THE U.S. PEACE CORPS: AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY STRATEGY IN CRITICAL GLOBAL

STATES

By

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Abstract: The U.S. Peace Corps has been operating programs globally since 1961 with an enduring mission toward international friendship and world peace structured around clear goals that emphasize cross-cultural learning objectives. Little is known about whether the program has a positive effect on U.S. soft power abroad and, if so, the magnitude of that influence. This paper examines the impact of Peace Corps programming in foreign states on U.S. soft power potential. The primary research objective aims to understand the relationship between indicators of a foreign population's favorability toward the U.S. and Peace Corps participation to determine the effects of program size as well as program presence and removal. Pew Research Center U.S. favorability scores were analyzed alongside Peace Corps volunteer cohort sizes between years 2004 to 2017 among 20 sample countries. The findings indicate a positive and statistically meaningful relationship between the size of the Peace Corps volunteer cohort and U.S. favorability. Each additional volunteer increases favorability toward the U.S. by 0.12 points. The results are robust to the inclusion of additional soft power factors. Supplementary findings illustrate that the removal of Peace Corps programming may adversely impact favorability toward the U.S., establishing the negative soft power effect of ceasing participation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Government-sponsored exchange programs, such as the U.S. Peace Corps, intend to accomplish goals relevant to a state's national interests. International engagement strategies that communicate with foreign audiences represent public diplomacy activities, or more specifically, a state's leveraging of their soft power potential. Public diplomacy has been utilized in global relations throughout history, but conceptually has only been considered in scholarship and research in the past few decades. Of importance to both government decision-making and scholarship is the ability to measure the effectiveness and magnitude of public diplomacy activities.

This paper considers a recent decision of the Peace Corps to discontinue operations in China as a case study by which to measure the impact of state-sponsored programming, and subsequently the effectiveness of a U.S. public diplomacy strategy. This introduction discusses in more detail the purpose, background, and significance of this study as well as the history and mission of the Peace Corps as it relates to 21st century U.S. public diplomacy objectives.

The History of the Peace Corps and U.S. Public Diplomacy Engagement

The end of World War II led to a new era of U.S. foreign policy objectives. By 1945 vast portions of Western Europe were destroyed and two superpowers emerged on the world stage – the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The drastically opposing ideologies of the Soviet Union gave rise to U.S. fears of losing potential political and economic allies in vulnerable post-WWII states that adopted communist systems. During Harry Truman's presidency, in an effort to contain the spread of communism, the United States actively promoted the expansion of democratic and capitalistic ideals abroad. This strategic shift in foreign policy became known as the Truman Doctrine, when in 1947, $400 million in aid was provided to Greece and Turkey to repress 'communist aggression' following financial difficulties in those regions (Belmonte, 2013).

Amidst the emerging Cold War with the USSR, U.S. public diplomacy[1] experts believed that it was necessary to articulate U.S. values and ideals abroad in conjunction with injections of financial aid set by the Truman Doctrine (Belmonte, 2013). These U.S.-led communication strategies were largely aimed at contesting anti-American propaganda being distributed by the Soviet Union as well as advocating for democratic capitalism. This effort of distributing large sums of money while simultaneously proselytizing political values became known in the Soviet Union as dollar imperialism (Belmonte, 2013).

The Cold War also coincided with the decolonization of a large number of countries throughout the world, beginning in the 1930s but gaining traction into the 1960s (Betts, 2004; Cobbs, 1996). At the beginning of 1960, then Senator John F. Kennedy asked students at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor if they would be willing to serve their country in the cause of peace in the developing world (Peace Corps, n.d.-e). Later in 1961, President John F.

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[1] Public diplomacy generally refers to government-sponsored communication directed at a public foreign audience. The term employs various academic disciplines and continues to develop as a field of study. The concept is discussed in-depth in Chapter II.

Kennedy's belief that the U.S. needed to be better "at competing with Moscow for the allegiance of newly independent countries" led to the creation of the Peace Corps (Cobbs, 1996, para. 2). The founding of the Peace Corps occurred alongside rising Cold War tension, becoming officially established shortly before the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The backdrop of a looming war with the USSR inadvertently positioned the new organization as a state-sponsored political tool. The first cohort of Peace Corps volunteers arriving in Ghana during the fall of 1961 were even cited as CIA spies by Ghanaian state media, a narrative perpetuated by the Soviet Union (Meisler, 2012).

In the same year, founders of the Peace Corps considered the purpose of volunteers beyond their direct role in assisting communities but also endeavoring to reconstruct negative imagery of Americans abroad. This fundamental public relations approach is rooted in the Peace Corps' framework still in 2020 (Meisler, 2012). The organization continues to send Americans to countries worldwide with mission-specific goals of providing trained men and women to interested countries while also emphasizing ongoing cross-cultural learning objectives to, in part, promote a better understanding of Americans abroad (Peace Corps, n.d.-f).

Since 1961 Peace Corps volunteers have participated in programs in 142 countries and as of 2020, are actively engaged in 61 countries. A total of 240,000 volunteers have served in roles abroad including agriculture, economic development, education, environment, health, and youth development (Peace Corps, n.d.-g; Peace Corps, 2019c).

Volunteers aim to promote peace and friendship in accordance with The Peace Corps Act (1961), outlining the structural framework of three goals that specifically illustrate the organization's mission:

1. "To help the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women."

2. "To help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served."

3. "To help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans."

(Peace Corps, n.d.-b, p. 9).

The three Peace Corps goals can sensibly be divided into two categories: the first of providing technical skills and the second and third goals of grassroots diplomacy achieved through people-to-people exchange. Goals two and three establish the organization's effort to promote friendship through the encouragement of cross-cultural learning between Americans and their host and home communities. The second goal of specifically promoting a better understanding of Americans abroad directly aligns with public diplomacy efforts stemming from President Truman's era of controlling the global U.S. narrative. U.S. foreign policy during the establishment of the Peace Corps in 1961 was largely shaped by previous administrations and perpetuated by the Kennedy, and later, the Johnson presidencies through the Cold War. Sharing an understanding of Americans in the developing world (as well as newly independent countries following a period of decolonization) serve the goals of containing communism through mechanisms of sharing American culture and subsequently spreading ideals of democracy and capitalism.

By 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall signified the end of the Cold War reducing the need for U.S. public diplomacy experts to actively contain the spread of communism. This time period represents the second phase of modern U.S. information efforts abroad, characterized as the adoption of a passive stance to spreading U.S. information, ideals, and values to foreign audiences (Szondi, 2008).

A little over a decade later, the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 again shifted the U.S. approach to public diplomacy. The direction of efforts and resources were reallocated from the containment of communism to preventing terrorism (Rieffel, 2003; Szondi, 2008). Public diplomacy efforts following the attacks of 9/11 include information campaigns, such as the 'shared values initiative', that dispersed advertisements in predominantly Muslim countries that aimed to illustrate those values that are shared (such as religion, family and education) between the U.S. and those populations, specifically in foreign states, that identify as Muslim (Kendrick & Fullerton, 2004).

The shift in U.S. public diplomacy efforts included attention on the Peace Corps in the 21st century as well as other activities and programs that were established during the Cold War. Former and first Director of the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver encouraged the organization to consider a fourth goal following 9/11, that being to "promote global acceptance" and "non-violent coexistence among peoples of diverse cultures" (Rieffel, 2003, para. 24). As the U.S. government and the Peace Corps consider how their efforts can contribute to renewed U.S. foreign policy objectives, their current mission still remains much the same as it did in 1961 (Exec. Order No. 10924, 1961).

Following 9/11, global empathy toward the United States was brief as President Bush declared war on terrorism, strongly asserting to the international community "you are either with or against us" (Payne, 2009, p. 21). The Bush administration's response to the tragic events of 9/11 have heightened sentiments of anti-Americanism globally, a perception that poses a national security risk if it aims to motivate terrorism (O'Connor & Griffiths, 2006).

The negative international response to the Bush administration and a heightened global environment of anti-Americanism shaped the decision-making of future leadership. The Obama administration actively engaged in public diplomacy efforts through a strategy that relied on

citizen diplomats in an effort to "shape global narratives" (Yu, 2015, p. 36). Consistent with emphasizing the role of citizen diplomats, Barack Obama largely advocated for the Peace Corps during his campaign for the U.S. presidency, stating in 2007 that he intended to double the number of volunteers within the organization (Meisler, 2012). The efforts of shaping global narratives of the United States through the mechanism of people-to-people exchange demonstrates a public diplomacy strategy intended to achieve outcomes relevant to national interests. The Obama administrations' emphasis on citizen diplomacy also established legitimacy of the Peace Corps in achieving 21st century goals.

Background of this Study

With the support of the Obama administration, the Peace Corps continued to grow, increasing volunteer participation drastically beginning in 2010 (Peace Corps, 2010b). Yet renewed political turmoil in D.C. risks the longevity of participation in specific countries. As of January 2020, U.S. political pressure may have contributed to the decision of the Peace Corps to end programming in the People's Republic of China. The abrupt action to remove programming shortly followed the proposed Peace Corps Mission Accountability Act (2019) introduced on July 30, 2019. The bill sought to end participation in the country, noting that the Peace Corps should not participate in adversarial states, specifically calling for the closure of programming in China by September of 2020. The proposed bill also attempts to transfer the supervision of the Peace Corps from an independent agency to an accessory under the U.S. Department of State. The shift in supervision would prevent participation in countries that are deemed adversarial or hostile to national security interests at the discretion of the U.S. Secretary of State (Derby, 2020). Within the U.S. Senate, proponents of the bill have expressed the importance of not dedicating U.S. taxes to adversarial states through the vessel of Peace Corps programming. Senate references to the

People's Republic of China as 'communist China' resurfaces Truman era sentiments (Derby, 2020).

While an official response regarding the Peace Corps' decision to leave China seems unclear, staff and volunteers have been informed that the program is graduating[2] from the country, as it is no longer considered a "developing country" (Hessler, 2020). The volunteers participating in Peace Corps China generally serve in less-developed provinces in western portions of the country. In addition, volunteers actively seek out projects and activities that offer engagement in cross-cultural learning, a public diplomacy goal that aligns with the Obama administration's foreign policy strategy. Under these circumstances, withdrawing volunteers that ideally serve to shape global narratives of Americans may result in a missed opportunity.

Statement of Problem

In June of 2010, Peace Corps Director Aaron Williams created a Comprehensive Agency Assessment Report that was provided to the U.S. Congress (Peace Corps, 2010c). The report outlines current initiatives and strategies implemented by the agency as well as opportunities and recommendations to improve upon and reform aspects of the Peace Corps. The report includes recommendations for the process by which the agency determines future program closures and entries. As outlined in the report, of those program closures that occurred between years 2000 and 2010, almost 75% were the result of Peace Corps volunteer safety and security concerns. The remaining 25% of closures, representative of six Eastern European states, resulted from a decrease in demand for the skills offered by Peace Corps volunteers as well as external funding directed from the European Union (Peace Corps, 2010a).

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[2] The term graduation is used within the Peace Corps to imply a program closing as a result of meeting all intended goals.

The U.S. Executive Branch, Congress, and the State Department act as influencers in country closures and entries as reflected in the allocation of resources to countries through the Peace Corps network. The 2010 Agency Assessment Report recommends that future allocation of resources be reviewed with more transparency and direction. Allocation of scarce resources may include volunteer cohort size placements, entry of new states, and closures of existing participating countries. The recommendation of an annual portfolio review outlines the criteria by which the agency reviews program performance to determine resource allocation. The criteria as outlined in the 2010 assessment report includes these broad categories:

- "Country's commitment to the Peace Corps program"

- "Safety, security, and medical care of the Volunteer"

- "Impact (Goals 1 and 2)"

  o Peace Corps effectiveness

  o Where there is a need to build relationships

- "Post Management"

- "Strategic Interest"

  o Assists with other U.S. development efforts

  o "Countries critical to ensuring global peace and security"

- "Cost Effectiveness"

- "Country Need"

  o Human Development Index

o "Limited number of active donors present"

(Peace Corps, 2010c, p.48-49).

The assessment's portfolio review criterion, 'country need', may indicate development status, aligning with the Peace Corps' unofficial response for closing programming in China. Of note, subsections of 'country need' included in the assessment are 'Human Development Index' and 'donors present', with no indication of economic development status as a criterion.

As based on the recommended criteria, the decision to withdraw programming from China may indicate a poor leveraging of soft power potential in the region. Adversarial states, that do not risk volunteer safety, may actually indicate a high need to create and shape U.S. narratives through public diplomacy efforts to include people-to-people exchange tactics.

Applying grassroots diplomacy in states deemed adversarial may serve the criterion as articulated in the annual portfolio review as 'strategic interest' or the ability to work with countries critical to ensuring global peace and security through relationship-building tactics. The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and China has been cited as one of the most strategically important and complex in the world (Shambaugh, 2012). The interdependence of the two states economically and politically as well as their efforts toward partnership may ensure global stability, security, and peace. It is difficult to downsize the critical and strategic importance of U.S.-China relations in the 21st century.

Purpose of this Study

The purpose of this paper is to better understand the relationship between the Peace Corps and its impact on larger U.S. foreign policy objectives post-2001 that aim to enhance U.S. favorability abroad as a public diplomacy and national security strategy. As the Peace Corps

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enters a third phase of U.S. foreign policy and public diplomacy objectives, the mission and the criteria by which countries enter or exit programming requires renewed evaluation in their alignment with 21st century U.S. goals. Determining the impact of Peace Corps' grassroots diplomacy tactics (goals two and three[3]) may assist in understanding the soft power potential of programming. Exiting programs early or unnecessarily (that do not pose a risk to volunteer health and safety) may adversely impact established public diplomacy objectives by which the organization intended upon entering. This study will also compare findings to the recent decision to end programming in China, reviewed in this paper as a guiding case study by which to generate research objectives. In this way, a key objective will aim to determine if ceasing Peace Corps operations impacts U.S. soft power potential. This will assist in better understanding the effect of withdrawing programming from China as well as provide measurable indicators for future program suspensions or closures globally.

<div align="center">Research Question</div>

Does the Peace Corps' decision to end operations in China affect the United States' soft power potential? This research intends to determine the long-term impact of the Peace Corps on U.S. soft power globally and to understand the impact of withdrawing programs from foreign states. It also intends to better understand the agency's effectiveness as it relates to a participating state's level of economic development. In this way, research intends to analyze the decision of the Peace Corps to withdraw programming from China as a guiding case study.

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[3] As mentioned earlier, the Peace Corps' mission adheres to three goals as outlined in The Peace Corps Act (1961). Goals two and three establish the agency's objectives to "help promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served" and to "help promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans" respectively.

Overview of Methodology

A quantitative research approach is utilized in this study to provide measurable indicators of the Peace Corps' effectiveness in contributing to regional soft power. These indicators also serve to better understand the criteria utilized by decision-makers in determining future allocation of resources (to include the number of participating volunteers by region and future program closures and entries). This study's methodology can be summarized in its purpose of identifying a series of possible relationships. A sample of 20 globally diverse countries, 85 indicators of U.S. favorability, and Peace Corps volunteer cohort sizes were measured between years 2004 to 2017. Employing linear regression, three key relationships are considered:

- Regional Peace Corps volunteer cohort size and indicators of favorability toward the U.S.

