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THE END OF EDEN: ANTI-SEMITISM IN IRAQ, 1917-1951

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the rise of anti-Semitism in 20th-century Iraq, how it evolved into a powerful force in governing circles, and gave rise to mass violence, discriminatory legislation, and an official desire to eliminate the country's Jewish population.

Iraq can be a roadmap to study anti-Semitism in the Middle East. The country has a Jewish history dating back to the biblical era; no common border with Israel/Palestine; and no direct interaction with the Yishuv, Palestine's Jewish settlement, nor rival interests with it. These characteristics enable researchers to better differentiate political strife from anti-Semitism, in contrast to areas with political antagonism or shared boundaries.

At World War I's end, Baghdad was home to a venerable and prosperous Jewish community. Many historians have argued that the 1920s was a Jewish 'Golden Era,' when Jews were the largest ethno-religious group in Baghdad. Through a study of Iraqi Jewish, British, Israeli and American archival sources, and data-sets of arrests and murders, this dissertation follows anti-Semitism's development. Current historiography focuses on the Jewish Exodus in 1950-51, or the Farhūd, the mass violence against Jews on June 1-2, 1941. Yet these monographs were not infrequently veiled debates on Israel and Palestine. This study will avoid political debate, but will concentrate instead on the topic *stricto sensu* – anti-Semitism, broadening the scope to analyze Iraq's Jew-hatred as a history from the 19th century until the mid-twentieth century, when the overwhelming majority Jews departed.

The Historical literature contains three theories of anti-Semitism in Iraq, which are wrong, ahistoric and lack progression: 1) that anti-Semitism was adopted from Europe; 2) there was no anti-Semitism; or 3) anti-Semitism was high and constant since Islam's introduction.

This dissertation departs from these Eurocentric interpretations and repositions of anti-Semitism back in the Middle East. Iraq's anti-Semitism, which is the focus of this dissertation, was not acculturated from Europe. On the contrary, negative notions of Jews, derived from popular stereotypes that evolved from medieval religious texts, a social hierarchy wherein Muslims monopolized politics, opposition to equality and the evolution of a unique nationalism, *Qawmiyya*, which defined Arabs as Muslim descendants of the 7th-century Islamic conquerors and excluded Jews as an 'internal enemy.' Iraq became an anti-Semitic state, and by 1951, this led to the forced mass exodus of Jews. Whereas previous scholars understood clearly enough that the position of Iraq's Jews declined, they could not explain the process by which this occurred. The present dissertation examines how Jews declined from ostensibly equal citizens into internal enemies.

This dissertation moves away from an ahistoric, static model, excluding Iraq and the Middle East, to a developmental model, centered on Iraq and the region, with a concrete cause, that can explain the decline of Jewish status, anti-Jewish laws, and ultimately, the Jewish exodus. Anti-Semitism was a developmental process in Iraq fueled by the desire to preserve the hierarchy of faith, a monopoly in politics and the development of *Qawmiyya*. Understanding these factors will produce a better understanding of the origins and development of anti-Semitism in the Middle East more generally as well.

A Brief Introduction

Iraq is the setting of the fable of the Garden of Eden, and, at the end of World War I, Baghdad was home to a venerable and prosperous Jewish community. Historiography says Iraq of the 1920s was the Jewish ‘Golden Era.’ An intellectual class emerged, and the middle class grew, so that Jews were the largest ethno-religious group in the city. Nevertheless, this dissertation’s title is a double entendre. Like the Garden of Eden, the ‘Golden Era’ was partially a fable; not as Golden as recalled. This dissertation will explore how anti-Semitism emerged – from symbolism, power structures and nationalism – and came to predominate in Iraq. Current historiography focuses on the Jewish exodus in 1950-51, or the Farhūd, the mass violence against Jews on June 1-2, 1941. This dissertation will broaden the scope, analyzing Iraq’s anti-Semitism and anti-Semites as a history from the late 19th century until the mid-twentieth century, when most Jews departed, following a trajectory from Iraq’s establishment to transformation into an anti-Semitic state.

Anti-Judaism, a contempt for Judaism on religious grounds, evolved in Iraq from sentiments about *ahl al-dhimma*, non-Muslims under Islamic rule. In the medieval era, conventions justified Muslims’ monopoly on power. Negative depictions of Jews, as inept, ill-

willed, and needing protection, were devices to reify Muslim governance. The labels contrasted Jews with Muslims and embodied their prescribed roles: Muslims as authority, and Jews as subjects. These archetypes developed into themes of Muslims safeguarding Jews – an epitome of the social hierarchy, in which the ruler, the higher, shielded the disempowered.

Whereas Muslim authority was seen as normative, Jewish authority was viewed an inversion of social order. Violations of this ‘hierarchy of faith,’ of Muslims ruling others, sparked indignation. When Jews supervised Muslims or failed to act like *dhimmīs* (protected non-Muslims), attacks on Jews increased to ‘correct’ the hierarchy. Yet persecuting *ahl al-dhimma* also offended Muslims’ own sense of fairness, upon which these stereotypes of protection were predicated. As a result, Jews were vilified to rationalize why they were inferior, or should not manage Muslims.

Anti-Judaism built the foundation for anti-Semitism, hatred of Jews based on chimerical fantasies, fictional reasons, and myths, such as demonism or pan-ethnic conspiracies. In the 19th century, Anti-Semitism was in part a backlash from anxiety Muslim dominance would end. In that era, the Ottoman Empire ruled the Middle East, and economic development and centralization of the Ottoman state expanded non-Muslim rights, attenuating customs that emblemized Islamic sway. Trade concessions to Europe were open to Jews, increasing their standard of living, and the influx of capital from British-dominated markets expanded the Jewish community. The *Tanzīmāt*, an Ottoman reform program to regularize the state, granted equality to all sects, including Jews. Nevertheless, Jews were still recognized as *dhimmīs*, and Iraq, an Ottoman province, still rooted in Islam’s hierarchy of faith. Those who valued such a convention rejected equality.

Strife ensued as to whether Jews should be equal. The Tanzīmāt's civil rights also ushered increasingly frequent blood libels, the false and superstitious slander Jews engage in cannibalism. The Young Turk revolution of 1908, a movement that overthrew the Ottoman monarchy's absolutism and introduced a constitution, brought riots against Jews and allegations of secret Jewish control. The apprehension in each of these events – the Tanzīmāt, the Constitution – was that Muslim dominance would end.

Stereotypes about Jews shaped the creation of Iraq as a nation. Despite the changes from World War I – the Ottomans' collapse, Britain's conquest of the area, or the establishment of an independent Iraq – *dhimmī* notions persisted and were interwoven into law. British officers built the country atop these sentiments to appease Muslims: Jews were lawfully separate from Muslims, and without political clout. Administrators created a legal system of institutional discrimination, wherein rules of governance were not explicitly anti-Semitic, but were promulgated with a discriminatory purpose and results that paralleled older *dhimmī* roles. Jews were taxed at higher rates, received less public funding, and were disfavored in the employment process in a variety of fields.

From the 1920s, the emergence of *Qawmiyya*, a form of Arab nationalism that excluded Jews, was propagated in the school system. *Qawmiyya* said Arabs were a people in need of an empire, and urged a return to an idealized past of the medieval Caliphates' empires, imagining then Arabs were powerful. Yet also *Qawmiyya* said Iraq was a state for Arabs only, and defined Arabs as Muslim descendants from the 7th-century Islamic conquerors of the Middle East. *Qawmiyya* embraced stereotypes that associated Jews with European urbanites and Arabs as indigenous Middle Easterners, to differentiate Jews and Arabs into two rival peoples. *Qawmiyya* fueled anti-Semitism. Government patronage of jobs and subsidies for *Qawmiyya*'s polemicists

cultivated the myth in literature, punditry, and arts, which served to perpetuate fears, and convince all social classes to embrace the libels.

In 1932, Iraq was granted independence on the condition it protect minorities, but soon thereafter the government encouraged anti-Semitism. Iraq's king, Fayṣal, ordered the Assyrian Massacre. Assyrians were Christian refugees from Turkey, and the killings ultimately demonized not just Assyrians but all minorities. Fayṣal's successor, Ghāzī, promoted anti-Semitism on the radio; and the Education Ministry introduced a militant form of *Qawmiyya* into the school system that said Iraq's Jews were an internal enemy and should be killed. In 1934, the government enacted the first restrictions against Jews in an unofficial manner – never in writing. These “extralegal” constraints terminated Jews from the civil service to remove them from government, restricted Jewish travel, e.g., by ignoring applications, and schools imposed *numerus clausus* against Jews.

In 1935, Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Gaylānī and Prime Minister Yāsīn al-Hāshimī seized power and instituted state-sponsored anti-Semitism. They used three government front organizations that blamed Jews for Iraq's instability: the Futuwwa, which dominated the schools; the Muthanná Club, which recruited military officers and policymakers into a secret anti-Semitic society; and the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, which used state funds to distribute propaganda to the public through news publications.

State support for anti-Semitism enabled these agitators to topple the state and establish anti-Jewish regime. After Rashīd ‘Ālī was overthrown, military officers whom Muthanná recruited, forcibly installed Rashīd ‘Ālī as Prime Minister in 1941. His conflict with Britain and Pro-Axis ties sparked the Anglo-Iraq War of 1941. Rashīd ‘Ālī's wartime broadcasts urged attacks on Jews to raise morale, saying Jews were “internal enemies.” The wild emotions of war,

the propaganda, and previous indoctrination from state Jew-hatred in the 1930s, spawned a wave of accusations – e.g., that Jews were British spies – normalizing rhetoric to kill Iraq’s Jews.

There were episodes of mass violence against Jews in the wake of Iraqi defeats in the Anglo-Iraq war. The largest was the Farhūd. The Economics Minister, Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī, stole registers from Jewish schools to identify victims and organized militants to perpetrate the atrocity. Though British forces conquered Iraq and Sab‘āwī fled, in Baghdad, the police, army, and militants were still armed; still loyal to Sab‘āwī; and agitators still called to exterminate the internal enemy – Jews. Sab‘āwī’s fighters perpetrated the Farhūd without him.

The crux of the *Qawmiyya*’s allegations – that Jews were an internal enemy and executed attacks – transformed Iraq into an anti-Semitic state, and led to the mass exodus of Jews in 1951. Three factors drove this transformation. Firstly, the continuity from Rashīd ‘Ālī’s regime, though deposed, its propagandists worked for subsequent administrations, sustaining the canard Jews were adversaries who served external foes, such as Communism and Zionism, or the new state of Israel. Second, the notion of protecting *dhimmi*s lost appeal, as politicians no longer wished to guard Jews, and accepted the aspersions of Jewish animosity. Third, Jewish authority became more taboo, as leaders acted as if the libels were real, and marginalized Jews to protect the country. The government barred Jewish non-citizens from entering Iraq, and barred Jewish citizens from transactions, ownership, careers, education, public institutions, travel, and government. Jews became legally inferior.

The government wanted to expel Jews to protect the state, though preferred to do so by indirect means, so as to not sully government’s reputation. For policymakers still valued *dhimmi* norms of protection, even as *Qawmiyya* scorned the concept as insufficiently harsh. So the government created a system of rules for Jews to willingly leave in exchange for surrendering

their citizenship, or, through Jews' own actions, to be deported with no right to return. For the State to remain 'innocent' of the crime, Iraq avoided direct expulsion, though that was what the government intended to do and in fact, achieved. Jews then ceased to be citizens or *dhimmīs*, for their status declined to a lower caste, that of 'internal enemy.'

Chapter 1

Dhimma and Hierarchy

Anti-Judaism in Iraq evolved from traditional notions about *ahl al-dhimma*, (Arabic for “people of the pact of protection”) non-Muslims under Islamic rule. In the medieval era, conventions justified Muslims’ monopoly on power. Negative images of Jews were literary devices to illustrate Islam’s truth or to reify Muslim governance. These motifs were the kernels of what became anti-Judaism, a series of tropes which characterized Jews as weak, ill-willed, and needing protection. The labels served to contrast Jews with Muslims. Each representation embodied their prescribed roles, Muslims as the authority, depicted as ethical and strong, and Jews as ineffectual and subjects. These archetypes of Jews and Muslims were framed in religious rhetoric and preserved in sacred texts. Yet rather than dueling enemies, the archetypes developed into a reoccurring theme of Muslims saving Jews, or treating Jews well. The image of Muslims granting protection to Jews exemplified the social hierarchy – the privileged ruler protected the disempowered inferior. The notion of Muslim heroism derived from and bolstered taboos against Jews in leadership roles. Tropes said Muslims rescued those they subjugated and treated them well. Muslim authority was seen as normative, while Jewish authority was an inversion of the social order wherein Muslims were supposed to rule others.

Violations of this ‘hierarchy of faith,’ of Muslims ruling Jews, discomfited those who valued such norms. When Jews supervised Muslims or failed to act like *dhimmi*s (protected non-Muslims), attacks on Jews increased to ‘right’ the hierarchy. Jews who were too successful or supervised Muslims sparked indignation. Yet persecuting *ahl al-dhimma* also offended Muslims’ own sense of fairness, upon which these stereotypes of protection were predicated. As a result, Jews were vilified to rationalize why they were legally inferior, should not espouse their religion, supervise Muslims, or define themselves.

Though Middle East anti-Judaism remained local and within the boundaries of social conflict, anti-Judaism was not a ‘normal prejudice’ found in any society, either. Biases, preserved in sacred traditions, continued long after their original purposes ceased, and long after the local conflict that spawned them ended. Anti-Judaism prepared the seedbed for anti-Semitism in the 19th and 20th centuries, when Arab nationalism and global capitalism transformed the Middle East and exacerbated prohibitions of Jewish authority – and equality – into anti-Semitism.

Dhimma

In Iraq, as everywhere throughout the Muslim world, attitudes about Jews were preserved in sacred texts. The Qur’ān, Islam’s holy book, speaks of Jews positively, but also with denunciation.¹ “The most hostile to those who believe are the Jews,” says the Qur’ān’s fifth sūrah, a term for a chapter of the Qur’ān.² There are *Ḥadīths*, traditions of Prophet Muhammad’s words and deeds, of anger at Jews: they did not accept his prophethood; they contradicted him;

¹ The Qur’ān states Allah gave Israelites “scripture, laws, prophecy and blessed them,” see Qur’ān 45:16

² Ibid., 5:82

they ridiculed him.³ Jews were depicted as opponents; as cursed by Allah.⁴ They tampered with Scripture, were untrustworthy, bitter, and transgressed as oath breakers.⁵ These tropes were expanded in Muḥammad’s hagiographies, which narrate clashes with Jews.⁶ In one legend, a monk saw a symbol of prophethood upon Muḥammad, and warned: “Beware of the Jews.”⁷ In others, Jews attempted to assassinate him.⁸

Such stories crafted images that Jews are hostile and dislike Islam, and these images could be expanded, referenced or used as desired: from a 12th-century Baghdad native’s polemic, *Silencing the Jews*, which castigated “God made the Jews blind when they tampered with the text” to an 18th-century Iraqi treatise that argued Jews were idolaters.⁹ Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaydī, alluded to these stereotypes, when, he recounted meeting Haim Weizmann, the leader of the World Zionist Organization, at the London Conference in 1939. He said Weizmann was “cunning;” “malicious;” and “angry;” and Suwaydī used the Arabic word *ghāḍib*, a pun on *maghḍūb* from the Qur’ān, those with whom God is angry.¹⁰ He said Jews were plotting. They were overly “bold.”¹¹ They were beneath Arabs as “vagabonds and hoodlums.”¹²

While motifs of Jewish ill-will once served to reify the Qur’ān, to ‘prove’ Islam true, the venom of such caricatures was mitigated with assumptions of Jewish impotence in society. Islamic literature emphasized Muslims win, while Jews were deemed ineffectual, harmless and

3 Norman Stillman, “Traditional Islamic Attitudes Toward Jews and Judaism,” *The Solomon Goldman Lectures: Perspectives in Jewish Learning*, Vol. IV, ed. Nathaniel Stampfer, (Chicago: Spertus College of Judaica Press, 1985), 77

4 al-Bukhārī, *Sahīh*, Bk. 23 (Kitāb al-Janā’iz), Bāb 472.

5 Qur’ān 3:78; Stillman, “Traditional Islamic Attitudes Toward Jews,” 78; Bernard Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice*, (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1986), 129

6 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 127

7 Nissim Rejwan, “Bē’āyâ vë-Šorešēha: ‘Agādāt Ha-Antišēmîyôt Ha-‘Ārāvîṭ,” *Encounter*, (November 1967), 145

8 Norman Stillman, “Traditional Islamic Attitudes Toward Jews and Judaism,” 79

9 Moshe Perlmann, *Samau’ al al-Maghribī Iḥḥām al-Yahūd: Silencing the Jews*, (American Academy for Jewish Research: New York, 1964) 33; the 18th century polemic is the *Journey of Baḥr al-‘Ulum the Sayyid*, see Vera B. Moreen, “A Shī’ī Jewish ‘Debate’ (Munāzara) in the Eighteenth Century,” *Journal of the American Orient Society*, Vol. 119, No. 4 (Oct- Dec., 1999), 571-573, 575

10 Tawfiq al-Suwaydī, *Mudhakarātī: Nuṣuḥ Qarn min Tārīkh al-‘Irāq w al-Qaḍīya al-‘Arabiya*, 2nd ed., (al-Muasasa al-‘Arabiya l’il Dirāsāt wa al-Nashar: Beirut, 2010) 282; compare with Qur’ān 1:7

11 *Ibid.*, 281

12 *Ibid.*

incapable of success. They were ridiculed, not feared.¹³ In Baghdad, a British diplomat, Gertrude Bell, recounted after Ottomans implemented the draft, “a hundred young men of the Jewish community applied-” and thousands served in WWI- yet Jewish conscripts were mocked.¹⁴ In one joke, Jews requested gendarmes to protect them on the trek to the frontlines.¹⁵ Abraham Elkabir, who worked in the civil service from the 1920s, recalled that his “professor of Moslem theology believed the Jews could not react to any aggression because their hands were crippled by the will of God.”¹⁶ In the decade prior to WWI, Iraq’s Jewish conscripts did not have arms nor important commissions.¹⁷ During Iraq’s Monarchy (1921-1958) there were just eight officers, and only one was assigned to combat.¹⁸ In government, Jewish civil servants were placed in mundane bureaus that focused on daily infrastructure – mail, telecommunications or finance – which adhered to stereotypes of Jews serving Muslims. Jews were almost devoid from departments related to power, such as diplomacy and defense.¹⁹ In 1897, Rashīd al-Riḏā, a proponent for government based on Islamic law, once worried that if the Ottomans collapsed, Muslims may “become powerless as Jews.”²⁰

According the Qur’ān (Sura 9:29), People of the Book (Jews and Christians) were to submit, pay tribute and be humble. Jews had defined roles as *ahl al-dhimma*, which reinforced a hierarchy that portrayed Muslims as strong, Jews weak, and was exemplified through Muslims granting protection to Jews.²¹ A 1941 letter from the Jewish Community in Basra, written on the behalf of a local sheikh, Aḥmad Bāshā’yān, relates his importance because his dynasty “accord

13 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 129; Stillman, “Traditional Islamic Attitudes Toward Jews,” 79

14 Gertrude Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, (William Heinemann: London, 1911), 187; Norman Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, (The Jewish Publication Society: Philadelphia, 2003) 49

15 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 130

16 A.S. Elkabir, *My Communal Life or Death of a Community*, Vol. 1, April 1961. BJHC (no. 7308) 16, quoted in 92

17 *Ibid.*, 15

18 The officer, Salim Ezair, threatened to resign unless he were given a combat role, see Yosef Meir, *Koaḥ Māgēn Yēhūdē Bē-‘Īraq: Sīpūrā Šel Zērō’a Hā-Haganāh Bē-‘Īraq* (Šlomo Levī ‘Avôdôt Dēfūs, 2009) 26

19 Report on Iraq: May 15, 1948-January 1949. American Jewish Committee (Paris) JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)- 2647991 (p.4)

20 Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983) 268-269

21 Norman Stillman, “Traditional Islamic Attitudes Toward Jews and Judaism,” 79-80

to the Jewish [sic] the most generous and considerate treatment and they have accorded them their protection... this exalted family have upheld their tradition of helping the weak.”²² This protection was enforced and reified social stratification.

On May 7, 1941, Britain retook Basra from the pro-Axis regime of Rashīd ‘Alīal-Gaylānī. The police left. Pilferers targeted Jewish shops. Two men knocked on the door of a Jewish home, demanding a woman within. Such impropriety outraged a neighbor, who exited with bodyguards, beat the pair and dragged them away.²³ The Bāshā’yān family owned the quarter and ordered their men to guard Jews’ streets.²⁴ As the Jewish community’s secretary, Avraham Twena, recounted, “the notables were very pleased and reiterated their commitments – in accordance with the tradition of their forefathers – to guard Jews.”²⁵ There are many such accounts in the history of those years. During the Farhūd, the mass violence against Jews on June 1-2, 1941, Aaron Matityahu related that friends of his sister went to kill her, grabbing her, but a stranger, a Muslim, stopped them, yelling “This belongs to me. You can’t touch her.”²⁶ At the same time, in Sulaymaniyah, a city to the north, rioters wanted to plunder a synagogue, when, an imam confronted them. “The Jews come under our auspices and are protected by us.”²⁷ The rioters dispersed.²⁸ In the most famous anecdote of this trope, just before the Farhūd, Sassoon Khaḍḍūrī, the Jewish community’s president, sought Baghdad’s mayor, Arshad al-‘Umarī, doffed his turban, and begged the mayor to save the Jews. “Tell your people not to worry. I shall

22 President of the Basra Jewish Community to President of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. July 2, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 49

23 Abraham Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot 5701, Yūnī 1941*, (Agūdat Bet Knesset Geulah, Ramle: 1977) 89-90

24 Ibid., 89-90; Personalities: Iraq (Exclusive of Baghdad and Kadhimain). 1919. IOR (IOR/L/PS/20/221) 25

25 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot*, 90

26 Aaron Matityahu. Interview. JIMENA Oral History Project. Ben-Gurion Archives. Published May 7, 2015. youtube.com. accessed July 19, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P0SF_rrwxog

27 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot*, 82

28 Ibid.

take care of everything,” ‘Umarī replied.²⁹ All these stories reinforce Muslim authority: the imam over his followers, the mayor over his city, men over women, and Muslims over Jews.

In this paradigm, Jews were expected to be submissive. Joseph Samuels, who was born in Baghdad in 1930, recounted “I grew up in a passive society. ‘Don’t fight back, it will be bad for the Jews.’ If somebody hit you, don’t fight back.”³⁰ Childhood memoirs often related parents advising children not to answer anti-Jewish taunts.³¹ To ignore slights. The lyrics of one children’s song included the lines, “Oh Hebrew, be quiet. Be careful, an Arab is he, a Muslim is he, until the rage passes. Oh Hebrew, don’t respond to the taunter.”³²

The *dhimma* concept manifested through the popular motif of Jews professing gratitude for Islamic rule, which they often compared to a shadow cast upon them, shading them from misfortune. An echo of the metaphor the Caliph was the shadow of Allah, safeguarding Muslims, and so too Muslims safeguarded Jews. The poet Yehuda Barshan entitled his memoir, *Jews in the Shadow of Islam*.³³ The Jewish poet Anwār Shaul won fame for eulogizing the death of Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa‘adūn in 1929;³⁴ radio played Jewish stanzas lauding army and king or the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday;³⁵ and the Jewish Literary Society acted performances of the play Saladin, extolling Muslims who vanquished crusaders.³⁶ This variety of entertainment continued for decades after most Jews left. In 1969, Shaul composed the most well-known poem of this genre, “Religion and Patriotism, or a Jew in the Shadow of Islam”:

My creed was adopted from Moses
The Eminence of Islam was my refuge

I reside in the shadow of the religion of Muḥammad
The eloquence of the Qur’ān was my spring.³⁷

29 Violette Shamash, *Memories of Eden*, ed. Mira and Tony Rocca, (Forum Books Ltd: Surrey, 2008) 196

30 Joseph Samuels. Interview. Ben-Gurion Archives. YouTube. May 7, 2015. youtube.com, accessed July 29, 2016.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3K4ph8yVYZA>

31 For example of this, see George A. Sofer, *My Life in the Middle East*, BJHC (No. 2519) 44; Saul Silas Fathi, *The Full Circle: Escape from Baghdad and the Return*, (Saul Silas Fathi: Central Islip, 2005) 33-34

32 ‘Ereṣ Yisra’elī, “Šārôt Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-Bagdad,” *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), July 27, 1926 (Vol. VIII, No. 257) 2

33 Yehuda (Gürgī) Barshan, *Yēhūdē bē-Šēl Ha-‘Islam: Perkē Zikrônôt Mē-Bagdad* (Ramat Gan: Hābašelet, 1997)

34 Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa‘adūn committed suicide, see see Reuven Snir, ‘*Arabiyyūt, Yahadūt, Šiyônūt, Ma’avak Zēhūyôt Bē-Yēšîr-tam šel Yēhūdē ‘Iraq*, (Yad Izhak Ben Zvi: Jerusalem: 2005) 82; 84

35 *Ibid.*, 119, 277

36 S.S. Shina, “Our Baghdad Letter : Zionism and its influence in Mesopotamia,” *Israel’s Messenger* (Shanghai) April 7, 1922, 32

37 Anwar Shāul, *Qīṣṣat ḥayātī fī Wādī al-Rāfidayn*, (Rabiṭat al-Jamī’iyyin al-Yahūd al-Nazīhin min al-‘Irāq: Jerusalem, 1980) 331

These displays could be ersatz or not intended as truth, but as myths to reaffirm Iraq's social structure. In 1946, perhaps eyeing domestic consumption, the government invited the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to see the country's excellent interfaith relations. Abraham Elkabir, the Director-General of Finance, testified Jews lived well for twenty-five centuries. "The Jews do not feel any social disability," he said.³⁸ "Islam acknowledges the Jewish faith and its adepts are not persecuted."³⁹ Albeit privately, Elkabir complained the state purged Jewish employees, refused to hire Jews, and impeded their careers through selective granting of licenses and enforcement of banking and tax laws.⁴⁰ Iraq's cult of heroism could be equally illusory. 'Umarī, the mayor reputed to have saved the Jews, may have panicked, for when the Farhūd's violence erupted, he asked to resign.⁴¹ He did not ask the Regent, 'Abd al-Ilah, to fire on the mobs until the second day.⁴² Perhaps he was callous, or thought it unnecessary, or, as his resignation suggests, perhaps he did not think.⁴³ 'Umarī was investigated as a culprit.⁴⁴ While amid the Farhūd, Jews defended themselves. In Baghdad, houses were traditionally built like fortresses, narrow and tall, three stories, without windows on the ground floor.⁴⁵ Some besieged Jews repelled their attackers, hurling weapons upon them below – boiling water, burning rags, gravel, or bricks.⁴⁶

38 Ibrahim al-Kabir, "Testimony before Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry," Public Record Office, London 371/52514. *Modern Middle Eastern Jewish Thought: Writings on Identity, Politics, and Culture, 1893-1958*, ed. Moshe Behar and Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, (Brandeis University Press: Waltham, 2013) 139

39 Ibid., 138

40 A.S. Elkabir, *My Governmental Life or Story of a Dream*, 1964, BJHC (no. 7308) 56-57; A.S. Elkabir, *My Communal Life or Death of a Community*, 145-146

41 Freya Stark, *Dust in the Lion's Paw*, (London: Century Publishing Co., Ltd, 1985) 114

42 Hayyim J. Cohen, "The Anti-Jewish Farhud in Baghdad, 1941," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., (Oct. 1966) 15; "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/1941," [Investigative Committee on the Events of June 1 and 2nd 1941], published in 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Ḥasanī, *al-Asrār al-khaḥfiyah fī ḥawādith al-sanah 1941 al-taḥarruriyah*, (Matba' at al-'Irfan: Sayda, 1958) 228

43 "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/1941," 232

44 Abraham Twena, "The Diary of Abraham Twena," *The Scribe: The Journal of Babylonian Jewry*, No. 11, Vol. II, (May-June 1973) 6

45 Salim Fattal, *Bē-Simta 'ōt Baghdad*, (Carmel Publishers: Jerusalem: 2003) 13

46 Ibid., 13, 115; Cohen, "The Anti-Jewish Farhud," 9; Sylvia Haim, "Jewish Life in Baghdad under the Monarchy," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, (Taylor & Francis Ltd: May 1975), 193; Shamash, 109, 206

Anti-Judaism

‘Anti-Judaism’ describes hostility to Judaism, on religious grounds. The term, and its controversy, came to prominence in the 20th century, when clergy, investigated for inciting genocide during the Holocaust, said their “anti-Judaism” was not associated with the Nazis’ anti-Semitism.⁴⁷ What complicates the term further, is an overarching term for Christian and Islamic ‘anti-Judaism’ is also false. While Christianity could be overtly hostile, in the Middle East, Islam presumed the role of protector.⁴⁸ Yet there was also a contradiction to this guardianship. Though Jews were protected, and doctrinal writings care deeply for justice, taboos prohibited Jewish authority over Muslims, even if Jews were delegates of a Muslim lord. Religious and local laws said Judaism and Islam could not be equal. Islam must be superior. Successive rulers imposed laws to distinguish *dhimmi* as lower subjects. Jews could not bear arms, serve in war, ride saddled horses, or worship in public, and paid a poll tax, the *jizya*.⁴⁹ In 9th-century Baghdad, the Caliph al-Mutawakil (d. 861) imposed the *ghiyār* (lit. “differentiation”), sumptuary laws, decreeing *dhimmi*s wear distinctive robes and hats, and at the thresholds of their homes, place statues of monsters. Though these restrictions changed over periods — from brown robes to yellow turbans or veils or badges or shoes of different colors, or bells about necks, sometimes enforced and often not.⁵⁰ These prohibitions were never repudiated because they derived from popular interpretations of religious lore. Sovereigns claimed to be Caliphs, political successors of

47 Susannah Heschel, *The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2008) 277
48 S.D. Goitein, “Interfaith Relations in Medieval Islam,” Yaakov Herzog Memorial Lecture, Columbia University, Oct 22, 1973, (Jerusalem Post Press: Jerusalem) 23

49 Haggai Ben-Shammai, “Jew-Hatred in the Islamic Tradition and the Koranic Exegesis,” *Antisemitism Through the Ages*, ed. Shmuel Almog, (Pergamon Press Inc.: Fairview Park, 1988) 164; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 123; Goitein, 26

50 Avraham Ben Yaakov, *Yehūdē Bavel: Mesōf Tēkūfat Ha-Ga’ōnim ‘Ad Yamēnū, 1038-1960*, (Kiryat Sefer, Inc., Ben Zvi Institute at the Hebrew University: Jerusalem, 1965) 12-13; Yedida Kalfon Stillman, *Arab Dress: From the Dawn of Islam to Modern Times*, 2nd ed., ed. Norman A. Stillman, (Brill: Leiden, 2003) 52-53, 100-107; Goitein, 30

Muḥammad; or Sultans, governing on a Caliph's behalf. The Qur'ān was read to call Jews to "pay the *jizya* readily, being brought low."⁵¹

Regulations were sanctified in apocryphal texts. The Pact of 'Umar, a compact for coexistence, was attributed to 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 634-644), one of Muḥammad's companions and one of the *Rāshidūn*, a group of four Caliphs who were paragons of justly rule. Legend said 'Umar spared Jerusalem's residence in exchange for submission. The Pact was 'Umar's conditions for surrender. It gave sacred weight to *dhimmī* obeisance.⁵² Jewish authority was banned, while stereotypes of Jews as cross, crooked and hostile to Islam, reinforced Muslim rule over them.

Caliph al-Ma'mūn (d. 833) complained "Jews are the most corrupt of all peoples," and forbade them work in tax registries and military.⁵³ In 849, Caliph al-Mutawakil banned *dhimmīs* from jobs with influence, because *dhimmī* "oppress the Muslims" and "are hostile to them."⁵⁴ In Mutawakkil's Baghdad, Jews were relegated to work in scorned careers as dyers, tanners, butchers and cobblers.⁵⁵ Prejudices of Jewish lowness persisted. Even in 1920s Baghdad, toilet cleaners were Christians or Jews, never Muslims.⁵⁶ (One local song had the lyrics: "Have you ever heard of a Muslim become a latrine cleaner? A Jew a night watchman?")⁵⁷ Perhaps most revealingly, in one instance, the Foreign Ministry tested applicants to be clerks, then delayed the results after Jews won, unsure if the Minister wanted only Muslims.⁵⁸

51 Qur'ān 9:29

52 For a translation of the Pact, see Norman Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, (The Jewish Publication Society of America: Philadelphia, 1979) 157-158

53 Avraham Grossman, "The Economic and Social Background of Hostile Attitudes Toward the Jews in the Ninth and Tenth Century Muslim Caliphate," *Antisemitism Through the Ages*, ed. Shmuel Almog, Pergamon Press Inc.: Fairveiw Park, 1988) 174

54 *Ibid.*, 175

55 Joshua Finkel, "A Risāla of al-Jāhiz," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 47 (1927) 328

56 Nissim Rejwan, "Childhood Memories: Baghdad as a Jewish City," *Midstream*, (February/March 2001) 14; Nissim Rejwan, *The Last Jews in Baghdad: Remembering a Lost Homeland*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004) 7

57 Rejwan, "Childhood Memories, 14

58 'Abdallah Ṣakhī, "al-Yāhūd Ta'aruḏū ilā 'Alā Mughādira al-'Irāq," Dec 25, 2002. A Conversation with Mīr Baṣrī. Publication unknown. Nissim Rejwan Archive. Unpublished. (Harry S. Truman Research Institute Library. Hebrew University of Jerusalem) 1

Anti-Judaism vs. Anti-Semitism

There are two views of anti-Judaism in the Middle East. Bernard Lewis, the distinguished scholar of Middle Eastern and Islamic History, regarded anti-Judaism as a normal prejudice. Anti-Judaism was the same as antipathies from all cultures, wherein outsiders are lower status and caricatured with pejorative traits.⁵⁹ This is incomparable to anti-Semitism, Lewis says, while both ‘isms’ are antagonistic to Jews, anti-Judaism is framed in religion and hostile to those who keep the Jewish faith, but ends when Jews convert out. Anti-Semitism does not. The precise meaning of ‘anti-Semitism’ is debated: hating Jews as an ideology or a race, or globally, regardless of religion or whether Jews are even involved in the strife.

Gavin Langmuir, a noted historian of medieval Europe and of anti-Semitism, speculated that anti-Judaism reacts to Judaism’s real characteristics: disbelief in Muḥammad; disbelief in the Qur’ān. Adherents of Judaism were treated no differently than other People of the Book – i.e., Jews and Christians. Anti-Semitism is a special hate, and what Langmuir calls a chimerical prejudice- a hate predicated on fantasies, reasons that are fictional and cannot be true, such as demonism, supernaturalism or pan-ethnic conspiracies. Langmuir said European anti-Semitism began in the 12th century, when the first blood libels occurred, the false myth Jews need Christian blood. This fiction was followed by others: host desecration, well poisonings, and causing plague.⁶⁰ Lewis, on the contrary, insists there was no allegations of magical crimes in the Middle East. Anti-Semitism stemmed from Europe’s deicide canard: Jews slew God, and theologians and agitators linked Jews with devilry and monsters, such as *judensau*, the jew

⁵⁹ Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 20, 123 and 128

⁶⁰ Gavin I. Langmuir, *Towards a Definition of Antisemitism*, (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1996) 6-12

fig.⁶¹ Anti-Semitism is based on hate. Whereas in Islamic societies, anti-Judaism flowed from contempt.⁶² The attitude “of a master people to a subject people,” Lewis said.⁶³ Muslims did not fear Jews. Jews were regarded as unimportant, so few polemicists bothered to refute them.⁶⁴

By contrast, Norman Stillman, a historian of Middle Eastern Jews, does see anti-Judaism as distinct from other prejudices, inasmuch as these notions are derived from religious lore.⁶⁵ The Qur’ān, *Hadīths* and *Tafsīr* (exegesis of the Qur’ān), amplify these motifs, as do the *Sīra*, a canonical biography of Muḥammad.⁶⁶ (The *Sīra* calls rabbis “men whose malice and enmity were aimed at the Apostle”).⁶⁷ Although this was not anti-Semitism. Jews had no demonic qualities; Muḥammad’s interactions with Jews had no cosmic significance. Instead, Jews were just literary devices, written as maladroitness to highlight Muslim heroism.⁶⁸

Anti-Semitism in the Islamic World

Langmuir’s definition of anti-Semitism could be said to occur in the Islamic world, in unusual circumstances, when restrictions upon Jews holding positions of authority were violated. Unrest boiled when Jews “did not conform to the humble dhimmi [sic] image,” were conspicuous, well-off, or powerful.⁶⁹ In 11th-century Spain, during Iberian Jewry’s Golden Age, Jews served in Muslim courts. Prior to that era, Jews were often excluded from politics through

61 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 122, 117; Jeremy Cohen, *Christ Killer: The Jews and the Passion from the Bible to the Big Screen*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 202, 206; Joshua Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jews*, (Jewish Publication Society of America: Philadelphia, 1943) 21-25

62 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 124

63 *Ibid.*, 125-126

64 *Ibid.*, 126-127

65 Norman Stillman, “Antisemitism in the Contemporary Arab World,” *Antisemitism in the Contemporary World*, ed. Michael Curtis, (Westview Press: Boulder, 1986) 73; Stillman, “Traditional Islamic Attitudes Toward Jews and Judaism,” 76

66 *Idem.*, “Anti-Judaism and Antisemitism in the Arab and Islamic World Prior to 1948,” *Antisemitism: A History*, ed. Albert S. Lindemann and Richard S. Levy, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2011) 213

67 *Ibid.*, 214

68 *Ibid.*

69 *Idem.*, “New Attitudes Towards the Jews in the Arab World” *Jewish Social Studies* Vol. 37, Summer-Fall 1975, Numbers 3-4) 198; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 124, 129

cultures of lineage, purity and historical awareness. Genealogies flaunted Arab descent and early converts to Islam, with those most consanguine to Muḥammad the most prestigious.⁷⁰ Yet the breakup of Iberia's Caliphate into *Taifas*, smaller kingdoms, and the breakdown of order, allowed Jews to rise. Samuel Ibn Naghrīla, and after him his son, Jehoseph, became the Chief Minister for the Kingdom of Granada. Nevertheless, the Pact of 'Umar and Jewish submission were still endemic to the culture. People knew, referenced, and read – minorities were tolerated if they submitted. Hegemony was to Muslims.⁷¹ “We shall show deference to the Muslims and shall rise from our seats when they wish to sit down,” the Pact said. Toleration was for submission.⁷²

Polemicists who cherished *dhimmī* norms said that a Jewish minister was reprehensible. Among such critics were 'Alī ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064), who said Jews lost sovereignty, and the poet Abū Ishāq, who implored to put Jews “back where they belong.”⁷³ Outrage inflamed what resembles Langmuir’s definition of ‘chimerical’ anti-Semitism. Several verses in the Qur’ān resemble Langmuir’s definition, particularly when removed from context: Jews believe Uzayr is the Son of God;⁷⁴ “killed the prophets,” suffer Allah’s wrath,⁷⁵ are cursed, and transmogrified into apes and pigs.⁷⁶ Malcontents brought these denunciations to the fore, writing Jews were cursed or satanic. Abū Ishāq refers to Jews as “the curse of the accurst” and “the vilest apes.”⁷⁷ The *Kitāb al-Tibyān*, the earliest account of the Naghrīlas from a writer who knew them, refers to Jehoseph as “the swine.”⁷⁸ Ibn Ḥazm called Ibn Naghrīla “the Devil.”⁷⁹ Ibn 'Idhārī, a 14th-

70 Jonathan Ray “The Jews of al-Andalus: Factionalism in the Golden Age,” *Jews and Muslims in the Islamic World*, ed. Bernard Dov Cooperman, (University Press of Maryland: Bethesda, 2013) 260

71 Benjamin Gampel, “Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Medieval Iberia: Convivencia through the Eyes of Sephardic Jews,” *Convivencia*, ed. Vivian Mann, (George Braziller, Inc: New York, 1992) 14

72 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, 157

73 Camilla Adang, *Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible*, (EJ Brill: Leiden, 1996) 106; for quote see, Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History*, (Open Court: Chicago, 1993)169

74 Qur’ān 9:30

75 Ibid., 2:61

76 For apes, see Ibid., 2:63-66; 7:163-166; for pigs, see Ibid., 5:59-60

77 Lewis, *Islam in History*, 169

78 'Abd Allāh ibn Buluggīn, *Kitāb al-Tibyān lil-Amīr 'Abd Allāh ibn Buluqqīn ākhir umarā' Banī Zīrī bi-Gharnātah*, (Arabic College: 1960) 72, 74, 79, 83 and 84

79 'Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥazm, *al-Radd 'alā Ibn al-Naghrīlah al-Yahūdī wa-rasā'il ukhrā'*, (Maktabāt Dār al-'Urūbah: Cairo, 1960) 46

century historian, said Jehoseph was a “devil.”⁸⁰ One poet recommends not greeting Jews because they belong to the “cult of the devil.”⁸¹ Moreover Ibn Ḥazm also imputed racial iniquity onto Jews. “Anybody who knows the Jews knows that they are a filthy and witless rabble, most repulsive, vile, perfidious, cowardly, despicable, mendacious, the lowest in aspiration, weakest in distinction,”⁸² he said in his work the *Refutation of the Jew Ibn Naghrīla*. “What a lineage!” Ibn Ḥazm writes, “Abraham marries his own sister. Isaac is a thief. Jacob married Leah in error. Reuben fornicates with his father’s wife.”⁸³ Or in his *Kitāb al-Fiṣal*, Ibn Ḥazm says Jews bribed Paul to create Christianity to lead Christians to hell. “The Jews possibly wanted to corrupt Islam in the same way,” Ibn Ḥazm said.⁸⁴ Social psychologist Neil Kressel argues such invective is part of the dynamics of massacre. Victims are dehumanized as a precondition, and degradation is more plausible if a sacred source can be cited.⁸⁵

In 11th-century Granada, provocateurs who opposed a Jewish Chief Minister claimed the Pact was violated, *dhimmīs* can be killed. “Do not consider it a breach of faith to kill them,” Abū Ishāq prompted, “They have violated our covenant with them...How can they have any pact when we are obscure and they are prominent.”⁸⁶ Abū Ishāq also wrote Jews oppress Muslims and exploit Granada’s wealth. “They dress munificently while you are dressed in rags.”⁸⁷

Almeria, a neighboring kingdom, sent a letter to Granada, asking, dismiss ibn Naghrīla.⁸⁸ Almeria threatened invasion to remove him.⁸⁹ A Jew should not rule.⁹⁰ “Never will I let you be

80 Muḥammad Ibn ‘Idhārī, *Kitāb al-bayān al-mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa-al-Maghrib*, Vol. 3, (Dār al-Thaqāfah: Beirut, 1967) 266

81 Grossman, 180

82 Moshe Perlmann, “The Medieval Polemics Between Islam and Judaism,” *Religion in a Religious Age*, ed. S.D. Goitein, (Ktav Pub & Distributors Inc., 1973) 111

83 Idem., “Eleventh-Century Andalusian Authors on the Jews of Granada,” *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, Vol. 18 (1948-1949) 279

84 Ibid., 278

85 Neil J. Kressel, “*The Sons of Pigs and Apes*”: *Muslim Antisemitism and the Conspiracy of Silence* (Potomac Books: Washington DC, 2012) 33

86 Lewis, *Islam in History*, 170

87 Grossman, 178

88 Eliyahu Ashtor, *The Jews of Muslim Spain*, Vol. 2, trans. Aaron Klein, (The Jewish Publication Society: Philadelphia, 1992) 71

89 Ibn Buluggīn, 70

90 Raymond Scheindlin “‘The Battle of Alfuente’ by Samuel the Nagid,” *History as Prelude*, ed. Joseph V. Montville, (Lexington Books: Lanham, 2011) 58

in peace as long as any breath is left inside this Jew,” said Almeria’s ruler.⁹¹ According to Ibn Naghrīla, Almeria’s purpose was to “wipe out all the Jews,” he wrote, “for how (they said) can aliens like these be privileged over Muslim folk.”⁹² A decade after Ibn Naghrīla died, mobs crucified his son, Jehoseph.⁹³ “They put every Jew to the sword,” records the *Tibyān*.⁹⁴ Rioters slew 3,000.⁹⁵ A century later, the Jewish historian Ibn Daud, suggested the massacre happened because Muslims were upset Jehoseph was proud and rich.⁹⁶ Ibn ‘Idhārī implied the same. “Jehoseph did not know humility of a *dhimmī* or how filthy Judaism was.”⁹⁷

Jew-hatred also erupted when Mongols ruled Persia during the Ilkhan era (1256-1334). The Mongols, from East Asia, did not observe local customs, and Arghun Khan (r. 1284-1291) appointed Sa‘ad al-Dawla, a Jewish doctor from Baghdad, as Chief Minister. Firebrands decried that Sa‘ad al-Dawla would destroy Islam, and groundless indictments circulated, such as Sa‘ad al-Dawla prepared a fleet to attack Mecca and transform the Ka‘aba into an idolatrous shrine. Provocateurs swore Sa‘d al-Dawla drafted a list of 200 Muslims to kill.⁹⁸ Poems threatened Jews will die for Sa‘d al-Dawla’s crimes.⁹⁹ The allegations were contrived, yet when the sick Khan died, anti-Jewish riots exploded. Sa‘d al-Dawla was executed. “These apish Jews are done away,” a *qasīda* celebrated.¹⁰⁰ “O foulest nation who ever earth did thrive.”¹⁰¹

Conclusion

91 Ibid., 63

92 Ibid., 62

93 Ibn ‘Idhārī, 266; Ibn Buluggīn, 86

94 Ibn Buluggīn, 86

95 Ibn ‘Idhārī, 231

96 Abraham Ibn Daud, *Sefer Ha-Qabbalah*, ed. Gerson Cohen (The Jewish Publication Society of America: Philadelphia, 1967) 57

97 Ibn ‘Idhārī, 264-265

98 Edward G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Iranbooks: Bethesda, 1997) 31-32

99 Ibid., 32

100 Ibid., 35

101 Brown translated nation as ‘race’ when he published his work in 1902, but the Arabic original word ‘Ummah’ is best translated into 21st century English as ‘nation’ or ‘people,’ see Ibid., 36

In Iraq, attitudes about Jews were preserved in Islamic texts, where Jews were intended as literary foils in the form of ineffectual antagonists to illustrate Islam's veracity. These depictions developed into stereotypes of Jewish frailty that continued to be acted upon into the 20th century: Jews were mocked, depicted as feeble, and became a byword for powerlessness. Jews defined roles as *ahl al-dhimma* reinforced the hierarchy in which Jews were seen as weak, Muslims strong, and was exemplified in Muslims granting protection to Jews. This trope produced two genre of stories. The first was rescue anecdotes, in which Muslims acted out the role of protector, and these stories reinforced Muslim authority, while Jews were expected to be submissive and not resist abuse. Secondly, the *dhimmī* concept produced a genre of 'Jewish gratitude,' praising Muslim rule. Yet both these stories- the savior Muslim, the thankful Jew, could be quite divorced from reality. When in truth, Jews could defend themselves, while Muslims could be incompetent, craven, weaklings, or perpetrators of oppression. Yet the impact of such stories were so treasured, that those Jews like Elkabir who privately complained of persecution, were expected to make public spectacles of gratefulness.

Protection of *dhimmīs*, rather than an innocent plot of heroism, self-flattery or an example of tolerance, was in fact a myth to perpetuate inequality and create an unequal society, in which Muslims subjugated non-Muslims and ruled them. Rules that imposed prohibitions to make Jews low – discriminatory taxes, sumptuary laws, prohibitions against leadership roles and relegation to demeaning jobs that were socially scorned – stemmed from the same tropes Muslim heroics derived from: Jews were weak, incapable and beneath Muslims.

Anti-Judaism was not a normal prejudice, just as Stillman contends. The prejudice was preserved in hallowed texts, the inequality was considered sacrosanct, and the stereotypes and taboos continued long after the initial purpose, to convince believers of Islam, had ceased. Anti-

Judaism contained aspects of Langmuir's chimerical anti-Semitism, for not infrequently when a Jewish person succeed in government and reached a noteworthy position, such the Ibn Naghrīlas or Sa'd al-Dawla, critics felt Muslim sway was under threat, the hierarchy of faith which exemplified Islam, Muslims ruling non-Muslim, was menaced, and agitators turned to magic-themed allegations – Jews were apes, pigs and devils, sought to destroy Mecca, Muslims, were an evil race or invented Christianity to condemn humanity to hellfire. By the scholarly consensus' own definition of what anti-Semitism is, there were such cases in the Arabic speaking societies. It happened but rarely, when the masses felt the hierarchy of faith was imperiled.

Many were uncomfortable with Jewish supervision of Muslims- a subversion of society where Muslims supervised others. Even in 20th-century Iraq, the biases against Jewish authority figures circulated, and so did the archetypal roles relating to Muslim protection and Jewish submission. Bāshā'yān, the local Basra sheikh, was proud he protected Jews. Iraqis esteemed their conventions as a source of self-worth, and did not feel that they persecuted anyone. Weeks after the Farhūd, one Iraq's foremost politicians, Nūrī al-Sa'īd, complained, "This assault stood in contrast to Arab and Islamic tradition. This does not add honor to Iraq in the world, as an independent country it is obligated to protect minorities."¹⁰² His memoirs said for "centuries Jews enjoyed complete freedom in Iraq."¹⁰³ The rage that Jews would reject this protection and desire equality, success, fruitful careers, to be acknowledged, not invisible, and have a political voice, for Jews to define themselves as they saw fit and not as tradition commended, laid the bedrock for anti-Semitism in Iraq in our era.

102 A. Sassoon to M Shertok. "Šīḥah 'Im Ha-Kōnsōl Ha- 'Īraqī Ha-Ḥadash Bē-'Ereṣ Yiśra'el," July 28, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 59
103 Nūrī al-Sa'īd, *Qadāyā 'Arabiyah: al-Istiqlāl- al-Waḥdah- Filasṭīn 1942*, (Dār al-'Arabiyah Lil Mūsū'āt: Beirut, 1942) 14

Chapter 2

Changes and Backlashes

Anti-Semitism was a backlash from fears Muslim dominance would end. In the 19th century, economic development in Iraq and the centralization of the Ottoman state expanded non-Muslim rights, which led to social innovations that faded *dhimmī* norms and emblems of Islamic sway. Initially, the differences of Jews served to incorporate them and reify Islam. Jews fit the *dhimmī* image: a separate and baseborn religion. Jews avoided salience and notice, even in Baghdad, where they were often the majority.

New government policies and economics wedged Jews and Muslims further apart. Capitulations, trade concessions to Europe to stimulate trade, were open to Jews, increasing their standard-of-living and drew Jews into British-dominated markets in Europe and Asia. The influx of capital benefited and expanded the Jewish community, but they also adopted European-style education. The European occupations and languages became stereotypes to highlight Jewish separateness in the Middle East.

Moreover, as the Ottoman Empire, improved equality across the region, a backlash ensued. The Tanzīmāt, an Ottoman reform program to regularize the state, granted equality to all sects, including Jews. Despite these social earthquakes, non-Muslims were still regarded as *dhimmīs*: each community autonomous, led by clerics, governed by religious law, as per the Islamic archetype. Iraq, then an Ottoman province, remained rooted in Islamic hierarchies of

faith, wherein Muslims ruled non-Muslims, Islam held sway, and those who valued such conventions rejected equality. They rejected Jews could supervise Muslims. Equality sparked resentment and resolve to enforce defunct *dhimmī* strictures or ordinances against Jews.

Strife ensued as to whether Jews should be equal or subjected to restrictive customs. Two events fostered the conflict. First, was the Tanzīmāt, which ushered in anti-Semitism, according to Gavin Langmuir’s definition, as chimerical and unmoored from local concerns. After the Tanzīmāt, the blood libel, the false slander Jews engage in cannibalism, and predicated on magic and myth, became more frequent in the Middle East.¹⁰⁴ Second was the Young Turk revolution of 1908, a movement that overthrew Sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd II’s absolutism and introduced a constitution, foreboding the first ‘global’ anti-Semitism, when riots against Jews were divorced from local discord, and accompanied claims of secret Jewish control. The fear in each of these events – the Tanzīmāt, the Constitution – was that Muslim supremacy would end. The violence pushed Muslims and Jews apart even further. At the end of the Ottoman period, Jews, acculturated to Europe, insecure, mistrusted their Arab neighbors and lobbied for British citizenship instead.

In 1800, Jews Fit the Dhimmi Role

At the dawn of the 19th century, Jews better fit the *dhimmī* image. They were poor.¹⁰⁵ Laws enforced separation and implied lowly status: a poll tax and sumptuary rules, wherein for Jews to dress like Muslims was banned.¹⁰⁶ Jews wore distinguishing garb.¹⁰⁷ They lived in

104 Langmuir, 13-14; 306

105 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 124

106 Goitein, “Interfaith Relations in Medieval Islam,” 24, 26, 29; Rejwan, “Ba‘aya v’Šoreshēha: Agadat ‘Ha-Antīšemiyyōt Ha-‘Aravīṭ,” 149; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 131

107 A.G. Brotman, *Present Day Jewry of Baghdad*, 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047); J. R. Wellsted, *Travels to the city of the caliphs; along the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean: including a voyage to the coast of Arabia, and a tour on the island of Socotra*, (Lea: Philadelphia, 1841) 196

designated quarters.¹⁰⁸ They concentrated in trades to which Muslims looked askance, such as foreign commerce or jewelers.¹⁰⁹ They were barred from military duties.¹¹⁰ Into the 1920s, watchmen were always Muslim, even in Jewish neighborhoods.¹¹¹ Jews avoided possessing weapons; and were “afraid of the Muslims,” an 1891 letter said.¹¹² The community was autonomous, and registered its own births, deaths and marriages (which Ottomans did not track);¹¹³ financed their own social services, and levied their own taxes.¹¹⁴ A series of *Nasi'im*, lay leaders, led the community. They appointed rabbis; could exile or flog lawbreakers; worked as *šarrāfs*, bankers, for the city’s ruler;¹¹⁵ and *Nasi'im* were responsible for their community’s conduct.¹¹⁶

Jews were a minority among Muslims. In 1820s Baghdad, they numbered only 6,000 or 7,000.¹¹⁷ They were also socially distant.¹¹⁸ Jews had their own dialects of Arabic, with dissimilar vocabulary, syntax and pronunciation, written in Hebraic script, and called *Ibrāniyī*, Hebraic.¹¹⁹ Some could not write Arabic, nor was *Fuṣḥá*, written Arabic, widespread.¹²⁰ In Iraq’s north, Jews spoke Neo-Aramaic.¹²¹ The Jewish biblical names of Ezra and Hesqel (Ezekiel) were different from the Islamic versions of these names in the Qur’an, making Jews recognizable from speech, attire, name and where they were from.¹²²

108 Zvi Yehuda, “Daily Life in the Community of Baghdad at the End of the 19th Century,” *Nehardea: Journal of the Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center*. No. 9, Dec 1996. ed. Zvi Yehuda. (Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center, Tel Aviv: 1996) 8

109 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, 93; Wellsted, 178; 188

110 Goitein, “Interfaith Relations in Medieval Islam,” 26

111 Rejwan, *The Last Jews in Baghdad*, 7

112 Zvi Yehuda, *Yēhūdē Bavel Bē-‘Elef Ha-Shēnī Lē-Sēfirā*, (Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center: Or Yehuda, 2013) 179

113 Extract from letter No. 2871 (31/1/5) Nov 17, 1948. IOR (R/15/2/1402)- 5

114 A.S. Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 16-20

115 Dshen, 24-25; Sassoon, 113-115, 121-122; Hillel, David D’Beth, *Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands: The Travels of Rabbi David D’Beth Hillel (1824-1832)*, ed. Walter J. Fischel, (Ktav Publishing House: New York, 1973) 83

116 Wellsted, 196

117 David Hillel, 83; Wellsted, 196

118 Sassoon Somekh, “Lost Voices: Jewish Authors in Modern Arabic Literature,” *Jews Among Arabs: Contacts and Boundaries*, ed. Mark R. Cohen and Abraham L. Udovitch, (Darwin Press Inc.: Princeton, 1989) 10

119 Hayyim J. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East, 1860-1972*, (John Wiley & Sons: New York, 1973) 37; George A. Sofer, *My Life in the Middle East*, BJHC (No. 2519) 54

120 Sofer, *Ibid.*, Snir, ‘*Arabiyyūt, Yahadūt, Šiyônūt*, 80

121 M. Zalšer, “Yēhūdē Ha-Mizrāh Bē-Yamēnū” JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2648047. (p. 7)

122 Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 38-39

These distinctions conveyed *dhimmī* status – incorporated and low. Jews were expected to behave as *dhimmīs*, and they hid displays of religion to be inconspicuous. They kept menorahs inside, out of sight.¹²³ The cemetery was shabby.¹²⁴ Additionally, there was never a Jewish monument – only Muslim ones.¹²⁵

Capitulations Slacken *Dhimmī* Constraints

Capitulations, trade concessions to other countries to increase investments, elevated a small number of Jews beyond the bounds of *dhimmīs*' legal handicaps.¹²⁶ Capitulations stimulated trade and cemented alliances between the Empire and European countries, increasing the Ottomans' customs revenue.¹²⁷ Beneficiary countries, such as England and France, received trade privileges in the Ottoman Empire: tax exemptions, lower tariffs, as well as extraterritoriality – to be judged in consular courts, outside the Sultans' purview.¹²⁸ Extraterritoriality protected foreign merchants from a Sultan's or a pasha's arbitrary confiscations and arrests. These merchants were subject to their home country's laws, not Ottoman jurisdiction, an arrangement emplaced to encourage foreign merchants to trade in the Empire.

As the number of countries with capitulations grew, so, too, did the types of professions that benefited. In 1604, the extraterritorial privileges granted to a beneficiary country's merchants and diplomats were extended to their Ottoman employees, such as dragomans,

123 Idit Sharoni Pinchas, "The Chanukah Menorah in Baghdad in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," *Nehardea: Journal of the Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center*. No. 9, March 1993. ed. Zvi Yehuda. (Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center, Tel Aviv: 1993) 15

124 Mozelle Sassoon. Diary. Reproduced in "The Sassoon's Return Visit to Baghdad: A Diary by Mozelle Sassoon" *The Scribe*, (No. 74) 24-25

125 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 29

126 Maurits H. van den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System Qadis, Consuls and Beratlis in the 18th Century*, (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 2, 9; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 198

127 van den Boogert, 6-7

128 Ibid., 10; 47-48

locally-hired interpreters, and by Ottoman law, only *dhimmīs* could be dragomans.¹²⁹ Dragomans were exempt from the *jizya* and trade fees.¹³⁰ This was significant, when before 1839, *‘Askarī*, the Ottoman warrior class, paid no taxes, and Jews four times the Muslim rate.¹³¹

From the twilight of the 18th century, capitulations’ extraterritoriality protected more and more classes of Europe’s government employees: brokers, moneychangers, warehousemen and clerks. Families and servants of employees received protections, including adult children. Sons often inherited their fathers’ occupation, and the protection along with it. In 1793, one chronicler recorded in Aleppo 1,500 protégés, Ottoman locals protected with capitulations. Though Janissary guards, Muslims, who defended European consuls, also received the same protections, Janissaries were *‘Askarī*; already tax exempt, and were the elite who rose to be viziers or rule Pashaliks.¹³² Janissaries did not need capitulations. Whereas *dhimmīs*, who lived in positions of legal inferiority, greatly benefited. *Dhimmīs* too could achieve importance in Ottoman hierarchy – Baghdad *Nasi’im* were ennobled *Ṣarrāf Bāshī*, chief bankers, or took part in statecraft and had a seat in the Divan, the council chamber – yet *dhimmīs* were still vulnerable to autocratic decrees. One year, two *Nasi’im* were executed.¹³³ Ahmet Pasha of Acre (r. 1777-1804), ordered his Jewish vizier, Ḥaim Fārḥī, to be blinded and his nose removed. A successor had Fārḥī drowned.¹³⁴ Capitulations’ extraterritoriality could protect *dhimmīs* from such abuse.¹³⁵

Tanzīmāt and European Intervention

129 Ibid., 50; 64-65

130 Ibid., 32-33, 66

131 Charles Issawi, “The Transformation of the Economic Position of the Millets in the Nineteenth Century,” *Christians & Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Benjamin Braude (Lynne Reiner Publishers: Boulder, 2014), 172, 174

132 Ibid., 273; van den Boogert, 63-64; 67-69

133 David Sassoon, *A History of the Jews of Baghdad* (Welwyn Garden City: Alcuin Press, 1949) 123; David Hillel, 83; Wellsted, 196

134 Jonathan Frankel, *The Damascus Affair: “Ritual Murder,” Politics, and the Jews in 1840*, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1997) 34

135 van den Boogert, 8

European lobbying also benefitted *dhimmīs*, when Britain strove to bolster the Ottomans to keep sea routes open to India, the source of British wealth, interest in the Middle East also inspired British campaigns to protect religious minorities, all of whom were considered *dhimmīs* and indistinguishable under sharia law.¹³⁶ Various countries claimed to protect one religion or clerical order, and England took interest in Jews. England was Protestant, but there were few Protestants to defend, and most religions were already claimed by other Powers. Moreover, the Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston, was under the influence of his son-in-law, Lord Shaftesbury, a philanthropist who wanted to help Middle East Jews to convert them to Christianity.¹³⁷ Palmerston opened a consulate in Jerusalem in 1838, advising the diplomats to protect Jews.¹³⁸ In 1918, one British officer wrote: “I have always regarded active support of Jewish commercial community as a potential asset of great political value.”¹³⁹ Helping minorities also created opportunities to intervene in Ottoman affairs. Likewise and as if in concert, Ottoman society encouraged Jews to seek protection in others, so European lobbying plugged easily into the practice.¹⁴⁰ Baghdad Jews asked French organizations to protect them in the 1860s after the *Vali*, the governor, imprisoned two landlords.¹⁴¹ When several Jews were arrested on false charges in 1891, two locals contacted London, whereupon Britain complained, if the Sultan would not help the Jews, Britain would. The Sultan removed Baghdad’s *Vali*.¹⁴²

Furthermore, Ottoman reformers like Foreign Minister Rashīd Pasha implemented European amendments to strengthen the state, part of a program of reforms known as the *Tanzīmāt* (1839-1876), Ottoman Turkish for restructuring, which aspired to improve the

136 Barbara Tuchman, *Bible and Sword*, (New York University: New York, 1982) 162; Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, 95-96
 137 Anthony Ashley-Cooper; in 1809, Shaftesbury founded the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the Jews, see Tuchman, 183
 138 *Ibid.*, 190
 139 Political Office (Baghdad) to India Office. October 4, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700)- 4409
 140 Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 178
 141 Maurice M. Sawdayee, “The Impact of Western European Education on the Jewish Millet of Baghdad,” PhD Thesis (New York University, 1977) 13
 142 Ben Yaakov, 155; Yehuda, *Yēhūdē Bavel*, 177; Sawdayee, 15

Empire's army, administration and economy.¹⁴³ Rashīd Pasha issued an edict, the Khaṭṭ-i Sharīf of Gülhane of 1839, promising civil liberties for Muslims and *dhimmīs* alike.¹⁴⁴ The decree also appealed to Muslim sensibilities, using religious discourse to blame failures on violating sharia, concluding, "countries not governed by the laws of the Şeriat [sic] cannot survive."¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, within years, the portions of the Ottoman Empire abandoned Islamic norms. Britain, France and Austria fought in the Crimean War (1854-1856) to stave off a Russian invasion. To warrant the military action and accompanying bloodshed, these countries' ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire dictated another edict, the Khaṭṭ-i Humāyūn of 1856,¹⁴⁶ which declared equality for all, regardless of religion.¹⁴⁷ The edict eliminated the classification of *dhimmī* in Ottoman law, made no reference to sharia, and abolished restrictions that conveyed Islam's dominance and *dhimmīs*' subordination.¹⁴⁸ *Dhimmīs* could practice religion freely and were guaranteed that "no one shall be compelled to change their religion."¹⁴⁹ They could vote, build houses of worship, or serve in government or army, and be taxed at the same rate as Muslims.¹⁵⁰ The decree also annulled the *jizya*, or the poll tax, a symbol of civil disability.¹⁵¹ Though Jews were an incidental part of the *Tanzīmāt*. The clauses never mention Jews, save an oblique reference to Rabbis. Yet, Jews benefited from it.¹⁵² When the Ottoman parliament convened, Jews represented Iraq's provinces and served as secretaries to the *Vali*.¹⁵³

143 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press: New York, 2002) 105-107

144 "The Hatt-I Şerif of Gülhane: 3 November 1839," trans. Halil Inalcik, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd ed., ed. J. C. Hurewitz, (Yale University Press: New Haven: 1975) 270

145 *Ibid.*, 269

146 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 136

147 "Sultan 'Abdülmecid's *Islahat Fernani* Reaffirming the privileges and immunities of the Non- Muslim Communities: 18 February 1856," *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, 315

148 *Ibid.*, 316

149 *Ibid.*, 317

150 *Ibid.*, 316-318

151 Hayyim J. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 14

152 Roderic H. Davison, "The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Function of a Plural Society*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Vol. 1, (Holms & Meier Publishers Inc.: New York, 1982) 328

153 Haim, 190

Nevertheless, the new policies did not acculturate Jews or integrate them with Muslims. The Ottoman court, swept aside the *ancien régime* of *Nasi*, the Jewish lay leader, and expanded central control, but laws still treated Jews according to the *dhimmī* archetype and instituted autonomy among different religious sects.¹⁵⁴ In 1835, Sultan Maḥmūd II replaced the *Nasi* with a new office, the Hakham Bashi, chief rabbi.¹⁵⁵ Like *Nasi'im*, rabbis could prescribe habits, such as set age limits on brides, or whip Shabbat transgressors.¹⁵⁶ The difference was Hakham Bashis was a state employee. Sultans decreed them superintendents of Jews.¹⁵⁷ The Hakham Bashi spread state authority, with the Empire appointing Hakham Bashis in major cities, and in 1849, in Baghdad.¹⁵⁸ The policy reinforced sentiments Jews were a separate collective predicated on religion. The Khaṭṭ-i Humāyūn, which declared equality for all, rejected individual citizenship and organized inhabitants into *millets*, sects, licensing religious separation.¹⁵⁹ The Khaṭṭ-i Humāyūn established a committee for Jewish leaders, the *Majlis Jismānī*, a board of prominent and wealthy.¹⁶⁰ *Ṣarrāfs* and rabbis lead Jews as before, under new titles. Jews remained politically unimportant.¹⁶¹ They were expected to be marginal. Ottoman Islamic symbols, by contrast, were unaffected. Sultans in foreign affairs continued to style themselves as Caliphs, the political successor of Muḥammad.¹⁶²

British Shipping, Iraq's Economy, and Jews

154 Deshen, 25

155 Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860-1925* (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1990) 43

156 Sassoon, 183-184; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 55

157 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 10

158 Ibid.; Deshen, 33

159 Davison, "The Millets as Agents of Change," 330; 333

160 Deshen, 33

161 Longrigg, 52

162 Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1963) 272-277

Despite attempts to maintain *dhimmī* standards, sea traffic drew Iraq into the world market, expanding the local economy and improving Jewish status.¹⁶³ Basra, Iraq's port, was on Britain's route to India. From the 18th century, the East India Company built a factory in Basra. British consular services followed, escorted by British-Indian troops. Ten thousand Indians settled in the country, and trade from India flowed through the port. An official said that Iraq was "potentially one of the richest areas in the world."¹⁶⁴ British businesses were established to service the ships. Steamboat services plied cities. Post offices opened. India's rupee became accepted currency.¹⁶⁵ Jews were well positioned to benefit from this new economy. Jews, excluded from institutions of power, concentrated in sectors Muslims scorned but capitalism favored: finance and industry.¹⁶⁶

Baghdad became a center of imports. International businesses created a middle class of clerks, rail workers and liberal professions, opening new career opportunities for Jews.¹⁶⁷ British law-and-order safeguarded commerce. Indian troops were stationed in Basra and Indian fleets policed the Persian Gulf.¹⁶⁸ Capitulations insulated *dhimmīs* from despotic confiscations and arrests. Jews thrived in the Asian trade, once a Muslim preserve, and comprised much of Baghdad's international commerce.¹⁶⁹ By 1850, all of Britain's seven protégés, employees who benefited from capitulations, were Jews in the India trade.¹⁷⁰

163 Issawi, 159

164 Political Department, India Office "Indian Desiderata for Peace Settlement" 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/142/5266)- 5; see also Grattan Geary, *Through Asiatic Turkey. Narrative of a Journey from Bombay to the Bosphorus*, (Harper & Brothers: New York, 1878) 19

165 Longrigg, 3, 28, 34

166 Issawi, 169; Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, 93

167 Issawi, 159-160

168 "Indian Desiderata for Peace Settlement" IOR (L/PS/11/142/5266)- 5; see also Geary, 19

169 Wellsted, 178

170 Issawi, 273

Baghdad Jews migrated to Bombay or Calcutta, where 6,000 would eventually reside.¹⁷¹ All the industry titans settled in India or China.¹⁷² Even those who flourished in the old economy like the Daniel family – landowners, and caretakers for Ezekiel’s sepulcher – sent sons to India.¹⁷³ A *Nasi*’s son, David Sassoon (1792-1864), established an entrepôt there.¹⁷⁴ The new field attracted Jewish immigrants. In 1794, there were 2,500 Jews in Baghdad.¹⁷⁵ Yet the community grew to 24,000 by 1876. A correspondent for the Prussian Hebrew newspaper, *Ha-Maggid*, wrote of “thousands of Jewish middlemen,” with many coming from Kurdistan or Persia.¹⁷⁶ Others came from Europe. A visitor to Iraq found one local student had an Austrian parent.¹⁷⁷ The poet, Anwār Shaul, also had Austrian heritage.¹⁷⁸ The Daniel family were immigrants from Kyrgyzstan.¹⁷⁹

In 1900, Jews outnumbered Arabs in Baghdad, and were integral to business. Jews were commercial agents in Bombay, Paris, and Manchester, where eighty families lived and worked as exporters, and “made Iraq one of the commercial centers of the East.”¹⁸⁰ Baghdad’s Jewish population grew to 60,000, while another 20,000 concentrated in Mosul or Basra, or scattered throughout the North.¹⁸¹ When Britain conquered Iraq in 1917, 5% of the Jews were wealthy, (the businessmen and bankers); and 30% were middle class.¹⁸²

171 Sadok Masliyah. "The Bene Israel and the Baghdadis: two Indian Jewish communities in conflict." *Judaism: A Quarterly Journal of Jewish Life and Thought*, vol. 43, (no. 3, 1994) 281; Nissim Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq: 3,000 Years of History and Culture*, (Westview Press: Boulder, 1985) 184

172 S.B., The Fate of Iraq Jewry, Baghdad Oct 18, 1936. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 1

173 Elie Kedourie, "The Jews of Babylon and Baghdad," *Elie Kedourie CBE, FBA, 1926-1992: History, Philosophy, Politics*, ed. Sylvia Kedourie, (Frank Cass: Portland, 1998) 15; "The Sassoon's Return Visit to Baghdad: A Diary by Mozelle Sassoon," 22

174 Masliyah, "The Bene Israel," 281

175 Dshen, 20, 22

176 "Baghdad," *Ha-Maggid* (Prussia), Asian Section, (January 12, 1876), 4-5; for quote see p. 4

177 Geary, 18

178 Anwar Shāul, *Qiṣṣat hayātī fī Wādī al-Rāfīdayn*, (Rabiṭat al-Jamī'iyin al-Yahūd al-Naziḥin min al-'Irāq; Jerusalem, 1980) 16; Geary, 18

179 Ibrāhīm al-Drūbī, *al-Baghdādūn Ākhhbāruhum wa-Majālisuhum*, (Ṭaba'a fī Muṭba'a al-Rābiṭah; Baghdad, 1985) 238

180 Issawi, 168; Longrigg, 10; Until 1951, Jews were the biggest sect in Baghdad, see Kedourie, "The Jews of Babylon and Baghdad," 21; for population figures in 1917, see Haim, 188; "Baghdad," *Ha-Maggid*, 4-5; BOD To Reginald McKenna (Home Office) Jan 20, 1915. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047); for quote, see S.B., The Fate of Iraq Jewry, 1

181 Yūsuf Rizqāllāh Ghanīmah, *Nuzha al-Muštāq fī Tārīkh Yahūd al-'Irāq*, (Al Warrak publishing, Ltd: London, 1997) 210; J.G. Lorimer, Esq. "Report on a Tour in Turkish Arabia and Kurdistan.; April- May 1910." (Government Monotype Press: Simla, 1913) 10, 20-24, 49. IOR (L/PS/20/61)

182 H.D.S., "Account of the Jewish Community at Baghdad," February 17, 1910, published in Eli Kedourie, "The Jews of Baghdad in 1910," *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, (Frank Cass: London, 1974) 267

The Development of Baghdad

Economics transformed Baghdad. After the Suez Canal opened, the time it took British ships to reach India shortened from months to weeks. Trade increased. Baghdad's streets were paved and illuminated with electric lights. The *Vali* introduced public education and banks.¹⁸³ In 1911, Baghdad's first cinema opened. A year later, a London company installed electric trams.¹⁸⁴ Rail lines were laid.¹⁸⁵ Bureaucrats replaced soldiers.¹⁸⁶

The economic expansion broadened the scope of Jews' commercial activities beyond *dhimma* restrictions and religion. The lending and credit system was open to Jews, which transitioned small moneylenders into corporate.¹⁸⁷ Khedouri Zilkha borrowed money in 1899 to found the Middle East's largest multinational private bank, K. A. Zilkha, Maison de Banque.¹⁸⁸ Others in consumer-oriented industries produced sesame oil, liquor and date juice; or in handicrafts such as shoemaking and tailoring.¹⁸⁹ From the 1870s on, Jews patronized coffeehouses, read European newspapers or picnicked and played music on Shabbat.¹⁹⁰ A visitor in 1910 saw "many cafes, which were brightly lit up. Nearly every man in Baghdad spends the evenings at the cafes."¹⁹¹

Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) - Languages, Better Jobs and Semi-Secular

183 Sawdayee, 45-48; "The Sassoon's Return Visit to Baghdad," 20

184 Longrigg, 53

185 Ibid., 60-61

186 Ibid., 17

187 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 84

188 The account is according to Khedourie's son, Ezra, who worked for the bank, see Ezra Zilkha, "Ezra Zilkha," *Iraq's Last Jews*, ed. Tamar Morad, (Palgrave MacMillian: New York, 2008) 30-31

189 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 85-86

190 Yehuda, "Daily Life in the Community of Baghdad," 8; Deshen, 37

191 "The Sassoon's Return Visit to Baghdad," 18

The financial boom also fueled European-style education, which differentiated Jews from Muslims evermore. Previously, the *Istādh*, schools dedicated to praxis, were ubiquitous.¹⁹² However, in the 19th century, when European power prevailed and many saw Europe as a panacea to the Empire's feebleness, Baghdad's Jews invited the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), the Jewish organization in France, to open a school.¹⁹³

The AIU was dedicated to Jewish equality through integration and cultural reform, a mission derived from bourgeois notions of French philanthropy, such as the *noblesse oblige*, that sought to alleviate social problems, and to 'regenerate' the lower classes, whose poverty was viewed as a moral failing.¹⁹⁴ The AIU adopted these ideas within the phrase 'regeneration,' building a network of schools across the Middle East to 'regenerate' Jews.¹⁹⁵ Baghdad expatriates in the Far East built several: the David Sassoon school, the Laura Kedouri school and the Albert Sassoon College.¹⁹⁶ In Baghdad, grounded in religion, Jews continued to receive doctrinal education in the *Istādh* before receiving Western instruction.¹⁹⁷ So, there were no waves of conversions, intermarriage, schisms nor deprecations of Judaism as in Europe. Social and political identity in the Middle East remained religiously communal, and that is true until this day.

Jews never recast their practice. Religious solidarity served a function similar to nation.¹⁹⁸ On a Shabbat afternoon of 1889, Baghdad had twenty-five synagogues attended with 150 worshippers each, and synagogue attendance was regular for decades.¹⁹⁹ Meanwhile, AIU

192 Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 11

193 Derek Angus Frenette, "L'Alliance Israélite Universelle And the Politics of Modern Jewish Education in Baghdad: 1864-1914," MA Thesis (Department of History, Simon Fraser University, 2005) 15; Sawdayee, 30; Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, 101

194 Frankel, 20; Lee Shai Weissbach, "The Nature of Philanthropy in Nineteenth-Century France and the mentalité of the Jewish Elite," *Jewish History*, Vol. 8, Nos. 1-2, (1994), 192-194

195 Rodrigue, xii

196 Sassoon, 171; it opened in 1873; Frenette, 20; Sawdayee, 47

197 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 42

198 Kedourie, "The Jews of Babylon and Baghdad," 20; Deshen, 40

199 "Bayn Ahīnū Ha-Rēhūqīm," *Ha-Zefira* (Warsaw), May 29, 1889, (No. 109) 445; A. H. Nahūm, "Ha-Yehūdīm bē-Aram-Naharāym." BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) (p. 3)

students studied Talmud and Torah.²⁰⁰ Rather, the schools concentrated on language acquisition so Jews could enter commercial fields. One writer complained in 1940s Baghdad, “English and French- were the languages of commerce and trade, and rather useful only if you wanted to get a job.”²⁰¹ In 1882, most of the school day, five and a half hours, was dedicated to learning French and English.²⁰² *Ha-Maggid* in 1876 marveled at the change. “The Jews of Baghdad and their trade branched out to Europe,” the correspondent said, but “they had no education 15 years ago.”²⁰³

Yet European knowledge separated Jews from the Muslims in Islamic societies.²⁰⁴ One official noted in 1910: “boys in the highest class (age 14 or 15) being quite at home in the history of the crusades, Coeur de Lion, Charles I of England, Frederick the Great, the French Revolution and its principal characters.”²⁰⁵ European knowledge and languages highlighted Jewish separateness.²⁰⁶ Whereas Arabic only became the language of instruction at Jewish schools after Iraq’s independence.²⁰⁷

Therefore, Ottoman Jews did not improve their positions by integrating, like their coreligionists in Europe, but by withdrawing to unfamiliar mores. As overseas markets dominated the economy, and shifted cultural norms, Jewish differences ceased to affirm Islam, but became unfamiliar and disaffected. Capitalism introduced new avenues of success outside the *‘Askarī* and *‘ulema*, specialists in Islamic law.²⁰⁸ Jews became estranged from conventions of

200 Michael Laskier, “Aspects of the Activities of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in the Jewish Communities of the Middle East and North Africa: 1860-1918,” *Modern Judaism*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (May 1983), 154

201 Nissim Rejwan, “Bookshop Days,” *Keys to the Garden: New Israeli Writing*, ed. Ammiel Alcalay, (City Lights Books: San Francisco, 1996) 48

202 Sawdayee, 68

203 The correspondent thought the Jewish prosperity was linked to David Sassoon’s business successes, see “Baghdad,” *Ha-Maggid*, 4

204 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 25-26

205 Lorimer, 33. IOR (L/PS/20/61)

206 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 41

207 Haim, “Jewish Life in Baghdad under the Monarchy,” 189

208 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 125

submission, and preferred European sentiments of civil rights.²⁰⁹ The economy impelled Jews to support the AIU, seeing Europe as a pathway out of poverty, and to learn European languages to secure better employment. In 1914, AIU graduates became clerks and businesspeople, while Jews who never attended AIU schools performed menial labor.²¹⁰ At independence, among Jews, AIU students outnumbered public school counterparts more than six to one.²¹¹

The historian Jacob Katz, in his study of Jewish emancipation in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, noticed the spread of secular literacy did not produce a neutral public, whereof Jews and non-Jews were the same, but rather created what he called, a ‘semineutral’ society, in which Jews adopted their own “particular Jewish variation” of the national culture, “that had some contact with their non-Jewish counterpart but, on the whole, remained socially aloof and also conceived of themselves as having a special social mission - namely, the spreading of enlightenment to the Jewish communities.”²¹² Likewise, AIU education, which commingled Judaism with Arabic, did not forge an integrated Arab Jew, as some like the writers Anwār Shaul and Nissim Rejwan aspired. Rejwan, a columnist for the *Iraq Times* and who managed a bookshop, had values and tastes unlike most Iraqis. He enjoyed debating with intellectuals at Baghdad’s Cafe Suisse, discussing George Orwell, Kafka, Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot and James Joyce, and though Rejwan says he also discussed Arabic literature, his memoirs mention no such authors’ names.²¹³ Rejwan complained western authors in Iraq were unknown. These are very different ‘Arab values’ than those enumerated by Ṭaha al-Hāshimī, the military chief-of-staff who dominated anti-Semitic groups and later served as Prime Minister. In a journal entry dated

209 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 179

210 Deshen, 36

211 Ghanimah, 212

212 Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870*, Syracuse University Press, 1998) 54

213 Rejwan, “Bookshop Days,” 46, 50

1919, Ṭaha enumerated his ‘Arab values’ as obedience of women, readiness for war and “submitting to Allah and to the Prophet.”²¹⁴

Mesopotamia’s history gave Jews a sense of belonging. Iraq was Abraham’s birthplace, where the Talmud was written, tombs of Ezra and Ezekiel located, and pilgrimages made.²¹⁵ In the Talmudic era, there were claims Herod’s family married locals, and some interpreted Gen 49.1 “The Scepter shall not depart from Judah,” wherein ‘the scepter’ was a metaphor for Babylon.²¹⁶ Later, synagogues attributed their founding to Daniel or King Jehoiachin, the Judean king exiled to Babylon and into the 20th century, legends persisted Baghdad’s synagogue lay atop Jehoiachin’s sanctuary.²¹⁷

Jews thought of Baghdad as a Jewish city, and the AIU as Iraqi, but others did not.²¹⁸ After Iraq’s independence, Sāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrī, the Director-General of Education, pushed to classify AIU schools as foreign institutions – notwithstanding students and administration were citizens, or the Jewish community funded the schools – because the AIU’s goals were “to educate and acculturate Israelites in the French language,” with Paris as a token center.²¹⁹ Wealthy Muslim families derived authority from values of genealogy and shrines, and were disinterested in European learning.²²⁰ From the 19th century, those Muslims who adopted Western habits were chided as foreign, or sneered as *Alafranga Çelebiler*, Frenchified gentlemen.²²¹

214 Ṭaha al-Hāshimī, *Mudhakarāt Ṭaha al-Hāshimī: 1919-1943*, (Dār Ṭalī’a: Beirut, 1967) 47

215 S.B., “The Fate of Iraq Jewry,” 1; Kedourie, “The Jews of Babylon and Baghdad,” 14; Sassoon, *A History of the Jews of Baghdad*, 181

216 Jacob Neusner, “Some Aspects of the Economic and Political Life of Babylonian Jewry, ca. 160-220 CE” *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, Vol. 31 (1963) 167, 191

217 Salo Wittmayer Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd Edition, Vol. II: Ancient Times, Part II, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1952) 206; Sassoon, 165

218 Snir, ‘*Arabiyyūt, Yahadūt, Şiyônūt*, 49

219 Sāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakarātī Fī al-‘Irāq: 1921-1927*, Vol. 1. (Dār al-Ṭalī’a Lil-Ṭibā’atī w’al-nashar, Beirut, 1968) 164-165; for quote, see 164-220 Longrigg, 21

221 Davison, “The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century,” 321; Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman Empire the Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1980) 210

Some Jews' adoption of European habits and attire, gave rise to snide remarks, Jews were more European and belonged less.²²² Such as one British official, Stephen Longrigg, who referred to them as "half-Europeanized;" and later in 1948 the World Jewish Congress reported Jews were mistreated because they were associated with Europe.²²³ The diplomat and scholar, Philip Willard Ireland, who interviewed Iraqi politicians and later served under the US ambassador in Baghdad, noted, in 1921, "widespread opposition to the employment of any but 'Iraqis professing Islam. This opposition was evinced as early as 1921, when "Jews and Christians were included in the outcry against the employment of foreigners."²²⁴

Anti-Semitism in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Notwithstanding the transformations in Ottoman societies: capitulations, a constitution, a world market and industrial goods- the ethos of Iraq remained rooted in genealogies and hierarchies of faith, in which Muslims ruled *dhimmīs*. So, as Jews ceased to behave as custom prescribed, materially improved or gained rights, safety declined.²²⁵ Anti-Jewish violence evolved from notions that Muslims protected Jews, and needed to make Jews conform. In Kurdistan, locals extorted Jews for 'protection.'²²⁶ A British official complained Kurdish attitudes were "that of a master toward slaves whom he treats with a certain lordly tolerance so long as they keep their place."²²⁷ The animus stemmed from local concerns: whether Jews could ignore unfair ordinances, participate in politics, dress as they please or criticize Islam. In Baghdad, Jews who strolled the city on

222 A. H. Naḥūm, *Ha-Yehūdīm bē-Aram-Naharāym*. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047); Hayyim J. Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 38

223 Longrigg, 20; World Jewish Congress, *Treatment of Jews in Egypt and Iraq*, (World Jewish Congress, New York, 1948) 10

224 Philip Willard Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*, (Kegan Paul: London, 2004) 436

225 Stillman, "Traditional Islamic Attitudes," 80; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 123-124; Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands*, 101

226 Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 24

227 Issawi, 275

Shabbat in their holiday clothes evoked ire.²²⁸ In the late 19th century, hooligans assaulted Shabbat picnickers.²²⁹ Daily, riffraff threw filth on Jewish pedestrians. While Jewish passersby who wore suits frequently suffered mud flung upon them or their turbans snatched.²³⁰ This phenomenon continued into the 20th century. The Farhūd, the mass violence against Jews in 1941, was sparked when soldiers saw Jews ambling in holiday clothes, “begrudged them” and assaulted them with knives.²³¹

Maltreatment worsened when Jews had political voice. In 1817, Da’ud Pasha became governor with the help of the *Nasi*, and subsequently, the Pasha’s advisors unleashed an anti-Jewish purge.²³² Maltreatment exacerbated when Jews ‘disobeyed’ Muslims. In 1889, ‘Abdallah Somekh, a prominent rabbi, died during a cholera outbreak, and worshipers wanted to inter his body at a Baghdad shrine.²³³ But the *Vali*, Muṣṭafá ‘Aṣim, quarantined the city from outside Jews. In defiance of the prohibition, devotees dug Somekh’s grave. The mayor, ‘Abdallah Zaybag, ordered they desist.²³⁴ Later, when the funeral procession marched through the district, Zaybag arrived with two hundred street-ruffians to thwart them, and saw Jews scaling the Shrine walls to open the gate. Zaybag's men attacked. Zaybag said, Jews were scofflaws and attack Muslims; that the Shrine was a mosque. His recriminations sparked riots. Rowdies mobbed a synagogue, taunting the Rabbi inside. At another Jewish funeral, unconnected to Somekh, horsemen

228 “Bayn Aḥēnū Ha-Rēḥūqīm,” *Ha-Zefira* (Berlin), May 29, 1889, (No. 109) 146

229 Yehuda, “Daily Life in the Community of Baghdad,” 8

230 “Bagdad Bē-Mēdinah Bavel,” *Ha-Zefira* (Berlin), May 7, 1877 (No. 9) 67

231 “Investigative Committee on the Events of June 1 and 2nd 1941,” 226

232 Wellsted, 178; the advisors imprisoned the *Nasi* and his son, and after Da’ud Pasha was overthrown, still engineered the death of another *Nasi*, see Sassoon, 123-126

233 Yehuda, *Yēhūdē Bavel*, 167-168; Ben Yaakov, 154; Sawdayee, 14

234 Ben Yaakov, 154

charged to thwart the ceremony, assailing the mourners. Thereafter, when lawmen halted the mayhem, Zaybag denounced the police for helping Jews.²³⁵

Equality engendered violence. In 1841, two years after the *Tanzīmāt* began, a visitor noted Baghdad's residents see Jews "not more unfavorably" than those in London.²³⁶ Yet fifteen years later, the *Khatt-i Humāyūn* "had a very adverse effect on the Muslims," one Ottoman official said. "Many Muslims began to grumble: today we have lost our sacred national rights."²³⁷ Writing in 1889, one journalist observed, according to "the government there is no difference between a Muslim and someone not Muslim, and for all there is one law, but in the view of masses hate the Jews with all their heart and soul, and here and there a Muslim man hits a Hebrew on the back of his nape and strikes his cheek and pulls an old man's beard at all hours."²³⁸ Despite religious freedom, Jews were still lynched for blasphemy. In 1876, a mob hung one victim from Baghdad's walls, after an altercation with a Muslim, wherein both cursed another's religion, but crowds surrounded the Jewish quarreler, screaming, a Jew cannot curse Islam, beating him bloody, and demanding the punishment under sharia, death.²³⁹

Blood libels

The *Tanzīmāt* escalated hostility towards Jews into a hatred akin to European anti-Semitism: Jews were accused of scientifically impossible crimes, and despised for reasons unanchored from practical concerns. Equality inspired a surge of blood libels, charges Jews

235 Yehuda, *Yēhūdē Bavel*, 171-174; Ben Yaakov, 154-155

236 Wellsted, 196

237 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 136

238 "Bayn Aḥēnū Ha-Rēḥūqīm," *Ha-Zefira* (Berlin), May 29, 1889, (No. 109) 146

239 Ben Yaakov, 143; "Bagdad Bē-Mēdinah Bavel," *Ha-Zefira* (Berlin), May 7, 1877 (No. 9) 67

commit ritual murder, a canard without basis that fits Langmuir’s definition of anti-Semitism as chimerical. Blood libels arrived from Europe centuries before the Tanẓīmāt, transmitted first among Syria’s Christians through French traders and later via 19th-century missionaries.²⁴⁰ In Syria, Christians owned much of the nascent Arabic press, which propagated the libel. Muslims initially rejected the lie. The myth was linked to Jesus’ crucifixion, and in Islam, Jesus was never crucified.²⁴¹ So blood libels were often confined to Christian areas.²⁴² The Empire denounced the libels as untrue – ‘Abd al-Majīd condemned the myth as “pure calumny” – and there were few such insinuations until the Tanẓīmāt.²⁴³ Prior in the early 19th century, there were but six blood libels in cities where Egypt expanded *dhimmi* rights.²⁴⁴ After the Khaṭṭ-i Humāyūn (1856), blood libels became more common among Muslims and broke annually, the largest increase in the region’s history.²⁴⁵ Helmut Walser Smith, a German historian who examined the Konitz blood libel of 1900, observed blood libels conform to social values, which in the case of the Middle East, was a Muslim monopoly on politics.²⁴⁶ Blood libels reaffirm that value, and reinforce communal lines, dichotomizing Muslims as protectors and Jews as pariah, as accusers derived authority from persecuting wrongdoers.²⁴⁷ In the most notorious case, the Damascus Blood Libel (1840) the disappearance of a priest edified Judaism as lowly, and Muslims as rulers. Damascus’ governor, Yusuf Pasha, employed incarceration and torture to garner confessions, entrenching the influence of the accuser, the French Consul.²⁴⁸ In Persia, a cleric, ‘Abdallah, used anti-Jewish incitement to dominate Hamadan, a city west of Tehran. The Shah ordered Abdallah exiled, but

240 Jacob Barnai, “Blood Libels in the Ottoman Empire of the Fifteenth to Nineteenth Centuries,” *Antisemitism Through the Ages*, ed. Shmuel Almog, (Pergamon Press Inc.: Fairveiw Park, 1988) 189; Stillman, “Antisemitism in the Contemporary Arab World,” 74; Sylvia Haim, “Arabic Antisemitic Literature: Some Preliminary Notes,” *Jewish Social Studies*, 17 (1955), 307-312

241 Stillman, “Antisemitism in the Contemporary Arab World,” 75

242 Barnai, “Blood Libels’ in the Ottoman Empire of the Fifteenth to Nineteenth Centuries,” 191-193

243 *Ibid.*, 189-190; for quote see Frankel, 376

244 Franekl, 54; Stillman, “Antisemitism in the Contemporary Arab World,” 74

245 Barnai, 189-191

246 Helmut Walser Smith, *The Butcher’s Tale: Murder and Anti-Semitism in a German Town*, (W. W. Norton & Company: New York, 2002) 22

247 *Ibid.*, 267, 87; Frankel, 3

248 *Ibid.*, 38; the accuser was Ratti-Menton, see *Ibid.*, 19-20

20,000 followers surrounded him, beating their chest, refusing to see ‘Abdallah go. He remained.²⁴⁹

Anti-Jewish violence

With strife unmoored from local concerns, cherished ways menaced, and Jews deemed foreigners and acting as they should not – a pattern of bloodshed emerged: whenever the regime that represented Muslim power verged on defeat, agitators targeted Jews to ‘right’ the hierarchy. Assailants attacked ‘successful’ Jews to make them low. In 1908, anxiety the new government would end Islamic sway sparked riots. The Young Turks, a coalition of reformists, curtailed the Sultan’s absolute rule and imposed a republic, introducing a constitution and promised equality.²⁵⁰ The Young Turks allowed Jews to enter the civil service and participate in elections. Jews were a majority in several Baghdad districts, and elected a deputy, Sassoon Hesqel.²⁵¹ Opponents despised the constitution.²⁵² Agitators said, Jews welcomed the new order, and falsely claimed the Young Turks were Jews. In response, the press reprinted recriminations of Jewish control.²⁵³ In Mosul, Muslim mobs targeted Christians. Seventy people died.

