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**Repairing a Strategic Partnership:
Congress and US Foreign Policy with Turkey**

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
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
**Repairing a Strategic Partnership:
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Abstract

The United States and Turkey have shared an important strategic partnership since Turkey was admitted to NATO in 1952. This relationship began to decline following Turkey's denial of Washington's request to position US military forces in southeastern Turkey for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Because of the strain in this critical relationship the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs began holding regular hearings on US-Turkish relations to understand the future of the partnership. This thesis is a qualitative theory-affirming case study that analyzes these hearings and demonstrates that the House has tried to positively influence foreign policy with Turkey. Congressional influence on foreign policy is traditionally viewed as limited which the hearings support, but this thesis also exposes new ways in which Congress can approach foreign policy objectives.

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Introduction

Of the many historic and informational displays at the Pentagon, the hall dedicated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is relatively simple but also quite striking. In alphabetical order the flag of each member nation hangs behind protective glass as well as the NATO flag and other wall mounts describing NATO's evolution. The compass which adorns the NATO flag has also been constructed into a model seemingly too large to fit the height of the hall imposing on passersby the magnitude of NATO's strategic importance. If one walks along this hall Turkey's flag can be found right next to the Union Jack in a display of considerable irony for those knowledgeable of the UK-Turkish relationship just one hundred years ago.

Turkey's admittance to NATO in 1952 is frequently and accurately described as a significant maneuver in the West's overarching strategic plan to thwart Communist expansion in the Middle East (Baran 2010, 1; Fuller 2008, 33; Kamrava 2011, 111). Since that time the relationship between Turkey and the United States has waxed and waned due to strategic frictions, but it has overwhelmingly remained positive even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey particularly enjoyed US support during President Reagan's administration following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Owen 2004, 123) and again during the Persian Gulf War (Baran 2010, 1). Iran is still a source of contention that preserves Ankara (Turkey's capital) and Washington's strategic partnership to this day but Iraq is a slightly different story.

As the US prepared for war in Iraq in 2003 Ankara delivered startling news. The Turkish Parliament voted down Washington's entreaty to position US military forces along the Turkey-Iraq border for the invasion (Kinzer 2008, 215; Owen 2004, 222). Typically the US could rely on Turkey's generals, an eclipsing force in Turkish politics, to cooperate but the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which prevailed in the 2002 parliamentary elections proved that the

new leadership in Turkey meant a new foreign policy. Even beyond the military-staging rebuttal, Zeyno Baran (2010, 3) points out that public attitude toward the West in Turkey has significantly changed, stating that the “plummeting popularity of the United States and Euro-Atlantic structures during the period of the AKP government is surprising – even shocking.” Thus it seems that in a relatively brief expanse of time the long partnership between Turkey and the US has reached its most enfeebled moment to date. This depreciation of Washington’s standing in Turkey could not have come at a worse time.

On Turkey’s eastern borders tensions continue to multiply particularly with Iran, Syria, and Kurdish Iraq. Two English language newspapers, the *Hürriyet Daily News* known for swaying to the secular side of arguments and the *Today’s Zaman*, a more religious/conservative paper, daily host stories about Iranian vitriolic rhetoric, the civil war which has erupted in Syria, and Kurdish violence spurred on by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK. Not one of these situations will likely be resolved soon which has left Turkish leadership in a precarious position.

In order to prepare for the growing insecurity around Turkey’s borders, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül have been forced to rekindle relations with the US in order to obtain an array of weapon systems. Since the inauguration of President Barack Obama in 2009 his administration has also sought to normalize relations and openly stated its support for Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership (Kinzer 2010, 203-204). According to Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil (2012, 20), who regularly publish articles on Turkey in *Defense News*, the Obama administration is prepared to work with Turkey on weapons deals but Congress has been hesitant to consent. This does not necessarily mean that Congress is attempting to direct foreign policy with Turkey but it does raise questions as to its policy divergence from the Obama administration in such a critical area of the world.

The purpose of this thesis will be to determine whether Congress is beginning to assert its own foreign policy interests with Turkey or if the hesitancy to sell Turkey weapons reflects a previous dilemma with Turkey as will be described in the literature review. The prevailing theories on Congress and foreign policy are nuanced but not very surprising. In one of Robert A. Dahl's (1964, 62) lesser known works Congress and Foreign Policy, he states of the Executive: "however decentralized and uncontrolled the total executive structure appears from the White House, *as compared with Congress* it is unified, it is decisive, it is expert." The multiple roles of Congress in foreign policy will be observed but these roles will only be considered in light of the body of literature describing executive dominance in foreign policy. As a qualitative theory affirming case study it is the hypothesis of this thesis that Congress is not attempting to direct foreign policy with Turkey given the supremacy of the Executive Branch in that area but merely applying legislative pressure on the executive.

In order to complete a qualitative theory affirming case study this thesis will revolve around two separate literature reviews and an analysis of several hearings in the House of Representatives. The hearings will help to understand the legislative position on Turkey and relate that position to the theory on Congress and foreign policy which claims that Congress has a limited role. Analyzing House hearings is not the most ideal way to construct the rationale behind Congressional actions but without multiple interviews or direct statements from Representatives on the Subcommittee of Europe it is effectively the most plausible way to piece together legislative intent. The two-part literature review will firstly revolve around Turkey's unique position in world affairs and the history behind its current predicament. This way the content of the House hearings can be understood. Secondly, the review will look at the literature

behind Congress and its role in foreign policy in order to understand the context with which the House is approaching foreign policy with Turkey.

Turkey: West of the Middle East

The literature surrounding Turkey is so vast that for the purposes of this thesis a relatively broad scope must be taken in order to highlight all of the major issues the House Subcommittee on Europe discussed in its hearings. The reason behind the glut of literature is because Turkey serves as a highlight for so many important subjects in political science including pseudo-democratic practices and transition, the value of carrot and stick reform in Turkey's relationship with the European Union, Islam and modernity, Islam and secularism, and even the role of state contiguity in Militarized Interstate Disputes (Bremer 1992). Thus, in order to begin to understand Turkey's current political and social climate, it is only natural to take into account the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the fingerprint it has left on modern Turkey. Turkey's current socio-political situation is so highly predicated on Turkey's founding that some modern issues and problems are inseparable from the Ottoman legacy.

According to Lord Kinross (1977, 580) the Young Turk genesis toward the end of the Ottoman Empire was the result of education policies pursued by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Within the Ottoman Parliament the Young Turks was a reformist party that actualized its goals through the Committee of Union and Progress. During the reign of Hamid's successor, Mehmed V, a triumvirate of Young Turks effectively took power in 1913 making the Sultan a mere figurehead (Kinross 1977, 595-609; Kinzer 2010, 37). As the European victors of the Great War divvied up Ottoman lands at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and in the resulting Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, a Young Turk and former Ottoman general Mustafa Kemal (later given the name Atatürk, meaning Father of the Turks) was hard at work preparing to counter the impending European subjection.

There are many biographical accounts of Mustafa Kemal and his expansive political reforms of Turkey but it was his military success at the Battle of Gallipoli that paved the way for his future political rise (Kinzer 2010, 36). Gallipoli was a critical victory for the Central Powers against the Allies in WWI but would ultimately not change the outcome of the war. The attack resulted in a spectacular loss of life for both the Turks and Allied powers but Kemal's fighting tenacity contributed tactically and symbolically to the Turks' victory. According to biographer Andrew Mango (2000, 156):

Mustafa Kemal was not alone the saviour of Istanbul, but he made a notable contribution to the defence of the capital. He displayed personal courage and inspired his men who were fighting in appalling conditions. Although his ambition and self-righteousness made him a difficult man to work with...his ability was not in doubt.

Later at the Treaty of Sèvres the British would obtain retribution for defeat at Gallipoli in the creation of an International Control Commission over the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Strait but this retribution would be short lived (Montgomery 1972, 781). The Gallipoli victory launched Mustafa Kemal towards the rank of general and eventually President. Where Kemal had succeeded in war however the Young Turk triumvirate had not. They fled the defeated Ottoman Empire in 1918 leaving Sultan Mehmed V's brother and successor, Mehmed VI, to settle the armistice. He would be the last sultan of the Ottoman Empire and all three members of the Young Turk triumvirate would face their demise within a few years.

Descriptions of Mustafa Kemal's immediate conversion from soldier to political leader in the aftermath of World War I are quite astonishing. Following the end of the war Kemal quickly reached out to fellow soldiers and other persons of political clout speaking on many occasions to denounce the Allies and their puppet sultanate (Kinross 1965; Mango 2000). In March of 1920 Kemal called for the Istanbul-based Ottoman Parliament to meet in Ankara forming a new body

called the Grand National Assembly which was used to expunge the Sultan. After the creation of a rebel army, Kemal returned to military duties during Turkey's Independence War which ended with an armistice in 1922. Throughout the war Kemal continued to amass backing in the Turkish Grand National Assembly where a new leader would soon be elected, Mustafa Kemal. On July 24, 1923 the Lausanne Treaty was signed negating the Treaty of Sèvres and Turkey was born.

As President, Atatürk was quick to make changes that he saw as modernizing forces for Turkish society. Throughout his presidency Atatürk uprooted the Islamic caliphate, closed religious schools in favor of secular ones, pursued multiple measures of women's equality, normalized foreign relations, encouraged Western style dress, had a Latin-based script created for the Turkish language, and remodeled much more in order to make Turkey resemble Europe (Macfie 1995). Not all of his renovations are viewed in a positive light however and critics of Atatürk have called many reforms anti-Islamic. Bernard Lewis (2002, 107) goes so far as to call Atatürk the "arch-enemy" of Muslim militants and radicals given his devotion to modernization and secularization. These reforms have left mixed legacies for Turkish society and some are currently being overturned such as the ban on religious schools. Indeed, it was the harshness of Kemalist modernization efforts that has given rise to current policy retraction. As Mohammed Ayooob (2008, 99) states:

The implicit authoritarianism of the secular Kemalist state provided political Islam the opportunity to don the mantle of democracy and turned symbolic Islamic issues, such as the wearing of head scarves by women in universities and public offices, into major human rights issues.

Apart from modernization efforts it is really the initial constitutional creation of a republic feverishly desired by some (Lewis 1995, 313) and completely foreign to much of the population (Kinzer 2010, 60-61) that has created tottering democratic stability but a democratic system

nonetheless. The literature generally notes that a secular and modernized society could not have been created through true democratic processes after the fall of the Ottoman Empire but this lingering democratic deficit has produced significant tension in Turkey's current political environment (Kinzer 2008, 10).

This is the root of modern Turkey's problems. Without question Atatürk faced an unbelievably daunting task in moving Turkey forward and it is remarkable enough that the Turks were able to grapple their independence away from European colonial tentacles. It cannot be denied however that Atatürk's methods of reform bordered on authoritarianism. Since Atatürk's death in 1938 his devoted civilian and military followers, Kemalists, have not fully moved away from this authoritarian style of governance. In Turkey and the broader Middle East Kemalism stands in direct confrontation with Islamism which calls for the creation of an Islamic state or at least the centering of a country on Islamic ideals. Islamist movements are divided across many axioms and political goals including nationalist centered Islamism, pan-Islamism, radical Islamism, and moderate Islamism. For the purposes of this paper Islamism will refer to "a modern intellectual and political movement that seeks to bring society and politics into agreement with Islam" (Selvik and Stenslie 2011, 128).

Opposition to Kemalists in Turkey has come most notably from moderate Islamist parties that attempt to advance their goals through typical forms of government/social participation including elections, the media, protest, and etcetera. These Islamists (namely the current AKP) have developed a dual sense of nationalism and Islamism which stands in stark contrast to pan-Islamism. This is because "outright secularism in the Turkish Republic subordinated religion to a nationalist state, and created unique combinations of religion and nationalism" (Zubaida 2011, 109). Islamists that believe in a pan-Islamic state maintain it is "justified by reference to the

early years of Islam” (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, 33), often referred to as the Golden Age of Islam which took place following the conquests of the Prophet Muhammad and the reign of the first four caliphs (Ayoob 2008, 3). Most Islamist groups realize the model society of the Golden Age cannot be perfectly actualized in modern life but attempt to adhere their political ideologies to Islam as seen fit (Ayoob 2008, 3). This includes Turkey’s Islamists.

