THE UNITED STATES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

By

RALPH AUSTIN BRANN

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Bethel College

McKenzie, Tennessee

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Thesis Approved:

Guy R. Donnell
Thesis Adviser

G B Hawkins

Raben Maddox
Dean of the Graduate School

PREFACE

In July 1949 the United States Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty and the long standing principle of foreign policy known as isolation moved farther in the background as a facet of American foreign policy. With the ratification of the Treaty the United States became involved in the collective security of the North Atlantic area and Western Europe. The purpose of this thesis is to study the causes and effects of United States membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Membership presupposes certain obligations in regard to mutual aid and self-help. In this study I have endeavored to examine the contributions made by the members, especially the United States, in carrying out the obligations assumed under the Treaty. Contributions included both economic and military assistance and the effects of the Treaty are considered in the light of the progress made toward economic recovery in the North Atlantic Treaty member nations.

One of the objectives of the Treaty is to provide for collective action in case of armed attack. To meet this requirement an integrated defense force is to be established. The study of the organization of the NATO defense forces reveals the many problems to be encountered in establishing a military unit capable of resisting attack within the area defined by the Treaty.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been in existence less than four years and many projects commenced have not yet been successfully completed. In preparing this thesis the majority of source ma-

terial has been found in government publications and in many instances figures which would be beneficial to the study are not available.

I would like to acknowledge indebtedness to Dr. G. B. Hawkins, Head of the Political Science Department of Oklahoma A & M College, for his valuable assistance and encouragement during the preparation of this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Professor Louis Antrobus of the Political Science Department and Dr. O. A. Hilton of the History Department of Oklahoma A & M College.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND EVENTS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF NATO

Throughout the first one hundred and twenty-five years of its existence, American foreign policy was characterized by the principle of isolation. Isolation was established as a foreign policy principle by President George Washington in his Farewell Address of 1796, when he advised Americans to honor existing obligations of an international character but to go no further in forming alliances.

Pursuing the policy of isolation during the first quarter of a century after the Farewell Address was not a difficult task because the nations of Europe were engaged mainly in their own continental problems and interfered in the affairs of the new American republic very little. During the early years of the 1820-1830 period affairs in Europe began to be of importance to Americans. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 the victorious European powers under the leadership of Czar Alexander of Russia, formed the Holy Alliance. The purpose of the Holy Alliance was to prevent future wars and to restore divine right rule to the nations of Europe. During the early 1820's many Spanish colonies in Latin America revolted and proclaimed their independence.

Fearful that the Holy Alliance might have intentions of trying to restore the Spanish colonies to the Spanish crown, Americans became concerned about the actions of the Alliance. Russia also entered the

American diplomatic picture at this time. The Czar issued a ukase[1] in 1821 which forbade foreign vessels to approach within approximately one hundred miles of the coast line, of that is now Alaska, north of the fifty-first degree north latitude.[2] This indicated an attempt to extend the Russian area of control on the northwest coast into the Oregon territory which was claimed by Great Britain and the United States.

To forestall any possible action of the Holy Alliance in Latin America and to assert to the Russians that the United States considered the American continent as being no longer subject to any new European colonial establishments, the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated in 1823. The Monroe Doctrine expressed the idea of isolation in that President Monroe stated that the United States did not intend to take part in European affairs, either politics or war; and that the United States would regard it as a manifestation of an unfriendly attitude for any European power to acquire any new territory on the American continents.

Isolation as a foreign policy was interrupted in the late nineteenth century and again early in the twentieth century. After the Spanish-American war in 1898 the Philippine Islands became a possession of the United States and in watching over that possession the United States became involved in the affairs of the Far East. Secretary of State, John Hay, in 1898 proposed to Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France and Russia that they all join in protecting their interests in China. China was not a powerful nation and the European countries were attempting to partition China by extending their control over various

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[1] A ukase is an imperial edict or law.

[2] Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), p. 7.

areas. Secretary of State Hay's proposal was that the door to Chinese trade and commerce should be kept open so that all nations might share alike. This action on the part of the United States was a movement away from the traditional policy of isolation and became known as the "open door policy."

Early in the twentieth century, during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, the United States took part in the settlement of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. The peace conference was held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1905 and the results of this conference mark the beginning of the difficulties the United States has had with Japan within the last fifty years 1900-1950.[3] President Roosevelt was critized at home for taking part in an affair where no American interest was directly concerned.

President Roosevelt's action in connection with the Russo-Japanese peace treaty was a move away from isolation and it was because of the still strong feeling, or belief, in isolation that he was criticized at home. This step away from isolation was followed in 1906 by United States participation in the Algeciras Conference. The United States had no direct concern of any significance with the troubles in Morocco yet the Algeciras Conference which settled a dispute between France and Germany was attended by two American diplomats. The Roosevelt administration was condemned for departing from the time honored policy of non-entanglement in European affairs and weakening the position of the position of the United States under the Monroe Doctrine.[4]

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[3]These difficulties were the Japanese immigration question, the disarmament conference in 1921-22 and World War II.

[4]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1950), p. 562.

After meddling in the affairs of the Far East and in Europe, the United States lapsed back into the long standing policy of isolation and during the first world war President Woodrow Wilson made efforts to maintain this policy by closely observing neutrality. President Wilson called upon the American public to be "neutral in thought, as well as action" after the American neutrality was officially proclaimed. President Wilson thought the more scrupulously neutrality was observed the greater would be the United States' opportunity to act as an impartial mediator in the final adjustment of peace terms.[5]

Being neutral in thought was not an easy task. The American public did not appreciate the German invasion of Belgium neutrality and definitely resented the German action of sinking the Lusitania. Great Britain was hindering American commerce by halting American vessels to determine if contraband of war was aboard. President Wilson's patience with both Germany and Great Britain was near the breaking point several times. The announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans on January 31, 1917 and subsequent sinkings of American vessels led to the United States entry into World War I on April 6, 1917.

In January 1917, before the American entry in the war, President Wilson announced his proposed League of Nations for establishing world peace. Little attention was given to the idea of a League of Nations at that time. Throughout the remaining year and a half of the war Wilson stressed the League of Nations idea and his fourteen point program for peace. When war ended President Wilson decided to attend the peace conference in person to make a determined fight for

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[5]John H. Latane, A History of American Foreign Policy, (New York: Doubleday-Doran Company Inc., 1934), p. 584.

the establishment of the League. While he was successful in promoting the League of Nations at the peace conference, he was losing the fight for United States participation in the League at home.

The isolation idea still smoldered in the thoughts of many Americans as late as 1918. This fact coupled with the election of a Republican Congress in the 1918 congressional elections led to the defeat of the United States ratification of the peace treaty. The League was weakened by the failure of the United States to become a member.

Despite the nonparticipation policy of the United States in the League of Nations the idea of isolation has never interfered with the desires of Americans for peaceful settlement of international disputes.[6] Since the beginning of the United States, the government has worked for peaceful settlement of disputes and at the Hague Conference in 1899 the American representatives broached the idea of a permanent court of international justice. The 1899 Hague Conference was convened on the initiative of Czar Nicholas of Russia. Twenty-five nations[7] were represented at this international conference to rid the world of the curse of war and limit the increase in armaments.

American representatives assisted in the formation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the 1899 Hague Conference. The first international dispute brought before the court was a case involving the United States and during the first thirty years of existence of the court the United States was a party to five arbitrations.[8] This is evidence of the desire of Americans to participate in the peaceful settlement of dis-

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[6] Manley O. Hudson, The World Court, 1921-1938, A Handbook of The Permanent Court of International Justice, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1938) p. 237. Hereafter cited as The World Court, 1921-1938.

[7] Frederick W. Hulls, The Peace Conference at the Hague and its Bearing on International Law and Policy. (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1914), p. 36.

[8] Latane, op. cit., p. 724.

putes even if they do cling to the idea of isolation in so far as alliances are concerned.

The Permanent Court of International Justice was established in January 1919, and only after the Permanent Court of Arbitration had failed to satisfy many who were concerned with the question of settlement of international disputes. Throughout the period between 1899 and 1919, efforts to improve the method of peaceful settlements in regard to the Permanent Court of Arbitration were continued. The chief problems of the Permanent Court of Arbitration were that it was difficult, time consuming and expensive to set in motion and that it afforded no basis for the cumulation of a body of jurisprudence.[9] Because of these difficulties the second Hague Conference in 1907 attempted to establish a new court, however, the small states represented at the conference could not reach an agreement with the larger states on the question of equal rights. The small states maintained that all states were equal and therefore equality should be observed in appointing judges. The large states did not agree and the attempt to establish the court failed because of this difference.

The efforts of the 1907 Hague Conference cannot be considered a complete failure because the conference revealed the desire of many nations to establish an organization that could peacefully settle their disputes. The first world war served to stimulate this desire of the nations of the world to seek an organization such as the 1907 conference sought. The first world war offered an unparalleled opportunity for launching a new effort in this direction.[10] At the Paris Peace Conference

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[9] Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1934), p. 77.

[10] Ibid., p. 85.

in 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the establishment of a Court of International Justice. The problems of selecting judges and the equality of states proved no serious handicap at Paris as it had at the Hague Conference in 1907.

The Permanent Court of International Justice was to be a court of justice as well as a court of arbitration. The court was to sit permanently as a selected body of men without need of being selected after a dispute arose, as was necessary in the Court of Arbitration. The court was to apply the accepted rules of international law such as international custom as evidenced by general practice, the judicial decisions and teachings of highly recognized publicists, and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

The Permanent Court of International Justice came into being on September 1, 1921.[11] The Statute, which the plan or draft of the court was called, was approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations on December 13, 1920 in the form of a resolution. The resolution provided for the Statute to be effective as soon as it had been ratified by the majority of the League members. This resolution also contained a paragraph making it possible for states mentioned in the annex to the League Covenant to sign the Statute. This paragraph was placed in the resolution to permit non-League members, especially the United States, to be able to adhere to the court.

The sentiment of the Congress of the United States, especially the Senate, had not cooled toward the League of Nations. President Harding was aware of the strong Senate feelings, however, the executive depart-

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[11] Ibid., p. 120.

ment of the United States government seemed to favor United States participation in the court.[12] President Harding realized the feeling of the Senate towards the League of Nations and therefore never pressed for United States membership, however, he did in February 1923 seek the advice and consent of the Senate to the adherence of the United States to the Statute of the court. Adherence was to be based upon four conditions that he believed would be acceptable to the nations that had ratified the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.[13] The United States Senate finally approved in 1925 the request of President Harding in the form of a resolution but only after a revision had been made. The resolution was sent to the various signatories of the Statute and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The League Council determined that the Statute was a multilateral agreement and therefore the United States resolution would have to be passed upon by all signatories of the Statute.[14] A conference was called and the United States was invited. The United States would not attend and the court issue was not pursued for another two years by the United States.

The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 revived American interests in the court and Mr. Elihu Root, a noted American statesman, was instrumental in proposing a plan whereby the United States could participate in the court. The plan, known as the Root Plan, was sent to the Senate for ratification after being signed by the President. It languish-

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[12] Bailey, op. cit., p. 710.

[13] U. S. Congress, Senate, Message From President of the United States, Senate Document 309, 67th Congress, 4th Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), Vol. XII, p. 1. See also Hudson, The World Court, 1921-1938, p. 246.

[14] Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, p. 213.

ed in the Senate for five years before it was brought to a vote on January 29, 1935 at which time it was defeated.[15]

Although the United States would not participate officially in the League of Nations or the Permanent Court of International Justice the desire of the American public and the government was the assurance of peace. During the 1920's several efforts had been made to assure peace by disarmament. The Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the Geneva Conference in 1927 and the London Naval Conference of 1930 are examples of efforts to assure peace by disarmament. The Geneva Conference ended in failure, yet out of this conference came the belief of Americans that the way to assure peace was not by disarmament but by abolishing war completely.[16]

A definite step was taken toward the official outlawing of war by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Monsieur Aristides Briand when he proposed to the United States that the two countries join in a pact announcing the outlawing of war. Not too much attention was given to Monsieur Briand's suggestion since it was made in a public address and not in an official statement to the American government. The President of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, took up the issue and aroused public opinion in favor of action as Monsieur Briand proposed.

The French government later officially contacted the United States government on the proposal. By that time Secretary of State Kellogg, aware of the pressure of public opinion, proposed that not only should the two nations agree to a pact renouncing war but also that the pact should be left open to any nation that should desire to join in the renunciation of war. The Paris Pact otherwise known as the Kellogg-Briand

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[15]Hudson, The World Court, 1921-1938, p. 268.

[16]Bailey, op. cit., p. 707.

Peace Pact was signed on August 27, 1928 by fourteen nations and was later signed by forty-six other nations. The Pact bound the signatory nations to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. The Paris Pact was ratified by the United States Senate on January 15, 1929. The provisions of the Pact were contained in two articles which specifically state that all signatory nations agree to renounce war as a means for settling disputes among themselves, however, in the negotiations of the Pact many questions arose that seem not to be answered in the Pact. Many reservations, interpretations and explanations came up in the negotiations but none were incorporated in the Pact. One major issue the United States was concerned with was the right of self-defense. Secretary of State Kellogg stated that the right of self-defense was inherent in any sovereign state and regardless of treaty provisions every nation is free to defend its territory. In the Senate debate on ratification the general idea prevailed that there was no harm in the Pact but in so far as its value was concerned little could be seen. Nevertheless the action by the United States in participation in the Paris Pact forms a landmark in the history of American foreign policy. Instead of a two party agreement as Monsieur Briand had proposed, the United States was a member of a pact involving sixty nations. In extending participation to so many nations the United States relations with these nations would have to undergo changes and take on significant international aspects.

Although the major concern of the United States during the early 1930's was domestic recovery following the depression years of the late 1920's many problems were posed on the foreign policy front. Preoccupation with domestic affairs did not lessen the impact of fast developing affairs abroad, especially in Europe. During the early years of the 1930's the European nations, with exception of Finland, owing money to the United

States defaulted in their payments. By the Johnson Act of 1934 loans were stopped to all European governments in default in their payments. In 1933 the United States recognized the USSR and diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed after sixteen years of non-intercourse.

In the late 1930's the United States resorted to the foreign policy facet of neutrality in the hopes of insuring peace for the United States. In 1935 the Italian-Ethiopian crisis speeded the American desire for measures of neutrality. The policy established in 1917 of protecting American interest on the high seas was reversed in the Neutrality Act of 1935.[17] The Act provided for a public announcement by the President when war existed between foreign states and upon such announcement it would be unlawful to export arms, ammunition or implements of war to belligerent ports or neutral ports for shipment to any belligerent. This Act was broadened by the Second Neutrality Act of 1936 which made unlawful, upon the announcement of war, any act to sell, purchase, exchange goods, or loan money to belligerent states. The two neutrality acts were further augmented in 1937 by the Third Neutrality Act which defined civil strife as war between or among foreign nations. The effect of the Third Neutrality Act was to be felt in the civil war being fought in Spain at that time.

War clouds loomed on the horizon and in 1936 Japan withdrew from the Washington Naval Conference Treaty of 1922. The United States therefore felt that it was necessary to proceed with the building of a two ocean navy in the face of the Japanese action. Meanwhile President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed the intent of the United States to adopt

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[17] Bailey, op. cit., p. 741.

such measures as were necessary to minimize the risk of involving the United States in war. Such measures were not immediately forthcoming and in 1937 when Japanese aviators sank the American gunboat Panay in the Yangtse river the breach between the United States and Japan widened until in 1939 the United States abrogated its trade treaty of 1911 with Japan.

