

EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION IN PERSONALISTIC
REGIMES

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Abstract: When a dictator dies, who steps in as a replacement? While considerable research has examined the dynamics of regime change, little work has focused on the dynamics of leadership transitions in nondemocratic regimes. This project combines institutional and consent based approaches to sources of authority in nondemocratic regimes, arguing that likely leadership successors will have network connections to key sources of nondemocratic power. Using the transition in Spain following Francisco Franco's death, I have developed two hypothesis concerning executive succession in personalistic regimes focusing on the depth versus the breadth of these network connections and then test them using a case study of leadership succession within Uzbekistan, a sultanistic regime in Central Asia. This research uses newspaper articles and other sources to identify potential successors, and then I use these sources to build comparative biographies looking specifically for connections to sources of power and the institutions that support them. The findings indicate support for the hypothesis that the breadth of ties is more important than their depth.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In late August 2016, the longtime president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, suffered a stroke. At 78 years old, Karimov had suffered from previous health issues, including a potential heart attack in 2013 that the government officially denied (Reuters Staff 2013). Speculation about his health started when Karimov skipped giving a televised address to celebrate the anniversary of Uzbekistan's independence, and shortly after, his daughter Lola Karimov posted on social media that her father had suffered a stroke. Some might expect that the government would have made a formal announcement at the time of his stroke, possibly even delivered by his successor. Instead, the government seemed to go into a cover up on the seriousness of his illness, only stating that Karimov had been hospitalized (Najibullah 2016). Karimov subsequently died on September 2, but no official word from the government was released until after Turkey broke the news the following day. One clue that the rumors might be true is that Uzbek state TV stopped showing light entertainment shows (British Broadcasting Service 2016).

Following Karimov's death, there was widespread speculation within the domestic and international media about who his successor might be. Three names were floated as possible

successors, Finance Minister Rustam Azimov, Head of the National Security Service Rustam Inoyatov, and Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Due to his age, it was speculated that Inoyatov might serve as kingmaker to Azimov or Mirziyoyev, rather than try and become the successor himself (Radio Free Europe 2018, Pannier 2016). In the end Mirziyoyev became the successor and was put in charge of Karimov's funeral arrangements (Radio Free Europe 2016). This was despite the fact that the Uzbek Constitution clearly states the chairman of the Senate (which was held at the time by Nigmatilla Yuldashev) would take over as interim president.¹ Instead Mirziyoyev was appointed to this position by September 8. He was subsequently elected to a full term as President in December, winning 88% of the vote (Radio Free Europe 2016, 2016b).

The preceding example serves to highlight the uncertainty behind the death and succession of personalistic leaders. Not only was the leader's death secretive, the process in which the final successor consolidated their power occurred largely behind closed doors. Current scholarship on authoritarian regimes is unable to answer the question of why Mirziyoyev became the successor. In fact, within the current scholarship on authoritarian regimes there is very little research on peaceful government transitions between authoritarian leaders. Those studies that do exist tend to focus on individual case studies, such as the failed Spanish transition (Share 1986) or the PRI in Mexico (Magaloni 2006). Other research focuses on regime failure and the transition from authoritarian government (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, Bodea, Garriga, and Higashijima 2019, Company 2019). A related field examines hybrid regimes – political systems that do not neatly fall into either the democratic or authoritarian category. But the emphasis of this work tends to be on examining the institutions that make them hybrid, as opposed to the individuals who govern them (Diamond 2002, Levitsky and Way 2010, Mufti 2018).

¹ Uzbek Constitution. Article 96. Available translated in English at: <http://www.ksu.uz/en/page/index/id/7>

None of this extant literature provides a detailed study of peaceful leadership transitions within authoritarian governments broadly speaking. This oversight is especially important to address given that non-democracies are primarily governed by individuals rather than institutions or formal rules (Svolik 2012). In other words, research into authoritarian regimes needs to include a discussion of the individuals who make up the regime, especially the ruler and the person likely to succeed them in times of political change.

My approach to filling this gap is to connect leadership transition to potential sources of authoritarian power. To do this, I combine institutional- and consent-based understandings of authoritarian power, using social network analysis to connect individuals with institutions. This better understanding of those connections can then help us understand how authoritarian successors navigate informal rules and consolidate power.

I argue that leaders who are connected to multiple sources of power, represented by institutions, are best positioned to take over as authoritarian leaders during periods of government transitions. To develop this theory, I use the fall of the Francoist Regime in Spain as a useful inductive case study, which leaves me with two hypotheses, one that looks at the number of connections to power, and the other that looks at the strength of those connections. These hypotheses are then tested using the leadership transition in Uzbekistan following the 2016 death of longtime ruler Islam Karimov. By looking at Uzbekistan, I can do a most different comparison at the system level. By focusing on individuals instead of institutions, it is my goal to create a foundation that can later be used for research on authoritarian leadership transitions in additional case studies. My results show support for the hypothesis that it is the number of connections to sources of power that matter, rather than overwhelming strength in any one source.

CHAPTER II

DEFINING FEATURES OF AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNANCE

To understand authoritarian leadership transitions, we first must understand what authoritarian regimes are and how they stay in power. The simple definition of an authoritarian regime is the absence of democracy (Svolik 2012); however, defining democracy is more complex than a binary yes or no, and so this conception of nondemocracy needs expanding. Diamond (2004) has a four-part definition of democracy that provides a useful contrasting definition. Free and Fair Elections refers to citizens choosing their leaders through elections in which everybody can participate, and power flows from the people to the government. Active Participation refers to the responsibility of citizens to participate in public life, including voting in elections, and taking time to hear all sides and make an informed decision. The Protection of Human Rights refers to basic rights accorded all citizens that cannot be taken away by the state, including the right to protest and join organizations, and the right to access multiple sources for news and opinions. Finally rule of law protects the rights of citizens and serves to regulate interactions between individuals, where not even governing officials are above the law (Diamond 2004). These basic elements form the basis of classic notions of the *social contract*, and this system of give and take between the leaders and the citizenry explains why democratic citizenry are generally acceptant

of democratic leader authority.

In a near mirror image of Diamond's democracy definition, Linz (2000) uses a four-part definition of authoritarian regimes that includes a lack of pluralism, the absence of political mobilization, legitimacy based on emotional appeals, and an executive with ill-defined limits on power. Pluralism here is sharply contrasted with that experienced in democracies being sharply limited, either explicitly or de facto. The result is that the government is not accountable to the citizens, even in cases where they are at times responsive to the population. The absence of political mobilization means that the citizenry is disengaged from politics, which can occur either because the ruler actively discourages mobilization or the population is experiencing apathy and willingly stops participating in politics. Mass mobilization, for example through a political party, is often seen as a threat by other groups within the government, such as the army and bureaucracy. The result is that most citizens are disengaged from the regime. Third, authoritarian regimes often have an executive with ill-defined limits on power, with authoritarian leaders often able to rule with little oversight from parliaments or courts. Finally, authoritarian regimes often rely on emotional appeals to shape the public's perception of regime legitimacy, and these appeals often change with time. Linz (2000) calls these appeals "mentality", in contrast to the ideologies found in totalitarian systems. He argues that while ideologies are entrenched, often written down by intellectuals or pseudo-intellectuals, and are designed to last beyond the lifetime of one ruler. Mentalities on the other hand are more emotional in their appeal, are often not written down, and frequently change with time (Linz 2000).

The definition above highlights how authoritarian regimes operate, but is less clear on how these behaviors allow leaders to maintain their control over the population. For instance, demobilization emphasizes citizen disengagement with the political system, but cannot fully explain why the citizenry would not shift their support to an alternative government or system. This definition of authoritarian government, therefore, needs to be matched with an understanding

of how power flows in an authoritarian regime. To maintain their hold on power, nondemocratic leaders need to assert both "authoritarian control" and "authoritarian power sharing" (Svolik 2012). The first focuses on controlling the mass public, and the second looks at control over the ruling elite.

Between the two forces, power sharing is often the most pressing concern because most authoritarian rulers are ousted through internal coups.² Even so, in many authoritarian regimes, the biggest fear remains regime outsiders and the threat of regime overthrow from those forces. For example, in Russia the Putin regime uses its hybrid system of government and its use of Russia's energy wealth to distribute rentier rights and maintain a high degree of elite cohesion (Gandhi 2008, Reuter and Robertson 2015). However, the greatest threat to the regime appears to come from outsiders, such as the opposition leader, lawyer, and anti-corruption activist Alexie Navalny, a man described by some as "the man Putin fears the most"³ (Dollbaum, Semenov, and Sirotkina 2018, Kaminski 2013). To control these outside threats, the ruler will often need to rely on other elite to assert authoritarian control over the masses, reinforcing the importance of this authoritarian power sharing arrangement.

In asserting control over the masses, most authoritarian leaders would rather maintain power because the population believes they have legitimacy to rule: authoritarian regimes are careful to protect their legitimacy, and fear losing it (Mastro 2019). Being perceived as legitimate by the public prevents the regime having to use costly coercion and cooptation techniques, or the even more costly strategy of the use of force. However, when threatened by mass protests,

² In a study updating Svolik's data through 2012, Kendal-Taylor and Frantz (2014) find a sharp decrease in the number of internal ousters and an increase in removal through mass protest. They found that from 2010 through 2012, 25% of dictators ousted through popular uprisings, more than doubling from the previous decade (p. 37).

³ This idea originated with a 2013 Wall Street Journal opinion piece. Scholars such as Dollbaum, Semenov, and Sirotkina (2018) have subsequently done research looking at Navalny and his threat to the Putin regime.

authoritarian leaders may use the provision of public goods to buy off potential protestors, or they may crack down on the freedom of assembly or information which help protestors organize (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). To do either of these things, however, requires key allies with resources to make these strategies viable. The most useful coalition of elite, therefore, will be ones that helps an authoritarian leader assert their control and prevent threats from below. Traditionally there have been two approaches that gave potential insights into the coalitions most important to maintaining authoritarian control: consent theory and institutional approaches.