The battle for power between Kemalists and Islamists in Turkey has consistently produced political conflict ranging from multiple coup d’états to the regular prohibition of Islamist political parties. Falling in line with the literature on pseudo-democracies Turkey has long been dominated by the Kemalist military enclave that seeks to ensure the legacy of Atatürk as well as its own success (Cizre 2011; Cook 2009). Steven A. Cook, a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, regularly publishes material analyzing the state of Turkey’s political duel effectively describes this ongoing dilemma in *Ruling But Not Governing*. Written in 2007 before the Arab Spring, Cook (2007, 15) states:

Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey are not to be confused with military dictatorships. They are better characterized as military-dominated states. The officers of the military enclave, along with their civilian allies, strategically created political systems that have benefited themselves at the expense of the rest of society. By overseeing the development of political institutions that allow for the appearance of pluralism but also incorporate key mechanisms for oversight and political control, the officers sought to guarantee the maintenance of their political order.

In Turkey the military enclave acts through the National Security Council (NSC) which has been the true nucleus of political activity since Atatürk’s death. The enclave has hesitantly allowed for the election of Islamist leaders such as Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (who was subsequently removed in a 1997 post-modern coup) and current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2003. By having their party frequently outlawed the majority of Islamists have had

to rebuild under different names because the military enclave has “questioned their democratic credentials, accusing them of using democracy to gain power that, once gained, will be used to subvert that democracy” (Zubaida 2011, 109).

Turkey’s history of coups has been made easy by the dominance of the military enclave, though it should be noted “the feasibility of the *coup* derives from a comparatively recent development: the rise of the modern state with its professional bureaucracy and standing armed forces” (Luttwak 1979, 19). Successful coups inherently have the potential to result in a military dictatorship but the military enclave in Turkey has regularly sought to semi-normalize democratic *modus operandi* while simultaneously giving itself further power in the government.

Eric Nordlinger (1977, 7) notes that “many coups entail immediate and fundamental changes in regime structure.” Nordlinger (1977, 7) goes on to state that “at the outset, the praetorians establish an authoritarian regime that is closed to popular participation and competition.” The Praetorian problem refers to the civil-military conflict between the Roman military guard and the emperors the guard frequently removed. By closing the regime to popular participation and competition the leaders of the coup can “destroy or alter those structural features of the previous regime that do not accord with their own preferences” (Nordlinger 1977, 7). In Turkey the military enclave did exactly this in the constitutional creation of the National Security Council after the 1960 coup (Owen 2004, 193). The NSC has since been the constitutional source of the Praetorian problem because the NSC is setup as constitutional protectorate which has the power to remove any opposition deemed a threat to the Turkish government, namely Islamists. The NSC recently witnessed a reduction in its constitutional power after the 2002 Parliamentary elections pushed the AKP to prominence but this certainly does not mean that the military enclave is dead. Kemalists are very wary of the AKP and are still

waiting to see how Islamists will reconcile their faith with the secular government (Tepe 2005). Bernard Lewis (1961, 418) noted this after the 1960 coup by suggesting that “the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture are still alive, and the ultimate identity of Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still unchallenged.”

Apart from secularization there is significant literature surrounding Islam and modernity much of which has been influenced by, and critical of, Bernard Lewis. Other scholars such as anthropologist Ernest Gellner have also faced criticism for their attempts to paint a picture of a modern Islamic society since the debate of modernity what is arguably Eurocentric (Zubaida, 2011). From a Eurocentric standpoint modernity typically means secularism, industrialization, and a free market economy. The military enclave has sought these progressions leading to the creation of a “Western” Middle East country. Because Turkey is relatively Western compared to the rest of the Middle East, it is often the focus of modernist literature which has at times influenced policy makers. Critics such as Michael Hirsh (2004, 13) have stated that “Lewis's Kemalist vision of a secularized, Westernized Arab democracy that casts off the medieval shackles of Islam and enters modernity at last - remains the core of George W. Bush's faltering vision in Iraq.” Questions of modernity in the Middle East typically revolve around topics such as secularism and industrialization but also subjects like women’s rights, social equality for religious and ethnic minorities, judicial practices, and etcetera. Specifically in Turkey, women and the Kurdish minority have faced extra-judicial killings and an overall denial of socio-political rights.

The Kurdish situation in Turkey, much like the current struggle between Islamists and Kemalists, has its roots in the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds initially had hopes for a Kurdistan statehood as briefly outlined in the Treaty of Sèvres but “with the demise of Sèvres

went the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state” (Robins 1993, 659). The Kurds quickly responded militarily, and would on further occasions due to the lack of sovereignty granted to them which Philip Robins (1993, 660) notes:

The first rebellion against the state took place in February 1925, and was led by a Kurdish religious leader, Sheikh Said of Piran. His appeal was far from being exclusively nationalist, garnering support on the basis of tribal and religious allegiance. Moreover, he was spurned by Kurdish nationalists based at Diyarbakir. The threat to the state was, however, no less serious for that, as Sheikh Said and his men succeeded in occupying one-third of Kurdish Anatolia.

The rebellion was ferociously put down and since that time Kurds have been fighting, literally and figuratively, for their rights and independence. Without a state to call their own in the post-Ottoman world the Kurds currently occupy southeastern Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq where they maintain significant regional autonomy which is often referred to as Kurdistan. In each of those states Kurds have faced depreciations in social and political rights not to mention genocidal acts by Iraqi regimes and arguably in Turkey.

Although the conflict in Turkey and elsewhere remains a serious issue today particularly in the form of bombings, violence has been greatly reduced compared to the 1980’s and early 90’s. During that time the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK grabbed international headlines by igniting turmoil that sparked government backlash resulting in over 30,000 deaths, military and civilian (Cagaptay 2007, 1). The PKK is a terrorist organization founded on Marxist tenets by Abdullah Öcalan who is a source of much attention given his cultish leadership style. The PKK tends to dominate discussions in the literature surrounding Kurdish nationalism even though it is not the sole authority on the Kurdish plight (Cagaptay 2007; Radu 2001). Fears resurfaced about the PKK when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 because of potential destabilization in the Kurdistan

region (Zanotti 2012, 15). Other Kurdish parties are not necessarily more helpful in their promotion of Kurdish rights as noted of Kurdish leadership in Iraq:

The democratic deficit in Kurdistan stems from the collusion of the two corrupt political parties that have governed the region since the end of a bitter civil war in 1998: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the north, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the south. (Weinberger 2009, 1)

Fortunately for Kurds in Turkey the policies of the AKP led government, in quite a contrast to Kemalist leadership, have resulted in the greatest source of socio-political change of Kurds in any country. Particularly, Kurds have witnessed a discernible restoration of their previously suppressed cultural rights including the use of the Kurdish language (Baran 2010, 99). This improvement is due to a number of reasons including Turkey's drive to become a member of the European Union, grassroots reform, and also due to a realization by the AKP that the Kurdish minority is a potential ally in its political battle with Kemalists (Baran 2010, 99).

Another problematic situation preventing EU membership is the ongoing occupation of Cyprus. In 1974 the Turkish military occupied Cyprus after a Greek sponsored coup on the island. The island's population is predominantly Greek but there is a significant Turkish minority presence which is why Turkey was concerned with the coup. The coup caused Turkish Cypriots to consolidate in the north which unofficially became the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or TRNC. Turkey has maintained an armed presence on the island since that time but has also sought to normalize relations. Specifically, Turkish Cypriots accepted a 2004 negotiation formulated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that would have created two states linked by a federated government. Greek Cypriots denied the Annan Plan which has caused some change in the opinions of House members as to who is blamed for the ongoing dilemma.

The relationship remains precarious because of sustained Turkish troop presence but it also continues to improve because of Turkey's drive toward EU accession.

Of these reasons for Turkey's many reforms, the most frequently highlighted is the Turkish leadership's drive to become a member of the European Union (EU). As Füsün Türkmen (2008, 147) states of Turkey's constitutional reforms:

Since Turkey's candidacy to the European Union was officially confirmed by the Union on 11 December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, the country has been undergoing a profound transformation in terms of democratization. Two series of constitutional amendments and eight reform packages, comprising more than 490 laws, were adopted or amended by the Turkish Parliament in the last six years.

Admittance to the EU has turned Kemalists and Islamists into strange-bedfellows on this issue for reasons unique to each party. For Kemalists EU accession represents a tangible fulfillment of Atatürk's modernization efforts and means Turkey will have to look predominantly West in forming state relationships. The process of EU admission has already caused Turkey to steer its foreign policy more in line with Europe's raising questions about possible Europeanization in Turkey. It seems however that the foreign policy shift has had more to do with longstanding pragmatic defense concerns (Oğuzlu, 2010).

On the other side of the aisle "the leaders of the AK came to see membership in the European Union as the best means to forge a Kemalist reformation" (Cook 2007, 131). In other words Islamists realized that true efforts toward democratization would have to take place in order for Turkey to become an EU member. Thus, the military enclave would be forced to loosen its grip on Islamist parties allowing them participate in elections more freely.

Acceptance to the European Union is officially based on meeting the Copenhagen criteria which are the standards a country must meet for EU membership. For Turkey this namely

includes the military's withdrawal from political prevalence, addressing human rights issues, and legal alignment with the *acquis communautaire* or body of EU law. Such changes are not easy because "the nitty-gritty of joining the EU means there are eighty thousand pages of rules and regulations which Turkey will have to implement and adopt." (Morris 2005, 172) Turkey has readily accepted these challenges as witnessed by the reform packages, the military's acceptance of the NSC's debasement, and many reforms on human rights. Congress has taken note of the changes in Turkey fomented by EU accession and expresses support for admittance throughout the hearings. Cook (2007) along with other scholars heavily emphasize the EU incentive as a major source of change prescribing it as an example of how to approach future foreign policy aimed at reform. Also, it should not go without mention that on human rights issues "grass-roots protest from civil society has...bubbled up through the system to burst out in a flood of reform" (Morris, 2005, 134).

The outlook of Turkey's EU admittance is a source of constant analysis because there seems to be consistent progress in Turkey's meeting the EU's reformation demands yet accession does not appear much closer. There are many reasons members of the EU are hesitant to accept Turkey including the very real sentiment of Islamophobia across Europe. Islamophobia is "a term that has come to denote acts of intolerance, discrimination, unfounded fear, and racism against Islam and Muslims" (Esposito and Kalin 2011, 4). In Europe this has been demonstrated in a wide variety of ways such as the growth of radical parties with anti-Muslim/immigration platforms, to negative media attention, and even murder on the individual level.

Apart from such drastic examples of hatred there simply does not seem to be significant support for Turkey's admission. John Redmond (2007, 309) points out that "the lack of any strong supporter (other than Britain) and the opposition of France and Germany make full

Turkish membership an unlikely prospect in the immediate future.” Germany has a very large Turkish immigrant population and EU membership would make it easier for that population to grow which could easily invigorate further anti-immigration sentiment and backlash. Members like France and Germany are also hesitant to admit Turkey because the growing population of Turkey “would give it a dominant role at regular EU summits, and in the policy-making Council of Ministers” (Morris 2005, 8). Add to this Turkey’s potential influence in the European Parliament and the “balance of power in the EU would swing decisively south and east, away from its original core members” (Morris 2005, 8). In spite of these arguments and many others Turkey does have a favorable outlook for reasons related to energy security in the form of the Nabucco Pipeline. According to Ali Tekin and Paul A. Williams (2008, 420):

The value of Turkey for the EU from an energy-security angle is becoming vital. Although increasing awareness of Turkey's valuable role in this regard does not automatically make EU member states more receptive to the prospects of Turkey's accession into the Union, the fact that Europe's capacity to meet projected energy demand from existing supplies remains tenuous argues for a more positive EU attitude towards Turkish membership in the Union.

