

THE RISE TO POWER OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY:

(An Historical Survey and Political Assessment)

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1943

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College
in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
1954

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THE RISE TO POWER OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY:
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PREFACE

The rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party was selected as the topic of this thesis because of my academic interest in, and personal experience with, aspects of China's political problems. As an employee of the Ministry of Information of the Nationalist government for several years, I was in a position to receive a personal insight into the workings of the Nationalist administration. I was also able to observe at first hand, while in China, the factors that promoted the development of the Chinese Communist Party.

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Clifford A. L. Rich and to Dr. Guy R. Donnell of the Political Science Department of the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College for their tireless advice and assistance in preparing the manuscript and in making improvements in its composition and documentation. Particular gratitude is also due to Dr. Glenn B. Hawkins, Head of the Political Science Department of the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College for his invaluable advice and encouragement in the preparation of this thesis.

A. H. T.

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CHAPTER I
ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Chinese Communist Party was formed early in 1919 in Peking by a group of Chinese intellectuals and students.¹

In 1920 Chen Tu-hsiu, a brilliant intellectual leader, made contact with the Comintern. Shortly afterwards the Comintern convened a congress of oriental nations at Baku, to which the Chinese Communists sent representatives.²

In May, 1921, Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao summoned a conference in Shanghai and proposed the formation of a Communist Party, while Chinese worker-students in France, Germany, Russia, and Japan conferred and decided to organize branches in those four countries.³

By 1921, the Comintern had sent agents to China to consolidate the Chinese Communist Party and to seek co-operation with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Chinese Revolutionary People's Party. H. Sneevliet, under the name of Maring, was an energetic Comintern advisor in that early period.⁴

¹U. S. Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, 1949), p. 41. (Henceforth referred to as the China White Paper).

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 42.

⁴Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 1951), p. 58.

Comintern propaganda concentrated on the fact that Western capitalists especially that of Great Britain, was using the backward countries of Asia as a source of profit to bolster itself, while Russia proclaimed her willingness to live in peace and amity with her Asiatic neighbors, and work with them for the attainment of democracy. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was undoubtedly influenced by this propaganda.⁵

In June, 1922, the military leaders in Canton revolted against Dr. Sun Yat-sen, forcing him to flee to Shanghai where he joined forces with the Comintern.⁶ In January, 1923, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Adolph Joffe, a representative of Russia, issued a joint statement, in which both agreed that the bolshevik dictatorship could not be introduced into China, because there did not exist the conditions for its successful establishment.

China would, however, accept the aid and collaboration of the Soviet Union and the Third International in the solution of her problems.⁷ Dr. Sun Yat-sen, apparently convinced of the need of this help, began the reorganization of the Kuomintang on soviet lines, and adopted a program of radical social reform.⁸ As a result, Chinese officers were sent to Moscow for military training, and the Whampoo Military Academy was established at Canton, where Russian officers gave tactical instructions to officers.⁹ Following these events, the

⁵John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 186-187.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937-1945 (New York, 1947), p. 66.

⁸Fairbank, op. cit., p. 187.

⁹Isaacs, op. cit., p. 64.

third Congress of the Communist Party was held in Canton, where the decision was made to co-operate with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in fighting the northern militarists.¹⁰ Chiang Kai-shek was sent to Moscow in the summer of 1923, returning in 1924 to become head of the Whampoo Military Academy.¹¹ Meanwhile, Michael Borodin, an able organizer who had been working for the Third International in Mexico, Scotland, and Turkey, arrived in China in September, 1923. Borodin served as political advisor to the Kuomintang, and re-organized it as a revolutionary party along Communist lines. He helped to set up a political institute to train propagandists in the art of securing mass support.

A second objective of the Comintern was to develop the Chinese Communist Party, and place its members in strategic positions within the Kuomintang. In 1924, members of the Chinese Communist Party were, by agreement, admitted to full membership in the Kuomintang, while the Chinese Communist Party maintained its separate existence. Thus, in March, 1924, Mao Tse-tung worked in the executive bureau of the Communist Party while he was a member of the executive bureau of the Shanghai local of the Kuomintang. The admission of Communists to the Kuomintang was based on the agreement that both parties unite to resist militarists and imperialists, and at this time the Chinese Communists numbered less than a thousand members.¹² The death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in March, 1925, however, created a struggle for power inside the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun, during his life, had never been a leader of the masses, but after his

¹⁰China White Paper, p. 42.

¹¹O. M. Green, China's Struggle with the Dictators (London, 1941), p. 112.

¹²Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

th, every faction of the Kuomintang joined in exalting him as the
bol of the national revolution, and as the father of the Chinese
public.¹³

Wang Ching-wei, a left wing leader of the Kuomintang, became
irman of the Nationalist government, and the Russians and Chinese
munists appeared to be firmly in control of the Kuomintang machine,¹⁴
le members of the Communist Party were in strategic positions within
civil administration and the army. Chiang Kai-shek, head of the
umpoo Military Academy and commander of the First Army, maintained
ose friendship with Borodin and by September of 1925, became
mander-in-chief of the Kuomintang armies. Chiang Kai-shek was
arged with the dual task of overthrowing the Peking government, which
l been formed by the northern militarists, Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu,
l of unifying the country under the Nationalist flag.¹⁵

In March of 1926, Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of Borodin's
emporary absence from Canton to force Wang Ching-wei, the head of the
tionalist government, to leave the country. He strengthened his
sition by disarming a number of loyal troops to the Communists and
porting several Russian advisors. Chiang Kai-shek's triumph was
ort, for in less than two months, he was forced to compromise with
e leftists to gain support from the masses to carry on the war against
e northern warlords. The Communists were reinstated, and a number of
ssian advisors were attached to the Nationalist armies in order to

¹³Mary A. Nourse, A Short History of the Chinese (New York, 1935),
317.

¹⁴O. M. Green, The Story of China's Revolution (London, 1945),
. 72-73.

¹⁵Isaacs, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

rol Chiang Kai-shek and his followers. Borodin's position became
mount and Communist influence reached its peak.¹⁶

In July, 1926, Chiang Kai-shek led the united armies of the
onal revolution northward from Canton. In August, Hunan, Hupeh,
Hankow fell into the hands of revolutionary armies, and by
ber, all of central China was under Nationalist control. In March,
, the revolutionary armies occupied Anhwei and Kiangsu provinces
entered Nanking and Shanghai.¹⁷ As Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers
oached the cities of the Yangtze Valley, the wealthy merchants,
ers and industrialists flocked to his support in the hope of
ing him against the Communists. Simultaneously, a struggle for
er had developed within the Kuomintang, as Chiang attempted to
strict the growing power of the left wing of the Kuomintang, as the
munists and their sympathizers tried to consolidate their position.

On March 22, 1927, after the revolutionary armies had reached
anghai, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the suppression of the labor unions,
appreciation of which, the Shanghai Chinese Banker's Association
sed a thirty-million silver dollar loan for Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁹ In
il, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, with the support of the conservative
tion of the Kuomintang, set up his capital at Nanking, after the left
g of the Kuomintang and the Communists had established the seat of
national government at Hankow. One day before the formal inaugura-
m of the Nanking government, the Central Executive Committee of the

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 98-99.

¹⁷Victor A. Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets (New York, 1934),
61.

¹⁸Isaacs, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 151-152.

Kuomintang in Hankow, issued a manifesto by which Chiang Kai-shek and his collaborators were expelled from the Nationalist Party as traitors. The Nanking government responded by issuing a proclamation expelling the Russians and outlawing the Communist Party.²⁰ The Nanking government, in its manifesto, declared that:

The Nationalist Party wishes to emancipate the Chinese people as a whole, that is to say, all classes, including farmers, workers, merchants, and soldiers. It does not wish, therefore, that only one class should dominate. Especially it does not desire the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Nationalist Party wishes to assure every Chinese of his entire liberty of thought and action. It will not therefore admit a super-government under Borodin. It only admits a government of a liberated China enjoying a full measure of freedom. The Nationalist Party wishes to assure the welfare and the progress of the entire nation. It cannot therefore allow 390 millions of Chinese citizens to be treated at will by 10 millions of Communists. Dr. Sun admitted the Communists into the Party as collaborators and the Russians as friends. If the Communists wish to dominate and the Russians desire to ill-treat us, that means the end of their activities.²¹

In June, 1927, General Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called "Christian General," withdrew his support from the left wing of the Kuomintang and declared allegiance to Chiang, thus weakening the Wuhan government.²² In July, 1927, Borodin and other Russian advisors returned to Moscow.²³ At that juncture, Madame Sun Yat-sen, a leader of the left wing of the Kuomintang, issued a statement concerning the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists, in which she stated that:

Dr. Sun's policies are clear, if the leaders of the party do not carry them out consistently, then they are no

²⁰Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 64.

²¹Ibid., pp. 74-75. (Quoted from the text as given by Dr. Wellington Woo, in his memoranda presented to the Lytton Commission, p. 739.)

²²Harley Farnsworth MacNair, China in Revolution (Chicago, 1931), p. 119.

²³Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1930), p. 287.

longer Dr. Sun's true followers, and the party is no longer a revolutionary party, but merely a tool in the hands of this or that militarist.... At the moment, I feel that we are turning aside from Dr. Sun's policy of leading and strengthening the people; therefore, I must withdraw until wiser policies prevail.²⁴

After the split between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, the Nanking government started its purification of the armies and civil service. Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, with unrestrained brutality, purged Communists, progressives, and radicals without discrimination.²⁵ From 1927 to 1937 thousands of innocent intellectuals and students were murdered in the campaign to suppress the communists.²⁶

In August, 1927, Chiang Kai-shek retired to private life as a gesture toward facilitating a reconciliation between the warring factions within the Kuomintang. In December, Wang Ching-wei and other Wuhan leaders assumed nominal control of the government in Nanking, whereupon in January, 1928, Chiang was reappointed commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang armies, and in short order became chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang and of its Military Council.²⁷ By June, 1928, he had defeated Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu and captured Peking, which was renamed Peiping.²⁸

After Chiang Kai-shek had outlawed the Communists in June, 1927, the Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a decree

²⁴T. C. Woo, The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1928), pp. 270-272. (Quoted from Madame Sun Yat-sen's statement on the political situation in July, 1927, at Wuhan.)

²⁵Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 78.

²⁶Isaacs, op. cit., p. 296.

²⁷MacNair, op. cit., pp. 127-132.

²⁸Harry Gannes, When China Unites (New York, 1937), p. 120.

declaring that it had withdrawn its representatives from the Wuhan government. The Chinese Communists, together with the peasants' and workers' unions, Kuomintang progressives and elements of the Nationalist forces, organized soviets and Red armies, in Kiangsi and other provinces of south China.²⁹

On August 1, 1927, the Chinese Communists, under Generals Ho Lung and Yeh Ting of the Twentieth Army of the Kuomintang, and in cooperation with Chu Teh, who became commander-in-chief of Red armies, carried out the historic Nanchang uprising in Kiangsi. This successful revolt brought an armed force of fifteen thousand men into the Communist organization and became the nucleus of the Red armies.³⁰ After the revolt at Nanchang, the Chinese Communists set up local soviets in Kiangsi and Canton, and proclaimed a revolutionary policy that deprived the old upper classes of political power, and transferred power to the soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers. They reduced the hours of work in factories, raised wages, abolished the taxes of the central government, confiscated the property of the landlords and of religious bodies, and redistributed it to the peasants. Women were granted equal status and rights alongside men, and complete freedom of assembly and speech for the people were decreed.³¹ From Kiangsi and Canton, the soviets were extended to the neighboring provinces of Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Hupeh, and as far as western Szechwan.³²

²⁹Guenther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York, 1945), p. 10.

³⁰Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1938), p. 149.

³¹Isaacs, op. cit., pp. 281-287.

³²Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 82.

In December, 1929, the Chinese Communists held a conference in the province of Fukien at which ways to improve the Red armies were discussed. Eight rules of discipline concerning the Communist armies were adopted:

- (1) Replace all doors when you leave a house.
- (2) Return and roll up the straw matting on which you sleep.
- (3) Be courteous and polite to the people, and help them when you can.
- (4) Return all borrowed articles.
- (5) Replace all damaged articles.
- (6) Be honest in all transactions with the peasants.
- (7) Pay for all articles purchased.
- (8) Be sanitary, and especially establish latrines a safe distance from people's houses.³³

Three additional duties were taught to the Red Army:

- (1) Struggle to the death against the enemy.
- (2) Arm the masses.
- (3) Raise money to support the struggle.³⁴

In military tactics four slogans were used:

- (1) When the enemy advances, we retreat!
- (2) When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them!
- (3) When the enemy seeks to avoid a battle, we attack!
- (4) When the enemy retreats, we pursue.³⁵

In February, 1930, local groups of the Chinese Communist Party held an important conference in south Kiangsi to discuss the future program of the soviets, and decided to establish the Kiangsi Provincial soviet government at Juishin.³⁶ From that time, Mao Tse-tung and Hu Teh became leaders of the Chinese Communists. The Nationalist government offered a reward of a half-million silver dollars for the capture of "Chu-Mao," dead or alive.³⁷

³³Snow, op. cit., pp. 155-158.

³⁴Ibid., p. 156.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 158.

³⁷Ibid., p. 5.

Mao Tse-tung came from a poor peasant family. Mao hated his family and the old Chinese system. As a child he was fascinated by stories of China's romantic heroes, and became an intellectual rebel. While a student, Mao became interested in radical politics and in 1920 became a Marxist. In 1921 he joined the Chinese Communist Party, and in 1923, he became a member of the Kuomintang along with other communists.³⁸ In 1925 he became chief of the "agitprop" department of the Kuomintang, and a candidate for the Kuomintang Central Committee. In 1926, Mao directed the peasant department of the Communist Party, and, following the split between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in 1927, joined forces with Chu Teh and other Communists against Chiang Kai-shek. He concentrated his work on the organization of the Chinese peasants and workers, and became the chairman of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1930 Mao Tse-tung became political commissar of the Red First Front Army while Chu Teh became commander-in-chief of that army.³⁹

Early in 1930 a split in tactics occurred within the Communist Party between the so-called "Mao Tse-tung line" and the "Li Li-sen line." Li Li-sen had studied in France and was an accomplished labor organizer, who favored mass uprisings by the urban proletariat in preference to the organization of peasant cooperatives. After the successful sovietization of Kiangsi, and in the wake of local victories by Red armies over Nationalist troops, Li Li-sen and his followers believed that the time was ripe to direct an offensive to overthrow

³⁸Green, The Story of China's Revolution, op. cit., p. 139.

³⁹Snow, op. cit., pp. 142-152.

the Nanking government. This opinion was opposed by Mao Tse-tung, who feared to risk the chances of defeat in offensive action against the cities. Failure by the Communist forces to occupy Changsha proved Li Li-sen's tactics to be wrong, whereupon Li Li-sen was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party. His followers rebelled at Futien, but the revolt was suppressed by Mao Tse-tung, and Li Li-sen fled to Moscow, leaving Mao Tse-tung the dominant leader within the Chinese Communist Party.⁴⁰

In May, 1930, the Chinese Communist Party held a conference in Shanghai, to which delegates came from the soviets of Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi, and were joined by others representing the Red armies and Red trade unions of Shanghai, Nanking, and Wuhan. The conference brought together all the scattered soviets and unified them into a centralized party organization. Many proposals were adopted as goals, such as the eight-hour working day, social insurance, civil liberties, the emancipation of women, the abolition of taxes imposed by the feudal and military authorities, cancellation of debts owed to usurers, and liquidation of landlordism. The conference voted to convene All-China Congress of Soviets, and elected a special committee to make this possible.⁴¹

On November 7, 1931, the anniversary of Russian "October Revolution," the first Chinese Communist Congress of Soviets was convened at Juichin, in Kiangsi province. A total of six hundred ten delegates were assembled from Kiangsi, Fukien, and other provinces, from the Red armies and the Red labor unions. The first Congress of Soviets adopted

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 160-163.

⁴¹Yakhontoff, op. cit., pp. 130-134.

provisional constitution for the All-China Soviet Republic, and elected Mao Tse-tung president of the All-China Soviet Republic.⁴²

The Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic comprised seventeen articles, the most important of which were the following:

Article I. It shall be the purpose of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic to guarantee the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the soviet districts and to secure the triumph of the dictatorship throughout the whole of China....

Article II. The Chinese soviet government is building up a state of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. All power shall be vested in the soviets of workers, peasants and Red Army men in the entire toiling population....

Article III. In the Chinese Soviet Republic, supreme power shall be vested in the All-China Congress of Soviets of workers, peasants, and Red Army deputies. In the interval between congresses, the supreme organ of power shall be the provisional All-China Central Executive Committee of the Soviets; the Central Executive Committee shall appoint a Council of People's Commissars, which shall conduct all governmental affairs, pass laws, issue orders, etc.

Article VIII. The soviet government in China shall set itself the goal of freeing China from the yoke of imperialism. It shall refuse to recognize any political or economic privileges for the imperialists in China....

