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TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY:

The Difficulties for Countries to Become Democratized

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

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By

Zachary Wayne Sproul

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TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY:

**The Difficulties for Countries to Become Democratized**

A THESIS

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADEW   Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women

AFTURD   Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development

CAWTAR   The Center of Arab Woman for Training and Research

CEDAW   Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CREDIF   The Center for Research, Studies, Documentation and Information on Women

GDP   Gross Domestic Product

HIC   High income

LIC   Low income

MCA   Multiple Correspondence Analysis

MENA   Middle East and North Africa

MIC   Middle income

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UN   United Nations

UNDP   United Nations Development Program

UNGASS   United Nations General Assembly

US   United States

ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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ABSTRACT:

The main principle of this thesis is to contribute to the explanation and description of regime change in the Middle East and North Africa through the aspects of transitional democracy. In doing so, it will explore several countries that are going through the transitioning phase in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region - Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and what factors play a part in either the new form of government becoming successful or regressing back to old authoritarian way of governance. This thesis analyzes the forms of government as to the historical, political and regional significance of these concepts. In addition, it will use secondary data as the primary source of data used to conduct the qualitative research design method and data analysis of this thesis. The data collected is from scholarly journals, books and articles pertaining to how countries democratize. This thesis will focus on the economical struggles, the current form of authoritarian governments, lack of freedoms, educational levels, and gender inequalities in order to have long term stability. It will also cover how the use of technologies and social media helped pave the path towards this transition process. The background, development, current conditions and interactions of one or more individuals, groups, governments, or institutions is observed, recorded and analyzed for stages of patterns in relation to internal and external influences. The finding of this thesis concludes that while democracy is a way of life for all, there is no simple or normal method of how to set up a democratic government without multiple obstacles.

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

"The anchor in our world today is freedom, holding us steady in times of change, a symbol of hope to all the world"- George H.W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 31, 1990.

The events that shaped the world during the end of 2010 and the first few months of 2011 throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region will forever be echoed as "The Arab Spring." When it comes to democracy there is no clear cut path to achieve that end means. The citizens of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia saw each of their respected authoritarian regimes crumble right before their eyes as a result of years of ruthless rule and deteriorating conditions of civil life. There are multiple factors of a country's regime that can ultimately determine the transitional stability to democracy. Those factors that are most important are: technology and social media, regime type, gender equality, economics and education. The main principle of this thesis is to contribute to the explanation and description of regime change in the Middle East and North Africa through the aspects of transitional democracy.

Those words ring loudly in the world today as we see countries making giant leaps towards becoming free through democracy. Therefore, the work of this thesis is intended to demonstrate why it is important for the MENA countries to become democratic, albeit may not be an easy path to freedom. Secondly, the focus will be on the countries that fall in the MENA region, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, as they transition away from authoritarian governments to the early stages of democracy. The regimes of Hosni Mubarak, Muammar al-Qaddafi and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali were in power for decades ruling their citizens with iron fists. It is these relationships of those unique and hard-line styles of authoritarian leadership that forever have

lasting effects on the future of the countries. Lastly, the individual qualities that the former governments had will play a part as these countries try and set up new democratic governments; and try to avoid regressing back to their old authoritarian ways. There can be negative dynamics that work against these countries, yet there are also promising outcomes coming out of the Arab Spring revolts. As these countries move forward there is still much work to be done in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in regards towards democracy.

Democracy, it is argued, is an inalienable right that all men on this earth are created equal and deserve to be free. The only way for men and women to be truly free is in that of a democratic society that is ruled by the people. "Democratization is a process which leads to a more open, more participatory, less authoritarian society. Democracy is a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people" – statement from the UN's Secretary General as how the UN views democracy. The United Nation's standpoint on democracy comes through the UN Charter, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration is very clear on the importance of democratic values:

> "(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
> through freely chosen representatives.
> (2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
> (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be
> expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal
> suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedure."

A democratic form of government is one in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation involving free elections. Therefore it is important that individuals are given the opportunity to participate in these values of democracy. As these countries move through the transitional phase they will each

face multiple concerns that equally decide the outcome. These uphill battles that they will be going through will no doubt be slippery ones. Each step forward is a step in the positive direction, but if the current state of political unrest continues to become more violent and negative in thought this presents the opportunity for the country to slide back into authoritarianism. This old way of the authoritarian rule that has controlled Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, is one where history has not been kind to the people. Each country must now use its rich histories to peacefully transition towards democracy.

CHAPTER TWO: History

Since the 1970s the number of democracies has grown steadily throughout the world. There are approximately 195 countries that are recognized by the United Nations today, yet not all of these countries practice a recognized form of democracy. It is this movement of transitioning towards democracy that will be the focus of this thesis. This thesis will focus on the history as it relates to the third wave of democratization and what those factors are. By looking at the past, it is easier to understand the present and project towards the future. Within the last decade, the world has recognized that democratic state building is now an even more urgent movement, especially in the broader Middle East. As this movement continues freedom and democracy are the only ideas that can lead to just and lasting stability. Although there have been instances of reverting back to non-democratic regimes, the overall drift remains upward. The thrust of this thesis is to look at some of the difficulties countries confront on the road to democratization.

One doesn't have to look too far in the past to get a good understanding of what has transpired in the history of democratization. It would be easy to start at the beginning of this history and conclude with the current movement of the Arab Spring in regards to changes in democracies. However, focusing on the last 40 years will provide a good view as to what is taking place. Pre-1970s numbers show about 40 countries that were recognized as having some form of democratic government. Compare that with statistics from the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2010, showing that there are now 167 countries that practice some form of democracy (Democracy Index 2010, 8). The data that was compiled by Freedom House paints another picture with approximately 195 countries surveyed with 147 of them practicing some

form of democracy (See Table 1). Freedom House went back all the way to 1972 with its data, but for this thesis it focuses mainly since 2000. This movement towards democracy can be attributed largely to the fall of the Berlin Wall and Communism at the end of the 1980s. Many political scientists have called this rise the third wave of democracy.

'The Third Wave' was a phrase used by Samuel Huntington in his 1991 article entitled, "How Countries Democratize", which examined how countries moved away from authoritarianism to democracy. The 'wave' as he put it was greatly focused on the democratic changes that took place during the 1970s and 1980s and triggered a global democratic revolution with more than 30 countries from several different continents changing their political structure. Huntington believes that this wave was the most important political trend of the late twentieth century (Huntington 1991, 579). Mr. Huntington describes these changes as the way of transitioning from a non-democratic to democratic regime and they greatly outweighed transitions occurring in the opposite direction during the same time period. It is in this study that he dissected the way the third wave democratizations transpired and carefully analyzed the ways in which political leaders and publics ended authoritarian systems and created democratic institutions during the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington 1991, 580).

Huntington's main goal in the 'third wave' was to explain the process of democratization in contemporary world politics as occurring in three distinct waves. Huntington heavily relied on J.A. Schumpeter's "Democratic Method" which emphasizes democracy as merely an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the peoples' vote" (Schumpeter 1947, 269). Huntington's principal ideas focused on what he believed were certain factors in the third wave movement that could possibly be identified to affect the future expansion or contraction of

democracy in the world and to pose the questions that seem most relevant for the future of democratization (Huntington 1991, 4).

In all, there are five factors that he based his study on: deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems, the global economic growth of the 1960s, changes in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, changes in the policies of external actors, and snowballing effects. It is those five factors that caused the third wave to spread quickly throughout most of Latin America and several Eastern Europe countries. Many of those countries that experienced democracy through this wave had strong Catholic backing. It's interesting to note that the one region of the world that democracy had failed to infiltrate is in the Middle East, which is traditionally Islamic. Outside of Turkey and Israel, the rest of the region lacks democracy.

Those five factors that Huntington thought were essential in helping democracy move throughout the world were broken down into three elements of transition. Huntington believed the process of transition happened in one of three ways: transformation with top-down change; transplacement with negotiated reform; or replacement with total regime breakdown. He believed it was one of these three movements that would set the course for future democracies throughout the Middle East and North Africa region. Again, it seemed like time was standing still, as it would take another 20 years for democracy to finally breakthrough in the Middle East, and that was largely in the North African region. With democracy continuing to spread, countries that did transition away from authoritarianism saw a rise in civil wars in their respective countries. Democracy seems to rise and fall at different periods of time in different regions throughout the world. These changes throughout the world were supposed to bring 'winds of change' in the democratization processes for countries. Like most changes they take time.

Arab Spring

"There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab states" -A statement from the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (Human Development Report 2002, 205).

As the Human Development Report states the movement for democracy in the Arab region has lagged behind the rest of the world, but since 2010 there has been a movement taking place in the MENA region. This movement is being labeled by some analysts as the so called 'fourth wave', yet is nothing like that of its predecessors. This 'Arab Spring', as many have coined it, is still too young to fully know whether this new wave of democratization will truly be successful. The Arab Spring's roots are not that uncommon from generations that have come before. Democratization from below is what has happened in present day with the Arab Spring. These types of movements in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are from internally sparked uprisings. These citizens have decided they have had enough and felt that it was the right time to move from under the feet of their repressive regimes and seek new leadership.

Whether associated with the Arab world or not, it is not difficult to reach the same conclusion as the statement above. It seems that Arab countries are slow at adapting to democracy, but nonetheless it is something that can happen. Since 2002, a series of United Nations Development Program Arab Human Development Reports (UNDP) have been published disclosing serious deficits in personal freedoms, gender equality, governance and knowledge across the region. These issues are necessary for democracy to prevail. The history speaks for

itself when it comes to Middle Eastern politics or its background of the region to know that democracy is least developed in the Arab countries.

The uprisings that started to take shape towards the end of 2010 in the MENA region shows that there is hope. There is still plenty of work to be done with regards to the region. It is a popular conception that the Middle East is the last bulwark against the global development towards democracy (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 205). What is meant by bulwark is to put up a defense or safeguard against something. It isn't that the Middle East or North Africa is skeptical or afraid of democracy; it is the true uncertainty of what democracy can lead to. So the Middle East region has put up a safeguard around its form of governmental structure system to keep democracy out.

It is these values or ways of life that are simplistic, yet problematic at the same time. This region is not the last stronghold of authoritarian rule. There are plenty of countries still dealing with authoritarian rule outside of the Middle East. Russia hasn't fully embraced democracy. Most of the South-East Asia countries still haven't moved away from authoritarianism to democracy. One reason that the switch to democracy hasn't taken a firm grasp in the Middle East is that the rulers themselves are reluctant to share power. With that said, only Israel and Iraq worked to move towards democracy. Israel was set up as a parliamentary democracy when it gained independence in 1948 and is the only country in the Middle East region that is labeled as a democracy, whereas Iraq has been viewed somewhat as a failure in the international community's view as a democratic state. This is the fight that countries are up against in the MENA region as some try to transition towards democracy.

The literature argues that there is an actual difference between democracy and democratization (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 206). One might look at the two words and think that

they are the same thing. The concepts themselves need to be clarified; what is the difference between 'democracy' and 'democratization'?