Consent Based Theories of Authoritarian Governance

The oldest approach to understanding authoritarian control is derived from consent theories of governance. This theory originates from classic works like John Locke's (1689) *Two Treatise on Government*, which argued that the only legitimate government is one with the consent of its citizens. Consent theory argues that obedience from the population is voluntary and that a ruler's power is based on the degree of cooperation given them by their subjects. Since obedience is voluntary, it can be taken away by those within the state (Sharp 1973). This approach focuses on individuals (Martin 1989, Sharp 1973), meaning that the balance of power in these systems is viewed as a struggle that pits an individual ruler against each individual subject.

Sharp first identified six sources of authoritarian power in 1973. Since then he has written extensively on consent theory, and his work has been adapted for use by popular movements (Martin 1989). These six sources can be broadly categorized into legitimacy granting, cooptation, and coercion tools. In order to survive in power an authoritarian ruler needs to successfully manage all three, although the importance given each source is likely to vary across regimes.

Authority and *Intangible Factors* both serve as ways of granting legitimacy to the regime. *Authority* is the ability of the ruler to convince those around them that they should rule. This source is voluntary, and therefore potentially unstable. *Intangible Factors* refers specifically to

the psychological or ideological power of the ruler. *Intangible Factors* may include attitudes towards obedience among the elite or general population, a common faith, or ideology (Sharp 2005).

In contrast *Material Resources*, *Human Resources*, and *Skills and Knowledge* provide a leader the tools to effectively coopt the population. *Material Resources* can include physical property, natural resources, financial resources, infrastructure, communication, and transportation (Sharp 2005, 29); In other words, the ability to control the economy in a way than allows a leader to reward followers and punish dissent. *Human Resources* and *Skills and Knowledge* both refer to the people who actively follow and support the ruler. *Human Resources* refers to the number of followers and supporters of the ruler, both among the elite and within the general population, while *Skills and Knowledge* refers to the skills possessed by those who follow and support the ruler and to how those skills meet the needs of the ruler (Sharp 2005).

Finally, *Sanctions* can broadly be defined as the ability of the ruler to punish domestic and foreign threats. *Sanctions* can take multiple forms, from limiting freedom of speech and assembly (Piazza 2017), to targeting individuals or the masses for violent repression (Mason and Krane 1989). This is often done by a myriad of security institutions, although the military can be used as a last resort (Greitens 2016, Svolik 2012).

A major benefit to consent theory is it focuses on the individuals behind the regimes. It looks at both the mass public and ruler as people, as opposed to broad generalizations. Consent theory pits an individual ruler against each individual subject (Sharp 1973), which does not consider what institutions drive individual actions. This results in it often overlooking a lot of the driving forces behind individual's behavior, primarily institutions. These institutions can vary widely, whether intangible like capitalism, or physical like the secret police (Martin 1989).

Institutional-Focused Theories of Authoritarian Governance

In contrast to the classical consent-based theories of governance, recent scholarship on non-democracies has primarily focused on institutional explanations for authoritarian governance stability. Institutions, according to this approach, are structures of cooperation and power. Authoritarian institutions are characterized by cooperation between the “winners”, or regime insiders, but they also seek to deter or consolidate actions from regime “losers” - those who remain on the outside (Moe 2005). This approach emphasizes how authoritarian rulers use institutions to help negotiate concessions to groups outside of the regimes (Gandhi 2008), focusing on a few key institutions that help authoritarian regimes co-opt the masses and/or elites.

Since the end of the cold war, non-democracy is no longer considered legitimate on its own (Levitsky and Way 2010), and thus many authoritarian regimes use elections as a means to legitimize their rule.⁴ Regimes who can institutionalize elections and survive at least three election cycles significantly increase their chances for long term survival (Bernhard, Edgell, and Lindberg 2019). This is because an election victory portrays an image of regime impregnability, as it signals apparent mass popular support (Magaloni 2006). Electoral victory also increases legitimacy both domestically and internationally (Grewal and Kureshi 2019). Finally, it reveals information about who opposes the regime (Knutsen and Nygård 2015).

The media serves as another important institution used by authoritarian regimes. In many authoritarian regimes traditional sources of news media are controlled by the regime or its allies.⁵ This serves to shape the dominant political narrative, including discrediting the opposition, identifying foreign and domestic scapegoats for problems, and finally praising the regime (Walker and Orttung 2014, Guriev and Triesman 2015, Rozenas and Stukal 2019). For example, Russian state run television blames bad economic news on foreign actors, but praises the

⁴ Grewal and Kureshi 2019 find that the United States pressures countries to provide democratic window dressing, presumably to appease domestic US audiences, before providing/ continuing military aid following military coups.

⁵ Examples include Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Iran, Russia, and Rwanda (Walker and Orttung 2014).

government for positive developments (Rozenas and Stukal 2019). Often the media plays a role in creating a romanticized image of the regimes ruler, though traditional mass media like television (Walker & Orttung 2014), or even textbooks (Trošt 2014). While historically, state controlled media has focused on television (Walker and Orttung 2014, Rozenas and Stukal 2019), more recently states like China have moved their control to online media to prevent collective action or provide cheerleading for the regime (King, Pan and Roberts 2013, 2017).

Legitimacy can also be granted through effective performance, and few policy areas matter more to the population than the economy. Regimes with low or stagnant economic growth are more likely to suffer regime change from coups and mass protests (Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig 2020, Seifu 2009).⁶ In countries with considerable oil resources, control over this economic sector is especially beneficial to authoritarian regimes.⁷ Oil revenues help generate government income without having to rely on taxes (Ross 2012), The amount of cash available to the regime results in a “large, centralized, and repressive” (Diamond 2010, 98). Other resources have been found to have a similar impact. For example, Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008) have found that a reliance on foreign aid has a similar effect, and Elbra (2013) found that mineral wealth, represented through mining, had the same effects in South Africa. There is evidence that when citizens are expected to pay taxes towards a regime, they are more likely to demand some form of accountability (Kato and Tanaka 2019). Regimes that have access to other sources of income lack this form of social contract with their citizens. At the same time regimes with large amounts of non-tax revenue are free to spend that money on repression and coercion.

If possible, many authoritarian leaders would prefer to co-opt potential opposition rather than resort to overt oppression (Gandhi 2008). Legislatures and political parties are beneficial

⁶ Seifu 2009, for example found a one percent change in income resulted in a 19% difference in regime survival rates, regardless of other factors such as colonial history.

cooptation tools, as they provide an opportunity for the regime and opposition groups to meet and negotiate mutually acceptable compromises, with those compromises stacked in favor of the authoritarian leader. More specifically, they help the ruler co-opt the opposition by setting the rules of negotiation (Gandhi 2008), deter defection from other elites (Magaloni 2006), and to channel elite collective action (Slater 2010). This effectively serves to fool the elite into serving the interests of the regime.

An active civil society is often cited as being for a detriment to authoritarian regimes (Teets 2014)⁸, but it can instead be mobilized to support the regime (Riley 2010). Traditional scholarship on authoritarian civil society focused on corporatism (Howell 2012, Teets 2014), which involves all organizations within society operating as government entities. This is a form of artificial mass mobilization, where the state retains total control. The idea is to channel mass support for the regime into organizations that are non-threatening.

When regime legitimacy is weak or absent, authoritarian regimes are likely to use repression to keep the population in line (Svolik 2012). The ultimate goal of state repression is to ensure that the regime remains in power and it relies on strong coercive institutions including the military, militias or secret police to deter mass protest and insurgencies (deMeritt 2016, Greitens 2016). The military is the only force capable of fighting the mass public head on (Slater 2010, Svolik 2012), but this institution is made more effective in its suppression attempts with institutions like secret police and domestic-focused intelligence agencies. Some regimes use social exclusivity in their security institutions, which refers to how much they demographically look like the general population (Greitens 2016, Makara 2013). This creates a security

⁸ Teets 2014 develops a theory known as “Consultative Authoritarianism” where the state seeks to manage civil society through the use of positive and negative incentives.

organization whose members privileged place in society is dependent on regime survival, which can reduce the likelihood that a security organization will defect in times of crisis (Makara 2013).

Recent criticism of institutionalist approaches focusses on their problematic causal logics and their overlooking non-institutional regime features (Gandhi 2008, Pepinsky 2013). They lack the actor agency that is at the core of consent approaches, and in fact, for institutions to assert power, both sides need to agree as to their mutual benefit (Svolik 2012). Furthermore, institutional approaches ignore the role of individual leadership decisions, which is especially concerning because a key feature of what makes authoritarian regimes different from democracies are that these regimes are run by people more than institutions (Slater 2003; Svolik 2012).


An Alternative Conception of Authoritarian Power: Social Network Analysis

It is my belief that consent based and institutional explanations can be successfully consolidated using social network analysis. This will allow me to include both formal and informal power structures in my analysis, such as alliances between individuals. This will solve the major problems of both approaches by discussing individuals and institutions at the same time. Furthermore, social network analysis can be used to capture the concept of "authoritarian power sharing" which Svolik (2012) highlights as a key feature of authoritarian government. Broadly speaking, social network analysis looks at how patterns of relationships can shed light on substantive topics. It has been used by a variety of fields, including sociology (Smith and Christakis 2008), psychology (Curry, Roberts & Dunbar 2012), and political science (Keller 2016). For instance, recent work by Gade et al. (2019) use social network analysis to analyze rebel alliances in the Syrian Civil War, using simple diagrams to highlight "core" groups that facilitate joint actions as well as the role ideology plays in forming alliances. In simplest terms, this approach views social actors (individuals or groups) as points (nodes) connected to each other by lines on a graph, with those lines representing their specific social relationship. Figure 1

shows an example of a basic social network, where each numbered square represents an individual node. Social network analysis argues that the cause of an individual's behavior is largely based on their position within the social structure, which presents certain limitations, perceptions and opportunities.

Where an actor is positioned in a network matters; as Social network analysts argue that

Figure 1



members of a social network are impacted in differently by the network. More specifically, to understand an individual actor's actions, you need to look at the different types of ties each member possess (Carrington and Scott 2011, Marin and Wellman 2011). Social networks are typically analyzed by either looking at graphs like Figure 1 or by using matrices. The latter is better for larger networks that can be hard to spot patterns visually on a graph. This typically involves using computers to list the nodes and their various connections, using computers for quantitative analysis (Hanneman and Riddle 2011).

