A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS THE DEGREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL HARMONY WITHIN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Ву

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PREFACE

This study is concerned with educators at decision-making levels (whether it be the board of education or the classroom teacher), who continue educational practices which, for the most part, are neither guided by sound instructional theory, nor are the philosophical implications of their teaching practices considered. As a consequence, this study posits a Conceptual and Operational framework from which basic beliefs and values concerning the nature of the learner, the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge can be inferred from the use of a variety of variables teachers manipulate to affect learning (i.e., instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selected, materials and resources, physical environment, and evaluation techniques).

The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to his major advisor, Dr. Russell L. Dobson, for his continual encouragement, belief, and genuine interest in my own becoming. Appreciation is also expressed to the other committee members, Dr. Donald A. Myers, whose availability, relentless demands for scholarly pursuits, and invaluable assistance in preparation of the final manuscript is appreciated; Dr. Vernon E. Troxel, whose thoroughness and patience with me are genuinely appreciated; Dr. J. Kenneth St. Clair, whose gentle optimism and reassurance were welcomed during periods of uncertainty; and Dr. Frances Stromberg, whose warmth and friendship permeated every interaction.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

There appears to be a prevailing attitude among Americans to reject theory in favor of unguided practice. Teachers seem especially unaffected by theories propounded in journals and by university professors. Teachers claim to have profited little from classes in educational theory (curriculum, philosophy, administration, and psychology). Yet, when teachers are confronted with a problem that could be helped by insights from behavioral sciences, they tend only to experiment and innovate.

This posture has resulted in manipulation of certain concrete variables, such as time, money, personnel, facilities, and certain material objects in curriculum development attempts. In addition, the age-old controversy of process versus content continues to be debated, resulting in educational camps being established at bi-polar ends. Proponents of various educational camps seem to be more concerned with finding better ways of doing what they are already doing than with raising questions as to why it is that they do what they do. It seems apparent that educational issues are a consequence of divided perceptions of reality and values. Initially, this is one of the major concerns of the educational philosopher.

The critical educational issues of our time are philosophical in nature. They have to do with questions of right, justice, freedom, the nature of man, society, and knowledge. Philosophical problems are not only fundamental but are also timeless. Robert Ulich (1945) said:

No civilization can survive without a deeper and uniting definition of truths and values . . . only the mediocre person is satisfied with a mass of incoherent and isolated knowledge (p. 341).

It would seem that an educational program whose designs have failed to consider the fundamental questions of human existence breeds a very inadequate type of education. Alfred North Whitehead (1953) bears witness to this assumption in suggesting, "There can be no successful democratic society till education conveys a philosophic outlook" (p. 125).

Logically, a fundamental question is, Why should educators consider philosophy in the development, planning, and implementation of the school curriculum?

The educational philosopher entertains the question of philosophy in developing, planning, and implementing school curricula. The prevailing opinion is that philosophy has no role at all because developing, planning, and implementing a curricula is based upon theory. Theory, in turn, is based upon empirical concepts and principles and is contingent upon internal consistency and empirical evidence brought to its support. In other words, some would say that philosophy is one issue and science is quite another.

Most educators, however, adhere to the evidence which suggests that curriculum is related in some way to the development of the well-

rounded individual and to the preservation, if not the development, of the good society. The question of what a well-rounded individual is and how the good society is to be realized transcends the domain of science. Therefore, it seems evident that philosophy should play a role in the processes involved in developing, planning, and implementing the school curriculum. Kaplan (1970) emphasizes:

. . . one of the basic tasks of philosophy is clarification of our ideas and explicit formulation of basic assumptions, the purpose being to help us see the world steady and whole. The philosophic function or activity of a culture takes place at the interface between the life of the mind and the arts of practice, which is where the policy maker is. More than ever we desperately need principles of integration by which we can achieve a consonance of our beliefs with one another, and of beliefs with action (p. 18).

Bayles (1959) believes that educational philosophy can provide educators with the conceptual apparatus to evaluate and analyze the beliefs and practices in education to the end that one can enhance his/her ability to decide what should be done, how best to do it, and why. However, due to the abstract nature of philosophy, among other reasons, teachers have difficulty in realizing its utilitarian value.

Shermis (1967) suggests two different uses of a philosophical system. One, build a system that will provide "final" answers for all situations. However, in our multi-faceted culture, this would be selfdefeating. Two, a more logical use would concern the development of a coherent philosophical system that could provide a relatively dependable framework with which one can ask relevant questions, evaluate behavior, determine goals, establish priorities in values, and select appropriate

techniques. The creation of a basis for consistent, effective teaching would be one outcome of such an endeavor.

Through analyzing the methods used by philosophy (interpreting, classifying, evaluating, prescribing, systematizing), Shermis (1967) purports that educational philosophy can function as theory. In the same sense that theory acts to guide practice, educational philosophy as theory can function to provide guidance for educational practice. Dewey has suggested that philosophy is a general theory of education.

To prevent educational practices which foster inconsistency, and frequently poor teaching, Shermis suggests three ways philosophy may be utilized to: (1) gain a greater awareness of the existence of competing philosophical systems, seeing that different philosophical systems yield different kinds of educational practices, (2) learn to think philosophically, appraising educational practices in light of philosophical categories, and (3) in general, be more conscious of the philosophical issues which have generated thought for thousands of years.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is dualistic in nature. The primary purpose is the development of a conceptual framework (defined in Chapter IV) through which one might begin to examine and, eventually through future research, assess the degree of philosophical harmony within the elementary school. To accomplish this, results of the following endeavors will be used: (1) an examination of the basic tenets of supernaturalist philosophies of education (Essentialism and Perennialism) and selected naturalist philosophies of education

(Experimentalism and Existentialism), (2) an examination of the manner in which each philosophy treats the nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge, and (3) an examination of the treatment of variables within the classroom which affect learning (instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selection, materials and resources, physical environment, and evaluation techniques), and to explore the philosophical implication of each treatment. This conceptualization is an attempted educational translation of the conceptual framework.

Talleyrand was credited with saying, "I do not say it is good; I do not say it is bad, I say it is the way it is." This is the view of the author. In the development of a conceptual framework, it is not intended that any particular set of values (i.e., that either philosophical harmony or philosophical integration is more or less effective in affecting learning) be endorsed. It is also not intended that the conceptual framework champion any particular philosophy. Each of the philosophies considered are currently practiced by teachers who may not, of course, be aware of the underlying assumptions from which they operate. Nevertheless, the use of a conceptual framework could prove invaluable. Marshall (1973) suggests that the value of this invitation to learning is in the questions it may pose rather than in any answers it may provide.

A secondary purpose of this study is to demonstrate a need on the part of educators who develop, plan, and implement the elementary school curriculum for more serious consideration of the philosophical implications of variables teachers manipulate to affect learning within the classroom.

Basic Assumptions

The basic premise of this study is that values establish belief systems, beliefs systems in turn engender attitudes, and attitudes breed behavior. As a consequence, the manner in which one behaves and the choices one makes reflect one's basic attitudes, beliefs, and values.

Assuming validity of the basic premise, the study is based on the following assumptions which research appears to support:

(1) One's life philosophy is directly related to one's educational philosophy.

(2) Each educational philosophy contains beliefs concerning the nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge.

(3) The manner in which a school (teachers and/or administrators) treat the variables that affect learning within the school (such as instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selection, materials and resources, physical environment, and evaluation techniques) are expressions of particular philosophical beliefs.

(4) The treatment or manipulation of variables by educators may be conscious or unconscious.

(5) The nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge are reflected in the variables educators manipulate.

(6) The basic life beliefs and educational beliefs that a teacher adheres to will be reflected in the classroom.

Rationale for the Study

Today's educators who are responsible for providing input at the decision-making level treat schooling in a manner analogous to a fat lady who ate the best things from six different diets and wondered why she wasn't making any progress towards losing weight. Just as applicable is the teacher who shares the dilemma of a child in a candy store. First, the alternatives confronting the child (teacher) are overwhelm-There is an almost endless variety of colors, flavors, and shapes. ing. The result is that the child (teacher) chooses candy (media, instructional strategies, organizational patterns, evaluation techniques, etc.) by: (1) closing one's eyes and reaching in the dark, (2) flipping a coin, (3) the ever-popular "Eenie, Meanie, Minie, Moe" method, (4) allowing the storekeeper (curriculum guide, book salesmen, supervisor, principal) to decide for him/her, (At this point the teacher abdicates all responsibility for what he/she does by leaning on some external authority and then blaming that authority if the choice is unsuccessful.), or (5) ignoring all possible choices and select the one piece they know from experience tastes good, the only one that has been tried.

This author maintains that teachers cannot demonstrate haphazard decision-making behavior disrespective of underlying philosophic assumptions and expect to make wise decisions. Choices regarding curriculum and instruction practices need to be grounded in critical awareness of theoretical and philosophical alternatives underlying the various alternatives available. Miekeljohn (1942) raises the question of mere professional technicianship versus beliefs, motives, and values when he states:

One of the greatest failures of our contempory training of teachers is that they become mere technicians. They learn the tricks and devices of the classroom. But they do not learn the beliefs and motives and values of the human fellowship for the sake of which the classroom exists. The primary question of teacher theory and practice is one of purpose. Why do we teach? What should we teach? For whom do we teach? These are questions which must be answered if our teachers are to be themselves members of the fraternity in which they seek to initiate their pupils (p. 182).

Educators in America have a long history of implementing anything if it appears to be effective. Unfortunately, many of the innovations are adopted and implemented incongruously with only a peripheral understanding of the underlying theoretical and philosophical assumptions on which these innovations are grounded. This is understandable when one considers that some of the innovations have no coherent philosophical base. Perhaps what is needed is a moratorium on educational innovations to reflect upon the philosophical implications of the practices currently in operation. Mauritz Johnson (1967) supports this claim in suggesting, "The majority of educationist, educational practitioners and scholars . . . are oriented toward improvement rather than understanding, action and results rather than inquiry" (p. 127).

This posture has manifested itself in the prostitution of incompatible beliefs that constitutes a vitality in American education unmatched in the world. It would seem that energies directed in a variety of directions would dissipate, as well as vary in the quality and quantity.

Some of the consequences of incompatible beliefs or unconscious practices which Shermis (1967) believes can be observed daily are: (1) teachers who verbalize in one way and practice in another,

(2) internal conflicts due to potential learning experiences in which teachers really do not know what to do, (3) teachers who engage in mutually conflicting practices for poorly perceived goals, (4) teachers who require aimless busy work of their students, and (5) teachers who speak out for the importance of self-fulfillment and then force their students to adhere to a tightly prescribed curriculum.

The popular expressions, "By your deeds ye shall be known" and "A man's actions speak louder than his words", would seem all too appropriate for educators. This has implications of one's actions being an expression of some deeper held value and belief.

Marshall (1973) suggests that teachers cannot successfully achieve the objectives of refining and improving their craft until they are fairly certain of their own value orientation, the purposes and objectives that grow out of their values, and a set of criteria anchored in something deeper than the convenience of the moment, or a simple hunch.

Orlich and Shermis' (1965) comment reflects further confusion:

Teaching methods actually employed in the classroom depend not on what is consciously chosen as a better teaching method, but rather on the teacher's temperament, the feelings of the administrators, local tradition, and other poorly understood factors (p. 224).

Shermis (1967) operationally reports this dilemma:

To choose a book or give a test commits one to a range of values that go beyond the classroom on the school environment. When one makes an educational decision -- any kind of educational decision -- one is, in a sense, affirming or denying a universe of values (p. 278).

Combs (1962) perhaps describes this dilemma best in referring to the explicit values which underly educational practices:

Whatever we do in teaching depends upon what we think people are like. The goals we seek, the things we do, the judgments we make, even the experiments we are willing to try are determined by our beliefs about the nature of man and his capabilities. It has always been so (p. 1).

Combs appears to build a firm case relative to the beliefs one has acquired about the meaning of life, since the nature and destiny of man and the nature of reality are in some way reflected in the choices we make.

Research by Brown (1968) suggests that one's "... beliefs may be defined as predispositions for action". He further purports that "... when a person's values are known it often becomes possible to predict with great accuracy how he may behave in given situations" (p. 26). It would, therefore, seem only logical that on the basis of how one behaves and the choices made from available resources, inferences can be drawn as to that person's fundamental values and beliefs.

Research by Eriksen and Fiske (1973) points out that the beliefs teachers hold tend to indicate the way they organize and operate the classroom and the manner in which they interact with children.

Further research by Kelley and Rasey (1952) is supportive in suggesting that teacher beliefs about the nature of man help define interpersonal relationships with his/her students.

Research by Brown (1962) yields evidence which supports, among others, these two propositions: (1) What teachers believe about basic philosophic questions make a difference in how they teach in the classroom and (2) Basic philosophic beliefs are more consistently related to the teacher's classroom behavior than are teacher "perceived" educational beliefs (those educational beliefs to which teachers render "lip-service").

In a paper presented to the Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Brown (1974) reported various research studies which indicate that a person's life philosophy is significantly related to, and can be used as a predictor of, educational beliefs, attitudes, and practices.

Considering this evidence, it seems essential that a more systematic treatment of philosophical issues as they relate to curriculum, curriculum development, and instruction would be useful. Almost all of the research on teaching behavior and practices (Ellena, 1961; Morse, 1961; Barr and Jones, 1958; Anderson, 1946; Withall, 1949; Flanders, 1960) was done without any reference to underlying philosophical assumptions. Therefore, a search through the literature clearly gives evidence supporting the lack of unifying structures which could be used to examine more thoroughly this prevalent educational issue.

Since society's values are changing so rapidly, many educators have acquired a pragmatic view to almost every issue in education. Marshall (1973) suggests that this view can be reflected in Hook's essay, "The Scope of Philosophy", where he argues that if men agree in theory or share membership in any philosophical school of educational thought, they will not automatically agree about curriculum or teaching methods. Further, those who do agree about curricular objectives and teaching techniques may never share the same philosophical perspective. Consequently, most discussion concerned with educational philosophies is futile and evasive. Hook, therefore, rejects all absolutes, however founded, from which specific courses of action can be deduced. Instead, according to Hook, we examine the alternative possibilities each situation affords before we decide on which of the various alternative courses of action we should implement. This view of pragmatism suggests a rational philosophical study of schools is superfluous.

It seems quite evident that our culture produces an eclectic approach toward almost every activity. Educators are part of the culture and tend to reject theory and approach each task without concern for keeping practice consistent and harmonious with theory. It is this practice with which this study takes issue.

Methodology

This writer has constructed a two-dimensional conceptual framework which reflects the nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge as they are manifested in the philosophies of Essentialism, Perennialism, Experimentalism, and Existentialism (See Figure 2, p. 108). In addition, this researcher has attempted to demonstrate, operationally, how the variables teachers and administrators manipulate (such as instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selection, materials and resources, physical environment, and evaluation techniques) have specific philosophical implications. This endeavor is intended to provide a structure to narrow the gap between theory and practice (See Figure 4, p. 136).

It should be evident, therefore, that this study does not lend itself to the sanctioned research paradigm which calls for selecting hypotheses for their relevance to broad theoretical formulations and thereby testing them by laboratory manipulational experiments. Goodlad (1966) lends additional support in stating:

. . . the building of a conceptual system is more general than theory, nurturing a variety of theories pertaining to parts of the system. Further, while giving rise to hypotheses (which are parts and parcel of theories), it is neutral with respect to hypotheses. That is, a conceptual system suggests realms for fruitful hypothesizing but does not itself mandate a specific hypotheses. Such a system is, then, more than a theory in scope but less than a theory in precision and prediction (p. 142).

Building a conceptual framework is <u>a priori</u> to the formulation of testable hypotheses. The logic which will be employed in the drawing of conclusions will be in the form of syllogistic reasoning (i.e., $[p\rightarrow q] \land (q\rightarrow r] \rightarrow (p\rightarrow r)$).

The establishment of parameters and exclusive categories in this study have been established through the use of those noteworthy philosophers and scholars in pre-existing and current literature, as well as this researcher's interpretive and speculative perceptions.

The manner in which this researcher has treated those sources which are contrary to the assumptions and deductions in this study has been to acknowledge them.

Organization of the Study

Chapter II will be concerned with the basic tenets of selected Supernaturalist and Naturalist philosophies of education.

Chapter III will discuss the manner in which the nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge (later to be identified as Philosophical Screens) are reflected in the selected Supernaturalist and Naturalist philosophies of education.

Chapter IV presents a conceptual framework to assess the degree of Philosophical Harmony within an elementary school (the term "philosophical harmony" will be defined at that point). The structure of the variables teachers manipulate to affect learning will be discussed. Then, an attempt has been made to operationalize the conceptual framework, as well as the presentation of representative models of the elementary school and philosophical harmony.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF SELECTED SUPERNATURALIST AND NATURALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

If all educational philosophies were to be placed on a continuum, the rationale for positioning each philosophy could be contingent upon the extent of agreement or disagreement with the following philosophical issues: (1) The Dualistic theory (body and soul) versus the Continuity of mind and body, (2) Determinism versus Non-determinism, (3) Absolutism versus Relativism, (4) The nature of Mankind, (5) Man's sources of Moral Authority, (6) Theoretical Knowledge versus Practical Knowledge, and (7) The nature of Learning.

The task of identifying all major educational philosophies, and the various factions couched in each, would be too ambitious for this study. Childs (1936), Brown (1962), and Brubaker (1969) have dichotomized all educational philosophies into the Supernaturalist and Naturalist domains. Within the parameters of this dichotomy, this study identifies in an implicit mamner, four basic philosophies of education. Within the Supernaturalist realm, Essentialism (Idealism and Realism) and Perennialism (neo-Thomism) will receive attention. Identified in the Naturalist realm will be Experimentalism (Pragmatism) and Existentialism (Humanistic psychology/phenomonology). These are noted in the conceptual framework in Figure 2, p. 108.

The rationale for the selection of these exclusive educational philosophies is two-fold. One, they appear most often in the literature and, therefore, are recognized as basic philosophic views. Two, although some of the philosophies agree on particular philosophical questions, this study will focus upon the differences. Since there are splinter groups within each basic philosophy, an implicit nature will be entertained as a means of identifying a philosophical position on a continuum.

Supernaturalism

Langan (1935) identifies the Supernaturalist view as looking beyond nature to the supernatural for the dimensions and specifications of educational aims and purposes. Basic to this view is the so-called law of cause and effect which states that for anything to occur there must have been a preceding cause capable of bringing it forth. Resting on this assumption alone, some educators would conclude that the objectives of education should be guided by the old and the familiar. The Supernaturalist would posit an affirmative answer to the question of whether there was a beginning of time and a prime order, which set the primordial pattern of all that was to follow. They would insist that there was a first cause not caused by any antecedent cause. They would have no hesitation in affirming that nature had a beginning and that the Prime Mover of nature was an omniscient and omnipotent God.

If a supernatural God is the Maker and Ruler of nature, then man would do well to seek His will and purpose for his life. Likewise, the educational philosopher, seeking to formulate the aims of education, should find out the purposes for which God made mankind so that one may fashion a program which will enable mankind to meet his/her creator's expectations.

Supernaturalists would accept truths as fixed, even self-evident. More than that they would support their own human experience with divine revelation, which they believe to be factually verifiable. In fact, according to Langan (1935), it is primarily through revelation that mankind has any knowledge of the supernatural. Therefore, because of man's confidence in the supernatural, human learning results from more than human initiative.

Naturalism

Childs (1936) suggests that the Naturalist would find the Supernaturalist appeal "distasteful and unnecessary". The Naturalist finds no logical reason, not even the law of sufficient reason, the law of cause and effect, for undergirding the natural order with a principle or spirit more real than its own product. The supernatural, to them, is at best so speculative that they would prefer to conserve their time by attending to education in the natural order, where experimental methods permit more reliable and objective conclusions to basic questions of life.

Yet, in an attempt to conduct education according to nature, whether it is the nature of the child or the nature of his physical and social environment, what does the naturalist mean? Morland (1961) speaks to this issue in suggesting that the progressive educators (Experimentalist and Pragmatists) claim to make nature their norm, giving primary attention to dimensions of time, change, novelty, and individuality. Using this as a basis for building an educational

program, continual adjustment and readjustment of one's talents and aptitudes are permitted in terms of constant changing demands of time and space. Stretching this preoccupation to an extreme, the Existentialist would revere the unique and novelty developing in nature. They would advise wide and almost complete freedom for the child. They would warn parents and teachers to interfere only in the face of impending danger.

An institution will be following a Naturalist educational philosophy if the student is permitted freedom to express his individuality. However, whereas the Experimentalist would be following a Naturalist philosophy in suggesting that the greatest freedom comes, not from the uninhibited expression of mere whim, but from ruling himself/herself by principles of natural law, the Existentialist would say that the individual is the natural law.

Needless to say, the Naturalist trusts their own experience since they cannot transcend it. Since one's experience is the product of interacting with a changing environment, no truths are accepted as fixed or final. All truths are subject to adjustment in light of further consequences.

Further evidence of this dichotomy in education is evident in the work started by Sherman (1970). Sherman, in an attempt to identify this major dichotomy, operationalizes certain aspects of the Supernaturalist and Naturalist views by labeling them "Structure" and "Openness" respectively. In life, Sherman purports, sets of behavior, attitudes, and predispositions tend to cluster in certain patterns which fit these constructs.

In Figure 1, pp. 19-22, Brown (1962) summarizes and contrasts the Supernaturalist and Naturalist orientations:

Supernaturalist Orientation

1. Holds a dualistic theory of reality which claims the universe is divided into two distinct and separate entities, the inner world of the mind and the outer world of matter. The spiritual and physical worlds are two independent realms of existence having only certain and limited points of contact with each other. Man has a soul which is part, above, or beyond his physical organism.

2. There is some one final, ultimate end or purpose to which mankind aspires. Man's destiny is either determined by circumstances beyond his control or, if not, man can help mold his own destiny by bringing supernaturally inspired ideals and moral purposes to bear upon the course of natural events. Ends or goals are fixed, enduring, universal, absolute, having been decided upon from "on high" prior to and apart from passing situations of the moment.