The Nabucco Pipeline may potentially connect Europe with pipelines in Iraq and has the support of many countries including the US. Even if Turkey garners enough support from Germany and France just to achieve energy security, Turkey still faces an uphill battle along the lines of EU accession procedures. Turkey could fulfill all of the EU’s stated requirements but still not be voted in. According to Patrick R. Hugg (2005, 232) “the official, hortatorial pronouncements and, indeed, the logic of the overall debate are subverted by a fundamental structural fault in the EU constitutional architecture.” The structural fault is that “every Member State must consent to every new member's accession, with no exceptions” (Hugg 2005, 232). This means that if even a single nay-vote is produced from a relatively small country such as

Austria, which is “probably the strongest opponent of Turkish accession” (Redmond 2007, 309), then Turkey will have to continue to wait.

Beyond these issues lies the question of whether or not Turkey is even European. Hugg (2010, 229-230) states that “Turkey is not geographically in Europe; Turkey is not culturally in Europe...Further, it is unthinkable that such a massive, poor, Islamic country would be allowed to enter the EU.” It should be noted that despite being “poor” Turkey has remained relatively stable during recent world financial downturns especially compared to Greece, and it is primarily the rural areas of Turkey that are in need of drastic economic development (Bezen and Banu 2010, 272). Still, Europe already suffers from a number of identity issues including beliefs in national/regional autonomy, debates on how exactly inter-governmental relations should work, lack of consensus on a common European foreign policy, and most recently debates on how to handle economic crises like Greek default (Duchesne 2008; Hudson 2000; Mayer 2008). Even if Turks see themselves as more a part of Europe than the Middle East the nationalist tendencies of Turkey are not likely to fade given that Turkey was explicitly founded on post-Ottoman nationalism (Suvani 2010). This is not conducive to a common European identity if such an identity is critical to the future of the European Union.

The question of EU membership is also up in the air because the current debt crisis of the EU has Turkish leaders re-considering their goal of accession. Having been spurned by the EU thus far has not produced favorable attitudes toward Europe and as a whole Turkey feels unappreciated by the West (Baran 2010). At the same time however, tensions with Iran continue to mount making common defense goals the likely glue holding Turkey and Europe together. The same can be said for the US and Turkey.

Because anger over the Iraq War and Washington's unfailing support for Israel has not been fully assuaged by the Obama administration, it seems "the key foreign policy test for Turkey and its Western allies in coming years will be to insulate their 50-year partnership from the strains posed by some of the AKP's Islamist convictions and ambitions" (Baran 2010, 137). This means the United States will have to accept and work with Islamist leadership in Turkey (and abroad) in order to maintain positive relations (Diamond 2008, 286-287; Hamid 2011, 359). Graham E. Fuller sees nine areas for compatibility across US-Turkish interests but the most important of these are:

A peaceful, centralized Iraq; a nonmilitant, nonnuclear Iran; an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute; an end to terrorism in the region, particularly as it affects Turkey; an end to the development and spread of radical Islam; a continuation of good ties with Israel, especially in material goods; the realization of broader stability in the Middle East. (2008, 157)

Negative attitudes toward the West may simply be a "passing phase" (Morris 2005, 215) but one thing seems certain across the literature, Turkey's foreign policy direction is under construction. Ziya Önis and Suhanaz Yilmaz (2005) believe the current negative direction of relations between the US and Turkey can be overcome by a triangular US-EU-Turkey relationship but this is heavily reliant on Turkey's EU admission. Scholars such as M. Hakam Yavuz (2009, 237-238) posit chiefly negative outlooks but agree that the AKP has yet to solidify its stance on Washington which is why current foreign policy endeavors with Turkey are so critical. Delayed arms deals have caused tension between the US and Turkey before and Washington should take note, as this thesis does now.

Congress and Foreign Policy

Unlike the volume of political science and historical literature surrounding Turkey, the literature on Congress and foreign policy is less expansive. The literature tends to be spread across various case studies and is generally in agreement on the role of Congress in foreign policy for two primary reasons. Firstly, the role of Congress in foreign policy is largely informal and indirect (Hersman 2000, 8; Lindsay 1992-93, 609). Congress formally steps into the public limelight on foreign policy issues almost solely through hearings because members of Congress have little to gain from constituents by way of other announcements (Hersman 2000, 19; McCormick 1993, 124). The hearings held by the House Subcommittee on Europe, which include Turkey, are actually a shining example of foreign policy hearings because they are held frequently and focus on the current issues of Europe (McCormick 1993, 124).

The second reason there is limited literature surrounding Congress and foreign policy is the President's preeminence on foreign policy. Robert A. Dahl (1964, 97) states that this supremacy comes from the President's natural constitutional obligation but also from the singular organizational streamlining that Congress lacks. The President is the initiator of foreign policy so the role of Congress is relegated to after-action recommendations on policy goals (Baldwin 1966). The lack of initiative and organization does not mean that Congress has no organizational cohesiveness because in fact, Congress must be "prenotified" of arms deals prior to formal voting (Hersman 2000, 21). This gives Congress a chance to work on a preliminary consensus although it also means a Senator like Sarbanes (D-MD) can informally hold up a deal.

Fortunately, there are a few scholars (most notably James M. Lindsay) that have taken the time to identify how Congress influences foreign policy and have weighed congressional potential compared to the executive's. In line with the hypothesis of this thesis Lindsay

explicitly points out that Congress does not intuitively *direct* foreign policy (Lindsay 1994b; Grimmett 1999). Instead, Congress typically seeks to impress upon the executive goals which alter foreign policy in a small manner for reasons unique to each case. Usually this means that “Congress in its oversight responsibility can affect the course of policy through enactment of legislation governing foreign relations and through the appropriation or denial of funds” (Grimmett 1999). The abilities of Congress to influence foreign policy are most effectively described in a Congressional Research Service Report by Richard F. Grimmett. Grimmett (1999) states that “Congress can make foreign policy through:”

- 1) - resolutions and policy statements
- 2) - legislative directives
- 3) - legislative pressure
- 4) - legislative restrictions/funding denials
- 5) - informal advice
- 6) - congressional oversight.

Through these methods of influence Congress can engage in the same strategic foreign policy substitution behavior that the executive does. Policy substitution refers to “the possibility that foreign policy makers implement different types of policies in response to apparently similar stimuli” (Clark and Reed 2005, 612). In other words, foreign policy substitution means that a state may react to two nearly identical international situations in a different way so as to improve the strategic outcome (Clark and Reed 2005, 609). Foreign policy substitution was initially envisaged by Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr (1989) but is a complicated theory to empirically analyze given the broad use of policy tools a state has and the difficulty in interpreting substituted dependent variables (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000).

Despite the difficulties in research design David H. Clark and William Reed (2005) empirically demonstrate foreign policy substitution through an analysis of the United States’ use of sanctions and force against states that have similar characteristics. They found that in terms of

US foreign policy, “foreign democracies and weaker states are less likely to face either sanctions or force; foreign autocrats and stronger states are more likely to face both” (Clark and Reed 2005, 620). Other foreign policy substitution literature focuses on the role of diversionary tactics used to deflect attention away from domestic issues but such tactics are chiefly specific to the executive branch (Clark 2001; Bennett and Nordstrom 2000). For Congress, foreign policy substitution is primarily an area of consideration in formulating long-term goals because of the executive’s dominance in short-term foreign policy decision making. Also, the long-term influence of Congress on foreign policy is particularly pertinent when Congress utilizes the aforementioned measures posited by Grimmett (1999) to sway executive decisions on appropriations. This influence essentially correlates with Lindsay’s (1994) breakdown of Congressional activity into three policy spheres.

Lindsay (1994) sees the three spheres of foreign policy for Congress as being structural, strategic, and crisis related. In crisis policy Congress has the least power because crises are generally handled by the President. Strategic policy accounts for a slight increase in policy shaping potential because the executive typically forms strategic policy but Congress must approve of appropriations or legislation imperative to the strategy (Lindsay 1994). It is structural policy that truly enables Congress to leverage against the executive and which most of Grimmett’s (1999) legislative-controls example. Structural policy is similar to strategic policy but is broader because it involves the allocation of resources and decision making on domestic policies such as immigration, export subsidies, and defense mobility (Lindsay 1994, 156). For the purposes of this case study, the House hearings will be examined in their *potential* relationship to these policy directives and the policy sphere they exemplify.

The predominant way Congress shapes foreign policy has changed since the penning of the Constitution in that “the treaty power has given way to the appropriations power as Congress’s primary tool for shaping foreign policy” (Lindsay 1994, 30). This was seen in the delayed transaction of Turkish frigates and in the current delay of UAVs. The transition from the treaty power to the use of the appropriations power is strongly related to the change in America’s world presence. Lindsay (1994, 1) points out that between 1960 and 1990 the volume of literature on foreign policy legislation increased almost tenfold. This literature obviously does not represent a tenfold increase in the number of treaties but a broad array of appropriations concerns. The “prenotification” of arms deals that led to a holdup of the frigate transaction stems from the Arms Export Control Act which is a prime example of appropriations power. The Arms Control Export Act in combination with the War Powers Resolution and Case Act has increased the ability of Congress to acquire sensitive foreign policy information and thus an increase in potential influence (Drischler 1986, 198).

Congressional power over appropriations and the President’s veto power have at times led to significant altercations between the executive and legislative branches on foreign policy particularly because of the way appropriations can be stifled (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). On appropriations decisions both the legislative and the executive branches have an advantage over the other branch when the other branch wants to spend money (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988). This should not be taken to mean that Congress and the President have equal power in foreign policy appropriations. The President has an organizational advantage in foreign policy spending because of the flexibility of the State and Defense Departments. Congress does not have this same advantage but is more capable of shelving appropriations considerations through agenda setting. The President possesses partial

agenda setting power through the Office of Management and Budget or OMB but this does not compare to the power of agenda setting in Congress (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 183). Thus, Congress has a greater ability to withhold appropriations in foreign policy so the executive branch is generally forced to approach appropriations with measured goals.

The small advantages that each branch holds in foreign policy appropriations usually leads to budgetary incrementalization or small changes in the budget. Kiewiet and McCubbins (1985, 197) posit that “a rational strategy of accommodation described from the principles of game theory, will also reduce differences between what the president requests and what Congress appropriates, thus tending to produce ‘incremental’ budgetary outcomes.” In other words, both the legislative and executive branches approach foreign policy budgeting with less-than-bold plans unlike many domestic policies because stalemates on foreign policy cannot significantly improve constituent opinions. Incrementalization also extends from natural bureaucratic functions which have a hand in reducing discordance between the branches. The President may have partial agenda setting power through the OMB but the OMB also possesses some autonomy and typically “anticipates how Congress is likely to act” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 183). Congress adjusts to the OMB’s appropriations plans as it sees fit but generally considers the President’s position on appropriations and “will in all likelihood choose strategically among the appropriations levels acceptable to the president” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985, 183).

The literature surrounding agenda setting generally focuses on the role of negative agenda setting which is the power to prevent a bill, resolution, or issue from being considered. Conventional wisdom has held that the House of Representatives holds more negative agenda setting power than the Senate by way of the Speakership but this has been challenged by recent

literature (Gailmard and Jenkins 2007). The Speakership and Rules Committee in the House, which are controlled by the majority party, provide that majority party with negative agenda setting power that benefits Presidents of the same party (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). When the House and President are from different parties then negative agenda setting can be counterproductive to the President's goals. The role of the majority party is often a critical area of analysis because of theories on conditional party government.

Conditional party government is the theory that “partisan organizational structures in the House – especially those of the majority party – will (under certain conditions) seek to use their power to shift the policy outcomes produced by the body closer to the median position of the party” (Aldrich and Rohde 2000, 2). In foreign policy, conditional party government is not typically a salient issue as compared to domestic policies unless a major issue is disagreed upon. One such issue is the development of nuclear capabilities in Iran so the later hearings will provide some insight as to the possible division of the parties.

