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Case Studies of Anti-Immigration Parties

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
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
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Abstract

The goal of this research project is to determine anti-immigration party strength within the European Union. The question of concern is whether or not right-wing parties are stronger because of the changing nature of immigration – primarily due to the speed at which individuals are moving across borders, the cultural make-up of those individuals, and the governments’ inability to keep pace and adapt policies on immigration. The research will use case studies of anti-immigration parties in United Kingdom, Germany, and France to determine the degree of influence not only within their own countries but within the European Union itself. Based on the analysis of the case studies, right-wing party strengths are not beholden to the speed of cross border movements, make-up of individual immigrants, or the inability of governments to act, but due to an opportunistic environment that allows for the growth in strength and influence of right-wing parties.

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Introduction

Europe has a long history of reported ethnic violence. Some of the worst atrocities against humanity have been alleged to have been committed somewhere in Europe. These events for the most part garnered little attention unless one was a student of history or was applying some sociological theory as to why these atrocities occurred. There have been atrocities, however, that have gained great, modern day public attention such as the Jewish Holocaust or the alleged ethnic cleansing during the Croatian War for Independence in the early 1990s. More and more though as racially, ethnically, and bias crimes have increased, public and governmental scrutiny has also intensified. What motivates people to hate and more importantly why are these bias crime rates rising?

Why people hate is a fascinating subject. On a psychological level, it often brings back bad, childhood memories of beatings by a schoolyard bully. In either the sociological or the political context, the school yard bully actions of a misguided child have been replaced by the more calculated and devious behavior designed to instill fear to a larger audience. So again, why do people hate? Some are taught such hatred often through their religion or cultural norms. As the Theory of Differential Association suggests learned behavior is reinforced by others who have the same belief. In others this behavior is engrained in their psyche much like the murderous child Rhoda Penmark, as portrayed by Patty McCormack, in the 1956 film *The Bad Seed*. Still, others feel the need to protest against governmental policies or react to events occurring in another region of the globe. Unfortunately, other crimes of hatred have been fanned by an increase in right-wing extremism – specifically those racially, ethnically, and bias-

motivated crimes against Muslims, Jews, those of African or Southeast Asian descent, and members of the gay, bisexual, transgendered communities.

The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights issued a report at the beginning of 2009 in which it was noted that Germany reported a 1080% increase in hate crimes between the years 2000 and 2007. Anastasia Crickley and Morten Kjaerum described in an annual report to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights that crimes with extremist right-wing motivations have increased in a number of EU Member States. (Crickley and Kjaerum, 2009:27). A majority of EU Member States also reported increases in hate motivated crimes. What is happening?

There are a multitude of factors that account for the increase in hate crimes. High unemployment rates, lack of quality, affordable housing, high tax rates, governmental policies against certain ethnicities, an increase in right-wing extremists, an increase in legal and illegal immigration and migrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, South and Southeast Asia, and Islamist extremism all contribute in one form or another to the rise in reports. Archick, Rollins, and Woehrel (2005) state that by “excluding Turkey and the Balkans, researchers estimate that as many as 15 to 20 million Muslims live on the European continent. Muslims are the largest religious minority in Europe, and Islam is the continent’s fastest growing religion” (Archick, Rollins, and Woehrel, 2005: 1).

This paper, although not specifically addressing hate crimes against immigrants throughout Europe will, however, focus on one aspect of the reason hate crimes have increased and that is by examining the right-wing party or anti-immigration movements sweeping across Europe. Countless scholarly work attributes the hateful rhetoric and sometimes veiled violent

threats by right-wing parties as a contributing factor to the increase in hate crimes. This paper will also acknowledge that right-wing parties, whether large or small, have a considerable influence as to the behavior of their members and the behavior of elected officials. For example, the French center-right government of Nicolas Szarkozy moved to the right regarding immigration by toughening its entrance and citizenship requirements when then candidate Szarkozy ran on the notion of opening the borders and relaxing citizen requirements so that France could benefit economically from the influx of new workers. However as was the case, once in office, too many immigrants applied for temporary and permanent citizenship forcing Szarkozy's administration to abandon this policy, thus allowing a right-wing party rhetoric to heat up. This is but one example of the growing influence of right-wing parties on the electoral processes across Europe and within the European Union.

As one looks at the right-wing parties, one must also look at the political processes that avail themselves throughout the European political landscape – voting theories, political opportunities by way of issue and party competition, political structures, governmental responses – as well as the immigrants themselves. A complete study would not be valid without a look into the make-up of those individuals moving across borders and the reasons for those moves. There are a variety of reasons as to why individuals leave their homes and move to different locations. It seems that for some it is an economic necessity, while for others the reasons may be darker. War, famine, political unrest, and persecutions in one form or another, are all contribute to the mass movements of people from one state to another.

Few countries have the resources with which to absorb large communities of immigrants and those that do, often face uncertain futures. Primarily, one must ask the question as to

whether or not the existing political institutions have the will and indeed, the infrastructure to resist negative connotations surrounding immigration issues. This thesis will argue that right-wing parties are stronger because of the changing nature of immigration – primarily due to the speed at which individuals are moving across borders, the cultural make-up of those individuals, and the governments' inability to keep pace and adapt policies on immigration.

The structure of this paper is one of typical fashion. The first chapter will review the existing and available literature concerning European right-wing parties, immigration policies, and the European Union structure and goals and how an interpretation of the works will affect the outcome of the aforementioned thesis. Then, chapter two will be a case study of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and their respective right-wing parties, the British National Party, the National Democratic Party, and the French National Front. A detailed analysis of the interaction between the right-wing parties, national governments, and the European Union will be provided in order to provide a complete picture of right-wing party strengths. Although not relying on economic, election, and population data per se, some figures are provided to strengthen the thematic elements provided in the thesis. Chapter three is structured in such a way as to provide a detailed look as to how the European Union operates, its goals, and how the European Union interacts with its Member states and whether or not the European Union can withstand or absorb right-wing party influence. Finally, chapter four provides findings on the exploitation of political opportunities by right-wing parties and makes recommendations for future studies.

Chapter One: Literature Review

Within the European Union there is a rich and diverse field of study as to the varied responses towards immigrants. Some political systems openly embrace immigrants, while others openly shun them – even creating political parties (identified henceforth as anti-immigration parties, movements or their commonly held designation as right-wing parties) whose primary goal is to restrict the rights and freedoms of immigrants. Research on the anti-immigration issue has examined immigration and political systems and their research approaches and results have been as varied as the scholars themselves. Some scholars have focused primarily on economic issues, more specifically whether there is a correlation between unemployment numbers and the strength of anti-immigration movements. Scholarship focused on political opportunity structures and whether party or issue competition is a determinant factor as to whether or not anti-immigrant parties or right-wing parties are successful in elections. Moreover, some political scientists examined the significance of group theories, theories of realistic group conflict, and voter protest theories as well as other socio-political determinants. For the purpose of this paper, the following examination helps to shed light how the European political structure responds to immigration issues.

For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen a variety of literature that examines the broad scope of issues surrounding anti-immigration movements. The primary question of concern is whether or not the strength of the anti-immigrant movements reflects the degree of immigration, i.e. whether successful anti-immigrant parties are found in countries that have more immigrants. If so, why are these movements strong or if not, why are these anti-immigrant movements weak or unsuccessful?

General Determinant Factors

Political parties play an increasingly important role in shaping government policies. Increased immigration by Muslims is seen as a threat to not only the culture of the various European Union countries that are the recipients of this immigration, but as a security threat as well. Lisbeth Aggestam and Christopher Hill (2008) assert that indeed Muslims are the fastest-growing minority group in Europe; moreover, Muslims are demanding to be recognized as cultural entities with political and economic agendas all their own. This of course has increased the hostility and rhetoric from radical right-wing parties who see the enlarging Muslim communities across Europe as a threat. Again this reinforces the notion by Jorge Vala, Cícero Pereira, and Alice Ramos (2006) wherein they believe that immigrants, primarily of the Islamic religion, represented a threat not only to the security of these nations but to the central values of good and evil.

The EU has been, for the most part, able to speak with one voice on issues of human rights but has been unable to articulate a cohesive policy for minority rights. Aggestam and Hill stated that the “EU member states hold distinctive positions on questions of multiculturalism and how to interpret minority rights more specifically, both in their own domestic politics and in the external relations”(Aggestam and Hill, 2008:102). Integration has become an increasingly contentious political issue by member states intent on maintaining some control on individuals entering and the reasons for these cross border movements.

The rise of right-wing movements has proven difficult to ignore and most certainly portends to jeopardize the rights and freedoms in the EU. These organizations have shown a disregard to the globalization efforts of the EU; shunning immigrants, increasing hateful and

violent rhetoric, and at times leading to violence itself. At first such populist movements were ignored because these groups were seen as too extreme by both party and voters. However, voters seem to be warming up to the idea of these populist movements as the votes garnered by some parties have enabled them to enter into coalition governments. Now, anti-immigration movements have become even more mainstream.

So why are anti-immigration movements becoming mainstream? Somdeep Sen (2010) analyzed the rising stature of the populist movements across the European landscape and found that the overriding factor in the increase is “attributed to the changing socio-economic face of European societies...one of the key elements of changing face of European society is immigration” (Sen, 2010: 63). The global economic meltdown has only exacerbated the problem as right-wing movements have been legitimized by radical politicians who push for exclusionary policies against all but the native population. In a sense, radical politicians are building virtual walls around states – cutting off immigrants’ access to state institutions.

Somedee Sen (2010) offered just a small glimpse as to the rising popularity of the anti-immigration movement. Sen examined the number of seats won by right-wing candidates and the political make-up of various European Union member states and then looked at hot bed issues to see if there was a correlation. His methodology might be simple but it is only a cursory examination into the rising popularity of the anti-immigration movement at the local level. The significance of Sen’s work is that it foreshadows possible problems at the European level. One can assume that the rise in right-wing popularity in member states will eventually translate to increased representation in the European Commission. Moreover, The European Parliament

might also be influenced if popularity of right-wing parties continues to increase in those Member states like France, Germany, or Austria to name a few (Sen, 2010:65).

Economy – Driving Force

So is the economy the driving force for right-wing populist parties? One would expect to find correlations between economic issues and the rise in popularity of anti-immigration parties and it seems that most data supports this outcome. However, Michael O’Connell’s (2005) research allows for a much different interpretation. O’Connell believes there is a paradox when studies only focus their attention on economic issues (O’Connell, 2005:63). In his work, O’Connell approaches the subject of anti-immigration parties by first looking at the validity of realistic conflict theory. Realistic conflict theory as defined by O’Connell (2005) as two or more seemingly different groups competing for resources and thus, competition leads to conflict. To illustrate this concept, O’Connell briefly mentioned a study conducted in 1936 which concerned German immigrants to a small town in United States. At first, there was little to no hostility from residents, but as employment became scarcer, open hostility towards these immigrants became widespread. Eventually anti-immigration groups began forming. This forced local politicians to try and remove these immigrants. As another example of conflict theory, O’Connell included another study that focused on the hostilities towards the Chinese in their quest for gold in nineteenth-century California. Here the resources were housing, jobs, and location of exploration for gold. As the Chinese came into the country and utilized these resources, this meant less employment, housing, and opportunity for demobilized soldiers from the American Civil War. Again, this led to hostility and an open call for political change to restrict immigration from taking American jobs.

O'Connell then explores the hypothesis of economic deprivation with data supplied by voting patterns in European countries. O'Connell stated that "analysis of some voting patterns have shown political support for authoritarian parties to be greatest in constituencies experiencing sharp increases in unemployment; in France, for example, strong support for the Front National is found in the 'rust belt' of the North-east as well as in the less economically successful Mediterranean departments"(O'Connell, 2005:61). These two theories presented by O'Connell all seem predictable – meaning there are predictable outcomes. One would have to assume there would always be conflict as resources become limited. However, as stated earlier, this is only part of the story.

Cultural Difference – A Variable

To better understand realistic group conflict theory, one can look at it in terms of placing culture into the mix. Here, according to Michael Zárate et al (2002), prejudices can manifest themselves because of the perception of harm coming from immigrants whose behaviors, beliefs, morals differ from the norm. Succinctly put, those using different languages and interpersonal skills are blocked from being fully integrated into the surrounding community and therefore are seen as a threat to the normality that surrounds them. Thus, conflicts are derived because of the cultural differences and competition for government resources.

Numerous research showed broad and sometimes specific reasoning as to the popularity of anti-immigration movements. Some concluded that there was overwhelming support for a direct correlation between high unemployment with more powerful anti-immigration movements. One such scholar mentioned by Michael O'Connell (2005) was John Dollard, who in 1938 examined the effects on society when German immigrants moved into a small town in

the United States. According to O'Connell, Dollard concluded that anti-immigrant sentiments were not present when jobs were available but as soon as unemployment started to rise, these same German immigrants that had been once accepted into the small town life were now seen as pariahs and a drain on local resources. Yet another study concluded that those who are victims of long-term unemployment show great support for authoritarian, anti-immigration organizations such as France's National Front (O'Connell, 2005: 61). Nevertheless, there were numerous and perhaps more conclusive studies that showed a different and somewhat unexpected outcome. O'Connell is quick to make the point that studies are increasingly moving away from the economic issues as a determinant factor in anti-immigration behavior to factors that spotlight culture and values (O'Connell, 2005:66).

This requires the notion that it is our differences in customs, attitudes, and values that pose the greatest threat, not our skin color or ethnic qualities. Jorge Vala, Cicero Pereira, and Alice Ramos (2006) believe that "the idea that immigrants may represent a threat to the values of the receiving society derives from the general idea according to which the simple perception of differences regarding customs and values raises fear" (Vala et al, 2006:122). This idea presented supports the notion that after the September 11, 2001, March 2004, and July 2005 attacks in the United States and Great Britain, immigrants, primarily of the Islamic religion, represented a threat not only to the security of these nations but also to the core values of good and evil. Threats to core values are difficult to overcome. O'Connell noted several studies that suggested when individuals feel their core values threatened, their reactions are not easily predictable. That is why after such attacks anti-immigration movements gain more political prominence. The point O'Connell made was that economic indicators seem to be determinant factors in the

success of anti-immigration movements or right-wing parties. In summary of O'Connell's work, human behavior plays an important role as the perceived threat posed by immigrants. O'Connell suggested that economic issues should not be discounted; however, these matters must be put in proper context as they tend to compete with others that better frame immigration politics.

Security Threats – Protecting the Homeland

But other issues portend to the success of anti-immigration movements. Radical right-wing parties in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway have “framed immigrants as problems because they are: a threat to the national identity, a major cause of criminality and social unrest; cause of unemployment; and abusers of the welfare state” (Rydrigen, 2008: 739). These topics have been used to instill fear and loathing on immigrants who for all intent and purpose are seeking simply a better life for themselves, families, and communities.

There is the constant message that immigrants pose a threat not only to the security of the nation but to the values of the people, enabling the right-wing to frame non-nationals as less than human. This message is becoming more and more successful across the EU as well as being successful in the United States. This framing that immigrants are less than human was first used against the African Americans, and then adapted to justify actions against the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered communities. Messages that values are being threatened can be tailored against any person or group of people.

Just what are these values that seem to be under threat? Citizenship, loyalty, culture, and self-determination all come to mind when one speaks in terms of internal and external threats to the nation state. Are these threats different now than they were fifty, one hundred, or two

hundred years ago, or in the case of Western Europe, a thousand years ago? History reflects that the simple answer to this question is no. However, what has changed is the number of individuals or groups of individuals who harbor a deep fear of intellectuals or elitists and in turn use issues such as unemployment, immigration, the increasing welfare state, and national security as ladles to stir up the pot of discontent. Some populist parties diverge in their philosophies yet there are some things that unite populist parties to one another.

Racial Tensions

There is a difference between anti-immigrant rhetoric and the actual policy positions of most European radical-right parties insofar as some are extremely racists and xenophobic to the point of advocating expulsion of immigrants while other parties work with existing special interest groups to influence party politics and party positions. In some cases, members of the radical right in order to have increasing political success with the electorate, often “build their case on a defense of liberal values such as freedom of expression, a separation of church and state, and gender equality, a defense often raised against the threat of an ‘Islamitization’ of western cultures” (Akkerman, and Hagelund, 2007: 200).