Among the insurrectionists arose the League of Muḥammad, a group opposed to equality. The League said equality weakened Islamic norms.²⁵⁴ Riots lasted six weeks. A British asset predicted an uprising for a Caliphate.²⁵⁵ In Baghdad, the Naqīb, a hereditary officer that managed

249 Daniel Tsadik, *Between Foreigners and Shi’is: Nineteenth-Century Iran and Its Jewish Minority*, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007) 156, 160-161

250 Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, 250-251

251 Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 17-18; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 88-89

252 Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, 250-251

253 Ghanīmah, 204; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 138; one abetter reprinted was Britain’s ambassador to Constantinople, Gerard Lowther, who claimed: “the movement was rather a Jewish than a Turkish revolution,” see Elie Kedourie, “Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine,” *Arab Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, (Frank Cass: London, 1974) 249

254 Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, 250; Elie Kedourie, “The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution in the Arabic-speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire,” *Arab Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 142; Lewis, 138

255 Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, 250-251, 253

endowments for *ashrāf*, Muḥammad’s descendants, fomented a riot.²⁵⁶ A Young Turk functionary prepared for elections with a meeting at a mosque, but Jews were present, and the functionary smoked during Ramadan, flouting the fast. The Naqīb, ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Gaylānī, furious, seethed the Young Turks profaned a mosque with Jews. A crush of malcontents rampaged, besetting Jews, alleging: Jews support revolution, and suborned equality on Muslims. An observer relayed the insurgents were traditionalists who dreaded “Mohammedan [sic] supremacy might be in danger.”²⁵⁷

As threat to the hierarchy exacerbated, so did violence against Jews. In World War I, British troops from India occupied Basra, and in 1917, imperiled Baghdad.²⁵⁸ The government incited against *dhimīs* to raise morale, warning of horrors “if the Infidel takes possession of the land.”²⁵⁹ The Vali, Fā’ik, said, Jews sabotaged the economy, as Iraq suffered food shortages and inflation soared.²⁶⁰ Baghdad’s government said Jews were spies.²⁶¹

For Jews, whom bigots associated with Britain, regarded as foreigners, worshipping a lower religion, opinion was outraged any Jews could prosper while Ottoman power fell.²⁶² Initially, fifty prominent Jews were deported for cooperating with the enemy, and as the Ottomans continued to lose, persecutions increased.²⁶³ On February 20, 1917, police arrested seventeen Jews on charges of exchanging Turkish currency below the government-mandated rate.²⁶⁴ The detainees were the Community’s most successful: the Hakham Bashi’s brother,

256 The Naqīb of Baghdad was a special lineage, a Qādiriyah Sayid, a descendant from Mohammad via a Sufi mystic, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Kaylānī, whose neighborhood shrine was a pilgrimage site, see Table of the Qadiriyah (Saiyid) Family of the Naqībs of Baghdad in Turkish ‘Irāq. Compiled in 1907. Persian Gulf Gazetteer Historical Genealogical Tables . IOR (L/PS/12/504/PZ2068)

257 Kedourie, “Impact of the Young Turk Revolution,” 140-142; for quote, see 142

258 Ben Yaakov, 149

259 Gertrude Bell also reported, “the Turks were bad masters, but they are Mohammadens [sic] and have not failed to make a very potent appeal to the Arab’s religious prejudices,” see Gertrude Lowthian Bell. The Turkish Provinces in Asia. Part 2: The Arab Provinces, Baghdad. September, 1917. IOR (L/PJ/6/1482/1585)- 3878 (p. 3)

260 Ben Yaakov, 149; Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (Baghdad) to The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department (Simla) July 7, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/138/3698); Longrigg, 54; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 90

261 Mordechai Bibi, *Ha-Maḥeret Ha-Šiyyônūt Ha-Ḥalūšit be- ‘Irāq: meḥqār tī ‘ūdī*, (Machon Ben Zvi: Jerusalem, 1988) 6

262 Ben Yaakov, 149

263 Shamash, 20, 22

264 Two Christians were also arrested and murdered, see G.O.C. Mesopotamia to D.M.I. Jan 30, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/149)-1199

relatives of the wealthiest entrepreneurs.²⁶⁵ Ḥusnī Bey, the inspector of the currency, and Sa’ad al-Dīn, police commissioner, orchestrated the detainees’ torture. Authorities severed their noses and ears, blinded and strangled them, then discarded their corpses in the Tigris.²⁶⁶ “It was to make a terrible example of them,” said Yūsuf Ghanīmah, who lived in Iraq then, and display Muslim rule.²⁶⁷ “Jews were held responsible for the hardships suffered by all sects of the population,” Elkabir said, who also resided in Iraq. “A policy of oppression was followed.”²⁶⁸ Fā’ik planned to kill Baghdad’s Jews, but on the night of March 11, 1917, retreated from approaching British troops before he could slaughter his victims. Thereafter, looters struck Jewish stores.²⁶⁹

Jews ask for British Citizenship

The violence of the era turned Jews against Arab rule. Some preferred Britain, who were long their protectors, and welcomed the occupation.²⁷⁰ When British troops withdrew from Kirkuk during the war, hundreds of *dhimmīs* followed.²⁷¹ Others fled to the British side.²⁷² R. Ezra Dangoor, whose relatives were slain in Fā’ik’s massacre, instituted a special, local Purim to commemorate Britain’s entry into Baghdad.²⁷³ “The Baghdad Jews have already taken fright at the prospect of an uncontrolled Arab government, which they declare ‘would be far worse than the old Turkish despotism, as the Turks are more enlightened and tolerant than the Arabs,’” an

265 Ben Yaakov, 149

266 Only six bodies were found, see G.O.C. Mesopotamia to D.M.I. Jan 30, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/149)-1199

267 Ghanīmah, 206

268 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 90

269 Ben Yaakov, 149

270 A.G. Brotman, Present Day Jewry of Baghdad, 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

271 Longrigg, 91

272 Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 199

273 Sassoon, 178; Jews in different parts of the Islamic world had special Purims to commemorate being saved from a disaster. Jews in Cairo celebrate deliverance from an oppressive in 1524. In Tetouan, a port in Northern Morocco, Jews instituted a Purim, Purim de los Cristianos, “to commemorate their rescue by the Spanish forces” see Benjamin Hary, “The Cairene Purim” *Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World*, ed. Norman A. Stillman. Consulted online on 15 February 2020. First published online: 2010; and Jessica Marglin, “Tetouan” *ibid*.

Indian report said. “The Civil Commissioner tells us their fears are not without ground.”²⁷⁴ Days after the armistice, the Community petitioned to become British subjects, writing they opposed and independence and “request that they may be graciously taken under the shield of the British Government.”²⁷⁵ The Community rejected an Arab state, such a country would persecute minorities, the Community said, and preferred British government, for “protection against Arab tyranny.”²⁷⁶ The Community wrote “a government in accord with the desire of the local majority cannot but bear a very strong theocratical character due to the dominance of religious feelings which are unconciliable [sic] with the idea of giving alien confessions any sort of privilege or rights.”²⁷⁷ The Jewish community petitioned for British citizenship three times, as late as 1921, warning Arab dominance would persecute them.²⁷⁸ Signatories included those whose careers were later highlighted as paragons of tolerance: the Chief Rabbi; future Senator Menachem Daniel; and Director-General of Accountants, Abraham Elkabir; and Baghdad’s most prosperous families.²⁷⁹ Some had a history of conflict with Britain, such as one signatory whom Indian forces expelled.²⁸⁰ After Britain dismissed the request, another signatory, Sion Dangur, emigrated to England, proclaiming he was “faithful to the British Government, our redeemer.”²⁸¹

Conclusion

274“Indian Desiderata for Peace Settlement,” IOR (L/PS/11/142/5266)- 5 (p. 2)

275 Ibid., for quote, see President of the Jewish Lay Committee and Acting Chief Rabby & President of the Religious Council (Baghdad) to Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) November 18, 1918. IOR L/OS/11/154- 3819 (p. 3)

276 Enzo Sereni, “Ba’ayat Yēhudê ‘Īrāq,” Memorandum. 1942, in Yalqūt Mizrāḥ Ha-Tikôn. Vol. 1 March 1949 JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)- 2648047. (p. 10); for quote see “Indian Desiderata for Peace Settlement” IOR (L/PS/11/142/5266)- 5 (p. 2)

277 President of the Jewish Lay Committee (Baghdad) to Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) November 18, 1918. IOR L/OS/11/154- 3819 (p. 2)

278 Acting Chief Rabbi & Chair of Religious Commission (Baghdad) to Edwin S. Montagu, Secretary of India (London) May 28, 1919 . IOR (L/PS/11/154); Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies*, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970) 301

279 IOR (L/PS/11/154), Acting Chief Rabbi (Baghdad) to Montagu (London) May 28, 1919; President of the Jewish Lay Committee (Baghdad) to Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) November 18, 1918,- 3819 (p. 4)

280 IOR (L/PS/11/142)- 5509; JEC Jukes, Esq (Bombay) to Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. November 2, 1917. No. 7165 W; Denys Bray (Deputy Secretary to the Government of India) to the Chief Secretary rtf the Government of Bombay. May 21, 1918. No. 629 W 281 IOR (L/PS/11/154), President of the Jewish Lay Committee (Baghdad) to Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) November 18, 1918,-3819 (p. 4); quote found on Elias H. Dangoor and Sion E. Dangoor to the Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) June 8, 1919,- 4227

In Iraq, anti-Semitism emerged from tropes, in which Jews were said to be weaker than Muslims and needed protection. Stereotypes – Jews were cross, crooked and incompetent – reinforced Muslim rule over them. But Iraq’s integration into the world market enabled Jews to economically better themselves, and capitalism introduced a social mobility strikingly different from the castes of *‘Askarī* and *‘Ulema*. Many Iraqis were uncomfortable with Jewish supervision of Muslims – a subversion of a society in which Muslims supervised others. For in Iraq, a Muslim’s self-definition was in relation to other religious groups: Christians and Jews. In order to ‘right’ the hierarchy, wherein Muslims define what a Jew is and their place in society, attacks on Jews increased and so did defamation. Attacks on Jews increased with pushes for equality – the economic betterment of Jews; the promulgation of the *Khatt-i Humāyūn*; the introduction of a constitution. Differences once incorporated Jews as *dhimmī*, and they lived as custom expected: impoverished, attired per sumptuary laws, obedient to mores and subject to onerous taxes. Jewish leaders were responsible for the community’s conduct and served as the Pasha’s bankers, while Judaism was hidden from view.

Capitulations and capitalism morphed lifestyles to contradict *dhimmī* standards, and differences, once edifying, became garish and foreign. European appointments associated Jews with external interference. As did European knowledge and pursuits. Equality was a foreign import, one of the many innovations Ottomans adopted to institute a stronger central government. Yet while Jews saw Europe as succor, those who cherished the order of *‘ayān*, the notables, *‘askarī* and *‘ulema* saw in Europe a menace. Notwithstanding the transformations that occurred in Ottoman societies: capitulations, a constitution, a world market and the introduction of industrial goods – the ethos of many Iraqis remained in hierarchies of faith. The *Tanzīmāt* and the Young Turks kept Jewish communities as corporate entities. The Ottomans’ system of

millets, sects, assumed there was legal distinctions between Muslims and Jews. The Empire retained a paternalistic attitude towards Jews. Despite Iraq's integration into the world market, the stations of 'Askari, 'Ayān and 'Ulema continued to reign. 'Ayān halted the Baghdad riots of 1908, not the police.²⁸² Sects remained segregated.²⁸³ According to Violet Shamash, who was born in Baghdad in 1912, "the communities separated along religious lines, clustering around a mosque, synagogue or church- it was only at the great market, the Shorja, that people from all religions met."²⁸⁴

Jews viewed themselves differently than Muslims did. While Jews created a distinct Jewish version of Iraq, Katz's 'semineutral' society, a unique sense of belonging, Muslims continued to regard Jews as unimportant – and rescripts assumed they would remain so. Nevertheless, trade with India elevated Jewish economic status, and Jews excelled in schooling when much of Iraq was illiterate. Jewish success funded communal expansion and clashed with Iraqi expectations. So, as societal customs changed, restrictive laws fell away, and Jews ceased to act like *ahl al-dhimma*, economically improved or gained rights, traditionalists felt menaced and tried to force Jews to obey: with defunct blasphemy laws, burial ordinances or sumptuary rules when rowdies harassed Jews in fine clothes.

Two key events transmogrified the animus to anti-Semitism. The Tanzīmāt presaged the swell of blood libels, anti-Semitism under the definition of chimerical hate. While the Young Turk revolution augured the first 'global' anti-Semitism, when riots against Jews burgeoned with claims of hidden Jewish control. The fear in each case – the Tanzīmāt, the Constitution – was Muslim supremacy would end. Jews were censured to affirm they should be low and restrictions

282 Ghanīmah, 204

283 Longrigg, 52

284 Shamash, 13

remain. As the terror Muslims would lose their country exacerbated, so, too, did violence against Jews. Persecutions multiplied in WWI. The bloodshed followed a pattern: successful Jews were murdered when the pillars of authority disappeared and Judaism was on display. Each killing, the massacre of the moneychangers in 1917, and the Farhūd to come, had roots in history. Each occurred on the verge of a Jewish holiday: 1917 on Purim, and the Farhūd on Shavuot.²⁸⁵ Each happened as the government fell to non-Muslims. Three generations of one family, the Dangur, was slain in anti-Semitic violence: two in 1917, and one in the Farhūd.²⁸⁶ The worse Jews were treated, the more attractive Europe became. Abuse pushed Jews to seek British citizenship, to emigrate. Jewish preference for Europe amplified anti-Semitism and would prove a toxic mix when Arab nationalism arose, for among traducers Britain and Jews would become synonymous.²⁸⁷ Charles Issawi, an economic historian of the Middle East, argued equality and prosperity felled the Middle East's minorities, such as Baghdad's Jews – they believed the slogans of civil rights, and achieved professional success while forgetting the rancor directed at *dhimmi*s who climbed too high.²⁸⁸ Yet it was Muslims who created these opportunities. Young Turks, reformers, and sultans allowed business and education to flourish.²⁸⁹ The establishment of the State of Iraq would open a brief flourishing period, from 1921 to 1925, when optimism of a Arab Muslim state welcomed Jews as ministers and judges: partly from British control, and partly because the country seemed solidly Muslim Arab in power and character. In parallel, a new ideology, nationalism, wanted everything Muslim and Arab, and would marginalize Jews. The assurance of independence would wear thin; and as the government and others imposed an Arab Sunni character on society, paternalistic attitudes towards Jews – archetypes from religion

285 Bibi, 6

286 Abraham Twena, *Me'ore 'ot Hag ha-Shavut 'ot 5701, Yuni 1941*, (Agūdat Bet Knesset Geulah: Ramle, 1977) 59

287 AG Brotman, *Present Day Jewry of Baghdad*, 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

288 Issawi, 278

289 *Ibid.*, 277

– persisted. The result would be an upsurge in anti-Semitism that would pull Jews and Muslims apart.

Chapter 3

The Creation of Iraq

Ottoman era stereotypes about Jews shaped the creation of Iraq and were embedded in the structure of the State. Despite the political changes – the Ottomans’ fall, Britain’s conquest of the region, or the establishment of an independent Iraq – *dhimmī* notions persisted and were drafted into law.

British administrators focused on the cohesion of their empire – with links to India and ensuring Iraq was an ally – were only concerned with Jews insofar as to facilitate Jewish acquiescence to the new state. These administrators built the country atop *dhimmī* conventions to appease Muslim leaders: Jews were treated as a *millet*, the Ottoman-era autonomous sects, separate in law, and separate from Muslims. Jews were expected to support their own welfare and institutions, but without a significant political voice. Administrator created a legal system that constituted institutional discrimination, wherein laws were not explicitly anti-Semitic, but were promulgated with a discriminatory aim and results that paralleled older *dhimmī* roles. Jews were taxed at higher rates, received less public funding, and prejudiced hiring practices also meant that Jews continued in their *dhimmī* roles as assistants to Muslims.

Three factors obfuscated the continuance of *dhimmī* norms in the new state. First, the British occupation brought an economic upswing and pushed the Jewish Community to accede to

the new state. A new economic reality seemed imminent, with an improving standard-of-living and entry of Jews into fields in which they never participated before. Second, *dhimmi* norms also included tropes of protection, which were still attractive to Iraq's political elite. Many politicians who opposed Jewish equality loathed to publicly express anti-Jewish sentiment. They wanted to be seen as protectors helping the weak. Third, the government promoted a slogan, *Waṭaniyya*, a country based on homeland, rather than religion.

However, the scope of advancement toward equality belied how strong taboos against *dhimmi*s really were. Britain hired many of the Jews entering new fields of work, local Iraqis did not. Despite wanting to treat Jews well, politicians barred Jews from leadership roles and politics. *Waṭaniyya* was for the state, a slogan not of equality, but to assuage minorities to feel included in a Sunni Arab state that did not represent them. The result was that, when the League of Nations granted Iraq independence in 1932, Jewish status had declined, and there was no political will for equality.

British Interests

Britain conquered Iraq in World War I, to keep a “tight grip” on Basra as a way-station to India.²⁹⁰ Basra was a juncture in the route.²⁹¹ So, Iraq was demarcated as a buffer to defend Basra, one of a string of new states envisioned to be too weak to resist Britain hegemony, but strong enough to prevent other powers from menacing British routes.²⁹² The Foreign Office

290 Longrigg, 77-79; for quote, see Holon (India Office) to J.E. Shuckburgh, Esq. October 29, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/142/5266) (p. 1)

291 J.C. Minutes. Sept 25, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/597)- 8

292 Political Department, India Office “Indian Desiderata for Peace Settlement” 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/142/5266)- 5; Holon to J.E. Shuckburgh; Ibid., n.p.; ARS to Sir L. Holderness, November 12, 1918, Ibid., n.p.

loathed the liabilities associated with establishing a colony.²⁹³ So a new state, Iraq, was established under the guise of “self-determination.”²⁹⁴

Britain’s primary motivation was not to create an equitable state, or protect civil rights or Jews, but to avert a “hostile Iraq lying athwart our land and air communications,” the Foreign Office said.²⁹⁵ Britain had promised to free indigenous inhabitants during the war, and later, at the Versailles Peace Conference, said the same.²⁹⁶ “The fiction which the Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all,” explained a list of British talking points. “Self-determination, subject, as is implied, to the control of the protecting Power.”²⁹⁷

Still, statesmen fretted dismantling the Ottoman Empire, the last major Muslim power, would imperil Muslim loyalty in Britain’s Empire.²⁹⁸ Millions of Muslims resided in India. Many were soldiers or police, made pilgrimages to Mecca, and admired Istanbul’s Caliphs.²⁹⁹ Sudan’s governor warned “the disintegration of Islam” is “a dangerous line of thought for the British Empire, with its millions of Moslem subjects.”³⁰⁰ Thus, to avoid opprobrium as Islam’s destroyer, Britain created a series of Muslim states to replace the Ottomans.³⁰¹

Accordingly, Iraq was to have an “Arab façade.”³⁰² One diplomatic secretary proposed a Caliph to replace the Sultan, suggesting Mecca’s Emir, Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, commonly referred to

293 The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula. IOR (L/PS/11/142, P 5421/1918)- 5421A (p. 12); Though one dissenter was Percy Cox, the High Commissioner. He wanted to annex Basra, see Sir Percy Cox, *The Future of Mesopotamia* (London) April 22, 1918. Enclosure within Edwin S. Montagu. India Office (London) to the Governor General of India in Council. August 9, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700) (p. 3)

294 The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula, 21

295 J.C. Minutes. Sept 25, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/597)- 8

296 Gertrude Lowthian Bell, “Self-Determination in Mesopotamia: Memorandum by Miss. G. L. Bell, February 1919,” published in Arnold T. Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties, A Personal and Historical Record*, (Oxford University Press: London, 1931) 330

297 Imperial War Cabinet. “Mesopotamia.” Memorandum for Peace Conference. 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/142)- 5860 (2) (p. 5)

298 David Fromkin, *A Peace to End all Peace*, (Henry Holt & Company: New York, 1989) 101; see also *The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula*, 11; Longrigg, 77

299 Longrigg, 79; Gerald De Gaury, *Three Kings In Baghdad, The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy*, (I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.: London, 2008) 33

300 Col. C. E. Wilson, the Residency (Cairo) May 1, 1918 IOR (L/PS/11/139) - 192

301 *Ibid.*, 191; Fromkin, 101; *The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula*, 11

302 Cox, “The Future of Mesopotamia,” 4

as Sharīf Ḥusayn.³⁰³ Ḥusayn was a *sharīf*, a descendant of Muḥammad, and as Emir of Mecca, Islam's holiest city, he was believed to be popular among Sunnis.³⁰⁴ In a pact of convenience amid World War I, Britain recognized Ḥusayn as a "spokesman" for "various populations," and proffered him a Caliphate of Mecca, not of Iraq, but promised Mesopotamia would be "Arab" and "Independent."³⁰⁵ Nonetheless, the Foreign Office suggested the establishment of a mandate of Iraq, "which might involve the rather objectionable sham of a titular local sovereign" such as "the appointment of one of King Hussein's [sic] sons."³⁰⁶

Within the agreement to establish a mandate of Iraq were two contradictions that would impact the country's anti-Semitism to come. First, while Britain promised not to prejudice the "the legitimate interests" of "Jewry,"³⁰⁷ of whom 60,000 dwelled in Iraq, insofar as British India was concerned, there were no commitments to Jews, Kurds, or most Iraqis. Only Basra's notables, a tiny minority, had British promises, whereas the territory's 2.5 million people primarily lived elsewhere.³⁰⁸

Second, Britain alleged to rule per local wishes, but perhaps half of Iraq's population was Kurdish, Jewish or Christian, while many were Shiites, who disliked Sunni rule.³⁰⁹ Compounding these inconsistencies, for administrative ease, Iraq's High Commissioner, Percy Cox conformed the country's civil bureaucracy to Baghdad, "the real centre of Jewry," Cox said, a Jewish city.³¹⁰ Jews were the largest demographic in Baghdad, with 40% of the population,

303 Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations*, 1914-1939, (Frank Cass: London, 2000) 13-15

304 C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1973) 3-4; Fromkin, 100; Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, 5-7, 13-14

305 Fromkin, 104; for first quote, see *The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula*, 4, for second quote, see *Ibid.*, 6

306 *The Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula*, 13

307 *Ibid.*, 3

308 *Ibid.*, 9; Imperial War Cabinet. "Mesopotamia." Memorandum for Peace Conference. 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/142)- 5860 (2) (p. 1); Col. C. E. Wilson, the Residency (Cairo) May 1, 1918 IOR (L/PS/11/139) - 191

309 G.O.C. (Mesopotamia) to War Office (London) July 22, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/154 P 3860/1919)- 5465; De Gaury, 34

310 The document is torn, so it is unclear if the writer referred to Baghdad the city, the province or Mesopotamia as a whole, quoted in G.O.C. to War Office, July 22, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/154 P 3860/1919)- 5465; Cox, "The Future of Mesopotamia," 4

while Arabs made up a third of the population.³¹¹ Many in such a diverse population opposed the political arrangement.³¹² As mentioned earlier, Jewish leaders had petitioned for British nationality three times.³¹³ Mandate administrators feared to display Iraq's flag or colors, which carried Muslim Arab symbolism. Officials suggested neither be flown, as each "ignores Jews and Christians," and was "likely to give offense."³¹⁴ In Mosul, schools banned the colors, and predicted the flag would trigger riots.³¹⁵

To solve these inconsistencies – a country of 'self-determination' determined for the few, urban Sunni Muslims, Cox's deputy, Arnold Wilson, created a constitutional assembly weighted in favor of Baghdad Muslims out of proportion to their population.³¹⁶ Muslims had forty-seven representatives, Jews twenty. Later on January 22, when the delegates met – *Ashrāf* and prominent Jews and Christians – Muslims lobbied for an Arab state and Muslim king.³¹⁷ Jews and Christians balked;³¹⁸ an Arab state would revive Muslim domination.³¹⁹ The dispute swelled anti-*dhimmī* rhetoric. Out-of-power Ottoman propagandists fumed against minorities, and Muslim clerics said critics were infidels.³²⁰ Anonymous groups menaced Jews, their political relevance would end.³²¹ Jews "took alarm at the windy and violent oratory in the coffee shop," Bell said in her review of the events.³²² Officials despaired minorities would vote down self-rule,

311 Sir Percy Cox. April 22, 1918. Despatch. Contained in (Baghdad) to Under Secretary of State (London) October 4, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700)- 4409 (p.4); De Gaury, 28

312 Sereni, 10

313 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 128; Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 127; Acting Chief Rabbi to Edwin S. Montagu, May 28, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/154); Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version*, 301; Bell, "Self-Determination in Mesopotamia," 334

314 A. T. Willson. Office of the Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) to the Under Secretary of State for India (London) July 22, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/154 P 3860/1919)- 5442 (p. 1)

315 Deputy Director of Education (Mosul) to Capt. H.M. Bowman, Director of Education (Baghdad) May 10, 1919. Memo. IOR (L/PS/11/154 P 3860/1919)- 3860; Students who disobeyed were expelled, see May 20, 1919, Memo 370 in same reference number; Baghdad to the Secretary of State. August 6, 1919. Telegram. IOR (L/PS/11/154 P 3860/1919)- 5465

316 Bell, "Self-Determination in Mesopotamia," 334

317 For the quote, see Ireland, 171; Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 127

318 Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 127; Bell, "Self-Determination in Mesopotamia," 334

319 Hourani, 288

320 Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 127; Bell, "Self-Determination in Mesopotamia," 332-333

321 *Ibid.*, 334

322 Bell, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 127

and tried to assuage them, but at one assembly meeting, Jewish delegates, expecting violence, refused to relent.³²³ Statehood was a “scheme of Moslem Government,” said one.³²⁴

A Caliph was “for your regeneration,” a Muslim colleague said.³²⁵

Non-Muslim delegates grew alarmed, and, as Bell narrates the encounter, Jews withdrew and “signed a separate petition pleading for British administration, and the Christians followed suit.”³²⁶

Britain Propagandizes Iraq’s Jews

Officials rebuffed Jews’ requests for British citizenship, as to assent would have obligated Britain to Jewish safety and exposed the lie of a model state, and instead, worked to convince Jews to accept a Muslim state.³²⁷ Jews were Baghdad’s largest community, and Cox saw “advantage in singing encouragement to the local Jews.”³²⁸ He dispatched a scholar to persuade Jews to accept independence.³²⁹ High Commissioners visited AIU schools.³³⁰ In time, the authorities convinced Jews with pledges minorities would be treated fairly.³³¹ The forthcoming constitution would enshrine equality.³³² A 1919 draft proposed “freedom of conscience,” and that “no political or civil disability shall be imposed on the ground of religious beliefs.”³³³ A political officer said in 1918, “Jewish feeling in Baghdad has for some months past

323 Many feared a returned of Turkish rule, see Cox, “The Future of Mesopotamia,” 8; Bell, “Self-Determination in Mesopotamia,” 335

324 Bell, “Self-Determination in Mesopotamia,” 335

325 Ibid.

326 Ibid.

327 Sketch of a Draft Treaty of Peace between Turkey and the Allied Governments (Feb 21, 1919) IOR (L/PS/11/149)- 1041 (p. 21)

328 Sir Percy Cox. April 22, 1918. Despatch. Contained in (Baghdad) to Under Secretary of State (London) October 4, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700)- 4409 (p.4)

329 The academic was David Margoliouth. He wrote handbooks on Islam for the military, see Erik Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question: The Political Intelligence Department and the Eastern Committee, 1918,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, (Vol. 23, No. 4, Taylor & Francis, Ltd.: Oct 1987) 432, 436; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 129

330 Yisrael M. Katan, “Bagdad,” *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), June 17, 1926 (Vol. VIII, No. 224) 3

331 Political Office (Baghdad) to India Office. October 4, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700)- 4409; Board of Deputies to Secretary of State May 7, 1917. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

332 Sereni, 11; Ireland, 383

333 Part III. Mesopotamia. A Sketch of a Draft Treaty of Peace Between Turkey and the Arab Governments. Feb 21, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/149) p. 20

been improving and is now I think markedly pro-British.”³³⁴ The Community hosted a banquet for Britain’s victory, with speeches flattering British rule.³³⁵

Yet vulnerable groups like Jews faced a dilemma: they needed Britain’s strength to protect them, but were powerless to ensure Britain respected their interests rather than Britain’s own.³³⁶ Minorities adored Britain for the safety they assumed would come – intervention to protect them had been Europe’s previous role. Minorities lobbied to prosecute war criminals who terrorized them during Ottoman times;³³⁷ yet that protection was to gain influence when Britain was outsider trying to penetrate the region, and once Britain conquered Iraq, colonial administrators shifted policy to appease Muslims.³³⁸ The same officials that promoted Anglophilia had disincentives to punish oppression. Trials would spotlight the country’s prejudices, which clashed with goals of Arab statehood, and alienated the notables Britain sought to woo.³³⁹

So British strategy changed from safeguarding Jews to aiding Arab Sunni dominance and thereby consolidate British power. In 1919, British officials received evidence to charge the perpetrators for the 1917 massacre of the moneylenders.³⁴⁰ The British military forces in Iraq said there was enough documentation to extradite them.³⁴¹ Administrators refused.³⁴² They knew there was contempt for non-Muslim sects, and decided to placate the bigotry so as not to antagonize resistance to the Mandate. “It should be possible on the ground of racial and religious

334 Political Office (Baghdad) to India Office. October 4, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700)- 4409

335 Political Office (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (London) October 4, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/139)- 482; Political Office (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (London) October 12, 1918. IOR (L/PS/11/139)- 659

336 Hourani, 290

337 W.A. Wigram, Esq (Political Department) to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad. March 6, 1919 IOR (L/PS/11/149) (p. 2)

338 Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 179

339 Gertrude Lowthian Bell. *The Turkish Provinces in Asia. Part 2: The Arab Provinces*, Baghdad. September, 1917. IOR (L/PJ/6/1482/1585)-3878 (p. 1)

340 The organizers of the slaughter were Husni Bey and Sa’ad al-Dīn, see G.O.C. Mesopotamia to D.M.I. Jan 30, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/149)-1199; FO. Draft Paper. March 25, 1920. IOR (L/PS/11/149)-2290

341 G.O.C. Mesopotamia to D.M.I. Jan 30, 1919. IOR (L/PS/11/149)-1199

342 A British official rejected the request as a waste of resources, see To the Under Secretary of State. Mesopotamia: Outrages against Jews + Christians at Baghdad prior to British occupation proposed arrest of guilty parties. March 1, 1919, IOR (L/PS/11/149)-1199

susceptibilities to deny foreigners,” one memo said.³⁴³ Britain rejected Japanese peacekeepers because “it would alienate” Muslims who disliked “idolatry,” and nixed plans to build a Sikh temple for the same reason.³⁴⁴

Britain tried to mislead Jewish civil rights groups in England as to the true situation in Iraq, prohibiting their missions to the area, and monitored suspected critics of British policy.³⁴⁵ Beyond public view, British authorities were unconcerned for Jews’ welfare. The 1922 military manual on Iraq informed readers: “Jews and Christians are traders and artisans, pettifogging, little people, who are little less than thralls and deserve no higher fate.”³⁴⁶ The manual’s chapter on ethnography the year after made no mention of Jews.³⁴⁷ Bell defended Islamic chauvinism. “The Moslem is the ruler and claims his privilege, but he confines it with reasonable limits,” she wrote in 1917.³⁴⁸ In the same report, she said Muslims saw Jews’ with no purpose save “supplying the wants of the country.”³⁴⁹

Britain Treats Jews as A Separate Community

To appease public tastes, and with stereotypes of Britain’s own, officials treated Jews as a separate people, distinct from Arabs.³⁵⁰ Memos referred to Jews not as Arabs, but the “Jewish community,” or longer oblique titles, such as “a Jew + a native of Mesopotamia.”³⁵¹ British authorities already split the two groups before Iraq’s conquest. The Secretary of State

343 Employment of Japanese Troops in Mesopotamia. Memorandum by Political Department (India) 1917. IOR (L/PJ/6/1482/1585)- 4638 (p. 4)

344 Ibid., 1, 3

345 Longrigg, 84; Foreign Office (London) to Sir Percy Cox (Baghdad) August 22, 1918. Cypher Telegram. Telegram No. 9. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700); Foreign Office (London) to Sir C. Marling. August 22, 1916. Extract No, 439. IOR (L/PS/11/140/4700)

346 Military Report on Mesopotamia (Iraq) 1922. IOR (L/MIL/17/15/42) 34

347 Ibid., 1923. IOR (L/MIL/17/15/45) vii

348 Gertrude Lowthian Bell. The Turkish Provinces in Asia. Part 3: The Two Rivers. September, 1917. IOR (L/PJ/6/1482/1585)- 3878 (p. 8)

349 Ibid., Part 2: The Arab Provinces, Baghdad. September, 1917. IOR (L/PJ/6/1482/1585)- 3878 (p. 7)

350 John Pedder to Home Office (London) June 19, 1917. IOR (L/PJ/6/1482/1585)- 2850

351 for first quote, see Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Sir Horace Seymour. Sept 25, 1941. E6613/5126/93. NA (FO 371/27116); for second quote, see G. W. Silber February 4, 1918. Draft. IOR (L/PJ/6/1506)

differentiated between natives “in Mesopotamia of the Arab or Jewish race.”³⁵² That Cox established a constitutional assembly on sectarian lines, asking local leaders to appoint delegations of *Ashrāf* for Sunnis and the Hakham Bashi to appoint “leading Jews,” was an extension of the millets, but also of British practices.³⁵³ No attempt was made to merge the two. The Mandate treated Jews as a corporate community, separate in law, and regulated with Ottoman codes.³⁵⁴ *Millets* divided different religions.³⁵⁵ The Jewish community continued as an association of committees dedicated to education, healthcare or welfare.³⁵⁶ The Chief Rabbi remained a civil servant, as in the Tanzīmāt era.³⁵⁷ When the old regulations were replaced with ‘Laws of the Jewish Community’ in 1931, the new statutes reaffirmed Jewish separateness, centralizing Jewish institutions into a single organization.³⁵⁸ The rules codified a sub-society for Jews: the Community administered its own hospitals, courts and schools. They had financial autonomy: collecting dues and sanctioning accounts.³⁵⁹ The Community was economically self-sufficient.³⁶⁰ The *Gabelle*, a kosher meat tax, funded expenditures.³⁶¹ Volunteers staffed committees and advised the Community on legal and financial matters.³⁶²

This autonomy not only served Jewish needs, but Muslim needs as well – allowing authorities to identify who was Jewish, who was not, and steering Jewish isolation or integration, as the government chose. The distinction between autonomy, which the state liked, and Zionism, the movement for Jewish peoplehood and a home, which the state did not like, was control.

352 John Pedder to Messers. Cobbett Wheeler & Cobbett. May 25, 1917. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047); J.F. Henderson (Home Office) to Lucien Wolf (Conjoint Committee) June 5, 1917. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

353 Bell, “Self-Determination in Mesopotamia” 333-334, quoted 334

354 Article 17. Law of the Jewish Community No. 77 of 1931. *Iraq Government Gazette*. 1931, 551. CZA (S8\2101)

355 Article 18., Ibid.

356 David Salman Yehuda, “The Education Committee of the Jewish Community of Baghdad.” In Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot*, 175

357 Article 9. Law of the Jewish Community No. 77 of 1931. *Iraq Government Gazette*. 1931. 549-50 CZA (S8\2101)

358 Article 18. Ibid., 551; Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot*, 187

359 Arts. 7, 11, 15. Law of the Jewish Community No. 77 of 1931. *Iraq Government Gazette*. 1931, 549-550 (CZA S8\2101)

360 Anonymous. Untitled. Memorandum. 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 1

361 A.G. Brotman, Present Day Jewry of Baghdad, 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 4-5; Concerning this traditional tax, see Leah Bornstein Makovetsky, “Gabela,” *EJIW* 2, pp. 248a-249b.

362 D. Yehuda, “Education,” 176- 177; Davide Sala (Salman), “The Organization of the Community,” published in Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 253

Under autonomy, Jews were expected to follow Arab government and norms. An *Irada*, a royal decree, appointed and removed the Community's President.³⁶³ Presidents were subservient to the Justice Minister.³⁶⁴ Every Jewish institution was under Justice Ministry supervision.³⁶⁵ One Education official, Sāmī Shawkat, said the government used schools to “control their isolation” and appointed instructors to enforce “the supremacy of the country.”³⁶⁶

Conversely, Zionist clubs encouraged a freer Jewish culture of self-definition, outside state sway. These groups functioned as educational gatherings. Members learned Hebrew, corresponded with Jews abroad, and read culturally likeminded publications.³⁶⁷ In the early years of the Mandate, Zionism was an intellectual pursuit of reading Jewish topics, and resembled the local pastime of chatting at cafes.³⁶⁸ Enthusiasts opened Hebrew schools.³⁶⁹ Two young men founded the Jewish Literary Society to promote Hebrew works.³⁷⁰ Though these societies could have hundreds of members, the Community had tenuous links to the Yishuv, the Jewish settlements in Palestine, hiring teachers or donating to Jewish life there – practices that predated Zionism.³⁷¹ Perhaps Zionism's attraction was the freedom to be openly Jewish as one chose, in an era when Jews not infrequently hid religious expression. Menachem Daniel, the Community's first senator, considered Zionism's appeal “the reaction of a subdued race, which for a moment thought that by magic the tables were turned.”³⁷² Nevertheless, Zionism had no large following,

363 Article 4. Law of the Jewish Community No. 77 of 1931. Iraq Government Gazette. 1931, 549 (CZA S8\2101)

364 Article 17. *Ibid.*, 551.

365 Twena, *Meor'ot Hag ha-Shavu'ot*, 170

366 Sāmī Shawkat, “Imbarātūriya al-'Arabiya,” Speech. The Muthannā Club. Undated.(Baghdad) *Hadhihi Ahaka Afuna*, (Muṭba'a al-tafayid al-Ahaliya: Baghdad, 1939) 38

367 The Zionist organization was banned in 1929, see H. Cohen, 4; Masliyeh, 217

368 Sadok H. Masliyeh, “Zionism in Iraq,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25 (No. 2, April 1989) 217

369 Aharon Sassoon and R. Yaakov Nissim (b. 1885), see Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 135; Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavu'ot*, 49

370 Hayyim J. Cohen, *Ha-Pē'ilūt Ha-Šīyônūt Bē-'Irāq* (Jerusalem Post Press: Jerusalem, 1969) 38-39; S. S. Shina, “Our Baghdad Letter : Zionism and its influence in Mesopotamia,” *Israel's Messenger* (Shanghai) April 7, 1922, p. 32

371 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 135; Masliyeh, “Zionism in Iraq,” 217; One wealthy patron gave £140,000 to the KKL. Another established a town in his deceased brother's name. A third for a new neighborhood for the Hebrew University, see Author Unknown. Hebrew Text. n.d. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 7-9

372 Menachem S. Daniel (Baghdad) to the Zionist Organization (London) Sept 8, 1922. CZA (Z4/2101) in Cohen, *Ha-Pē'ilūt Ha-Šīyônūt Bē-'Irāq*, 238

when Jews, long excluded from statecraft, were averse to politics.³⁷³ Disputes could spark riots. Few were “politically minded,” as one leader observed, or were unafraid to be.³⁷⁴ Only thirty-two people subscribed to a local Zionist weekly.³⁷⁵

The following also had few fierce critics.³⁷⁶ Fayṣal told British officials Zionism “could well be the prelude of Jewish Arab cooperation.”³⁷⁷ In 1922, Fayṣal approved A. Benzion’s plans to raise money in Iraq for Keren Ha-Yesod, a charity dedicated to developing the Yishuv, and allowed Benzion to organize volunteers to travel to Palestine.³⁷⁸ In 1926, hundreds protested in support of emigrants to Palestine, without incident.³⁷⁹ One prominent politician, Nūrī al-Sa’īd, did not notice anti-Zionism until 1928. This scarcity of animosity stems partially from a reluctance to admit any hostility to Jews at all. Muslims were supposed to protect *dhimmī*, not hate them. Statesmen like Nūrī said there was no “feeling against the Jews.”³⁸⁰

Yet while Fayṣal said Arabs “admit the moral claims of the Zionists,” he declined to permit their societies.³⁸¹ British authorities did.³⁸² The British High Commissioner licensed the Mesopotamian Zionist Society in 1921, part of a campaign to convey Iraq’s openness to civil liberties.³⁸³ The Government itself refused to re-certify the group a year later.³⁸⁴ Interior Minister ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa’adūn said he liked Jews, and, according to the Pact of ‘Umar, was required to help. Albeit due to an ‘animosity’ Sa’adūn never named, was unable to register the group. Still, he worried newspapers would interpret the closure as persecution, and allowed the

373 Masliyah, “Zionism in Iraq,” 218

374 Ibrahim al-Kabir, “Testimony before Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry,” 140

375 Cohen, *Ha-Pē’ilūt Ha-Šiyônūt Bē-’Irāq*, 37-38

376 Masliyah, “Zionism in Iraq,” 218

377 A.S. Elkabir, *My Ideological Life: Illusions and Realities*, Vol. 5. BJHC (no. 7308) 50

378 Sassoon Khadduri (Rais al-Taifa) to Hikmet Sulayman (Interior Minister) October 31, 1934. No. 2997. IJA (3785)- 18

379 ‘Ereṣ Yiśra’elī, “Bagdad,” *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), Aug 11, 1926 (Vol. VIII, No. 270) 3

380 Nūrī al-Sa’īd, “Muqtaṭafāt KHiṭāb Nūrī al-Sa’īd fī Ṭāwla al-Mustadīra fī London ‘ām 1939” *Wathā’iq wa Muqtaṭafāt min al-Šiḥāfāt wa al-Muṣādar al-’Irāqīyah ‘an Yahūd al-’Irāq fī al-’Aṣar al-Ḥadīth*, ed. Nissim Qazzaz and Shmuel Moreh, (Maktaba Kul Shay: Haifa, 2013) 103

381 Interview with Sherif Feisal. Dec 30, 1918. IOR (L/PS/18/B309)- 11

382 Salman Darwīsh, *Kull Shay Hādi fī al-’iyaādah*, (Rabitat al-Jamī’iyin al-Yahud al-Nazihin min al-’I: Jerusalem, 1981) 100

383 Cohen, *Ha-Pē’ilūt Ha-Šiyônūt Bē-’Irāq*, 41

384 Ibid., 42; A. H. Ben-Iraq, “Tēšuvā Lē-Mar Drômūd Šils: ‘Igeret Galūyā Maṣav Yēhūdē ‘Īra’aq,” Part 1. *Haam* (Jerusalem), August 2, 1931,

organization to function unofficially through the 1920s, “provided that the societies did not press for formal recognition.”³⁸⁵

Later observers misinterpreted public rage as emanating from economic competition or Jewish separatism, when on the contrary, Muslims were upset Jews were dissatisfied at all. Convention said Jews should thank Muslims for tolerating them. In London in 1939, Nūrī insisted Jews consented to prohibitions against Zionism because Iraq treated them well.³⁸⁶ Muslims regarded Jews as “a very lucky person, from whom the country should expect full return for its lavash favours [sic],” Sen. Daniel said, and a prerequisite ‘payment’ was “unimpeachable loyalty.”³⁸⁷ After one overseas activist fundraised for the Yishuv,³⁸⁸ displays of enthusiasm for a Jewish home or culture infuriated some; and a cabinet minister chided “after so many centuries of good understanding” Muslims were shocked “they had inspired the Jews with so little esteem.”³⁸⁹ Jews must hide their feelings, said Daniel. “If they espouse so publicly and tactlessly as they have done lately, a cause which is regarded by the Arabs not only foreign but as actually hostile, have no doubt that they will succeed in making of themselves a totally alien element.”³⁹⁰

The Golden Years, 1921-1923: A Jewish Renaissance?

Nevertheless, the early years of Mandate benefited the Community, as it did Baghdad generally. After World War I, Iraq was backcountry, reachable only with ships from Bombay.³⁹¹

385 Cohen, *Ha-Pē'ilūt Ha-Šīyônūt Bē-'Irāq*, 42-43; for quote, see the Zionist Organization (London) to J.M. Rich (Joint Foreign Committee) Sept 17, 1924. Iraq Correspondences. Part 1. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

386 Nūrī al-Sa'id, “Muqatafaṭ Khatīb Nūrī al-Sa'id fī Ṭawla al-Mustadīra fī London 'ām 1939” 103

387 M. Daniel to the Zionist Organization (London), Sept 8, 1922. CZA (Z4/2101), in H. Cohen, *Ha-Pē'ilūt Ha-Šīyônūt Bē-'Irāq*, 238

388 Application for Passport. Endorsement of Passport, Memorandum. Nov 17, 1920. Reference: PE/B171120. IOR (L/E/7/1241); J.R. Shuckburgh to Under Secretary of State, Oriental Office (London) November 29, 1921. IOR (L/E/7/1241); J.R. Shuckburgh to Under Secretary of State, Oriental Office (London) January 20, 1922. IOR (L/E/7/1241)- 187

389 Daniel to Zionist Organization (London) CZA (Z4/2101). Published in Cohen, *Ha-Pē'ilūt Ha-Šīyônūt Bē-'Irāq*, 239

390 Ibid.

391 De Gaury, 16

Few in Iraq had running water.³⁹² Cholera epidemics were annual.³⁹³ Britain's occupation brought an economic upswing.³⁹⁴ Improved law enforcement brought greater security. The British administration hired Jews, and Jews entered the once Muslim-dominated civil service in noticeable numbers, constituting over a fifth of the new hires.³⁹⁵ Imports surged, and Jewish firms participated heavily in the field, representing major car companies like General Motors and Ford.³⁹⁶ Moneychangers entered Britain's credit and loans regime, establishing banks.³⁹⁷ Others joined the new economy's liberal professions of medicine, law and finance.³⁹⁸ Prosperity spurred urban migration, increasing Baghdad's population fivefold, to a million people. Old areas were razed to build skyscrapers.³⁹⁹ Cinemas and motorcars were introduced.⁴⁰⁰ The Community's population expanded to perhaps 125,000 by 1950 in one estimate, while the US embassy estimated 180,000.⁴⁰¹ A wealthy few left the Jewish quarters to build villas along the Tigris.⁴⁰²

Jewish economic clout affected the city's character. Bazaars closed on Jewish holidays.⁴⁰³ Banks closed on Purim, a Jewish festival.⁴⁰⁴ Noises dampened on Shabbat, the Jewish day of rest, and employers shuttered business. "Baghdad resembles an Eastern Jewish city, because the Jewish Commercial movement is big," a correspondent said.⁴⁰⁵ Arabic literacy

392 Rejwan, *The Last Jews in Baghdad*, 4

393 De Gaury, 17

394 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 115

395 Sereni, 11; Cox, "The Future of Mesopotamia," 6

396 Mīr Baṣrī, *Mulḥaq al-Ṭāʾifah al-Isrāʾīlīyah (al-Mūsawīyah) Fī al-ʿIrāq Fī al-Qarn al-ʿAshrīn*, in Yūsuf Rizqāllāh Ghanīmāh, *Nuzḥa al-Muṣṭāq Fī Tārīkh Yahūd al-ʿIrāq*, (Al Warrak publishing, Ltd: London, 1997) 264-266; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 116-117

397 Anonymous. Untitled. Undated. BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 4; One, Bank Zilha, was Iraq's first international bank, see Baṣrī, *Mulḥaq al-Ṭāʾifah al-Isrāʾīlīyah*, 266

398 Bibi, 2

399 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 113

400 AG Brotman, Present Day Jewry of Baghdad, 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 6

401 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 115; Harold Beeley, H.M. Embassy (Baghdad) to Geoffrey W. Furlonge. Foreign Office (London). June 27, 1951. NA (FO 371/91693)-37; Airgram. US Embassy in Baghdad. Secretary of State. Baghdad March 8, 1949. NA (FO 371/75128)-74

402 Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, 38; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 114; Anonymous. Untitled. Undated. BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 4

403 Rejwan, *Last Jews in Baghdad*, 2

404 AG Brotman, Present Day Jewry of Baghdad, 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 4

405 Anonymous. Untitled. Undated. BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 4; Anonymous. Untitled. Memorandum. 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 4

flourished, and Jews habitually wrote in Standard Arabic, rather than Judeo-Arabic, in Hebrew characters, for the first time.⁴⁰⁶ Arabic writers emerged, and with them Arabic publications.⁴⁰⁷

Meanwhile, the new Arab government tried to integrate Jews and ease their apprehensions. The constitution promised religious equality.⁴⁰⁸ Jews were legally equal, working in every field, in government, in the judiciary and police, and could attend any school. Jewish organizations were unfettered.⁴⁰⁹ “The situation of the Jewish Minority in Iraq compares favorably with that of other Jewish minorities in some European countries,” a Jewish organization in England wrote.⁴¹⁰ Fayṣal attached importance sectarian issues, and said Jews were related to Arabs.⁴¹¹ In 1918, he said Arabs “regard the Jews as kinsmen,” and told a synagogue Jews and Muslims were a single ‘race.’⁴¹² Jewish and Arab culture flourished in these early years. Baghdad’s Jewish schools expanded to over 7,000 pupils, Growing numbers in public schools were introduced to Arab culture.⁴¹³ Fayṣal encouraged the political creed, *Waṭaniyya*, allegiance to homeland, and he spoke of Jews' connection with other Iraqis.⁴¹⁴ For Jews, *Waṭaniyya* seemed to promised a culture of freedom.⁴¹⁵ Fayṣal visited Jewish schools.⁴¹⁶ In 1921, he spoke at a synagogue, kissed the Torah, and declared: “There is nothing in *Waṭaniyya* named Muslim, Christian or Israelite... You are nothing but Iraqis.”⁴¹⁷

406 Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, 26

407 Somekh, 15-16

408 Ireland, 383

409 Anonymous Memorandum. 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 3; Harry Vitales, “Report on Iraq” American Joint Distribution Committee. January 8, 1949. JDC (NY AR194554 4 42 516)-688696 (p. 4); see also al-Drūbī, 241

410 A.J. Brotman. Untitled. Memorandum. 1929. Iraq correspondence about Turkish rule. Part 1. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) (p. 4)

411 al-Hāshimī, *Mudhakarāt Ṭaha al-Hāshimī*, 118

412 Though this is hard to certify. Fayṣal spoke no English, and his racial references were often translations. For quote, see Interview with Sherif Feisal. Dec 30, 1918. IOR (L/PS/18/B309)- 11; Sereni, 11

413 Ibid.

414 Baṣrī, 259

415 Sereni, 11

416 Shāul, 176; Snir, ‘*Arabiyyāt, Yahadūt, Ṣiyônūt*, 17-18; ‘Abdallah Ṣakhī, “al-Yāhūd Ta’arudū ilā ‘Alā Mughādira al-‘Irāq, Dec 25, 2002. A Conversation with Mir Baṣrī. (Publication unknown. Nissim Rejwan Archive (unpublished) Harry S. Truman Research Institute Library. Hebrew University of Jerusalem) 1

417 Ghanīmah, 213; for the text of Fayṣal’s quote see, Baṣrī, 259; for an English translation of the quote, see Sereni, 11

Among Iraq's semineutral society, Jews and intellectuals interpreted *Waṭaniyya* differently than the general public. “These well-intentioned, somewhat naive men call for something designated as wataniyya [sic] ‘Iraqiyya,’” said Nissim Rejwan. “Denoting merely Iraqi citizenship and love of the homeland.”⁴¹⁸ For Jews, wistful or sincere, *Waṭaniyya* was a fellowship of equals. A poem recited at one Jewish event imagined: “all Muslims are their comrades.”⁴¹⁹ The Community promoted slogans like ‘Religion for God and the homeland for all.’⁴²⁰ The Community’s President, Sassoon Khaḍḍūrī, said *Waṭaniyya* was “different races and religions...all serving the strong *Waṭan*,”⁴²¹ and the parliamentarian Shalom Darwish described *Waṭaniyya* as “unity of the Iraqi homeland among different religions.”⁴²²

Optimists expected Fayṣal to usher in a halcyon era. Synagogues hosted ceremonies for his coronation. Writers dedicated poems to his ascent (“despite the different religions overshadowing us, A homeland unites us”), and adored him as a state builder.⁴²³ Nevertheless, an examination of *Waṭaniyya* suggests the term is a reflection of the scholar Jacob Katz’s semineutral society, in which Jews, intending to accommodate Arab norms, inadvertently created a culture different than the local society. The poet Murād Michael, may have wrote “oh my nation/loving you I am fortunate,” and though Reuven Snir, an Arabist born in Haifa to Iraqi-immigrant parents, contends the swell of intellectuals saw themselves as parcel of Arab culture, *Waṭaniyya*’s proponents were unaware how intimate Islam was to the daily life of many, who cherished doctrinal mores.⁴²⁴ Ṭaha, a soldier-turned-politician, who was never a theocrat, but his

418 Nissim Rejwan, “Jews Under Islam in Modern Times- Part Two” *Midstream*, (August/September 1993, Review Essay) 33

419 Shāul, 176

420 Snir, ‘*Arabiyūt, Yahadūt, Ṣiyônūt*, 43

421 Ya’aqūb al-Yāhir ‘Aqība, “al-Ṭā’ifa al-Isrā’īliyah Fī Muwākib Shahadā’ al-ḥuriyah,” filed under BJHC ‘*Alōn Miṣād lē-Zēker ‘Hālālē Ha-Ṣīhrūr*, (miṭba’ al-Rashīd) 6

422 Šālūm Darwīš, “Ikhlīl” found in *Ibid.*, 7

423 Shāul, 174 - 180, for quote see p.175

424 Snir, ‘*Arabiyūt, Yahadūt, Ṣiyônūt*, 12, 94-95, 133; for quote, see 94-95; the historian Orit Bashkin wrote a book on the phenomenon of Jews who saw themselves as part of Arab culture, entitled the *New Babylonians*, see the bibliography for details.

political views were close to *dhimmī* norms. He listed tropes of “protection for the weak” and keeping promises as Iraq’s political backbones.⁴²⁵ While a minority saw *Waṭaniyya* as a term for diversity, others wanted Islamic mores.⁴²⁶ Nūrī, who was Prime Minister twelve times, did not seem devout. He never advocated sharia. He drank.⁴²⁷ He was a drug addict.⁴²⁸ Yet he still wanted a Sunni state and praised *dhimmī* norms, telling an audience “this custom,” remained in force to “maintain good relations between Jews and Arabs.”⁴²⁹

Nicola Ziadeh, a historian at the American University of Beirut, wrote of the difficulties of separating the Arab background from Islam.⁴³⁰ Advocates for Arab states said their movements were inclusive to mitigate fears they would persecute minorities. Nevertheless, “Islam was what the Arabs had done in history, and in a sense it had created them, given them unity, law, a culture;” so “there lay a dilemma at the bottom of Arab nationalism...how was a complete secularism compatible with the existence of an Arab sentiment.”⁴³¹

Jewish organizations assumed Fayṣal looked unkindly towards an exclusive Muslim polity.⁴³² Yet Fayṣal’s ‘tolerance’ was tactical. Privately, he told British officials he was willing to adopt Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia’s interpretation of Islam, if necessary. “Wahhabis are intolerant of anybody and everything,” he said, but he had “no objection whatever to Wahhabism.”⁴³³ Fayṣal disliked giving voice to minorities. He planned to rig Kurdish elections,

425 He repeatedly served as Defense Minister for many years and briefly as Prime Minister. For quote, see al-Hāshimī, 48

426 Snir, *‘Arabiyūt, Yahadūt, Şiyônūt*, 59

427 De Gaury, 42

428 Unknown to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) “Anti-British archives in Iraq.” March 17, 1942 NA (FO 371/31362)- 36

429 Nuri al-Said (Paris) to the Prime Minister of the British Government. June 23, 1919. Memorandum of the Arab Question. IOR L/OS/11/154-4153 (p. 1); for quote see al-Sa’id, “Muqtaṭafāt Khīṭāb Nūrī al-Sa’id fi Ṭāwla al-Mustadīra fi London ‘ām 1939” *Wathā’iq*, 103

430 Nicola A. Ziadeh, “Recent Arabic Literature on Arabism,” *Middle Easter Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Autumn, 1952) 472

431 Hourani, 296

432 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 2

433 Interview with Sherif Feisal. Dec 30, 1918. IOR (L/PS/18/B309)-8

and confided Kurds frightened him, saying, Kurds sow chaos.⁴³⁴ As Jews entered public schools, Fayṣal's governments would push them out of the civil service.⁴³⁵

In parallel, Fayṣal's regime not only incorporated Jews, but also anti-Semites.⁴³⁶ The Abu Ṣibil family was appointed to government positions, who, in one incident, stormed a synagogue with guns, menacing congregants how to vote, and extorted money.⁴³⁷ The victims complained to police, but the culprits said supporting Jews would end Islamic sway: "If you void the law will you void the religion. Will you end the zeal of the Ummah of Ishmael for their honor? Here is a despicable Jew that curses the Prophet, reviles the Ummah and says that all of Islam is under his shoes."⁴³⁸

The term, *Waṭaniyya*, then was not to integrate minorities, but facilitate their acquiescence. The gatherings in which Jews held a reception for Fayṣal, welcoming him with praises and oaths – affirmed Muslim authority.⁴³⁹ Jewish performers recited, "we will return to the golden age, the age of the Abbasids...After passing hundreds of years the kingship returns to one of the great Arabs to his highnesses King Fayṣal."⁴⁴⁰ Children praised Fayṣal whenever he visited schools.⁴⁴¹ A Community pamphlet adorned by Fayṣal's portrait said he was "a haven that we take refuge in/a pillar which we support/the leader which is ours."⁴⁴² Though the Constitution promised "no discrimination," the legal codes that promised equality were also symbols to prove to the League of Nations and Iraqis themselves that a state could be Sunni Arab instead of neutral, and be just to all its citizens.⁴⁴³ However, the ambiguous term, *Waṭaniyya*,

434 al-Hāshimī, *Mudhakarāt Ṭaha al-Hāshimī*, 99, 101

435 Sereni, 12

436 De Gaury, 55

437 "Miktavīm Me-ʿĀram Naharāyim," *Ha-Aretz* (Jerusalem), June 10, 1925, 2

438 Ibid., 3

439 Yūsuf Rizqāllāh Ghanīmāh, *Nuzha al-Muštāq Fī Tārīkh Yahūd al-ʿIrāq*, Al Warrak publishing, Ltd: London, 1997) 213

440 Snir, 'Arabiyyūt, Yahadūt, Ṣiyônūt, 17

441 For an example of this, see Ṣakhī, 1

442 'Aqība, 3

443 Sereni, 12; for quote see Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932*, (Oxford University Press: London, 1951)

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which was more of a slogan than an ideology, quieted Jews who were discontented under Moslem law, wanted a neutral government, and complained civil courts relied on sharia in personal status suits – because they believed what was being promoted was eventual equality.⁴⁴⁴

Meanwhile, authorities interested in Iraq's image, not practical equality, made anti-Jewish laws implicit within the state framework. Higher taxes targeted Jews through indirect means. As Jews concentrated in import fields, the government decided to derive the majority of revenue through customs, not income, forcing Jews to “pay a major portion of the taxes,” a Jewish rights group said.⁴⁴⁵ In the 1920s, Customs duties and the Excise tax were the largest sources of state revenue.⁴⁴⁶

Other laws imposed an Sunni Arab character on society. Islam was the state religion. Arabic the official language.⁴⁴⁷ Though initially ‘Arab’ and citizenship were not linked – the government granted citizenship to Ottoman subjects who resided in Iraq before 1924 – applicants were obliged to sign an oath they “possess full knowledge of the Arabic language.”⁴⁴⁸ Laws banned immigrants who have “no adequate knowledge of the Arabic language or one of the languages of ‘Iraq’ or “whose belief, customs, habits and mode of life are such as to render him unable to become readily assimilated.”⁴⁴⁹

Sunni Arab mores were intertwined with the state, which the state could impose through constitutionally mandated controls on the press, associations, and selective taxation.⁴⁵⁰ Colonial

444 H. Dobbs (Camphire, Cappoquin, C. Waterford) to J.M. Rich (Anglo-Jewish Association) June 2, 1931. (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 2; J.M. Rich to Sir Henry Dobbs, May 26, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2) 2

445 Conditions in Iraq. Enclosed in Osmond de' Avigdor-Goldschmid to J.M. Rich, March 12, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2)

446 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 49

447 Nigel G. Davidson, “The Constitution of Iraq,” *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, 3rd Series, (Vol. 7, No. 1, Cambridge University press 1925) 45

448 “Regulations Under the Iraq Nationality Law, 1924,” Annexure of the Iraq Government Gazette No. 23 of 1926, CZA (S8\2100) p. 7; for quote see “Form No. 5. Declaration to be Made by an Applicant for a Certificate of Naturalization,” Annexure of the Iraq Government Gazette No. 23 of 1926, CZA (S8\2100) 1

449 “Regulations Under the Iraq Nationality Law, 1924,” 8-9, quote on p. 9

450 Davidson, 45

administrators intended Fayṣal as a monarch they could ‘advise’ to facilitate British influence,⁴⁵¹ but kingship also affirmed Sunni Arab ascendancy: law dictated only Muslim descendants could be king, and Sunnis utilized the monarchy to dominate the country, crafting a regime that was not structured to serve minorities.⁴⁵² Notwithstanding the denominational courts, the Constitution imposed sharia – with its unequal restrictions on non-Muslims and preference for Muslim testimony – for matters of inheritance and endowments, and barred Jewish adjudicators from issuing verdicts on these matters.⁴⁵³ Additionally, while public schools were open to Jews, those schools were located in Muslim neighborhoods, and classes held on Shabbat, when Jews are forbidden to work or write.⁴⁵⁴ Even in Baghdad, where the Community pushed for schools in Jewish areas, and Jews were the largest portion of the city’s population, the government refrained to fund them.⁴⁵⁵ Though the constitution granted Jews four deputies in parliament and a senator,⁴⁵⁶ Muslim deputies were established according to counts of nomadic populations to whom politicians neither represented nor had connections. This system served to amplify urban Sunni sway beyond their numbers.⁴⁵⁷ The High Commissioner, Henry Dobbs, said, Jews in parliament “cannot really pull their weight.”⁴⁵⁸

Dhimmi Norms in the Mandate-Era

Jews made gains during the monarchy, but the scope was illusionary. Britain, or Jews hired by Britain, hired the bulk of Jews in the civil service. Cox pressed the government to

451 De Gaury, 30

452 Khadduri, 210; Baghdad to the Secretary of State. August 6, 1919. Telegram. IOR (L/PS/11/154 P 3860/1919)- 5465

453 Anonymous to A.G. Brotman, May 1, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 1; J.M. Rich (Joint Foreign Committee of Board) to AG Brotman, Shamash School, Bg, May 31, 1931. Part 2. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 1-2

454 Anonymous. Untitled. Memorandum. 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 2

455 Ibid., 3

456 Ibid., 2

457 Anonymous to A.G. Brotman, May 1, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 1

458 H. Dobbs (Camphire, Cappelquin, C. Waterford) to J.M. Rich (Anglo-Jewish Association) June 2, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 1

appoint Sassoon Heshel (1860-1932), who was Jewish, as Finance Minister when British policy was to integrate Ottoman incumbents, and Heshel, once headed the Ottoman parliament's budget committee. Heshel took the position. Whereupon he hired Abraham Elkabir, who thereafter rose to be the Accountant-General and hired Jewish subordinates.⁴⁵⁹ Yet once the initial government Britain organized dissolved in 1923, Heshel, an icon of Iraq's tolerance, served but ten months in 1924, and thenceforth, the Palace excluded him from cabinet posts.⁴⁶⁰ Heshel's protege, Elkabir, was overpassed for promotions.⁴⁶¹ Despite that the accounts department was a steppingstone to high office, and Elkabir's subordinate rose to Finance Minister, Elkabir never advanced, though he did the Minister's job, establishing Iraq's currency and banks, negotiating debt, and in truth, ran the ministry from 1935-1939, Elkabir never became a minister.⁴⁶² He never had Ministerial powers – only the workload – and, whenever Elkabir sat on financial boards and voted in manner that benefited a business with Jewish ties, his “vote would not pass without nasty comment,” Elkabir said.⁴⁶³

Iraqis opposed Jews in government. Press and parliament condemned the number of Jews in government.⁴⁶⁴ Jews concentrated in the railways ministry because Britain oversaw it and did the hiring.⁴⁶⁵ It is unclear if these early years of the Mandate, 1921-1924, were a blip of tolerance in which Heshel could be Finance Minister, or, whether he was the aberration himself, for no other Jew played a role in government so high.⁴⁶⁶ Ever after, Jews were administrators that worked beneath Muslim supervisors.⁴⁶⁷

459 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 1, 3-4, 10; Başrı, 268

460 Ghanimah, 213; Başrı, 268; Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 83-84

461 One candidate promoted over Elkabir, Ahmed Fehmy, knew only Turkish, Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 8

462 Ibid., 18-19, 98-99; Başrı, 270- 271

463 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 101, 185

464 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 122

465 “Iraqi Jews and Palestine,” December 5, 1943. NA (FO 624/38/502)-35

466 One other non-Muslim, Yusuf Ghanima, briefly served as Finance minister in the 1940s, see Ireland, 436; Mathew Elliot, *Independent Iraq: The Monarchy & British Influence, 1941-1958*, (Tauris Academic Studies: London, 1996) 171-172

467 A.J. Brotman. Untitled. Memorandum. 1929. Iraq Correspondence. Part 1. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) (p.2)

Despite that Jews comprised over a third of Baghdad's population, had higher literacy rates, and composed a considerable share of the city's economy, taboos thwarted Jews partaking in politics.⁴⁶⁸ Even in Baghdad's Chamber of Commerce – an organization in a field where it was socially acceptable for Jews to thrive – the president was always Muslim.⁴⁶⁹ In years when Jews were the Chamber's majority, the glass ceiling remained.⁴⁷⁰ The restriction was intentional. When the Chamber chose Mīr Baṣrī, Iraq's preeminent economist, who was Jewish, to be vice-president in 1929, the selection was blocked.⁴⁷¹ Few Jews were in management. Elkabir and Dā'ūd Dāmṛā, the Vice President of the Courts of Cassation, were the highest ranking officeholders, neither post typically noteworthy in general histories. A Director-General, below a minister, was the uppermost position Jews achieved.⁴⁷² The few in government were treated with contempt. One Minister, as an insult, asked a Jewish colleague to bring him toilet paper.⁴⁷³

As discussed in Chapter 1, Jews continued to function in ancillary roles as assistants, once dragomans and *ṣarrāfs*, now civil servants in infrastructure ministries, such as mail and transportation, or as financial professionals, in fields unrelated to the country's social character.⁴⁷⁴ Ministries of power – Defense and Foreign Affairs – were nearly devoid of Jews.⁴⁷⁵ In the private sector, industries intertwined with political power – exports and heavy industry – were in non-Jewish hands.⁴⁷⁶ Biased hiring practices engendered a *dhimmī*-like order, placing Jews in positions which reinforced negative stereotypes of Jews serving Muslims. The few Jews

468 "he has not yet learnt to take full advantage of his position," the senator Menachem Daniel complained, see Daniel (Baghdad) to the Zionist Organization (London) Sept 8, 1922. CZA (ZA/2101). Published in H. Cohen, *Ha-Pē 'ilūt Ha-Štyōnūt Bē-'Irāq*, 238

469 Haim, 191; Masliyah, "Zionism in Iraq," 216; Rejwan, "The Last Jews of Baghdad," 2

470 Specifically 1926 and 1939, see Baṣrī, 264, and the articles "Intikhābāt Diwān Ri'āsa Ghurfa Lajān Baghdad wa al-Lajān al-Far'iya," *al-Thughur*, December 6, 1939; and "Intikhābāt L-Ghurfa Tujāra Baghdād," *al-'Alām al-'Arabī*, November 21, 1939, both reprinted in *Wathā'iq*, 110

471 al-Drūbī, 240; Ṣakhī, 2

472 Anonymous. Untitled. Memorandum. 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 2

473 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 191

474 Report on Iraq: May 15, 1948-January 1949. American Jewish Committee, (Paris), JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647991 (p.4); Baṣrī, 122, 268 and 271; Anonymous. Untitled. Undated. BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 4

475 Report on Iraq: May 15, 1948-January 1949, 4; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 122

476 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 118

of the political class – Hesqel or Abraham Nessim, who led parliament’s Finance Committee – pigeonholed Jews in their former *dhimmi* roles as bankers, stereotyped with money.⁴⁷⁷ Jews worked for the government – but were disempowered. Meanwhile, Iraq could project a reputation of tolerance. It was for this reason, notwithstanding the Jewish community’s half dozen legislators, Elkabir, a paragon of ‘Jews in government,’ testified without irony before a commission, the Community had “no political leaders.”⁴⁷⁸

For Jews, *Waṭaniyya*’s appeals of brotherhood were aspirations of what they wished Iraq was, and contradicted sharply with casual street harassment. “Every day insults against the Jews were very common. A Muslim would be cursed or badly insult being called ‘a son of a Jew,’” an observer wrote.⁴⁷⁹ It was rare for Jews never to suffer anti-Semitic insults at least once. Taunts such as “you are dirtier than a Jew,” were common. As were the compliment, you are not like other Jews or “you are not part of them.”⁴⁸⁰ Assaults were not uncommon either.⁴⁸¹ “Jewish pedestrians who come and go are rained upon with blows,” one journalist wrote.⁴⁸² “The issue has reached the point that Arabs stroll on Jewish streets and when they come upon young Jewish girls assault them and kiss them in broad daylight.”⁴⁸³ The writer mocked the “supposed renaissance” as a farce.⁴⁸⁴ Police were indifferent.⁴⁸⁵ Punishments were light. A driver convicted of raping three passengers was sentenced to six months.⁴⁸⁶ Law enforcement not infrequently presumed a Jewish party’s guilt.⁴⁸⁷ One woman, shopping, discovered her money vanished, and

477 Ibid., 131

478 Ibrahim al-Kabir, ‘Testimony before Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry,’ 138

479 Vitales, 5

480 Darwīsh, 73

481 Vitales, 5

482 “Miktāvīm Me-‘Āram Naharāyīm,” 3

483 A.B.N., “Miktāvīm Mē-Baghdad,” *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), July 8, 1925 (Vol. VII, No. 229) 4

484 ‘Ereṣ Yiśra’elī, “Ṣārôt Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-Bagdad,” *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), July 27, 1926 (Vol. VIII, No. 257) 2

485 Special Correspondent, “‘Avôdat Ha-Tarbût Bē-Baghdad,” *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), Oct 29, 1925, (Vol. VII, No. 31) 3

486 “Yēdi’ôt Me-‘Āram Naharāyīm,” *Ha-Aretz* (Jerusalem), June 15, 1925, 2

487 Special Correspondent, “‘Avôdat Ha-Tarbût Bē-Baghdad,” 3

notified the police, demanding a Jewish proprietor compensate her. Police beat the accused as a ‘thief.’⁴⁸⁸

Britain Invented Iraq’s ‘Golden Age’

Britain and Iraq’s governments conjured the mirage of a Golden period to promote the regime. For in truth, British intervention to protect Jews could clash with an Iraqi regime otherwise willing to safeguard Britain's ‘lines of communications.’⁴⁸⁹ Yet neither did diplomats wish to admit to abandoning commitments or to an inability to prevent persecutions – from persecutors Britain empowered. To avoid scandal, British leaders said Iraq was tolerant. They justified the oppression. One deputy minister told the House of Commons “there were 88,000 Jews in Iraq who were happy and well-contented.”⁴⁹⁰ Gertrude Bell said “they are happy with their lot.”⁴⁹¹ Britain refuted anti-Semitism existed. Whatever violence occurred was criminally motivated, British authorities said. Jewish groups inquired of Kurdistan abuses, and Britain blamed outlaws.⁴⁹² “Sunnis as a rule are not fanatical. If they try to rob Jews or Christians for something they have got, it is not because they are Jews or Christians, but because they have got something that the Sunnis want,” one official said.⁴⁹³ Several women disappeared. Britain said they eloped.⁴⁹⁴ From crime reports available prior to independence, four Jews were murdered

488 'A. H. Ben-Nahûm, “Têšuvâ Lë-Mar Drômûnd Šîls: ‘Igeret Galûyâ Mašav Yêhûdê ‘Îra’aq,” Part 2. *Haam* (Tel-Aviv), August 3, 1931, 3

489 Unknown to Mr. Montefiore, August 25, 1931. Part 2. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

490 Drummond Shiels, Britain’s deputy Minister of manpower, see A. H. Ben-Iraq, “Têšuvâ Lë-Mar Drômûnd Šîls: ‘Igeret Galûyâ Mašav Yêhûdê ‘Îra’aq,” Part 1. *Haam* (Tel Aviv), August 2, 1931, 3; Ephraim H. Bennahum to the Board of Deputies, August 6, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2), for quote see Position of the Jews in Iraq, Published in the Palestine Bulletin, No, 1890, August 4, 1931. Part 2. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

491 A. H. Ben-Iraq, “Têšuvâ Lë-Mar Drômûnd Šîls,” 3

492 Unknown to Under-Secretary of State July 10, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2); J.E.W. Flood to JM Rich, Esq, July 10, 1931, No. 88362/31. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2) 1-2

493 Lionel Smith (Director of Education, Iraq) to Monte. June 25, 1931. BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 1

494 Flood to Rich, July 10, 1931, Part 2. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 2

annually in Kurdistan, a not insignificant number for a community of three hundred households.⁴⁹⁵

The situation was dangerous, but the High Commissioner contended the statistics proved Jews were safe. “Jewish peddlers wander over the mountains quite alone, and carry money and wares of value, the immunity enjoyed by them, as illustrated by the above statistics, is remarkable.”⁴⁹⁶ In truth, few were peddlers. Most were craftsmen or horticulturists.⁴⁹⁷ In the Kurdish mountains beyond state reach, with no links to Baghdad, and where travel beyond Mosul was only possible by pony, Aghas owned Jewish slaves in numerous villages. Mandate officials said they banned slavery.⁴⁹⁸ In truth, British officialdom knew Iraq was still rife with disdain for other faiths, over a decade after the Mandate began. Iraq’s British Director of Education, Lionel Smith, said: “The question about Minorities is really a fairly simple one. The only safe rule in the East is not to be a Minority. If you are a Minority all the safeguards in the world won’t protect you.”⁴⁹⁹

Rather than Golden, the flowering of the 1920s was a Gilded Age, an era when achievement hid social dysfunction and Jewish status declined. The best indicator was Jews decreasing willingness to dissent. At the turn of the second decade of the twentieth century, Jews had lobbied thrice for British citizenship and against an Arab state. A decade later, when the Mandate’s end neared, and the League of Nations considered Iraq’s request for independence: “Jews don’t dare publicly but agree to all steps taken.”⁵⁰⁰ The decline was reported in the Jewish

495 Ibid., 1-2

496 Ibid., 2

497 “Kurdistan Jews in Bondage.” Part 3. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 1

498 Ibid., 1-3; J.G. Lorimer, Esq. “Report on a Tour in Turkish Arabia and Kurdistan, April- May 1910.” Government Monotype Press: Simla, 1913 IOR (L/PS/20/61)

499 Lionel Smith (Director of Education, Iraq) to Monte. June 25, 1931. BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 1

500 Capt. Mathew Cope, William Seymour Hall will write on behalf of the Christian Committee, Undated. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 2

press. “Since the present Faisal regime the Jews of Iraq have fared badly.”⁵⁰¹ wrote Ephraim Bannahum, an Iraqi-born Baghdad correspondent.⁵⁰² “Jews are thought of as second class citizens. They carry the burden of many taxes and they do not receive benefits like Arab residents. The Jews are persecuted and made low.”⁵⁰³ Bannahum worked in Palestine, and returned to Baghdad in 1930 to report for Tel-Aviv’s *Haam*. The day he arrived, he witnessed an anti-Semitic attack: two teens beat a passerby with impunity.⁵⁰⁴ His accounts detailed frequent hate crimes, and most controversially, implicated the Mandate.⁵⁰⁵

Advocates wanted minority rights to be part of a treaty terminating the Mandate, wary sharia would make Jews inferior citizens.⁵⁰⁶ Local contacts told the Board of Deputies of British Jews, which represented Britain’s Jews for nearly a century, there was widespread prejudice, ‘the situation was dire,’ ‘Iraq persecuted Jews,’ and urged action.⁵⁰⁷ Activists feared less could be achieved to protect Jews once independence was secured.⁵⁰⁸ “Non-Moslem minorities look forward to that time with considerable apprehension,” the Board said in 1929.⁵⁰⁹ Yet the Community was disinclined to complain when the threat of retaliation loomed, and the government prodded their leaders for public disavowals of danger.⁵¹⁰ Fayṣal told Community leaders to proclaim the situation was fine, while Community leaders asked the Board, do not

501 A. H. Ben-Iraq, “Tēšuvâ Lē-Mar Drômûnd Šîls,” Part 1., 3

502 Ephraim H. Bannahum to the Board of Deputies, August 6, 1931. Part 2. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047)

503 A. H. Ben-Iraq, “Tēšuvâ Lē-Mar Drômûnd Šîls,” Part 1., 3

504 ‘A. H. Ben-Naḥûm, “Tēšuvâ Lē-Mar Drômûnd Šîls: ‘Igeret Galûyâ Mašav Yēhûdē ‘Îra’aq,” Part 2. *Ha-‘Am* (Mandatory Palestine), August 3, 1931, 3

505 Position of the Jews in Iraq, Published in the Palestine Bulletin, No, 1890, August 4, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2)

506 For the Board’s views, see Adolph Brotman. “Conditions in Iraq.” Memo. Enclosed in Adolph Brotman (Baghdad) to J.M. Rich (London). May 15, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3); for the Anglo-Jewish Associations views, see J.M. Rich (Anglo-Jewish Association) to Adolph Brotman. March 18, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3); Anonymous to A.G. Brotman, May 1, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 2

507 J.M. Rich to Adolph Brotman, May 26, 1931; Adolph Brotman. “Conditions in Iraq.” Memo. Enclosed in Adolph Brotman (Baghdad) to J.M. Rich (London). May 15, 1931; and L. Hands to Osmod d’Avidgor-Goldsmid. June 23, 1931; all three found in file BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3); Paymaster Rear-Admiral H. Seymour Hall (Iraq Minorities Rescue Committee, Treasurer) to Miss Cazes, June 19, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2) 1

508 A.M. Wartski to Mr. Rich, Nov 6, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

509 A.J. Brotman. Untitled. Memorandum. 1929. Iraq correspondence about Turkish rule. Part 1. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) (p. 4)

510 Position of the Jews in Iraq, Published in the Palestine Bulletin, No, 1890, August 4, 1931. Part 2. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047); ‘A. H. Ben-Naḥûm, “Tēšuvâ Lē-Mar Drômûnd Šîls,” Part 2., 3

impede Iraq's independence, to avoid a backlash.⁵¹¹ The Board knew Community was not free to protest.⁵¹² The Board knew intervention to help, or to commit intentions to do so in writing, could endanger the Community with accusations of foreign ties, and so preferred "Jews of Iraq to make public demonstration," instead.⁵¹³ However, this was an act Iraq's Jews could safely do.

Conclusion

In Iraq, stereotypes about Jews – derived from religious-inspired folkways and strictures in the Ottoman-era – continued to shape the political culture under the Mandate. For despite the trappings of a bureaucratic nation-state, the public never surrendered *dhimmī* norms and continued to value them. Britain continued to treat Jews as a separate *millet*, and so did Iraq. Laws for equality were real, but were intended to serve as instruments to illustrate Iraqis treat *dhimmīs* well and protect them, enacting the same tropes Ottomans, such as the Young Turks, had used before.⁵¹⁴

Neither British nor Iraqi policymakers intended for Jews to have a voice in politics, save to praise the regime or serve in ancillary roles as assistants to Muslims. The prospect of a *Waṭaniyya* excited sections of the Community, as *Waṭaniyya* was superficially quite distinct from the old Islamic order. Yet Jews understood *Waṭaniyya* as a multicultural Iraq, for the State itself. In reality, *Waṭaniyya* was a phrase intended to facilitate *dhimmī* acceptance to Sunni rule.

Politicians still valued *dhimmī* norms of protection while, and part of those norms was disapproval of Jewish activism outside Muslim control. The economic upswing and protective

511 'Ereṣ Yiśra'elī, "Šārôt Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-Bagdad," *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), July 27, 1926 (Vol. VIII, No. 257) 2; "the Jews of Iraq did not desire any obstacles of any nature should be placed in the way of the termination of the Mandate. My Committee has acquiesced in this opinion," see Unknown to P. de Azcarato y Flores, Minorities Section, League of Nations, (Geneva), Dec 9, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047-Part 2); BOD to Vito Catastini, Director, Mandates, League of Nations, Geneva, Nov 2, 1931. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3); Unknown to Osmond d'Avigdor-Goldsmid (BOD) June 25, 1931. BOD (ACC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

512 Ephraim Bannahum to Board of Deputies of British Jews, Sept 17, 1931, (Tishrei 6, 5692) BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

513 Unknown to Mr. Montefiore, August 25, 1931. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047- Part 2)

514 Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 193-194

laws occluded the full effect of these *dhimmī* conventions implicit in the state: higher taxes in career fields where Jews concentrated, lack of public funding for Jewish neighborhoods, hiring biases that led Jews to fields that dovetailed with previous *dhimmī* roles. There were glass ceilings for Jews, even in the financial field, which Muslims stereotyped as ‘Jewish’ work.

The Community’s most successful public servants were hired by the British, not Iraqis. Sunni Arab mores were written into the state’s framework: preferences for Islam and Arabic, and preference for Arabic-speaking immigrants. That Britain could force the appointment of a Jewish Minister, Sassoon Heskell, speaks both to the imbalance of power in favor of Britain, as well as the lack of riots to unseat Heskell. This could happen, because in this brief Gilded Age, policymakers did not feel the hierarchy of faith was under threat. The contrary, Sunni Arab states multiplied from Ottoman Empire’s collapse. Popular opinion held a *Nahḍa*, an Arab renaissance was on verge of a new blossoming. Everything would be Arab and Islamic, and Arabs would return to the power they imagined they had in the Caliphates of the 7th and 8th centuries.

Later, when these enthusiasts failed to achieve the state they wanted, they grew disappointed with progress, the political process, and the economic disparities, and viewed Iraq as insufficiently Arab or Muslim or powerful. Such disgruntled young men would turn on Iraq’s Jews. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the discontented found solace in a particular kind of Arab nationalism that exacerbated taboos against Jews into a mass movement which were, in part, based on anti-Semitism.

Chapter 4

The Rise of Anti-Semitism

From 1924 to 1939, Anti-Semitism merged with Iraq's general culture due to societal taboos and institutional bigotry. This change originated from the preservation of the hierarchy of faith, *dhimmi* tropes, and the emergence *Qawmiyya*, a form of Arab nationalism that excluded Jews, and was propagated in the school system from 1923. *Qawmiyya* taught Iraq was not a state for all its citizens, only for Arabs. *Qawmiyya* did not consider Jews as Arabs; and reduced the definition of Arab to Muslim Arabic-speakers who descended from the 7th-century Islamic conquerors of the Middle East. *Qawmiyya* differentiated Jews and Arabs into two distinct and rival peoples – promoting the idea that Arabs were indigenous Middle Easterners, while Jews, whether from Iraq or abroad, were European urbanites who did not belong.

Qawmiyya fueled anti-Semitism. In 1924, after the government granted Jews citizenship, an agitator, Šādiq al-Qādrī, warned Jews wanted to 'steal' the country and were dangerous in politics, justifying the traditional restrictions against Jews, and implying discrimination should continue. Such slanders were popular because they promoted apprehensions Iraqis already held, creating a class of anti-Semitic celebrities, who enjoyed mainstream popularity. From *Qawmiyya* and *dhimmi* tropes emerged the anti-Semitic myth of the '*dhimmi* reversal' in which Jews wanted to subjugate Muslims and make Muslims as inferior as *dhimmi*s, while Jews would rule as

Muslims previously had. This myth explained why Jews could not be equal or participate in politics, warning, Jews sought to conquer Iraq and erode its Muslim Arab character. Even Zionism, the Jewish settlement in Palestine, was said to be a plot to attack Iraq. Ideologies became coded references for Jews - Zionism, democracy, separatism or Communism - and maligning them became a socially acceptable way to express anti-Semitism, without violating social mores that were predicated on treating *dhimmīs* well.

In 1932, Iraq was granted independence on the condition it protect minorities, but in 1933, the government perpetrated three events that increased anti-Semitism. First, Fayṣal ordered the Assyrian Massacre, which demonized minorities and made racist violence more socially acceptable. Assyrian leaders and militants wanted autonomy and engaged in political violence. Fayṣal ordered the killings in response. To avoid tarnishing the reputation of *Qawmiyya*, army, and state, Fayṣal blamed the Assyrians and Europeans for the bloodshed, which increased xenophobia. Second, Fayṣal's successor, Ghāzī, gave state sanction to anti-minority feeling. He exulted the killers in the Assyrian Massacre and promoted anti-Semitism on his radio show. His comments Jews would subjugate Muslims increased Jew-hatred in the press and inspired copycats. Third, the Education Ministry introduced a militant form of *Qawmiyya* into the school system that said Iraq's Jews were an internal enemy and should be killed.

In 1934, the government enacted the first restrictions against Jews in an unofficial manner – never in writing, lest they appear to persecute *dhimmīs*, but with the conscious policy to marginalize Jews. First, Jews were terminated from the civil service, with intention of removing Jews from government. Second, schools imposed *numerus clausus* against Jews in high schools and colleges to limit the number of Jews in public education. Third, the government banned Jewish publications from abroad, saying these writings defamed Iraq. Fourth, the

government restricted Jewish travel, though bureaucratic non-compliance, such as ignoring applications or legal pretexts. Fifth, the government imposed onerous regulations on Jewish schools, saying they were propaganda centers to vilify Iraq.

In 1935, Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Gaylānī and Prime Minister Yāsīn al-Hāshimī seized power in a coup and instituted state-sponsored anti-Semitism. They used three government front organizations that blamed Jews for Iraq’s instability: the Futuwwa, which dominated the schools; the Muthanná Club, which recruited military officers and policymakers into a secret anti-Semitic group; and the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, which used state funds to distribute propaganda to the public through Iraq’s major news publications. Later, when Yāsīn’s duumvirate was overthrown, these three hate groups continued to predominate through ‘Atrocities Propaganda,’ which falsely accused Jews of crimes to subjugate Iraq’s Arabs.

This propaganda convinced Iraqis from all social classes to adopt anti-Semitic myths. Politicians not associated with Muthanná believed its fictitious attacks and condemned Jews in private meetings with British diplomats. Government patronage of jobs and subsidies for *Qawmiyya*’s polemicists cultivated the myth of impending Jewish invasion in literature, punditry, and arts, which served to perpetuate fears Jews would conquer Iraq.

Government anti-Semitism had three effects. First, the incitement inspired popular violence against Jews. Second, lawmakers implemented the first legal inferiority against Jews to return them to their ‘place’ as *dhimmi*s to protect Iraq. These steps began in immigration and schools. The government banned Jewish immigrants to Iraq, and the Education ministry banned Jewish school instructors from teaching ‘Arab’ subjects: history, Arabic and civics, under the false assumption Jews were hostile to Arabs, and would negatively influence the students.

Thirdly, circles within government began to discuss plans to expel or massacre Iraq's Jews, on an organized and national-scale.

Qawmiyya

Qawmiyya escalated anti-Semitism, further dividing Jews and Muslims. The term *Qawmiyya* derived from the Arabic word, 'qawm,' or tribe. In *Qawmiyya*'s view, humanity is divided into *qawms* inherited from birth, each with an individual language and a religion, which all members possess. According to *Qawmiyya* 'Arabiyya, Arab *Qawmiyya*, which is often translated as Pan-Arab nationalism, or as Arabism, the heart of politics was not one's country, but one's *qawm*. *Qawmiyya* said Iraq was for the Arab *qawm*, which included Arabs not from Iraq. Whereas *Waṭaniyya* focused on birthplaces, a *waṭan*, "a piece of land," and "a love of the *waṭan*," and was attractive to minorities for the term's presumed inclusion of all residents, *Qawmiyya* was "a love of the Ummah," the Arab nation, wherein 'Ummah' was traditionally Arabic word for the Muslim community.⁵¹⁵

Neither *Qawmiyya* or *Waṭaniyya* were 'Iraqi nationalism.' *Waṭaniyya* never claimed Iraq's residents were a people, just they shared a homeland; *Qawmiyya* focused on Arabs, not Iraq.⁵¹⁶ *Qawmiyya* urged to remove Iraq's borders and merge with Arabs abroad in a unified Ummah state. *Waṭaniyya* included all Iraqis, while the Umma was for Arabs only, regardless of country. This distinction would contribute to anti-Semitism. In 1939, the Director-General of Education, Sāmī Shawkat, told students an Iraqi citizen can be "a foreigner of creed and spirit, and our bitter enemy."⁵¹⁷

515 Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth Mukhtāra fī al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya*, 1923-1963, Vol. 1, Dār al-Quds: Beirut, N.D) 28, 32, for quotes, see 28

516 The Baghdad-born journalist, Nissim Rejwan, once complained "The mere coupling of 'Iraqi nationalism' with a so-called 'Arab-Muslim nationalism' is a textbook case of the application of one's own contemporary norms and thought patterns to areas and times and cultures to which they are basically foreign," see "Jews Under Islam in Modern Times- Part Two" *Midstream*, (August/September 1993, Review Essay) 33

517 Shawkat, 5-6, for quote, see 6

Qawmiyya shifted Islam’s focus from the Prophet Muḥammad and his teachings, to the 7th-century conquests that spread Islam. Shawkat cited one expansionist Caliph from that century, “‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb is symbolic of what is in the spirit of the whole Arab Ummah.”⁵¹⁸ Ṣāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrī, the founder of Iraq’s education system encouraged faith in the Ummah and “final victory.”⁵¹⁹ *Qawmiyya*’s adherents despised the current condition of Arabs – weak and divided among states – and wanted to return to the days of empire through the merger of Ottoman mandates into one Ummah state.⁵²⁰ “Without this unit the Arabs cannot begin to take their place in the world,”⁵²¹ said Nūrī al-Sa’īd, Iraq’s foremost politician. *Qawmiyya* urged a *Nahḍa*, an Arab renaissance in which all culture would be Arab and Muslim. *Qawmiyya* never challenged Ottoman norms; it treasured those folk practices, deeming social change as ‘un-Arab’ or foreign; and *Qawmiyya* harkened to a romanticized past – a return to the ‘original’ Arab empires.⁵²²

Nationalism was a European import, one of the many innovations first, Ottomans, and later, Iraqis, adopted to institute a stronger central government. Europe brought new categories of typological thinking – nation and race – which undermined minorities.⁵²³ Only in the 20th century did a nationalism emerge portraying Arabs as a people in need of a country.⁵²⁴ Before World War I, Arabism was a belief of a small minority in Iraq.⁵²⁵ The majority recognized the authorities of Caliph and Sultan, power nested within a religious framework, and rhetoric conveyed the monarchy represented Muslims.⁵²⁶ The sentiment was the Ottomans preserved

518 Ibid., 13

519 al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth*, 100

520 Dawn, 82; Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1932*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1951) 156; Abd Allāh Jizānī, *Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl al-Iraqī, 1946-1958: al-Tujraba al-Fikriyah wa al-Mārasah al-Siyāsiyah*, (n.p.: Syria, 1994) 5

521 al-Sa’īd, 14

522 Hourani, 272-273

523 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 164

524 Ibid., 260

525 Dawn, 67

526 Kedourie, *Arab Political Memoirs*, 146; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 179

Islam – until the Young Turks scuttled these ties, deposing the Sultan and imposing a constitution.⁵²⁷ Preexisting convictions lent well to nationalism: respect for *Ashrāf*, Muḥammad’s descendants; reverence for Arabic as the language of sacred texts, and admiration for heroes who spread Islam. These values of lineage, language and faith melded into *Qawmiyya*.⁵²⁸ The new ideology spread through Paris émigrés and the global communication networks that enabled them to correspond from afar. Within two years of the Young Turk revolution, tens of Iraq’s newspapers advocated some variety of *Qawmiyya*, Arabic as an official language, and Arabs in parliament.⁵²⁹

Sāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrī

In 1923, the state promoted *Qawmiyya* through the public schools under the guidance of Sāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrī, teaching Iraq was for Arabs alone. Iraq’s first king, Fayṣal, was an immigrant from Mecca without ties to Iraq, and relied on *Qawmiyya* to nurture loyalty. He hired Ḥuṣrī as one of the many educators who would spread the dogma. Ḥuṣrī was powerful as the Director-General of Education, a position immune to cabinet changes when the Education Ministers were often sinecures with brief tenures. He established the Iraqi education system, and later led policy from chairmanship roles of senior administrative board. He developed schoolbooks, education guidelines, and organized schools, which, Ḥuṣrī claims, he never conferred with the Education Ministers.⁵³⁰

527 Hourani, 262; Longrigg, 43

528 Hourani, 261

529 Longrigg, 43-44; Jizānī, 9; Reeva Spector Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars: the Militarist Origins of Tyranny* (Columbia University Press: New York, 2004) 27

530 Sereni, 15; Elie Kedourie, “Continuity and Change in Modern Iraqi History, *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 62. (1975) 144; Simon, 69- 71; al-Hāshimī, 95; Sāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakarātī Fī al- ‘Irāq*, Vol. II, (Dār al-Ṭalī’a Lil-Ṭibā’atī w’al-nashar, Beirut, 1968) 8-9

Ḥuṣrī taught Iraq should be based on the Ummah. He denounced *Waṭaniyya*, saying the slogan was make-believe and without “benefit.”⁵³¹ He defined the Ummah as a people who descended, by myth, from Prophet Muḥammad.⁵³² To be Arab, he said, one must belong to the same people who expanded Islam in the 7th century, with an emphasis on the conquerers: Sa’d ibn Abi Waqāṣ, who vanquished Persia; Khālīd ibn al-Walīd, who vanquished the Levant; “We consider them our moral ancestors. We are proud of them and more proud of them than the pride in our real families,” Ḥuṣrī wrote.⁵³³ He said Iraq should not be for “loving the resident” as in *Waṭaniyya*, but the Ummah.⁵³⁴

Waṭaniyya wanted a strong Iraq and was inclusive of native-born Iraqis regardless of religious background. Ḥuṣrī rejected *Waṭaniyya* and wanted to merge Iraq with the Arab Ummah abroad, to create a single Ummah state. “You must put the general welfare of the Ummah over the welfare of the individual states,” Ḥuṣrī told undergraduates in 1923. He urged listeners to destroy *Waṭaniyya*, and, Ḥuṣrī menacingly disclosed, impose a “more restricted” patriotism, which would not include all Iraqis. He recommended “resistance,” a euphemism for violence, “to establish a new *Qawmiyya* state and merge the different regions.”⁵³⁵

Ḥuṣrī encouraged militarism in education. Speaking before an audience on an unknown date, Ḥuṣrī said enemies wage war through “psychological means” to “break” morale, such as hostile propaganda disguised as news.⁵³⁶ He said, Arabs were in the midst of a “*Qawmiyya* Jihad” and a “battle on the path of a *Qawmiyya* renaissance.”⁵³⁷

531 al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth*, 34

532 Ibid., 39-40, 42

533 Ibid., 41-42; for quote, see 42, Simon, 30

534 al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth*, 32, 34, for quote, see 32

535 Ibid., 29-30

536 Ibid., 102

537 *al-Jihād al-Qawmī*, see Ibid., 103

Qawmiyya in Education

Arabism in education encouraged a militaristic xenophobia, teaching Ummahs competed with another.⁵³⁸ Ḥuṣrī instructed facts should not be the focus. Teachers should appeal to a student's emotions to encourage "sacrifice and loyalty." Schools should emphasize Arab "mentality" or "traditions;" to reinforce ancestry and religion, and a zeal for both. Ḥuṣrī said history classes should be "chronicles of glory" with a "*Qawmiyya* tendency," and "should not highlight" foreign "roles." Educators were told to emphasize Arabs and not to mention non-Arab contributions. Arabs spread knowledge. Arabs developed science. Arabs invented math. Europe achieved nothing before Arabs arrived. Ḥuṣrī said, teach history "to increase pride" in "our ancestors;" and to "spur us toward future glory without end." He encouraged students to see the past as a model to "engage in violent revolutions," and urged students to emulate Khālīd ibn al-Walīd, who conquered Iraq for the Caliphs; to absorb Walīd's 'moral' qualities: "Faith in victory...courage, and not to tarry with any kind of sacrifice."⁵³⁹

Are Jews Arabs?

