

PUBLIC SCHOOL RESPONSIBILITY IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
A SYNTHESIS BASED UPON AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Chapter | Page |
|---|------|
| I. THE PROBLEM | 1 |
| II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA. . . | 9 |
| III. PRAGMATISM. | 27 |
| Introduction | 27 |
| General Philosophy | 27 |
| Education and Values | 29 |
| Application to Moral Development | 46 |
| IV. REALISM | 53 |
| Introduction | 53 |
| General Philosophy | 53 |
| Education and Values | 55 |
| Application to Moral Development | 61 |
| V. IDEALISM. | 64 |
| Introduction | 64 |
| General Philosophy | 64 |
| Education and Values | 66 |
| Application to Moral Development | 72 |
| VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 77 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY. | 109 |

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

One of the fundamental and practical problems of a society, primitive or advanced, is the transmission of the culture of the society from one generation to another. This transmission, whether it be merely through participation in the society or through a highly formal system of instruction, constitutes a basic function of the educational structure of that society.

Within the history of Western culture from the time of the ancient Greek renaissance to the modern period, it has been recognized that a part, and an important part, of the cultural tradition which is transmitted is comprised of the values, including the moral values, which society has come to esteem as worth realizing or attempting to realize.¹

From its inception the American school has maintained this belief, accepting the basic premise that one of the functions of education is the moral development of the student. In recent years the importance of moral development has been reiterated many times. One of the seven Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education set forth by the National

¹It is questionable whether any society has existed or could exist which did not include provision for the training of its youth in the personal and social moral heritage of the group. The failure of such transfer is often cited as the cause of the downfall and ruin of empires.

Education Association in 1918 was "Ethical Character."² In 1937 the Department of Secondary School Principals of the National Education Association listed as one of the Ten Functions of Secondary Education, "To establish and to develop interests in the major fields of human activity as means to happiness, to social progress, and to continued growth."³ In 1944 the Educational Policies Commission expressed as one of the Imperative Needs of Youth, "All youth need to develop respect for other persons, to grow in their insight into ethical values and principles, and to be able to live and work cooperatively with others."⁴ President Truman's Commission on Higher Education, in its Report of 1947, gave as the first objective of general education, "To develop for the regulation of one's personal and civic life a code of behavior based on ethical principles consistent with democratic ideals."⁵ The work of the Educational Policies Commission for 1950 was primarily concerned with moral and spiritual values in education. In its Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools, the commission gave the following report:

The American people have rightly expected the schools of this country to teach moral and spiritual values. The schools have accepted this responsibility. The men and women who teach in these schools, as responsible members of society, share its system of values. As educators, they are engaged in a vocation that gives a central place to values as guides to conduct--no society can survive without moral order. A system of moral and spiritual values is indispensable to group living. As social structures become more complex, as the welfare of all depends

²Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education, U. S. Office of Education Bulletin No. 35, Washington, D. C., 1918, p. 10.

³Department of Secondary School Principals of the National Education Association, Chicago, 1937, p. 161.

⁴"Education For All American Youth," National Education Association, Washington, D. C., 1944.

⁵"Higher Education for American Democracy," U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1947, Vol. I.

increasingly upon the cooperation of all, the need for common moral principles becomes more imperative. Especially in a society which cherishes the greatest possible degree of individual freedom, the allegiance of the individual to commonly approved moral standards is necessary. No social invention however ingenious, no improvements in government structure however prudent, no enactment of statutes and ordinances however lofty their aims, can produce a good and secure society if personal integrity, honesty, and self-discipline are lacking. . . . Since the ultimate success of a program to develop moral and spiritual values depends largely on the teacher, the institutions which educate teachers should give full recognition to these values in their curricula. . . . School administrators, having placed an emphasis upon character in the selection process, should encourage teachers to use initiative and imagination in the development of their subject matter in ways which teach moral and spiritual values.⁶

The April, 1955, issue of Phi Delta Kappan was devoted almost exclusively to religion in education. The contributors evidenced a concern that the public school contribute to the moral development of the student.

The editor stated:

Emphasis upon individual worth, upon human dignity, upon belief in the improvability of man and in his responsibility for his acts, are all basic tenets in the Christian philosophy. They are also the assumptions and presumptions underlying most educational thought and practice.⁷

He pointed out, however, that the problem of how to translate this awareness of the relation of education and moral and spiritual values "is one of the great problems of educational philosophy, of school administration, and of curriculum construction. It is quite evident that lip service to, and vocal emphasis upon, 'moral and spiritual' values is not enough."⁸

The White House Conference of 1955 concerned itself with six questions. Question number one was, "What should our schools accomplish?"

⁶Educational Policies Commission, Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools, 1951, pps. 3, 4.

⁷Phi Delta Kappan, April, 1955, Editorial, p. 241.

⁸Ibid.

In its general report the following answer was given to the question, "It is the consensus of these groups that the schools should continue to develop . . . ethical behavior based on a sense of moral and spiritual qualities."⁹

It is evident from these statements that there is widespread belief that moral development is an important part of the responsibility of the public school.

During the past two decades cries have arisen from all directions concerning a break-down in the morals of young people. Many people feel that the church is responsible for this break-down, that the burden of guilt should rest upon religious institutions. Other people point to the increasing number of divorces with the subsequent breaking up of home life as the primary contributing factor to the moral laxity of American youth. Still others are convinced that economic conditions are primarily responsible. Then, finally, there are those who point to the American public school system as having failed in assisting the student to develop moral ideas and behavior.

Whether this alleged break-down has in fact occurred, and who or what is responsible if the break-down has occurred, are questions beyond the scope of this study. The relevant point is that there is agreement that one of the functions of the public school is to assist the student in his moral development and that the discharge of this function is important. It is agreed that matters pertaining to morality are important and that the practical programs of the schools and the

⁹As quoted in Better Schools, published by the National Citizens Commission for Public Schools, New York, December 15, 1955, p. 6.

concrete outlines of their curricula should provide for moral development.

The term "moral development" is used here as elsewhere in this study to refer to the process whereby the individual acquires a disposition to live in accordance with accepted principles of social behavior. The purpose of moral development is, at least in part, to exalt and dignify human personality, to protect the rights of others, and to fulfill the common demands of society.

The present study is concerned with the examination of contemporary philosophies of education to ascertain what these philosophies expressly state or imply concerning the responsibility of the public school for the moral development of the student, especially to what extent these philosophies are in agreement upon ends to be sought and upon means to be used. The ultimate purpose is to provide the theoretical foundation for practical and concrete programs of education. Stated in another way, the purpose of this study is to ascertain what representative philosophies of education hold to be the proper function of the public school in the moral development of the student, and how the discharge of this function can best be incorporated into the public school program, with consideration being given to factors of method as well as of content itself.

Direct consideration will be given to three contemporary philosophies of education that represent culminations of three important strands of the developing American tradition; namely, pragmatism, as expressed by John Dewey; realism, as expressed by F. S. Breed; and idealism, as expressed by H. H. Horne. All three philosophies, as will be pointed out more fully in subsequent chapters, are the outgrowth of long developments both without and within the American tradition.

Perhaps idealism, as a distinctive philosophy, extends farthest back in the tradition both in the Western world generally and in America in particular. The main tenets of idealism, broadly conceived, are so deeply rooted in the tradition that they are accepted almost as axioms. Since the days of Josiah Royce, this philosophy has maintained a position of eminence in America. Pragmatism has roots in ideas that extend far into the past, although under its present title it has a much shorter history. It is well known as the foundation of some of the most widely accepted educational beliefs and practices in America today. Realism was influenced by factors of long standing in the tradition, but received its major stimulus in the rise of "scientific" philosophy around the turn of the century. Although both idealism and pragmatism give emphasis to scientific method and content, contemporary realism arose as a direct response to the challenge that science gave to philosophy.

Pragmatism, as expressed by Dewey, is naturalistic, humanistic, and pragmatic. It is naturalistic in that it asserts that nature is inclusive of all reality. It is humanistic in that it holds man to be self-sufficient in his attempt to solve all of his problems, there being no Higher Power upon whom he can depend. It is pragmatic in that it regards the value of a course of action to be determined by its consequences in practice, by its practical consequences. Idealism, as expressed by Horne, is theistic, idealistic, and transcendent. It is theistic in that it esteems God as the "self-conscious unity of all reality."¹⁰ It is idealistic in that it holds the essential reality to be mental.

¹⁰H. H. Horne, The Philosophy of Education (New York, 1930), p. 269.

It is transcendent in that it regards values as having their origin and culmination in God. Realism, as expressed by Breed, is realistic, evolutionistic, and objectivistic. It is realistic in that it considers physical reality to be the fundamental fact of experience. It is evolutionistic in that it holds that the world is a result of evolutionary processes and that man himself is "included among the forces of emergent evolution."¹¹ It is objectivistic in that it regards the truth of a value to be determined by its conformity to or consistency with external reality.

It is not the purpose of this study to investigate actual practices, although practices will occasionally be referred to in order to illustrate the theory which leads to such practices. Nor is this an experimental study, but rather an analysis of educational theories, particularly of the provision these theories make for achieving objectives in the moral development of students in a democracy of the type found in America. This is an analysis designed to show relationships and implications within the philosophies and relationships between philosophies and implications concerning those relationships.

It is impossible to give a clear portrayal of an educational philosophy without making some reference to the philosophy as a whole. Surely a better understanding of the implications of a philosophy in any particular area is made possible through an understanding of the general philosophy of which it is a part. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine in detail the many features of the philosophies

¹¹F. S. Breed, Education and the New Realism (New York, 1939), p. 50.

considered. However, a summary of the features of each of these philosophies that bear most directly upon the subject of moral development will be presented.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA

Although this study is primarily concerned with certain representative contemporary philosophies of education, these philosophies, as was observed in chapter one, are the outgrowth of a long development both without and within the American tradition. Two of them, the idealism of H. H. Horne and the instrumentalism of John Dewey, have their roots deep in the American heritage. The origin of the educational realism of F. S. Breed, while also traceable to earlier positions and influences, was closely associated with the rise of "scientific" philosophy near the close of the nineteenth century.

An understanding of the positions taken by the contemporary philosophers with regard to the subject of moral development is facilitated by an examination of the background from which they came. Such an examination shows the development of the divergent views and the issues which gave rise to the differences. It affords an opportunity to see the developing tradition from its inception to its contemporary culminations.

Also, such a review is helpful in that it shows that the three philosophies do represent the culminations of the development in the present. Since they are not alien to the tradition, but they represent such culminations of it, it is all the more probable that such common core of purpose as may be discovered in these three approaches may prove to be practically useful.

Historically, formal education in colonial America was a product of concern for religion. The first schools and colleges were established primarily to propagate the religious faith of the early settlers and to insure an educated ministry. This religious emphasis continued through much of the nineteenth century. Since in this tradition no sharp distinction was made between education in religion, in morality, and in citizenship, concern for education in religion involved concern for education in morality. It was taken for granted that to be a moral man and a worthy citizen one must be a Christian. Actually morality was considered by the adherents of this tradition as one effect of religion. Moral development was considered as an integral part of Christian nurture.

Formal education in colonial America was patterned after certain educational institutions of Europe. When the religious dissenters came to America their knowledge of schools was largely limited to that of the schools of the countries where they had lived. Consequently, when they established schools the patterns they used were the schools with which they were familiar.

The Puritans of the New England colonies set up a combined form of religious and civil government, and in 1642 and 1647 they adopted legislation that provided that schools be established and that children be taught to read and be given instruction in religion. A form of compulsion was provided, but the compulsion was upon the town, not upon the student or parent.¹ These laws were of special importance, for they represented the first attempt in the English-speaking world by a legislative body of the state to make education compulsory. They also show

¹E. P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (San Francisco, 1919), p. 17.

the extent to which religion and politics were conceived as related.

This point is made very clearly by Charles and Mary Beard:

The fact that the education was ordered by 'the state' was of no special significance, for the state and church were one in Massachusetts at the time; indeed, if the Mathers were to be believed, the church was superior to the state.

At all events no person who was not a member of a Puritan congregation could vote in Massachusetts until the English crown broke down the barrier in the charter of 1691; and the teachers chosen under the school system established by the law were as orthodox as those selected for sectarian schools supported by the fees and contributions of the faithful or for the charity schools maintained by gifts from the devout.²

Another educational concept inherited from Europe was the parochial-school attitude, which was well represented in Pennsylvania.³ In that state no one sect was in the majority, so each denomination was responsible for setting up its own private schools. Usually the school would be in a town where the particular church was established and would be set up and carried on as a part of the work of the church. The state did not interfere with educational matters and left complete jurisdiction to the parochial or private school. There was no appeal to the state.

The southern colonies followed still another European pattern, the pauper-school idea. According to the plan followed, the state exerted no direct influence upon or interference with these schools. Since the southern colonies had been settled primarily by people who were more interested in successful business ventures than in religious freedom, there was no strong religious motive to establish either public or private schools. Consequently, in most cases the education was left up to the

²Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York, 1933), Vol. I,

³Cubberley, p. 20.

parents. The usual choices made were (1) to hire a private tutor, (2) to select an expensive "pay" school, or (3) to send their children to the mother country.⁴ Provision was made, however, for apprenticeship training, and a few pauper schools for the children of the poorer classes were established. The church did not give special attention to education in the southern colonies, nor was education considered to be the business of the state. Consequently this English charity-school came to dominate such formal education as was provided.

However, since the religious fervor of the New England colonists penetrated to most of the other states, the Calvinistic attitude toward education came to be the most widely accepted American conception, and the private schools and pauper schools were subordinated to it.⁵ Education was primarily an instrument of religion, and this religious basis for education was firmly fixed in the early American mind. In fact, the school teacher was often expected to attend to his duties and to perform those of the minister as well. The following quotation from Richard Boone calls attention to this fact:

It has frequently happened that the services performed and the wages received by the common-school teacher have been sadly disproportioned. Concerning the former it is interesting to note the functions of the teacher in the early colonial period. He was usually, both in New England and in the middle colonies, clerk of the town, chorister of the church, and official visitor of the sick. Indeed, far into the last century, the teacher was scarcely differentiated from the preacher. The Rev. Gideon Sheets, when engaged as minister at Rensselaerwich, New York, was required among other duties 'to bring up the heathen and their children in the Christian religion; to teach the catechism; and to pay attention also to the office of schoolmaster for old and young.' The following extract from the 'Town Book,' indicates the manifold duties of a New England schoolmaster of 1661: 1. To act as court messenger; 2. To serve summonses; 3. To conduct certain ceremonial services of the church;

⁴Ibid., pp. 21-23.

⁵"Education," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1952), VII, pp. 991-992.

4. To lead the Sunday choir; 5. To ring the bell for public worship; 6. To dig the graves; 7. To take charge of the school; 8. To perform other occasional duties.⁶

The religious emphasis in the early school in the colonies was still more evident in the type of instruction and textbooks that were used. The pupils were taught to read the Word of God, the catechism, and perhaps some documents that were peculiar to the different sects. The "Hornbook" was the first device prepared for teaching the pupils to read. This was a small wooden paddle upon which had been pasted a single sheet of paper which contained the alphabet in both small and capital letters, the Christian invocation, and the Lord's prayer.

The Hornbook was replaced about 1690 by the famous schoolbook that was in general use for the next century and a quarter, The New England Primer. P. L. Ford in his New England Primer characterizes it as follows:

As one glances over what may truly be called 'The Little Bible of New England,' and reads its stern lessons, the Puritan mood is caught with absolute faithfulness. Here was no easy road to knowledge and salvation; but with prose as bare of beauty as the whitewash of their churches, with poetry as rough and stern as their storm-torn coast, with pictures as crude and unfinished as their own glacial-smoothed boulders, between stiff oak covers which symbolized the contents, the children were tutored, until, from being unregenerate, and as Jonathan Edwards said, 'young vipers, and infinitely more hateful than vipers' to God, they attained that happy state when, as expressed by Judge Sewell's child, they were afraid that they 'should go to hell,' and were 'stirred up dreadfully to seek God.' God was made sterner and more cruel than any living judge, that all might be brought to realize how slight a chance even the least erring had of escaping eternal damnation.⁷

The students who studied this Primer learned to read chiefly that they might be able to read the Bible, the Catechism, and other religious material. For the Primer was religious throughout. The pupils were

⁶Richard G. Boone, Education in the United States (New York, 1901), p. 12.

⁷P. L. Ford, New England Primer (New York, 1899), p. 45.

not likely to be ignorant of religious teaching with the Primer as a text. Cubberley describes some of its contents in this manner:

Each copy contained on its first leaf a rude woodcut of the ruling monarch, and later of some Revolutionary hero, and a page of Proverbs relating to filial duty and serving God. Sometimes a religious poem was printed for the letter. . . . Two and a half pages contain Watt's beautiful 'Cradle Hymn,' beginning

'Hush, My dear, lie still and slumber
Holy Angels guard thy bed.'

