UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL OKLAHOMA

Edmond, Oklahoma

Jackson College of Graduate Studies & Research

Alliance Dissolution: A Constructivist Approach

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

By

Christopher Fry

Edmond, Oklahoma

2018

Alliance Dissolution: A Constructivist Approach

A THESIS

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

MAY 4, 2018

By _____

ABSTRACT

Alliance dissolution is an understudied pattern in international politics. Independent studies by Walt, Leeds, and Snyder, within the realist tradition of international relations theory, have all touched on alliance dissolution as a caveat to alliance formation. Consistent with the realist tradition, change to the balance or distribution of power is viewed as the primary cause for alliance dissolution. Relying on a realist framework to scrutinize alliance formation may lead one to over–determine shifts in the balance or distribution of power, to the exclusion of other social conditions present during episodes of alliance dissolution. This study, relying on a constructivist approach, seeks to explicate the social process of alliance dissolution through utilizing a three-part framework of social conditions: military defeat, regime change, and political rivalry. Relying on this framework and the comparative case study method will show that alliance dissolution is a highly complex and dynamic social process, occurring over time, in which any possible combinations of identified social conditions contribute to a change in ontological security that provokes alliance dissolution. Importantly, the three social conditions scrutinized in this study are to be understood as sufficient conditions for alliance dissolution, no single condition is necessary for alliance dissolution to occur.

Contents

Introduction

Alliance dissolution is an understudied pattern in international politics. Independent studies by Walt (1985), (1997), Leeds (2007), and Snyder (1984), within the realist tradition of international relations theory, have all touched on alliance dissolution as a caveat to alliance formation. Consistent with the realist tradition, change to the balance or distribution of power is viewed as the primary cause for alliance dissolution. However, relying on a realist framework to scrutinize alliance formation may lead one to over–determine shifts in the balance or distribution of power, to the exclusion of other social conditions present during episodes of alliance dissolution. This study, utilizing a constructivist approach that focuses on change to ontological security, seeks to explicate the social process of alliance dissolution via a three-part framework of social conditions: military defeat, regime change, and political rivalry. Relying on this framework and the comparative case study method, this paper will show that alliance dissolution is a highly complex and dynamic social process, occurring over time, in which any possible combinations of identified social conditions contribute to a change in ontological security that provokes alliance dissolution. Importantly, the three social conditions scrutinized in this study are to be understood as sufficient conditions for alliance dissolution, yet no single condition is necessary for alliance dissolution to occur.

Key Concepts and Terms

The study of alliance termination must necessarily define what an alliance is and what it is not. For this purpose, this paper will use the term "alliance" to denote a military-political agreement between two or more states to collectively secure all partners from the threat of force originating from outside the alliance. Alliances may be further divided, as Benson does (2011),

into deterrent and compellent alliances – wherein the former seeks to prevent a common threat from acting in a certain way while the latter seeks to force a third party's hand. However, this and other divisions, such as multilateral, bilateral, and hub-and-spoke alliances, or as detailed Gibler's dissertation on alliance typology (1997) are immaterial to the subject of this study.

Alliances are, however, distinct from security pacts and coalitions in that alliances are not particular to a single opponent. While a security pact may be formed to assure the hegemony of a dominant nation within a region – or simply to align the defensive needs of nations in a region with a powerful protector(e.g. the United States and SEATO) – and a coalition may arise to combat a rampaging foreign power (e.g. the Third Coalition of the Napoleonic Wars), alliances are agreements entered with the understood purpose of securitizing partner states' sovereignty from general or specific threats that may not present immediate danger.

Furthermore, alliance, for the purposes of this paper, must also be distinguished from alignment. Recent scholarship (Wilkins 2012) (Long and Leeds 2006) has shown that while some states may not enter into formalized treaty agreements with clear military and political commitments, states may instead align with a pole or regional hegemon with which they share general interests. Alignment is far less formal, and slipping out of an alignment necessarily exacts far less costs than dissolving an alliance. Since this study is focused primarily on state actors and the decision to formally cut ties with another state, gravitation around or alignment with a pole do not offer qualifying examples that could be researched.

Alliances can form under a variety of conditions. The realist tradition boasts an impressive array of scholars whose work explores the multifaceted processes of alliance formation. Stephen Walt (1985), (1990), (2001), (2009) and Glenn Snyder (1984), (2007) are among the most prolific scholars of alliance genesis. However, in accordance with their realist view of international

politics, most scholars studying the topic of alliance formation consider the balance of power to be both the catalyzing factor for alliance formation and the primary ontological determinant – that is, states' understanding of the identity and nature of a threat leads them form alliance to counterbalance a potential adversary. The constructivist approach utilized in this paper, however, seeks to explain the social and normative conditions under which alliances may either form or collapse due to changes to a state's ontological security. Ontological security can be described as a state's "self-perception". That is, how a state views its role in history, international affairs, the world system at-large and that state's values and beliefs. How does this definition of ontological security differ from a conception of state identity? To answer this question, we must explore the nature of constructivist theory at large and the conception of state identity.

No discussion of constructivist theory would be complete without a reference to Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society*, which was one of the first descriptions of the effect of societal norms, identity, and international norms on the anarchy of international relations (Bull 1977). Bull's foundational work provides the theoretical framework under which ontological security and the ramifications of a change in identity can have on international agreements.

A substantial body of literature has accumulated in the last twenty years regarding ontological security. McSweeney (1999) defines ontological security as the identity of the state as collectivized by its participant parts – namely citizens, civil society organizations, and institutional structures. Identity is at the core of ontological security for states as it is for human beings on an individual level. A much broader literature exists regarding the individual's need for ontological security, and since the apparatus of the state necessarily springs from, but is separate from, its constituent individuals, this literature does influence the concept of ontology as it applies to the research presented here. Zarakol (2017) for example, distinguishes between three types of

ontological security providers: religion, the state, and a "hyper sovereignty" that combines the two. Individuals both draw their own ontological security from these one of these three providers, but so does the state at-large. Religious animosity is not a social condition associated with this study's framework, and therefore will not be present throughout much of the paper, however the state as ontological security provider is the primary referent unit for this work.

Some scholars (Neumann 2004) (Ricouer 1991) contend that there should be limits to the expansive nature of ontology, especially in regards to states. However it is clear that states do exhibit a drive to match their interests with their both their physical and ontological security needs. Neumann argues that state ontology is constantly shifting, and is product of both internal and external forces on a state's identity. Wendt (2004) further elaborates that states possess many of the characteristics of human beings, yet are regard as "*as if*" entities – meaning that while they are composed of, and exhibit similar characteristics as, real human beings, states are not "persons" in and of themselves. Yet our understanding of ontological security and alliance termination depends at least in part on the anthropomorphic qualities of state interaction. Therefore, this paper relies on a sense of the state as an individual in many ways.

This paper draws heavily on Wendt's (1994) distinction between "corporate identity" and "social identity". The former invokes the state's national and ontological security needs, which can be either endogenous or exogenous. The latter, of which there can be many per individual state, are "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object" (Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State 1994, 385). While ontological security is itself a product of corporate identity, this paper seeks to narrow its scope to the endogenous factors of collective action – namely a state's decision to nullify an international commitment. Realist scholars tend to focus on the exogenous changes to a state's

security – both physical and ontological. However, Wendt argues that interests, which often form the primary causal mechanisms of realist theory, are not developed outside the state but are entirely separate, yet endogenous to, the state's corporate and social identity/identities. Therefore, a narrow definition of corporate identity, as defined by Wendt, remains the operative framework for the cases selected in this paper.

While the international system, and particularly international alliances, are the focus of this paper, states remain the primary referent unit. States possess identities both separate from, yet reliant upon, the individuals and groups that comprise that state. International systems can have identities as well, particularly in a state of unipolarity. This study hypothesizes that alliance formation and termination is not always, as realist scholars have generally concluded, the result of changes to threats. The balance, or distribution of power, but more likely the result of changes to the ontological security and, thus, the identity, of a state. Through reviewing the sample cases, three social conditions appear to be present in each case of alliance dissolution, with varying degrees of influence on changes to ontological security. Previously listed, these social conditions include: military defeat, regime, and political rivalry. Through scrutinizing the sample cases, it will be shown that these social conditions contribute to shifts to state ontological security, which lead to alliance dissolution. Before embarking on this endeavor, an explanation of each social condition is provided.

First, military defeat is straight forward. As states engage in conflict with one another, there is the potential for one state to overrun another and impose an identity crisis. In some states, military defeat leads to international isolation (e.g. the Russian Empire after the Crimean War) while in others it fosters a revisionist lust for revenge (e.g. France after the Franco-Prussian War). No matter the resulting attitude, military defeat necessarily changes ontological security and

security interests of the defeated state, as it seeks to cope with the defeat through refashioning a sense of collective self, or reclaim its global status as a sovereign nation, and learn how to abide by social rules taught by international institutions (see Finnemore 1996).

Second, regime change can be chaotic or orderly, quick or slow, bloody or peaceful or any combination thereof. Regime change may be understood as radical change to the institutional structure of a state, such that a radical shift in the meaning of ontological security occurs that reflects new governing ideas, exogenous to the state, embedded within the new institutional structure of the regime. Shedding communism, in Eastern European countries, in favor of liberal democracy, during the 1990s, is an example of the sort of regime change observed in sample cases. The institutional rules of governance and decision-making procedures have undergone radical change.

Ideological change is closely associated with regime change, yet the two are sufficiently similar to deter separation. Ideological realignment reflects radical change in political ideas, norms, and principles that contribute to shaping collective identity (Wendt 1994). In the case of regime change, change in the general institutional structure of the state has occurred that reflects new institutional rules and decision-making procedures. Whereas, ideological alignment reflects radical change in ideas, principles, and norms without provoking radical change in institutional rules or decision-making procedures. For our purposes, ideological realignment may occur through an electoral defeat or victory that brings into political office an ideology distinct from that which previously contributes to the social construction of collective identity. The ontological security question is one of policy change. The ontological security of the state likewise undergoes a metamorphosis as the ideology of the state embraces or eschews conflict with other states. Examples of ideological realignment tend to include major revolutionary undertakings, as seen in

18th-century France, 1989 Russia, and 1979 Iran. However, regime change is, for the extent of this study, so closely followed by an ideological realignment that the two phenomena have no discernible variance on the cases selected for review.

Third, political rivalry results from a change in the interests and ontological security of a state without a change in regime or ideology. Political rivalry occurs between alliance partners. This condition for alliance termination is most closely linked to realist explanations for the phenomenon, in that shifts in the balance of power are linked to shifts in threat identity. However, while this paper does not seek to invalidate realists' empirical evaluations of alliance theory, it will offer an alternative explanation of alliance stability phenomena. In the case of political rivalry, this paper will demonstrate that it is not simply shifts in power that lead to hostility, but that changes in power lead to changes in a state's identity, which then promotes alliance formation or termination depending on the circumstances.

It must be noted again that while any of these conditions are sufficient for alliance termination, none are necessary. A single case of alliance termination may be the result of multiple conditions, each of varying importance to a single observed case of alliance dissolution. The cases studied in this paper, as will be explained more in the research design section, were chosen because they sprung from multiple social conditions deemed sufficient for alliance termination. The causal relationship between any single condition and a given case will vary depending on the social, historical, and political trends leading up to the termination. Alliances are, ultimately, an attempt to formulate some order out of anarchy, to pool resources in pursuit of collective security. In an international system plagued by uncertainty, alliances provide some assurance in the prospect of mutual aid, reducing the uncertainty a state faces and, ostensibly, increasing its physical security. The politics of alliance dissolution, however, do the opposite. Why would states seek to abandon

an orderly structure? What conditions may lead a state to sever its commitments to another? What changes to the identity of a state might result from these conditions, and how does a change in identity affect alliances? These are the questions this paper seeks to answer.

Research Design

The research design of this paper utilizes a comparative case study analysis of six alliances throughout history that demonstrate the ability of the above described social conditions to produce alliance termination: the Franco-American alliance that concluded in 1794; the alliances between the Russian Empire and the Allied Powers of the First World War that were severed with the February Revolution of 1917; Italy's alliance with Nazi Germany that ended with the conquest of Italy by the Allied powers in 1943; the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989; the Iranian-American alliance that was ended by the Iranian Revolution of 1979; and lastly Spain's withdrawal from the American-led Iraq War coalition in 2003. It should be noted that the last case did not result in formal alliance termination – Spain remains both a member of NATO and a bilateral ally of the United States – however the specifics of the case lend themselves to analysis in this paper.

The four conditions for alliance dissolution offered earlier in the paper should be understood as a framework. This framework operates as a system of inputs and outputs. The inputs – that is, any of the four conditions listed previously – affect a change to the collective identity and meaning of ontological security of the state in question. This ontological change

then produces outputs in the form of alliance dissolution. No single condition is necessary for dissolution, although all are sufficient. Certain conditions will be more prevalent in certain cases based on unique political features of each case. Some, e.g. military defeat, are intuitive to a case at hand. Others, like regime change, are not. This study will explore how each condition applied relatively in each case. We expect, in other words, to observe certain conditions mattering more than others depending on the case. This variance in significance of independent variables across observations is neither a detriment nor hindrance to our research design. Rather, the variance of social condition significance on the dependent variable of alliance dissolution is to be expected as phenomena in any social system and reflects the variance of meaning arising out of social actor patterns of interaction (Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State 1994). Before examining the layout of the remainder of this paper, there is one further consideration to apply to the framework described above.