Besides immigration, there is no other question that divides the electorate more so than gender equality. The European right-wing parties have latched onto these subjects in order to promote their policies of restricting immigration. This symbiotic relationship between right wing parties and other more mainstream topics only serves to legitimize the more radical positions taken by right-wing parties. These actions sometimes mask the damaging effects of tougher immigration laws as the more liberal parties are often fearful of turning down gender equality policies if tougher immigration rules are attached to legislation for fear of alienating

their liberal base. There are numerous questions to be asked of these situations. One in particular would be who do liberal parties fear the most--the right-wing parties or the alienation of the special interest wings of their own party? Only the passage of time will tell.

After decades of making multiculturalism and integration the corner stone of domestic policies, Norway and the Netherlands have admitted that most policies regarding these two issues have failed. While immigrants prove to be a drain on social resources, they in turn gravitate towards more extremist organizations and religious fundamentalist groups and have tendencies to protest against host government policies. As a reaction towards what many Dutch and Norwegians feel as threats to their economic welfare and culture, several right-wing parties have come and gone. In particular, the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FrP - Progress Party) are two that have an ebb and flow to their popularity. However, just because a particular party has fallen out of favor with the electorate does not mean its impact on policy and its influence in the government has waned.

Xenophobia

For example, the LPF rose to power in early 1994 as the popularity of uniculturalism peaked (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007:201). The LPF was the sole beneficiary of the popularity of protecting the national culture from integration. In the elections of 2002, the LPF managed to appropriate this issue. Specifically:

With 17 percent of the votes, the LPF became the second largest party in the newly elected parliament. The success of the LPF led the other parties to review their multiculturalist policies by way of a parliamentary inquiry. When the election manifestos of the Dutch political parties in 2002 are compared, the LPF scores the highest with regard to uniculturalism. It adopted the most extreme positions on the restricting of immigration and the strengthening of integration (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007:201).

In Norway, the FrP had and still has an extreme anti-immigrant agenda. The party's influence has steadily increased since the late 1980s, achieving a high of 22 percent of votes in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Both parties however, have continued to usurp traditional leftist issues and in doing so, legitimized their political standings. Tjitske Akkerman and Anniken Høgelund stated:

Radical-right parties have in most European countries been castigated for their restrictive approach to immigration control and their unculturalist approach to integration but, perhaps most of all, for the rhetorical style in which they have attacked the prevailing immigration regime. Accusations of racism or at least of inciting racism have been plentiful, particularly following incidents in which right-wing politicians have made derogatory remarks about immigrant cultures or religions (Akkerman and Høgelund 2007:213-214).

Moving the focus from Norway and the Netherlands to examine the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties in Denmark, it is again the politicization of immigration issues that has allowed right-wing parties to populate the political landscape. The distinctive Danish People's Party (DPP) adopted an ethno-pluralist xenophobia and anti-political establishment agenda that played well with the electorate. The DPP doctrine of ethno-pluralism states that "in order to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples they have to be kept separate. Mixing different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction" (Rydgren 2004:478-479).

Additionally, the Danish People's party looks at immigrants as threats to Denmark's identity. This party believes the breakdown of the homogenous society will be triggered as the result of high immigrant birth rates in contrary to the much lower birth rate of the Danish people. The DPP continues to believe that the mixing of cultures, specifically those with Middle Eastern or Asian descent, will usher in the demise of the Danish culture and its rich history.

It is also unfortunate that the Danish People's Party equates the immigrants – mainly those from Muslim countries – as maintaining close ties to Muslim fundamentalists. Immigrants are seen as criminals, preying on Danish people and robbing them of resources such as government subsidies, jobs, housing, etc. Threat assessments on immigration are usually addressed in economic or security terms. O'Connell suggested a move away from economic determinants as research methodology, this leads to suggest the same in researching anti-immigration movements.

Political Institutions and Opportunities

Political Scientist Yves Meny, according to John Lloyd (2003), believed that “however different populist parties are from one another, the common glue is anti-elitism—as well as hostility to institutions and regulatory intermediaries” (Lloyd, 2003:90). It is this hostility towards institutions that makes the European Union such a focal point for the formation of right-wing parties and the battle for power and control of issues. Generally speaking, in terms of an examination of the European Union policies, immigration is often the focus.

Does it matter if the party in power is right-wing or are right-wing parties more successful working in the background? John Lloyd (2003) explored this question. Lloyd examined the strengths of right-wing (populist) parties in various European states and the reasons why some parties seemed to hold power longer than others. He theorized that for many European right-wing parties, their rise to power was abrupt, mainly centered upon a deep distrust of institutions and how fast those institutions react to internal and external threats. The European Union is understood as a behemoth institution that threatens the individual nation state, which is the focus of right wing populism, by failing to act quickly in times of internal and external

threats. The European Union is also accused of trampling on individual rights and freedoms because it appears so detached from the populace.

There are questions that Lloyd should have been answering. Is it better for populist parties to be out of power? Do they exercise more power by working behind the scenes rather than in the limelight? If at the center of power, do right-wing leaders act differently than their parliamentary counterparts? Answers to these questions could provide insight as the power structure of right-wing parties and their staying power; nevertheless, Lloyd's suspicion is that institutionalism is at the heart of populist parties.

Unfortunately it is this common thread, one of distrust of institutions that proves to be the downfall of many right-wing parties. The parties themselves become "institution" like and therefore subject themselves to in-fighting. Thus, some right-wing parties collapse from within. For example, New Order party in 1972, the National Front of Britain in 1980 and the British Democratic Party all collapsed due to in-fighting (Lloyd, 2003: 88). However, this does not mean these parties dissolve into nothingness. For example, National Front of Britain was absorbed by the newly formed British National Party. Lloyd suggests that some European countries such as Switzerland and Sweden have relatively weak right-wing parties –meaning those parties hold little power in their respective governments, yet upon closer examination, enjoy considerable support within the electorate. That is, they are able to control enough issues important to their continued survival. They control issue competition. In the case of immigration, right-wing parties in these two European nations were able to get the government to pass tough anti-immigration laws with electoral pressure.

What separates John Lloyd's work apart from most other articles concerning populist parties is the fact that he offers policy suggestions that could be used to stifle the rise of most right-wing parties, especially those parties who primarily focus their attention on issues surrounding the movement of people. While this may be true, Lloyd unfortunately takes a more liberal approach with emotional key words that could be easily dismissed and exploited by the very parties he thinks should play a more diminishing role in European politics. What John Lloyd was trying to avoid was the forced closing of cross border movement. He, in a real sense, wanted to avoid the closing of the European gates.

European Integration

Researching how countries integrate themselves into the EU and not shutting those gates, Johan Hellström (2008) looked at the role of ideology in determining political parties' positions on European integration. He explored the notion that European integration is based upon the ideological perspectives of parties and their position along the ideological left/right continuum. Hellström reexamined and evaluated several sets of hypotheses concerning political parties and their positions on European integration. His evaluation consisted of applying a regression analysis on "an unbalanced panel made up of pooled data for parties in 16 West European democracies for the years 1970-2003" (Hellström, 2008: 190).

To conduct his empirical study, Hellström divided several hypotheses into three sets. For the first set, Hellström looked at the importance of party ideology. This party ideology was in response to voters' issue positions. However, he recognized the limited datasets from previous studies and so he made sure his data covered more time and had a wider cross-section. The second set of hypotheses he focused on strategies of the political party system and how each

party positioned themselves not only on the European integration issue, but how they positioned themselves relative to one another. More specifically, the examination showed how they fell on the left/right continuum and how positioning on that scale influenced party policies. The third set of hypotheses that Hellström scrutinized drew upon the cultural and historical aspects of the national context. These hypotheses reviewed how historical experiences, economic factors, and cultural differences shaped local politics and influenced party positioning on the issues.

For the empirical study, the author analyzed a “cross-sectional panel of data of 16 countries (15 EU members as of 1995, and Norway, a non-EU member country) between 1970 and 2003” (Hellström 2008:196). Since the scope of this analysis involves numerous countries over a long period of time, the evidence offered is in a series of involved and complicated tables.

Hellström reached the conclusion that party ideology is the primary reason for supporting or not supporting European integration when placed in the context of previously stated hypotheses of European integration. Other variables that Hellström identified determining European integration were a party’s national location or national indicators such as the aforementioned historical, cultural, or economic factors, and various party strategic influences. Looking at party ideology a little bit closer, Hellström notes that it is not specifically local party ideology that plays a role in party positioning on the integration issue but how local parties view their positions within the same party family. Hellström stated that “political parties have significantly more in common with their respective cross-national party families than they do with other parties in the same country” (Hellström, 2008:203).

It is important to note, however, that Hellström found, through the expanded data set, that local pressures do not play a significant role in determining the acceptance of European

integration as previous researchers have claimed. Local pressures are among a long list of variables that Hellström and other researchers identified in influencing the integration debate. Moreover, the passage of time has softened the ideological stances toward a more favorable position of integration.

If party ideology played a significant role in determining positions on European integration, one has to assume that marginal parties' positions would also have played an important role upon the conclusions reached. In this case, Hellström admits that it is still too early to factor in these marginal parties. I think this is an interesting article in the sense that it sheds light on how political parties reflect upon the importance and complexity of the integration issue. I would have liked for Hellström to have included the marginal parties for the simple fact that these parties are growing in prominence with younger voters who are more politically active. Perhaps another study is warranted to clarify any confusion between structural integration as examined by Hellström and cultural assimilation as assumed by marginal parties within the European project.

Party Availability

Outside of anti-immigration issues there is another variable that fuels the popularity of right-wing political parties. Unlike that of the United States whose political system discourages the introduction of a multiparty system, the various systems that permeate the European political landscape makes the introduction of new political parties easier. There are two cleavage dimensions to European politics that allow right-wing parties to mobilize the electorate. According to Rydrgren, the economic cleavage dimension is the first, "which puts workers against capital, and which concerns the degree of state involvement in the economy" and

secondly there is, “the socio-cultural cleavage dimension, which is about issues of immigration, law and order, abortion, and so on” (Rydgren 2004:489).

These two cleavages allow various political parties to exploit many issues within, thus motivating the electorate to the polls. Whichever party can best frame the message can successfully mobilize voters, thus gaining seats or forcing a coalition government. However, just as in the United States, economic issues, data, and plans typically fail to mobilize typical European voters to the polls. Wedge issues such as gay marriage, anti-government, abortion, and anti-immigration tend to incite fear and therefore have the best chances. Yet, when topics are connected to one another, such as unemployment and immigration, then message framing becomes even more important (Rydgren 2004:489). Political parties can be masterful in framing concerns to get the maximum impact with voters. They have to address the new breed of voters who have suffered at the hands of the recent turmoil in the world’s economy.

Emotional Voters

Young workers are suffering at the hands of extreme budget cuts, the loss of pensions and governmental assistance, and increased work hours with lower pay. Immigrants are moving into neighborhoods once occupied by the European middle class and taking jobs by accepting the lower wages – often working without pensions. Jens Rydgren believes older voters are usually routine voters – they do not particularly pay attention to issues and vote for a particular party out of habit. Nonetheless, younger voters who are adept at accumulating large amounts of information from a plethora of sources are adept at moving from one subject to another or in some cases, moving from party to party (Rydgren 2004: 492-493). Younger voters are in sense emotional voters.

Anti-immigration movements are quick to exploit so as to offer the electorate a less radicalized choice at the polls; moreover, the political establishment, defined as political elites, fear mainstream acceptance and therefore try to exclude these radicalized parties from political participation. Political institutions (elites) play a role in the success or failure of anti-immigration movements. To what extent, is still up for debate. Nevertheless, Joost Van Spanje and Wouter Van Der Brug (2007) attempts to answer just that when they examined what happened when anti-immigration movements were excluded by the political elite from the political process.

Isolationism

Van Spanje and Van Der Brug (2007) tried to answer two questions. Firstly, do anti-immigration movements become more radicalized if they are excluded from the political process? Secondly, if anti-immigration movements are not isolated from the mainstream, do these parties become more moderate? These two questions go hand-and-hand with John Lloyd's (2003) attempt to explain the staying power of right-wing parties. Van Spanje and Van Der Brug treat the political establishment and anti-immigration movements as if they are children. To illustrate this "child-like" analogy, Van Spanje and Van Der Brug suggest that if parties are disrespected, that is if they are not allowed to express their agenda to the electorate, the parties' behavior becomes more confrontational. Thus political parties, according to Van Spanje and Van Der Brug, have a tendency to act like school children (Van Spanje and Van Der Brug, 2007: 1027). If chastised or banned from participation, rather than switch direction the "children" or parties tend to act out even more. They become more radicalized. One could even surmise that if parties are not allowed to participate and are constantly restrained both economically in terms of

party fundraising or if the establishment act like gatekeepers keeping the parties from informing the electorate of its agenda. This then causes those parties to act like wounded animals. There is nothing more dangerous than a wounded animal. Wounded animals' behaviors are often unpredictable.

Van Spanje and Van Der Brug offered an interesting study on the effects of the ostracizing of anti-immigration movements. However, there are a couple of important omissions to their study that warrant mentioning. The issues are defined, explanations are used, and the rules governing party behaviors all come from political elites. For example, anti-immigration movements or parties are often defined in terms of agenda and beliefs out of the mainstream by the political elites. Anti-immigration parties do not see themselves as outside the mainstream and therefore do not subscribe to the definitions as prescribed by the elites. In order to accomplish this, political elites have great access to the news media and have well-organized political apparatuses that can help mold public opinion. Party surrogates routinely appear on news programs with the expressed goal of defining anti-immigration parties as out of the mainstream, radical, or dangerous. The political apparatus works well within the local level, routinely blocking anti-immigration parties from access to ballots. Political elites are shielded from public scrutiny (candidates, although having differing agendas, are still considered mainstream candidates) and therefore free from radical challengers.

Party System

The research method of Spanje and Brug (2007) only looked at what happened to the behavior of anti-immigration movements when they were excluded or absorbed. In fact they usually become more moderate over time to accommodate the fears of the electorate or they fade

away and work in the background. In some very rare cases, certain anti-immigration movements become even more radicalized thus acting as a wounded animal. Again, wounded animals tend to lash out, becoming violent towards their captors. When anti-immigration movements are forced into the background, there are little to no checks on their behaviors and in some cases, they lash out violently. Nevertheless, this study failed to mention how anti-immigration parties change or do not change the establishments' behavior. Does the establishment party take up issues they are not normally accustomed to (immigration, human rights, taxes, welfare, health care, etc) or does the establishment become more radicalized? One only has to look at the present American Republican Party as an example of what some say is the radicalization of a political party beholden to an anti-immigration movement once it was absorbed into the fold. This is an example of political opportunity at its best or worse depending on how one looks at it.

One other aspect of political opportunity that must be briefly touched upon is the fact that the European political system encourages multiple parties. Thus voters have easy access to parties that best represent their point of view, increasing the likelihood of more extremist parties having to become part of a coalition governing body. One only has to look to Belgium's 1999 elections in which the Flemish Block (VB) won 9.9 percent of the vote and picked up 20 out of 50 city council seats, or in Denmark where the Danish People's Party took 12 percent of the vote in 2001 (Guardian, 2011) as indicators that the allowance of a multi-party system increases the likelihood that anti-immigrant movements will have more power and visibility.

Voting Theories

In addition to the general issues that affect the success or failure of anti-immigration movements and the political opportunity structures, there is also the individual voter to be

concerned with. By first examining this broadly, a foundation is built that allows for an easy explanation as to the outcomes. If one were to make a broad assumption and discard all other reasoning, then looking at political institutions and opportunity structures flaws in reasoning begin to show up. When examining voter behavior, the reasons as to why anti-immigration movements are successful becomes problematic. One question that could be asked is why some voters support anti-immigration movements while others seemingly ignore the organizations? The typical right-wing voter is motivated by a large degree of xenophobia. Jens Rydgren (2008) explained how the right-wing parties have used immigration as a mobilization factor in getting people to the polls. Rydgren states that, “this research has convincingly shown that immigration skepticism (i.e. wanting to reduce immigration) is one of the principal factors in predicting who will vote for a radical right-wing party” (Rydgren 2008:737).