Although the aforementioned War Powers Resolution and Case Act improved the amount of information available to Congress, not all changes have led to an improvement in decision making. The powers of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee chairs were intentionally decreased in the 1970's by supplying subcommittees with a considerable level of autonomy (Hersman 2000, 14). This internal change along with the transition away from treaty power has left the committees' role in directing foreign policy fairly symbolic and is another reason conditional party government is not as relevant to foreign policy. That being said, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (briefly named International Relations Committee and then changed back) is still a pertinent source of analysis because hearings are regularly held and can be called when important issues arise. Lindsay (1994, 58) states:

Because House rules give subcommittee chairs significant authority to call their own hearings, the value of the committees as platforms is greatest to subcommittee chairs on Foreign Affairs. To the extent that foreign policy is influenced by public debate as well as by funding decisions, members of Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs have the means to affect policy.

Since Congress is more active in foreign policy than it was before WWII by way of appropriations, Lindsay (1994) posits that congressional activism is viewed in two lights. On the one hand there are scholars and policymakers which view congressional activism in foreign policy as a negative. Lindsay (1994) calls these persons Irreconcilables because they have no desire to see Congress detract from the President's ability to direct foreign relations. At the other end of the debate are Skeptics who view criticism of congressional activism as unwarranted because of the limited role Congress plays (Lindsay 1994). Lindsay (1994) states that most scholars and policymakers are Skeptics because events like the frigate transaction have few overall repercussions. This thesis technically falls into the Skeptics category because it does not seek to normatively express the value of congressional activism in foreign policy and also considers the role of Congress to be limited.

Finally, Lindsay (1994, 3) posits that there are "three common fallacies about Congress and foreign policy: the electoral fallacy, the technocratic fallacy, and the adversarial fallacy." The electoral fallacy basically states that members of Congress care little about foreign policy because they have little to gain from their constituents by discussing it (Lindsay 1994). The technocratic fallacy is essentially the fallacy of the Irreconcilables because it implies that Congress should take a back seat to policy formulation (Lindsay 1994). Finally, the adversarial fallacy posits that congressional activism is generally viewed as a fight between the executive and legislative branches. To an extent this thesis falls in with the electoral fallacy because it is

not likely that the House members at the hearing consider US-Turkish relations to be a subject that will improve their standing with constituents.

The three fallacies raise the question as to who influences foreign policy in terms of Congressional decision making. According to Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page (2005) there are three competing perspectives as to who influences U.S. foreign policy. The three perspectives center on organized interest groups, knowledgeable experts, and public opinion (Jacobs and Page 2005). Jacobs and Page fail to take party elites into consideration but this area of analysis is filled in by Souva and Rohde (2007). Again, this thesis falls in line with the electoral fallacy and of the four possible influences the role of public opinion is considered to be the least likely to affect Congressional decision making.

Organized interest groups have the ability to influence foreign policy primarily through the provision of information, of which “information about the likely effectiveness of proposed policies is especially important” (Burstein and Hirsh 2007, 196). Traditional theories hold that policymakers work with organized interest groups in order to improve electoral benefits (Jacobs and Page 2005, 107). However, in an analysis of what organized interest groups discuss when attempting to influence Congressional foreign policy decisions Burstein and Hirsh (2007, 195-196) found that rarely do those groups mention the “possible electoral consequences for members of Congress who support or oppose the policy proposal.” This implies yet again that constituent attitudes on foreign policy matter very little to members of Congress which allows for the incrementalization of appropriations given the bargaining space afforded to members of Congress on foreign policy spending.

The role of experts in decision making is particularly relevant to this thesis because the hearings largely revolve around the testimonials of many foreign policy experts. Steven Brint (1990, 381) posits that “the independent role of professional experts in policy-making is by no means as impressive as the more expansive theorists of professional power have suggested.” Namely, experts have less influence in countries with broad structural bureaucracies such as the United States because those bureaucracies decrease the acute impact of expert opinions (Brint 1990). However, Brint (1990) also notes that in relatively unorganized areas of foreign policy the influence of experts is improved. For Congress, Turkey is not an area of organized foreign policy decision making so the testimonies of the experts may prove critical to Congressional attempts at influencing foreign policy with Turkey.

Finally, in terms of party elites Souva and Rohde (2007, 121) find that “elite opinion cleavages are the primary influence on partisanship in foreign policy voting.” Members of Congress consider the positions of elite party members on critical foreign policy issues because “institutional forces encourage position taking” (Souva and Rohde 2007, 114). This namely applies to foreign policy issues, many of which involve appropriations decisions, where there is a substantial divergence of elite opinions. The cleavage of party elites is not really observable in the subcommittee hearings to be analyzed but the 2010 committee hearing demonstrates some potential party-elite differences as will be noted.

Unfortunately, the hearings do not fully reveal the role of interest groups, party elite cleavages (except for the 2010 committee hearing), or detailed appropriations considerations by members of Congress but this does not mean the dialogue is useless. The importance of the hearings extends from the basic opinions of members of Congress and how they relate to the

literature on Congress and foreign policy as well as the literature on Turkey. In a Congressional Research Service Report Jim Zanotti (2012, 36-37) posits:

The positions of Congress take on specific issues concerning Turkey – including defense cooperation, trade promotion, and Turkish domestic developments – also will indicate U.S. priorities at a critical time for global and regional stability and for the Turkish republic’s political and constitutional evolution. This could influence Turkish leaders’ future foreign policy rhetoric, decisions, and alignments, which in turn will likely have implications for regional security and for Turkey’s EU accession prospects. Congressional positions could also influence Turkey’s commitment to civilian-led, democratic government that enshrines individual, media, and minority rights; rule of law; and due process.

Thus, the hearings are critical because of the implications they bare for future US-Turkish relations. Congressional opinions on Turkey are naturally influential because of potential appropriations but also because of the broad structural foreign policy goals that may be formed. Beyond the aforementioned issues this thesis will also attempt to highlight areas of the literature that can be expounded. This literature review already indicates that the literature can be improved across comparative grounds in an analysis of parliamentary roles versus Congress in foreign policy. Further observations require analysis of the hearings.

Sinking Ship...Transactions

Before reviewing the House hearings from the Committee on Foreign Affairs there is an extremely applicable case study that must first be analyzed on its own. In *Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy*, Rebecca K. C. Hersman (2000) details a previous weapon transaction involving three frigates between the United States and Turkey that was upheld by Congress. The information of this case is pertinent to the delayed weapons transaction mentioned in the introduction. Turkey is currently waiting for Congress to consent to the provision of Reapers which are a type of armed unmanned aerial vehicle or UAV (Enginsoy and Bekdil 2012, 20).

According to Hersman (2000) what began as a simple relinquishing of US Navy frigates to Turkey in 1995 turned into a three year ordeal after facing staunch opposition from only a few individuals and hitting a set of bureaucratic speed bumps. The weapons transaction initially faced a holdup in the House International Relations Committee and then further delay after a relatively minor conflict between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean causing the State Department to delay its approval of the transaction (Hersman 2000). Control over the east-Mediterranean/Aegean Sea and a number of islands therein has long been a source of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between the Greece and Turkey dating all the way back to the Treaty of Lausanne. As the delay-time of the transaction increased President Bill Clinton and Turkish President Süleyman Demirel met to discuss the affair at which time President Clinton ordered the State Department to move forward with its approval in notifying congressional committee staffs (Hersman 2000, 57). Following the notification Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), whose ethnic background is Greek, moved to delay the transaction even further which ultimately angered Turkish leadership causing them to later cancel other potential weapons transactions (Hersman

2000). Eventually the frigates were delivered after Greek and Turkish foreign ministers moved to improve relations (Hersman 2000).

This case highlights a number of factors about Congress and US foreign policy with Turkey. Firstly, the transaction was initially designed to reinforce US and Turkish defense relations demonstrating that the close military ties the countries have long maintained were still relevant even though NATO's primary enemy had collapsed. The relevancy of NATO is under constant scrutiny, even for the EU (Duke 2008), though it is likely a less questionable relationship for Turkey given the tumult on Turkey's borders. Secondly, the case demonstrates how easily a congressman or the bureaucratic process can hold up a policy even when there is little controversy surrounding it. Third, and perhaps most important in regards to this thesis, is how the case shows the ability of Congress to influence foreign affairs without explicit aims to do so. It is highly unlikely that Senator Sarbanes specifically wanted the US to alter its foreign policy aims with Turkey and it is highly unlikely that he was aware of how the delay would alter future arms transactions. It is even unlikely that Senator Sarbanes believed a delay in the transaction might somehow encourage Greek and Turkish leadership to come together and amend their issues in the Aegean. In short, it seems Senator Sarbanes burdened executive-led foreign policy with little awareness of the consequences. This is not to say he completely negated the overarching foreign policy goals of the US toward Turkey but Senator Sarbanes did impact relations without a clear foreign policy objective in mind. This demonstrates how Congress is capable of affecting foreign policy without actually directing it.

Finally, the House International Relations Committee was responsible for a delay because it was trying to prevent "excessive 'foreign aid' to wealthy Persian Gulf countries...or countries that already received sufficient military assistance (Egypt and Turkey)" (Hersman 2000, 55).

Being lumped in with Persian Gulf countries and Egypt on a foreign policy stance is not a direct indicator of how Turkey is regionally viewed by Congress but certainly could reflect how some congressmen see Turkey. Even though the hearings dealt with in this thesis come from the Subcommittee on Europe, Turkey is likely to be considered Middle Eastern especially given Turkey's borders. Turkey is essentially the buffer-zone between the Middle East and Europe which calls into question its European-ness not just for Europeans and Turks but for US policymakers as well. Thus, in the analysis of the hearings it will be helpful to look at how each congressman views Turkey in terms of regional association which may have implications for the larger question of whether or not Congress is directing foreign policy with Turkey.

The Hearings

The five House hearings to be analyzed begin in 2003 and end in 2010 throughout which time US-Turkish relations evolved significantly. The first four hearings (2003/2005/2007/2009) come from the Subcommittee on Europe which was a subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations until it was renamed in 2007 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The last hearing (2010) was held at the committee level and not in the Subcommittee on Europe. Although the hearings are prime sources for understanding congressional concerns they are also cases for experts to present their opinions about US-Turkish relations and for committee members to ask questions about those opinions. If the House is attempting to influence executive decisions on foreign policy then the opening committee statements are where those directions and grandstanding are likely to be found. The question and answer section is also important because it indicates what topics the committee members are most interested in. The question and answer time is less important for grandstanding or to make specific foreign policy suggestions.

The 2003 hearing (U.S. Congress. House 2003) demonstrates that for the first time Congress began taking serious interest in Turkey. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Doug Bereuter (R-NE), opens up by discussing the stunning election of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the denial by the new Islamist government of military staging areas for the US invasion of Iraq. These two issues are clearly the center of attention for policymakers and the reason Turkey has been selected for a special hearing. Bereuter's opening statement is incredibly conciliatory and demonstrates that many officials are concerned about the potential breakdown of US-Turkish relations because of the staging request denial. As a sign of

good faith Bereuter engages in some adulatory speech suggesting that Turkey is a model for the rest of the Middle East and is a close friend of the US.

Bereuter's discussion briefly touches on a number of issues including the importance of Turkey's European Union membership, the role of Turkey in NATO, and on the history of strategic relations. He points out that Turkey was quick to support US efforts in Afghanistan and had long been an ally in balancing against Saddam Hussein. Bereuter insists that certain US authorities calling into question the democratic values of the AKP and even promoting the deterioration of US-Turkish relations are few and far between. Bereuter does not fully clarify who these persons are apart from a few nameless souls in the government but his statement is meant to be accommodating and suggest that those persons are wrong. Bereuter states that "officials in the American government in some cases were far too hard on Turkey and they wielded too strong an arm on Turkey" (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 2). Thus, the denial of the staging request represents a failure by the US to effectively work with the new Turkish government by approaching the government with an overbearing attitude.

