

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

BY

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PREFACE

The schism between the antagonistic ideologies of world Communism and democracy is demonstrated on a smaller scale in the division of Germany into East and West states. The German division is a product of the grand schism and further represents the anomalous situation wherein the former enemy German state has become a prize in the greater conflict.

It was in the Allied occupation of Germany that the Western Powers clearly recognized the threat from the Soviet Union and where efforts at co-operation proved futile. In view of the aims and requirements of the Soviet Union, it was evident that discord would develop in the attempted Four Power administration of defeated Germany.

The question of Germany's future, remains after a period of ten years, a part of the basic East-West conflict. The unyielding Soviet conditions upon which it would allow reunification are as unacceptable to the West as are the tenets of Communism itself, and the settlement of the German problem remains for the reconciliation of the schism which divides the world.

This study is an attempt to show the position which Germany holds in the basic security requirements and expansionist desires of the Soviet Union. Also included in the

study are an analysis of the underlying motives and results of Soviet policy and a description of the methods utilized by the Russians to achieve their objectives.

Four methods have been selected for study in the Soviet attempts to effect the permanent containment of Germany. These methods include the concepts of the Great Power Concert, the division of Germany, neutralization and disarmament of Germany, and the European Concert.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my major adviser, Dr. Robert O. Gibbon, for his invaluable and untiring guidance in the preparation of this thesis. To Dr. Guy R. Donnell and Dr. C. A. L. Rich, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for their able counsel and advice.

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CHAPTER I

BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF SOVIET DEFENSE

Establishment of Viable Frontiers

In the treatment of Soviet foreign policy in its relation to the reunification of Germany, the satellite states of Eastern Europe must be considered. Soviet consent to the absorption of its subservient East German regime into a free and united Germany would seriously jeopardize the minority rule of the Communist governments in these states. It would be difficult to permit government of free choice in one area without a reciprocal grant of freedom in others.

Therefore, it is necessary to recapitulate the Soviet ascendancy in Eastern Europe. Europe lies within the immediate Soviet plans of expansion and future world domination. To expand outward, however, a State must be secure within its own sphere. The subjugation of the states of Eastern Europe may be described as a necessary element within the primary Soviet concern for the security of its own frontiers, and secondarily, as a part of the expansive desire for world domination.

Extension of Control Over Eastern Europe

If the Soviet Union had sincerely adhered to the Atlantic Charter,¹ the territorial gains which resulted from the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939² would have been nullified. But throughout the war Stalin maintained that the territories annexed from Poland, Rumania, and Finland in 1939-1940 belonged legally to the Soviet Union; and that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, annexed and incorporated in 1940, had become member republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.³ Both the United States and Great Britain refused to acknowledge these annexations.⁴ Other than these acquisitions, which were declared to be historically and legally Russian territories, Soviet protestations against further annexations were offered on repeated occasions.⁵ By its adherence to the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union agreed to respect the principle of Big Three co-operation for the establishment of responsible democratic governments in the

¹Wm. Hardy McNeill, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: "America, Britain, and Russia, Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946" (London, 1953), p. 43. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1939-1946.

²Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 1933-1941 (London, 1953), III, pp. 376-380.

³Survey 1939-1946, pp. 406-407.

⁴Ibid., p. 179, pp. 166-168.

⁵Ibid., p. 333. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow during October, 1943, agreement was reached that no spheres of influence would be established in Europe.

former Axis satellites and liberated states of Eastern Europe.⁶ The more realistically-minded Churchill, as compared to the idealist Roosevelt, had early recognized Soviet designs in the Balkan area.⁷ Although thwarted in his attempts to place Anglo-American armies in the Balkans, Churchill continued his efforts to limit the Soviet influence in this area. The successes of the Red Army in early 1944 made it imperative, in his view, that some form of delimitation be achieved. A tentative arrangement was agreed upon in May, 1944 whereby Rumania and Bulgaria were to be in the Soviet sphere, with British influence to be predominant in Greece and Yugoslavia.⁸ In October, 1944 a more definitive agreement was reached, with the understanding by the Americans that the arrangement would not extend beyond the termination of hostilities. Pre-eminent Soviet influence was guaranteed in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Britain was to be assured predominant influence over Greek affairs, while in Yugoslavia, Russia and Britain were to exercise an equal proportion of influence.⁹

⁶Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference, ed. Walter Johnson (Garden City, 1949), pp. 335-336.

⁷Survey 1939-1946, p. 272, pp. 303-305, p. 352. Churchill endeavored repeatedly for an Anglo-American Balkan campaign in preference to a cross-channel invasion; I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York, 1949), pp. 507-508. Roosevelt sided with Stalin at the Teheran Conference against a Balkan campaign, which gave Stalin a free hand in the Balkans.

⁸Survey 1939-1946, p. 422.

⁹Ibid., p. 495.

Neither the agreements concluded between the British and the Russians, nor the Soviet espousal of the principles enunciated in the "Declaration on Liberated Europe", were of lasting extent. They could be more appropriately labeled a part of the Soviet machinations to gain complete control in Eastern Europe. The British, although able to maintain their influence upon Greek affairs, could not establish the necessary military basis for the exercise of their claim to equal influence in Yugoslavia.¹⁰

The Soviet Army, in its victorious sweep through Eastern Europe, placed the Russians in complete control of these countries. Armistice agreements concluded with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, although done in the name of the Allies, enabled the Russians to control the coalition governments which were established, with the exception of Finland.¹¹ Allied Control Commissions in the former Axis satellites were not permitted to function smoothly due to Soviet obstructions.¹² The coalition governments were required to be composed of representatives of the various political parties within each country. These normally included Communists, Socialists, Peasants, and Clericalists. The most strategic and decisive governmental positions (police and army) were secured by the Communists,

¹⁰Ibid., p. 496, p. 537.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 466-476; Deutscher, p. 533.

¹²Stettinius, p. 312.

which enabled them gradually to extend their control over the country and over other members of the coalition.¹³

At the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) Stalin attempted to secure American and British recognition of these satellite governments. The only concession which he could gain toward this end, however, was the agreement by the United States and Great Britain to study the subject of recognition prior to the conclusion of the peace treaties.¹⁴ The Council of Foreign Ministers, established by the Conference to draft the peace treaties, did not complete its task until December 6, 1946. Signatures were affixed to these treaties with the ex-enemy states (Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland) in Paris on February 10, 1947.¹⁵

The United States extended recognition, along with Great Britain, to Hungary on November 2, 1945 on the condition that free elections would be held as soon as possible. Elections held on November 4 produced only a small minority for the Communists.¹⁶ Overwhelming victories were scored by the Communists in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the same month.¹⁷ Diplomatic recognition was extended to the Rumanian Government by the United States and Great Britain on February 5, 1946 when it added members of the Opposition to

¹³Deutscher, p. 533.

¹⁴Survey 1939-1946, p. 624.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 723.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 702.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 702-703.

the Government. The Bulgarian Government did not make these changes, in accordance with agreements reached in Moscow the previous December; therefore, recognition was denied to it.¹⁸

By the time the peace treaties were signed, Soviet control had been consolidated throughout the ex-enemy states in Eastern Europe. Trade agreements had been negotiated with these states which effectively bound them to the Russian economy. Following the poor Communist showing in the November, 1945 elections in Austria (Soviet-occupied sector) and Hungary, measures were applied to the election machinery which would prevent the recurrence of such developments. Elections were not held in Rumania until November 19, 1946, and in Poland until January 19, 1947, with the results denoting the effectiveness of Communist police action in crippling the Opposition.¹⁹

The conclusion of the peace treaties meant that the United States and Great Britain would have no further legitimate claim to contest the actions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. The actions of the Soviet Union could be effectively disguised and manifested through the puppet regimes of these states, giving to it the appearance of being a "beneficent" protector of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Protests to Soviet actions by the Americans and the British were declared by the Russians to be violations of this principle.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 707.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 734.

Retention of East Prussia

Soviet policy toward the German state of East Prussia has been governed by three considerations. One was a punitive consideration and was concerned with the dismemberment of Germany.²⁰ This state, the symbol of the highly efficient German civil administration as well as the source of the German militaristic tradition, was formally liquidated by action of the Allied Control Council on February 25, 1946, with approval of this action given by the Council of Foreign Ministers on February 25, 1947. Its eleven provinces and administrative districts had previously been divided between the Soviet, British, and American zones, and Poland.²¹ The detachment of East Prussia, as a measure to weaken permanently the capacity of Germany to wage war, had been agreed upon by the three Powers early in the war. Poland was to be the primary beneficiary.²²

The second consideration for Soviet policy in relation to East Prussia concerns the resolute Russian quest for a year-around ice-free port. Tacit consent to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic port of Koenigsberg was given at the

²⁰See below, Chapter II.

²¹Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948 (London, 1952), p. 229. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1947-1948; United States Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents, Dept. of State Pub. No. 3556 (Washington, 1950), p. 151. Hereinafter referred to as The Story in Documents.

²²Survey 1939-1946, pp. 166-168, p. 319, p. 333.

Potsdam Conference with the proviso that final settlement must await the peace conference.²³ An atmosphere of permanence pervaded this arrangement, as in the following year the name of the city was appropriately changed to the more Russian "Kaliningrad".²⁴

The third consideration concerns the disposition of the southern portion of East Prussia. American and British consent was secured at Potsdam to the unilateral Soviet action which placed this area, in addition to Upper Silesia, all but a tip of lower Silesia, a part of Brandenburg, and all but the western extremity of Pomerania under Polish administration, subject to final settlement by the peace conference.²⁵ However, consent was not given to the mass expulsions of the inhabitants of these areas. Within this third consideration, the Russians, by placing these areas under Polish control, hoped to escape the onus for the severance of German territory and the expulsion of its inhabitants. It was hoped that German animosity would be directed toward the Poles, causing a subsequent dependence of Poland upon the Soviet Union.²⁶

²³James P. Warburg, Germany-Bridge or Battleground (New York, 1946, 1947), p. 30.

²⁴Survey 1947-1948, p. 227.

²⁵Warburg, p. 95.

²⁶Ibid.

Hegemony over Czechoslovakia and Poland

The establishment of Soviet hegemony over Poland and Czechoslovakia was a further step in the Soviet plan to secure viable frontiers. As in the states of southeastern Europe, it was considered essential that the Soviet Union have "friendly" states along its western frontiers as guarantees of its own security. Also, as in these states, "friendly" governments, in Soviet terminology, denoted subserviency.

Control over these areas extends the Soviet sphere of influence into the heart of north-central Europe. These two states become buffers against the possibility of a future German or Western attack upon the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia, with a higher degree of technological development than the agrarian states of southeastern Europe, became a welcomed addition to the Soviet economy. Extension of Soviet control to these areas also gives to the Soviet Union a decided tactical advantage in the event of war in addition to providing a defense in depth to its own boundaries. The area in which the armies of the Western coalition would be required to fight defensive operations has been seriously limited by this Soviet expansion. For this reason, a determination to hold Western Germany within the Western defensive system has arisen. This in turn gives rise to serious doubts as to the possibility of German reunification until such time as the greater problem of East-West animosity is resolved.

The Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, on February 10, 1948,²⁷ demonstrated to the Western world the full intentions of the Soviet Union to gain control of Europe as a part of the greater plan for world domination. Furthermore, it demonstrated an essential requirement of the Soviet system, i.e., the overriding need for uniformity. As one author has stated,²⁸ Moscow is guided by the realization that it must have complete uniformity in the areas which it controls. These states of Eastern Europe could not be left alone to develop a system between "popular democracy" and parliamentary institutions because of the danger of the emergence of social forces and ideas which might prove unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Therefore, it followed that in the states of Eastern Europe it was necessary to install in power either Russian Communists or local Communists who were so thoroughly indoctrinated with the Soviet viewpoint that all their actions would resultantly reflect this view.²⁹

Czechoslovakia, because of the appeasement policy of the Western statesmen at Munich, had occasion to be disillusioned with the West. In its disillusionment, it had

²⁷Kenneth Ingram, History of the Cold War (New York, 1955), pp. 86-90.

²⁸Max Beloff, "No Peace, No War", Foreign Affairs, XXVII (1949), 222-223.

²⁹Ibid.

turned to the Soviet Union, which made ostensible efforts to aid it.³⁰ The spirit of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union was renewed following the Soviet entry into the war.³¹ Subsequent to the evacuation of Soviet and American forces of liberation in December, 1945, elections were held on May 27, 1946 in which a genuine coalition government under a Communist Prime Minister was elected.³² Although containing sufficient non-Communist members to give it a Western orientation, the influence of Soviet Russia was seen in the July, 1947 refusal of the Czechoslovakian Government to participate in the Marshall Plan, which was a complete reversal of its previous position.³³

There were indications, during the summer and fall of 1947, that the popularity of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party was seriously deteriorating. This prompted a coup d'etat by which the Czechoslovakian police system came

³⁰Edward Taborský, "Benes and the Soviets", Foreign Affairs, XXVII (1949), 302-304. The Russians declared that they would come to the aid of the Czechs against the Germans in accordance with the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935, providing the French would first show their willingness to invoke the assistance terms of the Franco-Czech Treaty. This the French were not willing to do.

³¹Ibid., p. 308, p. 311, pp. 311-313. Czechoslovakian forces were trained in the Soviet Union; a Treaty of Friendship, signed in December, 1943, placed the Soviet Union as favoring an independent Czechoslovakia with its own national government; a treaty of May, 1944 provided that areas liberated by the Soviet Army would be turned over to emissaries of Dr. Benes for administration and control.

³²Survey 1939-1946, p. 734.

³³Ingram, pp. 86-87.

under Communist domination. With the police safely in Communist hands, elections were held on May 30, 1948 for a single list of Communist-sponsored candidates. The results were of the stereotyped Soviet variety, with the Communists receiving an overwhelming majority. President Benes, who had believed that co-operation with the Russians was possible, resigned from the Presidency of the Republic on June 7, 1948.³⁴

In Poland, Soviet policy was centered upon closing, once and for all, the historical gateway through which the western portion of the Soviet Union had been subjected to devastating invasions. As a part of this policy, there was an unrelenting effort by the Soviet Government to gain recognition of the Russo-Polish boundary as established by the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland in 1939. At that time, territories were regained by the Soviet Union which had been lost to Poland during the Russo-Polish War of 1920-1921.³⁵ The most incessant opponent to Allied recognition of the Soviet Union's infamous acquisitions was the Polish Government in Exile, established in London following the Nazi-Soviet partition.³⁶ However, the efforts of this Government to prevent the loss of this territory and what it feared most, Soviet domination of Poland, proved unsuccessful.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 89-90, p. 93.

³⁵Warburg, p. 93.

³⁶Andrew J. Krzesinski, Poland's Rights To Justice (New York, 1946), p. 24.

The Soviet Union, in pressing the governments of the United States and Great Britain for their recognition of the Curzon Line as the postwar Russo-Polish boundary, argued that the lands to the east of this line had been historically Russian and that as a matter of honor they should be returned to the Soviet Union. It was also declared, that in the interests of Soviet security, the postwar Polish Government must be "strong, independent, and democratic---, to help protect the Soviet Union".³⁷

Stalin won the approval of Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta for the establishment of the Curzon Line as the postwar Russo-Polish boundary. The Poles were to be compensated for the loss of the eastern areas with German territory.³⁸ Although the decision of the Big Three to recognize the Curzon Line was made without the consent or even with the consultation of the London Polish Government, it was indisputable that control of the area in question was exercised by the Soviet-sponsored Provisional Government of Poland, supported by the Red Army.³⁹ The areas which constitute western White Russia and the western Ukraine had been

³⁷Stettinius, p. 154. The Curzon Line was a supposedly ethnographical demarcation proposed in 1919.

³⁸Ibid., p. 155, p. 211. Final delimitation of the western frontier would be decided at the peace conference; Stettinius, pp. 337-338.

³⁹Survey 1939-1946, p. 431, p. 528. The Polish Committee of National Liberation was set up by the Russians on July 26, 1944 to administer liberated areas. It proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland on December 31, 1944.

formally annexed by the Soviet Union in January, 1944.⁴⁰ Although the Provisional Government was not recognized by the United States or Great Britain,⁴¹ these states had no other alternative than to attempt a compromise at Yalta to insure that the postwar Polish Government would include members of the London Polish Government. The actual compromise provided that the existing Provisional Government would be reorganized to include Poles from within Poland and from abroad. The reorganized government or the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would be "pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot".⁴²

A Commission was established by the Yalta Conference, representing the three Allied Powers, which was to hold consultations in Moscow with the various Polish elements in relation to the formation of the new Provisional Government.⁴³ The Russian insistence that no Polish leader could participate in the new Provisional Government who did not accept the Yalta Agreements relative to the Curzon Line⁴⁴ seriously obstructed the work of the Commission.⁴⁵

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 412.

⁴¹Stettinius, p. 158.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 337-338.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Survey 1939-1956, p. 576.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 414.

The stalemate in Moscow was broken during May with the arrival of the personal emissary of President Truman, Mr. Harry Hopkins, for personal consultations with Stalin. On July 5, 1945, the reorganized Provisional Government of Poland received the recognition of the United States and Great Britain. Of its total twenty-one seats, fourteen of the most important (and decisive) were retained by former members of the Soviet-sponsored Provisional Government.⁴⁶

Although it had been agreed at Yalta that Poland was to receive German lands as compensation for her losses to Soviet Russia, final delimitation was to await the peace conference.⁴⁷ Both Roosevelt and Churchill opposed any extension of Polish domain to the west of the Oder River.⁴⁸ However, prior to the Potsdam Conference, unilateral action by the Soviet Union had placed the German territory to the Oder and Western Neisse Rivers under Polish administration, with the exception of the Baltic port of Koenigsberg and the surrounding area, which was reserved to the Soviet Union. This action received the tacit consent of the United States and Great Britain at Potsdam, but remained conditional upon the final peace settlement.⁴⁹

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 588-589.

⁴⁷Stettinius, pp. 337-338.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 210-211.

⁴⁹Survey 1939-1946, p. 608.

