

DETERMINANTS OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

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PREFACE

The interpersonal struggle known as politics is organized competition among interest groups for power. Political action is conducted through responsible elites as a means to attain the ends of personal and economic security, social status and prestige, and the enjoyment of a given set of cultural values. Through the attainment of power to command individuals, groups and nations, elites enable the dominant national interest groups to achieve their aims and aspirations--viz., objectivize their subjective drives or values into material realization.

The drive to attain power begins locally and expands territorially to embrace not only the expanse of the national State, but the entire world community. Interstate relations are a clash of often conflicting and sometimes concordant drives by elites which direct the lives and fortunes of nations on behalf of the dominant interest groups. This extension abroad, or externalization of the power drive, by national elites constitutes the foreign policy of the State. Its ends are the same as those of domestic policy--viz., to enhance the security, status and prestige of the dominant interest groups of the national community and perpetuate the rule of their elites over the State or legal order of the national community. Preservation of the socio-economic order and its political and legal institutions very often impels national elites to displace internal pressures externally or to extend the influence and power of national interest groups beyond the territory of the national community. Imperialism is an ancient and tested method of

defending order and stability in inharmonious communities. The imperialism of aggressive elites forces the staid elites of harmonious states to pursue power in the interest of self-preservation and the perpetuation of their own institutions and the status of their dominant groups, for the penalty which results from defeat in the struggle for power may include impoverishment, subjugation or extinction. The same self-interest that forces men to coalesce into interest groups and to choose leaders (elites) also leads them to enlarge their sphere of activity and to conclude interstate ties (alliances, leagues, unions, etc.) of a voluntary sort, or such involuntary relationships as protectorates and colonies.

The determinants and mainsprings of a nation's foreign policy are to be found internally within the operation of the institutions, laws and mores of the State and its social order. A troubled social order having economic, cultural and political disequilibria creates insecurities not only for its own elites and interest groups, but also for those of equilibrated communities. The problems of each national community weigh upon the security and well-being of every other State. A study of the determinants of Japan's foreign policy is of importance to Americans not only from the standpoint of history, but from that of planning the future of the United States, its subdivisions, interest groups and its families and citizens. It concerns not only the statesman and politician, but the citizen-voter and parent. The method of investigation which has been employed is that of the sciences—selection of relevant data and application of the theories of social behavior developed by the behavioral sciences. It is hoped that the product of this study will reflect a sound, proper and judicious combination of scientific methodology.

This thesis was undertaken at the suggestion of Dr. Clifford A. L. Rich, for whose patience, assistance and invaluable guidance in its preparation I would like to express my sincere appreciation.

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CHAPTER I

DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICY

From the individual citizen with his attitudes to the organized group with its ideology, political action can be defined as a contest between interest-determined preferences. Each politically active group makes demands upon other groups, demands based upon the values and interests accepted, advocated, and defended by that group. It is the leadership of such organizations which is continually active in shaping political aims and demands on the basis of its ideology.

The nature of this leadership is of crucial importance to the study of political behavior, for neither the unattached individual nor the member of an interest group participates directly in policy making. Generally, each interest group is ruled by its own set of elected officers. These persons frequently tend to perpetuate their sway over long periods; or, more commonly still, new officers are chosen from a relatively small group of individuals especially fit for the position.

If several interest groups with similar claims are ruled for long periods by the same individuals, or by the same type of individuals, an "elite" comes into being. An elite is a body of like-minded persons habitually in charge of politically significant groups and attempting to have the entire community respect the values and beliefs peculiar to it. Thus, in Japan there is a labor-union elite, a big-business elite, and incipient elites speaking for small businessmen, farmers, large landholders and the like. The opinions, values, ideologies, and political

aspirations of key elites, therefore, are the crucial elements in the making of foreign policy.¹

Nationalism: Like any other community, the political community comprises a series of groups within a more-or-less compact geographical area in a state of mutual dependence upon one another. Of all communities that which is classified as a nation is probably the most important.

An analysis of the activities of interest groups will reveal their inherent conflicts and the divisive effects of their influence within the community. How, then, can a national community, built on unity and solidarity, emerge from the strife and division implicit in the struggle among competing elites and ideologies?

There are many objective and subjective factors which coalesce separate groups into a national community. Although groups have conflicting aims, the individuals who comprise these groups do not belong merely to one group, but participate simultaneously in several, so that there tends to be a degree of attitude sharing, not only within groups, but between interest groups as well. This attitude-sharing coexists with conflicting aims among groups. In most communities - whether democratic and pluralistic or authoritarian and monolithic - a measure of unity can be attained because of agreement on essentials. Additionally, interdependence is important: farmers rely on urban markets; industrial establishments rely on farmers to consume their products, etc. Other binding forces that may influence nationhood are common language, literature, religion, traditions and common historical experience.

¹Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1954), p. 67.

These are all important objective factors, but of themselves do not set the national community apart from other associations of men.²

Since such objective factors as physical interdependence, religion, and race are inadequate to distinguish the nation from other associations there remains the subjective factor of belief in a common system of value. A national community, therefore, is a complex of individuals, groups and elites united by a body of beliefs transcending their own restricted ideologies and distinguishing them from the rest of mankind, so that their national values make up the highest doctrine to which they profess political loyalty. A will to live together, regardless of the objective bonds of association, in a society larger than the town, province, interest group, or family, constitutes the strongest identifiable element in the consciousness of national life. The elements common to all group ideologies in a community, then, may be considered as the essence of nationalism. It differs from group ideology in that it stands above the beliefs of the community's constituent groups and thereby unites them. It is a compound of the common elements found in the differing and competing group ideologies within the nation. It cannot be proved to be "right" or "wrong," "good" or "bad," "true" or "false." What matters is that it exists because it is professed and believed in by the groups who identify themselves with it.

In a democracy, interest groups, despite their different ideologies, can attain a measure of agreement because compromise is generally an integral portion of their beliefs. Most of its items of policy are adopted as a result of compromises of interests among several elite

²Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York, 1956), pp. 45-60.

groups and the acquiescence of the opposing elites. The continuing belief that their long-range interests will still be served by the community keeps the defeated elites within the fold.³

In a democratic community the national ideology or myth originates as part of the ideology of one of several founding groups, and is diffused throughout the collectivity by a gradual process of evolution, education, and propaganda.

Unlike the common beliefs of a democratic community, the national myth in an authoritarian community does not grow as a result of the free sharing of values among interest groups. Authoritarian elites gain power by excluding their rivals from positions of prominence. Interest groups professing aims repugnant to the leadership are suppressed or eliminated. Opposition elites disappear from the political scene after the revolutionary success of the authoritarian group. The content of the national doctrine, therefore, is determined not by compromise and value sharing, but by imposition. The ideology of the authority becomes the community's national myth.

Over a period of time, it is quite likely that the entire community will accept the elite's ideology as its national myth without doubt or reservation. In this way, even an authoritarian community may rest on consensus because no scheme of values other than the officially sanctioned one is permitted expression. If there is no desire to challenge the elite's version of the national myth, the absence of dispute may indicate a degree of unity and solidarity surpassing that of the democratic community.

³K. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York, 1953), p. 18-25.

The content of the myth - democratic or authoritarian - is emotional rather than rational. It appeals to the individual's desire to be identified with others who share his attitudes and to find gratification in such identification. In a democracy, the continuing viability of such identification is demonstrated by the willingness of the minority to abide by the decision of the majority even if its aims are completely disregarded. So long as the primary requisite of the community's myth - the observation of the democratic process - is faithfully observed, the minority will obey the majority's decisions. Democratic decision making has been observed, and therefore the decision is legitimate, even from the defeated minority's point of view. Only continued and flagrant violation of a minority's aspirations will cause its disaffection, resulting in the shattering of community consciousness and in the outbreak of civil war.

This, however, is not the process whereby the myth of an authoritarian community remains viable. No problem of majority and minority interpretation arises. The elite, or, more commonly, the leader at the head of the elite, is exclusively capable of interpreting the myth; and authoritarian leadership is almost always "charismatic."

It is the essence of each national body of beliefs that the community espousing it will, in some degree, consider its own institution its way of life, and its values superior to that of all other national myths - that is, the beliefs of other countries. Its whole sense of identity is intimately tied up with such feelings. So long as these myths do not compete with each other, the feelings of superiority do not enter the realm of international relations. However, since national communities, like interest groups, have mutually incompatible claims

pon each other, these beliefs enter into a field of international competition, or even conflict. National policy, then, justifies itself as a necessity to the maintenance of the national myth.⁴ Whether this justification represents the true aims underlying the respective policy is beside the point. What is of importance is that national loyalty to a given policy is maintained by having the policy accord with the national myth. Thus, the content of national myth and the degree of energy with which the content is advanced outside the national community is in itself a vital factor in the dynamics of international relations.

Government and Authoritarian Elites: If, as has been discussed, relationships in the community and between national communities are relationships between elites, decision making on the part of the state is equally a process of adjusting or settling competing aims between elites.

One of the differences between the authoritarian and democratic form of government lies in the question of whether policy is made directly by elites, or by policy makers - politicians and statesmen - influenced by the elites of various interest groups. Whenever policy for a whole community is made by a single interest group acting as the government, the result is an authoritarian regime. The same is true whenever the government consists of a coalition of specific interest groups which have succeeded in permanently excluding others from positions of influence. Under such conditions, rival centers of influence do not exist. In such a system, elite, government and state are identical so long as the ruling group retains its unity of purpose.

⁴R. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton, N. J., 1954), p. 69.

In the democratic state the picture is otherwise. Government consists primarily of representatives of a given elite or interest group, but of professional politicians, who in turn are influenced by the rival elites leading the interest groups. Generally, the ruling party will legislate in order to translate the aims of the supporting elites into reality. The opposing party, or parties, associated with a rival set of elites representing rival interest groups will seek to prevent passage of such legislation in order to meet the interests of its supporters. Regardless of the party in power, shifts in opinion and in power are usually reflected in the composition of the legislature. The professional politicians who sit in the parliaments and congresses of democratic nations tend to be responsive to the ever-changing pattern of elite pressures, and thereby introduce a dynamic force into the process of making policy.

Control of the State and Application of Power: The state formally rules by means of law. Law comes into existence as the result of the capacity of an elite or a coalition of elites to impose its interests and values upon the community. The ability to make generally binding rules, therefore, is a reflection of political power. Power is here considered as the objective ability of an elite to carry out its will through possession of armies, military equipment, or propaganda instruments, or by the acquiescence of those who are expected to comply with that will. Or, subjectively, it may be considered as the probability that the elite in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out its will, despite resistance and regardless of the basis on which probability rests.⁵ In this case, it is the opinion of those who make

⁵R. Bendix and S. Lipset (eds), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), pp. 596-609.

les and decisions that compliance with these rules will come about which is of significance, regardless of whether actual quantitative superiority of force exists or not. It is this latter meaning which is of primary significance in the dynamics of international relations, since decisions are made on the basis of the amount of power thought to be available to each state. This strength of opinion is equally applicable as a restraint on the application of power where an ideologically determined unwillingness to make use of measurably superior power exists. While an observer may determine the amount of physical power available as adequate to attain a given aim, the statesman, subject to the intangible strictures imposed by his own thought and behavior pattern including the social pressure amidst which he makes decisions, may feel restrained from taking any action.

Ends are determined by group interests, and the ends of state policy are determined by the interests of ruling elites. Means of attaining ends are also determined by ideologies, but the amount of power thought to be available to the policy makers is crucial as well. Power, then, relates principally to the means chosen by the elite to translate its underlying aims into reality. Groups represent the shared values and demands of their members. Leaders are constrained to remain faithful to the aspirations of their supporters, even if, incidentally, they satisfy a personal desire for power in the exercise of their leadership. In terms of political relevance, therefore, group aims remain tied to values and interests. Commonly, a group seeks to strengthen its position and to increase its resources so as to be able to achieve its basic aims more effectively at a later time. Superficially, then, all groups and all states seek power: in armaments, trade, strategic position, and

ological appeal abroad. Yet the power is merely accumulated as as to
 lieve the basic ends dictated by the ideology.⁶ For these reasons
 in, power relates only to means and is not an end in itself. On the
 er hand, power to dominate the state is one of the positions which
 tes and political parties seek in order to achieve their aims. Once
 h a position is achieved, the mechanism of law makes it possible for
 a victorious group to impose its ends upon the entire population.
 ce, control over the state and lawmaking machinery is the supreme
 ze of political conflict.

National Policies: National policies are directed toward the
 ainment of the "national interest." These aims undergo change as the
 erests of elites alter and as new groups attain positions of influence.
 the domestic conflict for the realization of rival interests, it is
 fficult to define some overriding set of aspirations not only common
 the whole nation but also capable of guiding the statesman in making
 icy.

In broad terms, these aspirations of national interest include such
 eral and noncontroversial aims as the maintenance of peace, preserva-
 on of security, maximization of prosperity, and the protection of one's
 citizens abroad. There is also the more specific viewpoint that the
 onal interest is the sum total of all those geographic, political,
 ideological elements which have historically been associated with the
 ervation of each state. The attempt to apply this concept to a
 cific issue leaves some doubt as to what these elements might be.
 ferent groups will emphasize different elements. Individual values

⁶R. Bendix and S. Lipset (eds), op. cit., pp. 600-609.

d ideologies will argue for the primacy of one or another constituent the "national" interest, and no agreement on the sum will emerge. Competing group values continually assert themselves in the community defining them as "historical" and "permanent elements." No national policy is comprehensive enough, except in a highly authoritarian setting, to preclude this kind of controversy over basic aims. However, to the extent that policy corresponds in its broad outline to the values of the whole community in general and to the specific ideologies of opposition groups in particular, a true national interest is being defended.

Ends, Means, and Policy Makers: The appreciation of means becomes an even more significant factor in the definition of specific policy aims once we reach the level of the policy maker, the government. Policy makers, to be sure, frequently are members of elites, and they always try to translate their beliefs into reality. However, because they represent a political party which is itself dependent upon the support of many groups, they must compromise almost incessantly. They can never allow a policy repugnant to the myth of the community, because they cannot risk being left without the support of the overwhelming majority of groups and individuals in the event of international conflict. Hence, any politicians and statesmen must think twice before embarking on a foreign policy of speedily translating the values of their group into demands upon foreign nations. Only a secure autocrat can afford to ignore the wishes of his domestic supporters and opponents and to follow his personal values and preferences.

Thus, it is on the level of the policy maker that compromises between elites are finally translated into compromises with all groups, reducing the necessary power for carrying out a policy. The process

defining ends, then, includes within it the appreciation of means, even if this occurs only on the highest level of community action, the level of the state.

As we have seen, then, the ends of a nation's foreign policy are defined on each level of the social hierarchy: individuals, interest groups, elites, political parties, and the government itself. Ideology differs at each level, though the clarity and uniqueness of group values tend to be diluted and compromised away as the process of definition reaches the higher levels at which the over-all policy emerges.

In substance, then, the integrity of national beliefs and institutions is the supreme end for which nations will present a unified front and will struggle, however that integrity may be defined.⁷

In the large number of issues, however, in which there is no direct relation to these broad consensual forces, the view of the ruling groups alone defines the national interest, which therefore is not necessarily permanent, consistent, or national.

The foregoing chapter has discussed in some detail a number of the many dynamic forces which influence the determination of domestic and foreign policy. Based on experience patterns certain empirical premises have been established. As a major premise, it is assumed that the ends of foreign policy are qualitatively similar to ends implicit in any other field of policies. It is further held that the modes of thought associated with value structures implicit in idealism as well as in realism are useful tools of analysis only insofar as they shed light on the ends men seek to gain in politics. On these premises certain patterns

⁷Q. Wright, "The Nature of Political Conflict," Western Political Quarterly, IV (June, 1951), pp. 197-204.

ve been established to aid in the analysis of the dynamics of the
terminant's foreign policy.

The following chapters will analyze the objective and subjective
biological, economic, political and military factors extant in Japan,
ose understanding will provide some insight into the determinants of
an's foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC IMBALANCES OF JAPAN

Population Pressures

In the past 85 years, Japan has been in a state of continual and rapid growth. In the period from 1872 to 1935, Japan's population doubled, to reach a total of 69,000,000 people. Sixty-eight percent of this gain was achieved in the thirty-one year period following the Russo-Japanese War. Twenty-one years later, despite World War II losses, Japan's population has increased by 21,000,000 more people. This, together with the fact that as a result of the War she lost approximately 25% of her former area, leaves her in the position of being one of the most densely populated countries in the world. In Japan, a country smaller in size than California, with only 16% of its land arable, dwells a growing population in excess of 90,000,000 people.¹

A brief analysis discloses that of the population residing in Japan in 1946, 35.8% were in the juvenile class, less than fourteen years old; 58.3% were in the productive 15-59 age bracket; and only 7.9% were over sixty years old. This is a young, vigorous population.

A further breakdown of the productive group indicates that 22,000,000 males were in the 15-49 years age bracket of whom it is estimated 70% had served in some military, and approximately 6,000,000 had had actual service in

¹Economic Counsel Board, The Trend of Japanese Economy in the Past 75 Years (Tokyo, 1955), p. 7.

armed forces in time of war. In addition, over 90% of the population is literate. This population, then, provides one of the largest pools of potential military and skilled industrial manpower in the world. To add to this great pool, in 1955 the working age group was increasing at a rate of one-half million people per year.²

Although Japan has made great industrial progress, shorn of extensive foreign markets and sources of raw materials, and with little hope for any extensive expansion of agricultural areas, she is not currently able to absorb this yearly increment of population into productive channels. Geographically reduced in land area, possessing inadequate agricultural productivity, indigenous raw materials and access to raw materials and markets, Japan is faced with the grim problem of supporting her burgeoning population.

Japan has sought to resolve her demographic problem in the past through such practices as infanticide, birth control, emigration, increased agricultural and industrial productivity, lowered standards of living, and conquest.³

Population Control

1. Emigration and Colonization: From the later Tokugawa Era to the early Meiji Period, Japan had no appreciable population problem.⁴ Portion and infanticide were commonly practiced for the same reasons

²Statistical Office of the United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (New York, 1956).

³Ryoichi Ishii, Population Pressures and Economic Life in Japan (Chicago, 1937), pp. 249-254.

⁴Herbert E. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, Institute of Pacific Relations (New York, 1940), pp. 159-168.

that modern birth control is practiced in the West. Sheer economic necessity was not the only reason -- a conscious effort to maintain living standards and maximize inheritances were also factors that influenced their practices.

Following the Reformation of 1868, the government took strong measures to suppress these practices; after approximately thirty years it had succeeded fairly well in curbing the practice of family restriction.

In the wake of the Sino-Japanese War Japan emerged as a colonial power, expanding territorially and obtaining extensive spheres of influence in China. As the national economy expanded rapidly along the line of industrialization the population began to increase, and Japan turned from a food exporter to a food importer. The militaristic and imperialistic policies developing in Japan during this period encouraged a growing population.

Rapid industrialization hastened the transfer of the rural population to urban districts. Because of this industrial development and urbanization, colonization and emigration were not actively encouraged by the government, nor were there popular pressures to emigrate. Official disinterest in emigration continued until after World War I, when the government awakened to the desirability of mass emigration, but her efforts in this direction were substantially ineffectual.⁵

It was not until 1895 that the Japanese Government authorized emigration. However, in 1900, three years after annexation of Hawaii by the United States, immigration of Japanese into Hawaii was forbidden.

⁵Ishii, op. cit., p. 209.

In 1901, Australia closed her doors to Asiatics. In 1907, the U. S. - Japanese Gentlemen's Agreement excluded Japanese labor from the United States, Hawaii, and the contiguous areas of Canada and Mexico. In 1908, Canada limited the number of Japanese immigrants to 400 a year. In 1915, South Africa was closed to Japanese. In 1924, the United States enacted an immigration act which excluded all Asiatics.

Thus after World War I, when Japan awakened to the necessity of migration, political barriers prevented her surplus population from migrating overseas. There was one exception - immigration was permitted to some countries of South America, particularly Brazil and Peru. Nevertheless, over a five-year period the average annual number of permits issued to emigrants was only 20,322, while the average annual number of repatriates was 14,759, leaving the emigrant net total of only 5,563. By 1930, there were approximately 510,000 Japanese residing overseas, including a large proportion of second-generation Japanese.

While economic factors were predominant in influencing colonization and emigration movements, the economic factors were themselves conditioned by the historical, political, and social background of the nation. Three of the most important factors which contributed to the ineffectiveness of Japan's efforts toward colonization and emigration were:

(a) The prolonged policy of isolation under the Tokugawa regime suppressed the earlier tradition and ambitions of overseas activities, and thereby devitalized Japanese ventures in colonization and migration.

(b) When, after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan entered the field of international activity, she found that almost all undeveloped territories were already occupied by Caucasian peoples. In particular,

the Anglo-Saxon peoples were in possession of those territories which, for many reasons, seemed most desirable for Japanese colonization. Social prejudice, accompanied by economic ambitions, destined the exclusion of Japanese in these regions.

(c) Most of the colonies and dependencies secured by Japan in recent decades were already densely populated, long before their inclusion into the Japanese Empire, by peoples of relatively low standards of living.