Table 1.1 – Case Matrix	**Military Defeat**	**Regime Change**	**Political Rivalry**
Franco-American Alliance, 1794		X	
Bolshevik Revolution, 1917	X	X	X
Italy and the Axis Powers, 1943	X	X	
Iranian Revolution, 1979		X	X
Warsaw Pact, 1989		X	X
Spain and the Iraq War Coalition, 2003		X	

The general plan of this paper will follow a three-chapter structure, much like a three-act play, demonstrating the centrifugal conditions of ontological change and their effects on alliance stability. The first chapter will introduce the themes that are most prevalent in the literature and history of alliance dissolution, while the second and third chapters analyze three examples of

alliance dissolution each in chronological order. It should be explained, however, why these cases were chosen and not others.

First, it should be made clear that this paper does not seek to overturn the literature produced on alliance termination so far. It is empirically clear that the balance of power, relative power among states, the security dilemma, and a plethora of other factors described by the realist school do in fact influence states' decisions to join or leave alliance agreements. However, the realist approach fails to address the identity politics of alliance termination – that is, what changes in a state's ontological make up that causes it to break its commitments?

Several cases presented themselves as candidates for study. The infamous alliance dissolutions of history – Athens-Sparta, The Concert of Europe, the U.S. and Soviet Union – immediately leaped out as examples. However, it is unclear how the ontological security of any of the states party to these alliances was the primary influence on alliance termination. Therefore, while they are excellent examples of realist power dynamics at work in alliance dissolution, they are poor representations of what this paper is seeking to understand. Winnowing out the alliances that fit the needs of this paper left several more candidates, but for the sake of time and space, all but six were culled from the herd. These six examples were chosen due to the presence of multiple conditions of the framework in each case. Some may evince all three conditions operative at the time of alliance termination, while others deal only with one or two. Table 1.1 shows which social conditions can be applied to the case at the time of each alliances dissolution. To give the reader a general understanding of why these six cases were chosen above the others, each will be examined briefly.

First is the Franco-American alliance that concluded in 1794. This dissolution very nearly led to war between the nascent United States and France in the throes of revolution. While the

realist critique of this case may rest on France's unhappiness with U.S. trade with Britain, it leaves something to be desired in the analysis. It was not the anger over trade lanes that led the two ostensibly ideological siblings to not only sever their ties but prepare for war, it was the ontological change in France from a decaying, albeit still powerful, monarchy to an unstable republic on the verge of the Terror. Due to this ideological change, and the regime changes it inspired that peppered the early French Revolution, the nature of France's foreign policy changed, leading to conflict with formerly allied states, like the U.S., whose interests – in this case seeing a weakened Britain – generally complemented one another.

Second, the Russian Revolution of 1917 was, in many ways, like the French Revolution. However, the Russian Revolution that overthrew the tsars was sparked by the disastrous military defeats Russian forces experienced along the Eastern Front of the First World War. These defeats undoubtedly changed the nature of the Russian state's identity, sparking massive revolts against the tsar's government by the end of 1917 and leading to Russia's withdrawal from the war and the severance of its alliances with France and Britain. Like the French revolutionaries before them, Russia's national interests in 1917 ostensibly should have been near identical to those of its former allies – notably the defeat of Germany and the Central Powers and re-conquest of lost Russian territory, with the potential to gain further territory and influence in the remnants of the Ottoman Empire and Southeast Europe.

While Russia's February Revolution was no doubt the result of the empire's catastrophic defeats on the front, the country was not subdued entirely by Central Power forces by the time the Revolution took hold. The third case in this study, Italy in 1943, was wholly defeated by the Allied powers. This military defeat ousted dictator Benito Mussolini and his Fascist government, dissolving Italy's alliances with Germany and Japan and establishing a new relationship with the

Allies. This case is a good example of a state's identity changing due to military defeat. Ideological realignment takes a secondary position in this case, as it was clearly direct results of the Allied conquest. Political rivalry between Italy and the Axis powers likewise did not influence the dissolution of Italy's ties to Nazi Germany.

The fourth example, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, shares similar characteristics with its French and Russian predecessors, with a slight twist. As the Cold War slogged on, Iran found itself caught in the machinations of the United States and the Soviet Union as each attempted to wage proxy and espionage wars across the globe with the goal of undermining the other's ideological framework. The Iranian Revolution uncorked another ideological paradigm to counter the two dominant camps: the theocratic authoritarian state that has survived since the overthrow of the shah. The ontology of Iran in the late 1970s was greatly affected by animosity towards the United States – a reaction to the CIA's overthrow of the democratically-elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 to be replaced by the incompetent shah – and Israel. This animosity boiled over into a revolution that drove out the U.S.-backed dictator and the establishment of the Ayatollah as supreme leader of Iran – and the termination of the U.S.-Iranian alliance. Moreover, Iran saw itself as the rightful hegemon of the region, a title challenged by Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The theological differences between Iran and these states no doubt played, and continues to play, a role in constructing Iran's identity. Therefore it is the combination of an ideological shift and a resurgent political rivalry that led to the alliance with the U.S. being dissolved, making it a prime candidate for analysis in this study.

The fifth case in this study, the Warsaw Pact, presents no "hot" military conflict around which the alliance dissolution revolved. Of course, the alliance system arose in midst of the Cold War as a counter to the United States-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but

collapsed with the demise of the Soviet Union without a military conflict erupting between the two alliance systems. Although the alliance structure's failure as a whole is the framework to be studied here, the actions of the nations that made up the alliance are the referent units that must be analyzed, notably Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Hungary, and Georgia. Devoting a substantial portion of the paper to a single state would limit the sample size far too much, while over generous analysis of all states would be too cumbersome. This paper will strike a balance by generalizing the ontological shifts shared by all or most of the successor Soviet states.

The last case this thesis will examine is the withdrawal of Spanish troops from the American-led coalition that invaded Iraq. After Madrid suffered a terrorist attack in 2004, the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party swept the incumbent People's Party out of office and promised to withdraw Spanish troops from the unpopular war. This case differs from the others in several key ways. Counterintuitively, it does not deal with alliance dissolution as defined in the previous five examples. Instead, the Spanish case offers an example of an alliance sticking together despite the opportunity for collapse presented by the centrifugal forces of termination conditions. That is, although Spain left the Iraq War coalition, it did not abandon its alliance with the United States as might have been expected based on the conclusions derived from other examples.

Literature

Alliance termination literature is severely lacking in constructivist analysis. However, as has been noted before, there is an abundance of realist-tradition writing on the subject. Of these, Stephen Walt, Glenn Snyder, and Brett Ashley Leeds have perhaps been the most prolific, and serve as an excellent foundation in alliance theory. Many other scholars have contributed to a burgeoning literature on the subject from a variety of perspectives.

However, to accentuate the dearth of alliance termination literature from a constructivist perspective, most realist literature focuses heavily, or, in some cases, exclusively on alliance formation. The literature highlights the centripetal forces in international politics, bringing states together; this paper seeks to understand the centrifugal forces, those that tear states apart from one another. Moreover, this study focuses not on the centrifugal forces *outside* states, but on the changes those forces wreak on the ontology of states, and how that ontology influences alliance dissolution. For this aspect as alliance theory, there is little to no scholarship available. To understand why alliances fall apart, however, one must understand why they come together in the first place.

Alliance Formation Literature

Alliance formation theory can be traced back to George Liska's book *Nations in Alliance*, which established that alliances are, in many ways, international politics in microcosm. Liska writes succinctly that "It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name" (1962, 3) His work showed that alliances can be considered the wellspring of nearly the entire discipline, reaching into the various subsectors of both policy and scholarship in ways that few other institutional mechanisms do.

Walt likewise offers some of most foundational studies of alliance formation. His article "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power" (1985) is a seminal piece of the literature, focusing on the external threats to a state's security and how they propagate alliances between states that share those threats. His book *The Origins of Alliances* (1990) expands on the concepts presented in the article. Walt also examines the role of unipolarity on alliance formation (2009) and the conditions that lead to collapse or endurance (1997), which will be analyzed in the next section. However, as noted earlier in this paper, Walt's writings are heavily influenced by the

realist school of international relations, focusing considerable attention on the effect power has state's decisions to join and leave alliances. Absent is the effect of identity change on alliance stability, with which this study is primarily concerned.

Other scholars mirror Walt in this regard. Glenn Snyder, another prolific alliance theorist, builds on Walt's findings, while at the same time, decrying the lack of formal game theory application to the formation of alliances (2007). Those attempts at games theory prior to this article he criticizes as failing to give the appropriate weight to national interests, but concludes that they have generally given ample concern to the role of power in their equations. Once again, even in formation literature, the focus is on the distribution of power.

Some scholars (Axelrod and Keohane 1985) touch on game theory in international relations prior to Snyder's critique of alliance theory. Their findings showed that trust built over time between states, something somewhat unquantifiable in their original premises – notably the Prisoners' Dilemma. Trust influences states' willingness to ally with one another, a centripetal force. These findings can be extrapolated to the centrifugal forces of alliance termination. Distrust of another state, while partly founded in the power struggles of an international system in anarchy, necessarily change the ontology of the state in question. Like Walt's proposition that loss of credibility is a factor in alliance dissolution. For this paper's framework, loss of credibility and distrust can be joined together under the condition of political rivalry.

Several other theories of alliance termination have been put forward to explain the phenomenon. Some scholars (Kim and Sciubba 2015) suggests that alliances are at a greater risk of termination when one alliance partner has a population that is experiencing a shift in demographics toward younger ages. Others (Clark 2010) contend that as great powers lose influence and power relative to rising states, great power war will tend to become more likely, and

consequently may result in alliance dissolution. Others (Gibler 2008) maintain that states are reluctant to sever international agreements due to the potential delegitimization of the reneging state and a loss of power and influence, but states may do so if the costs are low enough or the risk of retribution for not doing so outweigh the benefits of maintaining the alliance.

Alliance Termination Literature

Alliance termination literature may start in the same place as formation literature: with Walt. Walt's contributions to termination scholarship are threaded throughout his writings on alliances, but termination takes a central role in his article "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse" (1997). Walt provides five factors that may lead to alliance dissolution: changing perception of threat, loss of credibility, domestic politics, regime change, and ideological division. Of these five, two should seem familiar to the reader as conditions for alliance termination shared by this paper, while a third – domestic politics – is a corollary to regime change for this study. While Walt's article notes that these factors can influence the identity of states, the overall conclusion is that power politics are the primary causal mechanism of alliance dissolution. The article lacks, like most of the scholarly works presented in the remainder of this section, a clear analysis of the ontological changes these conditions allow to affect alliance stability.

Another of Walt's writings (2009) also analyzes alliance termination, this time from the perspective of polarity. He surmises that alliances are more likely to be abandoned in an international system constructed around multiple poles, reasoning that weaker states have more opportunities to pursue their own national interests by shifting alliances with polar powers as the situation demands. This article presents similar limitations as the previous one, in that it approaches alliance dissolution as a function of power dynamics outside the state, not, as this study is concerned with, resulting from identity change.

Conclusion

Alliance termination is a complex phenomenon. Much of the scholarship conducted on this feature of international politics has been done under the auspices of the realist tradition, focusing on the power dynamics states face when deciding whether to join or leave an alliance. This paper has sought to prove that it is not just physical security concerns that drive states to conclude their alliances with one another, but that shifts in ontological disposition created by four identifiable normative conditions can also lead to alliance termination. These conditions – military defeat, regime change, and political rivalry – manifest as variables applicable to a case dependent on the context of the case itself. No single condition is necessary for an alliance to collapse, and most cases – certainly those studied in future chapters – are examples of two or more conditions leading directly to that case's dissolution.

Franco-American Alliance, 1794

Introduction

The Franco-American alliance is the first empirical test of the alliance termination framework developed in the previous chapter. This alliance evolved out of the American War of Independence and continued after the war. However, tensions increased between the nascent United States and France as the French Revolution erupted in 1789. By 1793, the Revolution had careened into radicalism, taking a much different approach to the formation of a new republic than the one undertaken by the American Founding Fathers. War with other major European powers, including Britain, which posed an existential and ontological threat to the U.S., led the latter to remain neutral. By 1794 the alliance broke down entirely.

The dissolution of the Franco-American alliance can be attributed to one of the three social conditions described in the framework: regime change. To fully examine the extent to which regime change influenced the termination of this alliance, an analysis of the centripetal forces of the alliance's origins must be conducted, followed by an analysis of the centrifugal forces leading to its dissolution, and how both centripetal and centrifugal factors affected the ontological security of both nations. It is the change in national identity in both the American government led by President Washington, and the French revolutionary government, in its various forms, that served as the harbinger of alliance dissolution.

As has been stated previously, one cannot deny the role of power, threat, and national interest on any state's decision to form or terminate an alliance with another state. Certainly these three factors affected the dissolution of the Franco-American alliance. Yet a hole remains in realist appraisals of alliance termination, in that the ontological security of allied states is rarely, if ever,

addressed as a catalyst of alliance dissolution. Many realist scholars allude to the role of collective identity – usually only as much as a state's ideology propels or prohibits alliance formation – however, few studies of this phenomenon consider the effect of ontological change on the international system. The role of regime change and its effect on the ontology of the states studied in this section therefore provides an opportunity to examine ontological change and its effect on an alliance. The United States undoubtedly stood to gain from a continued alliance with France, which was the avowed enemy of the young nation's most powerful adversary, Great Britain. It must be asked: why did the United States terminate an alliance that offered significant benefit to its national security? The answer lies in the rapid shifts in collective identity of the two governments, both of which discovered that their alliance posed a vital threat to the ontological security of their respective nations.

Origins

The basis of the Franco-American alliance, may be traced to European colonization of the Americas, beginning in the 17th century. Great Britain and France, having competed for political superiority on the European continent for centuries, began colonizing the New World, as a way to bolster national incomes and deny their opponent the same. By the late 1700s, Britain's American colonies, along the eastern seaboard, grew rebellious. The rebels' first and most powerful potential ally was, France which, had recently been defeated by Great Britain in the Seven Years' War and stripped of many of its colonies in Canada – although French Louisiana remained.