This is followed by three and a half pages of Verses for Children, and four pages of rhymed prayers and admonitions, among which one finds the old familiar

'Now I lay me down to sleep.'

. . . Next comes a page of 'Instructive Questions and Answers,' of which the following are illustrative:

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| Who was the first man? | Adam |
| Who was the first woman? | Eve |
| Who was the first murderer? | Cain |
| Who was the first martyr? | Abel |
| Who was the first translated? | Enoch |
| Who was the oldest man? | Methuselah |
| Who built the Ark? | Noah ⁸ |

Thus, the New England Primer spread its influence for religion and morals into almost every home in the American colonies. It has been said of this book that "it taught millions to read, and not one to sin." The fact that there were over three million copies of the Primer sold indicates its popularity and influence.

It is evident that the motive in the establishment and preservation of the first schools in New England and New York was religious. There seemed to be no doubt in the minds of the men who established these schools as to the purpose of the education of the young. Not only was the instructor expected to be a religious man, but the type of instruction,

⁸E. P. Cubberley, The History of Education (Boston, 1920), p. 374.

and the textbooks themselves were all centered around acquainting the student with a knowledge of God, the way of salvation, and how to escape the "old deluder, Satan." The teaching of principles of religion and morality was not incidental to the study, but was the study itself.

Another factor characteristic of European education was important in the development of the American tradition. It is commonly referred to by the historians as the "class system." According to the class system, educational privileges were limited largely to the higher classes, and such education as was provided for the lower classes was designed to produce an appropriate respect for the higher classes and the values they esteemed. The existence of a class system has an important bearing upon the moral values esteemed and consequently upon the aims of education. No less important was the reaction against this system that later became part of the developing tradition.

But this transplanted class system did not have the same meaning in its new environment as it had had in Europe. In the new and developing civilization of the American colonies, old class distinctions lost their meaning. In the new economy what class distinctions did exist were far from the rigid barriers common in Europe. One of the first blows struck for the new world equality came in Bacon's Rebellion of 1676. This rebellion had begun "as a thoroughly justified assertion of the rights of small farmers, laborers, and frontiersmen to protection against the savages and to fair political and financial treatment."⁹

One factor in the development of the distinctive American nationality was a new people, "an amalgamation of different national

⁹A. Nevins and H. S. Commager, A Short History of the United States (New York, 1945), p. 20.

stocks."¹⁰ Because of this amalgamation, by 1775 a distinctively American society was emerging, with its own social, political, and economic traits.¹¹

Class lines did exist, but they could be crossed. Indentured servants, at first unknown, became common in the eighteenth century in New England, but they found it easy to attain independence, and slavery declined.¹² In no part of the world did the common people show a stronger self-respect. The atmosphere of America at the close of the eighteenth century is well summarized in the following quotation:

. . . America was a fertile soil for doctrines of a republican or quasi-republican character. The population for a century and a half had been living in an atmosphere of democracy or 'leveling.' Economic differences were few; economic opportunity was equally open to all. What aristocracy did exist simply stimulated the growth of democratic principles. There was a little seaboard class or clique which held most of the wealth, . . . (and) the political power, and against this the rising democracy of the interior conducted a long struggle. . . . They did so in the generation before the Revolution with an energy which shocked their superiors, and the same spirit contributed to their revolutionary zeal against the mother country.¹³

Such changing social and economic conditions had a profound effect upon the whole realm of values, and accordingly upon educational aims and practices. For example, during the last half of the eighteenth century most of the colleges became more democratic in the admission of students. In his summary of colonial colleges, 1636-1776, Eby says, Harvard and Yale gave up the policy of listing their students according to the social status of the father. Sectarian requirements were gradually abolished. King's College, from its establishment in 1754, was liberally disposed; Brown University, founded in 1764 by Baptists, had the following in its charter:

¹⁰Ibid., p. 28.

¹¹Ibid., p. 28.

¹²Ibid., pp. 38-39.

¹³Ibid., p. 79.

Into this Liberal and Catholic Institution shall never be admitted any religious Tests but on the contrary all the Members hereof shall forever enjoy full free Absolute and uninterrupted Liberty of Conscience.¹⁴

It is well to point out, however, insofar as that education in religion was discontinued, it was discontinued not so much because of positive theory, but because members of the sects were unwilling to have beliefs other than their own taught. This sectarian controversy tended to promote the separation of public education from religious control. Such a basically different theory became a part of the developing American tradition. As subsequent events show, religion did not remain the dominant motive in American public education.

The demand for free public schools grew with the rising tide of democracy. However, the upper and middle class people took the lead to provide schools for the lower class. It was not until far into the nineteenth century that anything like a mass or popular movement on the part of the lower classes began. Persons in positions of prominence who were motivated by Christian idealism or by philanthropic purposes came to see that democratic self-government required an educated people. Governor George Clinton of New York remarked in 1782:

It is the peculiar duty of the government of a free state where the highest employments are open to citizens of every rank to endeavor by the establishment of schools and seminaries to diffuse that degree of literature which is necessary to the establishment of public trust.¹⁵

In 1805 the mayor of New York City, DeWitt Clinton, organized the Free School Society to provide free schools for the poor children of that city who did not receive instruction from the churches. In 1837

¹⁴Frederick Eby, The Development of Modern Education (New York, 1952), p. 403.

¹⁵Nepons and Cornagor, p. 114.

Horace Mann was elected Secretary of the Massachusetts State School Board. An eloquent speaker, he waged an unceasing fight for the common schools and for the elimination of the teaching of religion in the public schools.¹⁶

Thus, the issues in the developing tradition began to give rise to different views which in turn gave rise to differences in basic dispositions concerning educational philosophy. This is especially seen in the educational philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, which differed from the early American concept, but which is extended in more recently developed philosophies.

Perhaps the greatest early impetus to a changing concept in educational theory and practice was that provided by Thomas Jefferson, who favored state support of public schools. His confidence in the ability of the common man is seen in his statement that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." But in order to vote and to participate in public affairs intelligently, the masses should be able to read and write. In 1816 Jefferson wrote,

If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization it expects what never was and never will be. . . . There is no safe deposit (for the functions of government), but with the people themselves; nor can they be safe with them without information.¹⁷

Jefferson believed that men's liberties could be safeguarded, the arts and sciences could flourish, and that the mind of man is free to advance knowledge only in an environment where men are free from "religious dictation, political tyranny, and personal oppression."

Jefferson's strong feeling concerning religious dictation, and the

¹⁶Eby, pps. 552, 554.

¹⁷Gubberly, Public Education in the United States, p. 57.

effect of that position upon the American political and educational structure can hardly be overemphasized. The state and the public educational system, he declared, should be secular in structure and completely divorced from religious control.¹⁸

The cry of the sectarian opposition was that such an educational system would produce immorality and religious laxity. To this charge Jefferson answers in a letter to Edward Coles on August 25, 1814:

The creator would indeed have been a bungling artist had he intended man for a social animal, without planting in him social dispositions. It is true that they are not planted in every man . . . but it is false reasoning which converts exceptions into general rules. Some men are born without organs of sight, or of hearing, or without hands. Yet it is wrong to say that man is born without these faculties.

The want or imperfection of the moral senses . . . is no proof that it is not a general characteristic of the species. When it is wanting we endeavor to supply the defect by education, by appeals to reason and by calculation, by presenting to the being so unhappily conformed, other motives to do good and reject evil, such as love or hatred, or rejection of those among whom he lives and whose society is necessary to his happiness and . . . existence. . . . These are correctives which are supplied by education.¹⁹

Although the development of the separation theory was important in the elimination of sectarian control of education, the practice of separation was promoted by the mere fact that church-supported schools had not been able to meet the demands of a growing nation. For one thing, the curriculum of the sectarian school was too narrow to satisfy the ever-widening cultural and vocational interests of the people. Also the very fact that the number of religious sects was large, and

¹⁸It perhaps should be noted that Jefferson was primarily concerned with establishing public schools free of sectarian control, not the exclusion of all religious instruction. One of his proposed divisions for the University of Virginia was a department of theology.

¹⁹A. Koch and W. Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Jefferson (New York, 1944), p. 641.

that they failed to find a satisfactory basis for cooperation was important. Each attempted to maintain competing educational institutions in what proved to be a futile effort. Still, the belief that the school has a responsibility for teaching religion and morals did not altogether disappear.

The public schools grew with the growing nation. Although public schools had a difficult time at the outset in overcoming established custom, and although there was a conspicuous lack of finances and of educational leadership, gradually the various sorts of obstacles were overcome. Perhaps one of the greatest factors in the overcoming of obstacles was the agitation of educational leaders for legislation and support of public schools. Massachusetts took the lead in setting up reforms in its school system, and other states followed the example and instituted needed legislation.

As the opening of new territories pushed the frontier further west during the nineteenth century, as transportation and communication became more advanced, and as the rise of nationalism gave an impetus to the spirit of democracy, there was a growing concern for free, public education. Eventually this concern, although originating among the leaders, religious and secular, was accepted by the lower classes themselves. Sentiment favoring democracy and public education went hand in hand.

In the West, moreover, political equality was taken for granted. Every adult white male there was eligible to vote and to hold office. . . . The West liked a direct form of democracy. . . . The great new democratic wave which rose to flood tide in Jackson's day reached much higher levels than Jeffersonian democracy had touched.²⁰

Further, "In education a tremendous battle was being fought for free

²⁰ Nevins and Commager, p. 185.

public schools, nonsectarian, publicly controlled, and tax-supported."²¹ Religious and political leaders alike felt the necessity of an educational program that included provision for training in citizenship and social responsibility. The idea was accepted that democracy, the great experiment in America, could succeed only if the people were informed and could act intelligently on matters that concerned the common good. It seemed more and more obvious to those who were in positions of influence that the public schools should share with other agencies responsibility for providing for the preservation of the moral basis of social life. Gradually this enlarged responsibility came to be accepted by the masses of people. As new subjects were introduced, changes were made in administration, more adequate methods of financing were adopted, and eventually the public school as an agency for teaching the values upon which consensus exist, acquired a stable place in the minds of the people. Therefore, with all of its changes, the developing tradition continued to place responsibility upon the school for training in moral development. The concept of how that training should be implemented, and even of what the content of the training should be has remained, however, a matter of serious dispute.

At least three different basic dispositions emerged from the developing American tradition. Each had its own emphasis with respect both to purpose and method of education. The long-established tradition of theism continued through the nineteenth century, and is, of course, prominent today. It became increasingly the champion of the liberal education tradition and was expressed in terms of idealist philosophy.

²¹Ibid., pp. 189-190.

It represented a continuation of the early concern for religion and for training in morality.

Evidence of the vitality of the belief that religion forms a necessary basis of morality is rather overwhelming. For example, during the post-Civil War period, when certain secularist tendencies were also developing, the rate of church membership to the total population increased.²² During the seventies, President Laurens Hickok of Union College wrote two monumental works, Humanity Immortal and the Logic of Reason, which were widely welcomed by scholars as able defenses of theism. It was during this period, also, that Dwight L. Moody gained his national reputation as an evangelist and that the Salvation Army acquired prominence under the leadership of General Booth. Closely allied with evangelicism was "the widespread and emphatic insistence on divine sanction for traditional Christian piety and morals."²³ Supernatural doctrines were well-rooted among young people. Evidence of this may be found in various sources, among them in the work of Earl Barnes, a child psychologist, who submitted a questionnaire to a thousand California children in the early 1890's which showed that the children pictured God as "a tall white-haired old man, generally benevolent but quite capable of provoking an earthquake at will; Heaven as a place of golden streets. . .; and the devil as the horned and tailed creature of ancient lore."²⁴

Thus, although Theism was being challenged by new philosophies as it had never before been challenged in America, it would be a mistake to

²²Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York, 1943), p. 533.

²³Ibid., p. 534.

²⁴Ibid., p. 535.

consider it as lacking widespread acceptance by the American people. In fact, it continues to the present to be one of the most vigorously defended interpretations of human experience.

A second disposition which emerged from the American heritage, at least partly as an effect of the pioneer conditions of frontier life, was the pragmatic tradition with its emphasis upon dealing successfully with immediate practical difficulties as the embracing purpose of education. This philosophy was promoted by certain interpretations of the developing science of psychology, which in the late nineteenth century began to study the psychological basis of human behavior in as objective a manner as conditions would permit. Through the contributions of such men as Chauncey Wright, who explained self-consciousness as an adaption of existing powers to new uses, G. Stanley Hall, James Baldwin, and E. L. Thorndike, developed the conception of mind as a function of the adjustment of the organism to its environment.²⁵ In 1878, Charles S. Peirce declared that the test for the clarity of ideas was "the relation between these ideas and their practical consequences in action."²⁶ Although such theories were congenial to widely differing philosophies of education, they were used extensively to support the growing concern for a practical emphasis in education. This emphasis culminated in the philosophy known as pragmatism, experimentalism, or instrumentalism, a philosophy that is closely associated with progressivism in education. Another factor that greatly influenced the development of pragmatism as a philosophy was evolution, or, more precisely, certain interpretations of evolution. The regard of man as the product of a

²⁵Ibid., p. 557.

²⁶Ibid., p. 557.

process of development was radically different from the view of man as the creature of a divine Being. In America, although other philosophies were affected by evolutionism, pragmatism became the philosophy of evolutionism.

A third disposition which emerged during the past century was reflective chiefly of the emphasis upon the rapidly developing tradition of science. This interpretation either asserts or implies that the really important concerns of man are those that pertain to the world of nature. Curti, in describing the progress of natural science in the latter part of the nineteenth century says:

It [science] was no longer the concern of learned men and the cultivated few; the life of the common people increasingly provided science with new problems, and common people even helped to solve them. The rapid progress in science was partly the result of the awakening of the people in the ordinary walks of life, and it was also one of the causes of this awakening.²⁷

In the late 1860's Max Meisel prepared a Bibliography of American Natural History, which contains an important list of the titles of scientific publications up through the year 1865. This work provides an impressive testimony both of the interest in science and of the extent of the development of science in America up to that time. Natural history societies and other learned scientific organizations had their full quota of members. The American Journal of Science was recognized as one of the great scientific journals of the world. These and other evidences point to the fact that a basic disposition was developing with emphasis upon the world of nature, a nature that could be comprehended by man and controlled to ameliorate the conditions of living of man.

What is especially important with respect to the problem of

²⁷Ibid., p. 318.

present inquiry is not so much the fact that science and the practical benefits of science were becoming increasingly evident in American society, but that the presence of science was affecting the philosophical thinking of scholars and the attitudes of people generally. Though other philosophies show the influence of science, were affected by science, a philosophy was expounded that was specifically designed to provide a "scientific interpretation" of human experience. This philosophy is that described in this work as "realism." Such realism, it is important to note, is to be distinguished from classical and medieval realism with which it has little in common.

With the development of divergent dispositions and divergent educational philosophies, with widely different views on many aspects of education, there has remained in them all the recognition of the school's function in the moral development of the student. As was pointed out in chapter one, educational leaders of the present century include as one of the functions of the public school the moral development of the student. The fundamental hypothesis of this study is that although important differences exist among contemporary American philosophies of education, important agreement also exists among these philosophies concerning the responsibility of the public school for the moral development of the student.

A philosophy of education that represents the main current of the religious tradition in America is well expressed in the modern idealism of H. H. Horne. Basic to this educational philosophy is a general philosophy that is theistic and that asserts that values are transcendental in origin, and permanent in character. The philosophy is further in keeping with the tradition in that it holds that direct

moral instruction may be effective. Another contemporary American philosophy of education, that of John Dewey, represents more clearly the secularist strand of the tradition. It is a secularist philosophy in the sense that its values are derived from naturalistic presuppositions, and are relative. This philosophy is favorable to moral instruction, but holds that such instruction is effective only when undertaken by indirect methods. A third philosophy, that of Frederick Breed, somewhat mediates these two approaches, finding values socially and empirically verified, but regarding such verification, if and when it occurs, as evidence of their objectivity. Breed's emphasis upon science is as great as Dewey's, but his conclusions, in many respects, are more nearly like Horne's. These three philosophies, each representative of different strands of the developing American tradition, will be analyzed in the next three chapters in an effort to ascertain what agreement exists among them concerning the responsibility of the public school for moral development.

It has been found that the developing American tradition culminates in three types of educational philosophy. Since these three philosophies do represent such a culmination it is all the more probable that such common core of purpose as may be discovered in these three approaches may prove to be practically useful. They are not theories only, but theories representative of developing strands of types of practice.

