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Jackson College of Graduate Studies & Research

**Paranoid Politics:**

**A comparison of the use of fear during the Cold War and the Global War on Terror using  
the Paranoid Style of American Politics**

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Political Science

By

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
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
A Thesis

Approved for the Department of Political Science

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## **Abstract**

Two of the most frightening time periods in modern America have occurred in close proximity to each other. The Cold War pitted the United States against a fierce ideological competitor that pointed its weapons of mass destruction at the United States and its allies. Shortly after its demise, the new great threat to peace emerged in the form of terrorism. These two enemies spur and foster a certain type of politics and rhetorical approach that shapes not only international relations but also domestic policies. Comparing these two periods alone does not offer the best analysis and approach to understanding certain changes in policies. In order to do this, Richard Hofstadter's article explaining the Paranoid Style in American politics will be examined first, after which a comparison between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror can be made by looking at the rhetoric and the policies, and how these are examples of the Paranoid Style.

## **Introduction and purpose**

It was President Franklin Roosevelt who stated "...the only thing we have to fear is fear itself", contending that politics is not immune from emotion. In fact, emotions have been used to influence policy on several occasions, with many of those situations involving catastrophes and retaliation. For example, the sinking of the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, the Oklahoma City bombings, 9-11-01, and even wildfires in the western portion of the United States sparked a type of response that was fueled by how people felt about these disasters. The question to ask is what kind of policy result should the American people expect when emotions are involved in the policy's formation?

This study will look at two time frames to investigate the policy results of fear: the Cold War, and the Global War on Terror. These two eras will provide case studies in which the central question can be asked: how has the rhetoric of fear, or about fear, changed from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror? To answer this question, a model will be formed based on Richard Hofstadter's article titled "The Paranoid Style of American Politics" that will then be applied to each time period to provide evidence of the way in which policy mechanisms either quell or encourage action by emphasizing fear.

The objective of this thesis is to examine this fundamental shift in rhetoric and policy and draw conclusions between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror about legislating off of emotion. During the Cold War, fear was a security measure that stopped people from acting irrationally and spawned policies to follow this emotional lead. On the other hand, fear has emerged as a tool or as a weapon during the Global War on Terror for policy reform and international action. In both of these cases, the paranoid style model that will be presented can help explain how the periods were framed.

## **The Paranoid Style of American Politics**

Richard Hofstadter identifies a style of politics in America that is very applicable to the topic at hand. His analysis of American politics focuses on extremist rhetoric that sparks “the sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”<sup>1</sup> from the beginning of American politics up until 1964. The examples that he uses to illustrate this paranoid style range from Illumism and the Illuminati, anti-Catholic pogroms, and McCarthyism. Any time extremist rhetoric was used as a means to achieve a certain political goal against a specific group of people, Hofstadter claims that it is evidence of a paranoid style being used. This style of politics is not based on truth or falsity, but in how ideas are communicated to the public and how they elicit a reaction among the populous that, although exhibiting paranoid tendencies, promotes the passage of legislation.

The paranoid style requires a conspiracy to establish the roles everyone is expected to play, with people falling into one of two categories: “us”, or “them”. Categorizing in this manner necessitates that an unambiguous definition of conflict, or the conspiracy, is given so that there is no doubt left as to who the participants are.

The conspiracies that Hofstadter outlines are extreme right-wing conspiracy that can be summarized by three elements. The first element of the conspiracy states that there is a movement to “undermine free capitalism”<sup>2</sup>, or that the American way of life is under threat of being destroyed. This is the foundation for the rest of the conspiracy and is essential to remind Americans that their particular way of life is at threat of being demolished by agents of an oppressive regime, or by other actors that resent the American way of life. The second element is that the enemies are infiltrating the top levels of government. Once entrenched in their positions

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<sup>1</sup> Hofstadter, Richard. 1964. “The Paranoid Style of American Politics”. Harper’s Magazine. Pg 77-86. Accessed at <http://neuralgourmet.com/2008/05/09/paranoidstyle/> July 9, 2008.

<sup>2</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

of power they are completely able to “shrewdly and consistently sell[ing] out American national interests.”<sup>3</sup> Referring to spies or moles within the structure of the government simply allows the enemy an inside track for them to exploit American policy. The final element of the conspiracy theory is that “the country is infused with a network of [enemy] agents...so that the whole apparatus of education, religion, the press, and the mass media is engaged in a common effort to paralyze the resistance of loyal Americans”<sup>4</sup>. Meaning that no element of American society is safe or free from attack or manipulation, the enemies will use whatever tool they can to undermine American values. To perpetuate this conspiracy theory, the paranoid must re-affirm to the people that enemies, in fact, exist, and their sole aim is to undermine or take over the country by either legitimate means or force. The paranoid does not just spout out his theory of the other attempting to ruin the world that we know. It is much more formulaic according to Hofstadter. Using what is at the paranoids’ disposal, they will frame the world in an “Us versus Them” situation and forces those involved to pick a single side. But if the side of the paranoid is not chosen, then that person is obviously against them. For instance, it is as if he is saying to those who believe in what he is speaking about, that if you do not believe him and his theory about the world, then it is obvious that you are a part of the attempt to destroy that world. The conspiracy offered is quite radical and rigid with little room to move or for alternatives to spring up.

The question that arises is, “What type of person is this ‘paranoid’?” Before the characteristics of the paranoid are described, it is important to note that the paranoid person in politics is significantly different than a person who is disturbed in the mind. As Ellington points out, it is not the mentally ill that make the paranoid style, but “[I]t is the use of paranoid modes

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<sup>3</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

<sup>4</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

of expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon significant.”<sup>5</sup> The paranoid is not someone who is bound to paranoia as a mental illness, but is a willing participant in constructing a society around the paranoid style. It is that desire, or volition, that distinguishes the paranoid as a political description from the psychological. Forcibly creating a paranoid atmosphere, as Ellington argues, is a controlled action of withholding information that allows people to buy into conspiracy theories<sup>6</sup>. Conspiracy theories thrive on the withholding of information to the general public, and it is in these conspiracy theories that the paranoid style can take hold and begin to grow.

There are two distinct characteristics of a person who is in the paranoid style in American politics that are outlined in this model. The first characteristic of the paranoid is that he or she speaks of the world in fatal apocalyptic terms. Essentially, the paranoid will speak of the threats to his way of life by speaking of the enemy as a threat to “the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human values.”<sup>7</sup> In doing, so he will bring out other paranoids, anxious to turn them to see the world as he does. The paranoid can speak of the apocalypse in several different ways. It does not necessarily mean that the world will be destroyed, or that the anti-Christ will rise to oppress mankind; what it does mean is that the world, as “we” know it will be changed forever. For example, Hofstadter stated that phrases such as “Evidence is piling up on many sides and from many sources that October 1952 is the fatal month when Stalin will attack”<sup>8</sup> is evidence of the paranoid style by speaking in terms of apocalypse.

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<sup>5</sup> Ellington, Thomas. 2003. *Won't Get Fooled Again: The Paranoid Style in the National Security State*. Government and Opposition Ltd. 436-455. Pg 438.

<sup>6</sup> Ellington. Pg 442.

<sup>7</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

<sup>8</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

The second characteristic is that a person in the paranoid style is a militant leader who will only accept total victory. There is no room for any compromise, nor can any partial victory be obtained without the possibility for chaos to ensue. Unfortunately, accepting anything but total victory leads to extreme goals. The aim of the militant leader is that the enemy must be totally eliminated, lest the remaining find another gathering and the whole process starts over again. The fight against the enemy is then framed in the battle between absolute good and absolute evil. Since the enemy is total evil, it is necessary for “good people” to remove the evil enemy from the “theatre of operation”<sup>9</sup>. Unfortunately this type of thinking, “leads to the formulation of hopelessly unrealistic goals, and since these goals are not even remotely attainable, failure constantly heightens the paranoid’s sense of frustration. Even partial success leaves him with the same feeling of powerlessness with which he began...”<sup>10</sup>

Hofstadter states that the enemy is “on many counts the projection of the self; both the ideal and the unacceptable aspects of the self are attributed to him.”<sup>11</sup> Having the enemy allows the paranoid to exist and to advocate his stance toward the world and pass his agenda based on the enemy’s actions. Without a specified enemy that is threatening society, the paranoid has no ground to stand on, or an enemy to emulate. As stated before, the enemy is “a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman – sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving.”<sup>12</sup> The enemy also is the type of person that will cause chaos at whims by facilitating “runs on banks, causing depressions, and manufacturing disasters”<sup>13</sup>. The enemy also is capable of covering up his tracks, or placing the blame of its misdeeds on other people by infiltrating the necessary businesses or outlets that is able to do this. For example, take the common debate

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<sup>9</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

<sup>10</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

<sup>11</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

<sup>12</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.

