

University of Central Oklahoma  
Edmond, Oklahoma  
Jackson College of Graduate Studies & Research

Democracy in South Sudan:  
Prospects and Pitfalls

A THESIS  
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY  
In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
For the degree of  
MASTERS OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Edmond, Oklahoma

2012


**DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH SUDAN:**


**Prospects and Pitfalls**


A THESIS

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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## Chapter One

### Introduction

#### Vision and Mission of the Republic of South Sudan (ROSS):

*“A South Sudan where democracy is a way of life, where political power is exchanged through the ballot box in free and fair elections “And*

*“To develop and promote the principles of best parliamentary practices, good governance, multiparty democracy, equitable and efficient federal system in South Sudan” (Mission statement from the government of South Sudan, Int. 4/16/2012)*

Although the South Sudanese struggle against the Islamic fundamentalists in Sudan’s capital of Khartoum was one face of identity politics, the underlying principles and core objectives on which the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/ Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) fought the war were freedom for all citizens of Sudan, but primarily for the blacks and Christians in the South, and the establishment of a secular and democratic political system under which the rule of law and justice prevailed.

Experts and scholars on Sudan traced this history of struggle for freedom and democracy by southern Sudanese to the year 1955 (Jok, 2007; Collins, 1999; Biong, 2006; and Voll, 1991). The history of the birth of South Sudan can also be traced back to Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1898 between the British government and Egyptian government (Biong, 2006: 3). The agreement represents a mutual understanding between the two friends. Its significant was that it was a declaration on how to sustain domination over the Sudan. It gave English (British Empire) the right to administer South Sudan independently, and conceded North Sudan to Egypt.

When colonialism began to die down in Africa, Sudan is one of African countries that did not wage a liberation war for independence. It was awarded independence peacefully in 1956 with both North and South united into one Sudan. However, there was fierce resistance to it in the South. Jok (2007) noticed that Southern Sudanese rejected strongly the unity of the two under one Sudan in what is still known in Sudan's history of independence as the "1948 Table Conference". What unity with Arabs meant for Southern Sudanese was not only future political problems, but also the perception that it was just a change of masters. This symbolized a situation where the English gets replaced by the Arabs. Among the southerners, it meant that the transition would not amount to anything, other than the prompt return of Arabs slave trading in the south (Voll, 1991: 24). This same author argued that Southern Sudanese later dropped their demand for a separate and independent South when the British governor in the South at the time promised that justice will be served, while the Arabs on their part accepted the South's call for a democratic government and a federal political system (Voll, 1991: 24).

A. *Anyanya One* Movement (first South-North Civil War, 1955 to 1972)

The honeymoon and political marriage between South and North Sudan was terminated after few years. Military hostilities returned in 1962, when a Southern Sudanese military unit committed mutiny, went into the bush and led a military campaign with the end goal of independence for the South from Sudan (Voll, 1991: 25). This rebellion is popularly known as the *Anyanya One* in Sudan but specifically in the South. *Anyanya One* was the military wing of the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). It lasted from 1962 to 1972. The *Anyanya One* Movement was finally brought to end with the signing of the Addis- Ababa Agreement between the government of Jaffar Numieri and leaders of the *Anyanya One*, Joseph Lagu; Abel Alier;

Deng Nhial; and other high ranking military officers and politicians. The agreement established the following:

- (a). Right of autonomy for the South to govern its internal affairs
- (b) establish two militaries for both north and south with integration once the political will deemed it right
- (c) demarcated Sharia, one of the most things Southern Sudanese rejected the most to the North while leaving the South to choose any form of justice and law it wanted to adopt (Voll, 1991: 99).

The four settlements in the Addis-Ababa Agreement brought political stability back to Sudan. However, things begin to change in the later stage of 1979 to the first half of 1983. Numieri, the same president whose leadership play a role in making Addis- Ababa Peace possible, turned radical. He dismantled the entire Addis-Ababa Peace Agreement by reinstating Sharia in all of Sudan with his infamous “September Law”; a law which started with the pouring away of beers and wines into River Nile (Voll, 1991: 90).

#### B. Anya Nya Two (South-North Second Civil War, 1983 to 2005)

The disarray and controversial termination of the Addis-Ababa Peace Agreement by Numieri and his Islamic controlled regime brought wounds of the past back to life in the south. When the agreement was ended, the South was outraged. Its response was nothing other than the resumption of hostilities and military conflict altogether. This explanation favors a military account of the situation. However, the best way to capture the whole situation is to use idea of “contentious politics” by (Sidney Tarrow, 1998; See also, Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). Contentious politics is comprised of mainly socioeconomic disparities, and cultural, religious and political differences. When one of these elements or two persists, the end result, in the eyes of these authors, is the rise of a social movement or revolution (Tarrow, 1998: 19-20; Tilly and Tarrow, 2006: 8-9).

Since independence, South Sudanese have always felt marginalized by the Arab dominated government in the North. There are many examples of this claim. Through his examination and analysis of education research done between 1972 and 1983, Biong (2006) argument showed conclusively that there was imbalance in the education policy and outcomes in two Sudan regions.

Below are the findings.

Sudan North enjoyed 40% on growth enrollment contrasted to 12% for Sudan South. On university admission, north had 93% to 1% for the south. On ratio per teacher, it was 34 in the North and 42 in the South; a difference of 8 pupils more. On average number of schools. North came first with 87% and compare to 13% primary school in the South. It was 93% for North secondary but 7% of secondary schools in the South (Biong, 2006: 6).

The above results are significant. They help us to understand the reason for rebellion by South against the North. By just looking at disparities in the university admission, the North has a score of 99% admission rate for the university while just 1% of the South students who applied to higher education were accepted. This finding is perhaps the most striking one in this study. This is not due to 1% being a magic number but what is fascinating about it is the timing. This study was done in 1983, the same year when the war broke out. If the data was collected during the war, it would have been less supporting evidence because most of the people in the south were either refugee in other countries. Or it could have resulted as such because all universities in the South were closed in this time period. Because the data is from 1983, it gives us an argument not to look further for other evidence. For this matter, responses from the South to these disparities in addition to others culminated in the formation of the *Anya Nya Two*. *Anya Nya Two* started with a mutiny in the cities of Bor and Ayod in May 1983. The *Anya Nya* units retreated to the border between Sudan and Ethiopia where they set up a military training camp and established the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/ Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) under the



leadership of John Garang de Mabior who led a military struggle against the North until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

The SPLM/SPLA war against the North was both a social and a military revolution in progress. At least two events are often left out by many writers, but these are essential in understanding deeply the developments that were ongoing in the South even before the termination of the Addis-Ababa Peace in 1983. The first events were the student protests in Wau, Malakal and Malek. I will only explain Malek student protests. Malek is the most interesting one among them. This protest took place in 1982 at Malek Secondary school. Malek is one of the schools founded by missionaries in Bor and was later seized and nationalized by the government. When president Numeiri landed in Malek, the school was in flames. The students protested against the president and his government's policies against the South. They shouted in Dinka language, *Numeiri ma reth! Numeiri ma reth!* In translation, Numeiri is not a president but one that had to step down and get replaced.

The second event is the *Nyin e Bol* South conference of 1982. *Nyin e bol* is a name given by the Bor Dinka to one of the branches off the River Nile that passed in Bor Town, capital of present day Jonglei state. What happen in *Nyin e Bol* is that Southern intellectuals, Abel Alier, Garang and many others including high ranking military officers, conveyed a message to the people in villages that *Nyin e Bol* was going to be flooding and therefore, a rocky fence, as it was conveyed at that time, was needed along the edges to prevent it from over flooding into villages. The villagers received and took this message to heart for three reasons. One was that the Bor Dinka, whom the intellectuals appealed to do the fence, keeps cattle and does farming. If *Nyin e Bol* had to over flood into their villages, the flood would cause hardships. For instance, the flood would bring with it mosquitoes, which transmit malaria. It would also bring with it livestock

diseases which will claim lives of their livestock. And third, it was not going to be good for their crops due to the fact that the flood would wash away or prevent farming and planting in the first place. The Youth from the five clans that were closed to Bor, woke up every morning to go and build the fence in order to avoid overflow from *Nyin e Bol*. Interesting things about this event was that the Southern intellectuals actually used the event to get away from the government. While the youth from the villages worked on the fence, they (educated elites) were engaging in a conference, discussing on how the rebellion and revolution should be waged. One year later, the revolution started.

These two events plus others are evidence that SPLM/SPLA was a revolutionary movement, fueled by South discontents with the government in the North. It called for a regime change in Khartoum and to replace it with a secular and democratic political system, the writing of a new constitution, or the reinstatement of the federal constitution of 1956 (Voll, 1991: 25). If consensus could not be reached, South Sudan would then be forced to make a unilateral declaration of the independence for the South. By 2005, the war was in its 22 year. What has happened as a result is that a total of 2 million people is reported to have died from the fighting or due to other war related events (Voll, 1991: 125). Table 1 below shows the distribution of refugees from South Sudan to four Sudan's neighboring countries: Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Central African Republic. There were at least 2 or 3 hundred thousand internally displaced in Loboni, Nairus, New Cush, Natinga, and the Sudan capital Khartoum itself. I have not been able to find the data for these internally displaced persons (IDPS). Therefore, these have not been included in the table.

Table 1. Distribution of Sudan Refugees Population as of 2002.

Host Country	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Central African Republic	23,326	25,889	27,252	30,671	32,541	33,950	35,457	36,151	36,345	37,375
Ethiopia	44,376	51,800	61,113	75,743	56,868	58,580	70,262	71,732	80,934	89,952
Kenya	31,578	27,194	41,215	33,477	37,351	48,162	64,254	55,585	69,807	57,779
Uganda	180,000	180,000	209,860	223,720	160,365	189,840	200,565	212,156	176,766	188,194
Total	279,280	284,883	339,440	363,611	287,125	330,532	370,538	375,624	363,852	373,300

Source: UNCHR Report (2002).

### C. Peace Negotiations: 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to Independence.

The devastating face of the war, as seen in Table I, added pressure on the two parties to find solution to the conflict. The first peace attempts came in 1986 when delegations from opposition parties met the SPLM delegation in Addis- Ababa in 1986. Having been meeting on the sideline of the Organization of Africa Unity (OU, now African Union) the SPLM and the opposition parties agreed and signed “the Koko Adam Agreement” (Voll, 1991: 90). There are no records showing that this agreement was placed into effect.

The second peace settlement to the conflict was lunched by U.S former president Jimmy Carter in Addis-Ababa and Nairobi in 1989 (Voll 1991: 31; Collins 1999:106). These two

attempts did not materialize or achieve anything other than a return to fighting. Another two peace conferences were held in Abuja, Nigeria but failed as well. With respect to Abujas, I and II, Collins placed failure on the shoulders of the two by describing the situation as follows

Abuja I failed on the SPLA part. No one beforehand anticipated it but Garang, as it was later found out, made a calculation to fail negotiation by sending William Nyuon, the Second in command. Nyuon lack formal education and Garang calculation was to end up not accepting any common ground but to stick to what he has been instructed to do. It turned out exactly in how Garang wanted it. Abuja One failed without time wasted. On Abuja II, Garang did not made the same calculation for he knew his military position was weaken by the defection of two high ranking officers and therefore, was serious about diplomatic way out this time. On that ground, the current South Sudan President Salva Kiir was sent. The north was in a stronger position, for it has taken advantage of the SPLM/ division by retaking all the areas that the SPLM captured. For this case, the north was reluctant, knowing that their military might was closer to force Garang and his movement to their knee. Reaching any agreement was to be a miracle for them (Collin, 1999: 114)

Possibility of ending the conflict gained momentum in 1995 and later in 1997. It started with a third attempt by Jimmy Carter (Collins, 1999: 106). Interestingly, negotiations for the peace were not in the hands of nations or diplomats. A regional body, International Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) took responsibility. IGAD is a non-profit organization formed by countries of Eastern Africa to deal mainly with issues of famine, drought and war related situations. Member states are Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Tanzania, and Eritrea. This time around, a former retired Kenya LT.General, Lazaro K. Sumbeiywo, was put in charge to oversee the Sudan peace processes and negotiations. The first progress came in 1994 when the two sides to the conflict, SPLM and the Sudan government, signed “declaration of principle” (Collins, 1999: 115). The declaration was an understanding between the two sides, showing their understanding and a commitment to engage and negotiate throughout the peace process in good faith. The peace settlement later

seems to have experienced a breakdown as hostilities resumed. It is hard to figure out what happen in 2003 but the two parties were able to come back to the negotiating table. The two parties this time around negotiated and signed a memorandum of understanding on the structure the national government would take. The next agreement to be reached was the agreement on sharing oil revenue, which is basically in the South; the settlement was reach on 50/50 sharing. Lastly, the final peace, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was finalized in December, 2005, with agreement on Abyei, Blue Nile, and Southern Kora Dufan, signed in the present of many international dignitaries including Collin Powel, who signed the agreement on behalf of the U.S and the Bush Administration.