3. Absolutism. In quest of certainty, looking for the absolute reality, essence, or inner nature

Naturalist Orientation

1. Believes in the continuity of nature, and rejects all forms of supernaturalism stemming from the dualistic beliefs of classical philosophy and theology that there is a spiritual realm which lies beyond experience. Mind and body are continuous, inseparable. Man doesn't really have a "spirit" which is separable from his body and the natural world.

2. Ends are never final. Every means is a temporary end until it is attained; every end becomes a means of carrying activity further as soon as it is achieved. Rejects externally supplied ends imposed by some authority which limit intelligence and permit nothing but a mechanical choice of means. Ends, or goals are flexible, experimental, subject to revision based on consideration of changing circumstances.

3. Relativism. Nothing is or can be absolutely certain. Change is the basic characteristic of

Figure 1. Supernaturalist and Naturalist Orientations

of things. There is nothing new under the sun. Man can do nothing to alter the course of nature because all events have been predetermined by immutable natural and supernatural laws. Like situations closed, settled, nailed down, fixed with as much certainty as possible. Reaching a condition in which there were no more problems would be the perfect life. Believes a statement of fact must be either true or untrue from all standpoints and conditions.

4. Man is basically a passive spectator in events which he is powerless to influence. Man gains knowledge by having things impressed upon his mind. He cannot know the world as it really is but only the impressions made on the mind. The mind is formed from without, as one molds or shapes a piece of clay. Knowledge is the sum total of what is known, as that is handed down by books and learned men. True knowledge is primarily mental; the more passive the mind the easier it is to impress knowledge upon it.

5. Emotions are antithetical to the intellect. The intellect is pure light; the emotions are a disturbing heat. The mind turns outward to nature, and man has some degree of control over this change. Man is capable of managing his own destiny in an understandable and predictable world. What something is, totally independent of any observer or frame of reference, is a scientifically meaningless question. Like situations kept open and flexible, relative to changing conditions. Welcomes the excitement and challenge of problems. Believes a statement of fact may be both true and untrue, depending on the standpoints and conditions of the observations.

4. Man is basically an active participator in the affairs of his world. Knowledge is gained by actively responding to things and by putting things to use and discovering the consequences that result. Man acts upon, as well as reacts to his environment. He is not entirely shaped from without, but also shapes himself from within to a considerable extent. Man doesn't learn from books alone. Knowledge is not something one absorbs, as a sponge absorbs water; it is produced by purposeful activity.

5. Emotions and the intellect are closely connected, not opposed to each other. Knowledge separated from the emotions concerns of the

Figure 1. (Continued)

truth, inward to considerations of personal advantage and loss. In the absence of a moral code supported by absolute authority, bodily appetite and passion overpowers intelligence. Man's natural impulses are intrinsically depraved and must be controlled by a higher, external force. The ends and laws which regulate human conduct have been determined by the superior intelligence of an ultimate being.

Theoretical knowledge is 6. derived from a higher source than practical experience. Practice is subordinate to knowledge, merely a means to it. The crudest kind of knowing is connected with everyday affairs and serves the purposes of ordinary individuals who have no intellectual interests. True knowledge is the result of purely theoretical insight on the part of scholars. Knowledge exists for its own sake free from practical considerations. The worth of a theory has nothing to do with how it works in practice.

7. Learning is the sum of impressions made on the mind as a result of the presentation of material to be known. Learning is the acquisition of knowledge by the minds of individuals. knower simply is not possible. Man's primitive impulses are neither good or evil, but become one or the other according to the objects for which they are employed. The use of the scientific method can be extended to solve the problems of men in the area of values and moral judgments. Questions of values and morals ought to be open to experimentation and intelligent inquiry. The source of moral authority is inside nature rather than outside of it.

6. Theory has to do with reorganizing practice instead of being complete on its own account in isolation from practice. Practical activities are intellectually narrow only insofar as they are routine or carried on under the dictates of authority for some disconnected purpose. Intellectual studies, instead of being opposed to the active pursuits of everyday affairs, stem from practical problems and seek to discover useful generalizations about them. Practice carried on in the absence of a sound theory is unintelligent, irresponsible, pointless.

7. Learning is an act of intelligent inquiry, not merely the acquisition and possession of knowledge. Acquiring is always secondary and instrumental to inquiring. Knowledge is

Figure 1. (Continued)

Truth exists ready-made somewhere; the task of the scholar is to find it. Inquiry into the accumulated body of knowledge must necessarily precede inquiry into practical, personal, or social problems. One must possess knowledge before he can put it to intelligent use. artificial and ineffective in the degree in which it is merely presented as truth to be accepted, held, and treasured for its own sake. When knowledge is cut off from use it loses all meaning or else becomes an object of aesthetic contemplation. The value of knowledge lies in its use in the future, in what it can be made to do (pp. 43-46).

Figure 1. (Continued)

Essentialism

Idealism and Realism make up the Essentialist policy in American education. Although both philosophies of education are often treated separately by the majority of the literature, Morris (1961) suggests that they may be brought together because both consider the function of education in an epoch of social change and cultural transition, as being placed at the "trailing edge" of the present (See Appendix).

With this in mind, the Essentialist views the school's primary function as establishing for the child an anchorage of reference in the accumulated knowledge and tradition of the race. In order to do this they must remain at the rear of the human parade. In operational terms, the Essentialist would suggest that although we should spend money for research, this is not the work of the school. The school's job is to wait until something definite has been located and certified as true about our world. Prior to further discussion of contact points between Idealism and Realism, an examination of the origins, contributors, and basic tenets seems appropriate.

Idealism as a school of thought has the deepest roots in ancient Indo-European culture, according to Marler (1975). Although Plato is generally accorded the title of the "Father of Idealism," this school of thought was revitalized by the reformation and the thinking of philosophers such as Descartes and Spinoza. In colonial times, Calvinist Johnathan Edward and Samuel Johnson, and in Europe, Immanuel Kant, George Hegal and others contributed to this school of thought. Bishop Berkeley is considered the "Father of Modern Idealism." Their writings emphasized the discipline of the mind as the chief instrument for gaining knowledge.

<u>Realism</u> was awakened from its dormancy by the rising tide of science. Aristotle is often called the "Father of Realism". John Locke, Thomas Reid, Johann Herbert, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell and George Santayana are among the more distinguished contributors to this school of philosophy.

It was the realism movement which provided much of the philosophical basis for the school testing movement and the development of educational psychology. Examples include the spelling tests of J. M. Rice, the development of intelligence scales by Binet, Terman, and Judd, and the measurement of curricular and instructional variables systematically pursued by Edward L. Thorndike and his successors. All were in accord with the realist accent on the scientific method and the development of empirically tested bodies of knowledge for transmission by the schools. Realists, along with the Idealists, were leaders in

the Essentialist movement protest against progressive education in the 1930's.

Marshall (1973) defines Essentialism as a philosophical position held by educators which mediates between the realist and idealist extremes. "Some essentials, like the three R's, resting on established knowledge and tradition must continue to be taught as the indisputable core of Curriculum" (p. 97), suggests the Essentialist.

Although complete agreement on epistemological, axiological, and ontological issues does not exist between the idealist and realist camps, Kneller (1964) corroborates Marshall's definition in identifying four fundamental principles which provides the bases for the Essentialist movement:

(1) Learning, of its very nature, involves hard work and often unwilling application. This can be seen by the emphases on the importance of discipline (the child is urged to be dedicated to more distant goals), the importance of a command of a foreign language, and the importance of the student attaining personal control only through voluntary submission to discipline intelligently imposed by the teacher.

(2) The initiative in education should lie with the teacher rather than the pupil.

(3) The heart of the educational process is the assimilation of prescribed subject matter. It is largely man's material and social environment that indicates how he shall live. Self-realization takes place in a world independent of the individual, a world whose laws he must obey. Here there is a strong emphasis on the importance of the "social heritage" over the experience of the individual.

(4) The school should retain traditional methods of mental discipline. The sources of knowledge for dealing with problems of the present dwelt with the creative achievements of the past.

The thesis of Essentialism that all conservatives accept with a minimum of qualification is outlined by Wingo (1974):

- (1) From the standpoint of the individual, the purpose of education is intellectual discipline and moral discipline and these two are intimately related. From the standpoint of society, the purpose is to transmit the essential portion of the total heritage to all who come to school.
- (2) The curriculum of the school is an ordered series of subject matter, intellectual skills, and essential values that are to be transmitted to all who come to school.
- (3) Teaching is, in essence, transmitting. The art of teaching is the art of transmitting effectively and efficiently. The teacher is the active agent in the transmitting process.
- (4) The role of school in society is preserving and transmitting the essential core of the culture. As an institution, the school has no call for reforming or altering the historic character of society, except as it is the function of the school to contribute incidentally to the ordered evolutionary process of change (pp. 61-62).

Perennialism

Marshall (1973) defines Perennialism as most often used by philosophers of education to rationalize religious instruction, most notably neo-Thomism. Perennialists try to reconcile the findings of science with the faith of the believer based also on revelation, authority, and dogma. Neo-Thomism is named for St. Thomas Acquinas, the famed "Angelic Doctor" of 13th century schoolmen. St. Thomas devoted much of his energies to building upon the metaphysics of Aristotle.

Wingo (1974) notes that Perennial philosophy was formed from a great synthesis of the Judeo-Christian tradition in theology in the Hellenic tradition in philosophy.

Perennialism is a strong and continuing protest against the pattern of contemporary western culture with its science and technology, its corporate industrialism, and its political and educational institutions, which in America, at least, have become almost completely secularized. It is, in effect, an invitation or proposal for cultural regression, for at the heart of its proposals is the demand that we return to those conceptions of nature, of man, of society, and of the nature of good from which we were tempted by the hollow and arrogant promises of natural science and middle-class economics. As far as education is concerned, Perennialism has always found progressivism a natural mortal enemy.

In America, according to Morris (1961), the Perennialist philosophy of education operates under the guise of the Roman Catholic educational theorist, the Quaker educational system, Jehovah's Witnesses and, in general, secular public education.

This can be seen in recent decades in the writings of Robert M. Hutchins, former Chancellor of the University of Chicago. He, in particular, is known for proposing neo-Thomism for adoption by the secular public school in America.

Hutchins (1953) says that the aim of an educational system should be the development of the intellectual powers of men. Furthermore, the

American educational enterprise should cease the foolish attempts in trying to adjust the individual to society, or to meet his needs, or to attempt to reform the social order. Morris (1961) concurs by suggesting that although the school is maintained by society, ". . . it is not necessarily a social institution in the literal sense" (p. 64). Its function is to transcend society. That is, to deal in the absolute principles and changeless values on which all societies depend, whether they undergo change or not. For social changes and historical movements are quite irrelevant to the work of the school. The school, Morris (1961) continues, should be removed from and set above ". . . the chaotic conditions of men and focused upon eternal qualities as the proper intellectual and moral environment of the young" (p. 64). The school, according to Hutchins (1953), instead should turn its attention specifically to the training of the intellect. The intellect is the only part of man with which school should have concern.

Morris (1961) lists four basic tenets of the Perennialist philosophy of education:

(1) The world we wish to comprehend is potentially comprehensible, because our human minds are oriented to its logical requirement. There is a kind of metaphysical rapport between curselves and the cosmos.

(2) Knowing, then, centers in the cultivation of the logical powers of the human mind (training of the intellect).

(3) Schools should take hold of the intellectual and spiritual powers of the child and develop them to their fullest actuality.

(4) Man possesses three autonomous realms: the empirical and scientific realm, the rational and intuitive realm, and the spiritual and revelatory realm.

Experimentalism

Pragmatism and Experimentalism, as schools of educational philosophy, are terms which are frequently used interchangeably. Pragmatism, as a formal school of philosophy, is a modern movement which, according to Marler (1975), originated in the intellectually and socially turbulent years at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Although parallel ideas were presented by England's Schiller and Balfour and Germany's Vaihinger, Pragmatism, basically represents an American philosophical development.

The antecedents of Pragmatic thought goes back as far as the ancient Greek Heraclitus (535-475 B.C.), who emphasized the constancy of change; the Sophists of the fifth century B.C., who denied the possibility of knowing ultimate reality, and Quintilian (33-95 A.D.), a Roman orator who emphasized action rather than deductive reasoning as a pathway to learning.

Pragmatism's modern roots in America focus on harmonizing the individual and society, Darwinian evolutionism, Newtonian physics, and the new psychology. It was the work of William James (1842-1910) that caught the attention of John Dewey, who is credited with being the "Father of Experimentalism" (a branch of Pragmatism).

Dewey believed that the process of education provided the proper testing ground for philosophical theory. His philosophy emphasized the individual and stressed activity for activity's sake, rather than for evaluation. Other noted contributors to the Pragmatic philosophy are Bode, Childs, Kilpatrick, Madden, and Thomas. However, it was Charles Sanders Pierce who was credited with the original term "Pragmatism".
Marshall (1973) defines Pragmatism as an American philosophical movement which is a radical reflection of traditional philosophy, resting on the assumption that the world of experience accessible to scientific inquiry is all we can know and that propositions and acts have meaning only in terms of their verifiable, public consequences.

Experimentalism, a modern philosophy evolving from Pragmatism, stresses the unique context of each problem and its refinement and possible solutions as projected by the intellectual model of scientific thinking.

Butler (1951) suggests that Experimentalism approaches education as first and foremost a social phenomenon. It is a means by which society renews itself. Furthermore, Butler posits, ". . . social efficiency is the closest approach to a definition of the general objective of education. Society cannot, therefore, fulfill the edu-ational task without an institutional design for this purpose" (p. 406). Morris (1961) suggests that the primary mode for accomplishing this is to introduce the young to the fact and utter reality of change itself. This can be done by making the school an active participant in the changing conditions of modern society. The "growing edge" of American life is where the spirit of Experimentalism is found (See Appendix).

Some of the basic tenets which are associated with the experimental philosophy of education are:

(1) Emphasis upon the individual differences and interests of the student.

(2) Provision of alternatives so the student can experience the freedom of choice and the responsibility that goes with that choice.

(3) Emphasis on the scientific method as the method of thought and learning.

(4) Belief that knowledge is rooted in experience and is manifested in an activity-centered curriculum.

(5) Belief that truth is contingent upon, or relative to, a set of circumstances. The ultimate questions of life cannot be answered as absolutes or fixed truths.

(6) Emphasis on the student's psychological needs rather than the logical order of the subject matter.

(7) Belief that values are instrumental.

Existentialism

Marler (1975) suggests that Existentialism's very existence as a philosophic system is questionable. Because of its free and unstructured nature, it has, as a school of thought, had very little impact on public or institutionalized education until the 1940's. However, since that time its influence as a radical protest against the depersonalization of man in mass society has been steadily rising.

As a new-comer, its roots cannot be found in any of the ancient philosophies. Though there might be great similarity between its basic concepts about man with various religions, its origins as a philosophic outlook are not manifested until the 19th century. Although it may be accurately described as a modern 20th century philosophy, any account of Existentialism must begin with the Danish philosopher-psychologisttheologian Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855).

The writers of Existential thought are divided into two camps. Philosophers such as Heidigger, Nietzsche, and Sartre make up the atheistic Existentialists, while Buber, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, and Tillich are theistic Existentialists.

In recent years Humanistic psychologists have tried to translate Existentialism into a more operational realization. They have done so through the efforts of Ivan Illich, Abraham Maslow, Eric Fromm, Rollo May, Early Kelley, Arthur Combs, and Carl Rogers.

Existentialists would agree with Experimentalists that the ultimate questions of life cannot be answered, at least not with any finality. However, from an Existential view, trying to answer them, as Morris (1961) suggests, is what life is all about. Man's efforts to answer them, not the answers themselves, shape and direct experience; because the highest striving of the human within us is, according to Morris, to make some sense out of this world, and to address such questions is to address ourselves to the meaning of life.

Green (1967) suggests that the Existentialist aim of education is to understand oneself first of all. Green (1967) and Marler (1975) suggest some of Existentialism's basic tenets which speak to this aim:

(1) The Existentialist views modern man as alienated from his world and his life as meaningless until he develops ultimate concern for the ultimate questions of life. It is only through this concern that man will recognize his predicament and attempt to find, through self-knowledge, the only reality, truth, and value that he can hope to know.

(2) Existentialists reject any system that offers wholesale explanations of man's relationship to his universe and the ultimate meaning of life. To the Existentialist, the starting point for all

understanding is the recognition of his individual existence in an indifferent world.

(3) For the Existentialist, the one reality man can be certain of is his own existence.

(4) The Existentialist views as invalid and unreal all attempts by society or its institutions to tell man what his existence means and what he must do with it, for this is a threat to self-actualization. Each individual, through the choices he makes, fashions his own world view of what he is and what he is for (Existence precedes Essence). Therefore, man has both absolute freedom and absolute responsibility to authenticate himself through choices made among the alternatives presented by his environment.

In an attempt to infer what Existentialism might be in part a philosophy of education, Butler (1951) suggests, ". . . we need to infer from what is implied and on this we must depend alone. We have no direct and explicit pronouncements from which we can draw" (p. 462). However, several writers in America (George Kneller, Ralph Harper, and others) have made attempts in this direction.

CHAPTER III

SELECTED SUPERNATURALIST AND NATURALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION FILTERED THROUGH PHILOSOPHICAL SCREENS

Introduction

Any conceptualization as to the nature of the curriculum is a complex undertaking. Recent writers point out almost unanimously that confusion is the main characteristic of curriculum theory. When, for example, the stimulus-response theory of learning is applied in a particular teaching situation and the cognitive developmental theory in others without differentiating the particular aspects to which they are relevant, confusions is, more than likely, an outcome. When some subjects are selected or retained because they are regarded as good discipline for the mind, others because of their life utility, and still others because they meet the psychological needs of students, the curriculum tends to become a potpourri.

If the development of curriculum and the curriculum development process is to be clarified, all of these decisions need to be made competently, on a recognized and valid basis, and with some degree of consistency. The very complexity and multitude of decisions, and the fact that they are arrived at by different segments in the educational organization, make it all the more important that there be an adequate framework for developing and examining curricula. Yet, it seems that a clear-cut methodology of thinking and planning appears to be lacking in curriculum making today.

Taba (1962) suggests that if curriculum development, and eventually curriculum assessment, is to be a rational and efficient, rather than a rule-of-thumb procedure, the decisions about these elements need to be made on the basis of some valid criteria. According to Taba, in our society, at least, the factors are the learner, the learning process, the cultural demands, and the content of the disciplines. Therefore, effective curriculum development needs to draw upon an analyses of the learner, the learning process, society and culture, and the nature of knowledge to determine the purposes of the school and the nature of its curriculum. Herrick (1950) proposes that any purpose to be achieved by any educational program be determined by an analysis of one's beliefs concerning: (1) the society and its needs, (2) the learner, (3) learning, and (4) human knowledge.

Tyler (1949), to a degree concurs with Taba and Herrick concerning the sources to be used in selecting objectives. He suggests that, although no single source of information is adequate to provide a basis for wise and comprehensive decisions, at least these should be considered: (1) the learner, (2) the large body of knowledge collected over many thousands of years, and (3) the cultural-heritage. Tyler goes on to filter educational objectives from these sources through two screens: philosophy and the psychology of learning.

Johnson's (1967) model for curriculum development proposes for its sources of the curriculum, (1) the needs and interests of the

learners, (2) the values and problems of society, and (3) the disciplines of organized subject matter.

It appears, therefore, that a tacit examination of curriculum specialists yields evidence which suggests that the forces that determine organization and content in curriculum have included: (1) the nature of the learner (i.e., What is mankind's basic nature like, his needs, and his interests?), (2) the nature of learning (i.e., How does mankind learn?), (3) the nature of society (i.e., What is the "good" society? What are the demands and requirements of a culture? What role in society does the institution of the school play?), and (4) the nature of knowledge (i.e., What role should the disciplines of knowledge play? What knowledge is of most worth?).

This study establishes that the educational philosophies of Essentialism, Perennialism, Experimentalism, and Existentialism champion certain values and beliefs concerning these sources for curriculum development and decision making. For the purpose of this study these sources shall be called "Philosophical Screen" and are noted within the conceptual framework in Figure 2, p. 108.

The remainder of this chapter will be given to an implicit examination of the values and beliefs held by these four philosophies of education as they are filtered through the philosophical screens.

The Nature of the Learner

"What is man that Thou art mindful of him?" cried the Hebrew psalmist to God. From the beginning of time most men have believed that there is something called "human nature". The usual conception of human nature is that it is the essence of all mankind and that, regardless of one's place in history, social status, culture, intelligence or aptitudes, mankind possesses a nature that is everywhere the same.

Coleman (1960) declares that the underlying nature of mankind has been all but obscured by the tremendous diversity of human behavior. Is there a hidden order beneath this diversity, comparable to the order that scientists have found in the rest of nature? Just what sort of creature is man "down underneath"? These questions, Coleman suggests, are not idle ones, for on their answers hinge the type of life mankind should lead, the form of government that is best suited for him/her, and the kind of world he/she should try to construct for himself/herself. The educator, likewise, asks these questions to make sure that they take into account and make compatible as many factors as seem to be relevant to giving education direction.

<u>Human Nature as Evil</u>: The view that mankind is basically "sinful," unfair, distrusting, selfish, and not interested in the welfare of others, and is capable of achieving goals only by continuous prodding has received substantial support over the centuries from both religion and science, as well as from the experience of the human race. The Christian doctrine of original sin has taught that mankind, once capable of living a good and perfect life, was corrupted by the Fall. Without divine (Supernatural) help, he/she is unable to resist the temptations of evil. Genesis (8:21) tells us, "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." St. Paul (Romans 7:19) confesses, "I do not do the good that I want, but the evil that I do not want, that I do."

Coleman goes on to suggest further evidence in science, such as Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, and, in psychology, Sigmund

Freud's theory seemed to validate even further this conception of human nature.

In his presidential address to the American Psychological Association, Donald Campbell (1975) shows that it is not unreasonable to assume that mankind is genetically selfish and that the criticisms of society upon selfishness are entirely justifiable. In fact, Campbell asserts, it would be potentially disastrous to erect a social structure based upon the assumption that man is naturally good.