Ultimately, Bereuter does not demonstrate any sort of grandstanding and he is certainly not attempting to specifically influence executive decisions apart from suggesting the US move to repair the friendship. This appears to be a reasonable first step in the hearings but the apologetic tone of Bereuter raises a new area of discussion. In the literature on Congress and foreign policy little, if anything, was said about the possibility that Congress would use the hearings to reach out to another nation because the focus of the literature was on influencing the executive (Grimmett 1999; Lindsay 1994). This is not to say that such actions have never been taken before but a future area of study could take into account congressional messaging to foreign states and its potential impact, if any on relations.

Following Bereuter the statement by Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) is also primarily directed at Turkish leadership. Initially Mr. Wexler focuses on the importance of Turkey in NATO and suggests that Turkey and the US revive their critical relations. Like Bereuter he points out the storied history of mutual strategic benefits, the containment of Saddam Hussein, and Turkey's role in Afghanistan. Wexler sees the renewal of the relationship as critical in protecting from future threats and notes that he has personally witnessed how military officials from both countries were still working well together. However, the revival of relations does not come without underlying motives for Wexler. Unlike Bereuter Wexler specifies how relations should be restored by suggesting that the Turkish government become involved in the Iraq war (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). Wexler lists three primary reasons for Turkey to become involved in the war that are quite reasonable but this does not change the fact that an American representative is calling on another country to engage its military forces in a war.

Of the three reasons for Turkey to go to war Wexler first suggests that Turkish military intervention could enable a faster victory because the Turkish military better understands the terrain of Iraq, languages, and etcetera (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). Secondly, Wexler points out that Turkey has a lot at stake in the outcome of the war (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). The future of Iraq was/is critical to the future security of Turkey and thus it would behoove Turkey to see the fight go well. Finally, and perhaps the most unusual of the suggestions, Wexler sees Turkish involvement as a way to restore relations with the US (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). Indeed, Turkish involvement would have reestablished positive views in Washington toward Ankara but this statement seems to fall in line with the overbearing approach that got the US into trouble in the first place.

To be fair, Wexler goes on to suggest that the Bush administration regard Turkey with greater care because “mistakes were made on both sides” (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). He goes on to specifically list four confidence building measures (or CBMs) that could be used to restore a positive view of Washington in Ankara. Confidence building measures were not discussed as a potential foreign policy directive but they absolutely make sense in the context of how Congress can tangibly influence foreign policy by way of legislative directives (Grimmett 1999). Firstly, Wexler suggests that the Bush “Administration must enhance direct lines of communication with Turkey to ensure that the mistakes and misunderstandings of this past year are not repeated” (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). Second, the US should enhance its coordination with the Turkish military in the fight against the PKK (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). This is a very strong recommendation and would address Turkish worries about how US involvement in Iraq would influence the Kurdish situation. The third recommendation is also quite specific in that Wexler encourages strengthening economic ties through a free trade agreement (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5). Finally, Wexler posits that the United States should continue its endorsement of EU membership for Turkey (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 5).

Wexler’s list of four CBMs falls into the category of informal advice that could lead to legislative directives and resolutions. The specificity of his advice indicates a clear incentive to influence foreign policy but not take control which falls in line with the hypothesis of this thesis. Of the three potential policy spheres posited by Lindsay (2004) Wexler’s suggestions fall into strategic and structural policy because they seek to establish a long-term blueprint of relations. In a way they also fall into the crisis policy sphere that the executive is supposed to dominate because of strategic necessity. If one considers the falling out of a strategic state’s affinity for the US to be a crisis, then Wexler has reached into all three spheres.

The final statement of the 2003 hearing comes halfway through the question and answer session from Representative Frank Pallone Jr. (D-NJ). The statement was only delivered in written form since Pallone could not attend the hearing. His absence was probably for the best however since he fails to do nothing more than list Turkey's human rights failures. Although the message was not delivered by Pallone verbally, it still epitomizes extreme grandstanding because he aims the list particularly at Turkey's treatment of Cyprus and Armenia. Pallone addresses Turkish leadership in proposing how it can resolve conflict with Cyprus and Armenia but these proposals are very brief and inconsequential compared to the rest of the statement (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 52). His statement says nothing about the Bush administration, the war in Iraq, or even the Kurdish situation which should have easily made the list (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 52). It is true that Pallone's list represents a black mark on Turkey's history with Armenia and Cyprus but this does not change the fact that his statement is nothing more than an acerbic record of grievances.

Despite Representative Pallone's contentious approach to the hearing his remarks do raise the discussion of Turkey and Cyprus in the hearing. During the question and answer portion of the hearing inquiries about how to resolve the Cyprus situation and how such resolution would affect EU membership were brought up. Questions were also put forward as to how EU membership for Cyprus could affect the dilemma. To answer the panelists essentially point out that there are no easy solutions and difficult political calculations by both sides would likely delay any compromises. The most astute answer comes from Panelist Bulent Aliriza of the Turkey Project who believes that in terms of EU accession, "it is almost certain Turkey will not get in if the Cyprus problem is not resolved" (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 54). In a Congressional Research Service Report Carol Migdalovitz (2010, 26) expresses a similar opinion

by stating that “it is highly unlikely that Turkey would be able to join the EU without a political settlement on the divided island of Cyprus.”

The significance of this relatively lengthy discussion on Cyprus is that it predates the 2004 settlement proposed by Kofi Annan. The discussion effectively shows how Turkey is the focus of blame prior to the Greek Cypriot rejection of the 2004 settlement. Because of that rejection the 2005 hearing will offer an interesting contrast as to how the committee views Turkey’s policies toward Cyprus. Ultimately, the discourse on Cyprus might be considered unusual because it is discussed by the panel in fairly great length (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 49-57). One might expect the war in Iraq to dominate the hearing’s text but it simply does not. This signifies an instinctual but not necessarily self-evident understanding by the committee that its ability to influence future policy with Turkey primarily revolves around issues like Cyprus and not the war. War most basically fits into the crisis policy sphere of influence and is therefore dominated by the executive (Lindsay 1994). Extended issues like Cyprus and Armenia fall into the strategic category of policy spheres and are more easily addressed by Congress.

The question and answer portion continues with a discussion on Prime Minister Erdoğan, relatively new in office at that time, and certain questionable actions that he had taken. The most notable of these actions was Erdoğan’s potential visitation with Iranian leadership and Bashar al-Assad of Syria. The panelists believed that at the moment these meetings were not worrisome and misperceptions of Erdoğan’s intentions with Syria and Iran should not lead US officials to question Turkey’s foreign policy direction (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 57). Finally, at the end of the hearing Representative Bereuter asks the panel how the US can specifically improve relations with Turkey. Panelist and public policy advisor Mark Parris says that there is nothing

novel the US can do except to “stay engaged and to be candid, be honest” (U.S. Congress. House 2003, 58).

The 2005 hearing (U.S. Congress. House 2005) exhibits a fairly similar focus when compared to 2003 in that the opening statements and question/answer portion target many of the same topics in light of their progression. The hearing begins with a brief statement by Chairman Elton Gallegly (R-CA) who is worried about the “marked cooling” in relations between the United States and Turkey (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 1). Gallegly is concerned with this cooling especially because of the rapid downturn of public opinion in Turkey toward the United States (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 1). Gallegly’s notation of this dwindling public opinion recalls the work of Zeyno Baran (2010) who actually sat on the expert panel for this hearing. Baran’s (2010) work highlighted a number of factors contributing to the downturn of public opinion which seemed to correspond with the rise in popularity of the AKP. Of these factors, the negative reaction of Turkish opinion to the US military includes the accidental capture of Turkish commandos in 2003 (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 31). Like the 2003 hearing Gallegly expresses solidarity for Turkey’s entrance into the EU and gratitude for Turkey’s continuing role in Afghanistan (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 1-2).

Following his introduction Gallegly’s opening statement centers on three issues of which he expounds very little. Firstly, Gallegly praises Turkish Cypriots for working to advance the unification of Cyprus which displays a stark reverse from the condemnations just two years before (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 2). Secondly, Gallegly comments on the Turkish relationship with Armenia and the possibility of improving the situation (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 2). Finally, Gallegly expresses his worry about the Kurdish minority particularly in light of Kurdish standing in Iraq (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 2). Gallegly does not use his opening

statement to itemize or posit ways that the US and Turkey can improve relations but says that he looks forward to hearing what the panel has to say about the three aforementioned issues.

The second opening statement comes from Robert Wexler (D-FL) who had called on Turkey to join the Iraq war in 2003. Wexler openly admits his displeasure with Turkish leadership in its decision to not follow the US into battle and sees that denial as the primary source of tension between Turkey and US officials from the State and Defense Departments (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 3). Wexler states: “I visited Turkey twice during that period to try to make the argument of why I believed it was in Turkey’s interest to provide that front for our military” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 3). In 2003 it seemed Wexler’s comments were aggressive and ineffectual but citing his trips to Turkey demonstrates that Wexler genuinely meant to persuade the Turks to go to war. In reaching out to Turkey beyond a hearing Wexler has shown that a representative can extend commentary from a hearing to other countries so long as that congressman follows up with concerted efforts to indicate the seriousness of the claims. Without visiting Turkey the call to war by Wexler in 2003 was perceivably futile but it did give Wexler something to bring up during his visitation. In other words, Turkish leadership would have never noticed Wexler’s 2003 call to arms but having made that compelling assertion gives Wexler a visitation talking-point that demonstrates the extent of his concern.

Following his introductory note of disappointment on Turkey’s lack of involvement in Iraq Wexler briefly takes a more conciliatory tone just as Bereuter had in 2003. Wexler believes that it “would benefit both the American and Turkish people at this point to move forward, to remember why it is that our great friendship and coalition occurred in the first place” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4). To Wexler the continued breakdown of relations was nothing more than a petty squabble which detracted from how much Turkey was supporting US efforts in

Afghanistan. He also states that not enough praise had been dealt to Turkey for its support in Afghanistan because the Bush administration was focused so much on the Iraq rejection. This was an attitude that needed to be addressed as Wexler (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4) asks; “why don’t we display that same passion in thanking the Turks for, not on one occasion, but on two occasions, leading the Security forces in Afghanistan?”

Wexler continues his statement by turning his attention to Cyprus and Israel. Wexler expresses nothing but absolute delight with Prime Minister Erdoğan, Turkish Cypriots, and the acceptance of the 2004 Annan Plan. Wexler states that “what Turkey did with respect to Cyprus was nothing short of miraculous” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4). Again, compared to 2003 this shows how the Cyprus situation had completely shifted from a problem lingering because of the Turkish leadership to a problem with Greek leadership and its unwillingness to resolve matters. On Israel, Wexler is not so delighted with the work of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Wexler expresses concern over certain inflammatory comments made by Erdoğan about Israel which seem out of line and detrimental to Israeli-Turkish-US relations (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4). He points out that the President of Egypt and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia support US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is reason enough for Turkey to hold the same position (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4). In hindsight this is not a satisfactory argument because many policies extolled by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak can no longer be commended. This hearing took place prior to the Arab Spring however so exemplifying Mubarak’s foreign policy is not out of the question.

Wexler also finds it “unacceptable that our Ambassador in Ankara takes weeks, months, whatever it is to get an appointment with Prime Minister Erdoğan” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4). In light of such delayed meetings Wexler notes that Washington responded in a similar

manner by not scheduling meetings with Turkish officials which he calls a childish move that only adds to the compounding disagreements (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4). Much like 2003 Wexler views the continuation of declining relations as a problem caused by both parties that must end and that the US should “respect the fact that Turkey is now a fully evolved democracy” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 4). This recalls the argument by Shadi Hamid (2011) that the West will eventually need to accept the fact that in predominantly Muslim countries, Islamist parties will take high positions of government if true democratic practices are in place.

