FROM BOOKS ON THE SHELVES TO BOOTS ON THE GROUND:

MAO ZEDONG'S REVOLUTIONARY GUERRILLA STRATEGY IN CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT, AND APPLICATION

by

EDWARD N. SMITH

A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

University of Central Oklahoma

Fall, 2013

CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL

The abstract and thesis of Edward N. Smith for the Master of Arts in History was submitted to the graduate college on November 5, 2013, and approved by the undersigned committee.

COMMITTEE APPROVALS:

DR. LI XIAO BING, CHAIR

DR. JESSICA SHEETZ-NGUYEN

DR. GLEN ROBERSON

ABSTRACT

Between 1950 and 1953, the People's Republic of China (PRC) military leaders subscribed to a doctrine that incorporated revolutionary guerrilla warfare as standard operating procedure during the Korean War. Though influenced by a number of long-standing cultural and philosophical traditions, the Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission (CCP CMC) relied on Mao Zedong's approach to warfare. Indeed, this doctrine guided Chinese military thought and theory for much of the early twentieth century as the Red Army, the guerrillas of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), transitioned into the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the conventional forces of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Even after the creation of the PRC, the PLA and especially the Chinese People's Volunteer Forces (CPVF) in Korea continued to operate under this doctrine because of the limited industrial and economic development of China. This subscription to Mao military thought, however, did not completely divorce the doctrine of the PRC from traditional approaches to war. Indeed, the revolutionary guerrilla warfare of Mao demonstrated clear continuity with the methods of eras past such as pragmatism, efficiency, and adaptability.

The experiences CPVF troops gained from the stalemate of the Korean War demonstrated several implications for the future of the twenty-first century. The Korean War revealed the limited capabilities of revolutionary guerrilla war outside of the country where the cultural-national troops originated. It also demonstrated the military power of the PRC and its ability to halt the advances of industrialized and technologically superior Western forces, signaling the reestablishment of Chinese political and cultural dominance of Asia. Perhaps most important as a "lessons taught" approach to history, the CPVF demonstrated the viability of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a means for struggling, former colonial states to combat the supposed strengths of Western, industrialized, and modern state military powers.

Grounded in a two-thousand-five-hundred-year literary, philosophical, and historic tradition, Mao's model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare benefited from the rich military history of China. In several important aspects, Mao's applications represent a continuation of established Chinese military thoughts and theories, despite the trappings of Marxist-Leninist influences. That said, Marxism-Leninism, and the modern-era development of guerrilla warfare as a distinct approach to conflict, also guided the development of Mao's theories, wherein his works also demonstrate significant development and repeated successful applicability.

KEY TERMS

Chinese Philosophy
Cold War
Imperialism
Internationalism
Korean War
Guerrilla Warfare
Mao Zedong
Military Thought and Theory
People's War
Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare
Revolutionary Spirit

CCP—Chinese Communist Party

CMC—Central Military Commission

Comintern—Communist International

CPV—Chinese People's Volunteers

CPVF—Chinese People's Volunteer Forces; used interchangeably with CPV

DPRK—Democratic People's Republic of Korea

GMD—Guomindang [**KMT**—Kuomintang]

NVA—North Vietnamese Army

PLA—People's Liberation Army

PRC—People's Republic of China

RGW—Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, specifically used to refer to Mao Zedong's model.

ROK—Republic of Korea

UN—United Nations

US—United States

US-UN—United States-United Nations (specifically referring to the combined US-UN forces in Korea)

USSR—United Soviet Socialist Republic

VC—Viet Cong

A NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND ROMANIZATION

This work employs the *pinyin* style of Romanization. When a specific source, especially a primary source, uses the Wade-Giles system, this author replaced Wade-Giles Romanization with *pinyin* when able. Brackets identify such alterations. Readers may refer to footnotes for sources and page numbers to refer to original documents. In the case of citations and bibliography, names or authors appear in *pinyin*, while names of works originally in Wade-Giles appear as Wade-Giles.

With relations to names, this work maintains the conventional Chinese model of placing surnames before given names in both the case of historical actors as well as Chinese authors.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to extend his thanks to Dr. Jon House, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and Norwich University for overseeing the beginnings of this paper and Dr. Li Xiaobing, Dr. Jessica Sheetz-Nguyen, and Dr. Glenn Roberson, University of Central Oklahoma for assisting with further analysis and development of this project into a thesis; Dr. Susan Burke, University of Oklahoma, John Ray, University of North Texas, and Jack Bieler, Bell Helicopter, for proofing drafts of this work; Dr. Tian Chenshan, Beijing Foreign Studies University, for providing useful insights to expand the cultural and philosophical underpinnings of this work; Jyrki Kallio, Finnish Institute of International Affairs for reading and commenting on drafts of this work; his cohorts David Thomas and Thomas Brooks for providing consistent feedback and suggestions throughout the groundwork of this paper; and the editors of *American Review of China Studies* for publishing portions of this thesis.

All mistakes, as many should history prove, fall upon this author's responsibility alone to bear.

INTRODUCTION
A DRAGON FROM FISH

"A guerrilla force should be amongst the people like fish in water."[1] In this metaphor, Mao Zedong elucidated the nature of guerrillas originating from and finding their home amongst the masses. Making their way midst the people, guerrillas found their supplies, support and sanctuaries from better equipped, better trained, and better disciplined regular troops who, on a one-to-one and face-to-face battlefield easily overcame the unconventional guerrilla. These amateur soldiers—be they peasants with no crops to harvest, children with no parents, or bereaved loved ones left after the deaths of their family—were driven to violence as a means to generate political change when no other options appeared viable; they turned to violence to end violence. Over time in the practice of war, however, they underwent a myriad of changes and evolved into disciplined soldiers. Though they lacked the trappings of a professional force such as uniforms, grade and unit insignia, regular supplies and sufficient food, their struggles most certainly hardened them to handle the most brutal and horrific of human experiences. With time, as Mao observed, "There is no profound difference between the farmer and the soldier...and after you have fought several times valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops, and there will be many well-known regular soldiers who will not be your peers."[2]

Beyond this, however, swims a subtle link to the traditional Chinese folk tale of the carp that swam upriver. In this tale, a carp attempted to swim upstream in the Yellow River in order to reach the Dragon's Gate. Along the journey, the small carp swam his hardest

[1] Mao, Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 93.

[2] Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 73.

against the torrents currents and raging floodwaters. The fish could not totally escape the water so long as it remained an aquatic animal, as the fluid provided its nourishment. It continued forward, struggling continually. His little orange and white fins exhausted, he continued to swim along. At the end of his journey, the carp swayed up to the infamous Golden Gate, the entryway to the Jade Emperor's Court and the Heavenly Palace. With his last measure of strength, the carp leapt from the deluge and over the gate. Instead of landing in the water on the other side, however, the carp found himself suspended in the air, his form changed from a tiny, golden fish to a mighty dragon.

This carp-turned-dragon, though far from what Mao described as the relationship between guerrillas and the people, is an apt allegory for the development of his model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and the ascendancy of China during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Furthermore, the contrast between Mao's insistence that the water was the haven for the fish, and the symbol of hardship and adversity found in the water of the carp, both are equally the case for guerrillas. When examined in terms of historical progression through periods of theory, application, refinement and adaptation, the fledgling Revolutionary Army-turned-People's Liberation Army represents the carp-turned-dragon, Mao's model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare represents the carp's strategy to swim against the current. The struggles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the standing of the People's Republic of China (PRC) against a myriad of challenges including outside and inside-supported imperialist incursions, perceived threats from the United States and United Nations (US-UN), and well as internal challenges such as a primarily agrarian economy and little to no industrial capability acted as the water in and against which the fish swam.

Divided into six periods, a development of this strategy manifested from a seed based in traditional culture and literature through to fruition as a model applied to anti-industrialized warfare during the twentieth century, adapted as necessary, and exported across Asia during the collapse of the Age of Imperialism. To begin, during Mao's childhood, he received influence from traditional Chinese history and literature in his days in primary school, especially from *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *The Water Margin* shaped his world view.[3] According to Mao's recollections later in life,

> I have never attended any military school. Nor have I read a book on military strategy. People say I relied on "*Romance of Three Kingdoms*" and "*Military Strategy of [Sunzi]*" for my military campaigns. I said that I had never read "*Military Strategy of [Sunzi]*." Yes, I have read "*Romance of Three Kingdoms*.[4]

As a youth and student working in the Beijing University library, between 1911 and 1931, Mao developed a political awareness of Communism and sought to adapt European political theory to the unique circumstances of China. Between 1931-1945 Mao's theories on warfare, especially on asymmetric or guerrilla warfare crystalized during his experiences fighting industrialized, imperialist forces, during this period Mao wrote and published extensively on the subject of military thought and theory.

With the outbreak of conflict between the Chinese Communists and the Guomindang (GMD) and later the imperial Japanese, Mao refined his theories. Though the completion of

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[3] Tien, Chen-ya, *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern* (New York: Mosaic Press, 1992), 211. Tien mentions Mao's interest in *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *The Water Margin*. Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). 7. "There is no question but what *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* exerted a profound and lasting influence upon Mao [Zedong]."[3]

[4] "Dialogues with Responsible Persons of the Capital Red Guards Congress, July 28, 1968," *Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought*, Red Guards Publication, Marxist Internet Archive, accessed August 19, 2013. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_81.htm.

the Chinese Civil War in 1949 often marks the conclusion of the development of Mao's revolutionary guerrilla warfare model, to apply such a mark divests the study of one of the most important eras of development. From 1949, Mao's model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare both underwent its greatest challenge and witnessed its greatest measure of the importance of this theory as a means to develop the influence of the PRC as a central power in Asia. The first important period of the extended timeline occurred during the Korean War as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), on the one hand, experienced its own change from a guerrilla force into a regular army. On the other hand, it had to retain many of the strategies used in guerrilla warfare, especially when fighting in Korea. Though there the soldiers took on the official status of Chinese People's Volunteer Forces (CPVF), they still retained all of their original elements of being PLA troops including equipment, experience, and force organization—only insignia of the PRC and PLA did they not wear. These necessary adaptations created the greatest opportunities to develop revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a truly viable challenge to the supposed Western military superiority, as demonstrated by the lengthy stalemate at the 38th Parallel. For all of the United States forgetfulness of the Korean War, Vietnam stands as a haunting reminder of the dangers of underestimating proxy conflicts and the viability of unconventional forces. In China, however, the Korean War still stands as the hallmark conflict to Resist American Aggression. One final period served as a highlight of the success of this strategy and with it a means for China to exert influence again over China occurred between 1955-1970 when Chinese advisors assisted the efforts of the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong.[5] With little effort, one may see the application

[5] Merle L. Pribbenow, trans., *Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 55, and Qiang Zhai,

of Mao's model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare applied to the structuring and organization of the revolutionary forces of Vietnam. While both of these eras stand as important and rich grounds for historians to examine in an effort to understand the sources of human conflict, the importance of understanding cross-cultural communication, and being aware of a variety of thought and theory approaches to conflict and diplomacy, this work focuses on the period between 1950-1953 highlighting the ultimate stage of the PLA as a revolutionary guerrilla force as it transitioned to a conventional force while attempting to wrestle influence in the region from the US. To understand how the dragon of the PRC came from humble beginnings as guerrilla's amongst fish, readers must understand how Mao's military theories continued in books translated into the actions of boots on the ground.

The question that spawned the seed of this thesis arose as a seemingly simple enough examination: why did Mao Zedong direct the CPVF in a method similar to his model of guerrilla warfare? From this deceptively simple question (an àpropos situation, considering the topic of study) arose a myriad of further avenues of investigation necessary to examine in order to gain a better—if only slightly—grasp on Mao's military thought and theory. Some of the most important questions to blossom forth included, where do Mao's military writings fit with the larger military-philosophical literary tradition of China? How did traditional Chinese military methods manifest in Mao's approaches to war? Why did Mao alter his model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in Korea from what gained him success against the Japanese? To what extent did anti-imperialism influence Mao's military planning? Why did Mao emphasize the importance of people and individual heroism at the expense of technology and industry? Did Mao gain parity because the US mismanaged the conflict or

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"Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950-1954," *Journal of Military History* vol. 57, no. 4 (Oct., 1993): 689-715.

did Mao's model truly prove a viable alternative approach to conflict? This work analyses Mao Zedong's military thought and theory of revolutionary guerrilla warfare from three important perspectives. First, this work examines the influences of classical Chinese military philosophy upon Mao as well as the placement of his works within the larger military-philosophical literary tradition of China. Second, this work examines the particulars of Mao's military theories of guerrilla warfare as a pragmatic and efficacious means to an end—the forced, violent removal of foreign (*id est* powers Mao described as imperialist) in Asia. Ultimately, this work argues that Mao's military theories, based in applicable traditional philosophies with modifications as necessary based on situational demands created favorable circumstances from the limited resources and experiences available to Chinese forces while at the same time turned the supposed strengths of industrialization and popular opinion against oppositional forces. Third, this work deviates from the standard English language interpretation of the Korean War of "lessons learned" historiography that focused on the shortcomings of United States policy makers and military planners and instead examines a "lessons taught" approach that examined the strengths of Mao's military model that, in short, created a parity of force in Korea and how these lessons apply in current conflicts based on similar principles of asymmetrical warfare.

Methodologies and sources limit the English language historiography of the CPVF in the Korean War. From the scholarly works published on the Korean War, readers may extrapolate a handful of methodologies of the CPVF in the conflict: American Defeatist; Anti-Technologist; Great Man Mao; Social History of the CPVF; and CPVF in transition. Even with so many approaches to the study of the CPVF in Korea, the vast majority of works that relate to the subject examine questions related to the US-UN forces, or the international

diplomatic history. Sources concerned with the US-UN examine their quality of preparedness and the factors that forced the West into a stalemate with the CPVF and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) forces. Those authors that examine the role of China in the war, specifically the PRC, Beijing, and Mao Zedong, approach the topic from a diplomatic and political history and pay little attention to issues of the CPVF. These topics included the implementation of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the conflict, or why the CPVF, and by extension the PRC, was able to successfully force the US-UN.

Some historians had access to some Chinese sources, but these proved of limited usefulness. Newspapers, testimonies of captured CPVF soldiers, and propaganda, for example, comprised the core of early primary Chinese language sources available to historians. In both cases, political rhetoric of the time, both for the CCP or against it, inundated these works and of course colored the information therein as of inadequate value. Even following Deng Xiaoping's "opening to the outside world" programs of the late twentieth century, there remained numerous difficulties in accessing useful source material. These include stringent censorship and editing policies for works that may be contrary to CCP policies, travel restrictions, and lack of funding to conduct research. In his lecture-turned-article, "Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China's 'New Cold War' Documentation," Chen Jian described the continuing difficulty of finding primary sources in China, largely because of access to public circulation works and inner circulation works where the former many have access to and the latter only those with official capacities may access.[6]

[6] Chen, Jian, "Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China's 'New Cold War' Documentation," (paper presented at Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International History, Session IV, September 25-26, 1998, National Archives at College Park, Maryland). http://www.archives.org/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference-jian.html

Restrictions on the publication of party leaders' writings lessened beginning in the 1980s and the number of works by influential PRC leaders increases yearly. In an article released by *News China* in 2013, entitled "Official Literature," the authors examined the changing nature of published works by persons of import in recent history. In eras before, strict editing of works and separation of texts into internal and general circulation copies kept a strict control of literature. These writings, however, gradually changed in terms of style and number. Newer works contained more popular appeals with increased informal form of presentation and less political theory and official reports.[7] This should not suggest that printing in China reflects—indeed, it does not even approach—a sense of a free press, as all works still must undergo strict review and editing procedures. According to Feng Shuanqing and Min Jie, "From gardening manuals to sci-fi novels, all books in China are subject to the approval of censors, and writings by national leaders are far from safe from the red pen."[8] While this certainly does not reflect an ease of access to printed materials that Westerners enjoy, these changes in printing and publishing procedures contain glimmers of hopeful change for future researchers.

These complexities may no longer have as quite a direct effect on restricting access to sources beyond the restrictions of publishers. Chen provided an anecdote of receiving a mysterious package with an inner circulation copy of *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic of China*.[9] Despite this Cold War era tone of a spy movie complete with informants and secret documents, a key issue remained unknown to the readers regarding censorship at the post office. According to Jyrki Kallio, a Chinese policy

[7] Feng, Shuangqing and Min, Jie, "Official Literature," *News China* vol. 059 (July 2013), 30.
[8] Feng and Min, "Official Literature," 31.
[9] Feng and Min, "Official Literature," 31.

specialist with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, regulation of documents and materials for shipping abroad occurred at the post office level where officials open boxes, examined the contents, resealed the parcels, and sent them along if allowable. In most circumstances, however, the average postal worker either did not possess knowledge of the circulation policies of the CCP or generally concluded because of the high level of certain works that the person in possession had permission to possess these texts. [10]

To develop a sufficient qualitative analytical based for this study, the author drew from Mao's military writings, especially the *Selected Writings* series as well as accounts from Chinese soldiers, military leaders, and classical treatises on Chinese military thought and theory. Because of the voluminous scope of the topics included in the broad and overarching scopes of this work, the author chose to use the Korean War as a case study. First, this conflict represented the heights of the development and refinement of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a method to combat industrialized, Western powers in Asia. In this conflict, the CPVF participated actively (and quite dominantly compared to their DPRK counterparts), where their previous experiences combating the Japanese as well as familiarity with Mao military thought carried into their roles in Korea. Furthermore, the oppositional force, primarily US, provided a meaningful assessment in terms of asymmetrical warfare and the aforementioned "lessons taught" approach for current and future conflicts wherein the US may find itself entangled with a persistent, un-industrialized, insurgency, or for the sake of gaining insights into Chinese military thought—something that continues to demonstrate significant influence from both the classical writers and Mao himself.

[10] Interview, Jyrki Kallio, Chinese foreign policy expert, Finish Institute of International Affairs, July7, 2013.

These may be the most important contributions of this work to the study of history, especially with regards to understanding sources of, approaches to, and solutions for conflict. To begin with, when examined from the Chinese perspective, the Korean War shifts from a "forgotten war" of inappropriate preparations to one of remarkable note wherein an agrarian and semi-colonial state arose from under the tyranny of feudalism, colonialism, and imperialism, only to immediately venture into conflicts against the most developed and capable military power of the time. What's more, despite this military-industrial disparity, the CPVF reached a military parity with the US-UN forces, reinforcing the cliché adage to not underestimate one's opponent. From this "lessons taught" approach, industrialized powers should gain insights into the potential threats of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and be wary of the comforting temptation to rely on technological determinism as the most important factor when assessing military capability. This work also carries import as a "lessons learned" approach in that it highlights how pragmatism and adaptability, when used appropriately with traditional theories, directed Mao's philosophies more than single-minded adherence to principles. Despite these ominous components, this work should not be read as a statement of the inevitability of conflict between the US and the PRC. Neither should this work be read as a manual of sorts to direct conflict. Instead, the greatest import of this work is the lessons learned and taught from conflict as a means to prevent future bloodshed and suffering.

The carp and the Dragon Gate mentioned in the Introduction of this work continue to play an important role as a metaphor in Chinese society. When young people succeed in a particularly harrowing endeavor—most commonly academic exams—their communities announce their passing of the Dragon Gate. In many ways, this work represents the author's

journey up stream towards his own Dragon Gate. This gate, however, resides some distance yet away. Nevertheless, the progress made on this leg of the journey happened only because of the persistent mentorship and guidance of those mentioned throughout this work. Yet, there exists not enough praise in any and all languages to express an adequate measure of gratitude. Perhaps then, the best available means to articulate this feeling comes from the closing remarks of Tian Chenshan at the 2013 Institute of Chinese Culture and Cross-Cultural Communication, Beijing, "If you're satisfied with my response that is because I had a good teacher. If you're not satisfied with my response, it is because I'm not a good student."[11] No better words come to this author after exhausting his efforts to reflect honorably in his scholarship upon his mentors, teachers, and peers.

Figure 1: The Dragon Gate[12]

[11] Tian, Chenshan, "Transcendentalism and Dualism in Western Thinkers," lecture presented at Institute of Chinese Culture and Cross Cultural Communication, Beijing, PRC, July 7-August 3, 2013.

[12] L. Newton Hayes, *The Chinese Dragon* (Commercials Press Limited: Shanghai, 1923), 18. Unfortunately, this author had not the opportunity to visit the Dragon Gate in Nanjing during his study tour, July 4-August 5, 2013. As such, this image must suffice. If nothing else, the author hopes readers will appreciate the delicate artistry and successful capturing of the motion and transformation in the piece.

APPROACHES AND SOURCES
ENGLISH LANGUAGE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CPVF IN KOREA

Approaches and sources limit the English language historiography of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPVF) in the Korean War. Amongst the scholarly works produced on the Korean War, readers may extrapolate a handful of methodologies of the CPVF in the conflict: American Defeatist; Anti-Technologist; Great Man Mao; Social History of the CPVF; and CPVF in transition. Even with so many approaches to the study of the CPVF in Korea, the vast majority of works on the subject examine questions related to the United States and United Nations (US-UN) forces or the international diplomatic history. Sources concerned with the US-UN examine their quality of preparedness and the factors that forced them into a stalemate with the CPVF and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) forces. Those authors that examine the role of China in the war, specifically the People's Republic of China (PRC), Beijing, and Mao Zedong, approach the topic from a diplomatic and political history and pay little attention to issues of the CPVF such as the implementation of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the conflict or why the CPVF, and by extension the PRC, was able to successfully force the US-UN, to a stalemate after merely a year as a state.

Compiling the historiography of the CPVF, as printed in English language sources, is essential to understanding a number of historiographical trends, as well as general trends in military professional-education culture. First, the English language sources, dominated by US-UN authors, focus on the lessons learned aspects such as "why was the US-UN defeated?" or "how was it brought to stalemate by the CPVF?" These sources seldom if ever overtly raise the possibility of a more challenging—perhaps even superior—CPVF force. Traditional US interpretations of China, born from two-hundred years of colonial division

and suppression of China by Western powers, hold that China was politically and militarily weak and culturally backward. This Western-centric interpretation fuels the search for the causes of the stalemate within the Western forces instead of looking outwardly to the abilities of the CPVF. Furthermore, histories that focus on, written or funded by US interests are a significant portion of those available in English. Unfortunately, these works often lack a sense of the grand scale of China's rich, diverse, and lengthy military tradition that extends back nearly 2,200 years. This academic shortsightedness persists because of a combination of post 1800 exchanges between the US and China, where the former enjoyed significant imperial pressure over the later, and the post-World War II euphoria and a sense of indomitability of the US.[13] For example, the US was accustomed to knowing only a relatively military weak China, beginning with the later stages of the Qing (Opium Wars and Boxer Rebellion), the struggles of the Guomindang (GMD) and CCP against the imperial Japanese, and the mismanagement of the GMD. Furthermore, the Allied defeat of Japan, a modern, Western-modeled military force, and subsequent occupation of Japan were reminiscent of "imperial" occupation in Asia.[14] Thus, US examinations of the Korean War sought to explain the US parity and defeat in terms of *self-created* causes because of no direct experience with a militarily competitive China. Though such examinations are useful in terms of preparing

[13] This last element, the US victory over Japan, often plays a role in the interpretations of the conflict between the US-UN and the CPVF. Many sources, especially English language works, cite the Korean War as the first engagement of the PRC against a modern industrialized force. While the imperial Japanese forced lacked the same scale of industrial capacity as the US, it was a modern, industrialized force capable of competitive force projection at the height of the Second World War. Furthermore, the imperial Japanese command based their force organizations on Western models.

[14] Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 14.

for the next war by fighting the previous war—to be cliché—such self-criticism did little to prepare the US for future conflicts in the region or small wars across the globe.