<u>Human Nature as Neutral</u>: Anthropology gives us evidence that there are many people in this world who are friendly and kind. Studies by Mead (1939) and Maslow (1954) suggests that various tribes of Indians and natives have been discovered whose behavior lends evidence which suggests that mankind is naturally unaggressive and self-denying. This is similar anthropological evidence has led many social scientists, Mead conjectures, to the conclusion that man is a highly educable animal who is neither good nor bad by nature, but has potentialities to develop in either direction. Whether mankind becomes cruel, selfish, and warlike or kindly, self-sacrificing, and peaceful will depend largely upon the culture in which he/she is reared.

<u>Human Nature as Good</u>: Coleman (1960) points out that the belief that mankind is basically fair, trusting, capable of achieving goals without being prodded, and is interested in helping others was particularly strong in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. This has been forcefully expressed in the writing of many Romantic poets and philosophers, who believed that if mankind were allowed to live "naturally," much of the evil in the world would disappear. For example, Rousseau's Émile, a treatise on education, maintained that the aim of education

should be self-expression rather than the suppression of natural tendencies. The chief function of the school was to provide the individual child with opportunities to develop his natural gifts, unhampered by the corrupting influences of society.

While taking a more realistic approach to the problem of human development, Coleman further points out that, a growing number of psychologists are coming to accept a similarly positive view of mankind's essential nature. Recently psychologists have suggested that mankind is basically good if permitted to develop his natural propensities. Only when his/her nature is distorted by pathological conditions, (i.e., rejecting parents, constant failure and rebuff, or a repressive culture) does he become aggressive and cruel. This general position has been delineated by Maslow.

On the physiological level, too, it has been shown that the bedy functions most efficiently in joy, whereas the visceral activity accompanying unpleasant emotions such as hostility and anger, although useful in coping with many emergencies, disrupts the normal functioning of the body and over a continued period of time, can actually damage bodily tissues.

<u>Human Nature as Irrational</u>: Over the ages mankind has been characterized as stupid, irrational, and lazy. Interestingly enough, two of the early schools of psychology (Behaviorist and Psychoanalytic) contributed to the modern loss of faith in mankind's rationality. Freud emphasized the unconscious and irrational influences that permeate our thinking and behavior. Jung (1953) suggested that mental illness resulted from the overthrow of the conscious by forces rising up from the unconscious. Therefore, wars and revolutions are nothing

more than "psychic epidemics" over which man, as yet, has little rational control.

<u>Human Nature as Rational</u>: Reason, nevertheless, has its champions as well, and the American democratic social organization is based on the belief that mankind, given sufficient information and opportunity, can direct his/her own affairs and those of society with wisdom and responsibility. Many modern psychologists, Coleman suggests, believe that mankind's natural tendencies are toward reason and common sense, just as they are toward "goodness" and love. However, in both cases these tendencies can be distorted by environmental influences. The achievement of modern science, indicate mankind's capacity and inclination for dealing with his problems in rational ways. Efforts to probe the secrets of the universe and make sense of his world mark mankind, it would seem, as a rational creature.

<u>Human Nature as Reactive</u>: Most human beings operate on the assumption that they are free to make decisions and choose their own course of action. However, many philosophers, theologians, and scientists have raised the question of whether this freedom of action is real or merely illusory. Is mankind, in fact, an active and responsible agent with "free will" (Non-deterministic) or a puppet whose passive behavior is determined by forces beyond his control (Deterministic)?

For example, Coleman calls attention to the great dramatic tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles as being influenced by the ancient Greek belief that mankind is, in the last analysis, a pawn of fate. There is an inevitability in his/her action, and end from which he/she cannot escape. In another example, the Calvinist doctrine of

predestination holds that at the time of birth every individual has already been elected to salvation or condemned to damnation.

In the field of psychology, modern Determinists have taken their lead from the English philosopher John Locke, who concluded that the human mind, at birth, is a <u>tabula rasa</u>, or a blank tablet, on which learning and experience write their script, giving the mind its content and structure. This view of mankind as an essentially passive, reactive organism is exemplified by the behaviorist school of psychology. American behavioralist psychologists have, by and large, favored the view of man as a reactive organism. They have emphasized that the beliefs and values of people can be manipulated by society through punishment and reward.

<u>Human Nature as Active</u>: Another important school of psychological thought looks upon mankind as a purposeful and strong creature, continuously engaged in meaningful activities of choosing, judging, and organizing. This school of thought acknowledges that human behavior is influenced by the individual's culture; so, the effect of external stimuli on the individual's behavior is always partially determined by one's view of one's own group, by the ability to accept some ideas and reject others, by the tendency to behave in ways consistent with the concept of oneself, and by the ability to objectify personal experience (to be critical of one's own values), while striving for selfenhancement and self-growth.

For centuries, philosophers, poets, theologians, and essayists have theorized that an attitude toward the nature of mankind exists in each person. The ideas people hold about the nature of mankind have inevitable effects on the things they do in dealing with others.

Nowhere has this effect been more indicative than in the thinking about the goals of education. Whatever is done in curriculum and instruction depends upon what is thought about people.

An examination of the Essentialist, Perennialist, Experimentalist, and Existentialist philosophies of education should identify further the views of the learner (mankind) purported by each. The respective views of thelearner are capsulated and noted in the conceptual framework in Figure 2, p. 108.

Essentialist View of the Learner

As previously noted, the Essentialist policy is made up of Idealism and Realism. Although both philosophies of education differ somewhat, the views held are in close proximity as to the nature of the learner will be attended to.

Morris (1961) suggests that the Idealist frame is constructed upon the thesis that mind is the central element of reality. The world is seen as the manifestation of a super intelligence at work in the cosmos. The super intelligence can be thought of as a human mind infinitely extended across the measureless reaches of all creation. In its infinite capacity, this Ultimate Mind is capable of thinking ultimate thoughts and, hence, the author of final and ultimate truths. Mankind, therefore, must "tune in" to this Ultimate Mind and situate itself in such a way that it can increasingly discern and interpret the insights that the Ultimate Mind seeks to awaken through participation in his microcosmic mind.

Like part of the whole, mankind does not find true equilibrium in stable goodness unless he/she is somehow in relation to God and His

purpose in the world. Horne (1942) specifies two aspects of the need for this relation. The first is that the goodness God intends for mankind is of such high character that he/she cannot realize it apart from His help. The second is that there is something in the essential nature of godliness and the life of the Spirit which makes necessary that mankind's realization of it can only come when he/she loses himself in the love of God. The moral condition of man may be described as potential.

Marshall (1973) suggests that the learner is a spiritual being in the process of becoming. One is, in a sense, a small representation of the Ultimate Mind or Absolute Self. The learner must bring himself/ herself closer to the Absolute through imitation of the teacher and through study of the Humanities.

Shermis (1967) asks: Are pupils good or bad, according to idealist policy? John Calvin, responsible for Puritan theology, stresses the sinfulness and depravity of mankind. Mankind, Calvin conjectures, in his/her primal state rebelled against God, and to this day he/she has an innate desire to do evil, to disregard God's laws, to choose deliberately the wicked, the unwholesome, the diseased, the sinful. With this view of mankind the end results for children in school are stringent laws, coercion, verbal exhortations, and constant social control.

Horne (1931) suggests, "Bad characters are not born, they are made" (p. 178), but he grants that the bad are made with greater ease than the good. Horne finds an inborn basis for conscience in children and stresses the great importance of education as a process which feeds conscience, nurturing it in one direction or the other. This,

however, does not mean blindness to the actual behavior of people. Horne states:

The idealistic conception of the learner in no wise minimizes the fact that our pupils, like ourselves, are often ignorant, negligent, unaesthetic, willful, perverse, enslaved by bad habits, and far removed from their proper state. Such conditions, however, only accentuate the necessity and importance of education (p. 178).

Horne (1942) goes on to speculate that, left without some higher guidance, mankind is sure to produce and to become involved in all kinds of moral difficulties. Mankind, therefore, needs to be allied to a sustaining outside power for fulfillment of a true purpose.

The practical consequences in education of belief in the innate depravity of human nature have been manifested by many restrictive regulations, frequent punishment, constant spying on and supervision of behavior, extensive prohibitions on behavior, and, in general, the permeation of education with religious doctrine.

Marshall (1973), speaking of the Essentialist policy, maintains that the learner is not free, but is subject to certain natural laws. "The pupil," Marshall writes, "must come to recognize and respond to the coercive order of nature in those cases where he cannot control his experiences, while learning to control his experiences when such control is possible" (p. 37). The learner is viewed as a machine which can be programmed in a manner similar to the programming of a computer.

Shermis (1967) believes that under the previous assumption education must consist of indoctrination in certain ethical and moral beliefs. The Essentialist teachers seem to believe that their job is to make children good. Shermis concedes that because cultural pluralism has rendered obsolete a simple, unqualified notion of goodness, teachers themselves do not know very clearly of what goodness consists.

Butler (1951), on the other hand, offers a more considerate view of human nature as seen by one Idealist. At birth the pupil is neither good nor evil. He is potential and can become either good or evil, depending upon his environment, surrounding influences, education, and his own will. Since realization of ultimate values is such a stupendous life task, Butler posits, it is much easier, and perhaps more likely, for him to shrink back into evils that push onward in realizing the good.

Butler (1951) suggests that the Realist observes mankind as it finds him in actuality, and describes him as he reveals himself by his outward behavior. Realists have not hesitated in calling a spade a spade as they look at the condition of mankind. The Realist acknowledges that the world is just what it appears to be -- a complex of interwoven good and evil. And mankind, being so much a child of the natural order, may also have as much evil in its nature as good, if not more.

The moral condition of mankind, the Realist postulates, is that he is a sinner. The essence of his sinning is that mankind turned away from God; because of his turning away, he has put himself before God. Man's only salvation is to allow himself to be determined by the Word of God.

In dealing with the problem of Determinism and Non-determinism, Butler (1951) suggests that the Realists support Determinism more often than Non-determinism. Butler interprets this condition:

Though the world is a pluralism, the realist rationalizes that the operation of causes and effects is essential to its orderliness. The multiple forces interrelated in the universe can only have such effects on one another as they are appropriate to the causative influence they exert. Therefore, no single event just happens by chance. It is the only event which could have taken place, the forces immediately surrounding the event being what they were. Now the human individual is a part of this world of cause and effect, living within and not outside of it. Therefore, mankind can scarcely be regarded as possessing some sportive independence of the law of cause and effect, such as freedom of will (p. 274).

As a result, mankind must adjust his living to flow with the stream of these cosmic forces, instead of struggling futilely and punily against them. Attainment of such a resigned peace is one of the chief values of life, according to the Realist.

Hook (1963) relates that there is nothing new about the idea that the original nature of mankind needs to be altered and shaped by external forces. Certainly, he suggests, most systems of formal education, if not all, and most child-rearing practices are designed on the assumption that the behavior of human beings can be managed by exerting certain causal forces on the behavior of children.

Skinner (1953), who later will be classified as purporting the Essentialist policy of learning, charges:

. . . that the idea of 'freedom of the will' is left over from an age of superstition about human nature, and we are not likely to make real progress in the application of scientific method to the understanding of human behavior until we divest ourselves of it completely (p. 449).

It does seem clear that educators who believe as Essentialists do -that the learner is predisposed to evil, is irrational or yet rational at times, and is governed by external forces -- have access to many models when they desire to operationalize their conscious or unconscious beliefs.

Perennialist View of the Learner

Brubaker (1969) discloses that most Perennialist believe that prior to man's Fall from grace, he possessed a super nature. After the Fall, however, mankind was left with his powers of will and intellect. Therefore, if mankind had not sinned against God, each person would now possess the supernatural gift of integrity, thus having all faculties perfectly subordinated to will and intellect. As a result, mankind would not suffer the distractions from studies provided by unruly appetites, bodies lacking robust health, or the need to spend so much time working and taking care of bodily needs at the expense of time devoted to more spiritual development.

Maritain (1962) explains that the Perennialist philosophy insists that mankind is body as well as spirit, and that nothing comes into the intellect if not through the senses. The Perennialist idea of mankind, therefore, coincides with the Greek, Jewish, and Christian idea:

Man as an animal endowed with reason whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal relation with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of god; and man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine life and to the freedom of grace, who supreme perfection consists in love. Man is a person who holds himself in hand by his intelligence and his will. He does not exist merely as a physical being. There is in him a richer and nobler existence: he has spiritual superexistence, through knowledge and love. He is a universe unto himself, a microcosm in which the great universe can be encompassed through knowledge (p. 52). Morris (1961) suggests that within the Peremialist policy there are two patterns of personality development: the spiritual and the rationalistic. The highest expression of one's limited existence, according to Perennialist policy, is a fully-developed sense of duty to family, to Church, to God, as well as a highly-trained mind sharpened to a keen edge of intuition. We would expect this person, Morris speculates, to consider his/her first business to be the training of his/her intellect, the discipling of his/her mental processes by the most rigorous logic. Only in this way can a human being rise to the fullest expression of his/her unique role as a rational creature.

Wingo (1974) asserts that Perennialists share in an Aristotelian view of human nature. In Aristotelian terms there are three principal dimensions of human nature:

First, as men, part of our nature is shared with plant and animals. The human species exhibits power and nutrition and reproduction the same as radishes and dogs do. Moreover, men have powers of sensation and locomotion, as cats and turtles have. But man also has rational powers. Hence, man is a rational animal (p. 267).

Marshall (1973), on the other hand, interprets the Perennialist view of mankind's basic nature as not always rational. Marshall suggests that although mankind tends toward knowledge, he/she also tends toward the moral life. And just as knowledge is attained through reason, so the moral life is the best life compatible with reason. Marshall declares:

The good act is the act controlled by man's rationality. But man does not always act in terms of his rationality, he is sometimes controlled by his will, or his desires. The good man is one whose will is habituated to, and subservient to the intellect (p. 41).

Another interesting aspect of the Perennialist philosophy is the manner in which individual differences are treated. Brubaker (1969) charges that individual differences in school children are accidental, according to this philosophy of education. These differences are cultivated but they are not the essence of childhood or humanity. According to the Perennialist, it is the pupil's immortal soul that is the most important to save through education.

Wingo (1974) summarizes the Perennialist view of the learner:

- (1) All men share in the same human nature and this nature is constant; it does not change.
- (2) Since all men have the same nature, all men have the same natural powers.
- (3) By virtue is meant the perfection of a natural power and since all men have the same natural powers, the virtues are the same for all men.
- (4) Education is conceived with the development of man's rational powers, that is, with the formation of the intellectual virtues.
- (5) Since the aim of education is the formation of the intellectual virtues, and since these virtues are the same for all men, the aim of education is the same for all men (p. 262).

With this in mind, Morris (1961) suggests that school can best begin to fulfill its proper function by referring to our common human nature. Drawing out this common nature is accomplished through the application of the student to purely liberal studies. These are studies relating to the timeless truths of all mankind, truths, the Perennialists hold, which constitute the base of all human wisdom and all potential vision, wherever mankind happens to live.

Experimentalist View of the Learner

Shermis (1967) points out that both Pestalozzi and Froebel's theory and practice were transmitted to this country and formed the basis for what later became known as Progressive education. Based in the belief that children are basically good, adults should interfere with their natural, spontaneous activities as little as possible. Froebel likened children to plants in suggesting ". . . just as a plant will blossom into a lovely thing, children, too, should develop into something beautiful" (p. 209).

Montague (1967) would agree with these early pioneers adding:

Despite many known appearances to the contrary, human altruistic drives are as firmly based on an animal ancestry as in man himself. Our tendencies toward goodness, such as they are, are as innate as our tendencies toward intelligence; we would do well with more of both (p. 40).

According to Dewey (1910), the nature of mankind is good. He believed that mankind is in a state of change and that goodness resides within mankind. Dewey believed that the aim in living is not perfection as a final goal, but is the ever enduring process of perfecting, maturing, and refining.

Butler (1951) speaks to another aspect of the Experimentalist view of human nature. He suggests that the Pragmatists are the last ones to regret that when Johnny comes to school he must bring his body with him. For individual people are primarily organisms.

Morris (1961) suggests that the Experimentalist man is the supreme "problem-solver," scientifically oriented to the continuing task of confronting and resolving the problematic situations with which this life is filled. With this in mind, Marshall (1973) submits that the student is an experiencing organism capable of using intelligence to resolve personal problems. The student is viewed as a whole organism involved in the experience which is the school. The whole organism consists of the biological child, the psychological child, and the social child. The experiencing organism is the learner who brings to school all the meanings, values, and experiences that constitute his/her personality, his/her self.

The Pragmatist believes that the quality of human life is partly a product of what is within mankind, but is alos a product of the social environment in which mankind lives. Marshall (1973) interprets the Pragmatist's view of mankind as dependent upon his hereditary and specific environment. Mankind's habits of action can be changed by enlightened programs of enriched or changed environment. Wingo (1974) agrees with Marshall's interpretation in suggesting that human nature is originally good (or at least neutral). It may be, Wingo says, that we can do little to change the inherited part of human nature but we can control the environments which this nature develops.

Mosley (1974) speaks to human nature as an evolving organism in a world characterized by continual change. Because the human is still in the process of becoming, human nature is fluid and plastic and can make changes by altering human experiences. Human nature is acquired, Mosley contends, through human fellowship, and each individual is indispensable to the other. Individuals are, by and large, what they are by virtue of what they share in communication with others. The mind is, for the most part, a product of its relations. Consequently, intelligence is a quality of learned behavior and can be modified.

At best, Marshall suggests, the human mind is a tool to be used instrumentally in the resolution of problems, personal and social, and not some special faculty which achieves its fullest realization in the contemplation of given philosophical questions as the Perennialist believe.

Brubaker (1969) speaks to the stress laid by progressive education on the cultivation of individual differences. He suggests that one of the chief channels through which an emergent evolution works is that of individual differences. He suggests that one of the chief channels through which an emergent evolution works is that of individual differences. This, Brubaker notes, is easily discerned by the Pragmatists because biological and social reproduction occurs with variations, therefore, the stress of individual differences of pupils is easily understood.

Existentialist View of the Learner

Miller (1972) speaks to a new image of mankind that is emerging, one strongly at variance with the scientific/rational image of mankind. This new image of mankind restores the functions of emotions, spirituality bodily processes, interpersonal relations, manual skills, and intuitive thought to a place of importance. No longer is intelligence the highest function.

The emerging image of mankind concentrates directly on human welfare. That is, it values human beings above idealogies, above abstract values, above political systems, and above material things.

This new image, according to Miller is based upon three principles:

- (1) Man's knowledge of reality is personal; it is created by each person as a result of the syntheses of his unique being, his total experience, and the external world.
- (2) Humans have a vast potential for fuller functioning, for experiencing life, for knowing and performing.
- (3) Humans experience, learn and communicate by a variety of means other than language; language itself is inadequate for the complete expression of either experience or knowledge (p. 15).

Mosley (1974) interprets the Existential view of the learner by postulating that initially the human being discovers personal and individual existence. Their existence is given, but their essence is not given. Their essence is what is in question. It becomes their project. Milhollan and Forisha (1972) suggests that according to Sartre, "man is a being of whom no essence can be finally affirmed, for such an essence would imply a permanent structure, contradictory to man's power to transform himself indefinitely" (p. 4). The individual is nothing until they act. Sartre (1948) suggests that the individual is nothing but what one makes of oneself. Therefore, mankind is the sum of his/her own actions, for each of which he/she is fully responsible since he/she could have chosen otherwise. Mankind, Mosley (1974) continues, cannot escape the responsibility for choosing. The irony of the human predicament is whether or not one chooses to accept this responsibility. The individual who accepts this responsibility for choosing, acting, and taking a stand is the authentic person. Mankind, then, is what he/she becomes and what he/she becomes is a matter of his/her own choosing.

Morris (1961) interprets the Existential condition of mankind as being in a continual redesigning project. In this sense, mankind is a transcending being. Mankind transcends the circumstance of his/her present existing.

Existentialism encourages children to take increasing charge of their own life and to see their life, as it stretches out in front of them, as a potential statement of what they think they mean in this world. It asks children to specify what they think is best in themselves and to present that best, through the vehicle of their life, to the world.

Rogers (1962) speaks to another aspect of the Existential learner, his/her rationality. Rogers says:

I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent concept that man is basically irrational, and that his impulses, if not controlled, would lead to destruction of others and self. Man's behavior is exquisitively rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring to achieve (p. 31).

Wingo (1974) speaks to the issue of free will in Existential philosophy: "Man is free to choose and his choices are undetermined by external conditions" (p. 326). In this sense, Existential philosophers emphasize the principle of Non-determinism as opposed to various Deterministic theories of the nature of behavior.

Maslow (1962) lists, among others, six characteristics which most Existentialist adhere to concerning the nature of the learner:

- (1) We have, each one of us, an essential inner nature which is intrinsic, given, "natural" and, usually, very resistant to change.
- (2) Each person's inner nature has some characteristics which all other selves have and some which are unique to the person.

- (3) This inner core, or self, grows into adulthood only partly by discovery, uncovering and acceptancy of what is "there" before hand.
- (4) No psychological health is possible unless this essential core of the person is fundamentally accepted, loved and respected by others and by self.
- (5) This inner nature, as much as we know of it so far, is definitely not "evil," but is either what we adults in our culture call "good" or else it is neutral.
- (6) In the normal development of the normal child, it is known that most of the time, if he is given a really free choice, he will choose what is good for his health (pp. 35-48).

Gilchrist and Roberts (1974) identify aspects of mankind's nature established by the faculty of the School of Human Behavior at the United States International University:

Man is influenced genetically, culturally, and environmentally.

Each man makes a unique intermix of what is input to him from genes, culture, and environment. In other words, he is more than the sum of what is input to him.

Man is a creature potentially capable of choice.

Given reasonable opportunities to develop his capability, man's choice is growth directed; he can generate as well as transmit ideas; he is more than great potential; and he grows dynamically.

Man represents an open system. He is inclined to be creative rather than destructive; he is benevolent rather than malevolent; and he is trusting and trustworthy rather than suspicious and untrustworthy.

Man has potentialities for transcending his environment; he can control and shape his environment.

He is capable of instituting and directing humanitarian and often benevolent programs of action.

Man realizes his values through human transaction.

Man is predictable in many ways, but he is also unpredictable; he is rational, yet sometimes appears devoid of rationality.

Man is both unique and like other men.

Man is at the center of his world, immersed in his world, yet he can be objective.