However, Kai Arzheimer (2009) looked at a variety of studies and found that although most had valid reasons as to their outcomes, many often contradicted each other leaving more questions unanswered. Still ignoring that anti-immigration movements are defined by the political elite, Arzheimer does acknowledge that there are problems with the terminology and conceptual models as these anti-immigration movements are usually lumped into a single party family. For example, anti-immigration parties are not typically explained in terms of left-right demographics. Anti-immigration movements are usually grouped in the family of extremists with no gray areas. This usually skews the results and does not give a clear picture as to the success of the anti-immigration movements. Most studies, according to Arzheimer, developed a social profile of the extreme right voter. Arzheimer stated, “there is generally a much greater propensity to vote for the extreme right amongst men, voters who are either young rather than

old, those with a low level of formal education, and amongst the manual workers, the petty bourgeoisie, and those in routine nonmanual employment” (Azheimer, 2009:259).

Voting Behaviors

In order to best explain voting behavior, Azheimer (2009) reviewed studies that focused primarily on group conflict theories as the reason why anti-immigration movements are successful. Here scapegoating played a key role as minorities were often seen as convenient targets of hateful rhetoric and in some cases violence. Natives look at minorities and immigrants as being different from them and therefore as threats to national identity. In this case, voters become emotional ones – voting for candidates and parties that espouse this fear of the “different” people (Arzheimer, 2009: 260). Theories of realistic group conflict were used to help describe ethnic conflicts that were based on rational thinking by perpetrators. Simply put, groups in conflict see a realistic threat to scarce resources. Furthermore, supporters of extreme right-wing groups take advantage of this threat to rationalize their support for these extremist groups (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong, 1998). Arzheimer stated, “If xenophobia is the result of conflict between immigrants and lower class natives over scarce resources (low-paid jobs, welfare benefits), discrimination against immigrants, proliferation of racist stereotypes, and support for the extreme right can be interpreted not as an emotive reaction but rather as part of an instrumental strategy” (Arzheimer, 2009: 260).

Arzheimer (2009) only concentrates on the less educated voters, ones who are already suffering from a lack of resources. He ignored studies that were performed on the so-called middle class and educated electorate. One can only assume that since these groupings use less welfare state support, competition with minorities and immigrants are negligible and therefore

would not be significant enough to warrant mentioning. For example, unemployed or underemployed minorities and immigrants are a drain on governmental resources unlike those who are fully employed who do not necessarily utilize governmental resources. Competition between groups would not occur if the feelings that minorities or immigrants are a threat were lessened. However, unemployed or underemployed native citizens fear minorities or immigrants exhausting governmental resources and thus able to elevate themselves to a higher status over those native citizens struggling to make ends meet. This reinforces the emotional voter theory as described previously.

Political Systems – Lost Cause

One other aspect that can be briefly mentioned here is the dealignment and realignment processes that have taken place over the last several years. This is primarily due to voters losing trust in the establishment; specifically, trust in those political parties who have engrained themselves within the various European political systems. Mary Kadlor, Sabine Selchow, Sean Deel, and Tamsin Murray-Leach (2012), using various national studies from Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Spain as well as a two trans-Europe studies as their data sets, concluded in their 2012 study, that trust in established political parties has dropped considerably since the 1950s. Memberships in political parties have dropped from an estimated 5.4 million to less than 540,000. Only 11% of UK citizens have trust in their political parties – that means 86% do not trust their political parties. Trust in Germany's political parties do not fare any better; with only 15% having trust in their traditional political parties (Kadlor, Selchow, Deel, and Murray-Leech, 2012: 12). As voters' trust of political parties has dropped, the saliency of alternative parties and

issues has increased the political opportunities of emerging anti-immigrant movements who only reinforce the voters' xenophobic beliefs.

Researchers focused on political opportunity structures and whether party or issue competition is a determinant factor as to whether or not anti-immigrant movements or right-wing parties are successful in elections. Moreover, some scholars examined the significance of rational choice theory and voter protest theories as well as other socio-political determinants. Furthermore, other academics examined the significance of group theories, theories of realistic group conflict, and dealignment and realignment processes and political opportunities of a multi-party political system as explanations as to the success or failure of anti-immigration movements.

There is a plethora of research conducted trying to explain the success of anti-immigration movements. Despite this, I have noted a lack of a comprehensive study of all independent variables. Most literature focused on one or two variables ignoring the possible interaction between others. What I found most interesting is that not one study tried to see what happens to a successful anti-immigration movement when it moves from the local level (EU Member state) to the international arena – the European Commission. Are anti-immigrant candidates still successful, do they moderate over time, or do they become inconsequential? I am confident that the following provides answers to the many questions posed here.

Chapter Two

United Kingdom, German, and France: Case Studies

The literature review presented in the previous section examined the issues surrounding anti-immigration movements; specifically, it details the factors that lead to a strong anti-immigration movement or in some cases, anti-immigration movements that are weak and disorganized. These factors included the number of immigrants, whether government policies are based on multiculturalism or take a more assimilative approach to immigration; the make-up of the immigrants; specifically the country of origin; the external and internal threats to the host nation; issue competition; or decentralization. The literature review also suggested that political institutions are unable to keep pace with the changing nature of immigrants.

This section will focus on the immigration policies themselves in an attempt to explore relationships between anti-immigration parties to that of policies from three European countries. Great Britain, France, and Germany were chosen because each country has turbulent histories regarding immigrants as well as differing approaches to accepting immigrants as citizens. These three countries also exercise influence at the supranational level by having direct access to and exceptional controlling interests in European Union policy-making. Each country began with the notion that multiculturalism offered the best solution to maintain a national identity as well as offering a safe and inviting haven to new citizens. However, each country has since taken a different path towards developing a society based upon needs, security, and the welfare of its indigenous population. In addition to the multicultural or assimilation approach, the factors in the previous section will also be included to provide added value as to determine the outcomes of strong or weak anti-immigration movements.

In the quest to explain why right-wing parties are strong, one must ultimately look at other factors besides issue competition, institutional responses, voter fear, or party competition. In fact, one must look at the immigrants themselves. Where did they come from? How many are present? The countries examined, UK, Germany, and France, all have immigrants coming from different areas and reasons. The politicians will overstate a high number of immigrants but more often than not, exact numbers cannot be truly ascertained as many immigrants are present illegally and fearful of government reprisals – like deportation, jail time, or violence. Many countries such as the UK, Germany, or France do not conduct accurate censuses or place individuals into the correct ethnic categories as these questions are sometimes illegal to ask.

United Kingdom - The Immigrants

Determining the exact number of immigrants to the UK is difficult as there are gaps in available data and the collection of that data. It was previously thought that most immigrants came from other European countries and for a while that was the case. Polish migrant workers made up a high percentage of those entering the country in the 1990s, primarily due to the aging British population and the need for skilled agricultural workers. However, data from the International Passenger Survey released in February 2012 shows a 17% increase in immigration in 2010 from non-EU countries. A high percentage of those immigrants were for reasons of reuniting families while the rest of the make-up came for reasons of student visas or asylum seekers due to violence in countries such as Bosnia, Zimbabwe, Iraq, and other North Africa countries seeing an increase in the growth of Al-Qaeda (Blinder 2012:4). Scott Blinder (2012) in a briefing to the Migratory Observatory reached the conclusion that all data points to immigration in the UK to have a dramatic rise in the next 40 years (Blinder, 2012).

The European University Institute (2010) provides an estimated breakdown of immigrants and their countries of origin from the periods 1993 – 2010. The highest number of citizenship acquisitions has come from Turkey with 120,305 seeking application. The second number has come from Pakistan with almost 113,000 seeking citizenship with Asian acquisitions rounding out the top three ethnicities seeking citizenship applications (European university Institute, 2010). With data supplied by the Office of National Statistics (2008), there has been a significant increase in immigration to the United Kingdom between the years 1991 thru 2008 with the greatest gains between the years 2003 and 2008 (Office of National Statistics, 2008). Immigration will continue to increase.

As further evidence to the assertion that immigration to the UK will see an upturn, the University of Leeds (2010) released a study in the spring of 2010 which shows that by 2051, ethnic groups will make up 20% of the UK population. This study only serves to add fuel to the fire that is BNP's hatred of all things immigrant. The highest gains will be immigrants from Indian, Pakistan, and Bangladeshi origins (Wohland, Rees, Norman, and et al, 2010). As the influx of immigrants is noted, room must be made for these incoming ethnic groups so existing ethnic groups will fan out into the UK countryside thus diversifying the national population. Mark Tran (2010) wrote that Professor Phillip Rees of Leeds University believed that, "at a regional level, ethnic minorities will shift out of deprived inner-city areas to more affluent areas, which echoes the way white groups have migrated in the past. In particular black and Asian populations in the least deprived local authorities will increase significantly" (Tran, 2010). The speed at which this increase is projected to take is great news for some who see the influx of immigrants as gaining skilled workers, new cultural benefits, and a new understanding of the

importance of the UK while others such as the BNP see the influx as too fast for comfort and a drain on public services.

For decades, the United Kingdom had immigration policies that were strict. Since the mid 1990s, the UK has dramatically altered its policies towards immigration. What was once a strict process severely limiting the number of inflows, unless one was a rich family or highly connected to government officials has now become a set of policies designed to embrace almost an unlimited number of inflows. But these policies have their limits with the populace and elected officials as well, especially in times of economic crisis and terrorist scares (Hansen 2007).

Dr. Randall Hansen (2003, 2007) wrote on the history of immigration in the UK and said that after World War II, the United Kingdom opened its so-called gates, allowing large inflows from former colonies. Due to reconstruction efforts, labor shortages allowed for those seeking employment to easily navigate through the post-war red tape and take advantage of relaxed citizenship laws. Hansen believed that from the mid-1940s through the 1960s, United Kingdom immigration policies were primarily driven by the need to rebuild its infrastructure due to years of war and previous years of neglect. The United Kingdom's economy was dependent on the low-skilled labor provide by the influx of these migrant workers. Inflows decreased in the decades leading to the mid 1990s when the United Kingdom's policies turned from those driven by economic needs to those based upon the need to keep families together as other world issues such as famine, other economic issues, the rise of global terrorism, civil wars, and ethnic cleansing perpetuated by authoritarian regimes and non-state actors forced mass migrations from the Middle East, South-East Asia, and other European countries (Hansen 2003: 26).

The familial reunification policies of the mid 1990s only added to the growing frustration in the electorate and among officials within the United Kingdom, especially those in local councils who saw no clear evidence of a strong definition of family, no clear familial policies, and a drain on local resources. Basic questions as to what constitutes family, mixed policies regarding citizenship, and those identified as being non-European nationals with the status of indefinite leave are allowed to remain, adding to the confusion of local leaders and providing fuel to mounting political pressure from right-wing groups waiting on the sidelines to create political theater. Dr. Scot Blinder (2012) provided a report on non-European migration to the United Kingdom. Primarily he examined data on families and dependents from the mid-1990s through 2010. What he concluded, and what may seem shocking especially in this age of forced data sharing between governments primarily due to the global war on terror, is that there is no definitive data source that provides clear migration numbers of non-European family migrants. Although he could identify areas of origin, familial relationships – mothers, daughters, sons, and fathers - the definition of family differed from government agencies and from country to country. Blinder's report is significant as it reflects the frustration felt by many local councilors throughout the United Kingdom who see inflows of those claiming familial and dependency ties to citizens as perpetrators towards the erosion of British culture and identity.

National polls from the mid-1990s through 2010 signify a growing frustration with immigration policies. Immigration typically places in the top tier of concerns of British citizens, especially the white British populace. IPSOS MORI (2006), a private think-tank and research company, regularly concludes that as inflows of immigrants increase, there is a subsequent increase in anti-immigration rhetoric, hostility, and the politicization of immigration from a

multitude of sources including citizenry, media outlets, and anti-immigration parties such as the British National Party (BNP) who rose to prominence in the early eighties. The usual anti-immigrant rhetoric as earlier reported focuses on such things as employment matters, housing concerns, a drain on social services, and the breakdown of communities as a result of increased crimes, poverty, and forced government-sponsored housing. Quaint “British” looking villages and neighborhoods became a thing of the past as they rapidly became migrant neighborhoods; at times this forced long-time residents to move out to be replaced by low-skilled and low-paid migrant workers living in large-scale government subsidized housing. In addition to immigration as a reason, critics also use identity and value politics as justifications for exclusion.

Never to let a political opportunity to pass it by, the BNP laid claim to owning the anti-immigration debate by using events to score political victories and shore up the notion that it is the party that best represents British values and the protection of the British identity. BNP thinks those that come to the United Kingdom should fully integrate and lose all cultural distinctiveness (BNP, 2012). Family reunification, at the forefront of immigration policies, only heightened the volatility of the relationship between citizens and the “others”. For example, such high profile events such as white and Asian gangs fighting in northern England, the suicide bombing attacks by radicalized British Muslims on July 7, 2005 – often referred to as the 7/7 attacks, and Asian and Black gangs coming to blows as the global economic meltdown began are all frequently cited by skeptics including the BNP in questioning government officials’ capacity to understand integration, multiculturalism or immigration (Kenan 2010). As previously noted, the United Kingdom presently suffers from unprecedented inflows of immigrants, with some entering under familial reunification policies, under work and student permits, or as asylum seekers. It is clear

the United Kingdom has no clear policy to deal with such inflow and the ramifications are just now being felt as once again the usual rhetoric is beginning to heat up as both political and economic factors come into play.

This is the problem that allows parties such as the BNP to voice, rather loudly and publically its concerns with the UK's government response to what it perceives as threats coming from immigrants, but at the European Union as well. Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin (2010) say that BNP perceives the UK government as nonresponsive or responding with too little and too late. BNP views the EU as homogenizing all of Europe to the point that no one member state would retain its national identity. BNP's sentiment is that non-white immigration will destroy the national culture and that all whites should be kept separate from other non-whites. Previously Goodwin (2008) noted that as a national party, BNP has failed to gain much in electoral support; however its considerable power is derived at the local level with significant electoral support coming from villages and hamlets across the UK.

Political Opportunity: Fringe Parties Need Not Apply

Britain's multi-party system provides an opportunity for fringe groups to have voices in governance. Here the multi-party system provides an opportunity for right-wing parties a part in the political discourse; however, the chance of a right-wing party assuming control of the British parliament is almost non-existent. To some extent, right-wing parties in the United Kingdom have proven to be more like fleas on a dog's skin – an irritant to both the dog and the political elites. Matthew Goodwin (2008) believes there are four hypotheses that explain the failure of right wing parties from taking a lasting foothold on the political stage. First there is an environment that is just too hostile towards extremist behavior, primarily due to a rich history of

rejecting fascist beliefs and a commitment to democratic principles. Extreme right wing parties are not well funded and therefore cannot adequately compete against the entrenched institutionalism of the British political system. Multiple parties cannot exist in the same space – that is one strong party dictates the available space for other parties and usually it is the extremist parties that are left out. Finally, party characteristics typically found most objectionable by the electorate are showcased by the political elites in order to prove that the views held by extremist, right wing parties do not adhere to basic common decency and acceptable community standards and thus should be treated as fringe groups. These are examples as to what happens when anti-immigration movements or fringe parties are pushed aside by the political elite. These parties are now able to work in the background without many of the checks and balances afforded to those political elites.

All Politics are Local

Matthew Goodwin (2008) notes as a result of “distinct local histories and cultures, some working class districts in Britain are especially susceptible to perceptions of ethnic competition and ‘threat’ and, as a result exclusionary appeals such as those espoused by extreme right parties” (Goodwin, 2008: 348). Consequently, the BNP is able to galvanize electoral support more so at the local level than at the national level. The BNP exploits local traditions, histories, and fears against the “others” in order to increase seats in local governments. “They are coming to take your jobs” mentality works well in working class districts when unemployment numbers are high or steadily climbing. Local entities are unable to withstand long-term economic downturns as are their national counterparts and therefore are more susceptible to leadership changeovers (loss of seats) or in some cases, outright hostility towards those that are seen as

threats. However, the BNP chooses not to primarily focus on economic issues to gain support, but pushes the notion that the British culture is in fact in danger of being absorbed into a plethora of cultures and thus becoming non-existent. The very soul of what being British is all about is in danger.