Robert Dahl a prominent theoretician of democracy says there are five criteria that have to be met first before a form of government can be labeled a democracy (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 206). 'Effective participation' is first on that list. Citizens must have equal opportunity to vote and express their voices in the political process of their country. The second item he says that must take place is 'equal voting weight'. Each citizen's vote must carry the same weight as all others in decisive elections. The third principle is 'enlightened understanding'. The point is that there should not be any more class structure or categories that lump a single individual into a larger group, with no voice. This would give each citizen adequate and equal opportunities that best serves each individual, rather as a group collectively. 'Control over agenda' is the fourth principle. The citizens should have the right to select what should be on the agenda and what should be decided during the democratization process. Finally, Dahl believes 'inclusion' is a critical feature that has to be in place for democracy to stand. Individuals who must be included are all adult members of society with the exceptions of the mentally challenged and transients (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 206).

Huntington reaffirms Dahl's definition of democracy, a political system that meets the three requirements of competition, inclusiveness, and civil liberties (Doorenspleet 2000, 387). These requirements are what many of the countries in this study have a difficult time with. Along with Dahl, Huntington thought that there would be a fourth wave of democracy to spread through the Middle East just as it has done in the last few decades in other regions of the world. It is sad that Huntington is not around to see what has transpired in the MENA region. This would be exactly what he had hoped for and envisioned, though it is still too early to tell if this could be

the fourth wave. What has happened in the MENA region as the Arab Spring came to the public's eye in 2010, and it was those three factors that helped spark the uprisings. Without the individuals involved wanting freedom and other basic civil liberties, the Arab Spring may not have turned out as positively as it did.

There is no set definition of what constitutes civil liberties or civil rights. Freedom House is a non-governmental organization that has reviewed political and civil rights in the Middle East and since 1970 has had findings published in annual reports. By looking at the work that it has compiled throughout the last 40 years it is easier to understand those definitions. Freedom House has tried its best to explain these and other terms. Its methodology is based loosely on Dahl's "Operationalization of Democracy". The concept behind the Freedom House reports focuses on three categories. It divides countries into the 'free', 'partly free', and 'not free' categories. There are many criteria areas that come into play to place countries in the appropriate categories.

By looking at these three categories one can get a better picture as to how they affect the chances for survival and for democratization. The breakdown in terms from Freedom House explains that a 'free' country is one where there is open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media. A 'partly free' country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Partly free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain degree of pluralism. In a country where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are widely and systematically denied it is deemed 'not free' (Freedom House 2012, 4). The data that was compiled in order to place a country in one of the three respected categories

used two factors: political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House employs a 'backwards' scale from 1 to 7. A rating of one represents the' most free' and a seven rating represents the 'least free' of the two indicators that are used. An up or down status indicates an improvement or decline in ratings or status since the last survey (Freedom House 2012, 19).

The MENA region encompasses eighteen countries. When broken down there is one free country, four partly free and thirteen not free countries (See Figure 1). By looking at the numbers from the report one can see Egypt is listed as not free with a net score of six in political rights and five in civil liberties, but there is an upward trend since the recent revolution that took place in January 2011. Much is the same for Libya as it is still recognized as being not free with a score of seven in political rights and six (though it improved since the last survey) in civil liberties. Unlike Egypt and Libya, Tunisia has shown signs of being partly free scoring three in political rights and four in civil liberties, with both categories showing even more positive movement. This is encouraging not only for Tunisia, but also for what lies ahead for future countries. Since 2007 all three countries have seen some of the most significant changes in improvements of freedoms according to the surveys and research conducted by Freedom House (See Table 2).

So what makes these three cases unique? One of the biggest factors is that these countries are largely made up of Muslim populations. As it was stated earlier in this thesis, Islamic traditions and democracy typically do not go hand in hand. Although it is not this barrier that has kept democracy out of the region, it is the true not knowing of what democracy can lead to. This is the reason that all three dictators, who had great power, feared the roots that democracy establishes because it meant that most likely their regimes and power would be lost. Freedom, after all, is a powerful weapon. That's why it is no surprise that the citizens of Egypt, Libya and

Tunisia had had enough of the oppression from their current regimes and believed that the only thing to do was to revolt. These demands for freedom led directly to the Arab Spring.

In the truest form of democratization, people participate to a larger extent in the political process and decision making processes. In looking at the experiences of others who have undergone the democratization process, democratization can be begin from below, (society itself), from above, (individual leaders or elite groups), or from the outside, (typically external institutions, states or by force) (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 209).

The 'above' method typically comes from a new visionary leader, one who can promote democracy from within. Of course, one thing that hinders these types of leaders who envision change is that the rest of the elite have to provide them with the necessary space to democratize. One of the big drawbacks when rulers decide to use the democratic form of governance is that they give up their power, which in turn could lead to them losing their immunity. Power is one thing many cannot easily envision losing. Because of this, the rulers are fearful, which gives them little reason to encourage real democratization. Another area that these leaders fear is economic liberalization along with the continued restrictions on political liberties in much of the regions, which include the pro-Western vision.

The Arab Spring is a product of democratization from below. The revolutions that took place in 2010-2011 were by the people. It seems there are few actors who have both the will and the ability to lead a democratization process in the Middle East. This was not the case in the Arab Spring countries. Each case had plenty of actors on all levels who participated in the separate revolutions. By now, the world knows of the democratic process and what it takes to get there. Many people, including individuals from this region want to participate in this process, but lack the ability or means to exert pressure on their authoritarian regimes. The common theme in

the transition process was that it was a mixture of societal members, not just one particular group or class. Even though the mix included members of different classes, it is going to take the will of the elites to help further the process along in the future.

In respect to the uprisings that have taken place in the MENA region, the conclusion is that it is going to take citizens within a country to rise up from below. The emergence of 'street pressure' promises a new way that individuals see the light at the end of the tunnel (Selivk and Stenslie 2011, 231). It will take these types of events from citizens themselves in order for their leaders to better understand their concerns. This goes back to what Huntington was talking about when it comes to civil liberties and the importance of those freedoms for individuals to be able to call for change (Doorenspleet 2000, 387). It is recognized that every individual in the world should be able to elect one's leaders as an inalienable, universal right by the United Nations (UN), although many countries do not fully recognize or follow the UN's outlines when it comes to free elections.

The last avenue of democratization is from the outside. This is a huge one, due to the fact that most of the pressure comes from the Western powers such as the United States. It is these factors whether they are external actors, states, or other institutions that play a considerable role in the democratization process. This is the trickiest of the three pressures for democracy as it puts the role in an outside force that is usually seen as an occupier and not a liberator. Whether it is the likes of the United States, NATO or UN, outside help is not the first choice of the Muslim population. Muslims believe that the United States can help by staying out of conflicts and by refraining from forcing democracy on the Muslim world. Secondly, when they believe that while that time may come for the United States to help, they would ask that the US be that positive ally and intervene only when asked.

This paradigm is slow moving and the process will take time. It is this common theme with respect to international relations that most scholars believe will embrace this current wave of democracy. Part of this slow development is due to the fact that it varies on a case by case and basis and region by region. The path from authoritarianism to democracy never follows the same path twice. That is why it has been so difficult for political scientists and scholars to pin-point the sole reason why it is such an arduous task for a country to move away from authoritarian ways of organizing.

CHAPTER THREE: Regime Type

It is not only the history that is important to look at, but also the type of regime of in these countries. What has been learned from the third wave of democracy in respect to regime transition and democratization? There are three areas of regime classification that took place during the third wave: one-party systems, military regimes, and personal dictatorships. These are just three that Huntington discusses with regard to the third wave, but they could easily be broken down into a more narrowed group that would include some 19 different classifications of regimes. For this thesis and more inclusive purposes of the case studies, only the one-party system, military regime, and personal dictatorship will be emphasized. Out of those types of regimes they can be broken down even more precisely when it comes to their role in transitions to democracy (See Table 3).

Each country that was involved with the Arab Spring saw its current regime crumble for different reasons. Mostly, it was due to the arrogance of those in power because they didn't fully understand the implications of the revolts. It was not the individuals revolting who had room for error; it was the leaders who had to make the decisions that would forever change their countries. In each case there were common themes that the regimes practiced against their citizens, yet there were plenty of differences as to what led to the unraveling of their respective governments. Egypt's Hosni Mubarak's authoritarian rule controlled his country with an iron fist. Mubarak's regime could be considered a hybrid regime as the lines crossed over from time to time from personal dictatorship to a one-party system, yet at times looked like a military regime. Muammar al-Qaddafi's military regime kept the Libyan people oppressed. For four tormenting decades, Libyans had been at the mercy of this prison warden -- part tyrant and part buffoon (Ajami 2012,

2). Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali used his longtime personal dictatorship as a strongman with a system of control and oppression towards the people of Tunisia. As the world saw it, these three leaders ran their countries with total disrespect for the masses.

The 30 year reign of Egyptian President Mubarak started with the assassination of then President Anwar El Sadat, as Mubarak was the vice-president. Many believe he was behind the assassination as it would be him who had the most power to gain. Since that fall day in 1981, President Mubarak has kept a tight grasp over Egypt all while still employing signs of political freedoms. It was not an uncommon practice for President Mubarak to have deployed the resources of a high-capacity state, which helped solidify his power. During his tenure in power he was able to successfully crush all threats to his rule. From minor riots, to political coups from within to outside assassination attempts, he stood tall. Political corruption was a big issue during his presidency, along with trying to continue the old pharaoh's way of handing over the presidential power to a blood relative, rather than a military subordinate. That is why it was not uncommon for Mubarak to be the self-proclaimed Pharaoh of Egypt.

In 1995, Terry Lynn Karl is credited for coining what would become the term, *Hybrid regimes*, which are characterized by a peculiar mix of democratic and autocratic features (Schmotz 2010, 3). Egypt was a pure hybrid regime from 1935-1951, yet under Mubarak's leadership I feel he ran it again as a hybrid regime, although in a different form than what Karl would have defined. Typically under a hybrid model, access to power is open, but limited to some degree. It is these same degrees of authoritarian practices that severely limit civil liberties. Mubarak's mixture of strong presidential involvement, fear and the use of military power fell under the autocratic features, while still allowing reforms and open elections to take place. Here

is a big key as to why it possibly took nearly 30 years to unseat Mubarak from power: the United States. With being a trusted ally he was able to position himself ahead of the opposition.

That finally caught up with him due to the domestic unrest that was taking place before his eyes. Mubarak's downfall can be attributed to three factors: increasing corruption and economic exclusion, the alienation of the youth, and the 2010 elections and divisions among the Egyptian elite over questions of succession. These factors along with the continued limits on civil liberties accounted for change. The Egyptian people had endured six decades of military rule that had robbed them of the experiences of open politics, and they are unlikely to give it up now without a struggle (Ajami 2012, 3). The restrictions that were placed on the media during Mubarak's tenure were his biggest weapons; it was these same restrictions that could not silence the voices of discontent of the masses in the end.

