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**National Identities and the Decolonization Experiences of France and Great
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
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
**NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND THE DECOLONIZATION EXPERIENCES
OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN**


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Abstract

By the late twentieth century, both France and Great Britain achieved a similar status as economically-developed democracies of middling size within a global capitalist system. Yet each entered the twentieth century administering vast colonial possessions that spanned the globe. France, however, violently resisted the demise of its empire, fighting two wars in a single decade in Southeast Asia and North Africa. In contrast, Great Britain allowed its much more substantial empire to dissolve without significant resistance. What accounts for their varying responses to the process of decolonization? Though the material costs and benefits of empire clearly influenced both countries' response to decolonization, these considerations alone do not account for the different responses. This thesis applies a social constructivist approach that goes beyond material interests to highlight how ideas about national identity in France and Great Britain shaped their responses to the common pressures towards decolonization.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Literature Review

In order to understand the different responses by Great Britain and France to imperial decline, this thesis takes a Constructivist approach. Constructivism is an analytical approach in the social science that rejects the positivist distinction between facts and values. Rather than investigating the relationship between variables in its research design, a Constructivist agenda instead pays attention to the discourses, shared understandings, and identities through which political actors give meaning to, and make sense of, their decisions and actions (Wendt 1999 Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). Through its focus on language and ideas, Constructivism departs from the methodological individualism of social science, regarding individuals as merely the carriers of ideas which themselves shape the way those individuals understand and justify their behavior.

In the study of international relations (IR), Constructivism has grown from a niche critique of standard approaches to become a broad research agenda in its own right alongside the traditional alternatives of Realism and Liberalism. Realism, the oldest tradition, views international politics as an arena of competition and conflict. Realists consider the key actors in this arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, and which pursue their own national interests understood in terms of the struggle for power. Along with this emphasis on power and self-interest comes a skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms in relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a realm of anarchy, characterized by actual or potential conflict among states (Morgenthau 1960).

Hans Morgenthau did not deny the relevance of morality in international politics. Instead, he was skeptical of moralism, in the sense of abstract standards divorced from political realities. His particular target was the idealist strain of political thinking which, in the early 20th century, envisioned that nation-states could look beyond their narrow self-interests and pursue an international common good, even to the point of abolishing war as an instrument of policy (Carr 1951). This, to Morgenthau, was fatally unrealistic, as it failed to challenge the rise of revisionist powers like Italy, Germany, or Japan until it was too late to avoid global war. In the Realist view, if policy makers are guided by any ethical maxim in their decision making, it is the dictates of prudence, or the rational weighing of alternatives with respect to their consequences, rather than any values that might transcend the national interest.

Despite the blow to its credibility and to the relevance of institutions like the League of Nations, the older idealist tradition revived after World War II under the name of Liberalism, and under the wing of American power. Unlike the older idealists, modern Liberals didn't deny human nature. While modern liberals didn't dispute the anarchical nature of international politics or the imperative of self-help, they argued that formal international institutions (and less formal hybrids, called "regimes"), had the potential to shift the conduct of states in a more cooperative direction (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984). In this Liberal (or Liberal Institutional) view, states did have security interests, but other interests besides, such as economic well-being. States could think of their interests in terms of power, but they could also pursue their interests through institutional arrangements that gave them incentives to cooperate, rather than compete. Borrowing certain ideas about market failure from the field of economics, Robert Keohane in particular argued that institutions solved certain information and trust problems that impeded international cooperation (Keohane 1984, ch. 5). Liberal Institutionalists acknowledged that all

this rested on the fact of the postwar hegemony exercised by the United States, but they also argued that a Liberal international order might become so deeply institutionalized that it would outlive the hegemonic arrangement that first gave rise to it.

In response to this revived postwar Liberal tradition, modern Realists also reached out to economic ideas about market competition in order to recast their arguments. While Realists of the classical sort such as Morgenthau or Reinhold Niebuhr grounded their analyses on certain philosophical assumptions about human nature and sin, later scholars like Kenneth Waltz (1979) recast the Realist perspective in the modern language of social science, claiming to derive the structure of international politics from the core Realist assumption of rational self-interest: “Internationally, the environment of states’ actions, or the structure of their system, is set by the fact that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end” (Waltz 1979, p. 93). Waltz didn’t deny the reality of postwar international institutions. He simply didn’t think they mattered, in some long run. If, to Waltz, state behavior is constrained by the structure of the international system, then in the context of anarchy, each state must remain uncertain about the intentions of others. Even in situations of mutual gain, states may be afraid that the possible gains resulting from cooperation may favor other states more than themselves, thus diminishing their security. “States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.” (Waltz 1979, 107). In this Neo-realist view, International institutions, whether political or economic, matter only because they reinforce prevailing state interests, particularly those of powerful states. Once those interests change, Neo-realists contend, so too should the institutions.

Both Liberal Institutionalism and Neo-realism provide plausible narratives that make sense of the imperial decline of both Great Britain and France during the early to mid-20th century. In the Liberal account, empire became unsustainable for both countries because the very tenets of Liberalism contradicted it. Try as they might to justify empire in the paternalistic terms of the welfare of their subject peoples, as the Liberal ideal of self-determination unfolded, increasingly-large parts of the global South demanded political independence as a condition for their own socio-economic development. In this view, the fate of both empires was prefigured by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, which created a multitude of new nation-states. In India, this challenge to the British Raj solidified as early as 1917. The establishment of multilateral institutions, and the United Nations itself, reinforced this trend by recognizing the nation-state as the unit of international politics. Within this new international architecture, multi-national empires were becoming functionally obsolete. In addition, within the domestic politics of both Great Britain and France, the growth of Liberal ideals of governance and citizenship undermined political constituencies that supported empire. Particularly, the emergence of welfare-state politics in both countries beginning in the 1930s focused policies and resources on the domestic populations, and not on imperial commitments. By mid-century, the policy commitment to some form of the welfare state across Western Europe forced a rebalancing between the demands of ‘empire’ and ‘butter’ that made older imperial projects untenable.

Realists look at the same period and tell a different story. In both the British and French instances, the decline of empire was a straightforward consequence of imperial overstretch and the rise of a bipolar world order whose origins lay in the wreckage of World War I. If the late 19th-century imperial scramble for Africa was a straightforward expression of European great-

power competition, both France and Great Britain sought to protect their imperial cores through further acquisitions that were self-justifying. The rise of the revisionist Axis powers dealt profound blows to these empires, particularly as Germany's rapid defeat of France exposed its weakness to its colonial possessions in North Africa. This was all the more shocking because the French themselves had regarded their African colonial populations as a "force noire" that would enhance the country's military capacity against its historical enemy. As President Poincare put it in 1923, thanks to its colonies "France is not a country of forty millions; she is a country of one hundred millions" (quoted in Arendt 1951, p. 129). Likewise, the Japanese conquest of French Indo-China, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies both exposed the fragility of all three empires and energized the movements that would later aspire to national self-determination. Finally, even though Germany and Japan ultimately lost the war, the postwar *Pax Americana* was fundamentally hostile to colonial empires as ideologically inconvenient in its attempt to contain global communism. For its part, the Soviet Union for obvious ideological and geopolitical reasons routinely opposed colonial administrations as outposts of global capitalist exploitation.

In addition to the Liberal and Realist interpretations of colonial decline, a third tradition, Marxism, has analyzed colonialism from its economic significance within an expanding global capitalist system. In this view, capitalist "markets, rather than establishing values through supply and demand mechanisms, can be means of exploiting people by setting the prices of goods lower than the cost of the labor required to produce them" (Anderson, Peterson, Toops, & Key, 2015). In the Marxist view, the exploitative essence of capitalism required its expansion globally in order to provide new investment opportunities for surplus capital (Hobson 1938), or open up new markets for capitalist overproduction (Lenin 1933). As capitalism entered its "monopoly" phase

by the late 19th century, its expansion into underdeveloped parts of the world was regarded by Marxists as essential to its survival.

