

University of Central Oklahoma
Edmond, Oklahoma
Jackson College of Graduate Studies & Research

**The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-1955: The Contemplation of Going to War Over
Foreign Troop Morale**


A THESIS


APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY


(2013)

By


Xiaobing Li, Ph.D., (Chair, committee member)


Stanley Adamiak, Ph.D., (committee member)


Jeff Plaks, Ph.D., (committee member)


Kirk Webster, Ph.D., (graduate college representative)

“The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-1955: The Contemplation of Going to War Over
Foreign Troop Morale”

Justin E. Burch

Masters Thesis

Spring 2013

Graduate Committee: Dr. Xiao Bing Li, Dr. Stanley Adamiak, Dr. Jeff Plaks.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction & Historiographical Background to the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-1955.	1-14
Chapter Two: The US-Taiwan Defense Treaty and its Impact On the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-19455.	15-44
Chapter Three: Aftermath: Eisenhower and Dulles Re-evaluate a Failing Strategy.	45-75
Chapter Four: Stalemate: the Robertson-Radford Mission, Bandung, Negotiation, and the 1958 Crisis.	76-103
Notes	104-116
Bibliography	117-126
Maps	Appendices 1-9
Attachment: U.S. Policy Towards Nationalist China	

Chapter One:

Introduction & Historiographical Background to the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-1955

On September 3, 1954, the People's Republic of China (PRC) began a barrage of artillery fire on the island of Quemoy¹ controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) off the mainland China coast near the port of Amoy. The ROC had occupied Quemoy, along with other offshore islands, since Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek) Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government fled to Taiwan in 1949 as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and his Communist forces consolidated control over China. This attack on Quemoy began the first Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. The shelling of this small island precipitated an international confrontation that lasted over ten months. Ten months that gripped the entire world in fear of a third world war and the very real possibility of an atomic exchange. This event led to two major pieces of legislation; the 1954 US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution as well as a dangerous, under fire, hasty retreat by the ROC of islands north of Formosa with the help of the US Navy's Seventh Fleet. The crisis came to an unexpected end with a dramatic offer of peace at an international conference in Bandung, Indonesia by an unlikely source. Largely forgotten today in the collective historical memory of Americans, this incident, in many respects, was the first Cuban Missile Crisis, only played out, not in thirteen days, but over the course of months. On one side was the nuclear-armed United States of America and on the other a non-nuclear PRC allied to the Soviet Union with Taiwan in the middle playing the role as provocateur.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that in international relations between adversaries, the number one reason for the start of wars was miscalculation by

one side or the other.² Yet throughout the fall of 1954 and into the summer of 1955, the presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower made America's position in regards to the offshore islands anything but clear to Mao, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), or the international community. Eisenhower and the National Security Council (NSC) were consistently caught between two opposing philosophies and political realities in its dealing with the crisis. International pressure from the British and hostile domestic and global public opinion, kept America from publicly declaring that it would defend the offshore islands. The administration's fear of handing communism what was viewed as another Cold War victory and irrevocably damaging Nationalist troop morale on Taiwan kept Dulles and Eisenhower from formulating a publicly clear and unequivocal policy for Formosa, the Pescadores (Penghu islands) and the Nationalist-held islands. This failure extended a confrontation that should have ended in a matter of days or weeks for nearly a year.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles faced a quintessential cold war dilemma. Should America use military force to stand up to the aggression of China in an effort to thwart the threat of Communist expansion in Asia, a decision in keeping with the Truman and recently established Massive Retaliation Doctrine? On the other hand, should the US moderate its approach and use diplomacy and retreat to diffuse a situation in which the Eisenhower administration had few if any allies? Both the American people and international opinion was decidedly against a military intervention. Could the president give the Communists yet another perceived victory following on the heels of the Korean armistice and the end of French colonial rule

in Indochina (Vietnam)? Eisenhower and Dulles did not, in the end, take the US into a war with China over relatively insignificant offshore islands in the Pacific.

The complexity of this event is legion. International territorial law, the Domino Theory, the winding down of Colonialism, Cold War brinksmanship, the newly established Doctrine of Massive Retaliation, the role of the 1954 US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, The Formosa Resolution, Eisenhower's management style, and what constitutes a threat to US national interests are just a few of the many issues that will be unpacked in the course of this study. This is an endeavor to tell the entirety of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-5 from the US perspective with all of its nuances and intricacies. Historians from H.W. Brands, Xiao Bing Li, He Di, John Lewis Gaddis, and many others have tackled this wonderful Cold War case study, but have, for the most part, only looked at it from a particular vantage point, only telling a small slice of the broader story. This project will piece together the work of these talented historians along with new insights and research to produce the fullest account of this event to date.

With the defeat of Jiang's Nationalist forces on the mainland, the Generalissimo, as he was known at home and abroad, consolidated his political and military allies on the island of Formosa and the nearby Pescadores. In addition to this main stronghold, the KMT also controlled other offshore islands and groups of islands up and down the coast of China in the East China Sea and Taiwan Straits. Jiang controlled the large island of Hainan in southern China near Guangdong Province and the Zhoushan Archipelago off Zhejiang Province near Shanghai. However, the most important holdings for this story are as follows: The Quemoy group of two islands, big and little Quemoy, directly west of Formosa and off the coast of modern day Fujian Province in southern China; the Matsu

islands set a little further to the north near Fuzhou still in Fujian Province; and the other two main island groups controlled by Nationalist forces were the Dachen (Tachen) island chain off Zhejiang Province two hundred miles to the north of Formosa and various other island holdings just a few miles to the north of the Dachen's that have a variety names, including perhaps the most important, the island of Yijiangshan (for maps, please see appendices 1-9).³

Jiang relocated his government to Taipei, Taiwan on December 8, 1949. This left Mao Zedong and his generals with a new and unique problem. They would have to employ amphibious assault tactics to finish off the Nationalists, amphibious operations that the PLA was inexperienced with. Throughout late 1949 and 1950, the PLA began prepared, and in April successfully landed, 100,000 troops on Hainan, destroying the equally large Nationalist forces there with ease. The Zhoushan Archipelago fell soon after and the PLA was making preparations for their assault on Quemoy, and ultimately Taiwan itself, with a planned 800,000 man landing force intended to end the Chinese Civil War.⁴ China had seen unending warfare since the fall of the Qing dynasty at the turn of the Twentieth Century. Nationalists battled warlords and Communists fought Nationalists in the aftermath of the fall of the Empire. The Japanese invaded in the 1930s, occupied much of China and fought with both Nationalist and Communist forces through the end of WWII when the Allies defeated Japan in 1945. After the war Jiang and Mao attempted to set up a power sharing government. When the warring Chinese parties failed to secure a peace, President Harry Truman sent General George Marshall to negotiate a ceasefire in early January 1946. While both parties signed, it ultimately collapsed and the Civil War resumed in earnest.⁵ By 1950 the constant warfare had left China scarred and

weary. Mao's PLA and PRC was on the cusp of a historic victory to unify all of China for the first time in half a century when war broke out in Korea, putting the conquest of Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi and his Nationalists on hold.⁶

The Korean War marks the point at which the US began to involve itself directly into the Chinese Civil War. President Harry Truman ordered elements of the US Navy's Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits on June 27, 1950 only "two days after the North Korean invasion of South Korea."⁷ This move was to keep the PLA *and* Jiang's forces from engaging one another. The overall military strategy for Truman was to keep Beijing from capturing Taiwan, and posing a threat to US operations in Korea, as well as to ensure the war did not expand beyond the Korean peninsula. As a result of Truman's decision, Beijing suspended military operations in the straits and focused on the new war in Korea, which was closer to China's fledgling industrial base and supply routes to the Soviet Union and Manchuria.⁸ The Seventh Fleet, with its new orders, ensured a quiet period in the offshore region for the remainder of Truman's prosecution of the Korean War.

There has, to this point, never been a monograph written specifically about the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. However, the event is well covered by journal articles and chapters in books discussing US foreign policy, US diplomacy, the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration, US-China relations, military history, and a variety of other topics. While the Taiwan Straits Crisis is not now a major incident engrained in the American public's conscience, like World War II or the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is a standard case study that is nearly always mentioned in major academic reference works.⁹ Because of its ubiquity, a complete review of everything ever written about the subject is

not a reasonable goal of this chapter, especially considering much of the interpretation of the crisis will be repetitive across the major reference works. Therefore, although in depth, this discussion will only cover the major historians and scholarship on the subject to put this thesis within the context of the historiography of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-5.

Before this examination of the scholarship can begin, however, there is one historian that needs to be discussed and a full explanation proffered as to why his work does not appear in this thesis in any form other than in the following conversation. For decades anything the well-known historian Stephen E. Ambrose wrote about Dwight D. Eisenhower was considered the standard work on the subject. Ambrose was after all the “official biographer” of Ike. In November 2010, Tim Rives, the deputy director of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, hosted a retrospective on the work historian Stephen E. Ambrose did with the former President. Ambrose, as most Eisenhower historians know, wrote the standard biography of Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander during WWII and later as president. In research done for the Eisenhower Presidential Library event, Rives uncovered what has since become a major scandal in certain historical circles. Rives consulted the official appointment calendars for the former president and found that Ambrose had actually only met with Eisenhower three times for only a few hours in total. Ambrose, for his part, cited dozens of interviews with the former president in his endnotes for biographies covering Eisenhower’s military and political career, interviews that simply did not occur.¹⁰ Whether the information Ambrose used in writing his history was gleaned from other sources and attributed to

non-existent interviews or if Ambrose simply produced research out of whole cloth is still being debated.

The more important question for twentieth century, Cold War, and Eisenhower historians is what should be done with what has, for over two decades, been the standard works? The most academically responsible decision is to essentially trash them. For the purposes of this study, none of the published work of Stephen E. Ambrose has been consulted or will be referenced or discussed. Ambrose's work is no longer a credible source for academics and should be ignored in all further research and publications. The task of Eisenhower and Cold War historians now is to begin again. This study is, hopefully, the beginning of a total re-evaluation of Eisenhower's legacy, to dive back into the archives once again and produce a new, untainted, professional history of Eisenhower and his times. This particular thesis is not only a case study for understanding the Cold War but also a case study in a new historical research project on Dwight D. Eisenhower.

There are a variety of ways to tackle the historiography of a particular event. Chronological, topical, and even going through the scholarship based on the importance of the work are all legitimate avenues to take. For this study a chronological system will be employed, but with two major exceptions. Thomas E. Bailey's *A Diplomatic History of the American People* was the most important reference work on American diplomatic history from 1940 until well after its last updated version published in 1980. Bailey's breezy wit and simple construction brought diplomatic history to the masses and is not just the standard work for many, but is also a classic. Because of its popularity and wide use, an examination of how Bailey interpreted the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954-5 will begin this literature review. The second exception to the chronological format is the work

of historian H.W. Brands. In 1988 Brands wrote “Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait” for the journal *International Security*. This article was the first serious historical review of the 1954-55 crisis after the publication in 1985 of the State Department’s *Foreign Relations of the United States* covering the periods of 1952-4 and later the 1986 publication of records covering 1955-7. Brands’ interpretation of the crisis from this article has remained, for the most part, the standard view of the crises. Many larger reference works and monographs covering this time period will refer back to “Testing Massive Retaliation” as the major work on the topic. Because of the importance of Brands’ article, it will be discussed last in this review. From a historiographical point of view it could be argued that this thesis is as much an answer to the interpretation of Brands as any other historian.

Thomas E. Bailey in *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, describes the Taiwan Straits Crisis, not so much as an event on its own, but through the prism of the Formosa Resolution passed by Congress on January 25, 1955. Bailey does not even use the words Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-5 in his narrative, instead focusing solely on the Formosa Resolution giving to the President the power to use America’s armed forces to protect the Republic of China on Taiwan from the Communist mainland government of the People’s Republic of China. Bailey slyly tells the reader that the Formosa Resolution “was so deviously worded as to authorize the President to defend Quemoy and Matsu, even though these islets were purposely left unmentioned.”¹¹ Bailey claims the Formosa Resolution had a “sobering” effect on the PRC over time and contributed to a “gradually improved” situation.¹² Bailey goes into very little detail on the crisis itself and views the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, not in the context of the imbroglio as this study will

do, but only as a continuation of Dulles's efforts to create alliances in the Pacific against communism.¹³ Bailey's narrative is disjointed, jaundiced, and does not convey how serious the event was at the time, nor how close to war America came with China in the years 1954-55.

One of the very first professional historical accounts of the 1954-55 crisis was done in 1956 by D.F. Fleming in his *The Western Political Quarterly* article "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait." Fleming's account was hostile to the Eisenhower administration and clearly biased. The article reflects the author's liberal political views and is in line with Fleming being considered a mid-century revisionist historian. The most important aspect of the work, however, is that the main narrative of the crisis was established by this article. Fleming called the crisis "the high point of the Cold War," establishing the event as deserving of serious reporting and historical investigation.¹⁴ Fleming blamed the US military, specifically Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur Radford, and Dulles for pushing Eisenhower to the brink of war. According to Fleming, only after Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Robert F. Carney told a group of reporters that he believed the PRC would attack in mid-April 1955 did the American people wake up to the possibility of an atomic war starting over Quemoy and Matsu. Once this occurred, Fleming argues that the Eisenhower administration began to back down from its more bellicose statements with regards to the offshore islands.¹⁵

Fleming believed the Carney incident was the turning point of the crisis. Although current evidence places Carney's off the record comments as a minor affair in 1955, Fleming is correct in his conclusion that a lack of public support in America in conjunction with little allied world backing acted as an anchor on the Eisenhower

administration's more radical tendencies. Fleming, unfortunately, only got the story half correct. He astutely diagnosed why Eisenhower did not act more aggressively in the straits but did not ascertain why the administration was taking a hard line during the crisis in the first place. Fleming believed that the Republican "war party" in Congress along with the military and Dulles wanted a war with Communist China and used this incident as a reason to eliminate a possible larger threat that China could become in the future once she fully industrialized and then realize its full potential in the region.¹⁶ There is only one brief mention of the Eisenhower administration's obsession with Nationalist troop morale and no acknowledgement of the fear that the loss of Formosa would be the first domino to fall in Asia leading to the failure of freedom and democracy in the region.¹⁷

William M. Bueler, in *U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan*, had the opposite problem of Fleming. Bueler accurately diagnosed that the morale of the Nationalist troops was the principle reason why the Eisenhower administration was so attached to the offshore islands. Although he did not mention the Domino Theory, Bueler is one of the first historians to actually take Eisenhower and Dulles at their word when they said KMT troop morale was the most important aspect of the crisis with regards to the offshore islands.¹⁸ Unlike Fleming, however, Bueler did not attempt to explain why Eisenhower and Dulles refused to publicly support the offshore islands or discover why the administration was only willing to go so far in provoking the PRC. He never made the connection that domestic and foreign lack of support acted as a moderating force for the White House.

Michael Schaller, in *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, is a good example of how the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 is overlooked or folded into the 1958 crisis which often receives more attention in larger monographs on US-China relations such as Schaller's work. Schaller spends only a page and a half on both crises in a nearly two hundred page book and described the events as only important in how US policy developed concerning US support for Jiang to retake the mainland.¹⁹ Like Bueler, Schaller also does not discuss the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty within the context of the 1954-5 crisis.

One of the first accounts of the straits affair to use significant Eisenhower administration records was the work of Bennet C. Rushkoff in his article for *Political Science Quarterly* entitled "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955." Rushkoff's main purpose in writing his article was to dissect how involved Eisenhower was in the formulation of policy during the crisis as opposed to the influence of Dulles. The first historical interpretations of the Eisenhower presidency was that the president allowed his Secretary of State free reign to make policy and simply rubber stamped decisions made in the State Department. Throughout the 1970's and 1980's historians such as Richard H. Immerman and others overturned this initial perception and found a very involved chief executive. Rushkoff's "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955" can be seen as a continuation of the work started by other Dulles and Eisenhower historians.²⁰ Because it is now a settled issue that Eisenhower was deeply engaged in policy making and Dulles did not run rough shod over the entire diplomatic corps, this thesis does not discuss, in any meaningful way, the division of power between Dulles and Eisenhower. Historiographically, the question of who was in

charge in the White House during the 1950s has long been settled; Eisenhower ran the show.²¹

Leonard H. D. Gordon, in “United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962,” was, like Rushkoff, one of the first historians to be able to utilize declassified documents from the Eisenhower administration to begin the process of building a more complete narrative of the 1954-55 crisis. Gordon accurately points out that in March 1955 the administration was actively trying to avoid a confrontation with the PRC because it feared upsetting treaty negotiations going on in Europe (more on this later in this study), however, Gordon comes to the wrong conclusions from the documentary evidence.²² Gordon claims the Eisenhower administration’s goals throughout the crisis was to avoid using the military. While it is true the President in the end avoided an armed conflict in 1955 as well as 1958, Eisenhower contemplated using force off and on throughout 1954 and 1955 and was only held back by a lack of domestic and foreign support. The true nature of the conflict was more nuanced and complicated than Gordon describes in his article. One of the main purposes of this thesis is to bring to light those very nuances and complications.

To date, the most comprehensive sweeping historical look at the 1954-55 Taiwan Straits Crisis was completed in 1985 in the form of Thomas E. Stolper’s *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations*. Despite the heavy handed secondary title, this monograph is essentially about the 1954-55 affair. Because Stolper deals with the 1958 crisis and a few other issues, perhaps to satisfy a publishers request, it would not be accurate to call this work a monograph simply on Quemoy-Matsu Crisis in 1954 and 1955. Stolper does a wonderful

job of laying out the relationship between the three main parties of the US, ROC, and PRC. His interpretations are sound and complex, as the relationship between these countries were, and Stolper takes no shortcuts in his research or narrative. However, Stolper completed his study just before the publication of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes that covered his topic. The one major source not available to Stolper was the National Security Council meetings in which many of the most important decisions of the incident were discussed and made. As a result, Stolper missed the fact that negotiations for the US-Taiwan MDT in late 1954 were green lit by the White House as a *quid pro quo* for Jiang's support of action in the United Nations Security Council to enforce a ceasefire in the straits.

Xiaobing Li has written extensively on the Taiwan Straits. His first monograph, *Diplomacy Through Militancy in the Taiwan Straits: Crisis Politics in the 1950's*, is representative of a new addition to the historiography of the offshore islands in that it incorporates the use of Chinese language documents from the PRC and ROC point of view.²³ The fullest expression of this new scholarship can be found in Li's *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, which blends Li's interpretation of the relationship of the US and China with a detailed account of the history of the PLA, and for the purposes of this study the 1950s in particular.²⁴

Finally we must look at the work of H.W. Brands. As noted above Brands was the first historian to utilize the publications of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* in 1985 covering the periods of 1952-54 and later the 1986 publication of records covering 1955-1957. Brands' interpretation of the first Taiwan Straits Crisis is that the central character of the event was the "New Look" policy that included Massive Retaliation as its

main element. Brands argues that this was the first true test of that new policy and it was, in the end, successful. America threatened the use of atomic weapons and the PRC backed down.²⁵ As this study will hopefully prove, the New Look had little major impact on how the crisis unfolded. The determination that atomic weapons would need to be used to protect the offshore islands is certainly dramatic and draws the eye, but the Domino Theory and the fear of losing Taiwan to the Communists and perhaps as a result all of Asia was the more important Cold War concept throughout the confrontations between the US and China during the 1950s.

Chapter Two:

The US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and its Impact on the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-1955

The 1952 American presidential election ended with former WWII Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower becoming the thirty-fourth President of the United States. The virtually stalemated Korean War needed both the election of Eisenhower in 1952 and the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in early 1953 to truly pave the way for armistice talks. Eisenhower was the only credible American leader that could bring back to the United States a truce with less than complete victory and Stalin's death removed the last strong pressure on the Chinese to keep the war going. The Korean War truce was signed on July 27, 1953 ending combat operations that, to this day, never materialized into a formal peace treaty.²⁶ Eisenhower's decision regarding the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan straits, however, set the stage for confrontation between Washington and Beijing in the years to come.

After Eisenhower became president, he changed the orders for the Seventh Fleet from keeping both sides from engaging one another, to a policy of allowing Chiang's military to begin harassing operations against the mainland. According to Dulles, this policy shift, called "unleashing Chiang," was intended by the president as a "diversionary threat" to the PRC during the Korean War.²⁷ This change in the Seventh Fleet's orders caused Mao and the other Communist party leaders to enact a new propaganda and military campaign in the offshore area following the end of the Korean War. Beijing also renewed its focus on Taiwan because of a failed Beijing rapprochement at the Geneva Conference with America in May 1953, and rumors of possible mutual defense treaty

talks between the US and the ROC.²⁸ The 1954 US Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and ROC was both created by the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 and at the same time partially caused and fueled of the crisis. How these two seemingly opposite facts are true will be discussed throughout this first chapter of our story.

Jiang Jieshi proposed a defense treaty with America in early 1954 that Dulles and the Eisenhower administration considered ill-timed and too problematic for serious consideration. The main obstacle was the precarious status of the offshore islands.²⁹ Mao Zedong, for his part, decided to initiate a military campaign in the coastal area partly because of rumored negotiations for a bilateral pact between America and Taiwan.³⁰ Mao said China would inaugurate a crusade of “liberating Taiwan” to deal with the US and Taiwan issue off their coast on July 23, 1954 in a telegram to PRC Premier Zhou Enlai.³¹

The ROC began a variety of military actions off the coast of China, with US aid, that included raids on Communist and international shipping bound for China and CIA trained ROC troop assaults on the mainland itself.³² The ROC even seized the Soviet ship *Taupse* between Luzon and Formosa, which caused a minor international incident on June 23, 1954.³³ Because of these new ROC armed operations, the PLA came to the conclusion that it “could not defend the entire coast.” This fact, along with Mao’s “liberate Taiwan” campaign, led to General Zhang Aiping of the PLA, in command of forces off the Zhejiang coast, to plan an offensive combined military campaign against the Nationalist held Dachen islands 200 miles to the north of Taiwan and not far from Zhejiang Province. After gaining control of the sea and air space around the Dachen’s in skirmishes with ROC forces and taking the small Dongji Islands to the north of the main

target, Zhang was ready for a major bombing and amphibious assault on the Dachen's in early September 1954.³⁴

Unfortunately for General Zhang, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was visiting Zhejiang province in September 1954 and Mao cancelled the Dachen plans to avoid an international incident while Nehru was in the area. Mao did, however, allow heavy PLA shelling of the Nationalist held island of Quemoy off the Fujian Province coast and across the strait from Taiwan on September 3, 1954.³⁵ The shelling of Quemoy on September 3 began the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. Truman's decision to send the Seventh Fleet into the straits in 1950 and Eisenhower's decision to maintain the fleet's presence after the Korean War, along with "unleashing Chiang" and the offshore raids, led the PRC to begin ambitious military operations that Washington came to view as an immediate confrontation it had to deal with. The question that faced the Eisenhower administration was whether to use military force or find a diplomatic solution.

John Foster Dulles had been thinking about the PRC very early in the administration, largely because of Korea, but also in relation to the administration's broader policies in Asia. More importantly, Dulles attempted to stamp his rules on how to deal with international diplomacy on the State Department, namely: no miscalculations.

Dulles wrote to the new president that

Communist China is now extending aid to the Indochinese Communists in the training and equipment of local Communist guerilla forces. There is the risk that, as in Korea, Communist China might send its own army into Indochina. The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which

might not be confined to Indochina. I say this in the interest of peace and in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation.³⁶

The basis for this message to Eisenhower was a long developing view of why wars start and what nations of good will could proactively do to avoid them. On September 2, 1953 Dulles gave a speech in which he laid out his matured vision about international conflicts. Dulles said that

The Korean War began in a way in which wars often begin—a potential aggressor miscalculated. From that we learn a lesson which we expect to apply in the interest of future peace. The lesson is this: If events are likely which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make clear our intention in advance; then we shall probably not have to fight. Big wars usually come about by mistake not design. It is probable that the Korean War would not have occurred if the aggressor had known what the United States would do. The Communist thought, and had reason to think, that they would not be opposed, except by the then small and ill-equipped forces of the Republic of Korea. They did not expect what actually happened.³⁷

This standard of international relations should have served Dulles and Eisenhower well in the upcoming Taiwan Straits Crises; however, the secretary was never able to put into practice the architecture he eloquently laid out in 1953.