Importantly, the identity of the American colonies, relied heavily on the perception that colonists were, in fact, British citizens, and therefore entitled to the same rights as their peers in Europe (Gipson 1954). The British view of the colonies is often distorted in American historiography. While the colonies were allowed some representation in Parliament, contrary to

common belief in the United States, it is generally recognized that many American colonists felt disassociated from Great Britain and vice versa by the time of the American Revolution.

Frederick Jackson Turner's (1921) famous work *The Frontier in American History* – derived from an 1893 essay that is often referred to as the "Frontier Thesis" – best encapsulates the role of colonization on the American psyche. Turner, argues that as European colonists began the process of inhabiting the New World, they were inherently shaped by the frontier experience. As those Europeans, continued to drive westward, they slowly shed their European-ness and evolved an American identity. Having settled in a land uninhabited by white Europeans (of course, the preexisting native tribes were not considered by European colonists as part of the collective identity) the concept of rugged pioneers, bringing civilization to a strange and foreign place pervaded, the early republic and the colonial era. It is this precise, subtle, and slow-evolving alienation from European identity, and hence European politics, which confirms the proposition of this thesis – that as normative inputs of a state's ontology change, the policy outputs necessarily change as well. The United States had already drifted ontologically away from its alliance with France, which attenuated the benefits the alliance provided to ontological security. The French Revolution – the catalyzing event in this alliance's dissolution – changed the collective identity of France in such a way that the centripetal forces holding the alliance tenuously together faltered.

American identity, separate from that of the British, noticeably began to develop even as early as King Phillip's War of 1675 (Lepore 1999), fought largely between New Englander colonists and Native Americans without much interference from the crown. In the run-up to the American Revolution, the Royal Decree of 1763 provoked considerable ire from British colonials by prohibiting westward expansion beyond the Appalachians, which were the prime targets for a growing population along the coast with an identity focused on settlement of the wild frontier.

Additionally, the influx on non-British, Western European immigrants – namely Scots, Irish, and Germans, led to a further drift of American culture and identity away from its British foundations (Rossiter 1956).

The ontology of the early American republic was further shaped, of course, by the struggle for independence from Great Britain, which still posed the greatest threat to the nascent nation. Walt (1987), following the realist school of international relations, might argue that the British threat is what primarily drove the young nation to cooperate with France, Britain's historical rival and main challenger for hegemony in North America. While this assumption does validate some of the decisions made by American policymakers in the early years of the republic, it fails to account for the ontological condition of the United States at the time, which directly contributed to the alliance with France. France served as an offshore balancer for the United States during the Revolutionary War and early national period. Without economic and military aid from France, it is unlikely the United States would have triumphed over Great Britain. Yet the ontologies of both states contributed to the formation of the alliance – for the United States, opposition to British rule inundated much of the rhetoric prior to the war, notwithstanding the Loyalist elements of American society, which naturally had no representation in the government after the outbreak of war. Likewise, the ontology of the French state must be examined before the alliance's formation in order to assess the effect of normative change on that ontology, and therefore ontological change's effect on alliance dissolution.

The collective identity of the French state, developed from a centuries-long feud with the British that left the French monarchy well-disposed to any opportunity to hamper Britain's plans for hegemony. Moreover, having been defeated previously in the Seven Years' War by Britain, which had instigated the war largely in an effort to drive France from North America, had stung

French national pride and inflicted a blow to the collective identity of the French as Europe's most powerful military. Having been unable to overcome their ancestral foes, the French monarchy saw the rebellion in the Americas as a path to, if not restoring French colonial possessions, then at least robbing the British of one of their wealthiest and largest colonies in turn.

Schivelbusch's (2001) book, *The Culture of Defeat*, offers an in depth look at how military defeat affects a nation's collective identity. He writes that "the instinct for revenge is as elementary as thirst or sexual desire" (Schivelbusch 2001, 23). This thirst for revenge most certainly infused the French national identity – even on an individual level – following the defeat of 1763. The French alliance with the upstart British colonies, therefore, not only serves as an example of realist power politics in motion, but indicates a collective identity well-disposed to alliance formation.

Moore (1967) offers another explanation of French collective identity of the late 18th century. He argues that the French nobility and an emergent bourgeoisie became progressively estranged over the course of several decades as commercial agriculture changed the nature of labor and property rights. As these rights changed – and the discovery of considerable source of income that could be generated by enterprising nobles – the exploitation of the peasant class intensified. Moreover, the bourgeoisie was "heavily dependent on royal favor, subject to royal regulation, and oriented toward the production of arms and luxuries for a restricted clientele" (Moore Jr. 1967, 57). This points towards a collective identity that revolves around the king yet chafes under royal rule. Growing economic dependence on the monarchy collided with the absolute political rule of the Capetian kings – a situation ripe for overturning by elite and peasant alike. After the king's execution, this collective identity necessarily shattered.

Therefore, although France of the late 18th century lends itself more readily to the traditional realist explanation of alliance formation – namely that France felt threatened by the

growth of British power and sought to cripple that growth by supporting the independence of the American colonies, it cannot be said that that threat alone provoked French military, economic, and diplomatic support for the nascent American government. Instead, one must look to the collective identity of the French state as the bulwark of anti-British sentiment in Europe and at the celebration of American political figures in France, who were widely heralded as heroes of a novel movement in political philosophy. Moreover, French and British identities developed over the course of a centuries' long antagonism between the two nations. The remnants of this rivalry are still alive today, albeit having developed into generally amicable relationship since the dawn of the 20th century. The American identity likewise began to drift away from its British origins and towards something wholly different. Part of this new identity, influenced as it was by the vast frontiers of North America and the freedom to be had there, compounded the rebellious spirit of the colonists, leading to war and, in turn, an alliance with France.

Dissolution

The bonds of the Franco-American alliance devolved steadily over the course of the last decades of the 18th century. France, for its part, was bankrupted by the series of wars it had fought over the mid-century. Its first colonial empire had fallen into British hands, and although it had aided the Americans in their war of independence, the French showed little else gained from the war except monstrous debts. More importantly, the American Revolution sparked in France a change to the collective ontology of the French people. Not only had an upstart colonial nation defeated one of the great powers of the day, it had done so in the name of democracy – albeit in limited form. France, it must be remembered, was a monarchy centered on the divine right of kings, who, as Moore (1967) found, had subsumed the political and economic independence of the

elites. The nature of kingship, having been, according to the political philosophy of the time, handed down from God Himself, defined the political roles of all French citizens.

Despite the constrained nature of early American democracy, the ability of a state to successfully implement a government comprised of non-noble, voting citizens who ostensibly had some say in the affairs of the state ignited a desire among the common French for a share of their own government. Thus, the American Revolution not only changed the ontology of the United States, it also directly contributed to a change in the ontology of the French. It may be tempting to link this ontological change to the dissolution of the Franco-American alliance. However, the alliance persisted for over a decade after the end of the American Revolution, well into the 1790s. The ontological change that provoked the dissolution of this alliance instead lies in the changing nature of the French Revolution, particularly as the French Revolutionary Wars erupted in 1792.

France rapidly swept away the political structures of the *ancien régime*, heralding a new identity as the home of democratic revolution in Europe. Yet, as the revolution progressed, and began incorporating ever more radical liberal ideas, such as universal suffrage and emancipation of the working classes, many observers in the United States grew anxious. It should be noted, of course, that an egalitarian society was inherently antithetical to the Founders' original concepts of American democracy. Federalists, and Alexander Hamilton in particular, feared the outbreak of mob rule and derided the ability of the poor to participate meaningfully in the political process. This break in the ontological alignment of the two nations, presaged an irrevocable split in the identities and, ultimately, national interests of either state, leading to the abandoning their alliance.

One might argue that the ontological security of both France and the United States would have been equally in jeopardy while France remained a monarchy under the rule of Louis XVI. However, a few key factors explain why the alliance did not break at that time.

Firstly, the monarchy in France posed no threat to the ontological security of the fledgling United States. Monarchies were the most common form of government in Europe, and the world at-large, at that time. The rule of the Capetian kings was considered not only the norm but, in many respects, the standard of monarchial rule.

Secondly, although it seems obvious in retrospect, the influence of the American Revolution largely escaped the notice of France's societal upper echelons. The French nobility, which served as both domestic and foreign policymakers under the king, paid little heed to the growing resentment of the lower classes, meaning that the ontological shift described earlier did not influence the decision-making elements of the French government until after their replacement by their revolutionary successors. It is clear from this case study that the ontological shift necessary for alliance dissolution must by undertaken by those portions of the state that implement policy. Crane Brinton's (1938, 86) infamous work *The Anatomy of Revolutions* describes both the American and French revolutions as having deep-seated causes stretching back decades. He states

> [We must] hold that revolutions do grow from seeds sown by men who want change, and that these men do do a lot of skillful gardening; but [also] that the gardeners are not working against nature, but rather in soil and in climate propitious to their work; and that the final fruits represent a collaboration between men and nature.

However that soil lay largely untended by the power-wielding elites of the French Court prior to 14 July, 1789.

Lastly, American policymakers not only viewed France as a powerful ally – invoking a realist paradigm – but also shared an identity as opponents of the British. This last factor remained constant throughout the next century, but proved only tractable enough to prevent alliance decay throughout the monarchial period. As the ontological changes characterized by the Terror began

to sweep across France, this shared anti-British sentiment was too weak to keep either partner committed to the alliance.

The American government at the time of the alliance's dissolution, it must be remembered, consisted near wholly of wealthy elites – much like the government of France prior to 1792. While the king was deposed in 1789, only with his beheading and the rapid overthrow of monarchial system does a general upheaval in French national identity occur. The dissolution of the Franco-Austrian alliance is a direct result of the ontological change associated with this upheaval.

The Franco-Austrian alliance was broken by Austria after nearly fifty years of stability. The Austrians, whose own royal daughter Marie Antoinette was now a prisoner in France, invaded after the change in France's government to a constitutional monarchy. Clearly, the Austrian government viewed the rapid devolution of monarchy in France as both a threat to its own national and ontological security and as a provocation for military action. However, it must be said that, despite later historians' demonization of Austria as a bulwark of conservatism adamantly opposed to the modern liberal state, Austria of the late 18th century was remarkably progressive for its time (Beales 1987). France, viewing itself now as both as a victim of Austrian aggression and as a defender of the ideals of the Revolution, began its defense. The break in this alliance portended a broader European war, the War of the First Coalition, between Revolutionary France and the conservative monarchies of Austria, Prussia, Britain, Spain, and others.

This rupture in the Franco-Austrian alliance not only coincides with the dissolution of the Franco-American alliance, but mirrors many of the same factors that influenced them. Although the United States was obviously not a monarchy, its established elite felt a strong desire for the peaceful hold on power they had maintained through the revolution and into the early national period. In fact, the infamous Shays' Rebellion of 1785 – which sparked the conventions that led

to the writing of the Constitution – was a popular uprising that threatened to unseat the elite interests that had presided over the ineffectual government created by the Articles of Confederation. With the risk of rebellion from below, like the one that overtook the French government by 1792, American elites collaborated to create a government that allowed some popular input, but retained power for themselves. This government, therefore, reflects the ontological state of the early American republic as a product of elite stabilization.

Here it is useful to invoke Brinton again. He states that in a revolution, there is often a period of hope, renewal, and peace following the overthrow of the old order. This peace last only briefly under the moderate factions of the new government, until overtaken by the extremists. However, while the American Revolution "did not quite follow the pattern of the [English, French, and Russian Revolutions…" (Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolutions 1938, 176) it still engaged in some form of extremist rule. France on the other hand, is the archetypical case of revolutionary dictatorship coupled with political terror. It is the difference between these two revolutionary takeovers that sowed the seed for alliance dissolution.

Contrary to the ongoing turmoil in France, the collective identity of the United States reflects an established, near-aristocratic apparatus devoted largely to the maintenance of elite power. In France the September Massacres, the storming of the Tuileries Palace, and the outbreak of the Reign of Terror heralded a decisive shift away from a power structure controlled by traditional elites, and in fact marked a tumultuous period when power never resided anywhere for long. The anarchy that characterized the first few years of the French Revolution, therefore, posed a direct threat to the ontological security of the elite policymakers of the American government. This ontological threat, predicated on the regime change in France, spelled the doom of the alliance.

There are of course, other factors that inspired the dissolution of the Franco-American alliance. The fledgling coastal nation, fresh from its own war and still quite weak, was in no shape to oppose the mighty British military again. Additionally, a strong desire for neutrality with and distance from the politics of Europe pervaded much of the early American psyche, especially among President Washington's administration. This is perhaps best encapsulated in his notorious farewell address, in which he cautioned against entangling alliances and potential involvement of the far-flung affairs of the Europeans (Washington 1796).

From a realist perspective, one might argue that the strength of the British and commensurate weakness of the United States at the time prevented an effective alliance between the latter and the French. However, while this explanation may bear some fruit, it must be recalled that by the start of the War of the First Coalition, the United States could very well have fielded an army capable of challenging the British in Canada. Unlike the Articles of Confederation, under which the government had no authority to raise national forces, the Constitution authorized just such a thing. However, the identity of the early American republic, both shaped by and inherited from the British, opposed the creation of just such a military, in remembrance of the grievances committed by the British government and its armies in the colonies prior to independence, and the history of England's own standing armies in its civil strife of the previous century.

The last evidence of the effect of changing identity the dissolution of the Franco-American alliance lies in the XYZ Affair, and the hands of Citizen Genet. Citizen Genet, the French ambassador to the United States in the aftermath of the terror, was sent on a mission to drum up the American public's desire to join the War of the First Coalition on the side of the beleaguered French. In many ways he was quite successful, especially in his initial efforts in the South, where he recruited several privateers to harass British ships in the Atlantic, and even a small militia that

he proposed sending to fight against Spanish colonists in Florida. His call for an end to American neutrality, however, failed to move President Washington or his Cabinet. After a series of increasingly hostile interactions with Washington's administration, Genet was notified of the government impending decision to have him returned to France.