<sup>13</sup> Hofstadter. 1964.



between liberals and conservatives in America over media bias. Conservatives claim that their voices will not be heard favorably because of the liberal run media. This is a far stretch from saying that they are mortal enemies and if one or the other is in power it will lead to the end of the American way. However, take this example and place it in context of the paranoid model and it is easy to see how that argument can be made. Another attribute of the enemy is that it is masochistic. That is to say that looking at the damage, the chaos, and the turmoil or the end of societies that it has caused, it enjoys what it sees. The enemy has no regrets and strives to be able to claim responsibility for the destruction in which it causes.

The paranoid and the enemy that opposes him, whether imaginary or physically real, act off of each other according to the risks at stake. If a way of life and society is at risk, that high risk necessitates radical and immediate action. Not acting immediately or doing enough to stop the destruction would have catastrophic consequences that no one will be ready to acknowledge or accept responsibility for. Thus, the paranoid style does more than constructs a conspiracy, or defines an enemy; the paranoid style requires action.

The paranoid style is used as a call for action based on two objectives according to Nikolaev and Porpora, who analyze President Bush's pre-war rhetoric in relation to the paranoid style. They argue that using the paranoid style achieves two objectives. The first is framing the issue, or "to monopolize the interpretation the public receives of an event"<sup>14</sup>. Being the first to explain why something has happened, a person is able to define the boundaries of further debate with the first statement. By defining the interpretation, the paranoid leader is able to rally support by regulating the story that the public hears. Which, in turn achieves the second objective:

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<sup>14</sup> Nikolaev, Alexander and Douglas Porpora. 2006. *President Bush's Pre-War Rhetoric on Iraq: Paranoid Style in Action*. *Critical Inquiry in Language studies: an international journal*. 3(4). 245-262. Pg 249

neutralizing “opposition through the value-based interpretation of a certain political issue.”<sup>15</sup>

These two objectives are the bridge between the paranoid actor, and the paranoid style. The stated objectives serve as what the paranoid actor needs to accomplish before the paranoid style can take place. Only after the issue has been framed and opposition to it has been silenced can the apocalyptic spouting militant leader create the situation in which American interests are at risk.

The Paranoid Style that Hofstadter wrote about is a model that can be used as a tool to describe parts of American history. It transcends political boundaries and breaches into psychology and attempts to form a political psychology theory for the way things are done. The examples that Hofstadter provides in his theory gives rise to a new interpretation of events. One of these examples that Hofstadter used that is later expanded on is that of the Anti-Masonry movement. William Gribbin evaluates the Anti-Masonry in relation to the Paranoid style of political psychology. He says “[H]ere was a social phenomenon meeting all of Hofstadter's criteria for paranoid politics: an anti-elitist crusade provoked by some real grievances against vaguely defined conspiratorial forces, which were thought to threaten not just the status and pocketbooks of the Antimasons but all that was good in American life.”<sup>16</sup> Further, Gribbin agrees with the characterization of the paranoid leader placing all the blame on a single group. He argues that “[A]ccusing its foes of every diabolical evil, projecting upon them the guilt for the social dislocations of a time of economic and cultural change, Antimasonry seemed a prelude to the anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant bigotry that developed soon afterwards.”<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Nikolaev and Porpora. 2006. Pg 349.

<sup>16</sup> Gribbin, William. 1974. Antimasonry, Religious Radicalism, and the Paranoid Style of the 1820's. *The History Teacher*, Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 239-254. Pg 241.

<sup>17</sup> Gribbin. 1974. Pg 241.

The Paranoid Style of American politics depicts a story where government agents blame failures of policy on the enemy, act in direction opposition to perceived enemies and in general, fear monger in order to achieve their objectives. It is something that can penetrate even to culture and spur either critiques or descriptions of modern culture as it is clearly articulated in the movie “V for Vendetta”. In the movie, a terrorist that goes by the name V has encouraged and incited the people of London to rise up against the oppressive British government. In order to maintain stability, control and power, the Supreme Chancellor, Adam Sutler, gives a broadcast to the general public on the eve of the supposed uprising. In this speech, he uses fear as a tool in an attempt to retain support for his regime against Agent V. Not to drive the people to fear the government, but to love the government and what they are doing to protect the people. This is first mentioned when the terrorist V takes over the media outlet building and broadcasts a message in part condemning the people of London. He does this by proclaiming that, “Fear got the best of you, and in your panic you turned to the now High Chancellor, Adam Sutler. He promised you order, he promised you peace, and all he demanded in return was your silent, obedient consent.”<sup>18</sup> And reiterated later by the High Chancellor himself later in the movie when he bluntly tells his cabinet members,

...what we need is a clear message to the people of the country! This message should be read in every newspaper, heard on every radio, seen on every television. This message must resound throughout the entire interlink! I want this country to realize that we stand on the edge of oblivion! I want every man, woman, and child to understand how close we are to chaos! I want everyone to remember why they need us!<sup>19</sup>

This speech is followed by a flood of media reports of disaster, the need for unity, and the fear of coming and past terrorist events. In each case, the government has either stepped in to help stop the negative consequences, or has appeared to fix the problems after the fact. In which policy is

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<sup>18</sup> McTeigue, James. 2006. V for Vendetta. Warner Bros Studio.

<sup>19</sup> McTeigue. 2006.

implemented and news is reported to rally the people behind the government when in fact those policies and those news stories may not exist or be true.

As fictional as all this is, it provides an example as how the Paranoid Style is used in politics. The British government that is created in the film is one that touts that peace and security are maintained by unity itself. Dissent is only evidence of involvement in the conspiracy to destroy the British way of life. However, to truly understand this mindset, it has to be taken out of the fictional realm and examine it in the real world. Specifically, how has the paranoid style been used in the two case studies this thesis examines: the Cold War and the Global War on Terror?

### **Policy Through Rhetoric**

The Cold War and the Global War on Terror are both examples that offer evidence of how speaking of fear does not necessarily mean that only an irrational fear that subject to the Paranoid Style. This position is reached by analyzing the rhetoric used in both policy formation process and in the spread of information to the general public. The Cold War and the Global War on Terror both offer ample amounts of evidence through rhetoric that either proves the paranoid style, or that a legitimate fear existed. After that initial question is answered, the next logical questions are: What distinguishes the two times from each other? and What factors allow the Paranoid Style to flourish or discourages it from taking root?

## The Cold War

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is certainly unique. Here is a time period where two super powers are directly opposed to each other in terms of ideology. However, instead of outright confrontation, an arms race and proxy wars were employed. Eventually, the struggle ended without violence. That is not to say that confrontation and raised tensions were absent. Throughout the course of the Cold War, there are several different “eras” that can be defined. Peter Hough frames the Cold War in three vaguely defined time periods. The first phase is defined as the “First Cold War” this phase is littered with confrontation and conflict.<sup>20</sup> This period witnessed the conflicts in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. Although the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam were armed conflicts, it was the Cuban Crisis that reshaped and set the tone for the next period of the cold war, “Détente”. After coming to terms of what an all out nuclear war would do to the world during the missile crisis, tensions eased, the Cold War thawed. The super powers began to work with each other and tried to stabilize international relations. That lasted until crisis once again loomed with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that brought about the “Second Cold War” which lasted until the end of the Cold War altogether.

Dr Jack Ryan describes the Cold War in general in the movie “The Sum of all Fears” (which takes place in post-Cold War society). In the movie, Russia and America become entangled in a conflict after a nuclear device is detonated in Baltimore by terrorists. After that terrorist incident, the United States and Russia enter into a catastrophic conflict blaming each other for recent military strikes. Dr Ryan’s aim as an analyst is to figure out who is really at fault and to stop something worse from happening. In his attempts to negotiate to stop further nuclear use, he states to both presidents that, “Now it's about fear! Our fear of your missiles, your fear of our subs, fear of being weak, fear of making a mistake... the same fear of the other guy that had

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<sup>20</sup> Hough, Peter. 2004 (2006). *Understanding Global Security*. Routledge; New York. Pg 26-27.

us build these goddamn bombs in the first place!”<sup>21</sup> In this hypothetical, the Cold War, and even the subsequent world order, is dominated by the two states acting off of each other. During this era, the Cold War arms race, in global politics, the Paranoid Style took hold and guided the *modus operandi*.

Within the context of the Cold War, there are several indicators that point to a paranoid style being used to shape American foreign policy. These indicators are separated into two categories of analysis: political rhetoric and policy. Examples of political rhetoric are going to be limited to politicians’ speeches to the public and to each other. Limiting the examples in this manner ensures that only firsthand accounts of policy are used. The second category of indicators is the policies themselves. Policy, however, is not just legislation. It should be defined as the rules that govern action, whether or not they are explicitly stated. These can include policy that is apparent in the speeches mentioned beforehand, or from third party analysis outside of the policy makers themselves.