In addition to this new formula, Dulles and Eisenhower sought to reform how America would use its military to thwart Communist threats. The president adopted Truman's containment policy, but decided early in his administration to drastically cut defense spending. With a diminished defense budget, Eisenhower would not be able to

call on large reserves of conventional forces to do battle with Communist forces. As a result, Dulles and Eisenhower came up with the “New Look” or “Massive Retaliation” doctrine, which would rely on America’s atomic weapons arsenal to discourage the Soviet Union and the PRC from either attacking the US and its allies directly or involving themselves in revolutionary movements in the developing world.³⁸ The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-5 occurred in the midst of these policy changes and had a small but important role in how the administration handled the crisis, particularly with respect to discussions of atomic weapons use in the offshore area. However, “Massive Retaliation” did not play as large a role in the decision making process of the US as the issues of ROC morale in relation to the “Domino Theory.” This conclusion is in opposition to much of the current academic interpretation of the crisis.³⁹

At the end of August 1954, before the Quemoy shelling, the issue of a defense treaty between the US and the ROC was raised again in conjunction with a Dulles visit to Southeast Asia in early September that included a stop in Taipei to meet with Jiang. The State Department was sure that the Generalissimo would bring up the bilateral agreement issue and some even began to lobby for it.⁴⁰ In late August, Walter S. Robertson, who was the assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, attempted to convince Dulles for a second time to approve of treaty negotiations that Dulles had scuttled in May 1954. Robertson reported that if a treaty could be signed, Jiang was willing to clear all offensive military operations against Communist China with the United States beforehand. This removed, according to Robertson, a thorny issue plaguing the Eisenhower administration, namely, the fear of Jiang dragging the US into a war with Mao America did not initiate.⁴¹ Eisenhower was determined to be the one to choose where and when the US would go to

war and was intent on not allowing poor decision making by any of America's allies to back him into a corner. Eisenhower had already expressed, on October 23, 1953, that the US would not support President Syngman Rhee of South Korea if he initiated a renewed attack on North Korea on his own. Eisenhower told Dulles the US resolved "not to be involved if he should take any such extraordinary and foolish action."⁴² The Robertson memorandum raised treaty prospects once again, and with the addition of an issue close to the president's heart, started a significant debate within the State Department.

John D. Jernegan, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, wrote Robertson to inform him that a defense agreement with Taiwan would further deteriorate America's relationship with India, and this fact should be mentioned to Dulles.⁴³ Obviously, India was under Jernegan's purview and his responsibilities were to improve relations with India and his perspective can be challenged as biased. However, his objection is indicative of the struggle in the State Department over the treaty issue. The State Department planning staff director warned Robertson that if a treaty were in the works, the Eisenhower administration would have to come to a definitive conclusion on the status of the Nationalist-held islands.⁴⁴ Dulles was still reluctant to go forward with a treaty, stating that he believed a negotiation would probably have to happen in the future, but he still preferred to wait because of the offshore issues.⁴⁵ Dulles met with Jiang on September 9, 1954 and the treaty came up as predicted.⁴⁶ Dulles tried to make a strong argument for waiting, even stating that he felt Jiang was better off with the current Seventh Fleet orders rather than a defense agreement with all its problems concerning "phrasing" with respect to the various island positions controlled by the ROC.⁴⁷

The shelling of Quemoy on September 3, 1954 sent shock waves through the US military and diplomatic establishment. Eisenhower phoned Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith on September 4 and in a relieved tone told his friend “We are not at war now.”⁴⁸ Smith was a former general and right hand man of Eisenhower’s during WWII and in September 1954 undersecretary of state.⁴⁹ Despite this sentiment, the US government was scrambling to evaluate and come up with a strategy to avoid or, in the case of many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, start another war in Asia. In Washington on September 9, the National Security Council met for the first time since the September 3 shelling of Quemoy, only the NSC was without the two main architects of American foreign policy in the 1950s, Eisenhower and Dulles. Dulles was still in Asia and Ike was vacationing in what he called his “Summer White House” in Denver, Colorado. Vice President Richard Nixon chaired the NSC meeting and found a deeply divided government and military on how the US should respond.⁵⁰

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford spoke for the majority of the military when he recommended the United States use force to protect the offshore islands from Communist takeover. Army Joint Chief Mathew Ridgway was the lone dissenter among the chiefs, stating the coastal islands had no military benefit to the defense of Taiwan and any argument about the islands psychological benefit (more on this later) was not one the Joint Chiefs of Staff should evaluate.⁵¹ General Mathew Ridgway was the model soldier who had risen through the ranks with distinction in WWII and eventually became commander of UN forces during the Korean War after Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur.⁵² Ridgway’s caution with regards to sending American troops into harm’s way for questionable reasons extended beyond the Taiwan

Straits and into Indochina, where he convinced Eisenhower not to send in US soldiers to aid the French at Dien Bien Phu just a few months previous to the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis.⁵³ Radford, on the other hand, had argued the exact opposite position as Ridgway over Dien Bien Phu. Radford advised the president, at the time, that the French in Indochina were about to collapse and all of Southeast Asia would surely follow. He recommended to the president that the US gets involved. Radford said “I consider that the U.S. must be prepared to act promptly and in force possibly to a frantic and belated request by the French for U.S. intervention.”⁵⁴ Radford’s interventionist streak was not dulled by the president not taking his advice on Vietnam and was convinced once again that America needed to intervene militarily, only this time in the straits. Radford told Nixon point blank that “our prestige had been committed 100%,” to the offshore islands.⁵⁵

Radford believed that no ground troops would be necessary to defend the Nationalist-held islands, while Ridgway said at least one division would be needed. The most important aspect of Radford’s assessment was that air attacks on the mainland would probably be necessary in the defense of the Dachen’s and definitely needed in defending Quemoy and the other main island controlled by Jiang, Matsu. This military estimate would later prove a decisive element for Eisenhower in his determination of how to proceed during the crisis, especially the JCS’s conclusion that atomic weapons may need to be used. Radford argued a major air strike against PLA airfields and gun emplacements was the only way to insure the safety of the islands. If the administration ultimately decided to limit military action against the mainland, Radford said his recommendation would change and his new advice would be not to defend. He made it

clear that the chiefs, including Ridgway, did not want a repeat of the limited war imposed on the military during the Korean War.⁵⁶ Ridgway echoed that statement by saying the US should not get into a situation in which the Communists had a safe haven for PLA air that the US could not attack. Ridgway further stated that if the military were not given the right, at the command level, to attack the mainland they would recommend not defending the offshore islands.⁵⁷ Ridgway had conformed to both Truman and Eisenhower's policy of not expanding the Korean War in the wake of MacArthur's firing, but it is clear the general had no intention to fight another Korean style conflict.

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson contradicted Radford's assessment on the need for ground troops when he said the US should not get into this without recognizing that all branches of the military would be involved. He also commented that it would be difficult to explain to the public why the US was going to war on mainland China over these small islands, when we did not over Korea or Vietnam. Acting Secretary of State Bedell Smith had been in contact with Dulles during his Asia trip, and at this point in the meeting summarized Dulles's views by saying the US should defend the islands despite their dubious military value as long as they were in fact defensible and the administration cleared its action through Congress. If America could not defend them, Smith continued, then the US would find itself in "another Dien Bien Phu."⁵⁸ It is important to note that these were the initial conclusions of Dulles without the benefit of face-to-face consultation with his staff or, for that matter, the president. Dulles never seemed too comfortable with the direction the crisis was taking him and Eisenhower and this can be seen by his stipulation that a fractious Congress would have to be consulted and a guarantee that the islands could be secured. Dulles was throwing a bone to the hawks by

saying the islands should be defended, not wanting to alienate the majority of the Joint Chiefs, but it should come as no surprise that a few days later the tone and policy prescriptions of Dulles change dramatically during an equally dramatic NSC meeting in Denver on September 12.

Fundamentally, Admiral Radford believed that if Jiang lost the offshore islands, then the morale of his troops would fall to the point of an easy takeover of Formosa by the PLA, and this would then jeopardize the entire American position in the Far East.⁵⁹ The military significance of the various coastal islands became a running debate within the administration throughout the crisis, however, the issue of Nationalist troop morale and the psychological impact of the loss of the offshore islands, became the obsession of the executive branch and the argument of first and last resort against all those who opposed American bluster (if not actual action) in the Taiwan Straits. One cannot overstate the messianic hold the question of ROC troop morale had on Eisenhower and Dulles during this period. While there are a variety of reasons why the crisis persisted for such a long period of time, only this issue is mentioned by Eisenhower and Dulles, ad nauseam, from the beginning of the crisis to the end. The morale issue continuously held the administration, particularly Eisenhower, back from making a more realistic appraisal of the confrontation with China.

The Taiwan Straits Crisis was not the birthplace of Eisenhower's preoccupation with morale. As early as 1953 the president outlined how allied self-confidence in the context of the Cold War was an important issue. The president believed that the spirit of underdeveloped allies in the Cold War was of major concern and the US should place troops and bases there for the morale of these countries until they could begin to

contribute significantly to their defense against communism. However, the president made clear that the US could not arm a Roman wall against communism on their own and would not garrison Europe forever.⁶⁰

The only significant push back against the importance of the morale of Jiang's troops came during this meeting from an unlikely source. John Foster Dulles's brother, Allen Dulles, served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1953-61. During this initial NSC meeting over the Quemoy shelling, Nixon asked the CIA head what the ramifications for the US and the ROC would be if the administration decided not to intervene. Allen Dulles responded by saying the prestige of the US would be diminished, but suffer less if the coastal islands were voluntarily evacuated versus being overrun. As for Mao and the PRC, Dulles concluded that they would obviously gain in stature. Allen Dulles continued by saying that, "he did not believe that over the long run the loss of the offshore islands would have a very grave impact on the morale of the Chinese Nationalist government and the forces on Formosa." Radford, as one would expect, vehemently disagreed with Allen Dulles's last point saying that Jiang would not be convinced to evacuate and even if the US could, "the result might be a revolt and the loss of control of Formosa. Formosa might even go over to the Communists. We must consider our course of action in the light of our total strategic position in the Far East."⁶¹

Radford argued against the idea that the Nationalist-held islands were not of any value as well. Bedell Smith remarked that in the past, there had been no serious consideration to defend the islands. Smith's ideas were especially convincing because it was coming from the man who had studied the issue previously as the predecessor to Allen Dulles at the CIA. Radford responded by trying to make it clear that there were

reasons to hold on to the islands, for example as a place to invade the mainland in the future. The Admiral had also earlier in the meeting argued that the offshore islands may not be necessary for the defense of Formosa itself, but were important from a “strictly military point of view.” Radford also opposed seeking Congressional approval, stating that it would take too much time and the offshore islands needed to be protected immediately and that this protection almost had to be automatic.⁶² Despite the rigorous debate, no consensus was reached on September 9, but the transcripts and stories of the heated meeting surely reached Eisenhower in Denver and the president would be the one that would ultimately decide whether to follow Radford into a war on mainland China or forge a different course with the help of his Secretary of State who was, himself, on his way home from Asia.

With Dulles back in the United States, Eisenhower called for a national security meeting at Lowry Air Force Base in Denver, Colorado on September 12, 1954, nine days after the Quemoy shelling.⁶³ The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Dulles’s trip to Asia and decide on an official position for the government on the offshore islands based on Radford’s recommendations, the views of the other council members, and most importantly the views of the president himself.⁶⁴ The reason for the Dulles visit to Asia, which coincided with the outbreak of the crisis, was to negotiate a new international organization to combat communism.

The name of this organization was the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization or SEATO. Although SEATO sounded like an eastern equivalent to NATO, Dulles and Eisenhower saw it distinctly different in form if not function. SEATO was born out of Dulles’s failed attempt to create a similar organization he called United Action before the

Geneva Peace conference in the spring and summer of 1954, which decided the fate of the Korean War and the Indochina affair between the French colonial forces and Ho Chi Minh's Communist Viet Minh. The countries included in this new organization would have been Australia, New Zealand, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Thailand, Philippines, and Indochina. Dulles initially opposed the name of SEATO, because of its allusions to NATO that would inevitably occur, and because Dulles saw SEATO more in the vein of the Organization of American States (OAS), which was a deliberative consulting organization that did not have specific troop obligations for member nations.⁶⁵ Dulles further saw SEATO as an extension of the "Monroe Doctrine formula previously used in the Anzus and Philippine treaties."⁶⁶ Aside from the western countries involved, the other Asian allied nations were not in an advantageous economic or military position to contribute a significant military force to a NATO style organization. It was this plan that Dulles was finalizing in Manila when the shells began falling on Quemoy on September 3, 1954.⁶⁷ The extent to which Mao was feeling pressure by a new containment type organization attempting to surround and strangle China is one that has not been delved into in any great detail as of yet in the scholarship. This study is focused on the American perspective and will not attempt to ascertain how this affected Mao's decision making in the straits, however, SEATO is important to how the US eventually looked at the US-Taiwan MDT in its broader context of the Cold War and the American policy of containment in Asia. Dulles added, in a "separate protocol, Cambodia, Laos, and the free areas of Vietnam were also included in the treaty area."⁶⁸

The Denver NSC meeting began with Dulles reporting on the success of the SEATO talks. The discussions were fraught with divisions and compromise. Dulles

disclosed that the biggest controversy was over who the target of the treaty should be. Dulles wanted it to be communism, while the majority of the other signees wanted it to be aggression from any quarter. Dulles, in the end, told the new SEATO member's that only Communist attacks would allow for US intervention. Although this position seems to be somewhat dogmatic within the context of the Cold War, Dulles had good reason not to accept a broader definition of what actions would bring the treaty into effect. Dulles was afraid that border disputes in the region, which did not concern US national interest, could drag America into a war. The example he cited was a confrontation between India and Pakistan, since Pakistan was a signatory and India was most decidedly not.⁶⁹ Like Rhee in South Korea or Jiang on Taiwan, the US was not going to be forced into war by allies when American interests were not involved. SEATO was never a strong organization and did not represent a lasting Cold War organization, only surviving into the mid-seventies. However, it does show both Dulles's and Eisenhower's focus on the Pacific region as artillery fire directed on Quemoy began.

The secretary of state continued his Asia briefing by discussing his talks in Taipei with Jiang Jieshi. Jiang made his expected plea for a defense treaty with the US, arguing that America had concluded varying types of pacts "with all of the other free nations in the area." Jiang understood Washington's reticence out of a fear that Taiwan would drag the US into a war with the mainland, but he argued that his government not only did not want direct US help in retaking all of China but that it could even be a detriment to winning the hearts and minds of Asia if America led with its military. Jiang also made his case by stating that he was doing everything he could to clear any ROC action with the US beforehand and that they had even postponed a response to the Quemoy shelling for

four days waiting for American guidance. Admiral Radford at this point in Dulles's retelling said he doubted that Jiang's last claim was true.⁷⁰

Dulles made the argument that Jiang was better off under the president's Seventh Fleet orders born out of the Korean War. Dulles told Jiang that Eisenhower would have greater flexibility under these directives than a specific defense treaty. The secretary was meeting with Jiang just a few days after the attacks on Quemoy, and it is surprising that the shelling did not figure heavily in the discussions. Dulles believed that Jiang held back out of fear that if he brought the issue up, the US might refuse a specific plea for help.⁷¹

When the NSC meeting turned to the most pressing issue, the coastal islands, Radford began his argument for protecting the positions after Allen Dulles gave a brief presentation on the crisis. Radford said "that the importance of the offshore islands to the defense of Formosa cannot be overemphasized, but he could not say that they were essential, although the loss of these islands would make the defense more difficult." Dulles wanted to know whether Quemoy et al was "substantially related" to the defense of Taiwan, because he was worried that if they were not, then the president was on shaky ground constitutionally if he chose to act. Eisenhower and the attorney general both said this was a close call. Secretary of Defense Wilson clarified the arguments by saying that the offshore islands could not be defended without US help and intervention would require America to bomb the mainland. Wilson declared "the choice was between the loss of morale from the resulting loss of the islands, and the danger of precipitating war with Communist China." Eisenhower added, "this was not just a danger but would constitute precipitating such a war."⁷²

One of the major arguments against the protection of Quemoy, Matsu, and the Dachen's was that under international law, they really did belong to the mainland. Wilson summed up this belief by saying that he saw "a difference between the position regarding Formosa and the Pescadores, which were formerly Japanese, and the offshore islands, which are involved in finishing up the civil war in China." According to Wilson the United States should stop "supporting Chiang in stirring up hell with Communist China." Beyond the legal question of which island really belonged to who, Wilson's main objection to Radford's position was that it would start a war with China. Wilson believed "the Communist Chinese could accept substantial attrition of their forces and therefore force us to expand the war" and that "we should know how we could end such a war before we started it."⁷³ The idea of America *starting* a war was one that weighed heavily on Eisenhower and is one explanation for why he made the decision he did during this dramatic crisis meeting on an air force base in Denver.

The president was not swayed by any arguments, at least at this point in the crisis, that placed Quemoy as the lynch pin of Formosan security. He wondered aloud if the Nationalists could hold the offshore islands, which he doubted whether "the defense of Formosa would be considered drastically different from what it is today." However, Eisenhower pointed out that the morale and psychological aspects of the offshore islands were important and it was right that the council had brought up the issue and proceeded to argued the different merits of the case. Radford continued to contend that Quemoy had military value despite the president's seeming final word on the issue. Radford reiterated that the offshore islands were important for disrupting PRC communication in the region and Quemoy was the perfect staging point for an invasion of the mainland. Radford made

the point, from a moral and American responsibility point of view, that the US had encouraged the ROC to occupy these areas, had funded and supplied these forces, and that American personnel were, at that moment, on the ground on these islands.⁷⁴

One aspect of this extraordinary meeting is that it largely turned into a debate between Eisenhower and Radford. Both men traded blows, counterpoint to counterpoint. Eisenhower did not like the idea of having to put American prestige on the line in every corner of the world and staying indefinitely to defend the position. The president feared that the offshore islands would tie down American forces in the region and after seeing how the US responded to this particular crisis, the Communists would then use this tactic all over the world. He wanted the freedom to decide where and when American interests were truly at stake, again echoing the SEATO decisions on border disputes and insulating the administration from poor decision making by Rhee, Jiang, or any other US ally. Eisenhower would decide if America was going to go to war. Radford countered Eisenhower's assessment by articulating his view that the military did not envision a scenario in which the armed forces would be tied down over the Quemoy issue. Radford, ever the navy man, said that America's mobile forces, in the form of carriers, would be leading any defense and could nimbly move and react to any situation in the Pacific, even a renewed attack on the Korean peninsula.⁷⁵

The president, after listening to Radford, clarified for all those present that what they were talking about was war. Eisenhower stated that if they went ahead with this plan he would be in danger of impeachment proceedings by the Congress. The president reiterated that they had no constitutional authority to act and they would have to go before Congress and get approval. Under no circumstances would the president act unless

it was constitutionally mandated.⁷⁶ One of the lingering constitutional questions coming out of the Korean War was with regards to presidential authority and how and when did the executive have the right to engage the military in combat operations. The Republican Party criticized Harry Truman mercilessly for not getting Congressional approval for the Korean War and Eisenhower himself pledged when nominated that “We charge that they [the Truman administration] have plunged us into a war with Korea without the consent of our citizens through their authorized representatives in Congress and have carried on that war without will to victory.”⁷⁷ This apparent public pledge to seek Congressional approval before ordering combat operations by candidate Eisenhower would become much more important in 1955 with the creation of the Formosa Resolution. The president also contended that with regards to the present situation, that if a war were coming he would rather fight it against the Soviets than the Chinese.⁷⁸ Fundamentally, Eisenhower made it clear he was not prepared to go to war over these small offshore ROC positions.⁷⁹

With a gridlocked Security Council, Dulles stepped in and “expressed the hope that the Council would never have to make a more difficult decision.” Dulles restated the arguments of both sides saying on one hand if the US backed down it could endanger American positions throughout Asia but, on the other hand, if the US went to the defense of the islands it “would involve us in war with Communist China. Outside of Rhee and Chiang, the rest of the world would condemn us, as well as a substantial part of the U.S. people. The British fear atomic war and would not consider the reasons for our action to be justified. Possibly very few Americans would agree.”⁸⁰ Dulles decided to offer a third path that he had been thinking about since the end of his Asia trip that secured SEATO. He proposed taking the islands issue to the United Nations since the president had

overruled a strong military defense of Quemoy and other Nationalist holdings outside of Formosa and the Pescadores.⁸¹ Eisenhower consented to moving forward with Dulles's plan. With the UN suggestion, the president had decided on a diplomatic course of action that he further backed up by saying the American people would not support another war.⁸² Eisenhower laid down in this meeting the benchmark for action in the Taiwan Straits for the remainder of the crisis when he told the Security Council that "we must enlist world support and the approval of the American people."⁸³ Without domestic and international backing, Eisenhower would not give any orders that would likely start a war with China. This determination acted as an anchor keeping the administration from bold military action, and consequently forming the rock in the rock and a hard place America found itself with regards to the offshore islands.

With the understanding that the US was going to use the UN, both Dulles and Special Assistant to the President, Robert Cutler, recommended to Eisenhower that the policy of "unleashing Chiang" be ended and America cease its support and encouragement of ROC raids on Mainland China.⁸⁴ This move ended an Eisenhower administration practice, which had fueled the beginning of the crisis in the first place, too late to have a measurable impact on the international stage. On September 17, 1954, Dulles met with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and enlisted his support for a UN resolution to be placed before the Security Council. Eden was skeptical at first, especially concerning the issue of the offshore islands like Quemoy. He understood and supported the protection of Formosa but Dulles needed several days to convince the United Kingdom of the logic of his plan.⁸⁵ Eden suggested that New Zealand, which at that time was on the Security Council as a rotating member, be the nation to bring a

resolution on the offshore islands forward.⁸⁶ With the United States and Great Britain pulling the strings, New Zealand became the neutral arbiter in the UN for a resolution that was code named Oracle.⁸⁷ The British Cabinet, just before the Dulles meeting, had already determined that they could not support a war over Quemoy and hoped that they could impress upon the Americans the idea of neutralizing the offshore islands over time by, among other things, discouraging any further raids by the Nationalists on the mainland.⁸⁸

These events occurred in the midst of a mid-term election in the US. The myth of presidential administration's not paying attention to domestic politics and elections during an international crisis is a persistent one, and often argued most profusely by presidents and State Departments. However, the myth is just that, and Dulles and Eisenhower were no different. At the end of September, Dulles wrote to Eisenhower telling him that Eden had spoken with the New Zealand representative and they were advising the US that they should move quickly before leaks to the press could damage the initiative. Dulles was concerned about the effects this would have on the upcoming US election. He advised the president that they should fast track UN action because if they waited it might lose some "of its persuasiveness and genuineness if we should delay another month." He believed that in the end, it could have a good effect on the election but he would meet with Nixon to get his opinion and report back to Eisenhower.⁸⁹ Although Vice President Nixon was on the Eisenhower administration's National Security Council, and even chaired it in the absence of Eisenhower and Dulles, Nixon's role during this crisis was largely as a political advisor whose job was to give the president an idea of how national security issues would play on Capitol Hill. Hence,

Dulles's meeting with Nixon to gauge how house members and senators would react to a UN proposal in the middle of their campaigns. The UN decision had far reaching consequences for US-Taiwan relations and the possibility of a mutual defense treaty.

Although Dulles expressed doubts as to whether Oracle would actually produce results in the UN, he felt it was at least a good public relations move to build support for the United States in the court of world opinion.⁹⁰ The real problem was gauging, and hopefully gaining, Jiang's support for the resolution. The American argument to Jiang in favor of the UN was that the Security Council action represented the best way for Taiwan to maintain control of the offshore islands. This was especially true if the United States decided not to "intervene decisively in their defense."⁹¹ On October 5, 1954, the US Ambassador to the ROC, Karl Rankin, reported back to Washington that Jiang would not look favorably on Oracle. As a result of this determination, Rankin suggested that Dulles go forward with negotiations on a mutual defense treaty to smooth the way for the UN Security Council resolution.⁹² Jiang was opposed to Oracle and feared that it would lead to the admittance of the PRC into the UN. He even asked the United States to oppose the measure in the UN Security Council, obviously never having been told that the originator of the plan was his closest ally.⁹³ The PRC and ROC were certain to be hostile to Oracle because it attacked both countries' desires in the straits. For Communist China the UN proposal would internationalize what it viewed as an internal affair and reject that they had a claim to Formosa. For the Nationalist's, the UN Security Council measure would deny them their right to regain the mainland through armed action. For both sides the New Zealand proposal would freeze the current situation and establish a long term status quo neither government wanted.⁹⁴

The next day, Dulles took Rankin's advice and recommended to the National Security Council that the administration pursue talks with Taiwan on a bilateral defense agreement.⁹⁵ Two days later on October 7, Eisenhower signed off on treaty negotiations with the caveat that Jiang would have to "assume a defensive posture" in the straights.⁹⁶ If Jiang would give such an assurance, the only other issue of contention was the case of Quemoy, Matsu, and the Dachens. As noted above, the president in Denver, on September 12, had decided not to use the American military to secure those islands. As a result, Dulles knew that the islands could not be included in the treaty.

Before negotiations could begin, however, Dulles needed to convince Jiang not to oppose Oracle. Dulles telegraphed Jiang and told him that UN action would aid in deterring the PRC from attacking the offshore islands and expose the PRC and USSR as warlike nations. Dulles told Jiang that the US would support the measure. Then Dulles introduced the sweetener by saying, "We are in principle prepared to make with you a defensive security treaty along the lines which you discussed with me." Dulles advised Jiang that they had to wait to make an announcement until they could consult with Congress, and after the elections. Oracle, on the other hand, needed to go forward quickly because of the imminent threat to the offshore islands, and then Dulles had US officials read the language of the UN resolution to Jiang.⁹⁷ Jiang was certainly happy to begin negotiations on a MDT; however, bringing him around to support Oracle was a longer process for the Eisenhower administration.