Article X. The soviet government in China guarantees to the workers, peasants and toilers freedom of speech and the press as well as the right of assembly....

Article XI. It is the purpose of the soviet government in China to guarantee the emancipation of women....

Article XIV. The soviet government in China recognizes the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority....⁴³

The Congress of Soviets also passed a number of important measures, such as a Land Law and a Labor Law. The Land Law consisted of seven

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 217-221.

articles, the most important of which stipulated:

Article I. All the lands of the feudal lords and the landlords, the militarists and the tukhao, gentry and other big private landowners, shall be subject to confiscation without any compensation whatever, irrespective of whether they themselves work their lands or rent them out on lease. The soviets must distribute the confiscated lands among the poor and middle peasants....

Article II. The Red Army is the front rank fighter in the defense of the soviet government, and in the overthrow of the rule of imperialism. Therefore each Red Army man must be given a plot of land....

Article VI. All lands belonging to religious institutions, to temples, and all other public lands shall without fail be delivered into the possession of the peasants by the soviet government....⁴⁴

The Labor Law contained twelve sections and seventy-two articles, and was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung in December, 1931. The twelve sections consisted of: (1) General regulations. (2) Regulations governing the hiring of workers. (3) Collective agreements and labor contracts. (4) Working hours. (5) Rest time. (6) Wages. (7) Woman labor, adolescent labor and child labor. (8) Labor protection. (9) The all-China federation of labor and its local organizations. (10) Social insurance. (11) Organs to adjust labor conflicts and to determine violations of the labor code. (12) Amendments.⁴⁵

Another basic law was passed by the first Congress of Soviets that regulated elections and fixed the powers of various organs of the new regime. The Congress also authorized the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets to form a Supreme Military Council, that was charged with the tasks of purging the Red Army of undesirable elements and

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 221-223.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 224-235.

hancing the fighting ability of the Red Army, both in regard to numbers and quality.⁴⁶

Pursuant to the first Congress of Soviets, the Chinese Communists set up the Chinese Soviet Republic at Juichin, with Mao Tse-tung as its head. Seventy of the eight-five counties in Kiangsi province were under the control of the "Chinese Soviet Republic," and the expansion and effectiveness of the Communist forces became a serious menace to the Nanking government.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 140-141.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 90.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL

In 1930 one hundred eighty-one administrative districts of China were under Communist administration, highly concentrated in Jiangxi province, and extending into Hupeh, Kwangtung, Hunan, Fukien, Jiangsi, Szechuan, Honan, and Anhwei provinces.¹ The revolutionary potentialities of these soviets troubled Chiang Kai-shek so much that he resolved to eradicate the Chinese Communists by force. He launched his first anti-Communist campaign in December, 1930, with an army of about one hundred thousand men under the command of General Bai Ti-ping.² The Chinese Communists mobilized a total of about thirty thousand men to meet the Nationalist troops.³

In this campaign the Communist military commanders adopted guerrilla tactics, attacking each unit of Nationalist troops separately.⁴ The eighteenth and fiftieth divisions of Nationalist troops were crushed by the Red armies, while General Chang Hui-tsan, the commander of the eighteenth division of the Nationalist Army, was captured and executed, and many of the government soldiers deserted to the communists.⁵

¹Victor A. Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets (New York, 1934), p. 90.

²Ibid., p. 100.

³Herbert Treadwell Wade, The New International Year Book - 1930 (New York, 1931), p. 170.

⁴O. M. Green, The Story of China's Revolution (London, 1945). p. 142.

⁵Harry Gannes, When China Unites (New York, 1937), p. 135.

The first anti-Communist campaign lasted until the end of February, 1931, and ended in complete failure. General Tai Yueh, one of the brigadiers under General Lu Ti-ping, in his comment on the first campaign, said:

There are six reasons for the failure of the campaign: (1) The government forces...were ordered away before the territory was cleared of Communist bandits, giving them opportunity to come up again; (2) The government forces were unacquainted with the geography of the territory, the organization of the soviets, and the strength of the soviet forces; (3) The different units of government forces were reluctant to cooperate with each other, each trying to pass the responsibility to others; (4) The mismanagement and incompetence of the hsien (county) magistrates; the inefficiency of the police, who disturbed people instead of protecting them, the local gentry who fattened themselves on the people by oppressing them, combined to drive the people to the arms of the Communists; (5) The lack of cooperation among the party, government, military authorities and people in their common effort to put down the Communist bandits; (6) The bankrupt condition of the peasantry, unemployment among the artisans and workers, and the general economic distress among the people, supply inexhaustible fuel to the growth of Communism.⁶

In May of 1931 the Nanking government started its second anti-Communist campaign. An army of about two hundred thousand under the command of the Minister of War, Ho Ying-ching, moved into the soviet areas by seven routes. The Communist commanders still clung to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. First the Communists dispersed their armies before the advancing Nationalist troops into the mountain regions, where they concentrated their defenses and attacked the isolated divisions of Nationalist troops. As a result, portions of the Nationalist troops were destroyed, while others retreated and were re-grouped.⁷

⁶Yakhontoff, op. cit., pp. 100-102.

⁷Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1938), pp. 163-164.

On July 2, 1931, the Nanking government began its third anti-communist campaign with an army of three hundred thousand men under the personal command of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was assisted by Ying-ching, Sun Lien-chun, and Chen Min-su, each of whom had charge of a main route of advance. After two weeks of fighting, with Nationalist air forces participating, the Red armies retreated to the mountains. Nationalist troops occupied such strategic points as Ningku, Kwangchan, Hsinking and Yuitu. In August, heavy rains forced the Nationalist armies to stop their advance into the roadless mountain districts, bringing the campaign to a standstill.

In September, 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria shook Nationalist morale, and the Red armies, seizing this opportunity, started an advance of their own, and reoccupied Ningtu, Kwangchan, Hsinking, and Tungku. Many Nationalist soldiers and large amounts of munition, guns and equipment were captured, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw his troops.⁸

In March, 1932, the Chinese Communists launched a counter-offensive, and in April occupied the important town of Chanchow, in Anhui, not far from Amoy; in the south, the Red armies attacked Chen Chi-tang, warlord of Kwantung, at Nan Hsiang; while on the Kiangsi front they attacked Lo An, Li Chuan, Chien Ming and Tan Ning.⁹

In July, the Nanking government issued a proclamation inviting the Red soldiers to desert their ranks. The proclamation read as follows:

(1) Every one deserting the Red armies and joining the ranks of the Kuomintang shall receive a reward. If he comes

⁸Yakhontoff, op. cit., pp. 103-107.

⁹Snow, op. cit., p. 165.

with his rifle he is entitled to 20 dollars; if with a Mauser to 30 dollars; with a machine-gun to 300 dollars. Those coming without any arms shall receive 5 dollars.

(2) Every one who joins the Kuomintang after having killed a colonel of a Red regiment shall receive a reward of 500 dollars. For the assassination of a division commander or a brigadier one gets 5,000 dollars. For killing a chief of a battalion the reward is 300 dollars. For a commissar of an army corps 3,000. (3) Every one who joins the Kuomintang and brings with him as a prisoner a company or battalion commander of the Red Army shall receive 500 dollars. For a regiment colonel or brigadier the reward is 1,000 dollars. For a division or corps commander, 2,000. For the army leaders or various commissars, 10,000. For the army commander or for the commander-in-chief, 30,000.

(4) We welcome particularly those who join the Kuomintang bringing their arms. We welcome the Communists who repent; we welcome those who give us information on Communists. We protect the peaceful population, we send our greetings to the masses oppressed by the Communists, and render a relief to the hungry population of the sovietized areas. On the other hand, we forbid the spreading of false rumors and accusations out of spite and vengeance. Every one who comes with sincere penitence is welcome. We strictly oppose mistreatment and abuse of the peaceful population. Those who help us in our struggle with the Communists will be rewarded.¹⁰

In August, 1932, Chiang Kai-shek convoked a conference at Looshan which Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, and other prominent leaders of the Kuomintang participated. Here the new campaign was planned to include: (1) the formation of the Pao Chia system (the tithing system), a kind of police system, based on the family unit to establish strict control over the people; (2) the improvement of local administration; (3) the establishment of farmers' banks and cooperative societies; (4) the stiffening of the anti-Communist squadades, and the regulation of all business in the regions adjoining the Communist areas, especially the selling of salt; (5) the construction of roads adjoining the Communist zones in order to facilitate the

¹⁰Yakhontoff, op. cit., pp. 248-249.

ment of troops; (6) the utilization of all political methods might help to corrupt the Communist Party and the Red Army.¹¹

In the spring of 1933 Japanese troops approached Peiping, where Chiang Kai-shek signed an armistice with the Japanese at Tangku, 1933.¹²

In April, 1933, the Nanking government started its fourth anti-Communist campaign, the results of which were described by Mao Tse-tung as follows:

In April, 1933, began the fourth, and, for Nanking, perhaps the most disastrous, of its extermination campaigns. In the first battle of this period two divisions were disarmed and two divisional commanders were captured. The 59th division was partly destroyed and the 52nd was completely destroyed. Thirteen thousand men were captured in this one battle at Ta Lung Ping and Chiao Hui in Lo An hsien. The Kuomintang's 11th division, then Chiang Kai-shek's best, was next eliminated, being almost totally disarmed, and its commander seriously wounded. These engagements proved decisive turning-points, and the fourth campaign soon afterwards ended. Chiang Kai-shek at this time wrote to Chen Cheng, his field commander, that he considered this defeat "the greatest humiliation" in his life. Chen Cheng did not favor pushing the campaign. He told people then that, in his opinion, fighting the Reds was a "lifetime job" and a "life sentence." Reports of this coming [sic] to Chiang Kai-shek, he removed Chen Cheng from the high command.¹³

In October, 1933, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized nearly one million men, adopted the blockhouse and fortification system, which was introduced by German advisors, then in the employ of the Generalissimo.¹⁴ In accordance with the recommended tactics of the German advisors, Chiang Kai-shek built hundreds of miles of military roads and thousands of machine gun posts. This defensive-offensive strategy and these

¹¹Ibid., pp. 110-111.

¹²Ibid., p. 113.

¹³Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

¹⁴China White Paper, p. 45. (One of the most notable German advisors in 1933 in China was the late General Von Seeckt, former chief-of-staff

cs limited the effectiveness of Communist guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, Chiang avoided exposing any large body of troops beyond network of roads and fortifications. They moved inward only cover of heavy artillery, air support, and tanks.¹⁵ The nationalists inflicted great losses upon the Communists by pursuing tactics. According to Chou En-lai, the Red armies suffered sixty thousand casualties in one siege, while the losses among civilian population in the soviet areas were frightful.¹⁶ Se-tung admitted that the position of the Chinese Communists unfavorable in the following statement:

....With the overwhelming numerical and technical superiority of the Kuomintang forces, the Red Army was obliged, in 1934, to seek to change the conditions of its existence in Kiangsi, which were rapidly becoming more unfavorable. Secondly, the national political situation influenced the decision to move the scene of main operations to the northwest....¹⁷

Unfortunately, General Tsai Ting-kai, commander of the Nineteenth Army, revolted against Chiang Kai-shek and set up a provisional government in Fukien, in November, 1933. This new development forced Chiang Kai-shek to concentrate attention against Tsai, necessitating deployment of the bulk of the Nationalist troops against the insurrection.¹⁸ The Nationalist troops suppressed Tsai Ting-kai's rebellion in Fukien by January, 1934. At the same time the second All-China Congress of Soviets was convened in Juichin, the Red capital, and it was decided to withdraw the main Communist forces from Kiangsi

¹⁵Snow, op. cit., p. 173.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 174.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 166.

¹⁸Mary A. Nourse, A Short History of the Chinese (New York, 1935), 38.

the northwest. This withdrawal was begun in October, 1934.

Originally called a "general retreat," it later became known as the Long March.¹⁹ Mao Tse-tung in this "Long March" stated:

The victorious march of the Red Army, and its triumphant arrival in Kansu and Shensi with its living forces still intact was due, first, to the correct leadership of the Communist Party, and secondly, to the great skill, courage, determination and almost super-human endurance and revolutionary ardour of the basic cadres of our soviet people....²⁰

The success of the Communist strategic retreat reflected the inefficiency of Chiang Kai-shek's military machine. This inefficiency was due to at least seven reasons: (1) There was a lack of cooperation between the Nanking government and the provincial warlords in the anti-Communist campaign. Some of the provincial warlords, as Governors Chen Chi-tang and Ho Chien, made an effort in the anti-Communist campaign, while the others, as Governors Liu Hsiang, Liu Wan-wei, and Lun Yan, were not interested in field campaigning. (2) There was no unity within the military hierarchy, as each commander awaited his orders from Chiang Kai-shek. As a result there were delays that gave the Communists an opportunity to escape entrapment and pitched battles. (3) The Nationalists lacked intelligence reports of the Red Army movements. (4) The corrupt and inefficient military officers could not encourage the soldiers to fight at the fronts. (5) Chiang Kai-shek himself often made grave decisions without consulting his military advisors, and his evaluation of Communist tactics was often incorrect. (6) The struggle for power within the Kuomintang disrupted the latter's efforts to suppress the Communists. (7) Although Chiang Kai-shek had concluded a truce with the Japanese

¹⁹Snow, op. cit., p. 166.

²⁰Ibid., p. 167.

Tangku in May, 1933, the Japanese continued their aggressive policy towards China. This forced the Nanking government to divert attention to Japanese penetration of north China, and gave the Chinese Communists additional means to accomplish their "Long March."²¹

Although the core of the Red forces had been withdrawn from Kiangsi to northern Shensi, the Communist bases in Kiangsi and the neighboring provinces of Honan, Anwei, and Hupeh continued to engage in partisan activities. Lands were redistributed and taxes were lightened; collective enterprise was established on a wide scale; employment, opium, prostitution, child slavery, and compulsory marriage were eliminated, and the living conditions of the workers and peasants were improved; much progress toward mass education was made. In 1933, the Communists had already established one thousand cooperatives in Kiangsi province alone.²²

Mao Tse-tung, in his address to the second All-China Congress of Soviets in 1934, reported that:

The soviet democracy is also manifested in the city and hsien councils which form the foundation of the organization of the soviet. Two years' progress gives us now better organization of the councils....The delegates are scattered evenly to live among the people so that they will have the closest relation with them....Any delegate who commits serious errors may lose his seat through the suggestion of ten or more electors, seconded by more than one-half of the whole electorate or through the resolution of the council meeting.²³

....The eight-hour system is now universally observed in the soviet districts....In many urban and rural districts, there are labor-inspection offices which send out inspectors to examine whether the soviet Labor Act is violated by employers or not. There is the Labor Court for cases in

²¹Ibid., pp. 171-172.

²²Ibid.

²³Yakhontoff, op. cit., p. 260.

which the employer is accused of violating the soviet laws.... The soviet has absolute control of employment. All employers must go to the soviet for hiring workers. Unemployment relief measures are in broader practice. Generally speaking, unemployed workers can now get concrete relief. Village workers have their own farming land. The social insurance system is administered by a Social Insurance Bureau established in soviet towns....The real wages of the workers of the soviet districts has been generally increased as compared with the prerevolutionary period.... The smallest increase is 32 per cent (carpenters) and the biggest is 1,450 per cent (weaving workers)....²⁴

Agriculture in soviet districts is apparently forging ahead at a big pace. Agricultural products in 1933 have increased 15 per cent on the average as against 1932.... Under present conditions agricultural production shall be the first task in the economic reconstruction of the soviets....The soviets must lead the peasants to solve such vital problems as labor, oxen, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation, etc. Here the organized mobilization of the labor force and the participation of women in production are of vital importance. The soviets must lead the peasantry in launching the spring and summer plowing campaign....To relieve the shortage in salt, nitrate-salt has been manufactured.²⁵

²⁴Ibid., pp. 263-265.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 271-272..

CHAPTER III

THE "SIAN INCIDENT"

In 1935, the Chinese Communists set up their capital at Yen-an, in the northwestern province of Shensi.¹ At this time anti-Japanese feeling was spreading rapidly over the entire country, for the Japanese had penetrated from Manchuria into the provinces of north China. Chinese spokesmen of different classes and political creeds came more and more categorical in their demands that the Nanking government forge a genuine united front between the Kuomintang, the Communists, and the minor political parties to resist the Japanese. The Communists begged Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to pursue a policy "national peace within, resistance to the outsiders." Chiang Kai-shek, however, refused to change his previous policy towards the Communists.²

In fact, Chiang Kai-shek appointed the "Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang, to be vice-commander of the anti-Communist troops, and stationed him in Shensi province. The soldiers under the "Young Marshal's" command had retreated with him from Manchuria. Known as Wangpai troops, they hoped to regain their homeland from which they had been driven out by the Japanese. In Shensi, the "Young Marshal's"

¹Guenther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York, 1945), 15.