Because they both focus on material interests, Realism and Marxism share a common intellectual basis. Though economic historians have since disputed the importance of imperial expansion for world capitalism, particularly during the “scramble for Africa” during the late 19th century (Baumgart 1982, ch. 4), the decline of colonial empires can still be understood within a Marxist framework. In particular, capitalism responded to the global crisis of the 1930s by inventing forms of the welfare state that solved (or at least postponed) the problems of overproduction and underconsumption that colonial possessions were supposed to have served to correct. In any event, the emergence of a neoliberal economic order after World War II re-established exploitative relationships between a capitalist core and its peripheries without the need to maintain actual colonies. In this way, both the Liberal and Marxist perspectives converge on a common account of why colonial empires became increasingly untenable in the 20th century.

While these Realist, Liberal, and Marxist perspectives provide compelling explanations for why the era of colonial empires ended, they do not necessarily explain why the process of decolonization differed between the two empires. In particular, why did the British let go of their possessions in a relatively peaceful fashion, whereas the French fought wars in Algeria and Indo-China to maintain their position? In order to answer this question, concepts from the Constructivist tradition in international relations scholarship provide clues unavailable in the other traditions.

While there is much scholarly debate about whether Constructivism is compatible with a positivist epistemology (Wendt 1995), or whether it necessarily assumes a “critical” stance with

respect to the normative aspects of world politics (Hopf 1998), Constructivism makes an essential contribution to the IR field, especially in terms of understanding the significance and roles played by national identities, and their relationship to national interests (Horowitz 2002). Indeed, the concept of national identity has been picked up by mainstream political science as well (Huntington 1993).

Rather than assume national interests as given, or as otherwise driven by a rational interest to maximize power in an anarchical environment, Constructivism poses these interests themselves as a scholarly problem. In particular, it asks how norms and identities may shape interests (Checkel 1998). This concern with how national interests are shaped looks back to the very origins of the modern nation-state system to explore anarchy itself not as a fact of existence, but as a condition itself created through political practice (Wendt 1992).

Modern international politics takes place within, and through, the Westphalian system. For over 350 years, the nation-state has increasingly formed the core of this system. The modern state consists of four dimensions. First, it has a government, in the sense of some centralized machinery of rule based upon an administrative capacity that operates within a defined geographical territory. It is through this dimension that the state exercises power, in the conventional Realist sense. Second, it has a nation, in the sense of a community of citizens that recognize bonds among themselves that give rise to a collective sense of national belonging. This identity is necessarily “imagined” (Anderson 1983) in the sense that it exists without its members actually knowing each other. Third, it has an economy, in the sense that organized material production takes place which contributes to the sustenance and welfare of the national community. Even in the modern global economy, national economies are fundamentally autarkic in the sense that most economic value is still generated within, and with respect to, national-

territorial borders. Finally, the modern state enjoys sovereignty in the formal sense that its authority to exercise power over the people and conditions within its geographical territory is recognized both internationally and by its subject peoples themselves.

If this ideal-type of the Westphalian nation-state dominates the modern arena of international politics, anarchy is not some external condition to which nation-states must adapt, or die, but is actually constitutive of the four dimensions that define nation-states themselves. Since nation-states vary according to all four dimensions (and not just in terms of the first, with respect to their power capacities), a Constructivist perspective has much to contribute to IR scholarship in terms of how these variations come about.

In order to understand the different responses taken by the British and French empires to the common pressures of decolonization, this thesis looks at how British and French national identities shaped their understandings of empire, and how maintaining empires contributed to these identities. To do this, the thesis distinguishes between international norms that serve as a common constraint upon political action, and state-level norms (particularly understandings of collective identity) that represent sources of variation (see Farrell 2002). In particular, the second and fourth dimensions of the modern nation-state (identity and sovereignty) generate the international norm of national self-determination which became increasingly influential in world politics from the 19th century onward. Paradoxically, though, respect for this international norm created discursive spaces for the flowering of national norms, and national independence narratives, whose contents could contradict the broader construct.

From a Constructivist view, then, the pursuit of empire, and the acquisition of colonies towards this end, set up a distinctive tension between international and domestic norms. In her classic study of imperialism, Hannah Arendt framed the problem as a contradiction between the

ideology of nationalism (especially the imperative of national self-determination), and any possible justification for imperialism. “No nation-state”, she writes, “could with a clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign peoples, since such a conscience only comes from the conviction of the conquering nation that it is imposing a superior law upon barbarians.” Yet even a sense of national identity grounded in some belief in group superiority collided with the implications of national self-determination: “The nation, however, conceived of its law as an outgrowth of a unique national substance which was not valid beyond its own people and the boundaries of its own territory” (Arendt 1951, 126-7).

In effect, European imperial projects, and particular the late 19th century “scramble for Africa”, flowered precisely in that historical era when the growing legitimacy of national self-determination was calling such projects into question. Indeed, the British and French empires grew to their greatest extent even as older multinational constructs—the Spanish, the Ottoman, and the Austro-Hungarian empires, to name three—were disintegrating under the force of the national idea. Not only was imperialism delegitimated by the growth of national self-determination, the very practice of empire-building was self-limiting. As Arendt puts it, “wherever the nation-state appeared as conqueror, it aroused national consciousness and desire for sovereignty among the conquered people, thereby defeating all genuine attempts at empire building” (Arendt 1951, 127).

Even if imperialism was doomed, in this sense (the demise of the Soviet Union being a belated confirmation of this tendency), how these empires unwound requires recognizing the connection between empire and national identity. For the French, colonial projects articulated with, and supported, national identity in ways different from the British experience. The French commitment to assimilation expressed its self-regard for the universal meaning of its political

values. Thus, a loss of empire was tantamount to a loss of French legitimacy. This assimilationist ideology led to very different relations between France and its colonies, as compared to what prevailed in the British empire. Thus, when the moment came, the French opposed the dissolution of their empire, and above all, of their control over Algeria, with far greater violence than did the British. For the British, imperial expansion was also an important support to national identity. However, the British tended to regard the persistence of empire itself, particularly over non-whites, as a self-justifying project. There was no ulterior motive to it, in the same way that assimilation represented an ulterior motive to the French. The sheer fact and persistence of British rule over subject races was itself proof of the superiority of British institutions. In contrast, the British took a far different attitude towards the white settler colonies (the Dominions) that it spawned from the 18th century onwards. Again, according to Arendt (1951), in these settlements, Great Britain “did not expand, but transplanted, its political structure...Instead of conquering and imposing their own law upon foreign peoples, the English colonists settled on newly-won territory in the four corners of the world and remained members of the same British nation” (pp. 127-128). Yet, by the very nature of these settlements, British control was viewed as self-liquidating with the transition of its settler colonies to political sustainability and maturity. For India, on the other hand, there was no such expectation, yet the identitarian connection between the British colonizers and their subject peoples was correspondingly weaker. Thus, when Britain faced the historical moment of losing India as a colony, the blow to British self-regard was less existential than the loss of Algeria was to the French.

In order to explore these divergent responses to imperial dissolution, the thesis examines as a case study the violent end of French rule in Algeria. After that, the thesis sketches a

comparison between this experience and certain features of the British experience in India that point to why Britain did not resist disengagement from India with the same violence found in the French case.