By 1930, there were 1,246,743 Japanese living in the colonial territories and 509,754 residing in foreign countries. This aggregate of only 1,756,497 Japanese living outside of Japan proper represented only 2.7% of the over-all Japanese population. Within this total, actually less than 1,000,000 had migrated from Japan. In other words, after a considerable effort extending over several decades the number of Japanese emigrants abroad, including colonies, equalled only the number of one year's natural increase within the nation.⁶

Today, the prospects for emigration as a means of relieving the economic pressure are extremely unfavorable. The Anglo-Saxon countries, which might absorb a large number of emigrants, remain closed to non-white immigrants. Asia, in general, offers no possibilities. Neither in Africa be considered for large-scale immigration of Asians, for the resources at her disposal are no more than are needed for the benefit of her own rapidly increasing peoples. The South American countries, which have at their disposal the largest natural resources, will themselves have to absorb with their weak national economies an unprecedentedly rapid population increase. Thus, large-scale emigration of Japanese to

⁶Ishii, op. cit., p. 210.

outh America is not feasible. It would seem, then, that colonization and emigration as a remedy for Japanese overpopulation are definitely limited.⁷

2. Birth Restrictions: On the other hand, population control through birth restriction has been very effective.

High fertility, combined with a low-mortality rate and a youthful age structure, has resulted in a very high rate of population increase. In 1948, for example, Japan had the third highest birth rate in the world (34.3 per 1000), surpassed only by those of Russia (47 per 1000) and Mexico (44.3 per 1000), and a death rate of only 12 per 1000.⁸

To alleviate this rapidly growing threat of overpopulation, Japan has reverted to her pre-1868 Reformation practices of wide-spread abortion. Induced abortion was legalized by the Eugenic and Protection Law of 1948. This law provides for the artificial interruption of pregnancy in cases where the health of the mother is threatened not only by continuation of pregnancy or delivery, but also by repeated pregnancies at short intervals. Actually, abortions are induced for economic and social reasons. For the application of this practice, only a very simple procedure is prescribed by law. The spread of abortion is extensive. The number of legal abortions in 1952 was estimated at 300,000; the number of non-registered abortions for that year numbered between 200,000 and 300,000.⁹ In addition, the Japanese government,

⁷G. H. L. Zeegers, "Introduction to the Contest," Population Bulletin, XII (February, 1956), p. 13.

⁸Statistical Office of the United Nations, op. cit., p. 536.

⁹Zeegers, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

With the cooperation of the press, is propagandizing on a large scale, urging the use of contraceptives and family planning. This propaganda is prepared and supported by scientific research carried out by the National Institute of Public Health with a view to determining the reactions of the public and analyzing their attitude. The propaganda has achieved results far beyond initial expectations. As a result, the birth rate has dropped from the 1942 high of 34.3 per 1000 to a moderate rate of below 20 per 1000 in 1954. During the same period, her death rate dropped from 12 per 1000 to below 9 per 1000.¹⁰ These are the lowest levels of fertility and mortality ever achieved by any Asian nation, but it will take at least a generation for a falling birthrate to really put the brakes on population increase. If these rates are sustained, Japan's growth might stabilize soon after 1980.¹¹

Although effective steps have been taken to decelerate the rapid increase in Japan's population, she still faces the problem of caring for a population in excess of 100,000,000 by the time her population growth levels off. Japan is cognizant of this problem and is actively seeking a solution. With the swelling of the population it is natural that increases should take place in the demand for food, clothing, and other consumption articles. From a negative standpoint, the increased population might be sustained by lowering the standards of living. On the other hand, it is desirable to provide as high a standard of living as possible, consistent with national security and a viable economy. Industrialization is, of course, the most effective way to solve such a problem.

¹⁰"Asian Population Roundup," Population Bulletin, XI (March, 1955), p. 1.

¹¹Ibid., p. 3.

Economic Imbalances

A principal responsibility of a state is its economic responsibility to its citizens - insuring that they are provided with food, shelter, clothing and the economically productive activities requisite to earning an acceptable standard of living. The degree of success attained by the nation in accomplishing these objectives is perhaps the most accurate measure of its stability, the strength of its government and the success of its international relations. For upon these factors depend the welfare and morale of the individuals who in mass provide the welfare, morale, financial support, political unity and military strength of the state. In a broad sense, they formulate the determinants of the nation's domestic and foreign policies.

To be a strong and stable state, a nation must have a viable economy. The means of attaining this status reaches across international boundaries - the quest of essential raw materials to fill its industrial needs and the means of disposing of its surplus products, through state trading and competition for world markets. It includes the collective acquisitive efforts of bankers, merchants, investors, ship owners, farmers, labor, and other groups as components of the national economy.¹²

The economic policies of a state are designed to coordinate and control these various individual and collective economic efforts into a cohesive force directed at insuring the welfare and security of the state. What constitutes the welfare and security of a state may from time to time be subject to various interpretations arising from a

¹²Haas and Whiting, op. cit., p. 47.

plex of motives influenced by such factors as fear of aggression, love of peace, neutralism, quest for power, and the pressure of commercial, financial, labor or other groups.¹³

In the space of less than a century from the time the Japanese opened their country to foreign influences in 1854, Japan emerged from an isolated, agrarian, feudal society into a centralized, highly industrialized nation-state. In 1885, 80% of Japan's occupational population was engaged in agriculture and aquatic industries. In 1935, nearly 40% of the nation's gainfully employed workers were engaged in mining, manufacturing, commerce and transportation.¹⁴

In the early stages of the modernization of Japan's economy, agriculture was the principal source of capital and labor for industry. In 1880, the land tax accounted for 90% of the government's internal revenue; 30 years later, it accounted for about 50% of it; and from 1920 on, it accounted for less than 10%. Thus, initially, agriculture played an important part in the rapid development of Japanese industry. At the same time, industrialization created jobs for the surplus population in farming villages and contributed toward increasing agricultural productivity by making it easy to obtain industrial products required for the development of farming, such as fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, farming implements, and electric power.

In the early phases of industrialization, the government itself undertook to start new industries, or protected them by extending subsidies, guaranteeing dividends and establishing an enterprise licensing

¹³Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁴Economic Counsel Board, op. cit., p. 9.

stem. It was, therefore, the usual practice of the government to establish a fairly firm foundation for an industrial enterprise before handing it over to private management.¹⁵

As early as World War I, Japan had climbed into a position of competition in the established markets of the West in the Far East. World War I gave her an excellent opportunity to establish a firm economic foothold in China, and this she expanded politically and economically at every opportunity.

However, until the beginning of the 1930's, Japan's principal interest was in the development of light industries, especially the textile industry; and except for a very limited few that were protected and fostered by the government in the interest of national defense, heavy industry remained in a comparatively undeveloped stage.

By 1934, dependent as she was on foreign trade to support a prolific population and a fast-growing industrial economy, Japan faced a precarious future. Agricultural production and raw materials within the home islands were totally inadequate to meet her expanding needs as she saw them. In these circumstances, political views had vacillated between a continuing policy of maintaining an international but peaceful attitude and trade expansion dependent on friendliness with the Western powers and their colonies in the Far East, or a bold new policy, frequently argued as too risky, of sacrificing good will and securing sources of food and raw materials by conquest.

Japan's ambitions were not unique. European powers before her had acquired vast territories and enviable trading positions in order to

¹⁵Ibid., p. 10.

ure adequate sources of raw materials and markets for their expanding economic empires. Japan desired a share of these advantages.

The decision to enter Manchuria in 1934, and the successes that followed, only served to whet the ambitions of Japan's political and military leadership. During this period, emphasis on industrial development was transferred from the development of light industry to the intense development of heavy war industries; and by the end of the decade, Japan was practically self-sufficient in heavy industrial production. By 1941, with successes in Manchuria and North China, Japan's economy had been established on a sufficiently firm industrial base, and her politico-military leadership and supporting elements had become so powerful, that only a coalition of world powers was able to halt her further ruthless attempt at conquest and the establishment of an autarchic economic empire through the creation of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."¹⁶

It is reasonably clear that the roots of conquest found fertile soil in the need for economic expansion. That the traditional family organization, belief in the feudal emperor system, lack of democratic concepts, and the acceptance of authoritarian government were exploited by a despotic leadership, ambitious for world power, should not obscure the economic problems that faced Japan in 1934 and are again with her today.

By the end of World War II, Japan's industries had been largely destroyed. Her surrender was complete; and with it she lost her colonies, her principal sources of important foods, industrial raw materials, and export markets.

¹⁶Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York, 1955), pp. 360-364.

To regain a respectable place among the sovereign powers and to attain a stable government, Japan must attain a viable economy. This calls for widespread development in a number of vital economic areas, to include domestic food production, industry and the establishment of import and export markets.

Food Production

Of Japan's 147,000 square miles, only one-sixth is arable, and it is broken up into a complicated patchwork of small plains and valleys. So far, it has been able to produce only 80% of the food required to meet the needs of the nation. Consequently, food must be imported. These imports, one-fourth of which currently come from the U. S., are equal in value about one-half of Japan's total exports and cost one-half billion dollars annually. Although this amount has been offset by U. S. expenditures in Japan, foreign exchange is badly needed for industrial technological improvements and for raw materials for industry. To minimize dependence on external sources of food, a five-year agricultural plan has been initiated to increase the production of foodstuffs.¹⁷

The elimination of absentee landlords by the Occupation placed 89% of farm lands in the hands of those who worked it, but the average Japanese farm ranges from only one to three acres. While farms are worked efficiently, their small size and the poverty of the individual farmer precludes the use of large-scale modernized methods of optimum efficiency.¹⁸ Nevertheless, intensive farming methods have been

¹⁷Economic Counsel Board, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁸Lawrence I. Hewes, Land and Men (Ames, Iowa, 1955).

veloped, not only to increase crop yields, but to extend crop-producing areas. Especially noteworthy is the high level of Japan's rice culture techniques. Her farmers can produce three to four times as much rice per unit as is produced in Southeast Asian countries. This is still inadequate, and there is little room for expanding paddy fields. There is, however, considerable room for increased production of other farm products such as wheat and barley, and an appreciable area is still available which can be developed for non-paddy farming.¹⁹

1. Changing Food Habits: Due to the shortage of food, especially during the war, food habits have changed somewhat. The amount of rice consumed per capita has decreased by 20%, whereas wheat consumption has increased three hundred percent. The consumption of dairy products has also sharply increased. Consequently, it can be expected that Japan's agriculture, which has heretofore been based on the "rice first" principle, will begin to place emphasis on other cereals and stock raising.²⁰

2. Experiments in Increased Production: In this connection, experiments are being made in two relatively new fields for producing food: these are hydroponic farms which were used to some extent by the U. S. Armed Forces for producing vegetables for U. S. troop consumption in the Far East, and the development of algae for food.

Chemical-biological processes have been developed to produce algae - a group of water plants rich in protein - which can be developed with tremendous speed and promises a vast new source of human food. It is

¹⁹Economic Counsel Board, op. cit., p. 8.

²⁰Ibid., p. 8.

ready possible to produce algae that are 50% dry weight in protein. In all experimental plants, production yields of thirty tons per acre per year have already been attained; and through the careful study and selection of particular strains of algae, this yield might be increased to 100 tons. Experiments have already been made with these algae in Japan, where it has been proved that they are acceptable to the Japanese in certain forms as food. It is possible that this development of algae may provide a vast new and inexpensive source of human food.²¹

3. Modernization of the Fishing Industry: Another traditionally important source of food for Japan is fish. The scarcity of meat in Japan, the vast extent of coastline, and the continuous sheltered sea have led to her becoming one of the most important fishing nations of the world. Just prior to World War II one and a half million Japanese were engaged in the fishing industry, and national fishery production exceeded 6,300,000 metric tons, almost three times that of her closest rival, the United States, and from one-half to two-thirds of the world's total output.²²

Since the War, Japan has been excluded from some of her former fishing areas, particularly in the vicinity of China, Korea, Sakhalin and other areas which were taken over from her by the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, her fishery production reached 5,258,177 metric tons in 1952 - a very substantial production. Most of this production was in deep-sea fishing, and only 60,000 metric tons were taken in the adjacent inland

²¹James Reston, "Courage to be Patient," The New York Times, December 5, 1954, p. 26.

²²Motosaku Fujinaga, "Japanese Fishery," Contemporary Japan, XXIII (March, 1955), pp. 713-719.

aters. Yet, though Japan leads the world in total catch, her volume of fishery catch per capita, or per fishing vessel, falls far below that of other major fishery nations. This is accounted for by the longstanding fact that Japanese fishing has been carried out by an enormous number of individual fishing households operating along the coast, and by a relatively few organized enterprises participating in the industry. The operation of these fishing households is small scale, technically backward, and low in productivity; only a small number of fishing enterprises operate with advanced technique and high productivity. The recent introduction of various scientific devices, such as fishing nets and ropes of synthetic fibers, radars for detecting the position of a school of fish, or piloting radars for directing fishing vessels, and the construction of fishing vessels of high efficiency have increased the efficiency of the Japanese fishing industry.²³

In addition, it is entirely possible that with the increased development of hatcheries, feeding grounds and general cultivation of the inland seas about Japan, greatly enriched fishing areas may be developed to offset the loss of fishing banks which were formerly available to her. This potential expansion of the fishing industry could do much to alleviate the national food shortage and to augment the national income.

• Industrialization

Japan's best approach to the problem of attaining economic viability is through extensive industrialization. Since her indigenous production

²³R. E. Coker, "Role of Science in Marine Fisheries," Illustrated Science Monthly, XXII (April, 1956), pp. 176-193.

raw materials is limited, she must rely extensively upon imports from foreign countries. To pay for these imports she must expand her foreign trade. To do this, she must be in a position to produce sufficiently to compete in world markets, both in price and quality. Concurrently with this, Japan's wide variety of indigenous raw materials, although in limited quantities, must be exploited for greater use. More and different skills must be developed to process the raw materials of other countries. The need to import fuel might be reduced by the greater development of hydro-electric and atomic power and the development of greater efficiency in industrial machinery and processes. Concurrently, more jobs should be created by the development of new products, new skills, and new industries to absorb the manpower that will be joining the labor force within the next twenty to twenty-five years.

As a result of war-time destruction and occupation controls, Japanese industries, except for textile and textile machine plants, suffer from obsolescence of facilities and equipment. Most of this machinery has been used 10 to 20 years beyond its normal life expectancy. Collateral with this is the need for modernization of technical and managerial policies.²⁴

One of the most basic reasons for these conditions has been assessed as the acute shortage of capital. After Japan first regained her independence, she discouraged the investment of foreign capital in Japan. The opening of American firms was discouraged even when they offered to guarantee exports from Japan that would yield a net dollar balance. Not only did the Japanese fear economic domination by foreign capital,

²⁴Public Service Division, Department of State, On the Japanese Economy (Washington, November, 1954), p. 3.

but they feared the competition which efficient methods would offer in their domestic markets. Nevertheless, the principal source of Japan's economic stability since her surrender has been U. S. capital.²⁵

1. Restoration of Industry: Immediately following the surrender, one of SCAP's objectives was the complete destruction of Japan's heavy industry as an essential of war potential. However, this policy was short lived. With the onset of the Cold War in 1947, Japan's potential value as an ally of the West became obvious. The program of destroying heavy industries was modified, and all efforts were redirected toward increasing industrial potential to the highest levels and reestablishing the Japanese economy on a firm foundation.

In order to utilize Japanese prestige, capital and "know how" in speeding industrial recovery, SCAP modified many of the restrictions that had been placed on the old industrial elite class. They were eager and ready for the opportunity, and, although limited as never before by controls imposed by the Occupation and by Organized Labor, they took full advantage of the opportunity to reestablish themselves in a position of affluence. This, in effect, resulted in the reestablishment to a modified degree of the recently purged Zaibatsu.

With the advent of the Korean War, the flow of capital to Japan from the United States was greatly accelerated. However, this unanticipated influx of capital from U. S. procurement orders and from expenditures by U. S. Forces in Japan was used principally for nonessential purposes. The effect was to raise the standard of living, which in turn caused prices to go up, and priced Japanese goods out of the competitive export

²⁵E. O. Reischauer et al., Japan and America Today (Stanford, 1953), p. 81.

arket, and reduced income. In other words, imports were greater, and exports smaller, than they would have been if America had spent less in Japan. Much of the capital that was invested in industry was not wisely distributed, in that it was concentrated in elaborately equipping a small number of large factories selected by official policy rather than on commercial considerations.²⁶ This, however, further assisted in providing a firmer foothold for the re-emergent Zaibatsu; for those who still retained industrial holdings and capital were able to reestablish their industries at a time when demands and profits from the Korean War were greatest, and when capital for the establishment of new and competitive industries was scarce.

Since the mass of small industries were seriously under-equipped, it would have been more expedient for the government to have directed its money into developing the largest number possible of these smaller factories into self-sustaining and progressive businesses. As it is, the separation between a large-scale and a small-scale business is greater than before the War, and the small-scale industries are at a great disadvantage.

To correct these deficiencies and to minimize expenditures for imports, control measures were initiated by the Government in 1955. Another "austerity" budget was adopted: bank credits were controlled to restrict inflationary loans. To encourage foreign capital and investments, laws were passed allowing certain special tax exemptions for foreign investments, and permitting repatriation of foreign capital and reasonable profits. A program for modernizing about two-thirds of

²⁶C. G. Allen, "The Present Economic Situation in Japan," International Affairs, XXXI (July 1, 1955), pp. 291-295.

e steel industry was begun, and a second modernization plan is under way which will cost about \$60 million in foreign exchange.²⁷ A program to reduce production costs has resulted in improved facilities and techniques of coal mining, the development of more efficient blends of imported and indigenous coal, the intensified use of electricity, and the continued modification and expansion of key industries. Industry is already receiving excellent technical advice, both as to production methods and equipment, and the number of technical assistance contracts with foreign concerns for all industries is steadily increasing. (In 1953, they increased from 214 to 244.)

Before the War, Japan balanced her international payments by exporting shoddy, underpriced goods such as toys, novelties, and Christmas tree ornaments, items through which she could exploit the advantages of cheap labor and cheap materials. This trade continues to some extent, but it is regulated to avoid undue friction with other countries by the prohibition of flagrant dumping of cheap goods. At the same time, Japan has entered into an entirely new and promising field, that of manufacturing highly finished, high-quality products, requiring a minimum of raw materials but a great deal of skilled or semi-skilled labor.²⁸ In this direction, Switzerland is famous for her watches, Japan has established an enviable reputation for high-grade cameras, binoculars, etc. This type of industry is being aggressively developed and expanded in overseas markets with excellent results.

Likewise, Japan's efforts to restore her shipping and ship-building

²⁷Public Service Division, Department of State, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁸Time Magazine, March 6, 1957, p. 31.

industry have been eminently successful. By 1956, Japan had become the world's greatest ship builder, and in shipping she is rapidly outstripping her Western competitors.²⁹ These industries are providing substantial income from construction, services performed, and indirectly reducing the cost of shipping to Japan many of her necessary bulk imports.

2. Foreign Trade: Nevertheless, Japan's principal industries are textiles and heavy industries, which convert great amounts of raw materials into finished products. She must rely completely on foreign supplies for five of the principal materials that she requires - phosphate, cotton, wool, bauxite, and crude rubber. She is also highly dependent on imports for adequate supplies of iron ore, coking coal, petroleum, tin, lead, and food.

Since Japan has been unable to reestablish her nearby pre-war markets, most of these imports must come from great distances, and at proportionately higher cost. For example, much of her coal and iron comes from the U. S., and the ratio of coal costs to the total production of pig iron in 1952 was 54%, compared to 30% before the war. This has increased the cost, not only of iron and steel, but also of the products which are manufactured from them.³⁰ This, in turn, has placed Japan in an unfavorable position on world markets. Many of these materials might be obtained at a much smaller cost from Red China if restrictions on such trade were not required as a condition of alliance with the U. S. However, the advantages obtained from the U. S. far outweigh the

²⁹Los Angeles Times, March 31, 1957, p. 34.

³⁰Jerome B. Cohen, "Japan's Foreign Trade," Far Eastern Survey, XXI (November 19, 1952), p. 169.

advantages of the restrictions on trade with China. Nevertheless, vicious for the maximum foreign trade, such limitations are deeply resented and provide a source of strong propaganda for the socialists to use against the government.³¹

To pay for her imports, Japan must export to a competitive world market. In 1937, Japan's share of the world market was five percent. In 1951, her exports had been reduced to almost one-half their pre-war volume. However, since her population had increased by 20%, the reduction in volume per capita was even greater. This great decline makes it essential for Japan to restore her markets. The question where and how?

By the terms of the 1951 Peace Treaty, Japan was reestablished as a sovereign nation and given freedom to regulate her commerce with other countries on an equal basis, restricted only to conform to "internationally accepted fair practices" in public and private trade. In reality, however, many of her former markets are closed to her.

Many of the South and Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Indo China, and Burma, were occupied and ravaged by Japan, and they still look upon her with resentment and distrust. The problem is further complicated because many of these countries will not enter into formal relations with Japan until reparation agreements have been negotiated. However, Japan is making a sincere effort to arrive at satisfactory solutions with them, and is dealing with a fair degree of success. Further complications lie in the preoccupation of these countries with their own internal problems

³¹E. O. Reischauer, op. cit., p. 21.

newly won independence and the strong spirit of nationalism that vades them. They tend to look upon outside efforts to reestablish national integration with stronger countries as a form of colonialism, inimical to the independent development of their own industries. Because of the recent war, Japanese goods have been particularly unwelcome in these areas. In the meantime, other countries are establishing markets in these countries and will be difficult to displace.³²

Japanese views on Korea are conditioned by the belief that an independent, democratic Korea has never existed; that Japan's occupation of Korea was one of mutual advantage to both nations; and that the relations between Japan and Korea must be close for economic and strategic reasons.³³ Conversely, Korea feels that she was shamelessly exploited and abused by the Japanese. The new Republic of Korea is extremely nationalistic and expresses a fanatical hatred of Japan. There is little chance that amicable relations between the two can be established within the near future. In the meantime, the explosive question of Japanese vessels fishing in Korean waters (Rhee Line - 60 miles offshore) and the irritating question of the troublesome Korean minority living in Japan will continue to militate against the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries.³⁴

Due to the fear of being cut off from American aid, Japan has thus far foregone any extensive trade with Communist China, Manchuria and

³²Robert Sherrod, "How Can Japan Survive?", Saturday Evening Post, October 9, 1954, pp. 32-33.