Inside Poland, final claim to undisputed authority lay with the Communists upon the announcement of the results of the first postwar election which was held on January 19, 1947. The Democratic Bloc (the Communists and their allies) won 394 of 444 seats in the parliament. Opposition to Communist control had by this time been rendered inconsequential, notwithstanding the belated and ineffective protests voiced by the British and United States Governments to this travesty committed in the name of democracy.⁵⁰

Establishment of a Viable Balance of Power in Europe

The second major requirement of Soviet defense entails the establishment of a viable balance of power in Europe. For the stability of its hegemony over Eastern Europe, it is essential that Germany remain divided, or be united under Communist control. It is essential that Germany not be permitted to regain its former dominant European position. If such a development should materialize, the balance of power in Europe would be seriously jeopardized. In the Soviet view, not only would the Communist domination of Eastern Europe be threatened, but also the security of its own frontiers would be imperiled.

In the pursuit of its policy of containment of German power, four major concepts have been employed. They are: (1) a Great Power Concert, envisaging an alliance with the

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 185-188.

United States; (2) the division of Germany between East and West blocs; (3) the neutralization and disarmament of Germany into a buffer zone; and (4) a European Concert.

At the zenith of its victorious sweep through Eastern Europe, it was the object of Soviet policy to attain, if possible, the degree of control in Germany as had been obtained in the subjugated states of Eastern Europe. This could be ascertained in the Soviet reversal of its wartime position favoring German dismemberment to support of a policy demanding the unification of Germany.⁵¹ In relation to this demand for unification, the Soviet Union advocated a strong central government, i.e., one in which strategically-placed Communists could more easily assume control over decisive positions.⁵² Awakened to Soviet designs by the subversion of free government in Eastern Europe, the Soviet plans for the unification of Germany have been steadfastly opposed by the West. The Soviet Union, in view of the devastating losses in manpower and property during World War II, has ample reason to fear and respect the capabilities of the Germans. A desire to prevent the rebirth of German militarism could not be, nor was it, condemned. But a concomitant desire and motivation of Soviet policy has been for the complete subjugation of Germany and utilization of its dynamic resources in the pursuit of its expansionist aims.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 167, p. 548, p. 586.

⁵²Survey 1947-1948, pp. 225-227, p. 233.

Great Power Concert

The wartime alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union contained within itself a contradiction of ideals. It was hoped that these three Powers would continue their co-operation in the postwar world toward the perpetuation of peace. This objective was expressed repeatedly by the wartime leaders, and within this objective, the punishment and containment of future German aggression was unanimously agreed upon.⁵³ As for the methods by which this would be accomplished, it was agreed that the three Great Powers, complemented by France in recognition of its pre-war status and of its wartime suffering at German hands, would co-operate in the quadripartite control and direction of Germany until such time as it could be entrusted with the return to a sovereign status among the democratic, peace-seeking nations of the world.⁵⁴ There was complete agreement among these Powers that for the sake of a peaceful world, Germany must be contained and re-educated to democracy.⁵⁵

The Great Power Concert began to show the strains of its inner contradictions before the fighting had come to a close. The agreements with the Russians at Yalta were in part based upon the belief that Russian aid would be

⁵³Survey 1939-1946, p. 502.

⁵⁴James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), pp. 36-37.

⁵⁵Ibid.

necessary in concluding the war with Japan. They were based in part on a mistaken analysis of Soviet motives. They were based in part on a belief in the sanctity of agreements, a tenet totally alien to Soviet diplomacy. And possibly the greatest, and most damaging basis for concluding the agreements which put the Soviet Union in firm control in Eastern Europe, was the American failure to recognize the important position which it would be required to fulfill in the post-war world. It was thus the lingering vestiges of isolationism which caused American policy to be based upon the desire for a speedy conclusion to American participation in European affairs and a return to hemispheric relations.⁵⁶

As events in Eastern Europe revealed, prior to the end of hostilities, the Soviet Union was bent upon a unilateral course of action. In Germany, the inner contradictions among the Great Powers revealed their irreconcilable nature soon after the beginning of the occupation. Only upon matters of the most perfunctory nature could accord be reached.⁵⁷ Ironically, not the Russians, but the French provided the initial obstructions to the achievement of the objectives of the occupation as had been established at Potsdam. France, not a signatory to the Potsdam Agreements, had been assigned a zone of occupation and a seat on the Allied Control Council. It could, as a result of the

⁵⁶Survey 1939-1946, p. 532.

⁵⁷Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, 1950), p. 157, pp. 160-161, pp. 350-353.

failure to secure its signature to the Potsdam Agreements, pursue a unilateral course when it so desired. In view of the French fear of German military and economic strength, France offered repeated opposition to measures by which centralized authority would be placed in German hands.⁵⁸

At the beginning of the occupation, the Soviet Union desired a unified Germany.⁵⁹ This was a logical development of a policy which would enhance the possibilities for Soviet control over all of Germany. The expressed desire of the United States to disengage itself from German and European affairs at the earliest possible opportunity⁶⁰ must have encouraged Soviet hopes for the attainment of its objectives. Any realization of the attainment of a highly centralized administration in Germany was counter to the beliefs of the three Western Powers in regard to a future governmental system for Germany. France obstinately opposed any but the most decentralized type of administrative structure.⁶¹ The United States and Great Britain persistently advocated a centralized economic administration for Germany, as had been directed by the Potsdam Agreements.⁶² In regard to a political administration, they agreed upon a federal system, with Great Britain desiring more centralization

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 39, pp. 132-133, pp. 178-179.

⁵⁹Survey 1939-1946, p. 167.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 532.

⁶¹Clay, p. 39, p. 396.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 40-41, pp. 163-185.

than considered wise by the United States. A federal system was thought best suited to prevent the recurrence of the highly centralized militaristic German state.⁶³ Although advocating a centralized political administration for Germany, the Russians consistently obstructed British and American efforts to effect the unified economic administration directed by the Potsdam accords. This obstructionism was an example of short-term Soviet policy which thwarted long-range objectives. Short-term Soviet policy had as its objective the pursuit of a reparations policy which would both deplete the German war-making potential and also aid the reconstruction problem within the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ No agreement could be reached among the Allied Powers as to the final amount of reparations to be assessed against the Germans.⁶⁵ In view of this inability to reach agreement, the Russians were to be permitted to exact and withdraw reparations in advance of the settlement of a total amount. These advance reparations were to be accounted against the final sum allotted to the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ It had been agreed at Potsdam that no reparations would be taken from current German production. In order to minimize the costs of the occupation upon the occupying powers, each zone was

⁶³Ibid., p. 396.

⁶⁴Peter Nettl, "German Reparations", Foreign Affairs, XXIX (1951), 300-308.

⁶⁵Stettinius, pp. 266-267; Clay, p. 319.

⁶⁶Survey 1939-1946, p. 623.

to provide for the whole the goods and services for which it was best equipped.⁶⁷ However, in this vital function, both the French and the Russians refused to co-operate. In addition, the Soviet authorities refused to cease their policy of exacting reparations from current German production. This policy had been adopted upon the realization of the wastefulness of the Russian policy of removing plants and equipment to the Soviet Union. Also, by leaving the plants in operation in the Soviet zone to produce for reparations, jobs were created for German laborers. This placed the Russians in a temporary political advantage, due to unemployment problems in the Western zones which were created by the influx of expellees from the former German territories and Eastern Europe, and also by the Russian refusal to provide the Western zones with needed raw materials. The Soviet authorities refused to make an accounting of the withdrawals of equipment from their zone in addition to the open abrogation of the understanding reached at Potsdam.⁶⁸

As a result of the Soviet intransigence, the American and British zones were merged for economic administration in January, 1947. However, they retained their separate identities for military administration. American offers to Russia and France to join in the merger were rejected.⁶⁹

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Clay, pp. 121-122.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 163.

Further events in 1947 underscored the deteriorating state of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. Among these events, the Soviet refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe and its refusal to allow the participation of the satellite states of Eastern Europe emphasized the diversity of interests between East and West.⁷⁰ In Germany itself, the Allied Control Council increasingly became a forum for Soviet propagandistic harangues against the Western Powers.

Efforts at Four Power co-operation ended with the Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council in March, 1948. In defense of their actions, the Russians charged the Western Powers with attempting to create a separate German state. Soviet opposition was also expressed against the currency reform which was to be undertaken in the Western zones.⁷¹ The Berlin blockade, which followed the Russian walkout from the Allied Control Council, was an attempt to force the Western Powers to drop their announced plans to proceed with the formation of a central governmental authority for the Western zones in view of Soviet obstructionism in the unified administration of Germany.⁷²

⁷⁰Survey 1947-1948, pp. 24-39.

⁷¹Clay, pp. 349-357.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 362-363, p. 369.

Division of Germany Between East and West Blocs

Although the Berlin blockade served to magnify the serious divergence of interests between East and West, the actual division of Germany had begun prior to this action by the Russians. Policy in the Soviet zone had been from the outset of the occupation directed toward the creation of a replica of the satellites of Eastern Europe. The Soviet authorities were the first of the occupying powers to permit the formation of political parties.⁷³ Although the parties were initially allowed a modicum of freedom from interference, election results proved that such a policy was not beneficial to the attainment of Communist objectives.⁷⁴ A fusion of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the Communist Party (KPD) was directed in the Soviet zone in April, 1946, prior to zonal elections. The result of this merger was a "united worker's party" or as it was officially known, the Socialist Unity Party (SED). This party was to become the instrument for the fulfillment of Soviet policy in the Soviet zone.⁷⁵ Both the SED and the nominal opposition parties were gradually purged of all elements opposed to Soviet policy.⁷⁶

⁷³Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945-1954 (London, 1955), pp. 37-39. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on Germany 1945-1954.

⁷⁴Joachim Joesten, Germany: What Now? (Chicago, 1948), pp. 63-72.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 136-144.

⁷⁶J.P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50 (London, 1951), pp. 99-114.

The sovietization of the Russian zone was pursued further in the socialization measures taken in agriculture and industry.⁷⁷ These measures have been used as bargaining positions in subsequent negotiations among the Four Powers in the attempts to achieve reunification.⁷⁸ By divesting the Junker landowners of their large holdings and dividing them among small farmers, agricultural workers and refugees, and by nationalization of major industries in the name of the working population, the Russians have incurred the opposition of the free-enterprise adherents in Western Germany. This has subsequently created a deterrent to reunification. Although there may be a true desire for reunification, various vested interests on either side will be reluctant to endanger the system which is most beneficial to their interests. This has had its effects not only in the social and economic fields, but also in the political field.⁷⁹ In East Germany, the Communists were installed in power by the Soviet authorities, and only so long as the Soviet Union maintains vested interests in Germany can this group retain its control. The Communists could not effectively compete with either the Christian Democratic Union

⁷⁷Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 59-64; J.P. Nettl, pp. 151-184.

⁷⁸United States Department of State, The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955, Dept. of State Pub. No. 6046 (Washington, 1955), pp. 77-80. Hereinafter referred to as Geneva Conference of Heads of Government 1955.

⁷⁹Peter Nettl, "Economic Checks on German Unity", Foreign Affairs, XXX (1952), 559-560.

(CDU) or the Social Democrats.⁸⁰ Because free elections would mean almost certain defeat for the Communists, it is questionable that such a development will be consented to by the Soviet Union. It would mean the renunciation of all their objectives in respect to eventual control of Germany and would also be contradictory to what are considered genuine Soviet fears of a reunified, free and independent Germany.

As a part of the division of Germany both the French and the Russians, in their refusal to participate in a unified economic administration of Germany, erected zonal barriers to trade and communications. These barriers became increasingly difficult to surmount. Interzonal movement became almost as difficult as that between nations.⁸¹ The French were gradually induced to lower their zonal barriers and to co-operate with the Anglo-American bizon for economic purposes. This co-operation was further extended when, at a conference of the Three Powers in London during February and March, 1948, it was agreed that the three Western zones should be merged and that the German population be allowed to establish a Government for the merged area. The Germans were to be permitted to call a constituent assembly in September, 1948. Simultaneously, the three occupying Powers would draw up an Occupation

⁸⁰Joesten, p. 146.

⁸¹Clay, pp. 111-112.

Statute which would transfer the functions of military government to a civilian High Commission.⁸²

The Basic Law of the new German Federal Republic and the Occupation Statute were promulgated in May, 1949, simultaneous to the lifting of the Soviet blockade of Berlin.⁸³ Although maintaining the blockade for a year, the Russians failed in their objectives of driving the Western Powers from Berlin and in diverting them from their plans to allow the establishment of a central government for the Western zones. Instead, the decision to institute the blockade had made the Western Powers more resolute in their determination to remain in Berlin and to oppose at all costs the Soviet desire to control all of Germany. The division of Germany took a more permanent character when in September, 1949 the first Government of the West German Federal Republic was officially installed.⁸⁴

Upon the initial announcement by the three Western Powers of their intentions to allow the formation of a central government in their zones the Russians charged these governments with fomenting the division of Germany.⁸⁵ However, the Soviet authorities had laid the foundation for an East German Government (and the division of Germany) prior

⁸²Ibid., pp. 404-406.

⁸³Ibid., p. 390.

⁸⁴James P. Warburg, Germany-Key To Peace (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 118-120.

⁸⁵Clay, pp. 355-357.

to any like action by the three Western Powers. An embryonic central government for the Soviet zone was established in 1945. Its scope was gradually extended to the degree that the transformation to a governmental status was but a mere change in name. A "People's Congress" was summoned in December, 1947 which met at various times during 1948. It had embryonic governmental organs in the forms of a "People's Council" or Volksrat and a Presidium. This Congress approved a constitution, ostensibly drafted for all of Germany, which envisaged the formation of a "People's Republic" similar to the satellite states of Eastern Europe. This constitution became the fundamental law for the German Democratic Republic, which was proclaimed on October 7, 1949, following the establishment of the first Government of the West German Federal Republic.⁸⁶ The first Government of East Germany was of a provisional nature, as elections were not held until a year later.⁸⁷ This Government immediately made commitments, in relation to the disputed eastern provinces of Germany and the expelled inhabitants of these areas, which have seriously prejudiced the hopes of reunification. In their efforts to gain recognition as a sovereign state, the leaders of the new Government established relations with the Communist-bloc countries in Eastern Europe. In the process, the East Germans disavowed

⁸⁶Survey 1947-1948, pp. 257-260.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 192.

any future claim of Germany to the eastern territories which had been separated from Germany at the end of the war. Any claims of the expelled inhabitants of these areas were also disavowed.⁸⁸ The renunciation of any future claims in these areas has been repudiated by the Government of the German Federal Republic and by the three Western Powers.⁸⁹

Neutralization and Disarmament of Germany

The concept of a unified but neutralized and disarmed Germany began to be vigorously applied following the announcement in April, 1949 of the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As stated previously, it was unanimously resolved by the victorious Allies that Germany must be disarmed and demilitarized, i.e., she must be rendered incapable of creating another war machine. The Potsdam Agreements directed the dismantlement or destruction of industries producing or capable of producing war materials or materials essential to the conduct of war.⁹⁰ As with the other areas of disagreement in regard to Germany, this field was not immune to controversy and conflict. Charges and counter-charges were made to the effect that demilitarization was not being faithfully carried out.⁹¹ Reports of

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 193-196.

⁸⁹Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1949-1950 (London, 1953), p. 194. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1949-1950.

⁹⁰Survey 1939-1946, p. 618.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 726; Clay, pp. 127-129.

the increases being made in the para-military East German "People's Police" added to the consternation in the West as to Soviet intentions.⁹² NATO had received its inspiration in the context of rapidly deteriorating East-West relations and the mounting apprehension that the Soviet Union would resort to force in order to accomplish its aims. The formation of NATO brought forth charges by the Russians that this organization was an aggressive grouping directed solely against the Soviet Union.⁹³

Subsequent to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June, 1950, the matter of German participation in the defense of Western Europe became increasingly important, in particular to the United States Government. Prior to the beginning of this conflict, a German contribution to Western defense had not been contemplated publicly. However, the increasing fear that a situation similar to Korea would develop in divided Germany led American officials to press for the establishment of a system of European defense which could utilize the German potential. It was advocated increasingly in the United States that an effective defense of Western Europe could be made only with the participation of West Germany.⁹⁴

⁹²Survey 1949-1950, pp. 241-243; Warburg, Germany-Key To Peace, pp. 129-130.

⁹³Survey 1949-1950, pp. 13-14.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 154-155; Warburg, Germany-Key To Peace, p. 126.

Negotiations were conducted throughout 1951 which culminated in the signing on May 27, 1952, of the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty by France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the German Federal Republic, and Italy. The organization which would be established, upon ratification of the Treaty by the signatory nations, would provide for a supranational European Army to which a German contribution would be made. This organization satisfied the demand of the United States for a West German contribution to European defense while its supranational character helped to allay the fears engendered by the proposal to re-create a national German army. On May 26, 1952 the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany signed the Contractual Agreements. Under these Agreements, which were to enter into force with the EDC Treaty, virtual sovereignty would be restored to West Germany.⁹⁵

Upon the announcement of the plans for the rearmament of West Germany, it became the object of Soviet policy to prevent their maturity. The Russians were aided in this policy by propagandists in East Germany and the satellites of Eastern Europe. As has become common policy since, the lure of reunification was utilized in the efforts to prevent West German alliance with the Western Powers. Rearmament was declared to be the complete antithesis of reunification.

⁹⁵Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1952 (London, 1955), pp. 106-109. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1952.

It was further declared that West German rearmament within a basically anti-Soviet bloc would mean the permanent division of Germany.⁹⁶ In addition to arousing German fears of permanent division, Soviet propaganda was directed toward magnifying the French fears of German militarism and the easily provoked suspicion of the supranational character of EDC. Soviet propaganda continued to play upon the French apprehension of the loss of its sovereignty in an organization such as EDC, and alluded to the "inevitable" German domination of the organization. This line was continued after EDC met defeat in the French National Assembly in August, 1954 with its object then to create the same fears in relation to the Western European Union (WEU), which replaced EDC.⁹⁷

In its campaign to prevent ratification of the EDC Treaty, the Soviet Union proposed the reunification of Germany upon an armed, but neutralized basis.⁹⁸ Such a proposal finds many adherents, but is opposed by the leaders in West Germany and the three Western Powers.⁹⁹ This proposal, if

⁹⁶U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVII (1952), 518-521; U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXIX (1953), 745-749; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Dec. 9, 1953, pp. 17-18; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Jan. 6, 1954, pp. 20-21.

⁹⁷Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Jan. 20, 1954, pp. 40-41; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, Dec. 9, 1953, p. 18; New Times (Moscow), No. 41, Oct. 9, 1954, pp. 9-15.

⁹⁸U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVI (1952), 531-532.