This scholarship lacks investigations of a significant question: why and how did the CPVF overcome and create a parity of force and a stalemate with the US-UN? To understand the significance of this lack of an examination, it is essential to examine specifics related to the prevailing Western—especially United States—interpretations of China and comparisons between US and PRC military models. Conversely, the Chinese successfully spread their model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC). This, then, if there is a distinction between Eastern and Western military traditions demonstrates that the Western tradition found quite a bit of difficulty coping with the Eastern tradition, both in terms of its ancient roots and modern iterations throughout much of the mid-twentieth century. These arguments, though useful as lessons learned history, fail to consider the possibility that the CPVF and their doctrine of revolutionary guerrilla warfare provided a greater challenge than the US-UN could, against their previous experiences, successfully overcome, as this work attempts to argue.

In addition to the ideological limitations of early works, access to quality and diverse primary sources further restrained the abilities of historians to study the CPVF in the Korean War. Earlier historians relied on limited English language sources such as political and diplomatic correspondences, intelligence assessments, after action reports, and accounts of battle participants. The preponderance of diplomatic correspondence and intelligence estimates meant that many of the earliest histories focused on the diplomatic and political aspects of the conflict, such as the relations between the Soviet Union, PRC, and DPRK while unfortunately prevented these works from examining the military aspects in detail.

Intelligence assessments and after-action reports, while useful to compose strategic and operational histories in broad terms lacked valuable data from the CPVF to verify the specific units, troop numbers, doctrine influences, and other details otherwise available only in Chinese language sources. Memoirs and testimonies from soldiers served to fill in tactical elements of the histories, but possessed a set of limiting factors as well. To being with, many memoirs and testimonies collected after action suffered from the fog of war, and in some cases the fog of time as interviewers, authors, and historians did not collect these works until many years after the conclusion of the Korean War. Furthermore, the intense political climate of the Cold War carried over into the memories of the participants—a detail that historians must bear in mind when studying such accounts.

Early historians had access to some Chinese sources, but these offered limited usefulness. Newspapers and propaganda, for example, comprised the core of early primary Chinese language sources available to historians, with some limited access to translated testimonies of captured CPVF soldiers. In both cases, political rhetoric of the time, both for the CCP or against it, inundated these works and of course colored the information therein as of inadequate value. Even following Deng Xiaoping's "opening to the outside world" programs of the late twentieth century, there remained numerous difficulties in accessing useful source material. These include stringent censorship and editing policies for works that may be contrary to CCP policies, travel restrictions, and lack of funding to conduct research. In his lecture-turned-article, "Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China's 'New Cold War' Documentation," Chen Jian described the continuing difficulty of finding primary sources in China, largely because of access to public circulation works and inner circulation works

where the former many have access to and the latter only those with official capacities may access.[15]

These complexities may no longer have as quite a direct effect on restricting access to sources beyond the restrictions of publishers. Chen provided an anecdote of receiving a mysterious package with an inner circulation copy of *Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Formation of the People's Republic of China*.[16] Despite this Cold War era tone of a spy movie complete with informants and secret documents, a key issue remained unknown to the readers regarding censorship at the post office. According to Jyrki Kallio, a Chinese policy specialist with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, regulation of documents and materials for shipping abroad occurred at the post office level where officials open boxes, examined the contents, resealed the parcels, and sent them along if allowable. In most circumstances, however, the average postal worker either did not possess knowledge of the circulation policies of the CCP or generally concluded because of the high level of certain works that the person in possession had permission to possess these texts. [17]

Historians generally divide the chronology of the conflict into two distinct periods.[18] Millett and Cummings established the framework that the majority of later historians adopted in their interpretations, and is so used in this examination. The first period of the conflict occurred when hostilities broke out between the US-UN, including the ROK, against the DPRK. The second period occurred when the CPVF entered the conflict in October of 1950.

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[15] Chen, Jian, "Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China's 'New Cold War' Documentation," (paper presented at Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International History, Session IV, September 25-26, 1998, National Archives at College Park, Maryland). http://www.archives.org/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference-jian.html

[16] Feng, Shuangqing and Min, Jie, "Official Literature," *News China* 59 (July 2013): 31.

[17] Interview, Jyrki Kallio, Chinese foreign policy expert, Finish Institute of International Affairs, July7, 2013.

[18] Hanson, *Combat Ready?* 10.

Understanding this division of events and the reasons behind this division is essential to understand the development of the historiographical schools of the study of the Korean War, especially the military history of the CPVF in the Korean War. First, the entry of the CPVF into the conflict in October 1950 introduced fundamental differences in manpower including differences in Communist force sizes and troop quality, tactics (*id est*, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, the focus of research to which this historiography pertains), equipment, training, and logistics.[19] In addition to these changes, the CPVF also possessed a number of experiences that the DPRK lacked, such as the continuous combat experience gained since 1937 against the Imperial Japan (though there were elements of the DPRK who fought in the Red Army of the CCP against Imperial Japan who, at the onset of the first phase of the Korean War, returned to North Korea to assist their countrymen) through the end of the war in 1945, and further combat experience against the GMD from 1945 through 1949.

One of the key issues of common study introduced by the intervention of the CPVF in the Korean War was the doctrinal struggle of the US-UN to fight a limited war successfully. Allen S. Whiting points out, and Reeses examines in detail, that the Korean War, and especially the entry of the CPVF, raised a number of questions such as how to address limited wars in the nuclear age. He added that the entry of the CPVF and the foci of the US-UN on the "lessons learned" aspects—as in to who should the blame fall for the "setbacks" of the UN—reduced the critical inquiry paid to this topic.[20] This approach forms one of the largest schools of historical inquiry of the Korean War, and relates closely to the Western-centric, Western-Military Superiority interpretation of military history, because historians

[19] Hanson, *Combat Ready?* 10.

[20] Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 168.

find the sources for the US-UN "setbacks" not in the abilities of the CPVF but in the faults of the US-UN.[21] There is little conflict in the major theses of this approach, is in part because many proponents of this method of examination base their works either US-UN documents (including memoirs) or a handful of early works on the subject.

Whiting's *China Crosses the Yalu* is one of the most frequently cited references regarding the CPVF in the Korean War. While useful, this work has several limitations, primarily that much of the Chinese language sources included newspaper articles and CCP propaganda. So often cited, this work is, in the words of Stueck, "the traditional view" of English language authors on the PRC and CPVF in the Korean War.[22] Among others, this work forms the foundation of related studies in LeFeber's *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006* and Spence's *The Search for Modern China*. As a "lesson's learned" approach, Whiting warns US policy makers and strategic planners that keen cultural awareness, especially in the realms of history, philosophy, and language, proved essential in future international relations in order to prevent such conflicts. Furthermore, Whiting reminds readers that, though the US possesses nuclear capabilities, there are other forms of conflict for it to maintain preparedness and readiness to conduct. Because of the emphasis of the lessons learned approach of Whiting's work, and the continued reliance upon it as a foundation of other works, this approach continues to set firmly into place the study of the Korean War as an example of how a modern, Western army should *not* fight a war, and it will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

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[21] For more of a general interpretation of the Western-Military Superiority approach to military history, see the works of authors such as Victor D. Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power* (NewYork: Anchor Books, 2001).

[22] William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 107.

Since the time of Whiting's work, other historians addressed the lessons learned approach. Thomas E. Hanson's *Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War,* addresses the issue of the lessons learned approach as a collection of operational, doctrinal, and administrative lessons for military planners in an attempt to overcome the view that the Eight Army was unprepared for the Korean War. His argument holds that the Eighth Army gained experiences in combat from World War II that made it a competent fighting force for the time, but it lacked up-to-date equipment to combat the communist offensive. Though this work does not address the quality of the CPVF, the argument implies that the communist forces were a competitive challenge to the militarily superior Western forces.

Attached to the lessons learned approach is the American-defeatists approach that argues the US-UN, especially the latter, were bound for defeat long before the conflict began. The sources of this defeat, however, resided not in the CPVF or other communist forces, but rather Washington's mismanagement of the Korean War. T.R. Fehrenbach, from his conclusion "Lessons," in *This Kind of War,* posits "There was little in [the Korean War], from near-disastrous beginning to honorable but frustrating end, that appealed to American sensibilities. Because they cannot look back on it with any sense of satisfaction, of even the haunted pride that a defeated nation sometimes find, American prefer not to look back at all."[23] Though this work laid the groundwork for most early studies of the Korean War, and it referenced outright an American defeat, it focused on the "unpreparedness" of the US-UN rather than the abilities of the CPVF. This conclusion sums up the predominant popular

[23] T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2008), 452.

sentiment of the US, in both civilian and military realms, of the Korean War—a foreign action, in a foreign land, that had little worth remembering.

The final component of the lessons learned approach is the technological approach that relates closely to the American-defeatist interpretation. Whiting hints at this school with his warnings that nuclear weapons capabilities restricted the US ability to respond to limited wars, though this is only a portion of his larger analysis. Hanson also carries forth some of this approach when comparing the quality of equipment issued to the Eighth Army on the eve of the Korean War. That said these two are only two of the contributors to this approach. Marshall, as quoted in Hanson, discusses the "contemporary 'overemphasis on technology'" by the US during the early Cold War as a significantly limiting factor of the US-UN to combat the CPVF.[24] The fact, however, that this approach even exists provides credence to Mao and the CMC's decisions to use revolutionary guerrilla warfare in Korea as it outlines the specific limitations of the US-UN reliance's on technology rather than the abilities of soldiers. According to Mao, "the outcome of war is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons."[25] Due to the relatively minimal industrial development of the PRC at the time of the Korean War, there was not much choice in the matter of whether or not to rely more on either people or machines. This emphasis on superiority of manpower over technology, was essential to overcoming any disparity of arms.[26]

As with many of the subsequent works on the Korean War, Whiting sets the tone for studies that explicitly address the roles of the CPVF. Following the collapse of the Soviet

[24] Hanson, *Combat Ready?* 11.

[25] Mao, Zedong, *Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1958), 19-20.

[26] Li, Xiaobing, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 93.

Union scholarship on the CPVF witnessed a dramatic increase. This altered political climate allowed thousands of documents of the diplomatic and military exchanges between the Soviet Union, PRC, and DPRK, previously held tightly behind the Iron Curtain, to become available to a new generation of historians.[27] Furthermore, improved political ties between the PRC and US increased in the exchange of academics and research between the two. Since these phenomenal events, collections and initiatives such as the Cold War International History Project, Truman Library, Military History Center, The Cold War Museum, and others have initiatives to collect and translate an immense body of sources related to the Korean War, and especially the CPVF. That said there remain many difficulties in accessing Chinese sources directly. These include stringent censorship and editing policies for works that may be contrary to CCP policies, travel restrictions, and a lack of funding to conduct research. Because of these and other limitations, there is still much in Chinese archives that remains to be seen.

Scholarly research examining the PRC and CPVF address the Korean War from the perspectives of major-player/great man history with an emphasis on Mao Zedong, the institutional history of the CPVF and the CPVF as a social project, the CPVF in transition, and the Korean War as an attempt to reestablish Chinese hegemony in Asia interpretation. Despite the recurrence of the CPVF in these theses, the majority of works do not address, at length, the CPVF itself. Rather, they examine the CPVF as a portion of the larger military organization of the PLA, and then expand the study into one of the change and continuity of the PLA over time.

[27] For a detailed discussion of the revelations of these documents, see Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

The largest body of work on the role of China in the Korean War contains the studies of the major players, specifically Mao, in the planning, preparation, entrance, and campaigns of the Korean War. These works present Mao as the orchestrator of the CPVF's intervention in Korea, though whether he acted of his own accord or under the guidance of the Soviet Union is a point of contention. Nevertheless, what historians cannot argue is the extent to which Mao managed the affairs of the war from Beijing, going so far as to determine the timing of each of the CPVF's offensives.

Under the Mao as the orchestrator of the CPVF campaign school is an analysis of his model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Such an approach takes on two distinct dimensions: first, the usage of his doctrinal advancements developed during the previous decades as guiding principles; second, his amendments and alterations to these models during the Korean War. In both cases, Mao's thoughts and theories dominated the philosophies held by the Chinese military and political entities. The written works of Mao, most notably his military essays and the famous *Quotations from Chairman Mao* formed the basis of the written doctrine of these elements. Mao history, though valuable because of his direction of the Korean campaigns, reduces the significance of other important players such as Peng (perhaps one of the long-time victims of Korea and the political climate of the twentieth century), Nie, and others who, despite their efforts in Korea, were overcome by the Maoist cult of personality of the twentieth century.[28]

[28] Recently made available documents make it possible to examine more on the role and interpretation of the Korean War on the part of Zhou Enlai. For more, see Li, Xiaobing, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, trans. *Mao's Generals Remember Korea* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001) for a slightly scaled down major-player interpretation of the Korean War and Richard Peters and Li, Xiaobing. *Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004) for a plethora of first-hand accounts from soldiers. Readers may notice that Li

At the opposite end of the social spectrum from the major-player/great man history of the Korean War is the examination of the CPVF and social history. This relatively new interpretation is, on the one hand growing quickly, and on the other hand has only a limited time to do so. The growing interests in social history, especially the antithesis of the major-player/great man history, encouraged the development in the latter twentieth and early twenty-first century. These works focus on the experiences of combat soldiers in Korea in an effort to clear the fog of war from the commanders' maps and provide readers accounts of the war in the trenches from a bottom up approach. Social histories also demonstrate that soldiers from both the US-UN and the communist forces suffered the horrors of war in much the same ways. As intellectual histories, these personal accounts from participating belligerents are essential to understanding how Mao's model of Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare manifested at a variety of levels, not merely as a theory dictated from Beijing and contained in the pages of a little red book, but also as a means to an end. Valuable and worthy of increased scholarship as they are, there are important limitations to the Chinese accounts, according to Xiaobing Li, because the majority of literate personnel in the CPVF were officers.[29] Furthermore, the availability of Korean War veterans, whether from north or south of the 38th Parallel, diminishes with each passing day, reducing the number of participants available for interviews. Thus, extending the study of the CPVF in the Korean War to the lowest echelons of command may be an impossible task.

Relating to the social history studies of the CPVF in Korea is the examination of the Korean War as a time of transition for the PLA, wherein the role of the CPVF is a prime

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Xiaobing is, arguably, the forerunner of historians of the social-history interpretations of the CPVF in Korea.

[29] Li, *Voices*, xiv.

illustration of this period of transition. These arguments focus on the changes from a peasant guerrilla army, such as the early Red Army/PLA that fought the imperial Japanese forces and later the GMD, to a conventional force capable of mounting noteworthy resistance against the premier Western forces of the day. This change, especially during the Korean War, occurred during a time of when the CPVF (and by extension, PLA) recognized the strengths and limitations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and pushed to modernize.[30] This change was not one that occurred immediately with the establishment of the PRC. Instead, the Korean War provided for the PLA, through the CPVF, an opportunity to adjust Maoist Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare until the PLA could produce forces that were more modern.

There is, however, division amongst historians as to when and how the PLA would modernize. Bruce A. Ellerman, for example, argues that the PLA, specifically Peng Dehuai, wanted the PLA to be more modern, mobile army.[31] While this may have been a long-term objective for Peng, evidence from his memoirs stated that he desired a prolonged, guerrilla style war to overcome the US-UN, though following the war he *did* encourage more strongly the rapid modernization of the PLA.[32] Furthermore, the choice to use revolutionary guerrilla warfare was a conscious decision on the part of Beijing at the outset of the war. According to Peng, "If the Americans decided to fight against us, a quick war would be favorable to them, but a protracted one to us; regular warfare would be favorable to them but the methods [of revolutionary guerrilla war] that we had used to deal with the Japanese would be favorable to

[30] Li, *Voices,* 79.

[31] Bruce A. Elleman, "China's Role in the Korean War," *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 235.

[32] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 505.

us."[33] While the exact nature of the war changed throughout the course of the Korean War, this is not so far out of the overall Chinese model of warfare that advocates adaptability to conflict. Mao's "underground Great Wall" of tunnels and trenches did limit the maneuverability of the CPVF as the similar earthworks limited the US-UN forces.[34] Furthermore, considering that one of the precepts of Mao's model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare was the idea of trading space for time, the construction of the "underground Great Wall" maximized the amount of time traded for very limited gains in space around the 38th parallel. This is not to suggest that this adaptation was the ideal evolution of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in Korea, as Wortzel notes that Peng advised Mao that the CPVF was unaccustomed to trench warfare.[35]

It is important to note that, while the CPVF gained parity with the US-UN and prevented the US-UN from forcibly reuniting Korea, it came at an extreme cost in terms of human life. This is perhaps one of the most important indicators that this was a period of change for the CPVF. Revolutionary guerrilla warfare was still a useful doctrine to overcome Western forces especially in the absence of industry, mechanized and air forces. It was not, however, a doctrine that the CPVF could continuously implement against the US-UN or similar hostile powers.

The last major examination of the CPVF in the Korean War addresses the issues of history as propaganda. This perspective, however, has several layers to it. First and most

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[33] Peng, Dehuai, "My Story of the Korean War," in *Mao's Generals Remember Korea,* trans. and eds. Li, Xiaobing, Allen R. Millet, Bin Yu (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 32.

[34] Nie, Rongzhen, "Beijing's Decision to Intervene in *Mao's Generals Remember Korea,* trans. and eds. Li, Xiaobing, Allen R. Millet, Bin Yu (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 46.

[35] Larry M. Wortzel, "China's Foreign Conflicts since 1949," in *A Military History of China*, ed. David A Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 272.

familiar to readers, is the idea that Korean War is the "Forgotten War" in the US. As alluded to earlier, what is not said about the Korean War in the US is just as important as what is said. Perhaps this is because few cultures want to remember their almost victories, ties, and defeats. It is easier to accept these outcomes when cultures can look back and say "we were not prepared," rather than admitting that the opposition was better prepared than anticipated. Perhaps, in a reversal of interpretations, this is why in the PRC the Korean War is one of the most important markers of Chinese military prowess of the twentieth century because a largely agrarian, peasant, guerrilla army, with limited industrial capacity, was able to bring the premier military of the West to a stalemate.

As noted, one of the most significant shortcomings of the English language research is the limited availability of Chinese language sources. This limit originates from a variety of causes, chiefly the limited political and academic interactions between the PRC and US during the mid-twentieth century and a lack of declassified military documents from both sides in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century. Improved relations between the US and PRC, has made it easier for academics from both countries to exchange sources and research in the hope of fostering increased understanding. Furthermore, the declassification of documents from the Cold War, historians will continue to produce better research on the Korean War.

Another major question that begs for an answer: who was more an advocate of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in Korea: Mao, Peng, Nie, another party, or a combination of these leaders? As the literature stands, much focuses on the role of Mao as the orchestrator of the campaigns in Korea. This interpretation is not without merit, however, as Mao was the source of the doctrine used in the conflict. Furthermore, he instructed Peng when and how to

launch the campaigns—for better or worse. The question of whether Mao was the strongest advocate for revolutionary guerrilla warfare during the Korean War arose from sources that indicated Peng argued for a withdraw to lure the US-UN forces north of the 38th parallel. Sources available from Peng and Nie, however, became known more recently to allow historians to examine this picture. Considering, however, that most of these sources are still carefully examined by the Chinese government for details that put the Party in a negative light, and connected with this too (this author suspects) are documents that put Mao in a negative light, it may be some time before historians can have a more complete picture of the role of Peng and Nie, and others, in the Korean War.

The spilled ink, shredded trees, and split bamboo slivers that form the body of literature on the theory and practice of warfare record the insights of past generations into one of the most harrowing and trying elements of the human experience. Within this genre of literature, China possesses one of the richest continuous literary histories with some of the oldest received military texts the world over. The age of the Classical Chinese texts extends purportedly over two and a half millennia. The sands of time and fires of war reduced the number of texts to less than ten.[36] The military books included *The Six Secret Teachings*, *The Methods of the Sima*, *The Art of War*, *Wuzi*, *Weiliaozi*, *Three Strategies of Huang Shigong*, and *Questions and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong*. These works, especially the *The Art of War*, created the base of military thought in China that also influenced much of East Asia. According to Mao Zedong, these ancient texts bore special importance as literature, sources of study, and inspiration for the people of China. In his essay, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Mao wrote, "All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own times. We should seriously study these lessons, paid for in blood, which are a heritage of past wars."[37] This hard-purchased expertise developed from and reflected the experiences of the past that present scholars must study carefully, especially as new works of military thought and theory within the Chinese literary base, penned and spoken by

[36] For a detailed analysis of the age of the Chinese military texts, see Robin D. Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts: Notes on their Nature and Evolution, and the Development of Military Specialization in Warring States China," in *T'oung Pao* LXXIV (1998): 211-247.

[37] Mao, Zedong, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 87.

Mao himself, appeared in the twentieth century. These new texts demonstrated a steady continuity from the earliest times of Chinese military-philosophical literature. These common concepts included a consistent conceptualization about the societal role of warfare as a detestable but necessary violent action to create peace;, the importance of understandings and applying correctly complimentary opposites such as *qi* and *zheng* (unorthodox or surprise and orthodox or regular tactics) in a variety of situations; capitalizing on strengths and exploiting weaknesses; and adaptability to changing dynamics. This influence upon Mao's writings ensured that these precepts continued to exercise an important guidance in the People's Republic of China, carried forward in the canon of Mao that itself created the base of military-philosophical literature in the PRC.

Unfortunately, as Mao noted, the shortcoming in the study of military-philosophical literature arose from a lack of "general summing-up…insufficient synthesis and systematization" of the Chinese classics.[38] With the authoring of Mao's works, the body of knowledge without proper amalgamation grew. Because of insufficient specialization, restraints of space, or inadequate resources, none of the works to date attempted to place Mao's writings in the larger military-philosophical literary tradition of China. Many works attempted to draw parallels between *The Art of War* and Mao. This approach developed with good reason due to the parallels and direct quotations of *The Art of War* in Mao's works. Many other authors, however, penned works that analysts must examine in conjunction with Mao's writings to properly place the twentieth century works in the historical, literary, and philosophical context of Chinese military thought. Because of the important role of Mao's writings in guiding PRC thought and theory as well as the recent attempts of the PRC to

[38] Mao, Zedong, "Problems of War and Strategy," *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 282.

reclaim their intangible cultural heritage, understanding the interrelatedness of these works serves to fill an important scholastic void. This work breaks new ground by including post 20th century authors with classical masters, as Carine Deerfort noted, "Historical compilations of Chinese philosophy also often stop at the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth."[39] It furthermore attempts to build on the study of those works as a systematized, original, and subdivided whole of specialization in comparison and contrast to the works of Mao.[40] One particular objective coupled hereto is an attempt to examine, from the perspective of military-philosophical history, the continuation with or departure from the "Chinese historical experience. [41]

The voluminous writings Mao produced and the constraints of this work limited this paper to draw primarily from Mao's "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," composed in 1936, and "Problems of War and Strategy," created in 1938, both available in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung*, published in 1967. These works provide a useful base of study as the major sources of Mao's military thought. Other works, such as *On Guerrilla War* appear briefly throughout this paper to illustrate key concepts. To make comparisons for contextualization of Mao in Chinese military-philosophical literature, this work employs the military classics mentioned afore. This work uses at length *The Art of War* because of the central role this work plays throughout Chinese military history, the frequent referencing of this work in conjunction with Mao, and the general familiarity of the work with readers. Because of the far-reaching breadth of readership of the *The Art of War*, this

[39] Carine Defoort, "Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate," *Philosophy East and West* vol. 51, no. 3 (Jul., 2001), 295.

[40] Defoort, "Chinese Philosophy?" 397.

[41] Krzystof Gawlikowski, "Traditional Chinese Concepts of Warfare and CPC Theory of People's War (1928-1949)," (paper presented at the Institutio Italiano per I'Africa e I'oriente 26th conference of Chinese Studies Proceedings, 1979), 150.

work includes notations from several of the most widely available editions. These include Lionel Giles' 1910 edition, Samuel B. Griffith's 1976 edition, Roger T. Ames' 1993 edition, Ralph D. Sawyer's 1993 edition, and Wu Rusong, Wu Xianlin, and Lin Wusun's 2005 edition. Other Classical Chinese works of philosophy useful for constructing this examination include Confucian texts such as *Mencius* to provide a framework of Chinese state-military interactions and the Mandate of Heaven. This work also consults Daoist works such as *The Dao De Jing* to clarify philosophical precepts such as yin and yang. This later model becomes especially important when explaining larger Chinese paradigms of balancing complementary opposites present in the military writings.