In Europe the Hitler regime with its expansionists ambitions and its persecution of the Jews created a number of disagreeable incidents. In March 1939 Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia and Europe appeared on the verge of war. Germany's invasion of Poland in September 1939 led Great Britain and France to declare war. President Roosevelt immediately announced that a state of war existed between two or more foreign nations and the neutrality legislation of 1936 and 1937 went into effect. In November 1939 Congress modified the neutrality law in order to lift the embargo on arms and weapons of war and authorized the President to de-limit the danger zones where American ships could not enter. Throughout 1940 and most of 1941 the United States made efforts to safeguard the Western hemisphere and at the same time assist the Allies with all aid possible short of war. The 1914 idea of "neutrality in mind as well as action" was conspicuous by its absence in 1940.

By late 1940 the President was taking over, more and more, the conduct of foreign affairs and leaving the State Department to a subordinate role. Various moves enabled the administration to assist Great Britain with aircraft and munitions. In September 1940 by an executive agreement Britain was given fifty old destroyers in exchange for certain naval bases.[18] Late in 1940 following President Roosevelt's reelection

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[18] These bases were in the Bahamas Islands, Jamaica, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, British Guiana and Newfoundland.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill set forth the needs of Great Britain for survival in terms of airplanes, cargo ships, warships, convoys and other weapons of war. The response to this was the American Lend-Lease Act of 1941. By this Act the President was given discretionary powers probably never before permitted, even in times of war, to a President. The material resources of the American government were at his disposal. Lend-Lease was extended to China in August 1941 and by June 1947 over forty-eight billion dollars had been contributed to foreign governments other than American republics.[19]

Action by Germany in sinking American naval vessels brought about the repeal of the 1939 Neutrality Act in October 1941 and all that was lacking for the United States to be in the war was the formal declaration of war which was passed on December 8, 1941 after Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. On December 11, 1941 Germany and Italy announced that they considered themselves as being in a state of war with the United States. On the same day the United States Congress passed a resolution recognizing the existence of a state of war with both Germany and Italy. Now that the United States was in the war, allied unity became a paramount purpose.

On January 1, 1942 the Declaration of the United Nations was signed.[20] Twenty-six nations then at war with the Axis powers signed the Declaration and later twenty-one other nations adhered to the Declaration. Each government was pledged to employ its full resources, both military and economic, in fighting the Axis powers and each agreed not to make a

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[19] Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950), p. 749.

[20] This Declaration should not be confused with the United Nations Treaty of 1945.

separate peace with their common enemies. This was in effect a binding military alliance and as such was a significant departure from America's centuries old non-entanglement traditions.[21] This Declaration was an important landmark in the evolution of the United Nations of 1945 in that it provided the nucleus of a new world organization.

Several important meetings followed within the next three years to permit the allied leaders to plan for each phase of the war. During this period Premier Stalin of the USSR became exasperated at the Western powers for failure to establish a second front in Western Europe. The idea prevailed in the USSR that the allies, fearful of a potent Russia, wanted her to be "bled-white" before they moved into the fray.[22] In 1943 the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR met in Moscow for the purpose of resolving problems common to all. As a result of this meeting the Moscow Declaration was announced. This Declaration contained a provision which proclaimed that the signatory nations recognized the necessity for the establishment at the earliest practicable date, of a general international organization based upon the principle of sovereign equality of all peace loving nations, which would be open to membership of all states interested in international peace and security.[23]

The Moscow Declaration laid the groundwork, or the foundation, for international cooperation but the framework for an international organization to promote peace and international security evolved at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 which was attended by representatives

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[21] Bailey, op. cit., p. 806.

[22] Ibid., p. 811.

[23] L. M. Goodrich & E. Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946), p. 5.

of China, Great Britain, the USSR and the United States.[24] Many issues relative to the establishment of machinery for an international security organization were discussed. A charter was drafted at this conference to serve as a basis for a proposed charter of the United Nations.[25] The proposals at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference did not actually constitute a charter since they were not presented in charter language. The voting procedure of the planned organization was not determined at this conference in as much as each representative was apprehensive of denying itself a veto vote on issues relative to its own special interest. The solution to the voting procedure came with the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The main purpose of the Yalta Conference was not to complete the work of an international organization however the plan for voting was worked out to the satisfaction of all concerned at the Yalta Conference. The Big Three chiefs of state made it known at the Yalta Conference that they would call a conference of all signatories of the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942 to meet at San Francisco, California in April 1945 for the purpose of agreeing upon a world peace organization based upon the proposals made at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.[26]

The United Nations Conference on International Organization met in San Francisco from April 25, 1945 to June 26, 1945. The Dumbarton Oaks proposed charter draft was given thorough consideration and many changes were made. Perhaps the most serious crisis of the Conference developed over the Security Council voting question which had, supposedly, already

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., p. 11.

[26] Bemis, op. cit., p. 895.

been arranged for at the Yalta Conference. The USSR insisted that any of the Big Five nations[27] could veto any decision in the Security Council. The Security Council was composed of the Big Five, with permanent membership, plus six small powers elected to membership in rotation by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Russian plan for the veto power was objected to by the small nations. This problem was settled by requiring for a decision, on all except matters of procedure, a majority of seven votes of the eleven possible votes including unanimity of the Big Five permanent members. This meant that each of the Big Five could exert the veto power. The veto has proven to be an obstacle in the path of efficient and purposeful operation of the United Nations.

Other problems were reconciled with much less difficulty than was experienced with the problem of voting in the Council. The United Nations Charter was completed on June 26, 1945 and provides for a General Assembly composed of all member nations. The General Assembly has no real authority as it cannot legislate. The main function of the Assembly is to debate or discuss issues of a general nature. This body can only discuss security matters when requested to do so by the Security Council. The Assembly is not permitted to engage freely in discussion of international disputes. The Security Council established by the Charter is the legislative body of the United Nations. The Security Council functions continously and upon this body is conferred the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. There are other less important councils and committees in the United Nations organization.

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[27]The Big Five included Great Britain, France, China, Russia and the United States.

The United States government entered wholeheartedly in the United Nations and since its inception many able American diplomats have represented the United States. The aims and purposes of the United States foreign policy parallel the aims and purposes of the United Nations. To achieve these aims the United States has tried complete isolation, renunciations of war, limited economic and political cooperation, legislative neutrality and several other courses designed to insure the preservation of peace and the advancement of American security. Gradually by force of circumstances the American people are coming to realize that the price of world leadership means accepting the responsibilities of that leadership or surrendering principles and national integrity to the whims and ambitions of unprincipled dictatorships.[28] The wholehearted support of the United States in the United Nations introduced into American political thinking the concepts of international dependence and balanced national strengths in a world system of collective security.[29]

Almost immediately after the cessation of hostilities of World War II and even before the formation of the United Nations it became evident that the Soviet Union did not intend to live up to the pledges and agreements given at the various meetings of the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR. Difficulties arose over the peace treaty with Italy, the government to be recognized in Poland, the reparations to be extracted from Germany and in general the Soviet Union assumed the position that the countries of Europe lay entirely within its sphere of influence

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[28]Hilton P. Goss, "American Foreign Policy In Growth and Action," (Documentary Research Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, July 1952), p. 184. (mimeographed)

[29]The Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1949-1950, (Washington: The International Studies Group, 1949), p. 22. Hereafter cited as Major Problems, 1949-1950.

to control.[30] After the formation of the United Nations, and through April 1949, the Soviet Union participated directly as a member in five political blocs[31] with nations immediately surrounding the USSR geographically and had encouraged these nations or satellite countries to form seventeen separate alliances with each other. These states were quickly turned into vassal states by the USSR. It appeared that the men in the Kremlin regarded the misery and weakness of the post war world as an opportunity for extending their own power over the peoples of other states.

As the actions of the Soviet Union in the post-war world failed to agree with the promises given at various meetings of the Big Three leaders and tended to incapacitate the machinery of the United Nations, American opinion began to undergo changes in regard to the Soviet Union. Perhaps no single act of the Soviet Union made a more profound impression upon American thinking than did the communist seizure of control in Czechoslovakia, a state which has long been regarded with friendly interest by the United States. From that point in February 1949 forward, the steps leading to the negotiations of the North Atlantic Pact came in fairly rapid succession.[32]

The year 1946 saw little accomplished in the field of international security. The United Nations could not act in the face of the reluctance of the major powers to get together in a common cause. The Security Council was becoming nothing more than a debating class. In December 1946

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[30] Ibid., p. 8.

[31] Political blocs participated in by the USSR since the beginning of the United Nations are: Sino-Soviet bloc - August 14, 1945; Soviet-Rumanian bloc - February 4, 1948; Soviet-Hungarian bloc - February 18, 1948; Soviet-Bulgarian bloc - March 18, 1948; Soviet-Finnish bloc - April 6, 1948.

[32] Halford L. Hoskins, The Atlantic Pact, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 25.

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, proposed that the United States, the USSR, France and Great Britain enter into a treaty governing Germany. The idea was to neutralize Germany as to military capacity and at the same time prevent the communization of Germany. The USSR rejected the proposal.

Great Britain and France having joined together twice within thirty years to help defeat Germany sought exactly what Secretary Byrnes had proposed, a treaty to neutralize the German capacity to wage war. Political leaders of both countries openly expressed desires for an alliance between the two nations and on the 4th of March 1947 a fifty year mutual defense pact was signed. This pact was in accordance with Article 52 of the United Nations Charter.[33] Among other things it pledged both countries to assist one another in resisting any future German agression. The French Foreign Minister and the British Foreign Minister expressed a hope that the pact would soon become a Four-Power Treaty laying down the conditions of disarmament and demilitarization of Germany.[34]

Another event of international importance during the early days of 1947 was the trouble in Greece and Turkey. The gulf between the East and the West had gradually widened and it was evident that a new menace to international security existed in Moscow.[35] Russian propaganda attempted to brand the Turkish government as fascist and the USSR assisted

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[33]Article 52 of the United Nations Charter provides in part as follows: 1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 2. The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

[34]Andrew & Frances Boyd, Western Union, A Study of the Trend Toward European Unity, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949), p. 60.

[35]Major Problems, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 9.

communist guerilla warfare in Greece. Great Britain was at that time assisting both countries with military and economic aid, however, Great Britain now felt that she could no longer afford to carry on this aid.

The United States assumed the support of both countries and let it be known to the world that it was her determination to resist communist aggression. This was made known in the address of President Truman to Congress in March 1947 and has become known as the Truman Doctrine.

Shortly after the Truman Doctrine was put into effect another decisive step was taken to combat the spread of communism in Europe. Europe was in an impoverished condition because of the ravages of war and economic assistance was necessary, therefore Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who had replaced Secretary Byrnes late in 1946, announced in an address at Harvard University that the European nations should unite in forming a plan for European recovery. Secretary Marshall pledged American aid as soon as such plan could be worked out.

Great Britain and France invited all interested European nations except Spain to meet in Paris for the purpose of formulating a plan of recovery. The USSR immediately caused the satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain to refuse participation and the USSR would not participate in this plan of recovery. It was evident to American political minds that the Soviet Union was trying to use the distress of the European states as a means of bringing them within, or behind, the Iron Curtain.[36]

American states were, by this time, seeking collective defense alliances and in September 1947 nineteen American republics met in Rio de Janerio, Brazil for the purpose of drafting an inter-American defense pact. This action was in keeping with the provision of the United Nations Charter

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[36] Hoskins, op. cit., p. 12.

and is indicative of the extent to which the outlook of the American people had been undergoing fundamental changes. The American republics represented at Rio agreed to a system of collective self-defense whereby any attack by a state against an American state is to be considered as an attack, or an act of aggression, against all. Any measures taken by the collective defense system as established is to be reported immediately to the Security Council of the United Nations and such action will cease when the Security Council has taken action to restore peace. The Rio Pact, as it is called, is the prototype of the North Atlantic Treaty.

As far as the United States was concerned, combating communism in Europe was, until mid-year 1948, a problem in terms of economic assistance. European countries under the guidance and leadership of Great Britain and France were turning their attention to military collaboration as well as economic assistance.[37] Foreign Minister Bevin in a speech before the House of Commons urged the countries of Western Europe to unite more closely through treaties.[38]

The international cooperation in Europe had not approached any solution by early 1948. The Russians opposed the European Recovery Program. The Western European powers began to look to regional arrangements to provide the security that was lacking due to slow economic recovery and the inability of the four major powers to agree upon questions effecting international security. In February 1948 the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg met to discuss the proposal of British Foreign Minister Bevin.[39]

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[37] Major Problems, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 10.
[38] Boyd, op. cit., p. 61.
[39] Ibid.

The Brussels Treaty was signed on March 17, 1948 by the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. This Treaty is more commonly known as the Western Union. The provisions of the Brussels Treaty closely resemble the provisions of the Rio Pact. The Western Union was not an exclusive grouping of nations. The members were resolved to associate progressively with other states who pursue the basic aims of the Treaty. The Brussels Treaty was hailed in many quarters as a step of great significance and several features of the Treaty deserve notice. Article IV pledges each nation, in case of armed attack in Europe upon any member nation, to come to the aid of the nation being attacked. Armed attack "in Europe" applies to an attack on French forces in Austria or British forces in the British zones in Germany. Article VII establishes a Consultive Council for the purpose of consulting together on any question arising within the Treaty.

The Brussels Treaty as a means of providing collective security represented more hope than assurance. The five countries represented lacked the military force necessary to defend the Treaty members in case of attack.[40] The United States was not included since this Union was of Western European states, however, inclusion in a similar union was not out of the question for the United States because the traditional attitude of keeping free of entangling alliances had been cast aside by the United States participation in the United Nations and the Rio Pact.

The United States could make the Brussels Treaty something more than a hope but the Western Union would have to be expanded into the North Atlantic area to do so. Steps leading to this expansion were not long in coming. President Truman in his address to Congress on March 17, 1948

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[40] Hoskins, op. cit., p. 23.

praised the Brussels Treaty which was signed on the same day.[41] President Truman welcomed the Treaty and declared the United States would do everything possible to support the free nations, and that the determination of the free nations was backed by equal determination on the part of the people of the United States.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg in June 1948 proposed in the Senate that the United States associate itself by the constitutional methods with other states having the same regional desires regarding mutual aid and self help for international security. This resolution became known as the Vandenberg Resolution.[42] The United States, while continuing to give full support to the United Nations as a primary instrument of global peace and security, saw clearly that additional security might be obtained through a collective self defense arrangement with nations of the North Atlantic community.[43]

The Vandenberg Resolution was discussed thoroughly by the Senate before it was passed by a sixty-four to four vote on June 11, 1948.[44] The Resolution pledged the United States to the maintainance of peace by exercising the right of collective self-defense as is permissable under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The passage of the Resolution by the Senate marks a significant step in the development of American foreign policy.

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[41] Ibid., p. 25.

[42] See Appendix "A".

[43] U. S. Department of State, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Its Development and Significance, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 7. Hereafter cited as NATO Development.

[44] Congressional Record, International Peace & Security Through The United Nations, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1948, Vol. XCIV, Part VI, p. 7846.

The Secretary of State immediately inaugurated exploratory conversations with the Brussels Pact nations and military representatives of the United States and Canada held meetings to discuss measures of joint military action. By October 1948 an agreement had been reached between the Brussels Pact nations, the United States and Canada to the affect that a collective security arrangement would be negotiated within the framework of the United Nations. President Truman added impetus to the conclusion of such an arrangement in his inaugural address in January 1949 when he suggested that an agreement be worked out to strengthen the North Atlantic area.