⁹⁹U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVII (1952), 92-93; Survey 1952, p. 89.

carried out through a system of internationally supervised free elections, would be dangerous both to East and West. It was therefore surmised that the Soviet proposal was made either for propagandistic purposes, or else the Soviet Union felt it could be more secure with a united, armed and neutralized Germany than with a rearmed Western Germany allied with the West.¹⁰⁰ The value to the Soviet Union in the neutralization of Germany would lie in the removal of Western defense forces from Germany proper. This would aid any Soviet plans for gaining covert control while simultaneously placing a severe curtailment upon the area in which Western forces could prepare defensive operations.¹⁰¹

The policy of a unified, armed, and neutral Germany is discounted by the West. Such a policy is rejected by the Adenauer Government and is declared to be an endangerment to German freedom and security and is an open invitation to Soviet control.¹⁰² The major opposition party to Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Party, likewise opposes neutralization. It, however, is more prone to negotiation with the Russians in the matter of reunification.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰Survey 1952, pp. 88-89.

¹⁰¹Eric Dethleffsen, "The Chimera of German Neutrality", Foreign Affairs, XXX (1952), 369.

¹⁰²Survey 1952, pp. 73-74; Konrad Adenauer, "Germany, The New Partner", Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (1955), 182.

¹⁰³Carlo Schmid, "Germany and Europe: The German Social Democratic Program", Foreign Affairs, XXX (1952), 537, 544.

When the EDC Treaty was defeated in the French National Assembly in August, 1954, over two years subsequent to the negotiation of the Treaty, a disillusioning blow was struck to the concept of Western European defense in that West Germany continued to remain outside the North Atlantic defense system. Although the capabilities of NATO had been increased measurably during this period, it continued to be the belief of Western leaders that so long as West Germany remained outside the system, the capabilities of Western European defense would be seriously limited.¹⁰⁴ As a result of pressure exerted by the United States, and a British concession to its traditional insular policy, agreement was reached at London during September and October, 1954 upon an organization to supplant the defunct EDC.¹⁰⁵ The proceedings begun here culminated with the signing at Paris, on October 23, 1954, of agreements establishing the Western European Union (WEU). The structure of the existing Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO), formed in March, 1948 by Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg as a defensive measure against the Soviet threat, was to be utilized by the new organization. The WEU would include the original members of the Brussels Treaty Organization, in addition to Italy and West Germany. Although WEU would

¹⁰⁴U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 13, 49, 515.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 515-522, p. 845.

permit the retention of national armies, in this regard lacking the supranational character of EDC, safeguards were provided against any member embarking upon a unilateral course of aggression. The United States and Great Britain joined in a Declaration guaranteeing these safeguards.¹⁰⁶ This rapid progression of events was climaxed on May 5, 1955 when the Paris Agreements came into force and the West German Federal Republic regained its complete sovereignty. In addition to its position within WEU, West Germany was now admitted to NATO.¹⁰⁷ In its efforts to prevent EDC and later, the WEU, from becoming effective, the Soviet Union emphasized the "aggressive" character of these organizations and their antithetical relation to German reunification. This policy undoubtedly had its effect upon the apprehensions of the French in regard to the rebirth of a German army. It was likewise effective upon German disquietude relative to permanent division. However, an important factor responsible for the miscarriage of EDC, which was corrected in the organization of WEU, was the reluctance of the British to become firmly committed to a policy of positive and long-range participation in continental affairs.

¹⁰⁶United States Department of State, London and Paris Agreements, Dept. of State Pub. No. 5659 (Washington, 1954), pp. 5-6; Sidney B. Fay, "The U.S. and West Europe", Current History, XXVIII (1955), 36-40.

¹⁰⁷U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXII (1955), 791.

European Concert

The Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, meeting during January and February, 1954, was convened primarily for the purpose of renewing discussions upon the German problem. At the time, ratification and implementation of EDC looked promising; therefore, it was believed that a Four Power conference would not delay ratification.¹⁰⁸ Although no agreements were reached on the German problem, the Soviet Foreign Minister, V.M. Molotov, introduced his plan for European collective security.¹⁰⁹ This plan, with variations, represents to the present time the Soviet interpretations of its needs for security in Europe and for the reunification and containment of Germany. As originally presented, the plan envisaged the establishment of an all-European collective security system which would replace the existing regional collective security systems.¹¹⁰ This was obviously aimed at NATO and the proposed EDC. It was further aimed at displacing the United States position in European affairs. Such a concept was completely alien to United States policy. When American policy changed to that of full participation in the defense

¹⁰⁸United States Department of State, Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, Jan. 25-Feb. 18, 1954, Dept. of State Pub. No. 5399 (Washington, 1954), pp. xv-xvii, p. 1; U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXVIII (1953), 287-289.

¹⁰⁹U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 270, 317-318.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 270.

of Western Europe against further Soviet encroachment, the tremendous outlay of money, men and materials for the development of an effective defense system was not to be sacrificed solely upon the basis of a Soviet proposal. Under the direction of Mr. John Foster Dulles, American policy had become very skeptical of Soviet proposals.¹¹¹ The Western nations, although susceptible to Soviet proposals and entreaties in furtherance of the policy of "peaceful co-existence", have continued to follow the American lead in a policy which is directed at containing the spread of Communism. West Germany, once the power to be contained, has now been accepted conditionally as an equal in the struggle to contain Communism.

Unsuccessful in the proposals at Berlin, the Soviet Union later proposed that the United States join the all-European collective security system, or, if this proposal were unfavorable, that the Soviet Union be allowed to join NATO. The latter suggestion was bluntly rejected as being incompatible with the principles for which NATO was established.¹¹²

Primary opposition to the numerous Soviet proposals for an all-European collective security system (modified to include the United States) arises from the overall objective of these proposals which aims at the eventual dissolution

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 267-269.

¹¹²Ibid., pp. 757-759.

of the existing regional security systems (NATO and WEU and the Warsaw Pact)¹¹³ and their absorption into one all-European system. Concomitantly, these proposals are based upon the continued division of Germany, in regard to which Western policy is ostensibly opposed.¹¹⁴ As stated above, the division of Germany into two states with divergent political, economic and social systems is used by the Russians as a bargaining position in its proposals for reunification. The Russians declare that unification must be preceded by the establishment of a Provisional German Government composed equally of representatives from each German state. This Government, if constituted according to the Soviet proposals, would be authorized to perform functions which could easily establish Communists in sensitive positions. From these vantage points they could possibly prejudice the results of elections which would be held for the establishment of the permanent government.¹¹⁵ According to the Russian proposals, each German state would participate equally in the all-European collective security system prior to German

¹¹³New Times (Moscow), No. 16, May 21, 1955, pp. 68-70. The Warsaw Treaty, adhered to by the Soviet Union and the satellites of Eastern Europe, established a regional security system of these states in May, 1955 following the implementation of the Paris Agreements.

¹¹⁴U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 757; New Times (Moscow), No. 46, November 10, 1955, p. 10.

¹¹⁵United States Department of State, The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Oct. 27-Nov. 16, 1955, Dept. of State Pub. No. 6156 (Washington, 1955), p. 95, pp. 98-99.

reunification. The objective to be attained, according to the Soviet formula, would be the eventual merger of the two German states within this security system into a "peaceful and democratic", unified Germany.¹¹⁶

This system is basically opposed by the Western Powers because: (1) it would be dangerous to dissolve NATO and WEU prior to agreement upon international disarmament which provides positive methods of inspection and control; (2) a unified Germany without adequate controls is as unsatisfactory to the West as to the East; and (3) although committed to a policy which has as its objective the eventual reunification of Germany, the West is adamant in its refusal to permit reunification upon a basis which would allow for Communist domination of Germany.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Ibid., pp. 77-81, pp. 98-99.

¹¹⁷U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 819-823.

CHAPTER II

SOVIET FEARS OF GERMANY AND THE DESIRE TO CONTAIN GERMAN POWER

Punitive Measures to Weaken Germany

Soviet defense demands the establishment and maintenance of viable Soviet frontiers. It further demands a stable balance of power in Europe. These requirements have their origin in part from a fear of German power and a desire to contain and prevent the renaissance of this power.

The fear of German military might was accentuated by the devastation accompanying the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The repulsion of the Nazi invaders required a supreme effort on the part of the Soviet people. The Soviet Government, in order to inspire its people and to placate its allies, revived Russian nationalistic aspirations at the expense of Communist internationalism.¹ As a corollary, the Soviet Government had endeavored strenuously to diffuse among all elements of the population a feeling of bitter hatred toward the Nazi invaders.² Stalin, however,

¹I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York, 1949), p. 475, p. 491.

²Ibid., pp. 489-493.

distinguished between the followers of Hitler and the German people in general.³ Although favorable to the taking of punitive measures against Germany, Stalin was opposed to any public pronouncement of such contemplated actions during the war. The fear that the German will to resist would be bolstered by such action motivated Stalin's opposition.⁴ This distinction between Nazis and Germans in general instilled a suspicion among Russia's allies as to the possibility of a separate Russo-German settlement as had transpired at Brest-Litovsk in 1918.⁵ However, the distinction made by Stalin soon became obscured in the bitterness of the war.

Territorial Dismemberment

The concept of territorial dismemberment, as a punitive measure to contain possible German aggression in the future, was contemplated at a precipitate stage in the war. Even when the war was balanced heavily in favor of the Germans, Stalin demonstrated a proclivity for partition of Germany and the exaction of reparations in kind as retribution for the immense destruction in property and lives suffered by

³Ibid., pp. 489-490.

⁴Wm. Hardy McNeill, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: "America, Britain and Russia, Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946" (London, 1953), p. 348. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1939-1946.

⁵Ibid., p. 168.

the Soviet Union. Never separated from the Soviet concept of dismemberment was the desire to win the recognition by its allies of the territorial gains accrued during the period of Nazi-Soviet rapprochement. This recognition was made a condition of a proposed Anglo-Soviet treaty of formal alliance in December, 1941. These conditions were rejected by Great Britain because of British friendship with Poland and also because of the fear that such an agreement would endanger United States-British relations.⁶

Although the Atlantic Charter of August, 1941 and the United Nations Declaration of January, 1942 had expressly repudiated territorial aggrandizement as an object of the Allied conduct of the war, the persistent claim of the Soviet Union to the regions annexed during 1939-1940 made an incursion into the noble principles proclaimed in these documents. As final victory began to appear attainable, Western attitudes became more reconciled to the Soviet demands. The West used as its rationale the necessity to punish Germany for its inhumane wartime actions. They would accomplish this and prevent the future recurrence of German aggression through territorial dismemberment and would simultaneously compensate Poland for the loss to the Soviet Union of its territory beyond the Curzon Line.⁷ In pursuance of this line of reasoning, it was agreed at the

⁶Ibid., pp. 166-168.

⁷Ibid., p. 319.

Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow during October, 1943, that Germany should be deprived of territory acquired subsequent to 1938 and that Poland should receive East Prussia.⁸ However, the conferees did not reach agreement on the principle of complete dismemberment. Earlier in the year, President Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary Eden had considered favorably the concept of dismemberment of Germany into several states.⁹ At the Moscow Conference, however, the Russians were noncommittal on the subject and declared that they had not given it sufficient study.¹⁰ The Foreign Ministers did agree to the establishment of the European Advisory Commission (EAC), which would have its headquarters in London. Its primary tasks were to consider all specific questions pertaining to terms of surrender and their execution which might arise between the principal allies. It could make recommendations, but had no mandatory authority. Following the Teheran Conference in November and December, 1943, its primary tasks were to draw up an instrument of unconditional surrender for Germany and to reach agreement upon the postwar policy to be pursued by the Allied Powers in relation to Germany.¹¹

⁸Ibid., p. 333.

⁹Ibid., p. 319; Philip E. Mosely, "Dismemberment of Germany", Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (1950), 488.

¹⁰Survey 1939-1946, p. 333; Mosely, pp. 488-489.

¹¹Survey 1939-1946, p. 332, p. 480.

Premier Stalin had candidly opposed the unconditional surrender policy as proposed at Teheran by President Roosevelt. He considered that the pursuit of such an unyielding Allied policy would effectively strengthen the German will to resist.¹² It was at Teheran that the Russian fear of German power and apprehensiveness as to the contingency of its re-emergence was most pronounced. Stalin emphasized that the prevention of the renaissance of Germany as the dominant continental power would require an extended period of military occupation. Unless this policy were followed, he said, Germany, or any part of it, would dominate any confederation of states in which it was allowed to enter.¹³ He opposed dismemberment because, in his opinion, the "Germans would always endeavor to unite".¹⁴

The policy of dismemberment had undergone study in the United States as early as January, 1942. An Advisory Committee on Postwar Problems concluded its study by advising against dismemberment, and favored instead a long-range policy for prevention of German rearmament, promotion of democratic institutions, and reduction or control of Germany's economic preponderance in Europe.¹⁵ A memorandum by the Postwar Programs Committee of the Department of State,

¹²Ibid., p. 348.

¹³Ibid., pp. 356-357.

¹⁴Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 490.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 489.

approved by Secretary Hull in July, 1944, also opposed German dismemberment. The memorandum stated that unless the German people desired dismemberment, forcible partition would eventually in a desire to reunify at all costs. Furthermore, the State Department was of the opinion that a partitioned Germany could not exist economically. Partition, continued the memorandum, would result in some states seeking to gain influence over German affairs through promises of aid in reunification. The memorandum concluded by stating prophetically that unless a co-ordinated Allied policy was agreed upon prior to the end of the war the effect of establishing zones of occupation¹⁶ might lead to a de facto partition.¹⁷

The EAC had reached agreement by July, 1944 on the basic outlines of a tri-zonal division of Germany for occupational purposes. The Soviet zone had been defined and accepted by the Russians on February 18, 1944. This zone contained an estimated forty per cent of the territory, thirty-six per cent of the population, and thirty-three per cent of the productive resources of pre-1937 Germany.¹⁸ Disagreement between the Americans and the British as to which would receive the northwestern zone of occupation was resolved at the Québec Conference in September, 1944.

¹⁶Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany", Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (1950), 590, 594.

¹⁷Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 490, 491.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 589-590.

President Roosevelt agreed to accept the southern zone of occupation; but to meet the American requirements for port facilities, the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven were to be placed under American control. Rights of passage were guaranteed through the British zone.¹⁹ In accordance with the decision made at Yalta to include France in the occupation of Germany, the Americans and British transferred portions of their zones of occupation to the French. In the jointly-occupied city of Berlin, the French sector was constituted by withdrawing portions from the American and British sectors.²⁰

The EAC, although reaching agreement upon the occupation zones, was unable to reach agreement upon a co-ordinated policy for the postwar treatment of Germany. This had resulted primarily from a dispute within the United States Government which prevented the American representative on the European Advisory Commission, the late Mr. John G. Winant, from following a definite policy. The dispute centered around the proposed Morgenthau Plan, which had been favored by President Roosevelt during the period July-October 1944, but which had been bitterly opposed by the State and War Departments.²¹ The plan, which was agreed to by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 596-597.

²⁰Ibid., p. 600, p. 602.

²¹Ibid., p. 491.

Quebec Conference (September 11-19, 1944), envisaged the internationalization of the Ruhr and the transformation of Germany into pastoralized North and South German states. Specifically, Germany would be completely disarmed, which would include the removal or destruction of all industries basic to the creation of armaments. Southern Silesia and part of East Prussia would be transferred to Poland, with the remainder given to the Soviet Union. France would get the Saar and adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and Moselle Rivers. The Ruhr would be stripped of all capabilities of regaining its industrial might. The mines of the Ruhr would be closed, and the area would be internationalized. Restitution and reparation to countries invaded by Germany would be effected through the transfer of existing German resources and territories, rather than from future payments and deliveries. Emphasis was placed upon political decentralization and the formation of federal governments in the partitioned areas with a high degree of states' rights and local autonomy. Responsibility for sustaining the German economy would be left with the German people. The responsibility for the execution of this plan would have resided primarily with Germany's European neighbors.²²

The news of the Roosevelt-Churchill agreement upon the Morgenthau Plan was inadvertently leaked to the press shortly after the conference ended. The President abruptly

²²Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem (New York, 1945), pp. 1-4.

dissociated himself from the plan. His regression was possibly motivated by the adverse public reception to the plan and perhaps by his own realization of the incongruity of the plan with previously announced principles concerning the Allied conduct of the war. The disastrous effect which the plan would have had upon the general economic recovery of Europe conceivably influenced his withdrawal. However, Roosevelt did not prefer to consider alternatives to the plan at the time. This served to nullify the action of the American representative on the EAC, and effectively stalemated the possibility of Allied agreement upon postwar aims and policy in Germany.²³

At the Yalta Conference in February, 1945, it was agreed in principle by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin that Germany should be dismembered. Actual dismemberment was to be postponed until an indefinite date following the German surrender.²⁴ A Committee of Dismemberment was established to develop plans for the implementation of the decision. Its terms of reference made the problem of dismemberment secondary to the basic problem of what military and economic measures should be taken to prevent a renewal of German militarism. Stalin made this a significant condition to his

²³Survey 1939-1946, pp. 491-492.

²⁴Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference, ed. Walter Johnson (Garden City, 1949), pp. 121-126.

acceptance.²⁵ The Committee had only two formal meetings, at neither of which were substantive questions discussed.²⁶

The Yalta conferees had agreed that the decision to dismember Germany would be imparted to the Germans in the instrument of unconditional surrender.²⁷ However, the Act of Military Surrender which was substituted at the last moment by the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, because of conflicts in terminology in the surrender document approved by the EAC and that approved at the Yalta Conference, was exclusively a military surrender and the word "dismemberment" was not used.²⁸ Not until June 5, 1945, when a complete document of unconditional surrender was signed, in which it was succinctly impressed upon the Germans the finality of their defeat, did the future of the German state become subject to the supreme discretion of the victorious powers.²⁹

On May 8, 1945, the day the Military Surrender was signed in Berlin, Marshal Stalin announced in his "Proclamation to the People" that "the Soviet Union---does not intend

²⁵Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 492-494.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 494-498.

²⁷Stettinius, pp. 121-126.

²⁸Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945-1954 (London, 1955), p. 28. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on Germany 1945-1954.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 29-35.

to dismember or destroy Germany".³⁰ This Soviet refutation of the policy so recently agreed upon at Yalta indicated the continuation of the belief that forcible division would serve only to intensify German revanchism. Furthermore, it marked the initiation of the Soviet policy to effect the establishment of a servile government in Germany which would serve Soviet security interests through the conversion of Germany into another Soviet satellite. Although the concept of dismemberment was permitted to drop, following the Russian disavowal, the literal dismemberment of Germany occurred in the establishment of occupation zones as had been predicted by the American State Department in 1944. Because of the inability to achieve a common policy for all of Germany, the zonal boundaries became, in effect, barriers which divided Germany into four separate states. As fundamental East-West views and objectives became more pronounced and divergent, a crystallization of Western policy reduced the quadripartite partition into the present division of the two German states.