The news that the US was entering into negotiations with the ROC for a bilateral defense treaty was not welcome in London. Eden reported to the Cabinet that "disconcerting developments" were occurring with regards to Oracle and "it was

unfortunate that the United States Government had not warned us earlier of this possibility.”⁹⁸ Eden believed that the US had planned a treaty negotiations element to its strategy all along and expressed indignation that his government was left out of the loop. However, Eisenhower and Dulles’s response to the crisis was ad hoc at best and the development of treaty negotiations was clearly driven by the decision to take the crisis to the United Nations in the first place and not a preconceived master plan. Despite believing they were the victims of a double cross, Eden and the Cabinet had good reason to be skeptical, and demanded that the offshore islands not appear in the new pact and some restrictions on ROC mainland raids should be included in the MDT. Eden was also instructed to tell Washington that Oracle could not go forward until these questions had been satisfactorily answered, especially with regards to Quemoy.⁹⁹

The main problem with a bilateral defense agreement between the US and ROC had always been the offshore islands. The solution that Dulles came up with was to include language in the treaty that neither increased American commitments to the area nor reduced those responsibilities.¹⁰⁰ This was a delicate balancing act in which no one knew what the ultimate consequences would be. Dulles made clear in the first formal negotiating meeting with Taiwan that the United States would need “a fairly close definition of the mutual defense area” if the treaty was to make it through the US Senate ratification process.¹⁰¹ Dulles conveniently left out of the discussion the president’s decision in Denver not to use force to defend the offshore positions. This desire to keep Quemoy and other islands out of the agreement would later lead to language in article VI of the treaty, stating that the defensive area would include Taiwan and the Pescadores and “such other territory as may be determined by mutual agreement.”¹⁰²

The overall purpose and reasoning for this language was multilayered. The US position on the matter was that the function of the treaty, and the language that included the line “such other territory,” would keep the PRC guessing as to American intentions and not encourage them to take the offshore positions. In addition, the Eisenhower administration did not believe the treaty would receive Senate ratification if they specified Quemoy, Matsu and the Dachen’s in the agreement.¹⁰³ Dulles went further with this line of thought, stating that the language in the treaty needed to be “fuzzed up” in relation to an American response to a PLA attack on the offshore islands. Dulles wanted to keep Beijing guessing as to a probable American counter attack. Dulles intended to create a situation in which Eisenhower could react militarily to a PLA attack on an offshore island, only, if he believed it was a prelude to a more aggressive move against Formosa itself, maximizing Eisenhower’s ability to manage the crisis.¹⁰⁴ The precarious nature of the offshore islands and American unwillingness to commit to their defense, caused Dulles to go against his basic guiding principle of making international obligations and ‘red lines’ clear to your enemy lest he miscalculate and cause a war.

On November 1, 1954 the ROC air force attacked the Chinese mainland without American clearance.¹⁰⁵ As a result of this action, Dulles proposed a protocol to the treaty in an attempt at formalizing the private agreement that Taiwan would consult with the US before conducting offensive actions. Dulles wanted it made clear that America would not have treaty obligations forced on it by unauthorized Taiwanese attacks on mainland China.¹⁰⁶ The ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh, representing Taiwan in the deliberations along with Ambassador to the US Wellington Koo, objected strenuously to the inclusion of this protocol within the text of the treaty, and this became a major point

of contention throughout the negotiating process.¹⁰⁷ Although Yeh and Koo objected to Dulles' proposed covenant, they attempted to trade its inclusion in the treaty for an American promise to drop Oracle. Robertson, who was lead negotiator for the US during many of the meetings, flatly turned down this proposal. Eventually Dulles consented to his protocol being initiated in the form of an exchange of notes between Taipei and Washington in conjunction with the treaty's signing as a way of getting passed the roadblock.¹⁰⁸

Although the decision was made to go forward with treaty negotiations, not all on the national security team were in favor of a bilateral agreement. Radford and most of the joint chiefs were opposed to the idea and expressed some annoyance that a full hearing of their views was not requested before the decision was made. Eisenhower dismissed Radford's complaint stating that it only made sense to conclude a treaty enumerating the policy of the United States to protect Taiwan.¹⁰⁹ Later, Radford warned Dulles that if the offshore islands were kept out of the treaty, the Admiral believed they would eventually fall to the Communists.¹¹⁰ Despite this warning, and obvious hostility to the whole idea, the die was cast and the United States would have a defense treaty with Taiwan.

In mid-October 1954, Dulles outlined where the administration's policy was with regards to Asia, and China in particular. Dulles said, "Our basic policy is to be clear and strong in our resolve to defend vital United States interest, but not to be provocative of war. We want peace so long as this does not involve the sacrifice of our vital interests or fundamental moral principles." In support of this policy, the US had concluded treaties in the area and ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa and taken control of the

Ryukyu Islands. America's policy in the Pacific was to keep US defenses far from the US coast. The Korean War was ended to prevent an all-out war with the PRC and possibly the USSR. Dulles continued by saying that on the Korean peninsula America's major concern was to keep Rhee from restarting the war. In Vietnam, Dulles summed up America's position by saying that "the Executive was ready to recommend to the nation that we intervene in the Indochina fighting on condition that the objective would be independence and not colonialism, and if the action would be united action, including those most directly concerned in the area. When these conditions were not obtainable, we acquiesced perforce in the Indochina armistice and we stated that we would not seek, by force, to violate the armistice. We are, however, seeking to limit the ill results of the armistice as they may affect us, notably by the Manila Pact."¹¹¹

Dulles continued by saying American policy with regards to China was to recognize the Nationalists as *the* government of China. America would give aid to the ROC for its economy and military, and continue its position of non-recognition of the PRC, oppose the UN seating of Communist China, and maintain a trade embargo on the mainland. In the past the administration had relied "on Executive Order for defense of Formosa and the Pescadores by United States Armed Forces" and also "Encouragement of Chinats' harassing operations by sea and air against Communist shipping and certain mainland targets of opportunity. (This policy is partially and provisionally in suspense.)" America had, in the past, left the offshore islands issue to the PRC and ROC to fight it out with the US supporting the ROC materially.¹¹²

Dulles said that the above policies were put in place during the Korean War and later during the Indochina fighting. All of these decisions were made under the "War

powers” provisions of the US Constitution. Dulles told Eisenhower that some changes were needed since the shelling of Quemoy on September 3, 1954. A mutual defense treaty with the ROC should go forward without including the offshore islands. Echoing the legal debate over Formosa versus the offshore islands, Dulles argued that Japan had never ceded sovereignty of Formosa to China. Japan had renounced its control, but did not proscribe who would get it. The US, as WWII victor, then claimed an “unsatisfied interest” in Formosa and the MDT should now replace Seventh Fleet orders, which were becoming constitutionally “questionable.” The new treaty should be defensive, and the ROC could not continue to attack the mainland and then turn around and claim a “privileged sanctuary” on Taiwan.¹¹³

This new position was in line with US policy with regards to Germany and Korea as well, where a military settlement of reunification had been renounced. However, Dulles continued, if internal PRC opportunities presented themselves to the US and ROC, they should obviously take advantage of any weakness in Communist control of the Chinese mainland. Furthermore, Dulles said that the UN should step in and stop the fighting over the offshore islands and restore the status quo. The long-term solution would need to be peacefully resolved sometime in the future. If a resolution was vetoed in the UN Security Council, then the US could argue that Formosa be given the material support to defend the offshore islands. Dulles argued that the PRC was more aggressive towards the US than the USSR and this would justify a harsher embargo as well. If the PRC accepted UN action, the embargo may be harder to maintain throughout the international community.¹¹⁴

As the negotiations were completed on the Mutual Defense Treaty, and with the offshore issue and exchange of notes agreed to, the treaty was ready for initialing, signing, and eventual ratification by the Senate. Dulles initialed the treaty with Yeh on November 23, 1954.¹¹⁵ Eisenhower and Dulles saw the treaty in the broader context of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense treaty signed September 8, 1954, and as “another link in the chain of collective defense arrangements in the West Pacific.” The overall purpose of the agreement was to deter aggressive actions by communism in the treaty area.¹¹⁶ Dulles tried to make it clear that the treaty neither “promoted nor demoted” the offshore islands and he asserted that the bilateral agreement would deter Beijing from engaging in “probing” operations in the straits.¹¹⁷ London was not nearly as optimistic about the MDT. The British believed that Oracle was dead and expressed in closed door meetings that the New Zealand government were “as unhappy as we.”¹¹⁸ Eden claimed that the US-ROC treaty “might well have the effect of increasing international tension in the Far East.”¹¹⁹ Unfortunately, the British foreign secretary was more prescient than anyone in Washington could possibly realize.

Now it was Mao Zedong who had a decision to make. His ideological enemy, the US, had signed a defense treaty with his domestic civil war enemy, the ROC. The agreement, however, was vague on what the US would do if the PRC gave the go ahead for the PLA to renew its military operations against the Nationalist held islands throughout the South China Sea. Would the US go to war? Would the US back down? America was certainly, from Mao’s perspective, not making a lot of sense. Mao’s decision came on January 18, 1955 when he allowed the head of the PLA, Peng Dehuai, to authorize General Zhang to go ahead with his campaign against the Dachen’s, a

campaign that had been cancelled in September 1954 because of Nehru's China visit. Zhang's first target was the island of Yijiangshan just to the north of the main Dachen group.¹²⁰

With the People's Republic of China's 'Liberate Taiwan' campaign, the decision to shell Quemoy, and the resumption of the Dachen campaign, Mao Zedong ensured that a defense treaty was negotiated and signed by the United States and the Nationalist Republic of China. John Foster Dulles, in reaction to the Peoples Liberation Army's aggressive actions, decided to take the offshore issue to the United Nations after the president had refused to use American military power to secure the offshore islands, which in turn forced him to go forward with a defense treaty with Jiang Jieshi to secure his support of Oracle. Neither Dulles nor Mao wanted a defense treaty at the beginning of 1954, but events conspired to make the treaty a reality.

By the end of 1954, the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was paradoxically one of the causes of and also the result of the Taiwan Straits Crisis begun on September 3. Both the PRC and the US had danced the dangerous game of brinkmanship to gain an edge over the other, and by the beginning of 1955, it was Jiang that had achieved his goal of a bilateral pact. Whether Jiang intentionally set out to accomplish this from the beginning is difficult to discern, but the outcome gave Taiwan the security Jiang relished, all in the hope of making a return to the mainland one day in the future. Dulles's decision to 'fuzz up' American intentions with regards to the offshore islands backfired spectacularly once the MDT was signed and moved the crisis into a more dangerous period. The treaty had the exact opposite effect the Eisenhower administration had intended and only deepened the Taiwan Straits Crisis, extending it into the new year.

Eisenhower had made the decision not to go to war in Denver on September 12, 1954;
now the president was faced with that decision all over again.

Chapter Three:

Aftermath: Eisenhower and Dulles Reevaluate a Failing Strategy

The United States and Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty attempted to deter Communists from aggressive actions in the offshore area. President Eisenhower asserted that the deal complemented the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of September 8, 1954. Secretary Dulles put the arrangement in the context of a series of security alliances in the West Pacific designed to thwart Communist expansion.¹²¹ The new bilateral accord only specified Taiwan and the Pescadores for the Republic of China; however, the language of the covenant did include reference to “such other territories” that fell under the contracts’ protection if “by mutual agreement.”¹²² The joint statements of Washington and Taipei, announcing the treaty’s signing, left the offshore islands’ status in a state of ambiguity as to their defense. During the press conference announcing the deal, Dulles emphasized that the pact neither “promoted or demoted” the status of the controversial positions.¹²³

The test of this new deal came on January 10, 1955, when 200 PLA aircraft attacked the Nationalist held Dachen islands 200 miles north of Formosa.¹²⁴ Republic of China Ambassador to the United States Wellington V. Koo called the air assault a larger attack than any conducted by PRC forces during the entirety of the Korean War.¹²⁵ The initial reaction by Eisenhower, Dulles, and Radford to the PLA attack on Yijiangshan was to abandon the Denver meeting determination not to defend Quemoy and Matsu. They believed that the PLA’s Dachen campaign had radically changed the reality on the ground with regards to the straits crisis. However, all of the old problems with regard to the offshore islands eventually resurfaced. Eisenhower and Dulles, despite their

immediate, visceral, response to the MDT failing to deter the PRC, were unable to make a public declaration of full US military support for Quemoy and Matsu because they still lacked the necessary international and domestic support as well as a new concern over how US action in Asia would affect Europe.

Koo quickly asked what “moral and material support” his country could expect from the US as a result of the Yijiangshan raid, adding he did not expect direct American military involvement at that time. The ambassador commented that United States response in this matter would inform Generalissimo Jiang whether a complete defense of the Dachen’s should take place. Knowing his allies minds, Koo admitted the Dachen’s had dubious military value, but argued that the islands had strong psychological value and that their loss would cause great distress back on Taiwan.¹²⁶

Dulles and the president were shocked at the play for the Dachen’s and concluded that the defense treaty was not enough to solve the crisis in the straits.¹²⁷ On January 19, 1955, Dulles, Eisenhower, and Radford decided the time had come, as a result of the Dachen incident, to make the US policy clear as to what the United States “would or would not do” in regards to the defense of the Chinese Nationalist held offshore islands, exclusive of Formosa and the Pescadores. The president and his advisors concluded that the PRC was preparing to take back all of the Nationalist-held positions. If this occurred, American prestige and Asian allies’ confidence in the United States would be damaged, as well as deliver a deep blow to the morale of western-leaning countries in the region.¹²⁸ While the administration scrambled to arrest the failure of the MDT behind the scenes, the main voices of Eisenhower’s White House were sounding confident and nonchalant in public. Dulles told the press that the capture of Yijiangshan was of little overall

importance and Radford, after being asked if he was worried by the bold PLA move, responded by saying “I try not to worry too much about anything.”¹²⁹

Secretary Dulles reported his conversation with Eisenhower and Radford to a meeting of State Department officials, CIA director Allen Dulles, and Special Assistant to the President Robert Cutler. They then decided, preliminarily, to make a public statement announcing that Nationalist forces ought to withdraw from some islands and regroup on others. Unofficially, Jiang’s military would withdraw from every offshore position except the Quemoy’s and Matsu. Dulles and his small group also concluded that America commit itself to possibly aid, with American armed forces, in the evacuation of the various untenable positions. This initial plan morphed into the Nationalist evacuation of all of the Dachen islands. To further make US policy clear, the United States pledged, in a major reversal of the decisions made at the Denver NSC meeting, to make public its intention to defend Big and Little Quemoy. In addition, protection of these specific locales needed to be executed with the backing of a Congressional resolution.¹³⁰ Because the MDT failed to thwart the PRC, Dulles and Eisenhower decided, on January 19, 1955, ask Congress for an official finding giving the president special war powers to protect Taiwan and, if need be, the remaining offshore islands.¹³¹ This became known as the Formosa Resolution.

Damage to the Nationalist military’s morale, as a result of the forced evacuation of the Dachen’s was a forgone conclusion by the administration and this became the justification for the defense of Quemoy. Dulles believed the actions of the PRC had forced the hand of the United States because of American commitments and treaties with allies in the region. Dulles understood the new policy they were considering increased the

risk of general war with the PRC. On January 19, 1955, during a White House meeting, the first uneasiness concerning a change with regards to the offshore islands surfaced. Under Secretary of State Robert R. Bowie, expressed apprehension about a categorical statement of support for Quemoy and suggested United States protection be predicated on UN action to restore peace to the Taiwan Straits. After the establishment of order, Bowie argued, America could end its defensive obligation to Quemoy. No mention of specific Nationalist positions, apart from Formosa and the Pescadores, ended up in the first draft of the administration's idea of language for the Congressional action authorizing the president to use force.¹³²

During the January 19, 1955 meeting with Dulles, Eisenhower, and Radford, Dulles had advised the president the offshore islands could only be reliably supported with American military might.¹³³ The secretary of state also stressed his view that United States "prestige" was suffering in the West Pacific as a result of the Dachen incident and nations in the region were viewing the US as running away from a fight. In addition, Dulles communicated his belief that Quemoy definitely held military significance, while the Dachen's did not. Admiral Radford agreed with Dulles, saying that the United States needed to take a stand and even told the president that he preferred to hold all of the offshore islands the ROC controlled. However, the admiral acquiesced to the secretary's Dachen evacuation plan. The decision to guard Quemoy and possibly Matsu, and make this determination public, occurred only in terms of a provisional defense until the UN could force a cease-fire.¹³⁴ Despite Radford agreeing to the Dulles plan, the JCS Chairman a few days later had Admiral Robert Carney lay out an argument before Eisenhower detailing that evacuating the Dachen's "would be much more arduous than

their defense or reinforcement” and that the whole plan was “unwise and wanted to register with the president the difficulties they foresaw.” The CIA gave its determination that the Communists would not attack while an evacuation was underway, undercutting the joint chiefs concerns.¹³⁵ Radford and the chiefs, save Ridgway, were pushing for a harder line, but the president stuck with the Dulles plan.

Dulles began, soon after the PLA raid on the Dachen’s, to tie America’s protection of specific islands to the idea that the support of these positions became necessary as a result of aggressive actions by PRC forces that followed an overall program designed to invade Formosa itself. Dulles admitted that the United States initially decided not to make it clear whether America would defend the Nationalist-held islands in an effort confuse Beijing. Eisenhower’s top diplomat conceded that this policy had “backfired” and the PRC did not believe the US would stand and fight. Dulles concluded the old approach of ambiguity needed to end.¹³⁶

The administration decided the language of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty reading “attacks directed against Formosa and the Pescadores” should be used to justify the American protection of Quemoy and Matsu. The president agreed to the plan of evacuating the Dachen’s, while promising to guard the closer groups of Matsu and Quemoy.¹³⁷ Once discussion focused on a fresh doctrine for the Taiwan Straits, the initial divisions within the administration over the offshore islands resurfaced.

Cutler warned that if the White House adopted the new policy, as Dulles proposed, America ran the risk of general war with the People’s Republic of China. The president disagreed, saying if China wanted war, no strategic change averted the possibility of PRC desired conflict with the US. Secretary of the Treasury George M.

Humphrey expressed his worry of defending Quemoy and Matsu because of their proximity to the mainland. As Humphrey put it, they were “right in the middle of Chinese Communist territory.” In response, Dulles argued that if America allowed the islands to succumb, then the US fell into a disadvantageous disposition for the eventual invasion of Formosa by the Communists. The secretary of state believed that if all the offshore positions fell to the Peoples Republic, then the damage to the morale of Nationalist fighting men made an effective defense of Formosa impossible. As a result of the PRC threats to invade Taiwan, Quemoy, necessarily, attained a more important role.¹³⁸

Eisenhower expressed his agitation at the hand ringing and reiterated his belief that the new policy reduced the possibility of war as opposed to the current approach that he believed was driving America *to* war. Humphrey agreed that the United States should take a clear stand, but questioned why Quemoy needed to be included. Both Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and Humphrey put forward the idea that all offshore islands should be evacuated except Formosa and the Pescadores and that defending the others made no sense. Wilson and the treasury secretary further advised that the administration should make it clear to the PRC that if they attacked Formosa and the Pescadores, the US would go to war.¹³⁹ While this solution seems more in keeping with Dulles’ views of creating clear lines of demarcation in international diplomacy, the secretary of state attempted to find the middle ground within the heated debate.

Dulles tried to reassure those in dissent by saying that in the future if Mao’s government renounced its declared intentions of invading Formosa that the United States might give up these islands. Dulles also made clear that if the United Nations’ action succeeded, America may then feel free to not support Quemoy and Matsu. He went even

further to placate those in disagreement after Nixon asked who endeavored to give the announcement of the policy. Dulles responded by saying that responsibility fell to the president, and Eisenhower finally relented and decided not to specify which islands would be defended in the statement. Even with this reassurance, Humphrey restated that he opposed a permanent safeguarding of Quemoy and even suggested the territory be traded for American Korean War POW's still held in China.¹⁴⁰

Dulles attempted to gain consensus by saying again the United States needed to make a decision and hold to it by evacuating the Dachen's and possibly Matsu, but that Quemoy must be held. Wilson concluded for himself that if Mao's government gave up its claim to Formosa, then Quemoy would need to be abandoned. Eisenhower asked Admiral Radford, if in the event Jiang voluntarily evacuated all of the offshore islands, what effect that decision would have on America's strategic positions in the Taiwan area. Radford responded that the region had to be held if the American purpose was protecting Formosa. Even with the admiral's support, the president weakened in his stance and suggested the US use language in a possible statement that avoided forcing America to protect the controversial territory indefinitely, emphasizing the immorality of abandoning the islands while expecting Jiang to fight for Formosa.¹⁴¹

As word reached the British of America's new policy, Britain expressed its unhappiness with the idea of a conditional defense of Quemoy. The British position sought a compromise in which the PRC gave up Formosa and in return, the Chinese Nationalists would relinquish the offshore islands. The UK opposed action in the UN if the US was including Quemoy in the area of protection against the PLA. The British asked if this relatively unimportant piece of land was really worth defending with nuclear

weapons as Dulles had previously told them. The secretary of state attempted to clarify the Eisenhower administration's position by noting America's policy did not include a "long term" plan to preserve the contentious areas. However, Dulles made clear that the morale within Nationalist allied ranks constituted a problem that the United States unequivocally needed to take into consideration.¹⁴²

Dulles suggested the White House should be vague in public, but argued that the United States should supply the Republic of China with the specifics of the new strategy to defend Quemoy. However, this decision should be kept from the Russians and the PRC. Dulles argued that if Mao received warning of the US's new position then any restraint on the part of the People's Republic would garner sympathy within the world community and America would then lose the opportunity to look strong for Asia. He added that if the UN forced peace in the area, the latest policy with regards to Quemoy would become moot. As to the question of the use of atomic weapons, Dulles said their use needed to only occur as a last resort.¹⁴³

Dulles reported to the 233rd meeting of the National Security Council on January 26, 1955, that the British were unhappy with the prospect of safeguarding the offshore islands with atomic weapons. The secretary of state continued by informing the council that the US position, clearly stating an express intention to protect Quemoy and Matsu, forced the United Kingdom to oppose work in the UN and if the US changed the specific nature of a public defense claim of Quemoy and Matsu in the Congressional authorization for the president to use force, the British may change course and support a UN resolution. Secretary Dulles advised the administration to communicate the new

policy privately to the Chinese Nationalists and, in a reversal of what he told the British, also inform the Chinese on the mainland.¹⁴⁴

Dulles changed his scheme by advising that the administration not make clear to the general public the administration intentions and retain a measure of ambiguity as to which offshore islands needed to be protected and which did not. The pressure within the Eisenhower White House as well as demands from the United Kingdom damaged Dulles's latest plan on how to deal with the crisis. The president agreed, adding, vagueness in the statement to Congress liberated the UN to proceed with action, however, the US may do whatever it wanted behind the scenes. If the United Nations failed, on the other hand, then the diplomatic collapse freed the United States to enact a new policy to be formulated in the future.¹⁴⁵

Secretary Humphrey reiterated his belief in the uselessness of Quemoy and the folly of US defense of the disputed real estate. The president, irritated, told the National Security Council that he had reviewed the maps of the area and Quemoy needed to be safeguarded from a strategic consideration. The president had come much closer to Radford's point of view since the Dachen incident at the beginning of the month. Eisenhower concluded that he would rather be impeached than fail in his duty to protect America's vital interests.¹⁴⁶ The Security Council meeting decided in the end that Eisenhower would ask Congress for authority to defend Formosa and the Pescadores as well as other "related positions now in friendly hands." The White House agreed to push UN action to bring peace to the Formosa area and to help evacuate the Dachen islands as well as any other offshore territories both the US and Republic of China decided on. Finally, the administration concluded that the defense of Matsu and Quemoy ought to be

predicated on the determination, by the commander in chief, that PLA attacks forewarned a first step to the invasion of Formosa and the Pescadores.¹⁴⁷ Pressure from the British, as well as resistance within the administration to supporting the offshore islands, led Eisenhower and Dulles back into the trap of not deciding once and for all what the status of Quemoy and Matsu would be. Clarification for all the world to see was out of the administration's grasp because they could not get past the belief that letting the offshore islands go would fatally damage the Republic of China. Within the context of Cold War theology, the first domino to fall could be Taiwan. The administration now had its response to the Dachen threat. America would convince the ROC to evacuate the Dachen's, a new push for a cease fire in the straits through the UN would go forward, and a resolution would be put to the US Congress to authorize the president to use force to protect Formosa.