Man is partially measurable but is more than can ever be known about him. Man is best described in relative terms and best studied as a total entity (p. 12).

The Nature of Learning

This study posits the assumption that the values one adheres to regarding the basic nature of mankind will have some, if not a great degree of, influence upon the beliefs one possesses concerning how children develop and learn. Again, these may be conscious or unconscious beliefs.

Current literature continually expresses the importance of the relationship between how people feel about the nature of mankind and their interpersonal behavior with him. Dobson and Dobson (1976) submit that if teachers are to play a significant part in establishing the educational environment, then it will be important for them to have some insights into their beliefs about the nature of mankind which ultimately affects, and determines, the climate of the learning environment and the basis for beliefs about how children learn.

Rohwer, Ammon, and Cramer (1974) indicate that the nature of learning encompasses the areas in which the following questions seek answers: Why do developmental milestones occur when they do? Are the minds of children "programmed" by nature to develop in a particular pattern, or do the milestones simply reflect the kind of environment in which a child is brought up? Can the sequence or timing of certain ways of thinking be inculcated, or will they develop spontaneously if only given a chance? What conditions cause children to acquire a particular type of knowledge or new ways of thinking?

The intrinsic interest and practical importance of such questions are obvious, but the answers are not. Since developmental and educational psychology do not yield any definite answers, we must go beyond such facts and make some educated guesses about the essential nature of intellectual development. In other words, we have no choice but to get into the realm of theory.

A psychological theory is a set of principles that gives us a framework for understanding human development. The general principles that constitute a theory are not specifically applicable to any one situation but are relevant to a wide range of events.

The field of psychology has several different theories directly relevant to understanding intellectual development, and there is considerable disagreement as to which one gives the best explanation. Each, however, is somewhat based upon what the theory believes about the basic nature of the learner.

Coleman (1960) suggests that working together, the forces of heredity, environment, and self shape us all into the recognizable mold of human beings and paradoxically, make each of us a little different from everybody else. Influences upon the nature of learning and human development, which are championed by various philosophical views of education, are: (1) mankind's genetic endowment which includes potentialities for the individual's body equipment, for the development of specific skills, abilities, and kinds of behavior, and for patterns of growth and change throughout a predictable life cycle, (2) the environmental opportunities, limitations, and pressures in determining what the individual makes of his potentials; these include the physical and sociocultural environments, and (3) the individual's sense of personal identity and purpose -- his self-structure. This includes the self as object: referring to the individual's perception and evaluation of himself/herself as something distinct from other persons and things. It includes the self as process: referring to the individual's perception of himself as a knower, striver, and doer with facilities for perceiving, evaluating, choosing, and planning in reference to himself/herself.

An examination of the various views held by the Essentialist, Perennialist, Experimentalist, and Existentialist philosophies of education should provide greater insight into the nature of learning each purports. The respective views of learning are capsulated and noted in the conceptual framework in Figure 2, p. 108.

Essentialist View of Learning

Morris (1961) interprets the Essentialist view of learning as the process of the learner coming into a gradually larger and larger expression of mental awareness. This, the Essentialist believes, can be done more efficiently through reading and studying. The learner, therefore, should spend most of his time with books and teachers.

In the case of Idealism, learning is knowledge of mind and idea. In the case of Realism, learning is knowledge of fact and habituated response. However, in both cases the learner may be likened to a receptacle into which adults "pour" knowledge. Morris (1961) suggests that the child's mind is looked upon as a receptacle for information, producing factual mastery of content as a standard method (Mastery Learning), and since the mastery of content can be facilitated by organization, the Essentialist tries to present content to the learner in an ordered and systematic way, through textbooks and lectures. This, Morris suggests, is called the Receptacle theory of learning. Essentialist classrooms are organized in accord with this principle, with the teacher facing the learner, as in an auditorium. The schoolroom is literally where learners sit and listen and receive knowledge.

To use another metaphor, Morris says that some Essentialist educators have likened the mind to a kind of giant psychological warehouse which is capable, by means of the learning process, of receiving and holding in "cold storage" a multitude of facts, theories, formulas, concepts, feelings, attitudes, habits, skills, and so on. Then, when the occasion calls for one or another of these articles of learning, the mind delivers it to the stage of action.

Morris submits that the development of various skills through drill, practice, habit formation, and conditioning are all appropriate methods for the Essentialist teacher. In a wider application it assumed the insitutional label of Behaviorism. Theoretically, if the total experiential environment of the child were artifically specified and controlled, then the behavior and characterological outcome in the child could be predicted. If one were given charge of a child at birth, Watson claimed, it would be theoretically possible to turn him into any adult form (i.e., gangster, musician, financial wizard, scientist, writer, gambler, etc.) simply by ordering his experiences.

Dobson and Dobson (1976) suggest some of the basic tenets of Behaviorism:

- (1) Personality can be viewed only as the sum of outward, observable actions.
- (2) Man is a flexible, malleable, and passive victim of his environment which determines his behavior.
- (3) Ethics, morals, and values are relative and are learned as a result of conditioning influences in the environment.
- (4) Man is not free.
- (5) Good and bad behavior are determined by authority and the good of the school experience is to manipulate the child through reinforcement thus producing the "good" person (p. 124).

Behaviorism, therefore, takes a Deterministic view of mankind and is committed to the objectives and scientific study of mankind. In general, Behaviorist teachers are concerned with having their students master predetermined skills and content thereby establishing a foundation for adaptation into a preconceived and contrived society. Macdonald (1968) would say that, by definition, this is the process of training the child. It is the process of preparing a person to perform defined functions in a predictable situation.

In the Essentialist school of thought, children go to school for one fundamental reason: to be inducted systematically, efficiently, and deliberately into a prescribed or predtermined way of life.

Horne (1942) calls attention to another facet of Essentialist policy of learning -- that of imitation. They believe the most effective use of imitation is in focusing upon great personalities. Through imitating others, the Essentialist holds, the child becomes aware of his own capacity for a wide variety of acts that he otherwise would have believed were beyond his powers.

Perennialist View of Learning

Shermis (1967) suggests the "Formal Discipline," based on a number of Aristotelian theories, serves as the bases of Perennialist policy. The concept of formal discipline has come to be known as "Faculty Psychology." It is the view that the mind consists of separate but related faculties, that these faculties can be trained, and that there is an automatic transfer of training. The faculties include memory. will, reason, appreciation, and feeling. These faculties are believed to be similar to muscles in that they can be strengthened by exercise. It is further believed that there exists particular subjects especially useful in the development of each faculty. The faculty of reason is trained through the formal discipline of those subjects with the most logical organization (i.e., mathematics). The faculty of memory is trained by having the students memorize (i.e., history and grammar). The faculty of will is trained by having the students engage in tasks which are unpleasant enough to require a high degree of perseverance to complete. The development of the faculty of appreciation is achieved through the study of literature, music, and art.

Marshall (1973) interprets the Perennialist philosophy of learning in a similar fashion. The method of learning and teaching, Marshall asserts, is rooted in mental discipline and the training of the intellect. It is important for learns to know the answers to profound questions they will meet later in their lives. The primary strategy utilized in the training of each faculty seems to lie in the catechetical method of learning. Morris (1961) suggests that the catechetical method of learning is simply a refined version of the recitation method. All questions relevant to the subject matter are ordered and organized in a published list. Each question has one and only one answer. The questions and answers are committed to memory as the catechetical recitation is primarily a testing device to see if the learner has memorized his lesson.

Maritain (1962) suggests that the Perennialist also emphasize sensetraining (both as to perception and memory) and the direct Experiential approach, but on the condition that all this should be directed toward awakening the intellectual powers and the development of the sense of truth.

Hutchins (1953) suggests that the aim of an education system is the development of the intellectual powers of men.

The American educational enterprise should case the foolishness of trying to adjust the individual to society, or to "meet his needs" in all their multivariety, or to reform the social order. It should, instead, turn its attention specifically to the training of the intellect (p. 70).

Experimentalist View of Learning

Morris (1961) suggests that the Experimentalist have found the focus of learning in problems (i.e., problematic situations). The learner must see the problem or situation as his/her situation, the problem as his/her problem. The educative process, for the Experimentalist, must begin with the learner's identification of his own curiosities and concerns. This has come to be known as "Learnercentered" or "Child-centered" learning.

According to Dewey (1916), learning originates in a life situation, not in a book. Marshall (1973) interprets this philosophy in a similar manner when he suggests that the problems, on which education are centered, must be the real problems of the students, not problems from textbooks. Nor can the problems be thought up by the teacher who has a solution that can be revealed in the psychological needs of the learners rather than the logical order of the subject matter. Therefore, the Experimentalist educator would attempt to arouse in the learner an interest in some present problem having historical antecedents necessary to its understanding.

Wingo (1974) interprets Dewey's interest in the development of the child's experience as the central concern of education. But experience is a process involving both internal and external factors. From the standpoint of the learner, method means the way in which things and ideas are used effectively to realize some desired objective, which, in itself, leads on to other desired objectives.

Two key concepts are imperative in the teaching-learning process, according to Wingo's interpretation of Dewey. They are Interaction and Continuity. Experience, in its most fundamental sense, is the interaction of a living thing with the environment in which it lives and by means of which it lives. Experience is a continuum and it is serial in character. The events that make it up are not discrete and isolated; rather, succeeding events grow out of and are conditioned by antecedent events. What Dewey calls intelligence develops within this experiential continuum. In fact, Dewey suggested that intelligent behavior is that

behavior that puts one in control of the environment and his own experiences. Marshall (1973) specifies that to the Experimentalist educator the human mind is a tool to be used instrumentally in the resolutions of problems, social and personal, and not some special faculty which achieves its fullest realization in the contemplation of given philosophical questions.

The Experimentalist psychological foundation of learning have their bases in the Cognitive-Developmental theories of Piaget, Bruner, and Erickson. The theories of teaching derived from cognitive psychology's focus on a blend of the teacher's behavior as a manipulator, and the intellectual structures that characterized what is to be taught. Basically, cognitive psychology concentrates on how children think and how their thinking changes with age. Rohwer, Ammon, and Cramer (1974) submit:

The fundamental assumption of cognitive behavior theory is that a person's behavior is always based on cognition, an act of knowing or thinking about the situation in which behavior occurs, and not on the situation itself. It is also assumed that the person's way of thinking, his cognitive structure, is not determined simply by the situations he has been in before. Both experience with the environment and the maturation of innate potential influence development only insofar as they affect the child's activity in relation to the environment (p. 120).

Dobson and Dobson (1976) suggest that the basic tenets of cognitive psychology, among others, are:

- (1) School learning involves the development of cognitive structures; an organized system of ideas.
- (2) Individual perceptual systems capacity for handling information are limited or enhanced by environmental conditions.

- (3) Individual perception results in personal cognitive structures.
- (4) The concept of human variability results in individual aptitudes in the school setting.
- (5) Intelligence test scores are influenced by the social and educational environment of the child.
- (6) Readiness is the difficulty involved in learning a task according to a time interval (p. 124).

Existentialist View of Learning

Macdonald, Wolfson, and Zaret (1973) affirm that from the sources of humanistic psychology and humanistic-existential philosophy ". . . learning emerges in the flow and continuity of man's total experiencing and growing, where growth is not a static process, nor can there be static outcomes of learning" (p. 8). In a healthy, fully functioning person, experiencing, being, and learning is a totality. that is dichotomized into this and that only after the fact. The process of development is, by definition, personal, unique, and not standardized.

Learning, Macdonald et al. assert, is a result of an ongoing flow of experiencing involving three interacting facets: exploring, integrating, and transcending from new levels of consciousness. These aspects of learning are not seen as discrete stages in a hierarchy. Instead, there is a continuing back and forth flow from one facet to another. At a given time, one or more may be occuring. Of the three facets, interacting, comprises a highly individualized process of creating personal meanings through acting upon and transforming tentative patterns of "knowing" into personal knowledge. Exploring is the swift flow of processing all that the individual is experiencing. Integrating is
the preliminary structuring of some of the data being processed by the individual. Transcending, the crucial aspect of the learning process, is insightful knowing or the creating of personal meaning by an individual as he acts upon, tests out, and transcends his tentative understanding of personal and intellectual relationships.

Butler (1951) interprets the Existentialist policy as emphasizing what the student wants to become. The Existentialist fears that the institution of learning will conform the student to some preconceived end or absorb an individual so that they get lost in society and never find themselves.

Milhollan and Forisha (1972) note that in Roger's <u>Client-Centered</u> <u>Therapy</u>, 19 formal principles regarding human behavior are presented. All principles are concerned with learning from a phenomenological viewpoint. In other words, the development of an individual's own sense of reality or those internal forces which cause him/her to act, and the development of the individual's own self-concept. That is, his/her concept of himself/herself as a person who acts. Inherent in all 19 principles is Roger's assumption of an individual's ability to adapt, that is, their propensity to grow in a direction that enhances his/her existence. Roger's principles of learning from a phenomenological viewpoint are as follows:

- (1) Every individual exists in a continually changing world of experience of which he is the center.
- (2) The organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. This perceptual field is, for the individual, his reality.
- (3) The organism reacts as an organized whole to this phenomenal field.

- (4) The organism has one basic tendency and striving: to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism.
- (5) Behavior is basically the goal-directed attempt of the organism to satisfy its need as experience in the perceived field.
- (6) Emotion accompanies, and in general, facilitates such goal-directed behavior, the kind of emotion being related to the seeking versus the consummatory aspects of the behavior, and the intensity of the emotion being related to perceived significance of the behavior for the maintenance and enhancement of the organism.
- (7) The best vantage point for understanding behavior is from the internal frame of reference of the individual himself.
- (8) A portion of the total perceptual field gradually becomes differentiated as the "self."
- (9) As a result of interaction with the environment and, particularly, as a result of evaluational interaction with others, the structure of self is formed -- an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the "I" or "Me" together with values attached to these concepts.
- (10) The values attached to experiences, and the values which are a part of the self-structure, in some instances are values experienced directly by the organism, and in some instances are values introjected or taken over from others, but perceived in distorted fashion as if they had been experienced directly.
- (11) As experiences occur in the life of the individual, they are neither a) symbolized, perceived, and organized into some relationship to the self, b) ignored because there is no perceived relationship to the self-structure, or c) denied symbolization or given a distorted symbolization because the experience is inconsistent with the structure of the self.
- (12) Most of the ways of behaving which are adopted by the organism are those which are consistent with the concept of self.

- (13) Behavior man, in some instances, is brought about by organic experiences and needs which have not been symbolized. Such behavior may be inconsistent with the structure of the self, but in such instances the behavior is not 'owned' by the indivdual.
- (14) Psychological maladjustment exists when the organism denies significant sensory and visceral experiences, which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the Gestalt of the self-structure. When this situation exists, there is a basic or potential psychological tension.
- (15) Psychological adjustment exists when the concept of the self is such that all the sensory and visceral experiences of the organism are, or may be, assimilated on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship with the concept of self.
- (16) Any experience which is inconsistent with the organization or structure of self may be perceived as a threat, and the more of these perceptions there are the more rigidly the self-structure is organized to maintain itself.
- (17) Under certain conditions, involving primarily complete absence of any threat to the self-structure, experiences which are inconcistent with it may be perceived, and examined, and the structure of self revised to assimilate and include such experiences.
- (18) When the individual perceives and accepts into one consistent and integrated system all his sensory and visceral experiences, then he is necessarily more understanding of others and is more accepting of others as separate individuals.
- (19) As the individual perceives and accepts into his self-structure more of his organic experience, he finds that he is replacing his present value system -- based so largely upon introjections which have been distortedly symbolized -- with a continuing organismic value process (pp. 121-123).

The Nature of Society

The purposes of schooling, the knowledge most worthy of note, and the means for implementation are social issues which continue to spark debate. Brubaker (1969) relates a quote from Aristotle's book, <u>Politics</u>, in which Aristotle speaks to the diverse perceptions of reality.

As things are . . . mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing: no one knowing on what principles we should proceed -- should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the high knowledge be the aim of our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again about the means there is not agreement: for different persons starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it (p. 2).

Aristotle and his contemporaries found it difficult to agree on an appropriate type of education for the young because contemporary social conditions were in a state of accelerated change. People today are raising the age-old questions about how to educate their children for the dynamic social conditions in which they live.

The area of study dealing with the nature of society emcompasses answers to the following questions: What is human nature? How does the individual relate to society? How should mankind govern himself/herself and to what end? How can we reconcile the demands of freedom and order? What is the role of the school in society? To what degree should the school's aims reflect society's values?

Marler (1975) proposes that a social philosophy draws upon the activities (speculating, synthesizing, prescribing, and analyzing) and related attitudes of general philosophy, but its content centers on the variables of man's associative living. The content of social philosophy includes studies dealing with concepts such as the nature and function of the state, the relationship between the individual and society, the nature of freedom, the nature of justice and equality, the nature of community, and the nature and possibility of social progress.

Brubaker (1969) predicates various views as to the nature of society. According to one view, individuals antedated society. In the presocial state they were free and independent. In forming society they necessarily encumbered themselves with limitations to their former freedom and independence. Society, therefore, was contractural, its terms can be amended or even abrogated at the will of its members. In this guarded, almost mistrustful, attitude toward society there is a latent opposition between individual and social interests.

Another view of the nature of society purports to see grave difficulties in the way independent individuals come together to from society. If individuality is unique, how can the pupil possibly enter into the experience of the teacher. Because, one's own experience is peculiar to himself/herself, he/she seems precluded from ever knowing what his/ her fellow's experience uniquely means to him/her.

Another view of society is perceived as in the nature of an organism. As a biological organism is a whole consisting of many parts, so society, too, is a whole consisting of many individual persons each making his/her unique contribution toward an integrated totality. According to this totalitarian view, society is a corporate entity in addition to the individual entities which compose it. As any whole is greater than its parts, so the social organism takes precedence over the individual organisms which compose it. The individual realized freedom only through merging his/her identity with the organic whole. Here mankind is educated as a citizen rather than as mankind.

And yet in another view, Brubaker suggests that the individual and society are coeval, for society originates in human nature itself. The individual is regarded as endowed with a social nature. While the society of the family is necessary to offset the deficiencies of the child's early immaturity, he needs a larger society to actualize the full potentialities with which he/she is born.

Any concept of the nature of society that can be established must necessarily have its existence in a set of assumptions. The elementary school as a miniature society is no different. The various assumptions purported by the Essentialist, Perennialist, Experimentalist, and Existentialist philosophies of education which make up the nature of society will be treated. The respective views of society are capsulated and noted in the conceptual framework in Figure 2, p. 108.

Essentialist View of Society

According to Essentialist policy, Wingo (1974) interprets the purpose of education as the transmission of certain elements of the cultural heritage whose importance is so great that they cannot be neglected. Therefore, from an Essentialist point of view, the school is one of the most important institutions in society. Wingo asserts, as an institution in society whose purpose is preservation and appraisal of the heritage of culture and whose mission is to give intellectual training to the young, the school has no mission to change or reform the social order, but rather to preserve and refine that which exists. In fact, the Essentialist as a group, would strongly resist ideas that would alter the historic character, as well as resist all efforts to change

its nature. Marshall (1973) suggests that such a system is often static and authoritarian.

Arthur Bestor (1959) has argued that the school occupies a relatively autonomous role in culture and can preserve its own essential historic pattern in the face of cultural change. He has maintained further that the school has the power to alter society without the school itself being changed significantly in the process.

Kandel (1933), a leading educational conservative, interprets the Essentialist social policy in a similar manner in postulating:

The school is the instrument for maintaining existing social orders and for helping to build new social orders when the public has decided on them; but it does not create them. In the same sense that society is prior to the individual, the social order is prior to the school (p. 147).

Mieklejohn (1942) speaks to the social mind of the learner when indicating that in any given class there are at work not only the minds of the teacher and the individual pupils, but there is also a social mind. This social mind, according to Miekeljohn, is a corporate mind of the pupils and teacher organized around some principle of knowledge on which all minds are thinking as one. For an individual to learn the meaning of his lesson is equivalent to being a member of a class. There is a close relation between class as a social grouping in school and class as a logical category or classification.

Butler (1951) chrages that mankind can only be made a man by a cultural birth. He views mankind as scarcely more than an animal at birth and left to himself/herself he/she will be formed by whatever culture happens to surround him/her. Both Idealist and Realist are in agreement concerning this view, but many Idealist have rejected that God somehow speaks through the culture of mankind. Education, therefore, would be a human necessity for mankind to be made truly human. In some measure also it is divinely intended, because of its cultural function as a means of general revelation, that a person may come to see the ultimate context of his/her life to be that of Spirit, not human culture alone, much less the natural order alone.

As was mentioned in Chapter II, the Essentialist policy in American education, more or less, removes the school from society. In fact, they prefer to place the school at the "trailing-edge" of the present. And to do this it must remain at the rear of the human parade, so as to select and choose what is genuinely true as established by society.

Perennialist View of Society

Marshall (1973) interprets the Perennialist social policy as leaning toward the development of a standardized, typical kind of student-citizen as the product of the curriculum.

The Perennialist, Marshall establishes, have a regressive social policy. They have education solving 20th century problems by turning back the clock to a system of beliefs prevalent in the 13th century. Morris' (1961) interpretation suggests that as a society, we are lost ". . . until we find our way back to Aristotelian principles and to the training of the intellect in all of our citizens at each level of the educational experience" (p. 351). "They," Marshall (1973) corroborates, "would have us turn the clock back to a time when the source of authority was external to man and when man was at a moral and spiritual

peak, from which he has declined" (p. 44). Although the moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution is seen as coming from the church and university, the lower schools (secondary and elementary), Marshall speculates, have little to do with social change, since the school must transcend society and deal with the teaching of first principles (that which mankind can intuit), the permanent bases of eternal truth.

Hutchins, Morris (1961) conjectures, has for some time championed purely liberal studies. "The liberal studies," Hutchins says, "are those studies which have always represented 'the best education for the best'" (p. 348). Hutchin's educational policy in America, then, is straightforward: "Let us return to the liberal tradition and the training of the intellect which has characterized the education of the ruling classes for over two-thousand years" (p. 349).