It is this threat that is at the very core of BNP support and in fact its support is highest in those communities that are more ethnically diverse rather than in more industrialized communities where job security fears would be the norm. BNP perpetuates the fear that the United Kingdom is being taken over by outsiders and that the traditional British way of life is about to end if people who support stopping immigration are not put in place. The more BNP pushed its fear mongering, the more long-term residents began to blame immigrants for all the ills in their community. Increased crimes were blamed on immigrants; greater unemployment was again blamed on immigrants taking jobs at a lower pay scale as well as lower education opportunities, and an excessive demand in health and housing services. Just about any societal problem was blamed on immigrants even though immigrant communities paid their taxes and worked to better the neighborhoods by building parks and opening businesses. In a 2005 study, Goodwin (2008) noted that immigration was not on the minds of local residents until a campaign by the BNP noted that more money was being spent on immigrants than on long-term residents. This disclosure in turn enraged the locals, hate crimes against immigrants' escalated, and BNP's approval numbers increased by 35% (Goodwin, 2008: 351).

What is interesting to note is the steady rise in support for BNP. As other right-wing parties come and go, for some reason a significant pool of latent support of BNP remains high across Great Britain. At the local level, BNP has increased its seats scoring just over one million

votes in the 2009 election (Archer 2012). This level of support has maintained the party's legitimacy and at times caused trouble for the establishment and political elites. A precursor to the BNP was the National Front (NF) which was an all-white nationalist party in the mid-1970s which exploited working class fears over immigration. In an exposé on the NF for *The Independent*, reporter Jonathan Brown (2012) noted that in the late seventies, the NF garnered much support from the working class so much so that at its height, the NF had close to 300 candidates and "polled nearly 200,00 votes" (Brown, 2012). This did not last long though because infighting doomed the NF which lost 90% of its membership. Infighting seems to be taking its toll on the BNP as well. Some members have higher aspirations, meaning they want to try for higher offices and seats within parliament, thus forcing the political elites to deal with BNP's perception that Britain suffers from an immigration problem. Still a growing number of younger members want to maintain the party's grip on local municipalities thus controlling local issues, ordinances, and the message to local media outlets. It is a reminder that all politics are local and political opportunity allows for the creation and rise of sometimes popular but at other times unpopular movements. But because all politics are local and the slow speed at which the UK government works, right-wing parties view government as an abstract failure.

Germany

Germany – The Immigrants

Germany has a long history of exclusionary policies towards those that it considers different. These policies were designed to protect the national heritage of the German people as Germany had long been considered an archetype of an ethnocultural nation. On the one hand, the German people were aware of the differences others brought to their nation – certain skill

sets that enhanced the German economy were mostly approved of; however, when confronted with the real possibility of exterminating immigrants or those deemed not “pure” during World War II, most of the German people looked the other way.

Germany is an interesting nation as a precise population number and makeup cannot be garnered as no “official” census has been taken in decades. However, the German people have the perception that there are high numbers of immigrants flooding the streets and using up all the available resources or like locusts moving from one field to another-consuming everything in their path. Germany never considered itself a nation of immigration. Its xenophobic past is rich with violent acts perpetrated by those who considered themselves “pure” against those considered the “others”. The use of the term “others” is important as it is a running theme, a central one at that, throughout the immigration debate. It is designed to instill fear, mistrust, and to justify any “anti” behavior used against immigrants by either the state, private, or anti-immigrant parties.

In Germany’s case its immigration policies are about rectifying its unseemly past transgressions. Most policies are driven by the desire to distance itself from past human rights abuses and from the mismanagement of public trust. This clearly creates more uncertainty with programs yet to be fleshed out and failed immigration rules that clearly work against both natural citizens and those wanting or needing to become citizens. For example, Germany’s desire to remain a non-immigration country inhibits any real progression in terms of any comprehensive immigration policies yet it does in some way have an influence at the supranational level in terms of dictating European policies regarding immigration. When Germany speaks, the EU listens. According to Johannes von Stritzky (2009) Germany’s immigration policies have led to

uncertainty at the EU level as many Union states look to Germany as a guiding figure. Germany blocked the “Blue Card” program that would allow highly skilled workers to freely move between European nations because the German government was afraid that it would no longer be able to restrict the number of migrant workers. Additionally, Germany has allowed entrance to the country for some ethnic groups from Eastern Europe and India while at the same time restricting entrance from some Middle Eastern countries (Stritzky, 2009: 4). Many states have assumed or are in the process of following Germany’s lead in terms of protecting their resources, their citizenry, and their national heritages. The open and easy cross border policies for EU citizens are being re-examined as the numbers of immigrants seeking asylum or access for work is increasing. Germany’s unwillingness to enact comprehensive immigration policies has led other EU member states to not adopt comprehensive immigration policies.

Germany is an interesting case in determining the exact number of immigrants. German data collections of immigration statistics only follow the nationality of the immigrant not the origin of birth; therefore a statistic describing the number of immigrants does not give a true picture. With that being said, the International Organization for Migration (2010) determined that immigrants make-up 13.1% of total population. Of those immigrants, 46.7% are women, primarily due to the family reunification program. Prior to the 1980s, a majority of immigrants came from Southern and Southeastern Europe. In the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, due to the reunification of Germany, immigrants of German ethnic descent came from Poland, Romania, and the former Soviet Union (IOM, 2010). In recent decades the majority have come from Turkey.

The reasons for traveling to Germany are many. Germany's economic growth for one is a beacon to many coming from other European Union member states suffering from stagnant or declining economies. Furthermore, the immigration reforms enacted in 2005 are also reasons for immigrants coming to Germany. For example, as in some cases, the restrictions in seeking permanent living permits have been lessened or removed for specific ethnic groups. However, the biggest reason for influx of immigrants into Germany has been the ease at which cross border movements can take place. Asylum seekers now have a more streamlined process in which to apply. Germany has created a national integration program which details language requirements, raised the minimum age for family reunifications, and the continued ease of citizens of the EU member states to move from country to country without restrictions (Leise, 2007). This unencumbered cross border movement is the main reason why the National Democratic Party (NPD) has promoted its outright hostility towards the EU and its policies. NPD is forthright in its belief that the EU and the German government are working hand-in-hand to dismantle the rights of German citizens only to replace them with laws designed to allow foreign-borne individuals equal or in some cases priority access to government programs and resources (NPD, 2012). There is no evidence that this is occurring but rhetoric in times of uncertainty can go a long way.

Immigration Policies in Transition: An Explanation (1960 – 2005)

Germany's immigration policy (Clarence, 2009) was designed to address an important trend that began affecting the German labor market. Specifically, it lowered the age requirement of Germans entering the labor force but the steady increase in the age of the German workforce resulted in a higher number of workers leaving the market than entering it. After suffering

devastating losses during World War II and the after effects throughout the 1950s, Germany sought guest workers during the 1960s and 1970s. These workers came from both inside and outside the European community. The largest working group entering Germany were the Turks and also remain the largest ethnic group in Germany today (Clarence, 2009: 57-91).

The basic premise of immigration policy was to recruit single men primarily used to fill in labor gaps in lower skilled required jobs – specifically construction, assembly workers, and much like our own (U.S.) migrant workers, agricultural work. Most “guest” workers stayed until the end of their contracted work permit at which time these workers would return to their home countries. Speaking in economic terms, the money earned in Germany was not staying in the country but returned and used in the workers’ home country thus having a greater economic benefit to their home countries rather than in Germany. Partly due to an economic necessity and an employment necessity, there were incentives to Germany to explore permanent worker contracts in the hopes of balancing the inflow and outflows in the labor market and to shore up any and all economic benefits.

One incentive to the changing of Germany’s immigration policy was that these contracts were designed to stop the cheap labor offered by immigrants willing to do just about any job for less money and with no security in opposition to German workers who enjoyed relatively high and stable wages, benefits, and access to governmental institutions. Another incentive was eliminating the time for retraining new workers. With the expiration of worker contracts, employers would have to constantly retrain replacements which took time and lowered a company’s profitability. Employers did not have to spend the necessary capital to retrain new employees and the company retained continuity within the labor market. Offering permanent

contracts seemed to be the answer. However, there were no mechanisms in place to legally recognize permanent, foreign worker settlements. In most cases, worker exploitation was a given.

This all changed in 1965 as *Ausländergesetz* or Aliens Act of 1965, replaced the 1938 Nazi policy *Ausländerpolizeiverordnung* or Aliens Police Regulation, (Clarence 2009: 61) of worker exploitation and forced removal readily used in the 1940s, to be something a little less threatening but still one that puts all ownership to the State. There had been small changes to immigration policies throughout the years following World War II, but for the most part, the Nazi policy *Ausländerpolizeiverordnung* remained intact until this 1965 policy was enacted. The State determined if foreign workers served the interest of the State and if not, then again, any legal mechanisms to protect foreign workers from deportation were not in place if asked to leave. Yes, workers were afforded legal rights in terms of crimes committed against them, but in terms of deportation rights, it was up to the State to decide if workers were to either stay or be deported. This relationship, often times an antagonistic one, between the state and foreign workers was at the core of any immigration policy review. The State reserved the right to deny entry into the State or revoke residence permits at will. The foreign worker has no legal recourse but to accept the State's actions. One could look at this relationship as an abusive one. The State is the abusive husband, often controlling, secretive and exploitive, while the worker is always the dutiful wife, albeit a terrified one as she never knows when the husband will become angry and have them removed (Clarence, 2009: 62)

Germany had decided that it did not want to be a country of immigration and therefore continued controlling citizenship numbers through the nationalization process (Clarence,

2009:62). During the 1980s, German immigration policies worked to limit the number of migrant workers, especially placing restrictions on the number of family members applying for entry by way of male immigrants. Under German immigration policies, women migrant workers were handled differently. The policy determined that women workers would not be allowed additional family members. In essence, women were non-existent. Many women migrated to Germany in the hopes of escaping the various patriarchal societies only to find themselves caught up in a male dominated society with male “determined” policies. Policies only recognized settled (male) spouses and indeed worked against family reunification (Clarence, 2009:62).

The reason policies worked against family reunification was due primarily to the lack of resources, specifically affordable housing and access to government assistance programs such as health, education, and other monetary benefits. During the 1990s, immigration reforms were designed to elevate the socio-economic status of settled immigrants. To accomplish this, the German State awarded permanent work and living permits, giving immigrants more opportunities to improve and move up the socio-economic ladder. However, these new opportunities came at a price. Germany curtailed temporary worker and living permits for those outside Germany (Clarence 2009: 65). Seen as a drain on resources and a threat to jobs already held by German citizens, immigrants were refused entrance to the country, and parties long thought quieted began to rear their ugly heads and entered the political conversations.

The Politics of Division and Agenda of Mistrust

The end of the decade and the beginning of the 2000s saw the number of immigrants not changing much but old habits began to creep into the national conversation. The politics of division became front and center as various so-called political organizations began to take root.

Their aim, stop immigration fully and throw out those that were considered “different” or deemed not of “pure” German descent. Ethnic enclaves became more prominent as did the rise in xenophobic tendencies from some in the political elite. The National Democratic Party (NPD) of Germany called for the closing of the borders and the removal of all immigrants.

The NPD is a right-wing German nationalist party formed in 1964 after decades of failing to win seats in local elections. Various other right-wing groups grew frustrated with the pace of immigration laws and the reunification of Germany formed the NPD in an attempt to cash in on the years of economic discontent. Three short years later, the NPD did in fact win seats in the 1967 federal republic’s state election but not with enough to upset the status quo (NPD, 2012). In the early eighties, due to the anti-foreigner rhetoric coming from NPD, many Eastern European countries began to question West Germany’s commitment to reunification and a progressive economic agenda. After Germany’s reunification in 1989, the NPD quickly moved towards being labeled anti-Semites as many of its founders and members were old Nazi party members. In fact, many in the West and indeed some in Germany often referred to the NPD as the Neo-Nazi Party of Germany.

Since the end of World War II, Germany has been running from its past. The NPD’s purpose is clear to many: rewrite history, move Germany away from feeling guilty about its past, and move to action in the present to dictate the future. Roland Nelles and Gabor Steingart (2005) discussed the very nature of the NPD and Germany’s running from its past. Their written words, in a 2005 edition of *Der Spiegel*, speak volumes as to the power and influence of right-wing parties:

The shame felt by a majority of Germans stands in stark contrast to the stubborn prejudices of the few who all but celebrate their intolerance. The rhetoric of the neo-

Nazis runs the gamut from sharp comparisons, through memories clearly intended to downplay Nazi atrocities, to audacious lies. Their objective is to make everything seem relative, to minimize, to sweep so much history under the rug until only a few traces of German guilt remain -- if at all (Nelles and Steingart. 2005).

The NPD has been blatant in its distrust of foreigners and played up the distrust of institutions. As mentioned earlier it is a deep hostility towards institutions such as the European Union that fuels right-wing parties such as the NPD. The NPD looks at the EU not so much as a governing body but as a political arm of various left leaning governments designed to encapsulate Europe under a one rule or one party system. The NPD views this system as a means to disperse foreigners throughout the lands in an attempt to further decimate the “natural” blood of citizens. Sylvia Poggioli (2012) exposed the influence of the NPD on German society as she reported that the German government has followed a rise in Neo Nazi activity throughout Germany. Since the NPD routinely glorifies the Third Reich, the NPD is the focal point of the rise in right-wing extremist activities. Poggioli reports that the NPD has won several seats in two regional parliaments and numerous municipalities. In addition to local politics, the NPD has extensive involvement in organizing concerts, sporting events, and the running of several youth camps (Poggioli, 2012). The NPD and other lesser organizations of right-wing parties continue the theme seen throughout Europe and North America as labeling dangerous those they consider the “other”. One cannot escape this rhetoric when examining any right-wing party from any country. Those that are perceived to be different and those that are indeed different simply because of where they were born are looked upon as damaging to the national identity.

The NPD is comfortable with its current status because it is determined to harass the political establishment by constantly bringing up issues the NPD feels are important to that national dialogue. Germany is so concerned with the actions and influence of the NPD that the

German government is considering an outright ban on the organization. As of 2011, the NPD has 6600 members, not a lot considering Germany's population, but there are 6600 extremists' voices working against the establishment (Moore, 2011). By forcing this national dialogue on issues it feels important, the NPD has maintained a sort of relevance. The NPD has played these games of issue competition. In some cases, this modis operandi has worked, much to the dismay of the political elite and law enforcement organizations. Yes, its rhetoric is extreme and at times downright threatening, so much so that under the German constitution, such hate speech and activities can be banned from political participation. German courts however have been loathed to ban the NPD and organizations like it for fear that some of these organizations will go underground and not allow government agencies to scrutinize their practices. However, rhetoric is not enough to sustain organizations for long periods of time.

Internal fighting is the leading cause of right-wing parties falling out of favor with their electorate. The NPD suffered from this as some in the party began to question its tactics and goals. Was the goal of the NPD to work within the system to further its cause or work against the system in order to further its cause? Some members began questioning the very nature of the NPD, believing that the organization was becoming diluted and unfocused on elevating the opportunities for German purebloods. The NPD was becoming more and more like the institutions it was trying to bring down. Therefore, just as splinter groups came together in the 1960s to form the NPD, so too did groups splinter away. However, some of these groups were more violent than the original.

Failing to see a political future – or a way of furthering its causes within the established political system, these new groups turned to fear and violence. In some cases murder and other

violent acts were perpetrated to further the cause of removing all foreign influence from the German homeland. In the last few years a disturbing discovery of at least three right-wing parties – actually labeled right-wing terrorist groups by the German government – have been investigated for a series of murders, assaults, bank robberies, and other indiscretions, against Germans with Turkish descents (Hawley and Lindsay 2012). Turkish people make up the largest ethnic group in Germany at present time.