In social network analysis, a node is simply a member of the network being analyzed, which are connected by links, or the relationships between nodes. When looking at a network


centered on an individual, that node is called the ego. The connections between nodes are called by various terms like ties, links, and connections, falling into a few basic types, directed vs. undirected, and strong vs. weak. Directed ties travel from one node to the other and can be either in one direction or reciprocated. For example, a president has a directed tie with advisors, in that they directly advise him or her on policy. An example of this moving in only one direction is that the president has appointment power over their advisors and can remove them, but the advisors cannot remove the president. Undirected ties by contrast exist in no particular direction, such as co-membership in a party (Carrington and Scott 2011, Hanneman and Riddle 2011, Marin and Wellman 2011). Network connections can also be classified as strong or weak. Strong ties can be thought of as those who regularly and repeatedly interact with the ego, while weak ties represent a less developed relationship (Granovetter 1983). Being in possession of weak ties is not necessarily disadvantageous. Weak ties primarily serve as information channels, which means the more weak ties branching off a node, the better informed the actor of that node usually is. In fact, individuals with weak ties to multiple networks can often serve as information bridges, becoming “hubs” of interaction that allow networks comprised of more strong ties to coordinate on activities. In other words, a strategically placed ego node with numerous weak ties can use their strategic advantage to consolidate power and become the alliance leader in their network.

Figure 2⁹ shows a visual example of how strong vs weak ties may work. Ego, in this case number 1, has strong ties to numbers 2 and 3 because they all know each other and interact together. Number 1 has a weak tie with number 4 because number 4 is not connected to numbers 2 and 3. In other words think of numbers 2 and 3 as close friends, and number 4 as the cashier at a grocery store. You have a close affinity with your friends (2 and 3), and they likely interact over time with each other in addition to you (1). You are connected to number 4 because you shop at their store, but have a low affinity because they are not within your network of friends. But since

⁹ The thicker the line, the stronger the tie represented

number 4 is connected to numbers 5 and 6, they can feed information from them to number 1 that would otherwise be unavailable.

Figure 2



Social networks are often viewed in terms of whole networks and ego networks. The whole network simply consists of all the nodes within a network, for example all the workers in a factory. An ego network by contrast expands outward from a single node, referred to as the ego. (Marin and Wellman 2011). Figure 1 could be an example of either a whole network, or an ego network centered around the number one. I believe when looking at authoritarian regimes we can view institutions and their leaders as nodes in a social network. Institutions are run by individuals, who all have connections to other individuals both inside and out of the regime. However, authoritarian governments differ significantly in institutional structures, and it is important to recognize that these different types of governments can result in different network configurations.

That is why it is critical to understand the different typologies of authoritarian government and how these may alter our predictions of what factors are most necessary to keeping a leader in power. In the following section I will discuss four different types of authoritarian regime and the institutions that are most associated with them. These are monarchies, dominant party states, military regimes, and personalistic regimes.

Non Democratic Typologies: Different Power Structures, Different Network Structures

Numerous scholars have offered various typologies for authoritarian regimes based on the ways in which the leadership gains and maintains power (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013). I propose a simplification of the six category typology from Geddes, Wright, Frantz (2014),¹⁰ limiting my comparison to four categories: monarchies, dominant party states, military regimes, and personalistic regimes. Of these four regime types, I ultimately chose to focus on developing a theory for transitions in personalistic regimes for two reasons. First, when compared to other types of authoritarian regimes, personalistic regimes are the least predictable in regards to power succession. Second, I argue that leadership in personalistic regimes also represent the most simplistic form of network structure – an ego network – which suggests a more straightforward analysis which can be beneficial to theory building.

¹⁰ Geddes et al.'s typology also included indirect military and oligarchic regimes. Indirect military rule refers to regimes with competitive elections, but the military influences who can participate, or has an outside influence on policy decisions. For this reason, I would consider it a subcategory of military rule. Oligarchic regimes are more closely related to semi-democratic or hybrid regimes rather than a type of leadership structure, as they are classified based on having competitive elections but with widespread disenfranchisement.

Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013) propose a set of typologies based the ways regimes attain or maintain power: through hereditary succession or lineage, the actual or threatened use of military force, and popular elections. These correspond to monarchies, military regimes, and electoral regimes. There are two important features of this typology to note. The first is a focus on institutions and the second is that it does not rely on classifying a regime as democratic or not. This makes it easier to include hybrid regimes with multiparty elections that straddle the line between democracy and non-democracy, but risks contaminating comparisons by including countries whose political systems operate closer to a democratic system in asserting control over the population.

Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland (2010) also propose three category typology. Monarchies are personalistic regimes in which the ruler's family often plays a large role in governance, military regimes are led by military members either individually or in a junta, while civilian dictators often govern through political parties and legislatures. Monarchies base their legitimacy on tradition and culture, military regimes rely on coercive power, and civilian dictators lack the power to coerce or the legitimacy of a royal lineage to govern.

Monarchies are one of the oldest forms of government,¹¹ and are still seen in the modern era in countries like Saudi Arabia. These regimes have a highly institutionalized system of succession, where legitimacy to rule is based on membership in the royal family.¹² While succession is highly institutionalized in these regimes, they otherwise are often very personalistic in nature. They have legitimacy based on culture and history, but rely on outside institutions like the military for coercion (Bove and Brauner 2011). Given that transitions in power are so highly institutionalized, these nondemocratic systems are often the easiest to predict who the successor will be, and therefore will not be a primary focus of this study.

The other three regime types do have greater uncertainty in their leadership transitions, and are thus worth further study. Dominant party states, often called one party states, are nondemocratic regimes in which only a single party is allowed to legally operate, although they may allow satellite parties who have different names but help support the same issue positions as the governing party. Famous examples include the former Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. These countries may even have constitutions that look democratic, but this single party has a monopoly of control over the legislature and executive, making true competition and political limitations nonexistent. Often the ruling party and the state overlap, even down to the local level. Leadership always transitions through the party elite; however, the process is often more competitive than seen in monarchic systems, leading to greater uncertainty in their leadership transitions. They often lack the legitimacy granted monarchies through tradition and the coercive dominance of military regimes, though political parties – and to a lesser extent, legislatures and civil society groups – are powerful (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, Creak

¹¹ This regime type excludes monarchs who act in a largely ceremonial role rather than active political leaders, such as the English Monarchy. Ceremonial monarchies should instead be classified based on the structure of the government leaders who hold true power. This may be military leaders (nondemocratic military regimes) or democratic regimes (parliamentary or presidential systems).

¹² However, succession is not necessarily based on primogeniture. Instead it is often based on negotiations between leading members of the royal family (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2009).

and Barney 2018, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014, Joshi and Timothy 2018, Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013). As a result, these types of governments are well positioned to rely on cooptation or performance strategies to maintain public support.

Military regimes are governments in which military officers dominate the system. This category includes regimes where the military rules directly or indirectly through civilian governments (often using the threat of force to demand sizeable concessions from those civilian politicians). Military regimes almost exclusively come to power through a coup, often claiming to restore order from corrupt or inept civilian leaders. They are successful in monopolizing the government because coercive institutions are more powerful than other sources of power. As a result, scholars almost unanimously agree that these are among the most unstable regimes (Geddes, Frantz and Wright 2014, Kim and Kroeger 2018, Svobik 2012, Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013), their primary threat to power comes from other members of the military. These regimes invest heavily in these coercive institutions, which helps them co-opt internal elite. In addition, because militaries are the strongest institutions in these systems, they are more likely to use repression when faced with challenges from the masses. Controlling the military and maintain strong network ties to it is necessary for both current leaders and possible successors, and shapes the nature of leadership transitions in those regimes (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2013, Kim and Kroeger 2018, Sombatpoonsiri 2017, Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013).

Of all the forms of nondemocratic government typologies, personalistic regimes are the most weakly institutionalized. All power is centered around an individual ruler (creating a perfect ego network), but unlike monarchies, these regimes lack the dynastic succession which makes the monarchic leadership transition process more transparent. These regimes are the most difficult to predict, especially during periods of reform or transition, as they are run by a small number of insiders close to the dictator. Furthermore, this inner circle is characterized by constantly shifting

alliances. Unlike monarchies, the inner circle of a personalistic regime often lacks the cultural or historical ties to a family line, making them more likely to defect in times of uncertainty and crisis such as a sudden death of the leader (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, Geddes, Wright, Frantz 2014, Kalitz and Stockemer 2017, Shirk 2018).¹³ As a result of the weak institutions and extreme individual rule, these types of regimes are very difficult to predict leadership succession in.

¹³ Shirk (2018) argues that Xi Jinping is turning China from a one party state into a personalistic regime through things like purging rivals, refusing to name a successor, taking personal leadership of the military, and eliminating term limits

CHAPTER III

THEORY BUILDING CASE STUDY: THE SPANISH TRANSITION

In order to build my theory on authoritarian succession, I have used the executive transition in Spain following Francisco Franco's death as a theory building case study. The benefit of using a theory-building case is that it enables a scholar to develop a theory in areas where current theories and hypotheses are weak or underdeveloped – such as the topic of leadership succession. Theory building case studies can help generate novel theories and hypothesis, which then can be tested with additional case analysis (Eisenhardt 1989, Lijphart 1971). In my theory-building case of Spain, I intend to use a social network framework to examine the authoritarian power connections possessed by the two main contenders for power in post-Franco Spain: Carlos Arias Navarro and Juan Carlos. For this as well as the Uzbekistan case study, my level of analysis is the individual. As part of the discussion of their connections, I will touch on the relevant portions of their biographies, such as military experience. The Francoist regime is a good theory building case study, since it is a well-documented and involved a highly personalistic and weakly institutionalized regime, which fits within the larger population of non-democracies. This also allows me to eliminate multiple alternative factors that might impact the results of my finding.