Although Marshal Stalin had rejected the concept of dismemberment, the Russians by unilateral action, prior to the convening of the Potsdam Conference (July 17-25, 1945), transferred to Polish "administration" that part of Germany under Soviet control to the east of the Oder-Western Neisse Line, with the exception of the Baltic port of Koenigsberg

³⁰Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 498.

and its immediate surrounding area.³¹ This area contained Germany's second-largest coal deposits, its second most concentrated industrial area, and its most important food producing regions. One-fourth of Germany's pre-war food supply had come from this area. When considering that Germany was required to import twenty to twenty-five per cent of its foodstuffs, the loss of this area to the industrialized western areas would be a serious handicap to their economic revival.³²

At Potsdam, this Soviet action was denounced as being very irregular and was protested vociferously by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill. Marshal Stalin defended the Soviet action by arguing that the advancing Red Army had required an effective administration of the liberated areas in order that subversive activities did not hinder the advancing army in its major objective. It had been necessary, he declared, to turn the area over to Poland for "administration" since the German population had fled from the advancing Soviet army.³³ Although the arguments over the disputed area were prolonged and often stormy, especially between Churchill and Stalin, Marshal Stalin was firm in

³¹James P. Warburg, Germany-Bridge or Battleground (New York, 1946, 1947), pp. 30-31, p. 95; Stettinius, pp. 210-211.

³²Warburg, p. 31.

³³Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden City, 1955), I, pp. 366-367.

his insistence upon continued Polish administration of the area. Truman and Churchill, cognizant of the fait accompli, hoped to achieve concessions from the Russians elsewhere in return for their decision to postpone the final solution of the problem until the peace conference.³⁴

In the light of subsequent failures by the Four Powers to reach agreement upon the establishment of a central German Government with which a peace treaty can be negotiated, the severance of the territory from Germany has assumed the characteristics of a permanent settlement, thereby fulfilling Soviet objectives. The action was punitive in that it deprived Germany of valuable territory and forced millions of its inhabitants into an already overcrowded Germany. It also resulted in the dissolution of the feudalistic Prussian state, symbol of German arrogance and militarism. The action was protective in that it places Poland in perpetual dependence upon the Soviet Union. The fear of German revanchism leaves Poland no other alternative but to rely upon its powerful eastern neighbor. Soviet control of the subservient Communist Government of Poland in effect gives the Soviet Union a strategic position on the eastern border of Germany should it decide to withdraw from its bastion in East Germany.³⁵

³⁴Ibid., pp. 367-370; Survey 1939-1946, p. 624.

³⁵Warburg, p. 95.

Under the Potsdam Agreements, the United States and Great Britain agreed to support, at the peace conference, the Soviet claims to the Koenigsberg area.³⁶ However, an explicit condition of the agreement to turn over to Polish administration the area to the east of the Oder-Neisse Line was that the "final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement".³⁷

Western support for Soviet annexation of the port city of Koenigsberg was reaffirmed by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in a speech at Stuttgart, Germany in 1946. But American policy-makers have persevered in the contention that the Oder-Neisse controversy and the question as to the area that Poland should receive as compensation for its deprivations in the east are matters which cannot be determined until such time as the peace conference is called.³⁸ The action of the puppet Government of the East German Democratic Republic, by which a treaty with the Polish Government recognized the permanent status of the Oder-Neisse frontier, has been denounced by the West German Government as well as

³⁶United States Department of State, Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents, Dept. of State Pub. No. 3556 (Washington, 1950), pp. 52-53. Hereinafter referred to as The Story in Documents.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 53-54.

³⁸James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 190.

by the three Western Powers.³⁹ In subsequent Four Power negotiations in relation to the overall question of reunification, the Soviet Government has unremittingly argued that the question of the eastern German frontier was irrefutably settled at the Potsdam Conference.⁴⁰

Expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe

Immediately following the Russian cession of the eastern German provinces to Poland, a program of mass expulsions of the German population was begun.⁴¹ Many had fled in front of the advancing Soviet armies. When the Potsdam Conference was convened, Premier Stalin, in justification of the Soviet action placing the area under Polish control, maintained that "all" the German population had fled.⁴² Yielding to a fait accompli, the Americans and British agreed to recognize an interim Polish administration of the disputed area. As a quid pro quo, the Russians agreed to provide food and coal from their zone in exchange for ten per cent of the surplus German capital equipment from the

³⁹Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1951 (London, 1954), p. 154. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1951; Perry Lauckhuff, "German Reaction to Soviet Policy, 1945-1953", Journal of International Affairs, VIII (1954), pp. 70-71.

⁴⁰Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1952 (London, 1955), p. 89.

⁴¹Survey 1939-1946, p. 624.

⁴²Truman, pp. 366-367.

Western zones. Fifteen per cent of this equipment would be transferred gratis to the Russians on their reparations account.⁴³

The conferees at Potsdam did not sanction the Polish expulsion of the German inhabitants from the territory placed under its administration. However, the Poles declared that the presence of the Germans caused unrest among the Polish inhabitants and also that German houses and farms were urgently needed for the resettlement of the Poles who were uprooted by the Soviet annexation of the eastern Polish areas.⁴⁴ The Potsdam conferees did agree "that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be undertaken" and it was stipulated that the transfers were to be undertaken in an "orderly and humane manner".⁴⁵ The Allied Control Council was directed to effect a schedule for further transfers.

This solution to the problem of the unwelcome German minorities⁴⁶ proved a taxing burden to the already overcrowded "rump" Germany, shorn as it was of East Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia. The pre-war population

⁴³Byrnes, pp. 79-87; Survey 1939-1946, pp. 622-625.

⁴⁴Sidney B. Fay, "Europe's Expellees", Current History, XII (1947), 325.

⁴⁵The Story in Documents, p. 55.

⁴⁶Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, 1950), p. 315.

of the detached area was approximately 8,000,000. Five-sixths of the 1939 German population had lived in the more heavily industrialized "rump" Germany, i.e., the area comprised by the four zones of occupation.⁴⁷ As the thousands who later fled the Soviet zone were added to the millions expelled from the former German provinces and the countries of Eastern Europe, staggering social and economic problems were created.

The expellees who were crowded into post-Potsdam Germany were in two categories. One category was known as the Reichsdeutsche or those who were German citizens prior to 1939. They were the Germans from beyond the Oder-Neisse and constituted the largest segment of the expellees and refugees. The other category was known as Volksdeutsche or Germans who had lived outside the 1939 boundaries of the Reich and who were not citizens. The Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia and the German minority groups from Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia comprised the latter category.⁴⁸

On November 20, 1945, the Allied Control Council formulated plans for the transfer of Germans from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland into the four zones of occupation. The Soviet and British zones were to receive

⁴⁷Fay, p. 326, p. 328.

⁴⁸Charles Sternberg, "The German Refugees and Expellees", Journal of International Affairs, VIII (1953), p. 36.

the entire German population from Poland, some 3,500,000 persons. The German populations in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, some 3,150,000 persons, were to be received by the American, French, and Soviet zones. The transfers were scheduled to begin during December, 1945 and were to be completed during July, 1946.⁴⁹

The transfers were accomplished in a categorically opposed manner from the "orderly and humane manner" directed by the Potsdam Protocol. Expellees arriving in the American zone from Hungary had been assembled without a full allowance of food and personal baggage and were hungry and destitute. Those from Czechoslovakia had had their personal possessions withheld. The Czech authorities detained young, able workers while sending the aged, the women, and small children. Their reception and care were major problems to the inexperienced Laender (state) governments of the American zone. Shelter, food, and clothing were by no means adequate, but enough was provided for subsistence.⁵⁰

The American and British zones assumed the social and economic responsibility for 7,877,000 expellees, which constituted an increase of 23.6 per cent over the normal population of 33,383,500.⁵¹ In the Soviet zone, the large number of expellees was offset by the refugees who fled to

⁴⁹Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 89-90.

⁵⁰Clay, p. 314.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 314-315.

the Western zones to escape the Russians and/or Communism. Due to French intransigence and because it was not bound by the Potsdam Agreements, its additional burden was almost non-existent. The population of the French zone in 1948 was 0.2 per cent less than the pre-war figure.⁵²

Germany's first postwar census, conducted on October 29, 1946, listed 9,700,000 expellees and refugees (6,000,000 in the Western zones). In September, 1950, there were about 8,000,000 in West Germany and 4,400,000 in the German Democratic Republic. The 1953 figure for both East and West Germany totaled 12,500,000 people.⁵³

In the Russian zone, many of the expellees and refugees were benefitted by the land reforms of September, 1945. However, they also provided the Russians with a lucrative source of free labor. They were heavily exploited, both in East Germany and in the Soviet Union where many were transplanted under "contract" and "resettlement" plans.

In the Western zones, these persons were pronouncedly unwelcome and were subjected to job and housing discrimination and to social ostracism.⁵⁴ As long as these people have not been fully integrated into the economic, social and public life of West Germany, they will present a fertile

⁵²Ibid., p. 315.

⁵³Sternberg, p. 37.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 37-40.

field for the growth of a revanchism which demands the return of the former German provinces in the east.

Spoliations

The indifference in respect to the adverse effects created by the mass displacements of Germans was displayed also in the avid spoliation policy carried out by the Soviet Union. Immediately after assuming control of its zone, and prior to the Potsdam Conference, the Russians commenced an intensive program of removals of capital goods to the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ The Soviet policy in regard to spoliations and reparations led to the final breakdown of Allied co-operation and to the division of Germany into two states.⁵⁶

Both at Yalta and Potsdam, the United States and Great Britain displayed their acquiescence to a liberal allowance of reparations to the Soviet Union in compensation for its overwhelming war losses. Neither the Americans nor the British were inclined to demand large reparations from the Germans. They, as did the Russians, emphasized the permanent weakening of the German capacity to make war. Cognizant of the abortive reparations policy imposed upon Germany after World War I, they rejected financial reparations in favor of reparations in capital equipment and goods in kind. Therefore, the reparations policy agreed upon was to be prohibitive, retributive, and punitive. However, the

⁵⁵Peter Nettl, "German Reparations in the Soviet Empire", Foreign Affairs, XXIX (1951), 300.

⁵⁶Clay, pp. 121-122.

Americans and the British were also concerned that the reparations policy did not so impair the German economy that subsidization would be necessary. American and British policy, in relation to Germany, had turned a full circle in the few months following the espousal of the Morgenthau Plan.⁵⁷

The Soviet objectives in regard to reparations were twofold: (1) punishment, i.e., they desired to insure permanently that Germany did not regain its dominant position in Europe. They insisted that the German economy be so controlled as to insure that the German standard of living did not in the future rise above that of the Eastern European states;⁵⁸ (2) exploitation, or utilization of existing and future German capital resources to aid the reconstruction and further development of the Soviet economy.⁵⁹

The economic principles agreed upon by the conferees at Potsdam for the guidance of the Allied Control Council in governing Germany had as their objectives the complete elimination of Germany's war potential, the decentralization of its economy (decartelization), and the encouragement of the growth of agricultural and peaceful domestic industries.⁶⁰ Germany was to be "treated as a single economic unit" in order that the program of reparations, industrial disarmament and demilitarization could be effectively

⁵⁷Survey 1939-1946, pp. 549-551.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 549.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰The Story in Documents, pp. 49-50.

carried out, and also in order that the Germans themselves would be paying the costs of the occupation.⁶¹

In order that the basic political objectives of the occupation might be satisfactorily achieved, economic unity was essential. These political objectives included disarmament and demilitarization, impressing the Germans with the utter finality of their defeat and their responsibility for their condition of political and economic chaos, destruction of National Socialism, and the eventual rehabilitation of Germany as a peaceful, democratic nation.⁶²

It was agreed that reparations, which would be a part of the disarmament program, should not be permitted to interfere with Germany's ability to produce sufficiently for its own existence. This would entail production of a sufficient quantity of materials for export to pay for the necessary imports which would be allotted by the Allied Control Council. It was further agreed that proceeds of exports from current production and stocks "shall be available in the first place" for payment of necessary imports.⁶³

Russian reparations claims would be met from removals of capital equipment from its zone, and from German external assets located in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Eastern Austria. In addition, it was to receive

⁶¹Ibid., p. 50.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 48-49.

⁶³Ibid., p. 50.

fifteen per cent of the industrial capital equipment in the Western zones as determined to be unnecessary for a peace economy, in exchange for an equal amount of food and other raw commodities. It would receive gratis ten per cent of the industrial capital equipment in the Western zones as determined to be unnecessary for the development of a peace economy. Removals of this equipment were to begin as soon as the total amount unnecessary for a peace economy had been ascertained by the Allied Control Council and were to be completed within two years. The Russians were to begin the delivery of exchange commodities immediately and the deliveries were to be extended over a five-year period. It was agreed that advance deliveries would be started prior to the final determination by the Allied Control Council of the total amount of industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the successful development of a peace economy.⁶⁴

A common level of industry for the German economy was agreed to by the Allied Control Council in December, 1945.⁶⁵ This was an absolute minimum for subsistence, and in order for this level to be attained, the co-operation of each zone was essential. The Russians, however, upon the realization of the relative wastefulness of their dismantling and removals policies, began to extract reparations from the current production in their zone. This was an open abrogation of

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 50-51.

⁶⁵Clay, p. 108.

the Potsdam directives. When the Russians would neither cease this policy nor account for the amounts of equipment removed prior to the inception of this policy, the Americans halted deliveries of advance reparations from their zone in the spring of 1946. The American action was followed by similar British action. They justified these actions in that the Russian transgressions necessitated their subsidization of the economies of their zones. They declared their refusal to subsidize, in effect, the Soviet spoliations in its zone. Until the Russians agreed to treat Germany as an economic whole, they would receive no further reparations from the Western zones.⁶⁶

The Russian desire to extract as much as possible from their zone for their own uses made reconciliation appear very remote. The mulcting of East Germany behind increasingly-impenetrable zonal barriers was relatively a more lucrative prospect than that offered by Germany as a single economic unit, producing solely for its own subsistence in accordance with the level of industry plan.

Subsequent to the American and British action, the dismantling process was fitted into an overall scheme for reparations, including delivery from current production, expropriation of works in Germany and export of German output on Soviet account. After the autumn of 1946, dismantling decreased but did continue to affect certain

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 120-122.

elements drastically, such as railway repair shops, agricultural machinery plants and railway lines. This policy continued through 1948. The total value of dismantled plants has been estimated at about 1,600,000,000 dollars.⁶⁷

The Russians, in the summer of 1946, expropriated over two hundred of the largest industrial works in the Soviet zone. They were thenceforth termed "Soviet Corporations" or "SAG". This action also contravened the Potsdam Agreements which directed the decentralization of German industry. Three-fourths of the SAG production went direct to the Soviet Union or was exported on Russian account; one-fourth went to the East German economy which, however, was required to contribute a disproportionate share of the raw materials. By the end of 1950, ninety-seven of these works had been returned to East Germany after partial dismantling.⁶⁸

The most profitable type of reparations was that from current industrial production. In addition to being an enormous aid to the Soviet economy, the decision to extract reparations from current output required putting more plants into operation, thereby enabling the Russians to reduce unemployment in the zone. Although required to subsidize the plants producing for reparations, it nevertheless was a good political weapon in the Soviet hands. By 1950,

⁶⁷Peter Nettl, p. 301.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 304.

reparations from current production amounted only to seven per cent of East German output.⁶⁹ At the end of 1951, the Russians valued reparations at just over three billion dollars, with the equivalent amount remaining to be paid by the East Germans over a fifteen year period.⁷⁰

Following the uprisings in East Germany in June, 1953, an agreement was concluded between the Soviet Union and the puppet Government of the German Democratic Republic, which exemplified the seriousness of the situation. According to the agreement, the East Germans would be released from further obligations to make reparations payments on January 1, 1954. The requirement for East German financial support of Soviet occupation forces was reduced, liberal credits were to be extended to the East German Government, and thirty-three industrial enterprises were to revert to East German control.⁷¹

Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov attempted to justify the Soviet reparations policy at the second meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1946 at Paris, where he demanded a higher level for German industry, more economic freedom, four-power control of the Ruhr, and the

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 302-303.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 307; Carl G. Anthon, "East Germany", Current History, XXX (1956), 234. The author states that reparations to the value of twelve billion dollars had been removed through 1953.

⁷¹Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 592-596.

establishment of a central German Government.⁷² In addition to its being an attempt at rationalization of Soviet action, this was considered an insidious endeavor to curry German favor as the champion of German unity. The United States reacted by offering to merge its zone with any or all of the other zones for the administration of Germany as a single economic unit as had been directed by the Potsdam Agreements. Only the British were inclined to accept.⁷³

The unilateral Soviet pursuit of its objective to reconstruct its own economy at German expense while simultaneously creating an economic and political satellite in East Germany led to the economic merger between the American and British zones on January 1, 1947 and to the eventual transformation of the three Western zones into the West German Federal Republic in May, 1949. The Soviet refusal to put the resources of its zone into a common pool, and the resultant Anglo-American decision to cease the subsidization of Soviet reparations and to put the German economy on a self-supporting basis, were mutually antagonistic aims which eventuated in the final division of Germany.

Denazification

The denazification of Germany, along with the destruction of German militarism, and the eventual reentry of

⁷²Survey 1939-1946, p. 727; Clay, pp. 129-130.

⁷³Survey 1939-1946, pp. 727-728; Clay, pp. 130-131.