Hutchin's (1943) book <u>Education for Freedom</u> raised the question, What is wrong with our educational system? The answer, he says, is nothing. "There is never anything wrong with the educational system of a country. What is wrong is the country. The educational system that one country has will be the system that country wants" (p. 48). This, along with other Perennialist behavior, indicates that they believe that organized education has the power to effect desirable changes in society.

Maritain (1961) makes note of a paradox that arises out of the Perennialist social philosophy. Since education (one of the essential aims of which is to prepare for life in society and good citizenship) is obviously the primary means to foster common conviction in the democratic character, on the one hand, the educational system has a duty to see to the teaching of the character of freedom. On the other hand,

there is no belief, except that which is held to be intrinsically established in truth, nor is there any assent of the intellect without a theoretical foundation and justification. Thus, Maritain asserts:

... if the educational system is to perform its duty and inculcate the democratic character in a really efficacious way, it cannot help resorting to the philosophical or religious traditions and schools of thought which are spontaneously at work in the consciousness of the nation and which have contributed historically to its formation (p. 64).

Experimentalist View of Society

For the Pragmatist, Marshall (1973) submits, society is a process in which individuals participate. Society, for the Experimentalist, is the source from which people derive all that makes them individuals. It is from mankind's relationship to society that he/she derives his/ her values. All values are relative to the group situation. Society is a basic conception of contemporary Pragmatism since all actions must be considered in the light of their social consequences. School, therefore, must be concerned with society and with its students as members of society. Pragmatism sees the school as vitally interested in, and concerned with, social change and teaching the adults of the future to deal with the planning necessarily involved in the process called society. Dewey, Mosley (1974) submits, suggested that school become miniature social committees, imitating, on the child's level, the same kinds of problem-solving activities which absorb the energies of the surrounding society. Since this position strongly advocates whole-hearted involvement in society by all citizens, and because it places responsibility on the individual, it has been called a democratic philosophy. Obviously,

the greater stress is placed upon the socialization of the child as well as his intellectual training.

Butler's (1951) interpretation of the Experimentalist social policy agrees with Marshall's, because the Pragmatists approach to education is first and foremost a social phenomenon. It is a means by which society renews itself, and it is a process which, in its inner essence, is social. It embraces individuals who, while they are separate and distinct physical and psychical entities, are at the same time society cast into individual forms.

Butler suggests that according to Pragmatist policy, society cannot fulfill the educational task without an institutional design for that purpose. He relates three principles in which the school and society interrelate:

- Being a specialized institution designed for a particular purpose it can be simple, whereas society is unavoidably complex. It can represent society to the child in a simplified form which makes learning possible, whereas the child might never get beyond confusion if confronted only by the complexity of society as it is.
- (2) The school can be selective as it represents society. It can choose those kinds of social experiences which are conducive to wholesome natures and exclude those which are not.
- (3) The school has the responsibility of giving the child a balance of all segments of cultural society. This is to hint strongly at the place democracy has as an essential internal spirit in education (p. 407).

Brubaker (1969) suggests that the Progressivist would think it absurd that education can preserve civilization from decaying as it is to think that the science of medicine can keep one from dying. Rather, education must be the source of new ideas, of a social program that is constantly undergoing reconstruction. In other words, they think that the normative function of the school may also involve originating major changes possible in the norm or frame of reference itself. Education, Brubaker asserts, is a process of discovering what values are of most worth. The school is one of the community's resources for social experimentation.

Wingo (1974), in speaking to the role of the school in reconstruction, suggests that the Pragmatists believe that reforms based on laws and legal threats, or superficial modification of society, are futile. Wingo notes:

The only trustworthy means of social reconstruction, for the pragmatists, lies in the adjustment, through education, of individual actions on the basis of social consciousness. This approach recognizes both the individual and the social factors and it indicates that the ideal school will reconcile individualistic and institutional ideas (p. 165).

Existentialist View of Society

As things stand today, Morris (1961) suggests that there is no conceivable way in which we can find a place for Existential social policy. About all one can say in this respect is that the school's task is only incidentially social; its primary task is individual. The school is a social institution, but this means that it carries on its work by a commission from the body social and the body poletic to educate the child.

The Existential educator, Morris continues, would work primarily upon the development of absolute freedom in the child who comes to school. The educational aim of developing self-determination in American children is one of the social functions of our educational industry.

Existential social policy specifies that the way to improve civilization is by improving the quality of the individuals, not by improving institutions. Therefore, no amount of social reconstruction is likely to get at the root of our Existential problem, the problem of achieving some confirmation and endorsement from the universe on the intrinsic worth of the human enterprise as such. The school, of course, is at liberty to choose the course of social reconstruction, but, Morris conjectures, the chances are that once reconstruction has been successfully completed mankind would feel quite as lost as he/she does now.

The best social policy for the school, Morris' interpretation suggests, is to awaken individual boys and girls to the need to know themselves, to the need not to be steamrolled into social choices, and, ultimately, to the need to assert their own unique selves in a genuine way. The reason children go to school is not to perpetuate some tradition; it is not to learn how to think about contemporary problems so as to better solve them; it is not to learn how to reconstruct the social order or reform the human race. Children go to school, ultimately, to find out who they are and what a human life is for.

Sartre (1956) says each one of us individually may be in the same boat as far as the nature of our existence is concerned, but being in the same boat has no more significance than just that.

. . . There is no community of selves which derives therefrom. We are still individuals, unrelieved in our isolation from alleged community, even though we are

inseparably tied to existence and more precisely to a place in existence at a given time (p. 395).

This means that in Existentialism there are no categories of community or social processes, as in Pragmatism, from relations with which the self derives its selfhood. As far as society is concerned, Sartre maintains, it is a collection of such widowless individuals and there is no community, giving the self even an occasional vista beyond itself to some ground of being in which all selves may be at home.

Wingo (1974), on the other hand, says that this does not mean that Existentialists think interpersonal relationships are unimportant, nor does it mean that this philosophical tradition advocates a withdrawal by the individual to the existence of a hermit. Existentialists consider human relations to be a crucial problem in philosophy. The best condition of interpersonal relations is one of tension and conflict.

The Existentialist, Wingo suggests, have a profound contempt for the two chief ways present day man tries to escape the conditions of freedom that are forced upon him by the nature of his/her existence. One of these is the escape of the crowd. The crowd, Kierkegaard says, is always untruth, but those who seek this way out try to conform to the ways of the crowd, to become "socially adjusted," which means that they never do anything without thinking first about the reactions of other people. Their main goal in life seems to be not to offend anybody. The other effort is exemplified by the Behavioristic psychologists and the "group dynamics" advocates, who regard themselves as "social engineers" who can manipulate human behavior at will, and through the scientific method, create whatever human nature and whatever human society they desire. Their "social technology" is based on

an assumption of Determinism. What those "engineers" do, in the judgment of Existentialists, is to make human beings into laboratory subjects and do all they can to eliminate subjectivity and choice. Wingo suggests that the Existentialist believe that these efforts will always fail because the human spirit is capable of rising above them. It may be that most men/women of today are "other-directed," but the facts of existence are such that they need not be, and it is part of the mission of Existentialist philosophy to call attention to the essential social freedom of mankind.

Dobson and Dobson (1976) put forth five principles of the Existential social policy:

- (1) Society is self renewing . . . As the school encounters new stimuli, it will adjust, renew itself, and change in order to accomodate the new input.
- (2) The society has existence in man's mind . . . The quality of a miniature society, the elementary school, is a direct reflection of that which exists in the participants conceptions.
- (3) The society gives order and direction to man's behavior . . If children are involved in establishing the 'social order' of the school, which is an expression of their basic nature, they are not apt to go against this order.
- (4) The society gives identity to individuals in a group . . . A humane elementary school can provide an atmosphere or environment, and structure where youngsters may establish that which we choose to call their person.
- (5) The society provides a system of universals . . Ordering of an individual's personal time is a continuous process that more readily occurs in an accepting atmosphere where mistakes are viewed as a natural part of learning (pp. 18-19).

Macdonald (1973) proposes:

- (1) That schooling be liberating in contrast to controlling; that the basic goal be the development of autonomous, valuing human beings, not the development of role-oriented skills.
- (2) Schooling be personalized, in contrast to standardized; that schools reflect and cherish pluralistic life styles and cultures.
- (3) That decision making in schooling be participatory rather than dominated by authority; that students, parents, and teachers share in all decisions which affect them (p. 5).

Miller (1972) specifies that the Existential social goals to be translated through the institution of schooling are: (1) survival, (2) distribution, (3) preservation of the environment, (4) preservation of the planet, (5) ecological balance, and (6) war unthinkable and wholly evil.

Marler (1975) summarizes the Existentialist social policy:

The liberal society demands that individuals have real opportunity to define, develop, and provide their unique contributions to the common good, and, hence, to their own good. Competition is sick when it destroys such opportunity by treating men like horses in that all but those who 'win, place and show' are seen as 'losers.' Better, the liberal says, to restrict competition to seeing who can make the most distinctive contribution to social betterment. Better that social worth be defined along a multitude of scales than be attributed only to those who win races of intelligence, power, and wealth. This type of freedom and justice can be increased and justice served only in an egalitarian society (pp. 263-264).

The Nature of Knowledge

Morris (1961) defines epistemology as the study of how human beings take hold of their cosmos. He suggests, "It is a body of fundamental theory which underlies the nature of the mind and how it works" (p. 112). Marler (1975) defines epistemology as the study of the possibility, the limits, the development and the validation of knowledge claims. Wingo (1974) defines epistemology as a theory of knowledge. It is concerned with the nature and limits of human knowledge. Some important questions concern (a) the nature of cognitive processes, (b) the sources of human knowledge, and (c) the methods of validating ideas.

So as not to confuse further a definition of epistemology, it may be helpful to distinguish between the related but separate foci of "epistemology," "logic," and "psychology." Hunnex (1971) distinguishes between them:

Logic is concerned with the specific and formal problems of correcting reasoning, whereas Epistemology deals with the nature of reasoning, with truth and with the process of knowing. Psychology is concerned primarily with a descriptive study of behavioral phenomena and the like, whereas Epistemology deals with our claims to knowledge, and what is meant by "knowing" (p. 3).

Morris (1961) suggests that all the questions concerning knowledge: how knowing takes place, how we know that we know, how we decide between competing "candidates" for knowledge, how we decide what knowledge is most worth having, and how we know reality, encompasses the nature of knowledge.

Butler (1951), in examining the nature of knowledge, asserts that there will be those who accept <u>a priori</u> knowledge, knowledge based on principles which, when once understood, are recognized to be true and do not require proof through observation, experience, or experiment. Then, there are those who advocate a posteriori knowledge, knowledge based on sensory data received and systematically recorded, ordered, evaluated, and generalized.

In examining the various theories of knowledge, Brubaker (1969) indicates that according to the correspondence theory, adherents believe that truth results from the direct apprehension of naked reality. These adherents naively trust their experience. Reality is what their sense tell them it is.

The consistency theory suggests that knowledge takes its point of departure from the senses. Advocates doubt that anyone can ever come into naked contact with reality as it actually is. Hence, their view of sense impressions are merely copies of reality, copies, at that, which take much of their character from the á priori of the human mind.

Another way of knowing is through the world of intuitive or mystical experience. Here knowledge seems to come in sudden flashes or sharp insights. These insights may be a result of external (Divine) or inter (self) revelations.

Another way of knowing truth suggests that to know is to participate in what is known. Learning, and consequently knowledge, results from the individual interacting with his/her environment.

Finally, authority is also a path of knowledge. Here the learner accepts conclusions he/she does not otherwise understand. Without the acceptance of this kind of authority, the individual would have to learn everything slowly and painfully through personal experience.

Butler (1968) suggests that one feature of knowledge is the possibility of getting it. The second feature of the knowing experience is the instrument of knowledge (sense data, deductive reasoning, common sense, logic, self-evidence, disciplined intuition or acceptance of revelation, experimentation, or choice). Yet another feature has to do with the degree of directness or indirectness there is in the knowing process.

Shermis (1967) suggests that the central epistemological problem of our culture today appears to arise from the clash between the scientific method and intuition. This conflict is between those who feel that certain knowledge is intuitively grasped and those who believe that certainty comes only through the precise use of scientific procedures and the collection of abundant data.

An examination of the nature of knowledge via Essentialism, Perennialism, Experimentalism, and Existentialism should shed some light as to views held and their potential implications for the elementary school. The respective views of knowledge are capsulated and noted in the conceptual framework in Figure 2, p. 108.

Essentialist View of Knowledge

Wingo (1974) submits that one almost never finds an Essentialist saying that there are different ways of looking at the problem or situation, or entertaining the notion that there are possible alternative answers to important questions. This air of certainty seems often to have bred a kind of arrogance among Essentialist.

A basic proposition of all conservative thought on education is the existence of a central body of essential knowledge that must be transmitted to all who come to school. Involved also is the belief that education is a preparation for adult life, and it only follows that the Essentialist knows what essential truths are necessary for such preparation.

Marshall (1973) indicates that the Idealist takes a rationalistic approach to the knotty problems of knowledge and truth, and relies heavily on deductive logic. Although some Idealist thinkers would deny reliance on empirical or sense data, such data usually serves as the basis for the premises of deductive logic. The Idealist attempts to find, in the universe, general principles which can be given the status of Universal Truths. As one discovers these Truths or Ideas, real knowledge is acquired.

Wingo (1974) lists four basic tenets concerning knowledge and truth for the Idealist:

- (1) The universe is rational and orderly and therefore intelligible.
- (2) There is an objective body of Truth that has its origin and existence in the Absolute Mind and that can be known, at least in part, by the human mind.
- (3) The act of knowing is essentially an act of reconstructing the data of awareness into intelligible ideas and systems of ideas.
- (4) The criterion for the truth of an idea is coherence; that is an idea is true when it is consistent with the existing and accepted body of truth (p. 103).

Mosley (1974) summarizes the Idealist view of knowledge:

To know the truth means to realize something that is already there, for truth is pre-existent to the learning of it. In other words, ideas exist prior to and independent of their being known. The most valid ways of discovering truth are through intuition, reason, and revelation. Truth is a matter of logical consistency among various ideas and truth. Ideas work because they are true. Their worth is intrinsic. Ideas are prerepresentations of ultimate reality and are, therefore, worth learning as ends in themselves (p. 5). Wingo (1974) suggests that for the Realist, the process of learning, or the process of knowing, is a process of reacting to stimulation. Every mental act from the most primative and elementary to the most complex can be explained in terms of the basic stimulusresponse ($S \rightarrow R$) pattern.

Butler (1951) says that the Realist nature of knowledge is divided into two camps depending upon their beliefs as to whether objects are Presented in consciousness or Represented. When they say objects of the external world are presented in consciousness, they mean to say that when I perceive an object, it is the same identical object in the world "out there" which is in my consciousness. When one says that objects of the external world are represented, it is naive to assume that the qualities of the object are the same as you have in your consciousness.

Mosley (1974) summarizes the Realist view of knowledge:

To know the truth means to discover through our senses something that is already there, for truth is preexistent to the learning of it. In other words, facts about the real world exists prior to and independent of their being known. The most valid way of discovering truth is through the empirical method (sense experience). Truth is an observable fact. The world is intelligible and can be known in a one-to-one correspondence. The test of truth, then, is its correspondence to reality (p. 5).

Therefore, Marshall (1973) suggests, the Essentialist believes that truth exists and can be known. Education's responsibility is to teach the known. That which is known of the real world is taught through the sciences and mathematics, while that which is concerned with the ideal nature of mankind and the universe is learned through

the humanities. The world is best viewed as governed and determined and we must become familiar with the order of the world as it really exists.

One must, Morris (1961) explains, assimilate facts and master information about his/her world. One must confront his/her world with the realization that there are definite things about it that can be known and that one goes to school to learn them.

In general, Essentialists are more interested in the precise and definitive methods by which subject matter may be conveyed to the learner (i.e., $S \rightarrow R$ learning).

Perennialist View of Knowledge

The Perennialists see the analytic statement (one that contains subject and predicate), as a self-evident truth that may be known apart from all empirical experience, Marshall (1973) explains. It is, for them, a first principle. Mankind can intuit first principles, such as there is an after life. Shermis (1967) says intuition is a direct and immediate knowledge without the intermediary of either sense perception or conscious thought. These self-evident truths, open, for the Perennialist, a whole realm of truth that cannot be reached by science. For the Lay Perennialist truth can be known through reason and intuition. For the Ecclesiastical Perennialist there is, added to these two ways of knowing, the certitude of revelation which is given to mankind. While intuition is an activity of mankind, he/she is simply the recipient of revelation given from a source external to mankind.

Therefore, Wingo (1974) conjectures, God is the primary cause of knowledge. For the Perennialist we can know things as they really are

in their essential natures. Truth can be known for itself and not merely for some instrumental purpose. For the Perennialist, the truth exists and can be known, but this knowing is not easy and is possible only when one cultivates his/her logical powers through the development of the faculties of reason. This is the main role of the school.

Brubaker (1969) speaks to another aspect of the Perennialist view of knowledge in relating that it is an old article of Catholic faith that one must have faith in order to understand. The weaknesses of human nature's equipment for learning, however, can be further strengthened by divine grace and revelation. Neither faith, grace, or revelation alone is sufficient by itself to help intellect to the "deeper vision of truth." It is necessary that all three be employed.

Maritain's (1962) interpretation of the Perennialist view of knowledge appears to coincide with the other interpretations. Maritain says that knowledge, for the Perennialist, is a value in and of itself. It is an end in itself. Truth, therefore, consists in the conformity of the mind with reality, with what is or exists independent of the mind.

Experimentalist View of Knowledge

All knowledge, according to Morris' (1961) interpretation of the Experimentalist policy, must be considered temporary and conditional. The word truth is an equivocal term which is hazardous to use in Experimentalist theory. Dewey (1960) suggests, "There is no knowledge self-guaranteed to be infallible, since all knowledge is the product of special acts of inquiry" (p. 160).

Butler (1951) points out that while having an eye for facts, Pragmatism rejects fact accumulation. The acquisition of a store house of knowledge is a vice rather than a virtue.

The Pragmatists, Marshall (1973) asserts, holds that knowledge is rooted in experience, but experience may be immediate or mediated. Immediate experience is simply undergoing. Mediated experience is the interaction of mankind and his/her mind with the environment. The process involved in the mediation of experience has been called the five-step thought process and the scientific method.

Morris suggests that for the Pragmatists, the nature of experience is, in a sense, transactional. In the enterprise called knowing, various ideas occur to us as to the way things are. We may speak of these as hunches, guesses, hypothesis, intuitions, or insights. At this point, they have not epistemological status except that they have occurred to us. They are, at this point, only "candidates" for truth.

At this point we begin to redirect our behavior and to act as if such and such were true. That is, we enter the doing phase of knowing. Then we receive the reaction from the environment. In other words, we undergo the consequences of our doing (transacting). At this point we have an opportunity to see how well our original hypothesis stands up. If the consequences provide phenomena which we have not expected or imagined, we return to our original hunch and integrate these findings into another, more sophisticated hunch. We continue the doingundergoing procedure until we arrive at a view of things which seems to satisfy the requirement of the conditions under which we are working.

This endless progression, Morris describes, this open-ended series of doing-undergoing-doing-undergoing, etc., is the process by which the

Experimentalist engages in epistemological activity. It is what Dewey calls "reflective thinking." However, in its most generalized expression it is what Dewey calls "the reconstruction of experience."

On experience Dewey (1938) remarks:

First, the problem grows out of the conditions of the experience being had in the present, and that it is within the range of the capacity of students; and secondly, that it is such that it arouses in the learner an active quest for information and for production of new ideas. The new facts and new ideas thus obtained become the ground for further experiences in which new problems are presented. The process is a continuous spiral (p. 97).

For the Pragmatist, knowledge is something which is wrought out in action. Activities are necessary both to make education more lifelike and to make life yield the Truth. Before it is used, it is merely information. Information becomes knowledge when it is judged to be relevant to the solution of a particular problems, and that judgment is tested in the laboratory experience.

In examining the relevancy of knowledge in the traditional classroom, Dewey (1916) says, "Only in education, never in the life of farmers, sailors, merchants, physicians, or laboratory experimenters, does knowledge mean primarily a store of information aloof from doing" (p. 216).

Mosley (1973) summarizes the Experimentalist view of the nature of knowledge:

The human mind is active and exploratory. The human, because he is an intelligent, social being, 'creates' knowledge as he interacts with the total environment. All knowledge is held tentatively. As human experiences change, knowledge of what is true will also change. Before knowledge is used, it is merely information. Information becomes knowledge when it is considered relevant to the solution of a particular problem. The test of truth is its workability. The individual has to act on his environment and then observe, rationally and empirically the consequences of his manipulation (p. 6).

Existentialist View of Knowledge

In relative consistency with the Pragmatic position, Nauman (1971) suggests that most Existentialists at least accept the possibility that an external reality (a realm of absolute knowledge and truth) lies beyond our human experience. In concert with the Pragmatists, they also generally deny that the human being can gain such knowledge of such a realm. Nauman explains that for the Existentialist:

The individual is too limited by time and circumstance to be certain of ever knowing that objective truth. Therefore, the only truth is subjective, that is, relative to his own ability to discover it (p. 159).

Kneller (1958) corroborates in purporting:

The existentialist epistemology assumes that the individual is responsible for his own knowledge. Existentialist knowledge is 'intuitive.' It is 'human.' It originates in, and is composed of, what exists in the individual's consciousness and feelings as a result of his experiences and the projects he adopts in the course of his life (p. 59).

Kneller continues by adding that the validity of knowing is determined by its value to the individual.

Barclay (1966) suggests four basic tenets of phenomenology:

(1) The only thing we can know for sure is that we are experiencing a stream of thought and feelings.

- (2) The ultimate source of knowledge is locked within the very structure of the human mind.
- (3) The apprehension of innate knowledge or truth by the human mind is known as intuition.
- (4) The ebb and flow of perception, though fed in part by sensory data, are structured and invested with meaning by the internal power of the mind (p. 41).

Unlike other philosophical "schools" or "system," Kneller (1958) submits that the Existentialist tradition has refused to depend primarily upon sensory-based inductive reasoning and/or formal (or authority -- or revelation-based deductive reasoning for that knowledge which is open to mankind. Nevertheless, Existentialism is not a revolt against reason. It is a revolt, Kneller submits, against mere reason, the absolute primacy and superiority of mankind's reason. For the Existentialist an absolute belief in reason is itself unreasonable.

