AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF

C. I. LEWIS' ETHICAL SYSTEM

By

HENRY GARLAND BENNETT, III

Bachelor of Arts

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma

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Thesis Approved:

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Thesis Adviser

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Dean of the Graduate School

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INTRODUCTION

Clarence Irving Lewis has presented a system of ethical principles which he has asserted to be the proper guide for all human activity. This system is purported to be a cognitive one; that is, it is one the principles of which may be known in terms of meaningful, verifiable apprehensions. The justification of this system is thus based upon Lewis' epistemology.

According to Lewis, knowledge is composed of <u>correct</u> cognitions. Cognitions may be either analytic or empirical according to the nature of the verification involved. The basic assumption which Lewis makes, and which he takes care to point out, is that all men, in facing the facts of life, <u>acknowledge</u> the existence of an objective reality--a reality external to the self. It is this reality, as it is known, which provides the ultimate standard for judging the correctness of any judgment which is capable of affecting human life.

Since the justification of Lewis' system of ethics is based upon his epistemology, this basis must be discussed. As knowledge results from cognitions and is composed of correct cognitions, the elements of cognition will be discussed with emphasis placed upon those points which are deemed to be essential to Lewis' justification. The two types of cognition distinguished by Lewis (the analytically verifiable and the empirically verifiable) contain a judgment which is of something not immediately apprehended but is based upon what is so apprehended. It

is the judgment which is to be verified.

Apprehension must therefore be discussed. Three types of appre-
hension will be pointed out: 1) apprehension of immediately given sense
data only 2) analytical apprehension and 3) empirical apprehension. Of
these three types only the latter two are found to be cognitive i.e., to
possess the potentiality of becoming knowledge. However, it will be noted
that apprehensions of the first type are necessary components of empirical
apprehensions.

Analytic apprehensions, according to Lewis, deal with meanings and
meaning-relations which may result in analytic knowledge. All knowledge
and all cognitions which are analytic are also a priori, and the converse
also holds: all that is a priori is analytic. There is simply no know-
ledge which may be classified as synthetic a priori. Since a priori
knowledge is knowledge of meanings and meaning-relations, the four types
distinguished by Lewis will be discussed. These types of meaning are
extension, comprehension, intension, and signification. The discussion
of the types of meaning is presented in an effort to answer two questions
which are relevant to a priori knowledge and analytically verifiable
apprehensions in general: 1) What is meant by meaning? and 2) What, pre-
cisely, is the connection between meaning and knowledge?

A discussion of analytically verifiable apprehensions, the nature
and types of meaning, and a priori knowledge is deemed necessary to pro-
vide an adequate explanation of Lewis' justification of ethical knowledge,
because this justification depends upon his claim that the proposed
system of ethical principles is consistent and that the principles them-
selves are "objects" of pragmatically a priori knowledge. In just what
manner these principles are a priori is to be ascertained; thus, the

discussion of meaning and meaning-relations must be undertaken. However, the pragmatic element must also be considered since the principles require empirical justification of their usefulness as principles of the morally right. The consideration of the pragmatic element requires that attention be focused upon the nature of empirically verifiable apprehensions.

While the judgment contained in an analytic cognition is of meaning-relations, the judgment which an empirical cognition contains concerns matters of objective fact and is based, at least partially, upon immediately given sense data. An adequate discussion of empirical knowledge must include what is _given_ in experience, the part played by the "mind" in an empirical cognition, the types of empirical judgment, and the methods of justification and verification of empirical judgments. Empirical justification is a major point of concern here since any judgment of the moral rightness of an act is to be so justified.

Lewis' justification of his ethical system has, as its aim, the determination of the consistency of the _a priori_ nature of the ethical principles with the analytic and _a priori_ in general. The empirical implications and determinants of these principles must also be explained in a satisfactory manner. The justification, in other words, must show that the combination of ethical rationalism with ethical naturalism is consistent with Lewis' epistemology.

The ethical principles are _a priori_ in that they are _definitive of right_, and analytically derived statements of the principles are _a priori_ in that they are true by definition. The rightness of an act is determined by the consequences of that act, and rightness is therefore determined by means of an empirical justification. Furthermore, the empirical element of the ethical system also includes the acknowledgment

of the fact of the social aspect of human life. Lewis makes the combination of the empirical with the analytic elements by means of his conception of the pragmatically a *priori*. Thus, a discussion of the pragmatically a *priori* will be needed in conjunction with the discussion of Lewis' justification. And, both of these discussions rely in a large measure upon a detailed description of the analytical and empirical elements of knowledge.

Cognitions result in knowledge if the cognitive judgments which they contain are correct. In other words, a meaningful apprehension is considered to be knowledge if the criteria of knowledge are met by the apprehension. So, the criteria of knowledge will be enumerated. This enumeration is also necessary in order to explain the manner in which the principles of the morally right may be known. The principles of the morally right form a cognitive system, and apprehension of the moral principles stands in need of justification as much as any other apprehension. Thus, a morally evaluative cognition will be either correct or incorrect.

The question of whether any cognition is correct or incorrect is essentially the question of whether the cognitive judgment is right or wrong. The moral sense of right and wrong, however, cannot immediately be identified with right and wrong in general. A discussion of the justification of moral judgments requires a preliminary discussion of general value theory if for no other reason than to clarify terminology. Another equally, if not more, important reason for including a discussion of general value theory is (to show) in just what the justification of an evaluative judgment (of which moral judgments are a type) consists.

The justification of ethical principles also includes consideration of results of particular acts undertaken in view of the ethical principles.

Acts must therefore be distinguished from behavior in general, and also from action in general. This distinction also serves to illustrate the connection of epistemology, act, evaluation, and ethics. Since moral judgments are justified by results of particular acts based upon them, there must be some result which serves as a criterion of justification. At this point, a discussion of value, valuation, and comparative value will be presented. Values which are objective are distinguished from subjective values. It is held by Lewis that good and bad are objective values and are thus attributable to objects and events. The morally right, however, is attributable to acts and to the doers of the acts. Whether an act and the doer of it are morally right, and whether the result of the act possesses comparative good, are all matters of fact; and, as matters of fact, they are proper "objects" of cognition and can be known in one of the manners discussed in connection with Lewis' epistemology.

Lewis' justification seeks to establish that the moral principles are a priori and are imperatives of the morally right; yet, at the same time, it must account for the empirical element in our knowledge of the moral principles. This is attempted by making the distinction between the moral principles and the grounds of the moral principles. The grounds of the moral principles are simply acknowledged and remain un- changed. The moral principles are amenable to alteration or may be abandoned in the face of empirical situations which are new or changing and which repeatedly do not justify the moral principles as being the correct guides to right acts. The moral principles are the result of interpretations of the concept of the basic moral imperative. His argument for the pragmatically a priori nature of the moral principles

comes in for a large amount of criticism. Much of this criticism consists
of the complaint that Lewis doesn't develop his concepts of good and jus-
tice. This is, however, more of a complaint than a valid criticism even
though it is perhaps a well-founded complaint. Lewis makes some mention
of what the good is _not_, but he does not attempt to explain his concept
of good nor does he pursue any discussion of the nature of justice. There
are, on the other hand, two criticisms of Lewis' justification which are
serious, well-taken, and to which an adequate justification must provide
answers. The objection raised by William K. Frankena is representative
of the criticism of the cognitive nature of Lewis' system. The objection
raised by Hans Reichenbach is representative of the criticism of Lewis'
assertions to the effect that there must be _a priori_ principles as a
guide to morally right acting. Both of these types of objection will be
outlined and set against Lewis' justification.

A detailed exposition of Lewis' justification of his system of
ethical principles will show that there are indeed some shortcomings in
the justification. These shortcomings include those points which are
attacked by the two types of objection mentioned above. Lewis' justi-
fication cannot stand in the face of these objections. However, in _Our_
Social Inheritance, Lewis seemed to be aware of these difficulties and
began to rework his justification. This alteration, though, was never
completed and stands in need of clarification and further development.
The more recent justification, it is suggested, can be developed in such
a manner as to answer the mentioned objections and, at the same time,
remain consistent with his epistemology and with his system of ethics.
It is this suggestion which is the thesis of this entire presentation.

CHAPTER I

THE ELEMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE

Experience, Knowledge, and Reality

In an exposition of a theory of knowledge, the assumptions underlying
the particular theory are the first items of concern. Perhaps the most
fundamental assumption which has been made by Lewis is that of an inde-
pendent reality. Lewis considers the existence of an independent reality
to be so evident that he categorically asserts that _everyone_ acknowledges
it.[1] From this, it follows that there is some relationship between an
individual as the knower and what is external to the individual as the
known. There must be some means by which independent reality, at least
in part, becomes known by the individual, or, in other words, there must
be some manner in which the individual becomes aware of the existence of
something external to himself. As a first approximation, it might be
said that a person experiences independent reality.

Experience, however, is not a precise term. It can be used to
refer either to a passive or to an active mental state; but, when Lewis
writes of cognitive experience, it is evident that he is using the term

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[1]"Independent reality is not something to be proved but an original
acknowledgment which all men make confronting the facts of life." C. I.
Lewis, "Realism or Phenomenalism?" _Philosophical Review_ (LXIV, 2: 1955),
p. 238.

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."experience" with reference to an active mental state.[2] Furthermore,

only an active being is held to be capable of knowing.[3]

To this point, it appears that an active being may experience a

reality external to that being. What is to be considered next is the

subject-object relation involved in experience and how this relation may

result in knowledge. Knowledge results from cognition, although not all

cognitions result in knowledge. Cognitions which result in knowledge are

those which meet the criteria of knowledge.

Lewis, in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, suggests four

criteria of knowledge:

> "(1) Knowledge must be apprehension of or belief in what
> is true or is fact, as against what is false or is not fact. . .
> "(2) Cognition generally, or the content of it, must have
> meaning in the sense that something is signified, believed in,
> or asserted which lies beyond or outside of the cognitive ex-
> perience itself. . .
> "(3) Knowledge must have a ground or reason. . .[and]
> holding of belief in the absence of any warrant or justifying
> consideration is not to be classed as knowledge even when it
> happens to accord with the facts. . .
> "(4) Knowledge, or at least knowledge in the best and
> quite strict sense, must be certain."[4]

Immediately following this enumeration of the criteria of knowledge,

Lewis takes care to point out that it would be very difficult so to de-

fine knowledge as to insist upon the simultaneous application of all

four criteria.

In any given situation, one criterion might be applicable when

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[2]"First, it is requisite to point out that knowing be an assertive
state of mind." C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation
(Open Court, 1962), p. 9. In subsequent references Analysis of Know-
ledge and Valuation will be abbreviated A.K.V.

[3]Cf. A.K.V., p. 17.

[4]A.K.V. p. 27.

another criterion would not. However, each of these criteria reflect

the consideration that knowledge has an apposit: the possibility of

error. There is thus another consideration necessary in proper appli-

cation of the criteria:

> "In these conventions, the ruling consideration in each
> case, is the contrast of knowledge with some corresponding
> kind of possible error."[5]

It seems, then, that a description of knowledge might very well begin

with a discussion of meaning and of apprehension; for, meaning and appre-

hension are held to be the "fundamental cognitive phenomena."[6]

Meaning and Apprehension

Modes of Meaning. Traditionally, meaning has been characterized as

having two modes: the extensional (denotative) mode and the intensional

(connotative) mode. Lewis has designated two additional modes of mean-

ing: comprehension and signification.[7]

The denotation, or extension, of a term is that class of things to

which the term is correctly applied. The extension of a term is limited

to actually existing things; so, if a term names a null class, the term

is said to have zero extension. Even though a term may have zero ex-

tension, it may still have a denotative potentiality. And, it is just

such potentiality which distinguishes terms with zero extension from

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[5] A.K.V., p. 30.

[6] Cf. A.K.V., p. 37.

[7] Meaning is predicated of terms, and Lewis defines a term as
". . .an expression capable of naming or applying to a thing or things,
of some kind." A.K.V., p. 39. Cf. A.K.V., pp. 38-41.

what Lewis calls "nonsense-locutions."[8]

All those things to which a term might be applied correctly comprise the "comprehension" of that term. Thus, the extension of a term is included in its comprehension; the converse, however, does not hold.