Within China's extensive literary tradition, the texts on military thought and theory represented one of the oldest and most important genres. Robin D. Yates asserted that this genre constituted the first body of works "written by private individuals for their own and their followers' use."[42] Yates' claim bore a keen understanding of the circumstances the authors, editors, and compilers penned life into this genre—namely, the chaos and conflict of the Warring States Period, (475-221 BCE). During this era of internecine war between the seven states of Qi, Chu, Yan, Han, Zhao, Wei, and Qin that fragmented from the fall of the Eastern Zhou, many philosophical traditions, both civil and military, arose as attempts to understand, guide, and correct the chaos of this tumultuous time.[43] The military texts served as a means of providing recommendations for state survival, management of resources, and protection of the people. The authors and later owners of these texts found in this period an opportunity to gain employment and influence throughout the Warring States with their

[42] Yates, 219.

[43] For a brief overview of this period, see Li, Xiaobing, "Warring States Period," *China at War: An Encyclopedia* ed. Li, Xiaobing (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012): 484-484. For suggested further reading, Li included a bibliography at the conclusion of the entry.

expertise. Authored in the fires of war to bring peace to the land the final irony of the classical texts arrived at the conclusion of the Warring State Period when Qin Shi Huangdi, emperor of the unified China ordered the great book burning in 213 BCE wherein flames consumed many works of history, philosophy, and literature.

These foundational works established a framework that demonstrated, in the words of Christopher C. Rand, "a continuous tradition of ideas about war—its execution, moral goals, and cosmic significance—loosely amalgamated into a common lore."[44] Though a common genre, the classical texts divided into four subgenres. The received and most generally accepted canon of the classical military texts divided into four subgenres based on specialization. In *Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong*, Li Jing reported that Jen Hung divided the classical works into four categories.[45] Liu Xiang purportedly also divided the military texts into four separate groups based on specialization of skill: military power and planning; military form and positional advantage; yin-yang theorists; and military technologists; and craft specialists. [46] This categorization demonstrated a detailed and layered approach to war, with a variety of texts for a variety of situations.

With the addition of Mao's military writings, a new derivation of subgenres appeared: state theorists who wrote on behalf of the state and overthrow theorists who wrote texts on combating an established state with a rebel force to establish their own control over China. Ranging from the ancient period through today, internal political clashes formed the most

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[44] Christopher C. Rand, "Li Ch'üan and Chinese Military Thought," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, vol. 39, no. 1 (Jun., 1979): 107.

[45] Li Jing, "Questions and Replies Between T'ang Tai-tsung and Li Wei-kung," *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, trans. and ed. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 330; Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts," 215.

[46] Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts," 215.

characteristic Chinese military experience.[47] Mao's writings contained some of the most evident references to terms like revolution and rebellion as a purpose of authorship. This created a seeming disengagement with the majority of the classical military texts that addressed conflict in broad terms of military thought and theory with the presumption that the commanders wielded similar armies under similar circumstances. This conclusion, however, overlooked one of the oldest and most interesting of the Classical Chinese tests. *The Six Secret Teachings* approached the problem of warfare as a question of seeking to depose an established government, namely the overthrow of the Shang by the Zhou (c. 1046 BCE).[48] Thus, in an interesting sense of completeness and cyclical progression, the most recent contribution to the military-philosophical literature of China complimented one of the earliest military texts by purpose of composition enough to generate a new subdivision of genres.

Mao argued, however, that from these earlier works little in the way of similar circumstances carried over into his own time. In his essay, "Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War," Mao asserted, "All the laws for directing war develop as history develops and as war develops; nothing is changeless."[49] Three particular eras appeared in Chinese military history with relative ease to identify based on criteria such as weapons and organization. According to David A. Graff, "At the ancient and modern extremes, to be sure, certain changes are fairly obvious...the struggle to assimilate Western military technology, organization, and the ideas

[47] Ralph D. Sawyer, *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 24.

[48] Indeed, this war established the idea of the Mandate of Heaven as a justification for military action. See Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2001), xiv.

[49] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 80.

in the late nineteenth century marks the other obvious watershed."[50] Furthermore, the complicated position of China as "semi-colonial and semi-feudal country" marked the most important difference as the fractured and chaotic nature of the political climate differed greatly from precedent.[51] Since the establishment of the Zhou, China experienced only three significant periods of foreign invasion: the Mongolian established Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), the Manchurian established Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), and the period of imperialist expansion (1793-1945). This represented a notable deviation from the historical precedent of Chinese rebels overthrowing Chinese dynasties. These circumstances seemed to support an argument of little continuity between the periods. Such a conclusion, however, neglected the historically dominating characteristic of internal political clashes in China.[52] The dominant nature of internal political clashes related to a philosophical precept ignored in this assessment. This precept held that change represented an element of continuity. According to Tian Chenshan "Change is itself an embodiment of continuity between things that are not strictly contrastive."[53] This continuity through change embodied the cyclical progression of order, decline, chaos, and replacement of regimes throughout Chinese history.

In Classical Chinese philosophy, the concept of the Mandate of Heaven embodied this progression. The Mandate of Heaven, depending on the source, took on a variety of connotations, but overwhelmingly communicated justification of one source to take the reins of power because of their better ability to address the needs of the people. This justification did not possess mutual exclusivity of the ability of the one. Rather, it also contained an

[50] David A. Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2002), 17.
[51] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 77.
[52] Translator's Introduction, 24.
[53] Tian, Chenshan, "The Ideological Development of Confucianism in the Global Age," (paper presented at Beijing Foreign Studies University, 2013).

explication of the failings of the current ruler, often manifested by mismanagement of state affairs, an inability to prevent disasters, and moral corruption. The victorious usurper-turned-ruler then ushered in a new dynastic cycle that, overtime, also fell into disarray, then again cast aside when a better able sovereign wrested it away. This concept of the Mandate of Heaven had particularly interesting implications in the realm of military-philosophical literature. Indeed, the Zhou overthrow of the Shang served as not only the impetus for authoring the *Six Secret Teachings* but also the creation of the idea of the Mandate of Heaven.[54] Furthermore, the Confucian philosopher Mozi tied the loss of the Mandate of Heaven with military action in "The Declaration of Yu" (also referred to as "The Declaration of Gan"), Mozi recounted the use of the Mandate of Heaven as a justification for overthrow of government. In a stirring, pre-battle speech, the king declared, "This ruler of Hu has destroyed and reviled the Five Phases and has been remiss and abandoned the Three Spheres. Heaven shall cut off his mandate."[55] Thus, warfare served as a means to bring about necessary change. This precept of continuity throughout change developed in both the civil-philosophical modes and the military-philosophical models of the Classical Chinese authors. From this assessment, Mao's military thoughts and theories fit comfortably into the martial tradition of China despite his own words. Not only did Mao write in a time of war in order to bring peace to China and independence from foreign influence, he also represented a unique

[54] Ivanhoe and Van Norden, *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, XIV.

[55] Mozi, *Mozi*, ed. Ivanhoe and Norden (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2001), 108. Confucians typically extolled the primacy of *wen* [culture or civil or military] over *wu* [martial] in achieving objectives, be they political or military ends. The events depicted in this narrative predated Mozi, thus his work was in its time a secondary account. This inconsistency in the timing, however, increases the significance of this tale, as it demonstrated that Confucians understood the use of the Mandate of Heaven as a justification for war. Though in its original context this passage explored the possibility of the existence of ghosts, it serves as an important detail.

set of changes. In this manner, Mao represented continuity in the conceptualization of warfare as a means to protect the people in changing circumstances.

A similar notion of continuity through change existed in the embodiment of complimentary opposites, or as a conceptualization known as yin and yang. Yin yang, often associated with Daoism, represented two forms of contradictory yet complimentary forces that appeared in pairs: yin the darker colored portion (feminine, soft, passive, cold) and yang the lighter portion (masculine, hard, active, warm). Neither of these occurred independent of the other. Rather, the existence of the one correlated to the existence of the other. Tien Chen-ya, who cited Griffith, noted an adaptation of yin yang in Mao's writings. [56] He did not attribute Mao's "contradictory phenomena" to yin yang theory, however. Rather, Tien credited Marxist-Leninist influences. Specifically, Tien cited Mao's observation,

> In war, offence and defense, advance and retreat, victory and defeat are all mutually contradictory phenomena. One cannot exist without the other. The two aspects are at once in conflict and interdependent, and this constitutes the totality of a war, pushes its development forward and solves its problems.[57]

This quote possessed many of the same qualities as yin yang theory, namely "mutually contradictory phenomena," correlative existence, and interdependence between conflicting phenomena. The *Dao De Jing*, for example, described,

> Determinacy and indeterminacy give rise to each other,
> Difficult and easy complement each other,
> Long and short set each other off,
> High and low complete each other
> ...

[56] Tien, Chen-ya, *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern* (New York: Mosaic Press, 1992), 214.

[57] Mao, quoted in Tien, *Chinese Military Theory*, 213.

And before and after lend sequence to each other—[58]

Within the philosophical tradition, this approach required a careful discernment of complex, interrelated intricacies of a situation. Graff noted this process, though "not necessarily contradictory" required the reader of Classical Chinese military tests to reconcile "two or more passages, or determining which might be the more applicable to the particular situation at hand."[59] According to Ames, this interpretation of events and philosophical writings required readers to recognize "...particular 'things' are in fact processual events, and are thus *intrinsically* related to the other things' that provide them context."[60] In order to properly contextualize events and select the appropriate theorem, the situation took primacy over the individual or agency.[61] What's more, Mao's writings furthered the idea that awareness of interconnectedness of details lead to understanding and understanding resulted in success. According to Mao, "It is well known that when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it."[62] Thus, the idea of

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[58] Laozi, *Dae De Jing: A Philosophical Translation*, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine, 2003), 80. The Ivanhoe and Van Norden edition read,

To have and to lack generate each other.

Difficult and easy give form to each other.

Long and short off-set each other.

High and low incline into each other.

...

Before and after follow each other.

Laozi, "Dae De Jing," *Readings in Classical Chinese* Philosophy, eds. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2001), 163.

[59] Graff, *Medieval Chinese Warfare*, 24.

[60] Roger T. Ames, trans., "Daoist Cosmology: An Interpretive Context," *Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine, 2003), 15.

[61] Tian, Chenshan, "Ideological Development of Confucianism," 2.

[62] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 77.

discerning contextual circumstances and interrelatedness of the parts to the whole appeared in both Classical Chinese writings and Mao's own military thought and theory.

Mao himself argued that he possessed a dual nature as a whole with complimentary opposites. Stuart Schram citied Mao's response, "In all things, one divides into two…I, too, am a case of one divides into two."[63] Michael Sheng also noted this sense of duality in Mao's thought and theory, in the possession of a "tiger spirit" and a "monkey spirit."[64] Using animal symbolism, Mao described an ability to apply complimentary opposites as the situation warranted. The "tiger spirit," harkened to traditional Chinese symbolism, of outward displays of martial prowess as the "tiger spirit" while the "monkey spirit" symbolized his ability to use deception, adaptability, and subterfuge. This relationship between complimentary opposites of outwardly strong and subtly clever existed also in the classical military writings. *The Three Strategies*, contained many examples of this principle, though one noteworthy quotation tied particular strong to Mao, "Thus I say everyone covets strength, but rare are those capable of preserving the subtle. If someone can preserve the subtle he can protect his life."[65] The *Six Secret Teachings* noted simply, "One who does not have a penetrating understanding of both order and chaos cannot be spoken with about changes."[66] In this context, changes indicated a myriad of causes and effects that concerned commanders. Understanding these circumstances required a basic sense of the interrelatedness of complimentary opposites.

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[63] Mao, quoted in Stuart Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 187.

[64] Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 11.

[65] Tai Gong, "Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung," *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, trans. And ed. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 292.

[66] Tai Gong, "'Tai Kung's Six Secret Teachings," 71.

These appeared not only in the descriptions of the qualities of rulers and generals, but also in terms of force sizes and compositions. For example, the *Weiliaozi* described the complimentary opposites of heavy and light forces, "A heavy army is like the mountains, like the forests, like the rivers and great streams. A light force is like a roaring fire..."[67] In this description, the author noted that both types of forces, heavy and light, possessed unique and useful qualities. A heavy army had strength, force of presence, and could cover a vast area, but it was not the sole superior force. In a complimentary opposite fashion, a light force possessed mobility, the means to harass and pressure, and an ability to fight, ambush, withdraw, and confuse the enemy but it too was not the sole superior force. With proper application, these forces could overcome the opposition and even therein create complimentary opposites of sorts by causing "the enemy's troops to be unable to disperse and those that are dispersed to be unable to reassemble."[68]

Mao's writings also demonstrated awareness of Chinese military thought and theory that possessed a great sense of philosophical continuity. Of the classical Chinese military theorists, nearly all had some connection between war and political objectives. While for some these connections appeared as implicit correlations, inclusions in *The Art of War*, *The Six Secret Teachings*, and *Methods of the Sima* explicated these relations in terms not merely similar to Mao's writings but also comparable to Clausewitz. Few traditional Chinese works extolled the connection between war and affairs of state, and thus political objectives, better than *The Art of War*. According to this text, "War is a question of vital importance to the state, a matter of life and death, the road to survival or ruin. Hence, it is a subject which calls

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[67] Weiliaozi, "Weiliaozi," *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 244.

[68] Weiliaozi, "Weiliaozi," *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 244.

for careful study."[69] A quotation of this line appeared in *The Six Secret Teachings*, attributed to the Tai Gong. It read, "Thus, 'warfare is the greatest affair of state, the [Dao] of survival or extinction.'"[70] This line from Sunzi's seminal work, explained directly war held a status of concern for the "state," as differentiated from personal conflicts presumably by natures of resources and scale of conflict, and thus took on a political nature. Finally, *The Methods of the Sima* held a similar connection between power, influence, and authority with war and violence. This work explained the source of "Authority comes from warfare, not from harmony among men. For this reason if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then killing is permissible."[71] A much more pragmatic, if draconian, interpretation of the interactions between peace and war, as well as amongst men, this quotation drew similar connections to the ultimate aim of war to create peace for the people through the establishment of order by violence.

These selections bore striking resemblance to Mao's assessments of war. Mao's best-known description of the relationship between war, politics, and power, from his essay

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[69] Sunzi, *Sunzi: The Art of War*, trans. Wu, Wu, and Lin, 3.

Ames, "War is a vital matter of state. It is the field on which life or death is determined and the road that leads to either survival or ruin, and must be examined with the greatest care." Sunzi, *Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare*, trans. Ames, 103.

Sawyer, "Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way [Dao] to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed." Sunzi, "Sun-tzu's Art of War," trans. Sawyer, 157.

Griffith, "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War*, trans. Griffith, 91.

Giles, "The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected." Sunzi, *The Art of War*, trans. Giles.

[70] Tai Gong, "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings," 63.

[71] Simafa, "The Methods of the Ssu-ma," *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 126.

"Problems of War and Strategy," argued, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."[72] This quote contained many of the elements the classical Chinese theoreticians' writings advocated, namely a connection between politics and violence, with an implicit source of power from force, presumably from both the active and potential to execute. Mao further expanded on these ideas to explain, "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution."[73] This explanation carried even stronger bonds to *The Art of War*, *The Six Secret Teachings*, and *The Methods of the Sima* as it vehemently contended that violence exemplified the means to gain power. Following this line, Mao tied this principle to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, however. He wrote, "This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution *holds good universally*, for China and for all other countries." Though Mao credited Marxism-Leninism as his source of inspiration in this instance, these works fell too, at times, under the perceptual umbrella of Marxism-Leninism according to the Chinese Communist Party because of the inclusion of "materialism and dialectics" in works like *The Art of War*.[74] What's more, these works possessed histories that appealed to the cultural heritage of China. As noted afore, the theories found in *The Art of War* proved so influential that other works, such as *The Six Secret Teachings* and *Questions and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong* contained lines from this work while other texts exhibited similar conceptual principles. During a speech at the Group Leaders' Forum of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Committee, June 28, 1958, Mao reminisced that many of China's heroic military

[72] Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," 274.

[73] Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," 269. Emphasis added by author.

[74] Chief Lin, quoted in Mao Zedong, "Speech at the Group Leaders' Forum of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Committee," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Volume VIII* (Beijing: Foreign Lanauge Press, 1967), Marxist Internet Archive, accessed June 17, 2013. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-8/mswv8_12.htm.

leaders "all knew how to fight wars. China's past has quite a lot to offer."[75] From such points as previous conflicts, Mao tied the future security of the (PRC) with the military prestige of past eras.

This connection persisted overtly so long as it did not infringe upon the import and influence of Mao. As Schram noted, when "questioned in his later years about what he learned from the Chinese classics, [Mao] was generally whimsical and frequently contradictory in his replies."[76] Many of his *Open Dialogues* from the time of the Cultural Revolution sought to downplay the importance of *The Art of War* in the development of Mao's military thought and theory or criticize those who extolled it as an exemplary work. During a speech given to the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau, March 20, 1966, Mao denied any significant influence from *The Art of War* upon Red Army commanders. He explained that Red Army soldiers "...never studied the military tactics of [Sunzi]. Yet, did they not do battle just the same? Not a single person fought any battles in accordance with [Sunzi] on *The Art of War*."[77] This resulted from Mao's attempts to build the legitimacy of his work and cult of personality by denying the influences and significance of previous eras, a seeming contradiction of his previous exhalations of the military classics. This active denial, itself, held close to the traditional histories that denigrated the older regimes and extolled the new in order to build popular legitimacy.

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[75] Mao, "Speech at the Group Leaders' Forum."

[76] Schram, *The Thought of Mao*, 54. Zhang cites this quote in his work, *Mao's Military Romanticism*, 28, n 75, 286, but attributed the quote to page 14 of Schram's work. This quote may appear on such a page in the copy Zhang consulted, but not in the 1990 edition.

[77] Mao, Zedong, "Talk at the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau," *Long Love Mao Tse-tung Thought* (Red Guard Publication), Marxist Internet Archive, accessed June 17, 2013. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_55.htm.

Despite these conflicting claims of sources and clashing assessments, a series of continuous military-philosophical precepts of the relationship between war, violence, and politics persisted from the Classical Chinese works to Mao's writings. Chiefly, this relationship demonstrated that war served two overt and related purposes: a use of violence to restore peace amongst the people and as a means to gain political power. Though associated with malevolence because of the use of weapons, described as "evil implements" by the exemplary "Sage Kings," and the deaths and destruction these brought, war had an appropriate time and place, such that not even the worthiest monarchs of legend could avoid it.[78] The *Weiliaozi* explained "...Conflict is a contrary virtue." [79] This contradiction arose from the realization that, with an ultimate aim to create peace and prosperity, war had to create chaos and destruction. This too resonated with the words of Mao that "The aim of war is to eliminate war."[80] An evil but given the alternatives of prolonged suffering of the people, rebellion and disorder, and the expenses to the treasury, or the suffering of the people under an ineffective government, war served as the most expedient means to end these evils. A bitter medicine, indeed, washed down with the tears of families and blood of the people, but the best available cure for the ailment.

With a framework of complimentary opposites and the essential nature of understanding the intricate interconnectedness of phenomena, another issue may come to rest, namely the conflict between whether the Chinese military-philosophical tradition advocated as an artistic or a scientific approach to war and to what extent this permeated Mao's writings. This debate built one of the most frustrating issues for Western readers and

[78] Tai Gong, "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings," 51.
[79] Weiliaozi, "Wei Liao-tzu," 256.
[80] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 80.

indeed an intense issue of debate amongst scholars of Chinese military history in the English Language. Tien brought this problem to attention by noting that *The Art of War*'s discussion that "military devices 'are the strategist's keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand,' caused many writers to conclude that the Chinese military-philosophical approach contained a "high level of artistry."[81] According to Tien, the exact cause of issue in this line resulted from the use of the term "Art of War" in connection with Sunzi's writings.[82] Sawyer explained this line held two possible connotations, either that a general could not share his plans before battle or that military thoughts and theories could not "be rigidly or arbitrarily determined before the situation."[83] Unfortunately, Tien, and to a lesser extent, Sawyer, built their interpretations from an incorrect focal point. Rather than examine the complications of artistry found in this quote, the proper element of note resided in the examination of discussing or speaking of such things. The second proposition put forth by

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[81] Tien, *Chinese Military Theory*, 221.

Ames, "These are the military strategist's calculations for victory—they cannot be settled in advance," Sunzi, *Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare*, trans. Ames, 105.

Sawyer, "These are the ways military strategists are victorious. They cannot be spoken of in advance," Sunzi, "Sun-tzu's Art of War," trans. Sawyer, 158.

Griffith, "These are the strategist's keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand," Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War*, trans. Griffith, 103.

Giles, "These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand," Sunzi, *The Art of War*, trans. Giles.

[82] Tien, *Chinese Military Theory*, 221.

Ames, "These are the military strategist's calculations for victory—they cannot be settled in advance," Sunzi, *Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare*, trans. Ames, 105.

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Griffith, "These are the strategist's keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand," Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War*, trans. Griffith, 103.

Giles, "These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand," Sunzi, *The Art of War*, trans. Giles.

[83] Sawyer, "Notes to Sun-Tzu's *Art of War*, 437 n 20.

Sawyer held considerably greater substance when compared to a commentary of Mei Yaochen, included in Griffith's work. Mei wrote, "When confronted by the enemy respond to changing circumstances and devise expedients. How can these be discussed beforehand?"[84] Thus, *The Art of War* did not prohibit the examining of these issues rather than simply elucidated to do so in exhaustive detail was impossible as excessive amount of discussion lead to an undermining of adaptability as it created a set of prescribed circumstances and specific responses.

Mao included examples that illustrated his understandings of maintaining an open, and adaptable approach to war through discernment of multiple intricacies. In "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Mao noted, "Any war situation which acquires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as a whole."[85] He further added,

> It is well known that when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it.[86]

Tien used this quote to support his conclusion that Mao observed no artistry in war.[87] Rather, he persisted in his conclusion that to Mao, science and war held synonymous status. Tien, cited Mao's assessment "All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the experience of past wars summed up by people in former days or in our own time;" they "...like the laws governing all other things, are reflections in our minds of

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[84] Mei, Yaochen quoted in Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War*, trans. Griffith, 103.
[85] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 81.
[86] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 77.
[87] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," quoted in Tien, *Chinese Military Theory*, 221.

objective realities..."[88] This selection, however, seemed to have less to do with measurable, scientific principles of military application and more to do with interpretive understanding of situations. When divorced from the question of artistry or science and instead placed into the proper context of analyzing, understanding, and predicting a myriad of intricate phenomena in one event, this conceptualization fell much more appropriately into the tradition of Chinese military-philosophical thought. Mao's other writings further developed this connection. In "Strategy in China's Revolution," Mao noted, "Any war situation which acquires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages forms a war situation as a whole."[89] The matter of artistry or science, or discriminating a proper tactical response to be in accord with the strategies of the cosmos or formulating careful mathematical calculations to formulate the most appropriate scientific response possessed no significant bearing on this understanding of war found in both the Classical Chinese texts and Mao's writings. Alternatively, it held simple, pragmatic advice to prevent an inappropriate assessment of a situation born from incorrect preconceived notions and plans that could thereby lead to tragic military failure.

Within a military context, a number of important complimentary opposites arose in the Classical military texts that continued into the works of Mao. These included most notably the ideas of *qi* and *zheng*. Here again, another debate of terminology arose in the study of theory, namely whether the terms *qi* and *zheng* connoted meanings ranging from indirect and direct, normal and extraordinary, imbalance/asymmetry and spiking, unorthodox

[88] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," quoted in Tien, *Chinese Military Theory*, 221.