There are many reasons to why doing this thesis on democracy in South Sudan is an interesting one. Southern Sudan fought for it but that alone is not the justifying argument. We have seen African states claiming to democratize but at the last minutes become anti-democracy. Eritrea is a case study in this research. If democracy was something easily adopted, then this thesis would constitute a waste of time and energy. African rebellions often contain the rhetoric for establishing democracies. The National Resistance Movement, the current party of Yeweri Museveni came to power, with this vision of democracy in 1986. The same happen in Ethiopia when Tigray Peoples 'Liberation Front fought the socialist and ruthless dictatorship government of Mengistu Haile Mariam after 18 years of struggle to replace the dictatorial system with a democracy system. Since achieving victories, the vision has been shelved and democracy has experienced setbacks. It seems that there is a "curse" of democratization in Africa. We see as many as 30 or more democracies during the 1950 and 60s. Then the trajectory changed completely. Even if many re-democratized in the 1990s, they just disappeared either quickly or slowly. Due to these failures, it should not be wrong to

argue that the continent as a whole has always been in a democratic drought and perhaps a catastrophic one. What it is that will make South Sudan perform different transition? In other words, what will make South Sudan transition to democracy so different from Africa's fail transitions? If any, what a difference time can make? The next chapter will present a review of the literature on democratization in Africa.

## Chapter Two

### Introduction

I would like to begin in this chapter with an introduction to the coming of liberal democracy in Africa. This is a necessary step before going into a literature review. The reason is not that the readers of this thesis have no idea about the historical emergence of democracy in Africa. I expect, or for that matter assume, that my readers and audiences are informed in one way or another on how democracy emerged on that continent. My reason for reviewing this history is that democracy in Africa is a confusing topic because many people, from the west and Africa alike, have a view that there is no such thing as liberal democracy in Africa. I shared these peoples' pain. However, What I learned from the reading of the literature is that democracy has and even still exists in Africa. What is troubling is that few African countries are currently democratic. In this particular situation, the question on which most of the literature focuses on is why Africa has few democratic countries. I approach this phenomenon by looking at it through a different lens and perspective. I ask the question that why are there many undemocratic countries than democratic ones in Africa?.

#### A. Early Transition to Democracy in Africa (1950s to 1980s)

Burnell (2006) argues that democracy emerged in Africa during the early 1950s, the time when European colonial rule made way for the incoming African liberation movements, which replace colonial administrations with African ones. Democracy in that time period was characterized by elections. For examples, Deng, in *Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa* (2008) indicated that African countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, and including my own old Sudan, had Presidents, and Prime Ministers elected to their oath of offices via

elections, and constitutions were established with the help provided by the departing European Powers.

All the constitutional and electoral democratic developments described explicitly in the above paragraph were true signs of what African political systems and politics should look like today. That has not been a dream comes true. Democracy has sunk to its lowest point in Africa. This trouble began as early as late 1960s in countries which had attained independent. We came to know that during this time period, late 1960s to the late 1980s, many African countries were either under military governments, or one party rule. Huntington referred to this situation as “regress” or “reverse wave” in his Third wave of Democratization Thesis (Huntington, 1991: pp 18-19). Democracy in that time period was not withering away but it had actually buried and only awaits resurrection.

#### B. Transition from 1990s to the present

It was early in the 1990s that democracy actually made a comeback in Africa. Many experts on African politics referred to this period as the second wave of African democracy (See for instance, Burnell, 2006: 142). Mandela claimed it an “African renaissance” (Gilley, 2010: 87). Others like Bratton (1997) called it the “Second Wave of Liberation”. Peoples’ expectations about the success of democracy in Africa were basically high beginning in this time period due to a number of reasons. One argument pointed to the fact that the 1990s protest movements produced significant achievements by forcing political changes in many countries, and by ending one party and military domination and transitioning to multi-party politics that include elections in which all parties participated. These changing events also ended with the fall of long time authoritarian leaders whose vacancies were filled by the new



pro-democracy presidents (Bratton, 1997: 69). Another reason was that political liberalization was very popular. Chabal (1998) noted that political changes of the 1990s in African saw 16 of the 48 African countries established viable democracies. 12 countries went through a “flawed transition” and while only fourteen countries remained unchanged.

Even though the second liberation as some calls it or renaissance drew applause, underlining conclusion to be taken from this time period is that Africa has in fact transitioned backwards. It has moved away from the democratic gains of the 1990s. The continent has now moved back into its past politics and to unpredictable future. Numbers and data drawn from Freedom support this argument. Table 2 contains the record of all the countries, their status (democratic, partly democratic, and not democratic). This table also has each country scores on political rights and civil liberties as well. Score of 1 to 2 is considered free and democratic. Score of 3 to 4 are countries that are partly free. A score of 5 and up is not free and is undemocratic. Table 3 is where I calculate the percentages. i.e democratic, undemocratic, based the Freedom House ratings.

Table 2.

Countries	Status	Political Rights	Civil Liberties
Central African Republic	Partly Free	5	5
Algeria	Not Free	6	5
Angola	Not Free	6	5
Benin	Free	2	2
Botswana	Free	3	2
Burkina Faso	Partly Free	5	3
Burundi	Partly Free	5	5

Cameroon	Not Free	6	6
Cape Verde	Free	1	1
Chad	Not Free	7	6
Comoros	Partly Free	3	4
Congo (Brazzaville)	Not Free	6	5
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Not Free	6	6
Djibouti	Not Free	6	5
Egypt	Not Free	6	5
Equatorial Guinea	Not Free	7	7
Eritrea	Not Free	7	7
Ethiopia	Not Free	6	6
Gabon	Not Free	6	5
Gambia	Not Free	6	5
Ghana	Free	1	2
Guinea	Partly Free	5	5
Guinea Bissau©©	Partly Free	4	4
Ivory Coast	Not Free	6	6
Kenya	Partly Free	4	3
Lesotho	Partly Free	3	3
Liberia	Partly Free	3	4
Libya	Not Free	7	6
Madagascar	Not Free	6	5
Malawi	Partly Free	3	4
Mali©©	Free	2	3
Mauritania	Not Free	6	5
Mauritius	Free	1	2

Mozambique	Partly Free	4	3
Namibia	Free	2	2
Niger	Partly Free	5	4
Nigeria	Partly Free	4	4
Rwanda	Not Free	6	5
Sao Tome' and Principe	Free	2	2
Senegal	Free	3	3
Seychelles	Partly Free	4	5
Sierra Leone	Partly Free	3	3
Somalia	Not Free	7	7
South Africa	Free	2	2
South Sudan	Not Free	6	5
Sudan	Not Free	7	7
Swaziland	Not Free	7	5
Tanzania	Partly Free	3	3
Togo	Partly Free	5	4
Tunisia	Partly Free	3	4
Uganda	Partly Free	5	4
Zambia	Partly Free	3	4
Zimbabwe	Not Free	6	6

Source: Freedom House, 2012

©©. Indicates countries that went through military coup after I took this report.


Table 3.

Status	Number	Percentage
Free	10	19%
Partly Free	20	38%
Not Free	23	43%
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>100%</b>

As the table is indicating above, it is surprising to see that at Africa has ten democratic countries this year. This is a sign of hope but still we are unsure what will happen to the partly free countries. Will they turn fully democratic before too long, or are they more likely to move back into the not free category? It remains to be seen, but these are the situations that allow us to have interest in questioning the direction a new country like South Sudan which wants to democratize will take. Will it fall in love with the old way of democratization that we saw in Africa, or is the time right and South Sudan will experience a successful transition?

All the questions raised in this research topic have generated a rich literature. Literature that is entertaining and fascinating at the same time. Within the understanding of democracy in the international discourse, much of the literature has relied heavily on the pioneer work of Lipset (1959a; See also 1960b, 1994c). This theory is a theory of modernization but particularly socioeconomic development. The below figure is intended to show the way in which this relationship translates into democracy.

Figure 1.



Source: Drawn by the author

As the figure above demonstrates, what Lipset proposed is that industrialization first occurs, followed by urbanization with wealth creating more opportunities for people to get educated. The relationship can also work in reverse. Lipset linked these four elements of production to democracy by proposing the hypothesis, which I paraphrased as follows.

The more a country has industrialized, citizens bring in substantial and stable salary home, has an average population that is capable of having two Bill Gates or have people competing for Gate status, Population is well educated or at least on average the capacity to speak and write, many towns begin to have high rise buildings, dining out is picking up and birth day parties are increasing, the more it is an evidence that the country is on its path to democracy (Lipset, 1959: 75).

This theory has become the dominant force within the literature available on democratization. It has been supported by many of the distinguished minds in the field such as (Huntington 1991; Apter; 1968; Dahl, 1971). The theory has critics but what is important here is neither the support nor the criticism it has received over the past decades. The most striking about this research comes in the work of Przeworski Adam et al, (2000, See also Przeworski and Lomong, 1997). These authors did not nullify Lipset theory nor have they supported it in its entirety. Below are some of the findings they found in regard to the relationship between Lipset economic argument and democracy.

- a. Poor and rich country shared the same chances on democratization. For example, if a poor country has 2 percent chance to democratize; a rich country has the same chances as well.
- b. In addition to the above statement is that countries with middle economic development are the ones with greater chance to democratize.
- c. The third finding is on how democracies and dictatorships performed when they are facing economic down turn and a crisis. On this ground, democracies were found to facing death at a rate around 0.0512 when economy is shamble in a country. Dictatorship on the other hand tends to die slowly at a rate of 0.0240 (Przeworski *et al eds.*2000, pp 92, 109).

Placing the above findings in the context of democratization in Africa, It is clear that these findings explain why African countries are struggling to adopt democracy. Secondly,

another reason that can be drawn from these findings, particularly Item (b) is that African states are still poor and have not attained the middle income that Przeworski associated with democratization. This is where Przeworski *et al* finding that democracies are more like to survive in rich or wealthy countries, on per capita bases, has truth to it within the realization of African states experiences with democratic transitions (Przeworski *et al*, 2000:137). It can be drawn from this finding that the main reason why democracy comes slowly and dies quickly in Africa is that a poor economy does not allow those that have embarked on democratization to maintain and nurture what they have established.

One other theory that is even more relevant in the understanding of democratization is the theory of class conflict between upper class or land owners and the working class (those who tilled the land) developed by Barrington Moore (1966). This argument was based on a close and well observed study about the coming of democracy in the West, but particularly England and France. In Moore's argument, democracy came particularly in England after a very long and violent struggle, basically between the rich and the poor classes (Moore, 1966: 29). The relevance of this theory here is not to retest or try to find some new insights out of it. It is a theory that has been researched and applied in many studies. My use of it here is practical, and I am trying to understand what others have said about it in the study of Africans transitions and democratization.