On January 24 Eisenhower sent a message to Congress asking for permission to use force in the Taiwan Straits. As noted in chapter two, the president had already pledged as a candidate to seek Congressional authorization before using the military and fulfilled this pledge in the first month of 1955. Eisenhower laid out the case against the PRC and asked for the authority to engage the US military in aiding in a redeployment mission of Nationalist forces on offshore islands (Dachen's) and any other "emergency action" the president felt was needed "to protect the rights and security of the United States."¹⁴⁸ Many democrats in Congress grumbled that the president was asking for a right he already possessed, echoing the belief that the move by Eisenhower was as much about politics and rebuking the Truman way of doing things than satisfying any constitutional responsibility the president concluded was necessary.¹⁴⁹ Despite

Democratic Party annoyance, the resolution passed both house with relative ease. In the House the resolution passed on January 25 with a vote of 410-3 and once in the upper house was adopted 85-3 on January 28.¹⁵⁰

If Eisenhower's White House had decided to make an attempt of passing a resolution in the security council of the United Nations in regards to the straights crisis, Great Britain's support would have to be secured. On January 21, 1955, Dulles informed Sir Roger M. Makins, British ambassador to the United States, and Sir Robert Heatlie Scott, Minister at the British Embassy in the United States, that the NSC resolved not to mention Quemoy and Matsu in any public statement. Dulles informed the United Kingdom's representatives that the president intended to send a message to Congress and declare the aim of the United States to evacuate the Dachen's, come up with rules of engagement for attacking Chinese Communists, state clearly that the treaty area remained static, and finally, America had chosen to accept and promote UN action to bring about a cease fire in the area. Dulles also informed the foreign dignitaries that the White House had opted to make preparations for attacks against the mainland in case of a heavy incursion against Formosa, but that this plan remained secret. The secretary expressed his hope that the United States had dealt with British concerns and this would now allow them to go ahead with a United Nations proposition.¹⁵¹

John Foster Dulles made one last point to the British representatives. Dulles commented on a letter of January 21, 1955, sent by the UK government. The letter related British opinion that Formosa should be defended, that the Chinese Nationalists ought to restrain from attacking the PRC, and that the offshore islands needed to be turned over to Mao's control. Dulles made clear that the United States could not "accept or give any

commitments with respect” to the disputed territories going back to the mainland. Sir Makins assured Dulles of the ambassador’s intention to recommend to his government movement in the United Nations and that he believed Britain could go ahead with backing a resolution in the UN Security Council, which Eden did on January 24.¹⁵²

The complexity of the crisis only worsened with the diplomatic moves of Jiang and the KMT. Dulles told George Yeh, minister of foreign affairs for the Republic of China, that the United States intended to defend Matsu and Quemoy but this must not be made public, on January 21, 1955.¹⁵³ The British, for their part, believed that the Eisenhower administration had backed off completely from “a provisional guarantee to defend Quemoy,” when in fact they had decided to simply not make their decision publicly known.¹⁵⁴ How open the US had been with the British to get them to restart the UN process is an open question. Notes from the meeting between Dulles and Makins clearly show that Dulles only promised that “no statement” would be “publicly made regarding the intentions of the United states with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu Islands.”¹⁵⁵ Was there further assurances privately made with regards to Quemoy that has never been documented? Either way, the British Cabinet was told by Anthony Eden, categorically, the US would not defend the offshore islands.¹⁵⁶ The long term impact of the January 21 private assurance to Jiang with regards to Quemoy and Matsu would later come back to haunt the president in yet another ad hoc attempt at dealing with the crisis during the summer of 1955. In the meantime, despite this bit of good news for Taiwan, Yeh initially informed Dulles that the ROC did not intend on abandoning its position on the Dachen’s.¹⁵⁷ However, the next day the KMT government realized the implication of Dulles’s offer and informed the United States that it had agreed to the American proposal

of evacuation and the protection of Quemoy and Matsu, but was only doing so reluctantly.¹⁵⁸

Upon the announcement of the Dachen evacuation, Jiang once again insisted that the United States go public with its intentions to protect Quemoy and Matsu. Jiang also expressed his continued reservation on any action in the United Nations as well. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson reiterated that no widespread statement concerning Quemoy and Matsu would be made and that the United States eschewed any attempt of possibly tying itself to any territories beyond those already spelled out in the MDT.¹⁵⁹ In an effort to placate the Nationalists, Robertson pointed out that United States' decisions with regards to Taiwan, necessarily, made negotiations for the release of American fliers more difficult and that the issue did not supersede the preservation of Formosa and added no deal would be made that traded US pilots for islands.¹⁶⁰ The undersecretary also told Koo that the US military disagreed with the Nationalist ambassador's assessment that evacuating from the Dachen's constituted a mistake.¹⁶¹ The joint chiefs of course had proclaimed exactly the opposite assessment the day before when they requested a special meeting with the president to inform him of their view that the evacuation of the Dachen's was "unwise."¹⁶² It is conceivable that Robertson, half a world away, was not aware of this meeting, but it is less probable that he was not aware of Radford's opposition to the Dulles plan.

Generalissimo Jiang became upset that specific mention of the defense of the remaining offshore positions would not be made public at the time of the announcement for the evacuation of the Dachen's. Jiang believed the Soviet Union had brought pressure on the British, and the United Kingdom then influenced the United States not to fight for

the islands. He believed the ceasefire proposal in the United Nations was appeasement that had encouraged the Communists to attack. As a result of Jiang's presumption that the United States had abrogated its responsibilities under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, he informed America that Taiwan thought better of asking the Eisenhower administration for help in evacuating the Dachen's until the offshore issue was dealt with, adding that he hoped the United States did not believe that those in the Republic of China were "children."¹⁶³

During a national security meeting on January 30, that the president and Dulles did not attend, those that did attend expressed the opinion that Jiang was justified in being upset at the fact that the offering of a public statement about the defense of Quemoy and Matsu did not occur. The Security Council members in attendance lamented that tension occurred because of hazy language and reasoning surrounding the new policy authored by Dulles. The council also agreed that a delay in communicating American strategy to Taiwan as a result of a lag time between Yeh and Jiang contributed to the dispute. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State, crystallized the groups thinking, by mentioning that the American defense of Quemoy and Matsu was a unilateral decision and not a bilateral agreement. He also reiterated that the United States needed to communicate its decisions in regards to the offshore islands privately to Jiang, but not publicly.¹⁶⁴

Eisenhower, upon being informed of Jiang's misgivings, expressed the view that any attack on Quemoy and Matsu that he deemed "a threat to Formosa and the Pescadores" compelled the United States to fend off such a strike. The president did not want to bind the US to the support of Quemoy and Matsu indefinitely, and he would

decide on the necessity of engagement with the PRC over the islands. In the event of Communist invasion of any disputed territory in the Taiwan straits, and if the former supreme allied commander viewed such aggressive action as a prelude to the storming of Formosa, then he promised to order a complete defense of the Republic of China and this decision needed to remain undisclosed. This information might be passed along to the Generalissimo if he kept such information secret.¹⁶⁵ Jiang Jieshi finally became convinced of his new ally's position and announced the Dachen withdrawal and officially requested American assistance. Rankin believed Jiang had stalled for time hoping the situation would change, allowing the United States to make a public statement on protection for Nationalist held islands.¹⁶⁶ Regardless, the White House's plans for Quemoy were so confusing and convoluted that almost no one really knew where the administration stood on the issue. This was certainly part of the calculation by Dulles, however, confusing the PRC and even the British and ROC is one thing, but for members of Eisenhower's Security Council and ambassadors not to be clear on the policy is a major failing of America's Cold War strategy during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55.

The pressure from what seemed like all sides began to affect both Dulles and Eisenhower. The president lamented to Dulles at the end of January that most of the mail he was receiving was against any military action for the sake of Formosa.¹⁶⁷ A review of press reaction to the Formosa Resolution and the crisis in general revealed support for the president to defend Formosa but little backing for using the military to protect Nationalist coastal areas, let alone armed forays into mainland China. Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon criticized the administration's approach as akin to "preventative war."¹⁶⁸ While

the views of Morse were in the minority, as seen by the overwhelming support in the House and Senate for the Formosa Resolution, Eisenhower knew he was walking a very fine line in the straits. The president realized that the world and Congress saw a difference between Formosa and the Pescadores on one hand and the offshore islands on the other. Eisenhower himself came to the realization that the United States could not get tied down militarily to Matsu, Quemoy, and other positions exclusive of Formosa and the Pescadores because of the damage to America's ability in fighting the spread of communism throughout the world.¹⁶⁹

Eisenhower conceded that the administration had initially "contemplated" going public with the defense of Quemoy and Matsu after the Dachen attack, but that determination changed in his view because of the need to try and not get ham strung to a few islands off the coast of mainland China. Eisenhower reached the conclusion that the United States had to take into consideration the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Europe in regards to its decisions over Formosa. Quemoy and Matsu would not be defended from every Chinese Communist attack and the commander in chief mentioned that an attack by a single "battalion" was not enough for the United States to go to war over.¹⁷⁰ The evolving policy of Eisenhower towards the Nationalist-held islands boiled down to whether the president viewed an attack as a prelude to an invasion of Formosa. Under this rubric, a categorical defense of Quemoy and Matsu could not be given despite his and Dulles's initial decisions after the PLA attack on the Dachen's. Domestic, international, and internal administration opposition to publicly declaring the US would defend Quemoy and Matsu once again was keeping Eisenhower from making clear to the

PRC and the world what America would do in the event of a PLA attack on the offshore islands.

Aiding the Nationalist's in evacuating the Dachen's provided the US with unique problems, namely defining the rules of engagement. Eisenhower was determined that the operation itself not ignite a war when its whole purpose was to avoid a conflict. What would happen, however, if the PLA attacked the ROC or the Seventh Fleet during the delicate abandonment of the Dachen's? With White House direction, the Navy gave orders to Seventh Fleet to take care and not to be overly aggressive during the Dachen evacuation and start a war.¹⁷¹ Eisenhower understood the danger of losing control of a precarious situation, so he told the military that they were not to attack PRC bases on the mainland immediately after a possible first strike by the PLA, but only respond if it was continuous and only against fields "positively identified and contributing forces to the attack against us."¹⁷² In addition, if any actions against the PRC became necessary, then atomic weapons were not to be included in attacking PRC bases.¹⁷³

As the Seventh Fleet was preparing to aid in the Dachen evacuation, Eisenhower wrote his friend, General Alfred Gruenther, who was serving as Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the time of the crisis. Eisenhower told Gruenther that public relations were an important and difficult element in the crisis. In the depths of the Cold War, it is letters to the men Ike truly trusted that one can see the president's ability to see all sides of an issue and demonstrate that he was more of a moderate than he was perhaps viewed at the time. Eisenhower saw the extremes of all sides and looks in hindsight very much like a figure caught between them. The president lamented these extremes by describing the PRC demonization of the west and complained that the ROC only wanted

“immediate direct and destructive attack on Red China.” In America “jingoists and pacifists,” were the only voices driving the debate on American foreign affairs. The backdrop for the entire affair was of course the competition of Communist versus capitalist theories of government and economics.¹⁷⁴

Eisenhower saw the Nationalist-held islands as traditionally a part of mainland China. On their own merit, the coastal positions were not worth “American intervention.” According to Eisenhower, China did not pose an immediate direct threat to the US, but continued pressure in the Pacific would make them so and perhaps threaten the Philippines and Indonesia. Eisenhower recounted to Gruenther Hitler’s statements before World War II and compared them to the statements of China and the Soviet Union. The president told his friend that he would not make a definite commitment to the offshore islands as a result of too many long-term problems that would be associated with them. However, because of ROC morale, the US had to give some assurances with regards to the coastal positions, but less than those given in the MDT. Eisenhower declared that “we must make a distinction (this is a difficult one) between an attack that has only as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.” Eisenhower finished by saying that, “Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war,” and that he did not believe the USSR wanted a war at that time.¹⁷⁵

However, it was not Gruenther that Eisenhower needed to convince, it was the American public and probably more importantly, the British. Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who was serving in his second stint as prime minister, in an attempt to explain US actions with regards to Formosa. The president explained that the

pressure on him was to be aggressive with regards to Formosa while it was the opposite for Churchill. Eisenhower said the Communists knew this and were continuing to be aggressive in the hopes of dividing America and Britain. Eisenhower made the Domino Theory argument by saying that if Communism was to “penetrate the island barrier” in the Pacific, the Philippines and Indonesia would fall and then the whole region would go Communist. According to the president, the US was supporting and arming the ROC, but, the Nationalists were not content to stay on Formosa and their whole psychology revolved around the idea that someday they would return to the mainland. If Quemoy and Matsu were lost, then that would “destroy the reason for the existence of the Nationalist forces on Formosa” and Communists would take over. Because the morale of the ROC was of such importance, Jiang’s government “must have certain assurances with respect to the offshore islands.” Eisenhower continued that those assurances could not be as concrete as those in the MDT, which was passed the day before in the Senate, so, America would protect the Nationalist-held islands only if their being attacked was a prelude to an attack on Formosa. President Eisenhower said this was a difficult decision. He believed that the USSR did not want a war at that time but may be forced into one if the US and China started fighting. Eisenhower concluded by saying, “we believe our policy is the best that we can design for staying out of such a fight.”¹⁷⁶

Churchill responded that the US could not, of course, allow the PRC to destroy the ROC. He argued, however, that the offshore islands should be divorced from this issue and the Republic of China should not be allowed to attack the mainland while the US was protecting Jiang. This was an argument the Eisenhower administration had already dealt with in the exchange of notes accompanying the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The main contention between US and British policy was, however, the coastal positions in which Churchill said “are legally part of China and which nobody here considers a just cause of war” and that he could not “see any decisive relationship between the offshore islands and an invasion of Formosa.” Churchill continued by saying that the US could easily defend an invasion directed at Formosa from Quemoy if the PRC eventually captured it and alluded to the WWII D-Day invasion to make his point.¹⁷⁷

Europe was more important, according to the prime minister, and, echoing Eisenhower’s earlier statement, said that the Quemoy crisis may be a Communist ruse to split the allies. Jiang, according to Churchill, could not continue to say they were going to take back the mainland, even if it was to rally continued support around him. The prime minister told Eisenhower that, “He deserves the protection of your shield but not the use of your sword.” Churchill offered a policy change saying that America should “defend Formosa and the Pescadores as a declared resolve” and “announce the United States intention to evacuate all the off-shore islands, including Quemoy in the same way as the Tachens, and to declare that they will do this at their convenience within (say) three months.” The US should “intimate also by whatever channel or method is thought best that the United States will treat any proved major attempt to hamper this withdrawal as justification for using whatever conventional force is required.” Churchill continued by saying that the “coastal islands must not be used as stepping stones either by the Communists towards the conquest of Formosa or the Nationalists towards the conquest of China. But they might all too easily become the occasion of an incident which would place the United States before the dilemma of either standing by while their allies were butchered or becoming embroiled in a war for no strategic or political purpose.” Despite

the differences between the two old allies', Churchill ended by pleading that, "our strongest resolve is to keep our two countries bound together in their sacred brotherhood."¹⁷⁸

In response, Eisenhower wrote the US:

does not have decisive power in respect of the offshore islands... We must not lose Chiang's army and we must maintain its strength, efficacy and morale. Only a few months back we had both Chiang and a strong, well-equipped French Army to support the free world's position in Southeast Asia. The French are gone-making it clearer than ever that we cannot afford the loss of Chiang unless all of us are to get completely out of that corner of the globe. This is unthinkable to us-I feel it must be to you.

The US, Eisenhower argued, had done much diplomatically to create a cease-fire. He said that "We rounded out the far Pacific security chain by a Treaty with the Nationalists which, however, only covered specifically Formosa and the Pescadores, thus making it clear to Chiang and to the entire world that we were not prepared to defend the coastal positions as Treaty territory." The president mentioned the signing statement, which ensured that the offshore islands could not be used by the ROC to attack the PRC and gain back the mainland. Eisenhower also said "we have done much more than seems generally realized." The US had made the Dachen evacuation possible and convinced Jiang to go along with Oracle. The result of all this work to preserve the peace was that the Chinese Communists had viewed those efforts as weakness.¹⁷⁹

Eisenhower argued that the US still had American airmen being held by the People's Republic of China held over from Korean War. He expressed the frustration that

virtually all of the members of the administration were feeling by saying, “There comes a point where constantly giving in only encourages further belligerency.” He made allusions to the lessons of Munich, but, in the current crisis, the PRC had not even bothered to promise anything and instead had actually said they would continue their aggression. If the US retreated from the offshore islands, then morale would collapse in the ROC and Formosa would easily fall. America, according to the president, could not indefinitely keep the PRC from invading Formosa without the ROC army as a breakwater. The PLA could launch secret attacks easily, as demonstrated in Korea, and from many points of departure. Eisenhower relayed that it had taken two days to assemble an evacuation force for the Dachen’s, which were, at the point of Eisenhower’s letter, back at their bases in the Philippines and Japan.¹⁸⁰

Eisenhower’s closing argument began with the statement; “if we appear strong and coercive only toward our friends, and should attempt to compel Chiang to make further retreats, the conclusion of these Asian peoples will be that they had better plan to make the best terms they can with the Communists.” The US had demonstrated in Formosa and Korea that America was “not careless in letting others get us into a major war.” In a perhaps undiplomatic presentation, Eisenhower said Britain should trust America in this matter because of its greater knowledge and responsibility in this area. The president said “it would surely not be popular in this country if we become involved in possible hostilities on account of Hong Kong or Malaya, which our people look upon as ‘colonies’-which to us is a naughty word. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that, if the issue were ever framed in this way, we would be at your side.”¹⁸¹

Despite the presidents' arguments, the pressure from the British was decisive in moderating the Eisenhower administration's handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis. The opposing force to the British was a wide spread belief within the US government, both executive and legislative, that the west was losing the Cold War, especially in Asia. A national intelligence estimate released in mid-February stated that the "greatest importance of the offshore islands at present is political and psychological." If the PRC, and more broadly the world wide Communist movement, won on the Nationalist-held positions, it would be a continuous "string of communist victories in Asia, i.e., mainland China, Korea, Indochina and the Tachens. Conversely, any further loss or yielding of these islands will be a serious blow to CHINAT morale and regarded by the remaining anti-communist nations in Asia as a further disastrous retreat by the U.S., since at present, the U.S. is so closely identified with the Chinese Nationalists that any CHINAT reverse will be viewed as a U.S. loss." Both the PRC and ROC would not favor a cease-fire because it would disrupt both of their long term goals *vis-a-vi* the other.¹⁸² Despite this growing worry, the administration was moving further and further away from unequivocally defending the offshore islands. However, frustration at the actions of Mao's government was making Dulles re-think America's policy of restraining Jiang.

After receiving a briefing on Formosa in Manila in mid-February, Dulles wrote to the president asking for some clarification and guidance on issues relating to the continuing crisis. Dulles said that the US would not defend a variety of coastal islands near the Dachen's, specifically mentioning the island of Nanchi. Dulles expressed the hope that Nanchi would be evacuated by the Nationalists, but would not press the issue if Jiang felt that ROC morale would suffer greatly. Dulles continued by reaffirming that the

US would help Taiwan defend Quemoy and Matsu with material, but not “direct intervention.” He said America should also start stationing more US troops on Formosa in light of the MDT and Formosa resolution. Dulles claimed to be “impressed” with PRC buildup on the mainland and that very soon it may come to a point where only US intervention would allow the west to hold Quemoy and Matsu. Atomic weapons would “perhaps” be needed. Dulles suggested that the US must “consider allowing the Nationalists to attack by air this build-up, in the absence of any dependable assurance that it will not be used against Taiwan.” The US had been restraining the ROC with the hopes that a UN cease-fire could be brokered. He requested that he be allowed to tell Eden that the US could not hold back Taiwan forever.¹⁸³

Eisenhower responded that, according to a security council decision, the US would not aid in defending the island of Nanchi. Eisenhower continued that the US would aid the Nationalists on their offshore positions with material and logistical support, but America would only get more involved if attacks were determined to be the precursor to an attack on Formosa, but, “any offensive military participation on our part will be only by order of the President.”¹⁸⁴

Both Dulles and Eisenhower, and especially Dulles, were becoming ever more concerned that the PRC was intent on striking at Formosa. Despite all of their efforts, the US was struggling to gain some sort of foundation on which to work from. Both of these men, throughout the crisis, experimented with various policies to end the crisis, and this experimentation was continuing. Dulles met with Eden on Formosa and told him, after being cleared to do so by the president, that the administration now believed the PRC was actively seeking to take Taiwan by force as opposed to what they had believed just a few

weeks before. Dulles explained that there was a large buildup on the mainland conducted by the PRC and that the US would have problems continuing to hold back the ROC from attacking these positions. The US had done a great many things to prevent war in area, but the PRC seemed resolute and did not seem to care for a peaceful settlement. Dulles told Eden that America could not retreat any longer and to give up the Nationalist-held islands would damage the morale of democracies in Asia and Taiwan. Eden's view was that Taiwan should not be given to the Communists, but relayed to Dulles that Churchill did not see it as a strategic issue for the west, but would support America nevertheless. Eden warned Dulles that the world would support the US on Taiwan, but not the offshore islands. Eden was of the opinion that the PRC would not attack Taiwan, but might attack the coastal positions to get the US in to a trap that would cause US relations with its allies to suffer. Eden said he did not see the necessity of holding the controversial territory and asked US Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, and Dulles why America was so determined to support the offshore islands. Stump gave a tactical assessment of the positions, which the British military disagreed with. Dulles defended the American policy by saying that the British were not fully considering the morale aspect of the offshore islands. Eden then said he wanted to see if the PRC would give up on Taiwan and maybe a solution could be reached on the controversial coastal positions.¹⁸⁵

Writing back to the president on the meeting with the British foreign secretary, Dulles recounted to Eisenhower that Eden had told him that he would try to get the PRC to avoid a military solution to the Formosa situation. Dulles believed that this venture would fail and that it would then make it easier for Eden to push the US agenda in the

UK parliament. This was wishful thinking on the part of Dulles. At no point in the crisis did the United Kingdom ever give the impression that defending the offshore islands for the Republic of China would ever gain support in the British Parliament or in the minds of its people. With all of the shifting statements, both publicly and privately, by everyone involved in the affair, the one consistent message coming from Churchill's government was: no war for Quemoy. The secretary continued by relaying that Eden suggested that the US should back off of Oracle while he made his approach to the PRC. Dulles did agree to a "further brief period request for a cease-fire resolution so as to permit this other initiative," but if Eden failed however, Dulles wanted to go forward with UN action. Eden had told Dulles that a fallback position was to give up Quemoy and Matsu and this was supported in the commonwealth and Europe. The supremacy, dare even the obsession, with the morale of Jiang's troops and allies in the region were ever present in American calculation. Dulles relayed to Eisenhower the secretary's response to Eden on this matter by confiding his belief that Eden did not have a full appreciation of the issue of the morale in the non-Communist countries in the Far East.¹⁸⁶

Dulles had told Eden that he hoped the Nationalists could defend the islands on their own, but if the president saw any armed action as a prelude to an attack on Formosa, the US would have to intervene. Dulles told Eisenhower that he had:

reminded Eden that there must come a time in these matters where will to stand must be made manifest. In case of Hitler, Eden himself recognized that this had come too late. It should have come in relation to Czechoslovakia rather than Poland, and if it had come earlier, there might not (repeat not) have been the Second World War. Eden agreed that there

was a parallel but still seemed feel that we could afford a further retreat. I said this was a grave decision where you would have to exercise final responsibility and that the entire world could know you would do so with the sober sense of responsibility and dedication to peace with freedom.¹⁸⁷

Dulles and Eisenhower now believed that they had gone too far in placating the PRC. They were convinced that America could not back down any longer. The Eisenhower administration believed they had done much to ensure peace by enacting the US-Taiwan MDT including the exchange of notes that placed limits on ROC offensive actions and they had pushed for the Dachen's evacuation. They had restrained the ROC from attacking a PRC buildup on the mainland and saw to it a limited Formosa resolution did not specify the offshore islands. The US also convinced the ROC to sign on to a UN ceasefire proposition even though Jiang did not want to. In addition, Dulles believed that "We have resisted powerful popular and Congressional pressure to take retaliatory action against the Chinese Communists for their flagrant offense to the US in imprisoning our airmen captured in the Korean War."¹⁸⁸

Despite all of this work, the People's Republic of China, in response, had become more belligerent and built up air bases and forces around Formosa on the mainland. Therefore, the US "have gone as far as is prudent in making concessions." If the PRC gave up its claim to take Formosa by force, the US could negotiate further at that time. Dulles believed that at the very least the PRC was probing to see if the US would fight. Dulles argued to the British that simply handing over the offshore islands to the Communists was a step the US could not take. He said that to:

pressure the Republic of China into surrender of Quemoy and Matsu would (1) Importantly increase attacking capacity of the Chinese Communists by making more available Amoy and Fuchow harbors, the natural staging grounds for a sea attack; (2) greatly weaken morale of the Republic of China on Formosa and increase opportunity of Chinese Communists subversion; (3) probably increase the Chinese Communists' intention probe our resolution by putting it to the test of action. In other words, further retreat would, in our opinion, both weaken the defense capability Formosa and increase the risk that that capability will be put to the test of battle.¹⁸⁹

Despite the hard line the Eisenhower administration was taking with the British and because he was not going to overtly pressure Jiang to abandon positions like Quemoy, Eisenhower had decided that he was not going to give a blanket promise to defend the offshore islands either. At the first meeting between the US and the Republic of China under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the US made clear that it could not commit to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. The president would decide when and if the US would defend those positions. Dulles, at this meeting, took personal responsibility for any misunderstandings in the past on this issue. Dulles said the ROC's continual claims at armed re-conquest of the mainland were minimizing its important role in the world. The chance might arise to do this in the future but it "could not be created by the Republic of China alone." Jiang agreed and said that the MDT would be adhered to and he would not initiate large-scale military actions without consultation with the US. However, Jiang declared that he could never agree to a cease-fire as envisioned by Oracle. Dulles

responded that he was not asking for Jiang to support Oracle, but was asking that he not veto the UN resolution and let the USSR do so for its own crass political reasons. Jiang considered the crisis an international affair and not a civil war like the PRC. Earlier in the conversation Dulles also brought up the issue of the Soviet ship *Taupse*, which the Nationalists had seized. Dulles wanted Jiang to release the ship and its crew arguing that there was no benefit to America or Taiwan by continuing to hold them. Jiang said he would do so only after the PRC had released the American flyers. Dulles expressed his displeasure with this decision by saying he did not like that idea.¹⁹⁰

After Dulles's early March visit to Taipei, the secretary returned believing that the straits crisis was worse than he had thought previously.¹⁹¹ Early in the crisis the administration had spoken of the need for the use of atomic weapons to defend the offshore islands and Formosa. Once Dulles convinced Eisenhower and the other members of the Security Council that the situation on the ground in the Taiwan Straits was worsening, although not all believed the threat was imminent, the discussion of the use of atomic weapons deployment increased. The administration was particularly concerned about what effect a war, especially an atomic war, would have on Europe. The United States had become a global power following World War II and decisions in one corner of the world could have significant impact on American interests in another part of the globe. During this period, Western European countries were in the process of writing and signing treaties to integrate both their defensive establishments and their economies. The modern day European Union began during the post WWII era to find a way to ensure that the disaster of the 30's and 40's never happened again.