The _essence_ of a thing correctly named by a term consists of those attributes of the thing named which are necessary for the proper application of that term. The total essential character of a thing nameable by a term is the "signification" of that term.[9]

Intension (or connotation) simply refers to the intention in the use of a term. Intensional meaning is that mode of meaning which

> ". . .expresses in that simplest and most frequent sense
> [that] which is the original meaning of meaning; that sense
> in which what we mean by 'A' is what we have in mind in
> using 'A', and what is oftentimes spoken of as the concept
> of A."[10]

The intension of a term may be interpreted either as _sense meaning_ or as _linguistic meaning_, so it is necessary to distinguish these two interpretations.

If a consistent logical system is taken as an example, it can be seen that every proposition within the system has meaning _only_ in relation to the other propositions contained in the system. There is no criterion of meaning applicable to these propositions which is external to the system itself. In terms of this analogy, the criteria of meaning for words, phrases, and statements would be solely in terms of other words, phrases, and statements. However, such a system in and of

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[8]_A.K.V._, p. 40.

[9]"Abstract terms are those which name what some other term signifies. . . Non-abstract terms are _concrete_." _A.K.V._, p. 41.

[10]_A.K.V._, p. 43.

itself cannot determine analytic truth except, in a twisted sense, that

which is set up by convention. It is this interpretation of intensional

meaning which is referred to as <u>linguistic meaning</u>. Linguistic meaning

deals only with structural relationships of meanings and is thus inde-

pendent of empirical fact (which is one criterion of analytic truth).

But, the explanation of its independence shows that it is achieved by

virtue of removing from such analytic statements

> ". . .any character of <u>truth</u>; or at least by <u>abstracting</u>
> <u>from</u> any character of analytic statements [that] by virtue of
> which they could be either true or false."[11]

There is, in linguistic meaning, no significance found in analytic

truth beyond that of such linguistic conventions as syntax and defi-

nitions. Lewis thus makes the assertion that

> ". . .the conventions of language determine no analytic truth
> but only how it may be expressed. They are a factor in the
> analytic truth of statements only because correct expression
> of a relation which holds is essential to the truth of state-
> ments."[12]

If expressions have meaning only in relation to other expressions,

then all use of language would amount to nothing more than an abstract

deductive logical system in which meanings could be determined only by

<u>conventional</u> relationships.

The other aspect of intensional meaning is known as <u>sense meaning</u>.

Sense meaning is that interpretation of the intensional meaning of an

expression which refers to the signification of the expression. The

relations of sense meanings serve as criteria for the application of

expressions. For example, the sense meaning of "dog" will include

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[11] <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 147.

[12] <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 156.

"canine" and exclude "feline." Sense meaning is <u>not</u> denotation. The denotation of an expression is dependent upon the existence of what is meant; there is no such dependence in the case of sense meaning. As an aspect of intension, sense meaning is "in the mind." Thus, Lewis holds sense meaning to indicate ". . .intension as a criterion in mind."[13]

It is the sense meaning of an expression which enables one to determine whether to apply that expression to any given situation ("real" or imaginary) correctly. In a "purely" analytic sense, it is evident that for there to be any sense meaning, there must be a capacity for imagination. Imagination, <u>prior</u> to any experience, provides ". . .a workable criterion for applying or refusing to apply an expression under all circumstances of presentation."[14]

Sense meaning is not, however, simply that meaning which is contained in imagery. It is also a <u>schema</u>. The sense meaning of a term indicates a procedure and a procedural result which serve as criteria of applicability for the term. And, while the applicability of a term is determined by its sense meaning, the sense meaning of a statement (couched in "sense presentable characters") determines the truth or falsity of that statement.[15] The relationships of sense meanings are not subject to arbitrary linguistic conventions. Analytically true statements are, of course, true independently of any given empirical situation. Another requirement is imposed: that there be no theoretical limit

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[13] <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 133.

[14] <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 134.

[15] That "sense presentable characters" may have been provided by the imagination is irrelevant to the determination of analytic truth, because there is no denotation involved.

imposed upon the possible confirmation of such a statement.

It is intention in the form of sense meaning which makes analytic truth independent of any arbitrary conventions of language. Linguistic meaning serves only to determine the _mode of expression_ of analytic truth; it is a necessary part of analytic truth because the truth of statements includes correct expression. The fundamental consideration for analytic truth is thus ". . .the relations of testable and sense-recognizable characters which are our criteria of classification and of the application of verbal expressions."[16]

Concepts. The mode of expression, or structure of an analytic statement is called a _concept_. Since "The notion of a concept as such is its internal (essential or definitive) relationships with other concepts,"[17] conceptualization is thus an analytic process, the results of which may be determined as correct or incorrect. Since the concept is a definitive structure of relationships of meanings, the criterion of consistency is to be applied as a test for the correctness of any conceptual relation. Concepts represent those definitive classifications brought by mental processes to an apprehension (whether the apprehension is analytic or empirical) which render the apprehension cognitive.

Types of apprehension. There are, according to Lewis, three distinct types of apprehension: 1) apprehension of immediately given sense data only; 2) those apprehensions which are empirically verifiable; and 3) those apprehensions which are analytically verifiable or confirmable.[18]

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[16] _A.K.V._, p. 156.

[17] C. I. Lewis, _Mind and the World Order_ (Dover, 1956), p. 83. In subsequent references, _Mind and the World Order_ will be abbreviated _M.W.O._

[18] _A.K.V._, p. 30.

Apprehensions of the second and third types are meaningful, while those of the first type are not. The suggestion made here is that only _meaning-ful_ apprehensions may properly be called cognitive.

The first type of apprehension--that of immediately given sense data only--cannot, in and of itself, be considered as cognitive. In the first place, this type of apprehension implies a strictly passive mental state, while the cognitive mental state is an active one. Of the fundamental cognitive criteria, that of meaning is absent in such an apprehension. Immediately given sense data do not categorize themselves. Consequently, apprehensions of this type simply result in some sort of "feeling;" for, it is the missing analytical element, the concept, which provides the meanings that are necessary for any determination of correctness. Secondly, such apprehensions could not result in knowledge because they are immediate and complete in and of themselves and thus admit of no possibility of error. The lack of the possibility of error prevents this type of apprehension from being cognitive. Finally, even though such apprehensions are certain, they do not involve any ground or reason for holding a belief nor do they make an assertion about anything beyond or external to the experience itself. Apprehensions of immediate sense data only are not cognitive and cannot, by themselves, result in knowledge.

While apprehensions of immediate sense data only are not in and of themselves cognitive, such apprehensions are definitely a part of cogni-tive experience. If the element of mental activity is added to sense apprehension, the second type of apprehension--empirically verifiable apprehension--results. According to Lewis, "The content of cognition is belief. What is so believed is some objective state of affairs."[19]

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[19] Lewis, "Realism or Phenomenalism?" op cit., p. 236.

This notion of cognition is further explained in the second criterion of knowledge by asserting that cognitions must have meaning in terms of something lying beyond or external to the cognitive experience itself.[20] An empirically verifiable cognition asserts a proposition about an as yet to be experienced empirical situation on the basis of a now present apprehension. Such an assertion is made possible by the proper application of concepts to the given sense data. Knowledge based upon empirically verifiable apprehensions (empirical cognitions) depends upon verification of the cognitive assertion for its assurance of truth.

Actual verification is <u>not</u>, however, a criterion of meaning. Empirical meaning <u>does</u> involve conceivable verifiability. An empirical cognition might very well be meaningful; yet, due to practical or theoretical difficulties, it might not result in knowledge because of the lack of verification. An apprehension of this type might assert that there is some form of life present on the planet Saturn. While this assertion has not been verified, it is still a meaningful assertion. The primary requirement for empirical verifiability, according to Lewis, is

> ". . .that we should be able to analyze the supposed connection between the projected verifying experience and what is actually given. . .in such wise that this procedure of verification can be envisaged in analogy with operations that can actually be carried out."[21]

In short, empirically verifiable apprehensions are those which may be expressed by terms having denotative potentiality.

Apprehensions of the third type--those which are analytically

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[20]<u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 27.

[21]C. I. Lewis, "Experience and Meaning." <u>Philosophical Review</u> (XLIII, 2; 1934), p. 139.

verifiable--are also cognitive. What is "given" in this case are the
definitive relations of sense meanings of a statement or expression, and
the assertions made on the basis of the given meaning-relations are about
further relations implicit in those which are given. These apprehensions
are cognitive--possessed of the potentiality for knowledge--as was pointed
out above, because there is the possibility of error in the process of
inferring the implicit relations from those which are given. If such
inferences are consistent, then the relations are verified as certain;
hence, the truth claim of the assertion is validated, and knowledge has
resulted from an analytically verifiable apprehension.

There are thus two types of apprehension which are cognitive. If
cognitions may result in knowledge and if cognitions are meaningful
apprehensions, then, since the meanings of one type of cognition are
connotative and those of the other type are denotative, it follows that
there are two types of knowledge: analytic knowledge and empirical know-
ledge, respectively.

CHAPTER II

THE TWO TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

Since knowledge is <u>correct</u> cognition, the determination of the
truth-claims of cognitions is a necessary condition of knowledge.
This involves the notion of verifiability. As was noted above, those
apprehensions which are cognitive are verifiable, but some cognitions
are analytically verifiable while others are empirically verifiable.
The two types of verifiability give rise to the two types of knowledge.

Analytic Knowledge

<u>Analytic</u> knowledge is the type of knowledge which results from
the verification of analytically verifiable apprehensions. Verifi-
cation is taken here to be the certification of the truth-claim of a
cognition. In the case of cognitions which are analytically verifiable,
such certifications will involve the relationships of meanings.

Coincidence of the <u>a priori</u> and the analytic. A preliminary point
to be made is that ". . .the <u>a priori</u> and the analytic coincide."[1]
All analytic knowledge is <u>a priori</u> in that 1) it is completely independent
of empirical matters of fact, and 2) it is necessary. Lewis also con-
tends that all <u>a priori</u> knowledge is also analytic knowledge.[2] (For

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[1]<u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 35.

[2]Cf. <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 35.

the purpose of the present description of analytic knowledge, "analytic knowledge" and " a priori knowledge" will be used synonymously.)

The characteristics of a priori truths should suffice to describe a priori knowledge, since it is composed entirely of such truths. The manner in which a priori truths are discovered is also the manner in which the verification of the analytically verifiable apprehensions is accomplished. Lewis asserts that there are three factors in determining a priori truths: 1) linguistic expression; 2) methods of choosing our classificatory procedures; and 3) relationships of sense meanings.[3]

The conditions of necessity and independence from any and all empirical situations must be met if a statement is to be analytically verified. If the statement, "All men are mortals," is considered, the a priori truth of that statement is apprehended only by knowing that all men are necessarily mortals. It is the nature of such necessity and how it can be known which constitutes the epistemological problem.[4] Analytically true statements are not necessary in the sense of forcing themselves upon the mind. Rather, they are logically necessary.[5]

There are two types of analytic statement: those which are implicit and those which are explicit. An explicit analytic statement asserts the logical necessity of something. An implicit analytic statement asserts something which is logically necessary but does not assert that it is logically necessary.[6] "All men are mortals," is implicitly

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[3] Cf. A.K.V., p. 156f.

[4] Cf. A.K.V., p. 150.

[5] "A statement is logically necessary if and only if the contradiction of it is self-inconsistent." A.K.V., p. 89.

[6] Cf. A.K.V., p. 89.

analytic, while "All men are necessarily mortals." is explicitly analytic. Since necessity is used in the sense of logical necessity, the relationships of meanings are determinants of whether a particular statement is one which makes a necessary assertion. Such relationships in and of themselves are not, however, sufficient for the determination of analytic truth.

Definition and classification. The relationships of meanings are not fixed (and therefore not necessary) until definitions have been made and accepted. Analytic statements are certified by means of the definitive meanings of the terms involved in addition to the syntactic structure of the statement. However, the definitions themselves must be analytically certain; otherwise, all that is inferred from them would not be analytically true.[7] Such definitions must be fixed, and, at the same time, not be dependent upon linguistic conventions alone for their meanings. Definitive meanings must also be intensional, because an analytic statement is independent of any empirical matter of fact, and this consideration would eliminate the denotative mode of meaning from consideration here. Also, since such fixed definitions determine the relationships of meanings present in analytic statements, the linguistic mode of intensional meaning cannot be used. The necessary definitive meanings are thus those of the sense meaning mode of intension.