This diplomatic crisis demonstrates that the American government's adherence to a policy of neutrality was so central to both the interests and the collective identity of that government that the nascent nation's leaders were more willing to risk the dissolution of the alliance that President Washington considered the "cornerstone of American diplomacy" (National Archives 2017) than to risk engaging the United States in the European war.

Conclusion

The dissolution of the Franco-American alliance is a prime example of the effects of ontological change alliance stability. This case is abnormal, in that of the three conditions for ontological change described in the framework. As will be shown in future case studies, most examples of alliance dissolution owing to a change in ontology result from at least two conditions. However, this abnormality is perhaps the best to use as an introduction to identity and alliance because it demonstrates so thoroughly the effect of just such an identity change on alliances. Moreover, it is far easier to triangulate the causal relationship between identity and dissolution when there is only a single condition present.

It may be argued that France's defeat in the Seven Years' War served as a social condition for ontological change that lead to the alliance's eventual dissolution. However, while the defeat certainly contributed to France's ontological state prior to the American War of Independence – namely that France's long-term enmity with Great Britain was inflamed – the defeat in the war

cannot be linked casually to the alliance's dissolution. Some thirty years separate the conclusion of the Seven Years' War and the dissolution of the Franco-American alliance, far too long a time for military defeat to manifest in a decision to terminate an international agreement. Further research will elaborate on the limitations of military defeat on ontological change.

In this case, the regime change in France prompted a threat to the ontological security of the United States, which viewed itself as a neutral, albeit anti-British, nation far too removed from Europe to warrant involvement. Furthermore, the political turmoil in France began to excise the same class of political elites that held most of the power in the United States. Any American support for French revolutionary terror would have essentially signaled an acceptance of this class's removal from power. Naturally, this would have been unfathomable for the power elite of the U.S.

It should be surmised from this case study firstly that it is the collective identity of the governing institutions, and consequently the individuals and groups who dominate those institutions, that most determines the identity of the government. Secondly, a shift in the collective identity of these institutions or the people who most contribute to them can develop from any one of the conditions listed in the alliance dissolution framework. Lastly, should such a shift occur, an alliance is at risk of dissolving. States that see a threat to their ontological security must take action to mitigate or eliminate entirely that threat, just as they might do with a corresponding physical threat.

Triple Entente, 1917

Introduction

The collapse of the Triple Entente is the second empirical study examined under the alliance dissolution framework. Unlike the first case study, the Franco-American alliance, the Russian Revolution offers an opportunity to explore two separate, yet related, conditions for ontological change: military defeat and regime change. There are abundant similarities between the French and Russian revolutions. Both developed out of a period of crisis for their respective nations, both significantly altered the social and governmental structures of each nation. Replacing them with radically different structural systems which reflected a drastic shift in the ontology of the respective nations. However, there are a few key differences – namely the effect of the First World War on Russia's collective identity and the historical backdrops against which each respective revolution takes place. Yet Russia's withdrawal from the Triple Entente sufficiently demonstrates the role of ontological change on alliance dissolution.

This case will further explain the role of regime change on ontological security while introducing a second condition for ontological change: military defeat. Although, again, realist literature readily applies to many aspects of Russia's dissolution of its alliances with Great Britain and France in 1917, this study will describe the shifts in Russia's identity that provoked the dissolution just as much as the power politics of the First World War. Naturally, the roots of the alliance must first be examined, followed by an analysis of the conditions leading to the alliance's dissolution. This will be done in two parts, the first focusing on the effect of Russia's military defeat on the Eastern Front and it subsequent change in the ontological security of the state, and

secondly on the effect of the revolutions of 1917 that first overthrew the Romanov tsars and later led to the seizure of government by V.I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

Origins

The alliance between the Russian Empire, Great Britain, and France developed out of a period of intense European rivalry. Having lost the Franco-Prussian War to the then-Prussian Empire, which shortly after reformed as a united Germany, France was eager to find allies in Europe that could either help regain lost territory and national prestige, or at the very least prevent further losses of both. The Russian Empire, equally concerned with the growth of German power relative to its own, likewise sought an ally to support its own goals (Tuchman 1962, 61-62). Great Britain, in similar straits as the French and Russians, joined the two powers in alliance, forming the Triple Entente.

It is remarkable, in some ways that the three powers of the Triple Entente banded together in the first place. The historic rivalry between Great Britain and France posed a severe ontological challenge to the two nations' potential for cooperation, while the Russian Empire had generally taken an isolationist approach to foreign policy since its defeat at the hands of the other two Entente states in the Crimean War over sixty years prior to the formation of the Triple Entente. Realist literature, particularly that of Walt (1990) (2001) (1985) and Mearsheimer (2001), more than adequately explains the role of power in the formation of the Triple Entente. All three states saw a threat to their national security as Germany's power increased relative to their own. Their works also lend credence to realist theory that emphasizes the role of power (balance of power?) in the dissolution of Russia's ties to the Triple Entente. However, the complementary effect of ontological change on alliance stability only briefly mentioned in their work. This case study

offers an opportunity to describe this effect on Russian foreign policy throughout the First World War and the revolutions of 1917.

In order to understand the changes to ontological security that resulted in Russia leaving the Triple Entente, its collective identity must first be described as it was when it joined the alliance structure in 1907. First, counterintuitively, Russia's identity as an opponent to both France and Great Britain was deeply rooted in the great power politics of the 19th century. Although Russia and France had largely coordinated their foreign policies into a working alliance by the late 1870s, the former continued a "Great Game" with the British nearly into the early 20th century as each vied for supremacy in Central Asia. However, the Russian Empire also saw itself as the defender of all Slavic peoples of Europe, many of whom were then citizens of the aging Austro-Hungarian Empire. This rivalry with the Habsburg Emperors in Vienna undoubtedly fueled a Pan-Slavic internationalism in Russia, with which its policymakers sought to liberate the Slavic peoples of southeast Europe from Austrian rule – and, it goes without saying, unite them under a Russian-led umbrella. Pan-Slavic sentiment inundates much of Russia's foreign policy throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and was often centered on the conquest of Constantinople, the overthrow of Austrian rule in the Balkans, and the unification of the Slavic peoples into something wholly different that the contemporary empires of Europe – an empire equal to the rest of the continent combined (Danilevskii 1999).

Pan-Slavism infused much of Russia's foreign policy in the early years of the 20th century. Developed over the previous centuries of rivalry with the Ottoman Turks – who periodically ruled over the southeastern Slavs, fighting for territory and influence with the Habsburgs in Austria – the Russian Empire became a bastion of Slavic culture, one of the great powers of Europe, and the self-proclaimed "Third Rome". Other Slavic nations, namely Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, et al.

looked to the Russian Empire as their benefactor as each nation began to grow in power relative to the decaying Austrian and Ottoman Empires. The Tsars readily accepted this role, which promised influence and primacy across the Balkans and beyond.

Austria-Hungary's alliance, although at times tenuous, with Germany naturally shifted Russia towards its own alliance with France. By the dawn of the 20th century, two rival blocs began to appear. Historians have for decades debated the root causes of the First World War. For the purpose of this study, Russia's ties to Serbia and Serbian nationalism must take preeminence. Certainly there a plethora of contributing factors, attitudes, and events that shaped the lead up the Great War, but examining the ties between the Russian Empire and Serbia directly relate to the causes underlying Russia's withdrawal from the Triple Entente. With Austria's invasion of Serbia in August 1914 – and Germany's infamous "blank cheque" to support Austrian efforts – the First World War began in earnest. Russia mobilized in defense of Serbia, prompting France to mobilize in turn as the conflagration escalated beyond the control of any individual nation.

The Russian Army, massive yet poorly led, trained, and equipped, entered the First World War like most other belligerents – prepared to rapidly overrun its enemies in a blaze of glory. Convinced of its military superiority, both in numbers and ability, the Russian armies confronted Germany's Prussian legions and the Austrian troops that had been rushed eastwards, only to find themselves overwhelmed by the far superior forces. By the middle of the war, having suffered countless defeats, the conditions for ontological change in the Russian government began to become apparent.

Dissolution

There are two social conditions of the alliance dissolution framework, present at the time of Russia's withdrawal from the Triple Entente and the First World War. The first, military defeat, greatly affected not only Russia's ability to carry on the war in the east, but also destabilized Russian national identity through a loss in confidence, among the general population and government officials, in the Tsarist regime.

The second, more drastic, ontological change followed the overthrow of the Tsarist government. With the installment of the Communist Party, Russia's conception of threat rapidly shifted away from the war and towards an inevitable civil conflict. It is the conception of threat, resulting from an ontological shift, which helped propel the new Russian government to sever its ties with Great Britain and France in the winter of 1917. It should be noted that, despite the general backwardness of the Russian Empire, Tsar Nicolas II recognized that "the autocracy was fighting a losing battle against insidious liberal influences from the West. The direction of political change – toward something like a Western constitutional monarchy – seemed clear..." (Fitzpatrick 2008, 15). The stirrings of ontological change were evident in the Russian Empire long before the February Revolution.[1] Therefore, the seeds of regime change were present even as Russia entered the Triple Entente. These seeds bore bitter fruit in the form of the February and October Revolutions, each of which affected the ontological security of Russia in 1917, as will be shown forthwith.

[1] For a more complete picture of the causes and events of the Russian Revolution, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008 and Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1998.

Russia's Defeat in the First World War

By 1917, Russian armies had been ground down by three years of war on its frontiers of Galicia-Volhynia, the Baltics, Poland, and the Caucasus. Although the Austro-Hungarian forces proved generally unorganized and poorly led (traits they shared with the Russian armies of the day), German armies in the east often swept aside their Russian adversaries with ease even when outnumbered and/or outgunned. From the Baltic coast to the Black Sea Russian forces suffered humiliating defeats, a few key victories notwithstanding – namely at Warsaw and the Brusilov Campaign through Galicia, and the Persian and Turkish fronts. It cannot be overstated, however, how great the effect of military defeat on cultural identity is. The generally poor showing of the Imperial Russian armies sowed doubt in the minds of the population regarding the ability of the Empire – and its policymakers – to defend them, to effectively pursue the national interests, and to maintain the stability and independence of Russia.

It should also be noted that wars, especially wars in the process of being lost, demand a terrible sacrifice of a nation's youth. As young Russian soldiers were sent to fight – and often die – in the campaigns of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, their families stayed home awaiting their return. Often, no such return occurred. The debilitating effect of losing a family member and friend, especially in a conflict that bears little hope for victory, can greatly disrupt the established ontology of a state's population.

Macleod (2008) describes military defeat as both an event and a process that lingers in the memory of the defeated nation. The event of defeat is signified by the final decisive battle, the surrender mechanism, or the occupation of an important site or city. Of the process of defeat, she writes:

> At some point in the process, the question arises…of whether defeat can furnish the basis of a new normality or whether it remains unacceptable… [I]f defeat is rejected, this preserves or resurrects the culture of wartime… Conversely, accepting defeat implies reconciliation with the enemy (Macleod 2008, 24).

Russia's defeat in the First World War ushered in a new normality of sorts in which an alternative ontological meaning of security aligned with the new normative conditions within the Russian state. Riven by civil war and popular insurrection after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, the new rulers of Russia were compelled to redefine ontological security in terms of maintaining control over the Russian state, defeating civil war opponents, and instituting its promised political, economic, and social reforms.. An alliance with France and Britain against Germany, no longer aligned with the new meaning of Russian ontological security, leading to the dissolution of Russia's alliance with France and Britain.

It is important here to delineate between the state of Russia's physical security and its ontological security. Physical security refers to a state's ability to protect its territory, citizens, and resources from other states. Russia was unable to maintain its physical security throughout much of the First World War as the armies of the Central Powers invaded and captured many Russian cities. Conversely, ontological security refers to a state's perception of its role in the world – how that state should react, its values, beliefs, and collective will. These reflect the norms that a state's policymakers adhere to. Russian ontological security prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was predicated on a desire to expand Russian power abroad, protect or annex the Slavic peoples of southeastern Europe, and serve as a conservative bastion in the east against a German Empire that was growing in power. Russia's defeat in the First World War broke its ontological security, provoking a change in that ontology. The political and ideational norms of postwar Russia coalesced around a rejection of European imperialism and an embracement of both communism and modernization.

It should be noted that military defeat and ontological change share a history in Russia long before the October Revolution. By 1825 a coup led by members of the Russian army revolted in St Petersburg. These officers were inspired partly by the same dissatisfaction with the tsars as what led to the more successful revolution in 1917, but also partly by their experiences in the Napoleonic Wars ten years previously. Although the Russian Empire eventually found itself on the winning side of the conflict with Revolutionary France, it had also suffered tremendous defeats from 1804-1812. These defeats, coupled with many officers' experience in socially-advanced Europe, prompted an ontological shift that led to a revolution. Another example is the Crimean War, which saw Russia defeated by its future allies, Britain and France. After the defeat in 1856, the Russians withdrew from international politics for several decades, embracing an almost isolationist approach to European affairs. This is evidence of an ontological shift during this period in Russia, indicating a self-perception that the Empire was not the great European power it had once been, and that its interests lay outside the continent.[2]

Russia's defeat in 1905 at the hands of Imperial Japan also offers an opportunity to examine the role of military defeat on collective identity. Russia's capitulation in the relatively short war marks the first historical example of an East Asian nation defeating a European power. This war spiraled out of control, prompting social unrest, protests, and revolution that was only waylaid by a relatively favorable peace treaty and concessions from the tsar for domestic reforms (Fitzpatrick 2008, 32). This example, along with the 1860 reforms instigated by the Crimean War and other periods of social unrest indicate that the Russian nation at-large was on the verge of an ontological

[2] A more thorough history of Russia's revolutionary century can be found in Crankshaw, Edward. *The Shadow of the Winter Palace: Russia's Drift to Revolution 1825-1917.* New York, Da.Capo Press, 1976.

break. By the time Tsar Nicholas II finally abdicated in March 1917, the decay of the autocracy had been weakening his grip on power for decades.