The intense hatred for foreigners is what drives these new right-wing parties. As the NPD wrapped itself in other issues so as to blunt its weapon of choice – the use of anti-immigration rhetoric, these new right-wing parties gravitate to terrorist acts to force the government into acting much more quickly than it can or wants to. The German government's approach to immigration has been at best lethargic. Much the same as right-wing parties becoming more institution “like” and therefore negligent or incapable of achieving their stated goals, so too are governments. Governments are incapable of progressive, large-bodied changes in policies as there are too many players involved to make a real, meaningful difference.

France – The Immigrants

It has been established that right-wing parties are fueled by a number of factors. However, such as it was in the UK and in Germany, many right-wing parties in France are fueled by an intense hatred towards the “others”. Again, being repetitive it is important to note that this theme is significant in determining a connection between one or more factors. France has many points in its history that matched the trajectory of Germany. For example, France used immigration as necessary force to rebuild its economy after World War II and when immigrants

became a drain on the socio-economic wellbeing of the French, something needed to be done (Vladescue 2006). So just who are the “others” of France?

Just as in Germany, data concerning immigrants are only estimates as it is illegal to ask questions about ethnicity in the French census. In 2007, the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) showed there was a high percentage (47.4%) of immigrants of African descent residing in France (INSEE, 2007). The estimate also included countries of origin such as Algeria, Morocco, Sub-Sahara Africa, as well as other European countries. Just as in the UK and Germany, the census included a high percentage of immigrant women in the above estimate. What makes France an interesting case is that the national fertility rate has been in steady decline as more and more young French workers are opting not to start families or remain single longer than other average European citizens. As the nation’s fertility rate has decreased for natural-born French citizens, birthrates of children with at least one foreign-born parent have nearly doubled.

There are an estimated three million Muslims residing in France. Most of these Muslims live in low income housing, are unskilled laborers who are unable to find employment, and find it difficult to integrate themselves into a secular society. Muslims in France are segregated and blocked from attaining the promises of the French culture and economic well-being. More often than not, French Muslims find themselves ridiculed in the press, by police, and by the French government who because of several riots, look at the Muslims as having extremist ties (Hegan, 2001). In fact, the Muslim communities throughout all of France are increasingly targets of hate crimes and the subject of violent and threatening rhetoric from right-wing groups like the FN. The FN believes Muslims are a national threat to the very fabric that is French culture. Its ever

more hateful rhetoric has allowed the FN gain two seats in parliament. To most outside observers, holding two seats does not seem like much influence, but the FN has been able to encourage the center-right government of Sarkozy to move further to the right regarding new immigration laws. FN believes the French government hasn't acted in the best interest of the country in terms of immigration reform as well as its deep relationship to the EU and vows to increase the pressure to stop France from moving forward.

The last census conducted in 2009 disclosed there were nearly 8 million migrants in France. A census has been conducted annually since 2004. Unfortunately France does not collect data on ethnicity, so there are gaps in the information provided from the Census data (Dahal, Me, and Bisogno 2007: 5). It is therefore impossible to determine the size and makeup of the ethnic migrant population. What can be determined from the available data is that there is a majority of immigrants claiming non-European origin, mainly Turkish and Northern Africa locals (INSEE 2009). France, as of this date, has the largest Muslim population of any European Union member state. Such as it occurred in Germany, in France, there was an economic necessity after World War II to rebuild France's economic base as well as its infrastructure. What better way to accomplish this than to bring in labor willing to work for less money and without the security of state benefits enjoyed by the French labors?

Nearly 70 percent of the volume of immigration to France comes in the form of family reunification (Marthaler, 2008: 383). A problem has been identified. Before immigrants added to the economic stability and growth of France, now because of the shift from labor to family reunification, they began to drain local resources. Sally Marthaler (2008) believes that what was once an economic necessity, immigration now has social, political, and cultural implications. The

prevailing thought was to develop a model of integration whereas ethnic communities were to assimilate themselves into every aspect of French culture. One was to be French first and Muslim or Turkish, etc., second. The preservation of what it meant to be French was paramount in formulating French immigration policies. Ethnicity was to be practiced in the private sphere only. With ethnicity being practically outlawed in the public sphere, certain enclaves found it difficult to hide their culture, specifically Muslims whose core beliefs made assimilating into French culture all the more challenging. Thus, they were branded the outsiders or as the term is often used, “others”.

National Front and all Its Splinters

At the forefront of labeling groups as others and fighting for all things “French” is the National Front (FN). The FN embraced a multitude of issues that made it relevant to voters. The FN took populism to new heights. Formed in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, this multi-millionaire ran the party with a military precision, until his resignation in 2011. Prior to 1984, the FN had little success in the electorate arena; however since 1984, the FN has had more success with the electorate – even challenging the President in runoff elections for control of the government. In fact, the FN enjoys the significance of being the most powerful and long running far right-wing party in French history. The FN boasts numerous mayoral wins in several towns in southern France. In 1999 nearly half of the members of the FN splintered off to form a new far-right party more extreme than the FN. Le Pen believed that this new party, the National Republican Movement (MRN), was too extremist in its thinking and vowed to steer clear of the group (Shields, 2007: 279).

The MRN believed that Europe was being rapidly turned into Islamic states and that the European Union was allowing this to happen. The MRN did not have much electoral success as its harsh rhetoric was rejected by the French voter. It soon split into a new party called the Populist Party (PP) in 2005 at which time the PP quickly aligned itself and partnered with the FN in future elections (Shields 2007: 281). Both parties have had little electoral success primarily due to French election laws. However, it is believed that the infighting and missed opportunities were the inspiration for numerous French center right parties to merge.

The main success of FN however, has been in its constant criticism of France's immigration policy. Whereas cultural assimilation is the key to a successful French state, FN believes that certain ethnicities are incompatible with French society and therefore pose a threat to the French people. This threat comes in the form of the draining of French resources, increases in crime, and in some cases, FN accusing Muslim groups of subverting the French Government. FN takes a hard-nosed approach to immigrants, calling for the systematic removal of those deemed illegal entrants and ensuring the continued removal of all public displays of religious signs. FN even goes one step further and demands that natural born French citizens be given preferences in hiring, state sponsored benefits, and access to the courts.

In terms of institutions, the FN regards the European Union as irrelevant or at the very least subversive to the French people. The FN wants France to fully pull out of any and all agreements with the EU, regarding the institution as a behemoth without accountability to anyone but those who want to liberalize all of Europe. EuroNews (2011) reports that Marine Le Pen, the FN's current leader and daughter of Marie Le Pen, stated, "The Europists are building a monster in Brussels but this is not Europe it is more like a conglomerate under an American

protectorate, the anti-chamber of a total state, global, worldwide” (Euronews 2011). The FN regularly campaigns against the EU using the stated fear that Muslims and Jews were coming to take jobs and housing away from the French. The FN warned the French people that their very way of life will be forever Europeanized and the loss of what it means to be French will be relegated to history books. FN’s political clout has waned at times but what is impressive about the FN is its continued political relevance. The FN is very capable of forcing a political conversation about topics FN deems necessary and relevant to the French people.

During the times at which FN seems to be splintering and it has a few times, it still managed to hold onto its core constituency – young, idealistic, unemployed or underemployed white men or older white men who hold onto the old view that the French republic is a shining example that should be the envy of the world. Over the years, however, some members believed the FN was taking a much weaker stance on issues of immigration and the European Union and in some regards those members were correct. The FN leadership, primarily Le Pen, believed that the FN needed to adapt to the changing political climate and seek to become more mainstream in its politics and messaging (Shields 2007: 200). Not all of the FN members agreed that the best course of action was to mainstream their organization and ditch the xenophobic and discriminatory rhetoric used to win elections. Some members saw this change as a sign of weakness and accused the FN of becoming the very thing it fought against – an institution.

Marcus Ethridge and Howard Handelman (2009) specifically cite that the “Gaullist-conservative Rally for the Republic (RPR), the conservative-liberal party Liberal Democracy (DL), a sizeable portion of the Union for French Democracy (UDF), the liberal Radical Party, and the centrist Popular Party for French Democracy, all joined to form a stronger, single party

called the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)” (Ethridge and Handelman, 2009, 144). It too has had success in that Nicholas Sarkozy held the office of President of the French Republic for 5 years. Nicholas Sarkozy considered himself and his party center-right.

The UMP billed itself as center right and Sarkozy prided himself upon being able to bridge relationships with differing fractions; however, both the UMP and Sarkozy were forced to move further to the right by the FN and other fringe groups (BBC News, 2012). The FN and others focused on Muslim extremists. Sarkozy in some aspects moved so far right that he came close to alienating himself from the rest of the European Union and in particular some aspects of the West. In particular the United States government who looked at some of Sarkozy’s positions as undermining positions and plans held by the United States in terms of establishing a Palestine state (Ravid, 2011).

In 2002, the outcome of the presidential elections was seen by many as a wake-up call. The French electorate believed the center-left and center-right had become weak on immigration. In fact immigration was a primary concern of almost half of the FN supporters. Chirac’s administration would make immigration reform and protecting the French way of life a central theme in his next administration. In his run for the presidency, Sarkozy ran on the belief that multiculturalism would secure France on the right side of history and sought to relax France’s strict voting rules but he was rebuked by his mentor Chirac, FN, some in his own UMP, and the voters. Sarkozy quickly reversed course. Sarkozy abandoned the notion of multiculturalism and took a more hard-lined approach towards immigrants and their families. This is but one example of right-wing parties moving the establishment in a more rightward direction, a move that the

electorate and government officials, especially in the new Socialist government, see as the legitimization of bigotry and discrimination by mainstream parties (Myles, 2012).

The Politics of Immigration – French Style

When Nicholas Sarkozy was elected as the 23rd President of the French Republic in 2005, by all accounts the center-right leader promised a new way of doing business to the French people. He promised a more multiculturalist approach in terms of immigration policies, even going so far as to create a new office called the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development (Marthaler, 2008:382). However, the pledges that one candidate runs on are all too often not the reality once that candidate assumes his or her position in office. Sarkozy used the newly created ministry as a means to dispense nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric. So much so, that various migrant organizations began to complain that they were being branded and targeted by the government as possible threats to the national identity of the French culture. Was this Sarkozy's plan to move to the right or was his administration forced to adopt a more nationalist stance on immigration due to the far-right group FN? Sally Marthaler (2008) surmises that far right-politics played a significant part in moving Sarkozy further to the right. Sarkozy's polling numbers lowered, the threat of losing seats, as well as the rise of Marine Le Pen forced Sarkozy's tougher stances.

Governments and political parties are not immune to external influences in determining immigration policies. In fact, immigration was not even a discussion in multiple parliamentary elections. By ignoring the issues surrounding immigration, government and party leaders believed it weakened the FN by shutting the door on its hateful and extreme, xenophobic rhetoric. By ignoring the problem, maybe that problem would just go away. Unfortunately that

was not the case as clashes between Muslim youths and police in 2005 proved troublesome for France as it brought the world's attention and more importantly the voters' attention to the French government's weak or incoherent immigration policies.

The 2002 presidential election forced the center-right government to take a much harsher approach toward immigration than planned. This lasted throughout the Sarkozy years as his administration took immigration reform center stage by first limiting the number of immigrants, cracking down on illegal immigrants, and developing new integration policies with the focus being on helping those already in France integrate into French society more easily. Because of the 2002 election results in which the FN received considerable electoral support, its influence on the center-right government was felt throughout Sarkozy's administration (Marthalar, 2008).

Again the question comes up as posed in an earlier section; is it more beneficial for right-wing parties to be in power or working in the background to influence political outcomes? Here the answer was clear. Had the FN candidate Le Pen won the presidential election, the center-right government would have blocked Le Pen's agenda. Le Pen would not have had the votes in order to move his agenda forward and therefore Le Pen and the FN posed little threat. Le Pen and his followers would have been swallowed up by the natural political order. Moreover, had Le Pen and the FN succeeded in gaining enough seats in Parliament, the extremist agenda would have been assured. However, because Le Pen lost in the second round, his influence on political outcomes was assured because he and his party were not restricted by the normal political rules and therefore could operate outside of the normal political landscape.

Again in response to violent riots and with an eye on the presidential office, Sarkozy was able to pass immigration reform this time with the focus on selective immigration and a

restriction on family reunification which if one needed to be reminded, made up the largest percentage of immigration in France. Sarkozy believed the reason for the recent unrest and the rise of the FN was primarily due to the fact the immigration was no longer connected to economic outcomes (Murphy 2006). By looking for highly skilled workers in certain labor fields it would prove an economic boom for France and therefore not only boost his own chance of success running for president but also quell the rhetoric coming from FN and other right-wing parties. He also moved the immigration debate from a focus on economics to sovereignty thus stealing an issue from the FN in weakening the FN's image with voters. Appearing before fellow government officials in July 2006, Sarkozy stated, "selective immigration ... is the expression of France's sovereignty. It is the right of our country, like all the great democracies of the world, to choose which foreigners it allows to reside on our territory" (Murphy, 2006). In terms of family reunification, only those immigrants with the financial means to support each family member would be allowed. Sarkozy believed this too would unburden the French welfare system as well as take another issue away from the FN. By appealing to both the center-right voters and right-wing voters (primarily FN supporters), Sarkozy all but assured himself the presidency.

Once in office, Sarkozy appointed immigration experts with ties to various ethnic communities who seemed to quiet the dissent from the ethnic community leaders and with the stricter approach to immigration, Sarkozy also placated the far-right and center-right opponents to lackadaisical immigration policies. Sarkozy had the best of both worlds. However his policies sent a mixed message. On one hand the borders were opened only to the skilled few and those who had the financial means of supporting themselves (Murphy 2006). On the other hand, if one was poor, unskilled or low skilled, then one is seen as a potential drain on French society and a

possible security risk. It appeared that the French government was ill-equipped at formulating immigration policies to match those of the ethnic and economic make-up seeking entrance and citizenship. In fact, in his reelection bid for President in 2012, Sarkozy went to areas of France where support for the FN was greatest. There, he told FN supporters that he wanted to cut immigration by half. Furthermore in a televised debate in March of 2012, Sarkozy proclaimed there were too many foreigners and again vowed to cut immigration numbers by one hundred thousand. This time he mentioned that integration programs were failing the French people and that major changes needed to be done (BBC News Europe, 2012). Sarkozy was facing a tough reelection as he was behind the Socialist candidate Francois Hollande in opinion polls as well as having to compete for conservative votes against the National Front Party led by Marine Le Pen. Although Sarkozy attempted to win over supporters of the FN by moving his agenda more to the right, he lost his bid to remain as the French President to Hollande and his UMP lost considerable seats in the French Parliament. Hollande would end up winning 51.6 percent of the votes to Sarkozy's 48.4 percent (Erlanger, 2012).

Summary

Policy Milestones –UK, Germany, and France

In the preceding chapter, immigration policies of Great Britain, Germany, and France were examined. Great Britain, Germany, and France were chosen because they have great influence with the European Union, all three countries have turbulent histories regarding immigrants, and all three countries have different approaches in dealing with immigration. As previously stated, Great Britain's immigration policies were strict. More specifically, Great Britain had a two-fold approach to immigration. The first limits the number of immigrants

allowed. The second component was integration which had the main component of race relations designed to ease immigrants into the British way of life and prevent discrimination based upon country of origin, race, and gender (Somerville, 2009). As economic necessities became apparent, immigration policies were changed in 1997 order to highlight the need for high-skilled labor and attracting international students (Somerville, 2009: 7). According to Will Somerville (2009) of the Migration Institute, Great Britain's immigration policy has shifted once again with a focus away from a multicultural approach to a policy that highlights national identity (protecting what it means to be British) and social cohesion.