Once the definitional meanings are fixed, all analytical statements which are consistently derived from the definitions will be true and certain a priori. The definitions comprise that which is given in an analytically verifiable apprehension. What is asserted by such

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[7]Cf. A.K.V., p. 130.

apprehensions are further implied relationships of meanings. The relationship between the given and what is asserted in an analytically verifiable apprehension, in a word, is essentially that which holds between implicitly and explicitly analytic statements. (The definition is implicitly analytic, and the deduced statement is explicitly analytic.)

Of the three factors, the definitional relationships of sense meanings fix the other types of meaning-relations and thus provide the criteria of correctness for analytic statements. It is only by virtue of such definitions that the signification of expressions may be determined. A _priori_ truth does not arise from modes of classification or from linguistic formulation, it arises when the definitive sense meaning relationships ". . .are the basis of classification and of the application of linguistic expressions."[8]

Symbolic relations. Classifications and linguistic expressions are fixed by the definitive sense meaning relationships; they are _not_, therefore, merely arbitrary conventions. This leaves only such symbols as are used in the verbal expressions which may be arbitrarily determined in the form of linguistic conventions. Symbols are used to represent the already fixed meaning relations. The result of such symbolism is language. Again, however, once a symbol is used to designate a particular meaning relation, that symbol has become fixed according to the meanings to which it refers. When various meaning relations have been assigned symbols, the relationships of these symbols are expressed by linguistic conventions. These linguistic expressions are analytic, and the symbolic relationships have intensional meaning in the mode of

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[8] A.K.V., p. 153.

linguistic meaning.

If the underlying sense meanings are taken into account, linguistic conventions are seen to have constant meanings. The proposed relationships between symbols can thus be validated by showing that the proposed relations are consistent with the constant meanings of the pertinent linguistic conventions. All formal analytic statements are verifiable by reference to definitive meanings and the relationships which they express.

Formal logic has often been taken as a sufficient method of certifying a priori truth. Although all of those statements which belong to logic are formal analytic statements, all such statements are not included in logic. The only verification of a logical system consists in meeting the requirement that its principles must be true a priori. But, if the test of logical rules is that they be statements which are true a priori, their assurance of analytic truth ultimately is dependent upon that part of their meaning which is not formal. Once more, the relationships of sense meanings stand as the criteria of a priori, or of analytic, truth.

In summary, linguistic conventions make possible the verbal expression of meaning relations. These conventions are a necessary factor because ". . .no statement could be determined as true or not, or as analytic or not, without reference to the verbal expression of it."[9] The criteria which govern proper classification are indicated by the intensional relations of one expression to another. The reference here, though, is still to verbal expressions. After meanings as criteria of application have been verbalized, the relationships of verbal expressions are no longer merely conventional, but have become fixed. So, the final test of the a priori truth of a statement lies in the relationships of

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[9] A.K.V., p. 155.

sense meanings.

> "[Analytic knowledge,] . . .like the meanings it concerns, is
> essentially independent of linguistic formulation, though the
> modes of linguistic expression are a frequent and more or less
> reliable clue to the relationships of meanings so expressed."[10]

Analytic (a priori) knowledge is thus composed of those cognitions
whose assertions are verifiable in terms of their intensional meanings.
Cognitions which are not so verifiable but require a relation of mean-
ing to particular experience form the content of empirical knowledge.
Analytic knowledge holds for all possible (consistently thinkable) uni-
verses, while empirical knowledge is only of what actually is the case.
In a word, the distinction between analytic and empirical knowledge is
that between what can be known a priori and what cannot be so known.

Empirical Knowledge

As was noted at the beginning of the first chapter, empirical
reality (reality external to the individual) does not need to be proven;
it needs only to be acknowledged. The problem of empirical knowledge

> ". . .is not to prove the objectively real and the possibility
> of our empirical cognition of it, but to formulate correctly
> those criteria which delimit empirical reality and explicate
> our sense of it."[11]

Lewis' solution of this problem includes the elements of empirical cog-
nition, empirical judgments, and the distinction between verification and
justification.

Empirical cognition. Empirical cognitions cannot be validated or
certified as knowledge except ultimately through sense experience. In

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[10] A.K.V., p. 167.

[11] A.K.V., p. 361.

general, an empirical cognition contains what is given in experience and the interpretation placed upon the given by mental activity as well as the assertion made upon the basis of the experience at hand.

The element of sense experience which is _not_ dependent upon any mental activity is "the given." The given cannot be verbally described since this, in itself, would require mental activity. It is an abstraction, but this in no way diminishes its importance to empirical cognition.[12] The given is always constant and remains so even though different interpretations may be placed upon it. The given is thus that element _in_ experience which is not created by thinking and cannot generally be displaced or altered[13]; it is simply given.[14] "The given," as an abstracted element, is not to be found in isolation, but is identifiable only in experience.[15]

The given is recognized by means of _qualia_. Lewis introduces this term to describe ". . .recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences."[16] It is by means of _qualia_ that awareness of the given is possible. _Qualia_ are, however, entirely subjective and immediate. Thus, they do not have any temporal duration (although they are repeatable in experience) and cannot be the objects of knowledge.

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[12]". . .the condemnation of abstractions is the condemnation of thought itself. Nothing that thought can ever comprise is other than some abstraction which cannot exist in isolation." _M.W.O._, p. 55.

[13]Cf. _M.W.O._, p. 48.

[14]"It is of the essence of what will be meant by 'the given' that it should be given." _M.W.O._, p. 65.

[15]Cf. _M.W.O._, p. 66

[16]_M.W.O._, p. 121.

In analyzing empirical knowledge

"Our interest is . . . .in the element of givenness in what we
may, for usual and commonplace reasons, mark off as 'an ex-
perience' or 'an object.' This given element in a single ex-
perience of an object is what will be meant by a presentation.'"[17]

A presentation is thus composed of a quale or of a complex of qualia.

However, while qualia are recognizable from one experience to another,

a presentation is unique.

A presentation, since it is composed of qualia (which are immediate,

complete, and thus in no need of further verification), is not cognitive.

However, when categories are applied to a presentation, meaning-relations

are introduced by which one experience may be compared with another.

Such meaning-relations applied to sense presentations enable one to make

assertions about something other than the immediate experience. These

assertions are empirical judgments. The presentations provide the

"sensory cues" to empirical knowledge, but the cognitive significance of

an empirical apprehension does not lie in the givenness of sensory cues

alone; it lies in such predictions as are based upon them.[18]

Empirical judgments. Empirical judgments may be stated, generally,

in one of two possible ways: either hypothetically or categorically.

When an empirical judgment is expressed in the form of a hypothetical

statement, the prediction or assertion of the judgment concerns the con-

sequences of a particular action. A judgment of this type is verifiable

by acting in the proposed manner and noting the consequences. Such a

judgment might be expressed in the following fashion: "If I find myself

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[17]M.W.O., pp. 59-60.

[18]Cf. A.K.V., p. 178.

in a given situation, then, if I follow a particular course of action, specific consequences of that action will occur." or, "Given situation S, if action A is performed, consequent C will result."[19] Any empirical judgment of this type is capable of being conclusively verified, and a conclusively verifiable empirical judgment is called a "terminating judgment." These judgments always entail a ". . .prediction of a particular passage of experience.[20]

Most empirical judgments are concerned with objective properties of events and things rather than with consequences of particular modes of action. These judgments may be stated categorically; for example, it may be asserted that X is a property of Y. Such judgments of objective fact are called "non-terminating judgments" because there are always further verifications which can never be actually carried out.

Although non-terminating judgments cannot be conclusively verified, this does not imply that they are intrinsically unverifiable. What is implied here is that while everything included in a non-terminating judgment is expressible by a terminating judgment, ". . .no limited set of particular predictions of empirical eventualities can completely exhaust the significance of such an objective statement."[21]

Empirical cognitions which make categorical assertions, although they may never be completely verified, nevertheless are meaningful and may give rise to "knowledge which is probable." The significance of

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[19]Cf. A.K.V., pp. 173-174, 184.

[20]A.K.V., p. 181. It should be noted that the conclusive verification of consequent C is of the expected (or predicted) immediate experience of consequent C.

[21]A.K.V., p. 184.

empirical knowledge is for action,[22] so such knowledge has, as one cri-
terion, the determination of the categorically stated empirical judgment
as rationally credible. Rather than being conclusively verified, an
empirically verifiable apprehension needs only to be _justified_ in order
to function as knowledge.

Verification and empirical justification. The distinction made
between verification and justification in the case of empirical judg-
ments does not hold in the case of analytic judgments, since the rational
credibility and the truth of analytic statements coincide. Some empirical
"laws" are quite convincingly justified, but they are not (and probably
never will be) conclusively verified. If an empirically verifiable appre-
hension is rationally credible, then one may proceed _as if_ the assertion
of the cognition were true. This does not suggest, however, that all
further attempts to verify such a cognition should summarily cease.
Even a well-justified cognition may be shown, at some later date, to be
incorrect.

The objective beliefs (non-terminating judgments) are practical
judgments, and the characteristic motives of empirical knowledge are con-
cern for as yet to be verified assertions. According to Lewis,

> "It is the function of empirical judgment to save us the
> hazards of actions without foresight. And in this fact
> lies the significance of the justification of knowledge
> as distinguished from the verification of it."[23]

A prime consideration in dealing with the validity of empirical
knowledge is whether an empirical cognition is warranted or justified.[24]

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[22] Cf. _A.K.V._, p. 4.

[23] _A.K.V._, p. 257.

[24] Cf. Lewis, "The Given Element in Empirical Knowledge," _Philosophical Review_ (LXI, 2; 1952), p. 174.

Empirical judgments are generally based upon past experience,[25] and past experience is given, <u>at the moment of cognition</u>, in the form of imagination; and, any reports of the experience of others will be data given in our own first-person experience.[26] Thus,

> ". . .when knowledge is envisaged, as it must be, from within the egocentric predicament, all objects known or conceived must reveal themselves as constructions, eventually, from data given in first-person experience."[27]

Since empirical judgments are made from within the egocentric predicament and generalizations are made on the basis of data brought from memory, empirical knowledge is not certain--it is probable. This does <u>not</u> mean, however, that there is no certainty to be found anywhere in the structure of empirical knowledge. Both the definitional relations brought to the experience and the <u>presentational</u> element of the experience are, in and of themselves, certain. It is the interpretation placed upon the presentation that is subject to error and, in the case of empirical cognitions, requires justification.

That our knowledge of empirical reality is probable does not affect the certainty of the experienced presentations (when they are experienced), nor does it affect the certainty of objective reality itself. All empirical generalizations finally refer to some presentation (or set of presentations). The justification of an interpretation placed upon a presentation must take place after the presentation is experienced; so, at the stage of justification, the presentation is no longer immediate,

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[25]"It is obvious that, in general, the important ground of empirical belief is past experience of like cases." <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 259.

[26]Lewis, "Experience and Meaning." op cit., p. 142.

[27]Ibid. p. 129.

but is remembered and is no longer certain. Thus, there are two moments
in empirical knowledge: 1) the moment of cognition, and 2) the moment
of justification. And, the moment of cognition is distinct from the
moment of justification. In making precisely this point, Lewis states
that

> ". . .[empirical] knowing begins and ends in experience; but
> it does not end in the experience in which it begins. Hence
> the emphasis on the temporal structure of the knowing process,
> the leading character of ideas, and the function of knowledge
> as a guide to action."[28]

That empirical knowledge is always from within the egocentric pre-
dicament appears to be in contradiction to the assertion of the inde-
pendence of its object. Lewis contends, however, that such relativity
is not contradictory to, ". . .but requires an independent character in
what is thus relative."[29] Although _what_ is known is known only in terms
of some relation, such relative knowledge is

> ". . .true knowledge of that independent character which,
> together with the other term or terms of this relationship,
> determines this content of our relative knowledge."[30]

The point Lewis has in mind is simply that in the absence of anticipation
of future experience, there can be no knowledge of independent reality;
and, therefore, the content of knowledge has an element which is inde-
pendent of the mind.[31] Thus, one must be careful to avoid concluding
that the limitations of the egocentric predicament apply to the objects

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[28] Ibid. p. 134.

[29] _M.W.O._, p. 172.

[30] _M.W.O._, pp. 172-173.