CHAPTER III

PRAGMATISM

Introduction

In chapter one it was stated that one strand of the American tradition was developed by John Dewey. This strand included certain features of the Jeffersonian educational philosophy, but still more clearly the growing secularist emphasis. Pragmatism should be considered as a development or extension of that tradition. Jefferson believed in a "philosophy of the act," which was similar to the pragmatic theory of acting upon a belief and the value of the belief determined by consequences, which was also similar. This concept resembles certain features of pragmatism, but is hardly the same as the pragmatism of Dewey. Jefferson's insistence upon the secular nature of the school is fully accepted by Dewey. Also, both Jefferson and Dewey emphasize reason or intellect as the essence of man. However, Deweyan philosophy of education is properly thought of as a development of earlier philosophies rather than a re-statement of any of them.

General Philosophy

Dewey holds to an evolutionary theory of mind and intelligence, to the belief that mind and intelligence have resulted from the interplay of the factors of variation and natural selection. He holds that as man has been confronted with the practical problems of every day

experience, he has used his mind as a tool in solving those problems. He uses the term "mind" broadly to include not only thinking but feeling and willing as well. He believes that man utilizes his mental powers in attempting to control his environment, that by perceiving, remembering, and reasoning about objects and situations, man is able to increase his ability to avoid pain or to acquire satisfaction. He holds that experience is the source of knowledge and that the experimental method is "the method of both discovery and proof."¹

Dewey believes that all the knowledge man acquires and all the insights he has are the results of a process that occurs within nature. He believes that nature is inclusive of all reality, that, therefore, a proper explanation can be made in regard to all elements of existence without reference to the supernatural.

This naturalism of Dewey's leads to his humanism. His philosophy is humanistic in that it considers man as being self-sufficient in his attempt to solve all of his problems. Not only must man rely on his own intelligence and reason, since there is no Higher Power upon whom to depend, but man's concerns are for his own welfare and the welfare of the society of which he is a part.

Dewey's philosophy is pragmatic in that he conceives of truth and value as being relative to each particular situation, as being determined by the consequences which arise from a course of action. Such consequences are always pragmatic in the sense that they are consequences in practice; they are practical consequences.

The degree of reliability of knowledge, according to Dewey,

¹John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York, 1935), p. 393.

depends upon the way in which particular experiences are organized. Science, he believes, provides the most reliable kind of knowledge, since science "is the kind of organization effected by adequate methods of tested discovery."² Dewey recognizes five distinct steps which constitute reflective thought as the scientific method to knowledge. They are: (1) a felt need, a consciousness of a problem; (2) a brooding of the mind until the problem has come into focus; (3) a consideration of the possible courses of action; (4) the consideration of the consequences of each course of action, and the selection of the course which will bring the most satisfying results; and (5) the testing of the alternative selected by overt action.³ Thus, mind serves a functional purpose in utilizing past experience and knowledge for the solution of the immediate problem.

Education and Values

This naturalistic, evolutionist, and pragmatic theory of knowledge forms the basis of Dewey's theory of value and of education. He says that "life is development, and that developing, growing is life."⁴ He believes that process is all-important, that no static result is good in itself; but that what is good arises within the process, that simply continuing to grow has a value in giving rise to values. Since Dewey regards growth as life, in holding that education is growth, he concludes that education is life.

²Ibid., p. 223.

³John Dewey, How We Think (Boston, 1910), p. 107.

⁴Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 59.

Thus his interpretation of evolution is essentially the same as his interpretation of growth, and underlies both his conception of value and his conception of education. He believes that it is the task of education to develop every individual as fully as possible, that "the aim of education is development of individuals to the utmost of their potentialities."⁵ He focuses attention upon the individual members of the class, and stresses the importance of consideration of individual differences. Dewey believes that taking into account the diversity of capacities of human beings, and providing for the growth of individuals is more desirable than trying to make all students fit into the same mold. Thus, he believes not only that the growth process has no end beyond itself, but that the individuals involved in the growth process are ends, though they are also means in the ongoing ends-means continuum. Thus Dewey exhibits a respect for the individual child which involves a commitment to the moral value of the dignity of human personality.

Dewey believes that the development of the individual and his potentialities is not for the individual's sake alone, but also for the sake of society: "The end of education is social. The acquisition of skills is not an end in itself. They are things to be put to use, and use is their contribution to a common and shared life."⁶

From the pragmatic standpoint, education is growth through participation in social experiences, and has no end beyond continued growth: "The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end."⁷ But Dewey says that the kinds of experiences which the student has

⁵John Dewey, Education Today (New York, 1940), p. 297.

⁶Ibid., p. 296.

⁷Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 59.

determine the character of the growth of the individual, and that it is important, therefore, that the educator give special attention to the kinds of experiences. Dewey says:

There is one permanent frame of reference; namely, the organic connection between education and personal experience; or that the . . . philosophy of education is committed to some kind of empirical and experimental philosophy.

. . . (However) the belief that all genuine education comes about through experience does not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative. Experience and education cannot be directly equated to each other. For some experiences are mis-educative. Any experience is mis-educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience.⁸

Dewey insists that genuine education must provide growth for the pupil through social experiences, through individual development, through social participation, and through present interests.⁹ One implication of the concept that education has no end beyond itself is that it does not exist for the purpose of preparing the student for future responsibilities, but is to enable the student to grow in individual capacities to deal with situations, to solve problems as they are encountered. Dewey makes much of the problem-solving ability of the student. Since he believes in an evolutionary process which implies change and novelty, the individual is to be prepared to act when confronted with the unfamiliar. Dewey believes the intellect should be trained to use the familiar in dealing with the unfamiliar, thus the student is equipped to solve new problems as they arise. Such training, or growth, he believes, develops skills which will assist the student in his moral development.¹⁰

⁸John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York, 1938), pp. 12-13.

⁹Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 13-14.

Dewey believes not only that the kinds of experiences which a student has determine the character of the student's growth, but that it is important to distinguish between two aspects of the quality of experience which the student has: (1) the immediate aspect of agreeableness or disagreeableness, and (2) the influence the present experience has upon later experience.¹¹ The former aspect is easy to observe and judge, he says, but the latter is more difficult. He amplifies upon this point as follows:

The effect of an experience is not borne on its face. It sets a problem to the educator. It is his business to arrange for the kind of experience which, while they do not repel the student, but rather engage his activities are, nevertheless, more than immediately enjoyable since they promote having desirable future experiences. Just as no man lives or dies to himself, so no experience lives and dies to itself. Wholly independent of desire or intent, every experience lives on in future experiences. Hence the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences.¹²

Dewey points out that education is a development "of, by, and for" experience.¹³ Included in this conception of experience is that of the "experiential continuum."¹⁴ This idea of continuity basically rests upon the fact of the characteristic of habit, when habit is interpreted biologically.¹⁵ For every experience, Dewey says, modifies the one who has the experience, and this modification affects the quality of subsequent experiences. Because of this continuity of experience, Dewey believes it necessary to make a distinction between types of experiences.

¹¹Ibid., p. 16.

¹²Ibid., pp. 16-17.

¹³Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 26.

Since growth is an exemplification of continuity, growth may take the wrong direction. And since this growth includes the development of a social consciousness, i.e. a sympathy and responsiveness to others, it is the concern of the school that the growth be in the proper direction.¹⁶ Dewey answers an objection that is made to education as growth through the use of the illustration of a man who is making a career out of burglary and will grow in this direction until he becomes an expert burglar. Dewey raises the question of whether growth in this direction promotes or retards growth in general. He asks:

Does this form of growth create conditions for further growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing growth in new directions? What is the effect of growth in a special direction upon the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other lines? I shall leave you to answer these questions, saying simply that when and only when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing.¹⁷

Thus, continuity is one method of discrimination between experiences.

It becomes the duty of the adult, who has had a wider variety of experiences than the young, to evaluate the experiences of the young, says Dewey.¹⁸ In fact, he believes it is the business of the educator to be on the alert to see what attitudes are being nurtured, and what tendencies are being developed. The educator should, according to Dewey, be able to judge what attitudes and tendencies are actually conducive to growth in the proper direction and what are detrimental.¹⁹

¹⁶Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 31-32.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 33.

In the discrimination of experiences, Dewey is not content with selecting only those that change the individual and create attitudes for growth in the proper direction, but also those in which the experience changes in some degree the objective conditions under which the experience occurs.²⁰ "We live," he says, "from birth to death in a world of persons and things which in large measure is what it is because of what has been done and transmitted from previous human activities." And he observes that "when this fact is ignored, experience is treated as if it were something which goes on exclusively inside an individual's body and mind."²¹

Dewey is interested in the quality of the experiences which the student has, for the quality determines the direction of growth of the student. Objective conditions, he holds, are important to the quality of the experience, for there is an "interaction" between the subjective and objective in each experience:

Life activities flourish and fail only in connection with changes of the environment. . . . They afford convincing evidence that changes in things are not alien to the activities of a self, and that the career and welfare of the self are bound up with the movement of persons and things.²²

In this interplay between the inner and outer in experience equal rights are assigned to both factors.

Continuity and interaction in their active union with each other provide the measure of the educative significance and value of an experience. The immediate and direct concern of an educator is then with the situations in which the interactions take place. The individual, who enters as a factor into it, is what he is at a given time. It is

²⁰Ibid., p. 34.

²¹Ibid., p. 34.

²²Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 147-148.

the other factor, that of objective conditions, which lies to some extent within the possibility of regulation by the educator.²³

Thus, the school provides objective conditions which are conducive to proper growth of individuals.

Dewey gives considerable attention to the importance of social control as a factor in experience. For an individual cannot be regarded, according to Dewey, as a being apart from society. As an individual appropriates the attitudes and purposes of the society about him, society reproduces its attitudes and purposes. Since man is a social creature, Dewey holds that each person must consider the good of the whole. Social control is necessary for the continuance of society. Much control, however, he believes, involves no restriction upon personal freedom that hampers growth.²⁴ For example, he says that when children play, their games involve rules and these rules determine their conduct. For if they had no rules, there would be no game. The rules are part of the game. And as long as they are playing the game, they do not feel that some outside imposition has been forced upon them by observing the rules. And, further, if one of the participants feels that some decision is not fair, he may get angry. But it is not the rule to which he is objecting, but a violation of the rule.

The general conclusion I would draw is that control of individual actions is affected by the whole situation in which individuals are involved, in which they share and of which they are co-operative or interacting parts. Even in a competitive game there is a certain kind of participation, of sharing in a common experience. Stated the other way around, those who take part do not feel that they are bossed by an individual person or are being subjected to the will of some outside superior person. When violent disputes do arise, it is usually on the alleged ground that the umpire or some person on the other side is being unfair;

²³Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 43.

²⁴Ibid., p. 56.

in other words, that in such cases some individual is trying to impose his individual will on someone else.²⁵

In such a way as this, the school upholds its belief in the dignity and worth of the individual, and at the same time shows him that he is to be a participating and contributing member of social groups.

There are times, although seldom, according to Dewey, when the authority of the mature adult must intervene and exercise direct control. In the case of the teacher, not only are the times when such authority is to be executed to be reduced to a minimum, but it is always done in behalf of the interest of the group, never as an exhibition of personal power.²⁶ The conclusion Dewey reaches is that "The primary source of social control resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all feel a responsibility."²⁷

Dewey has often been censured for his views on control, for the alternative to control superficially suggests almost unlimited freedom. It is obvious from what has been said, however, that Dewey does not mean by "freedom" absolutely unrestricted action. Scherich points out that it is clear that whether society should exert control is no question in the Dewey philosophy. The questions are only as to how control should be exerted, what limitations should be placed upon it, and where sovereignty should reside.²⁸

Dewey's main point is that the control should be exerted by the group of which the individual is a part and recognizes himself to be a part.

Positively, concerning the subject of freedom, Dewey says that

²⁵Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 57.

²⁶Ibid., p. 59.

²⁷Ibid., p. 61.

²⁸Millard Scherich, An Educational Philosophy of Reconciliation. Privately published.

mental activity finds more fertile ground for developing in a situation where there is physical freedom. Where physical activity is stifled, he believes, intellectual activity is more likely to be stifled. Furthermore, he argues that in a schoolroom atmosphere where quiet is enforced the teacher is less likely to gain a knowledge of the real natures of the students.²⁹ Not only so, but such a restriction upon individual freedom he believes is superficial, not the kind of thing found in real-life experience which will belong to the student outside the classroom. Therefore, Dewey concludes that physical freedom is a means to an end, namely, intellectual freedom:

For freedom from restriction, the negative side, is to be prized only as a means to a freedom which is power; power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation.³⁰

As the student is granted freedom for his experiences, his interest in the experiences will help determine the educative value of them. For interest will cause the student to put forth whatever effort is necessary in pursuit of any goal. He will overcome obstacles in the classroom as well as outside of it. Dewey believes that certain activities are interesting because they appeal to natural, biological, and social tendencies. These tendencies are a part of the individual, and he accepts them as he accepts all attempts for natural satisfactions. The school then should capitalize upon this interest, for if studies are so arranged as to appeal to natural interests, the student will voluntarily put forth enough effort to overcome natural obstacles without the

²⁹Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 70.

³⁰Ibid., p. 74.

necessity of appealing to duty.³¹ Such work does not have the appearance of work, but rather assumes the aspect of play. Dewey would have the student play at his work and work at his play:

Play is not to be identified with anything which the child externally does. It rather designates his mental attitude in its entirety and in its unity. It is the free play, the interplay, of all the child's powers, thoughts, and physical movements, in embodying, in a satisfying form, his own images and interests.³²

The relationship is generally clear between what an educator holds to be valuable and what he considers to be the objectives of education. Since Dewey is interested in pupil growth and in freedom which aids growth, he holds that there is a relationship between value and the direction of conduct which growth produces. For a thing is valuable when it gives direction to conduct. The proper basis for judgment of values is that of consequences. That is, a thing is valuable if it produces consequences that lead in the direction of some positive good.

The pragmatist holds that value, like truth and knowledge, is relative. He also holds that empirically grounded propositions about valuation are possible. "Such propositions," he says, are "grounded in the degree in which they employ scientific physical generalizations as means of forming propositions about activities which are correlated as ends-means."³³ Dewey makes a distinction between value as "good" and as "right." About this, he says,

. . . value in the sense of 'good' is inherently connected with that which promotes, furthers, assists, a course of activity, and value in the sense of 'right' is inherently connected with that which is needed, required, in the maintenance of a course of activity.³⁴

³¹Ibid., p. 77.

³²Ibid., p. 78.

³³Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 123.

³⁴Ibid., p. 125.

In other words, the "good" is the satisfaction of society in welfare and happiness.³⁵ While the "right" is the means that produces the good. This idea of right includes the demands that others make upon one. It is social obligation. Dewey believes the idea of the "right" is subordinate to the "good." For, he says, "the right can in fact become the road to the good only as the elements that compose this unrelenting (social) pressure are enlightened, only as social relationships become themselves reasonable."³⁶

To be "enjoyed and to be a value are two names for one and the same fact."³⁷ Values for Dewey are not altogether determined by liking and enjoyment. However, value is not confined to objects "antecedently" enjoyed, apart from reference to the method by which they come into existence. In fact, Dewey contends that operational thinking must be applied to the judgment of values. For without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are not values, he says, but "problematic goods." However, they become values when they are re-issued from intelligent selection. He defines value as "enjoyments which are the consequences of intelligent action."³⁸ When situations are provided in which the consequences of selection become obvious, intelligent selection can be made. Dewey calls attention to the difference between the "enjoyed and the enjoyable, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the

³⁵John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), p. 211.

³⁶Ibid., p. 327.

³⁷John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929), p. 258.

³⁸Ibid., p. 259.

satisfactory."³⁹ To say that something is enjoyed, he says, is merely a statement of fact—something in existence; but it does not judge the value of the fact. But to say an object has value is to assert that it satisfies or fulfills certain conditions. To say that something is satisfying, places no value on it, but to say it is satisfactory means that consequences are considered, that the effect on the future is considered, it is defined in its connections and interactions,

To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions. It is, in effect, a judgment that the thing 'will do.' It involves a prediction; it contemplates a future in which the thing will continue to serve; it will do. It asserts a consequence the thing will actively institute; it will do. That it is satisfying is the content of a proposition of fact; that it is satisfactory is a judgment, an estimate, an appraisal. It denotes an attitude to be taken, that of striving to perpetuate and to make secure.⁴⁰

The important thing to note here is that a distinction is made between the statement of an already existent fact, and a judgment as to the importance of bringing a fact into existence; or if it is already in existence, of sustaining it. In other words, the important thing is to understand the relation of values to the direction of conduct.⁴¹

When some so-called value fails to give direction to conduct it is an assertion that there are "values eternally in Being that are the standards of all judgments and the obligatory ends of all action."⁴² Since values are always relative, they can never be fixed, eternal, or final, according to pragmatism. Dewey attacks the authoritarianism that he believes has tried to be the arbiter of the past in the field of

³⁹Ibid., p. 259.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 260-261.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 263.