In the 1920s, Iraqis did not consider Jews as Arabs. The terms 'Arab Jew' or 'Jewish Arab' were not yet coined. As Nissim Rejwan, a journalist born in Baghdad in the 1920s, wrote the term 'Arab Jew' "was never used," and "the conception itself was not known."⁵⁴⁰ Nor did Jews consider themselves Arab. The Jewish Religious council referred to Judaism in 1918 as one of Iraq's "alien confessions" and self-identified in correspondences as Jews of Baghdad or

538 Longrigg, 204; Dawn, 80

539 Nabih Amin Faris, "The Arabs and Their History," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring, 1954) 156; for quotes, see al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth*, 44, 74, 105-106, 108, 120-122

540 Rejwan, "Childhood Memories," 14; Rejwan became a proponent of the concept of 'Arab Jews' after he emigrated to Israel, see Nissim Rejwan, 'Semites- An Essay in Definition.' *New Middle East*, (March 1969) 44, 48

Iraq.⁵⁴¹ One immigration applicant to Britain that year described himself as a “Native of Mesopotamia + a Jew by race.”⁵⁴²

Muslims often considered Jews a separate people. The first Arab conference in 1913 defined Arabs in religious terms that excluded Jews.⁵⁴³ Najīb ‘Āzūrī, who published the first Arab nationalist book, *Reveil de la Nation Arabe* in 1905, included anti-Semitic depictions of Jews and Arabs as dualistic opposites, with Arabs as protectors and Jews as conspirators of slavery.⁵⁴⁴ Nūrī not infrequently wrote Arabs were both made and defined by Islam. “Their *Qawmiyya* extends from feelings of Islamic brotherhood,” he wrote,⁵⁴⁵ and at a London speech, in which Nūrī said Iraq’s *dhimmi* traditions treat Jews well, he referred to his subject as “Jews of Iraq,” or “Jewish Iraqis thinking themselves part of this Arab life,” but never as Arabs.⁵⁴⁶ Writings, meant to be respectful, referred to Jews as ‘*Isrā’ili*’; “Mosaic citizens” or “Jews in Iraq.”⁵⁴⁷ One memoir recounted when a 12th grader asked bluntly in class, are Jews Arabs? His teacher “got mad for bringing up a dilemma,” and “did not answer the sensitive question.”⁵⁴⁸

Qawmiyya too excluded Jews and narrowly defined an Arab as a Muslim Arabic speaker who originated with Islam’s 7th-century conquerors.⁵⁴⁹ Ḥuṣrī regarded Judaism as a rival *qawm* that would make Iraq less Arab – and which Ḥuṣrī vituperated in the same category as heathenism.⁵⁵⁰

Notwithstanding Arabism’s claims of history and language, Arash Abizadeh, a Political Scientist at McGill University, said the rationale of cultural nationalisms like *Qawmiyya*

541 quoted in President of the Jewish Lay Committee and Acting Chief Rabby & President of the Religious Council (Baghdad) to Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) November 18, 1918. IOR (L/OS/11/154)- 3819 (p. 2); Snir, ‘*Arabiyyūt, Yahadūt, Ṣiyōnūt*, 64

542 M.E. Shamash (Colwyn Bay) to Under Secretary of State for India (London) Sept 24, 1918 IOR (L/PJ/6/1506)- 4395

543 Simon, 27; Ziadeh, 469; Hourani, 284

544 Kedourie, *Arab Political Memoirs*, 112; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 173

545 al-Sa’id, 22

546 Nūrī al-Sa’id, “Muqatafāt Khiṭāb Nūrī al-Sa’id fi Ṭāwla al-Mustadīra fi London ‘ām 1939” *Wathā’iq*, 103-104

547 Baṣrī, 261

548 Sofer, 118

549 “Our ancestors were the conquerors,” see Shawkat, 36

550 al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth*, 45-46

“collapse” into definitions of descent. Such ideologies are diverse, but they all reify culture as an entity with immutable boundaries, core practices, and relies on blood ties of genealogical descent.⁵⁵¹ This ‘Abizadeh Collapse’ can be observed in *Qawmiyya*, where a key belief is a person can only belong to a single *qawm*. Ḥuṣrī wrote “you cannot mix *qawms* in a real blend.”⁵⁵² The desire to be part of an Umma never made one a member.⁵⁵³

Ḥuṣrī’s teachings marginalized Jews, who shared neither history nor religion as Ḥuṣrī defined them. His *Qawmiyya*-focused education introduced a new racial concept of Arabs that excluded Jews. Historians asserted Nazism’s racial theories were unpopular across the Middle East.⁵⁵⁴ Yet racialism, a belief in races, found acceptance in Iraq, where race was viewed through the lens of genealogies, akin to families claiming descent from holy men. Racialism and its medley of culture, pedigree, and creed dovetailed with Iraq’s reverence for Ummah, Arabic, and proper belief. Some academics adopted blood as a definition for Arabs.⁵⁵⁵ In 1931, Darwīsh al-Miqdādī, an instructor at the Teacher’s College, published a middle school textbook used widely through the 1930s, *The History of the Arab Ummah*, which defined Arabs as a race, and Semites in terms of skull morphology and blood types.⁵⁵⁶ One Iraqi leader’s PhD dissertation included a racial classification of ‘Arabs’ as “fair but sunburned skin, elliptical face, a very fine and narrow nose, jet black hair, and a dolichocephalic skull.”⁵⁵⁷ *Qawmiyya*’s new definition was reinforced with Europe’s concept of a ‘fertile crescent,’ a region extending from Iraq to Israel, which was

551 Arash Abizadeh, “Was Fichte an Ethnic Nationalist? On Cultural nationalism and its double,” *History of Political Thought*, (Vol. XXVI. No. 2, Summer 2005) 358-359, for quote, see 359

552 al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth*, 46

553 Ibid., 53

554 Stillman, “Antisemitism in the Contemporary Arab World,” 76

555 Ziadeh, 471

556 Simon, 91; N. Faris, 156-157; Darwīsh al-Miqdādī, *Tārīkh al-Ummah al-‘Arabīyah: muqarrar lil-tadrīs fī al-ṣaff al-thānī al-mutawassiṭ*, (Muṭba’ā al-Ḥukūma, Baghdad: Wizara al-Muā’rif, 1939) 5

557 Mohammad Fadhel Jamali, *The New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education*, (Bureau of Publications Teachers College, Columbia University: New York City, 1934) 49

introduced with Arabic translations in the 1920s.⁵⁵⁸ The academic term was reinterpreted as a concrete Arab land, renamed in textbooks *al-Jazīra al-‘Arabīyya*, the Arab Island, a homogeneous racial realm.⁵⁵⁹ One textbook informed readers some regions were “only for Arabs,” which was repeated by education officials to illustrate Arabs own Iraq.⁵⁶⁰ Racialism spread from academia to government. Citizenship forms asked for detailed descriptions of applicants’ eyes, nose, mouth, and complexion.⁵⁶¹

The notion that Jews and Arabs were the same ‘race,’ Semites, was a European invention, unpopular in Iraq. An 18th century scholar, August Schlözer, attributed several language cognates, Hebrew and Arabic among them, to biblical genealogy, naming the language family, ‘Semitic,’ for Noah’s son, Shem. Later intellectuals shifted the concept of Semites from language to race.⁵⁶² *Qawmiyya* never accepted this shift.⁵⁶³ “The Semites coalesced into the Arabs and became Arabs except for a few groups like the Hebrews,” Miqdādī’s textbook reads.⁵⁶⁴ Students learned Jews were not Arab and did not migrate with Arabs – meaning, Jews did not belong in Iraq.⁵⁶⁵

Jews are Europeans

In part, *Qawmiyya* was a backlash against Jews entering spaces *dhimīs* had never entered in large numbers before. Capitalism introduced avenues of advancement outside the ‘*Ayān*, the landed elite; ‘*Askarī*, the military class; and ‘*Ulemā*’, experts in Islamic law. Jews

558 The book in question was an Arabic translation of American Egyptologist’s James Breasted’s *Ancient Times, A History of the Early World: An Introduction to the Study of Ancient History and the Career of Early Man*, see Dawn, 83, ff. 11, 87

559 Ibid., 83; see also al-Miqdādī

560 Shawkat, 10-11; for quote see al-Miqdādī, 3

561 “Form No. 1. Declaration of Renunciation of ‘Iraqian Nationality (By ex-Ottoman Subjects);” “Form No. 2. Declaration for Acquisition of ‘Iraqian Nationality (By Ottoman Subjects born in ‘Iraq),” and “Form No. 3. Kingdom of ‘Iraq Certificate of ‘Iraqian Nationality,” all three found in Annexure of the Iraq Government Gazette No. 23 of 1926, CZA (S8\2100)

562 Gen. 10; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 42; 44

563 Dawn, 83

564 al-Miqdādī, 6

565 Ibid., 6-7

could succeed without Muslim protection. Social disparities created a glare – a tiny minority within the Community became wealthy, or achieved success, disturbing those who cherished *Dhimmi* norms.⁵⁶⁶ Successful Jews received inordinate media attention. The prosperity was a scandal. “Their beautiful villas were photographed and published in the proximity of some miserable looking Arab huts. Well dressed beautiful Jewish ladies were a striking contrast to the moslem slum,” Abraham Elkabir wrote. “People haunted with this vision could not see the other side of the picture, Jewish slums, Jewish beggars, Jewish destitute women” or the “‘nouveau riche’ Arab industrialists,” with “sumptuous palaces.”⁵⁶⁷ One newspaper said “Jews of Iraq dominate the resources and the economy of the country, buying the majority of villas,” and advised Fayṣal to act “in order that the Jews will not defeat us.”⁵⁶⁸

The issue was not economic disparity – Baghdad’s Turks in 1900 were a few dozen and dominated officialdom – but that Jews entered respectable professions.⁵⁶⁹ Prior to 1920, outside trade or medicine, neither Muslims nor Jews worked in the same field, and Muslims monopolized high government.⁵⁷⁰ Yet, after 1920, Jews entered every career path. Jews worked for the state, where “the presence of Jewish” was “considered as usurpation of these rights,” wrote Elkabir.⁵⁷¹ The popular poet Mullāh ‘Abūd al-Karkhī’s (1861-1946) wrote, “The Carpet was Stolen” an allegory for minorities ‘stealing’ Iraq, including Jews.⁵⁷² Published in Karkhī’s newspaper, *al-Karkh*, the plot recounts Karhī’s carpet’s disappearance on a train. The train is a metaphor for Iraq, as Karkhī realizes, everyone aboard the train – the passengers, the conductors

566 Kedourie, *Arab Political Memoirs*, 222

567 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 139-140

568 Nissim Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq Bē-Mē’āh Ha-‘Esrīm*, (Māhōn Ben Šēvi lē-Ḥeker Kēhīlōt Yisrā’el Bē-Mizrāh: Jerusalem, 1991) 212

569 Longrigg, 11

570 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 140-141

571 Ibid., for quote, see 141

572 Shmuel Moreh, *Ha-‘Ilan vē Ha-‘Anaf: Ha-Sifrūt Ha-‘Aravīt Ha-Ḥadashā vē Yēširatām Ha-Sifrūtīt Ha-‘Aravīt shel Yōšē ‘Īraq*, ed. Olga Bramson, Magnes, Ltd.: Jerusalem, 1998) 222, 233

– are *dhimmi*s that crowd him into a trap.⁵⁷³ He mourns the carpet was precious; as Karkhī says, he “could put it before my chair as the lord” like a “despot” or a “Shah.”⁵⁷⁴ As Karkhī searches for his carpet, he realizes the train is populated only with *dhimmi*s. There are no Arabs in sight. The stationmaster is Jewish. “My time passes a prisoner of Moshe and Ezra,” he writes. “Between a Yitzhak and his braying and a Moshe and a Khaḍḍūrī and a Indian and an Armenian and a Greek.”⁵⁷⁵ When the staff apologizes, the carpet is gone, Karkhī’s gazes to the passengers, “the Jew” all “braying” about him. Karkhī is alone and bereft, while Jews are now entitled “Shah” and Ottoman officials.⁵⁷⁶ The poem was part of the increasingly popular motif of anti-Semitism, ‘the *dhimmi* reversal,’ a story a warning when *dhimmi*s will rule as Muslims and Muslims will be the *dhimmi*.

From this anxiety, a stereotype emerged: Muslims could not compete because Jews were European and connected to global markets.⁵⁷⁷ Jews were stereotyped as pale, foreign and European, in Western dress, and allegedly recognizable from attire: only Jews wore suits, only Jews wore Fez caps.⁵⁷⁸ In truth, from the 19th century, urban residents of all religions increasingly wore European clothes, from students who studied abroad to mandatory sartorial requirements in officialdom and offices, a trend that surged after the British occupation.⁵⁷⁹ Many urban professionals ceased to wear local styles or the Fez.⁵⁸⁰ Women donned hats.⁵⁸¹ Western clothes replaced Arab dress. Muslims shaved beards. Women groomed Parisian haircuts.⁵⁸² Fayṣal held soirées were guests came in tailcoats and ulema in dinner jackets.⁵⁸³ Regardless of

573 ‘Abūd al-Karkhī, *Dīwān al-Karkhī*, (Maṭba’ al-Mu’ārif: Baghdad, 1956) 193

574 Ibid., 194

575 Ibid.

576 Ibid., 195

577 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 140

578 Twena, *Me’ore’ōt Haḡ ha-Shavū’ōt*, 150; Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 38-39

579 Y. Stillman, *Arab Dress*, 166; Bibi, 3

580 Dr. H. G. Houber, *Jenaische Zeitung*, March 15, 1935. IJA (3785) 31-32

581 A.G. Brotman, *Present Day Jewry of Baghdad*, 1929. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 2

582 Jamali, 8

583 A.S. Elkabir, *My Governmental*, 62

the fact that Baghdad crowds were a mix of suits and long robed ziboons, or that many Jewish women in 1929 were still veiled and the majority of Jewish women wore embroidered ‘*abbās*’ and *izārs*, local styles became ‘Muslim,’ European clothes ‘Jewish,’ and Jews who wished to ‘pass’ for Muslims could don a *dishdāsha*, an ankle-length robe.⁵⁸⁴ Jewish sartorial tastes were fetishized as ‘divergent,’ not ‘Muslim,’ and leveled as proof they were expatriates. Stereotypes depicted Jews wearing business suits too often, or ‘un-Arab’ headdresses, gave rise to comments Jews were more European and belonged less.⁵⁸⁵ In 1933, the newspaper *al-Istiqlāl* denounced western clothes as “a foreign swindle on the Arab states to remain weak.”⁵⁸⁶

For such supporters of *Qawmiyya*, who wanted everything Arab and Muslim, they resented Jews whom they assumed were European, and viewed as opposite of Muslims.⁵⁸⁷ The institution of *Qawmiyya* in Iraq’s education system spread this sentiment throughout the country. One Director-General of Education, Shawkat, told students “The Jew is fond of gold and cannot live without it,”⁵⁸⁸ while “The Arabs’ prominent feature” was his “moral excellence.”⁵⁸⁹ Media spread the trope. Karkhī, a popular poet broadcast on the radio, wrote of Muslims with metaphors of power – a lion, a bear, competent and brave – and depicted Jews with images of weakness – a cow, a boy, a “mangy dog,” or cowards. His piece, “A Jewish Threat,” asks, “Could a mangy dog threaten a lion?...Mordechai Shlomo is a boy/And Karkhī’s God is competent.”⁵⁹⁰

584 Brotman, “Present Day Jewry of Baghdad,” 2; Dr. Nissim Kazzaz. Testimony. 1990. Document 6. *Šin ‘at Yēhūdīm u-fera ‘ôt bē-‘Iraq*, ed. Shmuel Mores and Zvi Yehuda, (Merkaz Moreshet Yahadūt Bavel, Ha-Māhōn lē-Ḥeker Yahadūt Bavel: Or-Yehudah, 1992) 226

585 Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 38

586 The author was Yūnis al-Sab’āwī, see Khairī al-‘Umarī, *Yūnis al-Sab’āwī: Sīrah Siyāsī ‘Ašāmī*, 2nd. (Manshūrāt wuzārah al-thiqāfah wa al-‘Ilām, Republic of Iraq, 1980) 59-60

587 Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 179

588 Shawkat, 15

589 Ibid., 16

590 Mullā ‘Abbūd al-Karkhī, Poem, “Tahdīd Yahūdī.” Nissim Rejwan collection. (n.p.) 170

“Our identity was tainted,” Naim Kattan recalled the racial divisions in his memoir *Farewell, Babylon*, “we were different. Was our colouring [sic] not lighter than the Bedouins? Did we not know foreign languages?”⁵⁹¹ In contrast, Muslims were thought swarthy; descendants of tribes, the 7th-century conquerors from Arabia, with a culture and mentality ascribed to ‘desert life.’⁵⁹² *Qawmiyya* stereotyped Arabs as warriors, with a particular “mentality,” which could be generalized.⁵⁹³ Their traits were “bravery;” “faith;” and “freedom.”⁵⁹⁴ This archetype depicted Arabs as molded from desert life.⁵⁹⁵ In textbooks, Semites were powerful swordsmen on horseback, who “subjugated the Hebrews,” laid siege to Jerusalem, defeated Rome, and “led her nation to glory.”⁵⁹⁶ Iraq’s second King, Ghāzī, received advice upon his ascension, “respect the tribes and their chiefs for they are the origin of Arabs.”⁵⁹⁷

Effendis

Qawmiyya education spawned a generation of boys unable to find employment or earn a salary, conscious they knew little, had no skills, lived with parents, without money, nor means to marry or be independent, but taught Arabs were entitled to world mastery, these teenagers would rage at the world, hold contempt for the status quo that robbed them of success, and blame secret enemies who thwarted ‘them’- the Friends of the English, and want to destroy them.⁵⁹⁸ A *Qawmiyya* education, geared toward emotion, taught no abilities employers wanted. One official, in 1942, said of 230 applicants to the Teachers College, 92 could answer a question intended for

591 Naim Kattan, *Farewell, Babylon*, trans. Sheila Fischman, (Taplinger Publishing Group: New York, 1976) 8-9

592 Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavut*, 150; Jamali, 15

593 Ziadeh, 470-471; Nūrī claimed he could mediate for Palestine Arabs because he understood “Arab mentality,” see High Commissioner for Palestine (Jerusalem) to Secretary of State (London) Aug 30, 1936. NA (CAB 24/264/10)- 34 (6) p. 5

594 For first two quotes see, al-Hāshimī, 86; for third quote, see Taha al-Hashimi “Information Secured From Taha Pasha Al Hashimi Regarding the Status of the Tribes from a Military Point of View.” March 16, 1931. In Jamali, 141

595 *Ibid.*, second citation

596 al-Miqdādī, 10-13, for first quote, see p. 10, for second quote, see p. 13

597 Emir Abdallah (Amman) to King Ghazi (Baghdad) Sept 21, 1933. IOR (L/PS/12/2860)- 5852 (p.2)

598 n.a. Nov 4, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/800)- 3

eight-year olds.⁵⁹⁹ Elkabir, who sat on the law school exam board, said applicants were incapable of “ordinary mathematics.”⁶⁰⁰ Inspectors in Kirkuk found elementary schools with teenagers verging on adulthood, unable to pass.⁶⁰¹ These alumni were part of the new class that would populate anti-Jewish groups in the decades to come, the Effendi, those with Western education, in Western dress, who wanted to be professionals or in government.⁶⁰²

Effendis grew with the expansion of public education. In 1927, there were 26,700 elementary students. In 1950, there were 210,000.⁶⁰³ Yet the economy that produced them undermined the mores they cherished. Traditions such as veiling, Ramadan fasts and prayers declined.⁶⁰⁴ The *qaṣīda*, the stylized poem composed for a millennium, changed to a Western structure, and competed with English writers.⁶⁰⁵ There were architectural shifts: hotels, cinemas, and dance clubs were erected, while the bathhouses, ramparts and gates were removed.⁶⁰⁶ Drinking, jazz, and gender-mixed dancing spread, along with card games and the phonograph.⁶⁰⁷

Effendi, who studied European notions of politics, displaced from local cultures with their education in ‘theories’ few Iraqis knew, solved their ‘identity crisis’ with *Qawmiyya*.⁶⁰⁸ *Qawmiyya* was attractive with promises of belonging, empowerment and a way to be Arab, offering a solution for those who felt their culture threatened.⁶⁰⁹ Learned from teachers and the press, Arabism denounced the new pastimes – cafes, clubs and cinemas – as foreign immorality. Books excoriated evolution, heliocentricity, art, and novels.⁶¹⁰ Social and market pressures

599 Ibid.

600 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 84

601 British Embassy (Baghdad) December 2, 1941 NA (FO 624/26/834) -5 (p.1)

602 Michael Eppel, “The Elite, The *Effendiya*, and the Growth of Nationalism and Pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 30 (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 227-228

603 Ibid., 229, 233

604 Longrigg, 257; Jamali, 8

605 Snir, ‘*Arabiyyūt, Yahadūt, Şiyônūt*, 79, 146; Rejwan, “Bookshop Days,” 49

606 De Gaury, 97; Jamali, *The New Iraq*, 8

607 Ibid., Brotman, “Present Day Jewry of Baghdad, 1929,” 6

608 Eppel, 232

609 Muḥammad Mahdī Kubba, *Mudhakirātī fī Şamīm al-Aḥdāth, 1918-1958* (Manshūrāt Dār al-Ṭalī’a: Beirut) 54-55

610 Orit Bashkin, *The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2009) 56-57; Jamali, 9

created a positive feedback loop: migration to Baghdad and the education system provided a steady supply of Effendi, who found jobs in government, as teachers, police, and administrators. The Effendi, working in these positions, promoted an Arabism “imbued with the hatred of the Jews,” a report the Community smuggled out of Iraq said. “Their hatred to the Jews were felt by the latter in their everyday life whether at the courts, at the police or at any other Government Department.”⁶¹¹

Qawmiyya and Dhimmī conventions mix

Qawmiyya mixed with *dhimmī* conventions to fuel estrangement from Jews. Conceptions of Arabs as Semitic desert warriors were a return to Ottoman-era ideals, and kept the tropes of protection.⁶¹² A look at the PhD thesis of Muḥammad Fāḍel al-Jamālī, a politician who led the Education Ministry for years and later became Prime Minister, reveals Arab ‘traits’ were qualities Ottomans associated with Muslims: generosity, honor, loyalty, bravery and protecting the weak. “Dying in a raid takes a Bedouin to Paradise, while dying on a sickbed is shameful;” he wrote. “If a Bedouin undertakes to protect the property or the life of another person, he does so even though it may cost him his own life.”⁶¹³ Jamālī’s predecessor, Shawkat, enumerated the same traits, telling audiences society should be as an elder brother tending his younger, wherein both have obligations, the older to “love,” and the younger to feel “loyalty and obedience.”⁶¹⁴ Arabs have “nothing in mind but good and help of humanity,” he said.⁶¹⁵ “The Arabs love the non-Arabs like the Arabs loves themselves.”⁶¹⁶ The early Caliphates of the 7th and 8th centuries,

611 For the quote, see S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 3; Bashkin, *The Other Iraq*, 4

612 Kedourie, *Arab Political Memoirs*, 222

613 Jamali, 50

614 Shawkat, 10; for the list of traits similar to Jamali’s, see p. 33

615 Ibid., 11

616 Ibid., 12

in which Muslims ruled and *dhimmīs* did not, had in their histories “not a page that was defiled with oppression,” said Shawkat. “the happy obedience of Islam ruled.”⁶¹⁷

Sādiq al-Qādrī

The growth of *Qawmiyya* fed into anti-Semitism. Arabism retained adages of Muslims protecting *dhimmīs*, but pushed Arab culture and dominance. This created a conflict. Persecuting minorities violated Iraqis’ sense of fairness, upon which *dhimmī* stereotypes played. So a genre of vilifying minorities appeared that exonerated Muslims, and placed the onus on Jews. In August 1924, the government granted citizenship to habitual residents, including Jews.⁶¹⁸ Weeks after, an officer, Ṣādiq al-Qādrī, introduced the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a Czarist anti-Semitic forgery alleging secret Jewish control, as a warning to readers against Jewish equality or political voice.⁶¹⁹ Qādrī said Iraq’s Jews plotted global dominion.⁶²⁰ Qādrī fought in Russia’s Civil war (1918-1921), serving with coalition forces that opposed Bolshevik rule.⁶²¹ Afterwards, Qādrī repatriated to Iraq, and a bookshop published his memoirs as a series of brochures entitled *The Qādrī Memoirs*. The brochures said Qādrī defended Russia ‘against the Jews.’ Bolshevism was Jewish; “the foundation of this murderous terror is the Jews or the money of the Jews to weaken every country pretending to be upright and loyal behind a *Waṭaniyya* veil.”⁶²² Qādrī warned of a “Jewish menace,” in which all Jews were “a

617 Ibid., 35

618 Charles A. Hooper, *The Constitutional Law of Iraq* (MacKenzie & MacKenzie: Baghdad, 1928) 38; Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq, Made at Baghdad on May 1932, on the Occasion of the termination of the Mandatory Regime in Iraq, and containing the guarantees given to the council by the Iraqi Government. NA (FO 371/91692)- 34 (p. 1); Zainab Saleh, “On Iraqi Nationality: Law, Citizenship and Exclusion,” *the Arab Studies Journal*, Spring 2013, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Arab Studies Institute) 58

619 Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 104-105

620 Zionist Organization (Baghdad) to Zionist Organization (London). October 30, 1924. CZA (Z4\2470) 1; Shāul, 107

621 Ibid., Editorial staff, “al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd,” *al-Miṣbāḥ*, (Baghdad) September 25, 1924, (NLI) 1

622 “al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd,” 1

danger” readers should be “aware of and eliminate.”⁶²³ Qādrī drew from Ottoman tropes Jews were hostile, and schemed and associated with finance. The concept of secret enemies, *Munāfiqūn*, had a history in the region. The Qur’ān condemns them.⁶²⁴ In Qādrī’s account, Jews worked against Muslims in a “fierce campaign of hate” to create economic crisis and unemployment.⁶²⁵ With established tropes of Jewish machinations, Qādrī’s brochures added a veneer of Langmuir’s ‘chimerical anti-Semitism’ to depicted Jews as a menace: Jews commit human sacrifice.⁶²⁶ They inspire revolutions. They “extort the people of the earth” in a plot “coordinated with all Jews of the world without exception.” Qādrī contrasted Jews and Muslims as opposites, reaffirming the rightness of Muslim rule and the immorality of non-Muslim sway. Muslims were “hardworking,” and a “*Sha‘ab Mujtahid*,” a people of jihad. In contrast “Jews are parasites without power” who search “from country to country and land to land to rule your conscience.”⁶²⁷

Qādrī’s brochures became popular because they reaffirmed popular convictions: a pardon of Muslim rule in which minorities were voiceless, and resentment of *dhimmi* success. In Baghdad, a Zionist organization complained the “Arab Press” promoted Qādrī.⁶²⁸ The newspaper, *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, published a column of his memoirs.⁶²⁹

Attempts to refute the canards only increased anti-Semitism, as Qādrī’s fans were outraged they were labeled bigots. Anwār Shaul, an editor for the Jewish weekly *al-Miṣbāḥ*, found Qādrī’s brochures, read them and wrote a refutation to *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*.⁶³⁰ The paper rejected the submission. So Shaul published his response in *al-*

623 Shāul, 107

624 Qur’ān 63:1-4

625 “al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd,” 2; for quote see, Shāul, 107

626 Ibid., 108

627 “al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd,” 2

628 Zionist Organization (Baghdad) to Zionist Organization (London). October 30, 1924. CZA (Z4\2470) 2

629 Kazzaz, 211-212

630 Snir, ‘*Arabiyūt, Yahadūt, Ṣiyônūt*, 25

Miṣbāḥ.⁶³¹ Shaul blamed Qādrī's anti-Semitism on European influence, so as not to indict Iraqis, appealing to traditions of protection, insisting Jews only want to live in Iraq's "shadow and grow under its wings." Still, Shaul criticized Qādrī – "Qādrī slandered the whole Israelite people" with a "disgusting accusation" and "a fabrication" and for this "Qādrī will burn."⁶³² That a Jew would denounce a Muslim, for some, was shocking.

The reply sparked a six month feud.⁶³³ *al-Ālam al-ʿArabī* and Qādrī denied they libeled or hated *dhimmi*s. They reported on "Russian Jews and their Bolshevik plot" to "reform several of the Jews' crooked ways" and "dismantle bad social customs."⁶³⁴ *al-Ālam al-ʿArabī*'s responded in a series of articles under the pseudonym, 'the Arab,'⁶³⁵ (perhaps implying *al-Miṣbāḥ* was not Arab), and employing established anti-Jewish tropes, denouncing *al-Miṣbāḥ* for arrogance and hostility. "This snotty editor of *al-Miṣbāḥ*," 'the Arab' referred to Shaul, "supported bolshevism arguing in defense of the Jews."⁶³⁶ *al-Ālam al-ʿArabī* said *al-Miṣbāḥ* was a "Zionist magazine," which hid behind *Waṭaniyya*; and was a "poisonous essence," seething with "sneaking hatred" and had a "plan" to sow social divisions in Iraq and destroy the *Nahḍa*, the Arab Renaissance.⁶³⁷

That October, Qādrī publicized his upcoming brochures with a promise to prove the *Protocols*, and announced, in a session, Zionists voted "to destroy the Arab countries." Qādrī promised reporters he would publish documents: "the Zionist Movement, the Bolsheviks and the Freemasons are one, who are preparing to overthrow all the governments of the world,

631 Shāul, 107-108

632 "al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd," 1-2

633 Shāul, 106

634 "Ḥawla Mudhakirāt al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd," *al-Miṣbāḥ*, (Baghdad) Oct 16, 1924 (NLI) 2

635 Ibid., 1

636 "Kalama Ḥawla Radd," *al-Miṣbāḥ*, (Baghdad) Oct 2, 1924, (NLI) 7

637 "Ḥawla Mudhakirāt al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd," 2-3

particularly the Arab world. He would reveal, among Baghdad’s Jews, clandestine societies connected with the Moscow cabal.”⁶³⁸

The Prime Minister, Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, and his Justice Minister, Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Gaylānī, permitted rhetoric against Jews, refusing to enforce laws against incitement, and so implicitly sanctioned the prejudice. Laws barred “defamatory publications against religious communities;”⁶³⁹ or promotion of “hatred or contempt” against “any class of persons.”⁶⁴⁰ The government could confiscate issues of the publication or close the publisher.⁶⁴¹ Yet Qādrī and *al-Ālam al-Arabī* were never punished. The Community asked the state to intervene, warning the “the matter is endangering the position of the Jews.”⁶⁴² However, Yāsīn and Rashīd ‘Ālī refused.⁶⁴³ Instead, Yāsīn’s government warned Shaul: it would close *al-Miṣbāḥ*, if he continued to write against Qādrī.⁶⁴⁴

Increased Hate Crimes in Qādrī’s Wake

Qādrī’s invective and government permissiveness amplified anti-Semitism. Qādrī’s impact can be measured: he published his brochures in Baghdad. Outside the capital – in Basra, Kirkuk, and Khanikin – Jews were safe, had good relations with the police, and hate crimes were few. In Baghdad, Yāsīn’s indulgence was interpreted by those who scorned Jews as assent for anti-Semitism. First, it became unsafe for Zionists to solicit in public. Then, within a year, complaints of harassment were daily in Baghdad. A slew of hate crimes wracked the capital –

638 Qadri made the statements a week prior to the letter, see Zionist Organization (Baghdad) to Zionist Organization (London). October 30, 1924. CZA (Z4\2470) 1-2

639 Bashkin, *The Other Iraq*, 37

640 Section 89 of the Baghdad Penal Code. Chapter XIII. Title III (Dangerous Publications). The Baghdad Penal Code. (Proclamation. William Raine Marshall. Promulgated on November 21, 1918) 12

641 Ibid.; Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 105- September 30, 1933, Section 89-A of Baghdad Penal Code. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

642 Zionist Organization (Baghdad) to Zionist Organization (London) October 30, 1924. CZA (Z4\2470) 1-2

643 Ibid.; Longrigg, 150-151

644 Zionist Organization (Baghdad) to Zionist Organization (London). October 30, 1924. CZA (Z4\2470) 2

victims were attacked on Jewish holidays in Jewish-majority neighborhoods: women raped on Shavuot while returning from Jewish shrines. During Sukkot, two assailants accosted a ten year-old on a Jewish street, doused her with oil, and lit a match. Another pair immolated a child on Passover.⁶⁴⁵

The assaults themselves increased anti-Semitism; some loathed to admit Muslims harmed *dhimmīs*, and instead blamed Jews, saying, Jews fabricated crimes, or provoked the attack. Police blamed Jews, which increased attacks evermore as the perpetrators thought the government supported them. While Jewish leaders could boycott the brochure, as many Jews did, they anticipated condemnation would incense opinion and invite attack, so they tried to be inconspicuous, and illustrate Qādrī's accusations were untrue, donating to Muslim causes to generate goodwill. Privately, Jewish leaders appealed to Muslims' self-conception as protectors, pleading for Yāsīn's help.⁶⁴⁶

Alfred Mond

In 1928, Yāsīn and Rashīd 'Ālī brought the false myth to the fore that Zionism was the Jewish conquest of Iraq.⁶⁴⁷ They cultivated the smear from anger over Britain's sway in Iraq, and used it for political benefit. Yasin, who was then out of power at the time and wanting return, said the Prime Minister 'Abd al-Muḥsin Sa'adūn was a 'friend of the English,' who burdened Iraq with British debt and forces.⁶⁴⁸ Critics of Sa'adūn

645 'Ereṣ Yiśra'elī, "Šārōt Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-Bagdad," *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), July 27, 1926 (Vol. VIII, No. 257) 2; "'Avōdat Ha-Tarbūt Bē-Baghdad," *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), Oct 29, 1925, (Vol. VII, No. 31) 3; Zionist Organization (Baghdad) to Zionist Organization (London) October 30, 1924. CZA (Z4\2470) 1-2; A.B.N., "Miktāvīm Mē-Baghdad," *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), July 8, 1925 (Vol. VII, No. 229) 4; "Yēdī'ōt Me-'Āram Naharāyīm," *Ha-Aretz* (Jerusalem), June 15, 1925, 2

646 Ibid.; recall the Abu al-Shibil family, armed with guns, extorted synagogue-goers, saying "a despicable Jew that curses the prophet, reviles the Ummah and says that all of Islam is under his shoes," see "Miktāvīm Me-'Āram Naharāyīm," *Ha-Aretz* (Jerusalem), June 10, 1925, 3; S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 4; "al-Qādrī wa al-Yahūd," 2; A.B.N., "Miktāvīm Mē-Baghdad," 4; Zionist Organization, (Baghdad) to Zionist Organization, (London) October 30, 1924. CZA (Z4\2470) 2

647 Cohen, *Ha-Pē'īlōt Ha-Tsiyōnīt Bē-'Iraq*, 44

648 Twena, *Me'ore'ōt Ha-Shavū'ōt*, 15; F. H. Humphreys (Baghdad) to John Simon (London) April 3, 1933. IOR (L/PS/12/2860/2544)-424

assailed his policy of British alliance. Amid this acrimony, at a late January trial, Ḍārī, a tribal sheikh, who murdered a British Colonel, Leachman, was sentenced to life. Politicians lobbied to mitigate his sentence. His lawyers appealed, complaining he suffered debilitating illness, and, during the appeal process, Ḍārī died. Livid demonstrators stormed the hospital and seized Ḍārī's corpse to usher it to a shrine, singing songs of hatred for the English and screaming against foreigners. The debacle set opinion ablaze.⁶⁴⁹

Days later, Yāsīn and Rashīd 'Ālī launched a protest to topple Sa'adūn, and chose as a pretext the visit of British manufacturer, Alfred Mond, to ride the wave of xenophobia. Mond toured Iraq to review the fertilizer industry, and, by happenstance, Mond was Jewish and active in Zionist causes. Yāsīn and Rashīd 'Ālī, colluded with Education officials to initiate protests. Yāsīn hired forty unemployed immigrants to bolster the disorders, and days before Mond arrived, met Yūsuf Zaynal, a teacher at Baghdad's Secondary School, and co-leader of Nādī al-Taḍāmūn, a Marxist club. Zaynal convoked Nādī al-Taḍāmūn, and convinced his colleagues Mond intended to create a Zionist colony in Iraq. Educators incited students at the Central High School and at the Teachers College to protest, telling them Jews will seize Iraq.⁶⁵⁰

On February 8, dozens of students and hired faux-activists, marched in Baghdad lofting banners: "Down with Zionism," and "Long live the Arab Ummah." Many of the

649 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt al-'Irāqiyah*, Vol. II (Muṭba'a al-'Urfān: Sidon, 1924) 49-50; Intelligence Reports for the period of January 1928, Nos. 2 and 3 (FO 371/13027) 3. In *Records of Iraq: 1914-1966*. Vol. 5: 1928-1930, ed. Alan de L. Rush, (Archives Editions: Chippenham, Wilts, 2001) 9; High Commissioner (Baghdad) to Colonial Secretary (London) February 9, 1928 (FO 371/13027), in *Ibid.*, 10 650 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 137; Simon, 100; Darwīsh, 34-35; Vitales, "Report on Iraq," 5; Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country. 1914-1932*, (Columbia University Press: New York, 2007) 110; Hanna Batatu, *The old social classes and the revolutionary movements of Iraq: a study of Iraq's old landed and commercial classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1978) 398-399; Amatzia Baram, "The 'Other' Iraq," *Bustan: The Middle East Book Review* 2 (2011) 80; for the British report, which makes no mention of anti-Semitism, see High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, February 9, 1928 (FO 371/13027). In *Records of Iraq*, Vol. V, 10

poor – labor migrants, dwelling in shantytowns and disgruntled at their circumstances – joined the procession, screaming against taxes, the state, and “death to the Jews.” As they reached the al-Karkh train station, the main artery into the city, their numbers swelling to tens of thousands, and they rioted, looting and burning, attacking passersby they suspected were European or Jews – for in the attackers’ views, Jews and Europeans were the same. Authorities, who feared mass violence, diverted Mond’s route. Meanwhile police, positioned in wait near the Khirr bridge that spanned the Tigris and divided the city’s east and west, ordered the mob to disperse. The throng refused and rumbled forward. Combat exploded between law enforcement and mob, until police suppressed the rioters.⁶⁵¹

The chaos threatened the Jewish social position.⁶⁵² The public learned of Zionism from the mob, as the false calumny Zionism was the Jewish conquest of Iraq rather than the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. Opinion was furious that Muslims, who defended Arabism, were accused of persecution, or that Muslims were punished for clashing with Jews. Pressmen and politicians, including Yāsīn, proclaimed the rioters were patriots and denounced their incarcerations.⁶⁵³

Agitators said Jews were behind the arrests. A ‘Zionist’ witnessed the demonstration and induced police to quash it.⁶⁵⁴ Two days later, on February 10, a throng gathered at Baghdad’s Haydar Khana mosque, castigating the government, Balfour, and “the unjust decision to turn Palestine as a *Qawmiyya* homeland for the Jews.”⁶⁵⁵ Police

651 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary, February 9, 1928 (FO 371/13027). In *Records of Iraq*, Vol. V, 10; for first and second quotes see, al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakarātī Fī al-‘Irāq*, Vol. II, 11; Darwīsh, 34; al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt*, Vol. II, 50; Baram, 80; for third quote, see Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 44; Batatu, 400; Cohen, *Ha-Pē’ilōt Ha-Tsiyōnūt Bē-‘Iraq*, 44; Eppel, 238

652 Vitales, “Report on Iraq,” 5

653 Darwīsh, 35; High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary February 9, 1928 (FO 371/13027). in *Records of Iraq*. Vol. V, 10; al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakarātī Fī al-‘Irāq*, Vol. II, 15; Yāsīn extolled the protestors in parliament; see p. 20

654 al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt*, Vol. II, 50

655 Ibid., 51

arrested speakers and dispersed the assembly.⁶⁵⁶ Irate, Karkhī fired off a poem, disdainful “the Zionist Alfred the Jew Mond,” as a “strutting wealthy blasphemer” who robbed Iraq of “treasure;” while effendis were in rags. “Sweep these people of perversions away,” Karkhī said.⁶⁵⁷

The protest popularized anti-Semitic myths about Zionism in a manner Qādrī never did, as most Iraqis were illiterate. Few heard of ‘Zionists’ before the riot. Protestors themselves were confused what the word was, and, as teachers led the chant, ‘Down with Zionism,’ many in the file, either due to a language barrier, unfamiliarity with the term, or passive resistance to the duty at hand, mispronounced the slogan. Yāsīn’s hired faux-activists screamed “Down with platters.”⁶⁵⁸ (in Arabic, *sahyuniyya*) Students shouted ‘Down with the ash tray.’⁶⁵⁹ (*sahayana*) ‘Down with the municipal tax.’⁶⁶⁰ (*siniyya*) ‘Down with the Balkans,’ or ‘Down with the nightshift.’⁶⁶¹ Yet in a few short years hatred of ‘Zionism’ – Jewish rule over Muslims or the false myth of Jewish conquest of Iraq – blossomed into a lawful anti-Semitism, a codeword for Jews, when, to hate *dhimmi*s was uncouth but to hate Zionists was encouraged and socially acceptable, a sanctioned anti-Semitism by another name.⁶⁶² By 1932, a correspondent in Baghdad said the term ‘Zionist’ was a “synonym for traitor” that Muslims “attributed” to “every Jew whom they intend to persecute.”⁶⁶³ The euphemism reached every level of politics. Nūrī’s book described Zionism in anti-Semitic terms, “the Arabs are afraid of Jewish rule,”⁶⁶⁴ he wrote.

656 Ibid.

657 The term he used for ‘people of perversions’ “*Ahel al-Makhāzī*,” a slur for foreigners that also appears in his poem, ‘the Carpet was Stolen,’ is a pun for the Arabic term ‘the people of Satan,’ *Ahel al-Makhāzī*, see al-Karkhī, *Dīwān al-Karkhī*, 67-68; for use in “The Carpet is Stolen,” see 194

658 Darwīsh, 35

659 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 137

660 Darwīsh, 34

661 Ibid., 36; Baram, 80

662 “an anti-Zionist policy which soon developed into an anti Jewish movement, The line of demarcation between a Jew and a Zionist was so thin that the [p. 137] movement too took the form of the standard anti-semitism,” Elkabir said, see Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 136-137

663 n.a. (Baghdad) to Chief Rabbi of the British Empire (London), May 24, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

664 al-Sa’īd, 18

“They loathe political Zionism which seizes their country. The Zionist movement derives help from great riches, powerful institutions, political parties and prominent personalities with great influence in Great Britain, Europe and America.”⁶⁶⁵ Zionism came to be reviled as a competing *Qawmiyya*, a *Qawmiyya* of Jews, just as Judaism was the *qawm* of Jews, which made Judaism and Zionism, if not the same, then the later the outcome of the former.⁶⁶⁶

Anti-Semitism before Independence

‘Anti-Zionism’ was attractive for some because it reinforced *dhimmi* norms; the charges of misdeeds empowered the accuser and made the accused low. In August 1929, over a hundred died in the Wailing Wall riots. The newspaper *al-Waṭan*, inflated the killings, fabricating that Jews bombed a mosque.⁶⁶⁷ On August 30, crowds of the enraged, numbering between five to ten thousand, met at the Haydar Khana mosque, ostensibly to pray, but in truth to protest England “taking Palestine as a Homeland for the Jews.”⁶⁶⁸ Speakers said ‘Zionists’ were “secret enemies”⁶⁶⁹ and Europeans, who did not belong in Iraq and Jews with politics were dangerous.⁶⁷⁰ Attendants listened to ‘incendiary’ poems and sermons and a speech from Yāsīn.⁶⁷¹ Then a mob poured into the street, chanting “Down with the Jews,”⁶⁷² attacking every Jew they encountered and clashed with police.⁶⁷³ The next night, police discovered plans to coordinate assaults on

665 Ibid., 16

666 For examples of this, see al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt*, Vol. II, 114; al-Ḥuṣrī, *Abḥāth*, Vol. I, 45-46

667 In “articles of a violent and inflammatory nature,” related the High Commissioner. See High Commissioner (Baghdad) to Colonial Secretary (London) Sept 11, 1929 (CO 731/149/5) 3. in *Records of Iraq*. Vol. V, 569; Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 95

668 *Ha-Pē'ilūt Ha-Šiyônūt Bē-'Irāq*, 48; Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 95; for quote see, al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt*, Vol. II, 115

669 A.J. Brotman. 1929. Iraq Correspondence about Turkish Rule. Part 1. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 3

670 Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavū'ot*, 15

671 al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt*, Vol. II, 115

672 Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 95

673 Ibid.; Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavū'ot*, 15; High Commissioner (Baghdad) to Colonial Secretary (London) Sept 11, 1929 (CO 731/149/5) 2. in *Records of Iraq: 1914-1966*. Vol. V, 568

synagogues, and interdicted the plot.⁶⁷⁴ Jews closed their businesses.⁶⁷⁵ One owner who opened his store was assaulted.⁶⁷⁶ “Only thanks to prominent and energetic measures taken by the authorities – Iraqi and British – that the Jews were saved from mob violence,” one source said.⁶⁷⁷ For days, agitators called for riots or demonstrations, which were scattered by police. Yāsīn petitioned to hold more meetings, but was always denied.⁶⁷⁸

While authorities and inciters alike blamed the conflict in Palestine for anti-Semitism, and emphasized Iraqis protect Jews, the reality was both government and opposition encouraged images of Arab-Jewish clashes, and conveyed Zionism be “regarded with the gravest suspicion,” to highlight the danger of minorities, Jews with political voice, or multicultural states. Politicians castigated Zionism, and Parliament observed a silence for Arab dead, while newspapers exhibited families of the slain.⁶⁷⁹

Anti-Zionist hysteria silenced the Community’s ability to protest. Though Zionism was legal, no laws barred Jews from politics, and there were seven Zionist clubs in Iraq composed of a thousand people. Still, Jews who lived in Muslim neighborhoods or where Arabism was popular were wary to indicate their opinions, or mention Zionism, lest they be labeled as Zionist. Any apologetics were denounced as Zionism. “Arab leaders keep the Jewish population in complete subservience,” one liaison told the High

674 High Commissioner to Colonial Secretary (CO 731/149/5) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. V, 569

675 al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt*, Vol. II, 116

676 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Ḥag ha-Shavū’ot*, 15

677 A.J. Brotman. 1929. Part I. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) 3-4

678 High Commissioner (Baghdad) to Colonial Secretary (London) Sept 11, 1929 (CO 731/149/5) 4. in *Records of Iraq: 1914-1966*. Vol. V, 569-570

679 “the Iraqi government broke up these demonstrations with force to maintain neighborly relations,” Nūrī said, see al-Sa’īd, “Muqtaṭafāt Khīṭāb Nūrī al-Sa’īd” *Wathā’iq*, 104; for quote see B.A. Zaiman to Selig Brodetsky, Mar 1, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3); Cohen, *Ha-Pē’ilūt Ha-Šiyônūt Bē-’Irāq*, 49; al-Ḥassanī, *Tārīkh al-Wuzārāt*, Vol. II, 116

Commissioner, “the four Jewish deputies in the Iraq Parliament are practically dumb and can do nothing.”⁶⁸⁰

Once independent in 1932, the government restricted Jewish life under pretexts of combating Zionism, but the target was Jews, not Zionists. Zionist groups like Aḥi‘ever, continued to function, while the government shuttered Jewish cultural institutions, such as a women’s endowment, or papers, like *al-Miṣbāḥ*. Police ‘investigated’ charities using laws to restrict funds. Anti-Zionism ‘solved’ the contradiction of Iraqis’ two prevailing desires: firstly, to treat non-Muslims well, and second, to monopolize politics for Arab Muslims and restrict how Jews could express and define themselves.⁶⁸¹

Hājj Amīn al-Husaynī

In 1932, Jerusalem’s Grand Mufti, Hājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, visited Baghdad. At a reception, as crowds shouted ‘Long live Palestine,’ speakers said “every Jewish [sic] is becoming a Zionist.” One orator stated that Jews will expel Arabs from Palestine, then from Iraq, and “from there they will spread to Hejaz and to the other Holy countries of the Moslems. The Devil has blown the horn, and they do not know a limit.” Ḥusaynī told listeners “this menace will spread” to all “neighboring countries.”⁶⁸²

Street violence against Jews increased.⁶⁸³ “Any Jew is suspected to be Zionist,” Sen. Ezra Daniel said. Attacks occurred at day, in public, amid crowds. In Khanaqin, on Yom Kippur, a

680 A. H. Ben-Iraq, “Tēšuvā Lē-Mar Drōmūd Šīls: ‘Igeret Galūyā Mašav Yēhūdē ‘Īra’aq,” Part 1. *Haam* (Mandatory Palestine), August 2, 1931, 3; Zaiman to Brodetsky, Mar 1, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) Cohen, *Ha-Pē ‘ilūt Ha-Šīyônūt Bē-‘Irāq*, 51; BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047) Part 1.; n.a., 1929, memorandum; Lucien Wolf to C.E. d’Avigdor Goldsmid. Oct 11, 1929; n.a. to Lucien Wolf, Oct 10, 1929

681 Report on Iraq: May 15, 1948-January 1949,” 1; M. Zalšer, “Yēhudē Ha-Mizrāḥ Bē-Yamēnū” JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2648047. Undated. With documents from 1948 (p. 7); Aḥi‘ever was banned later in 1935, see “Iraqi Jews and Palestine,” December 5, 1943. NA (FO 624/38/502)-35; Twena, *Me’ore ‘ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū ‘ōt*, 179; A. H. Ben-Iraq, “Tēšuvā Lē-Mar Drōmūd Šīls: ‘Igeret Galūyā Mašav Yēhūdē ‘Īra’aq,” Part 1. *Haam* (Jerusalem), August 2, 1931, 3

682 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 4; for quotes, see I. Chizik to Selig Brodetsky, June 14, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 1.

683 N.A. (Baghdad) to Chief Rabbi of the British Empire (London), May 24, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

congregant was murdered at synagogue. On May 20, 1933, among Baghdad throngs who came to celebrate the unveiling of Fayṣal's statue, "a well known Jew was beaten by an Arab in the open day and in the middle of that great gathering with the pretense the Jew cursed the Moslem faith."⁶⁸⁴

Rashīd 'Ālī: Massacre of the Assyrians

In 1932, the League of Nations granted Iraq independence on the condition it promised to protect minorities. However in 1933, three events occurred which increased anti-Semitism. The first was the Assyrian Massacre under the tenure of Rashīd 'Ālī. Anti-Semitism increased in the aftermath, as fulminations against minorities turned more violent to defend the killings. Before the Massacre, Iraq was a duumvirate in which Fayṣal and Nūrī ruled together.⁶⁸⁵ The two were friends, and in 1931, discussed a coup to make Iraq an absolute monarchy, with Nūrī as vizier.⁶⁸⁶ Yet, once Nūrī became Prime Minister, he forged a military alliance with Britain and shepherded Iraq to independence. Fayṣal, perhaps jealous of Nūrī's success, wanted Nūrī to resign, but did not request his resignation, because the demand could jeopardize Iraq's entry into the League of Nations.⁶⁸⁷

In early 1932, whether from sincerity or passive-aggression, Fayṣal asked Nūrī to appoint Rashīd 'Ālī to the Royal Diwan, the palace secretariat. Nūrī objected. The post was important, and Rashīd 'Ālī despised Nūrī as a 'friend of the English.' Rashīd 'Ālī quit parliament to protest Nūrī, and as a private citizen, Rashīd 'Ālī often spoke against Nūrī.⁶⁸⁸ Fayṣal pretended to relent,

684 BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3), Ezra M. Daniel (Baghdad) to A. G. Brotman. June 25, 1933; A Sassoon Nissim to Percy Baker, Dec 6, 1932. Keren Keyemeth LeYisrael; N.A. (Baghdad) to Chief Rabbi of the British Empire (London), May 24, 1933.

685 Sir F. H. Humphreys (Baghdad) to Sir John Simon, Secretary of State (London) April 3, 1933. IOR (L/PS/12/2860/2544)-424 (p.2)

686 De Gaury, 48; J.E.W. Hood to Parkinson, July 25, 1932. NA (CO 730/178/8)

687 F. H. Humphreys (Baghdad) to Sir John Simon (London) Nov 17, 1932. IOR (L/PS/12/7454/PZ640)-465 (p. 4); NA (CO 730/178/8), J.E.W. Hood to Parkinson, July 25, 1932; F. H. Humphrys (Baghdad) to J.E.W. Flood, Esq. July 7, 1932, - 1

688 Sir Francis Humphrys. "A Note on my conversation with King Faisal on Tuesday, the 28th of June, 1932." NA (CO 730/178/8)- 1 (p.2); Iraq Intelligence Report No. 11. July 11, 1932. NA (CO 730/178/8)- 4

but in June 1932, appointed Rashīd ‘Ālī as Royal Diwan.

The appointment indicated Fayṣal turned to demagogic politics.⁶⁸⁹ Rashīd ‘Ālī was popular in *Qawmiyya* circles and had a history of tolerating anti-Semitism.⁶⁹⁰ He was Justice Minister during the Qādrī scandal, and served as Interior Minister from 1925-1928, overseeing the police during the surge of attacks on Jews.⁶⁹¹ He associated with known anti-Semites, such as regularly attending holiday celebrations of an imam who preached against Jews.⁶⁹² According to Abraham Twena, the Jewish Community’s secretary who tutored Rashīd ‘Ālī’s daughters, Rashīd ‘Ālī “hated Jews in all his heart.”⁶⁹³ From his German education, he adored Adolph Hitler, and modeled his career after Hitler’s own, and, according to Rashīd ‘Ālī’s eldest daughter, Rashīd ‘Ālī only saw one movie in a cinema, a film about Hitler – he watched it twice.⁶⁹⁴

Thereafter, in March 1933, Fayṣal named Rashīd ‘Ālī Prime Minister, to remove Nūrī and his politics.⁶⁹⁵ Rashīd ‘Ālī exacerbated hate speech. He repealed laws banning incitement and followed a policy of “neutrality in regard to Jews and not taking severe measures against criminals” who agitate against them, an Iraqi source said.⁶⁹⁶ Rashīd ‘Ālī’s Finance Minister, Yāsīn, said Britain imposed foreigners on Iraq.⁶⁹⁷ Within a week, the League of Nations registered worry if Iraq truly intended to protect minorities.⁶⁹⁸

689 Extract from Iraq Intelligence Report No. 11. July 11, 1932. NA (CO 730/178/8)- 4

690 al-Hāshimī, 89

691 “Rashid Ali al-Gilani.” NA (CO 730/178/8)- 2 (p. 1-2)

692 Khan Sahib Rafique, the President of Jamīe al-Islamiyah, see F.H. to Council, June 18, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/559)- 8

693 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Hag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 19

694 Ibid.; Basil Newton (Baghdad) to C. W. Baxter, Esq. (London) Feb 10, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062)- 17

695 Sir F. H. Humphreys (Baghdad) March 15, 1933. IOR (L/PS/12/2860/1709)-436; Sir F. H. Humphreys (Baghdad) to Sir John Simon (London) April 3, 1933. IOR (L/PS/12/2860/2544)-424 (p.3)

696 P. Knabenshue (Iraq). “Harmful Propaganda Law Repealed.” July 5, 1933. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2. Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Iraq) 1; quote found in N.A. (Baghdad) to Chief Rabbi of the British Empire (London), May 24, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

697 F.H. Humphreys (Baghdad) to John Simon (London) April 3, 1933. IOR (L/PS/12/2860/2544)-424 (p.1, 3)

698 Knabanshue (Iraq) March 22, 1933. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2. 890g.00 General Conditions/2) -6

Amid these volatile politics, agitators said Assyrians – Christian refugees from Turkey who settled near Mosul – were foreigners that stole Muslim land. Agitators said Assyrians colluded with France to carve Assyria out of Iraq. Race riots against Assyrians had erupted in 1923 and 1924, and months before the Massacre, lawmakers declaimed Assyrians in Parliament. Perhaps Rashīd ‘Ālī believed Assyrians wanted to ‘steal’ Iraq, for he decided to breakup Assyrian neighborhoods and disperse them, so they could not form homogenous ‘blocks.’ He also suspected the Assyrian Patriarch, Ishai Mar Shimun, incited rebellion to complain to the League, Assyrians were persecuted.⁶⁹⁹

On May 31, the Interior Minister, Hikmet Sulayman, offered to recognize Mar Shimun’s ‘spiritual’ leadership, if he foreswore politics. Mar Shimun, upset, complained, the government mistreated Assyrians. Authorities arrested Mar Shimun in retaliation. Tensions between the army and Yacou Ismail, an Assyrian militant, escalated. “The Iraqi army should not be employed against Yacou,” a British officer, Burnett, warned. “I did not think they would discriminate sufficiently between the followers of Yacou,” and “Assyrian inhabitants.” Mosul’s regional commander, Bakr Şidqī, “has strong anti-Assyrian feelings,” Burnett said. “it would be disastrous to employ Bekr Sidki [sic].”⁷⁰⁰

Fayşal promised to remove Şidqī for his venom against Assyrians, but never did.⁷⁰¹ Fayşal said he ordered Rashīd ‘Ālī to release Mar Shimun, but Mar Shimun was never released.⁷⁰² On July 22, Yacou’s 1,200 gunmen camped miles from Iraq’s border in Syria.⁷⁰³

699 Yusuf Malek, *The British Betrayal of the Assyrians*, (Kimball Press: Chicago, 1935) 51, 54; Note on An Assyrian Settlement. Appendix A. R. Brook-Popham, Acting High Commissioner (Baghdad) to Colonial Secretary (London) Sept 26, 1930. (FO 371/14524) in *Records of Iraq*. Vol. VI, 549; Longrigg, 147, 198; C. S. Burnett, Reports on Events in connexion with Assyrian Situation between May 26 and June 28, 1933. June 29, 1933. (FO 371/16883) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VII, 551; Longrigg, 232

700 Burnett, “Events in connexion with Assyrian Situation,” 552-553, for quotes, see 553

701 Ibid., A. Clark Kerr (Baghdad) to Lancelot Oliphant (London) December 15, 1936. “Information about Hikmat Sulaman and Bakr Sidqi. (FO 371/20015) 6. in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VII, 598

702 Burnett, “Events in connexion with Assyrian Situation,” 554

703 Hugo Headlam. “Report on the Part taken by the Iraqi Army in the Repression of the Assyrian Rebellion in Northern Iraq in July and August 1933.” Sept 6, 1933. Enclosure No. 1, Francis Humphrys (Baghdad) to John Simon (London) Sept 14, 1933 (FO 371/16891) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VII, 585

Rashīd ‘Ālī said this proved the Assyrians were dangerous and Britain supported them.⁷⁰⁴ His cabinet said the gunmen’s movements were a plot to sabotage resettlement, and dispatched Bakr Ṣidqī to bar their entry. At a location called Wadi Sufan, a group of 150 militants offered to disarm, and asked permission to enter to reunite with their families. The government agreed. However, as the gunmen forded the Tigris river, either from annoyance from crossing the waters, or hostile intent, they ignored Iraqi soldiers’ entreaties from the bank to surrender their guns. Ṣidqī ordered his troops to open fire, saying the militants were an invasion force.⁷⁰⁵ Amid the fighting, Assyrian militants struck an army post, and Assyrians from surrounding villages joined the fray.⁷⁰⁶ Rashīd ‘Ālī’s government announced Assyrians were a British-inspired danger. The announcement provoked demonstrations calling to kill Assyrians.⁷⁰⁷

Fayṣal precipitated the Assyrian Massacre, according to the testimony of the advisor to the Interior Ministry, C.J. Edmonds. No civilians had been slain until Fayṣal arrived from Switzerland.⁷⁰⁸ British officials publicly lied and said Fayṣal was abroad to protect Iraq, but on August 2, Fayṣal returned, at British urging, and arranged the Cabinet and British Embassy to meet and forge an ‘Assyrian policy.’⁷⁰⁹ There, Fayṣal said he would pay France to ‘take’ the Assyrians. Yāsīn said Assyrians cause bloodshed and incite against Iraqis. The Cabinet menaced the British attendee, Oglivie-Forbes, if Britain “insist on protecting these people His Majesty’s Government will be responsible for the consequences.” Despite Oglivie-Forbe’s pleas, Fayṣal refused to release Mar Shimun – the opposite of what he had promised earlier. Later, on August

704 Longrigg, 233

705 Ṣidqī claimed Assyrians “gouged out their eyes, slit open their stomachs and cut off their noses,” see Headlam. “Report on the Part taken by the Iraqi Army,” 585-588; Longrigg, 235

706 P. Knabenshue (Iraq) to Secretary of State (Washington) August 8, 1933. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2

707 Khadduri, 44

708 A. Clark Kerr (Baghdad) to Lancelot Oliphant (London) December 15, 1936. “Information about Hikmat Sulaman and Bakr Sidqi. (FO 371/20015), in *Records of Iraq*. Vol. VII, 595

709 For an example of one such claim Fayṣal was abroad, see De Gaury, *Three Kings In Baghdad*, 90; Knabenshue, Aug 2, 1933. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2

7, the day of the massacre, at a midnight meeting, Fayṣal told Yāsīn, the militants' desire to enter Iraq was a French plot. "French would be responsible for any deplorable results," Fayṣal said "he would like to kill all the French."⁷¹⁰ Fayṣal told the cabinet: "he did not mind how many men were killed but villages, the women and children must be protected." The Defense Minister, Jalāl Bābān, recruited men for the killing. Then Bābān visited the area, enflaming fighters, saying Assyrians' villages were a threat and would not be protected.⁷¹¹ Near the Turkish border, soldiers under Ṣidqī's authority surrounded Simel, a village of a hundred homes.⁷¹² The officer, Ismail Tohalla, ordered women and children evacuated, per Fayṣal's orders. Thereafter the troops shot men hiding within houses, extracted and executed them, throwing three hundred corpses into a ditch.⁷¹³

The massacre implicated the entire state: the army, the monarchy and the government. There was a cult of personality focused on Fayṣal.⁷¹⁴ Admirers praised him as a humanitarian and statesman.⁷¹⁵ Fayṣal chose each cabinet.⁷¹⁶ He elevated Rashīd 'Ālī. A League investigation terrified Fayṣal, because, if he was guilty, so was the state.⁷¹⁷ To protect the reputations of Arabism and Islam, upon which the army and monarchy rested, Fayṣal blamed Assyrians and foreigners, and congratulated Arab Muslims for displaying tolerance.⁷¹⁸ He defended the killings. "Great Britain had also cases of massacre;" he said.⁷¹⁹ "French bombarded the bazaar at

710 Oglivie-Forbes (Baghdad) Telegram (No. 204) Aug 3, 1933. (FO 371/16883), in *Records of Iraq*. Vol. VII, 557-559, 561-562; for first quote, see 558; for second quote, see 561

711 Kerr to Oliphant, "Information about Hikmat Sulaman and Bakr Sidqi," 597; Longrigg, 234

712 J. G. Ward. Minutes. Jan 6, 1937. "Information about Hikmat Sulaman and Bakr Sidqi," 592; Sami Zubaida, "Contested Nations: Iraq and the Assyrians," *Nations and Nationalism* 6 (3), (ASEN, 2000) 369

713 Ibid., 370; De Gaury, 89; "Information about Hikmat Sulaman and Bakr Sidqi," 597

714 The massacre was "a violent assertion that in an Arab Muslim State non-Arab and non-Muslim minorities have rights on in so far as they recognise [sic] that fundamental fact," the historian Hamilton Gibb said later, see H.A.R. Gibb, Review. *Tragedy of the Assyrians* by R.S. Stafford, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs) Vol. 15 No. 3 (May-June, 1936) 474-475

715 Elkabir said Fayṣal, was "a genius with a great intellect, tremendous memory and deep and long sighted political acumen," Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 87

716 Paul Knabenshue (Iraq) to Secretary of State (Washington) November 11, 1933. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 6

717 al-Hāshimī, 126

718 Oglivie Forbes (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) August 12, 1933. (FO 371/16885) in *Records of Iraq*. Vol. VII, 563

719 Oglivie Forbes (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) August 18, 1933. (FO 371/16886), Ibid., 578

Damascus and Italians dropped Arabs from airplanes.”⁷²⁰ Fayṣal said if Assyrians “wanted a *Waṭan* for revolutionaries look for it in Turkey.”⁷²¹ He refused to punish Ṣidqī.⁷²² He never removed Rashīd ‘Ālī.⁷²³

Rashīd ‘Ālī’s government cultivated xenophobia to deceive the public with stories of Assyrian aggressors, warning Britain planned to invade.⁷²⁴ Assyrians were British and massacre Muslims, and press cautioned against British spies.⁷²⁵ Many loathed to tarnish the images of government, Arabism, or the hierarchy of faith, so the government lionized the killers: Ṣidqī,⁷²⁶ Fayṣal and Rashīd ‘Ālī. The government said they broke British power, and arranged public celebrations.⁷²⁷ In Mosul, as troops returned on August 18, townspeople erected triumphal arches festooned with watermelons reddened in blood and impaled with knives to represent Assyrian heads. Crowds followed the soldiers to the main square, cheering and roaring, dancing with daggers, their acclaim punctuated with celebratory gunfire.⁷²⁸ “Public opinion has been intensely inflamed,” the British Ambassador said. “Neither the King nor the Government can face the outcry which a demand for punishment would entail.”⁷²⁹ Fayṣal’s son, Prince Ghāzī, visited Mosul on August 27, with Rashīd ‘Ālī, crowds hurraing: “Down with the British,” as Ghāzī reviewed a parade of troops who perpetrated the killings and decorated Ṣidqī with a medal.⁷³⁰ On

720 Ibid., 579

721 al-Hāshimī, 124

722 Forbes to Foreign Office, August 12, 1933, in *Records of Iraq*. Vol. VII, 563

723 P. Knabenshue (Iraq). King Ghazi Reappoints Gailani Cabinet. Sept 14, 1933. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 1

724 Longrigg, 235-236

725 Simon, 113; De Gaury, 90; Francis Humphrys (Baghdad) to Robert Vansitart (London) Aug 24, 1933 (FO 371/16889), in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VII, 583; Knabenshue (Iraq). Sept 13, 1933. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

726 Simon, 114

727 De Gaury, 90; M. Zalser, “Yēhudē Ha-Mizrāḥ Bē-Yamēnū” JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2648047, (p.7)

728 Oglivie Forbes (Baghdad) to John Simon August 22, 1933 Enclosure in No. 1. Consul R.G. Monypenny (Mosul) to Oglivie-Forbes (Baghdad) August 21, 1933. (FO 371/16888) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VII, 580

729 Francis Humphrys (Baghdad) to Robert Vansitart (London) Aug 24, 1933 (FO 371/16889), Ibid., 583

730 Longrigg, 236; al-Hāshimī, 124; for quote, see De Gaury, 94

Aug 31, revelers greeted Ghāzī and Šidqī upon their return to Baghdad.⁷³¹ A motorcade drove Rashīd ‘Ālī through Baghdad’s applauding crowds.⁷³²

The rancor against minorities fed into anti-Semitism, with its slurs against foreigners, treason and secret enemies, paralleled the canards that marked Assyrians for slaughter. The press said Jews displayed “suspicious movements.”⁷³³ Fayṣal had said Assyrian separatism was a British plot, just as provocateurs said Jews were ‘friends of the English.’ Government slander inspired anti-Assyrian riots, and members of the Jewish community warned to be on guard for “pogroms,” one witness said, do not protest the killings, and avoid public spaces during festivities.⁷³⁴

King Ghāzī and Radio Provocation

The second event in 1933 which fueled Iraqi anti-Semitism was Ghāzī’s ascension to the throne on September 7, heralding a swell of bigotry. As a prince, Ghāzī praised the perpetrators of the Assyrian Massacre.⁷³⁵ He was only 21 years-old, and an irresponsible, callow king, who destabilized a country already unstable from inception, making Iraq a hotbed for extremism.⁷³⁶ Ghāzī was disinterested in administration, and ignored his duties; instead, he loitered the Palace, pursuing his hobby of radio.⁷³⁷ He relished outraging others with his prejudice. Ghāzī had his own radio station and announced the news himself, attacking Jews and foreigners, while simultaneously opining fondness for Hitler and Mussolini.⁷³⁸ (One memoirist called his show

731 al-Hāshimī, 125

732 Simon, 81

733 Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 57

734 Longrigg, 236; for quote see, M. Zalser, n.d., “Yēhudē Ha-Mizrāḥ Bē-Yamēnū” JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2648047. (p. 7); “The Jews of Iraq: A prosperous, well-organized community the Anti-Jewish regime since 1933 the Catastrophe after May 15, 1948,” Jewish Agency for Palestine, Research Department, New York, New York. CZA (Z4\33505)-8

735 Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) to Viscount of Halifax (London) Oct 13, 1938, CZA (S25\22719)-37; De Gaury, 104

736 For an account of this see, De Gaury, 103; Fayṣal’s typical cabinets lasted ten months; Ghāzī’s cabinets’ six, see Khadduri, 29

737 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) August 23, 1934; and Feb 6, 1935. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

738 Maurice Peterson. Meeting with Ghazi. Oct 13, 1938. CZA (S25\22719-38); “Untitled,” *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, May 1935. *Wathā’iq*, 157-158

“anti-Semitic propaganda.”)⁷³⁹ Once, British Ambassador Maurice Peterson listened to Ghāzī’s broadcast, to hear Ghāzī “accused the Palestinian administration of arming the Jews against the Arabs” and “cited with satisfaction the day’s list of casualties inflicted on the Jews.”⁷⁴⁰

Ghāzī gave state sanction to anti-minority feeling. His broadcasts incited “two cases of kidnapping of Jews in Baghdad” said Peterson, and malcontents could “derive encouragement from the news sent out from the King.”⁷⁴¹ Newspapers repeated Ghāzī’s assertions.⁷⁴² Yāsīn’s paper, *al-Ikhwa al-Waṭanī* said readers should “fear of all Muslims’ final subjugation by the Jews.”⁷⁴³ Zionism, Jews and colonialism were the same, the paper said, – a “*Nakba*,” a disaster, “which is full of evil and destroys,” and “schemes in every era.” Zionism, said the paper, “understands nothing but the language of force;” and desires “pure blood;” thus the “Rightful Arabs” need to “cure the illness for good” and “expel” the Jews in a “jihad.”⁷⁴⁴

The American consul said “resentment against the Jews is growing daily.”⁷⁴⁵ Ghāzī’s show was popular with social conservatives and the young.⁷⁴⁶ He received volumes of fan letters, complimenting his monologues, asking for more tirades. The attention “served still further to unbalance the King and to increase the provocative tone,” said Peterson.⁷⁴⁷

Sāmī Shawkat and The Art of Death

739 Shamash, 157

740 Maurice Peterson. October 13, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 37-38

741 Ibid.

742 The Council of Administration, *al-Nas Daily* (Basra) No. 551 Feb 17, 1939, IOR (R/15/5/126)- 307 (p.1)

743 NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2), Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington). Program of the New Iraqi Cabinet and Press Commentary thereon. Baghdad, November 20, 1933. Diplomatic No. 225. 3; for quote, see Paul Knabenshue (Iraq) to Secretary of State (Washington) Nov 9, 1933. Disturbances in Palestine serve the Sympathetic Approval of the Arabs in Iraq, 3

744 “Fī Sabīl al-Ḥaḳ wa al-Mujidma ḍaḥat Filasṭīn,” *al-Ikha al-Watani*. Oct 31, 1933. Arabic Original. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

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745 Knabenshue, “Disturbances in Palestine,” NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

746 De Gaury, 99, 104

747 Simon, 116; for quote, see Maurice Peterson, *Both Sides of the Curtain, an Autobiography*, (Constable and Company, Ltd: London, 1950)

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The third event provoking anti-Semitism in 1933 was Sāmī Shawkat’s introduction of a militant Arabism into the school system that urged students to master what he called the ‘Art of Death,’ that is, to die in battle. He created a new program, the Futuwwa, named for the medieval Caliphate’s border guards, a high school club for military training that mimicked Italy’s Fascists, part of a tide of such groups in the region that included Egypt’s Green Shirts and the Iron Shirts of Syria.⁷⁴⁸ Shawkat admired Mussolini and Nazism, and created the Futuwwa to stave off the Jewish invasion of Iraq.⁷⁴⁹ “We were ready for Jewish gangs to attack the remaining Arab regions after several overrun Palestine,” said Sulayman Şifrānī, a Futuwwa member. “Any day our country and Ummah would be subject to the Jewish danger.”⁷⁵⁰

On May 15, 1933, Shawkat announced the Futuwwa program would be available throughout the school system in his most celebrated speech, the ‘Art of Death.’⁷⁵¹ Shawkat explained the Futuwwa’s necessity to the Baghdad Central High School’s student body: “The nation that does not perfect the art of death with iron and fire will die under horses’ hooves and foreign soldiers’ shoes.” He told his audience neither education nor wealth can help Arabs. “Riches without force is the prime reason for humiliation while education without force results only in a lot crying from the weak.” He concluded with an anecdote from Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd:

We do not deserve to honor him and call ourselves his descendants if we do not build what he built and destroy as he did the enemies of the Arabs. The spirit of Hārūn al-Rashīd and the spirit of Māmūn want Iraq to quickly become a file of a million soldiers and a hundred planes for in Iraq there are no cowards.

748 Gerard Salinger, “Was the Futūwa an Oriental Form of Chivalry?” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, (Vol. 94, No. 5, American Philosophical Society: Oct 19, 1950) 482-483; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/1941,” 232; Stillman, “Antisemitism in the Arab and Islamic World Prior to 1948,” 219; Idem., *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 107; for a more comprehensive discussion of the origins of the term ‘Futuwwa’ in the early medieval era, see Reeva Spector Simon, “Futuwwa,” *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, Vol. I, ed. Richard C. Martin (Gale ebooks: 2004) 263-264. *Gale eBooks*, <https://link-gale-com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/apps/doc/CX3403500162/GVRL?u=norm94900&sid=GVRL&xid=03810333>. Accessed 6 Apr. 2020.

749 Shawkat, 2; Basil Newton (Baghdad) to George Lloyd (London) July 4, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 29

750 Sulaymān Şifrānī, “Aina Nizām al-Futuwwa,” *al-Yaqza*, February 26, 1950. *Wathā’iq*, 96

751 Shawkat, 1, 17; Khadduri, 161

Shawkat said ‘the Art of Death’ could achieve anything. It brought Turkey into being and Fascism to power. For years, Shawkat urged students to master his ‘Art of Death.’ In 1939, he told Futuwwa to “kneel in subservience for the Art of Death.” To have “contempt for death in bed.” To “unleash our repressed rage” and “strike our enemy like a sweeping torrent to destroy him and shed his blood.” He said. “The machine gun, sword and bomb are more dignified ways to suffer than the microbe, malaria and pus. So let us dedicate death to fighting and martyrdom.” He told listeners at another school event, “there is no pleasure equal to the pleasure of seizing the enemy and tearing his limbs apart and spilling his blood.” He told students the Islamic conquerors, tradition praised for their piety, said “we are a nation that loves death,” and wanted to die in Jihad. “This time it is you, oh Futuwwa of Iraq to perform your military exercises to bring your pure eyes to the sky to witness the spirits of Khālīd ibn al-Walīd,” Shawkat said. “Fill these voids anew, conquer for us land and erect for us kingdoms.”⁷⁵²

In these monologues, Shawkat used coded synonyms to insinuate Jews were foes. He referred to them as the “internal enemy.”⁷⁵³ Once he told students a citizen can be a foreigner “even if he carried ninety nationality certificates or crammed our great tombs with their grandfathers for 2,000 years.”⁷⁵⁴ His audience understood ‘two thousand years’ was an allusion to Jews, who dispersed from the Land of Israel two millennia ago.⁷⁵⁵ Shawkat said the “internal enemy” connived with adversaries abroad and spied on Iraq “to destroy what can be destroyed until the Ummah is weak.”⁷⁵⁶ The internal enemy “used all kinds of hellish propaganda to degenerate the world” and “defamatory attacks on our sufficiency, theories, the weakness of our preparation and deem inferior every issue of ours” in psychological warfare against “the Arab

752 Shawkat, 2-6

753 Kazzaz, 221

754 Shawkat, 5

755 Kazzaz, 221

756 Shawkat, 36-37

Ummah,” Shawkat said.⁷⁵⁷ The internal enemy created hostile propaganda through books, publications, critical broadcasts and non-governmental schools.⁷⁵⁸ “This internal enemy is several individuals or a bloc that follows its culture, private education, and academic and social teachings to see itself as a stranger in the middle of the state, feels superior and above this state and harms it, exploits it, devalues it, lessens its nature and scorns its character” and “schemes to sabotage and this plan of destruction is being advanced in our era, pushed through the sciences and arts.”⁷⁵⁹

In a November 1938 speech,⁷⁶⁰ Shawkat said all Semites are Arabs except for Jews, “Regretfully they were *Ḍālīn*,” a term from the Qur’ān for those who went astray, often interpreted as idolators. However, Shawkat said the Qur’ān meant Jews were the *Ḍālīn*, because they “deviated from the path of its race, and went to war with its own family tree. From this branch they began to exploit Allah’s gifts of material treasure in the world attacking to harm the society to which they belong. If in Allah’s mercy he gave them a political view, which is unlikely, their view is money,” Shawkat said. Jews “work in useless matters that are unnecessary and harm the Arabs.”⁷⁶¹

The only solution was to kill the internal enemy “to purify the soil,” Shawkat said.⁷⁶² “No Renaissance arises without first and before everything else liquidating the internal enemy.”⁷⁶³ The Futuwwa, the student club for military training, were forbidden to be chivalrous or to love non-Arabs.⁷⁶⁴ For if Arab did not kill the internal enemy, Iraq could be destroyed. “Our Arab Ummah must be ready to swallow the races it rules,” Shawkat said. Turkey

757 Ibid., 37

758 Ibid., 38

759 Ibid., 36

760 Ibid., 61

761 Ibid., 63

762 Ibid., 37

763 Ibid., 36

764 Şifrānī, “Aina Niẓām al-Futuwwa,” *Wathā’iq*, 96; Shawkat, 13

“liquidated their internal enemies, exterminating them at their roots without mercy or a jot of pity. So did Hitler and Mussolini,” Shawkat said, the ‘internal enemy’ must be slaughtered “whenever a Renaissance progressed.” Then he repeated: “We cannot suffer the foreigners directing the enemies amongst us and leading them to its goals directed at us. Doubtless it behoves us to rise up and take on this type of enemies in the interior and kill them.” Reaching the climax of the speech, Shawkat said. “We will destroy the headwaters of the foreigners, the enemies of the country,” he said. “We will kill all the insects, scorpions and vipers. We will prevent them from laying eggs and pullulating across the soil of our holy pure homelands, polluting it with their drugs and epidemics.”⁷⁶⁵

Shawkat’s anti-Semitism endangered the Jewish community. Over a week after he announced the Futuwwa, on May 24, a Baghdad contact, too afraid to sign a name, warned Jewish groups in England, “the mentality of the Arabic folk here makes the Jews fear an echo of what is now passing on their coreligionists in Germany.”⁷⁶⁶ Iraqis “let themselves to be guided by dangerous men” and “actions made against the Jews by the Nazis in Germany are praised in certain Arab circles here who find no reason why such actions should not take place in this country as well.”⁷⁶⁷

Shawkat pushed to fire Jewish staff.⁷⁶⁸ He ordered schools to “eliminate harmful antipathies,” and “schism” implying Jewish schools had ‘harmful antipathies’ and ‘schism.’⁷⁶⁹ Shawkat hired hundreds of teachers selected for anti-Semitism, or grievances against Jews.⁷⁷⁰ As

765 Shawkat, 33, 37-39

766 n.a. (Baghdad) to Chief Rabbi of the British Empire (London) May 24, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

767 Ibid., Perhaps the unsigned author was Sen. Ezra Daniel. A month later, in a letter, he wrote a similar text. “The Hitlerite regime found admirers amongst the Iraqi Intelligentsia and many certainly were those who would have welcomed a similar treatment to their fellow Jews,” see Extract from letter of Ezra Menachem Daniel (Baghdad) to Mr. A. G. Brotman (London). June 25, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

768 Daniel to Brotman, June 25, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 1

769 Letter. Author unknown. Undated. (c. 1935) IJA (3785)- 43 (p. 2)

770 “Syrian and Lebanese Educators,” *al-Istiqlāl*, August 6, 1939. *Wathā’iq*, 98; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Hawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/1941,” 234; Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Viscount Halifax (London) Sept 15, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/375)- 9

months passed, education and press exacerbated each other's bigotry. Newspapers reported on Palestine in provocative terms, and teachers read them, were disturbed by them, and repeated the allegations in class and served as 'thought leaders' in their communities and the press, providing more incitement for newspapers to report.⁷⁷¹ Shawkat created his own news items, hosting parties for "Palestine's victims," and oversaw visits of Ḥusaynī's delegation or donations.⁷⁷² This process continued for years. Within months of Futuwwa's inception, the education system had inculcated sentiments against Jews.⁷⁷³ The Futuwwa published Jewish conspiracies.⁷⁷⁴ The Teacher's College dean said Jews were Zionists who corrupted Iraq.⁷⁷⁵ In Azamiyah, an elementary teacher invited pupils to his home and harangued against Jews. Thereafter, an anti-Jewish demonstration transpired, with "illegal excesses," a document complains.⁷⁷⁶ At scouting events – the Futuwwa program for elementary students – attendees cursed children from Jewish schools, saying, they are Zionists; and Jewish schools were "Zionism."⁷⁷⁷ Citizens of al-Tūbah, a town near Basra where only fifty Jews lived, complained of attacks.⁷⁷⁸ By 1935, Antisemitism had become a mass movement.⁷⁷⁹

The Jewish community was powerless to stop Shawkat; their only prerogative was to ask the government. Khaddūrī complained to the Interior Minister, Hikmet, of discrimination, and newspapers that "blame Iraq's Jews," saying, "their *Waṭaniyya* is Zionism." Khaddūrī asked Hikmet to "strictly monitor" schools, and "prevent local newspapers from publishing accusations

771 E.M. Daniel (Baghdad) to Adolphe Brotman (London), March 1, 1935. Part 3. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

772 "Enthusiasm for Palestine in Iraq," *al-Zaman*, November 18, 1939. *Wathā'iq*, 100

773 Sassoon Khadduri (President of the Israeli Taifa of Iraq) to Hikmet Sulayman (Interior Minister) July 31, 1933. IJA (3785) 14

774 Sassoon Khadduri (Rais al-Taifa) to the Education Minister, November 12, 1934 No. 3555. IJA (3785) 17

775 "Kashaf al-Ḥaqā'iq Musā'ī Maškūrah Sabīl al-Tālif al-Dā'im," Undated. (Found with documents from 1933) IJA (3785) 9

776 Iṣḥāq Effendi (A Resident of the Township of 'Āzmiyah) to Hikmet Sulayman (Interior Minister) July 31, 1933. IJA (3785) 12

777 IJA (3785), Sassoon Khadduri (Rais al-Taifa) to the Education Minister, November 12, 1934 No. 3555, 17; for quote, see Rais al-Taifa to Education Minister. Nov 21, 1934, 8

778 Rais al-Taifa to the interior Minister Nov 27, 1934. IJA (3785) 23

779 "Antisemitism in Iraq is a post-war feeling now in full process of growth," Ezra Daniel wrote in 1935, see E.M. Daniel (Baghdad) to Adolphe Brotman (London), March 1, 1935. Part 3. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); While Khaddūrī said the attacks indicated "an anti-Semitic movement," see Rais al-Taifa to the interior Minister Nov 27, 1934. IJA (3785) 23

against Iraq's Jews," appealing to tropes of protection, to Hikmet's "paternal sympathy" and the "Iraqi people's enlightenment."⁷⁸⁰ Yet pleas were incapable of swaying leaders when the government itself supported anti-Semitism. Hikmet's own ministry distributed anti-Jewish books.⁷⁸¹ The Propaganda Ministry coordinated the articles across Iraq's publications, with the same editorial sometimes appearing in three or four newspapers.⁷⁸²

First Restrictions: Arshād al-'Umarī and Firing Jews en masse

In 1934, the government imposed the first legal restrictions on Jews to remove them from the government and economy that, in time, would develop into the exclusionary laws that would drive Jews from Iraq in the 1950s.⁷⁸³ Stemming from taboos against equality, and apprehensions Jews were dangerous, the government wanted to isolate them, and encouraged Jews to form self-conceptions bound to Iraq's borders, unfree to cross.