[31] If the object of empirical knowledge ". . .were not determined
by a condition which is independent of the mind, it would not be deter-
mined at all." _M.W.O._, p. 187.

of knowledge. If these limits were so applied, the distinction which has been made between cognitive and non-cognitive experiences would have to be discarded. Such limitations are rather restrictions to be recognized as applying _only_ to our individual knowledge of objective reality.

Since ". . .knowledge always transcends the immediately given,"[32] and since knowledge, due to the limitations imposed by the egocentric predicament, is in terms of one's own cognitive experiences, there must be some means which enable one to distinguish between what is real and what is imaginary, or ". . .between that which is apprehensible to me alone and the object apprehended by us in common."[33]

It is the pure concept that provides the matrix which serves as the context in which meaningful relations between the sensual and the mental are formed; i.e., the pure concepts are the definitive meaning relations upon which our judgments are based. Thus, Lewis defines the pure concept as

". . .a definitive structure of meanings, which is what would verify completely the coincidence of two minds when they understand each other by the use of language."[34]

Without the concept, imagery could not be distinguished from the sensuously given, and there could be no conceivable verification of empirical cognitions. Empirical knowledge, therefore, is possible only in the presence of concepts.

That there are psychological and physiological differences between persons does not affect the possibility of the use of concepts with a

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[32] _M.W.O._, p. 118.

[33] Lewis, "Experience and Meaning." op cit. p. 130.

[34] _M.W.O._, p. 89.

view toward common, or shared, knowledge. To paraphrase one of Lewis'
examples, it is evident that discriminatory acuity varies markedly from
one individual to the next. If someone mentions "red," the sensation
received by A is probably not the same as that received by B; however,
this does not prevent A and B from "pointing" to the first band of the
sun's spectrum when asked to point to the "red" band.[35] In this case,
each person's concept of "red" is the same definitive structure of
meanings; i.e., their definitions of "red" are identical.[36]

Thus, community of meaning may be verified by definitions of terms
or by behavior which demonstrates the denotation of terms. By the proper
application of either verifying procedure, feelings and imageries of
individual subjects are distinguished from conceptual meaning in gen-
eral. This does not imply, however, that each individual does not
correlate concepts with sense data or imagery. On the contrary, such
correlation by the individual is necessary; but, whether such individual
correlations are shareable is completely irrelevant to the possibility
of common meanings. It is the abstraction called the concept which must
be made if there is to be any common understanding or common knowledge
of objective reality.

Lewis readily admits that community of meaning and genuine common
understanding are abstractions and are more ideal than realized; but
he also insists that concepts, ". . .as precisely such abstractions,"[37]

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[35]Cf. M.W.O., pp. 74-75.

[36]"You and I mean the same by 'red' if we both define it as the
first band of the sun's spectrum, and if we both pronounce the same
objects to be red." M.W.O., p. 76.

[37]M.W.O., p. 89.

are the fundamental grounds upon which our interpretations of our "common world" are based. In summary, Lewis asserts that

> "In general, we are able to understand one another because--for one reason--a common reality is presented to us. But so to put it is to reverse the order of knowledge. We have a common reality because--or in so far as--we are able to identify, each in his own experience, those systems of orderly relation indicated by behavior."[38]

[38]M.W.O., pp. 110-111.

CHAPTER III

VALUATION

The question of whether any cognition is correct or incorrect is
essentially the question of whether the cognitive judgment is right or
wrong. Right and wrong may be taken in different senses, not the least
of which is the moral sense. In fact, the most frequent signification
of right and wrong is the moral signification. However, although the
morally right is regarded as one type of right, ". . .it cannot forth-
with be identified with right in general."[1] So, a cogent discussion of
the morally right must wait upon an expository discussion of Lewis'
value theory. And, he has developed his conception of the nature of
values and valuation in terms of their relation to action.

Behavior, action, and act. "Action," like "experience," can be
used in many different senses. It is often used in a narrower sense
than that which Lewis takes. Action (activity) refers to any self-
governed process, whether that process is physical, mental, or a combi-
nation of both. While activity may be mental as well as physical, Lewis
assigns to "act," ". . .a narrower designation inapplicable unless some-
thing physical is brought about."[2] He goes on to assert that the

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[1]Lewis, The Ground and Nature of the Right. (Columbia University
Press, 1955), p. 10. In subsequent references, The Ground and Nature
of the Right will be abbreviated G.N.R.

[2]G.N.R., p. 15.

consequences of an act are not confined to the merely physical, but may also include the effects which an act might have on the experience of others (this type of effect is of prime moral importance).[3]

Since action refers only to that behavior over which the doer is able to exert some control, there must be some intent and purpose for an act to be initiated. The intent of an act (which is also the intent of the doer) is the entire expected result of the act, and "That part of the intent of an act for the sake of which it is adopted; we shall call its _purpose_."[4]

Value judgments. Evaluation essentially consists of assigning a value to the expected result of an act. This involves a judgment--a decision of the value to be assigned to the expected consequences of the act in question. The judgment is correct or not according to whether the actual consequences of the act "live up" to the expectations involved. Inasmuch as value judgments are either correct or incorrect and stand in need of justification of their assertions (which assertions are about something which is not immediately given in the cognitive experience itself), they are cognitive.

Since evaluation is cognitive, the question arises as to whether evaluative cognitions are to be classed as empirical only, analytical only, or as both empirical and analytical. That evaluative cognitions may be empirical can be seen from Lewis' statement that

> ". . .no intention or purpose could be serious and no action could be practically justifiable or attain success, if it were not that there are value-predictions which represent empirical

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[3]Cf. _G.N.R._, p. 15.

[4]_A.K.V._, p. 367.

cognitions, and are predictive and hence capable of confirmation or disconfirmation."[5]

Empirical knowledge based upon evaluative cognitions consists of _practically justified_ evaluative judgments, which, in turn, are rationally warranted beliefs.

To facilitate the present discussion of empirical value judgments, an operational definition of values is needed. "Value" is used by Lewis ". . . .exclusively in the sense of a value-quality, value-character or value-property of something, or of a _kind_ of value-quality, character or property."[6] Values are thus realized or thought of only as characters of some specific thing or kind of thing.

There is one concept which must be clarified in order to present a cogent discussion of evaluation: the concept of _sensibility_ as it is applied to action and to an act. An action is said to be sensible if and only if the expected result has comparative value. Comparative value refers to contemplated alternatives where one alternative is selected as having more value potential than the other possible alternatives. So, an intent is sensible if the expected result is the one which has comparative value ascribed to it, and an act is sensible if and only if its intent is sensible.[7] It is only a sensible action which is capable of being successful; and in order to be considered as successful, the expectation of resulting comparative value must be practically justified by the result obtained when the act is performed.

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[5] _A.K.V._, pp. 371-372.

[6] _A.K.V._, p. 393.

[7] Cf. _A.K.V._ pp. 366-367.

So, an act is successful

>". . .only as far as the purpose of it altogether is realized;
>so far as a hoped-for value-quality accrues by way of an in-
>tended specific result."[8]

There are value-predications which are representative of empirical cog-

nitions; but, the question of whether there are any value-predications

which represent analytic cognitions remains to be considered.

As in the case of empirical knowledge in general, analytic state-

ments contribute to evaluative activity. Analytic statements concern-

ing values are necessary if only for the reason that explication requires

the use of language, and sometimes even the language must be explained.

The use of analytic statements in evaluative activity serves only to

clarify the real issues involved by sorting out those considerations

which are merely verbal. The most important function of the logical

element in evaluative cognitions has to do with the explication of the

significations of value-terms. The logical element serves as a means of

explicating

>". . .one intension by another and more familiar or more lucid
>meaning; and thus delimit[s] the essential nature of what is
>named and is in question."[9]

Although rationally warranted beliefs may be analytic as well as

empirical, since value-predications represent empirical cognitions,

more is involved than meaning-relations alone. The justification of

all value judgments lies in the consequences of <u>acts</u>, which, in turn,

have resulted from the evaluative cognitive <u>activity</u>. While there must

be an analytic element in evaluative cognitions, analytic statements

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[8] <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 370.

[9] <u>A.K.V.</u>, p. 379.

are solely statements about the valuable and, at most, provide a schema

or model for evaluations. Analytic statements, in and of themselves,

are not evaluative statements; nor are analytically verifiable cognitions

evaluative cognitions.

Objective and subjective value-predication. A major problem which

arises in a discussion of moral evaluations involves the distinction

of ". . .the question what basic good is and what goods are derivative,

from [the] question of the subjectivity or objectivity of value-

predications."[10] It is the second of these questions which is of

immediate interest.

A guide to the subjectivity or objectivity of value-predications

is found in the types of empirical statement which Lewis has suggested.

Since value judgments are empirically verifiable judgments, it follows

that there will be value-predications which correspond to each of the

three types of empirical statement.

The first type of empirical statement is simply an expression of

what is immediately given. As in a non-evaluative case, such a state-

ment concerning an evaluation does not represent a cognitive judgment.

It represents that which is immediate and complete in itself. An ex-

ample of a statement about the immediately valuable is the following:

As one is listening to the music from a Tchaikovsky ballet, he suddenly

exclaims, "This is good!" This statement has no further need of veri-

fication and could be false only if the person were lying about his

experience. This type of statement, obviously, is an entirely subjec-

tive description of what is immediately given and no assertion is made

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[10]A.K.V., p. 374.

concerning anything other than what is immediately experienced.

If, on the other hand, the statement, "If I put this record on the record player, then I will enjoy a good performance of the music from a Tchaikovsky ballet" is made, a second type of empirical statement of an evaluation is evidenced. This type of statement is of a verifiable cognition which, at the moment of cognition, is not verified. Verification of such a statement depends upon the results of a specified act (that of putting this record on the record player). The demand for empirical verifiability of the statement designates it as an expression of an empirical evaluative judgment and thus as a statement of a cognition. The judgment represented by this type of statement is capable of complete and decisive verification, which consists of performing the specified act and noting the consequences. Empirically verifiable evaluative judgments which are capable of complete and decisive verification are thus terminating evaluative judgments.[11]

The third type of empirical statement--those which are concerned with properties of events and objects--may also be of evaluations. "The London Symphony Orchestra presents very enjoyable concerts." is an example of this type of statement. Whether the London Symphony Orchestra presents very enjoyable concerts is a matter which may never be completely and decisively verified. The statement, nevertheless, is still meaningful, and, in appropriate situations, may serve as a guide for human acts. Evaluations of the properties of events and objects are expressed categorically, and the judgments referred to in such instances are to be classified as non-terminating evaluative judgments. As is the case with non-terminating

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[11]Cf. supra., p. 25.

judgments in general, there is nothing in a non-terminating evaluative judgment which is not expressible in terms of some terminating evaluative judgment.

Practical and moral justification. The justification of a cognitive evaluation requires more than do the justifications of non-evaluative cognitive judgments. In addition to showing the correctness of predictions of objective consequences of acts, justifications of evaluative judgments must also show the correctness of the expected degree of satisfaction to the doer. Such satisfaction, of course, is a part of the consequences of an act which is based, at least in part, upon a value-predication. For the purpose of this discussion, the latter type of justification will be termed "moral justification," even though such justifications are necessary in the case of any cognitive evaluation.

Since moral justification differs from practical justification, it follows that there must be some real difference between the assigning of values and the assignment of other properties to objects and events. A precise statement of the difference, however, must be in terms of value type, or, in Lewis' terminology:

> "The manner in which this difference of the ascription of value
> to objects from predications of other properties, may be pre-
> cisely delimited, is by way of the distinction between intrinsic
> and extrinsic value."[12]

A more thorough discussion of value-predication, particularly of moral evaluation, is thus dependent upon an exposition of the value types which have been distinguished by Lewis.