The above two theoretical approaches have been applied in the ongoing studies of democracy and democratization in Africa. Fatton (1990) argued that Africa is not similar to Europe, which Moore used in his analysis because Africa in most cases lacks all the elements that add up to give rise to the bourgeois class. Secondly, the small capitalist economies that many African countries developed, for most part did not create the amount of conflict that we

saw between the bourgeois and the proletariat in Europe, two groups that were essential in the process that culminated in democracy in the west. Because these two things have been missing in Africa, He argued that they are the main reasons why “liberalism and with its ideological and legal emphasis on individual rights, civil liberties, and freedom of association” have not been embraced by Africans (Fatton, 1990: 457). The main point to take from this view is that Africa is missing the pieces that are vital for it to establish liberal democracies.

Ake (1991) argued that the absence of democracy is not something that has a relationship with the two theories. The reason is that liberal democracy has no place in Africa. At least four reasons are mentioned by Ake in support of why liberal democracy is not suitable for Africa. The author argued that democracy is perceived as an “alien” thing that is trying to sow its seed in a place where it is not welcome (Ake, 1991: 34). What this view represents is that the well founded reason why democracy is struggling to succeed is that many see it to be something that is in contradiction with the way things have been and are still going in Africa. In reference to his other article Ake (1993) argues that...

Even though the democratic west devotes its energies in trying to democratize Africa, the case in point is that African and the west are worlds apart. The two continents shared nothing in common; from cultural, social or political. These become building blocks because even if the west may gain success here and there, the reality is that the system is going to be based on western values which come into conflict with Africans own terms and it is through these differences that western form of democracy become inconsistent and truly undesirable for Africans.

While demand for democracy is becoming increasingly an everyday event in Africa as it was the case in the 1990s, Ake still holds firm to the argument he is putting forward. The main reason for him is that poverty will always at any time be the driving force for the demand of democracy among the poor people of Africa (Ake, 1993: 242). This is also to say that Africans’ understanding of democracy is ill informed. While the reasons I have discussed so far educated us about the issue behind the struggle of democracy in Africa, the argument that



follows is about some of the terms and issues associated with the lack of democracy on the continent.

*Different form of democracy for Africa:* Having rejects the possibility of democracy development in Africa, Ake is one among many that advocate for a different version of democracy in Africa; a form of democracy that will be a complete opposite of western liberal democracy. The most interesting thing about this is that the author did not in actual terms lay out what and how the African version of democracy is supposed to look like. However, he argues that it needs to be consistent and promote African values. For instance, liberal democracy “assume individualism” but “there is little individualism in Africa” (Ake, 1993: 243).

On political participation, Ake strongly argues that western or liberal democracy offers political participation that is inferior compared to African forms. For Africans, he argues, political participation is entirely oriented and well linked to the community. Africans engaged in the political process not as individuals with completely different desire and goals, but each considered him/herself as a party of the community (Ake 1993, 243). In concluding the argument, the author argues forcefully that the democracy that will emerged in Africa will have to be constructed in the image of prevailing “realities”, and around other political considerations that will fit well the cultural aspects of Africa (Ake, 1993: 244).

Jensen & and Wantchekon (2004) are the latest scholars to come out with a new theory on democracy and democratization in Africa. The theory or argument these authors are bringing into the field is that of a relationship between natural resources and transition to democracy or democratization in general. Their hypothesis argues that countries with vast

natural resources, or countries that are dependent on natural resources such as gold, oil, coca etc, are in most part less likely to move toward democratization initiatives whereas those with few and scarce resources are open to democracy (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004: 836). In their methodology, the authors took Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Gabon, Cameroon, and former Zaire in a group of natural resource-dependence states while grouping Benin, Mali, Senegal, and Madagascar as less or non-natural resource dependence countries. South Africa became the only country in Africa with huge natural resources to democratize with the second category. Furthermore, another thing that these authors found is that state dependency on raw materials resources indicated that such countries are more repressive and have worse human rights records, high level of government spending, and many other activities the government employed as a way to undermine democracy.

Bratton and Chang (2006) argued that Africa's democratization that starts with elections is illegitimate because it has proven ineffective to advance democracy. What Africa needs in his view, is to have political order in place before taking elections. In relations to state weakness in Africa, Bratton and Chang (2006) noted that we should not look somewhere else other than political instability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and controlled of corruption. The authors found evidence supporting that African states are in fact weak. On political instability, evidence is either a persistent presence of warlords, such as the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) or the international or domestic terrorist insurgencies such as the Boko Haram in Nigeria or Al Shabab in Somalia. On governing effectively, the problem is wide because African states have weak institutions beginning from the central government to the local government.

Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee (1998) wrote about some of the things and factors associated with the lack of democracy in Africa. One these factors is Pro-democracy or opposition parties' weaknesses. While opposition parties are supposed to engage authoritarian and to promote democracy, the reason that this author observed is that African oppositions are often weak to talk and demonstrated in the streets, leave alone a desire to capture state power. Secondly, on many occasions many of the opposition leaders have been members of the ruling party at one point or another. In other word, they are deserters. And the authors see this as a phenomenon that will not stop soon in Africa. As a matter of fact, their intentions are always viewed with cynicism or in more extreme cases can face harsh treatment from the government for being considered to be undermining or trying to take down the government.

Another point that explains transitions to democracy by African states have been a failure is the absence of middle class. Even though countries have few middle class, the issue is that they are either weak or they are part of the governing coalition. What this explain is that citizen participation is lacking because people are preoccupied, tying to meet other basic needs but not political.

One last thing, associated with this case, struggle of democracy to develop and prosper in Africa, is that of the media. These authors claim that almost every mean of communication is controlled by state in many cases in Africa. This means that they are easily manipulated by states; meaning that they will only work to advance the position and messages of the ruling government and very little if not zero for the opposition. What this does is that opposition movements have nowhere to get their messages out. In a political environment like this, victory belongs to the authoritarian, even if the presidency was contested through the ballot box.

*Violence Against democracy:* One other point to be made regarding the lack of democracy in Africa is the violence that a state employs against democratic movements. This is one of the critical points that needs close attention. The African experience of democracy is not without the experience of violence. Evidences are widespread. Some examples are: In 2008 when I was finishing up my undergraduate studies, Kenya, one of the recent African states seen to have put bad days from the last authoritarian tendencies behind was caught in political violence that did not end until power sharing agreement was reached between the incumbent Mwawi Kibaki and his challenger Raila Odinga. Another was the 2011 election violence in Ivory Coast in which the incumbent president refused to step down after election results were announced. These examples provide a glimpse of the violence that states used against pro-democracy and opposition parties and their supporters. Within such a violence environment, it is less likely that the opposition will have an open and just environment where they can operate for the good of democracy development. While these proposals may indeed satisfy us as to the problems that transition to democracy run into in Africa, these are not the only items.

*Corruption from Above:* Burce Giley (2010) devoted his article on democracy and its failures in Africa. Among the things his article talks about as formidable obstacles to democracy in Africa are: Number factor is the state failure, which he regarded as “increasingly African phenomena” (Giley, 2010: 94). While state failure or weakness may come in various forms, one of the things associated with its cause is what he coined as the “Big Man rule”. This big man rule is described as follow

What describe big man rule is that it represent an environment in which power of the government is vested in one leader who in turn governs through networks of whom he is the both and

the king---in this form of relationship, nothing call judicial independence, bureaucratic politics, less or weak opposition to be seen other than a commanding well organized and planned team of thugs running public affairs around the big man (Gilley, 2010: 94).

This statement gives us an opportunity to look at level of corruption and its relationship to the lack of democracy in Africa. Corruption in an African context is a drum that is often beaten and danced to from above, while being spectated from below. A Ghanaian economist argues that what is preventing democracy in Africa can be attributed in to two things: one being what he called the “Hippos’ . This group represents the first generation of African leaders who he argued “ran Africa into the ground after the independence by ruling like village chiefs”... The second group is the “Cheetahs’ group. This group represents African leaders of 1990s who assumed state power as a result of the 1990s democratic success (Gilley, 2010: 93). The Cheetahs, according to Gilley (2010) have turned their back and have since then turned into hippos and now appear to be indispensable. What his statement means is that even though the 1990s African leaders who assume power through ballot boxes allowed some moderation early on, the problem is that many, if not all of them have turns into the policies of their predecessors.

The above position has been supported by scholars like Larry Diamond, one of the most prominent scholars on democracy as a whole, democracy in Africa, but especially democratization in Nigeria. In his article, “*The Rule of Law versus the Big Man*”, Diamond (2008) characterizes the big man rule in the same colors as Gilley. However, what he adds is that the big man rule impedes the rule of law because under him, (the big man) the state becomes a house that is looted day in and day out and any law preventing it, or judge trying to

exercise justice, are often removed and replaced by loyalists (Diamond, 2008: 145 ; See also Gilley,2010: 94).

Wherever the big men have the power in their hands, they become absolutist by taking all states matters to their own hands. These situations allow Diamond to argue that they bring the memories of a time when the ‘king of the hill hang on and on” (Diamond, 2008: 146). The kings of the hills in Africa are not few, but are many in numbers. Examples include Yuwari Museveni of Uganda who has been Uganda president since 1986. Others are Meles Zenawi who is Ethiopia’s prime minister since 1993 until his death this year.

*Exclusive politics in Africa:* A good reason for relating exclusive politics with the lack of democracy and democratization in Africa is very much represented by the rebellions that have come and go in Africa. Many if not all Africa rebellions are consequences of the lack of inclusive politics on one hand and the presence of widespread evidence of political exclusion on the other hand. When Dhal (1971) argued about the ways in which a regime can get into polyarchy quickly is for a government of that state to adopt a broad base politics that include all persons. There has not been data obtained about this, but the overall assumption is that when a state allows people full political participation, there exist an indication that this political pluralism lead to full democracy.

*Knowledge of what democracy is in Africa:* Another issue of concern that has been raised in the argument about the failure of democracy in Africa is lack of public knowledge on democracy is really about. Bratton & Mattes (2001); and Braddly (2005) investigate both the meaning and support for democracy in Zambia, Ghana, and South Africa, the following is the summary of their findings.

Respondents in Zambia were able to equate democracy with political procedures including holding close contested elections. In the case of Ghana, the answers were both compelling and moving; 28% of the respondents associated democracy with liberties, 22 % for democracy as form of ‘government by the people’, 9.2% equate it with voting rights while 24.8% basically hang up their gloves, get honest and answered do not know when asked to expressed their opinion about the first defining things that come to mind when hearing democracy. Not only this, Overwhelming majority, 91.3 of South African saw democracy in redistributive terms getting housing, jobs and bringing a substantial and stable income home they had varying opinion whether it was necessary to have regular elections or not ( Bratton & Mattes, 2001:454).

As it can be seen above, the conclusion that can be reached is that democracy is popular, as it has been and it will continue to remain as such in Africa. However what is striking here is that, even though the respondents came from three countries, they are basically the population of a sample within the general population of Africa. What they portrayed is that vast majority of Africans in countries where political liberation has taken place before still do not know the true meaning of democracy.

*Elites factor in democratic transition.* Many scholars have explored the role of elites in states transition to democracy. While much literature exists, Burton and Higley (1989) are the authors whose point of view and discussion of the role of elites within the transition to democracy paradigm will be discussed here. The authors did not look at the role of the elites in only transition into democracy but also de-democratization. In this case, their research concerned with what they termed as the “National elite” which according the definition given is any national with entrenched power to effect national politics in his/her given state (Burton and Higley,1989: 18).

The authors categorized elites into two main groups: One is disunities and the other is unified elites (Burton and Higley, 1989: 17). The first being the type of elites that often

generated the events that bring about either democratic failure or the state failure as the whole. The latter is the one that can help moved a regime toward democratization. In their discussion of democratization and de-democratization, these scholars found that between 1963 and 1968, Africa was a victim of the disunified elites; and as a result less than 64 or more state seizer attempts were witnessed (Burton and Higley, 1989: 20).