Background to the Succession

Spain under Francisco Franco may initially appear to fit the typology of a military regime, given that Franco rose to power in a military coup during the Spanish Civil War. However, once established, his regime operated more closely to the structure of a personalist regime, with power consolidated around Franco as the core of the network. Franco's Spain was a weakly institutionalized regime, with the government largely held together by loyalty to Franco and the fear of returning to civil war. His winning coalition included a range of groups, some of which had agendas that were explicitly contradictory with each other. For example, the coalition included those who wanted to 1) restore the pretender Carlist monarchy, 2) those who wanted to restore the Borbón monarchy, and 3) those who did not want the monarchy to return under any family (Share 1986). The two most powerful groups within the coalition were the technocrats represented by the Opus Dei, and the traditional landowning Falangists (Preston 1986). The Opus Dei represented those who wished to modernize the economy, while the Falangists represented the agriculturalist landowners who were opposed to modernization. During his lifetime, Franco managed to successfully keep these united, under the banner of the National Front, a loosely organized national party. During Franco's rule the national front was the only political party allowed to legally operate. However, it lacked a cohesive ideology and was more like a loose coalition rather than a coherent political movement. During the later years of the Francoist regime the National Front was in decline, in large part due to the rift between the Opus Dei and the Falangists (Share 1986).

Furthermore, as typical when an ego is removed from the center of a network, Franco's death on November 20th, 1975 resulted in a power vacuum. When he died, Franco left behind two major potential successors: Carlos Arias Navarro as chief executive, and Juan Carlos as head of state. The Francoist regime would survive approximately seven months after Franco's death, ending with Franco's chosen successor as Chief Executive's resignation. Arias was not Franco's

first choice to succeed him as chief executive of the regime. Instead, Franco had favored his longtime ally, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, to succeed him as Chief Executive, with the intention that Juan Carlos would act as a more symbolic head of state. Admiral Blanco had served as Vice President from 1967 – 1973, then President from July-December 1973 when Franco had begun to step down from his various positions. During his tenure as President, Blanco was considered the second most powerful person in Spain. However, Blanco was assassinated in December 1973 by Basque Terrorists opposed to the regime. After that, Franco appointed Carlos Arias Navarro as President and successor (Share 1986). Even before Franco's death, Carlos Arias Navarro seemed less capable at consolidating his power, suggesting that he might not be up to the challenge of keeping the regime intact. In contrast, Juan Carlos was exceptionally adept at building a strong support network of key regime and opposition allies. At the time of succession, Juan Carlos could access a network that granted him legitimacy, cooptation, and coercion resources. It is no surprise, then, that within seven months of the dictator's death, Juan Carlos forced out Arias and Spain began to formally democratize Spain.

Juan Carlos Builds Alliances

As leader of the Spanish nationalists, Franco claimed to be fighting against the Republic and for the monarchy during the Spanish Civil War. When he consolidated his power in the 1940's, Franco officially reestablished the Monarchy, albeit as a strictly ceremonial institution. His goal was that after his death a member of the house of Borbón would be declared King and head of state. It would take twenty years before Franco appointed anyone to take the position, declaring Juan Carlos the Prince of Spain in 1969. Before that the monarchy existed on paper only (Share 1986).

This action would mean separating the chief executive and head of state at the time of his death. Furthermore, Franco was careful to select a member of the family who fit his vision for the

Spanish government. The designated heir, Don Juan de Borbón, had been passed on by the dictator, who feared that he would be too liberal and would dismantle the Francoist regime. Instead by 1962, it became obvious that the young prince, Juan Carlos, was the dictator's choice. The prince had been raised in Spain, and viewed as trustworthy by Franco (Preston 2004, Share 1986).

During the 1950's, Juan Carlos attended military academies for the army, navy, and air force. As an example of his training, in 1958 he served as a midshipman during a training voyage on the Spanish Naval ship Juan Sebastián Elcano, and received pilot training in the Spanish Air Force. At the conclusion of his training, he became the first person to be granted the rank of lieutenant in the Spanish Army, Navy and Air Force. He maintained contacts with his former military classmates, and could therefore get a sense of how junior officers felt within the military. In addition, he formed an alliance with the liberal General Manuel Díez Alegría. While Franco lay dying Alegría met with various military leaders to determine their support for Juan Carlos (Preston 2004).


Juan Carlos was also well-positioned with connections that granted him significant claim to being a legitimate leader. Like any monarch, he could count on legitimacy based on cultural traditions. In addition, he received moral support from the Catholic church and the United States. In the early 1970's he met with and received the support of Us President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. In 1971 he performed a state visit to the United States, and Nixon ensured that the visit boosted the prince's prestige through a series of public events. These included laying a wreath in Arlington Cemetery and a state dinner. During the meeting Juan Carlos and Nixon discussed the inevitable succession following Franco's death. After the visit Nixon became convinced to support Juan Carlos moving forward (Preston 2004, Share 1986).

One good example of his support from both the military and foreign actors, specifically the United States, is the end Spanish Sahara, modern day Western Sahara. The region was first colonized by Spain in 1884 and was among the countries final colonies (British Broadcasting Corporation 2018). In October 1975 the King of Morocco staged an invasion of 500,000 Moroccan civilians protected by soldiers, meeting little resistance. On October 31st Juan Carlos chaired a cabinet meeting where he announced that he planned to fly to the capital of Spanish Sahara, El Aaiún, and personally convince the military garrison of the need to depart peacefully. His boldness earned him the respect of the military officers present at the meeting. After the meeting Juan Carlos called on his ally Henry Kissinger, who sent an envoy to the Moroccan capitol and convinced the king of the need for a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile Juan Carlos traveled to El Aaiún and informed the garrison that they would neither slaughter the marching civilians or retreat in disgrace, but instead reach a negotiated settlement for withdrawing. This bold action gave him the firm backing of the Spanish army, which would be critical in order to consolidate power. After his return while chairing another cabinet meeting he received a call from the Moroccan king announcing a suspension of the invasion of Spanish Sahara. That was followed by a negotiated withdraw from the region by Spain (Preston 2004, British Broadcasting Corporation 2018).

As a youth, Juan Carlos had been tutored by members of both the Opus Dei and the Falangists (The Harvard Crimson 1971, Share 1986), giving him strong personal connections to both of the major families in the Francoist coalition. This key strategic position was only enhanced in 1969 when Franco formally appointed Carlos as his heir to be the head of state and gave him the title Prince of Spain. During this period, Juan Carlos often worked with Franco and attended public and ceremonial events with the dictator. When Franco fell ill in 1974 and 1975, Carlos formally took over as head of state, always to step aside when the dictator recovered. As a result, by the time Franco did die, the Spanish public had largely become used to Juan Carlos as

the national leader. His appointment as Spain's first King since the 1930's shortly after Franco's death seemed a natural evolution of his path to power (Share 1986, Preston 2004). Figure 3¹⁴ shows the various connections possessed by Juan Carlos.

Figure 3



For cooptation, Juan Carlos cultivated connections with groups opposing Franco, and had connections within Franco's National Front. His connections to the national front were informal, as he did not hold office during Franco's lifetime. Instead he filled in as head of state when needed while secretly building connections within the regime. Juan Carlos also built connections with the rising opposition. One example of this was the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE), which was anti-monarchy under Franco. Through intermediaries Juan Carlos convinced both the Socialists and the Communists not to oppose his ascension to the throne, promising them labor

¹⁴ Purple represents legitimacy, green cooptation, and red coercion.


reform after Franco's death. Despite their earlier criticism of the monarchy, the PSOE publically supported Juan Carlos after Franco's death (Preston 2004). As a result, Juan Carlos had support from within the Francoist coalition, and those opposed to it.

Carlos Arias Navarro is Outmaneuvered

In contrast to the more famous Juan Carlos, Arias was largely a political unknown when Franco selected him to be his successor. Privately he was close to Franco, but otherwise lacked significant political experience or connections to Spain's powerful elite networks. At the time of his appointment to the presidency, Arias was minister of the interior, which controlled the police and other states security services. However, Arias' connection to this key coercive institution was weak at best, since he had served in the role for just over a year before being elevated to the presidency. Before holding this position, he had served as the mayor of Madrid and a prosecutor during the civil war, which resulted in the Spanish opposition being openly hostile to him. While serving as Mayor of Madrid he also enjoyed good relations with the media, which could have been used to boost his claims to legitimacy. In addition, he lacked any military background (Share 1986, New York Times 1973). This meant that Arias was effectively an outsider even when he controlled these institutions. Arias, in fact, may have been selected more for his lack of connections than because of them. Carr and Fusi (1979) assert that one reason that he might have been selected is that he was not a member of either the Opus Dei or the Falangists, the two most powerful groups in the Francoist coalition, who both hated each other. His ascension, therefore, did not threaten the powerful interests of these groups. At the same time, being an outsider to both these groups also meant that he missed out on a potentially critical cooptation network. In other words, he lacked the Catholic and economic support of the Opus Dei or the support of the traditional elite through the Falangists. The fact that Franco selected him to serve as president and heir was Arias' sole claim to legitimacy.

In spite of his apparent weaknesses Arias still possessed a number of weak ties within the regime. This means that according to social network theory he should at least have been well informed. Instead he was viewed as simply a hardliner who echoed Franco's desires. One of his major problems is that unlike Franco, Arias was not respected by any of the major families in the Francoist coalition (Share 1986). As a result, it does not appear that he was able to transform his long government service into a meaningful advantage when competing against Juan Carlos.

Figure 4



Even when serving as President the two years before Franco's death, Arias seemed unable to navigate Spain's complicated power alliances. On the occasions Franco fell ill and was unable to govern, Arias struggled to maintain control of the government. He was criticized by the conservatives for wanting reform, and the liberals accused him of going too slow with the limited reforms he did tolerate. Each time, when Franco recovered, the regime stabilized. However, when Franco died Arias would be left on his own, and the regime would soon collapse under pressure from those seeking democratization (Share 1986). Arias seemed incapable of responding to the mass unrest by workers and Basque nationalists, (Preston 1986, Carr and Fusi 1979), with many of the regime's supporters abandoning him amidst this unrest. In July 1976, Arias was resigned at

Juan Carlos's request and was replaced with Adolfo Suarez, effectively ending the Francoist regime (Carr and Fusi 1979, Share 1986).