[89] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 81.

and orthodox, or surprise and straightforward. Giles translated these terms to mean direct and indirect,

> To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct [*zheng*] and indirect [*qi*]...In all fighting, the direct [*zheng*] method may be used for joining battle, but indirect [*qi*] methods will be needed in order to secure victory...Indirect [*qi*] tactics, efficiently applies, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams.[90]

Following Giles, Griffith translated these terms the same passages,

> That the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of the extraordinary [*qi*] and the normal [*zheng*] forces...Generally, in battle, use the normal [*zheng*] force to engage; use the extraordinary [*qi*] to win. Now the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary [*qi*] forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth; an inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers.[91]

Griffith also included an explanation of this passage from Li Quan that contextualized these passages. According to Li Quan, "the force which confronts the enemy is the normal [*zheng*]; that which goes to his flanks the extraordinary [*qi*]. No commander of an army can wrest the advantage from the enemy without extraordinary [*qi*] forces."[92] The issue came to a linguistic examination in Benjamin E. Wallacker's 1966 article "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought." Therein, Wallacker argued that the Griffith misinterpreted *qi* and *zheng* in his translations of *The Art of War*. Instead, using terms less familiar to Chinese military thought and theory and more so to European jousting, Wallacker insisted that *qi* most nearly connoted an idea of imbalance and asymmetry and *zheng* "spiking" an opponent in place.[93] While this assessment may assist in illustrating a portion of the meaning and imagery of

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[90] Sunzi, *The Art of War*, trans. Giles.

[91] Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War*, trans. Griffith, 136-137.

[92] Li, Quan, quoted in Griffith, trans. *The Illustrated Art of War*, 136.

[93] Benjamin E. Wallacker, "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought," *Language* vol. 42, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun., 1966), 295, 299.

these terms, it removed any connotations of the larger strategic connotations from the terms and instead placed them in more tactical descriptors. Sawyer chose to interpret the words in similar terms to Griffith, but with a vocabulary indicative of the military interests of the middle and late twentieth century. According to Sawyer's interpretation, the passage read,

> What enables the masses of the Three Armies to invariably withstand the enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox [*qi*] and orthodox [*zheng*]...In general, in battle one engaged with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven, as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers.[94]

Wu, Wu, and Lin chose not to translate the terms and instead preserved them as *qi* and *zheng*,

> Thanks to the combined use of *qi* and *zheng* tactics, the army is able to withstand the onslaught of the enemy forces...Generally, in battle, use *zheng* to engage the enemy and use *qi* to score victory. The resourcefulness of those skilled in the use of *qi* is as inexhaustible as heaven and earth and as unending as the flow of rivers.[95]

Rather than attempt to apply foreign descriptors to this, Wu, Wu, and Lin chose to keep the terms *qi* and *zheng* and, with them, applied a lengthy explanation of these terms in an appendix. The final significant contributor to this debate of terminology, Ames, translated the passage as,

> It is 'surprise' [*qi*] and 'straightforward' [*zheng*] operations that enable one's army to withstand the full assault of the enemy force and remain undefeated...Generally in battle use 'straightforward' to engage the enemy and the 'surprise' to win victory. Thus the expert at delivering the surprise assault is as boundless as the heavens and earth, and as inexhaustible as the rivers and seas.[96]

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[94] Sunzi, "Sun-Tzu's Art of War," trans. Sawyer, 164-165. A similar line appeared in the *Weiliaozi*: "Those who excel at repulsing the enemy first join battle with orthodox troops, then [use unorthodox ones] to control them. This is the technique for certain victory." Weiliaozi, "Wei Liao-tzu," Sawyer, 274.

[95] Sunzi, *Sunzi: The Art of War*, trans. Wu, Wu, and Lin, 31.

[96] Sunzi, *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, trans. Ames, 119.

Ames explained his word choice as a matter of correlativity. The use of "regular" and "irregular" in place of *zheng* and *qi* did not appropriately "capture their correlativity" as this connoted a use of "regular army" and "irregular militia."[97] This word choice held too specific associations regarding specializations of troops operations rather than a more broad applicability to usages of troops as determined by the situation. Instead, he chose the terms "surprise" and "straightforward" because these terms had a wider applicability to a variety of military situations as what the enemy possessed the ability to expect and what stunned him. Ames did not, however, combine the terms "irregular militia" and "guerrilla."[98] According to Ames, "it might be otherwise 'regular' action that surprises an enemy using guerrilla tactics." [99] The presumable corollary to this held that it might be otherwise "guerrilla" action that surprises an enemy using regular tactics.

Mao's approaches to warfare conformed to this idea of complimentary opposites, especially those of *qi* and *zheng*.[100] Such continuity appeared nowhere more prominently than concerning his assessments of guerrilla forces. Mao argued guerrillas fulfilled an accompanying role to regular forces and fulfilled an essential role on combat overall, but did not possess the ability to fulfill the same missions as conventional troops. According to Mao,

> Though the strategy of guerrillas is inseparable from war strategy as a whole, the actual conduct of these hostilities differs from the conduct of orthodox operations. Each type of warfare has methods peculiar to itself, and methods suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with success to the special situations that confront guerrillas.[101]

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[97] Ames, trans. *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, 287 n 144.

[98] Ames, trans. *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, 287 n 144.

[99] Ames, trans. *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, 287 n 144.

[100] Tien provided a lengthy examination of Mao's implementation of *xu* and *shi*, or vacuity and substance.

[101] Mao, Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 95.

In this passage, Mao used terms that described actions such as "conduct" and "methods" to differentiate between the missions of regular and guerrilla troops. This note supported Ames justification for choosing to translate *qi* and *zheng* as "surprise" and "straightforward." As Mao noted, and Ames argued, the actions of the troops defined their nature of *qi* and *zheng* more so than any official designations.

Extended from Ames' interpretation of *qi* and *zheng* as surprise and straightforward to not create inappropriate connotations of troop types rather than troop actions (but bearing in mind the ideas of orthodox and unorthodox as possible alternatives used with caution) Mao's guerrilla warfare theory fell well into the category of *qi* and *zheng* discourses. Since actions and circumstances determine the nature of *qi* or *zheng* forces, examining the particular tactics associated with guerrillas will place Mao's writings in a tactical continuity with the Classical Chinese authors. Mao's essay, "Basic Tactics," held numerous references to ambuscades and false retreats as a means for *qi* to engage *zheng*. One exemplary passage noted guerrillas overcame numerical inferiority with "sudden attacks and ambushes, so as to 'cause an uproar in the east and strike in the west,' appearing now here and now there, using false banners and making empty demonstrations, propagating rumors about one's own strength, etc."[102] *The Six Secret Teachings* described a similar approach to using ambushes in conjunction with unorthodox troops. The text advised, "Setting up ingenious ambushes and preparing unorthodox troops, stretching our distant formations to deceive and entice the enemy are the means by which to destroy the enemy's army and capture its general."[103] A

[102] Mao, Zedong, "Basic Tactics: Chapter IV, Operations, 2 The Use of Tactics" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: Volume VI*, Marxist Internet Archive, accessed June 20, 2013. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_28.htm
[103] Tai Gong, "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings," 70.

similar line appeared in Mao's "Basic Tactics," that noted, "When the enemy is pursuing us in great haste we select a spot for an ambush and wait until he arrives. Thus, we can capture the enemy all at one stroke."[104] Both cases instructed commanders to bait the enemy into pursuing a seemingly weaker or broken force into an ambush where surprise, positional advantage, and possession of the initiative in battle compensated for other shortcomings. The implement of feigned retreats often fell into the category of *qi* tactics. In *Questions and Replies*, Li Jing quoted *The Art of War* to demonstrate that "feigned retreats" and "although capable display incapability," are unorthodox.[105] *Questions and Replies* stated "In general, when troops advance to the front it is orthodox, when they [deliberately] retreat to the rear it is unorthodox."[106] Feigned retreats appeared throughout the Classical Chinese texts as a means to overextend the enemy or entice him into an ambush. These are merely two examples of *qi* and *zheng* tactics. In the traditional conceptualization of *qi* and *zheng*, the two had no beginning and end, as each came from and lead to the other. This, of course, came from the intricate details of the specific situation. *Qi* in one moment became *zheng* in another as the opposing *zheng* from the former morphed into *qi* in the latter.

In a military context, the circumstances of the commander, his force, and his resources as well as a consideration of the opposing commander, his force, and his resources determined the implementation of *qi* or *zheng*. The civil philosophical text, the *Dao De Jing*, articulated the necessity of understanding situations. This text explained that one who sought to gain an objective without being in accord with their situation would not succeed.[107] Such

[104] Mao, "Basic Tactics: Chapter II, Tactics, 13 Concealed Attacks from Ambush."
[105] Li Jing, "Questions and Replies," Sawyer, 323.
[106] Li Jing, "Questions and Replies," Sawyer, 322.
[107] Laozi, *Dae De Jing: A Philosophical Translation*, trans. Ames, 122. ""If someone wants to rule the world, and goes about trying to do so, I foresee that they simply will not succeed."

adaptations sought to create circumstances where commanders possessed the most advantageous position based on their abilities at that moment. Often, this consisted of a paired set of ideas, namely capitalizing on strengths and exploiting weaknesses. While the Classical Chinese military-philosophical texts presumed generally that the forces engaged in hostilities possessed some semblance of parity overall, these works nevertheless postulated the possibility that a force may engage a superior enemy. This case appeared most notable in *The Six Secret Teachings* and, to a lesser extent in *Questions and Replies* because of the frequent referencing of this work by Li Jing, as well as *The Art of War* and *The Methods of the Sima*. *The Six Secret Teachings* explained the matter in less cosmological, more pragmatic terms, as it encouraged the reader to, "Accord with the situation, be very cautious in making plans, and employ your material resources." [108]

The Art of War also referred to increasing the possibility of success by according with the circumstances. In this work, such adaptability appeared as a matter of being "invulnerable" and selecting the appropriate time to act. *The Art of War* advised readers, "The skilled commanders of the past first made themselves invulnerable, then waited for the enemy's movement of vulnerability."[109] Such invulnerability came from being in accord with

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Ivanhoe and Van Norden, "Those who would gain the world and do something with it, I see that they will fail," Laozi, "Dao De Jing," trans. Ivanhoe and Van Norden, *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 177.

[108] Tai Gong, "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings," 58.

[109] Sunzi, *Sunzi: The Art of War*, trans. Wu, Wu, Lin, 25.

Ames: "Of old the expert in battle would first make himself invincible and then wait for the enemy to expose his vulnerability." Sunzi, *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, trans. Ames, 115.

Sawyer: "Thus, one who excels in warfare is able to make himself unconquerable, but cannot necessarily cause the enemy to be conquerable," Sunzi, "Sun-Tzu's Art of War," trans. Sawyer, 163.

Griffith: "Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability," Sunzi, *The illustrated Art of War*, trans. Griffith, 127.

their military strengths and weaknesses as well as those of the enemy. *The Six Secret Teachings* explained the state of invulnerability arose from understanding the circumstances surrounding the commander and the oppositions, as well as the timing of combat. According to the text, "One who excels at warfare will await events in the situation without making any movement. When he sees he can be victorious, we will arise; if he sees he cannot be victorious, we will desist. Thus it is said he does not have any fear, he does not vacillate. Of the many harms that can beset an army, vacillation is the greatest. Of disasters that can befall an army, none surpasses doubt."[110] *The Methods of the Sima* added further to this statement, in terms that familiar to Mao's writings. In addition to recognizing his own personal strengths and weaknesses as a leader and planner, the resources available to forces, and their positional advantage, the text advised that commanders had to possess an awareness of the particulars of troops as well. *The Methods of the Sima* stated, "Employ what [your men] want, and effect what they are capable of; abolish what they do not want and are incapable of. Do the opposite of this to the enemy."[111] From these understandings, *Questions and Replies* explained how to assess whether to employ *qi* or *zheng* as a response. According to *Questions and Replies*, "If the enemy is substantial, then I must use the orthodox. If the enemy is vacuous, then I must use the unorthodox."[112] If a force suited for *qi* tactics in a situation suitable for *qi* tactics where the enemy demonstrated weakness to *qi* tactics, employed *qi* tactics, then the commander made himself unconquerable. Alternatively, if a force suited to *zheng* tactics in a situation suitable for *zheng* tactics employed *qi* tactics, the

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Giles: "The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy," Sunzi, *The Art of War*, trans. Giles.

[110] Tai Gong, "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings," 69.

[111] Simafa, "Methods of the Ssu-ma," 134.

[112] Li Jing, "Questions and Replies," Sawyer, 336.

commander made himself conquerable. Understandably, considering the circumstances of a mixed-experience and equipment force, irregular supply, and minimally trained forces Mao's Red Army often utilized, *qi* tactics offered the most lucrative possibilities for success. Being that the instant determined the course of action, adaptability to changing circumstances became a necessity.

To wait for circumstances to be completely favorable prevented commanders from seizing the initiative at times and thereby creating a dangerous delay that could unnecessarily prolong hostilities. When favorable circumstances did not manifest, the authors advocated creating circumstances for victory. Sawyer analyzed this idea in his interpretation of *The Art of War*, with the inclusion of a commentary from Kuan Feng that articulated orthodox meant to realize an advantage and unorthodox meant a response to turn a disadvantage into an advantage.[113] In his essay "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Mao noted, "To defeat the offensive of an enemy who enjoys absolute superiority we rely on the *situation created* during the stage of our strategic retreat, *a situation which is favorable to ourselves, unfavorable to the enemy and different from that at the beginning of his offensive*."[114] Furthermore, Mao described several such evaluations to create favorable circumstances in his "Sixteen Character Formula." This formula held "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."[115] Tien drew multiple connections between this and *The Art of War*.[116] Mao's assessments bore similarity to, though not transcription of, words from *The Art of War* that instructed, "Thus, when the enemy is rested, tire him; when well fed, starve him; and when settled, get him on

[113] Kuan Feng, quoted in Sawyer, "Notes to Sun-Tzu's War of War," 441.n 59.
[114] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 121-122.
[115] Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," 111.
[116] Mao, quoted in Tien, *Chinese Military Theory*, 213.

the move."[117] Furthermore, The *Methods of the Sima* contained a series of guiding principles that built upon these, "In general, in warfare: Attack the weak and quiet, avoid the strong and quiet. Attack the tired, avoid the well trained and alert. Attack the truly afraid, avoid those that [display] only minor fears. From antiquity these have been the rules for governing [the army]."[118] In all selections, paired statements of a situation and an appropriate action to capitalize on the circumstances appeared. The notable difference in Mao's "Sixteen Character Formula" from the classical texts resided *in the specific circumstances* behind the genesis of Mao's military writings, namely that the Red Army often found itself combating a numerically and logistically superior force. Mao extrapolated a root concept from both *The Art of War* and *The Methods of the Sima* and added details pertinent to the Red Army. A combined approach, then, contained,

> Sima: Attack the weak and quiet, avoid the strong and quiet;
> Mao: when the enemy advances, we retreat;
> Mao: the enemy camps, we harass;
> Sunzi: the enemy is settled, we get him on the move;
> Sunzi: the enemy is rested, tire him;
> Sunzi: the enemy is well fed, we starve him;
> Mao: the enemy tires, we attack;
> Simafa: attack the tired, avoid the well trained and alert;

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[117] Sunzi, "*Sunzi: The Art of War*," trans. Wu, Wu, Lin, 37.

Ames: "Thus, being able to wear down a well-rested enemy, to starve one that is well-provisioned, and to move one that is settled lies in going by way of placed where the enemy must hasten in defense," Sunzi, *Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare*, trans. Ames, 123.

Sawyer: "Thus if the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is well fed you can make him hungry; if he is at rest you can move him. Go forth to position to which he must race. Race forth where he does not expect it," Sunzi, "Sun-Tzu's Art of War," trans. Sawyer, 166.

Griffith: "When the enemy is at ease, be able to weary him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move," Sunzi, *The Illustrated Art of War*, trans. Griffith, 145.

Giles: "If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move," Sunzi, *The Art of War*, trans. Giles.

[118] Simafa, "Methods of the Ssu-ma," 141.

> Mao: the enemy retreats, we pursue;
> Simafa: attack the truly afraid, avoid those that [display] only minor fears get him on the move.

To be certain, some aspects seemed repetitive. This repetition, as often the case developed in literature, arose as a point of emphasis by the authors. Nevertheless, alone or as a combined concept, these formulae explain how forces can strengthen their overall position by not attacking the enemy directly in a decisive engagement but reducing his ability to respond effectively in preparation for a decisive engagement when circumstances allow.

The military-philosophical literary tradition of China demonstrated a rich tradition of insightful concepts from the earliest writings through to Mao. Edward L. Dreyer, however, argued this tradition is the greatest weakness of the PRC and People's Liberation Army. According to Dreyer, "China's efforts to match and surpass [United States military progress] will continue to be hindered by too much baggage from her long history."[119] Mao recognized certain circumstantial limitations in the situation of China born from nearly a hundred years as a semi-colonial state with a weak imperial and later fractured republican government. Mao also recognized in the tradition of ever-flowing continuity and change that these circumstances bore little permanence. Even during the era of the conflict when Mao composed his core military treaties, he recognized these circumstances had a time to end. According to Mao, "Our army will then attain a high degree of centralization and organization, and its operations will lose much of their guerrilla character and attain a high degree of regularity; what is now on a low level will then be raised to a higher level, and the Chinese type of regular warfare will change into the general type."[120] If Dreyer's thesis bears

[119] Edward L. Dreyer, "Continuity and Change," *A Military History of China*, eds. David A Graff and Robin Higham (Boulder: Westview, 2002), 37

[120] Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," 278.

acceptance, in the case of change and continuity, this too will, be only for a phase. Clearly, the military classics played an important role in Chinese history because of their official nature. If these texts did not have some intrinsic value of substance, there would have been no occasion for them to become state canon on military matters. Furthermore, if the information contained therein were not continuously useful, there would be no need to continue to use them in official state exams or debates as to do so would endanger the security of the state. The early successes of the texts explain their initial adoption as state policy; their continued usefulness ensured this highly regarded status continued.

Is Mao the Sunzi of the twentieth century? To use the response often attributed to Mao, "It's too early to tell." As the evidence stands now, the legacy of Mao's military thought and theory will not attain the same note as *The Art of War*. This perception, however, originates not in the widespread dissemination of the work, as more people in more languages gained access of Mao's writings in the time of his life and shortly thereafter, whereas Sunzi's works remained largely secret. Instead, the foci of the works differentiate the import of Mao from Sunzi. Sunzi's writings centered on state versus state warfare and, while certain aspects of this specialization of Chinese military writings carried over to Mao's it remained a distinct and separate subgenre. What's more, many of these continuous elements appeared throughout the received military texts. With the addition of Mao's writings to the military canon, alongside *The Six Secret Teachings*, a new classification of literature appeared concerned primarily with overthrowing an established order. Perhaps a better equation between the role of Mao's writings and the extant and distinct traditions of military writings in Chinese history is Mao the Tai Gong of the twentieth century? Again, it is too early to tell.

BY DESIGN: REVOLUTIONARY GUERRILLA WARFARE AS ANTI-IMPERIALISM

As Mao noted, his period of history contained a set of unique circumstances that defined it as separate from the historical continuity of previous eras of Chinese history. Most notably, his time witnessed the division of China into a "semi-colonial" state. Readers should not find it surprising then that anti-imperialist rhetoric filled Mao Zedong's writings. This became most apparent in his works related to ideological and armed conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US). His military and political writings espoused revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a means to not only overthrow but also defend against capitalist and imperialist incursions into Asia. This method of warfare as a means to resist Western (US-UN) encroachments upon Asia confronted its specifically designed enemy during the Korean War, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Chinese People's Volunteers (CPVF) battled the Republic of Korea (ROK) and US-UN for physical and ideological control of the peninsula. At the outset of the war, Chinese policy makers listed several reasons for the PRC's involvement in a foreign war that included a combination of international and domestic concerns that sought to protect China, and by extension East Asia, from foreign and especially capitalist-imperialist Western influences. In statements issues by Mao and Marshal Nie Rongzhen, four general objectives appeared that characterized the nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a strategy well suited for anti-imperialist war. These included an emphasis on "people's war," a combined emphasis on human power and de-emphasis on technology and machines, resist US encroachments in both physical and ideological forms, resist foreign encroachments throughout East Asia, and protect the interests of the fledgling PRC. Though physical manifestations of violence, conflict, and hardship symbolized the three years of the Korean

War in the most tangible and appreciable ways, the abstract thought, theory, and direction of Mao's revolutionary guerrilla warfare provided a means to combat advanced, industrialized Western militaries that sought to conquer hearts and minds as well as lands and seas. Considering the duality of this politically charged conflict, the infusion of anti-imperialist rhetoric into the model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare ensured that with the spread of this information so too spread Chinese influence in the region.

Allen S. Witting's *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*, published in 1960, created the foundation for the English language study of the PRC/CPVF in the Korean War. Whiting concluded that "expectations may be inferred [about the PRC] from ideological assumptions about the enemy and past experience of him."[121] The past experiences Whiting described included a broader understanding of Chinese history and culture. This understanding allowed Whiting to create the work he did because of the time in which Whiting composed it, because the source material available to him consisted mainly of US-UN intelligence reports, Chinese propaganda, and newspaper articles from various sources—a weakness that Whiting possessed a keen understanding.[122] Following the opening of Chinese archives and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century, researchers gained access to new and crucial information. This flood of sources created a "new Cold War" history that, for the first time, based analytical conclusions on documentation form a variety of sources and sides rather than ideologically charged one-

[121] Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), viii.
[122] Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, ix.

sided accounts and collected propaganda.[123] In 1995, Shu Guang Zhang published *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953*. Shu's work laid plainly at the feet of Mao and his personal ambitions to regain Chinese supremacy the causes for the PRC entry into the Korean War as an effort to assert their power in the face of Western threats and demonstrate their value as an ally to Asia.[124] Shortly thereafter, in 1997, Michael Sheng published *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States*. In this work, Sheng echoed the common arguments that Mao and the PRC acted as a dedicated cohort to the Communist Bloc and denied the arguments of a more self-determined PRC.[125] Furthermore, his work carried the argument of the importance and centrality of the ideology of revolutions. Interestingly, he argued that Maoism possessed a dualism of a "tiger spirit" (outward displays of prowess) and a "monkey spirit," (deception, adaptability, and subterfuge).[126] Chen Jian authored the most recent work of import on the subject, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, published in 2001. Chen argued, based on his access to Chinese records that Mao aimed to achieve the idea of a perpetual class struggle and larger goal of an Asia-wide revolution. According to Chen, this resulted in both the involvement of the PRC in the Korean War and PRC support for Ho Chi Minh.[127]

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[123] John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 238. Quoted in Jian Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 1.

[124] Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 10.

[125] Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 196.

[126] Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism*, 11. This issue of duality may prove fruitful in a larger examination of Maoist models of warfare as it appears consistently throughout his works ("paper tigers" and "real tigers," "tiger spirit" and "monkey spirit") as well as a later description of Deng Xiaoping's policy of "black cat" and "white cat."

[127] Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 3.

This study examines the use of revolutionary guerrilla warfare by the PRC as a means to combat Western encroachments viewed as imperialistic *and* the use of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a means to spread PRC influence in Asia by building upon the culturally aware foundation established by Whiting and the pro-Chinese interest/larger East Asian revolution theory advocated by Zhang and Chen. Significant primary materials used in explicating this topic included the *Selected Works* series collections of Mao's writings, especially his military writings. In addition to these, *Quotations from Chairman Mao* also provided useful insights. While the programs of Deng Xiaoping's "opening to the outside world," begun in the 1970s and 1980s, instituted a number of helpful reforms to the study of Chinese history, the CCP continues to strictly control access to sensitive archives. Unfortunately, as Jian Chen notes, "In most circumstances, scholars must rely upon 'selected documents' to study China's Cold War history."[128] Interestingly, when Mao, Zhou Enlai, Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon conducted a number of discussions on the relations between the PRC and the US during the 1970s, Mao remarked, concerning his collective writings, "Those writings of mine aren't anything. There is nothing instructive in what I wrote."[129] Despite the questions raised regarding the authority of these works following their editing and compiling process and Mao's own humbling analysis, these documents do not

[128] Chen Jian, "Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China's 'New Cold War Documentation," *Cold War International History Conference* (paper presented at the Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and the Cold War International History) http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference/chen-jian/html (accessed October 16, 2012).