First, the government worked to eliminate Jews from civil service. Already from 1931 on, in the twilight of Fayṣal's reign, when Iraq's independence was imminent, the government gradually dismissed Jews on an individual basis to replace them with Muslims.⁷⁸⁴ Most Jews were British hires, and provocateurs said Britain 'stocked' the government with *dhimmīs*, leaving Muslims unemployed.⁷⁸⁵ Critics scrutinized the number of Jews in government: "opposition was made to any further enrollment and unveiled suggestions were circulated for the dismissal of those in office,"⁷⁸⁶ said Elkabir, who ensured half the staff in his department was Muslim, to assuage outrage.⁷⁸⁷

780 Sassoon Khadduri (President of the Israeli Taifa of Iraq) to Hikmet Sulayman (Interior Minister) July 31, 1933. IJA (3785) 14-15

781 Iṣḥāq Effendi ('Āzmiyah) to Ra'is al-Taifa (Baghdad), July 20, 1933 IJA (3785) 11

782 Lt. Col. HRP Dickson (Kuwait) to Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (Bushire) Sept 5, 1935. IOR (R/15/5/126/ File 2/1)- 115

783 Vitales, "Report on Iraq" 6

784 S.B. "The Fate of Iraq Jewry," 3; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 144

785 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 57; Simon, 43

786 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 122

787 He rigged the vetting process to 'pass' Muslims, see Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 43-44

Yet the trickle of Jewish terminations became a tsunami in 1934, when Arshād al-‘Umarī became Economics Minister.⁷⁸⁸ A former executive of the Posts and Telegraphs department, ‘Umarī had a reputation for “anti-Jewish activities,” firing subordinates who refused to work on Yom Kippur.⁷⁸⁹ Now as Economics Minister, ‘Umarī launched a mass layoff of 150 staffers – including department heads with twenty years experience, and two assistant Director-Generals – almost all Jewish.⁷⁹⁰ No senior non-Jews were terminated.⁷⁹¹ A trio of those discharged said the terminations were anti-Semitic.⁷⁹² ‘Elkabir, who was Jewish, was also demoted. His supervisor told him, ‘Umarī “wanted to get rid of me owing to my Jewishness.”⁷⁹³

The layoffs aroused friction between Muslims and Jews.⁷⁹⁴ ‘Umarī said he dismissed employees for disciplinary issues: one contributed to Keren Keyemet, a charity to develop Palestine for Jewish settlement; another falsified a receipt.⁷⁹⁵ Pressmen who wanted a Sunni Arab government defended the terminations, creating a reaction “similar in form to that which occurred in Germany,” said Britain's ambassador, Francis Humphrys.⁷⁹⁶ Newspapers like *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* and *Hadayah* said Jewish civil servants were “cowards” and too many.⁷⁹⁷ Reporters counted Jews in different departments, grumbling the Jewish ratio was too high.⁷⁹⁸ The Jewish community was split in how to respond.⁷⁹⁹ Some wanted protests.⁸⁰⁰ The two dismissed

788 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington). August 31, 1934. New Iraqi Cabinet headed by Ali Jawdayt Beg Al-Ayoubi. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2

789 Ibid., 4; for quote, see Arthur Lourie to Adolphe Brotman. Dec 6, 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Darwīsh, 201

790 Extract. “The Jews of Baghdad” The Palestine Post. October 21, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 31; Sereni, 12; Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to the Secretary of State (Washington) October 18, 1934. Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 1; Neville Laski. Nov 1934. (BOD ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2; the BOD came to the conclusion: “Jewish civil servants have been dismissed without justification. This was wholesale dismissal,” see Arthur Lourie to Adolphe Brotman. Dec 6, 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

791 Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2

792 Francis Humphreys (Baghdad) to Rendel (Col. Office), “Zionist Propaganda in Iraq,” December 13, 1934, CZA (S25\22719-185); British Ambassador to FO. “Jewish Propaganda in Iraq,” December 13, 1934, CZA (S25\22719- 187; 189)

793 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 90

794 Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 1

795 “The Jews of Baghdad” NA (CO 733/268/6)- 31; Sereni, 12; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 145

796 Sir. F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon. December 27, 1934. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 32

797 IJA (3785), for quote, see Ra’is al-Ṭā’ifah, n.a. 2; Ra’is al-Ṭā’ifah to the Interior minister. Oct 31, 1934. No. 2997, 4

798 Ibid., 5

799 Sir. F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon. December 27, 1934. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 33 (p. 2)

800 Sasson (Baghdad). Oct 3, 1934, Copy for Neville Laski. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Anti-Jewish Movement in Iraq. Two Reports from Baghdad. End of 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

assistant Director-Generals warned this was an anti-Semitic campaign.⁸⁰¹ Reinstatement was critical; and behind them stood the disgruntled mass of the fired and their families, impoverished without income, and those exasperated with the “hatred” for Jews with respectable careers.⁸⁰²

However, to accuse Muslims of mistreatment would bring public fury. Furthermore, none knew if ‘Umarī would lay off more or not. Hundreds still feared termination. To protest could invite more retaliatory dismissals, as Jewish officials were despised.⁸⁰³ Therefore, no policy was adopted. Attendees agreed “a movement of hostility against the Jews has taken shape,” and “is increasing from day to day.”⁸⁰⁴ Khaḍḍūrī blamed the news media, telling the government the practice enumerating Jews in government was “intimidation;” and asked the Prime Minister, ‘Alī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī, to suppress the papers for violating incitement laws. Khaḍḍūrī sent Ayyūbī an issue of *Hadaya*, “a newspaper against civil rights,” with the offending articles underlined in red. However, Ayyūbī did not punish the paper, and *Hedaya* published the anti-incitement laws, verbatim, to mock Jews, to convey to, Jews are powerless to stop the slander.⁸⁰⁵

Some politicians were angry ‘Umarī persecuted *dhimmi*s, when, for those who cherished values of *dhimmi* protection, a public display of cruelty to law-abiding citizens was disgraceful. Nūrī confronted ‘Umarī, fuming, ‘I just told diplomats in Geneva Iraq did not discriminate. You damaged Iraq’s reputation.’⁸⁰⁶ Other lawmakers denounced the terminations.⁸⁰⁷ The cabinet censured the policy and asked ‘Umarī to reinstate the senior Jewish employees he dismissed.⁸⁰⁸

801 Sion Zilcha, the secretary of Public Works; and Joseph Saul, the Postmaster-General, see Arthur Lourie to Adolphe Brotman. Dec 6, 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Sasson (Baghdad). Oct 3, 1934, Copy for Neville Laski. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Anti-Jewish Movement in Iraq. Two Reports from Baghdad. End of 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

802 Sir. F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon. December 27, 1934. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 32 (p. 1); Unknown. Untitled Hebrew Text. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) p. 4-5

803 Neville Laski. Nov 1934. (BOD ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 4

804 Sasson (Baghdad). Oct 3, 1934, Copy for Neville Laski. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Anti-Jewish Movement in Iraq. Two Reports from Baghdad. End of 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

805 IJA (3785), for first quote, Ra’is al-Ṭā’ifāh to Interior Minister, Oct 31, 1934. No. 2997, 5; for second quote, see Idem., Nov 5, 1934 No. 2999, 16

806 Knabenshue, “Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad,” 3

807 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) January 23, 1935. Iraqi Opposition Becomes Active. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 5

808 Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, 3

‘Umarī refused, saying he would “rid the public services of Jewish personnel.”⁸⁰⁹ Publicly, ‘Umarī veiled the anti-Semitic undertones by terminating others.⁸¹⁰ The law barred firing employees, so ‘Umarī would abolish the post occupied by a Jewish worker. Jews were technically laid off, not fired. Then ‘Umarī recreated the same job anew, with a different title, and hired Muslims.⁸¹¹ He rehired Muslims he had discharged to mask the purge.⁸¹² Regulations set yearly limits on hires, so the government ceased to appoint Jews to accommodate Muslims. Meanwhile, Muslim hires increased to try to absorb the burgeoning graduation rates. The state created posts to accommodate the unqualified “hosts of Iraqi officials who do little if anything,” said a British official.⁸¹³ Only three departments retained Jews: customs and finance because stereotypes associated Jews with money, and the railways, because Britain controlled that department and rebuffed ‘Umarī’s demands. Holdovers – those Jews Britain hired and remained at their posts – never advanced.⁸¹⁴ To ensure this, the government decreed no Jews could be promoted without permission from the responsible minister.⁸¹⁵

Student Quotas

High schools and colleges imposed a *numerus clausus* against Jews to “not exceed ten percent of student body,” when the Jewish population was significantly more than that – a quarter of Baghdad, and fifteen percent of Iraq’s urban population.⁸¹⁶ One teacher noted the

809 Knabenshue, *Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad*, 3; for quote, see Sir. F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon. December 27, 1934. NA (CO 733/275/4)-32

810 Sereni, 12; Neville Laski. Nov 1934. (BOD ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2

811 James S. Moose (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) The Ayoubi Cabinet. September 20, 1934. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

812 Sereni, 12; Neville Laski. Nov 1934. (BOD ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2

813 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 56-57; Idem., *My Communal Life*, 145; N.A. Hebrew Text. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 4; for quote, see G.N. Loggins to Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) “Note on the Future of British Influence in Iraq” Aug 10, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/597)-19

814 Sereni, 12; Britain controlled the rail department until 1936, see Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 91; Idem., *My Communal Life*, 145

815 Ireland, 436

816 Sassoon (Baghdad) to Neville Laski (London) Oct 3, 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); *Anti-Jewish Movement in Iraq*. 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2; Sereni, 13

number of Jewish students in his class fell considerably.⁸¹⁷ In medicine, where Jews long worked – and included Iraq's first pharmacist and founding faculty at the College of Medicine – quotas restricted Jews to five percent of the student body.⁸¹⁸

Banning Jewish Papers

Iraq imposed restrictions to sever Jews from coreligionists abroad. In 1934, Baghdad police concluded there was “Zionist propaganda” in Iraq, that is hostility to Iraq and desiring its conquest.⁸¹⁹ On September 13, ‘Ayyūbī ordered “periodicals containing ‘Zionist propaganda’” seized.⁸²⁰ However, there was no legal definition what Zionism was – no regulation linking Zionism to a particular entity, region or text. So there was no limit to what a ‘Zionist’ could be. Any bureaucrat could define Zionism as they wished; as anything Jewish.⁸²¹ ‘Zionism’ became code for ‘Jewish.’ Postal workers barred Jewish periodicals from every country and genre, including scientific papers if the scientist was ‘Jewish.’⁸²² Postal Authorities banned Britain’s *Jewish Chronicle*; France’s *Paix et Droit*; and Mumbai’s *Jewish Tribune*.⁸²³ Censors presumed Hebrew texts were subversive, barring goods with Hebrew markings, and reprobated Yiddish too, because the language used Hebrew orthography.⁸²⁴

The ban reinforced the ideas Jews were unacceptable and needed to be barred, and their culture was dangerous, ‘Zionist.’ As victims complained – Rabbis unable to acquire religious

817 Dr. H.G. Houbert, *Jenaische Zeitung*, March 15, 1935, 10. Arabic Translation. IJA (3785) 32

818 Heskell M. Haddad, “The Contribution of the Jews to Medicine in Iraq,” *Nehardea: Journal of the Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center*. No. 9, March 1993. ed. Zvi Yehuda. (Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center, Tel Aviv: 1993) 7

819 Ogilvie-Forbes (Baghdad) to High Commissioner of Palestine (Jerusalem) Sept 29, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 54

820 G. Ogilvie-Forbes to John Simon. October 22, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 45

821 G.W. Rendel (Foreign Office) to the Under Secretary of the State of the Colonies. Dec 1, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)-14

822 NA (CO 733/268/6), Ogilvie-Forbes to High Commissioner of Palestine Sept 29, 1934, - 54; “Iraq Bans the Post,” *Palestine Post*. Sept 27, 1934,- 57; S.A.G. Secret Oct 4, 1934, -2; Ogilvie-Forbes to Simon. Oct 22, 1934, - 45; “The Jews of Baghdad,”- 31

823 BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3), Sasson, (Baghdad) Oct 3, 1934. Copy for Neville Laski; “This has been done on account of its pro-Zionist sympathies and its strong denouncement of the Hitler Policy,” said the *Jewish Tribune*’s editor, Joe Sargon, see Sargon (Colaba) to the Joint Foreign Committee, Mar 13, 1934

824 NA (FO 371/45334), G.H. Thompson (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London)- 37; NA (CO 733/268/6), “The Jews of Baghdad,” - 31; Sir F. Humphrys (Baghdad) Dec13, 1934,- 10

tomes, readers severed from Jewish media, and critics who blamed the ban on ‘Umarī – the objections enraged Iraqis, who felt they persecuted no one. The ban became entangled with the question of Arabism’s morality, of whether the ideology was ethical. So the suppression of Jewish media expanded to a prohibition on reports on the suppression itself. Authorities censored foreign press and letters to Khaḍḍūrī to hide complaints.⁸²⁵

Eliyahu Levy, a bookseller, who owned a Baghdad store wrote a letter to the *Manchester Guardian* on Sept 24, denouncing the ban on Jewish papers and on “papers sympathetic towards the Jews.”⁸²⁶ He said Iraq persecuted Jews.⁸²⁷ The *Guardian* published his complaint.⁸²⁸

“Hostility against Zionism and against the Jews (all Jews are considered as having Zionist leanings) has become more violent, and any Jewish paper or any paper which defends the Jews, where published, is forbidden to enter Iraq,” wrote Levy.⁸²⁹ The next day, Oct 3, Yunīs al-Baḥrī, a journalist, entered Levy’s shop and assaulted him, though whether verbally or physically is unclear. Baḥrī’s paper, *Ukab*, suspended for insulting a Minister, was reinstated to rebuke Levy.⁸³⁰ “His writings against Iraq constitute an unpardonable crime and it is the duty of the Government to strike with an iron hand,” Baḥrī said in *Ukab*. “Are not the newspapers, which appear everyday expressing various opinions and which are read by this creature (behind) his glasses sufficient to shut his mouth and stop the croaking.”⁸³¹ *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* also

825 Thompson to Eden. NA (FO 371/45334)- 37; Sasson, (Baghdad) Oct 3, 1934; Neville Laski. Nov 1934, BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2; Knabenshue Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

826 for quote, see Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, 3 “I’itiqāl Šāhib Maktaba al-Rashīd Ilyāhū Lāwī,” *al-Istiqlāl*, Oct 19, 1934, *Wathā’iq*, 105; NA (CO 733/268/6) “Jews Heartened” *Palestine Post*, Nov 14, 1934,- 28; G. Ogilvie-Forbes (Baghdad) to John Simon. Oct 24, 1934,- 41; see also Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 393. Oct 18, 1934. Trans. ‘Al-Ālam ul-Arabi. Oct 12, 1934. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

827 Neville Laski. Nov 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2; “Jews Heartened” NA (CO 733/268/6)- 28

828 Ogilvie-Forbes to Simon. Oct 24, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 41

829 ‘Al-Ālam ul-Arabi. Oct 12, 1934. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

830 Knabenshue Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, 4

831 for quotes, see “Lies, Jugglery and Misrepresentation. To Quote Lawee?” ‘Al-Okab’ of Oct 15. 1934. trans. Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 393 Oct 18, 1934. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2; Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, 5

republished Levy's letter,⁸³² and for weeks, the press attacked Levy and Jews.⁸³³ Articles said, criticizing Iraq was Zionism. All Iraqis were “against this Eliyahu- the Zionist who harmed the reputation of Iraq.”⁸³⁴ *Istiqlāl* said,

Despite the benefits bestowed upon him in this country where he has taken refuge, felt that he could intrigue against it, and so availed himself of an opportunity to translate his enmity into action. He preferred false charges in the English Press against the authorities, claimed that his co-religionist were oppressed, and depicted the country in an unfavorable and untrue light.⁸³⁵

The *Guardian* was banned; Levy arrested. Media celebrated. Authorities charged Levy with fomenting “contempt.” A witness testified Levy had “prejudice against Iraq.” Levy was convicted, “for his message which harmed the reputation of Iraq.” *Istiqlāl* reviled Levy as “the criminal,” and “his Zionist newspaper clippings;” “It would be shameful to tolerate propaganda prejudicial to Iraq... The Government should punish severely the enemies of the state.” Iraq’s General-Consul to India told a reporter: “the prosecution was justified as Mr. Levy had no business to criticize his own country.”⁸³⁶

The government claimed to ban Jewish papers because they libeled Iraq, reinforcing stereotypes Jews hated Iraq. Authorities said the prohibition against the *Jewish Chronicle* was for an Oct 19, article, “One in a thousand,” reporting the government fired Jews from the civil service.⁸³⁷ “Under the cloak of ‘anti-Zionism’ the anti-Semites are conducting a furious agitation against what they term ‘unpatriotic’ Jews,” the *Chronicle* wrote.⁸³⁸ Iraqi opinion was

832 Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, 3

833 Oglivie-Forbes to Sir John Simon. Oct 31, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 30; Anti-Jewish Movement in Iraq. Two Reports from Baghdad. 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)2

834 “T’itiqāl Šāhib Maktaba al-Rashīd Ilyāhū Lāwī,” *al-Istiqlāl*, October 19, 1934, *Wathā’iq*, 105

835 Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, 5

836 Neville Laski. Nov 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2; “Jews Heartened” NA (CO 733/268/6)- 28; G. Oglivie-Forbes (Baghdad) to John Simon. Oct 24, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 41; for first quote, see Idem. to John Simon. Oct 31, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 30; for second and sixth quote, see “Qaḍīya Ilyāhū Lāwī Šāhib Maktaba al-Rashīd Maḥkama al-Juzā’ Tušar alá Hikmhu al-Sābiq li-Idānatahu,” *al-Istiqlāl*, December 25, 1934. *Wathā’iq*, 105; for third quote, see “Iraq Again” *Jewish Chronicle*. Nov 23, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 23; for fourth and fifth quotes, see “Muḥakama Tamyiz al-‘Irāq Tašdur Qirārha fī Naqd Hikm al-Muḥakama al-Kubrā fī Baghdad,” *al-Istiqlāl*, April 28, 1935. *Wathā’iq*, 106; for seventh quote, see Knabenshue Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad, 5; for eighth quote, see “Jewish Officials Re-instated. New Cabinet’s Encouraging Move,” *Jewish Chronicle*, Mar 23, 1935. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 12

837 F. H. Humphreys (Baghdad) to Sir John Simon. Dec 8, 1934. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 38; for quote, see G. Oglivie-Forbes (Baghdad) to John Simon. Oct 24, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 40

838 “Betraying the League’s Confidence: Anti-Semitic Incitement Condoned,” *Jewish Chronicle*, Oct 19, 1934. NA (CO 733/275/4)-39

scandalized. Consumers boycotted Jewish goods, and denounced *Istiqlāl* as “pro-Jewish,” alleging Khaḍḍūrī bribed the paper.⁸³⁹ In newspapers “Zionists are represented as indulging in an orgy of anti-Iraqi propaganda,” a British diplomat said,

To show that it is the Zionist alone who are responsible for this propaganda and are conducting it for ulterior motives, a number of articles by Iraqi Jews are being published, in which the Zionists or ‘renegade Jews’ are execrated and the Iraqi Government praised for their generosity and their good treatment of the genuine Iraqi Jew. This is a well-known game of the Iraqis and recalls the methods which they have always used for refuting criticism of their treatment of the Assyrians.⁸⁴⁰

Travel Ban

Ayyūbī restricted travel for Jews to sever them from Palestine. However, he avoided legislation, to bypass lawmakers who opposed persecution, and used ad hoc, unwritten policies instead. He impeded Jews’ money transfers to Palestine with regulatory obstacles, and refused to issue passports to Jews wishing to travel there. He said such excursions were “Zionism.”⁸⁴¹ In February 1935, the Passport Department ceased to respond to Jewish applicants, which effectively prohibited Jewish passports without putting the disallowance in writing.⁸⁴² Ayyūbī’s government denied there was a ban. An official said applicants received no response because they shirked military obligations.⁸⁴³

Move against Jewish Schools

Shawkat imposed burdensome regulations to cripple Jewish schools, saying they were “centers of foreign propaganda”⁸⁴⁴ wherefrom the ‘internal enemy’ funneled disinformation.

839 Neville Laski. Nov 1934. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 3; for quote and denunciations of *Istiqlāl*, see Knabenshue, Anti-Jewish Flurry, 5

840 Ogilvie-Forbes to Simon. Oct 24, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 40- 41

841 BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3), Anti-Jewish Movement in Iraq. 1934, 2; Sasson (Baghdad) Oct 3, 1934; Interview between Brodetsky, Downie and Parkinson. Dec 11, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 13

842 “Jewish Officials Re-instated. New Cabinet’s Encouraging Move,” *Jewish Chronicle*, Mar 23, 1935. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 12; F.H. Humphrys. (Baghdad) to Sir John Simon (London) Feb 28, 1935. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 15

843 “Jewish Officials Re-instated.” NA (CO 733/275/4)- 12; “The Jews of Baghdad” *Palestine Post*, Oct 21, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 31
844 Letter, n.a., n.d., (c. 1935) IJA (3785)- 42

Shawkat vowed to thwart them with government control.⁸⁴⁵ Shawkat's regulations implied Jews were foreigners who had too much power and needed to be disempowered. The Parliament invited 'experts' to testify Jewish schools facilitated Jews' "grip of the country's economic life," and urged lawmakers to impede them. Shawkat instituted rules to control their budgets and curriculum, and thin the schools' educators – tests to certify whether schools were 'indigenous,' and prohibited foreign funds or teachers. Then, foreign instructors were common in public schools; Shawkat himself hired hundreds. The ban applied only to Jewish schools.⁸⁴⁶ Ayyūbī's government said Jewish immigrant staffers spread "subversive propaganda" in schools, and ordered several expelled.⁸⁴⁷ On January 15, 1935, police arrested the Shamash School's principal, F. Kallay, and his brother, on charges of Bolshevism.⁸⁴⁸ "Allah curse your religion," an officer stamped Kallay's passport undesirable, and deported him.⁸⁴⁹

To find 'disloyalty,' Shawkat used plants, lecturers he appointed in schools and doubled as spies, or embedded students in class, as informers.⁸⁵⁰ He impelled one school to hire two teachers, whereupon the new employees accused their colleagues of Zionism, orchestrating their deportation.⁸⁵¹ Shawkat fired one Shamash teacher, Nissim Ezra, after ten year-olds implicated him.⁸⁵² The drive against teachers was part of Shawkat's campaign to eliminate the Judaism, as a 'foreign *qawm*' from private schools. His inspectors cancelled classes in Jewish history; the *Tanakh*, the Hebrew Bible; Hebrew, Judaism's sacred language, in which prayers and holy books are written.⁸⁵³ Meanwhile, schools could not teach Hebrew or English without fear of

845 Shawkat, 38

846 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 141-143, for quote, see 141; Letter, n.a., n.d., (c. 1935) IJA (3785)- 43

847 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) Feb 21, 1935. Iraqi Press inveighs against Communism. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2

848 Joseph Barnard to Chief Secretary (Jerusalem) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 1; Knabenshue, Iraqi Press inveighs against Communism, 3

849 Barnard to Chief Secretary. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2-3, for quote, see 2

850 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 143; Ra'is to the Directorate of Education (Baghdad) March 28, 1935. IJA (3785)- 29

851 Benjamin Shamash to L.G. Montefiore. Feb 19, 1935. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2-3

852 Ra'is to the Directorate of Education Baghdad. March 28, 1935. IJA (3785)- 28-29

853 Sereni, 13; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 143

denunciation.⁸⁵⁴ Miriam Meiri, born in Hilla, said at her school, Hebrew was included for liturgy, but regulations prohibited explanations of the meaning.⁸⁵⁵

Persecution pushed Jews to emigrate.⁸⁵⁶ Middle class families already moved weekly in the 1920s, but in 1934, the Jewish Community's wealthy began to leave, when fifteen families did so.⁸⁵⁷ Others, unable to acquire passports, fled.⁸⁵⁸ By October 1936, perhaps 12,000 Jewish expatriates lived in Palestine – the equivalent of a tenth of Iraq's Jewish population.⁸⁵⁹

Rashīd 'Ālī and State-Sponsored anti-Semitism

State-sponsored Jew-hatred coalesced in 1935, when Rashīd 'Ālī deposed Ayyūbī in a *coup*. Rashīd 'Ālī had a vendetta against Ayyūbī, whom Rashīd 'Ālī believed had manipulated Ghāzī to oppose him. After one quarrel with Ghāzī, Rashīd 'Ālī, then Prime Minister, resigned in a huff, and Ghāzī appointed Ayyūbī instead. Rashīd 'Ālī raged, he was tricked; Ayyūbī toppled his cabinet.⁸⁶⁰ On Dec 7, in a secret meeting at Rashīd 'Ālī's house, Rashīd 'Ālī and his two old ministers – Hikmet and Yāsīn – swore on the Qur'ān to overthrow the regime.⁸⁶¹ The three exploited resentment among bedouin tribes who seethed they were unrepresented.⁸⁶² Hikmet and Rashīd 'Ālī found a former tribal deputy Ayyūbī removed, 'Abd al-Waḥīd Sukkar, and

854 Shamash to Montefiore. Feb 19, 1935. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 3

855 Miriam Meiri, "Growing up Jewish in Iraq in the 1940s," Lecture. November 24, 2017. Temple Har Zion congregation. Toronto. Ontario Canada. Published November 26, 2017, YouTube. Accessed August 7, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrXogZ4Crx4>

856 Ha-'Ivrī, "Miktavīm Me-'Āram Naharāyīm," *Ha-Aretz* (Jerusalem), June 18, 1926, 3

857 "Yēdi'ōt Me-'Āram Naharāyīm," *Ha-Aretz* (Jerusalem), June 15, 1925, 2; This was according to Eastern Bank's manager. Britain never inquired, why managers monitored Jewish assets or how they knew who was Jewish, see Sir. F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon. December 27, 1934. NA (CO 733/275/4)- 33

858 In one example, William Shentov tried to escape to Palestine. Authorities arrested him on June 6, 1935, and sentenced him to a month in prison, see "Ḥikm 'Alā Hārab," *al-Istiqlāl*, June 7, 1935. in *Wathā'iq*, 104

859 Iraq correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3), Binnoce, et al. to High Commissioner for Palestine, Oct 28, 1936, 2; Va'ad Lē'ūmī to Weizmann (London) Oct 20, 1936

860 NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2), Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State, Mar 21, 1935. Political Situation in Iraq, 2; Idem., Aug 6, 1935, Parliamentary Elections and Immigrations, 2; Idem., Apr 4, 1935. New Iraqi Cabinet, 2

861 A Storm in the Senate. Jamil Beg al-Midfā'i attacks Rashid Ali Beg al-Gailani. Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 520. Aug 22, 1935, NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 1; Khadduri, 52

862 Knabenshue, New Iraqi Cabinet, 2

persuaded Sukkar to revolt.⁸⁶³ Rashīd ‘Ālī and Hikmet provoked discontent.⁸⁶⁴ They said Ayyūbī built a post office on a Shiite cemetery, when many Bedouin were Shiites, and a Shiite should be king.⁸⁶⁵ Fighters cut roads and expelled officials.⁸⁶⁶ In Baghdad, Rashīd ‘Ālī engineered a senate strike.⁸⁶⁷

Ayyūbī resigned in February 1935. Yāsīn offered to be Prime Minister, if Ghāzī would suspend the constitution and proclaim him dictator for two years. Ghāzī dithered.⁸⁶⁸ However, the army’s Chief-of-Staff, Ṭaha, was Yāsīn’s brother. Ṭaha refused to confront the rebels, knowing his brother would be Prime Minister.⁸⁶⁹ Powerless, Ghāzī asked Yāsīn to form a government and made Rashīd ‘Ālī his Interior Minister.⁸⁷⁰

Yāsīn’s new cabinet promoted dictatorship and anti-Semitism. At a celebration of Yāsīn’s ascension, on March 29, Yāsīn said he was “pro-German,” at a time when Hitler was in power. “Germany is the best example” for “how countries become prosperous,” Yāsīn said. “The common effort made by her people to defend their country from foreign aggression and to kill every germ seeking to disseminate evil.”⁸⁷¹ Yāsīn again asked Ghāzī to suspend the constitution and declare him dictator.⁸⁷² Yāsīn’s newspaper, *al-Iṣlāḥ*, published three editorials urging dictatorship.⁸⁷³ “Our parliamentary regime” is “a total failure,” the article said.⁸⁷⁴ “Eastern countries shall not enjoy settled political conditions unless they live under the banner of

863 Sukkar’s wealth derived from his vast farmlands, see Personalities: Iraq (Exclusive of Baghdad and Kadhimain). 1919. IOR (L/PS/20/221) 9; Henry Field (Chicago) to Douglas Murray (Washington DC) April 13, 1935. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

864 Knabenshue, Parliamentary Elections and Immigrations, 2; Knabenshue, Political Situation in Iraq, 3; Khadduri, 52

865 Field to Murray, Apr 13, 1935. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

866 Knabenshue, Political Situation in Iraq, 4

867 Ibid., 3

868 Knabenshue, New Iraqi Cabinet, 2

869 A Storm in the Senate, 1-2

870 Knabenshue, Political Situation in Iraq, 5

871 NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2), Selected Press Commentary and News Items Relating to Political Developments in Iraq During the Latter half of the March 1935, Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 466 of April 4, 1935, 1, 6, 8, for all other quotes after first, see 8; for first quote, see Knabenshue to Secretary of State Apr 4, 1935, 4

872 Knabenshue, “Political Situation in Iraq,” 3

873 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) June 15, 1935. Political Situation in Iraq. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2

874 “Parliamentary Regime and Dictatorship, Which one of the two is more suitable for Iraq,” *al-Islah* (Baghdad) May 17, 1935. Trans. Enclosure No. 1, Despatch No. 492, Jun 13, 1935, NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 1

dictatorship.”⁸⁷⁵ Iraq should follow the examples of ‘successful’ countries, “Hitlerite Germany has discarded the Weimar Constitution and accepted Nazi principles and dictatorship, Italy is ruled by the absolute will of the Duce.”⁸⁷⁶

Yāsīn’s government supported anti-Semitism in two ways. First, notwithstanding Yāsīn’s paper said he had “no desire” to “persecute certain races,” his regime said Jews were dangerous foreigners.⁸⁷⁷ To repel criticism that Rashīd ‘Ālī engineered a *coup de tat*, his supporters blamed the insurrection on foreigners and Jews.⁸⁷⁸ The newspapers *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* and *al-‘Irāq* said foreigners, who hated Arabs, were infiltrating Arab countries to spread Communism.⁸⁷⁹ Their provocation “incites the people to revolt;” Palestine was “ringed with red;” and so Iraq should suppress foreigners.⁸⁸⁰

Yāsīn’s cabinet was unstable. There were five revolts – Kurds for independence, Yazidis against conscriptions, Bedouin tribes against taxes and forced settlement. Authorities blamed foreigners and Jews. Police arrested Menashi Mansour, a Jewish Baghdad resident, for selling ammunition to bedouin tribes.⁸⁸¹ “This rebellion was secretly arranged by a foreign hand,” the newspaper, *al-Istiqlāl*, said, “The country requires that the harmful germs be destroyed and that the Government assume a ruthless attitude to push and eradicate the country’s enemies and the unlimited intrigues of the foreigners.”⁸⁸² Yāsīn’s cabinet ordered the Propaganda Department to spotlight the conflict with Jews in Palestine to help suppress mention of Iraq’s internal rebellions

875 Ibid., 3

876 Ibid., 2

877 “The Type of Dictatorship We Want,” *al-Islah* (Baghdad) May 25, 1935. Trans. Enclosure No. 1. Despatch- No. 492, Jun 13, 1935. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2

878 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) March 18, 1935. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

879 Knabenshue, “Iraqi Press inveighs against Communism,” 1

880 Ibid., 2

881 Khadduri, 62-63; Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) May 4, 1936. 890G.00/363. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2); idem. to Secretary of State (Washington) May 28, 1936. No. 656. Observations on Iraqi Courts Martial. 890G.00/367. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 1

882 “Evil-Doers” *al-Istiqlal*, May 12, 1935. Enclosure No. 3. Despatch No. 483. May 23, 1935. Press Comments. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 7

in the press. Police censored telephone and telegraph lines to ensure Iraq's rebellions were unmentioned. The newspaper *Bayan* condemned the tribe's suppression, and police seized the copies. Instead, newspapers announced the next day, May 21, "all loyal Iraqis" were to observe Palestine Day "as a day of mourning for Palestine." There would be "a mass meeting at the Haidarkhana [sic] Mosque." Two newspapers published that day's editions were edged in the color black, as in mourning. Vendors sold black mourners' armbands. "'Palestine Day' demonstration was originally intended to distract attention from disturbances in Iraq," said America's consul Paul Knabenshue, who said Yāsīn planned "anti-Jewish riots." Then Knabenshue continued "while the situation in Palestine receives a great deal of publicity, our own situation in Iraq is hidden in deep secrecy...It is almost impossible to get accurate information as to what is going on."⁸⁸³

Secondly, Yāsīn sponsored three anti-Semitic groups. In May 1935, Rashīd 'Ālī licensed the Muthanná Club, a *Qawmiyya* organization dedicated to opposing democracy, Jews and Britain.⁸⁸⁴ Named for al-Muthanná bin Ḥāritha, a commander in the seventh-century conquest of Iraq, the group used cultural motifs as a vehicle to cultivate a nativist mass following, with promises of empowerment.⁸⁸⁵ Activists urged reverence for Arab Palestine and drew parallels between the *Nahḍa* and Nazism, saying the two were compatible.⁸⁸⁶

Muthanná was a government front. The founders were civil servants tied to Yāsīn's cabinet: Shawkat's brother, Ṣā'ib, was the Assistant Director of Baghdad Hospitals; Darwīsh al-Miqdādī, Shawkat's collaborator and principal at the Central High School; and Fahmī Sa'īd was

883 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington) May 28, 1936. Aftermath of Revolt of Arab Tribes. 890G.00/366. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 1-4; for last quote, see Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Wallace Murray (Washington) June 11, 1936. 890G.00/368. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2)

884 "Untitled" *al-Istiqlāl*, May 28, 1935. *Wathā'iq*, 89; "Tāsīs Nādī al-Muthanā bin Ḥāritha al-Shaybānī" *al-Istiqlāl*, Feb 26, 1935, Ibid.; 'Imād Aḥmad al-Jawāhirī, *Nādī al-Muthanná wa Wājihāt al-tajammu' al-Qawmī fī al-'Irāq, 1934-1942*, (Muṭba' Dār al-Jāhīz: Baghdad, 1984) 146, 165; Cohen, "The Anti-Jewish Farhud," 6

885 "Tāsīs Nādī al-Muthanā," 89; Muḥammad Mahdī Kubba, *Mudhakirātī fī Ṣamīm al-Aḥdāth, 1918-1958*, (Dār al-Ṭalī'a: Beirut) 55
886 al-Jawāhirī, 165

the military inspector.⁸⁸⁷ Shawkat was a member.⁸⁸⁸ His deputy was a member. Yāsīn's newspaper editor, Yūnis al-Sab'āwī, was a member.⁸⁸⁹ Muthanná networked lawmakers and military to synchronize their goals, and liaised with politicians abroad to create a *Qawmiyya* bloc.⁸⁹⁰ Muthanná hosted talks promoting Shawkat's militant Arabism, and attended by politicians, teachers and middle-class professionals.⁸⁹¹ Nūrī spoke there.⁸⁹² Ḥusaynī spoke there.⁸⁹³ Ḥuṣrī spoke there repeatedly.⁸⁹⁴

In November 1935, Yāsīn published Law No. 50, which institutionalized the Futuwwa, the second group, to train students “in military maneuvers, shooting and love the regime.”⁸⁹⁵ Five months later in 1936, Yāsīn's government established the third group when Arabs revolted in Palestine. There, mobs in Jaffa slew nine people, accusing Jews of murdering Arabs. The British declared a state of emergency. In protest, Arabs in Nablus and Jerusalem went on strike in April.⁸⁹⁶ Meanwhile in Iraq, Yāsīn's circle organized the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, ostensibly a charity, to fund fighters and distribute anti-Jewish propaganda.⁸⁹⁷ The Committee was a veiled-government institution. The founder was the chief-of-staff, Ṭaha, who was Yāsīn's brother.⁸⁹⁸ Yāsīn's editor, Sab'āwī, was the director.⁸⁹⁹ Ṭaha led the Committee with other Muthanná members – politicians, civil servants or Yāsīn's employees and friends – creating layers of deniability, as Muthanná collaborated with the Futuwwa and the Committee,

887 “Tāsīs Nādī al-Muthanā ” 89; al-Jawāhirī, 146;

888 Shawkat edited Muthanná's publications, which produced a range of books and pamphlets. Exactly which texts Shawkat edited is unclear, see Khadduri, 160; Kazzaz, 213; Kubba, 55

889 al-'Umarī, 107

890 al-Jawāhirī, 146

891 Kubba, 55-56

892 Ibid., 57; Khaldūn Sāṭ'i al-Ḥuṣrī. “Muqadamat fī Tārīkh al-'Irāq al-Ḥadīth,” in al-Hāshimī, 16

893 *al-Zaman*, November 12, 1939. *Wathā'iq*, 100

894 Diplomatic Privilege Radio Tax NA (FO 624/17/327)- 4; “Untitled,” *Ṣawṭ al-Sh'ab*, October 28, 1940. *Wathā'iq*, 98

895 al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakarātī Fī al-'Irāq*, Vol. II, 381

896 Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion*, Vol. II, 1929-1939, (Frank Cass: Totowa, 1977) 162

897 The Committee did so through a third party in Damascus, see Cypher to Peterson (Baghdad). Feb 18, 1939. No. 35. CZA (S25\22719)- 2

898 Kubba, 59; Cohen, “The Anti-Jewish Farhud,” 6

899 *al-Mustaqbal*, n.d. in *Wathā'iq*, 112

and some Muthanná leaders participated in all three groups.⁹⁰⁰ The Committee was disguised with a cast of reputable frontmen: a senator, a parliamentarian, and a former Prime Minister – but behind the Committee was always Muthanná, Yāsīn’s insiders and the State.⁹⁰¹

The Committee was a political-media complex, enabling anti-Semitism’s spread. Members included the editors of the dailies *al-Istiqlāl* and *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*.⁹⁰² In Basra, two newspaper editors, *al-Nās*’ ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Sayyāb, and *al-Sijill*’s Ṭaha al-Fayyāḍ, were Muthanná agents that enacted Ṭaha’s secret orders.⁹⁰³ The group used *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*’s publishing house to distribute leaflets attacking Jews.⁹⁰⁴ Despite the front’s name, the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, its leaders were concerned with ‘protecting’ Iraq, which they believed Jews endangered. Their leaflets said Zionism would annex Iraq, destroy the economy, and predominate Communism because, they said, Zionism was Communism.⁹⁰⁵ Ṭaha’s journal from 1919 onwards, for decades, said Europe waged ethnocide against Arabs. France deracinated Tunisia, Algeria and Syria, Ṭaha said. Ṭaha visited Palestine in 1931, and said the country was not ‘Arab.’ England planned the same for Iraq. “English will become the official language. Arabic will not have a chance. The Iraqis of the Ottoman era will not know their language,” he wrote. “Foreigners will make the country as a foreign India as it was once Arab. The population’s increase in the coming years, six million or nine million cannot be ruled out, of which 3 million are Arabs. The rest are foreign colonialists.”⁹⁰⁶

900 Kubba, 59; Sāmī Shawkat, *Ṣāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣrī*, Muḥammad Faḍel Jamālī and Darwīsh al-Miqdādī, see Bashkin, *The Other Iraq*, 55

901 MP Said al-Thābit; former PM, Nājī al-Suwaydī (1938); Sen. Muḥammad al-Sadr (1939), see Mr. Howard (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) Palestine. And cognate Matters: Miscellaneous. March 18, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 17a

902 Cohen, “The Anti-Jewish Farhud,” 6

903 Jope (Habbaniya) to G.V. DeGaury. March 2, 1939. IOR (R/15/5/126/ File 2/1)- 337; Basra’s local Muthanná was called Muhalib, see Vyvian Holt to Wolstan Weld-Forester, Jan 20, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/214)- 22; Vyvian Holt to F.A.G. Cook, January 20, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/214)-20

904 Bashkin, *New Babylonians*, 104; Cohen, 6; Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 102; Ben Zvi (Vā’ād HaLē’ūmī) to Neville Laski (London) Oct 20, 1936. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 1

905 Bashkin, *New Babylonians*, 104

906 al-Hāshimī, 47-48, 102; for quotes, see p. 48

As Ṭaha managed the army, he left the Committee's operations to Sa'īd Thābit, a Mosul deputy.⁹⁰⁷ A month before the strike, Thābit traveled to Tiberius, exhorting jihad. In Jaffa, Palestine, at an event where speakers roared Jews menaced holy sites, Thābit said a non-Arab Palestine endangered Iraq. "Iraq herself cannot be independent unless Syria and Palestine are," he said, Iraq would be isolated because only Muslims and Christians can be Arab.⁹⁰⁸ Once the strike erupted, Thābit told Najaf's *Ashrāf*, of "the dangers of annihilation in Palestine and Arab countries, Muslim religious holy sites, in all their countries, due to the ambitions of the Jews."⁹⁰⁹

It is unclear if the Committee spread new calumnies or recycled popular convictions, but politicians unassociated with the Committee believed the slander. Less than a week later, on September 26th, Palestine's erstwhile High Commissioner, Herbert Samuel, chanced upon an Iraqi politician, Nūrī, in Geneva. Samuel hoped for a customs union between Palestine and Iraq, but Nūrī rejected it, lest the policy "enable the Jews to destroy the trade."⁹¹⁰ His colleague, the acting Foreign Minister, 'Abbas al-Mahdī, deplored "Jews had bombed the bazaars at Haifa and Jaffa, killing many Arabs on both occasions, yet the authorities had not retaliated by destroying the Jewish quarters," when the bombings were fictions of Muthanná's propaganda.⁹¹¹ Mahdī cautioned Iraqis were upset Britain bombed Arab homes instead and "something unexpected" might happen to Iraq's Jews.⁹¹² Or Later, in 1939, when Britain organized a regional summit, the London Conference of 1939, to determine Palestine's fate,⁹¹³ the proceedings suggest Nūrī, then Prime Minister, believed Muthanná's screeds. He asked for guarantees against "Jewish domination."⁹¹⁴ At the Conference, he said negotiations would fail "because of American

907 "The Jews in Iraq: Government Officials take part in incitement" *Jewish Telegraph Agency* (Oct 26, 1936) NA (FO 954/12B)-387

908 A.G. Wauchope (High Commissioner for Palestine) April 1936. Dispatch No. 382 No. N/9/36. CZA (S25\22719)- 182

909 Kubba, 59

910 Nūrī al-Sa'īd (Paris) to Iraqi Prime Minister. Iraqi Permanent Delegation to Geneva. Sept 26, 1936. No. 979. CZA (S25\22719)- 170, 172

911 W.E. Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) Sept 14, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 46-47

912 Ibid.,- 45

913 Baghdad to Foreign Office (London) Dec 27, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)-9

914 Perhaps 35% of population, see (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Dec 3, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)-22

pressure on England, and the Jews behind them.” Later, when Ben-Gurion said Jews wanted only a state, Nūrī’s colleague, Tawfīq al-Suwaydī, said the assertion was “Zionist lies,” ‘Jewish influence’ existed in Basra and Mosul, and “the Zionists and behind them the Americans strangled the British government,” indicating, Suwaydī believed in the false myth of hidden Jewish conquest, which Muthanná propagated.⁹¹⁵

Thereafter until 1940, Ṭaha, in his various roles, channeled funds to the Committee. As Interior Minister, he sent circulars to government offices, requesting donations.⁹¹⁶ As Defense Minister, he asked troops to donate.⁹¹⁷ The Red Crescent contributed.⁹¹⁸ Ghāzī contributed.⁹¹⁹ The government contributed.⁹²⁰ Basra’s governor contributed and hosted a banquet to raise funds.⁹²¹ So did a variety of senators, deputies and officials.⁹²² Newspapers published donors list and solicitors canvassed contributions for “Arab *Mujāhidīn*.”⁹²³ In 1936, the Committee sent two million dinars.⁹²⁴ The government said the money was for humanitarian purposes.⁹²⁵ Solicitors collected for ‘victims,’ or hardship, or a women’s group.⁹²⁶ Schools encouraged students to collect funds.⁹²⁷ Nevertheless, the Committee never sent donations to charities nor to Palestine, but to a militant in Damascus, Izzat Daruzah, who transferred the assets to gunmen to carryout attacks.⁹²⁸

915 al-Suwaydī, 281-283, 286, for first quote, see 281, for second quote see, 282, for third, see 286

916 Peterson to FO (London). February 2, 1939. CZA (S25\22719)-7

917 Lee (Colonial Office) to Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine Miscellaneous.” Mar 2, 1939. NA (KV2/2084)- 45a

918 British chargé d’affaires (Baghdad) to High Commissioner for Palestine. CZA (S25\22719)-178

919 Peterson to Foreign Office. Feb 14, 1939. CZA (S25\22719)- 4

920 Diplomatic Privilege Radio Tax. NA (FO 624/17/327)- 4

921 Sadr Nashaf Sayt, see “The Jews in Iraq: Government Officials take part in incitement” *Jewish Telegraph Agency* (Oct 26, 1936) NA (FO 954/12B)-387; Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2

922 Ambassador (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) CZA (S25\22719)- 80

923 Cypher to Perston (Baghdad). Feb 18, 1939. No. 35. CZA (S25\22719)-2; for quote, see Kubba, 59

924 Simon, 65

925 Cypher to Peterson, Feb 18, 1939. No. 35. CZA (S25\22719)-3

926 Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Feb 2, 1939. CZA (S25\22719)- 7; Ambassador (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) CZA (S25\22719)- 80

927 Simon, 101

928 CZA (S25\22719), Ambassador (Baghdad) to High Commissioner for Palestine, Aug 2, 1938, -77; Cypher to Peterson (Baghdad) Feb 18, 1939. No. 35, -2; Ambassador (Baghdad) to High Commissioner for Palestine (Jerusalem) Jul 19, 1936, -78; Ambassador (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London), - 80

Britain's Ambassador, Peterson, warned, Yāsīn would not suppress the Committee.⁹²⁹ The Committee smuggled weapons at Yāsīn's behest.⁹³⁰ Yāsīn's editor, Sab'āwī, and a colleague at Muthanná, an officer, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh, snuck guns from military depots.⁹³¹ Sab'āwī's editorials for dictatorship and the Assyrian Massacre made him popular among soldiers, furnishing him contacts, and Ṣabbāgh's rank yielded access to guns.⁹³²

Anti-Jewish violence

Iraq's incitement against Jews was part of a tide of anti-Semitism swelling the region. In Damascus, rowdies beat Jews in the streets, and placarders and pressmen falsely cautioned Jews sold poison candies.⁹³³ Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood predicted if the strike failed, Islam could die.⁹³⁴ The Brotherhood's founder, Ḥassan al-Bannā, conveyed the strike in apocalyptic terms, saying "The disaster of Palestine is the severest disaster to befall all Muslims."⁹³⁵ If listeners did not help, the Muslims would lose.⁹³⁶ The rhetoric mirrored Thābit's own, who said Arabs fought "for the defense of Arab culture, Islam and Christianity."⁹³⁷ Yet, in Iraq, the incitement did not initially increase persecution. The Committee published fictitious victories. Readers believed Arab fighters slew hundreds of Jews. Or Jews fled in thousands, or starved. Swaths of Palestine were under Muslim rule. The information fit readers' expectations: Jews were defeated and Muslims prevailed. So the public was content.⁹³⁸ Later, as Palestine's militants fled to Iraq, they

929 Cypher to Peterson (Baghdad) Feb 18, 1939. No. 35. CZA (S25\22719)-2

930 Simon, 65

931 al-Jawāhirī, 147; Batatu, 457

932 Batatu, 458; al-'Umarī, 64-65

933 Stillman, *Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times*, 101

934 Maḥmūd 'Abd al-Ḥalīm, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn: Aḥdāth Ṣaḡhat al-Tārīkh- Rawīya min al-Dākhil*, (Dār al-Da'wa: Alexandria, 1983) 174

935 Ḥassan al-Bannā, *Mudhakarāt al-Da'wa wa al-Dā'iyyā*, (al-Zāhira lil'ilām al-'arabī: Cairo, 1990) 285

936 Abd al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question, 1928-1947*, (Tauris Academic Studies: London, 1998) 19-20; 36

937 Sa'īd Thābit (Palestine Defense Committee) Sept 19, 1936. No. 40. Translation. Enclosure No. 2. Despatch No. 708. American Legation (Baghdad) Oct 14, 1936. NARA (890G.4016)

938 S.B., "The Fate of Iraq Jewry," 5-6

brought news of defeats that enflamed the country.⁹³⁹ One such ‘exile,’ ‘Abd al-Raḥman, organized a ring to massacre Iraq’s Jews, but, the plotters, were reluctant to wage murder on such a scale, and never enacted the scheme.⁹⁴⁰

On Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish new year, when families go to synagogues to pray, there was indignation Jews celebrated while Muslims ‘lost.’ The day was proclaimed Palestine Day. The Committee extorted ‘contributions’ from Jewish businesspeople or pedestrians. Gangs of solicitors roved the Jewish quarter, and wherever Jews gathered – synagogues or cafes – demanding money.⁹⁴¹ Mosques denounced Iraq’s Jews and the government for protecting Jews.⁹⁴² At the conclusion of prayers at the Hayder-Khana Mosque, thousands of worshippers spilled forth, bullying Jews they crossed.⁹⁴³ Amid the fury, as two patrons left al-Zawra, a Jewish social club, a gunman in the crowd, fired at the pair. Police concluded neither victim was in politics, a ‘Zionist,’ nor had enemies, but they were identifiably Jewish from the establishment they left.⁹⁴⁴

The killings increased anti-Semitism, as those who resented Jews blamed them for the murders in order to avoid indicting Arabism. Yāsīn’s government censured Jews for the disturbances. Agitators praised the shooting. The murders inspired more attacks. Some subversives built homemade bombs with fantasies to drive out Jews. Public ‘Jew-beatings’ increased. Gunfire strafed a Jewish club and a cafe.⁹⁴⁵ The slogan, ‘slaughter the Jews,’ *aṭbahū al-yahūd*, was graffitied on walls.⁹⁴⁶ On Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year, as

939 Shmuel Moreh, “The Role of Palestinian Incitement and the Attitude of Arab Intellectuals to the Farhud,” *Al-Farhud: The 1941 Pogrom in Iraq*, ed. Shmuel Moreh, (the Hebrew University Magnes Press: Jerusalem, 2010) 122

940 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 6

941 *Ibid.*, 6-7

942 *Ibid.*; Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Haḡ ha-Shavū’ōt*, 17

943 Sa’īd Thābit, Sept 19, 1936. Enclosure No. 2. Despatch No. 708. Oct 14, 1936. NARA (890G.4016); S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 6-7

944 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Haḡ ha-Shavū’ōt*, 17

945 S.B., “The Fate of Iraq Jewry,” 7

946 *Ibid.*; Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

hundreds gathered at synagogue, someone hurled a bomb that failed to explode.⁹⁴⁷ On October 8, the last day of Sukkot, a holiday which commemorates Moses leading Jews through the desert, a man who wanted a government contract assassinated Yehezkel Kader, a Jew who outbid him, on a late morning street when many bustled about.⁹⁴⁸ The atmosphere tensed. Yāsīn banned news of the slaying.⁹⁴⁹ Police claimed the assailant was Jewish.⁹⁵⁰ Meanwhile, the Jewish community asked Yāsīn for protection.⁹⁵¹ The request implied Jews were imperiled and Yāsīn, embarrassed, ordered the Community to sign a ‘spontaneous’ renunciation of Zionism.⁹⁵² The government said, renounce Zionism in favor of Iraq, or your community will be massacred. The press made similar threats.⁹⁵³ To divert danger, Khaḍḍūrī issued a press release: “the Jewish community in Iraq has no connection with the Zionist movement.”⁹⁵⁴ Though some papers lauded the announcement, others complained, “The Jews are Zionists despite the announcement.”⁹⁵⁵

The day after at Kader’s funeral, perhaps ten thousand marched beside the coffin, protesting Yāsīn.⁹⁵⁶ Young men brandished knives, threatening to kill Arabs. Following the ceremony, they marched to Khaḍḍūrī’s house, angry at the incitement or the murder or both, cursing, screaming, blaming him for Kader’s death, banging on walls, yelling: ‘Khaḍḍūrī is an Arab. Khaḍḍūrī is Yāsīn’s stooge. Khaḍḍūrī acts against Jews.’⁹⁵⁷ Those hostile to Jews chose to see the protest as against Khaḍḍūrī’s statement.⁹⁵⁸ “There is a need to purify Iraq from this ugly

947 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 7

948 James S. Moose “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” Legation of the United States (Baghdad) Oct 14, 1936. NARA (890G.4016 Jews/I2) 1; Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Hag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 17

949 “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” Oct 14, 1936. (890G.4016 Jews/I2), 1-2; Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch 708. Oct 13, 1936.

950 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Hag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 17

951 Moose “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” Oct 14, 1936. (890G.4016 Jews/I2), 1-2; Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch 708.

952 Sereni, 13

953 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 7-8; Ben Zvi (Vā’ād Ha-Lē’ūmī) to Neville Laski (London) Oct 20, 1936. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2

954 Moose “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” (890G.4016 Jews/I2), 1-2; Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch 708, see also “Bē-‘Ares ‘Aravīṭ ‘Asher Lē-Yēhūdīm Yesh Bah Zēhūt-Mī’ūt Maṣavam shel Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Iraq.” *Davar* (Tel Aviv) Oct 16, 1936. CZA (S90/2193/35)

955 Moose “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” Oct 14, 1936. NARA (890G.4016 Jews/I2) 2; for quote, see Quoted from *Ṣawṭ al-Ṣ’ab* newspaper, see Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

956 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Hag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 18

957 Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Moose “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” Oct 14, 1936. (890G.4016 Jews/I2), 1-2; Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch 708. Oct 13, 1936.

958 Moose “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” Oct 14, 1936. NARA (890G.4016 Jews/I2), 2

race,” one newspaper told readers, to show “this is Iraq, it will not hesitate from effacing every virus that wants to lose its head.”⁹⁵⁹

The violence also enraged Jewish opinion. Khāḍḍūrī, together with other Community leaders met Rashīd ‘Ālī, protesting the murders and incitement. Rashīd ‘Ālī promised to act, but he never closed the government-linked newspapers, Muthanná, Futuwwa or the Committee, all four fomenting against Jews.⁹⁶⁰ Nor did Khāḍḍūrī’s renunciation abate attacks. “The effect of such denial was nil, and the Arab public, far from refraining from any acts against the Jews, continued their acts of violence under the nose of a lenient Government,” a report smuggled out of Iraq that October said.⁹⁶¹ Perpetrators assaulted or robbed.⁹⁶² Blackmailers threatened to accuse victims of Zionism.⁹⁶³

Police promised to quell the situation, but days later, on Oct 12, *Lailat al-Mi’rāj*, a holiday celebrating Muḥammad’s heavenly ascension from Jerusalem, though the Arab Strike ceased, there were lectures for Palestine, and afterwards a Jew was murdered. Rumors flew four others were slain.⁹⁶⁴ On Oct 13, knifemen killed George Khalif in his Basra home.⁹⁶⁵ That night, a gunman assassinated David Ezra, a Kirkuk businessman, near the Iraq Museum. Ezra’s death was a scandal: in a public area, only briefly in the city. Yāsīn ordered Jews to avoid Ezra’s funeral; police demanded the body transported by car to a tiny hall to avoid crowds. Nevertheless, large numbers disobeyed. Twenty thousand followed Ezra’s casket in procession. Police charged the mourners with batons to prevent the procession, injuring many.⁹⁶⁶ The next

959 The newspaper was al-Liwa, see “Bē-‘Areṣ ‘Aravīt ‘Asher Lē-Yēhūdīm.” *Davar* (Tel Aviv) Oct 16, 1936. CZA (S90\2193\35)

960 Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. Iraq Correspondences (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

961 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 8

962 Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. Iraq Correspondences (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

963 “Bē-‘Areṣ ‘Aravīt ‘Asher Lē-Yēhūdīm.” *Davar* (Tel Aviv) Oct 16, 1936. CZA (S90\2193\35)

964 Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. Iraq Correspondences (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); Moose “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” Oct 14, 1936. NARA (890G.4016 Jews/I2) 2-3

965 Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. Iraq Correspondences (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2; S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 9

966 n.a., Hebrew document. Oct 15, 1936. Iraq Correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 8-9

day, Oct 14th, at a cafe in one of the bustling areas of Baghdad, where numerous Jews ate, a patron stood upon his chair, remunerated discriminations against Jews, and implored his listeners to do something,⁹⁶⁷ “Long live Jewish unity.”⁹⁶⁸ Abruptly, a Muslim strode forth and slapped the speaker. A fistfight exploded, as bystanders, Jewish and Muslim, rushed into the melee. Police arrested fourteen Jews for incitement, including the speaker who stood upon his seat. Afterwards, Jews closed their stores in protest. More stores closed the next day, Oct 15, after a perpetrator stabbed a man in the bazaar. Jewish schools closed two days after the academic year began. Few went out.⁹⁶⁹ Opposition leaders promised to help the Community by impeaching Yāsīn, saying, Yāsīn does not protect *dhimma*, and urged parliament to remove him.⁹⁷⁰ In response, Yāsīn confronted Khaḍḍūrī, demanding to reopen the schools.⁹⁷¹ The Education Supervisor threatened to terminate unopened schools, but when he investigated, found the schools open and administrators asking pupils to come.⁹⁷² It was parents who refused to send their children.⁹⁷³

On Rosh Chodesh, the holiday marking the new moon, Oct 17, David ‘Azir was murdered beside his house. A strike was announced, by who is unknown.⁹⁷⁴ For three days, Jews refused to work.⁹⁷⁵ On the eve of October 19 or the early dawn after, Levi, a pharmacist, (unrelated to the bookseller mentioned earlier) was murdered. Levi accompanied Ghāzī’s doctor on house calls, and while returning home, the culprit, incensed a Jew worked in the palace,

967 The neighborhood was called Exchange Square, see James S. Moose, Jr. JSM: MH File No. 800. “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” American Legation (Baghdad) 3-4

968 n.a., Oct 15, 1936. Iraq Correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

969 Ibid.; Moose, Jr. JSM: MH File No. 800. “Anti-Jewish Agitation in Iraq,” 3-4

970 Letter (Baghdad) Oct 13, 1936. Iraq Correspondences (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2

971 n.a., Oct 15, 1936. Iraq Correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

972 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 18

973 n.a., Oct 15, 1936. Iraq Correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

974 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 18

975 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 9

ambushed Levi.⁹⁷⁶ The same evening, Reuven Barmag, a train manager, was murdered. The culprit said all Jews were close to the Yishuv, the Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Yāsīn wanted to show the Community was well, and refute the assertions his cabinet hated Jews. So, he announced he would play bridge at a Jewish club; yet, when he arrived, the hall was empty except for friends he had arranged to meet. Where were the all patrons, Yāsīn asked. His friends told him, there are attacks on Jews. He did not know, Yāsīn said, and promised to protect them in a public show.⁹⁷⁷ For it was his own government that agitated against Jews. Jewish leaders and Britain’s ambassador asked Rashīd ‘Ālī to stop the administration’s “anti-Jewish terror.”⁹⁷⁸ Thereafter Yāsīn may have assented, for he censured his press, warning of harsh punishments against “disturbers of peace,” but he never mentioned anti-Semitism.⁹⁷⁹ He never admitted wrongdoing or that anti-Semitism was wrong. Those who cultivated the violence remained in power.

Bakr Sidqī

State-sponsored anti-Semitism halted when Yāsīn was deposed. From his machinations to steal power, Yāsīn, in a pact among plotters, promised Hikmet the Interior Ministry, but proffered the post to Rashīd ‘Ālī instead.⁹⁸⁰ Incensed and insulted, Hikmet left Yāsīn’s coalition, and Iraq, sulking in Turkey for months, and abandoned *Qawmiyya*. He returned with the habit of donning Turkish hats, telling colleagues Iraq should be like Turkey.⁹⁸¹ Hikmet joined friends in the Ahālī party.⁹⁸² The group used socialist rhetoric and advocated an ideology of its own

976 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Hag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 18; 54

977 Ibid., 18

978 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 9; for quote, see Vā’ād Ha-Lē’ūmī to Weizmann (London) Oct 20, 1936. Iraq Correspondences (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

979 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 9

980 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Hag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 19

981 Khadduri, 77-78

982 Ibid., 77

crafting, what members called *Sha‘abiyya*, Popularity, a pastiche of terms in political vogue: ‘family,’ ‘religion’ and ‘*Waṭaniyya*,’ and echoed the medieval *Shu‘ūbīya* movement that denied Arab supremacy.⁹⁸³ Next, Hikmet conspired with Bakr Ṣidqī.⁹⁸⁴ The two were friends since Hikmet supported the Assyrian Massacre, and Ṣidqī wanted to be chief-of-staff, but Yāsīn’s brother, Ṭaha, occupied the post.⁹⁸⁵ So when Ṭaha visited Turkey in October 1936 to procure weapons, Ṭaha, ignorant of the plot, left Ṣidqī in command.⁹⁸⁶ Ṣidqī feigned practice maneuvers to concentrate forces near Baghdad, and on October 29, marched on the capital.⁹⁸⁷ Twenty-pound guns blasted the Defense Ministry.⁹⁸⁸ Bombs killed civilians.⁹⁸⁹ Yāsīn’s cabinet fled and Ṣidqī’s troops entered the city.⁹⁹⁰

Hikmet ended state-sponsored anti-Semitism and promised to treat religions equally so long as *dhimmi*s avoided politics.⁹⁹¹ He blazoned his cabinet with motifs of protector, telling officials he was “disgusted by the sectarian and racial fanaticism” Yāsīn abetted; and Hikmet revealed, days earlier, as he chided his children to remain home on the day of the putsch, “the children at once became happily excited and said ‘Oh! Papa, are they going to kill all the Jews and may we kill the grocer the corner of our street and loot his shop?’”⁹⁹² Hikmet was “horrified to find such thoughts in his children’s minds. Ideas of this kind had never been voiced in his house and he had no doubt that the infection came from the school where hatred for others was

983 Khadduri, 72-73; Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Shu‘ūbīyah Controversy and the Social History of Early Islamic Iran,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 7 (1976) 161-182

984 al-Hāshimī, 135

985 Ibid., 137; Khadduri, 82;

986 al-Hāshimī, 135; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 233

987 De Gaury, 99; Khadduri, 85

988 De Gaury, 100

989 J.G. Ward, Minutes. Aug 12, 1937, in “Murder of Bakr Sidki” Aug 12, 1937, E. 4688/14/93. (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 106

990 Longrigg, 249-250; Khadduri, 92

991 n.a. to M.D. Waldman, (American Jewish Committee) Nov 30, 1936. Iraq correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 2; J.G. Ward, Minutes. Aug 12, 1937, (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 108

992 A. Clark Kerr (Baghdad) to G. W. Rendel (London) Nov 3, 1936. (FO 371/20014) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 597

inculcated.”⁹⁹³ Hikmet sent Khaddūrī a letter denouncing Yāsīn’s anti-Semitism, and perhaps asked Khaddūrī publicize it:

Corrupt persons have seized the opportunity of the present situation in Palestine here after the end of the strike to try to disturb the comfort and familiarity between religions through different media and disgusting rumors. In the face of these abhorrent attempts we affirm to everyone that the government is taking firm measures to punish corrupt persons.⁹⁹⁴

When Muslims treating *dhimīs* well was part of the country’s foundational myth, persecution was a smear for critics to denounce a regime. Indicting Rashīd ‘Ālī and Yāsīn with oppression was to discredit them, and Khaddūrī response conveyed Hikmet protected *dhimīs* while Yāsīn abused.⁹⁹⁵ Hikmet ceased Palestine propaganda, later telling British officials, he “did not care a hang for Palestine.”⁹⁹⁶ He told Arabists he would not tolerate disturbances.⁹⁹⁷ Perhaps Hikmet rejected *Qawmiyya* because in a state ‘for the Arabs,’ there was no place for him, a Turk and Turcophile.⁹⁹⁸ Yāsīn, an Arabist, had disposed of Hikmet quite easily, and, while Hikmet was born in Baghdad, *Qawmiyya* did not base inclusion on birthplaces. Opponents denounced Hikmet’s dereliction of Arabism.⁹⁹⁹ They impugned Hikmet was a Communist;¹⁰⁰⁰ a Leftist;¹⁰⁰¹ and everyone for equality was a Communist;¹⁰⁰² and an anti-Arab racist.¹⁰⁰³ Suwaydī’s memoir said Iraq suffered “sneaky Communists under the veil of *Waṭaniyya*.”¹⁰⁰⁴ Neither Hikmet nor Šidqī, a Kurd of mixed background, belonged.¹⁰⁰⁵ Both wanted a multicultural autocracy,¹⁰⁰⁶ without Arabist or Islamic overtones.¹⁰⁰⁷

993 Ibid., 598

994 Sāsūn Khaddūrī, “ Bayān ilā Abnā’ al-Ṭā’ifāh al-Isrā’īliyah Fī al-‘Irāq,” Iraq correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

995 President of the General Council (Vaad Leumi) of the Jewish Community of Palestine. Oct 30, 1936. Iraq correspondence. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

996 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 20; for quote, see Baghdad to Foreign Office (London) June 22, 1937. CZA (S25\22719)- 163

997 Ibid.

998 Khadduri, 77; J.G. Ward, Minutes. Aug 12, 1937, (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 108

999 Khadduri, 97

1000 Ibid., 98

1001 al-Hāshimī, 138

1002 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 20

1003 Khadduri, 109

1004 al-Suwaydī, 301

1005 Twena, *Mē’ōre’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 19

1006 Khadduri, 108

1007 J.G. Ward, Minutes. Aug 12, 1937, (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 108

Popular anti-Semitism continued under Hikmet. He valued the tropes of protector and *dhimmi* norms, excluding Jews from politics and leadership roles. A lawyer told one Jewish group in Britain though Hikmet would not discriminate, “the attitude of the present Government towards the Jews will not differ from that of the former,” he said “they have a deep rooted suspicion of all foreign Jews who are ipso facto dubbed as Zionists.”¹⁰⁰⁸ From November to July 1937, Palestine’s violence ebbed as the Peel Commission worked to recommend British policy.¹⁰⁰⁹ Hikmet presumed the Commission’s recommendation of partition would enrage Arabists. A Jewish polity subverted ideals *Qawmiyya* held dear: Arab rule over a vast Arabia where everything is Arab and Muslim, while minorities serve as props to reify the rightness of the regime. “He would have to think of the Jewish minority and how to ensure their safety,” Hikmet said. “There would certainly be unfortunate incidents which it would not be within his power to prevent.”¹⁰¹⁰ Firebrands already said a Jewish government would rule Medina, Islam’s second holiest city.¹⁰¹¹ On July 7, Peel recommended partition of Palestine. Hikmet publicly denounced Peel; but privately, he apologized and predicted pogroms, a massacre of Jews. Opinion was furious. “His government would be obliged to show that they fully shared the popular feel in this matter for if they did not everyone would be against them and they would not be able to control the situation.”¹⁰¹²

Outbursts were not timed to coincide with the announcement, July 7, which political circles knew in advance, but weeks later, with the Jewish holiday of Tisha’ Bě-‘Av on July 18, a fast mourning the destruction of the Temple. ‘Aunī ‘abd al-Hādī, a politician from Palestine, who

1008 n.a, to M.D. Waldman, (American Jewish Committee) Nov 30, 1936. Iraq correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 1-2

1009 Francis Nicosia, “Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933-1939: Ideological and Strategic Incompatibility,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (Cambridge University Press: 1980) 356

1010 Baghdad to Foreign Office (London) June 22, 1937. CZA (S25\22719)- 163

1011 Enclosure from Jedda despatch No. 41 (402/430/24) March 23, 1937. CZA (S25\22719)- 89

1012 Baghdad to Foreign Office (London) July 11, 1937. CZA (S25\22719)- 155

ascribed the Arab Strike to jihad, and dubbed Palestine, *Filasṭīn Mujāhida*,¹⁰¹³ jihadist Palestine-mustered a protest that enflamed into rioting. There were no deaths, but thirty were hospitalized.¹⁰¹⁴

Assassination

Muthanná seized power and returned state-sponsored anti-Semitism. Within the military, a secret ring of seven officers who are unnamed in history, but for ease of reference will be called the Ring of Seven, plotted to kill to Ṣidqī to make Iraq a *Qawmiyya* state. Among the conspirators were members of Muthanná's covert army organization, *Jamia' al-Jawāl*, the Society of Scouts: Ṣabbāgh, Sab'āwī and Fahmī Sa'id.¹⁰¹⁵ Sab'āwī gathered the Ring at his house.¹⁰¹⁶ The Ring said, Ṣidqī favored minorities;¹⁰¹⁷ and threatened Iraq's Arab character.¹⁰¹⁸ Ṣabbāgh's memoirs said Ṣidqī, a Kurd, led a Kurdish front and submerged Iraq's Arabism.¹⁰¹⁹ The prospect of non-Arabs in power – Hikmet a Turk, Ṣidqī a Kurd – radicalized them.¹⁰²⁰ Ṣidqī's private life disgusted them – he insulted Arabs; he married a European dancer.¹⁰²¹ To protect Arabism the Ring decided Ṣidqī must die.¹⁰²²

On August 11, Ṣidqī lunched at Mosul's airdrome, in an officers' mess hall, at a table upon a lawn. Then at 5 p.m., as Ṣidqī napped, a driver transported two men, a corporal and private, to the mess: the Private to identify Ṣidqī, the Corporal to shoot. The Corporal stood

1013 al-Bannā, 283

1014 C.V. Redd to Adolph Brotman, July 28, 1937. Iraq correspondence. (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); "Scores of Jews Reported Injured, Shops Looted After Baghdad Arab Demonstration," *Jewish Telegraphic News Agency* (New York) July 19, 1937 (Vol. 11, No. 289) 2. Jewish Telegraphic Agency Digital Archive. <https://www.jta.org>. accessed September 27, 2019. <https://www.jta.org/1937/07/19/archive/scores-of-jews-reported-injured-shops-looted-after-bagdad-arab-demonstrations>

1015 'al-Jawāhirī, 145-146

1016 al-'Umarī, 68

1017 Oswald Scott (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) August 18, 1937. No. 342. E-5071. (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 116

1018 Khaldūn Sāt'i al-Ḥuṣrī, "Muqadamah fi Tārīkh al-'Irāq al-Ḥadīth," in al-Hāshimī, 26

1019 Ṣalāh al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh, *Fursān al-'Arūba: Mudhakarāt al-Ṣahīd al-'Aqīd al-Ruken Ṣalāh al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh*, (Rabat, 1994) 30

1020 K. al-Ḥuṣrī, 28

1021 Scott to Eden, Aug 18, 1937. (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 116; Longrigg, 109

1022 K. al-Ḥuṣrī, 26

under the veranda, Browning revolver in hand. He waited. A half hour later, at 5:30, Şidqī emerged, and sat on a chair in the evening breeze, under the shade, unaware two men lurked behind. The Corporal shot Şidqī in the head.¹⁰²³

The regional commander, Gen. Amin al-‘Umarī, seized Iraq’s North. His soldiers seized the killers, but Amin refused to surrender them or arrest the Ring. The disaffected admired Amin as an Arab champion. Amin issued a manifesto, demanding Şidqī’s supporters banished and Yāsīn’s cabinet returned from exile, for though Yāsīn had died, Rashīd ‘Ālī was still abroad. Faced with civil war, Hikmet resigned.¹⁰²⁴

Parliament became a façade for a small circle of Muthanná leaders.¹⁰²⁵ From the Ring emerged a clique of four colonels, the Golden Square, who overshadowed politics until the Anglo-Iraq war of 1941.¹⁰²⁶ Three of them belonged to Muthanná: Şabbāgh, Fahmī Sa’īd, and Maḥmūd Salman.¹⁰²⁷ They promoted *Qawmiyya* and Anglophobia,¹⁰²⁸ seething Britain undermined Iraq,¹⁰²⁹ was ‘pro-Jewish,’¹⁰³⁰ and politicians who opposed conflict with Britain were crypto-Turks.¹⁰³¹ The Golden Square ensured their supporters officered units they influenced.¹⁰³² Nevertheless, the Golden Square was disinclined to rule directly, and never tried. They admired Japan’s military men who guided policy to invade China without governing Japan. The Golden Square likened themselves to these Japanese officers and emulated the same role.¹⁰³³ They installed politicians who agreed with their goals. If a Prime Minister acted contrary, the

1023 Scott to Eden, Aug 18, 1937. (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII, 111-112

1024 Ibid., 114-116, 118

1025 John Bagot Glubb. “Secret: A Report on the Role Play by the Arab Legion in connection with the Recent Operations in Iraq.” Amman. June 10, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/589)- 25 (p. 13)

1026 The four Colonels were Şalāh al-Dīn al-Şabbāgh, 3rd Division; Kāmel Shabīb, 1st Division; Fahmī Sa’īd, Mechanized Brigade; and Maḥmūd Salman, Air Force, see Chancery. British Embassy (Baghdad) to Eastern Department. Foreign Office (London) February 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062)- 15

1027 Jamia’ al-Jawāl, see al-Jawāhirī, 145-146

1028 Chancery. British Embassy (Baghdad) to Eastern Department. Foreign Office (London) February 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062)- 15

1029 C.J. Edmonds to Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) July 1, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561) 269 [211]

1030 Bashkin, *New Babylonians*, 104

1031 al-Şabbāgh, 27-28

1032 Chancery. British Embassy (Baghdad) to Eastern Department. Foreign Office (London) February 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062)- 15

1033 Scott to Eden, Aug 18, 1937. (FO 371/20795) in *Records of Iraq*, Vol. VIII., 120

Golden Square deposed him.¹⁰³⁴ From 1938 thereafter, Ṭaha, while chairing the Committee, served as Defense Minister or Prime Minister in each cabinet, an instrument to impose the Golden Square's views.¹⁰³⁵

Ṭaha and the Golden Square amplified anti-Semitism around the issue of Palestine. On April 11, 1938, Finance Minister, Rustum Haider, told parliament Britain championed Zionism for “gold and the great influence which gold exercised.”¹⁰³⁶ Applause exploded through the chamber.¹⁰³⁷ Days later on April 20, Passover, the government issued a secret memorandum to Britain, stating the Cabinet was in “fear of being overwhelmed by the Jews and from the possibility of ultimate subjection to Jews.”¹⁰³⁸ A Jewish state would “endanger security in the Arab countries,” and was a “threat” to their “existence,” the Memorandum said.¹⁰³⁹ On May 12, for Prophet Muḥammad's birthday, the government observed Palestine Day, with mass meetings and processions, and promised to hold another Palestine Day in three months.¹⁰⁴⁰

Amīn Ruwayḥa, a leader of the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, urged “atrocities propaganda” to rouse disorders.¹⁰⁴¹ Muthanná forged letters protesting fictitious ‘atrocities.’¹⁰⁴² Akram Zu'aytar, a co-founder, pretended to be ‘Ismā‘īl al-Sāmīrā’ī’, and published an open letter in the press.¹⁰⁴³ British authorities “supply the Jews with arms, bombs and other infernal

1034 C.J. Edmonds to Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) July 1, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)- 270 [212] (p. 2)

1035 Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) Dec 27, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)-13; C.J. Edmonds to Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) July 1, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)- 270 [212] (p. 2)

1036 Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) April 11, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 108

1037 Ibid.,- 109

1038 A.C. Troat (Baghdad) Aug 24, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 61

1039 Iraqi Memorandum against a Jewish State. Enclosure in Baghdad Despatch No. 166 of April 20, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 105

1040 CZA (S25\22719), Ambassador (Baghdad) to the High Commissioner of Palestine (Jerusalem) August 1, 1938,- 76; R. J. Bowker (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) May 9, 1938,- 94 Ambassador (Baghdad) to High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan (Jerusalem) Aug 2, 1938.- 77

1041 NA (KV2/2084), “Palestine: The Mufti's policy.” October 27, 1938, - 35a (p. 4) Lee (Colonial Office) to Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine: Miscellaneous.” December 13, 1938, - 38b (p. 2)

1042 Isma'il al-Samirai (Basra) to the High Commissioner for Palestine (Jerusalem) CZA (S25\22719)- 159

1043 Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine: Miscellaneous.” December 13, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 38b (p. 2); Moreh, “The Role of Palestinian Incitement,” 130; al-Samirai, CZA (S25\22719)- 156, 159

machines” against “unarmed Arabs,” and “have been so thrown by order of the British,” Zu’aytar wrote under his pen name, Sāmīrā’ī.¹⁰⁴⁴ The “flame might extend to all Arab countries.”¹⁰⁴⁵

Violence followed incitement. Assailants bombed the Laura Khadduri, a Jewish club, repeatedly. On August 13, Motzei Shabbat, the evening following the Jewish day of rest, an explosive blasted the club’s garden, injuring two children.¹⁰⁴⁶ Muthanná convinced a Shiite cleric, Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’, to declare a jihad for “saving Palestine from the criminal Zionist filth;” publishing his remarks,¹⁰⁴⁷ and days later, on August 22, more firebombs flew at Jewish clubs.¹⁰⁴⁸

Moreover, the Shawkat brothers lobbied to expel Iraq’s Jews. At an unsure date, Ṣā’ib Shawkat, Muthanná’s president, pressed the Interior Ministry’s British advisor, Cecil Edmonds, to accept an expulsion. Later on August 22, Ṣā’ib’s sibling, Nājī, the Interior Minister, told Edmonds: “a demand might arise for the expulsion of all the Jews;” press daily reported Nazi programs against Jews, Nājī explained,

Nobody had been able to prevent Hitler from carrying out his drastic anti-Jewish measures in Germany. The Arabs countries as victims of Jewish territorial ambitions would have far stronger justification than the European. It was not entirely fantastic to visualize the ninety thousand Jews of Iraq being escorted across the Euphrates and told to run the gauntlet of the desert to this Palestine of theirs. No one could tell when such a demand might arise; it might develop overnight, it might not be made for three, four or even five years.¹⁰⁴⁹

Embassy staff guessed the Shawkats could unleash such an ethnic cleansing in 1941 or 1942. The Farhūd, the mass-violence against Jews, occurred in 1941, though the documents do not disclose how British officers reached this estimate. Days later, on August 28, a traveler aboard a steamer traversing the Cyprus coast, overheard a passenger relate “proposals to carryout

1044 al-Samirrai, CZA (S25\22719)- 156-157

1045 Ibid., - 158

1046 Houstoun Boswall (Baghdad) August 15, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 191

1047 Kubba, 60

1048 C.J. Edmonds (British Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior) to W.E. Houstoun-Boswall, Esq. (British Embassy, Baghdad) August 22, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 194

1049 Ibid.,- 195

a large scale assassination of Jews in Baghdad;” the passenger despised Nūrī’s government, which suppressed mass violence, and planned to bring an “anti-Jewish party” to power. Such views were “common enough among certain classes of all sections of the Arab community,” British authorities said.¹⁰⁵⁰

Edmonds warned, Iraq’s government would use any violence to enforce an Arab character or maintain the hierarchy of faith.¹⁰⁵¹ Attacks on Jews were applauded. Jewish reprisals, in any country, anywhere, unleashed “bitter feelings,”¹⁰⁵² and invited more persecution.¹⁰⁵³ Complaints of hate crimes invited more persecutions, as the public bristled at assertions Muslims persecuted anyone. Thus anti-Semitic attacks were on a positive feedback loop, wherein assaults encouraged more assaults. The national myth was Muslims are always virtuous and courteous to *dhimmi*s. “We ruled other Ummahs and many other races which we ruled with justice,” said Shawkat, among “the Arab conquerers and rulers were the most just ever seen.”¹⁰⁵⁴ Objections against discrimination were seen as a threat. Naim Kattan, born in Baghdad in 1928, recalled his piece on anti-Semitism was bowdlerized, because, the editor detected “a strong odor of Zionism.”¹⁰⁵⁵ Provocateurs wrote or spoke wistfully of attacking Jews, and some of audience, so influenced, attacked Jews. As reports of assaults and incitement became more frequent, those who believed Muslims were ethical, defended the assaults as self-defense, inviting repetition from copycats, as there was nothing wrong with attacks. Complaints of

1050 P. H. Croswaite, Sept 19, 1938. Minutes. Houston -Boswall (Baghdad) Position of the Jews in Iraq. Aug 29, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)-192; H. R. Palmer. Governor. Government House (Cyprus) to Majesty’s Ambassador. British Embassy (Baghdad) Sept 16, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 200-201, for quote, see -200

1051 C.J. Edmonds to W.E. Houstoun-Boswall, Esq., Aug 22, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 195

1052 Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) to Viscount Halifax (London) August 29, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)-193

1053 C.J. Edmonds to W.E. Houstoun-Boswall, Esq., Aug 22, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 195

1054 Shawkat, 39

1055 Kattan, 12

mistreatment enraged those who thought Muslims treated Jews well, inviting repetition of attacks.¹⁰⁵⁶

Politicians were livid at Jews. The former Interior Minister, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Qaṣṣāb, stalked his office “eye ablaze with anger,” the Prime Minister, Nūrī prohibited demonstrations for Palestine martyrs.¹⁰⁵⁷ Religious leaders appealed to Nūrī to revoke the ban against incitement.¹⁰⁵⁸ “We had a pale indication of some of the possibilities of in 1935 [sic; 1936], when several Jews were murdered in Baghdad in quick succession,” Edmonds wrote. “They were nonetheless symptomatic of a diminution of respect for the sanctity of Jewish life.”¹⁰⁵⁹ In one example, On September 13, 1938, the Embassy’s Counsellor, William Houstoun-Boswall, met the acting Foreign Minister, Maḥdī, and proffered him, as evidence, an extortion letter addressed to a 150 Jewish businessmen.¹⁰⁶⁰ “Protection of Jews, as such, was no part of my duties, but this circular had reached at least one British firm and I was no less anxious than the Government not to witness a popular outbreak against the Jews,” Houstoun-Boswall said.¹⁰⁶¹

The news of the blackmail amused Maḥdī, “he had not heard before of the circular,” he said, and changed the subject to Britain’s oppression of Arabs and favoritism for Jews.¹⁰⁶²

Nūrī was also disinclined to punish attacks on Jews. After the Rafidayn bombing, police never searched for assailants.¹⁰⁶³ Nūrī wanted to amnesty¹⁰⁶⁴ “Arab nationalists or terrorists.”¹⁰⁶⁵

1056 Robert Michael, *Holy Hatred: Christianity, Antisemitism, and the Holocaust*, (Palgrave: New York, 2006) 104

1057 C.J. Edmonds to W.E. Houstoun-Boswall, Esq., Aug 22, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 196

1058 W.E. Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) Sept 14, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 45

1059 C.J. Edmonds to W.E. Houstoun-Boswall, Esq., August 22, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 196 (p. 3)

1060 W.E. Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) Sept 14, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 45

1061 Ibid., - 46

1062 “Saiyid Abbas Maḥdī [sic] did not attempt to conceal his amusement at my reference to this telegram,” see Ibid., - 46-47

1063 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Haq ha-Shavū’ot*, 21; C.J. Edmonds to W.E. Houstoun-Boswall, Aug 22, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 194

1064 Secretary of State (London) to High Commissioner of Palestine (Jerusalem) Nov 30, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 25

1065 NA (FO 371/21861), Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) to Lord Halifax. Oct 24, 1938, 1938, -220; Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) Nov 7, 1938, - 219

The motivation for inaction, was as Mahdī explained, “the Ministers hate Zionism as much as the most forceful members of the Palestine Defense League.”¹⁰⁶⁶

As government took no action and violence continued. On October 22, an assailant hurled a bomb in a Jewish club's garden, injuring three.¹⁰⁶⁷ On November 9-10, the evening of *Kristallnacht*, students marched against Britain in Palestine, and, either as copycats to the Nazis or coincidence, they rioted, smashing boutique windows on the thoroughfare and looted.¹⁰⁶⁸ Over a week later, on November 18, an assailant lobbed a bomb at a cafe “frequented by Jews,” killing one and injuring seven.¹⁰⁶⁹ As the propaganda pulsed in the press, terrorism increased: murders; kidnappings; acid thrown at pedestrians; bombs at stores, and a series of break-ins among Jewish homes. Many began to return home early, feeling unsafe. Rumors said gangs were recruited to attack Jews.¹⁰⁷⁰ By 1939, Britain estimated there were three to five attacks on Jews per day.¹⁰⁷¹

Muthanná's and the Committee's campaigns encouraged a more extreme Jew-hatred in literature, punditry and art, that called for their elimination.¹⁰⁷² Burhān al-Dīn al-‘Abbūshī, a poet, whose works were recited on the radio, in schools and mosques,¹⁰⁷³ wrote in “I will burn the land,” his disgust at, having departed Palestine to escape ‘the Jews,’ he discovered Jews in Iraq too, and urged listeners to destroy them and freeze their assets:

I visited Baghdad on Saturday; shuddering with fright.
I saw malevolence. I saw the shops closed, preparing evil plot.
Near to murder in the Abode of Peace, if Arabs tarry in closing at all.
Destroy them. Tell other Arabs, where their money flows no god is found.
Freeze their money as long as money imprisons your countrymen.¹⁰⁷⁴

1066 WE Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) to Viscount of Halifax (London) Sept 6, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 49

1067 Sir Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) Oct 25, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 202

1068 British Ambassador (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London). Nov 11, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 32

1069 Sir Maurice Peterson (Baghdad) Nov 22, 1938. Telegram. NA (FO 371/21861)- 205

1070 Sereni, 15; Shamash, 178; “The Jews of Iraq,” CZA (Z4\33505)-18; Maurice Peterson. October 13, 1938. CZA (S25\22719)- 38

1071 Bashkin, 104

1072 Moreh, “The Role of Palestinian Incitement,” 128

1073 Ibid., 127; Philip Mendes, “The 1941 Farhud (pogrom) and the Ethnic Cleansing of Jews from Modern Iraq, *Midstream*,” (Vol. 57, Issue 2, 2011)15

1074 The ‘Abode of peace is a pun, an appellation for Baghdad as well as regions where Islam holds sway, see Burhān al-Dīn al-‘Abbūshī, “Sālhub al-Ard,” *Dīwān Jabal al-Nār*, (al-Shirka al-Islāmiya lil-Tibā'a wa al-Nashar al-Mahdūda: Baghdad, 1956) 39-40

Ban on Jewish immigrants

After school quotas, the second step of legal inferiority of Jews in Iraq was immigration policy, wherein foreign Muslims could enter Iraq without a passport, while foreign Jews were barred. Prior to Yāsīn's premiership in 1935, there were no restrictions on Jewish immigrants, and twenty-five refugees from Germany settled in the country. Iraq had a demand for immigrant labor.¹⁰⁷⁵ However, on April 2, 1936, weeks before Palestine's strike, Yāsīn refused to admit immigrants from Iran, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, because they were Jews.¹⁰⁷⁶ This was the first instance of barring Jews from the country, which in time would grow from irregular and ad hoc to a consistent policy. On December 10, 1938, regional delegates met in Damascus, and agreed "Arab countries" should "reject any suggestions for Jewish emigration to their countries."¹⁰⁷⁷ In contrast, Arab Muslims who professed *Qawmiyya*, were "accorded special facilities for entering or leaving Iraq without passports,"¹⁰⁷⁸ British assets said. At the London Conference, on March 10, 1939 in a secret discussion, with the envoys from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq's Suwaydī, the group said banning Jewish immigrants was more crucial than Palestine.¹⁰⁷⁹

Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, proposed Arab states take Jewish refugees, so they need not go to Palestine. The delegates refused. "Immigration of Jews into Iraq" was "regarded as a threat," said Suwaydī. MacDonald explained if there was a proposal to restrict Jews in Palestine – anti-Jewish legislation – outrage in the House Commons would be assuaged if neighboring states accepted refugees, to illustrate, opposition to Jewish

1075 Kurt Battsek. Summary of Information on Emigration Possibilities collected by the Anglo-Hicem (German Jewish Emigration Council London: London, Dec 31, 1934) in Jewish Refugees Committee, London, Jan 1, 1935. JDC (NY AR193344 4 22 588)-472609 (p. 32)

1076 J.H. Thomas. April 2, 1936. CZA (S25\22719)- 184

1077 Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) "Palestine Miscellaneous." January 4, 1939. NA (KV2/2084)- 42a (p. 2-3)

1078 "The Mufti" Nov 18, 1939. (Haj) Amin El Husseini. NA (KV2/2084)- 71a (p. 3)

1079 Settlement of Jews in Iraq: Cabinet Papers. NA (CO 732/85/15)- 1, 6

immigrants was political, not anti-Semitic, foes of the Yishuv, the Jewish settlement in Palestine, wanted to help those fleeing persecution. MacDonald proposed Iraq accept 20,000 refugees. Later, the Foreign Office, contacted Britain's Ambassador in Baghdad, Basil Newton, instructing him to ask Iraq to accept 20,000 Jewish refugees. Newton refused to inquire. The government would never agree.¹⁰⁸⁰

Ghāzī's Death

Shawkat tried to strengthen the anti-Semitic character of the school system. Perhaps his motivation was to counter what he considered a 'Jewish' conspiracy. On April 5, 1939, Ghāzī died in a car crash and public grief burgeoned into xenophobic disorders.¹⁰⁸¹ As tens of thousands attended Ghāzī's funeral,¹⁰⁸² speakers denounced Britain.¹⁰⁸³ Flyers said Nūrī and Britain murdered him. Students in Mosul demonstrated, and on April 6th, a group of pupils, belonging to a secret organization whose name is unknown, protested, raging – Nūrī killed Ghāzī; the government was British – they tromped to Britain's Consulate, swarming the Consul, Monck-Mason, and, brained him to death with a pick-axe. Shawkat belonged to the same secret organization as the students, and maybe feared he would be implicated, saying 'the Jews' bribed the mob to attack. Shawkat said the mob was linked to a Jewish scheme to remove German public school teachers.¹⁰⁸⁴

1080 For quotes, see Settlement of Jews in Iraq: Cabinet Papers. NA (CO 732/85/15)-12; A.W.G. Randall, Esq to Basil Newton. July 11, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/488)-13; the letter is also found at NA (CO 732/85/14) (p. 1-2); Basil Newton to A.W.G. Randall, Esq. July 22, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/488)- 2-3

1081 Fritz Grobba (Baghdad) "Intarigôt Yēhūdiyôt v-Briṭiyôt KēSibā Lē-Ṣa'adīm šninqaṭū 'al-yadê Ha-Iraqīm Neged Ha-Germanīm," June 12, 1939. trans. Temima Hillel. Document 3. *Šin'at Yēhūdīm u-fera'ôt bē-'Iraq*, ed. Shmuel Mores and Zvi Yehuda, (Merkaz Moreshet Yahadut Bavel, ha-Makhon le-heker Yahadut Bavel: Or-Yehudah, 1992) 219; De Gaury, 110

1082 Longrigg, 276

1083 Marginalia. "French Authorities in Syria Refuse Admission into Syria of Official Sent Out on Deputation by Iraqi Ministry of Education." *al-Istiqlāl*, August 8, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 4

1084 Grobba, 219-221; Shamash, *Memories of Eden*, 158; Longrigg, 277; Basil Newton to Viscount Halifax, Sept 15, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/375)- 9; De Gaury, 111

Later that year, possibly in retaliation, Shawkat imposed new regulations to eliminate the Community schools' Jewish character, through two tracks. First, Shawkat imposed an Arab Muslim stamp on education.¹⁰⁸⁵ He banned Community teachers, who were Jewish, from instructing classes in history, geography, Arabic and 'Waṭaniyya,' a class for civics and homeland pride, compelling Ministry teachers, who were Arab Muslims, to instruct them instead.¹⁰⁸⁶ He menaced to shutter schools that taught contrary to *Qawmiyya*.¹⁰⁸⁷ He banned Hebrew instruction,¹⁰⁸⁸ and 'Chapters from the Bible,' a textbook intended to foster tolerance, because it encouraged Jewish students to be Jewish.¹⁰⁸⁹

Second, in May 1939, Shawkat, introduced The Homeland Defense Law¹⁰⁹⁰ mandating middle and high school students join the Futuwwa, and complete its training to graduate.¹⁰⁹¹ Students learned the 'Art of Death,' while elementary students learned "martial ideals."¹⁰⁹² The law made all educators Futuwwa officers, and conferred them ranks of militaristic titles and trappings: the Education Minister became the Emir, Shawkat the Protector, and teachers donned uniforms with badges bearing crossed swords on their shoulders.¹⁰⁹³ Futuwwa also wore soldiers' uniforms,¹⁰⁹⁴ and each morning they saluted the flag, sang martial songs,¹⁰⁹⁵ and heard

1085 Basil Newton (Baghdad) to the Legation of the United States of America (Baghdad) Nov 25, 1939 NA (FO 624/17/375)- 6

1086 Draft New Public Education Law. Enclosure in Bagdad Despatch No. 454 Dated 16th August, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/375)- 19-20; Summary of Committee Meeting of Aug 7, 1939. IJA (3785)- 57 (p. 2)

1087 Referred to regulations as "heresy or destructive ideas," see Draft New Public Education Law. Enclosure in Bagdad Despatch No. 454 Dated 16th August, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/375)- 20

1088 Anglo-Jewish Association, Dec 8, 1947. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/031) (p. 1); Notes ON: Position of Jews in Irak. January 10, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 5

1089 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 143

1090 British Council to Basil Newton (Baghdad) June 16, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 40

1091 NA (FO 624/17/489), FO SWI. E 3959/3959/93. June 20, 1939.- 38; Houstoun-Boswall to Lord Halifax, May 20, 1939. -42

1092 Houstoun-Boswall (Baghdad) to Lord Halifax (London) May 20, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 41

1093 NA (FO 624/17/489), FO SWI. E 3959/3959/93. June 20, 1939.- 38; Houstoun-Boswall to Lord Halifax, May 20, 1939. -42

1094 "Extract from the Proceedings of the Iraqi Senate Meeting of June 24, 1939." Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Lord Halifax (London) July 5, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 26

1095 "Ta'aziz Nizām fī al-Mudāris wa Murāqiba Suluk al-Fatiyān Fī al-Mudarisa wa Khārijha," *al-Thughur*, November 28, 1940. *Wathā'iq*, 94

a speech,¹⁰⁹⁶ or Shawkat in military regalia and on horseback, led the teens¹⁰⁹⁷ through Baghdad's streets in parade.¹⁰⁹⁸

From a small program, the Futuwwa grew to 63,000 members. On June 29, *al-Istiqlāl*, published Shawkat's objectives, to show Futuwwa's "beneficial nature," the editor said. Two versions of Shawkat's editorial are preserved. The Arabic, Shawkat published in a book that year to promote the Futuwwa, and an English translation in British archives. Entitled, "The Higher Objectives of the Futuwwa," the objectives said education's purpose was to inoculate "militarism" and a "love of the regime." New pastimes "blackened the spirit of obedience" such as "detestable things found in these cafes, theaters, and the cinema with its scenes of mirthful people. The West floods us with many things terrible and few good in the home. Sadly the change in our day is to deracinate the father and son," Shawkat said. "This regulation will restore to our nation the quality of manliness, courage, the spirit of chivalry, discipline and sacrifice which our glorious ancestors possessed." The Futuwwa would be an engine to reorient society "to obey Allah and his apostle first and foremost, even if it is to obediently sacrifice their lives for the service of their Ummah." Shawkat said. "Without this we cannot offset a wave of Western secularism weakening and diminishing our moral adequacy."¹⁰⁹⁹

The Futuwwa was the apotheosis of an education system that produced a mass of young people endeared to violence. A 1940 report from Baghdad's Central High school, with a student body of seven hundred, noted a rash of blackmailers menacing death unless grades were raised. Law students shot two instructors.¹¹⁰⁰ "Knives and choppers have been brought into an

1096 The Central Secondary School (Baghdad) 1940. NA (FO 624/21/396)- 10

1097 Khadduri, 161

1098 Sulaymān Šifrānī, "Aina Nizām al-Futuwwa," *al-Yaqza*, February 26, 1950. *Wathā'iq*, 96

1099 Sir Harry C. Sinderson, *Ten Thousand and One Nights: Memoires of Iraq's Sherifan Dynasty*, Hodder and Stoughton: London, 1973) 201; Grobba, 218; for first quote see, Extract from the Press. June 29, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 34; Basil Newton (Baghdad) to George Lloyd (London) July 4, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 29; for other quotes, for Arabic, see Shawkat, 7-9; for an English translation, see Sami Shawkat, "Higher Objects of the 'Futua' Organization," *al-Istiqlāl* (Baghdad) June 29, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 34-35

1100 The Central Secondary School (Baghdad) 1940. NA (FO 624/21/396)- 6, 8

examination to encourage teachers to look the other way,”¹¹⁰¹ an official said. At a school speech contest, debating poetry’s aim, the winner, Najda Şafwā, said poetry should instill masculine power, and then disparaged older topics of romance. “Enough yearning for nightly love,” he said, “yearn for bombs;” the “sound of bullets;” “sacrifice for the fatherland!”¹¹⁰²

Nazis: Influence and radio

There is a question regarding to what the extent Nazism spurred anti-Semitism. Britain and Iraq blamed Fritz Grobba, Germany’s envoy from 1932 to 1939.¹¹⁰³ Grobba told Iraq’s leaders, “Jews are the real inciters of propaganda.”¹¹⁰⁴ Jews and English were friends, and had the same aims.¹¹⁰⁵ Grobba spread propaganda among soldiers and officers, with “beautiful, slender, German secretaries,” surreptitiously offering arm sales, women, money or gifts.¹¹⁰⁶ He gave Ghāzī a car.¹¹⁰⁷ Grobba threw nightly soirees, plying cigars and alcohol to attendees, increasing his contacts, acquaintances and friends, until Grobba knew every minister.¹¹⁰⁸ He financed news stories in *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, and in *al-Istiqlāl*, encouraging the papers to highlight anti-Semitic acts.¹¹⁰⁹ In 1940, Britain’s Foreign Minister told the cabinet: “The Germans have bought up all the newspapers in Iraq and were able to influence public opinion.”¹¹¹⁰

1101 Ibid. -9

1102 Peter Wien, *Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, totalitarian, and pro-fascist inclinations, 1932-1941*, (Routledge Taylor & Francis: New York, 2006) 108

1103 Stark, 76; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 233

1104 “Part III. Judenfrage: Irak. Dated Aug 19-1938-June 6, 1939,” German Foreign Ministry: Politische Abteilung Pol. VII, Bundle 1. Judenfrage u. Beziehungen Indien u. Iran. Date Microfilmed, March 19, 1947. Foreign Office/State Department, Document field team. NA (GFM 33/782) 2

1105 Grobba, 218

1106 For quote see, “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 233; De Gaury, 114; “The Jews of Iraq,” CZA (Z4\33505)-8

1107 Simon, 36

1108 Ibid.; Dr. H. G. Houbert, *Jenaische Zeitung*, March 15, 1935, 10. IJA (3785) 32; “Hafla al-Mufawḍiya al-Amāniyah,” *al-Istiqlāl* (Baghdad) May 3, 1935. *Wathā’iq*, 90; “Irak,” German Foreign Ministry: Politische Beziehungen Irans zu Deutschland. 29 Juli 1935- 6. No. 435753. Foreign Office/State Department, Document field team. NA (GFM 33/782)14

1109 Knabenshue, “Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad,” NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3; Bashkin, *The Other Iraq*, 58; S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 5

1110 Meeting of the War Cabinet. June 15, 1940. 10 am. 10 Downing Street (London) War Cabinet 167 (40). NA (CAB 65/7/62)- 308 (p. 475)

al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī crowed Nazism's success, announcing “three inaugural, consecutive articles will celebrate and praise fascist organizations under the title ‘How to establish strong reforms to win a clear victory.’”¹¹¹¹ Grobba induced *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* to publish a serialized column of *Mein Kampf*, in sections, daily, for over a year.¹¹¹² “Within this story is many practical lessons,” the series introduced Hitler: “the marvelous story of the life of a great adventurer.”¹¹¹³

Paralleling Nazism’s praise, these newspapers menaced Zionism lurked in Baghdad, threatening Arabs.¹¹¹⁴ At first, only *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* made the claim, more ferocious than before with the infusion of German money, but the paper was popular. Others followed.¹¹¹⁵ Press said Iraq’s Jews were Zionists, “Their *Waṭaniyya* is Zionism.”¹¹¹⁶ The charge spread to radio; to literature – the book, *al-Ṣahyūniya*, argued Iraq’s Jews are Zionists. *Al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* published the books contents.¹¹¹⁷

German anti-Semitism had several effects. The campaign created strife between Muslims and Jews. In one incident, Grobba asked cinemas to show Nazi films. Jewish owners refused. Hostile gossipers said the proprietors “feared the Jews would raid the cinema.” Baghdad’s mayor, Muḥammad al-Daferī, threatened cinema managers, show the film or he would incite demonstrations. *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī* scathed the theater owners, and in an escalating cycle, in which each side heaped more insults on the other, the owners ceased to advertise in *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, which prodded the paper to slander them more. Whereupon the Community boycotted the publication. “Thereafter it was (and still is) war to the knife between *Al-Alam ul-Arabi* [sic]

1111 *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, June 21, 22, 23. *Wathā’iq*, 90

1112 Wild, 49; Jeffery Herf, *Nazi Propaganda in the Arab World*, (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2009), 24; Ezra M. Daniel (Baghdad) to Adolphe Brotman (London) March 14, 1934. (Part 3). BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3); S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 5

1113 al-‘Umarī, 41

1114 Anonymous. Untitled Hebrew Text. Iraq Correspondences (Part 2). BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3) 6

1115 Neville Laski. Nov 1934. Iraq Correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 3; Knabenshue, October 18, 1934, Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

1116 Pres. of the Jewish Community (Ra’īs al-ṭā’ifā) to the Interior minister. Oct 31, 1934. No. 2997. IJA (3785) 3

1117 Ibid.; President of the Community (Sassoon Khāḍḍūrī) to Interior Minister (Rashīd ‘Ālī) October 26, 1934. No. 2981. IJA (3785) 21-22

and the Jewish community,” the American consul said. “Their refusal to show the German film, together with the recent disturbances in Palestine, are but oil cast upon the smoldering fire of hatred which Moslems hold against all Jewish.”¹¹¹⁸ German interference encouraged blackmail of the Jewish community. Other publications, not on German payrolls, demanded hush money on threat of publicizing anti-Semitic screeds.¹¹¹⁹

German money created a class of professional anti-Semites by giving them a revenue stream. From May 1935, when Goebbels directed Nazi propaganda to target Iraq,¹¹²⁰ Germany spent £10 million a year, from 1935 to 1941.¹¹²¹ Germany paid journalists at *al-‘Alam al-‘Arabī* a monthly salary.¹¹²² The reporter, Yūnis al-Bahrī, broadcast anti-Semitic monologues on Berlin radio.¹¹²³ German money professionalized Jew-hatred and expanded the career field for these journalists, orators, writers and public personalities, yet the acclaim these agitators received stemmed from reifying convictions fans already held. Anti-Semitism’s popularity was local, Iraqi, and real. An illustrative example of this process was the translator of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī. Before he associated with Nazism, Sab‘āwī was a columnist convicted of inciting a riot. In 1930, Sab‘āwī wrote pamphlet warning Jews and Britain deracinated Iraq:

You suffer hunger and nakedness because of the English and their followers. They enjoy your riches; your wealth. They teardown your *Qawm*; your humble glory. They have done in it every homeland of ours. In weary Palestine the English spread their people and throw them from their homes to settle hostile Zionists to deteriorate it. They deteriorate the Arabs in every part of your holy Arabian peninsula.

At his trial for disturbing the peace, Sab‘āwī testified he wrote “against the English and the followers of the English.”¹¹²⁴ His conviction made him a celebrity¹¹²⁵ before Grobba hired him.