⁴²Ibid., p. 255.

value. Generally, this has been through the influence of institutional religion. Such religion, Dewey says, has taught that there are both good and evil which are characteristics of an inferior Being, and:

Just because they (good and evil) are things of human experience, their worth must be estimated by reference to standards and ideals derived from ultimate reality. Their defects and perversions are attributed to the same fact; they are to be corrected and controlled through adoption of methods of conduct derived from loyalty to the requirements of Supreme Being.⁴³

And just as Dewey does not accept the idea of a Supreme Being, he likewise does not accept the idea of absolute standards or of eternal values.

He believes it is only through the dogmatism and fanaticism of authority that the idea is presented that there is a moral conflict between something that is clearly bad and something that is clearly good. Most conflicts, Dewey says, are not between good and evil, but between things which are or have been satisfying.⁴⁴

Dewey denies the existence of a "hierarchical table of values." Although such a "table of values" has been given in the past through custom, reliance upon precedent, uncriticized tradition, and other forms of dependence, man is gradually turning away from such authority to one of action based upon intelligent thinking. The school can play an important role in guiding the student to depend upon intelligence and consequences rather than tradition and authority in selecting those things which are of value. Dewey is optimistic when he says:

Change from forming ideas and judgments of value on the basis of conformity to antecedent objects, to constructing enjoyable objects directed by knowledge of consequences, is a change from looking to the past to looking to the future.⁴⁵

⁴³Ibid., p. 256.

⁴⁴Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 266.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 272.

But the question is raised, if the values claimed by authority of the past are rejected, if what custom and tradition prize as values are refused, where will regulation come from? Dewey supplies the answer when he says that scientific knowledge has been deprived of one of its proper services—a guide to conduct.⁴⁶ He does not claim that we have as yet enough knowledge of the scientific type to regulate all our judgments of value, but we would probably gain more if we would put to use the knowledge that we do already have. For this is to provide the basis of judgment. Dewey says, "But a moral that frames its judgments of value on the basis of consequences must depend in a most intimate manner upon the conclusions of science."⁴⁷ These conclusions of science will be utilized by the schools as they assist the students in determining what will be valuable.

One important advantage in relying upon the scientific method as a basis for judgment of values is the knowledge of the relationship between antecedents and consequences.⁴⁸ Dewey contends that the moralist has been limited in his scope; he has tried to isolate moral conduct from conduct having to do with such things as health, business, education, etc. The moralist, Dewey says, applies technical knowledge to these latter fields, but excludes such knowledge from moral standards and ideals.

Another advantage of the scientific method applied to values, says Dewey, is that it removes subjectivism from the field of values.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 273.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 274.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 274.

Subjectivism, Dewey maintains, is common among those who hold to the reverence of and enjoyment of ultimate values. For if the standard of thought and knowledge is placed in antecedent existence, then thoughts make no difference in what is significantly real.⁴⁹ Dewey feels that this is placing the emphasis upon a change made in the attitude of the person rather than a change in the world. This seems to him to be a retraction into self rather than giving an impetus toward social objects and appreciation of self. Dewey says it might be called egoism instead of subjectivism. But when the scientific principle is carried into the region of values, then there is a transfer of attention and energy from the subjective to the objective.

Dewey advances a third improvement which he believes will issue from carrying over the experimental method from physics to man, namely, a changed concept of standards, principles, and rules.⁵⁰ With this shift from authority to experimental method all such rules and creeds would be considered as hypotheses. That is, instead of being absolute standards, they are merely intellectual instruments to be experimented with, altered, or confirmed through the consequences which attended their being acted upon. Furthermore, Dewey says:

They would lose all pretense of finality—the ulterior source of dogmatism. It is both astonishing and depressing that so much of the energy of mankind has gone into fighting for . . . the truth of creeds, religious, moral, and political, as distinct from what has gone into effort to try creeds by putting them to the test of acting upon them. The change would do away with the intolerance and fanaticism that attend the notion that beliefs and judgments are capable of inherent truth and authority; inherent in the sense of being independent of what they lead to when used as directive principles.⁵¹

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 275.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 277.

⁵¹Ibid.

A moral law, for Dewey, is a formula of how to proceed under certain particular conditions. When the conditions present themselves, and the formula is followed, the consequences can be predicted; and the consequences were actually chosen by a strict adherence to the formula. If the formula is acted upon and wrong consequences follow, then discard the formula, or alter it. For Dewey claims:

Its soundness and pertinence are tested by what happens when it is acted upon. Its claim or authority rests finally upon the imperativeness of the situation that has to be dealt with, not upon its own intrinsic nature--as any tool achieves dignity in the measure of needs served by it.⁵²

So the test of consequences is believed by Dewey to be more practical than those afforded by comparison of conduct with fixed rules. In addition, the test of consequences is continually undergoing change and development as new acts are tried and new results are experienced, while an absolute standard, Dewey thinks, is a denial of the possibility of development and improvement.

If the school is to assist the student in moral growth by providing the opportunity to choose those things which are valuable, there should be a recognition of the danger involved in wanting the satisfying instead of the satisfactory, if the two should conflict. That is, to choose without consideration of future consequences and to choose that which is temporarily satisfying but will not yield satisfactory consequences. Dewey thinks there should be reflection upon the results before action is taken.⁵³ The school is to teach the student how to make discriminating judgments, careful appraisal of consequences. For when there is a conflict between the immediate value-object, and the ulterior value-object,

⁵²Ibid., p. 278.

⁵³Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 398.

reflection should throw light upon this conflict, and provide an intelligent course of action.⁵⁴ But the only way to tell that there is a difference between an immediate value-object and a future value-object is to consider the relationships, or conditions, or consequences; such consideration is reflection. Thus, to arrive at a system of values, the attempt is made, deliberately and systematically, to arrive at courses of conduct brought about by reflective contemplation upon all possible consequences. Dewey comments as follows upon this point:

It starts from actual situations of belief, conduct, and appreciative perception which are characterized by immediate qualities of good and bad and from the modes of critical judgment current at any given time in all the regions of value; these are its data, its subject-matter. These values, criticisms, and critical methods, it subjects to further criticism as comprehensive and consistent as possible. The function is to regulate the further appreciation of goods and bads; to give greater freedom and security in those acts of direct selection, appropriation, identification and of rejection, elimination, destruction which enstate and which exclude objects of belief, conduct, and contemplation.⁵⁵

This reflection which Dewey also calls criticism, is for the regulation of the appreciation of goods and bads. So the consequences of action are to be viewed in the light of positive goods which human experience has achieved and offers. Dewey enumerates these positive goods as (1) science, (2) arts, and (3) social companionship. He says:

Positive concrete goods of science, art, and social companionship are the basic subject-matter of philosophy as criticism; and only because such positive goods already exist is there emancipation and secured extension the defining aim of intelligence.⁵⁶

Here are some definite fields of study to be included in the curriculum of the school through which the student learns discrimination and criticism.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 402.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 403-404.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 412.

Since education, for Dewey, is growth, it must be growth in the direction of some positive good. And growth in this direction comes from reflection and intelligent action which make use of the scientific method in the selection of goods and value. Such intelligent action becomes the "reasonable object of our deepest faith and loyalty, the stay and support of all reasonable hopes."⁵⁷ Dewey says, further, "To claim that intelligence is a better method than its alternatives, authority, imitation, caprice, and ignorance, prejudice and passion is hardly an excessive one."⁵⁸

Application to Moral Development

Dewey declares that the school has a moral purpose, a purpose to contribute to the morality of the student by giving him moral ideas. In the light of what Dewey says about values giving direction to conduct it is easy to understand why he defines moral ideas as "ideas of any sort whatsoever which take effect in conduct and improve it, make it better than it otherwise would be."⁵⁹ Moral ideas are considered to be those ideas which have become a part of character and the motives of behavior. Dewey believes the business of the school is to see to it that the students acquire ideas in such a way that they will become "moving ideas, motive forces in the guidance of conduct."⁶⁰ Thus any subject matter is considered to be teaching morality if it is teaching ideas which produce enlightened conduct. Although Dewey considers the

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 436-437.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 437.

⁵⁹John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (Boston, 1909), p. 1.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 2.

primary responsibility of the school in the moral development of the student to be for social interaction, he does say that "conduct may be looked upon as expressing the attitudes and dispositions of an individual."⁶¹ This conduct, Dewey declares, comes from native instincts and impulses.⁶² This is one reason Dewey insists upon freedom for the child in the schoolroom activity. The spontaneous acts of the child are considered as stimuli to which the teacher responds in directed ways. These acts are the material with which the teacher shapes future moral conduct and character. And if the student is to grow in such a way as to develop his maximum capacity, he must be allowed freedom of experience. Such freedom will provide opportunities for the pupil's interests to be followed, and interest in any experience will help determine the educative value of the experience. This does not mean complete freedom for the child, however. For Dewey believes that some control should be exercised by the adult, who has had a wider variety of experiences than the young. It is the business of the adult, he believes, to evaluate the experiences of the young to see what attitudes are being nurtured, and what tendencies are being nurtured. Such control assists the moral growth of the student for it keeps him growing in the right direction.

Although Dewey does not set up a standard of value for the development of character, he does enumerate efficiency, sociability, aesthetic taste, intellectual training, and conscientiousness as criteria for organization of subject matter.⁶³ By efficiency he means a competency

⁶¹Ibid., p. 47.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 235-236.

in the management of resources. When any subject matter is mastered so that it produces such a competency, it is contributing to the development of character. Sociability is a desire for the companionship of others; aesthetic taste is an appreciation of the arts; intellectual training is an interest in some method of scientific achievement; and conscientiousness is a sensitiveness to the rights of others. Dewey lists as a necessary constituent of character, "force" or overt action.

He says:

The individual must have the power to stand up and count for something in the actual conflicts of life. He must have initiative, insistence, persistence, courage, and industry. He must, in a word, have all that goes under the name 'force of character.'⁶⁴

Persistence, he believes, is especially necessary when obstacles arise between the beginning and ending of an activity. Such persistence he considers as discipline to carry through with a purpose.⁶⁵ When a person is trained to consider his actions, to intelligently choose a course of action, and to persevere in spite of difficulties, he is well disciplined, according to Dewey.⁶⁶ But when all that goes under the name "force of character" is exhibited, there must be some control, some channelling. For it is to be utilized for social activity. In fact, the channelling of action for social use is another constituent of character, says Dewey.⁶⁷ For sheer force could be misused. It could ignore or harm the interests of others. So the powers of the individual must be directed. This direction, according to Dewey, involves both the

⁶⁴Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 49.

⁶⁵Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 150.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 151.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 50-51.

intellectual and emotional side of the individual. The intellectual side refers to judgment which is knowledge put to use for accomplishment of some purpose.⁶⁸ Good judgment is a reflection upon values and the consequent regulation of a course of action. Such judgment involves what might be called intellectual honesty. For the individual is honest with himself as he evaluates any situation, the possible courses of action, the consequences of each, and the choosing of that one which will produce the most satisfying consequences. The individual is objective, scientific, and scrupulous in each of these steps. Such conscientiousness which attends reflection and judgment develops honesty in the individual.

The emotional side refers to a personal responsiveness which is a sensitiveness to the interests of others.⁶⁹ It is an acknowledgment of the claims that others have and a corresponding sympathy for these claims. About this intellectual and emotional direction, Dewey says:

We must also test our school work by finding whether it affords the conditions necessary for the formation of good judgment. Judgment as the sense of relative values involves ability to select, to discriminate. . . . The test comes when the information acquired has to be put to use. . . . The child cannot get power of judgment excepting as he is continually exercised in forming and testing judgments. He must have an opportunity to select for himself, and to attempt to put his selections into execution, that he may submit them to the final test, that of action.

I shall be brief with respect to the other point, the need of susceptibility and responsiveness. The informally social side of education, the aesthetic environment and influences, are all important. In so far as the work is laid out in regular and formulated ways, so far as there are lacking opportunities for casual and free social intercourse between pupils and between the pupils and teacher, this side of the child's nature is either starved, or else left to find haphazard expression along more or less secret channels. When the

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 51.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 11.

school system, under plea of the practical (meaning by the practical the narrowly utilitarian), confines the child to the three R's and the formal studies connected with them, shuts him out from the vital in literature and history, and deprives him of his right to contact with what is best in architecture, music, sculpture, and picture, it is hopeless to expect definite results in the training of sympathetic openness and responsiveness.⁷⁰

But this moral development, as Dewey views it, is such that the individual develops his powers, and shapes and directs them for social participation. In fact, he says, "only as we interpret school activities with reference to the larger circle of social activities to which they relate do we find any standard for judging moral significance."⁷¹ Further, he states, "Apart from participation in social life, the school has no moral end or aim."⁷² All morals, for Dewey, are grounded in social relationships. Since he holds that the good is that which contributes to the welfare or happiness of society, the student must be aware of his social obligations if he is to develop morally. The student must make his decisions and regulate his conduct in the light of social relationships. Moral development is considered by Dewey to be identical with a social development which considers the welfare and happiness of society.

Dewey laments the fact that there still exists in the minds of some the idea that characterized the early American philosophy of education, namely, that moral development and ideas about morality are the same. To hold that these are the same means that courses in morality or ethics would lead to moral development. But he says, "There is nothing in the

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 54-57.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 13.

⁷²Ibid., p. 11.

nature of ideas about morality, of information about honesty or purity or kindness which automatically transmutes such ideas into good character or good conduct."⁷³ Any subject matter that teaches ideas which will produce enlightened conduct will be giving moral instruction. So the people who look over a school curriculum and fail to find courses in moral instruction as such and assume that no moral training is being given, misunderstand the significance of the indirect teaching of morality. Dewey points out:

As a matter of fact direct instruction in morals has been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as such but the reenforcement of it by the whole regime of which it was an incident make it effective. To attempt to get similar results from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to rely upon sentimental magic. . . . Just because the studies of the curriculum represent standard factors in social life they are organs of initiation into social values. As mere school studies, their acquisition has only a technical worth. Acquired under conditions where their social significance is realized, they feed moral interest and develop moral insight.⁷⁴

When any subject is taught in such a way that there is an understanding of social life and a regulation of individual conduct, it is moral training.

Just because the direct method of teaching morals is not used by the school, the indirect methods should not be belittled. Nor should moral training be considered as separate and apart from subject matter.

Dewey says, rather:

What we need in education is a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application. We believe, so far as the mass of children are concerned, that if we keep at them long enough we can teach reading and writing and figuring. We are practically, even if unconsciously, skeptical as to the possibility of anything like the same assurance in morals. We believe in moral laws and rules, to be

⁷³Ibid., p. 1.

⁷⁴Ibid., pps. 411, 414.

sure, but they are in the air. They are something set off by themselves. They are so very 'moral' that they have no working contact with the average affairs of every-day life. These moral principles need to be brought down to the ground through their statement in social and psychological terms. We need to see that moral principles are not arbitrary, that they are not 'transcendental'; that the term 'moral' does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the conditions and forces of our community life, and into the impulses and habits of the individual.⁷⁵

Thus morality is best taught by the school, according to Dewey, when it is taught indirectly and when it leads the individual to reflect upon the consequences of any course of action and to make his own choice as to what is conducive to his own welfare and to the interests of others in any given situation.

⁷⁵Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, pp. 57-58.

CHAPTER IV

REALISM

Introduction

Realism represents a development of another strand of the American tradition. It, too, goes back to nineteenth century innovations associated with such men as Thomas Jefferson, but its primary impetus was the growing tradition of science. It is a common sense viewpoint refined by the accumulated results of science generally, both physical and social.

General Philosophy

The realist is one who accepts physical reality as the fundamental fact of experience. Brubacher defines realism as "The philosophy . . . that objects have a reality independent of mental phenomena."¹ These objects make up the "real" world, the world which exists primarily outside of the individual, and the aim of realism is to find out scientifically, the nature of reality and how to adjust to this reality.

The realism of Frederick Breed holds to the view that the world is a result of evolutionary processes and that man is "included among the forces of emergent evolution."² The realists believe that the

¹John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education (New York, 1939), p. 343.

