ip, Director of Welfare and Recreation to Chief of BuPers, November 2, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File.
- ⁹⁴ Elwood Brown of the Young Men's Christian Association proposed the games to General John J. Pershing, AEF Commander, shortly before the Armistice of 1918. Orders to train for the events were issued on December 29, 1918, and men were released from duty for up to four hours per day to train for the various sports, championships for which were held on both the AEF and Allied levels along an Olympic format the following spring. Twenty-nine nations, colonies and dependencies took part in the game eliminations, which had included soccer, rugby, basketball, football, volleyball, and baseball. Finally, championship bouts in boxing, fencing, equestrians, tennis, track and field, shooting, and grenade throwing, among others, were held in the giant YMCA stadium before a crowd of 90,000 in Paris. See The Allied Games Committee, The Interallied Games 22nd June to 6 July 1919 (Paris, 1919).
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- ¹¹⁷ Clary, pp. 154-155.
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¹³³Blaik, p. 204.

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¹³⁶"Red Blaik of West Point," p. 12.

CHAPTER VII

WARTIME ATHLETIC PROGRAMS

AND PEACETIME AMERICA

The commitment of the United States to war altered the thinking of those in political power regarding the emphasis necessary in physical training through sports. As a prerequisite to survival in international conflict, deep interest was created in physical fitness, but no structure had been created centrally to carry out a national policy. The Office of Civilian Defense, headed by Jack Kelly, was a political cipher, with a budget of only \$80,000 per year and a small staff.¹ Its advisory function was largely limited to the numerous fitness conferences held under the auspices of the Office of Education. Even there it was usually military spokesmen and their civilian advisors who molded public attitudes in relation to athletic fitness. Kelly's attempts to make his office meaningful in formulating a national sports policy had been frustrated. His idea for local athletic clubs as part of a community services aspect of the Federal Security Agency was largely preempted by AAU efforts in the same area. His insistence that the office be used to coordinate wartime civilian sports was denied. The eventual separation of the Office of Education from the Federal Security Agency, under which the OPF operated, changed the function of the Kelly operation.

Kelly, therefore, turned the Office of Physical Fitness into a

kind of medical and health care advisory operation through the creation of a Joint Committee on Physical Fitness, made up of representatives of the American Medical Association and the Committee on Physical Fitness. Budget Director Harold D. Smith marked the OPF for obliteration because of the duplication of efforts involved with the Public Health Service and the Office of Education and the lack of congressional authorization for its function. Presidential advisor Edwin "Pop" Watson also was skeptical of the office because it seemed a front for "limited work... in promoting sports and physical buildup."² Kelly protested this exclusion in a letter to Watson and in a memorandum to Mrs. Roosevelt, whom he asked to influence the President in his behalf.³ The Budget Director informed Mrs. Roosevelt of the lack of authorization for Kelly's job, but this did not deter the first lady from pushing the fight for its continuance.⁴ The struggle continued until the President's death. On March 45, 1945, Kelly wrote Smith that his unique program differed from those of other government agencies since it involved national preparedness to eliminate draft rejections for physical infirmities. On April 2, 1945, a perplexed President assigned the problem higher up on his level of advisors for further evaluation. The President's death on April 12 eliminated this far-sighted seminal program from budget consideration for 1946.⁵

The elimination of the Office of Physical Fitness switched the concentration for a nation-wide sports and physical fitness plan from the federal bureaucracy to the military. The success of physical training in the military, as well as that of the highly visible preflight sports training method, had been vital in bringing the American fighting man to a high degree of physical and psychological trim. The

recognition of this, the high prewar physical rejections for the draft, and the popular belief that the people of the United States had been "duped" with a mental condition of unpreparedness led advocates of centralized physical training to propose a universal military training plan. Ideally this would have provided compulsory military training for periods of a year to all high school graduates prior to their entry into college or vocational training. Satisfying the needs of the nation for perpetually trained national reserve, the method had an auxiliary of providing physical training for health, dexterity, and the elimination of physical defects.