CHAPTER TWO

France: Identity and Colonization

Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. These are the bold words of the French Revolution, an event that shocked the world, and which would transform the European continent forever. Putting French colonial ambitions aside, it's important to note the French political climate that persisted at the time of the Revolution. France was one of many traditional European monarchies that was a mainstay of the European continent previous to the Revolution. However in France its unique aspect was a society broken down by the estate system. The first estate was the traditional landed aristocracy that consisted of the entitled class to certain land and ruling rights. The second estate consisted of the clergy. This being those who were in the traditional roles of the Catholic Church including priests and deacons, and was the dominant religion of the time. Lastly was the third estate which consisted for a lack of a better term everyone else. This included not only the poor, but also the many other professions as well including artisans, lawyers and blacksmiths.

Given the theoretical framework of Constructivism and its ideas on identity and in relations to states, it's easy to see where there might be explanation of why the French pursued their colonial ambitions in the early of the 19th century. The 19th century was an era of much change and the French people and state experienced major institutional changes. The French Revolution brought the end of the traditional hierarchy of inherited rule in France as well as elsewhere in Europe. This grassroots movement would see the toppling of a powerful monarchy and the establishment of a more egalitarian system in which the people would decide the outcomes of who was to lead rather than a aristocracy.

Though sometimes not fully understood it's easy to spot that the French leaders early on were not sure how to pursue their goals of colonization. After the Napoleonic wars, the European continent became less of a volatile place for the time being in that balance of power strategies pursued by the Concert of Europe decreased political competition on the continent. France and other nations began to look elsewhere to where they could find potential sources to project power and gain political advantage for themselves in the continent and the world. In the wake of the defeats it experienced during these conflicts, the French had lost a great majority of its overseas possessions and the country had been saddled with massive debt from its many military expeditions. After Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, the Bourbon monarchy line was restored and began to try and interject their own form of policy to reshape France's posture in order to maintain its relevancy on the political field with the other European powers.

France had had a long history up to this point of failed colonial ambitions. In the contest of the western powers of Europe to colonize the New World, France, owing to a mistaken policy, failed completely and saw her flag and sovereignty practically driven back from the North American continent (Balch 1909). When the French debarked in July, 1830, in Algeria, they were still dominated by the idea of collective colonization. At that time they had not the slightest notion how to develop a colony.

Ethnically the region was dominated by small farmers and traders known as Berbers in the region known as the Maghreb (the areas of North Africa west of Egypt). They were a loose organizations of tribes who had developed trade and agriculture with the surrounding areas. They however were first conquered by the Carthaginians in 900 B.C and the region was

controlled until it was annexed by the Roman Empire in 24 A.D. Under Roman rule it would see that the region had Christianity brought to it and would eventually become the dominant religion for the time being. Then in the 8th century A.D., there was a significant event that changed the course of the region's history. The first Arab military expeditions into the Maghreb, between 642 and 669, resulted in the spread of Islam. By 711 the Umayyad's (a Muslim dynasty based in Damascus from 661 to 750), helped by Berber converts to Islam, and had conquered all of North Africa. In 750 the Abbasids succeeded the Umayyad's as Muslim rulers and moved the caliphate to Baghdad. The area would become slowly intermixed with Arab culture and the Berber culture and would take on the new identity. In 1516, Algiers would be captured by 2 brothers Orec and Hayreddin (known to Europeans as Barbarossa or Red Beard). They requested the assistance of the Ottoman Empire in securing the region from Spanish invasion.(Naylor 2009, p. 117).

However Spain retook Algiers in 1519 and Orec was killed. When aid from the Ottomans came, Barbarossa was able to turn the tables and defeated the Spanish in 1525. The Ottoman' then made Barbarossa head over what came to be known as the Regency of Algiers. The Ottoman Empire would then use Algiers as a major base of operations for war with Spain until a peace treaty is signed in 1580 (Abun-Nasr 1987, p. 151). At this point many European countries (including France) began to take serious interest in the region. The independent rulers of the region (including those of Tripoli, Algiers, and others) began raiding European and American merchant ships traveling through the Mediterranean. Though collecting valuable goods and other products was indeed an important part of their raids, they also sought to capture white sailors to be sold into slavery. The slave trade business in the Ottoman Empire was a very vital part of the economy and the capture of white sailors by the Barbary Pirates helped fuel the demand. Many of these slaves were mostly kept in the surrounding regions of the Maghreb to be

used to work the wheat fields and would be used in other aspects as serving in camel caravans. In many cases these sailors were negotiated and given back to their respective countries. In other cases if they converted to Islam they would be set free (as Muslims don't enslave other Muslims), but on the condition that they could never leave. Not only were Barbary Pirates seizing vessels, they were also raiding areas throughout Europe in the Mediterranean and even as far north as Iceland. This didn't sit too well with many European nations who at the time were beginning to also expand more beyond their own borders as well and building empires. The attack on their trade was becoming more of a problem for European traders to do commerce and the demand for action was rising. Many nations would pay tribute to these Barbary States in hopes that they would not attack their shipping. These however were only deals that were struck between European nations and one or two of the Barbary States and it wouldn't guarantee any safe passage from the other states in the area.

There began a call for action. In Algiers, the Dey was in dispute with the Dutch, who had claimed that the Dey was not holding up his end of the bargain and letting their ships pass. The Dutch responded by sending a squadron of ten ships which proceeded to bombard Algiers. Though Algiers later rebounded and recovered, the effects of the European and American wars against the Barbary States that would last throughout the 18th and early 19th century, and this would put pressure on the leadership of Algiers to try and revive their economies while trying to fight conflicts with the European powers. However in the late 18th century, French relations with the Regency of Algiers were cordial in nature as the French were trading with the city via the ports of Marseille and even helped move pilgrims to Mecca by means of Alexandria (McGougall 2017, p. 50). Algiers however would make a pact that would ultimately change the course of history for Algeria. In 1790s, merchants who were part of the treasury the Dey of Algiers made

an agreement in which grain supplies were sent to revolutionary France and the French would pay Algiers in credit in exchange for wheat and other food items which Napoleon would need for his war in Egypt and other campaigns throughout Europe (Strathern 2007). The Dey made the deal and even sent some soldiers to take part in some of Napoleon's campaigns throughout Europe. However as Napoleon's rule came to an end and a new line was restored, things between France and the Regency began to deteriorate. With peace on the continent following the Congress of Vienna, the French monarchy and the French people were desperate to find an opportunity in which their aspirations to greatness could once again find expression in the political field of Europe and even that of the world. With relations falling apart as the Dey of Algiers demanded repayment of the debt that had been brought upon them by the French, the Bourbon monarchy countered with a proposition that all Christians that had been taken prisoner be returned (McDougall 2017, p. 58). Things boiled over in 1827 when the French consul to Algiers, Pierre Deval, was struck by the Dey with a fan because Deval was quoted to have insulted the honor of the Dey. This meant war, and the French enacted a blockade of the city of Algiers for the next three years, crippling the coastal city. The French military embarked from Toulouse and landed outside of Algiers and easily brushed off the defenses of the Algiers defenders. Over 37,000 French troops forced the capitulation of the Dey and had caused turmoil within the Regency. The Dey and his many commissaries first fled to Naples and then later fled to Izmir. Within a week of the occupation, the Bourbon monarchy had completely collapsed and a new government had emerged. Charles X was overthrown in a revolution and was replaced by Louis-Phillipe, Duke of Orleans to the French throne. Despite the collapse, the military continued its campaign against the Regency forces, and despite being outnumbered, the Dey's capitulation created confusion amongst the Regency's forces and in many cases they

simply put up no defense against the French. Hajj Ahmad, the Bey of Constantine, refused to submit to French authority and only to the authority of the Ottoman sultan. He returned from the defense of Algiers to overthrow the commissaries in the city only to protect his interests in anticipation of the French occupation (McDougall 2017, p. 52). The city of Oran fell without a shot and the French later sailed to Alexandria. The French invasion of Algeria was almost one of self-ambition and image building in order to bolster their own strength and prestige on the world stage. After the Fan Affair, the monarch at that time Charles X was in a weak position and not popular among his subjects. Thus, some striking action was necessary in order to show his resolve. The French for three years before the invasion had been blockading the port of Algiers and had for the most part had been unsuccessful. Britain's control of Greece gave them an advantage in trade with the region.