Out of the three countries in the MENA region that felt the sting of revolutions in 2011, Libya may be different from the other two. In the case of Libya the past has been marred much the same as in Egypt, but unlike that of Egypt the transition towards democracy may be down the road as the democratic reform is still very much in doubt. The single gain out of the revolts in Libya was the ousting of longtime dictator and mad man General Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Al-Qaddafi seized power of Libya in September 1, 1969, when he executed a successful coup d'état, overthrowing the monarchical regime. Since that One September Revolution granting him the throne, his ideology has been somewhat of a quagmire. For much of the first two decades of the revolution, the ideology of Muammar al-Qaddafi was defined in the familiar terms of Arab nationalism, positive neutrality, socialism, and Arab unity (St John 2008, 91). Al-Qaddafi gained much of his political ideology from Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser during the Egyptian revolution of the 1950's. Since the reforms that were taking place in Egypt

at that time, he shifted his thought process and aimed to bring the Egyptian revolution back to

Libya. Behind al-Qaddafi's ideology was to make Arab nationalism the focal point due to the

rich history of the Arabian culture that he felt was part of Libya. By bringing in a new era of

thinking his regime supported institutional reform, socioeconomic change, and pushed for a

revisionist history. It seemed during al-Qaddafi's regime his ideology kept changing along with

that of ever constant reform change. It was these every changing ideologies that he felt were in

the best interest for the country, but in the end it would only take more and more civil liberties

and freedoms from them.

   During his reign he tried to launch stronger reforms against political corruption and the

ineffective use of Libya's oil resources; the regime promoted economic liberalization, centered

on diversification, privatization, and structural modernization. But even these policies and

reforms couldn't last as he kept changing the methodology behind them. By selecting the

members of the government, popular and executive officials throughout the districts gave him

control over the Libyan government, which was to ensure that no one could challenge his

authority. This system allowed al-Qaddafi to remain above petty politics in the theoretical role of

'The Leader' or 'The Guide'. Obviously that works in favor of the ruling power, but it only puts

further distance between governing and the public. Therefore it created a vacuum that was tough

to escape.

   His economic platforms never took shape as he envisioned them as he tried to create a

socialist economy that teetered between the 'popular capitalism' or 'people's socialism'.

Therefore he was still pushing his system of direct democracy rather than a free market

economy. Much of his time in power al-Qaddafi dealt with UN sanctions. This played a part as

to his relations with terrorist organizations. These sanctions were not only in part from that, but

also dealt with how he handled internal issues of the people, most notably civil liberties. In the case of direct democracy few elements of Western-style, representative democracy are present in Libya today, but others, like the rule of law, respect for human rights, and freedom to dissent, are not (St John 2008, 104). Most of these reforms that were part of his overall ideology throughout the nearly four decades leading the Libyan people didn't happen, due to the fact that he was unwilling or unable to recognize the deficiencies in the system he had produced.

It is these issues that not only helped with the revolts in 2011, but in the end ultimately did him in. When the Libyan revolution started to take shape in February 2011 the future course of the country was set. As the protestors gained momentum the al-Qaddafi regime fought back. The Libyan regime shot down hundreds of peaceful protesters. Most of the participants in the uprisings have never found themselves going against the grain of the regime, but one can only be told what to do for so long. These same people do not even care as to what outsiders or the West thinks of the unrest that was taking place. It was about change and especially those changes would be in the best interest for the Libyan people. These same people listened and waited on al-Qaddafi to make good on those promises of change that he had signaled since he took office. Those changes never happened; if anything conditions in Libya worsened during his reign of terror.

With already on-going deteriorating relations with Western powers this move generated an immediate backlash against al-Qaddafi. Of course one of the issues of al-Qaddafi faced much like that of Mubarak, was that he was a quasi-ally of the United States. Even with his constant flip-flopping statements that he would make towards the United States. Libya's transformation away from the authoritarian dictatorship of al-Qaddafi not only took place from below, but it also took the efforts of an outside resource, NATO. This was an important step for the United States

to back the use of NATO in Libya. Instead of forcing Libya to change, America led from behind in the transition phase and allowed the people of Libya make that change. It was this foreign intervention that paved the way for the rebels to topple the regime. NATO's Operation Unified Protector officially ended on October 31, 2011, 222 days after it had begun (Daalder and Stavridis 2012, 3).

Like most Arab countries Tunisia was an old state that had a defined national identity, so when the revolutions happened the country settled its affairs with relative ease (Ajami 2012, 3). The country of Tunisia has always stood out as stronghold of control and oppression of its people. This was no different during the tenure of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Ben Ali was a strongman who crushed every opposition that tried to challenge his throne. As his style of personal dictatorship continued to grow out of control, he didn't discriminate against anyone; no one had a chance under his rule. Citizens that rebelled against his system of control usually were met with prison time or were exiled; the media was completely censored, and the judiciary was under strict political control. In 2009, President Ben Ali won a fifth term, with a massive 89.62% support (Paciello 2011, 3). This is no surprise as in most authoritarian countries the current regime typically always wins elections in stunning fashion with a majority of the vote, but generally it is how they receive those votes with the oppressive power with the use of force or scare tactics. Like other countries in the region one either voted for the current government or didn't vote, but they were rarely opposed as that typically led to death.

At the time of the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia was quite unlikely to see any sort of revolt against the authoritarian oppressive regime. Something was different about the citizens in Tunisia; they knew it was possible to overthrow the Ben Ali regime. All the elements were set in place for a revolution to emerge. Although on paper President Ben Ali was oppressive in context

he was not as oppressive as his fellow dictators throughout the region. Tunisia has long enjoyed the Arab world's best educational system, largest middle class, and strongest organized labor movement. Yet behind those achievements, Ben Ali's government tightly restricted free expression and political parties (Anderson 2011, 3). Nepotism ran rampart throughout his administration as some way somehow everyone was related. This was a big part of the corruption issue during his years as president. Nepotism was so bad in the Ben Ali regime that it was referred to as 'the Family'. With the family running the country it would take time to dissolve this faction. It would take a strong opposition to bulldoze the Ben Ali regime out of power and it was just that that happened in the spring of 2011.

As the New Year began, the Tunisian people welcomed a new message towards its President Ben Ali and that message was: it's time for change. When the Jasmine Revolution started to take shape in January 2011, no one other than the citizens saw change coming. By the end of 2011, Tunisia had become one of the most remarkable successful revolutions to sweep through the MENA region or for that fact most of the world in quite some time. It was Tunisia that set the revolutionary ball rolling for both Egypt and Libya. The scene in Tunisia was one for the history books. From the moment the movement began it caught the world by surprise, not to mention the Ben Ali regime.

Each revolt was dealing with common themes each were up against, yet also had issues that had to be approached in different ways. Citizens of Tunisia were dealing with an authoritarian ruler whose corrupt and ineffective government was destroying the future of their country. From education issues to the unemployed and disaffected youth, Tunisia was experiencing growing pains. The youth movement was again the backbone of the Jasmine Revolution. The participants that moved the momentum forwards toward the capital came from

mostly the neglected rural areas. These common people joined forces with the once powerful, but now repressed labor movement and the elites to clash with the Ben Ali regime.

The Jasmine Revolution was in part due to several factors. Like Egypt, Tunisia was experiencing a growth in population, most notably the younger generation. The percentage of young adults between the ages of 15-29 years old in Tunisia hovered around 38 percent (Goldstone 2011, 4). With that the market for jobs for an educated population was scarce; therefore the economy was unable to keep up with the growing numbers. This lead to issues of underpaid workers and those jobs that couldn't meet the need of the rising economic times taking place in Tunisia. This was not the first protest that the Ben Ali regime had faced. In the past it was the same educated youth and workers that were carrying out the local protests. They were trying to call attention to high unemployment, low wages, police harassment, and state corruption. It just happened to be the right time for the masses to be able to come together for a common goal.

One factor leading up to the revolution was the economical future of Tunisia. The economic policies of the Ben Ali regime were not always the best for Tunisia, but they were better than most in the region. Even with economic growth and macroeconomic performance, Tunisia is a complex case. There has always been a link between the regime and society. In the past the Tunisian people were provided with good levels of social services and benefits, but these came with a price; that price was the lack of civil and political freedoms (Achy 2011, 5). It was like a house of cards that was built too high, yet there was no real foundation to support the true need of the people. It was time for the house of cards to come tumbling down. It was these types of civil liberties that the Tunisian people had felt the wrath of for so many years that it was time for change. Being denied these simple civil liberties is just one part in the fight towards

democracy and that is why the Tunisian people spoke. As the masses gained more and more support Tunisia was the first country to feel the pressures of the Arab Spring.

As the protests grew larger and more organized, when it came time for government intervention the country's military played a lesser role in the revolution. Even with Ben Ali being a former military police officer the military held no alliance towards him in the end. This was due mostly to the fact that in the past the relations between the military and Ben Ali had been tense. The military in all accounts had been hiding in the shadows of the entire revolution, not even taking part in the new government in any meaningful way. It didn't have anything truly vested in the regime that would have made it a real actor in either supporting or being against the revolution. It is unknown if it will get involved during this critical transition period.

The three different styles of leadership between Mubarak, al-Qaddafi and Ben Ali were in a way linked together by that of personal power, greed and unimaginable visions for their countries. All of them seemed to overlap the other in regards to the type of regime that they governed. It is easy to label each one as an authoritarian dictator, but in sense each regime was a little bit of the other all wrapped up into one evil regime destined to implode given the right circumstances. Those circumstances were a combination of the will of the people, economics, power and greed that in the end ultimately lead to the dismantling of three styles of authoritarian government that needed to be wiped clean.

CHAPTER FOUR: Technology and Social Media

It was not only the will of the people that had impact as to the unfolding of these regimes, but the world of technology played just an important part. First and foremost, change revolves primarily around new information technologies and a growing number of enlightened and increasingly accessible pan-Arab media all of which offer uncensored news and expose the political elite and, thus, (at least some of) their actions to public scrutiny in an unprecedented way. These changes in censorship or technologies in general have laid the foundation for a growing number of social movements (Schumacher 2010, 2).

With the rise in technology this gave the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia a better chance to be more successful than others, whereas in Libya's case the social networks played a role, but not as large. This is greatly due to the freedoms of expression and countries allowing the media to be a part of the political process. It gives citizens choices and makes them better informed. When it comes down to regime change media is a powerful tool, for both the respected parties and the masses. This played out right in front of our eyes, with the most recent use of social media that helped the Arab Spring fully come about.

The respected governments only added fuel to the fire by trying to silence the youth and a majority of the union parties in its country with its censoring of the media. The youth population in Egypt, ages 15-29, is said to be more than one-third of the entire country's population. While the fires were still burning in Tunisia from the recent Jasmine Revolution, the events were just starting to unfold in Egypt. By seeing what took place in Tunisia this gave the youth a cause to act upon. In the growing world of social media with the likes of YouTube, Twitter and

Facebook, word spreads fast. The events that took place in Tunisia were all over the news, web, and social networks via smart phones. The dawn of technology had risen.