Although the method by which physical training should be carried out differed among its advocates, there was diverse support for some form of universal physical if not military training. Grantland Rice wrote in the May, 1943, issue of Recreation, "What this country must have is enforced athletic training, nation wide, from the ages of twelve to sixteen or eighteen." Rice included hiking, jumping, running, swimming, and a compulsory "rough body contact sport" in his regime.⁶ The schools, although approaching this philosophy during the war, were by no means unanimous in their efforts of motives; and it became obvious that if the war continued, the military would have to take responsibility for the physical and psychological conditioning of the American youngster. Brigadier General Walter Weible, Director of Training in Army Special Services, spoke to the National Federation of State High School Athletic Association in December of 1943 and urged that competitive sports be required of all students not only to condition youth in the physical demands of combat training but to psychologically prepare them with "fighting spirit" and "teamwork."⁷

The Navy preflight schools practiced this approach on a broad scale from their inception in the spring of 1942, and Frank Wickhorst suggested in the NCAA 1944 Football Guide that this same method be required in some form of unified instruction. Wickhorst commented:

...it is possible for a boy to take a well-rounded training program in athletic activities and at the same time carry on academic load. This could be done at all educational institutions by revising schedules, spreading them out over the full day, and it would be invaluable in the development of manhood for the future in America. This would avoid a future catastrophe which we almost had at the beginning of the present war in the lack of physical fitness of our youth.⁸

William R. (Killer) Kane, Wickhorst's successor in the Navy preflight training program, was more emphatic. In a speech of January 24, 1945, to the Eastern Intercollegiate Athletic Association meeting in New York, Kane proposed a grade-school-through-college competitive program for every boy and tied athletics to compulsory military training.⁹ Another advocate, E. B. DeGroot, Public Relations Director of the Boy Scouts of America, outlined a method by which this training would be incorporated into the young man's secondary school years. Athletic training would be a partial substitute for military aspects, creating within the young man the "unshakeable confidence" in himself.¹⁰

The first UMT bill was submitted to Congress on January 11, 1944, but it died in committee. It was not reintroduced until October 11, 1945, after the war was over.¹¹ The fight over the passage of the bill ran well over a year, and advocates of the physical training attributes of the measure were important in dissecting its rationale.

America's civilian athletic leaders had been initially supportive in principles of using athletic training for military purposes, but using military training as a rationale for physical fitness and

motivational conditioning in time of peace was another matter. A subcommittee of the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association voted unanimously in March of 1944 to rebuff any efforts for the passage of UMT, further declaring that "A year of Army life is not a guarantee of lasting health and fitness...."¹² John Griffith, one of the foremost advocates of rough and tumble combat sports and games as military training, compared the scheme with "youth camps" by which "Hitler did his poisonous work in Germany...." Griffith insisted that the American schools and colleges were more fit to provide all the needs of American young people.¹³ Writing that "there must be no confusion between military training and physical education," an editorialist for the Journal of Health, Physical Education and Recreation compared placing young people in "primitive conditions" to cure their intellectual and physical weakness as being close to the "opportunity for the nationalization of our youth such as Germany and Italy have suffered."¹⁴

The UMT subject was the topic of lengthy discussion at the NCAA convention held at Columbus, Ohio, in January of 1945. That body was primarily concerned with correcting the alarmingly high rate of physical rejections for military service by emphasizing compulsory physical education and athletics in the colleges. However, the use of military encampments to achieve the same objective was considered unwarranted. Fears were expressed that the military served its own ends rather than that of physical education, and that most physical defects to which UMT arguments referred were incorrectable through military training. In a resolution passed on January 13, 1945, the NCAA requested full consultation with government representatives before such a plan was implemented.¹⁵

Military figures were assembled into an informal advisory committee to formulate a "statement of principles" under which the physical and athletic purposes would operate in the universal training plan. This Army-Navy committee included three representatives of Army Special Services and four from the Navy, including three from the Division of Aviation Training, which had fathered the preflight concept. Also on the planning board was Max Farrington, Gene Tunney's successor as officer in charge of the Physical Training Section, and Kane, who followed Tom Hamilton and Wickhorst as officer in charge of preflight athletics. Their statement was prepared by General Wieble, who was the liaison with General Marshall and the War Department, through which the measure was being channeled.¹⁶