[129] "Nixon Discusses Philosophy with Mao Zedong, 1972," *in Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914,* ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 458.

stray significantly from the tradition of the official histories of Imperial China.[130] Furthermore, declassified documents, especially telegrams exchanged between Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang composed a noteworthy addition to the research materials for this analysis. Reminiscent of Whiting's preface line, "This approach is intended neither to justify Chinese Communist action nor to find fault with U.S. and U.N. decisions,"[131] it is necessary to add here a similar statement. This analysis neither justifies PRC actions nor resurrects ideological conflicts. Instead, it seeks to articulate in the English language the qualities of imperialism the PRC, especially policy makers such as Mao, observed in the US and to describe the application of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a model of warfare especially suited to combating more industrially capable, extended and projected forces outside of their home culture. Expanding the English language study of these issues, especially in an attempt to recount these details from a Chinese-perspective, adds a significant contribution to understanding historical events in terms of not only one's own perspective, but also the perspective of the opposition. This work also expands the current trend in US military historiography of "lessons learned" to not concentrate merely on the "what we did wrong" approach, but also add to this a "what they did right" interpretation.

This work builds on the definition of imperialism as articulated by Mao inspired by his interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Although other persons participated in the planning and execution of the Korean War, because of the active and central role of Mao in Chinese policy, as well as the continuing influence of his theoretical writings that guided Chinese

[130] Traditional histories such as the *Shiji* served more to explain in terms of the Mandate of Heaven (the celestial blessing to govern China) why the previous dynasty failed to uphold its obligations to the people and, therefore, the succeeding dynasty possessed a right to overthrow it. These works, furthermore, acted less as a description of how things came to be and the lessons learned from the past and more as a guide suggesting pathways to future rule.
[131] Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, ix.

military, government, and civil policy from the 1950s through the 1970s, any study of the PRC policy must begin with an examination in detail his thoughts and theories. From the *Selected Works* series of documents from Mao and the infamous collection of essays and speeches by Mao, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, an explicit definition of "imperialism" surfaced after careful analytical examination.[132] Mao sought to tie the roots of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the Marxist-Leninist ideologies of communism.[133] Considering that he repeatedly drew attention to this supposed connection between the CCP and Marxism, Marx's definitions of imperialism served as a usable starting point from which to extrapolate further details of Mao's definition. According to Marx, the foundations themselves of imperialism occurred by force. In his address to the Paris Commune, May 1871, Marx noted a distinct connection between militarism and economics with the rise of imperialism when he described the origin of empires: "The empire, with the coup d'état for its birth certificate,...and the sword for its sceptre..."[134] This quote held not only beginning of imperialism by force but also the maintenance and spread of its influence found in the same means as symbolized by the references to the "coup d'état" and "sword for its scepter." Marx's fundamental argument that inspired communism, centered on economic struggles

[132] Readers must carefully analyze the date of the quotations included to help preserve historic context.

[133] While Mao uses both "Marxist" and "Marxist-Leninist" to describe his interpretations of Communism, readers must carefully analyze the date of the quotations included to help preserve historic context. From this, readers may also infer that Mao uses the Marxist model of history when analyzing this phenomenon that he sees as so important. Mao, Zedong, "Criticism and Self-Criticism," in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, ed. Lin Biao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 259, and Mao, Zedong, "The Communist Party," in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, ed. Lin Biao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 1, 4.

[134] Karl Marx, "The Paris Commune Address to the International Workingmen's Association, May 1871," in *Selected Works of Karl Marx*, Marxist Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/civil-war-france/ch05.htm (accessed February 20, 2013).

that, in the case of imperialism, manifested as exploitation of one group for the profit of the other. Lenin built upon this concept of economics and violence when he described imperialism as a stage of capitalism. According to Lenin, "Imperialism is a specific historical stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is monopoly capitalism; parasitic, or decaying capitalism; moribund capitalism."[135] This connection to economic dominance continued throughout Mao's works on imperialism, notably in essays such as "Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers," and "U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger."[136] For example, he described imperialists as "the slave-owning class, the feudal landlord class and the bourgeoisie."[137] These descriptions held tenuous overt connections to the US of 1950 on, as they either harkened back to previous eras of US history ("slave-owning class," though Mao demonstrated consciousness of the social conflicts within the US during the 1960s) or descriptions reminiscent of US consumerism.[138] Mao's definition of imperialism with relation to foreign powers, however, gained more specificity as his writings shifted from social concerns into other realms.

Just as Marx and Lenin both discussed and emphasized a connection between imperialism and an inevitable violent upheaval of the proletariat, so too Mao added an

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[135] V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism," in *Lenin Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964) Marxist Internet Archive http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/oct/x01.htm (accessed January 24, 2013).

[136] Mao, Zedong, "Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers," in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, ed. Lin Biao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 72-81 and Mao, Zedong, "U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger," in *The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection*, ed. Pei-kai Cheng and Michael Lestz with Jonathan D. Spence (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 382-285.

[137] Mao, "Imperialism and Paper Tigers," 73.

[138] For more on Mao's works related to social struggles in the US, see Mao Zedong, "A New Storm Against Imperialism," *Peking Review, April 19, 1968*, 5-6, Marxist Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_80.htm. (accessed March 20, 2013).

element of violence to his model. He described the duality of imperialists—their "paper tiger" and "real tiger" qualities—as one where "they devoured people, devoured people by the millions and tens of millions."[139] Because of the scale of the devouring, this statement communicated a combination of economic devouring through impoverishment and physical devouring through violent conflict. Mao reinforced this last aspect when he alluded to the devouring of "tens of millions of lives before the victory in 1949."[140] From here, Mao added that imperialism used force to seize "colonies and semi-colonies," and oppress the people.[141] While these descriptions contained parallels to the descriptions provided by Marx and Lenin, they also articulated a distinct character of his interpretation of imperialism forged in the two hundred years of Western colonization and, experiences that are more personal to his own. Throughout the work, he named specific powers that embodied his definition of imperialism, such as Japan (especially in writings from the period of 1938-1945), Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang (GMD), and the US (in writings from the period 1945 to compilation, editing, and publishing of *Quotations*). For example, "Its main characteristic is that Japanese imperialism wants to turn China into a colony... As we all know, for nearly a hundred years China has been a semi-colonial country jointly dominated by several imperialist powers."[142] From this quote Mao's definition of imperialism also included an element of an outside or anti-nationalist power forcing upon a sovereign people their will. In this instance, any effort to undermine or weaken the strength of an indigenous (presumably communist) China served

[139] Mao, "Imperialism and Paper Tigers," 78.

[140] Mao, "Imperialism and Paper Tigers," 78. The victory of the CCP over the GMD in the Chinese Civil War.

[141] Mao, "Imperialism and Paper Tigers," 78.

[142] Mao, Zedong, "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Volume I* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1975). Marxist Internet Archive. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_11.htm (accessed 20 February, 2013).

to further imperialism. Mao's words advanced this conclusion when he noted, "To win independence and freedom for China is a great task. It demands that we fight against foreign imperialism and the domestic counter-revolutionary forces."[143] Thus, for Mao, imperialism contained a composite of economic exploitation and forceful dominance of Asia by outside, Western forces and their Asian.

The following secondary sources most appropriate for understanding the role imperialism played regarding revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a reaction to imperialism and Western incursions into Asia that threatened Chinese interests in the region, included: Stephen Howe, Bonnie G. Smith, Michael Parenti, and Daniel Headrick because these works, though seemingly divorced form the subject at hand, each dealt with details intimate to the study and appreciation of Western imperialism ("Western" and "imperialism," ideas near synonymous in Mao's writings). In a general sense, according to Stephen Howe, the combined terms "empire" and "imperialism" connoted all relations between a more powerful political entity, specifically states or societies, and a less powerful one through "formal…physical control or full-fledged rule" and "informal…implied, less direct…dominance."[144] Such influence possibly manifested through force, diplomacy and political maneuvering, or information and ideas. This first element, waging war, meant that the political entity in question possessed a means to raise forces, be they land or maritime (or in modern parlance, aerospace as well), initiate military or policing actions with those forces, and maintain those forces in the field, *id est* away from the home, for an extended period. This second element, the legislative and executive element, while more self-descriptive,

[143] Mao, "Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism."

[144] Stephen Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 13, 24, 30.

possessed subtle connections to the first. This third element, information and ideas, seemed to be the defining cause of the death of the old empires and birth of the new empires during the twentieth century and, for the foreseeable future, the domain of the empires to come, as ideological conflicts underpinned the anti-imperialist conflicts of the Cold War. Before Howe, Headrick examined the interaction between imperialism, colonies, and technologies. Headrick emphasized the geographic "extent" and, in the case of Western European imperialism, the lasting technological/industrial "legacy" of imperial powers on their former colonies.[145] The attribute of geographic extent certainly became an important feature of the conflict between the PRC and US as manifested during the Korean War. While both the PRC and the US extended their supply lines to reach the 38th Parallel, the US operated most distinctly outside its immediate realm in a region foreign in the starkest senses of the term.

Economic issues appeared consistently in definitions and interpretations of imperialism and anti-imperialism. Modern analysts, such as Parenti, stressed that economics is the ultimate motivation of imperialism. According to Parenti, "the process of transnational investment and capital accumulation" defined imperialism.[146] This interpretation fell in line most akin to the Marxist-Leninist appraisal of imperialism (discussed at length above), but seemed to have little—indeed, if any—overt connection to the Korean War, despite the persistent insistence of Mao Zedong to the contrary. For example, the Korean peninsula had little economic bearing on US-UN, USSR, or PRC interests. Rather than an accumulation of capital, the belligerents in the Korean War sought to accumulate the capital of "hearts and minds" of the populace into their respective ideological spheres of influence in East Asia in

[145] Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3.
[146] Michael Parenti, *The Face of Imperialism* (St. Paul: Paradigm Publishing, 2011), 6.

order to develop favorable positions and initiative for the inevitable global clash of capitalism and communism. These particular circumstances aligned more with B. Smith's definition of imperialism. According to B. Smith, imperialism as modern state power ensured "national prosperity" and the development of a sentiment that the citizens of a state believed their nation superior to others.[147] The conflict over influence of "hearts and minds" in Korean exemplified B. Smith's national superiority component of imperialism.

The purposes for Chinese intervention in the Korean War explicated several distinct, anti-imperialist interests of the PRC. At the outset of the war, Chinese policy makers listed several reasons for the PRC's involvement in a foreign war that included a combination of international and domestic concerns that sought to protect China, and by extent East Asia, from foreign, especially capitalist-imperialist Western influences. Mao's October 1950 order to the CPVF directed Chinese troops "to support the Korea people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East."[148] Marshal Nie Rongzhen, acting chief of the People's Liberation Army General Staff and vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission and the People's Revolutionary Committee during the Korean War, remarked that Beijing entered the war to "resist America and aid Korea; defend our nation and guard our homeland."[149] While the wording of these statements placed a

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[147] Bonnie G. Smith, *Imperialism: A History in Documents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10.

[148] Mao, Zedong, "Order for the Chinese People's Volunteers." October, 1950. Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Marxist Internet Archive. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/msw5_10.htm. (accessed October 16, 2012). (Order)

[149] Nie, Rongzhen, "Beijing's Decision to Intervene in *Mao's Generals Remember Korea,* trans. and ed. Li, Xiaobing, Allen R. Millet, and Bin Yu (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 42.

noticeable emphasis on protecting Chinese security, both arguments also noted the importance of resisting US encroachments, supporting the struggle of the communist DPRK, and further prevent foreign incursions into East Asia. By the conclusion of the war, Mao's aims for the CPVF continued to demonstrate similar elements as found in his orders of 1950 though the extent and nature of the conflict required adjustments of the scope and specifics of the terms of victory. According to Mao's speech to the twenty-forth session of the Central People's Government Council, September 12, 1953, the Chinese entered the war "to resist US aggression and aid Korea…a new imperialist war of aggression against China and a third world war have been put off."[150] Though the specifics of these statements vary, four general objectives appeared that characterized the nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a strategy well suited for anti-imperialist war. These included (1) an emphasis on "people's war," a combination of an emphasis on human power and a de-emphasis on technology and machines, (2) resist US encroachments in both physical and ideological forms, (3) resist foreign encroachments throughout East Asia, otherwise known as "internationalism," and (4) protect the interests of the fledgling PRC.

In terms of description and conduct, the actions of both the DPRK and the CPVF adhered to the model of "people's war." The term "people's war" designated a "revolutionary war…a war of the masses."[151] This model applied especially well to the communist forces that relied on armed masses and the efforts of people, both combatant and noncombatant,

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[150] Mao, Zedong, "Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korean and Our Future Tasks, September 12, 1953" *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Volume V* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977). Marxist Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_34.htm. (accessed March 20, 2013) (Victory).

[151] Mao, Zedong, "People's War," in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung*, ed. Lin Biao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 88. (People's War)

contrasted to complex military-political bureaucracies and military-industrial complexes such as the US-UN. This situation originated, at least on the part of China, because it had yet to develop a noteworthy industrial complex prior to the invasion of the Japanese in 1938 and continued to struggle in this arena following the domestic instability of war caused by both the conflict against the Japanese and later the GMD.[152] Overtly, the supposed differentiation in technological capability, specifically found in differences of military hardware, defines—and at times inspires—revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Mao stressed the disparity in technological capability between the CPVF and the US in speech that commemorated the victory of the CPVF. According to Mao, "We fought U.S. imperialism, an enemy wielding weapons many times superior to ours, and yet we were able to win and compelled it to agree to a truce."[153] During the Korean War, the PLA, and by extension the CPVF, possessed a myriad of arms that ranged from Soviet supplied weapons, "liberated" arms captured from the GMD (often of US manufacture), and additional arms collected from the retreating imperial Japanese forces. Compared to the DPRK, the CPVF seemed to operate under a more textbook example of this disparity between industrialized and anti-imperialist forces. When PLA forces entered North Korea, they found their communist allies possessed better and

[152] This lack of an industrial revolution in China created conflict amongst communists who adhered to the Marxist model of history that mandated each state must proceed through a predetermined series of developmental stages before it can attain a proletariat class-consciousness, under industrialized capitalism, capable of comprehending and executing a communist revolution. With the Great Leap Forward, Mao attempted to force China into an industrial power. In an opening address to the Eighth National Congress of the CCP, September 15, 1956, Mao described China as "a *backward agricultural* China" that sought to become "an *advanced industrialized* country." Mao Zedong, "Study," in *Quotations form Chairman Mao Tsetung* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 304.

[153] Mao, "Victory."

more arms, supplied by the USSR.[154] Thus, the CPVF found itself operating under quite strained conditions with regards to their own manufacture and supply of weapons. Mao requested significant quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives from Stalin in November, 1950, to reduce the despairing gap between the PLA and the US-UN. This request included 140,000 Soviet rifles with 58,000,000 rounds, 26,000 sub-machine guns with 80,000,000 rounds, 7,000 light machine guns with 37,000,000 rounds, 2,000 heavy machine guns with 20,000,000 rounds, and 1,000 tons of TNT.[155] The overall technological and manufacturing differences, when taken as a whole assessment of the capabilities of both sides, stood in stark contrast to one another. The CPVF, on the one hand, either relied on inconsistent and mixed weapons from a variety of sources. The US-UN, especially the US, possessed complex, reliable, and predictable means of manufacturing that could, when necessary, develop and implement weapons ranging from common small arms to advanced weapons of mass destruction such as atomic weapons.

Beyond clearly superior US-UN airpower, some advantages in artillery, and nuclear strike capability, the average weapons, employed by average soldiers, for the majority of the conflict possessed relative parity throughout the duration of the war. The technological differences between the CPVF and the US-UN in capability on a limited war battlefield such as that of the Korean War spanned a shorter distance than during previous confrontations between China and the West. In the first instance, the battlefield weapons of the period

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[154] Jong Kan Lee, "A North Korean Officer's Story," *Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 80.

[155] Ciphered Telegram Mao, Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), 8 November 1950, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Wilson Center, Washington, D.C. http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org (accessed October 16, 2012). Though not explicitly stated, Mao did not likely intend all of these arms for the Korean front.

performed little different from those used during the closing days of World War II. Furthermore, once the CPVF engaged US-UN forces, Chinese troops made concerted efforts throughout the war to capture or salvage US-UN manufactured weapons. According to Mao, soldiers were to "replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captures from the enemy."[156] The significant technologically based differentiation of this conflict resided not in the products of technology, but the technologies of industry and manufacturing that the belligerents possessed. While the CPVF managed to provide minimal supplies and salvage what it could not self-supply, the disparaging differentiation in technological ability lay in China's home agrarian economy.

The CMC, well aware of this disparity, committed to battle against the industrially superior US-UN but not without an appreciable counter-strategy. For all the assets the PRC lacked, manpower composed the most significant natural resource the PRC possessed to commit to battle in Korea.[157] Mao recognized this military resource first during his war against the Japanese Imperial Army and, later, during the Chinese Civil War. In both of these conflicts, the Red Army armed and equipped based on the weapons and provisions it acquired from forage and salvage. Without the assistance of industry, the Red Army relied on the individual abilities of guerrillas and, more often than not, on their sheer numbers. Despite the difficulties these circumstances created, they were not the determining factors in victory.

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[156] Mao, "People's War," 97.

[157] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 42. A number of interesting sources this author has come across also mention women in the CPVF. One such account, a debriefing of a US soldier from the 45th Infantry Division, told of a female Chinese soldier he overheard while "playing opossum" in his bunker and she and her comrades searched for salvageable weapons. This most certainly seems likely, considering the communist insistence upon equality among people in both class and gender as well as the support of females in the PLA and Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution. An examination of this would be an interesting endeavor in the future.

According to Mao's observations from 1936, "A military strategist cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory."[158] This proscription deemphasized the importance of technology and industry in attaining military victory, contrary to the consistent measure of such as indicators in Western military culture, and thereby disarming the seemingly invulnerable juggernaut. This neither meant that guerrillas did not seek to improve their material situation nor that the PRC did not attempt to improve its industrial and manufacturing capabilities. In a 1946 interview with American journalist Anna Louise Strong, Mao noted, "…the outcome of war is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons."[159] Though the GMD stood as Mao's primary struggle at the time, in this quote he referred specifically to the US and their recent development and implementation of atomic weapons in 1945. Whether because of US support of the GMD or concern of US encroachments into Asia, Mao made careful assessments of his strategies against the Japanese and GMD out of concern for armed conflict with the West.

When faced with the overwhelming industrial capability of the US-UN, the communist forces required intense, ideological reinforcement. Mao referred to this as "revolutionary spirit," described in a variety of terms. One particularly fitting description equated revolutionary spirit with "courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue,

[158] Mao, "People's War," 91.

[159] Mao, Zedong and Anna Louise Strong, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung: Volume IV* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1961), Marxist Internet Archive. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_13.htm (accessed March 21, 2013).

and continuous fighting."[160] In another, more culturally driven assessment, Mao wrote, "We the Chinese nation have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of our blood..."[161] These descriptions encouraged the CPVF to draw upon individual pride in themselves and national pride in the long tradition of China for courage in the face of their foreign enemies. Furthermore, when dealing with irregular, revolutionary guerrilla forces drawn from the masses, the revolutionary leadership had to compensate by instilling their troops with an *ad hoc* and easily appreciable discipline and motivation.

Often, this inspiration originated and perpetuated in ideological education. Educational models and institutions served an essential role in Mao's models of revolutionary guerrilla warfare because of the intense need for galvanizing political ideologies, or to use the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, create political awareness, in the masses. Revolutionary guerrilla forces required extensive political indoctrination, to ensure that the decentralized manner of this combat did not disintegrate into roving bandits that threatened the political unity of the larger revolutionary guerrilla effort and the masses.[162] As such, the PLA created a "primary school" for numerous soldiers who had a desire and a need to learn Chinese writing in order to understand Communist propaganda.[163] Furthermore, warfare and conflict, especially against the US-UN, provided opportunities to increase the political awareness of the PRC and CCP.[164] Because of the ideological conflict inherent between the

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[160] Mao, Zedong, "Revolutionary Heroism," *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung*, ed. Lin Biao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 181. (Heroism)

[161] Mao, "Heroism," 185.

[162] Mao, Zedong, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party: On the Ideology of Roving Rebel Bands." *Five Articles by Chairman Mao Tsetung* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 46-49. (Correcting)

[163] Lee, "North Korean Officer's Story," 78.

[164] Mao, "Victory."

competing powers of the Korean War, continued to ensure a political consciousness among the people served a continually indispensable necessity. It furthermore provided the PRC an opportunity to spread its influence, be it as a communist power or an Asian power in Asia, in opposition to the encroachments of the US-UN. This political awareness that originated in China and spread through Chinese involvement established and maintained ideological domination that proved especially important in the power vacuum that followed the dismantling of Imperial Japan that itself largely destabilized the previous European imperial systems in Asia established nearly a century earlier.

The CPVF required one last essential element of "people's war"—the support of the people. In general, according to Mao the revolutionary guerrilla army must "become one with the people so that they see it as their own army."[165] In a more artistic and perhaps better-known allegory, Mao described the relationship between the masses and revolutionary guerrilla forces as one where "the former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it."[166] This model of cooperation served to develop ideological, cultural, and nationalistic ties between the revolutionary guerrilla forces and the surrounding masses while at the same time creating fissures in the pro-Western supporting camps by highlighting the differences between the forces.

While doctrinally this seemed especially powerful against the foreign US-UN powers, in practice on the Korean Peninsula a number of difficulties surfaced. Just as they did in China during the wars against the Japanese and the GMD, the soldiers of the CPVF had to subsist off the benevolence of the Korean people. The sheer number of CPVF soldiers in

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[165] Mao, Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 93. (On Guerrilla Warfare)

[166] Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 93.

Korea ranged from 300,000 and greater than one million throughout the course of the war. While the entire PLA contained many times this number of troops, the massing of so many Chinese soldiers in addition to the DPRK forces, placed a considerable logistical burden on the Korean people. What's more, the war had already drained the Korean people of many resources by the time of the CPVF's arrival some five months after the DPRK crossed the 38th Parallel in June 1950. No matter how strong their communist ideological bonds or their anti-Western sentiments, the Korean people could not provide every means of support. According to Wang Xuedong, a CPVF soldier,

> "We had to take with us whatever we needed, or whatever we could carry on our shoulders. When our regiment ran out of food, we had to trade our blankets, towels, and even medicines with local Koreans for their rice, corn, and vegetables."[167]

While Mao discussed the importance of cooperation between the revolutionary guerrilla forces and the people of the countryside, the picture created by Chinese soldiers contained an air of desperation, as CPVF troops traded their supplies for necessities. Furthermore, the mere presence of the CPVF troops and the tensions they placed on Korean infrastructures strained the morale of the Korean people. According to a periodic intelligence report published by the US 45th Infantry Division, the North Koreans were not pleased with the presence of the CPVF, though this attitude varied with age and location. A deserter of the CPVF informed US forces that the Koreans held attitudes towards the Chinese troops as "generally cold."[168] These attitudes highlight the inconsistent attitudes of communists

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[167] Wang, Xuedong. "The Chosin Reservoir: A Chinese Captain's Story." *Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 119.

[168] "North Korean Civilian Attitudes Towards the CCF." *Periodic Intelligence Report No 63*. HQ 45th Infantry Division, 221800I Feb 52 to 231800I Feb 52. 45th Infantry Division Museum, Oklahoma City.

towards gaining assistance from outside powers, thereby calling into question the perceived unity within the Comintern.