1118 Paul Knabenshue (Iraq) to Secretary of State (Washington) Nov 9, 1933. Disturbances in Palestine serve the Sympathetic Approval of the Arabs in Iraq. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3-4

1119 Neville Laski. Nov 1934. Iraq Correspondence (Part 3) BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3) 3

1120 “Da’āya al-Amāniya,” *al-Istiqlāl*, May 27, 1935. *Wathā’iq*, 90

1121 Vitales, “Report on Iraq,” 5

1122 500 rupees a month, see Knabenshue October 18, 1934. Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 4

1123 Simon, 35

1124 al-‘Umarī, 44-46

1125 Ibid., 48, 50

A former classmate, Anwār Shaul, recalled in school, Sab‘āwī was nebbish and soft-spoken. He never forced his opinion, as extremists are wont to do. However, he was poor, and to earn money, he translated for newspapers after school. He discovered *Mein Kampf* when al-‘Alam al-‘Arabī hired him to translate it.¹¹²⁶ That translation rocketed his popularity, whereafter he socialized with Yāsīn and Ḥuṣrī.¹¹²⁷ “First it was for a professional salary, but then changed to arrogant exploitation,” Shāul said.¹¹²⁸ Sab‘āwī came to admire Fascism, and his writings proclaimed Fascism was the real *Nahḍa*, the Arab revival¹¹²⁹ – because the violent rhetoric reinforced views Sab‘āwī already held about Britain and Jews. Britain, too, paid assets to proclaim their praises, such as Shiite Cleric, Ghiṭā’, who preached for England. Anglophilia was unpopular and so was Jewish equality. Ghiṭā’ was accused of treason. British officials suspected Iraqis at their own embassy leaked the evidence. To remove the stain of British money, Ghiṭā’ preached jihad against Britain¹¹³⁰ and Jews at Muthanná’s behest.¹¹³¹ While Shawkat was adored for his love of Germany and hatred of Jews, Nūrī was unpopular for his “anglophile attitudes” and “English politics.”¹¹³² Nevertheless, the German money also corrupted the people who accepted it – the schools,¹¹³³ politicians, publications, police and military-¹¹³⁴ who in time came to be as loyal to their paymasters in Germany as to their own country, which they claimed to defend.

German radio was more fashionable than BBC and was listened too in cafes and public spaces, spreading anti-Semitic lies about Palestine.¹¹³⁵ Five days before the Farhūd, Germany's

1126 Shāul, 138-139

1127 al-‘Umarī, 42

1128 Shāul, 138

1129 al-‘Umarī, 38

1130 Translation of Maulvi Mohd Bashir’s Report. Report on Iraq and Iran. Telegram. February 7, 1941. IOR (L/PS/12/418)- 33 (p. 4)

1131 Pres. of the Jewish Community (Ra’īs al-ṭā’ifa) to the Interior minister. Oct 5, 1934. No. 2999. IJA (3785) 7

1132 “Irak,” German Foreign Ministry: Politische Beziehungen Irans zu Deutschland. 29 Juli 1935- 6. NA (GFM 33/782)- 15

1133 Simon, 36

1134 Sereni, 15

1135 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 233

Iraqi announcer, Baḥrī, told listeners: “Jews everywhere are an abomination. The biggest enemies of mankind are the Jews.”¹¹³⁶ Germany tapped into local tropes Jews were untrustworthy and hostile to Islam. Berlin broadcasted on February 20, 1941: “the Jews who have always been and are also today the enemies of Islam and the Muslims.”¹¹³⁷ Iraqis must “destroy the influence of the Jewish merchants and leading officials.”¹¹³⁸ Germany trumpeted lurid accounts of Palestine’s Arabs sentenced to death, and promised to support Arabs’ war against Zionism.¹¹³⁹ Maulvi Mohd Bashir, the prince of Bahalwapur, a semi-autonomous state in British India, visited Iraq two months after the Farhūd.¹¹⁴⁰ “Iraqis had great respect and sympathies for Germany,” he said, “German secret agents had succeeded in creating intimate social contacts with the students in colleges and schools whom they always asked to their tea parties and invited them to their educational lectures.”¹¹⁴¹ ‘Ulema’ told Bashir German sympathies prevailed because British were “the enemies of Islam” who destroyed Mecca’s shrines, and were allies with Palestine’s Jews.¹¹⁴²

However, as the historian Hayyim Cohen pointed out: Nazis could not directly influence most Iraqis. Most were illiterate nor owned radios.¹¹⁴³ Germany only broadcasted from 1939, the month Ghāzī died.¹¹⁴⁴ “No homes had radios then, and we didn’t get one until 1938,” George Sofer, who grew up in Baghdad, said, “newspapers were also not found in the homes. We received news, by word of mouth.”¹¹⁴⁵ Even during the Munich crisis of 1938, when Europe was

1136 E. Cohen. “Radio Berlin in Arabic: The First Nazi Radio in Arabic.”

1137 Herf, 53

1138 Extract. “The Jews of Baghdad” *The Palestine Post*. October 21, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 31

1139 Basil Newton (Baghdad) May 16, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-221; Baghdad to Foreign Office (London) June 22, 1937. CZA (S25\22719)-163

1140 Nawab Sadiq Muhammad Khan V Abbasi to Lithgow. Dec 15, 1941. IOR (L/PS/12/418)- 12

1141 Translation of Maulvi Mohd Bashir’s Report. Report on Iraq and Iran. Telegram. February 7, 1941 ‘Propaganda among Shi’ite communities in Iraq and Persia’ IOR (L/PS/12/418)- 31

1142 Ibid.

1143 Cohen, “The Anti-Jewish Farhud,” 12

1144 Herf, 37

1145 Sofer, *My Life in the Middle East*, 40

on the cusp of war, anxiety was high, and many hoarded food, spiking prices, the public still had to gather in cafes or the street to listen to radio bulletins.¹¹⁴⁶ Britain did not try to publicize its war effort through the radio, but a cinema van, and showcases of pictures and cards on the packages of cigarettes, indicating radio had less reach than one might suspect.¹¹⁴⁷

“The close and at times active relationship that developed between Nazi Germany and sections of the Arab leadership...was due not to a German attempt to win over the Arabs, but rather to a series of Arab approaches to the Germans,”¹¹⁴⁸ wrote the historian Bernard Lewis. A Baghdad *Qawmiyya* committee approached Grobba in 1935, requesting closer ties with Germany. Grobba rebuffed them. *al-Istiqlal*'s publisher ‘Abd al-Ghaffūr al-Badrī, wrote Grobba asking to form an Iraqi Nazi party. Germany banned non-Germans to exclude Arabs.¹¹⁴⁹ Arabs turned to Germany for support against Jews and Britain, but Anglo-German understanding was the bedrock of Hitler’s Foreign Policy until 1939.¹¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile Hitler did not focus on Iraq until 1941, preferring British ties.¹¹⁵¹ There was no German propaganda in the country when Shawkat established the Futuwwa. *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, already had “pronounced anti-Jewish tendencies,” said America’s consul,¹¹⁵² before Grobba paid them. Anti-Jewish themes appealed to the paranoid who believed Jews were a danger.¹¹⁵³ Already in June 1933, Ezra Daniel complained: “The Hitlerite regime found admirers amongst the Iraqi intelligentsia and many certainly were those who would have welcomed a similar treatment of their fellow Jews.”¹¹⁵⁴

1146 Houstoun- Boswall (Baghdad) to the Viscount Halifax. Oct 4, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 217

1147 Basil C. Newton. Minutes. March 3, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/260)- 3; British Embassy (Baghdad) to Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Note Verbale. January 23, 1941 NA (FO 624/23/260)- 5

1148 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 139

1149 Nicosia, 355

1150 *Ibid.*, 351, 359

1151 Stefan Petke. Lecture. “1941 as a Turning Point. Nazi Germany’s Changing Perception of the Middle East.” The Jews of the Middle East in the Shadow of the Holocaust Conference. April 5, 2016. Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 14 Ibn Gabirol Str., Jerusalem; Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 139, 141

1152 Knabenshue October 18, 1934. Anti-Jewish Flurry in Baghdad NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

1153 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 146

1154 Extract from letter of Ezra Menachem Daniel (Baghdad) to Mr. A. G. Brotman (London). June 25, 1933. BOD (AC 3121 C11/12/47/2 1931-1933 20/F3)

The German consulate received fan letters for Hitler.¹¹⁵⁵ Stores displayed Hitler's photograph.¹¹⁵⁶ German victories were celebrated.¹¹⁵⁷ Newspapers contrasted Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland, a German-populated region of Czechoslovakia, with Iraq's failure to do likewise for Palestine.¹¹⁵⁸ When Hitler advanced, street revelers danced. In 1940, an informant warned the Foreign Office, "all Iraq is Nazi."¹¹⁵⁹ Iraq's Consul in Jerusalem estimated 60% of Iraq was pro-Nazi.¹¹⁶⁰ In 1941, Erwin Rommel landed his forces in North Africa, and Iraqi protests chanted: "Rommel, hasten your footsteps, Rommel."¹¹⁶¹ When Rommel besieged Tobruk, stores sold Tobruk-themed goods: Tobruk produce, Tobruk bread, Tobruk humus or Tobruk seeds.¹¹⁶² On April 17, Stark noted, "young opinion has been caught by the Nazis."¹¹⁶³ Houbert said Iraqis admired Nazism "owing to the energetic measures which the later has taken against the Jews."¹¹⁶⁴ Students "always urge me to tell them about Hitler and the New German Reich and they always explain that they need a strongman savior like Hitler to rule their country."¹¹⁶⁵ Politicians adored Nazism and let the Germans in.¹¹⁶⁶ Ghāzī urged officials to meet German counterparts; to make German contacts.¹¹⁶⁷ Shawkat invited German instructors.¹¹⁶⁸ The government hired Julius Jordan, a German legation attache, to manage the Iraq Museum, and sponsored his lecture on Nazism at the Teacher's College.¹¹⁶⁹ The more successful Germany seemed, the more popular Germany became; and the more anti-Semitism increased.¹¹⁷⁰

1155 Nicosia, 353

1156 Extract. "The Jews of Baghdad" *The Palestine Post*. October 21, 1934. NA (CO 733/268/6)- 31

1157 Grobba, 218

1158 "Iraq Kullha Naziyyeh," see Houstoun- Boswall (Baghdad) to the Viscount Halifax. Oct 4, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 218

1159 The informant said Nūrī was the only person in Iraq who liked British, see "From a conversation," (1940), 2. CZA (Z4\31215-3)

1160 A. Sassoon to M. Shertok. "Biqūr Bē-Qōnsōliya Ha-'Iraqiya." Feb 18, 1942. CZA (Z4\31216-37)

1161 "Rommel, qaddem khatwatak, ya Rommel" see Herf, 58; Shamash, 180

1162 Nir Shochet, *Bēn 'Or vē-Hōsheh*, in Twena, *Me 'ore 'ot Hag ha-Shavū 'ot*, 101

1163 Stark, 81

1164 Dr. H. G. Houbert "Anti-Semitism in Iraq: An Advantage for Us Germans." *Jewish Daily Post*. March 27, 1935. Republished from *Jenaische Zeitung*. IJA (3785) 36

1165 Dr. H. G. Houbert, *Jenaische Zeitung*, March 15, 1935, 10. Arabic Translation. IJA (3785) 33

1166 Kazzaz, 216

1167 "Irak," German Foreign Ministry: Politische Beziehungen Irans zu Deutschland. 29 Juli 1935- 6. NA (GFM 33/782)15

1168 Dr. H. G. Houbert, *Jenaische Zeitung*, March 15, 1935, 10. IJA (3785) 31

1169 *Ibid.*, 32; Simon, 35

1170 S.B., *The Fate of Iraq Jewry*, 5

Instead of radio, Germany influenced Iraq with personal interaction.¹¹⁷¹ Iraqis wanted German contact, and the more Iraqis had, the cruder anti-Semitism became. For years, Shawkat sent students to Nuremberg rallies.¹¹⁷² The Futuwwa returned in 1938,¹¹⁷³ chanting “Long live Hitler, the killer of insects and Jews!”¹¹⁷⁴ Walls became placarded with “Long Live Hitler, killer of Jewish microbes.”¹¹⁷⁵ Other Iraqis studied in Berlin, and upon return, lobbied to discharge Jewish civil servants.¹¹⁷⁶ Though German policy was “to subject foreign students to intensive Nazi propaganda,” as Newton complained,¹¹⁷⁷ and Germany sponsored hundreds of young professionals to visit, feting them with vacations and friendliness, or encouraging politicians, teachers and young people to attend the 1936 Berlin Olympics – visitors came willingly. Iraqis were not obligated to go.¹¹⁷⁸ Though Nazis created faux Arab organizations and encouraged Iraqi students to join, students were not required to join.¹¹⁷⁹ Germany’s interests were secret. German anti-Semitism was not. Expats in Germany knowingly worked for a regime to promote anti-Semitism. ‘Alī al-Şāfi, from Najaf, wrote Jews and foreigners undeveloped Arabs. Jabir ‘Umar, from Baghdad, said Jews “were racially alien intruders,” in the Nazi press.¹¹⁸⁰ When World War II erupted, those students in Germany – Şāfi, ‘Umar and Miqdādī,¹¹⁸¹ returned to Iraq.¹¹⁸² They agitated.¹¹⁸³ They exhorted students and colleagues against Jews.¹¹⁸⁴ Germany and Italy promoted their creeds,¹¹⁸⁵ but their creeds were willfully adopted by Iraqis; by Shawkat; repeated

1171 Łukasz Hirszcwicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1966) 27

1172 Grobba, 218

1173 Wild, 37

1174 Baram, 78

1175 Vitales, “Report on Iraq,” 5

1176 Extract from the local press dated 2nd Oct 1939. NA (FO 624\17\375-26)- 26; “The Jews of Iraq,” CZA (Z4\33505)-8

1177 Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Viscount Halifax (London) Aug 10, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/375)- 15 (p.1)

1178 “The Jews of Iraq,” CZA (Z4\33505)- 8-9; NA (FO 371/20010/4772), Mr. Bateman (Baghdad) “German Propaganda in Iraq,” Jul 13, 1936, - 438; B. H. Bateman (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) Jul 13, 1936, - 439

1179 Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Viscount Halifax (London) Aug 10, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/375)- 15 (p.2)

1180 Peter Wein, “The Culpability of Exile. Arabs in Nazi Germany” *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 37. Jahrg, H. 3, Arab Encounters with Fascist Propaganda 1933-1945, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (July – September 2011) 338, 342

1181 Moreh, “The Role of Palestinian,” 126

1182 Local Press Extracts, Monday, Oct 2, 1939. NA (FO 624\17\375-26)- 28

1183 Wein, “The Culpability of Exile,” 356

1184 Mr. Hutchings to Vyvyan Holt, March 24, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/188)- 23

1185 Adrian Holman to F.A.G. Cook (Baghdad) Dec 10, 1940. NA (FO 624/21/579)- 2

by educators and clergy,¹¹⁸⁶ and spread by teachers, newspapers, preachers, and youth groups.¹¹⁸⁷ Shawkat hired hundreds of foreign teachers, on the basis of ideology. Whenever the government instructed them to teach against Nazism, they refused.¹¹⁸⁸

The government ignored anti-Semitism. Laws against incitement could have quashed *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*.¹¹⁸⁹ Students complained teachers promoted Nazism.¹¹⁹⁰ The government ignored Khāḍḍūrī’s warnings teachers promoted anti-Semitism. Khāḍḍūrī sent an Arabic translation of Houber’s words,¹¹⁹¹ as evidence of a German conspiracy against Jews: singing Nazi hymns in school, leading discussions on Hitler. “All these aforementioned utterances cannot be interpret except being a political mission,” Khāḍḍūrī said.¹¹⁹² Khāḍḍūrī asked the government to suppress *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*. “This incitement is baseless. It exhorts citizens against their Jewish brethren,” he said. “This is a directed plan. Its goal is to create a turbid climate of hatred.”¹¹⁹³ The government did nothing. Khāḍḍūrī complained Ghīṭā’ preached six times against Jews. “Slander and obscene insults that are said in these sermons against the Community are to such a degree everyone thinks it may affect the safety and security.”¹¹⁹⁴ The government took no action. Ezra Daniel asked to suppress *Mein Kampf*. The government refused.¹¹⁹⁵

Jews were impotent to counter Grobba. They could boycott Germany¹¹⁹⁶ or *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, but taboos excluded Jewish political activism. There was hostility to Jewish voices,

1186 F.A.G. Cook (Baghdad) to Adrian Holman. Nov 27, 1940. NA (FO 624/21/579)- 4 (p.1)

1187 Shlomo Shinā et al, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret: Yōš ‘im La-‘ōr bē-Mel’ot ‘Esrīm Šānā lē-ḥāsōl Gulāt Bavel*, (‘Ergūn Yōšē ha-Maḥteret ha-Ḥalūš bē-‘Īr’aq: Tel-Aviv) 3

1188 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 233

1189 Paul Knabenshue (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington). Program of the New Iraqi Cabinet and Press Commentary thereon., Nov 20, 1933. Diplomatic No. 225. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 3

1190 Baram, 79; Grobba, 220

1191 “Mu’āda al-Sāmīn Fī al-‘Irāq: Faīda lina Niḥna al-Ālmān.” *Jūwīsh Dīlī Būst*. March 27, 1935. IJA (3785) 37

1192 Sassoon Khadduri (President of the Jewish Community) to Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Kaylānī (Interior Minister) June 25, 1935. IJA (3785) 34

1193 President of the Community (Sassoon Khāḍḍūrī) to Interior Minister (Rashīd ‘Ālī) October 26, 1934. No. 2981. IJA (3785) 22

1194 Pres. of the Jewish Community (Ra’īs al-ṭā’ifa) to the Interior minister. Oct 5, 1934. No. 2999. IJA (3785) 7

1195 Ezra M. Daniel (Baghdad) to Adolphe Brotman (London) March 14, 1934. (Part 3). BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

1196 Guy Bracha, “A Letter From Iraq: the Writing of Iraqi correspondents in al-‘Ālam al-‘Isra’ili and Isra’il,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 1, (2016) 109

particularly those who prescribed Muslims what to do. “In this country Germany found new special good will such as incentives of this favor to persecute all the Jews,”¹¹⁹⁷ Houbert said.

“This antagonism is rather [an] advantage and it facilitates my work.”¹¹⁹⁸

British pleas to denounce Germany were rebuffed. Britain asked Rashīd ‘Ālī to condemn Germany. He refused. “Iraqis would mock him,” he said. Criticizing Germany toppled cabinets.¹¹⁹⁹ Britain asked Shawkat to expel German teachers. Shawkat refused.¹²⁰⁰ The government instructed teachers to lecture against Nazism. Teachers refused and promoted Nazism.¹²⁰¹ Rashīd ‘Ālī instructed news editors to denounce “German aggression,”¹²⁰² and papers published apologetics for Hitler.¹²⁰³

Iraq’s own government sponsored Nazism. Authorities banned a pamphlet criticizing Nazism, “The Hitler Terror,” falsely alleging the booklet was manufactured by British Jews.¹²⁰⁴ While Iraq’s National Library published *Mein Kampf*.¹²⁰⁵ The government allowed *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*’s to publish *Mein Kampf* daily, without censure.¹²⁰⁶ A government investigation found Iraqi broadcasts themselves gave “strong support for Nazism,” and “clear incitement against the Jews.”¹²⁰⁷ German influence did not direct the Futuwwa, nor was the Futuwwa a German front. The Futuwwa was Shawkat’s creature, and he was neither a German agent nor did he want German control.¹²⁰⁸ Rather, like many others, Shawkat liked Nazism for its Jew-hatred and

1197 Dr. H. G. Houbert, *Jenaische Zeitung*, March 15, 1935, 10. IJA (3785) 32

1198 Dr. H. G. Houbert “Anti-Semitism in Iraq: An Advantage for Us Germans.” *Jewish Daily Post*. March 27, 1935. Republished from *Jenaische Zeitung*. IJA (3785) 36

1199 Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) Cypher. May 16, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-221

1200 Fritz, 218

1201 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 234

1202 Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) Cypher. May 16, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-221

1203 Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Viscount Halifax (London) May 28, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-223

1204 Adolphe Brotman (London) to Ezra M. Daniel, Esq. (Baghdad) February 26, 1934. Iraq correspondence (Part 3). BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

1205 “Kitāb Hitler al-Mur’ib,” *al-Istiqlāl*, May 27 and June 16, 1935. *Wathā’iq*, 90

1206 Ezra M. Daniel (Baghdad) to Adolphe Brotman (London) March 14, 1934. (Part 3). BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/012/047/3)

1207 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 233

1208 Basil Newton (Baghdad) to George Lloyd (London) July 4, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 29

power. Shawkat welcomed Nazi motifs into education.¹²⁰⁹ Shawkat introduced Houbert¹²¹⁰ to his colleagues and supported Houbert's work and lectures on German discipline to Iraqi educators.¹²¹¹

After Britain compelled Grobba's expulsion in 1939, and Iraq severed relations, Iraqis maintained contact with Grobba, facilitating his propaganda.¹²¹² British officials continued to report "pro-German and pro-Italian propaganda in the chief towns,"¹²¹³ where agitators, according to one resident, "were swearing by Almighty Allah to join forces with Hitler and help exterminate the Jews."¹²¹⁴

Conclusion

Nationalism was a European import, one of the many innovations Ottomans and later Iraqis 'bought' to institute a stronger central government. Part of nationalism's package was anti-Semitism. The new ideology wanted to Arabize the Ottoman *'askarī* and *'ulema*, and harkened to a fictive past where Arabs were warriors. The popular nationalism, *Qawmiyya*, excluded Jews, and promoted a polity focused on the 7th-century conquests of the Middle East. *Qawmiyya* used Jews as a rhetorical prop to differentiate Arabs' positive stereotypes as bedouin warriors – brave, indigenous, and dedicated to higher ideals, whereas Jews' negative stereotypes were as weak, racist urban office clerks concerned with money. Notwithstanding the trappings of language and culture which intellectuals harnessed for their theories, the definition of Arab was sectarian and genealogical: Arab Muslims descended from the 7th-century Muslim conquerors.

1209 Longrigg, 264

1210 Grobba, 220

1211 Dr. H. G. Houbert, *Jenaische Zeitung*, March 15, 1935, 10. Arabic Translation. IJA (3785) 33

1212 Report on conversation with Khan Sahib Saiyid Tahrir Hussain Qureshi, Vice-Consul at His Majesty's Consulate, Baghdad 'Propaganda among Shi'ite communities in Iraq and Persia'. IOR (L/PS/12/418) -95

1213 Ibid.- 96

1214 Violette Shamash, *Memories of Eden*, ed. Mira and Tony Rocca, (Forum Books Ltd: Surrey, 2008) 178

Prominent Arab personalities – Ṣāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Sa'adūn – were Turkish-speakers but deemed Arab because they were Muslim with *Qawmiyya* politics. In contrast, Jewish difference was fetishized as alien. Jewish mundane habits – clothes, success, careers – were scrutinized and fixated upon as markers Jews did not belong. Jews ceased to reify Islam's truth but to embody Arabism's contention Europe oppressed Arabs, and the necessity of an Ummah state to return to empires of the past. Jews and Arabs came to be thought of as contrary principals, rival Ummahs and different races. *Qawmiyya* never accepted Jews and Arabs were related, or that Jews were 'Semites' at all. 'Semite' was a European creation, and European ideas were borrowed to buttress the hierarchy of faith and Muslim Arab aesthetics which Iraqis cherished. Europe itself was but a prop to illustrate Jewish foreignness, depicting Jews as Europeans.

There was a great change in stereotyping. Jews' images morphed from incompetence to danger. Prejudices of Jews as hostile to Islam, to explain why Jews should not be equal or have voice, proved toxic when *Qawmiyya* wanted everything Arab and Muslim. In part, *Qawmiyya* was a backlash against Jewish equality, and Jews entering spaces *dhimmīs* rarely occupied before, against the dread the hierarchy of faith would collapse, and Muslims would be subjugated as they had subjugated others. That there would be a '*dhimmī* reversal,' Muslims would be '*dhimmīs*' and *dhimmīs* the new 'Muslims.' Al-Kakhī's poem 'the Stolen carpet' illustrates this well. Poems of Burhān al-Dīn al-'Abbūshī expressed anxiety of Jewish strength and Iraq 'losing' its Arab character. Among anti-Semites and later, the public, Zionism was falsely understood as a plan to conquer Iraq and make the region Jewish.

Anti-Semitism magnified the most detrimental stereotypes and gave them the force of authority with the imprimatur of publication, in a society where scholarship, the written word,

and personal experience had a long history of respect. The slanders became a positive feedback loop. Attempts to refute the defamations only served to increase anti-Semitism, as the public was outraged that Muslims were accused of persecuting anyone. Fans of Ṣādiq al-Qādrī, who introduced the canard Jews hidden control, were outraged they were accused of prejudice when many came of age in a society where *dhimmīs* were powerless to accuse Muslims of anything. Anti-Semitism increased with each anti-Semitic act: attacks inspired apologetics for the assailant or the assault, or allegations Jews were at fault, normalizing the hate.

Criticism of politics – Communism, Capitalism or Zionism – became a socially acceptable covers for anti-Semitism, yet these vilifications were frequently never about the ideology: Zionists could demonstrate and solicit without harassment, but Jews who succeeded in government or were wealthy were always harassed. Even Hikmet's regime, which opposed to Arabism and promised to treat minorities well, conditioned this policy on Jews avoiding politics. No Zionists were murdered, but those who were identifiably Jewish were. Days important to the Zionist movement were frequently not subject to protest or attack, but Jewish holidays were. Hysteria against Zionism restricted Jewish life: writing favorably of Jew, or Judaism, or refuting defamation against them was labeled Zionism. Jewish culture was labeled Zionism. Yet Zionism was never banned. Jewish cultural institutions were banned. To make Iraq Muslim, all things Jewish were targeted, such as Jewish holidays and synagogues, to show Judaism does not belong in Iraq. Muslim holidays were sacrosanct and intertwined with the state, while Judaism was harassed to the margins.

1933 was a turning point. The Assyrian Massacre incriminated the entire state and the pillars upon which the state stood. To protect the hierarchy of faith, xenophobia and adoration of violence was even more strongly endorsed, in a hysteria against secret enemies, foreigners, and

treason, and the need to kill them. Ghāzī's own agitation made the monarchy complicit, with his radio vilification of minorities and Jews. The political exclusion developed into the government's first legal restrictions against Jews: student quotas, bans on publications, and travel to Palestine – these expanded into a ban on Jewish immigrants and Jews in instructor roles. Within two years, demagogues dedicated to Arabism and dictatorship, Rashīd 'Ālī and Yāsīn, instituted state-sponsored anti-Semitism, through a series of government front organizations: the Muthanná club, the Futuwwa and the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, warning, Zionists would conquer Iraq. Extremists discussed and planned massacring Jews. There were at least two unrelated plots for such ethnic-cleansing from 1936 to 1938.¹²¹⁵ Muthanná planned to expel Iraq's Jews. Iraq's Interior Minister probed Britain on the possibility of perpetrating such a crime.¹²¹⁶

Iraqis wanted to blame anti-Semitism on outsiders: Europe, Nazism or Zionism. The emphasis served a purpose: to shift responsibility away and to argue others, Germans or Jews, made Iraq anti-Semitic. Yet if Germany 'succeeded,' it was because Nazis promoted convictions Iraqis already held. There was great anger Jews were successful, participated in politics, or criticized Muslims, and this made Jews powerless to fight allegations against them.

Anti-Semitism was to reaffirm the hierarchy of faith and protect Arabism's reputation. The hate stemmed from a sense of entitlement that Arab Muslims should have a monopoly of control, in Iraq and in the region, to manicure their societies as they saw fit; to define their minorities as they desired; to uphold definitions that made Muslims heroes, and minorities churlish and weak. Definitions that served to keep Iraq's hierarchy without admitting there was a

1215 S.B., The Fate of Iraq Jewry, 6; Palmer to British Embassy (Baghdad) Sept 16, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 200
1216 Edmonds to Houstoun-Boswall. Aug 22, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 195

hierarchy or persecuted minorities. So those who wanted to keep Muslim control oppressed Jews to keep them in their place and oppressed Jews when they complained.

Chapter 5

Rashīd ‘Ālī’s Coup

Government-sponsored anti-Semitism enabled the agitators it supported to seize power, bringing the first openly anti-Semitic regime to power and led to the Farhūd, the mass violence against Jews on June 1-2, 1941. Then, the state had spread anti-Semitism and *Qawmiyya* to all levels of society, through education, the press, radio, and sponsorship of a professional class of anti-Semites. One such agitator whom Iraq subsidized to spread propaganda against Jews, and who would come to overthrow the regime was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, the chief religious leader in Palestine with a history of Jew-hatred. Ḥusaynī promoted the ‘*dhimmī* reversal’ – the false myth that Jews would conquer Iraq. He said Jews were friends of the English, and Britain ‘created’ Jews to steal Arab resources. The government funded Ḥusaynī and persuaded him to live in Iraq, after he fled as a fugitive from Palestine in 1937 for his role in the Arab Revolt. The government promoted him in the state-controlled press, allowing Ḥusaynī free reign to agitate. Ḥusaynī energized anti-Semites and the *Qawmiyya* base, who were excited for a likeminded demagogue.

His fellow conspirator, Rashīd ‘Ālī, used anti-Jewish bigotry to gain national influence. The Golden Square was a junta of four colonels who guided the country’s politics through installing Prime Ministers in line with their goals, and who deposed leaders they opposed. The

Golden Square chose Rashīd ‘Ālī to be Prime Minister, because he instituted anti-Semitic policies in the past and had led the country during the Assyrian Massacre. The Golden Square supported Rashīd ‘Ālī because he proceeded to make Iraq a *Qawmiyya* state partly through anti-Jewish measures: he banned transit visas for Jews, effectively banning Jewish non-citizens from the country, and he created secret anti-Semitic cells under Ḥusaynī’s control, with the goal of fomenting violent revolution to enforce a *Qawmiyya* state, wherein Islam, Arabism and regime were one. The Golden Square supported Rashīd ‘Ālī’s efforts to make common cause with Italy in a partnership based on anti-Semitism. Despite Italian territorial claims to Palestine, Syria and Egypt, Rashīd ‘Ālī partnered with Italy to fight “international Jewry” on the condition the Axis support a solution to the Arabs’ “Jewish problem” along German lines – which Rashīd ‘Ālī interpreted as destruction.

Finally, Rashīd ‘Ālī used anti-Semitism’s appeal to prevail over the monarchy. For then, Iraq was under a regent, a person who exercised power while the king was too young to rule. The Regent was Prince ‘Abd al-Ilāh, because the late Ghāzī’s son, King Fayṣal II, was five years-old. When ‘Abd al-Ilāh discovered Rashīd ‘Ālī’s plans for an Axis alliance, the Regent forced him to resign. Yet, Rashīd ‘Ālī vowed “to fan the flames of passion” against English and Jews. He joined Muthanná, an anti-Semitic government-front organization created in the 1930s. He, Muthanná and Ḥusaynī, whom the state sponsored, colluded and agreed Iraq’s government was under English-Jewish influence and vowed to overthrow it to foster Axis ties. Under this conspiracy’s direction, the Golden Square toppled the government, reinstating Rashīd ‘Ālī as Prime Minister. The monarchy lost power to government-sponsored anti-Semitic groups.

Rashīd ‘Ālī declared the Regent a traitor. ‘Abd al-Ilāh fled, and Rashīd ‘Ālī took power. The new regime’s anti-Semitism, anglophobia, and *Qawmiyya*, appealed to Iraqi society, long

inured to such views. The public flocked to Rashīd ‘Ālī, placing him firmly in power. With the government’s anti-Jewish hate groups in power, the conditions were set for the Farhūd.

Hājj Amīn al-Husaynī

As part of the campaign of Jew-hatred, the government sponsored Hājj Amīn al-Husaynī, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and leading Sunni authority in Palestine, to spread anti-Semitism in Iraq.¹²¹⁷ Hūsaynī had abetted anti-Jewish riots in 1929.¹²¹⁸ His memoirs convey an anti-Semitism couched in religious rhetoric. Hūsaynī said Jews had “plots against Allah;” conspired to kill the Caliphs; and colluded with anti-Muslim foreigners. He said Muslims were “recklessly ignorant” of Jewish dangers.¹²¹⁹

In April 1936, as the Arab Strike erupted, Hūsaynī chaired the Arab Higher Committee, an umbrella of nationalist groups.¹²²⁰ His two strategies as leader were to use anti-Jewish violence and propaganda. He said his cause was a religious war against Jews. Hūsaynī’s pamphlets said there were “Jewish designs on Holy Places” to “Judaize the Holy Land.”¹²²¹ He told a group in Lebanon that Jewish immigrants and investments endangered their country.¹²²² Hūsaynī said Nazism helped Arabism, because Nazis showed Britain Jews were weak.¹²²³

Iraq funded Hūsaynī through the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, and this revenue stream from the Committee drew him to settle in Iraq. In September 1937, British

1217 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/1941,” 233

1218 Mohammad El Haj Amin al-Husseini. D.S.O. Palestine. October 1944. NA (KV 2/2085)- 124b (p.1)

1219 Muḥammad Amīn al-Husaynī, *Mudhakarāt Muḥammad Amīn al-Husaynī*, ed. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-‘Umar, (al-Ahālī: Damascus, 1999) 70

1220 Mohammad El Haj Amin al-Husseini. D.S.O. Palestine. October 1944. NA (KV 2/2085)- 124b (p. 2)

1221 NA (KV2/2084), Jerusalem Police. Extract. Relating to the Mufti. Extracted from SF 75/Palestine/1 v.9. No. 213a. August 26- Sept 9, 1938,- 31a; quotes found in Mr. Howard (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) Palestine. Miscellaneous Arab Information. February 16, 1938,- 14a (p. 1)

1222 Howard to Jebb. February 16, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 14a (p. 4)

1223 “He [Hūsaynī] attributes this to the successful purge by Germany to which there has been no real reaction from world Jewry. This causes him to think that the British Government is beginning to realize that Jewish support will not be so necessary,” Hūsaynī told a colleague, who unbeknownst to him, was a British asset, see Jerusalem Police. Extract. Relating to the Mufti. August 26- Sept 9, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 31a

authorities concluded Ḥusaynī ordered assassinations.¹²²⁴ The cabinet decided to arrest him, whereafter he fled to Lebanon, inciting revolt from there.¹²²⁵ The common border gave him a free flow of men to order attacks.¹²²⁶ Nevertheless, Ḥusaynī’s donors tired of his strategy, and ceased to finance him.¹²²⁷ His last sources of funds were the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, and Baghdad’s German Embassy. However, Lebanon’s French authorities blocked the remittance of both.¹²²⁸ In March 1938, Ḥusaynī considered relocating to Iraq to “carryout reprisals on the Jews.”¹²²⁹ The Committee knew of Ḥusaynī’s plans, and urged him to settle in Iraq.¹²³⁰ The Prime Minister, Nūrī al-Sa’īd, invited Ḥusaynī to come to Iraq and live as the government’s guest.¹²³¹

Ḥusaynī’s arrival on October 15 energized those antagonistic to Jews or who admired Arabism, captivating listeners with the same style of provocations that made Ghāzī so popular, saying: Jews are criminals, and they confiscate Arab food, commit robberies, and wage violence against Arabs. He “was received in Iraq with great enthusiasm,” a government report said.¹²³² Nūrī and Rashīd ‘Ālī welcomed Ḥusaynī at the palace, along with the Speakers of Parliament and Senate. Then Nūrī took Ḥusaynī to his house for a second reception, then they went to a third

1224 Officer Administering the Government of Palestine (Jerusalem) to Secretary of State for the Colonies (London) Sept 29, 1937. Cabinet 35 (37). Appendix II. NA (CAB 23/89/6)- 243 (p. 1)

1225 Draft Telegram to the Officer Administering the Government in Palestine. (As Approved in substance by the Cabinet on Sept 29, 1937). Cabinet 35 (37). Appendix I. NA (CAB 23/89/6) - 240 (p.1); Mohammad El Haj Amin al-Husseini. D.S.O. Palestine. October 1944. NA (KV 2/2085)- 124b (p. 2)

1226 “From a Conversation with an Arab a Few Days After his Return From Baghdad.” October 1, 1940. CZA (Z4/3125)- 2; Mr. Howard. Colonial Office. “Palestine and cognate matters: Miscellaneous.” August 8, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 25a (p. 3)

1227 NA (KV2/2084), “The Mufti.” Oct 16, 1939. (Haj) Amin El Husseini,- 65a; Howard to Jebb, Palestine: Miscellaneous. July 21, 1938,- 24a (p. 1); “Palestine: The Mufti’s policy.” October 27, 1938,- 35a (p. 2)

1228 NA (KV2/2084), “Palestine and cognate matters: Arab information. Oct 11, 1939. (Haj) Amin El Husseini,- 64a (p. 1); “The Mufti. Restoration of Prestige his main consideration. Nov 11, 1939. No. 161 (Haj) Amin El Husseini,- 68a (p. 1); see also Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine. Mufti’s intention to keep the revolt simmering: Propaganda favor of his return to Palestine, etc.” December 7, 1939 NA (KV 2/2085) - 79a (p. 2)

1229 NA (KV2/2084), Mr. Howard (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) Palestine: Miscellaneous. June 21, 1938,- 23a; for quote, see Mr. Howard. Colonial Office. “Palestine and cognate matters: Miscellaneous.” August 8, 1938, (p. 3)

1230 NA (KV2/2084), “The Mufti” Nov 18, 1939. (Haj) Amin El Husseini,- 71a (p. 1); Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) “The Mufti’s return of ‘utmost importance. May 18, 1939,- 53a

1231 Eastern Department. The Mufti: On the question of efforts to remove him. July 20, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 24x (p. 2)

1232 Over a month after Ḥusaynī arrived, a British informant said, “The anti-Semitic movement in Iraq has recently been gaining ground,” see “The Mufti” Nov 18, 1939. (Haj) Amin El Husseini. NA (KV2/2084)- 71a (p. 2); Sereni, 13; al-Ḥusaynī, 51; for quote, see “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Hawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/1941,” 233

at a hotel.¹²³³ Poets wrote sonnets for Ḥusaynī.¹²³⁴ The Senate President held a soiree in his honor, and so did Parliament.¹²³⁵ There were riverside festivities; Ḥusaynī was a guest of honor for the Regent, ‘Abd al-Ilāh.¹²³⁶ Whenever Ḥusaynī entered or left a mosque, cheers emanated from the crowds; and men passed collection plates for Palestine’s Arabs.¹²³⁷

The press lauded Ḥusaynī. “Iraq’s feelings flow for the leader of Palestine the Great Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī,” dailies said.¹²³⁸ He was “the leader of the *Mujāhidīn*,”¹²³⁹ an Arabic term for those who wage jihad; “the shield of al-Aqsa;” “the leader of *Qawmiyya*.”¹²⁴⁰ Anti-Semites lionized Ḥusaynī. Sa’īd Thābit, a Committee leader, raised money for him.¹²⁴¹ The Committee hosted ‘celebrations’ for Ḥusaynī, with Ḥusaynī’s son, reciting the poem, “Clap for the Glory of Jihad,” to solicit donations for “Palestine’s Mujāhids.”¹²⁴² The Committee repeatedly hosted him “to celebrate bravery, jihad and *Qawmiyya*,” one newspaper said.¹²⁴³

The Prime Minister, Nūrī, prohibited Ḥusaynī from participating in politics, but Ḥusaynī could promote anti-Semitism if directed against ‘Zionism,’ which, since 1928, had become a code word for Jews.¹²⁴⁴ Ḥusaynī established a public relations department, attacking Jews. He regularly sent material for broadcasts to Yūnis al-Baḥrī, an Iraqi radio announcer for Germany

1233 “The Mufti,” NA (KV2/2084)- 71a (p. 1); al-Ḥusaynī, 51; “Simāḥa Muftī Filasṭīn al-Akbar fī Baghdād,” *al-Thughar*, October 19, 1939. in *Wathā’iq*, 99

1234 al-Ḥusaynī, 60

1235 *Wathā’iq*, Mohammad al-Sadr was the Senate President, see “Baghdād Takrum Šāḥib al-Simāḥa Muftī Filasṭīn al-Akbar,” *al-Zeman*, October 28, 1939, 99; “Mu’ālī Ra’īs Majlis al-Nuwab yukrum -Simāḥa al-Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī Za’īm Filisṭīn al-Akbār,” *al-Zeman*, December 19, 1939; *al-Istiqlāl* Dec 18, 1939, 101

1236 *Wathā’iq*, “Jami’a al-Shubbān al-Muslimīn Takurum Imām al-Mujāhidīn Muftī Filisṭīn al-Akbar,” *al-Zeman*, December 8-10, 1939, 101; “Simāḥa al-Muftī al-Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī Diyafan ‘alā Mā’ida Šāḥib al-Samū al-Wašī,” *al-Thughur*, October 30, 1939, 99-100

1237 “From a Conversation,” CZA (Z43125)- 2

1238 “‘Awāṭif al-‘Iraq al-Fiyaḍa Naḥwa Za’īm Filisṭīn al-Akbar al-Ḥāj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī,” *al-Zeman*, *al-Istiqlāl*, December 4, 1939, *Wathā’iq*, 101

1239 “The Mufti. Restoration of Prestige his main consideration. Nov 11, 1939. No. 161 (Haj) Amin El Husseini. NA (KV2/2084)- 68a (p. 2)

1240 “Simāḥa Muftī al-Akbar Yazūr al-Bašra,” *al-Thughar*, October 26, 1939, *Wathā’iq*, 99

1241 Peyton (Colonial Office) to Jebb (Foreign Office) “The Mufti’s Activities and Interests” Feb 5, 1940 NA (KV 2/2085) - 81b (p. 4)

1242 *Wathā’iq*, for first quote, see “Li-I’āna Filisṭīn al-Mujāhida,” *al-Zeman*, March 10, 1940, 102; for second quote, see “‘Awāṭif al-‘Iraq al-Fiyaḍa,” 101; *al-Zeman*, March 24, April 23, and May 1, 1940, 102

1243 al-Ḥusaynī, 52; for quote, see “Da’awa Simāḥa al-Muftī l-Ziyāra al-Mūšul- Barqiya al-Mūšul,” *al-Zeman*, October 31, 1939. *Wathā’iq*, 100

1244 al-Ḥusaynī, 55; NA (KV2/2084), “The Mufti. Restoration of Prestige his main consideration. Nov 11, 1939. No. 161 (Haj) Amin El Husseini- 68a (p. 2); “The Mufti” Nov 18, 1939. (Haj) Amin El Husseini.- 71a (p. 1-2)

who broadcast in Arabic to the region.¹²⁴⁵ Baḥrī told listeners Jews were ‘friends of the English,’ who would rule the Middle East if Britain won World War II.¹²⁴⁶ Baḥrī announced Ḥusaynī’s boycotts against Jews.¹²⁴⁷ Ḥusaynī himself “took to broadcasting Nazi propaganda,” a later government report said.¹²⁴⁸ Ḥusaynī said Britain gave the Arab *Waṭan* to Jews.¹²⁴⁹ He said there was a “British-Jewish conspiracy,” and Britain ‘created’ Iraq’s non-Arab peoples, including Judaism, to “rule over the wide riches of the Arab world.”¹²⁵⁰

Nūrī never curbed Ḥusaynī’s incitement; never punished Ḥusaynī; never surveilled him, but instead, facilitated Ḥusaynī’s efforts, giving him financial support.¹²⁵¹ His revenues sources included Shawkat’s fundraisers, Muthanná, government grants, and secret funds from Ṭaha al-Ḥāshimī, the Defense Minister and founder of the Committee of the Defense of Palestine, of origins unknown.¹²⁵² Ṭaha thwarted British attempts to monitor Ḥusaynī, deporting those suspected of spying on him.¹²⁵³

Agitators turn against Nūrī

The government's own paid provocateurs turned against the regime for what the agitators sulked was a lack of commitment to anti-Jewish causes on part of the government and disrespect for their work. Nūrī’s and Ḥusaynī’s relations soured.¹²⁵⁴ Nūrī’s decreasing financial

1245 “The Mufti. Restoration of Prestige,” NA (KV2/2084)- 68a (p. 2); “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/1941,” 234; “From a Conversation,” CZA (Z4\3125)- 2; NA (FO 624/17/489)- 7 (p. 2)

1246 Edy Cohen. Lecture. “Radio Berlin in Arabic: The First Nazi Radio in Arabic.” The Jews of the Middle East in the Shadow of the Holocaust Conference. April 5, 2016. Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 14 Ibn Gabirol Str., Jerusalem

1247 Eastern Department. To Mr. Jebb (Colonial Office) “The Mufti’s Activities.” Feb 21, 1940 NA (KV 2/2085) - 82b (p. 1)

1248 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq,” 233-234

1249 al-Ḥusaynī, 54

1250 for first quote, see al-Ḥusaynī, 53; for second quote, see *Ibid.*, 70

1251 £1,500, or a \$106,000 in today’s purchasing power, see “From a Conversation,” CZA (Z4\3125)- 2; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq,” 234; “The Mufti,” NA (KV2/2084)- 71a (p. 1)

1252 Ṭaha funded Ḥusaynī’s Palestinian Refugee Committee, a group dedicated to supporting Palestinian Arabs in Iraq. The grants were 15,000 dinars monthly, see Interrogation Report on Abdul Raouf Abdul Razzak. NA (KV2/3658)-39A (p. 2); *al-Zaman*, November 18, 1939, *Wathā’iq*, 100; al-Jawāhīrī, 149; Peyton (Colonial Office) to Jebb (Foreign Office) “The Mufti’s Activities and Interests” Feb 5, 1940 NA (KV 2/2085) - 81b (p.3)

1253 Eastern Department to Mr. Jebb (Colonial Office) “The Palestinians and Syrians in Iraq.” April 20, 1940. NA (KV 2/2085) - 84b (p. 2)

1254 Eastern Department. “Activities of the Mufti. Possibility of intrigue in the Middle Euphrates.” Jan 18, 1940 NA (KV 2/2085) - 81a (p. 1)

contributions irked Ḥusaynī.¹²⁵⁵ Nūrī humiliated him: when Ḥusaynī, uninvited to a London Conference, said he intended to boycott it, Nūrī snidely remarked Ḥusaynī no longer led Palestine’s Arabs anyway.¹²⁵⁶ For years, Nūrī spoke poorly of Ḥusaynī to his face, saying, Ḥusaynī was a mediocre politician; Ḥusaynī “ruined everything.”¹²⁵⁷ Ḥusaynī, likewise, said Nūrī was “England’s obedient servant.”¹²⁵⁸ In late 1939, Ḥusaynī wanted Nūrī deposed. In conversations with others, he insulted Nūrī.¹²⁵⁹ He held secret meetings with Muthanná, urging “anti-Nuri risings.”¹²⁶⁰ Colonialism “enabled evil Zionism to rape their land.”¹²⁶¹ Ḥusaynī persuaded the Golden Square, of whom three were Muthanná members, Iraq would become a Jewish country if they did not revolt.¹²⁶²

When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Britain and Germany were in the grips of World War II, which triggered a clash in Iraq among politicians as to whether to ally with the Axis or Allies. *Qawmiyya*’s supporters pressed to align with the Axis, saying was that Britain would betray Arabs after World War II, and “emerge from the war with still lenient commitments to the Jews;” and, if war ended, Jewish immigrants would deluge the Middle East.¹²⁶³ The Golden Square, who did not consider Iraq sufficiently ‘Arab,’ saw war as an opportunity to turn Iraq into a *Qawmiyya* state.¹²⁶⁴

Nevertheless, the Prime Minister, Nūrī, sought to break away from the Axis. He severed relations with Germany, infuriating the Golden Square – for though Nūrī supported *Qawmiyya*, and saw the Middle East as one “Arab country,” he was, unusual for someone of his politics, an

1255 Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine: Miscellaneous.” December 13, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 38b (p. 1)

1256 Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine: Miscellaneous Items.” December 21, 1938. NA (KV2/2084)- 41a (p. 1)

1257 Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Mr. Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine Miscellaneous.” January 4, 1939. NA (KV2/2084)- 42a (p. 1)

1258 Ibid.

1259 Mr. Lee (Colonial Office) to Jebb (Foreign Office) “Palestine. Mufti’s intention to keep the revolt simmering: Propaganda favor of his return to Palestine, etc.” December 7, 1939 NA (KV 2/2085) - 79a (p. 2)

1260 Eastern Department. “Activities of the Mufti. Possibility of intrigue in the Middle Euphrates.” Jan 18, 1940 NA (KV 2/2085) - 81a (p. 1)

1261 Nāǰī Shawkat, *Sīrah wa Dhikariyāt Thamānīn ‘Āmān: 1894-1974*, Vol. II, (Manshūrāt Maktaba al-Yaqza al-‘Arabiya: Baghdad, 1990) 439

1262 Ibid., 439-440

1263 Ambassador (Baghdad) to High Commissioner of Palestine (Jerusalem) CZA (S25\22719)- 42

1264 Elie Kedourie, “Continuity and Change in Modern Iraqi History, *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 62. (1975) 144; Hirszowicz, 46

Anglophile, and wanted to ally with Britain. “Opposition to Nuri [sic] became violent,” a British asset said.¹²⁶⁵ The Golden Square said Nūrī was a ‘friend of the English,’ more loyal to Britain than Iraq, and one of the country’s “phony leaders of British Power.”¹²⁶⁶ The Golden Square’s strongman, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh said, in his memoir, Nūrī was a Turk, under “slavery to the British,” and the Regent, ‘Abd al-Ilāh was “a signboard for the heads of Jewish money.”¹²⁶⁷ Muthanná pressed the army to oppose Nūrī.¹²⁶⁸ In March 1940, Nūrī deported undesirable foreigners from Germany, and the Golden Square, members of Muthanná, aligned with the Axis’s anti-Semitism, still irate Nūrī interned Germans a year prior, replaced him with Rashīd ‘Ālī. “Nūrī was dismissed from the premiership on the account of his unfriendly action towards Germany,” Rashīd ‘Ālī said in a letter to Fritz Grobba, Iraq’s former German envoy.¹²⁶⁹ Rashīd ‘Ālī also maintained relations with Italy, a non-combatant and close German ally, enabling German money and propaganda to flow through Italy’s legation.¹²⁷⁰

Imposing Arab Character

Rashīd ‘Ālī exploited the war to make Iraq an Arab *Qawmiyya* state, as the Golden Square desired, by restricting ‘non-Arab’ cultures, particularly Jews. He legislated strictures against non-Arabs in two ways. First, he limited the of number of Western entertainment workers, prohibiting dancers, and capping their numbers at twenty-six artists, one casino with jazz, and one cabaret with Western music.¹²⁷¹ Rashīd ‘Ālī also prohibited non-Arab behaviors,

1265 for first quote, see al-Hāshimī, 54; for second quote, see “From a Conversation,” CZA (Z4\3125)- 3

1266 for first quote, see ‘Uthmān Kemāl Ḥaddād, *Ḥarakāt Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Kaylānī sanat 1941*, 10th ed. (Maktabah al-‘Aṣṣafī: Sidon) 14; for second, see al-Ṣabbāgh, 26

1267 for first quote, see al-Ṣabbāgh, 27, for second quote, see *Ibid.*, 198

1268 Nuri Said and His Opponents. Nov 24, 1939 (Haj) Amin El Husseini. NA (KV2/2084)- 73a

1269 Basil Newton to Viscount Halifax. June 10, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-235; for quote, see “From a Conversation,” CZA (Z4\3125)-3

1270 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq,” 233

1271 “Limitation of Number of Cabarets in the Capital. One Western and Three Local Cabarets. Foreign Artists to be Sent Away,” *al-Bīlad*. May 8, 1940. NA (FO 624/21/403)-2

banning liquor sales near mosques, smoking on Ramadan, “lewd” dances, dresses in cabarets, and mixed gender cinemas. He decreed street names must be Arabic, with street signs in Arabic script.¹²⁷²

Second, Rashīd ‘Ālī tightened Nūrī’s ban on Jewish immigrants, forbidding transit visas to Jews, and thereby barring all Jewish non-citizens from Iraq.¹²⁷³ The ban applied to all travelers of “Jewish stock,” the Foreign Ministry said.¹²⁷⁴ In July 1940, the Jewish Agency wanted to bring through 600 holocaust refugees to Palestine, as part of Palestine’s immigration quotas; however, the government refused to grant any transit visas to Jews.¹²⁷⁵ Two refugees, Marie and Izzak Kleinbaum of Poland, were detained at the border and denied entry. On December 16, a ship arrived at Basra, with six refugees from Lithuania. “The Iraqi authorities refuse to allow them to land,” an official said.¹²⁷⁶

In parallel to his overt policies, Rashīd ‘Ālī’s cabinet secretly established anti-Semitic cells. His Defense Minister, Ṭaha, ordered *al-Istiqlāl*’s editor, ‘Abd al-Ghāffur al-Badrī, and the deputy, Sayid Thābit, to create the White Society, a covert organization dedicated to Axis triumph. Under Ḥusaynī’s control, the White Society issued proclamations calling for violent revolution to make Iraq an Arab state, wherein Islam and regime were one.¹²⁷⁷ “The Great Day has come. The Day to draw the sword in the face of the wicked English,” one pamphlet said. “Strike the first blow for our country.”¹²⁷⁸ Ḥusaynī and Badrī also founded the Society of Arab

1272 Simon, 59-60

1273 Minutes. Oct 29, 1940. NA (FO 371/24567)- 112

1274 NA (FO 624/21/464), In Arabic the term was, *al-Simah min al-Yahūd*, see Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Baghdad) to H.M. Ambassador (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) October 21, 1940. Arabic Original, -43; British, French, Americans, Egyptians and nationals of neighboring countries exempted, see A.S. Halsford, Minutes, The Standing Iraqi visa regulations are at 205/4/39. Nov 21, 1940, -27

1275 NA (FO 371/24567), J. Linton (Jewish Agency for Palestine) to S.E.V. Luke, Esq. (Colonial Office)- 90; R.L.B. to Baggalay. July 20, 1940, -88; see also, Foreign Office (London) to H.M.Minister Basil Newton (Baghdad) June 18, 1940. NA (FO 624/21/464)-55

1276 NA (FO 624/21/464), A.S. Halford to Saiyid Abdul Mejid Allawi, December 3, 1940, -23; Transit visas for Iraq granted at Kovno to immigrants to Palestine,-11- 12 for quote, see - 11

1277 NA (FO 624/23/214), “The political, social and cultural unity of all Arab countries” and “The establishment of a regime of national and social reform to bring the State and Religion into harmony,” see Secretary of the White Society Party. Pamphlet. Enclosed in Vyvyian Holt to F.A.G. Cook, January 20, 1941.-20 (p.2); Vyvyian Holt to F.A.G. Cook, January 20, 1941, -20; F.A.G. Cook to Vyvyian Holt, February 4, 1941,- 16

1278 Secretary of the White Society. Pamphlet. NA (FO 624/23/214)-20 (p.1-2)

Union Guards, a secret Basra group of medical students and educators under the command of Muthanná.

Rashīd ‘Ālī’s identity politics and clandestine societies may have incited a mass shooting targeting Jews. While in Mosul, the White Society implored locals to kill the English, and the Society of Arab Union Guards made “violently anti-British speeches.”¹²⁷⁹ Yet, *Qawmiyya* circles popularly derided Jews as ‘friends of the English.’ So, on January 10, 1941, Shabbat evening, a band of thirty attacked Sundur, a Jewish village fifty miles away from Mosul, where inciters pushed for attacks on ‘the English.’¹²⁸⁰ The band entered the village, approaching the home of Moshe Me’allim’s brother, and fired into the window, injuring two minors. Then the band advanced to Moshe’s house. Moshe opened the door and invited the band in. “No, we came to kill you,” a gunman said.¹²⁸¹ The band shot everyone within the house, killing seven, and wounded five others.¹²⁸²

To divert blame, police denied the killings were anti-Semitic, claiming the crime was a “blood-feud,” an ongoing conflict between villages, lasting years.¹²⁸³ Nevertheless, the attacks proximity to Mosul, where state-sponsored groups urged violence against the English and their friends imply a correlation. Rashīd ‘Ālī’s reaction seemed to encourage further attacks. He released the killers after ten days, and confiscated the Jewish village’s firearms, so Jews could not retaliate.¹²⁸⁴

The Axis Alliance

1279 NA (FO 624/23/214), for quote, see Vyvian Holt to Wolstan Weld-Forester, Jan 20, 1941,- 22; The White Society. Pamphlet, -20 (p.2)

1280 F.A.G. Cook to Ambassador (Baghdad), January 16, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/202)- 7

1281 Mordechai Zaken, *Jewish Subjects and their Tribal Chieftains in Kurdistan: A Study of Survival*, (Brill: Leiden, 2007) 208

1282 Ibid.; NA (FO 624/23/202), F.A.G. Cook to Ambassador, January 18, 1941, - 6; Basil Newton to Foreign Office, January 20, 1941, - 5; see also Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) January 20, 1941 NA (FO 371/27099)

1283 F.A.G. Cook to Ambassador (Baghdad), January 16, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/202)- 7

1284 Zaken, 82, 207

Iraq's program to promote anti-Semitism developed into an Axis alliance. Italy became a rallying point for *Qawmiyya*'s adherents who were opposed to Britain and feared a 'dhimmī reversal.' The conflict of whether to side with the Axis or Allies erupted again when Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940. Nūrī, then the Foreign Minister, wanted to break relations with Italy,¹²⁸⁵ but he was an outlier in the cabinet. He only held the post because the Regent 'Abd al-Ilāh – who served as monarch until the King, then five years-old, came of age – wanted to moderate Rashīd 'Ālī.¹²⁸⁶ The cabinet opposed Nūrī's plan, as did the Golden Square, contending Iraq was a British colony and need to break free. The cabinet and Golden Square said the military alliance with Britain, known as the 1930 Anglo-Iraq treaty (henceforth referred to as the Treaty) fettered the country, but war could liberate them.¹²⁸⁷ Ḥusaynī lobbied Rashīd 'Ālī to affiliate with the Axis. "Britain and its settler allies are the plague which degrade the Arab Ummah," Ḥusaynī said.¹²⁸⁸

Rashīd 'Ālī refused to cut Italian relations.¹²⁸⁹ He said Iraq "should adopt a waiting attitude in considering the severance,"¹²⁹⁰ stalling as France collapsed, and Italy entered the war, while secretly cementing Axis ties, based on fighting the Axis and Iraq's common enemies, Jews and English, whom both Axis and Iraq's government said were the same. At Rashīd 'Ālī's direction, Nājī Shawkat feigned an earache, traveled to Turkey under pretext of medical care.¹²⁹¹ There, he met Franz Von Papen, Germany's ambassador, to obtain assurances. Von Papen said Germany would "safeguard" the "independence of existing Arab States" in return for

1285 'Uthmān Kemāl Ḥaddād, *Ḥarakat Rashīd 'Ālī al-Kaylānī sanat 1941*, 10th ed. (Sidon: Maktabah al-'Aṣrafī) 21

1286 Khadduri, 155

1287 Ḥaddād, 7-9; NA (FO 371/24561), C.J. Edmonds to Basil Newton (Baghdad) July 1, 1940, - 269; Newton to War Cabinet, June 18, 1940, - 259

1288 al-Ḥusaynī, 59; Report from an Arab Source on the Situation in Iraq. January 13, 1941 (Jerusalem) CZA (Z4\31215)- 8

1289 Basil Newton (Baghdad) to War Cabinet. June 11, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)- 253 [195]

1290 C.J. Edmonds to Basil Newton (Baghdad) July 1, 1940, - 269-270

1291 NA (FO 371/24561), for quote, see C.J. Edmonds to Basil Newton, July 1, 1940, - 269-270; C.J. Edmonds. United Kingdom-Iraq Relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Baghdad) October 10, 1940, - 279-280; Khadduri, 163

“disturbances in the Arab East” and “the destruction or immobilization of British lines of communication.”¹²⁹² Next, Rashīd ‘Ālī deputized ‘Uthmān Ḥaddād, Ḥusaynī’s secretary, to negotiate further. In Ankara, Ḥaddād showed Von Papen a letter from Ḥusaynī, explaining Palestine was “fighting the democracies and international Jewry.”¹²⁹³ Ḥaddād said Iraq wanted nothing except independence for other Arab states and “to execute the irrevocable extermination of the Zionist entity in Palestine and thwart the Jewish Colonialist conspiracy.” The Arabic phrase Ḥaddād used for “execute,” *Qaḍatu Qaḍā’*, is a legal term used for death sentences in court.¹²⁹⁴

On September 20, Germany agreed to Ḥaddād’s preconditions. However, Italy refused. Italy claimed the Levant for its empire, including Palestine and Syria. Ḥaddād suspected Italy also intended to conquer Egypt. Italy proffered to put a promise to respect Arab independence in writing, but Italy said it would not recognize its own declaration. Italy’s dictator, Benito Mussolini, refused to sign it. “Italy does not understand how the Iraqi Prime Minister will benefit from Italian recognition of the independence of Arab states. What is the point?”¹²⁹⁵

Still, Rashīd ‘Ālī wanted to cooperate with Italy, and part of the reason was anti-Semitism.¹²⁹⁶ “Jews are masters of economic and financial influence in America,” Iraq’s agreement with Italy reads. “To strike World Jewry in Palestine is a decisive blow that will destroy the morale of the Jews in America.” Arabs will “cooperate with Italy against the Jewish-English policy.”¹²⁹⁷ That October, in Berlin, Ḥaddād spoke with Germany’s Foreign Ministry about “the Jewish problem.”¹²⁹⁸ Ḥaddād told Grobba, “The enemies of the Arabs and Germany

1292 Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)- 8

1293 Ḥaddād, 25; for quote, see Joseph Schechtman, *The Mufti and the Führer*, (Thomas Yoseloff: New York, 1965) 104

1294 Ḥaddād, 26; for quotes, see al-Ḥusaynī, 78

1295 Ḥaddād, 40-41, 43-45, 48; for quote, see 41

1296 *Ibid.*, 43

1297 *Ibid.*, 52-53

1298 Quote in *Ibid.*, 49; Schechtman, 105

are the same, namely, the English, the Jews and the Americans who favor the Jews.”¹²⁹⁹ Ḥaddād requested Germany and Italy recognize “the right of the Arab countries to solve the question of the Jewish elements in Palestine and the other Arab countries in a manner that conforms to the national and ethnic interests of the Arabs, and to the solution of the Jewish question in the countries of Germany and Italy.”¹³⁰⁰ Ḥaddād knew Germany planned to eliminate Europe’s Jews. “Germany decided on the necessity of expelling Jews from every part of Europe,” and to “liquidate the problem in a final manner,” Ḥaddād wrote. “The Jewish problem is a minority problem that has destroyed their wealth in the view of all Western countries, and so it is necessary to eliminate it.”¹³⁰¹

“Arab countries have the right to solve the Jewish question in the national and racial interest on the German-Italian model,” the German Embassy in Italy agreed.¹³⁰² Nazi agents and Ḥusaynī pressed Rashīd ‘Ālī to accept German declarations they would respect Arabs’ sovereignty.¹³⁰³ In January, Ḥaddād returned to Berlin with a letter for Hitler.¹³⁰⁴ British policy was an “obstacle” to “independence of the Arab countries by pitting them directly against the Jews of the entire world.”¹³⁰⁵ Rashīd ‘Ālī said he will fight if Germany recognizes the independence of Arab countries, regardless of Italian territorial ambitions.

“The Germans and the Arabs agree to struggle against their common enemies which are the English and the Jews,” said the Nazi Secretary of State of Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Weizsäcker. “Germany is ready to collaborate with you.”¹³⁰⁶

1299 Herf, 43

1300 Ibid., 42

1301 Ḥaddād, 63

1302 Herf, 42

1303 Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)-8

1304 Herf, 107

1305 Ibid., 55

1306 Ḥaddād, 107-108

Rashīd ‘Ālī backed the agreement with its anti-Semitic article, and was willing to risk civil war or a British invasion to see the Axis pact through. At a secret cabinet meeting in Baghdad, Rashīd ‘Ālī submitted the proposal to ally with the Axis. The pact with Italy and Germany was a ‘great opportunity,’ he said. Only Nūrī dissented. An altercation exploded between Rashīd ‘Ālī and Nūrī at the cabinet meeting. Nūrī wanted to support Britain, screaming, countries that follow Nazis do not end well. Ministers interjected, howling, “traitor,” and ‘Nūrī accepts British bribes.’ Nūrī left, furious, threatening to resign and leak the ‘pact.’ The meeting adjourned without resolution, and Nūrī refused to attend future meetings. Though he did not resign, Nūrī tried to undermine Rashīd ‘Ālī, and leaked the Axis ‘pact’ to Basil Newton, Britain’s Ambassador. Nūrī implored intervention, complaining Britain was too meek. Newton ordered ‘Abd al-Ilāh, the Regent, to dissolve the cabinet, and told British forces to be ready to invade if Rashīd ‘Ālī did not resign.¹³⁰⁷ ‘Abd al-Ilāh demanded Rashīd ‘Ālī resign.¹³⁰⁸

Still Rashīd ‘Ālī and his backers risked war with Britain to see the pact through. Rashīd ‘Ālī denied everything, saying, there was no negotiations nor Axis pact. Newton and ‘Abd al-Ilāh squabbled with Rashīd ‘Ālī for days to force Rashīd ‘Ālī to quit, until, as a compromise, the government eliminated two ministers: Nājī, who promoted the pact, and Nūrī, who opposed it.¹³⁰⁹ However, within days, Newton realized he was tricked.¹³¹⁰ Rashīd ‘Ālī replaced the pair with two warmongers, Muthanná members who despised ‘the English’ and their friends, and Rashīd ‘Ālī again contacted Germany. Rashīd ‘Ālī’s backers, the Golden Square visited the Regent to force him to accept the Axis pact. “Intern Nuri el Said [sic] and all pro-British

1307 Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)-9

1308 Longrigg, 285

1309 Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)-9

1310 Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)-10

politicians,” the colonels said, “show sympathy for the plan of Rashid Ali [sic].”¹³¹¹ The Golden Square threatened, ‘Abd al-Ilāh must assent or his family would die.¹³¹² ‘Abd al-Ilāh relented, and the Golden Square, pleased, left. Thereafter, ‘Abd al-Ilāh fled to Diwaniya, a city a hundred miles south of Baghdad, and then messaged Rashīd ‘Ālī, demanding he resign. ‘Abd al-Ilāh sent a letter to Parliament, ordering legislators to censure the cabinet; and a second to Baghdad’s commanding officer, to arrest the Golden Square. ‘Abd al-Ilāh asked Ṭaha to form a government. Perhaps ‘Abd al-Ilāh thought Muthanná and the Golden Square would accept Ṭaha, for he was Rashīd ‘Ālī’s Defense Minister, and Ṭaha long nurtured the *Qawmiyya* movement and founded the Committee for the Defense of Palestine. Meanwhile, Diwaniyah’s Commander, Ibrāhīm al-Rāwī, agreed to reconquer Baghdad at the Regent’s behest, despite that it could spark civil war.¹³¹³

To remain in power, Rashīd ‘Ālī consciously fomented xenophobia. He threatened if he were ousted, he would “tell the story of British interference” and “fan the flames of passion.”¹³¹⁴ He told Parliament, “The British were asking to occupy Iraq and were insisting on the disbandment of the Iraqi army.”¹³¹⁵ Yet, as he spoke to rally Parliament, deputies jeered, crying: “Long Live the Regent,” and “Down with the Cabinet.”¹³¹⁶ The Chamber despised Rashīd ‘Ālī; but, he could not dissolve it. Doing so required ‘Abd al-Ilāh’s signature, so Rashīd ‘Ālī resigned – “Only because of the great pressure put upon him by a Foreign Power- meaning England,” his resignation letter said.¹³¹⁷

1311 Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī and ‘Ālī Shaykh Mahmud, see Longrigg, 285; Sab‘āwī later testified at trial, Rashīd ‘Ālī pushed him to become Justice Minister, see in Rafā‘īl Buṭṭī, *Dhākira ‘Irāqīya*, Vol. II (al-Madā, Damascus, 2000) 366; Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)-10

1312 Basil Newton (Baghdad) March 6, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062)- 27

1313 Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)-10

1314 C.J. Edmonds to Basil Newton, February 3, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062) - 19

1315 F.A.G. Cook to British Embassy, “Extract from Letter (secret) dated 5th February 1941 from H.M. Consul at Mosul to British Embassy, Baghdad.” NA (FO 371/27062)- 41

1316 Report from an Arab Source, CZA (Z4\31215)-11

1317Ibid.; The version publish in newspapers mentioned “foreign hands” without naming England, see The Ministerial Crisis in Iraq. al-Sajjar newspaper (Basra) Feb 16, 1941 (Jerusalem) CZA (Z4\31215)- 21

His downfall had the desired effect of exacerbating bigotry, and anti-Semitism increased. His supporters said Britain removed him at Iraqi Jews' bidding.¹³¹⁸ This libel was frequently heard in bazaars.¹³¹⁹ In Parliament, Ṭaha denied the allegation Jews toppled Rashīd 'Ālī.¹³²⁰ Nonetheless, opponents of Rashīd 'Ālī's ouster said Jews would remove Ṭaha too.¹³²¹ Ṭaha's own policies fed the anti-Semitism. On February 6, 1941, in a meeting with journalists, Ṭaha forbade them to criticize Iraqi leaders, but permitted publishers to disparage policies if they blamed Jews instead. Ṭaha allowed Axis influence to grow. The Italian legation acted on behalf of Germany, with the legation's correspondence costs rising accordingly, from £30 monthly on stamps to £600. Britain pressed Ṭaha to prepare "public opinion for rupture with Italy." Ṭaha refused. The legation was harmless, he said.¹³²² Ṭaha's Foreign Minister, Tawfīq al-Suwaydī, appears to have believed Rashīd 'Ālī's provocations, for Suwaydī refused to discuss Palestine with Newton, the British Ambassador, saying Newton was under "Jewish influence."¹³²³

Rashīd 'Ālī Seize's Power

Rashīd 'Ālī used the Government's program of state-sponsored anti-Semites to seize power, exploiting their anxiety that English and Jews would rule Iraq and Arabs would be powerless. Once Rashīd 'Ālī resigned, he was bitter and joined Muthanná, visiting Nājī and Yūnis al-Sab'āwī, a Muthanná leader and editor of anti-Semitic publications, or met with the Golden Square at Ḥusaynī's house.¹³²⁴ They were all Ḥusaynī's acquaintances, and debated

1318 Saudi Minister. Position of Jews In Iraq, May 29, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-289

1319 Basil Newton, June 7, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-292

1320 Translation of Prime Minister's Statement in the Chamber of Deputies on February 6th, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062)- 9

1321 Baggallay. Position of Jews In Iraq. May 27, 1940 NA (FO 371/24561)-290

1322 NA (FO 371/27062), Al Ahwal dated 7.2.1941. Statement by Prime Minister to Local Journalists about the Government's Foreign Policy, - 10; for quote, see Basil Newton, March 21, 1941, -45-45a

1323 Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Athens). NA(FO 371/27062)- 108

1324 Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) Political Situation in Iraq, April 4, 1941. NA(FO 371/27062)- 110; al-Jawāhirī, 149; N. Shawkat, 433

politics.¹³²⁵ Rashīd ‘Ālī, Nājī, and Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī raged Britain ruled Iraq and Ṭaha did whatever Britain wished.¹³²⁶ All agreed only Axis relations avoided subservience to the English, and the English were “biased toward the Jews.”¹³²⁷ This was a “war between loyal patriots and the English,” Ḥusaynī said.¹³²⁸ In his view, Britain hated Arabs and wanted “to occupy their countries and enslave their Ummah.”¹³²⁹ War could save Iraq “from the clutches of colonialism and Zionism,” he said.¹³³⁰ At a secret gathering at Ḥusaynī’s house, on February 28, the conspirators – Ḥusaynī, Sab‘āwī, Nājī, Rashīd ‘Ālī and the three colonels Ḥusaynī knew from Golden Square, created a covert committee of seven members called ‘Secret War.’ They agreed Ḥusaynī should lead. They took an oath on the Qur’ān to never to cut Italian ties, and to “rid colonialism’s lackeys and the agents of the English.”¹³³¹

Secret War toppled the government and made Rashīd ‘Ālī Prime Minister when they felt their power threatened and foreign rule imminent. The Golden Square, the junta of four colonels who installed and deposed Prime Ministers, was able to interfere in politics because they controlled Baghdad’s four military command posts. If one colonel were removed, the Golden Square would lose this monopoly, and could no longer launch coups. So on March 30, when ‘Abd al-Ilāh ordered Kāmil Shabīb, part of the Golden Square, to transfer to Diwaniya, Shabīb refused.¹³³² Shabīb urged the Golden Square to rebel against ‘Abd al-Ilāh. “Cleanse Iraq of political friends of the English,” Shabīb said.¹³³³ The day after, at 10 pm, the Secret War launched the coup. Soldiers picketed city entrances and occupied the telegraph office, phone

1325 Kāmel Shabīb was the only member Ḥusaynī did not know, see al-Ḥusaynī, 57; N. Shawkat, 434

1326 Report on Conversation with J.H. (Jerusalem) March 22, 1942. CZA (Z431216)-42; Ḥusaynī’s memoir confirms this, see al-Ḥusaynī, 64 ;N. Shawkat, 434

1327 al-Ḥusaynī, 58

1328 Ibid., 64

1329 Ibid., 66

1330 Ibid., 58

1331 al-Jawāhirī, 148-149; Sab‘āwī’s codename was ‘Farhūd,’ see N. Shawkat, 434-435, for quote see N. Shawkat, 435

1332 Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London), March 31, 1941. FO 371/27062- 75 (p.1)

1333 Ḥaddād, 100

exchange, and broadcasting station. The Golden Square tried to seize the Regent, ‘Abd al-Ilāh, to appoint Rashīd ‘Ālī to be Prime Minister.¹³³⁴ For per the constitution, only the monarch could designate a candidate for this role.¹³³⁵ However, ‘Abd al-Ilāh already fled to Basra to avoid capture or death. Unable to locate him, the Golden Square barged into Ṭaha’s house at 5 am, where Ṭaha’s cabinet met in emergency session, the Golden Square roaring, ‘Abd al-Ilāh was under foreign influence.¹³³⁶

By April 10, the anti-Semitic front organizations the government created in the 1930s, the Muthanná and the Futuwa, controlled the state.¹³³⁷ Rashīd ‘Ālī created a High Defense Council, composed of Muthanná leaders: Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī and the Golden Square, to veto cabinet decisions.¹³³⁸ His cabinet were composed of Muthanná members, who now controlled the interior workings and character of the state, with ministry portfolios of Justice, Economics, Communication, Labor, and Propaganda.¹³³⁹ He granted the Futuwa police powers, and armed them to patrol streets.¹³⁴⁰

In parallel, Rashīd ‘Ālī ratcheted incitement to amass support for his regime. State radio said Britain murdered Fayṣal and Ghāzī, slew Arabs; and Jews were Anglophiles who “admired Great Britain.”¹³⁴¹ When Rashīd ‘Ālī convoked parliament, which was the monarchy’s prerogative alone, to declare himself Prime Minister, he warned of plotters.¹³⁴² He said ‘Abd al-

1334 Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London), April 2, 1941. FO 371/27062- 73, 84

1335 Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 3, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062) - 94

1336 Sir Basil Newton (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London), April 2, 1941. FO 371/27062- 73, 84; al-Suwaydī, 303; Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)- 82; Khadduri, 180

1337 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 11; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. British Embassy (Baghdad) April 28, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)-91 (p. 6)

1338 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 8, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 72; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)- 83 (p.3)

1339 ‘Haddād, 105- 106; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 12, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 61; Al-Wayai al-‘Iraqyah No. 1899 of 28/4/41. Principal Contents. NA (FO 624/26/650)- 13; al-Jawāhirī, 150

1340 ‘Haddād, 116; Longrigg, 295; Shamash, 192

1341 Stark, 77; “Feelings about Palestine which though not so intense during the past few months seem to be going to be intensified by propaganda,” see Weekly Reports of Public opinion in Bahrain. April 5, 1941. IOR (R/15/2/687)- 179; for quote, see Draft Record of a Meeting held in the Minister of State’s Room on 2nd April with a Delegation representing various British Jewish Associations. NA (FO 371/91691)-6

1342 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London), April 3, 1941. NA (FO 371/27062)- 86; ‘Haddād, 104

Ilāh was a traitor, who tried to “destroy” the army.¹³⁴³ Rashīd ‘Ālī said he established a new government because British interference was “an attack aimed against the independence of the country.”¹³⁴⁴

The coup was popular because *Qawmiyya* and Jew-hatred were indoctrinated within all levels of society. Mosul and Basra supported Rashīd ‘Ālī. So did junior officers, the educated, the young, the proponents of Hitler and haters of Jews.¹³⁴⁵ Listeners of radio disinformation and enthusiasts of the regime voiced Axis support, suspicions of Jews and wore swastikas on their shoulders to brandish their loyalties.¹³⁴⁶ In one incident, as the Futuwa marched through Baghdad’s streets, they passed a Jewish school, and hurled stones at the door, and a teacher among them said his charges “want to murder all Jewish students.”¹³⁴⁷ Parliament unanimously deposed the Regent, ‘Abd al-Ilāh and replaced him with a figurehead, a relative, Sharīf Sharaf, who nominated Rashīd ‘Ālī to be Prime Minister.¹³⁴⁸ ‘Abd al-Ilāh broadcast appeals to soldiers to join him. None did.¹³⁴⁹ The new British Ambassador, Kinahan Cornwallis, urged the Regent to flee, saying “the Regent’s cause is hopeless.”¹³⁵⁰ ‘Abd al-Ilāh departed for Palestine aboard a British ship.¹³⁵¹

Conclusion

1343 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)- 82 (p.2); for quote, see Royal Iraq Legation (London) to Foreign Office (London) April 6, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 45 (p.2)

1344 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 15

1345 Air Head Quarters (Iraq) to Head Quarters Royal Air Force (Middle East) April 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 52; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. British Embassy (Baghdad) April 28, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)-90 (p. 5); Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavut’ot*, 23

1346 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 18, 1941. NA (FO 371/27065)- 137 (p. 2); Shlomo ‘Azaria. Interview. September 18, 1998, in Sagiv, 104-105; Shā’ul Ḥakhām Sāsūn Khaḍḍūrī, *Rā’ wa Ri’iya: Sīra Ḥayāh al-Ḥakhām Sāsūn Khaḍḍūrī*, (Rābita al-Jāmi’īn al-Nāziḥīn min al-‘Irāq: Jerusalem, 1999) 189

1347 Yosef Menachem. Testimony. November 6, 1989, *Śin’at Yēhūdīm*, 224

1348 NA (FO 371/27064), A.Amin (Iraq Royal Legation) to C.W. Baxter, Esq. (Foreign Office) April 11, 1941,- 47; Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 11, 1941,- 17 NA (FO 624/26/650), “Important Laws, Regulations, Royal Iradas and Notifications issued in the Official Arabic Gazette during the Month of May, 1941.”- 7; Al-Wayai al-‘Iraqyah No. 1898 of 21/4/41. Principal Contents,- 12

1349 Air Head Quarters (Iraq) to Air Ministry (London) April 5, 1941 . NA (FO 371/27064)- 35

1350 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 13, for quote, see - 28

1351 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)- 82 (p.2); Foreign Office (London) to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) April 13, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 31; Foreign Office (London) to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) April 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 25 (p.2)

State-sponsored anti-Semitism developed into the Rashīd ‘Ālī coup, the first openly anti-Semitic regime in Iraq, and as will be discussed in the next chapter, led to the Farhūd, the mass violence against Jews on June 1-2, 1941. The state funded the agitators – the Muthanná, the Futuwa – who seized power in Iraq. Ḥusaynī’s was part of the government’s program to spread anti-Semitism. Iraq’s lawmakers urged Ḥusaynī to come to Iraq. The government provided him with an income, protected him from British measures, and facilitated his promotion of prejudice among the public and politicians – that Jews were Friends of the English. While Muthanná created a network of associations among military officers and lawmakers, and provided an ideology to muster a pre-existing base of supporters among the population who venerated *Qawmiyya*. Muthanná and Ḥusaynī exploited the ‘*dhimmi* reversal,’ the fictitious myth Jews would seize power in Iraq, helping Muthanná seize power instead. Three of the four members of the Golden Square belonged to Muthanná – so did Rashīd ‘Ālī and all seven members of Secret War, save Ḥusaynī, belonged to Muthanná.

The putschists seem to believe their own paranoia of ‘*dhimmi* reversal’ and European plots to deracinate Iraq – that Iraq was not sufficiently ‘Arab’ and needed to be made so. Rashīd ‘Ālī banned Jews from transit visas, and established secret anti-Semitic cells under Ḥusaynī’s direction. Muthanná politicians and the Golden Square wanted Axis relations to make Iraq an Arab state, for they imagined Nazism and Arabism were in agreement due to their hatred of Jews. Iraq and the Axis were not allies of convenience for politics, for Italy claimed Palestine and Syria for its own empire. Yet Rashīd ‘Ālī wanted to work with Italy, in part because of its anti-Semitism. Italy and Rashīd ‘Ālī’s cabinet agreed their common enemies were ‘the Jews,’ and to cooperate against ‘the Jews.’ Italy and Rashīd ‘Ālī’s cabinet agreed the Allies were biased for Jews or in fact were Jews. Ḥusaynī’s initial letter to entice the Axis into an alliance promised

Arabs fought “international Jewry” for “extermination.” Ḥaddād asked Germany to solve the ‘Jewish problem’ in line with solutions in Germany. Rashīd ‘Alī’s regime knew Nazis wanted to “destroy” the Jews. Britain wanted only to protect its lines of communication, and had acquiesced to Arabism and anti-Semitism, only pressuring Rashīd ‘Ālī to break Axis relations, but Rashīd ‘Ālī refused. He chose to partner with the Axis, with a calculus, predicated, in part, on anti-Semitism.

Contrary to Rashīd ‘Ālī’s defenders who claim he was an ‘Arab nationalist,’ in truth Rashīd ‘Ālī willfully fomented demagogic anti-Semitism as a means to achieve power by awakening the darkest impulses among the public. He was Prime Minister three times, and each tenure was marked with mass violence against minorities: Assyrian Massacre, the mass shooting of Jews at Sundur, and as will be discussed in the next chapter, the Farhūd, which occurred the day after he fled the country. He established secret anti-Semitic cells to incite violent revolution. He vowed to ‘fan the flames of passion’ and tell the public that Britain controlled Iraq. As a result, Rashīd ‘Ālī’s supporters blamed his first downfall in January 1941, on Jews, and he may have convinced at least one minister in Ṭaha’s cabinet, who said Britain was under ‘Jewish influence.’ Rashīd ‘Ālī, irate and out of power, joined Muthanná, and agreed that Zionism threatened to destroy Iraq and ‘friends of the English’ ruled Iraq. Together, he, Ḥusaynī and Muthanná conspired to overthrow the state. The coup was a final logical step in *Qawmiyya*’s paranoia, which saw a conspiracy of ethnocide against Arabs, and secret enemies – English and Jews – in every institution they did not control. When Rashīd ‘Ālī declared himself Prime Minister and declared ‘Abd al-Ilāh a traitor and saboteur, Rashīd ‘Ālī was expressing the ideology and fears the state had indoctrinated into the public, through the schools, the press, and

public policy, since the early 1920s. World War II gave men who held these ideas the opportunity to take power.

Chapter 6

The Farhūd and World War II

Members of Rashīd ‘Ālī’s regime were responsible for the Farhūd, a mass violence against Jews, on June 1-2, 1941, that killed hundreds and amplified anti-Semitism in Iraq. The Prime Minister, Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Gaylānī, afraid of a ‘*dhimmī* reversal,’ in which Iraq ceased to be Muslim and Arab and *dhimmīs* would rule, cemented an Axis military alliance against Britain. An ancillary effect of Iraq’s alignment with the Axis was Iraq’s war on Jews.

The government incited violence against Jews as part of the war effort. Rashīd ‘Ālī appointed his Economics minister, Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī, to organize radio propaganda. Sab‘āwī was a Muthanná member and a former editor of anti-Semitic publications. Sab‘āwī mixed Anglophobia with anti-Semitism in his broadcasts, urging attacks on Jews to raise morale and foment rage among the public. He said Jews were friends of the English and internal enemies. With Sab‘āwī, two others called for killings: Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, formerly Palestine’s highest Sunni religious authority, who was invited to Iraq for his incitement against Jews; and the Futuwwa, a high school club for military training dedicated to *Qawmiyya*. The heightened emotions of war, the propaganda, and previous indoctrination from state-sponsored Jew-hatred in the 1930s, combined to engender anti-Jewish hysteria among the public. This trifecta spawned a

wave of accusations – Jews were British spies and sympathizers – normalizing rhetoric that advised to kill Iraq’s Jews.

There were two major episodes of mass violence against Jews in the wake of Iraqi defeats in Baghdad, wherein attackers believed Jews threatened Iraq’s Muslim Arab character.

Perhaps both episodes were partly government coordinated. The first occurred on May 7, 1941 after Britain’s Air Force bombed Baghdad. Thereafter, a Baghdad mob, saying Jews signaled the planes where to strike, attacked a Jewish hospital. There was also a plot to kill Baghdad’s Jewish stationmasters, and in Basra, a port city in the far south, government agents organized a riot to attack Jews.

The second episode was the Farhūd. Sab‘āwī planned the massacre, creating militias under his command to orchestrate the killings. He controlled the propaganda, influenced the police, and created and led a militia, Katā’ib al-Shabāb, (the Youth Phalanxes) a government-funded force composed of the Futuwwa and Muthanná volunteers to monitor civilians. He seized registers of Jewish schools to identify who was Jewish, prepared maps of Jewish streets, and secretly armed his militants to perpetrate the massacre. The military issued secret orders to monitor Jews. As British forces approached Baghdad, most of Rashīd ‘Ālī’s regime fled, but Sab‘āwī remained in power and distributed weapons to his followers for the Farhūd. Sab‘āwī ordered Jews to self-isolate in their homes, and not communicate with another, in order for Jews, ignorant of the plan, to be in their residences, which the Katā’ib had mapped from the registers. Then Sab‘āwī prepared a speech to enflame the populace against ‘the enemy’ as a signal to massacre Baghdad’s Jews.

Baghdad’s mayor, Arshād al-‘Umarī, had a history of anti-Semitism and tried to eliminate all Jews from the civil service in 1934. He claimed to have seized power to thwart the

killings. However, ‘Umarī never suppressed Sab‘āwī’s forces. Rather, ‘Umarī paid Sab‘āwī to leave Iraq, and asked Sab‘āwī’s forces to voluntarily return their weapons. The police, army, Futuwwa, Muthanná, and Katā’ib were still loyal to Sab‘āwī. Agitators continued to call for the extermination of the internal enemy – Jews – enflaming the populace as Sab‘āwī intended, and signaled the massacre. Sab‘āwī’s forces perpetrated the Farhūd without him.

The regime had the capacity to engineer riots that appeared spontaneous, according to British sources. Attacks were synchronized to stop and start at multiple locations at once. In cooperation, hospitals poisoned Jewish patients, including those wounded in the riots. These events occurred under the direction of Şā’ib Shawkat, a former leader for the Committee of the Defense of Palestine and brother of Futuwwa’s founder, Sāmī Shawkat.

The Jewish community could not organize a cohesive defense to stop the provocations. *Dhimmī* norms imposed strict taboos against Jewish participation in politics, law-enforcement, and military. The Jewish community had no defense force or leaders with experience in political action, and the regime expected Jews to be weak and meek. The Jewish community’s previous method – to appeal to the government with tropes of protection – was of no avail when the government wanted to kill them.

After the bloodshed, the state was more interested in safeguarding itself, and denied responsibility for the Farhūd. The new Prime Minister, Jamīl al-Midfa‘ī, hid the Farhūd and downplayed the tragedy. His policy of ‘forgetting’ sought to absolve the government, Arabism, and Muslim rule of any wrongdoing. The Farhūd laid bare that Muslims did not protect *dhimmīs*, and Iraqis acted disgracefully by Iraq’s own cultural standards. Muslim Iraqis murdered their own friends, colleagues, neighbors, and loved ones, those they promised to shelter, or, in the case of police and soldiers, civilians in their charge to defend.

Midfa‘ī never mentioned the Farhūd, nor did he punish its perpetrators or remove them from power. In part, he wished to avoid outraging those who cherished *Qawmiyya* and notions of the righteousness of Muslim rule. As a result, the members of the army, police, and government who perpetrated the attacks stayed in power. Midfa‘ī did not extradite perpetrators who fled. His probe into the killing was structured to exclude evidence and Jewish participation; to erase government complicity. The investigation functioned little more than a month, set deadlines for testimony, downplayed the death toll, and concluded before the Jewish community testified. The investigations produced a report stating that the attacks were spontaneous, without government direction. The Report diverted responsibility for the atrocity away from Iraqi authorities, *Qawmiyya*, and the hierarchy of faiths, stating the attacks stemmed from Nazi propaganda, and bystanders joined the attacks, with mob mentality spreading throughout the city.

The Farhūd increased anti-Semitism. Those who wanted to preserve the reputation of Arabism and the hierarchy blamed Jews for the massacre. Such agitators said Jews ‘provoked’ the attack, or justified the Farhūd as a necessity, calling for a second. Perpetrators terrorized Jews into silence, regarding the Farhūd or similar events, to avoid criminal responsibility. As a result, the Farhūd worsened Jewish-Muslim relations in Iraq and exacerbated anti-Semitism.

The Anglo-Iraq War

The Farhūd occurred in the aftermath of the Anglo-Iraq War, a clash between Rashīd ‘Ālī and Britain. Rashīd ‘Ālī launched hostilities, and his regime, believing anti-Semitic myths that Iraq’s Jews were spies and ‘friends of the English,’ dragged Jews into the conflict and targeted their community, despite that Jews had no connection to the war or its disputes. The crux of the war was British India, a major source of wealth and manpower for Britain. If Germany

conquered the Suez Canal, as Germany forces threatened to do, Basra would be Britain's only link to India.¹³⁵² So in April 1941, Britain wanted to placate the new Prime Minister, Rashīd 'Ālī, who had seized power in a coup. Britain's Chief-of-staff of the Middle East, Archibald Wavell, preferred to settle with Rashīd 'Ālī, as did Britain's Ambassador to Iraq, Kinahan Cornwallis.¹³⁵³

The Anglo-Iraqi treaty promised Britain the "use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes, and means of communication" in Iraq.¹³⁵⁴ Britain transited troops through Iraq, lingering soldiers, slowly and continually, to impose a *fait accompli*, to overawe Rashīd 'Ālī into cooperation, and to illustrate to the public "any regime in Iraq," no matter how opposed to Britain, would obey the Treaty and honor British prerogatives.¹³⁵⁵ If Rashīd 'Ālī acquiesced to Britain's 'lines of Communication,' and agreed, Britain could keep its foothold in Iraq, then Britain would allow Rashīd 'Ālī to rule.¹³⁵⁶ If Rashīd 'Ālī resisted, Britain intended the troop movements to draw Rashīd 'Ālī into a war to destroy him.¹³⁵⁷

Rashīd 'Ālī tricked Cornwallis, pretending to assent to Britain's conditions, to stall for time to build up his forces. The Foreign Office pursued a "non-committal" line, to avoid formal recognition of Rashīd 'Ālī's government, in order not to demoralize Britain's supporters in Iraq. Rashīd 'Ālī told Cornwallis that he sought British recognition to stabilize his regime. Rashīd 'Ālī contacted the British Embassy, asking for recognition, promising to adhere to the treaty, to "stop all agitation" and "prepare public opinion for a rupture with Italy." Rashīd 'Ālī met Cornwallis in an unofficial meeting. "His greatest desire in life was to implement the Treaty," Rashīd 'Ālī told Cornwallis, who was ignorant of Rashīd 'Ālī's secret Axis talks. Rashīd 'Ālī's Charge d'Affaires

1352 Viceroy to Secretary of State for India (New Delhi) to Political Department (London) April 21, 1941. NA (FO 371/27066)- 19

1353 Elie Kedourie, "The Sack of Basra and the Farhud in Baghdad," *Arab Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, Frank Cass: London. 1974) 285; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 19, 1941. NA (FO 371/27065)- 150

1354 Government of India (New Delhi) to His Majesty's Minister (Kabul) April 19, 1941 NA (FO 371/27065)- 178

1355 Longrigg, 291; NA (FO 371/27065), Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 18, 1941,- 136; Sir M. Lampson (Cairo) to Foreign Office (London) April 19, 1941,- 169

1356 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 11, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 28

1357 Longrigg, 291

in London told the Foreign Office that Rashīd ‘Ālī “had nothing to do with Axis influence.” He did not oppose Britain. Neither Cornwallis nor anyone in the Foreign Office was aware Rashīd ‘Ālī furtively and simultaneously negotiated a military accord with Germany to destroy British forces in Iraq.¹³⁵⁸

The next morning, April 16, Cornwallis learned a British artillery battery was due to arrive in Iraq. Cornwallis fretted the short notice would trigger war, and hurried to tell Rashīd ‘Ālī, asking to meet that evening. Rashīd ‘Ālī agreed. There, Cornwallis said troops would reach Basra immediately. The landing was a test. Cornwallis offered recognition for unconditional cooperation, but warned of “overwhelming strength, which we would have no hesitation in using” if Rashīd ‘Ālī refused. Rashīd ‘Ālī assented. He performed well at the interview, for Cornwallis commended his behavior to London, and the Foreign Office told an Iraqi official Britain “will be in a position to give formal recognition.”¹³⁵⁹

While Rashīd ‘Ālī dissimulated cooperation with Cornwallis, he clandestinely secured an Axis military accord on April 25, 1941. Since February, Rashīd ‘Ālī’s envoy, ‘Uthman Ḥaddād, had covertly met Italy’s ambassador in Baghdad. So as not to provoke a British invasion, Ḥaddād agreed verbally – to avoid written evidence Britain could detect – to give the Axis military bases, oil, and pipelines to deliver oil to Germany. In exchange, Germany would recognize Iraq’s ‘merger’ with Syria, and give military aide and a personal payment to Rashīd ‘Ālī of a billion Italian lira. Privately, Rashīd ‘Ālī said Cornwallis broke the Treaty: Britain stationed excessive

1358 NA (FO 371/27065), for first quote, see Sir M. Lampson (Cairo) to Foreign Office (London) April 19, 1941,- 169; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 19, 1941,- 150; for second quote, see Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941,- 82; for third quote, see Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 15, 1941,- 14; for fourth quote, see H. Seymour, April 16, 1941,- 46

1359 NA (FO 371/27076), Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941,- 82; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941,- 82; NA (FO 371/27065), Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 16, 1941. Cypher.,- 36; Foreign Office (London) to Washington, Cairo, Angora and Jeddah. April 17, 1941, - 26; for first quote, see Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 17, 1941, - 74; for second quote, see Sir H. Seymour (Foreign Office) to Iraqi Chargé d’Affaires (London). April 1941. Draft,- 45

troops and Cornwallis informed Rashīd ‘Ālī of troop movements too late. Rashīd ‘Ālī dispatched forces to Basra. On April 18, as British seaborne troops arrived from India, Iraq's military resisted. Rashīd ‘Ālī, embarrassed or angry that British soldiers docked without deferment, or that Cornwallis publicized their landing to convey no regime can break the treaty, imposed preconditions to limit British troop numbers in Iraq.¹³⁶⁰

The day after the Axis Accord was finalized, on April 26, Rashīd ‘Ālī threatened serious consequences if his conditions were violated. Britain continued to dispatch forces regardless — a convoy of ships was scheduled to arrive on April 29, then travel upriver to Baghdad.¹³⁶¹ With the Axis accord, Rashīd ‘Ālī now refused to acquiesce. However, Britain's troops landed regardless. So Rashīd ‘Ālī ordered an attack on British forces in Iraq. That night, Iraq's tanks advanced sixty miles from Baghdad to the British airbase of Habaniyah, and laid siege from the south at a plateau overlooking the British troops. Iraq's tanks struck on May 1. British forces counterattacked the next day. The Anglo-Iraq War had begun.¹³⁶²

War Spurs Hysteria

Iraq's war hysteria prompted mass violence against Jews. Rashīd ‘Ālī appointed his Economics Minister, Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī. Under Sab‘āwī's direction, radio declared jihad, and publicized fictitious victories: “We captured 35,000 British soldiers;” “We conquered 45 tanks” – and fabricated atrocities to foment rage: “RAF planes bombed the

1360 IOR (L/PS/12/504), P. R. Crosthwaite (London) to Kinnahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) August 27, 1941,- 62 (p.1-2); Sir Kinnahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London). November 9, 1941, - 7248; Ḥaddād, 94; NA (FO 371/27076), Iraqi Foreign Office. Direction of the Occidental Affairs (Baghdad) May 2, 1941,- 34; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Anthony Eden (London) June 24, 1941,- 82 (p.1); NA (FO 371/27065), Foreign Office (London) to Tehran April 18, 1941, - 93; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 18, 1941, - 99, 107

1361 Longrigg, 290; C. in. C. East Indies to H.M. Ambassador (Baghdad), April 22, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/249)- 26

1362 Khadduri, 189, 191; Longrigg, 290; Schechtman, 112; Walid M.S. Hamdi, *Rashid Ali al-Gailani and the nationalist Movement in Iraq, 1939-1941: a political and military study of the British campaign in Iraq and the national revolution of May, 1941* (Darf Publishers Limited: London, 1987) 107; John Baggot Glubb. "Secret: A Report on the Role Played by the Arab Legion in connection with The Recent Operations in Iraq" June 1941. Arab Legion, Amman, Trans-Jordan. NA (FO 624/26/589)- 13

Mosque of ‘Abdul Qadir Gailani.’ The public believed what they heard. Soldiers chanted the victories on the way to the front.¹³⁶³ Once, Freya Stark, then a British official trapped in the Embassy, called to a police officer below the wall, telling him, Britain destroyed six Iraqi planes.