Germany into the family of nations as a peaceful, democratic state, were common aims enunciated by the anti-Nazi coalition during the course of the war and more specifically at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. At Yalta, the Three Powers reaffirmed their intentions to "bring all war criminals to swift and just punishment---; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people".⁷⁴

The decisions made at Yalta were amplified by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference in a set of political and economic principles by which the Allied Control Council would be guided in the occupation of Germany. In addition to the "complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production", it was declared to be an objective of the occupation to impress upon the German people the finality of their defeat and their responsibility for their condition. Another major purpose of the occupation was to "destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to insure that they are not revived in any

⁷⁴Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1944-June 1945 (Princeton, 1947), VII, p. 351. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on American Foreign Relations VII.

form and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda". The political principles then directed the abolishment of all Nazi laws and the apprehension and trial of war criminals, "Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives---". It was further directed that "all members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings". The directives further provided for the control of German education in order to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines, reorganization of the judicial system, and decentralization of the political structure with concentration upon the development of local responsibility. The right to form "democratic political parties" was granted and it was provided that representative government would be introduced on the regional, provincial and Land (state) levels as quickly as it became justifiable.⁷⁵

Preparations had been under way for some time previous to the Potsdam Conference to bring the major war criminals to justice. It had been agreed upon by the United States,

⁷⁵Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1, 1945-Dec. 31, 1946 (Princeton, 1948), VIII, pp. 927-928. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on American Foreign Relations VIII.

the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in October, 1943, and issued in a "Declaration on Atrocities" that full retribution would be made to victims of Nazi atrocities. It was provided that wherever possible the perpetrators of these crimes would be returned for judgment to the countries wherein the crimes were committed. For those whose offenses had no particular geographic location, appropriate machinery for meting full justice would be established.⁷⁶ On August 8, 1945, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for the establishment of the International Military Tribunal. This Tribunal would try the major war criminals whose offenses had no particular geographic location.⁷⁷ The composition of the Tribunal was confined to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, who represented the collective United Nations. Prosecution was likewise in the hands of the Four Powers. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal extended to the following crimes: (1) Crimes Against Peace; (2) War Crimes; and (3) Crimes Against Humanity. A fourth charge was included within the first category. Broad in scope, it included "participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment" of any of the crimes against peace.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁷Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, 1946), I, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 5.

The International Military Tribunal, from November, 1945 to October, 1946, found nineteen of the twenty-two defendants guilty on one or more counts of the indictment, and acquitted three. It sentenced twelve to death by hanging, three to life imprisonment, and the four others to terms of ten to twenty years of imprisonment. The Tribunal also declared four Nazi organizations to have been criminal in character. These included the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, Die Schutzstaffeln or SS, Die Sicherheitsdienst or SD, and Die Geheimstaatspolizie or Gestapo. Die Sturmabteilungen or SA, the Reichscabinet, and the General Staff and High Command were not declared criminal.⁷⁹

Following the conclusion of the Nuremberg trials, which had as a basic purpose the demonstration to the defeated German nation the intent of the victorious powers to extirpate Naziism and militarism, the task of prosecuting the innumerable lesser criminals devolved upon the Military Governments of the four zones. The prosecutions were directed against representatives of all the important segments of the Third Reich, including industrialists and financiers, leading cabinet ministers, top SS and police officials, and militarists.⁸⁰

The eradication of the doctrines of National Socialism involved an exhaustive scrutiny of the records of several

⁷⁹Documents on American Foreign Relations VIII, p. 345.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 347; Clay, pp. 250-251.

millions of people. In 1939, there were some nine million party adherents.⁸¹ A problem encountered in each zone of occupation was the necessity to rehabilitate economic life, making it necessary upon occasion to disregard the denazification directives in order that this might be achieved. For example, in September, 1945, it was necessary for General Eisenhower to publicly rebuke his commandant in Bavaria, General Patton, for failure to carry out denazification.⁸² At the time of the armistice, the majority of the Nazi adherents were located in the American, British and French zones. This coincidence was possibly motivated by an assumption that the denazification policy would be less vigorously enforced in these zones.⁸³ The virulence of the Communist attacks against National Socialism during the course of the war, in addition to the vituperative tenor of the ideological exchanges prior to the modus vivendi of 1939-1941, left little question in Nazi minds as to what fate awaited them from the Soviet occupation forces.

As has been stated, it was necessary to conclude the denazification process as rapidly as possible in order that the economy of Germany could begin to function. In addition, it was necessary that other processes resume their functions, conditioned upon their denazification. These

⁸¹J.P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50 (London, 1951), p. 5.

⁸²Warburg, pp. 80-81.

⁸³J.P. Nettl, p. 11.

included the police, schools, courts, media of information, and government. The political, economic, and social processes of German life would be seriously curtailed until this primary objective of the occupation was satisfactorily achieved.

In the process of denazification there was a considerable degree of unity of effort insofar as the Allied Control Council was concerned. The implementation of the numerous denazification laws issued under its aegis, however, was dependent upon the zonal commanders (who collectively formed the Allied Control Council).⁸⁴ It was in the implementation of these laws wherein divergences of policy appeared and caused controversy.

Denazification progressed very slowly in the French zone. To the French, a German was a German. The fact that he was or was not a Nazi neither added to nor detracted from the inherent French animus toward Germans. French

⁸⁴Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 79-81, pp. 83-85, pp. 97-102, pp. 102-107, pp. 134-136, pp. 142-143, pp. 179-180, pp. 233-234. Control Council Law No. 2, providing for termination and liquidation of Nazi organizations, Oct. 10, 1945; Law No. 4, reorganization of the judicial system, Oct. 30, 1945; Law No. 10, punishment of war criminals, Dec. 20, 1945; Directive No. 24, for the removal of Nazis from positions of responsibility, Jan. 12, 1946; Order No. 4, directing the confiscation of literature and material of a Nazi and militarist nature, May 13, 1946; Directive No. 32, providing disciplinary measures against persons guilty of militaristic, Nazi or anti-democratic propaganda, June 26, 1946; Directive No. 38, providing for the arrest and punishment of war criminals, Nazis and militarists, and the internment, control, and surveillance of potentially dangerous Germans, Oct. 12, 1946; Directive No. 54, providing the basic principles for the democratization of education in Germany, June 25, 1947.

policy, dictated by its security interests, lay primarily in attempting to secure the severance of the Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland from Germany.⁸⁵

Similarly, in the British zone, denazification progressed at a slow pace. The British were concerned with rehabilitating the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr. Because Germany had been a good market for British products prior to the war, the British were interested in effecting a rapid economic recovery in Germany. This necessitated the utilization of many individuals with Nazi backgrounds; yet their peculiar skills were non-replaceable in the emergency.⁸⁶

From comparisons with available information, it appears that the denazification problem was attacked most scrupulously in the American zone. The denazification program proved to be so immense in this zone that it was necessary to transfer the load to the Germans themselves. The Laenderrat, or Council of States, which was composed of the Minister-Presidents of the three Laender in the American zone, adopted the "Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism" in March, 1946, thereby assuming responsibility for purging major Nazis from positions of leadership.⁸⁷ This law, extending in its scope to the

⁸⁵Warburg, p. 64.

⁸⁶Russell B. Hill, Struggle For Germany (New York, 1947), pp. 72-73.

⁸⁷Clay, pp. 258-260.

fields of business and industry, received vigorous application.⁸⁸ Denazification continued to be supervised by Military Government.

In the Soviet zone, varying standards were applied to the denazification policy. Generally, the Russians applied thorough denazification procedures to public servants and to citizens engaged in politics. In the fields of industry, commerce, and agriculture, only the most influential Nazis were removed.⁸⁹ In view of the abuse bestowed upon Nazis and German militarists by the Communists prior to, during, and following the war, broken only by the mutually beneficial interlude of 1939-1941, it would be expected that the Russians would be most devout in the extirpation of the last vestiges of Nazism and militarism. However, denazification was pursued in a practical sense, i.e., it was related to the basic Soviet objectives in their zone and in all of Germany. The Russians were desirous of gaining huge reparations from Germany. This necessitated the restoration of the economic life of the zone as rapidly as possible. In order to accomplish this objective, it was necessary to ignore or to give little force to the implementation of Allied Control Council laws and directives. In relation to the establishment of political control over the Soviet zone, it was necessary to institute a thorough

⁸⁸Clay, p. 68; Hill, pp. 71-72.

⁸⁹Warburg, p. 55; Hill, p. 73.

purge of all elements opposed to the assumption of Communist control, whether they might be Nazi or otherwise. In this process, as in the process of socialization and nationalization, denazification served to cloak the Communist designs to gain complete control of the political and economic life of the zone.

The distinction made by Stalin early in the war between the German people and the Nazis was revived with intensity immediately upon the cessation of hostilities.⁹⁰ The Russians were the first of the occupation authorities to allow the formation of political parties of an "anti-fascist" nature. Naturally, German Communists were to figure prominently in any political activity in the Russian zone. The next major move made by the Russians was the initiation of land reforms at the expense of Nazis and Junkers.⁹¹ These exhibitions of "democracy" were intended, first, to insure that the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or KPD) would have a role in the establishment of any central government for Germany, if and when the Four Powers agreed upon its timeliness. Secondly, the Russians were endeavoring to present themselves in a different light

⁹⁰Mosely, Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, 498.

⁹¹Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 37-39, pp. 49-64. The Soviet Military Administration decreed on July 10, 1945 that "anti-fascist" political parties could form in the zone; the first land reform was decreed in Saxony on September 3, 1945, and was followed by similar measures during the same month in the other provinces of the Soviet zone.

to the German people, i.e., to mitigate the animosity and fear of retribution and reprisal. Their objective was to display themselves as stern yet just conquerors. In this manner, the overall objective, which was the sovietization of all Germany, would be greatly facilitated.

The establishment of an "anti-Fascist" or "Democratic bloc", comprised of all the political parties in the Soviet zone, was utilized both in the Soviet denazification process and also to disguise Soviet activities committed under the mantle of denazification. Committees of the "bloc" were established throughout the zone to supervise the work of the local administrations and also to deal with denazification. Opposition by members of the "bloc" to policies proposed by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was quickly labeled "neo-Fascist" or "anti-occupation" and thereby effectively squelched.⁹²

The failure by the Soviet occupation authorities to implement Allied Control Council directives in their proper spirit was attacked by Secretary of State Marshall at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947.⁹³ The Foreign Ministers directed the Control Council to accelerate the denazification process and to encourage the German authorities to adopt uniform legislation for

⁹²J.P. Nettl, pp. 76-78.

⁹³Documents on American Foreign Relations VIII, pp. 53-54.

completion of denazification.⁹⁴ The Soviet occupation authorities made a nominal compliance with this directive but simultaneously extended the right to vote and hold office to an extensive number of ex-Nazis.⁹⁵ Following the unsuccessful Soviet effort to force a Western withdrawal from Berlin during 1948 and 1949, a political amnesty for ex-Nazis was granted. This was apparently designed to cultivate the support of this group for Soviet policy.⁹⁶ The anti-Nazi policy which had been utilized by the Russians to consolidate their control over the zone was dropped at that time. In its stead, the subservient politicians of the Eastern zone took up the hue and cry for German reunification. The cognomen "Fascist" then was applied to the Western Powers and elements within Western Germany who, according to the Soviet view, were attempting the permanent division of Germany.⁹⁷ As has been seen, the Western efforts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union for a unified administration of Germany had met with failure. This failure prompted the decision to proceed without the Soviet Union and attempt the unification of West Germany. Subsequent efforts to bring West Germany into the Atlantic security system have drawn the opprobrium of the Soviet Union. It has striven to

⁹⁴Clay, pp. 152-153.

⁹⁵Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 234-238.

⁹⁶J.P. Nettl, p. 109.

⁹⁷Ibid., pp. 108-110.

ensconce itself in a position as the champion of German reunification. The actual conditions under which it would agree to German reunification have in turn been repudiated by the Western Powers as well as by responsible political leaders of Western Germany.

Democratization of the Political Elite

The efforts undertaken by the Soviet Union to "democratize" its zone of occupation were part of the basic Soviet plan to secure ultimate Communist control of Germany. Thus it was a necessary element of this plan to create a political atmosphere favorable to Communist assumption of authority. The plan, as it evolved in the Soviet zone, followed the basic design utilized in the Communist subjugation of Eastern Europe. This involved the establishment of a bloc of "anti-Fascist" political parties, ostensibly free and equal, but in actuality controlled by the Communist Party in the operation of the "bloc". The program was begun by the authorization of the establishment of political parties prior to their sanction in the other zones of occupation.⁹⁸ Originally, four parties were licensed in the Soviet zone. These included the Communist Party (KPD), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).⁹⁹

⁹⁸See above, footnote no. 91.

⁹⁹J.P. Nettl, pp. 75-80. Nettl states that the CDU and the LDP did not apply for permission to organize in the Russian zone until the fall of 1945.

The German Communist Party ostensibly had been extinguished by the Nazis. It therefore required substantial assistance by the Soviet authorities to resuscitate the Party and to effect its domination of the political life of the zone. A primary function of the East German Communists was to make Soviet policy palatable to the general populace.¹⁰⁰ The favored position of the KPD was readily ascertainable by the other parties. Following its amalgamation with the Soviet zone branch of the SPD into a "united worker's party", the resultant party, known as the Socialist Unity Party or SED, became the vanguard of Soviet policy in the zone. Cognizance of the position of this party as the instrument for the expression of official Soviet policy led the other parties to temper their opposition in apprehension of the possible consequences of outspoken disagreement with Soviet policy. Another factor which abetted the German Communists in dominating the "anti-Fascist" coalition was that of the fundamental Communist-Nazi antagonism. The Communists declared that since they had suffered most extensively at the hands of the Nazis then they logically were most suited to lead in the denazification process. It was upon this basis that Communists were placed in many responsible positions.¹⁰¹

It would have been more simple to have installed Communists or fellow-travelers at the outset; but at that stage

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 75-80.

the Russians' immediate concern was in establishing an orderly and efficient administration in the zone for the facilitation of their reparations policy. Flagrant disregard for democratic procedures would have caused concern in the West and would have immediately and openly revealed Soviet objectives. Thus it was that the dictates of expediency and efficiency allowed for the nominal participation of all political parties in the zone, with the obvious exception of the National Socialists.

Although anxious to rejuvenate the political life of their zone, the Russians did not allow provincial elections to be held in the five provinces of the zone until October, 1946.¹⁰² During the intervening period, municipal, regional and provincial governments were organized under the control and supervision of the Soviet Military Administration (SMA). These governments were appointed by the occupation authorities and were responsible for carrying out their directives.¹⁰³ Following the merger of the KPD with the SPD in April, 1946, it became increasingly evident that the multi-party system of the zone was becoming a mere facade. The nominal opposition parties were subjected to such a degree of discrimination and official pressure that the more conscientious leaders were forced to retire, leaving those who

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 61.

were willing to follow subserviently the Communist lead in the political life of the zone.¹⁰⁴

In July, 1945, the Russians laid the foundation for a central government for their zone in the establishment of Central German Administrations. Originally, twelve Central Administrations were established, with two additions made at a later date. Their functions were to co-ordinate the work of the provinces. Their major scope lay in the economic field. In this field, Central Administrations were established for Industry (categorized into basic, heavy and light industries), Fuel and Power, Trade and Supply, Agriculture and Forestry, Transport, Finance, Statistics, Labor and Social Affairs, and Posts and Telegraphs. In the non-economic field, Central Administrations were established for Education, Justice, Health, and Refugees (since refugees were a good source for labor, this Administration soon became an appendage of the Administration for Labor and Social Affairs). These German Administrations were on a central level, and initially issued directives only under the authority of the central SMA. The provincial authorities originally were permitted to function at their discretion in areas which had not been pre-empted by the Central Administrations. The Russian penchant for centralized planning, direction and control, however, permitted the exercise of this discretionary authority for only a short period. The

¹⁰⁴Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 121-125; J.P. Nettl, pp. 99-105.

provincial authorities then served merely to fulfill central directives. Each Central Administration had a president, one or more vice-presidents, and was divided into departments. Departments had their counterparts on the provincial ministerial level and these were directly responsible for executing the central directives.

Originally, appointments were made on the basis of efficiency and capability; however, Communists were usually placed in control of internal administration. After the formation of the SED, the Central Administrations came entirely under Communist control.

In the economic field, the major task of the Central Administrations was to put the industry and commerce of the zone on a profitable basis, i.e., to satisfy the avidity of the Soviet reparations demands. Another major objective of the Central Administrations was to facilitate the socialization of the zone. In the non-economic fields, the Administrations aided the Russians in the denazification of the judicial, educational, and medical fields and in their reorientation upon a Communist basis.

In 1947, two additional Central Administrations were added. One was the Administration for Internal Affairs, which established the "People's Police" of the zone, and which was under the control of the Russian secret police. The other addition was the Commission for Sequestration and Requisitioning, which had as its function the co-ordination and control of the work of the local Sequestration

Commissions. Its establishment indicated the acceleration of the policy for the nationalization of industry.

As the Central Administrations gradually consolidated their powers vis-a-vis the provincial governments, opposition arose from these elements which was not to the policies pursued, but to the increase of central control. To settle the controversies, an Economic Commission was established which was superior to both the Central Administrations and to the provincial governments. The Central Administrations then became departments of the Economic Commission. The Economic Commission itself consisted of a plenum, a Secretariat, seventeen general departments, and a sub-commission for the Safety of the National Property.

The SED was in effective control of the Economic Commission. The degree of centralization and the authoritative character of the Commission was demonstrated by the transfer of two-thirds of the capacity of nationalized industry to the control of the Commission, one-third remaining under the provincial governments.

The Economic Commission was readily transformed into the Government of the German Democratic Republic in October, 1949, following the establishment of the West German Federal Republic. The Russians hoped to convey the impression that their action in establishing this government was simply their final alternative in view of the Western determination to proceed with the establishment of a German government for the Western zones. However, the lengthy process involved

in the organization of a government entirely subservient to the Soviet Union, in addition to the sovietization of the Russian zone, indicated that the decision to guarantee the inclusion of East Germany within the Soviet orbit had been made considerably in advance of the Western action.