- Program closures and indicators of favorability toward the U.S.

- Status of a foreign state's economic development, Peace Corps programming, and indicators of favorability toward the U.S.

Significance

While public diplomacy has served a role in international relations throughout history, the scholarly field and dedicated research is relatively new and limited. The act of government-sponsored communication with a foreign population is expressed by various terminologies globally, but the founding of the term 'public diplomacy' can be traced back to the 1960s to Edmund Gullion. The former diplomat aimed to create a term that democratized the terminology that better represented propaganda in an effort to articulate the activities of the then United States Information Agency. The term today varies greatly from propaganda and encompasses a wide

range of academic disciplines (Cull, 2019). This research contributes to the field as it applies quantitative analysis to measure the theoretical and practical concepts of public diplomacy.

This research also provides a means by which the Peace Corps and other government agencies can measure the impact of their programming on achieving soft power objectives through people-to-people exchange. Limited studies currently exist that quantitatively measure the individual and combined impact of exchange programs on outcomes that demonstrate a state's soft power potential. The limited research is in part due to the intangible nature of soft power and therefore the difficulty in identifying a clear method by which to provide statistical evidence of an outcome (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011). Contributing research that provides quantitative and statistical measurement intends to enhance the decision-making of government agencies engaging in these activities and encourage higher impact of those programs that seek a global environment of peace and stability.

Summary

The following chapters include a literature review, research design, findings, discussion, and recommendations for future research as well as suggested policy changes. The literature review provides an overview of concepts related to public diplomacy and soft power that develops better context for understanding the role of the Peace Corps in achieving U.S. strategic objectives abroad. Previous studies are also considered measuring outcomes associated with exchange programs. Additionally, a theoretical and practical framework is presented to provide a lens by which to approach this research. Chapter III discusses in detail the research design, data sample, and those variables considered for this study that provide measurable indicators of soft power. Chapter IV presents findings with discussion of those results. This study concludes with

future recommendations for policy that aim to assist decision-makers in best allocating U.S.

resources in their goal to leverage and maximize the potential of soft power.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

        This chapter reviews the literature and research related to soft power and public

diplomacy. While the terminologies are relatively new, both concepts have been employed by

states throughout history and in various methods to engage in international relations (Cull, 2019).

The beginning of this chapter provides an overview of each concept as an individual field or

academic discipline. As this study considers the interdependence of the terms in their practical

application, additional sections will discuss their relationship in achieving favorable state

outcomes. Later sections within this chapter will then apply these terms to a theoretical and

practical framework that provides context to this paper's guiding case study[4]. Of importance to

this study also includes research associated with the quality of interactions among Peace Corps

volunteers and their host communities as a means to understanding the organization's grassroots

role in achieving desired soft power outcomes. Finally, a thorough review of the available

literature and research that incorporates methodology consistent with measuring the effectiveness

of people-to-people exchange programming will be included.

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[4] A review and statistical analysis of the Peace Corps' decision to remove programming from China in
2020.

The Power of Attraction

A central theme and core component to this research is the concept of soft power, or the ability of a state to persuade other actors to achieve desired outcomes. The term was introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990 and later developed in 2004 (Nye, 1990; Nye, 2004). As the U.S. prepared for an environment beyond the polarizing geopolitical landscape of the Cold War, Nye discussed the importance of considering new forms of influence (Roselle et al., 2014). As opposed to hard power, or the ability for a state to coerce others, soft power influences through the power of attraction. Datta (2014) argues that general attitudes toward the U.S. suggest to what capacity foreign states will work with or against the interests of the United States. An audience's perception of a foreign state may have both economic and political consequences, strengthening the need to understand soft power potential.

As many policymakers are aware, a combination of both powers is normally considered necessary for a state to operate within international relations, sometimes referred to as smart power (Cull, 2019). This blend of power can be visualized in the structuring of government, representative of the differing behaviors of a diplomatic corps and armed forces in their pursuit to achieve those outcomes that benefit the position of their state. Soft power may be enhanced by a state's capability for hard power. Official diplomats representing a nation with a strong military may find desirable outcomes with fewer barriers than those without. This combination of power is especially useful as coercive behaviors or actions are subject to increased accountability, a consequence of the transparency created by the digital communication age (Cull, 2019).

Variations in behaviors or actions serve as a visible indicator when comparing the differences between soft and hard power. Nye (2004) expresses an additional key difference between methods of power, that being the tangibility of those resources utilized. Hard power resources tend to be visible and tangible to include behaviors such as bribes, payments, and

military force. Soft power resources include values, culture, and policies. Nye asserts that the spectrum between hard and soft power offers overlap as based on individual and collective perceptions of attraction. This overlap is evident in a military's ability to also deploy soft power through tactics that aim to enhance regional stability (Williams, 2011).

The intangibility of soft power resources creates challenge in deciding a clear method for measuring outcomes. In part, this is due to the multifaceted nature of soft power. Conceptually, hard power is a representation of a state's monopoly and control over specific resources, such as its military, whereas soft power may be developed in sectors beyond the control of government (Roselle et al., 2014). Nye does identify three sources of soft power, utilized in this study to consider the relationship between the Peace Corps and a foreign population's attitude toward the U.S. These resources, or sources of soft power, are outlined by Nye (2004) as representing a country's culture, political values, and foreign policy.

Culture, as described by Nye, is "a set of values and practices that create meaning for society" (Nye, 2004, p.11). Globalization has increased the rate by which culture is exported and consumed. Whether in the form of enterprise, media, or people exchange, this resource transcends borders and can positively or negatively impact perceptions of the origin country. Nye suggests cultures that embody values that are universally accepted pose the highest potential for soft power.

Similarly, political values and government policy impact a state's overall soft power potential as it corresponds with a policy's alignment with universal values. A state might erode soft power potential if it internationally exports a culture that values freedom but then oppresses its own population through restrictive internal policy. Possible changes in perception associated with a nation's adopted policy is more volatile than those attached to culture (Nye, 2004).

Nye's categorization between sources of soft power position their success on their relationship to universally accepted values. These values imply to some degree a shared consensus among a global population. This shared understanding can encourage other states to adopt similar values and policies. In this way, soft power may increase collaboration to achieve shared goals, engage in commerce, and enhance global stability (Roselle et al., 2014). Applying universal values to all states, however, may act as a form of coercion through pressuring others to adopt or remain committed to a set of agreed ideologies (Mattern, 2005).

Fan (2008) argues that Nye's concept of soft power is ethnocentric as universal values represent Western ideologies that may not be applicable in all nations or cultures. Additionally, Fan contends that of the three resources, only culture truly represents a source of soft power as policy aligns more with hard power in its role of adopting and enacting action. This poses a challenge when considering the depth of culture and history in China despite a rank of 27 out of 30 for soft power in 2019 (McClory, 2019). Portland's[5] Soft Power 30 index for the same year includes only one non-western state, Japan, in the top ten. McClory's (2019) index ranks states on soft power criteria related to digital infrastructure, culture (global reach and appeal), enterprise, education, engagement (diplomatic network), and government. In Fan's critique, he expresses the ethnocentrism present in the concept's focus on core western values such as, "democracy, liberty and consumerism" (Fan, 2008, p.153). While China did rank within the top ten for culture, the country's overall ranking is notably low resulting from poor scores in government as based on restrictions to individual freedoms and liberties.

A high capacity for soft power does not necessarily translate into effective deployment or leveraging of that source. Fan (2008) conveys that resources, such as culture, are better understood as areas of potential. An attractive culture will only generate soft power if it is effectively transferred to a global audience, requiring a system of institutions and infrastructure.

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[5] UK based international strategic communication consultancy.

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The deployment of American popular culture is possible only through the state's infrastructure that provides Hollywood with the capability to produce and disperse media. Soft power, similar to hard power, offers sources that can be leveraged if it intends to maximize potential and desired outcomes.

Public Diplomacy: Leveraging Soft Power Resources

Soft power conceptually provides a framework by which states can interpret their ability to influence others, however it is limited in its practical application of leveraging those sources (Golan, 2017). As Roselle (2014) asserts, funding a cultural documentary will not increase soft power if it is not dispersed. Public diplomacy (PD) provides states an opportunity to leverage their sources of soft power (Nye, 2008; Cull 2019).

PD is a new term, but representative of a concept that has been practiced in international relations throughout history (Cull, 2008; Cull 2019). In scholarship, the terminological details are debated, in part, as the concept comprises characteristics belonging to multiple disciplines including international relations, communications, marketing, public relations, and political science, each offering varying perspectives (Golan, 2017; Szondi, 2008; Gilboa, 2008).

Szondi (2008) describes the traditional definition of public diplomacy as a form of government-sponsored communication that aims to achieve a change or desired perception in the minds of a foreign audience. This definition shares an association with the term propaganda in its relationship to a state entity dispersing information to influence an outcome. Cull (2019) asserts, that while propaganda is about dictating a message intended to persuade, public diplomacy instead aims to develop shared understandings through elements comprised of: listening, advocacy, culture, exchange, and international broadcasting (Cull 2008; Cull 2019, p. 19).

Public diplomacy is based in truth and respect, engages in partnership, and offers the opportunity for perceptions to change for both the sender and the target of activity (Cull 2019). Historically PD has been primarily developed and employed during conflict, as evident in its expansive role throughout the Cold War (Belmonte, 2013; Szondi, 2008). These activities oftentimes targeted public perceptions in an effort to shape government opinion. As Szondi (2008) highlights, newer definitions of public diplomacy include concepts related to cultural diplomacy and generally intend to create a public opinion environment that is conducive to national interests, while not necessarily designed to shape a foreign government's perceptions.

In this way, soft power, leveraged through PD, is representative of the shifting nature of traditional diplomacy. Conventional government-to-government communication adapts to a modernizing geopolitical landscape, demonstrated through government-to-citizen engagement that aims to shape public opinion (Golan, 2013). The direction of activity indicates shifting power from a government to the general public. Castells (2013) theorizes that "power is exercised by means of coercion and/or by the construction of meaning on the basis of the discourse through which social actors guide their action" (p.10). Power traditionally is representative of a state's monopoly on violence, or their ability to exercise hard power capital through imprisonment, military action, economic sanctions, and other acts that seek to coerce an outcome. In Castells' theory, a state could also exercise power through controlling the construction of meaning. Especially evident in the digital age, however, power also resides in a population's ability to circumvent a state's communication, identifying and crafting their own meaning of specific narratives. Castells (2013) conceptualizes this relationship as the 'network society', where value and power reside in the influence of a state's social capital: their people's minds (p.27).

In this power shift, scholars argue that public diplomacy has changed in its traditional format of singularly being government-sponsored communication to include non-state actors among sources of PD efforts (Gilboa, 2008; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). Positive perceptions

associated with a country create an opportunity for non-state actors to benefit from that reputational capital. Simon Anholt (1998) coined the term 'nation brand' to express the equity products gain in their association with a nation. Rooted in country-of-origin studies, nation branding represents an emerging field that shares similarities with public diplomacy. Through this emergence, marketing, advertising, and public relations find their way in scholarship and practical application to public diplomacy. Scholars debate the relationship between PD and nation branding, ranging from independent to equivalent fields (Szondi, 2008). The vast collection of definitions and academic disciplines that converge on public diplomacy both add contributions and confusion to the subject.

As wide scholarly support for a universal definition has so far not been applied, this research acknowledges the role of public diplomacy as government-sponsored communication directed at a foreign audience. This definition considers the importance of desired outcomes that align with a state's national interests and therefore are orchestrated, directly or indirectly, by a state entity.

A Model for Public Diplomacy

The multifaceted nature of this field requires, in scholarship and among other sectors, a process by which to conceptualize the interrelationships of PD elements[6]. Variations among PD components include the directional flow of information, source credibility, and timeline (Cull, 2019). Exchange programs, for example, may require a long timeline to achieve desired outcomes but may offer high credibility through a mutual flow of information. Differences among elements impact the process by which decision-makers utilize and deploy their PD efforts.

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[6] Those five elements that contribute to public diplomacy as described by Cull (2008) are listening, advocacy, culture, exchange, and international broadcasting.

Nation branding considers elements that comprise a hexagon model (Anholt & Hildreth, 2010). These elements are categorized as "tourism, exports, governance (foreign and domestic policy), immigration (and investment), culture (and heritage), and people" (p. 9). This hexagon considers the marketing and advertising components of branding a national identity, and subsequently impacting the perceptions of that brand.

Necessary to understanding processes include tools, such as models, to visualize the interrelationships of those components that comprise PD. As Gilboa (2008) states, "models are needed to develop knowledge because they focus on the most significant variables and the relations between them" (p. 59).

Of significance in visualizing PD is the deviation presented by soft power in transferring traditional government-to-government communication to relational strategies that include government-to-citizen methods (Golan, 2013). Golan (2013) discusses the shifting nature of public diplomacy in the digital communication age, noting the divergence of PD efforts in their source, timeline, and methods to achieve outcomes.

Figure 1

An Integrated Model of Public Diplomacy

Note. The figure was produced by Golan in 2013. From "An Integrated Approach to Public Diplomacy," by G. Golan, 2013, *American Behavioral Scientist 57* (9), p.1252. Copyright 2013 by SAGE Publications.

Golan's (2013) model suggests the important role of "government-to-citizen engagement that is mediated by a third party – the global news media" (p. 1251). While soft power represents sources related to culture, political values, and foreign policy, Golan (2013) argues that this strategy of engagement should complement global communication strategies (Nye, 2004). The model discusses other aspects of PD to include nation branding and relational public diplomacy alongside indications of timeline associated with each method. These three components form integrated public diplomacy, indicating the necessity of combining all three to achieve desired objectives (Golan, 2013). This model also outlines the varying functional and scholarly fields that contribute to the concept, represented in their role to integrated PD. In this way, each discipline can consider their role as a component of the entire PD process.

Fullerton and Kendrick (2017) consider the integrated PD process as it relates to various components in shaping a foreign audience's opinions. The Model of Country Concept (MCC) incorporates both public diplomacy and nation branding, acknowledging the multifaceted nature of this study, presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2

The Model of Country Concept

Note. The figure was produced by J. Fullerton and A. Kendrick. Reprinted from *Shaping International Public Opinion: A Model for Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy*, by J. Fullerton and A. Kendrick, 2017. Peter Lang. Copyright 2017 by Peter Lang Publishing.

As visualized in Figure 2, the MCC considers mediated and relational public diplomacy. These components contribute to integrated PD, described in this model as government-sponsored

communication targeting a foreign audience. The model also integrates those elements that comprise nation branding, as categorized in Anholt's hexagon (Anholt & Hildreth, 2010; Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017).