Although UMT was largely an Army project, the Navy athletic advisors deeply influenced the advisory group's philosophical stance with regard to physical training. Farrington's brief for UMT referred to both varsity and intramural athletics as "essential" in the compulsory plan. The teaching of advanced swimming was required for all hands, and the maintenance of a cadre of "professionally trained" physical training officers was emphasized. These goals were considered necessary to maintain a "fighting, aggressive spirit in trainees through team play and vigorous competitive athletic activities." A general progressive physical maintenance program was also included.¹⁷ The advisory committee almost totally repeated these Navy principles in its report to General Wieble. The experience of both services led to the inclusion of a testing program. The motivational statement on athletics was changed slightly after consultation with Special Service advisors, substituting the term "cooperative" for "fighting" and adding "unit

espirit" as the basis for engaging in athletics.¹⁸

With the war nearly over, physical educators became extremely vocal in their opposition to the War Department measure. A leading argument expressed fears about the centralization of authority in the indoctrination of young people. Former AAHPER president Jay B. Nash declared, "military discipline is not the discipline of democracy," and he accused advocates of UMT of using physical fitness to disguise their real motives.¹⁹ H. V. Porter, Executive Secretary of the National Federation of High School Athletic Associations, tied the War Department effort to that of civilian reconversion, one of trying to satisfy an imaginary need created by the war in the social condition of postwar America. Porter insisted that there was no pre-war situation to which the United States could return in the field of physical training, and that it was up to the schools to provide a program of "initiation not reconversion."²⁰ Defense Secretary Forrestal and other government leaders pressed for physical and mental discipline through the use of sport metaphors, including an argument by President Harry S. Truman that the project would give American trainees "a fundamental basis for discipline."²¹ Yet universal military training was not able to capture the long-range imagination of American athletic leaders in their desire for physically trained youth.

The services had contributed much in the fashion of broad popular participation in sports and games. By establishing a Field Administrative Division in Physical Training, the Navy had worked with civilians in an advisory capacity during the war. "The hundreds of thousands of service men and women returning to civilian life after the war will bring with them a much greater familiarization with many more sports

activities than they had before they went into service," remarked athletic administrator Charles Forsythe. A Navy assistant to Farrington, Forsythe also predicted the establishment of a broad sports program in the public schools for both boys and girls and emphasized the necessity of swimming for all able citizens.²² However, at the time the Army Special Services athletic programs were enjoying much success, the Navy began dismantling its innovative physical training school and preflight facilities. "Tight" conditions in the postwar Navy dictated the use of already qualified men in the advisory and training capacity. On December 10, 1945, the Chief of BuPers rejected a request for continuation that such a move would be "disastrous," and he objected to the return of the Navy to the "hit or miss volunteer recreation and athletic programs of prewar days." The Physical Training Director lamented that "morale, fleet efficiency, and attractiveness of service to youth" would be destroyed by the cost-saving measure.²⁴ Plans for the September 1, 1946, discontinuance were not abandoned.

Preflight training was consolidated. Contracts for the V-5 schools were allowed to expire, and by the summer of 1946, only the Del Monte facility remained. Its function was later merged with the consolidation of flight training at Pensacola. The nature of the preflight program had already been modified. Beginning in the spring of 1944, only men with some preliminary certification of flying skills were admitted. Applicants were carefully screened, but athletic skills were still desired. By lengthening the training program to twenty-six weeks, the V-5 schools portrayed more of the appearance of air academies, complete with the highly developed varsity athletic programs. The final preflight students entered the college facilities in January, 1946, and by May 31 of

that year the V-5 experiment had ended. Approximately 80,000 men had been introduced to athletic and indoctrination courses of preflight during the World War II era.

The Chief of Naval Operations recognized the work of the preflight athletic planners in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy in August, 1946, in which Tom Hamilton and others were credited with using competitive athletics to "develop in a minimum amount of time those characteristics deemed desirable in a combat pilot such as leadership, a fighting will to win, teamwork, physical stamina, tough physical condition, mental alertness, and esprit de corps...." The American athletic ethic had been officially recognized as contributing to the spiritual, social, and psychological qualities of the Allied victory of 1945.²⁵