²Harry McNeil, The Truth About Communism in China (New York, 1939), 11.

ff and troops formed ties with the forty thousand Hsipei troops, commanded by General Yang Hu-cheng, the pacification commissioner of n.³

In October of 1936, Japanese, Mongol, and Chinese puppet troops occupied Jehol and Chahar, and began to invade northern Suiyuan. Chinese patriots demanded a war of resistance, but the Nanking government replied that extermination of the Communists must come first. In the meantime, the Japanese demanded that the Nanking government suppress the National Salvation Movement, which was led by Chinese lawyers, workers, and professors. At the end of October, seven prominent leaders of the National Salvation Movement were arrested in Shanghai. This stirred up strong resentment throughout China. The Communists took this opportunity to ask the Tungpei and Hsipei garrisons in Shensi: "Why don't you fight against the foreign invaders, for the sooner they are gone, the earlier you can go back to your homes and villages. After all, we are all Chinese; why should you be fighting instead of fighting the Japanese?" The words took effect. The Tungpei officers petitioned the "Young Marshal" and persuaded him to join with the Communists to support the patriotic demands for a united front against the Japanese.⁴

An American writer, Miss Nym Wales, who was in Shensi at that time, reported the situation in Sian as follows:

In Sianfu, the 'Western Capital' of China, a critical situation is developing in the ranks of 'Young Marshal' Chang Hsueh-liang's bitterly anti-Japanese northeastern

³H. H. Chang, Chiang Kai-shek (New York, 1944), p. 243.

⁴Ibid., p. 244. (National Salvation Movement was a kind of patriotic movement. Its organization, National Salvation Association, is established in May, 1936. It advocated the cessation of civil war and urged national resistance to Japanese aggression.)

army, stationed here for suppression of the Reds. These troops, dwindled from 250,000 men in 1931 to 130,000 at present, are all men without a country, homesick, sick of civil war, and in a high temper against the continued non-resistance policy of the Nanking government towards Japan. The attitude of the lower rank and file might very easily be described as mutinous, and this feeling has permeated even to the high officers. This condition has given rise to rumours that even Chang Hsueh-liang's previously good personal relations with Chiang Kai-shek have become strained, and that he is planning an alliance with the Red Army in an anti-Japanese united front, under the direction of a national defence government.⁵

In October, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Sian to launch his sixth anti-Communist campaign. Twenty divisions were to be sent into the northwest, while ten well equipped divisions were concentrated near Hsuehkwang, the gateway to Shensi. One hundred bombers were prepared to support the drive to destroy the remaining Communists. Upon the arrival of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang handed a petition to Chiang Kai-shek which stated:

In order to control our troops, we should keep our promise to them that whenever the chance comes they will be allowed to carry out their desire of fighting the enemy. Otherwise, they will regard not only myself, but also Your Excellency, as a cheat, and thus will no longer obey us. Please give us the order to mobilize at least a part, if not the whole, of the Tungpei army, to march immediately to Suiyuan as reinforcements to those who are fulfilling their sacred mission of fighting Japanese imperialism there. If so, I, as well as my troops of more than 100,000, shall follow Your Excellency's leadership to the end.⁶

Stubbornly Chiang Kai-shek rejected Chang Hsueh-liang's suggestion and insisted that the Tungpei and Hsipei armies fight the Communists. Chang Hsueh-liang was extremely disappointed at Chiang's intransigence, and he related to William Henry Donald, an Australian advisor to Chiang Kai-shek:

⁵Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1938), pp. 396-397.

⁶Ibid., pp. 399-400.

I told Chiang to accept a Communist offer to join forces and fight the Japanese, but Chiang said: "I have given orders, you and every one else must obey."⁷

Chang Hsueh-liang also told Donald:

My men would not fight the Communists. It is not Communist bullets they are afraid of. They listen to what the Communists say to them and the Communists say, "We are Chinese and you are Chinese; why do you fight with us; your officers get rich. They don't pay your wages. They have their motorcars, their concubines, their silk gowns and you get nothing." Every thing they say, of course, is quite true, but what can I do? Old Man Chiang says we have got to fight the Communists.⁸

In November, General Hu Tsung-nan's army, composed of picked Nationalist troops, was heavily defeated by the Red Army in Kansu province. Chiang Kai-shek became incensed and resolved again to destroy the Communists.⁹

On December 4, Chiang arrived at Tungkwan and summoned the commanders of the anti-Communist troops from Shensi and Kansu to confer with him. He told his generals that the anti-Communist campaign was to be definitive. If they would carry out his orders and fight on with courage, all would be over in a few days and the government could then direct its attention against the Japanese.¹⁰

On December 8, Chiang returned to Sian by plane, but by this time the commanders of the Tungpei and Hsipei troops had secretly made a truce with the Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek had knowledge of this, but thought that he could alter their decision by a personal appeal. On his arrival in Sian, Chiang Kai-shek summoned a general staff

⁷Earl Albert Selle, Donald of China (New York, 1948), pp. 318-319.

⁸Ibid., p. 318.

⁹Chang, op. cit., p. 244.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 245.

ference to which most of the prominent military leaders of the Lintang were invited. An anti-Communist campaign was proposed, to which Chang Hsueh-liang and other commanders displayed obedience and loyalty. It was rumored that if the "Young Marshal" disagreed with Generalissimo's plan, his Tungpei troops would be disarmed by Lintang forces, that Chang Hsueh-liang himself would be dismissed from his command, and that General Chiang Ting-wen, Chiang Kai-shek's trusted lieutenant, would be appointed to replace Chang Hsueh-liang as head of the Bandit Suppressing Commission.¹¹

Two days after Chiang Kai-shek's arrival at Lintung, outside of Ninghsien, thousands of Sian students and school children staged an anti-Japanese demonstration. They planned to petition Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to end the civil war and reinforce General Fu Tso-yi's armies facing the Japanese in Suiyuan. Acting upon orders from the Shensi governor, who received his instructions from the Generalissimo, the police fired on the student demonstrators, wounding many of them.¹² Chang Hsueh-liang intervened at this point, stopped the fighting, and persuaded the students to return to the city. That night the "Young Marshal" attempted to speak to Chiang, but Chiang Kai-shek was very angry and rebuked the "Young Marshal" for supporting the student demonstration. On December 11, the "Young Marshal," in company with General Yang Hsiung-cheng, again tried to open conversations with Chiang, but Chiang Kai-shek pounded the table and cursed Chang Hsueh-liang.¹³

¹¹Ibid., pp. 244-245. (The Bandit Suppressing Commission was a military organization which directed the efforts to suppress the Red Army.)

¹²Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York, 1943), p. 140.

¹³Selle, op. cit., p. 323.

When Chang Hsueh-liang returned to his Sian headquarters, he told officers, "I am afraid this may mean the end of my association with the Generalissimo. I cannot stand for such disgraceful treatment." General Yang Hu-cheng suggested, "There may be a way out. I will bring him into the city, and then he will have to listen to what we want."¹⁴

On the night of December 11, Chang Hsueh-liang, General Yang Hu-cheng and their staff officers held a conference at which time they decided to arrest Chiang Kai-shek. Yang Hu-cheng's army was ordered to move into the environs of Sian, and Chang Hsueh-liang sent his cousin, Sun Ming-chiu, with hundreds of Tungpei soldiers to surround the temple at Lintung. They assaulted the Generalissimo's residence at dawn, killing the Generalissimo's body-guard. Chiang Kai-shek managed to escape into the hills, but was discovered and brought back to Sian.¹⁵

On December 12, the commanders of the Tungpei and Hsipei armies issued a circular telegram, addressed to the Nanking government, to various provincial leaders, and to the people. In this circular telegram they proposed eight demands to Generalissimo Chiang for the preservation of the nation, and "requested" the Generalissimo to remain in Sian for the time being, giving assurances for his personal safety. The eight demands were:

1. Reorganization of the Nanking government, and admission of all parties to shoulder the responsibilities of national salvation.
2. Cessation of civil warfare.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 324.

¹⁵Smedley, op. cit., p. 141.

3. Immediate release of the leaders of patriotic groups who were arrested in Shanghai.
4. Release of political prisoners throughout the country.
5. Guarantee of the people's liberty of assembly.
6. Assurance of freedom to the people to carry out patriotic movements.
7. Faithful execution of the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
8. Calling a conference for national salvation without delay.¹⁶

These eight points were approved by the Chinese Communists, for the day following Chiang Kai-shek's arrest, the Communist representatives, Chou En-lai, political director of the Red Army, and Chien-ying, chief-of-staff of the Red Army, arrived in Sian on Chang Hsueh-liang's personal plane.¹⁷

Chou En-lai paid his respects to Chiang Kai-shek, and a joint meeting was called between the commanders of Tungpei and Hsipei troops and the Red Army representatives. These three groups became open enemies, and on the 14th they announced the formation of an anti-Chinese army consisting of about one hundred thirty thousand Tungpei troops, forty thousand Hsipei troops, and ninety thousand troops of the Red Army. Chang Hsueh-liang was appointed chairman of the United Anti-Japanese Military Council, and Yang Hu-cheng vice-chairman. On instructions from the newly created council, Tungpei and Hsipei troops moved eastward to the Shensi-Shansi and Shensi-Honan borders, while the Red Army pushed southward along the Shensi border.¹⁸

When news of the uprising reached Nanking on December 12, it was reported that Generalissimo Chiang was dead and that Sian was on fire.

¹⁶Chang, op. cit., p. 249.

¹⁷Smedley, op. cit., p. 146.

¹⁸Snow, op. cit., pp. 1407-1408.

central government committee held an emergency meeting, ordering arrest of Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng, and declaring a state of national emergency. Believing Chiang to be dead, the political factions within the Kuomintang, such as the "Political Alliance Clique," the "Pro-Fascist Whampoo Clique," the "Wang Ching-wei Group," the "Western Hill Group," the "C. C. Clique," etc., began a struggle for power. General Ho Ying-ching, the minister of war, supported by the Whampoo Clique, became the commander-in-chief of the "Punitive Expedition." Government troops were moved toward Shensi province, and hundreds of bombers were readied for action.¹⁹

Madame Chiang opposed General Ho Ying-ching's punitive operation, and sought desperately to find a peaceful solution without bloodshed. Turning to the leading men and to the young officials of the Whampoo Clique, Madame Chiang entreated them to refrain from rash actions. Like the warlords of various provinces, such as Han Fu-chu, Li Shan-shan, and Pa Shung-hi, urged a peaceful settlement, and disagreed with General Ho Ying-ching's punitive operation.²⁰

On December 13, Madame Chiang secretly sent Donald, the Generalissimo's personal advisor, to Loyang by air with a letter to Chang Hsueh-liang, saying that she knew that everything he had done was in the interest of China. Chang Hsueh-liang invited Donald to come to Nanking, because he wanted to assure the Nanking government that Chiang Kai-shek was safe and alive.²¹

¹⁹Chang, op. cit., p. 249. (Punitive Expedition was the name of military force which was designated to carry out punitive operations against Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng.)

²⁰Sven Hedin, Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China (New York, 1940), p. 104.

²¹Selle, op. cit., p. 324.

When Donald arrived at Sian on December 14, Chang Hsueh-liang told him:

My intelligence officers have informed me that Nanking has ordered Sian attacked. This means they want the Generalissimo killed. Either they will try to do it with bombs, or they hope that some one here will be inflamed enough to do it. They are using this, of course, as a means to seize power. They have cut telephone communications and have ignored my requests to have them restored.²²

After Donald had a conversation with Chiang, he told Chang Hsueh-liang:

You must tell your people that their future depends upon saving the Generalissimo, that the Nanking crowd want him removed so that they can take his place. They will run the government and you will be rebels or outlaws. To avert that, to put the responsibility where it belongs, to sheet /sic/ home the blame, you must save the Generalissimo at all cost.²³

On December 15, Donald returned to Loyang and telegraphed to the ruling government that Chiang Kai-shek was alive and in good health, expressed Chang Hsueh-liang's wish that Madame Chiang and H. Kung, the minister of finance, go to Sian. No one believed the contents of this message, and it was rumored that the insurgents had seized Madame Chiang and H. H. Kung as hostages.²⁴

On December 18, General Chiang Ting-wen, one of Chiang Kai-shek's trusted men who had been seized at Sian, arrived in Nanking with Chiang Kai-shek's personal letter to General Ho Ying-ching, the minister of war, that ordered him to stop the punitive operation. On the following day T. V. Soong, Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law, and General Ku Tsu-tung, one of the prominent military leaders, went by

²²Ibid., p. 325.

²³Ibid., p. 327.

²⁴Hedin, op. cit., p. 106.

ane to Sian. On the 22nd, Madame Chiang, accompanied by Donald and General Chiang Ting-wen, flew to Sian.²⁵ After Madame Chiang's arrival, conversations continued between Madame Chiang, T. V. Soong, Donald, Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng, and Chou En-lai. What went on at these talks remains a mystery. But finally Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng, and Chou En-lai agreed upon terms for the Generalissimo's release.²⁶

Before leaving Sian for Nanking on Christmas Eve of 1936, Chiang delivered a lecture to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng in which he emphasized that:

....The present outcome of the coup d'etat shows that you are both ready to correct your own mistakes, and that is creditable to you as well as auguring a bright future for the Chinese race. Since you are now so convinced by my sincerity towards you that you have the courage to acknowledge your wrong-doing, you are entitled to remain as my subordinates. Furthermore, since you can be so readily converted it will certainly be easier for your subordinates to follow suit....The responsibility of this coup d'etat naturally rests with you two, but I consider myself also responsible....I have not paid any attention to my personal safety. I have taken no precautions on that account and have therefore tempted the reactionaries to take advantage of the situation....My own carelessness was the remote cause of this coup d'etat and gave rise to this breakdown of discipline....I feel I am to be blamed and must apologize to the nation, the party and the people. A country must have law and discipline. You two are military officers in command of troops, and when such a coup d'etat has taken place you should submit to the judgment of the central government....Our lives may be sacrificed, but the law and discipline of the nation must be upheld. Our bodies may be confined, but our spirit must be free. My own responsibility to the country and the central government will always be willingly borne as long as I live. That is why I have repeatedly refused to give any orders or sign anything you wanted me to give or sign while under duress.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 107-108.

²⁶Stein, op. cit., p. 17.

It is because I consider life or death a small matter compared with the upholding of moral principles....²⁷

The day Chiang Kai-shek arrived at Nanking, China was swept by a raging tide of mass feeling that engulfed the nation. People cheered, danced through the streets, and tons of firecrackers were exploded. When Chiang stepped from the plane the entire government lined out shouting: "Long live the Generalissimo!" "Long live the Kuomintang!"²⁸

The first official act of Chiang Kai-shek, upon his return to Nanking, was to issue a statement in which he confessed his inability to prevent the revolt. He then petitioned the central government to be relieved of all his posts, and that he be punished for neglect of the performance of his duties. The official reply from the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee declared that:

During a period of great difficulty and danger you were able to maintain a spirit of grandeur and Olympian calm; you were able to show a large and magnanimous personality so that those who created the trouble became deeply and sincerely moved and at last repented. What is there about the episode to make you desire to resign from your posts, much less to ask for punishment?²⁹

Chang Hsueh-liang returned alone to Nanking and sought judgment for his actions, whereupon a military tribunal was convened by the Military Council to pass sentence upon the "Young Marshal." Chang Hsueh-liang was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, and was deprived of civil rights for five years. However, at Chiang's request, the

²⁷General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, General Chiang Kai-shek (New York, 1937), pp. 178-181. (Quoted from the Generalissimo's admonition to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng prior to the departure from Sian.)

²⁸McNeil, op. cit., p. 12.

²⁹Chang, op. cit., p. 259.

entence was suspended.³⁰ Chiang Kai-shek, in his letter to the Military tribunal, stated his opinion that:

In view of his (Chang Hsueh-liang's) admission of guilt and repentance, the government must be lenient with him and show a forgiving attitude so that he may lead a new life.³¹

Following Chiang's return to Nanking, the Nationalist troops were withdrawn from Shensi, the "Punitive Expedition" headquarters was abolished, the cabinet was reformed, and the "pro-Japanese" officials were replaced by a "European-American Clique." Chiang Kai-shek returned to his native home, Fenghua, taking Chang Hsueh-liang along for safekeeping. The "Sian Incident" was concluded.³²

What agreements had been reached between Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang, the Kuomintang and the Communists, are still unknown. According to Chiang Kai-shek's Diary From Sian, Chiang Kai-shek did not sign the terms that Chang Hsueh-liang had demanded. Madame Chiang, in her Sian Diary, stated that, quite contrary to outside belief, the Reds were not interested in detaining the generalissimo.³³ Edgar Snow says that the "eight demands" were condensed into a six point agreement that was signed by both Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang. The six point agreement stipulated:

1. Cessation of the civil war and cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists.
2. A defined policy of armed resistance against further Japanese aggression.

³⁰Chien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge 1950), p. 107.

³¹Chang, op. cit., p. 260.

³²Selle, op. cit., p. 336. (The "Young Marshal" has remained under protective custody of the Kuomintang ever since.)