### **Pre-Cuban Missile Crisis**

After the end of World War II, the intentions and actions of the USSR came into question by US diplomats and was the subject of a telegram sent by George Kennan, who worked at the Moscow embassy. The long telegram, which became known as the “X Article” describes the intentions and motivations Soviet action and how the United States should react and respond<sup>22</sup>. The telegram explains that the Soviets will act to protect their interests in Socialism, even if it

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<sup>21</sup> Robinson, Phil Alden. 2002. *The Sum of all Fears*. Paramount Pictures.

<sup>22</sup> Kennan, George. 2001 (1946). Long Telegram. In *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts ‘Long Telegrams’ of 1946* ed Kenneth Jensen. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Pp 17-31. Pg 17.

means that it is at odds with Capitalist, or Western, interests. In the six excerpts that follow, Kennan describes what the world should expect in terms of Soviet policy.

The first is that the USSR will attempt to “undermine general political and strategic potential of major Western Powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity.”<sup>23</sup> The USSR is going to attempt to undermine western, pro-democratic countries by massive grassroots movements to show the strengths of communism versus those of capitalism. The second action that Kennan outlines is the separation of Western powers from colonial ties by violent efforts<sup>24</sup>, thereby exploiting the weaknesses of Western administrations and their need to create new markets. Of course, after the colonies declare independence, Communist governments will be prepared “to take over domestic power.”<sup>25</sup> If these governments do not go willingly, the USSR will be prepared to remove these individual governments in their attempt to take control. Thus, removing and installing these governments is the third plank of the Soviet plan of action<sup>26</sup>. The fourth step, as Kennan suggests, is that the “Communists will...work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence – economic, political or moral.”<sup>27</sup> The fifth contention, of Kennan’s argument is that the Soviets will seek to pit all of the Western Powers against each other. Ranging from Germany, Britain, to America, the unity of these nations must be compromised at any cost<sup>28</sup>. All five of these are then followed by a final characterization. Kennan argues, “all Soviet efforts...will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is

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<sup>23</sup> Kennan. 2001 (1946). Pg 27.

<sup>24</sup> Kennan. 2001 (1946). Pg 27.

<sup>25</sup> Kennan. 2001 (1946). Pg 28.

only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is dominant.”<sup>29</sup>

This telegram from Moscow was what led to the US’s policy of containment in which it was a clearly stated goal to limit the spread of communism<sup>30</sup>. Beyond the consequences of the telegram, looking at the language of it shows the makings of a paranoid style. He has defined a conflict in which American interests are at stake by enemies who will attempt to undermine its, or its allies’, way of life. Two of the three criteria of the model are met by what Kennan advocates. However, the paranoid style never comes to fruition during the Cold War. Kennan never calls for the complete and total destruction of the Soviet Union or of communism; just that it should be contained. The United States was to “hold the line and firmly resist Soviet and Communist expansion by providing a counterpoint to their ‘shifting geographical and political maneuvers’”<sup>31</sup>. It was not to undermine or destroy Soviet states, but it was a defensive stance to prevent them from expanding.

Assuming the telegram signals the beginnings of the official Cold War, the rhetoric of the telegram does not deviate any from depicting the situation of “us versus them”. Defining the conflict in this way does not necessitate any act of hostility between the two parties while at the same time assumes that if there is any such hostility, only one side can remain in existence or as a clear winner. The paranoid style requires total victory, and anything less than complete domination is only the first stage of defeat. Yet, the Cold War super powers did not dominate the world stage, but they shared it with their opposite. The Cold War was hostile but at the same time, it was played by certain rules that encouraged cooperation.

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<sup>30</sup> Roberts, Chalmers M. 1972. How Containment Worked. Foreign Policy No. 7. (Summer) pg 41-51 pg 41.

<sup>31</sup> Smith, Adam. 2003. New Kids on the Bloc: Revisiting Kennan’s Containment in a Pre-emptive World. Harvard International Review. Pg 30.



## Nuclear Primacy

The X Article set the stage on which the Cold War was to be acted upon. It was on this stage that certain actors emerged that would influence the rest of the war. One such actor was Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev attempted to distinguish himself from Stalin from the onset by condemning Stalin's policies during the so-called "Secret Speech". However, his attempts were sometimes misguided. Even though he implemented "efforts to reduce the intensity of the Cold War, his belligerency occasioned some of the most dangerous confrontations of the...period."<sup>32</sup> For example, Chairman Khrushchev once stated that the USSR had the ability to "literally wipe from the face of the earth the country or countries that attacked us."<sup>33</sup> This concept, as appalling as it may have seemed to America, was reiterated on several different occasions by both the US and the USSR. Two prime examples of this are evident in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's speech on "Mutual Deterrence"<sup>34</sup>.

In October of 1962, the Soviet government decided to place some of its nuclear missiles and launchers in Cuba, ninety miles off the Florida's coast. This move sparked nation-wide, and even global fears that nuclear war was at the doorstep. However, it was done not to cause panic and chaos, but to guarantee the security of Cuba; there was "a sound military logic for the deployment of nuclear weapons as a deterrent force."<sup>35</sup> The result of this move fostered an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev that provides insight into what the political leaders were thinking and feeling at the time. The lettered correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev is teeming with the rhetoric of fear *of war*, or other nasty consequences from arming, and the possibility of disarming, Cuba. Stretching from October 22,

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<sup>32</sup> Nation, Craig. 1992. *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991*. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, New York. pp 202-244. Pg 203.

<sup>33</sup> Nation. 1992. pp 235.

<sup>34</sup> McNamara, Robert. 1967. *Mutual Deterrence*. San Francisco. September 18.

<sup>35</sup> Nation. 1992. pp 237.

1962 to October 28, 1962, there were ten letters or telegrams that were exchanged by the two leaders, in which they both express and address concerns of possible war. President Kennedy's first letter to Chairman Khrushchev on October 22 expressed Kennedy's concerns and hopes "that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiations."<sup>36</sup> Making maintaining the peace *a priori*, Kennedy cared more about not pushing either country over the brink to war, stating that the measures that he and the US government were taking were very minimal, but that their resolve was firm. The threat in Cuba needed to be dealt with, but as gingerly and as carefully as possible. Khrushchev's response to Kennedy came four days later acknowledging that war would not benefit either country. He leaves no question as to what his stance on and the consequences of open engagement would be:

What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us... Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them... and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself... Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.<sup>37</sup>

The ball is thus placed back into Kennedy's court and the administration takes its time in responding. This is in part due to the fact that they now have to respond to the question of war, not just the establishing of Soviet nuclear capabilities off the US coast, but open warfare between the USSR and the United States. Despite other communications during the thirteen-day period, Kennedy's last telegram to Khrushchev refers to his statements from the October 26<sup>th</sup> letter and he agrees that something needs to be done to stop anything that would resemble warfare from

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<sup>36</sup> Kennedy, John. October 22, 1962. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev.

<sup>37</sup> Khrushchev, Nikita S. October 26, 1962. Department of State Telegram Transmitting Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy.

happening. Further, Kennedy wants reassurance that war will not happen to essentially calm fears about potential war. President Kennedy, in part, states that, “Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war.”<sup>38</sup>

Being free from the fear of war is the ultimate reassurance. It is this concept, the one that the leaders desire peace and stability rather than complete destruction that negates the paranoid style. Had either President Kennedy or Chairman Khrushchev been a militant leader that sought only total victory over the enemy, the Cuban Missile Crisis would have been a conducive time for it to happen. Instead, the opposite occurred, and the situation was resolved peacefully. Indeed, the world was defined in fatal apocalyptic terms, due to the potential that the world could have ended during a nuclear war. But that definition was not acted upon to eliminate the enemy of “pure evil”.

Unfortunately, the fear that was brought about during the Cuban Missile Crisis never subsides to where US-Soviet relations can be defined as friendly. In fact, fear remained present until the end of the Cold War and was reiterated over that time period by several different people. One of the most prominent people was Robert McNamara, who served as Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, and whose role in the Cuban Crisis was. However, the speeches that McNamara delivered did not have an air of calming fears or of stopping hostility. What McNamara can be credited for was solidifying America’s stance when it came to mutual deterrence.<sup>39</sup> McNamara, in this speech, outlines what mutual deterrence is, and how this concept does in fact prevent thermonuclear war. He states that nuclear war is deterred by “maintaining a

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<sup>38</sup> Kennedy, John. October 28, 1962. Department of State Telegram Conveying President Kennedy's Reply to Chairman Khrushchev.