The V-5 experience was involved in the idea of Universal Military Training, and the failure of UMT was perhaps the last gasp for the utilization of a massive centralized compulsory sports program for young men. Hamilton, who again joined the staff of the United States Naval Academy as Head Football Coach in 1946, helped in the formation of the "V-5 Association of America" at Annapolis in 1949. Among its objectives was the "promotion of proven principles, standards and beneficial methods in Physical Training of American Youth as developed by the military services in World War II," and an emphasis on molding the "Social Competency" of young people through "Competitive Athletics." The V-5 Association also aimed to lift athletic and physical instruction to levels of academic professionalism as well as instill "wholesome and competitive spirit" and "a love of country" in its recipients. A constitution with an outline for officers, a board of directors, and annual meetings of interested membership kept the ideals of preflight

alive.²⁶

No one had to remind the young American fighting men from the victorious armed services of their debt or interest in athletics. They laced the immediate postwar period with athletic contests. The American public, starved for skilled spectator sports competition, reacted enthusiastically to the exploits of the service athletes. Not only was the 1945 West Point football team hailed as one of the best of all time, but the spectacular Fleet City (California) Base eleven attracted a following among civilians normally accorded to professional or major college clubs. All but one man of the thirty-eight member Fleet City team had played college football, and of that number twenty-six of the merchant mariners would be or had been professional players, the greatest single aggregation of civilian talent of any club during the war period. Over 70,000 fans gathered that fall in the Los Angeles coliseum to see the "Bluejackets" race by El Toro Marines to claim service superiority.²⁷ The Marines, too, had a well-developed postwar demobilization program. Hundreds of Marine varsity squads had competed around the world. One base at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, claimed sixteen organized teams.²⁸ Together with the Pacific recreation program the ETO demobilization project, among the other similar camp activities, these activities unified America's sporting heritage under a panoply of cultural and spiritual hegemony.

Established and aspiring young athletes poured into the professional and collegiate sports world to find expression for their war sharpened skills. Other Special Service standouts returned so rapidly to active professional football status during the fall of 1945 that the service was suspected of giving the men preferential discharge treatment over combat

veterans with longer service, a charged voice in Congress by Representatives Mike Monroney of Oklahoma and Raymond Springer of Indiana.²⁹

The postwar period involved an expectation of an increased interest in team sports, created by the absence of normal civilian activity and by the sports rhetoric issued in the name of American fighting men and the athletic training which went before them. This interest was not at all unexpected. Jack Meagher, football coach in the V-5 program and formerly of Auburn University, noted in 1943 that ready-made athletic material for the colleges would be the heritage of the Navy experience in athletic training.³⁰ This trend was echoed throughout the war by Navy officials, and in October of 1944 Allison Danzig predicted of the sport of football that:

Thousands of young men who have had no previous connection with the sport who have been playing...in college service training units and in Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force camps....will avail themselves of an opportunity to go to college after getting their discharge and will swell the football squads.³¹

The first professional beneficiary was football, in which new leagues were "dropping out of skies like paratroops." Twenty-one new clubs for three new nationwide leagues were announced during the fall of 1944.³² One of these, the All-America Football League, managed to survive the proliferation and challenge the National Football League for spectator appeal. War-impacted Honolulu, with aid of public stock subscriptions and the urging of Navy athletic officer George Halas, launched an optimistic though ill-fated venture in professional football in 1946.³³ With the flood of young men returning to college campuses under government benefits, the college athletic rosters reflected a surge of renewed participation.

Anticipating the boost in interest and revenue, many colleges reinstated college football in 1945, if they could find equipment. Although the youngsters on the squads could hardly be compared to the postwar material that appeared the next fall, 168 colleges had returned to the game in 1945.³⁴ Attendance actually rose from the prewar period, despite the caliber of play. The Rose Bowl attracted a record 103,000 fans to see Southern California defeat UCLA, even though both teams were much inferior to little St. Mary's College, which was taking a "back-seat" to a preflight team on its own campus. St. Mary's, which had only sixteen healthy players to suit, attracted 60,000 at the turnsiles for a game with the University of Nevada. The "Gaels" then played in front of nearly 80,000 more in the Sugar Bowl, only to be decisively beaten by the young Oklahoma A & M "Aggies" and their great 4-F back Bob Fenimore. An oddity of the war period, the Aggies and Fenimore were, with the exclusion of the academy teams, the best of their peers in 1945.³⁵ The average player was incredibly young. Fenimore was only nineteen years old, and most of his teammates were younger. Texas A & M, whose enrollment dropped from 7,000 to 2,5000 during the war, used mainly seventeen and eighteen year olds despite the availability of some discharged veterans; and the University of Nebraska had twenty-nine youngsters and 4-F's were swept away with the return of the "G. I.s" in 1946. All but three members of the University of Oklahoma football squad in 1946 were war veterans. There were forty-one of these men in 1947 on a squad of fifty-two, twenty-six of whom were twenty-three years of age or older. As late as 1948 fully sixty percent of the "Sooner" team was made up of "vets." Other universities showed similar trends.³⁷ Forty-eight G. I.s, nearly ninety percent of the team, graced the 1946 Iowa