Actual negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Pact were instituted in December 1948 and once negotiations were underway Secretary of State Acheson thought it proper to keep the American public abreast of the actions.[45] This took the form of a brief outline in which he discussed the difficulties of international cooperation and the relationship our national security has to the security of the North Atlantic area.

The original participants in the negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty were: the United States, Canada, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Great Britain. The Norwegian government did not participate until after March 4, 1949. The original powers felt that such a security arrangement as this should be extended to as many nations as could possibly qualify and on March 17, 1949, the original governments invited Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Iceland to become members of the Pact.

The Treaty[46] was signed by all member nations in Washington on April 14, 1949 and was submitted to the United States Senate for ratification.

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[45] Hoskins, op. cit., p. 28.

[46] See Appendix "B".

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee debated the Pact extensively and reported the question to the Senate recommending favorable action. The Senate ratified the Pact on July 21, 1949.

The forming of a defensive pact alone does not compensate for the disadvantages of disunited states. In many instances it has been shown that only a superior will by free peoples to preserve their freedom and a readiness to make any sacrifice in that cause balances the scale of relative advantages.[47] The problem before the North Atlantic Treaty nations was the formation of an organization that would provide the opportunities to make the scales balance.

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[47] Hoskins, op. cit., p. 56.

CHAPTER II

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Senate vote on the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty coupled with the Senate vote on other treaties[1] at the close of World War II indicate a bipartisan trend concerning foreign affairs. The pattern of bipartisanship established then and continued during the formation of the United Nations has been followed since then.

The North Atlantic Treaty was conceived, during the Republican Eightieth Congress, at a time when the executive and legislative branches of the government might have been at loggerheads in the field of foreign policy had not the attitude of bipartisanship prevailed.[2] This unity which was evident in both the Senate committee work and on the Senate floor also prevailed in the relations between the Department of State and the Senate; however it would be unwise and equally untrue to say that the North Atlantic Treaty was unopposed or that efforts were not made to block or amend the Treaty because such actions took place.

In every vote relative to the Treaty the affirmative vote was sufficient to indicate unified support by the Senate. Action of this nature was necessary to assure a continuity of support and effective American leadership in all foreign policy as well as in the North Atlantic Treaty program.[3]

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[1] On four different occasions during the closing months of the war the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter; the Rio Pact; the Italian peace treaty and the Japanese peace treaty.

[2] Francis O. Wilcox, "Bipartisanship and the North Atlantic Treaty," Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 92, (March-April, 1952) p. 57.

[3] Ibid., p. 61.

Bipartisan support of the North Atlantic Treaty is evidence of the concern American political leaders have for the part Western Europe may play in the protection of freedom and the security of the western hemisphere. Perhaps the most important factor in the interest the United States has in a free Western Europe is the strategic value of that area to the free world. As long as this area remains free the strength of the free world is far greater than the strength of any potential aggressor.[4] The population of a free Western Europe is an important factor in its strategic value inasmuch as it serves as a man-power pool for both arms and industry. This pool includes a large number of skilled workers and every individual of free Western Europe whether in industry, in the military service, in the government or in business is a valuable asset to the cause of liberty and peace.

The tremendous industrial capacity of this area is also of strategic value to the free world. Western Europe's industrial capacity is surpassed only by that of the United States and the combination of the two would provide an industrial potential that could not be matched by any other combination of powers in the world today.

Another factor influencing American interest in preserving the freedom and security of Western Europe is the long standing economic relations of the United States with this area. Many American products find a ready market in Western Europe and likewise many Western European products find a ready market in the United States. American economy would suffer should the commercial relations with Western Europe be broken.

Finally, Americans have a common heritage with Western Europe. Our

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[4] NATO Development, op. cit., p. 2.

forefathers brought with them to this country the culture and philosophy of Europe. In signing the North Atlantic Treaty the United States has not so much assumed a new obligation as it has recognized an existing fact. The course of action followed by the United States under the Treaty is probably the same as it would follow without the Treaty.[5]

The charter or text of the Treaty resembles the American Constitution in that it establishes the broad, general aims of the organization but makes no effort to outline or establish the organizational structure necessary for a properly functioning unit. In this light it is not a self-executing treaty but rather it must be augmented by the directives of an organization in setting up the properly functioning units. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, commonly referred to as NATO, is the machinery through which the Treaty members work together to achieve their common objectives.

Article IX of the Treaty provides for the organization of NATO. This article authorizes the establishment of a council called the North Atlantic Council which is sometimes referred to as the Council of Ministers, or NAC for North Atlantic Council. The NAC was, in the initial stages of NATO, composed of the foreign ministers of the member countries. The NAC is now composed of the top ministerial officials of the member countries. Top ministerial officials include foreign ministers, defense ministers, finance ministers, any one of whom may at any time represent his government. In addition to these representatives, each member country has a permanent representative who is of sufficient diplomatic rank to express the views

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[5] Ibid., p. 5.

of his country.[6] Having so many members might seem to give the body a cumbersome appearance, however all representatives are not present at every meeting of the NAC.

The NAC is charged with considering all matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty. In considering the business of the NATO, the NAC can establish committees of both a permanent and temporary nature. The NATO has undergone many changes, especially during the early years of operation. In searching for a well organized unit many boards and committees have been established only to be dissolved a short time later.

NAC usually meets two or three times a year and generally at times when the top ministers can be present. Other meetings are held with only the permanent representatives present. In this manner the business of the NATO can be carried on continuously.

The first meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in Washington, D. C. on September 17, 1949.[8] At this meeting the Council established a Defense Committee in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty. In November 1949 NAC held its second meeting at which time the Defense Finance and Economic Committee was established. This committee was responsible for developing, in cooperation with the military committee, financial and economic guides for defense planning. This committee from time to time was to appraise the financial and economic impact of military defense measures upon member countries. In May 1950 the Council recognized the need for more

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[6] Ibid., p. 18.

[7] Ibid., p. 17.

[8] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, North Atlantic Council Communique, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. XXI, p. 469. Henceforth cited as NAC Communique.

thorough coordinated planning in order to accomplish the objectives of the organization and as a result established a Council of Deputies composed of a deputy Council representative from each government. The Headquarters of the Council of Deputies was to be in London and each deputy had to be in a position to give whatever time was necessary to insure that the responsibilities of the Council were effectively carried out. In the periods between meetings of the North Atlantic Council, the Council of Deputies was authorized to carry on business in the name of the Council.

On May 8, 1951, the North Atlantic Council Deputies announced another reorganization in the Council. Under this reorganization the Council was still to be the principle governing body, however, the reorganized Council incorporates the Defense Committee and the Defense Finance and Economic Committee. The last two committees ceased to exist as separate entities and their functions have been taken over by the NAC. The Council continued to be composed of persons of ministerial rank, although in exceptional circumstances member governments could be represented by persons other than those duly designated for the purpose. Heads of governments may attend meetings of the Council in person, otherwise governments will be represented by their Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Defense or by other competent ministers, especially by those responsible for financial and economic affairs, depending upon the nature of the agenda for the meeting.[9]

Many changes in organization took place during the first few meetings of the NAC, however as NATO developed the organization moved out of the

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[9] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, North Atlantic Council, Financial and Economic Board Adopt Terms of Reference, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. XXIV, p. 810.

mere planning state into the stage of actual operation. At the Lisbon conference in February 1952 the NAC took notice of this fact and agreed to other basic organizational changes.[10] As a result of this conference the NAC was to be composed of both foreign and defense ministers and a permanent representative. Other ministers, especially the finance ministers, could represent their governments in case of the absence of the foreign minister or the defense minister. The permanent representatives replaced the Council of Deputies and provided a means of continuous operations. To assist NAC in the discharge of its duties an International Staff was established, headed by a Secretary General.

Lord Ismay of the United Kingdom at present holds the post of Secretary General and directs the International Staff. In order to accept the appointment as Secretary General Lord Ismay resigned as British Secretary of the Commonwealth. During World War II Lord Ismay served as a general officer and Chief of Staff to the Defense Minister of Britain.

The International Staff assists the NAC by preparing reports of progress and studies of the various phases of NATO operation. From these reports and studies the NAC is able to take quick action in the short period of their meetings. The Secretary General supervises the International Staff and serves as vice chairman of the NAC.[11]

The North Atlantic Council organized the Defense Committee at its first meeting in September 1949. This committee was charged with top level planning for the defense of the North Atlantic area. The Defense Committee was composed of defense ministers of the Treaty nations. Since the defense ministers probably would be able to be in session only two or

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[10] NATO Development, op. cit., p. 17.

[11] Ibid., p. 18.

three times each year the NAC suggested that a military committee be established composed of one military representative from each Treaty nation. The Defense Committee was dissolved in 1951 and its functions absorbed by the NAC. At the 1952 Lisbon Conference the defense ministers were made members of the NAC.

Upon the reorganization of NAC in 1952 the Military Committee, established as a subsidiary body to the Defense Committee, became the highest military unit of NATO and is at present composed of the Chief-of-Staff of each Treaty nation. The Military Committee meets once a year and serves to advise the NAC on military matters, develop unified defense measures and provide general guidance for the Standing Group.

The Standing Group is the nucleus of an international chief-of-staff organization for Europe in the event of an emergency.[12] It was organized so as to be able to meet continuously and is composed of one representative from France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The other Treaty members may appoint a special representative to provide liaison with the Group if they so desire.[13] Since the Military Committee meets only once each year the bulk of the military planning and coordinating falls to the Standing Group. One of the main tasks of the Group is to encourage the standardization of arms and equipment within NATO countries. Another task is to coordinate the plans for defense and give military guidance to other NATO commands. Headquarters of the Standing Group is Washington, D. C.

The NATO organization provides for regional planning groups for the

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[12] Blair Bolles, "The Armed Road to Peace: An Analysis of NATO," Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, No. 92, (March-April 1952), p. 40.

[13] NAC Communique, op. cit., p. 469.

purpose of insuring speedy and efficient planning of the unified defense of the entire North Atlantic area. There are four regional planning groups: the Northern European Regional Planning Group, the Southern European Regional Planning Group, the Western European Regional Planning Group and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. In discharging their responsibilities the regional planning groups plan, develop, coordinate and recommend to the Military Committee through the Standing Group their plans for the defense of their respective areas.

The Military Representative Committee is a permanent body in the NATO organization and is located in Washington, D. C. Its members are officers designated by the Chief-of-Staff of each member country. This committee maintains close contact with the Standing Group and provides a means for presenting to it national views on military matters when the Military Committee is not in session.[14]

Perhaps the best known of the North Atlantic Treaty military commands is the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, more commonly known as SHAPE, under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, SACEUR. The North Atlantic Council at the Brussels meeting in December 1950 completed arrangements for the establishment of this integrated European defense force. The Council requested the President of the United States to designate a United States officer to be the Supreme Allied Commander. It was hoped and openly expressed by the Council that the President would find it possible to designate General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to fill the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.[15] General

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[14] NATO Development, op. cit., p. 19.

[15] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Command NAC Defense Forces, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. XXIV, p. 6.

Eisenhower was designated as the Commander in compliance with the request of the North Atlantic Council.[16] Upon the release of General Eisenhower from the duty as Supreme Allied Commander in 1952, General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, became Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

SHAPE, which is responsible for the defense of Western Europe is divided into three subordinate commands: Central European Command, including the large land area of Western Europe; the Northern European Command, including Norway, Denmark, and adjacent sea areas; and the Southern European Command, consisting of the areas around the Mediterranean. The organizational commanders of SHAPE give it an international character, as Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of the United Kingdom is the deputy SHAPE commander; Admiral Sir Patrick Brind of the United Kingdom is the commander of the Northern European Command; General Matthew B. Ridgway of the United States is the Supreme Allied Commander, who in addition serves as commander of the Central European forces; Admiral Robert B. Carney of the United States is the commander of the Southern European forces. There is also an air deputy who is British and a Naval deputy who is French.[17]

The second major military command in NATO is the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic which is often called SACLANT. SACLANT and SHAPE are mutually supporting commands whose activities are coordinated by the Standing Group. SACLANT is of such recent origin that at this time there is no detailed structure of its organization. Admiral Lynde D. McCormick of the United States is the commander of SACLANT with headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. His command is responsible for the defense of the

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[16] Ibid., p. 7.

[17] NATO Development, op. cit., p. 19.

entire North Atlantic area up to the coastal waters of the British Isles and the European continent.

During the formative period of NATO the organizational chain was changed many times. Flexibility in the organization enabled NATO to take advantage of the experiences gained and improvements have been made which have resulted in a strong political and military structure.[18]

The military commands of NATO cover a wide territory. The area of NATO control is defined in Article VI of the Treaty. The territory includes any member nation in Europe or North America, the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer and the Algerian departments of France. Colonial territory of Treaty member nations located outside the North Atlantic area are not considered in the area of control of NATO. Some people in the United States[19] believed that in consideration of consultations called for in Article IV in case the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any Treaty member is threatened the United States would be obligated to assist any member nation in the protection of her colonies. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Treaty, Secretary of State Acheson declared that the United States ratification of the Treaty did not in the slightest way indicate approval of any member nation's colonial policies.[20] The Treaty is perfectly clear in defining the area as including Western Europe, North America, the Algerian departments of France and islands of any member party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

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[18] Ibid., p. 17.

[19] Senators Donnell of Missouri and Watkins of Utah led a vigorous attempt to defeat the ratification of the Treaty.

[20] "North Atlantic Treaty," Hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (1949), Part I, p. 80. Hereafter cited as North Atlantic Treaty Hearings.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not, and is not now, likely to be open to any member qualifying insofar as geographical location alone is concerned. The original members participating in the exploratory conversations leading to the Treaty spent a great amount of time in discussing the logical limits of membership in the alliance.[21] They considered that a very large group of states might present difficulties in arriving at a common purpose. In addition to this, consideration was given to factors such as: military strength, economic capabilities, proximity to Soviet Union and political institutions. The member nations were expected to be free people capable of controlling their government without subserviency to another nation. It was desirable to have all nations that could meet the above qualifications as members and in view of this thinking several states were admitted to the North Atlantic Pact which by their geographical location could not rightly be considered for membership.

Sweden made no effort toward joining the North Atlantic Alliance and the fact that Sweden did not become a member caused no serious friction among the peoples of Sweden. There were a few liberal newspapers that supported Swedish membership but their efforts had little effect on public opinion in Sweden.[22] Sweden has been able, through two World Wars, to remain a neutral yet in so doing she cannot be considered a puppet of any outside government.

By their location Sweden considers the three countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden as controlling the Kattegat Strait. This body of water connects the Baltic Sea and the North Sea and is a water outlet for the

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[21] Ibid., p. 37.

[22] Hjalmar Mehr, "Why Sweden Won't Join," Nation, Vol. CLXIII, (June 11, 1949), p. 657.

USSR. Control of this area by other than a neutral state would be intolerable to the USSR. In order to stay out of any future conflicts, a Scandinavian defense pact to insure neutrality of this area would be useful and such a pact was proposed by Sweden.[23] Denmark was favorable to an alliance such as proposed by Sweden but Norway was not unless the same United States support would be gained as could be gained through membership in NATO. This support desired by Norway could not be assured, therefore Norway preferred the NATO to the proposed Scandinavian pact. The proposed Scandinavian pact failed to materialize.