“We have burnt forty of yours,” he replied.¹³⁶⁴

Sab‘āwī’s propaganda fed into Iraqi anti-Semitism, with the already established tropes Jews were friends of the English, and an internal enemy. Sab‘āwī’s false reports of a downed British fighter invoked street dancing, and fabricated news of British war crimes provoked fury.¹³⁶⁵ Both public glee from invented triumphs and umbrage at real defeats inspired attacks on Jews. Wins metamorphosed into anti-Semitism, when radio announced, falsely, Iraq conquered Habbaniyah, the British airbase. Crowds in ‘Amara, a city south of Baghdad, rejoiced, screaming “We will destroy London, tonight. The Jews are defeated,” and hurled rocks at a Jewish school, exhorting a pogrom.¹³⁶⁶ In another incident in ‘Amara, warning sirens wailed and children at school hid under benches. The children heard gunfire; a rapid boom, boom. Then the shooting stilled. News spread: Iraq downed a plane. Everyone, ecstatic, hooted, ‘Victory.’ Children lofted another on their backs. Street musicians played. Stores distributed candies and sold out in shopping sprees. Celebrations proceeded until people realized the felled plane was Iraqi – the anti-aircraft guns had mistakenly downed it. A telegram, informing the plane would come, arrived late. The townsmen were ashamed, so “a rumor passed that the Jews delayed the telegram, and the Jews were traitors,” a witness said.¹³⁶⁷

1363 Khadduri, 192; first and second quote, see S. Khaḍḍūrī, 190; third quote, see British Embassy (Baghdad) July 21, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/559)- 4; Sofer, 93

1364 Stark, 107

1365 Fattal, 92

1366 for quote, see Avraham Cohen. Testimony. “Yamē Rašīd ‘Alī Bē-‘Amara,” March 1951. Document 34, *Šin‘at Yēhūdīm*, 307-308; David Shamash, “Gērūš Tōšvē ‘el-‘Azīr,” in Twena, *Me‘ore‘ōt Hag ha-Shavū‘ōt*, 92

1367 Nir Šōhet, “Mōrā‘ā Šel Malkūt- ‘Az‘āqā Rišhōnā,” Twena, *Me‘ore‘ōt Hag ha-Shavū‘ōt*, 93-95, for quote, see 95

The war's tumult mixed Anglophobia with anti-Semitism, alleging Jews were friends of the English, and an internal enemy. Accusers said Jews were spies or signaled British planes, to deliver secrets or to direct which Iraqi targets to strike. Residents alerted police, reporting Jews for typical behavior: a woman arrested for the gleam of the sun on her button said to be British signals, a musician arrested for a 'suspicious' violin used to inform Britain, a coffeehouse patron detained for directing airstrikes "with the shaking of his legs;" and a woman hanging wet clothes on a line arrested for 'flagging' enemy aircraft, part of a wave of denunciations against washerwomen.¹³⁶⁸

The incitement had two effects. First, it chased Jews to the social margins, unsafe to mix with Muslims. Some Jews did not leave their homes for a month – their houses closed, the market empty. Others did not do laundry. "It was not quite safe or wise for a Jew to be out at night," said Nissim Rejwan, who lived in Baghdad then and did not leave his home during May. "the populace in Iraq's major cities was in a state of euphoria alternating with attacks of fear and xenophobia." Several politicians exploited Jews' increasing disempowerment to extort them. In a Baghdad suburb, middle-class professionals and the mayor, Arshād al-'Umarī, gathered and decided to organize army 'contributions' from Jews, imposed through peer pressure and implicit threat, under the Red Crescent, which 'Umarī chaired. In Mosul, the Mutaṣarrif, Qāsim Maqsūd, asked the local Community for a payment in gold to 'protect Jews.'¹³⁶⁹

The May 7th Attacks

1368 Haim, 192; Darwīsh, 104; Moše Dabas, "Ha-'Īr Qirquq," in Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavū'ot*, 85-86; for quote, see Sofer, 92
1369 Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavū'ot*, 62; for quote, see Darwīsh, 104; Nissim Rejwan, "Rashid Ali's Month of War," *Midstream*, Memoir Section, (Nov 1984) 42; Haim, 192; Qasim Maqsud to H.M. Ambassador (Baghdad), June 23, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/318)- 8; Raphael Hamou, Naim Arbili, Yamin Barazani and Solomon Barazani, "Mosul events," in Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavū'ot*, 84

The second result was the passions of war generated attacks. Though initially, Iraqis thought they were winning and did not riot against Jews, this changed within days. On May 6, 1941, six British bombers streaked across Baghdad, dropping leaflets.¹³⁷⁰ “Şabbāgh is a foreigner, do not be subjugated by him,” the leaflets said, referring to the Golden Square’s strongman, Şalāḥ al-Dīn al-Şabbāgh, exhorting readers to overthrow Rashīd ‘Ālī.¹³⁷¹ Then the planes bombarded several military hangars. Seven people died. The day after on May 7, British bombers pummeled the airport.¹³⁷²

The bombings exacerbated paranoia Jews signaled planes, giving Britain local information to attack Iraq. The shock of vulnerability: fatalities, fear, families cowering in basements – or, outrage Iraq’s leaders were so flagrantly insulted – anti-Jewish violence exploded in the first bout of riots in Baghdad and Basra. In Baghdad, the same morning, May 7, a wild throng raged before the Meir Eliyahu Hospital, a Jewish medical center, accusing patients within hid pilots and directed attacks. Rowdies roared to kill the Jews. Then the mob stormed the hospital with cudgels and knives, firing guns. They sexually assaulted children within, attacked the staff, and set rooms aflame. Medical workers fled. Others confronted the assailants, insisting no English were there. Yet the rioters, believing Jews were spies, ‘apprehended’ the male nurses and brought them to the police.¹³⁷³

There is circumstantial evidence government agents perhaps guided or orchestrated some of the attacks. In Baghdad, Jewish leaders uncovered a plan to kill Jewish railway stationmasters. There was a stereotype Iraq’s rail industry was ‘Jewish’ and needed to be purged. In the poem,

1370 Hamdi, 124

1371 De Gaury, 127; for quote, see al-Şabbāgh, 34

1372 Hamdi, 123-124

1373 Fattal, 86; Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 4; idem., “Yōmān Mēfōrās ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt bē-Yēhūdē Bavel bē-Ḥag Ha-Shāvū’ōt 5701 (1-2 bē-Yūlī 1941),” in Twena, *Me’ore’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 26; idem., *Me’ore’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 61-62

‘The Carpet is Stolen,’ an allegory wherein *dhimmīs* rob Iraq’s patrimony, Jewish stationmasters impede the author, so that he cannot find what was pilfered from him. Once Rashīd ‘Ālī assumed power, he moved to terminate Jewish stationmasters. Harassment became open. “Those employees outside on the line during April and in earlier months were frequently submitted to insults” and were “under suspicion,” one administrator said. On May 7, Jewish railway stationmasters said there was a campaign to kill them, and pleaded to leave their posts.¹³⁷⁴

In Basra, there was a riot under the regime’s direction. Then, British forces secured Basra’s port, and cleared fighters from ‘Ashār, a commercial neighborhood on the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. British Gurkhas fanned the area to secure strategic points. Iraq’s police withdrew. However, Britain never occupied Basra nor ‘Ashār, concerned only with lines of communication. In this limbo of authority, with no government nor occupation, gaggles of men gathered at police stations, perhaps to confront the British, but found empty offices. Government agitators urged to pillage Jews. The scofflaws targeted only Jewish-owned businesses, and somehow the perpetrators knew each proprietor’s religion.¹³⁷⁵

These attacks in Basra are less known than the Farhūd because none were killed, due to Basra’s higher rates of firearms-ownership and Jewish self-defense.¹³⁷⁶ Months of incitement put Jews on guard. Before the riot, “fear pervaded the Jewish community,” said Yoel Sarraf, who lived in Basra. He built inner doors and collected stones to hurl from his balcony to repel attacks. When Sarraf heard a gunshot, he peeked through the shades, saw crowds with baskets, and assumed they were conducting a pogrom. In another case, in the midst of night, the Basra

1374 ‘Abūd al-Karkhī, *Dīwān al-Karkhī*, (Maṭba’ al-Mu’arīf: Baghdad, 1956) 194; for quote, see Col. H.C. Smith, Memorandum on Administration of Iraqi State Railways by Col. H.C. Smith, Director General Between April 1st and July 31st, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/282)- 9 (p. 3); Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 4

1375 Kedourie, *Arab Political Memoirs*, 288; Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot*, 97; ‘Abd al-Razāq Ḥasanī, *al-Asrār al-Ḥafīyah fī Ḥawādith al-Sunnah 1941 al-Tahririya*, (Muṭba’ al-‘Urfān: Sidon, 1958) 162; Telegram to Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. NA (FO 371/27069)-17; Extract from ‘Basrah Times, “Proclamation to the People of Basra,”” May 23, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)- 94; Mr. Epstein to Mr. Shertok. My Mission to Iran and Iraq. Aug 28, 1941. CZA (Z4\31216)-28; Avraham Ya’akov ‘Óvadaya. Interview. December 6, 1998, in Sagiv, 102

1376 Mr. Epstein to Mr. Shertok. My Mission to Iran and Iraq. Aug 28, 1941. CZA (Z4\31216)-28

resident Nissim Menashe heard a thwack at his door. He peered out and saw hundreds of rowdies below, “Open the door, or we will force it open and kill you,” shouted someone from the mob. Menashe grabbed his rifle. “Get out of here or I will put bullets in your belly,” he leveled his gun to the crowd. They dispersed.¹³⁷⁷

Unlike Baghdad, Basra had an armed local leadership not under government sway. Basra’s wealthy employed guards and several of these economic elite sent gunmen to enforce law-and-order.¹³⁷⁸ In the most well-known incident, two men, a teacher and a cafe owner, pounded on the door of a Jewish home, pistol in hand, demanding a woman within. The family screamed for help. Then, their neighbor, Salah al-Radinī, a politician, unleashed several bodyguards to pistol whip the criminal pair and drag them off. A second politician, a former mayor, organized his guards to defend Jewish streets.¹³⁷⁹

Incited to Massacre

In the aftermath of the attacks, three components of Rashīd ‘Ālī’s government-Sab‘āwī, Ḥusaynī and the Futuwwa – encouraged more violence, saying Jews and British were the same. The next day, May 8, 1941, while Basra riots continued, radio announced, “After the victory over the British, revenge shall be taken on the internal enemy, and we shall hand him over to your hands for destruction,” a threat repeated often that day.¹³⁸⁰ The term ‘internal enemy’ was a reference to former Education director Sāmī Shawkat’s contention that Jews were the ‘internal enemy,’ who endangered Iraq and needed to be

1377 for first quote, see Yoel Saraf. Interview. November 1, 2001, in Sagiv, 109; for second quote, see Shaul Menashe. Interview. April 5, 1997, in Ibid., 106-107, for quote, see 107

1378 Avraham Ya’akov ‘Ōvadaya. Interview. December 6, 1998, in Ibid., 102; Ḥasanī, *al-Asrār al-Ḥafiyah fī Ḥawādith al-Sunnah 1941*, 162

1379 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Ḥag ha-Shavū’ot*, 98; Shlomo ‘Azaria. Interview. September 18, 1998. Sagiv, 106; President of the Jewish Community (Basra) to the President of the Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 2, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 49

1380 Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 4; Idem., “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ot,” 27

killed. Sab‘āwī’s radio frequently played a song, “Haim, I will trample you to nothing/We’ll burn your father and hang you from your legs,” wherein ‘Haim’ is a Jewish name, and the song ends “Iraq was for the Arabs.”¹³⁸¹ When British troops first disembarked in Basra, before the war began, Cornwallis wrote for publicity's sake, “non-Moslem communities in Basra openly delighted,” and radio twisted Cornwallis’ falsehood to claim Jews welcomed British “with open arms.”¹³⁸² Ḥusaynī’s radio monologues exhorted to kill collaborators and loot them. He declared jihad against Britain’s “outrageous infiltration of Jews.” He visited Mosul on May 27, and told city leaders to “liquidate the Jews.”¹³⁸³

“We were thought of as English in the eyes of the Muslims,” said Avraham Cohen, then a student in ‘Amara. One weekend, Cohen went to school, and there, a group of Futuwwa congregated, chatting amongst themselves, insulting Jews, saying “we must butcher them.” Later, two Futuwwa followed Cohen’s relative in the market, accosted him, saying, Cohen’s relative spied for the English, and smuggled a map to British forces. A mob formed. They called the police, and beat the victim. Then the police beat the victim. Cohen’s relative fled to his cousin’s store, where he found refuge and they closed the door, while the crowd outside screamed to kill him.¹³⁸⁴ With Basra lost, the army dug a new line of defense, at al-Azir, a town in southern Iraq, and expelled the local Jews, alleging they were spies.¹³⁸⁵ On May 17, 1941 Aḥmad al-Sus, Diwaniya’s Mutaṣarrif,

1381 Fattal, 94; Sofer, 92

1382 for first quote, see Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 19, 1941. NA (FO 371/27065)- 178; for second quote, Kedourie, “The Sack of Basra and the Farhud in Baghdad,” *Arab Political Memoirs*, 307

1383 Stark, 97-98; Twena, *Me’ore’ot Ḥag ha-Shavū’ot*, 23; Schechtman, 110-111; for first quote, see 111; for second quote, see Raphael Hamou, Naim Arbili, Yamin Barazani and Solomon Barazani, “Mosul events,” in Twena, *Me’ore’ot Ḥag ha-Shavū’ot*, 84

1384 Avraham Cohen. Testimony. March 1951. Document 34, *Šin’at Yēhūdīm*, 306-308, for quote, see 307; Twena, *Me’ore’ot Ḥag ha-Shavū’ot*, 92

1385 David Shamash, “The Expulsion of al-Azir” in Twena, *Me’ore’ot Ḥag ha-Shavū’ot*, 92

ordered Jews in Shamiya, a city ninety miles south of Baghdad, to be concentrated into a ghetto.¹³⁸⁶

Ezra Daniel confronts Sab‘awī

The Community was unable to organize a defense or stop the provocateurs calling for slaughter, because the tried method of the past – to flatter the government, appeal to tropes of protection, and ask for help – was of no avail when the government itself wanted to kill Jews. On May 7, 1941, Jewish leaders asked Rashīd to cease incitement, and he promised to restrain “people striving to take revenge on the Jews.” However, he did nothing, and his regime escalated incitement.¹³⁸⁷ The earlier reliance on government protection, from the 1920s, when the cabinets deemed safeguarding *dhimmīs* as important, left Jews disarmed and disorganized.¹³⁸⁸ The Community had no defense force, and, led by the affluent and civil servants, relied on friendships with politicians. A study of the committees that led the recovery from the Farhūd reveal Jewish leaders were entrepreneurs, bank managers, and a lawyer. Those who could socialize with lawmakers or military men who might help Jewish community in a crisis.¹³⁸⁹ Yet when Rashīd ‘Ālī was in power, and the government hostile towards Jews, the Community had no means to help themselves. *Dhimmī* norms enforced powerful taboos against Jewish involvement in politics. Neither Jewish parliamentarians nor the Senator ever voted against the Prime Minister’s cabinet, and rarely dissented for Jewish rights.¹³⁹⁰ Criticism or complaints of persecution sparked outrage and more persecution, which the Community wanted to avoid, so

1386 Izzat Moulim, “The Murder of Menashe Kolasji” in *Ibid.*, 87; 90

1387 Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 4

1388 The Position of Jewry in Iraq (the Jewish Agency) September 1942. NA (FO 624/38/502)- 33

1389 Jewish Relief Council (Baghdad) “Note on Jewish relief at Baghdad,” December 10, 1941. JDC (NY AR193344 4 35 714)- 486837 (p. 1);

The Position of Jewry in Iraq (the Jewish Agency) September 1942. NA (FO 624/38/502)- 33; Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 28

1390 The Position of Jewry in Iraq (the Jewish Agency) September 1942. NA (FO 624/38/502)-34

the Community was largely apolitical to avoid harassment. The Jewish Senator, Ezra Daniel, avoided politics.¹³⁹¹ Community institutions were geared toward education only and made no attempt to impose politics on the Jewish public nor inform their views.¹³⁹²

To compound this, Daniel may not have been particularly adept at politics, having inherited his Senate seat from his father, Menaḥem, several years earlier, rather than achieving the office in his own right.¹³⁹³ Daniel confronted Sab‘āwī to halt the radio incitement. On May 10, Daniel met him at the Tiger Palace Hotel, the headquarters of the economics ministry, where Sab‘āwī worked to produce propaganda with a crew of men. As Daniel entered Sab‘āwī’s office, built like fortress, six men present, perhaps bodyguards or cadres in Sab‘āwī’s circle, did not react to Daniel, but silently sat and never rose to shake hands.

“I asked them if they intended to destroy us,” Daniel said, “Why do they want to deliver us into the hands of Hooligans? Why do they incite the masses against us on the radio? The radio began to insult the English and said they will be sentenced to death for hanging a Palestinian sheikh for murdering the Jew Moshe Yehezkiel. What did Moshe Yehezkiel against the Arabs? He sinned because he was murdered? Mr. Minister, the entire community is in a state of frenzy from the incitement on the radio every hour, raising hands on Jewish passersby, in the streets threats are made and rumors are spread that the Jews are signaling British aircraft and possess secret broadcast stations. The man in the street believes everything and wants revenge on the Jews. Please honored Minister put an end to this all.”

1391 Salman Shinah, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyôn: Zikrônôt u-Hašqafôt* (Dēfūs Ha-Merkazī: Tel-Aviv, 1955) 140

1392 Minorities: Jews (1944) NA (FO 624/38/502)- 22-23; Sen. Ezra Daniel said, he “could not speak for the community as he did not know the general view, of if one even existed,” see Vyvyan Holt, (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) March 29, 1944, FO 624/38, Ref No: S/163/243 8

1393 Ibrāhīm al-Drūbī, *al-Baghdādūn Ākhhāruhum wa-Majālisuhum*, (Ṭaba’a Fī Muṭba’a al-Rābiṭah: Baghdad, 1985) 239; Peter Wien, “Daniel, Ezra Menaḥem,” in: *Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World*

“We have lots of Jewish friends, you can be sure we will act to restrain all inciters,”

Sab‘āwī said.

“I don’t believe they will restrain them,” Daniel told the Community later. “The danger hovers above all our heads.”¹³⁹⁴

The Farhūd was Planned

The Farhūd was planned under Sab‘āwī’s direction, and perhaps with Rashīd ‘Ālī’s cooperation. The plan may have been formulated before Rashīd ‘Ālī seized power, for Muthanná had discussed eliminating Jews since the 1930s, and already in 1940, the politician Nūrī al-Sa’īd, then Prime Minister, warned “Palestinians in Baghdad were planning an outbreak,”¹³⁹⁵ in reference to Ḥusaynī. After the Farhūd, Nūrī said the Farhūd’s killings were planned. “The pogrom in Baghdad had been organized,” Nūrī said on July 21, 1941, seven weeks after the killings. “The attack was deliberately anti-jewish, not just ‘disturbances.’”¹³⁹⁶ British documents connected Sab‘āwī with the slaughter.¹³⁹⁷

The name of the mass-violence, ‘Farhūd’, derived from Sab‘āwī’s background. Prior to the massacre, Farhūd was a not unusual last name among Bedouin.¹³⁹⁸ In 1919, the Bani Zuraij tribe’s Sheikh was ‘Abd al-‘Abbās al-Farhūd.¹³⁹⁹ The conspirators of Secret War, the secret Muthanná organization which vowed to overthrow “the agents of the English,” and brought Rashīd ‘Ālī to power, each took codenames. Sab‘āwī’s was Farhūd.¹⁴⁰⁰ In 2007, the historian

1394 S. Khaḍḍūrī, 189; al-‘Umarī, 88; for Daniel’s confrontation of Sab‘āwī and quotes, see Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrās ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 28;

Twena also published a shorter, English version of Daniel’s words, see Idem., “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 4

1395 C.J. Edmonds (Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior) to Basil Newton (Ambassador) May 19, 1940. NA (FO 371/24561)-228 (p. 1)

1396 M. Shertok (Cairo), July 21, 1941. Letter. CZA (Z4\31215)-57

1397 ‘Umarī, 107

1398 Kazaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 207; Nissim Kazzaz, Sayafa’ ū-Safra’, (Hōṣ’at Re’ūven Mass, Jerusalem, 2010) 80; A satirical newspaper, *Habazbuz*, ridiculed Bedouin with a caricature named Sheikh Farhūd, see Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 485 of May 29, 1935, American Legation, Baghdad, NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2.)

1399 Personanlities: Iraq (Exclusive of Baghdad and Kadhimain). 1919. IOR (IOR/L/PS/20/221 (p. 3)

1400 N. Shawkat, 434-435, for quote, see 435

Mordechai Zaken theorized the mass-violence's name came from Sab'āwī's *nom de guerre*.¹⁴⁰¹

The aforementioned Sheikh, 'Abd al-'Abbās al-Farhūd, was considered a hero for rebelling against Britain in 1920,¹⁴⁰² perhaps why Sab'āwī chose 'Farhūd' as his *nom de guerre*. Or, alternatively, named the pogrom after the rebel directly.

Sab'āwī created militias under his command to orchestrate the killings.¹⁴⁰³ He amassed more power than legally subscribed to an Economic minister, controlling propaganda, militias, influence over police, and administered the Defense Ministry when its Minister was abroad.¹⁴⁰⁴ Rashīd 'Ālī wanted to appoint Sab'āwī as Defense Minister, but Kāmel Shabīb, the one Golden Square member not in Muthanná, opposed.¹⁴⁰⁵ As noted above, Sab'āwī created Katā'ib al-Shabāb (henceforth referred to as Katā'ib), a force composed of Futuwwa and Muthanná volunteers to monitor the civilian population for spies or dissidence, and Sab'āwī requested government funds and weapons to arm the group. Rashīd 'Ālī assented verbally to arm and fund Katā'ib, but refused to put the order in writing, either to deny responsibility or avoid opposition from Shabīb and law-enforcement, who feared police would lose control.¹⁴⁰⁶ Sab'āwī also misappropriated funds intended to alleviate food shortages to bankroll Katā'ib.¹⁴⁰⁷ Disturbed, the Golden Square's Fahmī Sa'īd called the Propaganda Director, Šādiq Shanshal, asking, why did Sab'āwī want weapons and a militia?¹⁴⁰⁸ Shabīb aired suspicions Sab'āwī wanted to seize power.¹⁴⁰⁹

1401 Zaken, 301

1402 'Abd al-Razāq al-Ḥasanī, *al-Thawra al-'Irāqiya al-Kubrā: Uṣrā al-Thawra min Brīṭānīn wa Hanūd*, Muṭba' al-'Irfān : Sidon, 1952) 113

1403 Elkabir, *My Governmental*, 120

1404 Sab'āwī released suspects from arrest, a prerogative Economics Ministers do not possess, see Twena, "The Diary of Abraham Twena," 4; al-'Umarī, 95-96

1405 "Testimony of Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd," published in Buṭṭī, vol. II, 346

1406 al-Jawāhirī, 150-151, 153-154; al-'Umarī, 87; Peter Wien, *Iraqi Arab Nationalism*, 111

1407 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 121

1408 al-'Umarī, 95

1409 Buṭṭī, vol. II, 341

Sab'āwī intended to use the weapons and Katā'ib for the Farhūd.¹⁴¹⁰ Katā'ib seized two Jewish schools on May 5, and confiscated the schools' registers, to obtain a list of Jews.¹⁴¹¹ Using the schools as command centers, Katā'ib prepared maps of Jewish streets.¹⁴¹² The military issued a secret order to monitor Jews and create a directory of their names and where they lived.¹⁴¹³ Throughout May, culprits marked Jewish stores with Hamzas or in red lettering.¹⁴¹⁴ A week after the Farhūd, when police searched the schools Katā'ib seized, they found weapons and looted goods, as if collected to a central location, maps of Jewish streets, and “a roster of names of Kataib al-Shabab [sic] with codenames and opposite every name appeared a street they were appointed too [sic].”¹⁴¹⁵

Sab'āwī used the British invasion to seize power and initiate the Farhūd. When two British columns drove toward Baghdad to the outlying neighborhood of Kadhimain, and Rashīd 'Ālī's cabinet debated abandoning the city, Sab'āwī pressed to wage guerrilla war with his militia, Katā'ib. However, Shabīb feared to give Sab'āwī authority over combat.¹⁴¹⁶ Shabīb persuaded Sab'āwī to fight at the front, leaving the Golden Square to rule Baghdad.¹⁴¹⁷ Later on May 29-30, 1941, Rashīd 'Ālī's cabinet fled in the depths of night.¹⁴¹⁸ The Golden Square escaped. Meanwhile, Sab'āwī still at the front, returned. He saw the regime gone, but he still could access the ministries. His militias still functioned. So did his network of newspapers and radio.¹⁴¹⁹ Sab'āwī later testified at trial: he knew the cabinet had withdrawn, and decided to hold

1410 Ben Ya'akov, 251

1411 Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 4; Idem., “Yōmān Mēfōrās 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt,” 25

1412 *'Al Hereg Ahēnū bē-'Irāq: Haq Ha-Shavū'ōt 6-7 Sivan 5701, 1 ve 2 lē-Yūnī* (Dēfus Aldōmī) 16; Twena, *Me'ore'ōt Haq ha-Shavū'ōt*, 22

1413 Šaul Šhayek. Testimony. “‘Adūyōt 'al Mašav Ha-Yēhūdīm 'Arev Ha-Pērā'ōt,” September 9, 1990. Document 4. *Šin 'at Yēhūdīm*, 221-222

1414 Ben Ya'akov, 252; Twena, “The Detailed Journal,” 32; Fattal, 94; Anonymous, *'Al Hereg Ahēnū*, 8

1415 *'Al Hereg Ahēnū*, 16; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 227; Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrās 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt,” 35-36, for quote, see 36

1416 John Baggot Glubb. “Secret: A Report on the Role Played by the Arab Legion in connection with The Recent Operations in Iraq” June 1941. Arab Legion, Amman, Trans-Jordan. NA (FO 624/26/589)- 18; al-'Umarī, 94-95

1417 “Testimony of Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd,” published in Buṭṭī, vol. II, 346

1418 Ḥaddād, 125

1419 al-'Umarī, 96; Ben Ya'akov, 251

Baghdad until he received orders from Rashīd ‘Ālī. Sab‘āwī declared himself Military Governor-General, and occupied the Prime Minister’s office, wherefrom he directed the front.¹⁴²⁰ Japan’s ambassador urged Sab‘āwī to continue the war.¹⁴²¹ Sab‘āwī decided to erect a *Qawmiyya* state and declared martial law.¹⁴²² He distributed weapons to his followers, ostensibly for guerrilla war, but perhaps for the Farhūd. He organized his militants into positions he considered vital – commercial centers and key road arteries – and prepared a speech to enflame the people against “the enemy,” long a coded reference for Britain and Jews, imagining everyone would fight – men, women and children.¹⁴²³ This speech was a signal to massacre Baghdad’s Jews.¹⁴²⁴

The Farhūd’s Motive

The government seems to have believed its own contentions Jews were ‘friends of the English’ who deracinated Iraq, and unleashed the Farhūd to exact revenge. Previous Historians attribute the Farhūd to anger at defeat or instability, but few ask: why attack Jews and not the 326 British subjects in Baghdad?¹⁴²⁵ Why Jewish businesses and not British businesses? There were British banks or companies like Stephen Lynch and Co, and restaurants with English names like Picadilly Cafe.¹⁴²⁶ These were not targeted. Jews were targeted. Amid the riots, twice pillagers broke into a store, realized the property had no Jewish proprietors, and exited without stealing.¹⁴²⁷

1420 al-‘Umarī, 96; “About the Testimony of Yūnis al-Sab’awī” in Buttī, vol. II, 367

1421 “Testimony of Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd,” in Buttī, vol. II, 349

1422 al-‘Umarī, 96; Wien, *Iraqi Arab Nationalism*, 111

1423 al-‘Umarī, 96; Buttī, Vol. I, 454

1424 “Yōmān Mēfōrās ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 30

1425 C.G.H.G., “Propaganda,” April 22, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/737)-24 (p. 4)

1426 NA (FO 624/26/650), “Important Laws, Regulations, Royal Iradas and Notificaitons issued in the Official Arabic Gazette during the Month of May, 1941.”- 7; Al-Wayai al-‘Iraqyah No. 1900 of May 4, 1941. Principal Contents,- 14; Kattan, 24

1427 Bashkin, *New Babylonians*, 120

Sab‘āwī’s motive was to exact revenge on Jews, whom he said were Anglophiles and ruined Iraq’s Arab character. In 1930, he said “they teardown your *Qawm*; your humble glory. They have done in it every homeland of ours...They deteriorate the Arabs in every part of your holy Arabian peninsula.”¹⁴²⁸ The *Katā’ib* was composed of Futuwwa, which Shawkat said he created to prevent a Jewish invasion. Instructors told Futuwwa members “Jewish gangs” would “attack the remaining Arab regions after several overrun Palestine.”¹⁴²⁹ Jews were an “internal enemy” who connived with England, spied “to destroy what can be destroyed until the Umma is weak,” and the only solution was to kill them “to purify the soil.” Shawkat told the Futuwwa, a *Nahḍa*, an Arab renaissance, could not exist “without first and before everything else liquidating the internal enemy.”¹⁴³⁰ The radio promised the internal enemy would be offered up for revenge. If Jews and British were the same, then a British victory was a Jewish victory, violating all propriety. The message was Jews betrayed Muslims. Instigators, media, politicians, and press said Jews helped Britain win. The Farhūd was to avenge this loss, and to make Iraq an Arab Muslim state.¹⁴³¹

Sab‘āwī’ vs. Internal Security

Baghdad’s governing bodies, despite knowing Sab‘āwī planned genocide, never removed, overthrew, or suppressed Sab‘āwī’s forces. On May 30, 1941, a temporary council called the Committee for Internal Security (henceforth referred to as Internal Security), composed of Baghdad’s Mayor, Arshād al-‘Umarī, and police officials, arranged a ceasefire with Britain. However, without Sab‘āwī’s surrender, there were two governments in Baghdad. The

1428 al-‘Umarī, 44

1429 Sulaymān Sifrānī, “Aina Nizām al-Futuwwa,” *al-Yaqza*, February 26, 1950. *Wathā’iq*, 96

1430 Shawkat, 36-37, for first two quotes, see 36, for third quote, see 37

1431 The Jewish Agency reported on July 19, “Massacre began upon return Jewish delegation from Revenge,” Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941 CZA (Z4\31215)-56; Darwish’s memoirs mention a the rumor the Farhūd was revenge; see Darwish, 63

police and army obeyed Sab‘āwī. Sab‘āwī said he would stop ‘opponents’ of *Qawmiyya* from ending the ‘jihad.’ He surrounded the Prime Minister’s office with police and soldiers, armed with machine guns and in armored cars. Included in these guards were foreign ‘*Mujāhidīn*,’ Arabic for wagers of jihad; they were fighters without ties to Iraq, and served under names that conveyed loyalty to Sab‘āwī alone, such as the *Fidā’ī al-Sab‘āwī*, those who sacrifice themselves to Sab‘āwī, and the National Sab‘āwī Forces. Sab‘āwī spoke with ‘Umarī through letter or phone, saying he wanted to work with Internal Security. Sab‘āwī invited Internal Security, ‘Umarī and his colleagues, to the Prime Minister's building. Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd, the Director of Military Logistics, warned: “Sab‘āwī is planning to kill members of the committee [of internal security] and exterminate the Jews.”¹⁴³²

On the morning of May 30, 1941, Sab‘āwī tried to trick the Jewish community to remain in their addresses, as obtained from the registers, so his forces could attack them. He called the Jewish community’s leader Sassoon Khaḍḍūrī, asking to meet immediately. Khaḍḍūrī rushed over. In the Prime Minister’s office, ringed with police, Sab‘āwī ordered Khaḍḍūrī to make an announcement. “Tell all the Jews to prepare food for three days and not to leave their houses,” said Sab‘āwī. Jews are not to use phones. “Prepare one suitcase per family, and stand by to be taken to detention camps for their own safety.” Martial law empowered the state to “evacuate certain localities from their inhabitants, either wholly or partly” and to restrict “communication between any particular localities.” Sab‘āwī ordered Khaḍḍūrī to make the statement at noon. A witness at the meeting, Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd, affirmed this account. Khaḍḍūrī returned and told the other community leaders of the order within a half-hour. He told ‘Umarī, president of

1432 al-‘Umarī, 96; “Testimony of Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd,” in Buṭṭī, Vol. II, 348-350, for quote see, 350; “Testimony of Arshad al-‘Umarī” in *Ibid.*, 315; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Hawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 232

Internal Security, about the order.¹⁴³³

Despite claims the contrary, ‘Umarī never deported or overthrew Sab‘āwī. ‘Umarī opposed using force against Sab‘āwī and never tried. Instead, ‘Umarī called Sab‘āwī, and lured him to a meeting, intending to arrest him, but Sab‘āwī came with two armed Mujāhidīn, refusing to depart or be jailed, arguing with ‘Umarī, exhorting a people’s war. In the midst of their bickering, ‘Umarī asked Sab‘āwī to flee, and either ‘Umarī offered Sab‘āwī the Economics Ministry’s gold reserves as a bribe, or Sab‘āwī requested the gold as a precondition for departure. Thereupon, ‘Umarī gave Sab‘āwī the gold and Sab‘āwī’s salary as Economics Minister, and Sab‘āwī left.¹⁴³⁴ Whereafter, ‘Umarī contacted the Jewish community leaders, saying he saved them. “The danger has disappeared; we seized power.” ‘Umarī said. This was a lie; Internal Security never seized power. Internal Security issued an order, called Order No. 2, instructing Katā’ib to surrender their weapons to police, but at their own volition. No law-enforcement agency compelled Sab‘āwī’s fighters. Internal Security did not send police to disarm them, or arrest them. Many police were loyal to Sab‘āwī, and had guarded his office. ‘Umarī never tried to calm, disarm or restrict the discontented masses of Baghdad who had been encouraged to kill Jews on radio, in newspapers or in schools. ‘Umarī never assumed control of Baghdad’s media or Sab‘āwī’s propaganda apparatus.¹⁴³⁵ Meanwhile, Sab‘āwī’s propagandists persisted to incite against Jews, saying, Jews were British and traitors and Iraq needed to be

1433 for first quote, see Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 4; S. Khaddūrī, 190; Cohen, “The Anti-Jewish Farhud,” 10; Shamash, 195-196, for second quote, see 195; for third quote, see Ordinance of Safeguarding Public Security and the Safety of the State No. 56 of 1940. Translation from *Al Waqayī al-Iraqiyah* No. 1804 dated June 1, 1940) NA (FO 371/24561)- 240 (p. 4); Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrās ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 30; “Testimony of Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd,” in Buttī, Vol. II, 348; the historian Orit Bashkin speculates “Sab‘āwī may well have intended to harm Jews, but it is also possible that he was indirectly expressing his fear that something bad might happen to the Jewish community because of the anti-Jewish atmosphere that was prevalent in Baghdad,” see *New Babylonians*, 116. See critiques of her by Norman Stillman, book review, *New Babylonians: A History of Modern Iraq* by Orit Bashkin, *Shofar*, 32.2, Winter 2014, 148-150; and Baram.

1434 Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrās ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 30; al-‘Umarī, 97-99; “Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Jum’a,” in Buttī, Vol. II 316; “Testimony of Arshad al-‘Umarī” in *Ibid.*, 315; “Testimony of Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd,” in Buttī, Vol. II, 345

1435 for quote, see Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 5; al-Jawāhirī, 155; ‘Umarī, 96; Buttī, Vol. I, 455; “Testimony of Nūr al-Dīn al-Maḥmūd,” in Buttī, 348; *Al Hereg Ahēnū*, 5; “Testimony of Arshad al-‘Umarī” Buttī, Vol. II, 315-316

avenged.¹⁴³⁶ Abroad, Ḥusaynī broadcast against Jews. Ḥusaynī said Jews “were all spies;” “had been signaling with mirrors to the British bombers;” “intercepted phone calls” and “passed the information to the British embassy.”¹⁴³⁷

Jewish residents took no precautions to protect themselves, because they trusted ‘Umarī and believed they were safe. That evening, May 31, 1941, as Shabbat, the Jewish day of rest, ended at sundown, ‘Umarī’s Internal Security falsely announced on the radio they seized power and made peace. A new government would follow the day after. ‘Abd al-Ilah would arrive at 10 am. Internal Security asked citizens to return to normal life. Jewish leaders knew the regime’s fall could engender massacre. That evening was Shavuot, a Jewish holiday which commemorates the giving of the Torah at Mt. Sinai, and malefactors often attacked Jews on their holidays, angry Judaism or Jews existed in Iraq. “Jews should not appear happy on the streets,” leaders said at synagogue. None were to worship at prophets’ tombs. However, others thought the danger passed. If a pogrom were to happen, it would be on Shabbat, which occurred on the day defeat. Now Baghdad was safe.¹⁴³⁸

The Farhūd

Though Sab‘āwī was gone, his forces were intact – armed, organized and able to perpetrate the Farhūd, the mass violence against Jews on June 1-2, 1941, in which they murdered perhaps 500 Jews in 22 hours.¹⁴³⁹ Much of the Community was directly affected from the killings. 14,00 victims, almost 20% of Baghdad’s Jewish community, were looted and lost their

1436 Mr. Epstein to Mr. Shertok. My Mission to Iran and Iraq. Aug 28, 1941. CZA (Z4\31216)-27

1437 Shamash, 200; Ḥusaynī’s memoirs include these allegations. “The fifth column was the big cause of the failure which afflicted the movement of Iraq, and this column was composed of many partisans of whom the most important was the Jews of Iraq,” Ḥusaynī wrote. “Jewish clerks in the telephone department recorded official and important telephonic conversations on reels and then forwarded them to the British embassy in Baghdad, as well as Jewish clerks in the mail and telegraph department,” see al-Ḥusaynī, 69

1438 Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 5; Idem., “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 30; *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 5

1439 Memorandum: Position of Jews in Muslim Countries, n.d., BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/031) (p.1); *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 29

homes. 40,000 suffered theft. Later, the Community's Relief Council concluded that, of the 2,731 families in Baghdad, 2,000 needed relief.¹⁴⁴⁰

There are two kinds of attacks mentioned in the sources: spontaneous assaults and organized killings. Both were perpetrated by Sab'āwī's forces and law-enforcement who served under Sab'āwī and Rashīd 'Ālī. Much of what is known about the Farhūd comes from an official government report that Iraq produced to determine the Farhūd's cause (hereafter referred to as 'the Report') or eyewitness accounts of victims, or testimonies and leaks from government officials. To divert blame away from the state, the Report depicts the killings as spontaneous, but eyewitness accounts and lawmaker testimonies and leaks say the slaughter was premeditated and planned. According to the Report, the first attacks were impromptu. On June 1, as 'Abd al-Ilah, entered the city, hundreds attended his reception, including the Community's delegation.¹⁴⁴¹ Among the crowds walking to the event were Jews well-dressed in holiday attire. For decades, the government and provocateurs had said Jews were Europeans, in formal European clothes, hostile to Arabs, and friends of the English who relished in schadenfreude at Arabs' defeat. As this group of Jews crossed the Khurr bridge, they chanced upon soldiers, who saw them, "begrudged them," assaulting them with knives, killing one and injuring sixteen. Bystanders joined the attack. Police and troops, stationed about the city to keep order, witnessed the assault, but did not investigate or make arrests, as Jews were 'friends of the English.' Police only took the injured to a hospital. News spread: police do not protect Jews.

A mob gathered at the hospital. "Jews come out," they yelled.¹⁴⁴²

1440 Jewish Relief Council (Baghdad) "Note on Jewish relief at Baghdad," December 10, 1941. JDC (NY AR193344 4 35 714)- 486837; *Šin'at Yēhūdīm*, 251; Twena, "The Diary of Abraham Twena," 7

1441 "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941," 226; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 147; Testimony. July 1, 1941. Document 8. *Šin'at Yēhūdīm*, 229; *Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 6

1442 "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941," 226, 230, for quotes, see 226

A police chief, Muḥammad ‘Alī, saw the throng press at the door “to kill the Jews,” and ordered them to disperse. Rioters refused to leave. So ‘Alī ordered officers to club and scatter the mob. However, some clubbed their fellow officers instead, in defense of the rioters. Others clubbed disobedient colleagues. No one was investigated or pursued.¹⁴⁴³

The perpetrators were furious at Jews, after years of incitement, and were exacting ‘revenge.’ The attackers chanted, “surrender Jews, the forces of Gaylānī are coming,” referring to Rashīd ‘Ālī’s last name.¹⁴⁴⁴ Culprits mocked the Jewish holiday of Shavuot, to demonstrate Jews and Judaism did not belong in Iraq, hollering, “This the Holiday we looked forward too;” “This is a blessed day;” “this day we will sanctify.”¹⁴⁴⁵ Attackers targeted victims based on stereotypes Jews were Europeans and dressed as Europeans; assailants yelled at female victims, “These are fashionable, modern women.”¹⁴⁴⁶ In one case, knifemen mistook a seven year-old boy as Jewish “because I wore short trousers and a spotless white shirt,” the victim said. Attackers spared him upon learning he was Muslim.¹⁴⁴⁷

The slaughter was particularly sadistic because the assailants saw it as vengeance. Attackers brutalized victims to inflict maximal pain, including mutilation, sexual assault, slaying infants in ostentatiously cruel manners, such as hurling them into the Tigris, or subjecting victims’ corpses to humiliations, such as castration or disrobing.¹⁴⁴⁸ The culprits destroyed what loot they could not take, because the goal was to afflict suffering, not profit.¹⁴⁴⁹ They set

1443 Ibid., for quote, see 230

1444 *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 7

1445 Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 56; for first quote, see Efiyahū Ḥaim, *HaṢōrā: Ha-Haganā bē-Bagdad bē-Šanīm*, 1941-1951,” (Seminar Thesis Tel-Aviv, 1983) 7; for second quote, see Fattal, 123; for third quote, see *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 25

1446 *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 7

1447 Moreh, “The Role of Palestinian Incitement,” 138

1448 Ben Ya’akov, 251; E. Ḥaim, 7; Yaakov Peretz. Testimony. Document 21, *Šin’at Yehudim*, 251; *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 7, 17-18; Sereni, 16; Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 56

1449 One victim said, “They took a single shoe and left the other, broke chairs and ripped his wife’s clothes. This shows their intention was not only to pillage but revenge,” see Mūsā Shābandar, *Dhikrayāt Baghdādīyah: al-‘Irāq Bayna al-iḥtilāl wa al-Istiqlāl*, (Riad El-Rayyes Books: London, 1993) 386

buildings ablaze, collapsed roofs, shot walls full of bullets, left faucets running to flood homes, and hurled Torah scrolls into the street.¹⁴⁵⁰

The Farhūd's Organized Attacks

Sab'āwī also organized the Farhūd's killings. At 6 pm, east of the Tigris, at the 'Abd al-Qādir al-Gaylānī Shrine, Baghdad's most famous mosque, soldiers and Katā'ib dissimulating as worshippers and armed with daggers and swords, exited, shouting anti-Jewish slogans, dispersing onto the busy intersection between the major roadways of Sinak and Ghāzī streets, and rioted. They killed ten people. The assailants then stormed onto Ghāzī street, overwhelmed a taxi, and, extracting its Jewish occupant, murdered him. Thereupon, leaders of the rabble, who appear to have organized the slayings, for they directed the rioters and wore nice clothes while the killers not, supervised the knifemen to stop traffic, halting buses.¹⁴⁵¹ "Jews out now," they said.¹⁴⁵² They extricated those believed to be Jewish and slaughtered them. Fifty victims died.¹⁴⁵³ Those who 'looked Muslim' were spared: those who were swarthy, wore non-Western clothes, spoke Muslim Arabic, and did not fit the stereotype of a Jew.¹⁴⁵⁴

Police themselves were perpetrators and cooperated with the assailants. By 7 pm, violence spread to both sides of the Tigris.¹⁴⁵⁵ Police received reports of corpses throughout the city – on Ghāzī street; at a cinema; in the Abī Sīfīn neighborhood "where the poorest Jews live." Police watched the attackers or joined the plunder, or stormed homes, extorting money in exchange for 'protection,' then allowed the mob to loot as they left.¹⁴⁵⁶ One Baghdad resident,

1450 'Al Hereg Aḥēnū, 10, 17; Testimony. July 1, 1941. Document 8. *Šin'at Yēhūdīm*, 230

1451 Peretz, Document 21, *Šin'at Yehudim*, 251; see also Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 56; Zvi Yehuda, "The Pogrom (Farhud) of 1941 in Light of New Sources," *Al-Farhud*, 15-16; Twena, "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 31; Idem., *Me'ore'ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū'ōt*, 63; "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Hawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/6/1941," 232; *Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 6

1452 Twena, *Me'ore'ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū'ōt*, 67

1453 Peretz, Document 21, *Šin'at Yehudim*, 251; see also Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 56

1454 Twena, "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 31

1455 *Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 6

1456 "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Hawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/6/1941," 226-227; for quote, see Mozelle Sassoon, 19; *Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 7

writing under the pseudonym, Gimel, said he locked his house and fled to his roof; then, an officer appeared, demanding food and money for protection. Gimel dropped them from the roof. The officer left, but returned again: it was not enough. He wanted more. Thereafter, a second officer, stationed on a roof, shot at Gimel, while rioters below, battered at his door.¹⁴⁵⁷

Other police officers, not involved in the conspiracy, refused to stop the attackers. According to the Report, the police were required to fire upon rioters, but did not, maintaining they needed an order, though laws stipulated no order was necessary for repelling perpetrators in midst of a crime. Internal Security's Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Jum'a, the Director-General of Police, and his deputy, both refused to issue an order. Only when 'Abd al-Ilah was asked did he consent. However, the Report itself mentions two instances in which officeholders commanded the police to fire on attackers. Each time, police disobeyed and refused to shoot.¹⁴⁵⁸

The Farhūd's perpetrators behaved as if they were organized units, not a mob. If confronted by police, assailants fled but then regrouped to attack again. They targeted poor Jewish neighborhoods areas unable to afford firearms or guards.¹⁴⁵⁹ Many Katā'ib militants did not reside in Baghdad, and returned to their villages after Farhūd, but had remained after Sab'āwī's flight, at the risk of arrest, perhaps, for the Farhūd.¹⁴⁶⁰ The pillaging was regulated.¹⁴⁶¹ Riots ceased at the same time before dawn, in multiple, disconnected locations, and on June 2, began again at 6 am, synchronized in two different locations: in al-Karkh, a west bank neighborhood; and, at the same time, on the opposite bank of the Tigris, in Abī Sīfīn, 10,000 police, soldiers, and government functionaries gathered at Ghāzī street. Some made speeches.¹⁴⁶²

1457 Gimel. Letter. n.a., in *'Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 20

1458 "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941," 227-228, 231

1459 Yehuda, "The Pogrom (Farhud) of 1941 in Light of New Sources," 16-17

1460 al-Jawāhirī, 155

1461 Twena, *Me'ore'ot Ḥag ha-Shavū'ot*, 66-67

1462 Yehuda, "The Pogrom (Farhud) of 1941," 17; "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941," 227, 229; Peretz, Document 21, *Šin'at Yehudim*, 251

Then, at 7:30 or 8 am, police divided the crowd and directed them to different neighborhoods, armed with knives and guns, chanting, ‘Kill;’ “Come Kill the Jews.” They moved into target areas, breaking into homes. Police shot open doors.¹⁴⁶³ *Katā’īb*, with military-issue machines for cutting metal, broke open doors. Army trucks stole furniture. Within an hour, mobs burgeoned in at least four Jewish neighborhoods.¹⁴⁶⁴ Then looters traveled to the Serai to divide spoils, under police supervision.¹⁴⁶⁵ Hospitals synchronized with the assailants to poison Jewish patients.¹⁴⁶⁶ One witness, Ya’akov Pereš, saw a room of corpses, many with minor injuries.¹⁴⁶⁷ A nurse, Salima, said she saw a room with two hundred corpses.¹⁴⁶⁸ While later, on June 3, 1941, when Jewish leaders, Abraham Twena and Moshe Yetaḥ, arrived at a hospital, two nurses approached them, warning patients were poisoned to kill them and “Dr. Saib [sic] Shawkat, is not interested in treating them.”¹⁴⁶⁹ Moreover, there were other organized massacres outside of Baghdad. On May 31, Diwaniya’s governor, Khalīl ‘Azmī, gathered Futuwwa, and distributed weapons. Futuwwa coordinated a pogrom in Hila, on June 3, 1941, inflicting several casualties.¹⁴⁷⁰

Comparison with Jefferies

The government had the capacity to organize a riot with the appearance of spontaneity like the Farhūd, and the impulsive assaults mentioned in the Report on the Farhūd could have been planned. Rashīd ‘Ālī helped organize Mond disturbances in 1928 and the Bedouin rebellion in 1934. Two days after the Farhūd, on June 4, 1941, the municipality of Nasiriyah, a town of

1463 Twena, “Yômān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 32; Peretz, Document 21, *Šin’at Yehudim*, 251; *‘Al Hereg Ahēnū*, 8- 10, for first quote, see 10, for second quote, see 8

1464 *‘Al Hereg Ahēnū*, 10; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/1941,” 227, 229

1465 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 148

1466 Several witnesses claim Šā’ib ordered the poisonings, see Fattal, 125; and Mendes, 15

1467 Peretz, Document 21, *Šin’at Yehudim*, 252

1468 Fattal, 123

1469 Twena, “Yômān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 33

1470 Idem., *Me’ore’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 88-89

15,000, organized a mob with the semblance of impromptu rioting, with the intent of assassinating a British captain. When Nasiriyah's Mutaşarrif, Yusuf Dhiya learned of the officer, J.F.D. Jefferies', arrival, Dhiya ordered the attack. While Jefferies spoke in Dhiya's office, "an angry crowd of soldier, policemen and people collected round the serai;" Dhiya ordered police to 'disperse' them, to give the false impression the crowd were unwanted. An intelligence officer monitored Jefferies movements. The attack on Jefferies resembles the Farhūd's initial assault on the Khurr bridge and indicate how such mob violence is planned, in which soldiers make an initial strike, and cadres, pretending to be bystanders, then attack, to foment a mob. Jefferies drove to the bazaar to purchase cigarettes, and, as he exited, Dhiya's hostile crowd gathered. Someone shot Jefferies and then Jefferies fled. The assailant, a soldier, chased after, revolver withdrawn, and fired three times, as a mob caught Jefferies in the street, hurling tables and chairs. Jeffries, injured, sheltered in a store, but customers inside attacked him, whereupon he escaped, exhausted and the soldier, the initial assassin with the gun, strode forth, and shot him dead.¹⁴⁷¹

In both the cases, the stabbing on the Khurr Bridge and Jefferies' assassination, the assailants were soldiers with pretensions of explosive resentment. Bystanders joined in the ambush, and at the Khurr Bridge, as in the case of Jefferies' assassination, could have, initially, been cadres, acting as bystanders. Sab'āwī issued an order similar to that of Nasiriyah's Mutaşarrif, Yusuf Dhiya, and unleashed a similar attack, but on a larger scale – the Farhūd. Just as Dhiya used intelligence officers to monitor Jefferies movements, Sab'āwī monitored Jews: the

¹⁴⁷¹ Jefferies was posthumously promoted to a Major, so sources refer to him as both Captain and Major Jefferies. NA (FO 624/26/583), Assistant Political Adviser to Ambassador (Baghdad) "Murder of Captain Jefferies," Sept 22, 1941, - 39-41; 'Isa Husain, Translation of the Report of the Committee of Enquiry on the murder of Captain Jefferies & S.H.O. Police Nasiriyah, July 26, 1941, - 22, 24, 27; Assistant Political Advisor (Basra) to Ambassador (Baghdad) 'The Murder of Captain Jefferies, October 6, 1941,- 36; Ibid., October 14,- 33; C.J.E., Murder of Major Jefferies, August 31, 1941, -54

registers were seized from Jewish schools,¹⁴⁷² and a secret military order was given to monitor Jews, to create a list of their names and where they lived.¹⁴⁷³ Katā'ib's maps of Jewish streets and Katā'ib's roster of names, assigning which streets to attack.¹⁴⁷⁴ Perhaps the entire Farhūd, including what the Report says was an 'impromptu' initial attack on the bridge – was planned. Many of the perpetrators were soldiers, police and Katā'ib, who were under Sab'āwī's orders, and Sab'āwī himself, intended to foment a riot. Moreover, a riot is what occurred after he left, and unleashed killings exactly as he planned. Police uninvolved in the conspiracy did nothing.¹⁴⁷⁵ There were mounted police every fifty yards that day to keep order for 'Abd al-Ilah's return.¹⁴⁷⁶ Police knew of killings by 6 pm.¹⁴⁷⁷ Perhaps, it could be, those who did not intervene were under orders not too. Therefore, the Report's accounts of 'spontaneous' attacks do not necessarily refute government leaks of a planned pogrom, but perhaps reinforce it.

Refusal to intervene

Internal Security, the Iraqi monarchy, and Britain were all accomplices to the Farhūd. All three refused to halt the murders. 'Umarī never ordered police to stop rioters. He barred Jum'a from declaring an emergency.¹⁴⁷⁸ 'Umarī never imposed a curfew.¹⁴⁷⁹ He tried to resign, but as 'Umarī – who tried to expunge Jews from the civil service in 1934, and was until recently, a party to an extortion campaign against Jews – he may have resigned to avoid responsibility for the killings.¹⁴⁸⁰ One parliamentary deputy,

1472 Twena, "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 25

1473 Šaul Šhayek. Testimony. "'Adūyōt 'al Mašav Ha-Yēhūdīm 'Arev Ha-Par'ōt" September 9, 1990. Document 4. *Šin'at Yēhūdīm*, 222

1474 Twena, *Me'ore'ōt Haq ha-Shavū'ōt*, 22; Idem., "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 36

1475 "The police played the role of spectator," the Report said, "They did not enforce a single article of the law," see "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Hawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/6/1941," 230

1476 Stark, 113

1477 Testimony. July 1, 1941. Document 8. *Šin'at Yēhūdīm*, 230

1478 Twena, "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 34

1479 Kedourie, *Arab Political Memoirs*, 298

1480 Stark, 114

Yusuf Elkabir (not to be confused with the previously mentioned Abraham Elkabir), said ‘Umarī was an accomplice. “Every functionary joined together in order that the pogroms happened. I know that Arshad is a strong man. There is no possibility at the same time that the regime did not have a hand in things occurring like this,” Yusuf Elkabir said.¹⁴⁸¹

‘Abd al-Ilah too could have halted the Farhūd. He was in the city, and, as Regent, he was the commander of the armed forces, with constitutional authority to impose martial law.¹⁴⁸² Perhaps ‘Abd al-Ilah was complacent, incompetent, or was afraid the army would not obey him.

Britain could have halted the Farhūd. However, Britain refused, to keep a promise to Nūrī al-Sa’īd. Nūrī, in exile in Jerusalem, feared Britain would abolish Iraq’s independence. Britain asked him to be Prime Minister once more.¹⁴⁸³ Nūrī, an Anglophile, was perhaps the only prominent lawmaker who liked Britain.¹⁴⁸⁴ Yet, Nūrī refused to rule unless “British forces will not enter Baghdad, and the Iraqi army will not be disarmed, to avoid giving rise to the impression that the Iraqis were beaten by the British- all this to save the army and the people from humiliation.”¹⁴⁸⁵ So, when British troops reached Baghdad on May 29, to protect Britain’s link to India, British troops stationed at Baghdad’s outskirts, banned from entering when the massacre occurred. They waited for ‘Abd al-Ilah’s forces to enter, so as not to look like an occupation.¹⁴⁸⁶ Cornwallis ordered the troops remain far from the bridges, so the bridges were

1481 Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 34

1482 Cohen, “The Anti-Jewish Farhud,” 14

1483 Report on Conversation with J.H. Jerusalem March 22, 1942. CZA (Z4\31216)-43

1484 “From a Conversation with an Arab a Few Days After his Return From Baghdad.” Oct 1, 1940. CZA (Z4\3125)- 3

1485 Report on Conversation with J.H. Jerusalem March 22, 1942. CZA (Z4\31216)-42

1486 Longrigg, 295; *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 29; Kedourie, “The Sack of Basra,” 295

unguarded, and attackers could cross from the Muslim areas in the West to the Jewish neighborhoods of the East.¹⁴⁸⁷

Cornwallis could have broken the Farhūd. The Foreign Office authorized Cornwallis to order airstrikes and instructed British Naval authorities to obey him.¹⁴⁸⁸ The British Embassy was forewarned there could be mass violence against Jews. In 1938, Embassy staff predicted the government would unleash ethnic cleansing against Jews in 1941 or 1942.¹⁴⁸⁹ In 1940, an informant said “Anti-Jewish feeling is assuming threatening proportions, and there is little doubt that in the event of a Germany victory attacks and wholesale murder are to be feared.”¹⁴⁹⁰ On April 14, 1941, Britain prepared for mass violence.¹⁴⁹¹ Contingency plans to evacuate British nationals said “the most probable circumstances would be when there was an outbreak of racial or religious riots with a strong anti-foreign bias.”¹⁴⁹² The plans included scenarios in which the government, police, or army would be “actively hostile,” informing readers that, “where it is necessary to open fire, an Arab crowd can usually be dispersed by short bursts of fire.”¹⁴⁹³ Nevertheless, Cornwallis wanted to keep Britain’s promise to Nūrī, and preserve the Iraqi state’s reputation, not protect Jews. Cornwallis downplayed the Farhūd as “street fighting,” and was thereafter promoted to sit on the Middle East War Council, charged with representing the British War Council in the Middle East.¹⁴⁹⁴ Somerset de Chair, an intelligence officer during the Anglo-

1487 Kedourie, “The Sack of Basra,” 301; Stark, 114

1488 NA (FO 371/27064), Foreign Office (London) to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) April 13, 1941, - 31; Foreign Office (London) to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) April 11, 1941, - 25; Foreign Office (London) to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) April 12, 1941, - 105

1489 P. H. Croswaite, Sept 19, 1938. Minutes. Houston -Boswall (Baghdad) Position of the Jews in Iraq. Aug 29, 1938. NA (FO 371/21861)- 192

1490 “From a Conversation with an Arab a Few Days After his Return From Baghdad.” Oct 1, 1940. CZA (Z4\3125)- 4

1491 Government of India (External Affairs Department) to Secretary of State for India (New Delhi) April 14, 1941. NA (FO 371/27064)- 137

1492 Chapter V. Plan. Evacuation of British and European Civilians from Baghdad. NA (FO 624/23/283)- 4

1493 for first quote, see *Ibid.*, for second quote, see *Ibid.*, -11

1494 for quote, see H.M. Ambassador, Kinahan Cornwallis, to Foreign Office (London). Telegram. June 2, 1941. NA (FO 624/23/258)- 14; NA (FO 624/26/586), July 9, 1941 Oliver Lyttleton to Kinahan Cornwallis. Middle East: Cabinet Minister, -3; Eden, Foreign Office to HM Ambassador (Bagdad) July 4, 1941, - 4

Iraqi War, said while the Farhūd occurred, “British force which could have prevent all this. Ah, yes, but the prestige of our Regent would have suffered.”¹⁴⁹⁵

Internal Security, the Regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah, Cornwallis, or law-enforcement could have efficiently defeated the attackers. On June 2, 1941, ‘Abd al-Ilah appointed Jamīl al-Midfa‘ī to be Prime Minister, and gave Midfa‘ī “a free hand” to end the violence. Midfa‘ī was a pugnacious lawmaker who opposed Muthanná and Rashīd ‘Ālī, and who, in 1935, attempted to assassinate a Pro-Rashīd ‘Ālī politician on the Senate floor. Midfa‘ī declared martial law and ordered the army’s Kurdish units to fire on any who violated a curfew, ending the Farhūd. Assailants scattered in the gunfire.¹⁴⁹⁶

Jamīl Midfa‘ī: A New Policy of Forgetting

Midfa‘ī never punished the Farhūd’s culprits; he hid the crime, and returned to old ideas of Muslim protection to remove the shame of the killings. A superficial reading of events conveys the government punished perpetrators. Midfa‘ī removed officials and arrested 700 suspects. Rashīd ‘Ālī and Ḥusaynī were sentenced to death in absentia. Authorities executed Sab‘āwī and the Golden Square, hung six perpetrators, and dissolved the Futuwwa. Police raided Muthanná’s headquarters, for “incitement against the English and the Jews.”¹⁴⁹⁷

However, defendants were never indicted for the Farhūd, but for other crimes. Sab‘āwī was never charged for the Farhūd. Baghdad’s and Basra’s Mutaṣarrifs were

¹⁴⁹⁵ Kedourie, *Arab Political Memoirs*, 302

¹⁴⁹⁶ for quote, see NA (FO 624/23/258), Iraqi Foreign Ministry to British Embassy. Cabinet. June 3, 1941 (Arabic Original),- 13; H.M. Ambassador, Kinahan Cornwallis, to Foreign Office (London). Telegram. June 2, 1941,- 14; A Storm in the Senate. Jamil Beg al-Midfa‘ī attacks Rashīd Ali Beg al-Gailani. Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 520- of August 22, 1935, from America Legation at Baghdad. NARA (RG 50 Microfilm T1180 Reel 2) 2; Al-Wayai al-‘Iraqiyah No. 1918 of June 3, 1941. NA (Laws and Regulations NA (FO 624/26/650)- 33; ‘*Al Hereg Ahênû*, 12 1497 Bashkin, *The Other Iraq*, 60; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) May 5, 1942 IOR (L/PS/12/577) - 12; Kedourie, “Continuity and Change in Modern Iraqi History,” 145; Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 6; Nawab Sadiq Muhammad Khan V Abbasi to Linlithgow Dec 15, 1941. IOR (L/PS/12/418)-17 (p. 6); al-Jawāhirī, 156, for quote, see 158

never reprimanded for failing to stop the mass violence, nor was ‘Umarī. The Committee for the Defense of Palestine was not dissolved. Midfa’ī indicted Rashīd ‘Ālī’s ringleaders, and brought them to trial, but “others will be treated leniently,” Cornwallis said, allowed to return “unconditionally.” Midfa’ī did not want to put on trial Sab‘āwī or the Golden Square. The culprits fled to Iran, whereupon police arrested them and surrendered to them Britain. On September 1, 1941, Baghdad’s military court requested their extradition, and Midfa’ī balked, saying the perpetrators should not return.¹⁴⁹⁸

Neither Midfa’ī, nor his successor, Nūrī, punished perpetrators. Midfa’ī left them uncharged, lest he outrage those who wanted Iraq to be a *Qawmiyya* state; or those who saw punishing Arab Muslims for attacking Jews as an assault on their ‘way of life’ or *dhimmi* norms. So while Midfa’ī punished *Qawmiyya*’s most prominent malcontents to diminish Rashīd ‘Ālī’s sway, the actual killers were unpunished, to avoid backlash. Sāmī Shawkat, who established the Futuwwa and grounded education in the Art of Death, continued in politics. He formed a new party. He continued to disseminate pro-Nazi propaganda in education. There was a “failure of Government, in spite of my repeated representations, to take sufficiently strong and positive action against Rashid Ali [sic] and Axis cells both in the civil administration, the army and elsewhere,” Cornwallis said. “Fifth column organization thus remains.”¹⁴⁹⁹

1498 IOR (L/PS/12/577), charges framed under articles 2 and 11 of the chapter 12 and article 80 of chapter 14 of Baghdad Penal Code ; see Mr. Holdman (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) September 9, 1941,- 112; Sir R. Bullard (Tehran) to Foreign Office (London) October 3, 1941, - 89; al-‘Umarī, 110; IOR (L/PS/12/504), Mr. Holman (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) September 3, 1941,- 63; Foreign Office (London) to Baghdad. Cypher. July 21, 1941,- 106; for quote, see Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 25, 1941. Cypher,- 103 (1); 1499 Government of India (External Affairs) to Secretary of State for India. (Simla) Sept 22, 1941. IOR (L/PS/12/577) - 105 (p.1); Foreign Office (London) to Baghdad. Cypher. July 21, 1941. IOR (L/PS/12/504)- 106; Simon, 152; Major. Mallaby (War Office) to H.A. Caccia, Esq. (Foreign Office) March 10, 1942. NA (FO 371/31362)- 26; for first quote, see Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) June 21, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)- 53; for second quote, Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 25, 1941. Cypher. IOR (L/PS/12/504)- 103 (2)

Perhaps Midfa‘ī feared anti-Semitism was too widespread. When he visited a hospital’s wounded on June 5, a man saluted, “the Jew came to visit the wounded Jews.”¹⁵⁰⁰ Rashīd ‘Ālī had a large following.¹⁵⁰¹ “The feeling in favor of Rashid Ali and against us, is still so prevalent that treatment by dismissal is impracticable,” Cornwallis said.¹⁵⁰² Rashīd ‘Ālī followers remained in government while Anglophiles and Midfa‘ī’s supporters feared to take office.¹⁵⁰³ G.N. Loggins, a British advisor who worked for the state, reported his minister spoke daily of “getting rid of foreigners.”¹⁵⁰⁴ A British naval officer said “The IRAQI army has not been sufficiently cowed by defeat,” with emphasis in the original text, “I do not, now, trust any Iraqi at all... the leaders of the late rebellion will undoubtedly plot sabotage.”¹⁵⁰⁵ Iraq’s Minister in Tehran warned, the military and police oppose Midfa‘ī. “Authority is maintained only though the British army,” he said.¹⁵⁰⁶ Rashīd ‘Ālī loyalists mixed with Britain’s Muslim troops at the Gaylānī Shrine, and organized a campaign to sway the soldiers to join Rashīd ‘Ālī.¹⁵⁰⁷ Iraqi officers plotted to form an Axis legion in Turkey.¹⁵⁰⁸ Cornwallis said, “If the Germans advance I could not rely on the Cabinet nor the army and police. The feeling that the Germans will win the war is deeply rooted in this country.”¹⁵⁰⁹

The Report Downplays the Tragedy

The Government Report, written to determine the Farhūd’s cause, downplayed the tragedy to absolve the government and return to the status quo of Arabism. Murders so

1500 Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 34

1501 United Kingdom-Iraq Joint Defense, Shatt NA(FO 624/26/564)-24

1502 Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 25, 1941. Cypher. IOR (L/PS/12/504)- 103 (1)

1503 Mr. Epstein to Mr. Shertok. My Mission to Iran and Iraq. Aug 28, 1941. CZA (Z4\31216)-27

1504 G.N. Loggins to Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) Aug 10, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/597)-11, for quote, see -13

1505 United Kingdom-Iraq Joint Defense, Shatt NA(FO 624/26/564)-24

1506 Mr. Epstein to Mr. Shertok. My Mission to Iran and Iraq. Aug 28, 1941. CZA (Z4\31216)- 25

1507 CR Grice to V. Holt. Nov 26, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/790)-6

1508 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Angora. August 6, 1941. Cypher. IOR (L/PS/12/504)- 83

1509 Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 25, 1941. Cypher. IOR (L/PS/12/504)- 103 (2)

prominent implicated the state, and shamed the security forces. Police and military were the perpetrators. The sadism was an embarrassment to assertions of tolerance and protection. The government was afraid to be implicated, or to implicate Arabism or Muslim rule.¹⁵¹⁰

For the Farhūd revealed acts considered disgraceful by Iraqis' own standards. The event laid bare Muslims did not protect *dhimmīs*. One soldier accused of murdering six, 'Abd al-Muḥammad al-Zāḥī, was stationed in Baghdad to keep order.¹⁵¹¹ Others killed their close relations.¹⁵¹² Two perpetrators confessed they murdered eight friends.¹⁵¹³ Contrary to the myth Muslims defended their neighbors, or government assertions Muslims frequently saved Jews, or suffered greater casualties than Jews, the Report mentions just a single Muslim died protecting Jews.¹⁵¹⁴ Some 'rescuers' were, in fact, perpetrators. Neighbors tricked Salim Dangoor, 27, to shelter in their home, then looted Dangoor's house, returned and shot him.¹⁵¹⁵

Midfa'ī approved two investigations. Firstly, he appointed Ma'arūf Jiyāwūk, a politician and former Magistrate, who opposed Arabism in schools, to explore how to rehabilitate the Community.¹⁵¹⁶ Secondly, Midfa'ī also appointed a committee to investigate the Farhūd.¹⁵¹⁷ Yet the geographer Ken Foote, who studies the spatial dynamics of violence, argues such inquiries are intended to exculpate the State.¹⁵¹⁸

Midfa'ī structured the probe to exclude evidence, setting deadlines for testimony. The

1510 Yehuda Tagar, "Ha-Farhūd bē-Kētāvīm bē-'Aravīt Mē'ēt Mēdinā'im ū-Mēḥabērīm 'Iraqiim," (*Pe'amim*, Summer 1981) 44; Kenneth E. Foote, *Shadowed Ground*, (University of Texas Press: Austin, 2003) 174, 176

1511 "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941," 229

1512 Mendes, 15

1513 Twena, "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 40

1514 Minorities: Jews (1944) NA (FO 624/38/502)-21; "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941," 229

1515 Twena, *Me'ore'ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū'ōt*, 63

1516 Twena, "The Diary of Abraham Twena," 6; al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakarātī Fī al-'Irāq*, Vol. II, 16-17; *Iraq Government Gazette* (Baghdad) Nov 8, 1931 (No. 46. No. of Notification 319) CZA

1517 Twena, "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 35

1518 Foote, 180

probe functioned little more than a month. Investigators decided on an official casualty toll before they questioned the Jewish community or its leaders. The Community did not finish its own findings into casualty figures for another seven months.¹⁵¹⁹ Neither government inquiry included Jews.¹⁵²⁰

The Report downplayed the death toll, counting 110 deceased, and 208 injured.¹⁵²¹ These numbers were lower than the 1,900 casualties ‘Umarī disclosed on June 4, 1941; or the 900 deaths that Jiyāwūk tallied on August 4.¹⁵²² One member of the investigative committee divulged the real number of Jews killed was 600. The police commander confirmed this number.¹⁵²³ The Foreign Office asked Cornwallis if the higher death tolls, perhaps 500, were accurate, for the Foreign Office had no access to government figures and 500 was the highest estimation Britain heard.¹⁵²⁴ Cornwallis responded, the “report of the *Anti*-Jewish excesses though too highly coloured [sic] is, I fear, substantially true.”¹⁵²⁵ The death toll could be substantially higher; these numbers may not include the disappeared who were never found, or those who committed suicide rather than fall to the mob.¹⁵²⁶ The Jewish community’s secretary, Abraham Twena’s own amateurish investigation uncovered more victims than the police, 179, with a 126 questionnaires.¹⁵²⁷

Midfa‘ī hid the killings. He forced Khaḍḍūrī to sign a statement, declaring progromists killed only seventy.¹⁵²⁸ Midfa‘ī hid the Report, refusing to furnish a copy to British

1519 Twena, *Me'ore'ot Hag ha-Shavut*, 145; Idem., “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 36, 41, 44

1520 Darwīsh, 59

1521 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Hawādith Yūmā 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 229

1522 Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 35, 41

1523 Kedourie, “The Sack of Basra,” 298

1524 Foreign Office (London) to (Baghdad) July 24, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- E.4060/1/93

1525 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 29, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- E.4060/1/93

1526 ‘*Al Hereg Ahēnū*, 10

1527 Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 45

1528 Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)- 56

authorities.¹⁵²⁹ Nor did he mention the Report publicly or confirm its existence. On August 21, 1941, the deputy, Yusuf Elkabir, leaked there was a Report to the Jewish community's leader, Sassoon Khaddūrī. On August 25, 1941, Khaddūrī confronted Midfa'ī, saying, why hide the Report?

Midfa'ī told Khaddūrī not to delve further. "The circulation or the hiding of the report would not change a thing," Midfa'ī said. "If things will rest in the past, and people brought to judgment, it will only bring harm to the Jews," he said. "It is worth the Community's while to turn its face to other affairs."¹⁵³⁰ Midfa'ī surrendered the Report, but labeled it top secret, and forbade the Community from a public response.¹⁵³¹

He hid the Report because it did not absolve the government as Midfa'ī desired. The Report concluded most of Baghdad's police rioted, and recommended investigating them all and replacing the force. We "cannot exonerate the members of the Committee for Internal Security," the Report said. Sab'āwī did not 'escape.' He was not expelled, the Report concluded. Internal Security paid him and allowed him to leave. "He should be punished, not rewarded," the Report said. The Report also elided discomfiting facts. The Report hid Muslims targeted Jews, avoiding the term 'Muslim,' and instead employed the euphemism '*min Islām,*' from Islam.¹⁵³² The Report also hid the hospital poisonings, wherein healthcare workers killed their Jewish patients, including those injured in the riots, perhaps under the influence of the hospital director, Ṣā'ib Shawkat, the brother of Futuwwa's founder, Sāmī Shawkat, and a former leader for the Committee of the Defense of Palestine.¹⁵³³

1529 Sir K. Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Feb 25, 1942. NA (FO 371/31365)

1530 Twena, "Yōmān Mēfōrāš 'al Ha-Pērā'ōt," 41-42; for quotes, see Twena, "The Diary of Abraham Twena," 7

1531 Bashkin, *New Babylonians*, 134

1532 "Lajana al-Taḥqīq 'an Hawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941," 229, 231-233, for first quote, see 231, for second quote, 232

1533 Peretz. Document 21, *Šin'at Yēhūdīm*, 252

Midfa‘ī refused to enact its recommendations. He never investigated the police. He removed no officers the Report incriminated by name, of which there were several.¹⁵³⁴ Investigators said they could not determine the extent of damages, and urged Midfa‘ī to establish another committee.¹⁵³⁵ Midfa‘ī refused. No Jew received compensation; police remained in their posts.¹⁵³⁶ Writing bitterly in 1961, Abraham Elkabir said, “No action was taken to find and punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime. No restitution was made, no compensation was granted, except a derisory amount which hardly represented more than a fraction of the total loss. No word of regret was uttered by any of the leaders even by the Prime Minister Jamil El Midfai [sic].”¹⁵³⁷

While the Jewish community wanted to sanctify the graves to remember the disaster, to illustrate the dangers of anti-Semitism, grieve and assure survivors the deaths were not meaningless, Midfa‘ī wanted the public to forget the Farhūd and make the Farhūd meaningless.¹⁵³⁸ Police gave a hundred twenty corpses of Farhūd victims to the *Hevrâ Qadishâ*, the Jewish burial society, to quickly inter in a mass grave.¹⁵³⁹ Hundreds visited. The government made the mourners stop.¹⁵⁴⁰ The Community erected a stele to memorialize the Farhūd.¹⁵⁴¹ The government wanted the public to forget the Farhūd, and so removed the marker, and later razed the cemetery in 1962.¹⁵⁴² The government ‘disappeared’ the memorial to exonerate those blamed for the deaths.¹⁵⁴³

1534 CZA (Z4\31215), Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941,- 56; Leo Kohn (Jerusalem) to J. Linton, Esq. (London) Feb 23, 1942, -35

1535 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 230

1536 ‘*Al Hereg Aḥênû*, 13

1537 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 148

1538 Foote, 7, 10, 81

1539 Dalet. Letter. in ‘*Al Hereg Aḥênû*, 21; Twena, *Me’ore’ôt Hag ha-Shavû’ôt*, 193; Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tôledôt ha-Maḥteret*, 3

1540 Bashkin, *New Babylonians*, 134

1541 Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tôledôt ha-Maḥteret*, 3; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 148

1542 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 148; Twena, *Me’ore’ôt Hag ha-Shavû’ôt*, 197

1543 Foote, 23

The State denied responsibility for the Farhūd and refused to compensate victims.¹⁵⁴⁴

The Jewish Relief Council sent Midfa‘ī requests for compensation, saying “most of the housebreaking was done by armed soldier and by policeman.” Midfa‘ī balked, “the Government could, in no case, admit the principle of compensation.” The Relief Council submitted their own report, but Midfa‘ī refused to read it.¹⁵⁴⁵ A family sued the monarchy for the disappearance of their children, charging negligence. The Court ruled that the government was not responsible.¹⁵⁴⁶

Rather than implicate Arabism or Islam, the State said the murderers were others – outsiders – to divert blame from Iraqis to the official enemies of Zionism and Nazism, to subvert the killings to suit Iraqi needs.¹⁵⁴⁷ The Report listed several causes for the Farhūd, and behind each one was Nazi Germany. “The investigative committee determined the principle reasons for the occurrence of these disturbances is Nazi propaganda,” the Report said.¹⁵⁴⁸ Germany broadcast in Arabic. Grobba spread propaganda among soldiers. The Report censured other non-Iraqis: Palestinians, Syrians, and Ḥusaynī – and always behind them was Nazi Germany. Ḥusaynī “took to broadcasting Nazi propaganda.” Palestinian and Syrian teachers refused instructions to lecture against Nazism. Yet the Report never asks: why did the government tolerate Grobba or the international teachers who agitated for Nazism? Why were Iraqis receptive to Jew-hatred or so resolved to support Germany? Or why the government collaborated with Ḥusaynī, or why he was “received in Iraq with great enthusiasm.” Iraqis are not mentioned until the final clause of the Report – Iraqi broadcasts – the only factor the Report admitted was ‘Iraqi.’ Yet these broadcasts, too, the Report concluded, were for Nazism.¹⁵⁴⁹ The government

1544 Leo Kohn (Jerusalem) to J. Linton, Esq. (London) Feb 23, 1942. CZA (Z4\31216)-35

1545 Jewish Relief Council (Baghdad) “Note on Jewish relief at Baghdad,” December 10, 1941. JDC (NY AR193344 4 35 714)- 486837 (p. 2)

1546 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Haq ha-Shavū’ot*, 73, 76, 78

1547 Foote, 27

1548 “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 233

1549 *Ibid.*, 233-234

said Nazis precipitated the Farhūd.¹⁵⁵⁰ Nūrī said “the pogrom in Baghdad had been organized by Nazi agents.”¹⁵⁵¹ His 1942 book, *A Case for Arabism*, says “propaganda spread from German broadcasting made this strong outburst. This led to the establishment of a mob in Baghdad of Muslims looting the Jews” which “killed several of them.”¹⁵⁵²

Anti-Semitism Worsened After Farhūd

However, for those who insisted Muslims are equitable, and, as reflections of Arabism and Islam, do no wrong, such agitators said the killings as ‘justified.’ *Qawmiyya* obscured their ability to see killing Jews as wrong. The Report, if negatively read, blamed Jews: they provoked soldiers with nice clothes.¹⁵⁵³ Popular assertions blamed Jews: Jew on the Khurr Bridge were “shouting threats to Moslems,” or hurling “insults at the beaten Iraqi troops.”¹⁵⁵⁴ The Farhūd became, in the eyes of such believers of stereotypes of Muslim rightness and Jewish hostility, a just act, to threaten Jews and keep in their place as pariahs. Or to aspire to a second, greater Farhūd. There were complaints Baghdad residents spoke of “a wholesale massacre of the Iraqi Jews” once Britain left.¹⁵⁵⁵ Fliers in Baghdad appeared, with threats. “This holiday arranged for the Jews was only a small holiday and they will prepare a big holiday still.”¹⁵⁵⁶

“Listen up, Jews,” another flier read “Next time everyone will fall victim in our hands, we will return, we will murder and afterwards we will pillage.”¹⁵⁵⁷ One group, calling itself the Secret Association for the Murder of Jews, distributed a flier which said,

Oh Jewish Infidels
Leave our Muslim Land, if not
We will massacre you plenty

1550 A. Sassoon to M. Shertok. Extract from July 28, 1941 CZA (Z4\31215)- 59

1551 M. Shertok. Cairo, July 21, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)-57

1552 al-Sa’id, 14

1553 Darwīsh, 59; “Lajana al-Taḥqīq ‘an Ḥawādith Yūmá 1 wa 2/6/1941,” 226

1554 Minorities: Jews (1944) NA (FO 624/38/502)-21

1555 Leo Kohn (Jerusalem) to J. Linton, Esq. (London) Feb 23, 1942. CZA (Z4\31216)-35

1556 *‘Al Hereg Ahênû*, 23

1557 Šōhet, “Mōrā’ā Šel Malkūt,” 101

Until we kill everyone one of you
We will annihilate you soon
What we did before was only a test
What will be done soon:
Grisly Murder
Mass pillage
Deadly kidnapping
- The Secret Association for the Murder of Jews.¹⁵⁵⁸

The defeated remnants of Rashīd ‘Ālī’s regime continued to encourage anti-Semitism to say the Farhūd was self-defense, or a people’s war, as a means to destabilize the new government. In December, ‘*Ālam al-‘Arabī*, a newspaper part of the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, said Jews caused price hikes for products such as wheat, rice, barley and ghee.¹⁵⁵⁹ “Propagandists attribute the rising cost of living largely to exploitation by Jews,” Cornwallis said.¹⁵⁶⁰

Rashīd ‘Alī and Ḥusaynī escaped to Germany, and agitated on Axis radio:¹⁵⁶¹ Rashīd ‘Ālī said we “will resume on the path of jihad to carry out our *Qawmiyya* faith.”¹⁵⁶² Ḥusaynī broadcast three times daily.¹⁵⁶³ He told listeners to “Kill the Jews wherever you find them, for the love of God, history and religion.”¹⁵⁶⁴ he said. “British and Jewish [are] enemies of the world.”¹⁵⁶⁵ He said “with the aid of England the Jews have seized all the key positions;” and he said Jews occupy banks; they control the press.¹⁵⁶⁶ Ḥusaynī continued:

If, God forbid, England should be victorious, the Jews would dominate the world. England and her allies would deny the Arabs any freedom and independence, would strike the Arab fatherland to its heart, and would tear away parts of it to form a Jewish country whose ambition would not be limited to Palestine but would extend to other Arab countries.¹⁵⁶⁷

1558 ‘*Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 14

1559 Ibid., 14; J.F. Wilkins (Office of the technical advisor, Directorate General of Police) to Vyvian Holt (Oriental Secretary), December 23, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/737)- 3

1560 Sir Kinnahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Relations. Cypher. November 7, 1941. PZ 2068/1941(2) IRAQ. Rebellion in: - 1941. IOR (L/PS/12/504)- 7196

1561 “Grand Mufti. Extract from Middle East Intelligence Summary No. 9. December 12, 1941. KV 2/2085 - 91b

1562 al-‘Umarī, 104

1563 “Mufti’s Money,” *Cavalcade*. From the Press, Aug 15, 1942. KV 2/2085 - 99a

1564 Hirszowicz, 311

1565 “Ex-Mufti Busy in Berlin,” *Jewish Chronicle*, From the Press, July 1942. KV 2/2085 - 98a

1566 Jewish Telegraphic Agency (New York City) to the Jewish Daily Press (Johannesburg) January 24, 1942. KV 2/2085 - 94a

1567 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 155

One motive for this surge in extremism was the perpetrators self-interest: to terrorize witnesses into silence and to persuade the public Jews were enemies, friends of the English, who deserved persecution in order for the culprits to avoid imprisonment or death for murdering them. Investigators interviewed Jewish leaders,¹⁵⁶⁸ but incitement frightened many to not testify to avoid retaliation.¹⁵⁶⁹ Or a second Farhūd.¹⁵⁷⁰ ‘Next time, not a single Jewish refugee or survivor will be in Baghdad,’ suborners told survivors. Police menaced survivors.¹⁵⁷¹ One family was arrested after complaining relatives disappeared.¹⁵⁷² The Jewish Community’s secretary, Abraham Twena, received death threats. An officer implored police to arrest Twena, and when questioned about casualties, Twena was too afraid to divulge the numbers. In one round of questioning Twena records, on August 4, 1941, the investigator, Ma‘arūf Jiyāwūk, asked the Jewish leader, Moshe Yetaḥ, “what was his opinion of Arshad [al-‘Umarī, Baghdad’s mayor], if he was not responsible for the pogrom.”

Yetaḥ blamed the English.

Could ‘Umarī have prevented the Farhūd? Jiyāwūk asked.