In 1955, several European countries were attempting to negotiate and sign a treaty that was known as the European Defense Community (EDC). The primary goal of this particular agreement was to re-arm Western Germany and integrate it into Europe's defensive establishment. The main opponent to this was France. Dulles was one of the major architects of this pact.¹⁹² The secretary of state and Eisenhower wanted to delay a possible war with China as long as possible while the EDC was being negotiated and hopefully, ratified by the governments involved. Any use of atomic weapons in Asia would surely threaten everything the administration was working on in Europe.

Eisenhower wanted to “avoid direct US intervention in the Formosa area, at a time while the Western European Treaties were pending; to limit US intervention as much as possible if it became necessary to intervene.” Air Force Joint Chief General Nathan Twining believed that Formosa would not be attacked soon by the PRC because there was not a significant build up on airfields in the offshore area. Eisenhower, for his part, wanted the ROC to do more artillery fire on the mainland, since that was what the PRC was doing, and retaliation in kind would not escalate the conflict. To defend Formosa, Admiral Carney suggested that US personnel would have to increase from 1000 to 11,000. Dulles, again concerned about the EDC, said that atomic weapons should not be used in the first forty to sixty days of an all-out war. The president agreed, not wanting to disrupt the European treaties. To underscore how seriously the administration was bracing for a probable war, Eisenhower advocated using napalm against invading troops if atomic weapons were not immediately used. He continued by saying that conventional weapons may not be “decisive; that the time might come when the US might have to intervene with atomic weapons, but that should only come at the end, and we would have

to advise our allies first” and “that we are confronted with an extremely delicate situation, because we could not afford to be isolated from our allies in the world, and that our aim should be to delay Chincom attack in strength on Quemoy and Matsu, without thereby provoking Chincom attack.”¹⁹³

Domestic and international opposition, along with fears of how US policy in Asia would affect the EDC, kept the Eisenhower administration from publicly announcing a new plan to defend Quemoy and Matsu in the wake of the PLA Dachen Island’s attack in early January 1955. On the other side of the equation, the belief within the administration that any blow to the morale of Nationalist troops, as a result of losing the offshore islands in disgrace, forced Eisenhower and Dulles to oppose abandoning the disputed territories in the Taiwan Straits. The American position, as all knew, was untenable over the long term. Something had to change in America’s calculations if war was to be avoided. Cold War ideology had hamstrung the administration and Eisenhower was struggling to find a way out.

Chapter Four:

Stalemate: The Robertson-Radford Mission, Bandung, Negotiation, and the 1958

Crisis

Within the historiographical literature of the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954-55, it is often given second billing next to the 1958 Crisis. One of the goals of this study is to reverse that interpretation and only treat the 1958 event as a postscript to the imbroglio several years before. The dynamics that did not allow Eisenhower and Dulles to make a clear decision on the offshore islands were forged even before the September 1954 shelling of Quemoy and remained the catalyst for the resumption of hostilities in 1958. In fact the morale of Nationalist troops became even more important in the second crisis because Jiang used the interim period to pour even more of his troops onto Quemoy. The administration was still unwilling to write off the offshore islands because of the KMT morale issue but could still not give a full throated defense of them because of a lack of worldwide public support. These dynamics continued to drive Eisenhower to attempt a strange diplomatic mission to Jiang in an effort to convince him to decide for himself to either abandon or drastically reduce his forces on the disputed territories. Even when the PRC signaled its willingness to negotiate, little was accomplished because the status of the offshore islands was still in limbo and as a result the 1958 Crisis occurred.

Although General Nathan Twining was not convinced of an imminent attack in March 1955, Dulles was busy moving the bureaucracy in the direction of making the hard decisions that war with China would force on America. He was convinced that the PRC was going to “try and capture Formosa” and only a “successful defense” would dissuade them. ROC army loyalty to Jiang was in question and as a result, the administration

needed to educate the American public on the possibility of intervention, including defending Quemoy and Matsu. In a memo detailing Dulles's points from a national security meeting, he reiterated that the US should stall until the treaties in Europe were completed, but, they had to decide whether atomic weapons would be used tactically and then prepare the world for atomic weapons use to make up for the perceived "deficiency" in conventional forces that America had in the area. Dulles, in a chilling final thought, said the US must use atomic weapons for security purposes despite world and domestic reaction.¹⁹⁴

The M31 "Honest John" rocket had the capability to handle an atomic war head and was the first US designed delivery system for tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁹⁵ By the beginning of April, the military began the process of identifying atomic weapons in the American arsenal that could be transferred to the Taiwan region. General Ridgway reported to Radford that the US Army had eight Honest John batteries. Five were in Europe and one was on its way. One was undergoing testing and an eighth was scheduled for deployment in Japan by June 1955, but could be put on Formosa. Ridgway continued that those in Europe, up to six, could be transferred to Formosa. Underscoring what these weapons would be used for, Ridgway advised that their "most effective use would be with atomic warheads."¹⁹⁶

The administration, from nearly its beginning, attempted to develop a new strategy to meet Communist challenges around the world without bankrupting the US treasury in the process. Dulles, with Eisenhower's blessing, developed what has become known as the "New Look" defense policy which was largely in place by 1954. Eisenhower and Dulles decided to rely on America's nuclear arsenal and, in a major shift

from post WWII strategy, diminish the US's standing army forces in favor of propping up allies around the world and drawing them into a vast collective security arrangement. Foreign, front line, countries would form a buffer for the US while it focused on funding less expensive air, naval forces, and other delivery systems for atomic weapons.¹⁹⁷ In keeping with the 'New Look,' Dulles was convinced that the US could not match Communist conventional forces on the battlefield and therefore atomic weapons would inevitably be needed in any defense of Formosa and the offshore islands. Dulles told the president that the use of atomic weapons would need to be used to protect Quemoy and Matsu, which Eisenhower heartily agreed with. Eisenhower responded by saying that he believed atomic missiles were the only way to take out Chinese Communist forces in the area and conventional weapons could not do the job.¹⁹⁸ Dulles stressed to the president that there was a difference between tactical atomic weapons versus "the big bomb with huge radio-active fallouts," and that the administration needed to educate the public about the difference.¹⁹⁹ One of the more frightening thoughts about this time period in Cold War history is how close it actually resembled the famous Stanley Kubrick and Peter Sellers movie *Dr. Strangelove*. A few years after the 54-55 incident during the second Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Nathan Twining exclaimed in an NSC meeting that he "could not understand the public horror at the idea of using nuclear weapons."²⁰⁰

The administration was talking itself into the inevitability of having to use nuclear weapons if a war started in Asia. Admiral Stump in the Pacific theatre warned Dulles and Eisenhower that if the PRC put in major air force power in the area, the US would have to use the ultimate weapon. Conventional forces would not be enough and "special

weapons” would have to be used if the US had to attack deep into China to destroy its air power.²⁰¹ Dulles continued to warn that the US must avoid atomic weapons use in the next sixty days because of the Europe situation. Both Dulles and the president believed that America had to give the ROC the tools it needed to defend themselves in the near term and that US troops needed to stay “well below a figure of ten thousand.”²⁰²

The defense department was also coming to the conclusion that a PRC and US war was “a real probability.” Secretary of Defense Wilson believed that the administration’s attempt to enforce a cease-fire and also separate the offshore issue from Formosa had failed. Wilson told the Joint Chief that “the Chinese Communists will continue to probe the real intentions of the U.S., by increasing military actions against the off-shore islands” and “that the Chinese Communists are likely to believe that U.S. political considerations, both domestic and international, will inhibit U.S. from reacting militarily to attacks on the off-shore islands or at least from using atomic weapons, should they attack, and that subsequently they would soon be able to take over Formosa.” The PRC, according to Wilson, were soon to have the forces necessary to take the offshore islands.²⁰³

While the president was trying to keep the administration’s deliberations private, the Secretary of Defense was busy making life for the president more complicated in public remarks in mid-March. Wilson had boasted of a more powerful bomb than a hydrogen bomb to reporters and said “that the loss or retention of Quemoy and the Matsu’s would make little difference in the long run.” Infuriated, Eisenhower personally dressed down the secretary of defense and added in his diary that “While I think that he considers himself a master of public relations, he seems to have no comprehension at all

of what embarrassment such remarks can cause the Secretary of State and me in our efforts to keep the tangled international situation from becoming completely impossible.²⁰⁴

Even members of the military were speaking to the press and predicting imminent war. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carney was identified as the source for some comments that gave to “newspaper reporters a behind the scenes account of possible attack by Chinese Communists against Formosa.” Eisenhower told Dulles that if Wilson did not regain control that the “President himself will take charge of Defense Department.” In the mean time the press, according to Eisenhower, should be told to look at statements given by Dulles to gain a more accurate appraisal of the situation in the straits.²⁰⁵ Carney eventually apologized for his comments personally to the president; however, Eisenhower was finding it more and more difficult to stay ahead of the crisis.²⁰⁶

Underlying Dulles’s fear that war was close was the belief that the US could not back down any longer. In the minds of the men who were making the decisions of whether or not to go to war, the US, and by extension the west, was losing the Cold War in Asia. Dulles said in private and in public that the PRC was basking and emboldened by successes in Korea, Vietnam, and forcing the Nationalists to evacuate the Dachen’s. Peoples Republic of China aggression would not stop until the west stood up to them. He warned that if Formosa was lost then New Zealand and Australia would go next. Dulles continued to argue that “with respect to the defense of Formosa...this was only partially a military problem. The major factors of morale and psychology were involved.” Dulles said that if you look at a map, it looks like a smart thing to give up the offshore islands, but this would destroy morale on Formosa. In an extraordinary and hyperbolic

declaration, Dulles tied the fortunes of America and the West to Asia and a small defeated army on a collection of coastal fortifications in the South China Sea. Dulles concluded that “therefore, the loyalty and morale of the forces on Formosa became a vital link to the whole Western position” and the US would have to attack the mainland to defend the offshore islands.²⁰⁷

Even the usually moderate Eisenhower expressed his deepest Cold War fears during the crisis to friends. At the end of March 1955, the president wrote to Lewis William Douglas, former US ambassador to the UK, whose public service stretched back to the depression era, and told him that “I have come to the conclusion that some of our traditional ideas of international sportsmanship are scarcely applicable in the morass in which the world now flounders.” Eisenhower lamented that the US was “in a life and death struggle of ideologies. It is freedom against dictatorship; Communism against capitalism; concepts of human dignity against materialistic dialectic.” The president believed that Communists were bent, as they had declared themselves, on world revolution and the overthrow of every non-Communist country by violent revolution. Eisenhower characterized this movement, and the people who espoused it, as lacking in “honor, decency and integrity.” He proclaimed that the history of America would end if the Communists won, clearly echoing the old adage that history is written by the victors. Eisenhower expressed in this letter to Lew Douglas, a very real existential debate the president was having with himself. He believed in the principles of honor, duty, right and wrong, and the dishonor of “breaking faith with our friends.” However, to allow the Communists victory out of squeamishness to use tactics that would deliver success for the West, would have inexcusable repercussions for free people around the world.

Eisenhower said he thought that Truman had been right to oppose the Communists in Korea. However, that did not mean the US “must” or “should fight for Quemoy and the Matsu’s. What I am asking you is this: If you became convinced that the capture of these two places by international Communism would inevitably result in the later loss of Formosa to the free world, what would you do?” Eisenhower truly believed that if Formosa fell, then the rest of Asia would soon to follow.²⁰⁸

Despite Eisenhower and Dulles’s flights of Cold War ideological fancy, the pressure from Britain and the American public was forcing the two into cold hard reality. Going to war over the offshore islands was simply not an acceptable decision. General Gruenther in early April wrote to the president and told him that Anthony Eden “considers the Quemoy-Matsu issue the only one of any importance between the US and UK.” Gruenther stated that not one percent of the British people would support America if it went to war over Quemoy and Matsu adding, “I don’t think I could do much to increase that percentage no matter how hard I tried.”²⁰⁹ Dulles and Eisenhower, once again, went to work on improvising a solution to the offshore islands. On February 21, 1955, the president and Dulles hatched a scheme to plant a seed in the mind of Jiang Jieshi. That seed was the idea to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu of his own volition, thereby removing the administration from having to force the issue on the Generalissimo and risk the loss of ROC morale.²¹⁰

Eisenhower confirmed his desire to increase personnel on Formosa itself, but he suggested, in a dramatic example of how the crisis had stubbornly refused to yield an acceptable solution, that this pledge come in conjunction with a pledge from Jiang to withdraw either completely or partially from Quemoy and Matsu. Eisenhower was slowly

coming around to the British point of view that the offshore islands were an intractable problem for the US and in need of radical re-thinking. In addition to more American troops on the ground on Formosa, the president wanted to offer Jiang more support for the Nationalist air force and navy. Eisenhower wanted Jiang to evacuate the coastal islands, but the only way to do this was to “make” Jiang “ostensibly the originator of the idea.” The president said Jiang would probably never agree to this and “the need for preserving his force as a part of our security arrangements in that region should not be lost sight of in our efforts to make him see that great difficulties involved in the defense of the coastal islands.” If Jiang was resolute in staying on the offshore islands then the US opposition to ROC operations on the PRC buildup on mainland China could not be maintained indefinitely and this could be relayed to Eden. Eisenhower ordered that the US command in the region should be “fully acquainted with this entire line of thinking.”²¹¹

Radford came to the president in early April wanting to put 10,000 US personnel on Formosa. Eisenhower decided that he only wanted “small sections of technicians and advisers to be attached to ChiNat units.” The president was inching his way back to the idea of having Jiang withdraw from the coastal positions, but first toyed with the idea of simply demoting them in importance. Eisenhower told Radford that he wanted the offshore islands to only be considered as outposts and not major strongholds. He was willing to give Jiang a division and air wing on Formosa only if the coastal fortifications were demoted in value and both ROC and American prestige were not tied to them. Morale was the biggest issue with respect to Quemoy and Matsu and it was his determination to untangle ROC troop confidence from being wrapped up in controlling

the offshore islands. America could not force Jiang into this decision, so Jiang had to decide for himself that this was the correct course to take. The US, for its part, should encourage this in Jiang with a little help from American advisers the he trusted, such as Secretary Robertson or retired General Albert Coady Wedemeyer, the last of which spoke Mandarin and had served as Jiang's Chief of Staff and commander of US forces in China from 1944-6.²¹²

Eisenhower crystallized his new thinking by telling Dulles that the Chinese Nationalists have "some right to assume" the US would protect the offshore islands. However, to do so would raise the ire of foreign and domestic support. American prestige would be attached and therefore tie down the US there indefinitely. On the other hand, if the US refused to help, the consequences could be equally as bad because of the morale issue and it could set the stage for yet another defeat at the hands of the Communists. The two choices were "unacceptable." Therefore, a change in the situation must be attained. World opinion favored the defense of Formosa itself, but not for the offshore islands. The coastal positions presented difficulties both political and militarily. The reality was that they were "difficult to defend." To effectively guard them, the US would have to attack the mainland, whereas, that was not the case for Formosa, where the US could use its superior naval forces. The US would "probably" have to use atomic weapons in any offshore defense and if the struggle expanded into a worldwide conflict, the US would be at a disadvantage because domestic and world opinion would be against America.²¹³

Eisenhower continued his evaluation by saying that Jiang was risking his whole position on Formosa for "militarily weak" offshore positions. "All of these risks and disadvantages exist because of the calculation that for us to persuade Chiang to adopt any

other plan would result in a collapse of morale on Formosa and the loss to the free world of that bastion of strength. In other words, the principal military reason for holding these two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their loss upon morale in Formosa.” If the US gave up on the Nationalist-held islands, it would have a poor effect on other Asian countries and it would detrimentally affect their morale. If, however, Jiang decided on his own to retreat from the coastal defenses, it would be good for everyone. The question that faced America was how the US could accomplish this.²¹⁴

Eisenhower believed that the best way to de-emphasize the offshore islands was not to abandon them, but make it known that neither the ROC nor the US would commit to their “full-out defense.” That way, any result from an attack would not necessarily damage America’s position in the region. Eisenhower was beginning to doubt much of Jiang’s bluster in regards to the coastal fortifications and said that he did not believe “the sincerity of Chiang’s contention that the retention or loss of the offshore islands would spell the difference between a strong and a destroyed Nationalist government on Formosa. If this is so, his own headquarters should be on the offshore islands.” The US would need to convince the Generalissimo that he should change his troop deployments and begin to see the offshore islands as outposts only. Formosa should assist in the defense of the offshore islands, and plan for a defense that would exact heavy losses on the PLA before retreating. The US for its part needed to increase military support on Formosa, in part, to help with taking advantage of a future situation in which Chiang could invade and retake mainland China. Finally, these changes should be viewed as coming from Jiang and not forced on him by the US to preserve the morale of his troops.²¹⁵

The White House began a push to implement this new strategy in mid-April. The president directed US military and diplomatic personnel on Formosa to get Jiang to propose a solution for the offshore islands. The administration wanted the ROC to pull back from Quemoy and Matsu and in return the US would increase its forces on Formosa. American officials, however, should not force Jiang's hand. America "should lead the Generalissimo into making a proposition that will neither commit the United States to war in defense of the controversial positions nor will constitute an implied repudiation of the Generalissimo by this government."²¹⁶ The president desperately wanted Jiang to minimize the offshore islands in its defensive arrangements. Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that the US could not go to war over them because American public opinion was against it and believed that in addition Jiang would also lose popular support in the US as well.²¹⁷

On April 25, 1955 the administration received word from Taipei that Eisenhower's new strategy had collapsed. Representing the US in meetings with Jiang and his staff was Admiral Radford, Ambassador Carl Rankin, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson and Rear Admiral George W. Anderson Jr., the last of which was serving as Special Assistant to Radford.²¹⁸ The US delegation told Jiang that America would not go to war over Quemoy and Matsu, mostly because of world opinion, and would commit only to defend Formosa. If a war with USSR ever came about, the US would need bases around the world and other countries would not support the administration if a war started over the offshore islands. The president had decided that the US and ROC must accept a Communist buildup of forces across from Quemoy and Matsu and could not initiate a war over this issue. If, however, Jiang would withdraw

from the coastal positions, the US would help in interdiction efforts in the sea lanes off the mainland as a substitute for an offshore islands defense.²¹⁹

Jiang said that he would abide by the MDT and signing statements, especially with regards to his pledge to not take any military actions without US consent. However, he refused the US proposal to evacuate Quemoy and Matsu. Jiang declared that the ROC would defend the positions with or without American help. He continued by saying that if he abandoned the coastal strongholds, his government would lose domestic support. Jiang asked if Eisenhower had changed his mind in regards to Quemoy and Matsu and Radford responded by saying the president, despite his January 31 message to Jiang, could not protect those islands, because to do so would mean the use of atomic weapons. If that occurred then the world would disapprove and the possible huge loss of civilian life as a result needed to be considered. Radford assured the Generalissimo that Eisenhower had not come to this decision lightly. Jiang asked if Eisenhower understood what this proposal would do to confidence in Asia. Yeh, present at the meeting on the ROC side, asked if atomic weapons were absolutely necessary for a defense and Radford said yes. Jiang was visibly upset at what he perceived as the president's backtracking on what the Nationalist leader viewed as a private assurance that the US would defend Quemoy and Matsu.²²⁰

After a brief adjournment Jiang returned to the meeting telling his American allies that the PRC would not attack the offshore islands for their own sake, but would do so as a prelude to an assault on Taiwan. He also stated that the PRC was not going to attack the disputed territory any time soon. Jiang believed Mao would not launch any military operations against Quemoy and Matsu without a green light from the USSR and the

Soviets would not give that go ahead yet because they were not ready for a world war. Jiang informed the US delegation that he was turning down Eisenhower's proposal.²²¹ Robertson attempted to clear the air about Eisenhower's previous commitment to defend Quemoy and Matsu saying that the US had the right to withdraw from this private assurance to defend the offshore islands at any time and should expect there would be no bad feelings from the KMT. This was, in the end, a US prerogative. Robertson cited a changing US and world opinion as the reason the alteration had occurred at that time. This explanation did not assuage Jiang and after the leader of Nationalist China excused himself from the meeting, Yeh told the American's that Jiang had not expected this proposal.²²²

Eisenhower, upon learning of the particulars and result of the meetings in Taipei, was understandably disappointed. The president was more upset at the perceived deficiencies in the American delegations delivery than in Jiang's decision. In fact Eisenhower told Dulles that after reading the accounts of the meeting, that he would have done the same thing as Jiang. Eisenhower commented that Radford and Robertson simply did "not grasp the concept" that he, the president, was trying to accomplish. The end result of the meeting was too blunt of an offer and was not carried out with the tact Eisenhower had envisioned.²²³ Eisenhower's disappointment and rather harsh critique of Radford and Robertson in the aftermath of the Taipei meeting was unfair at best. The president's expectations were wildly unrealistic. There was no possibility of any American talking Jiang into reducing his forces on Quemoy let alone removing them and then convincing a shrewd politician like Jieshi that he had come up with the idea himself in the first place. Eisenhower's latest ad hoc plan was doomed from the beginning. That

he convinced grown men to travel half way around the world and attempt it was impressive in its own right.

Eisenhower, in April, laid out the difficulties of the Taiwan Straits and what his administration's policy would become for the remainder of the crisis. Eisenhower said that the defense treaty with the ROC did not require the United States to protect the offshore island but, because of circumstances, the Republic of China could expect the United States to safeguard Matsu and Quemoy. He put on paper that foreign and American domestic opinion was against the United States on the issue of fighting for the contentious territory. The international community believed these controversial positions belonged to the mainland and Eisenhower believed that US involvement in their defense would be corrosive to American designs in the rest of the world and in particular Europe.²²⁴

However, Eisenhower made the case that, by not protecting the islands, great dangers arose as well. If the United States backed down in the Taiwan Straits, the morale of the Nationalist military would be damaged and the rest of Asia could fall to communism. The two choices of defend or not were "two unacceptable choices" and the president's administration had to find a third option. The world agreed with the United States in its support of Formosa, but absolutely did not stand behind Quemoy and Matsu.²²⁵

Eisenhower pointed out the various obstacles of defending the Quemoy and Matsu groups by saying the use of atomic weapons would have to be used to adequately protect the positions, and this use would have a disastrous effect on world opinion of the United States. Domestic opinion would suffer as well and with the combination of the

two, the US would be at a severe disadvantage if a general war broke out with the PRC. If American honor were attached too strongly to the islands close to the mainland, this would endanger the other regional allies and commitments of the United States government. Eisenhower summed up the commitment to the offshore area, as “the principle military reason for holding these two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their loss upon the morale in Formosa.”²²⁶

The president described the “psychological effect” on Asian countries in the region if the United States did not defend the islands and this danger would lie in opposition to any benefit America would receive for not fighting for them. Eisenhower hoped that Jiang would remove his government and the president’s from staking their collective national pride on the controversial territories and reposition the Nationalist forces to concentrated locations on Formosa and the Pescadores. The president hoped that such a move would be seen by Asia as a wise decision. The administration’s overall goal was to fulfill America’s obligation under the defense treaty, keep domestic and world opinion on the Administration’s side, keep the morale of the Nationalists high and keep Asian countries allied to America during the Cold War. The third option for the administration was America and Formosa to announce that Quemoy and Matsu would not be protected all out nor abandoned. The islands should be considered outposts and supplied and secured such.²²⁷

The failure of the administration to successfully convince Jiang to voluntarily abandon the remaining offshore islands had little short term consequences. Eisenhower’s less than clever plan was upstaged by PRC Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung, Indonesia conference of Asian and African states from April 18-24, 1955.