It would not be true to say that Sweden fears the USSR. The USSR controlled Sweden for approximately one hundred years yet made no deep or lasting imprint upon the culture, philosophy, social or political life of Sweden. Sweden must necessarily give consideration to the proximity of the USSR and in so doing believes she must be cautious and careful in entering into any alliance that might offend her neighbors.

Sweden is aware of the possibilities of becoming involved in a future war of this advanced technological age and in view of the failure of the Scandinavian pact, Sweden requested information from the United States as to what support she could expect if she remained outside the NATO. The United States ambassador to Sweden, Freeman Mathews, advised that no military supplies would be forthcoming and only such non-military supplies of which there was a surplus could be given Sweden.[24] The Department of State supported Mr. Mathews in this advice to Sweden.[25]

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[23] New York Times, January 23, 1949, p. 37.

[24] New York Times, January 13, 1949, p. 10.

[25] "Swedish Message," Newsweek, Vol. XXXIII, (January 24, 1949), p. 17.

Swedish feeling is that all the Scandinavian countries can get along with the USSR. The Scandinavian countries were under heavy pressure by Western powers to come into North Atlantic Pact with no halfway measures. Sweden feels that the United States will have to bear a heavy share of responsibility for any future war,[26] however, this feeling was not expressed by Swedish Minister of Defense Allan Vought. According to Mr. Vought, the United States did not invite or urge Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and neither has the USSR sought to form an alliance with Sweden in view of the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Vought considers a Western coalition to be less threatening than a Soviet alliance.[27]

Sweden realizes that in any future general conflict they are likely, because of their geographic location, to become involved. Because of her dependency upon Russian satellites for certain raw materials as well as her nearness to the USSR, it is very likely that Sweden will never become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In consideration of these factors no assessment can be made of the value to Sweden of her non-participation in the treaty.

There was much opposition to the inclusion of Italy in NATO. The geographic position of Italy in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty would make her inclusion in the Treaty unlikely. Italy had little to offer from an economic or military standpoint because she had not yet recovered sufficiently from the ravages of World War II. Great Britain and France opposed Italian membership because of her lack of military strength. Italy's

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[26] Gunnar Fagrell, "Swedish View of the Pact," New Republic, Vol. CXXVI, (March 14, 1949), p. 12.

[27] New York Times, June 28, 1949, p. 4.

population is composed of a large number of communists. Italy was not a member of the United Nations, however this would not necessarily be a barrier to NATO membership as Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter permits United Nations members to enter alliances with non-members in the interest of international peace.

Italy realized her condition and was anxious to establish her solidarity with the Western Nations in order that her condition might be improved.[28] The United States favored the inclusion of Italy with the view toward halting the growth of communism and strengthening politically and economically the non-communist element.[29] In addition the geographic position of Italy, although removed from the North Atlantic community, did have value to that area. Italy has strategic value because she guards the approaches to North Africa which is important militarily and politically; militarily in that as a friendly member nation Italy could not be used as a springboard for troop movement into North Africa; politically in that she could stem the flow of communism into North Africa through Italy.

Geographically then, Italy is of value to the North Atlantic community and with the advantages of membership outweighing the disadvantages, Italy was accepted as a member in the Western family of nations, however, strong opposition to Italian membership developed in Italy. Red tactics in the Italian parliament delayed the vote on the pact for quite some time. One hundred and eighty-three Left-Wing Deputies declared each

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[28] John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 534.

[29] Hoskins, op. cit., p. 42.

would speak in opposition to Italian membership. Debate in the Chamber of Deputies was marked by violent incidents, fist fights and heated exchanges of invectives.[30] Street demonstrations were held in many cities as the communists made every effort possible to defeat the measure. When the voting did take place the issue of Italian membership was won by a decisive vote.

Spain was opposed for membership in NATO by most of the original NATO members except Portugal, because of Spain collaborationist policies before and during World War II. Portugal supported the membership of Spain. This is of course understandable since the two are bound by political ties and military alliances. Geographically Spain is strategically located, bordering the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and would ordinarily be expected to be a charter member of any alliance effecting the defense of the North Atlantic area. Another factor favoring Spanish membership is Spain's decided anti-communistic attitude; although some British government officials feel that Spain, as an ally against communism, is an extremely doubtful asset.[31]

Spain has posed a problem to the United States in their belief that some way can be found for cooperation with Spain in such manner as not to injure the feelings of Great Britain and France. Business and military groups in the United States have advocated an active policy of cooperation with France.[32]

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[30] New York Times, March 17, 1949, p. 2.

[31] Ibid., February 10, 1949, p. 7.

[32] The Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1952-1953, (Washington: The International Studies Group, 1952), p. 223. Hereafter cited as Major Problems, 1952-1953.

The civil war in Spain served as a vehicle upon which Franco established a personal dictatorship. This dictatorship has not been severe and has never approached the ruthlessness of other totalitarian systems. The main effort of Franco's dictatorship has been to suppress opposition. In accomplishing this it has overlooked all constructive policies. The Western powers have looked upon what they call an economically unsound Spain and likewise a militerily unsound Spain. The question may be asked then, what has Spain to offer to the North Atlantic Treaty organization? The answer is strategic value. The ports and harbors of Spain could furnish the navies of NATO with protected maintenance bases. The Pyrenees mountains afford a land barrier to protect the land bases in Spain from European land invasion. These factors are of great significance to a military defense. Political regimes may come and go but the strategic value of Spain to NATO remains. Great Britain in opposing Spain fears that too much emphasis is being placed upon European democracy in military and economic terms and not enough in terms of political and moral principles.[33] The French and Italian outlook toward Spain may be found in their negative attitude toward including Spain in the European Recovery Program. Irving Brown, European representative of the American Federation of Labor, in speaking for the non-communist trade unions of France and Italy says the extension of the European Recovery Program to Spain would wreck the Atlantic pact and destroy all the good the European Recovery Program has built up.[34]

The United States still looks for some way to bring Spain into the

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[33] New York Times, February 3, 1949, p. 1.

[34] Ibid., April 12, 1949, p. 17.

picture and maybe even membership in NATO. The latter idea has been opposed by some American factions and opposition to Franco in Europe is still strong. It is questionable whether even strong American pressure could gain the ends desired without generating a degree of friction and resentment that would outweigh any advantages of having Spain as a member of NATO.[35]

It is unlikely that Spain will become a member of NATO for some time. The political disadvantages outweigh the military advantages and even though NATO is a defense alliance there are other phases of the program that require close observation prior to any commitment.

Meanwhile Franco does not seem to be chagrined at having been left out of the Pact. He continues, apparently, to entertain hopes that the passage of time and the exigencies of European politics will yet make the inclusion of Spain in the North Atlantic group an essential matter.[36]

Since the beginning of the alliance both Turkey and Greece had hopes of being members. Turkey reacted to her exclusion from NATO in a despiteful manner. Ulus, the official Turkish newspaper remarked that all that the United States promises is a "two weeks resistance" followed by years of occupation.[37] Italy had been an enemy during the war and, in addition, it was hard to understand how Italy could be considered any more Atlantic than Turkey.

The military problems would be great if Turkey, located next door to Russia and remotely located to the Atlantic area, were to be included in NATO.[38] Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Minister Bevin both revealed

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[35] Major Problems, 1952-1953, op. cit., p. 231.
[36] Hoskins, op. cit., p. 44.
[37] New York Times, March 28, 1949, p. 5.
[38] Campbell, op. cit., p. 533.

an interest in Greece and Turkey during the exploratory conversations regarding NATO. Great Britain was giving assistance to both countries until 1947 and when Britain was forced to cease their aid the United States assisted both countries through the Truman Doctrine. Turkey and Greece, however, were sufficiently removed from the Atlantic area to preclude their membership in NATO in 1949. The interest of the United States and Great Britain in the Middle East increased when the Iranian oil crisis developed, in fact both countries sought ways of including Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic alliance and discussions concerning membership for both countries were revived.

The Western powers were fortunate in that Turkey was frank and open in her desires for close relationship with the Western nations. There was no middle of the road attitude prevailing in Turkey; nor did such an attitude prevail in Greece, however Greece never agitated for membership like Turkey. Turkey felt that Greece should also be a member and in several instances Turkey and Greece spoke together. Both countries advised France in August 1950 that they desired membership. Notice of such desires were also to be delivered to the United States, Great Britain and other Treaty members.[39]

Turkey felt insecure in that the Truman Doctrine was not a formal commitment of United States help. In the light of United States support to the other NATO countries there was the possibility that Turkey might not receive the support needed. Turkey realized her neutrality would not keep her out of any future war and the only way to remain friendly with Russia was to remain strong.[40] If war should come, the other NATO countries would

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[39] New York Times, August 6, 1950, p. 14.

[40] "What Turkey Means to the West," U. S. News and World Reports, December 7, 1951, p. 32.

receive help first while Turkey would probably receive the brunt of Russian pressure first and Turkey did not desire to become a gallant outpost.

It was not until 1951, however, that Turkey and Greece were offered membership. At the Ottawa conference of the North Atlantic Council the decision was made to invite both to membership.[41] Both governments accepted and by February 15, 1952 all member nations had signified their acceptance of Greece and Turkey as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The area included in the NATO extends to the Algerian departments of France located in North Africa. To clarify any misunderstanding as to why this area is included in the Treaty, it is considered as a part of France since it is incorporated in the metropolitan area as departments which are political divisions of France. This is in contrast to Morroco and Tunisia which are French protectorates and as such retain their individual international status and are not a part of the French Union.

The geographical distribution of the nations included in the NATO makes it a regional arrangement. The area of control extends into the Mediterranean Sea area for the purpose of containing the communist influence within its orbit in Europe. Other than this the member nations border the Atlantic and qualify the NATO under the United Nations Charter, Article 52, which concerns regional arrangements. By this article nothing is said that would preclude countries not immediately bordering the North Atlantic from membership.

The inability of the League of Nations and the United Nations to deal

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[41] United States Department of State Bulletin, NAC Releases Protocol Inviting Greece and Turkey to Join NATO, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. XXV, p. 650. See also New York Times, August 22, 1951, p. 10.

with many important matters of international concern has led to the proposal for some form of world government. Many of the proposals are in favor of some form of international federation or union. Failure of these proposals to materialize has caused the political leaders of the world to seek security in a collective, or group, arrangement. There are several regional agreements in existence today. In addition to the NATO there are the Soviet bilateral agreements which are in effect regional arrangements, but are unlike NATO in that membership might be considered as being in defiance to the individual will of the member.[44] Broad outlines of defense alliances similar to NATO are emerging in the Far East and among the American states.

That the North Atlantic Pact conforms to the 20th Century trends of international organization cannot be denied. Despite the wars and difficulties experienced by states they are compelled to live in the same world. In the advanced age of technology which has brought nations into closer proximity the problems of common existence require joint solution.

Since the turn of the 20th Century nations have sought to resolve these problems, which have become international in scope, by creating international organizations. How many such international organizations exist, or have existed, is questionable, but they have existed in many forms, i.e., international organizations governing trade and economics; international labor organizations, peace enforcement organizations and many others.

International organizations for peace enforcement developed out of the desire for peace and security. After the first World War the League of Nations was established with the idea of settling international disputes

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[44] Major Problems, 1949-1950, op. cit., p. 15.

peacefully. The League was not entirely unsuccessful yet it was not able to accomplish the peaceful settlement of disputes unless it was the desire of the participants concerned to have the dispute settled. The League did not have the power to enforce its decisions. After the second World War the United Nations was established and this body stood on the same shaky grounds as the League and its inability to settle international problems led to the formation of regional alliances.

One factor leading to the development of international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty is the lack of international legislation connected with such bodies as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Of course the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and similiar bodies do not possess the power of international legislation because the world has not progressed to the point of partially giving up state sovereignty for a world organization. Therefore smaller regional groups have developed.

Membership in an organization of international character like the NATO is likely to place requirements upon a nation that have never before been experienced through treaty alliances. Prior to ratification of the Treaty, an exhaustive study was made by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to determine to what extent the United States would be committed and just what the new obligations were. The most significant obligations are found in Articles III, IV, and V. These articles contain the most important aspects of the Treaty. By these articles, all signatory countries have agreed to maintain and develop, separately and jointly, and by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, the individual and collective capacity of all parties to resist armed attack.[45] This is an

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[45] Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (July 5, 1949), Vol. LXXXV, Part VII, p. 8813.

obligation assumed under Article III and the United States has committed itself to this principle and therefore agrees to work together with other nations in building up the capacity of all the signatories to defend themselves against attack. But in so doing, it appears that the United States has made no secret agreements and therefore all that has apparently been committed can be found in the words of the Treaty.

Each signatory power may rely on the other members for assistance only after it has done everything within its power to defend or provide for itself. The concept of mutual aid is that each party will contribute such aid as it reasonably can, consistent with its geographic location and resources and with due regard to its own needs.[46] The aid that is contributed may take any form such as military equipment, manpower, productive capacity, or other types of assistance. This part of the Treaty is necessary because some countries are weak in areas where another country may be strong. One country may have the productive capacity but lack raw materials; another country may have manpower for both industry and military forces but lack equipment to supply these men. Therefore, both individual and collective efforts are necessary to make the overall program a success.[47]

Senator Tom Connally of Texas asked Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings if a senator, in voting for the Treaty, was committed to vote for an arms program later. Senator Connally was answered to the effect that there was something in the Treaty that required each senator, if the Treaty was ratified, to exercise his

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[46] Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of National Power, (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1951) p. 558.

[47] NATO Development, op. cit., p. 12.

judgment less freely than he would have had the Treaty not been in existence. Secretary of State Acheson explained that he did not believe that any senator could vote for the Treaty and then say he did not believe in the principle of mutual assistance.[48] In ratifying the Treaty, the principle of mutual assistance is or should be, automatically accepted.

Secretary Acheson also said that there was nothing in the Treaty that determined how each senator should vote on any question. The "something" that required a senator to exercise his judgment less freely, after voting for the Treaty and when confronted with an arms program, was the principle of mutual assistance. Each senator must necessarily use his own judgment in reaching a decision as to whether he would consider an arms program as a means of mutual assistance. This seemed to be a clear indication that in the mind of Secretary of State Acheson that there was a close relation between the Treaty and any assistance program that was being planned, although Congress must take action on each separately.

Article III is a general statement of purpose. To what extent the United States is bound by this article depends upon the situation. The European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization looked upon this article with great interest. They had high hopes that the United States would take an interest in their own self-defense.

n The obligations of the United States under Article III are not meaningless. No one would pretend that the Treaty would not in some manner alter any existing situation. The immediate objective of Article III is to make existing forces more efficient.[49] Although by this article the

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[48] North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, op. cit., p. 16.

[49] Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (July 6, 1949), Vol. LXXXV, p. 8894.

commitments of the United States are not spelled out specifically, it appears to be definite that by the ratification of the Treaty the United States accepts an obligation to contribute, to the best of its ability, to further the purposes of the Treaty, among which is mutual assistance for defense.

Article V is the main and most important part of the Treaty. This article alone serves as a suppressor of aggression. No aggressor can hope for a cheap military victory by attacking the small nations one at a time. Article V is based upon Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which expresses the inherent right of collective, or individual self-defense.