Any further examination of the role of military defeat in collective identity formation must return to Schivelbusch (2001, 13) who says that "the elation that follows the initial post defeat depression thus signals a recovery from the collective psychological breakdown, a recovery triggered by the overthrow of authority" a state he calls *dreamland*, borrowing from German historian Ernst Troeltsch, "in which all blame is transferred to the deposed tyrant and the losing nation feels cathartically cleansed, freed of any responsibility or guilt." Tsar Nicholas II and his family undoubtedly became the receptacles for Russian national anguish in the wake of the First World War. His personal involvement on the Eastern Front likely contributed to many Russians perception of his failings as well. In any case, the rule of the tsars as an institution came under attack once again as Russian armies reeled from defeat after defeat, sparking a national ire and fervor for change.

Fitzpatrick (2008, 39) sums up the role of Russia's military catastrophes in prompting the revolution thusly:

> The First World War both exposed and increased the vulnerability of Russia's old regime...When defeats occurred, the society did not rally behind its government...but instead turned sharply against it, denouncing its incompetence and backwardness in tones of contempt and moral superiority. This suggests that the regime's legitimacy had become extremely shaky...The war lasted too long, draining not only Russia but the whole of Europe.

Riasonovsky (2011, 416) likewise concludes that "Before very long, many Russians began to speak of the war as a catastrophe. Casualty rates were the most vivid sign of the disaster. By the end of 1914...nearly 400,000 Russian men had lost their lives." 1915 continued to drain the nation, and despite some success in 1916, by the end of the year "morale among soldiers was even worse

than during the great retreat of 1915." These defeats highlight a key shift in the ontology of the Russian state. Victory was all but unattainable, and the alliances with Great Britain and France nigh useless.

There is some reason to believe Russia could have maintained a meaningful presence in the conflict. However, it is clear in the historical record that an ongoing ontological shift against the war was taking place throughout the Russian population at-large, and more importantly, in the highest levels of government. McMeekin (2011, 221) notes that, by the winter of 1916-17 "there was every reason for the Russians to fight on." Despite the loss of Poland in 1915, Russia had won considerable victories in Turkey and Persia, and had even pushed the Austrians back in Galicia. Yet morale began to crack among troops and civilians alike, heralding a – perhaps not inevitable, but still quite likely – ontological shift. McMeekin (2011, 228) says of the summer campaigns "In Galicia in June-July 1917, if not at Tannenberg in August 1914, we can finally see Russia "falling on its sword" for the western Allies." Although this campaign took place after the ousting of the tsar in February, it is indicative of a larger change in the perception of Russia's role in the conflict. Having sustained millions of casualties during the war, many Russian's viewed their sacrifices as not only unbeneficial but also as supportive of a world system – led by Britain and France – that did not serve their interests, and in fact sought to subjugate them and their country to the whims of self-interested foreigners. This is the first ontological shift that culminated in the dissolution of the Triple Entente.

Military defeat therefore had a tremendous effect on how Russia, like all nations after such a catastrophe, reconstructed its identity. Russia, like other nations that have been vanquished by foreign conflict, experienced similar changes to its collective identity as it withdrew from the First World War. The various defeats of Russian armies along the Eastern Front shook the foundations

of the tsar's grip on power, calling into question the Russian people's trust in the autocrat to defend their territory. Having once again lost the faith of the Russian people, revolution became all too apparent, and the combination of these two conditions proved sufficient to rupture Russia's alliance with Great Britain and France. As for its effects on alliance termination, the conclusions drawn from this aspect of Russia's ontological change are clear: having been defeated by Germany, the Russian Empire began to crack, and in an effort to secure peace, the government's perception of threat began to change rapidly away from foreign invaders in exchange for increased scrutiny on domestic concerns. This highlights a shift in the collective identity of Russia in the waning month of 1917 that parallels a realist interpretation of the political-military straits the empire found itself in.

Overthrow of the Tsars

Revolution, like military defeat, has a long history in Russia and is closely associated with that nation's ontological security throughout the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century. The Decembrist Revolt of 1825 has already been described, having been borne from the embers of the Napoleonic Wars. Even as late as 1905-6 Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War sparked protests against the regime that culminated in some concessions from the autocracy, such as the creation of the Duma. By 1917, however, prompted by the terrible losses of the First World War, revolution finally succeeded in overthrowing the autocracy. This regime change marks a period of identity change in Russia that culminated in the severing of its alliances with Great Britain and France.

There are two important instances of revolution in Russia in 1917 – both of which contributed to ontological shifts. The first, the February Revolution, led to Tsar Nicholas II's abdication in March. After his abdication, a Provisional Government was established. As was

shown in the last case study, a change in governing elite can create conditions sufficient for an ontological change. In some ways, the February Revolution was capable of doing this. Brinton's (1938) famous work *The Anatomy of Revolution* placed the Provisional Government that followed the February Revolution in the "honeymoon" phase of revolution, meaning that, born out of hope for a better future, the as-yet undivided government embarked on a foreign policy it felt would best reflect the collective identity and interests of the state. Yet, Russia continued to fight the war and remained allied to their western peers throughout most of 1917, until shortly after the October Revolution. It is at this point, when V.I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks assumed power, that the process of ontological change sufficient for alliance dissolution concludes. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the shift in collective identity most relevant to this case is the later revolution.

Lenin withdrew Russian troops from the Eastern Front in early December 1917, evincing a clear recognition among the new set of policymakers that Russia's role in the war was at an end. Certainly, Russia's economic and military weakness contributed to the decision to withdraw. These weaknesses, relative to Germany and Austria-Hungary, evoke a realist assumption of the role threat and power. However, it is clear from the historical record that the Russian public no longer desired to fight the war, an ontological change that contributed directly to the success of regime change. According to Fitzpatrick (2008, 39)"The regime was so vulnerable to any kind of jolt or setback that it is hard to imagine that it could have survived long, even without the [First World] War."

Identity shapes the perception of threat; the perception of threat, in turn, shapes a state's policy regarding alliance formation and termination. With the threat of Germany all but nullified after V.I. Lenin and the Bolsheviks assumed power and began peace negotiations, policymakers in the Russian government perceived that their state's territorial and ontological security no longer

rested on the Triple Entente. At this pivotal juncture in Russian history, therefore, the Provisional Government abandoned its foreign obligations. This is often interpreted as the necessary concessions of a defeat power. However, although certainly the very real need to exit the war with Germany was at the forefront of Russian foreign policy in late 1917, the changing ontological conditions in Russia necessitated such a withdrawal just as much. Leninist ideology, which quickly became the predominant force of the revolution, held that Russia society was diametrically opposed to the capitalist powers that sought to exploit it. Great Britain and France were undoubtedly at the top of the list, making an alliance with those powers unfathomable to a nation in the grips of an ideological revolution.

The role of Marxism cannot be elided when examining the ontological change of the post-Revolution government. Having for centuries been a massive agrarian empire ruled by autocrats wielding unlimited power, the concepts of Marxism evince a radical change in the social structure of both the policymaking elements of the Russian government – to which ontological change is most likely to affect foreign policy and alliance stability – but even the broader Russian public. Marxism's portrayal of capitalism as bourgeois versus proletariat was a broad departure from the near-feudal societal structure of the old empire. More importantly, communist ideology was able to effectively capitalize on the population's anger with the war by portraying it as an "imperialist war", fought by Great Britain, France, and Germany to further exploit the proletariat and increase their own nation's wealth at the expense of the common man. In way, early Russian communists were not mistaken in this regard, as Germany and Russia both desired to conquer, for example, the Low Countries and Constantinople, respectively, in addition to other conquests (McMeekin 2011, 232).

Brinton (1938) notes that, although the Russian economy of the early 20th century was, in fact, growing, the poverty of the peasants and lower class was only marginally improved by the beginning of the First World War – by its end much of the economic progress was reversed. Therefore, when V.I. Lenin became the unofficial leader of the revolution, promising economic reform and an end to the old capitalist system that had for so long disparaged the will and wealth of the people, many Russians exuberantly embraced him. This sort of ontological change proved too much of a strain on the alliance, prompting Russia's exit.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Russian Revolution marks a period of substantial ontological change. This change, epitomized by the resignation of the tsar and subsequent destruction of that office, drastically altered Russia's collective identity. When its collective identity was altered, Russia broke its alliances with Great Britain and France. This ontological shift was a result of the military defeats Russia suffered along the Eastern Front, corroding the citizenry's will to continue fighting, which in turn lead to an overthrow of the regime, causing further ontological shifts away from autocratic rule and towards Marxist-inspired isolationism.

The defeat of Russia's armies in the east, notwithstanding some success in Turkey and Persia, allowed the general population to lose faith in the abilities of the tsar. Additionally, and more importantly as demonstrated from the Franco-American case study, the structures of government that exerted the most influence on foreign policy began to follow suit. This ontological shift – a change in the perception of Russia's role in the war based on military defeat – precipitated a dissolution of Russia's alliances with the west. When the population began to view the war as the machinations of imperialist powers, the collective identity of Russia effectively changed in such a way that alliance dissolution was possible. This is best represented by the

February Revolution and the abdication of the tsar, although Russia's full withdrawal from the war came later that same year.

By October of 1917 military defeat had sparked a far vaster social revolution than had previously been expected. Although the impetus for alliance dissolution had already been set in motion by the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, it is with V.I. Lenin's assumption of power in October that the final shift in ontological security necessitated a collapse of Russia's foreign commitments. Great Britain and France, being the leading imperialist-capitalist powers of the day, posed an ideological threat to the survival of the new regime. It would have been unconscionable for the communist government led by Lenin to continue Russia's participation in the Triple Entente.

Warsaw Pact, 1989

Introduction

The third empirical test of the alliance termination framework is the Warsaw Pact's dissolution circa 1989, focusing on the relationship between Poland and Russia from 1987-1989. It offers another opportunity to explore the effect of regime change on alliance politics, but, importantly, it allows the exploration of the third condition in the framework: political rivalry. The relationship between Russia and Poland stretches across the centuries, and historical factors necessarily inform the ontology of both states. This case study will demonstrate that Polish opposition to communism developed into an intense political rivalry with the Soviet Union that drove Poland to overthrow its communist regime in favor of a democratic, Western-leaning government, which then severed the alliance between Poland and the Soviet Union.

The origins of the alliance will first be examined, followed by an analysis of the conditions that led to a change in one or both states' collective identities, and how that change led to the dissolution of their alliance. While the Warsaw Pact is sometimes viewed as a show of force or similar political act without inherent substance –the Soviet Union already had pre-existing bilateral treaties with all Warsaw Pact member states – it notably served more than just national security purposes. It was a structure created out of the Cold War that symbolized the unification of communist governments against their capitalist, American-led peers. The Warsaw Pact encompassed all the nations of Eastern Europe under the Soviet umbrella from 1955 to 1989. However this study will focus heavily on the Polish-Soviet relationship that inspired the ultimate collapse of the entire system. Certainly other events contributed to the fall of the Warsaw Pact – the fall of the Berlin Wall, for example – yet the change in Polish ontology throughout the 1970s

and 1980s marks the first such ontological shift within the Warsaw Pact, and therefore the starting point for any analysis of the alliance's demise.

Origins

The Warsaw Pact was an alliance created in the early phases of the Cold War, as a counterpart to the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The structurationist nature of ontology is observed in this case. Identity shapes, threat perception and interests which, in turn, inform and reshape identity. In this case, the identity of the Soviet Union[3] was set in opposition to the US other, giving rise to the perception of threat on the part of the Soviet Union toward the formation of NATO. Similarly, Western liberal democracies perceived a threat in the form of the Soviet Union which, reflected ontological discord with the Soviet Union's expansionist counter-Western liberal ideology. With the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviets had expanded their rule across Eastern Europe, including Poland, for the purpose of extending a sphere of ontological influence to serve as a buffer against ideological encroachment by Western Liberal democracies. The United States likewise spread its influence across Western Europe – within a few years of the surrender of Germany, the two remaining superpowers had squared off into mutually suspicious blocs rallied around ideological poles.

Poland was liberated from German occupation only to be conquered by the Soviet Union as early as 1944, when the Red Army began its push into Nazi-controlled territory. The Yalta Conference authorized the formation of a provisional Polish government, with the caveat that free and fair elections take place after the end of the war. However, the Soviet Union, led by I.V. Stalin, effectively promoted the rise of a communist party in Poland, loyal to the Soviet Union, in

[3] Note - for the purposes of this study the terms "Soviet Union" and "Russia" will be used synonymously.

general, and its leader, specifically. A recurrent theme, herein, is the substantial influence ideology has in shaping collective identity. By the end of the 1940s, the Communist Party of Poland, wholly controlled the government, allowing communist ideology to shape its ontology, ontological security, and therefore alliance options (Suny 1998).

While the themes of power and threat are quite clear in the early stages of the Warsaw Pact, and have thus been studied relentlessly for the past eighty years, the role of collective identity in the formation of this alliance structure has often been taken for granted. Walt (1997) demonstrated that states with similar ideologies are more likely to ally one another, although in most of his writings ideology is merely a side note or contributing factor to traditional *realpolitik* motives. It should be conceded, on this point at least, that the Soviet Union's powerful material hold on nations that found themselves on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain undoubtedly contributed to their participation in the Warsaw Pact. However, the dissolution of this alliance began demonstrably with a change in Polish ontology, which was caused by and incipient political rivalry and subsequent change in regime.