“Why do you ask me and not Arshad?” said Yetaḥ. Whether he was scared or sincere cannot be known.¹⁵⁷³

The Myth Britain Suppressed Anti-Semitism

1568 Nissim Kazzaz, “Divrê Māvô’: Doh Va‘adāt Ha-Kira Miṭa‘am Memšelet ‘Īraq: ‘al *Me’ore’ôt* 1-2, bē-Yūnī 1941, *Pe’amim: Studies in Oriental Jewry*, (Vol. 8, 1981, Yad Izhak Ben Zvi) 46

1569 “There has been difficulty in persuading the Jews to give evidence. Anti-Jewish talk continues,” see Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 29, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- E.4060/1/93; Twena, “Yômān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ôt,” 36

1570 “Air full of poisons incitement, renewed outbreak feared by community,” see Jewish Agency (Jerusalem) July 19, 1941. CZA (Z4\31215)-56

1571 *‘Al Hereg Aḥēnū*, 13

1572 Fattal, 122

1573 Twena, “Yômān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ôt,” 40-41, for quotes, see 41

There are two myths concerning the aftermath of the Farhūd. Both are intended to minimize anti-Semitism and exculpate the states of Iraq and Britain. The first myth is Britain and the Government suppressed anti-Semitism after Farhūd. Before the war, Britain steered Iraq's policies through Britain's embassy, advisors, and companies, and their power to persuade was less after the Anglo-Iraq war. Cornwallis said if he pushed ministers too hard, they resigned. He lacked troops to stabilize the country. Therefore, Britain controlled Iraq surreptitiously, through government cooperation. Britain instituted a censorship regime and only allowed editors published if they wrote 'appropriately,'¹⁵⁷⁴

Outsiders, like the American Jewish Committee, saw Britain's censorship as protecting Jews, but the safeguard was unintentional. Britain countered anglophobia, insofar as the idiosyncrasies of Iraq's anti-Semitism equated Jews and Britain. Sometimes, anti-Semitism and hating Britain overlapped.¹⁵⁷⁵ The radio announcer Yūnis al-Baḥrī, for example, urged listeners to boycott both Jewish and British goods.¹⁵⁷⁶ "Jews are supposed to have such a great influence on everything in Britain, being anti-Britain and being anti-Semitic are one and the same," said one resident.¹⁵⁷⁷ Britain's list of Anglophobes to be purged reads like a rogues' gallery of anti-Semites: the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, Ḥusaynī and Muthanná.¹⁵⁷⁸ However, they were interned for opposing Britain, not anti-Semitism.¹⁵⁷⁹

1574 Report on Iraq: May 15, 1948-January 1949, 8; G.N. Loggins to Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) "Note on the Future of British Influence in Iraq" Aug 10, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/597)-15; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) June 21, 1941. NA (FO 371/27076)- 53; Foreign Office (London) to Ambassador (Baghdad) June 8, 1941. NA(FO 624/26/564)- 31; "Fortnightly Report on period of 1-15th October '41" Oct 15, 1941. Public Relations Section, British Consulate Section (Basra) NA (FO 624/26/703)-7 (p. 2)

1575 Report on Iraq: May 15, 1948-January 1949, 2

1576 Eastern Department. To Mr. Jebb (Colonial Office) "The Mufti's Activities." Feb 21, 1940 NA (KV 2/2085) - 82b (p. 1)

1577 Censorship Note. Special Note on Conditions in Germany. Summary of notes on recent letters from Germany, mission posted between beginning of June and middle of July, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/160)- 26 (p.5)

1578 Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 25, 1941. Cypher. IOR (L/PS/12/504)- 103 (1)

1579 IOR (L/PS/12/504), Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) October 30, 1941,- 7071; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) October 8, 1941,- 6436

Neither Britain nor the government cared about anti-Semitism. Nūrī's cabinet included Sab'āwī's propaganda director.¹⁵⁸⁰ The Propaganda Department had staff to plant articles in newspapers, but no staff to censor incitement.¹⁵⁸¹ Britain also used a variety of 'assets' throughout the Anglo-Iraq crisis who, themselves, promoted anti-Semitism. One propagandist's anglophile sermon tours told listeners. "In the 6th Chapter of the Quran you will find the following 'you will find that your enemies will be Jews.'"¹⁵⁸²

These same British officials, unconcerned with anti-Semitism, blamed the bloodshed on Jews themselves to evade responsibility for the Farhūd and British officials' own failure to make Iraq a democratic state. British officials supported allegations of Jewish provocation: Jews "had the temerity to fly British flags and banter the defeated Muslims," one British official said, "the Baghdadi Jews were not entirely above blame."¹⁵⁸³ Cornwallis had the most to lose. His policy decisions were accountable and potentially criminal. He disallowed British troops' intervention to end the Farhūd, despite witnessing the massacre in Baghdad as it occurred. So, he said Zionism instigated Rashīd 'Ālī, and the Farhūd. "Baghdad Jewry has fallen on evil days. This is largely due to the unfortunate reaction of Zionism," Cornwallis said. He defended the behavior of Iraq's army and government during the Farhūd. Cornwallis absolved himself, claiming Zionism was callous, warning Zionists "might try to make a 'case' out of the plight of Baghdad Jewry," but not he, Cornwallis. "I am anxious to do what I can to help the Baghdad Jewish community."¹⁵⁸⁴

1580 Šādiq al-Baṣṣām, see Cabinet. October 9, 1941(Arabic Original) . NA (FO 624/23/258)- 8

1581 S.P., Minutes, Nov 23, 1944. Press NA (FO 624/38/495)- 2

1582 Translation of Maulvi Mohd Bashir's Report. Report on Iraq and Iran. Telegram. February 7, 1941 'Propaganda among Shi'ite communities in Iraq and Persia' IOR (L/PS/12/418)- 36, 38, for quote, see 38

1583 for first quote, see De Gaury, 128; for second quote, see Minorities: Jews (1944) NA (FO 624/38/502)- 21

1584 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 29, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- E.4060/1/93; for quotes, see Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Horace Seymour (London) Sept 25, 1941. NA (FO 371/27116)- E6613 (87/29/41) 1, 3; for quote, see

A Myth of Forgetting

The second myth, perpetuated by the government and British, and later adopted by scholars, is that Jews ‘forgot’ the Farhūd. Behind the claim was a denial the Farhūd had significance, was not an analytical lens from which to deduce answers, and did not convey a ‘lesson’ for the public to learn. To say Iraq’s Jews forgot the Farhūd was, to argue obliquely, the Farhūd should be discounted from any discussion of Iraq’s treatment of Jews. The assertion exonerated Iraqis of the Jewish exodus to come, and denied persecution played a significant part in Iraq’s history. The Iraqi-born Israeli scholar of Arabic literature, Sasson Somekh illustrated this premise in 1951, writing, “why did this occur, and what were the primary reasons that caused the mass exodus from Iraq? These questions belong to a context that has absolutely no relation to the Farhud [sic].”¹⁵⁸⁵

British officials invented the concept of ‘forgetting the Farhūd’ to minimize it. “A close observer of the life of Baghdad’s Jewry must gain the impression that the riots of June 1941- against all expectations- did not basically influence the mentality and attitude of this community,” read a 1942 British report, which blamed Jewish decline on trends Britain disliked: weakening British control and Jewish politics in Palestine.¹⁵⁸⁶ Cornwallis said the Farhūd was forgotten to avoid implicating his own role in the slaughter, and claimed Jews were “less anxious.”¹⁵⁸⁷

In reality, the Farhūd precipitated an exodus of Iraqi Jews. British Officialdom’s denial of persecution made Jewish emigration controversial. The numbers of Jewish flight was a quantifiable benchmark of British failure, of Jewish discontent, of Iraq’s anti-Semitism – real

1585 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) July 29, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- E.4060/1/93; for quotes, see Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Horace Seymour (London) Sept 25, 1941. NA (FO 371/27116)- E6613 (87/29/41) 1, 3; for quote, see Sasoon Somekh, *Bagdad, ‘Eimól*, (Hotsa’at HaKibutz HaMeuchad: Israel, 2004) 106

1586 The Position of Jewry in Iraq. (The Jewish Agency). September 1942. NA (FO 624/38/502)-32

1587 C. W. Bunte, Foreign Office (London) to R. T. Peel (India Office) May 26, 1942 IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- 3969 (p. 1)

data more difficult to refute. Already, before the Farhūd, perhaps 10,000 already emigrated to Palestine.¹⁵⁸⁸ After the killings, 4,000 refugees lingered in Baghdad to go to India.¹⁵⁸⁹ A thousand “merchants” applied for family visas.¹⁵⁹⁰ Hundreds lined outside the British consulate, such as Sam Shamoön’s family, who reached Bombay two weeks later.¹⁵⁹¹

In a sign of shaken confidence, emigrants included the financially successful. The only Jewish politician to ever serve as minister, Sassoon Heskell, his niece and her family applied for Indian visas.¹⁵⁹² So did the daughter of a parliamentary deputy, and her family.¹⁵⁹³ “As applicants wish to be accompanied by families there is no doubt that real object is to seek refuge in India for indefinite period as result of serious anti-jewish rioting,” India said, and predicted the “number would no doubt increase if policy of free grant were adopted.”¹⁵⁹⁴ Another thousand departed for Palestine.¹⁵⁹⁵ “A big pogrom like before seemed on the horizon,” said one resident “thousands of Jews ran about to get passports.”¹⁵⁹⁶ Each week, twenty to forty people approached the Jewish Agency for immigration to Palestine.¹⁵⁹⁷

Many others wanted to leave but could not acquire visas or could not do so until years later. India placed quotas on Jewish immigrants to forestall a mass migration, accepting fifty people maximum, a month.¹⁵⁹⁸ India hesitated to allow more “which would be tantamount to the encouragement of a Jewish exodus from Iraq,” one official said.¹⁵⁹⁹ With India closed, Jewish

1588 *‘Al Hereg Aḥênû*, 23; Masliyah, “Zionism in Iraq,” 228

1589 Y.13, Iraqi Jews and Palestine, December 5, 1943. NA (FO 624/38/502)-36

1590 Government of India to Secretary of State for India (Simla) August 24, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- 4429; J.P. Gibson. Sept 1, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)

1591 *‘Al Hereg Aḥênû*, 15; Sam Shamoön, “From Baghdad to Bombay.” Lecture. University of Rhode Island. October 7, 2009. Multicultural Diversity Week. [YouTube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZvhTqtWQDA). Accessed August 4, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZvhTqtWQDA>

1592 Sir Thomas Carey Evans (Shepherd’s Bush, London) to Undersecretary of State for India (London) Sept 12, 1941 IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- 4842

1593 Sofer, 95

1594 Government of India to Secretary of State for India (Simla) August 24, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)- 4429

1595 Y.13, Iraqi Jews and Palestine, December 5, 1943. NA (FO 624/38/502)-36 (p. 2)

1596 Nîr Sôhet, “Môra’â Šel Malkût,” 101

1597 Ehud (Iraq) to Nissim. July 23, 1942. Copy of Handwritten Letter. CAHJP (P145/11) 1

1598 IOR (L/PJ/7/4749), Government of India to Secretary of State for India (Simla) August 24, 1941, - 4429; Government of India to Secretary of State for India (New Delhi) October 8, 1942, - 8676; Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) January 22, 1943,- 1016/948

1599 J.P. Gibson. Sept 1, 1941. IOR (L/PJ/7/4749)

emigrants fled to Tehran, Shanghai, or Indonesia.¹⁶⁰⁰ One difficulty gauging the Farhūd's impact is there was no effective measure for desire to emigrate. Many who wanted to depart were disinclined to publicize their plans to avoid persecution. Moreover, those planning to leave may have done so long after. A year later, in 1942, there was still a demand for Palestinian visas.¹⁶⁰¹ One memoirist, a child during the Farhūd, departed years later, but said, the moment of the killings, "I, too, had decided that Iraq was not going to be my home."¹⁶⁰²

Contrary to contentions of 'forgetting the Farhūd,' in the subsequent years, there would be at least four 'Farhūd Scares' – panics among the Jewish community a new Farhūd was imminent. Starting in 1944, when Nūrī, in a radio speech, declared war on Zionism, frightening listeners, his words were a signal to unleash a Farhūd.¹⁶⁰³ Again in 1946, after a British and American committee recommended 100,000 Holocaust refugees to immigrate to Palestine. En masse, Baghdad's Jews stayed home to avoid a possible Farhūd. In 1947, when the UN voted for partition of Palestine, public opinion expected a Farhūd, and Jews absented themselves from work, and cloistered at home, as a safety precaution. In 1948, Jews who inferred the Palestine Mandate's end would stir a Farhūd, abandoned Arab areas for Jewish neighborhoods. Demand for firearms surged. "because they remembered what had happened in 1941," wrote the historian Sylvia Haim, born in Baghdad in 1925. On May 14, when Israel declared independence, many ceased to exit their homes. They collected stones, knives, iron pipes, boiled water and readied guns, guarding their homes, and listening to radios for signs of pogrom.¹⁶⁰⁴

1600 Kattan, 26-28

1601 Ehud (Iraq) to Hagana (Palestine) June 9, 1942. Handwritten Letter. CAHJP (P145/11) 1-2

1602 Sofer, 95

1603 Nūrī's campaign "badly scared the Jews and inspired the fear of general attack and massacre," a Foreign Office memo said, see Foreign Office. "Iraq: Political. Restlessness among Minorities." Memo. Nov 1, 1943, NA (FO 624/34/239)-7

1604 for quote, see Haim, 196; Somekh, *Bagdad, 'Eimōl*, 108; Twena, *Me'ore 'ot Hag ha-Shavū 'ot*, 107-108; Moshe Gat, *The Jewish Exodus from Iraq 1948-1951*, (Frank Cass: London, 1997) 30; Shlomo Hillel, *Ruah Qadīm: bē-Shlīhūt Mahterūt lē-Arṣōt 'Arab*, ('Aidanim: Tel Aviv, 1985) 137; Shīnā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledōt ha-Mahteret*, 15; Report on Iraq: May 15, 1948-January 1949, 3

The myth of forgetting is a derivation of two contradictory, but not mutually exclusive impulses. The first, among anti-Semites, stems from prejudices that pair Jews with money as their motivation, in which Jews ‘forgot’ the killings because the economy improved. The second, is the tendency among Jews, to create a positive ethnicity, of ‘Iraqi Jews,’ or ‘Arab Jews,’ a culture with value and is worthy of continuance, and is not a ‘lachrymose conception’ of history, to use Salo Baron’s famous phrase. Such advocates also urged a ‘forgetting.’ In his 1955 memoir, the deputy Salman Shina said “peace returned and influenced the homes of the Jews. Prices rose and Jews earned giant sums.” Others repeated his claims. The journalist Nissims Rejwan wrote “the older generation, virtually forgot the trauma of 1941.” Somekh, born in Baghdad in 1933, said “the years immediately after the ‘Farhud’ were years of recovery of the likes of which the Jews of Iraq had never seen...It’s not true the Farhud created a historical turning point. The opposite, the Farhud was almost wiped from the collective memory.”¹⁶⁰⁵

This premise of forgetting is based on falsehood, for in reality, the Farhūd exacerbated an economic depression. Britain’s effort in World War II brought higher prices to Iraq and a dearth of supplies as worldwide resources diverted to military necessities.¹⁶⁰⁶ Within six months, the Community was hit with an economic downturn. The government cut subsidies. Foodstuffs disappeared from the Bazaar. “We knew some families were crazy with hunger,” Twena said.¹⁶⁰⁷ The advisor to the Directorate-General of Police, J.F. Wilkins, warned there could be bread riots.¹⁶⁰⁸ In 1942, the cost of living was four times higher than in 1939. A year later, six times. Inflation grew.¹⁶⁰⁹ Grain shortages wracked the country. Cornwallis asked Tehran for food

¹⁶⁰⁵ for first quote, Šinah, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyôn*, 126; for second quote, see Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 229; for third quote, see Somekh, *Bagdad, ‘Emôl*, 105-106

¹⁶⁰⁶ Longrigg, 316

¹⁶⁰⁷ Twena, “Yômân Mēfôrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ôt,” 43

¹⁶⁰⁸ J.F. Wilkins (Office of the technical advisor, Directorate General of Police) to Vyvian Holt (Oriental Secretary), December 23, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/737)- 3

¹⁶⁰⁹ Longrigg, 319

shipments. “I am gravely concerned with wheat shortage here,” he said. “Arrival of wheat in the immediate future is essential to allay growing anxiety of Government and public which may well become panic.”¹⁶¹⁰ Britain and the US sent aid to prop up Iraq.¹⁶¹¹ Years later, in 1948, one British Jewish organization concluded there was no recovery after the Farhūd, only continuous economic decline.¹⁶¹²

The Farhūd devastated the Jewish economy. For the majority of Jews, like the majority of Iraqis, as prices rose, the standard-of-living declined. The war economy enriched only those wealthy and upper-middle class few who sold goods to British forces or received government contracts – middlemen, and landowners selling crops – a demographically insignificant elite of sixty persons among a population of 150,000, according to the Jewish community’s budget forecasts.¹⁶¹³ Excepting this minuscule group, rising prices hurt the Community, left with no income to cover the pogrom’s losses.¹⁶¹⁴ As a result, social services declined. Schools were unopened until August 25, 1941.¹⁶¹⁵ Teachers, hospital staff, and charity workers were unpaid for five months. “When I say that the families of these are starving, then I literally mean it,” one British official said.¹⁶¹⁶ “Hospitals and schools are miserably pulling on with their annual deficits, at a time when the poor students of the Jewish Community is increasingly needing them....thousands of poor Jewish families who turned away of these institutions for lack of money.”¹⁶¹⁷

1610 Kinahan Cornwallis (Baghdad) to Charge d’affaires (Tehran) Dec 31, 1941. NA (FO 624/26/823)- 2

1611 Longrigg, 317

1612 Memorandum Concerning the Present Position of Jews in Moslem Countries. Feb 12, 1948. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/031) (p.2)

1613 Longrigg, 316; Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-’Olām Ha-Mūšēlēmī. (Joint Distribution Committee, 1949) JER (44-52 2 3 JER.307) 3; Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 6

1614 Jewish Relief Council (Baghdad) “Note on Jewish relief at Baghdad,” December 10, 1941. JDC (NY AR193344 4 35 714)- 486837 (p. 2); and Twena, “The Diary of Abraham Twena,” 6

1615 Twena, “Yōmān Mēfōrāš ‘al Ha-Pērā’ōt,” 43

1616 NA (FO 624/26/811), “The Donation to the Jewish Community,”- 7; C.R. Grice, Controller fo Foreign Property, to H.W.A. Freese-Pennefeather, Nov 27, 1941,- 3

1617 “A Donation to the Jewish Community.” NA (FO 624/26/811)- 5 (p.2)

Conclusion

Iraq's government and popular cults of Arabism and the hierarchy of faith produced the Farhūd. Rashīd 'Ālī's regime, and anti-Semitic groups the government funded – the Muthanná, the Futuwwa, the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, all which composed Rashīd 'Ālī's regime – contemplated mass killings, and Sab'āwī tried to enact it. Rashīd 'Ālī's regime provoked a war with Britain and incited riots, saying Jews were foreigners, Anglophiles, and detrimental to Iraq. Though Jews were tangential to the conflict, Rashīd 'Ālī's promoters pulled Jews into the crisis, as props for their propaganda, to redirect blame from authorities for a war in which they would lose. Such scapegoating was a symptom of state-sponsored anti-Semitism and the regime's reliance on appeals to prejudice. The assertion that Jews were Europeans, and do not belong, predated the wartime, but accusations Jews signaled British planes lent well to Iraq's bigotries. The allegations grew from *Qawmiyya*. A look at the previous mass violence against Jews – the riot of 1908, the massacre of businesspeople of 1917, and the Farhūd of 1941 – reveals each crime occurred in the aftershock of conflicts Iraqis lost. Each time the assailants felt society's 'character' was threatened, whether it be as 'Muslim' or 'Arab,' and accused Jews of aiding and abetting an 'external enemy' – the Young Turks in 1908, the British in 1917 and 1941, and later in 1948, the 'external enemy' would be 'Zionism.' It was irrelevant 'who' the external enemy was – the crux was whether the hierarchy of faith – Muslim domination – was feared to be under threat by Jews, the 'internal enemy.' Proponents of the hierarchy, who opposed equality and cherished *dhimmī* norms, vindicated their discrimination with the dismay civil rights for the disempowered minorities, and the most loathed of them, Jews, would herald a *dhimmī* reversal, in which Jews would rule and Muslims would not. After decades of *Qawmiyya* indoctrination and state-sponsored Jew-hatred, the regime and much of the public believed this

racist conspiracy theory was real. The May 7, 1941, bombings of Iraqi cities appear to have inspired a nationwide violent reaction. The May 7 anti-Jewish attacks illustrate Iraqis believed the claims. Mobs attacked Baghdad's Jewish hospital, railway station masters, and a commercial district in Basra. Rashīd 'Ālī's government invented and/or believed the claims, as the government may have engineered the attacks. Despite the rampages or promises of protection, the government continued to incite against Jews, saying Jews are internal enemies, and the friends of the English. The government promised to 'destroy' the internal enemy, and expelled Jews from the towns of Shamiya and al-'Azir, because local leaders considered Jews a threat, a precursor to the mass exodus of 1950-1951. Already in 1941, the government and public wanted ethnic cleansing.

The Farhūd was premeditated and plotted. The perpetrators – the police, military, Futuwwa and Sab'āwī's militias, Katā'ib al-Shabāb – were all under Sab'āwī's direction. He misappropriated funds to create and arm the Katā'ib. The Katā'ib created maps of Jewish streets, assigned fighters to different areas, and seized Twena's register, to create a list of who was Jewish and where they lived. Assailants prepared and synchronized attacks: the killings of automobile passengers on Ghāzī street, the attackers at Shrine of 'Abd al-Qādir Shrine. The attack on Jefferies proves that an organized assault can appear chaotic and 'spontaneous.' Part of the attacks were spontaneous – bystanders witnessed the slayings and joined to murder their own friends, coworkers, neighbors and loved-ones. Perpetrators targeted those they knew; those who looked stereotypically 'Jewish,' wearing European button-up shirts and trousers.

The Farhūd undermined the ideological foundations of the state and very stereotypes upon which Iraq's anti-Semitism played on – it revealed neither Muslims nor Britain protected *dhimmi*s. Muslim Iraqis murdered their intimate relations. Police, soldiers and government slew

those they were charged to protect and there were no repercussions. Baghdad's mayor, 'Umarī, who claimed to rule, did not act. 'Abd al-Ilah dithered for days and did not act. Britain refused to act. Contrary to anti-Semitic stereotypes of 'friends of the English,' Britain callously allowed Jews to die. Britain was the friend of Iraq's Sunni politicians, not Jews. Shalom Darwīsh, a Jewish deputy, called the Embassy at 3 am, in the midst of the killings, pleading for help. Cornwallis' Oriental Secretary, Vyvyan Holt answered the phone,

His Excellency went to sleep dead tired and already learned of the shooting and looting before he slept. He decided that it is a purely internal matter which is up to the Regent to decide after his return. His excellency does not see a reason for the intervention of the British Military. I don't see any reason to wake his excellency.

Then, Holt hung up.¹⁶¹⁸

After the Farhūd, the government hid the massacre from public consciousness, to preserve and reimpose *Qawmiyya* and the hierarchy of faiths. For to acknowledge the Farhūd would be to indict Arabism; and to punish perpetrators would be to empower the victims, Jews, to accuse their attackers in court. To make Jews and Arabs were equal before the law was an anathema to Arabism. To admit Muslims persecuted Jews was an anathema to *dhimmī* norms, upon which the hierarchy of faiths rested. So, the government downplayed the tragedy and blamed the killings on outsiders, Germans and Ḥusaynī, or on the victims themselves. This reaffirmed Muslim Arabs are ethical rulers, and Jews live well as a voiceless minority under a Muslim Arab state. Proponents of the hierarchy of faith, *Qawmiyya*, and the government exhorted the Farhūd was an aberration which should be discounted and forgotten, while at the same time, swelling anti-Semitism to evade criminal responsibility and silence witnesses and critics.

¹⁶¹⁸ Darwīsh, 61; Holt twice urged to send troops to stop the pogrom, see Stark, 115

Sab'āwī may have been the Farhūd's initiator, founding the Katā'ib and controlling the militias and the propaganda, and he instituted the plan, but the Futuwwa and Muthanná were already part of the government's state-sponsored anti-Semitism years before Sab'āwī became a politician. The State's *Qawmiyya* 'created' Sab'āwī. Ḥuṣrī indoctrinated students with *Qawmiyya* and militarism when Sab'āwī was a pupil in school. Sab'āwī studied under Ḥuṣrī's curriculum. Shawkat introduced the 'Art of Death' to students when Sab'āwī was in college. The government funded and guided newspapers to incite against Jews and minorities when Sab'āwī was a journalist and the popularity of *Qawmiyya* made Sab'āwī a celebrity when he publicly proclaimed Jews were enemies of the *qawm*. After the Farhūd, at his trial for insurrection, Sab'āwī told the judge "I will serve my country" in "Jihad, death and honor,"¹⁶¹⁹ three mainstays of Iraq's education system.

State-sponsored *Qawmiyya* and anti-Semitism produced a crop of militants and a demand for ethnic cleansing. Before Sab'āwī's arrest in Iran, whereto he absconded to avoid capture, he praised the Farhūd. Sab'āwī said the Farhūd was 'proof' Iraqis support *Qawmiyya*.¹⁶²⁰ He planned to organize an army, and then return to Iraq to wage a second Farhūd, which he regarded as a people's war.¹⁶²¹ *Qawmiyya*'s adherents and more destructive militants followed slogans, anti-Semitic motifs and stereotypes to their emotional conclusion. They ceased to treasure norms of protection and chose to highlight the local aesthetics that were violent, exclusionary, and anti-Semitic.

State-sponsored *Qawmiyya* and anti-Semitism created a public receptive to Sab'āwī. He planned the Farhūd, but many uninvolved joined. Many uninvolved supported the atrocities, or

1619 "About the Testimony of Yūnis al-Sāb'āwī" in Buṭṭī, Vol. II, 367

1620 Baṭatu, 459

1621 al-'Umarī, 104, 109

defended the slayings or minimized their relevance. A great shift occurred from Iraq's independence, when the public ceased to see Jews as props in their hierarchy of faith to prove Islam true. Instead, the society came to accept anti-Semitic rationalizations for an unequal society, in which one faith ruled others lest their way of life or Islam would end. *Qawmiyya* no longer wanted minorities as props to display Muslims' rightness. The public wanted a monoculture, in which Islam, *Qawmiyya* and state were one, and Jews were gone – an ethnic cleansing. Opinion wanted to isolate and remove Jews from Iraq; they wanted everything to be Muslim Arab. The Farhūd was a manifestation of this desire: the ultimate method to 'protect' the hierarchy of faith, in which the upper caste, the Muslims, destroy the lower rungs.

Chapter 7

An Anti-Semitic State

The thrust of the *Qawmiyya*'s anti-Semitic allegation – that Jews are an internal enemy, hostile to Arab Muslims, and conspired with opponents abroad to attack the country– transformed Iraq into an anti-Semitic state, and led to the mass exodus in 1951. Three factors drove this transformation. First, was the continuity from Rashīd 'Ālī al-Gaylānī's regime and the cabinets that followed his overthrow. His propagandists worked for subsequent administrations. Muthanná, the anti-Semitic government-front behind his coup, reconstituted itself as Istiqlāl, an influential political party, whose ministers served in government. These provocateurs continued to level the charge Jews served external foes. Second, the notion of protecting *dhimmi*s lost appeal. Policymakers believed the canards of Jewish malevolence, felt betrayed, and no longer wished to play the role of guardian. Third, the taboo of Jewish authority grew in ascendancy. *Qawmiyya*'s purpose for asserting Jews were internal enemies was to exclude them and make them pariahs. In the 1920s, Iraq guaranteed minorities equality to convey Muslims respected their rights. However, after the Farhūd, authorities act as if the libels of Jewish conspiracies abroad were true, and created a foreign policy to thwart it: stop the 'spread' of Jews in the Middle East and barring Jewish non-citizens from entering Iraq. These programs developed into a series of anti-Semitic laws intended to protect Iraq from the non-existent 'plots'– Jews were

barred from transactions, ownership, careers, education, public institutions, travel, and government. Jews became legally inferior.

Ultimately, the government wanted to expel Jews, though preferred to do so by indirect means, so as to not sully the reputation of the government or hierarchy of faith. For Iraqis still valued *dhimmi* norms of protection, even as *Qawmiyya* derided the concept as insufficiently militant, and the concept was less popular, a shadow remained. So Instead, the government created a system of rules for Jews to willingly leave themselves, or, through Jews' own actions, to be deported. For the State to remain 'innocent' of the crime, Iraq avoided direct expulsion, though that was what the government intended to do and in fact, achieved.

The Continuity of State-Sponsored Anti-Semitism

The prejudices of Rashīd 'Ālī's administration motivated policy in the post-Farhūd era. In 1942, Iraq's Prime Minister, Nūrī al-Sa'īd interpreted news items of Jewish advocacy abroad as an "anti-Arab" threat. Nūrī had a history of anti-Semitism. In 1936, he said trade with Palestine's Jews would destroy Iraq's economy. His neighbor recounted Nūrī's children "had been indoctrinated from birth to hate us, If we passed them on the street, they would call us names and shout, 'Jews!' Traitors! Go away." Nūrī wrote Jews were not Arabs and collaborated with anti-Semites throughout his career. When Britain established Iraq, and Nūrī was but 29 or 30, and thought himself an "extreme Arab nationalist," he socialized with street toughs, and soldiers, encouraging listeners to engage in "anti-Jewish demonstrations" and "rough 'acts of justice.'" He later spoke at the Muthanná club.¹⁶²²

1622 For first quote, see G.H. Thompson, Political Review: 1943- 1945. Embassy Reports Annual, NA (FO 624/38/463)-8; Nūrī al-Sa'īd (Baghdad) to Richard Casey (Cairo). n.d., in al-Sa'īd, 5-6; for second quote, see Saul Silas Fathi, *The Full Circle: Escape from Baghdad and the Return*, (Saul Silas Fathi: Central Islip, 2005) 33-34; al-Sa'īd, 10; for all other quotes, see De Gaury, 49; Nūrī spoke there in 1939, see al-Ḥuṣrī, in al-Ḥāshimī, 16

In 1942, Nūrī read in *Foreign Affairs*, in which Chaim Weizmann, a leader of the Zionist movement, lobbied for ‘political guarantees.’ The article was inconsequential, and is unclear from the term ‘political guarantees’ what the article meant, but by Nūrī’s account, he became anxious a “Jewish homeland” would harm Arabs. For in Iraq, among anti-Semitic circles, Zionism was popularly understood as the Jewish conquest of the Middle East. A year later, in 1943, government sources told Nūrī that “Zionists in the United States” developed anti-Arab propaganda” and made “subversive preparations.”¹⁶²³

In response, Nūrī restarted Iraq’s program of state-sponsored anti-Semitism through control of the news media. In a speech, Nūrī declared war on Zionism, and launched an “anti-Zionist campaign” in press and radio, part of his plan to direct the media against Jews. He released 350 of Rashīd Ālī’s supporters, who hated Jews as friends of the English, and the English, as servants of Jews, hiring them as civil servants and pressman.¹⁶²⁴ One such employee was Raphael Buṭṭī, a newspaper proprietor, incarcerated for Nazi incitement. Buṭṭī was the former press supervisor of Yūnis al-Sab’āwī, the mastermind behind the Farhūd.¹⁶²⁵ In 1944, Nūrī ordered Buṭṭī’s newspaper, *al-Bilād*, reopened and supplied to promote pseudo-fascist strongmen suchlike Ṭaha al-Hāshimī, the founder of the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, an anti-Semitic government front.¹⁶²⁶ In turn, Buṭṭī hired seven journalists who promoted Rashīd ‘Ālī in 1941, and were members of Muthanná and the Committee.¹⁶²⁷

The acquisition of Buṭṭī was part of Nūrī’s appropriation of Baghdad’s dailies. Nūrī’s government subsidized three papers – *al-Bilād*, *al-Akhbar* and *al-Zaman*, ordering journalists

1623 al-Sa’īd (Baghdad) to Casey (Cairo). n.d., in al-Sa’īd, 7-8, for first quote, see 8; for other quotes, Thompson, Political Review: 1943- 1945, NA (FO 624/38/463)-8

1624 Foreign Office, “Iraq: Political. Restlessness among Minorities,” Nov 1, 1943, NA (FO 624/34/239)-7 (4); Thompson, Political Review: 1943- 1945, NA (FO 624/38/463)- 8; Kazzaz, *Ha-Yehūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 259

1625 The Staff of ‘al-Bilad.’ NA (FO 624/38/495)- 7; S. Jawaida. Minutes, Jan 19, 1944. NA (FO 624/38/495)-19

1626 NA (FO 624/38/495), Minutes. Feb 8, 1944, - 9; al-Bilad, Feb 3, 1944 The Personality of the Day, - 11; Frank Cardnay (?) Squadron Leader, Ariea Liaison Officer, Baghdad, “Al-Bilad, February 13, 1944, - 5

1627 The Staff of ‘al-Bilad.’ NA (FO 624/38/495)- 7

what to write and when. He directed them to write about Palestine. When Winston Churchill, Britain's Prime Minister, voiced support for Jewish brigades to fight Hitler, Nūrī said, "The real aim to form this army is war against the Arabs," and instructed pundits to excoriate Churchill with material from the Propaganda Department. Thereafter, *al-Akhbar* said 'Zionism' planned to conquer Transjordan. "The Jewish Community which speaks in the name of the voice of Israel," used Britain to protect Palestine's Jews.¹⁶²⁸

The 'anti-Zionist' campaign continued after Nūrī's tenure. In 1944, his successor, Ḥamdī al-Pāchachī, a former President of the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, founded the Arab Bureau, a series of information centers his government said was "to counteract Zionist propaganda," in America and London. Zionists were "befogging and bewildering both British and American public opinion," and were "harmful to the Arab cause," said Arshad al-'Umarī, the Foreign Minister and former mayor of Baghdad during the Farhūd.¹⁶²⁹

Then, Nūrī, temporarily out of power, expanded the campaign against 'Zionism' abroad. He interpreted two events as affirmation of the false myth Jews conspired against Arabs. First, on November 6, 1944, Jewish militants assassinated Britain's Secretary of State for the Middle East, Lord Moyne. Nūrī said the murder signified Jews had a hit list. Iraq's leaders were on it, including Nūrī himself. Arab leaders "felt grave doubts as to the wisdom of incorporating the Jews in an Arab state," Nūrī said. "A dissatisfied minority consisting of such dangerous elements might lead ultimately to its disintegration."¹⁶³⁰ Secondly, the day after Moyne's slaying, Franklin

1628 NA (FO 624/38/503), n.a., Sept 21, 1944,-12; Ahmed Mukhtar Baban, Foreign Minister of Iraq (Baghdad) to British Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sept 24, 1944- 11; Foreign Office (London) to (Baghdad) Sept 30, 1944. Telegram.,- 8; for first quote, see al-Sa'id (Baghdad) to Casey (Cairo). n.d., in al-Sa'id, 7; n.a. Marginalia signed 'W.', Sept 21, 1944,-12; Mūqaf al-Arab Manah, "al-Nišāt al-Şahyūnī," *Al-Akhbar*, August 16, 1945, (MDC) 2; NA (FO 624/38/495), Minutes. Feb 8, 1944,- 9; for second quote, see "Tanmiya Qaḍiyah Filasṭīn," *Al-Akhbar*, December 12, 1945, (MDC) 4

1629 "Rijālat al-'Irāq Takrum Simāha Muftī Filisṭīn al-Akbar," *al-Zaman*, November 11, 1939, *Wathā'iq*, 100; Norman J.W. Goda, "Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism in the Wake of the Holocaust," *Antisemitism Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2017, (Canadian Institute for the Study of Anti-Semitism, Indiana University Press) 97; for first quote see, Jamali, *Inside the Arab Nationalist Struggle*, 98; for second quote, see HM Chargé d'Affaires Thompson (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Aug 10, 23 and 30, 1944, NA (FO 624/38/503)- 13, 15, 17, 22

1630 for quote, see Top Secret Report. British Resident (Trans-Jordan) Nov 28, 1944. (Part 2) NA (FO 624/38/503)- 15;

Roosevelt was elected to his fourth term. Iraq's political class wrongly concluded 'Zionists' influenced the election. The assassination and election were linked.¹⁶³¹

Nūrī intended to make 'the Jews' a point of propaganda. Iraq's press informed readers Zionism intended to subjugate the Middle East. "Zionism is preparing itself to rob all the Arab countries," Buṭṭī's *al-Bilād* said. "Zionist capitalism intends to use Palestine" to "enslave the Arab countries...They sucked the marrow of the Arab countries by their heap of goods which are being sold at many times their real price...The Zionists directly influence internal policy in the democratic countries. They have an influence on the elections, trade and press."¹⁶³²

The lie of a Jewish conspiracy to conquer the Middle East convinced Nūrī that Jews should be barred from the Middle East. He wanted to isolate into a small geographic area, perhaps Palestine. On November 25, in Amman, Nūrī met Britain's resident minister, Alec Kirkbride. "Jewish terrorism had caused him to revise his opinions," Nūrī said. "Might perhaps be best to lose part of Palestine in order to confine the Zionist danger within permanent boundaries" so "the poison did not spread." The alternative to Partition was a White Paper, a policy which restricted the immigration of Jews, but a White Paper's "disadvantages were the continued presence of Jews," Nūrī said. "The advantage of partition was the confinement of Jewish activities within a permanent limit...the Jews would attempt to conquer the Arab territories economically but that danger could be parried by a complete Arab boycott of Jewish manufacturers." The "principal fear," Nūrī said, was "the Jews would use their powerful influence in Great Britain and the United States to secure a revision of its boundaries." Or, "if the Arabs acquiesced in the formation of a Jewish state, and then took steps to protect themselves

1631 NA (FO 624/38/503), for quote, see Top Secret Report. British Resident (Trans-Jordan) Nov 28, 1944. (Part 2)- 15; HM Chargé d'Affaires Thompson (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Aug 10, 1944. Telegram. (Part 1)- 22

1632 NA (FO 624/38/503), Palestine: Settlement (Part 2)- 8; "A Zionist policy directed towards the creation of an empire extending from the Libyan desert to the Persian Gulf," said *al-Nidā'* on November 14, see "Attitude of the Baghdad Press to the Palestine question" Nov 24, 1944. NA, - 30; for quotes, see Mashakif, (Tel Aviv) to British Embassy (Baghdad) Nov 30, 1944, - 18-19

against economic penetration by Jewish capital and industries, they would be subjected to pressure by Great Britain and the United States of America to co-operate with the Jews.”¹⁶³³

Later, on December 5, 1944, Nūrī dined with Iltyd Clayton, an East Office hand. Nūrī said he feared a Jewish state would acquire Dominion status and use British passports to immigrate to Arab countries. Zionists wanted Jordan and more, said Nūrī. We must draw a border for Jews, Nūrī said.

What was Nūrī’s solution, asked Clayton.

Permanent borders and no immigration to Arab countries, said Nūrī. “Nor allow them transit through Arab lands, nor buy their products.” But two weeks later, on December 18, Nūrī denounced partition. “They would do their utmost to ruin the scheme by imposing a complete boycott on the Jews and all things Jewish,” he said, and he welcomed the boycott.¹⁶³⁴

The Union of Fighting Zionism and Anglo-American Inquiry

Part of the state’s anti-Semitism campaign was the creation of public spectacles to denounce Jewish politics and reassure the public anti-Jewish laws did not ‘violate’ *dhimmī* norms. Pāchachī allowed newspapers to attack Zionism with anti-Semitic allusions; yet, he also maintained Jews were treated equitably. To illustrate this, he sponsored a Jewish group, the Union of Fighting Zionism, to parrot the regime’s obloquy and praise *Qawmiyya*. The Union’s messaging paired Zionism with the ‘*dhimmī* reversal,’ the myth that Jews would conquer Iraq, and other anti-Semitic motifs of foreigners, money, and menace. The Union said Zionism was “a danger to Arabs and their *Qawmiyya*.” Zionism “intended to get riches;” “tries to rip the unity of

1633 Top Secret Report. Office of the British Resident (Trans-Jordan) Nov 28, 1944. NA (FO 624/38/503)- 14-15; Report. Nov 28, 1944. NA (FO 624/38/503)-13

1634 Foreign Office (London) to Ambassador (Baghdad) Dec 13, 1944. Telegram. NA (FO 624/38/503)- 23-24, for first quote, see 24; for second quote, see Kinahan Comwallis to Lord Gort. Dec 18, 1944. NA (FO 624/38/503)- 9

their country;” and is “the enemy of Arabs.” The Interior Minister, Sa‘ad Ṣālīḥ, organized the Union, and perhaps was its founder. He granted the group formal recognition so they could testify before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, a binational panel to determine if Palestine should accept Jewish Holocaust refugees.¹⁶³⁵

Muḥammad Fadhel al-Jamālī, the Foreign Ministry’s Director-General, invited the Inquiry to Baghdad to display that Arabism treated Jews well. He wanted to prove, to the Inquiry, and perhaps to the public, a ban on Jews was not anti-Semitic and Jews do not belong in Iraq. Jamālī led the education ministry from 1939, and during the Rashīd ‘Alī regime, oversaw the expansion of the Futuwwa. In his testimony, Jamālī said Jews “are not wanted” in the region East, “and if they come there it is simply shifting the problem from Europe to the Near East,” he testified on March 5, 1946. “We don’t want skyscrapers... We don’t want to live as Americans do in New York City” with a “foreign body of inhabitants” harboring “the clear objective of creating a foreign state inside its body.” Jews “may be much happier in the USA, in Australia, in Canada, in South America.” Yet, Jamālī said, Zionism “undermines the loyalty of many a Jew to his own country.”¹⁶³⁶

“If there were non-Zionist Jews who wish to go to Iraq could they be admitted as immigrants?” asked Frank Aydelotte, a member of the Inquiry.

“When Zionism is dead that might be considered,” said Jamālī.

“Suppose these individuals- there are, of course, many Jews in the world who are opposed to Zionism?”

“Yes.”

“Would such Jews be welcomed as immigrants to Iraq?”

“The Zionists are invading us,” said Jamālī. “When you were at war in Germany, [you] didn’t think some good Germans could enter your country.”

“We did admit good Germans.”

“We cannot think of that unless the danger of political Zionism is all gone.” said Jamālī. “They are predominantly a commercial people, and then they

1635 A Cairo pogrom on Nov 2, 1945 attacked synagogues, and inspired copycats to arrange similar demonstrations in Baghdad, but Pāchachī banned them, see Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 233; Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Irāq*, 261; “Fakhāma Ra’is al-Wuzarā’ yuwad ‘Uṣba Mukāfaḥa al-Ṣahyūniyah,” *al-Sha‘ab*, July 21, 1945, *Wathā’iq*, 136; for quotes, see ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Ṣāfi, “Kifāḥna Didd al-Ṣahyūniyah,” *Minzama Taḥrūr Filasṭīniya*, *Wathā’iq*, 137-138; Snir, *‘Arabiyyūt, Yahadūt, Ṣiyōnūt*, 287

1636 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Hearing at MENA House, Cairo. March 5, 1946 CZA (S25\6386)- 4, 7-9,13

have the financial life, banks and so on and so forth. They are very prosperous and they are very happy in Iraq. On the whole they dominate in the economic world.”¹⁶³⁷

“The absorptive capacity of Palestine, I think, has no relation to the problem?” Frank Buxton, another Inquiry member, asked.

“Not so much. It is the fear of Zionist domination,” said Jamālī.¹⁶³⁸

In response to the inquiry, Pāchachī’s Government stoked anti-Semitism, and encouraged war on Jews as a people. On May 1, 1946, the Inquiry recommended Palestine allow 100,000 Holocaust refugees to immigrate to Palestine.¹⁶³⁹ The state-funded newspaper *al-Akhbār* said Jews menaced the region’s Arab character. “This recommendation is a threat to the Arab Ummah,” *al-Akhbār* said on May 4.¹⁶⁴⁰ Zionism “is a fundamental principle in the heart of every Jew,” *al-Akhbār* continued. “They are soldiers, capitalists and colonialists at one time... The Jewish people’s plan” is to “smash the glory of the Ummah and eradicate the Arabs in their native countries.”¹⁶⁴¹ According to *al-Akhbār*, ‘Abd al-Raḥman ‘Azzām, the Arab League’s Secretary, implored war. “Evacuate Palestine of Arab women and children and make it a war zone,” he said, and *al-Akhbār* recommended Iraq follow ‘Azzām’s advice.¹⁶⁴²

Once the Inquiry ceased, there was no need for the Union of Fighting Zionism, as their purpose was to illustrate to Iraq’s public and the international community anti-Jewish laws were not anti-Semitic. Pāchachī’s government was uncomfortable with Jewish activism, even as boosterism. In June, Arshād al-‘Umarī became Prime Minister and impeded the Union’s protests. On June 28, without government permission, the Union and *Qawmiyya* activists demonstrated against Britain’s presence in Iraq. Three thousand stormed the embassy. Police opened fire, killing Shaul Tweig, a Union member.

1637 Ibid.,- 11

1638 Ibid.,- 12

1639 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Haq ha-Shavū’ot*, 107

1640 “‘Azm ‘Arab Filastīn ‘Alá al-Difā’ ‘an al-bilādhum Ba-Jamī’a Wasāik” *Al-Akhbār*, May 4, 1946, (MDC) 1

1641 “‘al-Ḥalūsiyyūth’ or the colonizing immigration to Palestine” *Al-Akhbar*, May 4, 1946, (MDC) 1

1642 “‘Ikhla’ Filastīn al-Nisā’ al-‘Arabiyyāt wa al-Atfāl wa Ja’alhā Miṭṭaqah Ḥurbīyah...l’lān al-Jihād: al-Sha’ūb al-‘Arabiyyah tuqaf Safān Waḥīdan bi-jānīb ‘Arab Filastīn fī Niḍālum” *Al-Akhbār*, May 5, 1946, (MDC) 1

Though the Union had acted in partnership with *Qawmiyya* groups, and advocated for an Arab Iraq, critics discomfited with Jews in politics denounced the Union only among groups involved, as “Stop these crazy egoists which swagger Communism,” and “under foreign influence.”¹⁶⁴³ Critics consciously selected ‘Communism’ to slander Jews, because, unlike Zionism, which the State never prohibited to avoid charges of persecution, “Bolshevik (Communist) doctrine” was banned as a ‘nefarious’ ideology under Law No. 51 of 1938. Accusers wanted Jews jailed under the law, which paired Communism with “teachings against ‘religion and family,’” and dovetailed with negative stereotypes about Jews as hostile to Arabs.¹⁶⁴⁴ There is a myth in historiography, that after the Farhūd, Jews interested in politics split into two groups: Zionists and Communists.¹⁶⁴⁵ A study of either blocs’ numbers undermines the claim. Of the perhaps 150,000 Jews in Iraq in the 1940s, 2,000 belonged to Tenuah, the underground Zionist movement, and 245 were Communists.¹⁶⁴⁶ Twena said there were no ‘real’ Communists – anyone for equality was defamed as such. Critics said Jews ‘drowned’ in Communism, and the Union was Communist.¹⁶⁴⁷ ‘Umarī banned the Union, and suspended their newspaper, *al-‘Uṣba*.¹⁶⁴⁸

At trial, the Union’s members were vilified as Communists and Zionists, for the government said all Jewish participation in politics was Zionism. Prosecutors presented meeting at a ‘Jew’s house’ as evidence. The judge said,

The Jews have two parts, and the big part of them has no interest in politics, he loves Jerusalem as a center of religion for Jews and not for a Zionist center. The second part deals with politics, and is truly a minority, but all Jews involved in politics are doing it for Zionism, its not important if they are in the Communist part,

1643 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Irāq*, 262; for quote, see “Asbāb al-Khilāf Bayna al-Ḥukuma al-Aḥzāb,” *al-‘Ālam al-‘Arabī*, August 3, 1946. *Wathā‘iq*, 150

1644 Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949. The American Jewish Committee (Paris) JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p.2);

1645 Twena, *Me’ore’ōt Haq ha-Shavū’ōt*, 102

1646 Censuses rarely counted Jews, so precise figures are unknown. Sometimes authorities said 150,000 Jews lived in Iraq, other moments, 80,000. A 1947 census listed 118,000, 2.6% of Iraq, lower than Community estimates. In 1943, a British source said 125,000 Jews lived amid Iraq’s 3.5 million, see Julius Jung (Chairman, Aliens Committee) to Sir David Maxwell, February 7, 1952. NA (FO 371/98767)- 150; Gat, *The Jewish Exodus*, 7; Y.13, Iraqi Jews and Palestine, December 5, 1943. NA (FO 624/38/502)-35; Faḍel al-Burāk, *al-Mudāris al-Yahūdiya wa al-Irāniya fī al-‘Irāq*, republished in *Wathā‘iq*, 152-159

1647 Twena, *Me’ore’ōt Haq ha-Shavū’ōt*, 20, 106

1648 *Wathā‘iq*, 140

or in another radical party, he makes this for Zionism, the explanation is not a distortion, Jews organizing against Zionism they want to explain to the world, but Zionism exists so they are obligated to protect it, they confuse the government from the beginning to try to play innocent but are working for the Jewish state, because the war against Zionism is the war for Zionism.¹⁶⁴⁹

The Partition of Palestine and Calls to Violence

The United Nations' partition of Palestine on November 29, 1947, into Jewish and Arab territories, and Israel's independence created the same dynamic that led to the Farhūd, in which Iraqis, dejected, afraid the hierarchy of faith was under threat, of Jewish domination, waged violence against Jews to reimpose *dhimmi* norms. In 1947, Britain submitted the Palestine crisis to the United Nations to resolve.¹⁶⁵⁰ Jamālī sent a memorandum to the UN, falsely predicting Zionism's expansionism "from the Nile to the Euphrates," he said. "Palestine is just a stepping-stone to the economic exploitation of the Middle East" and "domination by the force of money... What is involved is the loyalty of the Jews in every city in the world... Zionists political ambitions are dangers" to "Arab nationalism... Either one or the other must disappear."¹⁶⁵¹

Iraqi politicians stoked resentment against Palestine's partition, mixing dread of Jews who were hostile with contempt for Jews who were weak, leading to talk of massacring Jews in Palestine and Iraq.¹⁶⁵² "It will not be a war, it will be a slaughter," said one senator. "The Jews, condemned by the Koran to eternal military impotence can offer no resistance. It will simply be a walkover, perhaps a holocaust."¹⁶⁵³ An intelligence officers told one Jewish deputy, "if your men use a weapon or fire even only a single bullet, countless of your people will fall victim to the rifles of police and daggers of mobs."¹⁶⁵⁴ Parliament said Jews sabotaged Iraq, were aliens, and

1649 Twena, *Me'ore 'ot Haq ha-Shavū'ot*, 106-107

1650 Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 29

1651 Memorandum submitted by Dr. Mohammad Fadhel Jamali on behalf of the Government of Iraq to the United Nations Special Committee, in Sofar, Lebanon, July 23, 1947, in Jamali, *Inside the Arab Nationalist Struggle*, 293, 297-298

1652 Y. "Mētōk Tazkīrīm ū-Miktāvīm: 'Irāq," End of June 1948, in Yalqūt Mizrāḥ Ha-Tikōn. Vol. 1 March 1949 JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2648047. (p. 26)

1653 Elkabir, *My Ideological Life*, 51-52

1654 Shinā, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyōn*, 134

ted to the Yishuv, the Jewish settlement in Palestine.¹⁶⁵⁵ The day of the Partition vote on November 29, protesters gathered at the Prime Minister's office, listening to Muḥammad al-Sawaf, an employee of Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī. "Come today and we will liquidate all the Jews," said Sawaf.

Salman Shina, a Jewish deputy, hurried to ask the Justice Minister, Jalāl Bābān, for protection. Shina knew Bābān since the Ottoman era, and found Bābān at the Prime Minister's building, amid the protests calling to kill Jews. Bābān motioned Shina to a private room. "Don't you see the danger hovering over your heads? If Allah forbid, something happens, in other words, if the mobs attack- who will protect you? The army and police will not intervene."¹⁶⁵⁶

Talk of massacring Jews turned violent weeks later. Iraq's Prime Minister, Jabr, signed a defense pact with Britain, the Portsmouth Agreement, which promised Britain bases and 'consultative councils' in Iraq. The public, apoplectic, erupted into riots on January 20, 1948.¹⁶⁵⁷ They attacked the *Iraq Times* offices.¹⁶⁵⁸ Police fired onto the crowds, but the shootings swelled the fury of the mob, yelling, kill the police, war on the West. Four hundred died in clashes.¹⁶⁵⁹ Hordes of the livid marched on the palace, demanding Jabr's death.¹⁶⁶⁰ The police fled, and so did Jabr.¹⁶⁶¹ For years, the State and provocateurs said Jews were foreigners and 'friends of the English,' who controlled world affairs. The next day, January 21, in the midst of riots against Britain, rioters raged against Jews. Throngs attacked Jews and pillaged their stores, saying Jabr was a 'Jew-lover' who protects Jews; who sells Jews passports, and yelling, "Destruction to all

1655 Somekh, *Bagdad*, 'Etmōl, 108; R. O. Chandler. Confidential Report. May 1949. JDC (JER 44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647989 (p. 1)

1656 Shīnā, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyōn*, 131

1657 Jamali, *Inside the Arab Nationalist Struggle*, 116

1658 De Gaury, 151

1659 Hillel, *Rūaḥ Kadīm*, 133; Report on Iraq, 2

1660 De Gaury, 154

1661 Report on Iraq, 2

Foreigners;” “Death to all enemies.”¹⁶⁶² Jabr’s government encouraged the canards, blaming Jews for the protest, distributing leaflets, saying the demonstrators were Zionists.¹⁶⁶³ Both government and its opponents fomented against Jews, despite that Jews had no connection to the Portsmouth Treaty.

Scholars like Nissim Kazzaz mistakenly contend the riots against the Portsmouth Treaty, known in history as the Wathba made Nūrī anti-Jewish, because he despised Jews involved in the protests.¹⁶⁶⁴ In truth, Nūrī’s animus was decades older. He encouraged anti-Jewish demonstrations from Iraq’s inception, and expressed anti-Semitic vitriol from at least 1936. Nevertheless, He did view the Wathba as an affirmation of his enmity. Some Wathba activists were Jewish, who trusted Iraq’s airs of equality, and wanted to be politically involved.¹⁶⁶⁵ However, protest violated *dhimmī* taboos which presupposed Jews as meek and unseen, without authority nor voice. Nūrī and the politician, Tawfiq al-Suwaydī, had shepherded the Portsmouth Agreement. They were irate, insisting Jewish protests ‘betrayed’ Arabs and were a Communist threat.¹⁶⁶⁶ A year later, when Twena met Nūrī at his office, and Nūrī once more Prime Minister, removed from his drawer a set of pictures, “See what number of Jews joined the Portsmouth demonstration? These ingrates protested the people helping them. They are not worthy of the government’s protection.”¹⁶⁶⁷

Moreover, when fighting erupted in Palestine, those angry that Arab irregulars were unable to defeat the Yishuv called for violence.¹⁶⁶⁸ On April 8, 1948, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Ḥusaynī,

1662 World Jewish Congress, *Treatment of Jews in Egypt and Iraq*, (World Jewish Congress, New York, 1948) 20; “The Jews of Iraq: A prosperous, well-organized community the Anti-Jewish regime since 1933 the Catastrophe after May 15, 1948,” Jewish Agency for Palestine, Research Department, New York, New York. CZA (Z4\33505)-21, 23; Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot*, 107-108; Elie Kedourie, “Anti-Shiism in Iraq under the Monarchy, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr. 1988) 250; for quote, see De Gaury, 154

1663 Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 14; Kedourie, “Anti-Shiism in Iraq,” 249

1664 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 263

1665 Haim, 197

1666 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 270

1667 Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot*, 110

1668 Rejwan, “Bookshop Days,” 55

a commander who fought for Rashīd ‘Ālī, was killed in Palestine.¹⁶⁶⁹ Istiqlāl, the reconstituted party of Muthanná, and Rashīd ‘Ālī’s supporters, vowed vengeance.¹⁶⁷⁰ They chanted, “death to the Jews,” lofting ‘Abd al-Qādir’s picture.¹⁶⁷¹ Sit-ins demanded Iraq invade the Yishuv. On April 27, a mob stormed a Baghdad synagogue, desecrating the contents within.¹⁶⁷² Later, days after Passover, on May 6, 1948, a mob beat three Jews, perhaps one to death. The violence fueled anti-Semitism, as those who admired *Qawmiyya* in the press, defended the assaults.¹⁶⁷³ *Al-Sha‘ab* said the three victims had poison candy to murder children, and the aspersions incited more mobs, attacking Jews and yelling of poison candy.¹⁶⁷⁴ Those who wanted an explanation for the lack of victory against the Yishuv, but loathed to impugn Arab prowess blamed conspiracies: Britain orchestrated Jewish successes. Iraq’s oil strike was a plot – either Jewish, British, or Communist – or all three – “to disrupt Iraq” and “fuel supplies to the Arab forces,” the newspaper *al-Yaqza*, said.¹⁶⁷⁵

A “gang of Communists is working in all branches of Iraqi States Railways, working on a plan to cause disturbances,” said Istiqlāl’s publication, *Liwā’ al-Istiqlāl*, referring to a stereotype the rail industry was Jewish. “Zionists and Communists constitute a fifth column ... They must be dismissed from their government positions, expelled from schools’ and carefully watched.”¹⁶⁷⁶

The government said it may seek ‘revenge’ against Jews. The Prime Minister, Muḥammad al-Ṣadr, a Shiite cleric, organized a cabinet of *Qawmiyya* adherents and social

1669 Moreh, “The Role of Palestinian Incitement,” 130

1670 Hillel, *Rûah Qadīm*, 136

1671 for quote, see Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 33; Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 237; Hillel, *Rûah Qadīm*, 136

1672 Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 33

1673 Authorities denied a victim died, see Report on Iraq, 1

1674 Sam Pope Brewer, “Jews Slain in Iraq as Hatred Mounts,” *New York Times*, May 10, 1948, 17 ; for the victim’s killing, see also Baghdad Press Summary, May 2-8, 1948. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688698; Victor H. Bernstein, (Jewish Agency) to Hector McNeil, M.P. (New York City) NA (FO 371/75183)- 60

1675 Brewer, “Jews Slain in Iraq,” 17

1676 Baghdad Press Summary, May 2-8, 1948. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688698

conservatives – three of whom were members of the Committee for the Defense of Palestine.¹⁶⁷⁷

When Sassoon Khāḍḍūrī, the President of the Jewish community, met Ṣadr, beseeching protection as tradition expected, Ṣadr disagreed. He said, Jews have politics: they have political opinions and they participate in protests. Jews broke the *dhimmī* taboo. “You must search, investigate and be exact,” Ṣadr said, find the Jews with politics, “otherwise we cannot help.” Then Ṣadr menaced, “if this leads to the Communists and a part of them are Jews....or there is a Zionist underground discovered it’s the end of the chapter of Iraq’s Jews.”¹⁶⁷⁸

Israel’s Independence War

Terror of an ‘internal enemy,’ of Jews with politics, convinced Ṣadr’s government to isolate Iraq’s Jewish community in a crackdown. On May 14, 1948, at 10 p.m., radio announced the Yishuv declared a Jewish state in Palestine, the State of Israel.¹⁶⁷⁹ As Ṣadr dispatched 12,000 soldiers to conquer it, and neared Tel Aviv, the radio said, Ṣadr established martial law, banning demonstrations and revoking Jews’ firearms licenses to protect Iraq from its Jews.¹⁶⁸⁰ “The Iraqi Government was compelled to intervene militarily in Palestine to save the Arab inhabitants from Jewish terrorism, it found it necessary to proclaim martial law in Iraq for protecting the rear lines of its units,” the government said.¹⁶⁸¹ Yet martial law never halted incitement. *Istiqlāl*, part of Ṣadr’s own political coalition, urged destruction of Jewish neighborhoods.¹⁶⁸² Newspapers said “Jews created a danger to the security of the state.”¹⁶⁸³ Ṣadr enflamed prejudices in order to charge Jews with Communism. His government campaign in media and schools said Jews were

1677 “The New ‘Iraqi Cabinet,” CZA (Z4\33878)- 17-18

1678 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yehūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 270

1679 Report on Iraq, 3; Hillel, *Rūaḥ Qadīm*, 138

1680 Longrigg, 348; Hillel, *Rūaḥ Qadīm*, 139; Report on Iraq, 3; Shinā, 16; The memorandum of the Baghdad’s Jews congregation leader to the Government of Iraq. Transcribed by Norman Stillman. (p. 3); see also Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 239

1681 Government of Iraq (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to United States Embassy. November 18, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)-121

1682 *Treatment of Jews in Egypt and Iraq*, 21

1683 Shinā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 16

Communists who endangered Iraq, and Communists were ‘hired by Jewish elements to defend Israel.’¹⁶⁸⁴ Ṣadr used Law No. 51, which forbade Communism, to imprison Jews en masse with military courts he prison in anticipation for his invasion of Israel.¹⁶⁸⁵ Police jailed perhaps 400 on Communist charges: Khaḍḍūrī for refusing to issue a statement or office clerks for mocking Arab fighters.¹⁶⁸⁶ One student, Fuad Abraham, 17, was sentenced to two years for insulting the army.¹⁶⁸⁷ These charges were intended to target Jews, not actual Communists. Nissim Rejwan, who then lived in a duplex in Baghdad, and whose home was ransacked, recalled police ignored his *Communist Manifesto* or Communist periodicals, but seized books on Jewish history as ‘evidence.’¹⁶⁸⁸

Next martial law, Jewish assets were confiscated and employment of Jews terminated. The state had always, unofficially, assessed Jews at a higher tax rate, despite the Constitution forbade the *jizya*, a poll tax on non-Muslims.¹⁶⁸⁹ Now agitators said Jews restricted credit in “a definite policy” for “injuring Iraq’s economy.”¹⁶⁹⁰ Ṣadr appears to believe the lie. To retrieve this credit, he ‘reassessed’ Jewish income from 1943 onward, requiring arrears so high, firms collapsed, unable to pay.¹⁶⁹¹ Ṣadr leveled fines based on suspects’ assets, not the text of the law, to extract this wealth. Courts fined the well-off £10,000, (approximately \$600,000 in 2017), and two entrepreneurs £500,000.¹⁶⁹² These fines merged with taboos against Jews’ participation in politics, alleging the suspects were ‘Communists’ who intended to harm Iraq. On June 15, police

1684 Longrigg, 349; Khadduri, 218; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 149; Vitales, “Report on Iraq,” 7, 9

1685 Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949, JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p.2); Baghdad, Basra and Kirkuk, see Shinā, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyôn*: 134

1686 Secretary of Board of Deputies of British Jews, Notes of Position of Jews in Iraq. NA (FO 371/75128)- 43; Sir Henry Mack to Clement Attlee, M.P. (London) December 12, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 116

1687 Memorandum of the Situation of the Jews in Iraq. (CZA C2\535)- 61

1688 Nissim Rejwan, “The Last Days of Iraqi Jewry,” *Midstream*, January 1983, 41

1689 Mack to Attlee, December 12, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 117; The memorandum of the Baghdad’s Jews congregation leader to the Government of Iraq, 3; Constitution Art. 92, C.A. Hooper, *The Constitutional Law of Iraq*, (Gaunt, Inc.: Holmes Beach, 1998) 152

1690 Mack to Attlee, December 12, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 117

1691 Secretary of Board of Deputies of British Jews, “Notes of Position of Jews in Iraq,” NA (FO 371/75128)- 43

1692 Memorandum on the Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq submitted to Hon. Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, October 22, 1949, World Jewish Congress, (CZA C2\535)- 10-11; idem., NA (FO 371/75183)- 21

arrested ten importers for ‘Communism,’ and the Courts fined them £10,000.¹⁶⁹³ In July, police arrested forty businessmen for ‘Communism’ and ordered them to pay the same fine.¹⁶⁹⁴ About half of the suspects were released after paying fines, and for the next year, at any time, there were up to six hundred Jews in jail, waiting to pay.¹⁶⁹⁵

Anti-Jewish Regulations

Martial law permanently transformed Iraq into an anti-Semitic state, and made Jews a class of lesser citizens.¹⁶⁹⁶ *Qawmiyya*’s desire to make Jews disappear galvanized restrictions against Jews, which heretofore were *numerus clausus* in schools and bans on their immigration and publications. Before the Farhūd, authorities selectively enforced officially unbiased laws to favor Sunni Arabs – teachers gave lower marks to Jews in school, military examination boards assigned lower marks to Jews, and passport officials ignored Jewish applications.¹⁶⁹⁷ However, there was no juridical sanction for prejudice – discrimination was illegal. After the Farhūd, from 1941, Nūrī unofficially, surreptitiously, extended Rashīd ‘Ālī’s ban on Jews without citizenship, barring their entry into Iraq. Charities planned to rescue 4,600 Holocaust refugees, stranded in Tehran, Iran’s capital, or a refugee camp nearby, by transiting them through Iraq to settle in the Yishuv. Poland’s Government-in-Exile gave them Iraqi transit visas.¹⁶⁹⁸ Nūrī knew of the Holocaust, which he called “Jewish massacres.”¹⁶⁹⁹ However, he forbade the refugees’

1693 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yehūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 274; Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavū’ot 5701, Yūnī 1941*, 108

1694 Report on Iraq, 4

1695 “The Jews of Iraq: A prosperous, well-organized community,” CZA (Z4/33505)-23; Vitales, 13

1696 Report on Iraq, 2

1697 A practice imposed on all minorities, see Foreign Office, “Iraq: Political. Restlessness among Minorities,” Nov 1, 1943, FO (624/34/239)-7 (3); NA (CO 733/275/4), “Jewish Officials Re-instated. New Cabinet’s Encouraging Move,” *Jewish Chronicle*, Mar 23, 1935,- 12; F.H. Humphrys. (Baghdad) to Sir John Simon (London) Feb 28, 1935,- 15

1698 Harry Vitales, Report on Visit to Baghdad (Nov 2- Nov 9, 1942) and to Tehran (Nov 11- Dec 2, 1942) Dec 31, 1942. JDC (NY AR193344 4 34 712)- 486793 (p. 5-6); Henrietta K. Buchman (Committee on Poland & Eastern Europe) to Simon Mirelman (Buenos Aires) December 10, 1942. JDC (NY AR193344 3 10 2 422)-448911 (p. 1); Harry Vitales. Report on Visit to Baghdad (Nov 2- Nov 9, 1942) and to Tehran (Nov 11- Dec 2, 1942) Dec 31, 1942. JDC (NY AR193344 4 34 712)- 486793 (p. 15-16), for quote, see 15

1699 Al-Sa’īd (Baghdad) to Casey (Cairo). n.d., in al-Sa’īd, 7

transit.¹⁷⁰⁰ Nevertheless, there was no written prohibition, as Nūrī did not want an anti-*dhimmi* codes in writing. However, later, in 1944, Pāchachī made the ban official. When J. Leon Jona, an Australian UN employee, arrived in Basra, on a layover to Egypt, passport control inquired about his religion. Jona said he was Jewish, whereupon the officer said, “no Jews were to be given transit.”¹⁷⁰¹ Pāchachī’s government requested Britain cease granting Iraqi visas to Jews.¹⁷⁰² Iraq denied entry to a British parliamentary staffer, Hugh Cohen, who had a layover to Hong Kong on official British assignment. When one British national applied for a visa, the Consulate rejected her, “we never give visas to Jews.”¹⁷⁰³

In 1946, Pāchachī’s government expanded travel restrictions to Jewish citizens, through a series of administrative orders that avoided legislation. Jews who desired to exit the country were required to sign a formal promise, to avoid travel to Palestine, or forfeit 2,000 dinars. Muslims could enter Palestine without restrictions. One man, Dr. Samuel, tested the restriction. He paid the guarantee, traveled to Palestine, and returned. He was unpunished. Once Ṣadr became Prime Minister in January 1948, he wanted to sever Iraq’s Jews from the outside world, falsely believing they colluded with external foes. Ṣadr said citizens could not leave without an exit visa, and rarely rarely granted such visas to Jews, saying the rule’s intention was “no Jew may leave.”¹⁷⁰⁴

1700 Neither by land nor plane, see Eliyahu Epstein to Moshe Shertok, “Śiḥa im Sir K. Cornwallis, Tsīr Bṛīṭāniyah Be-Bagdād.” Nov 11, 1942 CZA (Z4\31216)- 63; Harry Vitales. Report on Visit to Baghdad (Nov 2- Nov 9, 1942) and to Tehran (Nov 11- Dec 2, 1942) Dec 31, 1942. JDC (NY AR193344 4 34 712)- 486793 (p. 14)

1701 NA (FO 371/45334), R.M.A.H. Minutes. March 27, 1945, - 6; Alfred Shiling to C.W.Baxter, Esq. Foreign Office (London). March 22, 1945,- 7; Thompson (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 2, 1945, -13; for quote, see Dr. J. Leon Jona of Melbourne state, - 8

1702 British Embassy (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London), April 30, 1949. NA (FO 371/75185)-6

1703 Walter Fletcher, M.P. to C.P. Mayhew, Esq., M.P. (Foreign Office) November 25, 1949. NA (FO 371/98769)- 25, see also NA (FO 371/75185)-21; for quote, see Doreen Dangoor-Khalastchy. Interview. London. Sephardi Voices. Shasha Collection. sephardivoices.com, accessed August 26, 2018. <https://sephardivoices.com/doreen-dangoor-khalastchy/>

1704 Report on Iraq, 5; Vitales, 13; for quote, see JCBR. Telegram 518. (Tel Aviv) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 21, 1949. NA (FO 624/165)-7; for quote, see Memorandum Concerning the Present Position of Jews in Moslem Countries. Feb 12, 1948. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/031) (p.2); Mallory Browne, “Jews in Grave Danger in All Moslem Lands” *New York Times*, May 16, 1948. CZA (C3\1420)-8

With martial law, for the first time, Ṣadr instituted a series of openly anti-Jewish laws, which have no name in historiography but for ease of reference, will be referred to as ‘the Ṣadr Laws,’ overriding constitutional prohibitions against discrimination, once part of the legislative façade Iraq treated Jews well.¹⁷⁰⁵

These laws derived from the fear in Ṣadr’s cabinet Jews were a threat, and so disallowed Jews to depart, assuming every Jew who left was a ‘Zionist’ who traveled abroad to attack Iraq from afar. In one parliament session, deputy ‘Abd al-Razzah Ḥamūd, said, “Iraqi Zionists escape to struggle in Palestine against the Iraqi army.”¹⁷⁰⁶ Ṣadr's ‘security measures’ hampered their flight. Only those with the Defense Minister's authorization could leave.¹⁷⁰⁷ The Home Office ceased to renew Jews’ passports, and pressured consulates to not issue Jews visas. So the majority could only leave via illicit means.¹⁷⁰⁸ To impede absconders and those unwilling to return, Ṣadr banned Jews from selling real estate, wiring money or Jewish banks from foreign transactions or currencies, and punished ‘illegal emigration’ with as much as seven years labor. Law limited Muslim sentences to six months.¹⁷⁰⁹

Martial law barred Jews from public institutions, making them a pariah caste segregated from Muslims in every major state establishment. The stereotypes that once considered Jews “suited for clerical work” – meek, European and knowledgeable of money – wherefore financial firms recruited them – now made Jews a danger.¹⁷¹⁰ Already after the United Nations voted to partition Palestine, Jabr forbade Jews from working in ‘sensitive’ positions, such as railroads and

1705 Elkabir, *My Governmental*, 190-191; For example, article six, said “There shall be no differentiation in the rights of Iraqis;” or article 18, “Iraqi nationals are equal,” see C.A. Hooper, *The Constitutional Law of Iraq*, (Gaunt, Inc.: Holmes Beach, 1998) 41; 59

1706 JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990, April 26, 1949, see Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949. The American Jewish Committee (Paris) 6; for quote, see Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949. The American Jewish Committee (Paris) 7

1707 Jung to Maxwell, February 7, 1952, NA (FO 371/98767)- 139

1708 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 150; Vitales, 13

1709 Bernstein, to McNeil, NA (FO 371/75183)- 63-64, 87; Report on Iraq, 3; Memorandum on the Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, (CZA C2\535)- 13; see also JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990, Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949. The American Jewish Committee (Paris) 6; Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Ōlām Ha-Mūsēlēmī (Joint Distribution Committee, 1949) 3

1710 US Embassy in Baghdad to Secretary of State, March 8, 1949. NA (FO 371/75128)- 72

Basra's port.¹⁷¹¹ Ṣadr's government broadened these restrictions to other branches of government – hospitals and schools. First, Ṣadr purged Jews from various branches of government. He cited a regulation to terminate staff for disloyalty, to dismiss Jews from the post office, lest they leak information. He dismissed 350 railway employees, whereafter police arrested the workers for “interest in Zionism.” Ṣadr ceased to appoint Jews to juries, the Foreign Ministry, police academy, and, quietly, stopped enlisting Jews into the military, deploying them to labor battalions, where they toiled but never trained, or reassigned Jewish soldiers to non-combat positions, where they were disarmed.¹⁷¹² Public schools ceased to admit Jews. Previously, fifty Jews entered the University of Baghdad annually. However, in 1948, zero entered. Previously, five Jews received state scholarships to study abroad. In 1948, zero were awarded. Public Hospitals ceased to admit Jewish patients or hire Jewish doctors, or grant them license to practice.¹⁷¹³ Jews and Muslims became separate and unequal legal classes, with Jews as the inferior citizen.

Outlawing of Zionism

On June 26, 1948, Pāchachī's brother, Muzāḥim, became Prime Minister and criminalized Zionism, exacerbating the pariah status of Jews. On July 12, in parliament, Ḥussein Jamāl, a deputy, recommended the government confiscate Jewish property, to put Jews in camps, and purge Iraq of Jews. Istiqlāl endorsed the suggestion.¹⁷¹⁴ “Many Iraqi Jews were disdain

1711 Y. “Mētōk Tazkīrīm ū-Miktāvīm: ‘Īrāq,” June 1948, in Yalqūt Mizrāḥ Ha-Tīkōn. Vol. 1 March 1949 JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2648047. (p. 26)

1712 The Supplementary Civil Service Law, see Jung to Maxwell, February 7, 1952. NA (FO 371/98767)- 138-139; Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 278; US Embassy in Baghdad to Secretary of State, March 8, 1949. NA (FO 371/75128)- 72; “Notes of Position of Jews in Iraq,” NA (FO 371/75128)- 43; see also M.T. Walker to A.G.Brotman. Secretary (BOD) April 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 39; Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tôledôt ha-Maḥteret*, 16; for quote, see Mack to Attlee, December 12, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 116; Baghdad's Jews' congregation leader to Government, 3

1713 Memorandum on the Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, October 22, 1949, (CZA C2\535)- 15; Baghdad's Jews' congregation leader to Government, 2; Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949. The American Jewish Committee (Paris) JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p. 5); “Notes of Position of Jews in Iraq,” NA (FO 371/75128)- 43; JCBR to Foreign Office, Oct 21, 1949. NA (FO 624/165)- 12

1714 *Treatment of Jews in Egypt and Iraq*, 21

Iraqi citizenship by fleeing,” said another deputy, ‘Alī Kamāl, “Jewish youth have Zionist ‘inclinations.’”¹⁷¹⁵ As part of the program to enact this purge, two days later, on July 14, the Defense Minister, Istiqlāl’s Šādiq al-Baššām, and Muzāḥim added Zionism to the Criminal code’s ban of ‘nefarious’ ideologies, which imposed up to fifteen-year sentences or death for expressing approval of Zionism or belonging to a ‘Zionist’ organization. However, there was no definition or agreement regarding what Zionism was; no single Zionist party. Self-identified Zionists not infrequently disagreed what Zionism was. So Zionism was whatever the authorities said it was, which was anything Jewish, when adoration of *Eretz Yisrael*, the Land of Israel, was common in prayers and the *Magen David*, Star of David, a symbol of Jewish faith and on Israel’s flag, was emblazoned on ritual objects. Police search homes for ‘evidence’ of Hebrew texts, or a Star of David on a tallis, a Jewish prayer shawl. Courts sentenced ten persons to three years in prison for dancing the hora, a Jewish folk dance, alleging the activity was ‘Zionism.’ Ezra el Saigh, 55, was sentenced to three years’ hard labor for discussing Israel with his son.¹⁷¹⁶ Every criminal sentence, published in the press, kept the issue of Zionism burning in the public conscience, communicating to audiences — Jews are enemies. On July 20, 1948, at a Senate session, the acting Prime Minister, Jalāl Bābān, challenged Ezra Daniel, the only Jewish Senator, “furnish us with information which will save the Kingdom from Zionist activities,” Bābān said, “The Zionists are the enemies of this country.”¹⁷¹⁷

The most infamous case was Shafīq ‘Ades, a partner of ‘Ades & Co, a financial firm.¹⁷¹⁸ ‘Ades was targeted because he was visibly wealthy, owning a villa in Basra when attractive

1715 Baghdad Press Summary. June 27- July 17, 1948. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688698 (p. 2)

1716 Memorandum on the Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, October 22, 1949, (CZA C2\535)- 6, 62; Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949, JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p.2); Jung to Maxwell, February 7, 1952. NA (FO 371/98767)- 139-140; JCBR to Foreign Office, Oct 21, 1949. NA (FO 624/165)-7; Hillel, *Rūaḥ Qadīm*, 140; Shinā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 16

1717 Iraq Times, July 20, 1948. Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p.2)

1718 Vitales, 9

Jewish homes were vilified, and his company, ‘Ades & Co, was one of Basra’s largest agencies.¹⁷¹⁹ *Al-Yaqza* said the villa was a palace intended “to be the future Consulate of the imaginary State of Israel” and the villa’s “sketches” were “made in Tel-Aviv.”¹⁷²⁰

Notwithstanding ‘Ades owned a minority 15% stake in the company, and his partners were Muslims, ‘Ades’ partner position, his affluence and influence, chafed *dhimmi* norms, when, amid Iraq’s wealth disparity, 2% of the population owned 80% of the assets, and, due to war, the cost-of-living rose and food shortages wracked markets.¹⁷²¹ *Istiqlāl* denounced ‘Ades as a Communist and a Zionist. The Presidents of Basra’s Court and military tribunals campaigned to indict him, perhaps with Baṣṣām’s encouragement. ‘Ades & Co bought British military surplus to resell as scrap, and law enforcement charged ‘Ades, and only ‘Ades – not his partners – that he used the transactions to arm Israel and promote Zionism. ‘Ades’ arrest illustrates the criminalization of Zionism was a campaign against Jews, not Zionism. His brother, Ibrahim, also a partner, publicly expressed interest in Israel, and visited the Yishuv, where his daughter lived. Ibrahim was never charged nor arrested. ‘Ades had no connections to Israel except his relation to Ibrahim, and had no history of interest. Yet ‘Ades was famous for his wealth, and Ibrahim was not.¹⁷²²

After the arrest, a government employee leaked that Baṣṣām prepared a list of Jews, not Zionists, to detain. More would follow. Salman Shina, a deputy in parliament, was next. Thereafter, newspapers vituperated Shina, quoting old issues of *al-Miṣbāḥ*, the irregular paper he published years before, castigating: Shina praised Jerusalem’s Hebrew University, Shina told readers, “learn the sayings of Zion.” Journalists pressured Muzāḥim to arrest Shina. Zionism had

1719 Šinah, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyôn*, 131; Vitales, 9; “Iraq Jew Accused of Aiding Israeli War Effort Hanged Despite Plea from U.S. Minister,” *Jewish Telegraph Agency* (New York), Daily News Bulletin, Sept 24, 1948 (Vol. XV, No. 221) 7

1720 El-Yaqdha, No. 422. The Following is the description of the execution of Adas [sic], publishers by the daily paper “El-Yaqdha” Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p. 11)

1721 Vitales, “Report on Iraq,” 8, 10

1722 Hillel, *Rūaḥ Qadīm*, 140; Mack to Attlee, December 12, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 116; Report on Iraq, 6; Baghdad Press Summary. Sept 8- Sept 18, 1948. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688698 (p.3); Vitales, 9-10

joined Communism to replace England as the ‘external enemy’ to which Jews, the ‘internal enemy’ were said to aid and abet.

‘Ades’ trial was an engine for anti-Semitism, eroding the respect for *dhimmī* norms of protection, and encouraged ethnic cleansing. He was arrested with media sensation in August. News coverage spread images of the maleficence of Jews with power, and the necessity to remove them. Throughout August and September, newspapers favored a “purge of all Jews from the government.” and stated “Arab Governments must also expel from their countries Jewish agents.” The trials reaffirmed the confiscations, boycotts and imprisonments, were not persecutions, but appropriate punishments, which should include death. The press beseeched to use these measures to expand the war to Jews in Arab countries. “Jews in the Arab countries must bear all the costs of what was stolen by the Tel-Aviv Jews,” *al-Nidā’* said. “The decisive battle against the Jews is not confined to the battlefields,” said *Şawṭ al-Sha‘ab* a day before ‘Ades’ trial, on September 10. The economic field is the “most important;” with “The maintenance of a blockade of Jewish trade, because the most important weapons in the hands of the Jews is their money.”¹⁷²³ On September 11, 1948, Shabbat, the first day of ‘Ades’ trial, a crowd gathered at the military court, discussing his punishment, saying, “hanging would be the least.”

The trial charged ‘Ades with the false myth Jews were an internal enemy that aided external foes to destroy Iraq’s Arab character. In court, the Attorney read the indictment: ‘Ades “encouraged illegal demonstrations which preached anarchy,” “Zionism,” and “Partition,” and

1723 *Shīnā, Me-Bavel Lē-Şiyôn*, 138-139, 141-142, for quote, “learn the sayings of Zion,” see 142; for second and third quote, see Baghdad Press Summary. Aug 8- Sept 7, 1948. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688698 (p.2); *Al-Sijil* said “His hanging will be a good lesson for all traitors;” *ibid.*, 3; for third quote, see Iraq Times, Sept 10, 1948. Iraqi Press Roundup. Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688697 (p.3); for fourth quote, see Iraq Times, Sept 10, 1948. Iraqi Press Roundup. Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p.2)

“condemned Arab nationalism. These demonstrations were financed by him,” and “the accused used to send all kinds of arms and ammunition to the Zionist murderers, the enemies of Iraq.”¹⁷²⁴

The proceedings were a show trial to reaffirm *Qawmiyya* and the necessity of anti-Semitic laws. The prosecution called twenty-four witnesses, each testifying, ‘Ades bought rifles. On September 13, ‘Ades’ lawyers, motioned to call witnesses, but one judge, ‘Abdallah Nasani, an Istiqlāl member once arrested for Nazism, denied the motion as *de minimis non curat lex*, a waste of time. ‘Ades’ attorneys either resigned in protest, and ‘Ades refused to speak. Or in an alternate account, ‘Ades’ attorneys were blocked from the chamber. With lawyers absent, the judges sentenced ‘Ades to death and fined him five million dinars – the equivalent of \$20 million – and sequestered his property. Four hundred spectators cheered.¹⁷²⁵

The sentence was a catharsis to scapegoat Iraq's defeats in war against the Jewish state. Muzāḥim declared the execution a holiday. In Basra, it was a public celebration. The morning prior, September 22, throngs coursed into the square, burgeoning to 15,000. Radio dedicated minute-by-minute coverage. According to *al-Yaqza*, which detailed the execution of “the Zionist dirty criminal,” crowds waited “near the palace which belongs to the criminal.” Baghdad Radio said the same. “The whole city of Basra were up eagerly awaiting the hour of execution,” said *al-Yaqza*, “People from all the provinces in the vicinity came.” On September 23, at 4:35 am, a prison vehicle, brought ‘Ades to the square, to his own courtyard, to show that Iraq is Arab and Jews defeated. ‘Ades exited the car, in chains, under the supervision of the Execution committee: two judges who sentenced him; a doctor; and the Chief of Basra prisons. Then they escorted ‘Ades to the gallows erected before his house. The crowds screamed, “death to the Jews.” At

1724 “The Trial of Adas,” Al-Š’ab, translation of a Report which appeared in the daily paper “El-Shaab in its 1152nd Number. Murasaurat al-Gib. Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p. 10)

1725 Ibid.; Memorandum of the Situation of the Jews in Iraq. NA (FO 371/75183) - 62, 87; Shinā, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyôn*, 137-138; Gat, *The Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 38; Vitales, 10, 13; Hillel, *Rūah Kadīm*, 141; Baghdad Press Summary. Sept 8- Sept 18, 1948. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688698 (p.3-4); Report on Iraq, 6

4:40 am, the rope was affixed about his neck. “The execution was made and his dirty body
hanged in the air amidst victorious cheers of the crowd-

“Long live the Arab people”
“Long Live His Majesty the King”
“Long Live Justice”
“Long live the ‘Iraqi Army”
Then orchestra played songs, as crowds sang and danced.

At 5:00 am, the doctor, examining the body to certify, ‘Ades’ “devilish soul had parted
his defiled body. This is the end of all those who betray their country,” whereupon the doctor
spat in the corpse’s face. Then the body hung for two hours, as attendees snapped pictures, or
spat on the corpse.¹⁷²⁶

Yet Muzāḥim was angry at the hanging’s spectacle: Iraq persecuted Jews.¹⁷²⁷ Press
circulated photos.¹⁷²⁸ International media reported it. America’s ambassador requested
clemency.¹⁷²⁹ Muzāḥim forced Baṣṣām to resign on September 27, 1948, and the day after in the
Senate, Muzāḥim denounced him. “If Bassam [sic] thinks martial law was proclaimed to
tyrannize and combat Jews, we disagree...we say proudly that we oppose him.”¹⁷³⁰ Muzāḥim
said. “This government declares it was never against the Jews....The existing law and the Islamic
Shariah grant Jews of Iraq rights like other citizens.”¹⁷³¹

Muzāḥim’s denunciation was intended to convey that Iraq did not persecute *dhimmīs*, but
Muzāḥim’s speech itself was also a spectacle, for though he reduced the punishment for Zionism
and removed the death penalty, martial law continued, as did arbitrary arrests. On December 30,
a judge sentenced Shaua Bekhar to a year of hard labor, because he “quarreled with the witness,

1726 Shinā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 17; Idem., *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyōn*, 143; Vitales, 2, 9; for first and third quotes, El-Yaqdha, No. 422. Description of the execution of Adas [sic], publishers by the daily paper “El-Yaqdha” Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p. 11); for second quote, see Hillel, *Rūaḥ Kadīm*, 141; Situation of the Jews in Iraq. NA (FO 371/75183) - 62
1727 Twena, *Me’ore’ōt Haq ha-Shavū’ōt*, 109
1728 Notes on Position of Jews in Irak [sic], January 10, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 6
1729 Twena, *Me’ore’ōt Haq ha-Shavū’ōt*, 109
1730 Embassy (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington DC) March 8, 1949. Airgram. NA (FO 371/75182)- 71
1731 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Īrāq*, 278-279

Mr. Thomas, when the latter insulted the Zionists.” Courts fined defendants “for propagating false news,” or receiving letters from Jewish Israelis.¹⁷³² Trials against successful Jews continued with less publicity. Authorities arrested eight in Basra as ‘Ades collaborators, including Solomon Zilkha, owner of Zilkha Bank, “for helping the Zionists;” Stanley Shashua for “creating obstacles in the economic prosperity of the Country;” Salem Shamoun, “for disorganizing the economic life of the country.”¹⁷³³ Reuben Baṭṭāt, a former Vice-President of Basra courts, who helped draft the Constitution, was sentenced to three years for a 1922 ruling that deceased can bequeath assets to Yishuv charities.¹⁷³⁴ Khāḍḍūrī was arrested for “inciting the Jews.”¹⁷³⁵ By October 31, 1948, five weeks after Muzāḥim denounced Baṣṣām, there were \$80 million dollars worth of fines against Jews, and their property seized, accounts frozen, and businesses sealed.¹⁷³⁶

Acting on stereotypes that said Jews were hostile and associated with finance, Muzāḥim removed Jews from the economy. Publicly, he encouraged Jewish businesses to resume and to rehire civil servants, but belying his speeches, he shuttered Jewish businesses and fired Jews en masse. Muzāḥim’s government dismissed 95% of Jewish officials, perhaps 796 employees, “to safeguard the secrets of the State.”¹⁷³⁷ Previous cabinets considered Jews a security risk and never employed them in Defense and Foreign Affairs, except as accountants.¹⁷³⁸ Muzāḥim enlarged the taboo to the state as a whole. His government told companies, “it looks [with]

1732 for quote, see Report on Iraq, 7; He reduced the maximum sentence to three years, see Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavut*, 109

1733 for second quote, see “After the Discovery of the Subversive Activities of Iraqi Jewry” *El Sabah* (Egypt) Oct 21, 1948. No. 1152. Report on Visit to Iraq. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p.13); for first quote, see A Letter From Iraq in Treating the Trouble Makers Jews. Nov 30, 1948. Muraṣurat al-Gib, idem.

1734 Mack to Attlee, December 12, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 116; Kazzaz, *Ha-Yehudim Bē-’Irāq*, 285; Darwish, 105; See also, al-Drūbī, 243; JCBR, Marginalia, to Foreign Office, Oct 21, 1949. NA (FO 624/165)- 12

1735 “Subversive Activities of Iraqi Jewry,” JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p.13); see also “Iraq in Treating the Trouble Makers Jews,” JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697

1736 Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, October 22, 1949, (CZA C2\535)- 12; see also NA (FO 371/75183)- 64

1737 Report on Iraq, 7; Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, October 22, 1949, (CZA C2\535)- 12; see also Bernstein to McNeil, NA (FO 371/75183)- 63, 87; for quote, see “Subversive Activities of Iraqi Jewry,” JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p.13)

1738 Report on Iraq, 4

disfavor upon their reemployment,” and firms, either by coincidence, agreement, or anxiety, dropped Jewish agencies.¹⁷³⁹

In parallel, Muzāḥim ceased to grant Jews’ import licenses, because “Iraqi Zionists are disrupting the finance of the country.”¹⁷⁴⁰ Jews were already excluded from the export industry, where Muslims prevailed, and instead concentrated in imports, because others were tepid to enter a market that required intensive long-term investments.¹⁷⁴¹ Muzāḥim license denials halved the Jewish market share and restricted supplies to other Jewish companies.¹⁷⁴² Wholesalers, retailers, and stores were unable to receive merchandise. Business shifted to Muslims.¹⁷⁴³

Expanding the War

Iraq’s invaded in Israel’s Independence War to ‘destroy’ Jewish statehood. The failure to do so infuriated militarists, who wanted to expand the war to target Iraq’s Jews.¹⁷⁴⁴ Muzāḥim claimed Iraq was winning to satisfy the irate politicians and public that wanted victory, but he also wanted to end the conflict.¹⁷⁴⁵ The war bankrupted the country.¹⁷⁴⁶ 40% of state revenue went to the army.¹⁷⁴⁷ The treasury emptied.¹⁷⁴⁸ The deficit rose seven-fold, to half the government’s income.¹⁷⁴⁹ Iraq was forced to import food.¹⁷⁵⁰ Bread prices quintupled, sparking

1739 for quote, see Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, October 22, 1949, (CZA C2\535) - 12; see also Bernstein to McNeil, NA (FO 371/75183)- 63; 87; Vitales, 12

1740 NA (FO 371/75183), Mack to Attlee, December 12, 1949,- 117; Bernstein to McNeil,- 63; see also CZA (C2\535)- 13; Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949. JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p. 5); Elkabir, *My Ideological Life*, 50; Report on Iraq, 3; for quote, see “Subversive Activities of Iraqi Jewry,” JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p.12)

1741 Embassy (Baghdad) to Secretary of State, March 8, 1949, NA (FO 371/75182)- 71-72

1742 Situation of the Jews in Iraq, Nov 3, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)-87; Baghdad’s Jews congregation leader to the Government of Iraq, 2

1743 Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949. JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p. 5)

1744 Vitales, 16

1745 “Cairo Gives Attack Details,” *New York Times* (New York) January 5, 1949, 15; *Iraq Times*, Oct 1, 1948. Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit.

JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p. 4)

1746 *Iraq Times*, Nov 4, 1948. Iraqi Press Roundup. Report on Visit to Iraq. Exhibit. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697

1747 Longrigg, *Iraq*, 351

1748 Jen Kimche “Iraq Wants to Hock Oil for Quick \$” *The Daily American* (Newsletter) Dec 2, 1948. JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688699;

The decline reduced the state budget by half, see Gat, *The Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 32

1749 Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 32

1750 *Iraq Times*, Nov 4, 1948, Report on Visit to Iraq, JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697

riots, and oil and railway strikes.¹⁷⁵¹ Muzāḥim told Parliament that hostilities could not continue. He was booed. Students protested to fight on in Israel. “The Iraqi nation is many times greater than the Jewish bandits,” *al-Nidā’* chided Muzāḥim. “The Jews have no supply base near them. They have to obtain their supplies by fraud and theft. They lost most of their European bases during the war and they can only rely on their American supply bases,” in which ‘European bases’ is a euphemism for the former Jewish communities in Europe murdered in the Holocaust.¹⁷⁵²

Demonstrators demanded full-scale war, and an official promise to continue the fight. Muzāḥim said the promise was forthcoming, but never announced it.¹⁷⁵³ On January 5, 1949, as the UN pressed for a ceasefire, Israel invaded the Egyptian-occupied Negev, awarded to Israel in the Partition. Amid the clashes, Muzāḥim ordered Iraq’s commander, Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd, to “resume the fighting.” Maḥmūd balked. Only ‘Abd al-Ilah could initiate hostilities. Muzāḥim threatened, engage or he would resign.¹⁷⁵⁴ A day later, Muzāḥim quit.

Muzāḥim had built on preexisting Ṣadr Laws to isolate Jews and coalesce Iraq into a segregated state. Nūrī became Prime Minister and would reinforce Muzāḥim’s work. Politicians pressed Nūrī to “extend the anti-jewish measures,” and “renew the war.” Press spoke of resumption of full war.¹⁷⁵⁵ Nūrī presented his program to parliament: “Struggle against Communism,” he said, “struggle against Zionism in particular.”

Baṣṣām, now a deputy, rose to address the Parliament:

Zionism and Communism are the same thing, Now that the Jews have their State, we have to struggle against the Zionist fifth column in Iraq and in particular against those people who have economic contacts with the Zionists in Palestine. We have to remove them from the political and administration fields.

1751 “Iraq Economic Tangle has Shocked City: Notes Withdrawn as Prices Soar,” *The Daily Mail* (England) December 27, 1948, JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)-688700; Longrigg, 352

1752 for quotes, see *Iraq Times*, Oct 1, 1948, JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697 (p. 4); Longrigg, 352

1753 Sam Pope Brewer, “Iraq Cabinet Shift Widens Arab Rift” *New York Times* (New York) January 8, 1949, 5

1754 Dana Adams Schmidt, “New Negev Attack Reported by Cairo,” *New York Times* (New York) Jan 5, 1949, 15

1755 “Iraqi Premier Out, Successor Named,” *New York Times* (New York) January 7, 1949, 15; Vitales, 15; Brewer, “Iraq Cabinet Shift,” 5

Pundits in the press repeated the accusation. “Those condemned for adherence to Communism are Jews,” who “help Zionists flee,” said *al-Yaqza* on February 18, 1949, “The Government must therefore combat Zionism which has given birth to Communism.”¹⁷⁵⁶

In February, Nūrī told the public, ‘Arabs’ were losing the war.¹⁷⁵⁷ Jews – aliens, pariahs who were scorned as docile and fragile and powerless, a subject minority – were defeating Arabs, subverting the old order. The public was shocked.¹⁷⁵⁸ When opposition to equality had motivated anti-Semitism, and authority predicated on *Qawmiyya* and a hierarchy of faith, a Jewish state was an outrage. In revenge, malcontents assaulted Jews across the region. There were pogroms in Syria, Libya and Yemen.¹⁷⁵⁹ Albeit in Iraq – where firebrands were satisfied that Nūrī attacked Jews – there was no bloodshed. The Interior Minister, ‘Umar Niẓāmī, told one deputy, arrests were to placate those who wanted Jews expelled.¹⁷⁶⁰ From February, over two months, Nūrī tried at least 137 Jews for Zionism: joining ‘ranks of the enemy,’ “the enemy’s army” “shown sympathy to the Zionists,” “propagation of Zionism;” “for being Communists and Zionists;” or “dangerous to the security of the State.”¹⁷⁶¹ In the most notorious case, judges sentenced Ṣalāḥ Ephraim, 60, a village leader, to seven years of hard labor for receiving a letter from his son in Israel prior to May 15. Ephraim died in prison; a warden beat him during morning exercises, but Ephraim failed to rise, so the warden beat him more, until Ephraim, unable to stand, was lashed to a pipe, bleeding in the sun without water. He expired at dusk.¹⁷⁶²

1756 Second Report of Iraq: January–April 1949. The American Jewish Committee (Paris) JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p. 3-4)
1757 Ibid.

1758 Lewis, *Semites and anti-Semites*, 239

1759 Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Ōlām Ha-Mūšēlēmī, JDC (JER 44-52 2 3 JER.307) (p.7)

1760 Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 62

1761 for quotes, see Appendix. Excerpts from Iraqi Newspapers. Second Report of Iraq, JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p. 1, 3, 5-6); NA (FO 371/98767)-140; Situation of the Jews in Iraq, Nov 3, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183), Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, October 22, 1949, CZA (C2\535)- 10; NA (FO 371/75182)-26/31

1762 (CZA C2\535), Situation of the Jews in Iraq.- 61; Treatment of the Jewish Population in Iraq, October 22, 1949,- 9; BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/026/1), E. Yapou, Press Attache, Legation of Israel, Tel Aviv, Oct 25, 1949. General conditions for Jews; NA (FO 371/75183)- 33, Israeli Embassy to Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge of Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanon Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, October 18, 1949

Daily, radio and newspapers listed Jews convicted of treason, conveying to every listener: Jews are being punished – but also, that Jews are traitors, so they should be punished, and their numbers are many. Convictions were a method to ‘expand the war’ and compensate for losses. In February, when Israel’s parliament convened and a President announced, Iraq’s tribunals sentenced eleven to death in absentia, within a three-day period, for joining “Zionist gangs.” On March 10, 1949, Israel conquered the Negev, the southern half of the Mandate. In response, tribunals sentenced twenty-three to death in absentia in a spate from March 11-21. On March 13, the day before Purim, a Jewish holiday celebrating victory over Jews’ oppressors, Baghdad radio announced the death sentence of seven ‘Zionists.’ On March 19, Shabbat, the Jewish day of rest, Baghdad Radio announced, eight were sentenced to death in absentia.¹⁷⁶³

Part of Nūrī’s plan to widen the war was ethnic cleansing. He threatened “to expel the Jews.” He told British counterparts that ethnocide would ‘harm’ Israel. “He regards this as a measure of subsequent retaliation,” Britain’s Ambassador Henry Mack said.¹⁷⁶⁴ When Nūrī first threatened to eject Jews is unclear, but earlier, on August 8, 1948, Nūrī suggested a population exchange to third parties, including the UN.¹⁷⁶⁵ Now, Nūrī intended to rectify war losses: liquidate Iraq’s Jewish community, and offered Israel a population exchange, Iraq’s Jews for Israel’s Arabs. Israel refused and denounced Nūrī. On February 7, 1949, America’s State Department fretted Nūrī would oust Iraq’s Jews. “A few extreme nationalists have from time to time put forward the idea that Iraq should get rid of all its Jews,” the Embassy said. “The Iraqis’ fear that Israel may attempt by aggressive action to expand its present boundaries. If this occurs,

1763 JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990, for quote, see Appendix, Excerpts from Iraqi Newspapers, 1-2, 10; Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949, 3; NA (FO 371/75182) Leonard Stein to Foreign Office, March 16, 1949,- 21; see also,- 64; Sir O. Franks (Washington D.C.) to Foreign Office (London) March 19, 1949, - 50; Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) March 19, 1949, - 27
1764 NA (FO 371/75182), Sir H. Dow (Jerusalem) to Foreign Office (London) Feb 14, 1949, -12; Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) February 24, 1949,- 19

1765 Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 46-47, 49

Iraqi attitude toward the Jewish community and their treatment of Jews would change severely for the worse.”¹⁷⁶⁶

Nūrī already said he believed Jews wanted to conquer the Middle East, while expulsion and confiscation was exhorted in press, parliament and protests in the street. On February 21, in a parliamentary session, the deputy ‘Alī Kamāl said, “the Jews had dominated the economic life of the country,” and regard “themselves as foreigners.” Then, Kamāl told the chamber, Jews should “be good citizens” or “they should go.”¹⁷⁶⁷ Demonstrators denounced Nūrī for protecting Jews, carrying signs “Death to the client government of Nūrī al-Sa’īd;” “Death to the Jews;” “No Borders. No Jews;” “We want to kill the Jewish Insects.”¹⁷⁶⁸

October Crackdown

The second wave of persecutions began in September, with the Jewish holiday season.¹⁷⁶⁹ At that time, 450 were in jail, and 150 awaited trial on charges of Zionism or Communism.¹⁷⁷⁰ In the next six weeks, Nūrī imprisoned 700 to 1,000 more.¹⁷⁷¹ Police, believing the false myth of the “internal enemy,” said Irgun, a Jewish militant organization dedicated to overthrowing British rule in Palestine, and international Communism colluded to harm Iraq. Nūrī launched a crackdown to break the conspiracy.¹⁷⁷² On October 2, 1949, the eve of Yom Kippur, the highest holiday in Judaism, police conducted countrywide arrests. In ‘Amara, south of Baghdad, law enforcement raided a synagogue while worshippers prayed, arresting ten and dragging them

1766 NA (FO 371/75182), “Persecution of Iraqi Jews: Preliminary to Renewed War with Israel?” October 28, 1949, *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, -144; for quotes, see Embassy (Baghdad) to Secretary of State (Washington DC) March 8, 1949, - 71

1767 Second Report of Iraq: January-April 1949, JDC (44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647990 (p. 5)

1768 Darwish, 102

1769 Cohen, *The Jews of the Middle East*, 34

1770 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yehūdīm Bē- ‘Irāq*, 278

1771 Ibid., 280; “Iraq ‘Endangered Peace’” October 28, 1949 *The Jewish Chronicle*. NA (FO 371/75182)- 154

1772 D.L. Haldane Porter (M.I.5) to A.M. Williams (Foreign Office), “Security Service Report from the Middle East on the Zionist Pamphlet which was recently discovered by the Iraqi Police,” December 14, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)-111

through the streets, beating and abusing them as they went. In Basra, police raided schools, arresting faculty and students. In Khaninqin, police arrested the community's president, torturing him to death. In Baghdad, police cordoned Jewish neighborhoods, ransacking homes for 'evidence' of the Irgun-Communist plot. Inside headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department, a witness heard "screams;" saw scores of detainees with "signs of grave ill-treatment," and "truckloads of prisoners passed through the *Suq*," an Arabic term for an open market.¹⁷⁷³ Nūrī sent eighty "to a concentration camp," said Mack.¹⁷⁷⁴

Amidst the dragnet, police apprehended Sa'īd Khalaşajī, a former member of *Ha-Ḥalūş*, a scouting club dedicated to Zionism.¹⁷⁷⁵ Khalaşajī's confession led police to arrest five more high school students, and under torture, two confessed to "being members of a study group engaged in spreading Zionist doctrines."¹⁷⁷⁶ They divulged more names. One detainee, Ishāq Shamash, said he taught Hebrew and the "Jewish nationalist spirit." The group taught the Jewish history in King Solomon's era. He encouraged emigration to Israel. The confessions led to more mass arrests on the night of October 11-12, the Jewish holiday of Sukkot.¹⁷⁷⁷ Police raided houses accompanied with soldiers, arresting perhaps nineteen or as many as eighty.¹⁷⁷⁸ Among the Hebrew literature lawmen seized was a pamphlet, "the Campaigners' Movement in Jerusalem – Methods of Action," printed in Tel Aviv, which encouraged immigration to Israel.¹⁷⁷⁹ Authorities said the pamphlet "indicated the existence of an organized Zionist

1773 NA (FO 371/75183), Bernstein to McNeil,- 64-65, for first quote, see 64; Porter (M.I.5) to Williams, December 14, 1949,- 111; for other quotes, see NA (FO 371/75182), "Jewish Quarters Cordoned Off During Night Raids: Community Council and Jewish Members of Parliament Powerless." *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*. Bulletin No. 247. October 27, 1949, - 138; "Iraq 'Endangered Peace'" October 28, 1949 *The Jewish Chronicle*,- 154

1774 Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 21, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 99

1775 Cohen, *Jews of the Middle East*, 34; Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tôledôt ha-Maḥteret*, 20

1776 Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 51; Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tôledôt ha-Maḥteret*, 20; Porter (M.I.5) to Williams, December 15, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 114; for quote, see Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 21, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 99

1777 Porter (M.I.5) to Williams, December 15, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 111; 114

1778 NA (FO 371/75182), Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 21, 1949,- 99; Oct 25, 1949, -110; Israel Official Announcement on Jewish Persecution in Iraq. BBC. Oct 23, 1949. 7:55 pm,- 104; NA (FO 371/75183)-116; Appendix 'A.' Jews Arrested in Baghdad on 11/12th October 1949,

1779 Mack to Foreign Office, Oct 25, 1949, NA (FO 371/75182)- 110; for quote, see Documents Recovered from Jewish Arrest. NA (FO 371/75183)-117; Documents Recovered from Jews Arrested. NA (E13757/1571/93, No. 369/50/49)

movement in Iraq.”¹⁷⁸⁰ Detainees surrendered more names with each successive interrogation and torture, leading to more arrests and farfetched charges.¹⁷⁸¹ Menashi Khadduri, a former member of the Union of Fighting Zionism, was accused of publishing a manifesto on Palestine; Ephraim Ishāq was charged for harboring a Holocaust refugee. Yūsuf Heskell was arrested for speaking of Jewish history, the Torah, and return to Zion. One suspect, Fraja Ezra, confessed, “At each synagogue there are now scores of emblems of the Israeli State. I, as well as all the Jews in the world sanctify the State of Israel.”¹⁷⁸²

Police determined the society’s name was Tenuah, and discovered cells in four cities: Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ramadi and Basra. Tenuah distributed pamphlets smuggled from Israel, that were written by an Iraqi emigrant that resided there. Members studied the pamphlets and discussed them. Nevertheless, neither police nor Britain’s MI5 could link Tenuah to Israel’s government; or to a plot. “There is very little indeed to suggest that the Society is or has been connected with Communism,” said an agent for MI5, Britain’s intelligence agency. “Police have apparently been unable to establish any connection between the ‘Tannua’ [sic] in Iraq and the Communists or the Irgun.”¹⁷⁸³

The Leadership Unravels

The crackdown hobbled the Community. Their leadership depended on lobbying the government for protection. Yet, the role of protecting *dhimmī*, which once had powerful attraction in Iraq, ceased to interest Nūrī. He refused to see Khaḍḍūrī, and refused to meet with

1780 A.M. Williams, “Alleged Persecution of the Jews of Iraq,” October 28, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 35

1781 Appendix C. Secret. Jews Arrested in Baghdad Following the Interrogation of those First Arrested. NA (FO 371/75183)-118; A.M. Williams, “Alleged Persecution of the Jews of Iraq,” October 28, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 35; “Alleged Persecution of Iraqi Jews,” Foreign Office (London) to (Bahrain) October 28, 1949. IOR (R/15/5/169)- 3

1782 NA (FO 371/75183), Secret. Appendix E. Personality Notes, -119; Jewish Activities in Iraq. Appendix E. Personality Notes. Dec 15, 1949. E 15052G, -111; for quote, see Statement by Fraja Ezra. Appendix F. Jewish Activities in Iraq, Ibid.