To open up the question and answer session Representative Gallegly asks about how Turkey views the war in Iraq and its effect on Iraqi Turks (Turkmens) there. Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D. (also a panelist in 2003), notes that Turkey is accepting the US presence in Iraq but is still primarily concerned with how the US is handling Kurds (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 29). Kurds dominate the political landscape where Turkmens live which causes some concern but also because the Kurdish situation is naturally broader than Iraq. Cagaptay ultimately believes that “Turkey is coming to a comfort level in terms of Iraq’s rebuilding as a new country with institutions of representative government” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 29). Gallegly goes on to ask about the ramifications of continued EU rejection for Turkey to which Zeyno Baran sees a real problem. Baran believes rejection could drive radicalism within Turkey because it gives credence to radicals that “would try to take advantage of a ‘no’ vote from the EU and push forward the clash of civilizations argument” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 30). Further rejection could also breed the anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism that was already brewing.

Representative Wexler asks about how to quell this anti-Americanism and proposes two answers himself. Wexler believes that Turkish anti-Americanism could be snuffed by intensifying attacks on the PKK and by tempering political pressure on Turkish Cypriots (U.S.

Congress. House 2005, 31). Attacking the PKK would help change the mindset in Turkey that the US favors the Kurds over the Turks which was largely caused by the US support of relative Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. The political relaxation on Turkish Cypriots would demonstrate US support of the recent vote by Turkish Cypriots on the Annan Plan. Former Ambassador to Turkey, Mark Parris (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 31) agrees with these steps but states “that the specifics are less important than doing almost anything” since efforts to improve relations at that point amounted to nothing. Panelist Henri J. Barkley, Ph.D., disagrees with the first point in that US attacks on the PKK during the late 1990’s had not improved relations (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 33). The circumstances of the military effort in the late 1990’s differ from what effect a potential attack would have in 2005 so Barkley’s case is not very convincing.

The panel moves on with thoughts by Representative Thaddeus G. McCotter (R-MI) who concludes that Turkey’s relationship with the US is bound to change because of the new Iraqi government and also due to possible EU accession. McCotter states; “it would seem to me that much of the problem that we are facing is the nature of a transforming relationship with the additions of new partners on each side” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 35). For Turkey this means Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Cagaptay acknowledges this new direction but specifies that Iraq will be the real source of future relations. As of 2005 the rebuilding of Iraq was barely underway and Cagaptay is astute in saying that Iraq, far more than EU accession, will be the primary point of US foreign relations with Turkey.

Representative McCotter follows up by asking about the possible conflict between EU accession and the nationalist tendencies of Turks (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 37). This is a well thought out question that recalls the literature surrounding European attitudes and the need to have one European identity in order for the EU to survive (Hugg 2010; Suvari 2010). Barkley

agrees that EU alignment will raise conflicting nationalist interests and states that growing nationalist sentiments in Turkey are “mostly focused on the United States primarily because of Iraq, but you can be sure that it ultimately will have to do with the European Union and also Cyprus, etcetera” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 37). Barkley also notes that EU accession is a long process but the war in Iraq spurred accession debates sooner than would be expected (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 37). Barkley then reverts to discussing the military staging denial at which point Cagaptay quickly cuts in and states that “in terms of the March 1 vote and its impact, I think it is time to cross the T’s and dot the I’s” (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 38). In other words, Cagaptay believes it is time to finally close the discussion on the rejection of military staging grounds.

The dialogue ends with additional discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which worries Wexler. He is curious about a visit by Erdoğan to Israel and the role of Turkey in that conflict. The panelists essentially state that Erdoğan is naturally going to have a different method when dealing with Israel than previous regimes and there is no cause for concern (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 40-41). The most important way that Turkish leadership can influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to maintain economic ties and polish political rhetoric (U.S. Congress. House 2005, 40-41). As with US-Turkish relations, Turkish-Israeli relations must be built on openness and constant communication.

The last hearing that took place while the Bush administration was still in office reveals a slightly more focused approach than by the House than in 2003 and 2005. The 2007 hearing (U.S. Congress. House 2007) is more focused because General Joseph W. Ralston who worked specifically on countering the PKK in Iraq was brought in to discuss developments in Kurdistan. As of 2007 Ralston was the most influential panelist brought in and his testimony reveals the

seriousness with which the House looks upon the region. Also, for the first time the appendix material of the 2007 hearing proves very valuable as an indicator of what other political actors feel about the situation.

The 2007 hearing opens with a statement by Representative Wexler, now chairman of the subcommittee, who cites four areas of concern which include Turkey's borders, Turkish-Israeli relations, strategic energy concerns, and Turkey's role in Afghanistan (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 1-2). Much like previous years Wexler expresses support for EU membership and is worried about declining public approval of the US in Turkey. The only unique factor of Wexler's statement is that he hopes "the Bush administration and the European Union will fulfill its pledges to the Turkish Cypriots to lift their economic isolation and work with the new U.N. Secretary General to restart negotiations" (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 2). Once again this shows a change in the way the Turks are no longer the main source of blame for the ongoing situation in Cyprus. Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) concurs with Wexler and is at the hearing despite not sitting on the Subcommittee of Europe. Burton's presence at a meeting he need not attend is testament to the importance of Turkey and the need to get US-Turkish relations back on track. Burton states; "I am not a member of this subcommittee, but I do appreciate you allowing me to sit in today. Turkey has been a tremendous ally of the United State, a NATO ally, for a long, long time. They have been there through thick and thin, and they deserve the best that we can offer them as a friend, colleague and associate" (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 4).

Because of General Ralston's presence the hearing largely focuses on the PKK and progress made in the fight against that group. Ralston's testimony describes how important the fight against the PKK is especially in terms of how it affected Turkish perceptions about the US

presence in Iraq (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 17-19). Since 2004 PKK violence has increased in Turkey and because the effective elimination of the PKK was not the US military's primary focus in Iraq, the increased violence had a negative impact on public opinion in Turkey toward the US. To demonstrate this point Ralston (U.S. Congress. House 2007,18) offers a metaphorical story:

How would the American public feel if there was a terrorist group that set up operations 10 miles inside Mexico, came across the border, and blew up hotels in Phoenix, Arizona and then went back into Mexico? And if we complained to the Mexican Government and nothing was done about it, what would the American people demand? That is the situation we have in Turkey today.

Ralston goes on to state that Kurdish leadership was "being cooperative" with the US fight against the PKK because the PKK was/is as much a threat to Kurds as Turks (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 24).

Ralston resigned seven months after the 2007 hearing but Carol Migdalovitz (2010, 6) points out that Turks believe Ralston was only hired to delay Turkish military actions against the PKK. Ralston was initially appointed to the special military envoy position in 2006 after "Turkey mobilized military forces on the border to signal impatience with the continuing PKK presence in northern Iraq" (Migdalovitz 2010, 6). In 2007 Turkey began military attacks against the PKK in northern Iraq and with US cooperation Turkish leadership has "expressed satisfaction with their results" (Migdalovitz 2010, 7).

The 2007 hearing also centers on a potential resolution that would formally recognize the Armenian genocide though it would not go so far as to criminalize denial of the genocide as sought in France. Panelist Daniel Fried from the Department of State believes that if such a resolution were passed it would negatively affect US-Turkish relations because the resolution would be viewed as an insult by many Turks. This correlates with Migdalovitz's (2010, 32)

statement that “U.S. Democratic and Republican administrations have never used the term genocide to describe the events of 1915 so as not to offend Turkey.” Fried believes that the Turkish government might likely seek some form of retribution if the resolution passed which would further hinder relations (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 22). Specifically, it could hurt US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan if the Turkish leadership decided to impede NATO operations from the Incirlik Air Base in southeast Turkey. According to Migdalovitz (2010, 1, 50) “Turkey’s geostrategic importance to the United States is symbolized by Incirlik Air base” because of the operations carried out from the air base and the number of nuclear weapons stored there.

The last noteworthy discussion of the 2007 hearing focuses on Cyprus and Erdoğan’s efforts to negotiate a lasting arrangement. Wexler reiterates disappointment with the failure of the Annan Plan due to the rejection by Greek Cypriots and postulates that reducing the number of Turkish troops might encourage resolve (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 28). Wexler does not openly blame Greek Cypriots but the text lends one to believe that he considers them to be the source of the ongoing tension since the Greek government (not Greek-Cypriots) was working on a solution much like Turkish leadership (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 28-29). Fried states that it is really the economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots that makes the situation so problematic because lifting sanctions would seem like “de facto recognition of a divided island, de facto recognition of the Turkish Cypriots as a government, which is not our intention” (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 28).

While these discussions are important the extra material submitted for the 2007 hearing is markedly more involved in the attempt to influence foreign policy. Firstly, there is a letter from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the Speaker of the

House, Nancy Pelosi, asking her to prevent the Armenian genocide bill from reaching the House floor. Gates and Rice state that the “President recognizes annually the horrendous suffering that ethnic Armenians endured during the final years of the Ottoman Empire” but an official resolution would critically hurt US-Turkish relations just as Ralston, Fried, and Migdalovitz have all pointed out (Migdalovitz 2010, 32; U.S. Congress. House 2007, 22, 33). Rice and Gates encourage reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia and repeat that the resolution will only cost the US an incomparable ally that is an “indispensable partner to our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan” (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 34). As a tool of foreign policy influence (Grimmett 1999), resolutions are a unique example of how Congress can hurt US foreign policy in a manner other than stalled appropriations (Hersmann 2000).

Written statements were issued by Representative Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) and Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) who take issue with the improved status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus since failure of the Annan Plan. Bilirakis and Maloney are members of the Congressional Hellenic Caucus so their statements naturally favor Greek Cypriots. Bilirakis (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 49) believes that “Greek Cypriots could not accept a fundamentally flawed plan which did not address core issues of concern” and that Turkey is not fulfilling its commitments to the EU in the handling of the Cyprus situation. Maloney (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 38) states “the Annan Plan was unacceptable for many reasons, including permitting the continued presence of Turkish troops on Cyprus.”

The Bilirakis and Maloney statements offer little in the way of suggesting how to go about fixing the problem but are followed by a letter to President George W. Bush signed by Bilirakis, Maloney, and ninety-five other representatives. The letter asks Bush to remain engaged in the situation and not to be disparaging of Greek Cypriots for their denial of the

Annan Plan (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 41-48). It lists five fairly straightforward items that an effective resolution must contain in order for Greek Cypriots to accept a deal. The most significant of these items are the “removal of foreign troops on Cyprus” and the instillation of “a property recovery system that recognizes the rights and interests of displaced Greek Cypriots” (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 41). This letter is yet another example of Congressional advice in an attempt to influence foreign policy by way of a formal letter. In recognizing that Bush holds the greatest sway in foreign policy the representative signatories have attempted to sway policy by offering up their aims in the hopes that Bush would heed their suggestions.

Another letter submitted for the hearing comes from Hilmi Akil who is a representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The letter was written to Chairman Wexler and begins by suggesting that the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots has worsened the situation (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 51-53). Akil points out that the EU has formally stated in the EU Council and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that the dismissal of the plan was inappropriate and has caused Turkish Cypriots to become disillusioned with the process. He states that the TRNC will continue to pursue a resolution and asks that the economic isolation of the TRNC be lifted (U.S. Congress. House 2007, 51-53). Finally, Akil encourages Greek Cypriots to do their part in working toward a solution as a way of poking at their credibility in the affair. The letter does not suggest that TRNC leadership has taken notice of congressional discourse on the matter but it does point to the belief by the TRNC in congressional influence. If the TRNC believed that Congress had absolutely no role in foreign policy then such a letter would not have been submitted.

Finally, the 2007 hearing ends with a written question and answer portion which amounts to little more than ongoing debate over the situations with Cyprus, Armenia, and the Kurds. The

text does briefly deal with appropriations particularly because of a program oriented at economic growth in Cyprus. Fried notes that formally recognizing the TRNC would be detrimental to cooperation in Cyprus in light of the economic incentives it would provide TRNC. Placing the TRNC under the same program as the rest of Cyprus could hinder Turkish Cypriot desires to join with the Greek Cypriots and is thus a bad idea. The program is a part of a broader appropriations issue so it could be something to consider by another scholar when looking at economic incentives and the formal recognition of states.