²F. S. Breed, Education and the New Realism (New York, 1939), p. 50.

fundamental approach to ascertain the nature of physical reality is through the physical sciences. Rupert Lodge says:

The realist is interested primarily in facts; in the orbis pictus of the physical universe, in the story of physical science, including both its content and its methods, in developing what we can roughly and symbolically call the encyclopedic mind. For the realist, education is the work of nature. Our minds are open books upon which nature writes its own story in its own way. Our nervous systems are plastic material upon which reality stamps its own structure, its own order, and its own truth. Into the kingdom of nature, as into the kingdom of heaven, we can enter only as little children. Like Bacon in his wiser years, we must cease to be judges, in order to become pupils.³

Since the realist holds that external objects constitute ultimate reality, and that those objects exist independently of man's knowledge of them, he holds that the proper way to ascertain the facts of reality is through the scientific method. Thus subjectivity, personal bias, and prejudice are denounced by the realist, for each of these must give ground when the facts of reality become known.

Although man is "included among the forces of emergent evolution," in the total process realism asserts that he has been a "relatively insignificant factor," that while man's knowledge "helps to guide him along its devious pathways . . . it hardly guides the evolution of the whole."⁴ Thus, it becomes evident that emphasis upon objectivity in science generally is assumed to have important implications in the general area of social philosophy. The concerns of the larger whole that constitutes society are esteemed as more important than individual interests and satisfactions.

³Rupert C. Lodge, The Questioning Mind (New York, 1937), p. 255.

⁴Breed, Education and the New Realism, 50 ff.

Education and Values

F. S. Breed expresses quite clearly the philosophical basis of scientific realism in education in his book, Education and the New Realism. As a realist, Breed insists that the scientific method be applied to the content of education, the learning process, and the learner. The basis of education is the transmission of the cultural heritage to the student. Such a transfer would constitute a contribution to the moral development of the student, according to the realist. For the cultural heritage and the experiences of the race are both invaluable to the student. Breed defends this view of education when he says:

Broadly, its basis is the cultural tradition, patterns of achievement based on those accomplishments of human personality that have proved of most worth, the most precious products of civilized life, our best institutional inheritance. . . . This cultural tradition with its knowledges and skills, its customs and laws, its manners and conventions, its attitudes and appreciations, represents the best solutions up to date of the typical problems confronting humanity.⁵

Since the cultural tradition is to be taught to the pupil, the teaching cannot be left to chance. Therefore, the teacher must exercise control over the pupil. Breed does not think that the pupil should be given permission to follow his own interests and inclinations---but should be led by the teacher. He says, "Guidance represents a healthy mistrust of the dependability of such interests."⁶ Breed feels that control and guidance are necessary if the student is to develop morally. In fact, if no control is exercised, and the student is given unbridled freedom, he would develop immorally. For if the motto "obey that impulse," he

⁵Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 215.

⁶Ibid., p. 214.

says, were to be observed in home, in school, and the state, anarchy would result.⁷ If something besides anarchy is desired, there must be some curb on individual impulse and spontaneity. The student cannot be left to follow his own interests and pleasures if the cultural tradition is to be mastered by the student, for such interest may lead the student far afield from the tradition. If such interest should lead the student from the tradition it would contribute to immoral development. If the student followed his own interests he would not be likely to profit from the experiences of the race. Rather, he would likely commit many errors and fail to do many things that he should do. And Breed says:

Always, one comes back to those fundamental factors in adjustment—purpose and possibility, organism and environment, individual and society, personal interest and external demand. In its broadest sense external demand is lodged in laws of nature. The laws of nature are not laws of thought nor of personal behavior. They are much more than that. They are objective statements of reaction of entities, personal or otherwise, throughout the whole extent of the known world.⁸

Here, the realist is trying to sound a note that the individual be prepared for a world of fact.

In this preparation, the teacher should be equipped to guide the student in such a fashion that the pupil is faced with problems and consequently receives the thrill of personal discovery when he learns the solution to these problems. But the teacher will not wait for the student to rediscover all the laws and principles that are already known.

As has been pointed out, the teacher is to render guidance in assisting the student to master the cultural tradition. Such guidance

⁷Ibid., p. 29.

⁸Ibid., p. 225.

on the part of the teacher means that there will be a lessening of pupil freedom. This means that there will be a restriction on physical activity. For Breed says:

The educator will understand, also, that the horizon of the pupil's knowledge may commonly be widened without the detailed process of gross physical action and personal discovery. In fact, he will be aware that concrete objects and gross physical activity may injure in excess, and that language increasingly provides a substitute for overt activity as the child matures.⁹

Even though the realist says the interests of society are to be served, he also says the interests of the individual members of society are to be considered. This is a kind of character training as the school acknowledges the rights of individuals and attempts to serve these rights. For Breed says, "The realist, however, defers to no one in his enthusiasm for the salvation of individual souls and offers an educational program designed to bring them into greener pastures or a safer haven in the end."¹⁰ While Breed recognizes a respect for the demands of the external world, he also recognizes a respect for the demands of the individual. It appears, then, that the realist wants to find a "golden mean" or a "happy medium" in the matter of serving the individual and society, in allowing individual freedom while insisting upon control.

Breed summarizes his position in these words:

Mastery of this tradition (tradition of the culture), this embodiment of the finest fruits of human thought about the world, is a supreme educational objective; the activities of the learner, the mode of mastery. One furnished the goal of growth; the other, the method of approach. The two are related as end and means.¹¹

The school in instructing the student concerning the cultural

⁹Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 226.

¹¹Ibid., p. 228.

tradition is teaching that which is valuable. This teaching is to include a knowledge of the types of situations which are "attractive" to humans. These "attractive" situations have a basis in objective fact. Since Breed is committed to the belief of an objective physical reality, independent of man, he postulates that the truth of a value must be determined by its conformity to or consistency with this objective reality. The ultimate determinate of this truth is regarded by Breed as something beyond mere personal satisfaction, "something external to the personality and not dependent upon it, something that can be definitely referred to as objective fact."¹² The cultural tradition is composed of those skills, attitudes, customs, values, and commitments which society has come to feel have this foundation in objective fact. Where the pragmatist rejects the idea of a standard of value, the realist insists upon this standard and its conformity to objective reality.

Truth, for Dewey, is relative to each situation, but for the realist, the truth of an idea---whether about value or physical science---is its conformity to reality. Breed explains it this way, "The realist holds . . . that there is a difference between truth and reality. Reality is; truth is a quality of an idea or proposition referring to reality."¹³ Man might advance an idea, Breed continues, but the validity of the idea is determined by the constitution of the external world. And sometimes this external world manifests a veto power on human interests. "Man proposes, but it (the world) disposes,"¹⁴ Breed says.

¹²Ibid., p. 35.

¹³Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 55.

So the whims of man will not determine value for Breed. For he says that a person's likes or dislikes are not the final determiners of right action, but rather, "Moral obligation, needless to say, may conflict with personal predilection, for it rests on the demand of the world without. An obligation to be discharged is an invitation to accept the universe."¹⁵ Furthermore, Breed says, "When personal satisfaction is made the criterion of truth and morality we seem oriented for the fate that awaits all who misconceive the nature of the world."¹⁶

Although Breed does not use the word "value," he speaks at one point about the types of situations which "attract" humans and those which do not. He says:

We seem to know already that in general a full dinner pail is more attractive than an empty one; that freedom is more attractive than slavery; peace than war, knowledge than ignorance, and reason than a revolver as a means of composing differences of opinion.¹⁷

Science must develop a systematic fund of knowledge of the "selective reactions" of man so it will be able to invade the field of value, Breed suggests.¹⁸ Generally, these selective reactions of man—which are no more or no less than man's choosing what he considers of value—are "determined by the prospect of greater well-being, welfare, or happiness."¹⁹ The student is learning that which is valuable, then, when he is learning to contribute to the greater welfare of society. And the general welfare, Breed contends, is sought as naturally as

¹⁵Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

self-preservation, and, in fact, is not essentially different from self-preservation.²⁰ Science will tell man what will be "attractive" to his general welfare based on previous human experience. In fact, science will guide the way for man's self-preservation and general welfare. Science will tell man in advance of his actions many things which will be attractive and many things which will not. For these things will come under scientific observation. Says Breed:

Things and their relations, man and his reactions, including the purposive and the ethical, all come within the comprehensive grasp of science. It evaluates human procedures in terms of results, and these results in terms of criteria set up on the basis of what is favored or should, with wider knowledge, be favored by humans.²¹

But what should be favored by humans? Certainly Breed would reply those values revealed in the cultural tradition representing the evidence compiled by previous generations; those things which have proved to be of worth to human personality, technical skill and knowledge, attitudes and appreciations, customs, laws, etc.²² These are things of value for Breed. They seem to be common social values, and by and large they are. For the interest of the group takes precedence over the interest of the individual for the same reason, Breed says, that "ten dollars outvalues one."²³ There is value in individual growth and development, and Breed insists that individual interest be recognized; but individual interests, social interests, and values must conform to ultimate reality or they will be disposed.

²⁰Ibid., p. 19.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 215.

²³Ibid., p. 119.

Application to Moral Development

The realist desires to teach only that which has been objectively proved and which is considered to be certified knowledge. For this knowledge is truth, and teaching this knowledge supplies the student with truth. Such teaching assists the student in his moral growth for it acquaints him with facts, and prepares him for the demands of the external world. If something has been positively identified as conforming to objective reality it is worth teaching. For example, Breed says:

From the field of natural sciences he (the educator) should select liberally and teach definitely, because of the relatively high degree of certainty of the findings. In the field of the social sciences he will impartially teach what is definitely known about any form of political organization, but he will deny the right of any instructor to teach the superiority of communism, fascism, capitalism, or socialism when it is not definitely known.²⁴

So the degree of certainty of the knowledge of a subject determines its educational value. This is not to say, however, that those things with lesser degrees of certainty are to be omitted. But they are to be labelled as such. Breed says:

The scientist does not make emphatic claim beyond the truth; as citizen and worker in the practical world, he may take sides when the relative merit of alternative proposals is in doubt. Hypotheses are legitimate in the classroom only if carefully labelled so as not to be confused with verified results.²⁵

Breed does not close the door on the possibility of the moral and ethical becoming scientifically certain. For he has stated that these too are included in the drive for scientific knowledge. "Things and their relations, man and his reactions, including the purposive and the

²⁴Ibid., p. 69.

²⁵Ibid., p. 186.

ethical all come within the comprehensive grasp of science."²⁶ At the present time, though, it appears that there has not been sufficient scientific data compiled to justify including direct moral instruction as part of the function of the school except in certain restricted areas which Breed lumps under science dealing with "attractive" situations.

Breed anticipates a social science which will be successful in accumulating systematic knowledge of the "selective reactions" of man. "The selective reactions of man," he says, "are generally said to be determined by the prospect of greater well-being, welfare, or happiness."²⁷ This suggests that to morally participate in society, one must do those things which contribute to the general welfare. It will be the job of the social sciences to determine the types of situations which will attract people. And those things will be attractive which promote the general welfare. Breed does not attempt to exhaust attractive situations, but he does say that we already know such things as "a full dinner pail, freedom, peace, knowledge, and reason"²⁸ are attractive. It becomes apparent then that any subject matter which deals directly or indirectly with attractive situations or the general welfare is teaching morality.

Breed places a strong emphasis on control and guidance by the teacher over the student. For Breed this is not only important, but necessary if the student is to grow morally. Since there is specific information to transmit to the student, namely, the findings of the several branches of science, pupil whims are not to be catered to in the dissemination of

²⁶Ibid., p. 19.

²⁷Ibid., p. 18.

²⁸Ibid.

this information. However, according to Breed, such discipline works to the advantage of the individual for he must sooner or later be disciplined to the demands of society, or at least to the demands of the external world. "Moral obligations, needless to say, may conflict with personal predilection, for it rests on the demand of the world without."²⁹ Even though man may propose certain moral responsibilities, these responsibilities must be in accordance with the demands of the external world, or they will be disposed, Breed says.

This discipline is also for the guidance of the pupil in receiving the cultural tradition. Whatever have been the accomplishments of man that have proved of most worth, whatever customs or manners or attitudes which represent "the best solutions up to date of the typical problems confronting humanity"³⁰ are considered to be part of the cultural tradition. But this is no more than the "general welfare," so once more the student is brought face to face with that which would assist him in morally participating in society.

Evidently Breed considers personal morality to be identical with social morality. And until the time when the sciences can provide a more positive knowledge of ethical principles or moral conduct, the primary responsibility of the school in the moral development of the student is to lead the student to promote the general and "tested" values of greater well-being, welfare, or happiness of man.

²⁹Ibid., p. 89.

³⁰Ibid., p. 215.

CHAPTER V

IDEALISM

Introduction

It has been pointed out that one strand of the American tradition favored the direct teaching of morals and ethics. For there can be no right action, according to this view, unless one knows the right. This view is a part of contemporary idealism as represented by H. N. Horne. In the early tradition, however, it was assumed that training in ethics and morals would guarantee right conduct. Horne, on the other hand, states that knowledge about the right will not insure right action, but that knowing the right "through the motor-tendency of ideas, is at least a temptation to do it."¹ The early tradition is further extended in the idealism of Horne through a concept of values as theistic, transcendent, and permanent in character.

General Philosophy

Horne states that consciousness develops from "sensation and movement"; and that "sensation interpreted becomes knowledge, movement directed becomes will, the activity involved in each of these . . . (gives) a tone of feeling to consciousness."² The nature of the

¹H. N. Horne, Idealism in Education (New York, 1923), pp. 136-137.

²H. N. Horne, The Philosophy of Education (New York, 1930), p. 61.

activity of mind by which mind develops, Horne says, is "self-activity"; that is, "The mind is the source of its own reactions upon its world."³ And "without the mind's response to its world," he says, "there is no world." He holds that the nature of the mind in consciousness "is the root of all knowledge, feeling, and will."⁴

Horne believes that the types of human ideals are symbolized in "the scholar, the gentleman, and . . . the Christian." These ideals, he says, are derived from the qualities of an educated mind, "the power to know," which is the inner basis of the spiritual ideal of truth, and results in cognition; "the power to feel," which is the inner basis of the spiritual ideal of beauty, and results in emotion; and "the power to will," which is the inner basis of the spiritual ideal of goodness, and results in volition.⁵

Perhaps the most central factor in Horne's philosophy, which he calls "idealistic theism," is that God is "the self-conscious unity of all reality."⁶ He holds that matter is "ultimately a process of thought in the consciousness of God," and that the "adequate explanation of man . . . is God."⁷ Horne affirms that the "origin of man is God, the nature of man is freedom, and the destiny of man is immortality."⁸

³Ibid., p. 170.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 226.

⁶Ibid., p. 269.

⁷Ibid., p. 273.

⁸Ibid., p. 284.

Education and Values

Horne bases his conception of education upon his belief in the fundamental nature of reality. He believes the answers to the questions of the origin, nature, and the destiny of man provide the basis of education.

Education, for Horne, is a process of "becoming;" the fulfillment of what is inherent in the child. It is a growth in life of the finite toward the infinite--a growth which will take eternity to complete. Even though Horne poses eternity for completion and perfection, he believes that man's reach should exceed his grasp. In explanation, he says:

Truth is as infinite as the thought of God, but it is waiting to be revealed to man's growing intellect; beauty is as limitless as God's passion for the perfect, but it is waiting to be appreciated by man's developing emotions. Goodness is as eternal as the will of God, but it is waiting to be realized through the finite will of man. These infinite ideals are the unattainable objects of man's legitimate endeavor; they represent the goal of his development; they are the prophets of his present nature and future progress.⁹

By this it is seen that Horne does not just live in "another world" apart from this present temporal one. He is attempting to recognize the temporal span of man's existence.

The applications to the moral development of the student become obvious when it is seen that the idealist regards education as a means, not an end in itself. Society uses education as a tool in realizing its ideals for the young. The mature person is to use sympathy and understanding in the guidance of the immature, but this necessitates control by the mature person in putting the "experience of the race

⁹Ibid., p. 281.

at the disposition of its young members."¹⁰ Horne says:

In view of the vast amount of knowledge the race already has acquired and the relatively slight amount of it that any individual can re-discover for himself, and the likelihood that he will make no valuable addition to it at all, direct personal control will probably continue to hold the major, but not the exclusive place in the educative process.¹¹

Nevertheless, there is to be a personal relation between the teacher and the pupil, the teacher's ideas and ideals securing responses from the pupil.¹² But the teacher must exercise direct control over the pupil since the experiences of the race are to be presented, and such presentation is intended to aid the student in his moral growth.