1783 Porter (M.I.5) to Williams, December 15, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 111, 115

petitioners appealing for the detainees' release.¹⁷⁸⁴ They demonstrated in front of his house and he refused to meet them.¹⁷⁸⁵ The government was the persecutor, so the communal leaders' sway dissolved. When police gave the Community four bodies for burial, each burnt,¹⁷⁸⁶ word spread the police torture children to death. Parents swarmed the *Va'ad Kēhillâ*, the Jewish community council, screaming, where are their children. Do something.¹⁷⁸⁷ Plead to authorities.¹⁷⁸⁸ Their children were "hostages," the petitioners said, and arrests on Yom Kippur augured the government intended to harm them.¹⁷⁸⁹ Yet leaders could not convene to decide a solution as few could attend: police spied on the council, informers lurked among them, and the government told Jewish deputies "not to attend." Others hesitated, "intervention might only lead to a further extension of the wave of terror." The Community sent a delegation. Nūrī refused to see them. He approved the raids.¹⁷⁹⁰

Without recourse, the dissatisfied turned on the Community's leadership. On October 23, perhaps 150 wives and sisters of the detainees assembled at Khaḍḍūrī's house, asking him to lead a delegation to protest the detentions. Amongst the protestors, unbeknownst or not, were two Tenuah leaders who shepherded the event – perhaps Rīmá Bint Şālīḥ and Şabīḥa bin Ya'aqūb, for police arrested both as instigators.

Khaḍḍūrī hid in his office.

1784 Shinā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 21

1785 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-Īrāq*, 280

1786 "Iraq 'Endangered Peace'" October 28, 1949 *The Jewish Chronicle*. NA (FO 371/75182)- 154

1787 Shinā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 143

1788 "Jewish Quarters Cordoned Off During Night Raids: Community Council and Jewish Members of Parliament Powerless." *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*. Bulletin No. 247. October 27, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 138

1789 Baghdad's Jews congregation leader to the Government of Iraq, 3

1790 Shinā, *Me-Bavel Lē-Şiyōn*, 143-144; for quotes, see "Jewish Quarters Cordoned Off During Night Raids," NA (FO 371/75182)- 138

The women stormed inside after him, breaking furniture, and seized him and forced him into the street. Khaḍḍūrī was dragged and pulled with the protestors as they marched to ‘Abd al-Ilah’s palace to demonstrate.¹⁷⁹¹

Police surrounded them as the women reached al-Amīn square, a major rotary in East Baghdad, and dispersing the protestors, retrieved Khaḍḍūrī. However, as officers scattered the crowd, they also arrested forty-two passersby who were uninvolved in the protests. The Jewish public was livid, and as a show of dissidence, proprietors closed their stores.¹⁷⁹²

Simultaneously, those who valued *dhimmī* norms, and thought Muslims treated Jews fairly, were outraged the Jewish public was dissatisfied. These deprecated the protestors as the ‘real’ offenders. The press promoted this view, saying, without evidence, a “Zionist Secret Society” caused and controlled the demonstration.¹⁷⁹³ “Tel Aviv directs and leads the Jews in Baghdad.”¹⁷⁹⁴ Those hostile to Jews chose to see the protest as anti-Arab and “to cause economic and political chaos.” Istiqlāl’s paper proposed to “expel the Jews from Iraq in order to end the problem for once and for all.”¹⁷⁹⁵ Nūrī may have believed the canards – he submitted a law to the Senate to punish Zionism with death; and he refused to see Khaḍḍūrī’s deputation to plead protection.¹⁷⁹⁶

On October 24, Khaḍḍūrī’s deputation met ‘Umar Nizāmī, the Interior Minister. Nizāmī was belligerent and unappeased with requests for protection. “We put an end to the Communists and now we will end the Zionists,” Nizāmī said. “The Jews have had too much liberty. They

1791 Foreign Office. Minutes. Oct 24, 1949. Part 1. Fourth Document in file. NA (FO 624/165); Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 24, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 103

1792 Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 24, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 103; Kazzaz, *Yēhūdīm Bē- ‘Īrāq*, 280; Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 21; Porter (M.I.5) to William, December 15, 1949, NA (FO 371/75183)- 115; Secret. Appendix D. The Jewish Demonstration on 23rd October 1949. NA (FO 371/75183) -119; Foreign Office. Minutes. Oct 24, 1949. Part 1. Fourth Document in file. NA (FO 624/165); Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 60

1793 Porter (M.I.5) to William, December 15, 1949, NA (FO 371/75183)- 115

1794 Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 21

1795 Foreign Office. Minutes. Oct 24, 1949. Part 1. Fourth Document in file. NA (FO 624/165)

1796 Twena, *Me’ore ‘ōt Haq ha-Shavū ‘ōt*, 110; “Baghdad Jewry’s Leader Resigns,” *Jewish Chronicle*, December 30, 1949. NA (FO 371/82477)-

must be satisfied that the Government protects them. Without this protection, they might be massacred.” Due to “the strong anti-Jewish feeling in Iraq the Jews should keep quiet,” he said.

When the deputation mentioned the detainees, Niẓāmī balked. “Because this is not clear to you, the law prohibits interfering with the work of the investigators.”

“Could you calm the parents by promising them their children are alright?” The deputy Salman Shina asked, “Maybe allow them to see each other?”

“I will do what I can,” Niẓāmī frowned behind dark glasses. “Please leave.” And, as Shina left, depressed, officials stared at him, as if to say, Shina thought, “You see your supplications have no value anymore.” The police chief covered his eyes with his hands, feigning not to see the deputation, to indicate law enforcement will ignore their calls for help.¹⁷⁹⁷

Popular politics stopped portraying Jews as weak and meek, but now regarded them as hostile foreigners who directed external threats – Sāmī Shawkat’s ‘internal enemy.’ When 200 students demonstrated at Iraq’s consulate in New York City on November 8, 1949, the Consul-General presumed or ‘knew’ the protestors were Jews, “provoking public feeling against Iraq,” and called the police, suspecting Jews would attack the Consulate.¹⁷⁹⁸ *Al-Yaqza* published a front-page article telling readers notions of *dhimma* and protection were artifices for Jews to exploit Muslims. The time had come, *al-Yaqza* said, to abandon Islam’s *dhimmī* norms of protection and remove Jews.

This minority, which had for thousands of years wallowed in shame and disgrace, gained over-night complete control of Iraqi trade and finance; not by virtue of intelligence or diligent labour but by throwing overboard all universally sanctified moral principles...Have not we protected them as a minority in the name of the constitution? Have not they been referred to by person in high office as ‘good citizens’? Have not we exempted them from most of the duties and obligations of national service. Have not they enjoyed the protection of our Army and policy? Was not the blood this country’s citizens shed solely in their interests in two or three wars? Is it not heart-breaking that a soldier or officer of ours lies writing in this

1797 Sir Henry B. Mack (Baghdad) to Ernest Bevin (London) Nov 3, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 76; “Baghdad Jewry’s Leader Resigns,” NA (FO 371/82477)- 4; for the first quote, see Twena, *Me’ore’ot Hag ha-Shavû’ot*, 110; For a bloodier version of this quote, see Kazzaz, *Ha-Yehūdīm Bē-’Irāq*, 281; for second quote, see “Iraq ‘Endangered Peace’” October 28, 1949 *The Jewish Chronicle*. NA (FO 371/75182)- 154; for third quote, see A.M. Williams, “Alleged Persecution of the Jews of Iraq,” October 29, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 36; for other quotes, see Šinah, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyôn*, 144-145

1798 Government of Iraq. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NA (FO 371/75183)- 107

blood while Jews squats in his office, chewing the curd of materiel gain? Is it not heart-breaking to witness our fellow citizens toil in anxiety and distress while the Jews enjoys his blessings in return for a few shillings so-called tax which he pays to the Government after robbing the people of colossal sums....The people of this country have suffered to the utmost limit, and their anger at the deeds of what we call fifth-columnists- nay, sixth devils- is no longer controllable...This Jew, who has sucked the blood out of the Iraqi people, who has derided their ideals, and thwarted their patriotic fight for independence, is in many of his characteristics, like the octopus, which envelops its predestined prey with its tentacles and sucks its blood away unto death. This beast sucks your life away quietly and without leaving any trace, for it has no teeth or claws which make a wound or incision: numbness follows and then death. When approaching his prey the octopus discharges an opaque liquid which serves as a cover; and such also is the method of the Jew: he lets down a curtain which screens off his criminal activities and thus deludes those who are blinded by his money or tempted by his women....In short, we urgently demand that concentration camps be opened for these 120,000 'head of Jews' (alluding to them as sheep) as reprisal for the treatment¹⁷⁹⁹

The government's notions of protection were reduced to a minimum: Nūrī would not 'allow' Jews to be massacred, a qualm so nominal Nūrī rejected responsibility if slaughter occurred. Muzāhim, now Foreign Minister, told the United States' Chargé d'affaires, the lead diplomat in the Ambassador's absence, that a "violent reaction which may take place in Iraq," and the government "disclaimed responsibility," because "Zionist quarters outside Iraq" were the "cause."¹⁸⁰⁰

Nevertheless, the government still did not want to be charged with persecution. When Khaḍḍūrī, livid at the insults to Jews in the press, wrote a memorandum, enumerating ten policies of state-sponsored anti-Semitism, and met Niẓāmī on October 29, 1949, to resign. Niẓāmī tried to dissuade Khaḍḍūrī, and then rushed to contact Britain's Inspector at the Interior Ministry, Ditchburn, informing him of the Memorandum. Niẓāmī asked Ditchburn to stop any inquiries "into the validity or otherwise of these complaints," Niẓāmī said. "The best thing would be if the Jews could be persuaded to withdraw their memorandum."¹⁸⁰¹

1799 "The Jewish Octopus." *al-Yaqza*, March 23, 1951, trans. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/026/1) 1-3

1800 NA (FO 371/75183), for first quote, see Government of Iraq. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, - 106; for second quote, see Mack to Foreign Office, November 9, 1949, - 67; for third quote, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Baghdad) to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy (Baghdad) November 8, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 105

1801 Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 21; Sir Henry B. Mack (Baghdad) to Ernest Bevin (London) Nov 3, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)- 76-77, for quote, see 77

Iraq's Foreign Ministry told the United States embassy that "Martial Law was not directed against the Jews," but repeated anti-Semitic myths Jews were hostile, too powerful, and do not belong: "Government departments are thronged with Jewish officials;" the Foreign Ministry said, repeating the false allegations: "the Jews dominate the markets;" "they own great wealth;" and they "participate in provocative demonstrations and destructive communist activities. There is nothing strange in this, as most of the Zionist leaders believe in the communist ideology on one side, and work to hamper government functions on the other." The government falsely claimed to have documentation that Jews "joined the clandestine Iraqi Communist Party and worked earnestly until they were able to assume the leadership of the Party."¹⁸⁰²

The government untruthfully claimed it had documentation of "Iraqi Jews in the Zionist movement and their conspiracy against the security of Iraq." The Ministry delivered this 'evidence' to the UN. "The Jews in Baghdad organized an artificial demonstration with the object of covering the activities of said societies." Demonstrations contravene martial law. "The Government sent a police force to protect the demonstrators against a possible outrage by the public," the Ministry lied. "Notwithstanding the injustices and atrocities committed by the Jews against the peaceful inhabitants."¹⁸⁰³

In November, authorities arrested over a hundred children. Police said that 7% of Jews belonged to Tenuah, and should be dispatched to a prison camp. So, on November 19, 1949, Jews boycotted the Gabelle – the kosher red meat tax which funded the Community's hospitals and schools – to protest excessive Jewish incarceration rates.¹⁸⁰⁴ Nūrī blamed Tenuah for the

¹⁸⁰² Government of Iraq (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to United States Embassy. November 18, 1949. NA (FO 371/75183)-120 -121

¹⁸⁰³ *Ibid.*, 121-122

¹⁸⁰⁴ Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 21-22; Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 63

boycott, and ordered Khaḍḍūrī to end it. However, Khaḍḍūrī was unable to do so, because he was uninvolved and the protest was launched without him. So he resigned.¹⁸⁰⁵ The Regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah, could not find a suitable Community president. He tried convince either Abraham Elkabir or Salim Tarzi, a former Director-General of Telegraphs, to accept the position, but the government already fired them, part of the purges of Jewish civil servants.¹⁸⁰⁶ So Nūrī resigned. The Jewish public had rebelled against the persecutions, and the government lost control of the Jewish community, temporarily, thwarting Nūrī’s plans for mass incarceration and permanent legal inferiority.

Denationalization

Nevertheless, the paranoid contradiction of Iraq’s policymakers remained: politicians feared if Jews escaped, they would harm from afar, yet also believed Iraq’s Jews were an internal enemy, and a danger to Iraq if they remained. ‘Alī Jawdat al-‘Ayyūbī succeeded Nūrī. A former Prime Minister in 1934, ‘Ayyūbī had overseen the first restrictions against Jews – in travel, school quotas, foreign publications, terminations from the civil service, and onerous restrictions in school. Though he wanted to marginalize Jews and considered Jews a menace, ‘Ayyūbī had refused to anchor discrimination in law, and opposed state anti-Semitism, believing Iraq should treat *dhimmīs* fairly. In 1934, he used ad hoc regulations to avoid legislating anti-Semitism. Now, in 1950, though he agreed with the intentions of anti-Semitic codes, he still opposed prejudicial laws. ‘Ayyūbī tabled the law punishing Zionism with death, and abolished martial law, including Ṣadr’s strictures on Jews.¹⁸⁰⁷ However, ‘Ayyūbī still believed the myths Jews were dangerous

1805 Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 65; British Embassy (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) January 21, 1950. NA (FO 371/82477)- 16

1806 Baghdad Jewry’s Leader Resigns, *The Jewish Chronicle*, December 30, 1949. NA (FO 371/82477)- 4

1807 Twena, *Me’ore’ōt Ḥag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 110; Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 66-67

and said the end of the Ṣadr Laws threatened Iraq: Jewish flight surged thereafter, as “there was the constant fear that the reimposition of martial law.” Action was necessary to block Jews from escaping, which ‘Ayyūbī believed, was to collude with external foes to attack Iraq. Courts could no longer charge suspects with “attempting to join Zionist bands.” Violations for passport laws were less severe, often a week in jail or a ten dinar fine. Police monitored Jewish travel to Basra, which was suspiciously close to Iran’s border, to catch escapees. Authorities said forty arrived in Basra daily to escape.¹⁸⁰⁸ A year later, Khaḍḍūrī’s son, Shaul, told the British Embassy, since 1948, 14,500 Jews reached Israel legally through circuitous routes; 14,000 with Iranian passports returned to Iran; and another 10,000 fled.¹⁸⁰⁹ In comparison, from 1919-1948, 7,988 emigrated to Israel.¹⁸¹⁰ The persecutions, intended to ‘neutralize’ Jews as a danger in the mind of lawmakers, inspired them to flee.

Media urged Ayyūbī to stop Jews emigration, saying they would plot with the external enemy, Zionism, to attack Iraq.¹⁸¹¹ Basra’s Mutaṣarrif, a provincial governor, said Jewish emigrants were “undermining” Iraq with “bribes.”¹⁸¹² So to curb emigration, Ayyūbī closed Basra’s train station to Jews. Police cordoned the station and detained anyone appearing ‘Jewish.’ However, entering Basra was not technically illegal, so detainees were deported to Baghdad.¹⁸¹³

The government created a series of laws to displace Iraq’s Jewish population without the stigma of culpability. On February 5, 1950, Tawfiq al-Suwaydī became Prime Minister, and politicians lobbied him to halt Jewish emigration, saying it triggered unrest.¹⁸¹⁴ Suwaydī believed

1808 Ibid.; for quotes, see Humphrey Trevelyan (Baghdad) to Ernest Bevin (London) March 7, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 9

1809 Harold Beeley. British Embassy (Baghdad) to Eastern Department. Foreign Office (London) December 14, 1950. NA (FO 371/82486)- 23

1810 Masliyah, “Zionism in Iraq,” 228

1811 Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 24

1812 Trevelyan to Bevin, March 7, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 9

1813 British Embassy (Baghdad) to British Embassy (Tehran) March 8, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 4

1814 Elie Kedourie, “The Break Between Muslims and Jews in Iraq,” *Jews Among Arabs: Contacts and Boundaries*, ed. Mark Cohen & Abraham Udovitch, (The Darwin Press: Princeton, 1989) 50; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 151

the anti-Jewish libels. He said the Wathba was a Communist-Zionist front.¹⁸¹⁵ His memoir said Iraq suffered “sneaky Communists under the veil of *Waṭaniyya*.”¹⁸¹⁶ He also rejected assertions Jews wanted only a state in Palestine as “Zionist lies,” and said Jews wanted to rule more: ‘Jewish influence’ existed in Basra and “the Zionists and behind them the Americans strangled the British government.”¹⁸¹⁷ Perhaps Suwaydī also believed Iraq was not sufficiently ‘Arab,’ for he opposed Jewish immigration to Iraq and, in 1938, promoted mass Arab immigration to Iraq from Palestine.¹⁸¹⁸ However, neither Suwaydī nor Britain wanted the appearance of persecuting Jews. On February 25, 1950, Suwaydī told Humphry Trevelyan, Britain’s Acting Ambassador, he would introduce a bill to allow Jews to leave if they renounced citizenship. Suwaydī gave Trevelyan a copy. “The Iraq Government must be careful not to include anything in it which could be represented as anti-Semitic,” Trevelyan said, wanting to protect Iraq’s reputation. International press would report the laws. “If its provisions can be represented as harsh or discriminatory the Iraqi Government will be the object of strong attack, and they should therefore consider carefully what their reply would be,” Trevelyan said. “The Iraqi Government should find out whether and under what conditions the Egyptian and Lebanese Governments have permitted their Jewish citizens to leave for Israel. If they can quote a precedent action taken in other Arab states which has not been the subject of criticism, their position will be stronger.” Trevelyan also recommended to “study the action taken by the Israeli Government in respect of the property left behind by the Arab refugees.”¹⁸¹⁹ Perhaps Trevelyan meant how to expropriate the Jewish community’s property.

1815 Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-‘Irāq*, 272

1816 al-Suwaydī, 301

1817 al-Suwaydī, 282-283, 286, for first quote, see 282, for second quote, see 286; “Central Chancery of the Orders of Knighthood,” Supplement to the London Gazette, June 2, 1925, (No. 33053) 3767. [thegazette.co.uk](https://www.thegazette.co.uk). Accessed Sept 16, 2019, <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/33053/supplement/3767>

1818 Settlement of Jews in Iraq: Cabinet Papers. NA (CO 732/85/15)-12; Edward A. Norman, Second Report on Iraq Scheme- May 15, 1939. JDC (NY AR193344 4 35 714)- 486844 (p. 5-6)

1819 Trevelyan to Bevin, March 7, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 6 , 8

Suwaydī's government hid the plan's motive was to eject Iraq's Jews. Suwaydī assured Trevalyan there would be no 'optics problem' as only 7,000 would emigrate.¹⁸²⁰ The government's false pretenses were Ṣāliḥ Jabr, the Interior Minister, wanted to 'help' Jews.¹⁸²¹ Jabr had Jewish friends.¹⁸²² Jabr appointed Jews to the Emigration Committee.¹⁸²³ The Community would organize the flights, but whereto, was never clarified.¹⁸²⁴ "We promulgated the law for revoking citizenship because we thought the young would not find work in Iraq," Jabr said.¹⁸²⁵ In truth, Jabr engaged in anti-Semitism and cooperated with those who promoted genocide. In 1939, as Education Minister, he worked with Sāmī Shawkat – who called to liquidate the 'internal enemy' – to mandate all students in middle and high schools join the Futuwwa.¹⁸²⁶ Later, Jabr merged his party with Shawkat's *al-Iṣlāḥ*.¹⁸²⁷ His government blamed Wathba, that aforementioned series of violent riots protesting Britain in 1948, on Jewish conspiracies.

The government obfuscated that the Jewish community, was not, in fact, organizing the emigration. Of the hundreds of employees that worked for the law, Jews served as a façade for others – the security forces, secret police, and interior ministry employees, which was Jabr's ministry. These state officials did the bureaucratic work and supervised what Jews clerks there were.¹⁸²⁸ The Foreign Office warned the Emigration Committee was an "Iraq stooge," and its leader, Moshe Shohet, was a government agent.¹⁸²⁹

1820 Ibid.,- 7

1821 Twena, *Me'ore'ot Haq ha-Shavū'ot*, 110

1822 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 96; Twena, *Me'ore'ot Haq ha-Shavū'ot*, 154; 'Abdallah Ṣakhī, "al-Yāhūd Ta'aruḏū ilā 'Alā Mughādira al-'Irāq," Dec 25, 2002. A Conversation with Mīr Baṣrī. Publication unknown. (p.2) Nissim Rejwan Archive

1823 Twena, *Me'ore'ot Haq ha-Shavū'ot*, 110

1824 Foreign Office (London) to Tel Aviv November 22, 1950. NA (FO 371/82485)- 39

1825 'Abdallah Ṣakhī, "al-Yāhūd Ta'aruḏū ilā 'Alā Mughādira al-'Irāq," Dec 25, 2002. A Conversation with Mīr Baṣrī. Publication unknown. Nissim Rejwan Archive, 2

1826 al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakirātī Fī al-'Irāq*, Vol. II, 382; FO SWI. E 3959/3959/93. June 20, 1939. NA (FO 624/17/489)- 38

1827 Longrigg, 363

1828 Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 29; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 152

1829 J.E. Chadwick (Tel-Aviv) to Foreign Office (London) November 6, 1950. NA (FO 371/82485)- 4-5, for quote, see -5

Two years earlier, in 1948, the government decided to pillage the Jewish community's assets, and in 1950, Suwaydī's plans for denationalization was the next phase in this process. The Şadr Laws bankrupted Jewish firms which the government barred from importing goods, legally practicing, and subjected to draconian income taxes and fines. Later, on January 12, 1950, Ayyūbī issued the Regulation for Banking Control, that decimated Jewish financial professionals – small private banks and lenders. The Regulation required a 15% deposit for each loan in the National Bank. Lenders were unable to maintain operations and were forced to liquidate their assets.¹⁸³⁰

The Şadr Laws and Banking Control exacerbated Iraq's recession. Restrictions reduced business confidence. Credit restricted. Investors loathed to invest or lend when the government seized funds at a whim. The "stagnation in the market" was "from recent measures affecting the Jews," said Mack. "The general feeling of nervousness was heightened by the circulation of rumors that the Government intended to freeze Jewish-owned deposits." As the Korean War spiked food prices, Suwaydī's government, impoverished from war, lacked liquid assets to stimulate the economy with public works. So, Suwaydī removed Banking Control and replaced it with the Ordinance to Remove Nationality (henceforth referred to as the Ordinance) and a press statement, promising loans and claims will be settled with Jews before their departure. Jews' property and assets would remain in Iraq. The Ordinance said refugees could not bring their money with them, except fifty dinars for personal spending, with an increasing number of limitations: no more than twenty dinars for children, thirty kilograms of luggage; and no Iraqi currency, gold, jewelry, nor valuables. On December 14, 1950, Suwaydī banned young men

1830 Henry B. Mack (Baghdad) to Ernest Bevin (London) March 23, 1950. NA (FO 371/82422)- 3; Commercial Secretary, British Embassy (Baghdad) to the Under-Secretary of Commercial Relations & Exports Department (London) March 21, 1950. NA (FO 371/82422)- 9

from departing without paying 10,000 dinars to obtain the Defense Ministry's permission to forgo military service.¹⁸³¹

On March 2, 1950, when Purim was to begin at Sundown, the Ordinance's bill was proposed under an emergency procedure.¹⁸³² It empowered Jabr "to divest any Iraqi Jew, who, of his own free will and choice, desires to leave Iraq for good of his Iraqi nationality," the law said. "The Minister of the Interior must order the deportation of any who has lost Iraqi nationality...Any Iraqi Jew who leaves Iraq or tries to leave Iraq illegally will forfeit his Iraqi nationality...Any Iraqi Jew who has already left Iraq legally will be considered to have left Iraq for good if he does not return within a period of two months."¹⁸³³

To pass the law, Jabr exploited pre-existing fears Jews extracted wealth. Politicians, already alarmed Jews would send money abroad, had opposed inducements for foreign investments. One newspaper said Jews stole gold as they left. "There exists a smuggling movement of Jews," Jabr said as he introduced the bill. "The number of arrivals seeking escape in the last weeks are tens and hundreds, smuggling gangs arose. Public centers of sales sprouted, prepared to liquidate businesses. These centers act openly." The Ordinance also appended a 'supporting argument' to elicit fears Jews were a hazard: "To keep their Iraqi nationality would inevitably lead to results affecting public security and give rise to social and economic problems." A deputy, Isma'il al-Ghānim, said Jews were traitors. Parliament voted in favor of the bill that day.¹⁸³⁴

1831 NA (FO 371/82422), Commercial Secretary to the Under-Secretary of Commercial Relations, March 21, 1950, - 9; for Mack's quotes, see Henry B. Mack (Baghdad) to Ernest Bevin (London) March 23, 1950, - 3; Mack to Bevin, March 21, 1950, -17; Longrigg, 360; Shinā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledôt ha-Mahteret*, 26; NA (FO 371/82486)- 23, Harold Beeley (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) December 14, 1950

1832 "Qānūn Isqāt al-Jinsiya 'an al-Yahūd al-'Irāqīn" *History of Iraq*. December 18, 2006, in *Şafahāt min Tārīkh al-'Irāqī al-Ĥadīth* by Hāmid al-Ĥamdānī, historyofiraq.blogspot.com. accessed July 29, 2007, historyofiraq.blogspot.com/2006/12/1950-law-renouncing-iraqi-jewish.html. Nissim Rejwan Archive; Mack to Foreign Office, March 3, 1950. NA (FO 371/82477)- 21

1833 Enclosure No. 1. Sir Henry B. Mack. Despatch No. 55. March 7, 1950, in Mr. Younger (London) to H. Trevelyan (Baghdad) July 20, 1950. NA (CO 323/1910/4); the original Arabic in "Qānūn Isqāt al-Jinsiya 'an al-Yahūd al-'Irāqīn," Nissim Rejwan Archive.

1834 Elkabir, *My Governmental Life*, 179; Kazzaz, *Ha-Yēhūdīm Bē-'Irāq*, 287; for Jabr's quotes, see Shinā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledôt ha-Mahteret*, 26; for Ordinances supporting argument, see Enclosure No. 1 in Mack's Despatch No. 55, March 7, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 11; for Ghānim's words, see Kedourie, "The Break Between Muslims and Jews in Iraq," 50-51

Days later on March 4, Shabbat, the Senate debated the Ordinance. Of chamber's 138 lawmakers, 133 made no criticisms. Only Sen. Daniel, the lone Jewish member, denounced the persecutions or the Ordinance's unfairness. "What can be done to reassure the Jews who do not wish to leave their homeland for good and who are loyal and law abiding citizens? These are now deprived of their constitutional and legal rights as a result of administrative measures placing exceptional restrictions on them alone of all Iraqi nationals." Daniel said, the Jewish Iraqi "had not been admitted to the Higher Colleges," and he was "not allowed" to study abroad. "Work was denied to him and he suffered restrictions in business. But for these severe handicap Iraqi Jews would not have gone so far as to attempt large scale flight."¹⁸³⁵

"A not inconsiderate section of Jewish nationals, however, committed acts which were not consistent with the country's interests and were in fact a disservice to the nation," Jabr said. It was "not in the national interest to prevent the emigration of these people," and "would do the country harm if they remained."¹⁸³⁶

"Jews who left the country under the new law would be young men who would constitute a Fifth Column," Muzāḥim said, urging the UN to facilitate a population exchange between Jews and Arabs, and liquidate Jewish properties.

"Why the Iraqi Government had not frozen Jewish property in the same way as Arab property in Israel?" asked Sen. Muṣṭafá al-'Umarī.

The bill passed and Suwaydī addressed the chamber. "When his Government had taken office it had found widespread complaints against the economic paralysis caused by thousands of

1835 Masliyāh, "Zionism in Iraq," 228; for Daniel's quotes, see Mack to Bevin, March 21, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 31; also in Mack, (Baghdad) No. 67 (1571/17/50), March 21, 1950, FO (371/75183)
1836 Ibid., -32

people selling their movable and immovable property,” he said, a reference to Jews. “The Government had seen no point in forcing these people to stay.”¹⁸³⁷

Afterwards, Suwaydī lied and told Britain’s ambassador, Mack, the restrictions also apply to Muslims. This was untrue. Suwaydī further lied, and said he lifted restrictions on Jews, when this was not the case. ‘Practical’ restrictions remained. The government hired no Jews, granted no professional licenses to Jews, and the private sector refused to hire or work with Jews. Mack knew Suwaydī lied. “Discrimination against Jews is applied in practice. In the Southern States of America, it is said to be difficult for a negro to obtain his rights against a White American in the Courts or to send his son to study alongside his white fellow citizens in higher colleges. An Iraqi Jew today suffers similar disabilities.”¹⁸³⁸

The Ordinance validated anti-Semitism. Suwaydī’s government agreed with agitators Jews ‘smuggled’ Iraq’s wealth and imperiled the country. Politicians blamed economic stagnation on “Jewish malcontents,” Suwaydī’s cabinet said Jews fleeing were disloyal, and those arrested were “traitors.” Meanwhile, leaders who tried “to improve the position of Jews are immediately the object of Nationalist attack,” Mack said. Istiqlāl said the Ordinance “did not provide a radical solution” and was “too favorable to the Jews.” Istiqlāl toughs attacked Jewish yard sales. Demonstrations erupted against Jewish auctions. Demagogues said proceeds would leave Iraq. The press increased vituperations against Jews, saying Jews were “waging a cold war against the country by trying to paralyze trading activities and of pretending to be bankrupt in order to rob the people.”¹⁸³⁹

1837 Ibid.

1838 Ibid.; Humphrey Trevelyan (Baghdad) to Ernest Bevin, M.P. (London) March 7, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 8-9; Kazzaz, *Ha-Yehūdīm Bē-’Irāq*, 292; for Mack’s quotes, see Mack to Bevin, March 21, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 32

1839 for “malcontents,” quote, see Ibid.,- 33; Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 73; for “traitors” quote, see F.A.G. Cook (British Consulate-General, Basra) to J.C.B. Richmond (British Embassy, Baghdad) March 24, 1950. NA (FO 371/82479)- 22; for Mack’s quote, see Mack to Bevin, March 21, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 33, 17; for Istiqlāl’s quote, see Trevelyan to Bevin, March 7, 1950. NA (FO 371/82478)- 8-9; Moshe Gat “Between Terror and Emigration: The Case of Iraqi Jewry,” *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (Frank Cass: London, Autumn 2000) 14; for the press’ “cold war” quote, see Ibid.- 33; idem., March 23, 1950, NA (FO 371/82422)- 5

On March 16, the Finance Minister, ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Uzrī, convoked a meeting of Bank managers to improve the economy. Rafidayn Bank’s Muḥammad al-Chalabī castigated “the Jews for not co-operating;” Arab Bank’s Ṭālib Mushtāq blamed “the Jews of deliberately sabotaging the economy.” However, one manager suggested Uzrī restore business confidence with a promise not to freeze Jewish assets. Uzrī refused.¹⁸⁴⁰

Nūrī Tries to Expel Iraq’s Jews

In parallel with State efforts to orchestrate the appearances of a willing departure, the government also planned to expel Iraq’s Jews. In September 1950, Nūrī became Prime Minister again. He had mulled evicting Iraq’s Jews the year before. Three days after ascending to office, on September 18, Nūrī asked the Emigration Committee, a government-front within the community to manage applications to depart, to accelerate the pace. Provisions provided registrants must leave within three weeks. Yet as 105,000 registered, only 9,500 departed. For registrants to tarry longer portended the specter they could permanently remain. Nūrī asked the Committee’s chair, Moshe Shohet, to clandestinely meet Israelis in Cyprus to expedite the departures. Nūrī told Mack “he contemplated transporting Jews by air to Beirut or Mafraq and thence by lorry to Israel’s frontier” and dumping them there. “These Jews had ceased to be Iraqi subjects and he could not keep them,” said Nūrī.¹⁸⁴¹

Later, on October 21, Nūrī met ‘Abdullah, and asked to ferry Jews through. Abdullah refused. “It was not in Jordan’s interest to help to increase Israel’s manpower.”

1840 for quotes, see Mack to Bevin, March 23, 1950, NA (FO 371/82422)- 5; Kedourie, “The Break Between Muslims and Jews in Iraq,” 51-52
1841 NA (FO 371/82484), Moshe D. Shohet (Committee for the Renunciation of Nationality and Deportation) to the Director-General of Iraqi Airways (Baghdad) Sept 19, 1950. Memo.- 8; Mack to Bevin, October 18, 1950,- 7; NA (FO 371/82483), Bernard A. B. Burrows. British Embassy (Washington DC) to Geoffrey W. Furlonge, Esq., Foreign Office (London) Oct 9, 1950,- 36; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 154; For the “lorry” quote, see Sir Henry Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 3, 1950,- 33; NA (FO 371/82486)-5, “Iraq subjects” quote, see Sir Henry Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) November 23, 1950

“Israel[’s] Government was deliberately slowing up the the airlift and that an influx by land would be an embarrassment to [Israel],” said Nūrī.

Not true, said ‘Abdullah, Israel asked him to permit Jewish travel through six weeks before.¹⁸⁴²

Again, ten days later, when Abdullah visited Iraq, Nūrī asked to ferry Jews through Jordan, so they could be “forced over the frontier into Israel,” said Nūrī.

‘Abdullah demurred. If Israelis “refused to receive their fellow Jews, Jordan would be left with the prospect maintaining the Iraqi Jews.”¹⁸⁴³

The Foreign Office told Nūrī, ‘Abdullah would not acquiesce. “There will be no question of the Iraq Government attempting to expel these Jews over land,” the Foreign Office said. Nevertheless, two days later, on November 6, Britain’s Chargé d’Affaires in Tel Aviv, complained: “Iraq is trying to gain our support to expel Jews from Iraq.” Included in a handwritten marginalia from the embassy was a warning: registrants were deprived of nationality as soon as they enroll. Registrants could not work. They could not use their property. “The Iraqi Government appears to be trying to involve His Majesty’s Government in a cold-blooded attempt to expel the Jews,” the Embassy said.¹⁸⁴⁴

“It is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent the Iraq Government from taking some wide action. They have already toyed with the idea of pushing the Jews over the Kuwait frontier,” said Mack. Nūrī was anxious that lawmakers would lambaste him for failure to vacate the registrants when parliament convened on December 2. He wanted Jews gone.¹⁸⁴⁵ On

1842 Sir Henry Mack (Bagdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 25, 1950. NA (FO 371/82484)- 20

1843 A.S. Kirkbride (Amman) to G.W.Furlonge (Foreign Office, London) November 1, 1950. NA (FO 371/82485)-20

1844 NA (FO 371/82484), Foreign Office (London) to (Bagdad) November 4, 1950,- 14; for first quote, see NA (FO 371/82485), Chargé d’Affaires (Tel Aviv), November 6, 1950,-2; P.A. Rhodes, August 8, 1950, Ibid.; for all other quotes see J.E. Chadwick (Tel-Aviv) to Foreign Office (London) November 6, 1950,- 4-5, for quotes, see -5

1845 Sir Henry B. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) November 29, 1950. NA (FO 371/82486)- 21

December 20, Nūrī again demanded a faster departure rate, worried the Ordinance would expire in March. Nūrī’s cabinet urged him, “drive them across a land frontier,” preferably Kuwait, because its border was unguarded, or “intern them in concentration camps.”¹⁸⁴⁶

On January 16, 1951, Nūrī visited Jordan, and asked Jordan’s Prime Minister, Samīr al-Rifā’ī, to ‘ferry’ Jews through to Israel. Rifā’ī refused. Nūrī dragged Rifā’ī to the home of Britain’s Plenipotentiary, screaming, Britain would ‘persuade’ Rifā’ī, while the Plenipotentiary, dumbfounded, watched as the two Prime Ministers raged and roared, and perhaps devolved into fisticuffs. Nūrī, furious, threatened to expel Iraq’s Jews to Jordan or Kuwait. On January 25, the Foreign Minister, Suwaydī, told Mack, stateless Jews “would become a danger to the country and would themselves be in danger from the Iraqi people,” he said. “Unless a solution were found the Iraqi Government would be compelled to drive them over the frontier to Kuwait.”¹⁸⁴⁷

“His Majesty’s Government could accept no responsibility. The Iraqi Government had passed the law without consulting us,” Mack said. (This was untrue. Suwaydī consulted Britain’s ambassador, Trevalayan, who offered suggestions). Kuwait and Cyprus could not “take these people,” and “Jordan had refused their passage;” the only solution was Israel. “If this was unobtainable, they might be put in camps in Iraq administered by some international Jewish body.”¹⁸⁴⁸

Mack warned London, Nūrī intended to expel Iraq’s Jews. “The Iraqis are in earnest about this. Their real fear is of a general war which would find them with a large number of

1846 for first quote, see Jakins (Kuwait) to Bahrain, Eastern Department, Iraq, 1951. NA (FO 371/91689)- 54; for second quote, see Harold Beeley (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) December 20, 1950. NA (FO 371/82486)- 29
1847 NA (FO 371/91689), Amim to G.W. Furlonge, Esq, Foreign Office (London) Jan 16, 1951,-11; Henry Mack (Baghdad) to Geoffery Furlonge Jan 18, 1951,-27; for quote, Sir Henry Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) January 25, 1951,- 28
1848 Sir Henry Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) January 25, 1951. NA (FO 371/91689)- 28

stateless and disloyal persons many of them without means of support within their border. They are also genuinely afraid of a popular outburst against the Jews similar to that of May 1941.”¹⁸⁴⁹

The Property Freezing Law

In the process of Denationalization, the State expropriated most Jews’ property, but the the government’s plan to deprive Iraq’s Jews of their assets, utilize mass incarceration and make them legally inferior was made earlier, in 1947, before Israel’s Independence War. The program derived from Palestine’s partition, and was regarded as a new front against Jews, as a people, and with whom Iraq’s policymakers considered themselves at war. In January 1948, Jabr, then Prime Minister, approved a secret agreement, that, at a coordinated date, “bank accounts of Jews will be frozen” and Jewish citizens “will have to register with the authorities;” and those deemed Zionists “will be interned...His financial resources, instead of being frozen, will be confiscated. In 1949, as Israeli forces conquered Gaza, and drove into the Sinai, a desert in Egypt bordering Israel, Nūrī considered confiscations as a ‘counter-attack.’ A day before Israel’s campaign ended, on January 6, 1949, Nūrī proposed to “sequester” property of “all Iraquian [sic] Jews who are now abroad and who do not return to Iraq within one month.”¹⁸⁵⁰

Proponents of seizure – of property and finances – said Jews stole Iraq’s patrimony. The National Bank’s Deputy Governor, Salah Haider, said Jews “smuggled” out 10 million dinars.¹⁸⁵¹ “The Jewish Criminals in Iraq: How to end them?” *al-Yaqza* said on May 9, 1950,

1849 Ibid.,- 29

1850 for quotes of Jabr’s secret agreement, see BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/031), World Jewish Congress, Memorandum to the UN Economic and Social Council, Jan 19, 1948, 1; “Text of Law drafted by Political Committee of Arab League” Memorandum Submitted to the UN Economic and Social Council by the World Jewish Congress, Jan 19, 1948, 4; Shinā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Mahteret*, 31; for Nūrī’s quotes to sequester property, see Vitales, 13

1851 Harold Beeley (Baghdad) to Geoffery Furlonge, Foreign Office (London) March 7, 1951. NA (FO 371/91690)-18

“Jews murder taxi drivers. They attack soldiers. They kidnap children. They are the swindler Jew,” and

the Jews behind in Iraq and in surrounding Arab countries under their guise of legality gather information secretly and publicly to support the Jewish invasion of Palestine. Every one of them has a full role: almost all of them are enlisting their capabilities for weapons for young men and women in Jewish gangs in Palestine to make war on us there. They donate their wealth and their money to aide their gangs. ‘Ades and his colleagues worked to smuggle weapons to Tel-Aviv. Others waged economic and commercial confusion in the markets through banks and Zionism. Their bureaucrats worked to impeded the work of the government.¹⁸⁵²

One of Nūrī’s legislative advisors said, “Would you let them drain all the money that doesn’t belong to them? Did they earn this money with their handwork?”¹⁸⁵³

Nūrī seemed to agree with this sentiment. In November, 1950, he delivered a speech. “These people exploited the wealth of this country” and “actively assisted the enemies of the country, who fought against us,” he said.¹⁸⁵⁴ Nūrī said Jews did not pay taxes, and their tax obligations will be checked because, “at the time of the Exodus from Egypt, the Jews exploited Egyptians and took the Egyptians’ goods.”¹⁸⁵⁵ Nūrī also said, “I will turn the Jews into the role of seed medlars in the streets of Baghdad.”¹⁸⁵⁶

He waited for the Ordinance to expire to ensure maximum registration.¹⁸⁵⁷ Then, on March 10, 1951, Shabbat, when Jewish religion dictated believers refrain from work, the Parliament and Senate – convening a secret session, suspending Baghdad’s telephone service to prevent leaks to stop withdrawals, and ordering banks closed to stop transactions- promulgated a bill ‘freezing’ registrants’ assets, 105,000 Jewish people, and those abroad who did not return. The government froze their accounts, property, real-estate, material goods, businesses, bills of

1852 Sulaymān Šifrānī, “Ajrām al-Yahūdī fī al-‘Irāq min Yuḍa’a Lehu Ḥadā,” *al-Yaqza*, May 9, 1950, No. 859. IJA (2746) 2

1853 Darwīsh, 79-80, for quote, see 79

1854 Kedourie, “The Break Between Muslims and Jews in Iraq,” 55

1855 Šinā, *Me-Bavel Lē-Šiyôn*, 149

1856 Elkabir, *My Ideological Life*, 50

1857 Alex Easterman, Iraq Government’s Persecution of the Jews, NA (FO 371/91692)-124

lading (lists of shipment of goods) and documents. Authorities ordered real-estate and financial professionals to cease transaction with registrants and surrender their assets.¹⁸⁵⁸

Sen. Daniel denounced the law as discriminatory and unconstitutional. However, he alone criticized the law. None responded to him. None applauded him. Both chambers adopted the bill unanimously, save Daniel and one abstention. The Regency Council ratified the law the same day.¹⁸⁵⁹

The law completed the marginalization of Jews into outcasts. Helping registrants recover their property was an imprisonable offense. In an extraction campaign so thorough to ensure Jews were penniless, Nūrī's government used Sterling exchange control rules to freeze accounts in Britain designated 'Iraqi,' seized 2,000 Torah scrolls, and demanded Jewish deposits for Indian and Palestinian visas held at Britain's embassy and consulates. For a year, Basra's Mutaşarrif demanded the visa deposits, totaling £300, for seven individuals. On March 22, 1951, Parliament froze the property of Jews who left Iraq legally, including furniture, foodstuffs, clothing and "trifling articles and sums of money." The law even cancelled the right for emigrants to bring fifty dinars.¹⁸⁶⁰ Nūrī closed 'Jewish' businesses until police could issue 'Jewish' identity cards, proving the bearer was unregistered. For several days, police arrested anyone they thought looked 'Jewish' with parcels or suitcases, and unable to produce evidence they were unregistered. Police not infrequently froze accounts or sealed businesses, regardless of

1858 Shīnā, *Me-Bavel Lē-Şiyôn*, 149; NA (FO 371/91690), Bulletin No. 63. March 15, 1951, - 31; Harold Beeley (Baghdad) to Herbert Morrison, M.P. March 14, 1951, -36; Law for the Control and Administration of the Property of Jews who have been deprived of Iraqi Nationality No. 5 of 1951. (Translation from al-Waqayi al-Iraqiyah No. 2938 March 10, 1951), -39; Regulation for the Control and Administration of Property of Jews who have been Deprived of Iraqi Nationality. No. 3 of 1951. (Translation from al-Waqayi al-Iraqiyah No. 2939 dated March 10, 1951)-43, 46

1859 The one abstention was Šāliḥ Jabr, see Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 158-159; Jamīl al-Midfa'ī and Muḥammad al-Şadr sat on the Regency Council, see Law for the Control and Administration of the Property of Jews, NA (FO 371/91690)-41

1860 Ibid.; C.E. Loombe (Bank of England) to D.R. Serpell (H.M. Treasury) "Iraq" Nov 19. 1951. NA (FO 371/91694)-4; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 168; T.E. Bromley (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 10, 1952. NA (FO 371/98769)- 8; O.G. Forster (London) to K.H. Peck (New Delhi) Sept 26, 1951. NA (FO 371/91693)-22; NA (FO 371/98767), R. W. Munro (Baghdad) to P.A. Rhodes (London), December 4, 1952,- 200; British Consulate-General (Basra) to Foreign Office (London) Feb 4, 1952,- 120; for quote, see Law No. 12 of 1951 Supplemental to the Law for the Control and Administration of the Property of Jews, NA (FO 371/91690)- 118; Ad Hoc Committee on Iraq, March 27, 1951. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/026/1) 2

whether proprietors registered or not, searching for valuables, cars or furniture, or entered homes to list their contents.¹⁸⁶¹

This official suspicion had two effects. First, the law routinized Jews as a legal class of undesirables. Carrying a government issue “Jewish Identity Card” became obligatory, and had to be produced, upon request, at financial institutions for all transactions. Failure to produce the identity card made bearers liable for confiscations and deportation.¹⁸⁶² Moreover, as ‘Jewish’ became a legal classification, some were categorized as ‘Jewish’ despite not being Jewish, suggesting a conception of Judaism that denoted something more akin to caste. Basra’s Mutaşarrif classified two Syrian Catholics, Jamil Raffael Naayem and his daughter, as Jewish due to their last name, though they were not Jewish and had no Jewish ancestry.¹⁸⁶³ A Christian, a convert, Mukamal, was classified as Jewish because his parents were. The government knew “my Christian followings,” Mukamal said. In 1950, Mukamal tried to send his son, a born-Christian and British national, abroad, but the government refused to issue a passport, categorizing his son as ‘Jewish.’ For twenty months, Mukamal tried to emigrate to England. The government agreed once his son signed a confession: that the son was Jewish and would return in three months or be denationalized.¹⁸⁶⁴

Those who hated Jews chose to interpret the confiscations as meaning the state shared their animus and would not protect Jews. Rowdies attacked Jews in provincial towns and in Mosul. In Baghdad, where diplomatic presence was stronger and foreign press accessible, attacks were fewer, but the hysteria led to several violent incidents. Crowds stoned lorries of registrants

1861 NA (FO 371/91690), Jewish Emigration from Iraq,-15; Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin March 12, 1951 (Tel-Aviv),-25; Bulletin No. 63. March 15, 1951- 31; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 158; NA (FO 371/91691), British Ambassador (Baghdad) April 4, 1951,- 26; Ad Hoc Committee on Iraq, March 27, 1951. BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/026/1)

1862 NA (FO 371/98767), Jung to Maxwell, February 7, 1952,- 140; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 158; NA (FO 371/91690), Bulletin No. 63. March 15, 1951,- 31; Beeley to Morrison, March 14, 1951, -37

1863 British Consulate-General (Basra) to Foreign Office (London) Feb 4, 1952. NA (FO 371/98767)- 120

1864 N. Mukamal (Chatham) to Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill (London) June 16, 1953. NA FO (371/104716)- 2-3, for quote, see 2

en route to the airport. Mobs looted businesses identified as ‘Jewish,’ such as a clothing bazaar.¹⁸⁶⁵

Synagogue bombings

The incitement spawned six bombings that terrorized Jewish institutions from April 1950 to July 1951, of which the government acknowledged five, and hid one.¹⁸⁶⁶ The government falsely accused Israel of bombing the synagogues to scare Jews into flight, to divert blame from *Qawmiyya* and hide the truth: the Community fled because Iraq oppressed them – the Farhūd, the ‘Ades execution, the Ṣadr laws, mass incarceration, and publicity of death sentences terrorized Jews into leaving. The population despised Jews, and if they had not fled, Nūrī would expel or jail them. Nūrī, not Israel’s Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, pressed to increase departure rates of Jews from Iraq to Israel. Nūrī blackmailed Israeli authorities to increase the pace, menacing he would expel those not gone by his deadline, June 1, 1951. “Israel authorities consider that the decision has been forced on them by the actions of the Iraq Government,” wrote Britain’s Ambassador to Israel, Kevin Helm.¹⁸⁶⁷

Possibly the bombings’ culprits were Jew-haters, for whom Iraq was not sufficiently ‘Arab,’ and saw Jewish ownership and emigration as a victory over *Qawmiyya*, inviting revenge. Perhaps the perpetrators were affiliated with the government; perhaps not. Perhaps the culprits wanted Jews gone to seize their assets. Istiqlāl belonged to both legislatures and promoted genocide, hating the Jewish migration and Nūrī, and Nūrī knew violent malefactors wanted to attack Jews. In 1939, Nūrī told a London audience: “If political violence continues in Palestine

1865 Ad Hoc Committee on Iraq, March 27, 1951, BOD (ACC/3121/C/11/013/026/1) 2; Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin March 12, 1951 (Tel-Aviv) NA (FO 371/91690)-25; Alex Easterman, Iraq Government’s Persecution of the Jews NA (FO 371/91692)-125; Draft Record of a Meeting held in the Minister of State’s Room on 2nd April with a Delegation representing various British Jewish Associations NA (FO 371/91691)-9; Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 160-161

1866 Criminal Jewish Incidents. NA (FO 371/91693)- 38

1867 Sir K. Helm to L.A.C. Fry Esq. Foreign Office (London) February 5, 1951. NA (FO 371/91689)- 69-70, for quote, see -70

and bombs are thrown by Jews. Such factors would incite prejudicial feelings of Arabs in Iraq and it is not my pleasure to say it could result in greater hostility against Jews, such as throwing several bombs in the Jewish quarter or Jewish clubs.”¹⁸⁶⁸ In the 1930s, offenders bombed Jewish institutions, and amidst violent exhortations to expel Jews after war with Israel, on November 4, 1950, Nūrī said there was a “murder gang which had decided on a definite campaign of murder in Syria and Iraq.”¹⁸⁶⁹ Rashīd ‘Ālī’s cadres were involved. Amīn Ruwaiḥa – a former leader for the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, liaison for Baghdad’s German legation during the Nazi-era, and accused of anti-Jewish terrorism in the 1930s – now in 1950, the year of the spate of anti-Jewish bombings, was apprehended in Syria and found to possess six passports. “He was probably a prominent member of the murder gang,” said Nūrī.¹⁸⁷⁰

In the first attack, on April 8, 1950, an assailant threw a grenade at Baida cafe, a restaurant Jews frequented, injuring four people. Police searched for suspects, but not among anti-Semites, revanchists discontented with the war’s defeat and wanted revenge, or the ‘murder gang’ Nūrī warned of – rather, among Jews and their ‘spies.’ The government and police appear to have believed the myth Jews were an ‘internal enemy’ who attacked to defame Iraq. “The object of these persons was to disturb the peace and to damage the reputation of Iraq,” the Propaganda ministry said.¹⁸⁷¹

After a second bombing, authorities again blamed Jews. On January 14, 1951, assailants hurled grenades at the Masuda Shemtob Synagogue as registrants weighed luggage. Two

1868 Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 31; for quote Nūrī al-Sa’īd, “Muqatafāt Khiṭāb Nūrī al-Sa’īd fī Ṭāwla al-Mustadīra fī London ‘ām 1939” *Wathā’iq*, 104

1869 Gat “Between Terror and Emigration,” 20; for quote, see Sir Henry B. Mack. British Embassy (Baghdad) to G. W. Furlonge Esq., Foreign Office (London) November 6, 1950. “Rashid Ali.” NA (FO 371/82495) [p. 1]

1870 “Palestine: The Mufti’s policy.” October 27, 1938 NA (KV2/2084)- 35a (p. 4); Twena, *Me’ore ‘ōt Hag ha-Shavū’ōt*, 21; al-Hāshimī, 285; for quote see, Sir Henry B. Mack. British Embassy (Baghdad) to G. W. Furlonge Esq., Foreign Office (London) November 6, 1950. “Rashid Ali.” NA (FO 371/82495) [p. 1]

1871 for quote, see Acting Director-General of Press and Propaganda. “Criminal Jewish Incidents.” Translation. NA (FO 371/91693)- 38; Shīnā, *Pereqīm ba-Tōledōt ha-Maḥteret*, 30; Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 173

explosions killed four people and injured sixteen. Police arrested Jamīl Māmo, a soldier and Istiqlāl member, who resided across the street. Investigators found bombs in his home. At trial, an officer testified the grenades used were military issue. Yet police, under public pressure to find Jewish perpetrators, were disinclined to pursue *Qawmiyya*'s adherents. Again, the press said Jews attacked themselves to defame Iraq. "Leaders of the Jewish community had instigated the crime in order to draw attention," pundits said.¹⁸⁷²

The next three bombings occurred on Rashīd street, in locations associated with the United States or Jews. On March 19, 1951, explosive material detonated at the U.S. Information Service on Rashid Street, injuring several. On May 10, an explosion rocked the Lawee Company building, also on Rashid Street, which imported American cars. On the evening of June 9-10, explosive material detonated at Stanley Shashua's building near Rashid street, which also imported American cars.¹⁸⁷³ Nūrī blamed "a Jewish terrorist," to protect *Qawmiyya*'s reputation.¹⁸⁷⁴ Yet three of the attacks targeted sites that anti-Semites, not Jewish militants, would want to strike. The Masuda Shemtob Synagogue was the center for Jews to register to emigrate. Shashua was arrested as an 'Ades-collaborator, charged with "creating obstacles in the economic prosperity;"¹⁸⁷⁵ and fled to Tehran after media denounced him as "the Jewish Millionaire" in "contact" with "Zionists."¹⁸⁷⁶ Finally, the sixth bombing, which the government's talking-points ignored, because the attack occurred while the suspects were jailed, and indicated the perpetrators were not Jewish, but disgruntled at Jews: on July 9, 1951, a bomb exploded in

1872 Criminal Jewish Incidents. NA (FO 371/91693)- 38; for quote, see Tom Bromley (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Feb 3, 1951. NA (FO 371/91689)-62; "Qēšīn 'Īraqī Heṭīl Ha-Pēzzah?" *Davar*, January 28, 1951, 1. NLI. Historical Jewish Press. <http://www.jpress.nli.org.il/>; Gat "Between Terror and Emigration," 9, 12-13.; "The Baghdad Trials" NA (FO 371/98767)-14

1873 Criminal Jewish Incidents. NA (FO 371/91693)- 38; for quote, see Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 173

1874 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 156

1875 A Letter From Iraq in Treating the Trouble Makers Jews," JDC (NY AR194554/4/42/516)- 688697

1876 Vitales, 1-2

the law office of Jalāl Bābān, despised in *Qawmiyya* circles for representing Jewish terror suspects.¹⁸⁷⁷

In truth, authorities were less concerned with Israelis or spies than with the ‘internal enemy.’ Nūrī knew Israeli agents were active in Iraq and ignored them. Police arrested and released them, whereafter they resurfaced, weeks later, under new aliases.¹⁸⁷⁸ Mossad operative Shlomo Hillel’s “visit was of no great consequence as the Government had already decided to allow the Jews to leave” said Meir Baṣrī, the Community’s last president; “after a few days the Authorities asked him to leave.”¹⁸⁷⁹ Whereas foreign agents were ignored and those imprisoned spared execution, Iraq’s Jews, such as ‘Ades, Yehuda Tsadik, and Sassoon Dalal – whom Nūrī said were saboteurs and wanted removed – were falsely accused of treason and hanged.¹⁸⁸⁰

Police were unconcerned with real Israeli spies, but fixated on chimerical machinations of a nonexistent, ‘internal enemy.’ When police did capture real Israeli agents, they treated them more leniently than Iraqi Jews detained on trumped up charges. Police focused the investigation on an imaginary Jewish terrorist plot, to ‘prove’ Iraq’s Jews were the ‘internal enemy’ and Muslims never persecuted minorities. On May 22, 1951, police arrested Yehuda Tagar, an actual Israeli operative.¹⁸⁸¹ Days later, authorities apprehended a second agent, Robert Rodney, posing as a business professional. Tagar confessed. Yet prosecutors were disinterested in espionage, the real crime, and instead wanted to indict him with terrorism and link him to the bombings. Investigators wanted to find the ‘internal enemy.’ Police said without foundation,

1877 “Baghdad: Bomb in office of lawyer defending Zionist Terrorist.” BBC Monitoring. July 9, 1951. (FO 371/91693)-30

1878 A.S. Elkabir, *My Communal Life or Death of a Community*, Vol. 1, April 1961, BJHC (ELK, no. 7308) 157

1879 Meir S. Basri, “My Part in the Operation,” *The Scribe: The Journal of Babylonian Jewry*, (The Exilarch Foundation, No. 27 June 1988) 6

1880 Twena, *Me’ore ’ot Hag ha-Shavut’ot*, 111

1881 “Special Court Judgement in Zionist Activity Case,” *Iraq Times* (Baghdad) December 20, 1951, No. 10171 (MDC) 7

Tajar and Rodney attacked Jewish locales to defame Iraq. The Press called to expel Iraq's Jews in response.¹⁸⁸²

Tagar's arrest set off a manhunt for Jewish co-conspirators. At Tagar's house, investigators uncovered documents of acquaintances or collaborators, presumed to be involved, which led to more arrests, more interrogations, and eventually to Tenuah's arms, hidden in homes and synagogues: submachine guns, grenades, pistols and ammunition, as well as Tenuah's registries. Detectives said the registries listed "members of a terrorist organization;" which was "calculated to disturb the peace and security;" maps illustrated "military objectives." Police photographed the arms in the presence of Jewish leaders to 'prove' there was no persecution.¹⁸⁸³

The Farhūd had spawned a clamor for self-defense groups with Judaic overtones, from those expecting future pogroms or upset, "instead of fighting back, they had locked the garden gate," a British asset said.¹⁸⁸⁴ A day after the Farhūd, eight Baghdad high school students founded Shabāb al-Inqādh, dedicated to defending Jews with guns. The Farhūd also drew in the Yishuv. The Haganah established Tenuah to protect Jewish neighborhoods. Tenuah members trained in firearms they received from Haganah operatives and mapped Baghdad's Jewish areas to guard entry points during pogroms. At the induction ceremony, recruits placed a hand upon a Tanakh and a gun, and swore to protect Jewish life.¹⁸⁸⁵

On June 21, 1951 police announced they uncovered a "Zionist terrorist Movement," finding arms depots and Hebrew literature. "Their aim was to cause disorder and show Iraq to

1882 Harold Beeley, H.M. Embassy (Baghdad) to Geoffrey W. Furlonge. Foreign Office (London). June 27, 1951. (FO 371/91693)-35; "Two Iraqi Jews to Die Sentences Confirmed by Supreme Court." *Jewish Chronicle*, December 14, 1951, 28. EQ 1571/1 Trial of Jews in Baghdad (1952) NA (FO 371/98767)-5; Gat, *Jewish Exodus from Iraq*, 174

1883 "Special Court Judgement in Zionist Activity Case," 7; Zionist Arms Caches Reported Found in Baghdad (BBC) June 22, 1951. NA (FO 371/91692)-133; "Iraq Trial of Zionist Terrorists Now Likely." BBC Monitoring. Aug 23, 1951. (FO 371/91693)-302; for quotes, see Acting Director-General of Press and Propaganda. "Criminal Jewish Incidents." Translation. NA (FO 371/91693)- 38

1884 Haim, 10; Shīnā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledot ha-Mahteret*, 3; Y.13, Iraqi Jews and Palestine, December 5, 1943. NA (FO 624/38/502)-36 (p. 2)
1885 Haim, 10; Masliyah, "Zionism in Iraq," 221; Gat, *The Jewish Exodus*, 25; Munya M. Mardor, *Strictly Illegal*, trans. H.A.G. Shucklev, (Robert Hale Ltd.: London, 1964) 84; Gat, "Between Terror and Emigration," 4-5; Rejwan, *The Jews of Iraq*, 231; Assistant Inspector General 'C'. Visit to Baghdad and Mosul, 6th January-14th January, 1944. NA (FO 624/38/502)-18 (p.2); Mardor, 92, 96; Shīnā, *Pereqim ba-Tōledot ha-Mahteret*, 13

the world other than she really is,” said the Secretary of the Director-General of Propaganda.¹⁸⁸⁶ Authorities claimed Jews emigrated because of the bombings, not persecution. A “Zionist Fifth Column” perpetrated five bombings to defame Iraq, (The sixth bombing occurred later on July 9, when the suspects were in jail). Newspapers exaggerated allegations, reporting detectives found “explosives, enough to blow up the whole of Baghdad,” under mastheads of the same quote, with exclamation points. Then, 110,000 Jews had departed for Israel, and 5,000 were expected to stay, with media pushing Nūrī, “expel the remaining Jews.”¹⁸⁸⁷ The pundit Muḥammad al-Durrah, writing in *al-Ara’*, said there was a “fiendish master plan” to “launch a night attack on Bagdad” and “blow up all strategic centers,” and “since the safety of the nation were at stake, it would be too risky to leave any Jews in the country.”¹⁸⁸⁸ Perhaps police believed this terror plot. For notwithstanding most Tenuah members were in high school, when one suspect was charged in the crime, Nūrī sent a bomb disposal unit to his house to search for mines.¹⁸⁸⁹

“It is well known that the Jews in Iraq have been collecting arms and ammunition for their own protection since Rashid Ali’s [sic] coup d’état in 1941 when they suffered greatly. This is not espionage however,” said Harold Beeley, a British diplomat. “These ‘discoveries’ are reminiscent of the Reichstag fire.”¹⁸⁹⁰ The ‘Reichstag fire’ was a reference to the Nazi party’s 1933 ploy of using an arson as a pretext to impose dictatorship and retract civil rights. Iraqi authorities created a legal drama not dissimilar to a show trial to reinforce Jews jeopardized Arabism – indicting thirty men, women and a rabbi, with manufacturing explosives, plotting

1886 Zionist Arms Caches Reported Found in Baghdad (BBC) June 22, 1951. NA (FO 371/91692)-133; for quote, see Secretary of the Director-General of Propaganda. Report of testimony of Jewish spy rings and arms caches. (FO 371/91693)-25

1887 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 155; Gat “Between Terror and Emigration,” 8; (FO 371/91693), for quote of “Zionist fifth column, , see Harold Beeley (Baghdad) to Geoffrey W. Furlonge (London) June 27, 1951,- 35; for “explosives” quote, see “Iraq Trial of Zionist Terrorists Now Likely.” BBC Monitoring. Aug 23, 1951, -302; for the “expel” quote, see “By the beginning of this week 100,000 Jews had been flown out of Israel.” Elkabir told the Embassy. Out of a population of 125,000, only 5,000 would remain. 10,000 left illegally, see Beeley to Furlonge, June 27, 1951,-37

1888 Beeley to Furlonge, June 27, 1951. (FO 371/91693)-37

1889 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 154-155

1890 (FO 371/91693), for first quote, see Beeley, to Furlonge, June 27, 1951,- 35; for second quote, see Harold Beeley (Baghdad) Minutes. Press Extract about the discovery in Baghdad of an alleged Zionist Fifth Column and reports on editions in the city subsequently, June 24, 1951- 34

against the government and contacting an enemy state. On October 24, 1951, the Justice Minister convened a special court to try the suspects. Evidence was undisclosed, the lead judge was Iraq's Chief Prosecutor, and police used torture to coerce confessions. Shalom, 19, a former Community employee was manacled, mid-air, and beaten, until he said he threw bombs. Shalom signed a statement implicating Yūsuf Baṣrī, a lawyer, in the attacks. The confession was the basis for the trial. The prosecution's witnesses recanted in court: Eliyahu Kurji said police broke his glasses under blows; David Matsafī said police threatened him, digging his 'grave' as he watched.¹⁸⁹¹

Moreover, the prosecutions' case was an established anti-Semitic canard: that Jews conspired to fake persecutions to defame Iraq. "These crimes benefited the Jews," testified a policeman, 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Samārrā'ī, "Every bombing incident brought in its wake rumors and a wave of propaganda, originating among the Jews, whose object was to demonstrate that the Iraqi government and people were persecuting the Jews."¹⁸⁹² The prosecutor, Shāker al-Ānnī, argued the Haganah "instructed its branch in Iraq to carry out these actions," he said. "The purpose of the crimes was to incite the Jews to carry out legal or illegal actions in their places of residence, in order to force the authorities to expel them."¹⁸⁹³

On November 5, 1951, the judge, Ḥamdī Ṣadr al-Dīn, found Baṣrī and Shalom guilty of bombing the US Information Services in Baghdad.¹⁸⁹⁴ Though no one died in the attack, Ṣadr al-

1891 NA (FO 371/91693), "Iraq: Trial of Alleged Zionist Plotters." BBC Monitoring. Oct 23, 1951,- 68; Memorandum Relating to the Trial of Shalom & Basri,-118; Harold Beeley to Foreign Office (London) Dec 17, 1951,- 136; R.H.Landman (London) to R.M. Hadow (London) October 24, 1951,- 76; NA (FO 371/98767), "The Baghdad Trials,"- 15; "Two Iraqi Jews to Die Sentences Confirmed by Supreme Court." *Jewish Chronicle*, December 14, 1951, 28. EQ 1571/1 Trial of Jews in Baghdad (1952)-5; "The Baghdad Trials,"- 14, 16

1892 Gat "Between Terror and Emigration," 8

1893 *Ibid.*, 9

1894 Note Verbale Concernant Le Process Intente Contre Un Groupe D'Israelites Irakiens, le 24 Octobre 1951. AIU (Paris) Nov 8, 1951. NA (FO 371/91693)- 110; Beeley to Foreign Office, Dec 18, 1951. NA (FO 371/91693)- 142

Dīn sentenced the defendants to death.¹⁸⁹⁵ Courts confirmed the sentence of the “two terrorist Jews,” and Baṣrī and Shalom were executed on January 21, 1952.¹⁸⁹⁶

On December 13, 1951, Judge Ṣadr al-Dīn presided over a second trial against twenty-one “Jews...accused of storing arms” and “being members” of Tenuah. Fifteen were convicted. Ṣadr al-Dīn read his verdict: Jews were responsible for the Farhūd and all subsequent anti-Semitic attacks, in a conspiracy to defame Iraq. “Plans were made outside Iraq by Zionist authorities,” to “be executed strictly to the letter in Iraq by the Jewish youth” to “inflare” opinion, the judgement read,

They pretended that they were just preparation for self-defense, on part of Jews in case of any attacks like that of May, 1941 against them...There was no need for taking such precautions as it is not in the nature of the Iraqi people to harm. The 1941 events were but an expected affair caused by some Jews who used what excited and enraged the soldiers and civilians against them...The Jews had lived for centuries past among other communities in Iraq as brethren enjoying peace and security. They never needed any such collective activity or military training or arms had it not been for this aggressive creed of theirs which makes them look upon any country where the Jews live as a foreign one. Smuggling is one of the obligations which this creed imposes upon them, as also resisting the law of the country they are in and waging war against it secretly and openly...To pretend that the training of the Jews in the use of arms was for self-defense is an excuse,

Judge Ṣadr al-Dīn said, Jews claimed they needed to protect themselves after the Holocaust – that they need a state, Israel. “What contradicts their pretend excuse are the military sketches and maps which police seized, drawn up for the destruction of the military institutions and especially the city of Baghdad.” The maps illustrate “Jewish aggressive activity” and, as Ṣadr al-Dīn said:

The Jews in order to execute this well-organized plan, hid the arms, bombs and explosives in their synagogues and houses, so as to train their youth...They also began throwing bombs on places where Jews congregated to kill and wound some of them, to destroy their buildings, and then to spread false rumors and make propaganda that the Iraqis were oppressing the Jews. By doing this, they would have stored up hatred against Iraqis who are completely innocent.¹⁸⁹⁷

Erasing Iraq’s Jewish Community

1895 Abba Eban (Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations) to Luis Padilla Nervo (President of the General Assembly of the United Nations) January 10, 1952. NA (FO 371/98767)-86; “Two Death Sentences in Iraq Trial of Spies.” BBC. Nov 5. NA (FO 371/91693)-94
1896 Samuel Solomon to Under Secretary of State, December 27, 1951. NA (FO 371/91693)- 150; for quote, see “Special Court Judgement in Zionist Activity Case,” 7; Sir J. Troutbeck to Foreign Office (London) January 21, 1952. NA (FO 371/98767)-94 -95
1897 for first quote, “What contradicts,” see “Special Court Judgement in Zionist Activity Case,” 7, for block quote, see Ibid., 9

In 1952, after most Jews left, voices in media and politics continued to call to expel Jews or put them in concentration camps.¹⁸⁹⁸ In April, Nūrī deported 110 Jews, whom the government said were foreign nationals. “Iraqis do hope to get rid of all the Jews in Iraq in time and that the present action is one step to that end,” said a British official.¹⁸⁹⁹ On July 30, 1952, Nūrī imposed new restrictions: Jews could be abroad for a maximum of three months for each trip, and for every journey, must furnish documentary evidence of their intentions: medical reports for the sick; certificates from academic institutions for students; documents of commercial activity for businesspeople; and documents of “intentions” for vacationers. None could tarry abroad after the approved activity ceased. Jews received specially ‘time-limited’ passports, valid for a year, and upon each departure required a signature to “guarantee that they will return to Iraq within three months and that they recognize that the penalty for not returning will be forfeiture of their property and nationality.”¹⁹⁰⁰

To remove Jews, Iraq’s consul arbitrarily refused to renew passports: students studying abroad or convalescents who sojourned to Britain for care.¹⁹⁰¹ Ezra Nisan, arrived in Britain in 1952 to study with a valid passport, but the government stripped him of his nationality two months before the deadline, informing Britain: “notwithstanding the validity of his passport, he would be imprisoned if returned.”¹⁹⁰² Yousif Shahrabani received permission to reside indefinitely in Britain in 1948, to live with his ill wife. Yet when Shahrabani mailed his passport

1898 Longrigg, 362

1899 Bromley to Foreign Office, April 30, 1952. FO 371/98770- 3, 5, for quote, see -5

1900 NA (FO 371/91693), Instructions Relation to the Departure of Jews. Enclosed in Chancery to Foreign Office (London) July 30, 1951,- 57; for quote, “guarantee that...,” see H.M. Embassy to Foreign Office, July 30, 1951,- 55

1901 K. A. L. Parker to Col. J. Teague, (Passport Control Department) July 21, 1953. NA (FO 371/104716) (p.1)

1902 “Examples of insistency and delay on the part o the Iraqi authorities in dealing with applications for revalidation of app sorts of Jews studying in the UK” July 16, 1953. NA (FO 371/104716) (p.1)

for renewal in 1954, the consulate impounded it: “Shahrababni has over-stayed his time outside Iraq and consequently has lost his nationality under the Iraq law relating to Iraqi Jews.”¹⁹⁰³

Iraq continued to eject Jews from the country into our present day, in the 21st century. During World War II, there were perhaps 150,000 Jews in Iraq. However, after 1951, the Jewish population was perhaps 20,000 and continued to decline. In 1955, there were 5,000.¹⁹⁰⁴ A 1964 census found 2,974 Jews. Persecutions intensified. ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Ārif came to power in a coup in 1963. On June 19 of that year, he issued Law No. 54, decreeing all Jews abroad must return in six months, or lose their nationality and property. Thousands of Jews were denationalized. On December 8 of the same year, Law No. 161 ordered Jews to the police stations, to prove residency and receive new identification cards. Those who failed to comply were denationalized.¹⁹⁰⁵ Four years later, in 1967, Law No. 64, allowed applicants to unfreeze funds, but courts “will not accept as evidence claims from people of *Dhimma* religions,” the law said. “Official circles should avoid engaging in official capacity with trade with those declared as Jew by law.” Iraq’s 2005 constitution stated that the denationalized can request citizenship returned, but specially barred Jews and their descendants who lost their nationality under Suwaydī’s laws.¹⁹⁰⁶ After World War II, for decades, the state worked to eradicate Iraq’s Jewish presence and Jews from Iraq’s history. Elkabir visited Baghdad in 1965. He commented, “Little remained of the great edifice built by so many past generations.” The great synagogue was “a heap of ruins.” The Ghawee group of Synagogues was turned to warehouses; Meir Twieg synagogue a passport office. The Laura Khedouri School was “guttled by fire.” Albert Sassoon School became

1903 NA (FO 371/104716), Zand. Iraqi Embassy (London) to P.S. Falla, Esq. (Foreign Office) Sept 28, 1953; for quote, see O. C. Omany Home Office (Aliens Department) to G.H. Baker, Esq. (Foreign Office) August 20, 1953. “Yousif Ezra Shahrabani: Iraqi 650, Wilmslow Road, Withington, Manchester,” 2

1904 R.A. Beaumont to Col. J. Teague (London) July 27, 1955. NA (FO 371/115794) 1

1905 Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 167, 170-171, for quote, see 171

1906 Zahīr Kāzīm ‘Abūd to Sami Moreh and Mordecai Ben-Porat. E-mail. “*Ḥaḡūq al-Yahūd al-‘Irāqīn*,” July 14, 2010, 1-2, for quote, see 2, Nissim Rejwan Archive

tenements. David Sassoon's villa was turned into a cowshed. The government seized the Meir Elias Hospital and renamed it Ruṣāfa Hospital. The Jewish cemetery was razed.¹⁹⁰⁷

Rehabilitating Rashīd ‘Alī Rebels

In parallel with the erasure of Iraq's Jewish culture, the State rehabilitated Rashīd ‘Ālī al-Gaylānī, to signal the institutionalization of anti-Semitism in Iraq as a *Qawmiyya* state. In 1945, after World War II, Rashīd ‘Alī hid in Saudi Arabia. Initially, the Regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah, wanted Rashīd ‘Ālī killed for his 1941 1941 putsch, and urged his extradition. “Rashid Ali [sic] based his claims to popular support in Iraq on anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist feeling.” ‘Abd al-Ilah said. “If he is not executed he will be able in the course of years to start a movement.”¹⁹⁰⁸

Istiqlāl adored Rashīd ‘Ālī for the same reasons, and corresponded with him. “He has plenty of friends here, especially among the Istiqlal,” Trevelyan said of Rashīd Alī. In 1949, in the wake of Iraq's defeat in Israel's Independence War, rumors said Nūrī would pardon Rashīd ‘Alī to usher “a return to power of the Rashid Ali party [sic].” Nūrī's son, Ṣabāḥ, asked Trevelyan to allow Rashīd ‘Ālī's return. Notwithstanding Nūrī's public denials, for he knew the Foreign Office considered Rashīd ‘Ālī an old adversary, leaks warned the British Embassy, “Nuri was working to bring Rashid Ali [sic] back.”¹⁹⁰⁹ Later in 1951, as Rashīd ‘Ālī's wife collected signatures in Egypt to petition his return, Nūrī advised her campaign.¹⁹¹⁰

1907 Ruṣāfa was the name of the district in Baghdad where the hospital was, see Elkabir, *My Communal Life*, 168-169, for quotes, see 168
1908 James C. Wardrop. Minutes. Secret. Rashid Ali. Nov 15, 1950. NA (FO 371/82495) (p.1); Regent ‘Abd al-Ilah (Baghdad) to Prime Minister Clement Atlee (London) Nov 3, 1945. NA (PREM 8/64) 1-3, for first quote, see 3; for second quote, see 1.

1909 NA (FO 371/75186), Humphrey Trevelyan (Baghdad) to Bernard A. B. Burrows, (London) July 27, 1949,- 31; for first quotes see Idem., July 18, 1949- 13; for the quote “a return...,” see Idem., July 26, 1949,- 25; NA (FO 371/91695), Alan Trott. British Embassy (Jedda) to Foreign Office (London) March 25, 1951; for quote, “Nuri was working...,” see Henry Mack (Baghdad) to G. W. Furlonge Foreign Office (London) January 7, 1950.

1910 Beeley to (London) June 20, 1951. NA (FO 371/91695)

In 1953, Jamīl al-Midfa‘ī became Prime Minister and pardoned Rashīd ‘Ālī, restoring his property, “on the occasion of King Feisal’s accession on the 2nd May.”¹⁹¹¹ Midfa‘ī promulgated Law No. 17 for the Restoration of Property, which said that “any person” convicted “for taking part in the incidents of April and May 1941,” an oblique reference to crimes linked to the Farhūd and Rashīd ‘Ālī’s coup, would be refunded property and assets the government seized then. The law was to be executed by the Defense Minister, Nūrī; and the Justice Minister, Muḥammad ‘Alī Maḥmūd, who was Rashīd ‘Ālī’s Communication Minister in 1941. The perpetrators’ rehabilitation signaled Rashīd ‘Ālī’s brand of *Qawmiyya* – a demagogy to encourage the country’s worst impulses – was now the state ideology. This message was intentional, and was a transformation Nūrī steered since releasing and employing Rashīd ‘Ālī’s propagandists amid World War II.¹⁹¹² Iraq was only for Arab Muslims.

Conclusion

The *Qawmiyya* behind the Rashīd ‘Ālī coup that came to power amidst World War II, though briefly, and overthrown, became the dominating politics in Iraq and inaugurated the ethnic cleansing of Jews. Anti-Semitism was an affirmation that Iraq was a *Qawmiyya* state. The political class absorbed the stereotypes of Rashīd ‘Ālī’s uprising – that Jews, an “internal enemy,” sought to destroy Iraq from within. These lies drove Iraq’s policies. Nūrī employed Rashīd ‘Ālī’s pressmen to spread propaganda. The Prime Minister Ḥamdī al-Pāchachī’s Arab Bureaus circulated the canard ‘Zionists’ dominate the West. The political class acted on these

1911 Law No. 17 of 1953 for the Restoration of Property to those who took part in the incidents of April and May 1941. NA (FO 371/104667) 2; for quote, see J.Y. MacKenzie (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) April 20, 1953. NA (FO 371/104667)
1912 for quotes, see Law No. 17 of 1953, NA (FO 371/104667) 2; A.D. M. Ross. Minutes. April 14, 1953. NA (FO 371/104716)

mistruths. Leaders told their colleagues Jews intended to kill Arab leaders, conquer the Middle East and controlled Anglo-American decision-makers.

The State tried to isolate Jews so they could not execute these fictitious ‘plans.’ The State interpreted foreign affairs of any kind as Jewish control. Jews were labeled as foreigners – associated with ideologies that uprooted social norms in Iraq. Jamālī told the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that Jews would turn the Middle East into New York City: Jewish and foreign and no longer Arab. Zionism and Communism became code words for anti-Semitic myths about Jews – that Jews use wealth and global influence to dominate societies and wage wars. Anti-Semitism conflated Communism, Zionism, and Jews together because they were foreign and rivaled State norms.

The government did not ethnically cleanse Iraq’s Jews because of a concrete and present reason, such as Israel’s Independence War, but rather under the inspiration of *Qawmiyya* and a chimerical fear Jews were an ‘internal enemy’ that would conquer Iraq and make Muslims *dhimmi*s. Israel was not a real fear. The ‘*dhimmi* reversal’ was. Iraq’s Jews were. When authorities captured Israeli agents, courts gave them lighter sentences than Iraq’s Jews who were accused of the same crime. Rodney, an actual Israeli agent, was indicted with a charge carrying a five-year sentence.¹⁹¹³ Tagar, also an Israeli agent, was sentenced to ten years. The court refused to sentence Tagar and Rodney to death, despite the prosecution’s request.¹⁹¹⁴ Shalom and Baṣrī, Iraqi Jews, were executed.

Authorities terrorized and imprisoned Iraqi Jews on suspicion they departed for Israel or spoke with Israeli Jews. Yet the government also engineered a mass departure of Jews to Israel

1913 Harold Beeley to Wardrop. Oct 30, 1951. NA (FO 371/91693)-89

1914 Felix S. Awdish, “More Evidence Heard in Zionist Activity Case” *Iraq Times* (Baghdad) December 31, 1951, No. 10177 (MDC Arabic Press Archive) 7

and repeatedly contacted Israel, asking that country accept more Jewish immigrants. For, in truth, the government was unconcerned what Jews or Zionists said or did abroad. In 1949, Britain's Ambassador, Henry Mack, told Niẓāmī that Jewish groups in America complained Iraq persecuted Jews. Niẓāmī said his government did not care. Iraq would not publicize Jews were equal or treated well, despite Mack's pleas.¹⁹¹⁵ The government only cared what Iraqis said or what Iraqis said Jews did. Niẓāmī's concern was eliminating the 'internal enemy,' meaning Iraq's Jews, not Israel.

The trope of protection, to be keepers of *dhimmīs*, lost appeal among politicians. In 1948, Ṣadr said he would not protect Jews if they had politics. In 1951, Nūrī denied responsibility if a massacre occurred. Denationalization and property freezes in 1950-1951 exploited fears that Jews stole Arab money, and the government needed to recoup it. What replaced *dhimmī* concepts of protection was Istiqlāl's anti-Semitism of elimination: to destroy Jewish neighborhoods, attack Zionists, boycott Jews, seize their property, and put them in camps. This 'elimination anti-Semitism' derived from taboos of Jews in power – taboos which expanded from precluding Jews from key positions in government to banning them from government as a whole, and then segregating them from society. The taboo of Jewish authority meant that all Jewish political engagement was prohibited. 'Good' Jews were quietists. Agitators exploited the anxiety perhaps taboo had faded, saying Jews were too often in the administration, wealthy, or successful. Muslim defeats at Jewish hands were an outrage.

Jews long had corporate autonomy, but the perceived misdeeds of Jews needed to be avenged. Mass media extended the awareness of Jewish-related events around the world – the Anglo-Committee of Inquiry, protests in New York, and the Partition of Palestine. Any event

1915 Sir H. Mack (Baghdad) to Foreign Office (London) Oct 28, 1949. NA (FO 371/75182)- 132

that could be interpreted as Jews defeating Muslims inspired attacks on Jews to reaffirm the hierarchy, and slanderous lies of conspiracies to explain why Jews should have no voice. Those hostile to Jews interpreted Iraq's war against Israel from 1948-1949 as evidence Iraq's Jews were a danger. Zionists' trials illustrated the dangers more, and encouraged Iraqis to view their defeats as the machinations of internal enemies, not Israeli victories in battle, while executions were reaffirmations of Arab authority.

State-sponsored anti-Semitism derived from a desire to protect Iraq from Jews – their creeds, their bridgeheads. Nūrī restricted Jews with bans on Jewish immigration. Ṣadr introduced guarantees to stop Jews from traveling to Palestine. Moreover, once Iraq invaded Israel, Ṣadr created a class of regulations that only applied to Jews – travel restrictions, harsher punishments, mail prohibitions, and exclusion from military, education, foreign transactions, hospitals and employment. In six months of 1948, Muzāḥim sought to eliminate Jews as a class, firing them from the government and forbidding import licenses to strangle their companies. A secret British report said, “more than one Arab indicated that the policy toward the Jews was now to be a long term one, with the avoidance of overt acts and violence, but a definite policy over the years of training young Arabs to take the place of Jews” and “milking the Jewish population of its resources.”¹⁹¹⁶

The notion of ethnic cleansing, once the preserve of only the radical fringe, such as Muthanná and Yūnis al-Sab‘āwī, had become mainstream. Nūrī wanted to expel Iraq's Jews. Yet the government did not want the vestiges of persecution. The government wanted Jews to ‘disappear,’ without compulsion, so as not to impeach Arabism, the State, or the hierarchy of faith. As a result, the government orchestrated the denationalization with a Jewish façade, to

1916 R. O. Chandler. Confidential Report. May 1949. JDC (JER 44-52 2 3 JER.307)-2647989 (p. 9)

create the appearance of a voluntary departure. Nevertheless, Nūrī made clear he wanted to expel them if they would not go. *Qawmiyya*'s supporters called to expel Iraq's Jews in June 1951, when most departed, and only 5,000 were expected to remain. Laws seizing property routinized Jews' legal inferiority, with requirements for "Jewish identity cards" for service, making Iraq an anti-Semitic state and degrading Jews to a pariah caste worse than a *dhimmī*. For a *dhimmī*, though inferior, had some theoretical protections, and a space. Jews in a *Qawmiyya* Iraq had no other role than as a bugbear for propagandists, an 'internal enemy' to be expelled.

A Brief Conclusion

In Iraq, government sponsorship of the hierarchy of faith and *Qawmiyya*, swelled anti-Semitism, leading to the displacement of the Jewish community. Before the 20th century, the hierarchy reinforced attitudes about Jews, in which Jews were seen as maladroit, Muslims adept, and the social order was exemplified in Muslims safeguarding Jews. The motif of defending *dhimmīs* was a myth to perpetuate an unequal society, in which Muslims subjugated non-Muslims to rule them. Prohibitions to make Jews lowly – discriminatory taxes, sumptuary laws, injunctions against leadership roles, and relegation to demeaning jobs – derived from the same tropes Muslim heroics derived from: Jews were beneath Muslims. Into the 20th century, biases against Jewish authority circulated in Iraq, and so did the archetypal roles regarding Muslim protection and Jewish submission.

Taboos of Jewish authority clashed with Iraq's integration into global markets in the 19th century. Capitalism enabled Jews to better themselves economically and introduced social mobility outside *dhimmī* norms. Yet despite the transformations in Ottoman societies – a constitution, a world market, and the infusion of industrial goods – the hierarchy's ethos remain rooted in Iraq. As customs changed, restrictive rules fell into disuse, and Jews economically

improved or acquired rights, traditionalists, mortified, tried to force Jews to obey defunct *dhimmī* strictures. The anxiety in each case was that Muslim hegemony would end, and as this panic intensified, so, too, did violence. A look at mass bloodshed against Jews – the riot of 1908, the massacre of the moneychangers of 1917, and the Farhūd of 1941 – reveals that each crime occurred in the aftershock of defeats. Assailants felt the hierarchy imperiled, and accused Jews of assisting an ‘external enemy’ – Young Turks, Britain, or Zionism. The external adversary was irrelevant – the crux was whether the hierarchy was threatened, and the ‘internal enemy’ were believed to be Jews. In each episode, the pillars of authority crumbled, and Judaism was on display, such as its festivities or Jews in spaces they were previously forbidden. In 1908, Jews attended the Young Turks’ gathering at a mosque. Both the massacre of the moneychangers, and the Farhūd occurred on the cusp of Jewish holidays: 1917 on Purim, and the Farhūd on Shavuot. Each happened as the government toppled to non-Muslim or secular foes: Britain and the Young Turks.

Dhimmī norms shaped politics. Even into the 20th century, the public never surrendered the hierarchy’s ancillaries of protection or taboo of Jewish authority. Laws for equality were real, but promulgated to illustrate that Iraqis treat *dhimmīs* well, and neither British nor Iraqi policymakers intended for Jews to have a voice. Moreover, *dhimmī* conventions were implicit in the state for Jews: higher taxes in industries where they worked, lack of public funding, and hiring biases. These conventions concentrated Jews in fields akin to *dhimmī* roles that compounded with glass ceilings.

These social prejudices led to ethnic cleansing of the Jewish community with the development of *Qawmiyya*, a nationalism that was in part, a backlash against Jewish equality. *Qawmiyya* viewed Jews as effete, hateful Europeans avaricious for money. Jewish characteristics

and habits – clothes, diction, complexion, and career – were fetishized as markers that Jews did not belong. Jews ceased to embody Muslims’ hierarchy of faith and tropes of protection, instead embodying Arabism’s contention Europe oppressed Arabs, and came to be thought of as racial foes.

Motifs of protection and taboos of authority blocked Jews’ ability to counteract slanders. Those Iraqis who cherished *dhimmi* norms were infuriated that Muslims were accused of demonizing Jews, or that Jews would accuse Muslims of impropriety. Complaints inspired defenders of the hierarchy to excuse the attacks, and attacks inspired copycats, which served to promote a positive feedback loop, in which attacks encouraged more attacks. The only socially acceptable recourse for Jews was to plead government protection. Yet, with *Qawmiyya*’s growing ascendancy in the state, the government itself was hostile; there was no recourse. The government was a source of anti-Semitism, first through a series of government fronts – the Muthanná Club, the Futuwwa, and the Committee for the Defense of Palestine – each warning that Jews would conquer Iraq. Already in the 1930’s, the state’s agitators espoused ethnic cleansing. Rashīd ‘Ālī’s plotters seized power, alarmed that the hierarchy would end. Their intended solution was to ‘destroy’ Iraq’s Jews. The same phobia produced the Farhūd, and the exit of most of Iraq’s Jews in the 1950s.

State revenue enabled anti-Semitism to consume the country. Government activists, the Muthanná, and Ḥājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī seized power in the Rashīd ‘Ālī coup, and used the Futuwwa to police the streets. Though *Qawmiyya* was popular for appealing to existing Iraqi prejudices, stirring the public’s basest bigotries, the government supplied the putschists’ funds, structure, contacts, security, and means to spread their propaganda. Rashīd ‘Ālī, while in power, established secret anti-Semitic cells under Ḥusaynī’s direction to foment revolution. *Qawmiyya*

and the hierarchy of faith were pillars upon which anti-Semitism stood, promoted via government propaganda and largess.

The political class came to accept the anti-Semitic interpretation of the necessity of an unequal society: Muslims ruled not because they were ethical protectors, not because they were believers in the truth of Islam, as in previous eras, but hereafter, as *Qawmiyya* postulated, because Jews were internal enemies and needed to be crushed. This ‘interpretation’ drove Iraqi policy; it transformed Iraq into an anti-Semitic state to protect itself from a mythical plot. The state imposed segregationist laws, while ethnic cleansing became a respectable opinion.

In the post-World War II era, anti-Semitism motivated by the interplay of *Qawmiyya* and *dhimmī* motifs created a strange duality: libelers and lawmakers called to expel Jews, rob them en masse, or imprison them in concentration camps, yet also denied that Iraqis mistreated or oppressed Jews. Instead, *dhimmī* norms and *Qawmiyya* compromised, and demoted Jews from the low position of *dhimmī* to the lesser class of ‘internal enemy’ or ‘Zionist.’ Jews became pariahs, subject to expulsion and denationalization at the whim of bureaucrats, barred from free movement, expression, and from most public institutions and careers, under the false belief that ‘internal enemies’ were plotting against the state.

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