Following their hard fought victory in the Pacific in 1945, coupled with competing interests in the region, the US sought to maintain its national and ideological prosperity in the face of Soviet encroachments in Asia that threatened to weaken the US presence in the region. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the US created made concerted efforts to create a defensible perimeter in the Pacific to protect US interests. Furthermore, the infamous National Security Council document, NSC-68, outlined the official policy of the US towards international relations "as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community."[169] Born from the competition between the USSR and US, this policy thrust the US into Asia as it attempted to preserve its interests—a maneuver that brought it into direct confrontation with the PRC. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's speech to the National Press Club, January 12, 1950, outlined a defensive perimeter "along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus."[170] This speech outlined a specific, territorial border of US interests and influence that occupied several foreign territories. It not only explicated the extent to which US

[169] "National Security Council Paper No. 68 (NCS-68) Reassess the Soviet Threat and Recommends a Military Buildup, 1950," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914*, ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 203.

[170] This speech served as a key element in the historiography of the Korean War, especially with regards to the theses the purport this statement served as an official policy upon the US that, because of the exclusion of Korea, invited the DPRK to invade the ROK in June, 1950. For the US response to these accusations, see *Secretary Acheson and the Defense of Korea*, cited above. Dean Acheson, "The Test of the Extemporaneous Remarks Made by the Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State before the National Press Club," Washington, D.C. in *Secretary Acheson and the Defense of Korea*. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

influence encroached into Asia, but also held qualities reminiscent of foreign powers carving out territories in the region.

Even when spiked with the sharpest ideological rhetoric, the claim that imperialism embodied "expansion as an end in itself," as Howe described it.[171] This doubt arose simply because of the cost and labor involved in the establishment and maintenance of imperialist systems. Furthermore, when examined from the perspective of a military history, and when compared with the leading philosophers on military thought and theory of Europe in the nineteenth century (most notably Clausewitz) or the founders of Chinese models (most notably Sunzi), the undertakings of hostilities, a prime means of expanding imperialism, is a risky, costly, and purposeless endeavor.[172] Clausewitz, for example, emphasized that warfare is a matter of state, an expansion of policy by armed means and not something *ex nihilo*.[173] Sunzi also emphasized the dangers of engaging in warfare foolishly, especially in a time of expansion and conquest seeking to establish hegemonic imperial power over competing states.[174] By the initiation of hostilities of the Korean War, the US possessed all of the industrial resources necessary to carryout global military operations for an extended period of time and found nothing, resource wise, to gain from Korea. China, on the other hand, needed desperately assistance from the USSR to rearm and reequip the People's Liberation Army following the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1949, as well as to develop lasting industrial infrastructures. Even so, neither country had an immediate, measurable interest, in exploiting

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[171] Howe, *Empire*, 23.

[172] Howe, *Empire*, 16.

[173] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. ed. Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin Books, 1982), 119.

[174] Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, trans. Roger Ames (New York: Ballantine: 1993), 103, 107, and 111. These pages discuss in brief the importance of warfare as a matter of state primacy and the importance of efficiency in warfare. For additional notations, see Sunzi, *Art of War*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 167.

Korea of its economic resources; Korea possessed control and influence over trade routes. According to "The Position of the United States With Respect to Asia, NSC-48/2," as of 1949, the US actively sought to deny the USSR and DPRK "strategic materials and equipment" through Chinese channels of gain *and* "prevent the Chinese Communists from obtaining from non-Soviet sources supplies of materials and equipment of direct military utility."[175]

Korea possessed a divided arena of "hearts and minds" wherein the US-UN could carve a significant sphere of anti-communist influence in Asia and create a foothold on the eastern flank of the USSR, thereby creating a multi-hemisphere pincer. What's more, a US presence on the Korean peninsula coupled with their support for the GMD on Taiwan threatened the PRC's political influence in Asia and industrial sectors or northeast China.[176] It seemed to Peng that the positioning of the US in Asia indicated larger designs aimed at China.[177] This assessment found validity in part because forces intent on invading China throughout history entered the continent though Korea. On two previous occasions, during the sixteenth century and the twentieth century, Japanese forces that sought to conquer China began their wars with the acquisition of Korea. Considering the fervent anti-communist and pro-GMD position of the US, it was not unreasonable for the PRC to fear this presence, especially because the US possessed nuclear attack capability and long-range delivery platforms that operated in the skies over Korea. If the US controlled Korea, the possibility of a nuclear strike on major cities in China, notably Beijing, loomed a dreadful possibility.

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[175] "National Security Council Extends Containment to Asia, December 1949," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914*, ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 243.

[176] Peng, "My Story," 31 and Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 43.

[177] Peng, "My Story," 31.

According to Mao, the presence of "the American invaders" in Korea created circumstances that allowed the US ever increasing control of the region, "such a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East."[178]

Mao argued in his military writings that revolutionary guerrilla wars served to complete a larger revolution in Asia. According to Mao, "wars of national liberation patriotism is applied internationalism."[179] In Mao's essay "Patriotism and Internationalism," he emphasized the importance of "patriotism," action that sought to develop China, and "internationalism," support of anti-imperialist efforts abroad.[180] What Mao describes as "internationalism" defined terms from studies military and diplomatic as "joint" or "shared interests" between state and political powers.[181] Prior to the DPRK's crossing of the 38th Parallel, China transferred a number of Korean troops in the PLA to Korea under the command of Koreans.[182] This international cooperation manifested during the Korean War as a "people's war," where "the whole nation [of China] gave it support and the people of China

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[178] "Chinese Leader Mao Zedong Informs Joseph Stalin of China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, 1950," trans. Xiaobing Li, Xi Wang, and Jian Chen, in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914*, ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 250. Despite this deep concern, MacArthur advised in his "No Substitute for Victory" speech, "While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China—and such was never given a thought—the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old,"[178] "MacArthur's 'No Substitute for Victory' Speech, 1951," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914*, ed. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: Wadsworth, 2010), 252.

[179] Mao, Zedong, "Patriotism and Internationalism," in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung*, ed. Lin Biao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 176. (Patriotism and Internationalism)

[180] Mao, "Patriotism and Internationalism," 176.

[181] It is essential to note here the role of revolutionary guerrilla forces first, as political entities and later, if successful, state entities as they evolve from untrained *ad hoc* units into regular military forces of a new state.

[182] Lee, "North Korean Officer's Story," 77.

and Korean fought shoulder to shoulder."[183] Policy makers and the CPVF shared this perception. Zheng Yanman, a CPVF soldier, referred to the efforts to maintain his defensive bunkers as endeavors to preserve the territory of North Korea, as opposed to China or Communist spheres of influence, and deny the Americans this territory: "The hill belongs to North Korea as long as we keep it in our hands."[184] While the soldiers possessed a more personal connection to the struggles of the DPRK, likely forged from their direct participation in the conflict, internationalism also contained a subtle implication of the spreading of PRC influence throughout East Asia. From the essays and speeches of Mao also came implications that this idea of "internationalism" represented a broadening of the influence of Chinese Communism across Asia. For example, Mao exercised great care to explain, "It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn..." that makes "a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation."[185] Furthermore, though Mao proscribed an obligation to assist other Asian states in their struggles and requiring the assistance of the PRC demonstrated military and political weakness. According to Mao, "In the fight for complete liberation the oppressed people rely first of all on their own struggle and then, and only then, on international assistance."[186] This idea of self-reliance before assistance implied an inability to successfully carryout a revolutionary struggle and, by requesting assistance, placed the PRC in a position as superior entity, not unlike the ancient tributary system. Furthermore, this conclusion complemented Smith's assessment that stronger states require influence over

[183] Mao, "Victory."

[184] Zheng, Yanman. "The Chinese go Underground," in *Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 175.

[185] Mao, "Patriotism and Internationalism," 176-177.

[186] Mao, "Patriotism and Internationalism," 176-177.

neighboring states for security. According to Smith, "In such cases, the interests of border security and trade relations always require that the more civilized state have a certain authority over its neighbors, whose wild and unruly customs render them very troublesome."[187] This idea also manifested in the policies of PRC. While the language of PRC policy towards entry into the Korean War spoke of foreign powers in terms of communist lexicons and US imperialism, the connotations contained reminiscences of imperial relations between China and tributary states. While the PRC did not have, initially, the economic, political, or military prestige as Imperial China it did have a proven ability to assist other Asian, especially communist, societies overcome outside, especially Western, influences. Mao and his methods of revolutionary guerrilla warfare not only greatly contributed to the defeat of the imperial Japanese forces in China, but also defeated the US supported GMD in the Chinese Civil War. Furthermore, entrance in the Korean War provided the PRC an opportunity to directly, if only subtly, test the mettle of the PLA against the US-UN. China presented to the former colonies of Western imperialism in Asia the commodity of access to Chinese thoughts and theories, as in previous eras. Specifically, in the twentieth century, the PRC traded Mao's theory of revolutionary guerrilla warfare that, between 1937 and 1970, demonstrated a consistent ability to cause significant complications to Western models of warfare, for increased influence.

Above all else in the interests of the PRC, avoidance of another "imperialist war of aggression against China," held the highest concern.[188] When viewed through the traditional interpretive lenses of the US historiography of the Korean War as a limited war of the larger conflict between the US and the USSR, the concerns and the conflict of the PRC with the US

[187] Smith, *Imperialism: A History in Documents*, 45.
[188] Mao, "Victory."

took a secondary role of inquiry. This assessment, however, overlooked a key element of not only traditional Chinese approaches to warfare, but also an expansion of this approach to suit the anti-imperialist nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. Often, imperial powers viewed the coming of their banners, their ways of life, their systems of government, and their ideologies as blessings of civilization to "barbarian" people on the periphery of society.[189] Whiting argued that the rise of the PRC and its adherence to communism "drastically modified a traditional Chinese admonition to 'use barbarians to control barbarians.'"[190] To quell barbarians by using other barbarians, Chinese states sought to buy them off with products of Chinese or pitted them against each other in an effort to wear down the martial abilities of both while preserving Chinese defensibility. In light of the entirety of the Cold War and with access to Chinese and Soviet documents, the PRC indeed employed a variation of the "barbarians to control barbarians" strategy. During the Cold War, as in previous eras, foreign entities threatened China's security, self-determination, and influence in Asia. While Beijing proved unable to bait the two "barbarians," the US and USSR, into significant open conflict with one another, it *did* gain from the USSR desperately needed military and industrial resources and expertise in order to compete with the West, an exchange made easier by the intense competition between the two "barbarians." Furthermore, the greater and more direct Soviet involvement in the Korean War, the greater the likelihood of armed conflict between the USSR and US in the region. This threat brought with it the possibility that either power could attempt to carve out regions of physical control in northeast China, not only depriving China of the industry and manufacturing in the area, but also reopening it

[189] Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, 14.
[190] Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, 8.

to the potential of colonization, reminiscent of the ending days of the Qing.[191] Considering the later breakdown of relations between the USSR and the PRC, it became clear that the two powers were not united as strongly in their communist ideologies US-UN observers predicted.

Memories and fears of a resurgent Imperial Japan also stoked PRC concerns leading up to and continuing long after the Korean War. As the war carried on, the US further altered the military balance of power in the region to maintain spheres of influence and a defensible perimeter that resulted in a rearming effort in Japan.[192] Because of increased communist influence in East Asia, the US adopted a total reversal of Allied policy towards Japan in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Japan possessed a remarkable ability to adapt to the imperialist model of the West produced during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, as the US took a solitary role as the guide of Japanese post-War occupation, Chinese fears of "American imperialism rearming Japanese militarism" grew.[193] When discussing the merits of rearming Japan, General Robert Eichelberger appraised the Japanese soldier,

> Dollar for dollar there is no cheaper fighting man in the world than the Japanese. He is already a veteran. His food is simple. His uniform can be manufactured in Japan […] this man, if armed, could defend his country from internal uprisings or in the last analysis his country from invasion […] Japanese soldiers would be a commander's dream.[194]

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[191] For a detailed analysis of this concern, see Zhihua Shen, "China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing's Policy Making Process," in *China and the United States: A New Cold War History*, eds. Xiaobing Li and Hoongshan Li (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1998), 38-39.

[192] Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 6.

[193] Whiting, *Whiting Crosses the Yalu*, 35.

[194] Yoneyuki Sugita. *Pitfall of Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 78.

In 1948 Eichelberger recommended to Secretary of State George Marshall that an ideal rearmed Japan raise a 200,000 man strong army, medium-sized navy including small aircraft carriers, and an air force of at least 100 aircraft.[195] One proposal advocated that Japan should create a standing army of 300,000 to 325,000 fighting men in ten fully equipped combat divisions by 1953 to serve as a support for noncommunist Asia.[196] With a sizable US military presence in the region, and fears that the US prepared to rearm Japan on a scale competitive with the imperial Japanese Army, the PRC had significant cause to feel their ideological interests threatened. In addition to concerns about overt military interactions between the US and Japan against China, the cooperation between the periphery entity of Japan and the US in a subversive manner concerned Mao. In Mao's speech at the twenty-fourth session of the Central People's Government Council "Our Great Victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks," September 12, 1953, he noted that, despite the victory of the CPVF in Korea, places within the US spheres of influence still threatened Chinese interests. According to Mao:

> "The enemy may resume the war, and even if he doesn't, he is sure to make trouble in all sorts of ways, such as by sending in secret agents to carry out wrecking activities. He has set up a vast network of secret services in places like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan."[197]

For Mao, and by extension the PRC, the continued presence of foreign powers in Asia threatened the security of China.

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[195] Yoneyuki, *Pitfall of Panacea*, 79.

[196] Yoneyuki, *Pitfall of Panacea*, 158-159.

[197] Mao, "Victory."

The timing of the Cold War and the rapid decolonization of the world, both beginning in the mid-1940s, created a set of circumstances that "intertwined" the two phenomena.[198] Nationalist movements often rose to the forefront as former colonies sought to determine their own destinies following the casting away of foreign yokes of control and exploitation. The absence of a significant, and stable, political structures in East Asia in the wake of the dismantling of the majority of European and Japanese colonial possessions following World War II, as well as the prime competing ideologies of communism and capitalism turned Asia—both metaphorically and literally—into a battlefield. While nationalism provided a basic unifying idea to muster the indigenous masses, it did not provide a means to revolution. Marxism-Leninism provided an ideological means to an end, but only in a limited sense. Focused primarily on economics and social structures, Marxism-Leninism had little to say regarding the use of ideology in conjunction with military operations to bring about socio-political change. Perhaps this lack of literature, in itself, resulted from the determinist model of Marxist history that argued that all societies eventually rise to overthrow their oppressive, capitalist ruling class. It also provided an alternative model of governance as a reaction or antithesis to the capitalist colonial administrators. It failed to provide, however, a clear means to achieve these goals.[199] Mao provided, however, an idea and a method to overcome remnant imperial powers, and the incursions of the US and USSR specifically designed to capitalize on nationalist sentiments and adapt to the strengths and weaknesses of anti-imperialist revolutionary guerrilla warfare. This total approach to anti-imperialism provided

[198] Stephen Morillo, Jeremy Black, and Paul Lococo, *War in World History: Society, Technology, and War from Ancient Times to the Present: Volume 2, Since 1500* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2009), 574.

[199] Marx, Engels, and Lenin all did compose some works on military matters. Of the three, only Lenin composed a coherent work of guerrilla warfare.

Mao not merely control of Beijing, but also a means to spread Chinese influence throughout East Asia. According to Mao, "under no condition, remain content with the overthrow of imperialism in China, but, on the contrary, will, as its ultimate objective, aim at waging a war against world imperialism until the latter is all blown up."[200] The time did come, however, when Asian states had to choose whether to follow the PRC or USSR, but these conflicts are matters for other investigations. As in previous imperial periods, the PRC spread its influence throughout Asia through the diffusion of ideology and philosophy. Previously, Confucianism, Daoism, art, writing, and the various other products of *wen* ("culture") spread Chinese influence. In the 1950s, the influence of the PRC extend through a combination of a uniting Communist ideology, a touch of anti-Western Imperialist/pro-Asian sentiments, and the military thought and theory of Chairman Mao.

No matter the advances man makes, no tool—be it weapon or device—can overcome the central element of all human endeavors: humans. It is ultimately the red eyes and tear-stained cheeks of mothers that witness the horrors of war, the cries of children that echo in ears longer than the bursts of shells, and the hands of men that bear the blood drained of the enemy. Even so, no matter how secure a head of state, stout a soldier, or greedy an industrialist, the sources of initiative in this grand struggle of interests and influences are information and ideals. Information is the currency, commodity, and the lifeblood of states. For all of the power of words and ideas in an age where access to information is greater than ever before, where literacy is no longer as rare as before, the use of ideas to establish and overthrow powers is not new. "Information is ammunition" and the means to motivate

[200] *Central China* Post (Hankow) , Nov. 25, 1931, quoted in O. Edmund Clubb, "Chinese Communist Strategy in Foreign Relations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,* Vol. CCLXXVII (Sept. 1951), 156, quoted in Whiting, 6.

masses to commit to the subjugation or overthrow of power.[201] As George Orwell noted with the motto of INGSOC in his dystopian novel, *1984*, "He who controls the present, controls the past. He who controls the past, controls the future." The control of information is a key to establish or overthrow imperial power. Not merely, as Orwell noted, censorship and propaganda, but also the use of information (specifically ideology, thought, theory, and philosophy) to spread influence and encourage subservience or rebellion as the case may be. Those with access, control, and understanding of this are the imperial powers to come. As proven the case during the early 1950s as the PRC attempted to spread its influence (both as a communist state and the central state in Asia—pun on Middle Kingdom intended) just as it is today as Western defense and intelligence analysts worry over the possibility of a PLA information attack via computer networks. This is especially the case of the empires of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the US and USSR sought to purchase, persuade, or purloin the "hearts and minds" of people across the globe with information and ideology. What's more, the peoples of East Asia, tired of colonial rule, found in these two competitors an opportunity to gain independence from outside rule and, with the aid of the PRC and Mao's military thoughts and theories, East Asian states resisted US attempts to create spheres of influence.

[201] *BattleTech*, television program. Los Angeles: Saban Entertainment, 1994.

FROM BOOKS TO BOOTS
PUTTING MAO'S THEORIES INTO PRACTICE IN KOREA[202]

Revolutionary guerrilla war, *id est* unorthodox war, formed the central guiding doctrine of both the Red Army and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) throughout the early decades of the twentieth century and into the initial years of the People's Republic of China (PRC). This doctrine included ideas such as the primacy of the human numbers and effort, the potency of ideological motivation, drawing out the enemy's forces, finances, and will to fight, and surprise attacks on isolated forces to overcome the superior technology and firepower of United States and United Nations (US-UN) forces. Though this model assisted the Red Army achieve military success against both the imperial Japanese and Guimindang Chinese Nationalists (GMD) in the previous decade's conflicts, it required modification during the Korean War to combat "a well-trained force with high morale equipped with modern weapons and possessing the will and the skill to use those weapons" such as the US-UN in a foreign land.[203] Throughout the initial phases of the five campaigns conducted by the Chinese People Volunteer Forces (CPVF), traditional elements of revolutionary guerrilla war directed and influenced military doctrine persistently. Employed by the CPVF. As the war continued, however, the limitations of revolutionary guerrilla war, most notably limited supply, limited communications and a reliance on Beijing for operations guidance, and inconsistency of weapons types limited the advantages the CPVF enjoyed and proved insufficient to overcome US-UN forces completely. That said, considering the situation in which the CPVF found itself during the Korean War, the doctrine of revolutionary guerrilla

[202] The core of this chapter appeared in "Mao's Revolutionary Strategy and the Korean War," *American Review of China Studies* Vol. 12, No. 1 & Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 2011 & Spring 2012).

[203] *Record Group 319*, Records of the Army Staff, G3091 Korea TS (Section III) JCS 1924/17, 11 July 1950, National Archives, Washington.

war and the adaptations there to it employed proved sufficient that the PRC and PLA could, if tested in an armed conflict against the US-UN, hold their own and at a minimum create a stalemate in a foreign land, and by implication, create a costly war for foreign aggressors who dared invade China.

The Central Military Committee (CMC) of the PRC chose to adopt revolutionary guerrilla war as the basis for operations in Korea for a number of reasons. According to Peng Dehuai, commander of the CPVF, "If the Americans decided to fight against us, a quick war would be favorable to them, but a protracted one to us; regular warfare would be favorable to them but the methods [of revolutionary guerrilla war] that we had used to deal with the Japanese would be favorable to us."[204] Many members of the CMC such as Peng and Nie Rongzhen served with the Red Army during its campaigns against Japan and the GMD. With the multitude of similarities of the oppositional forces and the continuity of abilities of the PLA, Chinese military leaders found it best to operate in Korea under Mao's model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare in the hopes of repeating their previous success. They based these hopes on their knowledge that US-UN forces, like the imperial Japanese, operated with extended supply lines that required maritime or airborne transport. Indeed, many elements of the US forces came to Korea from staging points based in Japan. While the CPVF could not threaten these supply lines because of their nature of transport, the extended nature did limit the amount of supplies that the US-UN could bring to Korea at one time because shipping tonnage. Furthermore, transporting resources by sea and air required substantial resources in terms of manufacturing, maintenance, and fuel. The secondary nature of the Korean theater

[204] Peng, Dehuai, "My Story of the Korean War," in *Mao's Generals Remember Korea,* trans. and eds. Li, Xiaobing, Allen R. Millet, Bin Yu (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 32.

to US interests compared to those in Europe further this situation, as the Washington funneled more resources to Europe. Understandably, the CMC expected the US-UN forces to seek a quick victory through superior technology in order to compensate for the limitations of extended supply lines and limited numbers. Moreover, though industrially advanced in comparison to the PRC, to maintain these more complex machines came at a cost, as such machines required greater resources to construct, maintain, and repair. If nothing else, a protracted, defensive campaign carried out on the part of the CPVF and NKPA would cause the conflict in Korea to be too expensive monetarily for the UN to execute for an extended period.

Furthermore, the PRC lacked significant industrial and manufacturing centers to produce weapons and munitions for the PLA. These limitations upon Chinese troops made the prospects of engaging the US-UN forces in conventional combat unnecessarily dangerous. This is not to suggest that the PLA did not possess useful weapons. During the course of the war against Japan and the Chinese Civil War, the Red Army salvaged a number of Japanese and American made weapons and received some assistance from the Soviet Union (USSR). This was, however, according to military planners in Beijing insufficient to meet the needs of the PLA and CPVF in Korea in terms of firepower and especially logistics. In November of 1950, Mao requested significant quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives from Stalin. This request included 140,000 Soviet rifles with 58,000,000 rounds, 26,000 sub-machine guns with 80,000,000 rounds, 7,000 light machine guns with 37,000,000 founds, 2,000 heavy machine guns with 20,000,000 rounds, and 1,000 tons of TNT.[205]

[205] Ciphered Telegram Mao, Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), 8 November 1950, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Wilson Center, Washington, D.C. <http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org>

Obtaining further battlefield salvage from US-UN troops provided additional up-to-date weaponry, but brought with it complexities in supplying ammunition and parts.

Despite these myriad shortcomings, the PRC did not lack one crucial element of Mao's model of revolutionary guerrilla warfare—manpower. According to Mao, "…the outcome of war is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons."[206] During all five campaigns of the CPVF in the Korean War, Chinese forces enjoyed significant numerical advantages over their adversaries. This was a point on which Mao was notably passionate. Due to the relatively minimal industrial development of the PRC at the time of the Korean War, This decision represented a matter of doctrine adapted to pragmatism. It furthermore reflected continuity with a larger Chinese military precept of the primacy of the ability and concerns of the masses. This emphasis on greater numbers and the superiority of manpower over technology, coupled with emphasis on revolutionary spirit combined as essential to overcome any disparity of arms.[207]

Considering the political, economic, and industrial affairs in China between 1949 and 1950, it is not surprising that initially United States intelligence services were convinced that China would not interfere with a war in Korea.[208] The dust had only begun to settle in Beijing behind the boots of the Red Army before Mao announced his support of North Korea's

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Though not explicitly stated, Mao did not likely intend all of these arms for the Korean front.