At this point, the French felt they were forced to act. On the 25th of May, 1830, the French expeditionary force left from Toulon and several weeks later they landed in the bay of Sidi-Furruch just several miles from Algiers and within a matter of weeks they had routed the Dey's forces and Algiers and surrounding cities including Bon. Oran also fell to the French (Dunwoodie 1998, pp. 9-10). Initially the French only had interests in controlling the coastal cities, but eventually had to push inward as constant rebellions threatened French military and economic interests (Hussey 2014, p. 112).

The French occupation of the Maghreb had repercussions for French national ideals. Now it may be said that there were material gains to be had from the adventure. However with the instability of the French regimes in this era colonialism was a means to re-establish some national pride and to revalidate the achievements of the French revolution with respect to the French nation. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it

We should set out to create not a colony properly speaking in Algeria, but rather the extension of France itself across the Mediterranean. It is not a matter of creating new people with its own laws, its customs, its interests, sooner or later its separate nationality, but of implanting in Africa a population that resembles us in everything. If this goal cannot be attained immediately, it is at least the only one for which we should constantly and actively strive (quoted in Ahluwalia, p. 24). By asserting its control over the Algerian people, France sought to assert its civilization superiority and its right to rule foreign lands. Algeria officially became part of France in 1848 and was divided into three departments. Benjamin Stora states:

An Algeria made up of three French departments would forever 'Gallicize' the territories of the central Maghreb and its aim to ensure the absolute and complete subjugation of the population to the needs and interests of colonization. The colons enjoyed full rights, the colonized were subjects not citizens, liable to special provisions: tallage, corvee, and detention without due process.

The Jews of the Maghreb had an interesting time adjusting to the new situation and they had been trying to get situated with a new European identity. Two rabbis claimed they had already had been proven in other European lands:

Sentiments and passions are not abstract or immutable. They need the nurturing of concrete forces in order to develop; civil and military courage come from love of the patria, this noble instinct of the soul is what allows men to connect to the soil where they can exercise their civic life that armies of Holland and Belgium are teeming with Jews. Poland roused an entire regiment whose bravery was remarkable. Our Republic, as with Italy, could demonstrate with pride, the noble and valorous soldiers born with thin the bosom of the Jewish faith.

The Jewish population by 1890 had been fully integrated and had been given roles by the French government to favor them over the Algerian Muslims and Berbers.

As Jews, French, neo-French, Algerians, and natives, were becoming formally embedded within the conditions, practices, interactions, and the institutions of every day political life in Algeria, these categories varied according to context. A settler may have been French when requesting aid at the public assistance office in central Algiers, a Valencian at the café in his local Bab el Oued neighborhood, and an Algerian around election time (Ahluwalia, p. 31).

Despite all this the Jews were not well received by the local pied-noirs. In fact like many of the Algerian Muslims and others, they were subject to discrimination.

With a large part of Algeria 'civilized', the French began to bring in colonists to fill in the regions where Arabs and Berbers once lived. Local military officials transferred land from the local Berbers and Arabs over to the white French and Spanish settlers (Dunwoodie 1998). By 1900 the European settlers would number nearly 2 million. While the European immigrants enjoyed the rights of being French citizens, the local Arab and Berber Muslims were treated very differently. The local population outnumbered the European population nearly 2 to 1, but they enjoyed little to no rights that the French citizens had. Almost every district and municipalities on all levels were overwhelmingly controlled by the French settlers with only a few Algerians being able to even vote (about 50,000). Many observers from the outside looking in however had favorable views of what many saw as a great system of colonization. "Whoever has witnessed the tremendous amount of labor which France has expended on Algeria, feels only contempt for those even in the presence of remarkable achievements still dare to allege that the French are not good colonizers", boasted on German observer (Holstein 1932, p. 385).

For many observers looking in the European settlers were seen as the ones best at putting the land and the resources to good use. Algerians themselves had little input into the legal regime established by the French occupiers. "Laws specifically related to Algeria were adapted or

initiated in a 'regime of decrees' established in 1834, controlled by the administration and thus escaping parliamentary control. The nearest semblance to any Algerian legislative assembly was the *Delegations Financieres*, composed of mixed European and Muslim members, but the competence of this body was limited to budgetary matters; and in practice, for one reason or another it tended to reflect the interests of the grand colons ” (Horne 1978, p. 33). This meant as the colony was ruled by decree and rather through parliamentary laws that might have treated the Algerian population with some sympathy. The Third Republic's push for control contributed to the formation of a new identity among the colonials now living there. The passage of a new French citizenship law in 1889 “consolidated the basis of modern French national identity, a republican universalistic ethos and a territory-based (jus soli) idea of citizenship” which impacted Algeria as well (Zack 2002, p. 65).

By the late 19th century, the French state had a two-fold aspect. “Constitutionally, the Third Republic was simultaneously a parliamentary state whose authority derived from popular consent and a colonial state whose authority derived from political conquest. It had somehow to reconcile the precept of national-popular sovereignty with a legalized racial distinction between rulers and ruled. It is therefore appropriate to characterize France by World War I as an imperial nation-state. The term indicates the dual character of France as a single political formation in which parliamentary republican and authoritarian colonial elements were structurally interrelated and not simply added to one another.” (Wilder 2005, p. 26). The French in general had segregated the native population from the rest of the other Europeans and had made the people of Algeria virtual slaves in their own countries.

As the years went on the Algerians began to in some ways get weary of their French masters and many grew resentful of the French. However during World War I, thousands of

Algerians fought with the French and with the end of the war and the shifting of ideas especially from those of Woodrow Wilson's idea of colonial autonomy, many Algerians began to have an interest in independence. During WWII however the French quickly capitulated to the Germans and Algeria came under the control of the fascist Vichy French government. With the Allies landing in Morocco in Operation Open Torch, the Vichy French government collapsed and the Algerians helped the Allies in retaking parts of North Africa. With the end of the war in sight, the Algerians began to think that just maybe there might be some resolution. On the very day the war ended in Europe, thousands of Algerians took to the streets in the town of Setif to celebrate the end of the war (Paul et al. 2013, p. 77). They also took the opportunity to express their grievances with the French. The events turned violent when the French authorities attempted to seize the banners and flags of the demonstrators. This led to a riot in which the rioters attacked and killed nearly one hundred French settlers. This prompted a harsh response by the French in which airplanes and troops were called in and they began bombing villages and shooting at civilians, producing thousands of deaths. This event known as the Setif Massacre marked the rise of nationalist consciousness and organizations in French Algeria. The most famous of these organizations would be the National Liberation Front or FLN.

The FLN was established in 1954 after a split in the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, and was formed largely by former members of the Special Organization paramilitary group who were in hiding. It initially had a five-man leadership consisting of Mostefa Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M'hibi, Rabah Bitit, Mohammed Boudiheb and Mourad Ahmed Bella and Mohamed Khider later in the summer (Tachau 1994, p. 31). The FLN were avowed socialists and wanted to replace the colonial regime with a socialist government. On November

1st, 1954, the FLN released a proclamation to the Algerian people stating the goals and intentions of their revolution:

1) the restoration of the sovereign, democratic and social Algerian state, within the framework of Islamic principles. 2) The respect of all fundamental liberties without distinction of race or religion. 3) Political reform by the returning of the National Revolutionary Movement to its true path and by the wiping-out of the vestiges of corruption and reformism, the causes of our current regression. 4) The gathering together and organization of all the healthy energies of the Algerian people for the liquidation of the colonial system. 4) The internalization of the Algerian problem. 5) The realization of North African unity within its natural Arab-Islamic framework. 6) Within the framework of the UN Charter, the affirmation of our active sympathy with regard to all nations who support our operations for liberation (trans. Mitchell Abidor).