The MCC is discussed in detail in the following section in its role of applying theoretical and practical framework to this research, to include a focus on relational diplomacy (as this is representative of the role of Peace Corps volunteers). A scholarly review of public diplomacy and nation branding indicates a divide in recommendations for approaching the concepts. Few models attempt to unite the varying disciplines and components that encompass the complexity and dynamic nature of these activities in their modern applications. The MCC provides "a cohesive structure from which to consider related theory, research, strategy and practice" (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017, p .7)

A Theoretical and Practical Framework

The Model of Country Concept considers the role and functioning of public diplomacy, necessary to fully conceptualize the means by which soft power is leveraged to achieve desired outcomes. In this way, the MCC provides a natural framework by which to apply this research's guiding case study of the soft power impact of removing Peace Corps volunteers from China. This section will include an analysis of the MCC and describe the role of Peace Corps programming within the model. It will also apply a theoretical and practical framework to the role of the Peace Corps as a relational public diplomacy strategy in shaping perceptions of a country among a foreign audience.

An overview of the model, as depicted in Figure 2, highlights the factors and their interrelationships that, "may influence to varying degrees [a foreign population's] formation of a country concept" (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017, p. 10). Less discussion within the field recognizes

the role of the external environment, depicted as those areas beyond the control of the agent (or the sender of communication). These external influences are illustrated in the outside ring of Figure 2 to include environmental or man-made disasters, mainstream and social media communication, geopolitical relationships, historic relationships and cultural similarities, economics, as well as technology. While these are beyond the control of the agent, they may pose challenges or opportunities (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017).

The MCC highlights the roles of various components in shaping a country concept, described as a combination of a country reputation and country image. The difference in concepts is representative of timeline and malleability of a person's assessment of a country, with reputation indicating deep-rooted ideas that are less likely to change over time. Public diplomacy agents would therefore aim to influence a country image in the minds of a foreign audience (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017).

The MCC illustrates the directional flow of influence, moving initially from nation branding to country concept. Fullerton and Kendrick (2017) describe nation branding within the model as "the strategic act of shaping a country's reputation and country image through the use of branding techniques" (p. 16). The flow of influence indicates that the elements that comprise nation branding represent an action that can shape country concept. Changes to country concept then flow back to nation branding, indicating what actions should occur in response to achieve desired outcomes. This highlights the continuous efforts of an agent to shape and manage the country concept (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017).

Nation branding elements, such as tourism and brand exports, are considered independently of each other and are representative as the source of activity or action. This highlights the varying agents and sectors that may contribute to a country's image and reputation beyond government entities. Of special interest to this research is the role of state-sponsored

engagement in shaping foreign perceptions, expressed in this model as public diplomacy (or the combined activities of relational and mediated public diplomacy).

Mediated public diplomacy in the MCC represents "government-sponsored communication that takes place via the media [whereas] relational public diplomacy includes the people-to-people programs funded directly or indirectly by the government" (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017, p. 10). Relational public diplomacy includes those programs that are coordinated and funded (entirely or in part) by state entities. U.S. examples include the Fulbright Program, International Visitor Leadership Program, Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange, and the Peace Corps. These activities, within the MCC, flow from sub-categories within relational public diplomacy to the combined (or integrated) PD efforts that ultimately incorporate those government actions that form a nation brand to shape a country concept. Programs that engage in people-to-people exchange beyond the scope of a government entity, such as a high school study abroad program, also contribute to a nation brand and are represented within the MCC as 'people', an element of Anholt's hexagon (Anholt & Hildreth, 2010; Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017).

Measuring the Impact of Relational Public Diplomacy

The MCC illustrates those actions that at varying degrees of influence, shape a country concept in the minds of a target population. Of special significance to this research is the impact of relational PD programs on soft power potential. While scholars and program coordinators understand the inherent and oftentimes holistic value in people-to-people exchange, the intangible and delayed effects of these programs limit research in identifying measurable public diplomacy outcomes. The inability to consistently and comparably apply methods of measurement across different program types poses additional challenges, in part, due to the complexity of these

programs that oftentimes vary greatly in their timeline, geographical location, mission, values, and purpose (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011).

Relational exchange programs are generally measured by the use of surveys and interviews to understand the short-term impact on the participant and those communities that were engaged. Measuring outcomes associated with exchange programs may also focus on either the impact on the individual (in their self-interest or personal endeavors), or societal effects that demonstrate long-term impacts to communities, institutions, and nations (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011).

Earlier research on the Peace Corps tended to focus on predictors of success of Peace Corps volunteers as opposed to the Peace Corps' impact on larger U.S. foreign policy objectives (Guthrie & Zektick, 1967; Jones & Popper, 1972). More recently, the Peace Corps conducts in-country surveys following operations that aim to measure the impact of programming on achieving goals associated with capacity-building and sharing American culture. These surveys specifically measure the change associated with a foreign audience's understanding and favorability of Americans before and after interactions with Peace Corps volunteers (Kerley & Jenkins, 2010). These surveys measure the short-term impact among those communities directly engaging with the program as based on their level of interaction with the participant. Measuring the longer-term impact of programming tends to be difficult, but provides a better scope for understanding those outcomes associated with public diplomacy objectives (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011).

The purpose of cross-cultural learning naturally intends to generate feelings of positivity between those engaging populations. In this case, cross-cultural learning between Peace Corps volunteers and a foreign population (representing goals two and three) aims to increase favorability of American culture as well as the host culture among Americans. Measuring the

quality of interactions between Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs) and host country nationals (HCNs) may imply the extent to which these programs accomplish mission goals associated with developing cross-cultural understandings (Cohn & Wood, 1982). More research is needed to identify the long-term and societal impacts of Peace Corps programming globally in accomplishing public diplomacy objectives. While measuring the impact within those participating communities demonstrates positive findings in the short-term, those perceptions are significant to national interests in their long-term application.

Magu (2018) compares the motivations for Peace Corps programming as they vary between the goals of the U.S. government and Peace Corps volunteers, finding that PCV motivation is altruistic whereas the U.S. is motivated by foreign policy objectives. Snow (2010) discusses this relationship, stating exchange program initiatives "are not just for an individual's personal fulfillment, cultural enrichment, resume padding, or professional development. They also have national security and policy objectives" (p. 5). That is, while individuals may experience impacts to their personal interests, governments seek long-term objectives related to national interests.

Magu's study considers national interest as a component of Peace Corps programming as based on UN General Assembly voting behavior and its correlation with the number of citizen diplomats in that specific country. This relationship implies that foreign policy behavior is impacted by citizen diplomats (or in this case, PCVs). In essence, Magu's study argues that states "leverage private citizens' altruism to further their strategic interests" that cannot be achieved through traditional forms of power (Magu, 2018, p. 175). It also highlights methodology utilized to measure the societal impact of exchange programs.

While Magu's (2018) findings indicate a relationship between UN voting behavior and the number of PCVs in a specific country, these voting behaviors are not indicative of public

opinion and a foreign audience's favorability toward the U.S. as a result of Peace Corps programming. Shared voting behavior with the U.S. does not necessarily indicate changes in country image or reputation among a foreign public population, as these audiences may not engage in state-level voting or have an impact on policy outcomes. A foreign population's perception of favorability is of specific importance in U.S. public diplomacy efforts post-9/11.

Magu (2018) does note that this gap between voting behavior and attitudes toward the U.S. may vary, as countries do not necessarily vote with the U.S. due to positive attitudes. That is, citizen diplomacy does not necessarily indicate that states will vote with the United States, as shared interests and goals may occur regardless of people-to-people exchange or favorability toward the U.S.

Other studies related to the Peace Corps do not include clear methods of measuring relationships to U.S. foreign policy objectives or long-term favorability outcomes. Additional research conducted to measure outcomes associated with citizen diplomacy tends to consider impacts on cultural competencies, networking, language improvement, institutional retention, employment prospects, as well as other categories that do not explicitly consider national interest (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011). This paper will contribute to a broader understanding of the Peace Corps' impact on U.S. soft power and its relationship to U.S. favorability among foreign audiences.

Summary

Soft power provides a framework by which decision-makers can consider their state's potential to achieve desired outcomes through sources that attract as opposed to coerce. The shifting geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, in part due to the rise of the digital communication age, has contributed to a reimagining of how governments interact with the global

public. Leveraging soft power potential through mechanisms of public diplomacy allows states to share their culture, politics, and policy to foreign audiences to achieve desired outcomes. Adversely, not engaging in public diplomacy may pose geopolitical disadvantages. As Datta (2014) argues, attitudes towards the U.S. determine to what capacity a foreign state will work with or against American interests.

Public diplomacy was especially prevalent during the Cold War, as two emerging superpowers delicately navigated a global environment armed with nuclear weapons. The battle was fought instead, as Gilboa (2008) states, "for the hearts and minds of people around the world" (p. 55). As the world changes, public diplomacy continues to evolve in its role of communicating with foreign audiences. The evolution of the field assists in identifying its multiple facets, to include a better understanding of the sources of activity, actors, and the processes by which the concept is employed.

The Model of Country Concept (Figure 2) provides a theoretical and practical structure by which to approach the multifaceted nature of public diplomacy. The model implicitly outlines the sectors that engage in PD efforts, as well as the process by which these activities shape foreign perceptions (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017). It assists in combining multiple theories and applications in their role of contributing to PD activities. It also considers the position of state-sponsored exchange programs, such as the Peace Corps, in achieving outcomes that align with national interests.

Studies that consider the impact of people-to-people exchange tend to either consider the individual or social effects of the programming in the short-term. This may include methods of surveying participants or those communities they engaged with to understand the impact on a variety of factors that oftentimes do not consider national interests (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011). Magu (2018) does consider the impact of citizen diplomacy on national interest but does not

necessarily indicate changes in the perceptions of a public foreign audience, a goal of public diplomacy strategies. Considering the wider implications of an audience's favorability may indicate benefits beyond shared voting behavior.

The Peace Corps started conducting post-operation surveys in 2008 to determine the impact of their programming on improving understandings and positive attitudes toward Americans (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011; Kerley & Jenkins, 2010). These measurements, however, indicate short-term changes as they are conducted following the conclusion of operation and specifically for the community that was engaged in the program. These findings also demonstrate outcomes that do not consider larger state entities and wider population samples that may offer a better perspective of long-term geopolitical changes in a country concept. Long-term changes in the perceptions of a foreign audience represents a better indicator of achieving goals associated with benefiting national interests (Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011).

This research considers statistical methods that can be consistently applied globally to those countries that participate in Peace Corps programming to measure potential relationships to sustained public opinion outcomes. Previous studies included in this literature review indicate that citizen diplomacy contributes to favorable foreign policy outcomes, improved cultural understandings, and heighted positive attitudes toward Americans (Magu, 2018; Bhandari & Belyavina, 2011).

As we currently know the positive short-term effects of Peace Corps programming on both cultural awareness and positive attitudes toward Americans, this study aims to evaluate the long-term global impact indicating sustained perceptions that align with public diplomacy goals. While the Peace Corps' method of measurement includes only those communities and participants engaged in programming, this research will consider a wider audience at the national and global level. Utilizing the Pew Research Center Global Indicators Database, this research

provides context for international perceptions of the U.S. Magu (2018) states that while the Pew

Global Indicators Database illustrates favorability of the U.S., it may not translate to policy. This

study considers a foreign public's opinion as a means of measuring the magnitude of soft power

that may better represent long-term shifts in U.S. image and reputation. It also expands the

potential benefits of those public opinions beyond the scope of shared voting behavior. Nye

(2004) also suggests that sources of soft power associated with policy are more volatile than those

associated with culture, further strengthening the need for PD programs to improve cultural

understandings that enhance favorability.

This research contributes to providing additional methods by which to measure the

outcome of relational public diplomacy programs. As the field of PD continues to grow,

significant contributions are needed in providing measurable indicators of soft power potential

and the effectiveness of those tools engaged in leveraging it. In visualizing the Model of Country

Concept, this research intends to specifically provide statistical evidence of the effects of the sub-

element: visitor program – or a government-sponsored exchange (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017).

This paper also suggests a consistent platform for measuring soft power and public diplomacy

outcomes. As exchange program types vary greatly in their mission, purpose, and processes,

applying a similar and general measurement to global outcomes will assist in the practical

application of PD. This may be through Pew Research Center Global Indicators or other

platforms that provide extensive data to measure the effectiveness of programs.

Future studies may prove valuable toward identifying possible correlations between

increased positive attitudes toward the U.S. and impacts on national security, further

strengthening the need for enhanced PD efforts globally. The strategy of leveraging American

citizen diplomats to increase national security may align with post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy

objectives. It will also assist in adding relevancy to 21st century Peace Corps goals that develop

mutual cultural understandings to improve foreign public opinions of the American population.

The next section discusses this study's method of measurement in identifying the potential relationship between the Peace Corps and long-term indicators of favorability outcomes. Research objectives are considered beyond the direct role of PCVs on a state's favorability to also include consideration of the potential negative soft power implications of removing exchange programming from a participating state. Sample countries and sources of soft power are discussed in their application to this paper's research design.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This paper intends to conduct a quantitative study that aims to highlight the potential

relationship between Peace Corps participation and global indicators of favorability toward the

U.S. By doing so, it will provide additional insights into the Peace Corps' ability to serve as an

effective public diplomacy strategy that meets 21st century U.S. objectives. The Peace Corps

manages a limited pool of resources in meeting its goals, and in conjunction, meeting the broader

strategic interests of the U.S. This study's quantitative approach intends to interpret measurable

indicators of Peace Corps programming that may offer insights into resource allocation that

maximizes those interests.

Research Objectives

Findings will initially assess general potential relationships between a foreign audience's favorability toward the U.S. and Peace Corps program participation abroad. This will consider both regional and global impacts of programming as based on favorability outcomes. The objective will also assist in identifying the role of the Peace Corps as a PD strategy in shaping foreign public opinions.

Additional objectives consider the U.S. decision to remove Peace Corps participation from China. This area of research considers the potential relationship of removing programs from a host country and those outcomes to favorability. Analyzing this relationship will assist in understanding the soft power impact of the agency exiting China.

While political pressure may have contributed to the withdrawal of programs, Peace Corps staff and volunteers have unofficially stated the decision is based on indicators of economic development (Hessler, 2020). In considering this case, research will be conducted to understand the potential relationship between Peace Corps programming and U.S. favorability as based on variations to a state's level of economic development. As expressed in the introduction, the Peace Corps' approach to serving in developing nations may be rooted in its founding. During the ongoing Cold War, Peace Corps participation was strategically intended for recently decolonized and newly independent states in U.S. attempts to contain the spread of communism (Meisler, 2012).

These objectives and measurable findings may also offer insights into how the Peace Corps may best allocate scarce resources in achieving modern public diplomacy goals in those foreign states that are critical to U.S. economic, political, and security interests. The key research objectives are best summarized in the following hypothesis.

a) H_0: PCVs have no impact on HCN[7] favorability toward the U.S.

b) H_0: Ceasing a Peace Corps program has no impact on U.S. soft power potential.

c) H_0: Peace Corps participation in countries as based on a state's level of economic development has no impact on HCN favorability toward the U.S.