³³Hedin, op. cit., p. 130.

3. Dismissal of certain "pro-Japanese" officials in Nanking, and the adoption of an active diplomacy to cement closer relations with Great Britain, America, and Soviet Russia.
4. Reorganization of the Tungpei and Hsipei armies on an equal footing (politically and militarily) with Nanking's forces.
5. Greater individual liberties for the people.
6. The creation of some sort of democratic, political structure at Nanking.³⁴

Edgar Snow also indicates that an important statement was issued Chang Hsueh-liang on December 19 to the foreign press regarding agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. This telegram was suppressed by Nanking censors. The important part of the telegram read:

The Generalissimo's prolonged stay here is not of our doing. As soon as Mr. Donald arrived last Monday, and the Generalissimo had somewhat recovered from his natural indignation and his reluctance to talk, he calmly discussed the problems confronting us all, and by Tuesday had agreed in principle with the points we had in view for adoption of a defined national policy and the effecting of changes to permit the nation to develop logically and freely, both politically and materially, and in accordance with the will of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen. I therefore telegraphed, welcoming any one to come from Nanking to hear the Generalissimo's views, and arrange with him for the necessary safeguards to prevent the development of civil warfare. The Generalissimo naturally vigorously demanded that he be released to proceed to Nanking, but while I personally had full confidence that the Generalissimo would carry out his promises, it was impossible to risk his being persuaded after his arrival at Nanking to continue with the warfare....³⁵

Agnes Smedley, an American writer who was in Sian when the incident occurred, gave a brief description of Chiang Kai-shek's departure from Sian as follows:

The Generalissimo was secretly released on Christmas Day. The people knew nothing of this, and the authorities

³⁴Snow, op. cit., p. 421.

³⁵Ibid., p. 419.

in Sian were apparently afraid to let them know. On the preceding day they deliberately circulated rumors that General Fu Tso-yi, heroic defender of Suiyuan, was arriving by plane on Christmas Day to join the anti-Japanese alliance. At the rumored hour the airdrome was black with people carrying banners to welcome him. A closed car drove up. Out stepped Marshal Chang. He was greeted with applause. Then Generalissimo Chiang and his party followed; only two or three recognized them and then hardly believed their eyes. The whole party entered the plane and took off. General Fu Tso-yi did not come, and the people were left milling about in confusion. When the truth became known, there was consternation....Within an hour a group of young Manchurian officers and national salvation leaders were going from room to room in the hotel, complaining bitterly of the ruse. They stopped and said to me [Agnes Smedley], "We have been betrayed! The Red Army induced the 'Young Marshal' to release Chiang"....³⁶

After it was all over, in January of 1937, Donald wrote a letter his old friend Harold Hochschild, concerning the peaceful settlement the Sian Incident in which he noted:

....The kidnapping was on the twelfth, I left Nanking by plane the next day, got to Sian on the morning of the 14th; heard the "Young Marshal's" story; cursed him; went and saw the Generalissimo and cursed all and sundry for giving so much trouble....The "Young Marshal" was not the prime mover in the matter, though he takes full responsibility for it, and it came about that he was put in that position in order to save the Generalissimo and prevent harm coming to him personally....He looks well and does not regret anything, and is highly amused to see that all he demanded has now been agreed to. The chief thing was cessation of fighting with the Reds. The fighting stopped automatically and negotiations are now coming to a head to wind up the whole business....So, in principle, the "Young Marshal" won out....³⁷

³⁶Smedley, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

³⁷Selle, op. cit., p. 336.

CHAPTER IV

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE UNITED FRONT

Shortly after the Sian Incident, the Nanking government abandoned policy of hostility against the Chinese Communists, and Chiang -shek invited Chou En-lai to the capital. Negotiations went etly ahead and, bit by bit, the Kuomintang adopted a policy that ncided in all respects with Chang Hsueh-liang's proposals. itical prisoners were set free, and newspaper censorship was lished.¹

In February of 1937, the Chinese Communists sent an official egram to the third plenary session of the Kuomintang Congress, ting their conditions for a united front. This telegram proposed : following conditions:

- (1) Cessation of the civil war and concentration of strength against Japanese aggression.
- (2) Freedom of speech and assembly, and release of political prisoners.
- (3) Calling of a national salvation conference representing all groups and the armed forces.
- (4) Intensification of military preparations to resist Japan, and improvement of the living conditions of the people.²

The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang replied to the linese Communists by setting forth four conditions as the basis for

¹Earl Albert Selle, Donald of China (New York, 1948), p. 337.

²Lawrence K. Rosinger, China's Wartime Politics 1937-1944 (Princeto: 45), p. 23.

participation in a united front, namely:

1. Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the national forces.
2. Dissolution of the soviet government.
3. Cessation of Communist propaganda.
4. Termination of the class struggle.³

As proof of the Kuomintang's sincerity, the economic blockade was lifted by the Nanking government, communications were restored between Nationalist China and the Communist zone, and Nanking delegates were sent to Yen-an to review the local soviet administration and the Red Army.⁴

The negotiations toward unity proceeded with success, and the Communists promised not to refer to themselves as Communists. They were willing to drop all claims to a separately constituted government and army, providing the Red armies were permitted to remain under the command of the Communist generals, and retain their own political and educational system. It was also announced that, in the interests of national unity, the Communists had already ceased confiscating privately-owned land, and were broadening representation in the local Soviets.⁵

By the fall of 1936, meanwhile, anti-Japanese sentiment had become widespread among the Chinese populace. Numerous incidents had occurred throughout the country. A Japanese druggist was killed by a mob at Pakhoi, in Kwangtung province; a Japanese consular policeman

³Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937-1943 (New York, 1943), p. 50.

⁴George Creel, Russia's Race For Asia (Indianapolis, 1949), p. 76.

⁵Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York, 1943), p. 173.

killed at Hankow; a Japanese officer was assaulted at Fengtai; and
 ee Japanese soldiers were shot by Chinese gunmen at Shanghai. In
 ly to these incidents the Japanese, in September, 1936, demanded
 nese acceptance of certain basic demands as the price to maintain
 ceful relations between China and Japan. The Japanese insisted
 t Chiang Kai-shek himself, and not merely the Foreign Minister,
 ng Chun, approve the following demands:

1. The acceptance of responsibility by the Nanking government for termination of anti-Japanese agitation.
2. The recognition of Japan's special position in north China.
3. Cooperation in the suppression of Communism through the brigading of Japanese with Chinese troops, wherever the latter were confronted with Communist forces of equal numbers, and also in the areas bordering on Outer Mongolia.
4. The acceptance of advisers in all branches of the Chinese government, including the military organizations, as well as the civilian branches of administration.
5. Economic collaboration, including the revision of the Chinese tariff down to the 1928 level.⁶

Chiang Kai-shek refused to discuss these demands with the Japanese
 assador, and upon his departure to Sian in October left negotiations
 the hands of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chang Chun.⁷

Following the "Sian Incident" a short respite in Sino-Japanese
 lations occurred. This was in part the result of political changes
 Japan, which brought about the overthrow of the Hirota government
 the beginning of 1937.⁸ In May, 1937, the new Japanese cabinet,

⁶Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times
 ew York, 1941), p. 568.

⁷T. A. Bisson, Japan in China (New York, 1938), p. 145.

⁸Ibid., p. 569.

ded by Prince Konoye, and supported by the army and the navy, intensified the militarist's strong policy toward China.⁹ On July 7, 1937, during the course of army maneuvers in the vicinity of Peiping, Japanese demanded the right to search the town of Wanping for a missing soldier. When the Chinese garrison resisted, shots were exchanged, and a battle ensued at Lukuochiao (Marco Polo Bridge), about fifteen miles southwest of Peiping.¹⁰ At the mountain resort Kuling, Chiang Kai-shek consulted his highest commanders on the question of whether to fight the Japanese in earnest.¹¹

On July 14, in the face of active hostilities commenced by the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek appealed to the Communists to end their armed revolt and anti-national propaganda.¹² On September 22, the Chinese Communists agreed in an important declaration to the following points:

1. The San Min Chu-I (Three People's Principles), enunciated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is the paramount need of China today. This (the Communist) party is ready to strive for its enforcement.
2. This party abandons its policies of overthrowing the Kuomintang of China by force, and of sovietization, and discontinues its policy of forcible confiscation of land from landowners.
3. This party abolishes the present soviet government and will enforce democracy based on the people's rights in order to unify the national political machinery.
4. This party abolishes the Red Army, reorganizes it into the National Revolutionary Army, places it under the direct control of the Military Affairs Commission of

⁹Ibid., p. 570.

¹⁰Smedley, op. cit., p. 181.

¹¹Ibid., p. 182.

¹²Creel, op. cit., p. 78.

the national government, and awaits orders for mobilization to share the responsibility of resisting foreign invasion at the front.¹³

In addition, an agreement was signed between the Nanking government and the Chinese Communists on September 22, according to which the Communist base in north Shensi was designated the Shan-kan-Ning Border region, and the Red Army was named the Eighth Route Army and placed formally under the nominal command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁴

The Eighth Route Army consisted of three divisions, totaling forty-five thousand men. Another fifteen thousand irregulars, who had been operating south of the Yangtze River, were much later officially organized into the New Fourth Army. The hard-bitten Communist, Chu Teh, was left as field commander of the Eighth Route Army.¹⁵ The Eighth Route Army was authorized to penetrate behind the Japanese lines in north China, following the withdrawal southward by the Nationalist armies, to organize guerrilla bands to harass the Japanese.¹⁶

Chiang Kai-shek welcomed the Chinese Communist declaration and, on September 24, 1937, issued a statement which praised the reestablishment of Chinese unity. In his statement Chiang said:

....The manifesto recently issued by the Chinese Communist Party is an outstanding instance of the triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration. The various decisions embodied in the Manifesto, such as the abandonment of a policy of violence, the cessation of Communist propaganda, the abolition of the Chinese soviet government, and the disbandment of the Red Army are all

¹³Rosinger, op. cit., p. 97.

¹⁴Harrison Forman, Report From Red China (New York, 1945), p. 55.

¹⁵Creel, op. cit., p. 79.

¹⁶Guenther Stein, The Challenge of Red China (New York, 1945), p. 18.

essential conditions for mobilizing our national strength in order that we may meet the menace from without and guarantee our own national existence....I sincerely hope that all members of the Communist Party will faithfully and unitedly put into practice the various decisions reached, and under the unified military command that is directing our resistance, will offer their services to the state, fighting shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the nation for the successful completion of the Nationalist revolution....¹⁷

At its three hundred thirty-third meeting in September, 1937, the Executive Yuan of the Kuomintang confirmed, by decree, the agreements made with the Communists concerning the designation and boundaries of the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. This border region consisted of one hundred thirty thousand square kilometers, and contained a population of some two million inhabitants.¹⁸

In other decrees, issued at the same meeting, the Nanking government permitted all political parties to enjoy freedom of speech, press, assembly, and values, provided they did not seek to overthrow the government.¹⁹

On December 13, 1937, Nanking fell to the Japanese, whereupon the Nationalist government retreated to Hankow.²⁰

In January, 1938, the New Fourth Army was organized in the area east south of the Yangtze River. It was composed of peasants and students, some of whom were Kuomintang volunteers, and was placed under the command of the Communist General, Yeh Ting. This New Fourth Army was recognized by the Kuomintang's National Military Affairs Commission, and was assigned to guerrilla activities in the Nanking

¹⁷Chiang Kai-shek, Resistance and Reconstruction (New York, 1943), p. 20-21.

¹⁸Forman, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁹Harry McNeil, The Truth About Communism in China (New York, 1939), p. 13.

²⁰Sven Hedin, Chiang Kai-shek, Marshal of China (New York, 1940),

rea.²¹ Also in January, 1938, the provisional Executive Committee of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region was established by the Communist Conference at Fuping, following authorization by the Nationalist government. This provisional Executive Committee was to serve as the high command over the guerrilla bands in the three provinces which were under Japanese occupation.²²

At the beginning of 1938, the first Communist newspaper, Hsin Hua Shih Pao, was published in Hankow upon permission by the Nationalist government; the initial expense was borne by the Finance Minister, T. H. Kung.²³

In March of 1938, the People's Political Council was established in Hankow by an order of the emergency session of the Kuomintang Congress. Its creation was a compromise measure agreed upon by the Kuomintang and the other parties as the first step towards a united front government. Seven Communist representatives were included in this council, among whom were Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.²⁴ Its membership was set at two hundred,²⁵ most of the members coming from the following groups:

1. The Kuomintang and the unaffiliated masses.
2. The Youth Party and the National Socialists.
3. The Communists.
4. The "Popular Front" group, including the intellectuals and the National Salvationists.

²¹Paul M. A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek (Boston, 1941), p. 15.

²²Ibid., p. 16.

²³Rosinger, op. cit., p. 29.

²⁴Ibid., p. 50.

²⁵Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

5. The provincial and municipal representatives.²⁶

The People's Political Council was given three main powers:

1. To consider all important measures, whether of domestic or foreign policy, before these were enacted into law by the central government.
2. To submit proposals to the government.
3. To question high government officials and receive reports from them.²⁷

After the People's Political Council was created in 1938, there was a greater degree of political freedom than China had ever known before. Co-operation and unity among all parties and groups were paralleled. The council became an organization of national opinion. However, there was no definite rule that required all decrees to be submitted to the People's Political Council for approval and, as a result, the government was frequently free to act as it pleased. The council became merely an advisory body to the government.

In October, 1938, Hankow fell to the Japanese forces and the Nationalist government retired to Chungking.²⁸ Friction developed between the Kuomintang and the Communists early in 1939. The united front was formally maintained, although clashes occurred between troops of the local warlords and the Communist forces. The antagonism between the Kuomintang and the Communists was due to various factors:

1. When the Nationalist government established its war capital at Chungking, the right wing of the Kuomintang became suspicious of the Communists, and sought to restrict their influence and effective

²⁶Ibid., p. 78.

²⁷Rosinger, op. cit., p. 50.

²⁸Vinacke, op. cit., p. 595.

participation in the war, beyond the extreme northwestern area.²⁹ During the two years of hostilities, the Chinese Communists had spread out and had set up soviets in the towns and villages of north China. Communists were also working assiduously among the Nationalist troops, seeking converts, and sowing dissatisfaction against the Kuomintang.³⁰

2. The Communists represented a link with the Soviet Union. When the Nationalist government withdrew to Chungking, the main external source of armaments and munitions was Soviet Russia. The right wing of the Kuomintang feared that military aid from the U. S. S. might create strong tendencies within the Nationalist government to extend greater influence to the Communists, as a political concession for Soviet economic aid.³¹

3. After the Nationalist government withdrew from Hankow to Chungking, Communist-led guerrilla operations increased in north-central China, which strengthened the Communist forces. The New Fourth Army, stationed in west-central China, had also extended Communist influence territorially to the disadvantage of the Kuomintang.³²

4. The Chinese Communists had formally announced their support of the Nationalist government in the fight against the Japanese, but they had not really given up their ultimate goal to bolshevize China. George Creel quoted an important document, given him by U. S. Congressman Walter H. Judd, on June 19, 1948, which stated that in October, 1937,

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Creel, op. cit., p. 82.

³¹Vinacke, op. cit., p. 596.

³²Ibid.

one month after loyal cooperation was promised, Mao Tse-tung issued the following secret directive to his followers:

The Sino-Japanese war affords our party an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our policy should be 70 per cent expansion, 20 per cent dealing with the Kuomintang, and 10 per cent resisting Japan. There are three stages in carrying out this policy; the first is a compromising stage, in which self-sacrifice should be made to show our outward obedience to the central government....But in reality this will serve as camouflage for the existence and development of the party. The second is a contending stage, in which two or three years should be spent in laying the foundation of our party's political and military powers....The third is an offensive stage in which our forces should penetrate deeply into central China, sever the communications of the central government troops in various sectors, isolate and disperse them until we are ready for the counter offensive to wrest the leadership from the hands of the Kuomintang.³³

5. The Nationalist government was annoyed that the Chinese communists were engaged only in raiding Japanese-occupied areas. The communists had not contributed support in any of the major battles of the anti-Japanese war, either at Shanghai in 1937, at Taierchwang in 1938, in the defense of Hankow, or in the battles of Changhsa and Chungking Lake.³⁴

According to the testimony of Theodore H. White, the Chinese communists only attacked small groups of the enemy when they had an opportunity. Theodore White wrote:

During the significant campaigns it was the weary soldiers of the central government who took the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died. During the campaigns of 1937-1938, or the eastern China campaign of 1944, more than 70 per cent of Japanese effort was concentrated against the troops of Chiang Kai-shek and his warlord allies.³⁵

³³Creel, op. cit., p. 80.

³⁴Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis, 1947), p. 202.

³⁵Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York, 1946), p. 210.