State football list, and nineteen returning wrestlers competed for positions on a squad of twenty-six at Oklahoma A & M.³⁸

If there was a single sport toward which World War II contributed significantly, it was football, and the post war approach to it was largely one of attitude. It should not be surprising that the most successful coaches of the most spectacular team game in American society were affiliated with the social engineering of the preflight training. The vision of the highly conditioned rapid hitting precision units of Oklahoma's Charles (Bud) Wilkinson, who, like the Navy instructor he was, led his own men in calisthenics, is enough of an insight to the meaning of competition handed down to postwar America. The combat training methods of Paul (Bear) Bryant's Texas A & M and early Alabama teams, the military organization of Woodrow (Woody) Hayes' famous Ohio State squads, the efficient free-enterprise of the fledgling Cleveland Browns by their innovator Paul Brown offer evidence that a portion of the American character was seized by these men and offered to the American public in an idealized and highly polished image of itself as it hoped to be. If the attitude of young people in America adjusted from a prewar ambivalence toward world affairs and foreign doctrines to one of awareness, aggressiveness, and self-assurance, then the same thing was reflected in the sports that the young soldiers, sailors, Marines, and Airmen so vigorously and confidently pursued.

A concentration of energetic young men, located far from home and anxious for opportunities to exhibit the cherished values of accomplishment and companionship, readily participated in team play. Regardless of the rhetoric involved, millions of men would have participated in sport, because the opportunities were there, whether or not there was

sophisticated organization. Yet feeling was important as well as recreation, and something basic to American society was found in the expression of sport in the postwar United States. The war made Americans aware of their deficiencies and awakened citizens to the things they really wanted to preserve, part of which was found to be representative of the old community feeling in all of us, team sport. Another was found to be of an entirely new sounding term, physical fitness. In these two terminologies, the old and the new America were to meet in globe-girdling circumstances in the middle of the twentieth century. The federal government, as a vehicle for innovation or as an office of regulation, did nothing more than show plainly what American institutions meant to its people. Sport forms were emblematic of the great power exhibited in the wealth of the American nation and spirit.

FOOTNOTES

¹Letter, John Kelly to Edwin Watson, December 6, 1944, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

²Memorandum, Harold D. Smith, Budget Director, to M. C. Latta, December 21, 1944, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

³Memorandum, Kelly to [Eleanor Roosevelt], December 18, 1944, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

⁴Telephone memorandum, Kelly to Watson, December 30, 1945; Memorandum, Harold D. Smith to Eleanor Roosevelt, February 23, 1945, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

⁵Letter, Kelly to Smith, March 15, 1945; Memorandum, Roosevelt to McIntyre, April 2, 1945, FDR Papers, file 4565-D.

⁶Grantland Rice, "A Problem of the Country," Recreation, XXXVII (May, 1943), p. 51.

⁷Walter L. Wieble, "Fit to Fight," Athletic Journal, XIV (January, 1944), pp. 36-37.

⁸Frank H. Wickhorst, "Football in Naval Aviation Training," NCAA 1944 Football Guide, p. 46.

⁹New York Times (January 25, 1945).

¹⁰E. B. DeGroot, "Is Compulsory Military Training the Answer? Yes!," JOHPER, XVI (February, 1945), p. 69.

¹¹U. S. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, XCI, p. 19; Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, XC, p. 9563.

¹²Educational Policies Commission (pamphlet), Compulsory Peacetime Military Training (Washington, 1945).

¹³John Griffith, "Compulsory Military Training," Athletic Journal, XV (September, 1944), p. 19.

¹⁴Mabel Lee, "Is Universal Military Training the Answer?," JOHPER, XVI (January, 1945), p. 235.

¹⁵NCAA Proceedings (1944), pp. 34, 114-117.

¹⁶E. E. Wieman, "Physical Education Under Universal Military Training," JOHPER, XVI (May, 1945), p. 235.