³³Jerome B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 168.

³⁴Robert Trumbull, "Japan's Left and Right Gear for a Showdown," New York Times, November 20, 1955.

eria. Although her pre-war trade with these areas was quite limited, that with China amounted to only 12 percent, the high cost of raw materials, shipping, and the tariff and import barriers imposed by many available markets have made many Japanese look to trade with China as a source for Japan's economic ills. Consequently, restraints on such trade have become a burning issue in Japanese politics.³⁵

Even in 1935 Japan obtained only 10.8 percent of its imports from what is now Red China (including Kwantung and Manchuria), which absorbed only 10.7 percent of Japanese exports. In the case of only six commodities that Japan obtain from China at that time a substantial proportion of its import requirements: copra and oil seeds, 83 percent; coking coal and organic fertilizers, 69 percent each; salt, 39 percent; iron ore, 31 percent; hides and skins, 27 percent.³⁶

Since World War II, Japan has been able to obtain most of these commodities from other sources without undue difficulty.

Today, chemical fertilizers and salt are produced in Japan. Pre-war food imports came principally from Korea and Formosa, not from China. Southeast Asia was then, and is today, much more important than China as a source of raw materials.

Japan's pre-war economic ties with China were based on a semi-colonial relationship, while Kwantung and Manchuria, with which two-thirds of this trade took place, were under Japanese political control. So, Sino-Japanese commerce was subsidized by heavy Japanese investments

³⁵C. F. Jones, "The Political Situation in Japan," International Affairs, XXXI (April, 1955), pp. 163-165.

³⁶Jerome B. Cohen, op. cit., p. 169.

Manchuria, Kwantung and North China. These Japanese controls over Sino-Japanese trade no longer exist.

Today, the socialistic economy of Red China is basically different from its capitalistic counterpart. Thus, even if Japan could trade with Red China, the amount could not be accurately assessed. There are strong factions within Japan which fear involvement with China. They distrust Communism, and fear that Red China, with the collusion of the U.S.S.R., might manipulate trade to obtain political benefits. The theory is that by allowing the expansion of trade to a high level, Japan might become heavily dependent on mainland markets. The threat of discontinuing this trade could then be used either to disrupt Japanese economic stability or to obtain political concessions.

Nevertheless, manufacturers and traders look upon China as a great unexplored market that could provide a big stimulus to Japan's foreign trade. An increasing number of trade missions are being exchanged between the two countries to develop economic relations. In the first eight months of 1955, total trade between the two countries amounted to \$648,205.³⁷ In October 1955, the Peiping radio announced that a delegation of Japanese businessmen had initiated trade contracts with the Chinese worth \$33,600,000, including embargoed goods. Japan was to provide China with freighters, tugs, steel and iron, and was to receive in exchange coal, rice, and magnesite. This trade was "made under the \$18 millions two-way trade pact signed in Tokyo last May."³⁸

³⁷ The Daily Oklahoman, "Japan, Red China Initial Contracts," October 17, 1955, p. 4.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

The lure of restoring pre-war trade with China has been the same Japan as for Britain. This prospect has been dangled before unofficial Chinese foreign trade and peace delegations to Moscow and Peking. The Chinese resent restrictions on their trade with China which are not applicable to Britain, and want to share in this trade. It is possible that China could be of vast importance to Japan's economy, providing her in large quantities of needed raw materials in exchange for transportation machinery, construction materials and chemicals. On the other hand, it is probable that China's economic policy, like that of the Soviet Union, will be one of economic self-sufficiency, offering no inducements for reciprocal export except for political purposes to obtain separately needed critical items.

In other countries, Japan's exports are limited by inability to compete in efficiency and quality, or because of high tariffs and trade restrictions.

Japan industrialized during the period of free-trade world economy, and the level of industrialization she achieved depended on a pattern of international economic specialization developed within that world economy. As a result, her economy was molded in a pattern of economic development which was vitally dependent upon world trade. Thus, she cannot easily change that pattern to one which involves a progressive reduction of external dependence without sacrificing potential future gains of productivity and real income. Her economy has become so dependent on foreign trade as to make it impossible for her to adopt a policy of national autarky without sacrificing much of her future potential of economic growth - dependent both in the sense that the ratio of her trade to her national output is high and in the sense that

future growth will tend to be higher if that ratio rises than if it falls. She cannot find a satisfactory answer to the problem of living standards growing in the present disordered economy, dominated by superior American competitive power by turning in on herself.³⁹

For an industrial economy such as Japan's, with her relatively greater endowment of natural resources, an adequate rate of growth depends on a rapid expansion of industrial exports and imports of primary products at favorable terms of trade. Within the existing structure of the economy, future gains in productivity will depend upon the concentration of future gains of capital stocks and labor in export industries rather than spread evenly over a wide range of industries and agriculture producing for domestic markets. This is true because Japan's industrial economy has outgrown her base of natural resources in the sense that her fertile land and mineral resources are already so intensively exploited that a more intensive exploitation would yield returns far smaller than could be earned by similar expenditures of labor and investment in export industries. This is true also because her economy has largely exhausted the potentialities of her domestic markets for manufactures, in the sense that a high rate of growth of industrial productivity can be sustained only if exports can be expanded rapidly at favorable terms of trade.

Rate of growth of primary products (food and raw materials) in, and export from, the major primary producing countries is one of the key factors in the economic growth of Japan. Her industrial economy depends on the exchange of export manufactures for import primary goods. For

³⁹William Y. Elliot et al., The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1955), p. 63.

reason, the rate of growth of her industry and real income is largely influenced by the rate of demand for her exports overseas and the terms of foreign trade. These factors are, in turn, strongly influenced by the rate of growth of overseas primary production and export.

If world primary production is rapidly expanded, the world's imports for manufactures will grow rapidly, and Japan's trade will tend to improve. Conversely, if world primary production lags, the terms of trade with Japan will tend to deteriorate and the expansion of her exports will be inhibited.

Japan has made remarkable progress since World War II in reestablishing her basic national economy. That she has been able to recover so quickly from the devastation of the war and the loss of her overseas assets and sources of raw materials is due to a very large extent to external assistance, principally from the United States. To improve her economic condition to a degree consistent with her national requirements require continued aid and cooperation from external sources sufficient to enable her fair and reasonable access to the primary products she needs, and the markets to dispose of her products.

In this respect, Japan's economic situation is similar to that of Western Europe. However, because of historical and sociological reasons, similar economic demands are not nearly so insistent or as politically effective in Japan as they are in the West. Thus, Japan's chances of solving her economic problems as they pertain to meeting the people's minimum demands for consumer goods and economic security are good. The attainment of a constantly improving material living standard has at least a subordinate place in the Japanese system of values. The stratified traditional pattern of Japanese society, although it is being changed

organized labor and the land-owning agrarian population, still supports a relatively passive attitude by the mass of the people to the adjustments meted to them by the economy. If during the next few years the living standard fails to rise, or even declines a little, the effect on Japan would probably be much less serious than a similar development in a western country. Hence, it may be valid to conclude that during the next decade it would be politically feasible to apply the major proceeds of Japan's economy to increase industrial capital rather than the standard of living.

The obstacles to Japan's economic growth are more external than internal. Internally the rate of savings is still high, as it has been for many years. There is no evidence of a decline in entrepreneurial vigor, a crystallization of economic institutions, or of the resistance to innovation so conspicuous in some western countries. There is a new earnestness in quality which may in time overcome the reputation of Japanese products for sacrificing quality to price. Labor mobility is high, and so is the rate of capital accumulation. The crux of Japan's economic problem, now as in the inter-war years, is that its energetic self-confident business class lacks sufficient outlets for its talents and energies at home. In the inter-war period the Japanese threw in their lot with the militarists in an effort to solve this problem through imperialism. Today, the same problem faces them again in a much-ravaged form. To achieve her aim of economic viability, Japan is dependent on external aid and expanded markets.⁴⁰

The principal danger of not expanding her export markets is not that it will lead in the near future to frustration of consumption claims

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 133-137.

to disaffection and political trouble among the Japanese people, rather than prolonged frustration of Japanese exports - and thus of energies and ambitions of the Japanese business class - might contribute to a rift between Japan and the West and in the reorientation of Japanese foreign policy toward neutralism.⁴¹ The history of the 1930's would be a warning to the West, and especially to the United States, that failure to provide sufficient economic opportunity for the expansion of Japan's exports and economic growth can be disastrous for the security of the West and the peace of the world. The logical way to supply this opportunity would be to make possible greater Japanese participation in the development of South and Southeast Asia. This insecurity of export markets further inhibits the growth of her exports by making export industries relatively unattractive to new investment and by inhibiting change in industrial structure and technology necessary to meet international competition or to respond to changes in foreign demand. The limited export market is a major limitation on Japanese economic growth. The weakness of incentives to industrial expansion due to external causes reinforced by, and in turn reinforces, restrictions on growth, both private and public. These factors lead to balance of payments weaknesses which further impair the economic growth capacity of Japan. The slow growth of per capita output resulting from this complex of factors tends to be self-reinforcing in another way. Slow growth makes it difficult to maintain an adequate rate of savings and capital development in the face of eventual rising consumption claims and defense requirements.⁴²

⁴¹Ibid., p. 138.

⁴²Ibid., p. 138.

Thus, it would seem that the danger of Japan's economic situation is from the possible repercussion on her domestic, political and foreign policies of continued economic weaknesses and frustrations. If a prolonged period of time her economic growth is restricted, Japan will be exposed to strong temptations to give up the effort to play an active role in the free world and may try instead to isolate herself from, politically and morally, from the struggle between communism and the West. Politically, a failure to achieve satisfactory rates of growth will confront her with the grave danger of greatly intensified communist aggression, open strife, or the need to resort to authoritarian techniques to force a reconciliation of economic claims and requirements and to maintain order. These possibilities contain the gravest dangers to Japan's future as a free, independent, sovereign and democratic country.

These are all possible developments based on hypothetical contingencies. In reality, however, notwithstanding some real obstacles to her economic progress, Japan has made an impressive and rapid comeback from military and total defeat. By 1953, her industrial production surpassed that of the 1932-1936 period by 55%.⁴³ Despite a 20% increase in population and a 44% decrease in territory, living standards, although execrably low by western standards, equalled those of Japan in any previous year. In 1955 and 1956, even though U. S. Security Forces' expenditures had been sharply curtailed, Japan attained strongly favorable trade balances of over \$300 million each year. Her reserves of gold and foreign exchange at the end of 1955 stood at \$1400 million, where they represented 100% coverage of all Japanese currency in circulation, and the Government

⁴³Economic Counsel Board, op. cit., p. 11.

announced that the budget for the 1956 fiscal year was in balance and as restricted to essential operations with no government borrowing tailed. Concurrently, the Government took steps to pay off some of its financial obligations. It offered to repay a \$65,500,000 credit obtained from the International Fund in 1953, and announced in Paris its intention to resume service on the 4% franc loan of 1910 and pay all coupons since November 15, 1940. The Government approved a Burmese project that will cost the Japanese \$15,400,000 as part of her commitment to pay Burma \$200 million in reparations in the next ten years.⁴⁴

To obtain continued progressive improvement there are still many factors which must be resolved, some of which are externally imposed and cannot be directly controlled by the Japanese themselves. Nevertheless, the actions thus far taken by the Japanese Government have been remarkably successful in achieving economic improvement and stability, and are ample evidence of the competence of the Japanese people to achieve their aims. Bankrupt and living on American aid eight years ago, Japan is beginning to act like a solvent citizen in the world community of nations. There is no apparent reason why Japan cannot be expected to attain a high economic level that will meet the needs of the nation and satisfy the needs of the people within a reasonably short time.

⁴⁴Burton Crane, "Japanese Advance on Economic Front," The New York Times, December 4, 1955, p. 1.

CHAPTER III

SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS IN POST-WAR JAPAN

Socio-political Factors

In spite of ethnic heterogeneity in so far as origins are concerned, after centuries of continuous assimilative process, there exists today striking cultural homogeneity among the Japanese which in any ways exceeds that of almost any other peoples. This remarkable homogeneity has been brought about by a common language, way of life, tradition, and customs, bolstered by a strong sense of kinship which is the product of centuries of isolated, insular national development, unmolested by alien invasions and reenforced by actual inbreeding of centuries.¹

. Social Hierarchy

Through generations dating back to feudal times the Japanese have a record of long-term, self-imposed restraints. They have been regimented from the cradle to the grave by their government, by strict and hide-bound traditions, by parents, teachers, bosses, police, and by superior officers in the Army. They existed as units of a family, as objects of the state, as parts of a group to which they have been subordinated. Their entire social fabric has been woven around the proposition that

¹Chitoshi Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (New York, 1956), p. 11-12.

younger sons should obey older sons, that sons should unquestionably
 obey fathers, and fathers their fathers; and that exactly in the same
 way all men should unquestionably obey those above them; thus, they have
 had little experience in self-expression.² This subordination to the
 group and the paternalism of the government robbed them of individualism
 and initiative. The most striking misfit among the Japanese was the
 individualist. The feudal system under which they lived until some
 seventy years ago taught them to be loyal to their lord, an individual.
 With the abolition of feudalism this loyalty was transferred to the
 emperor. Under him, as patriarch and religious leader, the nation was
 considered as one big family, unique in its divine heritage; and stratified
 in its social hierarchy.³ Thus, the Japanese have been conditioned
 to attach loyalty to individuals rather than to principles. The self-
 discipline, and the acquired narrowness and intensity of the Japanese, in
 his conviction, has approached fanaticism, and he can be ruthless in his
 self-righteousness.

In the moral code of the Japanese the performance of duty is the
 highest good. Evil is the lack of strength to live up to the prescribed
 code or, more accurately, instead of evil there are varying degrees of
 falling short of one's duties. Such a state of mind astutely guided can
 be a powerful instrument.

Religion

Religiosity has been one of the characteristics of the Japanese

²John Embree, The Japanese Nation (New York, 1945), p. 154.

³Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, The New Japan (Minneapolis, 1956), p. 5.

ople, and all religions are tolerated. The three principal religions are Shintoism, Buddhism, and Christianity.⁴

Japan's native religion, Shinto, is based on the legend that the emperor, or Imperial house, descends from the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, and is the family of highest rank; the people are related to it through their descent from other gods related to Amaterasu. Thus, as a religion it has a unifying influence, since it reinforces the concept of the Japanese as one great family, of which the emperor is the head, and infuses into this blood relationship a religious sanction.

Buddhism and Confucianism, received from Korea and China, have added richness to the Shinto conception, and strengthened the hierarchic concepts by adding ethical obligations to the Shinto foundation of duty and loyalty. Thus, Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintoism all merge, rather than conflict in Japanese culture to instill the worship of ancestors and reverence for the emperor.

Initially the impact of Christianity, democratic principles, and natural science upon Japanese youth shook the foundations of the political order, leading the Restoration governments of the later nineteenth century to re-annunciate the dogmas of imperial divinity and racial superiority and to require acceptance of the cult of Shinto by all Japanese. Ultra nationalism, chauvinism, and irrational super patriotism resulted.

Although the old constitution forbade the teaching of religion in schools, the government circumvented this by decreeing that State Shinto was not a religion at all but a philosophy and code of conduct above all

⁴"Religions in Japan," C. I. & E. Handbook, Tokyo: G H Q, S C A P, 1947.

ligions. It provided an official medium for further indoctrination of the people with a fanatical sense of submission of the individual personality for the sake of group action, group thinking, utter obedience to authority, and national, moral superiority. In this sense, the state became not the protector and patron of religion; rather, religion became the matrix of the state.⁵

The new democratic constitution divested the emperor of all pretense of divinity. Nevertheless, belief in the imperial institution has a firm foundation in the Japanese culture, and is as profoundly adhered to by the liberal and learned Japanese as by the simplest citizen. Thus, it may be anticipated that the core of the traditional concept of the unity between religion and government, symbolized by the imperial household, will not be destroyed as the Japanese turn away from these artificial stimulants and progress toward liberalism and internationalism.

Social Norms

While every society is subject to certain norms, there are four which are somewhat peculiar to the Japanese, and which are pertinent to the understanding of political behavior. These are the Oyabun-Kobun group relationships and certain formalized obligations known as on and ri.

1. The term oyabun is made up of two words, oya or parent and a meaning part; while kobun comes from ko or child plus bun. The oyabun-kobun system is a particularistic pattern of social relations based upon simulated patrimonial principles. In special groupings of this type, persons of authority assume obligations and manifest attitudes

⁵Quigley and Turner, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

ward their subordinates much as if they were foster parents; and, conversely, the subordinates behave dutifully and hold feelings of great personal responsibility toward their superiors.⁶

Groups of this kind have structural characteristics similar to those found in the family. The leader is called the oyabun, and his subordinates are kobun. There is also differentiation among the kobun. Those who join the organization earlier, or who are closer to the oyabun, outrank others, just as the older brother outranks the younger. Furthermore, a kobun might be in his own right an oyabun and have his own followers. The end result is a complex organization composed of linked groups of several hundred or even thousand members, the ties between and within the group being highly particularistic and personal rather than contractual and impersonal.⁷

The oyabun-kobun relationship is widespread in many sectors of society, and in particular in economic pursuits where individuals are subjected to serious insecurity of one kind or another and find that their security can be alleviated to a certain extent by attaching themselves to an oyabun-kobun organization. The workers thus become dependent upon the "benevolence" of the oyabun. By maintaining such dependence, the oyabun is able to demand greater personal loyalty from, and discipline among, his workers. The particularistic and personal ties are important, and reinforce the oyabun's symbolic role of the father.

The oyabun's authority and influence extend into what we would

⁶Nobutake Ike, Japanese Politics - An Introductory Survey (New York, 1957), pp. 26-28.

⁷Iwao Ishino and John Bennett, The Japanese Labor Boss System (Columbus, Ohio, 1952), p. 53.

ward as the private sectors of the kobun's life. The political implications of this are clear. They are that, essentially because of his control over his workers an oyabun may wield considerable influence with a political boss during an election.

2. On and Giri: Norms have to do with expectations; and these expectations may be either implicit or explicit. In Japan, certain norms are explicitly stated and more or less formalized in social codes. Two of these norms, on and giri are of special importance.

Ruth Benedict describes on as follows:

The Japanese have many words meaning 'obligations.' The words are not synonymous, and their specific meanings have no literal translation into English because the ideas they express are alien to us. The word for 'obligations' which covers a person's indebtedness from the greatest to the least is on. In Japanese usage it is translated into English by a whole series of words from 'obligations' and 'loyalty' to 'kindness' and 'love,' but these words distort its meaning.— On is in all its uses a load, an indebtedness, a burden, which one carries as best one may. A man receiving on from a superior and the act of accepting on from any man not definitely one's superior or at least one's equal gives one an uncomfortable sense of inferiority. When they say, 'I wear an on on him,' they are saying, 'I carry a load of obligations to him,'⁸ and they call this creditor, this benefactor, their on man.

This brings us to giri, which is related to on, and is, in effect, the other side of the coin.

To an Occidental, giri includes a heterogeneous list of obligations ranging from gratitude for an old kindness to the duty of revenge.—The rules of giri are strictly rules of required payment; they are not a set of moral codes like the Ten Commandments. When a man is faced with giri, it is assumed he may have to override his sense of justice and they often say, 'I could not do right because of giri.'⁹

⁸Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston, 1946), pp. 99-100.

⁹Ibid., pp. 133-134.

We refer to on and giri in terms of group norms - the ideas men re of what they are expected to do under given circumstances. On is rolved when an individual, as an act of generosity, does a major favor another individual, and this favor enables the recipient to meet a .sis situation or is vital to one's livelihood. In general, the two s associated with group situations in which the group is small in se and the personal element is dominant.

In the transition from the old feudalism in which person-to-person ralty was deeply ingrained, the on concept was used as an expedient transfer political allegiance to the nation-state, symbolized as a rge family with the emperor as the father. A son incurred on to his ents; by the same token a subject incurred on to his emperor, the tther of the nation.¹⁰

Since the on-giri concepts apply more specifically in personal ations, which are conspicuously missing at the national level, it is estionable where or not they have any influence in establishing ralty toward the government today. On a personal basis, however, ilar to the oyabun influence, they may be used to obtain politically nificant objectives.

Education

The educational processes provide one of the strongest means of luencing the thoughts, conclusions and attitudes of a people. Uncon- lled educational institutions lead to the development of a free- nking, critical-minded population that is able to influence the sion-making process of the elites; whereas a controlled educational

¹⁰Nobutake Ike, op. cit., p. 34.

stem tends to mold in the people a homogenous set of ethical values, which undermines or destroys consensual control over political decisions and enables political elites greater latitude in formulating the foreign policy of the State. Regimentation of the populace is a relatively simple task for those in control of the educational system and the mass media of communication.