However, it should be noted here that a cognition may be practically, but not morally justified; or, it may be morally, but not practically

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[12] A.K.V., p. 382.

justified. If I should decide to play a particular record because I expect to gain satisfaction from hearing Belafonte sing "Delia," then the evaluative cognition, of which this decision is a part, may fail to be justified in either of two ways: 1) if I play the record and do not gain the expected satisfaction, or 2) if I play the record and it is not of Belafonte singing "Delia." An evaluative judgment must be justified in both aspects in order for the cognition in question to be called knowledge. Of course, in the case of moral evaluation, the expected feelings of the doer will be of "goodness."[13]

Since the judgment of an evaluative cognition involved the attribution of a value to an object or to an event, the question arises concerning whether values are subjective or objective. As value judgments are _always_ empirical, values themselves cannot be _a priori_.[14] If values are predicated of objects, then it follows that justification of such valuation would show the value in question to be a property of the object and thus objective. On the other hand, the "feeling" involved in the justification of an evaluative judgment leads to the conclusion that things are valuable only relative to some subjective feeling; i.e., that values are subjective and that we call something valuable only if it appears to be valuable. There are two problems, then, which must now be considered: 1) the predication of objective value to objects and events, and 2) the anterior problem of ". . .the nature of value as

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[13]Cf. _A.K.V._, pp. 394-396.

[14]"The supposition that 'values are _a priori_' could arise only through confusion between apprehension of a meaning itself and apprehension that this meaning has application in a particular instance." _A.K.V._, p. 380.

immediate and prized."[15]

Extrinsic and intrinsic value. In so far as all valuations are in the form of empirical judgments, cognitive valuations involve the assignment of values to objects and events. Such objects and events are valuable either in and of themselves, or they are valuable in the sense of being useful or instrumental in bringing about some future desideratum. The latter type of value is called extrinsic value, while values of the former type are called intrinsic values.

In most cases of the predication of extrinsic value to an object or event, the truth of such value predication requires

> ". . .that the something else, to which the thing in question
> is instrumental, should have intrinsic value; or at least be in
> turn instrumental to some still further thing having intrinsic
> worth."[16]

A predication of extrinsic value is generally of the form: X is useful for, or instrumental to, Y. However, in this general form, there is no necessary inference that Y has any genuine value. Thus, Lewis asserts that ". . .A has extrinsic value. . .only if B (or some eventual Z to which it may lead) has intrinsic value."[17] Judgments that merely assert that X is instrumental to, or useful for, Y, with no implication of the certainty that Y (or some eventual thing) has some intrinsic value, are not to be classified as judgments of extrinsic value. From this it follows that something may have utility and not have extrinsic value; but, any extrinsic or instrumental value of an object or event

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[15] A.K.V., p. 400. Lewis admits having borrowed the term, "prized," from Dewey, but he does not claim to be using the term in the same sense which Dewey gave to it. Cf., A.K.V., p. 398.

[16] A.K.V., p. 383.

[17] A.K.V., p. 385.

is also part of the utility of it. So, the assertion that something

has utility does not necessarily imply that it also has extrinsic value.

The first distinction of intrinsic from extrinsic value made above

suggested that the intrinsic value of an object or event is realizable

finally in that object or event in itself. There is a difficulty here

that must be noted and clarified concerning the phrase, "valuable in

and of itself." When something is called valuable in and of itself,

what is meant is that something is intrinsically valuable, not literally

valuable for its own sake, but because its values are ". . .realized,

or realizable, in experience through presentation of the thing to which

they are attributed."[18] Thus, an object may possess intrinsic value so

far as such ascribed value is realizable in the presence of that to, or

for, which the object (or event) is instrumental, or useful.

Values, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, are finally disclosed in

experience. Thus, the distinction between the assignment of values and

the assignment of other properties to things can be explicated by saying

> ". . .values ascribable to objects are always extrinsic values;
> intrinsic value attaching exclusively to realizations of some
> possible value-quality in experience itself."[19]

In other words, Lewis is simply stating that if a thing has extrinsic

value, then that thing has the capability of providing some possible

goodness in experience. The distinction between value predications

and predications of other properties lies in the observation that a value

may be correctly understood in terms of language expressing the experi-

encing of the immediately given; other objective properties cannot be

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[18] A.K.V., p. 386.

[19] A.K.V., p. 389.

correctly understood through expressive terminology alone, but, in order

to be understood, must be in terms of a cognitive statement (hypothetical

or categorical).

Another distinction of value types follows immediately from the

above discussion of intrinsic and extrinsic values: that of inherent

and instrumental value. Very briefly, an instrumental value of something

is the value realized through the presentation of that something else to

which the thing in question is instrumental. The inherent value of some-

thing is, of course, the value realized in the presentation of that thing.

One point to be noted here is that something may be both extrinsically

and intrinsically valuable, or have inherent as well as instrumental

value.

All values which are resident in objects and events are extrinsic,

but this classification must be subdivided in order to describe more

fully the variety of value-qualities found in experience. From this

point throughout the remainder of this thesis, the concern will be not

so much with values in general, but with moral values and moral valu-

ation.

CHAPTER IV

LEWIS' SYSTEM OF MORAL PRINCIPLES AND VALUES

When the question arises concerning the uses of "right" and "wrong"
it is the moral sense in which these terms are usually taken. And, it
is the morally right and wrong which will be the primary concern here.

The right and the morally right. Although it is important, all
that is accomplished when logical analysis is applied to the determin-
ation of right is a justification of a decision through the application
of the test of consistency. An inconsistency indicates a faulty con-
clusion, but a consistent argument does not prove the rightness or
truth of the conclusion.[1] A consistent argument claims only that the
conclusion is as probable as the premisses involved. Such premisses are
found, particularly in ethical considerations, to be beliefs. Hence,
the rightness of the conclusion is dependent upon the rightness of the
underlying beliefs.

Lewis has asserted that "Whatever is decidable or can be determined
by deliberation is right or wrong."[2] Since both the moral and practical
justifications of a value judgment depend upon the consequences of an
act, judgments of the morally right are also to be determined as justi-
fied or not according to such consequences. Thus, empirical data, as

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[1]Cf. G.N.R., p. 27. "Rightness" is used synonymously with "correct-
ness" here.

[2]G.N.R., p. 30.

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well as analytical criticism, are needed for the positive justification of any belief.[3]

The morally right, then, is predicated of acts, the consequences of which serve as the moral and practical justifications of particular value judgments. However, since "The field of judgment of right and wrong extends to whatever is subject to human deliberation or calls for decision,"[4] the morally right must be delimited. There must be some character of the predictable consequences of acts which, when the act is committed, will make the act in question either right or wrong. Lewis assigns this as the principal problem of ethics which arises when a choice of acts confronts the individual. In Lewis' terminology,

> "Solution to the central problem of ethics requires us to determine what character of the consequences of action it is by reference to which one act will be right and another wrong."[5]

Objective and subjective right. Prior to discussing the "central" problem of ethics, it would be well to distinguish objective from subjective right. As all questions of the morally right are concerned with acts and since the content of an act consists solely of the consequences of its commitment, the distinction of objective from subjective right must lie in the judgment upon which an act is based.[6]

If an act is objectively right, it must be so regardless of opinion or any other subjective consideration alone. The judgment which serves as the impetus for an objectively right act is correct or incorrect in

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[3] Cf. A.K.V., pp. 37-38.

[4] G.N.R., p. 9.

[5] G.N.R., pp. 61-62.

[6] Cf. G.N.R., p. 47.

the same sense as any other cognitive judgment of empirical matters of fact. Thus, an objectively right act is one which, on the basis of the given evidence, ". . .is judged that its consequences are such as it will be right to bring about _and_ that judgment is correct."[7]

An act is subjectively right if, in the judgment of the doer, it is right to bring about. Whether or not the judgment is justified is beside the point. A judgment leading to a subjectively right act may be based entirely upon ill-founded opinion which disregards much of the given evidence; and though the judgment may be incorrect, the act in question may remain subjectively right. ". . .an act is subjectively right if the doer thinks it is objectively right, whether his thinking so is justified or not."[8]

The important point to note here is that an act is right to do if it is judged, on the basis of the given evidence, to be that act which will provide a greater probability of good results than will alternative acts _and_ if that judgment is correct.

It is the objective rightness of acts which is a major concern of ethics. "The requirement to make assessment of worth and of validity beyond the bounds of what is merely subjective and relative to himself, is one which the self-conscious being cannot set aside."[9] The temptation to identify what moral terms intend with physical correlates must be eliminated as must the temptation to consider moral values as subjective only. Moral issues are among those which can be determined only

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[7]_G.N.R._, p. 49.

[8]_G.N.R._, p. 49.

[9]Lewis, _Our Social Inheritance_ (Indiana University Press, 1957) p. 49.

on the pragmatic grounds of human inclinations and intellectual capacity because moral terms, as is the case with all value terms, ". . .have their essential significance, finally, by reference to the qualities of consciousness."[10]

The role of the good. The question of which character of the consequences of acts is that which serves as the criterion of rightness still remains. This criterion, of course, must hold independently of any subjective considerations of particular acts, and that character of the consequences of acts must be present regardless of whether any doer decides to bring them about. If this were not the case, no act could be held to be morally right or wrong. This character is usually called "goodness" or "badness." Without the character of goodness or badness, no consequences of an act could provide justification for a moral judgment.

Since goodness and badness are properties of the consequences of acts (consequences of acts are objects or events), there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as moral goodness or moral badness. Objects and events are good or bad, but, in themselves, they are not moral. Acts and the doers of the acts are properly called moral. There is, however, a definite relation between the good and the morally right, and the relation is such that the morally right is dependent upon the good. Although men and their acts are often called good, this sense of "good" is quite different than the sense in which an object or event is good. As it is applied to men and acts, "good" is taken in ". . .the sense, namely, of being useful; of contributing or being able to

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[10]Ibid., p. 83. Cf., M.W.O., pp. 248-249.

contribute to some desirable end."[11]

The determination of rightness. There are, thus, two factors in-
volved in the determination of the rightness of an act (as far as the
doer is concerned): 1) a rule concerning right acting, and 2) a judg-
ment of the good which is expected to be realized in the consequences of
the act in question.[12] If the decision to act is based upon these two
factors, then, if the act is carried out and the consequences justify
the judgment, the act is one which is morally right. Thus, in order to
be a moral person, one must attempt to achieve the good and, at the same
time, knowingly conform to the principles of right acting. This is ex-
pressed by Lewis in somewhat stronger terminology in his statement that
"The achievement of the good is desirable but conformity to the right is
imperative."[13] Conformity to the right consists of following the prin-
ciples of right acting, and the principles of right acting are the moral
principles.

Man, as the self-critical animal, may claim the ability to make moral
judgments which are not merely relative to his own subjectivities. It
is Lewis' observation that

> "If we can ask the question whether the judgments of worth
> which we make are merely relative to our subjectivities,
> then it is already implied that we can determine correctness
> of an answer to it, and that in such answer we can free our-
> selves of the subjectivities suspected."[14]

Furthermore, the moral factors are to be admitted as the controlling

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[11]G.N.R., p. 63.

[12]Cf. G.N.R., pp. 70-75.

[13]G.N.R., p. 59.

[14]Lewis, Our Social Inheritance. p. 49.

factors in human activity if there is to be any justification of such

activity at all.[15]   In any particular question concerning right acting,

> ". . .there is the same need to call upon accumulated social
> wisdom, and to submit the matter to the social criticism, that
> there is in any other department of man's continuing search for
> ways to the better life."[16]

Since man lives in a social environment, that which is right to bring

about must take into consideration other people who will be affected by

the act as well as the doer. When predictable social consequences are

properly judged as good (as the right thing to bring about), the act in

question is called a just act. Thus, Lewis defines justice in the follow-

ing manner: "Justice is 'rightness toward others affected.'"[17]

The imperative of right. It is the recognition of the principles

of right as rational that distinguishes human activity from all other

behavior. Such recognition implies generalization and objectivity,

both of which are characteristics of rationally determinable activity.

Since "A reason is a consideration which justifies: to have a sufficient

reason for believing or doing is to be justified in so deciding."[18]

And, the principles of right (the moral principles) are the sufficient

reasons for right acting.

The principles, as sufficient reasons for human activity, are

rational precepts. The justification of the principles themselves can-

not be found in acts, since acts are based, at least partially, upon the

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[15]Lewis, Our Social Inheritance, p. 109.

[16]Ibid., pp. 103-104.

[17]G.N.R., p. 53.

[18]G.N.R., p. 88.

principles. On the other hand, the principles are not purely subjective
in the sense of being relative to the individual. They are, however,
brought to the evaluative cognitive experience by the mind. Thus, such
principles are a priori; and, therefore, the justification of principles
is not empirical, but must be a priori.

Imperatives are not rationally derived from some principle which is
still more fundamental; they are acknowledged in much the same manner as
is independent reality. They are knowable, but they do not require proof,
only acknowledgment. The moral imperative is the basic principle of right
upon which all other principles of right acting rely for their claims of
validity.