Bratton Michael and Nicolas van de Walle (1994) build on this argument in their discussion of African elites. Because of the patrimonial nature of African states, the lack of political opening that we saw ongoing is due to the fact that African national elites found it harder to transform political systems because of the loss of incentives (Bratton and Walle, 1994: 462). Even in cases were a civil society that is known for advancing democratization is present, most African elites, but particularly head executives used their power advantage to weaken the civil society. What this does according to these authors is that when a social movement or pro-democratic protest broke out, the weak civil society cannot do anything because its lacks support (Bratton and Walle, 1994: 462). It can be concluded from this reason that elites served both functions, help the country in transitioning to democracy and away from democracy.



## Chapter Three

### Case Studies

#### Case I: Uganda

Uganda represents one of the most interesting cases in this thesis. After gaining independence in 1962, Uganda was one of the earliest African states with democratic tendencies e.g, constitution was put in place, rule of law, and parliamentary elections held. From good luck to bad luck, Uganda's politics went into decay between 1970s to 1984; a period describe in this paper early as the time period in which early African democracies were swept away by a flash flood of military coups, dictatorship, and authoritarianism. It was necessary to highlight Uganda's past political experience. However, this thesis is concerned with is the period from 1985 to present.

The National Resistance Movement under Museveni was a rebel movement inspired by its desired to re-install and restore democracy in Uganda after it experienced decisive years of misrule. In clarifying the objective of his rebellion to the outside world and Ugandans in particular, Museveni, is quoted saying that "we are fighting for the democratic rights and human dignity of our people" (Omara-Otunnu Amii, 1992: Page number here). The soon to be president of Uganda, reinforced the fundamental goal of his NRM as follow:

In order not to make the form of democracy his movement was fighting for to be very far from becoming a "mockery", democracy, he argued would contain some of the important parts in it. Number one was that the system has to be a parliamentary system where each member would be elected to in free and fair elections. Second is the installment of popular democracy that granted equal rights and allow every Uganda a decent political participation. Third is for that democracy to provide Ugandan with outstanding standard of living (Omara-Otunnu, 1992: 447).

The form of democracy, Museveni and his NRM wanted to establish seem to have come true when his military won the battle in 1986. The NRM established itself as the true representative government of Uganda. What this meant was that the undemocratic nature and bad experiences of the previous administrations were to be left behind. What was meant to take its place was liberal democracy. What the NRM and Museveni awarded to Ugandans for their support was the opposite. Political reforms did not just fail but they were not started in the first place. In fact, the NRM took the fight back into the media and the public as a whole. One example, Omara-Otunna (1997) writes that Museveni's team did not waste time in reverting to the old terror by first warning the public media that they should look their steps or otherwise risked incarceration at any time. This declaration did not stop there. Found in this cited work are the name of the former persons who met their fate.

Former-Vice President Francis Bwengye, minister of finance opposition party leading figure, editor in chief of the citizen newspaper, Anthony Ssekwenyama, anticipated Uganda future president Kayiira, all found themselves arrested and charged over the allegations that they were undermining and posing a threat to Museveni rule and the state stability as a whole (Omara-Otunna, 1999: 449).

After 1989, Uganda joined the community of African single party states. However, this later changed when tectonic protest movements for democracy propelled onto the national stage in Africa at the time. Even though he had made it clear in his previous speeches that he was not enthusiastic or looking to take international donor aid, for he believed it was bad for Africa, Nzongola-Ntalaja and Lee (1997) argued that Museveni and his NRM movement were faced with economic difficulty and if they rejected the aid, there were no other alternatives. This situation forced Museveni and his NRM controlled government to look for a paradigm shift. The shift was that Museveni and his NRM had had to sing the song of the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank so that Uganda received momentary assistances it needed (Nzongola Ntalja and Lee, 1997: 46).

It was evidenced that the IMF and World Bank song indeed brought changes to Ugnada. By early 1990s, Uganda was in a transition stages. For example, agenda for the rewrite of the constitution adopted. Political parties return from hiding. Uganda, around this time period received warm applause and even some branded her a “Beacon of Hope” (Mugisha, 2004: 140).

Despite the recognition it received after its liberalization program, it is possible that you get debated in Uganda if you happen to rated Uganda to be democratic. Uganda is a partial democracy according to Freedom House table found on page --- of this book. What is happening in Uganda is a disappointment. The country is becoming more and more authoritarian as Mugisha (2004) has claimed. Each elections is a last time for President Museveni but he keep coming back and run when a national election comes(Mwenda and Tangri, 2010: 34). That this means is that Uganda has reversed course and it may be moving into the 1960s and 1970s when power becomes a cause for rebellions including the NRM rebellion.

There are many reasons to fear. The first thing is that Museveni and NRM elites have placed strong resistance to the idea of multiparty politics. One may even say that they do not know actually what they wanted to be. They seem to be for multi-party politics but they are against it at the same time. In Summing up the system that Uganda has, Giovanni (2003) called it a “No-Party Democracy”. This could mean many things to many people. What is to be made about this system is that it does recognize part politics. The name says it all and nothing more.

Since the establishment of no-party democracy, democracy and democratization that Ugandans have hoped for has instead been abandoned and the country has fallen back into a system of “One man rule” or the “big man” discussed early in the literature section of this thesis. This position is also consistent with what Mwenda made of Museveni and democratization in Uganda. He argues that Museveni is the only one who “wears all the hats and pulls all the strings” (Mwenda 2007, 27).

Building on the point raised in the quote, Museveni has not refrain from breaking his democratic promises. Having advanced his no-party politics, the NRM has remained the sole party. This gave him all the rights and powers to govern with presidential decrees or make changes to anything political or social in Uganda. In 2004, Museveni did what most African leaders do best, making the state constitution their personal book or journal note book where one can write anything at any moment. One good example is his rants on the 1995 democratic constitution:

The president issued presidential decrees removing term limits on the office of the president, eliminated number of years on which the judge can qualify, dismantled parliament’s power to vet on the president’s ministerial posts and finally scrapped and eliminated the office of the Human Rights Commission (Mwenda, 2007: 24).

There are number of explanations to be generated from the actions above. In *Democracy and Development*, Przeworski and his team of editors define democracy in many terms but one definition that strikes to the heart of this argument characterized democracy as a form of political system under which those running the country or to be specific, the executive, can lose re-elections and can make way for the president elect to assume office in accordance with that state constitution (Przeworski et al, 2000: 54). From this definition of democracy, what is seen in Uganda is the opposite. By removing term limits, it means that Museveni can

run over and over again. He has in fact done just that over the years. In order to Uganda to qualify as a democratic country, the idea is not that Museveni leave office for one and for all but that the rule of law is observed, Human rights is protected, voices are being heard by the government. And more importantly, the office of the president is occupied in a smooth political exchange between the winner and a loser.

## Case II.

### Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a country that has remained a nucleus of Africa. Whether it was during the colonization of Africa or now, it still plays a central role in many political and social issues in Africa. It became a victim of the socialist and tyrannical government of Mengistu Haile Mariam, who overthrew a constitutional monarch in 1974. Mengistu went on to rule Ethiopia with an Iron fist in a 17 year rule that was often characterized by growing violations of human rights. Those days were seen to have been laid to rest in 1991 when a coalition of rebel movements for democracy (Ethiopia Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF) took down Mengistu's regime and exiled him to Zimbabwe.

What was supposed to take place was the transition to a democracy. For Joireman (1997) transition began with a conference in which Ethiopians from all walks of life, students, traders, politicians, opposition groups including Mengistu former supporters as well as the other outside stakeholders, meet to decide the fate of democracy in a new Ethiopia. The conference was a success as it later led to the formation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. Meles Zanawi was elected under the constitution.

Since taking office, Meles Zanawi and EPRDF has tried to differentiate themselves and the way they would rule from their predecessors. For example, all Ethiopia ethnic minorities were given specific rights, including the rights to break away from Ethiopia to become an independent state (Young, 1998:194). Whereas this right was made available to all Ethiopia's ethnic groups, it marks the last time the government of Ethiopia was seen to be on the people's side. Those who have wished this to continue were completely in violation of African leaders'

love affair with state power. What latter emerged in Ethiopia, although it keep calling itself a democracy, is a diverted transition from pro-democracy to autocracy and authoritarianism.

Meles has retained the office and title of Ethiopia's prime minister since his election following the fall of socialist Mengistu regime.

Many questions and answers have been raised about what actually led to the failure of democracy transition in Ethiopia. Who's fault was it? Or in other words, who should be held accountable if a warrant is given? Teams of scholars on Ethiopia have discussed some clues they believed have cause the fall back in, instead of seeing positive developments in Ethiopia. One of the explanations fall in line with the issue of the state failure hypothesis that was already explain in the literature. Therefore, I felt there is no need to repeat it here. To redefine what state failure is in African context, I personally use it in this study to mean incapacity of the government in power to govern. Some would cite the presence of rebels as a symptom of state failure. This is not the only issue that has affect Ethiopia's democratization. Ottaway (1995) also noted that lack of resources has not only limit the ability of the government to act responsibly but citizens and opposition parties have been the one mostly devastated. What this means is that participation, which a country in transition like Ethiopia needed, was low.

One other point to be made about the ongoing transition into autocracy rather than to democracy is that the leader was in fact more interested in developing ways in which his grip on power could not be challenged or seized by another. This point upholds Lipset argument by showing that the transition to democracy struggled to become a reality in Ethiopia, because the country had not had any "democratic transformation" existing in the first place (Ottaway, 1995: 68).

A third factor is a striking one. There is no any discussion on transition to democracy without mentioning political opposition parties. This paper has mentioned this in previous sections by citing Robert Dahl (1971). This same thing can be repeated here through the work of Przeworski *et al* (2000) who argued that in order for democratization to take place, a country has to have more than one party. What these authors are saying is that the goal of the opposition is not just to be there but they have to engage in politics. Some opposition parties have been part of the problem hindering democratization in Ethiopia. For example, Ottaway (1995) blames Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) for two reasons: The first is that OLF was expected to play a very important role during the transition process, but it performed below expectations. Second reason was that it did not counter EPRDF head on even though it has enormous power relative to that of the ruling party (Ottaway, 1995: 74)

The above author is not the only one blaming opposition parties on the failure of transition and democratization in Ethiopia. Joireman (1997) places most of the blames on the opposition parties in general. EPRDF may have been uncooperative and unforgiving. On the other hand, Joireman (1997) noted that the process was democratic exercise with a high degree of inclusiveness. What bring the down fall or in that sense what led to EPRDF hegemony in Ethiopia's political rested with opposition. Instead of engaging in the political process, almost all opposition parties in Ethiopia only like to charge the EPRDF with tribal politics rather they should have been engaging them at every opportunity (Joireman, 1997: 388) what has come to hunt the opposition as a result of their tactics is the EPRDF took advantage of the situation by portraying them as not being serious about participating in politics but wanted to cause state crisis. One other failure these authors associated with the failure of democracy in Ethiopia is the role of international or external bodies. Ottaway(1995) also placed blame on the United



States by arguing that while the U.S supports the advancement of democracy, the position it took was inconsistent with its democracy mission because it was focusing on the stability of Ethiopia. It should have continued pressuring the regime on transition and democratization process (Ottaway, 1995:74).

Case III.

## Eritrea

Eritrea is an interesting case. Its' historical background is identical to the history of South Sudan. Until 1941, the area that is Eritrea today was a colony of Italy. This history later changed when Second World War led to the Axis's loss of their overseas territories. Eritrea, as a result was first transferred to the British Empire but was withdrawn and placed in federation with Ethiopia (Sherman, 1980). Ten years later, Eritrea under the Haile Selassie Monarchy was annexed into Ethiopia, its' previous separate autonomous administration was eliminated, and it became a province of Ethiopia in 1962.