The tensions ran high in Tunisia. A single death contributed to the Arab Spring revolt that would send Tunisia into a whirl-wind of change. That death was of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old Tunisian man. As he was unable to find formal work, he sold fruits from a vending cart on the streets that the police ended up seizing. A humbled young man who only wanted a fair shot in life, he then did the unthinkable. Bouazizi sat himself on fire. Some would say it was too extreme as it led to his own death, but others will argue that Bouazizi showed the world true Arab Nationalism and the triumph of the human spirit by setting himself on fire. Whether or not he died a poor street vender is contrary to the point as he set the Arab world ablaze. Once the protests began the Ben Ali regime acted like most authoritarian governments that fear change and tried to suppress the movements by force and violence. Particularly in the early phase of the uprising, the regime caused numerous deaths, radicalized the movement and eroded what little was left of the regime's legitimacy (Paciello 2011, 8).

These events and the death of Bouazizi caught the world media by storm. Soon reports, news feed and photos hit the airwaves showing the protests and the government's intervention. The use of social media also helped ignite the protests by bringing the Tunisian people together to remove Ben Ali from power. Even with forms of media, such as the internet censoring that was in place, the youth were able to garner enough support for their cause. The youth that were at the heart of the social revolution were from urban areas and for the most part were relatively educated. These young people were the forerunners, who laid out the game plain that later led to a larger and more mass-based campaign.

By using such social media forms as Facebook and Twitter, this allowed the protesters to mobilize more quickly without real organizational structure. Social media was also instrumental in spreading information about the upheaval both within and outside the country. Despite the regime's restrictions over the media, many Tunisians were able to get around the regime's censorship so that information rapidly circulated among internet users, both internally and outside the country (Paciello 2011, 9). Even with these censorships in place, 38 percent of Tunisians had capable access to the internet (Stepanova 2011, 3). The crackdowns the waning governments placed on the networks also spurred new technology solutions, such as utilizing router/path diversity methods, IP proxy servers, and Google's voice-to-Twitter applications (Stepanova 2011, 2). With the youth being more and more tech savvy it has become easier for them to get around such crackdowns by employing these methods.

The success of the social media revolution in Tunisia didn't come about without setbacks and a great deal of violence. It took one brave young man to start the revolution and it took the acts of the masses to completely ouster the Ben Ali regime. Finally, after several weeks of massive protests, government intervention, and mounting deaths Tunisian President Ben Ali fled in defeat on January 14th, 2011.

Now it was Egypt's turn. This was not the first time that the social network had played a part in protests in Egypt. The April 6 Movement in 2008 was the first social movement on Facebook, which attracted some 70,000 members. At the time it marked the largest youth movement in Egypt. As successful as it was it failed to grasp the full momentum. In less than two years fast forward to 2010. The Arab Spring was gaining momentum throughout the MENA region. What started as a small band of youth that supported change, turned into full support by all masses. The day was set. Youth activists agreed to hold protests against the state on Police

Day, January 25. This movement had one underlying goal and that was the ousting of the Mubarak regime.

Unlike previous demonstrations in the region, this one had glue that would keep it together; as the size and momentum of the protests grew, these activists formed the Coalition of January 25 Youth. They had a plan of action that presented their ideals of change to the regime: the resignation of Mubarak, the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of all political prisoners, the dissolution of parliament, the appointment of a government of independent technocrats, the drafting of a new constitution, and the punishment of those responsible for violence against the protesters (Shehata 2011). The stage was set in Tahrir Square where Egyptians of all walks of life came together in mass protest to oust Mubarak.

Besides the civil liberties, lack of economic growth and the constant political corruption the message of the 25 January revolts was to honor Khaled Sa'id, the blogger, who was killed a year earlier by Egyptian police. As if the public needed any more reasons to dislike the local police, his death led to even a greater hate. That is when the youth rallied together to form the Facebook group called "We Are All Khalid Sa'id". The 'day of rage' as it was promoted started off small, but would grow to a powerful mob of citizens that wanted change.

The scheduled protest was to last just a few hours outside the Interior Ministry building, which turned into a hoax of sorts for the government. That morning of January 25, organizers used cell phones and landlines to disseminate the real locations of the protests and the actual start time: noon (El-Ghobashy 2011, 6). The participants were to start marching down small side streets and pick up momentum as they made their way to the announced location. By this time the security would be outnumbered and couldn't contain the crowd, explained organizer Ziad al-'Ulaymi (El-Ghobashy 2011, 6). The protest was to be non-violent as determined by the

protesters. Whether or not the police used force the crowds were to remain calm and not get caught up in the moment. There are times during the protests that things did get out of hand on both sides, but in the end cooler heads prevailed and the demonstrators stood their ground and made their point. For the next 18 days the scene on the streets of Cairo was one for the history books.

Of course as the revolts were taking place on the streets of Cairo and other cities throughout Egypt, the Egyptian rulers had said that their country was not Tunisia and could survive these protests. In fact this was the furthest thing from the truth, as the wheels of the regime were falling off the track with each new day. In the last few days of the revolution the country was approaching a state of total civil disobedience. In every arena workers were striking en masses. It was just not the youth, the students that led the movement, but elites of all classes joined in the protests to voice their discontent with the regime. With the elites now joining the protests, it was this development that finally convinced the military to oust Mubarak and assume control, according to Shady El Ghazaly Harb, a leading Egyptian youth activist (Shehata 2011). Since the fall of the Mubarak regime three main explanations have come to light as to what made this one successful: technology, Tunisia and tribulation (El-Ghobashy 2011, 1). Just as the government of Egypt had kept its hands on the media and communication networks, in the end it was just that that led to the downfall. This is due to the old Egyptian Constitution that allows the freedom of speech, but there are limits placed on those freedoms. Some of the freedoms that are allowed in the constitution in the end have been overridden by the sitting government.

When it comes to freedom of speech Libya is not much different than most countries in the MENA region. Libya was the one case where social media didn't play as big as role as it did with Egypt and Tunisia. In Libya traditional communication means were used. This role helped

achieve the goal of spreading the word more effectively. As of 2009 most basic freedoms, like freedom of speech, assembly and the press, did not exist mostly due to the state nationalized Saif's budding media empire. That is why many countries in the MENA region deal with the same underlying issues for democracy or at very least civil liberties. Libya's youth movement again is one of the youngest populations in the Arab world with one in three under 15 years of age (St John 2010, 4). Because of these numbers not only the current rate of unemployment and underemployment will be high, but they will only increase in the years ahead. Another reform area that remains slow and uncertain at best is the human rights reform. These issues are loosely tied together as they go hand-in-hand. The demographics of protestors across the Arab Spring have been driven by disillusioned youth defending their freedoms and asserting their resentment towards the current regimes.

It is these types of individuals that have been brought together for a just cause. The Libyan case it was not as structured as both Egypt and Tunisia nor did it use the same resources as those revolts. Nonetheless the individuals behind the movement to rid President al-Qaddafi from power have one common goal and it is to remove the regime. What seemed to be just another routine measure of power by the al-Qaddafi regime with the arrest of a human rights activist triggered a riot in Benghazi, Libya. As the protestors were peacefully demonstrating in the streets of Benghazi, al-Qaddafi directed the Libyan Internal Security forces to halt these protests by the use of tear gas and batons (Human Rights Watch 2011). This single act of aggression paved the way for the violent protests. At the onset of the initial phase of the Libyan revolution on February 17th, 2011, it was unclear as to how the end would look. It didn't take long for the outside world to step in and take responsibility for the violence that was taking place upon the Libyan people. The UN authorized sanctions against Libya to include an arms embargo

and a demand for an immediate ceasefire. This only caused the situation to further deteriorate and the threat of violence against the civilian population increased (Quartararo, Rovenolt, and White 2012, 144).

Before the uprising started to shift it into high gear, the Libyan people had hoped for a peaceful revolution much like that of Egypt and Tunisia. That was quickly smashed as al-Qaddafi launched a series of brutal crackdowns upon the protestors. The events in Libya were more intense than that of the other revolutions taking place simultaneously throughout the region. All in all between the protests towards the regime, the air strikes by NATO forces, rebel fighters standing up against the Libyan military and the al-Qaddafi firing back at all involved, the task in Libya was much more daunting than first thought. The back and forth push for victory by all groups involved lasted roughly six months. Amidst the uprising taking place right under his watch al-Qaddafi said, "That his republic was not Tunisia or Egypt" (Ajami 2012, 2).

He was right; Libya was not like the other two countries that were experiencing revolutions of their own. The people of Libya were more violent and felt more hatred towards the al-Qaddafi regime. The protests were met with a different result. Unlike the more peaceful happenings taking place in Egypt, Libya was in the midst of violent outbreaks. As it was known throughout much of the MENA region, Libya, the kingdom of silence, was at the realm of the deranged, self-proclaimed 'dean of Arab rulers'. It was this self-proclamation that was the beginning of the end of al-Qaddafi. After many days of fighting between the rebels and the Libyan Army, the Libyan people prevailed. Al-Qaddafi was pulled out of a drainage pipe, beaten and murdered, along with one of his sons. A victory had been won by the citizens. Death to al-Qaddafi signaled a new dawn in Libya and that dawn was hope.

CHAPTER FIVE: Gender Equality

When it comes to an authoritarian regime many of the leaders like to make a claim that they have done positive reforms in relationship to women's rights. Sadly most of these claims are only on paper. In most cases the relationship between gender equality and regime type are complicated in nature. It is these traditional dictatorships and military regimes that are based on conservative, religious, and/or nationalistic ideologies that actually discourage women's equality. Depending on the dictator in control these ideologies may promote a traditional role for women, yet that generally reduces the gender equality (Ferrant 2010, 22). Although there are some authoritarian regimes that may bestow rights upon women from above to increase women's equality, these are far and few between.

Women who have been oppressed for so long under the authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have much to gain in equal rights. The areas that women's equalities lag in the MENA region are especially high in politics and employment, where as women's representation in economic and political power is almost non-existent. Their situation in education and access to health has been improved by growth in these middle income countries. But it is still slow to develop in the lower income states. There is strong discrimination in identity and patriarchal institutions limit the involvement of women in economic and political activities. Gender discrimination in economic activities can create distortions: more able women than men are excluded from the labor market.

Women living under these conditions seek to have the same rights as their male counterparts. That is why when it comes down to these simple human rights that individuals seek it is important for those women to be informed, educated and have the freedom to voice their

opinions. This is a key to the transition to democracy. Without these rights as humans, authoritarianism will continue to negate the movement towards democracy and keep the citizens' voices silent at all costs. The debate that continues amongst political scientists is that there are key links regarding the relations among Islam, attitudes toward women and gender equality, and the democracy deficit (Salehi-Isfahani 2010, 23). It is this democracy that over time is more likely to create conditions that favor greater gender equality. For the purpose of this thesis gender equality will be a focal point.