[206] Mao Zedong, *Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1958), 19-20.

[207] Li, Xiaobing, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 93.

[208] "Korea," in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Vol. VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.

struggle in October 1949.[209] A war in Korea, however, gave the PRC an opportunity to flex its military muscle and establish a reputation as a competitive military power, especially against the exemplar imperialist-Western power, according to Mao's rhetoric from the time. Peng asked of the CMC, "Who could [we] show our power and strength if we did not send our forces to aid and save Korea?"[210] According to Mao, to provoke a war with the US was like "prodding the tiger's buttocks."[211] Though dangerous, a victory against the UN in Korea held the potential to demonstrate the potency of the newly formed PLA. In addition, a Chinese victory over an assembly of Western powers could show the world that the days of a militarily weak China were over, a change that would regain China international influence and restore national-cultural pride. This possible victory demonstrated not merely the ability of the PRC to defend itself against Western, anti-communist, forces, but also the Communist Bloc. A Chinese victory revealed to other communist countries, especially the USSR, that the PRC possessed capabilities worthy of their respect that made a valuable addition to the larger collection of communist states.

While Mao held ideas of supporting the socialist cause abroad and testing the military might of the PLA against the UN, Peng and Nie considered the military security of the PRC to be most important deciding factor in entering the war. Peng and Nie shared the idea that the Korean War was "forced" upon the PRC when the UN forces advanced towards the Yalu River.[212] According to Peng, the United States presence on the Korean peninsula coupled

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[209] Richard Peters and Li, Xiaobing. *Voices from the Korean War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 81.

[210] Peng, "My Story," 32.

[211] Geoffrey Perret, "Warrior Mao," *Military History Quarterly* Vol. 19, No. 3 (Spring 2007), 12.

[212] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 40 and Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War*, 2.

with their support for the GMD on Taiwan threatened the PRC's political influence in Asia and industrial sectors or northeast China.[213] It seemed to Peng that the positioning of the US in the Pacific were merely steps in a larger scheme to invade China.[214]

Like any protracted revolutionary guerrilla war, a Chinese operation in Korea required extensive preparation. Accordingly, the PRC began preparations for war in Korea long before the PLA reached the Yalu River. Between late 1949 and early 1950, China executed a number of preparatory political and military maneuvers to demonstrate their intention to enter the war. The two most important preparations conducive to the revolutionary nature of the PRC's approach to the potential war in Korea were the agreement to share intelligence and the construction of additional telephone and telegraph lines.[215] At the request of Zhou Enlai, premier of the PRC and vice chairman of the CMC, these lines of communication further increased with the construction of telephone lines connecting the DPRK and PRC.[216] Although a general technological disadvantage characterized—at times point of pride—revolutionary guerrilla war, not possessing communication technologies would have put the CPVF and DPRK at a significant disadvantage. While Peng commanded the CPVF on the ground in Korea, Mao retained a considerable amount of control over the planning and implementation of the various phases of the war. So much so, that Mao personally decided the timing, style, and direction of the five campaigns. This made the process of creating operational plans a difficult and prolonged affair. Based on the situation in Korea, the general staff drafted plans and then submitted these plans to Mao and the CMC

[213] Peng, "My Story," 31 and Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 43.
[214] Peng, "My Story," 31.
[215] Peng, "My Story," 31.
[216] Peng, "My Story," 31.

for review and editing, which, following revision, were dispatched to units in the field.[217] In order for communications from Mao and the CMC to reach Peng in time to be effective in combat, reliable and secure communication means between the field and Beijing were necessary and thus had to be in place *before* revolutionary operations commenced.

On July 7, 1950, the same day as the United Nations passed a resolution to aid the Republic of Korea against the invasion of the DPRK the CMC authorized the creation of the Northeast Border Defense Army (NBDA).[218] These conventional forces served to reinforce the Chinese-Korean border if a revolutionary guerrilla war in Korea proved ineffective. Mao and many other leaders of the PRC learned during their struggle against the Japanese and the GMD that guerrilla forces did not possess the abilities to carry out all forms of combat operations. Thus, the PLA required conventional forces in order to achieve complete victory over their foes. Shortly after the creation of the NBDA, in September of 1950, the CMC established four air force regiments, three tank brigades, and eighteen antiaircraft artillery units for PLA's defense of China.[219] Consistent with the view of the supremacy of revolutionary guerrilla war under their operational circumstances, few of these assets (most notably, air assets) ever engaged UN forces in Korea, instead remaining nearby to guard the PRC from an expansion of hostilities.

During the five campaigns the CPVF conducted during the Korean War, Chinese military doctrine experienced a number of alterations due to unique situational differences between the two regions of combat, yet the PLA doctrine demonstrated a remarkable adaptation of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. These changes occurred with time, often in the

[217] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 44.
[218] Chen, *Mao's China*, 81.
[219] Chen, *Mao's China*, 82.

middle of battle or immediately following defeat rather than in military schools or think tanks.[220] Because of the lengthy time involved in transmitting information from the battlefield to Beijing and back, commanders had to make battlefield decisions quickly. Decisions about major operations, however, remained the prerogative of Mao. The most successful example of the continuation of revolutionary guerrilla warfare into the Korean War occurred during the First Campaign (October 19, 1950-October 25, 1950). On October 19, 1950, the CPVF crossed the Yalu River in order to engage nearby Republic of Korea (ROK) units and advancing US forces. Despite the resources of the NBDA, the CMC sent only infantry and limited artillery support into Korea. This decision represented the CMC's decision to wage a discrete revolutionary style of war instead of attempting to compete in a conventional war with the UN. The forces originally dispatched to Korea in October 1950 included six infantry armies and three artillery divisions for a total of 300,000 men. By November of that same year, the number of Chinese troops swelled to 450,000 men. Exploiting a significant resource of the PRC, Peng designed CPVF operations around the principle of numerical superiority[221] to compensate technological inferiority between CPVF-KPA and the US-UN forces.[222] The initial CPVF force of 300,000 that crossed the Yalu River in October 1950 faced approximately 130,000 UN troops—an advantage of more than two to one. [223] This numerical superiority built upon Mao's tactics to attack only when superior numbers contributed to the possibilities of victory, most often as a means to compensate for insufficient mechanized support.

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[220] Chen, *Mao's China*, 80.

[221] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 42.

[222] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 42.

[223] Chen, *Mao's China*, 42 and Li, 254 n. 9-10. Readers should take warning: as with anything related to an intensely ideological confrontation, many of the statistics provided by Chinese sources are somewhat suspect.

Once within the Korean border, the CPVF achieved success against American, British, and South Korean troops at once. Using local superiority of numbers, surprise, feigned retreats, and human wave tactics, the CPVF made great advances between October 21 and October 25, 1950.[224] During this four-day assault, the CPVF defeated ROK troops at Puckchin-Unsan and later pushed forces of all three nations south to the Chongchon River and Tokchon. On October 25, 1950, nearly 100,000 CPVF troops attacked two ROK divisions (between 20,000 and 30,000 troops) south of the Yalu River. In the process, the CPVF inflicted nearly 1,000 casualties, routed the survivors, and then retreated into the mountains.[225] This phase made extensive use of Mao's principles of operations in revolutionary guerrilla war:

> "Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first…make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective…in every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four, and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net."[226]

These principles manifested in CPVF's use of superior numbers and surprise attacks to overwhelm technological advantages of the US supported ROK forces, as well as feigned retreats in order to draw overconfident US-UN forces out and attack the weakly defended flanks and rear.[227] During these small engagements, CPVF troops multiplied the force of their already considerable superiority of numbers as they isolated pockets of overextended UN forces. In addition to draining manpower, these attacks provided the CPVF an

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[224] Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *The Unknown Story of Mao* (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 360.

[225] Perret, "Warrior Mao," 13.

[226] Mao, *Quotations,* 95.

[227] Larry M. Wortzel, "China's Foreign Conflicts since 1949," in *A Military History of China*, ed. David A Graff and Robin Higham, 267-284, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 272, and Chen, *Mao's China*, 91.

opportunity to gain battlefield salvage, which could in turn produce better weapons and equipment, a key tenet of Mao's revolutionary guerrilla war.[228] Like any successful revolutionary army, the CPVF did not stay in the field long after battle. In order to preserve as much of their force as remained, the CPVF retreated into the mountains to consolidate their forces and take up defensive positions against a possible reprisal. The mountains provided additional defensive strengths as the CPVF needed to hide from the prying eyes of US-UN air assets—something the Red Army did not need to concern itself with during the Chinese Civil War.

During the Second Campaign (November 25, 1950-December 24, 1950), the CPVF continued their practices of revolutionary guerrilla war such as luring the enemy in deep, attacking the flanks in order to attack the front, and relying on numbers to overcome technological disparities.[229] In response to General MacArthur's "end the war" offensive of November 1950, Peng ordered the CPVF to withdraw their battle lines 30 kilometers north and form a defensive Unsan-Kusong line to lie in ambush on favorable terrain to face the advance of US-UN forces.[230] Throughout the early stages of the Second Campaign, the CPVF used smaller units to engage and draw out the US-UN forces while the majority of the troops deployed along the eastern and western areas of Pukchin.[231] The withdrawal stretched US-UN supply lines (and shortened straining CPVF logistics lines) and forced them into terrain with which they were unfamiliar. Using smaller units gave the impression that the CPVF had limited resistance capabilities and encouraged US-UN forces to pursue them

[228] Mao, "People's War," 97.
[229] Peng, "My Story," 33.
[230] Chen, *Mao's China*, 91.
[231] Peng, "My Story," 33.

deeper into Peng's trap.[232] These smaller units also had greater tactical flexibility to maneuver, engage, break away, and reengage US-UN forces—tactics to which the Red Army veterans within the CPVF recognized—and thus kept the enemy preoccupied longer while sustaining minimal casualties. Taking advantage of these strengths small units continued to draw US-UN forces northward until they reached the prepared counterattack positions of the Unsan-Kusong line.[233]

The CPVF instituted a number of ingenious measures to limit the advantage of US-UN armor and mechanized forces. The armor of the US-UN forces in Korea was a significantly different variety than what the Red Army experienced against the imperial Japanese. US-Un tanks possessed large caliber main guns ranging from 75mm on the US M-24 *Chaffee* to 105mm on the British *Centurion*. Furthermore, US-UN armor mounted hull armor ranging from 25mm of the *Chaffee* to 152mm of the *Centurion*. Nevertheless, while US-UN armor posed a problem for KPA tanks, mostly older Soviet T-34/85 tanks comparable to the US M-26 *Pershing* the CPVF had no significant armor assets in Korea and thus adapted revolutionary guerrilla war to combat this imbalance. CPVF forces constructed roadblocks in order to restrict and divide UN forces and slow their advance.[234] These roadblocks directed US-UN forces towards the CPVF prepared line. In addition to directing the forces into the prepared trap, roadblocks slowed the advance of US-UN forces and allowed time for the CPVF to complete defensive preparations. This strengthened their positional advantage and turned the armor strength of the US-UN into a weakness, as these machines became little more than turrets. Both the use of small units and the roadblocks

[232] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 45.
[233] Peng, "My Story," 33.
[234] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 101.100.

represented adaptations of the revolutionary guerrilla war principle of trading space for time. The Korean peninsula lacked the voluminous space of China, so in order to make the principle viable, it was necessary for the CPVF to increase the amount of time traded for limited space by making space more difficult to traverse.

The efforts of CPVF small units and roadblocks to direct, slow, and wear down the US-UN provided enough time for the CPVF defenders of Unsan-Kusong to complete their defensive works. Less than twenty-four hours after the preliminary air strikes on November 24, 1950, the CPVF attacked with 200,000 troops supported by 50,000 KPA troops. This attack modeled a larger version of Mao's "short attack," an ambush on a grand scale that inflicted thousands of casualties.[235] That evening, after protracted preliminary actions and the battle at the Unsan-Kusong line, UN forces were fatigued and scattered. Taking advantage of the situation, the CPVF launched a surprise attack with sheer force of numbers against the US-UN rear elements and overwhelmed their positions. This attacking the rear and flanks too exemplified revolutionary guerrilla war.

The CPVF used many elements of shock combat during their surprise attack to demoralize and overpower their technologically superior opposition quickly. According to Peng, the element of surprise contributed most to the CPVF victory in the second campaign.[236] In addition to surprise, CPVF forces made extensive use of grenades, bayonets, and hand-to-hand combat so that UN forces "could not employ their superior firing power." [237] Grenades provided a means for individual CPVF troops to employ significantly disproportionate firepower for one soldier in comparison to their other weapons. The use of

[235] Perret, "Warrior Mao," 13.
[236] Peng, "My Story," 34.
[237] Peng, "My Story," 33.

explosive devices also allowed CPVF troops to affect larger areas with a single weapon. When combined with their already significant numbers, the overall battlefield effect of explosives *en masse* had a devastating effect. Furthermore, grenades and explosives used in such a scale exacerbated the confusion and shock of the battlefield. With UN forces dispersed, the CPVF created a situation advantage better suited to employ superior numbers to overcome the technological edge of the US-UN.

Once dispersed, isolated and surrounded, the CPVF used hand-to-hand combat to annihilate enemy forces. The use of hand-to-hand combat had additional psychological effects by making battle a very personal matter of survival between combatants. Considering the strains on logistics that the CPVF experienced during this and later campaigns, Peng's choice to use bayonets may have also been one of necessity. Because the CPVF relied on superiority of numbers, it required significant quantities of supplies. This problem worsened the farther south the CPVF advanced. As logistics lines lengthened, the demands to supply the hundreds of thousands to CPVF troops at the front increased and required greater efforts to transport supplies. Furthermore, the CPVF had inconsistent weapons across troops that added to the logistical strains of extended supply lines already present.[238] The revolutionary guerrilla war principle of salvaging weapons and equipment from the enemy somewhat alleviated logistics problems. At the close of the Second Campaign, Peng reported that the CPVF "captured more than 6,000 enemy vehicles, about 1,000 tanks, and artillery pieces."[239] Interestingly, US-UN accounts of lost equipment total notably less than Peng's: about 1,000 pieces.[240] Because the CPVF already had significantly more troops than the US-UN, finding

[238] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 106.
[239] Peng, "My Story," 34.
[240] Li, *Mao's Generals Remember*, 253 n. 10.

adequate supplies amongst battlefield salvage proved insufficient to resupply the entire force. The use of battlefield salvage caused difficulties in keeping units resupplied with ammunition and spare parts, unless the CPVF managed to salvage additional ammunition and parts later. Furthermore, the mobile withdrawal north prevented the small units from collecting significant quantities of resupply. Eventually, US-UN forces took countermeasures to prevent their equipment from falling into the hands of the CPVF. Prior to their withdrawal from Unsan-Kusong, US-UN forces used incendiary devices such as napalm to destroy equipment left behind.[241] Expenditure of CPVF resources and stretched supply lines plagued the CPVF as the battle line advanced closer to Seoul and away from the PRC-DPRK. These lengthened supply lines took an increasing toll on the CPVF. In a communiqué to Mao dated December 19, 1950, Peng informed him that many troops of the CPVF slept in the open air and had no winter uniforms or equipment—indeed, some had no shoes whatsoever in the minus 30 degrees centigrade Korean winter.[242] In the coming months, the CPVF not only had to combat the US-UN, but also the elements.

Though the Second Campaign continued to demonstrate many of the strengths of revolutionary guerrilla war experienced during the First Campaign, the CPVF felt the strains of conducting a revolutionary guerrilla war in a foreign country. Despite a significant advantage of numbers, Peng recognized that the CPVF held at a severe technological disadvantage against the US-UN forces, especially in their lack of air support.[243] The CPVF found successful methods to maneuver around and engage the US-UN infantry and, with the support of KPA tanks and combat engineering, methods to overcome US-UN mechanized

[241] Peng, "My Story," 34.
[242] Chang, *The Unknown Story of Mao*, 360.
[243] Chen, *Mao's China*, 92.

forces. US-UN forces adapted quickly, however, to the CPVF style of revolutionary guerrilla war. Overtime, US-UN forces expected overextension, surprise attacks, prolonged engagements, and night raids. In a manner similar to that employed by the CPVF, the US-UN forces pulled back just far enough each day as the CPVF could advance on foot in order to bait them into a trap. Furthermore, the US-UN enjoyed significant air and artillery support that the CPVF critically lacked. US-UN aircraft reconnaissance, bombings, and close air support of ground forces posed a significant challenge to the CPVF. According to Peng, "Enemy airplanes raided us every day, and their long-range guns shelled us day and night. We could not move at all during the daytime. Our troops did not have even a one-day break."[244] With a combination of tactical withdrawal and close air support, US-UN forces used methods of conventional war to inflict gradual losses, expenditures of resources, and fatigue on the CPVF.

The value of a numerical advantage waned as the Second Campaign ended. With their lines of supply strained and exhausted from nearly two months of nonstop combat coupled with incessant aerial and artillery attacks, the CPVF needed rest and resupply. By this point in the war, Nie estimated that the CPVF had between two and five more divisions than the US-UN.[245] In order to alleviate some of these logistics problems, Mao ordered the withdrawal of 300,000 troops from the front to Northeast China; Nie later suggested a reduction to 260,000.[246] Though this lessened the strength of one of their primary forms of attack, it also reduced the strain of keeping so numerable an army viable. Though smaller than before, the CPVF at the front still possessed significantly greater numbers than the US-

[244] Peng, "My Story," 34.
[245] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 45.
[246] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 49.

UN. Furthermore, with supplies more efficiently distributed amongst troops, the CPVF gained an overall improved performance.

Despite the approaching winter, fatigue, insufficient and inadequate supplies, and other deficiencies, Mao ordered another offensive campaign to advance further south towards Seoul. Mao's disregard for the hardships of the CPVF arose partly because revolutionary guerrilla warfare *expected* such hardships. According to Mao, revolutionary armies possessed an "indomitable spirit…determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield" that inspired them to fight "no matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, he will fight on."[247] Mao, Peng, Nie, and other veterans of the Red Army experienced hardships during the Chinese Civil War and in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Where in these conflicts the Red Army could draw on the Chinese peasantry for provisions, the CPVF could not expect the same kindness from the Korean people. Though Korean communists undoubtedly sympathized with the CPVF, the Korean people already dedicated their resources to KPA forces and stretched too thinly to support the influx of nearly a half-million Chinese. Despite having communist ideology in common, this did not make up for the cultural differences between the Chinese and the Koreans. Nevertheless, Mao believed, based on his experiences gained during the Chinese Civil War, that the superior numbers of CPVF coupled with higher morale could defeat the US-UN forces.[248] As a result, the CPVF fought in inhospitably cold weather with insufficient clothing, inadequate food, and minimal supplies of ammunition.[249]

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[247] Mao, *Quotations*, 181.

[248] Chen, *Mao's China*, 93.

[249] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, second edition (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 505.

The Third Campaign (December 31, 1950-January 9, 1951) began with a surprise attack on New Year's Eve, 1950, near the 38th parallel.[250] Following nine days of intense fighting that began on December 31, 1950, the CPVF took Seoul. Though the Third Campaign resulted in the conquest of Seoul and advance of CPVF to the 37th parallel, this victory held a tenuous status. An advance so far south significantly stretched the already weak supply lines of the CPVF. Furthermore, the Third Campaign also cost the CPVF many casualties—casualties, according to Peng, that resulted from human wave attacks.[251] Finally, the lack of air support continued to be a significant disadvantage for the CPVF.[252]

On January 27, 1951, US-UN forces seized the initiative and launched a counter attacked on CPVF and KPA forces. Peng knew the dire nature of the situation. Lacking supplies and critical support, Peng requested permission from Mao to retreat. Mao, however, still held the belief that the combined efforts of the CPVF and KPA fend off the US-UN forces—even push them farther south—and ordered Peng to commence with the Fourth Campaign (January 27-April 21, 1951).[253] Because of the threat of US-UN airpower and artillery, the CPVF consolidated their defensive works around the 38th parallel with underground tunnel fortifications.[254] According to Mao, these tunnels acted as an "underground Great Wall."[255] With the construction of earthen defenses, the conflict entered a stalemate. No longer did US-UN aircraft and artillery able to put as much pressure on the CPVF and KPA.

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[250] Peng, "My Story," 34.
[251] Chang, *The Unknown Story of Mao*, 360.
[252] Chen, *Mao's China*, 93.
[253] Chen, *Mao's China*, 96.
[254] Peng, "My Story," 36.
[255] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 46.

The construction of earthen defenses continued throughout the Fifth Campaign (April 22-May 21, 1951). Similarly, US-UN forces prepared fortified defensive positions to repulse night attacks and raids. Peng recognized that the CPVF lacked familiarity with this style of warfare and the disadvantage this unacquaintedness created.[256] Once entrenched in a foreign land, the revolutionary guerrilla war model of Mao lost its strengths. The protection of the tunnels came at a cost. The earthworks limited the mobility of the CPVF and KPA, as they could only safely operate as far as the tunnel and trench system extended. When the CPVF and KPA left the earthworks to attack the US-UN the safety of the tunnels limited operations due to how far they could advance and still be able to withdraw safely.

Frustrated by the inability of superiority of numbers and revolutionary guerrilla war to check the US-UN forces, the CPVF received heavy conventional support. In April 1951, Chinese T-34 tanks and heavy artillery entered Korea.[257] This alteration in the PRC approach to warfare represented their recognition of the limitations of revolutionary guerrilla warfare outside of country attacked. These forces, however, failed to inflict significant defeats on US-UN forces. This occurred, more often than not, because US-UN armor outflanked and outmaneuvered Chinese armor.[258] Being in the transition from a revolutionary army to a conventional force, the PLA lacked the training and experience using armor that their US-UN opposition possessed. Though the CMC issued the creation of three tank brigades in 1950, these new tank crews could not develop competency in mechanized warfare competitive with their opposition in one year's time.

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[256] Wortzel, "China's Foreign Conflicts," 273.

[257] Bruce A. Elleman, "China's Role in the Korean War," *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1980* (New York: Routledge, 2001) 247.

[258] Elleman, "China's Role," 247.

During the Fifth Campaign that Mao advised Peng to approach battle with greater patience and engage the US-UN as if "eating sticky candy;"[259] that is, one little bite at a time. This iteration of warfare took shape during the summer and fall of 1951 after the CPVF completed their tunnel and trench systems. With these positions in place, the CPVF concentrated their available forces and firepower in covert offensives designed to eliminate one small portion of US-UN forces, generally ranging from platoon to battalion in size.[260] The persistent significant resource of the CPVF remained superiority of numbers. During the Fifth Campaign, the CPVF and KPA forces numbered 700,000 against 340,000 US-UN troops.[261] Reliance on numerical superiority came with a cost. The CPVF still struggled to adjust to larger operational management with inadequate supplies and varied weapons.[262] Such disunity of equipment made it difficult for the CPVF to acquire supplies and organize combat operations, especially when CPVF units lacked particular weapons that they required. Many commanding officers in the CPVF, like Peng, insisted upon abandoning the earthworks, luring the US-UN into the northern areas, and carry out defensive guerilla operations there.[263] With their advantage in numbers, shortened supply lines, and ability to acquire battlefield salvage, such an approach provided the CPVF an opportunity to use their strengths and experience to good effect against the US-UN. Mao, however, stood fast in his in his determination to hold every inch of Korea. Following the Fifth Campaign, Mao realized that the total victory objectives of the Korean War proved unachievable with the

[259] Peng, "My Story," 36.
[260] Peng, "My Story," 36 and Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 47.
[261] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 101.
[262] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 101.
[263] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 101.

current limits of the CPVF, and by extension the KPA.[264] Mao ordered the CPVF to engage the US-UN in a protracted defensive war[265] in order to preserve CPVF-KPA gains. The CPVF, however, received orders to continue fighting during the peace negotiations.[266] While the entrenched defensive nature of the "underground Great Wall" prohibited the trading of space for time advocated in the revolutionary guerrilla war model, the continuation of hostilities during peace negotiations allowed the CPVF to trade words for time until an armistice. While revolutionary guerrilla warfare marks protracted war as a strategic hallmark in Korea, the CPVF could not overcome the stalemate at the 38th parallel.