Ethiopia's declaration eventually triggered a long and bitter struggle for Eritrean identity. Eritrea People's Liberation Front (EPLF) came into existence in 1964 with the political objective of independence from Ethiopia. The war was long but the EPLF in coalition with Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF) matched to victory in Ethiopia, ending the entrenched socialist and dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. Following the fall of Asmara, the EPLF immediately declared Eritrea an independent state. In 1993, Eritrea became a newest nation after conducting a successful referendum.

It is stated in the literature section in this paper that many African leaders take democracy as a tool to get into power. This has a remained strategy that has not been corrected by many African leaders. This same strategy could be seen at work in the case of Eritrea. Eritrea's war against Ethiopia was without a question a war of identity politics, but the goal was freedom. When independence was finally achieved, transition to democracy was inevitable. Hob (1997) noticed that friends of Eritrea from outside world argued that Eritrea was going to be a leading example for African on both development and democracy.

Not even the outside world alone was the one with high hope for Eritrea. Optimism and expectations, particularly on democracy were very high among Eritrean citizens themselves. One Eritrean citizen captured the Eritrean public mood by arguing that Eritrea's future is not going to be in association with the experience of Africa... Eritreans knew what brand of country they wanted to build (Reid, 2005: 471). This statement was disputed by one young Eritrean who Reid interviewed. As he was interviewed, the young man, who is not mentioned by name argues in 2004 by asking that in the early days of the independence, Eritreans talked of a different Eritrea from other African countries; "Why it was that we thought we were any different, any better than the rest of Africa?, what gave us the right to think ourselves in that way" (Reid, 2005: 473).

The two questions raised by the young man demonstrate public frustrations and anger against the Eritrean government. Transition to democracy that was supposed to be happening, took a U-turn. . Democracy was possible but it was hijacked by the government. The EPLF and government of Isaias has its own view on the process in which democracy had to develop. The movement urged that the path to democracy had to be the *akay' da gobi ye*, which in translation means "the tortoise's pace"; in its simple translation, democratization had to proceed slowly and one step at a time (Hob, 1997: 650). The issue involved here has not been the time and the slowness of the democratic transition process itself. The main problem is that democracy has not taken this tortoise walk. What has happened is that Eritrea has been walked into single party and one man government. Freedom is suppressed. In present politics, Weldehaimanot (2010) noticed that "Eritrea is regarded the North Korea of Africa".

Eritrea's transition into being North Korea of Africa did not just come quickly. It began a few years after the declaration of the independence. The government failed to facilitate and

cultivate any process leading to democratization. Many people can form opinion about this. FOR Reid (2005), the issue was the EPLF was obsessed with its historical past. For example, He argued generally that history meant everything to the generation who brought freedom in 1993(Reid, 2005: 471). In fact, this history manifested itself when Eritrea went into border wars with its neighbors. The wars added to already divided country between those fought and who did participated in the liberation struggle. What this did was that Eritrea became a country governed by what he refers to as “liberation legacies” (Reid, 2005:471). Given that Eritrea has remained an EPLF country, one cannot go wrong to suggest and conclude that the liberators have won that internal struggle.

Since reversing to liberation politics as described above, Eritrea’s President, Isaias Afewerki, has since then ruled with the iron fist. While the constitution provided the basic foundation for governing, the transitional constitution that was drafted had been temporarily shelved and has not completely been put into effect (Weldehaimanot, 2010: 239). Even when confronted about the reason behind the move, the explanations that were given made the conversation interesting. The first explanation stated the constitution itself is “a paper”. Which means it is of little use. The second is that they argued “the rule of law is not the only option for good governance” (Weldehaimanot, 2010: 239-240). These two explanations pointed to the general argument that EPLF lacked interest or what so ever in democratization.

Not only has the president and his EPLF succeeded in governing without the constitution. Elections which are vital for democratization have not been held. The president has been asked directly but interestingly, he either jokingly or seriously answered that elections may not come or may come probably after three or more decades (Weldehaimanot, 2010: 240). It’s been decades already and elections have not yet come.

On freedoms such as freedom of information, Eritrea has basically remained a prison camp since independence. Even during the time when technologies such as the Internet, ipad, the digital phone and cameras and to social networks like twitter, Facebook to Myspace, those who earned Isaias Afewerki name “arrogant and control-freaks” in his personal rejection of donors aides, intended to help his poor country may now be proven right (Hob, 1997: 649). His government has led a strict rule and crackdown on the media and even academic. There is little internal reporting.

## Chapter Four

### Lessons four South Sudan

There are many lessons for South Sudan in this research. Unlike chapter three where each case study is argued independently, this chapter will not follow such organization. Argument in this chapter is a collection of lessons drawn from the three case studies that this paper employed. Before discussing these lessons, it will be helpful to the understanding of this important topic if I can first explain what the lessons are intended to do. The lessons have two basic functions. The first function to mention is that these lessons will direct the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the country as a whole, away from repeating the same transition mistakes made by National Resistance Movement in Uganda; Eritrea People's Liberation Front in Eritrea; and Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front in Ethiopia. Second function is that the lessons will allow the SPLM and South Sudan authorities to utilize any achievement made by the NRM, EPLF, and EPRDF to help process its democratization. There is one problem with this second function. The problem is that South Sudan may have difficulty finding any achievements due to the fact that the NRM; EPLF; and EPRDF have engaged in un-successful and messy democratization.

The three case studies have enough lessons for South Sudan. These lessons can help the SPLM and South Sudan to perform a successful transition, and to become a democracy if they are well understood, followed, and executed to their completion. The first lesson, South Sudan can learn from is the lack of democracy shown by the three movements in their early post-war periods. When Museveni and his NRM movement won the battle of Kampala, the victory was good news. Ugandans were jubilant because it was argued by many that the new president and his movement "...Would usher in genuine democracy and the enjoyment of Human Rights for the majority..." (Omara-Otunnu, 1992: 446). Given what is now known about the National Resistance Movement, it can be argued that Ugandans' expectations were turned into hopelessness by the National Resistance Movement. Democratization as it was hoped did not become a priority. What took its

place was the same politics that took Museveni to the bush. From 1986 through 1993, Uganda was a one party state. No oppositions, elections, elected parliament or democratic constitution.

Democracy returns to Uganda, following the popular uprising and the massive democratic protest movements that swept through Africa in the first half of the 1990s. The National Resistance Movement accepted multi-party politics as it was the case for rest of African states during that time period. The first indicating factor representing this change was the election for the constituent Assembly on March 28, 1994 (Carbone, 2003). This election paved the way for a multiparty constitution. By 1995, Uganda adopted new constitution, and Museveni was elected president for the first time, since taking power militarily in 1986 (Mugisha, 2004: 140). While these two reforms, constitution and presidential election symbolized steps toward democratic transition, NRM was not in position to widen the playing field. It knew that its authority and power could be challenged. As a result, the National Resistance Movement launched a democratization that can be termed 'gentle approach'. What this means is that the NRM allowed the process to proceed slowly as much as it can be. On the other hand, the intended target for Museveni and his party was not the actual democracy many Ugandans demand but rather it was a consolidation of his rules and government.

The gentle approach demonstrated that the National Resistance Movement was lacking the commitment to democratize Uganda. The NRM motive was to govern Uganda indefinitely. In fact, Museveni and his party has done just that. Tangri and Mwenda (2010) noticed that Museveni, as of 2010 encompassed the reign of his predecessors. This is Museveni's 26 years in power. Whether he will relinquish power after this term ended or hang on for more terms, Museveni will be remembered along with other African presidents, in the likes of Mubutu in

former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC) and many other first generations of African presidents who spent thirty or more years in office.

Democratization process, in Eritrea under EPLF, took the same path taken by the National Resistance Movement in Uganda. During their bush wars, both movements placed emphasis on democratization. NRM was credited for having had elections in many areas it controlled (Otunnu, 1992a: 446; Carbone, 2003b: 485). EPLF on the other hand did not hold elections. Instead, it was credited for gender reforms. For example, Eritrean women were treated as equal to men, many of them actually led infantries and fought alongside men in the battlefields (Connell, 2005: 70-71). After the war was won and Eritrea became independence, EPLLF continued to honor these reforms. For instance, when the first government was formed, women were appointed into ministerial positions such as justice, labor, tourism, and social affairs (Connell, 2005: 72).

While the gender reforms were good steps in a right direction, the EPL reversed courses on these reforms quickly. Connell (2005) noted that women were immediately disallowed to participate in public policy discussion nor allowed to compete for government positions. During the time the transition ended in 1997, Iyob (1997) was able to describe Eritrean democratization approach as a “cautious optimism”. Eritrea’s democratization was a caution process indeed. The party did not take any institutionalized reforms. Instead, the EPLF did what NRM had done so well in Uganda; taking control of the state. Like Museveni in Uganda whom Mugisha (2004) argued that he strengthened his grip on power by removing his rivals, Connell (2005) noticed it that, in order to cement his power,...the Eritrean President formed departments which he staffed with team of loyal and handpick staffers “who report to no one but himself”; also, ministerial position were constantly reshuffled ... to avoid any members



from gaining loyalty and alliance. This policy was enhanced during Eritrea war with Ethiopia. In 2000, Connell (2005) argued that the president initiated a “sweeping crackdown” on his critics within the EPLF by either removing them for all or removed them from their positions but continue to pay their salaries. This policy and behavior by the president, basically helps raised another issues in democratic governance which I will touch later on in this paper. Given the behaviors by the EPLF, idea of a democratic Eritrea was a bye gone case. Its’ comeback soon cannot be predicted as long Isaias and the EPLF run the country at its current state.

In comparison to the transitions in Uganda by the National Resistance Movement and in Eritrea by the EPLF, Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Front for Democracy has a much better approach to its democratization on paper but failed on the substances. The EPRDF, kicked off transition with a conference called to all parties, political organizations, and all other stakeholders to a conference in Addis-Ababa where the future of Ethiopia, with democracy on the table was discussed (Lyons, 1996: 123).

The above consultation exercise produced mixed reviews from many of the scholars who have observed Ethiopia transition right after independence. The process was democratic (e.g. Lyons, 1996: 122). Ottaway (1995), the process did not adhere to international standards. One of the issues was that the EPRDF controlled this process (Ottaway, 1995: 71). For example, EPRDF had 37 of the 87 representatives that developed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (Ottaway, 1995: 71). This number gave EPRDF unilateral advantage, whether it is by giving out directions, advancing its agenda or by voting.

One of the things South Sudan can take away from this experience should be the overall lack of commitment to democracy by these movements. Instead of taking advantage of the

honeymoon periods, we can see from the case studies that many of the reforms they should have taken were not pursued. For this reason, South Sudan can see that these movements missed great deal of time and opportunity in their early stage of development to show that they meant what they have said throughout their struggles. SPLM can avoid these missteps by undertaking reforms.

One of the ways in which SPLM can do this is by undergoing internal reforms. This is something that has not been done by any of the movements. There is a need for it because the structure of the SPLM administration has remained as it was during the course of struggle. During the war, SPLM and SPLA were one. The first being the political movement while the second was the military Wing as it was called the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The administration of the two was a top down leadership. John Garang, the founder, held chairmanship in both followed by second in Command, third, fourth and so forth.

After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the misery death of John Garang in the plane crash, 2005, the tradition of the SPLM/SPLA administration and leadership continues in its entirety during the Interim period. It has also remains so in the post-independence South Sudan. This tradition must be broken apart if the SPLM is indeed motivated and is serious about democratic transformation. There are couples things why breaking the two apart is critical to the success of the transition. Number one reason is that transition will be very difficult to complete if the SPLM and the SPLA continued to be inseparable. It was this type of relationship that gave NRM, EPLF and EPRDF advantage over other opposition parties. We have seen it playing very well in Uganda where Museveni has make good use of the military to keep his opponents at arm length (Mwenda, 2010: 35).