Horne does not think that pupil interest can be the factor which determines conduct or curriculum because:

Some obligations are binding, that duties must be done, that right must be obeyed, that voluntary attention to the uninteresting but important is possible, that effort at times can and must be put forth, that discipline in doing the disagreeable that is necessary is worth while, that effort may lead to interest, that even if interest never comes as a result of effort in such cases, still the obligatory thing must be done.¹³

Horne seems to appreciate the value of interest, but here he says that even if there is no interest, if the child is set to doing a task that he should do, he may develop an interest in it. But even if he does not develop an interest, he has developed the discipline of doing that which is disagreeable but necessary; he has done what he should do. Such development, for the idealist, would be an important factor in molding and strengthening character.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 30.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 30-31.

¹²Ibid., p. 307.

¹³Ibid., p. 313.

The aim of the school in this instance is not only character training in personal morality but to assist the student in taking his place in society. A child must become adjusted to his environment. But this environment, according to Horne, includes all relations in which man stands to his fellow man. It includes the achievement of the race to which the child belongs. This would involve experiences in democratic group relations, a consideration for the rights of others, and contributions to a shared life. In making provisions for individual development the interests of society are also to be served. He does not magnify one to the exclusion of the other. He rejects authoritarianism as being unduly repressive of the individual, and at the same time he rejects individualism as being unduly subversive of authority.¹⁴ What he suggests is seen in the following quotation:

Authority is to be upheld when its principles are true; individuality is to be asserted against false propositions, whether in theory or practice. Individual freedom is lost by rejecting true authority or by accepting untrue authority. Freedom is not the absence of truth, it is conformity to truth.¹⁵

What Horne would do is to merge freedom and authority, to make a synthesis of the two. This has significance for both society and the individual.

Brubacher says:

On the one hand, it projects individuality to front-rank importance. Much is made of the spiritual autonomy of the individual. . . . In this respect, idealism can lay definite claim to favoring a democracy as the social soil in which its educational theory is to grow. On the other hand, the individual seems subordinated to the social whole. About this whole there is a definite oneness; it is monistic.¹⁶

¹⁴H. H. Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education (New York, 1935), p. 419.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 420.

¹⁶Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education, pp. 342-343.

Horne summarizes his conception of education by saying:

Education is the eternal process of superior adjustment of the physically and mentally developed, free, conscious, human being to God, as manifested in the intellectual, emotional, and volitional environment of man.¹⁷

Unlike Breed, who is reluctant to invade the field of values, Horne sets forth several values which are not only worth while, but necessary, if man is to develop his fullest powers. He believes that the public school has an important task in helping the student to develop morally, by helping him to lay hold of those values which are the race's spiritual ideals. Like Breed, Horne finds values centered in objective reality. That is, values are not made by man, but man is made aware of pre-existent value. In answering Dewey's position on value as reflective selection, Horne says:

Instead of making value man-centered, it might well be made reality-centered. In this case the intelligent liking of man does not create value so much as discover pre-existent value. So man's education would be a process of realizing values already inherent in the universe of reality. Man does not create logical truth, emotional beauty, and ethical worth; he discovers them, and recreates them in individual thought, feeling and conduct. Man not only makes value, he discovers and uses it. This view enriches not only human experience but the universe itself. And it solves the intellectual difficulties inherent in the theory of socially subjective values.¹⁸

Horne posits a "table of values" with an ascending order which the school must recognize as it attempts to contribute to the moral development of the student. He places physical life at the bottom, for he says "The first thing is to exist, to live, and this is a practical matter. After that one may pursue ideal ends."¹⁹ But since the physical is the

¹⁷Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 235.

¹⁸Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 325.

¹⁹Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 53.

basis for all life and since it will affect both mind and spirit, Horne says it is following nature's own leading to put it in the basic place it is due.²⁰

Horne believes that values may be discovered on various levels; the biological, the physiological, the sociological, and the philosophical.²¹ It becomes valuable, according to Horne, for the individual to adjust to his "spiritual environment." This adjustment to what Horne calls the spiritual environment includes three elements, intellectual, emotional, and volitional. The "intellectual is what is known; the emotional, what is felt; and the volitional, what is willed."²² He continues by saying, "The mind knows truth and avoids error; it feels, as its highest object, beauty and avoids ugliness; and it wills, in momentous issues, goodness and avoids evil."²³ The race's spiritual ideals are therefore truth, beauty, and goodness, and the individual member of society is to become adjusted to these essential realities.

Horne places religion under the emotional phase of the spiritual environment and says that "religion is the most important element in the life of man."²⁴ He defines religion as "The expression of the feelings in the presence of the divine."²⁵ But all experiences which are experiences of the emotions are to assist the individual in feeling what is beautiful and avoiding what is ugly. For Horne declares:

²⁰Ibid., p. 59.

²¹Ibid., p. 99.

²²Ibid., p. 101.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 125.

²⁵Ibid., p. 123.

The sense of the beautiful is the finest pleasure the human mind can enjoy. . . . The beautiful object itself is harmonious and perfect, and, in enjoying it, one identifies himself with it, becomes the thing he enjoys for the time being. Reverence for the beautiful is an uplifting force in the individual life. Beauty reminds morality that perfection is possible, and the holiness of beauty enhances the beauty of holiness. An aesthetic appreciation of the beautiful makes the imperfect and the ugly more dissatisfying and repellent, and so tends to remove it from existence. This is the practical outcome of the love of the beautiful. Its selection means the death, by atrophy, of the ugly.²⁶

Horne concludes his discussion on adjustment to the spiritual environment by presenting the characteristics of an educated man as "the scholar, the gentleman, and the Christian."²⁷

Truth, beauty, and goodness which are the goals for man's development, according to Horne, are to be realized through the intellect, the emotions, and the volition of the individual. Although man will never attain these goals in this present world, according to Horne, yet, they are waiting to be revealed, appreciated, and realized by finite man.

The fact that a goal is placed before a man gives him direction and a challenge to achieve the goal. Horne criticizes the pragmatic philosophy of education which makes growth leading to more growth its sole aim. For he says:

There is no need to mince words at all. Children must be directed in their growth toward something worthwhile in personal and social relations. They must grow up to be something admirable by constantly having admirable models and patterns and associations. Growth must be toward an ideal of human character. This ideal is not the objectionable idealizing of life itself as the embodiment of worthwhile purposes and patterns. We do not have to be afraid of the word goal. We need a goal to work toward. If it is really valuable, we rarely fully attain it. If we should attain it, another and higher goal should and would straightway take its place. There is no danger of the pursuit of a goal leading to a static life. Let's have a goal for growth, including the admirable features of social and individual living, and omitting the

²⁶Ibid., p. 226.

²⁷Ibid.

base. This involves having a standard by which to judge growth. We do not lack such a standard.²⁸

Horne's goals are eternal, and all temporal values receive their ultimate recognition in eternity. But since he says the destiny of man is immortality, that means that there will be opportunity for man to reach these goals, "to finish his education, to achieve his destiny, and to grow unceasingly into the likeness of the Infinite Being."²⁹

Application to Moral Development

When Horne sets up truth, beauty, and goodness as the race's spiritual ideals, he says the task of education is to adjust the child to these essential realities.³⁰ Such adjustment necessitates control by the mature members of society. Thus, control itself contributes to the moral development of the student, for it is through control that the ideals of the race are passed on to the student and the experiences of the race are placed at the disposal of the student. As has been pointed out previously, the adjustment of the student to the race's spiritual ideals includes adjustment to environment, all relations in which man stands to his fellow man. This adjustment involves social participation, group living, contributions to a shared life, etc. This is part of the moral development of the student.

In addition, Horne finds in each of these ideals ways in which the moral development of the student is promoted. In listing the sciences, which comprise the intellectual environment of the child, he subdivides

²⁸Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 53.

²⁹Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 283.

³⁰Ibid., p. 102.

them into those concerned with matter and those concerned with mind.

The sciences listed under mind are subdivided into subjective and objective. The objective sciences include Ethics which he defines as the "science of human conduct."³¹ Thus Horne favors the direct teaching of morals through the science of Ethics. He defends this position in the following manner:

In our country, where the truth of religion cannot be taught systematically in the public schools, for good and sufficient reasons, as we think, it is the more important that ethics be taught. But this recommendation is no simple matter. The fact that we are discussing it so late in this series shows it is not the thing to begin with in developing character. Furthermore, we cannot rely upon it implicitly; if pupils have been rightly trained before studying ethics, they will hardly need ethics to make them do right; on the other hand, if pupils are not good, ethics will hardly make them so. The fact is that ethics is a science; it reaches the intellect, but the springs of character are the emotions and the will. If ethics degenerates into exhortation, the net is being spread in the sight of the bird; Christianity has discovered how hard it is to reform the world by preaching. . . .

Why then teach ethics? Because, though knowledge does not insure right action, there can be no right action without knowledge. Because, too, knowing the right, through the motor-tendency of ideas, is at least a temptation to do it. That man is actively bad, morally depraved, who sins against the light he has. Ethics turns the light on; it cannot make men prefer darkness to light.³²

The second spiritual ideal which Horne lists, viz., beauty, also teaches morality to the student. For he says, "Beauty reminds morality that perfection is possible, and the holiness of beauty enhances the beauty of holiness."³³ He contends that a failure on the school's part to develop an appreciation for beauty will arrest the development of the student and fail to bring the student fully into the life of the race.

³¹Horne, Idealism in Education, p. 137.

³²H. N. Horne, Idealism in Education (New York, 1923), pp. 136-137.

³³Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 128.

For he says, "That which is ultimately beautiful is also good. The feeling of this truth is needed to bring up into just emphasis the aesthetic studies of the school."³⁴ He illustrates the necessity of the appreciation of the beautiful—which, he says, makes the imperfect and the ugly more dissatisfying and repellant—by suggesting some vicarious experiences which are possible through the study of literature.

For jealousy, ambition, a sister's devotion, the hard schoolmaster, in typical forms, we go, not to life, but to literature. These ideal, that is mentally constructed, personages suffer, and we are instructed by their sufferings. As Aristotle showed, we pity their ends, and fear similar things for ourselves. Thus are we purified and taught.³⁵

This, then, is Horne's way for the spiritual ideal of beauty to teach morality.

Goodness, the third spiritual ideal which Horne lists is concerned with the volition of the individual in the presence of right and wrong, "the action of the individual in accord with the personal sense of right and duty."³⁶ Horne subscribes to Plato's theory that good is self-preservative and evil is self-destructive. He says, "The constitution of things whereby evil is suicidal and good self-conserving is the greatest sanction which morality possesses."³⁷ Horne says that the race's ideals of the volitions of man are taught through history, through citizenship and the national constitution, through social participation and laws, and through self-legislated moral laws. These are the ways goodness teaches morality.

³⁴Ibid., p. 129.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 140.

³⁷Ibid., p. 141.

Morality is also taught to the student as the student is disciplined to doing the necessary but disagreeable. This is a persistence and stick-to-it-iveness to do the thing that should be done even when there is no interest in the activity.

In addition to morality being taught through the exercise of control, the race's spiritual ideals, and discipline, Horne also says that it can be taught through the natural and instinctive tendency of the pupil to act upon the suggestion of others. All individuals, he points out, develop a sense of self-consciousness as they imitate others in their social surroundings, and the school should capitalize on this. For when the copies are bad, he holds that imitation would work in the interest of immorality just as readily as in the interest of morality when the copies are good.³⁸ Teachers and educational leaders should try to put the best models of every kind before the student. Material models would include

. . . a beautiful playground, an architecturally good as well as serviceable school building, well-lighted corridors, broad stairways, carefully ordered schoolrooms, neat and clean texts, a reasonably high requirement of the quality of work done, and an atmosphere of agreeable and engrossing occupations, to breathe which cultivates the sense both of the reality and the winsomeness of living.³⁹

Material models, however, do not offer the possibilities for imitation as much as a personality, Horne continues. For this reason, the person of the teacher is of paramount importance in directing the moral growth of the student. For Horne contends that morality, as a disposition of the heart and will, is to be developed by the individual under right

³⁸Ibid., p. 181.

³⁹Ibid., p. 183.

patterns of right conduct and personality.⁴⁰ So teachers should be persons who are worthy of imitation by the pupil. He says, "the highest duty and privilege of the teacher, is to be in whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good report what he is willing for his pupils to become."⁴¹

Horne also maintains that the school is to train the individual to judge safely and well. This also contributes to the moral development of the student. The vast majority of the human race has the capacity for judgment, he says. This judgment is similar to Dewey's reflective thinking, however, it goes beyond mere reflection. Horne says, "The trained judgment reports facts as they are, sees their meaning, foresees their consequences, and glimpses the whole of which they are fragments."⁴² This judgment helps the individual to make sane choices, to make worthy characters the object of endeavor. "It is judgment," Horne says, "that distinguishes the true from the false, the beautiful from the ugly, and the good from the evil."⁴³ As the school assists the student to develop an ability to render judgment, it is helping the student to grow morally, according to Horne.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 185.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 185-186.

⁴²Ibid., p. 235.

⁴³Ibid., p. 233.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The contemporary philosophies examined in chapters three, four, and five differ in certain of their basic assumptions, in certain of their fundamental arguments, and in certain of their conclusions both concerning knowledge, truth, and value in general and concerning educational applications in particular. They differ in important respects concerning the ends and the means of moral instruction in general and concerning the ends and means of such instruction in the public schools in particular.

Summary of Philosophies

Dewey considers experience as the whole of encountered reality. Through experience he believes that mind and intelligence have evolved in a purely natural way, that mental processes have developed as means whereby man controls his environment. He holds that knowledge is made through experience arising in action, that reflective thought as an active experiential process is the method through which knowledge is gained. He conceives of values as neither absolute nor eternal, but as relative. He believes that the good is the satisfactory, and the satisfactory is what is satisfying both immediately and in its probable consequences. Since the character of probable consequences is a matter of knowledge, he believes that the ascertainment of value is a proper

subject of science. Dewey believes that education should be conceived as a process of which problem-solving is the essence, rather than as a process of preparation. He believes that moral ideas are derived from experience and that all such ideas are no more than hypotheses to be re-examined continuously as suitable objects of experimentation in the light of continuously changing conditions. This means that there are no moral absolutes, that all judgments of value are "appraisals" not facts, and are relative only. Dewey is opposed to any moral instruction which seeks to furnish to the student finished value judgments (i.e. "appraisals"). In fact Dewey generally distrusts direct instruction, and particularly emphasizes this distrust in the area of morals.

Breed, in contrast, accepts physical reality as the fundamental fact underlying experience. He believes that a "real" world exists outside of the individual and independent of any relation involving human experience of it, that the function of science is not merely to solve human problems, but to ascertain the nature of an objective reality. He regards the criterion of truth as correspondence of belief with objective fact; knowledge as the demonstration of such correspondence. Breed holds that since truth simply is, it is always and everywhere essentially the same. Breed holds that man naturally seeks his welfare and happiness, that things are valuable to the degree that they promote welfare and happiness. Among the types of situations which attract humans, he lists satisfaction of physical hunger, freedom, peace, knowledge, and reason. Breed considers the basis of education to be the transmission to the student of the essential truths discovered in the past and preserved in the cultural heritage. He believes that this heritage represents the closest approach thus far made toward truth, and, thus, that it includes the best solutions up to date of the problems which confront humanity.

Horne, as an idealist, holds that the essential reality is mental. He believes that the origin of man is God, the nature of man is freedom, and the destiny of man is immortality. He places much emphasis upon subjectivity, upon consciousness, and regards self-activity as the central principle in such consciousness. Horne regards values as centered in reality, but in a reality which, while mental, is still objective. He believes that values may be discovered by man on various levels; the biological, the physiological, the sociological, and the philosophical; but that all values culminate in, as they have their origin in, God. Horne believes that the good for man is for him to become adjusted to his "spiritual" environment, which includes three elements: the intellectual, the emotional, and the volitional. The mind, he says, knows truth and avoids error, it feels beauty and avoids ugliness, and it wills goodness and avoids evil. But while this tendency towards preference for truth, goodness, and beauty is natural, it may be corrupted in childhood and youth. This fact, he believes, gives to moral education a great urgency. Moral education, according to Horne, is a development of a tendency toward the divine, a tendency that was itself of divine origin, a development of the child and youth in a certain direction; this is not simply growth, but a process of becoming, a growth in the life of the finite toward the Infinite.

These three positions are among the most influential philosophies of education in contemporary America.¹ The question is, what kind of moral instruction can be practiced in the public schools in the light of the fact that all three types of philosophy are widely held?

¹Roman Catholic philosophy of education has been excluded from consideration because, although it is important, its primary concern is in private, rather than in public, education.

Possible Solutions

One solution to the problem is a solution tested in American tradition. This was the practical compromise which arose out of the conflict of religious groups concerning religious instruction in the public schools. The compromise was that no sectarian instruction be given. This solution satisfied no one, but it satisfied all better than having the views of other sects than their own taught in the public classroom.