Globally, Latin America tends to be the most unequal region, followed by Africa and the Middle East (Houle 2007, 32). Gender equality in the MENA region is often overlooked as a stable source of guidance or leadership. It is those same women and especially the constituency of women's rights advocates – who believe that democratic development, with the association of civil liberties, participation, and inclusion starts with women. The region's feminists are among the most vocal advocates of democracy, and frequently refer to themselves as part of the 'democratic' or 'modernist' forces of society (Handbook 2010, 293). So even before the Arab Spring started to take shape, women in the MENA region started to stand their ground on the issue of gender equality and raised their voices. Research has been conducted in regards to democracy and gender equality that points to the correlation between the effects of democracy as it is positively related to the status of women (Beer 2009, 226). These correlations show that most women that are excluded from the democratic process are under an authoritarian regime (See Table 4). It is therefore the greater the inclusion of the feminist movement the greater the chance for a successful democratic governance.

As the Arab Spring took shape and the governments of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia shifted away from the authoritarian stalemate that had been in place for decades and transitioned

towards democracy, reforms took shape as well. Although it is a slow process change was happening. Tunisia set itself apart from other countries in the region as it took on the reforms in such fashion to enhance women's economic, social and political inclusion. The outlook remains uncertain as it is early on in the transition period and only time will tell. In one of the first acts towards those reforms Tunisia mandated that an equal number of men and women run as candidates on the electoral list, and women have secured a quarter of the seats in the constituent assembly (Vishwanath 2012, 1).

For example, a Tunisian feminist lawyer said: "We recognize that, in comparison with other Arab countries, our situation is better, but still we have common problems, such as an authoritarian state. Our work on behalf of women's empowerment is also aimed at political change and is part of the movement for democratization" (Moghadam 2010, 293). In 2008, a prominent Tunisian feminist organization, Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development (AFTURD), issued a statement declaring "that no development, no democracy can be built without women's true participation and the respect of fundamental liberties for all, men and women" (Handbook 2010, 293). As we saw during the revolts of the Arab Spring it was this precise statement that was taking place; women were at the forefront of the revolutions. The last couple of years the world has noticed the power of the Arab women as true catalysts of change.

Tunisia like other countries throughout the world has made admirable progress in closing the gender gaps in education and health areas, yet still lags in the total human development arena. With many educated women in the region and lower fertility rates the hunt for employment continues to rise. But jobs are scarce. Even when given equal weight with education, women are unable to compete on an equal footing due to several interrelated factors (Vishwanath 2012, 2). These factors that women face are mobility and agency. Part of the issue

lies with the legal framework of the Tunisian government. This legal framework, social and cultural norms, and regulations that restrict work and political participation are nothing new for women of this area.

When looking at the data collected by Gaëlle Ferrant in regards to the gap between genders, *The Gender Inequalities Index (GII) as a New Way to Understand Gender Inequality Issues in Developing Countries* in 2010 paints a better picture of gender inequalities throughout the world (See Table 5). For this thesis the MENA region is specifically focused. The author uses a two prong approach to apply to his research. First, appropriate indicators are needed to compare the relative situation of women in developing countries. Second, there is renewed attention given to the relationship between gender inequality and economic growth. The GII avoids comparison between countries and ranking. Second, the GII is used to study the relationship between gender inequalities and economic growth using seemingly unrelated regressions. The end results show large variations between regions with the Middle East and North Africa with averages of 0.48 and 0.46 respectively. This includes Egypt 0.465, Libya 0.497, and Tunisia lagging well behind at 0.156.

The Gender Inequalities Index (GII) is a new alternative to measure gender inequalities in developing countries. It addresses the shortcomings of gender-specific measures through a new aggregate strategy using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Ferrant 2010, 12). The GII is a new tool used to characterize women's situations in comparison to men's in developing countries. Ferrant's research uses a normative analysis that describes a single optimal configuration; the GII ranks countries depending on their characteristics, in terms of gender inequalities.

As these numbers shed some light as to how wide the gap is between men and women in the MENA region, it should be noted that women's involvement in the political process is still lagging behind. It is this area of concern that should be addressed as women are still being excluded in many of these processes, because of their weak perception in the eyes of men. But the gap is slowly narrowing due to the recent revolts and women's inclusion in the transitioning phases. During the democratic process women are sometimes susceptible to higher standards, which in turn can cause the entire institution to become weaker. If this process is not founded on the principles of equality and the rights of all citizens; and is not backed by strong institutions that allow political parties bound by patriarchal norms to come to power then democracy can be seen as a failed system. This is partially due to the implementing of new laws relegating women to second class citizenship.

These are the everyday 'norm' issues that Arab women are faced with. Depending on the situation, these issues may be hard to overcome, yet in the right instances gender equality can be achieved. One way that it can be achieved is when women are more involved in the political process. Typically their numbers reflect higher in the overall participation and rights correlates with peaceful, prosperous, and stable societies. If the Nordic model of high rates of women's participation and rights correlates with peaceful, prosperous, and stable societies, could the expansion of women's participation and rights in the Middle East also lead the way to stability, security, and welfare in the region, not to mention effective democratic governance? (Moghadam 2010, 294).

Violence against women is another form of gender inequality and the fact is that violence against women in the MENA region is particularly higher than in other parts of the world. This cannot be overlooked when discussing aspects of gender inequalities. Women in Arab countries

typically don't have personal security in any fashion. This provides them with little hope in the quest for equality and basic freedoms that humans deserve. In the MENA region it is not out of the question that many women are often victimized by their own families. Therefore, the public and governments can more easily victimize these women due to the lack of personal securities, which put women at a greater risk to be victims. The sad fact is that they generally have little power to defend their own rights and few champions to defend those rights for them (Arab Human Development Report 2009, 79). Part of the issue lies at the history of the region. Throughout history the Arab world has placed an emphasis on women as subordinates; women find themselves in this role even within their families and receive little protection from the law or legal systems against these violations.

A statement from the UN General Assembly's (UNGASS) on *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women,* defined its focus as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life" (AHDR 2009, 80). This statement speaks volumes. It is not just in the Middle East, but violence against women in general is a world-wide epidemic. It is a phenomenon that needs to be eradicated just like that of the plague during the 1800s. It is those same women and those dedicated to the cause of women's rights, involved in the political process who will have to advocate against these crimes of gender, not to mention human rights. This is one of the single most important issues that the MENA region is faced with for the future of democracy to take root.

If women's rights and specifically gender equality are not addressed, nothing will change and in end the Arab Spring could be labeled a failure. Part of the problem is that when it comes

to these cases of abuse or violence against women it is most often their spouse or family member committing the crime. Therefore reporting this to the authorities is often overlooked as it is common practice by the police and the public to look the other way. That is why it is so important for gender inequality to be taken seriously by transitioning governments as part of the reform process.

Development NGOs such as Egypt's Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) and think tanks such as The Center of Arab Woman for Training and Research (CAWTAR) and The Center for Research, Studies, Documentation and Information on Women (CREDIF) of Tunisia are helping pave the way to address the needs of women in their respective countries (Moghadam 2010, 288). Those groups along with many Arab states that have signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) are thus obligated by its provisions, reservations excepted (AHDR 2009, 84).

In the case of Tunisia, the country has already done work to help the rights of women. It has shown great progress in amending the personal status laws towards women. Some of the least discriminatory laws against women are in the MENA region, especially Tunisia, which began to expand women's freedoms and rights in the 1950s. But it is not the entire region as Egypt does not have the 'unified personal status law', neither does Libya. Both Egypt and Libya have shown some progress to make changes. This system is one that members of various ethno-religious groups are subject to a certain jurisdiction of communal norms and institutional regulations in regards to personal matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. This is a common system throughout the Muslim world as it is a subject to the Islamic, *Shari'a.*

Libya is the country with the most to gain from these changes, yet human right issues, specifically women's rights progress, remains slow and uncertain at best. Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia have all signed this act, but only time will tell if any real progress is made for women in regards of true equality of rights. These issues regarding women's rights, violence and gender equality are just a few that women in the MENA region are faced with throughout their lifetimes. These issues need to be addressed in a serious fashion for future generations. Whether or not a country successfully transitions to a pure democracy, the chances diminish drastically if women's equalities are left out.

Most scholars who have conducted research including, Gerring, J. et al. in their 2005 scholarly article, "Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective" relate the growth of democracy directly to the rate of economic growth. There is surprisingly just not much empirical research out there that has addressed the relationship between democracy and gender equality (Beer 2009, 213). Carolina Beer, political scientist at University of Vermont, conducted research that proves there are two key factors that deal directly with gender equality: those being modernization and economic development of a particular country. It is those two factors that are clearly important in generating greater gender equality; long term democracy and women's participation in democracy are also strongly related to greater gender equality (Beer 2009, 226). The status of women throughout the world has significantly been affected by both modernization and development, therefore improving their status with that of men.

The more that woman are included in the political process the greater the chances of equal rights will be given to them as they are directly in control of their own choices and needs. Even in poor countries, which include parts of the MENA region with low levels of public spending, literacy, democracy, and women's participation, these two factors can make a

difference in the lives of women. It is unrealistic to expect democracy to fix long-standing structural problems such as income, racial, ethnic, and gender inequality in just a few years after a new regime is established (Beer 2009, 225). But it is those key factors that play into women being equal vary from country to country.

As gender equality rises in a country the greater stability the country has to successfully transition into a democracy. The numbers in (See Table 6) show that even more recently the gap between equality of genders in the MENA region seems to be trending downwards to a narrower margin. It is these types of trends that show there is hope for the region in the efforts of women and gaining more equal rights. It seems out of the three countries examined in the case studies of this thesis Tunisia is the least discriminatory towards women. Tunisia is a stark example that by including women in the political process, giving them equal weight when it comes to human rights; and allowing them to receive proper education and training, the country's overall successful transition towards democracy has become greater than both Egypt and Libya. The case for Egypt is an alarming one as most rules of state go against women's rights. Even as the most populist Arab country, Egypt lacks real reform of these issues regarding discriminations towards women. Egyptian women's groups campaigned for the issuance of individual identity cards for women and for women's right to a *khul* divorce (Moghadam 2010, 288). These are important steps for women's rights in Egypt. Studies have shown that Egypt is on the right track to achieving most of the Millennium Development Goals that have been set by the 2015 date.

The *Declaration of the Right to Development* was established in 1986 by the UN, which formally defined this fundamental human right. This declaration sets out provisions for states that they must provide public policies that enhance the well being of their citizens (Sika 2011, 27). This is the case for the MENA region as most MENA countries go against these policies or

UN declarations that are geared to end discrimination against women. Until these countries start to follow such guidelines, the discrimination will directly obstruct good governance and will work against the efficiency of social and legal institutions (Sika 2011, 27-28). It is this same discrimination towards women that also hinders economic success and development. These inequalities of gender in the MENA region also are tied to directly to both economics and education. That is why gender inequalities, economics and education can play a key role as to how the transition towards democracy pans out. If any of those three factors are not in the formula the success rate towards democracy tends to be lower. As the improvements for gender equality continue to occur so too will the positive gains of the economy and educational levels of the region. The roles that economics and education play in this process are just as important as gender equality.