Germany's immigration policies were ones in transition. At first, Germany needed high-skilled workers and others to rebuild the country's infrastructure and economy after the devastation of World War II. The cheap labor offered by immigrants posed problems for the German labor force. Businesses did not want to continuously retrain new workers once worker permits for those immigrant employees expired so therefore, it became apparent that immigration policies had to change. Although Germany recognized the importance of having immigrant workers, it also knew that the German way of life was in jeopardy and therefore immigrant workers were at the mercy of the German government. If the German government values the contribution of a particular set of immigrant workers, all was well. If not, those immigrant workers did not have an acknowledged legal remedy in which to fight deportation. Germany did not want to be known as an immigration nation. In 2007, Germany revised its immigration policies with the creation of the National Integration Plan (NIP). Eric Leise (2007), reported that the NIP is based upon the European Common Basic Principles (CBPs) that integration is a

two way process between State and immigrant, that integration implies respect for European values, and that employment leads to civic participation within the European Community.

As for France and immigration, France too had an economic need to rebuild after World War II. Therefore, France, like Germany, sought a cheap but highly-skilled labor force to rebuild its infrastructure and economy. France's immigration policies have now shifted to policies of familial reunification but policies with more political and social ramifications than economic ones. This was primarily due to the fact that former French President Nicholas Sarkozy's immigration policies were "random and discriminatory." (Myles, 2012). As of 2012, with new French leadership in a transition phase, the new Socialist government will focus on integration with an emphasis on what it means to be French as well as a redesigned worker permit program which will move most guest permits from a single year to a multi-year rule. Immigration numbers will also be based upon the demographics of France with the keen observation that France's population is living longer and reproducing less (Mykles 2012). As stated before, immigration policies were once driven by an economic necessity but now, most immigration policies have more political and social ramifications.

Anti-Immigration Parties – the BNP, the NPD, and the FN

Most of the political and social ramifications come in the form of anti-immigration parties or as they are more commonly known as, right-wing political parties. While it is true that not all right-wing parties are anti-immigration parties, BNP, NDP, and the FN have a strong record of anti-immigration rhetoric and actions. In Great Britain, the British National Party (BNP), the oldest right-wing party, has concentrated primarily on protecting what it means to be "British". The BNP has had some electoral success – mainly on the local level with several

candidates winning seats in local councils, as local constables, and other positions. The BNP in some races have been a serious challenge to the usual comfortable Labor candidate. Under the leadership of Nic Griffin, the BNP has seen its membership steadily increase as well as its profile in the media. Nic Griffin has been successful in the modernization of the BNP (Graham, 2009). In 2008, Nic Griffin, leader of the BNP, was elected as a Member of the European Parliament in a move that legitimized the party's anti-immigrant stance and moved it into the European community's purview.

Again the one of the main goals of the BNP is to protect all things "British." What is meant by the term "British? There is no clear definition for the term "British". The reason for this is because Great Britain has such a rich and diverse culture and the uniqueness that is "British" is being overshadowed by those cultures. Prime Minister Tony Blair (2000) suggested that blood no longer defined the British people. In fact he stated, "Modern Britain was shaped by a rich mix of all different ethnic and religious origins" (BBC News: UK Politics, 2000). If one were to pursue a variety of websites, there would be available a multitude of opinions as to what being British means to the citizenry.

The National Democratic Party (NPD) is a right-wing party formed in 1964. The NPD is commonly referred to as the Neo-Nazi Party of Germany – a label it gladly accepts if it allows the NPD's name to remain in the media spotlight. In 2008, the NPD had electoral success, pulling in 5.1 percent of the vote. In some areas, the NPD candidate polled stronger than the Social Democrats. In one town, it was noted that the NPD received 25.1 percent of the vote. (Der Spiegel, 2008). NPD's greatest success is the fact that the party regularly exploits the lack-luster immigration policy approach of the German government. As with most right-wing parties,

the NPD has been able to parlay the threat of losing what it means to be “German” into modest success both in the electoral and the political sense as the German government routinely tries to ban the party from participating in the political process. Germany has strict anti-hate behavior laws and by labeling the NPD as a hate group, the German government hopes to rid itself of an annoyance. Unfortunately for the German government, the courts have routinely held-up the right of the NPD to exist and participate. These court decisions are widely seen as the legitimization of the NPD’s anti-immigration policies.

France’s National Front Party or the FN, which was formed in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, has had electoral success. The FN boasts numerous mayoral wins in several towns in Southern France and even was the first far right-wing party to have a candidate in a run-off for President in the 2002 presidential elections. The primary reason for the FN success is the fact that more and more of the French electorate are becoming increasingly nationalist. The FN has secured the position that all that is ‘French’ is under attack by immigrants and that being “French” should be the top priority of any government policy. The FN also views the EU as a threat to being “French” and therefore has routinely worked against the French government in its aspirations towards further expansion of the EU. The FN even boasts that it forced the Sarkozy government into adopting a more right-wing approach to immigration by educating the French electorate on the dangers that immigrants pose. In the last election held in 2012, the FN received almost 7 million votes (Brown, 2012). These votes are widely seen as the legitimization of the FN’s anti-immigration policies.

As Great Britain, Germany, and France try to find immigration plans that both represent their country’s values as well as support the values expressed throughout the European

community, there are still organizations that try to threaten the progress made. Right-wing parties such as the British National Party, the National Democratic Party, and the National Front will continue to act as roadblocks towards successful immigrant integration. As these parties continue to gain electoral success, their anti-immigration rhetoric will eventually move out of the local political sphere into the general European community.

Chapter Three

European Union

As I posed previously, right-wing parties are stronger because of the changing nature of immigration – primarily due to the speed at which individuals are moving across borders, the cultural make-up of those individuals, and governments' inability to keep pace and adapt policies on immigration. Right-wing parties exist for a multitude of reasons; however, most voters recognize right-wing parties as being “anti” something. As more and more resources become depleted, national security becomes threatened, and the government's inability to address these concerns, voters search for an alternative in order to voice their opinions, and to hold someone accountable. Right-wing parties are prime to capitalize on these voter concerns.

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli believed war was essential against an “other” figure. Here the “other” is used as pawns by the political elites. He wrote extensively believing that war was central to elitists maintaining power and control over their citizens. J. Ann Tickner (1992) said that for Machiavelli, “politics is a continual quest for power and independence; it is dependent on the presence of an enemy at all times, for without spurs to greatness energized by fighting an enemy, the polity would collapse” (Tickner,1992: 87). Put succinctly, elites are threatened by those individuals who seek a better way of life. Therefore, in an effort to maintain their elitist status, those that encroach on the elites' way of life are seen as threats. This behavior then can manifest into acts of hate, violence, or political behavior used to insulate those elites. The more pronounced anti-immigration parties become, meaning the more electoral successes or the more political influence they have, anti-immigration parties then rapidly become elitists themselves. Anti-immigration parties cannot exist without this perceived war on an “enemy.”

What is immigration? Simply put it is the movement from one region to another. A more complex answer deals with the reasons why people move across border. Relocations involves many issues such as sovereignty, political, security, manufactured and natural disasters, nationalism, gender, and the economy. Immigration, both illegal and legal, has repercussions for the state. Immigration is primarily the responsibility of each state. It is sensible for all states to maintain comprehensive policies regulating the entry and exits or movements across borders. The International Organization for Migration [IOM] (2011) believes that only through cooperation between states can comprehensive immigration reform and policies be successful. According to IOM's mission, if one state adheres to rigorous immigration policies that are seen as punitive, while another state offers open borders or less stringent immigration policies, then cross border movements will be skewed toward the second state's direction thus having consequences for both states (IOM 2011).

Comprehensive policies that work to establish cooperation are easier said than done. One must take into consideration who benefits from these policies and who does not. Sometimes policies can overtly and covertly further exploit inequalities that originally led to the movement of certain segments of the population. If history is to be trusted, then not all actors in the political arena act fairly. In fact some political actors will stop at nothing in order to achieve their goals regardless of the concept of fair play. Not all governments can work in an efficient manner to meet the demands placed upon their regimes by the mass movements of people. The ethnic, cultural, economic, and political make-up of those immigrants all lend to the belief that they are not natural to the state and therefore threats to the very fabric of that society.

European Community – What History Says

When one looks to Europe, one sees a continent rich in diverse thought, people, and ways of life. Europe has made significant contributions throughout history. Demands for liberty, freedom, and equality came from great strife such as the French Revolution and World Wars I and II. Europe has played an important part in the formation and guidance of modern economic and democratic theories. However, with all that can be accomplished, so too can darkness come. Fascism, Nazism, and genocide all can be attributed to some point in European history. Europe has struggled with a controversial past in order to forge a brighter future. Nevertheless, even now Europe continues to struggle.

Europe is in the midst of a global economic downturn. Just as in the United States, unemployment has dramatically increased and European governments are struggling to maintain economic growth or in some cases, protect their economies from shrinking. During this time, Europe has seen an increase in racism, hate crimes, and Islamophobia; specifically, fears of immigrants and foreigners have crept unchecked into the European consciousness. As the European Union (EU) continues to grow, one would think its growth would outpace racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia. However the ugly truth is that the EU's policies are hampering the effort of protecting its member states and their new citizens as the rising threat from radical right parties continues to grow and if left unchecked, could in a sense threaten the very existence of their fragile Union.

The events of September 11, 2001, were the catalyst in changing the perception of threats and the best course of actions to take in dealing with those changes. After September 11, all of Europe stood with American President George W. Bush when he proclaimed "either you are

with us or against us” (G. W. Bush, 2001). Either from fear of American reprisals or a belief that radical Muslims were indeed a global threat, the EU governing body stood quietly by as the United States began its war on terrorism; however, the EU’s approach was to try and understand Islam and the radicalization process of young Muslim men.

One cannot have it both ways and the open gestures of understanding and sympathizing became just empty words. The EU had an opportunity to use its history in dealing with terrorism (Irish Republican Army – London; Armed Islamic Group – France; or, the Baader-Meinhof Group better known as the Red Army Faction – Germany) to help the world understand, act, and recover without furthering the divide (Concepts of Terrorism, 2008). EU member states had a unique approach, unlike that of the militarized response of the United States, to view terrorists and radicalized groups as criminals and therefore relegating prosecution to the courts.

That approach legitimized radical groups by giving them a means in which to disseminate their groups’ message within the structured environment of a legal system. This gave their ideas a forum rather than the militarized approach taken by the United States, whose actions only served to radicalize young, disenfranchised, Muslim men who saw the West prospering while the Middle East continued to suffer from failed European colonial policies. It has been said before and bears repeating now, the sins of the past will always catch up to the present and influence the future. Long simmering hostilities towards the West throughout the Middle East have finally moved throughout the European base. Muslim men are finding it more and more difficult to fit into European society and with Europe’s connection to the United States and its constant war on terror. Therefore, they feel disconnected to the community around them. The EU must decide

what it stands for and if it is willing to include “others” in the pursuit of liberty, equality, and democratic rule.

The European Union

Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states, “The Union shall respect cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity” (Gündüz, 2010: 36); which sounds good on paper, yet in reality may not be so easy to accomplish. Member states are pursuing laws and going down avenues that seek to weaken minority status of some while strengthening the rights of others. In fact if one were to delve deeper into the EU, one would be forced to conclude that in essence, the EU and its lofty goals looked good at the start. But to date, the EU has been unable to adapt to the ever changing political and economic climate facing many of its member states. Article 22 does not seem to trickle down to some member states like Germany which views Islam as a threat or Holland which wants to close all Islamic schools (Euro-Islam, 2012). Italy still refuses to acknowledge that Islam – the second fastest growing religion in the world – is actually a religion at all (Johnson, 2011). Because of this, Muslims are not afforded the same status as other socio-economic groups and therefore cannot partake of resources made available to others. This state sponsored segregation does little to quell the mounting tensions. Radical right parties routinely seize upon this as an excuse to up the rhetoric and consequences are minimal as their governments are basically doing the same thing. Membership in the Union has its price...the question is, are the member states willing to pay that price?

The EU was originally developed as a means to unite Europe both economically and politically in order to prevent future conflicts between member states. Member states would

enjoy certain economic freedoms in exchange for acknowledging and giving up certain powers under centralized governance made up of elected members from each member state. This central governing body would make quick decisions and broad policies that would enable all of Europe to flourish through peaceful negotiations and actions. If the EU would have stopped with this central theme of uniting Europe through economic means, the EU probably would be able to withstand much of the inner turmoil it now suffers from; to wit, this gave rise to the influence of the radical right parties. Unfortunately, the second part of the EU's goal comes into play, that of uniting Europe politically. On the surface, politically throughout Europe much is the same, but delving deeper into the political landscape, deep chasms begin to be seen and it is these differences that make a strongly cohesive Union near impossible. European countries govern differently – face diverse problems, and have varied goals that collide both internally and externally with their neighbors. For this very reason, perhaps if the EU had confined its aspirations to economic integration, rather than including political integration, the EU would have been better prepared to deal with right-wing organizations. Economic issues are at times easier to solve or build some sort of consensus between like-minded groups. Economic issues usually have concrete or tangible results, i.e. lowering unemployment, cutting interest rates, economic stimulus and bail-outs all have results that can be verifiable. Political issues involve human behaviors which are more difficult to measure with a degree of certainty. As stated earlier, although Member States are bound together with a common goal, each Member State in turn have different constituencies and therefore it is much more difficult to reach any kind of consensus.

European Union – Structure

There has been a lot of discussion mentioning the EU but not much explanation as to what it is, how the EU is structured and more importantly, how it works for the European community it claims to represent. Simply put, the EU was created by a group of six states that believed problems could be addressed and solved if these states all worked together for a common purpose. Today, the EU has evolved into an organization that displays both intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, although its founders hoped the EU would adopt a more federal form (Jordon, 2001: 194). Intergovernmentalism refers to a decision making process that allows for the cooperation of states without losing their sovereignty. Within the EU, the Council of Ministers is an example of an intergovernmental body. Supranationalism allows the EU to transcend borders; however its power is formally delegated. Within the EU, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Union Court of Justice are all examples of supranational decision-making entities (Puchala, 1999: 318).

The EU revolves around a series of treaties and agreements between member states of the Union. The one treaty that began the EU was the Treaty of Maastricht which went into effect on November 1993 and created a three pillar system: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (EU, 2012). The EU describes the first pillar as consisting of the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and Euroatom. With this pillar, the European Community shares their sovereignty via Community institutions. The second pillar refers to foreign and security policies. Here Member States work jointly in creating foreign and security policy decisions. The European Commission and European Parliament play a role here. The third pillar consists of Member

States acting jointly in the protection of and promotion of citizen's security, freedom, and justice. The third pillar is another example of the intergovernmental decision-making process (EU, 2012). These three pillars have a goal in which to promote the economic, social, and justice welfare of EU citizens.

Most decision-making comes from the Council of Ministers which has the power to reject or adopt the European Commission's proposals. However, the Council of Ministers must confer with the European Parliament. Andrew Jordon (2001) has completed extensive research on how the EU operates. On what EU tier binds the Member States together, Jordon states that it is European Court of Justice "that binds Member States by interpreting founding treaties and creating new EU laws" (Jordon, 2001:195). Over the years, the EU has transformed itself into a different kind of organization that continues to merit scholarly studies. To what it will become in the future all depends on the continued cooperation between Member States and the willingness to adapt.

European Union – Radical Right on the Move

European right-wing parties are often authoritarian and populist, taking on such issues as abortion, women, homosexual, and voting rights, which some aspects of European society see as important. Some right-wing parties accept the EU's economic policies as a lesser of two evils, but most see EU's politics as the deal breaker and threats to national sovereignty. A centralized base of governance usurps the sovereignty of all European nations. For years, the EU has paid little attention to the growing threat of the radical right to its governing body – that is those elected to the EU parliament who holds agendas similar to those plans held by the radical right. To date, the EU has been unable to keep pace with the changing political landscape that has

increased the likelihood of right-wing politicians being elected to the EU; however, the EU in recent years has taken notice.

Between the years 1999 and 2002, the radical right parties and candidates have gained both in popularity and electoral votes received. The National Front Party in France had a candidate (Le Pen) receive 17% of the vote on the first ballot in the 2002 presidential elections. This was unprecedented as it was the first time that a leftist candidate was shut out of the presidential elections and a far-right candidate was poised to win the presidential vote (Shields, 2007: 282). Other right-wing parties also saw gains in both popularity and votes, so much so that the EU began to seek the reasons why this was happening. Just as the EU tried to understand Islam and the radicalization process, so too did it try to ascertain why voters were turning to the radical right.