The departments of the Economic Commission became ministries of the new Government of the German Democratic Republic. The "People's Council", which had been convened to protest the "division" of Germany by the Western Powers, became the lower chamber of the legislature (Volkskammer). An upper house (Laenderkammer) was elected by the legislatures of the five provinces. A constitution, which had been voted previously for all Germany by the "People's Congress", gave legality to the whole system. Because it was questionable whether the SED could secure a majority in an election, the election of representatives to the provincial and republican legislatures was postponed until October, 1950.¹⁰⁵ Elections had not been held in the Soviet zone since October, 1946, when relatively unobstructed elections had demonstrated the weakness of the SED. Simultaneous elections in Berlin, where the Social Democrats were allowed to compete, resulted in the routing of the SED. As a

¹⁰⁵J.P. Nettl, pp. 114-144. The discussion of the development of centralized authority in the Soviet zone, above, pp. 81-84, is taken from the author's Chapter V, "The Development of Administration and Government". It presents a comprehensive view of this aspect of the Soviet "democratization" of its zone as part of the overall design to project this system to the entirety of Germany.

result, it became necessary for the Soviet authorities to apply more coercive measures to aid the SED. These moves were masked behind the activities of the "anti-Fascist" bloc wherein opposition to Soviet policies could mean, at the minimum, political suicide.¹⁰⁶

Socialization and Pacifist Re-orientation of Germany

According to a Soviet propaganda publication,¹⁰⁷ "a firm foundation for socialism" has been laid in the German Democratic Republic "in the shape of a socialist sector in industry and agriculture". The article continues by stating that all the major industrial plants are now the property of the people, that the banks have been nationalized, and that the mineral resources, means of transportation, and the key positions in trade have likewise been brought into the "socialist sector". According to this information, the "socialist sector was---accounting for eighty-six per cent of the total industrial output---in 1954". There are agricultural producer's co-operatives, agricultural sale-and-supply co-operatives, artisan's co-operatives, and consumer's co-operatives. The "socialist sector in agriculture controls one-third of the total cultivated area". Heavy industry output exceeds that of industry in general,

¹⁰⁶Ibid., pp. 90-94, pp. 100-105.

¹⁰⁷New Times (Moscow), No. 41, October 6, 1955, pp. 10-12.

showing a priority to major capital goods in iron, steel and engineering. The "agrarian reforms" instituted in September, 1945, confiscated the estates of "7,136 Junkers and landlords", or thirty-one per cent of the total area of the German Democratic Republic. According to the report, this was distributed among "559,089 peasant households".

Seventy-five per cent of the foreign trade of the German Democratic Republic is with Soviet-bloc countries. This Soviet satellite follows, or attempts to follow, the Soviet line in its entirety. It has a "democratic foreign policy", hueing to Soviet guidance in this respect: "normal relations with all the countries of the world, for a united effort of all the forces of the German nation, and for the unification of the country on democratic lines". It advocates all-German negotiation on reunification "and is vigorously opposed to the resurrection of German militarism".¹⁰⁸

The socialization of East Germany is a primary deterrent to the reunification of Germany. Those who have benefitted from the socialization measures, both politically and economically, have the support of the Soviet Union in demanding that as a condition of reunification nothing be

¹⁰⁸Ibid. The information from this Soviet publication in relation to the extent of socialization in East Germany is assumed to be reasonably correct. The extent to which the "people" have benefitted from such "reforms" is open to question.

allowed to jeopardize these benefits.¹⁰⁹ The adherents of the free enterprise system, in control of West Germany and staunchly supported by the United States and the West German industrialists, refuse to recognize that the socialization of East Germany is an achievement of the democratic process.¹¹⁰

Socialization began with the land reforms in Saxony, in September, 1945. This was followed by similar measures in the other four provinces of the zone. This was perhaps the most far-reaching of the socialization measures, since a large group of property-owners were created¹¹¹ who depend upon the government in power to maintain their holdings. The fear of a change, which possibly could deprive them of their gains, cements their loyalty to the regime.

Initially, expropriations of private property for the state were directed against Nazis and Junkers. Although continuing to use denazification as a cloak, the expropriations soon became merely the fulfillment of the objective of the SED to socialize East Germany. Failure of the nominal opposition parties to condone such expropriations would have led to their denunciation as "fascists" or "monopoly capitalists".¹¹²

¹⁰⁹New Times (Moscow), No. 46, November 10, 1955, p. 10.

¹¹⁰U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 819-823.

¹¹¹New Times (Moscow), No. 41, October 6, 1955, p. 11.

¹¹²J.P. Nettl, pp. 101-102.

Expropriated industries were initially administered by the Provincial Ministries of Industry. As the power of the Central Administrations grew, their functions likewise changed from co-ordination to control, including planning and supervision and the power to take remedial measures against provinces which fell behind in assigned tasks. This centralization was carried to its ultimate step in 1947 with the formation of the Economic Commission, a central planning and co-ordinating authority, which was superior to both the Central Administrations and the provincial governments. The announcement of a "Two Year Plan" for the zone in 1948 indicated the extent to which socialization upon the Soviet model had progressed. The Economic Commission took over two-thirds of the capacity of the nationalized industry, leaving one-third to the provincial governments. The zonal industry was administered by the departments of Industry and Fuel and Power of the Economic Commission. Between the end of 1948 and the summer of 1949, two monopoly organizations were established: the German Import-Export Corporation and the Commerce Organization (Handels Organization). This put the field of commerce under central control.¹¹³

When the Economic Commission was transformed into the Government of the German Democratic Republic, the socialization measures which had been instituted by the SED with

¹¹³Ibid., pp. 125-143.

the guidance and support of the Soviet authorities, received a legal basis for their continuation. Socialization has been extended into all fields, such as industry, commerce, agriculture, health, medicine, welfare, education, and labor.¹¹⁴ Thus, what began as a punitive measure against the adherents of National Socialism was expanded as a major factor in the sovietization of East Germany in hopeful preparation for the Communist domination of both sectors of the divided state.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 133.

CHAPTER III

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIVISION OF GERMANY

Breakdown of Great Power Concert

During the occupation of Germany, the Western allies became fully cognizant of the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union. This recognition eventuated in the disintegration of the Great Power Concert and in the integration of the western portion of Germany into the Western defensive system.

Success for the objectives of the occupation of Germany had necessitated a continuation of the wartime unity among the Great Powers. That this unity of purpose had disappeared upon the defeat of Germany became increasingly perceptible to the Western Powers in the singular reparations policy pursued by the Soviet Union. Its legitimate claim for reparations was inverted into a policy which had as its object the maximum exploitation of the productive resources of its zone of occupation.¹ Simultaneously, the Soviet Union followed a course which had as its objective the sovietization of East Germany and its inclusion within

¹Peter Nettl, "German Reparations in the Soviet Empire", Foreign Affairs, XXIX (1951), 300-308.

the satellite orbit of Eastern Europe.² The sovietization of its zone offered to the Soviet Union a base for a prospective communization of the entire German state. As an alternative objective, if Soviet efforts to achieve German unification upon its terms proved a failure, the addition of East Germany to the Soviet bloc would in itself afford a beneficial stimulus to the Soviet-bloc economy. In addition, as long as there is a German desire for reunification, the Soviet domination of East Germany will continue to offer German Communists a wedge for gaining admittance into the government of a reunified Germany.

Obstinate Soviet application of its reparations policy to the exclusion of the overall objectives of the Allied occupation led to the avowal by the Western Powers to proceed in the unification of the three Western zones.³ The Soviet Union, in an effort to curry favor with the German people, demanded the unification of Germany. It excoriated the Western Powers for professing to desire unification while pursuing a policy which the Soviet spokesmen described as being aimed toward either extreme federalization or dismemberment.⁴ Yet the Russians had refused to join

²J.P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany (London, 1951), pp. 74-145.

³Beatte Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945-1954 (London, 1955), pp. 286-290. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on Germany 1945-1954.

⁴Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948 (London, 1952), p. 238, p. 242. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1947-1948.

their zone to the American and British zones in the American-sponsored move to eliminate zonal barriers for the administration of Germany in the manner as directed by the Potsdam Conference.⁵

The administration of Germany as four separate entities had created a situation whereby the reparations of the Soviet Union were subsidized, in effect, by the Americans and the British. The level of industry which had been agreed upon for Germany provided for the retention only of the productive capacity necessary for the subsistence of the population in a peacetime economy. The production which the Soviet authorities removed or exported for reparations detracted proportionately from the amount which should have been available, according to the level of industry, for the payment of the imports necessary for the subsistence of the population. Therefore, if the total proceeds of the exports from the four zones were not placed in a common pool, the level of industry plan would be placed out of balance. Since the plan had been prepared upon the assumption that Germany would be treated as an economic whole, the loss of the returns from the exports of one zone required that the other zones increase production or else finance the necessary imports themselves. To prevent starvation and disease, it was initially necessary for the Americans and

⁵Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, 1950), pp. 130-131.

the British to finance the deficits. Due to the general deteriorated condition of the productive facilities and to the reparations and dismantlement programs, it was impossible to meet even the minimum levels allowed in the level of industry plan. Although subsidizations were necessary following the formation of the Bizone, it was possible to formulate a new level of industry for this area and to provide assistance through loans which would enable the economy to eventually pay its own way.⁶

Unification of West Germany

The American and British zonal merger was not motivated by a desire to partition Germany, as was charged by the Soviet Union. The merger was designed to effect a more efficient and economical occupation of the two zones, i.e., to eliminate the necessity for the anomalous situation whereby the occupying powers were meeting the expenses of the occupation in addition to their subsidization of the local economy.⁷

There was no attempt at the outset of the merger to establish a political administration for the Bizone, although a Bizonal German Economic Council was established. Its authority lay exclusively in economic and fiscal affairs and it was responsible to Military Government. Under

⁶Ibid., pp. 156-157.

⁷Ibid., p. 164.

this Council were German administrative agencies for Economics, Food and Agriculture, Transport, Communications, Civil Service, and Finance. Each agency was headed by an executive committee.⁸

Two meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers during 1947 failed to produce a resolution of the German problem. Therefore, it was decided by the Bizonal military authorities to reorganize the German administration and to give it more of a governmental character. Simultaneously, plans were formulated for the merger of the three Western zones and the establishment of a responsible German government for this area. The resulting structure of the Bizonal reorganization was of the federal type, although it lacked sovereign powers and its authority remained exclusively in economic and fiscal matters. Although the Russians had given no indication to warrant such a belief, the Western Powers continued to hope for a resolution of East-West differences and a solution of the German problem. In addition to the Economic Council, the members of which were elected by the Land (state) parliaments, there was established a Landerrat to protect state interests. Its members were designated by state governments. It could initiate legislation in all of the fields in which the Council could legislate except for revenue and appropriations bills. An Executive Committee, composed of a chairman and the heads

⁸Ibid., pp. 168-169.

of the administrative agencies, carried out the decisions of the legislature. A High Court and a central bank also were established.⁹

The decision to proceed with the establishment of a government for the three Western zones was made following the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers during November and December, 1947. At this meeting, the Russians continued to defend their intransigent reparations policy. They refused to consider unification until their reparations demands were met by the West. This refusal convinced the three Western Powers that the only way to eventual reunification lay in the merger of the Western zones.¹⁰

Representatives of the three Western Powers and the Benelux states met in London during February and March, 1948, and again during April, where agreement was reached upon the establishment of a German government for the tri-zonal area. The French conceded the merger of their zone after provisions had been made for international control of the Ruhr and security against Germany.¹¹ The Conference agreed in principle that a federal type of government would be best adapted for West Germany. It was agreed that the

⁹Ibid., pp. 174-175.

¹⁰Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1948 (Princeton, 1950), X, pp. 114-115. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on American Foreign Relations X.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 111-127.

French zone would not be economically merged with the Bizone until political fusion was achieved. However, during the interim the French were increasingly co-operative in co-ordinating economic matters and in attending regular conferences of the military governors.¹² A Parliamentary Council, composed of delegates elected by the Laender (state) parliaments, drafted the Basic Law for the West German Federal Republic.¹³ It convened on September 1, 1948 and the Basic Law was approved by the Military Governors on May 12, 1949. Simultaneously, an Occupation Statute was promulgated which gave full legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the Federal Republic except in certain reserved fields, including disarmament and demilitarization, the Ruhr Authority, and foreign affairs. Furthermore, it provided for the transference of the powers of the military governments to a three-man civilian High Commission. The Occupation Statute was to be reviewed within eighteen months with a view toward further increasing the powers of the Federal Republic.¹⁴ The foreign ministers of the three Western Powers had previously announced their objective to integrate West Germany into a "European association".¹⁵ Also, West Germany

¹²Ibid., p. 110.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 1949 (Princeton, 1950), XI, pp. 109-111. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on American Foreign Relations XI.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 148.

would be permitted to negotiate for aid from the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) and it would be supported for membership in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).¹⁶

Elections for parliament were conducted during the summer of 1949 and the first Government of the German Federal Republic assumed office in September, 1949.¹⁷

Soviet opposition to the plans to establish a West German Government was expressed in its imposition in June, 1948 of the Berlin blockade which was designed to drive the Western Powers from Berlin and to deter the plans for the establishment of a government for the three Western zones. The only accomplishment of the blockade, which was lifted in May, 1949, was of negative value to the Soviet Union. The Soviet resort to openly coercive measures had bolstered the Western determination to consolidate its strength against the further extension of Soviet rule in Europe. In a further attempt to deter the establishment of a West German government, the Russians proposed, at the May, 1949 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, withdrawal of all occupation forces to the periphery of Germany, leaving the Germans to form a government for themselves. In the opinion of the Western Powers, this proposal portended a situation whereby Germany would be left exposed

¹⁶Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 118.

to complete Communist domination. It was now their belief that Soviet policy had as its major aim the subjugation of Germany to Communist rule. Therefore, Western policy-makers felt that their aims to democratize and reunify Germany could best be achieved through proceeding with the plans for a West German government.¹⁸

Integration and Rearmament of West Germany within NATO and WEU

Another consequence of the division of Germany has been, at the firm insistence of the United States, the attempted integration of West Germany into the North Atlantic economic, political, and defensive alignment. Economic and political integration have had more success than has had rearmament.¹⁹ Rearmament has received its most extensive

¹⁸Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁹Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1949-1950 (London, 1953), pp. 159-160. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1949-1950. West Germany was admitted, in August, 1950, to the Council of Europe, an organization established to study and co-ordinate Europe's economic, social, cultural, and judicial problems. At this time, demands were increasing for a European Army which would include a German contingent; Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1951 (London, 1954), p. 99. Hereinafter referred to as Survey 1951. West Germany, with France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Italy, signed the Treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community on April 18, 1951. Ratifications of the Treaty by the signatory states were completed in 1952. Designed to prevent the possibility of recurrent war between France and Germany, it placed under a common authority the coal and steel industries of the participating nations.

support from the United States.²⁰ Major opposition has come from France, which is fearful of the renaissance of a national German army. Although the solution arrived at for West Germany's rearmament has provided safeguards against the revival of German military aggression²¹ and has put the industrial wealth of the Ruhr under international control and supervision, rearmament has not progressed apace.

In the efforts to prevent German rearmament, Soviet propagandistic attacks have been aimed at perpetuating the Franco-German animosity and at antagonizing the fears of other of Germany's neighbors.²² Another target for the Soviet attacks has been the German people. The Russians hold that the inclusion of West Germany within the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

²⁰Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 104-106. Hereinafter referred to as Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954.

²¹Ibid., pp. 115-117. In adhering to the London and Paris Agreements, which established WEU and granted sovereignty and membership within NATO to the German Federal Republic, the Federal Republic voluntarily relinquished the right to manufacture atomic, biological, chemical and certain other types of weapons. It also pledged that it would not resort to force to achieve reunification or the modification of its boundaries. Under WEU, the size of the internal defense force of West Germany and its contribution to NATO are limited. An Agency was established to enforce the limitations put upon armaments. The U.S., Great Britain, and France have declared that any government which resorts to aggressive action shall be denied its rights under NATO.

²²Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, No. 43, December 9, 1953, pp. 17-18; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V, No. 49, January 20, 1954, p. 41; New Times (Moscow), No. 44, October 30, 1954, pp. 1-7; New Times (Moscow), No. 46, November 13, 1954, pp. 5-6.

(NATO) has seriously jeopardized the chances for German reunification.²³ Aside from the implications that rearmament could lead to permanent division, the Russians have resorted to a display of the so-called cohesiveness of the "socialist camp" and to thinly-disguised threats. Prior to the final ratification of the Paris Agreements, the Russians declared that should the Agreements come into effect it would be necessary for the countries of "peace and democracy" to prepare defensive measures against this "aggressive" grouping. When the Agreements came into force in May, 1955, the Soviet Union hastily convened a conference of its satellite bloc and put into effect the pre-conceived Warsaw Pact. This provided for the establishment, in Soviet terminology, of a counterpoise to the "aggressive Western grouping". In effect, it added nothing to the extensive integration and control already effective in the Soviet-satellite relationship.²⁴

Because of the continued delay in West German rearmament, Soviet policy unrelentlessly strives for its prevention through dubious proposals for reunification and through the maximum utilization of the "peaceful co-existence" campaign. The reunification proposals aim at

²³New Times (Moscow), No. 48, November 27, 1954, pp. 2-3 (Supplement). "Pravda" interview of former Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov.

²⁴U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 905-907; New Times (Moscow), No. 21, May 21, 1955, pp. 68-70.

the neutralization and complete control of Germany.²⁵ The "peaceful co-existence" campaign has as its objective the neutralization of as large an area as possible through the propagation of a doctrine which alludes to the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union while openly declaring the "inevitable" victory of the "socialist camp".²⁶

Weakening of the Balance of Power
and Increased Tension

The division of Germany and the rearmament of West Germany within the Western bloc seriously weakened the predominant power position of the Soviet Union in Europe. The zealotness with which it attempted to defeat West German rearmament demonstrated the concern with which the Soviet Union viewed the contribution which West Germany is capable of making to the Western defense effort. There are several factors which, when withdrawn from the reach of Soviet expansionist designs, seriously prejudice the European balance in favor of the West. These factors include: (1) the natural resources of Germany; (2) its position as hub of Europe's transport system; (3) the naturally aggressive bent of the German people; (4) the proportion of population in West as to East Germany; (5) the business and financial

²⁵New Times (Moscow), No. 48, November 27, 1954, pp. 2-3 (Supplement).

²⁶New Times (Moscow), No. 8, February 16, 1956, p. 8.

acumen, responsible in part for the rapid West German economic recovery; and (6) the great Ruhr industrial complex, viewed covetously by the Russians from the beginning of the occupation.²⁷ However, until such time as West German factories are producing armaments on a large scale and until West Germans have resolved their inner contradictions in relation to rearmament, the most positive benefit from the present alignment, in the Western view, is simply that the productive resources of West Germany have not fallen to the Soviet Union.

From the inception of the Berlin blockade to the period subsequent to Stalin's death, which marked the initiation of the policy of "peaceful co-existence", the Soviet policy toward the West was one of venomous hostility.²⁸ Under this incessant Communist vituperation, the Western nations were under compulsion to rearm as expeditiously as possible.²⁹ The necessity to divide resources between economic recovery and military preparation was a factor in the consideration upon securing a West German contribution to Western European

²⁷Wm. Hardy McNeill, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: "America, Britain and Russia, Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946" (London, 1953), p. 625, p. 727. At Potsdam, in 1945, and at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in July, 1946, the Russians sought Big Four control of the Ruhr. But because of their obstinate stand on reparations, the chance for a voice in the control of the Ruhr slipped from their grasp.