The above is a mistake that the SPLM and South Sudan should not repeat. The party should be separated from the SPLA by doing couple things. One is that the party should sit down for a reconstruction that will do away with bush leadership that recognized ranks from the highest to the lowers. This can be reverse by holding party election to elect those in civilian cloth to head the party. Writing of an inclusive party constitution that defined SPLM clearly as a political party and no longer a political and liberation movement would also help change mindset among the freedom fighters and supporters altogether.

The commitment for democracy argument leads to the second lesson for South Sudan. This lesson comes from constitution and constitutional development. Constitution is one of the common features of democratic states. Any state that wants to democratize is often expected to start that process with the writing of the constitution. The reason is not that it is a must make document. The best answer is provided by Deng (2008) when he quoted former South African minister of justice who argued that

“Constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which mechanically defines the structures of government and the relations between government and the governed, it is a ‘mirror of the national soul,’ the identification of the ideals and aspiration of a nation, the articulation of the values binding its people and disciplining its government”

The above word and definition even become more strong if we add Muma Ndulo’ s point of view which argue convincingly that the constitution should be nothing else but “an autobiography of the nation... people should be able to look at the constitution and see themselves and their lives and aspirations within its pages and their protection in its words” (Deng, 2008: 10). The three case studied nations have all saw constitutional development.

I will begin with NRM in Uganda. After sailing into presidency through the barrel of guns in 1986, Museveni and his National Resistance Movement were only interested in making sure democracy they talked about was just a thing of the past. Many of the materials used in this research have not shown any constitutional developments from 1986 to the 1992. After embracing democracy again in the 1993, the existing Uganda' constitution was drafted and put into effect in 1995.

On Eritrea and Ethiopia, the EPLF and EPRDLF did not follow in the footsteps of the National Resistance Movement. Both began their constitutional making process early. In Eritrea, constitutional body formed first to establish transitional constitution. The transition constitution was meant to last for the duration of the transition period as designated by the Provisional Government of Eritrea (Iyob, 1997: 648). However, the transition period ended without permanent constitution in place. Finally in 1997, permanent constitution was brought before Parliament which went ahead to ratify it, but the president did not sign or implement it (Iyob, 1997: 668). On the other hand, EPRDLF began its democratic transition with the consultation on the draft of the constitution, and transitional government. The constitution took long to come but it was finally adopted and put into law in 1997, two years after the transition ended.

What the constitutional developments in Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia teach South Sudan is timing. We can see in all three countries that constitutions were delayed. This is a good lesson for South Sudan because SPLM and South Sudan authorities can make sure that the final constitution get done and made ready for implementation once the transition period comes to end. Anything short of this can be a huge mistake because delay can lead to anxiety and distrust of government. What South Sudan can do in order to diffuse and not fall into this

same trap is to improve the item mention by starting process and writing of the permanent constitution soon than later. This is a very important step because it would give committee that will be responsible its development to have enough time and to finish it on time.

South Sudan has a good base on which it can start constitution development. First, there was an interim constitution which was established by the Comprehensive Agreement. The Interim Constitution was modified and changed into Transitional Constitution. These two constitutions have many of the features the final and permanent constitution should have. The only thing South Sudan need at this point in time is to build its permanent constitution from the two constitutions that are mentioned.

While the Constitutions making process is a good lesson for South Sudan, there is one aspect of it that neither the movement finished. This issue is the issue of the term limited on the office of the president. In Uganda, we knew that the 1995 democratic Constitution. Article 105 (2) established that the office of the president gets two five year terms (Mugisha, 2004: 140). This article came under heavy attack by Museveni and in 2005, he succeeded and the parliament removed term limit from the constitution (Tangri and Mwenda, 2010: 35). In Eritrea, the president shelved the permanent constitution despite the fact that it was ratified by elected parliament. Whether it has or does have the term limit, it' absent and existence cannot make any different now since the entire constitution is put on hold and has no use. Ethiopia's constitution also has no term limit either. And this has allowed Zenawi to run again and again before his death this year. It is premature at this moment, but perhaps, his successor will follow in the same footing.

While South Sudan may be well aware of the absent of term limit from these three countries and the tragedy it carry with it, The SPLM seem not to be getting better understanding of the consequences either. Many organizations such as the Carter Center have called upon the SPLM to include term limits, but the call seem to be falling into the deaf ears (Sudan Tribune, retrieve 10/22/2012). This action by the SPLM is a point of concern, and one that generates worries; not only about transition and the future of democracy, but it also include future of South Sudan as a viable state. One of the reasons is that many of the African rebellions, including NRM, EPLF, and EPRDF were fuelled by the lack of shared presidency. In Uganda for example, many things got involve but if we held them separate, the main cause to NRM war should be regarded a struggle over power and the office of president in particular. South Sudan should avoid all these future uncertainties by establishing term limit on the officer of the presidents as well as the governors. Doing just that will stabilized the country because aspirational leaders will be confident of their chances in ever election. This will also help eliminated rebellions since everyone would know that there are not offices for life.

The third lesson for South Sudan is found in the area of electoral politics. I will begin with Eritrea. Since gaining independent in 1993, Eritrea democratization took a hit early on. Reforms were slow coming. There is no record of a national elections and Isaias has not yet faced a political challenger in the national politics. Ethiopia and Uganda have carried out number of elections including local, regional, and presidential. The First elections in Ethiopia was the 1992 elections, followed by 1994, 1995 regional and parliamentary elections, 2000 and 2005 national elections. Elections in Uganda were the 1994, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2010.

While Ethiopia and Uganda can be characterized by frequently elections, the fact of the matter is that these elections have been marred with fraud, violence, and have failed to advance democratization in these countries. I begin with Ethiopia. The 1992 regional elections marked the first elections in decades. While the EPRDLF can be credited for having taken this path, the elections received tremendous outcry from the opposition parties (Joireman, 1997). The outcry led to the withdrawal of the Oromo Liberation Front, The only party along with EPRDLF that has its own army, pulling of the elections in protest against election irregularities (Joireman, 1997: 399). Withdrawal from elections by the opposition parties did not prevent or stop elections. And the EPRDF proceeded with elections. The second Election was the 1994 constituent Assembly. Significant of this election was that it was a ground breaking and acted as a prerequisite to the 1995 parliamentary election. While there should have been lessons learn in the 1992 elections, nothing was changed to improve these elections. As EPRDF insisted in conducting elections as planned, The opposition parties respond was more withdrawals and many of them pulled their candidates off and stayed home (Lyons, 1996: 130). Despite pullout, 38 small parties participated and off 547 contested seats, the EPRDF won 484, leaving only 63 to the oppositions (E.g Joireman, 1997a: 402; Lyons, 1996: 130). The next elections were the 1995 regional elections, 2000 elections and 2005 elections. Two elections 1995 and 2005 are critical to the understanding of democratization process an democracy development in Ethiopia

The 1995 regional and general elections came one year after the end of the transition period. While these elections were the second step in right direction in term of the transition to democracy in Ethiopia, Lyons (1996) argued that they were the elections where EPRDLF ‘dominance’ began. Given the lessons of 1992 elections, the opposition parties, many of them

refused to participate by citing irregularities and control by the EPRDF (Lyons; 1996, 132). Some of the parties that did not engage in elections were consisted of many of the big guns opposition parties such as The All-Amhara People's Organization; The Southern Coalition, and the Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (Joireman, 1997: 403). When the prime minister was confronted and questioned why many opposition parties did not contest election, Prime Minister Zenawi reply made the conversation even more interesting by replying that "One can take the horse to the river but one can't force the horse to drink water" (Lyons; 1996: 132). Apparently, what the prime minister missed here is that the opposition parties were eager to drink but he and his party was the one blocking them from drinking.

The election continued despite protest and condemnation from the opposing parties. From the perspective of one of the opposition member, Zenawi and EPRDLF party bragged about the elections being democratic, but they were far from being democratic. The respondent argued that "we don't consider it a democratic elections. --- This is an exercise where the same party and its surrogates are seeking a vote of confidence" (Lyons, 1996; 132). Having sidelined oppositions parties which had the capacity to challenge its power, EPRDLF emerged victorious.

Unlike the first three previous elections, 2005 elections according to Abbink (2006) were the most democratic elections Ethiopia has had since the EPRDF came to power. There are number of reason for this. Abbink (2006) mentions at least four reasons. The first was that it was well organized and peaceful in the beginning. Second was that level of participation by the opposition parties and third high voter turnout. What this means is that the election was a competitive election. For example, EPRDF maintained dominance but its seats were down from



484 in the previous election to 371 and the oppositions increased their seats to 171 (Abbink, 2006: 183). While these developments were good for the transition and democracy development in Ethiopia, the election did not end peaceful as it began. The trouble started again between the oppositions and the EPRDF. The disagreement escalated. Given its authoritarian attitudes and unwillingness to share power, the prime minister seized the opportunity and moved quickly to issue a ban on kind and type of demonstration for one whole month (Abbink, 2006: 185). The opposition did not like it. When students from Addis-Ababa Unity staged a protest in support of the students who were arrested for being supporters of one of the oppositions, CUD, EPRDF security attacked them, this situation led to the death of one female student the next day (Abbink, 2006:186). While Ethiopia did not explode, but a situation like this will not be helpful for democratization if they continue to exist in Ethiopia after Meles.

Elections in Uganda are similar to the Ethiopian elections. Its first multiparty elections were carried out in 1996. The second election was that of 2001, lack of specificity existed but there is a consensus among many Ugandans that Museveni's election victories in almost every election is not without vote corruption. On similarities, both Uganda and Ethiopia have had elections periodically since their first elections. Secondly, there are no term limits on the office of the presidents and that has allowed both Museveni and Meles to run over and over again. On differences, the fundamental difference is that Ethiopia unlike Uganda is a home to several opposition parties which are all formed along ethnic lines. Many if not all have direct ethnic names. For example, All Amhara Peoples' Organization, which is for the Amhara ethnic group, Guroge Peoples' Democratic Front for Guroge ethnic group etc. This is something that is not only uncommon in Uganda, but is sanctioned and outlawed by Museveni and his National

Resistance Movement. While Ethiopia has significant opposition parties, Uganda is a home to three parties namely, the National Resistance Movement, Uganda People's Congress, and Uganda Party.

The conduct of elections we see in Ethiopia and Uganda, in addition to the absent of elections in Eritrea presented South Sudan with some good lessons. The first lessons for South Sudan is that it should know path to democracy starts with elections. For this reason, Eritrea model is not a favorable option to consider. The best way is to follow in the footsteps of both Ethiopia and Uganda which have elections as outlined by their constitutions. However, the Uganda and Ethiopia elections cannot too transformed South Sudan into democracy because exchange of power is necessary and this has been absent due to their omission of the term limit. If there was term limit, perhaps, these countries would be successful democracies. South Sudan can avoid this mistake by accepting and adopt a two term limit, either for a period of four or five year..

The second other lessons South Sudan can take from this electoral experiences is that elections have not been democratic as discussed early. What This means for South Sudan and the SPLM in particular is that it must work to avoid repeating these missteps by the National Resistance Movement and Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. It will be a big challenge how the SPLM can refrain from the same failure. However, that does not means there are no alternative on how and what can be done. There has not been a discussion on particularity of election laws in both countries. What this means is that South Sudan authorities can put down elections laws to govern the conducts of elections as well as how to deal with uncertainties. By doing just that, South Sudan elections can not only be democratic but will

also pave the way for greater and smooth transition that will also pave way for a functioning democracy.