From the Communist point of view, the rifts in the united front are due to the following causes:

1. The Communists felt that they had been unjustly treated. They accused the Nationalist government of failure to provide arms, medical supplies, and material support. They demanded legalization of their party and release of Communists imprisoned by the Kuomintang.³⁶

2. By early 1939, the Nationalist government had purged the Political Department of the National Military Council, which had been formed to unify all patriots, and to explain the issues of the war. Mou En-lai, the Communist vice-chairman, was deprived of all real functions, so that the Communists suspected that the Kuomintang was going to restore one party dictatorship.³⁷

3. Early in 1939 the police began to raid bookshops, confiscating publications that extolled the activities of the Communist Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. Many branches of the National Salvationist "Life-Bookstore" and the Communist Party's "New China Publishers" were ordered closed. Secret agents dogged the footsteps of writers, intellectuals and students.³⁸

4. Free communication between Chungking and Yenai was gradually cut off. People making their way to the Communist area were arrested and confined to special camps for "re-education."³⁹

5. The government troops began to blockade the Communist areas in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsa. In 1939, the Communists announced that

³⁶"China in Danger," The Nation, CLII (January 18, 1941), p. 61.

³⁷Israel Epstein, The Unfinished Revolution in China (Boston, 1947), p. 123.

³⁸Ibid., p. 124.

³⁹Ibid., p. 125.

the Border Region was surrounded by several hundred thousand crack Nationalist troops, that over ten thousand blockhouses had been built, and that this blockade had reduced the Border Region from one hundred thirty thousand square kilometers to only ninety thousand square kilometers, with a population of one million five hundred thousand, that supported eighty thousand garrison troops.⁴⁰

Following the Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact of August, 1939, Mao Tse-tung announced that Russia's understanding with Nazi Germany had strengthened the confidence of the whole of mankind in the possibility of winning freedom. United States Lend-Lease was denounced by the Communists as a wicked device for imperialist war. From that time on, the Chinese Communists refused to take orders from the Chungking government, and renewed their declarations that the Chinese Communists were social revolutionaries.⁴¹

In the fall of 1939 the Chinese Communists commenced operations against the Nationalist government. The Eighth Route Army moved forward into the provinces of Hopei and Chahar, forcing the Nationalist garrisons to withdraw. Other Communist troops moved into Shantung and captured Tsinan, the provincial capital. As a result, all three provinces came under Communist control.⁴² Lin Yutang described the Communist Shantung campaign as follows:

Over 35,000 troops of the Communist forces joined in an attack on the government commissioner's headquarters in the Seventh District....While the Japanese were attacking Chihsia, the 5th column...of the Eighteenth Army corps took the

⁴⁰Forman, op. cit., p. 56.

⁴¹Utley, op. cit., p. 195.

⁴²Creel, op. cit., p. 82.

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opportunity to attack the Central 27th Brigade and the county government at Chaoyuan....⁴³

Early in 1940, it was reported that Nationalist troops had attacked the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and had occupied five counties. The Communists appealed to the Generalissimo to intervene. Chiang Kai-shek stopped the hostilities, but would not give orders to withdraw the Nationalist troops. The Eighth Route Army addressed an open telegram to Generalissimo and all members of the Nationalist government, stating that:

....Special Kuomintang agents have been sent into the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to create disturbances, while huge armies have been sent to surround it. One day they raid a city, another day they sieze a county....The Sian-Yulin highway and the Lunghai Railway are communication lines of the Eighth Route Army. They are dotted with special agents, and members of the Three Principles Youth Corps intercept and kidnap travelers.⁴⁴

The major controversy to divide Nationalists and Communists was the "New Fourth Army Incident." Late in 1940, the Nationalist War Minister, Ho Ying-chin, had ordered the New Fourth Army to evacuate the rich Shanghai-Nanking area and to move northward. The leaders of the New Fourth Army agreed to make the move, but asked that arrangements be made for the protection of the partisan troops that were left behind. This arrangement was never made, and, in January of 1941, fighting broke out between government troops and the New Fourth Army. In a nine day battle, four thousand of the New Fourth Army were massacred by twenty-seven divisions of Nationalist troops. Two famous communist commanders, Generals Yeh Ting and Hong Yang, were captured.⁴⁵

⁴³Lin Yutang, Vigil of a Nation (New York, 1945), p. 119.

⁴⁴Edgar Snow, The Battle For Asia (New York, 1941), pp. 354-355.

⁴⁵The Nation, CLII (February 1, 1941), p. 114.

In January, 1941, the Nationalist government formally charged that the Chinese Communists had broken the united front agreement by seeking to establish themselves politically in the territories captured from the Japanese, and by refusing to submit to orders from the minister of war.⁴⁶ Chiang Kai-shek declared:

In November, 1940, the New Fourth Army was ordered by the high command to move northward to engage the enemy in a certain appointed area. It elected not to respond, but waited until after expiration of the period of time allotted, then to make an arbitrary move southward, executing a premeditated maneuver leading to an attack in broad daylight upon the headquarters of the 40th Division. This plainly mutinous proceeding caused its disbandment as a disciplinary necessity....⁴⁷

In reply, the Chinese Communists accused the Nationalist government of seeking to destroy the New Fourth Army, and presented the following twelve demands for settling their disputes with the Kuomintang:

1. Immediate cessation of provocative steps leading towards anti-Communist civil war.
2. Annulment of government orders of January 17 (order to liquidate New Fourth Army). Open apology by the government.
3. Punishment of Ho Yin-chin, Ku Chu-tung, Shan kwan Yun-siang.
4. Immediate restoration of Yeh Ting's freedom, and Yeh Ting to be reappointed commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army.
5. Return of all New Fourth Army ammunition seized by the government, and release of all New Fourth Army prisoners.
6. Reparation for the wounded and dead of the New Fourth Army.
7. Immediate steps to stop the anti-New Fourth Army operation in central China.
8. Termination of the blockading system along the Border Region.

⁴⁶Ibid., CLII (March 22, 1941), p. 310.

⁴⁷Forman, op. cit., p. 162.

9. Release of all political prisoners, including Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and General Yang Hu-cheng
10. Abolition of the one party dictatorship, and democratic reform of the administrative structure.
11. The realization of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principles, and obedience to his last will.
12. The purge of all pro-Japanese groups.⁴⁸

In March, 1941, when the People's Political Council was convened, the Chinese Communist Party announced that its members would not attend unless its twelve demands were accepted by the government. Chiang Kai-shek rejected these demands and insisted that his military command be respected by the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek made two concessions however:

1. That the Chinese Communists would be allowed to air their grievances in the council, and to make any proposal regarding political matters.
2. With reference to fears of civil war, that "at no future time could there conceivably be another campaign for the suppression of the Communists."⁴⁹

Owing to Chiang Kai-shek's promises, and following discussions held within the People's Political Council, the Communists gave up their demands. By September, 1941, armed clashes had again ceased, and the New Fourth Army reoccupied the territory south of the Yangtze River from which it had been driven by the Nationalist troops. However relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists did improve markedly.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Rosinger, op. cit., pp. 111-114.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 39.

⁵⁰The Nation, CLIII (September 20, 1941), p. 238.

CHAPTER V

THE STILWELL - CHIANG DISPUTE

Early in January, 1941, Lauchlin Currie was sent to Chungking by President Roosevelt as a special envoy to evaluate the real situation inside China. On April 4, Currie returned to Washington with a lengthy report, which was to guide the President in determining the character and extent of United States military and economic aid to China.¹

The Currie report was not made public, but I. E. Stone reported that Currie had been deeply impressed by the political controversy that divided the Chinese, and was disappointed that a large portion of the money which the United States had loaned to China had slipped into the pockets of highly placed officials of the Nationalist government.²

On April 4, 1941, due to the Currie mission to Chungking, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang announced that the Chinese government planned to reform its administrative organization and personnel, and that intensive economic measures were being adopted to increase China's power to resist Japan.³

In February, 1942, General Stilwell was dispatched by President Roosevelt to Burma and China to see whether a road could be built

¹The New York Times, March 20, 1941, p. 1.

²I. E. Stone, "Chungking and Washington," The Nation, CL 11 (April 5, 1941), p. 400.

³The New York Times, April 4, 1941, p. 4.

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cross the Himalayas--the so-called Burma Road--over which supplies might be poured into China. General Stilwell served simultaneously as commander of all American forces in China, Burma, and India, chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek, and deputy to Lord Louis Mountbatten, the United Nation's commander in Southeast Asia. While in China, Stilwell was independent of Lord Mountbatten, but was subordinated to Chiang Kai-shek.⁴

For a time General Stilwell cooperated with the Generalissimo in mapping the strategy against the common enemy. Stilwell, in his memoirs, wrote that he found the Generalissimo determined and forceful, that Madame Chiang was intelligent and energetic. Generalissimo Chiang transferred supreme authority over the Chinese divisions in Burma to General Stilwell.⁵

Friction and animosity developed gradually between Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell over conflicting interpretations of strategy and tactics against the Japanese. The reason for this animosity appears to lie in Stilwell's refusal to allocate American military supplies to support the main Chinese armies, since American supplies were being used to maintain the blockade against the Communists in the northwest border, instead of flowing to the anti-Japanese forces. High Kuomintang officials believed that civil war was inevitable once the Japanese were defeated, and that preparation to defeat the Communists had to be undertaken regardless of their effect in prolonging the war against Japan.

⁴John Fischer, "Vinegar Joe's Problem," Harper's CXK (December, 1948), pp. 91-92.

⁵Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York, 1948), pp. 80-81. Stilwell said, "When you consider their history and experiences with foreigners, this is really a handsome gesture that Chiang Kai-shek is making.")

⁶Harry McNeil, The Truth About Communism in China (New York, 1939)

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Friction resulted when General Stilwell attempted to contact the communist headquarters in Yen-an, and when he sought to persuade Chiang to stop opposing the Communists, and to concentrate his forces against the Japanese. Chiang and the conservatives within the Kuomintang continued to follow their policy of containing and uprooting the communists in an effort to inherit the whole of China after the defeat of Japan.⁷ Animosity resulted also from General Stilwell's insistence that Chiang Kai-shek reform the Chinese army and suppress widespread official corruption.⁸

Finally, in the spring of 1943, when General Stilwell required a number of Chinese divisions to launch an offensive against the Japanese in Burma, Chiang Kai-shek agreed on condition that the British undertake a landing action against Rangoon. The British, however, argued that they lacked the ships for such an attempt.⁹ In May, 1943, Generals Chennault and Stilwell were called to Washington, where Prime Minister Churchill strongly opposed General Stilwell's plan and campaign in Burma, and gained the support of President Roosevelt.¹

⁷Pacificus, "The Chinese Impasse," The Nation, CLIX (November 11, 1944), p. 588. (General Stilwell, in his diaries, commented on Chiang as follows: "The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek. The only thing that keeps the country split is his fear of losing control. He hates the Reds and will not take any chances of giving them a toehold in the government." The Stilwell Papers, p. 321.)

⁸Fischer, op. cit., p. 94. (Stilwell wrote in his diary: "I judge Kuomintang and Kungchintang [Communist Party] by what I saw: KMT/ Corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, words and deeds. Hoarding, black market, trading with enemy. Communist program... Reduce taxes, rents, interest. Raise production, and standard of living. Participate in government. Practice what they preach." The Stilwell Papers, p. 316.)

⁹Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), pp. 47-50.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 63-66. (Stilwell commented on his defeat as follows: "Churchill has Roosevelt in his pocket...The Limeys are not interested in the war in the Pacific, and with the President hypnotized they are sitting tight." The Stilwell Papers, p. 205.)

When news of this Roosevelt-Churchill decision reached Chungking, Chiang and his generals renewed their opposition against the Stilwell strategy of using Chinese divisions to regain British territory from the Japanese.¹¹ General Stilwell, however, insisted upon the Burma-Salween offensive, to which Chiang Kai-shek replied that thirty divisions could not be diverted from the Chinese theater of operations. General Chennault, commander of the Fourteenth American Air Squadron, sided with Chiang Kai-shek, for he, too, considered the Burma-Salween campaign as a squanderous division, and wanted to concentrate all available air power to severing Japanese sea communications, and to opening up a seaport on the Chinese coast to supply Chiang's armies.¹²

General Chennault, was quoted by the New York World Telegram of April 2, 1948, as having stated that:

The Generalissimo's position was that if there was no landing in southern Burma to disrupt the Japanese rear and sever the lines of communication, the Burma campaign was a poor investment for his slim military resources.¹³

Because of Chiang's disagreement with his strategy, General Stilwell developed an intense personal dislike and contempt towards Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.¹⁴

Early in 1943, President Roosevelt became interested in the Chinese Communists following the comprehensive report made to him by

¹¹George Creel, Russia's Race For Asia (Indianapolis, 1949), p. 97.

¹²Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis, 1947), p. 209.

¹³Creel, op. cit., p. 99.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 93. (General Stilwell described Chiang Kai-shek "this insect, this stink in the nostrils...training his lousy troops, bucking his bastardly chief of staff, and general staff, and the Jovian dictator, who starves his troops and who is the world's greatest ignoramus, picks flaws in our preparations." The Stilwell Papers, p. 210.)

the United States Military Mission, and based upon the accounts of westerners who had escaped from Peiping through guerrilla-held territory in December, 1941. The report noted that the Yen-an regime was efficient in its organization, and that it was putting up a good fight against the Japanese. The report also stated that the Chinese communists were protecting peasant properties, and had divided only the lands of those landlords who supported the Japanese.¹⁵

During the summer of 1943, a group of American military officials and newspapermen asked the Chinese government for permission to enter the Border Regime held by the Communists. The Chinese government acquiesced reluctantly, and the Americans became convinced that Yen-an's four hundred seventy thousand regular troops and two million two hundred thousand partisans were the best organized and best led troops in China, and that they would be a most effective force to oppose the Japanese, if they could be supplied with modern arms. The Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, declared that he would be very happy to have the United States establish a consulate in Yen-an. Mao Tse-tung believed that, with an American observer in Yen-an, the Chungking government would not dare to precipitate a civil war.¹⁶

In August, 1944, General Patrick J. Hurley and Mr. Donald Nelson were sent to Chungking by President Roosevelt. General Hurley was instructed to discuss military problems with General Stilwell, and to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to agree that General Stilwell be made supreme commander of all ground and air forces in China.¹⁷ Mr. Nelson's

¹⁵ Pacificus, op. cit., p. 589.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Maxwell S. Stewart, "The Myth of Patrick J. Hurley," The Nation, XI (November 10, 1945), p. 489.

ssion was to inform the Generalissimo that the White House was anxious to see China emerge from the war as the first power in Asia, and that the American government was prepared to make every effort to industrialize China. There was a major condition attached to this offer of United States support--namely, that Chiang Kai-shek first organize his cabinet, eliminating all members of the reactionary clique, and including representatives from the democratic groups, whether they were affiliated or not with the Kuomintang.¹⁸

When Hurley and Nelson arrived in Chungking early in September, 1944, they were accompanied by American Ambassador Gauss in their first interview with the Generalissimo. This first meeting proved to be a rousing success, for both Nelson and Hurley assured the Generalissimo that the American government stood solidly behind Chiang personally, and that American aid would increase. All they required was Chiang's agreement to place General Stilwell in command of all Chinese armies. Chiang signified his acceptance in a formal letter to Stilwell, and granted authority to Stilwell to promote, reward, dismiss, transfer, and reorganize all Chinese troops as he saw fit.¹⁹ This grant of supreme authority was made in mid-September, while Japanese troops were approaching Kweilin, capital of Kwansi province. Stilwell flew to Kweilin to survey the field, and drew up a memorandum in which he formulated tactics for the defense of Kweilin, and commended a drastic reorganization of the Chinese armies. He insisted to Chiang that these measures be carried out immediately.²⁰

¹⁸Pacificus, op. cit., p. 588.

¹⁹Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York, 1946), p. 219.

²⁰Ibid., p. 220.

A few days later, while Chiang was still considering Stilwell's memorandum, a telegram was sent by President Roosevelt from Quebec to General Stilwell instructing him to demand that the civil government as well as all China's armed forces be subjected to his personal authority, so that Stilwell could direct the whole of China's war potential. The telegram stated that, in case of Chiang Kai-shek's refusal, Stilwell should withdraw all American forces from China and cut off all Lend-Lease supplies to Chiang.²¹

General Stilwell went at once to the Generalissimo's residence, where Hurley and Nelson were being entertained as guests. After Hurley had read President Roosevelt's telegram, he indicated to General Stilwell that the demands could probably be obtained if diplomacy and not threats were employed. General Stilwell, however, insisted that the telegram be shown to Chiang Kai-shek. When the telegram was translated, Chiang remained silent, but later he told Ambassador Hurley:

Tell your President that I cannot abdicate the leadership of my people or the presidency of my country. If he insists on withdrawing American forces and Lend-Lease, we will have to do the best we can. We have been fighting for seven years and, except for Chennault's air force, we have received no aid from America to date. We will continue to fight to the end without any if we have to, but now I insist that General Stilwell leave China. I will accept another American general in his place, but Stilwell cannot remain.²²

In his reply to the United States government, Chiang mentioned that when he had accepted the United States' proposal of appointing General Stilwell as his chief-of-staff, he assumed he retained authority over the General.²³

²¹Utley, op. cit., p. 213.