Dulles wrote to Eisenhower to inform him that Zhou Enlai told the Bandung conference that the PRC was ready to discuss the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means. Dulles described this stunning turn of events as “significant.” Although Dulles had his reservations stating that Mao’s government might be trying to separate the offshore islands and Taiwan so they could attack the former without US intervention, the Secretary of State was quick to realize that this was perhaps a sea change in the direction of the crisis.²²⁸

The result of this statement, and American willingness to talk, resulted in the inauguration of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Geneva on August 1, 1955.²²⁹ Beijing genuinely hoped the talks would produce tangible results in their relations with America. The main purpose of the talks was to deal with the issue of Taiwan; however, the PRC also wanted an end to an American economic embargo, gain official diplomatic recognition by Washington and admittance into the United Nations as the sole representative of the Chinese people. The United States was only interested in recovering American citizens held by the PRC and forcing Mao to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Straits.²³⁰ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed anti-Communist forces and governments in Asia would weaken if America caved on issues like recognition, trade or cultural exchanges.²³¹ After China agreed to the release of Americans, the talks deadlocked when neither side was willing to agree to the others’ proposals.²³²

The United States demanded that the PRC renounce the use of force in the straits before any other substantive issues could be discussed.²³³ This precondition essentially ended the talks. In 1957, after two years of stalled negotiations, Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, suggested to Dulles that the

ambassadorial talks be downgraded because the United States could not convince the PRC to renounce military action in the Taiwan area, and therefore no further success in the talks was possible.²³⁴ The ambassadorial talks from September 1955 to the end of 1957 became stalling tactics for both sides.²³⁵ During this nearly three-year period, the United States and ROC took the opportunity to increase their military interdependence in the straits and make important military decisions that would agitate Beijing, culminating in the 1958 shelling of Quemoy.

Jiang realized that the United States was reluctant to go to war over the offshore islands in 1954 and 1955 and decided to increase ROC troop strength on Quemoy and Matsu, hoping to tie America to the islands. Jiang increased his military forces on Quemoy from 30,000 at the time of the MDT signing to 90,000 by August 1958 and put 10,000 men on Matsu by 1958. Jiang concentrated one third of his entire military on two small islands off the coast of mainland China.²³⁶ In April of 1955, the United States counseled against this personnel buildup on the islands, but did nothing substantive to stop it. Later, during the 1958 crisis both Eisenhower and Dulles lamented the fact that so much of Taiwan's prestige was wrapped up in the offshore islands because of this buildup and declared the move "extremely foolish" and "utterly mad."²³⁷

The United States used the inter-crisis years to build up its own military forces in the area. America constructed a huge \$25 million B-52 ready air base on Taiwan and also shipped Matador surface to surface tactical nuclear missiles to the island that had a range of 600-650 miles.²³⁸ Zhou Enlai called these moves part of a plan "to turn Taiwan into a nuclear base against China."²³⁹ By March 1958, the U.S. and ROC had combined their respective military operations in the Taiwan area under the U.S.-Taiwan Defense

Assistance Command, which grouped the formerly separate Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG).²⁴⁰ In the spring of 1958, joint exercises were conducted in Taiwan with the use of Matador missiles.²⁴¹ The ROC conducted sabotage and propaganda leaflet dropping missions along the China coast, as well as air reconnaissance missions that resulted in frequent air battles between the PRC and ROC.²⁴² The unmistakable message to Beijing was that America was in Taiwan to stay.

Scholars debate the reasons why Mao decided to shell Quemoy again in August of 1958. Some academics claim the decision was prompted by Mao's desire to bring America back to the negotiating table in Geneva under the auspices of the ambassadorial talks. Others claim the reason was for domestic political consumption during Mao's Great Leap Forward. Still others claim Mao wanted to show support for Arabs in Lebanon when Eisenhower decided to intervene diplomatically and militarily in July 1958. Fear of Jiang's movements in the Taiwan straits also contributes heavily to the thinking of Mao in the summer of 1958.²⁴³ Regardless of why Mao started shelling Quemoy in 1958, the fact that America had failed to deal with the offshore issue effectively in the 1954 MDT, and subsequent continued crisis in 1955, left Mao an easily accessible target that could gain him international attention and put pressure on the Eisenhower administration.

The United States only included Taiwan, and the nearby southwestern island chain called the Pescadores, within the treaty area of the MDT in 1954. The only provision for Quemoy and the other ROC held offshore islands came in article VI of the treaty, which stated the defense area would also include "such other territories as may be

determined by mutual agreement.”²⁴⁴ This language was designed by the United States to ensure the Eisenhower administration did not commit to the defense of the offshore islands and keep Mao guessing as to American plans for those islands not covered in the MDT.²⁴⁵ This policy backfired after the signing of the MDT when Mao authorized the invasion of the ROC controlled Dachen islands off the Zhejiang Province coast in December 1954 and January 1955. The result was the Formosa Resolution and the Eisenhower administration helping to completely evacuate all ROC forces from the Dachen’s.²⁴⁶ The status of the remaining offshore islands continued in limbo through the ambassadorial talks. With the breakdown of the Geneva talks in 1958, Mao once again could turn to Quemoy as an outlet for his displeasure with both Taipei and Washington.

In the weeks leading up to the shelling of Quemoy, the Eisenhower administration was seeing signals that a crisis was looming and tried once again to make a decision on how to handle the offshore island issue. Everett F. Drumright, U.S. ambassador to Taiwan, informed Washington that tensions in the straits were rising on July 30, 1958, and there was intelligence that the PRC military, the PLA, was moving aircraft from Manchuria and Southeast China to positions opposite Taiwan.²⁴⁷ A few days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to Drumright’s alarm by stating there was no evidence that the PLA was preparing for offensive actions in the area.²⁴⁸ Drumright turned out to be correct, Mao had ordered the shelling on July 17 and jet fighters were redeploying in the area as Drumright was writing the State Department.²⁴⁹ Washington’s ignorance of the situation in Asia only lasted a week after Drumright’s first warning and by August 7, both the military and the CIA were cognizant of the rising tensions and the movement of PLA planes in the vicinity of Taiwan.²⁵⁰ The next day Walter S. Robertson, predicted the

PRC would probably attempt to blockade Quemoy in an attempt to secure another round of negotiations with the United States.²⁵¹ The question in early August 1958 for the Eisenhower administration was how would they treat the offshore islands if conflict did occur?

In 1954, Eisenhower had decided not to defend the offshore islands, but on August, 12 1958, Dulles tried to convince Eisenhower that an attack on the offshore islands was an attack on Taiwan and that the situation in the area had changed dramatically since 1954 and 1955.²⁵² President Eisenhower initially argued that the islands had no strategic value, but Dulles prevailed in convincing the president that they did have important psychological and morale value for the ROC and America should issue a statement linking the islands to Taiwan.²⁵³ The most important change in the situation for the administration was that in 1958 Quemoy and Matsu had 100,000 troops stationed on them.²⁵⁴ As tensions rose, Jiang began insisting that America declare that an attack on Quemoy was an attack on Taiwan.²⁵⁵ On August 20, 1958, Robertson tried to push Dulles and Eisenhower into making a decision on whether the US would defend the offshore islands “under any circumstance,” and made the argument that America should, but not go public with the decision.²⁵⁶

Hours before the beginning of the Quemoy shelling, Dulles sent a letter to the chairman of the house foreign affairs committee stating that the offshore islands were integral to the defense of Taiwan and then ordered the note leaked to the press.²⁵⁷ As soon as his brother Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, informed the secretary of state that the PLA had opened fire on Quemoy, John Foster Dulles immediately backtracked on his conviction that Quemoy was vital to American interests. He stated that America was not

in a defensible position in the court of public opinion if they argued Beijing could not attack Quemoy knowing “this area is used by the Chinats as an active base for attempting to foment civil strife and to carry out widespread propaganda through leaflets...” Dulles continued by saying the United States was asking the world to accept the offshore islands as a “privileged sanctuary” that the ROC could use to wage war against the PRC while Beijing could only stand and watch. The secretary also made the point that the western powers had stopped dropping propaganda leaflets in Eastern Europe. Dulles finished with presenting the possibility of taking the new crisis to the United Nations just as they had contemplated in 1954.²⁵⁸

Despite Dulles’ wavering, the administration was moving closer to defending the offshore islands. Eisenhower said that the offshore islands would probably have to be protected “for one reason and one alone, namely, to sustain the morale...” of the ROC. Eisenhower also decided that the time had not come to name publicly which islands would be protected and which would not.²⁵⁹ On August 24, with the shelling well on its way, Jiang asked again if Quemoy and Matsu could be included in the MDT. Ambassador Drumright responded that any change would have to be approved by the United States Senate.²⁶⁰ While the Eisenhower administration debated how far it was willing to go in defending Quemoy, the exchange of notes, accompanying the MDT in 1954, was acting as a buffer keeping the crisis from spinning out of control.

In November 1954, while the MDT was being negotiated, the ROC launched an air raid on Mainland China without prior American approval.²⁶¹ As a result of the November raid, Dulles proposed a protocol to the MDT formalizing an agreement that the ROC would consult with the United States before any military action was taken by

Taiwan. The purpose of this arrangement was to ensure that America would not have any treaty obligations forced on the United States as a result of ROC offensive actions against the PRC. Dulles was unable to convince Taiwan to include this new provision within the text of the treaty, but did succeed in having the protocol agreed to in an exchange of notes after the signing of the MDT.²⁶² This exchange of notes played an important part in how the 1958 crisis unfolded.

Once the shelling of Quemoy began on August 22, 1958, Jiang did not retaliate against the PRC beyond what the United States had approved. Drumright wrote back to Washington extolling the patience and “restraint” Jiang showed in not conducting any military operations not approved of by America beforehand. Drumright continued by saying that he believed that the ROC would continue to consult with the United States even in the face of mounting casualties on Quemoy.²⁶³ On August 31, Jiang became upset that the U.S. would not attack PRC airfields and complained that Taiwan’s right of self-defense was being abridged. Despite Jiang’s frustration, he continued to make it clear that he would do nothing without consulting with Washington first.²⁶⁴ On September 4, the U.S. military responded to a request from the ROC asking for permission to launch air strikes against mainland targets by citing the exchange of notes on December 10, 1954 and refusing the request.²⁶⁵ Even the White House was amazed at Jiang’s restraint. The president noted that the ROC air force was not attacking PRC junks in the Amoy harbor, even though they had the right to under the terms of the exchange of notes.²⁶⁶ As long as Jiang acceded to the exchange of notes, this assured that only the People’s Republic of China would remain as the sole unpredictable actor that Eisenhower would have to account for while managing the crisis.

That is if you do not count the United States military. The Eisenhower administration, with Dulles in the lead, developed a new worldwide defense strategy called, alternately, the 'New Look' or 'Massive Retaliation.' The purpose of the New Look policy was to use strategic nuclear forces to deter, and possibly respond, to hostile action from Communist states. If an enemy believed the United States would strike back with dozens or conceivably hundreds of nuclear weapons against any provocation, then perhaps the enemy would not make an armed move against the western allies. The most appealing aspect of this doctrine was that America could contain communism in Europe and Asia with minimal use of conventional military forces, and minimal cost to the US taxpayer.²⁶⁷ Eisenhower was saddled with this Massive Retaliation strategy as the second Taiwan Straits crisis began.

During the week leading up to the shelling of Quemoy, as evidence was mounting that Mao was positioning the PLA for an offensive move, the JCS was already telling the president that "U.S. intervention would necessitate nuclear bombing of mainland bases."²⁶⁸ The JCS throughout the crisis attempted to convince Eisenhower to delegate operational responses to the field commanders, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Fortunately, Eisenhower ordered that authority over all nuclear weapons would remain with him as commander in chief.²⁶⁹ Eisenhower retained control over the nation's nuclear arsenal, but because of the New Look policy, the military began moving massive nuclear forces into the area. The JCS ordered the Pacific fleet to prepare for nuclear attack against PLA coastal air bases and sorties deep into China. A B-47 nuclear attack squadron on Guam, containing fifteen bombers, was made available to attack the PRC.²⁷⁰ On September 2, Chairman of the JCS, General Nathan F. Twining, continued to insist

that if the United States began military operations, atomic weapons would have to be used. Twining made the case that small tactical nuclear weapons were the only option “to do the job.” The great fear among many of the JCS staff was another long, hellish, protracted war like Korea.²⁷¹ One other justification for the use of nuclear weapons was the realization that the communist bloc had vast resources of men that America simply did not have.²⁷²

With nuclear control squarely in Eisenhower’s hands, Jiang in a strait jacket and the PLA only shelling Quemoy; the president could waffle for the time being on Quemoy and decided to begin a program of escorting shipments of supplies to the beleaguered island. Eisenhower decided to restrict convoys to international waters and only offer material support to the ROC.²⁷³ On September 7, the American navy began escorting ROC supply ships to Quemoy. Although the first attempt was successful, subsequent attempts failed under the withering fire of PLA guns. This forced both Taipei and Washington to change tactics. The ROC started using Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVTs) amphibious vehicles to bring supplies directly from the sea onto the beaches of Quemoy and this along with the ROC fighter jets being outfitted with air-to-air sidewinder missiles, helped break the artillery blockade of Quemoy.²⁷⁴ General Twining reported to the president on 30 September that the siege was “broken.”²⁷⁵

Before the conclusion of the Quemoy resupply problem, the president went on national television to address America and the world on the crisis in the straits. The President told the audience that America was prepared to defend Quemoy for the first time. However, behind the scenes Eisenhower told Dulles that he was ready to abandon Quemoy, but not ready to say this publicly.²⁷⁶ After nearly a decade of not being clear on

the United States' position on the offshore islands and as a result causing two major international incidents with the People's Republic of China, Eisenhower made a public statement on defending Quemoy, while privately determining to let the island go to the Communists in the middle of the most tense moments of the 1958 crisis. The public's response to Eisenhower's address was one of shock and disapproval. Sixty two percent of the eighty percent of Americans who were following the crisis Gallup polled did not want to go to war over the offshore islands. Eighty two percent wanted the United States to go to the UN before taking military action and 470 out of 640 letters to the White House wanted America to stay out of the conflict.²⁷⁷

With public support negligible for the administration's policy and the resupply crises eased, Dulles decided to take up a PRC offer to resume the ambassadorial talks only in Warsaw instead of Geneva on September, 15 1958.²⁷⁸ On October 6, Mao gave the order for a six day ceasefire after realizing the blockade had failed and was not willing to push the United States any further in the crisis.²⁷⁹ The crisis gradually cooled down, as both sides were not willing to go to war over the offshore islands.

The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, because it left the offshore islands out of the defensive perimeter, left Mao Zedong a convenient place on the map to test American resolve and further his own domestic and international policies. If Dulles and Eisenhower had either decided to include the offshore islands in the treaty or abandon them in 1954, Mao would not have had the opportunity to start a conflict that threatened world peace in 1954-5 and again in 1958. The exchange of notes accompanying the signing of the MDT in 1954 did have a mollifying effect on the 1958 crisis once it began. Because Jiang was reliant on American support for his defense, Jiang abided by the notes

and did not make any major military moves against the PRC that might have expanded the conflict. The notes gave Eisenhower the ability to manage the crisis and avoid going to war over Quemoy as long as the PRC restricted itself to only shelling the island and not making an amphibious assault or conducting an air bombing campaign.

Because the MDT failed to thwart the PRC, Dulles and Eisenhower decided on January 19, 1955 to go before Congress and ask for a resolution giving the president special war powers to protect Taiwan and, if need be, the remaining offshore islands. The Dachen campaign led to a sweeping Congressional resolution that passed nearly unanimously in both the House and Senate, and gave broad powers to the president by January 28, 1955.²⁸⁰ The furor over Beijing's military move led also to the quick and overwhelming passage of the Mutual Defense Treaty by the Senate on February 9, 1955.²⁸¹ A casualty of these furious moves on both sides of the Pacific was the shelving of the UN Oracle plan on February 14, 1955.²⁸²

Oracle was already falling apart of its own weight by February 1955. There were indications that the PRC, with Soviet help, would do everything it could to defeat the proposal despite the fact that it did not have a seat in the United Nations. The ROC was firmly against the proposal as well, despite getting its defense treaty with the US. Ironically, both Chinese governments opposed Oracle for the same reason. They felt that a UN enforced cease-fire would freeze into place the idea of two China's, something neither side was prepared to accept. New Zealand and Great Britain wanted to drop Oracle because they felt a veto in the security council would damage their reputations as well as the strength of the UN. Although Dulles did, behind closed doors, continue to

lobby for the resolution, Zhou Enlai's rapprochement at the Bandung, Indonesia conference ended the need for Dulles to pursue Oracle any further.²⁸³

The Eisenhower administration spent the better part of a year from the fall of 1954 to the summer of 1955 wavering back and forth between making a public declaration that they would defend the offshore islands and, conversely, attempting to find an alternative to any public support. In the MDT, Dulles attempted to "fuzz up" the language surrounding Quemoy, Matsu, and the Dachen in the hope of confusing the PRC as to what the US would do if they were attacked. When this failed, and the PRC began its Dachen campaign, Eisenhower flirted with the idea of telling the world America would guard the offshore islands along with Formosa. After a strong push back from the British, Eisenhower abandoned this idea, however he did give a private assurance to Jiang that this was the US policy. Eisenhower next attempted to convince Jiang to either withdraw or severely diminish ROC troop levels on Quemoy and Matsu to devalue the controversial islands morale value, and strangely, do so in a way in which Jiang would believe he came up with the idea. When Jiang refused this alternative, Eisenhower and Dulles had no alternative but to wait and hope the PRC was not willing to go to war with America over the offshore islands. Luckily, the PRC did not and Zhou Enlai offered a negotiated solution to the crisis at the Bandung Conference in April 1955.

Dulles came into the Eisenhower administration with a clear idea of how to conduct foreign policy. The new secretary of state believed in clarity of design and purpose. If America was straight forward in what it wanted and what it would and would not do, then miscalculation by the enemy, in this case worldwide Communism, would be negated. The best way to avoid a big war in the calculation of Dulles was to avoid

misunderstandings between nations. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the Cold War and the realities of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits kept Dulles from implementing what should have been a rational, even successful policy. Because the KMT government on Taiwan was wrapping up so much of its prestige into holding all of the territory it still controlled, the US believed it could not allow the offshore islands to fall and result in catastrophic consequences for the morale of the Nationalist military and destabilize Chiang's government. If Taiwan fell to the Communists as a result, then it would serve as the first domino of western leaning democracies to crumble. Southeast Asia, Japan, and the Philippines could be next and America would be endangered of losing the Cold War altogether. However, American allies like Great Britain would not support a war over the offshore islands and American public opinion was decidedly against another conflict in Asia so soon after the conclusion of the deeply unpopular Korean War. The Eisenhower administration had painted itself into an ideological corner that created longstanding tensions and crisis after crisis all because it could not make a clear decision on the status of Quemoy, Matsu, and the other ROC holdings along the mainland Chinese coast.

Notes

¹ For the purposes of this study the pinyin romanization system is applied to Chinese place names and individuals. In some cases the more well-known spellings will appear in parentheses after the more modern, academically correct, pinyin spelling, such as Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). Quemoy has a variety of English spellings and pronunciations. The most common today is the non-Pinyin 'Kinmen' spelling. However, the use of 'Quemoy' is one of the exceptions to the use of pinyin in this study, which actually happens to be Jinmen! Most English language scholarly works describing the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 and 1958 use Quemoy and I will adhere to this unwritten rule for consistency in the scholarship.

² Elie Abel, "Aim is to Prevent Start of Big War," *New York Times*, January 24, 1955, 1.

³ Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 131-135.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 131-135.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 71-72.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 131-135.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 134-135.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 134-135.

⁹ For general diplomatic histories please see: Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People: Tenth Edition* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), 852-3; George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 662-664; Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy: A History* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1977), 499-501; and for specifically Cold War histories see: John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 233, 249; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-2006* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 172.

¹⁰ Richard Bayner, "Channeling Ike," *The New Yorker*, April 26, 2010. Article courtesy of http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2010/04/26/100426ta_talk_rayner. Accessed May, 23 2010 & December, 16 2011; Also, for a wonderful discussion on how historians are dealing with Ambrose today see David Frum's article "David's Bookclub: Eisenhower in War and Peace," at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/23/david-s-bookclub-eisenhower-in-war-and-peace.html>.

¹¹ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People: Tenth Edition* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), 852.

¹² *Ibid.*, 835.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 833.

¹⁴ D.F. Fleming, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep., 1956), 545.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 542.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 535-552.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 543.

¹⁸ William M. Bueler, *U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1971), 21-42.

¹⁹ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 143-4.

²⁰ Bennet C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Autumn, 1981), 465-480.

²¹ For a discussion on the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship please see: Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology* 1 (Autumn 1979): 21-38; Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979-80): 575-99.

²² Leonard H. D. Gordon, "United States Opposition to Use of force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 72 issue 3 (Dec. 1985), 639.

²³ Xiaobing Li, *Diplomacy Through Militancy in the Taiwan Straits: Crisis Politics and the Sino-American Relations in the 1950's* (Beijing: China Education Press, 1993.)

²⁴ Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*.

²⁵ H.W. Brands, "Testing massive retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring, 1988), 124-151.

²⁶ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 627-630.

²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key), Washington, October 18, 1954, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 771-772 [hereafter cited as FRUS, however; document, volume, area, and part will continue to be cited as multiple volumes and documents will be used throughout the course of this study]; Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 136.

²⁸ Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating With The Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 78-81; Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 136; Xiaobing Li, "Making of Mao's Cold War: The Taiwan Straits Crisis Revised," In *China and the United States: A New Cold War History*, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1998), 53-54, [hereafter cited as Xiaobing Li, "Making of Mao's Cold War: The Taiwan Straits Crisis Revised,"].

²⁹ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, February 25, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 929.

³⁰ Gordon H. Chang and He Di, "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, luck, Deterrence," *The American Historical Review* Vol. 98, No. 5 (Dec., 1993), 1508.

³¹ Xiaobing Li, "Making of Mao's Cold War: The Taiwan Straits Crisis Revised," 54.

³² Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 140-141; Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 136.

³³ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 19, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 541-542.

³⁴ Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 137-140.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 140.

³⁶ Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, August 29, 1953, Dulles, John F. August, 1953, Box 1, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

³⁷ Elie Abel, "Aim is to Prevent Start of Big War," *New York Times*, January 24, 1955, 1.

³⁸ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-2006*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 158-61.

³⁹ For a representative discussion that is focused on atomic weapons and "Massive Retaliation" as primary issues during the Taiwan Straits Crises of 1954-5, please see: H.W. Brands, "Testing massive retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring, 1988), 124-151; George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 663-4; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 232-4.

⁴⁰ The Charge in the Republic of China (Cochran) to the Department of State, Taipei, August 23, 1954-5 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 547.

⁴¹ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, August 25, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 548-549.

⁴² Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Dwight D. Eisenhower, October 23, 1953, DDE Diary October 1953 (3), Box 3, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS. Declassified 5/13/77.

⁴³ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, August 27, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 551.

⁴⁴ Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, August 27, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 552.

⁴⁵ Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bowie), Washington, September 1, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 555.

⁴⁶ The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, Taipei, September 9, 1954-8 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 581-582.

⁴⁷ The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, Taipei, September 9, 1954-8 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 581-582; Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 614.

⁴⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower to Walter Bedell Smith, September 4, 1954, 4:00 PM., Telephone Calls, Phone Calls June-Dec. 1954 (2), Box 7, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

⁴⁹ *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, s.v. "Walter Bedell Smith," <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/549890/Walter-Bedell-Smith>.

⁵⁰ Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, Thursday, September 9, 1954, 213th Meeting of NSC September 9, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-15.

⁵¹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 9, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 586.

⁵² For a more in-depth look at Ridgway's pre-Korean biography and the immediate impact of his first command in Korea see David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 486-493.

⁵³ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, 489; David M. Lampton, "The U.S. Image of Peking in Three International Crises," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1973), 35-42.

⁵⁴ Memorandum for the President, March 24 1954, Radford, Admiral Arthur W. (2), Box 29, Administration Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-2.

⁵⁵ Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, Thursday, September 9, 1954, 213th Meeting of NSC September 9, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 5-12.