Three months prior to CPVF's crossing into Korea, on July 12, 1950, Zhou Enlai issued a list of five objectives of the CPVF in Korea: (1) all foreign troops withdraw from Korea; (2) US forces withdraw from the Taiwan Strait; (3) the issue of the Korean leadership be resolved by the Korean people; (4) Beijing take control of the China seat in the US-UN; (5) and Japan and China sign a peace treaty.[267] These initial objectives held much more for China than Mao's purported sympathies for a communist state under siege. These objectives possessed as amalgamation of the various interests of the CMC leadership and Mao for the security of China, a demonstration of the military might of the PLA, and the continuing of an Asian communist revolution. As the war led to a prolonged stalemate at the 38th parallel, the CMC realized that the CPVF lacked the resources or abilities to attain the initial objectives of Chinese intervention. Throughout the war, the CPVF relied primarily on superior numbers in order to overcome the technological disparity with the US-UN. These numbers, however,

[264] Chen, *Mao's China*, 97.

[265] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 46.

[266] Chen, *Mao's China*, 97.

[267] Chen, *Mao's China*, 89. It is important to note that these objectives relate to the reestablishment of Chinese influence in East Asia, though such an examination is beyond the scope of this paper.

proved too large for the available logistical support of the PRC to deliver sufficient supplies, especially over the significant distances between the PRC and 38th parallel in the harsh Korean winters. Though the CPVF initially relied on battlefield salvage, once the battle turned into a stalemate and the US-UN forces took measures to deprive the CPVF of recovered materials, CMC plans for logistics failed to develop.

Nevertheless, the numerical advantage of the CPVF could not compensate for their lack of air power. US-UN airpower and artillery forced the CPVF to alter their approach to the war from one of mobility and revolutionary operations to a static "underground Great Wall" with armor and artillery support. Once settled in static defensive positions, US-UN forces developed better abilities to predict the directions and timings of CPVF attacks and take appropriate defensive measures. Furthermore, despite the construction of underground tunnels and trenches, US-UN air power continued to harass CPVF and KPA forces and lines of communication and supply. Once dug in, the CPVF could not achieve their primary objective of driving US-UN forces from the peninsula.[268]

After experiencing some of the most traumatic combat in the memory of the twentieth century, once the balance of power on the peninsula returned to pre-war conditions, many leaders in the CPVF and DPRK felt the time arrived to do away with the original objectives for the CPVF and reconsider the situation. Once his state secure, prime minister Kim Il-sung sought to end the war in 1951.[269] Even Nie argued that by reestablishing the DPRK's prewar boundaries, the CPVF attained its political goals.[270] Nevertheless, Mao insisted that the

[268] Chen, *Mao's China*, 85.
[269] Perret, "Warrior Mao," 14.
[270] Chen, *Mao's China*, 97.

conflict continue in order to gain victory, or at least some advantage.[271] President Eisenhower's diplomacy of nuclear force brought China to the peace table.[272] On July 27, 1953, Mao, the PRC, the DPRK, and the US-UN reached amicable terms for an armistice. General Mark W. Clark commented when he signed the armistice, "This is the first time in American history that an American general signs an armistice of a no-win war."[273]

For the Chinese, the "war to resist American imperialists" provided a significant event at the dawning of the CCP. It represented a test of the fledgling People's Liberation Army against another organized, industrially capable, technologically advanced adversary (the previous example being Imperial Japan). While China failed to push the US-UN forces from Korea, it did demonstrate the military power of the PRC to halt the advances of industrialized and technologically superior forces.[274] This partial victory of the Korean War also served to build the cultural-nationalism of the young PRC. According to Nie, "Through the War to Resist America and Aid Korea, our country has become more united, and our people have become more confident in their ability defeat any foreign invaders."[275] This revolutionary spirit, reinvigorated by the Korean War, continued to infuse Chinese culture for a considerable portion of the twentieth century. Because of the CPVF involvement in Korea, "China could never have been what it is today."[276]

In order for the PRC and PLA to be competitive with other industrialized powers, it needed improved manufacturing capabilities and more advanced technologies. Recognizing

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[271] Peng, "My Story," 35.
[272] Spence, *The Search for Modern China,* 505.
[273] Peng, "My Story," 37.
[274] Perret, "Warrior Mao," 14.
[275] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 44.
[276] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 43.

this weakness during the Korea War, China sought to develop technologies to manufacture conventional and atomic weapons in order to ensure the security and supremacy of the PLA in future conflicts.[277] As the war progressed, the CPVF changed as means allowed from a revolutionary army to be a "mirror" of the US in their adoption of joint operations and standardized weapons in order to be a more flexible and easily maintained force.[278] This last element, the limits of logistics, particularly plagued the CPVF from the Second Campaign onward. Peng recognized the limitations of the CPVF and advocated significant steps to improve it along Soviet lines in order to compete against Western countries in future conflicts.[279] Considering the growing tensions between the USSR and PRC, however, such an arrangement proved questionable. Because of the immense experience gained by PRC officers and soldiers who survived the Korean War,[280] it was not out of the question for the CMC to use their experiences to rebuild the PLA in a more culturally homogeneous fashion, rather than relying on the assistance of the USSR. Nevertheless, as a result of the Korean War, China made great leaps to close the technological gap by procuring from the USSR advanced conventional weapons to outfit over 60 infantry divisions from 1951-1954.[281] A few of these weapons trickled into the hands of the CPVF; only in 1952 did Chinese forces employed a notable quantity against US-UN forces, approximately 45,000.[282]

The experiences of the CPVF during the Korean War demonstrated the limitations of revolutionary guerrilla war and large multi-national/cultural forces. First, revolutionary

[277] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 80.
[278] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 105.
[279] Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 505.
[280] Nie, "Beijing's Decision," 49.
[281] Li, *History of the Modern Chinese* Army, 106.
[282] Elleman, "China's Role," 247.

guerrilla war has limited capabilities *outside* of the country where the cultural-national troops originated. As noted elsewhere, the CPVF had little direct and appreciable familiarity with the terrain and climate of Korea and thus proved insufficiently prepared for the winter climate, a situation that undoubtedly had an adverse effect on their fighting ability. Because the CPVF was the *Chinese* People's Volunteer Force, it could not accept the same form of support from the *Korean* people as the Red Army received during the Chinese Communist Revolution. Even within the framework of an ideological struggle where the two cultures share the same underpinning belief, their inherent *cultural* differences inevitably complicate their working relationship. In such a situation, Mao and his model of revolutionary guerrilla war expected more from the CPVF than they could reasonably deliver.

CONCLUSION
THE VIABILITY OF AN ALTERNATE CHALLENGE

There exists amongst the scholarship on Mao's military thought and theory a conflict as to whether Mao subscribed to Western conceptualizations of war, *exempla gratia* the theories put forth by Carl von Clausewitz, or the traditional Chinese notions. According to Tien Chen-ya, "Mao consistently accepted Clausewitz's definition of war, that is, the relationship between war and politics."[283] Presumably, Tien referred to the renowned line from *On War*, "War is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means."[284] In his military writings Mao did mention Clausewitz, but not with a direct quotation that connected to this idea. For example, Mao quoted Clausewitz's assessments of wars having varying forms in different periods in *On Guerrilla Warfare* but not the famed "relationship between war and politics" Tien described.[285] Nearly twenty years after the composition of *On Guerrilla Warfare* and the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Allied powers, Mao prohibited the consultation of Clausewitz: "Clausewitz should no longer be read since the Germans had been defeated."[286] Mao certainly possessed knowledge of Clausewitz, but neither attributed his theories to his works or made the references Tien claimed. Unfortunately, this conclusion seems to negate the important intricacies of the Chinese military tradition that many Western-focused studies tend to overlook.

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[283] Tien, Chen-ya, *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern* (New York: Mosaic Press, 1992), 214.

[284] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 252.

[285] Mao, Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 49.

[286] Mao, Zedong, "Talks at a Conference of Secretaries of Provincial, Municipal and Autonomous Region Party Committees, January 1957," Marxist Internet Archive, accessed June 17, 2013, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_57.htm

The Age of Imperialism brought about a notion of the military superiority of Western nations. These European, North American, and European-modeled states possessed supposedly inherent superior militaries because of cultural traits, according to the Western-centric historiography that persists to this day. These definitive characteristics included reliance on advanced technologies, discipline and drill, and the mobilization of economical means behind a single-minded military expansion into the world characterized the corner stone of this theory.[287] The victory of the British and other European expeditionary forces to open treaty ports in China and the triumphs of Western (and Western-modeled Japanese) militaries over the Qing during the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), and the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) include some of the most crucial and often cited instances used to illustrate the supposed superior power of Western military might in the face of a stereotyped pacifistic, weak, and primitive Asian way of war—or so some historiographical interpretations purport. Whether created by circumstances of geographic, linguistic, or ethnocentric barriers, Asian military history in Western scholarship most often remained quartered off as an oddity of sorts until serious erudition on the subject appeared in the English language during the twentieth century. Since then, the efforts of authors such as Roger T. Ames, Ralph D. Sawyer, Peter Lorge, Karl Friday, John K. Fairbank, Hans van de Ven, Kenneth Swope, Li Xiaobing, and Jian Chen, established for non-Asian readers a sense of the richness and depth of East Asia's developed and formidable military history that in many ways parallels *and in key instances surpasses* that of the West.

[287] Geoffrey Parker, "Introduction: The Western Way of War," *Cambridge History of Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-3, 6, 10.

Two of the prime advocates of the supremacy of the Western Way of War, Victor D. Hansen and Geoffrey Parker, argue that one of the key factors to Western military dominance was reliance on superior technology.[288] This conclusion seems rather simple and ethnocentric to presume that one culture possesses a preoccupation with technology greater than another does, especially when matters of individual, societal, cultural, and state survival intertwine therein. What's more, this approach ignores the basic reality that technologies embody tools and all humans, as a species regardless of location or culture, understand the importance of tools that provide a meaningful addition to their lives. According to Peter Lorge, technology, like any creative endeavor, is as much an element of culture as other arts such as painting, music, or literature.[289] Necessity and apparent usefulness lead to the creation and implementation of technologies. In warfare, these conditions often manifest as one belligerent's desires to obtain a greater advantage in offense or defense that allows them to overcome the opposition more easily. Advanced technologies were not the sole privilege of the West. Much like the historiographical debate of the Western Military Revolution initiated by Michael Roberts 1955 lecture, John K. Fairbank argued that technological improvements initiated reforms and restructuring in Chinese armies.[290] According to

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[288] Exemplar works of the primacy of Western War or a distinctly Western Way of War include Victor D. Hansen, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002) and Geoffrey Parker, ed., *The Cambridge History of Warfare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. Geoffrey Parker, "Introduction: The Western Way of War," *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-14, and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[289] Peter A. Lorge, *The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 13.

[290] For more regarding the Military Revolution debate, see Clifford J. Rogers, ed. *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995). According to Roberts, the military revolution

Fairbank, the development of technologies such as the crossbow and iron weapons from the fourth century BCE instituted a number of organizational and communication reforms in Chinese forces that resulted ultimately in larger, better organized, and highly disciplined armies. Perhaps one of the most astounding was the invention of the crossbow during the middle Warring States period, c. fourth century BCE.[291] This weapon provided Chinese states with the opportunity to raise larger numbers of ranged attack troops that also required less training Chinese armies as it allowed the Chinese government to equip larger numbers of ranged troops with less training and expenses than to arm foot or mounted archers. This development spread to the west, as Western military historians may recall, and European armies and mercenaries used it extensively during the Crusades, eleventh-thirteenth centuries CE, and Hundred Years War, c. fourteenth-fifteenth centuries CE—nearly fifteen-hundred years after the development of the crossbow in China.

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resulted from attempts to solve tactical problems of combining ranged and close attacks and how to unite hitting power, mobility, and defensive strength. Early modern commanders found the solution to this equation in firearms. This alteration created four distinct changes: (1) a revolution in tactics; (2) significantly larger armies; (3) creation of more complex strategies to make use of larger armies; (4) and an increased effect of war on society including higher costs, greater damage, and increased administrative challenges. While initially, little disagreement with Roberts' conclusions surfaced, discord arose during the later decades of the twentieth century among Western military historians as to whether the precepts of Roberts' theory possessed credibility as to the timing of the beginning of and, if indeed such a phenomenon occurred, the specific causes of the supposed Military Revolution. Geoffrey Parker, Jeremy Black, and Kelly DeVries later published interesting analyses and critiques of Roberts' work that attempted to alter the dates of the supposed revolution, to noting the value of the framework for discussion provided by Roberts, to outright denying a military revolution ever occurred and instead arguing that the phenomena described as such was actually a military evolution. Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 13 and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-2.

[291] John K. Fairbank, "Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," in *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 5.

Discipline amongst Western military forces stands as a hallmark of the supposed Western Way of War. Ethnocentric Western histories of the early conflict between Western and Western-modeled forces from the period spanning 1793-1945, including the Opium Wars, the Boxer Rebellion, and the First Sino-Japanese War depict the Chinese as backward and superstitious mobs easily overcome with firepower, discipline, and bayonet. These approaches fail to appreciate the longer and deeper military history of China that includes discipline as a similar hallmark. China was, according to Ken Swope, "one of the only Non-Western states to emphasize training and drilling."[292] Drill, as in the coordination of forces in an organized manner, existed in order to foster teamwork, cooperation, self and unit discipline, and most fundamentally to move large numbers of troops from place to place as expediently as possible. This circumstance arose, and understandably so, as China possessed a far-reaching history of mounting numerically significant armies. Estimates of troop strength from the seventh through sixth centuries BCE range from 10,000 men to 50,000 men per army amongst the then dominant infantry centered forces.[293] Period texts from the Warring States, beginning in the fifth century BCE, suggested some armies fielded forces as large as 600,000 men.[294]

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[292] Ken Swope, "The Origins of Asian Military Thought," *Seminar IV, Lecture 2*, (Norwich University Lecture, 2011), 2.

[293] Mark Edward Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 59.

[294] Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence*, 60. Lewis notes that, while these numbers may not be entirely accurate with regards to actual numbers of fighting men put in the field, an approximate "ten-fold increase in the size of armies seems plausible." Interesting, this increase in armies, alongside a dramatic change in military hardware, seems to parallel the supposed arguments of the Western Military Revolution. Perhaps, instead of being indicative of a Western or Eastern Military Revolution, these patterns are indicative of a *human* reaction to threats, challenges, and opportunities presented during times of conflict.

To maintain discipline within units, Chinese armies had to maintain order through a well-structured hierarchy. This unit discipline originated with the commanders who made use of existing hierarchies, especially those as articulated by Confucianism that articulated specific behaviors of a person based on his relationship with family, state, and friends. Confucianism extolled the supremacy of culture/civilization (*wen*) over martial supremacy (*wu*). Indeed, in the Confucian hierarchy contained no place *literally* for a martial class. The key tenets of deference to authority and improving the self through arduous work and study, however, proved quite useful in reinforcing military discipline and order. War indeed served an important part of Chinese political thought. The most important purpose for war was to establish order, whether through the suppression of rebellions, defeat of raiding barbarians, or overthrowing a despotic and ineffective government that lost the Mandate of Heaven.[295] The Tai Gong, for example, emphasized proper behavior between social groups in addition to military discipline. For example, "If you set up the proper forms of etiquette [*li*], the *li* can be perfected.[296] Sunzi described this accordance between people and the ruler as the Dao.[297] Civilian hierarchies possessed limitations, however, when it came to war, as Sunzi also warned readers that rulers should not interfere with the authority of the commander, though originating from the ruler, once in battle.[298] One only need to read as far as the work of the icon of Western warfare, Clausewitz, to note that war even in the West is a last resort of politics rather than a phenomenon *ex nihilo*.[299] The role of discipline in Chinese military

[295] Fairbank, "Varieties," 8, and Van de Ven, "Introduction," 9.
[296] Tai Gong, "T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings," 53-55.
[297] Sunzi, *Art of War*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boston: Westview Press, 1993), 157.
[298] Sunzi, *Art of War*, Sawyer, 162.
[299] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 78.

history extends much deeper than presented herein. The prime importance of this discipline came from the necessity to coordinate and conduct operations effectively, funded by immense state resources and personnel over great distances. Even so, from a pragmatic perspective discipline functioned as a central element in war because governing bodies asked human beings to engage in counterintuitive, self-destructive behavior while destroying other human beings.

An interesting case where extreme discipline on the parts of an Eastern and Western army confronted one another was the Korean War. During this conflict, Western, *id est* United Nations, forces were disciplined and trained according to the prevailing beliefs in a unique Western military tradition. Similarly, the Eastern, *id est* Chinese, forces were disciplined in their prevailing ideals of Chinese-Revolutionary Warfare and the victory of the proletariat over the imperialist West. Despite the differing details, both forces were well tempered by training, hardship, and culture to endure the horrors of battle and engage their enemy, be he superior in technology or numbers. This discipline manifested with the UN forces in their steadfastness to hold their positions until forced back due to lack of resources in the face of overwhelming odds and in the Chinese with their determination to engage the technologically superior UN forces in hand-to-hand combat. Though discipline was hardly *the* single factor that contributed to the stalemate at the 38th Parallel, it was certainly an important contributing factor. Arguably, the Korean War served as the epitome of the conflict between Chinese and Anglo-American Ways of War.

During the middle of the twentieth century, the supposed supremacy of the Western Way of War became questionable and shaky as warfare in East and South East Asia provided serious challenges to this long help presumption. Two conflicts in these regions illustrate the

shortcomings of conventional Western war making. The victory of the Chinese Red Army against both the US supported Guomindang and the Chinese People's Volunteer's parity against the US-UN, as well as the victory of the North Vietnamese over the Republic of South Vietnam illustrated some of the difficulties that the Western way of war faced in the mid-twentieth century. Because of the significantly different abilities in terms of organization, industry, and operational advantages between the Western and Asian forces, as well as the fluid, adaptable, and pragmatic nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, conventional Western forces formed by the works of men like von Clausewitz found themselves in unfamiliar physical and doctrinal terrain. This Chinese military tradition of nearly two millennia armed the Chinese Communist Party and the Viet Minh with skills that allowed them to outmaneuver, outlast, and eventually overcome conventional and Western influenced opposition. Mao determined that in order for his forces to succeed against the imperial Japanese and the Guomindang, they had to organize, consolidate, and defend.[300] This approach held resonance with the traditional avocation to attack when circumstances proved advantageous and efficacious rather than charge headlong into a battle with no chance of victory. Once in a stable defensive position, Mao decided that the guerilla CCP should expand its ranks and carryout asymmetrical warfare with sabotage, terrorism, assassination, *et cetera*, in order to build supplies of war material and experience.[301]

This style of warfare, often described as "small wars," characterizes the greatest challenges to the West during the twentieth century. For a significant period, Western warfare encountered these styles of conflict in remote places where the "fought only

[300] John P. Cann, "Low-Intensity Conflict, Insurgency, Terrorism and Revolutionary War," in *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History,* ed. Matthew Hughes and William J. Phillpott (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2006), 115.
[301] Cann, "Low-Intensity Conflict," 115.

secondarily against human foes, the real enemies being climate, disease, distance, lack of food and water, and inhospitable terrain."[302] And these constraints hold true for the United States in Vietnam. The preparations of the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh, for example, followed many of the guidelines developed and collected in Mao's writing on guerilla warfare. The longer the United States committed to hostilities in Vietnam, the longer popular opinion of the war dematerialized, especially following the Tet Offensive and the My Lai Massacre.[303] If one defining hallmark of a supposed Chinese model of war persisted throughout the ages that proved elusive to the West, especially the Unites States, this attribute rests in patience to commit to lengthy campaigns that bleed the opposition of resources, men, and support at home. Often—and into the twenty-first century—technology appealed to Western military planners as a quick fix to solve these small wars. Whether born from experiences of the imperial era or from another source, having the most innovative weapon no longer—indeed, rarely during history—proved to be the defining factor of battle. To consider such the case divorces studies and assessments of the human element of war, in both terms of the admirable heroism of people under duress as well as the all too unfortunate human suffering experiences during the violence of combat.

THE HUMAN WAY OF WAR

"Violent conflict between states or polities is now mankind's common problem, a unifying menace."[304] Perhaps the most important element of war that extends beyond cultures without equivocation is violence. Though long held and misconceived impressions

[302] Bruce Vandervort, "War in the Non-European World," in *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History,* ed. Matthew Hughes and William J. Phillpott (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2006), 196.
[303] Cann, "Low-Intensity Conflict," 125.
[304] Fairbank, "Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," 1.

of Eastern warfare are contrary, traditional Chinese interpretations of war hold that violence is a necessary element of war. According to the *Methods of the Sima,* violence is a necessity in war to restore order and eliminate oppressive governments.[305] This is not violence for the sake of violence or war for the sake of war, but rather recognition that war is a bloody affair necessary to create peace. Much in the way of some Confucian interpretations of strictness as necessary to form and direct human behavior, violence in war is necessary to restore peace and order, especially in the works produces by authors such as Mozi.

The sheer volume of violence perpetrated by combatants often appears as a keen element of warfare of the Western tradition, especially within the notion of total war. Discussions of the efficacy of such a label as total war aside, similar descriptions of appeared in classical Chinese military texts that proscribed the use of all available means to discourage, intimidate, and destroy the enemy, though arguably these approaches more closely resembled the idea of deterrence associated with nuclear war theory. Conjoined to the notion of total war appeared the idea that states must prepare for war by always anticipating the possibility of conflict and readying accordingly to employ the available means of production; appearing weak the foster overconfidence in the enemy; create disharmony in the enemy through subterfuge; provide the means for the enemy to dismantle their own war machine.[306] This bore striking resemblance to the often quoted *"si vi pacum para bellum*" that in order for states to desire peace and security, they must continually prepare for the possibility of conflict. Such seemed quite in line with the Western mode of war, especially industrialized war characterized by World Wars I and II, but more over

[305] Ibid., 7 and Simafa, "The Methods of the Ssu-ma," *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview, 1993),126.
[306] Sawyer, *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, 33.

demonstrated that between the two cultures there existed an idea that some conflicts are simply so massive or perhaps so crucial that the option of defeat never entered the possible realms of conclusion.

In these large patterns, no significant difference between an Eastern and a Western way of war surfaced. This condition existed because, despite differences in periods, cultures, regions, technologies, the perpetrators, combatants, and victims of war always were human beings. Thus, while cultural nuances may affect certain details of wars, periods restrict the technologies available, and regions necessitate the use of one form of attack or defense over another, war continues to serve as an activity that bridges periods, cultures, and regions. It is excessively narrow-minded to conclude that a military or government would adopt a purposefully weak military stance because of nothing more than cultural tendencies. Though cultures may influence war and war influence cultures, when able states adopt the most advantageous technologies and methods available.[307] Human beings possess a viciously competitive nature, no matter what culture, and this is especially the case in competitions where annihilation is a possible outcome for one competitor. This primal competition, where issues of nation and culture seem to fade from the consciousness of the combatants, who instead focus on the immediacy of the moment, the then-and-now struggle of one spearman struggling against another or one rifleman sighting down on another, that the axiom "war never changes" enters the most real manifestation that ultimately, despite the supposed progress of man, the lingering reality of war as organized violence, seeking to exert influence

[307] Van de Ven, "Introduction," 23.

and bring peace upon a chaotic situation through the means of violence available will remain.[308]

[308] *Fallout*. MS-DOS, Microsoft, (Interplay, 1997).

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