Therefore, Watts (1968) suggests, as a vital supplement to reason, the Existentialist has called for an exploration of mankind's non-cognitive resources, his feeling, his intuition. Watts explains, "To know reality you cannot stand outside it and define it; you must enter into it, be it, and feel it" (p. 114).

It should be obvious that metaphysics, the philosophical area least open to scientific experimentation, is systematically interwoven with epistemology. The assumptions of the Existentialist concerning basic reality has been correlated with almost every epistemological assumption.

As an earlier discussion has shown, the central metaphysical principle in Existentialism is the priority of existence over essence. Hence, Morris (1961) proposes: We are confronted at the outset with the epistemological significance of the existentialist ontology, namely, the existential freedom of man in choosing his own truth. Each man is his own supreme court of epistemological judgment, and he is, therefore, in an ultimate sense, absolutely on his own when it comes to deciding between candidates for truth (p. 172).

The primary epistemological concept is the division of knowing into two modes. Morris (1961) calls attention to Sartre's distinction between the two modes:

I see a tree outside my window: I am, that is, perceptually conscious of a tree. The tree possesses 'Being-in-itself.' Like other objects, it is. My perceptual knowledge of it (Mode One) is a brute fact of existence. However, I am conscious of the tree, i.e., I am cognitively aware of my cognition. Ultimately, this means that I am conscious of my own being as well as that of the tree, but not in the same way, not perceptually. Rather, I have epistemological access by my own being through quite a different route, an internal, subjective awareness, which we are calling Mode Two (p. 172).

For science is the 'Mode One" of knowing in its most elaborate and sophisticated form. Mode Two of knowing, however, almost defies description. About as close as we can come, Morris indicates, to it in nontechnical language is awareness, a kind of total feeling-tone which is simply had by the individual.

Macdonald (1966) declares that from a person-point-of-view knowledge makes living tolerable and in rare cases personally fulfilling. Knowledge provides structures or patterns for personal meaning with which one can deal with the phenomena of himself/herself and his/her environment. Knowledge is not experience in packages of socially structured discipline, nor is it highly idiosyncratic perceptions in the service of a need system. Mosley (1973) summarizes the nature of knowledge via Existential-

ism:

Knowing comes through intuition, and so true knowledge originates solely with the individual person. There is no external, objective standard for judging truth. The validity of assumed knowledge can be measured only by its value to the human chooser. Truth cannot be settled once and for all because the indivdual is constantly becoming, constantly making choices. Truth must be ever growing, ever becoming a more valid instrument of self-identity and action. Only a truth that the individual appropriates to himself in full subjectivity is significant truth (p. 5).

Concept of Curriculum

At this point it seems clear that as each philosophy of education is filtered through the four philosophical screens, the outcome, as far as a conceptualization of the curriculum is concerned, would reflect the relative considerations of each philosophy. In other words, the manner in which the Essentialist philosophy conceptualizes the curriculum would differ somewhat from the Perennialist, and be quite at odds with the Experimentalist or Existentialist conceptualization of curriculum.

According to its latin origin, Brubaker (1969) indicates a curriculum is a "runway" or a course which one runs to reach a goal.

In an attempt to draw some conclusions as to the concept of curriculum each philosophy entertains, a brief review of each philosophy as it passed through the philosophical screens will precede the conceptualization of the curriculum.

Essentialist Concept of Curriculum

The Essentialist learner is a spiritual being trying to "tune-in"

to the Ultimate Mind. The individual is innately either evil or predisposed to evil. Individuals function in a Deterministic world, where they must be controlled, conditioned, or shaped. They must be manipulated and indoctrinated in certain ethical and moral beliefs. Individuals reveal themselves by their outward behavior and are, for the most part, irrational, although at times rational.

The Essentialist view of learning manifests itself in the Receptacle Theory, (i.e., adults pouring knowledge into the learner where they recapitulate upon demand). The field of Behaviorism is, therefore, purported and manifests itself through the concept of mastery learning and "training" of the child. Learning also comes about through imitation of great personalities and the teacher.

The Essentialist view of society suggests that the purpose of education is the transmission of the cultural heritage. The school has no mission to change or reform society, but to preserve it. It is, therefore, static and authoritarian. The learner functions as a corporate social mind.

The Essentialist view of knowledge suggests that there is a central body of essential knowledge that must be transmitted to all who come to school. Education is a preparation for adult life. Knowledge has value in and of itself. Where the Idealist relies primarily on reason and revelation as valid ways of discovering truth, the Realist relies on the empirical method.

With this in mind, Wingo (1974) conjectures that the Essentialist would have little patience with such statements as, "The curriculum is the sum total of all the experiences the school provides for students." For the Essentialist, the curriculum is that part of the school's

program that nurtures intellectual discipline. It consists of a common core of subject matters, intellectual skills, and accepted values that are so essential they must be transmitted to all who come to school.

The Essentialist view curriculum as an ordered series of subject matters to be transmitted by teachers and "absorbed" by pupils. In the last analysis, however, it is always the fact-learning aspect of education that gets the emphasis in Essentialist writing.

As a consequence, Brubaker (1969) submits that the curriculum comes to be prescribed without much regard for the interests and point of view of the learner. It is enough that the curriculum is backed by the authority of the teacher, who is backed by the authority of the centuries. The subjects of the time-honored divisions are learned one by one. Finally, the curriculum so learned remains stored away in memory until one assembles enough to be able to use it or is asked to bring it forth on demand in the recitation or examination.

Perennialist Concept of Curriculum

The Perennialist learner is both body and spirit endowed with reason whose supreme dignity is in the intellect. The learner is a sinful creature whose righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God. Therefore, the learner functions in a Deterministic world. Mankind's first business is the training of the intellect, the disciplining of his/her mental processes by rigorous logic. Mankind does not always act in terms of his/her rationality. All men share the same human nature and the aim for education is the same for all of mankind.

The Perennialist view of learning suggests that "Formal Discipline" is the bases for learning. The mind consists of separate but related faculties which can be trained. This concept is known as "Faculty Psychology." The primary strategy utilized in training each faculty lies in the catechetical method of learning. The purpose of the school is the training of the intellect.

The Perennialist view of society leans toward the development of a standardized, typical kind of student-citizen as the product of the curriculum. The social policy is regressive in that education can solve today's problems by turning back the clock to Aristotelian principles and to the training of the intellect. The elementary and secondary schools have little to do with social change.

The Perennialists view of knowledge is based on self-evident truths that cannot be reached by science. For the Perennialist, truth can be known through reason, intuition, and revelation. The primary cause of knowledge is God which comes about through a strong basis in faith. Knowledge is a value in and of itself.

With this in mind, Wingo (1974) submits that the key to understanding the Perennialist curriculum is the idea of liberal education. There is no place in the curriculum for "electives" since all of mankind pursue the same curriculum.

The liberal arts are, in the strict sense of the word, ways of doing things. Thus, there are the arts of rhetorical analysis, grammatical analysis, and logical analysis.

The liberal arts are disciplinary in character. That is, they develop the natural powers of the intellect and lean toward the perfection of these powers. In Hutchin's (1943) own words, "The liberal arts, after all, are the art of reducing the intellect from mere potentiality to act" (p. 115).

Shermis (1967) suggests that the content of the curriculum is transmitted first by a catechism, or an organized series of questions and answers in certain theological and philosophical topics. There is in this curriculum, Morris (1961) speculates, a built-in bias against recency and modernity.

Experimentalist Concept of Curriculum

The Experimentalist view the learner as innately good, active, and the supreme "problem-solver". Mankind's development is dependent upon his/her heredity and specific environment. The individual is what he/she is by virtue of what he/she shares in communication with others. The mind is a product of its relations, as well as a tool to be used instrumentally in the resolution of problems. Consequently, intelligence is a quality of learned behavior.

The Experimentalist view of learning has found its focus in real personal problematic situations. This is best accomplished by creating and manipulating environments through direct sequential experience. The foundation of learning has its bases in the Cognitive-Developmental theories where school learning involves the development of cognitive structures.

The Experimentalist views society as a process in which individuals participate. It is the source from which people derive all that makes them individuals. The school is vitally interested in social change, teaching the learners to deal with and plan for change. The school, therefore, is a miniature society always changing. Education is a process of discovering what values are of most worth. Therefore, the school is one of the communities resources for social experimentation.

Experimentalist view knowledge as rooted in experience. Knowledge is the reconstruction of experience. Information becomes knowledge when it is judged to be relevant to the solution of a particular problem. The human being creates knowledge as he/she interacts with the total environment. As human experiences change, knowledge changes. The test of truth is workability.

With this in mind, Dewey advocates an active-process oriented curriculum as opposed to the passive-product acquisition of subject matters. Dewey (1960) submits:

The problem of education is to engage pupils in these activities in such ways that while manual skill and technical efficiency are gained and immediate satisfaction found in the work, together with preparation for later usefulness, these shall be subordinated to education -- that is, to intellectual results and the forming of a socialized disposition (p. 231).

Marshall (1973) evaluates the Experimentalist curriculum as not hindered by subject matter lines, but rather it is divided into units which grow out of the questions and experiences of the learners. The curriculum is learner-centered; it changes and shifts as the needs of the learners vary. Subject matter per se and the traditional arrangements of subject matter are seen as an arbitrary and wasteful system to which all learners have been forced to conform. Certainly it would follow from this that a variety of electives and the opportunity for students to select independent study programs would be encouraged, since the needs, aptitudes, and abilities of the learners are so diverse.

Existentialist Concept of Curriculum

Existential philosophy values human beings above all else. For the Existentialist, the learner's existence is given, yet his/her essence is not. The individual is nothing until he/she acts. Mankind realizes his/her values through human interaction. Mankind is at the center of his/her world.

The Existentialist view of learning and development is, by definition, personal, unique, and not standardized. Learning is a result of three interacting factors: exploring, integrating, and transcending. The emphasis is upon what the student wants to become. Learning takes place when the individual is loved, accepted, and encouraged.

The Existentialist views the school's role in society as working primarily upon the development of the learner's sense of absolute freedom and self-determinism. The way to improve civilization is to improve the quality of the individuals. The best social policy is to awaken the learners to the need to know themselves. Children go to school to find out who they are and what a human life is for. Society is self-renewing and its values are best realized in an egalitarian society.

The Existentialist view of knowledge is that the only truth is subjective, that is, relative to its own discoverer. Existential knowledge is intuitive. It originates, and is composed of, what exists in the individual's consciousness and feelings as a result of his/her experiences. In other words, the ultimate source of knowledge is locked within the very structure of the human mind. There is no

external, objective standard for judging truth. Truth cannot be settled once and for all because the individual is constantly becoming, constantly making choices. Only a truth that the individual appropriates for himself/herself in full subjectivity is significant truth.

In seeking to locate connections of some kind between Existential philosophy and their practical use in education, Wingo (1974) suggests that we are at a disadvantage. This disadvantage lies in the fact that the leading figures of this tradition have had little to say about education. Further, the amount of commentary on the implications of Existential thought for educational theory is not very extensive.

On the character of the curriculum, Wingo submits, there does seem to be considerable agreement that to achieve the aims of education, as these are stated or implied in Existential philosophy, education must be conceived as liberal education.

Since for the Existentialist the truth is infinite, it follows that the curriculum cannot be prescribed. Kneller (1958) suggests that the literature champions no denial of the integrity of subject matter; no denial that limits may be set on the extent to which at a certain point in human development certain material is appropriate; but far more essential, in fact indispensable, is the student's relation to the material studied.

The necessity of mastering certain fundamentals is defended by Sartre. This, however, does not imply an objective approach to teaching fundamentals in the manner of the martinet or drill master, rather one should foster a method and approach by which fundamentals are learned in the context of the student's existential situation.
The paradox of learning fundamentals, which are by nature universals, in accordance with a student's existential situation, is recognized by Sartre (1956) who can only reply, "One should do what everyone else does but like nobody else" (p. 122). The purpose of learning fundamentals is to authenticate self.

There is evidence in the writings, Wingo indicates, of both Sartre and Heidegger of their belief that the humanistic studies are the most valuable. Since truth for the Existentialist derives from human subjectivity, since truth is a relationship in which mankind places himself/herself, literature, the graphic arts, music and myth are far more the source of truth than that of science.

The usual thesis is that under the influence of Existential ideas, the teacher-student, student-student relationships will be more personal and more "interactive." Therefore, the Socratic Method is advocated as an instructional strategy.

Berman (1968) suggests that the fundamentals be couched in the process-oriented skills. She defines process skills as those which have an element of ongoingness about them, which enable the person to know, to think, to value, to feel, and to act. The eight processoriented areas she proposes are: (1) perceiving, (2) communicating, (3) loving, (4) knowing, (5) decision making, (6) patterning, (7) creating, and (8) valuing.

Macdonald et al. (1973) propose that the Existential curriculum is the cultural environment which has been purposefully selected as a set of possibilities for facilitating educative transaction. Each individual will participate in the selection of relevant content, and each individual's curriculum will be unique. The curriculum as environment would encompass (a) political and social actions (social and cultural maintenance and change), (b) personal actions (moral and ethical choices), and (c) cultural actions (creation of new cultural meanings).

Macdonald (1966) indicates that the focal point in curriculum is the person, not the individual, or the group, or the content to be mastered, or the society to be served, but the persons to be served. That is, education is first and foremost a moral enterprise, in contrast to a psychological, or a socialogical, or a political, or a technological enterprise.

A concern for morality in school should not be confused with a concern for specific right or wrong (good or bad) actions on the part of students. Morality here is used by Macdonald in the anthropological sense as the quality of the ways we relate to each other as persons, not the goodness of a socially approved set of behaviors. A good curriculum then is a moral curriculum in the sense that it maximizes the opportunity for moral interpersonal relationships to occur, and by so doing focuses on the personal meanings of knowledge and the worth and integrity of the person.

In this sense, curriculum is, in fact, a plan and/or an organizational pattern for channeling influence in appropriate directions. This is the basic Existential fact of the school life.

In moral terms influence can never be a one-way procedure, for morally, those who dare to influence others must be open to the influence of others. Thus, if conversation to talk in the schools is to be moral, it must be of the nature of a dialogue, in contrast to the process of talking to others. It is conversation where the outcome is not preordained (as it is in most teacher questions), but where the resolution is created out of the mutual influence (upon each other) of the participants. One criterion of a moral curriculum is then that the plans and organizational forms maximize the opportunity for true dialogue between participants rather than the usual one-way processes of informing, directing, and managing that characterize so much of our present activity. The one-way process does not respect the other person, but treats the other as an object or thing to be influenced.

Summary

Chapter III has been an attempt to lay a foundation and, therefore, give credibility to the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter IV. It was also an attempt to demonstrate the concept of Philosophical Harmony. That is, when a particular philosophy of education is filtered through the philosophical screens there is linear consistency from the basic values (theory) of that philosophy to resulting behavior (practice).

Chapter IV presents the proposed Conceptual and Operational frameworks, as well as a four-dimensional model representing the elementary school and a model which represents the concept of Philosophical Harmony.

CHAPTER IV

A CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS THE DEGREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL HARMONY WITHIN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Decisions in education are based on a variety of considerations of the issues. A decision involving one issue necessarily affects decisions involving others. Therefore, conceptual frameworks are needed to facilitate comprehension of the interplay among the multiplicity of issues. The design of the conceptual framework provides for continual examination, revision, and growth.

Taba (1962) describes a conceptual framework as, ". . . a way of organizing thinking about all matters that are important to curriculum development" (p. 420). She further states that a framework,

. . . identifies the elements of the curriculum, states what their relationships are to each other and indicates the principles of organization and the requirements of that organization for the administrative conditions which it is to operate (p. 421).

Goodlad (1966) indicates that especially in education there is a great need for conceptual systems to guide theory-building, research, and planning. Goodlad defines a conceptual system as:

... a carefully engineered framework designed to identify and reveal relationships among complex, related

interacting phenomena; in effect, to reveal the whole where wholeness might not otherwise be thought to exist. Such a system consists of categories abstracted from the phenomena that the system is designed to describe and classify, categories which can be readily discussed and manipulated at consistent, clearly identifiable levels of generality and which can be developed from differing perspectives (p. 141).

Just as a conceptual system has structure, so does it perform functions. Goodlad suggests that it facilitates the following:

- The identification of problems and questions presumably having relevance to planning any instructional program.
- (2) The clarification of the types of inquiry likely to be productive in dealing with these problems.
- (3) The revelation of possible connections among these problems and questions.
- (4) The identification of promising data-sources for dealing with these problems and questions.
- (5) The initiation of processes designed to reveal the relevance of these sources and of data extracted from them to the problem and questions classified by the system (p. 143).

A conceptual system further provides a bridge between general theory and specific practice. The worth of that bridge depends upon its ability to bear two-way traffic. If theoreticians cannot use the system to gain perspective and, subsequently, to formulate theories, build models, and conduct research, they reject it. If practitioners cannot see in the theoretical models derived from the system at least blurred reflections of their daily concerns, they do not see much vogue in them. A conceptual framework does not contain judgmental qualities but rather is intended to be descriptive in nature. Although the use of the terms "conceptual framework" and "paradigm" are not meant to be used interchangeably, they do possess similar qualities. According to Gage (1963), a paradigm derives its usefulness from its generality. By definition, "they apply to all specific instances of a whole class of events or processes" (p. 94). A second characteristic of paradigms is:

. . . they often represent variables and their relationships in some graphic or outline form. Events or phenomena that have temporal, spatial, causal, or logical relationships are portrayed in these relationships by boxes, connecting lines, and positions on vertical and horizontal dimensions (p. 95).

Conceptual Framework

The Conceptual Framework (See Figure 2, p. 108) is an attempt to present schematically the philosophical and theoretical considerations developed in the preceeding chapter. Functionally, the Conceptual Framework is designed to aid educators at decision making levels in planning, developing, implementing, and evaluating the elementary school curricula. A primary function of this framework is to assess the extent, measure, or degree of Philosophical Harmony within the elementary school.

Philosophical Harmony (consistency, symmetry, or congruency) is contingent upon a linear agreement within the philosophical screens, operationalized in the variables which teachers manipulate congruently when selecting either an Essentialist, Perennialist, Experimentalist, or Existentialist view of mankind. When there is not a linear agreement (Philosophical Harmony) within the philosophical screens, thereby reflecting an integration (mixture, combination, blend, heterogeneous

relationship) of philosophical views of mankind, this condition is called Philosophical Integration.

To understand the utility of the Conceptual Framework one should begin with a philosophical concept of mankind (See Figure 2). As the framework suggests, all philosophical concepts of mankind can be divided into either Supernaturalist or Naturalist realms (See Chapter II for the distinctions). Four philosophies of education are identified in the dichotomy. Following the arrows downward then, each philosophy of education views the nature of mankind differently. Therefore, based upon their respective orientations, they view the nature of the learner, the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge (Philosophical Screens) in a manner which reflects their respective orientations as to the nature of mankind, in general. It should, therefore, be obvious, that when each philosophy is filtered through the philosophical screens, divergent views of the concept of curriculum results. One of the major assumptions of this study is that philosophies of education contain beliefs concerning the nature of the learner, learning, society, and knowledge. However, any one of these screens, in and of itself, reflects a view of mankind held by each respective philosophy. For this reason the arrows represent a reciprocal arrangement.



Figure 2. Conceptual Framework

Variables Teachers Manipulate

To Affect Learning

Within an instructional setting the teacher manipulates, treats, utilizes, employs, or sets in motion certain variables which affect learning. The teacher and/or elementary school staff, either consciously or unconsciously, do something in a certain way which either promotes or impedes learning. In an attempt to operationalize the Conceptual Framework, it is necessary to describe, in a limited detail, the variables that affect learning within the elementary school. The variables within the elementary school as shown in Figure 4, p. 136, are instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selection, materials and resources, physical environment, and evaluation techniques.

An examination of the aforementioned variables will provide the reader a brief overview. No attempt has been made to examine the variables in considerable detail. Any attempt to explore these variables is a difficult task because a majority of the literature speaks to them from a particular philosophical position that reflects specific views of the learner, the learning process, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge. Nevertheless, if any particular philosophical viewpoint appears in the following discussion, it is unintentional and merely an attempt to speak to these variables in describing their existing structure. Figure 4 will attempt to clarify specific practices in light of their respective philosophical viewpoints.

Instructional Strategies

Instructional behavior demonstrated in the classroom is based on instructional theory. Discussion relative to instructional behavior concomitantly, consciously or unconsciously, involves instructional theory. The teacher is constantly making decisions, either consciously or unconsciously, within a frame of reference. Ideally, the teacher's instructional behavior is in harmony with a carefully developed theory of instruction that is at least tentatively held.

Bruner (1963) in discussing a definition of a theory of instruction indicates:

It is not a description of what has happened when learning has taken place -- it is something, which gives you something to shoot at and which, in the end, must state something about what you do when you put instruction together in the form of courses (p. 523).

Selected instructional strategies reflect the teacher's basic beliefs about not only the nature of learning, but the nature of the learner, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge.

Haddan (1970) suggests that a clear distinction between methods and techniques be established. It is not enough to say that technique is specific, whereas method is more general. Whereas technique does not cut across subject matter lines, method, on the other hand, does.

Ascher (1966) provides some guidelines for differentiating between methods and techniques. The common types of methods are listed as "telling," "showing," and "doing." However, techniques of applying the methods differ from person to person and age to age. Ascher's categories of method are listed as follows and are applicable to those instructional strategies listed in Figure 4, p. 136. 'Telling' methods: lecture, lecture and questions, panels, training conferences, debate, case study, incident process, recording, oral quiz.

'Showing' methods: written words, pictures, motion pictures, charts, diagrams, physical objects, demonstration, observing skits, viewing on-site operations.

'Doing' methods: role playing, project, committee work, performance tests, practical exercises, on-the-job training, understudy, supervised practice, guided experiments, rotating assignments (p. 1).

Ascher establishes that effective use of methods may be readily taught as a proper subject matter for teacher education, whereas techniques, being the actual performance of teachers, presents a much more difficult area to influence. Attempts to deal with techniques used in teaching performance has been labeled "microteaching" and "interaction analysis." Techniques are a function of many complex variables resident in the personality of the teacher. Mannerisms, temperament, attitudes, enthusiasm, appearance, needs, and desires all influence the application of techniques. This study focuses primarily on teaching methods or teaching strategies utilized in an instructional setting.