From 2003 to 2007 the hearings primarily demonstrate a learning experience on the part of the House to grasp the complexity and multi-faceted issues facing US-Turkish relations. The House was not able to accomplish much as far as directly influencing executive decisions but the hearings did bring to light certain areas of influence (such as confidence-building measures and the role of resolutions in hurting foreign relations) not discussed by the literature on Congress and foreign policy. The hearings show that Congress was considerably worried about the decline of relations with Turkey and the election of Barack Obama in 2008 brought about the potential to change that decline.

In 2009 Robert Wexler (once again the chairman of the subcommittee) opens with an immediate commendation of President Obama for his visit to Turkey just one month prior to the hearing (U.S. Congress. House 2009, 1-2). Wexler claims that Obama decidedly revamped the ability of the US to collaborate with Turkey stating; “President Obama’s trip to Turkey laid the foundation for enhanced American and Turkish cooperation and dramatically changed the playing field for increased United-States-Turkish collaboration in the economic, military, and political spheres” (U.S. Congress. House 2009, 1). David Scott (D-GA) agrees that it is

important for the Obama administration to remain involved with Turkey specifically due to military strategic concerns (U.S. Congress. House 2009, 5).

Wexler so firmly believes that the Obama administration had changed the direction of US-Turkish relations that during the question and answer session he asks whether the US and Turkey have reached a much greater level of reciprocity in the relationship than in previous years. Panelist Ian Lesser, Ph.D., believes that cooperation is very high in regards to the fight against the PKK but the same cannot be said about the Israeli partnership (U.S. Congress. House 2009, 38-39). Since the 2002 election the AKP had continued to open up to Iranian and Syrian leadership causing tension but not a breakdown of Turkish-Israeli relations. Panelist David L. Phillips, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States, questions Turkey's direction with Israel and views it as part of the much larger worry as to the AKP's Islamist agenda. Phillips states that the US needs to consider whether the AKP is "actually a Trojan horse for an Islamist agenda in Turkey" (U.S. Congress. House 2009, 39).

Wexler disagrees and sees Turkey as moving toward both the West and Middle East which is a positive for NATO. This argument is very reminiscent of the work by Morris (2005) which analyzes Turkey's dual East/West path. Panelist Stephen Flanagan, Ph.D., not only agrees with Wexler but sees Turkey as a potential middle-man with Iran and Syria. Flanagan believes that "Turkey has been trying to show that it can be a conduit and be helpful to us, and its ability to talk to some parties, including Hamas, including Syria, and even Iran, the countries that we can't and don't want to talk to directly" (U.S. Congress. House 2009, 40). Phillips similarly condones the middle-man arrangement but notes that Turkey cannot guide policy towards Iran especially in light of its nuclear potential.

The conversation shifts to Cyprus and the representatives are once again curious about what the US can do to help the situation. The panel regards EU accession as a substantial point of leverage on Cyprus but advancements in joining the EU are still likely to be held back for another distinguishable reason. Phillips points out that Islamophobia is a very real issue in preventing accession which recalls the literature by Esposito and Kalin (2011). It only takes one country within the EU to deny Turkish membership and the relevance of Islamophobia makes that denial a very strong possibility (Hugg 2005, 232). Phillips also notes that the AKP has made real progress in resolving the Kurdish situation which will help determine accession potential but not override other issues like Cyprus.

The final point of consequence in the 2009 hearing is a discussion over energy concerns and the Nabucco pipeline. The length of discussion on energy policy highlights the work of Tekin and Williams (2008) as well as Zanotti (2012, 24) but little is discussed in detail. The comments by some of the representatives about how the US could *help* with energy policies in Turkey, display a desire for Europe to reduce its reliance on Russian energy supplies (Migdalovitz 2010, 40). The pipeline would also help development in Iraq because it would give Iraq another export-point for their energy resources (Migdalovitz 2010, 42).

The submitted material for the 2009 hearing exhibits more of the same debate and is not nearly as profound as the submissions in 2007. Overall, the 2009 hearing reflects a discernible change in the House's focus from Turkey's role with Iraq to its proceedings with Iran. Although the US had yet to withdraw from Iraq for another two years, it is clear that US policymakers had finally accepted Turkey's denial of the military staging areas and started taking a serious look at how to quell Iranian nuclear advances.

The 2010 hearing (U.S. Congress. House 2010) was the first to be held at the committee level instead of the subcommittee level and was chaired by Howard L. Berman (D-CA). The hearing has several opening statements and for the most part they do not extend the conversation on Turkey any further than what was mentioned in years past. The interesting dynamic of the committee hearing as opposed to the subcommittee hearings is the blatant opinions offered about Turkey. These opinions perfectly exhibit Lindsay's (1994, 5) description of the technocratic fallacy which views Congressional activity in foreign policy as litigious. The opinions range from viewing US-Turkish relations as completely broken down to being very congenial. For Berman it has become quite clear that the AKP has shifted its foreign policy in an alarming direction which is indicated by its ties to Hamas (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 1-2). Berman understands that those ties were sought in order to influence Hamas positively but he sees the continuation of the political connection as perturbing. These ties to Hamas are highlighted by Migdalovitz (2010, 15) who points out that Erdoğan believes it is important to speak with actors other than Palestinian authority, President Mahmud Abbas. Berman goes on to suggest the need for Turkey to draw down troop levels in Cyprus, much like the letter to Bush in 2007, and also questions the freedom of press in Turkey stating, "press intimidation has no place in democracies" (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 3).

Along with Berman other pessimists include Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) who wonders how far the AKP will breakdown the separation between church and state in Turkey. Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY), and Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) all see Turkey's foreign policy direction as troubling citing a variety of reasons for concern. Connie Mack (R-FL) goes so far as to say "the relationship with Turkey is hanging by a thread" (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 11). Representatives coming from a middle-area include Donald M. Payne (D-NJ),

Albio Sires (D-NJ), Jim Costa (D-CA), and Dan Burton (R-IN) who believe that Turkey is still a strong ally but that there are many issues which need to be worked on. Bill Delahunt (D-MA) is on the opposite end of the spectrum from the pessimists stating that US-Turkish relations were very solid as exemplified by Turkey's support in Afghanistan. Delahunt notes Turkey will continue to be an important ally in balancing with Iran and that the real change in Turkey is not foreign policy (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 7-8). The change in Turkey extends from its improvement in democratization due to the removal of the military enclave from political prominence. This directly recalls the work of Steven A. Cook (2007) and his description of the shift away from pseudo-democratic practices in Turkey. Finally, Michael E. McMahon (D-NY) and David Scott (D-GA) adopt a wait-and-see stance because Turkey is obviously facing a transition period.

Unlike the previous subcommittee hearings the question and answer portion of the 2010 hearing bounces around very quickly and little is discussed in depth. Albio Sires (D-NJ) states that he sees "Turkey as the bully in the corner, especially when it comes to Cyprus, when it comes to Armenia, and when it comes to even Greece at times, now even Israel" (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 61). Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY) believes that in regards to Turkey; "for purposes of, shall we say, military association, we recognized them as a brother in arms and welcomed them into NATO" (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 61). He then states that "for purposes of joining my European family, you got to be kidding, you ain't marrying my sister, and they were rejected" (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 49). This kind of commentary is an extension of the opening statement portion of the hearing in that the representatives primarily seek to pronounce their opinions on Turkey. The contrast between the committee hearing and previous subcommittee hearings seems to indicate that committee level hearings accomplish less because

those present are less interested in the opinions of the panelists and more interested in their own. This is only one observable instance of such a change based on the level of hearing but it could be part of the greater condition party government trend.

Again, conditional party government is the theory that “partisan organizational structures in the House – especially those of the majority party – will (under certain conditions) seek to use their power to shift the policy outcomes produced by the body closer to the median position of the party” (Aldrich and Rohde 2000, 2). The majority of Republicans at the 2010 committee hearing posit wholly negative outlooks for US-Turkish relations, while many Democrats tend to adopt stances that are more neutral. It is likely that party elite cleavages have influenced this division especially due to increasing Republican criticism in 2010 of the Obama administration over foreign policy with Iran and the broader Middle East.

To open the question and answer period, Chairman Berman asks why anti-Americanism is still so prominent in Turkey. Ross Wilson (a former ambassador to Turkey) notes that the worries over anti-Americanism were misguided because those attitudes were very shallow (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 47). In other words, the public opinion polls do not reflect a vehement loathing of America but more of a broad agitated sentiment. Representative Delahunt notes that as of 2010 the United States was not popular in any part of the world and the same agitation was reflected in countries across Europe. Delahunt’s point is interesting because Zeyno Baran (2010) did not discuss how anti-Americanism sentiments extended well beyond Turkey or how deep they were. This discussion is tantamount with anti-US rhetoric by Turkish leadership which Soner Cagaptay views as being used for domestic purposes and not an indicator of true foreign policy intentions (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 52).

Representative Delahunt, being the only representative who views the relationship as perfectly fine, interprets Turkey's new foreign policy as based on ideology, pragmatism, and nationalism. This is not a troubling direction because Turkey has an uncommon place in the world and forming new connections with the Middle East was likely along with the AKP's ascendance. Cagaptay similarly points out that Turkey has two identities and the political values the US and Turkey share are what count. All of this recalls Morris (2005) once again and Turkey's East/West simultaneous direction. Joe Wilson (R-SC) characterizes Turkey as being purely Middle Eastern but this detracts from Turkey's historical birth.

More than anything else from the 2010 hearing the connection to Hamas worries panelists and representatives alike. The focus on Hamas is timely because relations between Israel and Turkey did not really "sour" until early 2009 and in May 2010 just two months before the 2010 hearing (Migdalovitz 2010, 11; Zanotti 2012, 16). The 2010 Gaza-Flotilla incident in which eight Turks were killed is a major source of contention between Turkey and Israel but only Delahunt acknowledged this grievance (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 58). Ros-Lehtinen and Cagaptay express displeasure with Turkey's approach to Hamas and consider it a source of enmity with Israel. Iran is another point of contention in the Turkish-Israeli partnership and Cagaptay regards the middle-man position for Turkey as one not beneficial to the United States. Representatives Phillips and Flanagan had stated in 2009 that a middle-man role would improve Washington's ability to influence Tehran but Cagaptay is now decrying this ability. Cagaptay believes Turkey needs to be reprimanded for its ties to Iran and Hamas and it must shift predominantly to the West in its dual East/West foreign policy in order for the partnership to grow (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 65).

The hearing continues with even more discussion about religious freedom for Christians, Cyprus, Armenia, and Iran but these conversation pieces add nothing to the same topics in previous years. The hope in 2009 that the Obama administration would magically improve relations was completely gone. Panelist Ian Lesser, Ph.D., notes that Turkish public opinion of the US was still low in spite of the expected improvement due to presidential change. If a new administration had a hard time assuaging Turkish anger then the ability of Congress to do the same is even more limited.

The 2010 hearing primarily demonstrates that the learning process on Turkey never ended. From 2003 to 2010 many of the same questions, answers, and opinions surfaced repeatedly which reveals the lack of organization Congress has when dealing with foreign policy. The hearings took place prior to the Arab Spring and events across Syria and Iran have since forced Turkish leadership to alter its foreign policy with those countries into conflict preparation. The US and Turkey still face mutual strategic concerns but it is not likely Congress will significantly influence that relationship within the next four years apart from appropriations.

Conclusion

The learning process that Congress displayed throughout the hearings is indicative of Dahl's (1964, 62) statement "however decentralized and uncontrolled the total executive structure appears from the White House, *as compared with Congress* it is unified, it is decisive, it is expert." This was displayed most prominently in the 2010 hearings by the diverse set of opinions on US-Turkish relations which lacked cohesiveness or any policy aim. Congress may lack foreign policy influence because of powers granted in the Constitution but even if this role was expanded the decentralization of congressional decision making processes would not override the need for executive decision making. In other words, the hearings demonstrate that Congress lacks foreign policy influence primarily because of its non-unitary decision making nature and less because of formal limitations in the Constitution. The President can speak with and direct a State Department official on a moment's whim. Congress argues about policy goals year after year.