Japan has one of the highest rates of literacy in the world. In the past, emphasis was placed on literacy as a means of indoctrination and regimentation rather than of attaining a well-rounded education.¹¹ From the time of the Meiji era to the beginning of the Occupation, textbooks were a predominant means of propagating national ideologies. Teachers were little more than national propagandists.

Today, under the Ministry of Education, the school system has been centralized. All militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideas have been eliminated from texts and a curriculum initiated that will assist in developing an appreciation and understanding of democratic principles.

The forty-four year old plan of issuing national textbooks has been abolished in favor of a new plan calling merely for national inspection. It is significant that new textbooks on social studies are being published. These are directed at the establishment of an "enlightened democratic society in which the dark age of the preceding years cannot recur." In addition, a new concept has developed - the idea that textbooks, while important, represent only one of a number of teaching tools. The organization of the school system has included an increased emphasis on those professional, semi-professional, technical and vocational skills necessary to the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy.¹²

¹¹Yanaga, op. cit., p. 13.

¹²Hiroshi Suekawa, "Educators Review of the Revision of the Education Law," Contemporary Japan, XXIII (January, 1954), p. 199.

As a political sidelight on the reorganization of education in an on a democratic foundation, when the constitution provided for edom of learning, it also took steps to provide for the freedom and ependence of education and its use in teaching civic responsibility.

Article 10 of the Fundamental Law of Education provides: "Education ll not be subject to improper controls, but it shall be directly possible to the whole people." It further states that "School adminis- tion shall--aim at the adjustment and establishment of the various ditions required for the pursuit of the aim of education." Apparently was felt, too, that one of the values of education was to provide a teria of civic values by which political trends could be measured and luated, for Article 8 provides that "The political knowledge necessary intelligent citizenship shall be valued in education." However, it ther states that "Schools prescribed by law shall refrain from itical education or other political activities for or against any cific party."

Nevertheless, the provisions of Article 8 have been strongly ticized as a means of encouraging the propagation of a particular itical outlook by the party in power. In May 1954, two education bills re passed with a view to further ensuring political neutrality in ool education and the prohibition of political activity among school achers, with provisions for the punishment of offenders.

Inasmuch as the pre-war educational system provided one of the ongest media in the hands of the government for disseminating national opaganda, and for molding the national attitudes of emperor worship, auvinism, fanatical nationalism, and support of national policies, are is precedent for abuse of the original provisions of Article 8.

the other hand, the "corrective" measures could equally well be used to limit or strangle academic freedom.

Although some definite progress has been made toward the improvement and democratization of educational theories and programs, these transitions have not been entirely smooth. Shortages of materials have retarded the production of democratic textbooks and the reconstruction of schools. A natural increase in school population has overcrowded available school units. Many teachers have left their profession to seek more lucrative employment in industry. In 1955, there were approximately 19,000,000 pupils attending 42,000 schools, and only about 65,000 teachers.

Since the reestablishment of Japanese sovereignty there has been a reactionary sentiment favoring the abolition of social studies, which are regarded as an occupation importation. Nevertheless, it can be expected that some of the American ideas introduced during the last few years will have a lasting effect upon the Japanese educational system, and, as a by-product, the national attitude itself. The democratization of education may go far to imbue the new generation with a keen awareness of its rights and interests in national affairs. The free discussion of political issues, domestic and international, by the press, radio, and television keep the people continuously aware of their individual and organizational stake in current issues. These factors help to maintain a balance in the establishment of policies that more accurately reflect the democratic interest of the masses in contrast to the almost complete control formerly exercised by a relatively small autocratic elite group.

Class Structure

Communities everywhere are generally stratified. Social distinctions be based on age or wealth, or on a variety of other factors depending on time and circumstances. Among the major divisions are class distinctions which divide society into a graduated order of social strata. Power and status combine in such a way that it is hardly possible for one to conceive of the social order organized other than by rank and position.¹³ Class divisions are usually accompanied by differences in income levels, occupations and the like, and by a sense of social status and social distance which prevails among the members of the society.¹⁴

Japanese society, like other societies, may be represented by a pyramid, but because it is a highly complex and changing society it cannot be described with precision.

Japanese society is highly stratified. Within the urban areas, those who hold important positions in government agencies, who own or control property, and who have specialized skills involving mental, rather than physical, effort are in general esteemed. In the rural areas traditionally, ownership of the land and long and continued residence have been the determinants of social prestige and power. In a study by Royama Masamichi, a tenant farmer is quoted as saying: "It is still commonplace that all official positions should be circulated among those who, having inherited wealth and social position from their ancestors are regarded as gentlemen even though they may be stupid."¹⁵

¹³Ike, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁴R. M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York, 1947), p. 98.

¹⁵Royama Masamichi, Changes in Local Government in Rural Areas (Tokyo, 1948), p. 16.

the evidence suggests that in rural areas at least power, property, status each so sustain and augment the other two that they create a single hierarchy.

Below the top rung of the local social pyramid are found the small landowning families. As a result of the land reform program sponsored by the government, this class has been expanded considerably in size and social influence. Local shopkeepers and professional people, notably school teachers and Buddhist priests, now belong generally in the same class as the small landowning families.

The lower levels of the pyramid are composed of craftsmen such as carpenters, stonemasons, blacksmiths and the like. Poor farmers, tenant farmers, and landless agricultural workers also belong to the lower classes.

In comparing the rural and urban social orders, two observations can be made. The top strata of the rural social order corresponds roughly to the center strata of the urban class. Similarly, the smaller landowners, the shopkeepers and the rural professional people correspond to the bottom of the middle third of the urban social structure. These latter two groups comprise the "middle strata" of Japanese society.¹⁶

The middle class may be roughly divided into two groups. The first group consists of such types of individuals as owners of small factories, clerks in urban factories, building contractors, owners of small retail establishments, carpenters and masons, small landlords and landowning farmers, school teachers, officials in the village government, lower officials in government agencies and priests. These individuals as a

¹⁶Ike, op. cit., p. 16.

ip have gained great political influence and provide a focal point of
 or in Japanese society.

In the second group are found such individuals as urban white collar
 ers, journalists, and free intellectuals, such as professors, lawyers
 students. These people have not been as successful economically as
 laboring and industrial classes with the result that they are being
 anted politically toward the left by privations and poverty.

The rapidly growing class of skilled industrial workers, although
 an enjoying higher wages than the white collar worker, is considered
 the lower levels of the pyramid, followed by craftsmen such as
 penters, stonemasons, blacksmiths and unskilled urban laborers. Poor
 ners, tenant farmers, and landless agricultural workers also belong
 the lower classes.

Power Structure

Social power is the capacity to control the behavior of others, either
 order or by manipulation of available means. Status and property are
 of the more conspicuous sources of power since they determine who
 ll hold the reins of political power. But there are other sources
 h as office or position (party leaders, union officials, bureaucrats,
 cutives, managers), knowledge (specialists, scientists, intellectuals),
 l personality.

In nearly all societies today there is a privileged class of elites
 ch, regardless of the form of state, exercises power out of proportion
 its numbers. The laws reveal where the government power resides,
 le the economic system shows the repository of political power. The
 mer is legalized government power and the latter is informal political

c. It is the informal power structure that provides the real key to understanding of politics in action. In Japan, groups having power others have been the landowners, financiers, industrialists, and businessmen. Except for a stringent modification in the overall power the landowners as a class, this continues to be the case. However, there is an increasing tendency among the workers to challenge the existing state of affairs, and it is evident that the managerial class and the technical experts have come to wield influence in recent years. With a higher state of technological development, a greater concentration of political power has developed in Japan.

Agriculture

The notion that agriculture is the basis of the state is a recurring theme in Japanese political writing. The policy of the state with respect to agriculture has been guided by certain principles, not all of which were mutually compatible. Among these have been the achievement of self-sufficiency in food for purposes of national power, to husband capital that would otherwise be required for the importation of foodstuffs, and the preservation of the peasant class as a kind of balance wheel to maintain national stability. Two other principles, somewhat at odds with those just mentioned, have been to charge against the agricultural population, through taxes, a disproportionate share of the cost of industrialization; and, since the wage level was tied to the price of rice, there was a consistent effort, particularly by business and industrial groups engaged in export trade, to keep prices at a low level. The latter aim was closely allied to the importation of rice grown in Burma and Formosa, where the cost of production was lower than in Japan.

ian groups tried to check this inflow, but industrial and commercial groups favored it as a means of maintaining low food prices.¹⁷

In these conflicts of interest, the agricultural population generally came out second best.

Commercialized agriculture, based on large-scale operations, with extensive use of labor-saving machinery and representing the investment of large amounts of capital, has not accompanied industrialization. At least 50 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, yet it is still a family enterprise much as it was a century ago.¹⁸

The land reform initiated by the Occupation was an epoch-making event. The change that came over the pattern of land-holding may be seen in the following figures: in 1941, 53 percent of the land was cultivated by tenant farmers, but in 1949 this figure had dropped to 14 percent. As a result of the land-reform measures, absentee landlords and absentee landholders disappeared, and Japan became a country in which about 80 percent of the land is cultivated by its owners.¹⁹ Land reform destroyed the institution of tenancy without fomenting class conflict between peasant and large landholders. The former large landholders retained a degree of respect and leadership in the farm community, but the peasant became free and more independent of these former patrons. Unfortunately, the farms are small and uneconomical, and the farmer remains poor; but he is better off than before, and he is politically conscious of his improved status. He owns the entire product of his land, free of the serf-like subservience to a dominant resident or nonresident

¹⁷Ibid., p. 116

¹⁸Yanaga, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁹Economic Counsel Board, op. cit., p. 10.

lord is no longer necessary. This is but one step toward agrarian independence, and further improvements are being sought in the areas of defense against urban and commercial exploitation by the development of farmer-owned cooperatives to insure bargaining equality. Likewise, efforts are being made to establish a means of meeting the farmer's need for a modern agricultural credit system, for technical guidance, and an enlightened and politically long-range program for the education of both adults and children in rural areas. It is only in this way that the present unorganized and somewhat frustrated rural mass can be turned into an enlightened and politically capable farm bloc. In the meantime, the ownership of the land is a dream come true to the mass of the peasantry, which will never willingly be reduced to tenantry again.

The most important consequence of the land reform was political rather than economic. Farm production might rise somewhat because owners are likely to take better care of their land, but improvements in this direction will be limited. In the final analysis, the old problem of too many people trying to make a living off a limited amount of land remains as acute as ever. Politically, however, the reform brought a measure of stability. The ownership of land made the farmer quite conservative. It resulted in the further drifting away of the farmer from the industrial worker and siphoned off discontent which might have been canalized into revolutionary action. In China and Russia the Communists came to power on the hunger of peasants for land; in Japan the Communists were denied this opportunity.

The land reform had another political effect, in that it altered the nature of local leadership. In those areas in which the landlord-tenant relationship was based on kinship, as it was in northern Japan, and where

e was accommodation between the two on a give-and-take basis, the r structure remained basically intact.²⁰ Elsewhere, the larger holders have been put on the defensive and their power challenged enant farmers. On the whole, however, the conservative forces, led he large landholders, are still in power, although this has sometimes achieved at the cost of putting non-farmers into office. It is ible that this trend will continue in the future and that more and local offices will be filled by professionals who seek careers in l government service. If this occurs, the way will be open for es other than those represented by landed families to make their uence felt in local affairs.

In an effort to redress economic disadvantages, farmers have mpted, mainly through their organizations, to achieve political tions to some of their problems. Partly due to cleavages within the cultural community itself, particularly between large-landholder and l-farmer interests, the results have not been substantial. However, e is reason to believe that farm organizations will not develop in the near future into powerful political representatives of the cultural population's interests.

Labor

The emergence of a capitalist economy and the growth of industry a substantial scale brought about changes in virtually every sector Japanese life. Of these changes, one of the most important was the tion of a working class, owning little or no property, and dependent

²⁰Furashima Toshio, "Japanese Agriculture in the Process of Reform," Temporary Japan, XXIV (January, 1956), p. 126.

wages for its livelihood. The creation of such a class can, at potentially, bring about far-reaching modifications in the political structure. Since the mode of life and economic interests of workers are different from those of other groups such as peasants and the business class, their political attitudes too might be different. If all workers could unite behind a single political program, they could indeed become a potent political force.²¹

The pre-war laborer fared only slightly better than the peasant. Organized labor remained small and ineffective; and although it began to grow after World War I, it never became a major force, either in economic or political affairs, and at its zenith represented only 6.9 percent of the total Japanese population, including agricultural workers. This lack of success of the labor unions can be attributed largely to a general hostile attitude toward unions, and the common view that labor activity was somewhat subversive; the fact that the great Zaibatsu organizations were too strong for labor organizations to challenge, and the majority of the others were too small to organize effectively;²² the existence of surplus labor in the countryside; the inability of urban industry to absorb the surplus population, creating a situation in which the supply of labor almost always exceeded demand; and the paternalism that has characterized labor relations. In regard to the latter item, the relationship between employer and employee has involved more than the payment of a wage for work done. The relationship has been a highly personal one in which the employee was expected to work faithfully and loyally, in return for which the employee

²¹Ike, op. cit., p. 100.

²²Hugh Borton (ed.), Labor Relations in Japan (Ithaca, New York, 1931), p. 95.

and the obligation of looking out for the welfare of the worker (Jiyabun-Kobun relationship).

These latter two situations continue to exist: there is a surplus labor; and employers, particularly in small plants, prefer to hire wives or persons who have been recommended to them by relatives or friends.

The intellectual and social ferment of the immediate postwar period led many people to question the validity and usefulness of old ideas and institutions and developed an atmosphere favorable to the growth of unions.

Encouraged by the Occupation, labor reform laws were passed and labor unions flourished.

On March 1, 1946, the Diet passed the Trade Union Law guaranteeing workers the right to organize, to conduct collective bargaining, and to act as a collective unit. In 1947, the Labor Standards Law came into effect and greatly widened the scope of legal protection to the workers. This law redefined the standards of working conditions in conformity with international commitments. This law provides that working conditions be such as to "enable the worker to live a life worthy of a human being"; further, that in order to determine the level of these working conditions, they should be decided by the worker and the employer on an individual basis. In addition, no worker must be discriminated against, or favored of, in wages, working hours or working conditions, by reason of nationality, creed, or social status. All workers must be treated equally, which includes equal pay for equal work by male and female workers.

With respect to wages, working hours, safety, sanitation, and

nitary facilities, conditions in Japan have not only improved greatly have reached a high level in comparison with those of other countries.

On the basis of an index of 100 for the 1934-1936 period, the average earnings of a production worker in the manufacturing industry in 1953 were 307, while the prices of producer wholesale commodities stood at 300, and the consumer wholesale commodity price index was 340. This rise in prices of production, raw materials and manufactured goods has exceeded the rise in overall earnings of labor. However, it should be borne in mind that, concurrently, working hours have been reduced and living conditions, welfare facilities, social insurance benefits and other security measures provided by employers have greatly improved the lives of the working man; and, despite the rise in consumer prices, real wages of workers exceed the pre-war level.²³

The labor movement got off to a bad start. It mushroomed overnight, freed from militaristic control and led by emancipated or repatriated intellectuals, labor rapidly became politically and power conscious. Intellectuals and white-collar workers joined wholeheartedly and in force to provide, during this confused period, a knowledge and leadership which they did not possess. Actually, the inflation had lowered the income of these classes to the level of the workers with whom they united. The government and public officials too organized themselves to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the government. The labor policy of SCAP subsequently went to extremes to protect labor unions; it coddled the Japanese Communist Party and enforced measures which were incompatible with actual conditions. Without experienced leadership and guidance in

²³ Wages in Japan, Daily Labour Press (Tokyo, 1954), p. 15.

er labor-management relations, the union movement frequently became political tools of radical interest groups.

In 1946, two major unions were formed: The General Federation of Japanese Trade Unions - 1,000,000 strong and influenced by the Social Democratic Party; and the National Congress of Industrial Unions (NCIU) - 1,000,000 strong under communist domination. Under lenient U. S. labor policies, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was able to gain control of a large segment of labor through the NCIU. By the middle of 1949, 3600 large unions, with 6,700,000 members representing 38% of non-agricultural labor and covering all basic industries, had been organized.

It was estimated that in 1950 the JCP exerted ideological and political influence over two-thirds of the Government Worker's Union and one-fifth of the industrial unions, and was in a position to cripple telegraphic, radio and postal communications, electric power and production.²⁴

The general strikes and street disturbances of May 1, 1950 came as a shock to the Japanese people and to the Occupational authorities. They used the labor unions to bitter public censure and caused the Diet to approve the Subversive Activities Prevention Bill which was being strenuously opposed by the labor unions. Due to adverse public reactions to the violence of communist-inspired strikes, to suspicions that the government was taking orders from Moscow and that the slowness of repatriations was based on advice to Moscow by the JCP, many of the Communists' efforts were frustrated. To combat communist activity in labor unions, democratization

²⁴ Labor Movement in Japan, Labor Division, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, 1949, 27-36.

gues were organized. Membership in communist-controlled unions increased by 50 percent within a short time.²⁵ Freed from the control of the more radical elements, unions continued to function on a more stable basis.

Decline in the labor movement set in visibly in 1949 with the shift to the Occupation policy which began to emphasize the building up of the national economy and national strength. This resulted inevitably and naturally in de-emphasizing democratization and instead emphasized every reasonable means of increasing industry. Thus, labor was forced into assuming a defensive position as government pressure was increased.²⁶

If the decline in the labor movement was inevitable, it was because of the conditions under which it began and developed. The initiative, inspiration, and energy for democratization of which it was an integral part had all come from outside. Since the movement was launched from above, with the necessary force and support all coming from above, there was little opportunity to develop within the unions themselves the kind of leadership necessary for carrying on under their own power. Furthermore, since the movement flourished because of the weakness of capitalist and management groups, it was destined to recede in the face of the revival and increasing strength of capital and management and the normalization of capital-labor relations. Another weakness in the development of union strength has been the inability of large unions to remain intact. There has been a tendency for "splinter" groups to secede and join with other groups to form new unions. Often this has been

²⁵Labor Union Movement in Postwar Japan, op. cit., pp. 31-36.

²⁶Yanaga, op. cit., p. 102.

cause of ideological differences. In addition, an unusual feature of organized labor in Japan is the preponderant position occupied by all "enterprise" unions. Almost 80 percent of all unions and about 70 percent of all unionized workers are organized on this basis. This trend is toward many small unions rather than large ones. This tends toward a lack of unity among units and a diffusion of their strength in political matters.²⁷

Nevertheless, like unions everywhere, the Japanese unions have as their goal the betterment of the social and economic positions and conditions of the working class which constitutes their membership. Their political activities have been directed at the capitalist groups whose control over politics has been direct and powerful. It is quite natural, therefore, that they should affiliate themselves with those parties drawn largely from the working class; namely, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party.²⁸

Although the unions vigorously carry on their political activities, it is chiefly the leaders who are directly participating in political action. In other words, the close relation between labor unions and political parties is largely, if not exclusively, a tie-up between the union leadership and the party leadership. There is a large chasm between the masses or rank-and-file membership and the political parties. This condition is responsible for the fact that, while unions proclaim the overthrow of the reactionary conservative regime in power, the members continue to vote for conservative parties because of existing geographic or personal bonds which are stronger than the party or union ties.

²⁷Ike, op. cit., p. 106.

²⁸Yanaga, op. cit., p. 103.

Capitalist Groups

Since the advent of the industrial revolution, economics has dominated the general environment and overshadowed other aspects of life in Japan. A new elite of mercantile and industrial magnates, known as the Zaibatsu, emerged. Ever since, this business group has been intimately associated with the political management groups, resulting in a periodic interchange of personnel. Their concentrated economic power, especially with the growth of monopolistic capitalism, made them influential in the newer methods of effective political campaigning, in the control of the press, and even in the cruder and more direct forms of outright corruption of lawmakers and officials. The Japanese political scene is largely dominated by the financiers who wield the greatest power in determining policy.²⁹

Among these great Zaibatsu industrial concerns, there was keen rivalry and competition. There was also a good deal of cooperation effected through interlocking directorships, joint investments in enterprises, and investments in each other's companies. For these reasons, the word "Zaibatsu" came to symbolize monopoly, especially from the viewpoint of small business.³⁰

While these great companies were particularly active in those sectors of the economy which required the investment of large amounts of capital and the use of a high order of technical skill, they also competed with small firms. Against Zaibatsu competition, the latter are practically helpless, for the Zaibatsu firms controlled, through

²⁹Ibid., p. 99.

³⁰Ibid., p. 100.

air banks, the system of credit; they controlled the sources of raw materials and markets; and, lastly, through their prestige and wealth, they were able to "pirate" key personnel and employees from smaller business enterprises. Thus, many independent businessmen were absorbed into the Zaibatsu, or placed under their domination through sub-contracts.

Consequently, in order to create a more competitive economy, the government ordered the dissolution of the Zaibatsu. The great holding companies were ordered broken up, and a Fair Trades Commission was established to prevent the revival of monopoly. As a result, the Zaibatsu were to some extent dissolved in theory and practice.

The dissolution was probably one of the least successful of the government measures, for with the independence of Japan the trend has gone unmistakably in the direction of their revival; and today, the Zaibatsu has, to all intents and purposes, been reestablished.