<sup>39</sup> Mutual Assured Destruction as a political mechanism will be discussed later. For now, ‘Mutual Deterrence’ is the sole policy stemming from McNamara’s speech he delivered in San Francisco in September 18, 1967.

highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange...it is important to understand that assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept.”<sup>40</sup> Essentially, that in order to protect America from any nuclear attack, America has to possess the ability to completely destroy anyone who would ever try to harm it with a nuclear weapon. As long as the United States held this capability, to wipe out the Soviet Union’s society during a second strike, it will remain safe from any attack. A single attack on either society would not go unpunished, nor would it be just a single attack. Both sides had decided that the nuclear silos would be the first targets in hopes to limit the amount of second-strike capability in an attempt to lose less during a nuclear war. McNamara’s speech outlined this very well. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the rhetoric used between Kennedy and Khrushchev points to this understanding. The knots of war, asking what war would give the world, and everything that surrounded the Cuban Missile Crisis points to this mutual understanding of assured destruction.

The Khrushchev era came to an abrupt end in 1964 with his forced retirement by the Party while he was on vacation. His obituary in the New York times states that, “it was a measure of the changes he had wrought that he was voted out of office, not shot, and that some of his key policies, such as peaceful coexistence and arms limitation and emphasis on Soviet consumer needs, were taken up by his successors...”<sup>41</sup>

## **Presidential Responses**

From Truman to George H. W. Bush, each sitting US president has had to deal with the USSR and the threat its nuclear capabilities posed. The best cross-section of how a sitting

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<sup>40</sup> McNamara, Robert. September 18, 1967. Mutual Deterrence. San Francisco.

<sup>41</sup> Whitman, Alden. "Khrushchev's Human Dimensions Brought Him to Power and to His Downfall," The New York Times, 1971.

president framed the issue of a global threat and the concept of fear is to look at the major speeches of the presidents, specifically their Inaugural Addresses and the State of the Union Addresses. Richard Nixon, unfortunately, is mostly remembered for the Watergate scandal and his subsequent resignation before impeachment. However, Nixon did have policies and views on issues that were, at the time, spot on. His Inaugural Address, for instance, depicts a world in which war and the threat of war are horrible things that must be, and should be avoided. The Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to be a stark wake up call to all political leaders in the world that nobody wins a nuclear war. From this mindset Nixon remarks, “For the first time, because the people of the world want peace, and the leaders of the world are afraid of war, the times are on the side of peace.”<sup>42</sup> Not only does he recognize that war needs to be avoided, he also recognizes that every leader that is capable of launching nuclear arms fears having to make that choice. Even the smallest skirmishes at that point had the very real potential of escalating into something much more dangerous; and Nixon wants to avoid that. He would much rather “play the role of peacemaker”<sup>43</sup> and be remembered for preserving society instead of demolishing it. President Nixon went into office with a hope of seeing an end of hostilities, if not a de-escalation of conflict. Regardless, he did not want to go into his term thinking that it will be he that had to make the choice to attack or retaliate America’s enemies. He states in his closing that he has hope and that his eyes have seen the breaking of dawn that can bring a new period. That “our destiny offers, not the cup of despair, but the chalice of opportunity. So let us seize it, not in fear, but in gladness...let us go forward, firm in our faith, steadfast in our purpose, cautious of the dangers...”<sup>44</sup> Nixon attempted to shed the fear of a nuclear war by moving past it as a viable

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<sup>42</sup> Nixon, Richard M. January 20, 1969. First Inaugural Address.

<sup>43</sup> Nixon. 1969.

<sup>44</sup> Nixon. 1969.

option. If peaceful opportunities offer themselves to be used, then they should be welcomed as policy in both the USSR and the United States.

This mindset did not end with Nixon either; it was carried on in Ford's presidency. Forget for a moment everything that surrounded Ford's appointment and assent to the executive office. This is why his "inaugural address" is not used as part of the case study. His remarks when he came into office focus on the Nixon scandal and how the country ought to move on from that plight. It is not until his 1976 State of the Union Address (SUA) that he mentions foreign conflict or the Cold War in general. However, when he does he does not deviate much from Nixon's stance. Ford claims that "we are at peace, and I will do all in my power to keep it that way."<sup>45</sup> But he also does recognize the sobering reality of the danger that still exists in the world. The tool that he employs next is one that stretches back to the days of hardship during the Revolutionary War. President Ford said that to paraphrase Tom Paine "1976... was a year of fears and alarms and of dire forecasts-- most of which never happened and won't happen."<sup>46</sup> But the harsh reality of a nuclear arms race cannot be ignored.

Being involved in an arms race of this magnitude is something that President Carter felt strongly about (and still does today). Even though it is nothing more than a passing note at the end of his inaugural speech, Carter leaves no doubt that he would like a world in which "we will move this year a step toward the ultimate goal -- the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth. We urge all other people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death... we would hope that the nations of the world might say that we had built a lasting peace, built not on weapons of war but on international policies which reflect our own most precious values."<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ford, Gerald. January 19, 1976. President Gerald R. Ford's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State of the Union.

<sup>46</sup> Ford. 1976.

<sup>47</sup> Carter. January 20, 1977. Inaugural Address.

President Reagan, setting aside the political differences between the two presidents, echoes this. However, Reagan takes it further in terms of rhetoric than just speaking to the nuclear threat. Reagan's structure and terminology that instills images are what the Cold War is remembered for. He acknowledged that the United States

...and the Soviets have lived under the threat of mutual assured destruction; if either side resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the other could retaliate and destroy the one who started it. Is there either logic or morality in believing that if one side threatens to kill tens of millions of our people, our only recourse is to threaten killing tens of millions of theirs?... We will meet with the Soviets, hoping that we can agree on a way to rid the world of the threat of nuclear destruction. We strive for peace and security...<sup>48</sup>

In each of these speeches, Presidents did two things: the first is that they made attempts to calm the public and assure them that he will strive for peace. The second thing is counter to that, that while striving for peace we must recognize the fact that there is an enemy that is willing to launch nuclear missiles on the United States causing the extermination of the human race. In each instance, the reality and the hopes were all mentioned. This fails the test of the paranoid model as well. The Paranoid Style requires a militant leader to create the atmosphere; it is this lack of this type of leader that does not lead to a Paranoid Style. The evidence in the speeches of a call for peace and a rational approach to an enemy that will attack if it needs to is not the leader that speaks of an apocalyptic world where only total victory is accepted. Each president spoke of the presidency as an opportunity to lead the world into a lasting peace or at least to avoid an all out conflict leading to a nuclear war. In the paranoid style, the militant leader would ignore any opportunity for peace in order to entirely eliminate the enemy and claim complete victory.

This is the reason that President Johnson was left out of this analysis. Johnson's presidency was framed and started by a vast victory over Barry Goldwater, due in part to his infamous 1964 Daisy Ad. The ad indirectly states that electing Goldwater would lead the United States into a nuclear war with the USSR, and that to avoid this, the citizens must elect Johnson.

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<sup>48</sup> Reagan, Ronald. January 21, 1985. Second Inaugural Address.

There is a difference of rhetoric between what has been previously mentioned. That is that the other presidents have said that they will strive for peace, whereas Johnson said Goldwater leads to war. The shift of subjects is important. Being involved in Vietnam Johnson could not say to the people that he would be a peaceful president. Instead, he had to paint himself as the lesser of two evils when compared to Goldwater. Regardless of what was happening at the time, nothing could compare to the damage that would happen if Goldwater were elected. The job of the president during the Cold War was to assure the people that he hoped that he would never have to make the choice of pushing the button or not, but that he will if it means protecting America.

## **MAD**

One of the most well-known and most feared policies of the time was that of Mutual Assured Destruction. MAD takes typical deterrence, the notion that attacking country A would be to the detriment of the aggressor, and expands it to say, any type of wide-scale nuclear attack would be extremely destructive to all parties involved. MAD's formation can be attributed to Robert McNamara in a series of speeches that he gave during the Kennedy administration. Speeches in Athens, Georgia and Ann Arbor, Michigan are two examples of policy that were "constituted a major Pentagon strategic initiative."<sup>49</sup> The formal term of assured destruction can be attributed to a study by General Glen Kent, who "developed two accounting devices which were called 'damage limiting' and 'assured destruction'."<sup>50</sup> It was not until the Soviet Union developed the bomb and a delivery mechanism that some sort of nuclear war fighting strategy emerged; with these developments "came the onset of MAD. Washington abandoned its strategy

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<sup>49</sup> Fairbanks, Charles. 2004. MAD and U.S. Strategy. In *Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practices*. Ed Henry Sokolski. Strategic Studies Institute. Pg 140.

<sup>50</sup> Fairbanks. 144.



of a preemptive nuclear strike...<sup>51</sup> With the United States no longer being the sole nuclear power, a different approach to needed to be developed in order to coincide with multiple states possessing the bomb. It is argued that this emergence of a bi-polar, nuclear possessing, Cold War made the world stable and actually safer in the long run. Lieber and Press state that it was “MAD [that] made the world relatively stable and peaceful because it induced great caution in international politics, discouraged the use of nuclear threats to resolve disputes and generally retrained the superpowers’ behavior.”<sup>52</sup> At the same time, MAD doctrine was not exclusive to the US.