Research Design

Multiple linear regression techniques are employed for the analyses (OLS, probit, and logistics regression). Analyzing existing data related to sources of soft power through statistical methods may provide measurable indicators of PD efforts toward improving opinions of the U.S. Research design varies for each objective with additional information on the methodology described for each below.

a) Relationship between U.S. Favorability and Peace Corps Participation

In order to better understand the relationship, this study compares existing U.S. favorability ratings collected by the Pew Research Center to the number of Peace Corps volunteers participating in a country at a specified time (Pew Research Center, 2020). The Global Indicators Database by the Pew Research Center collects data on perceptions toward the U.S. by country and by year (beginning in 2002). Pew Research Center data regarding opinions toward the U.S. will be referred to as a 'favorability score' or 'favorability rating'. For the purposes of this paper, U.S. favorability will indicate soft power potential, thereby analyzing the ability of the U.S. to leverage global strategic interests through the vessel of Peace Corps as a public diplomacy

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[7] Host country national.

tactic. Peace Corps volunteer cohort size variables will be regressed on U.S. favorability scores while controlling for additional soft power factors discussed in more detail in later sections.

Two methods for measuring Peace Corps volunteer population size were utilized for this research. The primary approach, the 'cohort method', measures the number of volunteers by cohort size each year. This method contains 78 observations among 20 sample countries comparing the relationship between Peace Corps cohort size by year and the Pew Research Center favorability score by year. The timeframe with available data utilizing this method ranges from 2004-2016. The second approach, the 'annual method', measures the total number of volunteers and trainees within a country annually. With some cohort overlap between incoming and outgoing groups, the annual method will inflate the overall sample size. Additionally, those years measured using the annual method vary slightly from the cohort method. A brief summary of the primary dataset (cohort method), including countries sampled as well as the frequency of available favorability scores, can be found in *Appendix A*. The annual method's summary can be found in *Appendix B*.

Volunteers are expected to participate for two years (not including roughly three months of in-person training), meaning normal and ongoing operation will generally find that two separate Peace Corps cohorts are in a country during the same year. Depending on the country and style of operation an additional incoming cohort of trainees will arrive every year as well (Peace Corps, 2019a; Peace Corps, 2019b; Peace Corps, n.d.-d). Due to variation in operation style by country, the annual method may limit some consistency when comparing results. This study primarily focuses on the cohort method as it provides a clear representation of changes in those resources (volunteer size) being allocated to each country annually. The annual method will be included in a robustness check when analyzing the relationship between U.S. favorability and volunteer population size.

b) Program Closures and Impact on U.S. Soft Power

Understanding the potential relationship between program closures and U.S. soft power will assist in analyzing the Peace Corps' decision to end programming in China. It also aims to identify the best use of resource allocation in efforts to strengthen U.S. soft power potential in critical regions.

This study employs OLS regression measuring U.S. favorability against those programs that have been suspended, closed, or are in the process of closing. This method includes a total of 85 observations among the 20 sample countries. Sample countries measured can be found in *Appendix A*. Details on specific country suspensions and closures among the sample data are included in this chapter within section, 'Sample and Data Sources'.

c) Peace Corps, U.S. Favorability, and Economic Development Indicators

The decision to end programming in China was unofficially described by staff and volunteers as a response to improved economic conditions and development in the country no longer requiring Peace Corps presence (Hessler, 2020). While Peace Corps' Annual Portfolio Review criteria does not necessarily state that economic development is an indicator in determining program closures, the organization is rooted in their 1961 mission that initially focused on serving in developing countries (Peace Corps, 2010c).

To better understand the relationship, OLS regression will measure variables related to U.S. favorability, Peace Corps programming, and a state's economic development status. For this method, the size of the log of Peace Corps volunteer cohort size will be interacted with the log of GDP per capita for each sample country. This independent variable will be regressed on the log of U.S. favorability scores.

All designs incorporate multivariate regression analysis measuring additional independent variables to include factors such as democracy index, American media broadcasting, U.S. presidential administration, and religious similarity. These additional factors are discussed and analyzed further in this chapter within section, 'Controlling for Additional Soft Power Factors and Independent Variables'.

Several robustness checks, including instrumental variable regressions, are considered to account for outliers, variations in categorical factors, the inclusion of additional independent variables, and instrumental variable estimation.

Sample and Data Sources

The sample of data for this paper includes 85 Pew Research Center U.S. favorability scores dispersed by country and time. Favorability scores were collected from the Pew Research Center Global Indicators Database. Scores are based on a foreign population's response to a four-point Likert scale survey with indicators of favorability toward the U.S. ranging from very unfavorable to very favorable. The specific question asks participants to answer if they have "a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States." Results to the survey question are then represented in percentage terms from 0-100, illustrating the total percent of participants answering either somewhat favorable or very favorable (Pew Research Center, 2020). The timeframe of the dataset ranges from 2004 to 2017 and includes 20 countries in three global Peace Corps regions that correspond to five standard World Bank regional classifications. The timeframe and sample countries selected beginning in 2004 represents the availability of Pew Research U.S. favorability indicator points and Peace Corps population data. Based on limited favorability scores, not all countries that included Peace Corps programs were included in this study. The number of observations vary slightly based on

the available volunteer population measurement utilizing cohort or annual method. Data sources for both methods were gathered from the Peace Corps (Peace Corps, 2019a; Peace Corps 2019b).

Each research objective for this study utilizes methodology sourced from a similar dataset in terms of sample countries and U.S. favorability scores. Slight variation exists in frequency of favorability scores between methods; however, each utilizes the same pool of sample countries.

Countries included in the sample are representative of a diverse range of global regions. Regional areas are based on Peace Corps' categorization with samples included in Africa (AF), Europe, Mediterranean and Asia (EMA), and Inter-America and the Pacific Region (IAP) (Peace Corps, 2010a, p.21). A robustness check considers World Bank regional categorization with sample countries included in East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as well as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (The World Bank, n.d.). World Bank regional indicators as they correspond with country samples are included in *Appendix E*.

Of the 20 sample countries included, 30% have suspended, concluded, or are in the process of closing Peace Corps participation as of 2020. These countries include Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, China, El Salvador, Jordan, and Mali. For the purposes of this study, previous program closures and suspensions as well as those currently closing are treated equally in regressions as all indicate the removal of people-to-people exchanges under the auspices of U.S. government programming. Suspensions, previous closures, and those programs that are currently closing will be referred to as exits. Among the 30% of exits, Jordan and Mali have remained temporarily suspended since 2015 due to volunteer health and safety concerns. Program closures in El Salvador in 2016 and Burkina Faso in 2017 were also related to volunteer health and safety concerns. Bulgaria's closure in 2013 was considered, by the agency, as a successful conclusion to Peace Corps partnership. China is currently closing operations as of 2020 and has abruptly

evacuated Peace Corps Volunteers from the country prior to a planned closure due to COVID-19 health and safety concerns. As staff complete work necessary to close participation, volunteers will not return to the country (Peace Corps, 2013; Peace Corps, 2015a; Peace Corps, 2015b; Peace Corps, 2016; Peace Corps, 2017; Peace Corps, 2020). While this study considers a timeframe from 2004 – 2017, the closure of operations in China at the beginning of 2020 is included due to low volatility among China's favorability scores from year to year.

Controlling for Additional Soft Power Factors and Independent Variables

In this study, variables associated with culture and political values are analyzed in their role on impacting U.S. favorability in addition to Peace Corps programming. To account for other factors that may contribute to a foreign state's favorability of the U.S., data analysis considers additional independent variables. Other variables added were considered in their ability to serve as enhancers of soft power potential[8] and are detailed below.

1) Democracy index

A political and cultural source of soft power, the democracy index[9] of each sample state has been added to this study. Scores are included for all sample countries and are representative of the year in which they were measured[10]. Democracy index scores represent a state's electoral process, functioning capability, political participation, and culture, as well as a population's civil liberties (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020; World Population Review, 2018). As a strong

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[8] These are resources related to culture, political values, and foreign policy (Nye, 2004).
[9] Data was gathered by The Economist Intelligence Unit.
[10] Democracy index scores are unique to each sample country and the year measured. When conducting OLS regression, data was entered for each year. For those years without a recorded score (2007 and 2009), years prior and after were averaged to generate a result. OLS regression includes a placeholder for year 2005 as based on the 2006 score.

cornerstone of the United States' history, culture, and government structure, democracy is expected to have a large impact on soft power outcomes.

2) Voice of America broadcasting exposure in the region

Voice of America (VOA) is a U.S. funded international broadcaster that disperses news globally in more than 40 languages. For the purposes of this study, foreign populations were considered as a potential audience of this U.S. broadcasting service based on either language availability offered by VOA as it relates to the (or among the) official language(s) of that state or explicit statement of broadcasting activities in that region or country as expressed by the U.S. Agency for Global Media (Voice of America, n.d.). VOA is likely to demonstrate increases to favorability scores as it may provide additional perspectives beyond state or region-specific media sources. The broadcaster also includes segments on American culture that may contribute to favorable views of the U.S.

3) U.S. presidential administration

During the years measured for this study, the two major presidential administrations were under President Bush and President Obama. Favorability toward the U.S. may be impacted by the varying presidencies, and via their associations with the Republican party and the Democratic party respectively. A case study conducted by Dragojlovic (2011) finds that a potential influence may exist between U.S. presidents and a foreign audience's favorability toward the U.S. To control for this potential relationship, a dummy variable has been included representing presidential administration during the years measured. For regression analysis, the variable has been named "democratic president". '1' indicates the years in which the Obama Administration was in office, and '0' otherwise.

4) Religious closeness

Common religious values and beliefs among the majorities of a foreign population and Americans may indicate shared cultural understanding that could contribute to favorability outcomes. The potential relationship between religion and favorability indicators holds relevance when considering public diplomacy strategies post-9/11 as evident in the United States' "shared values initiatives" campaign that targeted those values that Americans share with foreign populations that identify as Muslim (Kendrick & Fullerton, 2004). An academic study conducted by Ciftci and Tezcür (2016) quantitatively measures concepts related to anti-Americanism and religion. Their findings indicate that foreign policy objectives related to democracy shape perceptions of favorability less than those related to religion. For this study, data related to religion is hosted by CEPII[11] (Head et al., 2010; Head & Mayer, 2014) measuring the degree of closeness in which the majority of the U.S. population's religious views align with the majority of a sample country's population in their religious identity. It is expected that religion closeness will have a positive relationship with favorability scores as it may indicate shared cultural understandings.

5) GDP per capita

GDP per person data from the World Bank Development Indicators has been included in various multivariate regressions to control for the size of a country's economy (The World Bank, 2020). Larger economies may indicate increased opportunities for trade with the U.S. and greater access to information that may impact a foreign public's opinion of the United States. Beyond controlling for GDP per person in general favorability OLS regressions, the independent variable will be utilized in measuring for the Peace Corps' specific impact on public diplomacy goals in developing nations.

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[11] Le Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationals (CEPII) is a French research center specifically focusing on international economics (CEPII, n.d.).

6) Control for country, region, and time fixed effects

Additional data analysis considers independent variables such as the interaction between Peace Corps volunteer cohort size and the population of the sample country. Various multivariate OLS regressions included in this study control for time, region, and country fixed effects that can potentially influence favorability toward the U.S.

Summary of Variables

A summary of the dependent and independent variables in various multivariate OLS regressions for this research paper are included in Table 1 (utilizing the cohort method).

Table 1

Summary of Variables

	Statistic						
	Min	Pctl(25)	Mean	Pctl(75)	Max	Median	St. Dev.
U.S. Favorability Score	5	44	57.435	76	94	59	22.224
Cohort Size by Year	14.000	39.250	63.500	82.750	129.000	66.500	27.600
Democracy Index	2.970	3.920	5.487	6.730	7.910	5.930	1.483
Voice of America	0	1	0.859	1	1	1	0.350
Democratic President	0	0	0.671	1	1	1	0.473
Religion Closeness	0.019	1.255	11.351	18.340	28.918	9.974	11.127
GDP Per Capita	482.639	1,489.372	4,016.379	6,096.488	10,301.360	3,434.681	2,886.613
College Education	51,749	58,574	63,795.860	68,945	74,103	65,506	6,092.022

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Results are interpreted with recommendations for future research and discussion of the

findings. Supplementary discussion is included at the end of this chapter that considers these

findings as they contribute to the scholarly and practical concepts of soft power and public

diplomacy. Findings within this chapter demonstrate the impact of Peace Corps volunteer cohort

size, program closures, and participation in developing countries on U.S. favorability indicators.

These findings do not intend to gauge the agency's capability of achieving mission-specific goals

of building understandings of Americans. Attitudes of favorability toward the U.S. may provide

some insight into long-term strategic success of programming. This discussion does assume to

some degree that improving understandings of Americans is intended to improve attitudes toward

the United States, therefore serving as an effective public diplomacy and soft power strategy.

Findings in this section are robust to the inclusion of additional soft power factors, removal of

outliers, different measurements of independent variables, and estimation method. Results are

presented independently as based on this study's three research objectives.

Volunteer Cohort Size and U.S. Favorability

A broad multivariate formula illustrating the relationship between favorability (Pew Research Center U.S. favorability scores) and Peace Corps participation (cohort size) among the sample is represented in the liner regression equation below.

(1) $\text{Favorability}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Cohort Size})_{it} + \beta_2(\text{Democracy Index})_{it} + \beta_3(\text{Voice of America})_{it} + \beta_4(\text{Democratic President})_t + \beta_5(\text{Religion Closeness})_{it} + \beta_6(\text{Log of GDP per Capita})_{it} + \text{Region}_i + \text{Year}_t + \epsilon_{it}$

Where *i* represents host country and *t* represent time. Betas are parameters to be estimated, alpha is a constant, and ϵ_{it} is the error term that is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. While this formula considers additional factors, a bivariate linear regression between favorability and PCVs is illustrated in Figure 3 as a scatterplot.

Figure 3

Cohort Method: Favorability and Cohort Size by Year

Cohort Method: Favorability and Cohort Size by Year

As visualized in the bivariate scatterplot (Figure 3), initial findings indicate a positive relationship between Peace Corps participation and Pew Research Center U.S. favorability ratings. Table 2 includes bivariate results in the first column. At the 0.01 level of significance, there is a statistically meaningful relationship between the size of the Peace Corps cohort and U.S. favorability ratings with a linear regression of $Favorability_{it} = 35.85 + 0.34(Cohort\ Size)_{it}$. These findings indicate an increase to the favorability score for every volunteer added at a rate of 0.34(Cohort Size). This highlights a positive relationship between only factors of U.S. favorability and the size of the volunteer cohort by country and by year in which the corresponding Pew Research favorability score is recorded.

To control for other factors that may contribute to a foreign state's favorability of the U.S., multivariate OLS regression considers additional independent variables estimated in the

other columns within Table 2. Variables added were considered based on their level of contribution to a state's soft power potential.