Despite the preponderant power of the great business houses and industrializations, small plants and businesses still predominate insofar as numbers of workers are concerned. In 1951, three-fifths of the total number of plants employed less than 100 workers. However, on the whole, all businesses occupy an unhappy position in the general economic structure. Geographically, they are widely scattered. Chronic overpopulation in the rural areas provide the cheap labor without which they could not operate. Many of them operate on such a narrow margin of capital that they must concentrate their efforts on day-to-day existence, with little opportunity for larger, long-term development. Competition is intense among themselves as well as with big business. Politically, they are unable to exert either economic or political influence commensurate with their numerical strength.³¹

³¹Ike, op. cit., pp. 90-92.

Today, business in Japan, like other groups, has its organizations which seek, among other things, to defend its interests. However, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japan Federation of Employers Associations, and the Japanese Management Association are four of the principal organizations representing business interests. These are the "Big Four" of Japanese economic associations which by combining their resources can translate economic power into political power more effectively than all other organizations put together.³² It is through these economic organizations that business and financial interests apply pressure on the government and political parties. They are in a position to make the government listen to their views. This they do periodically by reacting to political changes and government policies and actions, or by transmitting their views directly and formally to the government or in informal discussion with the prime minister and the key cabinet ministers. Their policy proposals receive prompt attention and, more often than not, are adopted by the government. Heads of these organizations confer with government and party leaders, apply pressures, mediate, intercede, and perform a variety of functions of a political nature. They intercede even in the internal disputes of a political party.³³

Business and trade associations exist in every conceivable type of economic activity, organized on the basis of type as well as geography; but ordinarily they do not play such an important role, inasmuch as they do not enter the picture in the relationship of business and government. From time to time, ad hoc organizations are set up to promote trade, such as the Association to Promote Trade with Red China.³⁴

³²Yanaga, op. cit., p. 100.

³³Ibid., p. 101.

³⁴Ibid. p. 101

In spite of the power of business, financial, and industrial interests, economic interests are quite dependent on politics. In the process of translating economic power into political power, a struggle of varying intensity is taking place continuously and incessantly on ever-shifting grounds, though most of the actions are not visible to the public. However, there is a high degree of understanding and cooperation between the government and business, since a preponderant percentage of the business leaders, especially in managerial positions, come from the same social and educational backgrounds as the civil service, and thus share a very similar outlook and viewpoint.

The Bureaucracy

In the socio-cultural value system of Japan, government officials have always enjoyed far greater prestige than in most Western countries. The idea that government officials were leaders of superior ability and virtue has continued down to the present time; and, in the course of its development, has given rise to the general public attitude which stresses the superiority of the officials and the inferiority of the people. Such an attitude, which is a legacy of feudalism, has had the effect of boosting the prestige value of government positions to such a point that the achievement of a position in the government is a measure of one's success, particularly for people in the rural areas. As a matter of fact, becoming a government official is the only way open to great many persons for the achievement of social recognition in the form of honor and material advantages as well as special privileges. This accounts for the fact that, ever since 1886, the greater portion

the aspirants to government positions have come from rural communities, for a time sons of rural landlords comprised a very high percentage of these recruits.³⁵

Trained as legal technicians and armed with the proper ideology of officials, they go into government service to form the bulwark of the bureaucracy. Since most of them go through practically identical courses of study in imperial universities, it is natural for the officials to be cast in the same mold. Since it is the bureaucratic apparatus that gives the government a monopoly of power, it is quite natural that the administrative officials become highly conscious of the power they exercise; and self-perpetuating and expansive tendencies are practically inherent characteristics of the bureaucratic machinery.

In the past, the growth of Japanese capitalism was achieved through the guidance and direction of the bureaucrats and with the funds made available by the state. Business enterprises prospered through close ties with political power. The financial interests owed their prosperity and expansion to the bureaucracy and the military.

Since business and industry must depend heavily on the government and the bureaucracy for their success, the best possible relationship is maintained at all times. The interchange of personnel between the government and business is taking place continuously. Government officials leave their posts to accept attractive positions in industry, while leaders of finance and business join the government to assist in policy making.³⁶ Favors received by business from the government are frequently paid through parties, and other emoluments with ex-officials as beneficiaries.

³⁵Yanaga, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 317.

Government officials in most of the departments who have reached certain level and become well known to business and industry have no difficulty in finding attractive jobs upon leaving government service. This is particularly true in the fields of finance, trade and industry, transportation, and construction. The effective vertical and horizontal organization that exists within the bureaucracy, together with the bureaucratic esprit de corps, enables the transfer from government to business with the greatest of ease.

Defeat in 1945 brought in its wake the military occupation of the Allied powers, resulting in the heavy reliance by the Occupation on the bureaucracy for administration of the country, thus actually enhancing its position and prestige. Although the civil service system was revamped along American lines, in spirit and substance it remained altered. Nor did the change in the Constitution materially diminish its prestige or power.

The government's administrative machinery is enormous and complex. In 1954, a force of 2,910,000 government workers was required for its operations. Of these, 1,543,000 were in the national administration; while 1,370,000 were in prefectural, town, and village administration.³⁷

In the period since the end of World War II, several attempts have been made to carry out reduction-in-force and the simplification of administration through reorganization. However, every attempt has failed. Even a government commanding an absolute majority in the Diet was forced to back down by the united front of the bureaucracy, and the highly publicized program of administrative reform was completely

³⁷Ibid., p. 302.

sculated. In effect, the politicians and Diet are completely at the mercy of the bureaucracy, since without the help and support of the senior officials and ex-bureaucrats they are unable to operate effectively.

Politically, the position of the bureaucracy is strong because the Diet members in general are inexperienced in legislation as well as in negotiations. Experienced members are generally those with bureaucratic backgrounds, and they quite naturally are prejudiced in favor of the bureaucracy.

Party politics today are essentially bureaucratic-dominated politics. Since the end of World War II, there has literally been a steady procession of bureaucrats and ex-bureaucrats coming into the arena of politics. Under the new Constitution, it has become necessary for most of the cabinet ministers to be members of the Diet. This forces those bureaucrats who aspire to membership in the cabinet to go into politics. The presence of bureaucrats in the Diet became conspicuous following the general election of April, 1953, when more than one hundred were elected. These M.P.'s were mostly from departments handling money and materials and from offices in charge of various enterprises. Most of them were elected on the strength of the support obtained from bureaucrats whom they once supervised and now represent.

The professionalization of the bureaucracy makes the civil service subservient to political authority and subject to the official will. In theory, it is placed in the position of having to faithfully execute the duties of office, regardless of personal sentiments and disagreements with the parties involved. It must be prepared to serve with the same competence whatever party is in power and observe strict neutrality and impartiality. Actually, however, any absolute dissociation of the

bureaucrats from the realm of policy decisions is unrealistic and practically impossible. As the administrative instrument for the executive branch of the government, the bureaucracy occupies a strategic position. Though much of the work it performs is routine and can be performed in accordance with existing rules and regulations, it frequently formulates policy or at least plays a part in the final crystallization on the departmental and cabinet level as well as in the Diet. But more important, perhaps, is that the bureaucracy frequently carries out the policy without real control by either the Diet or the executive department. Thus, it becomes obvious that the bureaucracy constitutes a powerful elite class, which unlike most of the others not only maintained its strength but enhanced it during the occupation period, and today is in a powerful position to guide and influence policy.

Political Factors

A nation pursues its foreign policy as a legal entity called the state, whose agents act as representatives of the nation in international affairs. They speak for it, negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the means for achieving them, and try to maintain, increase, and demonstrate its power.

The best conceived and most expertly executed foreign policy, relying upon an abundance of material and human resource, will be frustrated if it cannot draw upon good government. Good government, viewed as an independent factor of national power means three things: a balance among the material and human resources that comprise the national power; a balance between these resources and the policy to be pursued; and popular support for those policies. It must choose the

ectives and method of pursuing its foreign policy in consonance with
 power available to implement them with the optimum chance of success.
 must then develop the right combinations of those resources of power
 pursue a given foreign policy with a maximum chance of success, and
 must secure the approval of the people for its foreign policies and
 the domestic policies which are designated to mobilize the elements
 national defense in support of them.³⁸

Political Effects of Democratization Reforms: Occupation Reforms.

The surrender in August 1945 came as a shock to the Japanese people.
 effect was like that of a spiritual atomic blast, for they had been
 led by their leaders to believe that Japan was invincible, superior and
 destined to dominate the world. They had made tremendous sacrifices.
 At families had lost one or more members, many had lost their homes,
 and suddenly many felt that they had been deluded.³⁹

This was the mood in which the occupation forces found the Japanese
 their arrival in September 1945. It contributed to the success of
 the occupation in several ways. A spirit of docile resignation had
 always marked the Japanese masses; now it prepared them to submit to
 the will of their conquerors. However, when they found that their
 former enemies were not cruel and vindictive, surprise and relief led
 them to willing cooperation with the occupying powers. The collapse of
 traditional ideals created a sense of spiritual desolation which the
 Japanese sought to fill with the new ideals offered them by the democratic
 institutions.

³⁸Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 132.

³⁹Arthur H. Dean, "Japan at the Crossroads," The Atlantic Monthly,
 November, 1950, p. 30.

Politically the occupation's first task was the demobilization of armed forces and the extirpation of militarism. Ultra-nationalistic militarist organizations, including the secret police, were barred from public office and other positions of high trust. These measures wiped away the remnants of the old order. The Occupation then directed the establishment of a government that would conform "as closely as may be to the principles of democratic self-government."⁴⁰

The New Constitution

The Occupation's major task was the drafting of a democratic constitution. Early in September of 1945, SCAP informed the Japanese government that a revision of the Meiji Constitution would be required. Two committees were appointed. The first, the Konoye committee, operating as an adjunct of the Imperial Household, produced no tangible results and was replaced by a committee under the chairmanship of State Minister Joji. After several months, this latter committee recommended changes which largely ignored the type of reform that the Occupation authorities considered necessary, and seemed to be based on the premise that the Meiji Constitution, with minor adjustments, was adequate. SCAP informed the Japanese Cabinet that its proposals were "totally unacceptable" and took the initiative of providing the Japanese Government a draft constitution which was hastily prepared by the Government Section of SCAP. The Japanese Government was advised to use this draft as a guide in its continued efforts to revise the Meiji constitution. With some reluctance

⁴⁰The New Political Life in Japan, Sect. IV, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, June, 1950.

with few exceptions the new constitution followed faithfully the draft prepared by SCAP.⁴¹

The new constitution proclaimed that sovereignty resides in the people and is exercised through the Diet, consisting of two houses, the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, with ultimate power residing in the House of Representatives. Executive power is vested in a cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and collectively responsible to the Diet. The Prime Minister and a majority of the cabinet are chosen from members of the Diet. All cabinet members must be civilians and serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. On a refusal by the Diet to vote its confidence the cabinet must resign or dissolve the lower house. Judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, and in inferior courts established by additional legislation. Local self-government is guaranteed. A Bill of Rights contains such basic guarantees as universal suffrage, secret ballot, freedom of thought, religion and assembly, right of peaceful petition, impartial public trials, and a process of law. It also provides for compulsory education, the right to minimum standards of living, and nondiscrimination on the basis of social status, sex, race, or religion. It renounces war forever.

Under the new constitution with its bill of rights and built-in system of checks and balances, the parliament controls the government and cannot be frustrated in its control by any small elite group, bureaucracy or appointive officials. Perpetuation of governmental control by a small clique as was formerly possible is precluded.⁴²

⁴¹Robert Ward, "The Constitution and Current Japanese Politics," Far Eastern Survey, American Institute of Pacific Relations, XXV (April, 1956), p. 56.

⁴²Quigley and Turner, op. cit., pp. 75-78.

Political Parties

The constitutional changes in the organization and operation of government provide the bases for effective democratic government. United States gradually restored full political freedom to the Japanese under the supervision of SCAP. One of the results was the emergence in 1945 of political parties.

Multiplicity of parties has characterized the Japanese political scene since they first appeared. In the general election of April, 1946, there were more than 260 parties not counting scores of organizations which could not be legally recognized as parties.⁴³ Most of these were all independent local organizations not affiliated with any of the large parties of nation-wide scope. Most of them were based on geographical and personal affiliations, and had little connection with principles, policies, or ideas of interest to the nation as a whole. Most of them had any political significance. However, among these were a few which had their origins in the old prewar parties of national importance. First to reappear was the Social Democratic Party organized on November 2. Immediately following, came the Japan Communist Party which was legitimately and openly organized on November 8, 1945. Then the following day came the launching of the Liberal Party and on the 10th came the Progressive Party. The labels of these new postwar parties give little indication of their nature, policies, or principles. They were in reality a revival of the old political forces and personalities, and were the direct descendants of the pre-war parties. The Liberal Party comprised a number of the old familiar figures of the Seiyukai

⁴³Yanaga, op. cit., p. 238.

le the Progressive Party drew its membership from the prewar
 seito. They were both conservative in spite of their deceptive
 les. The ranks of the Social Democratic Party were filled by many
 ninent socialists of the past years, drawn from the various
 tions representing ideas ranging from the extreme right to extreme
 t.⁴⁴

Government under the Conservative Party

The first post-occupation government of Japan was conservative and
 strongly pro-American. Prime Minister Yoshida, who also headed the
 government under the Occupation was an autocratic bureaucrat closely
 connected with Japan's former ruling classes - particularly the
 aristocracy and Zaibatsu.

Although he was personally disliked, fear of communism engendered
 the Korean war gave Yoshida a strong hold on the people. His internal
 policies were conservative and his foreign policy was pro-American. He
 favored close ties with the United States through the Mutual Security
 Agreement; the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Taiwan
 Nationalist Government; the reorganization of the National Police Force
 into the National Defense Force into a Regular Army; and the centraliza-
 tion of police forces under the national government.⁴⁵

Yoshida's policies met with growing opposition despite the uneasiness
 concerning communism, for there was widespread feeling among a large
 portion of the population that the Mutual Security Agreement was a

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 234.

⁴⁵Fumio Ikematsu, "The Yoshida Cabinet and Political Parties,"
Contemporary Japan, XXIII (January, 1954), p. 55.

ism to perpetuate the occupation and force Japan to serve as an advanced base for the U. S. in the Far East. Fear of involvement in East-West war was increased by the 1950 Friendship Treaty between U.S.S.R. and Red China which many Japanese interpreted as a counter move aimed at Japan. However, the North Korean aggression of South Korea in June of that year made the Japanese realize their dependence on American military forces in Japan.

In view of the constitutional renunciation of war and the prohibition of armed forces, the public and the political opposition questioned the legitimacy of Yoshida's remilitarization program. The pacifists feared that restoration of standing armed forces would undermine democracy and constitutional government and restore the pre-war monarchy. Yoshida's penchant for centralizing power and administration increased these fears. The youth feared a recrudescence of militarism and women feared the loss of their newly gained independence and franchise. Vigorous anti-Americanism followed in the wake of the Korean armistice, and demands for a foreign policy of greater independence from the U. S.⁴⁶ and the development of closer ties with Red China and the U.S.S.R. were evident. These trends together with the uncovering of a large scale political scandal involving large business, shipping, and shipping and shipbuilding interests, resulted in a merging of and realignment of political parties to bring about the defeat of the Yoshida Government in December 1954, and its replacement by another conservative government under Ichiro Hatoyama.

⁴⁶ Keyes Beech, "Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese Strongman," Daily Oklahoman, December 6, 1954, p. 22.

The platform of the Yoshida government and the succeeding conservative governments differed principally in that the latter pledged to establish diplomatic relations with Russia and with Red China within the framework of friendship with the West.

Emergence of a Two-Party System

In October 1955, after four stormy years of conflict and separate existence, the Japanese Socialist Parties merged into a single organization in order to increase their vote-getting ability and to combat the restoration policies of the Conservatives.⁴⁷ Soon after on November the 15th, the Liberal and Democratic Parties merged into a single Conservative Party in order to cope with the growing strength of the Socialists. Thus a two-party system emerged, at least in form if not in substance, with the conservatives and radicals in opposition for the first time in Japan's constitutional history. However, the structure and inner workings of these parties showed few, if any significant changes. In this case, it was a merger effected not primarily on the basis of a political issue or goals but rather on the personal ambitions and desires of individual leaders whose real concern was to either capture or retain political power.⁴⁸

Since the merger of the parties, leadership in the government has remained in the hands of the conservatives, and the premiership has passed from Hatoyama to Tanzan Ishibashi to Nobusuke Kishi. Although these changes have made no substantial changes in government policies,

⁴⁷Robert Trumbull, "Japan's Left and Right Gear for a Showdown," New York Times, November 20, 1955, p. 6-E.

⁴⁸Yanaga, op. cit., p. 242.

It is interesting to note that each of the individuals succeeding to the office of the premier has been a little more to the "right," more nationalistic, and less friendly toward the U. S. than his predecessor. At the same time the Socialists have steadily gained in parliamentary strength and have halted efforts to amend the constitution.

Trends Toward Constitutional Revision

The New Constitution was drafted by the Legal Section of the Headquarters, Supreme Command Allied Headquarters. Although it met with overt opposition from the Japanese Government, it was, in effect, imposed upon it, and was accepted with misgivings and reluctance. This constitution contained many innovations and advanced democratic concepts. However, such a document is effective only to the degree that its terms and spirit are carried out at the statutory level and by administrative, legislative and judicial practices. Since its promulgation in November 1946, powerful figures and groups have been pointing out that while its content was undoubtedly praiseworthy, some of its key provisions were not in accord with Japanese political traditions,⁴⁹ ideals and practices, and that a certain amount of revision would be necessary at some future date. In actuality, the government by definition and interpretation, through a variety of administrative practices, or by simply ignoring the constitution has acted in ways manifestly contrary to the letter or spirit of the constitution. There have been significant incursions upon many of the occupation "reforms" which were established as fundamental law in the constitution. Some of the most conspicuous examples of these

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 348.

the central government has consistently so defined its own actions and powers as to leave few matters of importance to the control of local governments, thus obviating the decentralization and establishment of local self-government which was one of the Occupations aims;⁵⁰ in 1954, the decentralized police force established in 1947 under the control of local government was abolished, and a centralized police force as well as the nucleus of an army, navy, and air force have been established; the Ministry of Education has been gradually reasserting some claim of control over the local Boards of Education; and the Local Autonomy Agency, under the Prime Minister's Office has been subtly taking over many of the powers by which the Old Home Ministry, abolished in 1947, maintained centralized control over the prefectures and municipalities of Japan.

Since the termination of the Occupation in April 1952, revision of the Constitution has been a conspicuous issue in all political campaigns. Initially the revision centered principally on the question of rearmament. Conservative parties in general favored it, while the left-wing parties opposed it on grounds that it would endanger international peace as well as the civil liberties and democratic rights of the Japanese people.

Subsequently more sweeping proposals for revision were made by the conservative parties. After the victory of the Democratic party in February 1955, Hatoyama allegedly stated: "Our Constitution was drawn by the Occupation. Since there are countries which consider a constitution drawn up by an Occupation as invalid, I believe that Japan's

⁵⁰Robert Ward, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

stitution is essentially invalid."⁵¹ In June 1955, a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives providing for the creation of a Constitutional Inquiry Committee to be made up of Diet members, scholars, and constitutional experts selected by the Prime Minister.

The introduction of this bill created a political furor. Shortly thereafter Mr. Hatoyama announced to the Democratic members of the Diet his primary tasks for the party; (1) negotiations with the USSR and (2) revision of the constitution.⁵² The conservative parties established a common front on these issues. The left-wing parties already united their opposition had formed a National League for the Defense of the Constitution to popularize their views. They now rallied to oppose the establishment of the Inquiry Committee and succeeded in stalling it at least temporarily.

The October 1955 merger of Socialist parties formed a bloc controlling 154 seats in the Lower and 68 seats in the Upper House of the Diet. This bloc, together with the support of the small communist and Labor-Farmer parties, gives the Socialist slightly more than the necessary two-thirds of the votes necessary to forestall an amendment of the constitution. To meet this coalition, the two conservative parties merged on November 15, 1955 to form the Liberal-Democratic party. This new and stable grouping controls 300 of the 467 seats in the House of Representatives. Thus, for the first time, unstable though it is, Japan has a clearly aligned two party system, engendered principally on the issue of constitutional revision.⁵³

⁵¹Fumio Ikematsu, "General Elections and the Hatoyama Cabinet," Contemporary Japan, XXIII (September, 1955), pp. 456-463.

⁵²Ward, op. cit., p. 56.

⁵³Yanaga, op. cit., p. 243.

Currently the conservatives are giving main emphasis to four major reasons for revision; (1) the fact that the constitution was written by Americans and imposed on the Japanese Government by SCAP; (2) the untraditional and unsatisfactory legal and theoretical position of the Emperor under the new constitution; (3) the need for more extensive, but still limited, rearmament to ensure Japan's security and fulfill its obligations under the United Nations system; (4) the need for overall revision of the administrative structure "so as to make it congruous with the state of international affairs."⁵⁴

For the Japanese, these are complex and emotion-laden issues. The circumstances under which the constitution was drafted and accepted lend themselves easily to emotional exploitation by those elements favoring revision.