⁵⁶ Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 9, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 587-588.

⁵⁷ Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, Thursday, September 9, 1954, 213th Meeting of NSC September 9, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 5-12.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 9, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 591.

⁶⁰ Eisenhower to Gruenther, October 27, 1953, DDE Diary October 1953 (2), Box 3, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-3.

⁶¹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, Thursday, September 9, 1954, 213th Meeting of NSC September 9, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 5-12.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 613; Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), 266.

⁶⁴ Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, 266.

⁶⁵ Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 91-96; Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 214th Meeting of NSC

September 12, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1.

⁶⁶ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 214th Meeting of NSC September 12, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1.

⁶⁷ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 214th Meeting of NSC September 12, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1; Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 91-96.

⁶⁸ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 214th Meeting of NSC September 12, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1; Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 96.

⁶⁹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 214th Meeting of NSC September 12, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 2.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁶ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 618-619.

⁷⁷ Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: The Purpose of the Message and Its Form," *New York Times*, January 25, 1955, 24; Neal Stanford, "U.S. Reshapes Policy on China," January 21, 1955, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9.

⁷⁸ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 617.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 689.

⁸⁰ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 214th Meeting of NSC September 12, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 9.

⁸¹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 619; Scott Kaufman, "Operation Oracle: the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Offshore Islands Crises of 1954-55," *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History* Vol. 32 Issue 3 (Sep 2004), 108.

⁸² Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, September 12, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 621.

⁸³ Memorandum of Discussion at the 214th Meeting of the National Security Council, Denver, Sunday, September 12, 1954, 214th Meeting of NSC September 12, 1954, Box 6, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 11.

⁸⁴ Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Secretary of State, Washington, September 26, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 661.

⁸⁵ Dulles to Eisenhower, September 18, 1954, Churchill, July – December 1954 (3), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 19, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

⁸⁶ Scott Kaufman, "Operation Oracle: the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Offshore Islands Crises of 1954-55," 109.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 106.

⁸⁸ Conclusions of a Meeting at the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 17th September, 1954, at 10:30 a.m., United Kingdom Cabinet Papers. CAB/128/27, 3-4. All United Kingdom Cabinet Papers courtesy of The National Archives website: <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/>. [Hereafter cited as CAB, followed by catalog numbers, date and page numbers where appropriate, and preceded by document title.]

⁸⁹ Dulles to Eisenhower, September 29, 1954, Dulles, John Foster Sep. 1954 (1), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 10, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS; Telegram Dulles to Eisenhower, September, 29, 1954, Dulles, John Foster Sep. 1954 (1), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 10, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

⁹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key), Washington, October 4, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 678.

⁹¹ The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, October 1, 1954-5:42 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 672.

⁹² The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, Taipei, October 5, 1954-4 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 682-3.

⁹³ Rankin to Dulles, October 14, 1954, Formosa (China) 1953-57 (5), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 10, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

⁹⁴ Neal Stanford, William R. Frye, "Cease-Fire Outlook Scanned; U.S. Sees Asia Truce Pitfalls," January 20, 1955, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1.

⁹⁵ Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 691.

⁹⁶ Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, October 7, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 708.

⁹⁷ Dulles to Chiang Kai-shek, October 14, 1954, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (5), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 19, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

⁹⁸ Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Friday, 15th October, 1954 at 4:30 p.m., CAB 129/27, 2.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 7, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 707.

¹⁰¹ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy), Washington, November 2, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 848.

¹⁰² Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy), Washington, November 4, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 860.

¹⁰³ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy), Washington, November 6, 1954-10:30 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 872.

¹⁰⁴ Memorandum of Discussion at the 221st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 2, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 828-829.

¹⁰⁵ The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, Taipei, November 3, 1954-6 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 853-854.

¹⁰⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy), Washington, November 6, 1954-10:30 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 870-871.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 873.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 878-879.

¹⁰⁹ Memorandum of Discussion at the 220th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 28, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 808-809.

¹¹⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, by Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President, Washington, October 29, 1954-3:30 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 816.

¹¹¹ Dulles to Eisenhower, October 19, 1954, Dulles, John Foster Sep. 1954 (1), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 4, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, November 23, 1954, *FRUS: Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part 1*, 929.

¹¹⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, "Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China Transmitted to the Senate," *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan 24, 1955, 150-151.

¹¹⁷ "U.S. and Republic of China Sign Mutual Defense Treaty," *Department of State Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, 896-897.

¹¹⁸ No official title to Document. Notes apparently made at a meeting, possibly by Eden, entitled: Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 5th November, 1954 at 11 a.m., CAB/195/12, 4.

¹¹⁹ Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W. 1, on Friday, 5th November, 1954 at 11 a.m., CAB/128/27, 6.

¹²⁰ Gordon H. Chang and He Di, "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence," 1513-1514.

¹²¹ "Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China transmitted to Senate," Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, *Department of State Bulletin*, January 24, 1955, 150-2.

¹²² Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 465-6; "Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China transmitted to Senate," Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, *Department of State Bulletin*, January 24, 1955, 151.

¹²³ "U.S. and Republic of China sign Mutual Defense Treaty," *Department of State Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, 895-6.

¹²⁴ Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler), January 11, 1955, *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 10-11; "100 Communist Planes Raid Nationalist Isles Off China," *New York Times*, January 11, 1955, 1.

¹²⁵ Memorandum of a Conversation, Dept. of State, Washington, January 12, 1955, *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 13-7.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Gordon H. Chang and He Di, "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence," 1513-1514.

¹²⁸ White House Conference, Department of State, January 19, 1955, 4:45-7 p.m., 1, Taiwan and Offshore Islands, Box 17, Briefing notes Subseries, NSC Series, White House Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹²⁹ "Dulles Discounts Yikiang's Capture," *New York Times*, January 19, 1955, 3.

¹³⁰ White house Conference, Department of State, January 19, 1955, 4:45-7 p.m., 1, Taiwan and Offshore Islands, Box 17, Briefing notes Subseries, NSC Series, White House Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹³¹ Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Armok: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), 68.

¹³² White house Conference, Department of State, January 19, 1955, 4:45-7 p.m., Taiwan and Offshore Islands, Box 17, Briefing notes Subseries, NSC Series, White House Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 2-3.

¹³³ Ibid., 3.

¹³⁴ Memorandum of Luncheon Conversation with the President, January 19, 1955, Meetings with President 1955 (7), Box 3, White House Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles: Papers, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1.

¹³⁵ Meeting in the President's office, 4:00 p.m. Friday, January 21, 1955, Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1.

- ¹³⁶ Memorandum of Discussion at the 232nd meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 20, 1955, *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 71.
- ¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 73-4.
- ¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 75-6.
- ¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 76-7.
- ¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 77-80.
- ¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 80-1.
- ¹⁴² Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 20, 1955, 6:30 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 86-88; Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday, 20th January, 1955 at 4:30 p.m., CAB/128/28, 4-5.
- ¹⁴³ Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 20, 1955, 6:30 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 88-9.
- ¹⁴⁴ Memorandum of Discussion at the 233rd meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 21, 1955, 9 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 91.
- ¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 91-2.
- ¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 94.
- ¹⁴⁷ Memorandum for the Secretary of State, James S. Lay, Jr. Executive Secretary, National Security Council 233rd meeting, January 26, 1955, Taiwan and Offshore Islands, Box 17, Briefing Notes Subseries, NSC Series, White House Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-2.
- ¹⁴⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress Regarding United States Policy for the Defense of Formosa, January 24, 1955, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10355>.
- ¹⁴⁹ Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: The Purpose of the Message and Its Form," *New York Times*, January 25, 1955, 24.
- ¹⁵⁰ Henrietta and Nelson Poynter, eds., *China and U.S. Far East Policy: 1945-1966* (Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., 1967), 72.
- ¹⁵¹ Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955, 10:30 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 97; Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday 24th January, 1955, at 4:30 p.m., CAB/128/28, 3-4.
- ¹⁵² Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955, 10:30 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 97-8.
- ¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 100-2.
- ¹⁵⁴ Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday 24th January, 1955, at 4:30 p.m., CAB/128/28, 3-4.
- ¹⁵⁵ Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955, 10:30 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 97.
- ¹⁵⁶ Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Monday 24th January, 1955, at 4:30 p.m., CAB/128/28, 3.
- ¹⁵⁷ Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955, 11:45 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 100-2.
- ¹⁵⁸ Memorandum of a conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 22, 1955, *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 106.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 106-7.
- ¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 110.
- ¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 108.
- ¹⁶² Memorandum of a Conversation, the White House, Washington, January 21, 1955, 4 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 104.
- ¹⁶³ Telegram from Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, Taipei, January 29, 1955, 11 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 166-168.
- ¹⁶⁴ Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 30, 1955, 10:45 a.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 170-171.
- ¹⁶⁵ Memorandum of Conference with the President, 1830, A.J. Goodpaster Colonel, CE, U.S. Army, Staff Secretary, January 31 1955, Taiwan and the offshore islands, U.S. policy Toward, 1955-58,

Box 17, Briefing Notes Subseries, NSC Series, White House Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-2.

¹⁶⁶ Telegram from the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, Taipei, February 5, 1955, 10 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 219-20.

¹⁶⁷ Meeting with the President, John Foster Dulles, January 28, 1955, Meetings With the President 1955 (7), Box 3, White House Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles: Papers, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1.

¹⁶⁸ Max K. Gilstrap, "Mid-America Support for Eisenhower: Press Lauds Formosa Stand," January 29, 1955, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 3.

¹⁶⁹ Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 30, 1955, 6:30 p.m., *FRUS: Vol. II, China, 1955-1957*, 174-5.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹⁷¹ Naval Message, January, 1955, Formosa Area. U.S. Mil. Ops.-messages, Directives, etc. (non-presidential) (2), Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-2.

¹⁷² Memorandum for the Record, January 29, 1955, Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-2; Memorandum for the Record, January 31, 1955, Radford, Admiral Arthur W. (2), Box 29, Administration Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁷³ Radford to Stump, January 29, 1955, Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁷⁴ Eisenhower to Gruenther, February 1, 1955, DDE Diary – February, 1955 (2), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 9, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Eisenhower to Churchill, February 10, 1955, DDE Diary – February, 1955 (2), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 9, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁷⁷ Churchill to Eisenhower, February 15, 1955, President – Churchill Jan. 1, 1955 – April 7, 1955 (2), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 19, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Telegram, Eisenhower to Churchill, February 18, 1955, President – Churchill Jan. 1, 1955 – April 7, 1955 (4), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 19, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Intelligence Estimate: Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action With Respect to Chin-men, Matsu, and Nan-Chi Islands Through Mid-1956, February 18, 1955, Formosa Visit to CINCPAC [1955] (3), Box 1, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Dulles, John Foster: Papers, 1951-59, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS; "CHINAT" refers to the Chinese Nationalists or ROC. This abbreviation appears throughout the primary source documents of the Eisenhower administration in both the *FRUS* and from the *Eisenhower Presidential Library*.

¹⁸³ Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, February 21, 1955, Dulles, John Foster Feb. 1955 (1), Box 4, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁸⁴ Eisenhower to Dulles, February 21, 1955, Dulles, John Foster Feb. 1955 (1), Box 4, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁸⁵ Telegram, Dulles to Hoover, February 25, 1955, Dulles, John Foster Feb. 1955 (1), Box 4, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS; Commanders, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN: 10 Jul. 1953-14 Jan. 1958, United States Pacific Command, <http://www.pacom.mil/commander/uspacom-commanders.shtml>.

¹⁸⁶ Telegram, Dulles to Eisenhower, February, 25, 1955, Dulles, John Foster Feb. 1955 (1), Box 4, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Telegram, Dulles to Hoover, February 25, 1955, 8:06 a.m., Dulles, John Foster Feb. 1955 (1), Box 4, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Dulles to Hoover, March 6, 1955, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (4), Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁹¹ Memorandum For Files, March 11, 1955, DDE Diary March, 1955 (2), Box 10, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

¹⁹² Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 53.

¹⁹³ Memorandum For the Record, Before Meeting in President's Office & Meeting in President's Office, March 11, 1955, Formosa Visit to CINCPAC [1955] (1), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

¹⁹⁴ Memorandum For the Record, At the National Security Council Meeting on March 10, March 11, 1955, Formosa Visit to CINCPAC [1955] (1), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-3.

¹⁹⁵ For a complete early history of Honest Johns please see: http://www.rocketryplanet.com/images/stories/archives/982/M31_Honest_John_History.pdf

¹⁹⁶ Memorandum For: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unknown date but in response to April 2, 1955 request, Formosa Area. U.S. Mil. Ops.-Messages, Directives, etc. (non-presidential) (1), Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-3.

¹⁹⁷ For a brilliant history of the development of the 'New Look' please see "The New Look" in Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 59-86.

¹⁹⁸ Memorandum of conversation with the President, March 6, 1955, Meetings with the President 1955 (7), Box 3, White House Memoranda Series, JFD: Papers, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1.

¹⁹⁹ Memorandum of conversation with the President, March 7, 1955, Meetings with the President 1955 (7), Box 3, White House Memoranda Series, JFD: Papers, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1.

²⁰⁰ Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, September 2, 1958, 12:15-1:47 p.m., September 2, 1958; *FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIX, China*, 121.

²⁰¹ Memorandum for the President, March 15, 1955, Formosa Visit to CINCPAC [1955] (1), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-2; Memorandum for the Record, Meeting at Pearl Harbor, March 18, 1955, Formosa Visit to CINCPAC [1955] (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

²⁰² Notes Taken During Meeting, March 11, 1955, Formosa Visit to CINCPAC [1955] (1), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

²⁰³ Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 22, 1955, Conferences on Formosa (interfiled-3/30/78, Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-3.

²⁰⁴ Memorandum for the Files, March 12, 1955, DDE Diary March, 1955 (2), Box 10, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²⁰⁵ Telephone Calls Monday, March 28, 1955 9:25, Phone calls – Jan-July 1955 (2), Box 9, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²⁰⁶ Telephone Calls Wednesday, March 30, 1955 12:45, Phone Calls – Jan-July 1955 (2), Box 9, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²⁰⁷ Summary of Remarks of the Honorable John Foster Dulles at Cabinet Meeting, Ottawa – March 18, 1955, Dulles, John Foster Mar. 1955, Box 5, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

²⁰⁸ Eisenhower to Douglas, March 29, 1955, DDE Diary March, 1955 (1), Box 10, DDE Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

²⁰⁹ Gruenther to Eisenhower, April 3, 1955, Dulles, John Foster April 1955 (2), Box 5, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 2.

²¹⁰ Memorandum for the Record, March 24, 1955, Conference on Formosa (interfiled-3/30/78, Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²¹¹ Eisenhower to Dulles, February 21, 1955, Dulles, John Foster Feb. 1955 (1), Box 4, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²¹² Memorandum of Conference with the President, April 4, 1955, ACW Diary April 1955 (6), Box 5, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS; *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*, s.v. Albert Coady Wedemeyer, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/638732/Albert-Coady-Wedemeyer>.

²¹³ Memorandum for the Secretary of State, April 5, 1955, Dulles, John Foster April 1955 (2), Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4-6.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 6-10.

²¹⁶ Conversation between the President and Under Secretary Hoover, April 21, 1955, Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²¹⁷ Notes on President's thoughts re: Taiwan (no official document title and unknown author or recipient), April 22, 1955, Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²¹⁸ Robertson to Dulles Naval Message Section I, April 25, 1955, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (4), International Series, Box 10, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1; Biographies in Naval History, Admiral George W Anderson Jr., US Navy 1906-1992, Naval History & Heritage Command, http://www.history.navy.mil/bios/anderson_georgew.htm.

²¹⁹ Robertson to Dulles Naval Message Section I, April 25, 1955, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (4), International Series, Box 10, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-3.

²²⁰ Robertson to Dulles Naval Message Section II, April 25, 1955, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (4), International Series, Box 10, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

²²¹ Robertson to Dulles Naval Message Section III, April 25, 1955, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (4), International Series, Box 10, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-4.

²²² Robertson to Dulles Naval Message Section IV, April 25, 1955, Formosa (China) 1952-57 (4), International Series, Box 10, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS, 1-3.

²²³ Eisenhower to Dulles, April 26, 1955, Formosa (2), International Series, Box 9, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS, 1-2.

²²⁴ Memorandum for the Secretary of State Subject: Formosa, Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 5, 1955, 1, Position Paper on Offshore Islands, Box 2, White House Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles: Papers, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Dulles to Eisenhower, May 18, 1955, Dulles, John Foster May 1955, Box 5, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-61, *Eisenhower Presidential Library*, Abilene, KS.

²²⁹ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 169-170; Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin ed., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 180.

²³⁰ Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin ed., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*, 181-184.

²³¹ Rosemary Foot, "The Eisenhower Administration's Fear of Empowering the Chinese." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 111, No. 3 (Autumn, 1996), 518.

²³² Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin ed., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*, 184; Xiaobing Li, "Making of Mao's Cold War: The Taiwan Straits Crises Revised," in Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li ed., *China and The United States: A New Cold War History* (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1998), 59.

²³³ Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Armok: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.), 114.

²³⁴ Rosemary Foot, "The Eisenhower Administration's Fear of Empowering the Chinese," 509; Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin ed., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*, 187-188.

²³⁵ Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin ed., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*, 184-188.

²³⁶ Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1980), 76.

²³⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 13, 1958, 10:30 a.m., *FRUS 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 181.

²³⁸ Xiaobing Li, "Making of Mao's Cold War: The Taiwan Straits Crises Revised," 59; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, 77.

²³⁹ Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American confrontations, 1949-1958*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 226.

²⁴⁰ Appu K. Soman, *Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958*, (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 172; Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American confrontations, 1949-1958*, 227. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, 82.

²⁴¹ Appu K. Soman, *Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958*, 172.

²⁴² Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, 79.

²⁴³ Many examples exist for these arguments and what follows is but a small sample: For a treatment on the ambassadorial talks as reason see: Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations*, 114-117 and Appu K. Soman, *Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958*, 165-201; For a multi-causal reason see: Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, 63-98; For the Middle East connection see: Xiaobing Li, "Making of Mao's Cold War: The Taiwan Straits Crises Revised," in Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li ed., *China and The United States: A New Cold War History*, 58-70 and Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American confrontations, 1949-1958*, 231.

- ²⁴⁴ Chinese Association for the United Nations ed., *The Sino-American Treaty of Mutual Defense*, (Taipei: Chinese Association for the United Nations, unknown), 39.
- ²⁴⁵ Memorandum of conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy), Taipei, 13 October 1954 8:00 a.m., *FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. xiv, The China Area*, 738.
- ²⁴⁶ Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 142-146.
- ²⁴⁷ Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, Taipei, 30 July 1958, 6 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 33.
- ²⁴⁸ Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, Washington, 2 August 1958, 4:02 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 38.
- ²⁴⁹ Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American confrontations, 1949-1958*, 235-236; Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 178-179.
- ²⁵⁰ Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump), Taipei 4 August 1958, 5:40 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 39; Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 42.
- ²⁵¹ Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 8 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 44-45.
- ²⁵² Memorandum for the Record, Washington, 14 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 53; Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower, Washington, 12 August 1958, 10:11-10:43 a.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 50.
- ²⁵³ Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower, Washington, 12 August 1958, 10:11-10:43 a.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 50-51.
- ²⁵⁴ Memorandum for the Record, Washington, 14 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 53.
- ²⁵⁵ Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 8 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 45-46.
- ²⁵⁶ Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 20 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 62-65.
- ²⁵⁷ Memorandum of Meeting, Taiwan Straits, Washington, 22 August 1958, 2 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 67-68.
- ²⁵⁸ Memorandum from the Secretary of State Dulles to Acting Secretary of State Herter and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Easter Affairs (Robertson), 23 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 69-70.
- ²⁵⁹ Memorandum of Meeting, Summary of Meeting at White House on Taiwan Straits Situation, Washington, 25 August 1958, 3:02-3:55 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 73-75.
- ²⁶⁰ Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, Taipei, 24 August 1958, 11 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 70-72.
- ²⁶¹ The Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, Taipei, 3 November 1954, 6 p.m., *FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. xiv, The China Area*, 853-854.
- ²⁶² Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy), Washington 6 November 1954, 10:30 a.m., *FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. xiv, The China Area*, 870-878.
- ²⁶³ Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, Taipei, 24 August 1958, 11 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 70-72.
- ²⁶⁴ Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, Taipei, 31 August 1958, 8 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 107-108.
- ²⁶⁵ Memorandum From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Chief of General Staff, Republic of China (Wang), Taipei, 4 September 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 128-129.
- ²⁶⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 2 September 1958, 12:15-1:47 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 117.
- ²⁶⁷ Richard M. Saunders, "Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Administration" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 100, No. 1 (Spring, 1985), 106-107.
- ²⁶⁸ Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State Herter to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 15 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 56.

²⁶⁹ Memorandum of Meeting, Summary of Meeting at the White House on Taiwan Situation, Washington, 25 August 1958, 3:02-3:55 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 74; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: A Personal Account 1956-1961, Waging Peace*, (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), 299.

²⁷⁰ Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), Washington 25 August 1958, 4:47 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 75-76.

²⁷¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Washington 2 September 1958, 12:15-1:47 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 118.

²⁷² Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Macmillan, Washington, 4 September 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 138.

²⁷³ Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), Washington, 29 August 1958, 2:26 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 100-102.

²⁷⁴ Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 185-189.

²⁷⁵ Appu K. Soman, *Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958*, 184.

²⁷⁶ Memorandum of a conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, 11 September 1958, 4:02-6:10 p.m., *FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. xix, China*, 162.

²⁷⁷ Appu K. Soman, *Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958*, 184.

²⁷⁸ Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin ed., *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*, 188-189.

²⁷⁹ Xiaobing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 187-189.

²⁸⁰ Thomas E. Stolper, *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations*, 68-69.

²⁸¹ Henrietta and Nelson Poynter, eds., *China and U.S. Far East Policy: 1945-1966* (Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., 1967), 65-66.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 73.

²⁸³ Scott Kaufman, "Operation Oracle: the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Offshore Islands Crises of 1954-55," 118-121.

Bibliography

Primary Resources

Archives

Eisenhower Presidential Library. Abilene, KS.
(See Attachment: U.S. Policy Towards Nationalist China).

The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.
Cabinet Papers, 1954-8: www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers

The American Presidency Project:
www.presidency.ucsb.edu

Naval History & Heritage Command:
www.history.navy.mil

Wilson Center: Cold War International History Project:
www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project

Magazines

Department of State Bulletin, 1954-8.

Newsweek, 1954-8.

Time, 1954-8.

US News and World Report, 1954-8.

The Nation, 1954-8.

Newspapers

New York Times, 1954-8.

Times (London), 1954-8.

The Christian Science Monitor, 1954-8.

Memoirs

Dwight D. Eisenhower. *The White House Years: Mandate For Change 1953-1956*. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963.

Dwight D. Eisenhower. *The White House Years: A Personal Account 1956-1961, Waging Peace*. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965.

Eden, Anthony. *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden*. Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960

Government Documents

U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. xiv, *China and Japan, Part 1*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985.

U.S. Department of States, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. II, *China*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1986.

U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, vol. xix, *China*, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996.

Secondary Sources

Books

Aldrich, J. Richard, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-Yeh T Rawnsley. *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and special Operations*. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Anderson, George L., ed. *Issues and Conflicts: Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1959.

Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1980.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *The United States As A World Power: A Diplomatic History 1900-1950*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936.

Brands, H.W. *Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's generation and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

- Bueler, William M. *U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan*. Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1971.
- Burton, David H. *British-American Diplomacy 1895-1917: Early Years of the Special Relationship*. Malabar: Krieger Publishing Company, 1999.
- Campbell, Charles S. Jr. *Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy*. Yale University Press, 1951.
- Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday. *Mao: The Unknown Story*. New York: Anchor Books, 2005.
- Chen, Jian. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- Chinese Association for the United Nations ed., *The Sino-American Treaty of Mutual Defense*, Taipei: Chinese Association for the United Nations, unknown.
- Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. *Gray Steel And Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex 1881-1917*. Hamden: Archon Books, 1979.
- Crabb, Cecil V. Jr. *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age*. Harper & Row, Publishers: New York, 1960.
- Donelan, Michael D. and M. J. Grieve. *International Disputes: Case Histories, 1945-1970*. New York: St. Martins Press, 1973.
- D'este, Carlo. *Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2002. Fairbank, John King. *The United States and China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
- Foner, Eric. *The New American History*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
- Graebner, Norman A. *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961.

- Gurtov, Melvin and Byong-Moo Hwang. *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
- Hahn, Peter L. and Mary Ann Heiss. *Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World since 1945*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000.
- Halberstam, David. *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*. New York: Hyperion, 2007.
- Herken, Gregg. *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.
- Herring, George C. *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Hoopes, Townsend. *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973.
- Howe, Jonathan Trumbull. *Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971.
- Hunt, Michael H. *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- Immerman, Richard H. *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999.
- Iriye, Akira., ed. *U.S. Policy Toward China: Testimony taken from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings-1966*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.
- Jian, Chen. *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- Jo, Yung-Hwan. *U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia: an Appraisal*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 1978.
- Kalicki, J.H. *The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy: 1900-1950*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- Koo, H.E. Dr. V.K. Wellington. *The Open Door Policy And World Peace*. London: Oxford University Press, 1939.