The broader concept includes both the philosophical base, concerned with ends or objectives, and a psychological base, concerned with the learner, the learning process, and the psychology of subject matter. Broudy (1963) states:

Method refers to the formal structure of the sequence of acts commonly denoted by instruction. The term covers both the strategy and tactics of teaching and involves the choice of what is to be taught and the order in which it is to be taught (p. 3). Michaelis, Grossman, and Scott (1975) suggest the identification and selection of teaching strategies are a major task of curriculum planners, developers of instructional materials, and the classroom teacher.

In recent years there has been considerable discussion of discovery versus directed-teaching strategies. Currently, Michaelis et al. submit there are some who equate discovery with inductive strategies and directed with deductive strategies. To further confuse the issue, multiple views and definitions of discovery, directedinductive and deductive-teaching strategies exist.

As an implicit means of explaining these terms, the author assumes the following position as delineated by Michaelis et al. If discovery versus directed approaches could be placed on a continuum with teacher-directed strategies on one end, discovery strategies on the other, and varying degrees of teacher direction in between, then most teaching strategies could be placed between the two extremes. The inductive versus deductive debate can be resolved by analyzing strategies in terms of their reliance on inductive, deductive, and transductive moves. That is, moving from particular to general, from general to particular, and from particular to particular. When these two views are joined together, it is possible to identify teacherdirected and discovery strategies that move inductively, deductively, or transductively.

Those strategies which identify with the Supernaturalist philosophies of education are: Directed-Deductive Strategy in which the teacher starts with the definition of the concept and moves to particular examples of it. Here the teacher provides direct instruction in all phases except the last one in which students state the definition and give examples of the concept; Directed-Inductive Strategy in which the teacher directs instruction step by step from the particular to the general, moving from examples or attributes to a generalized meaning of the concept, and Directed-Transductive Strategy in which convergent thinking is emphasized in this strategy which is highly structured in moving children from particular to particular. It is used in teaching specific motor skills, word association skills, map skills, and the like.

Strategies identified with Naturalist philosophies of education are: Discovery-Deductive Strategies which move from the general to the particular. In these strategies rules or attributes that students have learned, or that the teacher provides, are given so that students can discover applications or new examples. Students proceed deductively from what they know or what is given to find supporting instances. Discovery-Inductive Strategies move from the particular to the general and is used to guide children to develop a concept by discovering common features and using the common features as a basis for grouping the Discovery-Transductive Strategies which are useful in creative items. expression in a variety of forms in which divergent thinking is emphasized. It is also in situations in which children are to associate, relate, or compare words, numbers, patterns, forms, and other items in a variety of ways. The teacher's role is that of manipulator and experimenter.

Organizational Patterns

Firth and Kimpston (1973) indicate that the various organizational

schemes for elementary schools have numerous curricular implications. They include structures for (1) the assignment of the instructional staff, (2) the arrangement of space within school buildings, (3) the classification of students, and (4) the allocation of time influence. In each of the four categories, the decisions that are made help fashion the vehicle that facilitates or hampers the kinds of learning experiences offered in school.

At the most general level, school organization can be viewed as being vertical or horizontal. According to Goodlad (1963), "Vertical organization provides a system for classifying students and moving them upward from entry to departure from the school unit. Horizontal structure provides a system for dividing students into instructional groups and allocating them to teachers" (p. 70).

Two plans have evolved to facilitate the vertical movement of pupils through the elementary school. The oldest of the plans is called the "graded school." A newer plan is called the "nongraded school."

The prevailing pattern of organization has been the graded classroom. Ragan and Shepherd (1971) point out that the graded elementary school, which reflects the Supernaturalist philosophies of education, grew out of conditions that existed in the 19th century, when public school systems were being established. Some of the factors that contributed to the establishment of the graded school included the necessity of dividing children into groups for instructional purposes, the relative simplicity of giving a single assignment to an entire class, the scarcity of instructional materials, the economic necessity of maintaining large classes, the low level of teacher preparation, and the apparent factory-like precision present in the industrial era.

However, a new plan to govern the vertical movement of pupils through the elementary school began to penetrate the organizational patterns of schools during the 1950's. Goodlad and Anderson (1963) note: "The nongraded school is designed to implement a theory of continuous pupil progress" (p. 57). The basic features of the nongraded structure as noted by Goodlad and Anderson (1963) can be more clearly conceptualized by comparing its features with the graded structure.

Graded Structure

A year of progress in subject matter seen as roughly comparable with a child's year in school.

Each successive year of progress seen as comparable to each past year or each year to come.

A child's progress seen as unified: advancing in rather regular fashion in all areas of development; probably working close to grade level in most subject areas.

Specified bodies of content seen as appropriate for successive grade levels and so labeled; subject matter packaged grade-by-grade.

Adequacy of progress determined by comparing child's attainment to coverage

Nongraded Structure

A year in school life may mean much more or much less than a year in subject matter.

Progress seen as irregular; a child may progress much more rapidly in one year and quite slowly in another.

A child's progress seen as not unified: he spurts ahead in one area of progress and lags behind in others; may be working at three or four levels in as many subjects.

Bodies of content seen as appropriate over a wide span of years: learning viewed vertically or longitudinally rather than horizontally.

Adequacy of progress determined by comparing child's attainment to his ability deemed appropriate to the grade.

Inadequate progress made up by repeating the work of a given grade; grade failure the ultimate penalty for slow progress.

Rapid progress provided for through enrichment: encouragement of horizontal expansion rather than vertical advancement in work; attempt to avoid moving to domain of teacher above.

Rather inflexible grade-tograde movement of pupils, usually at end of year. and both to long-term view of ultimate accomplishment desired.

Slow progress provided for by permitting longer time to do given blocks of work: no repetitions but recognition of basic differences in learning rate.

Rapid progress provided for both vertically and horizontally: bright children encouraged to move ahead regardless of the grade level of the work; no fear of encroaching on work of next teacher.

Flexible pupil movement: pupil may shift to another class at almost any time: some trend toward controlling shifts on a quarter or semester basis (pp. 58-59).

<u>Horizontal Organization</u>: Ragan and Shepherd (1971) note that horizontal patterns determine and govern the distribution and division of pupils into instructional groups or classes as well as the allocation of teachers at the various levels, grades, or positions on the vertical axis. The following patterns of organization -- selfcontained, departmentalization, platoon or dual progress, and differentiated staffing -- appear to be the most frequently chosen plans for the horizontal axis of elementary school organizations. These organizational patterns can be found in Figure 4, p. 136.

Ragan and Shepherd (1971) provide the following definitions for the more popular school organizations. These are exemplary and by no means definitive:

- (1) The Self-Contained Classroom calls for placing a group of pupils with one teacher for the major portion of the school day; it is designed to enable the teacher to learn a great deal about each pupil by observing them in a wide variety of learning experiences.
- (2) Departmentalization may be viewed as a plan for grouping pupils which permits the teacher to specialize in the teaching of one or a few subjects. The plan is used more in grades four through six.
- (3) The Dual Progress Plan permits pupils to progress through a graded sequence of certain subjects, called cultural imperatives, and through an ungraded sequence in other subjects, called cultural electives. The plan also provides for the use of specialists to teach cultural electives.
- (4) Team Teaching is an arrangement that provides for having two or more teachers with abilities and skills that complement each other, assume joint responsibility for directing the learning activities of a group of pupils. The plan provides for large group learning situations, small-group learning situations, and individual learning situations (p. 156).

Patterns utilized for grouping pupils (interclass grouping) are heterogeneous, homogeneous, small-group interaction, skill grouping, laboratory, and so on.

Decisions that are made concerning the selection and creation of an organizational pattern to govern the veritcal and horizontal movement of pupils in an elementary school should be made in light of the established purposes based on fundamental beliefs as to the nature of the learner, the nature of the learning process, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge.

Content Selection

Preplanning of the curriculum framework takes place at the

national, state, and local school system levels. At these levels, decisions are made as to general subject matter to be taught. The data sources for curriculum development seem to center upon the logic of the subject matter, the nature and needs of children, or the demands of society. Each of these (logical, psychological, and social) has served as a basis for selecting content and organizing learning experiences. However, it is at the local level and classroom level that the teacher can exert some influence as to specific content selected.

Michaelis et al. (1975) suggests that the content of the curriculum should be considered in terms of the level of complexity, recognizing that all types are important and should be selected in terms of criteria. Criteria for selecting content will depend upon basic philosophical beliefs.

Taba (1962) suggests that both content and human interaction are involved in selecting content. Content selection, with accompanying learning experiences, is one of the central decisions in curriculum making. Today the problem of a sound basis for selecting curriculum content is especially crucial for several reasons as outlined by Taba. First, proposals for what to include or exclude in the curriculum emanate from a variety of sources, based on a variety of considerations. Second, the explosion of knowledge has made the classical simplicity of school subjects almost impossible to embrace. As specialized knowledge increases, it is necessary to add more subjects or to assign new priorities in the current offerings. Third, the extension of the objectives of education has called for new areas of learning which were not part of the classical curriculum. New areas such as subjects dealing with sociology, the family or personal development, the

development of creative thinking, or an objective understanding of the cultures of the world. And finally, improved educational technology permits an expansion of what can be learned in a given period of time. New technical aids for self-teaching, for communicating information and for learning a variety of skills are shifting the balance of time and of effort needed for acquiring a substantial portion of the current curriculum.

All of these reasons have naturally lead to the questions of priorities in curriculum content. Hutchins (1943) reflects upon this dilemma:

The crucial error is that of holding that nothing is any more important than anything else, that there can be no order of good and no order in the intellectual realm. There is nothing secondary, nothing basic and nothing superficial. A course of study goes to pieces because there is nothing to hold it together. Triviality, mediocrity, and vocationalism takes over because we have no standard by which to judge them (p. 26).

The criteria for selecting content, Hutchins advises, should, therefore, encompass and integrate the implications from views regarding the functions of the school in society, from the studies of the learners and the learning process, and from the analysis of the nature of knowledge and of the subject matter (Philosophical Screens).

Smith et al. (1957) suggest that an appraisal of each criterion for the selection of content will involve two questions: (1) Is the criteria adequately supported by facts and sound reasoning? and (2) Does its use contribute significantly to the realization of desirable educational and sociological objectives? Smith et al. suggest four procedures for the selection of content.

<u>The Judgmental Procedure</u>: Selection of content by this procedure requires the curriculum worker to raise and answer the following questions: (1) What social and educational objectives should be accepted?, (2) What is the existing state of affairs in which these objectives are considered desirable and appropriate, and in which they must be realized?, and (3) What subject matter best satisfies these objectives under the existing conditions? Curriculum content chose on the basis of the prejudices and rationalizations of uninformed and uncritical persons will not satisfy the conditions of the judgmental procedure.

<u>The Experimental Procedure</u>: This procedure tries to determine by actual tests whether or not subject matter satisfies a particular criterion. It answers such questions as: Is this subject matter interesting? Is this subject matter used by adults?

When these requirements are translated into procedures of content selection, they take the following form, according to Smith et al. (1957):

- (1) Tentative selection of subject matter in accordance with a criterion.
- (2) Hypothesis what the tentatively selected subject matter meets the conditions of the criterion (that it is interesting or useful).
- (3) Prescribed conditions of the try-out (description of children, teacher, classroom, methods of teaching, materials to be used, and other factors affecting the experiment).
- (4) Objective techniques for determining the results (tests and other observations and records).
- (5) Checking the results against the hypothesis to find whether or not the subject matter satisfies the criterion (p. 153).

<u>The Analytical Procedure</u>: This procedure is one of the most widely known methods of content selection. It has been closely identified with the criterion of utility. In general, it consists of an analysis of the things people do to discover the subject matter functioning in these activities: (1) activity analysis, (2) job analysis, and (3) analysis to determine the generally useful knowledge and skills.

<u>The Consensual Procedure</u>: This procedure is a way of collecting society's opinion about what they believe the curriculum should be. This procedure is exemplified in the practice of asking local businessmen to express their opinions about what elements of mathematics or English should be included or stressed in the curriculum.

Another aspect currently debated concerns the issue of the "disciplines" versus "process" as the proper content. Phenix (1962) suggests that the basic assumption behind the concept of "process" as the content for elementary school curriculum is that the disciplines are in the realm of pure knowledge. That is, the disciplines are specialized professional scholarship and research oriented and that ordering education is a difficult sort of enterprise. These disciplines, Phenix postulates, have a life of their own and knowledge in them is not directly available for the purposes of instruction. Therefore, to be suited for education they must be translated and transformed so as to become useful and meaningful to ordinary learners. Thus, the argument goes, for the curriculum we should draw upon life situations, problems, projects, and the like, for the primary content of instruction, using the knowledge supplied by the disciplines as auxiliary material to be employed as required by the basic instructional process.

Parker and Rubin (1966) define process, ". . . as the cluster of diverse procedures which surround the acquisition and utilization of knowledge is the highest form of content and the most appropriate base for curriculum change" (p. 2). Phenix (1962), on the other hand, suggests that only knowledge contained in the disciplines, is appropriate to the curriculum. The distinguishing mark of any discipline, Phenix posits, is that it is peculiarly suited for teaching and learning. Implied in this assertion is the recognition that there are kinds of knowledge which are not found within a discipline. Such non-disciplined knowledge is, therefore, unsuitable for teaching and learning. It is not instructive.

Given this understanding of what a discipline is, Phenix (1962) would submit:

... it follows that all teaching should be disciplined, that it is undesirable to have any instruction in matters which fall beyond disciplines. This means that psychological needs, social needs, and any of a variety of patterns of materials based on other than discipline content are not appropriate to the determination of what is taught (p. 65).

Schwab (1961) in a paper presented to the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Council on Cooperation in Teacher Education, suggested that the compendium of information which comprises the learning material for a particular course or a given grade is that which should serve as content (the disciplines). Schwab suggests that this content serves as a rhetoric of conclusions transferred to the student.

The criteria for selecting content for the purpose of transmitting the cultural heritage and/or cultivation of the logical powers have included: the disciplined subjects, the "Great Books," and the content defined by the Great Research Disciplines. The criteria for selecting content for the purposes of utility, social effeciency, self-direction and/or self-knowledge have included: the child's interests and needs, current social practice, and current social problems. These sources of selecting content are noted in Figure 4, p. 136.

Materials and Resources

If philosophical harmony is desirable, then educational materials and resources in use in the elementary school will be in harmony with the general philosophy of education established by that school, and more specifically the individual teacher's philosophy. That is, instructional media will be selected in terms of criteria directly related to instructional planning which reflects basic philosophical views. Tyler et al. (1971) suggest that it is essential that the selection of instructional materials be described.

The word "resources" is a much more inclusive and general term than that of "materials." Educational materials are but one type of resource available for selection by the teacher and/or school staff.

The ASCD Yearbook (1964) suggests that there are many ways in which source materials for learning may be classified. Resources range from direct experiences to the abstractness of verbal, symbolic materials. Five general types of resources listed are: (1) human resources, (2) first-hand observations and experiences, (3) exploratory and experimental material, (4) materials and opportunities for selfexpression, and (5) printed materials, various audio-visual materials.

Michaelis et al. (1975) suggest that there are three main types of media that are generally available and useful to the classroom teacher in all areas of the curriculum. There are: (1) printed materials (i.e., textbooks, pamphlets, programmed materials, references, source materials, activity booklets, periodicals, and simulation games), (2) audio-visual materials (i.e., sound and film resources, television, relia and models of realia such as costumes and dioramas, pictoral resources such as photographs and sketches, graphic materials such as maps and diagrams, projectors and viewers for taking slides, maps, and other items), and (3) community resources (i.e., locally available printed and audio-visual resources, field trips, persons to interview, service projects, libraries, museums, recreational areas, and the mass media).

Dale (1953) suggests that an important purpose for selecting instructional material be in the communication of ideas and experiences. Instructional materials become a means whereby learners can come into contact with ideas, values, and concepts that have been experienced by others. In this sense they become tools for learning.

Ofiesh (1971) suggests that the use of any device, piece of equipment, or form of typograph to transmit audio-visual information for educational purposes constitutes the mediation process. Ofiesh lists 13 classes of media which are applicable to Figure 4, p. 136:

(1) Teacher

(2) Pictoralized media (opaque projector, motion pictures, slide projector)

(3) Symbolic media (illustrative media, posters, charts, diagrams, graphs)

(4) Auditory media (cassettes, reel to reel, radio, public address systems)

(5) Similators and gaming devices

(6) Photographic media (recording media, cameras)

(7) Representative media (bulletin boards, chalkboards, models, mock-ups)

(8) TV, VTR, Instructional television

(9) Programmed Instructional media

(10) Multimedia kits

(11) Dial access and retrieval systems

(12) Computer-based systems

(13) Existing culture and community environments

Any instructional resource or material will reflect a combination of abstraction levels. If philosophical harmony is desirable, the level of abstraction which the media reflects will be compatible with the learner's abstraction level. Although the source is unknown, Figure 3, p. 126, suggests a process for matching the learning environment to the student's entry behavior.

Beauchamp (1965) notes that the effect of instructional materials upon learning activities of children is one feature of the rationale for selection and use of those materials resources, but that there is another one. The use of modern instructional media has brought about a technology that has had a considerable and revolutionary effect upon the potential behavior of the teacher. Often, however, their implementation into the operational framework of learning experiences has gone about without regard or prior thought for the philosophical implications of such media. Again, the emphasis has appeared to be "improving" the curriculum rather than upon "understanding."

Figure 3. A Process for Matching the Learning Environment to the Student's Entry Behavior

	A PROCESS FOR MATCHING THE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT TO THE STUDENT'S ENTRY BEHAVIOR					
TY PE OF MEDIA	lectures, text- books, discussion	chalkboard, over- head transparen- cies, slides, photographs	audio-tape recor- dings, films, T.V.	3-D model displays, instructional games and simula- tions	lab experience, field trips, directed "hands on" experience	
MEDIA CHARA CTERISTIC	Symbolic	Picture language	Schematic diagrams	constructed structural repre- sentations	Directed observation &/or participation	
STIMULUS ACCEPTABLE TO LEARNER	Verbal (written) symbolic expres- sion	iconic representation	Dramatization demonstrations	Contrived experien- ces & simulations	Documentation & directed real world experience	
ABSTRACTION LEVEL	High	Medium High	Intermediate	Medium low	Low	
ORGANIZATION LEVEL OF PRESENTATION	Random	Filling in of detail needed	sequential order- ing with detail applied toward that end.Emphasis on applied details	sequential ordering of basic constructs with emphasis on detail in relation to the whole is needed	complete direction for developing sed- uential understand- ing & labeling of basic structure is needed	
SYMBOLIC LEVEL	complete mastery of symbolism principles & de- tails	general mastery of verbal symbolism fundamental prin- ciples understood, but details mis- sing	Fundamental prin- ciples partly un- derstood, details partly missing, vague, & or partly confused	"Laymans" awareness basic principles partly confused or missing, little de- tail present & is distorted	No useful symbolism basic principles nonexistent, details unrelated	
PERCEPTION LEVEL	Complete & accur- ate perception of relevant percept- ual phenomena tot- al differentiation and integration	Minor distortion of perception, distorted percep- tion of detail faulty different- iation	Genaral perception of environmental phenomena detail & integration of total perceptual phenomena distort-	Considerable dist- ortion of all rel- evant perceptual phenomena, faulty integration	Phenomena invisible &/or unrecognized by the student	

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Physical Environment

The physical environment established by the school staff and the individual teacher will reflect the basic philosophic considerations and beliefs held by the individual teachers. The physical arrangement of the instructional setting should give clues as to basic purposes for education.

It must be realized, however, that any description of the physical aspect of the elements functioning within a learning environment always operates in combination with personal relationships. This is the sociocultural environment which includes the world of people, customs, values, and man-made things. However, this study considers only the physical make-up of the school and/or classroom.

As a means of coping with the multiplicity of environmental factors, the classification system set forth by Holm and Larson (1953), identifies three major environmental factors: (1) cosmic -- all the forces and forms which exist independent of mankind, (2) human -- all the attributes that characterize mankind, and (3) cultural -- all the fields of activity and forms created by mankind. Meihofer (1974) establishes that the physical environment involves: (1) the visual learning environment (i.e., lighting and colors), (2) the acoustical learning environment (i.e., noise effect, background music), (3) the thermal learning environment, and (4) classroom space and furniture.

The physical environment of the classroom often indicates the living that is going on. The ASCD Yearbook (1954) supports assumptions of this study when postulating that the physical environment gives clues about the school personnel's attitude toward learning. A

classroom's physical features, more than likely, reveals the human relationships which exist there. Over a period of time room arrangement usually indicates the teacher's philosophy of education.

The physical environment is a framework for learning. It can either promote or impede learning. The classroom is not just a shelter teachers and students have to live with, but rather an educational tool that can be treated in many ways. It includes regulating such matters as pollution, traffic, temperature, lighting, volume control, arrangement of materials and supplies, seating, activity or research centers, audio-visual equipment, teaching aids, bulletin boards, and many unexpected items from the existing culture or community.

Teachers know they work through the mediums of activity and props, and that environmental variations is one of the strategic measures available to them to influence the quality of their classroom behavior settings.

Only recently has the importance of the environment to the outcomes of learning be identified. As Wakefield and Bloomfield (1969) have noted:

The classroom is a concealed or hidden teacher; it is constantly at work helping or hindering what the visible teacher is struggling to do. At its best it gives each learner his greatest opportunity to prosper intellectually. At its worst it can induce both physical and educational disabilities, particularly if it is neglected or ignored (p. 201).

Coleman (1960) suggests that on the basis of the learner's experience in this particular environment, he/she gradually develops a coherent frame of reference which he/she uses in evaluating new experiences and selecting appropriate modes of behavior. The key elements of a person's frame of reference, Coleman suggests, are his/ her basic assumptions about himself/herself, his/her world, personal worth, abilities, deficiencies, the kind of world he/she lives in, what is good and bad, what can be changed, and so forth.