Despite the Imperial rescript of 1945 disclaiming divine origin of the Imperial family the Emperor continues to enjoy symbolic and emotional significance in the Japanese mind. This attitude was systematically developed and exploited after the Restoration of 1868 to create attitudes of awe, reverence and selfless devotion toward the Imperial House and the system of theocratic-patriarchal government which it symbolized. The Meiji Constitution described the Emperor as "the God of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty - - - sacred and inviolable." While these beliefs seem undemocratic and irrational to the Western mind, and while the Emperor has not exercised any real political authority in Japan, for an overwhelming majority of the Japanese people he has been and is a symbol of the unity of the

⁵⁴"Address by Prime Minister Hatoyama to New Cabinet," Japan Report, Japanese Embassy (Washington, December, 1955), p. 4.

anese people, of the continuity of their national history, and of the
 their and accomplishments of the state. According to the conservatives,
 his background makes the present constitutional provisions concerning
 the Imperial position untenable in terms of popular reaction.⁵⁵ This
 view together with that of the alien authorship of the constitution
 provide a potent means of convincing broad sections of the population of
 the need for constitutional revision.

Despite the constitutional prohibition against armed forces, Japan
 has a National Self-Defense Force. The question which has arisen is,
 should rearmament be continued under the present evasive "defense force"
 clause, or should the constitution be revised to permit a more open and
 constitutionally legitimate rearmament. Should the revision eliminate
 Article 9,⁵⁶ or merely modify it to permit armaments restricted to
 defensive uses and prohibit and dispatch of forces overseas.

What was implied by the Hatoyama government concerning "overall
 revision of the administrative structure so as to make it more congruous
 with the state of national affairs" is at best vague. Other suggested
 changes propose the abolition of the national component of the seats in
 the House of Councillors or its reapportionment on a functional or
 representative (rather than the present geographic) basis; changes in the
 amendment process to allow amendments to be effected with the Diet alone,
 eliminating the need for a national plebiscite; the restoration of a
 greater degree of centralization in government by such means as the
 substituting of appointive for elective prefectural governors and the

⁵⁵Ward, op. cit., p. 55.

⁵⁶The renunciation of war and all armed forces clause.

abolishment of local governments to replace or coordinate several prefectural governments, or general increases in national political and local authority at the expense of local autonomy at all levels.⁵⁷ The provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution affecting traditional customs such as the abolition of arranged marriages, the patriarchal family system, etc., also have come in for consideration for possible reversion to the old traditional system.

Thus it becomes obvious that while Japan has made many great strides toward democratic forms in her constitution and in many of her cultural, economic, and political developments, there are nevertheless powerful regressive forces being exerted to restore many of the old cultural and political forms. The proposals for constitutional changes follow a general trend of a return to the old order, a return to traditional political forms and practices; to restore to some extent the pre-war political structures and relationships, discretionary powers of the emperor, the enhancement of cabinet and administrative powers at the expense of the Diet and the people, and the strengthening of central government controls at the expense of local autonomy.

It is ironic that the proposed changes in the constitution, affecting principally reform measures insisted on by the Occupation are being proposed and supported by the ordinarily pro-American conservative elements, while the Socialist party which has normally been strongly critical of U. S. policies and actions is solidly supporting the maintenance of the constitution as it is.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 56.

So far the Socialists in their united opposition have successfully frustrated all efforts toward constitutional change. In view of the unanimity of their alignment on this issue and their increasing strength in recent elections the possibility of change seems slight. However, in January 1956, Premier Hatoyama announced that

the government contemplates making a basic revision in the electoral system with a view to stabilizing the political situation and renovating the political world in line with the new situation arising from the inauguration of a two party system.⁵⁹

The plan contemplated would involve a revision from the present cumbersome election law which combines medium-sized and multi-member districts to a single non-transferable vote to a system of single member or dual member districts. Such a change might reduce Socialist representation in the Diet from one-third to two-thirds of their present strength and provide the conservatives with the majority they need for a major constitutional revision. However, such juggling with the electoral system would set a dangerous precedent, so that despite the obvious defects of the present law, many conservatives are reluctant to resort to so risky a device.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, while public opinion on these various issues is vague, polls and other surveys indicate a gradual, although reluctant acceptance by the people of the need for some sort of national defense force. Beyond this, no consensus is discernible, and the public will make up its mind on each issue in the light in which it is presented.

⁵⁹ "Address by Prime Minister Hatoyama," Japan Report, Japanese Embassy (Washington, February 17, 1956), p. 3.

⁶⁰ Ward, op. cit., p. 58.

Elite Objectives

Despite the variety of elites, there is no cleavage within the nation on the urgent need to achieve a sound and viable economy. On the issue of national prosperity, the nation is united. It is with regard to the question of how this prosperity is to be achieved and what methods should be used in its distribution that conflicts arise.

The conflict among the elites is an unceasing and continual process through which the social needs of both individuals and groups are translated into public policy. As such, it is a substitute for force and a method of living together and working together in peace in the face of diversities and conflicts which are ever present in the community.

The political situation is vastly complicated by rivalries and conflicts arising from the clash of interests. Cleavages among industrialists arise from the difference in their specialization. Competition creates tension among corporations engaged in similar enterprises. Political parties find themselves at odds in their contest to capture the government. Struggle for power is manifested in a variety of ways: government versus business, government versus labor, business versus labor, etc. At the same time, a vertical struggle for power is going on within each of these groups. It is out of these complex power relationships and struggles that compromises and policies emerge.

SCAP's initial eagerness to root out every vestige of the old autocratic regime laid the groundwork for the development of a democratic government. Free reign was given to the development of mass movements. Labor unions were organized in the principal industries; and strong, well-organized, middle-class interest groups were developed.

During this same period, however, communists established their control over most of China and North Korean communist forces attacked

h Korea. By 1950, it became apparent to the Occupation that firmer measures must be initiated to limit and control Japan's communists. It conveniently ignored some of the liberal principles it had finally professed, and encouraged greater regimentation and the development of armed forces to suppress internal rebellion and repel aggression. An all-out effort was made to expedite Japan's economic recovery, with particular emphasis on the restoration of her heavy industries. In 1951, Japan was restored to the status of an independent sovereign nation.

By this time, pre-war elite groups such as capitalists, bureaucrats, aristocracy, and large landholders had regained much of their former influence under the aegis of the conservative parties. Opposed to them, elites evolved with the growth of the organized labor movement and within the Socialist Party.

The Conservative Party draws support from various occupational groups, with somewhat stronger support coming from businessmen and farmers. Yet the interests of its component groups are multifarious. Farmers and landholders are generally conservatives, as are industrialists. Traditionally the industrialist has favored the importation of food from areas of cheap production in order to keep food prices down; the farmers want high food prices. But even among the farmers there is a diversity of interest. The large landholder with great surpluses is usually interested in high prices, whereas the small landholder who has little surplus to sell is more interested in other things - such as how to get more land. Similarly, big industries with great capital are more concerned with international trade, investment opportunities, export markets and external sources of raw material than are the bulk of the

ll industries which subsist principally on local consumption of their ducts. Big business discourages too much production for home consumption, advocating an austerity program so that capital can become available for increased production for export trade to increase Japan's de balance. Many large businesses desire to invest abroad to obtain higher interest rates and develop sources of additional capital. Local groups deplore this, and want the money invested in Japan to provide more jobs and more modernized industries. The Liberal branch of the party advocates strong adherence to the viewpoint of the United States, whereas the Democratic branch advocates a more independent attitude.

These are typical of some of the cleavages that exist within and among groups comprising the Conservative Party today. It is true that the capitalistic elites do not have the same close-knit integration and control over the national economy formerly exercised by the Zaibatsu; the aristocracy does not have the prestige and supra-national powers it formerly held; and the large landholders have been limited in number by land reforms, and in power by political reforms. Nevertheless, as a group, they have exhibited remarkable ability for unified action in those matters affecting the Conservative Party.

On the other hand, the Socialist Party is the party of the working class. Yet, almost as many union and non-union laborers support the Conservative Party as do the Socialist Party. This may be due to traditional conservatism which has not worn off, to rural conservative family ties, and to a considerable extent to the oyabun-kabun relationship in the multiplicity of small industries. While all of the workers are interested in better working conditions and higher wages, there are strong divergencies of opinion between Right and Left Wing Socialists

the degree to which the economy should be controlled, of nationalization, and private property rights. In addition, the Right Wing Socialists accept the need for rearmament to a limited extent, consistent with defense needs, whereas the Left Wing Socialists are strongly opposed to

In any event, the cleavages that have resulted between the Left and Right Wing Socialist groups have been deeper and more difficult to overcome than those which exist in the Conservative Party. Further, the Socialists face a serious dilemma in that the more militant they become, the more support they are likely to get from the class-conscious portions of the electorate; but at the same time, they frighten away the propertied classes with a stake in the capitalist order.⁶¹

Policies

The political goals of the Conservative elites include the restoration of their former prerogatives, autocratic administration, greater centralization of government, and restoration of the armed forces. Since they are strongly supported by the United States, they have been pro-American in their international relations. Yet they are also sensitive to the popular desires for non-entanglement in the international struggle for power, and for economic ties with Red China and the U.S.S.R.⁶²

The Socialist elites claim the right to shape governmental policy in the interest of the laboring classes. Their objectives include the nationalization of a State-directed economy, equalization of living standards, and non-alignment in the international power struggle. They oppose

⁶¹Ike, op. cit., p. 180.

⁶²Yanaga, op. cit., p. 264.

alized government control and resent American pressures that might restrict commercial intercourse with communist countries and hinder their relations with their neighbors. They oppose changes in the constitution support the ban on armed forces.⁶³

From the beginning, the Conservative forces have owed their position strength to U. S. support. The U. S. first utilized elements of the conservative elites, the bureaucracy, as the framework for the new democratic administration; it supported the suppression of extreme socialism in 1949 and 1950; it supported the reemergence of a modified capitalism and assisted in the rapid rebuilding of Japan's industrial economy. Through economic aid and support in international affairs, the United States was largely instrumental in the continuance of Conservative governments in power.

The continued aid of the U. S. is largely essential to Japan's progressive economic development; and its support can be of immense value in her foreign relations. Thus, it behooves the Conservatives to align themselves with U. S. policies to the maximum extent feasible.

Two of the principal desires of the U. S. are: that Japan, as a democratic nation, build up her national strength, to include an armed force, as a bulwark against communism in the Far East; and that Japan refrain from trade with Red China and the Soviet Orbit.⁶⁴

This latter question will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. However, the Conservative elites who control the government are fully in accord with the policy of building up national strength; for, as concomitant to it, it increases their own strength.

⁶³Ibid., p. 276.

⁶⁴Dean, op. cit., p. 35.

Rearmament and Constitutional Revision

The creation in 1954 of a new defense establishment, with land, , and air arms, centered Japanese attention upon concrete and current acts of rearmament, and caused growing concern about its future implications.

The Conservative elite favors rearmament for many reasons. Among these are: Japan is a sovereign and independent nation, and the preservation of public order and security from external aggression require equally to the point, maintenance of good relations with the United States, upon whom the elites are largely dependent, requires the development of an armed force as Japan's contribution to the strength of the democratic forces in the Far East; the armed forces, commanded by pre-war military leaders in key positions, would in all probability be a strong political adjunct as an instrument to support the policies of the Conservative elite, and a source of strength in an emergency; rearmaments are expensive and call for extensive buying of heavy industrial products, thus providing extensive profits to capitalist groups; armed forces involve the employment of several hundred thousand men, thus relieving unemployment and labor unrest that would add to the strength of the socialist opposition and reflect unfavorably upon the Conservative Party in control of the government.

In its simplest form, the problem of Japan's rearmament is only the constitution of military forces to insure the nation's security from external aggression. But in the minds of a great number of Japanese, rearmament is synonymous with the rebirth of militarism. They have not forgotten that militarism was a dominant force in their society, their politics and their government; and that it went hand-in-hand with the

gression that destroyed freedom inside Japan.⁶⁵ It was militarism that launched Japan on the aggression that made the Japanese a hated people throughout Asia and most of the world. And it was Japanese militarism that eventually brought devastation to Japan itself. Consequently, many Japanese look with dread upon rearmament as the specter of a renascent militarism, and as a first step toward involvement in a future war.

Surpassing the fear of rearmament as a step towards involvement in war, is the fear that the newly created military organization may become politically powerful and play a major role in stifling Japan's developing democracy.

The Left Wing Socialist elite opposes rearmament in any degree as an augmentation of Conservative strength and a potential threat to their own organization and growth. In opposing it, they play upon the fears of the people, and point out that the rearmament issue served as the point of departure for a Conservative attempt to revise drastically the democratic constitution; and not only to eliminate the so-called "renunciation of war" clause, but also to modify many democratic provisions of the Constitution.⁶⁶ These proposed changes are, in a sense, reactions against former U. S. control, and an assertion of Japanese independence from the U. S. However, they go far beyond this, and are aimed at securing greater centralization of the government. Success in obtaining them would further strengthen the Conservative elite's control of the government, and lessen the prospect of a political upset that could remove them from power.

⁶⁵John W. Maki, "Japan's Rearmament: Progress and Problems," The Eastern Political Quarterly, VIII (December, 1955), p. 554.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 554.

The proponents of constitutional revision in Japan also stand to derive practical political advantages from a reaffirmation of Imperial sovereignty, however restricted in actual terms. The true political function of the Imperial institution in modern times has always been to serve as a facade for oligarchical decision-making. The institution, essentially neutral, has in the past been captured by various elite groups, and its prestige and protective qualities have been exploited on behalf of their particular goals. This is in line with the desire of the present Conservative leadership's yearning for a return of the Emperor to a position more in keeping with Japan's traditions. Conversely, these changes would weaken the Socialist elite and restrict their latitude for action. However, the Conservatives are aware that any long move toward drastic constitutional revisions that would restrict the people's democratic freedoms would crystallize the opposition of a large segment of the lower classes, both conservative and socialist. Such a reaction could defeat constitutional change and permanently weaken the consensual power of the Conservative elite.

Additionally, the use by industry and government of capital that would otherwise be used unproductively for the provision and maintenance of armed forces places Japan in a favorable position in commercial competition with other countries, a large percentage of whose national income is so committed. This, together with the accompanying betterment of living standards, would reflect favorably upon and enhance the prestige of the Socialist elites. Eventually, the Socialists want to create a state-directed economy with an equalization of living standards. However, they must remain frustrated in the attainment of these aspirations until a strong Socialist government can be established.

Consistent with its policy of non-alignment in the power struggle, Socialist elite opposes the stationing of U. S. troops in Japan. The United States, in its support of Conservative government has been one of the greatest handicaps that the Socialists have faced in political competition. Consequently, they oppose her by every possible means - depicting the Conservatives as pawns of American imperialism, and exploiting in the radical press the frictions and irritations growing out of economic tests, the stationing of U. S. Security Forces in Japan, and the occupation by the U. S. of former Japanese territory. They claim that the presence of these troops not only subjects Japan militarily to the United States, but serves to increase international tension and endangers Japan's security.⁶⁷ To offset this viewpoint, the Conservatives strive to convince the Japanese people that the risks inherent in this situation are far less than the risks they would run without American protection.

Playing on the pacifism which the United States did so much to create, the Socialists not only increased their voting strength markedly at the last election, but have been winning adherents ever since.⁶⁸ If they were to gain as much in the next elections as they did in the last, the present Government's hope of making constitutional changes to facilitate rearmament may have to be abandoned and there will almost certainly be crippling changes in the administrative agreement, thus weakening the Conservatives' hold on the government.

⁶⁷ Tadataka Sato, "The Socialist View on Foreign Policy," Japan Quarterly, III (January-March, 1956), p. 166.

⁶⁸ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Japan at Cross-Purposes," Foreign Affairs, XXXIV (January, 1956), p. 229.

Further, to be on friendly terms with all countries, the Socialists pose the restoration of full diplomatic and economic relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union. With the removal of U. S. Forces in Japan, the economic and political support of the Socialist elites these countries could be of great value in establishing their dominance in Japan.

CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES CONDITIONING JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Defeat in World War II had a devastating effect upon Japan's economy, and resulted in its virtual collapse. This was brought on by the destruction of her productive power and the loss of territory, as well as sources of raw materials and markets.

Exclusive of the destruction of military materials and equipment, direct war damages amounted to an equivalent of thirty-five percent of Japan's national wealth in 1935. An equally severe blow was the loss of forty-five percent of her overseas territory. The loss brought an end to advantageous industrial specialization in the manufacture of steel and in the production of sugar, salt, and major food products. It resulted in the loss of valuable fishing grounds in the waters close to Soviet territory. It forces Japan to pay in foreign currency for those materials which she formerly obtained with her national currency, and it exposes her to the stiff competition of foreign manufacturers in areas in which, as colonies, she had maintained an effective monopoly. Moreover, it laid bare the inherent weaknesses of Japan's economic structure; namely, the paucity of raw materials, high density of population, obsolescence and inefficient production facilities, and dependence on foreign markets.²

¹Yanaga, op. cit., p. 369.

²Ibid., p. 322.

To maintain a stable government, the ruling elites must provide a stable economy which will insure independence, security and prosperity to the people individually as well as to the nation as a whole.

Since Japan first entered into world commerce, her manufacturing has been geared to foreign trade. Goods were manufactured primarily for the export market and not for domestic consumption. Consequently her economic prosperity was extremely vulnerable to the fluctuations of the foreign market. This feature of the Japanese economy has in no way been altered, and her successful existence will depend on her ability to obtain foreign markets and sources of raw materials.³

Thus Japan's economic problems constitute the most important elements in her foreign policy today. In order to survive Japan must act accordingly.

Although Japan is technically a free, independent, and sovereign nation, actually her independence is limited by her reliance on external assistance for her security and economic survival. However, she does not desire to remain indefinitely dependent upon direct aid. Such a position of dependency paradoxically arouses resentment among the people receiving it, and this resentment may provide to the opposition elites a strong propaganda weapon against the governing elite. To be truly independent the nation must restore her industries, her foreign trade and her sources of raw materials.

The modernization and expansion of her industry requires more capital than she presently possesses, and the development of markets and sources of raw material depend on the cooperation of the outside world.

³William Y. Elliot et al., *op. cit.*, p. 134.

is cooperation will not be given solely in the spirit of altruism. Japan is politically oriented toward the West, and her stability, national strength, and political alignment are strongly dependent upon her success in international trade. However, the establishment of these markets places her in direct competition with many of the democratic or politically uncommitted countries, who are likewise struggling for economic viability and are dependent upon foreign markets. Since many of these countries are already established in the areas in which Japan is interested, the extension of Japanese trade in these areas will require international adjustments and concessions.

Although Japan's importance to the democratic world as a strong and able ally in the Far East is of inestimable value, the immediate economic advantages and needs of these nations tend to overshadow the less tangible political value of this orientation, causing them to deprive Japan within their limitations of any opportunities which they themselves aspire to.

Thus Japan must again look to the United States to use its influence on her behalf in international relations.

The United States, with six percent of the world's population, produces almost forty-five percent of the world's goods and services. Consequently, the American economy has a one-sided, or noncomplementary, relationship to the international economy. The rest of the world depends on the American economy to a much greater extent than the American economy depends upon it. Actually, the rest of the democratic world could not live without the American economy, which is its largest single market and source of supply of goods and capital. At the same time, other countries find great difficulty in living with the American economy, which sets for them generally inaccessible and rising competitive and consumptive

standards and generates inflationary and deflationary impulses against which they cannot insulate themselves successfully.⁴ The American economy is vital to them quantitatively, as a source of goods and capital, and qualitatively, as the most important stimulus to dynamism and growth in the international economy. But, by the same token, it exerts a disturbing influence in the international economy, particularly on those countries heavily dependent on foreign trade, whose capacity for adjustment has been impaired. This strong economic dominance, plus her position as one of the two great powers in the world bi-polarity of power, to which democratic nations must look for financial and military aid to insure their economic viability and security, places her in a position to wield great influence among these nations in economic affairs. As she can exert pressure upon Japanese foreign policy, and she can exert pressure upon other democratic countries in favor of Japan. Should she fail in obtaining immediate results, she has the power and wealth to give direct support sufficient to sustain Japan until the latter can establish a firm economy. Consequently, while Japan is somewhat dependent upon other countries, her principal reliance is upon the United States.

In an outline of foreign-policy aims, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu stated in an address to the Diet on January 30, 1956:⁵

We cannot accomplish the task of building up a new Japan as a free and democratic country without cooperating closely with the free and democratic nations of the world. This is why our government, in conducting the independent diplomacy of its own, considers cooperation with the United States as the basis of national policy.

⁴Ibid., p. 47.

⁵"Shigemitsu Outlines Foreign Policy Aims," Japan Report, II, Japanese Embassy (Washington, February, 1956), pp. 4-5.

With the United States we are maintaining cooperation along all lines, including national defense. This cooperative relationship is essential to the consummation of our independence and to the advancement of our international position, and the necessary measures must be carried out under thorough mutual understanding and intimate contact.

* * * * *

In regard to an Asian policy, he stated:

We should lay special emphasis on the fostering of friendship with the new-risen states of Asia, and initiate practical programs of cooperation in our own quarter of the globe...I regret that we have not established diplomatic relations with important countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, because of the non-settlement of the reparations problems, and consequently, we are encountering serious difficulties in the furtherance of our economic relations with those countries. The government will do its best to clear the war's aftermath by solving this problem. As regards the negotiations with the Philippines, which are being conducted at present, a settlement will be reached, I hope, in the near future.

* * * * *

Obviously, the Japanese Government which recognizes the Nationalist Government of China, cannot recognize the Peking regime at the same time. However, in the light of the fact of the existence of the latter, the government will continue to pursue its policy of increasing our trade with mainland China within the bounds of our international commitments. Japan, a country whose interests are directly and vitally involved, cannot but hope that the dispute over the Formosa Strait will be taken up internationally for a quick, peaceful solution by negotiation.