²⁸R.C. Tucker, "Stalinism and the World Conflict", Journal of International Affairs, VIII (1954), pp. 7-21.

²⁹Survey 1949-1950, pp. 158-160.

defense. Furthermore, some felt that the resurgent West German economy should be included in the defense preparations lest those states engaged in the diversion of a large portion of their resources to this effort would be economically displaced.³⁰ Under the sometimes impatient insistence of the United States and with the assistance by it of extensive outlays of financial and material aid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been developed into a capable, although comparatively small, defensive force. The climax of over four years' effort was reached in May, 1955 with the formation of the Western European Union (WEU), a continental defensive grouping of nations, which will function through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and within which West Germany is allowed to rearm.³¹

The defensive measures taken by the West were denounced by the Soviet Union as aggressive acts designed solely against Soviet Russia and the countries of the "peace camp". These defensive measures, furthermore, were coincidental with the anti-Western campaign adopted in the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. By reviving the doctrinaire concept which envisaged the "socialist state" surrounded by "hostile, imperialistic capitalist" states, some reason

³⁰Ibid., p. 152; Michael T. Florinsky, "United States-Soviet Relations: 1954", Current History, XXIX (1955), 16-17.

³¹Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954, p. 137, p. 146, p. 151, pp. 169-174.

could be given to the Soviet population for the prolongation of pre-war and wartime deprivations. These deprivations were, in actuality, engendered primarily by the intense desire of the Soviet leadership to attain maximum industrialization and to surpass the United States, which represents the major deterrent to the Soviet plan for world domination.³²

Encouragement of German Nationalism and Revanchism

The division of Germany has resulted in the creation of an intense, yet controlled, German desire to achieve ultimate reunification.³³ Furthermore, the conditions under which the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse were transferred to Polish control have been declared unacceptable to the Western Powers. Neither they nor the West German Government accept the transfer of this territory to Poland as a permanent settlement. This results, in effect, in the creation of a German "Irredenta" which thereby creates an unstable condition, especially for Poland. However, the West German Government has pledged that no forceful measures will be utilized in attempting an adjustment of the eastern German frontier with Poland.³⁴

³²Tucker, p. 9, pp. 15-17.

³³Konrad Adenauer, "Germany, The New Partner", Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (1955), 182.

³⁴Documents on American Foreign Relations 1954, p. 115, p. 117.

In protesting the establishment of the West German Government and its rearmament, the Russians have charged the Western Powers with abetting the rebirth of fascism and revanchism. It is true that there have been attempts within West Germany to form extreme nationalist and openly neo-Fascist groups.³⁵ However, the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic forbids the establishment of any associations "directed against the constitutional order"³⁶ and the Constitutional Court is empowered to dissolve any parties which "jeopardize the existence of the Federal Republic".³⁷ This provision is directed against extremist groups of both the Left and Right. Furthermore, the Electoral Law of 1953 effectively abets this provision by making it extremely difficult for splinter parties to gain representation in the Bundestag (lower house).³⁸ Naturally, such laws rely upon

³⁵Taylor Cole, "Neo-Fascism in Western Germany and Italy", The American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), 139. The Socialist Reich Party existed from 1948 until 1952 when it was disbanded while the Constitutional Court debated its legality.

³⁶Documents on American Foreign Relations XI, p. 123. Basic Law, Sec. I, Art. 9, par. 3.

³⁷Ibid., p. 125. Basic Law, Sec. II, Art. 21, par. 2.

³⁸James K. Pollock, "The West German Electoral Law of 1953", The American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), 109-110. One-half of the 484 Bundestag seats are elected from the 242 single-member constituencies in West Germany; half are divided proportionately among the parties in each Land according to the votes received by each party. A party does not receive any seats under proportional representation (PR) unless it has received five per cent of the valid votes cast for candidates on the Land PR lists. However, if a party wins a seat in a single-member district, it will be considered in the distribution of seats under PR.

the continuance of the democratic order for their proper enforcement. Although the democratic type of government was imposed upon West Germany, the system has functioned relatively well, considering the adolescence of democratic institutions in Germany.

As long as the present prosperity is maintained, extreme nationalism and a return of fascism seem to present no major problems.³⁹ Revanchism, or the desire to reacquire the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse, is concentrated largely in the expellee groups, who have formed a political party which is represented in the Bundestag. Its platform is centered upon the demand for the abrogation of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements.⁴⁰

Growth of Unrest in East Germany

The extent of the popular support of the Soviet-inspired and perpetuated East German regime was effectively displayed in the uprisings in the German Democratic Republic on June 17, 1953. The intensity of the revolt was demonstrated by the necessity for the utilization of Soviet troops for its suppression.⁴¹

In East Germany, as in the Soviet Union, the oppressive demands for higher productivity, yet with continued

³⁹Cole, pp. 135-139.

⁴⁰Office of the U.S. High Commissioner For Germany, Elections and Political Parties in Germany 1945-1952 (Bad Godesberg/Mehlem, Germany, 1952), pp. 8-9.

⁴¹U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXIX (1953), 8-9.

deprivations for the workers, had reached its practical limitations. In July, 1952, the decision of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) to "build the foundation of Socialism", called for the collectivization of agriculture and increased productivity through higher work norms. Opposition to these measures was demonstrated in the mass defections to West Germany. In an attempt to ameliorate the workers, as well as the middle class, economic, political, and cultural concessions were made in June, 1953. Their objective was to increase the production of consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry.⁴² Notwithstanding these concessions by the SED and the Government, the uprisings materialized on June 17.

In August, 1953, the Soviet Union, in recognition of the insecurity of the regime in East Germany, provided further concessions which had as their objective the reduction of the East German financial obligations to the Soviet Union.⁴³ Also, by previously proposing to the three Western Powers that these concessions be granted to all of Germany,⁴⁴ the Russians had hoped to place a further obstacle in the path of the European Defense Community Treaty, which was then going through the process of ratification in the signatory states. The concessions, which became effective

⁴²Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 585-588.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 592-596.

⁴⁴Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1953 (New York, 1954), p. 225.

on January 1, 1954, provided for the termination of reparations, the return of Soviet enterprises in the German Democratic Republic to the East German regime, a reduction in the payments of the German Democratic Republic for the support of Soviet occupation forces, the release from debts connected with the occupation, deliveries of raw materials and food products, and credits to the value of 485,000,000 rubles.⁴⁵

The concessions granted in June, 1953 were continued until March, 1955, when it was decided that heavy industry had suffered too drastically under the policy of relaxation, especially in the socialized sectors of the economy. There had been no striking improvement in the standard of living, nor had rationing and exorbitant prices been removed in state-operated stores.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Documents on Germany 1945-1954, pp. 592-596.

⁴⁶Carl G. Anthon, "East Germany", Current History, XXX (1956), 233.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY

During the interim between the 1949 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris and the Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, during January and February, 1954, East-West relations had deteriorated to the point of open conflict in the so-called isolated campaigns in Korea and Indo-China. In Europe, the primary concern of the Western nations was to strengthen European defenses by the inclusion of West German forces against a possible onslaught by the Soviet forces. Conversely, the policy of the Soviet Union was dedicated toward preventing the realization of these plans. The Western Powers had relegated the subject of German reunification to a future period when a strengthened West could better deal with the "realistic" Russians, who seemed to respect only material force superior to their own. The Russians, however, as an element of their campaign to defeat West German rearmament, capitalized upon the Western reluctance to jeopardize the progress made toward the inclusion of West Germany in Western European defense. Soviet proposals for renewing Four Power negotiations on German

reunification, even though not acceptable to the Western Powers, created opposition within West Germany to ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty. Acceptance of this Treaty by the West German parliament in May, 1953, however, opened the way, in the view of the Western Powers, to ratification by all the signatory states. As a result, in the estimation of the Western Powers, the climate for Four Power discussions upon German reunification was considerably improved.¹ The exchange of notes, leading to the agreement to call a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, displayed such a divergence of methods by which German reunification would be effected that few positive achievements toward reunification could be expected of the conference.

Soviet support for the conference vacillated, however, as its interpretations of the progress of EDC fluctuated. If the progress on ratification of EDC appeared favorable for its approval, Soviet obstructionism and propaganda increased; if the Treaty seemed to be meeting with ill-favor, the Russians seemed in no rush to call a conference. This changeableness of the Russians effectively displayed their fear of West German rearmament, and the false nature of their reunification proposals.²

¹Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1953 (New York, 1954), pp. 218-220.

²Ibid., pp. 220-222, pp. 225-227, p. 229; U. S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXIX (1953), 745-749.

The Berlin Conference

The Berlin Conference, which was in session from January 25 until February 18, 1954, resulted in no progress on the question of reunification. It served in demonstrating the requirements of Soviet security and the fundamental differences in objectives between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. Objectively, each side in this controversy has legitimate concerns for its security. The West believes that the possibility of recurrent German aggression is adequately curbed in the provisions made for the rearmament of West Germany within EDC (and later, the Western European Union).³ The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that the rearmament of West Germany, under any conditions, is a permanent threat to its security and to that of the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe.⁴

A fundamental difference in approach to the solution of the basic security requirements of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers was made evident by the two plans for German reunification put forward at the Conference, i.e., the Eden and the Molotov Plans. The approach as exemplified in the Eden Plan demonstrated a belief in the principles of democracy, as conceived in the United States, Great Britain, and

³U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 179-182.

⁴United States Department of State, Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, Jan. 25-Feb. 18, 1954, Dept. of State Pub. No. 5399 (Washington, 1954), pp. 13-18. Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, 1954.

France. In the outline of the Eden Plan, the Western Powers demonstrated their willingness to jeopardize their lengthy efforts to integrate West Germany into the Western defense system through their offer to allow a united Germany - reunited by free elections - its complete freedom of choice in its international relations.⁵ Because of the anti-Communist bias of the dominant political forces in West Germany, in addition to the preponderance of population in West as to East Germany, the outlook for a Communist victory in a free election in Germany is not favorable from the Communist viewpoint. But the dominant Communist positions within the Soviet Union itself and in the satellite states of Eastern Europe were not founded upon free elections. With the recognition of this fact, the Soviet approach to the solution of its security requirements, in relation to the problem of German reunification, could point in no other direction but that which would guarantee the predominance of Soviet interests.

The Eden Plan, formulated by the present British Prime Minister, then Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, envisaged the establishment of a German government, with participation by the occupying Powers restricted to the minimum necessary to guarantee the unfettered German formulation of its own institutions. The first step, in the Eden proposal, calls for the holding of free elections throughout Germany. These elections would be conducted under an electoral law prepared

⁵Ibid., p. 225.

and promulgated by the four occupying Powers. It would guarantee free elections and the elements necessary in their conduct. The elections would be supervised by a commission representing the Four Powers, and might also include representation by neutral observers. Its decisions would be by majority vote.⁶

The second step of the Eden proposal would be the convocation of a constituent assembly resulting from these elections. While this assembly proceeded in the preparation of a constitution, part of the supervisory machinery would remain in effect.⁷ Step three, the actual drafting of the constitution, would also include preliminary negotiations concerning the peace treaty. The constituent assembly would be authorized to create a provisional all-German Authority empowered to enter discussions with the occupying Powers on the preliminary stages of a peace treaty. This Authority would assist the assembly in the preparation of the constitution and would prepare the nucleus for future all-German ministries.⁸

Step four of the Eden Plan would be the adoption of the Constitution and the formation of a German Government possessed with full powers and responsibility for the negotiation of a peace treaty. This Government would decide, at its own discretion, which, if any, of the existing

⁶Ibid., pp. 223-224.

⁷Ibid., p. 224.

⁸Ibid.

international obligations binding upon the West and East German Governments, would become obligations of the united Germany. Prior to the conclusion of the peace treaty, the occupying Powers would continue to exercise certain rights relative to their forces in Germany and to their security, to Berlin, to reunification, and to the peace treaty. The peace treaty would become effective when ratified by the Four Powers and Germany.⁹

The Soviet refusal to permit reunification on other than their own terms was evidenced in the criticisms of the Eden Plan as raised by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. A major point of the Soviet opposition lay in the provision whereby decisions of the supervisory commission would be made by a majority vote of its members. That this would be inimical to any influence by the Russians upon the electoral machinery was almost a certainty. At least, the ability to make decisions by majority would allow progress to be made. Because of a lack of legitimate objections to the Eden proposal, Molotov obstinately insisted that the obligations of the West German Government would become obligatory upon the government of the united Germany. In an attempt to curry German support, he declared that the plan did not give the German people actual freedom in preparing and holding the elections. Molotov came to the crux of the Soviet opposition to the Eden Plan when he declared that a

⁹Ibid., p. 225.

reunited Germany must not be bound by obligations to any group of powers.¹⁰

With the introduction of the Molotov Plan for German reunification and the proposal for a "General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe", further illustration was not required in order to present Soviet objectives in Germany and Europe. The essence of the proposals lay in the aim to neutralize the united Germany by virtue of guaranteed Communist participation in the establishment of its governmental institutions. Also, the proposals had as their objective the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through the establishment of a general European collective security system which was designed to "prevent the establishment of groups of European states directed against other European states---".¹¹ Reunification of Germany under the Soviet plan would insure German pacification in the East-West struggle as long as Communists were in the government of a reunited Germany even though the government were not Communist-controlled. With sovereignty fully restored and Western forces withdrawn, the path would be cleared for Communist machinations, such as transpired in Eastern Europe, which would place the Communists in full control of the government.

The Russians have deviated but little in their proposals for German reunification since the espousal of the Molotov

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 61-65.

¹¹U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 270.

Plan at Berlin. As later developed, this plan would operate in conjunction with the plan for a European collective security pact. An integral component of these proposals is the Soviet insistence that East Germany, because of its different political, economic, and social structures, must be allowed an equal voice in the establishment of the governmental institutions of a united Germany.¹² This obstinate demand is made, notwithstanding the lack of a popular base for the Soviet-sponsored East German regime and the fact that the population of West Germany more than doubles that of East Germany.

Specifically, the Molotov Plan envisages the formation of a provisional all-German government by the parliaments of East and West Germany. The existing governments would be temporarily retained, should their replacement "prove difficult".¹³ As its primary task, the provisional Government would prepare an electoral law and conduct all-German elections. This electoral law would insure that the elections were "democratic in nature" and guarantee the participation of "democratic organizations".¹⁴ Under the Molotov proposal, the occupying Powers would withdraw all forces from Germany prior to the elections,¹⁵ leaving the provisional

¹²Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, 1954, p. 228.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 229.

Government in almost complete control. Another task of the provisional Government would include the representation of Germany "in the preparation of the peace treaty" and in international organizations. It would also have as one of its duties the prevention of Germany's adherence to "coalitions or military alliances directed against any power whose armed forces participated in the war against Hitler's Germany". It would guarantee the free activities of "democratic parties and organizations" and ban all "Fascist, militarist, or other organizations hostile to democracy and to---peace". It would have authority over questions of transport, postal and telegraph services, free movement of people and goods throughout Germany and "other questions concerning---the German people as a whole".¹⁶

In summary, this plan ingenuously proposes that the Western Powers agree to a repetition of the Communist assumption of power in Eastern Europe. Although the provisional Government would be empowered to negotiate with the Four Powers relative to the peace treaty, there would no doubt be delays, and the negotiations would not necessarily result in the formulation of a treaty. In the interim, the Communist position could easily be consolidated. Most objectionable of all is the Soviet assumption that the puppet Government of the German Democratic Republic should participate equally with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the establishment of a constitution and government for a

¹⁶Ibid., p. 228.

united Germany. The lack of a representative character of the Government and legislative organs of the German Democratic Republic is exceeded in its obviousness only by the quantitatively larger respective bodies of the Soviet Union. Even though the Soviet proposal is replete with references to the necessity to banish all "non-democratic" and "Fascist" organizations,¹⁷ there is a wide gulf separating the Soviet and Western connotations of such ostensibly simple words and phrases, the application of which gives witness to even more appalling divergences in beliefs.

The general consensus of the Western negotiators at the Conference was that the Soviet Union, cognizant of the unfavorability of its proposals, did not truthfully desire reunification. Their doubts, if any, were removed in the presentation of the Soviet proposal for a "General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe". In the interpretation of the Western Powers, this plan was designed to destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to remove the United States from participation in European affairs, and had as its basis the continued division of Germany.¹⁸

As stated in the Soviet proposal, the Treaty would provide for a system composed of European states, "irrespective of their social systems", and its purpose would be to eliminate the "formation of groups of European states directed against other European states---". The Treaty

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 267-269; U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 270.

would be open to a "united, pacific, democratic German state", and pending unification, to both East and West Germany. In fact, in the Soviet view, the reunification of Germany would be greatly facilitated by the entry of the two German states into this collective security system. The removal of antagonistic European power groups would create conditions which would enable the two German states to establish a basis for the settlement of their problems and upon which a merger could be evolved.¹⁹

By making the eventuality of German reunification conditional upon the dissolution of NATO and EDC, the Russians hoped to place the burden for continued world tensions and the division of Germany upon the Western Powers. It also hoped to weaken the desirability of rearmament in West Germany in view of the German fear of permanent division and apprehension that rearmament would perpetuate this division.

In March, 1954, following the Berlin Conference, the Soviet Union proposed, in a note to the United States Government, that the United States join in the Soviet-proposed European collective security system. As an alternative to this proposal, should it not be acceptable to the United States, the Russians suggested that NATO be enlarged to include the Soviet Union.²⁰ To both suggestions, the United States replied negatively, asserting that the Russian proposals were based on a continuation of the division of

¹⁹U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXX (1954), 270.

²⁰Ibid., 758-759.

Germany and that Soviet entry into NATO would be "contrary to the---principles on which the defense system and the security of the Western nations depend".²¹ The Russians retaliated with charges that the refusal by the United States served to substantiate the "aggressive" character of NATO.²²

Soviet hopes for defeat of West German rearmament lifted when the French National Assembly voted, on August 30, 1954, against the EDC Treaty.²³ However, under strong pressure by the United States and Great Britain,²⁴ a substitute for EDC was arrived at in conferences held in London and Paris during September and October, 1954. The new organization, the Western European Union (WEU), although not of the supranational character of EDC, provided for contributions from the armed forces of the signatories to the NATO command in Europe. Through this organization, which was designed as a regional grouping of continental nations functioning within NATO, West Germany would be permitted to form a national army and would regain full sovereignty.²⁵ West German sovereignty was restored on

²¹Ibid., p. 757.