Mixed Insights from the Spanish Case

When we put these two regime contenders side by side (as seen in table 1), Juan Carlos held both stronger ties to sources of power, and more of them. He possessed ties to cooptation, coercion and legitimacy granting networks. His strongest ties lay in his connections to the House of Borbón and position as Franco's designated heir, and his connections to the military. However, he also possessed ties to cooptation networks that he could draw on. By comparison Arias could only tap into weak legitimacy and coercion networks. He did not serve as President or Interior Minister long enough to build a large base of support to draw on.

Table 1: Sources of Power and Executive Succession in Spain		
Sources of Power/ Supporting Institutions	Carlos Arias Navarro	Juan Carlos
<p>Legitimacy Granting Networks</p> <p><i>Authority; Intangible Factors</i></p> <p>Institutions: <i>Media; Constitution; Support from Religious Leaders; Dynastic</i></p>	<p>Privately Close to Franco</p> <p>President 1974-1976</p> <p>Constitutional Successor after 1974</p> <p>Designated President and Heir by Franco (1974)</p>	<p>Publicly Very Close to Franco</p> <p>Heir to the House of Borbón</p> <p>Support of the Catholic Church</p> <p>Designated King and Heir by Franco (1969)</p>
<p>Cooptation Networks</p> <p><i>Human Resources; Skills and Knowledge; Material resources</i></p> <p>Institutions: <i>Legislatures; Bureaucratic Connections; Political Parties and Civil Society; Business Connections, control over property and resources</i></p>		<p>Secret connections to Spanish opposition</p> <p>Foreign Support (USA)</p>

Table 1: Sources of Power and Executive Succession in Spain		
Sources of Power/ Supporting Institutions	Carlos Arias Navarro	Juan Carlos
Coercion Networks <i>Sanctions</i> Institutions: <i>Military; secret police; other Security Institutions</i>	Previously Served as Minister of the Interior	Support of the Military Military Training (Army, Navy and Air Force) General Manuel Diez Alegría

However, from the Spanish case alone, it is difficult to distinguish whether Juan Carlos succeeded because he had very strong ties to a few key institutions or whether his advantage was the “strength of his weak ties.” Strong ties, because they are based on repeated interactions and can generate strong loyalty, might lead to direct support from powerful offices such a military unit or government ministry. These strong ties can also provide an ego node – an actor at the center of the network – considerable advantage in building directed ties.

For example, two contenders for succession may have access to authority, material resources, and intangible factors through the ruling party, military and church. Depending on the regime type, one of these sources of power may serve as a “keystone” keeping the regime stable. Therefore, the actor with the stronger, deeper connection would be better positioned to mobilize those power resources quickly and effectively to support their power bid. For example, in a military regime or personalist regime with strong military elements, ties to the military might matter more than those to a dominant political party, with the opposite being true in a one party state or personalist regimes that rely on cooptation strategies. As a result, potential successors who only possess weak ties to the sources of power will be at a disadvantage in their attempt at succession when competing with those with strong ties:

Hypothesis 1: A successful authoritarian successor will possess stronger ties to one key source of power than the competition.

However, actors with many weak ties can be highly successful information brokers and “go-betweens,” helping build cooperation between powerful factions. In addition, the information that can flow in from multiple weak ties in an ego network may provide valuable information that can be used to strengthen one’s position within the succession struggle. Potential successors who lack ties to multiple institutions and their associated sources of power will lose in their attempts to succeed an outgoing ruler. Successful leaders in personalistic regimes, as they are seeking to negotiate weakly institutionalized ego networks, might especially benefit from multiple weak ties in navigating these shifting alliances:

Hypothesis 2: A successful presidential successor will have access to more of the sources of power than the competition.

Given that Juan Carlos’ social network exhibited both strong and weak ties while Arias’ network lacked either, it is impossible to establish with this one case whether only one of these hypotheses hold up, or whether both are true. For this reason, I propose to further refine this theory with an additional case study, the Uzbekistan transition first mentioned in the introduction.

CHAPTER IV

ADDITIONAL CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

In order to further refine my theory, I will be looking at Uzbekistan following the death of Islam Karimov as an additional case study. This will enable me to examine whether my findings hold outside of Spain, and also to further refine my theory. Uzbekistan is a strong choice because of its sultanistic nature, which according to Linz and Stepan (1996) are supposed to be dynastic in their succession. However, this did not occur which leaves us with a good case to examine. Uzbekistan also varies greatly from Spain at the system level, which allows me to eliminate several alternative factors that might impact the succession.

Of the Five Central Asian states, Uzbekistan is the only one that is viable for this study. Kazakhstan's first leadership transition since independence is still ongoing. Longtime president Nursultan Nazarbayev formally resigned in early 2019, but is still around and likely running the country in the background (British Broadcasting Corporation 2019). Kyrgyzstan has seen two revolutions that swept away its presidential system and left a fragile, semi-democratic, parliamentary system. The current leader of Tajikistan came to power during that country's civil war in the 1990's (Hiro 2009, Cummings 2012).

That leaves Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as possible case studies for my research. On paper both are ideal cases, with the president since independence dying suddenly while in office, and being replaced by a non-dynastic, non-constitutional successor (Pannier 2006, Radio Free Europe 2016). Initially this research set out to test both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Unfortunately, due to the extremely secretive nature of Turkmenistan I was unable to collect sufficient data on that country, leaving Uzbekistan as the best option for an additional case study

Using news articles from before and during the succession I managed to identify five possible successors to Islam Karimov. Comparing these five individuals, I found that in personalistic regimes it is the number of connections to sources of power that matter, and that possessing very strong ties to only one source, even the states coercive institutions, is not enough to take power. While this represents only two case studies, I have contributed to the literature by generating a new theory on executive succession in authoritarian regimes and demonstrating early support for it.

Like Spain under Franco, Uzbekistan's regime is weakly institutionalized and highly personalistic in nature (Cummings 2012, Hiro 2009). Authoritarian regimes are by nature governed by individuals, and Uzbekistan is a good example of this. In fact, this regime fits the definition of a sultanistic regime, representing an extreme example of personalistic dictatorships. The concept of a sultanistic regime originated with Max Weber in his work *Economy and Society*, and is defined as a government where:

traditional domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely instruments of the master... Previously the master's authority appeared as a pre-eminent group right, now it turns into his personal right, which he appropriates in the same way as he would any ordinary object of possession. ... where it [domination] indeed operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism. (Weber 1978 231-232)

This basic framework would later be expanded upon, especially through the work by Linz and his co-authors (Linz and Stepan 1996, Chehabi and Linz 1998, Linz 2000). According to this more

modern definition, under sultanistic rulers, the line between the regime, and the state blur, or even merge (Chehabi and Linz 1998). As part of personalization, rulers surround themselves with the trappings of charismatic leadership. Sultanistic rulers may think of themselves as great thinkers, often “writing” books or filling volumes with their speeches and decrees. Sultanistic rulers frequently invent traditions to accompany their rule, with these traditions often emerging as manifestations of the ruler’s personal world views. When it comes to succession, Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that these regimes will form dynasties and power will remain with the ruler’s family. All these factors reinforce the ego-centric focus of these regimes, making them extreme manifestations of personalistic dictatorships.

Sultanistic regimes often lack much in terms of formal institutions that structure their rule. Unlike totalitarian systems that have a well-defined ideology, sultanistic regimes often possess a pseudo ideology centered around the ruler and their family. Furthermore, rather than have defined political positions, these governments are run as personal family networks, with the ruler’s family often playing an outside role in government. Finally, and reinforcing the intense personalistic nature of these regimes, Sultanistic rulers often interfere in the economy, which leads to a distorted form of capitalism. Since the regime and state have blended, the ruler often sees the state’s economy as an extension of their personal wealth. As a result, they might arbitrarily take away private property, and these regimes lack the institutions to resolving conflicts or enforce contracts. However, to maximize economic benefits, a certain rationalization of the economy can take place (Chehabi and Linz 1998, Linz and Stepan 1996).

While the term sultanistic might conjure up images of Ottoman rulers, many non-Muslim rulers have been classified as Sultanistic. Eke and Taras (2000) identify Belarus as a sultanistic regime, while Chehabi and Linz (1998) include Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Batista in Cuba, and Marcos in the Philippines in this category – none of which are Muslim or even predominantly Muslim.

Fisun (2003, 6) classified Uzbekistan as featuring “sultanistic neopatrimonialism,” a further refinement of Linz’s definition which includes regimes characterized by façade elections and clan voting. In this case, the clan refers to those with personal connections to the ruler, based on either regional or ethnic connections, as well as rent seeking opportunities. Overall, sultanistic and sultanistic neopatrimonial regimes are extreme examples of personalistic rule. They suffer from a total absence of the rule of law, governance by personal decrees, weak institutionalization, and a frequent pattern where personal and financial success directly tied into support for the individual ruler.

Uzbekistan as a “Most Different” Case from Spain

An additional benefit of using Uzbekistan to test the hypotheses derived from the Spanish case is that in many ways, it represents a “most different” system or “Mill’s Method of Difference” design (Mill 1884, Seawright, and Gerring 2008). The logic of this sort of case comparison is that by selecting two cases that have similar outcomes but vary greatly on other potential causes, a researcher can focus their analysis solely on the points of similarity between the cases in establishing their causal argument. What this means is that I can look at the system level in order to eliminate possible alternative factors that might impact the results of my two cases.

One major difference between the two cases is the dominant culture and religion of the countries. Spain is a European country with strong ties to the Catholic Church. Uzbekistan by contrast is a predominantly Muslim country, with a Turkic population that has been heavily influenced by its Russian imperial legacy (Cummings 2012). This means that my results are not likely to be influenced by either the culture or religion of the countries in my study.

The timing of the transitions is also an important difference. My cases include one cold war (Spain) and one post-cold war (Uzbekistan) transition. This difference is predominantly

important because it eliminates the impacts of the international system on my analysis. The pressures on countries by the international system have changed greatly since the end of the cold war, so this gives temporal support to my theory.