Concerning economic diplomacy, Mr. Shigemitsu further stated:

In order to put Japan's overseas economic advance on a stabilized foundation it is necessary for us to conclude a treaty of amity and navigation with as many countries as possible. So far, Japan has made a treaty of commerce and navigation with a dozen or more countries. It is the intention of the government to negotiate such treaties with more countries this year. In view of the general tendency among all countries to solve international economic problems through international organs, the government intends to strengthen cooperation further with those organs.

In this connection, the U. S. has made its policy toward Japan
ally clear. The State Department Bulletin of November 1954 stated:⁶

We want to help Japan develop as an independent nation,
stable internally and secure from external attack. In helping
restore Japan to its place as an industrial nation, we are also
serving our mutual interest in the establishment of a system of
security in the Pacific.

Japan has heavy responsibilities as a free nation. Its
economic problems are particularly intricate, and the way in
which they are solved will largely determine the manner in
which its political problems are also solved. It is in the
interest of the United States and of all other nations of the
free world that Japan be given an opportunity to bolster its
economic stability by engaging in world commerce on a basis of
equality.

An enduring solution to Japan's economic problem will require a
sitive program of cooperation by many countries, but particularly the
ited States and the British Commonwealth. It will require the removal
reduction of obstructions to world markets such as quotas and tariffs;
mplification of customs procedures; elimination of discriminatory
ying by governments and by private parties; freer convertibility of
urrencies, particularly between sterling and dollar areas; and a program
increase the purchasing power of all nations of the free world through
increased capital investment and technical assistance, especially in
diatic countries.

Unfortunately, except for the matter of capital investment and
chnical assistance to undeveloped countries, Japan can do little to
omote these developments, except to convince the Western democracies
at the development of her strength is dependent on such concessions
nd adjustments, and that her strength as an ally in the Far East is

⁶Public Service Division, op. cit., p. 7.

tal to their future welfare and security. Since most of these countries are also to some extent dependent on American aid, the United States has been able to exert some pressure on them in Japan's behalf.

Economic Nationalism of the U. S. and Commonwealth Nations

Largely as the result of her military defeat and the Cold War, Japan's foreign trade has been dominated by the United States, from whom she has bought three times as much as she has sold. Although the disparity in trade balance was rectified by invisible receipts such as U. S. procurement, those procurements are decreasing at a fairly rapid rate. The continuation of such a deficit trade balance would seriously hamper Japan's ability to import vital commodities.

Next to Canada, Japan is the United States' best customer,⁷ and she is heavily dependent upon the United States for raw materials. Yet, compared to her pre-war level, she receives a very small share of trade from the United States in return. Nevertheless, while most Americans subscribe to the efforts of the U. S. Government to promote the development of foreign markets and raw materials, this trade has been characterized by the alarm of special interests and small segments of the American community at the incursion of Japanese products.

Individual interests take exception to any encroachment on their own resources or markets. For instance, Japanese tuna exports to the U. S. led West Coast fishing industries to demand that Congress increase the duty on tuna. Similarly, efforts were made by U. S. shipping interests to restrict Japanese shipping and shipbuilding interests, and

⁷Sadao Iguchi, Address of Japanese Ambassador to the U. S. to the National Trade Convention, New York, November 5, 1955.

ber interests protested against leasing Alaskan timberlands to Japan to augment her meager supply.

In recognition of this situation, and pursuant to the recommendations obtained in the Randall Commission Report advocating the liberalization of U. S. trade policies, the President sent a message to Congress on March 30, 1954, in which he recommended a gradual and selective tariff revision by executive agreement. In this same message the President said, "I may also recommend special provisions for negotiations with Japan in view of the economic problems of that country."

Conversely, many Japanese resent the necessity of buying items from the U. S. that, were it not for restrictions imposed by the need for adherence to U. S. policies, could be bought from nearer sources at substantially cheaper prices. This is, of course, a source of considerable political friction. Not only do the Socialist elites decry this as U. S. imperialism, but the Conservative elites among the industrialists want to buy raw materials at prices most advantageous to them, regardless of U. S. desires.

In June 1955, Japan was finally invited to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The invitation was extended largely as the result of hard negotiations by the United States,⁸ which had to prevail over the fears of several nations, notably England, France and Australia, that Japan's admission would loose a flood of cheap Japanese goods on the world. The principal argument used by the U. S. was that Japan must have the trading opportunities of GATT to counter the economic blandishments of the Soviet-Red China bloc.

⁸"GATT - The Open Door," Time Magazine, June 20, 1955, p. 34.

This invitation met with loud opposition from individual industries, particularly British and American textile makers. As a result, Great Britain and several other countries announced that they would not extend GATT's most-favored-nation treatment to Japan. On the other hand, several nations, including the United States, signed or negotiated contracts with Japan under the GATT regulations.⁹ The Japanese estimated that these contracts would increase her annual foreign trade balance by forty million dollars annually, mostly by more sales to the U. S. of Japanese cameras, binoculars, chinaware, toys, and tuna. Nevertheless, they are disappointed and bitter at the number of participants invoking Article 35, the Escape Clause, for protection against unusual and unfair competition.¹⁰

Economic Expansion in South and Southeast Asia

The continuing difficulties and obstacles to trade with the Western nations encountered by Japan, have emphasized the need for intensified efforts to develop a strong economic position in South and Southeast Asia.

In April 1954, the Colombo Plan, sponsored by the United Kingdom, or "cooperative economic development in South and Southeast Asia" was initiated. This program represented no integrated regional development plan. Each Asian country participating establishes its own individual development plan or program, to which those countries on the Consultative Board may extend aid on a bilateral country-to-country basis. This maintains the full freedom of choice on the part of the recipient, and

⁹Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁰"GATT Hears Japan's Plea on Escape Clause," Japan Report, I, Japanese Embassy (Washington, November 18, 1955), p. 4.

provides the donor country an opportunity for investment, of capital, ¹¹
 skill, and equipment.

Initially Japan was excluded from the plan with the implication
 that she was the principal cause of Asia's ills. Subsequently Japan was
 permitted to join, and while she has plans for contributing to the
 development of the area, they are largely contingent upon aid in the form
 of capital from the United States.¹²

In April 1955, a conference of representatives of some thirty
 Asian-African-Middle Eastern countries met at Bandung, Indonesia to
 consult on the solution of their future problems, and to determine the
 degree to which their common interests could be translated into terms
 of practical cooperation.¹³ No white-ruled nations, no western powers,
 or the U.S.S.R. were invited. All of the participants, with one exception
 were in various stages of economic and social transition from primitive
 agriculture to the initiation of industrial enterprises which are, for
 the most, consumer goods only. Of these nations, only Japan has an
 advanced industrial economy.

These countries badly need capital and technical assistance. However
 due to the rabid nationalism of their newly attained independence they
 are extremely sensitive concerning the maintenance of complete sovereignty
 and against any taint of colonialism. Consequently, while foreign capital
 and enterprise are accorded an important role in their development plans,

¹¹ Department of State Bulletin, September 26, 1955, p. 5.

¹² Masayuki Tani, Ambassador to the U. S., Speech, Washington,
 February, 10, 1955.

¹³ V. M. Dean, "Bandung, Acid Test For West and East," Foreign
 Policy Bulletin, XXIV (April 15, 1955), pp. 118-119.

ey are usually regarded as acceptable only if they carry no conditions, explicit or implicit, which might even remotely affect the country's freedom to take an independent line in international affairs.¹⁴ Further, while the foreign investor shares with the country the benefits of his investment, ultimate control over foreign investments must lie with the state.

Japan can meet these conditions, and is in a position to supply technical experts, as well as industrial equipment such as textile machinery, railway and electrical equipment, chemicals, hydroelectric plants, cars, ships, etc. Furthermore, Japanese experience in farming and experimental stations could be used to great advantage in these areas.

In this way the recipient country would receive an infusion of advanced technology, business efficiency and productivity, modern technical equipment and the opportunity for the employment and training of native personnel. Japan would obtain a commercial foothold in the country, with the opportunity to gain trade contacts, special advantages in obtaining important contracts, and the possibility of gaining additional outlets for home plants.

However, despite the fact that Japan is an Asiatic country, a participant in the Colombo Plan, and a member of the Bandung nations, there are still factors which seriously limit her participation in this plan. The countries of Southeast Asia have not forgotten Japan's World War II attempts to dominate them; they still fear that Japanese colonialism

¹⁴Daniel L. Spencer, "Foreign Participation in South Asian Enterprises," Far Eastern Survey, XXIV (March, 1955), p. 39.

ght replace the recent colonialism of the West, and they accuse Japan
 : having a superiority complex towards other Asians which they resent.
 me of them, notably Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines demand satis-
 ictory War Reparations Agreements with her before they will consent to
 ore extended commercial intercourse. Additionally, most of the countries
 f this region are eager to build industries of their own and to use
 heir raw materials for this purpose instead of exchanging them for
 anese finished products.¹⁵

In furtherance of the development of these areas, to allay the
 itterness of these nations toward her, and to lay the ground work for
 apan's participation in a leading capacity in their development, Premier
 ishi, in the Spring of 1957, visited many of the national leaders of
 outheast Asian countries involved.¹⁶ He pointed out the advantages to
 e derived from the development of an Asian bloc to promote security,
 onomic development, and to oppose further inroads of communism. He
 urther pointed out, as reassurance against fear of possible imperialistic
 ims of Japan, that under her democratic constitution, and with her
 imited defensive military forces, Japan could offer no threat.

In his June 1957 visit to the United States, Premier Kishi advocated
 he origination of a Southeast Asia Development Fund to support economic
 evelopment, unity, and peace throughout Asia. In the implementation of
 his plan, it was proposed that the financing would come from the United
 States, the raw materials would be drawn from the Southeast Asian countri
 and Japan would supply the necessary capital goods and technology.¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁶Go-Prosperity Again, # Time Magazine, June 3, 1957, p. 24.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 24.

Although definite commitments have not been publicized, Japan's proposals apparently were received favorably.

With the financial backing of the United States, such a program would have a strong political and economic impact upon Japan. The extension of markets for technical skills and for heavy industries as well as consumer's goods together with greater opportunities for foreign investment and access to cheaper sources of raw materials would have a salutary effect upon the overall economy and the standard of living of the masses. Politically it would enhance the prestige and influence of the Conservative elite classes, and by their success strengthen their hold upon the Government. The increased employment and higher wages provided by the Conservative government to the laboring class would to some extent invalidate their dependence upon the Socialist Party, thus weakening its support. Additionally, increased trade in this area would relieve the pressure for extended trade with Red China, which would further weaken the position of the Socialist elite vis-a-vis the conservative elite.

Such a development might go far toward establishing a substantial economic complex of Asian States under Japanese hegemony, and reestablish her as a world power in the Far East. In a sense this might result in the belated achievement, in a modified form, of Japan's old goal of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Trade With the USSR and Red China

Despite her overall Western orientation, the question of trade with the U.S.S.R. and Red China is a strong political issue.

The relationship between Japan and the United States is one of

tual advantage. The United States is anxious that Japan develop as a democratic nation oriented toward the Western democracies. Japan's dependent position internationally, and the dependence of her elite governing class on U. S. support, make it incumbent upon her to comply.

But she is not completely subservient. Any overt interference by the U. S. with Japanese internal affairs would arouse strong resentment among the Japanese people, and would serve to substantiate Socialist claims that the government is dominated by the U. S. It would weaken the Conservative elite's position in the government and relations between Japan and the U. S. Conversely it would strengthen the Socialist elite and make Japan more amenable to communist overtures. Thus the United States is in a delicate position in insisting on a Japanese embargo of trade with the communist bloc. The strength of public opinion, the direct interests of the powerful industrialist elite, and the rank and file of both the Conservative and Socialists parties favor such trade, not only as a means of extending foreign markets and bettering living conditions, but as a display of independence of U. S. control. Such a move then not only strengthens the Conservative elite directly through increased prosperity, but indirectly by denying to the Socialists one of their strongest propaganda themes. In view of the steadily increasing volume of trade between other democratic countries and the communist bloc, a requirement by the U. S. for an embargo by Japan on anything besides essential war materials is untenable.

Although the Conservative government in initiating this trade has ostensibly accepted communist overtures, it does not indicate any modification in its political or ideological opposition to communism. It is merely an expedient to meet popular demand for extended trade.

Trade With The Soviet Union

Trade with the Soviet Union has been small and disappointing. Of the \$80,000,000 agreement signed in 1954 between private Japanese firms and Soviet trade representatives, less than one fourth of the contracts are actually implemented, and the Japanese were dissatisfied with the quality and the prices of Soviet exports.¹⁸

This trade venture demonstrated the unsatisfactory nature of trading with the U.S.S.R., and reflected unfavorably on Socialist elite propaganda.

Trade With Red China

What Red China wants today is not consumer goods, as in the past, but heavy industry, transportation, machinery, construction materials and chemicals which are turned out abundantly in industrialized Japan, but which, in deference to her relations with the U. S. Japan is reluctant to export. Consequently China is importing little from Japan. On the other hand, the Chinese drive for industrialization means China herself needs the raw materials she formerly exported to manufacturing countries; and what raw materials are available for export, she prefers to ship to Russia and the satellite state.¹⁹

Nevertheless, there is great pressure on the Japanese government to extend this trade. Experience to the contrary, producers of heavy industrial materials look to China not only as a market for their products, but as an important source of cheap materials. Light industry

¹⁸"Trade with the Soviet Union," Japan Report, I, Consulate of Japan (Seattle, August 23, 1955), p. 6.

¹⁹Arthur H. Dean, Japan at the Crossroads," The Atlantic Monthly, November, 1954, p. 32.

visions China as a rich market for consumer goods, and public opinion assumes that free trade with China is a key to higher standards of living in Japan. However, to many, China is but a component part of Japan's needs. The capitalists aspire toward the broader aims of expanding the Red China market, together with widespread industrial development in Southeast Asia, and the maintenance of the present, or an improved volume of trade with the United States and the Western Democracies.²⁰ Then, they say, Japan can become economically independent, and aspire to a position of dominance in the Far East.

While this policy of extensive trading with Red China is apparently to the advantage of the government, the advantage may be of a transient nature. The Japanese Government must be well aware of certain dangers inherent in such trade. They realize that trading with China when she was dominated by Japan was much different from today's situation. The old capitalist system in China has been replaced by a socialistic economy in which trade is governmentally operated, and in which communist economic negotiations are frequently geared to political objectives. The Communists fully realize the desirability of gathering Japan into their fold, they are also aware of the Japanese Government's antagonistic attitude toward communism, and the pressure of public opinion for trade with mainland Asia. The offering, by China, of trade encumbered by political commitments, may have deferred acceptance by the Japanese indefinitely, and with the full support of public opinion which would have balked at communist entanglements. However, by offering attractive trading opportunities initially, the Japanese Government could not, without

²⁰Shogo Yamaguchi, "Economic Difficulties Facing Japan," Japan & America Today, Stanford, 1953, pp. 109-120.

mage to itself, ignore the force of public opinion, and not take advantage of it. The danger lies in the probability that once substantial economic intercourse has been established, political concessions will be interjected as a condition of continued trade. In such an event, the threat of a substantial trade loss could exert pressure on the government to accept undesirable political conditions, or as an alternative, the government would be subjected to opposition pressure at home. As widespread public opinion favoring trade with communist Asia, together with the desires of the powerful industrialist interests served as a determinant in the selection of this policy, so can the threat of a withdrawal of such trade become a potential determinant of foreign policy in some future contingency.

There are three principal courses of action that might develop if China and the U.S.S.R. should manipulate trade to involve political commitments.

One, by carefully controlling trade from the beginning, the Japanese government might prevent any subsequent withdrawal from damaging the national economy. However exercised, such restraint would expose the government to the same criticism and opposition that the prohibition of such trade initially evoked. Consequently, such a course is unlikely to be taken by her. On the contrary, she will probably encourage trade to the fullest extent consistent with maintaining friendly relations with the U. S. and non-entanglement initially with communism.

Should Japan become heavily involved economically, she might accede to communist overtures to avoid economic and political pressures at home. This would appear to be an unlikely solution. Unlikely, because such a move would result in the certain steady growth of communist influence,

the strengthening of the opposition Socialist elite and the progressive diminution of the conservative elite, to include the decline of the industrialist elite in the face of a socialist controlled economy. The third alternative would be to refuse political entanglement. In the case of such a refusal, the Communists might take no action rather than lose the foothold established within Japan. On the other hand they might feel that by cutting off trade, the economic disruption might cause a political crisis that would overthrow the conservatives, place the government in the hands of the socialists, and create a situation favorable to the satellization of Japan. In such an event, it is probable that the conservatives would make a patriotic appeal to the people to accept economic hardships rather than communist domination. The peasantry and middle class voters would very likely respond to such an appeal, for while these classes are anxious to obtain the maximum foreign trade that will raise their standard of living, they are not willing to purchase these transient advantages at the price of communism. Nor is the Conservative Party likely to sacrifice its political existence for trade with the Communists. But they might play dangerously close to communism as a means of extorting economic concessions from the United States.

Japan's Bargaining Position in International Relations

Today, Japan is a somewhat isolated and dependent country. Her dominant elites refuse to make her a part of the communist world, but she has not been fully accepted by the occidental bloc which can only make a place for her at the reluctant sacrifice of certain economic and competitive advantages. Yet Japan's power potential is such that she can vitally affect the world balance of power in the Far East.

In seeking her national objectives, perhaps the strongest point favoring Japan is her bargaining position incident to her strategic position and power potential.

Japan has one of the world's largest pools of skilled industrial and potential military manpower, consisting of approximately 22,000,000 males in the 15-49-year-old age bracket. Of this number a large proportion have had some military training; as a whole they have a warrior heritage and a psychological attitude that make them formidable soldiers. As a people, they are intelligent, industrious, skilled, and 90 percent literate.

Economically, Japan has the most highly developed industrial system in the Far East.

From a strategic standpoint, a strong Japan, or Japan supported by a strong military force, is geographically located in a vital position across the trade routes of the North Pacific, and is in a position to dominate the exits and entrances to the Sea of Japan, the East China and the Yellow Seas, and control of the ports of Asia from Shanghai north to include Vladivostok.

From Russia's point of view, U. S. occupation of Japan not only threatens her Asiatic territory but also denies her a strategic outpost for future aggressive and defensive action. Under Soviet control, Japan would serve to complete a chain of offshore defenses, the northern section of which consists of Kamohatka and the Kurile Islands; as a base for aggressive action, it is in a position to threaten U. S. bases from Alaska to the Philippine Islands, or serve as a stepping stone to more southerly areas.

As an adjunct to either of these two inimical super powers in the bipolar world power bloc, her skilled population, highly developed industrial

ystem, and strategic location give Japan immeasurable importance. This puts Japan in a position of leverage to bargain her advantages and to play one power against the other.

There are three principal bargaining approaches: as a member of the communist bloc; as a member of the democratic bloc; as a neutral power.

However, Japan must carefully and realistically consider all contingencies and weigh the risks against the advantages before deciding on the adoption of a policy.

Some of the considerations involved in establishing closer relations with the communist bloc are:

The industries, skills, and population of Japan integrated into a complex with the raw materials and population of the Asiatic mainland and the markets of the communist countries would create a concentration of power that might well exclude the democratic world from economic and political influence in the Far East. The precedents of both mainland China and Japan going communist would have great influence on the remainder of Asia to follow them. The advantages to Japan could be the re-accession to extensive markets and resources as a step towards attaining economic viability and a tantalizing possibility that she could attain within this complex the return of her former island possessions, a restoration of her former position in Korea, and possibly even a position of dominance in the Far East.

However, such a development would be contingent upon the ascendance of the leftist elements in Japan. This appears most unlikely within the foreseeable future, and is unlikely to occur except as the result of drastic economic and political upheavals.

Nevertheless, the advantages to both sides are so great that the

vernment will be subjected to considerable pressures both internally from neutral and leftist elements, and externally from the communist bloc. It is possible that by astute political action the present government elite may turn these pressures to its own bargaining advantage s-a-vis the Western powers.

In dealing with the West, Japan has the same powerful advantages to offer: strategic location, skilled manpower, and the most highly developed industrial base in the Far East.

An homogenous population, an experienced bureaucracy, a hereditary monarchy, the innate conservatism of the Japanese people, and ten years experience in democratic government all contribute toward political ability and orientation toward the West. As an accepted member of the free world, Japan can achieve her aspiration of becoming a principal Asiatic power. As an accepted member of the democratic society of nations, with equal access to their raw materials and markets, Japan could within a reasonable time build up a strong economy. Given the opportunity, Japan could regain her position as a world power and vie with Red China as the predominant Far Eastern Power. This would be of immense political value to the West by providing a strong pro-Western Asiatic Power to which the uncommitted Asiatic nations could turn for leadership, or for defense as a bulwark against the further encroachments of communism. Japan's definite alignment with the West as a strong and sovereign power would go far toward stabilizing the status-quo between the Democratic World and the Communist World. In such a role, she would be able to exercise more independent action than as a communist satellite.

The attainment of such a role presupposes the objective cooperation and support of the Western democracies, again predominantly the United

ities, in developing a viable economy based on trade with the West and in Southeast Asia on a nondiscriminatory competitive basis, and capital assistance from the U. S. in expanding her economic role in the latter area. Such support would undoubtedly encounter stiff opposition from strong individual commercial interests concerned, and could only be secured by U. S. political and diplomatic backing. Such support would require of Japan reasonable assurance that she would remain aligned with the democracies, that her influence on the Bandung countries would be favorable to the democracies, and that she would continue rearmament to the point of becoming a positive factor in the maintenance of her independence and as an ally in the event of any future conflict between a democratic and communist blocs.