That being said, Congress did attempt to influence foreign policy. These attempts were informal and arguably negligible, but attempts nonetheless. Specifically, the House continually encouraged a fundamental improvement in the US-Turkish partnership, issued a letter to President Bush asking him to remain engaged in the Cyprus situation, and in 2003 Robert Wexler solicited four confidence building measures as a way of improving relations. These attempts to influence foreign policy fall into the structural and strategic policy spheres confirming the work of Lindsay (1994). Thus, the hypothesis of this study is confirmed but more importantly, new lessons were learned about Congress and foreign policy.

One positive aspect of the hearings is that they generally covered topics on Turkey relevant and important to the partnership. The isolation of Turkey for hearings enabled the

House to delve into many critical topics that otherwise might not be examined by Congress on a regular basis. The hearings also allowed for continued analysis of ongoing strategic operations such as the fight against the PKK. From 2003 to 2007 Iraq and Afghanistan were two of the most prominent issues discussed because of the wars and subsequent US occupations. Operation Iraqi Freedom ended in 2011 and Operation Enduring Freedom is still being fought by US/Turkish troops. For this reason the drop-off in conversation over those wars in 2009 is somewhat surprising. Although Iran had been mentioned in previous years the conversation clearly shifted in 2009 from Iraq and Afghanistan to Iran. The switch is not entirely unfathomable because the deliberations correlate with escalating fears over the Iranian nuclear program and the change in executive administrations. The election of Barack Obama as President in 2008 brought about new timetables in Iraq but the war in Afghanistan should have continued to be a major point of discourse. The lack of continued debate on Afghanistan can only be described as odd at best.

Table: 1

Most Prominent Topics by Year

Issue	2003	2005	2007	2009	2010
Afghanistan	X	X	X		
Armenia	X		X		X
Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X
Democratization					X
Energy Policy				X	
Erdoğan	X	X			X
EU Membership	X	X	X	X	X
Hamas					X
Improving Relations	X	X	X	X	
Iran & Syria				X	X
Iraq	X	X	X		
Islamism				X	X
Israel		X		X	X
Kurdish Situation	X	X	X		
NATO	X	X	X	X	X
Palestine		X			X
PKK	X	X	X	X	
Public Opinion		X	X	X	X

Certain conversation-constants like EU accession and the role of Turkey in NATO are not so unusual. As long as Turkey is a member of NATO, involved with Kurds, and attempting to join the EU, these issues will be common points of discussion. The constant focus on Cyprus is another understandable point of discussion but it did not always seem appropriate. Until the written statements of Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) and Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) were revealed in 2007, it seemed peculiar that Cyprus dominated the hearing text especially when compared to discourse on the war in Iraq. In 2010 opinions on Cyprus still abounded when the overwhelming focus became Turkish ties to Hamas. The spotlight on Cyprus evinces the relative power of the Congressional Hellenic Caucus and its ability to make Cyprus a common point of deliberation in the hearings. Hersman (2000) noted that interest groups gravitate toward specific policymakers in order to maximize their potency in policy focus. The Congressional Hellenic Caucus is presumably backed by pro-Greek interest groups that can sway congressional opinions, such as the opinions of Bilirakis and Maloney, through the provision of information (Burstein and Hirsh 2007). The focus on Cyprus also indicates that similar to the holdup in the frigate transaction, US policymakers worry about Turkey's strength in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea.

Apart from the near-obsession with Cyprus most topics proved timely and appropriate for the years discussed. Declining public opinion and anti-American sentiments became a common point of discussion after 2003 due to the notice in the trend. Discussions on the Kurdish situation dropped off at the same time as discussion on Iraq which shows how concern for those topics was appropriately correlated. The Nabucco Pipeline was a critical point of discussion in 2009, not long after the literature cited the importance of the Nabucco to European energy security (Tekin and Williams 2008). Ultimately then, the isolation of Turkey or any country for a hearing

enables Congress to more effectively influence foreign policy because it provides Congress with expert advice on current events just as the State Department provides advice to the President.

On a negative note, very little was discussed about Turkey's history and the legacy of Atatürk or even the dominance of the military enclave. Not until 2010 did Bill Delahunt (D-MA) take note that democratization was occurring in Turkey which led to the new direction in Turkish leadership and foreign policy. The importance of the military enclave and its role in the formation of modern Turkey cannot be understated. The fact that nothing was said until 2010 as to the long process of democratization conveys an unfortunate desire to maintain the status quo in order to protect US interests. This was most effectively exemplified by Brad Miller (D-NC) who questioned whether the change in civil-military relations was dissatisfactory for US-Turkish relations (U.S. Congress. House 2010, 55). Because the military enclave was pro-secular and pro-West, Miller believed that the improvement in democratization did not encourage a positive Turkish foreign policy stance. Soner Cagaptay responded by suggesting that democratization was not a negative but the AKP's desire to adhere to democracy was the source of worry. Nevertheless, Miller's comments indicate a fear of democratization when that democratization yields negative results for the United States and our relations with Muslim countries.

It is also clear that some individuals in Congress fail to understand Turkey's dual East/West foreign policy position. Joe Wilson (R-SC) openly stated that Turkey was only a Middle Eastern country and that any argument as to its Western-ness was flawed. Without insinuating that any House member is guilty of Islamophobia, it is clear that because the AKP is an Islamist party that many in the House fear Islamism and its role in Turkey. Such fears are not entirely unjustifiable because the breakdown of secularism in Turkey is equally as worrisome as the dominance of the military enclave. However, if Congress really wants to influence and

improve relations with Turkey or any predominantly Muslim country then it will have to accept that Islamists are going to be prominent political actors (Hamid 2011).

The hearings did demonstrate that the House members were concerned with expert opinions recalling the work of Brint (1990) and Jacobs and Page (2005). Because Turkey was initially an unorganized area of foreign policy for Congress, the debates/testimonies revealed a lot of information for members to consider. The opinions of the experts may not have had a direct impact of foreign policy decisions given the bureaucratic constraints of US foreign policy, but they were important nevertheless.

More than anything the hearings fully demonstrate how limited and informal congressional influence on foreign policy really is. The few attempts to influence executive decisions show that Congressional foreign policy goals often depend on the mercy of the executive to heed legislative pressure and advice (Grimmett 1999). Appropriations were only discussed in passing which is regrettable given the potential impact appropriations can have on US-Turkish relations. There is potential for Congress to become more involved in foreign policy especially if the Foreign Affairs Committee would discuss the importance of appropriations and weapons transactions.

This case study also highlights some things not mentioned about Congress and foreign policy. One observation from the hearings not mentioned in the literature is the role of congressional messaging to foreign countries and its potential. Although the ability to effectively message a foreign country is limited, it is not inconsequential. Robert Wexler's attempts to reach out to Turkey indicate that a congressperson has the ability to influence foreign policy by looking beyond the executive. Wexler was unable to draw Turkey into the Iraq war but given how daunting the task was it should not be seen as a failure. Should a congressperson

attempt to influence a foreign state in the future the attempt may not prove so futile especially in less difficult affairs.

Another observation that can be drawn from the hearings and not mentioned in the literature is the difference between subcommittee and committee hearings as they relate to conditional party government. Lindsay (1994) described the ability of subcommittees in the Foreign Affairs Committee to serve as a platform for important events which Aldrich and Rohde (2000) failed to consider in terms of the likelihood of conditional party government. It is possible that there were no elite opinion cleavages on Turkey from 2003-2009 but highly unlikely. One can expect hearings to resemble a circus at times because of the way certain House members use them for grandstanding. This was true of the committee hearing but not of the subcommittee hearings which were generally more considerate of events in Turkey. Only one of the hearings took place at the committee level but the difference was so stark that it cannot go without acknowledgement. The divergent opinions between Republicans and Democrats at the 2010 committee level hearing and the overt willingness to solicit those opinions proved so unproductive that it is not difficult to see why Congress is limited in its foreign policy influence. Conditional party government is clearly more of an issue at the committee level at least in terms of foreign policy with Turkey and perhaps foreign policy as a whole.

It was also demonstrated that certain congresspersons take particular issues more seriously than the issue at stake even when those congresspersons are not backed by an interest group. The focus on Iran in 2009 and 2010 detracted from the hearing because it showed how the House members only cared about Turkey in light of Iran. Again, the literature indicates that it is not unusual for individuals within Congress to spotlight specific policy problems because of the information funneled to them. Burstein and Hirsh (2007, 193) found that in terms of public

policy, “information provided by supporters does increase the likelihood of enactment.”

Similarly, information funneled to Congress about foreign policy from party elites or interest groups can alter foreign policy objectives. If Congress as a whole wants to influence foreign policy, then the central issue of the hearings must be the focus. The 2010 hearing was the first in the analysis where the majority of congresspersons did not proclaim the need to improve the US-Turkish relationship which had been one of the primary goals in the subcommittee hearings. Again, the subcommittee hearings proved far more valuable in determining a foreign policy course with Turkey and the literature should take note that subcommittee hearings may improve the potential influence of Congress due to their more focused nature.

The level of hearing could be another point of contrast in a review of Senate hearings versus House hearings. If Congress truly wanted to influence foreign policy then Senate hearings might be better equipped to handle tough issues but they may also be just as divided. Conditional party government is particularly relevant to the Senate where party membership has become increasingly important since the late 1970s (Theriault and Rohde 2011). Because Senate hearings carry significant partisanship, determining foreign policy goals at the Senate level could be even more detrimental to proposing foreign policy goals. Still, there is room for analysis as to the type of hearing and the role of Congress in foreign policy.

One of the most revelatory observations is the ability of Congress to hurt foreign relations apart from failing to approve appropriations measures. The resolution that would have formally recognized the Armenian genocide was a source of great concern to General Ralston and the Bush administration because of the potential backlash by the Turkish government. The formal recognition of many political issues like human rights abuses, the creation of new countries, and the drawing of borders are hot-button issues that can sway the foreign policy of other states.

This example along with the delayed appropriations case suggests that Congress can at times more easily hurt foreign relations than help them. More cases need to be studied in order to establish this trend but in this instance the observation affirms the possibility.

The final and most critical area where the literature can be advanced is the role of confidence building measures (CBMs) in foreign policy. CBMs are policies or actions taken to increase transparency/trust between states and range from broad security measures to fairly painless actions such as trading military officers for goodwill purposes. The common purpose of CBMs is to increase transparency across policy issues such as trade, weapons proliferation, nuclear capabilities, and even multilateral missions to space (Robinson 2011; Sethi 2007). In the Middle East, CBMs are already in use for a variety of reasons but have significant room to be expanded, especially between the US and Turkey or even between Turkey and Iran (Lieven 2008). CBMs easily fall within strategic and structural policy spheres and are an untouched area of scholarly analysis in Congress and foreign policy even though CBMs are commonly discussed.

The chief reason CBMs can be utilized by Congress is because they may require appropriations. Congress could consider those appropriations before drafting a bill or soliciting the CBM to the President. Because it is easy for the executive to reject appropriations there must be consensus by members of Congress as to the goal of appropriations beforehand. Wexler listed four CBMs in 2003 designed to improve US-Turkish relations but he did not say whether or not any other members of the House supported them. A little support could have demonstrated the seriousness of his CBM suggestions.

Overall, this case study mostly highlights that the literature on Congress and foreign policy can be advanced in a number of ways even if those advancements are somewhat trifling.

There are not many formal opportunities for Congress to influence foreign policy beyond appropriations but a less divided and more focused Congress could increase its role in informal and formal influence. Turkey is a critical ally and the limited attempts by Congress to improve the relationship signify just how critical US-Turkish relations are. The strategic weight of Turkey in the region will only multiply because of the situations in Iran and Syria. Congress should be wary of delaying arms transactions if it wants to maintain an ally that will help US efforts to stabilize the region.

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