Three steps are plotted in Article V. First, an armed attack against one is to be considered an attack against all and each party will assist the victim of the attack in whatever manner deemed necessary to resist attack. Second, the attack and all measures taken as a result of the attack will be reported immediately to the Security Council of the United Nations. Third, when the Security Council has taken action to restore and maintain order the individual and collective measures adopted under Article V shall be terminated. In the event of an attack, each party will exercise such individual or collective self-defense as it considers necessary. This is the inherent right of all sovereign nations. The charter does not grant it, but merely recognizes that each nation has the right to protect itself collectively or individually.

The provisions of Article V do not constitute a declaration of war. Under the United States Constitution the power to declare war is vested solely in the Congress of the United States. The question of whether the United States is obligated by the provisions of this article, if the

Treaty should be ratified, brought forth considerable discussion in the hearings on the Treaty in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At the hearings not one witness denied the constitutional right of Congress to declare war; however, it appears from the witnesses testimony that they felt Congress would have a moral obligation to declare war should any of the signatory nations be attacked. This was the feeling of Secretary of State Acheson.[50]

This problem had been recognized during the period of time in which the Treaty draft was under preparation. It was also recognized by all parties that without the full willingness of the United States to participate in the pact, it would be meaningless. The question then arose as to the possibility of the United States to participate in view of the constitutional requirement of the approval of Congress for action involving the use of the armed forces. In answering this question it was necessary to find a formula that would not bind the United States to go to war formally and automatically in the event of an attack on a member of the pact. This answer was found in the requirements of Article V whereby each party is to take prompt action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force when authorized by persons in positions of responsibility.

Each member is free to determine whether an armed attack has occurred and the steps it must take if the decision is made that an armed attack has occurred. Internal disorders are not considered to be attacks unless aided and abetted by outside interests. Neither is an attack of a minor character considered to be action bringing on full obligatory provisions. What constitutes an attack of minor character is questionable, however, such acts as the Japanese firing on the United States gun boat Panay in

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[50] North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, op. cit., p. 80.

Yangtze River in 1937 would not call for full play of obligations under Article V.[51] This type of aggression could be handled through diplomatic channels or perhaps by a stern warning. There were other problems discussed and some may have an inconsequential effect upon the United States as a new obligation, however, the major obligations of the Treaty can be found in Articles III and V.

One of the lesser problems is that many Americans felt that membership in the United Nations is as far as the United States should go in forming alliances. Many Americans hold to the theory of isolation in military alliances even in the present age of international development. Because of the few who have maintained this theory much concern was exhibited over the relationship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the United Nations.

Is the North Atlantic Pact in conflict with the charter of the United Nations? This was the question put forth by many who were in opposition to the Pact. The charter of the United Nations recognizes that certain groups of countries have common interests of a social, political, economic and strategic nature.[52] It was not the intent of the framers of the North Atlantic Treaty that it would conflict with the United Nations Charter and this is expressed very definitely in several places in the Treaty. The preamble reaffirms the faith the signatories have in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Article I specifies that in their international relations nations will refrain from the use of threat or

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[51] Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session, (July 5, 1949), Vol. LXXXXV, Part VII, p. 8813.

[52] Vera Micheles Dean, "Pros and Cons of North Atlantic Defense Pact," Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XXIV, (February 15, 1949), p. 230.

force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Security Council of the United Nations is referred to in Article V. Armed attack as referred to in this article will be immediately reported to the Security Council for action. When the Security Council has taken measures necessary to restore peace further action by Treaty members will cease. This is in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in that the use of force in the exercise of self-defense is provisional and temporary.[53]

Article VII states that the Treaty does not effect the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations is considered to be an international organization and by Article VIII any existing international engagements will not be effected by membership in the Atlantic Pact. Article XII of the Treaty expresses a hope that one day the system of security as originally envisioned by the United Nations Charter may be a reality.[54]

President Truman in his speech at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty said:

> The nations represented here have known the tragedy of those two wars. As a result, many of us took part in the founding of the United Nations. Each member of the United Nations is under a solemn obligation to maintain international peace and security. Each is bound to settle international dispute by peaceful means, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or independence of any country, and to support the United Nations in any action it takes to preserve peace.
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> That solemn pledge - that abiding obligation - we reaffirm here today.

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[53] Ibid., p. 230.

[54] Phillip C. Jessup, "The Atlantic Community and the United Nations," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, A Series of Addresses and Papers Presented at the Semi-annual Meeting of the Academy of Political Science, April 1, 1948, (New York: Columbia University, 1948), Vol. XXIII, Part III, p. 314.

> We dedicate ourselves to that obligation, and propose that this North Atlantic Treaty as one of the means to carry it out.[55]

The North Atlantic Treaty as conceived must be considered as within the framework of the United Nations Charter. There are several questions pending concerning its place in supporting international security. Some think the influence of NATO is likely to diminish the influence of the United Nations. They believe it may intensify a global division of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union. If such happens it will reduce the opportunities of the United Nations development to practically nothing.[56]

These questions will not be answered until such time as a situation develops requiring action as envisioned in the Treaty and in conformance to the charter of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Treaty was attacked by non-treaty nations on the grounds that it conflicted with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. In general, however, the resistance to the Treaty was confined to small minority groups other than that applied by the communist faction.

As negotiations progressed toward agreement on the character of the North Atlantic Alliance and the form of the Treaty, the world was left in little doubt as to the reaction of the Soviet Union. Communist factions in each of the prospective member states, especially in Italy, gave voice to their opposition in most vigorous terms. The official Soviet protest

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[55] United States Department of State Bulletin, Address of President of the United States, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. XX, p. 481.

[56] Grayson Kirk, The Atlantic Pact and the International Security, (World Peace Foundation, 1949), Vol. III, p. 250.

on the Pact was issued on April 1, 1949.[57] The Soviet protest charged the Pact was directed against the USSR. The reasoning for this charge followed several lines. The USSR maintained that the Pact could not be directed at either the United States, Great Britain or France and of the great powers today only the USSR was left out of the Pact. They believed the only answer for this was that it was directed against the USSR. The Soviet Union also protested the reference to the Soviet bilateral treaties as defense treaties. These treaties in the Soviet meaning were directed toward the friendship and mutual assistance of countries of the people's democracies. Their aim was to prevent German aggression and the USSR claimed the NATO completely ignored German aggression and in so doing must be aimed directly at the USSR as the aggressor. In the official protest, the USSR stated a belief that the extensive military measures to be carried out under NATO by the United States and Great Britain could not be justified as being in the best interests of the defense of the countries.

At the time of the Soviet protest nothing had been said about extensive military measures by either Great Britain or the United States. Just what the USSR could have based the extensive military measures on is not known.

The Pact was also attacked as undermining the United Nations in that it violated Articles 51 and 52 of the charter. By Russian interpretation the Vandenberg Resolution refutes the idea of regional arrangements as expressed in Article 51 and 52 by the statement in the Resolution "that for the first time in its history the United States has associated itself with a country outside the Western hemisphere."

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[57] "Soviet Memorandum Says Atlantic Pact Evades U. N. and Aims at USSR." USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. IX, (April 8, 1949), pp. 205-206.

On April 2, 1949 the Foreign Ministers who were gathered in Washington issued their reply to the Soviet charges. In answer they referred to the Soviet views on the Pact in January 1949, prior to public announcement of the provisions of the Pact. The views of April 1, 1949 were the same as those in January and therefore must have been based upon something other than the Pact because they reflected a complete misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Pact.[58] The Pact explains its defensive character and the preamble reaffirms faith in the United Nations. The USSR claims this to be subterfuge to gloss over the aggressive intent of the United States and Great Britain.

The Atlantic Pact may have been conceived because of the USSR but the Treaty members claimed it was aimed only at aggression. Mr. Platts-Mills of the British Parliament asked the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, during parlimentary discussion, if he intended to propose to prospective members of the NATO that the USSR should be invited to join. Mr. McNeil, also of the British Parliament, answered in the negative and replied that the North Atlantic Pact would not be necessary had not attempts to organize collective security under the United Nations been made impossible by the obstruction, suspicion and non-cooperation of the Soviet Union.[59] Soviet denunciations come with poor grace from a country that has been so obstinate in the work of the United Nations Security Council and which has resorted to the use of the veto in obstructing attempts to bring all the nations into an understanding leading to world peace.

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[58] United States Department of State Bulletin, Atlantic Pact Countries Take Note of Soviet Views of the Treaty, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Vol. XX, p. 457. Also New York Times, April 3, 1949, p. 1.

[59] Hansard, Parlimentary Debates, (Fifth Series,) Vol. CDLXI, (1949), p. 15.

Prior to the formal announcement of the Treaty, resistance developed elsewhere in Europe mainly through the efforts of the Communists. European reaction to the Treaty was mixed and dependent upon the politics of the individual. Many Europeans looked to the Pact with relief and felt that the United States had a sincere interest in their well-being and would stand beside them. On the other side of the political fence were those who looked upon the Pact with a fury. Some five weeks before the Pact was announced the Communist Information Bureau apparently had issued orders to resist the Pact by strikes, sabotage, riots and political pressure.[60] Other than the two opposing factions, there were those in Europe who were fearful that the Pact might lead to war, although realizing the possible ultimate end in favor of the Western powers, they knew that Europe would be the battleground in any future war. This thought, following so closely on the heels of the devastation of World War II, leaves this group in a mood of uncertainty and fearfulness of the Pact.

The propaganda contest to win the middle-of-the-roader was underway early in 1949. The West claimed the Pact was purely defensive and need never be enforced unless the East forced war. On the other hand the East claimed that the Pact crystallized a coalition of aggressive aims. Throughout the early months of 1949 the communist dominated satellites of Finland, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland protested with demonstrations against the North Atlantic Treaty.

The communist factions in the proposed Treaty member countries were also active in protesting the Pact. The Red Dean of Canterbury spoke

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[60] New York Times, March 19, 1949, p. 5.

against British membership declaring that the United States was trying to organize the British into a war camp.[61] Dr. Harold Laski, professor of Political Science at the University of London, wanted a commission of high notables to go to the USSR and explain the Treaty. His idea was that a discussion with Stalin, of the proposed Pact, would clarify in the minds of the Soviets the real intent of the Pact. Dr. Laski believed that Great Britain and the United States should go to Stalin rather than wait for Stalin to seek the meaning from them.[62]

Communist resistance to the Atlantic Pact continued throughout the years following formal announcement and resistance took many forms. Dock strikes against unloading supplies sent to various European countries by the United States took place. The assignment of General Matthew B. Ridgway as Supreme Allied Commander Allied Powers in Europe to replace General Eisenhower brought about communist demonstrations in France.

It is not intended that the political doctrines of the Progressive party in the United States be discussed here. Neither is it intended to infer that the Progressive party is a communist party. Nevertheless, the greatest opposition to the Pact in the Senate Foreign Relation Committee hearings developed from members of the Progressive party and they generally expressed the ideas of Henry A. Wallace who openly expressed sentiment for the USSR. When Mr. Wallace testified before the above committee his entire testimony was along the theme of sympathy for the USSR. The Progressive party had six or seven members testify before the committee and they subscribed generally to the statements of Mr.

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[61] Ibid., March 25, 1949, p. 18.

[62] Ibid., March 30, 1949, p. 18.

Wallace. Throughout the testimony of the Progressive party members a negative feeling toward the North Atlantic Treaty was expressed.

Other than this testimony there was no large scale opposition to the Treaty.[63] Most of the people appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favored ratification. There were a few Quakers who opposed the Pact, and Mr. Charles F. Boss, Secretary of the Methodist World Peace Commission, testified against its ratification. He did not speak for the church or the Peace Commission, as only the General Conference which meets every four years could commit the church to a stand. Mr. Boss did state that the commission favored building up the United Nations as a means of maintaining peace. The Methodist Commission opposed the Atlantic Pact strongly by calling on everyone to combat the unchristian attitudes toward the USSR.[64] In opposition to this attitude fourteen bishops of the thirty-five in the Methodist Church approved the alliance as an intelligent action for freedom in the frame of a world government.

Resistance to the Pact from the communist factions can be understood when consideration is given to the fact that even prior to the Treaty the advance of communism had been curtailed in Europe. This is evidenced by the losses suffered by the communist party in Italy and France in the 1948 and 1949 elections. Further economic assistance as well as military assistance which the Pact held out hope for, but did not specifically include, would seriously injure communist efforts in Europe.

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[63] Freda Kirchway, "Questions About the Pact," Nation, Vol. CLXVIII, (March 26, 1949), p. 348.

[64] "Methodist Group Warns on Treaty," Christian Century, Vol. LXVI, (May 18, 1949), p. 636.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

World War II left Europe in an impoverished condition that will require a long time to remedy. Despite this condition Europe was slowly on the way to economic recovery until a severe set back was experienced in 1947. The set back resulted from several factors: rising costs of food and other essentials that had to be imported; a drought in 1947; exhaustion of natural resources, especially coal and other resources of lesser importance. By 1947 it became evident that early economic recovery in Europe could not take place without continued aid from overseas. Prior to 1947, European recovery had been largely enhanced by emergency aid obtained through the UNRRA[1] (United Nations Relief Rehabilitation Association).

Europe in 1947 was in the throes of an economic depression and in view of the economic condition of Europe at that time President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine in an address to Congress in March 1947. According to the Truman Doctrine the United States was to help support the free peoples of the world who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. The Truman Doctrine was not an organized plan but rather an attempt by words to tell the free nations of Europe they could expect assistance in order to maintain their freedom. President Truman requested that Congress approve financial assistance for Greece and Turkey in 1947, both countries having asked for aid when Great Britain was unable to assist them further.

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[1] Boyd, op. cit., p. 11.

With the aid to be given to Europe under the Truman Doctrine the President hoped to gain the initiative in the "cold war" against the advances of communism. Congress supported the doctrine only after much delay.[2] The Truman Doctrine was based on the principle of containment of communism within its present boundaries in Europe and halting the spread of communism into Greece, Turkey and the Middle East. To accomplish this the United States realized that the real need of Europe was the bolstering of the economic system. This need was partially answered in June 1947 when Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed the European Recovery Program in a speech at Harvard University. In his speech, Secretary Marshall described the European economic situation as having a demoralizing effect upon the whole world.[3] He proposed that the free nations of Europe draft their own program for recovery and pledged that United States assistance would consist of aid in drafting the program as well as the support of it. This was noteworthy because Secretary Marshall intended for the plan to be a European plan for recovery and not an American plan for European recovery.

Great Britain and France took the lead in starting European action on Secretary Marshall's proposal. Invitations for a meeting were sent to all European countries except the USSR and Spain. Spain was omitted because under the United Nations Charter non-intercourse had been voted against Spain in view of her collaborationist policies with Germany before and during World War II.[4] The USSR was omitted because she had

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[2] Walter Lippmann, The Cold War, A Study in U. S. Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 55.

[3] Boyd, op. cit., p. 45.

[4] Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-1947, (Lake Success: Department of Public Information United Nations, 1947), p. 129.

previously announced that she would not join in the proposed recovery program.[5] The communist dominated nations of Eastern Europe rejected the invitation, although Poland, Czechoslovakia and Finland indicated a desire to accept. By June 1948 a program had been worked out and the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, was in operation. Aid to the European countries was carried out through the Economic Cooperation Administration, better known as ECA with Mr. Paul G. Hoffman serving as administrator.

The Marshall Plan is reliably credited with materially lessening communist influence in France and Italy where elections in 1948 resulted in decisive defeats for the rapidly growing communist parties. The Plan helped to bolster the economy of the non-communist countries and to start them on the road to a state of rehabilitation, a state in which it was believed communism would have little attraction to the masses. Under the Marshall Plan economic aid became an integral part of the overall foreign policy of the United States in its efforts to stem the tide of communism.