Another potential factor that can be excluded with my analysis is the origin of each regime. Spain emerged as a military dictatorship following a coup and civil war (Share 1986), while Uzbekistan emerged peacefully from the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Hiro 2009). This difference has an impact on the importance of the military to my cases. While in Spain the military support was crucial for Juan Carlos, it does not even come up when discussing the Uzbekistan transition. This suggests that my theory can be applied both to civilian and military forms of personalistic regimes.

Additionally, the nature of the economies in both cases allows me to account for potential economic differences. Spain had a modernizing economy, that featured diverse interests including agriculture, tourism and industry (Share 1986). By contrast Uzbekistan's economy is largely based on agriculture and natural resources. The most important agricultural product is cotton, with Uzbekistan exporting 5% of the world's cotton in 2005. In addition, oil and natural gas also make up a large part of the economy, with most of the investment coming from Russia and China (Library of Congress 2014). Again this will allow me to account for different economic models, one based on a diversified economy (Spain), and one that is far more commodities focused (Uzbekistan).

Uzbekistan also varies greatly from Spain in terms of state capacity. In a study of fifteen different operationalizations of state capacity, Hendrix (2010) finds that gross domestic product (GDP) and bureaucratic quality were the best measures to capture this concept. Unfortunately, Spain's post-Franco transition occurred prior to most standard, cross-national measures of

bureaucratic quality used by researchers.¹⁵ This means that the only way to assess Spain’s bureaucratic quality in 1974 would require expert analysis of this time period, which is not feasible given the current focus of my project. Instead, I solely focus on GDP as a proxy for state capacity. I present this comparison in Table 2, with the data representing each country’s GDP at the time of succession (World Bank 2020a), converted into 2020 US dollars to improve comparability. Spain was comparatively a much wealthier country in 1975 than Uzbekistan was in 2016, with a GDP of 114.777 billion (2020 USD) at the time of Franco’s death, compared to Uzbekistan’s 81.779 billion (2020 USD) at the time of Karimov’s death. On the surface, this suggests that Spain’s state capacity was significantly higher than Uzbekistan’s, the comparison of economic wealth between the government elite and the average citizen is even more extreme in Uzbekistan. Using the World Bank’s (2020b) Poverty headcount ratio, which reports the percent of the country who lives on less than \$1.90 per day, less than 0.5% in Spain lived in extreme poverty in 1980 (the first year the data are available). In comparison, in Uzbekistan in 2003 (the most recent year collected), over 61% live in extreme poverty. This suggests that the elite in Uzbekistan are far wealthier than the average citizen. When compared to Spain in the 1970’s the difference is even more stark. This suggests that the elite in Uzbekistan had a much greater power advantage over the masses than the elite in Spain.

Table 2: Summary of differences between Spain and Uzbekistan		
Country	Spain: 1975	Uzbekistan: 2016
Culture/ Religion	Spanish/ Christian	Turkic/ Muslim
Temporal	Cold War	Post-Cold War
Regime Origin	Military Coup and Civil War	Peaceful Transition
Domestic Economy	Diversified	Commodities focused

¹⁵ Data availability for the World Bank’s Good Governance Indicators begins in 1996 (World Bank 2011). The bureaucratic quality measure employed by DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and derived from the Political Risk Services Group’s *International Country Risk Guide* (2020) is only available after 1984, and is behind a pay wall.

Table 2: Summary of differences between Spain and Uzbekistan		
GDP (2020 USD)	114.777 Billion	81.779 Billion
Percent in Extreme Poverty	0.5%	61.6%

Identifying Potential Successors in Uzbekistan

The first step in my additional case study is to identify potential successors. Since Karimov's regime was highly personalistic, this requires some detective work. My sources in this investigation are news articles sourced through the Factiva database. I begin by performing a search using the actual successor, and then use a form of snowball sampling. The first step is to enter the name of the successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, along with a date range leading up to the succession. In Appendix 1 I provide an example of a search performed using the successor to the late President of Uzbekistan and covering a five-year period before his death. Some of the articles discussing the actual successor also mention or discuss other individuals who were considered potential successors. After that I begin entering those names into the database, which results in more names of potential successors. The end result is a list of names that I can compare against the actual successor to test my hypotheses. The result was a list of five individuals who could have been the successor. Table 3 shows all of the potential successors identified for my case study using this search process.

Table 3: Potential Successors in Uzbekistan (based on Factiva news searches)
Shavkat Mirziyoyev * ¹⁶
Gulnara Karimov
Rustam Azimov
Nigmatilla Yuldashev
Rustam Inoyatov

¹⁶ * Denotes the actual successor

Eliminating Alternative Explanations

Before I examine the network connections of Uzbekistan's potential successors, I want to explore some alternative explanations for leadership succession that can be eliminated before diving into my case. First, Linz and Stepan (1996) contend that sultanistic regimes should behave like monarchies by forming dynasties. We see this in prominent examples like North Korea and Syria. There is also some evidence that Egyptian ruler Hosni Mubarak planned to have his son succeed him as president (Aziz and Hussein 2002). However, in my case the successor was not related to the outgoing president, an inconsistency that demonstrates that sultanistic succession may be less straightforward than predicted by previous scholars.

Second, we can eliminate the role of constitutional law in shaping succession. In Uzbekistan the constitutional successor was sidelined fairly early on. As senate chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev was first in line to succeed Karimov when he died. However, shortly after Islam Karimov's death, Nigmatilla Yuldashev reportedly abdicated his position as constitutional successor and nominated Shavkat Mirziyoyev as acting president. Mirziyoyev ultimately rewarded Yuldashev for his loyalty, appointing him as General Prosecutor once his term in the Senate had ended, amidst a presidential shakedown of the Uzbek justice system (Radio Free Europe 2016, Eurasianet 2019). This quick abdication highlights how weakly institutionalized personalistic regimes are, and how little guidance a constitution provides in time of leadership transition in a dictatorship.

CHAPTER V

THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION IN UZBEKISTAN

Before analyzing the succession struggle following Karimov's death in 2016, it is first important to overview the major elite players in Uzbekistan. Uzbek politics are dominated by two competing clans, those in Tashkent and those from Samarkand (Global Security Watch, N.D.). The Samarkand clan had strong influence in Uzbekistan's historically important cotton sector and dominated the Interior Ministry, while the Tashkent clan had long controlled the state's security forces (Radio Free Europe 2006). Under Karimov, peace was kept through dividing power between the clans, with Karimov (who was from Samarkand), filling the government with ministers from Tashkent. Each clan represents a major city in Uzbekistan, and competition between them dates to before Russian colonization. In addition to these major clans, other smaller cities have clans that ally themselves with one of the two major clans (Star 2006), meaning that clan politics in Uzbekistan operates based on principles in line with a patronage network or a mafia state, reinforced by marriage and personal ties. Clans in Central Asia are informal identity networks, based on blood or marriage and have their roots in a culture of kin based norms. Many scholars reportedly ignore them as irrelevant or having been stamped out during soviet rule (Collins 2002). In fact, the clans adapted and managed to maintain influence throughout the

soviet period (Star 2006).

Competition between the clan's dates to before Russian colonization, and the Soviet system generally tolerated their politics as long as the republic delivered on its production quotas set by Moscow (Star 2006). During Gorbachev's reform period, there were attempts to reign in the clan influence. In 1983, Inamjan Usmankhoyev became the leader of Soviet Uzbekistan and with Gorbachev's support, he attempted to eliminate clan politics in the name of cleaning up corruption. This process was initiated when a Soviet Satellite photographed a field that was supposed to be planted with cotton and discovered it empty (Hiro 2009), leading to a highly visible issue the Moscow leadership refused to ignore. Thousands of officials in Tashkent and Moscow were arrested, including the son in law of Leonid Brezhnev. The anti-corruption campaign backfired, however, and the clans began to actively resist Moscow.


As the Soviet Union began to unravel, the Uzbek clans re-asserted their influence. When the first elections were held in 1989, they reestablished the traditional balance of power between the clans. That same year, Islam Karimov was appointed the leader of Soviet Uzbekistan, and was elected president of the Uzbek SSR the following year. The election was part of Gorbachev's policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*. During the 1989 elections across Uzbekistan it was the clan leaders who ensured that Karimov was elected as head of the Uzbek SSR by acting as local power brokers (Star 2006). Throughout his reign Karimov sought to balance power between the Tashkent and Samarkand clans, usually through appointments to important ministries, especially those concerned with state security (Radio Free Europe 2006). There is no evidence for why the clans supported Karimov, other than they likely assumed he would work in their interests and restore the pre Gorbachev balance of power (Star 2006). Karimov would rule Uzbekistan from independence until his death in 2016. Until 2013 his eldest daughter Gulnara was believed to be the likely successor, although in 2013 she suffered a fall from grace and eliminated as a possible successor (Radio Free Europe 2016).

While Karimov left no official successor, three individuals quickly emerged as contenders. These were Finance Minister Rustam Azimov, Head of the National Security Service Rustam Inoyatov, and Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Meanwhile the constitutional successor, Nigmatilla Yuldashev, publicly abdicated early on, endorsing Mirziyoyev in the process (Pannier 2016).

Gulnara Karimov: The Dynastic Heir Eliminated Before the Game Began

Up until 2013, Gulnara Karimov was the favorite to succeed her father as President of Uzbekistan. Prior to her downfall, Gulnara had ties to both legitimacy granting and cooptation networks. As the daughter of Islam Karimov, she could claim legitimacy based on dynastic succession. In addition, her ownership of domestic media and membership in the Samarkand clan also enhanced her ability to claim legitimacy. For cooptation, her multiple businesses offered ample opportunities for the distribution of rent seeking opportunities. In addition to ownership of domestic media companies, Gulnara's businesses included cosmetics, fashion, jewelry and running several charities. Her business connections, while numerous, were not to Uzbekistan's predominant industries, cotton and natural resource extraction. This means that she lacked the business connections that were important to the local economy. In addition, as a diplomat she served as Uzbekistan's ambassador to Spain and the United Nations in Geneva (Radio-Free Europe 2013, Agence France Presse 2013), which gave her experience dealing in foreign policy and ties to the Uzbek foreign ministry. She was a business woman and diplomat, but lacked ties to the domestic government.