²²Ibid.

²³White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 222.

At that time, H. H. Kung, who was in America, asked Harry Hopkins at President Roosevelt planned to do about Stilwell. Hopkins replied that, if Chiang insisted, the President would remove Stilwell. Kung cabled immediately to Chiang, who summoned the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang to inform it that he had agreed to have an American supreme commander in China, but that he would not accept General Stilwell as supreme commander.²⁴

When this news reached the American Embassy, Ambassador Gauss cabled Washington for confirmation or denial of the Hopkins story. Hopkins wired back that Kung had misinterpreted him, and that before President Roosevelt made any decision regarding General Stilwell, he would consult his chief-of-staff, General George Marshall.²⁵

On October 1, 1944, Stilwell wrote to his wife:

It looks very much as though they have gotten me at last. The Peanut has gone off his rocker and Roosevelt has apparently let me down completely. If old softy gives in on this, as he apparently has, the Peanut will be out of control from now on. A proper fizzler.²⁶

On October 18, 1944, Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek were informed that the former had been relieved of his command and was to depart immediately for America; there would be no American supreme commander, and the China-Burma-India command was to be terminated.²⁷

²⁴Ibid., p. 223.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Stilwell, op. cit., p. 339.

²⁷White and Jacoby, op. cit., p. 224. (Stilwell wrote in his diary that: "The ax falls. Radio from George Marshall. I am recalled." Sultan in temporary command. Wedemeyer to command United States troops in China...So F. D. R. has quit. Everybody is horrified out Washington...The Politicians are in full command...Some of the boys here were confident that F. D. R. would stand up to the Peanut. I felt from the start that he would sell out.")

On October 19, the Generalissimo sent a messenger to tell General Stilwell that he was being awarded China's highest decoration. Stilwell refused to accept it, and on October 20, 1944, he left China for Washington.²⁸ Some of the reasons why General Stilwell was recalled were:

1. Chiang disliked Stilwell because of the latter's insistence that the Chinese Communist Army be equipped to fight the Japanese, and that the anti-Communist blockade be lifted. This seemed to Chiang to be part of a political plot to overthrow the Nationalist government.
2. Chiang had granted authority to Stilwell to command the Chinese armies, upon which Stilwell had presented him with an ultimatum that had undermined Chiang's prestige.
3. Appointment of a foreigner as supreme commander was an infringement of China's sovereignty, which Chiang was willing to accept; however, any wholesale reorganization of the Chinese armies would have uprooted the nepotism and spoils system of the Kuomintang bureaucracy, a reform which Chiang was unwilling to condone.²⁹
4. Chiang and his generals believed that Stilwell had not worked out any plans for the liberation of China, and that he was draining China of manpower and resources for the liberation of Burma.
5. In Chiang's eyes, President Roosevelt's first telegram was a plot, hatched by Stilwell, to reduce China to the status of an American colony. Chiang could no longer allow Stilwell to remain in China.

General Stilwell was not a good choice to collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek, for his lack of patience, tact and self-control made it impossible for him to get along with Chiang.

²⁸Ibid., p. 346.

²⁹Ibid., p. 224.

Stilwell openly expressed his dislike of Chiang, who, as the head of the Chinese government merited at least formal respect from an allied officer. His mission was to coordinate the military effort of the allied powers in the Far East, but instead, "Stilwell treated Chiang Kai-shek like a tribal chieftain."³⁰ According to the testimony of his friends and admirers, Stilwell hated "paper work" and was a poor administrator.³¹ He lacked diplomatic finesse, and, while he made a good field commander, he was ill-adapted to perform his task of eliciting Chinese good will in the common war effort against Japan.

³⁰Utley, op. cit., p. 211.

³¹Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE UNITED FRONT

General Wedemeyer was appointed to succeed Stilwell in November 1944,¹ and approached his task with more tact and less personality. He treated the Chinese soldiers as equals of the Americans and restored amicable Sino-American relations. By his masterly strategy, he prevented the Japanese troops from taking Kweiyang in December, 1944.²

In consequence of Wedemeyer's arrival in Chungking, hundreds of war trucks and thousands of tons of war supplies rolled into China over the newly opened Burma Road. The reorganization of the Chinese army, the improvement of its food supplies, the raising of the soldiers' pay, and the tightening of discipline were gradually carried out. General Wedemeyer was permitted to attend meetings of the Chinese general staff, a privilege not granted to General Stilwell, but Wedemeyer never was given the direct command of Chinese troops.³

Why did Generalissimo treat Wedemeyer with favor? The reasons probably were:

1. Wedemeyer was strongly anti-Communist, and he left all political negotiations with the Kuomintang to Hurley. This non-political attitude was deeply appreciated by the Nationalist government.

¹China White Paper, p. 76.

²Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis, 1947), p. 265.

³The Nation, CLX (March 3, 1945), p. 236.

2. When Wedemeyer became commander-in-chief of the United States Forces in China, the Chinese government was able to receive arms and equipment from United States Lend-Lease supplies. General Sennault told Freda Utley that in 1944, General Stilwell had one hundred thousand tons of arms and equipment stored at Kunming, while the Chinese were fighting desperately without benefit of Lend-Lease supplies, only a short distance from Kweilin.⁴

3. Wedemeyer often told Chinese officers:

We are American and you are Chinese. We are different but we are friends and equals. I want to help you for the sake of both our countries. I can not help you unless we are frank with one another and speak plainly. I see and appreciate your difficulties and doubt if [sic] I could have done better in your place. But if we co-operate the situation can be greatly improved.⁵

In November, 1944, the United States Ambassador to China, Laurence E. Gauss resigned, and Patrick Jay Hurley was appointed to succeed him.⁶ After Hurley became the United States ambassador to China, he arranged for negotiations to be resumed between the Kuomintang and Communists on the following four points:

1. Recognition of the Chinese Communists Party.
2. Inclusion of Communist officials in the National Military Council.
3. Inclusion of Communists and non-Kuomintang representatives in the Chinese cabinet.
4. Unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of China.⁷

⁴Utley, op. cit., p. 207.

⁵Ibid., p. 269.

⁶"General Pat," Time, XLIV (December 4, 1944), p. 18.

⁷China White Paper, pp. 74-80.

On the surface, these terms appeared to be realistic, but the crucial issue was whether the five hundred thousand or more men in the Communist Eighth Route Army were to be absorbed into the Nationalist Army. The Chinese Communists insisted that a true coalition government must be established before they placed their forces under Nationalist direction. Negotiations broke down in January, 1945.⁸

In May, 1945, an announcement was made by the sixth Kuomintang Congress that the National Assembly in order to inaugurate constitutional government would be convened on November 12, 1945, to approve the Kuomintang's draft constitution. This announcement meant that the majority group in the National Assembly would consist of those delegates chosen by the Kuomintang in 1936 and 1937, that its members were not meeting to frame a constitution, but were being summoned to approve a draft constitution which had been carefully prepared by the Kuomintang inner group. Under this draft constitution vast substantive and appointive powers were vested in the president, who was to hold office for six years and could be re-elected for a second term. The president was not to be chosen by popular vote, but by an elected National Assembly.

The Chinese Communists joined with the splinter parties to oppose the Kuomintang constitution, and demanded the establishment of a coalition cabinet composed of leaders of all the political parties who were to hold a free election of representatives to a national constituent assembly.

The Chinese Communists preferred to adopt a formal constitution only after all Chinese territory had been recovered from the Japanese,

⁸The Nation, CLX (February 24, 1945), p. 198.

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d when an untrammelled election could be arranged. The Yen-an Communist government warned Chiang Kai-shek that the Communists would not participate in his premature and hand-picked National Assembly, and that they regarded his arbitrary actions in proclaiming the Kuomintang constitution as a declaration of political war.

Upon receipt of the deliberations of the sixth Kuomintang Congress, the Communist Party held its seventh Congress at Yen-an, assembling delegates from the northwest border region and from the partisan formations of central China in the summer of 1946.⁹

In July, a delegation from the People's Political Council petitioned Generalissimo Chiang for permission to send a good-will committee to Yen-an. The Generalissimo agreed, and a seven-man People's Political Council went to Yen-an. Its mission was to form a new Kuomintang-Communist Committee that would resume the stalemated negotiations for political unity. At the same time, Generalissimo Chiang sent his premier, T. V. Soong, to Moscow to confer with Stalin on the issues concerning the provinces of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. Soong also sought to induce Moscow to put pressure upon the Chinese Communists to accept the terms of the Kuomintang.¹⁰

On August 14, 1945, China concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union, at which time the Russian Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, told Premier T. V. Soong that Soviet Russia regarded the dispute between the Chungking government and the Chinese Communists as an internal question, and would not interfere with it in any way.¹¹

⁹T. A. Bisson, "Trouble Brews in China," The Nation, CLX (June 2, 1945), pp. 621-622.

¹⁰"Opening Door," Time, XLVI (July 9, 1945), pp. 39-40.

¹¹The New York Times, August 27, 1945, p. 1.

Molotov also added that Soviet Russia regarded the Communists of China as a sort of farmer-labor group.¹²

It was understood in the T. V. Soong-Molotov talks that China would have to make a quid pro quo for the Soviet "non-interference" pledge. The quid pro quo was the re-establishment of the servitudes over Manchuria that Russia had held prior to 1905, and renunciation of China's claims over Outer Mongolia.¹³

On August 26, the texts of the Chinese-Russian Treaty of Alliance and supplementary agreements were officially released in Moscow, following release of an official statement by the Soviet government in which it recognized Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government as the sole government in China, and, by inference, would withhold all support from the Communist regime of Yenan.¹⁴ The Treaty of Alliance and supplementary agreements contained seven parts. Part one--Articles I, II, and III--was a defensive alliance against Japan. Articles IV to VII, pledged that both countries would work together in close and friendly cooperation with mutual respect for their respective sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁵

Part two was a railroad agreement of 18 articles which united the main trunk lines of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway into one railway system under the name of the Chinese Changchun Railway. This railway system was to become joint

¹²Ibid., p. 5.

¹³Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵China White Paper, pp. 585-586.

property of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic, and was to be ministered by a Sino-Russian administration.¹⁶

Part three was an agreement on Port Arthur, by which the Chinese government agreed to joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base by both the contracting parties; that the civil administration in Port Arthur was to be Chinese, and that military fortifications were to be manned by the U. S. S. R. Thus, Soviet Russia had exclusive right to maintain its army, navy, and air force in Port Arthur.¹⁷

Part four was an agreement on Dairen, by which this seaport was declared a free port, open to trade and shipping of all countries. Civil administration in Dairen was to be Chinese, but the chief of the Port was to be a Russian selected by the Russian manager of the Chinese Changchun Railway.¹⁸

Part five was an agreement on Manchuria that provided that, upon Soviet occupation of the three eastern provinces pursuant to the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, supreme authority over the occupied zones of Manchuria would be executed by the Soviet military commander for the duration of hostilities.¹⁹

Part six pledged the Soviet government to give China moral support and material assistance in the form of military equipment and other supplies. This assistance was to be given only to the Nationalist government. The Soviet government recognized Manchuria and Sinkiang

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 593-596.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 590-592.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 589-590.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 592-593.

part of China, and promised that it had no intention of interfering with China's internal affairs.²⁰

The last part concerned Outer Mongolia, and involved recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia within her existing boundaries.²¹

Upon the announcement of Japan's surrender to the United Nations, the Chinese Communist commander-in-chief, General Chu Teh, ordered his forces to seize the arms of all Japanese troops in their zones, and to assume the administration of all Japanese and puppet-occupied territories and communication centers. This was an open challenge to the Nationalist government, and it was abetted by the Russian armies which had occupied Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and northern Korea. Chinese Communist armies were able to penetrate and occupy the whole of north China and significant areas of central China before the Nationalists could assume administrative control over China.²²

On August 20, Generalissimo Chiang wired General Chu Teh that the Communist forces should remain at their posts and await further instructions. General Chu Teh ignored Chiang's orders, pushed his troops into Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, and neared Peiping and Tientsin. Generalissimo Chiang conferred with General Wedemeyer and with Ambassador Hurley, who arranged for United States air forces in China to transport Chiang's armies to north China to receive the surrender of the Japanese garrisons.²³

The Generalissimo telegraphed to Mao Tse-tung to come to Chungking

²⁰Ibid., p. 587.

²¹Ibid., p. 588.

²²Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, 1953), pp. 356-357.

²³"Wan Wan Sui!" Time, XLVI (August 27, 1945), p. 43.

discuss matters in person, declaring, "This involves our national
 lfare. Please do not decline." Mao Tse-tung replied that he
 uld send General Chou En-lai to Chungking to confer with the
 neralissimo, but subsequently agreed that United States Ambassador
 trick J. Hurley might accompany him from Yen-an to Chungking and
 ck again.²⁴ Mao Tse-tung agreed to journey to Chungking, it is
 lieved, because of the Chinese-Soviet Treaty, by which Russia agreed
 support Chiang's government.²⁵

In September, 1945, Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking in the
 mpany of Hurley and, under cordial conditions, negotiations between
 e two party leaders were resumed directly. The Communist spokesman
 reed to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the national leader of China.²⁶
 ter five weeks of conversations between Generalissimo Chiang and
 o Tse-tung, agreement on fundamental issues was still not in sight.
 e principal demands of the Communist were:

1. The Kuomintang and the Communists should avoid civil war
 d together build a free and prosperous China.
2. A political consultative council representing all political
 rties was to set up a coalition government in place of the Kuomintang
 gime.
3. The National Assembly, originally scheduled to convene on
 vember 12, 1945, to debate the proposed draft constitution, was to
 delayed.

²⁴Ibid., p. 44.

²⁵The New York Times, August 27, 1945, p. 1.

²⁶"Reunion in Chungking," Time, XLVI (September 10, 1945),
 42.

4. The Kuomintang secret police was to be abolished, and only the courts of law were to order arrests, judge, and sentence.

5. Political prisoners were to be released.

6. The Communists insisted that they be permitted to administer the vital areas they had occupied in north China.

7. The Communists also insisted that they be allowed to maintain intact forty-eight divisions of their armies.²⁷

The crucial demands were the last two, for the Communists would formally recognize Chiang's leadership in China providing the key provinces of north China--Jehol, Hopeh, Chaher, Shangtung--and the eastern provinces were allowed to remain under the de facto control of the Communists. Mao Tse-tung's minimum demands were that the Chinese Communist position be permitted to remain essentially intact north of the Yellow River, which would have divided China territorially into two regimes. Chiang Kai-shek rejected this proposal as being inconsistent with China's unity and with his government's recognized status.²⁸ On the issue of keeping forty-eight divisions intact, the Nationalist government insisted that only twenty divisions might be maintained, which proved to be unacceptable to the Communists.²⁹

In October, a Communist functionary, named Li Shoo-shik, was shot and killed in Chungking by a Nationalist army corporal, arousing the indignation of Mao Tse-tung, who flew back forthwith to Yen-an.³⁰

During the Chiang-Mao conversations, United States Marines had

²⁷"China, One Goal," Time, XLVI (October 22, 1945), p. 30.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

en landed in most of north China's key ports and cities to receive the surrender of the Japanese. American planes were used to transport Nationalist troops to these cities, and as Nationalist and Communist forces made contact, local clashes ensued and spread over the whole north China.³¹

³¹China White Paper, pp. 311-312.

CHAPTER VII

THE ABORTIVE MARSHALL MEDIATION

In December, 1945, Ambassador Hurley resigned, whereupon President Truman appointed George Catlett Marshall to be his special envoy to China.¹ His mission was to mediate the strained relations between the major contenders for control of China, and thus, prevent the outbreak of civil warfare. President Truman announced that: (1) The United States forces would remain in China to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government to take over control of north China and Manchuria from the Japanese, but not to intervene in China's internal strife; (2) Political unification of China should be arranged by a national conference of all major Chinese political parties; if internal peace were not established, China could not expect to receive United States' loans and other assistance.²

When General Marshall arrived in China in December, 1945, he summoned the Political Consultative Council, which represented all political parties in China. His second task was to establish a committee of three, consisting of a Kuomintang representative, a communist leader and himself as chairman. Generalissimo Chiang appointed Chang Chun, governor of Szechwan province, to be the

¹Maxwell S. Stewart, "Exit Pat Hurley," The Nation, CLXI (December 7, 1945), p. 614.