The FLN was looking to gain international sympathy while at the same time turn towards the region in which they lived to gain support from other groups in the surrounding areas of Tunisia and Morocco and even as far as Egypt. The following part of the proclamation is a call in which the FLN outlines their struggle and what means they intend to use:

1) The opening of negotiations with the authorized spokesmen of the Algerian people on the basis of the recognition of sovereignty through Algerian liberation, one and indivisible. 3) The creation of a climate of confidence through the liberation of all political prisoners, the lifting of all measures of exception and the ceasing of all pursuit of the fighting forces. 3) the recognition of Algerian nationality by an official declaration abrogating the edicts, decrees and laws making Algeria a “French land,” which is a denial of the history, the geography, the language, the religion, and the mores of the Algerian people (trans. Mitchell Abidor).

Essentially the FLN directly challenged the French premise that Algeria was an integral part of the French nation. Uncounted Algerians had been killed or imprisoned by the French in the years of struggle. However even with their opposition to the French, the FLN made an interesting move in the next part of their declaration by appealing to French civilians living in Algeria and offering them some sort of amnesty:

1) French cultural and economic interest, honestly acquired, will be respected, as will persons and families. 2) All Frenchmen wishing to remain in Algeria will have the choice between their nationality of origin, in which case they will be considered foreigners vis a vis the laws in place, or they will opt for Algerian nationality, in which case they will be considered such in rights and obligations. 3) The bonds between France and Algeria will be defined and will be the object of an agreement between the two powers on the basis of equality and mutual respect (trans. Mitchell Abidor).

With the stage set thusly, the FLN would begin its operations and movement for independence. In November 1954, a group of about 300 FLN members began operations against French military installations, police posts, and communication centers. The FLN members were armed with nothing more than hunting rifles and shotguns and were limited to hit and run tactics in order to avoid large French military engagements (Paul et al. 2013, p. 77). Much to the dismay of the leaders of the FLN, they did not at first gain much support from the local Arab population. With these small attacks the French merely shrugged them off as just small acts of banditry and were easily dispersed.

The FLN realized that it needed to garner more support for their cause and they retreated to the mountainous interior of Algeria where they focused on creating cells of

resistance groups in and around Algeria whose main task was to recruit new members and develop support for independence among the Algerian Muslim communities (Chalk 2007, p. 18). As a consequence, the FLN began to grow in size and support. They began to dominate the regions of Aures and Kabylie and in the mountainous areas around the major coastal cities of Constantine, Algiers and Oran. The FLN began to even establish small military and civil committees that raised taxes to help support their efforts and as a counter part to the French administrators. The FLN also began to receive support from neighboring countries like Egypt and Syria. The support came in the midst of the increasing role of the notion of Pan-Arabism and Arab nationality movements like Nasserism in Egypt and Baathist movements in Syria, even though these were reluctant to give material support to the FLN. Other French colonies nearby that had gained independence (Morocco and Tunisia) had allowed the FLN to use their countries as a base of operations from which to coordinate and govern affairs, most notably in the Tunisian town of Oujda in Morocco. In Oujda the FLN would establish a main headquarters for their government in exile that was headed by Colonel Houradi Boumediene (Paul et al. 2013, pp. 78-9).

In 1955 the group began to shift from small guerilla tactics against military and government targets to larger terrorist campaigns against the French colonists and the French loyalist Algerians (Elkhamri et al. 2005). This would lead the French authorities to inflict harsh retaliations against the insurgents and impose tougher restrictions against the Arab Muslim community which would lead more of them to become sympathetic to the FLN's cause. Things began to escalate and an event in August 1955 would put the whole country on edge and would become a watershed event in the course of the war.

An action that started in Constantine and spread to the village of Philippeville involved some 80 FLN fighters who entered the village and began slaughtering every man, woman and child they found. “European mothers were found with their throats cut open, and their bellies dashed open by meat hooks, infants still in the hands of their mothers their heads bashed in” (Horne 1978, p. 121). In all, 127 French civilians were killed. The French governor general retaliated by killing 1273 guerilla and Algerian villagers, which set off a chain of events resulting in the deaths of 12,000 Arab-Muslims by the French military, police, and roaming bands of colonist vigilantes. These acts of violence committed by the French against innocent people in Algeria began to drive them further into the arms of the FLN. It became apparent to the French authorities and policy makers that this wasn’t any just a bunch of disjointed bandits running around causing trouble, but represented an outright insurgency that threatened the very fabric of French society in Algeria and their rule there.

After the Philippeville massacre, the French government abolished the civilian Algerian Assembly and allowed the military unlimited power to rule by decree (Toth 1994). The French Premier Pierre Mendes-France declared to the French National Assembly: “One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic, between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession.” The local military leaders used their unlimited powers to issue a number of decrees suspending the civilian legal system and instituting military rule. This allowed the military to enact policies on the colonies and hear crimes that were normally under the jurisdiction of a civil court in which the colonial state sought to consolidate its sovereignty over Algeria and the local population.

This authorized the military to use whatever violence necessary to isolate and capture leaders and operatives of the FLN. The military was quickly mobilized to meet the threat. Over the course of 1955, the number of troops rose from 150,000 to 400,000 troops. The main plan of their counter terrorism efforts was to try and isolate the FLN leadership and use overwhelming force to try and isolate the FLN from the population. Their strategy also included an escalating of oppression and the use collective punishment for gaining actionable intelligence (Paul et al. 2013). The FLN responded by conducting a strategy of urban based terrorism in 1956. Due to their inability to confront the French army in a conventional manner they decided to strike at the French in the heart of their security forces in Algiers and at the French civilian population. In so doing, the FLN sought to drive a wedge between the French colonists and the local administrators and military gain the attention of the mainland French government as well as the international community.

The FLN began targeting civilian locations beginning on September 30, 1956 when the FLN bombed two restaurants in Algiers that were frequented by French colonists and even bombed the Air France terminal in the Algiers airport. The attacks that followed including the assassination of the city's mayor and other high ranking colonial administrators and caused the local Algerian population who worked in the city to go on strike and disrupt transportation and communication lines. From the fall of 1956 to the spring of 1957, the FLN carried out an average of 800 shootings and bombings per month which resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties (Chalk 2007, pp. 18-19). The French responded in a forceful manner and beginning in January 1957, they launched a campaign to end the violence which became known as the Battle of

Algiers, with assistance from the 10th Parachute Division lead by the notorious General Jacques Massu. He was given direct control over all security forces and was instructed to do what was necessary to end the violence. The paratroopers began conducting roundups of entire neighborhoods mostly the Arab neighborhood of the Casbah in Algiers (Crenshaw 1973). Over the next nine months the French arrested some 24,000 men and some 3,000 disappeared while they were in detention (Chalk 2007, p. 165). The parachute regiment used methods of torture in order to get information from the captured insurgents. Electrocution, simulated drownings, and abuse aimed at degrading human dignity were heavily used by the troops. If the paratroopers felt that a suspect wasn't supplying enough information they would take them out into the desert and execute the individual.