Figure 5



Her path to power abruptly changed in March 2013, when her father reportedly suffered a heart attack that was denied by official state media (Sindelar and Yusupov 2013). In November of that year, her businesses started to come under scrutiny at home, and those around her started getting arrested. For example, Gulnara claimed that Uzbek entertainers were forced to testify that she demanded bribes from them and that Inoyatov was making a move to remove her as the successor. Meanwhile her media networks were taken off the air and her companies bank accounts frozen (Radio Free Europe 2013, 2013b). This culminated with her reportedly being put under house arrest, and she would not appear in public until after her father’s death, when she was convicted on corruption charges and ultimately sentenced to five years of house arrest. Then in early 2019 she was imprisoned for violating house arrest and again put on trial for financial crimes, receiving a 13-year jail sentence in early 2020 (Radio-Free Europe 2013, Pannier 2016, Radio Free Europe 2020).


There is some speculation that Islam Karimov’s heart attack led those around him to plot a coup against Gulnara, eliminating a potential rival for succession. Some believe Rustam

Inoyatov and Shavkat Mirziyoyev were behind the charges brought against her and her business partners, although this is just speculation. As head of the National Security Service it makes sense that Inoyatov would have played a role in her demise, since he controlled the police. (Radio Free Europe 2013, Pannier 2016). The fact that Inoyatov did not publicly oppose Mirziyoyev suggests there may have existed an alliance between the two.

Nigmatilla Yuldashev: A Constitutional Successor Quickly Sidelined

When Karimov died in 2016, the individual that should have stepped into the presidency – at least, according to the constitution – was Senate Chairman Nigmatilla Yuldashev (Pannier 2016b). Like Gulnara, Yuldashev had some access to legitimacy granting and cooptation networks, primarily through his position as the constitutional successor and as a member of the Tashkent clan. A lawyer by training, Yuldashev previously served as the justice minister and as a prosecutor. In 2015, he was nominated by Karimov to be the chairman of the Uzbek Senate (Uzbekistan Report 2011, Interfax 2015).

Figure 6



At the time of Karimov's death, few in the media considered him a viable successor (Pannier 2016b). The primary reason for this is that he was not chosen to organize Karimov's funeral. This tradition, that a political successor should be in charge of arranging a leader's funeral, dated back to the Soviet period (Radio Free Europe 2016, Global Security N.D.b). Instead, this honor was given to Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the Prime Minister. Shortly after Karimov's funeral, the government announced that Yuldashev had abdicated as successor and nominated Mirziyoyev to serve as acting president. His statement merely said that he believed that he lacked the experience for the position whereas Mirziyoyev possessed "many years of experience" (Radio Free Europe 2016).

Looking at his limited connections it is not surprising that Yuldashev chose to back the better positioned Mirziyoyev's bid for the presidency. He lacked strong access to any of the three crucial networks, legitimacy granting, coercion, or cooptation. For legitimacy he could count on being from Tashkent and his role as the constitutional successor. However, there is no evidence that when Karimov appointed him as senate chair he was endorsing him as the successor. In a regime as weakly institutionalized as Uzbekistan that means that any legitimacy gained from the position was weak at best. His cooptation networks came from his years as a government administrator, but again he lacked the number and strength of connections possessed by Mirziyoyev. As a note in 2019 Yuldashev was again appointed as a prosecutor in Uzbekistan, suggesting a possible reward for his previous loyalty to Mirziyoyev (Eurasianet 2019).

Rustam Inoyatov: The Enforcer Who Became Kingmaker but not King

One of the more controversial figures in the Uzbek succession struggle was Rustam Inoyatov. A member of the Tashkent clan (and educated there), Inoyatov served the KGB starting in the 1970's. Working his way up from the Uzbek KGB to the KGB USSR, he later served in Soviet embassies overseas as a KGB operative. Karimov appointed Inoyatov as head of the

National Security Service (SNB), the post-Soviet successor to the KGB. Some believe this appointment was done to balance the power of Zakir Almatov, the then leader of the Interior Ministry (MVD) and member of the Samarkand clan. As part of their rivalry, Inoyatov was allegedly responsible for a series of bombings in 1999, which has been suspected of being a ploy to undermine the MVD. In December 2005 following the Andijon¹⁷ massacre Almatov resigned from his position as head of the MVD, allegedly for health reasons. (Radio Free Europe 2005, 2005b, Global Security N.D.c). Around the same time 20,000 soldiers responsible for internal security were transferred from the Interior Ministry to the National Security Service. This, along with the 1,000 strong National Guard left Inoyatov with a large private army at his disposal (Eurasianet 2018). The result was that Inoyatov stood as the preeminent strong man in Uzbekistan after 2005.

By 2016, Inoyatov had run the National Security Service for 19 years. The National Security Service controlled the police in Uzbekistan, and Inoyatov oversaw the countries consistent human rights abuses (Global Security N.D.c, Radio Free Europe 2018). During his time in office, Inoyatov gained a reputation as “one of the most ruthless figures in all of the post-Soviet space, responsible for building up the most feared and notorious security services agencies in the whole former Soviet region” (Putz 2018).¹⁸ As a result of his role in consistent human rights abuses he was banned from 2005 to 2007 from travel to the European Union (Brunnstrom 2007). The SNB operated with impunity, and its agents – and certainly its leader – were effectively above the law in Uzbekistan (Putz 2018).


Unlike Gulnara and Yuldashev, Inoyatov had strong access to Uzbekistan’s coercion networks. This means that he is a great example of my first hypothesis, possessing overwhelming

¹⁷ In 2005 security forces under the National Security Service and Interior Ministry fired on demonstrators in the city of Andijon (Radio Free Europe 2005).

¹⁸ The original quote, as cited in *The Diplomat*, is attributed to Human Rights Watch Central Asia researcher Steve Swerdlow.

connections to a single source of power. His cooptation connections, however, were much weaker and came primarily in the form of his being recognized as one of the leaders of the Tashkent clan, which was much more affiliated with security rather than economic power. His only tie – and a weak network tie at that – to Uzbekistan’s influential business leaders affiliated with the Samarkand clan was through his believed political alliance with Shavkat Mirziyoyev. During Mirziyoyev’s time as prime minister, the two allegedly formed an alliance that led to Gulnara’s downfall (Pannier 2016, Global Security N.D.c).

Figure 7



Ultimately, however, Inoyatov’s strong coercive network was not enough to propel him into leadership. Inoyatov was 72 at the time of Karimov’s death, leading some to speculate that he would act as a kingmaker rather than take power directly. Another reason he was not considered a likely candidate was that in the 10 years prior to Karimov’s death he was only photographed once, on a visit to China (Pannier 2016). This and his clandestine past seemed to reinforce his preference to avoid such a public role as a leader (MacFarquhar 2016). He would head the National Security Service until two years after Karimov’s death, being the last major official to be replaced by Mirziyoyev. He was officially named as an advisor to the president, but not before having the National Security Service dressed down in a televised address by the President. In addition, Mirziyoyev has removed thousands of names from a black list created by Inoyatov

security services. It has been speculated that one reason Inoyatov was removed is that he stood in the way of reforms planned by Mirziyoyev to bring Uzbekistan out of isolation (Putz 2018).

Rustam Azimov: The Public Face with Limited Network Reach

When Karimov died it was thought that Rustam Azimov would make a more sophisticated replacement for Karimov than the other lead candidates, Mirziyoyev or Inoyatov (Pannier 2016). Like Mirziyoyev, he was a one of Karimov's technocrats, but he hailed from the Tashkent clan as Inoyatov did (Snow 2016). An economist by trade, Azimov possessed a Masters from Oxford and multiple degrees from Soviet universities. He was seen as being more diplomatic than his other contenders for succession, and was the only one with foreign relations experience (Global Security N.D.d).


Beyond his membership in the Tashkent clan, his long government service provided Azimov with cooptation networks. During the Soviet period, he was a member of the communist party and worked for the party within the Uzbek SSR, serving as a chief economist for a collective farm that dominated Soviet Uzbekistan's cotton production. During the early years of independence, he acted as Karimov's chief financial liaison with external actors, working to get loans from the west for Uzbekistan's development (Global Security N.D.d).

From 1991 to 1998, Azimov served as Chairman of the Board of the National Bank of foreign economic activity, and from 1992 onwards he managed the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development of Uzbekistan (Global Security N.D.d). He would continuously serve the Uzbek government from 1998 – 2017, with each position being related to the economy. From 2007 – 2017 he served as First Deputy Prime Minister. At the time of succession, he was also serving as the finance minister (Pannier 2017). All of these positions reinforced his strong ties to Uzbekistan's influential cotton sector, their rapidly growing natural resources business, and major domestic and international investors. Examining his network, few of the Uzbek elite

possessed the potential cooptation network of Azimov’s financial relations. He was the public face of Uzbek business at home and abroad, and frequently accompanied Karimov in his dealings with foreign leaders (Hanks 2010).

Unfortunately for him, Azimov lacked the coercive connections possessed by Inoyatov, but still possessed access to legitimacy granting and cooptation networks. So what explains why he did not become the successor? One possible explanation is that being from the Tashkent clan his appointment would have upset the delicate balance maintained under Karimov (Pannier 2016). In addition, he appears to have lacked any meaningful connection to Inoyatov or the Samarkand clan. Given his position of power the consent of Inoyatov would likely have been a prerequisite to Azimov being named the successor.

Figure 8



Azimov, like Inoyatov possessed strong connections to one source of power, in this case cooptation networks. Again this makes him a good example of hypothesis 1, which states that the successor will have overwhelming support from one source of power. However, like Inoyatov this single, very strong connection was not enough to propel him into the presidency. He was also

unable to maintain his government positions, first being relieved as finance minister, then six months after the succession as deputy prime minister. Like with Inoyatov a year later this was likely due to a desire for reform by Mirziyoyev, although regime consolidation cannot be ruled out (Putz 2017).