From the EU perspective, right-wing electoral gains and membership can be blamed on disadvantaged, young, white males. This would mirror what many believe to be the reason why young Muslim men radicalize – they see themselves as disadvantaged. Katrine Anspaha (2008) believed that most radical Muslims are between the ages of 18 and 27 years of age just as are the members of a majority of radical right wing parties in Europe. Their radicalization process begins on the streets as groups of disenfranchised youths congregate to feed off of each other's' frustrations and angers and within Islamic movements banned in the Middle East (Anspaha, 2008:11). In essence, if one were to look at the two groups in the same light, the radical right parties are in fact mirroring the same group that the radical right is trying to paint as dangerous. This also mirrors the fact that right-wing parties see the EU as an elitist political group and they

themselves have become political elites. The more influence they gain, the more elitist they become. The irony cannot be missed except by themselves.

The focus on why young, white men feel disenfranchised and why they typically identify themselves with right-wing parties is one way to go, but the focus should not be entirely on young, white men. Here the EU makes a mistake in assuming it is all about the disenfranchised youth. For one reason, young people have always felt disenfranchised throughout the ages in one form or another – this is nothing new. In the past, youths rebelled against authority, protested against the Vietnam and Korean Wars, protested the election of Margaret Thatcher, railed against economic reforms of the late sixties, protested against increased tuition at colleges, and joined in the revolution to stop corporations from exploiting workers, communities, and third-world countries. Another reason that the EU's sole focus on young people is wrong has to do with leadership. Successful or even partially successful right-wing parties must have a charismatic leader in which to lead and organize those disenfranchised youths. Where right-wing parties are concerned, there is no generation gap. Older leaders can just as easily tap into young angst as can a much younger leader.

Sarah Graham (2009) authored a profile on Nicholas Griffin who at the age of 53, is the current chairman of BNP. His life story is a ballad of right-wing activism as he quickly joined the right wing movement directly out of college. Tapping into his inner angst, he began working with so-called hate rock groups in the late eighties and soon found himself heading back into politics in the nineties. He ran for several parliamentary seats as a right-wing candidate only to come in as a third or fourth tier candidate. He became chairman of BNP in 1999 and in 2009 won a seat in the European Parliament for North West England (Graham, 2009). What makes this

noteworthy is the fact that Nicholas Griffin's main push from BNP is England's complete separation from the EU. It is the direct belief of the BNP that the EU is trying to create a European super state in which sovereign governments cede their constitutional powers to that of the EU, thereby, according to BNP, insuring that natural British citizens become second or third class citizens.

BNP has had its ups and downs in terms of electorate success but it also has had its ups and downs in its financial holdings as well. Matthew Chapman (2010) reported that BNP is in debt and has been in debt for the last three to four years. Although Nicholas Griffin tries to paint a bright picture in terms of the solvency of BNP, the truth is that the BNP is in danger of financial collapse. Risky election ploys that backfired and low membership threaten the financial stability of BNP. A copyright infringement case due to those risky election schemes is currently sitting in an English court and might cost BNP millions if found guilty. Because Griffin sits in the European Parliament, the EU does provide BNP with monthly funds and in a sense bankrolls a party that spews hateful and dangerous rhetoric (Chapman, 2010). BNP has survived with less in the past and has been able to rebuild itself. BNP will most likely succeed in rebuilding itself in the future as more and more focus continues to be put on the dangers of immigrants and the EU's ever present shadow.

Juxtapose this with the FNP and its recently retired leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. According to Christian Fraser (2012), the National Front Party of late has had some major electoral success with the ever charismatic Le Pen. He has been able to tap into populist movement across the political spectrum and enabled the National Front Party to get its nationalist and Euroskeptical messages out to the ever listening French public. His party forced the center-right government of

Sarkozy to move further right and making right-wing ideology relevant to the voters. Le Pen has taken the message of: “if the center-right government adopts its (FP) policies, then our policies are the right ones for France” directly to the people thus ensuring FPs continued electoral growth in future elections (Fraser, 2012). In terms of funding, FN has been successful both in fundraising, membership, and having its founder, Le Pen, being rich and reinvesting within the party (BBC News World, 2002). Again what makes this noteworthy is the fact that a rich, white man can tap into the angst of struggling young, white males and forming a strong bond.

However, will things be different for the FN now that Marie Le Pen has stepped down from his leadership position? Marine Le Pen, Marie Le Pen’s daughter, has managed increase the political profile of the FN by receiving 6.4 million votes or 17.9%” in the first round of France’s presidential election early in 2012. Her support bested her father’s votes of 4.8 million or 16.8% (Schofield, 2012). Marine Le Pen’s votes mainly came from those living in poverty and she was able to tap into those voter’s fears of not being able to get ahead in life. Unlike her father, Marine Le Pen’s campaign focused on stopping further European Union expansion as well as concentrating on the shrinking France economy. However, according to Hugh Schofield (2012) writing on the elections for BBC Europe, when Marine Le Pen’s polling numbers began to slide, she returned to the agenda that made her father famous: immigration and law and order issues (Schofield, 2012).

Marine Le Pen has been successful in expanding her constituency. The FN has had great success in what was primarily the “rust belt” of France – those areas with high number of industrial complexes. FN had found most of its support in cities in France that had a high number of immigrants such as Paris, Bordeaux, Toulon, Montpellier, and Saint-Étienne to name a few

(CIA-Europe, 2012). However, in the 2012 presidential election, the FN's support expanded to the rural areas of France. Schofield noted this expansion included small provincial townships and new commuter villages (Schofield, 2012). Marine Le Pen has been able to tap into those individuals and families that moved out of the high immigration neighborhoods of cities to the much rural areas of France. Marine, like her father, was able to tap into the frustrations and mistrusts of those French citizens who viewed immigrants as a threat to their French way of life.

Unlike that of her father, Marine has been able to increase women's votes for the FN. Beforehand, the FN was seen as a male dominated organization – building on the angsts of the young, white males. Nevertheless, Marine's ascension to the leadership position of the FN has allowed her to present a somewhat softer image. The image might be somewhat softer, that of the modern French women, but the rhetoric has not softened in the least. Marine Le Pen believes that the term "far-right" only serves to marginalize the FN as a fringe element of French politics. Moreover, Marine Le Pen once said, "I refuse to accept as inevitable the fact that we are being... consigned to the edge of political life" (BBC News Europe, 2012).

Her agenda since assuming control of the FN has been one of protectionism, decrying the euro, and increasing the FN's profile concerning anti-immigration. Even though Marine detests the FN being labeled an extremist party, the rhetoric she uses against the large Muslim minority has done little to change the minds of some. According to the BBC News Europe profile on Marine Le Pen, she likened the "Islamisation" of France by Muslims to a tsunami about to drown her country. During her presidential campaign, Marine Le Pen proclaimed, "French citizenship should be either inherited or merited" (BBC News Europe, 2012).

Just as the FN has increased its support in the more rural areas of France, right-wing parties have found support at the local level. Right-wing parties are somewhat of a local problem. That is, they may influence election outcomes at the local level but have little influence with the EU. This may be changing as right-wing elected officials to the European Parliament are forming coalitions in order to move the EU to the right. In the 2009 European Parliament elections, the center-right European's People Party (EPP) received 267 seats or 36 percent of the assembly's 736 seats. Italy's right-wing populist party, the Northern League, among other conservative and other right-wing parties, increased its seats to 35 (Spiegel International, 2009). At this point, the EU is capable of absorbing right-wing influence but if the 2009 elections are any indication, far-right and right-wing organizations are rapidly making their way into the EU.

These simple facts are known. Right-wing parties are having an increased effect on elections. Right-wing party candidates are winning elections as evidence by the 2009 European elections. Right-wing parties are forcing the EU to take a hard look at itself. Can the EU push off the growing influence? Can the EU adapt to the rapidly growing movement of people and succeed in recognizing the diversity of those immigrants and still remain strictly European?

Political Institutions and Opportunities

The EU is a bureaucracy and as such, the very structure of this bureaucracy is an impediment to its long term success. The EU is not a country nor is it like the United Nations. Simply put, the EU is a collection of sovereign, democratic nations unified to prevent future conflicts within their borders. It is not a supra-nation per se, but it is an economic body whose policies are designed to protect member states' interests as well as its own economic prosperity. It is under the guise of "economic interests" that motivates the EU to develop policies that deal

with a variety of issues such as managing immigration. In order to accomplish this, the EU has set up three governing bodies: The European Parliament with members directly elected by member states' citizens; the Council of the European Union which represents member states; and the European Commission which represents the EU in its entirety ("How the European Union Works: Your Guide to the EU Institutions", 2007: 2).

With all good intentions set aside, the EU Parliament along with the Council make the laws; however, most of the so-called "laws" are only directives with little bite and regulations that can be challenged, as are routinely by a large percentage of member states. Although seemingly successful for the past fifty years, the EU is facing incredible odds to remain successful for the next fifty years. Legislation, if not challenged, is usually bogged down through a variety of commissions and committees and therefore most are unable to be passed and problems such as with immigration needing to be addressed go unchanged.

EU Immigration– A Single Policy

In terms of immigration, each Member state is allowed to create its own immigration policy. Member States can decide entry and exit policies, employment opportunities, and asylum protocols (Directorate of EU Communications, 2009:7). The EU has taken notice that some member states are struggling to control and manage immigrants. In a memorandum, the Directorate of EU Communications (2009) stated that "the existence of the EU's single market makes it necessary for the EU Member states to act together in a number of cases. This includes making sure that foreign residents in one country can enjoy the same social security rights as EU citizens, if they move to another" (Directorate of EU Communications, 2009:17). The EU has also recognized that of those struggling states, there is not the political will to deal with

immigration issues so the EU has looked to manage immigration. Centralizing immigration management to the EU level seemed like a political opportunity; however, it quickly became a controversial issue as sovereignty concerns came into play. Immigration is typically handled within the first pillar or the European Community. On one hand there were member states that wanted to block or control the flow of unwanted immigrants, here defined as “Third-Country Nationals” or TCNs, and on the other, this institutional behemoth was telling them to relax their borders for all European citizens and that EU economic interests trump national issues and security concerns (Luedtke, 2009:1). To further define TCNs, these are individuals who come from a third country not an EU member state.

Explaining this in further detail, Adam Luedtke (2009) details the 1987 Single European Act that in essence allowed EU citizens the right to work, live, and vote in other European states. The right to vote is only, according to Luedtke, at the local and European levels. Ever since this “Single Europe” plan, Europe, in a sense, has been granted the freedom to create a two tier immigration system. Firstly, EU citizens have unfettered rights, but secondly, Europe restricted the privileges of TCNs. This included prohibiting the free movement of TCNs throughout the “zone of freedom, security and justice’ and its travel area free of internal border controls, put into EU law by the Schengen Agreement in 1997” (Luedtke, 2009: 2). This two tier immigration system comes into direct conflict with the needs and wishes of NGOs, businesses, and Brussels who believe limiting the rights of TCNs restricts the economic freedoms of the EU. These beliefs pit these groups against justice ministers who are fearful of the security risks and crimes usually attributed to immigrants and want to fully constrain the movements of these individuals. So on one hand, there are local governments which need more control over TCNs and on the other, and

there is Brussels which is more sympathetic to the plight of TCNs and the economic needs of a successful EU. According to Luedtke, “Paradoxically, Eurocrats are free to take this pro-immigrant line because they do not face direct electoral pressure in the way that national officials do” (Luedtke, 2009: 2). Additionally, immigration issues and expansion rules have now been handled in the European Parliament and European Union Court of Justice. This is in part because again, the EU recognizes that national governments may not have the will to draft or indeed the leverage to enact comprehensive immigration policies for fear of upsetting the status quo (Luedtke, 2009:20).

Right-wing parties such as the FN and BNP have seized upon this opportunity to paint the picture that the EU is taking away the state’s national security power by eliminating the state’s right to label third-country nationals as security threats. In 2009, 29 right-wing representatives were elected to the European Parliament and in Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Eastern Europe saw rises in elected right-wing representatives (Langenbacher and Schellenberg, 2011). This may not pose much of a concern in the near future as party competition is being replaced by issue competition.

Party Politics – Games People Play

The changing nature of party politics will help shape the EU of the future. Party competition is being driven by issue competition; specifically, party agendas are no longer being dominated by socioeconomic left-right issues but by a competition for the content of party political agenda. Reviewing past election data it has become increasingly evident that there was a decline in social-structural voting, especially class voting, and increasingly many saw the EU as more of a burden than a unifying institution (Green-Pederson, 2007: 607-628). Voter

volatility also increased significantly. This meant that voters were no longer continuing their traditional voting habits but searched for those that best reflected their personal values and beliefs. Right-wing parties looked at voter uncertainty as an opportunity to snag those searching voters, thus targeting neighborhoods, businesses, and locations where those voters were likely to go. Tailored messages, pointing at the danger of EU control, losing the right to protect one's homeland from foreign influences, and the worsening of socio-economic issues, were all used to increase the electoral strengths of right-wing parties.

While right-wing parties are tailoring their messages to targeted voters and adapting to the increased voter volatility, the political elite are hardwired to change slowly with the times. In fact, Western European political parties seem to be stuck in pushing the traditional socioeconomic left-right issues rather than new social trends to the detriment of the changing Western European electorate. The EU is almost hardwired in the same way as political elites of the national level have been appointed or elected to the EU level and thus have moved their traditional political structures with them. The EU pushes traditional left-right issues because it sees the world as a left-right issue. So to remain relevant, the EU will have to recognize at the national level the increasing significance of issue dominance over the traditional party politics and those issues will translate eventually up to the EU level. It is as if voters are finally waking up from a long slumber and have finally taken notice of the political landscape that surrounds them. Voters are finally taking an active interest in the future of their own countries and the future of the European Union.

Making a comparison of the political landscape of the United States to that of its European counterparts is difficult at best. A cursory glance shows similarities, yet a deeper

examination shows profound difference as to how political parties in the United States include hot-bed issues into their agenda and how political parties in Western Europe adopt issues into their agenda at a much slower pace. The evidence is clear as to the changing of the electorate in Western Europe. The traditional political parties are slowly moving towards capturing the electorate, but can they keep pace with the ever changing tactics of right-wing parties?

The changing political landscape of European politics may be due in part to the increasing number of pressure groups, specifically, right-wing parties. It is increasingly clear that the electorate is looking at individuals that best represents their individual concerns and values and pushing traditional parties aside. Right-wing parties are issue specific and therefore their core beliefs change depending what issues attract the highest number of voters. Right-wing parties live or die if they can or cannot maintain voter volatility whereas traditional parties can maneuver through the voter landscape in a more generalized way in order to appeal to the more common, traditional voter.

It has been mentioned several times that right-wing parties look at the EU as an anti-democratic monster poised to strike at sovereign nations when the time is right (BNP, 2012; FN, 2012; BBC Europe 2012). Great Britain has a strained relationship with the EU. It did not adopt its central currency, it did not adopt nor does it recognize most of the intergovernmental treaties proposed and ratified by the EU and its member states, it still checks identification and citizenships at its borders as it routinely ignores the Schengen agreement, and in the latest blow to the EU, Great Britain has refused to accept new financial treaties pushed by Germany and France (Kaden, 2011). Nevertheless, Great Britain is a reluctant member of the EU and pursues a role as an obstructionist – blocking most important directives and regulations, while never

shouldering the financial burden that is required of a member. This however does not impede BNP's never ending rhetoric that the EU and Great Britain are tied together – each growing more dependent on each other. If anything, Germany is the one tied to the EU and its financial relationship may bring the EU down.