Outside of Algiers, the French troops included the Foreign Legion, and other regular military forces as well as over 150,000 Algerian Muslims called *harkis* who used guerilla tactics against the FLN. The French also wanted to create a stronger presence all over the country and they instituted a system of *quadrillage*, which divided the country into sectors with permanently garrisoned troops in each assigned territories (Paul et al. 2013). This was established in order to reduce the number of FLN attacks. The French also established areas known as *zones interdites*, or forbidden zones, by evacuating farms and villages into large 'self-defense villages' which were put under strict military supervision. This massive resettlement program was part of the French's plan to cut off local support from the FLN and resulted in more of 1.3 million Algerians (about 10 percent of the population), being relocated into overcrowded and poorly maintained camps. The French army also sought to minimize the amount of outside

support for the FLN. The FLN had bases in both Morocco and Tunisia and were funneling supplies into the rebels on the ground in Algeria. The French built an eight foot electric fence that had searchlights and minefields. The Morice Line ran along the Tunisian border and the Pedron Line ran along the Moroccan border and were both completed at the end of 1957.

By 1958, the Battle of Algiers was going in the French security forces' favor. They were extremely successful in destroying the FLN's infrastructure in Algiers and severely limited its capabilities. By the spring of 1958 the violence in Algiers had gone down. The French security forces claimed victory and it indeed was a strategic victory, however the tide of public opinion was turning against the French. Moderates in Algeria began to view the French more negatively and there was a growing sympathy for the FLN. There was even opposition in France as news of the inhumane treatment of people in Algeria and there began protests in the streets of Paris by members of the Communist and left leaning parties who were infuriated by the use of torture by the military. There was even anger at the United Nations where France was accused of human rights violations. France being one of the members of the Security Council couldn't ignore these accusations (Chalk 20017, p. 19).

Meanwhile in Algeria, there was growing dissatisfaction among the military commanders and French colonists who began to see the current government in France (the Fourth Republic) as incompetent and unwilling to do anything to assist in the ongoing conflict in Algeria. The tension boiled over in May 13 in Algiers as demonstration that was to be held at the main government building turned into a riot led

by a young student activist named Pierre Lagayette who led thousands of students and ransacked the building. The army, with General Massu at command, came to break it up but ended up joining them and there they created the Committee of Public Safety and petitioned for general Charles De Gaulle to return to power in France (Williams 1997, pp. 374-5). De Gaulle had retired from the political scene and wasn't too interested in returning to public life, but after much consideration he agreed to run for the Assembly and had won. De Gaulle was concerned with the situation in Algeria, however, and he was determined to keep Algeria French. On October 3rd 1958, he travelled to Constantine and gave a speech to both the French people and the native Algerians on the possibility of establishing a coalition government of French and Muslims:

Stop this absurd fighting and you will at once see a new blossoming of hope over all the land of Algeria. You will see the prisons emptying; you will see the opening up of a future big enough for everybody and for you yourselves in particular. And then, speaking to those States which are throwing oil on the fire here while their unhappy peoples writhe under dictatorships, I say: Could you do what France is in a position to do here, what only France is capable of doing? Could you people do it? No. Then let France carry on, unless you deliberately decide to envenom the conflict in order to distract attention from your own difficulties. But in the present state of the world, where can these bitter incitements lead if not to a universal cataclysm? Only two paths lie open to the human race today: war or brotherhood. In Algeria as everywhere, France, for her part, has chosen brotherhood (French Embassy Information Network).

This however was rejected by the insurrectionists. The FLN vowed to continue its operations until independence was recognized. In the summer of 1959, General Maurice Challe began a campaign against the FLN with brutal efficiency (Williams 1997, p. 400).

Despite this campaign, the FLN was not fazed and continued operations against the French military. Seeing this demonstration of courage and dealing with internal and external pressures to end the war in Algeria, De Gaulle saw the writing on the wall and knew he that the only way to end the war was allow Algerian independence. On September 16, 1959 he made a speech to the nation calling for the Algerians to pursue self-determination. This pleased the French on the mainland and Algerian Provisional Government, but not the French colonists in Algeria. In the midst of the chaos there was a paramilitary group in Algeria called *the Front National Francais* (FNF) that was formed from extremist white settlers. Even General Massu and Challe began to criticize De Gaulle and they were recalled to France for a dressing down (Williams 1997, p. 401).

In January, 1960, the FNF began what to be known as Barricades Week in Algiers in which they tore up large parts of the street and barricaded themselves in cafes and stores. Even Lagailarde led a student group that was to occupy the main university building. This provoked violence in which the police and the protestors exchanged gun fire in the streets, resulting in the deaths of 14 people and wounding 123. On December 20th, De Gaulle announced that there would be a referendum of the French people on January 8th, 1961 in order to determine whether or not independence should be granted to Algeria. The vote in France was overwhelmingly in support for granting of independence and arrangements were made for a meeting between the French government and the Algerian Provisional Government in Evian on the 7 of April 1961 (Williams 1997, p. 404). This however was met with some stiff opposition in the name of *the Organization Armee Secrete* (OAS). This group of right wing nationalists aimed to stop Algerian independence by using terrorist methods. No one took them as a serious

threat until bombings began throughout Paris. There was talk of a possible putsch against the government, and then it was announced that Challe and other French generals went into retirement and left for Algiers to start the putsch. On April 21st, the generals and several high ranking authorities declared the putsch was on. It became a serious concern that paratroopers might be soon landing outside Paris and pushing to take Paris and overthrow De Gaulle. It was so serious that the British and American forces in Europe were standing by to assist De Gaulle (Williams 1997, p. 405). De Gaulle went on to broadcast to the nation asking for the assistance of the French people and appealing to the soldiers on the ground to know who they were loyal to. In the end the regular forces on the ground in Algeria were not willing and able to support the rogue generals and on April 27, General Challe turned himself in. The putsch was over. With this incident out of the way, the Evian negotiations began on the 20th of May. While these occurred the OAS was still active and has even attempted to assassinate De Gaulle. During the talks that would go on for several months, it was clear that the only solution was that Algeria was to achieve complete and total independence from France. On March 18th an agreement was concluded and a ceasefire was declared. The Second- Franco Algeria War was over.

In the aftermath of the war there became an issue of trying to repatriate the stream of colons who began to try and come back to the metropole. In all the entire population of white colonials returned to the metropole, but what of the native Algerians? Those who were in the government or had served in the auxiliaries of the French military were fleeing as well from the possible persecution that would come from the FLN. However they were not the priority and the Secretary of Repatriates made this clear:

No doubt, our European compatriots from Algeria would vehemently oppose any attempt to prioritize the French Muslims in distributing financial aid, even though the French Muslims would be fully entitled. In considering the psychological effect, we cannot have such a migration take place because it will create a precedent and unleash a massive, explosive, and uncontrollable migration of Muslims to the Metropole even before the government could devise measures that would deal with the different categories of repatriates” (quoted in Choi 2016, p. 67).

This became a growing issue as there was no clear consensus as to who and what could be done with these new wave of refugees. In France’s colonial policy of assimilation, they had in fact tolerated a huge contradiction with respect to who served under them, sacrificing loyal Algerian subjects who took seriously French ideals of universal rights in a common political community.

The aftermath saw the withdrawal of all French military and security personnel from Algeria to France. There also was a mass exodus of white settlers of Algeria to France. The Evian agreements were put to referendum in Algeria in July and the people embraced the decision. In July of 1962 the leaders of the FLN rode triumphantly into Algiers where thousands of people cheered them on and they elected Abderrahmane Fares as their first president. The FLN would then be the ruling party of Algeria all the way up till 1989. In France the war brought an end to the Fourth Republic, and ushered in a new era under Charles De Gaulle, who served as president until 1969, despite attempts by the OAS on his life. The casualties were staggering for both sides. Over 1.2 million Algerians were killed along with over 400,000 French.