¹⁷Navy memorandum P-2161-DH, Director of Planning and Control to Chief of BuPers, January 4, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Box 28, Entry 445; "Proposed Navy Physical Training and Swimming Program Universal Military Training," Physical Fitness Correspondence, O. W. Olds File, Reports folder.

¹⁸Wieman, "Physical Education Under Universal Military Training," p. 235.

¹⁹Jay B. Nash, "Is Compulsory Military Training the Answer? No!," JOHPER, XVI (February, 1945), p. 70.

²⁰H. V. Porter, "Where Do We Go from Here?," Scholastic Coach, XV (September, 1945), p. 5.

²¹As quoted in Mrozek, "Rhetoric and Reality in the Defense Department's Use of Sport," p. 9.

²²Charles E. Forsythe, "Some Things We Have Learned About Physical Fitness," Athletic Journal, XV (June, 1945), p. 30.

²³BuPers memorandum 2133-CC, Director of Planning and Control to Director of Training, December 10, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Box 28, Entry 445.

²⁴Undated and unsigned draft by the Director, Physical Training Section, in defense of Navy Physical Training, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Box 28, Entry 445.

²⁵Operations letter 513-G-JM, Chief of Naval Operations to SecNav, August 9, 1946, Hamilton Papers.

²⁶V-5 Association of the United States, Constitution and By-Laws of the V-5 Association of America, Hamilton files.

²⁷Football game program, Fleet City vs. Camp Beale, October 7, 1945, Pro Football Library, Military World War II File.

²⁸Speech of Brig. Gen. F. A. Hart, USMC, in National Collegiate Athletic Association Proceedings of the Forty-first Annual Convention (January, 1946).

²⁹U. S. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., XCI, Appendix, pp. 5207-5208.

³⁰New York Times (September 20, 1943).

³¹Ibid. (October 27, 1944).

³²Ibid. (September 19, 1944; November 28, 1944).

³³Football game program, Hawaiian Warriors vs. Los Angeles Bulldogs, September 19, 1946, Pro Football Library, World War II Minor League Professional Football File.

³⁴Walsh, pp. 33-937; Classen, pp. 37-655.

³⁵NCAA 1946 Football Guide, pp. 23-25, 32-33, 141.

³⁶Publicity information on Texas A & M and Nebraska football teams, University of Oklahoma, Sports Publicity file 1935-46, 1945 football folder.

³⁷University of Oklahoma football rosters for 1946, 1947, and 1948, University of Oklahoma, Sports Publicity File for 1935-56, Sports Publicity File 1947, Sports Publicity File 1948, Football folders for 1946, 1947, and 1948.

³⁸Iowa State College Press Release, University of Oklahoma, Sports Publicity File 1935-56, 1946 football folder; Oklahoma A & M College Sports Publicity Scrapbook, Oklahoma State University.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON ORGANIZED ATHLETICS

As a result of government and military initiative during World War II, a sporting and athletic culture pervaded American life as never before. By equating aggressive group behavior with positive combat traits, the Navy and Army gave credibility to athletic games as an expression of national virtue and commitment. Combative sports acquired overtones of war and national solidarity. Group sport emerged from World War II with a positive social definition related to such combativeness, therefore justifying the promotion of these activities for civilians. The involvement of the Office of Physical Fitness in the advice which the Office of Education directed toward the schools, coupled with the use of pamphlets and advice produced by the military services, helped to establish a combative philosophy for athletes and physical education in the schools and colleges. The war aided the federal bureaucracy in initiating its control over state education through federal advice in physical training.

During this period suspicion was voiced that military and government involvement in vital social expressions such as exercise and games was a dangerous manipulation of the group mind through social engineering tactics, which was uncharacteristics of basic American traditions. Objections to social development as a war rationale were effectively

silenced within the physical education profession. However, the issue of social control was again raised through the debate over universal military training. The argument, which had been successfully defended regarding physical training in the schools, could not be transferred to the universal military training analogy in a peacetime setting. Navy preflight training methods were elevated as a model for this type of civilian character development but were not adopted.