The final lesson for South Sudan is the lesson on democratic governance. Based on cases studies and the story of transitions in the three countries, I tend to argued that the three movements did not governed democratically, either during the course of transition or after the end of the transitions. By democratic governance, I agree to the definition provided by the World Bank which define it as a governance measured by effective of the rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability (World Bank. retrieve 11/2/2012) .

Although the four terms and many others are some of the face of democratic governance as defined by the World Bank, I wanted to concentrate on the rule of law, control of corruption and voice, which is represents the idea of civil society. The literature section discussed these as some of the factors that have crippled democratization in Africa. From the case studies, we can see that they have been party of the reasons why democratizations in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea were unsuccessful. The story is about to repeat itself in South Sudan.

. On the rule of law, the new nation is flooded with wide spread organized crimes, of which most of them are committed by the police particularly in the state capital Juba. Journalists are the most affected group. Last year, the new nation received condemnation worldwide when Journalist and the host of Radio, Wake UP Juba, Mading Ngor was torture for appearing at the Parliament session (Sudan tribune, 10/19/2012). This was not the only occasion, South Sudan received another condemnation this year when Deng Athuai, head of South Sudan Civil Society was arrested and torture to a near death (Sudan Tribune, Retrieve 11/2/2012). Another dispute is now ongoing and that is the charges of rape, and torture by the Human Rights Watch against the

SPLA's disarmament unit in trouble Jonglei state (Sudan Tribune, retrieve 10/29/2012) To make matters worse, South Sudan according to a press release by the Sudan Tribune on August 29, 2012 confirmed that United Nations Human Rights representative to the country has been discredited and is expelled from the country (Sudan Tribune, retrieve 10/29/2012). All these incidents reveal a bigger picture and that is lack of the rule of law, and inability by the government to enforce the rule of law. This is not an endorsement of the crackdown policies of the EPLF in Eritrea, but this is a call to the government of South Sudan to not only enforce law, but to show the way so that citizens become law abiding people. When the government becomes too compulsion, the action leads to recklessness by the citizens. What South Sudan need to is to reforms its police and the military alike so that they know their duties to, not only to the nation but to their citizens.

On corruption, little is written about it in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This leaves the SPLM and South Sudan government to look up to Uganda and how the National Resistance Movement deals with corruption. Corruption was one of the problems that Museveni and his National Resistance Movement wanted to get rid off, when he took up arm against Obote regime. This was made clear in the "ten point programs" and corruption was listed number of 7 (Flanary and Watt, 1999: 517) After winning the war, Museveni and his NRM followed up this promise by establishing office of Auditor General (AG) and Inspectorate Government (IG) as means to fight corruption (Flanary and Watt, 1999: pp. 524, 528). Interestingly, while these two bodies should have root out corruption in Uganda, since their duties were defined clearly, Mwenda and Tangri (2001) noticed that they have failed to deal with high profiles, implicated in some of the corruption issues in Uganda. The reasons is simple and that is continued interference by the president and his NRM party on behave of culprits (Mwenda and Tangri, 2001: 129). When we come to South Sudan, the new nation is flooded with corruption scandals. in March This year, an article published online on

South Sudan Nation home page read “*Corruption Bombshell: The most Corrupt officials*”, this article went on to mention SPLM secretary general Pagan Amum; South Sudan Vice President Riek Machar; Speaker of the South Sudan Parliament Wani Igga, and the President Kiir as the most top corrupted officials in South Sudan (South Sudan Nation., Retrieved, March, 20, 2012). The revelation did not stop there, Sudan tribune published a news report, in which President Kiir reveal that he has written a letter to 75 officials, not named in the article to return 4 billion they are accused of stealing (Sudan Tribune, retrieve 10/8/2012). This is not to shed light on any given rumor or accusation that have not been settled in the court of law. However, there seem to be accuracy here and may be sooner or later, truth would be known on this matter.

Corruption is one alongside rule of law that the South Government needed to tackle. These two things go one in hand. Without the rule of law in place, No matter what the government does, things like corruption will be very difficult to be controlled. So, the question here becomes, what can South Sudan do to combat corruption? The answer here is to take Uganda process as a model to wage a war on corruption. Already, article 102 (1/a) of South Sudan Transitional Constitution established Anti- Corruption Commission of South Sudan (Sudan, Tribune, 11/20/2012). South Sudan can incorporate this commission into its permanent constitution. I expect it to be done. Present of such a body on paper will not lead to reduction in corruption. What South Sudan can do in order to avoid what happen with anti-corruption in Uganda is for South Sudan to do two things. One is to make the commission completely independent from any branch of the government and secondly to task it with powers so that it can has a jurisdiction to deal with any form of corruption and to prosecute wrong doers. This will be the only solution to tackle corruption, if not, South Sudan will just become another Uganda were corrupt individual continue with business as usual and no fear for any consequences.

One of the third things that deserve attention in this argument of democratic governance is the civil society and the need by the government to engage it all public policy and decision matters. There is little research on civil society in Eritrea. In Ethiopia, civil society organizations, according to Teshome (2009) were allowed to exist and operated freely in post-Mengistu regime by the EPRDF from 1991 through 2005. This has change in recent years. The government began to be worried of the organizations and their role in day to day affairs. As a result, Meles government passed a law known as Charities and Society Draft Proclamation, which aimed at regulation of the civil society organizations in the country (Teshome, 2009: 86). The motive for this law cannot be regarded only as regulatory law but it will also give the government right to do away with some, if not all of them in the near future.

The EPRDF action that we saw above has already taken place in Uganda. In the post-war periods, Lee and Nzongola-Ntalaja (1998) argued that Museveni and his NRM move quickly to allow the formation of civil society organizations. In fact, it was directly involved in this process. For example, it hosted and supported a student movement in 1988 (Lee and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998: 47). In respect to women, women were represented in every Resistance Council by a secretariat; and in 1993, National Association of Women's Organization in Uganda (NAWOUO was created with the help and support from the NRM (Lee and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998: 47). These two developments entail NRM's desire to construct and build a democratic society. However, that is not how it turns out to be. The government maintained interest in them and this could be verified as follow. One of the reasons is that their leaders were chosen by the NRM and what this means according to these two authors is that the organizations were "orbit of the state" (Lee and Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1998: 49). This is to say that the organizations were not independent to peruse their own policies but only polices crafted by the Museveni and his NRM.

While the NRM has reduced opposition parties to the rubble, the presence of civil society organizations is meaningless. For these authors, civil society organization will just “melt and crumble” in the face of the controlled NRM Uganda (Lee and Nzungu-Ntalaja, 1998; 51).

The above narrative on the civil society in Uganda has one lesson for South Sudan. The lesson is that Museveni and his National Resistance Movement has not made civil society organizations part of the public policy and governance in Uganda. In Lee and Nzungu-Ntalaja (1998), point of view, civil society organizations in Uganda have been at “bay”. With civil society organizations considered part of democratic governance, few civil society organizations are beginning to form, and it is very important that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and South Sudan Government do not follow NRM dealing with civil society. What South Sudan can take from here is simply and that is make civil society organizations, not enemies of the state but part of a governing coalition and should be consulted, so that they involve in every public policy and decision pertaining their interest. In order to make a successful transition to democracy, civil society organizations have to be part of that journey.

## Prospects and Pitfalls

This paper was two parts arguments. The first half covers democracy and the case studies. The second, which is the shorter sections, is about prospects and pitfalls to democratization in South Sudan. What conditions make it possible for South Sudan to democratize? And what conditions make it difficult? Due to the current situation in South Sudan, it looks convincing that there are fewer prospects than pitfalls. That is South Sudan has many conditions that will make it hard for transition and democratization to take place. I will first discuss some of the prospects that may permit democratization.

One of the first prospects that may be a sign of hope for South Sudan to emerge as a democracy is dependency. I used this word (dependency) with high caution and I would wish my readers to take the path as well. This is done to lower any expectations it may carry. Dependency could be political, social, cultural or economic. The first three are not the subject of discussion. The subject of discussion is economic. The view out there is that African is economic dependent. This view does not need verification because it is a true fact that Africa survived on western aid or foreign assistance. I have mentioned early that the National Resistance Movement in Uganda took political liberalization to heart as a way to attract donor countries to grant it fund. In opposite, Alex de Wall (1997) argued that foreign aides complete quite opposite, it allowed many authoritarians to remain in powers more than it is anticipated. Goldsmith (2001) also sees little linkage between western aid and some of the democratic successes made by some African countries. They argued that democratization steps we see in many African countries is not explained only by aid but duo to some other factors which appeared to be internal in nature.



South Sudan is a 9 million populated country blessed with underground natural resources. None of these resources is running. Oil which was the only source of government's revenue was shut down due to disagreement with the north over transit fees. However, mismanagement is a huge killer and the south still remain intake with foreign aides particularly from the United States. While it is facing severe challenges and no resources to take on such problems, I argued that South Sudan will have a change of heart just as Uganda did and will carry out some democratic reforms so that the U.S cannot discontinue funds. In fact, the argument I 'm making here is supported by one of the article published by Sudan Tribune. The Sudan Tribune published a report in which U.S ambassador to South Sudan, Susan Page, delivered what I would call an early warning. The ambassador warned that South Sudan may lose U.S support if the government does not take steps to reverse its undemocratic rules (Sudan Tribune. Retrieved 9/24/2012). It is quite difficult to narrate what the South Sudan government would do but statement like this cannot be ignored by Juba. South Sudan is facing a dare economic situation and it may continue that way for sometimes. For this reason, there is a chance that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the government of South Sudan will be forced into democratization even if it does not want.

Search for market may bring blessing to the possibility of transition in South Sudan too. Relationships between the people in South and the north has provided opportunity for Southerners to look east as they see themselves more related to the Kenyans, Ugandans, Tanzanians and Burundis. The adventure developed strongly during the war when many refugees from the South were sheltering in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. The relationship even becomes stronger especially after the signing of the compressive peace agreement. When South Sudan finally gained independence, there have been influx of professionals, business men and women from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Somalia into the country and are operating normally in South.

Now, chances are that if you sit in a hotel in Juba, Wau, Malakal or Bor, you either see a Kenyan to your left and a Ugandan to your right. From this experience and intermingling by the people, South Sudan is looking to become part of the East African Community for many purpose, such as cultural relations, market and development interests. Last year, South Sudan forwarded its application to become member of this community (Sudan Tribune, 9/12/2012). However, a release published online, All Africa, report the ‘defers’ of South Sudan and Somali applications to become a member of the community because the two countries failed to meet democracy, respect for Human Right requirements (All Africa, retrieve 12/08/2012) South Sudan maintains high interest in this organization and that may allow the South to reconsider its democratization process and to adopt position that permit, perhaps, controlled and restricted democratization that we saw in Uganda.

If there is another thing that can be seen as a prospect for democracy in South Sudan, then it has to be the referendum exercise of January 9, 2011. Many people from South believed that free and fairs elections are not knew in the area when compare to Khartoum. Many pointed to the local and regional elections of the 1970s and early 1980s after the signing of the Addis-Ababa Peace Agreement. None of those elections has been recorded or reported in many of the writings on South Sudan and so is there used in this argument unnecessary. This makes the Referendum excise the only legitimate democratization process South Sudan has experience.

The important thing about the referendum to the development of democracy in South Sudan is not only that it brought the session. There are many other reasons why it is a point of hope for democracy development. Without having had such unprecedented experience before, it was expected that the referendum would not be carried out as plan due to many things like timing, lack of organization on the ground. Still, South Sudanese with guidance from the Sudan Peoples’

Liberation Movement broke through all the odds and carry out the referendum on time. The Referendum was organized by team of volunteers, many of whom had never participated in occasion big as the referendum. Given the experience, average South Sudanese will be expected to have a high demand for democratization than if they were not informed before.