The imperatives are acknowledged by all rational persons, so their
ground must, in some manner, lie in human nature, because "Human nature
calls for principles of [correct] decision."[19] That character of human
nature which calls for the acknowledgment of principles of correct de-
cision is labelled by Lewis the "antecedent sense of rightness."[20]
Since to decide is unavoidable, the acknowledgment of such basic prin-
ciples of correct decision, the imperatives, is necessary.

There are two fundamental characteristics of all thinking: gener-
ality and objectivity. Consequently, all behavior which is rationally
determined will also exhibit these two characteristics. Since knowledge
involves responses to new and changing situations and since the frame-
work which enables one to choose between alternative acts on a

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[19]G.N.R., p. 86.

[20]It is the ". . .antecedent sense of rightness which will, at
some point, constrain any reasonable person to acknowledge [the impera-
tives]." G.N.R., p. 85. "Rightness" is used synonymously with "correct-
ness" here.

rational basis is built upon past experiences, generalization from past experiences is a necessary characteristic of knowledge. Also, since "The primary and persuasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action,"[21] and since acts can only affect the future, objectivity is a necessary characteristic of knowledge. According to Lewis, "To weigh the absent but represented in the full size of it, and not in the measure of any presentational or emotive feeling which serves to intimate it, is to be objective."[22]

While Lewis has formulated several statements representing imperatives, the root of all of the imperatives of one's thinking and doing is the Law of Objectivity:

> "So conduct and determine your activities of thinking and doing, as to conform any decision of them to the objective actualities, as cognitively signified to you in your representational apprehension of them, and not according to any impulsion or solicitation exercised by the affective quality of your present experience as immediate feeling merely."[23]

Inasmuch as it is from the Law of Objectivity that all other imperatives are derived, and since "The peculiarly human kind of life is imperatively social,"[24] the basic imperative, when given a moral context, is

> ". . .the dictate to govern one's activities affecting other persons, as one would if these effects of them were to be realized with the poignancy of the immediate--hence, in one's own person."[25]

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[21]A.K.V., p. 3.

[22]G.N.R., p. 88.

[23]G.N.R., p. 89.

[24]G.N.R., p. 90.

[25]G.N.R., p. 91.

Since fundamental laws are the formulations of those definite con-
cepts or categorical tests by which alone all verification and practical
(including as well, the moral) justifications of cognitive beliefs are
made possible, these laws are a priori. And, as the moral imperative is
the fundamental law governing human activity (rational behavior), the
moral imperative is a priori. The moral imperative, as an a priori law,
is the criterion by which morally right acts are distinguished from
morally wrong acts.

Categories and definitions--hence, imperatives--are social products
which have resulted from previous common experiences; and,

> "Since neither the human mind nor human experience is fixed,
> absolute, or universal, whatever is a priori need not be
> universally accepted nor is it beyond the possibility of
> alteration."[26]

Thus, the basic moral imperative and the derivative formulations of it[27]
are a priori in a "pragmatic" sense. The pragmatic aspect of moral im-
peratives is present because their meanings, at least partially, are
found in social situations and have resulted from common experience.
When the generalizations drawn from previous common experience fail to
apply to (or to make intelligible) new situations, these generalizations,
even when they have resulted in imperatives (including, of course, the
moral imperative), may be altered or abandoned altogether. And, the

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[26]Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori." In Feigl and
Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Ind., 1949), p. 293.

[27]Lewis states two such derivative formulations: 1) the Law of
Moral Equality--"Take no decision of action which is member of any class
of decisions of doing all members of which you would call upon others
to avoid." and ·) the Law of Compassion--"Recognize, in your own action
affecting any sentient being, that claim on your compassion which com-
ports with its capacity to enjoy and suffer." G.N.R., pp. 92, 93.

fact that an imperative may be altered or abandoned in the face of new
objective situations in no way denies the a priori character of the
imperative; or, as Lewis has asserted,

> ". . .the most fundamental laws in any category--or those
> which we regard as most fundamental--are a priori, even
> though continued failure to render experience intelligible
> might result eventually in the abandonment of that cate-
> gory altogether."[28]

By formulating the rules of right acting--the moral principles in
such a manner as to take into account both the social and rational as-
pects of human life, Lewis has presented what he holds to be a thor-
oughly rational, yet practical, cognitive ethical system. Since know-
ledge is for the sake of action, which, in turn, is grounded in
evaluation, the justification of this ethical system is held to lie in
the manner in which human knowledge is gained and in the extent of
human knowledge.

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[28]Lewis, "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori.", p. 292.

CHAPTER V

LEWIS' JUSTIFICATION OF HIS ETHICAL SYSTEM
AND A SUGGESTED EMENDATION

Lewis' Justification and Some Objections to it

The justification presented by Lewis for his system of ethical
principles is primarily concerned with the cognitive nature of the prin-
ciples. The question which must first be answered is, what is (are) the
source (s) of our knowledge of the ethical principles? After this question
is answered, the means of attaining knowledge of the ethical principles
will be compared with Lewis' general theory of knowledge. This com-
parison will make possible the determination, using the criterion of
consistency, of whether Lewis' system is cognitive. If the ethical prin-
ciples are knowable in a manner which is consistent with the cognitive
processes and justifying procedures outlined by Lewis, the system of
ethical principles will be justified. The justification itself, however,
is the primary point in question. The first part of this chapter, then,
consists of an exposition of Lewis' justification and an outline of two
objections to it.

Lewis' justification. Throughout his writings concerning moral
problems, Lewis insists upon the claim that his system of moral principles
is cognitive. So, the principles of right acting (the moral principles)
are meaningfully apprehended. Justification of Lewis' claim that moral
principles are cognitive therefore entails showing that the moral

principles are apprehended in a manner described in his epistemology as meaningful.[1]

Since it is the system of moral principles which is held to be cognitive, the grounds of the system must be distinguished from the system itself. It is from these grounds that the moral principles are derived. Included in the grounds of Lewis' system of moral principles are acknowledgments, human nature and imperatives. The most fundamental of the acknowledgments is of objective reality.[2] Human nature, however, demands the acknowledgment of imperatives;[3] and, the fact of the necessarily social nature of human life must also be taken as a fundamental datum for any system of ethics.[4]

Throughout his writings on ethics, Lewis also insists upon the a priori nature of the moral principles. Therefore, the apprehension of the moral principles is analytically verifiable, and the grounds of the system of moral principles are "given" in the apprehension of the moral principles.[5] The task at hand, then, is to show how the grounds of the system of moral principles are combined in a manner which makes possible the analytic apprehension of the moral principles.

The elements of the grounds of the moral principles are not acknowledged one prior to another in a temporally ordered sequence leading to the acknowledgment of the basic moral imperative. The basic moral

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[1]Cf. supra., pp. 9-16.

[2]Cf. supra., p. 7.

[3]Cf. supra., p. 50.

[4]Cf. G.N.R., p. 90.

[5]Even in the case of meaningful analytic apprehensions, there is a given element. Cf. supra., p. 16.

imperative is acknowledged as such.[6] The fundamental data, while they are indeed acknowledged, are yet distinguishable only by abstraction from the concept of the basic moral imperative. What is thus acknowledged is not merely one or another of the grounds of the moral system, but the totality of these grounds, and this acknowledgment results in an awareness of the sense meanings whose structured relations fix the definition of "morally right."[7] It is this structure of the definitive sense meanings of "morally right"--the concept of the morally right--from which the moral principles are derived in a cognitive manner.[8] What is acknowledged is the basic moral imperative, but it is the concept of the basic moral imperative which is the "given" element in the apprehension of the moral principles. It is the concept of the basic moral imperative which is definitive of the morally right. While the basic moral imperative is not known, since conceptualization is an analytic process the results of which are analytically verifiable, the concept of the basic moral imperative is known a priori and is an a priori truth.[9]

Lewis holds the fundamental law of ethics to be the basic moral imperative. As a fundamental law, the basic moral imperative is asserted to be a priori.[10] The moral principles derived from the basic moral imperative are explicitly analytic statements about the basic

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[6]Cf. supra., p. 50.

[7]Cf. supra., p. 19f.

[8]Cf. supra., p. 13.

[9]Cf. supra., pp. 19, 20.

[10]Cf. supra., p. 51f.

moral imperative,[11] and the analytic truth of the moral principles is
determined by showing that they are consistent with the concept of the
basic moral imperative.

The moral principles are the rules concerning right acting which
are a necessary factor in the determination of the morally right, but a
moral judgment is also required.[12] The required moral judgment must be
cognitive because it is one of the two factors involved in the systematic
determination of the morally right. Since the judgment must be cogni-
tive, it is either analytically verifiable or empirically verifiable.[13]
Moral judgments, however, are a type of value judgment and, as such, are
empirically, not analytically, verifiable.[14] Since an empirically veri-
fiable judgment is required in the systematic determination of the moral-
ly right, the analytic verification of the truth claims of the moral
principles is insufficient to justify Lewis' claim that his ethical
system is cognitive. Not only must the meaning relations of the moral
principles be analytically verified, the significance of the analytic
knowledge of the moral principles must also be taken into account.[15]

The moral principles function as a guide for human acts. The prin-
ciples of right acting are brought by the mind to the cognitive moral
evaluative judgment, but the judgment involved in the cognition of the
principles of right acting is not a moral evaluative judgment since it

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[11]Cf. supra., p. 18f.

[12]Cf. supra., p. 47.

[13]Cf. supra., pp. 15f, 25ff, 29.

[14]Cf. supra., p. 35f.

[15]Cf. supra., p. 10. The signification of the moral principles
includes their applicability to concrete situations.

is analytically verifiable. The assertion of the truth of the meaning

relations expressed by the moral principles is analytically verifiable,

but the assertion that the moral principles are relevant to human acts

requires empirical justification of its truth claim.

Thus, there is another consideration which is relevant to the dis-

cussion of our knowledge of the moral principles. In addition to being

consistent with the basic moral imperative, a cognitive ethical system

must be ". . .characterized by that integrity which summons all pertinent

evidence and gives all items their due weight in conclusions drawn."[16]

The moral principles provide a _priori_ criteria for making judgments con-

cerning which of the possible alternative ways of acting in a given

situation is that way which is morally right. "Morally right" is proper-

ly predicated only of acts and the doers of acts. Since an act is

morally right in so far as it results in comparative good,[17] the doer of

the act is moral in so far as his acts result in the realization of com-

parative good. So, another criterion is suggested for the justification

of the cognitive claims of the moral principles: comparative good.

To this point, the following assertions have been made: 1) the

basic moral imperative is definitive of "morally right;" 2) "morally

right" is applicable only to acts and to the doers of acts; and 3) a

morally right act is one the results of which possess comparative good.

From these assertions, it follows that the moral principles must provide

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[16] _G.N.R._, p. 79.

[17] Cf. supra., p. 34. "Comparative good" refers to the good ex-
pected to be realized in the consequences of the contemplated alternatives
where one alternative pattern of acting is selected as having more
potential for good than have the other alternatives.

those guides to acting which, when the acts are performed in cognitive

accordance with the principles, <u>consistently</u> result in the realization

of comparative good. Since goodness is an objective property of objects

and events, there is an empirical element as well as an analytical element

involved in the justification of Lewis' system of moral principles.[18]

The empirical element which must be taken into account in the justification

of any moral principle consists of the consequences of acts. That part

of the consequence of the act which is a determinant of the moral right-

ness of an act is the property of goodness.[19]

The decision to perform any particular act is in part a judgment of

the potential for good of each of the contemplated alternatives. That

act which is selected is selected because it is judged to possess more

potential for good than the other alternatives. The judgment that to

act in one particular manner will result in more good than will another

pattern of acting calls for justification of its claim of correctness.

In other words does the chosen act, when carried out, result in compara-

tive good?

The problem at this point is one of reconciling the <u>a priori</u> nature

of the moral principles with the pragmatic element of their justification.

The reconciliation is made through the use of Lewis' concept of the

"pragmatically <u>a priori</u>." By taking the moral principles as

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[18]Cf. supra., pp. 40ff, 46.