The North Atlantic Treaty is a necessary complement to the broad economic features of the European Recovery Program. There is no formal connection between the two since the European Recovery Program extended to countries that were not members in the NATO.

Emphasis on economic factors in the North Atlantic defense planning indicates a real awareness of the interrelation of military, economic and political factors in the overall rehabilitation of the Western European nations. The United States will contribute perhaps the largest share of any aid given but the United States realizes that it is equally essential

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[5] Ibid., p. 47.

to see that her own economy does not become endangered while trying to bolster that of Europe. In accordance with the plan of self-help and mutual aid, many of the NATO member countries took action toward building sound economies themselves. In doing this they signified their intention of not being completely dependent upon NATO. Perhaps no better evidence of the desire of the Western European countries to develop self-help can be found than in the formation of the Coal and Steel Community better known as the Schumann Plan. Throughout the present century, the coal and steel industries of France and Germany have had an important effect upon their political and economic relations. The principles enunciated in the Schumann Plan were without precedent.[6] The basic purpose of the Plan is to remove the element of nationalism in the control of coal and steel industries of the six nations agreeing to the Plan.[7] This, in effect, would remove trade barriers between the member nations and therefore limit the sovereignty of these nations in order to promote economic welfare and unity in Western Europe. Necessary governmental control over these industries would be vested in new institutions similar to a federal government. This action could help knit the free nations of the world with stronger and more enduring ties.

During the hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early 1949 Secretary of State Acheson advised the Committee that the Administration planned to present to Congress very soon a proposed military assistance plan to augment, in general, American foreign policy and to assist the Atlantic Pact countries.[8]

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[6] Norman J. Padelford, (ed.), Contemporary International Relations Readings, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 375.

[7] Western Germany, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg are members of the Coal and Steel Community.

[8] North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, op. cit., p. 11.

This plan became a reality with the signature of President Truman on October 6, 1949 and is cited in the law as the Mutual Defense Assistance Program of 1949. The program is sometimes referred to as MAP (Mutual Assistance Program) and sometimes as MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program).

The Mutual Assistance Program, like the European Recovery Program, is separate and distinct from the North Atlantic Treaty. The two have the same objectives since they are striving to maintain and develop, by mutual aid and self-help, the collective capacity to resist aggression. The European Recovery Program was designed specifically to promote economic recovery whereas the Mutual Assistance Program is aimed toward providing assistance in the military field which in turn would have an effect upon the ability of any recipient country to build its economy.

After the European Recovery Program had been in effect for approximately one and a half years it became increasingly clear that economic measures alone were not enough to bring about economic recovery and stability in the European countries. Economic recovery depends to a considerable degree upon the people possessing a sense of security. This sense of security in turn depends upon a firm belief in the ability of the free nations to defend themselves against armed aggression. This belief is lacking in Western Europe and the capacity for mutual self-defense on the part of the free nations of Europe must be increased largely by their own efforts without impeding the progress toward economic recovery.[9]

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[9] "Military Assistance Program," Joint Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 81st. Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 6.

The Mutual Assistance Program although designed to build up the defense forces of Europe served as an economic support for the countries. This kind of economic spending on the part of the United States might be called "defense support." Assistance in the form of money, equipment, technical advice and training serves to reduce the cost of economic recovery to any recipient government and the amount the recipient government might spend toward these items can be devoted to economic rehabilitation.

Part of the industry of Europe survived the ravages of war but cannot be used for economic recovery because housing shortages have immobilized portions of the manpower in the vicinity of the industrial areas. Reactivation of these industrial plants would make it possible to take advantages of the manpower available, however this reactivation could not take place without retarding economic recovery unless dollar aid was granted for the purchase of essential materials and industrial machinery.[10] This type of aid is the economic assistance envisioned in the Mutual Assistance Program. The Mutual Assistance Program terms expenditures of this nature as assistance to stimulate increased production. Under this program a total expenditure of one hundred and fifty-five million dollars was necessary to make it possible for Atlantic Pact countries in Europe to rebuild their military productive capacity without diversion of effort from economic recovery.[11]

Under the Mutual Assistance Program aid was to be given to countries that were not members of the Atlantic Pact. These included the

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[10] U. S. Department of State, The Military Assistance Program, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Publication No. 3563, General Foreign Policy Series 13, p. 19.

[11] Ibid.

nations of Iran, Korea, the Philippines, Turkey and Greece. The last two were later to be members of the Pact.

The entire Mutual Assistance Program was estimated to cost the United States one billion, four hundred and fifty million dollars for the fiscal year of 1950. It is difficult, if not an impossibility to say that an exact portion of this would be applied toward economic recovery. It was anticipated that military assistance in the form envisioned would have economic aspects and thereby serve to further economic recovery. The one hundred and fifty-five million dollars to be allocated for the purpose of stimulating increased military production in the Atlantic Pact countries probably would be the only figure that does not take into consideration technical assistance and training.

Under the Mutual Assistance Program aid was also given to Yugoslavia in December 1950. With the exception of Yugoslavia all nations receiving aid signed bilateral agreements with the United States. In the case of Yugoslavia the need for aid was urgent and time did not permit negotiation of an agreement. In 1950 a severe drought occurred in Yugoslavia with the consequent results of crop failure and the eminence of a famine. The Yugoslav's have been stoutly resisting communist efforts to subject them to foreign domination and their ability to resist in the face of a food shortage was seriously threatened. In accordance with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 the President had the authority to determine that United States aid was needed. The Yugoslav government requested United States assistance in October 1950 and under the Mutual Assistance Program the United States furnished sixteen million dollars to Yugoslavia to be used mainly by the Yugoslav armed forces during the critical food shortage. In the light of possible future value to the North Atlantic area this assistance may pay rich dividends.

Yugoslavia's geographic location makes it of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area. Austria is immediately northwest and occupation forces of certain NATO countries are on duty there. Greece is to the south and Italy is to the west. In view of its geographical location in respect to certain NATO countries it becomes necessary for Yugoslavia to be able to defend herself against continued and increasing pressure of the Soviet Union satellite countries.

The Mutual Assistance Program was the responsibility of the Department of State and to facilitate the orderly and systematic conduct of this responsibility the Department of State created the position of Director of Mutual Defense Assistance who served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. In addition, officers were appointed to serve as assistants to the United States Ambassador in the several countries receiving assistance. The bilateral agreements between the United States and countries receiving aid do not specify the assistance to be given.[12] In general, allocations to any NATO country under the act were based upon the defensive needs of the given area after those needs have been weighed against the total demands upon available United States resources, as well as the relative importance of the particular area to United States security and world peace. In the case of countries outside NATO their requests have been screened in the light of the above considerations.

The effect of the Mutual Assistance Program could not be determined by Spring of 1950 because the program was not well underway. Several countries that later received assistance under MAP had not by the

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[12] See excerpts of the bilateral agreement with Belgium under the MDAP in Chapter IV.

Spring 1950 completed conventions or agreements with the United States on the assistance to be rendered.

The European Recovery Program by early Spring 1950 had helped Western Europe tremendously in getting back on a sound economic footing but the job was by no means complete. Most of the European countries receiving Marshall plan aid had increased their industrial capacities approximately one hundred percent. Agricultural production had risen and with it came a rise in living costs but not to an extent that inflationary tendencies had developed.[13]

In addition to the increase in industrial and agricultural production, Western European trade had increased during the first three months of 1950 by approximately eighteen percent above prewar levels. These favorable developments encouraged the Western nations in the belief that continued progress would shortly enable them to carry on without being dependent on aid from the United States.

The situation developing in Korea with the out break of hostilities on June 25, 1950 greatly impeded the progress of economic recovery in Europe. The Korean crisis reemphasized the undefended condition of Western Europe. With the United States taking its stand in the Korean affair many European nations were fearful that United States resources would be used to aid the Korean crisis leaving Western Europe without the aid necessary to rebuild its economy.

A rift between the United States and the Western European powers developed at this point and threatened to disrupt the idea of collective economic recovery. The United States insisted on maximum economic effort

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[13] Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1950, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 134.

on the part of the NATO nations, to be primed with equipment, machine tools, and other aid under an expanded Mutual Defense Assistance Program. European governments were more interested in preserving their recent economic gains, keeping domestic tax rates down and living standards within practical limits, therefore they tended to expect more from the United States and less from their own people.[14]

Emphasis upon military requirements after the outbreak of war in Korea caused the economic recovery program in Europe to suffer. The meetings of the North Atlantic Council of Deputies in 1950 indicates the change in thinking that was taking place. Interdependence of rearmament and economic progress was still recognized but the latter was now definitely relegated to a subordinate position. Economic requirements, particularily from a United States viewpoint, would henceforth be subordinated to the overall needs of the military program. This emphasis upon the buildup of military forces retarded the continued growth of economic recovery in Europe. In turn this postponed the time when the United States would be able to cease economic assistance to Western European nations.

In May 1951 President Truman recommended to Congress a Mutual Security Program to assist the free nations of Europe. Under this program all foreign aid by the United States was to be directed under one administration. The program called for one and three-quarter billion dollars to be used as economic aid. This did not compare with the five and one-quarter billion dollars called for in the Mutual Security Program for military assistance to the free nations of Europe.[15]

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[14] Ibid., p. 258.

[15] Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, (May 24, 1951), Vol. XCVII, Part IV, p. 5844.

The Mutual Security Act as passed by Congress was approved by the President and most of its provisions became effective on October 10, 1951.[16] Under this program a total of one hundred and seventy-five million dollars was envisioned for economic assistance to the NATO countries and other European nations. Again much of this economic aid was in the form of military weapons, nevertheless aid in this form reduces the economic burden of Europe. Other economic aid consisted of technical assistance, medicines, and seeds for agricultural products. This economic assistance was established for the purpose of enabling the nations receiving aid to plan for better land utilization as well as diversification of light industries especially those that produce consumer goods.

It would appear that with the planned economic assistance of the Mutual Security Program that no difficulty would be experienced in putting the Western European nations on a sound basis economically and this probably would be true if one overlooked the fact that military recovery was in progress as well. Military recovery places approximately a two to three times greater demand upon a country than would be needed merely for economic recovery. In order for the Western European countries to divert more effort toward defense it became necessary to increase their economic aid. Under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act the President could transfer monies allocated for military assistance to economic assistance. This transfer could not exceed ten per cent of the total allocated for military assistance.[17] After approximately two and one half months of operation it became evident that Great Britain, France,

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[16] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Progress Toward Mutual Defense, Excerpts from the Presidents Fourth Report on MDAP, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), Vol. XXVI, p. 312.

[17] U. S. Statues at Large, Vol. LXV, Part I, p. 374 (1952).

Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia would need additional economic assistance if they were to be able to meet their defense plans.

Mr. Averill Harriman, Director of the Mutual Security program, felt that funds taken from the defense allocations would contribute more effectively to defense by being used as economic aid. Mr. Harriman requested President Truman to transfer approximately four hundred and seventy-eight million dollars from the amount allocated to the defense assistance.[18] The fact that this action had to be taken indicates the difficulty of attempting to resolve, in advance, the highly complex question of what portion of the money allocated should be devoted to economic assistance and what should go to military assistance.

The need for adjustment between economic aid and military aid at this early date raised the question of whether there was sufficient flexibility in the Mutual Security Act to meet future contingencies.[19] There are several tangents to this question, however the flexibility that was written into the Act originally, seemed to satisify Congress, which has repeatedly opposed the granting of actual dollar aid on the grounds that it wants to know how American aid is used.

How long the United States will have to continue economic aid to Europe is questionable. Ambassador William H. Draper, United States special representative in Europe, who has been coordinating United States spending abroad believes that with the next two or three years it will be

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[18] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Recommendations from Mutual Security Director, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), Vol. XXVI, p. 318.

[19] Major Problems, 1952-1953, p. 140.

not only feasible but also highly desirable to cease United States economic assistance to Europe.[20] In order for this aid to cease the United States and Europe must establish the necessary economic policies to insure European economic recovery. Mr. Draper thinks the answer to this is for the United States to buy more from Europe. This has long been a problem in United States economic relations with other countries. The fact that the United States does not take a sufficient volume of goods and services from other countries to enable those countries to pay for what they need from the United States is a significant factor in many of the international economic difficulties encountered in the past few years. There have been many things that effected United States imports during the past few years.[21] Of course Europe has been unable within the last decade to produce an export that the United States could use. This lack of production as well as burdensome customs restrictions have effected the United States importation program. Unless the United States removes the burdensome restrictions on imports, the Mutual Security Program and other efforts toward unity with its allies will be thwarted.[22] Mr. Draper thinks that increasing American buying in Europe is possible after examining the legislative program that the Eisenhower administration has outlined.

During the first two or three years after the war, United States aid to Europe was designed to help keep the people from starving. The Marshall Plan helped this program and in addition served to finance production in order for Europe to be better able to put itself back on a sound economic basis. With the coming of the Korean crisis it

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[20] "When Can Aid To Europe Stop?," U. S. News & World Report, (April 17, 1953), p. 45.

[21] Major Problems, 1952-1953, p. 137.

[22] Ibid., p. 139.

became evident that not only was the build up of European economy necessary but the ability to resist aggression had to be strengthened by building up the armed forces. Economic aid gave way to military aid in building European defenses. The Western European nations realized the need for increasing their armed strength and binding themselves together in NATO on a collective defense basis.[23] Part of the importance of Western Europe in the current effort to build up the defenses of the free world lies in the fact that when its industrial capacity is linked with the United States resources, the balance of economic strength lies with the non-communist nations. Based on this factor the policy of the United States has been to help Europe rearm and at the same time preserve the economic gains already made.[24]

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[23] "When Can Aid To Europe Stop?," U. S. News & World Reports, (April 17, 1953), p. 49.

[24] Major Problems, 1952-1953, p. 134.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Until preparations commenced on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, American political leaders thought of combating communism in terms of economic assistance. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was studying the North Atlantic Treaty, the State Department was preparing a bill for military aid to the free nations of Europe. The necessity for such aid to the free nations was the direct result of the basic disparity between the Western European military forces and those of the USSR.[1]

Military aid under this program which became known as the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, (MDAA) envisioned three types of assistance. The first type has been discussed in Chapter III as economic assistance. Aid of this type was to be "dollar aid" for the purpose of increasing direct military production within the European countries receiving the aid. The second type of military assistance was the direct transfer of essential American military equipment to the European countries receiving aid. This was essential if the countries were to be able within any reasonable length of time to defend themselves against an invasion. Western European efforts toward rebuilding had previously been concentrated on industries producing consumer items rather than those producing military weapons. Until industry could be turned to the production of military weapons, direct transfer of essential military

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[1] Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1949, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 79.

items was a necessity. The third type of assistance envisioned in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was technical assistance. The equipment transferred would be strange and difficult to operate by the people receiving it, therefore technical assistance was necessary in training the people on the equipment transferred as well as instruction on improved methods of production.

The program under the MDAP authorized a total expenditure of approximately one billion, four hundred and fifty million dollars for the fiscal year 1950. The bulk of this amount was to be used to provide military aid to the North Atlantic Treaty countries requesting aid. It can readily be seen that American foreign assistance was beginning to be directed toward military assistance rather than economic assistance. The year preceeding the Mutual Defense Assistance Act saw the United States spending approximately five billion dollars on foreign economic assistance as compared with less than one and one-half billion for military aid.