Although its coining can be attributed to US officials, the Soviets understood the concept just as well. There is a report that has been previously cited that looks at MAD as a concept critically. The report also contains in a chapter interviews with Soviet officials and commanders to get their take on the issue. The report states “The Soviet nuclear strategy relied heavily on deterrence...[their] strategists recognized that deterrence was, to some extent, mutual because each side was capable of launching a retaliatory strike and of inflicting unacceptable damage on the other.”<sup>53</sup> The end result, even for the Soviets, was that there could not be any “meaningful concept of victory in nuclear warfare.”<sup>54</sup> Another article gives the argument of why MAD, or mutual assured destruction, is actually preferable to other possible policies. In the conclusion, there are three indicators or reasons that lead to the conclusion of preferring mutual assured destruction. These three indicators “influence the probability that the U.S. will be able to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union: 1) the U.S. ability to deter premeditated attacks; 2) the crisis

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<sup>51</sup> Lieber, Keri and Daryl Press. 2006. The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy. Foreign Affairs. March/April. Accessed online: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85204/keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/the-rise-of-u-s-nuclear-primacy.html>

<sup>52</sup> Lieber and Press. 2006.

<sup>53</sup> Battilega, John. 2004. Soviet Views of Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War Interviews. In Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practices. Ed Henry Sokolski. Strategic Studies Institute. 159-160.

<sup>54</sup> Battilega. 2004. 163.

stability of the nuclear situation; and 3) the robustness of the nuclear situation.”<sup>55</sup> Using these criteria, a defensive stance and the mutual assured destruction stance are evaluated to determine which policy would provide better stability and security for all parties involved. The result is that the defensive stance, or the alternative to MAD does not hold up to the stringent standards for global security. In short, the claim is made that MAD provides stability better than the alternatives. The argument that removing mutual assured destruction as a policy directive and replacing it with an alternative, such as a defensive stance, increases the probability of nuclear war.<sup>56</sup> MAD went from being a strategy and then later attained rhetorical status to prevent disaster.

It was the existence of MAD that required caution to avoid disaster despite its attributes that look like elements of the Paranoid Style. Simply put, MAD argued that nuclear warfare would not only eliminate an enemy completely, and was something to be feared at all times, but would also cause the aggressor to be equally harmed. Overlooking the construct of MAD would be to underestimate the severity of any action deemed hostile. Having a policy that speaks of the world in apocalyptic terms was more than issue framing, or garnering support against inaction; it was MAD’s role in the Cold War that stopped action to prevent that apocalypse. Needless to say, mutual assured destruction, as a policy, was successful in preventing nuclear war.

### **Conclusion of the Cold War**

The Cold War’s rhetoric and policy reflects the sensitivity and the tensions of the time. No other time in the history of mankind was there such a real threat of total destruction. Even still, the impacts of the nuclear arms race can be felt in entertainment media, politics, and every

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<sup>55</sup> Glasner, Charles. 1984. Why Even Good Defenses May be Bad. *International Security*. 9-2. 116.

<sup>56</sup> Glasner. 117.

day life. From movies, to books, to documentaries that explore the Cold War, the time period itself is fascinating and is represented in a myriad of ways in the entertainment. In the political spectrum, policies like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START I and II, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and many more all are the remnants of the Cold War. Setting aside their age and the fact that the USSR no longer exists, these treaties and international agreements exist to foster an atmosphere of peace throughout the world.

The Cold War does possess some of the characteristics of the Paranoid Style, but does not entirely fit the model that was constructed. Certainly over the course of the conflict different elements are more evident than others, but that does not account for the lack of a militant leader. The fact that the presidents implemented policies for security and strived for peace rather than war and the eradication of the enemy goes to show a different emphasis and motivation. That is not to say that the Cold War was not a frightening time, or that fear was not felt across the globe. From bomb drills, to fallout shelters and other actions to show how afraid the people were, the Cold War was by no means a happy occasion. However, the overarching theme of the Cold War was to avoid outright confrontation, and that nuclear war was not the preferred option.

## **Defining Terrorism**

Defining terrorism is no easy task. Most experts on the subject will agree to that statement. There have been countless books and articles dedicated to describing what terrorism is with no entirely acceptable definition as a result. That is not to say that no work has been accomplished to provide working definitions of the term, mindset, and acts. *Prima facie*, terrorism is nothing more than “violence – or, equally important, the threat of violence – used

and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim... This definition underscores clearly the other fundamental characteristic of terrorism: that it is a planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act.”<sup>57</sup> The definition does not stop here either. Terrorism cannot be understood by simply looking at one definition. Another way to define terrorism is to define its unique characteristics. Aubry Cronin distinguishes four characteristics of what terrorism embodies. First, is that it is a political act. Second, is that terrorists are not states. That is they are individual actors that may be backed or supported by states. Third, terrorism does not target just military or political targets. The fourth characteristic is that they do not abide by international laws or agreements. They act, as it were, illegally.<sup>58</sup> While a comprehensive definition is still elusive, these two can provide a working definition of the issue at hand. Terrorism, in short, is carefully planned, illegal violence carried out by individuals on innocent parties to achieve a stated political goal. Terrorism in this context came to the limelight as a major threat to global security after the events of 9-11. September 11, 2001 showed the means that global terrorist organizations were willing to take for their cause. The Global War on Terror was conceived as a direct result of catastrophic actions carried out by terrorists.

### **9-11 / Global War on Terrorism**

At the risk of using a cliché, 9-11 changed the way the world, at least the United States, operated. The fact that a terrorist organization had attacked in a massive way on US soil that cost several thousand lives necessitated change. This was the first time that a foreign enemy had attacked on US soil since Pearl Harbor, and the second time since the war of 1812. With such rare instances of violence at home by foreign enemies, it would be hard to continue on without

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<sup>57</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press. Pg 2-3.

<sup>58</sup> Cronin, Aubry. 2002. Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism. *International Security*. 27-3. Pg 30-58.

seeing any type of policy change. Just as the attacks on Pearl Harbor brought about the United States' entrance into World War II the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the fourth plane that did not reach its intended target forced the United States to act, once again, in the global theatre with force. With the attacks came a structural and rhetorical change that fits the Paranoid Style of American Politics by looking at the changes in context of the established model.

The first change was the structure of warfare and international cooperation. According to the White House's report of the first 100 days of the Global War on Terrorism, the "war against terrorism is the first war of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century – and it requires a 21<sup>st</sup> century military strategy."<sup>59</sup> President Bush's strategy, as well as Donald Rumsfeld's, was to create a coalition of willing countries to take on the threat of terrorism in the country of Afghanistan. Using allied troops from the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Russia and Turkey the United States made 9-11 a global event. This is not to say it was not already considered as much by the nationalities represented among those affected. There were a multitude of non-US citizens and residents that had worked at the WTC and approximately 120 countries represented at the two towers. However, it was an attack on the United States and on US soil. By joining together against an event of terrorism, and defining it as a global war, the burden of fighting these terrorists out to everyone else to do their part in the fight.

Under this new type of warfare, the US headed "a global dragnet to help bring terrorists to justice and help prevent future terrorist acts."<sup>60</sup> In order to carry out this type of warfare, with an undetermined length and subjective terms of victory, the public's support was necessary. To

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<sup>59</sup> Bush, George W. 2001. The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days. The Coalition Information Centers.

<sup>60</sup> Bush, George W. 2001. The Global War on Terrorism...

attain this, President Bush and his administration used rhetorical devices and a specific language to the people. Looking at what was said and is currently being said about terrorism in the United States, the people can get a sense of hypocrisy and confusion coming from political leaders. On one hand, the American people are being told not to be afraid, that terrorism cannot win, and that being afraid only empowers the terrorists. At the same time, it is also being said that if we do not do enough, then the terrorists can attack again, at even greater stakes and heavier costs.

Further, the rhetoric from politicians experienced a change from pre-9-11 days. Speeches on 9-11 evolved from depicting a horrific event to using it as a political tool to fulfill policy agendas. President Bush's first objective during the aftermath was to reassure the public to not be afraid. In a series of speeches following the event, Bush stated on that eve that, "Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve"<sup>61</sup>; "I'm here to remind people that the best way to fight terrorism is to not let terrorism intimidate America"<sup>62</sup>; "With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends... Freedom and fear are at war... Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war."<sup>63</sup> President Bush tried to solidify the resolve of the American people to rally them against the evils of terrorism. By defining the situation as freedom versus fear, Bush put before the people the ultimatum that you are either free, or you are afraid. If freedom is to be preserved, to be valued, and to endure, America must not be afraid. Not only must America not be afraid, but also this stance against terrorism must spread across the world. After Bush spoke to the American people, he turned his remarks to the Taliban and to the people

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<sup>61</sup> Bush, George W. September 11, 2001. Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation.