Shavkat Mirziyoyev: The Contender Who Became Strong Through Many Weak Ties

Shavkat Mirziyoyev was the man who ultimately succeeded Karimov as president of Uzbekistan. In comparison to the other succession contenders, Mirziyoyev could access legitimacy granting, cooptation, and coercion networks at the time of his succession. If Azimov was the public face of Uzbek finances, then Mirziyoyev was the man behind the curtain. Described by some as Karimov's right-hand man, Mirziyoyev rarely appeared on domestic or international television news (British Broadcasting Corporation 2016b). Like Karimov, Mirziyoyev was associated with the Samarkand clan (Snow 2016), a relationship that was reinforced by his close personal ties to Karimov and his wife Tatiana Karimova. Even though he ultimately succeeded in his bid for control, Mirziyoyev was not initially obvious as the primary contender for successor, especially given how unpopular he was amongst most of the Uzbek public (British Broadcasting Corporation 2016b). Many Uzbek elites viewed him as a "thug who is short on reason and quick to aggression," a reputation he earned after allegedly physically assaulting a farmer who complained about local conditions during Mirziyoyev's time as governor of Jizzakh Province (Pannier 2016).

Mirziyoyev's educational background was in agriculture; specifically, he is an engineer with a PhD from the Tashkent Institute of Irrigation and Melioration. During the Soviet era, he appears to have worked for the Komsomal, the soviet youth league, and after independence worked in Tashkent for the successor to the Communist Party (Global Security N.D.b).

From 1996 to 2001 he served as a provincial governor, first of Jizzakh, and later Samarkand (British Broadcasting Corporation 2001). The economies of both provinces are dominated by agriculture (Gazette of Central Asia 2013, Ibragimov 2016). In addition, the city of Samarkand is considered “the crossroads of world cultures” according to UNESCO (N.D.). This claim is due to the cities importance as part of the ancient silk road, and its role in the regions history, from Alexander the Great to Tamerlane. This work as a provincial governor, and his later service as the Prime Minister gave Mirziyoyev a cooptation network he could work with, especially as it allowed him to build up key connections in Uzbekistan’s key cotton sector.

In 2003, Karimov named him prime minister of Uzbekistan, a post he served until becoming acting president in 2016 (Radio Free Europe 2016). According to Karimov, he was selected because of his agricultural background, and was appointed to improve Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector (British Broadcasting Corporation 2003). This position put Mirziyoyev directly responsible for the annual harvest of Uzbekistan’s important cotton crop. As prime minister, he continued the tactics he developed first as regional governor, relying on police and local courts to control a forced labor workforce through the use of intimidation and aggressive property seizures (Human Rights Watch 2017, 26). Unlike Azimov, who took a soft approach to wooing international investors, Mirziyoyev was more of a “cleaver” relying on the state’s coercive tools to reinforce his economic influence.

If his time as governor taught him the value of the coercive forces for keeping the population in line, Mirziyoyev as prime minister would come to value this alliance even more as a way to control national politics. After becoming prime minister, he allegedly formed an alliance with Inoyatov, and used this alliance to have Gulnara placed under house arrest (Pannier 2016). While the presence of this political alliance is purely speculative (but seems to be supported by Inoyatov’s support of Mirziyoyev’s rise to power), this would have granted Mirziyoyev access to coercion networks through the National Security Service. In other words, over his career

Mirziyoyev developed multiple weak ties to coercive institutions within the regime. An added benefit to his alleged alliance with Inoyatov was a connection to the Tashkent clan. Being from Jizzakh he had the support of that clan, and then through his term as provincial governor received the backing of the Samarkand clan. This meant that when he became president he had the support of the Samarkand clan and most likely the Tashkent clan as well.

Figure 9



Mirziyoyev had a fairly strong tie to Uzbekistan’s cotton production, but it appears that it was the strength of his weak ties to all the major power sources in Uzbek politics that explain his consolidation of presidential power. When compared to the other power contenders (see Table 4), Shavkat Mirziyoyev possessed ties to institutions that served legitimacy granting, cooptation and coercion, which he could leverage to further his claim on power. Gulnara possessed strong ties to legitimacy and cooptation, but had no ties to coercive networks. Likewise, Azimov also had strong ties to cooptation networks, but weak legitimacy and no coercive tools. The other two

contenders, Inoyatov and Yuldashev, also lacked the connections necessary to become the successor. Yuldashev had the stronger claim to legitimacy, but weak cooptation and no coercive networks. By comparison Inoyatov had the strongest coercive tools, but weaker legitimacy granting and cooptation resources. In fact, the network I describe perhaps underestimates Mirziyoyev’s social network connections, as his time as prime minister allowed him almost 13 years to appoint loyalists to key positions around the country, and possibly even gain foreign connections such as with Russia (British Broadcasting Corporation 2016b).

Table 4: Sources of Power and Executive Succession in Uzbekistan					
Sources of Power/ Supporting Institutions	Gulnara Karimov	Nigmatilla Yuldashev	Rustam Inoyatov	Rustam Azimov	Shavkat Mirziyoyev
Legitimacy Granting Networks <i>Authority; Intangible Factors</i> Institutions: <i>Media; Constitution; Support from Religious Leaders; Dynastic</i>	Owner of Domestic Media Companies Daughter of Islam Karimov Member of the Samarkand Clan	Constitutional Successor Member of the Tashkent Clan (Find citation)	Allied to Mirziyoyev, who had the support of the Samarkand Clan	Member of the Tashkent Clan	Support from the Samarkand Clan Allied to a leader of the Tashkent Clan
Cooptation Networks <i>Human Resources; Skills and Knowledge; Material resources</i> Institutions: <i>Legislatures; Bureaucratic Connections; Political Parties and</i>	Owner of Multiple Businesses (Fashion, Jewelry, Cosmetics) Ran Several Charities Former Diplomat (Spain, UN in Switzerland)	Senate Chairman Former Justice Minister Former Deputy Prosecutor General	One of the Leaders of the Tashkent Clan	Finance Minister First Deputy Prime Minister	Prime Minister Previous role as Provincial Governor

Table 4: Sources of Power and Executive Succession in Uzbekistan					
Sources of Power/ Supporting Institutions	Gulnara Karimov	Nigmatilla Yuldashev	Rustam Inoyatov	Rustam Azimov	Shavkat Mirziyoyev
<i>Civil Society; Business Connections, control over property and resources</i>					
Coercion Networks <i>Sanctions</i> Institutions: <i>Military; secret police; other Security Institutions</i>			Head of the National Security Service		Allied to the Head of the National Security Service

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have attempted to develop a theory of executive succession within non-democratic regimes. In order to accomplish this, I looked at two government transitions within personalistic regimes. The first case looked at the transition in Spain following the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 and led to two hypotheses on potential successors. Then I looked at Uzbekistan in 2016 following the death Islam Karimov in order to further refine my theory. Both cases demonstrated support for my theory of executive transition, and the second case enabled me to refine it even further.

In the Uzbekistan transition when looking at all five contenders for succession I have found greater support for my second hypothesis; *A successful presidential successor will have access to more of the sources of power than the competition.* This finding is clearly demonstrated when looking at this case. Shavkat Mirziyoyev possessed significantly more ties than either of his two main competitors for power. If the first hypothesis held true than either Azimov or Inoyatov would have been the successor. Both possessed very strong ties to their respective networks, cooptation and coercion. Having two contenders with strong, but few ties lose out gives me added

confidence in the results. In addition, it weakens the argument that Inoyatov would have taken power if he were a few decades younger, since Azimov did not face any age related pressures.

Overall it appears from this research that what matters when looking at personalistic succession is the number of ties, rather than their strength. Furthermore, this pattern also holds true for the Spanish case that I used to generate the hypothesis. When examining these most different systems side by side, both Juan Carlos and Shavkat Mirziyoyev could access legitimacy granting, cooptation, and coercion tools, whereas their competition often were limited to only one major authoritarian control network. While Spain's Juan Carlos could outcompete Arias in both the depth (strong ties) and width (weak ties) of his social network, the added analysis of Uzbekistan's Shavkat Mirziyoyev suggests that many weak ties may be the most effective network for an aspiring leader of an authoritarian regime. In Uzbekistan, Inoyatov and Azimov had very strong ties to their respective networks (coercion for Inoyatov, cooptation for Azimov), but neither possessed as many or as varied ties as Mirziyoyev.

This research has contributed to our knowledge of authoritarian regimes by offering a theory of succession that combines both consent and institutional theories. This builds off the strength of both approaches while also addressing some of their major drawbacks. It does this by discussing individuals and institutions as being interconnected and having an impact on each other. It also provides nuance on the succession dynamics in sultanistic regimes, as my results demonstrate that dynastic succession is not an inherent feature of these regimes as was assumed by Linz and Stepan (1996).

The primary limitation of this work lies in the limited number of cases studied. In my case selection, I have controlled for multiple external factors that might impact succession, such as culture/ religion and economic development. However, to take this research beyond theory

generating requires additional cases to be examined. Only then can the generalizability of my theory be determined.

Future research should continue to explore the importance of connections to sources of power in authoritarian regimes. Ideally this should be tested on a variety of regime types to determine its generalizability. I would personally like to apply this theory to a one party state, such as the People Republic of China. It is my belief that even in a highly institutionalized state there is something to be gained by combining consent and institutional approaches of authoritarian regimes. It is possible that when deciding on a successor within these regimes the same competition between strong vs. many network ties plays out. Even a monarchy can be looked at using this theory, since monarchs often have multiple children who could legitimately claim power. The list of possible regimes to test this theory on is virtually as long as the list of modern authoritarian regimes. The possible exception would be within a military regime, where I would expect the results of this study to flip, with the successor possessing the strongest ties to the military. But even that could prove incorrect, as the successor might instead need both ties to the military and ties to the civilian bureaucracy and businesses. In addition to applying this theory to other regime types, an obvious expansion of this research would be to look at other personalistic regimes. Researchers with greater time and resources could take another look at Turkmenistan, or Kazakhstan after the ongoing transition stabilizes.

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APPENDICES

Figure 10. Screenshot of the Factiva Database search summary for Shavkat Mirziyoyev

Search Summary	
Text	Shavkat Mirziyoyev
Date	01/01/2001 to 09/01/2016
Source	All Sources
Author	All Authors
Company	All Companies
Subject	All Subjects
Industry	All Industries
Region	All Regions
Language	English
Results Found	975
Timestamp	2 November 2020 11:09 AM

VITA

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