The second support to this was how it turns out to be a very smooth referendum. There were a lot of cynicism leading up to the actual day and date of voting. Many including the government in Khartoum did not expect it be free and fairs. However, the referendum turns out to be a smooth and well organized event. Many international observing groups and organization such as the Carter Center, one of the few non-profit organizations that is promoting democracy around the globe, published a preliminary report on which it complemented South Sudanese people and their government and declared the process and results as free and fairs based on International Standards (Carter Center, Retrieve 10/12/2012).

Thirdly, the referendum meets the qualifications of being a prospect for democracy. This is because it has given South Sudanese a taste of the right to vote and how to use it. Since independence, Sudan has been a country that has suffered dearly in the hands of undemocratic regimes. The first was the The Abboud's junta of 1958 to 1964. The second was the 1969 to 1985 Nimeiri regime and the final, which is not discussed but needed to be add, is the 1989 military dictatorship of the current Sudan President Bashir (Ryle *et al*, 2011: 87-93). Adding two rounds of wars between the South and North, the country has not been democratically governed. This situation is even worse in the South were underdevelopment had prevent most from even knowing there is a government leave alone being politically informed. It is a hope that this has changed with the independence of the South in 2011. However, it's a situation that cannot be changed in one day or two. But for a point of optimism, significant number of people in the South who did not

know about the right to vote and its important can be said now that they have learned and now know their political rights, how to request and use it. As the South progresses, it can be argued that people will be willing to demand democratic rights if the government is not giving it to them or become.

## Pitfalls

There are many pitfalls. Many people would point to poor economy and economic growth; others would not be afraid to name poverty to be the number one challenge to South Sudan democratization. Many would definitely point to political underdevelopment in term of educations, knowledge of political rights and other values that comes with it. Given the ongoing ineffective control of corruption in a country were resources are scare and the citizens are going hungry, sleep or live on one meal per a day or two, It would not be incorrect if anyone has to list corruption to be the one that will eventually cause transitions and democracy setbacks in the new nation. However, all the issues and the challenges that are mention are real and dangerous in South Sudan than ever before. Nevertheless, I tend to argue that they may be the least problems to democratization there. Rather, I argued that the number challenge and one that can kill democratization at a speed of lightening is instability that is developing and growing fast in South Sudan. This is not only the stability of a country alone but also the stability of the system of government and governance. As a nation born out of a decades of war, the country is awash with so many divisions that goes way back to 1980s. This division has return after the independence of the South in 2011. What supported this was the last year incident when the students at Juba University fought over a soccer argument. The fighting as it was reported started between two students, but it went immediately from being Dinka students on one side and the Equatoria students at the other end (Sudan Tribune, 10/8/2012) as a result, Juba University was later closed for one whole year because of this ethnically motivated violence (Sudan Tribune. Retrieve, 10/8/2012).

Another example source of instability is the rivalry among South Sudan cattle keeping ethnic group such as the Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Anyuak etc. The rivalry was ignited to a new

level during the war. Khartoum used to arm ethnics and tribal groups such as the Murle which did not alliance with the SPLA to attack communities and tribes particularly the Dinka and the Nuer were SPLA gained support (Johnson, 2004. cited in Arnold, 2007: 492). This year, a paper published on e-irs web page by Diana Felix Da Costa, details specially the ethnics conflict of in Jongles States were ethnic politics and scare resources have contributed to the surge of violence among the Dinka, Nuer, Murle and Anyak (E-International Relations, Retrieve 11/20/12). These conflicts among ethnics groups cannot only cause democratization setback but also can lead to the fall of the state if not handle properly.

The given examples, are not the only one, there are many of them that have not been reported. On government and the army of South Sudan, the situation even becomes more intense and unbearable at the same time. The government is a fragmented government made up of distrusted nationals. What causes this is the war itself. The Sudan People Liberation Movement, which is the current governing party, was fractured by the war. The current SPLM/, is made up of many rivalries. The most are the SPLM/SPLA considered as the main stream and the South Sudan Defense Force. The SPLM/SPLA was that of John Garang. South Sudan Defense Force on the other hand was headed by the current South Sudan Vice-president, who defects from the SPLM/SPLA in 1991 but later came back after his unsuccessful bid for the/SPLM/SPLA chairmanship in a military struggle. After joining the SPLM, South Sudan Defense Force was left in the hand of Galuaak Deng and major General Paul Matip Nhial (Arnold, 2007: 491). The two armies were emerged according the CPA's stipulation and the Juba Declaration of 2006 (Arnold, 2007: PP. 490, 492). Matiop became a deputy chairman of the SPLA, which is the military wing to South Sudan president Kiir. This year Matiop Passed away. The trouble here is that the two armies were old time rivals were the SPLA main stream

enjoyed legitimacy from the public than South Sudan Defense Force, which in the eyes of many is considered a “southern sell out” organization, due to its positions during the war when it used to have alliance with Khartoum (Arnold, 2007: 504). Achieving unity between the two armies has been a difficult one due to the lack of trust each one has against the other. Through this reasons, one can begin to see whether the presidents has the legitimacy from army as a whole. This analysis can be confirmed through recent death of Matiop Nhial this year. In one of the article published by the Sudan Tribune, report one of the analysts asking “who Matip soldiers would be loyal to”? (Sudan Tribune, retrieve 10/22/2012). Few days later, another article where one of the former generals in the SSDF, who has defect in and out between the SPLA and SSDF, on more than four occasions, claimed that Matiop soldiers have pledged loyalty to him was published (Sudan Tribune, retrieve 10/22/2012). This uncertainty within the army could not be just a headache to Juba government but it could trigger instability and fall of the state, leave alone South Sudan transition to democracy.

Besides the above argument, South Sudan is already battling rebel movements and militias in the three states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile. In Unity and Upper Nile, there is instability caused by the Ruminants of former South Sudan Forces who formed after Juba Declaration and carry on as South Sudan Force. In Upper Nile, there is the South Sudan Liberation Army. And in Jonglei, there is a South Sudan Revolutionary Forces. All these rebel movements are operating loosely with other militias throughout South Sudan. When putting lack of civilian disarmament to the mix, one can definitely argued that South Sudan security is at a greater risk and so does the stability of new nation remains attained.

## Chapter Five

### Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to assess the transition and the future of democracy in South Sudan. The search for freedom and democracy by the South Sudanese is a long one. It's a history that goes way back to 1989 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement that divided Sudan into two colonized territories with British in the South and Egypt in the north. When colonialism die down in the first half of the 1950s in Africa, Sudan became the first African country under colonial rule to gain independence in 1956 with both south and north combined. However, idea of a single Sudan was never popular in the South. A rebel movement, bearing the name, South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) started the war for the independence of the South in Torit, in 1955. This war is understood as the First South- North civil war. It lasted from 1955 until when it was brought to end by the Addis-Ababa Agreement in 1972.

The termination of the Addis- Ababa Agreement by president Numeiri in 1983 fueled South- North Second Civil War. Military mutinies in Bor and Ayod brought the establishment of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/ Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) under the leadership of the John Garang de Mabior who led a military campaign against Khartoum from 1983 to 2005. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, known as the CPA settled this conflict in 2005 between the SPLM/SPLA and the Khartoum.

Having won independence after unanimous referendum results, Democracy is one among other things in the nation building package that the SPLM and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan wanted to achieve. I ask, where or what are the hopes that the SPLM or South Sudan government is going to fulfill this promise?. South Sudan is immersed in so many challenges. Many of which cannot be solve with quick fix. It cannot be a hope that



many of them will wither away by themselves. All these challenges are only reasons for concern. History of African states, but more importantly, of the former pro-democratic rebellions of the mid 1980s and 1990s in Africa, has shown that they have not produced functioning democracies on which they waged war upon. This paper used the National Resistance Movement in Uganda, Eritrea Peoples' Liberation Front in Eritrea, and Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front in Ethiopia as case studies to support this research's argument

This paper's argument is supported by both literature and case studies. I applied socioeconomic theory of developments by Lipset (1959a, 1960b, and 1994c) to understand where the trouble lied. This theory argued that democracy succeed in a country that has seen and reached comfortable level of political, economic, and social developments, but not among countries at the opposite end. Variations are there but the reality is that Africa states have long way to be part of the debate in term of the analysis and observation from Lipset. The World Bank ranked African below all other continent on all its development indicators at 38% (World Bank, retrieve, 11/15/2012). When it comes to Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and South Sudan, South Sudan does not have any data for a reason that its figures have not yet been produced and posted. On the other hand , Eritrea, Uganda, and Ethiopia are listed as "low income" countries by the World Bank (World Bank, Retrieve 11/15/2012) This result confirmed the finding by Przeworski *et al* (2000) who found that democracy is more attained by countries in the mid-level of economic development.

Moore (1966) theory of democracy development in the west which resulted from the conflict between the land owners and the working class did not fail or support struggle of democracy in Africa. However, Fatton (1990) dismissed this theory because he believed that

Africa is a continent that still existed in agrarian form. No argument from any case study indicated that land conflicts have developed in any country, on level similar to what Moore analyzed.

Although the two theories showed a convincing argument to why African states have struggle to democratize fully as we have seen from the three case studies, the issue here is that the trouble with democracy in Africa cannot be explained these two theories alone. The trouble has multiple explaining factors. Three points, weak middle class, weak oppositions, and lack of access to media by the oppositions or control by the authoritarian governments by Nzongola-Ntalajaa and Lee (1998) are consistent with what have been reported in the three countries. Taking the control of the media as an example, Eritrea fit the bill well. Connell (2005) argument showed how private newspapers as well as other means of communications were shut down by the government. This action is done by the government because it knew that it was cutting oppositions communication channels.

Corruption, exclusion, insufficient knowledge of about democracy, and elitism are other factors which have hindered the growth of democracy in Africa. On the issue of corruption, corruption is wide spread in Africa. We can see from Giley (2010) and Diamond (2008) that corruption is not only accumulation of scarce resources in the hand of few but also the idea of rule of law in African is an illusion. The reason, from the expertise of scholars is that government elites in the like of president, etc, under the rule of law to go after and prosecute the culprits because the “big man” as they argued dictator what the law can and cannot do. This can be seen playing well Uganda and South Sudan. The government of Museveni, as Mwenda argued has not been able to charge, leave alone prosecutes many of the high profiles government officials considered to be corrupted in Uganda. The Same thing is taking place in

South Sudan. No court, either the lower court, traditional court or higher court has charge any of the 75 officials implicated in president kiir's letter.

While the factors given above could hinder democratization in South Sudan, I argued that they may be the least to kill democratization in the young country. One of the reasons is that I believe South Sudan can still play around them to get to where it can be democratic. However, I believe that there are other serious factors that can undermine transition there. One of these as I have discussed before is the lack of unity among South Sudanese. This is not weak claim but one that has been supported by current developments such as ongoing Jonglei ethnic conflicts. The fear her is that present of such identity politics could escalated easily and can filtrate the government and trigger the fall of the states. However, there seem to be a room for optimism. I will base my optimism on the overall changes not only in the world but particularly in Africa. Africa has never been the same since the end of U.S –Russia (former Soviet Unions). The end of Cold War saw the rise of pro-democracy movements. This culminates in number of African countries, such as Uganda, undergoing both political and economic liberation. Since then, African dictators, authoritarians or autocratic have been on the run. Elections have been held frequently even though it's the same results now and then. Secondly, there is a consensus that Africa is more hostile military and undemocratic rules more than ever before. This attitude is reinforced by African Union Charter on democracy, Article 4 (1) which requires all state parties to work in promoting democracy, rule of law and protection of Human Rights in their respective countries (African Unions. Retrieve, 11/24/2012). It could a point of optimism that incoming nations such as South Sudan will respect this charter and would take necessary steps to meet the requirement. For further study, it has emerged in this study that African countries that are not democratic have higher ratings on political values; meaning that they have more

restriction on those values than they do on civil liberty values. What this suggests is that perhaps, democratization in African needs a new direction. This will be a direction that places more focus on political values than civil liberty one.

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