[19]Since it is the result of an act which is in question, and since
an act entails the bringing about of something objective, the application
of the criterion of comparative good gives an empirical justification
because goodness is an objective, empirically known property of an object
or event. Since goodness and badness are objective properties, there is
no such thing as moral goodness or moral badness. Goodness can, and does,
however, serve as a criterion of the morally right. Cf. supra., pp. 32f,
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pragmatically a priori principles, Lewis has suggested that although the moral principles have an a priori and an imperative character, they are, nevertheless, subject to alteration or abandonment in the face of new and changing empirical situations. In other words, if the categories are not applicable with any degree of consistency, they may be abandoned in favor of new or modified generalizations which are more consistently applicable. This is not meant to imply that the basic moral imperative, which is acknowledged as such, is altered or abandoned. Instead, alternative formulations of it may be deduced, or the formulations in use may simply be altered. Thus, the a priori nature of the moral principles is maintained even though the usefulness of formulations of the moral principles is determined empirically. As an analytic principle, a moral principle is true independent of any new or changing situation. But, as a rule of right acting, its usefulness, in that capacity is justified by the consequences of acts which have been committed in accordance with the principle. The analytically derived principle of the morally right is known a priori; but, the principle, as a principle of right acting which is applicable in concrete situations, is empirically justified as useful or not. And, since knowledge is for the sake of action, the correctness of our moral evaluative cognitions is determined by the consequences of our acts; i.e., the correctness of our moral evaluative judgments is determined empirically. So, as rules of right acting, moral principles demand empirical justification as well as analytical verification: they are pragmatically a priori principles.

In summary, the principles of right acting are analytically derived from the basic moral imperative. The basic moral imperative is simply acknowledged; but, if this acknowledgment is questioned, the elements of

the basic moral imperative can be abstracted from the concept of the
basic moral imperative. When these elements are considered, the acknow-
ledgment of the basic moral imperative is shown to be necessary, and the
necessity of the acknowledgment results from human nature itself--from
the demand for principles of correct decision. The moral principles
are known insofar as they are analytically verified apprehensions of the
meaning relations of the basic moral imperative. Thus, the judgments of
the meaning relations implicitly contained in the basic moral imperative
are cognitive judgments which result in knowledge of the moral principles.

The moral principles, as principles of right acting, must lead to
acts the consequences of which possess comparative good. Therefore, in
addition to analytical verification, the moral principles require em-
pirical justification. The analytical verification and the empirical
justification of moral principles are the same as for analytic appre-
hensions in general and for empirical evaluative cognitions, respectively.
The combination of the analytic and empirical elements by means of his
concept of the pragmatically a priori enables Lewis to assert that the
principles of right acting are analytically true; but, since the prin-
ciples are guides for deciding upon a particular course of action which
is expected to result in comparative good, practical justification is
called for in order to ascertain whether, in fact, acts performed
according to the moral principles do result in comparative good.

Thus, in accordance with Lewis' epistemology, there are two con-
stituents involved in the determination of the moral rightness of any
act: 1) the a priori moral principle which is the rule concerning right
acting; and 2) the (empirically justifiable) judgment of the good which
is expected to be realized in the consequences of the particular act or

acts decided upon.[20]   The system of ethical principles is meaningfully

apprehended and analytically verifiable, and the judgments of expected

good and of the correct pattern of acting to follow in a given situation

are practically and morally justifiable.[21]   Our knowledge of this system

as a system of principles of right acting is pragmatically a priori know-

ledge, and this knowledge is attainable in a manner which is consistent

with Lewis' epistemological findings.

Objections to Lewis' justification. There are, to be sure,

difficulties to be found in Lewis' proposed justification of the cogni-

tive claims of his ethical system. There is the objection to his teleo-

logical approach in general as well as some more specific objections.

There is objection, such as that raised by William K. Frankena, to his

treatment of the a priori and analytic regarding the ethical principles.

And, there is also the objection, such as that of Hans Reichenbach, which

calls into question the necessity of the analytic truth of the moral im-

perative. These objections, beginning with the one typified by Frankena,

will now be presented. Suggested answers to these objections will be

presented in the succeeding section of the present chapter.

In his review of Lewis' The Ground and Nature of the Right, Frankena

raises the question whether the basic imperatives of right[22] are re-

garded by Lewis as a priori and analytic, or as a posteriori and

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[20]Cf. supra., p. 47.

[21]Cf. supra., p. 38.

[22]Here, Frankena is concerned with the various statements of the
basic moral imperative such as the Law of Moral Equality and the Law of
Compassion.

empirical.[23]   According to Frankena, these are the only alternatives open

to Lewis on the basis of his insistence upon the coincidence of the a

priori and the analytic. If Lewis' justification is to be successful in

showing that the system of ethical principles is cognitive, so the argu-

ment goes, it must ascertain whether all of the principles of right

(including the basic moral imperative) are analytic. In other words,

Lewis must clarify his treatment of the analytic character of the basic

moral imperatives. Frankena states this objection to Lewis' justifi-

cation in the observation that Lewis

> ". . .regards what is usually called naturalism (the view
> that ethical and value judgments are a species of empirical
> knowledge) as false for at least the basic 'imperative of
> right,' though true for judgments of good and bad. But
> there is no indication that he regards such imperatives as
> analytic."[24]

The accusation here is that Lewis wavers between holding the basic moral

imperative to be the result of an analytically verified apprehension and

holding the basic moral imperative to be acknowledged because of the

demands of human nature.

The position is taken by Frankena that Lewis cannot offer other than

an analytic verification for the basic moral imperatives and that Lewis'

principles of right acting are some sort of expression of a fundamental,

universal human need. So, according to Frankena, "It is, at any rate,

not clear that Lewis thinks of rightness as a property of actions, as

cognitivists do. Much of the time he equates being right and being

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[23]Cf. Frankena, W. K., "Review of Lewis' The Ground and Nature of
the Right." Philosophical Review, (LXVI; 1957), pp. 398-402.

[24]Ibid., p. 399.

'justified.'"[25]   This type of objection raises two questions: 1)   Does

Lewis hold that the basic moral imperative is a priori in the sense of

being analytically apprehended?   and 2)   If the pragmatically a priori

is not coincident with the analytic, can his ethical system be justified

as consistent and cognitive according to his epistemology?

Objections of the type raised by Hans Reichenbach are primarily

objections to basing any cognitive system of ethics upon principles

which are claimed to possess analytic certainty.   The claim is made, in

the course of such objections that a priori principles are not applicable

to empirical matters of fact if they are to retain their analytic charac-

ter.   This leads to the conclusion that any system of principles which

is cognitive and which has practical application must begin in experience

and be validated through experience.[26]   According to this point of view,

any principle which is definitive of something which, in turn, calls for

empirical justification, is a synthetic principle.[27]

Thus, if Lewis insists upon the a priori nature of the basic moral

imperative, the imperative would have to be synthetic as well as a

priori; Lewis, of course, often and explicitly denies this to be the

[25]Frankena, W. K., "Lewis' Imperative of Right." Philosophical
Studies, (XIV; 1963), p. 27.

[26]Cf. Reichenbach, Hans. "Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely
Certain?" Philosophical Review, (LXI; 1952), p. 148.

[27]A synthetic principle results from a synthetic judgment. A
synthetic judgment asserts something which is not present either
implicitly or explicitly in the grounds upon which the judgment is
made. Such a judgment relates two concepts--a subject concept with a
predicate concept. The predicate concept is not included within the
subject proper. Cf. "Synthetic Judgment" in Dictionary of Philosophy
ed. by Runes, D., (Littlefield, Adams and Co.; 1959), p. 310.

case.[28] Again, Lewis' concept of the pragmatically a priori is called into question. The argument here is that Lewis uses the concept of the pragmatically a priori to provide a framework of certainty for moral evaluative judgments. But, since principles which are applicable to concrete situations are themselves generalizations from experience, such principles are actually a posteriori, synthetic, and require empirical justification.

However, if Lewis still insists upon the pragmatically a priori nature of the basic moral imperative, the objection is that this claim amounts to nothing else than a claim that the imperative is, after all, a synthetic a priori principle. This objection leaves only the following alternatives open to Lewis: 1) If the system is indeed cognitive, the basic moral imperative must be recognized for what it is--a generalization based upon empirical data and which calls for empirical justification and not analytic verification only; or 2) Since Lewis denies the claim of any principle to be synthetically a priori,[29] if the a priori nature of the basic moral imperative is insisted upon, that imperative cannot be applied as a guide to moral judgments (which are a type of empirical judgment) in any manner which could be classified as cognitive. This first alternative would require an alteration of Lewis' justification, particularly in regard to his treatment of the basic moral imperative as pragmatically a priori; and, the second alternative would be tantamount to rejecting the cognitive claim of the system of ethical principles of right acting altogether.

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[28]Cf. A.K.V., pp. 151-168, and M.W.O., pp. 25f, 214-229, 433-436.

[29]Cf. supra., p. 17f.

Both types of objection mentioned above are implicitly directed at the teleological orientation of Lewis' ethical system. The question is how Lewis can maintain his claim of the a priori truth of the moral principles and, at the same time, hold that the moral principles are justified empirically? In both types of objection, the implication is that Lewis should abandon his claims of the a priori nature of the moral principles and that he should recognize his teleological position and the resulting empirical nature of the moral principles. In other words, since Lewis holds the principles of right acting to be justifiable empirically in terms of consequences of acts, he must admit that the principles themselves must be the result of empirically justifiable judgments and, therefore, empirically known only.

However, Lewis does admit the necessity for empirical justification both of the moral principles and all moral judgments. In spite of this admission, he holds that a priori moral principles are also necessary for any cognitive system of ethical principles.[30] The a priori truth of the moral principles is not incompatible with the alterability of the principles.[31] The compatability of pragmatic elements with a priori elements is necessary for Lewis' ethical system; but, an a priori element is necessarily present in any empirically verifiable apprehension,[32] so the compatability of pragmatic and a priori elements alone does not justify his claim that his ethical system results from a combination of ethical rationalism and ethical naturalism. Nor does that

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[30] Cf. supra., p. 47.

[31] Cf. supra., p. 52.

[32] Cf. supra., pp. 15, 29f.

compatability, in and of itself, justify the claim that, as a priori
principles of right acting, the moral principles are cognitive. Lewis
cannot admit to a purely teleological system of ethics, because such an
admission would negate his claim that his system results from a combi-
nation of ethical rationalism and ethical naturalism. But, the ethical
system is not shown to be a cognitive system resulting from that combi-
nation by merely showing the compatability of a priori with pragmatic
elements within the system.

A Suggested Emendation of Lewis' Justification

In so far as Lewis' justification is intended to show that the
moral principles are a priori and cognitive, according to his episte-
mology, any mistake would be in the form of an inconsistency. An incon-
sistency in the justification might very well be the result of an equivo-
cation which would be found in discussing the nature of the basic moral
imperative and the moral principles. Thus, the point of the objections
is that in his treatment of the basic moral imperative, the moral prin-
ciples, and the pragmatically a priori, Lewis is either unclear or incon-
sistent, or both. The first task, then, is to clarify Lewis' conception
of the pragmatically a priori as it applies to the moral principles and
to the basic moral imperative. In the course of this clarification, the
suggested emendation of Lewis' justification will be formulated.

Although the a priori and the analytic coincide, Lewis has used
"a priori" in three distinct ways while he has made only two distinct
uses of "analytic." A statement is a priori if it is true by definition.
It is this sense of a priori which is used in referring to linguistic
meaning relations. There is also the corresponding use of "analytic,"

and here, at least, the analytic and a priori coincide. There is also

another sense in which the a priori and the analytic correspond: it is

the sense in which a statement is said to be a priori or analytic as it

is definitive of something. In this case, "a priori" and "analytic"

refer to the relations of sense meanings and are coincident. While

this exhausts the types of the analytic, there is yet one more type of

a priori: the pragmatically a priori. Thus, the question here has

become one of whether and, if so, in what manner, the pragmatically

a priori coincides with the analytic.

Since the concept of the basic moral imperative is definitive of

the morally right,[33] statements which contain the phrase, "morally right,"

are not statements of the concept of the basic moral imperative per se.