Table 2

Cohort Method: Multivariate Regression

	Cohort Method: Multivariate Regression							
	Dependent variable:							
	U.S. Favorability Rating							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cohort Size	0.344***	0.351***	0.230***	0.230***	0.273***	0.144***	0.114**	0.119**
	(0.086)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.057)
Democracy Index		7.443***	4.302***	4.141***	1.993	2.731**	1.844	2.082*
		(1.337)	(1.091)	(1.096)	(1.265)	(1.044)	(1.116)	(1.165)
Voice of America			35.596***	34.237***	30.422***	27.690***	27.198***	26.390***
			(4.692)	(4.813)	(4.746)	(3.915)	(3.924)	(4.103)
Democratic President				4.321	4.785	6.491**	6.535**	12.529
				(3.601)	(3.424)	(2.819)	(2.782)	(12.655)
Religion Closeness					0.531***	0.620***	0.828***	0.795***
					(0.178)	(0.147)	(0.229)	(0.234)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-9.656***	-7.016***	-6.088***
						(1.604)	(2.108)	(2.236)
EMA							-5.266	-5.169
							(4.292)	(4.408)
IAP							-12.060**	-12.761**
							(6.035)	(6.298)
Constant	35.847***	-4.806	-10.256	-11.388*	-5.395	75.976***	64.398***	44.341**
	(5.979)	(8.884)	(6.746)	(6.792)	(6.756)	(14.605)	(15.414)	(19.095)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
R²	0.172	0.414	0.671	0.677	0.713	0.810	0.821	0.847
Adjusted R²	0.161	0.399	0.657	0.659	0.693	0.794	0.800	0.797
Residual Std. Error	20.934 (df = 76)	17.725 (df = 75)	13.383 (df = 74)	13.344 (df = 73)	12.674 (df = 72)	10.384 (df = 71)	10.213 (df = 69)	10.305 (df = 58)
F Statistic	15.822*** (df = 1; 76)	26.538*** (df = 2; 75)	50.220*** (df = 3; 74)	38.249*** (df = 4; 73)	35.704*** (df = 5; 72)	50.361*** (df = 6; 71)	39.595*** (df = 8; 69)	16.892*** (df = 19; 58)

Note: AF reference category dropped. | | | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

As illustrated in Table 2[12], OLS multivariate linear regression results that control for additional soft power factors indicates that at the 0.05 significance level there is a statistically meaningful relationship between the size of the Peace Corps volunteer cohort and the subsequent U.S. favorability ratings among foreign audiences. A linear regression of the results expresses the following equation:

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[12] Regions are categorized according to the Peace Corps' classification: Africa (AF), Europe, Mediterranean, and Asian Region (EMA), as well as Inter-America and the Pacific Region (IAP). *Appendix A* illustrates regional classifications among the sample countries measured for this study.

Favorability$_{it}$ = 44.34 + 0.12(Cohort Size)$_{it}$ + 2.08(Democracy Index)$_{it}$ + 26.40(Voice of America)$_{it}$ + 12.53(Democratic President)$_t$ + 0.80(Religion Closeness)$_{it}$ – 6.09(Log of GDP per Capita)$_{it}$

Findings illustrate a positive relationship between Peace Corps programming and a foreign population's favorability toward the U.S. The bivariate relationship between favorability and cohort size only changes slightly and remains significant when controlling for additional soft power factors. Multivariate OLS regression represented in column (8) illustrates a constant of 44.34 percent favorability of a sample audience's attitudes toward the United States. This grounds some understanding of the base level of favorability before controlling for other factors, naturally around the 50% mark.

The soft power factors included in this model vary based on their level of impact, but among the set, Peace Corps cohort size offers a high level of control. That is, a Peace Corps program can increase a state's favorability toward the U.S. with the addition of volunteer recruitment and participation. This offers more control than other sources of soft power such as language, presidential administration, religion, and other variables less subject to change.

The model also suggests the high impact of U.S. international broadcasting efforts on favorability outcomes. Voice of America (VOA) presence in a state demonstrates favorability scores that are 26.39 percentage points higher than those that do not, and the result is statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude in which VOA increases positive attitudes toward the U.S. indirectly expresses the importance of cultural understanding in increasing favorability, as the broadcasting generally aims to increase an understanding of American culture. It also provides information to those peoples served beyond the scope of potential government-controlled or alternative state-sponsored media sources. Many people-to-people exchange

programs to include the Peace Corps aim to increase cultural understanding, positioning culture within this model as high impacting.

U.S. broadcasting may be limited in its capability to reach audiences due to political pressure, external efforts to block messaging, and competitiveness in a modern communication environment. In comparison, the Peace Corps may face obstacles related to foreign government trust, capacity limits on the number of volunteers accepted, and U.S. government funding. Despite these possible limitations, the significance of control is noteworthy as a state considers how to leverage a source of power that is oftentimes viewed as intangible.

Other significant findings include the impact of a state's democracy index. The model illustrates a statistically significant and positive relationship between democracy index and U.S. favorability outcomes at a rate of 2.08. The findings are not necessarily surprising in their positive relationship, but a higher rate of impact may have been expected based on Truman era sentiments and early public diplomacy efforts that strived to prevent the spread of communism and advance global ideals of democracy and capitalism. The low level of impact would allow for ease of counteracting favorability outcomes associated with democracy index through controllable sources of soft power.

Presidential political party indicates a positive relationship between favorability and the presence of a democratic presidential administration in power. This study measures a time period between 2004 to 2016, largely covering both the Bush and Obama administrations. Favorability, therefore, indicates a positive relationship during the Obama administration when measuring among the 20 sample countries included in this study at a rate that is 12% higher than the Bush administration. This may indicate that U.S. democratic presidents increase favorability among a foreign population at a higher rate than republican administrations. These results may also signify post-9/11 increases in global sentiments of anti-Americanism prevalent during the Bush

administration and potentially resulting from U.S. government response during the time

(O'Connor & Griffiths, 2006). Changes in presidential administrations and the leading U.S.

political party may greatly shape U.S. narrative through foreign policy decision-making. Global

response to U.S. presidential changes may be indicative of anticipated or tangible changes to

policies that impact geopolitical relationships.

Religious closeness is highly significant and shares a positive relationship with U.S.

favorability. Religion, as a source of strongly held beliefs, correlates to positive favorability when

shared among major identifying populations between two states. Similar to the Peace Corps and

Voice of America, factors that demonstrate culture tend to offer high and significant impacts to

U.S. favorability outcomes.

GDP per capita indicates a negative relationship with favorability. That is, for every

percent increase in a foreign state's GDP, U.S. favorability among that population decreases by

6.08%. It was hypothesized that increases in GDP per capita would increase favorability to the

U.S. as it increases opportunities for trade with the United States and allows for greater access to

information among a foreign state's population. The negative relationship may indicate increased

competition with the U.S. Later regressions in this study consider the interaction between the

Peace Corps and a state's GDP per capita.

Regions, as based on Peace Corps' classification, illustrate a relationship that is

statistically significant at the 0.05 level at a rate in which IAP (Inter-America and Pacific) is 12

percentage points less favorable to the U.S. than AF (Africa), indicating an opportunity for

regional targeting of Peace Corps public diplomacy efforts. IAP regions in this categorization

sample style include El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. Following the tragic events of

2001, the United States' War on Terror led to the introduction of the Patriot Act toward the end of

the same year. The passage of the Act led to a large increase in the number of deportations of

individuals living within the United States, specifically seeing the deportation of almost 400,000 Mexican nationals by 2010 (Massey & Pren, 2012). Table 2 considers a time range between 2004 – 2016, which may contribute to this significant negative relationship between IAP regions and U.S. favorability outcomes. This study has not considered U.S. policies related to immigration or number of deportations among a foreign population that may impact attitudes towards the U.S.

In general, multivariate regression results indicate the importance of utilizing a range of public diplomacy and soft power tools to manage U.S. narratives abroad. Many sources of soft power are beyond the control of the government as they are embedded into history and culture. This demonstrates the importance of counteracting, balancing, and implementing those sources of soft power that are within the control of a state. As based on the model, negative outcomes on U.S. favorability related to less malleable sources of soft power can be offset by increasing state-sponsored broadcasting and exchange programs. In this sense, soft power can be better understood as manageable and transactional.

Program Closures and Impact on U.S. Soft Power

Understanding the relationship between program closures and U.S. favorability intends to measure the impact of withdrawing Peace Corps participation on a foreign audience's opinion of the United States. As expressed earlier, program exits for this research include suspensions, closures, and those ceasing operations as of 2020 among the sample population. A multivariate linear equation measuring the relationship between U.S. favorability and program exits is represented as:

(2) $\text{Favorability}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Exit})_i + \beta_2(\text{Democracy Index})_{it} + \beta_3(\text{Voice of America})_{it} + \beta_4(\text{Democratic President})_t + \beta_5(\text{Religion Closeness})_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$

Results are illustrated in Table 3:

Table 3

Program Exit and U.S. Favorability

Program Exit and U.S. Favorability						
	Dependent variable:					
	U.S. Favorability Rating					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Exit	-26.529***	-22.539***	-7.929	-8.258	-7.868	-22.064
	(4.319)	(6.270)	(5.456)	(5.348)	(5.347)	(34.022)
Democracy Index		1.740	1.789	1.650	0.786	2.867
		(1.980)	(1.585)	(1.555)	(1.722)	(3.691)
Voice of America			37.158***	35.017***	33.991***	46.446***
			(5.428)	(5.416)	(5.477)	(10.824)
Democratic President				7.211**	7.474**	12.739*
				(3.448)	(3.448)	(7.141)
Religion Closeness					0.218	-2.513
					(0.188)	(2.886)
EMA						-34.386
						(44.561)
IAP						63.590
						(68.793)
Constant	65.862***	55.048***	18.226	16.093	18.941	32.979
	(2.434)	(12.544)	(11.395)	(11.211)	(11.455)	(35.365)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country Code Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	85	85	85	85	85	85
R^2	0.313	0.319	0.569	0.591	0.598	0.958
Adjusted R^2	0.304	0.302	0.553	0.570	0.572	0.932
Residual Std. Error	18.538 (df = 83)	18.563 (df = 82)	14.865 (df = 81)	14.565 (df = 80)	14.534 (df = 79)	5.812 (df = 51)
F Statistic	37.730*** (df = 1; 83)	19.200*** (df = 2; 82)	35.583*** (df = 3; 81)	28.892*** (df = 4; 80)	23.480*** (df = 5; 79)	35.673*** (df = 33; 51)

Notes: AF reference category dropped. Column 6 includes country and year factors
$^*p<0.1;$ $^{**}p<0.05;$ $^{***}p<0.01$

The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between program exits and favorability towards the US. As shown in column (1), program exits tend to have favorability scores that are about 26.5 percentage points lower than those that are still in the program. This result is significant at the 1% level. In this sense, a program closure decreases U.S. favorability by over 26 percentage points among the specific foreign population in which the program participation was ceased.

The inclusion of additional soft power factors maintains the negative relationship between program closure and U.S. favorability abroad. A multivariate OLS regression illustrating additional factors is illustrated below based on findings in Table 3. Controlling for additional

factors indicates a decrease in favorability at a rate of -22% per exit. This relationship can be expressed as:

Favorability$_{it}$ = 32.98 – 22.06(Exit)$_i$ + 2.87(Democracy Index)$_{it}$ + 46.45(Voice of America)$_{it}$ + 12.74(Democratic President)$_t$ – 2.51(Religion Closeness)$_{it}$

These results provide insights into the unintended consequences of the Peace Corps' decision to remove programming from China. It is assumed to some degree that adversarial states will have lower favorability rating of the U.S. when compared to friendly states. In this way, the Peace Corps Mission Accountability Act (2019) may risk further decreasing attitudes toward the U.S. in those states that pose the highest growth opportunity for improved favorability scores.

The Peace Corps manages a set amount of scarce resources in determining future program entries and exits. As two of the three agency mission-specific goals represent grassroots diplomacy tactics (and therefore public diplomacy objectives), the negative consequence of exiting a program may serve to counteract the positive gains of entering.

The criteria by which the agency determines allocation of resources should align with U.S. strategic and long-term global objectives. As the Peace Corps acts as a vessel of developing and shaping U.S. narratives abroad through public diplomacy people-to-people exchange tactics, program exits should be carefully considered as they risk large decreases in those efforts by which the agency is operating.

Reducing the number of volunteers in country in an effort to redistribute resources may serve as a better engine by which the Peace Corps may reduce negative outcomes as opposed to dismantling programs. Soft power factors considered for this study generally represent cultural, political, or foreign policy resources that may be outside the control of the U.S. government. Factors such as religion and democracy index of a foreign state are often considered deeply embedded and lasting. As the Peace Corps expands their global network to a diverse range of

regions, maintaining partnerships, if even in lower numbers, may better serve the United States'
ability to control favorability scores by leveraging the organization as a soft power resource. As
participating countries must invite Peace Corps programming, the decision to exit partnerships
may be long-term and indefinite. Eliminating those programs that do not represent a risk to the
health, safety, and security of participating Peace Corps volunteers poses a high risk to
diminishing soft power potential and outcomes.

Peace Corps, U.S. Favorability, and Economic Development Indicators

As expressed earlier, the Peace Corps has historically served in developing states. Despite
political pressure at the time, the agency unofficially stated to staff and volunteers that the
decision to exit China was due to the country's level of economic development (Hessler, 2020).
OLS regression among the sample data aims to better understand the relationship between the
Peace Corps as a public diplomacy strategy and a participating state's level of economic
development. The relationship between Peace Corps volunteer cohort size, U.S. favorability
ratings, and economic development indicators can be expressed as:

(3) $\text{Favorability}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Log of Cohort Size})_{it} + \beta_2(\text{Log of GDP per Capita})_{it} + \beta_3(\text{Log Cohort Size} * \text{Log of GDP per Capita})_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$

The results measuring this initial relationship are illustrated in column (1) of the
multivariate regression model represented as Table 4.