Michofer (1974) notes that anthropologists tell us that every organism has an intuitive and learned concept of physical space and its interrelationships with it. In general, classroom spaces can be classified as those that tend to keep students apart and those that tend to bring them together. The various physical environments are categorized as to their respective educational philosophy in Figure 4, p. 136.

Evaluation Techniques

Bloom et al. (1971) posit that education past and present is conceived of as a set of learning tasks which seemingly are more difficult as one proceeds from the first to the last year of formal schooling.

Examinations of some kind have been used to make the decision about who should be permitted to go to the next level. Included in this process are the results of examinations and teacher judgments which have been turned into a grading system in which all students are classified annually or more frequently. The purpose of evaluation, therefore, as it is most frequently used in the existing educational systems, is primarily the grading and classifying of students.

The system of categorizing students is generally designed to approximate a normal distribution of marks (such as A, B, C, D, and F) at each grade or level. The results of categorizing individuals, according to Bloom et al., (1971) is to convince some that they are able, good, and desirable from the viewpoint of the system and others that they are deficient, bad, and undesirable.

For Bloom et al., evaluation is an attempt to describe, appraise, and in part influence the changes which take place rather than to analyze all the processes which bring them about. For these purposes Bloom et al., define evaluation as, ". . the systematic collection of evidence to determine whether in fact certain changes are taking place in the learners as well as to determine the amount or degree of change in individual students" (p. 8).

This view of evaluation is much broader in that the primary concerns of its uses are to improve teaching and learning. This view, according to Bloom et al., encompasses:

- (1) Evaluation as a method of acquiring and processing the evidence needed to improve the student's learning and the teaching.
- (2) Evaluation as including a great variety of evidence beyond the usual final paper and pencil examination.
- (3) Evaluation as an aid in clarifying the significant goals and objectives of education and as a process for determining the extent to which students are developing in these desired ways.
- (4) Evaluation as a system of quality control in which it may be determined at each step in the teachinglearning process whether the process is effective or not, and if not, what changes must be made to ensure its effectiveness before it is too late.
- (5) Finally, evaluation as a tool in education practice for ascertaining whether alternative procedures are equally effective or not in achieving a set of educational ends (pp. 7-8).

Evaluation is also concerned with the effectiveness of classroom teaching, curriculum improvement, the basis for instructional

classification and grouping, and facilitating of the guidance and counseling process. However, this study is primarily concerned with individual pupil evaluation and reporting practices with regard to the pupils academic achievement, aptitudes, and personal-social adjustment.

Ahmann and Glock (1975) indicate that educational measurement is the process that attempts to obtain a quantified representation of the degree to which a pupil reflects a trait. Pupil evaluation is a process in which a teacher commonly uses information derived from many sources to arrive at a value judgment.

Payne (1974) notes that the term educational assessment refers to:

. . . the collection and evaluation of data involving inputs to, transactions within, and outputs from an educational system. Measurement is the process of collecting, quantifying and ordering information on an individual, attribute, or object. Evaluation is the process of making value judgments about measurement data (p. 3).

Among the several types of educational measurements as notes by Ahmann and Glock (1975) are oral, essay objective, speed, power, mastery tests, verbal, nonverbal and performance tests, readiness, diagnostic, norm-referenced, criterion-referenced, and objective reference tests.

Stratemeyer et al. (1975) indicate the diversity of understanding concerning pupil evaluation by suggesting that in some schools, the primary means of evaluation are tests designed to check the pupil's acquisition of knowledge and skills. In other schools, evaluation includes the use of anecdotal and other types of records, day-to-day observations of the way learners deal with varied problems they face, and oral and written examinations calling for reasoned judgments of specific situations. Some schools view regular tests and report cards to parents as comprising an adequate evaluation of student growth and even of the curriculum itself. In other schools, parent-pupil-teacher conferences are held as needed to evaluate pupil progress and to plan better ways in which the school and home can supplement each other's efforts in guiding the learner toward agreed-upon goals.

Stratemeyer et al. (1957) ask, "What evidence of individual growth shall be gathered and appraised?" (p. 8). It is suggested that some educators would base evaluation on pupil responses to paper-and-pencil tests focused primarily upon factual knowledge, where others would use similar instruments but stress questions that require the use of knowledge in meeting a prescribed situation. Still others believe that such means of evaluation should be supplemented by behavioral responses as observed and recorded in cumulative records. This group, Stratemeyer et al., indicate, tends to favor the use of a number of additional evaluative instruments including sociograms, projective techniques, and evaluative conferences.

Stratemeyer et al. further note that measurement alone is not evaluation. When the evidence of progress is in, there is still much soul-searching and sometimes heartache when the time comes to translate this evidence into an evaluative statement for an individual student. Some teachers hold that pupil progress should be judged in terms of certain standards determined by educators. Other teachers believe that evaluation should be focused upon progress in terms of individual capacities and without reference to predetermined inclusive standards. Still others argue that evaluation should consider both the learner's

progress in terms of his/her possible growth and how that progress relates to general expectancies for individuals of his/her age range and general ability.

The concept of promotion is closely related to the foregoing. Stratemeyer et al. explain that some educators would promote a pupil only when pre-set standards are met, some favor automatic promotion, others would base a decision on action that promises the most for individual growth in the future.

Another relevant question which Stratemeyer et al. ask is, "How are learners and other persons to be involved in the evaluation process?" (p. 9). In one classroom the teacher grades all papers to insure accurate marking, as well as satisfying their distrusting nature. The teacher's record book contains the evidence of growth, entered in letter grades. In another classroom, teacher and learners together appraise written work. Pupil's notebooks contain a variety of evaluation devices (i.e., individual spelling lists, check lists of oralreading needs, reminders of special English errors, etc.). In one classroom, pupils help to phrase letters to parents reporting their progress. In another, pupils wait anxiously at report time to see what grade they will be given.

A variety of procedures indicate that some teachers see evaluation as an integral part of the learning process with teacher and learners reflecting on work done and planning next steps. Others see evaluation as periodic stocktaking by the teacher who then informs the pupil and his/her parents. Some teachers make evaluation an important part of daily learning experiences while others divorce the evaluative process from other activities.

The variety of evaluation techniques used by teachers are expressions of particular philosophical beliefs. These are delineated in Figure 4, p. 136.

Operational Framework

It was a basic assumption of this study (number three) that the manner in which a school (teachers and/or administrators) treat the variables that affect learning within the elementary school are expressions of particular philosophical beliefs. The treatment or manipulation of these variables by educators may be either conscious or unconscious treatments.

Therefore, in Figure 4, p. 136, an attempt to operationalize the Conceptual Framework has been made to implicitly interpret and identify the instructional strategies, organizational patterns, types of content selected, materials and resources utilized, physical make-up of the instructional environment, and evaluative procedures which the Supernaturalist and Naturalist philosophies of education purport.

The procedure for filling each cell in the Operational Framework was to adapt that which the literature proposed. As each philosophy of education was explored, looking into the nature of the learner, which in turn implicated certain beliefs about the nature of the learning process, certain views were reflected as to the nature of society and the role of the school in society. This ultimately leads to beliefs held as to the nature of knowledge. As a result, a harmonious pattern developed. Therefore, due to this harmonious, consistent pattern, certain operational practices seemed to naturally reflect the stated beliefs. The Operational Framework is a combination of existing operational practices and descriptive phrases which have been categorized as reflecting and/or identifying a particular philosophy of education.

A word of caution is necessary on the grounds that the interpretation of the Operational Framework is in no way inclusive and by no means complete.

		ESSENTIALISM	PERENNIALISM	EXPERIMENTALISM	EXIS'TEN'TIALISM
SELECTED VARIABLES THAT AFFECT LEARNING	Instructional Strategy	lecture, recitation, competition, drill, competency based instr- uction, imitation, pro- grammed instruction, teacher directed	lecture, recitation, memorization, drill, catechism, character training, stories told, mental calisthenics, teacher directed	project method, inquiry method, committee work, contracts, independent study, uni-packs, life related, individual dif- ferences	choices, human-center- ed, improvision, role playing, information sharing, socratic met- hod, intimately invol- ved, independent study
	Organizational Patterns	ability grouping, I.P.I. self-contained, homogen- eous grouping, large grouping	ability grouping, self- contained, departmental- ized, Platoon system, (1-4 and 5-6)	skill grouping, family grouping, non-graded, team teaching, interest grouping, differientia- ted staffing, flexible	heterogeneous grouping, dynamic, school with- out walls, maximizes personal interaction & dialogue, selected
	Content Selection	prescribed subject mat- ter, Isolated, basic skills, 3 R's, perpetu- ates way of life, Hist- ory, literature, human-	languages, the basics, "The Classics", ethics & morality, highly str- uctured, liberal stud- ies. Science, Math.	sequenced, selected to solve problems, social problem oriented, in- tegrated, process, art, music, drama	student selected, en- courages pupil to con- sider who he is & who he might be, contro- versy-priented, emo-
	Materials and Resources	ities, content oriented single textbook approa- ch, programmed mater- ials, teaching machines, teacher	litérature correlated material, Great Books, single text approach	multi-level materials, multi-media, community- oriented, service pro- jects, media centers, multi-sensory, scrap-	determined by want & desires of learner, encourages learner to consider who he is & who he might be, the
	Physical Environment	highly structured, environment not import- ant, screwed-down desks, focused on teacher, seated alphabetically	environment not related to teaching-learning process, "A place for everything & everything in its place, seating chart	books activity-centered, flex- ible, learning centers, moveable furniture, de- mocratic environment, decentralized, interest centers	Available culture Liberating, emotional environment, supports diversity, promotes self-direction, inter- play of pupil & envir- onment, options
S	Evaluation Techniques	low level cognitive questions, regurgitation of facts, comparative, letter grades, predeter- mined criteria, learn- is observable	grades on the curve, standardized, objective formal techniques, paper-pencil tests, re- gurgitation of facts, catechism	diagnostic instruments, profile sheet, contract, narrative reports, pupil-teacher-parent conferences, anecdotal records, descriptive	Feedback by invitation non-damaging, non-com- parative, subjective informal techniques, cooperative pupil & teacher evaluation

SELECTED PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION

Figure 4. Operational Framework
Representative Model of the

Elementary School

As another means of conceptualizing those elements, events, or phenomena comprising the elementary school involved in this study, the following four-dimensional model is presented in Figure 5, p. 139, as an alternative expression of the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks.

This model represents the elementary school. Each cube represents one of the four philosophies of education (vertical face), one of the four dimensions comprising the Philosophical Screens (horizontal face), and one of the six variables which teachers manipulate to affect learning (vertical side).

In examining one cube for the purpose of exploring its significance, the following explanation is offered. Looking at the singled-out cube, it can be seen that this cube is an expression of the Experimentalist philosophy of education. This philosophy of education has established particular views as to the nature of the learner. Looking back to the Conceptual Framework (Figure 2), and more explicitly Chapter III, it can be seen that the Experimentalist view of the learner is as an "experiencing organism," always changing. Therefore, based upon this philosophy's view of the learner, certain instructional strategies congruously lead to Philosophical Harmony which is an expression of the Experimentalist view of the learner. That is, not only does a philosophy of education hold certain beliefs as to the nature of the learner, which, in turn, are operationalized in instructional strategies used in the classroom but those same instructional strategies are expressions of one's view of the learner which is a belief held by that

philosophy. Previously mentioned research appears to be supportive of this position.

Similar explanations of the remaining 63 cells are applicable and possible, however, this shall be left for further research.







Philosophical Harmony

The Conceptual model (See Figure 6, p. 141) is an attempt to pictorially explain this studies' definition of Philosophical Harmony. That is, Philosophical Harmony (consistency, symmetry, congruency) is contingent upon a linear agreement within the Philosophical Screens, operationalized in the variables which teachers congruently manipulate, when reflecting either an Essentialist, Perennialist, Experimentalist, or Existentialist philosophy of education.

In other words, in looking at the model of Philosophical Harmony, it can be seen that the Existentialist philosophy of education holds certain beliefs and values which are in harmony concerning the nature of the learner, the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge. As a result, these values are operationalized equitably through the appropriate instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selection, resources and materials, physical environments, and evaluation techniques. Therefore, there is a linear agreement among all three dimensions (Philosophy of Education, Philosophical Screens, and the variables teachers manipulate to affect learning). This is Philosophical Harmony.

The antithesis of Philosophical Harmony would be an integration (mixture, combination, blend, heterogeneous relationship) of various variables teachers manipulate which, in turn, are expressions of a variety of philosophical beliefs as to the nature of the learner, the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge. There would not be a linear agreement in either dimension, but instead a combination of cells from all three dimensions. The condition is Philosophical Integration.



Figure 6. Philosophical Harmony

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Summary

In review, the criteria for conceptual systems was delineated prior to the explanation and presentation of the Conceptual Framework. This was followed by a discussion of the variables teachers manipulate to affect learning within the classroom. Based upon this discussion, an Operational Framework was explained and presented as an attempt to cross the bridge between theory and practice.

Chapter IV concluded with a representative model of the elementary school as an alternative expression of the Conceptual Framework. A pictorial expression of the concept of Philosophical Harmony was presented as well.

Chapter V explores the potential utility of the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks, as well as discussion future research and development of these conceptualizations.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

The validity of a conceptual system rests upon the theoreticians' use in gaining a perspective, in formulating theories, in building models and conducting research. Validity rests with the educational practitioner who attempts to visualize even blurred reflections of his daily concerns when utilizing a conceptual system. However, at this stage of development, the primary purpose of the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks is not that of utility, but rather one of clarity. At this point of development, it seems more important to clarify, and to raise questions as to the status of curriculum and instruction today. Any attempt to find immediate practical uses of these conceptualizations would probably be futile. Nevertheless, a tacit explanation as to the utility of the conceptualizations proposed is offered.

Utilization of the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks

Goodlad (1963), employing Parson's theoretical framework, identifies three levels of decision making in dealing with problems of curriculum and instruction. These are identified as the societal, institutional, and instructional levels. Myers (1970) suggests the types of decisions that should be made at each level, assuming one accepts Goodlad's conceptual scheme.

At the societal level, the board of education has three major responsibilities in curriculum and instruction. The first responsibility is that of articulating the values which guide the district's educational program. That is, it sees that the values or philosophy of the school district are interpreted. The second responsibility concerns the establishment of societal or global aims of the school district. And the third responsibility concerns the establishment of procedures for decision making.

At this level of decision making, the board of education, along with the superintendent, who mediates between the societal and institutional levels, could utilize the Conceptual Framework in identifying their respective philosophical orientations. As each board member has values which influence decisions, the process of identifying their respective philosophical orientations would permit greater insights as to the sources of their agreements or disagreements on appropriate values, aims, and procedures for guiding decision making.

The institutional level, according to Myers (1970), is usually thought of as the central office which consists of consultants, supervisors, and/or subject matter specialists. It is at this level of decision making that societal values are interpreted and societal aims are refined into institutional purposes. Societal procedures are refined into institutional procedures and decision making criteria are developed which reflects the board's statement of values. This level is primarily concerned with mediating between the various part of the organization and coordinating their efforts.

It is at the institutional level where major decisions regarding curriculum development are made. Both the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks would be useful in guiding the development of curricula. For example, program development could entail the Pragmatic approach, selecting what would seem to work in interpreting the societal values, aims and procedures. On the other hand, the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks would be instrumental in developing an instructional program based solely on one philosophical orientation.

All of the efforts employed at the societal and institutional levels are meant to provide teachers with objectives, procedures and criteria for decision making. This, then, is the concern of the instructional level. At this level, teachers develop instructional objectives and specify organizing centers (learning opportunities) that most effectively accomplish the instructional objectives. They utilize procedures established at the institutional level when making instructional decisions, as well as establishing criteria when making instructional decisions.

At the instructional level (included in this level is the building principal who preferably is instructionally oriented rather than operationally oriented), the principal and staff would probably find the most practical use of both the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks. Together, and separately, they could utilize them in the following ways:

(1) The principal, along with the team leaders, grade level chairpersons, or building master teachers, could coordinate and conduct a continuing in-service program. For example, the staff, over a sixmonth to year-long period of time, might engage in interaction, raising

questions, thereby soliciting a consensus of views as to what they, as a staff, believe about the nature of children, how children learn, the role of society and the role of the school in society, and the nature of knowledge. Once a consensus of beliefs had been identified, the staff might then be exposed to the Conceptual Framework for the purpose of identifying or classifying the general philosophy of education which appears to reflect their beliefs. At this point, a mission statement (statement of beliefs) could be drawn up to serve as the foundation of all decision making regarding the instructional program offered. This process would also be appropriate for the development of a new instructional program or as a re-evaluation of an existing program.

(2) If the staff has previously developed a mission statement, the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks could be used to identify whether Philosophical Harmony or Philosophical Integration best describes the school's primary focus. At this point, a re-examination of the mission statement and/or instructional focus would seem appropriate. For once a school has a mission statement, and more importantly has been involved in the year-long process of identifying their values and beliefs, the school would be better prepared to communicate its program to its patrons.

(3) If a school identified their primary focus as reflecting, or desiring to reflect, Naturalist philosophies of education, the Conceptual Framework, could serve as a menu of alternatives to choose from when planning for instruction. The establishment of a "school within a school" would be consistent with this focus.

(4) Finally, the individual teacher could employ both frameworks as a source or guide for personal re-evaluation. It could offer some insight and direction into establishing the degree of variance involved in the practice versus beliefs dilemma, thereby identifying their prevailing philosophy as reflecting a harmonious relationship or an integrated relationship. At that point, if the teacher believed a change or thorough examination of beliefs and/or practices was appropriate, the frameworks would be useful in facilitating this personal inquiry. For the value of such a Conceptual and Operational Framework is in the questions it might pose, rather in the answers it might offer.

Potential Research and Development

The following recommendations and considerations for future research and development of the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks exists:

(1) Further search of the literature would be helpful in identifying other philosophies of education than the four identified in this study (i.e., reconstructionism, distinguishing between Idealism and Realism).

(2) Further search of the literature could facilitate a more specific identification of the Ontological (nature of being or kinds of existence) and Axiological (nature of values) positions held by each philosophy, thereby adding another dimension to the study.

(3) The development of an instrument to identify those instructional strategies, organizational patterns, areas of content selected, materials and resources, physical environments, and evaluation techniques observed in use in the classroom and/or school building. The yielding of

a certain score on such a device would, therefore, portray the degree of Philosophical Harmony or Philosophical Integration. Such an instrument could provide evidence of reflecting what appears to be the philosophical implications of their classroom practices. At that point, individually or collectively, teachers and administrators could deal with the conclusions in whatever manner they wish. Whether they choose to strive for Philosophical Harmony or Philosophical Integration is their prerogative.

(4) Upon the administration of an instrument which yields evidence of a teacher's beliefs being an expression of a particular philosophy of education, followed by the identification of instructional strategies used, organizational patterns implemented, content selected, resources and materials used, physical environments established, and evaluation techniques employed by that particular classroom teacher, one might see if there is any particular statistical correlation.

Summary

It is evident from a search of the literature that past and present attempts in dealing with curriculum and curriculum development have focused upon rejecting theory and finding better ways of doing what is already being done rather than raising questions as to why it is we do what we do. The emphasis has been upon "improvement" rather than "understanding".

Evidence seems to authenticate the posture that issues and problems in education are a consequence of divided perceptions of reality and values. As a result, the critical educational issues are philosophical in nature. On this basis, it was demonstrated that a

need exists, on the part of educators who develop, plan, and implement the elementary school curricula, for a more serious consideration of the philosophical implications of those variables teachers manipulate to affect learning within the classroom.

A case has been built which suggests the lack of unifying structures which entertain the role of philosophy in guiding the development, planning, and implementation of the elementary school curriculum, much less the philosophical implications of educational practices. Therefore, a need for a more systematic treatment of philosophical issues and problems as they relate to the classroom, curriculum, and curriculum development has been established.

As a result of these concerns, Conceptual and Operational Frameworks have been posited to assess the degree of Philosophical Harmony within the elementary school. These frameworks were based on the premise that values establish belief systems, beliefs systems, in turn, engender attitudes, and attitudes breed behavior. As a consequence, the manner in which one behaves and the choices that one makes reflect one's basic attitudes, beliefs, and values. Based upon this premise, research appears to support the following assumptions:

(1) One's life philosophy is directly related to one's educational philosophy.

(2) Each educational philosophy contains beliefs concerning the nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge.

(3) The manner in which a school (teachers and/or administrators) treats the variables that affect learning within the school (such as, instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selection,

materials and resources, physical environment, and evaluation techniques) are expressions of particular philosophical beliefs.

(4) The treatment or manipulation of variables by educators may be conscious or unconscious.

(5) The nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge are reflected in the variables educators manipulate.

(6) The basic life beliefs and educational beliefs that a teacher adheres to will be reflected in the classroom.

Therefore, based upon these assumptions, it has been posited that by observing and identifying various instructional strategies, organizational patterns, content selected, materials and resources, physical environments, and evaluation techniques used by teachers, one can infer basic philosophical beliefs and values concerning the nature of the learner (mankind), the nature of learning, the nature of society, and the nature of knowledge.

In their present stage of development the Conceptual and Operational Frameworks have no immediate utilitarian value. If utility exists, it is couched in the questions the frameworks might raise rather than the answers they may provide. Nevertheless, with further research and development, suggestions have been posited at the societal, institutional, and instructional levels of decision making for conducting more relevant inquiries into developing, planning, and implementing the elementary school curriculum.

It seems apparent that educators might well afford to spend more time and effort examining the philosophic roots of specific educational issues and problems. If this implies that teachers be given greater opportunity for developing and understanding basic systems of philosophy, as well as understanding the lines of relationships connecting fundamental philosophic positions with education points of view, and, in turn, the connections of these to decisions teachers must make regarding classroom methods and procedures, then so be it. With this kind of exposure, teachers could become more astute in uncovering hidden or silent biases involved in recommendations to them to subscribe to current fads in curriculum and instruction, or in the findings of educational research. It is this concern that this study has attempted to focus upon.

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APPENDIX

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HISTORICAL TIME LINE

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HISTORICAL TIME LINE





VITA 🖘

Richard Graydon Dawson

Candidate for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

Thesis: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS THE DEGREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL HARMONY WITHIN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Major Field: Curriculum and Instruction

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