One analysis of Russian collective identity, The Long Telegram, written by George Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, at the outset of the Cold War, highlights some of the aspects of Russian collective identity. Kennan notes that Russian collective identity, is bent on expansion eastwards, its establishment of puppet states in nations like Poland, and predicted the rise of a Warsaw Pact-like entity that would aid the exertion of Russia's will on Europe. Kennan, quotes I.V. Stalin's 1927 speech to American workers:

> "In course of further development of international revolution, there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend towards socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline towards capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of

> the world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and of communism in [the] entire world" (Kennan 1947, 2)

This highlights the nature of communist-capitalist conflict in Soviet ideology, long before the beginning of the Cold War, a communal identity predicated on the superiority and eventual triumph of communism over liberal capitalism. This communal identity that pervaded Soviet history, played a huge role in the undermining of the Warsaw Pact, as Poles and other client states of the Soviet Union, equated the rising economic stagnation and political oppression of the regime to its ideological foundations.

Dissolution

Having described the extant ontology of the Warsaw Pact, the rest of this case study will analyze the alliance's ontological shifts that led to its demise – political rivalry, which, in Poland, sprung from deep-seated hostility towards Russia, and regime change that followed in Poland and other communist states in the late 1980s. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact is, in many ways, the story of the Cold War. The centrifugal forces tearing at the bonds of the pan-communist alliance system, were rooted in the antagonisms of history, politics, culture, and economics that pervaded much of the region for centuries, before the alliance was created. The first centers on the rise of Solidarity, the role of Catholicism and Pope John Paul II, and the decline of the Communist Party as an effective governing entity. The second is predicated on Poland's historical and cultural differences with Russia, which were heightened by the rule of Soviet Union over Poland in the postwar era.

Once again, these themes are not meant to supplant the role of threat, interest, and power on alliance dissolution theory. The weakness of the Soviet Union in the waning days of the Cold War undoubtedly contributed to, for example, the rise of Solidarity. Moreover, the economic

morass of the late Soviet empire sprung from a longstanding political malaise, both of which were exacerbated by American political and economic efforts. Economic stagnation very likely contributed to growing unrest among allied communist nations. However, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact cannot be adequately explained by economic stagnation.

It might be argued that military defeat played a role in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, via the Soviet Union's inauspicious – and unsuccessful – war in Afghanistan. The Soviets embarked on a campaign to support the Communist government in that nation in 1979, which quickly spiraled into a near-decade long nation-building effort, bogging down Soviet forces and leaving its leaders politically isolated. Although the Afghanistan War highlighted the immense – and growing – cracks in the Soviet system, it cannot be reasonably held that the war itself created the conditions sufficient for alliance termination as described in the framework.

For example, let's juxtapose the effect of military defeat demonstrated the Russian Revolution with the current case. In the former, three years of total war and devastation left the Russian Empire exhausted, on verge of collapse, and ready for a revolution. Prior to this war Russia had not only experienced considerable revolutionary trembling but was also ground down by sheer number of casualties on a scale unprecedented by any conflict before 1914 and on an exponentially grander scale than that of the Afghanistan War. It was the direct effect of the First World War that isolated Russia from its allies ontologically, which later manifested as a regime change that completed the process of alliance dissolution. Contrarily, the Afghanistan War did not invoke the Warsaw Pact's defense mechanism and did not draw allied nations such as Poland into the conflict. The conflict certainly bared the weaknesses previously hidden in the Soviet military and economy, stressing both to a breaking point, but from a historical perspective the effects of the war were quite indirect in prompting the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. It was only

after ontological changes in both Russia and Poland, undergone some time before the end of the Afghanistan conflict, that the Warsaw Pact was officially annulled. Therefore, the two social conditions present at the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact are regime change and political rivalry.

The Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe

Opposition to communism underlies much of Polish political thought throughout the later Cold War. As early as 1956 an uprising in Poland threatened Communist Party rule. By the mid-1960s, it was becoming increasingly clear throughout the Soviet Empire that the regime was stagnating both economically and politically. Moreover, an intense anti-Russian sentiment permeated Polish opposition politics (Sebestyen 2009) (Riasonovsky and Steinberg 2011, 584-585). As was noted before, the role of communist ideology on domestic and foreign policy can hardly be understated, particularly regarding the eventual triumph of the forces of communism over those of capitalism. By the late 1970s, however, the citizens of Poland, the Soviet Union, and other communist states were beginning to realize that not only was communism's victory far from inevitable, but that it actually may not come at all. In Poland and East Germany, anti-communist groups repeatedly challenged the government as the Cold War progressed, evincing a growing ontological shift away from communism and towards another form of government, in this case a democratic government and capitalist economy.

It is admittedly difficult to gauge exactly how and to what extent opposition to the regime was manifest in the Polish collective identity. Early in the history of the Polish People's Republic opposition parties were shunted out of the political system. As in Russia, the Communist Party merged its own structure with that of the state, leading to a construct that cannot be described simply as a one-party state, but instead must be depicted as simultaneously state and party, with only minor distinctions between the two. Therefore, overt opposition to the regime failed to garner

much support in the early-to-mid-Cold War. However, the Solidarity movement led by Lech Wałęsa managed to not only manifest widespread support by the late 1970s, but to actively challenge and eventually overthrow the regime in the late 1980s (Suny 1998, 469-472).

A simple change of elites within a similar regime – even a regime that has undergone some limited change – is not sufficient to provide the conditions suitable for alliance dissolution. The change in the American regime following the American Revolution, for example, failed to replace the effective ruling class of elites despite the considerable changes to government structure. Yet the French and Russian Revolutions – which not only drastically altered their respective states' governing structures but also effectively removed the ruling class prior to the revolutions and replaced them with new elites – sufficed to elicit the ontological shifts necessary for alliance dissolution. The revolution that took place Poland in 1989 followed a similar path, generally destroying the communist state in favor of a liberalized, capitalist model championed by the United States.

A deeply set dissatisfaction with the ruling Communist Party afflicted Polish politics for at least a decade prior to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Sebestyen (2009, 216) notes that according to "one senior official [the Communist Party] had 'used up all its strength and imagination in the battle against Solidarity in 1980-82.'" The weakened party structure which, like most communist states, had so thoroughly integrated itself into the apparatus of the state that the two were inextricably linked, enabled a new, radical and revolutionary body to challenge it in the waning years of the Soviet Union. In Poland the political movement Solidarity fulfilled this role, although in other states like Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Baltics this uprising was led by forces ideologically similar, but politically disassociated from Solidarity. For its part, Russia's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was in turn a result of the reforms of M.S. Gorbachev, who,

perhaps unwittingly, provoked the overthrow of the Communist regime by advocating the policies reforms of *glasnost* and *perestroika*.

The fall of the Berlin Wall represents a prime example of ontological change and is often the bookmark by which historians date the beginning of the end of the Soviet Empire. Although this case study will not devote a large amount of time to ontological shifts in East Germany, it should be noted that the fall of the Berlin Wall heralded far-reaching changes in collective identity across the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, to include Poland. It is this symbolic destruction of the barriers between east and west that marks a culminating epoch of Polish and Russian ontology. Furthermore, the fall of the Berlin Wall greatly aided the efforts of Lech Walesa to win a majority in the Polish parliament.

Lastly, the Catholic Church played a pivotal role in the ontology of Poland leading up to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II in 1978, for example, – the first non-Italian pontifex in over four centuries – must also be considered when accounting for Polish collective identity in the late Cold War. As Pope, John Paul II was ardently opposed to communist rule in Poland, including the influence of the Soviet Union in the country. Since Poland was, and is to this day, a largely homogenous, deeply religious state, the Papacy played a large role in the daily life of many Polish citizens. That John Paul II was himself Polish could only reinforce the weight of his opinions on the Polish identity.

> "The pope won that struggle by transcending politics. His was what Joseph Nye calls 'soft power' — the power of attraction and repulsion. He began with an enormous advantage, and exploited it to the utmost: He headed the one institution that stood for the polar opposite of the Communist way of life that the Polish people hated. He was a Pole, but beyond the regime's reach. By identifying with him, Poles would have the chance to cleanse themselves of the compromises they had to make to live under the regime... The Communists managed to hold on as despots a decade longer. But as political leaders, they were finished. Visiting his native Poland in 1979, Pope John Paul II struck what turned out to be a mortal blow to its

> Communist regime, to the Soviet Empire, [and] ultimately to Communism." (Codevilla 2008, 208)

The pontifex made several trips to Poland throughout the 1980s, usually avoiding overt condemnation of the Communist regime, but still making a point to advocate democratic and capitalist reform. During one such tip in 1983 – after a series of demonstrations organized by Solidarity – the Pope arranged to have the recently imposed martial law lifted and at a mass in Krakow "spoke 'of the terrible injustices of history' and declared the Poles had been 'called to victory'" (Sebestyen 2009, 104).

Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Prime Minister of Poland during the 1989 revolution, is quoted in Sebestyen (2009, 291-292) as saying "I blame the Church. They are the main culprits" after the Communist Party's disastrous losses in the elections of June 1989. This points to an understanding in the communist government that the ontology of Poland's population was closely associated enough, or at least influenced enough by, the Church that Pope John Paul II's very public opposition to communist ideology was having a drastic effect on Polish politics

Emerging Rivalries in the Post-Soviet World

The political rivalry that developed between Poland and Russia throughout the Cold War period can ostensibly be traced to the two nations' mutual rivalry for much of their histories, going back at least as far as the 16th century. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a major European power that exerted considerable influence in Eastern Europe throughout the early modern period. Likewise Muscovy, the state that eventually evolved into the Russian Empire, maintained interests in areas bordering the Commonwealth, prompting mutual threats to the national security of both states. Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, Poland underwent three partitions of its territories between its great power rivals – Prussia, Austria, and Russia. The

last partition in 1795 eliminated Poland from the map, after which most Polish citizens were ruled by the Russian Empire.

Central to the collective identity of Poland throughout the rule of the Russian – and later, Soviet – Empire is the process of Russification. This set of policies took different forms over the centuries, but generally revolved around the implementation of the Russian language as the sole administrative tongue, the primacy of rule from either St. Petersburg or Moscow, and prior to the establishment of the Soviet Union, the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. In Poland, Russification never succeeded as it did in other areas of the Russian Empire. The Polish language maintained a central role in domestic and civil affairs, while Catholicism provided a common faith around which much of Polish identity revolved.

More importantly the process of Russification – and that process's failure to convert Polish identity to a Russian identity – highlights the cultural and ontological conflict pervading much of the history of Eastern Europe. It is this conflict that informs the collective animus against the Soviet Union and its tightly controlled party apparatus in Poland throughout the Cold War. Notable uprisings against the Communist Party – which, it must be added, was controlled by Moscow – include the 1956 rebellions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the latter of which was crushed by Red Army tanks, the unrest of the early 1980s, and the final uprisings in 1989 that led to the fall of communism in eastern Europe and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. All these civil uprisings are evidence of a deep historical, cultural, and political divide between the Polish collective identity and the imposition of Russian identity via the Communist Party.

The rise of Polish nationalism must also be understood as a vital underpinning of Polish collective identity in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Riasonovsky (2011, 624) writes that "Nationalism was not simply a revival of the past, a return of the repressed. For many Soviet

citizens, alienated from the Soviet system and even from Gorbachev's idealist promises to make Soviet socialism work, nationalism offered an alternative faith, and an alternative path to prosperity and freedom." Indeed the Polish nationalism that arose in the waning years of communism was a direct result of not only the failed process of Russification, but an ontological shift heralded by the failures of communism at-large. Unlike the travails of the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, or the Central Asian states, Poland was itself an independent nation at the time of mass popular, nationalist upheaval – albeit one tightly-controlled by Moscow as described previously.

Poland swiftly looked to the United States as a protector against the ailing Soviet Union, which would shortly after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact reform into the modern Russian Federation. This switch from one pole of a bipolar system to another is indicative of an ontological shift on the national level. Having previously spent nearly fifty years under the umbrella of Soviet political and military dominance, Poland became a stout ally of the U.S. and NATO in the early 1990s. This can, in part, be attributed to the historical Polish distrust of Russia, and a fear of military or political interference from Moscow even as early as 1991. It might also be said that Poland, having escaped the gravity of one pole as it collapsed, merely associated with the only surviving superpower left in the world. These arguments, however, elide the role of ontological security leading to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact itself, which then informed the actions of post-Cold War actors.

Just as the Soviet Union, as described by Kennan in 1947, saw itself at perpetual war with capitalism, and the United States in turn saw itself as the protector of the free world and opponent of the communist bloc, so too did the Polish government view itself as not only the antithesis of communist rule in that country but as the harbingers of a defiantly un-Soviet phenomenon: free

market capitalism. Throughout the Cold War the concepts of "Russian" and "Communist" amalgamated to such an extent in the areas under the control of Moscow that the two became nearly inseparable, much the same as the state apparatus and the Communist Party in nearly all communist states. Therefore, as Poland underwent ontological change in the 1980s, to oppose Russia was to oppose Communism, and vice versa.

Conclusion

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact is vital to this study because it allows an opportunity to narrow the parameters of ontological shift sufficient to dissolve an alliance. The Franco-American alliance displayed the effect of regime change, but required that not only must the ruling elites be replaced, but that the very structure and nature of the government similarly be overthrown. The dissolution of Soviet-Polish alliance corroborates this finding. Moreover, it is important to understand that this ontological change need not be the result of a bloody revolution, as it was in France, but can come from a historical dissatisfaction with the regime that leads to a peaceful, albeit total, change in one of the allied nation's regimes. Secondly, the fall of the Warsaw Pact is the first evidence in this work of the effect of political rivalry on alliance stability. Again, political rivalry should not be interpreted as conflicts between regimes. Instead, it is the cultural, historical, and ontological conflict between two separate states that infringes on the alliance's ability to function properly – i.e. to adequately defend not only each nation's physical security, but its ontological security as well.