This change in the trend of foreign assistance from economic to military increased rapidly after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. In 1951 Congress appropriated a total of seven billion, five hundred and thirty-five million, seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars for foreign aid. Of this amount, slightly over six million went to military aid.[2]

Bilateral agreements were made between the United States and the nations receiving aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The agreements recognize the reciprocal pledges of mutual aid and self-help under Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty. The bilateral

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[2] Bolles, op. cit., p. 18.

agreement calls for a recognition of the promotion of an integrated Western European defense. Neither the MDAP or the individual bilateral agreements specify the type of services and assistance to be rendered. Both signatory nations of the agreement were to render assistance in accordance with their abilities to do so. Perhaps the best example of the services to be rendered by a nation receiving United States aid under the MDAP is indicated in Article I of the Mutual Defense Assistance agreement with Belgium. Article I of the agreement reads as follows:

> 1. Each government, consistently with the principle that economic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must be given clear priority, will make available to the other and to such additional governments as the parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or other military assistance as the government furnishing such assistance may authorize and in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing of any such assistance as may be authorized by either party hereto shall be consistent with the charter of the United Nations and with the obligations under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty . . . . The two governments will from time to time negotiate detailed arrangements to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.[3]

In order for the Mutual Defense Assistance program to operate efficiently a Director was appointed to serve as a special representative to the Secretary of State. The Director was also to serve as chairman of the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee which was established to coordinate the efforts of all agencies having a responsibility in the program. These agencies included the Department of Defense, the Economic Cooperation Administration[4] and the Department of State.

President Truman on June 1, 1950 requested that Congress continue the foreign aid program established under the Mutual Defense Assistance

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[3] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement With Belgium, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), Vol. XXII, p. 200.

[4] The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was the governmental agency established to administer the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.

Act of 1949. The President requested an appropriation for the fiscal year of 1951 of one billion two hundred and twenty-two million, five hundred thousand dollars. Of this amount one billion would be directed toward military assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty members.[5] In support of the amount to be directed to the NATO countries Secretary of State Acheson listed several factors as being important. For example the planning for the defense of Western Europe which had already been accomplished under the MDAP of 1949 must be carried on as well as continued military assistance to prevent the collapse of the rejuvenated economic condition of Western Europe.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Act terminated on October 10, 1951 with the passage of the Mutual Security Act. From the beginning of the MDAP the emphasis was to provide Western Europe with military assistance necessary for security against invasion until such time as the Western European nations could increase their military production. It is undesirable from a standpoint of security to present exact figures, however, it may be said that the total value of Western European production of military items during 1952 was approximately four times greater than it was in 1949.[6] Probably the greatest reason for this is the assistance given the Western European nations under the MDAP.

President Truman in May 1951 presented to Congress the Mutual Security Act (MSA). Under this act all of the various foreign aid plans of the United States were brought together in one program. This program allocated five billion, two hundred and forty million dollars to

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[5] Ibid., p. 940.

[6] U. S. Department of State, Building a Mutual Defense, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), Publication No. 4473, General Foreign Policy Series 68, p. 25.

Western Europe for military assistance. The future NATO countries of Greece and Turkey were provided for in the four hundred and fifteen million dollars allocated to the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to this five hundred and ninety-five million dollars was allocated to Asia and Latin American for military assistance. The total military assistance for the fiscal year 1952 amounted to over six billion dollars.[7]

Aid under the Mutual Security Act was to be mainly military aid of the type which the recipient nations were not able to provide for themselves. Like the Mutual Defense Assistance Act the Mutual Security Act did not specify the aid to be rendered but required that all nations receiving aid conclude an agreement with the United States in which they agreed to observe certain stipulations as set forth in the Mutual Security Act.[8] Section 511 of the MSA specifies the conditions to be met.

> Sec. 511 (a) No military, economic, or technical assistance authorized pursuant to this Act . . . . shall be supplied to any nation . . . . unless the President finds that . . . . such assistance will strengthen the security of the United States and unless the recipient country has agreed to --
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> (1) join in promoting international understanding . . . .
> (2) take such action . . . . to eliminate causes of international tension;
> (3) fulfill military obligations under multilateral or bilateral agreements . . . . to which the United States is a party;
> (4) make . . . . the full contribution permitted by its manpower. .
> (5) take all responsible measures . . . . to develop defense. . . .
> (6) . . . . insure the effective integration of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.[9]

In order to render aid efficiently the Mutual Security Agency was established with Mr. Averell Harriman as the Director. In addition, United States representatives were assigned to each country requesting

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[7] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Recommendations for a Mutual Security Program, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. XXIV, p. 885.

[8] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Our Far Eastern Policy, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), Vol. XXVI, p. 652.

[9] U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. LXV, p. 381, (1952).

aid. These representatives were assigned to the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission for supervision and control. The representatives' responsibilities included preparing and submitting reports to the Director of MSA regarding requirements under MSA and effecting plans and working with personnel of the nations receiving aid on requirements under MSA.

President Truman recommended to Congress, on March 6, 1952, the continuance of the MSA throughout the fiscal year 1953 ending June 30, 1953. The program for 1953 reduced the requirements in military assistance by approximately one and one-quarter billion dollars. This reduction was possible because Western European nations' military expenditures had approximately doubled the pre-Korea crisis expenditures.[10] The program as requested for the fiscal year 1953 called for no change in the procedures or the intent of the program. Despite the fact that under the Mutual Security Act for the fiscal year 1953 the military allotment was reduced the United States continues to provide the largest share of the combined NATO defense budgets. The United States share of the combined defense budget is approximately seventy-eight percent as compared to twenty-two percent of all other NATO countries.[11]

In preparing for the defense of Western Europe, prior to mid-year 1950, the greatest effort exerted had been along the economic front. The war in Korea brought about a change in the thinking of NATO political leaders and in September 1950 the North Atlantic Council issued a communique relative to discussions of an integrated

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[10] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, The Mutual Security Program, A Program for Peace, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), Vol. XXVI, p. 406.

[11] "NATO Balance Sheet," Senior Scholastic, May 13, 1953, Vol. LXII, p. 19.

military force in Europe.[12] Prior to this time the build-up of military forces in Western Europe had been on an individual basis with each nation striving to utilize the assistance rendered by the United States but not in a collective capacity.

In December 1950 the North Atlantic Council approved the recommendation of the Defense Committee on the establishment of an integrated defense force in Europe composed of members of the participating NATO governments. The Council requested General Dwight D. Eisenhower from the United States to be supreme commander. The United States government granted the request and General Eisenhower became the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. General Eisenhower immediately began a tour of the Western European countries in order that he might have a better picture of the task before him.[13] General Eisenhower returned from the visit with a glowing report of the will of the Western European nations to resist aggression. France had promised, despite the fact that she was already fighting communism in Indo-China, to have twenty-five divisions ready for battle in Europe by the end of 1953.

The military force in Western Europe has been slow in developing. The United States had two infantry divisions on duty in Europe, mainly as occupations troops, when the NATO army was conceived. Six months after General Eisenhower took command of the NATO defense forces in Western Europe he had twelve divisions, about half of what he believed was needed to protect the West. This belief was based on the fact that Russia had twenty-five divisions based in East Germany and Poland. With

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[12] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Creation of a Common Military Force Studied by North Atlantic Council, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), Vol. XXIII, p. 533.

[13] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Unity of a Purpose Urged For Security of North Atlantic Area, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. XXIV, p. 250.

the twenty-five Allied divisions, Russia would not dare attack with only the force in East Germany and Poland. Further build-up by Russia would permit the NATO forces advance warning in plenty of time to prepare.[14] The twelve divisions in Europe at mid-year 1951 were comprised of three United States divisions, four from France, Three from Great Britain and two divisions made up of elements from the Dutch, Belgians, Norwegians and Danes.

The NATO army was to eventually include approximately fifty or sixty divisions.[15] This number was considered by General Eisenhower and other NATO leaders to be the size of the army necessary to make Western Europe secure. This figure discouraged Western European nations, especially France. France, at that time, was experiencing fears of a rearmed Germany which the United States had been urging. France did not so much fear an attack on France by a rearmed Germany but rather feared that the rearming of Germany might provoke Russia.[16] France also did not believe that the USSR would start war and even if she did the fifty or sixty proposed divisions could not deter the USSR.[17]

The problems confronting the Supreme Commander and his staff in establishing a unified Western European defense force were many. The majority of the European NATO nations were strongly nationalistic in their feelings and collective action was unknown to them. In addition, the support of the United States in the shipment of arms was running behind schedule and even though General Eisenhower and his staff were

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[14] "12 Bosses Mess Up Eisenhower's Job," U. S. News and World Report, July 27, 1951, Vol. XXXI, p. 12.

[15] Ibid.

[16] "Army or No Army," Newsweek, February 25, 1952, Vol. XXXIX, p. 42.

[17] "Ike, Forging an Army on Faith," Newsweek, July 23, 1951, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 27.

doing a commendable job it became more and more evident that the solution to the defense problem of Western Europe was a European army that would include Germany. It would mean a peace treaty with Germany as the only means of quieting Germany's possible demands for restoration of lost territory.[18]

In November 1951 the French Foreign Ministry announced the tentative size of the new European Army. The plan for the European Army had originated with France probably due to their fear of Germany and the desire to prohibit Germany rebuilding an army of its own. The proposed European army was to be composed of fourteen French divisions, twelve German divisions, twelve Italian divisions and five divisions from the Benelux countries. Several divisions will make up an army corps and it is only at the corps level that internationalism begins. It is also only at the corps level that support troops, such as supply and maintenance, exist. This arrangement is for the purpose of prohibiting any nation from pulling their troops out of the European Army to serve elsewhere.

A unified, integrated armed force presupposes the unification of political power. The European Army was to be organized under the European Defense Community[19] (EDC) which had been accepted by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in September 1951.[20] In the political organization of the European Defense Community were two main functioning bodies; the council of Ministers is composed of

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[18] The Atlantic Monthly, November 1951, Vol. CLXXVIII, p. 8.

[19] The European Defense Community is composed of West Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and Luxembourg.

[20] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Foreign Ministers of U. S., U. K. and France Discuss World Problem, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. XXV, p. 485.

delegates from each member country and its function is to formulate basic directives on such matters as the budget and appointment of top commanders. The Commissariat is the executive organ of the EDC. Its members are chosen as individuals and not as representatives of any national government. Each member must be accepted by all of the participating states. Membership is to be for six years with one-third of the members being replaced each two years. Decisions of the Commissariat are to be reached by a majority vote. This body carries out organizational plans, reviews the recruiting procedures carried out by each state, instructs in accordance with standardized procedures, and directs the overall stationing of troops in accordance with the recommendations of NATO.[21] Direct military supervision of the European army is under a European army headquarters responsible to General Eisenhower's SHAPE staff and is on the same level as NATO's separate British and American army components.[22]

Many questions developed out of the European Defense Community proposal and although it was accepted by the nations as a signed treaty it had not been ratified by June 1953. Agreement on this treaty would create a European army and provide the structure of an organization through which Western Germany could contribute materially to the defense of Western Europe. Before it will ever be ratified certain issues between France and Germany must be settled.[23] Difficulties will exist and problems will develop but it should not be expected that the pro-

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[21] Andre Philip, "European Army - Our Doubts & Hopes," New Republic, May 26, 1952, Vol. CXXVI, p. 15.

[22] "Polyglot Army," Time, November 19, 1951, Vol. LVIII, p. 32.

[23] Report from Strasbourg, (New York: American Committee on United Europe, 1953), p. 4.

posal to give up sovereignty over national armed forces will pass through the ratification process without the stop, look and listen periods or without full debate upon the principles involved and the consequences.[24]

Early in the year 1953 Secretary of State Dulles traveled to Europe to spur the nations of the European Defense Community on to action. He returned to the United States hopeful and believing that action would soon take place to ratify the treaty. This action appears unlikely now and there is a growing fear that a congressional rider to the foreign aid appropriations bill may cut off aid to any or all of the six nations of the European Defense Community not signing the treaty.[25]

Meanwhile General Matthew Ridgway, Supreme Commander in Europe, has approximately twenty-five divisions on active duty in Europe with an additional twenty-five in reserve.[26] France and the United Kingdom have approximately five divisions each, the United States and Italy have approximately six divisions each, Denmark, Norway and the Benelux countries have approximately five divisions in all. These divisions are active duty units. General Ridgway believes only a few of the number on duty have adequate arms.

The greatest difficulty in planning for the defense of the North Atlantic area has been experienced in the land forces of the NATO defense forces. General Eisenhower envisioned the defense of Western Europe as the problem of the defense of a peninsula, with the flanks

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[24] U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Observation of NATO's Progress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), Vol. XXVIII, p. 292.

[25] "Confusion and Discord Upset Western Allies," U. S. News and World Reports, May 8, 1953, Vol. XXXIV, p. 17.

[26] Ibid., p. 18.

being protected by naval forces mainly.[27] Consequently in the organization of the NATO armies or defense forces three major units were necessary. The Allied Land Forces of Central Europe constitute the major force although an Allied Air Force for Central Europe under the command of Air Force General Lauris Norstad is organized. There is also a Flag Officer for the Central Europe command. The commander of the Central Europe Allied Land Forces is the French Marshal Juin. All Central Europe forces have headquarters in Fontainbleau, France.

The flank forces of the NATO Central European Forces are the Northern Europe Forces and the Southern Europe Forces. Although both commands have land and air forces, the naval forces constitute the major responsibility of the commands. The Northern Allied Forces have headquarters at Oslo, Norway and Admiral Sir Patrick Brind of the United Kingdom is the commander. The Northern Allied Forces will protect the north flank of the peninsula. The Southern forces are commanded by Admiral Robert B. Carney of the United States. The Southern forces headquarters is Naples, Italy and will protect the southern flank of the Western European peninsula in the Mediterranean area.

The major emphasis in building the NATO defense forces has been upon the land forces therefore little is said about the NATO Air and Naval forces. The consensus of opinion among military leaders is that to hold Western Europe a strong land force is necessary.[28] A land force is considered to be a greater defense against possible invasion than either a strong naval or air force.

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[27] "12 Bosses Mess Up Eisenhower's Job," op. cit., p. 13.

[28] NATO Development, op. cit., p. 36.

The production of military aircraft in both the United Kingdom and the United States has been slow.[29] The target for 1951 in combat aircraft was four thousand. The United States had by June 30, 1952 shipped over twenty-eight hundred aircraft of all types to Western Europe for defense.[30]

The naval and air forces have conducted several maneuvers in order to reveal the strong and weak points of the air and sea forces. In case of armed attack on any NATO country within the area defined by the North Atlantic Treaty it is likely that the navies and air forces of all NATO countries will operate in conjunction with the NATO forces.

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[29] Drew Middleton, The Defense of Western Europe, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 257.

[30] See Appendix "E".

CHAPTER V

Conclusions

The story of the gradual evolution of the co-operative institutions of men, families, tribes, towns, cities, provinces, countries, and finally of different nations is too long and complicated to be summarized here, but some appreciation of the difficulties which were slowly and gradually overcome as larger and larger units of society began to co-operate is necessary if one is to understand the actualities of world politics today. It may be said that the most impelling driving-force behind this ever increasing measure of collaboration was, and still is, necessity.