<sup>62</sup> Bush, George W. September 17, 2001. "We've all got a job to do." – Remarks by the President to the Employees in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

<sup>63</sup> Bush, George W. September 20, 2001. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People". United States Capitol.

of Afghanistan. Bush compared what each citizenry must endure by asking America to “imagine how that makes innocent people feel...when you’ve got these killers in your midst. It creates an atmosphere of fear...People like al Qaeda, whose ideology is hateful, have got one major tool at their disposal: they kill innocent life to create fear.”<sup>64</sup> In essence, terrorism equals fear and to counter that America represents freedom. Bush’s obligation as President was to not allow the American way to falter, fade, or be damaged by these attacks. Further, countries that do not want to be associated with terrorism must unite themselves with America’s goal of eliminating terrorists, or they will be accused of being terrorists themselves. Using this mechanism, as well as the recent events of 9-11 and involving countries that either suffered, sympathized, or did not want to misalign from America and 9-11, President Bush started the global effort to eradicate terrorism. This was not only America’s problem, it is the world’s, and the world must stand up against such atrocities or forever be under an atmosphere of fear. Vice President Cheney affirmed that the fight that America must endure was to “save ourselves and our children from living in a world of fear. We fight now in defense of civilization and humane values.”<sup>65</sup> Allowing a world of fear to take shape would not be the work of the terrorists alone, it requires a certain reaction to the action. As the noted philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argues, “...there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom.”<sup>66</sup> This may seem out of place, but it means that man, or people, must choose their own reaction to stimuli in the world around them. That is to say they will only be afraid of terrorism if they allow themselves to be afraid of it. Former President Bill Clinton agrees with this argument in a speech he delivered at Harvard when he stated, “The purpose [of terrorism], after all, is not to achieve military victory, but to achieve a change in

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<sup>64</sup> Bush, George W. September 29, 2006. President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror.

<sup>65</sup> Cheney, Richard. November 10, 2001. Remarks by the Vice President at Celebration for the Marine Corps Birthday.

<sup>66</sup> Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1965, 1993. *Essays in Existentialism*. New York: Kensington.

circumstances by terror, to make us all afraid of today, afraid of tomorrow, afraid of each other. Therefore, it cannot win unless we become admitting accomplices, changing the way we think and feel and live.”<sup>67</sup> Even though the terrorists may not be able to win the fight using any method at their disposal, they can still inflict a great deal damage to the US and its allies. No liberal, democratic government would allow such a threat to exist while the government would be able to stop it. Thus, it was imperative to act against terrorism. If terrorism were not countered, it would act against America and attack the very core of its existence. Which is exactly what the Paranoid Style model describes, that the American way of life was under imminent threat and attack by a determined enemy who only accepts total victory. Further, a militant leader exists to wage the war on terrorism. Whether it is President Clinton or President Bush, or any high-ranking cabinet official, each defined terrorism as a threat to America and its interests with the only clear course of action being to eliminate terrorism. After 9-11, the political leadership of the attacked countries spoke out against such acts of terrorism, but also went further to suggest that terrorism is the paramount threat to national and global security. Ignoring such a threat would only allow terrorism to harm American’s foundation and ruin the principles it stands on. It is not necessarily a military battle for victory, but also one of “hearts and minds”<sup>68</sup> where the battle is one of ideals to remove terroristic operations from the drawing table. From there the fight against terrorism then moves on to the political stage, and away from the rhetorical.

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<sup>67</sup> Clinton, William. November 19, 2001. Remarks of William Jefferson Clinton at Albert H. Gordon Track and Tennis Center, Harvard University.

<sup>68</sup> Winning hearts and minds is not new to the War on Terror, but it was used in the buildup to the Iraq War in 2003. It was then that terrorism can not be won by a military, but by changing the way in which America and warfare is thought of. See Elizabeth Beker. November 11, 2001. A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds -- A special report; In the War on Terrorism, A Battle to Shape Opinion. New York Times.



## United States Anti-Terror Policies

After the attacks, there was a wave of reforms aimed at stopping any terrorist activity in the US from happening again. These reforms happened in three stages: first was the bureaucracy stage, second was the policy stage, and third was the preventative stage. Each stage is reliant on the other, meaning that it is not three independent stages that can work without another; instead they are all part of a single package for a single goal: security.

The first stage of the reforms is in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. It was established in 2002 to expand the government's role in preventing terrorism and to consolidate intelligence agencies into a single branch of government. With this "managerial category for catastrophic terrorism, which is neither war, crime nor disaster...the U.S. did not have a managerial approach (i.e., a framework for bringing responsibility, accountability, and resources together in sharp focus) to deliver a key public good – security in the homeland against catastrophic terrorism."<sup>69</sup> That is, until, the creation of DHS whose mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act, is to "A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States."<sup>70</sup> Its goal is to be the figurehead of an organization for the sole purpose of combating terrorism. President Bush created the department with the charge of "developing and coordinating the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks."<sup>71</sup> Doing so "...merged 22 different government organizations into a single department with a clear mission: Secure America and protect the American people from future attacks... The Department

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<sup>69</sup> Carter, Ashton. 2001-2002. *The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism*. International Security. 26-3.

<sup>70</sup> Homeland Security Act of 2002.

<sup>71</sup> Murphy, Sean. 2002. *Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon*. The American Journal of International Law. 96-1. 243.

of Homeland Security is working to stop terrorists from infiltrating our country.”<sup>72</sup> Establishing a new department with the sole intent of presiding over security from terrorism is the first step in the multistep process.

The second stage is policy. After the creation of the DHS with a stated mission, it had to start passing policies to accomplish its goals. In this case, that action took the form of a policy titled the USA PATRIOT Act. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 was passed into law by President Bush’s signature October 26, 2001, and was designed so that the federal investigating agencies could investigate suspected terrorism. To do this, there are eight general provisions of the bill that allow action to take place:

(1) restrictions were lifted so as to allow intelligence and criminal justice officials to share information on investigations; (2) law enforcement authorities may be authorized by a special intelligence court to conduct ‘roving’ wiretaps on a person suspected of involvement in terrorism...;(3) intelligence authorities may obtain wiretap authority from the special intelligence court if foreign intelligence operations are a ‘significant purpose’ of the investigation...;(4) the scope of the subpoenas for electronic communication sent by terrorism suspects was expanded; (5) authorities may obtain nationwide search warrants for terrorism investigations...;(6) the law’s sunset provisions terminate the preceding, enhanced surveillance powers after four years; (7) the attorney general or the INS commissioner may certify an alien as being under suspicion of involvement in terrorism, in which case the alien may be held for up to seven days for questioning, after which he must be released if he is not charged with a violation of criminal or immigration laws; (8) possession of substances that can be used as biological or chemical weapons for anything other than a ‘peaceful’ purpose was criminalized, and criminal sentences for committing acts of terrorism and for harboring or financing terrorists or terrorist organizations were increased.<sup>73</sup>

Granting this leeway in domestic surveillance is nothing that should be taken lightly. However, when the USA PATRIOT Act was up for vote in both the Senate and the House, little to no revisions or debate took place<sup>74</sup>. Jasmine Farrier further argues that this lack of debate and revision is nothing more than the ambivalence of Congress stepping aside and letting “a bill drafted by a handful of people in secret, subjected to no committee process comes before us

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<sup>72</sup> Bush, George W. 2008. President Bush Commemorates Fifth Anniversary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Constitution Hall, Washington D.C.

<sup>73</sup> Murphy. 2002. 252-253

<sup>74</sup> McClintock, Michael. 2003. The Trials of Liberty. *Index on Censorship*. Pg 89.

immune from amendment.”<sup>75</sup> No formal committee, no real floor action, no substantive revisions, and voting it to pass twice allowed the executive branch undue amounts of power that they use to justify the trampling of individual rights for the end of national security.<sup>76</sup> Protecting individual rights, or proper legislative process was not a concern for the passing of the PATRIOT Act; the goal of the act itself was to provide the government with a vehicle of action against terrorism. It just also happens that passing the act in the United States offered a model for other countries to follow suit. National security has now grown and evolved into international security with the United Nations Security Council adopting Resolution 1373 which calls “on member states to become party to all relevant international conventions on terrorism and to enact the necessary domestic legislation to enforce these agreements.”<sup>77</sup> The PATRIOT Act has a much large effective radius than just the United States. This is conceivably a good thing as the more parties there are to anti-terror legislation, and who support international security, the easier it is to find, track, arrest and try suspected terrorists legally<sup>78</sup>.

Congress, thankfully, does not make the same type of mistakes often. For instance, it is attempting to reassert its legislative authority and its obligation to check and balance the executive branch with the current and ongoing struggle to either pass or kill the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act<sup>79</sup>, with the added provision of retroactive immunity granted to telecom companies. The argument made on behalf of the administration is that the telecom companies are helping the government find and stop terrorists in America. In doing so, the

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<sup>75</sup> Farrier, Jasmine. 2005. The PATRIOT Act’s Institutional Story: More Evidence of Congressional Ambivalence. University of Louisville. Pg 2.