Such statements utilize the phrase which the concept of the basic moral

imperative is purported to define.[34] These derivative statements are

a priori and analytic in the sense of being true by definition. The con-

cept of the basic moral imperative is not analytic in the sense of being

true by definition; so, if it is analytic, it must be analytic in the

sense of being definitive of the morally right. Whether this purported

analytic nature of the concept of the basic moral imperative coincides

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[33]The basic moral imperative is not known since it is not a veri-
fied (or justified) cognition. It is not apprehended in such a way that
it can be either empirically or analytically verified. It is the concept
of the basic moral imperative which is known a priori, and it is from
this concept that the principles of right acting are derived. Thus, it
is not the basic moral imperative itself which is definitive of the mor-
ally right, but it is the concept of the basic moral imperative which
is definitive of the morally right.

[34]An example of such a derivative statement is the following:
". . .a way of acting, to be right in a given case, must be one which
would, in the same premisses of action, be right in every instance and
right of anybody." Lewis, Our Social Inheritance, p. 93.

with the pragmatically a priori in the manner described in Lewis' episte-
mology stands in need of further consideration.

In order to discern the manner in which the pragmatically a priori
coincides with the analytic nature of the moral principles, statements
of the concept of the basic moral imperative must be distinguished from
the statements of the derivative moral principles. The concept of the
basic moral imperative is expressed in the imperative form; i.e., it is
of the form, "Act in such and such a manner." The terms, "right" or
"just," are not contained in a statement of the concept of the basic
moral imperative itself. It is the concept of the basic moral impera-
tive about which such statements as contain the terms, "right" or "just,"
are made. Since the concept of the basic moral imperative provides the
definition of "morally right" required in the validation of moral judg-
ments, it cannot be validated in the same manner as are derivative prin-
ciples of right or as are moral judgments. The concept of the basic
moral imperative is, however, a priori in another manner. It is a priori
as Frankena has observed in that it has an assured status because
". . . .the repudiation of it is self-contravening in a particularly crucial
pragmatic, though not strictly logical, way."[35] In this sense, the prag-
matically a priori nature of the concept of the basic moral imperative
renders possible the combination of the a priori and empirical types of
knowledge; but, this interpretation of the pragmatically a priori is not
the same as was presented in Lewis' justification of the cognitive nature
of his system of ethical principles.

Lewis' proposed justification bases the claim for the a priori

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[35]Frankena, "Lewis' Imperatives of Right." op cit., p. 27.

nature of the concept of the basic moral imperative upon its being defini-
tive of the morally right. The interpretation given in the preceding
paragraph suggests that the a priori nature of the concept of the basic
moral imperative does not rest upon its being definitive of moral right-
ness, but rests upon the fact of man's rational nature. If the pragmati-
cally a priori is interpreted in this latter manner, it has been taken
in a sense different than that which appears throughout Lewis' epistemo-
logical considerations. In An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Lewis
often emphasizes the coincidence of the a priori with the analytic in
such a manner as to disclaim any dependence of a priori or analytic prin-
ciples upon empirical matters of fact.[36] In Mind and the World Order,
he makes the following assertion: "That is a priori which we can main-
tain in the face of all experience, no matter what."[37] However, the
analytic nature of the basic moral imperative is no longer so urgently
insisted upon. In Our Social Inheritance, it is maintained that the con-
cept of the basic moral imperative is not independent of experience
because it is impossible to have a basic categorical ethical principle
which is ". . .independent of any kind of empirical facts, and yet
determine[s] in every instance, whether the act in question is right or
wrong."[38]

In his insistence upon a cognitive ethical system, Lewis has re-
mained aware of the need to take into account both the cognitive and
reflective characters of human nature. Thus, in addition to conformity

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[36]Cf., A.K.V., pp. 35-38, 72-77, 157-168.

[37]M.W.O., p. 224.

[38]Lewis, Our Social Inheritance, p. 97.

to the logical requirement of consistency, a cognitive ethical system

must be ". . .characterized by that integrity which summons all perti-

nent evidence and gives all items their due weight in conclusions

drawn."[39] In addition to the rational nature of man, there is also the

fact of the necessarily social nature of human life which must be in-

cluded in the determination of what is right to bring about.[40] The

fact of the social nature of human life is an empirical fact which is

acknowledged in the same way as is the existence of objective reality.

Since the ground of the concept of the basic moral imperative includes

all pertinent evidence, the acknowledgment of external reality and of

the social nature of human life must therefore be considered to be in-

cluded in that ground. Inasmuch as these acknowledgments are of em-

pirical facts, it follows that there is an empirical element to be

found in the apprehension of the concept of the basic moral imperative.

While Lewis holds that the basic moral imperative is a specific

instance of the rational imperative and therefore the analytic element

of the concept of the basic moral imperative must be consistent with

the concept of the rational imperative, this consistency is primarily

of linguistic meaning relations because the sense meaning relations con-

tained in the concept of the basic moral imperative are not found in

the concept of the rational imperative alone. Those sense meaning

relations present in the concept of the basic moral imperative, but not

in the concept of the rational imperative, account for the uniqueness

of the concept of the basic moral imperative. These meaning relations

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[39] _G.N.R._, p. 79.

[40] Cf. supra., p. 48.

are not, however, counter to those which are contained in the concept of
the rational imperative. (There is no implication of any synthetic a
priori aspect of the moral imperative intended here.) The sense meaning
relations found in the concept of the basic moral imperative, but not in
the concept of the rational imperative, are thus ultimately derived from
the acknowledgment of empirical facts.

There are, then, two elements involved in the cognition of the con-
cept of the basic imperative of right acting: an empirical element as
well as an analytic element. Since we are cognitively aware of the con-
cept of the basic moral imperative, the apprehension of it must be a
type of meaningful apprehension; and, as this acknowledgment contains
empirical as well as analytic elements it must be an empirically veri-
fiable apprehension. Due to the empirical element present in the cog-
nition of the concept of the basic moral imperative, the imperative, as
the basic principle of right acting, is, ultimately, empirically justi-
fiable only.

However, the a priori character of the concept of the basic moral
imperative precludes any experientially determined alteration of it.
Therefore, it must be the principles of right acting, which are derived
from the basic moral imperative, that are subject to alteration or aban-
donment in the face of new and changing empirical situations. These
derivative principles, if they are consistently derived, are analyti-
cally true by definition; but, as applicable principles of right acting,
they must be validated not only as a rationally warranted belief, but
also as empirically justified (both practically and morally). Although
the statements which are consistently derived from the concept of the
basic moral imperative are analytically true, they represent nothing

more than a particular interpretation of the basic imperative, which

interpretation is influenced by empirically apprehended data. Thus,

in the face of new or changing empirical situations, the interpretation

of the basic moral imperative which had been made at one time might not

be applicable at another time. In such a case, the derivative prin-

ciples of right are subject to alteration. This alteration (or abandon-

ment) is nothing more than a reinterpretation of the basic moral im-

perative which itself remains unaltered. By way of illustration, let us

suppose that at time t_o, we find ourselves in situation S_o where there is

a decision to be made concerning whether to commit act A_1 or A_2. So, we

make judgments concerning the consequences of the alternative acts,

which judgments are empirically justifiable. The decision of which act

to commit, however, must, if the performed act is to be morally right,

adhere to a principle of right acting. Having acknowledged the basic

moral imperative, an interpretation of the basic moral imperative is

made in light of S_o and previous similar situations. The formulation of

this interpretation is the principle of right acting which is to be

followed in electing to perform a particular act. If it is decided to

perform A_1 and if that decision is made according to the derived prin-

ciple of right acting, then, if A_1 results in comparative good, that

derived principle is pragmatically justified as a principle of right

acting. As the principle is applied to more and more situations, and

acts undertaken in accordance with it consistently result in comparative

good, the justification of the principle is, of course, strengthened.

Suppose, however, that the situation S_n, at some later time t_n, presents

alternative patterns of acting, A_n and A_m, and, when the principle in

question is applied to S_n and A_n is performed in accordance with the

principle, the consequences do not possess comparative good. And, furthermore, in subsequent situations, acts performed according to the principle do not consistently result in comparative good. It is in such a case that the principle of right acting, although it is an analytically true statement about the concept of the basic moral imperative, is to be altered or abandoned as an applicable principle of right acting. In other words, a reinterpretation of the basic moral imperative is to be made taking into account S_n and the subsequent situations. The main point to be made here is that the basic moral imperative remains unchanged and a priori in the sense of being the ground of the morally right. It is the practical application of the interpretation made in the face of present and prior experiential facts which is subject to practical and moral justification and, therefore, subjects the intepretation to alteration or abandonment if the justification of it is "negative."

The concept of the basic moral imperative is thus a priori and analytic in the sense of being definitive of right. The alteration or abandonment of derivative formulations of the basic moral imperative is not necessitated by the truth or falsity of the formulations themselves, but, instead, by the applicability of a given formulation to a given objective situation. This consideration leads to the clarification of what Lewis intends in labelling the concept of the basic moral imperative a pragmatically a priori principle. The intention is merely that a basic principle is pragmatically a priori if analytically deduced formulations of it are subject to alteration or abandonment in the face of empirical situations to which the formulations are purported to be applicable. While the pragmatically a priori does not coincide with the analytic, a system of pragmatically a priori principles may be at

once consistent and cognitive according to Lewis' epistemology.

Then the distinction between the basic moral imperative, which is simply acknowledged, and the concept of the basic moral imperative, which is known a priori, is pointed out, it becomes evident that Lewis' ethical system is not totally teleological. An a priori principle of right acting must be cognitively adhered to regardless of the actual consequences of the act. It is the concept of the basic moral imperative which is the non-teleological element in Lewis' ethical system. The partially teleological character of this system is the result of the combination of ethical rationalism and ethical naturalism. The moral judgments are cognitive and require analytic verification of the principle (s) of right acting upon which they are based as well as empirical justification. The teleological and the non-teleological elements in Lewis' ethical system are mutually compatible in the same manner as are the pragmatic and a priori elements.

The remaining question concerns the necessity of any a priori principle as a basis of a system which is purported to be applicable to empirical situations. In other words, is Lewis' attempt to combine ethical rationalism and naturalism successful? It is suggested that according to the criteria provided by Lewis' epistemology, the resulting system of pragmatically a priori principles of right is justified as consistent and cognitive. Thus, Lewis can consistently acknowledge the importance of the empirical element in a system of ethics which is demanded by Reichenbach, and, at the same time, Lewis can maintain the a priori validity of the concept of the basic moral imperative. So, Lewis is able to present his system of principles of right acting as a system of pragmatically a priori principles which, in fact, are validated

through experience. Since the principles of right are validated through experience, they are not at once synthetic and a priori. If they were synthetic a priori principles, they would be verified a priori as applicable to any possible empirical situation, and this would preclude the possibility of an experientially determined alteration.

The reformulated justification which enables cogent answers to be given to the stated objections consists primarily of a clarification of what Lewis intends by "pragmatically a priori." The suggested emendation of Lewis' justification of his system of principles of right as cognitive introduces a distinction implied to some extent in Our Social Inheritance, but one which Lewis did not utilize in his epistemological justification. The distinction in question is that drawn between the basic moral imperative, the concept of the basic moral imperative, and the principles of right derived from it. The concept of the basic moral imperative is now seen to be analytically apprehended. The apprehension is of the sense meaning relations formulated from the sense meanings of the antecedent sense of rightness. The principles of right are derived from the concept of the basic moral imperative and are thus analytic. The derivative principles of right, then, are composed of linguistic meaning relations. And, the derivative principles of right, not the basic moral imperative nor the concept of the basic moral imperative, are purported to be applicable to empirical situations. That the derivative principles are consistently deduced from the concept of the basic moral imperative is analytically verifiable. Such claim to applicability is the result of a non-terminating value judgment and, as such, requires practical and moral justification. Thus, a system of pragmatically a priori principles, such as Lewis' system of

principles of right, is consistent with, and cognitive according to,

Lewis' epistemology. The justification, as emended, is therefore

suggested in order to clarify the manner in which Lewis' ethical system

is cognitive according to his epistemological assertions.

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VITA

Henry Garland Bennett, III

Candidate for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Thesis: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF C. I. LEWIS' ETHICAL SYSTEM

Major Field: Philosophy

Biographical:

Personal Data: Born at Stillwater, Oklahoma, May 25, 1940, the son of Phil Connell and Frances Corbin Bennett.

Education: Graduated from Oklahoma City Harding High School in 1958; attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958-1960; received the Bachelor of Arts degree from Oklahoma State University, with a major in philosophy in August, 1962; completed requirements for the Master of Arts degree in August, 1964.