Leagues of one variety or another have made their appearance in one section of the world or another for defense or other purposes for upwards to 3,000 years. Some of these leagues were extremely successful in establishing peace and insuring domestic tranquility for decades if not centuries, but in time internal discord or external pressure invariably undermined their cohesive organizations and the components parts were case asunder to seek what protection their own resources would provide.

Ever since the closing days of the American Revolution there was dominant in the United States a spirit of isolationism and neutrality. This spirity had developed slowly on the basis of experiences during our quest for freedom. When this freedom was attained, we readily realized that unless a policy of aloofness to European political developments could be established we, from time to time, would be a mere pawn in the

hands of the great European monarchs, and our resources would be dissipated in behalf of their jealousies. With such a thought in mind, it is not surprising to find that our founding fathers urged, at every turn, that we remain free of entangling alliances so that the ideals associated with the American experience in democracy could be given an excellent chance for unfettered development.

So successful did this policy of isolationism and neutrality prove to the United States that it remained the dominant issue in our negotiations with foreign countries until Kaiser William II and his unrestricted submarine warfare so aggravated the American people that our abhorrence to entangling alliances was momentarily forgotten and we joined the Allied Powers "to make the world safe for democracy." Our great war president, Woodrow Wilson, did his best during the course of the war to erect a League of Nations that would perpetuate his ideals. Unfortunately, a United States Senate and some disgruntled politicians kept the dream from becoming a reality, and we, in turn, reverted once again, in due course of time, to a policy of isolation until World War II was well under way.

This war, once again, proved to most American statesmen that isolationism and neutrality were effete from an international point of view and that we, the United States, should or must become the leader in a new world movement to insure a peaceful means of settling international disputes. The Rio Pact of 1947, which in a way, had its inception in the Act of Chapultepec (1945), after years of fumbling toward some measure of political "continental solidarity," brought into existence an organization of twenty-one American republics for the express purpose of providing solutions to internal problems and external threats that might lead to military action. While the Rio Pact was not an airtight

military alliance, it did adopt in general the premise of mutual aid and self-help. Likewise it recognized collective security and accepted the dictum that peace is indivisible and, unless law abiding nations assist one another, an aggressor may be able to pick them off one by one as certain dictators had done prior to World War II.

In due course of time, other pacts similar to the one negotiated in Rio came into existence. For example, the Brussels Pact of 1948 provided that several European countries would automatically join their military forces in case of any renewal of German aggression within the next fifty years. Also, if any member of the Brussels Pact should be the object of an armed attack, the other members in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations would provide aid and assistance to the unfortunate colleague. This was a definite commitment to give military aid, not merely to undertake to help in some manner which might or might not, according to the discretion of the aiding state, include armed assistance.

Within a space of a few days of this concertive movement at Brussels, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, and an ardent exponent of a bipartisan foreign policy, introduced a resolution in the United States Senate which proposed in effect that the United States associate itself with countries outside the Western hemisphere in collective security. While this resolution dealt with a half dozen subjects relating to the United Nations and peace, by far the most important section was the one in which Senator Vandenberg declared it to be the sense of the United States Senate that this government

should pursue the policy of progressively developing regional or other treaties for individual and collective self-defense. It was also Senator Vandenberg's intention to exercise these rights under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

From many points of view this Resolution was apparently in keeping with the thoughts of most Americans. As a result, when a vote was taken on the Resolution, there were sixty-four in favor to only four against. The old-time isolationist had now hit the sawdust trail, and the former devotees were, in effect, saying that this nation's security demanded alliances.

The rise of the Soviet bloc in Europe and the utter frustration of the efforts on behalf of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union on many pending issues both within the United Nations and elsewhere prompted in a way the foregoing pronouncement. Within our governmental circles several individuals had for sometime been attempting to diagnose the anticipated Soviet plan of action. It would seem that the diagnoses were so variable that eventually Under-Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett influenced Senator Vandenberg and others to announce the new plan of world action from our point of view. With the passage of the Resolution Mr. Lovett undertook at once to negotiate with representatives of the governments that later became the original members of NATO.

The motives behind the Senators, who were the proponents of the Resolution, rested upon American interest from a long-range point of view. To describe this interest appropriately one need only to refer to the statement made by Secretary of State Dean Acheson when testifying

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1951. In his testimony Secretary of State Acheson unequivocally asserted that in the world at this time no national defense policy could insure security unless the nation had strong, reliable friends and allies. While the United States from his point of view is rich and powerful and its people energetic and resourceful, its total strength actual and potential, could not cope with our would-be adversaries if they were linked with the Soviet nation. Likewise, Secretary Acheson stressed the fact that the United States is far from self-sufficient in many vital raw materials and is inadequately protected by its geographical location. Its industries which heretofore have been reasonably secure on account of intervening oceans are no longer safe from devastating attacks which could come from gigantic aerial might. These pregnant statements apparently carried considerable weight in political circles at home and abroad. Before long, diplomatic conversations were under way to bring into existence an organization of Western European states that might be willing to accept with the United States certain obligations which were to be unified as far as possible with the United Nations in maintaining peace at home and abroad.

Needless to say, many major policy decisions had to be made by those associated with our new foreign policy. Membership in the organization most assuredly was important, but even more important was the policy decision concerning the exact nature of the mutual guarantees that the contracting parties would have to make. From our point of view, selfish as it may seem, we were interested in erecting a mutual security organization which would assure the peoples of Western Europe against the immediate threat of aggression and at

the same time allay the fears that might impede their economic recovery. At the same time the representatives of our State Department were trying to find a purveyor to carry home to the American people the urgency associated with a wholesome and heartily co-operative spirit with alien peoples and foreign nations in securing for us friends and collaborators in time of need.

With little delay a membership of twelve nations (later increased to fourteen), mostly democracies, was coalesced into NATO and, after protracted negotiations, a charter covering most of the points stressed by Senator Vandenberg and his colleagues was fabricated. In essence the treaty is an engagement for a twenty-one year period during which time the members agreed to settle disputes peacefully if possible and by military action if necessary. The kernel of the Treaty is to be found in the Fifth Article under which the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack on all; that they mutually agree to act collectively under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and will assist to the best of their ability the party or parties under attack by taking forthwith, individually and in concert, such action as is deemed necessary, including the use of armed forces if required.

Upon the release of the Treaty, many Americans and other nationals castigated it most critically as an alliance pure and simple by which the United States would be obligated to extricate its colleagues in Europe on picayunish issues as well as on serious questions. In part this criticism was valid, but in part it was quite wide of the mark. True it is that there is an excellent likelihood that if one member

were attacked at least some of the others would come to its assistance with actual military forces. This is, however, not necessarily the case inasmuch as it is the obligation of a member, in case of attack upon a colleague, to take forthwith "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." It is therefore, entirely conceivable that intervention, other than military action, may be taken which would tend to vitiate or immobilize the adversary.

The vitalization of the Treaty from some points of view appeared Herculean in nature. If states were to be allied for total military protection over a large area, vast quantities of arms would be essential and total aid necessary to assist in the resuscitation and the restoration of badly wrecked allies. Practically speaking, this meant the renewal of a lend lease program by which the United States would attempt to fill the voids, physical or otherwise, which existed. To do this the United States promptly inaugurated the Mutual Defense Assistance Program which was not a part of the Treaty itself, but supplemented it.

Although the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations sought to define with precision the character of the new obligations, events rather than legalisms gave the North Atlantic Treaty its real meaning. The Treaty in letter and in spirit is fully defensive. It is directed against no one, it is directed solely against aggression. Its provisions must be carried out in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of the signatories and they are expressly subordinated to the forces, principles, and provisions of the United Nations Charter. In all cases where this latter document is

applicable, its provisions take precedence in application and control.

If twelve or more states were to be banded together for mutual territorial assistance advanced planning was imperative on how they were to coordinate their armed forces. Tact, diplomacy, and financial concessions tended to mitigate the would-be hurdles, and before long the breath of life was injected into a mutual defense assistance program. With the coming of war in Korea in the early summer of 1950, the fears of Western Europe were intensified and doubt was expressed on the adequacy of the NATO defense arrangements. Probably the Korean war served as a catalyst in negotiating many of the would be hurdles. As a result, agreements were reached on proposals for integrated forces in which each country would make that type of contribution for which it was nationally or industrially best equipped. The unified procedure has tended to provide one composite force of the Army, Navy and Air Force, from which prompt and decisive action could be obtained on a moment's notice.

Just how effective such a force would be in event of Russian aggression is a mootable question, but there is in evidence a deterrent which has accomplished within a few years many things: (a) Of the many achievements toward the ultimate objective, some are tangible and others are intangible. The tangible achievements can be measured in terms of expenditures for defense, production of equipment, and rebuilding of armies. The intangible ones, while somewhat illusory, may be measured to some extent in terms of an improved morale, a wholesome co-operative spirit, and a unity of purpose. Prior to the birth of NATO, the nations of Western Europe were at odds with their neighbors on many issues, political, social, and economic. Politically,

there were wide divergences of views on almost all national and international issues; socially, the divergences were equally great on the subjects of socialism, capitalism, class legislation, and social rights; economically, each state existed for its own benefit, erected trade barriers against its neighbors, and maintained an economy of self-sufficiency if and when possible. Unity of purpose and co-operative spirit among the different nations did not exist. Fear of aggression from the outside and absence of morale on the inside beggared a medium such as NATO to give aid. (b) While the United States has, in a way, underwritten the expenses associated with the vitalization of NATO, the component parts have contributed immeasurably to its success. For example, in 1949 less than five billion dollars were expended by the Western European nations for defense--some six per cent of their gross national production. By 1953 these same nations anticipate a defense expenditure more than double in size. (c) In 1949 when NATO came into existence, the armies of the Western European nations were poorly trained and inadequately equipped. The combat effectiveness was indeed questionable from many points of view. At the moment their army of some fifty or more divisions is well equipped, excellently trained, and eager to execute the composite will of NATO or the United Nations. (d) The very fact that the United States was willing to sign such an alliance proved to the world and above all to any would-be transgressors that it considered Western European friendship vital for freedom and security. (e) If NATO had not come into the picture at the auspicious moment in 1949 to thwart possible Russian aggression and to stimulate unity of action among Western European states,

it is indeed difficult to say what might have happened to a disorganized, disunited, dispirited European family of nations.

While the motives which prompted the formation of NATO are approaching realization, there still remains many ticklish, troublesome issues before the peoples and industries of Europe are synchronized with those of the United States in such a way that would-be aggressors might be stymied in their efforts to provoke international strife. If it is possible for the United States to keep its colleagues in NATO obsessed with the ultimate goal of not only peace in Europe but peace throughout the world through the formation of an organization that could administer condign punishment on a moments notice to non-cooperative states, a great forward stride would be made toward the fulfillment of a dream possessed by many leaders throughout the world for thousands of years.

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APPENDIX "A"

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Source: Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2d Session, June 11, 1948.

APPENDIX "B"

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY TEXT

Preamble

The Parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the

principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North American shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

Article 7

This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements

under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.

Done at Washington, the 4th day of April, 1949.

Source: Department of State - North Atlantic Treaty. Publication 3464, March 1949.

APPENDIX "C"

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATIONAL CHART




Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR)
Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
Organization and Commanders as of 15 Sept. 1952
NATO Allied Command Europe
Flag Officer Central Europe V. Adm. Jaujard
Allied Forces Northern Europe Adm. Brind
Allied Land Forces Central Europe Marshal Juin
Allied Air Forces Central Europe Gen. Norstad
Allied Forces Southern Europe Adm. Carnay
Commander Allied Land Forces Norway
Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark
Commander Allied Air Forces Northern Europe
Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe
Commander Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe
Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe
Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe

APPENDIX "E"

Quantities of major military items shipped by the Services to NATO countries—cumulative totals are shown through December 1952.

Service and Item	Unit of Quantity	Total cumulative through Dec. 1951	Total cumulative through June 1952	Total cumulative through Dec. 1952
Dept. of the Army				
Radio and radar.....	Number	8,990	15,064	36,600
Tank and combat vehicle.....	"	7,310	12,002	18,664
Motor Transport vehicle.....	"	29,875	58,973	98,689
Small arms and machine guns.....	"	670,308	1,098,517	1,407,213
Artillery.....	"	10,808	13,594	20,095
Ammo—Small and machine guns.....	Thousands of rounds	240,000	427,095	496,869,000
Artillery-ammo.....	"	8,143	9,787	10,937,000
Dept. of the Navy				
Vessels.....	Number	316	377	441
Aircraft.....	"	365	464	481
Dept. of the Air Force				
Aircraft.....	"	962	1,175	2,311

Compiled from:

(a) The Mutual Security Program: for a strong and free world. First Report to Congress, December 31, 1951

(b) Second Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program (Supplement) June 30, 1952

(c) The Mutual Security Program: for a strong and free world. Third Report to Congress for the six months ending December 31, 1952

APPENDIX "F"
AID TO NATO COUNTRIES & YUGOSLAVIA
Paid shipments by Commodity Group and Coutry of Distribution
April 1948 - June 30, 1950

(millions of dollars)

Paid Shipments	COUNTRIES OF DISTRIBUTION										
	Belgium and Luxembourg	Den-mark	France	Gre-ece	Italy	Nether-lands	Norway	Port-ugal	Turkey	United Kingdom	Yugo-slavia
Grand total....	529.7	263.3	2,533.5	577.1	1,240.9	977.3	253.5	56.5	221.1	3,175.9	109.2
Commodity break-down											
Food, feed and fertilizer....	147.0	76.9	292.0	292.3	225.2	305.5	85.5	19.0	12.8	874.4	5.0
Fuel.....	61.1	66.6	659.7	25.9	214.6	81.1	37.0	8.4	3.0	359.6	20.8
Raw materials and semi-finished products.	95.1	51.5	719.1	52.2	430.2	58.8	1.0	13.0	-----	1,151.0	53.4
Machinery and vehicles.....	175.6	37.7	463.2	61.3	220.0	150.1	29.0	10.4	77.1	201.7	1.3
Miscellaneous & unclassified...	24.1	19.2	46.0	11.9	9.1	33.7	16.9	-----	4.3	246.9	1.2
Total.....	502.9	251.9	2,180.0	443.5	1,099.0	873.4	227.2	39.7	110.3	2,834.0	86.8

Total paid shipments are less than actual movements because of the time required for receipt and processing of documents requesting payments.

Compiled from:
Second Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program(Supplement) June 30, 1952.

VITA

Ralph A. Brann
candidate for the degree of
Master of Arts

Thesis: THE UNITED STATES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Major: Political Science

Biographical and Other Items:

Born: November 27, 1913 at Palmersville, Tennessee

Undergraduate Study: University of Tennessee Junior College, 1932-1933; Bethel College, 1933-1937

Graduate Study: O. A. M. C. 1951-1953

Experiences: Teaching and coaching 1937-1939; Army Air Corps Flying Training, 1939; Officer, U. S. Army Air Corps, 1939-1947; Officer, U. S. Air Force 1947 to present time.

Member of the Phi Delta Kappa professional Educational fraternity; Phi Alpha Theta, honorary historical society; Pi Gamma Mu, honorary social science society.

Date of Final Examination: November 1953

THESIS TITLE: THE UNITED STATES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ORGANIZATION

AUTHOR: Ralph A. Brann

THESIS ADVISER: Dr. Guy R. Donnell

The content and form have been checked and approved by the author and thesis adviser. The Graduate School Office assumes no responsibility for errors either in form or content. The copies are sent to the bindery just as they are approved by the author and faculty adviser.

TYPIST: Annie Ruth Reddoch