Table 4

Cohort Method: Log of Size and Log of GDP Per Capita Interaction

Cohort Method: Log of Size and Log of GDP Per Capita Interaction								
	Dependent variable:							
	U.S. Favorability Rating							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log of Cohort Size	4.394***	2.715**	0.777	0.855	0.480	0.412	0.597	2.292***
	(1.399)	(1.225)	(0.744)	(0.746)	(0.742)	(0.814)	(0.693)	(0.805)
Log of GDP Per Capita	1.975***	1.067*	0.211	0.248	0.031	0.052	0.152	1.529***
	(0.710)	(0.624)	(0.377)	(0.378)	(0.378)	(0.415)	(0.351)	(0.441)
Democracy Index		0.194***	0.103***	0.100***	0.069***	0.055*	0.059**	0.016
		(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.088)
Voice of America			1.114***	1.086***	1.030***	1.019***	0.917***	1.243***
			(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.086)	(0.242)
Democratic President				0.080	0.085	0.088	1.240***	1.091***
				(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.260)	(0.154)
Religion Closeness					0.009**	0.010*	0.010*	-0.071**
					(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.029)
EMA						-0.110	-0.092	-1.106**
						(0.112)	(0.094)	(0.466)
IAP						-0.147	-0.153	1.289***
						(0.162)	(0.137)	(0.452)
Log(Size)*Log(GDP)	-0.485***	-0.288*	-0.080	-0.090	-0.041	-0.036	-0.055	-0.277***
	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.083)	(0.098)
Constant	-14.049**	-7.368	0.175	-0.143	1.650	1.739	-0.360	-9.826***
	(6.005)	(5.237)	(3.167)	(3.175)	(3.174)	(3.485)	(2.966)	(3.450)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Country Code Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.222	0.448	0.809	0.812	0.826	0.830	0.903	0.979
Adjusted R^2	0.190	0.418	0.796	0.797	0.809	0.807	0.869	0.962
Residual Std. Error	0.527 (df = 74)	0.447 (df = 73)	0.265 (df = 72)	0.264 (df = 71)	0.256 (df = 70)	0.257 (df = 68)	0.212 (df = 57)	0.114 (df = 42)
F Statistic	7.035*** (df = 3; 74)	14.818*** (df = 4; 73)	61.064*** (df = 5; 72)	51.265*** (df = 6; 71)	47.467*** (df = 7; 70)	36.797*** (df = 9; 68)	26.547*** (df = 20; 57)	56.551*** (df = 35; 42)

Notes: AF reference category dropped. Column 8 includes country and year factors. Dependent variable is logged. $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

The relationship in column (1) is statistically significant at the 1% level. Interaction between the log of cohort size and the log of GDP per capita is negative at the rate of -0.485. Therefore, every 1% increase in GDP, increases favorability towards the US at a lower rate. This result indicates a negative relationship between Peace Corps volunteer cohort size and the GDP per capita for a foreign state. Interestingly, GDP per capita and cohort size without interaction, both share a positive relationship. Column (8) illustrates that results are robust to the inclusion of additional factors. A multivariate regression equation highlighting the results is expressed as:

Log of Favorability$_{it}$ = -9.83 + 2.29(Log of Cohort Size)$_{it}$ + 1.53(Log of GDP per Capita)$_{it}$ +0.02(Democracy Index)$_{it}$ + 1.24(Voice of America)$_{it}$ + 1.09(Presidential Administration)$_{it}$ -

0.07(Religion Closeness)$_{it}$ – 0.28(Log Cohort Size * Log of GDP per Capita)$_{it}$ + Country$_i$ + Region$_i$ + Year$_t$

All numeric relationships except democracy index are statistically significant at the 5% level. Log of cohort size, log of GDP per capita, and the interaction between log of cohort size and log of GDP per capita are all statistically significant at the 1% level.

Findings indicate that Peace Corps participation in countries as based on development status is relevant to favorability outcomes.

Robustness Check

Several robustness checks were utilized for this study. These aim to consider other methods of measuring data, variations in categorical factors, outliers, and controlling for additional independent variables. The following sections also incorporate an instrumental variable two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to test for endogeneity.

Annual Method

An introductory robustness check considers alternative methods for measuring the sample dataset. As discussed earlier, two methods were considered for measuring Peace Corps volunteer population size: cohort method and annual method. This study primarily conducted OLS regression using cohort method, as measuring volunteer cohort sizes by year indicates changes in the Peace Corps' allocation of resources.

Measuring the relationship between U.S. favorability and volunteer population size using the annual method also produces statistically significant results at the 1% level. The bivariate

relationship can be expressed as Favorability$_{it}$ = 44.14 + 0.08(Annual Size)$_{it}$. Favorability results remain robust to the inclusion of additional factors. A scatterplot and multivariate OLS regression model measuring the relationship between U.S. favorability and annual size can be found in *Appendix C* and *Appendix D* respectively. The multivariate relationship using the annual method measurement can be expressed as:

Favorability$_{it}$ = 64.34 + 0.037(Annual Size)$_{it}$ + 2.27(Democracy Index)$_{it}$ + 26.57(Voice of America)$_{it}$ – 0.56(Democratic President)$_{t}$ + 0.93(Religion Closeness)$_{it}$ – 7.20(Log of GDP per Capita)$_{it}$ + Region$_{i}$ + Year$_{t}$

<p align="center">Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression</p>

While increases in cohort size may increase favorability towards the US, favorability may also attract volunteers to that country – therefore, increasing cohort size to the host country. This leads to a correlation between cohort size and the error term. 2SLS is used to control for such reverse causality. To implement this, college education[13] was selected as the instrumental variable due to its inherent relationship to Peace Corps volunteer recruitment size. While the Peace Corps does not require a bachelor's degree for participation among all program types, the process is competitive and generally requires at least five years of specialized experience in lieu of a degree (Lenihan, 2020). Based on these requirements, it is possible to expect that as college degree attainment in the U.S. increases, so will the number of Peace Corps volunteers.

All regressions including instrumental variable estimation utilize the cohort method. First-stage instrumental variable multivariate regression results are represented in Table 5.

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[13] College education as an independent variable represents United States Census Bureau data of years of school completed by people 25 years and over (United States Census Bureau, 2019). The average age of a Peace Corps volunteer is 26 years as of 2020 (Peace Corps, 2019c).

Findings indicate a positive relationship between the size of the Peace Corps volunteer cohort and the percentage of Americans attaining a four-year college education.

Table 5

Cohort Method: IV Results with Log of College Education

Cohort Method: IV Results with Log of College Education								
	Dependent variable:							
	Cohort Method: Cohort Size							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log of College Education	-0.090	-0.089	-0.433	-0.437	-0.298	-0.216	6.604*	2.921
	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.498)	(0.497)	(0.496)	(0.496)	(3.844)	(2.408)
Democracy Index		0.002	0.002	0.017	0.037	0.059*	0.058*	0.118
		(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.100)
Voice of America			-0.005	0.051	-0.042	0.017	0.015	0.041
			(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.160)
Democratic President			0.087	0.081	0.076	0.076	-2.300*	-1.459*
			(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(1.289)	(0.804)
Religion Closeness				-0.005*	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.200***
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.044)
Log of GDP Per Capita					-0.091**	-0.156***	-0.156***	1.189***
					(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.240)
EMA						0.202**	0.201**	-1.707***
						(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.554)
IAP						0.100	0.097	2.868***
						(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.724)
Constant	5.227*	5.212*	8.947	8.916	8.036	7.363	-66.354	-34.759
	(2.986)	(2.996)	(5.427)	(5.411)	(5.378)	(5.372)	(41.608)	(25.987)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Country Code Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	291	291	291	291	291	291	291	291
R^2	0.0004	0.0004	0.003	0.012	0.032	0.046	0.086	0.673
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	-0.007	-0.011	-0.005	0.012	0.019	0.022	0.622
Residual Std. Error	0.489 (df = 289)	0.490 (df = 288)	0.491 (df = 286)	0.489 (df = 285)	0.485 (df = 284)	0.483 (df = 282)	0.483 (df = 271)	0.300 (df = 251)

Notes: AF reference category dropped. Column 8 includes country and year factors. Update demindex var

$^{*}p<0.1;\ ^{**}p<0.05;\ ^{***}p<0.01$

Two-stage least squares regression results are illustrated in Table 6. The initial bivariate relationship between U.S. favorability ratings and cohort size illustrated in column (1), is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The results remain positive to the inclusion of additional soft power factors.

Table 6

Cohort Method: 2SLS with College Education

	Cohort Method: 2SLS with College Education							
	Dependent variable:							
	U.S. Favorability Rating							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cohort Size	1.345**	0.781**	0.373	0.091	0.093	0.047	-0.015	0.177
	(0.609)	(0.347)	(0.305)	(0.180)	(0.210)	(0.165)	(0.185)	(0.151)
Democracy Index		7.581***	4.632***	3.822***	3.318*	2.921**	1.788	-0.024
		(1.618)	(1.327)	(1.204)	(1.693)	(1.113)	(1.167)	(4.305)
Voice of America			32.341***	37.378***	34.745***	29.468***	29.185***	65.112***
			(8.353)	(6.312)	(7.221)	(4.939)	(4.911)	(15.583)
Democratic President				4.323	4.277	6.662**	6.784**	12.781*
				(3.742)	(3.698)	(2.903)	(2.924)	(7.297)
Religion Closeness					0.297	0.567***	0.813***	-0.786
					(0.291)	(0.173)	(0.240)	(0.596)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-10.937***	-7.711***	0.701
						(2.648)	(2.396)	(4.616)
EMA							-7.287	-5.406
							(5.259)	(12.722)
IAP							-15.718*	28.964**
							(8.035)	(12.070)
Constant	-27.736	-32.836	-18.400	-3.527	-1.857	90.231***	78.388***	-17.274
	(38.894)	(24.361)	(18.349)	(11.944)	(9.702)	(27.525)	(24.950)	(31.873)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country Code Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
R^2	-1.289	0.145	0.643	0.651	0.669	0.800	0.805	0.964
Adjusted R^2	-1.319	0.123	0.628	0.632	0.646	0.783	0.782	0.938
Residual Std. Error	34.814 (df = 76)	21.414 (df = 75)	13.935 (df = 74)	13.867 (df = 73)	13.607 (df = 72)	10.642 (df = 71)	10.662 (df = 69)	5.707 (df = 44)

Notes: AF reference category dropped. Column 8 includes country and year factors. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

World Bank Regions

Primary multivariate regressions measure findings controlling for Peace Corps regions as described in the 'Sample and Data Source' section within Chapter III. In checking robustness, World Bank regions were substituted in for Peace Corps regions among the 20 sample countries. A table including sample countries and their respective World Bank region category can be found in *Appendix E*.

A general multivariate OLS regression comparing U.S. favorability indicators on Peace Corps cohort size with World Bank regions can be found in *Appendix F*. Results remain similar to

primary regression findings, though the inclusion of categorical factors reduces significance in columns (7) and (8). Results illustrate a positive relationship between favorability and cohort size.

Removing Outliers

Countries included in the study contained some outliers due to the availability of data. *Appendix A* includes a table of the sample populations along with the available frequency of favorability scores for each country (using cohort method). Frequency of available favorability scores range from 1.28% to 15.38%. To prevent countries with high frequencies of data availability to skew results, three samples were removed: China (15.38%), Jordan (12.82%), and Mexico (11.54%). The remaining 17 sample countries represented availability of favorability score data frequencies of below 10%.

A multivariate OLS regression measures U.S. favorability on cohort size with findings illustrated in *Appendix G*. Results remain positive and robust to the inclusion of additional soft power factors.

A similar OLS regression was conducted with annual method. *Appendix B* includes a table of samples along with available favorability scores measured in their frequency to other countries. Following a similar methodology, samples with frequency above 10% were removed, reducing the sample size by two countries: China (12.50%) and Mexico (12.50%). Findings indicate a positive relationship between favorability and cohort size using both Peace Corps regions and World Bank regions illustrated in *Appendix H* and *Appendix I* accordingly.

Controlling for Country Population

Population size among the sample countries was later considered in its impact on the magnitude in which a single unit input (or in this case a Peace Corps cohort size) may have on U.S. favorability indicator outcomes. A new independent variable was added indicating the impact of cohort size on population for every 100,000 volunteers. The variable, 'cohort size to population' was added to a multivariate regression model, specific to each country and year. Findings were significant and positive to the inclusion of additional independent factors. A multivariate formula illustrating the results in *Appendix J* for cohort method is:

$Favorability_{it} = 21.79 + 21.29(Cohort\ Size\ to\ Population)_{it} + 1.14(Democracy\ Index)_{it} + 39.37(Voice\ of\ America)_{it} + 21.35(Democratic\ President)_t + 1.06(Religion\ Closeness)_{it} - 4.98(Log\ of\ GDP\ per\ Capita)_{it} + Region_i + Year_t$

Results remained positive and statistically significant when measuring for the annual method, with an independent variable notated as 'annual size to population' in the OLS regression model found in *Appendix K*.

Supplementary Discussion

Findings enhance understandings of the quantitative impact of relational public diplomacy programs in their ability to effectively leverage a state's soft power. Nye's (2004) concept of the sources of soft power are represented within these findings, as based on a state's culture, political values, and policy. While these sources are often intangible, these findings demonstrate statistically significant impacts on global public opinion in relationship to cultural and political areas such as religion and presidential administration.

Those areas more representative of a state's public diplomacy strategy also indicate positive relationships with foreign public opinion, to include international broadcasting and people-to-people exchange programming. This paper identifies the impact of cultural exchange, through the vessel of Peace Corps programming, on global public opinion. This relationship more closely aligns with long-term strategic national interests that may indicate increased international security and stability. As Nye (2004) notes the volatility of policy changes on public opinion, those PD programs that seek to leverage culture, such as exchange programs, may pose greater impact to long-term geopolitical advantages as they are more deeply embedded and lasting.

The positive and statistically meaningful relationship between the Peace Corps and a foreign audience's favorability toward the U.S. provides a measurable indicator that can be applied to PD models, such as the Model of Country Concept represented in Figure 2 (Fullerton & Kendrick, 2017). The model considers the role of relational public diplomacy, and specifically visitor programs, as it contributes to a country concept. Future studies may consider applying similar methods to measuring the impact of other components that comprise the MCC, such as educational exchange, mediated PD, and nation branding. Additional research, as it relates to theoretical and practical models may enhance understandings of the scale and magnitude of varying PD and nation branding strategies that ultimately influence foreign public opinions.

Additionally, findings indicate the decision to exit programming in China represents a poor leveraging of soft power potential. Both reducing the size of a Peace Corps volunteer cohort and ceasing programming demonstrates a decrease in foreign public opinion toward the U.S. As heightened political tension poses a greater need for effective public diplomacy strategies, withdrawing programming may indicate a missed opportunity to develop shared understandings that contribute to soft power and long-term national interests.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This chapter considers the implications of these findings and how they may assist in improving the processes by which decision-makers allocate resources to maximize the role of the Peace Corps in leveraging U.S. soft power potential. This includes the role of the Peace Corps in adversarial states, program exits, and participation as based on a state's level of economic development. Additional sections discuss the limitations associated with this research and recommendations for future studies that further enhance understandings of relational public diplomacy as well as the structure and role of the Peace Corps as a PD strategy in the 21st century. Finally, concluding remarks consider this paper's guiding case study and the impact of a modernizing world on public diplomacy efforts.

Implications

The agency's fundamental mission of building international friendship and peace remain as relevant in 2020 as it did during the organization's inception in 1961. The Peace Corps' enduring goals align with post-9/11 public diplomacy efforts that seek to shape and control U.S. narratives among foreign audiences, generating positive attitudes and goodwill toward the general American population.

While the mission maintains relevancy, it requires consistent scrutiny and adaptation in its approach to an ever-modernizing world and global landscape to ensure it achieves the highest level of impact. Based on this research, it is recommended that the U.S. Peace Corps review and evaluate the criteria by which the agency determines program exits and entries as well as seeking partnerships critical to U.S. strategic interests. Areas of consideration, as it relates to the organization's ability to increase foreign attitudes toward the U.S., include:

1. Allocation of resources to those states with low favorability toward the U.S. as these states pose the highest opportunities for improvement.

2. Seek partnerships with adversarial states that do not pose risk to Peace Corps volunteers' health, safety, and security. These states indicate the highest strategic need for effective and controllable U.S. soft power factors.

3. Reduce the need for and advise against program exits as it limits and poses risk of decreasing regional soft power potential.

While this study has not identified conclusively that status of economic development is irrelevant to Peace Corps participation, it is still advised to reevaluate this criterion, if one exists. As the world develops, the Peace Corps' mission remains applicable to Americans, U.S. government interests, and the people of other countries. Exiting countries based on status of

economic development may impede the advancement of these interests and adversely impact Peace Corps' goals of friendship-building and peace. Future research is needed to quantify this impact.