Athletic programs as a part of military training had a great impact on the development of postwar civilian sport. The return of militarily trained athletes to the college, amateur, and professional sporting scene created an increased demand for sports programs. Huge numbers of men were exposed to physical training techniques during World War II. The Army's demobilization program effectively established the largest organized athletic program ever known. The military branches trained numerous athletic and physical fitness teachers and administrators through its recreation and special services programs. Those men who saturated college athletic rosters after the war had their interest maintained by military recreation programs. The structure of collegiate athletic competition was guaranteed by the investment of the Navy Department in furnishing students, instructors and improved facilities.

Realizing the importance of sport as a community control device, the government sought to develop a sports policy to accommodate organized professional athletics during the war. Only when horseracing, and to some extent, professional baseball and football, seemed to interfere with government manpower policies, were these organized activities threatened with dissolution.

It can only be suggested that the idealization of sport forms

somehow embodied the characterization of the American spirit, which led to an attitude of invincibility and correctness of national goals. The solidarity of the group and its ability to overcome obstacles was facilitated in the American character through sport. This lasted long past the Second World War and raises the need for investigation into its effect on determining American perceptions toward the outside world in the postwar period.

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APPENDIX A

MILITARY AND DRAFT STATUS OF COLLEGE

ALL-STAR PARTICIPANTS 1943-1945¹

| <u>Military Personnel</u> | <u>1943</u> | <u>1944</u> | <u>1945</u> |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Army | 20 | 30 | 36 |
| Regular Army | (13) | (24) | (14) |
| Air Corps | (7) | (6) | (22) |
| Naval Personnel--Total | 20 | 1 | 0 |
| V-5 (Preflight) | (2) | - | - |
| V-5 (College) | (4) | - | - |
| V-12 (College) | (2) | - | - |
| V-7 (College) | (4) | - | - |
| Marines | (2) | - | - |
| Reservists | (3) | - | - |
| Active | - | (1) | - |
| Coast Guard | (3) | - | - |
| Total Military | 40 | 31 | 36 |
| Discharged Servicemen | 0 | 10 | 9 |
| Civilians | | | |
| 4-F's | 2 | 9 | 6 |
| 1-A | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| Occupational deferment | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Medical and engineering students | 3 | 3 | 5 |
| Total Civilians | 15 | 18 | 16 |
| Total Participants | 55 | 59 | 61 |

¹Tenth Annual All-Star Game Program, 1943, 11th Annual All-Star Game Program, 1944, 12th Annual All-Star Game Program, 1945, Professional Football Hall of Fame Library, College All-Star Game File.

APPENDIX B

MILITARY STATUS OF FOOTBALL TEAMS RECEIVING VOTES

IN ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITERS POLL,

DECEMBER 6, 1944¹

| <u>Ranking</u> | <u>Club</u> | <u>Military Status</u> |
|-----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1 | Army | Military Academy |
| 2 | Ohio State | Civilian |
| 3 | Randolph Field | Army Air Corps Base |
| 4 | Navy | Military Academy |
| 5 | Bainbridge NTS | Naval Training Station |
| 6 | Iowa Preflight | Navy V-5 Officers School (Air) |
| 7 | Southern California U. | Navy V-12 cadet school |
| 8 | Michigan | Navy V-12 cadet school |
| 9 | Notre Dame | Navy V-12 cadet school |
| 10 | Fourth Air Force | Army Air Corps |
| 11 | Duke | Navy V-12 cadet school |
| 12 | Tennessee | Civilian |
| 13 | Georgia Tech | Navy V-12 |
| 14 | Norman NAS | Navy Air Base |
| 15 | Illinois | Navy V-12 |
| 16 | El Toro Marines | Marine Air Base |
| 17 | Great Lakes NTS | Navy Training Station |
| 18 | Fort Pierce | Army Training Base |
| 19 | St. Mary's Preflight | Navy V-5 Officers School (Air) |
| 20 | Second Air Force | Army Air Corps |
| <u>Unranked</u> | Oklahoma A & M | Civilian |
| | Tulsa | Civilian |
| | North Carolina Preflight | Navy V-5 Officers School (Air) |
| | Camp Peary | Army Training Base |
| | Alabama | Civilian |
| | Virginia | Navy V-12 cadet school |
| | Wake Forest College | Civilian |
| | Yale | Navy V-12 cadet school |
| | Pennsylvania | Navy V-12 cadet school |
| | Third Air Force | Army Air Corps |
| | North Carolina State | Civilian |
| | Indiana | Civilian |

¹New York Times (December 6, 1944).

VITA

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