Such a solution of the problem of moral instruction, however, is obviously not in keeping with the general feeling of society today as indicated in the quotations of public and educational leaders given in chapter one. It could well be argued that in the case of the present issue such a compromise would be impossible to implement and still maintain an educational program acceptable to the public. The fact that there is a recognition of the need for increased instruction in the area of moral development of the student may be due in part to the stalemate resulting from the three divergent but influential approaches offering what at least on the surface appears to be small common ground for action.

A second alternative is the choice of one philosophy as the basis for public policy. Aside from the theoretical problem, there is the practical difficulty of implementing a policy (whichever should be chosen) to which there would be wide-spread disapproval. For while each philosophy is ardently supported, each is no less ardently opposed.

A third alternative is to examine each of the philosophies to ascertain what can actually be done in response to the demand, but which will violate none of the basic premises of the different approaches and

which will still achieve at least some of the positive values sought by each. This alternative has the practical value of offering a basis for immediate action if such common ground can be found. In fact, it has been the hypothesis of this study that such common ground does exist among the three philosophies. The consensus of the three philosophies in certain areas which contribute to the moral development of the student constitutes the basis of a practical school program for the moral development of the student. This third alternative, then, is the hypothesis of this thesis.

Practical Considerations

There are certain practical considerations that must be made in organizing a program which can be supported by persons representing fundamentally different views: (1) To discover and exclude from the area of cooperative action those fundamental concepts of each position which are contradictory or obviously incompatible with principles of the alternative points of view; (2) To discover and exclude those items directly derived from those fundamental postulates which cannot be implemented independently of their basic premises; (3) To discover and include as the foundation for cooperative action whatever principles can be found to be acceptable by all; (4) To discover and include such derived principles, useful for application or implementation, as are not inconsistent with any of the philosophies.

Fundamental Concepts Present in at Least One of the Philosophies
Which are Contradictory to or Incompatible with
Fundamental Concepts of at Least One
of the Alternative Philosophies

Nature of Knowledge.

Dewey. Knowledge is made through experience arising in action. It is strictly a process of creation rather than of discovery. The experimental method is fundamental to this process.¹ It is not just a method. Reliability of knowledge is determined by the way in which experience is organized. Science is "the kind of organization of experience effected by adequate methods of tested discovery."² Reflection upon probable consequences of possible courses of action and testing the one selected is the method of knowledge making.

Breed. Reality simply "is," and truth "is a quality of an idea or proposition referring to reality."³ Truth is dependent upon the conformity to objective fact, "the ultimate determinant of the truth of an idea is . . . something beyond mere personal satisfaction, something external to the personality and not dependent upon it, something that can be definitely referred to as an objective fact."⁴

Horne. Consciousness develops from "sensation and movement." The principle of "self-activity" is "the central principle in consciousness." This principle is itself "the root of all knowledge, feeling, and will."⁵

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 393.

²Ibid., p. 223.

³Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 51.

⁴Ibid., p. 35.

⁵Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 170.

Since the mind knows only perceptions, it can have no knowledge of material nature. For man, then, all reality is mental or spiritual.

Summary. While Dewey holds that knowledge is made through experience, and that it is not a process of discovery, Breed and Horne hold that knowledge is strictly discovered by man. Man does not create knowledge, but rather he becomes aware of pre-existent knowledge, say Breed and Horne. Dewey holds the basis of knowledge to be reflection and action in testing hypotheses; Breed holds the basis of knowledge to be conformity to objective fact, and Horne holds the principle of "self-activity" to be the root of all knowledge.

Nature of Reality.

Dewey. Experience is the whole of encountered reality. Reality itself is experience. It is a kind of interaction, but not an interaction of entities, objects, or bodies. The interaction itself is experience, and experience is the "world of events and persons" and "the career and destiny of man."⁶

Breed. Physical reality is the fundamental fact underlying experience. The world is a result of an evolutionary process, and man "is included among the forces of emergent evolution." But he has been "a relatively insignificant factor."⁷ One of the characteristics of nature is "endurance" or "eternality."⁸

Horne. Matter is "ultimately a process of thought in the consciousness of God."⁹ Purposes and ideas are "the realities of existence," and

⁶Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 28.

⁷Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 50.

⁸Ibid., p. 48.

⁹Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 170.

"personality" is "the union of ideas and purposes" which constitutes "the ultimate reality."¹⁰ The "origin of man is God, the nature of man is freedom, and the destiny of man is immortality."¹¹

Summary. Dewey and Breed both believe that the world is a result of evolution, yet each has his own interpretation of the term "evolution." Dewey holds that all nature is a continuity of events, and that experience is "the world of events and persons," the whole of encountered reality. Breed holds that the world is a result of an evolutionary process of which man has been a relatively insignificant factor, with physical reality as the fundamental fact underlying experience. Horne holds that matter is ultimately a process of thought in the consciousness of God, the origin of man is God, the nature of man is freedom, and the destiny of man is immortality.

Nature of Value.

Dewey. Values are neither absolute nor eternal, but relative both with reference to space and time. The good is the satisfactory, and the satisfactory is what is satisfying both immediately and in its probable consequences. Science determines what is of value through experimentation to ascertain probable consequences. Reflection is always a part of the scientific process.

Breed. Man naturally seeks his welfare and self-preservation, which are the real goods of life. Those things are valuable which promote the welfare and happiness of society. Included among the types of situations

¹⁰Ibid., p. 270.

¹¹Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 284.

which attract humans are satisfaction of physical hunger, freedom, peace, knowledge, and reason.

Horne. Values have their origin and culmination in God. The good for man is to become adjusted to his "spiritual environment," which includes the intellectual, which is "power to know," the emotional, which is "power to feel," and the volitional, which is the "power to will."¹² The types of human ideals are "the scholar, the gentleman, and . . . the Christian."¹³ These correspond to the spiritual ideals which are "truth, beauty, and goodness."

Summary. Bread and Horne hold that values are absolute. They are not made by man, but man is made aware of pre-existent value. Dewey, on the other hand, believes that value is relative to space and time and determined by that which will produce satisfactory consequences.

Educational Concepts Derived from Fundamental Concepts
Present in at Least One of the Philosophies
Which are Contradictory to or Incompatible
with Fundamental Concepts of at Least
One of the Alternative Philosophies

Freedom and Control.

Dewey. The student participates more willingly in social experiences if he is allowed freedom. Moreover, an enforced atmosphere of quiet in the schoolroom is artificial, and not like real life. Mental activity finds more fertile ground for developing in a situation where there is physical freedom. Physical freedom is a means to an end, namely, intellectual freedom.

¹²Ibid., p. 226.

¹³Ibid.

For freedom from restriction, the negative side, is to be prized only as a means to a freedom which is power; power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends to operation.¹⁴

Breed. There must be some curb on individual impulse and spontaneity; otherwise anarchy would result. If the student were allowed unbridled freedom, and the motto "obey that impulse" were to be observed, the result would be anarchy. Since the teacher is to render guidance in assisting the student to master the cultural tradition, such guidance means there will be a lessening of pupil freedom. This means there will be restriction upon physical activity. Excessive physical activity may be injurious to the student, for

. . . the educator will understand, also, that the horizon of the pupil's knowledge may commonly be widened without the detailed process of gross physical action and personal discovery. In fact, he will be aware that concrete objects and gross physical activity may injure in excess, and that language increasingly provides a substitute for overt activity as the child matures.¹⁵

Summary. Dewey advocates encouragement of freedom on the part of pupils. He believes that freedom is necessary for mental activity, thinking, problem-solving. Breed, however, feels that control is more important than freedom for the consequences of freedom would be anarchy.

Growth and Preparation.

Dewey. "The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end."¹⁶ Further, "when and only when development . . . conduces

¹⁴Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 15.

¹⁵Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 53.

¹⁶Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 59.

to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing."¹⁷

Breed. Subject matter is of great importance, since subject matter is the cultural tradition to be transmitted to the student. Mastery of this tradition, which represents the finest fruits of human thought is "a supreme educational objective; the activities of the learner, the mode of mastery." Furthermore, "One furnishes the goal of growth; the other the method of approach. The two are related as ends and means."¹⁸

Horne. Education transmits the social inheritance to the student, and is of the nature of mental growth in the direction of the spiritual environment. It is development, not moulding. In this development the potential becomes the actual. But education should not lose sight of the fact that this development, which occurs according to successive stages of growth, needs a goal beyond itself.

Summary. Dewey does not conceive of education as preparation, but as a process of growth. He believes that the process is all-important, that what is good arises within the process, that simply continuing to grow has a value in giving rise to values. Breed and Horne, on the other hand, hold that education is preparation. While they agree that it is a growth, the value is not in the growth as such, but growth is the means to an end.

Interest and Effort.

Dewey. Interest and effort are connected. Interest means "the

¹⁷Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 29.

¹⁸Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 228.

point at which an object touches a man, and . . . the attitude of absorption."¹⁹ The child's interests will help determine his participation in social experiences. Effort is voluntary when interest is present.

Breed. The student should not be allowed to follow his own interests and inclinations. Since the school is to transmit the cultural heritage to the student, pupil interest will not be catered to. "Guidance represents a healthy mistrust of the dependability of such interests."²⁰

Horne. The experiences of the race should be made available to the student. Therefore, student interest should not be the primary consideration of educators. Effort is to be put forth in some cases whether there is interest or not. For "effort may lead to interest . . . even if interest never comes as a result of effort in such cases, still the obligatory thing must be done."²¹

Summary. Dewey, on the one hand, believes that pupil interest should be recognized and respected, for he believes that by following his own interests the student will participate more freely in social experiences. He also feels that effort will naturally follow interest. Breed and Horne, on the other hand, believe that pupil interest should not determine school experiences since the school is transmitting the cultural heritage to the student. Horne feels that in some instances effort will be arrayed against interest.

¹⁹Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 148.

²⁰Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 214.

²¹Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 313.

Fundamental Concepts Acceptable to All

Value of Individual Members of Society.

Dewey. The task of education is the development of the individual members of society to the utmost of their potentialities.²² Individual differences and the diversity of capacities of human beings should constitute important concerns of the teacher, since the individual is of incomparable worth.

Breed. The demands of society as a whole and the value of individual members of society should both be recognized by the educator. "The realist . . . defers to no one in his enthusiasm for the salvation of individual souls and offers an educational program designed to bring them into greener pastures or a safer haven in the end."²³

Horne. Each individual member of society is of incomparable importance, yet each member should become adjusted to his "spiritual environment." Authoritarianism is objectionable, since it is unduly repressive of the individual. "Authority is to be upheld when its principles are true; individuality is to be asserted against false propositions, whether in theory or practice."²⁴

Summary. Agreement is reached among the three philosophies in their recognition of the value of the individual member of society. Each one offers a program that stresses a respect for the individual and an attempt to equip the individual to take his particular place in society.

²²Supra, p. 30.

²³Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 226.

²⁴Horne, The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 420.

The Social Nature of Human Experience.

Dewey. The development of the young by the mature members of society is the method by which society perpetuates itself. Human beings associated with each other live in a social environment. "The aim of education is social. The acquisition of skills is not an end in itself. They are things to be put to use, and their use is their contribution to a common and shared life."²⁵ An individual cannot be regarded as a being apart from society.

Breed. The social aspect of human experience is of much importance, since the good of society outweighs the good of the individual. "Obviously, common interests take precedence for the same reason that ten dollars outvalues one."²⁶ Human experience is social in nature, for the human values are the social values, i.e. the greater well-being, welfare, happiness of society.

Horne. Human experience is itself social in nature. Hence, it is very important that the experiences of the race be placed at the disposition of the young members. Society attempts to realize their ideals through the education of the young. This is done through the "spiritual environment" of the pupil. This includes the relationships in which man stands to his fellow man. The best individual is the highly socialized individual. "Education is the individualizing of society as well as the socializing of the individual."²⁷

Summary. There is agreement among the philosophers as to the social nature of human experience. Each one recognizes man as a social creature.

²⁵Dewey, Education Today, p. 296.

²⁶Breed, Education and the New Realism, p. 119.

²⁷Horne, Idealism in Education, p. 126.

Also, each stresses the importance of social adjustments, of participating in society, of sharing with the other members of society.

Educational Concepts Derived From Fundamental Concepts
Acceptable to All

Exercise of Some Control.

Dewey. Control is exercised by the adult, who has had more experience than the student. The more mature member of society has responsibility to assist the student in using freedom and interest in such a way that the student grows in social effectiveness.²⁸ The educator should be able to judge what attitudes and tendencies are conducive to growth in the proper direction, and exercise control in order that these attitudes and tendencies will be developed.²⁹

Breed. The exercise of control is not only valuable, but is essential, since the standards of conduct which are exhibited in the cultural tradition or in the experiences of the race must be passed on to the student if education is to accomplish its purposes.³⁰ Some curb on individual impulse and spontaneity is necessary, else anarchy would result. Also, some control is necessary or the student would be likely to commit many errors and fail to do many things that he should do.³¹

Horne. Control must hold the major place in the educative process in order that the experiences of the race be placed at the disposition of its young members.³² The knowledge of the past is so vast that it is

²⁸Supra, p. 47.

²⁹Supra, p. 47.

³⁰Supra, p. 62.

³¹Supra, p. 56.

³²Supra, p. 68.

unlikely the individual can rediscover it all for himself without the imposition of control.³³

Summary. Although the amount of control advocated is not the same for Dewey as it is for Breed and Horne, nevertheless, there is agreement among all three that the school is contributing to the moral development of the student through the exercise of some control. Such control would not only make available to the student the culture of the race, but would also assist in developing a respect for other kinds of control, i.e. parental control, legal control, and social control. A respect for these kinds of control would make the student a better member of the family unit, a law-abiding citizen, and a more cooperative member of society. The right use of control can best be taught through the example of the teacher in teacher-pupil relationships, and by the school administration through its policies governing control.

Discipline to Carry Through with a Purpose.

Dewey. When obstacles arise between the beginning and ending of an activity, deliberation and persistence are required. Such deliberation and persistence is discipline to carry through with a purpose.³⁴ When a person has intelligently chosen a course of action and has the power to endure in the face of difficulties and distractions, he is disciplined.³⁵ Such discipline arises out of interest.

Breed. Discipline is "arrayed against interest"; it does not arise from it. Discipline is arrayed against interest because of the "veto

³³Supra, p. 66.

³⁴Supra, p. 48.

³⁵Supra, p. 48.

power" of the facts of objective reality. Discipline is necessary in order that the cultural heritage be transmitted to the student.³⁶ The student must persevere in his effort to master the heritage of the race.

Horne. Some things are obligatory, some things must be done. Therefore, the development of perseverance, a discipline to carry through with a purpose, is important. "Discipline in doing the disagreeable that is necessary is worth while, that effort may lead to interest, that even if interest never comes as a result of effort in such cases, still the obligatory thing must be done."³⁷

Summary. Dewey holds that discipline arises out of interest. Breed holds that discipline is arrayed against interest. And Horne holds that discipline is necessary whether interest is present or not. Yet there is mutual agreement that discipline to carry through with a purpose assists the student in his moral development. They agree that such a discipline could be developed through any activity of the school, whether in the classroom or outside the classroom. It would assist the student in reaching worth-while goals in his personal, social, or economic life. There would be the development of perseverance in achieving vocational fitness, a stick-to-itiveness in participating in mutually beneficial community projects, a determination to achieve acceptable forms of personal morality.

Sensitiveness or Conscientiousness.

Dewey. There should be a development of sensitiveness towards the

³⁶Supra, p. 57.

³⁷Supra, p. 66.

legitimate claims of others, a sympathetic attitude towards others, or compassion and responsiveness to the interests of others.³⁸ Force of character should never be misused to the point that it ignores or harms the interests of others. On the contrary, character should include a personal responsiveness and a sympathetic openness to the claims which others make upon the individual.³⁹

Breed. Sensitiveness to others is important in promoting the general welfare. An awareness of the claims of others should be respected, since that which is conducive to the greater well-being, the happiness of society, is of supreme importance.⁴⁰ In the transmission of the cultural heritage those attitudes which have proved to be of most worth to human personality are to be nurtured.

Horne. Sympathy for and understanding of others are among the cherished ideals of the race.⁴¹ The individual is to become adjusted to his environment, which includes all relations in which man stands to his fellow man. Such adjustment includes a sensitiveness to the legitimate claims that other members of society make upon the individual.

Summary. All three philosophies are interested in the good of society. Each one holds that the good of society is being served when a consideration for the individual members of society is shown. Such a consideration involves a sensitiveness toward the legitimate claims of others. An understanding or appreciation of this sensitiveness contributes directly to the development of the social morality and directly

³⁸Supra, p. 49.

³⁹Supra, p. 49.

⁴⁰Supra, p. 60.