Germany on the other hand actively seeks out a place at the head of the table; almost as if by being the breadwinner of the EU, Germany will move itself further from its destructive past. Being one of the founding members, the EU repeatedly requires Germany to play an ever increasing financial role in shouldering the economic hardships of other member states as Great Britain routinely stands on the sidelines. Germany is seen as the “bail-out queen,” the one member state to go to if one was to find its state suffering from an economic meltdown as did Greece and soon possibly to follow Spain and Italy. More times than not, German Chancellor Angela Merkel bypassed her parliament and unilaterally pushed financial assistance and financial reforms upon Greece in the hopes of blocking further economic meltdown across the Eurozone. Never to let a political opportunity pass it by, although not specifically a NPD position, the NPD ramped up its rhetoric against Merkel and her government, basically accusing Merkel of ignoring the plight of Germany's own slowing economy in order to prop up a failing Greece government (NPD 2012). Merkel was quick to act to help Greece yet, according to NPD, is slow to react to the increasing tide of immigrants.

The relationship between France and the EU is an interesting one. France increasingly sees itself as having political influence throughout the Eurozone and in world affairs. France needs a cooperative relationship with the European Union in order to sustain France's foreign and security policies. In essence, France is unable to act alone in the world and must rely upon

other European nations. However, this poses a problem in that there seems to be conflict between France's national interests and the foreign and national interests of the European Union. Tension is at the center of the relationship between France and the European Union. Specifically, the point is made that France questions its sovereignty, independence, and global role regarding its position within the European Union. This push back, although not just the anti-immigration right that expresses this ambivalence by France, a direct result by Le Pen and his right-wing party FN pushing the center-right government in its direction.

In terms of immigration, the EU must recognize that "an all encompassing" policy was not the panacea that was or is promised. The EU must also recognize that individual member states have different economic and societal requirements and therefore a comprehensive immigration policy from the EU level will do little to curb the resentment both politically and culturally being levied at the local level. If anything, the EU's attempt at "all-encompassing" immigration policy is not only allowing right-wing parties to strengthen but also gives access to right-wing candidates of voters that would have otherwise ignored them. It has been argued by the European Commission that a single immigration policy will be more transparent and simpler for immigrants as well as easier for authorities to monitor and control (Adam and Devillard 2009: 13). Christine Adam and Alexandre Devillard (2009) present the desire of the EU to move past its normal immigration rules that include regulating family reunification and TCNs (which are EU-wide), to comprise rules and regulations designed to expand worker migration. EU Member states are reluctant to give up controlling the inflow of migrant workers as it tends to become more of a political issue than one of an economic necessity. The EU should recognize

the cultural impact that increased immigration has at the national level as the EU details policies and directives that are moving away from national control to EU control.

The EU believes in the free movement of its citizens. However, it also recognizes there must be rules and regulations limiting and preventing illegal immigration. According to the Commission to the European Parliament (2008), the EU has developed a clear, concise, and transparent immigration policy that includes the concerns of EU member states but is strengthened by the backing of the EU. This includes defining clear and transparent rules for entry and residence in the EU, providing information to potential immigrants and applicants, in particular on their rights and obligations as EU residents; providing support and assistance on complying with entry and residence conditions to countries of origin as well as destination; and working towards a flexible Europe-wide visa policy (COM, 2008: 359).

What appears to be happening is that the EU is closely aligning immigration with economic prosperity whereas past immigration directives that address only cultural issues have failed. In drafting his conclusion of his examination of immigration legislation at the EU level, Adam Luedtke stated, “In the context of economic upturns and enhanced institutional power, the future directives on economic migration will probably stand a better chance of passage than their failed predecessor” (Luedtke, 2009: 21). The accusation by some right-wing parties that the EU is becoming a supra-nation may not be too far off. This in itself will only allow right-wing parties, with all their xenophobic and hate-filled rhetoric, more seats at the table and more control.

Summary

What is immigration? That is a question that one must answer in order to understand the political and social ramifications surrounding immigration policies. Immigration is the movement and settling into a foreign country or region. Usually a host country can absorb these new individuals or groups but as resources become scarce, native species can become displaced or replaced altogether. Government at times, struggle with developing and maintaining immigration policies that not only offer a helping hand to lift up the immigrant, but also protect the livelihoods of natural born citizens. Unfortunately, there are groups that work to block integration simply on the falsehood that immigrants pose threats to the norms of society. These anti-immigration movements use divisiveness as a tool in which to increase their influence. It was this sort of divisiveness that brought the European community together to form what many see as an ever evolving form of governance.

The European Union or EU was created by a group of six states that believed problems could be addressed and solved if states all worked together for a common purpose. The EU began with the signing and implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht which consisted of three: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (EU, 2012). The EU is commonly looked upon as both an intergovernmental and supranational body in which the Member States are bound by treaties and laws. Integration is primarily handled at the local and national level of government. In terms of immigration, the EU acknowledges that Member States all have different values, different challenges, and different opportunities; however, the EU also understands that in order to fulfill

the EU charters that promote the economic, social, and justice welfare of its citizens, a common and transparent immigration policy will serve to strength those EU goals.

As local governments face threats from right-wing parties, so too does the EU. Increasingly, right-wing candidates are winning seats in various European elections. For example, in the 2009 European Parliament elections, the center-right European's People Party (EPP) received 267 seats or 36 percent of the assembly's 736 seats (EU, 2012). Anti-immigration parties are having and will continue to have some influence of the immigration policies that are being shaped within the EU and by Member states. According to the Extremis Project run by Matthew Goodwin (2012), an organization that reviews right-wing parties released a series of polls that showed that 41% of respondents would vote for a party that proposed ending all immigration. Additionally, 37% would support a political party that promised to reduce the number of Muslims in Great Britain and stopped the spread of Islam across Europe (Goodwin, 2012). Right-wing parties are having an effect on the electorate which in turn will eventually have an effect on the EU. The bureaucracy that is the EU can slow down the right-wing influence but this bureaucracy may not be able to keep pace with the changing nature of immigration and the speed at which immigration is occurring.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

As one looks at the right-wing parties, one must also look at the political processes that avail themselves throughout the European political landscape – voting theories, political opportunities by way of issue and party competition, political structures, governmental responses as well as the immigrants themselves. There are a variety of reasons as to why individuals leave their homes and move to different locations. It seems that for some it is an economic necessity, while for others, the reasons may be darker. War, famine, political unrest, persecutions in one form or another, all may contribute to the mass movements of people from one state to another. Few countries have the resources in which to absorb large communities of immigrants and of those that can, face uncertain futures. Primarily, one must ask the question as to whether or not the existing political institutions have the will and indeed, the infrastructure to resist negative connotations surrounding immigration issues. This thesis has argued that right-wing parties are stronger because of the changing nature of immigration – primarily due to the speed at which individuals are moving across borders, the cultural make-up of those individuals, and the governments' inability to keep pace and adapt policies on immigration.

The forgoing analysis of the aforementioned thesis argument showed that political institutions do not have the will or infrastructure to deal with immigration issues either at the local or European Union levels. Looking at local issues first, the BNP has existed due to local village and district voter support. The BNP has been successful in attracting working class, white men by exploiting their fears of losing their homes, not being able to find good jobs, and losing their national heritage. Moreover, the FNP with Jean-Marie Le Pen at the helm also exploited the young, white male, French worker all the while framing the immigration argument

as “others are coming to take away your jobs and your national identity.” Both the British and French governments were ill-equipped and ignored the growing influence of right-wing parties. Right-wing parties have a tendency to come back by embedding their anti-immigration goals into populist issues thereby affording them greater voter access and greater voter numbers.

Local governments are unable to handle the immigration issue – some look at immigration as a drain on local resources while other localities look at immigration in terms of attracting qualified workers in an otherwise unqualified local workforce. There is no consensus as to how local governments should deal with these immigration issues. Should local governments ignore national law and deal with immigration problems themselves? After all, they are more knowledgeable as to what their communities can handle and what their communities need in terms of a workforce. Local governments are quicker to act than their national counterparts. However, local governments cannot handle the large numbers of immigrants presently moving across the borders and they cannot understand the cultural complexities of those immigrants. For example, recent young Muslims began a violent protest against the French government and what the Muslims considered regulations and laws directed toward their religious beliefs. In the interest of assimilating Muslims into French culture, new laws outlawing certain religious dress and icons were seen as an affront to the practice of Islam. Specifically, the 2004 French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools banned the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in French primary and secondary schools. This law is usually referred to as the “head scarfs” ban. According to Sagy Maayan (2007), this law, although not specifically against Muslim, did however arise because of the growing tensions between French citizens and the increasing Muslim communities (Maayan, 2007: 2). Moving from the schools

into the public square, a new law banning females from wearing niqabs, or face veils, in all public spaces was signed into law by Nicholas Sarkozy in April 2011. Violators are subjected to a fine or citizenship lessons. However, the police cannot forcibly remove the veil but can, according to Angelique Chrisafis (2011) who reports for *The Guardian*, order women to report to a police station to check their identities. Muslim youths took to the streets in seven days of violent rioting. In response, factions of the FNP targeted ethnic groups, thereby moving the anti-immigrant, pro-French rhetoric to outright violence. The French government was forced to relax what many considered to be anti-Islamic laws, thus ensuring the Muslim community its continued separatist appearance.

In the foregoing analysis, I provided examples of the make-up, the numbers of immigrants, and the reasons for cross border movements, the past history of right-wing parties or anti-immigrant movements, and the political structures' responses to those issues. I have found that all politics are indeed local. Local political structures allow for the growth of right-wing parties or anti-immigration movements as these parties or movements are more than capable of exploiting local fears and much more capable of the exploitation of the immigrants by painting them as threats to society, the "others" that need to be feared. Local political structures allow for the positioning of issues to the electorate that force local governments to react in ways that usually go against their core beliefs. The growing influence of right-wing parties or anti-immigration movements influence the very nature of local governments by forcing elected officials to adopt positions towards immigration that they normally would be loathe to do. It would be interesting to research immigration and right-wing party influence not from this position (outside looking in) but from the inside looking out. A detailed study would be

welcomed of voting habits of elected officials at the local level to compare voting behaviors of elected officials at the national level to see if there is indeed a strong right-wing party influence.

Right-wing parties tend to work against their governments all the while accusing immigrants of plotting some kind of nefarious actions. As right-wing groups pursue younger and younger members in order to ensure future success, so too do the so-called radicalized ethnic groups these right-wing parties routinely work against. In terms of goals, right-wing parties want to protect their national heritage while ethnic minorities seek to protect their culture while at the same time trying to fit into their surrounding societies.

The EU is a bureaucracy and as such, the very structure of this bureaucracy is an impediment to its long term success. However, through some ups and downs, the EU has remained steadfast in its pursuit of its lofty goals of economic equality and the recognition of human dignity regardless of ethnicity and cultural differences (Gündüz, 2010:36). In order to accomplish this, the EU has maintained that its integration policy is fair, transparent, and works for both the immigrant and EU Member state. The EU defines integration as a “two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third-country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant” (Collett, 2008). If there was any doubt that the EU was a bureaucracy, EU integration policy is handled, according to Elizabeth Collett (2008), by the Directorate General for Justice, Liberty, and Security (DG JLS) of the European Commission, the Directorate General of Employment and Social Affairs (DG Empl), and the Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG EAC). The EU also confers with the EU member states which further delays responses and coordination in integration efforts (Collett, 2008).

It is in these pursuits that the EU indeed falls short in the final realization of those goals. The EU is a bureaucracy and as such, the very nature of it is akin to a shining beacon of distrust (right-wing parties' rail against the EU's supranational elitism), missed opportunities, and bureaucratic red tape. As local governments move quickly to find solutions to problems, the EU's structure inhibits such swift actions as most issues get bogged down in committee procedures and political grandstanding. Whereas local political structures allow for the growth of right-wing parties, the EU on the other hand, can absorb these changes due to its size and bureaucratic make-up. The chance of a right-wing takeover of the EU is but a dream; nevertheless, there are examples of right-wing party members (29 additional right-wing members) being elected in 2009 to high posts within the EU and although their current influence is albeit weak it is there lurking in the background. As more and more right-wing party members are elected at the local level, this increases the likelihood of right-wing members moving up the political ladder and their eventual seating at the Commission of Council table (Beckett, 2012). If those right-wing members at the EU can forge coalitions between themselves and other interested parties, the future of the EU could come into question. Would the right-wing still look at the EU as a threat to national sovereignty or would right-wing parties become absorbed into the body politic?

Not much is available to accurately study the EU concerning terms of right-wing influences. With that said however, one cannot ignore that the EU is a bureaucracy and therefore its very make-up makes this body ill-equipped to work successfully in solving immigration issues because it does not understand the make-up of the immigration movements, it does not understand the number of people moving across borders, and it reacts too slowly to develop

policies to effectively control immigration. According to Denny Genç (2011), EU immigration policies have increasingly moved from member state control to that of European control. Amendments to EU treaties have included comprehensive immigration policy shifts. Moreover, according to Genç, what has started as “intergovernmental cooperation in the 1980s, took the form of intensive transgovernmentalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the Lisbon Treaty has supranationalized the field by December 1, 2009” (Genç, 2011: 3).

This ineffectiveness of the EU matches that of local and national governments who appear to run from their tortured pasts only to repeat those mistakes in the present. This ineffectiveness allows for the continued growth of right-wing parties or anti-immigration movements and until such time as local, national, and the EU can address comprehensive immigration reforms that benefit both the local body politic and the EU body, the anti-immigration movements will continue to influence voters, elected officials, and the international conversation for decades to come. It is my suggestion that countries not be afraid of multiculturalism, and that they embrace the diverse make-up of their societies because it is this richness of persons, ideas, and cultures that gives nationalism its power.

Unfortunately the bureaucratic make-up of the EU makes it nearly impossible to develop a comprehensive immigration policy. One must balance the needs and rights of the Member States within the context of the charters and treaties ratified within the EU. The EU is built upon three founding pillars: the European Communities, common foreign and security policy, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (EU, 2012). Most immigration policies try to balance the needs of the State with the needs of the immigrant. If the EU stands for the economic, social, and justice welfare of its citizens, then typically as history has shown, social

justice comes from courts. Since Member States are bound by the European Court of Justice, it stands to reason then that the European Court of Justice would determine best practices towards implementing a singular, transparent, and honorable European immigration policy. Although immigration is a political issue, it is also a human rights issue that requires one pillar to strengthen its chances of success. Great change has come as a result of court decisions here in the United States. It is only fitting that great change comes from the European Court of Justice as well. The United States should be an example of the right course of action, at least in part, in terms of solving the immigration problems. Immigration must be solved at the federal level and not left to the individual states. So too must the EU immigration decision-making be structured away from individual Member States. If respect for liberty and human rights in the EU is to be believed, then a European immigration policy must come through with greater democratic and judicial accountability (Carrera, 2007: 15).

Society evolves at times because of conflict. Machiavelli believed this as J. A. Tickner reminds that “politics is a continual quest for power and independence; it is dependent on the presence of an enemy at all times, for without spurs to greatness energized by fighting an enemy, the polity would collapse” (Tickner, 1992: 87). Put succinctly, elites are threatened by those individuals who seek a better way of life. Therefore, in an effort to maintain their elitist status, those that encroach on the elites’ way of life are seen as threats. Right-wing parties or anti-immigration movements are indeed the very elites they seem to be fighting against. Never mind the immigrants, right-wing parties are fighting against governments that they believe are taking away their way of life. In essence, right-wing parties may not really look at immigrants as threats; immigrants may be just an excuse.

The real issue may be that anti-immigrant movements are actually anti-government movements and that in this notion should be the next area of study because anti-immigration rhetoric is embedded in intense anti-government, anti-democracy sentiments. Again I ask who poses the greatest risk to society, immigrants or right-wing parties? Immigrants broaden society's capacity to grow through cultural exchanges, religious beliefs, and the understanding that we are just one human family. Right-wing parties on the other hand limit the growth of society by shutting off the cultural exchanges, by blocking interfaith alliances, and by segregating communities with fear and intimidation. Scholarship suggests there are a number of reasons as to why anti-immigration parties are strong. My thesis had argued that right-wing parties are strong because of the changing nature of immigration, the speed at which immigrants are moving across border and the governments' inability to keep pace and adapt policies on immigration and while all that may be true in part, one cannot accept this without also acknowledging that anti-immigration party strength is in actuality due to political opportunity and the ability for these right-wing parties to exploit those opportunities.

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