CHAPTER SIX: Economics and Education

The economical and educational scene in the MENA region before and during the Arab Spring was in sharp contrast as to why the revolutions happened in the first place. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia all have rich histories of wealth in some fashion, yet the present day struggles for the people would have portrayed a different picture than that of wealth. A vast majority of the citizens lived in poverty and less than desirable conditions. An estimated 41 percent of these people live below the poverty line (Beck and Huser 2012, 6). As these individuals dealt with lower incomes and more oppression on civil rights; they didn't have much to lose other than their lives. People had had enough of living in poverty so they rallied together to seek improvements on all levels. It wasn't just one socially driven background, but a vast array of small business owners, poverty-stricken individuals, and elites that felt the suffocating grip of their authoritarian regimes. Looking back at the uprisings that affected Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, a common theme was in place: the education standards as an overall were less than desirable and the economic state in each country were decaying along with the regimes.

Revolutions can often lead to more *de jure* changes in political institutions, without necessarily altering the underlying distribution of economic power; these lessons don't always result in effective changes. That is why it is difficult to see how the future will play out for the MENA region in regards to economic reforms or changes. Breaking down the economic barrier in the Middle East isn't as easy as it would seem. The relationship between the level of development (income per head) of a country and the effects that has on democracy is not clear cut. It gets even more difficult when such countries in the MENA region have a vast wealth of oil and other fine commodities at their disposal, but it is who is in power that typically controls

these assets and therefore it is only a select few that see any of the royalties from sales. The MENA region could be labeled as a rentier state region when it deals with oil issues. Even with the incomes of the oil-rich countries improving the average outcomes in education and health, there is still a lag in its overall effect on women and youth. Each country handles these issues differently as not one economy is like that of the next.

The Middle East and oil go hand-in-hand. Commodity markets tend to flux on the drop of a dime, and with the political unrest that has taken place the region countries like Libya have seen the efforts of these markets. These risks that Libya and other Arab economies face place great stress on the transition process. In most cases the public financial institutions are at the mercy at the hands of the volatile oil markets. One aspect that can be looked at is the rentier state theory. Martin Beck and Simone Huser use this theory to explain how the current economical make-up of the countries has been plagued heavily by the rentier state experience. This theory came about after the oil boom in the 1970s, which established the idea of the rent-based system of "petrolism" in the Middle East. Rents are incomes which are not balanced by labor and capital, and are thus at the free disposal of the recipients (Beck and Huser 2012, 8).

Out of the three cases examined here, Libya is the one where oil is a bigger factor than that of the other two countries. The enormous oil rents that are placed on the country can only entrench the autocratic rule of governance. These rulers can finance far-reaching patronage networks and security apparatuses, yet cripple the economy and markets at the same time. Oil revenue removes the need to levy taxes, thereby reducing accountability, which causes the civil societies to become much weaker and at the hands of the government throughout the region (Democracy Index 2010, 26). Egypt also has felt the strains from these tactics. As one of the

largest authoritarian countries in the region, Egypt has suffered declines from already low levels, as the ruling regime has tightened its control even further.

When political unrest takes place Arab governments typically have used their military might to subdue the protests or they will increase subsidies on food and fuel like the case in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. This only hurts the citizens as it causes more strife in the quality of living. Outside the oil market the MENA region suffers from a dangerous deficiency of manufacturing products and goods. The MENA region holds less than one percent of world market share in non-fuel exports (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 8). Since the 1970s the Arab GDP growth has been closely tied to the rise in export revenues, dominated by fuel exports. The latter constituted 75, 72.6 and 81.4 per cent of merchandise exports of the high income (HIC), middle income (MIC) and low income (LIC) groups respectively in 2006 (AHDR 2009, 100).

It is these oil markets that play an important part in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the MENA region for the most part are in the middle of the playing field. If more emphasis can be placed on these other areas of income or production then most likely it will loosen the stagnant economical grip that has settled over the region. One can look at the GDP of countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia and see what each is faced within the global markets. These numbers are a little outdated, but they paint a good picture as to the lagging economy and financial development taking place. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are on average more equal in terms of income than middle income countries, but not low or high income countries. The data compares key financial and real indicators along with the economic growth proxy across the geographical region to include income groups (See Table 7).

Among the data that was used to show how the specific geographic regions faired in regards to GDP per capita in US dollars, the MENA region ($2,026.6) was lower than Latin

America & Caribbean countries ($2,865.2), yet had higher GDP per capita than countries throughout the Sub-Saharan Africa ($849.1), which had the lowest GDP per capita (Hassan 2011, 92). What do all these numbers mean? Hassan's research shows that there is a serious need for reform in the region when it comes down to the MENA region's financial system. If these efforts were addressed correctly it would be quite valuable for the MENA countries and provide incentives to develop outside trade with neighboring states, not to mention other global players (Hassan 2011, 99).

This lack of development in the manufacturing world has hindered the Arab economies. It is these types of underdevelopment that play a critical part in the successful transition phase. Without a multi-diverse economic market these Arab economies will falter. As the world becomes more globalized, the Middle East remains well behind in terms of production, trade and economic linkage. Surprisingly it is that trade linkage between Arab countries that is weak. For whatever the reason is Arab countries do not see their neighbors to be natural trading partners. This again keeps what goods could be traded between neighbors out of the market therefore creating no new economic growth. Even with positive oil-led growth in the region, it can actually make things worse in turn. It has created a weak structural foundation in the Arab economies.

That is why so many Arab countries have turned to increasingly import oriented and service based economies. This is where the region lags behind other parts of the world. The types of services found in Arab countries fall at the low end of the value adding chain, contribute little to local knowledge development, and lock countries into inferior positions in global markets. This trend, which has been at the expense of Arab agriculture, manufacturing and industrial production, is therefore of concern (AHDR 2009, 103). If these other avenues of income are not addressed it will cause the MENA region to become stagnant in economic growth. These critical

markets are every so important for the countries to become more independent upon themselves. All of these factors, plus the rising unemployment numbers, are detrimental to the MENA countries.

The number of unemployed throughout the MENA region varies in terms of each country and by looking at those numbers that include education level; they alone paint a grave picture as to part of the problem. These numbers are not specific to just Egypt, Libya or Tunisia, but the MENA region in general (See Table 8). The economic scene in Egypt is plagued with high numbers of unemployment and political corruption that must be addressed; these reforms are needed for the economical levels to turn upward for the country.

The high youth unemployment can be attributed to two factors. The first factor is the actual knowledge the youth gain with their degrees as it relates directly to the productive skills. This typically causes a big gap in what the student learns in school and what is needed in the MENA labor markets. Secondly, youth who come from middle or upper classes can sometimes take longer to search for a competitive job due to the fact that their parents can afford to support them during this time. So by waiting for that high paying job, the youth who can wait it out are causing unemployment numbers to rise. It is these numbers of youth that are actually causing discrepancies in the unemployment numbers. These kinds of issues are hindering the positive growth of the economy in the region.

From 1996-2006, labor forces in the MENA region had grown three times as much annually as in the rest of the developing world, resulting in one of the largest rates of youth unemployment in the world (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 2). In 2010, the percentage of unemployed was officially estimated at 10 percent in Egypt and 15 percent in Tunisia, but stood at 30 and 25 percent among youths in the 15-29 age bracket (See Table 9) (El-Meehy 2011, 3).

The outlook is gloomy at best as it can take up to 24 months for someone to successfully find a job in Egypt while in Tunisia it can take up to 28 months. The last statement is truly alarming. This is a big uphill battle that the countries in the MENA region are faced with as the population continues to grow.

Another area of concern when dealing with the development of a country is the possibility of economic crises that can threaten democracy, such as the 2008 global slowdown. These types of events can cause a lag that will increase social unrest. On a historical note it is these economic crises and difficulties that have been known to be associated with such democratic breakthroughs. When a country goes through such events as sudden collapses of stable autocratic regimes the outcome can be damaging to the entire economic infrastructure and the possibility of increasing authoritarianism. The current issues taking place in the MENA region may or may not have felt the implications of the financial meltdown as a whole, but each country still is affected in some ways with the recent turmoil taking place. Add all of these economic factors up and it seems that they would have a negative impact on democratization throughout the region.

That is why education and the economy have to be at the forefront of the reforms. Without these two key pieces of the social network the societies in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia will not prosper. But the outlook is bleak. Even as the governments provide some of the basic necessities, the poverty that is going on throughout the region has to be addressed. In some cases income levels do not play a significant part in health and education as these things are largely publicly provided to the masses. In the majority of the MENA countries education even at the post-secondary level is freely provided, which should lead to greater equality of years of schooling. But this doesn't mean everyone is still able to receive free education as it is

competitive and therefore distributed on a rationed basis. This typically is the case for the lower incomes.

Poverty is one of the main barriers to education for both girls and boys, but other obstacles include adverse cultural practices, poor quality of teaching and school facilities and the distance to schools which can affect girls more deeply, perhaps helping to explain why girls living in rural areas can face additional challenges in attending secondary school (Barnes, Bouchama, and Loiseau 2011, 6). Again closely tied to the treatment of women in the region, the economy will lose out on women's productive capacity if it's not harnessed by access to employment. If women are unable to participate in community and public life then this has negative implications for their integration into and contribution to society (Barnes, et al. 2011, 19).

These education standards become more and more of a barrier to lower income and some middle class families. There are prices that come with schooling. The out-of-pocket expenditures for education have created a new level of hardship for these families. For example, in Egypt, private tutoring has become an essential part of preparation in admission into universities (Salehi-Isfahani 2010, 32). When it comes to education the less fortunate citizens are unable to afford these, in other words luxury items; therefore the quality of education lags behind. In the end the lack of opportunity may cause them to lose out to the more competitive drive of the universities and employment down the road. Everything in Egypt from obtaining a driver's license to getting an education is formally very cheap but in practice very expensive, since most transactions, official and unofficial, are accompanied by off-the books payments. The government pays schoolteachers a pittance, so public education is poor and the teacher's supplement their salaries by providing private lessons that are essential preparation for school

exams. So widespread corruption continues to plague Egypt and will be tough to completely eradicate.

This is the *de jure* factor at work. A country can change regimes, but unless the old players are removed the political power will just be redistributed leaving the basic economic structures unaltered. As these young Egyptians are seeing it can be quite difficult to unseat these old bureaucrats from years and decades of power and wealth. It will be a work in progress much like that of anything when change comes. But it is also these wealthy patrons that can offer guidance to the younger generations in regards to creating better regional economic commons for all people. By doing so this will boost regional markets, in return redistributing to the poorer class, which would be a critical hand-out to the masses instead of handing out billions of dollars in subsidies that only on paper keep the economy alive. One way to do this would be to create an 'open access order', by bringing people of lower income and poverty levels to the mainstream. In essence this offers them a stepping stone process for economic mobility; this process grants equal access defined by merit and competitiveness, rather than *wasita* or political connections. This single effect can open the door for the masses, but it also is one that will be tough to break through, because of the decades of political corruption.