²²U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 399.

²³Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1955), p. 726.

²⁴U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 363-364, 515-522.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 515-522; United States Department of State, London and Paris Agreements, Dept. of State Pub. No. 5659 (Washington, 1954), pp. 5-6.

May 5, 1955, and it deposited its instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on May 6, 1955.²⁶

In accordance with the campaign of "peaceful co-existence", which was being waged with intensity following its initiation in 1953 after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union attacked WEU in the same manner as it had denounced EDC.²⁷ The new organization was branded as "aggressive" in character and the product of United States "imperialists".²⁸ The Russians reverted to previous tactics by attempting to destroy French support for WEU through their assertions that United States and British guarantees of French security were illusory in view of previous performance. The Russians bluntly warned that rearmament of West Germany within NATO and WEU would insure the permanent division of Germany.²⁹ Notes were addressed to the three Western Powers in an attempt to reopen negotiations upon German reunification.³⁰ The Western Powers considered these Soviet proposals simply as delaying tactics, since the Paris Agreements (establishing WEU) were being pushed for ratification in the parliaments of the signatory states.³¹ At a conference in Moscow, from November 29 until December 2, 1954, Russia and its European

²⁶U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXII (1955), 791.

²⁷New Times (Moscow), No. 45, November 6, 1954, p. 6.

²⁸New Times (Moscow), No. 41, October 9, 1954, pp. 9-15.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 902-907.

³¹Ibid., pp. 901-902.

satellites declared that should the Paris Agreements be implemented, these countries of the "peace camp" would adopt "joint measures in the organization and command of their armed forces".³² In December, the Soviet Government addressed joint notes to Great Britain and France, warning that should the Paris Agreements be implemented, the Soviet Union would consider the mutual aid pacts existing between each of these countries and the Soviet Union as being null and void.³³ On May 5, 1955, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. formally abrogated these pacts which had originally been directed toward the containment of Germany.³⁴ Also in May, representatives of the Soviet Union and its satellites met at Warsaw, Poland, where a Mutual Assistance Treaty was concluded and a decision was reached to establish a Joint Command of the armed forces of the Treaty states.³⁵

Since the implementation of the Agreements providing for the restoration of West German sovereignty and its re-armament, the Soviet Union has retreated from its blunt assertion that this action would mean permanent division.³⁶ However, it has regressed only to the extent necessary to cause the hope of reunification to continue to be a

³²New Times (Moscow), No. 49, December 4, 1954, p. 8, p. 72 (Supplement).

³³New Times (Moscow), No. 51, December 18, 1954, p. 2 (Supplement).

³⁴New Times (Moscow), No. 16, May 14, 1955, p. 31.

³⁵New Times (Moscow), No. 21, May 21, 1955, pp. 68-70.

³⁶Ibid., p. 13.

disconcerting element in West German political affairs. If the division is allowed to exist long enough, there is the possibility that West Germany will negotiate directly with the Soviet Union or with the East German regime. In this manner, the Russians could hope to achieve concessions which would either neutralize Germany, or place Communists in strategic governmental positions.

The Summit Conference

In 1955 there was a marked alleviation of the bitter Soviet diatribes against the capitalist nations of the West. In the atmosphere created by the new Soviet policy of "peaceful co-existence", the prospects for German reunification appeared more favorable than in several years. The Soviet initiative in the restoration of Austrian sovereignty in May augured well for the resumption of negotiations upon the subject of German reunification.³⁷ The Soviet consent to a meeting of the heads of Government of the Four Powers, to be held in Geneva during July, 1955, was interpreted in the West as a reaction to the unity and strength displayed in the implementation of the Paris Agreements. United States Secretary of State Dulles attributed the shift in Soviet policy to "Western determination and unity".³⁸ Others interpreted the Soviet shift in policy as

³⁷New Times (Moscow), No. 17, April 23, 1955, pp. 2-3 (Supplement).

³⁸U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXII (1955), 871-877.

being merely a tactical maneuver, necessitated by internal requirements to strengthen the regime following the demise of Stalin. These requirements had developed from the intensive policy of industrialization which had been pursued from the earliest days of the regime. The intensification of this harsh policy, following World War II, had resulted in increased burdens upon the working class and a further decrease in the production of consumer goods. A generally unsuccessful agricultural policy added to the poor internal economic situation. In order for the regime to stabilize its control of the internal situation, a lessening of the tensions in the international situation was necessary so that some of the emphasis could be shifted from heavy industry to the consumer economy. As a result, the Russians had embarked upon the policy of "peaceful co-existence".³⁹

Thus it was in an atmosphere of general conciliation that the heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met at Geneva (July 18-23, 1955) to consider the major problems facing the world, among which was the German problem. The heads of Government did not attempt to arrive at the solutions to these problems, but rather to prepare the groundwork for a later meeting of the Foreign Ministers of these respective states.

³⁹Frederick Schuman, "The Dialectic of Co-existence", Current History, XXX (1956), 33-38; R.C. Tucker, "Stalinism and the World Conflict", Journal of International Affairs, VIII (1954), pp. 7-21.

Because the Soviet Union had linked the problems of German reunification and European security and had declared them inseparable,⁴⁰ Premier Edgar Faure of France presented a plan for German reunification which had as its basis the Eden Plan, augmented by guarantees to the Soviet Union against future German aggression. Faure suggested that if Germany, reunited under the Eden Plan, chose to enter WEU, it would be limited to the armaments allowed West Germany within WEU. The Western Powers would guarantee to the Soviet Union that if Germany engaged in aggressive acts, it would be deprived of its rights under NATO. The French Premier further proposed inclusion of Germany in a general security organization, composed of all European states. Existing alignments would be left intact, with a view toward eventual coalition into one system. Should Germany choose to enter the Western security system, assurances would be extended to the Eastern bloc. Should Germany choose to enter the Eastern bloc, guarantees against German aggression would be extended to the West.⁴¹

British Prime Minister Anthony Eden indicated British willingness to enter into a security pact composed of the Four Powers and Germany which, according to its terms, would bind each signatory to render assistance to the victim

⁴⁰U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXI (1954), 902-907.

⁴¹United States Department of State, The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955, Dept. of State Pub. No. 6046 (Washington, 1955), pp. 25-27. Hereinafter referred to as Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, 1955.

of aggression. Furthermore, any state which violated the peace would be denied any assistance enjoyed under existing agreements.⁴²

German reunification, as proposed by Premier Bulganin of the Soviet Union, would be made dependent upon the establishment of an all-European collective security system. German reunification would be postponed for an indefinite period while the collective security system, in a two-stage period of development, came into being. During the first stage, the members of the all-European collective security system would continue to adhere to existing agreements, but would pledge themselves to settle all disputes by amicable methods. At the second stage, the existing regional European security systems (NATO and WEU and the Warsaw Pact bloc) would be dissolved and the all-European system would emerge. Premier Bulganin placed emphasis upon the existence of two German states having different political, economic, and social systems. He declared that they could not be "mechanically merged" without committing injustices to both states. According to his plan, the two states would become members of the all-European collective security system, thereby nullifying the possibility of the rebirth of German militarism and rendering possible gradual rapprochement between the two states.⁴³

⁴²Ibid., pp. 33-34.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 39-41.

Two events followed the Summit Conference which were motivated in the hope of giving further substance to the Russian argument of the existence of two separate German states having entirely different political, economic, and social systems. On September 13, 1955, agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic upon the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.⁴⁴ The move received the approval of the United States, which viewed it as a "victory" for Western policy and an indication of a reversal in the Soviet "bankrupt German policy".⁴⁵ However, on September 20, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty with the German Democratic Republic, by which nominal sovereignty was gained by the Soviet satellite.⁴⁶ Rather than an indication of a reversal of a "bankrupt German policy", these moves indicated the determination of the Soviet Union in its insistence that settlement of the German problem was now primarily a concern of the two German states.⁴⁷ This would mean that there was no basic change in the Soviet demand and requirement for a pacifist Germany. If Germany could not be controlled, it would remain divided.

⁴⁴New Times (Moscow), No. 38, September 15, 1955, p. 1.

⁴⁵U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 494-495.

⁴⁶New Times (Moscow), No. 39, September 22, 1955, pp. 7-11 (Supplement).

⁴⁷Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, 1955, pp. 77-80; U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 559.

Conference of Foreign Ministers, Geneva, 1955

The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers met at Geneva, Switzerland, from October 27 through November 16, 1955, to attempt a settlement of the broad issues discussed by the heads of Government at the Summit Conference. The spirit of co-operation had declined in view of continued Soviet attacks upon WEU and NATO. A reaffirmation of the Soviet determination not to permit the entry of a reunified Germany into these organizations considerably dampened the prospects for conclusive settlements by the Conference.⁴⁸

The Foreign Ministers of the Western Powers again proposed German reunification on the basis of the Eden Plan. To assuage Soviet apprehensions on the possibility of the entry of a reunified Germany into NATO and WEU, a Treaty of Assurance was affixed to the Eden Plan. The Treaty would be signed simultaneously with the agreement to reunify Germany under the Eden Plan. Its provisions for mutual assurance would come into effect if the reunited Germany entered NATO and WEU. A zone would be established on the east and west sides of the eastern frontier of the reunited Germany. In this zone, armaments and forces would be limited and controlled through effective supervision. Members of the Warsaw bloc would be entitled to establish and maintain a radar warning system in the western portion of this zone, while the NATO bloc would receive reciprocal

⁴⁸New Times (Moscow), No. 44, October 27, 1955, pp. 4-5.

privileges in the eastern portion of the zone. Members of both security blocs would be obligated to take action against an aggressor of either group.⁴⁹ In the presentation of this plan for German reunification, the Western Powers clearly displayed their determination not to dissolve NATO or WEU, although in accordance with the Eden Plan, Germany could join any bloc which it preferred to enter.

As at the Berlin Conference, the Russians charged that the Western plan was designed to coerce Germany into joining the Western bloc. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov again emphasized the incompatibility of German rearmament with general European security.⁵⁰

In rejoinder to the Western proposal, the Russians introduced a revised version of the general European Collective Security Treaty, which followed the proposals of Premier Bulganin at the Summit Conference. The Soviet formula continued to be based upon the Russian desire for the dissolution of NATO and WEU and the neutralization or control of a reunified Germany. According to the Soviet plan, an overall European collective security system would be established which would include the existing opposed systems. The signatories would undertake to settle all disputes peaceably, although the rights of individual and collective

⁴⁹United States Department of State, The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Oct. 27-Nov. 16, 1955, Dept. of State Pub. No. 6156 (Washington, 1955), pp. 29-30. Hereinafter referred to as Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 1955.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 40-41, p. 43.

self-defense would not be infringed upon. There would be, as in the Western plan, a special zone for the limitation and control of armaments and forces.⁵¹ The portion of the plan which was unacceptable to the West was the stipulation which called for the eventual dissolution of the present security systems and their merger into one European system. Furthermore, the plan was based upon a continuation of the division of Germany which, in the view of the Western Powers, would not serve to lessen tensions between the two opposing blocs.⁵²

Coupled with this proposal was the Soviet plan for the formation of an all-German Council, composed of representatives from the parliaments of the two German states. This Council would act as a consultative body and work toward the achievement of co-ordination in the political, economic, and cultural life of the two states.⁵³ This Soviet proposal envisaged the establishment, in addition to the all-German Council, of committees which would co-ordinate matters relating to economic and cultural ties between the two states, currency and financial transactions, post and telegraph, and communications. The strength, armaments, and disposition of security and border police would be regulated by the all-German Council. It would be empowered to act in

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 77-81.

⁵²U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XXXIII (1955), 819-823.

⁵³Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 1955, p. 98.

matters relating to European security and the "unification of Germany as a peaceful and democratic state".⁵⁴ In a final repudiation of the Eden Plan and the Western formula for reunification by free, properly supervised elections, Molotov bluntly asserted that the social and economic reforms secured during the development of the German Democratic Republic could not be sacrificed in a purely "mechanical" merger. Therefore, Molotov declared, elections were incongruous until such time as a co-ordination of the two systems was effected.⁵⁵

With this firm statement of the Soviet position, the prospects for German reunification were relegated to the unfavorable status existing prior to the Summit Conference. As had the Berlin Conference, the Geneva meeting of the Foreign Ministers proved fruitless in relation to the German problem. The Soviet position had changed relatively little during the interim following the Berlin Conference. The Soviet desire for insurance against possible German aggression in the future was recognized as a legitimate objective. The uncompromising demands that NATO be dissolved and that German Communists be guaranteed a decisive role in the establishment of the institutions of government of a united Germany, however, were viewed as extending beyond the aims of legitimate security requirements, becoming instead poorly disguised attempts at aggrandizement.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 98-99.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 95.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

An examination of the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany leads to the conclusion that reunification is not and has not been desired by the Soviet Union except under Soviet terms. Although Soviet propagandists have striven to create the impression that the Soviet Union is the foremost partisan of reunification, the proposals put forward by the Soviet authorities reveal an altogether different objective. This objective is the security of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its ruling Communist elite, and the bulwark of satellites which serve as buffers against possible attack upon the western Soviet frontiers.

The security of the Soviet Union requires that Germany be reunified upon Soviet terms or not at all. Otherwise, the European balance of power would be placed in a state of flux which would endanger the security interests of the Soviet Union. The valuable Soviet foothold and vantage point in East Germany will not be sacrificed in a reunified Germany left to its choice of allies. A fully rearmed and united Germany could once again become a dominant European power and as such, hold the European balance. A restored Germany would endanger the Soviet grip upon the subservient

states of Eastern Europe, as well as the grip of the puppet regimes of these states upon their subjects.

As long as there continues to be a reluctance by West Germans to rearm, as a consequence of the fear of permanent division, Soviet interests are served beneficially. This is a major aim of Soviet policy in relation to Germany, i.e., to keep Germany weak and to prevent its reaching the stage of development where Soviet interests in Eastern Europe will be threatened by a revanchist Germany possessed with the power sufficient to reacquire the lost German provinces.

In the pursuit of its basic security requirements, the Soviet Union has spread its rule, through the media of circumstance, the Soviet Army, and international Communism, over the states of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic. That it would allow this security to be jeopardized by a resurgent Germany is not foreseeable.

The Soviet Union has attempted to stabilize this power situation primarily through four methods. The first, the Concert of the Great Powers, was short-lived and collapsed when the Western components of this Concert realized the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union and world Communism.

The second method has been through the division of Germany. The policy of division in itself has been beneficial to the Soviet Union through its exacting exploitation of the productive capacities of East Germany. Should reunification be permitted according to the Western

proposals, this valuable asset would be lost to the Soviet economy. While Germany remains divided, the forward position of the Soviet Union in East Germany serves as an advantageous base for the sovietization of all Germany. Continued division will tend to make West Germany a weak ally of the West; it will assure the Soviet Union control of the East German state; and it will continue to offer the prospect of eventual Communist control of all Germany through direct negotiations between East and West Germany or between the Soviet Union and West Germany.

As another method to stabilize the European power situation, the Soviet Union has striven for German reunification upon a basis of neutralization and disarmament. Its plans for reunification are qualified persistently by the requirement that the puppet Government of East Germany be given an equal voice in the establishment of the government for a united Germany. That the Western Powers will be duped into a scheme similar to that employed in the Communist domination of Eastern Europe does not appear probable. The nations of the West appear fully cognizant of the inherent dangers of the Communist menace, notwithstanding the attempts through the "peaceful co-existence" stratagem to weaken the resistance of these nations to Communist beguilement. The loss of the highly industrialized West Germany to the Soviet Union would seriously alter the European balance of power and subject the remaining free states of Europe to Communist aggrandizement, either economically or

militarily, or through the omnipresent danger of Communist infiltration and subversion.

It would require sizeable forces to permanently insure German neutralization, even if Germany were reunited according to the Eden Plan. Even though the memory of German militarism and National Socialism remains embedded in the minds of the Western European neighbors of the Germans, the fear of the encroachment of the Soviet Union and world Communism has served to cause these states to strive for the integration of West Germany, under controls, into the North Atlantic and Western European defense systems. The concept of a neutralized Germany is one held largely by those who believe that Germany herself is the primary problem rather than a fundamental antagonism between Western democracy and the totalitarian Communism of the Soviet Union. However, the forced neutralization of Germany would not solve the conflict between democracy and Soviet Communism.

A neutral Germany, unless effectively controlled and supervised, would be unsatisfactory to the security requirements of both East and West. Neither East nor West wishes to see Germany once again hold the European balance of power as it did prior to World War II. At that time Germany possessed the capabilities, economic and military, to play one side against the other.

Germany's geographic location and her economic and natural resources make it impossible for her to remain neutral in the East-West struggle. This may be ascertained from the obstinance with which each contender in the East-

West controversy has retained its vantage points in the presently divided Germany. That this conflict for German loyalty would cease upon German neutralization is not probable. Conversely, neutralization would create a power vacuum which would serve only to intensify the efforts of both sides to gain control. Given sufficient time to regain its full potential, it is possible that Germany would emerge strengthened as a result of these efforts.

The latest, and current, proposal by the Russians as a method by which a stable European equilibrium would be created and maintained, and through which Germany would be effectively neutralized, is the plan for an all-European collective security system. In addition to German neutralization, this plan has as its object the dissolution of the Western system of defense which is the product of many years of arduous labor and a consequence of the apprehensions created by Soviet intransigence in Europe.

This latest Soviet proposal, which envisages the continued division of Germany until such time as the basic differences between the two German states may be reconciled and a merger effected, epitomizes the dilemma facing the world. Notwithstanding the efforts by the Communists to create a lethargic opposition through recent gestures of conciliation, there can be no reconciliation between the aggrandizing ideology of world Communism and the principles of democracy as held by the free nations of the West. The two systems may "co-exist", but it will not be a "peaceful

co-existence". At present, reconciliation with the Communists may be achieved only when such reconciliation is of major benefit to the Communists. Reconciliation between the two German states, to serve the interests of the Soviet Union, will be a lengthy process. By the continued Soviet espousal of uncompromising proposals for reunification, the problem of reunification of Germany is a replica of the greater problems of the ideological conflict which divides the world. Only when this basic conflict is settled will a satisfactory reconciliation be achieved in Germany.

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