Pan-Arab Alliance, 1967

Introduction

Last, we bring the alliance termination framework to bear on the dissolution of Pan-Arab Alliance. The alliance termination framework, illuminates two social conditions present in the dissolution of this alliance: military defeat and political rivalry, following the calamitous defeat at the hands of Israel, during the 1967, Six-Day War. Prior to this defeat, a confederation of Egypt and Syria, known as the United Arab Republic, served as one of the first efforts at mobilizing pan-Arabism. By 1961 however, the union itself dissolved. Following the collapse of the United Arab Republic and its rival the Arab Federation – a union of the Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq – the four states were brought together in an alliance that shared a collective purpose as opponents of Israel expressed through pan-Arab nationalism.

Although most members of the Arab alliance of 1967 formed another pact against Israel for the 1973 war, the attempts at confederation were laid to rest after the Six Day War. The failure of pan-Arab sentiment to unite the various Arab states into a confederated whole marks a change in ontology significant to each state's broader foreign policy mindset. It is precisely because of the military defeat and subsequent intra-alliance politics after 1967 that the collective identity of the partner states shifted away from formal alliance.

It should be noted that this example of alliance termination might well be considered a disbandment of a coalition as opposed to a formal alliance. Taking a cue from Walt – whose work, *The Origins of Alliances*, focuses almost exclusively on postwar Middle East alliance formation and dissolution – this study will continue the practice of "using *alliance* and *alignment* interchangeably… and alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation

between two or more sovereign states" (Walt, The Origins of Alliances 1990, 12). The Pan-Arab Alliance fluctuated between formal and informal structure but was united by an ideological and ontological drive to accomplish two distinct goals: 1) unify the Arab states into a cohesive whole, and 2) defeat the state of Israel and reconquer Arab lands controlled by that state.

Origins

Walt (1990), notes ideological constraints that both brought the alliance together and eventually tore it apart. The primary ideology that informed Arab identity was a movement known as Pan-Arabism – also called Nasserism after its chief proponent, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Walt's realist analysis of the ideological elements of alliance formation and termination neglects the role of ontological security on both phenomena. Although he concedes that states with similar ideological leanings tend to band together, little else is said about why and how this might be occur. Ideology reflects state identity, which both influences and is influenced in turn by ideology. Identity – one of the key inputs of ontological security – shapes the perception of threat. The perception of threat in turn shapes interest, which culminates in an output: alliance formation or termination. For this alliance, Pan-Arabism ideologically bound Arab states together well enough to form an alliance system, but failed to hold those states together in the wake of military defeat and emergent political rivalries. An overview of the history of Pan-Arabism will demonstrate the state of Arab ontology prior to the 1967 war, while the remainder of this study will examine the changes to that ontology that led to the alliance's dissolution.

Pan-Arabism, as an ideological movement, dates to the waning days of the Ottoman Empire. For example, Dowty notes that "By 1905, Najib Azuri, a Lebanese Christian who served in the Ottoman bureaucracy...called for an Arab state, independent of the Turks, from Iraq to

Suez" in a textbook published in France (Dowty 2005, 65). Gelvin (2015, 3) succinctly draws the limits of Pan-Arabism by writing that:

> It is important to differentiate between…what might be called an "imagined Arab community" that exists in the heads of those who identify themselves as Arab and... Arab nationalism. Just because people might identify themselves as Arab does not mean the necessarily want to renounce their Egyptian or Lebanese citizenship, for example, in favor of citizenship in a pan-Arab state.

However, as Walt notes (1990, 206) the political forces that brought the alliance into fruition ultimately sowed the seeds of rivalry that would later tear it apart:

> "In simple terms, the ideology of pan-Arabism called for the unification of the Arab nation in a single state. Yet the more widely it was accepted and the more intently the goal of unity was pursued, the more conflictive inter-Arab relations became. This conflict is the paradox of pan-Arabism; although the ideology called for close cooperation and was widely accepted, it was in fact a source of intense division among the elites who claimed to embrace it."

Additionally, opposition to imperialism threaded the various identities of Arab nations together, having all of them been the product of British and French efforts towards consolidating their own nation's power in the Middle East since at least the end of the First World War, up to modern-day American neoimperialism. British foreign policy in the region relied on supporting the various Arab tribes in what is now Saudi Arabia to rebel against their Ottoman rulers – in return for fighting against the Turks, Great Britain promised to support a unified Arab state. However, after the end of the First World War, Great Britain reneged on its promises, signing the Sykes-Picot Treaty with France to divvy up the Middle East into their respective mandates. This treaty marks the foundations of almost all Arab states and their respective ontologies. Dowty (2005, 58) further explains other inputs of Arab ontology, noting that prior to the First World War:

> There were in fact several levels of common identity: as Muslims, as Ottoman subjects, as members of particular clans or kinship groups, as residents of particular areas. In addition, there was identity as an indigenous population resisting outside (usually Western) intrusions. Opposition to foreigners may be the most basic level of community feeling.

Yet Arab nationalism was inherently tied to anti-Zionism. The struggle against Israel is at the heart of any study of the Arab world after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, opposition to Israel is central to the ontology of almost every Arab state throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Walt's analysis, like other realist scholars, surmises that the failure of Pan-Arabism sprung from the failure – militarily, economically, and ideologically – of the Arab states to unify. However, Walt's attention to ideology does not adequately address the function of ontological security and its effect on policy. The anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist ideologies of the Arab world shaped the identities of the Arab states throughout the Cold War, which shaped the perceptions of threat and brought those states together in alliance. The next section will demonstrate that once changes to ontological security occur – the 1967 war and ensuing political rivalry between Arab states – identities changed as well, which resulted in changed outputs: alliance dissolution.

Dissolution

Guiding our scrutiny of how ontological change destabilizes alliances, will be the following questions: 1) how did the ontology of Arab states change after the war? and 2) how did the dissolution of the Arab Alliance stem from that ontological change? Answering these questions will explicate how an ontological security approach offers more analytical punch than a realist framework on the issue of alliance dissolution. Necessary for answering these questions, is a brief overview of the historical and political factors that provoked an ontological change among pan-Arab alliance members sufficient for alliance dissolution to occur.

The Pan-Arab Alliance differs from previous cases in that its dissolution was relatively short. The Arab states banded together only five years after the first dissolution to launch a surprise attack on Israel in 1973 which resulted in a strategic defeat but an ontological victory. However,

the termination of the alliance following the calamitous defeat in 1967 offers an opportunity to study the effects of ontological change on an alliance system in ways previous case studies do not.

At the heart of the Pan-Arab Alliance – and Pan-Arabism in general – was the ideology of Nasserism, named after then-President of Egypt Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser's dream of uniting the various Arab states into a single political entity led to the formation of the United Arab Republic, a short-lived Egyptian-Syrian union, and to broader calls for Arab unity. With Nasser's defeat in the Six Day War, his ideology lost considerable influence, effectively prohibiting future endeavors to unite the Arabs. However, the decline of Nasserism coincided with the growth of rivalries between the Arab states. Egypt in 1967 was undoubtedly the most powerful Arab state, although the defeat by Israel tarnished Nasser's reputation, leading to infighting and a struggle for hegemony over the Arab Middle East that persists today. Therefore, the demise of Nasserism as an ideology coincides with the dissolution of the Pan-Arab Alliance of 1967 and mirrors is centrifugal forces: the defeat in the Six Day War and corresponding political rivalries that sprung from the aftermath of that war.

Aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

The defeat of Arab armies in June 1967 was a horrific blow to each defeated state's national pride, rapidly altering the collective identity of those states and the Arab world at large. Once again Schivelbusch (2001) highlights the role of military defeat on the conquered nation, demonstrating throughout his book that defeat in battle can have long-lasting consequences for a state's identity.

Per the alliance dissolution framework, a change in ontological security arising from one of the three social conditions of the operative framework can result in a state's withdrawal from an alliance. In this case, the defeat at the hands of Israel exposed the ontological fragility of the Arab states and severely weakened the collective desire for cooperation. All three Arab states lost considerable amounts of land – from Syria, Israel captured the Golan Heights, from Jordan the West Bank, and from Egypt the Gaza Strip and the entirety of the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal. These territorial losses exacerbated the ontological despair experienced by the losing states in the aftermath of the war.

However, this case study provides an important lesson: alliance dissolution need not be permanent. Five years after the defeat of 1967, the Arab states banded together in a similar alliance to attack Israel in 1973 on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. This surprise attack, although ultimately repelled, was sufficient to assuage the feelings of defeat left over from the Six Day War. Therefore, the ontology of the Arab states after the war must be examined to understand how such a change in identity affects international security agreements.

The aftermath of the Six Day War, unlike the example of military defeated explored in the analysis of Russia and the First World War, offers a far better opportunity to scrutinize the effect of ontological change on alliance stability. For example, the Russian Empire of 1917 was drained of manpower, wealth, armaments, and national will to fight due to three years of near total war. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk stipulated explicitly that the nascent Soviet Union would sever its alliances with Great Britain and France, indicating that although the ontological factors previously described in that case study were undoubtedly present, there was simultaneously a *Realpolitik* influence on Russia's withdrawal from the Entente – it had been defeated by Germany and must therefore suffer the consequences. However, the aptly-named Six Day War did not deplete the

Arab nations' youth as did the First World War to Russia. Moreover, the consequences of the brief war, although geopolitically significant, did not overtly threaten the rule of Arab leaders such as Nasser or King Hussein of Jordan. Instead the changes to the collective identities of the Arab states manifested in an unwillingness to trust the military strength of other Arab states, leading to a political rivalry that effectively doomed the alliance system, albeit temporarily.

Realist literature often attributes policy decisions to materialist calculations – i.e. a state's economic and military strength. However, while the militaries of the Arab states were in disarray following the war, Israel's victory was a blow to Arab ontology far more than materiel. Arab ontology rested firmly on anti-Zionism and was tied to the destruction of Israel as a political entity. The 1967 war proved that the Arab states were unable to do so, which necessarily altered the identities – and hence, ontological security – of those states. An emerging political rivalry after the defeat sealed the fate of the alliance as its former members vied for hegemony in the remainder of the Middle East not under Israeli control. Military defeat, then, can be seen as the first catalyst for ontological change, followed by the second catalyst, political rivalry, followed in turn by a new output: alliance dissolution.

Failure of Nasserism

With the centripetal forces drawing the Arab states together vanquished after the Six Day War, the ideological identity formed by Nasserism lost its preeminence in the Arab world as well. Having succeeded to that point in uniting Israel's Arab neighbors against it, the shock of the 1967 defeat, diminished Gamal Abdul Nasser's legitimacy throughout the Arab world forever tarnishing pan-Arabism. It should be noted that anti-Zionism – and more broadly anti-Semitism – still fueled much of Arabic national identity in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan after the defeat. On the contrary, it

is likely these sentiments increased post-1967. However, their ability to unite the Arab states further was unequivocally diminished for a time, indicating an ontological shift away from conflict with Israel and towards an intra-Arab contest for hegemony in the Middle East.

This case study can be distinguished from the previous case study analysis of political rivalry's role in alliance dissolution – the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact – chiefly be highlighting the lack of clear cultural or historical animus between the allied states. Whereas Poland and Russia, like many other states organized under the Warsaw Pact, maintained a historical rivalry stretching back centuries that fueled animosity between Russia and its client states, the Arab states of the 20th century were relatively new to the world stage. Despite some cultural and minor ethnic divisions – for example, the predominance of Alawite Muslims in Syria and a large Shi'a minority in Iraq – the Arab states collectively shared much the same language, history, religion, and culture. Therefore the collapse of the Pan-Arab Alliance cannot be explained, as the Warsaw Pact could, as emanating from historical animosity. Instead, it must be viewed as a devolution of cooperation as each state vied for power in a region characterized by chaos and anarchy. This struggle for hegemony in the region, although low-key for much of early-20th century Middle East history, was exaggerated after the ontological changes provoked by the 1967 defeat.

Walt notes:

> "Although the ideology of Arab solidarity helped sustain a broad Arab coalition against Israel (especially during crises), the fact that the Arab states were equally suspicious of one another helped turn the conflict with Israel into another arena of inter-Arab rivalry. As the Six Day War revealed, the largely symbolic efforts of the Arab state to prove their anti-Israel credentials (while discrediting those of their rivals) were a poor basis on which to build an effective alliance against anyone" (Walt, The Origins of Alliances 1990, 51).

Moreover, the ideology of Pan-Arabism/Nasserism was far from the only ideological influence in the region at the time. The conservative Hussein family in Jordan and Saud family in

Saudi Arabia both opposed and supported Egypt as time and situations dictated. Egypt experienced a revolution relatively recently in 1952 which had installed Nasser; Iraq followed suit in 1958 with Nasser's endorsement and along similar lines as its Egyptian predecessor. Prior to their respective revolutions both nations had opposed one another in a contest for regional hegemony which continued after the Six Day War. All these rivalries were set against the backdrop of the Cold War. With the United States and the Soviet Union squaring off the world over, many Arab states sought to play each superpower against the other – Nasser's Egypt was undoubtedly the most successful – yet Arab states generally remained untouched by the ideological tenets of either democratic capitalism or communism.