²China White Paper, pp. 605-606. (President Truman to the Special Representative of the President to China.)

ationalist representative, while the Communist representative was General Chou En-lai.³

By January, 1946, a truce agreement was drafted by this committee and signed by the Nationalist government and by the Yen-an regime, which became effective on January 13. This truce agreement stipulated three points:

1. All hostilities were to cease immediately.
2. All troop movements were also to cease immediately, except in Manchuria and south of the Yangtze River, where Nationalist authority was unchallenged.
3. All lines of communications were to be cleared immediately. A commission, composed of Nationalist, Communist, and United States representatives left for Peiping to execute the agreement.⁴

The Nationalist government pledged itself to guarantee freedom of speech, press, and assembly. It agreed to recognize the legal status of all political parties and to release all political prisoners, and it consented to promote greater local autonomy and to hold free and general elections.⁵

The second function of the three-man committee was to unify the military command of the rival party armies. General Marshall proposed that there be a national army of sixty divisions and a Communist Army of ten divisions. The United States would lend direct assistance to improve the organization and to equip both forces, and Generalissimo Chiang was authorized to appoint and dismiss all officers. This plan

³"Hope," Time, XLVII (January 14, 1946), p. 27.

⁴China White Paper, p. 137.

⁵George Creel, Russia's Race For Asia (Indianapolis, 1949), 114.

filed due to the irreconcilable opposition that the Kuomintang generals made to any reorganization that undermined their status.⁶

Early in March, General Marshall returned to Washington to report to President Truman. General Marshall reported that he had given the Communists a role in the central government with full opportunity for enlargement, and that truce agreements were staying the outbreaks of hostilities between the Nationalists and the Communists.⁷

Late in March, 1946, Generalissimo Chiang encountered resistance from the feudal-minded landed gentry and Kuomintang warlords, who sought to preserve the old system of conservative Nationalist dictatorship. The reactionary wing of the Kuomintang sent a petition to the Central Executive Committee in which it denounced the government representative, Chang Chun, for having made concessions to the Communists. Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh was attacked for having signed the Sino-Russian Treaty of August, 1945.

The Russians were criticized for having stripped Japanese-built factories in Manchuria of machinery.⁸ Soviet Russia was accused of having violated her pledge to give moral support and military supplies only to the Nationalist government of China, by allowing her occupation forces to hand over captured Japanese military supplies in Manchuria to the Chinese Communists. By furnishing arms to the Communists in this manner, the U. S. S. R. made inevitable Communist resistance against the Nationalist government.⁹

⁶China White Paper, p. 143.

⁷Greel, op. cit., p. 145.

⁸"Glue for the Dragon," Time, XLVII (April 29, 1946), pp. 32-33.

⁹Freda Utley, Last Chance in China (Indianapolis, 1947), p. 244.

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In April, 1946, the Communists occupied Changchun, which broke the truce agreement. When General Marshall returned to Nanking on April 18, he urged both sides to order a total cease fire, but the Nationalist government declined to accept further mediation, for Chiang decided to use force to re-occupy Changchun.¹⁰

On May 23, 1946, the Nationalist forces recaptured Changchun and advanced toward Harbin and Kirin. The military situation appeared to be favorable to the Nationalists in Manchuria, which encouraged their decision to use force against the Communists in preference to a compromise solution as proposed by General Marshall.¹¹

In June, General Marshall conferred again with leaders of the rival regimes, and convinced both sides to accept a fifteen-day truce in order to discuss terms for the cessation of hostilities in Manchuria, resumption of communication with north China, and reorganization of the armed forces. As these discussions progressed, neither side was willing to make concessions, particularly in the size of the respective forces, and in the organization of command.¹²

In July, 1946, President Truman appointed Dr. John Leighton Stuart as the United States Ambassador to China. Dr. Stuart's job was to assist General Marshall in his mediation efforts.¹³ From July to August, General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart offered a series of proposals that met with stubborn counter-proposals. Nationalist troops resumed their offensive in north Kiangsu, clearing the

¹⁰China White Paper, pp. 149-150.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 155-156.

¹²Ibid., pp. 158-159.

¹³Creel, op. cit., p. 147.

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Communists from the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad and capturing Chengteh, capital of Jehol province.¹⁴

In August, 1946, General Marshall was beginning to admit the failure of his mission. He remarked at this time that:

Both government and Communist leaders are anxious to put an end to the fighting....It appears impossible for the two parties to reach a settlement on these issues which would permit complete cessation of hostilities in all of China.¹⁵

In the meantime, Nationalist troops recaptured Kalgan and other strategic points in north China, whereupon Chiang proposed a peace program that invited the Communists to designate a number of delegates to participate in the National Assembly. A five-man committee, headed by Ambassador Stuart, would consider civil affairs; and a three-man committee, headed by General Marshall, would consider all military problems. Upon acceptance of this proposal, Chiang was ready to issue a nation-wide cease-fire order.¹⁶

Chiang's proposal was met by the Communists with a counter proposal consisting of two demands: (1) the National Assembly should be postponed, (2) the military status quo of January 13 should be restored. The first demand was a refusal to participate in the sessions of the National Assembly, which was dominated completely by Communist delegates, while the second was an insistence that Kalgan, Kailashan, the Manchurian coal fields, and the other Manchurian territories occupied by the Nationalists be restored to the Communists. Upon receipt of a categorical rejection of their counter proposals,

¹⁴China White Paper, pp. 174-178.

¹⁵Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York, 1949), p. 7.

¹⁶Creel, op. cit., p. 148.

Communist representative, Chou En-lai, and his associates left
 king for Yen-an. Chiang became determined to pursue the campaign
 extermination against the Communists, when the prospect of a swift
 military victory mounted from the Nationalist successes and the
 volume of military aid that the United States was furnishing. Strong
 government forces were sent northward to capture Harbin and Chefoo.¹⁷
 September, 1946, the Communists had mobilized a regular army of
 million men, as well as two million guerrillas to resist the
 Nationalist offensive that Chiang had unleashed in northern China and
 Manchuria.¹⁸

General Marshall continued to urge both sides to agree on a
 cease-fire, whereupon on November 8, 1946, Chiang issued an order instructing
 government troops to cease fire and remain at their positions. He
 stated simultaneously that the National Assembly would be convened on
 November 12, as originally scheduled. He again invited the Communists
 to participate in the National Assembly, and to appoint a spokesman to
 a three-man mediation committee.¹⁹ In response to Chiang's cease-
 fire order, the Communists repeated their demand that the National
 Assembly be postponed indefinitely, and that the military status quo
 of January 13 be restored. Peace negotiations were thereupon effective-
 ly terminated by all parties and the Marshall Mediation Mission prepared
 to withdraw.²⁰

General Marshall returned to the United States upon being

¹⁷Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁸"Strategic A," Time, XLVIII (September 2, 1946), p. 26.

¹⁹Creel, op. cit., p. 150.

²⁰China White Paper, pp. 685-686.

pointed Secretary of State,²¹ and on January 7, 1947, he issued a
 ng statement concerning China, the important parts of which
 phasized that:

In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has
 been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which
 the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each
 other.

On the one hand, the leaders of the government are
 strongly opposed to a Communistic form of government. On
 the other, the Communists frankly state that they are
 Marxists and intend to work toward the establishing of a
 Communistic form of government in China, though first
 advancing through the medium of democratic form of govern-
 ment of the American or British type.

The leaders of the government are convinced in their
 minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in
 a government of the type endorsed by the Political Consulta-
 tive Conference last January had for its purpose only a
 destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that
 the government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of
 the Political Consultative Conference resolution for the
 formation of the new government and intended by coercion
 of military force and the action of secret police to
 obliterate the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual
 deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of
 ignoring the effect of the fears and suspicions of the
 other party in estimating the reason for proposals or
 opposition regarding the settlement of various matters
 under negotiations....²²

I think the most important factors involved in the
 recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side
 of the National government, which is, in effect, the
 Kuomintang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who
 have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I
 have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition
 government....They were quite frank in publicly stating
 their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist
 Party in the government was inconceivable, and that only
 a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. This
 group includes military as well as political leaders.

On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are,
 I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is

²¹"Pulling Out of China," The Nation, CLXIV (February 8, 1947),
 143.

²²China White Paper, p. 686.

vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments--men who would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future....²³

The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them....Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken off negotiations by their last offer, which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military position of January 13th, which the government could not be expected to accept....

The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence.²⁴

General Marshall's report was clear and concise--the failure of mission was solely and exclusively the result of deep-seated political intransigence.

After publication of General Marshall's report, the Chinese Communists made the following comment:

One year ago the people of the entire country welcomed President Truman's statement on China, and the arrival of General Marshall to mediate. But before long, the policy of American imperialism toward China was revealed in all its nakedness, while the policy of national betrayal by

²³Ibid., p. 687.

²⁴Ibid., p. 688.

Chiang Kai-shek's government also revealed itself in flat [sic] detail....During the changes of the past year, not only did the Kuomintang reactionary clique incite civil war and tear up the PCC decisions, but even the American mediator who signed the cease fire agreement never again referred to the cease fire order....

General Marshall knows only too well that Chiang's National Assembly, convened last year, violated PCC decisions and procedure, but still he deliberately described that dictatorial constitution, passed by Chiang Kai-shek's assembly as a 'democratic constitution,' saying that the main points corresponded to PCC decisions, and that the Communists Party demands seem to have been satisfied. All this is specious talk....²⁵

The Nationalist government did not comment on the Marshall report, but on January 24, 1947, the Kuomintang submitted a proposal to the American Ambassador Stuart for presentation to the Communist leaders which stipulated:

1. The government was willing to resume peace talks, or to participate in a round table conference of party delegates and independents.
2. The government and the Communists should order a cease fire, holding their current positions pending a conclusion of the negotiations.
3. The government was prepared to resume negotiations on the army organization plan suggested by the mediation committee.
4. In the contested regions, the government was willing to compromise on the issue of occupation rights with the Communists.²⁶

The Communists rejected Chiang's proposals, insisting that the military position of January 13, 1946, be restored, and that the draft constitution be suspended. The government again refused, whereupon on January 29, 1947, Ambassador Stuart announced that the United States had terminated its mediation.²⁷

²⁵Creel, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168. (Quoted from English Supplementary News Services of the Communist New China News Agency, January 13, 1947.)

²⁶Ibid., p. 169.

²⁷...

CHAPTER VIII

THE CIVIL WAR

At the outset of the civil war the Nationalist troops defeated the Communist armies, and forced them to evacuate the large cities, railway stations and fortresses. The Communists reverted to guerrilla tactics, avoiding open combat and large scale engagements.¹ When in March, 1947, Nationalist troops occupied Yen-an, the Communists intensified their guerrilla warfare.²

In July, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall dispatched General Albert C. Wedemeyer as presidential envoy to China and Korea to make appraisal of the overall situation.³ General Wedemeyer returned to Washington in September, 1947, but his report was not made public until August 6, 1949. The Wedemeyer Report consisted of four parts, of which part one was a general statement explaining that the situation in Manchuria was serious, and that prompt action was necessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite.⁴

General Wedemeyer recommended that the United Nations take immediate action to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria, as a prelude to the establishment of a trusteeship over the northeastern

¹"One The Great Wall," Time, XLVIII (October 21, 1946), p. 36.

²"China Vacuum," Time, XLIX (March 3, 1947), p. 36.

³"Much Need, Little Hope," Time, L (July 21, 1947), p. 15.

⁴China White Paper, pp. 765-766. (Report to President Truman by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U. S. Army.)

vinces to be administered by the Security Council. This guardian-ship could be proposed only by China, but should the Security Council reject this proposal, China might request the General Assembly to establish a trusteeship.⁵

In part two, the Wedemeyer Report pointed out that although the Chinese people were unanimous in their desire for peace, it was possible because of the irreconcilability of the warring protagonists. The Wedemeyer Report criticized the Kuomintang for its reactionary leadership, its repressive policies and corruption, and the Communists for being bound ideologically to Communism and the U. S. S. R.⁶ Wedemeyer also added that the reorganization of the Chinese government, in mid-April, 1947, had resulted in little change, and that the reactionaries continued to determine all basic policies.⁷

Part three of the Wedemeyer Report concerned Korea, while the last section concluded that the Chinese people were not favorable towards Marxism, but only desired food, shelter and the opportunity to live in peace.⁸

Wedemeyer noted that the internecine struggle in China might threaten world peace, and that the mediation should be referred to the United Nations.⁹

In February, 1948, the Communists commenced a general offensive in Manchuria that bottled up the Nationalists in the key cities of

⁵Ibid., p. 767.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., pp. 765-773.

⁹Ibid., p. 774.

kden, Changchun, Kirin, and Szepinkai.¹⁰

In April, 1948, the National Assembly was convened at Nanking, and Generalissimo Chiang reported that seven of the best Nationalist divisions had been decimated in Manchuria by the Communists. But, he told his audience, "I guarantee, within six months, to annihilate 1 Communist below the Yellow River," whereupon he was named president by the submissive Assembly.¹¹

By July, 1948, the province of Shantung was almost entirely in communist hands, and late the following September, General Wu Hua-wen, commander of the Forty-ninth Army, and Wang Yu-wu, governor of Shantung province, defected from the Kuomintang and surrendered the capital of Shantung to the Communists. The fall of Tsinan shook central China and precipitated the surrender of three divisions in Hansi province. The Nationalist armies were demoralized and the old commanders took the initiative in ending the struggle. In November, 1948, Changchun and Mukden capitulated to the Communists, ending the fighting in Manchuria.¹²

The Nationalists were faced with a complete rout in the north as the Communists advanced unopposed through the Great Wall into China proper, advancing at the pace of sixty miles a day. General Lin Piao's troops advanced eight hundred miles within twenty days, reaching the outskirts of Peiping by December, 1948.¹³

¹⁰"Year of the Rat," Time, LI (February 23, 1948), p. 40.

¹¹"Red Flowers for Father," Time, LI (April 19, 1948), pp. 36-37.

¹²Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York, 1949), p. 415.

¹³Ibid., pp. 416-418.

In desperation, the Nationalists dispatched Madame Chiang to the United States to plead for all-out assistance.¹⁴ But upon her arrival in Washington, no high ranking American official was at the airport to meet Madame Chiang. Both the White House and the State Department refused to receive her.¹⁵ On December 4, 1948, following Madame Chiang's arrival, the Chinese Ambassador requested \$3,000,000,000 of additional aid from the United States to bolster the Nationalist regime, and, in addition, the loan of United States personnel to operate the supply services of the Chinese Army, and to direct military training and strategic planning for the Nationalist forces.¹⁶ It was reported that Madame Chiang had requested:

1. An immediate declaration of United States support of Generalissimo Chiang in his fight against the Communists, in order to improve Nationalist morale.

2. Acceleration of United States material assistance to China.

3. An outstanding United States military leader to direct Chinese troops.

4. The \$3,000,000,000 aid program.¹⁷

President Truman had already rejected a suggestion to dispatch General MacArthur to China, while the other three proposals would have resulted in United States involvement in the actual conduct of the war against the Chinese Communists.¹⁸

¹⁴"You Should Never Yield....," Time, LII (December 6, 1948), p. 27

¹⁵The New York Times, December 2, 1948, p. 1.

¹⁶The New York Times, December 5, 1948, pp. 1, 39.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸Ibid.

Following Madame Chiang's formal reception by President Truman on December 10, 1948, the Executive branch showed no indication that it was considering the Chinese requests, and on December 31 President Truman indicated in a press conference that further aid to China would not be considered until Congress re-convened, and that he did not plan to see Madame Chiang again.¹⁹

Early in January, 1949, Tiensin and Peiping fell to the Communists, and the other Communist troops drove deeply into the Yangtze Valley towards Nanking. President Chiang was unable to mass the scattered Kuomintang remnants for a defense of the capital, which precipitated a political crisis in the Kuomintang. General Pai Chung-hsi, Commander-in-chief in central China, and Vice-President Li Tsung-jen pressed Chiang to resign as president, while General Pai withdrew his troops from Suchow, one hundred eighty miles north of Nanking, and sent a representative to Hongkong to arrange a surrender to the Communists.²⁰

On January 8, 1949, President Chiang appealed to France, England, the United States and the Soviet Union to mediate China's civil war, but without response. On January 14, Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, announced that the Communist Party would end the war under the following conditions: (1) Punishment of war criminals, including President Chiang and forty-two other members of the Nationalist Government. (2) Abrogation of the "bogus" constitution. (3) Reorganization of the nationalist armies. (4) Confiscation of bureaucratic property. (5) Reform of the agrarian system. (6) Convocation of the

¹⁹The New York Times, December 31, 1948, p. 1.

²⁰Belden, op. cit., p. 445.

Political Consultative Conference without the participation of reactionary elements. (7) Establishment of a coalition government to succeed the Nationalist regime. (8) Reform of the local administration.²¹

Such terms were tantamount to unconditional surrender and were rejected by the Nationalists. On January 21, Chiang vacated the presidency in favor of Vice-President Li Tsung-jen, and returned to his native town, Fenghwai, in Chekiang, while peace negotiations continued.²² As a precaution, however, Chiang had already transferred 10,000,000 of Nationalist gold, silver and foreign exchange from Peking and Shanghai to Formosa, where it remained under the vigilance of officials who were loyal to Chiang.²³

From January to April, 1949, Communist leader Mao Tse-tung made preparations to cross the Yangtze River into south China with an army of one million soldiers that extended along a six hundred mile front. On April 17, 1949, the Communists sent a three-point ultimatum to the Nationalists demanding: (1) An unopposed crossing of the Yangtze River. (2) Surrender of all war criminals. (3) Formation of a coalition government dominated by the Communists.²⁴

On April 20, the Nationalists rejected the terms, whereupon Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army, issued a joing order to their forces to advance southward to

²¹China White Paper, p. 293.