- Korda, Michael. *Ike: An American Hero*. New York: Harper Collins, 2007.
- LaFeber, Walter. *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963.
- . *America, Russia, and the Cold War: 1945-2006*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.
- Lee, Chi-Tun. *The Formosa Strait Crises of 1954, 1955, and 1958: A Historical Analysis of the Eisenhower Administration's Policy on the "Troubled islands."* Unknown: Northwestern State University of Louisiana, 1986.
- Li, Xiaobing and Hongshan Li. *China and the United States: A New Cold War History*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1998.
- . *Diplomacy Through Militancy in the Taiwan Straits: Crisis Politics and the Sino- American Relations in the 1950's*. Beijing: China Education Press, 1993.
- . *A History of the Modern Chinese Army*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007.
- , Xiabo Hu, and Yang Zhong. *Interpreting U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations*. University Lanham: Press of America, Inc., 1998.
- Lyon, Peter. *Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.
- May, Ernest R. *The Truman Administration and China: 1945-1949*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975.
- Martin, Edwin W. *Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986.
- McKee, Delber L. *Chinese Exclusion Versus The Open Door Policy 1900-1906: Clashes Over China Policy In The Roosevelt Era*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977.
- Oglesby, Carl and Richard Shaull. *Containment and Change: Two Dissenting Views of American Foreign Policy*. London: Macmillan Company, 1967.
- Patterson, Thomas G., J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth J. Hagan. *American Foreign Policy: A History*. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1977.
- Pinkley, Virgil; with James F. Scheer. *Eisenhower Declassified*. Old Tappan: Fleming H. revel Company, 1979.

- Poynter, Henrietta and Nelson, eds. *China and U.S. Far East Policy: 1945-1966*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1967.
- Purifoy, Lewis McCarroll. *Harry Truman's China Policy: McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947-1951*. New York: New Viewpoints, 1976.
- Rea, George Bronson. *What American Don't Know About "The Open Door."* Shanghai: The Japanese Association in China, 1932.
- Ross, Robert S. and Changbin Jiang. *Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954- 1973*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Schaller, Michael. *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search For Modern China*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.
- Soman, Appu Kuttan. *Double-edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958*. Westport: Praeger, 2000.
- Statler, Kathryn C. and Andrew L. Johns. *The Eisenhower Administration, The Third World, and The Globalization of the Cold War*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
- Stolper, Thomas E. *China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations*. Armok: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Tachi, Sakuyaro. *The Principle Of the Open Door In China And Manchoukuo*. Japan: Kenkyusha Press, 1937.
- Xia, Yafeng. *Negotiating With the Enemy: U.S.- China Talks During the Cold War, 1949-1972*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Young, Kenneth T. *Diplomacy and Power in Washington-Peking Dealings:1953-1967*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967.
- Young, Kenneth T. *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968.
- Zhang, Shu Guang. *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949- 1958*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Zhisui, Li. *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: the memoirs of mao's Personal Physician, dr. Li Zhisui*. New York: Random House, 1994.

Zhao, Suisheng. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 2004.

Journal Articles

Auerswald, David P. and Peter F. Cowhey. "Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 1997): 505-528.

Braibanti, Ralph. "The Southeast Asia Collective defense Treaty." *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Dec., 1957): 321-341.

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. "The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, 1945-1971." *The China Quarterly*, No. 161 (Mar., 2000): 95-123.

Brands, H.W. "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crises Management in the Taiwan Strait." *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring, 1988): 124-151.

———. "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State." *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Oct., 1989): 963-989.

Briggs, Philip J. "Congress and the Cold War: U.S.-China Policy, 1955." *The China Quarterly*, No. 85 (Mar., 1981): 80-95.

Chang, Gordon H. "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crises." *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring, 1988): 96-123.

Chang, Gordon H. and He Di. "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence." *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 98, No. 5 (Dec., 1993): 1500-1524.

Clubb, O. Edmund. "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-1955." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 74, no. 4 (Dec., 1959): 517-531.

Di, He. "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States." *The China Quarterly*, No. 137 (Mar., 1994): 144-158.

Dingman, Roger. "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War." *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter, 1988-1989): 50-91.

- Esthus, Raymond A. "The Changing Concept of the Open Door: 1899-1910." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* Vol. 46, No. 3 (Dec., 1959): 435-454.
- Fleming, D.F. "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait." *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep., 1956): 535-552.
- Foot, Rosemary. "The Eisenhower Administration's Fear of Empowering the Chinese." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 3 (Autumn, 1996): 505-521.
- Friedman, Edward. "Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War." *Modern China*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Jan., 1975): 75-91.
- Gordon, Leonard H. D. "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954- 1962." *Journal of American History*, Vol. 72 Issue 3, (Dec, 1985): 637-660.
- Greenstein, Fred I. "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence," *Political science Quarterly*, 94 (Winter 1979-80): 575-99.
- Immerman, Richard H. "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology*, 1 (Autumn 1979): 21-38.
- James, Patrick and John R. Oneal. "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 2, (Jun., 1991): 307-332.
- Kash, Don E. "United States Policy for Quemoy and Matsu: Pros, Cons, and Prospects." *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Dec., 1963): 912-923.
- Kaufman, Victor S. "Chirep: The Anglo-American Dispute over Chinese Representation in the United Nations, 1950-1971." *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 115, No. 461 (Apr., 2000): 354-377.
- . "Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd National Division." *The China Quarterly*, No. 166 (Jun., 2001): 440-456.
- Kaufman, Scott. "Operation Oracle: The United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Offshore Islands Crises of 1954-55." *Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History*, Vol. 32 Issue 3 (Sep, 2004): 106-124.
- Kinnard, Douglas. "President Eisenhower and the Defense Budget." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Aug., 1977): 596-623.

- Lampton, David M. "The U.S. Image of Peking in Three International Crises." *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 1973): 28-50.
- Lin, Cheng-Yi. "The Legacy of the Korean War: Impact on U.S.-Taiwan Relations." *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 11, Issue 4 (Winter 92): unknown.
- McClelland, Charles A. "Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: the Quemoy Case." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (Sep., 1962): 201-213.
- "Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises: Quemoy and Berlin." *Background*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Feb., 1964): 201-215.
- McMahon, Robert J. "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 3 (1986): 453-473.
- Nelson, Anna Kasten. "John Foster Dulles and the Bipartisan Congress." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 102, no. 1 (Spring, 1987): 43-64.
- Oate, Andres D. "The Conflict Interactions of the People's Republic of China, 1950-1970." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1974): 578-594.
- Potter, Pitman B. "The Nature of American Foreign Policy." *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan., 1927): 53-78.
- Prichard, Earl H. "The Origins of the Most-Favored-Nation and the Open Door Policies in China." *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2. (Feb., 1942): 161-172.
- Qimao, Chen. "The Taiwan Issue and Sino-U.S. Relations: A PRC View." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 11 (Nov., 1987): 1161-1175.
- Rushkoff, Bennet C. "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crises, 1954-1955." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (Autumn, 1981): 465-480.
- Saunders, Richard M. "Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 100, no. 1 (Spring, 1985), 97-116.
- Sigal, Leon V. "The 'Rational Policy' Model and the Formosa Straits Crises." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1970): 121-156.
- Tsou, Tang. "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-Shek and the United States." *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1959): 1075-1091.

Varg, Paul A. "William Woodville Rockhill and the Open Door Notes." *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1952): 375-380.

Whiting, Allen S. "China's Use of Force, 1950-1996, and Taiwan." *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Autumn, 2001): 103-131.

Zhao, Suisheng. "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan." *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Winter, 1999-2000): 495-512.

China Map
Appendix 1



Taiwan Straits
Appendix 2



PLA shells Quemoy September 3rd
Appendix 3



Dachen Area off Zhejiang Province
Coast where Nehru was visiting
Appendix 4



Intermediate view of Dachen area
Appendix 5




Tachen/Dachen Islands
Appendix 6




● Dachen

Taiwan Straits
Appendix 7



Taiwan Straits
Appendix 8



Map Sources
Appendix 9

- Appendix 1 Courtesy: <http://www.chaos.umd.edu/history/chinamap.gif>
- Appendices 2-3 Courtesy:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/taiwan_strait_98.jpg
- Appendix 4 Courtesy: http://0.tqn.com/d/gochina/1/0/f/B/-/-/Zhejiang_Province.jpg
- Appendices 5-6 Courtesy:
<http://www.chinatouristmaps.com/provinces/zhejiang.html>
- Appendices 7-8 Courtesy: <http://taipeiairstation.blogspot.com/2013/03/chaiyi-air-base-1958.html>

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATIONALIST CHINA

Dulles, John Foster: Papers

General Correspondence and Memoranda Series

- Box 1 Memos of Conversation A-D (3) [Taiwan]
Memos of Conversation E-I (2) [Dag Hammarskjöld and China]
Memos of Conversation J-K (2) [Knowland, Quemoy and Matsu]
Memos of Conversation L-M (1) [Quemoy and Matsu]
Memos of Conversation L-M (3) [Quemoy and Matsu]
Memos of Conversation L-M (4) [Communist China]
Memos of Conversation N-R (1) [Communist China]
Memos of Conversation N-R (2) [Far Eastern matters]
- Box 2 Strictly Confidential C-D (3) [Quemoy and Matsu; Formosa]

Subject Series

- Box 5 George, Sen. Walter 1/54-12/56 (3) [Formosa]
George, Sen. Walter 1/54-12/56 (4) [Chinese situation; Quemoy and Matsu]
File Received from Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr. (1) [visit to Far East]
- Box 8 Classified Material [China]
Confidential - Memos and Letters (1)-(3) [Chiang Kai-Shek]
- Box 10 Red China

Telephone Conversations Series

- Box 2 Telephone Memos - July-Aug. 1954 (1)-(4) [Formosa; China; flood relief]
- Box 3 Telephone Memos (Except to and From White House) September 1, 1954 - Oct. 30, 1954 (1)(2) [China]
Telephone Conv - General Nov. 1, 1954 -- Dec 31, 1954 (1)-(5) [China; trade with Red China]
Telephone Conv. - General Jan. 3, 1955 -- February 18, 1955 (1)-(4) [China; Red China's admission to U.N.]
Telephone Conv. - General Mar. 7, 1955 - Apr. 29, 1955 (1)(2)(4) [Quemoy and Matsu; China; Formosa Straits]
- Box 4 Telephone Conv. - General May 2, 1955 -- Aug. 31, 1955 (2)-(5)(8)
- Box 5 Memoranda of Telcon General January 3, 1956 - April 30, 1956 (6)
Memoranda of Tel Conv General May 1, 1956 to June 29, 1956 (3)
- Box 9 Memoranda of Tel. Conv. - Gen. August 1, 1958 to October 31, 1958 (1)-(5)
- Box 10 Telephone Conv. - White House Nov. 1, 1954 ---February 18, 1955 (1)(2)
Telephone Conv - White House Mar. 7, 1955 to Aug 29, 1955
- Box 13 Memoranda of Tel. Conv - W.H. August 1, 1958 to December 5, 1958 (2)(3)

White House Memoranda Series

- Box 1 White House Correspondence 1953 (3)(4) [Communist China]
Meetings with President 1954 (1) [China]
- Box 2 White House Memoranda 1954 - Formosa Straits (1)(2)
White House Memoranda 1955 - Formosa Straits (1)-(4)
Position Paper on Offshore Islands April - May 1955 (1)-(6)
- Box 3 White House Correspondence 1955 (3) [Taiwan]
Meetings with President 1955 (7) [Quemoy]
- Box 4 Meetings with President Jan. 1956-July 1956 [China and Offshore Islands]
- Box 5 Meetings with President Aug.-Dec. 1956 (7)
- Box 6 White House - General Correspondence 1958 (2) [China]

- Box 7 White House Meetings with President - July 1958-Dec. 1958 (3)(4)(6)(7) [Chiang Kai-Shek, Quemoy & Matsu]
- Box 8 Correspondence with President – Personal 1954-58 [general foreign policy matters]

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President (Ann Whitman File)

Administration Series

- Box 12 Douglas, Lewis W. (1)-(5)
- Box 16 Gruenther, General Alfred 1955 (1)-(4)
- Box 29 Quemoy-Matsu - Washburn, Abbott [1958] [U.S. Far East policy]

ACW Diary Series

- Box 2 ACW Diary June 1954 (1) [DDE-Judd conversation re Asia]
ACW Diary June 1954 (3) [Nixon re U.S.-Asia policy]
- Box 3 ACW Diary December 1954 (2) [Nationalist China]
- Box 4 ACW Diary January 1955 (1)(2) [Formosa]
ACW Diary February 1955 (2) [Far East]
ACW Diary March 1955 (5)(6) [Quemoy-Matsu, William Knowland and Far East]
- Box 5 ACW Diary April 1955 (6) [Formosa, Adm. Carney]
ACW Diary May 1955 (3)(6)(7) [China]
ACW Diary June 1955 (4)
- Box 6 ACW Diary July 1955 (3) [Red China]
ACW Diary August 1955 (5) [Red China]
- Box 8 May 1956 Diary (2)
- Box 9 August – 1957 – ACW Diary (1) [newsmen to China]
- Box 10 ACW Diary - October 1958 [Quemoy]
- Box 11 [ACW] DIARY August 1959 (2) [China]
[ACW] DIARY April 1960 (1) [Far East]

DDE Diary Series

- Box 3 DDE Diary - October 1953 (1)-(4) [Judd and Communist China]
- Box 5 Phone Calls July-Dec. 1953 (1)(2) [Judd re Communist treatment of POWs]
- Box 7 Phone Calls June-Dec. 1954 (1)-(3) [China, UN, Knowland and China]
- Box 9 DDE Diary January 1955 (1)(2) [DDE to Henry Luce re Formosa]
Phone Calls - Jan-July 1955 (1)-(3) [Formosa Crisis]
- Box 10 DDE Diary March 1955 (1)-(3) [Formosa]
DDE Diary April 1955 (1)(2) [Formosa and Quemoy]
- Box 11 Phone Calls August 1955 [British and China]
- Box 12 Jan. '56 Goodpaster [China]
- Box 22 March '57 Miscellaneous (1)-(4) [U.S.-Comm. China]
- Box 23 May '57 Phone Calls [shooting incident in Taiwan]
- Box 24 May '57 - Miscellaneous (1)-(5) [newsmen and Red China]
- Box 25 June '57 Phone Calls [China trade policy]
June '57 Staff Memos [pre-press briefings newsmen and Red China]
- Box 26 August - 1957 - Memo on Appts. (1)(2) [DDE meeting with Mrs. Mary Downey re son held prisoner by Chinese]
- Box 35 Staff Memos July 1958
August 1958 - Staff Notes (1)-(3) [Formosa]
- Box 36 Telephone Calls - Sept. 1958 [Quemoy and Matsu]
Staff Notes - Sept. 1958 [Quemoy and Matsu]
DDE Dictation - October 1958 [to Senator Green re Quemoy & Matsu]
- Box 43 Telephone Calls July 1959 [China and UN]

Staff Notes July 1959 (1)-(3) [Subcommittee Red China]

Dulles-Herter Series

- Box 1 Dulles, John Foster April 1953 [Chiang Kai-Shek]
Dulles, John Foster June 1953 (1) [Communist China]
Dulles, John Foster Aug. 1953 [Communist China]
Dulles, John Foster Oct. 1953 [Communist China]
- Box 2 Dulles, John Foster Dec. 1953 [Communist China and UN]
- Box 3 Dulles, John Foster May 1954 (1) [Communist China and Korea]
- Box 4 Dulles, John Foster Sept. 1954 (1)(2) [Chinese Offshore Islands]
Dulles, John Foster Oct. 1954
Dulles, John Foster Dec. 1954 (2)
Dulles, John Foster Jan. 1955
Dulles, John Foster Feb. 1955 (1)(2)
- Box 5 Dulles, John Foster March 1955
Dulles, John Foster April 1955 (1)(2)
Dulles, John Foster May 1955
Dulles, John Foster July 1955 [Red China]
- Box 6 Dulles, John Foster Nov. 1955 [Tito re USSR and China]
Dulles, John Foster Dec. 1955 [UK and China Trade]
Dulles, John Foster March 56 [Taiwan]
- Box 10 Dulles - September, 1958 (1) [Quemoy and Matsu]
Dulles - October 1958 [Quemoy]
- Box 12 Herter, October, 1959 (1) [Khrushchev and China]
- Box 13 Herter, Christian September 1960 [USSR and China]

International Series

- Box 9-12 Formosa
- Box 18-20 DDE-Churchill 1954-55
- Box 22 Eden Visit January 30--February 1, 1956 (1)-(5)

NSC Series

- Box 5 209th Meeting of NSC, August 12, 1954 [Formosa]
- Box 6 213th Meeting of NSC, September 9, 1954 [China and Formosa]
214th Meeting of NSC, September 12, 1954 [Chinese Offshore Islands]
215th Meeting of NSC, October 6, 1954 [Chinese Offshore Islands]
220th Meeting of NSC, October 28, 1954 [China and Offshore Islands]
231st Meeting of NSC, January 13, 1955 [Formosa and China]
232nd Meeting of NSC, January 20, 1955 [Offshore Islands]
233rd Meeting of NSC, January 21, 1955 [Chinese Offshore Islands]
234th Meeting of NSC, January 27, 1955 [Chinese Offshore Islands]
237th Meeting of NSC, February 17, 1955 [Formosa and Offshore Islands]
238th Meeting of NSC, February 24, 1955 [Formosa]
239th Meeting of NSC, March 3, 1955 [Formosa]
240th Meeting of NSC, March 10, 1955 [Formosa]
242nd Meeting of NSC, March 24, 1955 [Formosa]
243rd Meeting of NSC, March 31, 1955 [Formosa]
245th Meeting of the NSC, April 21, 1955 [Formosa]
- Box 7 253rd Meeting of NSC, June 30, 1955 [Quemoy]
264th Meeting of NSC, November 3, 1955 [Formosa]
285th Meeting of NSC, May 17, 1956 [Chinese Offshore Islands]

- Box 8 286th Meeting of NSC, May 31, 1956 [Chinese Offshore Islands]
- Box 8 290th Meeting of NSC, July 12, 1956 [Formosa]
- Box 9 328th meeting of NSC, June 26, 1957 [Amoy-Quemoy area]
- 337th Meeting of NSC, September 22, 1957 [Formosa]
- 338th Meeting of NSC, October 2, 1957 [Formosa]
- Box 10 376th Meeting of NSC, August 14, 1958 [Taiwan Straits]
- 377th Meeting of NSC, August 21, 1958 [Taiwan Straits]
- 378th Meeting of NSC, August 27, 1958 [Taiwan Straits]
- 379th Meeting of NSC, September 18, 1958 [Taiwan Straits]
- 380th Meeting of NSC, September 25, 1958 [Taiwan Straits]
- 381st Meeting of NSC, October 2, 1958 [Taiwan Straits]
- 382nd Meeting of NSC, October 13, 1958 [Taiwan Straits]
- 384th Meeting of NSC, October 30, 1958 [Taiwan and China]
- Box 11 399th Meeting of NSC, March 12, 1959 [Taiwan Straits]
- Box 12 447th Meeting of NSC, June 8, 1960 [Taiwan Straits]

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Records as President (White House Central Files)

Official Files

- Box 712-13 OF 168 – China, Government and Embassy of

General Files

- Box 802-4 GF-122 - China and Formosa
- Box 834 GF-122-A [China]

Confidential Files

- Box 28 Formosan Question
- Box 70 STATE, Department of (May 1955) [Gen. Chiang Khag-Kuo]

Herter, Christian A.: Papers

- Box 1 Chronological File - April 1957 (2) [visit to Communist China]
- Box 2 Chronological File - June 1957 (2) [China Pol]
- Chronological File - July 1957 (2)
- Box 3 Chronological File - Dec. 1957 (4) [China and Satellites]
- Box 5 Chronological File - Sept. 1958 (1) [Formosa]
- Box 6 Chronological File - Oct. 1958 (4) [Quemoy and Matsu]
- Box 9 Chronological File - July 1960 (1) [Bowles, Taiwan Straits]
- Box 11 CAH Telephone Calls - 7/1/58-9/30/58 [Vice Pres. re public opinion on Formosan policy]
- CAH Telephone Calls - 10/1/58-12/3/58 [Formosan Straits]
- Box 13 CAH Telephone Calls - 9/1/60-1/20/61 (2) [Kennedy-Nixon debate on Quemoy]
- Box 21 Meetings with the President 7/30/57 to 1/20/61 (1) [Chinese Offshore Islands]

Jackson, C.D.: Papers

- Box 29 Alexander, Roy [inc. memo re Quemoy and Matsu]
- Box 37 Bogdan, Norpert (1)(2) [inc. discussion on China in 1946]
- Box 40 Chiang Kai-Shek, Mme. Chiang (1)(2) [re Chiang's book Soviet Russia in China]
- Box 41 Committee for a Free Asia
- Box 49 Dulles, John Foster (3)(4) [inc. question of passports to China]

- Box 60 Hornbeck, Stanley [manuscript of article re Far East]
- Box 61 Institute of Pacific Relations-Report (1)(2) [re Alfred Kohlberg's charges of being pro-communist]
- Box 68 Log-1953 (4)
Log-1954 (4)
Log-1955 (1)
- Box 69 Log-1956 (1)
Log-1956 (3)
Log-1957 (4)
Log-1962-1964
- Box 70 Luce, Henry R., 1943 through Luce, Henry R., 1948
- Box 78 N-Misc. (1)-(3) [incl. letter to Gerald Noonan re Quemoy, etc.]
- Box 87-89 Quantico Meetings
- Box 91 Rosenberg, James (1)(2) [inc. correspondence re China]
- Box 109 V-Misc. (1)(2) [inc. observations by Gen. James Van Fleet on trip to Far East in 1956]
- Box 110 "War By Cease Fire" [documents on communist truce violations in Korea, Indochina, China]
- Box 115 World Trip, Transcripts, Quemoy-Taiwan, 1962 (1)(2)

Osborn, David L.: Papers, 1947-1994

- Box 4 China 1965-72 (1)(2)
China 1973-76 (1)(2)
China 1984-94 (1)(2) [draft memoirs of Marshall Green re US-China policy; Henry Kissinger; Nixon trip to China]
- Box 6 Oral History Interview (1)(2) [service in Japan and Taiwan; Taiwan straits crisis; Henry Kissinger and "One China" policy; Nixon's visit to China 1972; Osborn's meeting with Kissinger 1973 re China and Japan]

U.S. Council on Foreign Economic Policy, Office of Chairman: Records

Randall Series, Trips Subseries

- Box 1-2 Far East Trip [several folders containing references to Taiwan]

Randall Series, Agency Subseries

- Box 2 International Cooperation Adm (1) [October-November 1960] [Taiwan]

Note: These records plus the records of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy contain much documentation on CHINCOM - trade controls on Red China

U.S. President's Committee to Study the Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee): Records

- Box 7 Committee Mailing 59-59 [MAP for Far East]
- Box 8 III Ltr. To Admirals Jerauld Wright and H.D. Felt [Evaluation of MAP Asia]
- Box 17 Category V - Cent. Files - Milit. Jan 1959 (1)(3) [Taiwan]
- Box 19 Study on Taiwan

U.S. President's Committee to Study the Mutual Security Program (Fairless Committee): Records

- Box 9 Summaries of Testimony and Briefings (1)-(6) [cover many areas including Far East]
Mr. Reid (1)(2) [notes of Briefing from In Country Teams inc. Nationalist China]

Taiwan]

White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records

NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries

- Box 5 Communist China
- Box 17 [Taiwan and the Offshore Islands, U.S. Policy toward] [1955-58]

NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries

- Box 4 NSC 146/2 [Formosa and Chinese Nat. Govt.]
NSC 148 [Far East]
- Box 7 NSC 166/1 [Communist China]
- Box 12 NSC 5429/5 - Policy Toward the Far East (1)-(3)
- Box 14 NSC 5503 - Policy Toward Formosa
- Box 27 NSC 5913 - Far East

Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries

- Box 2 President's Papers 1954 (7) [Formosa]
- Box 3 Mtgs. with President 1958 (3) [Taiwan]
- Box 5 1960--Meetings with President--Volume 2 (9)

OCB Series, Subject Subseries

- Box 2 Far East
- Box 8 Taiwan & GRC [Formosa Straits]

White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records

International Series

- Box 3 China (Republic of) (1)(2)

International Trips and Meetings Series

- Box 8-9 Khrushchev Visit [includes some discussion of China]
- Box 12 Far East Trip, June 1960
President's Far East Trip, Chronology, Elmendorf-Manila-USS St. Paul (1)(2)
- Box 13 President's Far East Trip, Chronology, Taipei-Okinawa (1)(2)

Oral Histories:

- Judd, Walter (OH 196)
- Knowland, William (OH 333)
- Robertson, Walter (OH 121)

Suggested Reading:

Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China During the Era of Mao, 1948-1976:
National Intelligence Council. This publication is also available on the NIC public website at:
www.cia.gov/nic under Declassified NIC Publications.

2/6/2006