Limitations

Potential limitations with this study include gaps in availability of resources that are needed to measure indicators of a foreign audience's favorability toward the United States. Pew Research Center favorability scores were limited by country and year, reducing the available sample size. Other dependent variables were considered for this study, but none captured the perspective from a general public population as expansively as the Pew Research Center Global Indicators Database. Future methods and resources for collecting indicators of attitudes toward the U.S. among foreign populations would greatly assist public diplomacy experts in decision-making, allocation of resources, and best methods for improving perceptions of Americans abroad. As the U.S. enters into a third phase of public diplomacy efforts aimed at combatting anti-Americanism (notably to curb heightened sentiments that risk motivating terrorism) data collection post-2001 on international attitudes toward Americans remains flat. Greater access to a dependent variable that measures favorability indicators would allow this dataset to expand immensely.

This study was limited in its reach of soft power factors, as Nye's expression of resources related to culture, political values, and foreign policy can be far-reaching and open to interpretation. Future studies are recommended to include and experiment with variations in those factors, which are measured in terms of their relation to a state's soft power potential.

Of importance to consider are any potentially significant influencing economic, political, or security-related impacts to the bilateral relationships between states that may influence data

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related to U.S. favorability beyond the scope of these OLS regressions. Military intervention, tariffs, geopolitical conflict, and historical context represent a few of the variables that may be specific to individual states or regions within the sample dataset that alters results.

In addition, data collected regarding favorability toward the U.S. may not represent specific perceptions that differ between the U.S. government and the general American population. The Pew Research Center Global Indicators database utilized for this study may not offer distinction between attitudes toward a state versus those of its population. Respondents may not consider distinctions between the U.S. government and the general American population in their response to a survey question that only specifies favorability toward the U.S. This distinction is important and relevant in post-9/11 public diplomacy efforts, as favorability toward the American population may serve national security interests equally to favorability toward a government entity. This is also significant when considering people-to-people exchange tactics, as these programs are more likely to increase favorability of a cultural identity representative of a population as opposed to government-level policy and decision-making.

Future Scope

In ensuring the robustness of these results and increasing accuracy of findings, future studies may consider alternatives to Pew Research Center Global Indicators in terms of measuring U.S. favorability perceptions among foreign populations. Identifying alternative sources of measurable favorability indicators will expand available sample countries and increase the number of total observations.

Studies may also benefit from analyzing the relationship between U.S. favorability and other state-sponsored exchange programming to include those conducted by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA). The Bureau coordinates a wide

range of programs, with those for U.S. participation to include the Fulbright Program and the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange. ECA also engages foreign audiences through exchange opportunities for incoming populations to the U.S., including the International Visitor Leadership program. Notably, the Bureau began in 1961, the same year as the Peace Corps, with a mission to build "friendly, peaceful relations between the people of the United States and the people of other countries through academic, cultural, sports and professional exchanges, as well as public-private partnerships" (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Understanding the impact of other sources of U.S.-funded exchange programs may assist in future program development, those global audiences targeted for participation, as well as increase the robustness of research associated with the field of public diplomacy.

Identifying the quantitative impact of other PD efforts beyond the scope of people exchange programs will also assist in understanding the role of additional state-sponsored communication strategies. In this way, decision-makers and scholars could identify the variations in the magnitude and level of impact associated with varying tactics. This approach may assist in identifying the reach, effectiveness, and long-term impact of those components that contribute to public diplomacy strategies. Researchers may also consider the interaction of these components, such as the added value to nation branding concepts in regard to brand exports through increases in state-sponsored programming, to include people exchanges. In this way, decision-makers could identify the interrelationships and independent contributions of those factors that shape a country concept.

Additional focus on the Peace Corps within this study may benefit from the inclusion of research toward the effects of various sectors within the organization and subsequent outcomes on favorability. As introduced in this study, the Peace Corps includes volunteer-specific roles abroad such as health, education, agriculture, and economic development. Based on findings, sectors of people-to-people exchanges that further aim at developing cross-cultural learning

activities may serve as higher sources of soft power. Demonstrating changes in cohort size assists in identifying the allocation of resources by which the U.S. Peace Corps determines high need countries for the mission's three goals. These cohorts are likely representative of a variety of different sectors, with some potentially engaging more in cross-cultural learning activities than others based on their intended purpose. As the organization's second and third goal aim at improving cultural understandings, and therefore utilize grassroots diplomacy tactics, identifying those sectors that increase favorability most would assist in targeting critical international relationships by use of those specific roles.

Further research is needed to understand the role of the Peace Corps serving in developing nations and exiting participation based on factors of economic development. This study finds in OLS regression, that when cohort size is interacted with GDP per capita of sample countries, those states with higher GDP per capita offer less opportunity from increases in Peace Corps programming as it relates to U.S. favorability outcomes. While these findings indicate a negative relationship that naturally would encourage participation in states with lower economic development, it is of importance to consider the limited sample size associated with these results. Additional research toward this relationship will provide benefit in assisting the agency in decision-making as it relates to resource allocation and a relevant approach to a 21st century world. Established in 1961, the Peace Corps was introduced during an era of global decolonization alongside the Cold War with fears of communism spreading to newly independent states. In a post-9/11 world amidst heightening global anti-Americanism, the United States, under the Obama administration sought out programs and activities to increase U.S. favorability. The Peace Corps is historically rooted in positioning programs primarily in the developing world. Yet as the world develops, the Peace Corps may consider reevaluating their objectives to align with 21st century U.S. goals abroad. Additional studies that further enhance the understanding between cross-cultural learning through people-to-people exchange and favorability outcomes, may

provide insights into the Peace Corps' continuing contributions to modern U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Concluding Remarks

The Peace Corps has sent over 200,000 volunteers to participating countries globally since its founding in 1961. Volunteers serve to fulfill the organization's mission of providing trained men and women to interested countries, to promote a better understanding of Americans, and to promote an understanding of the people the agency serves. At its core, the organization meaningfully seeks to build international friendship and by doing so, to promote peace.

The decision to end programming in China amidst mounting U.S. political pressure has led to the conclusion of the 27-year partnership between these countries (Peace Corps, n.d.-a). Peace Corps volunteers in China, known in the country and the agency as 'U.S.-China Friendship Volunteers' have returned home with no current plans to be replaced by future cohorts of Americans. As the U.S. Peace Corps decidedly ended programming in 2019, tensions between the two states have continued to rise amid the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, escalating trade wars, and national security laws implemented in Hong Kong. By the summer of 2020, the U.S. ordered the immediate closure of the Chinese Consulate in Houston, Texas, a move that was later reciprocated with the closing of the U.S. consulate in Chengdu (Marcus, 2020; Bradsher & Myers, 2020).

The world is different today than it was in 1961, but the need for international understanding and partnership remains relevant and necessary. Rising tensions between the U.S. and China recall sentiments of USSR fears during the Truman era that eventually led to the founding of the Peace Corps. The agency was born out of a need to build friendship, sustain peace, and to allow Americans to control their own narrative abroad. While it is crucial to

reevaluate how the agency continues to meet these needs in a 21st century world, the foundation by which the organization was founded is as essential today as it was almost 60 years ago.

The Truman era led to the development of early U.S. public diplomacy efforts that sought to shape U.S. narrative and imagery of Americans abroad. The Truman administration and those following throughout the Cold War faced a world of uncertainty as they implemented strategies and tactics to improve foreign audiences' attitudes of Americans to encourage the adoption of democratic and capitalistic systems. After 9/11, public diplomacy efforts also aimed to shape attitudes of the United States with revised intentions of decreasing anti-Americanism as part of a national security strategy.

This study finds that the Peace Corps meets public diplomacy objectives of shaping and improving positive opinions of the U.S. among the international partners in which they serve. Based on OLS, probit, and logistics regressions, results indicate that Peace Corps volunteers contribute to increased U.S. soft power potential as evident in increasing positive attitudes toward the U.S among participating states at rates that are statistically significant. Based on these findings, the decision to indefinitely withdraw Peace Corps programming from China suggests a poor leveraging of U.S. soft power potential. Regression analysis also indicates that the act of exiting a program adversely affects the favorability of the U.S. among that state's population, further decreasing positive attitudes.

The introduction of the Peace Corps Mission Accountability Act (2019), if enforced, will likely result in the reduction of U.S. soft power in countries that are determined to be adversarial by the Secretary of State. Adversarial states that do not pose health, safety, or security risks to participating Peace Corps volunteers, however, may pose the highest need and opportunity for improving U.S. favorability. The Peace Corps must determine the best means of allocating scarce resources to effectively meet their mission as well as the broader interests of the U.S.

government. Seeking out partnerships among states that are less favorable will pose increased

opportunities toward improving a foreign audience's opinion of the U.S.

As global tensions rise, the Peace Corps and similar public diplomacy programs will

continue to gain relevancy. During historical periods of heightened global confrontation, Peace

Corps volunteers often questioned their role in larger U.S. objectives, having envisioned

themselves during wartime as "the smile on the face of the imperial American tiger" (Meisler,

2012, p. xi). Rooted in a looming war with the USSR, the organization has always sought to serve

larger U.S. interests. The first director of the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver understood the

importance of building partnerships that serve both the international community and the U.S.

During the Cold War, Shriver's emphasis on opening programs in 'non-aligned nations' or those

states that did not ally with either the U.S. or USSR reveals the need for strategic friendship-

building globally (Meisler, 2012). Limiting the potential of Peace Corps partnerships to states that

demonstrate favorability may effectively sustain those relationships but stunts the agency's

potential for growth as it aims to ensure global stability in a rapidly changing and dynamic global

landscape.

A post-9/11 environment and increases in anti-Americanism demonstrates the crucial

need to generate positive narratives and favorable attitudes toward the United States. While the

Peace Corps may require adaptation in its approach to resource allocation, future program exits

and entries, as well as targeting audiences critical to U.S. interests, its fundamental role as a

public diplomacy strategy remains increasingly applicable. The measurable and positive impact

of their operations on favorability demonstrates their capacity to effectively serve the needs of the

U.S. government in their public diplomacy efforts.

Considering the context by which the agency is rooted provides opportunities for

introspection. As John F. Kennedy asked students during a spontaneous speech delivered during

his presidential campaign on the willingness of the audience to participate in a U.S. Peace Corps, expressing, "[Your willingness] I think will depend [on] whether a free society can compete. I think it can. And I think Americans are willing to contribute. But the effort must be far greater than we have ever made in the past." A year later, President John F. Kennedy established the Peace Corps and a legacy of cross-cultural learning and engagement that has lasted decades. The agency by which President Kennedy created poses a controllable and measurable opportunity by which the U.S. government can expand its global interests, shape American narratives, and most importantly, build critical international friendships through shared understandings.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Cohort Method: Country and Favorability Score Sample

Sample Countries
78 Observations

Country	Frequency of Cohort Size	Frequency of Favorability Score	Region
Bulgaria	1.64%	1.28%	EMA
Burkina Faso	1.35%	1.28%	AF
China	16.23%	15.38%	EMA
El Salvador	1.10%	2.56%	IAP
Ethiopia	2.52%	1.28%	AF
Ghana	6.19%	5.13%	AF
Indonesia	7.19%	8.97%	EMA
Jordan	7.34%	12.82%	EMA
Kenya	7.54%	6.41%	AF
Mali	1.66%	1.28%	AF
Mexico	4.98%	11.54%	IAP
Morocco	2.64%	1.28%	EMA
Nicaragua	1.62%	1.28%	IAP
Peru	5.60%	3.85%	IAP
Philippines	4.84%	3.85%	EMA
Senegal	7.15%	3.85%	AF
South Africa	5.96%	6.41%	AF
Tanzania	6.93%	5.13%	AF
Thailand	1.12%	1.28%	EMA
Uganda	6.40%	5.13%	AF

Regions are categorized according to Peace Corps' classification:
AF: Africa, EMA: Europe, Mediterranean, and Asian Region, IAP: Inter-America and the Pacific Region

APPENDIX B

Annual Method: Country and Favorability Score Sample

Sample Countries
80 Observations

Country	Frequency of Cohort Size	Frequency of Favorability Score	Region
Bulgaria	1.72%	1.25%	EMA
Burkina Faso	1.08%	1.25%	AF
China	13.33%	12.50%	EMA
El Salvador	0.70%	2.50%	IAP
Ethiopia	2.25%	1.25%	AF
Ghana	7.34%	6.25%	AF
Indonesia	5.25%	8.75%	EMA
Jordan	3.75%	8.75%	EMA
Kenya	5.74%	6.25%	AF
Mali	1.53%	1.25%	AF
Mexico	5.82%	12.50%	IAP
Morocco	2.14%	1.25%	EMA
Nicaragua	1.65%	1.25%	IAP
Peru	7.96%	5.00%	IAP
Philippines	6.14%	5.00%	EMA
Senegal	10.26%	5.00%	AF
South Africa	8.50%	7.50%	AF
Tanzania	8.78%	6.25%	AF
Thailand	0.91%	1.25%	EMA
Uganda	5.15%	5.00%	AF

Regions are categorized according to Peace Corps' classification:
AF: Africa, EMA: Europe, Mediterranean, and Asian Region, IAP: Inter-America and the Pacific Region

APPENDIX C

Annual Method: Bivariate Scatterplot with Country Code Labels

Annual Method: Favorability and Total Size by Year

APPENDIX D

Annual Method: Multivariate Regression

Annual Method: Multivariate Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Dependent variable:				
				U.S. Favorability Rating				
Cohort Size	0.080***	0.079***	0.049***	0.057***	0.066***	0.034**	0.028*	0.037**
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Democracy Index		5.954***	3.165**	3.365***	1.805	2.788**	1.873	2.267*
		(1.406)	(1.232)	(1.201)	(1.401)	(1.104)	(1.175)	(1.157)
Voice of America			36.035***	33.708***	30.770***	25.892***	25.628***	26.569***
			(5.743)	(5.674)	(5.739)	(4.538)	(4.514)	(4.436)
Democratic President				8.392**	9.221**	10.405***	10.504***	-0.563
				(3.619)	(3.567)	(2.792)	(2.741)	(7.214)
Religion Closeness					0.381**	0.580***	0.907***	0.933***
					(0.186)	(0.148)	(0.220)	(0.215)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-10.894***	-8.534***	-7.195***
						(1.568)	(2.070)	(2.099)
EMA							-2.785	-2.325
							(4.168)	(4.057)
IAP							-13.412**	-15.221**
							(5.803)	(5.732)
Constant	44.137***	10.951	0.258	-6.213	-1.666	86.822***	74.410***	64.335***
	(5.146)	(9.121)	(7.644)	(7.940)	(8.086)	(14.217)	(15.102)	(15.204)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
R^2	0.122	0.288	0.531	0.562	0.586	0.751	0.768	0.813
Adjusted R^2	0.110	0.269	0.512	0.539	0.558	0.730	0.742	0.762
Residual Std. Error	19.840 (df = 78)	17.984 (df = 77)	14.692 (df = 76)	14.287 (df = 75)	13.992 (df = 74)	10.930 (df = 73)	10.686 (df = 71)	10.262 (df = 62)
F Statistic	10.806*** (df = 1; 78)	15.539*** (df = 2; 77)	28.643*** (df = 3; 76)	24.063*** (df = 4; 75)	20.910*** (df = 5; 74)	36.601*** (df = 6; 73)	29.390*** (df = 8; 71)	15.879*** (df = 17; 62)