²²Belden, op. cit., p. 445.

²³"Ultimatum," Time, LIII (April 25, 1949), p. 30.

²⁴Belden, op. cit., p. 454.

operate all China.²⁵ The Communist Army spearheaded its invasion of the south across the two miles wide Yangtze with wooden junks, countering almost no resistance from the Nationalist navy and air force. The Communist Army marched into Nanking unopposed on April 24, 1949, and in May opened a new drive toward Shanghai. Shanghai fell in June, 1949, which forced the Nationalist troops to evacuate to Formosa.²⁶

In September, 1949, the Communists proclaimed the formal existence of the People's Republic of China, removing the capital to Peiping. The Soviet Union recognized the revolutionary regime immediately as the legitimate government of China.²⁷ By December, 1949, the Communists had occupied the whole of China, compelling the Nationalist government to flee to Formosa.²⁸

²⁵Ibid., pp. 455-456.

²⁶China White Paper, p. 323.

²⁷Liu Tsun-chi, "1949--The Year of Victory," People's China, January 1, 1950), p. 19.

²⁸"Last Phase," Time, LIV (December 12, 1949), p. 28.

CHAPTER IX

NATIONALIST DEFEAT AND COMMUNIST TRIUMPH

In reviewing the Communist military victory and the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, it must be noted that in 1945 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek commanded an army of four million men, thirty-nine divisions which had been trained by American officials and equipped with United States arms, and that he had a powerful air force. Chiang was unquestioned dictator of these forces, as neither civilian officials nor military leaders in the Nationalist government dared to question his authority.¹

Why was Chiang unable to defeat the Communist guerrillas, who possessed mechanized equipment, air power, and a flow of supplies? The following reasons might be listed:

1. Chiang selected notoriously inept commanders to carry out his orders, simply because he would not brook any criticism.
2. The Nationalist forces were honeycombed with secret agents, who could arrest officers in the field or at headquarters, despite the objections of the field and staff commanders.
3. Chiang authorized many divisional commanders to report directly to him, in order to exercise greater control over the armed forces. The corps commanders were stripped of actual authority, and the divisional commanders consulted individually with Chiang.

¹Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York, 1949), p. 1.

consequent disruption in the unity of the field command was a
or cause for the defeat of the Nationalists in Manchuria.

4. The ranks of the Nationalist armies were composed of poor
sant youths, who lacked influence and money to evade conscription,
ch was administered through graft, bribery, and influence, so
t the sons of the well-to-do escaped, while the sons of the poor
e dragooned. The morale of the Nationalist forces was pitifully
r, and the will to combat was lacking entirely.² On the other
d, in the Communist Army the officers were simply ranked as commanders
commander-in-chief, with the commanders and the soldiers receiving
al pay, equal food, and equal treatment. Every Communist unit
m the platoon to the field command received political indoctrination
m political directors who raised the morale and fighting spirit of
troops.³

The Nationalist government was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient,
seethed with the intrigue and conspiracy of ambitious cliques. Of
se, there were three principal contenders for supremacy--the Soong
ily group, including T. V. Soong, former premier of the Nationalist
ernment, H. H. Kung, former minister of finance, and Madame Chiang;
clique headed by General Ho Ying-ching; and the so-called C. C.
up, headed by the notorious Chen brothers. The Soongs dominated
business and finance in China, while Ho Ying-ching exerted great
luence among the military bureaucracy, and the Chen brothers

²Ibid., pp. 336-337.

³Ibid., p. 343.

controlled the Kuomintang machine. All three groups were present in the cabinet, although the Chen clique held most of the cabinet posts.⁴

Chiang Kai-shek was the perennial commander-in-chief of the army, and derived great power from his ability to balance the rival factions through opportunistic compromises.⁵ However, there were a number of weaknesses in Chiang's personality: (1) Chiang selected cabinet ministers those who were supine to him, as those who possessed intellectual ability and strong character were summoned, most, only during an emergency.⁶ (2) Like Hitler, Chiang disliked to hear unpleasant news, and those close to him protected him from the harsh truth. (3) Chiang handled his officials as a lady handles household servants, and he attempted to direct and manage everything, because he distrusted everyone. In short, Chiang had all the traits of a whimsical and headstrong dictator.

After the prospect of a mediated peace ended, vast sums of paper money were printed, until the price of rice had risen to astronomical figures. In August, 1948, Chiang issued new currency and attempted to keep prices stable. Emergency laws were promulgated, and under threat of arrest and forcible house search, people were compelled to surrender to the Central Bank their gold and silver bullion and coins as well as foreign currency.⁷ Speculation ensued, and valuables were hoarded. Within a few days the new currency was worthless, and angry

⁴Maxwell S. Stewart, "Cross-Currents in China," The Nation, CLVII (September 25, 1943), p. 345.

⁵Ibid., p. 346.

⁶Belden, op. cit., p. 427.

⁷Ibid., p. 407.

s in Shanghai and Nanking looted rice shops, restaurants, and cery stores.⁸

In the Communist areas silver coins were introduced and the munist radio broadcasted incessantly that private property would respected. Businessmen were led to believe that they might sper under Communist rule, so they sold gasoline, automobile ts, chemicals and other products to the Communists, boosting the itary effectiveness of their armed forces.

After eight years of hostilities, the Chinese people were not ling to support a prolonged civil war which, it was commonly ieved, might have been settled amicably. Demonstrations against civil war were common, as thousands of students, workers, and inessmen braved beatings, imprisonment and bullets to protest inst the Nationalist government's war policies. The secret police ducted a reign of terror against intellectuals and students, which enated the mass of Chinese intellectuals against Chiang, and paved way for the triumph of Communist propaganda in the urban centers.

⁸Ibid., pp. 409-410.

CHAPTER X

CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY

In September, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party summoned the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (C.P.P.C.C.) in Peking.¹ Three organic or constitutional laws were adopted by the conference of delegates: (1) The Organic Law of the Chinese People's Republic; (2) the Organic Law of the Central People's Government; and (3) the Common Program of the C.P.C.C.² According to these organic laws, the Chinese People's Republic is a "popular democracy" that is supported by the working class, the peasantry and the enlightened segments of the middle classes. The Chinese People's Republic regards itself as the vehicle to free the Chinese masses from imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism.³

The supreme organ of State power is vested in the All-China People's Congress, that is elected by adult suffrage. Between the brief sessions of the All-China People's Congress, the Central People's Government Council (C.P.G.C.), like the Soviet Presidium, exercises absolute legislative powers, formulating all laws, policies and

¹H. Arthur Steiner, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship in China," The Western Political Quarterly, III (March, 1950), p. 38.

²Ibid.

³Chang Chih-jang, "Organic Law of the Central People's Government," China Digest, VII (November 2, 1949), p. 4.

ectives to the administrative organs. Subordinate to the powerful Central People's Government Council are the State Administration Council, the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the Supreme People's Court and the Procurator-General's Office.⁴

The State Administration Council is Red China's highest executive organ, and, like a parliamentary ministry, comprises a premier, four vice-premiers and thirty-two councillors, who direct the activities of all the departments.

Separate and distinct from the State Administration Council, the People's Revolutionary Military Council exercises complete command over the combined armed forces, including the People's Liberation Army, as well as the militia units. The Supreme People's Court and the Procurator-General's Office are the highest judicial and prosecuting organs of the State.⁵ While subordinated to these central organs are a series of locally elected councils, and of localized administrators, tribunals and prosecutors.⁶

The formal establishment of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China resulted from a proclamation issued by Mao Tse-tung on October 1, 1949, which served to notify the world community that the new government sought diplomatic recognition of its de facto existence as the sovereign authority of China.⁷

⁴Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford, 1953), 246.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 248.

⁷Aitchen K. Wu, China and the Soviet Union, (London, 1950), p. 329.

The Chinese People's Republic is ruled through the legal organs established by the fundamental laws of 1949, but political leadership and authority are the monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party, since responsible leaders of the party occupy all the positions of power and command in the government.⁸ Red China is a constitutional dictatorship of the Communist Party, whose purposes are proclaimed to be the promotion of the security and welfare of the proletariat, the peasantry and those of the middle classes who support the regime.

Pursuant to the Mao-Stalin meeting, held in Moscow during February, 1950, the Chinese Communist regime concluded a military alliance with the Soviet Union.⁹ Although the declared intent of this treaty was to ally China and the U. S. S. R. against any possible future aggression originating from Japan, Red China's purpose in concluding the alliance was to bolster her internal stability as well as her external security.¹⁰

The premise of Chinese Communist foreign policy, as outlined by the Common Program is the endorsement and support of all national independence movements in opposition to capitalistic imperialism.¹¹

⁸S. B. Thomas, "Government and Administration in China Today," Asiatic Affairs, XXIII, No. 1 (March, 1950), pp. 258-259.

⁹Tsou Yen, "A History Meeting in Moscow," People's China, V (January 1, 1950), pp. 5-6.

¹⁰Ko Pai-nien, "New China's Foreign Policy," China Digest, VII (November 2, 1949), p. 8. (Mao Tse-tung in his New Democracy states: "In the era when imperialism still exists, it is impossible for the Chinese people's revolution of any country to win its own victory without the assistance from the international revolutionary forces. It is also impossible to consolidate the victory even when it is won.")

¹¹H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," The American Journal of International Law, XLIV (January, 1950), pp. 74-75.

China regards the United States as the principal imperialist power in the world and, as such, an inevitable enemy that must be opposed, in alliance with the U. S. S. R. and the "popular democracies" of Eastern Europe.¹² Yet, like the U. S. S. R., Communist China is prepared to establish normal diplomatic relations with capitalistic and imperialistic countries, including the United States, on the basis of the rules of international law and comity.¹³

Since the formal establishment of the Communist regime in October, 1949, the Chinese Communists have steadily increased their power and prestige internally as well as internationally. Internally, the Chinese Communists openly admit that their military victory in the civil war against the Kuomintang was due to the overwhelming support of the Chinese intelligentsia and the peasantry. Since 1949 the Chinese Communist Party has continued, through its policies, to cement its bond of unity with these two classes. The academic scholars and professionally-trained intellectuals occupy the positions of authority and prestige in the governmental structure of Red China. Those having western training exercise leadership in the central and local administrations, and are entrusted with direction over the academic and scientific institutions.¹⁴

Vis-a-vis the peasantry, the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship devoted itself to carrying out the program of land redistribution, with the active participation of the peasants themselves. Leaders

¹²Ibid., p. 77 ff.

¹³Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁴Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, 1952), p. 476.

ing the local peasantry are appointed magistrates and labor heroes, peasant associations are set up in every district. The local administrations assist the peasants to establish waterworks and to secure emergency loans so as to make possible more intensive utilization of productive lands.¹⁵

In the urban centers illicit and criminal activities are for the first time being effectively suppressed by the authorities, all collusion between the underworld and the administrations having been rooted out. In the villages the pao-chia system of authority has been replaced by representative assemblies, while the former bureaucratic courts have been replaced by people's courts.¹⁶ Many former bureaucratic employees, nevertheless, remain at their posts because of the acute need for trained personnel. Only those having a criminal record, or those who refuse their loyalty to the new regime have been removed, thus far, from their jobs.¹⁷

Tactically, the Chinese Communist Party has utilized every possible measure to stimulate the Chinese people towards greater nationalism and patriotism, as a means of winning their loyalty and active support. In his opening address to the C.P.P.C.C. Mao Tse-tung stated: "Our nation will never be an insulted nation any more. We have already stood up. The Chinese people are now master of their own destiny."¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung emphasized further that:

¹⁵Mary C. Wright, "The Chinese Peasant and Communism," Pacific Affairs, XXIV, No. 1 (March, 1951), pp. 264-265.

¹⁶H. Arthur Steiner, "Chinese Communist Urban Policy," The American Political Science Review, XLIV (March, 1950), pp. 50-51.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁸Ko, op. cit., p. 8.

In defeating China in war, the imperialistic powers had taken many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took Korea, Taiwan, ~~The~~ Ryukyu Islands, ~~The~~ Pescadores Islands, Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hongkong; France occupied Annam; and even an insignificant country like Portugal, also took Macao.¹⁹

On January 1, 1950, the Chinese Communist Party, in a New Year's message, declared that Tibet was an integral part of China, reupon in October, 1950, Chinese Communist forces occupied that ntry. The effect of these declarations and positive actions has n to stir up intense pride and patriotism among the Chinese over Communists' success in re-asserting the sovereignty and prestige China.²⁰

The Communist regime treats Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang as endent nations within the Chinese People's Republic, but being tional minorities, they are allowed to develop freely their own guages, customs, and forms of worship. Inner Mongolia has become autonomous region under the jurisdiction of the Northeast Regional ernment, while Sinkiang forms an integral part of the Northwest inistrative Region, and its new provincial government, which was ablished at the end of 1949, is a broad coalition government that ludes pro-Soviet Turkestans, Chinese Communists and ex-Kuomintang icials.²¹

Externally, after United Nations troops had advanced to the Yalu er in November, 1950, the Chinese Communists intervened in force

¹⁹Mac Tse-tung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party China," China Digest, V (February 22, 1949), p. 21.

²⁰Werner Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minneapolis, 1953), 335-336.

²¹Thomas, op. cit., pp. 264-265. (The Chinese garrisons in kiang have been instructed to respect Moslem mosques and their vices.)

support the North Korean Communist regime. After a year and a half of active warfare in Korea, Communist China was strengthened politically and militarily, thanks to the propaganda appeal that the successfully waged war engendered. The ability of the Chinese to achieve military victories against a coalition of Western powers, headed by the United States, was a psychological victory that the Communist line was able to exploit with amazing success.

Vis-a-vis the Indo-China War the Chinese Communists extended diplomatic recognition to Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam Democratic Republic in January, 1950.²² Since then great quantities of ammunition and equipment have rolled into Indo-China from China, accompanied by military advisors and technicians to assist the Vietminh troops against the French. Premier Chou En-lai, at the recent Geneva Conference, denounced the United States government for financing the Indochinese war effort in Indo-China, and for its threat to intervene in the war in that colonial war.²³

The Chinese Communists have taken a stand on the Indo-China colonial war because of: (1) their determination to exercise a major political role in Asia, and to recover Formosa, the Pescadores and other islands that are held by the Nationalists, and (2) their desire to gain admission into the United Nations, as the legitimate government of China, with its permanent seat on the Security Council.

It is undeniable that Communist China is already a great Asiatic power, whose manpower and natural resources exert great weight on the

²²Milton Sacks, "The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia," Asiatic Affairs, XXIII, No. 1 (March, 1950), p. 242.

²³The New York Times, May 13, 1954, p. 1.

le of the world balance of power. Because of common ideology and idarity in the international rivalry against the capitalistic West, Chinese Communist regime has maintained a close relationship with U. S. S. R. However, there is no evidence that either China's munists or the Chinese people are willing to subordinate their ticular aspirations to the policies of the U. S. S. R. Reports of ction between Chinese and Russians, sent to give technical aid to na, have been published in Chinese Communist newspapers, and nese Communist leaders frankly admit that the Chinese masses are ll suspicious of the Soviet Union, and that pro-American sentiment still strong among the people.²⁴

Mao Tse-tung is not regarded by his countrymen and followers as uppet of the Soviet Union, but rather as a patriot, whose success due to his consistent championship of national independence and less opposition against foreign domination.²⁵ It is possible that Chinese people, under the Communist stimulus towards nationalism patriotism, may engender political pressures that may ultimately ermine the internationalist ideological foundation of the Communist ty.

Reports coming from Red China indicate that there are two factions in the Communist Party struggling for power, and that the rivalry

²⁴Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Observable Weaknesses of the Chinese unist Regime," New Weapons For a New Diplomacy, XXVIII (December, ?), p. 174. (Generally, the Chinese people are pro-American, ause they think the American missionaries have done wonderful jobs hina by establishing hospitals, churches and schools, which have ly given services to the Chinese people.)

²⁵Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, bridge, 1951), p. 187.

ultimately cool China's relations towards the Soviet Union.²⁶

The future of the Peking-Moscow axis may depend ultimately upon degree of Soviet willingness to support the expansion of Chinese power and prestige, and to assist its industrialization program through equitable exchanges and loans. Whether the U. S. S. R. and China have the same conception of their respective roles in Asia in the world politics cannot at present be answered. Should the intentions of the Chinese Reds not coincide with those of the U. S. S. R., it is not difficult to foresee the outbreak of an even more impressive socialist revolt against Communist unity.

²⁶ Reports would indicate that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai of the national faction are struggling for power against the international faction led by Liu Tsun-chi, Li Li-sen, and Lin Piao.

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(An Historical Survey and Political Assessment)

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