The whole notion of the French Empire whittled away in a manner so fast and violently that it was almost a flash. France had a deep feeling for Algeria, they considered it part of France and was a more than just some protectorate for the people who lived there, it was home, it was France. France's position there was doomed both because of the deep contradiction between maintaining an empire and serving the universalistic values for which the French ostensibly stood. This contradiction was reflected in the turbulent domestic politics of France itself, where the supporters of empire, though vociferous and sometimes ready to resort to violence, did not represent a majority of the French people.

Despite the efforts of the French to maintain and keep Algeria for the main fact that they wanted to keep their prestige and continue to be a major player on the world stage, the international environment represented a barrier to this ambition. This environment, whether in neighboring North African countries or in the U.N. General Assembly itself, was hostile. By the 1950s France was emerging out of being completely obliterated in World War II and had to rather quickly find itself back into the world. The colony was held so dear to so many, more importantly to the *pied noirs*, who had developed a unique identity on their own, one that separated them from their fellow citizens right across the Mediterranean Sea. The identity of the rough, adventurous, and individualistic colon exercised great influence over how French society and government perceived its interests in Algeria. In reality it was the colons that promoted racial separation, disinterest and stubbornness that would ultimately define much of the French colonial experience. The colons had almost created a deformed version of what French republican values had meant to them and had used these values to push the French

government into violently cracking down on dissidence among the Arab population.

This identity difference is what had made administering the colony such a great challenge, and it was this that tore at the fabric of the nation that ultimately led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic and ushered in the Fifth Republic.

CHAPTER THREE

Empire and National Identity: France Viewed Through the Lens of Great Britain

Both the British and French experiences with empire were complicated historical affairs. In the broadest sense, the period of European empire building included the first settlements of the New World, long before the late 19th century “scramble for Africa” made colonialism a competitive extension of European politics. For Great Britain and France, different parts of their empires meant different things to both countries. Unlike France, Great Britain had extensive experience with settler colonies, which expanded Britain’s global presence by literally transferring British people to conquered territories. These settlements eventually formed the British Dominions. These were mostly white territories whose political development eventually led to some form of self-government essentially independent from Great Britain (Hyam 2002, pp. 39-52). A very different set of expectations were imposed on those non-white populations within the British Empire, whose colonial status reflected the British belief that non-whites were not capable of self-government. The populations remained dependent upon, and subordinate to, British administration and authority for an indefinite period. Just as advocates for French imperialism stressed France’s need for an “Inde Noir”—African possessions that would contribute to France’s prestige just as did India to Great Britain’s—so too did some British leaders early in the 19th century hold out the possibility of an “American India”—a federated, white-run India that would replicate the success of the United States in Asia, and eventually evolve like the other settler colonies into a self-governing Dominion (Murphy 1968, p. 19; Hyman 2002, p. 6).

For the British, India would never become an Asian version of the United States. Though India was regarded as the core around which British imperial policy was shaped, Britain’s

acquisition of India reflected no long-term plan of territorial expansion. As an historical matter, its growth occurred opportunistically and in a haphazard fashion. Indeed, the fundamental fact of Britain's conquest of India is that it actually required relatively few British military and administrative personnel to achieve and to hold on to for some ninety years (counting merely from Britain's formal acquisition of control in 1858). Just as the British East India Company (BEIC) had earlier leveraged local rivalries to consolidate its power in the wake of the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, so too did the British government rely upon the cooperation of different indigenous elements. Even in the worst moments of the Rebellion of 1857, "the British owed the preservation as well as the acquisition of their empire to the help and devotion of Indians" (Moon 1989, p. 752). Throughout most of the history of this relationship, educated Indian elites saw some benefit in the presence of the British Raj, and typically did not advocate its violent resistance. By the early twentieth century, this traditional forbearance led those elites to pursue a peaceful transition to independence.

Given the degree of historical contingency evident in the British conquest of India, neither a Realist nor a Marxist perspective satisfactorily accounts for the unfolding of Britain's colonial project. While the British East India Company intervened in India for mercantile motives, control over India after the late 18th century shifted gradually from the BEIC to the Crown. By the early 1800s, those motives were modified by a growing belief that it was Britain's mission to civilize and Christianize India. During this period, the British Isles were experiencing an evangelical revival, and proselytizing overseas served as an expression of this movement.

The Rebellion of 1857 occasioned the official transfer of authority from the Company to the British government. It also resulted in the demise of the idea that Great Britain would attempt any profound transformation of Indian social conditions, either through Christian missionary

work or by opposing local practices (like sati) that the British found culturally abhorrent. In other respects, the attitude of the British towards Indian civilization was ambivalent, and there was no small amount of admiration expressed by knowledgeable Britons for its achievements. That said, the savagery of the British suppression of the Rebellion exposed the hypocrisy of its Christian pretensions (Moon 1989, p. 774). A fundamental lesson of the Rebellion was that the British risked destabilizing their control by challenging too vigorously certain Indian political and cultural preferences. While the Rebellion was sparked by rumors among native troops that rifle cartridges were greased in a ritually unclean manner, background discontents were also important. Indian princes resented the annexation of their territories. In addition, to the extent that the British accommodated the religious sensibilities of its Hindu and Muslim troops, these troops regarded the attempt to impose Christian standards as provocations. “Indians, it seemed, could not be made into brown Englishmen any more than into brown Christians” (Moon 1989, p. 772).

In the wake of the Rebellion, and until the end of the British presence in India some ninety years later, British colonial authorities governed India using a variety of indirect means. Indian princes continued to rule over their own territories without direct British interference. In practice, this meant that the British had to tolerate the persistence of some 500 principalities in order to assure the loyalty of these local elites. Likewise, large landowners (*talukdars*) were bought off by being allowed to continue their practice of extortionate moneylending despite the British preference for a more egalitarian land reform. As the small number of educated Indians grew, their ambitious were co-opted by limited political and administrative reforms that gave them some role in governance and the judiciary without essentially conceding the principle of white British superiority (Moon 1989, pp. 789, 793).

Through these strategies, Great Britain was able to rule the immense population of India with an astoundingly small number of administrative and military personnel. Yet despite the central importance of India to its empire, the British could only accept with great difficulty the idea that India would ever transition to the same self-governing status enjoyed by its smaller, white settler colonies. Even after it encouraged the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, Britain's negotiations with the INC over the twenty years after 1919 never led to a mutually-satisfactory scheme for transitioning the colony to self-governance. Ultimately, when independence came to India (and to Pakistan), Great Britain's acquiescence simply caught up with events that had grown beyond its control.

In contrast to the haphazard British experience, France always regarded its colonial expansions into Africa and Southeast Asia as part of a more systematic and explicit plan to promote France's position in the world, particularly its status as a Great Power in European politics and the value of French civilization more generally (Arendt 1951, p. 129). From the occupation of Algeria in 1830 onward, France's colonial policy served needs for national self-validation that were less prominent in the British experience. For France, empire served as a collective consolation, more than anything else. Between the loss of Quebec in 1763 and the taking of Algeria in 1830, France made no colonial acquisitions at all. In fact, it managed to lose control of Saint-Dominique (Haiti) to an independence movement in 1804. In contrast, despite its loss of its American colonies, the British expanded steadily.

This contrast struck a nerve with the French, and imperial rivalry with Britain by the late 19th century was openly motivated by its jealousy of British success, rather than economic or political considerations (Baumgart 1982, pp. 55-68). Even more so than the British empire, France's made little economic sense in the traditional Marxist view. France did not gain markets

and natural resources as a result of its colonial acquisitions. The defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and the humiliation of France by Prussia in 1870 stimulated French imperial adventures as exercises in restoring the nation's glory, and its international status. Thus, acquiring Algeria, as Tocqueville recognized, contributed to the restoration of France's political significance after Napoleon's defeat. Likewise, control over Tunisia in 1881 bolstered its great-power pretensions and helped make up for its defeat at the hands of Prussia a decade earlier.