<sup>76</sup> Whitaker, Beth. 2007. Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the ‘war on terror’ in the Third World. Third World Quarterly. 28-5. pp1017-1032. 1018.

<sup>77</sup> Whitaker. 2007.

<sup>78</sup> Whether this actually happens or not is not the focus. The act itself has shortcomings outside of the realm of emphasizing that the terrorists can attack. However, the fact remains that it is on the books as a law that is a response to the attacks of 9-11.

<sup>79</sup> Russell, Gail. March 18, 2008. ‘State secrets’ privilege fuels surveillance bill battle. Christian Science Monitor.

companies may have opened Pandora's Box in violating civil liberties and privacy laws that would leave them susceptible to lawsuits from violated customers. If this happens, the companies will not be as willing to help the government as they have in the past, thus resulting in more terrorist activity in the US. Congress, specifically the Democratic side of the aisle, is not as willing to allow blanket immunity for domestic spying as it did in the wake of 9-11<sup>80</sup>. Standing up against the administration on this particular is being met with the kind of rhetoric that is under examination. President Bush has stated that not having the cooperation of the private communications industry would "undermine America's security"<sup>81</sup>, and having the telecoms cooperating is essential to finding the enemy and what they are planning against America.<sup>82</sup> This is a Catch-22 with members of Congress who have to vote on these bills. To the public's eyes, they are passing laws that either infringe on privacy laws or allow the enemy to subvert surveillance and prevent the government from stopping attacks.<sup>83</sup> If the government is indeed overstepping its bounds as a government and its attempts to protect its citizens, it provides well-choreographed rhetoric to support its movements.

The third stage in the three part political process is the preventative stage. Once a structure or bureaucracy is setup, and the policies that allow that bureaucracy to function effectively are passed and on the books, the last step is to use those two elements to make sure the event that spurred their creation in the first place to never happen again. The Transportation Security Administration was not pulled from thin air and declared a new creation. It was founded on the Federal Aviation Administration's principles, and functionally replaced the FAA. 9-11

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<sup>80</sup> Miller, Greg. March 15, 2008. House defies Bush to pass wiretap bill; Democrat's measure, threatened veto, doesn't shield telecom firms retroactively. Los Angeles Times.

<sup>81</sup> Russell. 2008.

<sup>82</sup> Silva, Jeffrey. February 28, 2008. Senate grants immunity on wiretap lawsuits; Telecom giants nearly off hook. RCR Wireless News.

<sup>83</sup> Silva, Miller, Russell articles.; <http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Mar14/0,4670,TerroristSurveillance,00.html>; <http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/13/fisa.bush/index.html?iref=newssearch>; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7269452.stm>.

was allowed to happen based on failures of the FAA and simple reform was not adequate enough to solve the problems. So with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 that was passed in the wake of 9-11, the TSA was established as the agency to oversee passenger screening. Meaning “Congress eliminated the airlines’ role in passenger screening...”<sup>84</sup> and gave it “broad powers to ensure aviation security.”<sup>85</sup> In 2002, it was consolidated under the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. The policies in general all aim to provide security, and calm fears and tensions by anyone involved in mass transport in the United States and their families. Unfortunately, the cost of the sense of security comes at a significant price.

These three stages of reforms all refer back to the paranoid model. The creation of a paranoid atmosphere in America is not something that happens overnight. While the catalysts may happen in the blink of an eye, to perpetuate the cycle a system has to be established to constantly remind the people that something could happen, and that the government needs to work endlessly to ensure that it does not.

### **Paranoid Terrorism**

On face value, people are supposed to think that the PATRIOT Act, the Department of Homeland Defense, and the Transportation Security Administration are all good things that the government has done to protect the homeland. Just the names of these three policies are meant to sound comforting and even secure. However, these policies have forced Americans into a world of an extreme dichotomy. There is no longer any middle ground, or passive middle ground.

Travel, peaceful protests, and even reading certain books all are now a product of risk

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<sup>84</sup> Mew, Keith. 2005. Airport Security Screening Privatize or Federalize? Public Works Management & Policy. 10-1. Pg 4.

<sup>85</sup> Schroer, Gregory. 2004-2005. Doomed to Repeat the Past: How the TSA is picking up where the FAA left off. Transportation Law Journal. 32-73.

assessment, and government oversight to guarantee security<sup>86</sup>. It is because of these policies and the rhetoric used that the Global War on Terrorism fits into Hofstadter's Paranoid Style of American Politics. This is because of three specific reasons: first, the concept of the enemy; second, the framing of the war; third, the threat that this specific conflict or war poses to the global community.

Terrorists will employ whatever means necessary to accomplish their stated goals. They will target anyone from the innocent to the guilty to achieve whatever their stated goal or objective is. There is no dispute that the methods employed to target non-military agents is something that is to be condemned. However, to say that anyone who does not agree with the government is a terrorist should produce some shock in the populous. The line between actual enemy and perceived enemy has become blurred. Terrorists are not state actors, and do not subject themselves to laws or agreements set by governments. To enact laws against the threat of terrorism places anyone who is accused of being involved in those types of activities in the terrorist column. Anyone who goes against stated government policy or action is at risk of being labeled a terrorist. For example, at speeches given by President Bush, "those [who are] openly opposed to any Bush policy are ordered into 'protest zones,' isolated areas as much as three fourths of a mile from the president....Although the administration claims the isolation is to 'protect' the president from possible terrorists, a legitimate concern, the reality is that a terrorist merely has to wear a neutral or pro-Bush T-shirt to get into the rally."<sup>87</sup> All that needs to happen to be declared a terrorist is to openly oppose, or disagree with the status quo. This is a far stretching of the term "terrorists" from the definition that was offered earlier as the working definition. That is to say that if you are not "us" then you are obviously "them" regardless of

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<sup>86</sup> McClintock. Pg 92.

<sup>87</sup> Brasch, Walter. 2005. Fool's Gold in the Nation's Data-Mining Programs. *Social Science Computer Review*. 23. Pg 417.

your actual ideals on government, violence, or methodology for obtaining change. The middle ground of politics in this area has completely dissolved. Organizations such as the ACLU, Greenpeace, and a number of student organizations across the nation have been under investigation for possible terrorist activity when they merely speak out, exercising their First Amendment right<sup>88</sup>. When they are told not to do so, the people speak out. One law professor who serves as advisor to the Drake chapter of the National Lawyers Guild at Drake University that was under investigation by the FBI stated that, “They want to kill speech. They want to put fear into the anti-war movement...”<sup>89</sup> Terrorism is now a matter of identity by political stance; it could be the beginning of a slippery slope that resembles Orwell’s 1984 where the government spies on anyone and everyone in order to protect them from the enemy.<sup>90</sup>

The second reason that the Global War on Terror is part of the Paranoid Style is because of how the war is framed and discussed in politics. Winning the war on terror has no precise bright line. How does the US “win”? Despite having no aims other than eradicating terrorism from the globe, nothing else is used as the victory goals. Although, at the same time, small victories have been recognized. For instance, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are both justified actions for the war on terror. The buildup to both wars saw a heavy leaning on 9-11 and stopping it from happening again by taking the war to them<sup>91</sup>. President Bush stated that these two countries, in his “Mission Accomplished” speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, as having ties to al Qaeda, and that “the liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign

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<sup>88</sup> Brasch. 2005. Pg 418-419

<sup>89</sup> Brasch. 2005. Pg 419.

<sup>90</sup> Recent activity regarding the FISA reauthorization is the tool needed for the government to legally and without supervision to spy on its citizens.

<sup>91</sup> Bush, George W. May 27, 2006. President delivers commencement address at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Mitchie Stadium, West Point, New York.

against terror.”<sup>92</sup> Bush stated that progress was being achieved and that it was moving in the right direction; however, his speech fell short of saying that it was a victory.<sup>93</sup> In both Afghanistan and Iraq, they are both seen as progress against terrorism, but not *victories* against terrorism. Terrorism has dominated politics and political structure since 9-11; government thrives on security and has reorganized itself to meet that need. In fact, reorganization, itself, is seen as an accomplishment against terrorism. President Bush bragged that:

In this new war, we've undertaken the most sweeping reorganization of the federal government since the start of the cold war. We created a new Department of Homeland Security, . . . to protect America from future attacks. We created the new Director of National Intelligence, which has led a broad restructuring of our nation's intelligence agencies for the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We have transformed the FBI into an agency whose primary focus is stopping terrorism, and reorganized the Department of Justice to help us meet this new threat. We passed the PATRIOT Act, which broke down barriers that prevented law enforcement and intelligence agencies from sharing vital information on terrorist threats.<sup>94</sup>

Even though the US has reorganized government to better protect the people of America, the threat is not gone, nor has it diminished. Bush recently acknowledged at the fifth anniversary of the DHS that “we must also remember that the danger to our country has not passed. Since the attacks of 9-11, the terrorists have tried to strike our homeland again and again. . . The lesson of this experience is clear. It's clear to me, and I know it is clear to you: The enemy remains active, deadly in its intent – and in the face of this danger, the United States must never let down its guard”.<sup>95</sup> The fact is, the administration has framed the war on terror as not just a military battle, but is an ongoing battle of ideology that forces us to act both defensively and offensively. If action is not taken, in any capacity, then the United States will be vulnerable to more and more deadly attacks.