⁴¹Supra, p. 66.

or indirectly to the political morality of the student. In the study of history and literature especially, attention could be given to social values in the developing American tradition. Although this should be an objective study, it would be a study concerning social values. Such matters as racial prejudice, classes of society, human rights, the basis of our modern conception of law, and trial by jury would provide a starting point for a study of social morality.

Intellectual Honesty.

Dewey. The scientific method is the method of solving problems. This method includes a recognition of the problem, a consideration of alternative courses of action, with the probable consequences attendant upon each course of action, and the selection of the one most likely to bring satisfactory consequences.⁴² The use of the scientific method means that the individual must be objective, scrupulous, honest in each of these steps. The individual is honest with himself as he evaluates the situation, the possible courses of action, the consequences of each, and the choosing of that one which will produce the most satisfactory consequences. The development of intellectual honesty is necessary in the use of the scientific method for problem-solving.

Breed. Intellectual honesty is an essential ingredient of scientific experimentation. For it is only when such honesty is maintained that knowledge about objective reality can be ascertained. Dishonesty would eventually be deposed when it is brought face to face with true reality. The scientific approach would lose its validity unless intellectual honesty is applied to its method in attempting to determine the facts of reality.

⁴²Supra, p. 49.

Horne. Intellectual honesty is essential in the training of the capacity for judgment. Such judgment is to report facts as they are, to see their meaning, to foresee their consequences.⁴³ This necessitates honesty at every point if the judgment is to be valid.

Summary. An aspect of scientific method is objectivity, say Dewey and Breed. A part of judgment or reflection is a careful evaluation of all available data, say Dewey and Horne. Both objectivity and evaluation of data require intellectual honesty in dealing with facts and in the attempt to interpret the facts. All three philosophies are in agreement, therefore, that the development of intellectual honesty contributes to the moral development of the student. Such an attitude about or appreciation for intellectual honesty can best be taught in the natural sciences where the results of honesty and dishonesty can best be illustrated. In the social sciences and literature an objective study of the types of solution of problems of personal morality would develop an understanding of objectivity and evaluation in such problem-solving.

Reflection.

Dewey. By reflection one makes use of scientific knowledge, one's own past experience, and one's intelligence in considering his conduct.⁴⁴ Good judgment, which is reflection upon values, is to be put to use for accomplishment of some purpose. Since the power of judgment comes only by forming and testing judgments on the basis of their consequences, the school should provide opportunity for the development of judgment.⁴⁵

⁴³Supra, p. 76.

⁴⁴Supra, p. 49.

⁴⁵Supra, p. 49.

Breed. Science is a fundamental discipline. To discover the nature of reality through science it is necessary carefully to evaluate all available data, and to proceed on the basis of what the data show.⁴⁶ Such a process involves reflection as one of its methods. The school should attempt to develop reflection on the part of the student as it transmits the best of the cultural heritage to him.

Horne. The ability to judge well comes from training.⁴⁷ Such training helps the student to report facts, to develop a foresight that enables him to foresee consequences, and to make worthy characters the object of endeavor.⁴⁸ "It is judgment that distinguishes the true from the false, the beautiful from the ugly, and the good from the evil."⁴⁹

Summary. Each of the three philosophies holds that the development of the ability to judge critically, to evaluate, is desirable, that this ability helps the student to foresee consequences of probable courses of action and to select those courses that produce satisfactory (for Dewey) or true (for Horne) consequences. Opportunities for the development of this ability may be found in that phase of the curriculum that allows for group participation, outside activities, student initiative, or the like.

Effective Social Participation.

Dewey. The moral end of the school is to develop the student to

⁴⁶Supra, pp. 55, 60.

⁴⁷Supra, p. 76.

⁴⁸Supra, p. 76.

⁴⁹Supra, p. 76.

participate in social life.⁵⁰ All morals are grounded in social relationships. The skills which the school helps to develop are to be put to use in shared social experiences.⁵¹ The growth of the individual comes about through participation in social experiences.⁵² The good is the satisfaction of society in welfare and happiness.⁵³ One of the positive goods already in existence, "social companionship,"⁵⁴ which is a desire for the companionship of others, is a sharing in a common cultural heritage.

Breed. The general welfare is sought as naturally as self-preservation. Therefore, the student is to learn those things which will contribute to the welfare of society.⁵⁵ Those things have proved to be of worth to human personality, technical skill and knowledge, attitudes and appreciations, customs and laws are common social values. To morally participate in society, then, one must do those things which contribute to the general welfare.⁵⁶

Horne. The student must be prepared to take his place in society, to become adjusted to his environment.⁵⁷ This environment includes all relations in which man stands to his fellow man. It includes the

⁵⁰Supra, pp. 29, 49, 50.

⁵¹Supra, p. 29.

⁵²Supra, p. 30.

⁵³Supra, p. 39.

⁵⁴Supra, p. 47.

⁵⁵Supra, p. 59.

⁵⁶Supra, p. 59.

⁵⁷Supra, p. 68.

achievement of the race to which the child belongs.⁵⁸ The adjustment of the individual to such an environment involves participation in the experiences of the race and a relationship with other members of the society to which the individual belongs.

Summary. There is agreement among the philosophies that the student should learn to participate in society. For Dewey such participation is necessary if the student is to grow in the right direction. For Breed, participation in society promotes the general welfare. For Horne, participation helps adjust the individual to his spiritual environment. Even though the reasons for participation differ, the fact remains that each philosophy holds that the school should contribute to the moral development of the individual as it helps the student in effective social participation. This aspect of student morality may be developed through vocational studies, as they prepare the students for economic independence, which is itself dependent upon social participation. The schools can provide clubs, societies, or other organizations which give opportunity for social intercourse among the students. Student participation in class and group projects allow opportunities for the student to learn social participation.

Conclusions

It has been shown that disagreements and agreements exist both in fundamental concepts and in educational concepts derived from such fundamental concepts that pertain to the moral development of the student. Concerning fundamental concepts, pragmatism is naturalistic

⁵⁸Supra, p. 66.

in that it asserts that nature is inclusive of all reality. It is humanistic in that it holds man to be self-sufficient in his attempt to solve all of his problems, there being no Higher Power upon whom he can depend. It is pragmatic in that it regards the value of a course of action to be determined by its consequences in practice, by its practical consequences. Idealism is theistic in that it esteems God as the self-conscious unity of all reality. It is idealistic in that it holds the essential reality to be mental. It is transcendent in that it regards values as having their origin and culmination in God. Realism is realistic in that it considers physical reality to be the fundamental fact of experience. It is evolutionistic in that it holds that the world is a result of evolutionary processes and that man himself is included among the forces of emergent evolution. It is objectivistic in that it regards the truth of a value to be determined by its conformity to or consistency with external reality.

Concerning educational concepts derived from fundamental concepts, pragmatism favors pupil freedom as a means to intellectual freedom, as providing more fertile ground for mental activity. Breed believes that control is more important than freedom, holding that the consequences of absolute freedom would be anarchy. Dewey conceives education to be a process of growth, believing that simply continuing to grow is itself a value. Breed and Horne hold that education is preparation. They agree that it is a growth, but do not regard the value as in the growth as such, but in that to which the growth leads and in which it culminates. Dewey believes that pupil interest should be respected; for, by allowing the student to follow his own interest, he will participate more freely in social experiences. He also argues that effort develops through interest. Breed and Horne believe that pupil interest should not

determine school experiences, since the school has responsibility for transmitting the cultural heritage to the student.

While it can be seen that each of the three philosophies considered has basic premises which are fundamentally opposed to each other and educational concepts which are fundamentally opposed to each other, there are some things upon which there is agreement both as to principle and as to method. All three philosophies recognize that the school should help the student in his moral development in the following ways:

1. Through Exercise of Some Control. Dewey favors the exercise of control by the adult since the adult has had more experience than the student and should be able to judge what direction pupil growth is taking. Control is used in order that pupil growth may be in the proper direction. Breed favors the exercise of control over the student in order that the standards of conduct which are exhibited in the cultural tradition may be passed on to the student. He also believes that unless some curb on individual impulse and spontaneity were placed, anarchy would result. Horne holds that control must be exercised in order that the experiences of the race may be placed at the disposition of its young members. He believes that the school can best exercise control through the right use of teacher-pupil relationships and through the proper administration of school policies.

2. Through Discipline to Carry Through with a Purpose. Dewey considers persistence in pursuing an activity in the face of obstacles as discipline. Such discipline is necessary for pursuing an intelligently chosen course of action. Breed believes that discipline is necessary in order that the cultural heritage be transmitted to the student. Horne holds that some things are obligatory, some things must be done, regardless of individual preference. He favors the development

of discipline that leads to doing the disagreeable but necessary. Such discipline, he concludes, may be developed by the school through activities carried on by the student both within the classroom and without.

3. Through Development of Sensitiveness or Conscientiousness.

Dewey believes that a sensitiveness towards the legitimate claims of others should be developed by each student. This is a responsiveness or compassion for the interests of others. Breed favors that which would be conducive to the general welfare, the well-being, or happiness of society. Those attitudes which have proved to be of most worth to human personality are to be nurtured. Horne says the individual is to become adjusted to his environment, which includes all relations in which man stands to his fellow-man. Such adjustment would include a sensitiveness to the legitimate claims that other members of society make upon the individual. The study of history and literature would provide a basis for an objective study of social morality in the developing American tradition. The social sciences provide opportunities for attention to social values.

4. Through Development of Intellectual Honesty. Dewey commits himself to the use of the scientific method in the solution of problems. The development of intellectual honesty is necessary in the use of the scientific method. Breed is also committed to the scientific method which necessitates the development of intellectual honesty if the results are to be valid. Horne favors the training of the capacity for judgment. Such judgment is to report facts as they are, to see their meaning. This means that intellectual honesty must be developed if the judgment is to be valid. This kind of morality can best be taught in the natural sciences where the results of honesty and dishonesty can

best be illustrated. In the social sciences and literature an objective study of the types of solution of problems of personal morality would develop an understanding of objectivity and evaluation in such problem-solving.

5. Through the Development of Reflection. Dewey considers reflection as part of the scientific approach to knowledge. Through reflection the individual can use his intelligence in considering his conduct. Breed favors the use of the scientific method in the attempt to discover the nature of reality. This means that there must be a careful evaluation of all available data, and a proceeding on the basis of what the data revealed. Such a process would involve reflection as one of its methods. Horne believes that an ability to form judgment should be developed. Reflection is part of the ability to judge well. Such ability helps the student to report facts, to develop a foresight that enables him to foresee consequences. The school can give the student opportunities to form judgments and to reflect upon their consequences. This can be done through an emphasis upon activities that require student initiative. Through the study of historical or literary characters the student would see the result of selecting certain courses of action, and would develop a reflection upon consequences when similar circumstances occur in his own life.

6. Effective Social Participation. Dewey says the moral end of the school is to develop the student to participate in social experiences. The skills which the school helps to develop are to be put to use in shared social experiences. Breed believes that to morally participate in society one must do those things which contribute to the general welfare. Horne believes the student must be prepared to take his place in society, to become adjusted to his environment. This environment

includes all relations in which man stands to his fellow man. The school can contribute to the effective socialization of the student through the vocational subjects which prepares the student to take his place in the economic scene. Further, the schools may provide clubs, societies, or other organizations which give opportunity for social intercourse among the students. Student participation in class and group projects will allow opportunities for the student to learn social participation.

Thus it can be seen that there is actual agreement among the philosophies in certain areas which pertain to the moral development of the student. Furthermore, this agreement can be identified and expressed. It is clear from the evidence presented that these points of agreement offer grounds for a common school program in the area of moral development. Such a program if initiated would probably go beyond what is being done at the present. The possibility should be considered that out of such a program might come further compromise and expansion in this important function of the public school.

The net conclusion is that there is agreement among the philosophers whose philosophies have been analyzed in this thesis that (1) a good public school program would include provision for moral development; (2) that the features of such moral development would include the exercise of some control and the development of (a) discipline to carry through with a purpose, (b) intellectual honesty, (c) sensitiveness to the claims of others, (d) reflection, and (e) social participation; (3) that such features would not strictly be aims of education, for although Horne and Breed would not object to calling them aims, Dewey would object to regarding any particular values as aims of education; (4) that moral development would occur in a good public school

educational program as an incidental result of a program involving problem-solving.

Possible Applications

A public school program congenial to the conclusions summarized above might be organized in various ways and might include a wide variety of content. Following is an example of a type of possible application to a public school program of these conclusions. It should be emphasized that the program described is an illustration only of a possible application, surely not the only possible acceptable application.

1. It would be a program in which as full advantage as practicable would be taken of the experiences that human beings have had in coping with their environment, social and physical. Opportunity would be afforded at every level for the student to share in the experiences not only of his immediate associates or even of his contemporaries, but in the experiences of those who have gone before him, of those who have struggled with difficulties comparable in varying degrees with his own, and who have reached solutions to their problems which were more or less successful. Broad area inquiries of a type suggested by the following possible titles would provide one acceptable way of accomplishing the result described: "Man and Civilization," "Man and Nature," "Contemporary Civilization," "Man's Struggle Toward a Better Life." Such inquiries would concentrate the attention of the student, not primarily upon a segment of life or a limited aspect of life, such as political history, history of art, or economic history, but upon the interrelatedness of the various features of contemporary civilization. Attention would be directed to the backgrounds that have most deeply affected the

developments that have occurred and that represent typical solutions to problems that have been dealt with, especially to problems that are recurrent or that bear some clear similarity to present problems.

2. It would be a program which would concentrate upon the seriousness of man's present predicament. It would, thus, emphasize the importance of intellectualizing difficulties and, thus, of translating the difficulties into problems. It would make the school a place of work, a place in which the students would be engaged in persistent effort to find or create solutions to their problems, which would involve the problems both of the immediate group and of the larger group that is society. Full attention would be given to the importance of the individual in dealing with the problems of the modern world. Activities with little, if any, bearing upon the more fundamental personal and social problems would be discouraged. In other words, all life in the school and all activities in the school would be purposeful, would have a serious purpose, and one recognized, insofar as possible, by the student as of concern to him.

3. It would be a program in which emphasis would be placed upon the development of an appreciation of personal morality. It would involve a consideration of the main types of solution of problems of personal morality that have been used in earlier and other contemporary societies as well as those present in contemporary America. Objectivity would be stressed in studying such solutions. This purpose would be accomplished primarily as a dimension of other concerns rather than as a separate course. It would be assumed that any human problem has moral overtones, has moral bearings, and that in dealing with problems the moral overtones and bearings would simply be given serious attention.

Thus, an effort would be made to evaluate, to see the relationship or relationships, if any, between the types of solution of problems of personal morality in the lives of others and problems of such nature as might arise in the life of the student.

4. It would be a program in which the student acquires an understanding of his responsibility in the society of which he is a part and an appreciation of the importance of social participation. Emphasis would, therefore, be given both to the subjects of social rights and obligations. It would involve attitudes concerning public morality, such as those pertaining to classes of society and to attitudes with respect to religion, occupations, and race. Attention would be given to the development of social values in history, to such matters of broad human concern as the basis of modern conceptions of law, the development of the idea of human rights in general and of particular human rights such as are expressed in the Bill of Rights, the concept of laissez faire, and other related concepts. Such a program would stress the fact that participation in society involves contributing to the social welfare. It would stress the point that to receive the benefits from society imposes obligations to contribute to society. Here again, such topics would be considered as a part of and in connection with other problems. They would be regarded as aspects of problems as they appear.

5. It would be a program in which there would be the development of an understanding and appreciation of economic morality. Consideration would be given to the relationship between social participation and economic production. Every individual would be encouraged to develop his abilities and potentialities for economic participation to the fullest, not only for his own benefit, but for the benefit of society. In his

developing appreciation of economic morality the student should learn that the recipient of the benefits of any given economy owes to that economy his own participation.

6. It would be a program designed to develop in the student the ability to judge well. As the student, in dealing with contemporary problems, is introduced to the experiences of the race, both past and present, emphasis would be placed upon his developing skill in judging between alternatives, in making choices in every-day matters. As he is confronted with a multiplicity of choices he gradually acquires ability to choose more wisely. Practice in making decisions would, therefore, be a part of the program. Such a program in the public schools would present opportunities for evaluating facts, for making and testing hypotheses, for developing an attitude of careful reflection upon possible choices. The program, moreover, would be designed to train the student to utilize all available data in formulating hypotheses. On the basis of these data and other pertinent information, the student would learn to judge and select those courses that will serve well in meeting his own needs and those of society.

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VITA

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Doctor of Education

Thesis: PUBLIC SCHOOL RESPONSIBILITY IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT: A SYNTHESIS
BASED UPON AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES

Major Field: Philosophy

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