Given this psychological function of empire for the French, its approach to ruling its possessions was fundamentally different from the British, and this difference ultimately contributed to the violence with which France resisted the aspirations towards Algerian independence. Rather than govern like the British, using indirect methods that left native conditions essentially untouched, France's imperial policies were based upon the principle of assimilation. France's long-term goal was to transform its colonial possessions into parts of France itself. Assimilation was a corollary to, and expression of, the universal significance which France according to the ideals expressed in the Revolution of 1789. If France's Declaration of the Rights of Man had such a significance, then the validity of these political ideals could only be reinforced by their spread to and adoption by other peoples. This could be done by force if necessary. Ultimately, making French colonies meant making Frenchmen. This was an implication of empire that the British never drew.

A commitment to assimilation led the French to make different decisions than the British. For example, in 1848 Algeria itself was made a department of metropolitan France, meaning it was integrated administratively into the French state. While the British entertained similar ideas in the mid-19th century about establishing a federal scheme for its colonies that would involve colonial representation in the British Parliament, nothing was ever seriously pursued (Hyam

2002, p. 50). Instead, the British continued to distinguish within their empire the special status of white settler colonies, which would move on their own towards self-government and autonomy, and those non-white populations that were presumed to be incapable of self-rule, and thus requiring continued paternalistic rule by Great Britain. In contrast, France was prepared to offer citizenship status to residents of certain French colonies like Senegal, Martinique, and Guadeloupe, and even allowed their representatives to serve in the Chamber of Deputies during the Third Republic (Chamberlain 1998, p. 150). Even as late as the Fourth Republic, the French constitution could propound the following ideal: “France forms with the overseas peoples, a union founded on the equality of rights and responsibilities, without distinction of race and religion” (quoted in Betts 1991, p. 70).

Assimilation led the French to take a different approach to education than the British. While the British left educational policy in the hands of native Indians, and made little effort as a matter of policy to create an educated native class, the French regarded the teaching of its language and culture as an aspect of assimilation, and thus developed a degree of French acculturation among indigenous peoples, at least within the elites. These French-educated elites were regarded as proof of and justification for the superiority of French culture. These elites also served as talent for the administrative requirements of the colonies. The British, on the other hand, tended to regard English-educated Indians (*Babus*) as a nuisance at best and a threat at worst. Rather than encouraging them as evidence for the superiority of British ways, educated Indians were instead shunted into levels of colonial administration that had only an advisory or a limited judicial capacity, while real power and decision making remained in the hands of the white British (Moon 1989, pp. 860-862). Finally, it should be noted that France’s commitment to assimilation produced a notable difference in how certain types of human relations were

tolerated. The Victorian British disapproved of sexual relations between whites and natives, and by 1909 imposed an outright ban upon sex between colonial officials and the local populations. In contrast, the French always remained much more accepting and tolerant of mixed-race relationships (Hyam 2002, pp. 308-12, 335).

Despite these important differences in governing styles, basic commonalities between the British and French colonial experiences should be stressed. As Arendt (1951) recognized, in the political environment of the 19th century, when national self-determination was becoming a global aspiration, any justification of empire had to rest upon racist, or at least ethnocentric, premises. Both the British and French empires were racist not just in their presumption of white superiority over the subject natives, but in their readiness to treat natives with a brutality and lack of humanity that they would not have inflicted upon their own peoples. In effect, French and British national identities were two versions of the same racist construct. Despite the French professed commitment to assimilation, or British pretensions that India would advance under their benign tutelage, their empires rested upon a common denial of the equality and, in extreme circumstances, the humanity of their subject peoples.

In the first four decades of the twentieth century, both empires fought against increasingly strong headwinds of national self-determination. In order to mobilize their subject peoples to fight for their colonial centers during World War I, each country (and particularly Great Britain) made important concessionary gestures towards the principle of, and prospects for, self-rule. Though committing itself in 1917 to the principle of Indian self-governance, the British temporized on the question of whether or not to grant India Dominion status to the point when, by the late 1930s, the Indian National Congress no longer desired it as a final political goal.

World War II delivered a second blow that shattered the aura of invincibility that each empire cultivated towards its subjects. France's humiliation by Germany, and its split into Free French and Vichy camps "had the effect of compromising empire" (Betts 1991, p. 62). For Great Britain, the fall of Singapore in 1942, and its defeat by a non-white opponent exposed the weakness of the British Raj to its Indian subjects who, unlike during the previous world war, refused to cooperate with their colonial masters in prosecuting the conflict (Buettner 2016, p. 35)

As the stress of conflict cracked their masks of colonial authority, the racist premises of both empires became unavoidably visible. This was particularly apparent when the exigencies of rule required both imperial powers to act in ways that were profoundly and barbarically hypocritical with respect to their own values. The French response in Algeria may have been far more violent than anything done by the British in India (the Rebellion of 1857 excluded), but it is the structure of British imperialism rather than any greater humanitarianism on the part of the British that helps explain this difference. Unlike Algeria, with its million plus European population, India was never a settler colony whose protection against hostile natives might require a sustained application of violence. To be sure, enclaves of European populations within British India tended to be far more overt in their racism than was convenient for the colonial administrators, and this sometimes complicated British efforts to maintain smooth relations with its colonial subjects (Moon 1989, pp. 877-879). Otherwise, the white British settlements that evolved into the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all achieved political maturity and independence at the cost of the ethnic cleansing and even outright extermination of indigenous peoples. Violence on that scale far outstripped anything that the French were capable of during the Algerian War. Otherwise, of the twentieth century experiences of British decolonization, Kenya with its white settlements comes closest suggesting how capable the

British might have been of imitating the French response in Algeria had the settler mix in India been more similar to that found in Algeria (see Beuttner 2016, p. 50).

Short of violence, this hypocrisy of empire also manifested itself in softer, and perhaps more telling, ways. Even as the British professed to justify their rule of India in terms of the superiority of their political institutions and administrative techniques, they were never able to tolerate the prospects of natives participating in these institutions or applying these techniques on an equal basis with whites. Above all, the idea of Indians giving orders to whites or otherwise ruling them represented a fundamental taboo for the British. Paradoxically, while British national identity was bound up with a belief in a single rule of law as a bulwark of the rights of Englishmen, they could not bring themselves to incorporate natives into that vision. Conversely, while France professed an assimilationist ideal, they could not accept the actual integration of non-white populations into genuine political communion with the French. Instead, France's legal rationality always distinguished between laws applied to settlers and those suitable to Arabs (Arendt 1951, p. 127). Even the evidence for the success of its assimilationist policies belied France's condescending commitment to them. In practice, full political equality for natives within the French empire was only according to a select elite, those *Évolués* whose level of education and acculturation to French values qualified them for full participation in French citizenship (Chamberlain 1998, p. 150). The ultimate expression of this conflicted French attitude towards native populations was the abandonment of those Algerians that had taken French ideals seriously, and had fought against Algerian independence.

Not only were these colonial attitudes increasingly out of step with the Liberal ideas of national self-determination increasingly authoritative in the 20th century, but the hypocrisy inherent in both the British and French practices of imperialism were well understood by the

Indian and Algerian opponents of colonial rule. Whether their challenges to that rule were peaceful or violent, the Indian National Congress and the Front National de Liberation diagnosed this hypocrisy for what it was, and used it as leverage to ultimately succeed in promoting their independence agendas for both colonies.

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