Note: AF reference category dropped.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX E

Country Sample with World Bank Region Classifications

World Bank Regions

Country	World Bank Region	World Bank Code
Bulgaria	Europe and Central Asia	ECA
Burkina Faso	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
China	East Asia and Pacific	EAP
El Salvador	Latin America and the Caribbean	LAC
Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
Ghana	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
Indonesia	East Asia and Pacific	EAP
Jordan	Middle East and North Africa	MENA
Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
Mali	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
Mexico	Latin America and the Caribbean	LAC
Morocco	Middle East and North Africa	MENA
Nicaragua	Latin America and the Caribbean	LAC
Peru	Latin America and the Caribbean	LAC
Philippines	East Asia and Pacific	EAP
Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
South Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
Tanzania	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA
Thailand	East Asia and Pacific	EAP
Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa	SSA

Cohort Method: Multivariate Regression with World Bank Regions

Cohort Method: Multivariate Regression with World Bank Regions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Dependent variable:				
				U.S. Favorability Rating				
Cohort Size	0.344***	0.351***	0.230***	0.230***	0.273***	0.144***	0.074	0.083
	(0.086)	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.054)
Democracy Index		7.443***	4.302***	4.141***	1.993	2.731**	0.482	0.839
		(1.337)	(1.091)	(1.096)	(1.265)	(1.044)	(1.080)	(1.133)
Voice of America			35.596***	34.237***	30.422***	27.690***	31.030***	30.137***
			(4.692)	(4.813)	(4.746)	(3.915)	(3.725)	(3.932)
Democratic President				4.321	4.785	6.491**	8.336***	11.457
				(3.601)	(3.424)	(2.819)	(2.587)	(11.645)
Religion Closeness					0.531***	0.620***	0.961***	0.918***
					(0.178)	(0.147)	(0.213)	(0.219)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-9.656***	-7.354***	-6.684***
						(1.604)	(1.929)	(2.064)
ECA							40.873***	38.165***
							(10.707)	(11.231)
LAC							-8.150	-8.306
							(5.696)	(5.880)
MENA								
SSA							6.303	6.135
							(3.933)	(4.064)
Constant	35.847***	-4.806	-10.256	-11.388*	-5.395	75.976***	65.114***	50.525**
	(5.979)	(8.884)	(6.746)	(6.792)	(6.756)	(14.605)	(15.640)	(19.140)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.172	0.414	0.671	0.677	0.713	0.810	0.853	0.873
Adjusted R^2	0.161	0.399	0.657	0.659	0.693	0.794	0.833	0.828
Residual Std. Error	20.934 (df = 76)	17.725 (df = 75)	13.383 (df = 74)	13.344 (df = 73)	12.674 (df = 72)	10.384 (df = 71)	9.336 (df = 68)	9.479 (df = 57)
F Statistic	15.822*** (df = 1; 76)	26.538*** (df = 2; 75)	50.220*** (df = 3; 74)	38.249*** (df = 4; 73)	35.704*** (df = 5; 72)	50.361*** (df = 6; 71)	43.738*** (df = 9; 68)	19.543*** (df = 20; 57)

Note: EAP reference category dropped. Column 8 includes year factor

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cohort Method: World Bank Regions Without Outliers

Cohort Method: World Bank Regions Without Outliers China, Jordan and Mexico

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
					Dependent variable:				
					U.S. Favorability Rating				
Cohort Size	0.075	0.051	0.137	0.139	0.133	0.097	0.099	0.133	0.252**
	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Democracy Index		-1.973	-2.433	-2.775	-3.921*	2.975	-4.687	-3.510	11.858
		(2.549)	(2.190)	(2.211)	(2.111)	(3.364)	(3.586)	(4.041)	(7.392)
Voice of America			43.891***	39.223***	31.998***	14.783	49.273***	52.641***	93.805***
			(10.717)	(11.571)	(11.153)	(12.483)	(16.366)	(17.447)	(24.055)
Democratic President				5.997	6.938	9.552*	10.267**	-3.427	13.582
				(5.653)	(5.296)	(5.082)	(4.525)	(10.367)	(9.994)
Religion Closeness					0.576**	0.715***	0.972***	0.904***	6.164
					(0.217)	(0.211)	(0.251)	(0.268)	(5.229)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-10.710**	-1.576	-0.886	-56.766
						(4.220)	(4.470)	(4.898)	(37.578)
ECA							57.783***	55.027***	66.997**
							(18.005)	(18.974)	(30.459)
LAC							-10.976	-11.314	-208.868
							(8.108)	(8.580)	(174.263)
MENA									
SSA							6.124	5.098	-132.613
							(5.064)	(5.404)	(93.956)
Constant	63.949***	77.774***	32.002	33.688	40.256**	95.215***	31.960	17.654	376.867
	(7.987)	(19.584)	(20.180)	(20.213)	(19.056)	(28.099)	(29.495)	(32.226)	(268.889)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
ccode	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
R^2	0.012	0.026	0.299	0.317	0.418	0.498	0.644	0.700	0.957
Adjusted R^2	-0.010	-0.019	0.250	0.252	0.347	0.423	0.558	0.524	0.890
Residual Std. Error	16.635 (df = 45)	16.710 (df = 44)	14.337 (df = 43)	14.316 (df = 42)	13.382 (df = 41)	12.574 (df = 40)	11.008 (df = 37)	11.427 (df = 29)	5.499 (df = 18)
F Statistic	0.563 (df = 1; 45)	0.578 (df = 2; 44)	6.115*** (df = 3; 43)	4.881*** (df = 4; 42)	5.881*** (df = 5; 41)	6.625*** (df = 6; 40)	7.451*** (df = 9; 37)	3.974*** (df = 17; 29)	14.248*** (df = 28; 18)

Note: EAP reference category dropped. Column 9 includes country and year factors

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX H

Annual Method: Multivariate Regression Without Outliers

Annual Method: Peace Corps Regions Without Outliers China and Mexico

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Dependent variable:				
				U.S. Favorability Rating				
Cohort Size	0.090***	0.074**	0.029	0.040*	0.039*	0.024	0.024	0.035
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Democracy Index		6.137***	-2.533	-2.431	-3.366*	4.880*	3.098	3.030
		(2.290)	(1.909)	(1.882)	(1.845)	(2.857)	(3.047)	(3.093)
Voice of America			52.205***	49.958***	45.848***	20.277**	22.324**	25.839**
			(6.500)	(6.549)	(6.502)	(9.291)	(9.623)	(9.876)
Democratic President				6.708	7.416*	9.355**	9.628***	-7.306
				(4.089)	(3.930)	(3.605)	(3.590)	(9.940)
Religion Closeness					0.486**	0.713***	0.912***	0.903***
					(0.201)	(0.193)	(0.245)	(0.245)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-12.897***	-9.809**	-7.291*
						(3.622)	(4.036)	(4.198)
EMA							-3.303	-2.089
							(4.857)	(4.833)
IAP							-11.904	-13.358*
							(7.122)	(7.241)
Constant	43.875***	11.360	26.721***	21.263**	24.285**	96.222***	81.311***	62.496**
	(6.594)	(13.656)	(9.585)	(10.013)	(9.677)	(22.026)	(23.507)	(24.259)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
R^2	0.141	0.237	0.645	0.662	0.695	0.754	0.767	0.818
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.210	0.626	0.637	0.667	0.726	0.731	0.744
Residual Std. Error	21.329 (df = 58)	20.276 (df = 57)	13.945 (df = 56)	13.739 (df = 55)	13.168 (df = 54)	11.940 (df = 53)	11.836 (df = 51)	11.550 (df = 42)
F Statistic	9.492*** (df = 1; 58)	8.843*** (df = 2; 57)	33.962*** (df = 3; 56)	26.913*** (df = 4; 55)	24.615*** (df = 5; 54)	27.062*** (df = 6; 53)	21.021*** (df = 8; 51)	11.068*** (df = 17; 42)

Note: AF reference category dropped. Column 8 includes year factor

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX I

Annual Method: World Bank Regions Without Outliers

Annual Method: World Bank Regions Without Outliers China and Mexico

	Dependent variable:							
	U.S. Favorability Rating							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cohort Size	0.090***	0.074**	0.029	0.040*	0.039*	0.024	0.018	0.026
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Democracy Index		6.137***	-2.533	-2.431	-3.366*	4.880*	-4.390	-3.598
		(2.290)	(1.909)	(1.882)	(1.845)	(2.857)	(3.273)	(3.460)
Voice of America			52.205***	49.958***	45.848***	20.277**	46.372***	46.467***
			(6.500)	(6.549)	(6.502)	(9.291)	(10.393)	(10.953)
Democratic President				6.708	7.416*	9.355**	10.595***	-3.567
				(4.089)	(3.930)	(3.605)	(3.167)	(9.049)
Religion Closeness					0.486**	0.713***	1.039***	0.997***
					(0.201)	(0.193)	(0.218)	(0.223)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-12.897***	-3.110	-1.937
						(3.622)	(3.928)	(4.134)
ECA							56.072***	48.196***
							(14.061)	(14.859)
LAC							-14.309**	-15.541**
							(7.038)	(7.146)
MENA								
SSA							3.986	2.823
							(4.276)	(4.369)
Constant	43.875***	11.360	26.721***	21.263**	24.285**	96.222***	48.239**	38.287
	(6.594)	(13.656)	(9.585)	(10.013)	(9.677)	(22.026)	(22.935)	(23.882)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
R^2	0.141	0.237	0.645	0.662	0.695	0.754	0.823	0.855
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.210	0.626	0.637	0.667	0.726	0.792	0.791
Residual Std. Error	21.329 (df = 58)	20.276 (df = 57)	13.945 (df = 56)	13.739 (df = 55)	13.168 (df = 54)	11.940 (df = 53)	10.412 (df = 50)	10.428 (df = 41)
F Statistic	9.492*** (df = 1; 58)	8.843*** (df = 2; 57)	33.962*** (df = 3; 56)	26.913*** (df = 4; 55)	24.615*** (df = 5; 54)	27.062*** (df = 6; 53)	25.912*** (df = 9; 50)	13.407*** (df = 18; 41)

Note: EAP reference category dropped. Column 8 includes year factor

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX J

Cohort Method: Including Country Population

Cohort Method: Controlling Model for Country Population

	Dependent variable:							
	U.S. Favorability Rating							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Cohort Size to Population	-7.209	-4.362	29.728***	29.277***	29.507***	14.465**	20.784***	21.286***
	(8.930)	(8.018)	(6.347)	(6.219)	(6.170)	(5.560)	(5.510)	(5.945)
Democracy Index		6.832***	2.573**	2.517**	1.411	2.408**	0.832	1.144
		(1.471)	(1.072)	(1.050)	(1.271)	(1.048)	(1.085)	(1.100)
Voice of America			53.476***	51.444***	50.167***	36.689***	39.569***	39.371***
			(5.304)	(5.281)	(5.305)	(4.817)	(4.745)	(4.818)
Democratic President				6.555**	6.866**	8.692***	8.690***	21.345*
				(3.097)	(3.079)	(2.528)	(2.356)	(11.957)
Religion Closeness					0.255	0.492***	1.050***	1.061***
					(0.168)	(0.142)	(0.206)	(0.206)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-10.119***	-5.954***	-4.927**
						(1.587)	(2.033)	(2.077)
EMA							-2.068	-1.792
							(3.758)	(3.771)
IAP							-20.760***	-22.304***
							(5.438)	(5.487)
Constant	59.000***	20.896**	-9.064	-11.308*	-7.299	78.946***	49.191***	21.794
	(3.097)	(8.660)	(6.519)	(6.471)	(6.939)	(14.663)	(15.753)	(19.553)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
R^2	0.008	0.214	0.652	0.670	0.680	0.789	0.824	0.857
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	0.195	0.639	0.654	0.659	0.773	0.805	0.813
Residual Std. Error	22.270 (df = 83)	19.937 (df = 82)	13.358 (df = 81)	13.080 (df = 80)	12.974 (df = 79)	10.586 (df = 78)	9.809 (df = 76)	9.619 (df = 64)
F Statistic	0.652 (df = 1; 83)	11.191*** (df = 2; 82)	50.510*** (df = 3; 81)	40.630*** (df = 4; 80)	33.498*** (df = 5; 79)	48.704*** (df = 6; 78)	44.405*** (df = 8; 76)	19.220*** (df = 20; 64)

Note: AF reference category dropped. Column 8 includes year factor.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

APPENDIX K

Annual Method: Including Country Population

Annual Method: Controlling Model for Country Population

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Dependent variable:				
				U.S. Favorability Rating				
Annual Size to Population	3.479	2.120	6.996***	7.198***	7.590***	3.480**	5.273***	6.104***
	(2.997)	(2.705)	(1.978)	(1.927)	(1.913)	(1.641)	(1.661)	(1.746)
Democracy Index		6.767***	2.501**	2.398**	0.995	2.273**	0.661	1.102
		(1.473)	(1.137)	(1.107)	(1.342)	(1.087)	(1.135)	(1.108)
Voice of America			44.888***	42.901***	41.450***	31.922***	33.018***	35.089***
			(4.889)	(4.832)	(4.834)	(4.103)	(4.040)	(4.202)
Democratic President				7.594**	8.013**	9.315***	9.572***	6.660
				(3.231)	(3.195)	(2.556)	(2.402)	(12.014)
Religion Closeness					0.315*	0.531***	1.089***	1.151***
					(0.175)	(0.143)	(0.216)	(0.215)
Log of GDP Per Capita						-10.646***	-6.818***	-5.394**
						(1.567)	(2.031)	(2.049)
EMA							-1.743	-1.677
							(3.881)	(3.795)
IAP							-19.885***	-22.877***
							(5.558)	(5.560)
Constant	55.314***	19.013**	0.898	-2.050	2.804	88.139***	62.599***	44.582**
	(3.021)	(8.352)	(6.205)	(6.167)	(6.656)	(13.637)	(14.779)	(17.069)
Year Omitted?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	85	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
R^2	0.016	0.217	0.617	0.641	0.655	0.784	0.815	0.856
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.198	0.602	0.623	0.634	0.767	0.796	0.811
Residual Std. Error	22.178 (df = 83)	19.898 (df = 82)	14.014 (df = 81)	13.639 (df = 80)	13.453 (df = 79)	10.731 (df = 78)	10.043 (df = 76)	9.656 (df = 64)
F Statistic	1.348 (df = 1; 83)	11.393*** (df = 2; 82)	43.414*** (df = 3; 81)	35.761*** (df = 4; 80)	30.051*** (df = 5; 79)	47.049*** (df = 6; 78)	41.923*** (df = 8; 76)	19.047*** (df = 20; 64)

Note: AF reference category dropped. Column 8 includes year factor.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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