One hindrance will be the challenge to create jobs in the region. Over the next decade or so the MENA countries must create 100 million jobs to keep up with the numbers of the growing population (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 27). Part of this challenge will be to open up the private work sector; without this arena any gains in the human capital will go for nothing. For this to work the governments have to be willing to set aside their past economic governance and allow the regional markets to thrive and the private sectors be included in the growth of the economies.

This will be easier said than done in a region that has become more centralized around its governments and therefore in the end becoming more fragmented.

It is tough to estimate the number of individuals who live in poverty, because the numbers seem to be unreliable. This seems to be the trend as the standards for poverty level are generally set lower to that of per capita gross national income levels of these same countries. In recent years both Egypt and Tunisia saw a rise in their incidences of poverty due to impending financial, food and fuel crises. Despite desperate attempts by both regimes to keep these events from happening, it was these events that played critical roles in the Arab revolts in 2011.

CONCLUSION

The main principle of this thesis is to contribute to the explanation and description of regime change in the Middle East and North Africa through the aspects of transitional democracy. Those factors that are most important are: technology and social media, regime type, gender equality, economics and education. This thesis is intended to show the process that a country faces when transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democratic form of government. There can be negative dynamics that work against these countries, yet there are also promising outcomes coming out of the Arab Spring revolts. As these countries move forward there is still much work to be done in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in regards towards democracy. Each country faces a number of concerns that equally decide the outcome. These countries face uphill battles as their transitional phase towards democracy continues to be a slippery one. Each step forward is in the positive direction, but if the current state of political unrest continues to become more violent and negative in thought this presents the opportunity for the country to slide back into authoritarianism.

Given the fighting chance democracy will take root in the Middle East and Northern Africa regions, but only if the citizens of those respected countries chose to stand up for their own freedom. Throughout history there, revolutions have undergone phases of setback, real or apparent; these revolutions of 2011 will be no different. Even after a peaceful revolution, it generally takes half a decade for any type of stable regime to consolidate (Goldstone 2011, 7). That time table is even longer if at all achievable due to the likes of a civil war breaking out or if a counterrevolution arises. That is what these countries are faced with as they move forward.

Each country saw the respected revolutions that took place use similar formulas. These formulas are what many people throughout the world already have at their fingertips in everyday life: technology, civil liberties, freedom of speech, right to education, equal opportunities, and a better way of living. Yet, the people of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in most ways never were given the opportunities to take part in such liberties that many of us in the free world take for granted. If the awareness of these issues and that of gender inequality issues are not sufficient for a country to act on, then the development or reform of policies has to be at the very least the area of concern of necessary improvements.

During the Arab Spring there were a handful of reasons as to why the movement was as successful as it was. Social media is only one of the crucial elements that helped pave the way for the Arab Spring. When the revolts of the Arab Spring took place the use of social media cannot be single handedly be cited as to what led to the unraveling of three separate regimes in the MENA region. It, however, helped individuals who may not have been linked together in society achieve a common goal (Beck and Huser 2012, 7). The future of technology becoming more and more advanced, along with being intertwined with everyday life from America to the Middle East and beyond will definitely reveal new vulnerabilities and opportunities in the developing world. Without the use of technology the Arab Spring quite possibly could not have happened, but with the wills of so many different individuals it was a reality.

An inequality of justice towards both genders is something that no one should have to every deal with, as every human deserves to have the opportunity to be equal. Democratic development couldn't happen without the involvement of women. These situations are even greater for women living in the developing world, especially when dealing with the family, identity, and health dimensions. Depending on the country or the region concerned, the fight

against all forms of gender discrimination is appropriate. Therefore it is these same women that deserve equality and who played an important part in the successful plan of action during the revolutions.

The youth and the men were not the only ones that played an important aspect of these revolutions; women also employed a stable source of guidance or leadership throughout the entire process. One of the many reasons the Arab Spring was so successful was that of the women's role in the overall structural process. It is important for the future success of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and other countries that experience these sorts of revolutions that women continue to be seen as a valuable asset and have a place in society and government. The longstanding exclusion of women from the political processes and decision making in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) may be key to understanding why the region has been a 'laggard', when compared with the other regions, in democratization's third wave.

Economics and education go hand-in-hand no matter the case throughout the world. The lack of education will ultimately lead to a downfall in a country's economical standard. When a country is faced with poorer standards of living, lower education rates and gender inequalities it is almost certain to face less than desirable economic conditions across the board. The high unemployment rate most definitely contributed to the changing of the regimes. These individuals who couldn't find work or any sort of constant standard of living were a product of the system. The effects of globalization can either help or hinder a country's rise to democracy. With their export economies the Middle Eastern countries lacked diversification and did not have a competitive advantage in markets that are dominated by the hegemonic powers. These weak economies that the Middle East countries typically have are a product of their authoritarian regimes and the way they control all vested interests of the local markets.

This was the issue in Egypt under sultanistic dictators, such as Mubarak where he arranged national agendas around a personal consolidation of power, ensuring that the mass population remained depoliticized, disorganized and ineffectual (Moore 2012, 4). Therefore with dictators in power like him the country was bound to fail and not reach any economic growth potential. These long-standing social-economic conditions helped pave the way for the revolts. The one drawback to globalization throughout much of the world and specifically the Middle East is that it has been typically viewed through the Western constructed institutionalized concept of democracy. And it is that democracy that differs from Middle Eastern democratic ideas, which do not necessarily incorporate the same structures or systems (Moore 2012, 4). The only true successful globalization in the MENA region must come from within. Any external help must only be provided for if asked for in good faith, and in the best interest of that country, not whatever international actor is providing the help.

So were the Arab Spring uprisings part of an overall shift of the masses unhappy with living conditions in their respected countries or were they part of a bigger picture linked to globalization? By dissecting the events piece by piece in each of the three countries a link can be made back to globalization. But at the same time it can be attributed to the social issues. Without positive economic growth a country becomes stagnant. As the number of unemployed continues to rise, those frustrated individuals start to grow unruly towards the regimes. It is these events that can spark revolts. So in essence globalization did play a part in the revolts in the MENA region. The protests were a direct result of globalization, not to mention an unprotected exposure to the imbalance of the free market mechanisms. This region lacks many of the essential freedoms and opportunities that other parts of the world thrive in. Until the region becomes stable with strong pro-economic growth governments at the helm prospects will continue to look

gloomy. That is why education reforms must be addressed. It is paramount that education must start at the earliest of ages for the transition phase to be fully successful.

There is good news when it comes to education. It seems that even with the numbers of unemployed being high, the educational level for most continues to grow. Many of these unemployed are well educated; there are just not enough jobs to go around for the masses. Even the gender gap between men and women in the region has closed in educational attainment. Every child in the MENA region should be given equal education opportunities no matter the family's status in the community or level of income. As these kids continue to grow and experience the same hardships that their parents and generations before them experienced; the situations in the region will not change. Education should fall under the basics of necessities for every human being.

The crisis in the Middle East cannot just be attributed to the Arab state, but in many ways its failed efforts to redistribute, reform and represent the ordinary citizen's interests. These interests are that of any ordinary citizen throughout the world: a better standard of living, education, health care, and equality. One area that was not discussed in this thesis critical to the changing conditions of a country's economic progress was that of food shortage. The MENA region as a whole is one of the most food deficit regions in the world. Due to falling productions in agriculture the region is heavily dependent on food imports (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 6). This also attributes to struggling economic standards and poverty levels respectfully throughout the region as countries have to spend more of their budgets to provide food to the public. Food shortage is another example of the issues that Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are faced with as the existing governments are in the transitioning phase. In Egypt alone food subsides (directed mostly to wheat) consumed $3 billion US dollars in 2010 (Malik and Awadallah 2011, 6).

Further research would be ideal on this area to see just how great of an impact it has on the economic growth of the countries. As these countries continue to transition they are faced with many underlying challenges of change.

The comparison between the revolts in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia can be argued in many ways. One claim is that Libya was the only country to fully achieve the revolutionary goal. Jack Goldstone, director of Center for Global Policy, believes that for a revolution to succeed a number of following principles must be achieved: the government must considered a threat to the country's future, elites (including the military) must be unwilling to defend the state, a widely-representative section of society must mobilize, and international powers must either refuse to protect the government, or intervene (Goldstone 2011, 1). Therefore with the exception of Libya, and due to an absence of international intervention, the uprisings on the whole fail to constitute a revolution (Moore 2012, 1).

This claim is false. There are plenty of reasons to believe that the three separate revolutions that took place during the Arab Spring were in fact successfully achieved. As he states it, a government must believe there is a true threat for the future; in each case as much as the leaders wouldn't go on record and say that they felt their countries were unsecure, they knew this was the true case. The other key points he talks about all took place in some form. It was the masses that took to the streets that gave a growing presence that change was happening. The world saw the regimes of Mubarak, al-Qaddafi and Ben Ali crumble at the hands of the people, along with the help of the elites that included the military. Therefore how can one argue and saw that these revolutions were in sense failures? It is exactly these types of revolutions that other countries will look at and quite possibly model a reform of their own to oust whatever authoritarian oppressive regime standing in their way. The Arab Spring was a success.

It will take the efforts of the middle class, men and women, small business owners and the likes of the political elite to continue this transition of future success. It must be up to the citizens to choose their respected presidents, parliamentarians, village mayors, their trade union, and whomever else they feel is right to govern them as elected leaders. Women must be included in every step of the transition phase. Without the voice of the feminist side to have equal representation then democracy will not work. Not only is it gender equality that will continue the need to be addressed, but it is also the youth population. With the world's population growing governments need to be more in touch with the younger generations and listen to their opinions. They hold the key to the future. When it comes down to economics of a country, all walks of life must have a binding say in those decisions that affect their lives. Economics only cannot be the focus, but other avenues that affect everyday life like common liberties such as free press, the practice of religion, medical attention and education should all be included in the choices of the citizens, not be forced upon them.

The coming years will reveal how much of these changes may have happened or will take place and how. Each country comes from a storied past and just as promising future. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia all face different paths towards democracy. It is these paths that are chosen that will determine the future of existence as a free and democratic society. Generally post-revolutionary there are divisions within the opposition that start to surface. It's not uncommon for the acting government official or military commander to hold new elections as a necessary first step in the rebuilding phase. The overall political process then follows with further elections and then decisions to possibly write and introduce new legislation or a new constitution. These are the critical decisions that acting powers will be faced with during the post-revolution process in order to meet the needs of the citizens. It is highly likely that as conservatives, populists,

Islamists, and modernizing reformers fight for power in Tunisia, Egypt, and possibly even Libya that those countries will be faced with lengthy periods of unexpected government turnovers and policy reversals. It is not that of an uncommon scenario that could play out.

United States President Obama lit a fire under the Arab world by his profound statement during a trip to Cairo in 2009. Even before the Arab Spring took place the words that he spoke carried great weight.

> An unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will support them everywhere -- President Barack Obama (Anderson 2011, 7).