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<sup>92</sup> Bush, George W. May 2, 2003. Mission Accomplished.

<sup>93</sup> Cienski, Jan. May 2, 2003. Bush caps war with speech on aircraft carrier: ‘Mission Accomplished’: Major Operations over, President says in theatrical address. National Post.

<sup>94</sup> Bush, George W. May 27, 2006. President delivers commencement address at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Mitchie Stadium, West Point, New York.

<sup>95</sup> Bush, George W. March 6, 2008. President Bush Commemorates Fifth Anniversary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security.



The final reason that the Paranoid Style applies to the War on Terror is the threat that it poses to the global community. It is not just a war that states can remain neutral on. Since the President's response on 9-11, all countries are forced to take a stance on terrorism: they are either fighting for freedom and democracy to prevent terrorism, or they are fighting against freedom and democracy and allowing terrorism to happen. The war is not just the United States' war, it is the world's own war against a unified enemy<sup>96</sup>. Unlike World Wars I and II, there are no alliances and axis, where coalitions of states are pitted against each other; the GWOT is all states engaging in an "ideological struggle between tyranny and freedom"<sup>97</sup> in which "we have fought the enemy on every single battlefield. And so long as the terrorist danger remains, the United States of America will continue to fight the enemy wherever it makes its stand. We will stay on the offensive."<sup>98</sup> Worldwide wars of states versus states is absent and has been replaced with a global war shifting the emphasis to making the struggle something that affects all states and that all states need to be involved in solving. The theatre of operation is the entire globe, and the US will pursue this elusive and faceless enemy to the fullest extent possible. Its like Where's Waldo, but without really knowing what Waldo looks like.

Hofstadter's thesis about the unique style of American politics describes the nature of the Global War on Terrorism. By looking at the shifts in policy and rhetoric that have occurred since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the model of the Paranoid Style describes these changes aptly. Using the elements of the model and the characteristics that describe the paranoid leader, the Global War on Terror becomes a fitting example of the Paranoid Style in action.

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<sup>96</sup> Weber, Samuel. 2002. War, Terrorism, and Spectacle, or: On Towers and Caves. *Grey Room*. No. 7. Pg 21.

<sup>97</sup> Bush, George W. May 27, 2006. President delivers commencement address at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Mitchie Stadium, West Point, New York.

<sup>98</sup> Bush, George W. March 19, 2008. President Bush Discusses Global war on Terror. The Pentagon.

## **Analytical Comparison**

Besides the obvious, what separates these two time periods of conflict from each other? In short, the answer is caution; fear is used in the same manner in order to elicit entirely different actions. Why is this the case? The key issue is motivation for the use of fear. For instance, during the Cold War, fear was more or less a safety mechanism to prevent catastrophe from happening. Underlining the entire Cold War era is the fact of survival. Preventing the two great states from unleashing their arsenals on each other became the main focus of the conflict. It evolved from a war of political ideology to a war of cautious probing while still preventing nuclear war. Because of this evolution, it was necessary to frame it with a cautionary rhetoric that halted action. Fear provided politicians and world leaders with the proper tool in order to stave off disaster. On the other hand, for the War on Terror fear has become a weapon of the terrorist to change policy or culture. It is not a contest of strength and restraint, it is a fight in which liberty and freedom itself is at stake. Fear, then, is not something that requires an exercise of caution, but to exercise activity. The checks on action have been removed with the shift of the rhetoric surrounding fear and it has become necessary for people to not be afraid of being attacked or of what the terrorists may do to a state or society. The underlining issue then is the prevention of the destruction of ideological concepts that are central to liberal societies. If fear is that weapon of destruction, then it must be eliminated as its safety role in rhetoric. Fear must be redefined as something that can not be utilized as a weapon as is the case in the Global War on Terror and that has no place in liberal democracies.

Further, the type of enemy has changed as well. Changing the enemy requires a different approach to how it is viewed and discussed. During the Cold War, the US could identify its enemies and see what they were capable of. US intelligence was generally aware of what the

Soviet Union was doing. When Sputnik was launched, and when the USSR started building its space program, it was a public action to show Soviet strength and “superiority over the United States in science and economics, politics and ideology – in short, Soviet supremacy all across the board”<sup>99</sup>. The space race was nothing more than an alternative competition between the two governments flexing their muscles to see who would win. However, being able to identify your enemies can be more fearful than being left in the dark. It was knowing the potential consequences of action from both sides that caused foreign policy at that time to be cautious. If policy mechanisms such as MAD did not exist, and people did not have an idea of the destructive capabilities of the two states, action (in a reckless manner) may have happened. Being able to discern threats posed by specific states in specific theatres allowed for analysts to decide the threat level and the subsequent necessary actions to be taken. It was not a perception of an enemy, but a clearly defined threat to US interests.

On the other hand, the Global War on Terrorism utilizes fear as a reason *to* act instead to prevent action. Not knowing what the enemy looks like or what it is currently capable of, the worse case scenario is assumed. The US led coalition against terrorism to make sure that terrorists do not get a hold of weapons of mass destruction (as the case for the war in Iraq was made) or be able to act again (“fighting them there so we do not have to fight them here”). Not knowing what the terrorists are planning or what they are capable of “forces” states to act preemptively in an attempt to stop any terrorist activity. Even though politicians have said that the people should not fear because doing so would allow the terrorists to win<sup>100</sup>, the actions that they are taking suggest otherwise. The speeches that state that the terrorists are always planning, that they always are acting against American people advocate a mindset that America should be

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<sup>99</sup> Whelan, Joseph. 1968. The Press and Khrushchev’s “Withdrawal” from the Moon Race. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 32-2. 233-250.

<sup>100</sup> See Clinton, Bush, Cheney...etc.

afraid. If we were to be truly fearless of the faceless threat, then we should not restructure our government, or advocate policies that infringe on civil liberties to make sure that the terrorists can be caught. Robin Williams characterizes this best in his HBO standup comedy routine. In his act, he quips, "Remember when they sent Anthrax to Tom Daschle's office? And they cleared that . . . place out. Everybody out, come on! Helmets, suits, they're all leaving. And when the Congressman walked out they go: "But the rest of you, go about your lives. Everything is perfectly OK."<sup>101</sup> The old adage, do as I say, not as I do could not apply more than in this situation. The dichotomy of the rhetorical approach is one that requires fear to be used to prevent destruction by either being a mechanism of caution or one that calls for immediate action.

## **Conclusion**

The two case studies of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror provide insight and evidence for analysis using Hofstadter's Paranoid Style of American Politics. Through this examination, there are two time periods of conflict that can be defined as being part of the Paranoid Style. However, there is a key difference between the two, and that is that the militant leader is absent from the Cold War. The examination looks at the use of fear by political leaders during both cases and comes to the conclusion that the rhetoric used by the Cold War was that of caution to prevent disaster. On the other hand, the leader during the Global War on Terror claims that if action is not taken right away, then freedom and liberty will suffer. It is the role of the President that separates the Cold War from the Global War on Terror in the context of the Paranoid Style Model.

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<sup>101</sup> Williams, Robin. 2002. Live on Broadway. AOL/Time Warner.

However, the Global War on Terror does meet the five conditions, the three elements of the model as well as the two characteristics of the paranoid leader, that are outlined in the model. Both the Cold War and the Global War on Terror are good cases to examine in context of the Paranoid Style argument. In this case, it was done by looking at what was being said at those times by the political leadership, the goal of policies shifted with the terms of rhetoric. The move from survival against communist expansion and an arms race to not letting the terrorists win as the primary goal, the Paranoid Style came into full fruition with the shifting policies. The rhetoric of the Cold War suggests that the overall outcome was survival with an ideological enemy whereas the War on Terror wants to eradicate terrorism from the face of the planet. It is that difference between the two eras that delineates them from each other.

The Paranoid Style will never fully disappear or shy away from American politics. Despite its ever present framework for policy, it does come in waves and fluctuations and it so happens that the Cold War and the War on Terror happened back to back and provide a good comparison for examination for the Paranoid style. It is knowing the manner in which politics is done that allows a change to occur. By recognizing the paranoid style as what it is and its impact on American politics, the citizenry can understand and recognize the policy transformations and not buy into the reasons for which both are done. Despite the current era of the Global War on Terror, the globe did survive the Cold War and its policy choices, so there is no reason to think that the policies from the Paranoid Style of the Global War on Terror cannot be survived as well.

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