On the whole, the United States has given Japan strong political support as evidenced by her intercession on her behalf with the South and Southeast Asian countries in the matter of reparations and commercial relations, and with the Commonwealth nations concerning GATT and the Colombo Plan. The most recent evidence of this has been the generally favorable attitude evoked by Premier Kishi's visit to the United States in June 1957. At this time Premier Kishi proposed a plan for the development of Southeast Asia, to be financed by the United States, by which Japan's position among the world powers would be greatly enhanced.²¹ As an inducement for support by the Western democracies, he pointed out the value of such a plan as a deterrent to communist encroachment in that area, and as a means of satisfying Japan's economic needs without extensive trade with Red China.²² Although it is too early for a definite

²¹"Japan's Premier," Time Magazine, June 24, 1947, p. 25.

²²Ibid., p. 25.

mitment on this request, the proposal, in principle, elicited general approval from the State Department. Whether or not the United States ultimately supports this plan, Japan's effort in its behalf will strengthen good relations with the Southeast Asian countries.

Additionally, Premier Kishi presented a plan for the phased withdrawal of United States troops from Japan. The U. S. signified its general assent to this plan by the announcement of "a prompt withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces" to commence within the immediate future, and to result in a substantial reduction in the overall number of U. S. troops in Japan within a year, further reductions to be made as the Japanese defense forces grow.²³

The results attained are all that could reasonably be hoped for and constitute convincing evidence of the United States' interest in the early re-attainment by Japan of a strong and independent status and a balance in the Far East to the growing economic weight of Communist China.

Further, Premier Kishi requested authority for Japanese participation in the civil administration of Okinawa and the relaxation of the embargo on trade with Red China to permit an increase in volume of annual trade from \$140 million to \$200 million in nonstrategic materials only. This request was accompanied by the gratuitous declaration that Japan had no intention of recognizing the Peiping government.²⁴

While these latter requests were probably submitted as a response to nationalist and super-nationalist pressures, with little real hope of favorable consideration, the fact that they were made will reflect

²³ Ibid., p. 25.

²⁴ Oklahoma Times, June 24, 1957.

orably upon the government elite. If they do obtain any positive results, it will be a strong indication of the United States' acceptance of Japan's complete sovereignty and confidence in her as an ally.

Should Japan attain such a position of strength, her nationalism and aspirations toward greater world power might lead her eventually toward a more independent role as leader of an independent third bloc of Asiatic powers.

As a neutral nation, Japan would be in a position to auction her essential favors to the highest bidder, and get the maximum benefits in the form of concessions from both. This does not mean that Japan could not favor one side above the other, but it would preclude a wholehearted commitment to one side whereby the other would consider herself as definitely cut off and look upon further negotiations or concessions as fruitless. Assuming favorable circumstances, including economic cooperation and free access to markets, Japan might reestablish and even strengthen her pre-war economic position throughout South and Southeast Asia, to include Formosa and the Philippines. Such a development might well put Japan in a position as leader of a great neutralist bloc of committed countries.

While today India aspires to that leadership, and undoubtedly has within her the seeds of a future great power, Japan, given the opportunity, is ready now - industrially, politically, and by virtue of the quality of her population, educationally and experience-wise - to assume that position. Should she succeed and India accede to her leadership - even contesting it, remain in the neutralist bloc - an independent neutralist bloc of such power could develop as to provide a balancer in the Far East to today's bi-polarity of power.

Such a development would restore Japan to the preeminent position in the society of nations that she desires; it could provide a bulwark against further communist expansion in the Far East; it could incite Japan's ambitions to greater power. In any case, it would definitely provide another great power in the Far East to contend with Red China in prestige among the Asiatic countries, and to which Asiatic countries would turn for noncommunist Asiatic leadership.

In addition to its external advantage, such a policy is supported by the greater mass of the people in their pacifism, fear of war, and desire to avoid rearmament. This policy offers many advantages for Japan. On the other hand, it gambles Japan's welfare on the logic that one of the opposing blocs will be willing to meet the competition of the other. However, politics does not always adhere to logic; and if one side should decide to cut Japan off, the other bloc would then be in a position to exert pressure to the point of subjecting Japan to a state of dependence as a satellite.

There are various interpretations as to what Japan's true goal would be and wherein lie her national interests.

While the United States prefers Japan in the role of an ally, she realizes that she cannot definitely rely on this. Over the past few years, she has seen Japan become more assertive of her independence, and more sensitive of her right to diverge from American-prescribed policy. The United States is wise enough to realize that any attempt at coercion of her would be considered as an extension of the Occupation and an infringement of Japanese sovereignty that would undermine the Conservative Government and alienate the people against America to the extent that they might seek closer ties with the Communist bloc. Consequently, the United

ates must look to the effects of democratic concepts established within Japan during the past ten years; the relatively greater benefits of freedom and material advantages offered her as a member of the democratic bloc compared to what she could expect from an alliance with the Communist bloc; and the powerful economic and political support which the United States could give her as the principal proponents of continued Western orientation. Should Japan choose to assume the role of a neutral, the United States would not interfere or withdraw her general support from Japan.

The Communist bloc considers Japan as an anti-communist satellite of the United States. Deputy Premier Kuo-Mo-Jo of Red China stated that in order to be considered as a neutral country Japan would have to give up her position of subordination to the United States, abrogate the United States-Japanese Security Pact and break off relations with the Moscovite government.²⁵

In view of this attitude and the frequent anti-communist declarations of the Conservative government, an espousal of neutralism embodying a loosening of ties between the United States and Japan would be welcomed by the Communist bloc.

Assuming the implementation and success of a Southeast Asian Development Plan, it would be an easy and natural transition for a strong conservative elite to switch from a position as a relatively subordinate member of the democratic bloc to that of a membership in the neutral bloc of Asian states. At present, these countries are disorganized and underdeveloped; but with a well-financed development plan under dynamic

²⁵Rodger Swearingen, "The Communist Line in Japan," Far Eastern Survey, XXIV, April, 1954, p. 61.

leadership, they have the potential of becoming an economically and politically potent bloc. Japan may aspire to that leadership, and she has stated that one of the purposes of her proposed plan is to block the encroachment of communism in that area.

In such an event, it would be to the United States' advantage to foster friendly relations with Japan to the maximum extent possible, with a view to obtaining her good offices in strengthening a pro-democratic, anti-communist attitude throughout Southeast Asia.

The immediate communist reaction probably would be to welcome such an official severing of Japan's ties with the U. S., as evidence of the diminution of the democratic bloc. However, she would realize that at least potentially this advantage might be more apparent than real, and that Japan might serve as a means of crystallizing the Southeast Asian states into a substantial bloc which while neutral toward communist nations is determined against communist expansion within their area.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Within ten years after her surrender, Japan had completed the first steps toward her rehabilitation as a member of the international community of nations. Like the proverbial phoenix, an independent Japan has risen from the ashes of defeat and occupation. However, the changed world situation and the new orientation of the Japanese government since 1945 require that Japan's foreign policies and her foreign relations be radically different from the old patterns.

The pre-war government of Japan was a pyramidal structure controlled at the apex by a relatively small group of fanatical militarists, a tightly knit coterie of Zaibatsu, vastly rich and powerful, and a group of hereditary and appointive nobility, who together controlled Japan and under military dominance directed its policies.

Through tradition, heritage, religion and education, the great mass of the people with unquestioning obedience and loyalty supported these small elite groups in the pursuit of their aims as the true representatives of Japan and of the deified emperor, the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess.

Peasants, laborers, small businessmen, all were without influence in the government. In its paternal benevolence, the government directed the efforts of the people, and in its wisdom, determined the divine mission of the empire. The people accepted this guidance in a spirit of willing self-sacrifice and in blind faith as to its propriety.

Dominated by a fanatical, all-powerful military and autocratic clique, Japan's foreign policy was clearly aimed at the hegemony of all East Asia through its grandiose plans for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere over which she could be completely dominant. This was the will and aim of the militarists, and their power was unquestioned and unchallenged among the Japanese people.

Defeat and surrender brought about drastic changes in almost every aspect of Japanese life. The Japanese expected harsh and punitive treatment from her conquerors; instead, they were treated with kindness and consideration, and the position of the emperor was respectfully maintained. The impact of this unexpected treatment by the Occupation Forces had a tremendous effect upon the people. From the desolation of shattered faith in their own superiority and invincibility they turned to their conquerors for guidance.

The United States, although benevolent in its overall aims, had the definite and firm objective of establishing a peaceful and responsible government that would conform to principles of democratic self-government, government supported by the fully expressed will of the people.

In pursuance of this objective, SCAP decided to maintain the imperial system and to use the Imperial Government in implementing its policies. It then set about the elimination of the old feudal, autocratic elements. The militarists, untra-nationalists, and Zaibatsu were removed from positions of influence and purged. Political, economic, and sociological reforms were introduced.

During the period of occupation the seeds of democracy were sown, took root and were nurtured by the Japanese people. With the suppression of the old elite classes and the supervision of the democratic processes

government by SCAP, the people were given an increasingly greater part in conducting their government. And while the use of the pre-war bureaucracy in conducting the government undoubtedly sustained a vestige of an old elite class in power, they were closely supervised and were themselves educated in democratic processes. In the meantime, widespread innovations were made to establish a firm democratic base. These included land reforms to benefit the large mass of peasants and tenant farmers, labor and union laws to strengthen the lot of the laborer and small industrialist, and a constitution ensuring individual rights and suffrage for all people. These reforms had a far-reaching effect upon the people. In addition, as before the war the power of publicity media and education had been concentrated on propagandizing the glories of Imperial Japan, these media of education, press and radio were diverted to extolling the virtues and advantages of democracy. A further strong influence upon the Japanese people was that of the Occupation personnel themselves. Particularly in the urban areas, the example of these people opened new horizons of thought and introduced new concepts of personal conduct and responsibility. They did much to influence the Japanese in their ideas of personal rights, freedoms and responsibilities. They contributed to the dilution of old concepts concerning family ties, racial supremacy, the divine origin of the emperor and the race, aggressive nationalism and moral superiority. On the whole, the effects were most favorable to development along democratic lines. Perhaps the homogeneity of the people has been weakened; but at the same time, they have been strengthened in their individual initiative and independence.

In effect, then, during the Occupation a substantial foundation was laid for the structure of a democratic government. While the comparatively

all but all-powerful elite classes were suppressed, a broad new class of people with vested interests, protected by constitutional guarantees, and educated in democratic concepts emerged. This class for the first time enjoys rights and powers, and is sensitive to any threats endangering them. The constitution is democratic, and the governmental structure provides for the representation of the will of the people through democratic processes and precludes the perpetuation of power by any minority groups. In the meantime, the old elite classes, although suppressed, were not eliminated. As has been pointed out, the use by the Occupation of the existing Imperial Government with its established bureaucracy kept alive, although under control, elements of the old elite, which in a modified form persists in the right wing of the present Conservative Party. The strong move to expedite the economic recovery in Japan provided a foothold for the reemergence, again in a modified form, of the purged Zaibatsu class. Through the poverty and ignorance of many of the small landholders, the large landholders, through loans and financial support, have reestablished a degree of political influence and control similar to the old absentee landlord-tenant relationship. Even the National Defense Force, while lacking power at present, at least contains the seeds for a military elite. Thus, remnants of all the pre-war elite classes have reemerged to some degree and are united in the Conservative Party, which for a number of years has controlled and continues to control the government today.

On the other hand, completely new and powerful elite classes have developed in opposition. Foremost among these are the various union and labor groups under the aegis of the Socialist Party. In addition, there are many smaller interest groups which while presently aligned with either

Conservative or Socialist Party are moderate and democratic. These groups exercise a powerful moderating influence upon their respective policies and on the maintenance of liberal, democratic government. In the face of extremist action by any elite group within a party it is likely that they would unite in opposition to it.

The pre-war foreign policy of Japan was determined by the interests of a relatively small, well-defined group of elites. Today, establishing foreign policy is a matter of reaching a compromise and balance among a large number of contending interest groups. Additionally, an important consideration is the impact of external factors such as trade relations, sources of raw materials, export markets and strategic considerations on Japan's welfare and security.

Today, the principal basic objectives of Japanese foreign policy are the restoration of Japan to a position of national security and economic well-being. These aims require that Japan be an independent nation, economically strong, and accepted as a trusted member of the community of nations.

Unquestionably, difficulties lie ahead; but the Japanese people have recovered a confidence in their nation and are bending their best efforts to make Japan a respected member of the family of nations. Success in these efforts involve not only their purposes and choice of means, but their goals as well. Three questions which have been of particular interest to the West have been: Will Japan and her people be able to resist internal communism? Will the Japanese succeed in turning their country into a modern democracy? Will Japan and her people remain friends of the free nations? While these three questions are intimately connected, only the latter lies strictly within the field of international relations. It is with this question that we are principally concerned.

Japan's geopolitical position in Asia has imposed upon her definite decisions crucial to her foreign policy and national security. Since 1945 she has been exposed on the front line between the American and Soviet blocs, and in close physical proximity to the U.S.S.R. and Red China. That position has subjected Japan to great political pressure. It, because the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 brought the abolition of all military forces, whether of land, sea, or air, Japan has possessed no strength with which to protect herself. The ominous threat to Japan's security has been evident, for even recent postwar history is replete with examples which demonstrate that a country with no self-defense is a strong temptation for an invader.

At the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, the only means of self-defense left for Japan was to sign the Security Pact with the United States. The advantage of that pact to Japan was the assurance of American defense while powerless to provide it for herself. The pact provided advantages to the United States as well; for it was quite evident that if Japan fell to the communists, America's Pacific defenses would also crumble.¹

In this situation, it cannot be expected that the Japanese people should remain indifferent to their own national safety or feel secure behind the original Security Pact of 1951. Inevitably, in view of Article 9 of the Constitution, forbidding armed forces and renouncing war forever, the past few years have witnessed heated debates over the question of rearmament. It is clearly realized by the government elite that rearmament is not merely a matter of military policy, but is a

¹Hitoashi Ashida, "The Realities of Japan's Foreign Policy," Japan Quarterly, III (April - June, 1955), p. 151.

stion intimately related to Japan's security in the Far East, and
s to Japan's foreign policy.

Under the terms of the Security Pact, Japan invited the American
ces to stay in Japan, while at the same time she undertook to "assume
increasing responsibility for her own defense." The commitment to
rease self-defense forces, however, was accepted with considerable
uctance. While the pact was ratified in the Diet in the fall of
1 through the cooperation of the Conservative Parties, it met with
lborn opposition from the Socialists. This opposition includes not
y opposition to rearmament in principle and as a violation of the
stitution, but also loud denunciation of the Security Pact, particu-
ly by left-wing politicians, as an instrument of "Imperialist America,"
signed to make use of Japan in an emergency. The security arrangement
an open cause for friction in American-Japanese relations and will
ain so as long as it is susceptible to exploitation by left-wing
adership. The Communist powers, of course, also exploit this situation
their advantage, for their objective is to detach Japan from the
ited States and the free world.²

Since the advent of the Hatoyama Cabinet in 1954, the Government has
ken a firm stand that the maintenance of military strength for self-
fense is not a violation of the Constitution and must be undertaken.
is position lies at the heart of the Socialists' opposition to the
verment's proposals for constitutional revision, for the Socialists
alize that a defense force would be an adjunct to the strength of the
nservative elite and would dilute the hopes of extreme leftists for
ose ties with the Communist bloc.

²Ibid., p. 153.

A further development which might be anticipated for the future, which would be a natural development of the growth of Japan's power and influence in the Far East, would be to enlarge the Security Pact into a broadened and collective security agreement with the uncommitted nations of South and Southeast Asia. To that end a firm and convincing assurance must be given that the development of Japan's armed forces is aimed toward a recrudescence of the pre-war Japanese military machine.

Further, the rearmament issue has economic as well as military and diplomatic aspects. Any development of defense forces must be carefully guided by the Conservative elites within the limits imposed by the national economy's ability to support it financially without disrupting the standards of living of the mass of the people, for any such disruption would upset the political balance and weaken the position of the government elite.

Today foreign relations are more than "foreign politics" and economic conditions, including domestic economic conditions, have a major effect upon foreign policy.

Although Japan has made tremendous economic progress, she is still beset with many major problems. Her basic problem is that within the confines of a group of islands aggregating in size the area of the state of Montana, islands notorious for their lack of adequate natural resources Japan must feed and provide an adequate living standard for a population in excess of 90 million people. Moreover, as a result of the defeat in 1945, Japan lost all of her colonies, most of her former sources of raw materials and markets including China and Korea, and a large proportion of her industries at home. Thus her economic welfare is vitally affected by her ability to reestablish foreign export markets and to regain access

sources of raw materials in the highly competitive Western and South and Southeast Asian areas.

To nurture friendly relations and to dispel the distrust felt toward her by many of the countries within these areas, her activities must be carefully regulated. In her relations with the countries of both Asia and the West, Japan can no longer pursue a unilateral course of non-cooperation without regard to the interest of others. Her policy is based firmly on the conviction that there can be no security for her as long as insecurity plagues Asia, and that Japan's national existence and prosperity depend heavily, if not entirely, on the cooperation and good will of these nations.³ Japan's eagerness to get back into the fold of international cooperation is reflected in the speed with which she has resumed her place in world organizations. Starting with her re-entry into the International Postal Convention in July 1948, she had by 1952 achieved membership in practically all the major international organizations and agreements. Subsequently, she has gained entry into GATT, the Colombo Plan, the Bandung Conference and the U. N.

Technologically the industrially Japan is the most advanced nation in the Far East, and in these fields she has already begun to offer guidance and assistance to her neighbors. Her technical "know-how," productive capacity, and skilled manpower, combined with the financial support of the United States in the implementation of a plan for the development of Southeast Asia, such as proposed by Prime Minister Kishi during his visit to the United States in June 1957, would greatly accelerate the development of this area, to the enhancement of Japan's economic and political prestige and strength throughout the Far East.

³Yanaga, op. cit., p. 396.

On the Asiatic mainland, Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R. and China have not been satisfactory. Both of these countries look upon Japan as a satellite of the United States. It was not until October 1956, seven years after the end of hostilities, that a peace treaty with the U.S.S.R. was finally signed, and relations, both diplomatic and economic, have been disappointing.

Relations with Red China have been equally disillusioning. The Japanese Government in its need for extended commerce is under heavy pressure from industry and labor to extend trade in this area. Hence, within the limits imposed by the necessity of maintaining favorable relations with the United States, she exploits fully any opportunities for trade with China in non-strategic materials. Despite the fact that 1955 exports increased threefold and imports doubled over comparable periods in 1954, trade with Communist countries amounts to only two percent of Japan's total exports and four percent of her total imports with no immediate prospects of any large scale expansion of imports of necessary commodities.⁴

Within Japan, all parties, again with the exception of the Left Wing Socialists and Communists, fear the price tags accompanying closer relations with the Red China regime, and in his visit to the United States in June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi stated that Japan had no intention of recognizing the People's Republic of China.

The attitude of the Republic of Korea toward Japan remains dominant in its bitterness and hostility, blocking diplomatic or economic relations with that country.

⁴Ashida, op. cit., p. 156.

Thus, largely cut off from its pre-war ties with the Asiatic Inland, the strengthening of economic political ties with neutral North and Southeast Asian countries becomes of increased importance to Japan's future.

By virtue of her experience of more than a century, Japan is in an advantageous position as a purveyor of Western ideas and particularly Western techniques of production which have gone through a process of screening, modification, and adaptation, if not Asianization. After assimilation by Japan, ideas and techniques of the West would appear much less alien and far less repugnant to those Asian peoples who are still strongly anti-Western in their orientation. However, before she can effectively play a major role in Asian affairs, the considerable residue of distrust, suspicion, and even hatred toward Japan which exists in some of the Asian nations which she victimized in World War II needs to be dissipated and superseded by confidence and trust. This task conceivably will be aided by the fact that there still exists among Asian people a healthy respect for the Japanese for having dispelled their feeling of inferiority vis-a-vis the nations of the West, and for having played a direct role in hastening the end of European colonialism in Asia.

In effect then, the democrat bloc supplies Japan with the bulk of the goods required for her manufacturing industries, and in its markets provides her with the best prospects for improving her foreign trade balance. Thus a realistic appraisal of Japan's economic relations forces the conclusion that in order to attain her goals of economic stability and to maintain her sovereignty, Japan's interests under a conservative government dictate that she cooperate with the democratic areas rather than Communist Eurasia.

In the foregoing we have discussed some of the many internal and external factors prevailing in and upon Japan today. An attempt has been made to demonstrate and evaluate the interrelation and interplay of these conditions as they relate to the determination of foreign policy. The resultant influences represent a diversity of interests from extreme right to extreme left, and these influences will continue to vary with the shifting of political and economic tides. Nevertheless, despite divergent, shifting and countervailing influences a basic pattern determining Japan's foreign policy is discernible. This pattern is set by a predominantly moderate, conservative, democratic elite which seeks its goals of security, status, and prestige and is balanced by a mass of moderate liberal, and democratic group interests which preclude any merger of extremist elites to positions of national dominance, and which dictate the pursuit of moderate and democratic policies.

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