These events mark a significant shift in world history. As the world witnessed during the end of 2010 and throughout 2011, dramatic changes occurred in the way that democratic transition took place that most likely will lead to further revolutions. The year what would be known as the Arab Spring throughout the world has reminded us all that ordinary people want freedom even in societies where such aspirations have been written off as futile. But these efforts are not futile. It is these aspirations of just a handful of citizens in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia that led the revolts of the masses to see to it that those very freedoms can be grasped. Living under the rule of oppressive rulers will not be tolerated. The people have spoken.

The world's leading democracies, especially the United States, hopefully learned lessons during the Arab Spring that the help should only come from the outside community when it is requested. Just as NATO was the international force behind the Libyan movement, what most revolutions of the future need is strong support from the outside players in the avenue of 'words of wisdom' to help the process of democracy move along. Inserting democracy via a prolonged military campaign or by forcing it onto a country is not the way that democracy will successfully

spread. It solely should be left up to the citizens of the country to decide on whether they want to be free. When those opportunities have been opened up by the likes of the Egyptian, Libyan and Tunisian people, hopefully it will address the challenges that lie ahead during the transitional democratization period of how dictatorships can be overturned, and how stable, long-lasting and effective democracies can be built in their place.

After the successful toppling of al-Qaddafi's regime the future of Libya is in need of a full political revamp that has to include the establishing the rule of law, creating a modern constitution, building a democratic state, and establishing political pluralism. These are the necessary pieces of the transitional puzzle that must be achieved. For citizens that have been oppressed and out of touch with the right to express their political opinion for the last 40 years, it will take some time. It will take time for Libya, as stated by the writer Abdul Munsif al-Buri, "It is not an exaggeration to say that the situation in Libya will be fraught with dangers, difficulties and problems however good the intentions are, and however good and bright our hopes, wishes and dreams" (Hatita 2011, 5). But like that of anything the help through wealth, a sparse population, and foreign attention should see Libya through this transitioning period.

Of course Libya has many political and security challenges that lie ahead and has yet to hold its first post-al-Qaddafi elections. Life in Libya post-al-Qaddafi has been turbulent to say the least. One of the issues with Libya's transition process is that there is not a single promising figure to successfully lead the future of the country. The recent U.S. Embassy bombings in Benghazi that killed the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, along with several others have been part of a recent wave of violence of hatred once again towards the West. These types of events will only hamper the transition process.

Now that the Ben Ali regime has been defeated, Tunisia has already shown signs of a young democracy, but there is still a lengthy transitional phase that will continue. The beginning of this transition period has already taken a step in the right direction towards from an Arab autocracy to an electoral democracy. The new leaders have pledged themselves to moderation, adherence to civil liberties, and the rule of law (Anderson 2011, 3). These events show that Tunisia is ready for the future, but it will take time to build a stable democratic government. Areas that were once so corrupt have found new life. The media now can report unbiased news that is important to the building process. The reform of complex issues that are taking place is just one area that the new leadership must continue to tackle. These types of issues that have not been addressed for many years will need time to be worked out and it will take both civil society's input along with that of the newly elected officials. One area of consideration for a continued successful transition is that Tunisians will need to grapple with the class system. The different class structures that came together for a common goal must continue to work together for the future of Tunisia.

All these developments should give one cause for optimism today. In the case of the new Egyptian government the potential to build and sustain an open society is one that can be accomplished. It will be the young Egyptians, who started the Arab Spring uprising through peaceful protests that must continue to demand political (democratic) and economic (employment) reforms. When the protests started they cried out for 'dignity, freedom and equality'; it is now time for them to stand up and protect these qualities that they seek. It is their time to put down their name in history and show that democracy can exist in a Muslim society.

Before 2011, the Middle East and North Africa region stood out on the map with a red-pin as one of the last standing parts of the world without a single democratic country. With the

Jasmine Revolution taking place in Tunisia and Nile Revolution in Egypt there is hope that will change. The authoritarian way of life for the time being has come to an end. Only hope and prosper lie as true challenges ahead. Each country must make the best out of its revolutions in order to see the full success of democracy and the freedoms that it brings. There is much to be seen as to how the entire picture plays out in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, and for that fact much of the rest of the Middle East region. These countries alone witnessed what can take place when the masses have had enough of the aging authoritarian regimes and stand up for what they believe in. That is why the men and women of the MENA region deserve democracy. It should be the right that all men on this earth are created equal and deserve to be free. Therefore the only way for men and women to be truly free is that of a democratic society that is 'ruled by the people'.

As the coming years approach the region there will be highs and lows that are associated with the transitioning period due to the revolutions. Some of these will no doubt put into question the chances of democracy to survive. The region has not had the same opportunities to cherish democracy like others in the world; it will not be easy and will come with difficulties. These difficulties will be no different than what other countries experienced as they transitioned to democracy. If the people truly want those so-called freedoms in life they will work together to make democracy work. The system is far from perfect, but given a chance the positives will outweigh the negatives. It will take a lot of dedicated hard work of likeminded individuals to be able to guide these respected governments through the transition process.

One of the biggest challenges that lies ahead is trying to get past the fact that democracy can happen without the attributes of the Western world. It is a common misnomer that democracy and the West are one in the same, but democracy can be achieved nonetheless. As leaders throughout the world promote a stronger democratic practice and a world-wide goal of

peace, they have to find a common ground to make it work. The revolutions of late 2010 and early 2011 are not the first ones that Egypt, Libya and Tunisia have experienced, and as history has seen before there will be future revolutions. The road is a long and windy one as it is not about the destination of these countries, but ultimately the process of how they go about separating themselves from authoritarianism and establishing democracy. It will not be an easy transition. Just as countries before have experienced throughout history, democracy doesn't come without sacrifices.

As the world slowly moves further into the 21st century it is not the will of ill men to control the rights of everyone, but the right for every man to control his own destiny. That is why the Arab Spring shines new hope on the chances of democracy taking foot in the MENA region.

TABLES

Table 1   **Freedom Status, 1972- 2011**

Year Under Review	Total Number of Countries	Partly Free		Not Free		Free	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
2011	195	87	45	60	31	48	24
2010	194	87	45	60	31	47	24
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2005	192	89	46	58	30	45	24
2004	192	89	46	54	28	49	26
2003	192	88	46	55	29	49	25
2002	192	89	46	55	29	48	25
2001	192	85	44	59	31	48	25
2000	192	86	45	58	30	48	25

Notes: *FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2012: THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND THEIR GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS*

Table 2   **Largest Net Changes in Total Aggregate Score, 2007-2011**

IMPROVEMENTS	
Tunisia	35
Egypt	10
Libya	9

Notes: This table shows the countries with the largest net gains in total aggregate score (0–100) between *Freedom in the World 2008* and *Freedom in the World 2012*.

Table 3   **Democracy Index, 2010, by Regime Type**

	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	26	15.6	12.3
Flawed democracies	53	31.7	37.2
Hybrid regimes	33	19.8	14.0
Authoritarian regimes	55	32.9	36.5

Note. "World" population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population in 2010.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

Table 4   Women in National Parliaments

Rank	Country	Lower or Single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats*	Women	% W	Elections	Seats*	Women	% W
39	Tunisia	10 2011	217	58	26.7%	---	---	---	---
85	Libya	7 2012	200	33	16.5%	---	---	---	---
142	Egypt	11 2011	508	10	2.0%	1 2012	180	5	2.8%

Source: International Parliamentary Union, 2011 http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

* Figures correspond to the number of seats currently filled in Parliament
Libya: Following the popular uprising and protracted fighting that eventually ousted Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi, the General People's Congress - the unicameral parliament of the now defunct Libyan Arab Jamahiriya - has ceased to function. Parliamentary elections are expected to be held in 2012 under the supervision of the National Transitional Council, the interim government of the new Libya.

Table 5   The GII Ranking

Country	GII	rank
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.465	73
Libya	0.497	77
Tunisia	0.156	42

*Within the sample used here 109 developing countries provide information on all the 32 variables. The choice is guided by the availability of information so that as many countries as possible can be ranked. As the indicators primarily measure gender inequalities that pose problems in the developing world, the OECD countries are excluded in the first part of the factor analysis.

Table 6   Inequality for Selected MENA Countries and Regions

Country	Gini Coefficient
Egypt	32.45
Libya	Not Available
Tunisia	40.81
MENA	38.20
Low income	37.57
Middle income	43.56
High income	36.23

Notes: Averages of reported Gini coefficients for 2000-07, population weighted.
Source: World Bank, WDI 2008.

Table 7   Summary of Statistics by Region (1980–2007)

__Economic growth__		__Financial development__				__Real sector__		
GDP per capita (US $)	Growth (%)	DCPS (%)	DCBS (%)	M3 (%)	GDS (%)	TRADE (%)	GOV (%)	INF (%)
Middle East & North Africa (N= 12)								
Mean 2,0266	0.9	35.2	58.8	68.5	11.1	72.3	19.1	14.9
Median 1,406.3	1.3	33.7	55.8	60.2	15.3	65.4	16.3	7.8
Max 6,714.0	2.6	70.6	131.9	172.4	34.9	123.8	30.0	77.1
Min 498.8	−2.0	5.5	6.7	20.7	−23.8	38.4	13.1	4.3

Note: This table summarizes country-year statistics for six geographic regions and high-income OECD and non-OECD countries classified according to the World Bank. The time series average of each variable is calculated and then statistics are collected cross-country. Economies are divided according to 2008 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $975 per capita or less; lower middle income, $976–$3855 per capita; upper middle income, $3856–$11,905 per capita; and high income, $11,906 per capita or more. Geographic classifications are assigned only for low-income and middle-income economies. DCPS: domestic credit provided to private sector; DCBS: domestic credit provided by banking sector; M3: liquid liabilities; GDS: gross domestic savings; TRADE: import plus export; GOV: government expenditure, all as a proportion of GDP; INF: inflation rate.

Table 8   Unemployment Rates by Education, Average 2000-2007

	No. of countries	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
MENA	15	11.28	15.68	13.67
Low income	27	5.14	7.30	8.94
Middle income	50	10.33	12.90	9.53
High income	42	10.28	6.93	4.48

Note: Population weighted averages. Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 2005
PPP US dollars: Low income less than $3000; middle income $3000-$15000; high income greater than $15000.
Source: Author's calculation based on World Bank WDI data set.

Table 9   Youth Unemployment in Selected Countries, Ages 15-29

	Youth	Overall	Youth/Overall
Egypt	24.8	10.16	2.44
Libya	…	...	…
Tunisia	27.3	14.84	1.84
MENA Reg.	25.9	11.14	2.32
Low Income	9.9	4.88	2.03
Mid. Income	19.6	6.58	2.98
High Income	13.6	6.68	2.04

Notes: Country classification is based on GDP per capita in 2005 PPP US dollars: Low income: less than $3000; middle income: $3000-$15000; high income: greater than $15000. Source: Country groups are from WDI (ages 15-24), average 2000-07; MENA countries from Brookings, MEYI website.

MAPS

Figure 1   **Middle East and North Africa**

Notes: *Freedom House- Map of Freedom: Middle East and North Africa (2010)*

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