"Defeated nations waste little time, after recovering from their initial shock, in finding scapegoats" (Schivelbusch 2001, 57). In the aftermath of the Six Day War, Nasserism served as the scapegoat for the defeated Arab states and therefore the attempt to form a cohesive alliance – much less a functioning political union – in pursuit of Nasser's goals was abandoned in the wake of the war. Schivelbusch elaborates further "Losers who have completed the first stage of reaction to defeat – surprise, dismay, disbelief, and the search for scapegoats – begin to examine their history for the deeper reasons behind their failure. Forced to admit they took a wrong turn somewhere, they try to ascertain where they strayed from the true path" (2001, 69). A rejection of Nasserism after the war birthed a discussion on the role of Islam in Arab politics, from which Islamist fundamentalism eventually sprouted.

Walt (1990, 211) notes that "pan-Arabism was an important source of legitimacy..." and that "weak or unstable regimes rely on ideological arguments to bolster legitimacy..." (1990, 39). Given that the political order of the Middle East after the First and Second World Wars was often chaotic (Egypt experienced revolutions and/or coups d'état in 1919, 1922, and 1952; Iraq in 1920,

1952, 1958, and 1963; Syria in 1925, 1963, and 1966, to name a few) the Arab states were far from stable. The ideological draw of Nasserism therefore not only appealed to the collective identities of Arab nations, but to the need of new, often revolutionary, governments to build legitimacy in the wake of social upheaval.

The defeat of Nasserism as an ontologically-binding ideology signifies a broader shift in the collective identity of the various Arab states. Although Nasserism, as Walt described, often inspired more conflict than cooperation, it was moderately successful in uniting otherwise rival Arab states into a loose confederation. Military defeat of Arab forces notwithstanding, the humiliation of the war so dramatically weakened Pan-Arabism as a unifying force that the political rivalries of the region, only temporarily and restlessly dormant, surged to the surface once more.

Conclusion

The Six Day War marks an important turning point in Arab ontology. Despite the continued opposition to Israel grounded in fervent anti-Zionism, which often manifested as outright anti-Semitism, the collective identity of Arab policymakers shifted after the war to a less bellicose attitude towards Israel. The routing of Arab armies and conquest of vast swathes of land brought Arab leaders to the realization that even with the alliance system in place the Arab states could not defeat Israel alone – although they could certainly check its hegemony in the region by diplomatic or economic routes. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, despite ending in defeat for the Arabs once again, managed to achieve enough victories in the early phases of the war to rectify the ontological rupture of the post-1967 war, generally lowering the potential for a large-scale war.

Let us compare this case study with the other example of military defeat as a social precondition for alliance dissolution. In 1917 Russia, the overwhelming loss of manpower,

materiel, and treasure had sapped the national will to fight, leading to tension with allied partners and eventually culminating in two revolutions – the second of which led to Russia's withdrawal from both the war and the alliance. In the Arab states of 1967, the defeat in battle was not so devastating to the youth of those nations, nor did it overwhelming tax the national treasuries or drain the will to oppose Israel. Instead, there is a key shift in collective identity after the war that followed a tremendous blow to national pride for each Arab state involved in the war. Like many states that have suffered defeats, the Arab nations began looking for scapegoats rapidly, and settled generally on Nasserism.

With the undermining of Nasserism as an ideology capable of uniting the Arabs, the alliance fell apart. Pan-Arabism proved too weak politically to affect lasting change in the region and although it was capable of a few short-lived unions and of forming the alliance that fought in the Six Day War, it was not strong enough to weather the ontological blow struck by defeat in that war. Although the alliance would resurrect itself for the 1973 conflict, the ontological changes following the defeat of 1967 proved too much for the centripetal forces of the prewar era.

Conclusion

Review of Hypotheses

The focal point of this study is the hypothesis that states: 1) have collective identities that are subject to change, 2) collective identity shapes the perception of threat, which in turn shapes ontological security, and) changes in ontological security can provoke states to sever their alliances. To test these hypotheses, a framework was developed that outlined three conditions of ontological change that might lead a state to withdraw from its security commitments: 1) military defeat, 2) regime change, and 3) political rivalry. Any one of these conditions is sufficient to affect a state's collective identity to such an extent that an alliance dissolves. At least one condition is necessary, although any of the three can do so. In the cases studied here, often more than one condition was present; in the three cases with multiple conditions of ontological change, one condition segued into another, linking both to similar, although discernible, roots.

Key Findings

The four cases studied suggest that ontology is key to determining a state's willingness to maintain or dissolve an alliance. States' perception of themselves, their roles in the world, their ideas of how the international system does and should work, the relative perception of interest and capability all contribute to a state's ontology decision to maintain or disband an alliance. Political changes – defeat in a war, a change in institutions, or rivalry with an ally – disrupt ontology, and therefore change ontological security concerns. Once ontological security is threatened, states must make policy decisions to assure ontological security remains extant. Among the policy decisions states can make to do this is terminating commitments to other states.

It bears repeating once again that these findings do not support a refutation of power's role in shaping a state's foreign policy. Power underlies much of the international system, as Gibler (1997) (2008), Walt (1985) (1990) (1997) (2001) (2009), Snyder (1984) (2007), Leeds and Suvun (2007), Smith (1995), and many others have demonstrated in detail. However, while these scholars highlight the role of power in international society, realist theory does not adequately explain the role of ontology, ontological security, and ontological change on alliance dissolution. Therefore, an approach to this important phenomenon must be developed that includes an analysis of state ontology. This study has attempted to do just that.

Applications to Current Events

A state's ontology is constantly evolving. As new leaders and policymakers join the state's diplomatic institutions, the collective identity of the state potentially shifts. Yet ontology is often relatively static – since collective identity is drawn from a large group of individuals, institutions, and cultural inputs, the output requires a substantial change in those inputs to, in turn, be changed. Changes to state ontology can happen over a short period of time in the grander historical narrative, but still occur over a period of several years or decades. The world may be experiencing ontological change in states such as Turkey – which has drifted further away from its alliance with the United States as its government increasingly adopts authoritarian overtones – and Russia, which briefly embraced democracy and free market capitalism in the early 1990s but has steadily slid towards autocracy under President V.V. Putin. How these changes in ontology will affect alliance structure, with particular emphasis on NATO's cohesion, remains to be seen.

Suggestions for Further Research

This study focused on a subsector of international relations that, although important from both a scholarly and policy view, does not encompass the range of diplomatic decisions affected by a state's ontology. Moreover, the sample size of this study is necessarily limited by time and space. Future studies may seek to expand the sample to include historical instances of alliance dissolution. These studies might include the defection of Italy from the Triple Alliance prior to the First World War, or Yugoslavia's dissolution of its ties with the Soviet Union under Tito.

This framework might also be adapted to apply to alliance formation as well. Although alliance formation has often been studied under the auspices of realism, there is no need to concede such an important and relevant topic to a single theoretical lens. A constructivist approach like the one used in this paper could very well examine the origins of the Pan-Arab Alliance instead of its dissolutions, or the formation of the Axis Powers prior to the Second World War, for example. Likewise, this framework may help explain some peculiar phenomena in international relations such as the maintenance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after the fall of the Soviet Union. With its *raison d'être* collapsed and no other challenger posing a threat to the alliance system, NATO should have collapsed itself. Yet the system remained in place. Why this was the case deserves a thorough analysis.

Future researchers may yet be able to expand on the framework as well. Certain social conditions, namely ideological alignment, were subsumed into other conditions or elided altogether. There are potentially other cases that may evolve the thesis into a body of work all its own.

Bibliography

Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 226-254.

Beales, Derek. 1987. *Joseph II, Volume 1: In the Shadow of Maria Theresa, 1741-1780.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Benson, Brett V. 2011. "Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816–2000." *The Journal of Politics* 1111-1127.

Brinton, Crane. 1938. *The Anatomy of Revolution.* New York: Prentice-Hall.

—. 1938. *The Anatomy of Revolutions.* New York: Random House.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Buzan, Barry. 2004. *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chiba, Daina, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2015. "Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance Formation." *Journal of Politics* 968-982.

Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack L. Snyder. 2011. "Multipolarity, Perceptions, and the Tragedy of 1914." *International Studies Quarterly* 305-308.

Clark, Sean. 2010. "Deadly Decay: Great Power Decline and Cataclysmic War." *International Journal* 475-494.

Codevilla, Angelo M. 2008. "Political Warfare: A Set of Means for Achieving Political Ends." In *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare*, by J. Michael Waller, 206-223. New York: IWP Press.

Colaresi, Michael P., and William R. Simpson. 2005. "Alliances, Arms Buildups, and Recurrent Conflict: Testing a Steps-to-War Model." *The Journal of Politics* 345-364.

Danilevskii, Nikolai I. 1999. "Russian Pan-Slavicism: Danilevskii's Views." In *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917*, by Basil Dmytryshyn, 372-381. Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press.

Dowty, Alan. 2005. *Israel/Palestine.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. 2008. *The Russian Revolution.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gelvin, James L. 2015. *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibler, Douglas M. 1997. *An Empirical Typology of Alliances: Uncovering the Relationship Between Alliance Formation and War.* PhD Dissertation, Nashville: Vanderbilt University.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2008. "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 426-454.

Gibler, Douglas M., and John A. Vazquez. 1998. "Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980." *International Studies Quarterly* 785-807.

Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Reed Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 211-222.

Gipson, Lawrence Henry. 1954. *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775.* New York: Harper & Brothers Pub.

Hjorth, Ronnie. 2007. "Hedley Bull's Paradox of the Balance of Power: A Philosophical Inquiry." *Review of International Studies* 597-613.

Huth, Paul K. 1988. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War." *The American Political Science Review* 423-443.

Jarrett, Mark. 2013. *The Congress of Vienna: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon.* New York: I. B. Tauris & Co.

Jervis, Robert. 2002. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace "Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001"." *American Political Science Review* 1-14.

Johnson, Jesse C. 2015. "The Cost of Security: Foreign Policy Concessions and Military Alliances." *Journal of Peace Research* 665-679.

Kennan, George. 1947. *Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall: The "Long Telegram".* Diplomatic Telegram, Moscow: U.S. Department of State.

Kenwick, Michael R., and John A. Vazquez. 2016. "Defense Pacts and Deterrence: Caveat Emptor." *The Journal of Politics* 329-334.

Kenwick, Michael R., John A. Vazquez, and Matthew A. Powers. 2015. "Do Alliances Really Deter?" *The Journal of Politics* 943-954.

Kim, Tongfi, and Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba. 2015. "The Effect of Age Structure on the Abrogation of Military Alliances." *International Interactions* 279-308.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 427-439.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Burcu Suvun. 2007. "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?" *The Journal of Politics* 1118-1132.

Lepore, Jill. 1999. *The Name of War: King Phillip's War and the Origins of American Identity.* New York: Vintage.

Liska, George. 1962. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Long, Andrew G., and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2006. "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements." *Journal of Peace Research* 433-451.

Los Angeles Times. 1991. "Casualties of Mideast Wars." *Los Angeles Times.* March 08. Accessed March 06, 2018. http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-08/news/mn-2592_1_civil-war.

Lupovici, Amir. 2012. "Ontological Dissonance, Clashing Identities, and Israel's Unilateral Steps Towards the Palestinians." *Review of International Studies* 809-833.

Macleod, Jenny. 2008. *Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

McMeekin, Sean. 2011. *The Russian Origins of the First World War.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

McSweeney, Bill. 1999. *Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Moore Jr., Barrington. 1967. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* Boston: Beacon.

Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model ofAlliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 904-933.

Morrow, James D. 2016. "When Do Defensive Alliances Provoke Rather than Deter?" *The Journal of Politics* 341-345.

Motyl, Alexander J. 2015. "The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine." *World Affairs* 75-84.

National Archives. 2017. *Editorial Note: The Recall of Edmond Charles Genet.* November 26. Accessed January 21, 2018. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-26-02-0629-0001.

Neumann, Iver B. 2004. "Beware of Organicism: The Narrative Self of the State." *Review of International Studies* 259-267.

Readman, Kristina Spohr. 2011. "Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western Europe, the United States, and the Genesis of NATO's Dual-Track Decision, 1977–1979." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 39-89.

Rendall, Matthew. 2006. "Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe." *Review of International Studies* 523-540.

Riasonovsky, Nicholas V., and Mark D. Steinberg. 2011. *A History of Russia.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ricouer, Paul. 1991. "Narrative Identity." In *On Paul Ricouer: Narrative and Interpretation*, by David Wood, 188-199. London: Routledge.

Rossiter, Clinton. 1956. *The First American Revolution: The Colonies on the Eve Independence.* New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. 2001. *The Culture of Defeat: On National Mourning, Trauma, and Recovery.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Schivelbush, Wolfgang. 2001. *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery.* New York: Metropolitan Books.

Sebestyen, Victor. 2009. *Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire.* New York: Pantheon Books.

Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 405-425.

Snyder, Glenn H. 2007. *Alliance Politics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 461-495.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. 1998. *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Tuchman, Barbara W. 1962. *The Guns of August.* New York: Ballatine Books.

Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1921. *The Frontier in American History.* New York: Henry Holt and Co.

Walt, Stephen M. 1985. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 3-43.

Walt, Stephen M. 2009. "Alliances in a Unipolar World." *World Politics* 86-120.

Walt, Stephen M. 2001. "Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead?" *Journal of International Affairs* 1-17.

—. 1990. *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs: The Origins of Alliances.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

—. 1990. *The Origins of Alliances.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. 1997. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse." *Survival* 156-179.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1954. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Washington, George. 1796. "Farewell Address." Philadelphia: National Archives.

Wendt, Alexander. 1994. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State." *The American Political Science Review* 384-396.

Wendt, Alexander. 2004. "The State as Person in International Theory." *Review of International Studies* 289-316.

Wilkins, Thomas S. 2012. "'Alignment' not 'Alliance,' The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Towards a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment." *Review of International Studies* 53-76.

Zarakol, Ayşe. 2017. "States and Ontological Security: A Historical Rethinking." *Cooperation and Conflict* 48-68.